

Inter-National Imag(ining): Canada's Military
Intervention in Afganistan

INTER-NATIONAL IMAG(INING): CANADA'S MILITARY
INTERVENTION IN AFGANISTAN

BY
NICOLE L. WEGNER, B.A., M.A.

A THESIS
SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
AND THE SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES
OF MCMASTER UNIVERSITY
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

© Copyright by Nicole L. Wegner, March 2016

All Rights Reserved

Doctor of Philosophy (2016)
(Political Science)

McMaster University
Hamilton, Ontario, Canada

TITLE: Inter-National Imag(ining): Canada's Military Inter-
vention in Afganistan

AUTHOR: Nicole L. Wegner
B.A., M.A., (Political Science)
McMaster University, Hamilton, Canada

SUPERVISOR: Dr. J. Marshall Beier

NUMBER OF PAGES: xiii, 267

Abstract

THIS DISSERTATION examines narratives given by elite foreign policy voices during the Canadian Forces' involvement in the 2001–2014 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission(s) in Afghanistan.

Part I introduces the topic and outlines the theoretical and methodological approaches used. Part II explores three dominant narratives presented by foreign policy elites: (a) Canada was in Afghanistan to support our NATO allies and to avoid damaging our international reputation; (b) Canada was in Afghanistan to fight terrorism and promote security abroad to reduce the domestic threat of terrorism to Canada's borders; and (c) Canada was in Afghanistan to assist with humanitarian projects to help Afghans. I explore these narratives in light of a long-standing identity myth about Canada's role in international politics: Canada-as-Peacekeeper. I examine attempts by foreign policy elites to use the mission in Afghanistan to re-militarize Canadian foreign policy and shed the peacekeeper myth.

Part III demonstrates that official war discourses are a result of political negotiations and hegemonic power. Using the Support the Troops campaign, I demonstrate that critics of policy in Afghanistan were silenced using pro-military rhetoric. I argue that the control of foreign policy narratives and the de-politicization of the military as political agents has many problematic effects, most notably that military violence

is often cast as an appropriate solution for global political problems.

I argue that preoccupation with Canada's *place* in the world (i.e. Canada's international identity) in foreign policy scholarship has under-theorized how narratives about Canadian foreign policy distort and omit particular perspectives. Official discourse on Afghanistan was highly euphemized and politically strategic. The mythologized belief that Canada is a middle-power "helpful-fixer" obscures the actual violence that occurs within military interventions and omits the burden of trauma experienced by soldiers and foreign bodies.

Acknowledgements

I WOULD like to thank my supervisor, Marshall Beier, and my thesis committee members Catherine Frost and Lana Wylie, for their support throughout my doctoral studies. Marshall, thank you for your confidence in my ideas and abilities as a scholar, and in particular, your willingness to always make time for reassurances. Your teaching and research have inspired this project and the way I look at the world. Catherine, thank you for your enthusiasm and helpful prodding in the development of my research direction. Lana, I am sincerely appreciative of your careful reading and suggestions on my drafts and for your ongoing quiet confidence in me.

The undertaking of a Ph.D. has been rewarding but also resulted in many lonely, guilt-ridden years of isolation at my computer. I am grateful that I found a support system in my McMaster colleagues, who have provided lively conference trips, much needed pep talks, and distracting online discussions with the “Ph.D. Chat”. Mark Busser, Mike Di Gregorio, Phil Frowd, Heather Johnson, Jess Merolli, Jen Mustapha, Liam Stockdale, and Katie Winstanley: you have made what was an arduous process worthwhile through our friendship. Jen and Mark: I want to express my gratitude for your UB Pine encouragements and head-nodding during grad school and beyond. I can say with great certainty this project may never have come to fruition without your ongoing acts of kindness. I also wish to thank Colleen Bell at the University of

Saskatchewan who has acted as a mentor and friend through the final stages of my writing.

My dissertation was more than a multi-year research project. It was also an incredibly *personal* challenge, one that required me to confront serious anxieties and self-doubt. I am deeply appreciative of support from my family and friends throughout the process. I am grateful to Marixa Stewart and Crystal Derry for your years of loving, emotional reinforcement. Angela Marshall, thank you for believing in my ideas from our very first meeting. Kendra Brown, thank you for the many hours you spent editing my draft.

To Matt Bathgate, who talked me through irrational tears and fears, and who reminded me that the work was worth the end result: the juice *is* worth the squeeze. Thank you for all the nerdy programming you did to format the final product.

Finally, I wish to thank my parents, Lawrence and Dawn, who have patiently and unconditionally supported me through this process. I know you must have doubted many times if I would ever finish, and I know you worried about the toll that graduate studies inflicted on my emotional health. I love you.

Contents

Preface	ii
Abstract	iii
Acknowledgements	v
Contents	vii
List of Tables	xii
List of Figures	xiii
I Introduction, Theory, and Methods	1
1 Reflections: An Introduction	2
1.1 My War Story	2
1.2 Examining narratives in discourse: The broader War Story	13
1.3 Situating the project	18
1.4 Chapter outline	19
2 Theory and Methods	23
2.1 Situating the research within Canadian Foreign Policy studies	23

2.2	Methodological approaches	31
2.3	Selection of texts	41
II	What Were We Doing ‘There’?	47
3	Canadian Forces in Afghanistan: Supporting International Alliances	48
3.1	Connection to middlepowership	49
3.2	Appeasing ally nations in the post-9/11 context: Military and economic considerations	52
3.3	Loss of influence: Afghanistan as an opportunity for re-militarization and increased prestige	57
3.4	Bettering international status: Re-branding the peacekeeper image . .	60
3.5	Conclusion: Afghanistan as a means to support alliances and foster a militarized international identity	63
4	Canadian Forces in Afghanistan: Fighting Terrorism Abroad	65
4.1	Canada’s military stories: Peacekeeping and war-fighting	66
4.2	The Canadian Forces in the 1990s: A “decade of [peacekeeping] darkness”	70
4.3	Shift in discourse post-9/11: From peacekeeping to fighting terrorism	73
4.4	Justifying the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan: Fighting the terrorist threat	75
4.5	Descriptive power of foreign policy narratives	78
4.6	Savage terrorists and the civilized self	81
4.7	Ahistorical narratives about terrorism	86
4.8	Conclusion: Fighting terrorism as an (un)believable narrative	88

5	Canadian Forces in Afghanistan: Providing Humanitarian Assistance	93
5.1	Humanitarianism as an inherent middle power characteristic: Canada's peacekeeping image	95
5.2	Canada the Peacekeeper: Institutional reinforcement of the peacekeeper myth in social memory	102
5.3	Peacekeeping and Afghanistan: Public confusion about mission mandates	106
5.4	Contrasting narratives: The discursive polarization of humanitarianism and fighting terrorism	110
5.5	Humanitarianism through gendered notions of rescue	117
5.6	Humanitarianism and others: A secondary narrative of self/other . .	123
5.7	Conclusion: Effects of the humanitarian 'helping' narrative in Afghanistan	126
6	Narratives of Helping: Fight With the Canadian Forces	128
6.1	Re-branding through the "Fight with the Canadian Forces" advertisements	130
6.2	Fight Ad #1: International danger	133
6.3	Images and storylines in Fight Ad #1	134
6.4	Fight Ads #2 and #3: Domestic danger	138
6.5	Images and storylines in Fight Ads #2 and #3	141
6.6	Fight Ads and political messaging: Re-militarizing foreign policy . . .	147
III	Re-Militarization of Canadian Foreign Policy	150
7	The Framework of Militarism	153

7.1	Governmentality and the productive effects of negotiating national identity in foreign policy discourse	154
7.2	Theoretical foundations: Militarism and militarization	157
7.3	Gender and militarism	158
7.4	Hegemonic masculinity and militarism	161
7.5	Militarized masculinities	163
7.6	Militarized foreign policy narratives	165
7.7	War Stories: Political, personal, subjective	167
7.8	Narratives of sacrifice to regulate War Stories	171
7.9	Disciplining narratives and the logic of militarism	173
7.10	(Re)constructing the nation: Militarism as the foundation of foreign policy	175
7.11	Depoliticizing the military: Obscuring militarism	178
7.12	Conclusion: Militarization of foreign policy discourse and its affects .	180
8	Yellow Ribbons and Death	182
8.1	Cultural (re)production of militarism	182
8.2	Support the Troops movement(s): Red Fridays, Yellow Ribbons . . .	184
8.3	From social movements to government rhetoric: Tensions within the Support the Troops campaign	189
8.4	Support the Troops versus Support the War	193
8.5	Partisan correctness and the legitimization of militarism	195
8.6	Project Hero and the disciplining of critical thought	196
8.7	Yellow Ribbons as symbols of sacrifice: Disciplining anti-militarized narratives	197
8.8	Death and militarization	200

8.9	The Highway of Heroes	206
8.10	Portraits of Honour	210
8.11	Silences and omissions in the War Story: Death as a “trump technique”	213
8.12	Conclusion: Support(ing) the Troops in the war on Afghanistan . . .	217
Conclusion		219
9	Conclusion	219
9.1	What <i>were</i> we doing there?	219
9.2	What’s the problem with helping?	231
Appendices		237
A	Figures	237
Bibliography		240

List of Tables

5.1	Canadian Contributions to UN Peacekeeping Missions	97
6.1	Canadian Forces Television Advertisements	142

List of Figures

A.1	CANEX Yellow Ribbon	237
A.2	“Stand Behind Our Troops” Bumper Sticker and <i>Red Fridays Canada</i> Ribbons	238
A.3	Saskatchewan Support Our Troops Ribbon	239

Part I

Introduction, Theory, and Methods

Chapter 1

Reflections: An Introduction

1.1 My War Story

CANADA'S MILITARY intervention in Afghanistan began in October of 2001 and lasted until March of 2014. Notably, this period marked the start of my undergraduate education (2001) and the final stages of this doctoral thesis (2015). My research project on Canada's intervention in Afghanistan has been shaped by my own personal experience of the Afghanistan War. My analysis has been an on-going, messy, and at times difficult, interpretation of the discourse on this military intervention.

I have not experienced war as a direct participant. I have no experience with soldiering, nor do I have any family or close friends who have served in the Armed Forces. My war experience has been as an indirect participant: an observer. I have been a recipient of, and contributor to, the *discourse* on the war in Afghanistan. This indirect observer position is one that the majority of Canadians occupy. Many Canadians have not experienced war in a corporeal way. Only a small percentage of the total population is made up of Canadian Forces members. A slightly larger percentage of the Canadian population comprises close friends and family of soldiers.

Since most citizens never directly experience foreign combat the only mechanism to experience war is *by the ways it is narrated to them*.

My personal experience with the first five years of the intervention was that of an undergraduate student. I followed the news and studied International Relations theory. I was generally confused about the nature of the intervention and the role that the Canadian Forces were serving abroad. My political studies professors explained that Canada's foreign policy position was one of a middle power. This familiar trope—Canada as a 'helpful-fixer' peacekeeping nation—seemed at odds with narratives about the activities occurring in Afghanistan. I began to question whether the military intervention in Afghanistan would compromise the middle power identity that my undergraduate textbooks claimed was a unique, niche position for Canada globally. This would become the central research question of my graduate studies: What was Canada doing in Afghanistan? How was the national identity being defined? What did this mean for the (assumed) helpful-fixer peacekeeper identity?

The initial stages of my research centered around the collection of media and government publications on the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan. I sought to explore how Afghanistan would shape Canada's (inter)national identity. I was most interested in whether the increased focus on counter-terrorist combat activities would compromise the mythologized peacekeeping role associated with Canadian foreign policy. My original research questions were set up to answer a long-standing debate in Canadian Foreign Policy studies: should the Canadian Forces become a re-militarized combat force, or should they focus on peacekeeping in global conflicts? However, my research was re-directed when a committee member (Catherine Frost) asked me a question to which I did not have a satisfactory answer. She asked me for *whom* was I writing my dissertation. In the early stages of the project I was writing for myself in an effort to resolve my own questions about Canadian national identity and the role of

the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan. I had not considered that my project might be effectual to others.

In early 2013, *The Guardian* published an article detailing the suicide of William Busbee, an American soldier who had completed three tours in Afghanistan. In it, Busbee's mother recounted how her son told her, "you would hate me if you knew what I've done out there" ('US military struggling . . .', 2013). Busbee's guilt-ridden statement unsettled me. It was not a story about Canadian soldiers, but about a man who was serving in the same theatre. Busbee was described as the "archetype of a soldier" and his mother recalled how desperately he wished to enlist in the army from a young age. The data I was collecting on Canadian soldiers in Afghanistan expressed similar narratives of young heroes wanting to make a difference in a war-torn nation. In fact, the discourse from 2008–2014 was saturated with stories of young lives lost in the service of their country: narratives from the Highway of Heroes, newspaper photos of flag-draped coffins, and media articles that narrated obituaries of fallen soldiers. Official discourse did not mention returning veterans challenged with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Prominent discourse focused on soldiers who had died, but not on soldiers who returned from Afghanistan with non-lethal injuries, be they physical and/or psychological.

The 2013 *Guardian* article introduced me to a counter-narrative about soldiers. It offered a narrative that portrayed a soldier as traumatized by war as opposed to the dominant discourse that cast soldiers as champions of war. This counter-narrative demonstrated that dominant accounts of Canada in Afghanistan were only telling a portion of the story. Official discourse did not capture the true, distressing experience of war—an experience that led veteran Busbee to shoot himself in front of his family.

The *Guardian* article shifted the direction of my project and my research. Busbee's story served to decenter myself from my personal war experience. Until this

point, my war experience was characterized as a dull anxiety about how Afghanistan would re-define Canada's long-held peacekeeping identity. I realized that my tunnel vision was representative of the ways that discourse on Canada's foreign policy had been articulated by political and military elites. Prominent accounts of Canada's intervention in Afghanistan were filled with self-indulgent narratives about nationalism and the sacrifice of the Canadian Forces. The discourse centered on three dominant narratives: Canada needed to participate in Afghanistan to support our international alliances, Canada needed to participate in Afghanistan to fight terrorists abroad in order to protect our home borders, and Canada needed to participate in Afghanistan because the people of Afghanistan needed our help. These narratives were expressed alongside a demand for Canadians to Support the Troops, irrespective of their approval of the three dominant justifications for intervening in Afghanistan.

These dominant narratives did not portray the entire war experience to Canadians. They were specific narratives—reinforced by the government, military, media, and academics—that focused on defining the purpose of the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan. This elite-centered debate was rife with political disagreements about how to define the role and identity of Canada's military. The majority of the discourse aligned with the original research topic of this project: the purpose, role, and identity of the Canadian Forces in international relations, while the secondary focus on the deaths of soldiers emerged as a parallel narrative. The Support the Troops movement emphasized that political debate over the role of the Canadian Forces was a partisan issue for which the Canadian Forces need not be responsible. Proponents of this rhetoric argued that our military personnel should not be held responsible for the decisions of political leadership, and that the public owed their allegiance and support to the Canadian Forces regardless of the location or nature of foreign deployment. The Support the Troops discourse emphasized that soldiers were dying on behalf of

the nation, and this was a sacrifice that should be honoured.

The discourse did not include many stories from soldiers themselves, with the exception of stories about those who had died. Death of soldiers became a signifier for public support, a point for the nation to rally around. The dominant publicized discourse did not include narratives about soldiers who returned home with non-lethal injuries. The narratives offered to the public were a limited view of the experience of soldiers, often narrated by embedded journalists. In short, the majority of media information about the war in Afghanistan focused on the deaths of Canadian soldiers, with little attention devoted to activities occurring in the war theatre.

One should not be surprised. Citizens' lack of exposure to on-the-ground narratives was related to limitations placed on Canadian media reporting. Colin Perkel with *The Canadian Press* explains:

It's just one of the many restrictions that bind reporters who embed with the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan. Often, the military brands the most seemingly innocent detail as integral to operational security, which means an embedded journalist who discloses it faces the threat of expulsion from the base. (Perkel, 2010)

News reporters who embedded with the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan were limited by 'security considerations' and were required to temper the ways they reported the war if they wished to have continued access to the front lines and the base. Instead of reporting military activity, the focus of embedded journalists was on soldiers: their personalities, their hobbies, and their bravery. Particularly after 2008, Canadian media coverage of the intervention in Afghanistan was saturated with biographical accounts of dead soldiers, and the Canadian military made a concerted effort to minimize discussion of non-lethal casualties. The Department of National Defence (DND) only released data on wounded soldiers once per year, and withheld information about the gravity of the injuries (McKay and Swift, 2012, p. 23). The

stories told by embedded journalists were narratives of soldiers who participated in successful (i.e. completed) military missions (e.g. Chris Wattie's *Contact Charlie: The Canadian Army, The Taliban, and the Battle that Saved Afghanistan*; Bernd Horn's *No Lack of Courage. Operation Medusa, Afghanistan*; Christie Blatchford's *Fifteen Days: Stories of Bravery, Friendship, Life and Death From Inside the New Canadian Army*; Patterson and Warren's *Outside the Wire: The War in Afghanistan in the Words of Its Participants*) or narratives about the sacrifice made by soldiers who had died (Pete Fisher's *Highway of Heroes. True Patriot Love*; Kathy Stinson's *Highway of Heroes*). These narratives were dramatic stories about military adventures and dauntless Canadian Forces members. These stories centered on embedded journalists' *perceptions* of Canadian Forces members and activities.

As Doug MacNair, public affairs officer of the Canadian Forces reminds us, the definition of an embedded journalist is "any journalist who enters into a formal arrangement with the military whereby they trade journalistic freedom for access [to the war theatre]" (cited in Hobson, 2007). Therefore, the stories that were told to Canadians were narratives by civilian journalists about the individuals responsible for the journalists' bodily safety. It should be of no surprise then, that the stories from the front line are stories of heroics and bravery, as their authors relied upon soldiers for physical protection, housing, and resource provision.

Discussions about soldiers who struggled with war trauma, such as PTSD, were uncommon. Despite a series of Ombudsman's Reports in the early 2000s that called for better psychological service provision to soldiers, the image of the traumatized soldier did not appear in official discourse about Canada in Afghanistan. There were few newspaper write-ups on soldier suicides during the Afghanistan intervention (and only four overseas suicides officially documented between 2001–2011). The

suicide of Bombardier Karl Manning was described as a “non-hostile”, “non-accidental” death (Brewster and Perkel, 2011). Prime Minister Stephen Harper addressed his death by stating, “Canadians everywhere... will remember [Manning’s] dedication and sacrifice alongside all of those who have lost their lives in the defence of our country” (Brewster and Perkel, 2011). The Department of National Defence and the federal government presented Manning’s death as a death that should be mourned by the nation, as with other war fatalities. These accounts of Manning’s suicide failed to address the circumstances that contributed to his death. Also absent from government and military discourse were the 50 suicides that had occurred between 2005–2009 of Canadian soldiers that were not overseas. The deaths of non-deployed soldiers, even those who had served in Afghanistan before returning home to Canada, were neither mourned nor recognized in the same way as Manning’s. PTSD, and other emotional/psychological traumas that veterans may have endured, was largely absent from the discourse on Canadian military activity in Afghanistan.

Allison Howell (2011) explained that PTSD and the “medicalization of trauma” in the Canadian Forces masks the problems of militarization by focusing on PTSD as an individualistic health disorder, rather than a symptom of the trauma of war. Howell explained that the focus within the military is on curing PTSD as an ‘Operational Stress Injury’ rather than exploring the political circumstances that such a ‘disorder’ [*sic*] was formed within. Howell noted that anti-war supporters have attempted to use PTSD to mobilize pacifist support, but that the psy-disciplines and the military have re-defined PTSD from an environmental risk to an individual disorder. By viewing PTSD as an individual problem, rather than a political problem that results from political violence and war, Howell argues that PTSD has been re-packaged in a way that obscures the politics of this phenomenon.

I argue that the image of the soldier struggling with PTSD is contrary to the

‘hero’ archetype so actively (re)produced in the discourse on the Canadian military intervention in Afghanistan. The creation of the hero archetype can result in psychological violence(s) for soldiers who might feel they fail to uphold the hero image. The 2013 *Guardian* article captured this anxiety, which was exemplified through Busbee’s guilt-ridden belief that his mother would ‘hate him’ if she knew what actions he had done as a soldier in Afghanistan. The actions required by soldiers do not always align with a romanticized image of a hero, and therefore the ‘hero narrative’ is not necessarily beneficial to soldiers themselves. The depiction and narration of soldiers as heroes is problematic for soldiers, as well as citizens, who cannot possibly conceptualize the horrors of war if the representations of soldiers and their duties are sterilized, euphemized, or romanticized.

The average citizen, an indirect observer of war, relies upon journalistic narration to understand war. An indirect observer with limited information cannot possibly understand the complexity of political violence, the humanness of soldiers, and the full traumas of the war theatre, as narratives describing the war theatre are mediated in ways that euphemize or simplify the experience of war. Deconstructing the stories that are told during war serves to demonstrate that there is a complex web of actors that compete for hegemony within the discourse and that this is a political process whereby some actors emerge as legitimized voices, while some actors are silenced, shamed, or ignored.

It is helpful to remember that not all voices have access to equal resources or speaking time in the (re)production of discourse. During Canada’s intervention in Afghanistan, the Department of National Defence set quotas for how many times per year the Conference of Defence Associations think tank was to appear in the news media (Chase, 2008). Steven Chase (2008) argued that the think tank’s five-year contract priced at \$500,000 crossed the line between fostering debate and financing

pro-military commentary in the media. Ian McKay and Jamie Swift (2012) noted that the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI), a policy think tank that strongly advocated for increased funding to the Canadian Forces during the war in Afghanistan, was itself a recipient of funding support from the major U.S. arms dealer General Dynamics. The CDFAI was an active voice in discussions about the war in Afghanistan, as pro-military fellows such as Jack L. Granatstein, Colonel Benrd Horn, and David Bercuson regularly contributed their views in newspaper editorials and foreign policy interest books. In short, the military and militarized institutional bodies played an active role in what narratives were available to the public.

Government and military rhetoric, coupled with media focus on the deaths of Canadian soldiers, were dominant contributors to the discourse on the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan. These perspectives were projected alongside a grassroots civil society movement known as the Support the Troops campaign. This movement promoted the belief that the public should unquestionably support the Canadian Forces regardless of the nature of activities in military interventions. Support the Troops discourse focused on the notion that soldiers make the ultimate sacrifice: risking their lives in the name of national security, and dying on behalf of the nation's political objectives. This trope casts soldiers as uni-dimensional heroes and demands that the public support the military, even if they do not support the political objectives that inform military missions. This message eventually became part of the Harper government's rhetoric, and as I will argue, was used strategically to silence critics who opposed the War in Afghanistan.

The focus on the sacrifice of Canadian soldiers in the Support the Troops narrative encouraged the (re)production of militarism in popular consciousness. The caricaturization of Canadian soldiers as heroes depoliticizes the Canadian Forces, and has three

components that I find troublesome. The first is that when soldiers (or the Canadian Forces as an institution in general) are valorized, the discursive silencing that occurs through this (re)construction limits or closes spaces for critically assessing the actions of the military. The depoliticization of the Canadian Forces, as encouraged through the Support the Troops discourse, limits critical debate about the types of political policies and actions that the troops carry out on behalf of the nation. Not only is this inherently non-democratic, but it also forecloses the ability to speak out against soldiers or military officials who act in ways that do not align with ethical standards expected by the public.

The second problem with caricaturizing Canadian soldiers as uni-dimensionally heroic relates to symbolism of an archetypal hero. As archetypal heroes are associated with altruism and a motivation to help others, this role can seem (to both soldiers and the public) contradictory to military objectives that require bombing, shooting, or other direct acts of violence on human lives. Tasks that soldiers must complete are not necessarily glorious, and soldiers are often burdened with the emotional consequences of being subject to, and productive of, physical harm. Soldiers must make difficult decisions in combat scenarios, and the exultation of their duties, as well as the depoliticization of these actions, can create anxiety for individuals when reconciling their combat behaviour with the public perception that they are altruistic heroes.

The third problem with caricaturizing Canadian soldiers as heroes is that it reinforces military activity —‘soldiering’—as an “exceptionally valued activity” (Enloe, 2000, p. 15). The reinforcement of militarism ideationally encourages the types of political and cultural re-militarization that have occurred in Canada over the past decade. Fostering militaristic cultural beliefs (supporting the troops no matter where or how they serve their missions) facilitates the prioritization of militarized solutions

for political problems.

The outcome of this research reflects uneasiness with the connection between militarism, militarization, and national identity. The construction of national boundaries (“the state”) creates the spaces of Inside and Out (Walker, 1993). National identity is formed in these spaces. I am uncomfortable that national identity is (re)constructed in relation to activities of the military. Hinging national identity on the actions of the military casts the military as an essential institution, not only in the name of ‘national security’, but also because the military becomes the referent objective in defining ‘national identity’. In this understanding, the military is thought to be essential to the preservation of the Canadian state because it ‘protects’ the state from ‘Outside’ threats, and preserves the identity of the ‘Inside’. This is why Canadians, including myself, have been so concerned about whether Canada was a militarized warrior or a humanitarian peacekeeper: it is assumed that this identity reflects upon each of us personally.

Nationalism becomes (re)defined by the state’s international role. It is (re)produced through simplistic narratives that homogenize a diverse population within state borders. This narrative rests upon a sense of moral superiority that Canada *helps* by sending its heroic soldiers abroad to dangerous, disordered places that require assistance. As will be explored in the chapters to follow, Canadian nationalism is reproduced through a culture of militarism and the propagation of military values, symbols, and language. Militarism emboldens the use of violence as a means to resolve political conflict—violence that is targeted at others whom become (re)defined as not only different, but as *enemies*.

1.2 Examining narratives in discourse: The broader War Story

ABOVE I detailed my personal experiences as a participant and producer of this discourse. But this project also seeks to assess a broader, national anxiety to define the nature of the Afghanistan mission, and the role/identity of the Canadian Forces within this context. In 2007, the Standing Committee on National Defence released a report providing an overview to Parliament of Canadian Forces activities in Afghanistan. The Report listed three reasons that the Canadian Forces were in Afghanistan:

To protect the national security interests of Canada by helping to ensure that Afghanistan will not, once again, become a haven for international terrorists; To help provide a secure environment in which the rule of law, human rights and economic prosperity can grow; and to support [their] allies and other international friends in the UN, NATO and the G-8. (Parliament of Canada, 2007, p. 6)

The Government of Canada and foreign policy experts identified these three concepts as the primary justifications for military action. Although clearly stated in the 2007 report, the *integration* of the three roles was not well defined by the government or media in the early years of the intervention. Particularly in the first few years of policy, the objectives underlying Canada's military mission in Afghanistan were, "at best—rhetorically ambiguous" (Sjolander, 2009, p. 78).

Throughout the time that Canada contributed military troops to the various missions in Afghanistan there was confusion as to *which* role Canada was or should be performing. The three identified objectives—Fighting terrorism (defense), contributing to humanitarian services (development), and assisting NATO to politically reorganize the Afghan government and police forces (diplomacy)—were not necessarily mutually exclusive. These roles were part of the 3-D (defence, diplomacy, and development) policy approach initiated by Paul Martin's (2003–2006) government. The successor

government also supported this multi-faceted approach. Stephen Harper's government utilized the term "Whole of Government" to define the synthesis of military, diplomatic, and humanitarian objectives in Afghanistan. It was purported that all three aspects were required for mission success. However, the presence of these three objectives created confusion in the ways that the identity or purpose of the Canadian Forces was understood. Specifically, the combination of these objectives seemed at odds with the simplified, but nationally celebrated, association of Canadian foreign policy with the helpful-fixer peacekeeping identity. Canadians in the early years of the intervention struggled to understand how the "Whole of Government" approach in Afghanistan related to the romanticized peacekeeper myth.

Using Munton (2003) terms, Sjolander (2009) differentiated "active internationalism" (i.e. peace-making in a defensive war) and "liberal internationalism" (i.e. humanitarianism, development assistance, or traditional peacekeeping) in Canadian foreign policy. Sjolander explained that although the roles in practice were not oppositional, these terms evoked different conceptualizations of national identity (2009, p. 79). Specifically, liberal internationalism was imbued with a sense of moral superiority and cast as altruistic and benign. In the discourse on Afghanistan, "active internationalist" and "liberal internationalist" activities were presented as mutually requisite in the 3-D approach. Due to an absence of clear government explanation on the integration of these objectives, Canadians struggled to understand when and where each goal was present and how the roles were complimentary.

Public apprehension about defining the nature of the Afghanistan mission was also tenuously related to funding the military's pursuit of seemingly contradictory goals. In 2013, the estimated cost of Canada's contribution to Afghanistan was \$18.1 billion (Jeong, 2013). Throughout the intervention, there were public concerns about the

cost of an overseas military mission with unclear priorities and an unspecified timeline. This raised the question of whether taxpayer money was being spent on ‘good’ (i.e. justifiable) causes. The Canadian government had conducted several surveys that noted public receptivity for humanitarian objectives in Afghanistan (Government of Canada, 2006, p. 22). Military contributions to humanitarian goals (e.g. the Dahla Dam or polio vaccination initiatives) evoked sentiments of Canada fulfilling the imagined role of an international helpful-fixer, and the government released quarterly reports from 2008–2011 to highlight the charitable activities funded in Afghanistan. Conversely, although the purchase of new military equipment was supported by those within military circles, the government was cautious when presenting this information to the public (Granatstein, 2007a).

In 2008, as recommended by the *Independent Panel on Afghanistan*, the Department of National Defence (DND) announced its plan to lease aerial drones. The decision to lease, as opposed to purchase, was related to marketing optics, as the government was wary of negative public backlash when investing money into weapons systems (Pugliese, 2008). There was also institutional concern about how the purchase of new artillery guns would be perceived by the public. In January 2008, Public Works Canada issued a notice to defence contractors with a warning that no information or statements on the project could be released to media without written permission from DND (Brewster, 2008a). Marketing optics influenced the type of information released by the government about military activities and spending in Afghanistan.

The control of information released was not only related to funding concerns, but a general desire to increase public receptivity for the Afghanistan mission. An internal study commissioned by the Department of Foreign Affairs found that the Harper government’s rhetoric towards the Afghanistan intervention closely echoed that of U.S.

President Bush, and was not favorably received by polled participants (Government of Canada, 2006). The report conducted by the Strategic Counsel public opinion firm suggested avoiding phrases such as “freedom”, “democracy”, and “liberty” as these phrases were associated with the US War in Iraq (Government of Canada, 2006, p. 22). The report recommended that the government avoid lines of argumentation that were strongly based on values, as this could be seen as imposing values upon others, and cast as antithetical to the “Canadian way” (Government of Canada, 2006, p. 22).

Joseph Nye theorized that a nation must convince populations abroad and at home of the moral and legitimate nature of foreign policies if they are to be successful (Nye, 2004). In the case of Canada and the Afghanistan intervention, morality and values remained part of the discourse, but the referent object shifted from national identity to a focus on Canadian soldiers. Rather than endorsing unpopular justifications for publicly funding a contentious and ill-defined military intervention, official discourse shifted after 2008. In the Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan (Parliament of Canada, 2008), Chairman Rick Casson explained:

Canada’s commitment in Afghanistan matters because it concerns global and Canadian security, Canada’s international reputation, and the well-being of some of the world’s most impoverished and vulnerable people. Our commitment is important because *it has already involved the sacrifice of Canadian lives*. (p. 3, emphasis added)

The fatalities incurred by the Canadian Forces became the new measurement for moral considerations of mission ‘worthiness’. Maloney (2013) discussed how the Canadian “political-media complex meme” used the death of Canadians to measure the merit of the mission in its entirety. In short, the discourse justified the mission, not on the basis of its supposed merit, but because lives had been lost. There was a belief that in order to make these deaths meaningful, Canadians “owed it” to those who

had died to see the mission through to completion.

In 2006, the mission mandate for the Canadian Forces shifted when they assumed control of a southern, more volatile territory near Kandahar. The new leadership responsibilities in the Kandahar region meant greater exposure to combat and counter-insurgency operations for the Canadian Forces. It also resulted in higher levels of soldier fatalities. The mounting death toll of Canadian soldiers circa 2006 raised concerns that public opinion could be negatively influenced by soldier fatalities. Boucher (2010) examined the effects of “casualty sensitivity” and public support for the Afghanistan mission. He examined thanatoarithmetics (“To count the dead”) and explored the hypothesis that the Canadian public is thanatophobic (2010, p. 238). Boucher found that there were regional disparities in public opinion on soldier fatalities, but supported the notion that military fatalities had negatively affected public support for the mission in most provinces. Sometimes referred to as the *Trenton Effect* (Boucher, 2010), death tolls raised new challenges for foreign policy elites when justifying the combat role to the public. Taking Boucher’s observations into consideration, the post-2008 increase of Support the Troops rhetoric by government leaders can be seen as a response to public discomfort with war causalities. The popularity of Support the Troops rhetoric provided the Harper government an opportunity to garner consent for the mission without needing to convince the public that the three original justifications (fighting terrorism, supporting allies, conducting humanitarian goals) were still legitimate reasons for military intervention. Rising death tolls could have resulted in public outcry or a demand to pull troops from the region, but government leaders effectively dodged any criticisms about troop fatalities by evoking the deaths of soldiers to silence or shame anti-war voices who criticized the mission. Official discourse about soldiers’ deaths focused on the honour and sacrifice of these

deaths, and served to counter “casualty sensitivity” of the public. The shift in discourse to an increased focus on the Support the Troops narrative was employed by the Canadian government to justify military action; a response to the loss of “Canadian blood and treasure abroad” (Government of Canada, 2007, p. 12). From 2006–2014, discursive negotiation of the peacekeeper versus militarized warrior national identity coincided with the Support the Troops campaign. This popular narrative cast continued military activity in Afghanistan as necessary because Canadian lives had been lost. According to this rhetoric, to make the deaths of fallen soldiers meaningful [*sic*], Canadians should support the troops no matter the political circumstances of their deployment.

1.3 Situating the project

THE THEORETICAL contributions of this research draw from, and build upon, feminist International Relations theories, as well as feminist contributions to the study of Canadian Foreign Policy (CFP). Sandra Whitworth’s research on peacekeeping identities and theorization of “militarized masculinity” is instrumental in understanding the connection between the valourization and normalization of military activities and privileged notions about gender. Whitworth’s observations about the disconnect between militarized gender norms and the expectations of soldiers during peacekeeping missions is used as a framework for my analysis of the discursive re-branding of the Canadian Forces’ image during the Afghanistan intervention. My methodological approach was inspired by Claire Turenne Sjolander’s research that deconstructs foreign policy narratives that (re)produce Canadian identity. Sherene Razack’s study of colonialist assumptions in the Canadian peacekeeping mission in Somalia was also used to create a framework for studying the narratives use to justify intervention on the

basis of saving or helping Afghanistan's population. Unlike Whitworth and Razack's studies that extensively focused on the Somalia Commission of Inquiry, this research utilizes both state-directed texts as well as non-state centric (cultural) narratives, represented by media sources and civil society organizations.

This research takes as its focus the ideation of militarism as a problematic component of both Canadian foreign policy and the re-production of Canadian nationalism. I strive to demonstrate that national identity re-production occurs through a series of discursive negotiations about what is important, relevant, and possible in foreign policy, while at the same time obscuring alternative narratives, identifications, and political strategies. I argue that CFP scholarship's preoccupation with Canada's *place* in the world (i.e. Canada's international identity) has failed to account for the highly political (productive) nature of foreign policy discourse. This dissertation argues that elite foreign policy narratives (including academic research) about Afghanistan were not neutral accounts of the war. Failure to assess the ideational foundations of elite foreign policy narratives has many problematic effects; most notably that military violence is often cast as an appropriate solution for political problems while obfuscating military interventions' traumatic or violent consequences.

1.4 Chapter outline

THE BODY of this research is divided into three parts. Part I outlines the introduction, theory, and methods used. Part II *What Were We Doing 'There'?* focuses on my original research question, and examines the three dominant narratives used to justify the role and purpose of the Canadian Forces' military operations in Afghanistan. This section explores the ongoing negotiations by foreign policy elites that (re)produced Canadian national identity and the role of the Canadian Forces

in a re-militarized image. Part III *Re-Militarization of Canadian Foreign Policy* examines how militarism ideationally operated within the three prominent narratives, and explores types of cultural militarization that occurred during the Afghanistan intervention. Part III demonstrates that official war discourses are a result of political negotiations and hegemonic power. Using the Support the Troops campaign, I demonstrate that critics of policy in Afghanistan were silenced using pro-military rhetoric. I argue that Support the Troops rhetoric served to de-politicize the military and that this has problematic effects on foreign policy practice and theory.

Chapter 2: *Theory and Methods* and introduces the methods employed in my analysis. This chapter provides an overview of Canadian foreign policy literature and outlines academic debates about Canada's international role as a middle power and the relevance of this identity conceptualization to the discourse on Afghanistan. I reflect upon methodological challenges of the project and detail the sources used in my analysis.

Chapter 3: *Canadian Forces in Afghanistan: Supporting International Alliances* explores narratives by elites who articulated Canada needed to participate militarily in Afghanistan to avoid damaging its international reputation and to sustain positive security and economic relations with the United States. I argue that this narrative was situated within long-standing CFP debates about Canada's role as a middle power in international relations. This narrative (supporting international alliances) expressed a desire to brand the Canadian Forces with an increasingly militarized image in the post-9/11 era. I demonstrate that foreign policy elites saw Afghanistan as an opportunity to bolster Canada's international reputation by re-branding the Canadian Forces as a progressively combat-capable institution.

Chapter 4: *Canadian Forces in Afghanistan: Fighting Terrorism Abroad* examines

narratives that justified Canadian intervention in Afghanistan as a mechanism to reduce risks to domestic security by countering terrorism overseas. This narrative also promoted re-branding Canada's international peacekeeping image. These re-branding efforts attempted to portray the Canadian Forces as an increasingly militarized institution focused on traditional, hard security concerns. I argue this justification for military participation relied on problematic caricatures of the self and other that signified Afghan others as savage threats to Canadian civility. I suggest that the use of insecurity narratives by politicians facilitated, or cast as plausible, the desire by military elites to re-militarize Canadian foreign policy.

Chapter 5: *Canadian Forces in Afghanistan: Providing Humanitarian Assistance* explores narratives that framed the Canadian Forces' mission as necessary to providing humanitarian support to Afghan citizens. I argue that this narrative attempted to signify the connection between the Afghan mission and the mythologized peacekeeper identity embedded in Canadian public consciousness. I examine narrative efforts by elites to demonstrate that the 3-D approach in Afghanistan required militarized activities to perform humanitarian objectives.

Chapter 6: *Narratives of Helping: Fight With the Canadian Forces* closely examines a Canadian Forces recruitment campaign that signified the *helpful* nature of the Canadian Forces while re-branding the institution as increasingly combat-capable. I argue this campaign inadvertently mediated public desire to emit a helpful-fixer identity with the re-militarized image of the Canadian Forces. I suggest that this branding is part of larger discursive efforts by political and military elites to justify not only CF activity in Afghanistan, but also the relevance and importance of the military in global affairs.

Chapter 7: *The Framework of Militarism* explores how militarism operated within the three dominant narratives outlined in Part I. Using feminist theories about war

and militarization, I deconstruct assumptions in dominant narratives about the Canadian Forces' role in the Afghanistan War and explore the ways that militarized masculinity operated in this discourse. I argue that re-militarization of the Canadian Forces that occurred during the Afghanistan War relied on discursive maneuverings and narrations that depoliticized military action and therefore prevented a critical assessment of military activities in Afghanistan.

Chapter 8: *Yellow Ribbons and Death* builds upon the theoretical framework of the previous chapter. I examine several components of the Support the Troops movement in Canada: the Yellow Ribbon campaign, the Highway of Heroes gatherings, and the Portraits of Honour tour. I argue that the Harper government utilized Support the Troops rhetoric post-2008 to create an emotional connection to the war and encourage public support for continued military contributions to Afghanistan. I posit that the use of Support the Troops rhetoric is demonstrative of the ways that the death of soldiers was mobilized to stimulate support for ongoing political action while also stifling criticism of the war.

The *Conclusion* revisits my uneasiness with the re-militarization of foreign policy and popular culture in Canada. I offer a preliminary interpretation of the value of this research in light of new political leadership in Canada as of October 2015. I suggest that while the specific findings of this research offer valuable insight into the ways that Canadian identity was negotiated in Afghanistan (arguably re-militarized but still cast as a helpful-fixer) that the real value of this research is the deconstructive framework I have proposed that seeks to challenge the discourse of militarism that informs mainstream theorizations in Canadian Foreign Policy studies and International Relations.

Chapter 2

Theory and Methods

2.1 Situating the research within Canadian Foreign Policy studies

THE BASIS of this research must be situated within the sub-field of Canadian Foreign Policy studies. The sub-field, a branch of International Relations (IR), has established its own canon of commonly used texts to explain the behaviour and actions of Canadian policies abroad. As Heather A. Smith (2010) notes, the literature is largely committed to a problem-solving approach to Canadian foreign policy, although there have been recent shifts to including “non-traditional approaches” (a term of contention which in itself has political implications) that apply a critical lens to the traditional foci of study. As mentioned in Chapter 1, Canadian foreign policy as a sub-field involves the privileging and reinforcement of certain types of research, particularly in how the subject has historically been presented to undergraduate students (Smith, 2010; Wylie, 2010). While there has been some contestation about whether or not Canadian Foreign Policy could be considered a discipline in itself (Kirton, 2009), the ongoing disagreements over the nature, focus, and definition of Canadian foreign policy are an example of the disciplining that occurs between academics in this area

of study.

The emergence of Canadian foreign policy (CFP) as an area of study is relatively new. The 1931 Statute of Westminster formally emancipated Canada's international independence from the United Kingdom making the practice of Canadian foreign policy (at least an independent foreign policy) less than a century old. One of the first major Canadian foreign policy actions was the 1939 choice to enter the Second World War, a decision that has been imagined as Canada's step towards becoming an international actor of importance—a principal power (Dewitt and Kirton, 1983) or a 'foremost nation' (Earys, 1975) as solidified through Canada's military commitments to the Allied forces. Post-1945 scholarly discussions centered on whether Canada should practice a quasi-isolationist foreign strategy or if Canada should embrace international participation (Dewitt and Kirton, 1983; see also Holmes, 1979). John Kirton and David Dewitt argue that the governments of St Laurent, Diefenbaker, and Pearson privileged the precepts of liberal internationalism in foreign policy decisions (2011), and suggested the 1968 Trudeau government marked a shift away from these policies (Dewitt and Kirton, 2011; see also Holmes, 1979, who offers a more nuanced explanation of the Trudeau policies).

The pre-occupation with the role, place, and identity of Canada in the world has dominated the study of CFP, particularly the notion that Canada exemplified middlepowership: a particular form of international influence that rested upon multilateralism (Keating, 1993) and niche diplomacy (Cooper, 1997). There has been extensive writing on Canada's (self-)designation as a middle power. Adam Chapnick (1999) argued that while the notion of Canada-as-a-middle-power has been used extensively throughout CFP literature, use of the term is ambiguous. He explained that in the study of International Relations (IR), middle powers are states that are neither a great power nor a small power. Martin Wight described a middle power

as “a power with such military strength, resources, and strategic position that in peacetime the great powers bid for its support, and in wartime, while it has no hope of winning a war against a great power, it can hope to inflict costs on a great power out of proportion to what the great power can hope to gain by attacking it” (Wight, 1995, p. 65).

Robert Cox described a middle power as “a role in search of an actor” (1981, p. 827; as cited in Chapnick, 1999, p. 75). He meant that the term does not contain an inherent meaning, but rather can be applied to states that behave in normative ways associated with this term (Chapnick, 1999, p. 75). The presumed identity and behaviours of middle powers have been defined in many ways by scholars: using multilateral solutions (Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, 1993); performing a “helpful-fixer” role (Dewitt and Kirton, 1983); endorsing mediation (Gordon, 1966); normatively projecting ideals (Stairs, 1994); using strategies of diplomacy and conflict resolution (Keating, 1993, p. 204-223); prioritizing foreign policy related to the international political economy (Pratt, 1990). Claire Turenne Sjolander explained that the ascription of values to the term ‘middle power’ in the Canadian context related to a belief that “Canada was an altruistic middle power... ‘saints and crusaders’ in the cause of the just and the weak” (Sjolander, 2010, p. 322). However, this belief was not unanimously held. Politicians such as Pierre Trudeau cautioned that Canadians “should not exaggerate [their influence] upon the course of world events” (as cited in Sjolander, 2010, p. 322) and academic John W. Holmes wrote, “A certain moral arrogance has crept into the concept of middle powers” (cited in Sjolander, 2010, p. 324). Despite differing conceptualizations of the middle power role (a debate that continues to inform CFP, as exemplified by Part I of Nik Hynek and David Bosold’s 2010 *Canada’s Foreign and Security Policy: Soft and Hard Strategies of a Middle Power*), the self-identification of Canada as a middle power has been widely claimed

by academics and politicians, and has served as a central focus of mainstream CFP literature since the end of WWII.

The debate about the nature of Canada's middle power role (how it should be defined and if this term accurately represents Canada's foreign policy) reflects one of two primary themes that Maureen Appel Molot (1990) suggested has dominated the field of CFP studies. The first theme, as identified by Molot, is the practice of defining Canada's place in the world by analyzing status, position, influence, and power. This theme could be characterized as a debate between whether Canada is a liberal internationalist (Granatstein, 1969; Holmes, 1984; Hawes, 1984; Pratt, 1990; Keating, 1993; Cooper *et al.*, 1993; Dewitt, 2000) or a neo-realist principal power (Earys, 1975; Dewitt and Kirton, 1983; Molot, 1990; Hillmer and Molot, 2002; Dewitt and Kirton, 2011). This debate has continued in modern format, painting the role dichotomy of Canada as Empire/Umpire (Hillmer and Granatstein, 1994), Peacemaker/Peacekeeper (Gammer, 2001), Active internationalist/Liberal internationalist (Munton, 2003; Sjolander, 2009), or Warrior/Boy Scout (Bratt, 2007).

Molot argued that the second thematic focus of CFP literature has been analyses of the governmental and non-governmental mechanisms that influence the ways that foreign policy is made (Earys, 1961; Stairs, 1974; Pratt, 1984; Nossal, 1984, 1989). This categorization can be applied to recent studies analyzing the power of public opinion in shaping foreign policy decisions (Bratt, 2007; Nossal, 2008; Boucher, 2010).

Kirton (2011) explains that the early studies of CFP were largely focused on "idiographic concern with individuals, histories, and biographies" (p. 70) but that the subfield evolved to draw on influences from International Relations (IR) theory, including Waltz (1979), Keohane and Nye (1977), Cox (1981), Ruggie (1982), and Wendt (1992). Particularly with the growth of critical scholarship in the field, there has been greater reliance on using IR theories as a framework to analyze Canadian

foreign policy.

Black and Smith (1993) expressed a discomfort with Molot's focus on "place" (i.e. Canada's role) in CFP, noting that her characterization of two themes in the study of Canadian foreign policy (broadly characterized as external and internal effects on policy) did not adequately embrace the ways that domestic and systemic factors operated in tandem to determine why and how Canada makes foreign policy choices. They also note that the study of CFP has been confined to a very small group of scholars, and that many of these scholars have relied upon funding from institutions such as the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, North-South Institute (and I would add the Canadian Global Affairs Institute and Dalhousie's Centre for Foreign Policy Studies), which means that CFP research agendas have been "conditioned accordingly" (Black and Smith, 1993, p. 769).

Critical voices that responded to the 'traditional' CFP canon have expressed concern with the ways in which disciplinary boundaries and priorities have been drawn, re-constructed, and reinforced. J. Marshall Beier and Samantha Arnold (2005) explained that university cultures, funding agencies, and the quantity of voices in a field of study contribute to the ways that scholars are disciplined in these socio-political contexts. Research agendas do not always unfold organically, as both personal and institutional pressures can shape the content of researchers' programmes. Heather A. Smith, Claire Turenne Sjolander, and Deborah Stienstra (2003) shared an anecdotal example of this type of disciplining: they received a grant from the Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development but were later criticized by Foreign Affairs staff for the content of their Canadian foreign policy research, which focused largely upon feminist theories and methods. Foreign policy research is inherently political.

CFP is not an objective body of work but rather contains a variety of biases, preferences, and types of methodologies. In short, the body of literature that has

dominated the ‘mainstream’ canon in CFP has reflected an emphasis on problem solving theories, or at the very least, an emphasis on understanding how actors behave and create policy and how the international system affects state behaviour and priorities. In 2009, Kirton published an article titled “The 10 Most Important Books on Canadian Foreign Policy” that reinforced much of the details above; a small group of academic scholars had dominated the literature on Canadian foreign policy with an emphasis on analyzing the foreign policy making framework. Sjolander and Smith’s response to this article noted the problematic nature of Kirton’s discipline-defining practice (which focused on the work of white, male, Anglophone scholars at the exclusion of other perspectives). Sjolander and Smith were critical of Kirton’s article which cast CFP as having disciplinary coherence and theoretical parsimony (2010, p. 760; see also Beier and Wylie, 2010). Sjolander (2007) noted the exclusion of francophone foreign policy studies in the teaching of CFP to undergraduate students, as well as the absence of francophone scholarship in Kirton’s Top Ten list (Sjolander and Smith, 2010; see also Roussel, 2010). Sjolander, Smith, and Stienstra (2003) challenged the absence of feminist perspectives and gender considerations in mainstream approaches, and noted the ways that certain voices had been ignored or rendered illegitimate. J. Marshall Beier and Lana Wylie (2010) echoed these concerns and explained that the primary focus of mainstream CFP theories—“problem solving theories”—relied heavily on particular IR theoretical perspectives. Critical perspective informed by feminists, Marxists, postcolonialists, and poststructuralists has been largely absent in discussions of CFP. Beier and Wylie suggested that foreign policy has been centrally concerned with “political practice by and between states”, which can explain why critical scholarship, which often works to de-center the state, has not always been directed towards the foreign policy analysis community (2010, p. xiii).

It is within this ongoing series of debates—both within and outside of CFP mainstream research—that my own research lies. As introduced in Chapter 1, my own undergraduate exposure to CFP literature was the presentation of mainstream, problem-solving approaches, particularly the emphasis on Canada’s “place” or “role” in the world. The mainstream canon informed my preliminary research questions about what “role” and what “identity” Canada performed during the military intervention in Afghanistan.

Situating my research alongside CFP is also important for the secondary focus of my research, which was to examine how foreign policy discourse, including my own writing and research, (re)produces other effects such as increased militarization in popular culture. The work of critical scholars in CFP helped me to recognize the productive nature of my own research. Howell (2005) advised that the goal of analyzing Canadian foreign policy should be conducted in so as to “elucidate [its] effects” (p. 63). In other words, while analyzing the projected role and identity of the state through foreign policy discourse, what other effects can we notice? How does the *practice* of theorization contribute to other processes of foreign policy?

The academy expects that a doctoral student situate her work within the current field of study and justify the relevance and importance of her contributions to the already existing field. I see this as an important example of what Smith (2010) articulates as a disciplining practice of how CFP and IR are taught. The requirement of situating my work to the existing literature is a practice that reinforces this canon of work as central, mainstream, or traditional even though critical scholarship has questioned its coherence and genealogical evolution. The practice reifies mainstream scholarship as a voice of authority, a central body of literature to which all other work is compared.

I should note that the practice of situating doctoral research alongside established

research is not wholly problematic; there is value in speaking to others who research and write on similar subjects. The work of Sjolander, Smith, Razack, and Howell has been instrumental in creating a theoretical framework for this project. My work is indebted to the foundation of critical scholarship that many of these authors have provided.

Critical scholarship understands that the practice of theorizing Canadian foreign policy contains productive qualities. The choice of research subject matter reinforces the disciplinary boundaries of CFP and therefore (re)produces what issues and activities are considered important or relevant for foreign policy practice. As a scholar, I am not simply an observer of Canadian foreign policy discourses, but I am also complicit in the (re)production of particular discourses at the exclusion of others (most notably, my own research has largely relied on Anglophone narratives, or narratives that were presented bilingually). Even though I might label my work “critical” research, it certainly is not reflective of the diversity of perspectives that contribute to non-traditional approaches to CFP.

The practice of labeling this research as critical is part of the (re)production of boundary-marking for mainstream CFP literature, and the delineation of what is (and often is not) considered appropriate, serious, or useful research. Unlike ‘problem-solving’ theories, my research does not offer prescriptive advice for the practice of Canadian foreign policy. It offers an alternative reading of foreign policy discourses that dominated a particular time and space. This perspective is inherently personal, as it required my interpretation of data as understood through my own lived experience. There may be critics who feel my theoretical and methodological approaches lack a particular type of scientific rigour (the methods to be discussed in the following section).

Unlike some critical scholars who have challenged the ways that CFP has been

studied, I lack the stamp of authority (i.e. the conferred Ph.D. or tenure-stream position) that casts my voice as legitimate, and which might allow me to more easily make certain claims. However, as mentioned above, it is to the credit of other critical scholars who have been subject to disciplining practices and yet still publish and participate in academic circles that I am able to make critical claims. It requires that I ‘borrow’ some of their authority to create an acceptable foundation for my analysis and to inform set of guidelines for interpretive research that will be discussed below.

Interpretivists recognize the socially-constructed meanings of the world and therefore hold an ethical obligation to be mindful of the conditions where authoritative knowledge is produced (Salter, 2013, p. 21). My writing here is (re)constitutive of CFP studies yet my perspective has been shaped by particular conditions. I recognize my own privilege in the ability to assess a case study of political conflict without having corporally experienced the traumas of war. Although lacking certain symbols of academic prestige, I still hold a position of privilege as this research represents my elite (Westernized, white, educated, Anglophone) perspective on foreign policy studies.

2.2 Methodological approaches

SALTER (2013) NOTED that interpretivist methods face many challenges, but that the ultimate concern for this type of method, as opposed to hard scientific “testable” methods, is “legibility, not replicability” (p. 15). According to Salter, a sound (“unambiguous”) research design will clearly set out the case study, the reason for its selection, and the values at stake in the particular articulation of that relation (2013, p. 16). I began with a case study (Canada), and a time period (duration of Canada’s military intervention in Afghanistan), and the values that were at stake in the

articulation (how the national identity and roles were articulated during this time period). However, I did not start with a pre-existing thesis that speculated the nature of Canada's role or identity. Instead, I started with a curiosity of how these roles and identities were being presented to the public, and an interest in how this might have effects on foreign policy activity. This might be best aligned with what Luis Lobo-Guerrero (2013) describes as a flexible methodological practice, which he labels "wondering". Lobo-Guerrero explains that this methodological practice does not take the object of analysis for granted, but instead relies upon Foucault's practice of "pointing out on what kind of assumptions, what kind of familiar, unchallenged, unconsidered modes of thought the practices we accept rest [upon]... practicing criticism [as] a matter of making facile gestures difficult" (Foucault, 1988, p. 154-155; as cited in Lobo-Guerrero, 2013, p. 25).

Therefore, although my case study (Canada) was the determined focus, my project recognized the contingency of the ways that my research subject (national identity) was (re)constructed through speech and language acts. My research subject—the 'identity' and 'role' of Canada as a foreign policy object—was neither an objective or tangible object, but one that is (re)produced through narratives that exist within a discursive system of signs, symbols, and values. This project has relied on Discourse Analysis (DA) as the mechanism for studying this subject and the tool(s) in which I could explore the initial *wondering* that initiated the project.

The term 'discourse' is an analytical category that describes a multitude of meaning-making resources (Fairclough *et al.*, 2011). Discourses operate as systems of signification: "things do not mean (the material world does not convey meaning); rather, people construct the meaning of things, using sign systems (predominantly, but not exclusively linguistic)" (Milliken, 1999, p. 229). For Foucault, discourse can be understood as "practices that systemically form the objects of which they speak"

(1972, p. 49). Therefore, discourses do not exist out in the world; rather they are “structures that are actualized in their regular use by people in discursively ordered relationships” (Shapiro, 1989, p. 11).

Discourse analysis is a tool for examining social practices and political orders that are generally accepted as ‘natural’. These practices are commonly perceived as truths, or common sense. Discourse analysis uses a variety of techniques to destabilize these ‘truths’, to show the socially constructed foundations and practices that sustain them as common sense. Often, cultural and ideological assumptions present in discourse occur below the level of conscious awareness (Fairclough, 2001). Foucault (1980) understood that these commonly assumed ‘truths’ are discursively constructed *regimes of truth*, which contain powerful political and cultural meanings. Analyzing discourse requires an analysis of narratives or stories that comprise the larger system of discourse that sustains and renders plausible certain perspectives, while excluding other perspectives.

Narratives in discourse may try to pass off assumptions, often falsifying ones, about any aspect of social life as mere common sense (Fairclough *et al.*, 2011, p. 358). Discourse analysis is made useful in studying the assumptions that are present in foreign policy narratives by exploring the broader discourse through which these narratives make sense. It is not the goal to expose a grand truth that has been obscured, but rather to understand that there are a multitude of competing narratives, ideas, and perspectives present in all discourse, and that only certain perspectives become dominant and (re)produced. In studying foreign policy, the objective of discourse analysis “is not to establish the ‘right story’ but to render ambiguous predominant interpretations of state practices and demonstrate the inherently political nature of official discourses” (Milliken, 1999, p. 243). It therefore is not the intention to deconstruct or (un)package narratives to reveal previously masked truths, but rather to

show the contingency of claims made and to reveal that all discourse is (re)created in a highly political fashion. Understanding the discursive construction of these assumptions is important to altering perception in foreign policy study, and in turn, altering what can and cannot be considered plausible options for foreign policy practice.

There are a variety of tools used in discourse analysis. Deconstructive methods largely focus on poles of oppositions, usually expressed in dichotomous forms such as good/evil, black/white, or masculine/feminine, where one pole may be privileged over the other. The deconstructive method is used to render the privileging contingent and therefore showing other ‘truths’ (Milliken, 1999, p. 242). A similar approach is the juxtapositional method, which compares narratives within a discourse to events or issues this narrative fails to acknowledge or explain (Milliken, 1999, p. 243). I used both of these techniques throughout my research to analyze narratives about Canada’s role and identity in the Afghanistan intervention, noting the use and effects of dichotomous language and exploring the ways that the dominant narratives failed to account for particular events and issues. It is the silencing of particular perspectives in discourse that I am most interested in, as this reflects the circulations of power that exist within discourse.

A foundational concept in most critical work on discourse is that of power, and more specifically, the *social power* of groups or institutions (Van Dijk, 2001, p. 354). For my study, I am most interested in the social power of the military as an institution. The power of dominant groups may be integrated in laws, rules, norms, habits, and even ‘common sense’ (or a general societal consensus), and thus take the form of what Gramsci called “hegemony” (Gramsci, 1971). Hegemony, simply understood, is a concentration of power by a dominant actor. As a theoretical concept, hegemony is a form of dominance of one (dominant) social group over another, legitimized or supported through overt and/or unconscious consent from the ruled group. The ideas

put forward by the ruling class come to be seen as common sense or beneficial to all, however most likely to benefit the dominant group.

For foreign policy discourse, this means that there are not simply ideas that are dominant without reason, but that dominant narratives within this discourse are politically sustained and serve the interests of dominant actors. Often, those with the power to (re)create and articulate foreign policy discourse are those who benefit from the beliefs, norms, institutions, and rules that are (discursively) sustained through the telling of particular stories, or by the omission of other perspectives. In this research, I argue that the ideas put forward about the military (the trope of soldiers-as-heroes, and the necessity of military action to influence politics internationally) have been internalized by many Canadians and that this internalization of militarism stands to serve the benefit of the military, who is cast as an essential institution for foreign policy activities. It has also served to silence particular voices that were unwilling to support militarization such as anti-war critics. Militarism, therefore, is representative of hegemonic power. The hegemonic power in foreign policy narratives occurs both in the ways that certain narratives are legitimized, and the ways that alternative narratives are omitted or rendered illegitimate.

Van Leeuwen (2008) explores how legitimation is discursively constructed, and how the questions, “Why should we do this?” or “Why should we do this in this way?” are resolved in discourse (p. 105). Van Leeuwen suggests that one form of legitimation that occurs in language is *mythopoesis*: legitimation conveyed through narratives whose outcomes reward legitimate actions and punish non-legitimate actions (2008, p. 105). Storytelling is a form of legitimation and in moral tales protagonists are rewarded for engaging in legitimate social practices or restoring the perceived legitimate order (Van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 115). An example of this practice is the narration of soldiers as heroes who are restoring order in foreign, dangerous

lands. In this narration, soldiers are the protagonists who reinforce armed conflict intervention as a legitimate social practice.

Approaching discourse analysis as narrative analysis allows for study of how and what social practices are legitimized and which are not. Because the protagonist in any story is the main character and focus of the reader's attention, the story will be told from that perspective. Narrative analysis understands that discourse is not simply a re-telling of facts and truths, but rather a perspective that cannot possibly capture the complexity of events. In foreign policy discourse, particularly the discourse of Canada's War in Afghanistan, this helps to explain why dominant narratives were told by Canadian officials (both government and military) or Canadian media outlets, but very rarely contained opinions, perspectives, or narratives from Afghan citizens. Analyzing the hegemonic narratives within the discourse on Canadian foreign policy requires the analyst to pay attention to the voices that are deemed authoritative and to the perspectives that are absent.

The narratives that I study are related to how Canada's role and identity were articulated during the military intervention of Afghanistan. Thus, the association or disassociation with particular national imaginings is of interest as discourse can also act to constitute the citizenry as a political community (Fairclough *et al.*, 2011, p. 370). The narratives used within this discourse help to (re)construct a social identity for Canada and Canadians.

Foreign policy discourse helps to create a discursive delineation between "us" (the citizenry) and "them" (all others outside of this created boundary). Through foreign policy narrations, the imagined caricature or myth of whom "we" are or what "we" are like is discursively (re)constructed. Interestingly, this does not describe an individual's personal self, even if many foreign policy myths are affective in their ability to evoke personal identification with their messages. Promoting the 'identity' of the

nation (as defined by affirmative characteristics) reflects individual desire to have those imagined, self-professed qualities reflect their personal self. Benedict Anderson noted the modern understanding of nationality is viewed as a universal socio-cultural concept, and assumes a general acceptance that everyone “can, should, will ‘have’ a nationality, as he or she ‘has’ a gender” (1991, p. 49). Nationality is therefore conceptually linked to personal self-identification as an intrinsic reflection of an individual’s *self*.

Anderson considered how, perplexingly, nationalism has been hypostasized as a mechanism for personal identity demarcation. He defined the nation as an *imagined* community, rather than a sui generis category in itself (p. 49). Therefore, as the community distinguishes itself “in the style in which they are imagined” (Anderson, 1991, p. 49), the individual associates his or her personal identity as bound up in this same image. Despite the heterogeneity of individuals that comprise a nation, the generalized, imagined characteristics ascribed to national identity serve to bind citizens together by a myth of shared qualities and interests. Anderson explained that despite actual inequality or exploitation that may prevail in each community, the nation is always conceived as “a deep, horizontal comradeship” (p. 50), the imagined bond for which citizens are willing to die and to kill for. Therefore, despite the subjectivity of national identity, the (re)production of an imagined community has powerful affects on its membership.

Brent J. Steele also explained that these shared values or identities (nationalist) serve to comprise a state’s ontological security. Steele theorized that a primary motivation in foreign policy is not only the physical security of the state, but also the *ontological* security of the state, defined as both its physical existence and how it sees itself and wants to be seen by other states (Steele, 2008, p. 2-3). Steele argued that states wish to maintain “consistent self-concepts” by routinized foreign policy

actions and that if this self-identity is disrupted (through narratives and actions that do not reflect how the state sees itself) that actors in the state will “seek to re-establish routines that can, once again, consistently maintain self-identity” (2008, p. 3). Steele’s analysis shows that the values and “identity” of the state do not exist outside of the preferences, vision, and articulation of the community that (re)produces the composition of national identity. The site for (re)production and negotiation of this self-identity is in the narration of foreign policy and presentation of Canada’s international positioning.

The imagining of Canada as a peacekeeper nation and the multitude of meaning and expectations that accompany this image has been something that Canadians have historically felt an affinity for. This role is not naturalized, but is actively (re)produced through foreign policy discourses. The persistence of Canada-as-Peacekeeper identity was recognized by the Department of National Defence, who noted that although Canadian Forces operations in Afghanistan were explicitly not peacekeeping (particularly as this term was popularly understood; the image of a soldier pacifically standing between two warring parties), there was general confusion about how “peace support operations” in Afghanistan should be understood (Anker, 2005). In March 2006, a survey was conducted by the Strategic Council of Canada which asked poll participants about their perception of Canada’s role in Afghanistan. Seventy percent of respondents felt that the purpose of Canadian troops was “more peacekeeping than combat” (Tandt, 2006). The survey also asked participants if they felt that Canadians had “emotional feelings about our troops in Afghanistan” and 73 percent responded affirmatively. The personal identification(s) with the Canadian Forces and the peacekeeping role is demonstrative of how foreign policy can evoke personal sentiments. Fletcher *et al.* (2009) found that the Canadian government was unsuccessful in marketing policies in Afghanistan in a way that stimulated public

emotional support for the mission. Using survey data they studied the decline of public support for Afghanistan and suggested that the Canadian government failed to connect with the public on an emotional level through official discourse on the Afghanistan mission. Fletcher *et al.* concluded, “Canadians engage with foreign policy issues on an emotional level” (2009, p. 931) but failed to offer a reason *why* this emotional connection exists. I argue that foreign policy marketing does not occur in a vacuum, but rather in a larger system of discursive signs, symbols, and ‘common sense’ ideas. The personal sentiments that Canadian citizens exhibit about foreign policy roles can only be understood in relation to this discursive system.

The peacekeeping identity associations are of particular importance to Canadian foreign policy, because even when peacekeeping objectives are not part of international missions, many citizens express a desire to associate with that image. Despite the absence of a peacekeeping mandate in Afghanistan, Canadian citizens stubbornly clung to the association of Canada-as-Peacekeeper. In 2002 and 2004 *Focus Canada* polled the question:

Some people say that Canadian Forces should adopt a traditional peacekeeping role, which means trying to keep the two conflicting sides apart. Others say that Canadian Forces should adopt a peacemaking role, which might involve fighting alongside other UN troops to force peace in a disputed area. Which view is closer to your own?

Of the 2,021 Canadians polled, 52 percent indicated they preferred the “traditional peacekeeping role” (Environics Research Group Limited, 2002). In 2004, the polled participants preference for “traditional peacekeeping” increased to 59 percent (Environics Research Group Limited, 2004). In a 2003 GPC poll *Listening to Canadians*, 81 per cent supported “participating in international peacekeeping operations” as a top priority for foreign policy (GPC International, 2003; as cited in Anker, 2005).

In 2005, Ekos Research Associates Inc. conducted a study that found 57 per

cent of Canadians preferred a “traditional peacekeeping role” to a “peacemaking” mandate (cited in Anker, 2005). In October 2010, *The Globe and Mail* sponsored Nanos Research poll found that 52 percent of respondents felt UN peacekeeping was an important foreign policy role for the Canadian Forces, compared to 21 percent who felt that combat missions were an important role for the armed Forces (Clark, 2010).

The objective of my research is to observe and analyze the resilience of the peacekeeping affiliation, which has been well documented in other quantitative studies. Despite the absence of a peacekeeping mandate in Afghanistan, the self-identification by Canadians with that image remained throughout the military intervention. Anker (2005) explained the conceptual gap is related to two challenges. First, that academics and DND have strived to use modified lexicon to describe Canadian Forces activities (‘peace support operations’; ‘peacemaking’; ‘preventative diplomacy’) but that the public has not grasped the distinction of these terms. The second challenge is that the branding associated with traditional peacekeeping has been very influential in defining a sense of nationalism. Anker (2005) argued that DND and the CF must do a better job of reinforcing the new branding through the educational system. The challenge with Anker’s assessment is that while he addressed reasonable cognitive prescriptions for re-branding, he failed to address the emotional connection that peacekeeping plays in the national psyche. I argue that a more complex analysis of the discourse of militarism that sustains the peacekeeping identity would be helpful in understanding the prominence of this idea. Narratives about foreign policy, and not simply factual circumstances (such as the transition from ‘traditional peacekeeping tasks’ to peace support operations), are instrumental in how representations of the world and our relationships within it are (re)formed. Narratives are profoundly political as they both enable and limit representation—“and representation shapes our

world and what is possible within it” (Wibben, 2011, p. 43). Therefore, a priority for my research is to examine narratives in foreign policy and assess the (re)productive power of these narratives.

2.3 Selection of texts

DISCOURSE ANALYSIS, according to Milliken, “should be based upon a set of texts by different people presumed to be authorized speakers/writers of a dominant discourse” (Milliken, 1999, p. 233). Therefore, a large part of the discourse studied throughout has focused on what can be considered “elite voices”: government, military, academic, and media perspectives. Other scholars (Hobson, 2007; Nossal, 2008; Fletcher *et al.*, 2009; Boucher, 2010) have offered quantitative studies to measure public opinion of the war (largely achieved through polling), but since hegemony is present in all discourse, I was most interested in examining the narratives presented by dominant speakers, as they were presented to the public.

For this project, I included texts from government officials, the Canadian Forces, and a large sample of media texts. For government sources, I used publicly available information, specifically media briefings and speeches accessed through the Department of National Defence webpage (<http://forces.gc.ca>), the Prime Minister’s Office (<http://pm.gc.ca>), Foreign Affairs and International Trade (also Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada), and the Government of Canada’s *Canada In Afghanistan* webpage (<http://Afghanistan.gc.ca>). I also extensively used the April 2006 House of Commons proceedings, as there was lengthy debate about the role of the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan during this session. The Parliament of Canada’s *Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan’s* final report

(2008), “Canadian Forces in Afghanistan: Report of the Standing Committee on National Defence” (2007), and the Government of Canada’s “Canada’s Engagement in Afghanistan” quarterly reports (available June 2008–July 2011) were also used in this analysis.

With the assistance of online databases, I accessed Canadian news media articles, as well as radio media transcribed to text, that contained the key terms “Canadian Forces”, “War in Afghanistan”, “Afghanistan”, “Afghan mission”, “engagement in Afghanistan” and “peacekeeping”. The media outlets that these texts were accessed from include: *Calgary Herald*; *Canada AM*; *CBC News*; *CTV News*; *Edmonton Journal*; *The Globe and Mail*; *Guelph Mercury*; *Hamilton Spectator*; *Macleans*; *Montreal Gazette*; *National Post*; *Ottawa Citizen*; *Saskatoon Star Phoenix*; *The Toronto Star*; *Winnipeg Free Press*; *The Canadian Press*; *Vancouver Province*; *Vancouver Sun*; *Victoria Times Colonist*; *Waterloo Region Record*; *Western Morning News*; *Windsor Star*. Most of these daily newspapers are owned by media conglomerates (Tostar, BellCanada, and Postmedia News). As mentioned, the analysis did not contain francophone-directed media outlets, and outside of the “national” sources (*Globe and Mail*, *National Post*, *CBC News*, *CTV News*), there is a heavy bias for Western and Central news outlets. Maritime, Northern, and Quebec newspaper dailies are primarily owned by alternative media conglomerates (TC Transcontinental and Quebecor) which I did not have free access to through online databases. Keeping in mind my commitment to offer a reading of foreign policy discourse (inherently personal), I do not feel this bias is problematic as these are the news sources to which I (and other Canadians in geographic proximity to myself) had access. I limited the data retrieval by starting the collection with texts dated September 12, 2001, and ending July 1, 2014.

Texts from the academic community included articles published in peer-reviewed

journals (*Canadian Foreign Policy*, *American Review of Canadian Studies*, *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, *International Journal*, *Canadian Military Journal*) that addressed Canada's role in Afghanistan, as well as a number of publications by think-tanks (the *Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute* and the *Centre for Foreign Policy Studies*).

In Chapter 6, I closely examine the Canadian Forces 2006 "Fight" advertising campaign and in addition to using the video advertisements as a primary source, I also analyzed two research studies prepared for DND: *Enviro-nics Research Group's* "Advertising Post-Test: prepared for DND" (2007); and *Decima Research Group's* "Key Findings of qualitative research for the Canadian Forces recruitment advertising campaign 'Fight'" (2007).

As Salter identifies, one of the challenges for interpretivist methods is that of *sufficiency*: "when can we stop our actual data retrieval?" (2013, p. 15) While I did limit my textual findings to particular key terms and a time frame, it could be argued that there is still a great deal of discursive material not included within this study. However, I do not claim that this is a comprehensive study of all possible narratives; rather that it is a singular reading of a relatively large sample of texts. The time frame for analysis was longer than I initially expected, and this was a research challenge related to sufficiency. I had originally desired to examine how Canada's international role and identity was (re)produced during the Afghanistan conflict. A research challenge arose as Canada's military commitment in Afghanistan lasted longer than I expected.

I initially did not expect that the time frame would be as long as it was (twelve years), as the Canadian government did not initially intend to commit troops for this time duration. Following the September 11, 2001 attacks on New York and Washington, the Canada Forces deployed Joint Task Force 2 (JFT-2) special operations teams

to southern Afghanistan. In 2002, Prime Minister Chretien sent regular forces to assist the US in Operation APOLLO, a combat mission to destroy al-Queda and Taliban forces believed to be responsible for the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The secondary set of missions that the Canadian Forces performed from 2003-2005 was under the command of the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The land intervention was titled Operation ATHENA (primarily located in Kabul), and Canadian military contribution to ATHENA was expected to end in 2006. The naval contributions were through Combined Task Force 150 (CTF 150)'s Operation ARTEMIS (set to conclude 2016). In 2006, the Canadian Forces were transferred to a new US-command under Operation ARCHER in the southern city of Kandahar. In May of 2006, the Harper government announced a two-year mission extension until February 2009. In August of 2006, the Canadian Task Force (a Provincial Reconstruction Team that included military, diplomatic, and civilian support persons) was transferred back to NATO control under the Operation ATHENA mission. In March 2008, the Harper government motioned to extend the military mission to 2011, which received Parliamentary approval. The final Canadian Forces troops were deployed in the fall of 2010, and the final troops and equipment were withdrawn by December of 2011. From 2012-2014, the "combat mission" had ceased, but the Canadian Forces were committed to the Canadian Contribution to the Training Mission in Afghanistan (CCTM-A). During this time, Canadian soldiers (plus accompanying civilian support) assisted in training the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police forces. March 2014 marked the formal end to Canada's operations in Afghanistan.

As the mission was extended several times, I wrestled with Salter's *sufficiency* challenge—if I ceased data collection before the mission officially ended, would this affect my understanding of the discourse? With hindsight, I believe it might have. Messaging about the war by elites was not consistent throughout the twelve-year

period. This was due to two considerations.

First, the initial deployment was explicitly a combat mission intended to fight the political organizations deemed responsible for the 9/11 attacks. As the mission progressed, the DND realized that a more robust peace support operation was required to stabilize the region. As will be discussed in the latter half of Part II, the “Whole of Government” ‘peacemaking’ approach of the Canadian government was unpopular with the Canadian public, a challenge articulated by numerous studies (Anker, 2005; Hobson, 2007; Parliament of Canada, 2007, 2008). The Harper government pronounced the unfeasibility of traditional peacekeeping techniques (separating two warring parties in a ceasefire agreement) for Afghanistan, and although Canadians generally understood this explanation, the message was not enthusiastically received (Bratt, 2007; Fletcher *et al.*, 2009). Therefore, if I had ceased data collection in 2009, I would have been left to conclude what other scholars had: that the elite narration of Canada’s role in Afghanistan “echoed US President George W. Bush’s description of the War in Iraq” (Bratt, 2007, p. 6; see also Nossal, 2010) which contrasted the national self-image of Canada as a helpful-fixer nation for which many Canadians felt an affinity.

The second consideration is that ceasing data collection in 2009 would have resulted in a poor understanding of how the Support the Troops movement developed and how the Harper government actively used this narrative to solicit support for the military intervention. The emergence of Support the Troops rhetoric coincided with the change in government policy that allowed media coverage of repatriation ceremonies, allowing many symbolic elements of the Support the Troops campaign—such as flag draped coffins and the Highway of Heroes rallies—to become more prominently featured in discussions about the Afghanistan War. It also coincided with a documented awareness that the messaging from government about the role Canadian

Forces were serving did not connect with the public on an emotional level (Fletcher *et al.*, 2009). The Support the Troops campaign, although not directly politically affiliated with Afghanistan, was a mechanism that allowed the Canadian public to emotionally connect to the mission. Support the Troops discourse included narratives about soldiers' sacrifices and the altruistic motivations of soldiers to help create stability and peace in Afghanistan. The narratives about sacrifice and altruism were symbolic of the theme of moral altruism that existed in the peacekeeping national identification. Therefore, extending the data collection until 2014 allowed this research to gain a better understanding of how militarization of foreign policy coincided with a cultural re-militarization enabled by the Support the Troops campaign. Representative of this phenomenon was a 2010 Leger Marketing study that showed 75.7 per cent of Canadian respondents had trust and confidence in the Canadian Forces to do a good job, compared to only 54.1 per cent who trusted the federal government (Thompson, 2010a). The power of militarism exists in the unquestioned support of the military, even when the political activities of the military are not well received.

Despite the unexpected extension of timeline, I feel satisfied with my decision to analyze the discourse between 2001–2014. I feel that this time frame achieves my original research questions about how Canada's role and identity were articulated throughout the military intervention, as well as allowing for the unexpected encounter of alternative narratives in the discourse that offer alternative interpretation of how and why this identity articulation was (re)produced.

Part II

What Were We Doing ‘There’?

Chapter 3

Canadian Forces in Afghanistan: Supporting International Alliances

AS INTRODUCED in Chapter 1, my initial research objective was to explore how the Canadian Forces mission to Afghanistan was articulated by elite voices. There are three dominant themes to be explored. This chapter examines the narratives that assert Canada's participation in Afghanistan was required because of the nation's responsibility as a member of multinational security and economic organizations. This messaging was articulated through two interconnected arguments: (i) Canada needed to contribute to military operations in Afghanistan to appease security and trade relationships with NATO/the United States (ii) Canada needed to contribute to military operations in Afghanistan so that other nations did not mistake Canada for a weak, incapable international player without power or clout. The narratives that supported Canadian participation were voiced by foreign policy elites who stressed the need for a re-militarized foreign policy so that Canada's middle power position would not be compromised in international relations.

Narratives about alliance obligations must be understood in relation to discourse about Canada's role as a middle power (understood as having a limited scope of power compared to Great Powers). Canadian Foreign Policy (CFP) scholars have offered nuanced opinions on how to define "middlepowership" in the Canadian case. A generally agreed upon principle was that Canada's middle power status in the post-1945 era reflected a lesser military capacity than Great Powers like the United States (i.e. that middle powers possessed more capacity than small power but less capacity than Great Powers in international relations). The middle power role was associated with participation in multilateral organizations, which allowed Canada to receive military protection by allied states (specifically the United States) without needing to increase its own military capacity (Murray and McCoy, 2010; see also Keating, 1993). Scholars pointed to Canada's post-WWII involvement in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) as demonstrative of growing interconnectedness between the two nations on security issues and an example of how Canada benefited from involvement in collective security arrangements.

3.1 Connection to middlepowership

THE DECISION for Canada to participate in the NATO-directed mission in Afghanistan was rationalized by academics as a necessary condition of Canada's responsibility to the security organization (see Bratt, 2007). Elite-directed discourse also argued there was a need for Canada to appease US-security concerns based on speculated economic and security repercussions of abstaining from military action in Afghanistan. This assertion will be discussed in greater detail throughout this chapter. The narrative about 'appeasing the US' must be understood in relation to the ways that

Canadian middlepowerhood has been theorized by academics, particularly scholars who adhere to liberal internationalist theory.

Middle powers are understood to have less ability, in terms of material and military capabilities, to wield power internationally than their Great Power counterparts. By this same logic, it also opens middle powers to the threat of domination by Great Powers (Keating, 1993). However, participation in collective security agreements, which stipulate that allied member states will not attack each other and will defend against an outside attack should any member states be threatened, offers middle powers with limited military capacity the benefit of receiving the military protection of fellow members (specifically the US) without requiring an increase in their military budget or capacity (Murray and McCoy, 2010, p. 176).

As outlined in Chapter 2, academic scholars have conceptualized Canada's middle power status as a unique mechanism for influencing foreign relations. Kim Richard Nossal (1997) argued that the desire for middle powers to participate in international institutions, such as the UN, was a way for these powers to ensure systemic peace and avoid global conflict. Middle power preference for multilateralism was explained as the result of having limited military capacities but a desire to wield diplomatic influence (Murray and McCoy, 2010). Middle powers in the Cold War era therefore were understood to be well-suited for international peacekeeping which did not require robust military capacity and often relied on multilateral contributions through international institutions.

Over time, the belief that peacekeeping was an ideal niche role for Canadian foreign policy became embedded in Canadian consciousness¹. Robert W. Murray and John McCoy's (2010) definition of middlepowership—"normative promotion without the expectation of enforcement" (p. 177) aligned with the identity myth that

¹Canada-as-Peacekeeper myth will be discussed in further detail in Chapters 4 and 5.

middle powers could wield influence without requiring military might. To this end, Cox (1989) suggested, “middle powers... could be an important influence [in creating peace and order globally] because, unlike great powers, they were not suspected of harboring intentions of domination” (p. 241; as cited in Murray and McCoy, 2010, p. 173).

However, not all academics supported middle power strategies (as defined by multilateralism and limited military capacity) nor did they support the notion that middle powers could avoid military combat by participating in less-militarized multilateral policies such as peacekeeping. Pro-military supporters like David Bercuson were troubled by the decline in defence funding that occurred in the late 1990s:

Some Canadians no doubt would just as soon keep their military forces as far from a real battlefield as possible. They ignore the hard reality that all international relations, including trade, rest on a foundation of military power... Canada gained its independence from Britain, its memberships in the UN and other international organizations, and its entrée into innumerable foreign markets because of its participation in coalition wars and its troop commitments to NATO, the UN, etc. If Canada stops paying its dues, it won't be allowed into the clubs it must belong to. No one respects a freeloader. (Bercuson, 1996, p. 97)

Bercuson's articulation embodied the narrative that emerged in the early 2000s about the importance of supporting international alliances through reinvestment in the Canadian military. He argued that there were economic and security repercussions of avoiding military responsibilities to international organizations. Bercuson's argument was that Canada would suffer economically if it could not assure allies of its military capacity. He also suggested that Canada would lose geographical security, due to speculated loss of collective security protection, if the nation was unable to contribute troops to foreign interventions. This narrative was dominant in the early years of discourse on the war in Afghanistan.

3.2 Appeasing ally nations in the post-9/11 context: Military and economic considerations

IN THE post-Cold War era, Canada's relationship to the United States was viewed as paramount in determining foreign policy issues (Welsh, 2006, p. 589). Jerome Klassen (2015) characterized the economic relationship of Canada and the United States from the 1980s onward as a period of "continental neoliberalism" (n.p.). Using the free trade agenda (1988 Canada-US Free Trade Agreement, 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement) as an example, Klassen explained that governments and elite corporate interests had a vested interest in creating greater economic interdependence between Canada and the United States. The growing economic relationship with the US, coupled with the established security agreements of the Cold War (NATO and NORAD), led CFP scholars to conclude that Canadian international policy was heavily influenced by the United States (Keating, 1993; see also Stairs, 2000; also Cohen, 2003, for further discussion of the importance of trade in foreign policy). Like Bercuson's narrative from the late 1990s, much of the early period of discourse on the Afghanistan War (2001–2004) focused on both security obligations and the speculated economic repercussions of failing to uphold Canada's duties to its US ally.

Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on Washington and New York, the United States launched a military campaign on Afghanistan to retaliate against the terrorist group (al Qaeda) who claimed responsibility for the attacks. US military action was supported by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1368, which recognized the right to collective self-defence of nations (United Nations, 2001). The North Atlantic Treaty Organization supported US military action against Afghanistan, and obliged NATO allies (including Canada) to contribute to this mission under Article 5 of its collective agreement (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2001).

As mentioned above, many elites within Canada felt strongly that Canada needed to appease US security interests in order to maintain influence in global affairs. Following the September 11, 2001 attacks, there were many elite voices that reinforced the belief that Canada needed to appease US security interest for the sake of Canadian national security. George W. Bush's assertion to other global leaders that "you are with us or against us" reinforced fear by Canadian elites that Canada's continued security relationship with the United States required Canadian participation in the US retaliatory mission. Douglas Bland cautioned that "should Canada hesitate or seek to avoid these new [military] obligations, it seems likely that the United States will blockade its northern border, undertake covert intelligence operations in Canada [or] act unilaterally to defend itself by deploying its armed forces in Canada whenever the president deems it necessary" (Bland, 2002). Bland argued that the decline in military preparedness of the Canadian Forces since the late 1990s, coupled with American prioritization of homeland security, required Canadian leaders to reaffirm the nation's willingness to support the United States in foreign policy activities. Bland's (2002) "new realism" reasoned that if Canada was to regain or maintain its interests (i.e. benefits) of membership in coalitions, then our foreign policies must prioritize improving military and diplomatic capacity. In short, Bland argued that Canada relied heavily upon our security coalitions for national defence and that a failure to uphold our commitments to these coalitions might result in a lack of access to the security umbrella provided by NATO.

Allan Gotlieb, former Canadian ambassador to the USA, argued that the immediate (but temporary) closure of the Canadian-American border following the 2001 terrorist attacks and the resulting loss of trade, demonstrated the need for Canada to "aggressively address US [security] concerns... to ward off [future] closures [of the trade border]" (as cited in Welsh, 2006, p. 589). Gotlieb suggested that support for

US security concerns was directly related to reassuring continued foreign investment in Canadian markets. In other words, the military and economic relationship between Canada and the United States was viewed as interdependent, and an important foreign policy determinant.

Other elite voices in Canada speculated that a failure to participate in the Afghanistan War would have security repercussions. Jack Granatstein, a military historian who was prominently featured in media articles about foreign policy, explained the security-economic connection:

Canada has no choice but to cooperate [in the NATO mission to Afghanistan]. Since the 1940 Canada-US defense alliance, the two countries have become inextricably linked. Canada's refusal to support the United States would thus carry with it real costs, in terms of reducing its leverage in future negotiations with Washington on obtaining more secure access to the US market, as well as its sovereignty if the United States acted to protect itself from attack without working with the Canadian government and the Canadian Forces. (Granatstein, 2002)

Granatstein argued that supporting US foreign policy goals (i.e. intervening in Afghanistan) should be a priority, not only due to military considerations, but based on economic considerations. The pressures of retaining a military alliance were associated with the need to preserve a favorable Canada-US economic relationship.

Prior to the 2001 attacks, the focus of Canadian-US security relations was aerospace defence. Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) systems were intended to protect continental North America from missile attacks, a major security threat during the Cold War. Canada's geographical proximity to the United States, and the established relationship through NORAD led President George Bush to broach Canada about future involvement in a Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) system in the early 2000s. BMD was controversial in Canada, although the only real debate on the subject occurred between a small group of foreign policy academics and defence professionals,

in which there was no shared consensus on whether participation or nonparticipation was the best option (see Beier, 2005a). In a 2002 forum on BMD system negotiations, James Fergusson noted, “Canadian internationalism has been made possible because of the cost-effective continental and international relations with the US” (Fergusson *et al.*, 2002, p. 121). Authors of this roundtable asserted that Canada benefited from the geo-strategic alliance with the United States and noted that Canada’s military alliance with the United States provided economic benefits as well. Some authors speculated that declining involvement in the proposed BMD system could damage Canadian-US diplomatic relations. Other academics (Beier and Denholm Crosby) expressed concern that BMD was neither prudent nor a necessary foreign policy investment (Fergusson *et al.*, 2002; see also Beier, 2005a).

The relevance of the BMD debate relates to political considerations for Canada regarding Afghanistan. Janice Gross-Stein and Eugene Lang devoted an entire chapter of their book *The Unexpected War* to this subject, concluding that although Canada’s rejection to participate in the BMD program did not seriously damage diplomatic, trade, or security relations with the United States, “the foreign policy and defence establishment in Ottawa felt a renewed sense of urgency to do something significant to offset the negative consequences that they feared. Afghanistan seemed a logical place to start” (2007, p. 177).

It should also be noted that some narratives speculated that Canadian officials felt pressured to commit to military action in Afghanistan to “prove” Canada’s commitment to American security interests after Jean Chretien abstained from contributing military forces to the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Defence Minister John McCallum admitted sending a large deployment of troops to Kabul was a mechanism to avoid making a political commitment to Iraq (cited in Bratt, 2007, p. 7). This narrative was echoed in a *National Post* article: “Canada’s participation in NATO’s PRTs

[Provincial Reconstruction Teams] were seen as a way of ‘showing Bush that Canada is a strong ally’ ” (Albert, 2006, p. A1). Foreign policy elites’ desire to prove Canada’s allegiance to American security concerns relates to early narratives that justified Canada’s participation in Afghanistan (2001–2005) as a means to uphold collective security agreements and avoid economic repercussions of non-participation in the NATO mission.

Canada’s involvement in the initial NATO mission (2001–2003) was rationalized as an obligation to support international allies, particularly the United States. However, narratives about security and economic motivations for participation in Afghanistan continued into the median years of the war. As the mission continued from 2005–2009, elite voices emphasized the need for continued military involvement because Canadian interests were intrinsically tied to its relationship with the US.

In 2007 the Harper Government created the Manley panel, formally known as the *Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan*. The panel’s mandate was to provide recommendations to the government about future policy options for Canada’s military participation. Although the mission was originally set to expire in 2009, the Manley panel advocated for an extension of Canada’s military involvement. The report cautioned, “A premature military withdrawal from Afghanistan, whether full or partial, would imperil Canadian interests and values...it would undermine Canada’s influence in the UN and in NATO capitals, including Washington” (Parliament of Canada, 2008, p. 33). The panel’s report reinforced the narrative that Canada’s international power was dependent upon a good relationship with the United States.

The Manley panel was composed of former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs John Manley, former Cabinet Minister Jake Epps, former Clerk of the Privy Council Paul Tellier, former Canadian Ambassador to the United States Derek

Burney, and former Canadian Consul General in New York City, Pamela Wallin. Prime Minister Harper justified the selection of these members because he felt:

These individuals represent a wealth of experience in foreign affairs and each one of them has demonstrated their commitment to Canada through years of public service. I have no doubt they will examine the issues honestly, fairly, and expertly, and offer wise, impartial counsel that will help Parliamentarians and all Canadians choose the right course for Canada in Afghanistan. (Prime Minister of Canada's Office, 2007)

It is important to note the positions held by these individuals. Although many of the panel members had experience in foreign affairs, their experience was primarily with US-Canada relations. There were no members on the panel who had expertise with Afghanistan, expertise with military interventions, or expertise with diplomatic or military experiences with non-Western state relations. A 2007 *Toronto Star* article speculated that the composition of the Manley panel (individuals with no experience or knowledge of Afghanistan, but extensive knowledge and support of US-Canada trade and diplomatic relations) symbolized what some felt was Canada's true interest in the region—garnering US support ('Our role in Afghanistan...', 2007).

3.3 Loss of influence: Afghanistan as an opportunity for re-militarization and increased prestige

I NOW turn to the second element of the argument that Canada's participation in Afghanistan was required due to responsibilities to international alliances. In addition to arguments made that non-participation could have tangible security and economic losses for Canada, there were also narratives that feared non-participation would affect Canada's power and influence in international affairs.

The fear that Canada would lose influence, or be subject to a loss of power

resources, is linked to the conceptualization of middle powers utilizing soft power techniques through participation in international organizations (see Nossal, 1997; also Nye, 2004). Narratives that speculated non-participation in Afghanistan would threaten Canada's ability to wield influence in international organizations were informed by this conceptualization of middlepowership. Arguments made by both government officials and academics emphasized that supporting allied interventions was crucial for economic and geographical security, but also for continued existence of coalition agreements that (as discussed earlier) provided middle powers like Canada security advantages.

This narrative was reinforced by political elites. Stephen Harper cautioned, "if NATO can't come through with that help [military support in Afghanistan], then I think quite frankly NATO's own reputation and future will be in grave jeopardy" (Brewster, 2008b). Harper's comments suggested that not only Canada's reputation was at stake, but that the effectiveness of NATO would be compromised if Canada abstained from military action. The Commander of Canadian ground troops in Afghanistan claimed that participation in Afghanistan "established our credibility in the coalition. Canada has been tainted with an image of being blue-hatted peacekeepers, and I think... the aggressiveness and tenacity that the troops showed... dispelled the myth... [We] were like a pack of rabid pit bulls in satisfying the coalition's end state" (cited in Bratt, 2007, p. 12). Bratt (2007) noted that Afghanistan provided an opportunity for Canada to prove its credentials as a credible military to NATO peers, and to end the public perception that the military was used for "everything but fighting wars" (p. 13). In other words, Afghanistan was viewed as an opportunity to re-brand the Canadian Forces as an increasingly militarized institution with combat capabilities.

However, this re-branding objective must be understood within the context of

the ongoing debate between elites on whether Canada should strive to maintain its mythologized image as a peacekeeping middle power, or whether Canada should strive to shed its outdated and inaccurate peacekeeping identity in favour of new military policies of counterinsurgency (Murray and McCoy, 2010). At the end of the Cold War, middle powers including Canada, Japan, Argentina, and Germany, saw peacekeeping missions as a way to legitimize international military interventions and acquire international standing (Whitworth, 2004, p. 15). As mentioned above, peacekeeping was understood to be a niche task for middle powers that did not have the military resources to fight all-out wars, but that coordination of combined troops under multilateral strategies was a way for these middle powers to effectively utilize the limited military capacities they had in creating global order. There was also an element of moral prestige associated with peacekeeping and middlepowership that was promoted by liberal academics (see Chapnick, 1999 for in-depth discussion) and Liberal politicians (most notably Lloyd Axworthy in the late 1990s) as an opportunity to project Canadian values and influence internationally. Sherene Razack explained that politicians marketed the mythologized peacekeeping role as an opportunity to “prove [Canada’s] grown-up status and earn [a significant] place on the world stage” (2003, p. 208). She describes the national identification with middle-powership as a “dream... [that] neatly enables Canada to tell a story of national goodness and to mark itself as distinct from the Unites States” (1996, p. 134).

Other elite voices (academics Jack Granatstein and David Bercusson, and military officials General Rick Hillier and Colonel Bernard Horn) took issue with the feminized image of blue-helmeted peacekeepers. As Sandra Whitworth documents in her study of the 1993 peacekeeping mission in Somalia, many soldiers had a pejorative view of peacekeeping, describing it as “boring” (p. 86) and felt that “real soldiering” included the opportunity to engage in fighting: that “non-blue-beret-fight[ing]...had more

prestige” (2004, p. 100). During the late 1990s, there was substantial cuts to defence spending and concern by military supporters that the inability to access funding to maintain equipment and reserve supplies would lead to the “rusting out” of the Canadian Forces. These concerns were reiterated in a 2005 Interim Report by the Senate Committee on National Security and Defence that felt that defence spending between 1993–2005 was a “legacy of neglect” and that there was a need to “cut through the bull- ---” (Parliament of Canada, 2005)—that foreign policy needed to stop relying on American protection and that Canada needed to increase its capacity to defend itself.

The narrative that participation in Afghanistan was an opportunity to re-brand the Canadian Forces as a means to increase international prestige should be understood as part of the continuing debate amongst foreign policy elites about the appropriate role for the Canadian Forces in international affairs.

3.4 Bettering international status: Re-branding the peacekeeper image

THE NARRATIVE that participation in Afghanistan provided an opportunity to “shift away from middlepowermanship” (Murray and McCoy, 2010, p. 177) must be understood in relation to the growing concerns by the defence community that Canada had neglected to upkeep its military capacities and that post-9/11 security concerns put the nation at risk (Parliament of Canada, 2005). Particularly, in the early years of the Afghan conflict (2001–2005), government representatives expressed concern that Canada’s mythologized image of a global peacekeeper prohibited Canada from exhibiting power and influence among dominant state actors in international affairs. Michael Ignatieff explained: “Canada can acquire influence internationally and sustain its reputation (no longer deserved) as a leader in peacekeeping *only if it puts*

military muscle behind its good intentions” (Fraser, 2002, emphasis added). This narrative suggests that militarization of foreign policy was required for Canada to exert influence internationally. Ignatieff cautioned that the moral prestige associated with peacekeeping was not enough to influence Great Powers in international affairs: “I work in a policy environment where Canada is considered a well-meaning herbivore vegetarian boy scout. We’re not taken seriously” (Fraser, 2002). Ignatieff’s infantilization and feminization of the national image reinforced the narrative that Canada’s altruistic image undermined the state’s ability to garner respect from more powerful nations. The belief that Canada was viewed as ‘weak’ by allies was expressed by General Rick Hillier, who explained that at the start of the Afghanistan conflict, European countries were wary of Canadian involvement, and “the British in particular believed that Canada had ‘lost its ability to be a war-fighting nation’... They had ‘no faith that Canada would pull its weight, especially if things got tough’ ” (cited in Comte, 2009). Pro-military voices cautioned that the peacekeeping image had indeed caused allies to doubt Canada and that something needed to be done to remedy this.

After the initial military deployment to Afghanistan (2001–2003), the Canadian Forces accrued increased combat responsibilities in 2005. Despite the military’s increased participation in active counterinsurgency tasks, foreign relations elites continued to emphasize the need for continued military contributions to the NATO mission. The association of Canada’s reputation with military contributions to the Afghanistan War remained dominant in narratives about the mission. Granatstein (2007a) stressed the connection between Canada’s international status and continued military participation in the Afghan War when he argued:

If the prime minister wants to preserve his and his government’s credibility and a shred or two of Canada’s honour, if he wants to keep alive the idea that Canada isn’t getting ready to cut and run, he needs to mount a

major political and media campaign on the reasons for Canada's presence and role in Afghanistan. Now. Today. Right away. (Granatstein, 2007a, p. A19)

Granatstein, a historian who was prominently featured in media editorials on Afghanistan, reasoned that military withdrawal from the NATO mission would result in a loss of social clout (understood as the ability for Canada to be influential in international affairs). His narrative assumes that withdrawal of military support would have been viewed as a sign of weakness, and detrimental to state security objectives that rest upon having power (or being perceived to have power).

Military officials echoed Granatstein's argument that Canada needed to increase its hard power capabilities and image through increased militarization in foreign policy. Lt-Gen. Andrew Leslie touted Canada as a nation that was respected *because* it engaged in combat. He explains:

Our stature in the world and the respect that we are afforded because we are willing to, when required, step up and do the hard thing—which very few nations are—serves us well. (cited in Pacholik, 2011, p. A1)

Leslie was referring to Canada's efforts in Afghanistan, particularly the involvement of Canadian troops in the Southern province, as this region was perceived as more dangerous, and that it required higher military risks. His statement was meant to reassure Canadians that the risks incurred were worth it; that Canada was gaining respect and therefore a superior reputation internationally.

Colonel Bernd Horn (2010) assured the public that a shift away from traditional peacekeeping duties signaled strength to coalition nations:

Operation Medusa signaled to allies and the Canadian public that the national peacekeeper myth was dead. Canada was once again prepared to deliberately send its sons and daughters into combat. In simplest terms, Canada reiterated its status, earned in blood and tears on so many foreign

battlefields throughout its history, as a fighting nation. This was not missed by our allies. (p. 147–148)

Horn tried to convince Canadians that the peacekeeping image was both outdated and inaccurate. His narrative echoed other elite voices who saw Afghanistan as a way to re-claim international identity and re-brand this identity as increasingly militarized.

3.5 Conclusion: Afghanistan as a means to support alliances and foster a militarized international identity

IN THE immediate post-9/11 discursive environment, there was prevalence of narratives that stressed the need for participation in Afghanistan to “prove” Canada was a ‘good ally’, and to gain a more favorable reputation internationally. The belief that Afghanistan offered the ability to bolster Canada’s image as a ‘serious player’ was emphasized through the narratives that described participation in the US-led coalition as a symbol of prestige. Media responded to defence elites’ accusation that Canada’s reputation and relationship with the United States was at risk, by offering self-congratulatory assurances that Canada was *needed*. *The Globe and Mail* (2002) gushed:

This is the first time that the Americans have asked a coalition ally to join them on the ground with their operations in Afghanistan. This is the first time they have done that for any country, and they asked Canada first. (LeBlanc and Mahoney, 2002, p. A1).

This acclamation signals the desire by foreign policy experts to strengthen the Canadian-American political and economic relationship, and reinforces narratives about Canada’s duty to respond to collective security obligations.

The presumed honour of the US superpower requesting Canada’s assistance was also viewed as an opportunity for increased international prestige: “Canada decided

to send its troops into a combat mission under US control in Afghanistan rather than participate in the British-led multinational force because it is ‘tired’ of acting as mere peacekeepers” (Freeman, 2002, p. A1) The prospect of new credibility in the eyes of the US state speaks to the belief held by foreign policy commentators that Afghanistan was an opportunity to re-militarize the national image.

This chapter examines narratives from foreign policy elites that claimed Canadian military activity in Afghanistan was essential to upholding a favorable military and economic relationship with the United States. The following chapters will explore the two other dominant justifications for Canadian military activity in Afghanistan (the necessity to fight terrorism and the obligation to provide humanitarian services). Evident in the discourse on Canada’s commitment to Afghanistan was the strong call from elite voices for Canada to shed its middle power image. Afghanistan was viewed as an opportunity to move away from the peacekeeping myth. Within the narratives explored in this chapter, military participation in Afghanistan was promoted as an opportunity to increase power and influence through re-militarizing Canada’s international image. Granatstein commented:

The Canadian Forces have found their *raison d’être* again. They are a military force; they are not a peacekeeping force. That is, to my mind, absolutely critical for the survival of the Canadian Forces, and I would say, the long-term survival of the country. Peacekeeping has failed, except in the minds of the Canadian people. (2008a, n.p.)

The tensions between national nostalgia of the peacekeeper image and foreign policy officials’ declarations that peacekeeping was an outdated tool for the new millennium is explored through the two following chapters that focus on the discursive legitimization of Canada’s military activity in Afghanistan.

Chapter 4

Canadian Forces in Afghanistan: Fighting Terrorism Abroad

AS THE objective of Part II is to analyze discourse on Canada's role in the Afghanistan War, this chapter will focus on narratives that justified military participation in the region as a mechanism to fight terrorism. Within the discourse, foreign policy officials explained that a primary role of the Canadian Forces was to conduct combat activities to stabilize and provide security. Narratives about the Canadian Forces' role in Afghanistan were described in two ways: first, that Canadian military participation in Afghanistan was needed to take action against al Qaeda following the September 11, 2001 airplane hijackings that resulted in Canadian casualties; second, ongoing military action in Afghanistan was required to destabilize terrorist groups and to prevent the threat of future terrorist attacks on Canadian territory.

The first objective of this chapter is to explore how discourse on Canada's role in Afghanistan, including narratives about fighting terrorism, was a site for (re)constructing of image of the Canadian Forces. As outlined in Chapter 3, many foreign

policy elites promoted Afghanistan as an opportunity to brand the Canadian Forces with a re-militarized image and to shirk the peacekeeping myth associated with Canadian military history. I argue that these re-branding attempts occurred within a larger discursive environment that emphasized terrorism as a serious national security threat. Post-9/11, political elites in Canada were concerned about terrorist threats to domestic security and used narratives of insecurity to support political claims that combat activity was required in Afghanistan. In short, discourse that was heavily focused on insecurity cast political demands for a re-militarization of foreign policy as credible.

The second objective of this chapter is to explore the ways that foreign policy discourse is productive in nature. I use accounts of Canada's role in Afghanistan to analyze the ways that national identity was (re)produced alongside security discourses of the post-9/11 'War on Terrorism'. I suggest that elite voices promotion of the "fighting terrorism" explanation resulted in the (re)production of simplistic and gratuitous constructions of national identity whilst creating imagery about foreign enemies depicted as savage, barbaric, and alien. I argue that it is of great importance for scholars of Canadian Foreign Policy (CFP) to pay attention to the ways that war and insecurity are narrated, as these stories shape political perceptions about the self and others, often in erroneous ways.

4.1 Canada's military stories: Peacekeeping and war-fighting

AS DISCUSSED in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, CFP scholars have had lengthy debates about the appropriate role for Canada as a middle power, particularly in relation to the types of activities that the Canadian Forces *should* perform globally. This debate continued throughout the discourse on Canada's role in the Afghanistan War. The

narrative that Canada's role in Afghanistan was to fight terrorism must be understood within the larger discourse of how the Canadian Forces have been identified historically.

There have been long-standing efforts from military enthusiasts and some government leaders to (re)create national identity based on Canada's military history. Military historians have discussed the participation of the Canadian military in past world conflicts, usually emphasizing the War of 1812, World War I and II, and the Korean War. The narratives that underpin military histories tell a story of how Canada proved its military capacity and forged its identity as an autonomous, sovereign state who 'stood its own' in global conflicts (exemplified by the narration and celebration of particular military battles such as the Second Battle of Ypres, 1915; Vimy Ridge, 1917; Dieppe, 1942; or Juno Beach, 1944).¹ Despite historians' efforts to romanticize and memorialize Canadian involvement in international wars, war narratives have not been acknowledged as a source of national pride in the ways that nationalism associated with Canadian peacekeeping has. Canada-as-Peacekeeper is a popularly imagined myth.

The use of the term myth does not infer that Canada's historical participation in peacekeeping missions was fabricated. Canada has historically participated in a number of peacekeeping interventions. However, I am suggesting that the extent to which Canadian peacekeeping has been glorified reflects a particular rendering of national identity, and is not representative of historical reality. As Sandra Whitworth has observed:

Peacekeeping serves as one of the 'core myths' of Canada's 'imagined community'. That myth locates Canada as a selfless middle power, acting with a kind of moral purity not normally exhibited by contemporary

¹For more, see David Borys' *The Globe and Mail* article (2013, November 10) titled "Remembrance Day: 10 momentous battles from Canada's military history".

states. Canadian representations of nation and military depend on the benign and altruistic image of Canada as peacekeeper, which comes to form the ‘background knowledge that is taken to be true’ about both the Canadian military and the Canadian state.” (2004, p. 14)

The mythologized image of Canada-as-Peacekeeper is an important construct for understanding the ways that Canadian identity has been (re)produced.

Canada, particularly in the WWII era, was an active contributing state to United Nations interventions that called for peacekeeping (or cease-fire monitoring) across the globe. The reference to the peacekeeping *myth* is related to public preoccupation with peacekeeping as a naturalized or exclusive Canadian Forces international role, a fallacy demonstrated by the fact that Canadian Forces have historically conducted a variety of military activities, including traditional warfare. However, peacekeeping as a foreign policy activity has been widely received by governments, the public, and academics. The 1993 Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs explained, “Canadians have always seen peacekeeping as an important element of their identity and of their country’s position on the international stage” (Parliament of Canada, 1993, p. 7). The deeply held association with peacekeeping as a core identity marker—one that is both pretentious and problematic—will be explored more closely in the following chapters.

There exists, at least discursively, a favouring of narratives that (re)produce Canada’s role and identity as a peacekeeping middle power. This is contrasted with efforts from the military community to dismantle or dismiss the peacekeeping myth and demonstrate the robust, yet equally romanticized, narrative of Canada’s military

histories that include traditional warfare techniques and activities.² Canada's involvement in Afghanistan must be understood as contributing to the ongoing discursive disagreements on the appropriate or suitable international purpose of the Canadian Forces, disagreements that have historically centered on a falsely constructed peacekeeping/war binary.

Military elites have attempted to diminish the significance of Canada's peacekeeping history and to emphasize the Canadian Forces' experiences with war-fighting. Although many political elites preferred the romanticized peacekeeper image, the Harper government made efforts to celebrate military history. The 2012 bicentennial celebrations of the War of 1812, which included numerous war re-enactments, a memorial coin, and a new national monument on Parliament Hill, were not particularly well received by Canadians. A poll by Nanos researchers in 2013 found that only 15 percent of Canadians felt more patriotic as a result of the celebrations, estimated to cost \$28 million dollars (Galoway, 2013). The Harper government felt that these events celebrated a decisive moment in Canada's history that "deserved to be recognized accordingly" (Galoway, 2013). The lack of public endorsement and excitement for these events is demonstrative of the power of the peacekeeping myth so popular in public consciousness and the *disassociation* of nationalism with war history.

Despite publicly funded efforts by the government to try to memorialize military history³, there has been long-standing resentment from military supporters that the

²The presentation of peacekeeping as a less violent, less lethal, or more humane foreign policy role than traditional combat activities is deceptive. Despite the inclusion of the word "peace" in their description, peacekeeping missions are nevertheless military activities that sanction the use of violence and force in particular circumstances. Peacekeeping is therefore not an alternative to warfare, but a particular version of it.

³Another example of government-funded military memorialization is The Canadian War Museum in Ottawa. Although established in 1880, has an acclaimed newly-constructed (2005) building that showcases Canadian military history.

historical promotion of the peacekeeping myth has been detrimental to the Canadian Forces. Military supporters have accused federal governments of deprioritizing Canada's need [*sic*] for a robust, capable military—an accusation that centered on a lack of funding and government unwillingness to replace outdated military equipment. This criticism is reflected by accusations in the late 1990s that a lack of government funding and support for the military resulted in the “rusting out” of the Canadian Forces.

4.2 The Canadian Forces in the 1990s: A “decade of [peacekeeping] darkness”

THE FRUSTRATION expressed by military supporters was not solely related to the CF's decrease in resources in the 1990s, but was also related to the mythologized peacekeeping image that had been promoted since Lester Pearson's so-called Golden Era of Canadian foreign policy. Since WWII, Canadian governments had been promoting Canadian involvement in international peacekeeping missions as a unique middle power position that was believed to afford Canada respect internationally. For many military supporters, the peacekeeping myth de-valued the image of the Forces by presenting a passive, benign institution not associated with traditional combat activity. The emphasis on peacekeeping as a primary activity for the Canadian Forces was presented as problematic for soldiers because the expectations and tasks of peacekeeping duty did not align with soldiers' training in war-fighting (Granatstein, 2007c, p. 24). For example, the controversial torture incident that occurred in the 1993 peacekeeping mission in Somalia was justified as a consequence of a disconnect between peacekeeping expectations and soldiers' combat training. David Bercuson

(1996) argued that war fighting and combat are “at the centre of the army’s existence” (p. 242) and the frustration experienced by soldiers in peacekeeping missions, who were unable to conduct the military activities that had been trained for, was to blame for soldiers’ objectionable actions in Somalia. Military enthusiasts throughout the 1990s expressed desire to shirk the peacekeeping image and to restore Canada’s military purpose as a war-fighting institution. When the United States called upon allies to intervene in Afghanistan, Canadian military supporters saw the intervention as an opportunity to “knock the powerful peacekeeping mythology right between the eyes” (Granatstein, 2008b).

The peacekeeper image was largely cultivated by political and academic elites, but throughout the 1990s, the representations of soldiers in CF recruitment campaigns contributed to (re)producing the image of a less militarized institution. While there may have been military elites who disliked the peacekeeping image, the 1990s recruitment campaign of the CF focused on less-militarized benefits (ie. Scholarship opportunities, camaraderie, stable careers with advancement opportunities) which did little to oppose the politically crafted image of a de-militarized force. These campaigns did not represent internal opinions about peacekeeping; Whitworth (2004) observed that peacekeepers in the 1993 Somalia mission expressed frustration about the peacekeeping mandate, as exemplified by the statement “that’s why [we] join the army, to soldier” (p. 99). Pro-military voices emphasized that peacekeeping was not a desirable mandate for many soldiers, and that the inability to use force outside of self-defence (a stipulation of many 1990s UN peacekeeping operations) caused soldiers to feel a sense of powerlessness and conclude that “one could die ‘for nothing’ ” (as cited in Whitworth, 2004, p. 100). After testimony from the peacekeeping mission in Rwanda (1994) emerged, there was vocal opposition to the de-militarized nature of peacekeeping missions. Canadian General Romeo Dallaire detailed the inability of

peacekeeping forces to effectively stop a mass genocide in Rwanda due to restrictions on use of force by soldiers. Frustrated with large funding cuts to the Defence budget under the Chretien government, pro-military voices such as General Rick Hillier described the 1990s as the “decade of darkness” for the Canadian Forces (as cited in Berthiaume, 2013). There was concern that the lack of funding and de-militarized imagery associated with the Canadian Forces in the late 1990s was detrimental to the efficiency and image of the institution, and (as discussed in Chapter 3) scholars like Granatstein and Bercusson were distressed that this posed risks to Canadian national security.

What I wish to note is that the security environment in the late 1990s was markedly different than the global political system of the Cold War years. As military historian Desmond Morton noted, “Canada’s military problem is that Canada has no military problem. . . Canadians seldom feel endangered.” (Morton, 2001, p. A9). In the post-Cold War years, the perceived threat of global nuclear destruction had decreased—although the presence of massive national stockpiles had not eliminated this threat—and Canadian political focus had shifted to multilateral, diplomatic solutions to issues of global conflict (most notably, the Ottawa Treaty to ban landmine use during Lloyd Axworthy’s tenure as Minister of Foreign Affairs). There was growing academic speculation that Great Power conflict had subsided and that global conflicts were largely civil tensions (e.g. Yugoslavia, Rwanda, East Timor, Sudan) caused by secessionist movements in multi-ethnic states. Throughout the 1990s, peacekeeping in these warring civil conflicts was presented as an important global task, and a way for Canada to contribute to global peace and security. Therefore, despite protestation by military supporters that the peacekeeping image was demeaning and that the government was financially neglecting to properly support the CF, peacekeeping was dominantly promoted by political elites as an important tool in solving post-Cold

War conflicts.

4.3 Shift in discourse post-9/11: From peacekeeping to fighting terrorism

THE TERRORIST attacks on September 11, 2001 in New York and Washington caused a major shift in security discourses in North America. George W. Bush's 'War on Terror' narrative encouraged fears about risk from outside threats. For pro-military voices, 9/11 cast foreign policy re-militarization as not only desirable, but also necessary. The War in Afghanistan was presented by military elites as an opportunity for re-branding the Canadian Forces by shifting the imagery of Canada's foreign policy role from peacekeeper to combat fighter. General Hillier described the CF mission in Afghanistan as:

Fighting a savage enemy in some of the harshest conditions and terrain any Canadian soldier has ever had to endure, [Canadian Forces soldiers] fought in close-quarter combat for days on end and overcame a determined and cunning enemy... Canadians demonstrated the justly earned reputation as fierce warriors. (as cited in Horn, 2010, p. 10)

Hillier's description is filled with dramatized language that asserts the heroism and "toughness" exhibited by the Canadian Forces, and explicitly notes that the soldiers were "fierce warriors", not peacekeepers. It reinforces a desire by many within the military community to re-brand and reassert the image of the Canadian Forces as a militarized institution that was capable of waging war, as opposed to the more passive image associated with peacekeeping.

The emphasis on war fighting, as opposed to peacekeeping, as echoed in a 2007 *Hamilton Spectator* article titled "Hurrah to rebuilding Canadian forces", where Jack Granatstein said:

The Afghan War serves our national interests by helping to create a government there that will not support and shelter terrorists who can strike at us... Canada needs a military that can protect our people and protect our territory, the basic national interest of any nation-state. (Granatstein, 2007b, p. A25)

For Granatstein—a longtime critic of the peacekeeping myth—Afghanistan was an opportunity to emphasize the need for a robust military. The threat posed by terrorism justified this need as Granatstein argued that the military was inherently responsible for securing our national interests.

The narrative that Canada was in Afghanistan to fight terrorism was a dominant narrative throughout the discourse, particularly between 2001–2008. In a 2006 editorial, the *Winnipeg Free Press* stated that “winning the Afghan war is not just worthwhile, it is crucial to the war on terror...to quit Afghanistan would shame Canada and give heart to terrorists everywhere” (‘Editorial Fighting for ...’, 2006, p. A10). In 2007, Defence Minister Gordon O’Connor said that the “hardcore Taliban are determined to undermine the progress being made in Afghanistan...it is because of the continuing threat posed by these extremists that the Canadian Forces remain a vital part of this mission” (As cited in ‘Threat will keep troops...’, 2007, p. A5). In 2010, an *Edmonton Journal* article emphasized “at its core, the Afghan mission was designed to protect our national interests by denying Afghanistan as a base for international terrorism...the main goal [was] protecting Canadians and our allies” (Thompson, 2010b, p. A17).

The narrative that the Canada was in Afghanistan to fight terrorism was promoted by political elites as an “official” justification for military participation. The (2007) *Report on the Standing Committee on National Defence* listed the first objective of the Afghanistan War as “to protect the national security interests of Canada

by helping to ensure that Afghanistan will not, once again, become a haven for international terrorists” (Parliament of Canada, 2007, p. 6) as well as emphatically stated that “Canada has taken sides in this issue... the mission is not, and never has been, anything akin to a peacekeeping mission” (p. 7; p. 14; and p. 115). The Report made a clear link between the new security environment and articulated a shift in CF role from peacekeeping to combat. The 9/11 security rhetoric about terrorist threats was mobilized by military supporters to promote a re-militarization of the Canadian Forces. This narrative was stressed in the (2008) *Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan* final report that explained:

Canada [is in] Afghanistan as part of an international response to the threat to peace and security inherent in Al Qaeda’s terrorist attacks. The world had largely abandoned Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989; civil war and state failure followed. The haven that the Taliban gave to Al Qaeda before the 9/11 attacks showed how disorder and repressive extremism there could create a threat to the security of other countries including Canada—far distant from Afghanistan’s borders. (Parliament of Canada, 2008)

In short, expert voices were offering narratives that explained Afghanistan’s terrorist issue was a threat for Canadian national security, and that Afghanistan would mark a shift for the CF from past peacekeeping roles to a combat-focused mission.

4.4 Justifying the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan: Fighting the terrorist threat

AS NOTED, discourse on the Afghanistan War overlapped with broader War of Terror discourse that was dominant in North America. Unlike post-Cold War theorization of global conflict as something that was happening overseas in post-national civil wars, the security discourse post-9/11 emphasized that conflicts abroad could

be connected to insecurity of the homeland. The Canadian Forces counter-terrorist mandate was presented as an activity that assured global security. The following section is a closer reading of these narratives, and my interpretation of assumptions present in this discourse.

Initially (2001–2002), the objective of fighting terrorist insurgents existed within a larger security discourse of shock and fear related to the September 11, 2001 attacks on Washington and New York. As the war progressed (post-2003), the Canadian government marketed the mission as a “Whole of Government” strategy, and the initial justifications for involvement (a response to 9/11) were replaced with narratives that fighting terrorism was a necessary tool for creating order in Afghanistan, and preventing future attacks on Canadian soil.

From 2002–2008, the justification given for the Forces contributing to counter-terrorist efforts in Afghanistan was that this expenditure would contribute to both global security and domestic security. The links between homeland security and the Canadian Forces’ efforts abroad were reiterated frequently by political elites. In a 2006 House of Commons debate, (then) Minister of National Defence Gordon O’Connor told the House:

Canada is in Afghanistan to protect the safety and prosperity of Canadians. The danger is not always clear, but it is real and our safety begins far from our borders... this means going to Afghanistan to counter terrorists harboured there. (Parliament of Canada, 2006)

O’Connor’s explanation to the House links Canada’s purpose in Afghanistan to security concerns about a terrorist attack on Canadian territory.

The reference to 9/11 as justification for militarized action was prominent in the initial years of the intervention. Promoters of this narrative often exploited public sentiments of fear that many citizens experienced after 9/11 and reinforced credence

that a terrorist attack on Canada could happen at any time. Minister of Foreign Affairs Peter MacKay recalled, "Terrorism knows no boundaries. . . Canadians did die on that fateful day in New York" (Parliament of Canada, 2006). MacKay evoked the threat of death to convince other political elites that terrorism was a serious threat to national security. This narrative supported claims for retaliatory action, and (re)produced fear-based beliefs about the plausibility of a domestic terrorist attack.

Many narratives expressed a belief that securing Canada's homeland required proactive fighting abroad. Some accounts described a looming threat to homeland security, and cautioned that the terrorist enemy could inflict violence at any moment. Sentiments of fear and insecurity were reinforced by depictions of an unpredictable enemy. O'Connor reinforced this imagery in his question to Parliament:

Do we have to wait for terrorists to attack Vancouver, Toronto, Montreal, or here in Ottawa before recognizing the real threat that is hovering over our safety? (Parliament of Canada, 2006)

O'Connor's comments projected a sense of necessity for action and cast military action in Afghanistan as a credible policy to secure Canadian cities from potential attacks. The description of impending threats (re)created the sense of urgency for action. This sense of urgency discouraged discussions of alternative policies because of the perceived immediacy of the designated threat.

Other comments were more direct; emphasizing not only the *possibility* of attacks on Canada, but also the speculated intention of enemies:

Canada is not an island which is able to live in isolation from events taking place around the world. Al-Qaeda has singled out Canada as a target for terror, which means the fight against terror is our fight. (Hiebert in Parliament of Canada, 2006)

The above narrative depicted the world as an insecure threatening environment and

explained that the terrorist enemy had signaled the start of a war with Canada. This was a deliberate attempt by political elites to signal that military action was required because Canada was a target, and therefore was at war. It rendered plausible the political decision to engage in a military mission that was explicitly not peacekeeping and served to (re)produce discourses about dangers in the global arena.

4.5 Descriptive power of foreign policy narratives

TO UNDERSTAND why demands for re-militarization were taken seriously in the post-9/11 years, as opposed to the same claims that were made in the late 1990s and taken less seriously by political elites, I argue that it is important to understand how the security environment was defined. To understand why certain foreign policies are pursued, and others are neglected, it is helpful to examine narratives about the perceived environment of inter-state relations. By examining how political elites define the international environment, we can understand why particular foreign policies are pursued. It is important to remember that these constructions are always political and subjective. If the international arena is perceived as hostile and violent, narratives about risk or threat from a terrorist attack are cast as credible. This becomes a cycle of (re)producing both narratives: fear of terrorist attack reinforces the perception that the international arena is dangerous. Voices who argued that Canada needed to take action against the threat of a terrorist attack emphasized that the nature of global politics was violent and dangerous. Throughout the discourse, realist voices cast the 9/11 attacks as ‘proof’ that the global environment was unsafe. References to the threat of terrorism that were used by political elites to justify Canadian military action in Afghanistan must be understood within the larger discourse that depicted international relations as dangerous. Therefore, the widely articulated narrative that

the world was a dangerous place, and Canada was at risk of future terrorist attacks meant that calls for re-militarization of foreign policy (i.e. participating in a combat mission) were cast as appropriate, essential policies for Canada.

In addition to voices that depicted the global arena as dangerous, violent, and unstable, these descriptors were also used to describe the war theatre where foreign policy was conducted. Afghanistan was described as a failed state that was unable to contain the dangers within its borders. Political elites suggested that the state of Afghanistan allowed disorder, intolerance and conflict to harm other nations internationally. It was promoted by many political elites that Afghanistan was a “haven” for terrorists and that direct action in Afghanistan was needed to provide order and stability so that the terrorist threat could be contained.

Some have suggested that post 9/11 security concerns of the Canadian state, and the subsequent decision to participate militarily in Afghanistan were not unwarranted. A 2009 newspaper article explained that:

Arrests of terror suspects, the so-called Toronto 18, [show that] we are not immune from becoming a target [of terrorists]...had NATO forces not gone into Afghanistan, al-Qaida would still be there plotting their next attack. The continued existence of al-Qaida poses a demonstrable risk, not only to the U.S. but to us as well...from a security perspective, Afghanistan cannot be allowed to fester as a haven for terrorists. (Middleton, 2009).

This narrative suggests that military action was justified because of a manifested threat. One might also suggest that the October 2014 shooting of Cpl. Nathan Cirillo at the Canadian National War Memorial and the consequent fire on Parliament Hill would ‘prove’ the ever-present threat of terrorist activity in Canada. I argue that both these narratives rely on speculation and do not substantively corroborate narratives about military action preventing future terrorist attacks. As there is no

quantifiable way to prove that military action reduced actualized threats of terrorism, I do not intend to dis/prove this causality, but rather note how emphatically it was used by foreign policy elites in discourse to justify military policies in Afghanistan.

It is my intention to show how justifications for Canadian military action in Afghanistan were largely informed by (in)security rhetoric about terrorist threats to the Canadian homeland. Discourses of fear and insecurity can have powerful effects on how individuals make choices and assessments. It is not my intention to “dis/prove” the validity of security claims, but rather to draw attention to the descriptions of terrorist threats that validate narratives of insecurity by (re)producing beliefs about a pervasive threat to the Canadian state. These narratives can have powerful effects on the types of foreign policy choices that are made. For example, the description of national threat was expressed in a *The Globe and Mail* article that told Canadians, “We are once again facing the irony that our peaceful and democratic way of life must sometimes resort to the organized brutality of war as the ultimate means of our self-protection” (Bercuson, 2009). Bercuson justifies the use of military force as a way to preserve the nation from threat. Narratives about the nature of international relations, including descriptions of risks that states face globally, are powerful because they (re)produce and privilege particular actions (i.e. the “brutality of war”) and overlook alternative policies. In descriptions about the world that assume conflict and war, militarized policies are often rendered an appropriate solution.

Foreign policy narratives about threat and insecurity require a referent subject that threatens the state. To properly understand the discourse on Canada in Afghanistan, we must also consider how political voices described terrorists. I therefore wish to explore the ways that the discourse on Canada’s role in Afghanistan (fighting terrorism), including narratives about terrorism and *terrorists*, (re)produced a particular representation of Canadian identity, as well as (re)constructed an image

of Afghan identity that relied on imagery of barbarism and savagery. The following sections will explore the ways that “official” narratives about the Afghanistan War (re)constructed Canadian identity in opposition to simplistic and Orientalist portrayals of Afghan others to justify military activity.

4.6 Savage terrorists and the civilized self

THE DISCOURSE of danger in International Relations is best articulated by David Campbell’s (1998) explanation of how the concept of insecurity is integral to American foreign policy. If the construction of the political community (the “self”) is bound to the definition/existence of an outside threat (the “other”) then a state’s political identity requires a threatening force of the other (Husymans, 1998, p. 239). Therefore, the (re)construction of others in foreign relations discourse is a mechanism for (re)producing national identity: others are presented dichotomously as a foil to which the self is defined or understood. It is therefore my objective to draw attention to the ways that the self/Canadian identity was described and the ways that narratives about the others, or the threats by others, reinforced Canada identity (re)construction.

Sherene Razack (2004) objected to dichotomous language that has been used to (re)construct Canadian identity in international relations. She explains that the discursive division between “us” and “them” requires that the Canadian state be imagined in *opposition* to other states. In short, rather than simply signaling a difference, or a geographical demarcation, the type of national identity (re)construction that has existed in Canadian Foreign Policy discourse has articulated gratuitous representations of Canadian identity that mark other bodies not only as different, but as *lesser*

than Canadians. This has historically relied upon the use of a civilized/barbaric dichotomy that paints others as uncivilized, and cast Canadian values, policies, and actors as civilized.

Particularly in the first years of the Afghan War, government representatives used narratives that relied on the civilized/savage dichotomy when explaining Canadian Forces purpose in Afghanistan: both the initial justifications for participation (narratives that demanded military response to 9/11), and subsequent justifications for participation (narratives that demanded military action to prevent Afghan terrorism from threatening the Canadian homeland). Political elites evoked a particular image of “the enemy” (al Qaeda, ‘the terrorists’) to justify particular political response (military action in Afghanistan).

The prominence of political debate about Afghanistan increased in 2005, after the Canadian Forces were assigned a leadership position on a Provincial Reconstruction Team that definitively increased their combat activities. The Canadian Forces committed to increased military responsibilities in Afghanistan and the government committed participation until 2008, making the role of the Canadian Forces a significant foreign policy issue. Political elites justified the militarized focus of the Afghan mission in narratives about an immanent threat to national security.

During a 2006 House of Commons debate, Members of Parliament discussed the justifications for military contributions to Afghanistan. Throughout the debate, many speakers reproduced the message that 9/11 was carried out by dangerous, uncivilized Afghan terrorists:

On September 11 an attack was launched against innocent civilians in our part of the world. . . the war was against liberal, western, democratic values and the things we stand for. That was the motivating factor of that war, and it was a war. Where did the terrorists come from? They came from Afghanistan. Seventy thousand of them had been trained in a state that

sponsored and protected this group against civilized people around the world and nothing was done about these people. I think the objective of our initial involvement in that war was to destroy those terrorist camps in Afghanistan and to remove the government in power that had sponsored and protected them, and, as has so rightly been put forward tonight, the role is to rebuild that country, to bring back some civilization and some badly needed things to their society. (Parliament of Canada, 2006)

This depiction of uncivilized, savage Afghan enemies waging war on Canadian liberal democratic values suggests a struggle between righteous and immoral characters in a dramatized story. It is an exemplary example of a dichotomy that contrasts the Savage ‘them’ with the Civilized ‘us’. This narrative emphasizes the need for action to restore order through ‘civilizing’ the enemy, reinforcing the dichotomy of self versus other.

Through the discursive construction of the disorderly war theatre (Afghanistan) and the uncivilized enemy (Afghans), the War Story (re)constructs the self-Canadian identity and the role of the Canadian Forces, in opposition to these constructs. Discourse on the intervention in Afghanistan centered on the Canadians (the homeland, the citizenry, and the military) as the primary subject (protagonist) of the War Story and that these images are presented in opposition to the antagonist of the War Story (terrorists in Afghanistan). Using simplified dichotomous descriptors does not fully embrace the complexity of the relationships or identities that these terms purport to describe. What I mean to emphasize is that these simplistic constructions of the self and other are a part of a political narrative that has political objectives.

War Stories are deliberately simplistic, as political elites cannot effectively detail the complexities of war to the public and instead wish to present a simplistic account that provides plausible justification for using military force and national resources. Therefore I argue that it is important to pay attention to the ways that the environment (Afghanistan) and the enemies (specific factions of Afghan society) are narrated,

as these narrations render plausible the use of military force in foreign policy.

(Re)defining the threat (terrorist identity) affects what type of foreign policy will be developed, and also creates parameters for what type of action is required by the Canadian Forces. Gordon O'Connor depicts an enemy that is irrational, hateful, and aggressive:

We cannot allow the Taliban to return to their former prominence, to take over Afghanistan and resume their regime of terror and tyranny, to flaunt their disregard for human rights, to punish and terrorize their own people, to murder innocents, to harbor those who would threaten us and our families at home and abroad. (as cited in Armstrong, 2006)

The presentation of danger in this statement informs Canadians that the domestic homeland is insecure and requires securing from a hostile enemy. It presents the enemy as unscrupulous other (*they* terrorize and oppress *their* people), contrasted by an assumed Western innocence and moral responsibility to fix the disorder and tyranny that the other has caused. The emphasis on the brutality of the Taliban infers a need for assertive (read: military) action by the state.

In 2008, the *Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan* released a report, which reinforced the dichotomy of civilized/uncivilized participants in a War Story:

Afghanistan is at war, and Canadians are combatants. It is a war fought between an elected, democratic government and a zealous insurgency of proven brutality. (Parliament of Canada, 2008)

This presents Afghanistan as a war-torn country that is caught in a struggle between a legitimized, Western-approved government (the NATO-supported Hamid Karzai government) and an irrational, inhumane enemy (insurgency of unspecified individuals, usually understood to be either/both Taliban or al Qaeda members and regional

black-market cartels). The narratives that describe “us” (Canada as a nation who fights terrorism in order to provide stability) and “them” (terrorist members or groups of resistance) obscure the actualized experiences of the war theatre. The narratives describe terrorists as using fatal, vicious tactics to create bodily harm and fear, but it omits accounts of acts of violence and use of weaponry by Westernized forces. It reinforces and emphasizes violence used by ‘them’, but does not make note of violence caused by ‘us’:

There are bad people around who have killed and continue to kill, suppress and tear down the democratic process that is just starting to grow in Afghanistan. The truth of the matter is that there are people in this world who do not care for others apart from using them for their own purposes, which some of the Taliban and a few of the others are doing. (Parliament of Canada, 2006)

The depiction of the enemy—the terrorists, the Taliban, al Qaeda, the warlords etc.—was fundamental to the justification of CF action. The description of others determines the kind of social relations possible in foreign policy relationships. It defines both “their” and “our” social identities in a very specific representation of the world. These others—described as lacking compassion for others—were used as a foil to emphasize that, by contrast, Canada and its allies cared about the well-being of Afghans. It also reinforced that terrorists were incapable of civility and therefore our policies towards them cannot follow the type of diplomatic means usually pursued when engaging with democratic (rational) foreign actors.

The Taliban may be in the habit of cutting people’s heads off and making executive decisions about how to proceed, but we live in a democracy...our debate tonight demonstrated the strengths of a democracy compared with the unspeakable tyranny of the Taliban. (Parliament of Canada, 2006)

The above sentiments depicted the enemy as inherently savage and incapable of the

civility exemplified by the self-defined nature of Canadians. This narrative presented Canada as morally superior to the uncivilized oppressive enemy.

This is a problem identified by Razack (2004): the discursive marking of difference can result in the dehumanizing of others. The depiction of others, not only as different, but as *lesser*, can result in political leaders to consider or condone inhumane policies: policies that can include wide-scale bombings, or facilitation of torture. Razack explains that the dehumanizing of others is most apparent in discourses that present military action as the only alternative to solve, fix, or respond to the savagery, immorality, and brutality of an enemy. The dehumanization of others in language poses a risk that others will be dehumanized in policy.

4.7 Ahistorical narratives about terrorism

THROUGHOUT THE discourse on Canada and Afghanistan that occurred in Parliamentary debate, many narratives utilized Orientalist language: ideas of Canada “saving”, “civilizing”, or “providing” for a nation that lacked the moral ideals associated with Canadian values. Edward Said’s (1979) theorization describes the Oriental as strange, irrational, childlike, and barbaric in contrast to the familiar virtuous, logical, and paternal ‘us’ (West) that informs the narrative of Western intervention in Afghanistan (Bell, 2010, p. 66). The analysis of this type of discourse has been studied previously (Ware, 1992; Doty, 1993; Razack, 2004; Zine, 2006) and the use of the Orientalist rescue narrative is common in political justifications for foreign intervention.

The dichotomy of civilized/savage oversimplifies the complexity of relationships in the international arena to a dramatized account of conflict and injustice. This telling of war (as Miriam Cooke (1996) might call it, the *War Story*) portrays Canada

as the advocate of civility and liberal values; aspects perceived to be missing from a crumbled, barbaric Afghan society. As Colleen Bell (2010) observed, these types of explanations represent the West (Canada) in ahistorical terms and as a morally superior actor—an undeniably Orientalist perspective (p. 66). What Bell noted was that the over-simplified depiction of Afghan terrorists as a savage enemy does not account for the historical complexities that led to the political action by these actors. Specifically, the simplified narrative of a terrorist attack by uncivilized savages on a civilized, virtuous nation plays on the problematized subjective ally/enemy dichotomy.

During the Cold War, the West contributed to arming Islamic fundamentalist groups in Afghanistan, including members of the Taliban leadership, to help fight off a Soviet invasion during the 1980s. The Taliban, a previous ally of the West in the battle against communism, became the enemy of the West when they offered sanctuary to al Qaeda following the 9/11 attacks. Despite this historical relationship, most narratives about Canada's role in Afghanistan took September 11, 2001 as the starting point and neglected to offer an explanation for events that considered the tumultuous history of foreign intervention in Afghanistan. These narratives portrayed the West as innocent victims. Many accounts portrayed the enemy as oppressive, savage zealots that sought to inflict violence on liberal nations. These generalizations did not properly capture the political complexities, identities, or motivations of either the Taliban or al Qaeda, largely because they relied on simplistic language and dramatic descriptors. The use of Orientalist language served to obscure the colonial histories of Western interventions in Afghanistan that led to Taliban control. Most narratives did not account for the political frustrations of Afghans who had experienced decades of foreign occupation, they simply told a story of enemies who were savage and uncivilized.

An interesting irony is that narratives about Afghanistan failed to consider Afghanistan's history, but did evoke European history to (re)construct the enemy figure

as dangerous and savage. In the House of Commons debate, a member decreed:

It is not a time to back off and appease one of the most vicious terrorist elements the world has ever known. As a matter of fact, it was Winston Churchill who said that those who believed in appeasing were like those who fed the crocodile hoping they would be the last one to be eaten. Canadians, historically, have never taken that particular approach. (Parliament of Canada, 2006)

This particular expression contrives sentiment to Churchill, a staunch critic of the policy of appeasement of Nazi Germany, and Chamberlain's 1938 Munich Agreement with Hitler that allowed for the annexation of Czechoslovakia. It is an emotional and targeted inference that irrational, brutal enemies (the Nazis, and accordingly the Taliban) are insatiable in their quest for domination, and therefore incapable of being subdued through diplomatic action. It suggests that the insurgent groups in Afghanistan were comparable to organized fascist groups in Germany as a fearful, brutal, and terrifying enemy of the West. The use of historical references immortalized in Western history is demonstrative of the ways the presentation of the Afghanistan War was specifically targeted to Canadians as a story of war and of "us versus them".

4.8 Conclusion: Fighting terrorism as an (un)believable narrative

THE OBJECTIVES of this chapter were to analyze the narratives that explained the Canadian role in Afghanistan as a need to fight terrorism. However, the narratives that expressed this message were not apolitical accounts. The use of us/them dichotomies resulted in simplistic accounts that (re)produced representations of Afghans as savage, uncivilized, and dangerous. My concern with language used in narratives that justified military activity in Afghanistan is not merely that these accounts were

simplistic and unable to capture the complexities of the political situation. My concern is that these narratives were dominantly projected by political elites—persons with the power to influence, create, and choose foreign policies. Elite narratives are powerful due to their presentation as “official” explanations of conflict; meaning that these voices are taken seriously and these narratives are presented to public audiences as truthful and trustworthy.

Official narratives are often hegemonic narratives, due to the power of their speakers to dominate discourse. These hegemonic stories are legitimized as the official War Story, or the version of events that are disseminated to the masses (Cooke, 1996). These stories rely on simplified constructions of the self and the other to create a cohesive, believable explanation to justify state military activity globally. Therefore, not only do these simplified presentations of self/other lend credibility to the use of military force, but they also serve to demean othered/racialized bodies when demanding the use of violence.

The root of my concern is that these narratives are subjective—they are told from a particular perspective and hold a particular purpose: to convince citizens and other political leaders to support military policy. The officiality of the War Story obscures the subjective nature of the accounts. In other words, official stories are often depoliticized, so my examination of these accounts intends to demonstrate their political nature.

The political motivations within hegemonic narratives about the Canadian Forces’ mission to fight terrorism are best demonstrated by the ways that foreign policy officials presented these narratives to summon public support for the mission. As the Afghanistan War became a prominent foreign policy issue in 2006, political leaders expressed concerns that there were domestic obstacles to mission success: a lack of public support for the role, public discontent with mission objectives, and public

criticism of the CF. In 2007, the Standing Committee on National Defence identified what they considered to be the three most pressing threats in the CF mission to Afghanistan:

First, the main direct threat to the national security of Afghanistan, and to Canadian troops, is the Taliban who have continued to mount an insurgency against the Afghanistan government and use guerilla warfare tactics against JTF-Afg, including suicide bombers, improvised explosive devices and ambushes with machine guns and rocket propelled grenade launchers. The second threat is a poisonous mix of corruption, the illegal drug trade and continuing tribal warlord influence beyond the capital city of Kabul. The third threat is closer to home. It is found in our own national impatience with the pace of progress in Afghanistan. (Parliament of Canada, 2007, p. 7)

This narrative expressed the need to unquestionably support military activity in Afghanistan by explaining that while the Taliban threaten the corporeal security of soldiers, troop security and safety *also* relied upon the Canadian public's support of the mission. The conflation of support for soldier well-being with support for the specific military mission in Afghanistan will be explored further in Chapter 7.

The "fighting terrorism" narrative sought to mobilize public support. It evoked simplistic terminology that cast Afghans as guerilla terrorists, corrupt warlords, or irrational suicide bombers, while presenting the Canadian Forces as agents who are helping to fight these threats to national security. These narratives defined the war theatre as chaotic and uncivilized and conjured imagery of Afghanistan as a collapsed, dysfunctional society that required the assistance and firm guidance of our military forces. Bell (2010) noted that viewing intervention in this manner—as a burden or mission to civilize—presents the mission as an "ethical move to emancipate distant populations from social inadequacy, corruption, and poverty" (p. 65). In other words, the pejorative depiction of Afghanistan and of Afghans renders plausible the story that Canadians were helping Afghans to resolve these inadequacies and therefore

conducting commendable work. This story serves to (re)define the Canadian Forces as useful, helpful, and praiseworthy.

The identity of the protagonist (the Canadian Forces) in this War Story occurs through the ‘official’ explanation of their actions. However, as indicated above, this official story is not the only account of the war, but rather the hegemonic account that has been privileged and supported by political elites. These elites have the power to choose which stories and perspectives are accounted for in the official tale, but also have the power to control what stories and voices are excluded from the War Story. The perspectives sanctioned by political elites are used to mobilize support from public audiences for war, but also condition the public to accept these narratives as trustworthy.

Narratives that justified Canadian military activity in Afghanistan as a mechanism for fighting terrorism emphasized that the Canadian Forces were providing order, protection, and civility to Afghans. This narrative was prominent between 2001–2008, but was less common in the discourse between 2009–2014. I suggest that this could be attributed to two reasons.

The first reason is that by 2008 political elites were aware of public dissatisfaction of narratives that justified military action based on a threat of terrorism. Between 2002–2006 public opinion polls indicated a reduction in public support for combat-oriented foreign policy mandates. A (2007) internal Department of Defence study suggested that the government avoid language that sounded “too American” or used language that mimicked George W. Bush’s ‘War on Terror’ rhetoric (see Woods, 2007). I suggest that the emergence of these studies, which demonstrated rhetoric justifying military activity due to a terrorist threat was unpopular with public audiences, discouraged political elites from continuing to use this narrative as a means to mobilize public support for the war post-2008.

The second reason is that in 2009, allegations surfaced of Canadian military personnel transferring Afghan detainees to facilities known for torturing prisoners of war. The bulk of political debate in 2009 focused on whether or not these allegations were credible, with many political elites vehemently denying the validity of these claims. I argue that the emergence of accounts of Canadians, both officials and military personnel, engaging in unethical activities that were endangering or harmful to Afghans called into question the original civil/savage dichotomy of the War Story. The detainee dispute (the details and final result of investigation which have yet to be fully disclosed to the public) served to dismantle or destabilize the crafted image of Canadian military personnel who were helping to bring Afghanistan into civility by offering a counter-narrative that these Canadian personnel were actually complicit in uncivil or unethical activities themselves. And despite political elites' rejection of these counter-narratives, their existence within foreign policy discussions was enough to destabilize the civil/savage construct that propped up the "fighting terrorism" rhetoric.

The justifications for CF activities in Afghanistan were articulated to the public in three ways: as a mechanism for supporting our allies, as a mechanism for fighting terrorism, and, as will be discussed in the following chapter, as a mechanism for providing humanitarian services. This chapter has explored the "fighting terrorism" narrative, and offers a deeper understanding of this rhetoric by situating it within the larger discourse of insecurity that existed in the post-9/11 environment. This chapter also sought to examine the "fighting terrorism" narrative as it was presented as an official account. I argue that this narrative was a deeply politicized account of the Canadian mission, one that served to support policy choices of political elites. Although an "official" story about the Afghanistan War, this narrative did not accurately capture the complexities of the military intervention.

Chapter 5

Canadian Forces in Afghanistan: Providing Humanitarian Assistance

THIS CHAPTER explores the third dominant narrative in elite discourse on Canada's military role in Afghanistan: that military activity was intended to facilitate development projects and assist humanitarian objectives. This theme was predominately emphasized in the latter half of the mission (2008–2014) and I argue that its plausibility relied on a discursive connection to the mythologized Canadian peacekeeping image that has been outlined in Chapters 2, 3, and 4. Although Afghanistan was not a traditional peacekeeping mission, elite narratives about humanitarian activities in Afghanistan emphasized how the modern mission still signaled an objective of helpfulness—a key component of the long-standing national identity myth.

The chapter begins by offering a detailed outline of the mythologized peacekeeping image and discusses how this identification has been cultivated in public memory. Foreign policy elites have framed Canada's foreign policy behaviour as *helpful* humanitarianism, particularly through the association of the middle power role of the

international helpful-fixer. The development of this middle power myth resulted in the representation of peacekeeping as non-violent and de-militarized. I consider how political elites struggled to deconstruct this erroneous dichotomy (peacekeeping as the antithesis of war) when narrating the role of Canada's military in Afghanistan. I discuss how government and military elites' desire to re-militarize Canada's foreign policy image was juxtaposed by a misconception in public consciousness that Canadian foreign policy had historically been non-violent. The 3-D policy pursued in Afghanistan aligned humanitarian initiatives with military objectives and strategies, thereby militarizing humanitarian activities. In order to present re-militarization in foreign policy as desirable, elite voices cast humanitarian activities in Afghanistan—although increasingly militarized—as *helpful to* Afghan citizens.

The latter half of this chapter discusses how narratives about humanitarian objectives of the Canadian Forces relied on gendered and colonialist language. The language used to define both soldiers' and Afghans' identities (re)produced a framework of civilized self/savage other. I argue that although the government initially struggled to communicate how humanitarian activity was compatible with the Forces' combat role, foreign policy elites were able to do this by evoking narratives about soldiers helping uncivilized and feminized Afghan populations.

I conclude that the government justified military intervention in Afghanistan as a means to achieve humanitarian goals and this narrative became a central focus of the official War Story used to mobilize consent for the mission. Like the narratives discussed in Chapter 3 (participation as a responsibility to Canada's alliances) and Chapter 4 (participation as a necessity to fight terrorist threats), the narrative explored in this chapter (participation as a means to help oppressed persons in Afghanistan) were not neutral accounts of the intervention, but were political messages

intended to stimulate support for the chosen policies. Narratives about humanitarianism by the Canadian Forces relied on the (re)framing of national identity as a helpful-fixer nation and (re)scripting the military as a helpful, altruistic institution.

5.1 Humanitarianism as an inherent middle power characteristic: Canada's peacekeeping image

PEACEKEEPING IN Canada has been touted as a foreign policy priority and specialty since the Suez Crisis in 1956 (Maloney, 2003). Prime Minister Lester Pearson is often viewed as the 'father of peacekeeping' (Dorn, 2006); Pearson won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1957 for his diplomatic efforts that led to the formation of a multi-national military intervention to prevent political tensions from escalating between Israel and Egypt. Although peacekeeping conceptually had existed prior to 1956, it was the international recognition of Pearson's efforts that is understood as the foundation for the reputation of Canada-as-Peacekeeper, an identity that has been dominant in nationalist imagining.

The perceived international role of Canada as a middle power "helpful-fixer" has continued to be a primary point of national identification for many Canadians since the concept was cultivated during the Pearsonian era. It was accepted that peacekeeping was an area of competitive advantage for Canadians (Government of Canada, 1994, p. 16; quoted in Whitworth, 2003), due to the nation's middle power status. Canada's military did not have equivalent technological resources or breadth of military powers as the United States, but because peacekeeping did not require as much capital expenditure (Whitworth, 2003) it was viewed as a niche role in which Canada could gain reputation and power. Andrew F. Cooper (1997, p. 20) noted that

Canada's ability to influence international affairs through peacekeeping was disproportionate to its military or economic power. The belief that Canada's position as a middle power made peacekeeping an advantageous foreign policy role was echoed by Joseph T. Jockel who asserted that Canada's reputation acquired by participation in peacekeeping missions, "may have strengthened its position in the UN across a wide range of issues on the world agenda" (1994, p. 15).

The suitability of Canada as a peacekeeping nation was also articulated as a presumed alignment between the tasks of peacekeeping and discourses of Canadian values. Although there is no definitive understanding of what Canadian values are (Howell, 2005), the image of Canada as a "do-gooder" internationally is tied to a broad belief that Canada is a nation that values tolerance, diversity, and rule of law (Government of Canada, 2005). Allison Howell (2005) explained that Canada is portrayed (and represented) as the "provider of order" (p. 59), which problematically positions Canada as a suitable nation to restore peace and order internationally. The theoretical objections to the connection between Canadian values and peacekeeping as a niche activity for Canada globally will be explored below.

The meme of Canada as a peacekeeping nation is culturally well accepted by Canadians and transmitted through popular memory and the association of peacekeeping as a central component to Canadian international identity has been described as a "core myth" of Canada's "imagined community" (Whitworth, 2003, p. 76). Although Canada has historically contributed to a number of UN sanctioned peacekeeping missions (33 missions since 1956), the number of Canadian personnel actively serving UN missions has declined significantly since the mid-1990s, raising criticism that Canadian foreign policy is no longer dominated by peacekeeping activity.

The representation of Canadians as "the world's foremost peacekeepers" (Potter, 2009, p. 4) is one that academics have criticized; military supporters note that this

Table 5.1: Canadian Contributions to UN Peacekeeping Missions

Year	Canada Ranking	Total Ranked Nations	Canada Contributions (Military and Police)	Total UN Contributions (Military and Police)
2014	61	123	115	104062
2013	56	114	130	93244
2012	54	115	199	99030
2011	51	115	224	98837
2010	57	115	142	99943
2009	49	120	179	91382
2008	49	120	168	90883
2007	59	114	141	81992
2006	32	107	370	71811
2005	33	103	314	65050
2004	38	94	231	48590
2003	31	89	262	39147
2002	32	87	305	42239
2001	25	90	571	39061
2000	17	83	165	18643
1999	N/A	N/A	291	13955
1998	N/A	N/A	254	13329
1997	7	70	1060	24952
1996	11	70	956	29140
1995	6	74	2585	63504
1994	N/A	N/A	2290	71303
1993	N/A	N/A	3283	52127
1992	1	58	1026	11495
1991 ^a	4	37	850	9927
1990 ^b	1	46	1002	10304

Data Source: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors_archive.shtml

^aData taken from March.

^bData taken from November.

image does not adequately capture the role of the Canadian Forces in the 21st century. The accuracy of Canada-as-Peacekeeper has been called into question, particularly since the Canadian Forces contributions to United Nations (UN) multilateral missions has declined in the last 30 years. Table 5.1 shows Canada was the top contributor to UN missions in 1990 and 1992, but fell to 25th in 2001, and 61st in 2014.

Despite the decrease in Canadian contributions to peacekeeping missions, the Canadian public has strongly held onto the belief that peacekeeping is/should be

a primary objective in Canadian foreign policy. As Andrew Cohen suggests, the public's desire to see Canada as a peacekeeping nation has become "a touchstone of our identity" (2008, p. 124).

The belief of foreign policy elites that peacekeeping provided a niche position for middle power countries like Canada to participate in 'high politics'¹ internationally accompanies the misconception that peacekeeping is the antithesis of conflict. First generation peacekeeping missions, represented by imagery of a blue-helmeted soldier who stands between two warring parties, may have inspired the connection between peacekeeping and peace. For this reason, there is moral pride that accompanies the belief that Canada is/was an ideal candidate for serving the role of international mediator in multilateral peace missions because of presumed national values of "freedom, peace, and the rule of law" (Veterans Affairs Canada, 2013). This suggests a moral arrogance embedded in the notion of Canada-as-Peacekeeper, as it presumes that Canadians are morally superior to other nations who engage in violence and are therefore best suited to playing referee in these conflicts. Sandra Whitworth (2003) argues that this moral conceit operates on the assumption that peacekeeping is a more honorable practice than the types of military activities conducted by the United States, and therefore allows Canadians to imagine the nation as distinct (and morally superior) to the United States (see also Razack, 1996).

The moral arrogance accompanying Canada's self-identification as a peacekeeper has been observed by Canadian foreign policy academics. J. W. Holmes (1969) was

¹According to Bratt (2007), high politics are "issues relating to military, security, defence relations between states" which is contrasted by low politics, or "issues relating to economic, social, demographic, and environmental relations between states and non-state actors" (p. 1). CFP literature on middlepowerism argues that multilateral military solutions (such as peacekeeping or peace making interventions) are mechanism for middle powers to participate militarily without requiring increased resource allocation to their defence budgets. This is discussed more thoroughly in Chapter 2.

wary of this self-congratulatory image and explained “middle powers are middle powers because they are weaker, not because they are more virtuous” (cited in Sjolander, 2010, p. 324). Holmes’ argument negates the assumption that a philanthropic spirit accompanies middle powership. His thesis suggests that virtuosity is a self-declared identity feature of being a middle power state, not an actual qualification or characteristic. The belief that Canada is a “moral superpower” has been questioned by academics (Granatstein, 2007c, p. 53). Denis Stairs argued that Canadians have become haughty in the belief that their values are “unusually virtuous” (Stairs, 2003, p. 239; cited in Howell, 2005). Despite these objections, there are political elites and segments of the Canada citizenry that desire to associate foreign policy position as a middle power with altruistic humanitarian objectives.

Scholars (Razack, 2004; Whitworth, 2004; Cohen, 2008) have pointed to a history of Canadian peacekeeping missions filled with political scandals that should have compromised the moral clout of the helpful-fixer image: the Somalia Affair in 1991 where Canadian Forces tortured a Somali teen, the failure to intervene in the 1994 Rwandan genocide, and the post-1990s decline in Canadian active contribution to UN peacekeeping missions. Canada’s self-identified role as a peacekeeper has historically been (at times) neither successful, nor morally altruistic (Harting and Kamboureli, 2009, p. 659–660). Despite these instances, the self-identification of Canada as a global peacekeeper remains romanticized in the Canadian imagination.

The “branding” of Canada’s helpful-fixer-middle-power position (differentiated from a consistent historical reality) is how Sjolander (2010) argues Canadians like to represent themselves at home and abroad; citizens envision a foreign policy rooted in altruism and virtue (p. 326). Historians have remarked that, “it is certainly better for Canadians to think of themselves as umpires, as morality incarnate, than as mass murderers or warmongers.” (Hillmer and Granatstein, 1994, p. 350). The belief that

Canada's foreign policy is about altruistic assistance, rather than policy motivated by self-interest or power politics, has been entrenched deeply in cultural consciousness. In addition to the above listed peacekeeping scandals from the 1990s, the foreign policy directions and discourse of the Harper government from 2006–2015 was imbued with efforts to undermine or reject the peacekeeping/moral do-gooder image that is so popular in nationalist visions. Despite efforts to draw attention to alternative military histories, the Harper government's efforts to re-brand Canada in a more aggressive or militaristic way were not wholly successful in damaging the romanticized image of Canada the helpful-fixer internationally. I argue that efforts of the Harper government to re-militarize the image of the Canadian Forces had limited and marginal success, largely due to the steadfast myth of the helpful-fixer middle power. These efforts will be discussed in greater detail in this chapter, but it should be noted that foreign policy discourse surrounding the October 2015 election that resulted in the Justin Trudeau majority government provides an example of the immutability of the middle power narrative.

The Trudeau election platform explicitly stated “under Stephen Harper, [Canada's] influence and presence on the world stage has steadily diminished...our plan will restore Canada as a leader in the world...Canada can make a real and valuable contribution to a more peaceful and prosperous world” (Liberal Party of Canada, 2015). This sentiment was shared within government bureaucracy as well. In September 2015, a leaked document was obtained by the Canadian Press, which revealed that senior members of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD) felt that Canada's international reputation had been “eroded” in key foreign policy areas (Blanchfield, 2015). The document titled “Canada's International Policy: Strategic Questions in a Changing Global Context” indicated that Canada's international clout was under threat and defined Canada's traditional role

as a “‘middle power’, ‘honest broker’, ‘principled actor’... one ready to use soft power in tandem with other countries to ‘lead/shape/influence’ on the global stage” (Chase and McCarthy, 2015).

Other media outlets signaled the same sentiments: the Montreal Gazette reported how even former Prime Ministers such as Joe Clark and Jean Chretien have lamented Canada’s loss of world standing, as exemplified by the decrease in peacekeeping troops and absence on UN sub councils (Bruemmer, 2015). Clark’s 2013 book, *How We Lead: Canada in a Century of Change* is sharply critical of Harper’s foreign policies, noting that Canada’s international reputation had been squandered due to an emphasis on the military and by turning away from diplomacy as a “principal instrument [of foreign relations]” (Clark, 2013). The narrative was not only present in domestic publications, but also found in international sources, such as the British daily *The Guardian*’s coverage of the election. The August 2015 editorial explained that the Harper government had made “the Canada that was a pillar of peacekeeping and the United Nations a distant memory” (‘The Guardian view on Ca...’, 2015). The article concluded by stating “but we may be permitted to hope there is now a chance that something of the old Canada, committed to moderation and multiculturalism at home and to multilateralism and cooperation abroad, will re-emerge from the fray” (‘The Guardian view on Ca...’, 2015). The desire to return to the idealized narrative of Canada-as-Peacekeeper was heavily emphasized throughout the 2015 election and government transition in October 2015.

The call for a return to foreign policies rooted in the romanticized image of Canadian internationalism founded on Canadian values (most specifically, the association of values such as human rights and multilateralism) was exemplified by an editorial by Sharanjeet Parmar, a war crimes prosecutor and Harvard lecturer who penned:

Canada enjoys an illustrious history in international affairs that makes us proud: Lester B. Pearson won the Nobel Peace Prize for his role in the Suez Crisis, and invented the practice of peacekeeping. . . The next government and Parliament can continue this rich tradition and once again make us a valued and respected member of the international community.” (Parmar, 2015)

The prominence and resilience of the self-indulgent middle power narrative, has remained deeply entrenched in the Canadian imagination. This chapter will explore how this narrative has fit within the discourse on the Canadian Forces mission(s) to Afghanistan.

5.2 Canada the Peacekeeper: Institutional reinforcement of the peacekeeper myth in social memory

ADOPTED BY politicians and citizens alike, the construction of the “helper” and “do-gooder” foreign identity persists in Canadian self-awareness, as a national myth that permeates many aspects of social memory. Praise of Canada-as-Peacekeeper appears both in institutional memorializations, and also in public consciousness: the (re)enforcement and (re)iteration of this construction has been both intentionally promoted and subconsciously (re)produced in socio-political culture.

An example of this self-aggrandizement is the 2008 designation of August 9 as “National Peacekeepers Day,” which designates the date to remember Canadians serving on peacekeeping missions abroad. Although not a statutory holiday, such a commemoration shows that political elites felt strongly enough about the preservation of this service to institutionally honour it through a consolidated parliamentary act. This is indicative of the strong cultural support of peacekeeping by Canadians, but also by Canadian political institutions. This is an example of the ways that institutional promotion of peacekeeping reinforces the construction of the peacekeeper identity in

the public imagination.

There are also physical memorials to Canadian involvement in global peacekeeping. Paul Gough (2002) noted that these sites of memory are “rarely arbitrary assignments: instead they are consciously situated to connect or compete with existing nodes of collective remembering. . . monuments exist not only as aesthetic devices but as apparatus of social memory” (p. 214–215). Physical symbols (statues, art, museum displays, paraphernalia) are mechanisms for reinforcing Canada’s international image as a peacekeeping nation as they signify the importance of this role to citizens. An example of a physical memorial is the “Peacekeeping Monument” in downtown Ottawa. *Reconciliation* was unveiled in 1992, telling “a story that every Canadian can be proud of” (Department of Canadian Heritage, 2014). This description emphasizes the moral pride associated with this type of foreign policy position.

The monument has two inscriptions, “*Reconciliation*” and “*At the Service of Peace/Au Service de la Paix*”. The design motif is explained on a plaque, which reads, “*Members of Canada’s Armed Forces. Represented by three figures, stand at the meeting place of two walls of destruction. Vigilant, impartial, they oversee the reconciliation of those in conflict. Behind them lies the debris of war. Ahead lies the promise of peace; a grove, symbol of life.*” This dramatic description reflects John English’s (2003) description of the peacekeeper image embedded in Canadian memory: a referee in a boxing match, a peacekeeper “engaged in non-violent observation whose presence prevented conflict” (p. 1). The referee image presumes a special power held by the Canadian Forces (whose moral superiority prevented squabbling, irrational parties from committing unnecessary violence). The referee image is central to most observation about the mythological status of Canada as an altruistic peacekeeper and a respected middle power (Whitworth, 2004; Maloney, 2007; Wagner, 2007; Engler, 2009; Sjolander, 2010; McCready, 2010; Granatstein, 2012; McKay and Swift, 2012).

The inscription plaque refers to figures of three beret-donning peacekeepers, “standing on two sharp, knifelike edges of stone, cutting through the rubble and debris of war and converging at a high point, which symbolizes the resolution of conflict” (Veterans Affairs Canada, 2014). The three peacekeeping figures represent the impartiality that is assumed in peacekeeping service. It is this image—Canadian peacekeepers as rational, cautious referees—that is institutionally memorialized, and contributive to the public assumptions about Canada’s international role and the activities associated with peacekeeping.

The significance of this memorial is that it serves as a visual and permanent reinforcement of specific imagery that supports a specific narrative. It upholds the peacekeeper-as-referee image and supports the narrative that Canada has an important, niche ability to perform peacekeeping duties. The imagery does not reflect aspects of peacekeeping that might be less desirable to the Canadian public such as the use of violence and weaponry to achieve objectives for peace in foreign interventions. It is therefore important to recognize the role that this monument plays in sustaining the myth of peacekeeping as an altruistic, morally superior form of foreign policy action, as it ignores the reality of violence that is present in many international conflict zones. The narrative of Canada-as-peacekeeper is supported by the images present in *Reconciliation*.

The prominence of the peacekeeper self-identification is exemplified in the design and construction of the Peacekeeping Monument. *Reconciliation*’s side wall is inscribed with forty-eight locations where Canadians have served in peacekeeping roles. There was sufficient additional space left for thirty future inscriptions. Gough (2002) explains the significance of the extra space:

It presupposes a future peacekeeping role for Canadian troops into the

next two decades. In this sense it *projects* a future role with some certainty, suggesting the Canadian values of impartiality and fairness will be constants worthy of continuous aggrandizement. (p. 221)

Gough's observation is astute, as the notion of peacekeeping as a niche foreign policy specialty for Canada remains stubbornly present in public imagination.

Other peacekeeping memorials and monuments have been erected across Canada. Calgary's Peacekeepers' Park, Winnipeg's "Peacekeeping Cairn", and an outdoor training facility in Malhide, ON also named "Peacekeeper's Park" are intended to honour fallen peacekeepers and the missions served during the 20th century. These monuments provide a public site to honour soldiers, and in turn, publically romanticize this form of international military service.

The prominence of the peacekeeping myth (i.e. the belief that Canada was the world's foremost and best suited nation to conduct peacekeeping internationally) was, at times, inaccurately conflated with the role served in the Afghan mission (an intervention that military officials adamantly stressed was not a peacekeeping mission). This confusion is related to intentional fusing of the peacekeeper identity with the military intervention in Afghanistan. For example, "Peacekeepers Park" in Calgary had inscripted the names of Canadian soldiers who had died in peacekeeping missions on a park monument. Despite the Department of Defence's insistence that Afghanistan was not a peacekeeping mission, the organizers of the monument put the names of those killed in Afghanistan on the wall (McKay and Swift, 2012, p. 241). This demonstrates a lack of public understanding of what the Canadian military was doing overseas; this also suggests that the Canadian public has romanticized the peacekeeping identity without an accurate understanding of what types of tasks the Canadian Forces were actually undertaking in Afghanistan.

From 2001 to 2013, Canada's ten-dollar bill featured a female Royal Canadian

Air Force officer in a blue beret, below which appears with the script “In the Service of Peace”, quoting the *Reconciliation* monument. This was not the first time the Canadian mint had featured the monument in its currency. It was also commemorated on the one-dollar coin in 1995. The use of the Canadian peacekeeper on the ten-dollar note from 2001–2013 exemplifies the prominent association of peacekeeping with Canadian foreign policy. Canada’s intervention in Afghanistan was viewed by the military as an opportunity for re-branding the Canadian Forces as a war-fighting institution. Interestingly, during this explicitly non-peacekeeping intervention, it was images of peacekeeping that were chosen to reflect Canada’s foreign policy history and reputation. This juxtaposition shows the powerful and lingering association in popular memory of Canada’s reputation as an international peacekeeping nation.

5.3 Peacekeeping and Afghanistan: Public confusion about mission mandates

THE CONNECTION between military service in Afghanistan and Canada’s reputation as a peacekeeping nation was a source of confusion for the Canadian public. As I earlier indicated, there was a strong public sense of connection to traditional peacekeeping and humanitarian foreign policy missions and an assumption that these types of interventions were well suited to disseminate “Canadian” values through foreign policy action. The Canadian public felt that humanitarian-oriented missions should be prioritized in Canadian foreign policy. An Ipsos Reid Corporation survey (2010) found that Canadians preferred the role of the Canadian Forces to be a “friendly, helpful provider of humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping services” (p. 3). Confusion arose therefore, when early descriptions of Canada’s role in the Afghan mission did not comply with the peacekeeping foreign policy role for which Canadians assumed

their military was designed. The prominence of support for peacekeeping missions was important for public support of foreign policy missions.

It is not surprising then, that a major theme that appears throughout media and government publications on Canadian Forces in Afghanistan is the humanitarian efforts put forward through various Canadian policies. Notions of humanitarianism were already embedded in the public understanding of peacekeeping conceptually and Canadians seemed more comfortable with the language of peacekeeping than they did with rhetoric of combat (Sjolander, 2007, p. 328).

During the Afghan mission, several studies indicated that a majority of Canadians prefer a “traditional peacekeeping role” for Canadian foreign policy. A 2002 Focus Canada poll question read as follows (emphasis added):

Some people say that Canadian Forces should adopt a *traditional peacekeeping* role, which means trying to keep the two conflicting sides apart. Others say that Canadian Forces should adopt a *peacemaking* role, which might involve fighting alongside other UN troops to force peace in a disputed area. Which view is closer to your own? (Environics Research Group Limited, 2002)

Of the 2021 adult Canadians polled, 52 percent indicated that they preferred the “traditional peacekeeping role.” In 2004, when Focus Canada posed the same question, the preference for “traditional peacekeeping” had increased to 59 percent (Environics Research Group Limited, 2004). Although polling numbers varied between regions, these studies confirm the prominence of Canadian support for the peacekeeper-as-referee reputation and role in foreign policy.

In 2005, an Ekos Research Associates Inc. study asked, (emphasis added) “Should the Canadian Forces have a *traditional peacekeeping* role, which means trying to keep two conflicting sides apart? Or, should the CF have a *peacemaking* role, which might involve fighting alongside other UN troops to force peace in a disputed area?”

The study found 57 percent preferred “traditional peacekeeping” (Ekos Research Associates Inc., 2005). Both polls demonstrated that the Canadian public desired a specific type of foreign policy activity. Despite the option for multilateral “peace-making” (which more accurately described the type of policies being carried out in Afghanistan), Canadian public opinion reflected a preference for the traditional role and activity of peacekeeping.

The persistent desire of Canadians to support ‘traditional peacekeeping’ was frustrating for both the military, who viewed it as an antiquated and limiting label for success and prestige in military operations; as well as for academics like J. L. Granatstein, who felt Afghanistan was an opportunity to re-brand the Canadian Forces into a more militaristic institution: “The Canadian Forces have found their *raison d’être* again. They are a military force; they are not a peacekeeping force...Peacekeeping has failed, except in the minds of the Canadian public” (as cited in Blanchfield, 2008). The contrast between the realities of the Afghan mission’s militarized tasks and the mythological assumptions about Canadian foreign policy peacekeeping priorities were the root of these frustrations.

However, as public support for the mission began to dwindle (an Environics study in 2008 found that 56 percent of Canadians “strongly disapproved” or “somewhat disapproved” of Canada’s military action in Afghanistan),² the government became increasingly aware of projecting a positive message about the Afghan mission, particularly concerning the extension it proposed for Canadian Forces participation past 2009. A 2007 poll suggested that “the best way for Mr. Harper to obtain [parliamentary consensus to extend the mission] would be to argue that Canada ha[d] a duty to

²Environics poll as reported by CBC News, “Public Support for Afghan mission lowest ever” September 5th, 2008. The breakdown was 34 percent of respondents “strongly disapprove”, 22 percent “somewhat disapprove”, 27 percent “somewhat approve”, and 14 percent “strongly approve” about Canadian military action in Afghanistan.

safeguard the humanitarian gains of Afghan women and children” (Laghi and Freeman, 2007). Of the 1,000 Canadians polled, 81 percent listed the “rights of women and children” as the most important factor in considering an extension (Laghi and Freeman, 2007). The stubbornly held public desire to participate in “helpful” foreign policy tasks influenced the Harper government’s discursive strategies when selling the mission extension to Canadians.

Rhetoric about Canadian humanitarian activity in Afghanistan reinforced some confusion for the Canadian public about the nature of the mission and its connection to traditional peacekeeping. Although development and humanitarian activity were policy objectives in Afghanistan, they seemed contrary to messages about fighting terrorism, because of the perceived moral altruism associated with humanitarianism, and because of the Canadian public’s discomfort with combat-assertive language.

Despite military strategists’ understanding that humanitarian work in Afghanistan required military security to carry out projects successfully, the contrast between fighting terrorists and conducting humanitarian work seemed at odds to the Canadian public. The reason was that humanitarian work, or tasks associated with traditional peacekeeping, were oversimplified and under-explained in the peacekeeping myth. Most Canadians were unaware of the details of such missions, or the on-the-ground activities that modern interventions entailed. The prominence and power of the peacekeeping myth lay in the assumed moral altruism that accompanied the role of “helpful-fixer”. It was the perceived goodness of this middle power role that created popular support for peacekeeping and humanitarianism and created some unease about ‘fighting terrorism’: a role perceived to be less morally significant, with a higher risk of violence. In the following section, I will explore the tension between these two narratives (fighting terrorism and conducting humanitarianism) present in the discourse on Canada’s intervention in Afghanistan.

5.4 Contrasting narratives: The discursive polarization of humanitarianism and fighting terrorism

ABOVE WE explored the prominence of the peacekeeping identity in the Canadian imaginary and the conflation of this identity to the Canadian Forces' role in Afghanistan. Canada's role in Afghanistan was distinctly different from post WWII or Cold War peacekeeping missions, as well as different from millennial peacekeeping missions, such in Haiti (2004), East Timor (1999–2002) or the Sudan (2005). Particularly, in the first five years of the intervention in Afghanistan, the words 'peacekeeping' or 'peace mission' were often misused by media and some government officials to describe the intervention, despite military officials' emphasis that Afghanistan was not a peacekeeping mission.

The messages within the media were similarly mixed. In 2002, *The Globe and Mail* reported, "Canada decided to send its troops into a combat mission under US control in Afghanistan rather than participate in the British-led multinational force because it [was] 'tired' of acting as mere peacekeepers" (Freeman, 2002, p. A1). The phrase "mere peacekeeping" suggests that humanitarian work is less exciting or important than a combat mission, reflecting the desire of pro-military supporters to shed the peacekeeping myth through a new militarized role in Afghanistan. In 2003, media reported that, "As many as 2,000 Canadian soldiers will return to Afghanistan, this time in their traditional role as peacekeepers, not as terrorist-hunting warriors" (Blanchfield, 2003). This narrative reinforces public sensibilities that Canada was best suited for peacekeeping, rather than fighting terrorists in active combat. The contrast in these statements showed the different perspectives regarding peacekeeping identity. Pro-military supporters were eager to re-brand the Canadian Forces as a combat-ready institution, while many politicians and the Canadian public clung

to the self-image of a diplomatic, “helpful” peacekeeping force. From 2001–2011, Canadian involvement in Afghanistan took place under a series of missions and tasks forces (with nuances in mandates), but never actually reflected the type of peacekeeping (watchful soldiers separating two warring parties) that was imagined by the Canadian public. Yet the myth persisted throughout the discourse, in large part due to mixed messaging and a lack of clarity from government and media sources.

The Federal Government’s explanation of the nature of the Afghan mission lacked clarity. Defence Minister John McCallum (2002) remarked that the mission “was more in the nature of peacekeeping, not so much peacemaking” (‘Bullets fly Ottawa duck...’, 2006), yet one news source quoted Defence Minister Graham’s 2004 assessment of Afghanistan as, “a combat mission, and we have made our decision knowing that” (Fisher, 2011a). The government did not clearly articulate mandate shifts, and therefore mission objectives appeared muddled.

Academics contributed to the confusion, as Dorn (2006) explained that in Afghanistan, “some of the CF activities have been peacekeeping: support for elections, contributing to a secure environment in Kabul, and various forms of nation building” (p. 105). Dorn’s assessment spurred debate, as other academics disagreed with his description, noting that the Afghan mission “[was] not a UN mission; it was American-led and now NATO-led; it involves stabilization and counterinsurgency, and not peacekeeping; it has a defined enemy; and Canada is not neutral in this engagement” (Maloney, 2007, p. 101). It appears then that the confusion in messaging was the casual exchange of the terms “peacekeeping” and “humanitarianism”, causing general public confusion about what exactly the Canadian Forces were doing in Afghanistan.

Confusion about the multiple missions and mandates that Canada served, particularly in the first half of the intervention (2001–2008) was attributed to a lack

of clear, convincing government rhetoric about how humanitarian goals in Afghanistan aligned with security rhetoric about fighting terrorism. In the first five years of discourse, the government and the military referred to activities as a ‘campaign’, ‘operation’, or ‘mission’ and the Minister of National Defence explained that the word “war” was avoided strategically because they did not believe it would be a conventional war (Hobson, 2007, p. 5). The 2008 Manley Report³ was meant to address public confusion of mission mandate, and recommended that the government needed to take a more proactive approach to articulating the role served by the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan. The Manley Report noted that “many Canadians [were] uneasy about Canada’s mission in Afghanistan. They wonder what it’s all for, whether success is achievable, and in the end, whether the results will justify the human and other costs” (Parliament of Canada, 2008, p. 3). The report criticized mixed messages from government officials and felt that Afghanistan provided a “meaningful opportunity” to participate in an “international problem that gives us real weight and credibility” (Parliament of Canada, 2008, p. 4).

In 2008, the Department of National Defence (DND) website explained that Afghanistan “is not a peacekeeping mission. There are no ceasefire arrangements to enforce or negotiated peace settlements to respect” (Department of National Defence, 2008). The same message noted that the Canadian effort included diplomats, development workers, police officers, and other experts in human rights and “institutions of human democracy” (Department of National Defence, 2008). This messaging aligned with the military’s desire to shed the peacekeeping identity, while reassuring the Canadian public that humanitarian needs were still being met.

³Commonly known as the Manley Report, The *Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan* was conducted by J. Manley, D. H. Burney, J. Epp, P. Tellier, and P. Wallin and presented in 2008. It contained a series of recommendations for government action and future policy in Afghanistan.

Military officials stressed that Afghanistan, like other modern stabilization missions, required a balance of diplomacy, humanitarian assistance, and security measures. DND dubbed this strategy the “Whole of Government” approach. However, associating peacekeeping with the “three-block war” (also known as the 3-D strategy: defence, development, and diplomacy) was criticized because “mixing mandates by combining war fighting with peacekeeping and humanitarian action removes mission clarity...it confused the Canadian public, the population in the mission area, and even the soldiers themselves” (Dorn, 2006, p. 105). By 2005 the Canadian public did not accurately understand the mission objectives because of a lack of clarity in government explanation of the mission and the compatibility of these three mandates.

Dorn’s observations about the effects of mixed messaging on local populations and soldiers themselves are also incisive. Academics have noted the problems with humanitarian groups’ affiliations with intervening forces. If soldiers are conducting security operations involving combat activities that can put civilians at risk, such as raids, bombing, or shooting and also contributing to humanitarian tasks such as infrastructure re-building, distributing food and supplies, and/or providing medical care, it becomes difficult for local populations to determine how to perceive the intervening force. The presence of combat and humanitarian activities creates confusion for local populations who are left to determine whether the intervening force is helping, or whether they are contributing to destruction and increasing insecurity or political tensions. It also creates risk for humanitarian workers to be targeted by insurgents if the aid groups are viewed as politically affiliated with an enemy. The tensions and problems of soldiers conducting multiple, and seemingly contradictory roles, led to the confusion of the Canadian public, as well as projecting mixed messages to foreign populations by obscuring which bodies are combat personnel and which bodies are meant to provide humanitarian assistance. Having the same bodies provide both roles

is problematic for optics.

Soldiers who are asked to conduct multiple roles also feel these effects. Sandra Whitworth (2004) noted the frustrations felt by military personnel who are trained in combat fighting but mandated to perform humanitarian tasks in intervention scenarios. Whitworth explains that soldiers involved in peacekeeping duties feel that they are performing “less than soldierly functions” (2004, p. 85). Whitworth noted that soldiers in Somalia associated a certain glory or prestige with traditional warfare that was not associated with peacekeeping. As one soldier explained, “I think the men were glad when the mission changed from peacekeeping to peace making... this was more real. We’re training for war all our lives, and the guys all want to know what it is like. That’s why they join the army, to soldier” (Winslow, 1997, p. 198; cited in Whitworth, 2003, p. 86).

Whitworth demonstrates that the desire to fight ‘real wars’ is indicative of the link between masculinity and military values: a concept she titles ‘militarized masculinity’. This concept sees a particular type of masculinity privileged in the military, one that prioritizes the use of strength, violence, and aggression over alternative activities like diplomacy or infrastructure repair. Whitworth notes that the problem with having trained soldiers conduct humanitarian tasks is that not only are these individuals often ill-prepared to conduct these tasks, but it is often antithetical to the type of training they undergo in the military. She explains this predicament by quoting Major R. W. J. Wenek: “The defining role of any military force is the management of violence by violence, so that individual aggressiveness is, or should be, a fundamental characteristic of occupational fitness in combat units” (cited in Whitworth, 2003, p. 78). Whitworth notes that the restrictions on firing (in peacekeeping missions, usually limited to self-defence) and multilateral chains of command (as common in multilateral interventions) disrupt expectations and training practices

of military members. These perceived limitations frustrate soldiers, who have been trained in skills of war: skills that are not always transferrable in executing the kind of contributions expected in humanitarian missions (Whitworth, 2003).

In Afghanistan, the 3-D strategy required soldiers to conduct a variety of tasks including surveillance, counter-terrorist patrols, and other militarized activities as well as providing ‘soft’ skills such as working with community members, building infrastructure, distributing supplies, or purifying local water sources. It was believed that development and diplomacy (the second “D”s) could not be accomplished without creating a controlled security environment. The problem was that the 3-D mandate was not well articulated by the Federal government and the use of peacekeeping conceptually within this discourse created confusion for the Canadian public.

As mentioned above, the confusion can partly be attributed to a lack of proper articulation from governments (past and current) about what “peacekeeping” missions actually involved. Dorn suggests four general principles associated with traditional peacekeeping include: legitimacy (UN Security Council sanctioned and arisen from international law), consent (from the host government), impartiality (not aligning with any of the warring parties), and minimal use of force (broader than self-defence, but applying force only when necessary) (2006, p. 105). While government and military officials emphasized that humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan was complementary to that of security and defence against insurgence, there remained public confusion and conflation between the symbol of peacekeepers as neutral actors and their image of a moderated military capacity. As explained above, this disconnect can be attributed to mixed messaging in the media, and lack of clear messaging from the government. However, polls also showed that many Canadians were generally unaware of foreign policies, including military activities in Afghanistan. The lack of public knowledge about military activities abroad coupled with the preeminence of

the peacekeeper identity myth can explain why there was general ignorance surrounding the Canadian Forces' mandates in Afghanistan.

A study conducted by Ipsos-Reid/Dominion Institute/*The Globe and Mail* in 2003 supports my argument about public ignorance of the Canadian Forces' international missions. When respondents were asked to name two CF missions since 1990, only 41 percent were able to provide two correct answers, 29 percent were able to provide one correct answer, and 31 percent were unable to provide any correct answers. This study did not differentiate between peacekeeping missions and non-peacekeeping assignments.⁴ In 2005, an Ipsos-Reid study found that 67 percent of those polled knew "very little" or "nothing" about Canadian Forces operations in Afghanistan.⁵ As suggested above, this lack of knowledge regarding the Afghan mission can be attributed to the Federal government's failure to clearly articulate the mission mandates and the Canadian public's romanticization of, and self-identification with, the traditional peacekeeper image.

Particularly after 2005, the evocation of peacekeeping as a part of the Afghan mission relied on a loose relation to humanitarian or diplomatic practices in the 3-D (defence, development, diplomacy) strategy. The strategy specified that traditional peacekeeping, while undefined but associated with the referee-role held in public memory, was an outdated and insufficient practice for modern conflict. Military supporters had long claimed that peacekeeping was an outdated practice and this narrative was embraced by the newly elected Harper government who supported re-branding the military as a more robust combat force.

⁴Ipsos-Reid/Dominion Institute/*The Globe and Mail* poll conducted June 10–12th, 2003 with a randomly selected sample of 1055 adult Canadians.

⁵Canadian Ipsos-Reid Express, *DND Study* conducted March 8–10th, 2005 with a sample of 964 people polled. The question read: "How much do you know about Canadian Forces operations currently taking place in Afghanistan?" The results were: 12 percent "Nothing", 55 percent "Very little", 30 percent "A fair amount", and 3 percent "A great deal".

The Harper government from 2006 onward characterized the Afghanistan mission as both a war involving combat and as a policing or enforcing mission (McCready, 2010). Both of these characterizations relied upon the logic that traditional peacekeeping was insufficient in managing 21st century conflicts. Both descriptions (soldier and police officer) connote an increasingly militarized identity compared to the traditional peacekeeper image imagined in Canadian public memory, such as the image aesthetically memorialized in the *Reconciliation* statue that has peacekeeper's garb of beret, binoculars, and walkie-talkie, with gun slung but not drawn. These descriptions supported the desire by government and military officials to shift the *modern* association of the Canadian Forces away from the peacekeeping image and towards a more combat-oriented institution.

The Department of National Defence stressed that the military needed to be able to respond to international security threats more effectively and emphasized a need to re-vitalize the Canadian Forces ability for combat-readiness. From 2006 forward, the use of peacekeeping rhetoric surrounding the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan diminished, largely due to a recommendation by the Manley panel for the government to increase its diligence in communicating mission objectives with the public. However, the "helpful-fixer" symbolism remained present throughout government messaging. Re-branding efforts by the military and government took care to ensure the new combat-orientated image of the Canadian Forces still complied with the "helpful-fixer" trope that was popular with the Canadian public.

5.5 Humanitarianism through gendered notions of rescue

AS THEMES of rescue and *helping* were dominant in the promotion of Canadian Forces image, the rhetoric surrounding humanitarianism in CF policies can also be

examined as part of the discourse. Despite a heavy focus on the first “D” in the 3D strategy (i.e. defence), the Canadian Forces did participate and lead humanitarian projects, and there were policies directed at rebuilding infrastructure for local populations.

There were several major humanitarian projects led by the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan (Dahla Dam, polio vaccination of Afghan children), however much of the rhetoric from the government focused on how humanitarian policy objectives would improve Afghan women’s rights. Without undermining benefits or improvements living conditions that Afghan women experienced due to policies implemented by Western nations, the use of this rhetoric raised concern, especially among feminist scholars who noted that the “politics of rescue lies at the heart of imperial intention” (McFadden, 2008, p. 58). The concern is that the sensationalized textual and visual representations of Afghan women under Taliban oppression fail to present the (historical) entirety of the subordination, and also gloss over the new system of subordination of these same women, institutionalized through foreign intervention (Khan, 2001, 2008). Imposing apparently well intentioned neo-colonial practices has been discussed by Spivak (1994), who articulated the British abolition of specific Hindu practices as a case of “White men [who were] saving brown women from brown men” (p. 93). International concerns about the rite of *sati* (burning a widow on her husband’s funeral pyre) demonstrate how Western objections to non-Western cultural practices impose a foreign value system where one cultural practice that is deemed barbaric is replaced by a different cultural practice which is assumed to be ‘civilized’.

The replacement of one cultural practice is not a stand-alone incident. Often, assumptions about the ‘barbarism’ or ‘civility’ of a culture are drawn from the cultural subjugation that underpins interventionist rhetoric. Belief that one state or nation is morally superior to another has informed historical conflicts. What I have primary

concern with is that replacing or abolishing certain cultural practices does not ensure that oppression will be reversed or diminished. There is an aura of control, highly colonial in nature, in being able to determine what the daily lives of others *should* look like. This control, institutionalized through foreign intervention, may be less violent, but is no less imposing on others who were not allowed the opportunity to determine their own society.

The promotion of women's rights in Afghanistan does not assume that women will be able to access those rights unless the entirety of the system of oppression is examined. Simply put, removing institutional barriers to perceived oppressive tactics, such as mandates for women to wear a burqua, not only quashes traditional culture, but also fails to ensure self-directed emancipation. Post-colonial feminists have observed that many Western societies see the practice of wearing a burqua as inherently oppressive:

The archetypal image of the veiled woman, even when presented as a speaking subject, remains limited to the immediate sensory experience of what it is like to be confined. (Khan, 2008, p. 162)

The imagery of Afghan women wearing the *chadri* (burqua) is linked in Western consciousness as a form of oppression, a physical jail imposed upon women by the Taliban.

Although the overturn of Taliban policies means Afghan women do not legally have to wear the chadri and may attend school, the trumpeting of these changes (i) obscures the suppression of traditional Afghan cultural society and (ii) ignores the damages caused by a decade long military intervention, specifically the presence of war in the everyday lives of Afghan women (infrastructure destruction, fear of personal safety, loss of community or family members etc.). In other words, the removal of a particular cultural practice does not guarantee that women's daily experiences

have improved, particularly in a state of foreign occupation. It also simultaneously subordinates Afghan cultural practices to those preferred by Western interventionists. The matter of whether one practice is “better” than the other is less important than the reality that this was not a self-directed choice by Afghan women, but a structural change made by outside actors.

In Kelly Oliver’s call for “witnessing ethics” (2007), she proposes a shift towards a more ethical foreign policy by analyzing events in their socio-historical context and removing emotive rhetoric from the explanations of these events. Moving away from the “imposition of Western values that may lack significance for women of different cultures and faiths” (Jacob, 2010, p. 363), Oliver notes that all people should have the capacity to “imagine and create a meaningful life” (2007, p. 163) as a mechanism for freedom, rather than their lives being determined by outsiders. Oliver imagines foreign policy as more ethical when we can imagine security in terms of “freedom for all the inhabitants of the planet to have resources with which to live” (2007, p. 163). Her call for a different ethos in foreign policies is very different from the types of changes that were being imposed during the NATO intervention in Afghanistan 2001–2014.

Rhetoric of humanitarian action in Afghanistan provided citizens a sense of moral altruism; it evoked a sense that NATO countries, particularly Canada, were helping or being charitable to others in need. Many feminists noted concerns about misuse of humanitarian rhetoric to justify military actions in Afghanistan: specifically when authorities enlist public support by invoking women’s liberation.

The rhetoric of humanitarian altruism also obscures alternative motivations for NATO countries to participate in Afghanistan. Any geo-political and economic advantages gained by Western nations (e.g. access to new markets or greater control of foreign economies; for more see Klassen, 2015) through the intervention were not

dominantly promoted by political elites in Canada. There was an absence of narratives listing any ‘self-serving’ motivations of involvement as a dominant theme in messaging from political elites justified military intervention in the name of ‘helping’ Afghans: particularly emphasizing the ways that the “Whole of Government” approach benefited the political freedoms and health initiatives of Afghan women and children. Notably, humanitarian rhetoric was the most dominant message in narratives describing the war.

Altruism associated with humanitarian goals was mobilized by political elites to silence criticism of the war. During government deliberations about extending the military mission past 2008, narratives by foreign policy elites showed an increased emphasis on the positive changes that Canadian intervention had produced in Afghanistan. Based on recommendations from the Manley Panel, the government also issued quarterly reports between 2008 and 2011 that explicitly documented the humanitarian activities that were conducted in Afghanistan. These reports included vivid pictures of soldiers interacting with Afghan civilians, women holding books, girls sitting in school, and children smiling as they collected water from a public pump. These images signaled that the “Whole of Government” strategy was committed to humanitarian activities and that it was intended to *help* Afghans, particularly feminized citizens. An excerpt from a *Toronto Star* article covering political debate over troop withdrawal highlights the crafty shaming of political parties who did not wish to continue the military mission:

But when I hear [critics of the Afghan war] griping, I think of Afghan women like Nilab Zareen. The Taliban threw her out of the country’s medical school. When I think of the NDP’s previous demands that we pull our troops immediately, I think of Zareen’s struggle, and the girls who are no longer illiterate. (Cohn, 2008)

Cohn's argument reflected a movement to justify continued Canadian military involvement in Afghanistan on the behalf of women's education. It is a subtle hint that those who wished to withdraw troops did not care about the well-being of Afghan women and their education. His argument assumes that without the Canadian military in Afghanistan to save and protect women's rights, that both the struggle of Afghan women will be lost, and that the country would return to a former state of incivility. The use of "feminist" rhetoric by the government and media did not surprise critical academics:

Of course the government tries to spin its policy, and of course wars will be portrayed in ways that make the 'home nation' look just and righteous. In this case, however, the narratives not only offer a justification for the mission in Afghanistan, they also try to eliminate debate about the mission by mobilizing moral arguments. By evoking an image of a protector of women and children, the government implies that any critic of the mission is therefore content to sacrifice democracy and let women suffer. (Sjolander and Trevenen, 2010, p. 55)

This form of argumentation serves to silence critics of the war, as it conflates support of the war with supporting the well-being of Afghan women.

The use of intervention-as-rescue narratives specifically served to silence critics who questioned the practicality, ethics, or feasibility of Canadian Forces' continued deployment to Afghanistan. As discussed in Chapter 4, political elites "official" justifications for the CF in Afghanistan were not neutral accounts of the war, but rather political messages used to foster public support for ongoing military activity. By crafting a digestible set of justifications for the Afghanistan War, foreign policy elites articulated a War Story that cast military intervention as appropriate, while rendering alternative policy suggestions for Afghanistan (specifically non-militarized options such as diplomacy or troop withdrawal) as implausible. This type of political maneuvering is similar to the silencing techniques to be discussed in later chapters.

Official accounts of the War in Afghanistan limited which voices could contribute to narratives about the war.

5.6 Humanitarianism and others: A secondary narrative of self/other

CHAPTER 4 OFFERED a reading of the “fighting terrorism” narrative and suggested that the image of the Canadian Forces in this narrative was (re)constructed in reference to the caricature of the terrorist other. I suggest that narratives about Canada’s role in fighting terrorism in Afghanistan relied on language that used a civilized/savage binary to cast Afghan insurgents as uncivilized hostiles who wished to wage war on civilized nations like Canada. The (re)construction of identity occurred within narratives that justified military action in Afghanistan. I argue that these narratives (re)constructed Canadian identity (and the identity of the Canadian Forces) as civil and were used to justify military combat activities while depicting the war environment as disorderly chaos imposed by terrorists in Afghanistan.

The “humanitarian” narrative in the discourse on Canada’s role in Afghanistan plays upon similar constructs. I suggest that this discourse caricaturizes feminized Afghan bodies as victims of incivility or savagery and (re)constructs Canadian soldiers as the heroes who save them from the disorderly state imposed by the terrorist other. The dichotomy used in these narratives still relied on casting Canada as civil and Afghanistan as savage, but also portrayed certain Afghan citizens as victims of savagery. Therefore, the (re)production of identities in the “humanitarian” narratives cast the terrorist as aggressors and soldiers as helpers. The aggressor/helper narrative is symbolic of the popularly held belief that Canada as a middle power is a helpful-fixer and that Canadian military agents serve to provide assistance to needy others globally.

The symbolism presented in images of Canadian soldiers assisting veiled Afghan woman supplements both the “fighting terrorism” and “humanitarianism” narratives. This theme narrates a War Story where the Canadian soldier fights terrorism *and saves women and children*. This construction reinforces the “us versus them” dichotomy, and bespeaks an account of war where Canadian soldiers help those who have been oppressed by our mutual enemy (*terrorists*). Sherene Razack (2004) explained that imagining Canadian soldiers as White Knights, sent to subdue, order, or save others from Dark Threats is an inherently colonial narrative, reinforced in racist understandings of the construction of self and other. She clarified that this form of racism is not simply an overt hatred of othered peoples, but a powerful narrative that emphasizes pity and compassion for others that allows us [Canadians] to maintain a sense of superiority (2004, p. 155).

Razack suggested that in order to understand colonial and racist assumptions in foreign policy narratives about peacekeeping and humanitarianism, Canadians need to abandon the deeply internalized idea that Canada *helps*: that we are “an innocent people with a special gift for peacekeeping, a people outside of history” (2004, p. 144). This includes recognizing that the internal power and political systems of nations like Afghanistan are part of a larger history of Empire worldwide, and that Canada and its Western allies have played a role in this development. Without examining those histories or dismantling the simplistic War Stories, Canadians become complicit in (re)producing the belief intervention is required, or even noble. To get to the foundation of the War Story’s inexactness, it requires taking a more careful look at how we describe ‘us’ and ‘them’.

Campbell (1998) explains that if all meaning is constituted through difference, then there can be no declaration about the nature of the self that is totally free of suppositions about the other. Particularly in war, there are practices of opposition,

which occur through the articulation of difference known as othering. The depictions of soldiers are (re)constructed through their differentiation from their enemies. Throughout the discourse on Canada's military role in Afghanistan, soldiers were often contrasted to the savage Afghan terrorist:

It isn't Canadian soldiers who have killed scores of ordinary Afghan civilians, women, and children, in suicide bombs and improvised explosive devices on the gutted roads of that country, who bomb schools and threaten teachers with death. It is the men like those my colleague interviewed [referring to Taliban interviewees] who do and who send in as cannon fodder any sufficiently poor, illiterate, desperate young Afghan men they can find. (Blatchford, 2006)

This explanation does not directly describe Canadian soldiers, but it does create an artificial dichotomy that assumes Canadian soldiers are the opposite of their enemies. Blatchford evokes an enemy as irrational, dangerous to "their" people, and as people willing to take advantage of weak members of their own society. Her narrative aligns with the civilized/savage binary explored in Chapter 4, which assumes that 'they' are savage, an offence that stands in contrast to 'our' supposed civility. This savagery is postured as a threat to our civility. The *Montreal Gazette* printed a similar narration:

Islamists try to blow [Canadians] up, not for refusing them attractive jobs or for our foreign policy misdeeds, but because they think we should die for being happy, tolerant people who do not claim to love the Creator while despising his creation and his creatures. And unless we convert to their way of thinking they will not relent. (Robson, 2007)

Here, the construction of a radical, extremist, and irrationally jealous enemy is the foil against which Canadian policy actions are measured. Not only does the (re)construction of such an image legitimize the violence or aggression used by Western military forces, but it also represents Western violence towards Afghans as moral, superior, and rational. The identity re-scripting of Canadian Forces identity as

morally superior does not happen independently of the (re)construction of two types of Afghan others: those who require rescue, and those who require civilizing. This is a dangerous proposition, as the policies formed will reflect these assumptions. If foreign policy practitioners assume that a population requires rescue, this also presumes that they lack the agency to ‘save’ themselves or lack the agency to make governing decisions for their nation. If Afghan insurgents are represented as irrational, violent, and harmful towards Afghan citizens, then militaristic interventions are cast as defensible policy in the name of ‘saving’ others from their oppression. In these narratives, Western forces determine what is best or what is right for Afghanistan’s political future, a policy symbolic of the “old colonial script” (Razack, 2000, p. 133) that has informed much of Canada’s identity as a humanitarian helper in international relations.

5.7 Conclusion: Effects of the humanitarian ‘helping’ narrative in Afghanistan

AS SUGGESTED in Chapter 4, the justifications used by foreign policy elites to describe (or re-define) the role of the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan were not neutral accounts of activities, but political messages intended to garner public support for the use of military force. Indeed, throughout the discourse on Afghanistan, political elites worked to (re)script the image of the Canadian Forces and to justify a shift of Canadian foreign policy towards increasingly militarized activities. Chapter 3, 4, and 5 have explored the three dominant justifications for military activity in Afghanistan. Throughout these chapters I have offered a reading of the muddle of assumptions that underpin political elites explanations of Canada’s participation in Afghanistan between 2001–2014. In each of the justifications, there was a clear indication by

foreign policy elites (at least by vocal, hegemonic elites) that Afghanistan's political situation required a magnified military role that would juxtapose the popular imagining of Canadian foreign policies as demilitarized peacekeeping.

Many political and military elites desired to represent the Forces as a re-militarized institution in Afghanistan. Chapter 3 discusses how the foreign policy elites (primarily academics) considered the combat role in Afghanistan as desirable because it was reasoned that the re-militarized foreign policy image was necessary to wield power and influence amongst Canadian allies. Chapter 4 explores how the re-militarization of foreign policy was projected by elites in conjunction with discourses of insecurity. Narratives projecting insecurity due to the threat of terrorism served to support military elites desire to shift foreign policy priorities to combat rather than peacekeeping activities. This chapter (Chapter 5) explores the peacekeeping myth in further detail and explains that despite political and military leaders' desire to brand the Forces with a combat-oriented image, that re-militarized branding was actually accomplished by discourse that adopted the foundational narrative of the peacekeeping myth: that Canada (and its military) *help(s)*. As discussed above, this narrative is not an innocent self-imaging in a rose-coloured glass, but an inherently political activity. The final chapter in Part II explores the narrative of *helping* in foreign policy branding. Chapter 6 examines a 2006 Canadian Forces recruitment campaign that sought to re-brand the military image using symbolism that emphasized the "helpful-fixer" image that was popularly imagined as a niche activity for Canadian foreign policy.

Chapter 6

Narratives of Helping: Fight With the Canadian Forces

DISCOURSE ON Canada's role in Afghanistan was comprised of three dominant narratives that justified military action in the region. Early narratives (2001–2006) by elite voices focused on a need to uphold alliance responsibilities (as discussed in Chapter 3) and fight terrorism abroad (as discussed in Chapter 4). However, opinion polls throughout the intervention demonstrated that the public deemed these objectives as less desirable than foreign policy strategies focused on humanitarian-oriented and de-militarized rhetoric. The poll results reflect a popularly held association of Canadian foreign policy with traditional peacekeeping. In Chapter 5, I discuss how the peacekeeping myth that cast soldiers as de-militarized helpers has been reproduced in public consciousness. Canada's historical participation in international interventions has been associated with peacekeeping and imagined as morally altruistic. This imagined association has reinforced the self-identification of Canada as a helpful-fixer actor

in global politics. I suggest the peaceful middle-power myth was reflected in 2002–2005 opinion polls that expressed public preference for humanitarian or peacekeeping missions in Canadian foreign policy.¹

Therefore, within the discourse on Afghanistan, elite narratives in the latter half of the mission (2006–2014) increasingly focused on how the military was *helping* Afghans. Narratives about humanitarian activities in Afghanistan by the Canadian Forces relied on the (re)framing of national identity as a helpful-fixer nation and (re)scripting the military as a helpful, altruistic institution. Although the Harper government never fully abandoned its use of the ‘fighting terrorism’ combat rhetoric, there was increased government efforts to inform the public of humanitarian-oriented strategies (most notably, the release of quarterly reports from 2008 to 2011 that detailed development projects supported by the Canadian government). I argue that the humanitarian narrative better aligned with the public’s preference for Canada to perform roles associated with the helpful-fixer identity, and suggest this bespeaks the power of the helpful-fixer myth in foreign policy discourse.

However, the historical (re)production of the peaceful helpful-fixer myth has not been unanimously supported. As outlined in Chapters 3 and 4, military elites had long desired to abandon the peacekeeping/demilitarized image. The NATO combat mission(s) in Afghanistan provided Canadian officials an opportunity to re-brand the Canadian Forces’ image as increasingly militarized and capable of war-fighting. I argue that the desire by military elites to present a combat-capable national image was rendered plausible by signaling to the public that the re-militarization of foreign activities in Afghanistan prioritized *helping* and rescuing others, and therefore retained

¹There were three major polls conducted between 2002–2006 that demonstrated the public preferred peacekeeping or humanitarian missions to peacemaking or combat missions. The polls were conducted by Environics Research Group Limited in 2002 and 2004 and Ekos Research Associates Inc. in 2005. These polls are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5.

symbolism present in the helpful-fixer myth by casting military activities as morally altruistic.

This chapter explores how the themes of helping and rescue were symbolized by representations of Canadian soldiers in a 2006 recruitment campaign. The “Fight” campaign functioned to (re)brand the Forces as increasingly militarized, while signaling that the objective of the military was to help others. The subsequent sections are a detailed analysis of the “Fight” video campaigns released in 2006–2007. I use an analysis of the imagery and plots in these advertisements to show how the Canadian Forces attempted to re-militarize their image while at the same time signaling that the Forces’ mandate was to *help* (abroad and at home). I argue these representations served to bridge the (imagined) peaceful helpful-fixer identity with elite narratives that emphasized Afghanistan required military activity to support humanitarian goals (as mandated in the 3-D or “Whole of Government” approach). I suggest that this branding is part of larger discursive efforts by political and military elites to justify not only CF activity in Afghanistan, but also the relevance and importance of the military in global affairs.

6.1 Re-branding through the “Fight with the Canadian Forces” advertisements

THE RECRUITMENT campaign launched by the Canadian Forces in 2006 serves as a site of analysis for understanding the type of identity that the military was promoting. Designed by the Montreal-based advertising firm Publicis, the ads were intended to address a shortage of active members. Examining these ads allows an interpretation about the type of branding that was desired by the Canadian Forces (CF). Analyzing the symbols used in media promotions helps to identify the types of social norms and

values that were being promoted about the Canadian Forces. Kellner explained, “like myths, ads frequently resolve social contradictions, provide models of identity, and celebrate the existing social order” (cited in Goldie, 2014, p. 417). Specifically in the “Fight Fear. Fight Distress. Fight Chaos” advertisements, there is opportunity to explore the types of branding that were promoted by the CF, and the ways that this re-branding contributes to the reconstruction of military identity.

Through market research in the early 2000s, the Canadian Forces became aware that their “brand” was not clearly defined and that there was a general lack of awareness about the military among Canadian youth (Goldie, 2014, p. 418). The “Fight Campaign” ads were a stark departure from earlier recruitment campaigns. In 1980, a CF television ad used upbeat marching band music with images of ships crashing through waves, non-militarized equipment such as sonar radar, and a clip of a helicopter landing on the deck of a destroyer. The title and song of the campaign was “There’s No Life Like It”. The ads symbolized that military life was filled with adventure and fun but lacked overt reference to the use of weapons by soldiers and did not portray any violent occupational dangers about serving in the CF.²

In the later half of that decade, media ads entitled, “It’s your choice, your future” (1987) were released with images of non-uniformed Forces’ members attending university and playing sports. The videos showed members in traditional uniform dress accepting graduation diplomas. There was no imagery that showed characters engaged in combat scenarios or handling weapons. This recruitment focused heavily on educational opportunities, specifically post-secondary degrees, which could be funded by the Canadian Armed Forces.³

In the late 1990s, recruiting efforts diminished significantly, largely due to funding

²“There’s No Life Like It”, video available: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mDSaEWdMbI4>

³“It’s Your Choice, It’s Your Future”, video available: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1Uk3KerS21M>

cuts to the Defence budget and decreased resources for marketing. As discussed in Chapter 4, military enthusiasts criticized the ‘Decade of Darkness’ or ‘rusting out’ of the Canadian Forces in the 1990s, where recruitment levels dropped by 33 percent between 1991 and 2001 and many members of the CF were offered early release or early retirement compensation packages as a means to reduce overall membership (Statistics Canada, 2015).

Roger MacIassac, Director of Recruiting of Military Careers for the Forces, noted that the decline in recruitment related to an understandable response by young Canadians who wanted a “realistic” portrayal of what the Canadian Forces did (Ramage, 2006). Focus groups reported that young Canadians were aware of the hardships of war, and found it off-putting that the Canadian Forces wanted them to join without recognizing the realities of the profession (Goldie, 2014, p. 418).

The “Fight” ads were first tested in Atlantic Canada, where the military historically had drawn a disproportionate amount of recruits. The three-million dollar campaign was created to increase recruitment numbers and set a goal of 6,500 new personnel for 2007 (Ramage, 2006). The new ads were filled with dark, trancelike music and short, hazy video clips of soldiers performing domestic and international activities (‘Canadian Forces launch . . .’, 2008). Canadian television journalist Graham Richardson noted that “it [was] certainly an aggressive push for more soldiers, a move that the Forces desperately need[ed] to make. They want[ed] to grow the Forces significantly, and that is challenging at any time, and they’re finding it challenging now” (Smith, 2006).

The video campaign was aired on television and through Internet advertising banners. There were three sixty-second ads with different storylines and imagery but the same floating word slogans: “Fight Fear”, “Fight Distress”, “Fight Chaos”, and “Fight With the Canadian Forces”. In the following section, each advertisement

video is detailed and followed by analysis of the messaging and symbols present in the campaign.

6.2 Fight Ad #1: International danger

FIGHT CAMPAIGN Ad #1 subtitled “*International Security and British Columbia search and rescue*” begins with ominous music and the caption “Gulf of Oman”. There is a ship on the ocean at dusk. Below deck, a soldier grabs a gun off the wall and runs out of the cabin, onto deck. The background has military drumbeats and sounds of a ship ventilation system. The next caption flashes, “Afghanistan”. In dim light, armed soldiers are lined up to enter a warehouse. There is dramatic music and a dog is barking. The video cuts to “British Columbia” and a view of the Rocky Mountains through the open hatch of an airplane. A soldier stands by the open door. The video switches quickly between scenes: a soldier climbing down onto a raft that departs from a ship on the ocean; three soldiers wearing parachutes jump out of an airplane; a group of soldiers moving through snow-covered terrain with large backpacks and white helmets.

In the “Afghanistan” scene, soldiers move quickly and covertly through a narrow hallway, then kick open a door. The music becomes very dramatic, and there is a shrill siren blaring. There is a medic running alongside civilians and the caption says “Fight Fear”. There is an image of soldiers ushering out two men and a woman, with civilians climbing into a military ambulance. The video cuts to a man rappelling down the side of a mountain at the site of a plane crash.

The video cuts to a soldier at the bow of a small boat as it moves towards a large boat on fire. There is dramatic music and the sounds of waves hitting the side of a boat. A soldier hands a man a bag. The caption flashes “Fight Distress”.

The video cuts to a dramatic scene as a tank rolls through the streets. There is a sharpshooter aiming his gun out the window, a car bomb explodes and the video shows a car in flames. The caption flashes “Fight Chaos”. There is a clip of soldiers digging out rubble in trenches, and a group of four male soldiers in combat gear with the caption that flashes “Fight... With the Canadian Forces. Join Us. Over 100 exciting Full and Part Time Careers”. The “International danger and rescue in British Columbia” ad concludes with the image of the Forces crest on a plain black screen with a final loud drum beat, and the screen fades to black. The ad is segmented, but the flashing between storylines evokes a sense of confusion, urgency, and excitement for the viewer. The overall sentiment is melodrama.

6.3 Images and storylines in Fight Ad #1

THE ADVERTISEMENT is rich with imagery and messaging about the nature of careers with the Canadian Forces (CF). The Fight Ads provided an opportunity for identity re-scripting of the CF image. The typecast used throughout the ads needed to appeal to the target recruitment demographic (18-24 year old Canadians), but also to the general public at large. The images used reinforce the branding that the Canadian Forces wished to project, and emphasize the type of individuals that the institution sought and was represented by: assertive, brave, risk-taking youth. The Department of National Defence’s director of marketing and advertising services explained that “we had a story to tell and we wanted to establish those stories and those scenarios” (Dunn, 2008). The characters, whose faces are rarely shown, are constructed by their activities. The focus of the ad is on adventure and action, not on the characters themselves.

Fight Ad #1 projected an idea of a military career that was fast-paced, adrenaline-filled, and exciting. But it was not the content alone that portrayed this messaging. The videography style tried to address shortcomings identified by focus groups: namely the desire by young Canadians to see ‘realism and transparency’ in campaign ads (Ramage, 2006). Goldie (2014) explains that this type of cinematic style (cinema-verite) mimics other combat films such as *Saving Private Ryan*:

“Shot in de-saturated colours, with jerky camera movements and unfocused shots. . . the fast-paced quick cuts throughout the 60 second ad convey motion, action, adventure, and even danger. . . with these various techniques, this ad draws on the conventions or codes of the ‘war film’ or the combat film, in that the spectacle of battle, or action is the focus of the ad.” (p. 421)

The use of combat film imagery creates a sense of excitement about the Canadian Forces. The use of Hollywood techniques plays on the thrill of action movies that encourages beliefs about the nature of the Canadian Forces (i.e. a fast-paced, exciting career), as well as the nature of warfare experienced by the Canadian Forces (battle as excitement).

The representation of war as a scene of excitement does not accurately capture the complex realities of war. War produces many experiences, and soldiers can feel a variety of emotions, from boredom to anxiety to intense fear. The stress felt by soldiers who conclude they are ‘wasting their time’ or could ‘die for nothing’ (Winslow, 1997, p. 231; cited in Whitworth, 2003, p. 87) is not something for which soldiers can prepare, nor is it something that military training includes. Allison Howell’s study of PTSD in armed forces discusses the traumatogenic qualities of war that can produce psychological injuries (2011). Romeo Dallaire, viewed as a Canadian peacekeeping hero by many, has openly discussed his own battle with PTSD that resulted from the horrific events he witnessed in the UN peacekeeping to Rwanda. The complex realities

and the accompanying emotions of war are rarely fully explored in the popular media representations.

The representation of war in both Hollywood film and the Fight Campaign does not capture the daily experience of soldier life in a war theatre, rather these representations are intended to create appeal for the life of a soldier. Although the Fight Campaign was a departure from earlier Canadian Forces' recruitment ads that did not show active combat in their imagery, it is questionable whether the ads were truly transparent about military careers as the Fight Campaign showed a dramatized, romanticized version of the experiences of war.

Like many first-person video games, Fight Ad #1 puts the viewer as a direct participant in the storyline. Stahl calls this first-person perspective "interactive militainment" where war is depicted as something to be played and experienced (cited in Goldie, 2014, p. 416). First person techniques are used heavily throughout the Fight Ads, where the camera angles are shot so that the viewer feels immersed within the scene.

Another convention from war films used in the Fight Ads is the idea of being involved in a specialized mission: covert operations in which only a select and unique few characters can be involved. The "International danger and rescue in British Columbia" ad's imagery focuses largely on the "specialized mission" as an international one, focusing on scenes in urban Afghanistan and a naval mission in the Gulf of Oman. Action film genres that create a story of espionage focus on a protagonist that is unique in skill and mission. Fight Ad #1 plays upon this notion, as the Canadian soldiers perform a variety of skilled tasks, such as riding snowmobiles, rappelling down cliffs, and operating watercraft. The specialized mission narratives in Fight Ad #1 suggest that a career in the Canadian Forces is unique, thrill-based, and involves use of specialized skills and technology. This creates appeal to potential

recruits as military service is depicted as an adventure.

Fight Ad #1's images also focus on adventure. Symbols such as machine guns and foreign landscapes conjure the "specialized mission" that Canadian Forces soldiers conduct that mimics action movie suspense and thrill. These images in Fight Ad #1 are considerably more militaristic than previous Canadian Forces ad images. However, the images did not show any active fighting, direct shooting, or violence. The ad focuses on adventure, without depicting any actual danger. In the scenes, the Canadian Forces soldiers were in control, in charge, and in service of other characters that required rescue. These images serve to reinforce an established archetype of the Canadian soldier: the rescuer.

Canada's mythologized history as a peacekeeper has reconstructed the image of the Canadian soldier as one who altruistically helps others. Fight Ad #1 depicts a more masculinized, militaristic image of the Canadian soldier, but does not reconstruct the established role of the Canadian soldier. The adventure theme in the ad may have appealed to the target recruitment demographic (young Canadians aged 18–24), but they also appealed to public sensibility about the type of activities that Canadian soldiers *should* perform internationally: rescue and relief. It is not surprisingly, then, that the ads did not contain overt military images, such as shooting or bombing, as these were tasks that the Canadian public had consistently showed a discomfort towards. Fight Ad #1 was about military adventure, but it was primarily about reinforcing social consensus about the type of military activity Canadians desired the Armed Forces to conduct.

Related to the public digestibility of Fight Ad #1, is the presence of (assumed) international non-governmental organizations (INGO) in the Afghanistan urban rescue scene. The scene depicts a medic wearing a red cross symbol on an armband. Although not central or distinct, this symbol resonates with Canadians, who have found

appeal in foreign policy activities that involve multilateral efforts. The Red Cross, an institution that attempts to be unbiased and neutral in many international conflict zones uses as its logo a red cross. Goldie suggests highlighting this sign in the Fight Ad could be read as a signal of Canada's intention to help others in a non-politicized way (2014, p. 423). However, Canada's involvement in Afghanistan from 2001–2014 was inherently political. As many international interventions are politically motivated foreign policies, it is deceptive to associate state military interventions with INGO aid agencies and activity. Regardless of Goldie's interpretation of the red cross, it may be enough to suggest this symbol represents care; Canadian soldiers who help or care during times of conflict.

The symbolic conflation of the red cross symbolism to Canadian Forces activities in Fight Ad #1 relates to the Canadian federal government efforts to emphasize development projects in their Afghan policy. The red cross symbol in the ads takes on greater significance for the type of subtle messaging being associated with humanitarianism in Afghanistan, and the objectives of the Canadian government to present the mission to the Canadian public in a positive way.

6.4 Fight Ads #2 and #3: Domestic danger

FIGHT CAMPAIGN Ad #2, "*Disaster Relief in Canada and Rescue at Sea*," opens with an aerial camera shot of a forest fire, with the text "Forest Fires in British Columbia." The next scene shows fire damage in the background as a truck convoy drives past. There are drumbeats and dramatic music with short electronic signals. The video flashes the subtitle 'Flooding in Manitoba', depicting two military trucks half submerged in deep water. Soldiers are piling sandbags while a man is carried by a stretcher. A helicopter flies over the scene while the camera zooms out to show a

Red Cross emergency camp. The next scene shows firefighters putting out a large fire, while a soldier puts an oxygen facemask on a woman. The next scene shows a van stuck in flooded waters, with two people waving for help, standing on the roof. The camera angle is an aerial view, as if filmed from a helicopter. The video shows people being rescued from floodwaters. A woman and child are running next to two soldiers wearing armbands with a red cross. A caption “Rescue Off the Coast of Nova Scotia” flashes over a scene with a military ship on the ocean near a large boat on fire. Two soldiers dive into the ocean from a helicopter. The divers help the people who are shipwrecked in the water and pull them into a zodiac raft. There are electronic beeps as text flashes: “Fight Distress”, “Fight Fear”, “Fight Chaos”, and “Fight with the Canadian Forces”. The Canadian Forces logo then fades to black.⁴ The video, with its intense sound effects and jagged film cuts between scenes is the same *cinema-verite* style used in Fight Ad #1.

The images and symbols used in Fight Ad #2 reflect similar themes to the symbols used in Fight Ad #1. There is a focus on rescue and assistance. Unlike Fight Ad #1 that promoted the idea of thrill and adventure, Fight Ad #2 plays to sentiments in the audience about the ways that the Canadian Forces have assisted in domestic crises. The flooding scene signifies military assistance in the 1997 Red River flood in Manitoba that required military assistance in creating sandbag dykes to protect the city of Winnipeg. The sea rescue scenes play on the same notion that CF specialized equipment and personnel have been used to help in domestic crisis situations, such as naval rescue patrols in coastal regions. The images signify the rescue role that Canadian Forces have played in domestic states of emergency. They reinforce the archetype of “helper” which, as discussed earlier, is well accepted by the public as an

⁴Fight Ad #1 and Fight Ad #2 transcripts available at: http://cdn.forces.ca/_CAPTIONS/fight_1_EN.html and http://cdn.forces.ca/_CAPTIONS/fight_2_EN.html.

ideal role for the Canadian Forces. The importance of the rescue archetype will be discussed in greater detail later in this chapter.

Fight Ad #3, “*Drug Bust and Hard Landing*,” opens in the cockpit of a plane; the camera angle shows a snowy background and a male strapping into a harness. The next scene video pans to a formation of snowmobiles racing over an open landscape and the caption “Canada’s North” with nondescript coordinates. The snowmobiles appear to be racing towards a landed plane. Dramatic music with drum beats plays. The video flashes to an ocean scene with the caption “Canada’s East Coast”. The camera zooms in on a ship moving quickly towards a second ship with armed men shuffling machine guns. Under the deck of the first ship, Canadian soldiers view submarine radars and hurry down a hallway towards a ladder. The music increases in intensity. A motorized small boat races towards the second ship while men heave large barrels (presumably of contraband items) overboard. The video switches back to the plane where a man jumps out of the hatch, with silence as the camera watches the jumper dramatically pull his parachute in slow motion. The video flashes, and there is a new scene inside a frozen plane with passengers covered in frost. The video quickly switches back to the ocean scene where Canadian naval crew overtakes drug smugglers on the deck. A scene of a press conference plays where seized drug bundles, weapons, and stacks of American bills are presented against a backdrop of Canadian flags. The caption “Fight Chaos” flashes. The scene switches to men storming the frozen plane. The camera angle is inside the plane from a passenger seat and the image is blurry, as if the viewer was a frozen passenger watching rescuers enter the cabin. Men in jumpsuits usher frost-covered civilians from the plane, on a stretcher and wrapped in blankets. A helicopter hovers above the crash scene, with the loud sounds of helicopter blades whirling. “Fight Distress...Fight with the Canadian Forces” flashes across the scene. “Join Us”, the Forces logo appear with a final drum

beat, and the screen fades to black. The Fight Ad #3 uses the same video style (cinema verite) as Fight Ad #1 and #2.

6.5 Images and storylines in Fight Ads #2 and #3

THE THREE Fight Ads convey a message that the tasks associated with the Canadian Forces are exciting and adrenaline-filled: jumping from a helicopter into the ocean, driving snowmobiles across snow, parachuting from planes, piloting a helicopter, and operating submarine technology. These images suggest a fast-paced, exciting, and highly masculinized aspect of the Canadian Forces. What is notably absent from the latter ads is the militarized image of a Canadian soldier as seen in Fight Ad #1's clips. Rescue is the theme in both Fight Ad #2 and Fight Ad #3—but with an absence of combat scenery. Goldie (2014) suggests that while Ad #1 was well received by marketing professionals and the target audience, political opponents criticized this imagery for being “too American” (p. 424). Goldie argues that all three ads construct the Canadian Forces as “helpful heroes” despite the small differences between ad images 2014, p. 414. The rescue adventure narrative in the Fight Ads reinforces the Canadian public's desire to serve a helpful foreign policy role, while still creating appeal for young recruits.

The instances of “rescue” appear in each storyline from the ads. By focusing on the rescue theme, the ads create overlapping story lines. Two different types of rescue are performed in these scenes: saving citizens in corporeal danger and saving the nation from non-corporeal danger. In both of these notions, the Canadian soldier is in control, and is not at risk himself of danger. By fighting “fear”, “chaos”, and “distress”, the videos do not depict the Canadian Forces inflicting violence upon others. The notion of “fighting” bolsters a sentiment of masculinized militarism in the

Canadian Forces, but does so without making the public uncomfortable by showing the actual atrocities present in war and crisis situations.

The storyline in the Fight Ads shows multiple rescue scenes where soldiers are helping/rescuing people, as well as scenes where soldiers are conducting humanitarian tasks.

Table 6.1: Canadian Forces Television Advertisements

Ad #	Scene	Rescue activity	Theme
1	Afghanistan Urban	Two men and a women saved using flash bomb	Rescue
1	Gulf of Oman	Zodiac rescues rowboat, officer gives supplies to shipwrecked male	Rescue
1	British Columbia	White helmeted soldiers rappel down cliff towards plane tail wreckage	Rescue
1	British Columbia	Soldier in orange jumpsuits tends to woman's head wound	Rescue
2	Flooding in Manitoba	Soldiers rescue woman and child outside Red Cross camp	Rescue
2	Flooding in Manitoba	Soldiers lower ladder to people stranded on van roof in flood waters	Rescue
2	Coast of Nova Scotia	Navy personnel swim towards stranded people wearing life jackets near shipwreck	Rescue
3	Canada's North	Soldiers in orange jumpsuits storm frozen plane and rescue passengers	Rescue
3	Canada's North	Snowmobiles race towards plane wreckage	Rescue
1	British Columbia	Fire fighting	Hero/Helper
2	Flooding in Manitoba	Medical assistance, sandbag wall building	Hero/Helper
3	Canada's East Coast	Confronting drug smugglers, confiscating contraband items	Hero/Helper

The geographic references in the Fight Ads are used intentionally (Goldie, 2014). The use of geographic images seeks to create sentiment by the Canadian public by linking any potential personal experiences of rescue to the video. Sandra Whitworth, who has extensively studied the humanitarian peacekeeping activities of the Canadian Forces, discussed her sentimental feelings in the Preface to *Men, Militarism, and UN Peacekeeping*:

...In January 1998 I watched (with tears in my eyes) as members of Canada's armed forces helped clear ice from my roof, chop wood, and otherwise contribute to my family's and community's safety through an ice storm that had cut our power, water, heat, and phone for two very cold wintery weeks. (2004, p. 1)

Whitworth discusses her tension over the gratitude she felt when engaging with these "jovial, decent, and dedicated" individuals while studying and criticizing the military activities abroad in UN peacekeeping missions in which many of those soldiers had likely participated. The Fight Ads draw on these same sentiments, creating a connection (often personal) for Canadian citizens who have experienced domestic relief by Canadian Forces assistance. The ads show rescue assistance scenes that reflect a number of historical and geographically specific crises to which viewers cross-country can relate.

The reinforcement of the rescuer archetype in the ads mirrors public sentiment about what role the Canadian Forces *should* conduct. Goldie explains how the creation of the rescuer archetype plays on commonly understood binary role construction:

The paradigmatic structure of the text follows a combat/peace or aggressor/helper oppositional. Rather than face danger and use guns to kill, for instance, the Canadian Forces do this to save. While extreme conditions are evident and physical and mental challenges are present, no actual combat is witnessed in the ad, or even really suggested. Everything that is constructed is done with the ideological imperative that Canada is a nation that helps. (2014, p. 423)

The Fight commercials advertise the Forces as a militarized, adventure filled career option, while still reassuring the public that their helpful-fixer role is being preserved.

Goldie's semiotic interpretation of the Fight Ads focused on the objective of associating soldiers with helping. However, Goldie's analysis overlooks the symbolism of non-militarized others shown in the videos. The imagery in the Fight Ads is almost exclusively of CF members. The videos allude to drug smugglers at sea, and human captors in Afghanistan, but their actual agents of activity are not depicted. It depersonalizes the antagonist in the storyline as a faceless villain who wishes to bring chaos and harm to the Canadian state. The helpless people that are being saved by CF members in the videos are understood to be Canadian citizens. This represents the 'dangers' that the CF soldiers are fighting are non-Canadian antagonists, and the referent of security is the Canadian citizen. The Fight Ads help to reinforce the Canadian soldier as a hero who defends borders from external threat, and reinforces a fear that the Canadian public requires military protection.

Goldie's observation of the aggressor/helper dichotomy is reflected in the way that the Canadian soldier is depicted in the Fight Ads. The storyline suggests that the job of a Canadian soldier is thrilling and involves an element of danger (but not *too* much danger). The soldier is an actor that rescues/saves Canadians without showing aggression or violence. The storylines in the video resolve tension between the military's desire to re-brand the Canadian Forces in a more masculinized image and the Canadian public's desire to retain the helpful-fixer international image perceived as unique to Canada. The Canadian Forces ad demonstrates that their soldiers fight—but these videos don't show killing, firing weapons, or other overtly militarized activities. The videos symbolize that soldiers help, but not in an overly feminized or emotional way. The Fight Ads rebrand the Forces as a unique hybrid

of soldier and helper—the very qualities that most Canadians associate with traditional peacekeeping, even though the Forces have not performed that idealized role in decades. The emphasis on “helping” in the Fight Ads relates to the long-standing and immutable public belief that this is the inherent and appropriate role of the Canadian Forces, a belief that contributes to the larger discursive representation of Canada as an international do-gooder or helpful-fixer. The Fight campaigns therefore offer an image re-branding that is arguably more militarized than their precursors, but still align with the prominent myth of Canada-as-Peacekeeper: a self-delusional belief that Canada (and its soldiers) are helpful, benign, and virtuous.

The Fight Ads are not only a simplified, visual representation of the image that Canadians associate with their armed forces (“helpers”), but also a visual representation of how most Canadians may visualize war. Goldie discusses the role of cinematic techniques in the portrayal of war in film, noting that most people have a mediated concept of war: “[War] is (only) realistic according to other representations of war they have seen” (2014, p. 416). She explains that the purpose in war film is *simulation*, where the watched may experience the thrill “without the inconvenience of actually being shot or blown to pieces” (Chapman, 2008; in Goldie, 2014, p. 416). This explains why the Fight Ads omit actual violence. The public is not interested in seeing the horrors of war, but are invested in the ways the Fight Ad videos align with public preferences about of Canadian Forces activities and the stubborn association of Canadian military activity with traditional peacekeeping.

Cynthia Enloe explains why peacekeeping is viewed so popularly by civilians—it “inspires optimism because it seems to perform military duties without being militaristic” (1993, p. 33). Valourizing military duty through the creation of the hero archetype is central to the Fight Ads. The soldiers in these videos are depicted as

heroes—involved in thrilling action, performing gallant tasks. They are saving Canadians. They are preventing dangers both abroad and at home. When military activity is romanticized, the military is recreated and reified as a foundational, essential institution in Canada. The romanticization of military tasks in the Fight Ads leads potential recruits to believe that military experiences are exciting and heroic.

The depiction of military tasks in the Fight Ads is euphemized: the soldiers carry guns, but do not fire them. There is little struggle shown in the interactions between the soldiers and other characters in the Fight Ad videos. In these scenes, Canadian Forces members conduct their tasks with great ease and no resistance. The ads suggest the presence of actualized dangers, but do not show the outcome of these dangers. Such representation is common in the military-entertainment complex, as the purpose of the Forces ads, or other military-glorifying media, is to appeal to an audience. When he discusses using video games in the recruitment of American army recruits, Giroux (2004) quips, “Of course, the realities of carrying eighty-pound knapsacks in one hundred and twenty degree heat, the panic-inducing anxiety and fear of real people shooting bullets or planting real bombs to kill or maim you are not among those experiences reproduced for entertainment” (p. 217). The spectacle of danger demonstrated in the Fight Ad videos is exciting, but simultaneously misleads the viewer. Daily drudgery exists in military service, both in wartime and ordinary service life. The Fight Ads do not represent the monotony of base life, or the actual day-to-day experiences of Canadian Forces members at home or abroad.

The Fight Ads therefore contribute to the discourse about the military and war that was being (re)produced during the intervention in Afghanistan from 2001–2014, even if the imagery was not exclusively focused on Afghanistan. Public perceptions and imagining of both the military and war were informed by the symbolic, heavily mediated representations of Canadian soldiers and the roles they performed in these

videos. These representations, like the political narratives about the CF in Afghanistan, were not neutral accounts of military activity, but strategic attempts to glorify military service and appeal to potential recruits. The negative or traumatic aspects of soldierly duty are absent from these representations.

6.6 Fight Ads and political messaging: Re-militarizing foreign policy

THE DEPARTMENT of National Defence claimed that both the content and the timing of the ads had nothing to do with public opinion of the Afghanistan mission in 2006–2007. Col. Matthew Overton explained: “We certainly don’t pander to popular concern of anything the Forces are doing. We want [potential recruits] to see the full range of how we help Canadians defend sovereignty in the world” (‘Canadian Forces launch ...’, 2008). While Overton’s claims that the messaging in the ads was unrelated to Afghanistan specifically, the ability of the CF to recruit young Canadians for military service is indeed *generally* related to how citizens imagine the role and purpose of the military, and whether these associations are positively imagined. Discourse about the military in Afghanistan has shaped public perception about the role of the Canadian Forces and has influenced how the public has imagined military service. While the ads may not have been *directly* related to the marketing of the Afghanistan mission, they were strategically designed to increase public appeal of military service through glamourized imagery and served to re-brand the Forces as increasingly combat-capable.

Overton’s statement contains noteworthy assumptions about the military and public perception. Overton unapologetically claimed that the Canadian Forces were unconcerned with the desires of the Canadian public. The military is a publicly funded institution in Canada’s political democracy. As with domestic policy areas, foreign

policy should be informed by, and reflective of, values and priorities set out by a democratic citizenry. Therefore, I argue that the military has a responsibility to the public and that the military *should be* accountable for policies and conduct in their missions. I contest Overton's claim that DND does not [need to] pander to popular concern about the CF and argue that military unresponsiveness to public concern is inherently undemocratic.

Overton's assertion that the military was not concerned about public sentiment reflects a belief that the Canadian Forces is an essential, foundational institution that rests above public opinion. In short, Overton assumes that the Canadian Forces is an unquestionable institution, unaffected by public scrutiny, and essential to Canadian political existence. Overton's statement explicitly references the CF mandate to "defend sovereignty"—which is spurious considering Canada's initial presence in Afghanistan violated the international norm of sovereignty. However, Overton's claim reflects the belief that the Canadian Forces are an essential institution because international threats require military activity to secure the Canadian state and the well-being of citizens within the boundaries of the state. In other words, military activity is cast as acceptable policy if its objectives function to protect the state from outside threats.

This claim echoes narratives discussed in Chapter 3 about the need for Canada to prove to other nations that its military was capable of combat and fighting threats to global security. These narratives called for the re-militarization of foreign policy, as explicitly expressed by Harper's proclamation that "[W]e need to build a first class military and keep it that way. . . Canada must have a credible military to be a credible leader. . . countries that cannot or will not make real contributions to global security are not regarded as serious players" (Government of Canada, 2008). However, these narratives did not align well with popularly imagined foreign policy roles that many

Canadians felt the Canadian Forces *should* perform.

Post-2008, the Harper government was informed (by opinion polls, as well as the *Independent Panel on the Future of Afghanistan* and the Standing Committee on National Defence) that the Canadian public preferred to imagine the military conducting helpful, humanitarian-orientated foreign policies. This preference stands in contradiction to the strategy of developing a “credible military” presented by Harper. Therefore, scripting of Canada’s role in Afghanistan needed to balance political and military elites’ objectives to re-militarize foreign policy with the public desire to project an international image that Canada was a helpful nation.

I argue that, despite Overton’s claims that public opinion does not shape military marketing, symbolism in the Fight Ads inadvertently functioned to bridge the gap between public nostalgic desires for humanitarian foreign policy objectives, and the objectives of the Harper government to “finaliz[e] a long-term plan to thoroughly reverse the so-called ‘rusting-out’ of the Canadian forces.” (Government of Canada, 2008). The Fight Ads reinforced dominantly held assumptions that the Canadian military is an institution that *helps*, but does so in an adventurous, heroic way that utilizes militarized technology. This imagery signals that the Canadian military was still promoting values of moral altruism (“helping”), just in a modern, re-militarized fashion.

As I will argue in Part III, the representation of the military as a helpful institution and the representation of soldiers as rescuers and heroes, is what facilitates the unproblematized acceptance of militarism in foreign policy and popular culture. Part III will continue to explore how the *helpful* narratives in foreign policy discourse cast military intervention as a worthy policy and render plausible the belief that military force is a legitimate mechanism to achieve political goals.

Part III

Re-Militarization of Canadian Foreign Policy

PART II HAS focused on how Canada's foreign policy role was negotiated throughout discourse on the Afghanistan War. The three dominant justifications for military participation provided by government officials were that Canada was assisting international allies, Canada was fighting terrorism, and Canada was providing humanitarian assistance to Afghans. These narratives comprised the "official" War Story about Canada's role in Afghanistan. Throughout these narratives, many foreign policy elites expressed a desire to shift Canada's international identity and the brand of the Canadian Forces to a more militarized image.

Military elites had long tried to communicate that the peacekeeper/warrior dichotomy in the Canada-as-Peacekeeper meme was an inaccurate representation of Canada's foreign policy history. These voices emphasized fallacies of the peacekeeping myth and called upon public support for re-militarized foreign policy post-9/11. Military officials acknowledged that Afghanistan was not a traditional peacekeeping mission and that participation would require active combat by the Canadian Forces. However between 2001–2006, the government failed to consistently and coherently explain policy in Afghanistan. Despite military officials' insistence that Afghanistan was *not* a peacekeeping mission and required increasingly militarized strategies by the CF, media misuse of terms such as 'peacekeeping' or 'peace mission' also contributed to public confusion about objectives in Afghanistan.¹ Studies documented a lack of public awareness about the military in Afghanistan, and post-2006 the government made greater efforts to clearly promote military objectives.²

However, government officials struggled to convince the public of the *legitimacy* of

¹See section 5.4 for further discussion.

²In 2005, an Ipsos-Reid study found that 67 percent of those polled knew "very little" or "nothing" about Canadian Forces operations in Afghanistan. Canadian Ipsos-Reid Express, DND Study conducted March 8–10th, 2005 with a sample of 964 people polled. The question read: "How much do you know about Canadian Forces operations currently taking place in Afghanistan?" The results were: 12 percent "Nothing", 55 percent "Very little", 30 percent "A fair amount", and 3 percent "A great deal".

military participation in Afghanistan. By 2006, polls demonstrated that the public was wary of militarized activities.³ Despite public disenchantment, militarized policy and the re-branding of the CF was actualized throughout the intervention. Efforts to re-militarize the CF's branding were accompanied by government narratives that emphasized military policies in Afghanistan contained a broad objective to *help*. Although this did not resolve the peacekeeping/warrior dichotomy, the promotion of the military as a helpful institution served to correlate justifications for military participation with a familiar symbol of Canadian national identity: the role of helpful-fixer.

In the latter half of the mission, the Support the Troops movement reproduced a semiotic environment that cast soldiers as altruistic heroes and reinforced the imperative that Canadian soldiers *help*. Post-2008, elite narratives about the Afghanistan War focused on soldiers and the honorable nature of military activity. Elite efforts to dismantle the peacekeeper/warrior dichotomy dwindled and foreign policy officials instead focused their attention on mobilizing consent for the continued military participation vis-à-vis the Support the Troops movement. In Part III I will argue that the rise of the Support the Troops movement encouraged cultural militarization in Canada. This section will begin by exploring militarism as an ideology and the way it functions within discourse to encourage processes of militarization.

The central focus of Part III will be my argument that the long-standing negotiation of Canadian international identity takes for a starting point an ideology of militarism and generalized acceptance that the military should be a primary tool for foreign statecraft. This is facilitated by the ways that militarization is often cast as an expected, common-sense approach to foreign policy.

³By 2008, 56 percent of polled Canadians showed a disapproval of Canada's military activity in Afghanistan. An Environics poll as reported by CBC News, "Public Support for Afghan mission lowest ever" (September 5th, 2008) indicated the breakdown for respondents was: 34 percent "strongly disapprove", 22 percent "somewhat disapprove", 27 percent "somewhat approve", and 14 percent "strongly approve" about Canadian military action in Afghanistan.

Chapter 7

The Framework of Militarism

THIS CHAPTER starts by introducing the theoretical foundations of militarization. Militarism in foreign policy discourse operates as a *regime of truth* that regulates the ways that national identity is negotiated. The (re)production of national identity in the narratives about Afghanistan lent support to, and was supported by, a broader discourse of militarism. I will demonstrate the ways that militarism and nationalism have been interconnected in foreign policy discourse and draw upon feminist theory to show how militarism occurs alongside other socialization processes in society, particularly in the ways that gender is conditioned.

The subsequent sections seek to expound how militarism functions in discourses on war and will demonstrate the subjective biases present in war accounts that reinforce militarism as a regime of truth. I demonstrate how the official war story of Afghanistan (self-)governed what perspectives and voices could contribute to discussions about foreign policy. The chapter concludes by introducing the ways that militarism was (re)produced in public consciousness and how elite voices encouraged

consent for militarization in foreign policy by using Support the Troops rhetoric. I express a deep concern with the militarization of foreign policy because these processes privilege the use of violence as a political tool in international relations.

7.1 Governmentality and the productive effects of negotiating national identity in foreign policy discourse

NARRATIVES ABOUT Canada's role in Afghanistan were not only (re)productive of a dominant, imagined national identity, but the process of (re)negotiating this identity is also constitutive of processes of *governmentality*: the governance (understood in the broadest sense) of citizens' lives. For Foucault (1979), governmentality is how citizen conduct was influenced and shaped in ways that exist outside of domination. The type of citizen that we imagine ourselves to be affects how we self-govern and how we govern others (with the understanding that governing is a form of *regulating conduct*). Mitchell Dean (1999) explains that governmentality is therefore the "conduct of conduct" (p. 10). The construction of Canadian national identity (its subjectivity) moderates and controls many aspects of daily life, but in furtive ways. Governmentality refers to the "meticulous, often minute techniques" (Foucault, 1991, p. 136) that control the behaviour of a population. The re-branding and articulation of Canadian national identity is, as Dean would suggest, a "collective activity" (1999, p. 16) involving the beliefs and opinions of Canadians, but an activity that is not often examined by those involved in the process. If the processes involved in negotiating national identity are not examined, then the "naturalness" of these concepts (perceived identities) is taken for granted by those who are governed by the processes (i.e. citizens) (Dean, 1999, p. 17).

The ways that subjects are “constituted in the immanence of a domain of knowledge” (Foucault, 1994, p. 317) is important in understanding power in Canadian foreign policy discourse. Allison Howell explains discourse about Canadian national identity has “not only to power to obscure, but also has productive power to foster certain forms of life, subjectivity and of conduct” (Howell, 2005, p. 60; see also Dean, 1999). As we have already explored the productive ways that foreign policy discourse “helps to reproduce the political identity of the doer supposedly behind the deed” (Campbell, 1998, p. x; cited in Howell, 2005) and the constitution and subjectivity of both the soldier and the citizen, I would like to now turn our analysis to the ways that discourse can obscure other phenomena of power.

In short, discourses of foreign policy are part of larger systems of power that shape and manage all aspects of political and personal life. It is not enough to simply ask, “What did the discourse on Afghanistan say?” but it also necessary to ask what is made possible through such constructions (Howell, 2005, p. 63). By examining what has been made possible, we can also explore how these constitutions have made *impossibilities* through discursive representations.

Discourses are not separate from power, but are a system in which power circulates. Discourses are productive because they govern (regulate) how topics can be meaningfully discussed or reasoned:

Truth isn’t outside power... it induces regular effects of power. Each society has its regime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth; that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true, the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned... the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true. (Foucault, 1980, p. 131)

In other words, power operates to enforce the ‘truth’ of certain narratives, which when put together, constitute a *regime of truth* that regulates the common-sense

understandings of political life.

This chapter examines how militarism (understood ideationally) operates as a regime of truth that is constitutive and (re)productive of the discourse on Canada's foreign policies in Afghanistan and, in turn, how militarism operates as a framework in which national identity and nationalism are imagined. Militarism, as a discursive regime of truth, operates within the narratives on Canadian foreign policy, serving to naturalize and normalize militarization (the distinction which is discussed below).

The connection between militarism and nationalism is bound to the concept of the state: the defining of a nation happens in part by "a citizenry willing and able to rush to its defense or to pursue its expansionary aims" (Whitworth, 2004, p. 34). This does not mean that militarism is a naturalized foundation of the state, but rather a contextualized one: militarism operates as a regime of truth and (re)produces and upholds the notions of sovereignty, borders, and the inter/national.

(Re)construction of national identity is a dynamic process. The ways that national identity is re-shaped is a matter of perception, as opposed to any sort of objective state-of-being. Campbell (1998) explains:

Meaning and identity are always the consequence of a relationship between the self and the other that emerges through the imposition of an interpretation rather than being the product of uncovering an exclusive domain with its own pre-established identity. (p. 23)

There is not a 'true' identity, as identity is always fluid and dynamic. Identity labels cannot accurately grasp this fluidity; they can only simplistically reflect their object as it existed in a specific time, culture, and moment. The labels that we apply to objects are (re)produced in environments where power relationships dictate what can, and what cannot, be plausible. As Foucault (1980) directs, these environments are 'regimes of truth', where " 'Truth' is linked in a circular relation with systems of power

which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which induce and which extend it” (p. 133).

Therefore, exploring the (re)production of national identity through foreign policy discourse does not mean that identity is ‘discovered’, but that it rather is constantly being redefined through the discursive regime in which it exists. Campbell explained that foreign policy limits a *certain* identity as the environment in which foreign policy identities are reproduced contains “multiple political practices, related as much to the constitution of various subjectivities as to the intentional action of predetermined subjects” (Campbell, 1998, p. 17). The conclusion is that Canada’s national identity is constantly being reproduced within power dynamics in society. The dissemination of militarism in Canadian civil society and the increasing militarization of Canadian government policies are two sites/intersections where national identity is negotiated. I call attention to these intersections to recognize that our national identity need not be fused to military values.

7.2 Theoretical foundations: Militarism and militarization

UNDERSTANDING THAT foreign policy discourse is (re)productive and constitutive of nationalism and militarism, we can then move forward to the question posed above by Howell (2005): what *else* is made possible through such a construction? The correlation that most troubles me is the link between militarism (as a regime of truth in foreign policy discourse) and militarization in society. In short, militarism (an ideology) lends itself to processes of militarization.

Militarization can be defined as the propagation of a nation’s military expansion or power; it is usually accompanied by the belief that the military should be used to achieve national interests. Militarization is not exclusively projected by the military.

Militarization of society occurs in everyday practices, through processes of social, economic, political, and cultural militarization. Lutz (2002) described militarization as:

Simultaneously a discursive process, involving a shift in general societal beliefs and values in ways necessary to legitimate the use of force, the organization of large standing armies and their leaders, and the higher taxes or tribute used to pay for them... [it] is intimately connected not only to the obvious increase in the size of armies and resurgence of militant nationalism... but also to... the shaping of national histories in ways that glorify and legitimate military action. (p. 723)

But it is not solely the growth in financial, social, or political support of militaries with which I am concerned. The activities and practices that are seemingly unrelated to military activity are most problematic; they demonstrate the ways that military activity permeates many levels of social life. The presence of militarism in non-military spheres helps to normalize and depoliticize the practices and, in turn, the problems of militarization—namely, prioritizing the use of military means to solve political problems.

7.3 Gender and militarism

FEMINIST SCHOLARS have theorized the ways that gender and militarism intertwine in the propagation of militarization and war. Feminist theories see war as linked to masculinity(s) because the relationship properties of masculinity as a concept provide “a framework through which war is made intelligible and acceptable as a social practice and institution” (Hutchings, 2008, p. 389). In feminist theories developed throughout the 1980s, links between war and masculinity were made based on comparing archetypal qualities such as aggression, rationality, or physical courage, which were viewed both as essential components of effective war-participants and also of

Western-idealized masculinity (Hutchings, 2008, p. 389). Scholarship has focused on the ways that the masculinity-war relationship affected women in militarized situations (Enloe, 1983). Scholars such as Elshtain (1995), Enloe (2000), and Barrett (2001) saw the relationship between war and masculinity as mutually constitutive and mutually reinforcing, with masculinity acting as an enabling condition of war and vice versa (Hutchings, 2008, p. 391). In this perspective, gender and war are linked by shared norms and values that are associated with masculinity and with military activity. A basic feminist premise is that there is a hierarchical distinction between masculine and feminine, a hierarchy that sustains and suspends other binaries (Cohn and Enloe, 2003). In language, terminology is defined by contrast: black is contrast to white, evil is contrast to good, private is contrast to public, and feminine is contrast to masculine. Post-modern feminists have explained that each of these binaries are understood as oppositional, and in each pair, there is a privileged term and a subordinated term. This is how post-modern feminists understand the conceptual linking of masculine and feminine to other concepts: the hierarchical distinction between the masculine and the feminine is linked to the hierarchical distinction between other binaries, where the privileged binary becomes associated with the masculine, and the subordinated binary cast as feminine.

Masculinity and femininity are conceptual labels used to describe certain performative traits. Feminists understand that performative traits associated with masculinity are often traits that are encouraged socially for sexed male bodies to perform, reinforcing the traits as 'masculine' and in turn, (re)producing the association with masculinity. Both the concepts of 'masculinity' and 'femininity' are fluid and, to some extent, arbitrarily (re)constructed concepts that become associated with particular activities, and with particular sexed bodies (even though these association are neither

natural nor fixed). For example, in Western modern culture, aggressiveness is associated with masculinity. The association of aggressiveness is not naturally a masculine (male body) experience, anymore than it is a feminine (female body) experience; both bodies are capable and able of exhibiting this performative trait. However, due to complex and historical discursive (re)constructions of ‘aggression’ being a valorized performative trait for male bodies (and consequently, a discouraged performative trait for female bodies), the assumed fixed nature of this quality has become embedded in social consciousness as a trait associated with an archetypal form of masculinity.

Like all binary terms of language, the meaning of masculinity is contextual: it is (re)defined against its presupposed contradiction (femininity), but it is also measured against competing definitions and conceptions of other masculinities. Frank J. Barrett explained:

The term ‘hegemonic masculinity’ refers to a particular idealized image of masculinity in relation to which images of femininity and other masculinities are marginalized and subordinated. The hegemonic ideal of masculinity in current Western culture is a man who is independent, risk-taking, aggressive, heterosexual and rational. (2001, p. 79)

Therefore, hegemonic masculinity is one form of performative behaviours that become socially upheld as the dominantly preferred form of gender expression in a given society and time. Hegemonic masculinity (Connell, 1995) refers to sets of values, capacities, and practices that are identified as exemplary for men (Hutchings, 2008, p. 402). Recognizing that these values and practices are both variable and socially constructed helps us to better capture the complex and dynamic nature of gender, particularly in relation to war and militarism.

7.4 Hegemonic masculinity and militarism

WESTERN HEGEMONIC masculine characteristics are the same qualities that are idealized for soldiers and military personnel. This does not mean the qualities of aggression, heterosexuality, or rationality are the standards for masculinity in all cultures, or from various times throughout history. For example, values prioritized by Japanese samurai (*bushi*) were upheld as the archetype of iconic masculinity in early modern Japan. This can be compared to the white-collar, married, corporate-breadwinner archetype that was the idealized form of masculinity in in post-WWII Japan (Fruhstuck and Walthall, 2011, p. 10–11). In one context, a highly militarized form of masculinity was privileged, while in the latter a less militarized form of masculinity was valorized. Similarly, military values also change over time and throughout different cultures. Nonetheless, it is the similarities in Western culture's preferred characteristics of hegemonic masculinity and military ideals that feminist scholars have used to connect masculinity and militarism.

Militarism is not simply an ideology, but it is a discursive regime where power circulates and knowledge is (re)produced. My concern is that militarism (re)creates the belief that military solutions to politics problems are *natural*. Militarism includes all types of socialization processes that lend support to the military as a necessary and integral instrument in political relations. The socialization of gender is one of these contributing processes. The link between militarism and gender is the association of *natural* [*sic*] abilities of masculine political actors to conduct military operations and the exclusion of both feminine actors or feminized solutions (activities associated with pacifism, diplomacy, or non-military action) from preferred foreign policy options. The desire to “appear tough” or “wield power” through the propagation of a nation's military are phrases that are also used to describe an individual assuming (hegemonic)

masculine qualities.

This can be further explored in the link between war and gender. What is often inaccessible in the link between war and masculinity is the explanation of how and why the characteristics associated with the military ideal and war came to be identified as *masculine*: one cannot (re)conceptualize war and militarism outside of what we have decided they are and what we have determined they require (Hutchings, 2008, p. 394). The practice of militarized politics may have evolved as a male (masculinized) concept due to the historical absence of females in political-military decision making roles (and therefore a disassociation of politics from actions and characteristics considered to be feminine). Peterson (1992) explained that the state is a “bearer of gender” (p. 45), and argued that the top echelons of states have been dominated by males and a “cult of masculinity” (p. 45); a phenomenon that she maps historically from the Athenian polis to the early modern European state to the developed modern capitalist state. Peterson (1992) showed the genealogical association of women with private home life and the social construction of public-political life as a sphere for male bodies and masculinized politics. She explained that the artificial protector/protected dichotomy assumed of masculine/feminine bodies is crucial for sustaining military activities: “the ideological and cultural conflation of manhood, combat, militarism, and national chauvinism not only reproduces violence, but glorifies it as a ‘natural’ expression of masculine and nation-state identities” (Peterson, 1992, p. 48). The re-production of association of militarism and masculinity will be explored below.

What must be recognized is that that masculinity is not necessarily tied to specific values or identities, which are dynamic and fluid. Hutchings (2008) contrasted the different performances of masculinity studied by International Relations scholars: Cohn’s (1989) nuclear intellectual (unemotional and calculating) masculinity compared to Elshtain’s (1995) chivalrous and protective masculinity. In these instances,

both theorists were using masculinity as a medium through which to analyze war and militarism, however, the performative attributes of masculinity varied. This is because masculinity is not a fixed concept, nor are the values ascribed to it in any particular time or context:

For qualities to be identified with hegemonic masculinity (*masculinized*) does not require [them] to become identified with a substantive masculine characteristic, but rather to be differentiated from other *feminized* and *masculinized* alternatives in the appropriate hierarchy. (Hutchings, 2008, p. 394)

Hutchings suggested that the notion of hegemonic masculinity is not the hegemony of a certain type of masculinity but rather the *hegemony of masculinity* (an empty signifier that can be infinitely diverse in re-significations). Characteristics associated with hegemonic masculinity and military ideals are often features or behaviours that are privileged in politics. Feminized actions or qualities (such as emotion, pacifism, or weakness) have not been privileged in politics, and are often qualities viewed as inappropriate for military action. Many of the traits privileged in political leadership ability and military training are also traits associated with masculinity within many cultures.

7.5 Militarized masculinities

MILITARIZATION DOES not occur independently of other processes of socialization. The depoliticized acceptance of militarism as a normal process is entangled with practices of gender socialization. It is these processes that have led feminist scholars to link practices of gender performance with processes of militarization.

The characteristics of strength, rationality, and aggression are associated with a type of hegemonic masculinity that Whitworth labeled “militarized masculinity”

(2004). These qualities are culturally, at least within Westernized culture, privileged as signifiers of ‘manliness’. Whitworth (2004) explained that the rite of passage that many modern and historical cultures practiced as a symbol for the transition between male childhood and ‘becoming a man’ involved tests or activities for an individual, or group of individuals, to prove (appropriate) performances of (or characteristics believed to exhibit) masculinity (p. 159). Historically, these were tasks such as participation in a dangerous hunt, or proving oneself in battle (Whitworth, 2004, p. 159).

Military recruitment and training value these masculinized qualities, but also reinforce them. David H. J. Morgan (1994) noted that there are many sites where masculinities are (re)constructed and deployed but “those associated with war and the military are some of the most direct... the warrior still seems to be a key symbol of masculinity... [popular representations of the soldier] clearly connote aggression, courage, a capacity for violence” (p. 165). The link between militarization and gender is that many of the traits privileged in military ability and training are also traits associated with masculinity within many cultures. Masculinity as a concept can be signified in many ways, but militarized masculinity is a hegemonic masculinity, within North American culture in general, and within military training institutions specifically.

The traits associated with ‘manliness’—specifically a militarized masculinity (re)constructed and promoted within military training are:

courage and endurance, physical and psychological strength; rationality; toughness; obedience; discipline; patriotism; lack of squeamishness; avoidance of certain emotions such as fear, sadness, uncertainty, guilty, remorse, and grief; and heterosexual competency. (Masters, 2000; Arkin and Dobrofsky, 1978; cited in Whitworth, 2004, p. 160)

The connection between gender (hegemonic masculinity) and militarism (the privileging of military signifiers, activity, and personnel) (re)inscribes itself in social culture.

The military is not simply an institution for (re)producing militarized masculinity, because the privileging of hegemonic masculinity in society also reinforces a cultural acceptance of the military, military (masculinized) value, and other tenets of militarism. Simply put, it is not only the military that creates an ‘ideology of manliness’ (Enloe, 2000), but the privileging of certain qualities of hegemonic masculinity in society that in turn, makes military values seem desirable. This is how militarism in everyday activities thrives.

7.6 Militarized foreign policy narratives

MILITARIZATION in foreign policy is the tendency and desirability to use military technologies and strategies to conduct foreign relations. Enloe (2004) noted that the militarization of any country’s foreign policy can be measured by monitoring the extent to which its policy:

is influenced by the views of Defence department decision-makers and/or senior military officers; flows from civilian officials’ own presumption that the military needs to carry exceptional weight; assigns the military a leading role in implementing the nation’s foreign policy; and treats military security and national security as if they were synonymous. (p. 122)

Enloe concluded that US foreign policy is militarized. Using these criteria, Canada’s foreign policies (specifically policies in Afghanistan) would also be militarized.

Elite justification of militarization in Afghanistan was problematic. I am troubled by the political effects of militarizing Afghan bodies, and I am alarmed that socially feminized issues (issues traditionally associated with ‘low politics’¹) such as women’s

¹As explained earlier in this chapter, ‘low politics’ are often associated as ‘feminized issues’ because they are subordinated to ‘high politics’ or ‘masculinized issues’ in both International Relations theory and foreign policy practice. This is understood by feminists as the linking of the masculine/feminine binary hierarchical distinction to the hierarchical prioritizing of ‘high politics’ in International Relations. High politics are activities associated with military activity or economics/trade, and this association further links masculinity and militarism.

political rights, girls' access to education, etc. were being packaged as something that coincided with military objectives in Afghanistan. Enloe described a "test" for whether our policies help to militarize Afghan citizens: "if their well/being is worthy of our concern only because their lack of well/being justifies the military occupation of Afghanistan, then we are militarizing Afghan [citizens]—as well as our own compassion" (2004, p. 147). This narrative is present in the discourse on Canada as a helpful humanitarian that emphasizes the need for Canadian Forces in Afghanistan to foster women's rights, independence, and in some narratives, the belief that the Canadian Forces offer (political and moral) salvation for women who are cast as oppressed by cultural, religious, and political circumstances.

Even if lives in Afghanistan have actually been improved due to the NATO intervention (a contestable concept, as arguably the presence of decades of war, infrastructure destruction, and food scarcity are negative effects of foreign intervention on the daily lives of all Afghans), it is the assumption that these feminized individuals required Western militaries to "save" them that causes feminist concern. Governmental narratives about the military providing security, and conducting development in Afghanistan bespeak Spivak's depiction of "White men saving brown women from brown men" (1994, p. 93).

Neo/colonialist sentiments have been observed in past Canadian interventions (Whitworth, 2004; Razack, 2004; McKay and Swift, 2012) and are evident in the (re)scription of Afghanistan as a dangerous place with dangerous enemies—those who are barbaric enough to mistreat and subjugate their own feminized citizens. In this account, Canada is the "White Knight" responding to a "Dark Threat" (Razack, 2004), the civilized nation who intervened in a place that is "disordered, chaotic, tribal, primitive, violent, and exclusionary" (Whitworth, 2004, p. 15). This presentation of self and other inaccurately creates a one-dimensional trope of the Afghan

woman: a veiled victim in need of saving.

The dichotomy of self and other also affects the (re)scripting of the Canadian soldier. Razack argued that Canada's mythology of peacekeeping is about the making of the self, as it positions a barbarized other as the foil to the morally superior hero:

The confrontation of good and evil is a racialized narrative: citizens of nations who join the alliance against evil come to know themselves as members of a more advanced race whose values of democracy and peace are not shared by others. (2004, p. 16)

The creation of tropes through simplistic or dramatic narratives skews the complexity of interventions and supports militaristic strategies when others are caricatured negatively.

In media and government discourse, emphasis on the moral character of Canadian soldiers serving in Afghanistan was expressed repeatedly by the notion that those who died chose to serve in the attempt to help others. The (re)constructions of the Canadian soldier contrasted with the foreign others contribute to popular understanding of the dominant War Story being told by Canadian media and government, and shape public perceptions of the actors involved.

7.7 War Stories: Political, personal, subjective

WITHIN THE discourse of the Canadian military in Afghanistan, the mission objectives were presented as fighting terrorism, conducting humanitarianism, and upholding alliance responsibilities. Militarism is present throughout those narratives about war, each which represents a particular type of militarized masculinity that the state or Canadian soldiers represented. But, as Miriam Cooke explained, "a war story is never about war" (Cooke, 1996, p. 41). Especially in accounts of foreign wars,

war stories have a political purpose: “to camouflage the interests, agendas, policies, and politics that underpin the war in order to legitimize and gain consent for the war” (Hunt and Rygiel, 2007, p. 4). The stories told about war and its participants are mechanisms to gain and sustain consent for militarized practices. Narratives of military operations are constructed within a discourse that sustains and fosters legitimacy for the wars about which they are being told. Official narratives about Afghanistan and the role of the CF should be understood as a mechanism to mobilize consent for the military intervention.

By exploring the basis of militarism in the discourse of Canada’s military engagement in Afghanistan, I do not intended to “re-tell” the story in a more accurate way, rather to demonstrate that war realities are often more complex than the ways they are narrated in official discourses. My research does not seek to compare the “reality” of Afghanistan to discourse, but simply to note that war narratives are always subjective, and that my own reading of discourse is also subjective and personal. What I strive to achieve is a demonstration of how, as Cox’s (1981) famous maxim on theory acknowledges, the dominant discourse is always told from a particular perspective and for a particular purpose.

Stories of war are told from a particular perspective, and that narration (re)produces and shapes opinions and realities. Since many individuals have never, and may never, experience(d) international conflict or war environments, first-hand accounts are told to the public through other media, and as discussed, these accounts are often charged with political motivations, as opposed to be neutral reports of events. Chapter 3, 4, and 5 have focused on elite narratives promoted by academics, politicians, and military leaders, but media also predominantly presented narratives about the military’s role in Afghanistan.

As discourse of political elites contained subjective perspectives and politicized

narratives, we should also be aware of the ways that media reports of the Afghanistan War were regulated in their presentation. Media coverage of military operations in Afghanistan required cooperation (usually embedding) with military forces. Colin Perkel of the Canadian Press explained that “often, the military brands the most seemingly innocent details as integral to operational security, which means an embedded journalist who discloses it faces the threat of expulsion from the base” (Perkel, 2010). In 2002, the *Toronto Star*’s Mitch Potter was escorted from base when the military said that an article he wrote was a breach of security (LeBlanc, 2002). Potter confessed that he did not understand why his article caused a problem, as he believed his report fell within the guidelines of his journalist agreement (LeBlanc, 2002). I use this incident to demonstrate that even War Stories told about the ‘reality’ of Afghanistan were often regulated and inherently subjective.

Media accounts of Afghanistan therefore, were regulated by agreements that journalists signed in order to embed within military compounds. As journalists were tasked with writing about the individuals responsible for their physical security, media accounts also contained an element of self-regulation. Christie Blatchford’s national bestseller *Fifteen Days* is an example of the bias present in journalistic accounts of war. Blatchford’s book reads as a chronicle of many days that she spent in Afghanistan, but is largely a presentation of soldiers and stories about their personas. Blatchford’s book included testimony from another journalist Rosie Dimanno who wrote, “Yesterday...I logged onto the *Star* website. Immediately, I recognized the photo of [Cpt. Andrew James] Eykelenboom...it was like a kick in the gut and I wept as I read the story of his death” (cited in Blatchford, 2008, p. 291). Dimanno’s testimony speaks to the emotional connection of embedded journalists to their subjects of study. I suggest that it is incredibly difficult for journalists to think critically about the military when the military is the institution providing food, shelter, and

protection for embedded journalists. In the “Afterword” of *Fifteen Days*, Blatchford referred to members of the Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry as “my guys” and confessed that she struggled to emotionally decompress after witnessing the events detailed in the book. She explained that she “bawled unashamedly” when writing the accounts and was unable to read the book after publication for fear of re-opening emotional wounds (p. 355).

Blatchford and other embedded media personnel, including prominent photojournalist Pete Fisher who spent time with the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan, could not possibly offer a neutral account of military happenings, as they developed an emotional connection to the soldiers tasked with ensuring their corporeal safety in a warzone. I argue it is not only journalistic contracts that limited media reporting, but that personal relationships between soldiers and embedded journalists would have also significantly affected media accounts of the war.

As the dominant narratives on Afghanistan were presented to the public by government “official” discourses, military and foreign policy elites theorization, and media accounts, the stories about war available to the citizenry all contained their own bias. All of these sources were accounts of the war, but for the majority of Canadians, these sources provided the only accessible accounts of the war. Their subjectivity is important to recognize, because these are not neutral accounts, but rather, stories that have political effects.

What I mean to emphasize is that War Stories, as Cooke explained, function to “give order to wars that are generally experienced as confusion” (1996, p. 15). The narratives presented by elite foreign policy voices attempt to provide simplistic accounts of experiences that are messy, confusing, and complex. But in presenting a cohesive, or plausible account of war, the official discourse often omits narratives that destabilize or complicate the neatly packaged War Story. Therefore, it is not simply

a subjective story, but a hegemonic story that contained omissions.

In this War Story (Canada in Afghanistan), there are many perspectives that were untold or silenced. Citizens were discouraged from criticizing war politics and perspectives of Afghan citizens were not publicized, or when they were told, were used to bolster the image and purpose of the Canadian government's political objectives. Media and citizen groups were concerned with soldier fatalities, but the discussion of Afghan fatalities went unreported due to 'security considerations'. It was only after the 2011 mission was completed that rough estimates of enemy casualties were released. Due to unspecified documentation methods and an absence of comparable data, the accuracy of these reports is unclear. Michel-Rolph Trouillot declared that, "silences are inherent. . . because any single event enters history with some of its constituting parts missing" (1995, p. 49). Therefore, demonstrating the subjectivity of the "official" accounts of Afghanistan requires noting the dominance of particular speakers and the absence of others in official representations of the Afghanistan intervention.

7.8 Narratives of sacrifice to regulate War Stories

CANADIAN MEDIA coverage of Afghanistan depicted many photographs of caskets draped in the national flag, but did not show images of Afghan bodies lying in the streets. A large majority of media discourse on the War in Afghanistan was not focused on events in Kabul or Kandahar, but on gatherings along Highway 401 between Toronto and Trenton, Ontario—a stretch of road re-named "Highway of Heroes." The highway was where many Canadians assembled roadside to watch processions on their way from Trenton to official autopsy in Toronto. An intensive focus on soldiers' deaths—narrated as patriotic sacrifice—comprised the War Story about Canada in

Afghanistan.

Focusing on the ‘sacrifice’ of Canadian soldiers not only diverted the focus of the War Story from negotiations about the specific role of the Forces in Afghanistan, but it was also used to silence narratives that criticized the mission. As the War Story was created to simplify a complex political scenario, it also simplified the actors within it. In accounts of Afghanistan, soldiers were caricatured and the complexities of their individual personalities, circumstances, and histories were distorted. As with many War Stories, soldiers become valourized when they are cast as heroes, closing any space for criticism or questioning their actions.² The reproduction of soldiers as “heroes” upholds and valourizes the death of soldiers as patriotic acts of sacrifice, and humanizes soldiers in a way that makes their deaths feel personal. Death becomes a rally point to support the troops, a topic to be discussed at length in Chapter 8.

The War Story rationalized continued military involvement because of military fatalities rather than support of military actions or policies. The actions of military personnel in war were often ignored, while the deaths of soldiers become the focus of narratives. The aggrandizement of death/sacrifice of soldiers led to the foreclosure of open discussion on soldier behaviour, military policy, or political alternatives in Afghanistan. Deaths of Canadian soldiers enabled the government to silence war critics, because asking questions or being critical of militarism was labeled as insensitive and sacrilegious. A newspaper article from the *Winnipeg Free Press* narrated:

It is not a crime to sully the reputations of brave men and women who have

²The valourization of soldiers as heroes also produces an impossible expectation that is internalized by soldiers. This can result in emotional trauma for soldiers who feel they have failed to embody the actions and qualities of a hero. The acquisition of psychological injuries such as PTSD relate to the hero archetype. As the hero is portrayed uni-dimensionally, there is little room for emotion, fragility, or weakness in this trope and it makes it difficult for soldiers with PTSD to seek help, often due to fears about the stigma of looking weak. Howell (2011) explains that militarized masculinity can have negative effects on soldiers’ lives, particular in relation to stigmas surround PTSD. This will be discussed in further detail in subsequent chapters.

died fighting for their country and for the freedom of strangers in faraway lands. And while it may not be criminal, it is shameful—a reminder that peace now, peace at any cost, comes with a high price. (‘Editorial Path to peace’, 2007)

The messaging in this editorial suggests that those who criticize the military should feel shameful, and implicates anyone who criticized the military’s role in the Afghanistan War as reprehensible. This is a form of social disciplining, where members seek to regulate others’ behaviour, as well as their own behaviour, to uphold behavioural norms. In this case, support of militarization is a norm that is privileged through discourse. The fervent tone of this editorial reflects how deeply militarism is promoted as a valuable, honorable activity. This narrative (re)constructs militarist discourse by purporting that peace is something that can only be achieved through violence. Militarism as a regime of truth renders this assumption conceivable, and casts as implausible non-militarized strategies for peace.

7.9 Disciplining narratives and the logic of militarism

THE USE of soldier sacrifice to silence criticism about the war is exemplified by a House of Commons debate in April of 2006. The dialogue between Alexa McDonough (NDP Member of Parliament) and Jason Kenney (Parliamentary Secretary and CPC Member of Parliament) demonstrates the kind of gatekeeping that can occur when citizens are unable to ask critical questions about military endeavors without being portrayed as blasphemous or uncompassionate. McDonough noted that she believed the “ultimate loyalty” to Canadian troops and their families was the capacity to ask questions that military members are unable to ask without physically or emotionally compromising themselves while serving in a military mission (a reference to whether the mission is achievable and in accordance with Canadian values). Kenney responded

by challenging McDonough:

Does the honorable member believe that the colleagues of hers associating themselves with a call for troops out of Afghanistan is helpful to the morale of our troops and their mission? Does she believe that our troops would be proud to see members who help represent them and their families calling their mission, associating themselves with people who say that the mission in Afghanistan is really an imperialistic endeavor and that we should therefore call them home? Does she believe that is a morale building exercise or not, for her members to be associated with such an approach as that? (Parliament of Canada, 2006)

Kenney's insinuation refers to two NDP Members of Parliament who joined a rally outside Parliament prior to the debate. The rally contained signs that read "Bring Our Troops Home". Opposition members in the House made reference to the actions of the two NDP MPs several times throughout the debate. Kenney's statement suggests that the movement, which called for the removal of troops from Afghanistan, was anti-troop and anti-state. McDonough responded, noting:

Mr. Chair, precisely that kind of innuendo causes a lot of concern about whether Canadians are being well served even in this debate. Surely it is the essence of democracy to be willing to acknowledge the right of those who even hold an opposite point of view to protest. (Parliament of Canada, 2006)

McDonough raised a valid objection, which noted that both the protesters outside and the MPs who chose to support them were within their constitutional and democratic rights to object to a political policy. The response to her statement was an opposing MP demanding, "Yes or no?" (Parliament of Canada, 2006). McDonough continued by explaining her concern that Canada's military mission, with objectives to encourage democratic reform in Afghanistan, was a principle that should be observed in Canadian public debate as well: "For us to present ourselves as the champions of democracy, the champions of free speech and then engage in that kind of taunting and

demonizing is really an embarrassment—” (Parliament of Canada, 2006). She was cut off mid-speech by an opposing MP who interjected, “I guess that’s a no” (Parliament of Canada, 2006). The censure of McDonough’s statements is indicative of the power of militarism. This censure demonstrates how soldier fatalities were mobilized to exclude certain voices from contributing to the war story and also to silence challenges to the credibility of official discourse.

This dialogue was one of several instances in the debate on Afghanistan in which critics who wished to ask questions about the mission were silenced in the name of support for the troops. The power to silence particular voices is demonstrative that discourse on the Afghanistan War was embedded within militarism as a regime of truth.

7.10 (Re)constructing the nation: Militarism as the foundation of foreign policy

THE PERCEIVED necessity of the military in conducting state foreign relations rests on the premise that war is a unavoidable phenomenon in international engagement. This ontological viewpoint casts war as an acceptable political tool for solving global political challenges. If politicians assume that the military is a primary resource for influencing international engagement, then non-military alternatives may not be considered when choosing actions and forming policy for international relations. Cristina Masters (2005) challenged the assumption that military action is a desirable tool for creating peace:

The military, which is fundamentally predicated first on the fundamental need of an enemy “other” in order to legitimize its very existence, and second on the construction of soldiers as masculinized instruments

of violence, cannot be one of the institutions through which we can work towards a less violent world. (p. 115)

The view that the military should be used to influence global relations is the foundation of militarism. Militarism, as Masters noted, is not only counter-intuitive to reducing global violence, but it has domestic ramifications as well. The ability to (re)politicize military activity (and by this, I mean the ability to openly question military policies and activities in the public sphere) is critical for a healthy democracy in Canada. After all, the military is a publicly funded institution. I am troubled by the ways that militarism has become de-politicized through narratives that claim military action is integral and ‘natural’ in foreign affairs.

Foreign policy discourse is informed by, and reproductive of, militarism. Although this discourse is dominated by foreign policy elites, it is disseminated to domestic popular cultures, which also reproduce and support militarism as a regime of truth. Military ideas permeate consensus that allows militarism to infiltrate the everyday lives of Canadians. When militarism is accepted in public consciousness, the military becomes normalized as a requisite foundational institution for conducting foreign relations.

Citizens who consider the military a central and integral part of society are less likely to question the types of resource allocation given to the Forces. Citizens who consider the military an integral part of society are less likely to criticize the actions and policies carried out by the military overseas. When militaristic values are normalized in popular culture, these norms contribute to the story about the world and how we can engage in it. Militarism in popular culture also contributes to domestic narratives or opinions about where government resources should be spent.

As mentioned earlier, militarization is a process that occurs in multiple ways alongside other processes of socialization. The preference of certain values by society can

be connected to the privileging of militarism, as explained by Enloe (2004): “Things start to become militarized when their legitimacy depends on their associations with military goals. When something becomes militarized, it appears to rise in value [for society]” (p. 145).

The value of militarism, particularly in Canadian foreign policy, is something emphasized by government officials, military officials, and academics alike. Canada’s foreign policy towards Afghanistan was increasingly militarized as our national self-image—our “national identity”—became infused with militarism. For instance, Prime Minister Harper publicly stated that Canada’s reputation and ability to wield power internationally relies on its domestic military investment:

Our government is close to finalizing a long-term plan to thoroughly reverse the so-called ‘rusting-out’ of the Canadian Forces. . . we need to build a first class military and keep it that way. Ladies and Gentlemen, I believe Canada should be a leader in the world, not a follower. And in today’s dangerous world, Canada must have a credible military to be a credible leader. You understand that countries that cannot or will not make real contributions to global security are not regarded as serious players. They may be liked by everybody; they may be pleasantly acknowledged by everybody. But when the hard decisions get made, they will be ignored by everybody. (Government of Canada, 2008)

Harper’s statement bespeaks a militarized viewpoint. His perspective aligns with military historians (such as the CDFAI’s Granastein and Bercuson) who projected narratives about how Canada’s nationhood was forged through war (as discussed in Chapter 4). His emphasis on a “dangerous world” and the need for a “credible” (read: powerful) military conveys the importance of military power in international relations. This narrative cautions that without re-militarization, the state will lose both legitimacy and ability in global relations. In short, Harper’s narrative militarizes Canadian identity by casting militarized international engagement as the cornerstone of how [Canadian] national identity should be imagined.

The association of Canadian identity and foreign policy encourages citizens to “increasingly identify national belonging and virtue with soldiers and forms of militarized engagement” (McCready, 2010, p. 38). Citizens’ sense of national belonging is not only *infused* with militarism, the articulation of Canadian national identity is *part of* the complex processes (social, economic, historical) that normalize militarism. In other words, they are mutually reinforcing concepts. If our national character hinges upon the perceived role that the armed forces adopt abroad, then the Canadian Forces (CF) as an institution are framed as an unquestionable necessity. This allows for the depoliticization of the CF as an institution because they are viewed as an integral tool to the participation in foreign practices as well as the anchor of a distinct national identity.

The depoliticization and promotion of militarism in both Canadian foreign policies and in Canadian popular culture can only occur within a regime in which systems and expressions of power enforce the ‘truth’ that the Canadian Forces is an essential and fundamental actor in International Relations and that the CF are compulsory for the nation’s security. It is through this discursive foundation that militarization is prioritized in Canadian foreign policy. Narratives that decree the military should not be criticized because of their sacrifice (corporeally) function to present the military as an apolitical institution. My concern with viewing the military as an apolitical institution is that military activity is inherently political. The military should not be exempt from political scrutiny.

7.11 Depoliticizing the military: Obscuring militarism

THIS CHAPTER’S objective was to provide a theoretical framework for understanding the processes of militarization and the ways that militarism is (re)produced in foreign

policy discourse. Chapter 8 will build upon this framework to demonstrate how the CF was cast as apolitical within discourse on the Afghanistan War. As I have already argued that official war discourses contained political motivations, I wish to explore how political elites mobilized particular discourses to encourage public support of the military intervention.

A clever tactic used by the Harper government was to accuse individuals that questioned militarization—by criticizing the Afghan intervention, by raising objectives to military spending, or by demanding public debate on military deployments—of disrespecting soldiers. This practice dovetailed a populist campaign that I broadly label “Support the Troops”. The Support the Troops movement relied on rhetoric that cast the military as apolitical and instructed the public to criticize politicians, rather than the military, for any objections to the Afghanistan War.

Representative of the Support the Troops campaign was visual messaging promoted in popular culture. An example was a popular bumper sticker (included in Figure A.2) that read “Support Our Troops: If you don’t stand behind them, feel free to stand in front of them!” This symbolized militarized narratives about the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan that silenced or cast shame on citizens who spoke out against military action. Giroux (2004) explains:

Militarization and the culture of fear that legitimizes it have redefined the very nature of the political, and in so doing have devalued speech and agency as central categories of democratic public life. (p. 220)

I argue that stifling debate in a democratic society is problematic. Use of Support the Troops rhetoric by elites was an intentional strategy to control narratives produced about war. The control and domination of rhetoric in the “Support the Troops” campaign encouraged a militarized public consciousness.

By revealing how dominant discourses pose as regimes of truth, there is space

to be made for alternative discourses and the alternative politics that they enable (Hunt and Rygiel, 2007). Militarization involves institutional, ideological, economic and cultural transformations (Enloe, 1990). As A. L. McCready (2010) explains, militarization does not just ‘happen’ to culture, but involves cultural interventions by powerful forces such as the state, the military, and/or popular media, in addition to subtle everyday practices. Being able to question militarism, military policies, and the actions taken by military personnel is a step toward “hear[ing] beyond what we are able to hear and be[ing] open to narration that decenters us from our supremacy” (Butler, 2004, p. 18).

7.12 Conclusion: Militarization of foreign policy discourse and its affects

CANADA’S OFFICIAL discourse about Afghanistan was deeply militarized. As expressed in this chapter, the process of militarizing foreign policy occurred within processes that simultaneously militarized popular culture. I suggest that reviewing the official discourse to understand its effects requires an examination of the framework of militarism in which foreign policy discourses are (re)produced. To achieve the objective of explicating the effects of official accounts of Afghanistan, discourse must be (re)viewed and its narratives deconstructed. As Razack instructs, deconstruction involves “separating the experiences of individuals from the way their stories are assembled for our consumption” (2004, p. 18).

The following chapter explores the Support the Troops campaign and the ways that this rhetoric was employed to censure criticism of the Afghanistan War. By de-politicizing the military (as discursively achieved in Support the Troops rhetoric), questions about the nature, behaviour, and actions of the military were excluded from discourse on Afghanistan.

I am troubled by elite voices that demand a blind acceptance of the legitimacy of military action. By expounding the ways that militarism informs foreign policy discourse, I seek to re-politicize the military and their actions. The discussion to follow in the next chapter seeks to question whether we should continue to tell stories that valorize the use of violence to solve political problems, and to silence those that may oppose them.

Chapter 8

Yellow Ribbons and Death

8.1 Cultural (re)production of militarism

IN EXAMINING the discourse on Canada's role in Afghanistan the focus of earlier chapters has been on rhetoric from government leaders, the military, prominent media outlets, and foreign policy academics that justified militarization in three dominant messages. I argue that attempts to re-militarize Canadian foreign policy relied upon a discourse of militarism that circulated in the narratives about Canada's identity as a global actor, and the specific role of the military in Afghanistan. The hegemonic narratives that we have analyzed have largely come from foreign policy elites. However, these narratives were targeted for public audiences, and as I argue in Part II, strived to encourage public acceptance of the military intervention.

As introduced in Chapter 7, discourses of militarism are sustained and (re)produced through processes of militarization. This includes the militarization of government policies, but also militarization that occurred in cultural spaces that served to reinforce discourses of militarism. Howard Fremeth's concept of the *military-cultural*

complex is helpful in understanding the processes of militarization in culture. He explained that there are “intricate and complex ways in which those who benefit from militarism engage in the process of cultural production. The complex is not located in the ‘social mind’ but in the elaborate web of associations that connect the military, the state, and cultural agencies” (Fremeth, 2010, p. 58).

It is through this set of relations that militarism becomes normalized and that certain narratives prevail as common sense. Militarization, as it is culturally ingrained, (re)instills particular military “values and aesthetics through a wide variety of pedagogical sites and cultural venues” (Giroux, 2004, p. 216). It is therefore appropriate to explore these sites in order to better understand the negotiation of narratives about Canada in Afghanistan.

This chapter will explore the civic-social movements that facilitated and naturalized cultural militarization throughout the discourse on Canada in Afghanistan. I start by introducing populist campaigns in the Support the Troops movement. I outline how the rhetoric and sentiments of these campaigns were mobilized in government narratives and how there were tensions within the discourse about whether it was possible to support the military without lending support for the Afghan mission.

The chapter then expounds on how discourse about the Afghanistan War shifted after 2008 to focus on the deaths of soldiers in order to cast military death as an act of national sacrifice. I argue that presenting soldiers as heroes served to discipline war narratives and shame voices that criticized military activity. I outline the emotional persuasiveness of the Highway of Heroes gatherings and the Portraits of Honour tour and discuss how the emotionality of war deeply affected the types of narratives that were accepted as legitimize accounts of the Afghanistan experience. I conclude by arguing that the death of soldiers was used as a “trump technique” to silence war critics and to uphold militarism as normative framework in public consciousness.

8.2 Support the Troops movement(s): Red Fridays, Yellow Ribbons

WITHIN CANADA'S military engagement in Afghanistan, there existed a number of military-support campaigns. I broadly refer to the collective of campaigns as the "Support the Troops movement". Within this movement there were a variety of directives, but most of these organizations or campaigns had a broad mandate to show support for the military. I will discuss *Red Fridays Canada*, campaigns that sold Support the Troop emblematic ribbons, the Highway of Heroes gatherings, and the Portraits of Honour tour.

Red Fridays Canada (RFC) foundation is an online organization that primarily sells 'Support Our Troops' paraphernalia. The self-declared mission of this group is to:

Raise awareness of supporting our Canadian Troops by the sale of recognizable products (e.g. pins, badges, bumper stickers/magnets, clothing, etc.) in order to show a non-partisan Canadian citizen support for our men and women serving our country. (*Red Fridays Canada*, 2010)

The ultimate goal of *RFC*, therefore, encourages support for militarization in non-elite, everyday spaces. The campaign encourages citizens to symbolically show support of the Canadian Forces by wearing red clothing on Fridays.

The Red Fridays movement began in the United States around 2005, and became influential in Canada shortly after (McCready, 2013, p. 47). *RFC* is associated with Lisa Miller and Karen Boire, two military wives believed to have created the movement through a forwarded email which appears on the *RFC* website. The email, which tells a sentimental story before challenging the reader to wear red on Fridays, is cited as the grassroots effort of Miller and Boire that inspired the movement. The email story featured on the *Red Fridays* website, explains that a silent majority of

Canadians support the troops. Miller and Boire's email rationalized that a deliberate effort to wear red on Fridays was a mechanism to showcase public support that [already] existed in Canada. *RFC* encouraged citizens to wear red clothing on Fridays as a show of "silent" support for the Canadian Forces: a way to signal to the military that the public endorsed their efforts. The efforts to depoliticize the Support the Troops movement are evident in *RFC*'s mission statement, which declared that:

[We] show non-partisan support for our military troops. We do not support any particular policy, political position, agenda or the nature of military missions. This support is for all Canadian Troops regardless of their activity if it's here or abroad. (*Red Fridays Canada*)

The "Wear Red on Friday" campaign symbolized support for the military cast as an apolitical institution that has no agency in deciding the nature of military missions.

The practice and promotion of wearing red clothing to show military support reproduced a belief of supporting the military as normatively appropriate *moral* behaviour; wearing a piece of red clothing symbolized a gesture of (assumed) good will towards apolitical individuals [*sic*]. This is a reflection of how militarism has become ingrained in public consciousness: the depoliticization of the military is part of power relationships that privilege the military as an essential institution in Canadian society. The inferred apolitical gesture of wearing red clothing in support of Canadian Troops is inherently political. Support the Troops signifies power circulations that sustain militarism ideationally. Militarism is not simply an ideology, but it is a discursive framework that supports militarization as a natural political process. Militarism that is (re)produced in public consciousness casts militarization as a legitimate course of political action. As discussed in the previous chapter, public acceptance of militarization permits certain political possibilities, yet also renders political impossibilities

or omissions. An effect of militarization would be increasing defence budget allocations at the expense of other policy areas (social, health, education, etc.) or choosing military tactics over non-military policies when engaging internationally.

Another movement where discourses of militarism were actively (re)produced was the Support Ribbon campaign in Canada. The emblematic yellow ribbon became a commonplace symbol throughout the Support the Troops movement to signify public support for the military. I argue that the prevalence of this symbol demonstrated the ubiquitous way that culture can become militarized.

The emergence of yellow ribbons as troop support symbols began in the United States during the first Iraq War. Post-9/11 the Canadian Forces Personnel Support Agency (CFPSA) adopted the symbol and marketed it by adding a Canadian Flag to the yellow ribbon in forms of pins and decals. The yellow ribbon as a symbol of military support is an icon that has been culturally re-package and re-used to symbolize various political and cultural events. In American popular culture, the yellow ribbon as a symbol of public support evolved through various cultural memes.

G. E. Parsons, a folklore specialist, explained that the song “Tie a Yellow Ribbon ‘Round the Ole Oak Tree” (recorded in 1973 by Tony Orlando and Dawn) was a cultural meme from which the modern yellow support ribbon evolved (1981). The song, which is narrated by a former prison inmate returning home, requests, “Tie a yellow ribbon ‘round the ole oak tree, it’s been three long years, do you still want me?” (Parsons, 1981). The song suggests that loved ones of prisoners could tie a yellow ribbon around their front yard trees to signal to the returned inmate that they were welcome home. The song became associated with the return of American soldiers from Vietnam, particularly after Orlando performed the song at a 1973 pre-game show at an American collegiate football championship (McCready, 2013, p. 38).

This meme evolved to an American national symbol of support during the Iranian

hostage crisis in 1979. Parsons details how the song inspired the wife of hostage Bruce Laingen to tie yellow ribbons to a tree outside her house. When the ribbon on tree image was televised, it spread as a symbol of support for the Iranian political hostages in 1979 (Santino, 1992). Penne Laingen's involvement in hostage activist groups helped to disseminate the symbol throughout the media to encourage other Americans to take up the symbol in support (McCready, 2013, p. 38).

Jack Santino explained that the yellow ribbon is a type of "folk assemblage", or folk symbol that is (re)packaged with new meanings in popular culture. The signification of yellow ribbons in the Iran hostage crisis expressed both absence (of loved ones) and welcome (of their return home), as was similar to the signification of the original ribbon in song symbolizing the absence and welcome of a returning prisoner (Santino, 1992, p. 25).

Santino (1992) explained that the American yellow support ribbons were used again in 1990, with similar sentiments as before, this time reflecting Americans hostages in Iraq following the Iraq invasion of Kuwait. However, after the hostages were released and American military presence in the Middle East grew, the referent symbol of the ribbons was no longer political hostages, but instead symbolized military troops (Santino, 1992, p. 25). This transition happened as President George H. W. Bush awaited approval from Congress for aerial bombardment; symbolizing that the troops were "held hostage" by political bureaucracy (McCready, 2013, p. 39).

Santino felt the evolution of yellow ribbons still holds at its foundation the meaning of supporting loved ones who are far away (1992, p. 33). Since the deployment of both American and Canadian troops overseas in 2001, the ribbon has become the most prominent symbol used by organizations and associations in garnering support for soldiers serving abroad.

The use of yellow ribbons as a symbol for troop support has been described by

McCready as a “borrowed cultural practice” (2013, p. 40). McCready speculated that the heavy influences of US media in Canadian culture resulted in the prominence of the symbol following Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan. The official introduction of yellow ribbons into the Canadian cultural landscape happened through the Department of Defence’s Support the Troops campaign, facilitated through the semi-private Canadian Forces Personnel Support Agency (CFPSA) that sold products through the Canadian Forces Exchange System (CANEX) discount stores and online forum (McCready, 2013).

RFC and the Canadian Forces Exchange System (Canadian Forces merchandising stores) sell magnetic and vinyl vehicle stickers in the shape of ribbons (see Figure A.1). CANEX also sells an assortment of personal items with this logo (water bottles, t-shirts, hats, pins, patches). The inscription on the ribbons reads, “Support Our Troops” and often depicts a Canadian flag, maple leaf, or other patriotic cultural symbol. These icons are typically yellow, although they also have been manufactured in other colours and patterns (see Figure A.2). As McCready notes, it is difficult to estimate how many of these stickers and related items have been produced or are in circulation because there is not a central agency that dispatches them (2013, p. 42). Many churches, regiments, legion branches, and civic groups ordered or (re)produced versions of the ribbon icon for fundraisers and community events. The yellow ribbon logo has become a well-recognized symbol for military support in both Canada and the United States.

The support ribbon functions as a symbol in the semiotic process of the Support the Troops campaign: although the ribbon has traditionally been associated with yellow, other versions (such as camo print or khaki) have also been used to signal the same message. The broadly understood ribbon symbol, which has been used to signify support for a variety of other public causes (notably, the pink ribbon as

a symbol for breast cancer support in North America) became militarized through its use by Support the Troop movements. The innocuous nature of a vehicle decal, and the assumed moral decency of lending support by simply wearing or showing the ribbon, is a surreptitious way that everyday sites become militarized.

8.3 From social movements to government rhetoric: Tensions within the Support the Troops campaign

PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS in Canada chose to purchase yellow ribbon stickers to affix to public service vehicles such as police cars, ambulances, and fire trucks. The City of Toronto's affixed yellow ribbon support decals on nearly 350 emergency services (ambulance, fire, and police) vehicles in 2006. In 2007, after a public debate about whether the display of troop support ribbons was acceptable on public service vehicles, the Toronto City Council announced plans to remove the yellow ribbon stickers from its emergency services fleet.

A city councilor commented, "By putting messages on our vehicles it sends the message that the City of Toronto supports the mission in Afghanistan, and I don't believe we should be sending that message" (Patrick and Kari, 2007). Message boards and online forums of major Canadian newspapers were flooded with messages of citizens outraged that the stickers would be removed. Many commenters felt it offensive that the City would even consider removing the decals, decreeing that it was insulting to military service members: "The people who are complaining are slapping the faces of the family members of every living and lost soldier in this war" ('Voices decals spat', 2007). This exemplifies discursive attempts to de-politicize the Support the Troops message and to silence or shame anyone who did not openly endorse the military. As discussed in Chapter 7, discourses of militarism were not only productive

in their ability to de-politicize, but they also encouraged self-regulating behaviour of citizens who discipline themselves and others into condoning militarized values.

The city council itself was divided on the decision to remove or keep the decals. Some councilors were concerned the stickers were representative of a federal political issue beyond the jurisdiction of a municipality. Other councilors wished to keep the decals: “They’ve [the troops] made a lot of sacrifices for us and this [is a] little token of showing support” (CBC News, 2007). The city council debate centered on whether the stickers were a political gesture of support for the war, or whether they could be considered an independent gesture of support for individuals, regardless of political opinion on the Afghanistan War.

The council eventually voted unanimously to keep the decals. When then-Mayor David Miller was asked why he changed his mind, he noted that it was the “right thing to do”, particularly because of recent deaths of three Canadian soldiers (CTV News, 2007). The moral sentiment expressed by Miller strongly underpinned the yellow ribbon campaign. The indignation that many critics expressed over the removal of decals indicates a strong cultural belief that supporting the military is a morally righteous obligation. In short, the City of Toronto decal controversy exemplifies the deeply engrained moral belief that the military should be supported, no matter what activities or actions they are partaking. This narrative demonstrates how social and political spheres became militarized in Canada.

According to a CTV News article, Toronto spent three thousand (tax) dollars on the EMS Support our Troops stickers. Some critics were concerned that city resources were being used to represent an issue that fell outside of the city jurisdiction (CTV News, 2007). Regardless of jurisdiction, the council decision was a policy choice to spend public resources on a deeply political issue. Despite insistence that the purchase and display of the decals was an apolitical gesture, support for militarization is a

political choice. However, the Support the Troops campaign was very persuasive in arguing that their operational premise was morally appropriate, and any criticism of the campaign was morally unacceptable.

Public displays of the yellow ribbon image were less contested in other regions. In April 2009, the provincial government of Saskatchewan announced that all vehicles in the government fleet would be outfitted with a customized yellow ribbon “Support the Troops” decal (see Figure A.3): “a reminder that Canadian soldiers serve selflessly in missions around the world” (Government of Saskatchewan, 2009). This narrative reinforced the self-imagined nature of the Canadian Forces as a helpful, altruistic institution (as presented in Part II).

Government Minister of Services Dan D’Autremont explained, “This is to show support for the individual troopers and their families... So it’s not about any particular engagement, but to show general support for our military services, whether they are serving in Afghanistan, in Haiti, or shoveling snow in downtown Toronto” (CBC News, 2009). D’Autremont’s comment directly addresses the primary sentiment of yellow ribbons: to normalize public demonstrations of military support. D’Autremont’s comment draws on the publicly recognized image of the ‘helpful’ Canadian soldier, reminding the Canadian public of [peacekeeping] missions that were associated affably.

Suggesting unquestioned support of the military (supporting them no matter where or how they are stationed) is a dangerous predicament, as it removes the military from the scope of political scrutiny. This is not only about my uneasiness of a support campaign with strong discursive links to a political intervention (Afghanistan), but is a general discomfort with blindly supporting the military and its members no matter the activities in which they participate. Blind support of the military regardless of their mission or activity bespeaks the saturation and acceptance

of militarism in public life. The (re)production of militarism discursively relates to processes of cultural militarization because it naturalizes and valorizes the military as an institution and, in turn, reinforces the belief that scrutiny of the military is traitorous behaviour.

In short, the yellow support ribbons are an overt display of cultural militarization in Canada. The Government of Saskatchewan ribbon stickers, still present on many public service vehicles, was not a topic for major public contestation like was the case in Toronto. This suggests that the level of acceptance of cultural militarization may have differed between regions, but that nationally there was a sense of overall support for the campaign.

In 2007 the City of Ottawa fire trucks displayed similar Support the Troops decals. [Former Mayor] Bob Chiarelli endorsed the sentiment behind “Wear Red Friday”, a local movement promoted by the radio station CFRA (McGregor, 2007). When approached about the stickers, City of Ottawa spokesman Barre Campbell retorted, “There has never been an issue in Ottawa and they’re not coming off” (McGregor, 2007). Earlier the same year, the Ottawa airport received complaints about a large banner overhanging the baggage carousel with the Support the Troops message. The president and CEO of the company who ran the airport explained the banner was “a manner of respect...a manner of support. It says nothing about the Afghan war” (McGregor, 2007). This is symbolic of a broad cultural consciousness that felt that militarized political choices (i.e. Afghanistan) could be questioned, but that the military as an institution was uncontestable.

Many narratives attempted to distinguish between support for particular policies and support for the military itself. Within the discourse, it was clear that there was general support for soldiering. In instances where soldiering was associated with political criticisms about Afghanistan, there was vocal backlash and outrage that the

moral integrity of soldiering be tainted by political decisions. An *Ottawa Citizen* newspaper article covering the airport banner issue explained that many citizens felt the Support the Troops message was co-opted and politicized by the Harper government to garner support for the Afghanistan mission, and reflected the belief that it was possible to support the troops without supporting the Afghanistan War.

8.4 Support the Troops versus Support the War

VARIOUS ACTORS throughout the discourse on Canada in Afghanistan promoted the meme ‘support for troops without support for the Afghanistan war’. This concept was central to the depoliticization of the Canadian Forces during this time period. Depoliticization occurred when the responsibility for the legitimacy and the outcome of military activities was placed upon political leaders, and the military was cast as an apolitical agent that simply abided by the wishes of the government. Military supporters felt that the military should not be judged by the nature of their missions, and cast political leaders as solely responsible for dictating the role of the military in foreign interventions. Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie, when asked ‘why are you [in Afghanistan]?’, responded:

As a soldier, it’s not my job to explain why you sent us. Soldiers don’t do that. We tell you what we’re doing, tell you how we’re doing it, but we should not be in the position of explaining to the people of Canada why we’re there. The responsibility for that lies with the political leadership and those who sent us. (cited in Hobson, 2007, p. 5)

Leslie explained that it wasn’t his job to convince the public of the legitimacy of military participation in Afghanistan, and that this burden was the responsibility of the government. Leslie’s statement reflects an institutional belief (as previously analyzed in Chapter 6) that the military should not be responsive to, or responsible

for, public opinion. This bespeaks military willingness to participate in all sorts of militarized activities, regardless of whether the public deems *particular* militarized activities as legitimate.

Leslie's statement also infers that as a soldier, he is absolved of political choices and political decisions. It is precisely these sentiments that blur the political nature of the military as an institution. The assumption that soldiers lack agency and cannot be responsible for the political missions on which they serve mystifies the individual decision that a citizen makes when choosing employment in an institution whose primary training objective is to "kill and die for the state" (Whitworth, 2004, p. 151). The 'support for troops without support for the war' meme obscures aspirations and willingness of the military and its soldiers to participate in militarized activities, such as those in Afghanistan. It also obfuscates the role that military leaders, including Leslie, play[ed] in influencing, advising, and determining the nature of political interventions. Advocating the use of armed violence over diplomacy or non-militarized policies is political. I suggest that as the military and its soldiers have political agency they therefore should not be absolved of political culpability.

This relates to efforts to de-politicize the military through the 'support for troops without support for the war' meme. I question whether militarized symbols (specifically yellow ribbons) can be used in a neutral manner to support individuals without supporting the actions in which they participate. Like *RFC*'s endorsement of red clothing on Fridays, donning a yellow ribbon (or the magnetized decals most commonly seen on vehicles) signals political acceptance of the military and ascribes values to soldiering. These cultural symbols may be intended to show support for individuals, but they also support the military as an institution, and in turn, promote militarization as a necessary and righteous phenomenon.

8.5 Partisan correctness and the legitimization of militarism

THE NORMALIZATION of Support the Troops argumentation was (re)produced by political elites of most major federal parties. During a Red Friday support rally on Parliament Hill in Ottawa, New Democratic Party (NDP) Member of Parliament (MP) Paul Dewar was in attendance but noted that, “the NDP have disagreed with the mission in the south [of Afghanistan], but we can also say that we support the men and women out there risking their lives on the front lines” (Lewis and Ma, 2006). During this same rally, Prime Minister Harper contradicted Dewar’s sentiment, explaining, “you cannot say you are for our military and then not stand behind the things they do... We don’t start fights, but we finish them and we won’t leave until they’re done” (Lewis and Ma, 2006). This type of discursive maneuvering was very common in political circles, and this particular debate related to partisan disagreement over the extending the length of the Afghan mission beyond 2008.

MP narratives indicated that regardless of whether they supported military action in Afghanistan or advocated troop withdrawal from Afghanistan, that their respective parties unequivocally supported the Canadian Forces and individual members of the Canadian Forces. The continued practice of using the Canadian Forces as a foreign policy tool was not part of the debate, rather the debate centered on disagreement about the appropriate role or political context in which the Canadian Forces should be deployed. This discourse reflects a belief that military activity can be legitimized, although there are disagreements over *circumstances* for legitimation, and casts soldiering as an activity that is always legitimized and honorable.

In the promotion of the Support the Troops meme, which included wearing red on Fridays, publicly affixing the slogan to service or personal vehicles, public banners, and other cultural (re)productions of the slogan, militarism and soldiering become

naturalized. Belief that the military was an irrefutable institution became normalized in public consciousness and was self-regulated by casting military support as a symbol of political correctness. Support the Troops rhetoric encouraged political support for militarized activities, but also enabled cultural militarization and (re)produced an environment in which democratic debate about military activities was stifled.

8.6 Project Hero and the disciplining of critical thought

I WISH to note another incident of cultural re-militarization that occurred in Canada. In 2010, a controversy arose surrounding a scholarship program at the University of Regina. Several faculty members penned a letter to the university president asking that the institution reconsider its participation in “Project Hero”. Project Hero was the brainchild of retired general Rick Hillier, and held the objective of offering free tuition to children of deceased Canadian soldiers. Professor Joyce Green, author of the letter, cautioned:

When you attach heroism to the deaths of the military, it makes it very difficult, maybe impossible for us to talk about what’s going on, what the nature of our military engagement is. In other words, it shrinks the space for democratic discussion and criticism of military policy in Canada and in the university. (cited in Graham, 2010)

Green and other signatories noted that the program was not simply symbolic, but contained financial and political implications for the university. Premier Brad Wall and a number of federal politicians were quick to condemn the letter, including MP Andrew Scheer who said, “Attacking a scholarship for the children of our fallen service men and women is disgusting...no matter what one thinks of the mission in Afghanistan, there can be no doubt of the honour with which our soldiers carry out their duties” (cited in Graham, 2010). Critics of Project Hero were subject to the

same silencing and shaming as other voices that expressed discomfort with cultural militarization during the Afghan War.

The Project Hero controversy is demonstrative of the power of Support the Troops rhetoric. By depoliticizing the troops through a call for universal support, their agency is obscured and the ability to think critically about military action is removed. It is crucial for a functioning democracy to be able to raise concerns about, military decisions and actions directed by partisan missions, the promotion and funding of military bodies by civic resources, and also the actions of soldiers representing the military in both combat and non-combat scenarios.

8.7 Yellow Ribbons as symbols of sacrifice: Disciplining anti-militarized narratives

MCREADY EXPLAINED that the yellow ribbon as a symbol “affirms and exalts certain preferred national subjects: the masculinized, normative and morally unimpeachable young men (and to a lesser extent, women) whose sacrifice is not only the salvation of the national character, but retrospectively becomes its foundation and guarantor” (2013, p. 34). The Support the Troops campaign focuses on the notion of sacrifice to garner consent for militarization in general. But particularly in the discourse on the War in Afghanistan, Support the Troops rhetoric relied heavily upon the evocation of sacrifice and soldier fatalities to silence critics of policy in Afghanistan. The Harper government capitalized this technique, and conflated the Support the Troops messaging with support for the Afghan mission. When criticism of the mission was raised, the death of Canadian soldiers was often evoked to shame people into silence; noting that the moral altruism of Forces members who had lost their lives in Afghanistan should trump citizen concerns about the politics involved.

The use of Support the Troops rhetoric to stifle criticism for the Afghan mission was noticeable in political (partisan) debates about ongoing support for Canada's role in the War in Afghanistan. During a Parliamentary debate in 2006, Stephen Harper told the House, "The Canadian government supports our troops...I would urge the NDP to get behind our troops in Afghanistan" (Parliament of Canada, 2006, p. 204). His statement insinuates that a lack of support for the Afghanistan mission would be seen as a lack of support for the Canadian Forces. MP Robert Thibault responded to this comment: "Support for our troops should be not confused with support for the decisions of our politicians. Questioning our government does not at all question our support for our troops" (Parliament of Canada, 2006, p. 178). Many members of the NDP reinforced the sentiment that democracy should allow for open questioning of political motives in military missions. The Conservative Party responded to these objections by reinforcing the Support the Troops rhetoric: "Mr. Chair...there is confusion in the message they are communicating. On the one hand, they say they support our soldiers, but in the same breath they question the key elements of their mission. Despite what they say, this is not supporting our soldiers or their mission" (Parliament of Canada, 2006, p. 185). This statement clearly links support for the mission in Afghanistan to the Support the Troops campaign, and therefore creates an understanding that supporting individual soldiers requires citizens to unequivocally support whatever activities soldiers do. This is a dangerous proposition because it disallows citizen dissent on issues related to the political nature of military missions, as well as prohibits scrutiny of the individual actions of soldiers when serving those missions.

In the Parliament of Canada (2006) debate, MP Joy Smith asked: "Can the members across the way give absolute 100% support to our very courageous troops

abroad who are doing this compelling job to make lives better for the people of Afghanistan?” (p. 169). Smith’s comment plays on the trope of soldiers-as-humanitarian-heroes, which suggests that Members of Parliament who wished to ask questions about the political mission were unsupportive of the courageous and altruistic actions of the Canadian Forces. Her reasoning also suggests that there is no need to question the military mission or the actions of troops because the actions are cast as inherently good and beneficial to the lives of Afghans. The blind acceptance of the soldier-as-humanitarian-hero trope is dangerous. Not only does it disregard the ways that military presence negatively effected the lives of Afghan people (i.e. destruction of community infrastructure, creation of war-like conditions in many communities, the creation of fear and instability due to war), but it silences any voices that might raise concerns about the negative effects of the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan. It does not allow for open discussion or debate about the nature of the political mission, or the strategies being used by the military, or the possibility that foreign military intervention might not have wholly benefited the lives of Afghans.

Smith’s comments suggest that criticism of the mission in Afghanistan was insulting to soldiers making sacrifices overseas; her comment discursively conflates the specific political mission in Afghanistan with generalized support for the Canadian Forces. The comments made by Conservative party members insinuated that the sacrifice of Canadian soldiers should trump democratic ability to have open debate about the Afghan mission. This is demonstrative of how Support the Troops rhetoric was used to silence critical questions about militarized policies.

8.8 Death and militarization

MEDIA COVERAGE of soldier fatalities was prominent during Canada's involvement in the Afghan mission from 2006–2011. I argue that death was discursively contrived to cast military action as uncontestable, and therefore used to discipline any voices who spoke critically about the military mission. The evocation of death as a means to legitimize participation in Afghanistan was used in different ways throughout the discourse.

Between 2001–2006, death references were about civilian fatalities incurred in the 9/11 attacks. The use of military force in Afghanistan was justified by the loss of Canadian life in the 9/11 terrorist attacks. MP Fitzpatrick explained: “On September 11 an attack was launched against innocent civilians in our part of the world. Three thousand civilian people were murdered, 24 or so were Canadians...the war was against liberal, western democratic values and the things we stand for” (Parliament of Canada, 2006). The argument by Fitzpatrick connects the deaths of Canadians in New York with a war narrative about an attack on all things associated with liberalism, democracy, and western values. The statement connects actual deaths with the fear that future threats were possible since liberal, western democracies were the target of terrorist aggression. This sentiment was also exemplified by Prime Minister Stephen Harper's explanation that military contributions to Afghanistan were “justice for the twenty-four Canadians murdered in the Al Qaeda attack on the World Trade Centre” (Weese, 2011).

Hyndman (2010) reflected upon the ways that bodies are counted in war narratives. The emphasis on death, particularly the number of deaths after the 9/11 attacks, was prominent in the early years of the war discourse. Hyndman observed:

While counting is an important device for remembering, it is also flawed in the way it transforms unnamed dead people into abstract figures that obfuscate the political meanings of the violence, and its social and political consequences”. (2010, p. 197)

The emphasis on the number of deaths on 9/11 creates a war story that begins on that date and ignores the historical, political, and social circumstances in which that event occurred. In this narrative, the war story began with an attack on the United States and its allies, without careful exploration of the political climate that led to the event. The focus on death was destructive as it obscured the political context of 9/11 and the focus on death was productive in the narrative of a war story that presented a justification for military action against an offensive attack.

In other words, the death of civilians during the 9/11 attack provided a justification for military action in Afghanistan based on two rationalizations: retaliation for the deaths and preventative action for future (potential) deaths. But very few critical voices in the 2001–2006 discourses questioned this logic. Judith Butler, reflecting on the 9/11 attacks asked why “the experiences of vulnerability and loss have to lead straightway to military violence and retribution” (2004, p. xii). The War Story, which began on September 11, 2001, did not include discussions of the historical, social, and political circumstances that led to those attacks. The grieving of lives lost on 9/11 lead to public outcry for retaliation for those deaths, the result of which was the newly declared War on Terror and military intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan. The deaths of Canadian and American citizens on 9/11 were cited frequently as a justification for military action.

As the mission continued, there was an interesting juxtaposition between the number of 9/11 fatalities and the growing number of soldier and civilian deaths in Afghanistan. Hyndman explained this phenomenon as the “dark irony of fatality

equivalence” (2008, p. 195) when the number of soldiers killed in Afghanistan exceeded the number of civilian fatalities from the 9/11 attacks. The use of death as a justification for (continued) involvement in the Afghan mission shifted. Initially, the discussion of death focused on *civilian lives* lost in 9/11. However, the evocation of death as a justification for involvement transitioned in 2006 to an emphasis on the need to honour the lives [already] lost by *Canadian Forces fatalities* in Afghanistan.

In the “Chair’s Foreword” of the Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan, it explains: “Canada’s commitment in Afghanistan... is important because it has already involved the sacrifice of Canadian lives” (Parliament of Canada, 2008, p. 3). Referring to death of Canadian soldiers evoked an emotional sentiment: it stimulated feelings of survivor’s guilt, where in order to make meaning of their deaths, survivors (other soldiers, citizens at large) became emotionally indebted to supporting the mission—or in some cases, *shamed* into supporting the mission. The use of death as a political maneuver for war support is both political, yet profoundly personal in the ways that it affected and stimulated individual support for militarization.

The use of death as a political maneuver to control criticism was common in Parliamentary debates as exemplified by comments in the House of Commons by MP Ujjal Dosanjh:

In recent weeks brave Canadian soldiers in Afghanistan have been killed in the line of duty. Others have been grievously wounded. Mothers and fathers, sisters and brothers, have received the awful news that they dread most. Canadians have looked to us, their elected representatives, for reassurance that the mission is worth the loss. (Parliament of Canada, 2006, p. 132)

The use of death—viewed as the ultimate form of sacrifice for the nation—was frequently evoked in the Support the Troops meme that conflated support for the troops with support for the Harper government’s continued involvement in the Afghan War.

Dosanih's comment demands that Canadians honour fallen soldiers by offering their unwavering support to politicians.

Adoption of the Support the Troops rhetoric by government officials was not immediate in the intervention timeline. Prior to 2006, the Canadian government refused to use the word "war" in describing military operations in Afghanistan. It was generally understood that the Canadian public did not welcome the combat-assertive "Americanized" military identity, a phenomenon that was documented in several public opinion polls. Scholars also discussed that the peacekeeping myth created a thanatophobic (fear of death) sentiment (Boucher, 2010, p. 238). Academics theorized a correlation between rising death tolls and lack of public support for the war (Kirton, 2007; Massie, 2008; Nossal, 2008; Jockel and Sokolsky, 2009).

From 2002–2008, the role of public dignitaries and political elites played a very limited role in repatriation ceremonies (Nossal, 2008). In 2006, the Harper government issued a ban on media coverage of ramp ceremonies at CFB Trenton for fallen soldiers. This decision caused outrage in the public, including the father of fallen soldier Nichola Goddard who publicly condemned the ban. Jane Wilson, mother of fallen soldier Tim Wilson, expressed that she felt the public should be able to view the ceremonies on television so that they can honor the fallen soldier and share in his or her family's grief (Tandt and Walton, 2006). While other families of slain soldiers felt that the media ban provided privacy to grieve, there was a clear sentiment that the public shared a responsibility in honoring military personnel who had died. The ban was eventually lifted in 2008, due to public concern that the Canadian government was trying to obscure the corporeal costs of the ongoing war.

From 2008 forward, the official discourse on Afghanistan changed. As mentioned, there was greater emphasis on the humanitarian objectives being fulfilled, more government information including a dedicated webpage with quarterly reports, and a new

focus that embraced the Support the Troops messaging. Most notably, the attention to military fatalities became a focus of major Canadian media outlets. Particularly in 2008–2010, there was a prominence of obituary-style media articles that aimed to honour fallen soldiers in the Afghan intervention.

Many of the obituary-style media articles reinforced the narrative that Canadian Forces were serving a mission based on altruism and service. A *Hamilton Spectator* article interviewed the mother of Sgt. Shawn Allen Eades who explained that “My son used to say, ‘If I don’t go and fight on their territory, our kids will be fighting on ours’” (Fragomeni, 2010). The reinforcement of bravery and altruism was repeated throughout a variety of media outlets. In reference to Sapper Brian Collier, the *Guelph Mercury* stated, “He is one of those guys that we all admire. He was absolutely selfless. He put his friends and those section mates first—a true hero” (Graveland, 2010b). The *Canadian Press* reflected on the life of Yannick Scherrer:

[He] answered the call to service and dedicated himself to the cause of peace, security, and the rule of law in Afghanistan. He defended these principles with great courage and integrity, earning the respect of his fellow soldiers and bringing honour to the Canadian Forces and to all Canadians. (Brautigam, 2011)

A majority of news coverage emphasized the courage, bravery and altruism of the deceased as demonstrated by their sacrificial natures. The *Calgary Herald* wrote of Cpl. Nathan Hornburg who “went to support his fellow troops and friends, went because his country asked him to, and went because he felt, from the bottom of his heart, that it was the right thing to do” (Tetley, 2007). The motivation to help others was reflected in the description of James McNeil as “well-liked and well-respected by all his officers, peers and soldiers alike... he believed his deployments to Afghanistan would contribute to a better life for Afghan people” (Graveland, 2010a). From 2007 through 2011, the majority of coverage about the Canadian Forces was a focus on the

sacrifice of fallen soldiers as told through these eulogies.

News coverage portrayed the deceased in a personable way. The *Toronto Star* described Sapper Brian Collier as “an adventurous man who loved sports, including skydiving, white-water rafting, snowboarding and hockey—and who ended every conversation with his family with ‘I love you’” (‘Soldiers body met by cl...’, 2010). The personalization of these deaths is important to understanding public reception of the Support the Troops campaign and other social movements designated to create awareness and support for the Canadian Forces, through the emotional evocation of death.

In a 2010 study, Joseph Fletcher and Jennifer Hove from the University of Toronto documented that increased exposure to images of flag-draped coffins lead to greater public expressions of support in Canada (Delacourt, 2010). Fletcher and Hove said that this finding juxtaposed other assumptions that soldier casualties could be seen as a political liability (see Delacourt, 2010). Another study by Peter Loewen and Daniel Rubenson posited an correlation between war casualties and support for the Harper government’s policies in Afghanistan. Their finding showed “strong evidence at both the individual and district levels that support for Conservative Party candidates [was] higher in districts that experienced war deaths” (cited in Delacourt, 2010). These studies both suggest that the discursive emphasis on death in media reports fostered public emotional connection to the Support the Troops rhetoric.

In addition to studies that observed the popularity of the Support the Troops narratives in media coverage, I also suggest that the prominence of obituary-style news articles is likely related to a lack of transparent information available on military activities in Afghanistan. Media access, and therefore coverage of the Afghan War was limited due to bureaucratic red tape that prevented free press access to all areas of the war arena. As many details were branded as integral to operational security, media

personnel were often screened and prohibited from publishing information without approval from DND. Embedded journalists who disclosed information without approval faced the threat of expulsion from the base (Perkel, 2010), and henceforth a loss of access to information as well as the protection of a secured area from which to report. Therefore, a large percentage of the discourse from 2008–2011 was national tributes to fallen soldiers in media coverage and also through grassroots civil movements that developed to honour military fatalities. As mentioned in Chapter 7, many media reporters narratives served to humanize soldiers by focusing on their personal stories, as well as to valorize soldier deaths: an expression of the deep emotional connection of embedded journalists to their subjects of study.

8.9 The Highway of Heroes

SO FAR, we have explored the use of Support the Troops rhetoric and symbolism in a variety of cultural and political sites. I will turn our discussion to other sites where the use of death cast public support of the military and, in turn, the Afghan mission as morally requisite.

The stretch of highway between Canadian Forces Base (CFB) at Trenton, Ontario and central Toronto, Ontario became a physical symbol of the Support the Troops sentiment. During the years 2002–2011, local citizens would line the overpasses and sides of the highway as the motorcade drove to Toronto from repatriation ceremonies held at CFB Trenton. This grassroots movement was widely photographed and garnered significant local support.

In 2002, Canadian photojournalist Pete Fisher, was tipped off to a procession of cars leaving the repatriation ceremony held at CFB Trenton (Fisher, 2011b). Sergeant Marc Leger, Cpl. Ainsworth Dyer, Private Richard Green, and Private Nathan Smith

were the first four Canadian soldiers killed in Afghanistan in a friendly-fire incident when an American fighter jet accidentally fired at the area they were patrolling. Fisher's father, a retired emergency services member, heard that the procession would drive through Cobourg en route to Toronto where autopsies would be performed prior to the release of bodies to the families (Fisher, 2011b). Fisher phoned the Cobourg emergency services dispatcher and suggested presence of local police on the bridges would be a respectful way to signal support (Fisher, 2011b). According to the Fisher's recanting, there were many Port Hope and Cobourg citizens who heard about the repatriation ceremony through the news and had also made their way to the overpasses in a show of support (Fisher, 2011b). This first demonstration of support—local citizens waving and the Port Hope and Cobourg emergency services members standing at attention—was on April 20, 2002. But the sentiment continued and the movement spread as citizens from all over the extended Toronto area would line up to show support in the proceeding repatriation processions.

As soldier fatalities increased in the years 2006 and 2007, there was a growth in participants on the overpasses, bridges, and outside the coroner's office in Toronto (Fisher, 2011b). The unofficial naming of this display is attributed to a June 27, 2007 *Toronto Sun* headline "Highway of Heroes" that accompanied a Pete Fisher photograph of three hearses under an overpass near Port Hope. As the (unofficial) name grew in popularity, Fisher explains that after discussions with other citizens at the "Highway of Heroes" processions he was inspired to write an online article pressing for the official adaptation of this name. This spurred an online petition that collected tens of thousands of signatures in the summer of 2007. Fisher brought the petition and the concept of officially naming this particular stretch of Highway 401 to his local Member of Provincial Parliament (MPP) and in September 2007, Premier Dalton McGuinty's government agreed to dedicate the highway "Highway of Heroes/

Autoroute des heros” (Fisher, 2011b).

Fisher’s stories and collection of photos of the Highway of Heroes processions narrate how the grassroots movement was inspired to show support for families of the Canadian Forces. Canadian media outlets featured this movement prominently and it became closely associated with the broader Support the Troops campaign. Draped over the bridges and overpasses were banners and signs reading “Support our Troops” with the yellow ribbon emblem, as well as signage reading “We salute you” and “We will remember”. The public displays captured on the Highway of Heroes were a physical representation of the popularity of the Support the Troops message.

According to media narratives, the gatherings were well received by military families. The *Canadian Press* reported, “Jo-Anne McLaren, who lost her son on the Afghan mission in 2008 and was a part of a procession down that highway, says it was as if crowds of Canadians were sent from God to help her cope with the worst day of her life” (‘Calgary soldiers milita...’, 2009). The depiction of a mother in grief is sobering and unsettling, and the emotional response to observing another’s grief narrows our ability to define the war (and its political and corporal consequences) outside of this particular narration.

The depiction of the military mother who has lost her child is a prominent part of many War Stories that evokes popular, emotive responses from the general public. The presentation of the feminized citizen (lover, mother, or non-military civilian) mourning and honoring the loss of the masculinized soldier (not exclusively male, but always militarized) has been a foundational narrative in many War Stories that serve to give order or meaning to conflict or violence that otherwise would be experienced as confusion (Cooke, 1996). Cooke (1996) reminds us that war, unlike many other human activities, has been the “literary purview of those few who have experienced combat...those who had not been at the front had no authority to speak of the dead

and dying” (p. 3). Mourning of the dead and dying on the Highway of Heroes is a physical and localized symbol of war, and one that has tricky political consequences. The depiction of the Highway of Heroes, a symbol that actively contributed to cultural militarization in Canada, produces a “common-sense” acceptance of these tributes loaded with heavy moral underpinnings. It reinforces the trope of ‘soldier-as-hero’, and creates an environment where ideational dissent is not permitted.

Death in war stories plays a powerful role in the way that war stories are accepted and (re)produced in society. Since war is not part of most Canadians’ lived experience, and the effects of war are only felt by a small population of Canadians (specifically, members of the Armed Forces or family and friends of military personnel), the only mechanism for Canadians to experience the war is by the ways it is narrated to them. For Canadians, the media predominantly narrated the Afghanistan experience through stories of soldiers and tributes to their deaths. Due to military restrictions that prohibited journalists to disclosure many on-the-ground details about military activities, the War Story of Canada in Afghanistan was largely articulated as one of honor, loss, and heroics.

For Canadians, the focus of the War Story (particularly after 2008) was on death; the discourse featured photos of funeral convoys on Highway 401, and media interviews with family members of fallen soldiers. Death of Canadians created a dominant portion of discourse on Canada in Afghanistan, and the Highway of Heroes provided a public platform in which Canadians could rally around, affirm, and (re)produce the narratives of the War Story. Although only a minority of all citizens experienced the death of a soldier in a familial way, the Highway of Heroes and narratives that accompanied it, allowed all citizens to experience the war in an emotive and personalizing way.

8.10 Portraits of Honour

PORTRAITS OF Honour was another citizen-led movement that arose in tribute to soldier fatalities in Afghanistan. Dave Sopha, an artist from Cambridge Ontario, created a ten-foot by forty-foot canvas oil painting that features a portrait of every Canadian soldier killed in Afghanistan. In 2011, Sopha travelled across Canada to display the painting with the goal of “bring[ing] Canadians together to remember, honour, and celebrate our Canadian forces” (Portraits of Honour, 2015). The tour worked with local Kinsmen associations to fundraise for military families or veterans in need of support (although the actual details of funding distribution was unclear at the time of writing).

During August of 2011, I attended an unveiling of the Portrait of Honour banner at a Kinsmen gala event in Saskatchewan. The paintings (floating faces of soldiers in military fatigue) were very detailed. The ceremony that accompanied the banner display was charged with emotion. A local cadet told the gathered crowd about his experiences as a military officer who was responsible for giving death notifications to families of soldiers killed in Afghanistan. Witnessing a local narrator speak against the backdrop of detailed painted faces of fallen soldiers was unsettling as it revealed the personal traumas of war that the general public does not often experience. The speaker discussed a few biographical details of some of the fallen soldiers who had been local residents. The personification of the portraits through narratives about their lives: where they lived, recreational hobbies and interests they held, remaining family members, and their motivations for serving in the Canadian Forces, helped to conjure a personal association with the subjects of these stories. Like the biographical news coverage of fallen soldiers, the Portraits of Honour tour created a personal connection to the war, to the Canadian Forces, and produced an emotive environment in which

questioning the Support the Troops messaging or even the war efforts in Afghanistan became uneasy and tense.

The power in the Support the Troops rhetoric related to this personal, emotive connection that the bibliographic narration about soldiers created. Death, a universally experienced phenomenon, became a unifying rally point that garnered sympathy for the Support the Troops rhetoric. The success of Support the Troops messaging—directly related to the laudation of soldiers’ deaths—rests upon its ability to create personal, emotive responses to the message within all members of the citizenry.

Emotion is a highly under-theorized aspect of International Relations, one that is only quite recently being explored by feminists. Neta Crawford (2000) explains that the mainstream emphasis on a rational-actor theoretical model does not account for the ways that emotions do influence behaviour and theory: bias, misperception, and even fear. Crawford explains that “feelings are internally experienced, but the meaning attached to those feelings, the behaviours associated with them, and the recognition of emotions in other are cognitively and culturally construed and constructed” (2000, p. 25; cited in Sylvester, 2013).

In a forum on “Emotion and the Feminist IR Researcher” in *International Studies Review*, Sylvester and others try to understand why feminist researchers go missing in their own feminist IR writings (i.e. why so many researchers fail to properly account for their own emotional biases that affect interpretation and analysis of political issues). My own encounters, experiences, and reflections about the Support the Troops movement (specifically, the July 2011 Portrait of Honour event) are indicative of the power of emotion in (re)producing foreign policy discourse centered on militarism and the narrative of sacrifice. Death—perhaps the only universal human experience—is charged with emotions.

Shirin Saeidi and Heather Turcotte (2011) contend that personal emotions are

conditioned by power structures and historical legacies (cited in Sylvester, 2013). My own personal emotions from the Portraits of Honour event show how powerful the sacrifice narrative was. The ‘soldier-sacrifice’ should be understood as a sign. Ahmed (2004) explained how emotions circulate between bodies and signs to create “communities of like feeling, such as the nation, with attendant feelings about who belongs and who is a despised ‘other’ fantasized as causing injury and pain to the true community” (cited in Sylvester, 2013, p. 93). Even as a scholar, who had spent years deconstructing and questioning the soldier-sacrifice narrative, I was deeply affected by the ceremony; I felt pity, and sadness, and guilt hearing the narratives of sacrifice and loss. The narratives about the deaths of community members (‘us’) resulted in a sense of unity, a shared sense of loss. Ahmed discussed how collective feelings are formed and become political (cited in Sylvester, 2013, p. 94), as the feelings (mourning, grief, sadness, guilt, fear) (re)produced through narratives of the soldier-sacrifice were (re)productive and constitutive of the Support the Troops discourse. The focus on death is (re)productive of narratives of ‘us’ (those who have experienced loss) and ‘them’ (those who caused our loss).

The analysis of foreign policy discourse cannot occur outside of the power circulations of that discourse, and their prominence in common-sense understandings about war, soldiers, and sacrifice. My personal responses (emotional) speak to the very personalized (yet also politicized) affect of the discourse. While my emotions at the ceremony did not result in a change of beliefs about militarization or did not result in a new willingness to support the troops unquestionably, they did cause me to pause. That small gesture—a pause—is a tangible example of behavioural self-regulation. The notion of governmentality (as outlined in Chapter 7) is of great importance in understanding how death (conceptually) was mobilized discursively (and therefore affectively) to regulate citizen actions towards, and beliefs about the military.

8.11 Silences and omissions in the War Story: Death as a “trump technique”

I OBJECT to the use of death (of soldiers) as a political “trump technique” (the silencing of dissent through shaming tactics). The use of death in the discourse on Canada’s military intervention in Afghanistan can be expressed in four reflections.

The first observation is that the deaths of soldiers were being used for political maneuvering—to stimulate public displays of support for militarization, and to encourage support for the Harper government’s policy. The spread of this meme conflates the actual motivations of soldiers participating in war missions with a specific government policy and politics. It also reflects Enloe’s (2001) reservations about the sneaky ways that militarization (support for the military, military activities, and military processes) infiltrates public consciousness and becomes normalized in socio-political culture.

The second consideration is that by caricaturing all soldiers as morally altruistic, we limit the ability to think critically about soldiers’ actions. Sandra Whitworth (2004) has identified numerous aspects of military cultural practices that include overt racism, sexism, and other exclusionary practices that contributed to the Somalia scandal in 1993, and to other problematic incidents within the Canadian Forces training programs. If the soldier archetype is assumed to be morally righteous, it makes it difficult to think critically about their actions, and can result in a form of public cognitive dissonance when soldiers do not act in ethically appropriate ways. In 2009, Richard Colvin, a Canadian Foreign Service worker, testified before the Special Committee on the Canadian Mission in Afghanistan. Colvin alleged that detainees in Afghanistan were transferred to Afghan prisons despite Canadian officials’ awareness that the detainees would be tortured (see Parliament of Canada, 2009). Despite

significant media attention on Colvin's accusations, this incident did not appear to reduce public support for the Afghanistan mission, nor did it diminish the prominence of the Support the Troops campaign. The lack of public outrage surrounding the Colvin accusations is demonstrative of the power in the 'soldier as hero' trope; it suggests that the Canadian public was deeply invested in the messaging put forward through the Support the Troops campaign that depicted soldiers as heroes. As discussed in Chapter 5, rhetoric that had constructed soldiers as heroes along the civil/savage dichotomous division between 2001–2008 was replaced with narratives that constructed soldiers as heroes by *nature of their sacrificial deaths*.

I am aware that Canadian Forces soldiers *did* conduct activities that were heroic, dauntless, and courageous, but wish to draw attention to the dangers of *only* viewing these individuals in this static and narrow way. Soldiers are human and despite their training to act in homogenous ways as a military unit, they are still individuals who make choices and differ in beliefs and actions. Caricaturization of soldiers as altruistic heroes does not allow us to recognize when soldiers act immorally or unprofessionally, nor does it allow public discussion of what should be done when these actions occur. I argue that this affords a dangerous level of power to soldiers who are de-politicized as this casts them as agents without responsibility.

The valourization of soldiers also obscures the value of less militarized personnel that contributed to the intervention. In 2011, questions were raised about who would be eligible for military service medals: civilian police officers and Tim Horton's employees at Kandahar airfield were eligible for service medals, but bureaucrats working alongside the Canadian Forces were not (Mat, 2011, p. A1). Tim Horton's employees were not armed soldiers, but they were militarized due to their presence on base. Bureaucrats that conducted less militarized tasks (administrative, diplomatic) were

not rewarded for the labour they contributed to the Afghan mission. This is demonstrative of the ways that militarized workers were cast as valuable through the war narrative, while (less militarized) voices and experiences were not celebrated with the same reverence.

A third consideration is that by conflating government rhetoric about the political mission with the Support the Troops campaign, we limit the ability for grieving military families and veteran members who did not lose their lives, but have suffered other physical, emotional, and psychological traumas, to be able to openly share their burdens, and to process the horrors of war that they (or their deceased loved ones) experienced. Because the notion of heroics is directly associated with death, those who were physically and emotionally wounded, but not killed, were excluded from the official war story that was promoted. This obscures the rising numbers of veterans with post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).

The focus on death narrates war, and (re)creates characters in the war story, in a particular way. The discursive depiction of soldiers as brave heroes also creates a deep personal tension for individuals experiencing fear, anxiety, depression, and other stigmatized emotions that accompany the psychological tolls of war. The trope of the 'altruistic hero' runs in contrast with the guilt that many soldiers experience after executing violent actions upon enemies. Those who have died are labeled heroes, and those who have been wounded are not included in the official war narrative of the Canadian government or media.

The effects of this omission is most obvious in the Harper government's cuts to veteran funding which included the closing of nine select Veteran services offices across Canada, the removal of 900 Veteran Services jobs, and refusal to allocate \$1.13 billion dollars of budgetary approved funding to Veteran Services from 2006–2014. Based on a report by the Auditor General in November 2014, a quarter of applications by

veterans applying for disability benefits were refused on their first application (Iverson, 2014). The availability of statistics of non-fatal injuries was difficult to access from 2001–2011, as the Department of National Defence claimed this information was classified information integral to operational security. In 2008, the DND stopped publishing information on battlefield injuries. When the official military intervention ended in 2011, DND released a report that showed 1,859 soldiers had been wounded or incurred non-battle injuries in Afghanistan since 2001 (Government of Canada, 2011a). These individuals were not part of the dominant discourse on Canada's military intervention in Afghanistan. The War Story constructed through government releases and media coverage focused only the sacrifice of certain soldiers: those who died. Although there was significant attention paid to the 158 Canadian soldiers killed in Afghanistan, the discourse focused little attention on the 39,558 other veterans who experienced the war and all of its traumas, but did not die.

The final consideration to the “death trump technique” employed in political discourse is that only certain deaths were discussed: namely, the deaths of Canadian soldiers. The death of ‘others’ was omitted from all public narratives about the war, and difficult to find in the discourse in general. Butler (2004) rebuked the “the blithe way in which we accept deaths caused by military means with a shrug, or with self-righteousness, or with clear vindictiveness” (p. 32). The death toll number of Afghan citizens is unclear, with only speculative numbers estimated at 12,500–14,700 civilians or 30,000–45,000 total citizens killed from 2001–2011 (Crawford, 2011, p. 1). Butler explained that not all deaths are mourned equally; the discourse on Afghanistan paid very little attention to the deaths of others (i.e. Afghans). She reflected that:

Certain images do not appear in the media, certain names of the dead are not utterable, certain losses are not avowed as losses, and violence is derealized and diffused. Such prohibitions not only shore up a nationalism

based on its military aims and practices, but they also suppress any internal dissent that would expose the concrete, human effects of its violence. (Butler, 2004, p. 37–38)

Butler's observations showcase the disparity between mourning of Canadian soldiers with a general public ignorance of how many other deaths occurred during military occupation. The fatalities, injuries, or losses experienced by Afghan citizens were not part of the discourse to which the Canadian public was exposed. Butler noted:

There are no obituaries for the war casualties that [we] inflict, and there cannot be. If there were to be an obituary, there would have had to have been a life, a life worth noting, a life worth valuing and preserving, a life that qualifies for recognition... we have to ask... how the obituary functions as the instrument by which grievability is publicly distributed. It is the means by which a life becomes, or fails to become, a publicly grievable life, an icon for national self-recognition, the means by which a life becomes noteworthy. (Butler, 2004, p. 34)

This identifies a foundational component of the discussion of death in the War in Afghanistan: only certain deaths were worthy of mention in the official and unofficial war stories. Only certain lives were worthy of recognition as heroic, and many aspects of the war story that were deemed unworthy of attention or unproductive of creating public support for the military mission, were disregarded and often silenced. The discussion of death in the discourse on Canada's mission in Afghanistan was both productive in its use to garner support and create sympathy, but also destructive in its ability to omit, silence, and ignore alternative perspectives and alternative voices that did not support the dominant messaging about the war.

8.12 Conclusion: Support(ing) the Troops in the war on Afghanistan

THE SUPPORT the Troops movement, and its associated rhetoric, was a dominant component of the discourse on Canada's military role in Afghanistan. However, as

with my analysis of the articulated military roles in official narratives, the Support the Troops narrative(s) must be understood as productive: they both (re)produced the trope of the soldier-hero, and served to self-regulate or discipline anti-militarization sentiments.

Although these campaigns started as grassroots movements, the narrative that cast criticism of Afghanistan as criticism of the military was also popular among political elites. Considering the ways that critical academics (like Green) and politicians (like McDonough) were shamed and silenced for their opposition to militarized policies, I conclude that the Support the Troops was the *most* effective narrative in providing a cohesive, impenetrable political justification for military action in Afghanistan.

Chapter 9

Conclusion

9.1 What *were* we doing there?

THE ORIGINAL objective of this project was to analyze how the imagined self-identity of Canada as an international actor was negotiated through the military intervention in Afghanistan (2001–2014). I have suggested throughout the body of this work that an active re-militarization of Canadian foreign policy occurred and that this coincided with increasing militarization of popular culture in Canada. The use of the Support the Troops rhetoric created a discursive environment where militarization was normalized and military activities were valorized. The rhetoric used to support militarization by the Harper government advocated the replacement of middlepower-ship ideals and peacekeeping tasks with a more robust peacemaking mandate (Murray and McCoy, 2010). This shift in foreign policy mandate reflects historical debates in Canadian Foreign Policy (CFP) studies about the type of role Canada should assume as a global actor. The intervention in Afghanistan signaled a shift away from the image of a peaceful liberal internationalist towards what Kirton (1983) might describe as a neo-realist ‘principal power’.

Elite conversations about military policy in Afghanistan involved negotiations about the type of role the Canadian Forces *should* perform internationally. Some academics and military supporters welcomed the change in mandate that re-prioritized combat as the focus of the mission. Jack Granatstein, a vocal supporter of re-militarization, quoted the commander of Operation Athena who declared, “God, I hate it when they call us peacekeepers. We loathe the term, abhor it” (cited in Anker, 2005). Other elites, such as (former) NDP leader Jack Layton, were wary of the increased combat role, and advocated for other options including diplomatic negotiations with the Taliban (Walkom, 2007). Afghanistan proved to be a case study example of the disagreement between powerful actors in Canadian foreign policy over the role (combat or otherwise) that was most suitable for the Canadian Forces.

When analyzing media coverage of the Afghanistan War, I found that journalistic narratives emphasized the do-good actions of the Forces and focused on public displays of mourning for fallen soldiers. These narratives of sacrifice and calls to honour military personnel in public displays of mourning reinforced the symbol of the helpful-hero trope, and in turn, (re)produced a belief that Canada’s military agents help. I argue that the (re)production of moral altruism and the narrative of “helping” was a dominant theme in the discourse that represented the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan.

The long-standing myth of Canada as “peacekeeper par excellence” (Jockel, 1994) has been firmly entrenched in the Canadian imaginary. While there has been ongoing academic and political contestation about the accuracy of the Canada-as-Peacekeeper trope, the glorification of this identity has (re)produced the persistence of this image in popular consciousness. However, despite popularity of the Canada-as-Peacekeeper image, I argue that it is not peacekeeping *per se* that has been coveted as a symbol of identity, but rather the assumed virtuosity that peacekeeping was believed to

represent.

During Canada's intervention in Afghanistan, militarized policies were facilitated—not because the public fully embraced the Harper government's "Whole of Government" mandate that claimed to help Afghans through militarized activities—but because elite voices adopted Support the Troops rhetoric that drew upon notions of military heroism. Support the Troops rhetoric symbolized the long-held belief that Canadian military activities were inherently virtuous and cast soldiers as heroes willing to die for the greater good.

Kim Richard Nossal (2010) detailed the efforts by the Chretien (1993–2003) and Martin (2003–2006) governments to shift security rhetoric from the Cold War foreign policy notions of supporting one's Great Power ally (the United States) and traditional notions of state-centered security, towards a greater foreign policy focus on human security and multilateralism. He asserted that efforts to create public consent for the human security agenda between 1993–2003 were largely unsuccessful, as demonstrated by the "tepid" public support for the Afghanistan mission between 2003–2006 that explicitly utilized notions of humanitarianism. Nossal (2010) noted that the lack of public support for Afghanistan was a conundrum because the early years of the mission aligned (rhetorically) with the re-articulation of humanitarian multilateral goals of the Chretien and Martin governments. Rather than a result of communication failure by the government, Nossal concluded that the justifications for intervention in Afghanistan were "simply unconvincing to Canadians" (p. 122). Nossal suggested that this was due to an inability of Canadians to see past the security discourse as dictated by American interests, and he suggests that the "ear candy" rhetoric about multilateralism, global interests, and human security, touted in the decade prior to the intervention, failed to resonate with the public in the early years of the Afghanistan mission (2010, p. 124).

The analysis I conducted concludes differently. This is largely due to the time duration I studied, which included the years 2006–2014. While I agree with Nossal’s assertion that the public was largely unconvinced by the rhetoric they received about the role(s) that the Canadian Forces assumed in the mission, I argue that it was government inability to align official rhetoric with long-standing mythologized understandings of ‘helpful internationalism’ that may have affected the “tepid” public support for Afghanistan. In other words, I argue that official narratives failed to go *far enough* to align with rhetoric of Canada as a humanitarian helpful-fixer.

As considered in Chapters 3, 4, and 5, I examine how government elites presented the three roles (assisting allies, fighting terrorism, and offering humanitarian assistance) as justification for military participation but struggled to articulate how these roles were concordant. Foreign policy elites were tasked with not only marketing the viability of the “Whole of Government” approach, but also forced to (attempt to) dismantle the erroneous, yet long-standing, association of Canadian foreign (military) policy with peacekeeping—an activity explicitly not part of the Afghan mission.

The mythologized association of Canadian foreign policy with peacekeeping activities involved a misrepresentation of the definition of peacekeeping. The traditional conceptualization of peacekeeping embodied a false dichotomy: peacekeeping as the antithesis of war-fighting. Because early forms of UN peacekeeping interventions limited armed force to self-defence, the representation of a non-combative peacekeeper was (re)produced in Canadian consciousness. This representation has been criticized for being inaccurate since the end of the Cold War; Granatstein argued, “When Canada does peacekeeping, it’s really doing peacemaking or peace enforcement which are just synonyms for war” (2004, n.p.).

The false dichotomy in the peacekeeping myth explains why the government struggled to justify the Canadian Forces’ participation in a combat role and how the

‘defence’ component of the 3-D strategy could be reconciled with achieving peace. Therefore, it was not simply a failure of government to clearly articulate the message, nor was it simply a matter of public skepticism of the message. The “tepid” support by the Canadian public of government messaging about Afghanistan must be understood in relation to the power of Canada-as-Peacekeeper mythology, and the ways that this image has been (re)produced.

As Chapter 2 outlines, there has been historical emphasis of Canada’s foreign policy as virtuous, altruistic, and less militarized than Great Power actors (i.e. the United States). Academics have ascribed middlepowership identity to nations who prioritize peace, tolerance, and conflict resolution in foreign policy (Dewitt and Kirton, 1983, see also Keating, 1993).

Defining middle powers according to this definition has resulted in a “smug superiority” about the assumed altruistic nature of Canada’s foreign policy (Holmes, 1984, see also Stairs, 2003; Howell, 2005).

The problem with this particular (re)construction of Canadian identity is that it is one-dimensional. The dominant symbol of Canada’s historical foreign policy (Canada-as-Peacekeeper) has been caricaturized as morally superior to American policies. Canada-as-Peacekeeper is imagined to have a foundation of moral altruism, and this image is foiled with an abstraction of American foreign policies (cast as motivated by materialism or imperialism). The misrepresentation of Canadian foreign policy with moral virtuosity, and the long-standing belief that Canada was an international helpful-fixer (Dewitt and Kirton, 1983) is important for understanding the “tepid” public support for Afghanistan presented by Nossal (2010).

The first articulated objective of the Afghanistan mission(s)—assisting our international allies—contradicted the presumed moral goodness of Canadian foreign

policy because there was concern that the mission in Afghanistan reflected American geo-strategic interests, rather than a reflection of Canada's pure good will. The presentation of foreign policy activity in Afghanistan as a necessity to appease (American) allies did not align with the helpful-fixer image of Canada-as-Peacekeeper nation that prioritized virtuosity.

The second articulated objective—fighting terrorism—also departed from the helpful-fixer image. Although Nossal is correct that the in/security rhetoric of the Bush government (“you are with us or against us”) permeated Canadian consciousness in the early years of the War, this narrative was not well received. As discussed in Chapter 2, opinion polls throughout the intervention showed public discomfort with this type of narrative. In an internal report about the government's Afghanistan communication strategy, it was reported that Canadians were uncomfortable with presentation of narratives that came across as “too American”; the report suggested the Harper government should instead focus on terminology that emphasized humanitarian work (Woods, 2007). Therefore, this second articulation of Canada's role (the presentation of Canadian soldiers as increasingly militarized agents that were engaged in active combat against terrorist organizations) also departed from the helper-fixer image. More importantly, it was difficult for the government to promote military engagement in active combat, when long-standing assumptions about the nature of Canadian foreign policy emphasized the moral superiority of its middle power priorities of peace and conflict resolution. Despite diligent efforts by the government to demonstrate to Canadians that modern peace interventions required stabilization (achieved through combat activities), the mythologized association of “peacekeeping” as an activity that was de-militarized remained stubbornly in the Canadian imaginary. This false dichotomy of peacekeeping/war fighting made the terrorist-fighting narrative difficult to reconcile vis-à-vis the long-held association of

Canada-as-Peacekeeper.

The third objective of the Afghanistan mission—offering humanitarian assistance to Afghan citizens—was best aligned with the Canada-as-Peacekeeper abstraction. However, the government emphasized the need for increased military functions to accomplish humanitarian objectives in Afghanistan. The government was explicit that humanitarian activities could not be accomplished without military stabilization of the region. Despite deliberate government and military efforts to present traditional peacekeeping functions (separating warring parties across a peace line, only using force in self-defence, engaging in non-militarized diplomatic discussions) as outdated and inappropriate for the political context in Afghanistan, it was difficult to transfer the sentiment of moral superiority associated with Canada-as-Peacekeeper to the modern forms of peacemaking used in Afghanistan, even though foreign policy elites strived to emphasize the “helpful” nature of the mission. Therefore, I disagree with Nossal’s conclusion that “tepid support” for Afghanistan was due to the Canadian public’s inability to see past the American security rhetoric: I argue that government narratives about humanitarian objectives in Afghanistan did not adequately capture the firmly entrenched and clearly emotional connection of presumed moral virtuosity of Canada-as-Peacekeeper.

This conclusion aligns with calls by the newly-elected Justin Trudeau government to return to the glorified foreign policy goals of the so-called Golden Age of Canadian foreign policy. In 2015, a major foreign policy election issue was Canada’s (un)willingness to accept Syrian refugees. The Liberal government’s election promise to accept 25,000 state-sponsored Syrian refugees contained dominant messaging about how this policy reflects Canadian values of humanitarianism and helping others. The narrative of *helping* is central to the carefully crafted and publicly re-produced self-image of Canada’s role in global affairs: the ‘helper-fixer’. The self-congratulatory

sentiments of Canada's acceptance of Syrian refugees have occurred alongside the condemnation of American political elites who were wary to adopt similar policies (most notably Donald Trump, a Republican presidential candidate). The representation of *helping* by the Justin Trudeau government (re)produced a narrative that Canadian identity is distinctly antithetical to American nationalism, as reflected in the conceited misrepresentation that Canada's international policy contains an altruism lacking in American global priorities.

Since assuming office in November 2015, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has used a number of catch phrases to signal to global allies "it is time for Canada to step up once again" (Wherry, 2016). At the United Nations headquarters on March 16, 2016, Trudeau gave a speech outlining why Canada should be elected to the Security Council and claimed that his government was "determined to revitalize Canada's historic role as a key contributor to United Nations peacekeeping" (Wherry, 2016). Trudeau noted that Canada had "accomplished extraordinary things" with the UN since 1945 and stressed that "[Canada is] determined to help the UN make even greater strides in support of its goals for all humanity" (Wherry, 2016). Trudeau explained:

Canada always needs to look for how we can best help, how what Canada brings to the table is perhaps unique, or at least uniquely suited to the circumstance it weighs in on... We have capacities that many Western countries do not... as we go forward we will always look to how Canada can best engage with the world in a responsible way that is consistent with our strengths and of course, with our values. (Wherry, 2016)

Trudeau's campaign to the international community emphasizes the self-indulgent belief that Canada has historically held a niche, unique position as a global helper in peacekeeping missions and that Canada's global objectives to *help* are altruistic. Trudeau also infers that Canada's helpful, value-based position is unique and not possessed by other Western nations. These narratives signal a feel-good sentiment

about Canadian international identity cast as imbued with moral values of goodness and helping.

Trudeau's recent narratives reflect a moral smugness about Canadian international identity used historically by political elites to stimulate public support for global military activities. This smugness is facilitated by the deceptive belief that Canada's military activities historically have been *morally* distinct from American military activities. The (re)production of Canada's helpful-fixer international identity has relied on narratives that juxtaposed Canadian military history (cast as uni-dimensionally helpful) with American military history (cast as uni-dimensionally imperialistic).

In the case of the Afghanistan War, it is problematic to feign that Canadian soldiers were less violent or more virtuous than George W. Bush's or Barack Obama's American troops—both nations served similar missions and completed complementary activities through NATO. The assumption that Canadian military activities in Afghanistan were more virtuous than American strategies rests on the principle of *presumed intent*—a presumption that cannot be generalized nor plausibly sustained. While Canadian and American foreign policies were not identical (there were nuanced differences in objectives, tactics, and motivations), both of these countries engaged in over a decade of armed conflict in Afghanistan with the objective of promoting normative values. The rhetoric used by governments may have differed, but it is contentious to assume that Canada's global identity contains greater ethical foundations than that of the United States.

This is an important caveat to consider as Justin Trudeau's government establishes their foreign policy platforms. Trudeau had branded his government's approach to foreign policy as a return to Canada-as-Peacekeeper. It should be noted that Trudeau's (re)articulation of national identity is still being negotiated vis-à-vis the deployment

of Canada's military to promote political values abroad. Trudeau's foreign policy vision still serves to glorify the military in (re)defining Canada's "helpful" international identity.

What should be central to this discussion is that national identity, like Anderson's (1991) famous notion explains, is the product of *imagining* the community, rather than containing a naturalized or "true" identity. My original research question focused on the ways that national identity was imagined: what the role of the Canadian military was during the Afghanistan War, and how this role (re)produced a particular identity for Canada as a global actor. Through this analysis, I emphasize that the process of (re)constructing national identity involves competing visions, histories, and narratives and that there is no "true" identity to be revealed, but rather a hegemonic narrative that is neither true nor fixed.

The hegemonic narrative that emerged from the discourse on the Afghanistan intervention was that Canada, no matter the nature of military operations, is a nation that prioritizes helping others. However, the imagination of Canada as a helpful nation is not simply a conceited self-perception, but can have effects on how foreign policy activities are conducted. Many historical colonial foreign practices were informed by a "deeply held belief about the right to dominate others *for their own good*" (Razack, 2004, p. 10, emphasis in original). The mythology of the Canadian nation as a helpful, benevolent actor omits any instances of historical and current practices of violence executed by the state both abroad and within national borders. If Canada is imagined primarily as an altruistic helpful-fixer, then it becomes implausible to reconcile stories where Canadian foreign policies have been damaging. The tendency for academics and politicians to cast Canada as "an impartial and compassionate observer" (Razack, 2004, p. 14) ignores the historical circumstances and international practices of Canadian foreign policies that have used violence to achieve

political objectives abroad.¹ The myth of impartiality depoliticizes the inherently political practice of projecting Canadian normative values globally.

The myth of Canada as a nation that *helps* serves as a distraction from actualized effects of policies that may be un-helpful. The problem lies in the omission of scholars and practitioners of foreign policy to think critically about whether the claims to ‘helping’ in foreign policy discourse can be sustained. The myth that Canada’s foreign policy is underpinned by a desire to help, or the notion that promoting “Canadian values” abroad is neutral, should be of concern for scholars of CFP. The (re)production of theory helps to reinforce what can be considered plausible policy activity. Theorizing foreign policy is an inherently political exercise, and our personal lived experiences shape our conclusions about (im)possibilities in the world. Deconstructing foreign policy discourse demonstrates the contingency of narratives, particularly narratives from elite voices such as academics and politicians that are often read at face value, without acknowledgement of their contingency.

The ongoing debate about Canada’s Place in the World (a dominate focus of mainstream CFP literature) has distracted both scholars and policy makers from critically assessing the narratives that circulate in foreign policy discourse, and in turn, assessing the circulations of power sustained in these narratives. Razack notes that we should not underestimate the power of myths, and that a careful examination of

¹I again summon the example of allegations raised in 2006–2009 regarding the transfer of Afghan detainees by the Canadian Forces to the Afghan National Army (ANA). Richard Colvin, a diplomatic worker in Afghanistan, raised concerns that mistreatment of detainees (specifically the use of torture on prisoners of war) by the ANA was known by Canadian military/political officials. The allegation that Canadian officials were complicit in the use of torture (more accurately, that officials turned a blind eye to this practice) resulted in outrage by opposition party members in the Canadian Parliament. While there were demands for further investigation of this scandal, the prorogation of Parliament in 2009 prevented opposition MPs from gaining full access to the censored documents needed for assessment. The alleged use of unethical action by Canada is contradictory to the cultivated myth of the neutral and compassionate helper. While this particular case study requires future attention (as well as access to classified documents not yet available to the public), it does serve to de-stabilize the myth that Canada acts as benevolent helper in global practices by suggesting an alternative narrative about the types of actions performed in Afghanistan.

the ways that these myths are sustained is necessary for achieving a “more ethical way of imagining ourselves and living in the world” (2004, p. 9). I believe the theoretical contributions of this research that show the long-standing discursive re-production of the ‘helping’ narrative in CFP is useful in understanding how governments prioritize particular policy strategies, particularly in foreign policy decisions. To use Steele’s (2008) terminology, the ‘helping’ narrative is central to Canada’s *ontological security* and central to national self-identity (both in how it sees itself and wants others to see it). Steele suggests that understanding the ontological security concerns of states (informed by their need to reconcile their foreign policy actions with their perceived self-identity) is a helpful mechanism for international relations scholars to better theorize why and when states are willing to participate in foreign interventions (2008, p. 3).

Understanding the hegemonic narratives present in foreign policy discourse is also valuable to scholars of CFP. The methods used in this research require that academics be self-reflexive about their own culpability in producing particular political agendas. Reflexive scholarship must acknowledge the ways that academic theorization reinforces existing power dynamics that privilege certain social structures, institutions, and normative values that are neither neutral nor apolitical. My research diverts from mainstream theories of CFP (and IR) that do not problematize the military as an institution. Mainstream CFP does not ascribe sufficient agency to the military or its members when discussing foreign policy practices due to the conceptualization of Canada as a homogenous actor in global affairs, thereby obscuring the political responsibility of the persons who perform foreign policies.

I propose that the research presented is useful for future study of foreign policy and that the theoretical and methodological conclusions of this project can be used as a foundation for interpreting the many ways nationalistic discourse sustains militarist

ideology. As Colleen Burke notes, there are numerous ideological manifestations of militarism, including the normative acceptance of hierarchies, the normalization of violence as a means to resolve conflict, and a “nationalism [that] defines the ‘other’ as enemy” (1998, n.p.). These manifestations were present in the discourse on Canada in Afghanistan, and demonstrative of the ways that militarism operated as a regime of truth within foreign policy discourse.

9.2 What’s the problem with helping?

THIS RESEARCH has studied the competing narratives about the role the Canadian Forces served in Afghanistan, and how Canadian (inter)national identity was (re)defined. It has also served to show some of the consequences of imagining international identity in particular ways. Narratives of Canadian goodness, soldier heroics, and euphemized war stories, may cause unintended violence(s) due to the omission of other narratives. The presumed moral altruism of Canadian foreign policy present in these narratives renders implausible other stories; specifically, it omits narratives of instances when Canadian military presence in Afghanistan did not help Afghans. The presumption that the purpose of the intervention was to help Afghans contained a neo-colonial sentiment that it was Canada’s responsibility to ‘save’ Afghans from their barbaric oppression of their own citizens [*sic*]. The assumptions about the noble nature of the intervention carried over into the assumptions that the government, media, and public, cast upon the actors who executed these policies: the Canadian Forces.

My personal uneasiness with cultural militarization that occurred throughout the duration of the Afghanistan intervention is reflected in my apprehension of the Support the Troops campaign, the Highway of Heroes rallies, and the endorsement of *Red*

Fridays Canada—specifically, my unease with the militaristic assumptions present in these displays and the ways that these movements were co-opted for partisan political gain. Support the Troops rhetoric was fostered by civil society and was strategically used by the Harper government to silence critics of foreign policy in Afghanistan. General public support for the Support the Troops campaign(s) demonstrated the ways that militarization occurred *culturally* in Canada and how consent for militarism as a guiding foreign policy ideology was (re)produced. The construction of soldiers as heroes became a widely (re)produced trope in public consciousness. The representation of the fallen soldier, like the nationally beloved blue-bereted peacekeeper, signifies a type of moral virtuosity worthy of public respect. The problem with the representation of the fallen Afghanistan veteran, as with the representation of the peacekeeper, is that this caricature does not represent the complexity of these roles, nor does it capture the full humanness of its referent. Support the Troops discourse demands that soldiers be cast (only) as virtuous heroes, and any narratives about their political agency in war are silenced or accused of sacrilege.

My contention with the Support the Troops campaign is not that the representation of soldiers as heroes is inaccurate. I am aware that soldiers are indeed capable of brave and selfless actions, and I do not dispute that such actions occurred throughout this military engagement. However, I take issue with the portrayal of soldiers as unidimensionally heroic: soldiers are human and therefore capable of un/ethical actions as are all humans. The uni-dimensional portrayal of soldiers as heroes is problematic because it depoliticizes soldiers and strips them of culpability as agents of armed conflict. Suggesting unquestioned support of the military (supporting them no matter where or under what conditions they are stationed) is a dangerous proposition as it removes the military from the scope of political scrutiny, as well as romanticizes an institution created to use physical violence to achieve political objectives.

My unease with the Support the Troops discourse is founded upon several contestations with the artificial construction of soldiers as morally impenetrable, simplistic characters. The connection between the assumed moral superiority of Canada's policies, and the cultural re-militarization enabled through the Support the Troops discourse is as follows: the assumptions that Canada's foreign policies are altruistic and that its policy enforcers are heroes, leaves little room for critical discussion about whether these policies are adequate solutions, and whether these actors are the most suitable agents of foreign policy. As Christine Sylvester reminds us, militarization is about "molding people to accept the use of force in the preservation or overthrow of groups, regimes, and nations" (2013, p. 43). In other words, the molding of Canadian opinion to accept stories of moral altruism performed by heroic citizens is part of a larger strategy to convince the public that the use of violence to overthrow a particular group, regime, and nation, was acceptable both in terms of ethical implications and national financial resources.

Throughout this study, I have interchangeably used various descriptors to refer to the foreign policy actions between 2001 and 2014: intervention, mission, military action, and war. Let us not forget that each of these terms, although arguably nuanced in definition, refers to the deliberate use of state-initiated violence that resulted in the destruction of infrastructure, ecosystem, human life, and emotional psyches. These violences consumed the daily lives of Afghans (whom the hegemonic narrative about soldiers *helping* presumed to benefit), but also profoundly affected the Canadian individuals who carried out these policies in the name of *helping*, moral goodness, and heroics.

Using Sylvester's (2012) conceptualization of war as experience, it is important to remember "armed conflict is a collective violence that aims to injure bodies, even when perpetrators of that violence might experience war as an effort to avoid or minimize

‘casualties’ or ‘collateral damage’ ” (p. 502). I would add that armed conflict, no matter the rationalization, does injure bodies (in various physical and emotional ways), *even when the perpetrators of this violence experience/perceive war as a mechanism for helpful change*. These processes are (re)produced through an ongoing consensus of militarism that exists in many places within IR literature (as privileged by mainstream theory as a primary tool of statecraft) as well as within political and popular culture in Canada (as represented by the glorification of the Canadian Forces as an institution, and military foreign conduct as a historical practice that has forged an important role for the state, whether that be as a peacemaker or peacekeeper).

As Enloe (2004) reminds us, militarization creates a regime where soldiering is an exceptionally valued activity. But militarization also creates momentum through a culture of consent for military activities, especially when these activities are viewed one-dimensionally as valuable. Militarization supports the ontology of militarism that considers collective violence a necessary means to achieve political ends.

Part II focused on two central questions. The first question asked how the mission in Afghanistan and the role that the Canadian Forces played in Afghanistan were articulated to the public. The second question asked how these narratives affected national identity (re)production. Part III analyzed the discursive regime that sustained the dominance of these narratives and the exclusion of other narratives of war. Therefore, the central conclusion of this research is that the Support the Troops rhetoric functioned to sustain support for military activity, even when the original objectives of the Afghanistan mission presented by the government did not adequately align with the notion of ‘helping’ present in long-held associations of foreign policy identity. Specifically, the Support the Troops narratives’ emphasis on the heroism and sacrifice of the Canadian military, provided a symbolic representation of moral virtuosity that was popular in public imaginings of foreign policy.

Therefore, although this project focused specifically on the manifestations of foreign policy discourse about Afghanistan, the significance of this research is the unintended findings: the observation of how militarism operates within discourses of Canadian foreign policy, and how this hegemonic discourse casts the military as an essential institution for foreign policy practice. While it is possible to mobilize dissent for particular military missions or activities (exemplified by the small anti-war movement in Canada), it becomes implausible to question the existence of the military itself (exemplified by the grandiose gestures by critics of the Afghanistan intervention that specified they were criticizing the war but not the Canadian Forces; or by the overt shaming of MP McDonough or Professor Green who dared to speak out against militarization).

International Relations (IR) and Canadian Foreign Policy (CFP) studies rest on the ontological presupposition that armed conflict is an inevitable component of political life. This ‘common-sense’ assumption cannot be problematized without the deconstruction of foreign policy narratives. Therefore, I emphasize that the specific findings of this research project, although important in understanding how power circulates in Canadian foreign policy discourses, are of secondary importance to continuing this methodological practice, particularly as discourses do not exist ‘out there’, but overlap and intertwine—texts are, as Der Derian (1989) explains, intertextual. All texts are “bound up in a complex web of referential and deferred meanings” (Beier, 2005b, p. 24). These inter-related meanings are also in a constant state of (re)production. Understanding how militarism is sustained in foreign policy discourse requires an examination of the many processes of socialization and academic theorization that foster a belief that military activity is honorable. The future of Canada’s foreign policy role—whether a liberal internationalist or a principal power—matters less than the recognition that foreign policy discussions continue to focus on the appropriate role

of military at the exclusion of discussions about the *appropriateness* of international use of the military as a primary institution of statecraft in global affairs.

Appendix A

Figures



Figure A.1: CANEX Yellow Ribbon



Figure A.2: “Stand Behind Our Troops” Bumper Sticker and *Red Fridays Canada* Ribbons



Figure A.3: Saskatchewan Support Our Troops Ribbon

Bibliography

- (2006, August 28). Bullets fly, Ottawa ducks. *Maclean's*.
- (2006, August 4). Editorial: Fighting for Canada. *Winnipeg Free Press*, Pp. A10.
- (2007, June 13). Editorial: Path to peace. *Winnipeg Free Press*, Pp. A14.
- (2007, October 14). Our role in Afghanistan really about ties with US. *Toronto Star*, Pp. A06.
- (2007, April 4). Threat will keep troops in Afghanistan: O'connor. *Kitchener-Waterloo Record*, Pp. A5.
- (2007, June 20). Voices: decals spat. *Toronto Star*.
- (2008, April 16). Canadian Forces launch dark, edgy campaign. *CanWest MediaWorks*.
- (2009, November 8). Calgary soldier's military funeral to be held day before Remembrance Day. *The Canadian Press*.
- (2010, July 24). Soldier's body met by close-knit family; 24-year-old ended every conversation with his family with 'I love you'. *Toronto Star*.

- (2013, February 1). US military struggling to stop suicide epidemic among veterans. *The Guardian*.
- (2015, August 4). The Guardian view on Canada's elections: Is the Stephen Harper era over? *The Guardian*.
- Albert, S. (2006, April 25). Canada sends third of fleet: Biggest force since Korea: Contingent includes 2,000 troops, 6 ship and 6 aircraft. *National Post*, Pp. A1.
- Anderson, B. (1991). *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso.
- Anker, L. (2005, Summer). Peacekeeping and public opinion. *Canadian Military Journal*, Pp. 23–32.
- Arkin, W. and Dobrofsky, L. (1978). Military socialization and masculinity. *Journal of Social Issues*, 34(1), 158–168.
- Armstrong, J. (2006, November 15). O'Connor on blitz to sell Afghan Mission. *The Globe and Mail*.
- Barrett, F. J. (2001). The organizational construction of hegemonic masculinity: The case of the US Navy. In S. M. Whitehead and F. J. Barrett (Eds.), *The Masculinities Reader*, Pp. 77–79. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
- Beier, J. M. (2005). Canada: Doubting hephaestus. *Contemporary Security Policy*, 26(3), 431–446.
- Beier, J. M. (2005). *International Relations in Uncommon Places: Indigeneity, Cosmology, and the Limits of International Theory*. New York: Palgrave MacMillian.
- Beier, J. M. and Arnold, S. L. (2005). Becoming Undisciplined: Toward the Supradisciplinary Study of Security. *International Studies Review*, 7(1), 41–62.

- Beier, J. M. and Wylie, L. (2010). Introduction: What's So Critical About Canadian Foreign Policy? In J. M. Beier and L. Wylie (Eds.), *Canadian Foreign Policy in Critical Perspective*, Pp. xi–xix. Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press.
- Bell, C. (2010). Fighting the War and Winning the Peace. In J. M. Beier and W. L. (Eds.), *Canadian Foreign Policy in Critical Perspectives*, Pp. 58–71. Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press Canada.
- Bercuson, D. (1996). *Significant Incident: Canada's Army, the Airborne, and the Murder in Somalia*. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart.
- Bercuson, D. (2009, November 9). This Remembrance Day will be different; We are mourning the dead of the first Canadian war of this century, says military historian David Bercuson. *The Globe and Mail*.
- Berthiaume, L. (2013, March 20). Harper government's defence spending cuts raise spectre of another 'decade of darkness'. *National Post*.
- Black, D. and Smith, H. (1993, December). Notable Exceptions? New and Arrested Directions in Canadian Foreign Policy Literature. *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 26(4), 745–774.
- Blanchfield, M. (2003, February 12). Canada to send troops back to Afghanistan. *CanWest News Service*.
- Blanchfield, M. (2008, December 6). A difficult question. *Ottawa Citizen*, Pp. A5.
- Blanchfield, M. (2015, September 29). Foreign affairs officials urge new directions for Canada in 'secret' transition memo. *Toronto Star*.
- Bland, D. (2002). Canada and Military Coalitions: Where, How, and with Whom? *Institute for Research on Public Policy*.

- Blatchford, C. (2006, November 28). Our soldiers aren't trying to 'kill everybody'. *The Globe and Mail*.
- Blatchford, C. (2008). *Fifteen Days: Stories of Bravery, Friendship, Life and Death from inside the new Canadian army*. Canada: Anchor Canada.
- Borys, D. (2013, November 10). Remembrance day: 10 momentous battles from canada's military history. *The Globe and Mail*.
- Boucher, J. (2010, June). Evaluating the 'Trenton Effect': Canadian Public Opinion and Military Casualties in Afghanistan (2006–2010). *American Review of Canadian Studies*, 40(2), 237–258.
- Bratt, D. (2007). Mr. Harper Goes to War: Canada, Afghanistan, and the Return of 'High Politics' in Canadian Foreign Policy. Unpublished manuscript.
- Brautigam, T. (2011, March 28). Canadian soldier, Cpl. Yannick Scherrer, 24, killed in Afghanistan. *The Canadian Press*.
- Brewster, M. (2008, January 10). Feds demand secrecy as they shop for guns. *Hamilton Spectator*, Pp. A08.
- Brewster, M. (2008, January 28). Harper to press NATO for more help in Afghanistan combat mission. *The Canadian Press*.
- Brewster, M. and Perkel, C. (2011, May 28). Cdn soldier, Bombarider Karl Manning, dies in non-combat incident in Afghanistan. *The Canadian Press*.
- Bruemmer, R. (2015, September 26). Has Canada's reputation dimmed - and does it matter? *Montreal Gazette*.
- Burke, C. (1998). Women and Militarism. *Women's International League for Peace and Freedom*.

- Butler, J. (2004). *Precarious life: The powers of mourning and violence*. London: Verso.
- Campbell, D. (1998). *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- CBC News (2007, June 19). Toronto councilor battles to keep ribbons. *CBC News*.
- CBC News (2009, April 23). Sask. government's 'support our troops' decals praised, panned. *CBC News*.
- Chapnick, A. (1999, Winter). The Middle Power. *Canadian Foreign Policy*, 7(2), 73–82.
- Chase, S. (2008, May 16). Think tank's funding tied to getting good press. *The Globe and Mail*, Pp. A1.
- Chase, S. and McCarthy, S. (2015, September 27). Leaked internal report warns of Canada's declining world influence. *The Globe and Mail*.
- Clark, C. (2010, October 25). Part 2: Canadians pick peacekeeping over combat. *The Globe and Mail*.
- Clark, C. (2013, November 1). Joe Clark's new book: Canada is the country that 'lectures and leaves'. *The Globe and Mail*.
- Cohen, A. (2003). *While Canada Slept: How We Lost Our Place in the World*. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart.
- Cohen, A. (2008). *Lester B. Pearson*. Toronto: Penguin Publishing.
- Cohn, C. (1989). Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals. *Signs*, 12(4), 687–718.

- Cohn, C. and Enloe, C. (2003). A conversation with Cynthia Enloe: Feminists look at masculinity and the men who wage war. *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, 28, 1187–1208.
- Cohn, M. R. (2008, September 20). Afghan Mission a stealth topic. *Toronto Star*.
- Comte, M. (2009, October 22). Afghanistan will unravel NATO, says Canadian general. *Agence France Presse*.
- Connell, R. W. (1995). *Masculinities*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
- Cooke, M. (1996). *Women and the War Story*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Cooper, A. F. (1997). *Canadian Foreign Policy: Old Habits and New Directions*. Scarborough, ON: Prentice Hall Canada.
- Cooper, A. F., Higgott, R. A., and Nossal, K. R. (1993). *Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order*. Vancouver: UBC Press.
- Cox, R. W. (1981). Social forces, states and world orders: Beyond international relations theory. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 10(2), 126–155.
- Crawford, N. C. (2011). Civilian Death and Injury in Afghanistan 2001–2011. In *Costs of War Paper Series*, Pp. 1–41. Brown University: Watson Institute of International and Public Affairs.
- CTV News (2007, June 20). City votes to keep support our troops decals. *CTV*.
- Dean, M. (1999). *Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society*. London: Sage.

- Decima Research Group (2007). *Key Findings of qualitative research for the Canadian Forces recruitment advertising campaign 'Fight'*. Canada: Department of Defence.
- Delacourt, S. (2010, June 3). Highways of Heroes: How it helps; two new studies find flag-draped coffins lead to strengthened public view of Afghan mission. *Toronto Star*, Pp. A6.
- Department of Canadian Heritage (2014). Reconciliation: The Peacekeeping Monument. Retrieved from <http://www.pch.gc.ca>.
- Department of National Defence (2008). The Canada First Defence Strategy. Retrieved from <http://www.forces.gc.ca>.
- Der Derian, J. and Shapiro, M. (1989). *International/intertextual relations*. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.
- Dewitt, D. B. (2000, Spring). Directions in Canada's International Security Policy: From Marginal Actors at the Centre to Central Actor at the Margins. *International Journal*, 55(2), 167–187.
- Dewitt, D. B. and Kirton, J. J. (1983). *Canada as a Principal Power: A Study of Foreign Policy and International Relations*. Toronto, ON: Wiley.
- Dewitt, D. B. and Kirton, J. J. (2011). Three Theoretical Perspectives. In D. Bratt and C. Kukucha (Eds.), *Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy. Classic Debates and New Ideas*, Pp. 52–69. Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press, 2nd edition.
- Dorn, W. A. (2005-2006, Winter). Peacekeeping Then, Now, and Always. *Canadian Military Journal*, Pp. 105–106.

- Doty, R. L. (1993). Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Postivist Analysis of U.S. Counterinsurgency policy in the Phillipines. *International Studies Quarterly*, 37(3), 297–320.
- Dunn, B. (2008, May 1). Canadian Forces home home with ads. *Marketing Magazine*.
- Earys, J. (1961). *The Art of the Possible*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Earys, J. (1975, May–June). Defining a New Place for Canada in the Hierarchy of World Powers. *International Perspectives*, Pp. 15–24.
- Ekos Research Associates Inc. (2005, February 9-17). Canadian Attitudes Towards the CF.
- Elshtain, J. (1995). *Women and war*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2nd edition.
- Engler, Y. (2009). *The Black Book of Canadian Foreign Policy*. Blackpoint, NS: Fernwood Publishing.
- English, J. (2003). *Canadian peacekeeping is not what it used to be*. Ottawa: Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute.
- Enloe, C. (1983). *Does Khaki Become You? The militarization of women's lives*. London: Pandora.
- Enloe, C. (1990). *Bananas, Beaches, and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1st edition.
- Enloe, C. (1993). *The Mourning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Enloe, C. (2000). *Maneuvers: The International politics of militarizing women's lives*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Enloe, C. (2001, December). Sneak attack the militarization of US Culture. *Ms. Magazine*.

Enloe, C. (2004). *The Curious feminist: Searching for women in a new age of empire*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Environics Research Group (2007, March). *Advertising Post-Test: prepared for DND*. Canada: Department of Defence.

Environics Research Group Limited (2002). Focus Canada 2002.

Environics Research Group Limited (2004). Focus Canada 2004.

Fairclough, N. (2001). *Language and Power*. London: Longman, 2nd edition.

Fairclough, N., Mulderrig, J., and Wodak, R. (2011). Critical Discourse Analysis. In T. A. V. Dijk (Ed.), *Discourse Studies: A Multidisciplinary Introduction*. Sage Publications.

Fergusson, J., Beier, J. M., Harvey, F., Crosby, A. D., and Ross, D. A. (2002). Round table: Missile Defence in a post-September 11 context. *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal*, 9(2).

Fisher, M. (2011, June 4). Mission full of hard decisions; decade-long Afghan campaign is washed with Canadian blood and sacrifice. *Regina Leader Post*.

Fisher, P. (2011). *Highway of Heroes: True Patriot Love*. Toronto: Dundurn.

- Fletcher, J. F., Bastedo, H., and Hove, J. (2009, December). Losing Heart: Declining Support for the Political Marketing of the Afghanistan Mission. *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 42(4), 911–937.
- Foucault, M. (1972). *Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language* (A. M. Sheridan-Smith Trans.). New York: Vintage.
- Foucault, M. (1979). On governmentality. *Ideology and Consciousness*, 6, 5–22.
- Foucault, M. (1980). *Power/Knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings, 1972–1977* (C. Gordon Trans.). New York: Pantheon Books, 1st american edition.
- Foucault, M. (1988). *Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason* (R. Howard Trans.). New York: Vintage Books.
- Foucault, M. (1991). *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (A. Sheridan Trans.). London: Penguin.
- Foucault, M. (1994). Foucault, Michel, 1926—Translated by Catherine Porter. In G. Gutting (Ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Foucault*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Fragomeni, C. (2010, August 27). ‘Travelling flag’ event honours the fallen; mother of soldier killed in Afghanistan is intent on ensuring war dead are never forgotten. *Hamilton Spectator*, Pp. GT2.
- Fraser, G. (2002, November 10). Military muscle needed to back good intentions. *Toronto Star*.

- Freeman, A. (2002, January 11). Canadians sought war, insider says: British officials who offered passive role says Armed Forces wanted to face combat. *The Globe and Mail*, Pp. A1.
- Fremeth, H. (2010). Searching for the Militarization of Canadian Culture: The Rise of a Military-Cultural Memory Network. *TOPIA*, 23–24, 52–76.
- Fruhstuck, S. and Walthall, A. (2011). *Recreating Japanese Men*. Berkley: University of California Press.
- Galoway, G. (2013, February 21). War of 1812 extravaganza failed to excite Canadians, poll shows. *The Globe and Mail*.
- Gammer, N. (2001). *From Peacekeeping to Peacemaking: Canada's Response to the Yugoslav Crisis*. Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press.
- Giroux, H. A. (2004). War on Terror. The militarizing of public space and culture in the United States. *Third Text*, 18(4), 211–221.
- Goldie, J. L. (2014). Fighting Change: Representing the Canadian Forces in the 2006–2008 Fight Recruitment Campaign. *Canadian Journal of Communications*, 39(3), 413–430.
- Gordon, J. K. (1966). *Canada's Role as a Middle Power*. Toronto: The Canadian Institute of International Affairs.
- Gough, P. (2002). 'Invicta Pax' Monuments, Memorials and Peace: an analysis of the Canadian Peacekeeping Monument, Ottawa. *International Journal of Heritage Studies*, 8(3), 201–223.

- Government of Canada (1994). *Canada's Foreign Policy: Principles and Priorities for the Future. Report of the Committee*. Ottawa, ON: Special Joint Committee Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy. Public Works and Government Services.
- Government of Canada (2005). Canada's international policy statement: A role of pride and influence in the world. Ottawa, ON.
- Government of Canada (2006, November 1). *Public Perceptions of Canada's Role in Afghanistan. Executive Summary*. Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade.
- Government of Canada (2007, August 14). National defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. Why Are We There? Retrieved from <http://www.forces.gc.ca>.
- Government of Canada (2008, February 21). PM unveils revised motion on the future of Canada's mission in Afghanistan. Retrieved from <http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca>.
- Government of Canada (2008–2011). Canada's engagement in afghanistan. Retrieved from <http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca>.
- Government of Canada (2011). Archived—Canadian Forces' Casualty Statistics (Afghanistan). Retrieved from <http://news.gc.ca> on August 23, 2015.
- Government of Saskatchewan (2009, April 22). Government vehicles will show support for our troops.
- Graham, J. (2010, March 26). Criticism of scholarships for children of fallen soldiers draws sharp rebuke. *The Canadian Press*.
- Gramsci, A. (1971). *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*. London: Lawrence and Wishart.

- Granatstein, J. L. (1969). *Canadian Foreign Policy since 1945: Middle Power or Satellite? Competing Perspectives in the Study of Canadian Foreign Policy*. Toronto: Copp Clark.
- Granatstein, J. L. (2002, June). A Friendly Agreement in Advance: Canada-US Defense Relations Past, Present, and Future. *Commentary*, 166.
- Granatstein, J. L. (2004, February 3). Brush up on our 'proud history'. *National Post*.
- Granatstein, J. L. (2007, October 26). Defence spending still inadequate. *Guelph Mercury*, Pp. A13.
- Granatstein, J. L. (2007, November 17). Hurrah to rebuilding Canadian forces: New study using Cold War spending for comparison does nothing to advance real debate on defence. *Hamilton Spectator*, Pp. A25.
- Granatstein, J. L. (2007). *Whose War Is It?: How Can Canada Survive In the Post-9/11 World*. Ottawa, ON: Phyllis Bruce Books.
- Granatstein, J. L. (2008, December 6). Editorial. *Ottawa Citizen*.
- Granatstein, J. L. (2008, April 16). The End of The Hillier Era. *Ottawa Citizen*.
- Granatstein, J. L. (2012, November 4). Canada as a Peacekeeper? Or Canada as a Warrior Nation? *Hamilton Spectator*.
- Graveland, B. (2010, June 22). Early morning ramp ceremony for Canadian sergeant killed by IED blast. *The Canadian Press*.
- Graveland, B. (2010, July 22). Soldier slain in Afghanistan called absolutely selfless. *Guelph Mercury*, Pp. A5.

- Gross-Stein, J. and Lang, E. (2007). *The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar*. Toronto: Penguin Canada.
- Harting, H. and Kamboureli, S. (2009). Introduction: Discourses of Security, Peacekeeping Narratives, and the Cultural Imagination in Canada. *University of Toronto Quarterly*, 78(2), n.p.
- Hawes, M. K. (1984). *Principal Power, Middle Power or Satellite? Competing Perspectives in the Study of Canadian Foreign Policy*. Toronto: York University Research Programme in Strategic Studies.
- Hillmer, N. and Granatstein, J. L. (1994). *Empire to Umpire*. Toronto: Irwin.
- Hillmer, N. and Molot, M. A. (Eds.) (2002). *Canada Among Nations 2002: A Fading Power*. Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press.
- Hobson, S. (2007, June). *The Information Gap: Why the Canadian Public Doesn't Know More About its Military*. Calgary, AB: Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute.
- Holmes, J. W. (1979). *The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the Search for World Order, 1943–1957*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Holmes, J. W. (1984, Spring). Most safely in the Middle. *International Journal*, 39(2), 366–388.
- Horn, C. B. (2010). *No Lack of Courage: Operation Medusa, Afghanistan*. Toronto: Dundurn Press.
- Howell, A. (2005, Spring). Peaceful, Tolerant and Orderly? A Feminist Analysis of Discourse of 'Canadian Values' in Canadian Foreign Policy. *Canadian Foreign Policy*, 12(1), 45–69.

- Howell, A. (2011). *Madness in International Relations. Psychology, security, and the global governance of mental health*. New York: Routledge.
- Hunt, K. and Rygiel, K. (2007). *(En)Gendering the War on Terror: War stories and camouflaged politics*. Burlington, VT: Ashgate.
- Husymans, J. (1998). Security! What Do You Mean? From Concept to Thick Signifier. *European Journal of International Relations*, 4(2), 226–255.
- Hutchings, K. (2008). Making Sense of Masculinity and War. *Men and Masculinities*, 10(4), 389–404.
- Hyndman, J. (2008). Whose bodies count? Feminist geopolitics and lessons from Iraq. In R. L. Riley, C. T. Mohanty, and M. B. Pratt (Eds.), *Feminism and War: Confronting U.S. Imperialism*, Pp. 194–207. New York: Zed Books.
- Hyndman, J. (2010). Whose bodies count? Feminist geopolitics and lessons from Iraq. In R. L. Riley, C. T. Mohanty, and M. B. Pratt (Eds.), *Feminism and War: Confronting U.S. Imperialism*. London and New York: Zed Books.
- Hynek, N. and Bosold, D. (Eds.) (2010). *Canada's Foreign and Security Policy: Soft and Hard Strategies of a Middle Power*. Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press.
- Ipsos Reid Corporation (2010, March). *Qualitative & Quantitative Research: Views of the Canadian Forces—2010 Tracking Study*. Ottawa, ON: Department of National Defence. Retrieved from http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/200/301/pwgsc-tpsgc/por-ef/national_defence/2010/078-09/summary.pdf.
- Iverson, J. (2014, November 25). Auditor general's report slams government for failing veterans on mental health services. *National Post*.

- Jacob, C. (2010, September). A critical engagement with women and war. *Australian Feminist Studies*, 25(65), 361–367.
- Jeong, M. (2013, November 8). Will the Canadian mission in Afghanistan be a war to remember? *The Globe and Mail*.
- Jockel, J. T. (1994). *Canada and International Peacekeeping*. Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies.
- Jockel, J. T. and Sokolsky, J. J. (2009). Canada and NATO. keeping Ottawa in, expenses down, criticism out...and the country secure. *International Journal*, 64, 315–336.
- Keating, T. (1993). *Canada and World Order: The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy*. Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press.
- Keohane, R. O. and Nye, J. S. (1977). *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.
- Khan, S. (2001, Spring). Between here and there: feminist solidarity and Afghan women. *Genders*, 33.
- Khan, S. (2008). Afghan Women: The limits of colonial rescue. In R. L. Riley, C. T. Mohanty, and M. B. Pratt (Eds.), *Feminism and War. Confronting US Imperialism*. New York: Zed Books.
- Kirton, J. (2007). Two solitudes, one war: Public opinion, national unity and Canada's war in Afghanistan. Unpublished manuscript.
- Kirton, J. J. (2009, Spring). The 10 Most Important Books on Canadian Foreign Policy. *International Journal*, 64(2), 553–564.

- Klassen, J. (2015, September/October). Joining Empire: Canadian Foreign Policy Under Harper. *Canadian Dimension*, 49(4).
- Laghi, B. and Freeman, A. (2007, July 19). Canadians cool to extending mission; Harper would need to emphasize humanitarian gains to persuade country to continue costly exercise, poll suggests. Overwhelming numbers say they can't support a long-term presence of 10 years or more. *The Globe and Mail*, Pp. A13.
- LeBlanc, D. (2002, February 13). Canadian troops expel reporter from airbase. *The Globe and Mail*.
- LeBlanc, D. and Mahoney, J. (2002, January 8). Going to war: Canada opts for combat role. *The Globe and Mail*, Pp. A1.
- Lewis, K. and Ma, S. (2006, September 23). A sea of red washes over hill: Thousand turn out to show support for troops. *Ottawa Citizen*, Pp. A5.
- Liberal Party of Canada (2015). Canada's leadership in the world. Policy platform.
- Lobo-Guerrero, L. (2013). Wondering as research attitude. In M. B. Salter and C. E. Mutlu (Eds.), *Research Methods in Critical Security Studies: An Introduction*, Pp. 25–29. New York: Routledge.
- Lutz, C. (2002). Making war at home in the United States: Militarization and the current crisis. *American Anthropologist*, 104(3), 723–735.
- Maloney, S. (2003). *Canada and UN peacekeeping: Cold War by other means*. Toronto, ON: Vanwell.
- Maloney, S. (2007, Spring). Why Keep the Myth Alive? *Canadian Military Journal*, Pp. 100–102.

- Maloney, S. (2013, Winter). 'Was It Worth It?' Canadian Intervention in Afghanistan and Perceptions of Success and Failure. *Canadian Military Journal*, 14(1), 19–31.
- Massie, J. (2008). Regional strategic subcultures? Canadians and the use of force in Afghanistan and Iraq. *Canadian Foreign Policy*, 14(2), 19–48.
- Masters, C. (2000). Cyborg Soldiers and Militarized Masculinities. York University. Unpublished manuscript.
- Masters, C. (2005). Gendered Defenses, Gendered Offences: What is at stake in the politics of missile defense? *Canadian Foreign Policy*, 12(1), 105–118.
- Mat, K. (2011, January 12). Medals 'double standard' sparks anger; Tim Horton's workers, civilian police officers can be honoured in Afghanistan but not bureaucrats. *Ottawa Citizen*, Pp. A1.
- McCready, A. L. (2010). Tie a Yellow Ribbon 'Round Public Discourse, National Identity and the War: Neoliberal Militarization and the Yellow Ribbon Campaign in Canada. *Topia*, Pp. 23–24.
- McCready, A. L. (2013). *Yellow Ribbons*. Winnipeg: Fernwood Publishing.
- McFadden, P. (2008). Interrogating Americana: an African feminist critique. In C. T. Riley, R. Mohanty and M. B. Pratt (Eds.), *Feminism and war: confronting US imperialism*, Pp. 56–67. New York: Zed Books.
- McGregor, G. (2007, June 21). 'We support our troops' banner to remain on display at Ottawa Airport; 'Difficult to comprehend' why people would criticize backing military, airport manager says. *Ottawa Citizen*, Pp. A7.
- McKay, I. and Swift, J. (2012). *Warrior Nation: Rebranding Canada in an Age of Anxiety*. Toronto: Between the Lines Publishing.

- Middleton, M. (2009, September 26). The misunderstood mission. *Waterloo Region Record*, Pp. A15.
- Milliken, J. (1999). The study of discourse in international relations: A critique of research and methods. *European Journal of International Relations*, 5(2), 225–254.
- Molot, M. A. (1990, Spring–Fall). Where Do We, Should We, Or Can We Sit? A Review of Canadian Foreign Policy Literature. *International Journal of Canadian Studies*, 1(2), 77–96.
- Morgan, D. H. J. (1994). Theater of war: Combat, the military, and masculinities. In Brod and Kaufman (Eds.), *Theorizing Masculinities*, Pp. 165–182. London: Sage Publishing.
- Morton, D. (2001, December 31). Who stands on guard for us? Once our young men died for the wars of the British Empire, in future, will they die for the American Empire? asks military historian DESMOND MORTO. *The Globe and Mail*, Pp. A9.
- Munton, D. (2003, Winter). Whither Internationalism. *International Journal*, 58(1), 155–180.
- Murray, R. W. and McCoy, J. (2010, June). From Middle Power to Peacebuilder: The Use of the Canadian Forces in Modern Canadian Foreign Policy. *American Review of Canadian Studies*, 40(2), 171–188.
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization (2001, October 3). Invocation of Article 5 confirmed. NATO website.
- Nossal, K. R. (1983–1984). Analyzing the Domestic Sources of Canadian Foreign Policy. *International Journal*, 39, 1–22.

- Nossal, K. R. (1989). *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*. Scarborough, ON: Prentice Hall, 2nd edition.
- Nossal, K. R. (1997). *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*. Scarborough, ON: Prentice-Hall, 3rd edition.
- Nossal, K. R. (2008). The unavoidable shadow of past wars: Obsequies for causalities of the Afghanistan mission in Australia and Canada. *Australian Canadian Studies*, 26, 92–124.
- Nossal, K. R. (2010). Rethinking the security imaginary: Canada and the case of Afghanistan. In B. Charbonneau and W. S. Cox (Eds.), *Locating Global Order: American Power and Canadian Security after 9/11*, Pp. 107–125. Vancouver: UBC Press.
- Nye, J. S. (2004). *Soft Power: The Means to Succeed in World Politics*. New York: Public Affairs.
- Oliver, K. (2007). *Women as Weapons of War: Iraq, Sex, and the Media*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Pacholik, B. (2011, May 19). Leslie has a vision for Afghanistan. *Regina Leader Post*, Pp. A1.
- Parliament of Canada (1993, April 10). *Minutes of proceedings and evidence*. Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs. 34th Parliament, 3rd Session.
- Parliament of Canada (2005, September). *Canada's Military and the Legacy of Neglect: Our Disappearing Options for Defending the Nation Abroad and at Home*. Senate Committee on National Security and Defence. Retrieved from <http://www.parl.gc.ca>.

Parliament of Canada (2006, April 10). House of Commons Debate. 39th Parliament, 1st Session.

Parliament of Canada (2007). *Canadian Forces in Afghanistan. Report of the Standing Committee on National Defence*. House of Commons. Standing Committee on National Defence. 1st Session.

Parliament of Canada (2008). *Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan*. Ministry of Public Works and Government Services.

Parliament of Canada (2009, November 18). Special Committee on the Canadian Mission in Afghanistan. Retrieved from <http://www.parl.gc.ca>.

Parmar, S. (2015, October 26). How Canada can repair its international reputation? *Toronto Star*.

Parsons, G. E. (1981). Yellow ribbons: Ties with tradition. *Folklife Center News*, 4(2), 9–11.

Patrick, K. and Kari, S. (2007, July 19). Troop decal removal a 'slap in the face'. *National Post*.

Perkel, C. (2010, December 30). One Bomb, Many Lives: a look back at last year's tragic blast in Afghanistan. *The Canadian Press*.

Peterson, V. S. (1992). Security and Sovereign States: What Is at Stake in Taking Feminism Seriously? In V. S. Peterson (Ed.), *Gendered States. Feminist (Re)Visions of International Relations Theory*, Pp. 31–64. Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Portraits of Honour (2015, September 25). Portraits of Honour. Retrieved from <http://www.portraitsofhonour.ca>.

- Potter, E. H. (2009). *Branding Canada: Projecting Canada's Soft Power through Public Diplomacy*. Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Pratt, C. (1983–1984). Dominant Class Theory and Canadian Foreign Policy: The Case of the Counter-Consensus. *International Journal*, 39, 99–135.
- Pratt, C. (Ed.) (1990). *Middle Power Internationalism: The North-South Dimension*. Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Prime Minister of Canada's Office (2007, October 12). Prime Minister Harper Announces Independent Advisory Panel on Afghan Mission. Retrieved from <http://pm.gc.ca>.
- Pugliese, D. (2008, February 9). Military set to fast-track \$120-million drone lease. *CanWest News Service*, Pp. A4.
- Ramage, N. (2006, October 20). Advertising is War. *Marketing Magazine*.
- Razack, S. (1996). The Perils of Story Telling for Refugee Women. In W. Giles, H. Moussa, and P. V. Esterik (Eds.), *Development and Diaspora: Gender and the Refugee Experience*. Dundas, ON: Artemis Enterprises.
- Razack, S. (2000, February). From the 'Clean Snows of Petawawa': the Violence of Canadian Peacekeepers in Somalia. *Cultural Anthropology*, 15(1), 127–163.
- Razack, S. (2003). Those who 'Witness the Evil'. *Hypatia*, 18(1), 204–211.
- Razack, S. (2004). *Dark threats and white knights: The Somalia affair, peacekeeping, and the new imperialism*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Red Fridays Canada (2010). www.redfridays.ca. Website.

- Robson, J. (2007, July 7). Winning the peace is a matter of winning the war—not of giving up; Islamists blow us up because they think we should die for being happy and tolerant. *Montreal Gazette*, Pp. B7.
- Roussel, S. (2010). About Solitude, Divorce, and Neglect: The Linguistic Division in the Study of Canadian Foreign Policy. In L. Wylie and J. M. Beier (Eds.), *Canadian Foreign Policy in Critical Perspective*, Pp. 155–174. Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press.
- Ruggie, J. G. (1982). International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic System. *International Organization*, 36(2), 379–415.
- Salter, M. B. (2013). Introduction. In M. B. Salter and C. E. Mutlu (Eds.), *Research Methods in Critical Security Studies: An Introduction*, Pp. 1–24. New York: Routledge.
- Santino, J. (1992). Yellow ribbons and seasonal flags: The Folk assemblage of war. *Journal of American Folklore*, 105(415), 19–33.
- Shapiro, M. (1989). Textualizing global politics. In J. Der Derian and M. Shapiro (Eds.), *International/intertextual relations*, Pp. 11–22. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.
- Sjolander, C. T. (2007). Two solitudes? Canadian foreign policy/politique étrangère du Canada. *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal*, 14(1), 101–108.
- Sjolander, C. T. (2009, Summer). A funny thing happened on the road to Kandahar: The competing faces of Canadian Internationalism? *Canadian Foreign Policy*, 15(2), 78–93.

- Sjolander, C. T. (2010, Spring). John W. Holmes and the reconciliation of immoderate views. *International Journal*, Pp. 321–329.
- Sjolander, C. T. and Smith, H. A. (2010, Summer). The practice, purpose, and perils of list-making. A response to John Kirton's '10 most important books on Canadian foreign policy'. *International Journal*, Pp. 751–762.
- Sjolander, C. T. and Trevenen, K. (2010). Constructing Canadian Foreign Policy: Myths of Good International Citizens, Protectors, and the War in Afghanistan. In J. M. Beier and L. Wylie (Eds.), *Canadian Foreign Policy in Critical Perspective*. Oxford University Press.
- Sjolander, C. T., Smith, H. A., and Stienstra, D. (2003). *Feminist Perspectives on Canadian Foreign Policy*. Don Mills, ON: Oxford.
- Smith, H. A. (2010). The Disciplining Nature of Canadian Foreign Policy. In J. M. Beier and L. Wylie (Eds.), *Canadian Foreign Policy in Critical Perspective*, Pp. 3–14. Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press.
- Smith, R. (2006, September 13). Canadian forces ads zoom in on combat mission. *CTV News*.
- Spivak, G. C. (1994). Can the Subaltern Speak? In P. Williams and L. Chrisman (Eds.), *Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory: A Reader*. Herefordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
- Stairs, D. (1973–1974). Present in Moderation: Lester Pearson and the Craft of Diplomacy. *International Journal*, 29, 143–153.
- Stairs, D. (1994). The postwar study of Canada's foreign policy. *International Journal*, 50, 12–19.

- Stairs, D. (2000). Foreign Policy Consultations in a Globalizing World: The Case of Canada, the WTO, and the Shenanigans in Seattle. *Policy Matters*, 1(8), 12–19. Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy.
- Stairs, D. (2003). Myths, Morals, and Reality in Canadian Foreign Policy. *International Journal*, 58(2), 239–256.
- Statistics Canada (2015, January 5). A profile of the Canadian Forces. Retrieved from <http://www.statcan.gc.ca>.
- Steele, B. J. (2008). *Ontological Security in International Relations*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Sylvester, C. (2012). War Experiences/War Practices/War Theory. *Millennium - Journal of International Studies*, 40, 483–503.
- Sylvester, C. (2013). *War as Experience: Contributions from international relations and feminist analysis*. New York: Routledge.
- Tandt, M. D. (2006, March 14). Canadians get behind Afghan deployment. *The Globe and Mail*.
- Tandt, M. D. and Walton, D. (2006, May 26). PM says kin were asked, O'Connor says not. *The Globe and Mail*.
- Tetley, D. (2007, September 29). Calgary's Hornburg had 'warrior's heart'. *Calgary Herald*, Pp. A3.
- Thompson, E. (2010, December 22). Canadians trust military more than government: Poll. *Canada.com*.
- Thompson, G. (2010, November 11). Honouring those who fought and fight for our freedom. *Edmonton Journal*, Pp. A17.

- Trouillot, M.-R. (1995). *Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- United Nations (2001). Security Council Resolution 1368. Retrieved from <http://www.un.org>.
- Van Dijk, T. A. (2001). Critical Discourse Analysis. In D. S. D. Tannen and H. Hamilton (Eds.), *Handbook of Discourse Analysis*, Pp. 352–371. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
- Van Leeuwen, T. (2008). *Discourse and Practice: New Tools for Critical Discourse Analysis*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Veterans Affairs Canada (2013, August 10). Government of Canada honours Canada's peacekeepers. Retrieved from <http://www.veterans.gc.ca>.
- Veterans Affairs Canada (2014, October 23). Reconciliation: The Peacekeeping Monument. Retrieved from <http://www.veterans.gc.ca>.
- Wagner, E. (2007, Winter). The Peaceable Kingdom? The National Myth of Canadian Peacekeeping and the Cold War. *Canadian Military Journal*.
- Walker, R. B. J. (1993). *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Walkom, T. (2007, March 17). Maybe Layton was right about Afghanistan? *Toronto Star*.
- Waltz, K. N. (1979). *Theory of International Politics*. Boston: Addison-Wesley Publication Co.
- Ware, V. (1992). *Beyond the Pale: White Women, Racism and History*. London: Verso.

- Weese, B. (2011, May 2). Bin Laden's death received with 'sober satisfaction': Harper. *Toronto Sun*.
- Welsh, J. M. (2006). Canada in the 21st century: beyond dominion and middle power. *The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs*, 93(376), 583–593.
- Wendt, A. (1992). Anarchy is what States Make of It: the Social Construction of Power Politics. *International Organization*, 46(2), 391–425.
- Wherry, A. (2016, March 20). PM invokes Canada's peacekeeping past in seeking UN Security Council seat. Trudeau introduced to UN crowd as 'a person who deeply believes in multilateralism'. *CBC News*.
- Whitworth, S. (2003). Militarized Masculinities and the Politics of Peacekeeping: The Canadian Case. In C. T. Sjolander, H. A. Smith, and D. Stienstra (Eds.), *Feminist Perspectives on Canadian Foreign Policy*, Pp. 76–90. Don Mills, ON: Oxford.
- Whitworth, S. (2004). *Men, Militarism, and UN Peacekeeping: A Gendered Analysis*. New Delhi: Viva Books Private Limited.
- Wibben, A. T. R. (2011). *Feminist Security Studies: a narrative approach*. New York: Routledge.
- Wight, M. (1995). *Power Politics*. London: Continuum.
- Woods, A. (2007, February 17). To sell Canada on war, try 'hope' but not 'liberty'; focus groups advised Harper to not echo Bush. *Toronto Star*, Pp. A01.
- Wylie, L. (2010). Critical Conclusions about Canadian Foreign Policy. In J. M. Beier and L. Wylie (Eds.), *Canadian Foreign Policy in Critical Perspective*, Pp. 187–198. Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press.

Zine, J. (2006). Between Orientalism and Fundamentalism: Muslim Women and Feminist Engagement. In K. Hunt and K. Rygiel (Eds.), *(En)gendering the war on terror: war stories and camouflaged politics*. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing.