GREEK FREEDOM AND ROMAN HEGEMONY (201 BCE – 14 CE)
GREEK FREEDOM AND ROMAN HEGEMONY:
THE TRANSACTION OF ROMAN RULE IN THE GREEK EAST (201 BCE – 14 CE)

By

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ABSTRACT

This study investigates the nature, operation and development of Roman rule in the Greek East during the second and first centuries BCE through the communications between states preserved in the epigraphic record. Using Roman senate decrees, letters of magistrates and laws, and Greek civic decrees, it addresses the questions of how the Romans and their Greek subjects mutually understood Roman rule and why the Greeks, whose political traditions valued autonomy, came to accept subordination into the Romans’ imperial state. An investigation into the provincial system of the Roman empire – the institutional and administrative apparatus of the imperial state – reveals its limited arrangement and reliance to a great degree on local civic autonomy. In fact, the documents of state demonstrate the broader significance of freedom in Greco-Roman relations: more than simply propaganda or political sloganeering, it was a central political discourse whose normative values and rules circumscribed relations between Rome and the poleis of the East, complementing the limited structural arrangement of the empire itself, while also directing and constraining the actions of ruler and ruled. These actions are preserved in the state documents – actual artifacts of the transaction of empire – and reveal a dynamic, interactive empire. With reciprocity as the mode of interaction, this interactive empire operated through interstate benefactions, and social relationships like friendship and patronage that allowed Greek cities to negotiate their positions with Rome and de-problematize Roman authority as consistent with the traditional autonomy of the polis. Through these communications, the Romans and Greeks reached a consensus about the nature and operation of their relationship such that a Greek city-state in the first century could rationally declare war on behalf of both Roman hegemony and Greek freedom.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It is a great pleasure to acknowledge and give thanks to those who have helped me in this project. My dissertation committee has been very supportive of my work, even at those stages where progress was slow. I should particularly like to thank Dr. S. Corner for his patient discussions on freedom and the Greek polis, and his help with the theoretical material. Dr. E. Haley has also helpfully drawn my attention to important new historical material and modern studies and his keen editorial eye saved me from not a few errors. Naturally, I am indebted to my advisor, Dr. C. Eilers, for his guidance and keen practical sense of ancient history, epigraphy, and how they should (and should not) be treated by modern scholars; he has been a constant advocate for me and my project. I should also like to thank the other members of the department and my graduate colleagues, especially S. Russell for his collegiality and friendship. To those institutions that supported me with funding, I am deeply grateful: SSHRC, Department of Classics, Faculty of Humanities, and School of Graduate Studies of McMaster University. A special acknowledgment is due to the Kommission für Alte Geschichte und Epigraphik for supporting my summer in Munich with a Jacobi Stipendium, and to its faculty and students for their hospitality and engagement. To J.-L. Ferrary I owe thanks for learned discussions and providing me with unpublished material. A most warm thanks, finally, to my family for their steadfast support. A dissertation cannot be written without long days and long absences from home, and so I would like to thank, above all, my wife Amanda, for her patience, understanding and love. Though this project was often first in my thoughts, she has always been first in my heart. To her I dedicate this work.
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ABBREVIATIONS

A list of commonly cited works follows, including monographs, journal articles and reference material. Abbreviations for ancient authors and their works follow those in the *Oxford Classical Dictionary*; journals generally follow those recommended by *L'Année Philologique*; and epigraphic works follow the abbreviation system laid out by the *Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum* (described in vol. XLVI, p. v and based on the list found in the Consolidated Index for XXXVI-XLV, pp. 677-688). Where possible I have tried to reference inscriptions by their number in a major collection or *corpora* (e.g. SIG<sup>3</sup>, IG, IGRP, RDGE, IK series). In some cases, however, the versions given in these standard works have been superseded by newer and better readings, in which cases the newer version is cited (often by reference to a *lemma* in *SEG*), but the older reference is also given in brackets. Other abbreviations found in the text are in the form of author with brief title, which appears after the first full reference in the notes, and can be easily found fully referenced in the bibliography.

*AE*

Ager, *Arbitrations*  

*ANRW*

H. Temporini (ed.), *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt* (Berlin 1973 – )

*Aphrodis.*


Brennan, *PRR*  

Canali de Rossi, *Ambascerie*  
F. Canali de Rossi, *Le ambascerie dal mondo greco a Roma in età repubblicana* (Rome 1997)

*Claros*


Crawford, *RS*  

Drew-Bear, NIP  T. Drew-Bear, Nouvelles Inscriptions de Phrygie (Zutphen 1978)

Gruen, HWCR  E. Gruen, The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome, 2 vols (Berkeley 1984)

Eilers, RPGC  C. Eilers, Roman Patrons of Greek Cities (Oxford 2002)

Ferrary, Philhélienisme  J.-L. Ferrary, Philhellénisme et Impérialisme: Aspects idéologiques de la conquête romaine du monde hellénistique (Rome 1988)


IGSLM  A. Avram, Inscriptions grecques et latines de Scythie Mineure (Paris 1999)

IGRP  R. Cagnat (ed.), Inscriptiones Graecae ad res Romanas pertinentes (Paris 1911-1927)

I.Metrop.  B. Dreyer and H. Engelmann (eds.), Die Inschriften von Metropolis (IK 63; Bonn 2003), hauptsätze text

I.Pergamon  H. Fränkel (ed.), Altertümer von Pergamon VIII.1-2, Die Inschriften von Pergamon (Berlin 1890-1895)

I.Priene  F. Hiller von Gaertringen (ed.), Inschriften von Priene (Berlin 1906)


Labraunda  *Labraunda: Swedish Excavations and Researches*, vol. III.

*lex agr.*  *Lex Agraria* = Crawford, RS, no. 2

*lex Ant. Term.*  *Lex Antonia de Termessibus* = Crawford, RS no. 19

*lex XX quaest.*  *Lex Cornelia de XX quaestoribus* = Crawford, RS no. 14


*lex prov. praet.*  *Lex de provinciis praetoriis* = Crawford, RS no. 12

*lex rep.*  *lex repetundarum* = Crawford, RS no. 1


*OGIS*  W. Dittenberger (ed.), *Orientis Graeci Inscriptiones Selectae: Supplementum Syloges Inscriptionum Graecarum* (Leipzig 1903-1905)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Reference</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SEG</td>
<td><em>Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum</em> (Leiden 1923-1970; Amsterdam 1976 – )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIG^3</td>
<td>W. Dittenberger (ed.), <em>Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum</em>, 5th ed. (Leipzig 1915-1924)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wells, RC</td>
<td>C.B. Wells, <em>Royal Correspondence in the Hellenistic Period</em> (New Haven 1934)</td>
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EDITORIAL CONVENTIONS

Most of the Greco-Roman state documents used in this study come from inscriptions preserved on stone or metal. Owing to the vicissitudes of history, these texts have rarely come down to us complete, unadulterated, error-free, or fully comprehensible. The conventions for the presentation of inscriptions are as follows:

[αβγ] letters that have been restored
{αβγ} letters that were included by the stonecutter in error
<αβγ> letters that were erroneously inscribed or altogether omitted in antiquity
(αβγ) letters that resolve abbreviations
[[αβγ]] letters that were deliberately erased in antiquity
αβγ letters barely legible or restored with uncertainty, the traces of which do not exclude other readings

ABΓ letters which are not understood in their context
[... ] three lost or illegible letters (each dot representing one letter)
[--- ] lost or illegible letters of uncertain number
| marks the beginning of a new line
|| marks the beginning of every fifth line

As a rule, line breaks are included only in those instances where the entire text is cited, as are vacati between letters (marked by a superscript ‘v’). Within the limits of good sense, these same conventions are also used in the translations of the text, though I have used square brackets only where the whole word is uncertain; instances where a word in the Greek text is lost, but is reasonably restored by convention, formula, or repetition in the text itself, are not translated in square brackets
This study broadly concerns the nature, operation and development of Roman rule in the Greek East during the second and first centuries BCE. It seeks to address the questions of how the Romans and their Greek subjects understood this ἡγεμονία (hegemony) or imperium, and in what manner it worked so that the Greeks, whose political traditions greatly valued freedom, came to accept subordination in the Romans' imperial state. This sort of investigation has a long pedigree: Polybius, writing in the mid-second century, had already undertaken to explain for his readers "how and under what sort of government the Romans, in less than fifty-three years (i.e. 220-167), managed to subject nearly the whole of the inhabited world to their sole government." Modern scholars have approached the topic from a variety of perspectives: historical surveys, studies on the structural apparatus of Roman government, works on extra-legal
interstate relations, attempts to divine the Romans’ motivations, or their policy. Key recent studies have been particularly sensitive to the Romano-centric perspective of many of these works and have attempted to demonstrate the degree to which Rome had to adapt itself to local conditions and institutions. Indeed, profitable studies of the Romans’ hegemony have come from the perspective of the Greek city-state (polis; pl. poleis) during this period and the effects of Roman rule on its institutions and identity.

The present study reflects this more recent trend; however, it differs in exploring how Roman authority was viewed by both the Romans and the Greek city-states, and in this way seeks to uncover the complexities and dynamics of their relationship. That is, we are concerned with investigating how the two sides in the second and first centuries understood their relationship, how they expressed it, and how it was transacted, to

Administration (Oxford 1906); E. Taubler, Imperium Romanum (Berlin 1913); G.H. Stevenson, Roman Provincial Administration (Oxford 1939); A. Lintott, Imperium Romanum: Politics and Administration (Oxford 1993).


7 M. Holleaux, Rome, la Grèce et les monarchies (Paris 1935); W. Dahlheim, Gewalt und Herrschaft (Berlin 1977); A.N. Sherwin-White, Roman Foreign Policy in the Greek East (London 1984); Badian, Titus Quinctius Flamininus: Philhellenism and Realpolitik (Cincinnati 1970); R. Kallet-Marx, Hegemony to Empire (Berkeley 1995); A. Eckstein, Rome Enters the Greek East (Oxford 2008).


provide both a context and basis for the development and operation of Roman authority in and over the *poleis* of the East (i.e. mainland Greece, the Aegean islands, and Asia Minor).

For this purpose, traditional literary sources pose three distinct problems: first, with the exception of Polybius, the majority of accounts of the period before the Late Republic are not contemporary, but removed by generations if not centuries from the time of the events. This temporal dislocation obviously poses difficulties for an investigation of our sort: the details become less precise and the interaction described – its actors, arrangement, and language – must be considered in light of the practices and expectations of the author’s own time. Secondly, that these actions are mediated through the author in many ways makes them indissoluble from his own motives, objectives, bias, idiosyncrasies, etc, and reflect his choice of what is important to relate and how the facts are best presented. Thirdly, in deciding what to relate to posterity, an author rarely chooses the voice of the ruled over that of the ruler; thus in nearly every instance, the historical narratives that have come down to us today were written by the rulers, or concerned with the perspective of the rulers. As one scholar has put it:

> We do not have, or we have only exceptionally, the discourse of the ruled – and when we have it, it is in the historiography of the rulers, with their perspective, their stereotypes and possibly inappropriately used in a way that mediates the discourse of the ruled to their own purposes.  

---

Even our best source for the period, Polybius, observed and discussed the interaction of Rome and the Greek cities through the eyes of an analyst teleologically selecting and presenting the events that brought Rome to dominate the East.11

While our study must necessarily draw on Polybius and other literary sources from time to time, our principal evidence is a dossier of over two hundred state documents preserved in the epigraphic record, primarily on marble stones from mainland Greece and Asia Minor.12 These are, on the Roman side, senate decrees, letters of magistrates, as well as laws and treaties, and, on the Greek side, civic decrees, honorary decrees, and dedications.13 These sources, of course, are not without their limitations and drawbacks.14 Inscriptions are sources that have survived through good fortune, rarely through a conscious act of preservation, and as such we cannot always be sure of their importance and always risk over- or (less often) under-estimating their value. Further, their survival through historical vicissitudes means that we do not necessarily have a representative geographic and temporal distribution, and the evidence can appear patchy and unbalanced. The nature of the evidence, too, can be problematic since a public document of the Romans or of a Greek polis presents a singular voice of the people.

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11 On Polybius, see especially the various essays collected in F. Walbank, Polybius, Rome and the Hellenistic World: Essays and Reflections (Cambridge 2002).

12 I have not endeavoured to present a complete corpus of these documents. Many of the Roman documents are collected in R. Sherk, Roman Documents of the Greek East (Baltimore 1969) and M. Crawford (ed.), Roman Statues (London 1996), while the Greek documents can be found in collections such as R. Cagnat, Inscriptio Graecae ad res Romanas pertinentes (Paris 1911-1927), the series Inschriften griechischer Städt aus Kleinasien (Bonn), and corpora like W. Dittenberger, Orientis Graeci Inscriptiones Selectae (Leipzig 1903-1905), and idem, Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum (Leipzig 1915-1924). Updates and new material can be found in the lemmata of Supplementem Epigraphicum Graecum, L'Année Épigraphique and the Bulletin Epigraphique published in Revue des Études Grecques.

13 See below, p. 21 for more on the arrangement and language of these documents.

without presenting the various opinions of differing groups that make up the *populus* or the *dēmos*. Finally, the content of these decrees is almost universally positive: cities naturally chose only to publish and memorialize decisions that were advantageous to them, and as a result epigraphic evidence typically cannot speak to either unsuccessful communications or decisions that were made against a city.\(^\text{15}\)

Nevertheless, these limitations should not be exaggerated, and the unique possibilities presented by such evidence must also be highlighted. The patchy nature of the documents, for example, is not dissimilar to most other historical material and is compensated by the size and temporal and geographic diversity of our dossier. The documents preserved in the epigraphic record, moreover, can be said to represent issues and decisions that *were* important to the community (if not always to the modern historian) by virtue of having been purposefully selected by communities to be committed to stone – a laborious and expensive undertaking – and to be published in a prominent civic space. And while the singular voice of these documents does naturally obscure domestic political dissent, our study is concerned with the ways in which states, as singular collectives of individuals and discrete historical actors, communicated with one another and is less concerned with dynamics within states. Similarly, the almost universally positive perspective of the preserved state documents does not take anything away from the successful transactions of empire performed in and by them, and these positive perspectives can be balanced by recourse to the literary record.

\(^{15}\) Notable exceptions: *Aphrod.* 13; *RDGE* 15. For a discussion of unsuccessful interstate interactions, see T.C. Brennen, “Embassies Gone Wrong: Roman Diplomacy in the Constantinian *Excerpta de Legitationibus*” in C. Eilers (ed.), *Diplomats and Diplomacy* (Leiden 2009), 172-207.
More significantly, these epigraphic sources have the virtues of both historical immediacy and representing the unmediated voice of both ruler and ruled. They are documents in the name of and, more importantly, produced by the historical agents (i.e. the states themselves or their agents), that address a variety of different issues to give an immediate, unmediated and authentic, and varied perspective of the operation of Roman hēgemonia. They are, furthermore, the actual language in which states spoke to one another and to that extent are not just a record, but an actual artifact of the interaction between ruler and ruled, of the transaction of Roman hēgemonia. As artifacts, these texts, and the language used in them, did more than just represent and mirror the conditions of empire, they actually constituted it. In this epigraphic dossier, then, we can observe not just how the Romans and Greek poleis discussed their relations, but witness and analyze their actual interactions. The dossier of state documents, therefore, constitutes the best evidence for the dynamics of empire as an interaction between ruler and ruled.

0.2: THE INSPIRATION: AN EPHESIAN DECREE AND THE ROMAN EMPIRE

The present study is inspired by – indeed in many ways it is an extended meditation on – one of these decrees, an intriguing pronouncement of the city-state of Ephesus passed in 86 declaring war on king Mithridates VI of Pontus. The document raises a multitude of questions about the Romans’ rule in the East while hinting at its nuance and complexity:

[Whereas] the people have preserved toward the Romans, common [benefactors], their ancestral goodwill and have enthusiastically agreed to all their requests, Mithridates (VI), King of Cappadocia, having violated the treaty with the
Romans and having assembled his forces, attempted to become master of land not belonging to him; after first seizing the cities lying in front of us, he deceitfully gained control over our city too, overwhelming us by the magnitude of his forces and by the unexpectedness of his assault. But our people, preserving from the beginning its goodwill toward the Romans, and having now the opportunity to help the common interest, have decided to declare war against Mithridates on behalf of the ἱγεμόνια of the Romans and the common freedom, and all the citizens have unanimously given themselves up to struggle for these (goals). It has been decreed, therefore, by the people, as the matter relates to war and the protection, safety and security of the temple of Artemis, the city and the countryside, that the στρατηγοί and the secretary of the council and the προεδροί present a decree straightaway about both suitable rewards and what the people has decided.  

The context of the decree is the First Mithridatic War (89-85) – a clear instance of the breakdown of Roman authority over the poleis of the East during this period – a war that saw the massacre of tens or perhaps hundreds of thousands of Romans and Italians by their subjects in the province of Asia, many of whom sided with, or quickly capitulated to, Mithridates as he marched through the province setting up satrapies.

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17 Detailed discussions of the First Mithridatic War can be found in Th. Reinach, Mithridates Eupator: König von Pontos (Leipzig 1895); Magie, RAMI, 199-231; Sherwin-White, RFPE, 93-142; B.C. McGing, The Foreign Policy of Mithridates VI Eupator (Leiden 1986); Kallet-Marx, Hegemony, 152-158; F. de Callataÿ, L'histoire des guerres Mithridatiques vue les monnaies (Louvain-la-Neuve 1997).
appointing royal officials, and even minting coins in cities of the Roman province. The Ephesians themselves (though they are silent on the matter in their decree) initially welcomed Mithridates, toppling statues of Romans, destroying or stealing their dedications, and even going so far as to chase down and kill some who had taken sanctuary in the inviolate temple of Artemis.

The background to the decree, then, raises questions about the Romans’ rule over their subjects, particularly its structural arrangement – those institutions put in place for the administrative, financial and judicial operation of rule, which, it seems, were so quickly overthrown or disregarded by cities of the province. In light of the decree, we might inquire as to the precise nature of these arrangements; for while the city claimed to have made war against Mithridates for the ηγεμονία of the Romans, its decree makes no mention of any imperial structures. Indeed, despite the fact that Ephesus was situated within (was perhaps even the effective capital city of) the Romans’ province of Asia, which is traditionally held to have been part of the Romans’ empire since being organized by M.’ Aquillius forty years earlier, the Ephesians make no reference to Roman
administrators, institutions, laws, or anything else that might indicate systemic Roman control. This is perhaps unexpected given what would seem to be one of the aims of the Ephesians' decree, viz. to explain their earlier capitulation to the Pontic king and convey their unfailing devotion to Rome. In any case, the result is that while Ephesus speaks openly of Roman authority or rule, it does not express the operation of that ἡγεμονία Ῥωμαίων in terms of the structural apparatus of the imperial state – by which I mean that political entity greater than the res publica (Rome) itself, that Romans of the Late Republic spoke of as the imperium Romanum, which comprised cities arranged into provinces (provinciae) subject to Roman officials and their legal decisions, and who paid tribute annually to the city of Rome. 21 The Ephesians give no indication of the formal mechanisms by which the Romans exercised their power. In fact, had the decree not explicitly mentioned ἡγεμονία Ῥωμαίων would we have known that Ephesus was part of the Romans' empire, and could we have any idea that Rome had an imperial state? 22 Ephesus does, of course, claim to have “agreed to all the requests” of the Romans, and to that extent does elaborate somewhat on its subordination to Roman authority. 23 Here the context of the expression is important: it is made amidst descriptions of the Romans as benefactors and the city’s own long-standing goodwill (εὐνομία) toward

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21 On the language of imperium Romanum, see Richardson, Language of Empire (Cambridge 2008).

22 Admittedly the Ephesians claim to have “complied in all cases with what was instructed of them” (ἐν πάσιν τοῖς ἐπιτασσομένοις προθύμως πειθαρχύνοντος, lines 2-3), which speaks to the quality of the subordination to Rome, though not its arrangement.

23 Lines 2-3. The text is unfortunately lacunose here, though the implication seems clear. Wilhelm’s suggested reconstruction, adopted by Wankel for I.Eph. 8 (given above n. 16) seems most likely, however Hiller von Gaertringen’s (SIG 742) suggestion of [συμφρόνον]ούντος cannot be ruled out entirely.
them. It would seem that the Ephesians’ obedience to Rome is tied up in some way with (unrecorded) Roman benefactions and their own goodwill. In stark contrast, Mithridates, whom the Ephesians regard as not just a king but a master (κύριος), is described as using fear (καταπληξάμενος), trickery ([ἀπάτη], or similar) and force (δύναμις, ἔπιβολή) to subjugate lands that did not belong to him. The difference in characterization, of course, is tendentious – Ephesus is turning away from Mithridates and siding with the Romans, after all – but it is significant that Ephesus frames its opposition to Mithridates, and by contrast its obedience to Rome, in terms of universal freedom (κοινὰ ἐλευθερία).

This claim of the Ephesians to have waged war for both the ἡγεμονία Ῥωμαίων and the κοινὰ ἐλευθερία is the most striking passage in the decree. On first reading, it seems paradoxical, contradictory, or even irrational. And yet the silence of the decree on the arrangement of the Roman imperial state and the characterization of Roman power hints at something more complex. The agents of government in the decree are local civic institutions and magistrates, who deliberate and legislate their own domestic and foreign actions. Furthermore, it is also clear that despite being in the Romans’ provincia Asia, Ephesus was obliged to defend itself – or, more precisely, its residents were exhorted to protect the temples, city and countryside (no mention of the provincia Asia).

One might suppose that the Ephesians’ claim to simultaneously fight for their independence and subordination is simply rhetoric. On this reading, the city is making a desperate attempt to sycophantically reaffirm its commitment to the Romans’ power and
authority by speaking of a ἡγεμονία Ῥωμαίων,26 and with κοινὰ ἑλευθερία only parroting the slogan of Greek freedom, which is mere political propaganda. Yet it was more than just rhetoric to the Ephesians, for whom, it is clear, to fight for Roman hegemony and Greek freedom was both possible and desirable.

In order to understand the claim, we must approach these documents with a greater level of sensitivity to things like meaning, intent, and mutual understanding, applying what Ma has referred to as a “text-aware” approach. As he describes it,

(Applying) a ‘text-aware’ approach to the documentary material (is) taking the inscriptions seriously as texts, whose language matters to us as interpreters, because it mattered to the power actors who uttered them. This approach seeks out meanings, implications, and ideology, to be explored and teased out by close readings.27

For us, this means that we must take seriously the Ephesians’ claim to fight on behalf of both Roman hegemony and Greek freedom, accept that the city was not irrational in its claim to fight for both, and instead ask what they meant by it.

To explore this is to explore the world of state communications between the poleis of the Greek East and the Romans. These communications are sometimes an artifact of a directly dialogic communication, such as the accounts typically found in Roman senate decrees and magisterial letters, which preserve for us not only the Romans’ response to an embassy, but regularly also the petition of the foreign envoys to whom they are responding.28 But we should not limit our investigation only to such direct communications; there are other forms of state communication that constituted the

26 E.g. Magie, RRAM I.224-225.
27 Ma, Antiochos III, 19-20. In this passage, Ma has used the term ‘ideology’ in something of the colloquial rather than technical sense, on which see below p. 18.
28 On the structure of these documents, see below p. 21. For more on petition-response model of interaction, see the seminal work by F. Millar, The Emperor in the Roman World (London 1977), discussed at greater length in Chapter 3.
transactions between Rome and the Greek *poleis*. Greek civic decrees are part of interstate relations in so far as they might be made in response to an earlier Roman action – such as an Athenian decree entrusting, in response to an earlier Roman senate decree, the administration of the Serapeion on Delos to Demetrius of Rheneas;\(^\text{29}\) or may broadly be said to take account of the Romans – such as an Oropian honorary decree recording their envoy’s warning to the Achaean League not to mistreat a friend of Rome, however small;\(^\text{30}\) or are to be communicated to Rome – as when the Aphrodisians passed a decree to send troops to support an embattled Roman general and sent envoys along to inform him of their decree.\(^\text{31}\) In each of these cases, we find Greek *poleis* and the Roman *res publica* using the same political language and discourses, demonstrating the same knowledge base, and to that extent communicating and interacting in a larger interstate world.\(^\text{32}\)

Thus the Ephesian decree speaks not only *of* the Romans (claiming to wage war on their behalf and look to their interests), but also *to* the Romans (asserting the Ephesians’ goodwill toward them and justifying their earlier capitulation to Mithridates), employing political discourses like freedom, and, most significantly, framing its action as part of a series of interactions with the Romans whose past benefactions (unrecorded though

\(^{29}\) RDGE 5, lines 1-14.

\(^{30}\) SIG\(^1\) 675, lines 8-12, 20-22 (text at Chapter 3, n. 56). Here the text makes implications, assumptions, and expectations of the Romans and, Oropous even provokes the Achaeans in the name of Rome.

\(^{31}\) *Aphrod.* 2. Discussed below, p. 196.

\(^{32}\) Though he uses different language, F. Millar, “Epigraphy”, in *idem Rome, the Greek World and the East*, vol. 1 (North Carolina 2002 [1983]), 39-83, encouraged students to approach these texts in the same way (“[they are] by far the most important surviving products of political processes”), and to that extent studied such documents as part of a larger political system (e.g. *idem, The Emperor in the Roman World* [London 1977]).
certainly implied) have motivated their long-standing goodwill, obedience, and even the present decision for war. The decree, furthermore, if not immediately conveyed to Rome by an envoy of the city, was published in the city and would contribute to their interactions with Rome in the future.33

0.3: METHODOLOGY: HABERMAS’ COMMUNICATIVE INTERACTION

Jürgen Habermas’ theory of communicative action is a useful tool for approaching such interactions, treating as it does language as the medium for reaching mutual, intersubjective understanding and thereby as a mechanism for co-ordinating action, and in this way drawing communication, language, meaning, and interaction into a general social theory.34 Habermas takes as his starting point the notion of intersubjective rationality – that is, ‘what is rational’ is neither objective (i.e. universal, natural and immutable) nor subjective (i.e. individualistic, historically or socially contingent), but rather an understanding achieved between subject actors through the

33 It is possible that an Ephesian dedication on the Capitol at Rome (ILS 34) directly relates to this text as it praises the Romans for helping with their welfare (salus) and preserving their ancestral freedom (maiorum suorum libertas). The date is uncertain, but most scholars would place it ca. 133 (thereby relating it to the Romans’ decision to free the cities of the former Attalid kingdom) or in the present context, shortly after the Mithridatic war. See Canali de Rossi, Ambascerie no. 311.

process of communication. Using this understanding of communicative rationality we are not at liberty to criticize the Ephesians' claim to fight for ἔλευθερία and Roman ἡγεμονία from some external objective sense of those terms, nor, on the other hand, view it simply as subjective; it must be understood as a part of the larger interstate communication of the Hellenistic world and particular communications between the city and the Romans, through which its meaning was negotiated. Thus closely related to rationality is meaning, which is likewise intersubjectively and procedurally worked out through language and communication: rather than trying to discern a speaker's meaning by looking to understand his intentions (or the intentions that he hopes to convey to his listener), we must instead understand meaning as something worked out between a speaker and hearer through the co-ordinating action of communication. The question, then, is in fact not “what did the Ephesians mean by ἡγεμονία and ἔλευθερία?” but rather “how did the Ephesians (and other Hellenistic poleis) and the Romans understand ἡγεμονία and ἔλευθερία, and how did that understanding co-ordinate their actions?”

Communication performs this rationalizing, co-ordinating function for two primary reasons: (i) because, a priori, the aim of language is to bring about a shared understanding and reach consensus – or, in Habermas' formulation: “reaching

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36 Thus in contrast to Weberian instrumental rationality, we can say that a rational understanding of Roman hegemony and Greek freedom must exist prior to its instrumental use by the Ephesians such that both the Ephesians and Romans must have understood these terms before the Ephesians could use them to their own political ends.

37 Habermas, TCA I.274-279.
understanding is the inherent telos of human speech;” and (ii) because a communicative action is centred around claims to validity that both subject actors must accept in order for it to be successful. The first reason is straightforward enough and already implicated in the second, which requires a few comments. Central to this second point are so-called speech-acts, utterances that do not (or do not just) describe a state of affairs in the world but perform an action in and upon the world, such that e.g. when promising one “makes a promise” (i.e. a symbolic act that forms a real social condition). When, for example, the Romans declared a city to be ‘free’ it was by the Senate’s speech-act (by the so-called perlocutionary effect of its utterance) that the city became free. Habermas builds upon this idea by realizing that every speaker who makes a speech-act also makes a claim to truth and that the only way a speech-act can be understood is if its speaker and hearer know what makes it acceptable: “the speech act of one person succeeds only if the other accepts the offer contained in it by taking (however implicitly) a “yes” or “no” position on a validity claim that is in principle criticisable.” These validity claims are what allow communicative actions to produce a rationally-motivated consensus. Again, Habermas:

a speaker can rationally motivate a hearer to accept his speech act offer because ... he can assume the warranty for providing, if necessary, convincing reasons

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38 Habermas, TCA I.287.
40 Even in traditional speech-act theory utterances must be “felicitous” in order to be accepted by the hearer. That is, they must fit expectations, conventional rules and the context, and be executed correctly by an appropriate actor. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, 12-45.
41 Habermas, TCA I.287.
42 Compare: Habermas, TCA II.120: “Coming to an understanding means that participants in communication reach an agreement concerning the validity of an utterance; agreement is the intersubjective recognition of the validity claim the speaker raises for it.”
that would stand up to a hearer’s criticisms of the validity claim. Thus a speaker owes the binding force of his illocutionary act not to the validity of what is said [per se] but to the coordinating effect of the warranty that he offers: namely, to redeem, if necessary, the validity claim raised with his speech act. 43 [emphasis in original].

When making a statement, a speaker is also making claims as to its real world (objective) truth, its normative (intersubjective) rightness, and his own (subjective) truthfulness or sincerity, all of which he implicitly guarantees can be justified, if challenged, by recourse to further discourse (below). 44 These validity claims are, then, the mechanisms that assure that a communicative action is a mutually understood agreement, wherein both interlocutors have already reached a consensus on the meaning of each other’s utterance, claim, and intent. Take, for example, a Mithridatic-era senatus consultum, in which we find the people of Stratonicea petitioning the Roman senate for various rights “since the people ... has always preserved its goodwill, loyalty and friendship with the Romans” (II. 36-37), and the Senate enthusiastically acceding that “the Stratoniceans have continuously preserved friendship, loyalty and goodwill toward the Romans in times of war and peace”. 45 Here a successful communicative action has taken place, and we can see that both Rome and the Stratoniceans share a mutual understanding of the meaning of the nebulous notions of friendship, goodwill and loyalty and their relation to certain rights of autonomy and immunity. 46

43 Habermas, TCA I.302.
44 Habermas, TCA I.99-100, 302-8.
46 Other understood validity claims, of course, are (i) Rome’s authority to issue such rights, (ii) Stratonicea’s right to ask for them, (iii) the grounds under which such petitions are valid, (iv) the conditions of these rights, etc.
Not every communicative action is as simple as the above example, and we can imagine that in some instances the hearer might reject a speaker’s validity claim. When a validity claim is rejected, interlocutors rely on discourse, which in a technical sense is not a synonym for language but rather a subordinate communication about communication (a subset of a communication in which disputes are hashed out before the communication is completed), to reach a rationally-motivated consensus. To justify their validity claims in these discourses, interlocutors draw on a repository of shared social understandings and knowledge, which Habermas refers to as the Lifeworld. The Lifeworld is the social world – in contrast to the System or objective world – in which communication takes place, but also serves as the locus of shared ‘taken-for-granteds’ like common sense, common knowledge, normative values, and cultural rules. Here the speaker and hearer meet and, if necessary, raise claims that their utterances fit the world, criticize and negotiate each other’s validity claims, and settle disputes in order to arrive at a mutually understood agreement. As one can never be outside the Lifeworld, every new situation is always already familiar and, to a great extent, preinterpreted, while through the discursive negotiation one is forever testing, reproducing, or generating anew the stock of shared knowledge.

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47 Habermas, *TCA* I.42.

48 Habermas, *TCA* II.124: “the lifeworld appears as a reservoir of taken-for-granteds, of unshaken convictions that participants in communication draw upon in cooperative processes of interpretation.”

49 Habermas, *TCA* II.125-126.

50 Some might object that as discrete cultures, with different languages and limited interstate contact before the second century, the Greeks and the Roman did not share a Lifeworld. I would agree with this objection in principle, but would simultaneously note that Greeks and Romans did have many interactions before the second-century (dating back to settlement of Magna Graecia in the eighth century), even if not on a large scale, and that there was much similarity between these two city-state cultures, as we shall see e.g. in the discussion of Greek and Roman concepts of freedom (Chapter 2 §1). These similarities made their communicative negotiations less onerous at the outset, but, in any case, our focus in this study is
In some sense, when we speak of ideology in a non-technical sense we are thinking of the Lifeworld, though Habermas' formulation has the advantage of eschewing the Marxist notion of ideology as an epiphenomenon of economic relations and the mystification of false consciousness by removing individual agency (i.e. the agent who can be said to 'manipulate', 'obscure', 'elide', 'obfuscate', etc. reality through ideology) in favour of intersubjective and rationally-motivated consensus. For heuristic purposes the Lifeworld can be said to share similar traits also with, e.g., Bourdieu's notion of habitus and doxa or Foucault's understanding of discours, though it is more comprehensive and universally applicable than either of these. In any case, like each of these notions, the Lifeworld embodies the well of social knowledge – of normative values, conventions and rules – that is at once conservative but open to (gradual) revision, and that is drawn upon to coordinate action.

When, therefore, the Ephesians made the claim to take up war against Mithridates for the Ἱγεμονία Ῥωμαίων and the κοινα ἑλευθερία, they intrinsically made claims to real-world truths and their own sincerity, and drew on the shared knowledge of these notions to make a claim to their meaning and warrant their the normative rightness. It exposes the normative framework of Greco-Roman relations, furthermore, that Ephesus could warrant (i.e. could discursively redeem if necessary) their own autarkic authority to

on their surviving communications from the second and first centuries, in which there was a shared Lifeworld whose norms and taken-for-granteds we can watch develop and evolve through these same communications.


declare war, given their position as a part of the Romans’ *hēgemonia*, and warrant too their sincerity (truthfulness) in doing so for Roman rule *and* Greek freedom. The Ephesians’ claim, therefore, not only meant something to them, but was part of a larger discourse of freedom and the nature of Roman rule, whose meaning, norms and values resided in a larger social world of past experiences and knowledge – the Ephesians were warranting to justify their claim by drawing on the countless communicative and real-world actions that had preceded them and made up the well of shared knowledge. Their speech-act, furthermore, endorsed the commonly understood meaning of these terms and reproduced those norms as part of the social (Life)world. It remains now to understand (a) what such norms and meanings were and (b) how they shaped and directed relations between Rome and the Greek *poleis* of the East such that we might understand just what the Romans’ *hēgemonia* was to its actors, and how it operated.

0.4: ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY

Habermas’ theory of communicative action, then, provides useful conceptual tools for interpreting the evidence; however, as ever for the historian, the account must be true to the evidence and concerned with elucidating the historical case in its particularity.\(^{53}\) To that end, the first chapter of our study will address the real-world structures of the Roman imperial state – its formation, institutions, officers and constituents. Here we are curious as to the scope and extent of this administrative system of control and the

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\(^{53}\) Habermas’ communicative theory does take the objective world into account: claims to truth and truthfulness can only be justified by recourse to states of affairs and actions in the real world. His larger social theory also draws a distinction between the social world (Lifeworld) and the objective world of structures and institutions (System).
institutional operation of power. As the Ephesian decree hints, this governing system was not as comprehensive and extensive as many historians reconstruct it; or, put another way, there were serious limitations to the practical exercise of Roman power over the provincials, and Greek cities were relied upon to largely manage their own affairs.

Building upon this, and taking our lead again from the Ephesian text, the second chapter will address the notion of freedom in the development and operation of the Roman empire. Literary and epigraphic evidence reveals for us that ‘freedom of the Greeks’ was a central political narrative driving and shaping the interaction between ruler and ruled. Using Habermas’ theory of communicative action and pragmatic meaning, we shall try to understand just what both the Romans and Greek poleis mutually understood by the notion of “freedom”. We shall examine the language of their communication (the state documents) in order to elucidate the implicit norms and conventions (i.e. the rules) of the discourse of freedom. This chapter builds upon the institutional analysis of the imperial state, considering the grounding of the discourse in the real-world. To the extent that, as we shall see, ‘freedom of the Greeks’ was more than simply a vacant political slogan, we must also consider how the discourse of freedom operated (in both the objective and social worlds) to shape the development of Roman authority in the East.

Having observed the limitations of the institutional imperial state and the discourse of freedom in the Greco-Roman world, the third chapter will investigate the social, interactive empire: that is, the empire as it was transacted between the Romans and the cities of the East, of which, we noted, the state documents preserved in the epigraphic record are the principal surviving artifacts. In these, we find an interactive empire predicated on reciprocity, and the social relations of ‘benefactor’, ‘friend’ and ‘patron’.
As in the previous chapter, here we are concerned with illuminating these relationships and their functional significance for the direction and orientation of Roman hegemony. We will see how such relations were shaped by the discursive narrative of freedom that circumscribed Greco-Roman interaction generally, and how they worked to shape, integrate and normalize Roman rule over the poleis – how, ultimately, they came to generate a new, inchoate, imperial discourse and a consensus around Roman hēgemonia.

The fourth and final chapter is both a conclusion and epilogue. The object here is not simply to draw together the various points of the study into a concise and cogent form (though I hope it does that too), but also to return to the idea of a Roman empire and an imperial discourse, and presage the consensus of the High Empire admirably essayed by Ando.54 Here we shall focus on the shift in the first century – particularly its second half, culminating in the advent of Augustus – from a loose agglomeration of autonomous city-states with Rome as its friendly protector, to an entity recognized by those states as permanent and legitimate, of which they were a part and within which they identified themselves.

0.5: LANGUAGE AND STRUCTURE OF THE DOCUMENTS OF STATE

Before proceeding with the study, it is worth commenting briefly on the language of the state documents. As noted above, on the Roman side, these are above all decrees of the senate (senatus consulta) and letters of Roman officials (epistulae magistrorum),

54 C. Ando, Imperial Ideology and Provincial Loyalty (Berkeley 2000).
which regularly prefaced a senate decree or might convey a decision on their own. 55 The arrangement of these documents was formulaic. 56 Senatus consulta began with a prescript 57 that included the name and rank of the presiding magistrate, the date and location of the meeting, and the names of witnesses to the redaction of the decree; 58 this was followed by the motion (relatio) under consideration, introduced by the phrase quod verba fecit (περί οὖν ... λόγους ἐποιήσατο), which would provide a summary of events including motivations for the resolution, the names of ambassadors, and their speeches – these often comprised a history of the issue, past decisions, and relations with Rome; finally there was the actual senate decision itself, presented in indirect discourse following the phrase de ea re ita censuerunt (περὶ τοῦτον τοῦ πράγματος οὕτως

55 To a much lesser extent we shall also consider laws passed through the Roman assembly (leges populi Romani), particularly the lex de provinciis praetoris, lex agraria, lex Antonia de Termessibus, and lex portorii Asiae which, though not necessarily produced for foreign consumption, nevertheless addressed the arrangement of the empire and were published in the provinces, and follow the same discursive rules of interstate communications outlined above.

56 Sherk, RDGE pp. 7-8, summarizing Mommsen, St.R. III.2.1007-1009. On senate procedure, see: P. Willems, Le Sénat de la République romaine (Louvain 1883 [reprint 1968]), esp. II.144-227; Mommsen, St.R. III.2.1004-1021; Sherk, RDGE, pp. 4-13; M. Bonnefond-Coudry, Le Sénat de la République romaine (Paris 1989), 452-573; A. Lintott, The Constitution of the Roman Republic (Oxford 2003), 75-85. A lex Julia de senatu habendo put forward by Augustus in 9 BCE formalized senate procedures under the Empire (Dio 55.3.1-4; Suet. Aug. 35; Gell. N.A. 4.10.1; Pliny Ep. 8.14.19; 4.13.5-7; R.Talbert, The Senate of Imperial Rome [Princeton 1984], 222-224); under the Republic, they were based simply on mos maiorum – thus Pompey’s rather embarrassing commission of a handbook from his friend Varro after his election to the consulship in 70 (Gell. N.A. 14.7.2).

57 A typical example (RDGE 2, lines 1-5): Κόιντος Μαίνιος Τίτου υἱὸς στρατηγὸς τῇ συνκλή τωι συνεβουλεύσατο ἐν κοιμεῖτω πρὸ ἡμερ[ων ἔπτα Εἰδώλων ὁκτωμβρίων γραφομένωι παρῆσαν Μάνιος Ακήλιος Μανίου υἱὸς ὅλτε[ναι], Τίτος Νομίσιος Τίτου υἱὸς (‘Q. Manius T. f., praetor, consulted the senate in the comitia on the seventh day before the Ides of October; those present at the redaction were M’. Acilius M’.f. of the tribe Voltiniana and T. Numesium T.f.’). The Senate did not have a regular meeting schedule, but was summoned as necessary by the highest ranking curule magistrate in the city, which was generally the consul, but could also be the praetor urbanus if both consuls were outside the city (Willems, Sénat, 122-144; Bonnefond-Coudry, Le Sénat, 357-412).

58 Senate decrees were transcribed after the session was dissolved by a small group of, generally, three men including the relator of the motion (Sherk, RDGE p. 7, n. 12 for sources). Until 59, when the minutes of the Senate (acta senatus) were recorded by scribae and published (Suet. Iul 20), this would have been done from personal notes and memory (Cic. in Cat. 3.6.13Plut. Mar. 4).
These decrees were conveyed to a city by its envoys, or envoys of a larger city (in both cases often prefaced by an official letter from the chairman of the senate at Rome), or later by a Roman provincial magistrate in an epistula. Such correspondence followed the standard Hellenistic model, which included an introductory greeting formula (salutatio), an explanatory and/or motivation clause, and the substance of the decision.

The Roman senate deliberated and produced decisions in Latin, which had then to be translated into Greek before being communicated to the East (where they were preserved on stone and have come down to us). Communication through translation could naturally present problems for the ancient interlocutors (as well as the modern researcher) by filtering the will of the Senate through the medium of the translator, who naturally must balance faithfulness to the language with the Senate’s meaning and intent.

The example of the Aetolian League’s surrender to Rome in 191 is often cited as a cautionary tale: after being defeated by the Romans, the League surrendered itself into Rome’s faith (dedito in fidel), misunderstanding the word “faith” (fides – translated by

[59] The decree proper regularly followed the language of the rogatio, though sometimes it might differ for reasons of brevity (e.g. RDGE 2), or amendment (RDGE 11). Technically, the decree concluded with the mark of approval, c(ensuere) or ἐδοξέω (e.g. RDGE 2, 7, 15, 16 and 18).


[61] The salutatio followed the pattern (RDGE 55, lines 3-4): Πόπλιος Σεροίλιος Ποπλίου νῦν ἵσαυρικός ἀνθύπατος ἥρχουσι βουλή δήμωι Περγαμηνῶν χαίρετον (’P. Servilius P.f. Isauricus, procos., to the magistrates, boule and demos of Pergamum, greetings’). By the mid-first century a formula valetudinis was also common and with some variation followed the pattern, “if you are well, it is well; I with the army am well” (εἰ ἑρωθοδε, καλῶς ἐν ἔχοι καὶ αὐτῶς δὲ μετὰ τοῦ στρατεύματος ὑγίανον). See in general, Sherk, RDGE, pp. 189-197; on Hellenistic official epistolary, see Wells, Royal Correspondence (New Haven, 1934), esp. xli-xliv, 309-378; P. Viereck, Sermo Graecus (Göttingen 1888), 55-79; Kosenniemi, Studien zur Idee und Phraseologie des griechischen Briefes bis 400 n. Chr. (Helsinki, 1956).

[62] Since Latin was the language of the Senate, the speeches of foreign envoys were translated into Latin (e.g. Gell. N.A. 6.14.9; cf. Val. Max 2.2.3 relating that the Rhodian rhetor Molon was the first to address the Senate in Greek in the early 70s). For examples of Latin senatus consulta, see FIRA’ V 36, 39, 46, and 47.
πίστις) as something other than unconditional surrender and being surprised when they received harsh terms.  

Instances like these, however, are rare, usually found early in Greco-Roman relations, and often concerned idiosyncratic diplomatic conventions like the Roman deditio.  

By contrast, much of the language and system of reciprocity in Greco-Roman relations had its roots in both cultures, built on an intersubjective understanding negotiated through discourses, developed through long trial and error.

Thus where two early second century Roman documents explicitly detail the forms of reciprocity (Chapter 3, §1), later communications employed linguistic codes predicated on implicit common understandings.

Moreover, Sherk, among others, has demonstrated the “extremely literal and slavish” accuracy of the Greek translations of Roman state documents – a point well illustrated in the few surviving bilingual decrees.  

This includes not only vocabulary and phraseology – where Greek equivalents were found and consistently applied and

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63 Polyb. 20.9.10-12: δόντες αὐτοὺς εἰς τὴν Ῥωμαίων πίστιν, οὐκ εἰδότες τίνα δύναμιν ἔχει τοῦτο, τῷ δὲ τῆς πίστεως ὀνόματι πλανηθέντες, ὡς ἄν διὰ τοῦτο τελειοτέρον αφίσειν ἔλεος ὑπάρξοντος παρὰ δὲ Ῥωμαίοις ἴσον ἴσχυον εἰς τ’ εἰς τὴν πίστιν αὐτὸν ἐγχείρισαι καὶ τὸ τὴν ἐπιτροπὴν δοῦναι περὶ αὐτοῦ τῷ κρατοῦντι (‘they gave themselves “into the faith” of the Romans, not knowing the precise import of the word, but they were mislead by the word “faith”, as if they would get better terms. But with the Romans, to entrust oneself into another’s faith is equivalent to giving to the victor power to decide over you.’); cp. 36.4.1-3; Livy 36.27.8 (in fidem ... Romanorum); cf. Walbank, Commentary, III.79-80; Badian, FC, 4-7; E. Gruen, “Greek πίστις and Roman fides” Athenaeum 60 (1982), 50-68 for a summary of modern discussion and bibliography.

64 In the Aetolia case above, for example, the misunderstanding lay in the Roman convention of deditio in fidei, not with the translation of πίστις for fides, as Polybius himself (20.9.11) makes clear.

65 RDGE 34 and 35 (see below p. 199).

66 Sherk, RDGE, 13-19 and 188-209; idem, Municipal Decrees of the Roman West (Buffalo, 1970), 59 for quotation. Bilingual decrees: e.g. RDGE 22, 61, 62, 65; cf. IGUR 5, 6, 8, 9 and 15; Res Gestae Divi Augusti; F. Zilken, De Inscriptionibus Latinis Graecis Bilinguis Quaestiones Selectae (Bonn, 1909); R. Kearsley, Greeks and Romans in Imperial Asia (IK 59; Bonn, 2001), passim for examples. For recent discussions of ancient bilingualism, see the essays collected in J. Adams, et al. (eds.), Bilingualism in Ancient Society (Oxford 2002), and bibliography cited at p. 1, nn. 1-3.
unique Latinisms were transliterated\textsuperscript{67} – but also the syntactical arrangement of the \textit{consultum} itself,\textsuperscript{68} such that we can often reconstruct the original Latin from the surviving Greek with some ease.\textsuperscript{69} Indeed, the translations of \textit{senatus consulta} are so consistent that Sherk posits that they were routinely carried out by Roman copyists in the archives rather than local translators.\textsuperscript{70} Official letters are less problematic still since they appear to have been commonly composed in Greek by the magistrates – who became increasingly familiar with the language during the second and first centuries – or translated by their \textit{scriba} (secretary), so as, in the words of one provincial magistrate, “to

\textsuperscript{67} Thus, e.g., \textit{senatum consultum} = τῇ συγκλήτω; \textit{scribendo adfuerunt} = γραφομένῳ παρήσαν; \textit{ex senatus consulto} = κατὰ δόγμα συγκλήτου; \textit{ita uti ei(s) e republica fideque sua videretur} = οὕτως καθὼς ἂν αὐτῷ (αὐτοῖς) ἐκ τῶν δημοσίων πραγμάτων πιστῶς τε τῆς ἱδίας φαίνηται. Unique Latin terms were consistently rendered with a Greek equivalents: e.g. \textit{ἐπαρχεία} = \textit{provincia}, \textit{αὐτοκράτωρ} = \textit{imperator}, \textit{συγκλήτος} = \textit{senatus}. Transliterations were common with dates (\textit{εἴδοι} = \textit{Ides}; \textit{νόμαι} = \textit{Nones}, \textit{καλάνδαι} = \textit{Kalends}, \textit{οκτώμβριος} = \textit{October}), names and titles (\textit{Λεόντιος Κωνσταντίος Σύλλας δικτάτωρ} = \textit{Lucius Cornelius Sulla dictator}), and places (\textit{in comitia} = ἐν κοιμεῖτο). For more examples, see Sherk, \textit{RDGE} pp. 14-16; cf. A. Cameron, “Latin Words in the Greek Inscriptions of Asia Minor” \textit{AJPh} 52 (1931), 232-262; T. Drew Bear, “Some Greek Words: Part I,” \textit{Glotta} 50 (1972), 61-96 and “Some Greek Words: Part II” \textit{Glotta} 50 (1972), 182-228; H. Mason, \textit{Greek Terms for Roman Institutions} (Toronto 1974); Kearsley, \textit{Greeks and Romans in Imperial Asia}, 157-162.

\textsuperscript{68} In Latin, the phrase \textit{quod ... verba fecit} introduced the \textit{relatio}, which was expressed in indirect discourse; the Greek regularly employed \textit{περὶ δὲν ... λόγους ἐποίησατο} with indirect discourse. Likewise \textit{οὕτως ἔδοξεν διὸς} parallels the \textit{ita censuerunt ut} that introduced the decision itself. For a more detailed treatment of syntax and orthography in these documents, see P. Viereck, \textit{Sermo Graecus}, 55-70.

\textsuperscript{69} See, e.g., the efforts of Bruns, \textit{FIRA}\textsuperscript{7}, Chapter V and Crawford, \textit{RS}, esp. no. 12. Note also Avram’s efforts at reconstructing the highly fragmentary treaty between between Rome and Callatis, the only surviving example of a Latin treaty in the epigraphic record, from the standard Greek translation: A. Avram, “Der Vertrag zwischen Rom und Callatis” in B. Funck (ed.), \textit{Hellenismus} (Tübingen 1996), 491-511; \textit{idem}, \textit{IGLSM} III.1).

\textsuperscript{70} Sherk, \textit{RDGE}, p. 13. Note that it was not always the case that Greeks heard an ‘official’ translation of the \textit{senatus consultum}, e.g. Livy 45.29.3: \textit{silentio per praecem facto Paulus Latine, quae senatui, quae sibi ex consili sententia uisa essent, pronuntiavit. ea Cn. Octavius praetor— nam etipse aderat — interpretata sermone Graeco referebat} (‘After the herald had called for silence Paulus, speaking in Latin, explained the arrangements decided upon by the senate and by himself in concert with the ten commissioners; Gnaeus Octavius, who was also present, translated the address into Greek’).
make it impossible for (a community) to understand what is written in any way other than its intended meaning.”

The communications of the Greek cities are preserved in the decrees produced by the *dēmos* and published in public places on *stelai*, temple walls, statue bases, etc.

Traditionally, a decree (*ψήφισμα*) was passed first through the city’s council (*βουλή*) before being considered, amended, and approved by the popular assembly (*ἐκκλησία*), thereby expressing a deliberated and publicly approved decision. The proximity, furthermore, of these published decrees in both time and space to the *dēmos*’ decision warrants their validity and accuracy as collective sentiments (i.e. expressions of the state) since we must expect that objectionable or incorrect claims would have been removed or corrected. Thus what survives represents the expression of the state both *de iure* (by virtue of its passage through the appropriate bodies of the popular civic government) and *de facto* (by virtue of its acceptance in the public sphere).

These decrees followed a basic formula: after the prescript (which included the date, officials, the proposer and enactment formula) came the resolution itself, which began with a two-part motivation clause explaining the reasons (*ἐπεί / ἑπειδή ...*) and

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72 This probouleutic procedure is expressed by the common enactment formula *ἐδοξέν τῇ βουλῇ καὶ τῷ δήμῳ*, though in some states (e.g. Athens) reference to the *βουλή* was omitted, and in not a few others δήμος and *βουλή* seem to be used indiscriminately and to not reflect different procedures (Rhodes, *Greek Decrees*, 475-501).

intentions (ἵνα / ἀπώς ...) of the resolution, and concluded with the substance of the
decision in indirect discourse. Common in the surviving epigraphic corpus are honorary
decrees – a form of civic decree passed through the channels described above – which
bestowed honours on benefactors of the polis. These followed the same general outline
as civic decrees (preamble, motivation, resolution, decision) and could be quite lengthy
and detailed (e.g. the Claros decrees in honour of Menippos and Polemaios), or simple
statements found on statuary bases, which record the name of the honorand and his
service to the community.\(^\text{74}\) It remains now to consider how all these texts can help us to
reconstruct the nature and operation of Rome’s rule in the East in the first two centuries
BCE.

kind is a dedication by Mytilene to Pompey (Robert *CRAI* 1969): Γνα[i]ων Πομ[η]ήνον, Ἰρο[ίτα]υίον, Θεοφάνην, ἀνακομιδάμενον | παρὰ τῶν κοινῶν ἐνεργεῖσθαν Ἦρωμ[η]ίων | τάν τε πόλιν καὶ τάν χώραν καὶ
tάν || πάτριον ἐλευθερίαν, ἀποκαταστάσαστα ἐδέ | καὶ τά ἱπά τά πατ[ρ]ῶα καὶ ταῖς τιμαῖς | τῶν θεῶν,
ἀρετῶν ἔννεκα καὶ εὔσεβείας | τάς εἰς τό θεῖον. These could be even briefer, as in another decree of
Mytilene to Pompey (*SIG* 752): Γναῖω Πονπη[ῆ]ίω Γναῖω νύο | Μεγάλω, αὐτο[κράτοι], τῷ εὐεργέτα καὶ
σω[τήρι καὶ κτιστᾷ].
1.0 - INTRODUCTION

In 85 BCE, three years after welcoming and even supporting Mithridates, the Ephesians passed their decree declaring war on the Pontic king on behalf of Roman hegemony (ἡγεμονία Ῥωμαίων) and the common freedom (κοινὴ ἑλευθερία). The phrase, as noted in the Introduction, is striking for the way in which it draws together the themes of Greek freedom and Roman constraint in the same expression, suggesting a contemporary logic whereby the two conditions could rationally co-exist. In this light, questions concerning the structure and apparatus of the Romans’ empire are immediately raised as we try to understand how the Ephesians could meaningfully discuss – even expect – freedom within Rome’s hegemony.

An answer begins to suggest itself in the Ephesians’ claim to have been overwhelmed by the size and unexpectedness of Mithridates’ assault, for which reason they submitted to the Pontic king. The claim is something of a whitewash of history – not only was Mithridates said to have co-ordinated his brutal plot against the Italians from Ephesus, but the Ephesians are singled out by ancient authors for their zeal in toppling Roman statues, destroying dedications to Romans, and even murdering Italians.

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1 J.Eph. 8, lines 11-12.
2 J.Eph. 8, lines 7-8: ἐκράτησαν καὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας πόλεως καταπληξάμενος [τῷ] τε πλῆθει τῶν δυνάμεων καὶ τῷ ἀποδοκήτω τῆς ἐπιβολῆς (‘and after first seizing the poleis lying in front of us, he also deceitfully gained control over our polis, overwhelming us by the size of his forces and the unexpectedness of his assault’).
who sought refuge in the Temple of Artemis; yet the passage also leads us to question the structure of the Roman empire: what mechanisms, if any, did the Romans have in place to ensure obedience? When Mithridates invaded the province and was joined by many of the provincial cities, Rome only responded with a small group of its own soldiers who happened to be in the province, heavily supported by tens of thousands of hastily gathered men from neighbouring principalities, and auxiliaries supplied by Nicomedes IV of Bithynia.

The question follows: what, more generally, was the extent of the state apparatus of the imperium Romanum? The Ephesian decree makes no mention of any Roman administrators, Roman councils, Roman laws, judicial arrangements or any other indicators of systemic Roman rule. Rather, we find references to local officials (στρατηγός, γραμματεύς, l.17; προέδροι, l. 18), local organizations (βουλή, l.17; δήμος, l. 9, 15), who legislate by their own authority (δέδοχθαι τῷ δήμῳ, l.14), declare war on their own authority (κέκρικεν πόλεμον, l. 11), modify domestic finances on their own authority (II. 30-50), and of course prescribe their own freedom (l. 12). Recall, too, that the preamble closes by asserting that war posed risks to “the defense, security and salvation of the Temple of Artemis, city and territory”; the Ephesians make no mention

3 Plans issued from Ephesus: Orosius 6.2.2; Eutropius 5.5.2. Ephesians toppling statues and dedications: App. Mith. 21; cf. Cic. Flacc. 57, 60; Diod. 37.26; Justin 38.3.8; App. Mith. 10. Murder in temple: App. Mith. 23. In defence of the Ephesians, it might be noted that Chaeremon of Nysa took refuge in the Temple of Artemis at Ephesus from where he actively worked on the Romans’ behalf against Mithridates, and earned a bounty on his head from the Pontic king (SIG7 741, lines 30-33).

4 App. Mith. 11, 17-19; Justin 38.3.8; Magie, RRAM 210-211; Sherwin-White, RFPE, 118-131; Kallet-Marx, Hegemony, 250-260.

5 For the full text, see above Introduction, n. 16.

6 I.Eph. 8, lines 14-17. This sort of clause addressing the salvation and protection of the city was common in Hellenistic decrees, and F. Gschnitzer, “Zur Normenhierarchie im offentlichen Recht der Griechen: Volksbeschlusse ‘zum Schutz des Landes’ und ‘zur Rettung der Stadt’” in P. Dimakis, ed.,
of the province of Asia (established nearly fifty years earlier) or the Romans for that matter. To judge from the Ephesian document there would seem to have been very little apparatus to the Roman state and Ephesus quite clearly enjoyed the autonomy to deliberate, legislate, and execute its own domestic and even foreign policies. And yet, simultaneously, they fought for – and were a part of – the Romans’ hegemonia.

This chapter, then, examines the formal structure that ordered relations between the Romans and their subjects – that is, the provinces and provincial machinery used by Rome to organize and govern those under its control. Provincial administration has long been a topic of historical investigation, but following more recent trends in scholarship our examination will adopt a more critical view of the provincial system and eschew the sort of over-rationalizing that created the totalizing and too tidy reconstructions found in earlier studies. Since we shall pick up the thread of the transaction of empire (as interaction) in the second and third chapters, we need not here press the often narrow and scattered evidence to resemble a comprehensive imperial system.

In point of fact, the central theme of this chapter is the decidedly limited character of the infrastructure of Roman rule. The first section contextualizes the discussion by reminding us that Roman authority in the East existed before and beyond the provinces. The second section explores provincia on a broad scale and draws out its ambiguity and

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Symposion 1979: Vorträge zur griechischen und hellenistischen Rechtsgeschichte (Vienna 1983), 141-164, suggests that it placed the decree in a superior category that gave it priority over others; cf. Rhodes, Decrees of the Greek States, 522-523. Still, it is worth noting that by the Principate we find such ‘priority clauses’ express motivation as “piety toward the emperor” (SIG 798) or “piety toward the gods and the Augusti” (Milet I.3.134); according to Josephus (Ant. 14.264; Gschneiter, op. cit. no. 16) the Ephesians passed a decree in 42 freeing the Jews because it pertained to the Romans (δεδόχθαι τῇ βουλῇ καὶ τῷ δήμῳ, τοῦ πράγματος Ῥωμαίων ἀνήκοντος) – no such references to Roman power are made by the Ephesians in 83.

7 On the status of Ephesus as capital city of the province (caput provinciae), see below n. 294.
imprecision in conception, construction and operation. In the third section, we investigate the extent of provincial machinery – as the agency of Roman control – and observe the sizeable reach of the provincial magistrate, but also the institutional and practical limitations to the exercise of his power. The fourth section concentrates on the coercive apparatus of Rome’s empire, again highlighting the limited extent of Roman power, in large part a result of its citizen-state institutions. These clear limitations in the provincial system lead us, in the final section, to address the importance of local autonomy in the Republican empire and the significance of freedom in the structure of the imperial state. For most of the period under discussion, the Romans had a generally underdeveloped sense of their imperial state, which, like their own citizen-state had strong executive officers with far-reaching authority but a limited bureaucracy that relied heavily on subjects to address many of their own problems and accordingly afforded them a large degree of action outside the provincial system.

1.1 – ROMAN RULE BEFORE THE PROVINCES

Sometime during the 130s or even 120s Polybius completed his investigation into “how and under what sort of government the Romans, in less than fifty-three years (i.e. 220-167), managed to subject nearly the whole of the inhabited world to their sole government.” According to Polybius, by 167 the Romans had exercised rule (ἀρχή) over the entire inhabited world (οἰκουμένη), but in light of the Romans’ victories over

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8 Polyb. 1.1.5: τίς γὰρ οὕτως ὑπάρχει φαύλος ἢ ἡμεθύμος ἀνθρώπων δές οὐκ ἂν βούλοιτο γνώναι πῶς καὶ τίνι γένει πολιτείας ἐπικρατηθέντα σχεδὸν ἀπαντά τά κατά τὴν οἰκουμένην ἐν οὕς ὕλος πεντήκοντα καὶ τρισίν ἔτεισιν ὑπὸ μιᾶν αρχήν ἔπεσε τὴν Ῥωμαίων, ὃ πρότερον οὕς εὑρίσκεται γεγονός; cf. 3.19, 4.2; 6.2.3; J. Richardson, “Polybius’ View of the Roman Empire” PBSR n.s. 34 (1979), 1-15, esp. 1-3. On Polybius’ life, see Chapter 2, n. 183.
the Carthaginians, Achaeans and Macedonians in 146, he extended his account in order to consider the policy of the ruling Romans as well as the nature and manner of their rule.\footnote{Polyb. 3.4.6: προσθέτων ἂν εἰς ταῖς προειρημέναις πράξεις τὴν τε τῶν κρατοῦντων ἀφεσίν, ποία τις ἣν μετὰ ταύτα καὶ πῶς προεστάτει τῶν ἄλλων, τὰς τε τῶν ἄλλων ἀποδοχὰς καὶ διαλήψεις, πόσαι καὶ τίνες ὑπῆρχον περὶ τῶν ἡγουμένων (‘I must add to my earlier history an account of the policy of the rulers and the nature and manner of their governance over the world, as well as the reception and opinions of the subjects about their ruler.’). On Rome’s ἀρχή in 167, see Polyb. 3.42: ὁ τε γὰρ χρόνος ὁ πεντηκοντακαιρίτης εἰς ταύτ’ ἔληγεν ἢ τ’ αὐξήσει καὶ προκοπή τῆς Ῥωμαίων δυναστείας ἐτετελειωτό· πρὸς δὲ τούτος ὁμολογοῦμεν ἑδόκει τούτ’ εἶναι καὶ κατηγορηκαμένον ἀπασίν ὅτι λοιπὸν ἔστι Ῥωμαίων ἀκούσιν καὶ τούτοις πειθαρχεῖν υπὲρ τῶν παραγγελλομένων (‘For the period of fifty-three years finished here, and the growth and advance of Roman power came to an end; furthermore, it was now generally accepted that everyone must henceforth listen to the Romans and obey what they commanded.’); cf. 1.1.5; 3.1.9; 6.2.3. On the scope of Rome’s ἀρχή, see also 1.2.7, 4.1; 3.1.4, 3.9, 118.9; 8.2.4; 39.8.7; J. Richardson, “Polybius’ View”, 1-11.}

In that year, as we shall see, the Romans began sending out magistrates annually to oversee the provincia Macedonia thereby establishing what became the first regularly administered province in the East.

It is of some note that Polybius, whose Histories explicitly addressed the reasons, nature and methods of Roman dominance over the world, and who lived to see the establishment of the provinces of Sicily, Sardinia, the two Spanish provinces and Africa in the west, as well as the provincia Macedonia, if not also the provincia Asia, in the East, never once refers to any province of the Roman empire. We know from inscriptions contemporary with Polybius that ἐπαρχεία was used to describe a Roman provincia.\footnote{RDGE 44, line 2 (150-100 BCE); SIG 683, lines 53-55, 63-5 (140 BCE). On the Greek ἐπαρχεία for the Latin provincia, see H. Mason, Greek Terms for Roman institutions (Toronto, 1974), 135-138 (with the comments on Greco-Roman translations above p. 24 f). While ἐπαρχεία undoubtedly was used to translate the Latin provincia, it is important to note that the word had a history prior to and independent of the Romans, the implications of which are discussed in Chapter 4; cf. J.-M. Bertrand, “Langue grecque et administration romaine: de l’ἐπαρχεία τῶν Ῥωμαίων à l’ἐπαρχεία τῶν θράκων”, Ktema 7 (1982), 167-175.} Yet, he uses the word ἐπαρχεία (Lat. provincia) only three times in relation to the Romans – twice while relating the Romano-Carthaginian treaties in 241 (which perhaps follows the language of those texts) and once to mean a Roman military theatre.
against the Gauls in 290; never does he use the term in relation to the East or after the third century. The case of Polybius, therefore, illustrates that a contemporary student of Roman history and government could describe the development and structure of Roman rule without reference to *provinciae.* This encourages us to question what precisely these *provinciae* were and, in light of the expressions of Roman supremacy before 146, the mechanisms of Roman rule.

Polybius’ example also demonstrates for us the significance of the year 146 to the development of the Roman empire – the year at which his analysis stopped and Rome’s *ἀρχή* was undeniable. The establishment of the regularly administered *provincia* *Macedonia* in that year marks a watershed in Roman imperial development in the East as the first fixed *provincia.* Before this time there were *provinciae* in the region, but only in the traditional sense of areas of responsibility assigned to a magistrate, not regular areas administered by Roman officials on the basis of Roman legal and financial arrangements; these *provinciae* were typically large and loosely defined geographic regions where a senior Roman magistrate with *imperium* (i.e. a consul or praetor)

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11 Polyb. 2.19.2: ἐκ μὲν τῆς Ῥωμαίων ἐπαρχίας ἀσφαλῶς ἐπανήλθον (‘the Gauls retired safely from the Romans’ territory’); 3.27.4: μηδετέρως ἐν τοῖς ἄλληλων ἐπαρχίαις μηδὲν ἐπιτάττειν μηδ’ οἴκοδομείν δημοσίᾳ μηδὲ ξενολογεῖν μηδὲ (‘neither party is entitled to impose any contribution to build public buildings or enrol soldiers in the territory of the other’); 3.29.10 (same language); cf. 1.15.10: τὰς Συρακούσας ἐπολίσκουν οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι κατὰ πόδας … καὶ τὴν Ἐχέτλαν, ἐν μέσῃ κειμένην τῇ τῶν Συρακούσων καὶ Καρχηδονίων ἐπαρχίᾳ (‘the Romans at once besieged Syracuse … and Echetla, which lies between the Syracusan and Carthaginian provinces’); 7.4.2 (similar language); 1.17.5: Ἀγριγαντίτων πόλιν … βαρυτάτην ἄμα τῆς αὐτῶν ἐπαρχίας (‘Agrigentum … the most important city of the Carthaginians’ province’); 1.38.7 (identical language). Richardson, “Polybius’ View”, 5-6.

12 It might be noted too, that although it comes down to us incomplete, Polybius’ sixth Book on the constitution and machinery of the Roman ἀρχή contains no reference to the administration or arrangement of cities in the East. On this book, see F. Walbank, “The Construction of the Sixth Book of Polybius” *CQ* n.s. 4 (1954), 97-122; *idem, Polybius* (Berkeley 1972), 130-156; and more recently his “A Greek Looks at Rome: Polybius VI Revisited” *SCI* 17 (1998), 45-59.

13 See p. 38 for a traditional history of the provinces.
prosecuted a military campaign – in effect, they were theatres of war. T. Flamininus, for example, was assigned “Macedonia” as his provincia in 198 to wage war against Philip; in 198 M. Fulvius Nobilior was allotted “Aetolia” and the campaigns there while Cn. Manlius Vulso received “Asia” to combat Antiochus III; and in 168 L. Aemilius Paullus obtained the provincia Macedonia to defeat Perseus. In each case, the provincia dissolved with victory or the magistrate’s term of office, and his military force was removed and no personnel remained in the region. No regular, fixed administrative province was created. Before 146, the Romans’ imperium (‘rule’ or ‘power’) was ephemeral, with no fixed imperial institutions.

Yet before 146 – that is before the advent of the regular provincia – state documents demonstrate that Rome enjoyed an acknowledged power, influence, and even superiority in the East, as Polybius argued. By 196 the assembly and council of Preparathos procedurally heard issues relating to Rome second only to sacred affairs, even before those honoured with the right of first audience. Six years later, in a letter to

14 See p. 41 for a discussion of the term provincia.
15 Livy 32.8.4; cf. Livy 31.6.1.
16 Livy 37.50.5-8; cf. Polyb. 21.24.9 and 27.1.
17 Livy 44.17.4.
19 SIG 587, lines 22-30: δεδόθαι δ[έ] α[υτῷ καὶ γ[ῆς καὶ οίκιάς ἐγκτησαι καὶ προ[δ]ικίαν ἀνευ ἐπιδεικτῶν καὶ προεδριάν ἐν [τ]οῖς τῆς πόλεως ἀγώνας καὶ πρόσοδον πρό[ς] τὴν βουλὴν καὶ τὸν δήμον πρώτοις μετὰ τὰ ἱερὰ καὶ Ῥωμαίους καὶ ἀσφάλειαν καὶ πολ[έ]Μου καὶ εἰρήνης καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δος καὶ τοῖς ἄλ[λ]οις προξένοις ἐκ τῶν νόμων ὑπάρχει (’it is decreed that [Philoxenos the Athenian] shall have ownership of both land and building, enjoy priority of trial without the tithe, the privilege of first seat during the city festivals, and a hearing before the Boule and the Demos – among the first following sacred affairs and matters concerning the Romans – and he is to have safety both in war and in peace and whatever other things are given to proxenoi according to the laws’); cf. an Achaean measure that forbade the summoning of the general assembly except for matters of war and peace, or by written instruction from the Roman senate (Polyb. 22.10.11-12, 12.5-7; 23.5.14-17; Livy 39.33.7; with the observations of Gruen, HWCR 1.37).
the city of Heraclea ad Latmus, Lucius and Publius Scipio wrote candidly of “cities who gave us power over them to make decisions”,\textsuperscript{20} while in the settlement following the Achaean War (189), the Achaeans undertook to regard the ἀρχή and δυναστεία (power) of the Romans.\textsuperscript{21} Shortly before Macedonia became a regularly administered province, the Ionic and Hellespontine guilds of the Dionysiac Artists pointedly claimed to have made their decisions “according to the ordinances of the Roman people”.\textsuperscript{22} All throughout this period, of course, Roman commanders routinely established post-war regulations over defeated territories in their former provinciae – perhaps the most famous of which was Flamininus’ establishment of laws for the Thessalians in the 190s.\textsuperscript{23}

The literary evidence also demonstrates the sense among some Greeks that the Romans possessed a significant – and to some a dangerously superordinate – authority over the region at this time. The Seleucid king Antiochus III, for example, warned the Achaeans that the Romans looked to control the East and offered his help to remove their

\textsuperscript{20} RDGE 35, lines 10-12: συγκωρούμεν δὲ ὑμῖν τὴν τε ἐλευθερίαν καθότι καὶ [ταῖς ἄλλαις] πόλεσιν, ὅσα ἦμῖν τὴν ἐπιτροπὴν ἔδωκαν, ἔχουσιν ὡς τούτοις πάντα τὰ αὐτῶν πολιτείασθαι κατὰ τοὺς ὑμετέρους νόμους (‘and we grant freedom to you just as to other cities which have given us power to make decisions, while governing all their affairs by themselves according to their own laws’).

\textsuperscript{21} Pol. 21.32.2: ὁ δήμος ὁ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τὴν δυναστείαν τοῦ δῆμου τῶν Ῥωμαίων; cf. Livy 38.11.2: imperium maestatemque populi Romani gens Aetolorum conservanto sine dolo malo.

\textsuperscript{22} I.Iasos 152, lines 4-7: [ἀνεφ]οῦντες δὲ καὶ τὰ δεδο[μένα τῷ κ]οινῶι τῶν περὶ τὸν Διόνυσον τεχνιτῶν ὑπὸ [κρινομὲ]νον κατὰ τὰς [διαγραφὰς τῶν Ῥωμαίων τῶν κοινῶν τῶν ἐχειν]τῶν ἀσ[τας] σωτηρῶν ('[the !asians] preserved continually what was decreed by the Association of Dionysiac Artists, who made their decisions according to the [ordinances] of the [Romans, the saviours of the Association of Artists in Asia.']); cf. SIG\textsuperscript{I} 692, an Amphiictyonic decree of 130, in which the League grants various benefits to the Athenian guild of the Dionysiac Artists “unless something contrary is (decreed) by the Romans” (ἐὰν μὴ τι Ῥωμαίως υπεναντιόν ἦ, lines 60-61).

\textsuperscript{23} RDGE 10b, lines 14-19: [νεν]ικη[κ]ε]ιν κατὰ νόμους τῶν Θεσσαλῶν, οἷς [νό]μοις ἐστὶ τὰ [ν]ῦν χρῶν[τ]ι, ὡς νόμους Τίτος Κοίγκτιος ὑπάτος ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν δέκα προσβεβους γνώμης ἐδώκεν καὶ κατὰ δόγμα συγκλήτου (‘they had been victorious in the courts according to the present laws of the Thessalians, which Titus Quinctius, consul, gave on the counsel of his ten commissioners, and according to a decree of the Senate.’); cf. Polyb. 18.44; Livy 33.30 (2\textsuperscript{nd} Macedonian War); Polyb. 21.30.2-5, 32.1-14; Livy 38.9.9-11, 11.2-9 (Aetolian War); Pol. 21.42; Livy 38.38; RDGE 10b, lines 6-7 (Antiochene War); Livy 45.17-18 (3\textsuperscript{rd} Macedonian War).
yoke.²⁴ The Achaean statesman Lycortas gave a speech in 184 in which he conceded, after first acknowledging that his words had been less those of an ally or independent city than the bickering of a slave with his master, that real power (imperium) rested with the Romans.²⁵ By 167, even the republic of Rhodes was willing to advocate for king Perseus of Macedonia in an effort to restore balance to the region and avoid becoming the subject of an unchallengeable Roman imperium.²⁶

The famous speech of Callicrates before the Senate illustrates the reality and complexities of Roman rule during the “pre-provincial” era. According to Callicrates, there were two groups among the Greeks: the first (to which he belonged) felt that Rome’s requests should be carried out to the letter and that “neither laws, treaties, nor anything else should take precedence over Rome” – in effect conceding Roman hegemony; the second (and more popular party), by contrast, valued their own laws, treaties and measures above all else, including Roman requests.²⁷ It is clear from the

²⁴ Livy 35.16.2-4: “specioso titulo” inquit “uti uos, Romani, Graecarum ciuitatum liberandarum uideo; sed facta uesta orationi non conveniunt” (“I see that you Romans use the specious epithet of ‘Liberators of the cities of Greece.’ But your acts do not correspond to your words”); 35.32.10-11: Antiochus quamvis inclinatas Graeciae res restituere in pristinam dignitatem. Ea autem in libertate posita est, quae suis stat viribus, non ex alieno arbitrio pendet. (‘Antiochus will restore the affairs of Greece to their traditional dignity, however much they have deteriorated. This, however, rests in liberty, which stands by its own power, and does not depend on another’s will.”); cf. 35.33.8 (Achaeans invite Antiochus to fight for Greek liberty).

²⁵ Livy 39.37.13: re apud Achaeos precaria libertas, apud Romanos etiam imperium est; cf. Livy 35.31.14-16: et inter dicendi contentionem inconsultius eucteus proiecit tum quoque specie liberam Demetriadem esse, re uera omnia ad nutum Romanorum fieri (‘carried away by excitement he threw out the ill-advised remark that even then Demetrias was only free in appearance, in reality everything was at the nod of Rome.’).

²⁶ Cato ap. Gellius NA 6.3.16 (= ORF 8.164).

²⁷ Polyb. 24.9.2-5: δυνὴν γὰρ οὕτων αἱρέσεων κατὰ τὸ παρόν ἐν πάσις ταῖς δημοκρατικαῖς πολιτείαις, καὶ τῶν μὲν φασικόντων δεῖν ἀκολουθεῖν τοῖς γραφομένοις ύπὸ ‘Ῥωμαίων καὶ μήτε νόμον μήτε στήλην μῆτ’ ἄλλο μηθὲν προσφυγομένοι νομίζειν τῆς ‘Ῥωμαίων προσφυγών, τῶν δὲ τοὺς νόμους προφερομένους καὶ τοὺς ὀρκοὺς καὶ στήλας καὶ παρακαλοῦντων τὰ πλήθη μὴ ῥάδιως ταῦτα παραβαίνειν, ἀχαικωτέραν εἶναι παρὰ πολὺ ταύτην τὴν ὑπόθεσιν καὶ νικητικωτέραν ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς.
context that neither side is bound to follow Roman ordinances, though these seem to have been given frequently enough to cause debate among some members of the League. The speech itself demonstrates that, on the one hand, the Achaean poleis still operated normally—they are δημοκρατικαὶ πολιτείαι (democratic regimes), passing laws, making treaties, upholding both and disobeying Rome; and yet, on the other hand, that the Romans enjoyed a large measure of influence and power over them. In the end, both Aristaenus and Philopoemen, representatives of the two groups, acknowledged the pre-eminence (ὑπεροχή) and superiority (ὑπερβολή τῆς δυνάμεως) of the Romans. And so already three or four generations before the establishment of regularly administered fixed provinces—that is, institutional power—the Romans were said to enjoy supremacy and power in the region. Clearly the Romans could acquire, develop and exercise authority before the provinces, just as, we shall see, during the provincial era they could do so beyond the provinces.

28 Callicrates refers to the Greeks as δημοκρατικαὶ πολιτείαι (24.9.2), which pace Walbank (Commentary, s.v.) is not superfluous, but calls attention to their freedom (below, Chapter 2 §3.2); cf. 24.9.2 (continuance of νόμοι and στήλαι), 9.3 (continuance of νόμοι, δρκοι, στήλαι), 9.8 (maintaining the force of their νόμοι and δόγματα), 9.12-13 (Achaeans disobey Rome and destroy Messene). Kings, too, had to take due consideration of Rome to judge from a letter of Attalus II in which he is advised by one of his counsellors to do nothing without consulting Rome (Wells, RC 61, lines 8-10, 20-22).

29 Polyb. 24.11-13; 11.3: Ἡ Ῥωμαίων ὑπεροχής ἤδη τοῖς Ἑλληνικοῖς πράγμασιν ἐμπλεκομένης ὀλοσχέρως κατὰ τε τοὺς Φιλιππικοὺς καὶ τοὺς Ἀντιοχικοὺς καιροὺς (‘Now the pre-eminence of the Romans was completely caught up in Greek affairs during the wars with Philip and Antiochus ’); 24.13.1: ὁ δὲ Φιλοποίημα οὐκ ἐπὶ τοιοῦτον ἔρη δεὶν ἀμαβίαν αὐτὸν κατὰ γνώσειν ὧστε τὸ μὴ δύνασται μετείν μήτε τὴν διάφοραν τοῦ πολιτεύματος τῶν Ῥωμαίων καὶ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν μήτε τὴν ὑπερβολήν τῆς δυνάμεως (‘Philopoemen replied that they must not think of him as so foolish that he can measure neither the difference between the Roman and Achaean states nor the superior power of the former’).
1.2 – COMPLICATIONS WITH PROVINCIAE

1.2.1: History and Meaning of the Provinciae

That the Romans came to organize their rule with a provincial system – that is to say, an administrative and legal system whose primary unit was the provincia – has long been recognized by modern scholars.30 Ancient authors recognized the same, particularly by the Late Republic: Cicero, for example, praised Pompey for expanding nostrum imperium by adding three new provinces;31 while Augustus celebrated “extending the borders of all the provinciae of the Roman people that neighbored nations not subject to our imperium”.32 In this sense, scholars often speak of ‘provincialization’ – an assumed standardized process that transformed a conquered territory into an administrative region within the Roman empire – and assign discrete dates to the moment of creation and construct a history.

In this historical narrative, the earliest provinces had been established in the West: Sicily (241) and Sardinia (237) shortly after the First Punic War, and the two Spanish

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30 The bibliography of provincial studies is immense, I list here some of the major contributions on the subject, in chronological order: E. Person, Essai sur l'administration des provinces romaines sous la république (Paris 1878); J. Marquardt, Römische Staatsverwaltung, 5 vols (Leipzig 1881-1884), esp. v.1; W.T. Arnold, The Roman System of Provincial Administration to the Accession of Constantine the Great (Oxford 1906); Th. Mommsen, Römische Geschichte, 5 vols (Berlin 1923-27), esp. vol. 5 [republished in English, with additional notes, as The Provinces of the Roman Empire from Caesar to Diocletian (London 1909); G.H. Stevenson, Roman Provincial Administration till the Age of the Antonines (Oxford 1939); W. Dahlheim, Gewalt und Herrschaft (Berlin, 1977); J.Richardson, Hispaniae: Spain and the Development of Roman Imperialism 218-82 BC (Cambridge 1986); A. Lintott, Imperium Romanum (Oxford 1993); R. Schulz, Herrschaft und Regierung (Munich 1997); J. Richardson, The Language of Empire (Cambridge 2008).

31 Cic. Prov. cos. 31: ut Asia, quae imperium antea nostrum terminabat nunc tribus novis provinciis ipsa cingatur ('such that Asia, which formed the border of our empire previously, is now itself surrounded by three new provinces'); contra Richardson, Language of Empire, who does not see any sense of territorial empire in Cicero’s writings.

32 Res Gest. 26: Omnium provinciarum populi Romam quibus finitimae fuerunt gentes quae non parerent imperio nostro fines auxi.
provinces (Hither and Farther; 197) as a consequence of the war against Hannibal. 33

There follows a fifty year gap before the Romans established another province, this time in the East, where warfare had been a nearly annual event since the late third century, including three large scale wars against the Antigonid and Seleucid dynasties and their allies. 34 As noted already, Macedonia became a fixed province in 146 (perhaps even a year or two earlier), as also did Africa after the destruction of Carthage by Scipio Africanus Aemilianus that year; 35 the provincia Asia was established in the aftermath of the five year war against Aristonicus (ca. 128). 36 Cilicia, long a pirate stronghold, is described as a ‘praetorian province’ (ἐπαρχεία στρατηγική) in the lex de provinciis praetoris of 101/100, but is generally considered to have become a regularly administered province sometime in the first quarter of the first century, when we can observe a more steady pattern of magistrates. 37 Cyrene appears to have begun receiving regular Roman magistrates in 74, twenty-two years after it had been bequeathed to the

33 Sicily: Polyb. 1.62.8-63.3; Zonar. 8.17.4; App. Sic. 2.6. Sardinia & Corsica: Polyb. 1.88.8, 10; 3.10.1-3; Zonar. 8.18.3; Livy 21.1.5; Eutrop. 3.2; Sininius Capito ap. Festus s.v. Sardi venales p. 430; Solinus 5.1; Walbank, Comm. Polyb. 1.149-150; Brennan, PRR, 89-93. Spain (divided into Nearer [Certerior] and Farther [Ulterior]): Livy. 32.28.11; cf. Richardson, Hispaniae (1986), 73-125.

34 Second Macedonian War (201-196), the Antiochene War (192-189), and the Third Macedonian War (172-168). See: Gruen, HWCR (Berkeley, 1984), esp. vol. II; Sherwin-White, RFPE (London, 1984); more recently A. Eckstein, Rome Enters the Greek East (Oxford, 2008), for a Realist perspective.

35 Macedonia: Paus. 7.16.9-10; cf. App. Mith. 39, 58; Zonar. 9.31.6; RDGE 43 (Greece left free). Africa: Cic. de leg. 2.51; Verr. 2.2.86; Livy Per. 51; Pliny N.H. 5.25; App. Pun. 54; lex agr., lines 77, 81; MRR I, 467.

36 Asia: Livy Per. 59; Strabo 14.1.38; Just. 37.1.2; Eutrop. 4.20 ; I.Metrop; Magie, RRAM I, 147-158; Sherwin-White, RFPE, 80-92; Gruen, HWCR II, 592-608. In the West, a province of Gallia Narbonensis was likely established sometime after the victory over the Aedui in 121, though there is no clear indication it was a fixed provincia before Caesar (Suet. Jul. 25; Dio 40.43; cf. Caes. B.Gal. 1.45). See below, n. 74.

Roman people by Ptolemy Apion, while Bithynia was probably regularly administered in the same year, after a similar bequest from Nicomedes IV.\(^{38}\) In 68, Crete became a regularly administered territory,\(^{39}\) and owing to the supreme efforts of Cn. Pompeius Magnus by the end of the decade much of the land of the eastern Mediterranean was pacified; the kingdom of Pontus was added to Bithynia, creating a single *provincia* of Pontus-Bithynia, while Syria was regarded as a separate *provincia* under his post-war arrangements.\(^{40}\) Shortly thereafter Cyprus was removed from Ptolemy and assigned to a separate magistrate as a *provincia* – though it seems to have been regularly administered by the magistrate in charge of Cilicia – before it seems to have been given back to the Egyptian kingdom sometime during the 40s.\(^{41}\) Finally, the conquests and consolidations

\(^{38}\) Cyrene: Sall. Hist. 2.43; App. B.Civ. 1.111; cf. Livy Per. 70. Bithynia: App. Mith. 71; Livy Per. 93; Eutrop. 6.6; cf. Sall. Hist. 4.69.13, purportedly a letter of Mithridates VI disputing the validity of Nicomedes’ will.

\(^{39}\) Vell. Pat. 2.34.1; 38.6; Fest. Brev. 7.1; Oros. 6.4.2; Just. 39.4.3; Livy Per. 100; Cic. Flacc. 30, 100.

\(^{40}\) Pontus: Strabo 12.3.31 (though Marc Antony bestowed many of the cities of the former kingdom to minor kings and temple communities after 39 BCE – Strabo 12.3.14; Cass. Dio. 49.32-33). The province seems to have been called simply Bithynia until 63 the abdication of king Polemo II in 63 CE (G. Wesch-Klein, “Bithynia, Pontus et Bithynia, Bithynia et Pontus – ein Provinznamen im Wandel der Zeit” ZPE 136 (2001), 251-256 with SEG LI 1717); on the province of Bithynia-Pontus, see recently J. Majbom Madsen, *Eager to be Roman: Greek Responses to Roman Rule in Pontus and Bithynia* (London 2009), esp. 27-58. Syria: Cic., Prov. cons.12. Crete was also probably separately administered: Just. 39.5.3.

\(^{41}\) The former Ptolemaic possession of Cyprus was confiscated on a law of the Roman people, who also appointed M. Porcius Cato to carry out some sort of arrangement on the island (Livy Per. 104; Dio 38.30.5; Vell. Pat. 2.38.6; App. B.Civ. 2.23; Just. 40. P. Lentulus Spinther also appears to have made regulations for the province as Cicero refers to a *lex Lentula* (Cic. Fam. 13.48; below, n. 66). In 56 (Cic. Fam 1.7.4) and 51 (Cic. Att. 5.21.6-7; 6.2.9) the island was administered by the proconsuls of Cilicia, and this was probably normally the case after 56. According to Dio (42.35.5), Caesar gave the island to Egypt in 47, however Strabo (14.6.6) says that Marc Antony gave it to Cleopatra around 43 or 42. See S. Oost, “Cato Uticensis and the Annexation of Cyprus” *CPh* 50 (1955), 98-112; A.J. Marshall, “Cicero’s Letter to Cyprus” *Phoenix* 18 (1964), 205-211; E. Badian, “M. Porcius Cato and the Annexation and Early Administration of Cyprus”, *JRS* 55 (1965), 110-121.
under Augustus led to the annual administration of another four provinces in the East: Egypt (30), Achaea (27), Galatia (25) and Judaea (6). Such is a traditional history of the accretion of Roman provinces down to the death of Augustus. Yet as alluded to above, provincia did not always describe a fixed and regularly managed administrative-territorial unit (a province in the more modern sense) and presenting the provinces this way obscures the Romans’ complex and evolving notion of provincia and overly structures their imperial state. The traditional sense of provincia was broadly ‘an area of competence’, which in the political realm meant a magistrate’s task or sphere of responsibility and not necessarily an annually administered territory outside of Rome – a quaestor, for example, might be assigned the aerarium (treasury) as his provincia, and praetors were regularly allotted the urbana (city of Rome), and sometimes a naval fleet or ‘the war against So-and-So’. Part of the

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42 Egypt: Vell. Pat. 2.39.2; Tac. Ann. 2.59; Dio 51.17.1-3; Achaea: Dio 53.12.4; Strabo 17.3.25; cf. Paus. 7.16.7; Kallet-Marx, Hegemony, 42-56. Galatia: Dio 53.26; Strabo 12.5.2; S. Mitchell, Anatolia: Land, Men, and Gods in Asia Minor (Oxford 1993), I. 60-69 (in 6 BCE Paphlagonia was added to the province of Galatia: Strabo 12.3.41). Judaea: Joseph. AJ 17.355; BJ 2.111-113, 117; Dio 55.27.6.

43 Etymological arguments for the original meaning of the term have proven inadequate and unconvincing. The ancient etymologies suggested by Festus (283 Lindsay: provinciae appellantur quod populus Romanus eas provicit, id est ante vicit), Donatus (Phorm. ad 22-24: acquisitiae bello longe ab Italia regiones provinciae dictae a porro et vicendo) and Isidore (Orig. 14.5.19: procul postitas regiones provincias appellaverunt) are unlikely. Modern suggestions include i) derivation from vincia, which itself would be the root of the legal term vindicia; ii) a development from *provincus, as the root spatial noun vicinus plus the prefix *prov-, related to the proto-German *fro-/*frau-/*frawn- (lordship); iii) a noun formed from *provinquus, itself derived from the spatial ending -inquus and the radical *prov, perhaps meaning law (‘one who speaks laws’), or *provus from *praev-, *pri- (thus, ‘a unique space’); iv) a syncopation of the syntagm pro vindicia (thus, ‘a place laid claim to’). See G. Wessenberg, RE 23 (1922) coll. 996-998, s.v. “provincia” III; J.M. Bertrand, “A propos du mot provincia: étude sur les modes d’élaboration du language politique’, Journal des Savants 1989, esp. 196-200; Richardson, Hispaniae (Cambridge, 1986), 5-10.

44 lex agr. line 46; Livy 30.40.13; lex Acilia, line 68; lex XX quaest. col. I, line 2 (aerarium); Livy 24.9.5 (urbana); Livy 30.43.1; 42.48.2; 43.11.2; 44.1.3 (fleet); Livy 24.44.1; 25.3.3 (bellum cum Hannibale).
difficulty in any discussion of the Roman provinces and the structure of the Romans state
is, therefore, the broad meaning of the term *provincia*.

The semantic range of the word is fully evident in the *lex de provinciis praetorii*
(101/100), whose purpose is not entirely clear but was related to combating the problem
of piracy along the Cilician coast.45 In this law, *provincia* (translated into Greek as
*ἐπαρχεία*) describes not only the existing regularly assigned provinces of Macedonia and
Asia,46 but also the smaller areas in the Chaenic Chersonesus and Lycaonia associated
with them,47 and more broadly any territory assigned to a magistrate.48 In the Late
Republic, Cicero could still use *provincia* when speaking of the city of Rome, the sea, the
domestic judiciary as well as foreign territories not assigned to a magistrate.49 Even
authors of the Principate still had broad understandings of *provincia*: Velleius
Paterculus, writing under the emperor Tiberius, included in his history of Rome “a brief
account of the races and nations which were reduced to provinces and made tributary to
Rome”, which included Aetolia, Gallograecia, Illyria, and the Scordisci, among others,

45 See J.-L. Ferrary, “Recherches sur la législation de Saturninus et de Glaucia” *MEFRA* 89
(1977), 619-660.

lines 22-27 (p. 260-261).

47 Cnidos, col. III, line 25; IV, line 10.

48 Cnidos col. III, lines 6-7. This broad range in meaning has made it difficult for modern
historians to interpret the reference to an *ἐπαρχεία Κιλικία* (Cnidos III, line 37). The original editors of the
Cnidos text assumed that this *lex* formally created the *provincia Cilicia*, originally naming it the *lex de*
*provincia Cilicia* (Hassal, Reynolds & Crawford, *JRS* 64 [1974], 211; cf. Harris, *War and Imperialism*
[Oxford, 1979], 153 n. 3). Kallet-Marx, *Hegemony*, 233-235, has strongly argued against assuming the
creation of any kind of formal province, observing that there is no mention of tribute and explicit references
that the law was to have no effect on neighbouring kings and their subjects. On the whole, the discussion
above should help us contextualize the reference and see in it the possibility of a red herring: the Romans
themselves did not necessarily have the same civic definition as moderns.

49 *Verr.* 2.1.104; *Mur.* 41; *Vat.* 12; *Scaur.* 23; Richardson, *Language of Empire*, 79-81, cf. pp. 94
(Caesar), 100 (Sallust), 101 (Varro and Nepos).
and generally seems to have meant a conquered territory;\textsuperscript{50} by this loose definition Sicily is reckoned a \textit{provincia} starting under M. Claudius Marcellus (211), Aetolia after M. Fulvius Nobilior (189), Macedonia with L. Aemilius Paullus (167), and Greece with L. Mummius (146).\textsuperscript{51}

The Roman state’s recognition of a \textit{provincia} as a permanent piece of its imperial infrastructure outside Rome does not fully emerge until the Sullan era. As dictator in 81, L. Cornelius Sulla passed a law creating eight standing courts (\textit{quaestiones perpetuae}) at Rome, which meant that there were precisely as many domestic \textit{provinciae} as annually elected praetors and that the foreign \textit{provinciae} were assigned to them following their year in office.\textsuperscript{52} By proroguing a magistrate to assign him a province, Sulla’s legislation now presupposed a \textit{provincia} to exist before and without a magistrate; that is, rather than an elected magistrate being allotted a newly created \textit{provincia}, his power was extended beyond his elected year so as to fill the role of managing part of the larger imperial state (a province).\textsuperscript{53} Richardson has recently demonstrated that this conception of standing administrative provincial units appears in the literature of the Late Republic, aptly represented by Cicero’s complaint in 50 that some \textit{provinciae} have been left without anyone in command (\textit{sine imperio}) by the actions of the tribune C. Scribonius Curio.\textsuperscript{54}

\textsuperscript{50} Vell. Pat. 2.38: \textit{quae cuiusque ductu gens ac natio redacta in formulam provinciae stipendiaria facta sit.}

\textsuperscript{51} Vell. Pat. 2.38-39.

\textsuperscript{52} The same was not true for consuls, whose \textit{provinciae} were chosen six months before they entered office according to the \textit{lex Sempronia} (below, n. 127). \textit{Lex Cornelia}: Cic. \textit{Verr.} 1.37, 47-49; 2.2.77; Cluent. 55; Vel. Pat. 2.32.3; Tac. \textit{Ann.} 11.22.

\textsuperscript{53} Later the \textit{lex Pompeia} of 52 required a five-year span between one’s magistracy and taking up a \textit{provincia} (below n. 129).

\textsuperscript{54} Cic. \textit{Att.} 7.7.5: \textit{senatum bonum putas per quem sine imperio provinciae sunt (numquam enim Curio sustinuisset, si cum eo agi coeptum esset; quam sententiam senatus sequi noluit; ex quo factum est ut Caesari non succederetur)}; Richardson, \textit{Language of Empire}, 63-116, esp. 79-85.
1.2.1: Formation and Inconsistency in Standards

Above all, still down to the period of the Civil Wars there is little evidence for a provincia as a set of legal or administrative norms (e.g. forma provinciae). Indeed the central obstacle when discussing the Roman provinces and the central complication to our understanding of them – really a fundamental quandary of the Roman imperial state – is the inconsistency in the standards for the arrangement of a province.\(^{55}\) In neither their establishment nor their development can we observe a regular procedure or framework: \textit{de façon nullement systématique}.\(^{56}\) Modern historians have tried to patchwork together a rational system from the surviving evidence, but in many ways each province was idiosyncratic, and provinciae, like the term itself, could be enigmatic and equivocal entities. Their existence—and therefore the existence of a structured Roman rule in a given region—is not always clear, and their arrangement—that is, the mechanism of Roman rule—was by no means predictable, regular, or consistent.

According to Appian, as early as 146 the Senate had decreed that “a praetor should be sent out from Rome annually” to the province of Africa, while the \textit{lex provinciis praetoriis} at the end of the century assumes that the magistrate assigned Macedonia will be replaced annually. In this sense, a provincia can be said to be ‘fixed’.\(^{57}\) But there is no evidence that these areas of competency followed a standard

\(^{55}\) So Lintott, \textit{Imp. Rom.}, 28: “a greater stability of organization is sometimes assumed than is warranted by the evidence.”


\(^{57}\) App. \textit{Pun.} 54: στρατηγὸν ἐτήσιον ἀντίς ἐκ Ὀλίμπις ἐπιπέμπειν ἔκριναν (‘[After defeating Carthage in 146] the Senate decided that a praetor should be sent from Rome annually’); \textit{lex prov. praet.} Cnidos IV, lines 17-20: ὁ πλεῖος τε καθ’ ἐκαστὸν ἐνιαυτὸν ἔχοντο τῇ ἐλάσσω ἐν ἐκείνοις τοῖς τόποις πρὸ το[6] αὐτῶι ἐτερον διαδέχασθαι ἡμερῶν ἐξήκοντα ἐστὶ (‘let this man [viz. the magistrate assigned Macedonia] be in those places annually no less than sixty days before another replaces him’); cf. \textit{SIG}^2 700, lines 31-33
pattern, and in many cases – as we have seen – it is difficult even to identify these fixed *provinciae* or to speak of their creation.58 This is because in many instances, particularly early in the provincial era, what would become a fixed *provincia* followed the same procedure as any post-war settlement: the Roman commander made arrangements in a now-settled territory with the support and advice of a ten man commission (*decem legati*) sent from the Senate, sometimes carrying specific orders, the terms of which settlement were perhaps submitted for senatorial review upon his return to Rome. Livy describes Aemilius Paullus’ settlement of Macedonia in 167 as a *formula* (shape; arrangement) and Velleius writes of nations *redacta in formulam provinciae* (reduced to the shape of a province), perhaps reflecting a quasi-technical language of the Late Republic.59 Regardless, though, of the precise language, this was the procedure following the victories over Philip V (196), Antiochus III (189), Perseus (167), the Achaean (146), the Numantines in Spain (133), and the slaves in Sicily (132), while it is also explicitly attested for the settlements of the fixed provinces of Africa (146), Asia (129), Egypt (81), and was almost certainly done for many others.60 This close similarity between post-war

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58 See above on Velleius Paterculus, above p. 42. Ferrary, “Provinces, magistratures et lois” [forthcoming] has argued that the question of a ‘creation’ is “une faux problème, ou du moins un problème mal posé”.


60 Second Macedonian War: Polyb. 18.42.5; 44.1; *SIG* 591, lines 68-78; *RDGE* 9, lines 51-54; Antiochene War: Polyb. 21.24.9; Livy 37.55.7; *RDGE* 10b, line 6; Third Macedonian War: Livy 45.17-18; 26.15; 29-30; 31.1; 32.7 (*mandata* 45.18.1, 7, 8); Achaean: Cic. *Att.* 13.4-6, 30-33; Numantines: App. *Hisp.* 99; Sicilian Slave Revolt: Cic. *Verr.* 2.2.90; *provincia Africa: lex agr.* lines 54-55, 77; App. *Pun.* 54;
settlements and provincial settlements is not surprising given the martial origins of
domina discussed above, but all the same it is worth highlighting to remind us of the
difficulty in a) using this procedural model to identify and date a fixed province, but also
b) assuming that there was a clear distinction for the Romans between a martial and
institutional provincia. In their settlement of what became fixed provinciae these
commanders and legati were determining relationships between Rome and various other
states in the same mould they had earlier; in this sense the distinction between an ad-hoc
magistrate’s task and a fixed province might simply have been the regularity with which
that area was assigned over the course of time.

Sometimes these post-war/provincial arrangements might be inscribed (or
described) as a law (lex)—which modern historians regularly point to as the moment of a
province’s creation. This was certainly the case in Africa, where a lex Livia empowered
decemviri to carry out a settlement;\(^{61}\) and Bithynia, where Pompey’s arrangements were
grouped into a lex Pompeia;\(^{62}\) and Cyprus, which was removed by a law of the populus
Romanus (58) from the Ptolemaic king and given to M. Porcius Cato to arrange.\(^{63}\) It is

\(^{61}\) lex agr., line 81: extraque eum agrum locum, ubei oppidum Cart[hago] fuit quondam, extraqu[e] eum agrum locum, quem X virei, qui ex {h.}l. Livi facti el creati fuerunt, Uticensibus reliquerunt adsignaverunt (‘apart from that land or territory, where the town of Carthage once was, and
apart from the land and territory that the decemvirs, who had been appointed and created by that lex Livia,
duly delivered and assigned to the people of Utica’); cf. lines 77-78; App. Pun. 54: δέκα δὲ σφῶν αὐτῶν ἡ
βουλὴ τοὺς ἀριστοὺς ἔπεμψε διαθησομένους λιβύην μέτα Σκηπίων ἐκ τοῦ Ῥωμαίων συμφέρον ... καὶ
στρατηγὸν ἔτησιον αὐτοῖς ἀκρίβως ἐπιπεμεῖν ἔκριται (‘The Senate sent ten of the noblest of their own
number to arrange the affairs of Africa in conjunction with Scipio, to the advantage of Rome ... and they
decided that a praetor should be sent from Rome yearly [to govern the country].’).

\(^{62}\) Lex Pompeia: Pliny Epist. 10.79, 80, 112, 114, 115; cf. Dio Cass. 36/7.20.2; Strabo 12.3.1.

\(^{63}\) Livy Per. 104: lege lata de redigenda in provinciae formam Cypro et publicana pecunia regia
M. Catoni administration eius rei mandata est (‘When a law was passed about reducing Cyprus into the
form of a province and the public confiscation of the royal funds, M. Cato was assigned to administer the
matter’); Cic. Sest. 62: regno enim iam publicato, de ipso Catone erat nominatim rogatum (‘once the
important, though, to state clearly that the surviving evidence cannot support the once common notion of a standard *lex provinciae* (‘law of the province’), which modern historians believe established a comprehensive, if inchoate, fundamental legal-administrative system in a province,\(^{64}\) which under the Empire was expressed by the phrase *redacta forma provinciae*.\(^{65}\) With the exception of the *lex Pompeia*, the standard examples of such provincial constitutions all date after the inauguration of a province’s regular administration. Cyprus, for example, is thought to have been provincialized by a *lex Lentuli* (57) mentioned in a letter of Cicero, but these regulations could only have been laid down after the island was arranged by M. Porcius Cato in 58;\(^{66}\) undoubtedly Sicily had been administered for over a century before Rupillius’ settlement in 132 (the

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\(^{65}\) Ulpian *lib. X de off. procos.* (Dig. 48.22.71): *in insulam relegare praesides provinciae possunt, sic tamen, ut, si quidem insulam sub se habeant (id est ad eius provinciae formam pertinentem, quam administrant), et eam specialiter insulam adsignare possint inque eam relegare* (‘governors of a province can relegate to an island, but only if they have an island under their control (that is pertaining to the arrangement of the province that they are administering), and they can specially assign this island and relegate someone to it.’).

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\(^{66}\) Cic. *Fam.* 13.48: *quae, ut spero, facilius consequare, si et P. Lentuli, necessari tui, legem et ea quae a me constituta sunt sequi vulesitis* (‘You will, I hope, secure [your reputation] with greater ease if you decide to follow the law of your connexion Publius Lentulus, and the regulations made by myself’); cf. *Att.* 5.21.6.
so-called *lex Rupilia*),\(^{67}\) while Asia had been annually administered for over fifty years before Sulla’s post-Mithridatic arrangement (*lex Cornelia*).\(^{68}\)

These Republican *leges*, moreover, even granted their fragmentary state, do not demonstrate the consistency of content or comprehensive extent we might expect of a standard provincial charter, as for a *municipium*.\(^{69}\) Instead, in these provincial laws we find a diverse hodgepodge of regulations, addressing narrow issues of law or administration: Rupillus’ regulations in Sicily concerned judicial procedure for Romans and locals, Sulla’s in Asia seem to have been about regulating local elections, and Lentulus’ in Cyprus perhaps about the rights of the local business class.\(^{70}\) Cicero,

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\(^{67}\) Cic. Verr. 2.2.32 (text at n. 313), 90, 125; Val. Max. 6.9.8. It is worth noting that according to Cicero (Verr. 2.2.32), this was not a law *per se*, but rather “called a law by the Sicilians” (*quam illi [sc. Sicilii] legem Rupiliam vocant,*); according to a scholiast on the passage, it was passed by a *senatus consultum* (Schol. Gron. B.391: *qui [sc. Rupilius] ex senatus consulto iura Siculis constituerat*).

\(^{68}\) RDGE 65, frg. D, line 83; cf. IGRP IV 1188. A recently published inscription from Pergamum refers to ‘a council established by Roman legislation’: SEG L 1211 lines 11-15: *μεταπεσόντων τε τῶν πραγμάτων εἰς δημοκρατίαν [καὶ] τοῦ δῆμου συνεδρίας εἰροτονήσαντος τῶν ἁρίστων ἀνδρῶν κατεσκληρύνων καὶ Μηνυδώρως καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἐν τοίς κατὰ τὴν Ῥωμαίικὴν νομοθεσίαν ὑπελευθέρωσις γενόμενος διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὴν πατρίδα εὐνοιαν πολλὰ τῶν συμφερόντων συνήγαγον (‘After the governing regime turned into a democracy and the people elected councilors from the best men, Menodoros was chosen, and afterwards, when serving in the *bouleterion* established according to Roman legislation, he accomplished many things of advantage for the state owing to his goodwill toward the country’). B. Dreyer (*I.Metropolis*, p. 84, n. 333) suggests this is a *lex Aquillia*, but M. Wörle (“Pergamon um 133 v. Chr.” Chiron 30 [2000], 565-571; cf. id., *Stadt und Fest im kaiserzeitlichen Kleinasiens* [Munich, 1988], 16 n. 111, and p. 96), followed by Brixe (*Bull.Ép.* 2000, no. 366), rightly argued was a provisionary council established by legates sent out in 132 to evaluate Attalus III’s bequest; cf. C. Brélaz, *La Sécurité publique en Asie Mineure* (Basel, 2005), 24-25, n. 20.

\(^{69}\) Municipal charters (e.g.); *lex municipii Tarentini* (Crawford, RS no. 15), *lex Iulia municipalis* (Crawford, RS no. 24), *lex Coloniae Genetiviae Ursonensis* (Crawford, RS no. 25); *lex Rubria e Gallia Cisalpina* (Crawford, RS no. 28); cf. R. Sherk, *The Municipal Decrees of the Roman West* (Buffalo 1970); Lintott, *Imp.Rom.*, 132-145.

\(^{70}\) Cicero mentions nothing of the content of the *lex Lentuli* in his letter to Spinther, but Badian (“Cato and the Annexation and Early Administration of Cyprus”, 115) has suggested that it might have been the basis for sending his legate, Q. Volusius, to administer Cyprus since “those Cypriots who do business there cannot be called out from the island”; Cic. *Att.* 5.21.6: *Q. Volusium ... nisi in Cyprum ut ibi pauculos dies esset, ne cives Romani pauci qui ilic negotiantur ius sibi dictum negarent; nam evocari ex insula Cyprius non licet* (‘I have sent Q. Volusium into Cyprus to pass a few days there so that the few Roman citizens who do business there are not denied the right given them: for it is not permitted to call out Cypriots from the island.’).
furthermore, as provincial magistrate of Cilicia in 51/50, held Lentulus’ law on the same level as his own gubernatorial regulations (constituta), apparently not regarding the *lex Lentuli* to be of greater legal status.\(^{71}\) On the other hand, in the *lex Pompeia* we have broad and important regulations concerning the organization of local communities, some of which survived into the early second century CE.\(^{72}\) One needs to be careful in generalizing from these particular civic regulations, however. Not only was much about Pompey’s settlement of the East novel, but also such arrangements would have been essential in the Pontic hinterland – a territory so rural and incongruous with the Roman imperial system that Pompey had to create eleven new regional cities for provincial government; such arrangements would have been unnecessary in the Hellenized East.\(^{73}\)

While examples like the *lex Pompeia* illustrate a discrete set of provincial regulations (albeit inchoate and *ad hoc*) and a clear point in time for provincial creation, in other cases, such as Cilicia, Cyrene and Achaea, the evidence suggests a more dynamic and less stable developmental *process*, undermining the notion of a fixed province.\(^{74}\) Cilicia, for example, after being assigned as part of M. Antonius’ *provincia* against the

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\(^{71}\) *Cic. Fam.* 13.48 (text at n.66).

\(^{72}\) Sources above, n. 62. The *lex Pompeia* had established regulations for the organization of communities, including holding local office, entry into the senate, expulsion and citizenship. Pliny implies that many of these regulations were still in effect in Bithynia during his governorship in 112 CE, however it is clear from his letters that the rules for holding a local magistracy had since been overridden by an *edictio divi Augusti* (*Epist.* 10.78), while those that outlawed payment by *adscripti* to the Senate (*pecuniam dare*) had fallen into abeyance (10.112).

\(^{73}\) Strabo 12.3.1; cf. Magie RRAM II.1232-33, n.35; Sherwin-White, *RFPE*, 230; Majbom Madsen, *Eager to be Roman*, 29-34. Like Pontus, Egypt too had no tradition of polis culture (‘unacquainted with laws and ignorant of officials’, Tac. *Hist.* 1.11), which was likely one of the reasons it was not provincialized in 81; e.g. Sherwin-White, *RFPE*, 266-267.

\(^{74}\) Compare this with the *provincia Gallia* in the West. See the differing views in Badian, “Notes on Provincia Gallia in the Late Republic” in *Mélanges d’archéologie et d’histoire offerts à André Piganiol* (Paris 1966), 901-918 and C. Ebel, *Transalpine Gaul: The Emergence of a Roman Province* (Leiden 1976), 93.
pirates in 102, was not included amongst the provinces of 101, but was described as an ἐπαρχεία in the lex de provinciis praetorii of 100, at which point some modern scholars hold that it became a province. Yet there is no evidence for a magistrate or decem legati settling the territory (reference to which one would have expected in the lex of 101/100), nor for the regular administration of the province by Roman magistrates thereafter. One finds the same problem in the former kingdom of Cyrene, which, although bequeathed to Rome in 96, was first assigned as a provincia to P. Cornelius Lentulus Marcellinus in 75/74 with the extraordinary designation of quaestor pro praetore. Marcellinus’ unusual position and the fact that we cannot identify any provincial magistrate in the territory until one of Pompey’s legates, Cn. Lentulus Marcellinus, administered it pro praetore, has led some to argue that it was not routinely administered until 67, or even later. The status of Achaea, meanwhile, has long been the subject of scholarly dispute, and the evidence is so unclear that a widely accepted hypothesis holds that in 148 it was partly provincialized – whatever that means – and administered by the governor of Macedonia. Even in cases like Africa provincia, where

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75 Since only the magistrates of Asia and Macedonia were required to swear loyalty oaths to the legislation (Delphi, frg. C, lines 8-10) it is assumed there was no magistrate in 101.

76 At best we can suppose the presence of two magistrates (L. Cornelius Sulla in 98/7 or 93/2 and Q. Oppius in 88) in the province before Cn. Cornelius Dolabella in 80, and only three before Cn. Cornelius Lentulus Spinther in 56. Sources in Broughton MRR.

77 Sall. Hist. 2.43; App. BC 1.111; Broughton, MRR II.97 with p. 100 n.4. Provinces were typically held by consuls or praetors, the latter often with imperium pro consule (below, p. 62).


79 S. Accame, Il dominio romano (Rome 1946); E. Badian, Roman Imperialism in the Late Republic (Ithaca 1968), 21; E. Will, Histoire politique du monde hellénistique (Nancy 1967), II.396-400; Ferrary, Philhélienisme, 199-209; D. Baronowski, “Greece after 146 B.C.: Provincial Status and Roman Tribute” in J.Fossey, ed., ΣΥΝΕΣΦΟΡΑ McGill (Amsterdam, 1987), 125-138. This position, however, has
we know a commission was sent and some early settlement was made in 146, the
information is so sparse that we cannot confirm the presence of an annual magistrate or
any Roman action in the province before the *lex agraria* of 111.

This inconsistency in the development and regulations of fixed *provinciae* is
characteristic of the broader irregularity of Roman rule. A large reason for this was the
Romans' propensity to preserve local institutions as far as possible, even after
establishing a fixed province the Romans rarely looked to change a local practice – nor
could they, given the paucity of assets assigned to a *provincia* (below) – if it could be
adapted to their own rule, or if they could reasonably live with the local system. In
Sicily, for example, the provincial tax system followed the local system that had been in
place since the rule of King Hiero II (275-215), known as the *lex Hieronica*.80 Taxes in
Asia likewise continued to be levied and collected on a local basis until the *lex*
*Sempronia* (123), which recent evidence suggests also followed the traditional Attalid
arrangements on at least import duties (*portoria*), though Cicero claims that even the

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80 Cic. *Verr.* 2.3.13; 5.49-50; Pritchard, “Cicero and the Lex Hieronica”, *Historia* 19 (1970), 352-368; Lintott, *Imp. Rom.* 75-76. Note that in the settlement of Macedonia in 168 the Romans collected half the taxes previously paid to the king, which suggests that they followed the existing Antigonid system in its collection (Livy 45.29.4; cf. Richardson, “Administration of Empire”, 587. Cicero himself observed the brilliance of the Roman system of leaving existing tax codes in tact to earn the favour of provincial communities (*Verr.* 2.3.14): *videte nunc maiorum sapientiam, qui cum Siciliam ... ad rem publicam adiuxissent, tanta cura Siculos tueri ac retinere voluerunt ut non modo eorum agris vectigal novum nullum imponerent, sed ne legem quidem venditionis decumarum neve vendundii aut tempus aut locum commutarent, ut certo tempore anni, ut ibidem in Sicilia, denique ut lege Hieronica venderent* (‘See now the wisdom of our ancestors, who, when they had added Sicily ... to the republic, were so careful to defend and retain them in their allegiance that they not only imposed no new tax upon their lands, but did not even alter the law of putting up for sale the tithe contracts, or the time or place of selling them, such that they were put up for sale at the regular time of year, still in Sicily, and at last in every respect of the law of Hiero’).
system in his day pre-dated the Romans.\textsuperscript{81} In fact a surviving senatus consultum of 132 demonstrates the Senate’s propensity to follow native systems: after learning that King Attalus III of Pergamum had bequeathed his kingdom to the Roman people, all future magistrates in Asia were advised that “whatever king Attalus and previous kings have amended, punished, exempted, or given ... up to one day before his death are to be legally binding”.\textsuperscript{82} Even the earliest Roman road system in the province, established by M’. Aquillius immediately after defeating Aristicus, appears to have followed existing trunk roads,\textsuperscript{83} and the traditional leagues of the region continued to exist during the provincial period, operating as provincial councils.\textsuperscript{84} Elsewhere, in Africa, Scipio used the old Carthaginian trench network (fossa regia) to define the geographic extent of the province itself;\textsuperscript{85} while in Egypt, where much of the kingdom’s wealth came from an efficient bureaucracy, the entire royal system was preserved – the Romans merely replaced the king and his subordinates with their own praefectus and his officers.\textsuperscript{86}

\textsuperscript{81} Cic. Q. fr. 1.1.33. As a means of stabilizing the state’s revenues, C. Sempronius Gracchus farmed out the Asian taxes to the publicans on a quinquennial basis (censorio locatio): Cic. Verr. 3.6.12; Planc. 31; Vel. Pat. 2.6.1-3; App. B.Civ. 5.4; Diod. 34/35.25; Fronto, ad Verum, 2.1.17; Florus 2.15; Schol. Bobb. 157 (Sangl.); M. Rostovtzeff, SEHHW III.1567-8; Magie, RRAM I.164-166; Badian, FC, 184-185. Custom Dues: lex port. lines 67-72, portions of which date back to the Attalid era (M. Cottier, et al., eds., The Customs Law of Asia [Oxford 2008], 126-127). In Africa, the Romans adopted the local system of tributum capitis: App. Pan.135.


\textsuperscript{83} S. Mitchell, “The Administration of Roman Asia from 133 BC to AD 250” in W.Eck, ed., Lokale Autonomie und römische Ordnungsmacht in den kaiserzeitlichen Provinzen vom 1. bis 3. Jahrhundert (Munich 1999), 17-21; below, n. 120.

\textsuperscript{84} See below, 69f.

\textsuperscript{85} Pliny, NH 5.25 (text below, n. 105).

\textsuperscript{86} Sherwin-White, RFPE, 268.
Even after a province had been established as a regular administrative unit of the imperial state, the actual administrative system could be reshaped annually by the provincial magistrate. Every magistrate before entering his provincia published an edict that set the terms of law for that year and, though often tralatitious, these could differ significantly from the previous year’s law, just like the annual edict of the urban praetor at Rome. The best documented example is Cicero’s edict as proconsul of Cilicia, which followed some of his predecessor’s measures, but also borrowed heavily from those of Q. Mucius Scaevola, governor of Asia forty years earlier.

As mentioned earlier, by the time of the Principate there had developed a standard form for a provincia. Authors of the period routinely describe the process of creating a province with the set phrase in formam provinciae redigere, which by the High Empire seems to have been the state’s official language on the matter. This reflects a clearly abstracted sense of a bureaucratic unit, governed by a regular system with attendant legal and administrative norms and institutions. At the end of our own period, Caesar wrote of “reducing Gaul into a province” (in provinciam redacta), perhaps reflecting the fact that by the 50s a provincia had a standard set of legal and administrative norms. Still, for most of the Republic this was not the case: the provinces were the areas of

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87 Cic. Att. 5.21.11 (edictum translaticium); Fam. 3.8.4 (totidem verbis transferrem in meum); Greenidge, Legal Procedure, 86-91; A. Watson, “The Development of the Praetor’s Edict” JRS 60 (1970), 105-119.


89 Livy, Per. 45, 134; Vell. Pat. 2.97.4; Tac. Agr. 14; Ann. 2.56; 14.31; Suet. Rhet. 30; Iul. 25.1; Aug. 18.2; Tib. 37.4; Cal. 1.2; Nero 18; Vesp. 8.4.

90 ILS 5834 (milestone of Trajanic date): redacta in formam provinciae Arabia.

91 Richardson, Language of Empire, 95.

92 Caes. B. Gall. 1.45.2: in provinciam redigisset; 7.77.16: in provinciam redacta.
administration of magistrates, who followed the precedents set by previous commanders – who themselves may be following an earlier local arrangement – and who literally set the terms of law and administration every year upon taking up their *provincia*.

### 1.2.3: Provinces and the Territory of the Imperial State

Despite its broad semantic meaning and varied arrangement, a *provincia* carried with it some notion of territoriality: originally as an area in which *imperium* holders were authorized to act, and by the first century as a distinct territorial entity. In Cicero’s writings, for example, one begins to find use of the adjective *provincialis* to refer to those living in a particular province, and in state documents one finds references to actions ‘in the province’;\(^{93}\) Greek cities, meanwhile, by the first century had begun to conceptualize and identify themselves in reference to ἔπαρχεία.\(^{94}\) Yet even during the Late Republic *provinciae* were not simply bounded territories that might be coloured in solid on a map to represent Roman control over a region;\(^{95}\) Rome’s *imperium* was littered with ‘gaps’.

Laws like the *lex Porcia* (121) demonstrate that in some sense *provinciae* were a bounded space:\(^{96}\)

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\(^{93}\) E.g. *Aphrodisias* 8 (38 BCE): [ἄρχων, ἀντάρχων τε δὲ ἐν περὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ μέγα ἐπαρχείᾳ δικαίοδοτὴ] (‘[a magistrate or pro-magistrate who] would have jurisdiction over those in the provinces’); cf. *RDGE* 18, line 77; 52, line 50; 58 col. III, line 68.

\(^{94}\) See below, p. 297ff.

\(^{95}\) Contrast the Empire: G. Burton, “The Resolution of Territorial Disputes in the Provinces of the Roman Empire” *Chiron* 30 (2000), 195-215, who discusses the importance of territoriality in the first to third centuries CE, and the implication of territorial resolutions for the imperial state, “(they) represent both a distinct arena for the exercise of public authority and a distinct expression of the subordination of provincial subjects and communities to, and their integration in, the imperial state” (p. 195).

\(^{96}\) The *rogator* of the motion was probably M. Porcius Cato (cos. 118), grandson of Cato the Censor, who must have been praetor no later than 121 (see Ferrary, “Chapitres tralatices et références à des lois antérieures dans les lois romains” in Humbert and Thomas, edd., *Mélanges de droit romain et d’histoire ancienne: hommage à la mémoire de André Magdelain* (Paris, 1998), 157).
No magistrate or pro-magistrate shall march or lead troops outside the province (ἐκτὸς τῆς ἐπαρχείας), of which, according to this law, he is or will be in command unless by decree of the Senate, reasons of transit, or for the sake of the republic.97

Similar provisions appear later in Sulla’s laws on *maiestas* (81) and Caesar’s on *repetundae* (59), and we might expect that by the Late Republic they appeared commonly in other regulations relating to the provinces.98 Laws such as these operated on the assumption that a magistrate’s *provincia* had territorial limits and that he could identify them while in the field or refer to some common knowledge of a boundary when back in Rome accounting for his actions.99 Indeed, a passage in the *lex portorii Asiae* refers to ‘free boundaries of the province’ (τοὺς ἔλευθέρους ὄρους τῆς ἐπαρχείας) where taxing houses might be set up.100 The precise meaning of the phrase is unclear (especially the

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97 Claros, Menippos, col. III, lines 6-14: ἐκτὸς τῆς ἐπαρχείας ἐκτασοῦτω μήτε ἀγέτω τις μήτε πορευεσθὼ τις δι’ ᾧ ἔκαστο τὸν πολίτην ἔπαιξει εἰδὼς δόλῳ πονηρῷ μήτε τις ἄρχων μήτε ἀντάρχων ἐκτὸς τῆς ἐπαρχείας, <ἐφ’> ἃς αὐτὸν ἐπαρχεῖας κατὰ τούτον τὸν νόμον εἶναι δεῖ ἃ δεῖσθαι, εἰ μὴ ἀπὸ συγκλίτου γνώμης, πορευεσθὼ μήτε προαγέτω, εἰ μὴ διαπορείας ἐνεκεν ἢ δημοσίων χάριν πραγμάτων; cf. *lex Ant. Term.*, col. II, line 17; Cic. *Pis.* 60. If Livy’s language accurately reflects contemporary expressions, then in 171 the Senate became incensed at C. Cassius for daring to leave his *provincia Gallia* and cross over into P. Crassus’ *provincia Macedonia* (Livy 43.1.9: *senatus indignari tantum consulem ausum, ut suam provinciam reliqueret, in alienam transire*).

98 Cic. in *Pis.* 50: *mitto exire de provincia, educere exercitum, bellum sua sponte gerere, in regnum iniusu populi Romani ac senatus accedere, quae cum plurimae leges veteres tum lex Cornelia miestatis, Iulia de pecuniis repetundis planissime vetat* (‘I say nothing of his leaving his province, leading out an army, waging war on his own initiative, or entering a kingdom without the command of the Roman people and the Senate, which is forbidden by countless older legislation and particularly the law of Cornelius on treason and the law of Julius on extortion.’).

99 The idea of territoriality to a *provincia* was no doubt implicit in the original notion of a “magistrate’s sphere of responsibility” and can be found expressed in the early provincial era in the West: according to Livy, in 214 Ap. Claudius set up his forces on the boundary between Syracuse and the Roman *provincia* of Sicily (*ad provinciae regni fines omnia convertit praesidia*, 24.7.9; cf. 24.44.4); and in 194 the Senate refused M. Helvius a triumph for his victories in Spain on the grounds that he had fought in another’s province (*in aliena provincia*, Livy 34.10.5).

100 *lex port.*, line 35; similar language is also restored in the lacunae at lines 40 and 43. The passage is variously interpreted as the boundary between the provincial interior and coastline/harbour site, the boundary of a free city, land unassigned to the province, a mistranslation of the Latin original, or a typographic error by the mason (M. Cottier, et al., *Lex Portoria Asiae*, commentary s.v. line 35, pp. 114-115).
adjective ἔλευθερος), and even the date of this section of the document is insecure
(123BCE? 75 BCE? 62 CE?); however, it does plainly indicate some form of provincial
boundary and is not inconsistent with the evidence from the late second and first century.
It is also worth noting, for comparison, that the lex de proviniciis praetorii of 101/100
charged the governor of Macedonia with establishing “revenue boundaries” for the new
Chersonesan territory, which emphasises the importance of boundaries for purposes of
finances. Legal and ‘official’ documents, then, suggest that by the end of the second
century the Romans had come to conceptualize their rule within the provinces as
territorially bounded in some manner. To that extent the imperial state had borders and
subjects within this described territory.
We must be careful, though, not to overestimate the idea of bounded Roman rule.
There is little evidence, for example, to suggest that the Romans physically marked the
area of their control. While on the one hand we know that they used boundary markers
(termini) for land division under the Republic – even for dividing land between cities –
and that by the end of our period authors referred to termini imperii (boundaries of the

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101 Cnidos, col. IV, lines 10-12 & 25-29: οὗ τε ἐπαρχεῖα Χερσόνησος τε <καί> Καινεική [έστι],
tαύτην {τε} τὴν ἐπαρχεῖαν ἀμι μετα τῆς Μακεδονίας διακατέχετω ... ὁ στρατηγὸς ἢ ἀνθύπατος {τε} ὁ
{τε} τὴν τῆς Μακεδονίας ἐπαρχεῖαν διακατέχον πρὸ τοῦ ἐκ τῆς ἐπαρχείας ἐκχωρεῖν κατὰ τὸ τῆς
συνκλίσεως δόγμα τὸ ἐπ' αὐτὸν γενόμενον δρια τῆς Χερσονήσου τῆς προσόδο[υ] στήσῃ (‘whoever’s
province is the Caenic Chersonesus shall hold this province together with Macedonia ... the praetor or
propraetor holding the province of Macedonia, before leaving from the province according to the decree of
the Senate passed during his term in office, is to establish the boundaries of the
revenues of the Chersonesus’).

102 See, for example, ILS 5945 (terminus recording and representing the fines and termini between
Ateste and Vicetia in Cisalpine Gaul established by Sex. Atilius Saranus, cos. 136) and 5946 (terminus
marking the division between the Genuates and Langenses Veturi by Q. and M. Minucius Rufus in 117);
cf. ILS 5947-5999 for examples under the Empire. Under Augustus boundary markers (termini
Augustales) were used to identify the boundaries of civitates in Lusitania (J. Edmondson, “Romanization
and Urban Development in Lusitania” in T. Blagg and M. Millet, eds., The Early Roman Empire in the
empire), on the other hand, even in this later period there is still no evidence that the provinces were ever physically bounded, and there is no example of a provincial terminus in the material evidence. The best indications that provinces may have been artificially demarcated come from early Spain – where Livy’s use of the verb terminare to refer to the division of Hither and Farther might imply the use of termini and Africa – where Scipio evidently refurbished the earlier royal trench work (fossa regia) around Carthage to mark Roman territory. Again, no physical evidence of either remains, and it seems unlikely that during the Republic, in contrast to the later Empire, the Romans ever marked the limits of their imperium. Quite the contrary, at a time when the notion of the imperium Romanum had yet to represent a territorial empire, but simply the power of the Roman people, there was no impetus to create limitations; rather, Rome embraced an image of its rule during the Republic as boundless and without geographic space, particularly in the East.


104 Livy 32.28.11: et terminare iussi, qua ulterior citeriorve provincia servaretur (‘and having been ordered to determine boundaries, they divided the province into a further and nearer’) and Richardson, Hispaniae, 77-78; cf. Livy 36.2.11 (provinciam ita dividere ut una ab Agrigento ad Pachynum, altera a Pachyno Tyndareum), 41.8.3 (Gallia in duas divisa provincias).

105 Pliny, NH 5.25: ea pars, quam Africam appellavimus, dividitur in duas provincias, veterem et novam, discretas fossa inter Africanum sequentem et reges Thenas usque perducta, quod oppidum a Carthagine abest CCXVI (‘This part, which we have called Africa, is divided into two provinces, the Old and the New, marked off by a trench arranged by the second (Scipio) Africanus and the kings that extended up to Thenas, a town 216 miles from Carthage.’).


107 See also below, p.228.
Naturally, some *provinciae*, like Sicily, Sardinia and Crete, had physical limits that clearly marked the extent of Roman territory.\textsuperscript{108} Likewise, the Romans might look to physical landmarks as natural frontiers of a *provincia*: the Alps in Italy,\textsuperscript{109} the Ebro in Spain,\textsuperscript{110} the Rhine in Gaul,\textsuperscript{111} the Taurus Mountains in Asia,\textsuperscript{112} or the Euphrates in the Near East.\textsuperscript{113} But these *fines* were prescriptive limits of Roman *imperium*, not necessarily meant to describe the boundaries of Roman rule.\textsuperscript{114} They created spatial regions defined by power, not internal control, though distinguishing the difference is naturally confused by the semantic range of *provincia* and its close relationship with the notion of *imperium*.\textsuperscript{115} Cicero once famously described the *provincia Macedonia* as "adjoined by so many barbarian tribes that its commanders have always held that its boundaries (*fines*) extend only as far as their swords and javelins can reach".\textsuperscript{116} In this the difficulty of defining Roman control by provincial space is patently exposed: the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item For a general overview of provincial boundaries in the Republic, see A. Lintott, “What was the ‘imperium Romanum’?” *G&R* n.s. 28 (1981), 54-58; and Richardson, *Language of Empire*, 10-116.
\item Livy 39.54.10.
\item Livy 21.2.7.
\item Caes. B.G. 1.43-44.
\item Livy 34.58.
\item Plut. Pomp. 33.6; cf. Oros. 6.13.2; Florus 3.11.4.
\item Whittaker, *Frontiers of the Roman Empire* (Baltimore, 1994), 26-27.
\item Whittaker, *Frontiers*, 10-30, esp. 26-30; cf. J. Richardson, “Polybius’ View”, 4-7; Lintott, “What is the Imperium Romanum?”, 54-58. According to Whittaker, *provinciae* are a sub-set of the larger *imperium Romanum*, which, corresponding to the twin meanings of *provincia*, could express internal control and external power. Thus Pompey’s claim to have “taken the boundaries of the empire to the limits of the earth” (Diodorus 40.4), or Cicero’s assertion that Caesar and Pompey had added to the *termini imperii* (*Prov. Cons.* 12.31; 13.33), do not refer to the expansion of the provinces but the growth of Roman power; when, however, Augustus advised Tiberius that the “empire should be kept within its boundary stones (*termini*)” (*Tac. Ann* 1.11), he had in mind the preservation of internal control.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
provincia Macedonia, although a regularly administered civic unit at the time, nevertheless existed practically only as far as a magistrate might exercise control.

This leads us to a second, and more crucial observation about the provincial system and the extent of Roman rule: provinciae were not contiguous administrative units, they were tessellated with states and people outside direct Roman authority. So-called “free cities” (civitates liberae), for one, were autonomous enclaves that dotted the province, effectively existing as holes in the Roman provincial fabric. The well-known texts from Claros state that the polis of Colophon was outside the province of Asia (τῆς ἐπαρχείας ἐκτος) – the same language used in the lex Porcia – and beyond the administrative reach of the provincial magistrate. According to Strabo, writing during the Late Republic and early Principate, there were those lands ruled by the Romans “called provinces” but also free states not included within them. Independent kingdoms, too, might be within the broadest boundaries of the Romans’ empire, but outside a magistrate’s authority – in fact, they might even bifurcate his provincia. This was the case in early Asia provincia, when the Lycaonian territory was separated from

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118 Claros, Menippos, col. I, lines 39-40; col. II, line 4 (see below, §5.1).

119 Strabo 17.3.24: ταύτης δὲ τῆς συμπάθεις χώρας τῆς υπὸ Ἡρωμαίοις ἦ μὲν βασιλεύεται, ἢν δ’ ἔχουσιν αὐτοὶ καλέσαντες ἐπαρχίαν, καὶ πέμπουσιν ἡγεμόνας καὶ φορολόγους· εἰσὶ δὲ τίνες καὶ ἔλευθεραι πόλεις, αἱ μὲν ἐξ ἀρχῆς κατὰ φιλίαν προσελθοῦσαι, τὰς δ’ ἡλευθέρωσαν αὐτοὶ κατὰ τιμὴν (‘Of this whole country that is subject to the Romans, some parts are ruled by kings, but the Romans retain others themselves, calling them ‘provinces’, and send to them magistrates and tax collectors; but there are also some free cities, some of whom came over from the beginning on account of friendship, while others the Romans themselves set free as a mark of honour’); cf. Suet. Iul 25.1: omnem Galliam ... praeter socias ac bene meritas civitates in provinciae formam redegit (sc. Caesar) (‘all of Gaul ... except those states allied and in good standing Caesar reduced into the form of a province’).
the bulk of the province by Pamphylia, then controlled by the kings of Cappadocia.\textsuperscript{120} Cappadocia itself divided the \textit{provincia} of Cilicia, which meant that Cicero had to travel through the kingdom to get to the eastern end of his \textit{provincia}.\textsuperscript{121} Roman Syria was famously a hodgepodge of subjects and non-subjects, including tetrarchies, petty kings and the Jewish kingdom.\textsuperscript{122} Still, like the notion of liminal boundaries, boundaries nominally within the \textit{provincia} (though technically outside the \textit{provincia}) were not always rigidly observed. Sometimes, for example, free communities might play a role in the provincial framework, as \textit{caput provinciarum} or even a \textit{conventus} centre.\textsuperscript{123}

A passage of Cicero illustrates the breadth of the imperial state: in the fifth speech \textit{in Verrem}, he decries Verres’ disregard for the protective cry “I am a Roman citizen” (\textit{civis Romanus sum}) and warns Romans that condoning his actions would close off to them “all the provinces, all kingdoms, all the free-states, the whole world, which has to this point been open most especially to our citizens.”\textsuperscript{124}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[120] Pamphylia was granted to Ariarathes V of Cappadocia by M'. Aquillius as a reward for his support against Aristonicus (Justin 37.1.2). We know that Lycaonia was included in the \textit{provincia} Asia in 101 by the \textit{lex prov. praet}. and perhaps even earlier to judge from a milestone of M'. Aquillius discovered in Side that suggests the original provincial road network extended to the Lycaonian coast (D. French, “Sites and Inscriptions from Phrygia, Pisidia and Pamphylia”, \textit{EA} 17 [1991], 53-54). On the position of these kings outside the province, see Strabo 17.3.24 (text at n. 119).
\item[121] Cic. \textit{ad Fam.} 15.2: \textit{iter mihi faciendum per Lycaonium et per Isauros et per Cappadociam arbitratum sum} (‘I have decided to make my route through Lycaonia, the Isauri and Cappadocia’). The territory had been granted to the Cappadocian King by Pompey in his re-organization of the East (App. \textit{Mith} 105; Strabo 12.14).
\item[122] Pliny, \textit{N.H.} 5.81-82.
\item[123] Below, p. 104.
\item[124] Cic. \textit{Verr} 2.5.168: \textit{tolle hanc spem, tolle hoc praesidium civibus Romanis, constitue nihil esse opis in hac voce, 'civis Romanus sum'... quod qui sit ignotet: iam omnis provincias, iam omnia regna, iam omnis liberas civitates, iam omnem orbeh terrarum, qui semper nostris hominibus maxime patuit, civibus Romanis ista defensione praeclusseris} (‘Take away this hope, take away this protection from Roman citizens, establish that there is no assistance to be found in the words “I am a Roman citizen” ... by admitting that defence, you cut off from the Roman citizens all the provinces, all the kingdoms, all free cities, and indeed the whole world, which has to this point been open most especially to our citizens.’); cf.
\end{footnotes}
final term aside, Cicero here describes the extent of the *imperium Romanum* as based upon, but not limited to, the *provinciae*, but also encompassing free-states, kingdoms and all other places which respect Roman hegemony. The official language of the *lex repetundarum* and the *lex de provinciis praetoriis* extends the *imperium Romanum* even wider: not just citizens, or those of the Latin name, but also allies and friends are under the discretion, sway, and protection of the Roman people. 125 We shall discuss these relations in more detail in Chapter Three, but here it is worth noting that, like freedom (*libertas*), friendship (*amicitia*) and alliances (*societas*) were highly sought after and deeply significant forms of relations with the Romans. Some evidence suggests that there was a “register of friends” at Rome, which if true would underscore the importance of these as pseudo-statuses within the imperial state. 126

It is significant that neither the *lex repetundarum* nor the *lex de provinciis praetoriis*, both of which explicitly address provincial affairs, lists *provinciae* among the constituents of the *imperium*. This, of course, does not mean that *provinciae* were not a part of the empire, but does intimate yet again that there was more to the empire than the provinces and their apparatus. More will be said on these extra-provincial relations in the

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125 [--- *quai socium no*]minisve Latini exterarumve nationum, quoive in arbitratu dicione postestate amicitiae[populi Romani --]; cf. *lex prov. praet*. Cnidos col. III, lines 28-35 (= Delphi frg. B, lines 5-7): ὑπάτος δὲ πρώτος γενόμενος γράμματα πρὸς τοὺς δήμους πολιτείας της πρὸς οὓς ἢν αὐτῶν φανερότατον ἀποστελλέτων τὸν δήμον τὸν Ῥωμαίων ἐν ἑπιμελεῖαν <--- >, ὅταν τοὺς πολίτας Ῥωμαίων καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους Λατίνους τε τῶν τε ἐκτὸς οἴνον, οὕτως ἐν τῇ φιλίᾳ τοῦ δήμου Ῥωμαίων εἰοίν, μετ' ἀφαλαίας πλοῖζονται δύνανται ('the primus consul is to send letters to the peoples and cities to whom it seems best to him (to say that) the Roman people will keep in their care, that the citizens of Rome, and the allies, and the Latins and those of foreign nations, whosoever are in the friendship of the Roman people, might be able to sail with safety'); Cic. *Div. Caec.* 66; A. Lintott, *Judicial Reform and Land Reform in the Roman Republic* (Cambridge 1992), 111; Crawford, RS, p. 95.

126 On the *formula amicorum*, see p. 213f.
proceeding chapters, however it remains now to consider in more detail this apparatus of Roman rule in the *provinciae*.

1.3 – INSTITUTIONS OF THE PROVINCE

1.3.1: The Administrative Structure of the *Provincia*

The defining characteristic of a *provincia* was its command by a Roman magistrate holding *imperium*. At the end of every year the Senate identified what area or assignment would comprise the next year’s complement of *provinciae*, and these were allotted to the in-coming magistrates. Before the *lex Cornelia* (81), command of a *provincia* usually fell to one of the praetors – though consuls would receive *provinciae* where heavy campaigning was expected – who routinely administered it during his year in office; after the Sullan legislation, praetors managed their province *after* their year in office (that is, *ex magistratu*), usually with the rank of proconsul.

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127 Livy 40.1 is typical: *consules praetoresque sortiti provincias sunt. consulibus nulla praeter Ligures, quae decerneretur, erat iurisdiction urbana M. Ogulnius Gallo, inter peregrinos M. Valerio evinit; Hispaniarum Q. Fulvius Flacco citerior, P. Manlio ulterior, L. Caecilio Dentri Sicilia, C. Terentio Istrae Sardinia* (*the consuls and praetors drew lots for the provinces: for the consuls only Liguria had been deemed available, while it turned out that M. Oguinius Gallus got the urban jurisdiction and M. Valerius the foreign court; Nearer Spain went to Q. Fulvius Flaccus, Further Spain to P. Manlius, Sicily to L. Caecilius Dentrus, and Sardinia to C. Terentius Istra’*); cf. Arnold, *Prov. Admin.*, 46-54; Stevenson, *Rmn. Prov. Admin.*, 60; Richardson, *Language of Empire*, 17-23. Under the *lex Sempronia* (123) the Senate was required to name the next year’s consular *provincia* before the consular elections for any given year (Sall, *Jug.* 27.3; *Cic. Prov.cos.* 2, 3, 7; *Balb.* 27.61; *Dom.* 24; *Fam.* 1.7.10); later by the *lex Cornelia* the consuls drew their provinces before taking up their office and the praetors before the beginning of their prorogued term.

128 See below, §4.

129 Brennan, *PRR* II.394-396. The *lex Pompeia* of 52 mandated a five year span between office holding and provincial management (Suet. *Iul.* 28; Dio 40.56.1), which quickly fell into abeyance with the onset of the Civil Wars, but was reinstated by Augustus (Dio. 42.20; 43.14). The supposition that after 81 all provincial magistrates were empowered *pro consule* is based on the prosopographical information of individual careers and, after Sulla, the absence of any propraetors in the *fasti triumphalis* (Brennan, *PRR* II. 394-396, 398-400).
There is a natural tendency among modern historians to label these men governors of their province – indeed in some contexts the appellation is apt – but it is important to remember that during the Republic the Romans had no unique word like ‘governor’ to describe or differentiate a provincial (pro)magistracy from a traditional civic magistracy, which was itself undifferentiated from a military rank. A man elected praetor was such regardless of whether his provincia was at Rome or abroad – thus one’s imperium was valid even after leaving the area of his provincia until he returned to Rome. Sulla’s legislation (which we noted earlier seems to correspond to a new concrete conception of a provincia) represents the earliest signs of a constitutional distinction between foreign and domestic assignments as all foreign magistrates were given the rank of pro consule, thus beginning an evolution that was finally completed under the Empire when proconsul, legatus Caesaris, procurator, praefectus, and (especially) praeses were distinctly provincial offices. In the interim, under Augustus the so-called imperial provinces were administered by agents of the Emperor (legati Augusti pro praetore), thus for the first time creating provincial magistrates outside the traditional cursus honorum; while the provinciae populi Romani – though administered by traditional proconsuls –

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130 Official documents refer to a provincial magistrate by his civic office (consul, praetor: e.g. lex prov. praet, Cnidos II, line 13-14; III, line 23; IV, lines 5, 31; Delphi B, line 27; C, line 8) or as a magistratus (lex Ant. Term. col. II, line 6). For a pair of exceptions, see below n. 171. Gubernator, whence derives the English term, was commonly a ship’s steersman, which (given the common metaphor of the ship of state) came to take on the meaning of ‘state director’: e.g. Cic. QF. 1.1.5; Sest. 98; Rab. perd. 26; rep. 5.1; Seneca, Epist. 73.9; Apul. Plat. 2.26; Dig, de conc. dig. 2.6.


132 Macer, de off. praesid. 1 (Dig. 1.18.1): Praesidis nomen generale est eoque et proconsules et legati Caesaris et omnes provincias regentes, licet senatores sint, praesides appellantur: proconsulis appellatio specialis est (‘Governor is a general term, and so proconsuls and imperial legates and all people who govern provinces, although they may be senators, are called governors. Proconsul is a special title’).
were assigned to men only after they had been five years out of office (resurrecting Pompey’s lapsed legislation), effectively creating a new rank in the standard *cursus*.

The lack of distinction between domestic and foreign magistracies illustrates, and is a product of, the strikingly organic development of the empire as a natural extension of the Roman *res publica*. When, for example, the number of regularly administered *provinciae* exceeded the number of magistrates the *res publica* annually allowed for, rather than creating a new order or rank of officials, the number of officials was simply increased: thus the number of annually elected praetors rose to four *ca.* 228 to accommodate the regular administration of Sicily and Sardinia, six in 197 to account for the two new Spanish *provinciae*, eight under Sulla, until finally reaching sixteen under Caesar. Often even these increases were not enough to keep the annual curule magistrates equal to the number of active *provinciae* – particularly in times of war when consuls were in command of the army, or when the number of territorial *provinciae*

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133 Augustan settlement: Tac. *Ann.* 1.1; Dio 53.12-16; Ovid *Fast.* 1.590; Strabo 17.3.24; Suet. *Aug.* 47; F. Millar, “‘Senatorial’ Provinces: An Institutionalized Ghost” *AncW* 20 (1989), 93-97. According to Dio (53.14.2) Augustus implemented the practice of requiring a five year gap between one’s praetorship or consulship and provincial management, restoring the law previously established by Cn. Pompeius.

134 *Livy Per.* 20; cf. *Pomponius apud Dig.* 1.2.2.32; Solinus 5.1. On the date, see Mommsen, *Staatr.* II.3.198; cf. *MRR* I.229. Brennan, *PRR* I.87-89, has argues that the second praetor (*praetor inter peregrines*) was created around the mid-240s to command Sicily.

135 *Livy* 32.27.6; 32.28.2 & 11.

136 No ancient source explicitly states that Sulla was responsible for increasing the number of praetors, but Velleius (2.89.3) implies that there were eight before Caesar and the Epitomator of Pomponius (*Dig.* 1.2.2.32) erroneously claims that Sulla (rather than Caesar) increased the number to ten. Certainly there were eight in 57, when Cicero (*Mil.* 39) claimed that seven of the eight praetors supported his return from exile; cf. Brennan, *PRR* II. 389-392. By Sulla’s time there was an extraordinary pressure on the Roman administrative system, with as many as ten regularly administered foreign *provincia* (Sicily, Sardinia-Corsica, Hither and Further Spain, Macedonia, Africa, Asia, Cilicia, Cisalpine and Transalpine Gaul), while Rome itself required an urban and peregrine praetor, as well as *praetores* for the numerous standing courts (*quaestiones perpetuueae*); cf. E. Badian, “Notes on Provincial Governors from the Social War to Sulla’s Victory” in *idem, Studies in Greek and Roman History* (Oxford, 1964), 71-104.

137 Ten praetors were elected in 46 (Dio Cass. 42.51.3; Vell. *Pat.* 2.89.3), fourteen in 45 (Dio Cass. 43.47.2), and sixteen in 44 (Dio Cass. 43.49.1).
simply outnumbered annual magistracies – in which case, as we have seen, current
magistrates merely had their powers prorogued or ex-magistrates were re-empowered at
their previous rank or pro consule.\footnote{E.g. the \textit{lex praet. prov.} is addressed to the ‘praetor or propraetor of Asia’ (στρατηγὸς άνθυπατὸς τε ὁ{τι} τὴν Ἀσίαν ἐπαρχεῖαν, Cnidos col. III, lines 22-23) and the ‘praetor or propraetor or proconsul’ of Macedonia (πρὸς τὸν στρατηγὸν [ἡ ἀνθυπατος] τὸν τὴν Μ[ακε]δονίας ἐπαρχεῖαν, Cnidos col. II, lines 13-15); \textit{lex Ant. Term.} forbids ‘magistrates, pro-magistrates, or legate’ to introduce troops into the town (\textit{nei quis magistratus proue magistratu legatus ne[u] quis alius meilites in oppidum}, Col II, lines 5-6). Prorogation was not, of course, a new practice; at the height of the Hannibalic War there had been fifteen officials with \textit{imperium}, nine of whom would have held their \textit{imperium} through prorogation.}

Increasing the number of officers – or creating new offices – greatly upset the
socio-political arrangement of the elite, for whom office holding produced the
opportunity for the socio-political currency of fame and glory (\textit{fama gloriaque}). With
only two consulships available each year, increasing the praetorship diminished the
possibility of reaching the highest office while simultaneously diluting the glory of
holding a praetorship.\footnote{E.g. Sall. \textit{BC} 7.3-6; Mommsen, \textit{R.Staatsr.} II\textsuperscript{1}.198-199; E. Badian, “Provincial Governors”, 71-104; P. Brunt, “Laus Imperii”; Harris, \textit{War and Imperialism}, 10-41, esp. 17-24; Brennan, \textit{PRR} I.239-245, II.390-400.} Already in 181 a \textit{lex Baebia} had legislated that the number of
annual praetorships would alternate between four and six.\footnote{Livy 40.44.1-2, with discussion in Brennan, \textit{PRR} I.170-173.} This system seems to have
disappeared rather quickly, but by the Late Republic new consequences emerged because
of Sulla’s arrangements, particularly bribery, which led to a slew of \textit{ambitus} legislation
after his dictatorship.\footnote{Sulla himself probably introduced a \textit{lex de ambitu} to accompany his modification of state administration (\textit{Schol. Bob.} p. 78 St.). See E. Gruen, \textit{The Last Generation of the Roman Republic} (Berkeley 1974), 212-224. Similarly, the \textit{lex Baebia} (above) also contained measures \textit{de ambitu}.}

The point to be made here is that under the Republic the Romans made very little
effort to transform their traditional city-state into a larger bureaucratic imperial state –
indeed such action could only have been done at the cost of re-organizing the *res publica* itself, a thing not possible until Augustus. Instead, the imperial structures that we find are simply those of the *res publica* writ large: civic ranks were kept, terms were simply extended, and new offices were avoided.

1.3.2: Paucity of Imperial Bureaucracy

Given that the Romans preferred to adapt, rather than alter their *res publica* for their inchoate imperial state, it should be no surprise that the most striking aspect of Roman imperial governance was the paucity of men who actually governed and administered the subjects.\(^{142}\) The command of the *provincia* rested with the magistrate to whom it was allotted (see next section), however this man was supported by no more than a dozen or so individuals to manage often vast territories, comprising hundreds of city-states, representing millions of inhabitants.\(^{143}\)

Of these dozen or so aides, only a handful can be said to have played any sort of significant role: the *quaestor*, and as many as three each of *legati* and *praefecti*.\(^{144}\) Just as

\(^{142}\) This pattern continued into the High Empire: "(The Romans) did not ... develop an imperial administration that matched the dimensions of the empire. A rudimentary apparatus of officialdom sufficed a government whose concerns were limited to essentials .... The Roman empire remained undergoverned, certainly by comparison with the Chinese empire, which employed, proportionately, perhaps twenty times the number of functionaries" (P. Garnsey and R. Saller, *The Roman Empire* [London 1987], 20-42, quotation from p. 20).

\(^{143}\) Population figures for antiquity are notoriously equivocal. Nevertheless, some idea of the imperial population can be gathered from the estimates in J. Beloch, *Die Bevölkerung der griechischen-römischen Welt* (Leipzig 1886), passim, esp. 507 (Macedonia = 500,000; Greek peninsula = 3,000,000; Asia = 13,000,000); cf. P. Salmon, *Population et Depopulation dans l'Empire romain* (Brussels 1974), 30-39, who suggests somewhat smaller values. It is worth noting that through his successes in the East, Pompey claimed to have "routed, scattered, killed or received capitulation from 12,183,000" (Plin. *HN* 7.97).

with the praetors and consuls, the responsibilities of these men in a *provincia* paralleled their traditional civic or military functions: the *quaestor* – an elected civic position in Rome, the lowest rung on the *cursus honorum* – was primarily responsible for the provincial *fiscus*, but could also be entrusted with judicial or military affairs;¹⁴⁵ *legati* and *praefecti* were traditionally military posts but in the province the magistrate leaned on them for administrative support and advice. Cicero, for example, used one of his prefects to administer the island of Cyprus while he was proconsul of Cilicia, while Pompey as proconsul of Spain governed his *provincia* from Rome through his legates when he was elected consul for 52.¹⁴⁶ While in the provinces, these legates could be a vital source of counsel, making up the core of his advisory board (*consilium*), and were therefore often chosen by the governor from among seasoned and trusted friends.¹⁴⁷ Again, Cicero, for example, took his brother, Quintus, who had been proconsul of Asia for three years and had earlier served as legate for Pompey and Caesar.¹⁴⁸

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¹⁴⁵ E.g. Cic. *Div. Caec.* 17; Suet. *Iul.* 7. Quaestors were also something of a deputy-governor and could run the province between one governor’s departure and another’s arrival: Cic. *Att.* 6.6.3 (Cicero’s quaestor); *Fam.* 15.14 (Cassius in Syria); *Fam.* 12.14.15 (P. Cornelius Lentulus in Asia in 43); Sall. *B.J.* 103. Military: Tremellius Scrofa as quaestor, and under the auspices of the praetor Licinius Nerva, defeated Pseudo-Philip or Pseudo-Perseus in 143 or 142 (Varro *R.R.* 2.4.1-2; Livy *Per.* 53; cf. Eutropius 4.15). M. Annius defended Macedonia from Thracian invasions in 119 after the death of the governor of Macedonia, Sex. Pompeius (*SIG* 700, lines 10-31).

¹⁴⁶ *Att.* 5.21.6 (Cicero); Plut. *Pomp.* 55.7.

¹⁴⁷ RDGE 17, lines 9; no. 18, line 96; no. 23, lines 42-43, 55-57; no. 49b, lines 3-4 (Sulla decides μετὰ οὐ ἀπὸ συνβουλίου γνώμης); RDGE 51, lines 37-38 (Pompey decides ἀπὸ συμβουλίου γνώμης); cf. RDGE 48, line 6 (a wealthy citizen of Nysa donates grain to C. Cassius’ army and is admitted into his συνβουλίον).

¹⁴⁸ Sources in *MRR* (career summarized at II.627).
The remainder of a magistrate’s staff – which is to say, loosely, the imperial bureaucracy – were simply the magistrate’s personal attendants like the scriba (secretary), medicus (doctor), or accensus (un-official advisor), or his assigned aides (apparitores) like the lictores (guards), haruspex (diviner), praeco (herald), or viator (messenger), drawn from the official panels at Rome. These men had specific and narrow duties and did not have any official capacity in provincial administration. However, with so few men for support, a magistrate might rely heavily on these officials, though as Cicero’s invective against Verres demonstrates, the practice was frowned upon. Roman institutions were so sparse in the provinces that governors frequently relied on the publicani to act as state bankers and money-changers, and came to depend upon their couriers (tabellarii) to transmit letters to and from the Senate. It is important to bear in mind, then, that there was nothing like an imperial bureaucracy for administering the provincial subjects. A provincial magistrate had an entourage from whom he could solicit advice, and on whom he could lean to perform some functions of governance, but such arrangements were often ad hoc and not always looked well upon by the Romans.

The limited number of resources in the provinces meant (as we shall discuss below) that cities continued to operate with a high degree of independence from the Roman imperial state. In the context of provincial institutions, this resulted in the

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149 A.H.M. Jones, “The Roman Civil Service (Clerical and Sub-Clerical Grades)” JRS 39 (1949), 38-55; N. Purcell, “The Apparitores: a Study in Social Mobility” PBSR 51 (1983), 125-173; Schulz, Herr. u. Reg., 102-111, 148-150. Governors also took with them personal associates (cohors amicorum), like a cubicularius (personal attendant), interpres (translator), contubernalis (youngsters learning the ropes), alpites (masseuses), and cooks.

150 Cic. Verr. 2.2.33-34; cf. 2.2.10; 2.3.28; 2.3.69; Q.Fr. 1.1.11-12.

151 Cic. Att. 5.15.3, 16.1.
continuance of traditional Hellenistic federations (κοινά) that had evolved, by the time of Augustus, into provincial councils (concilia provinciae). It is important to stress that these federations were a traditional institution in mainland Greece and Asia Minor and were not a Roman construction, nor was their membership always coterminous with the extent of the province itself. From Pausanias we know that the Romans restored the various Greek κοινά shortly after suppressing the Achaeans in 146, while Cicero relates that a concilium of Sicilians met during Verres’ propraetorship of the province in the late 70s, and Caesar used to gather a concilium Galliae of the traditional chiefs while in Gaul. The best known koinon, however, is the League of the Greeks in Asia (το κοινόν τῶν ἑπὶ τῆς Ἀσίας Ἑλλήνων), which dates back to at least the proconsulship of Q. Mucius Scaevola in the mid-90s when some embryonic form of it established the Mouseia games in his honour. Subsequently, we find the body sending envoys to the

152 In general, see: Kornemann, RE Suppl. IV, coll. 931-935; F. Abbott and A. Johnson, Municipal Administration in the Roman Empire (Princeton 1926), Chpt 12; Magie, RRAM 1.447-452 (Asia; with II.1064-5, n. 48), 516-539 (Lycia); J. Deininger, Die Provinziallandtage der römischen Kaiserzeit (Munich 1965), esp. 12-16, 36-98; F. Millar, The Emperor in the Roman World (Oxford 1977), 385-394; Lintott, Imp. Rom., 40-41, 126; P. Funke, H.-J. Gehke, and L. Kolonas, “Ein neues Proxeniedekret des akarnanischen Bundes” Klio 75 (1993), 131-144, with a new inscription from the Acarnian League dating from the first century. Note the admonition of J. Larsen, Representative Government (Berkeley 1966), 107: “provincial assemblies” is an unhappy term which places the emphasis on the assemblies rather than on the organizations represented by the assemblies; and the discussion under “provincial assemblies” of eastern koina, that is, federal states and commonalities, tends to obscure their importances as the connecting link between earlier Greek institutions and the institutions of the Roman Empire.”

153 Paus. 7.10.16; Cic. Verr. 2.2.154; Caes. B.Gall. 1.30.4; 4.65; 5.24; 5.56.1-3; 6.3.4; 6.44. Larsen, Representative Government, 106-124. Note also that the Lycian koinon continued to exist down to 46 CE, when it was provincialized by Claudius, and even made treaties with Rome (Mitchell, Pap. Gr. Schoy). Under the Empire we find koina of Macedonia, Thessaly, Magnesians in Greece and the Bithynians, Galatians, Cappadocians, Lycians, Pamphylians, Cilicians, Cyprians, Syrians and Egyptians (see Deininger, Provinziallandtage, 36-98).

154 OGIS 438, lines 1-3: οἶ ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ δῆμοι καὶ τὰ ἔθνη καὶ οἱ κατ’ ἀνδρὰ κεκριμέναι ἐν τῇ πρὸς Ρωμαίοις φιλίᾳ (‘those peoples and tribes in Asia and those men inhabiting Asia who have been judged to be in friendship with the Romans’); cf. OGIS 439; RDGE 47. The language here is similar to that of Aphrod. 5, which uses the full title of the league in lines 24-25, but in line 28 speaks instead of οἶ ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ δῆμοι καὶ τὰ ἔθνη (‘those people and tribes in Asia’). Other abbreviations are: οἶ ἐπὶ τῆς Ἀσίας Ἑλλήνες (RDGE 65, lines 31, 78; Sardis 7.1.8, lines 77, 80, 85-89, 96, 99; IGRP IV 1410, 1236, 1608c,
Senate to complain of the burdens of the publicani and (later) to Augustus rejoicing at C. Caesar’s taking up of the toga virilis;\(^{155}\) in turn, the Roman magistrates could write to the koinon to have it disseminate information to the rest of the province, or to make sure that certain decisions of Rome were upheld.\(^{156}\)

From a late first century Sardian decree, we know that the Asian koinon had an annually elected principal magistrate (ἀρχιερεύς), and other officers, including an advocate (ἐκδικος), secretary (γραμματέως) and treasurer (ἀργυροταμίας), and from later evidence we can assume that it was comprised of representatives who met annually, probably at Pergamum.\(^{157}\) The koinon thus represented the interests of the province, with the capacity to advocate for its cities before Rome, issue its own decrees, collect revenue to pay for dedications and statuary, organize provincial festivals, and even alter the provincial calendar.\(^{158}\) These leagues speak to a growing sense of imperial identity – an acceptance of Roman hegemonia and a willingness to work within it.\(^{159}\) Yet fascinatingly (and perhaps not surprisingly), many such leagues were not coterminous with the province, even into the Empire, but followed more generally traditional ethnic lines.\(^{160}\)

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151 1, line 9), τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἑλλήνων (Aphrod. 5, lines 4, 21-22; RDGE 52, line 42; Sardis 7.1.8, lines 32, 58, 68, 104), τὸ κοινὸν τῆς Ἀσίας (RDGE 65, line 26), οἱ Ἐλληνες (Sardis 7.1.8, lines 43, 51, 94, 125, 131, 136), even simply ἡ Ἀσία (RDGE 65, line 41; Sardis 7.1.8, lines 78, 92, 97-88, 90, 94, 96).

155 Aphrod. 5 (decree of koinon sending envoys to Rome to complain of publicani); Sardis 7.1.8 (decree of koion honouring their advocate before the Senate).

156 RDGE 52 (epistulae magistrorum to the league handing down unknown decisions); RDGE 57 (letter of M. Antonius to league advising them of privileges for the synod of sacred victors and crown winners); RDGE 65b (decree of koinon altering provincial calendar to begin on Augustus’ birthday).

157 Sardis 7.1.8; cf. OGIS 458; CIG 2782; Magie, RRAM I.448-9 (with II. 1297-1301; Deininger, Provinziallandtage, 137-172. On the various locations of the meetings, see Magie, RRAM II.1295 n. 55.

158 One finds similar actions taken by the concilium Siciliae: Deininger, Provinziallandtage, 13-14.

159 See below p. 228, discussing similar consequence of the epithet ‘common benefactors’.

160 See above, n.153.
We find, for example, in Achaea, the Amphictyonic League including members throughout mainland Greece and the islands well before any formal province (as well as afterward), and Thessalian and Magnesian Leagues still after Augustus arranged the\textit{ provincia Achaea}.\footnote{For the federations of Greece, see J.A.O. Larsen, \textit{Representative Government in Greek and Roman History} (Berkeley 1966), 106-125; \textit{idem}, \textit{Greek Federal States} (Oxford 1968), 498-504.} Thus the traditional leagues of Greece continued in the region during the Republic despite the absence of any formal province, as did those of the Lycians in Anatolia.\footnote{On the Lycian \textit{koinon}, see Magie, \textit{RRAM} I.516-539.} Yet again, then, we find that the operation of the Romans’ empire cannot be circumscribed entirely by the \textit{provinciae}, which, again, have shown themselves to be limited in scope and arrangement, relying on local institutions and traditions for their effective operation.

1.3.3: Provincal Jurisdiction – Authority of the Provincial Magistrate

The nucleus of Roman institutional power in the \textit{provincia} was the provincial magistrate,\footnote{Strabo 17.3.24 (text above n. 119) and \textit{RDGE} 44, lines 2-3, with the remarks of J.-M. Bertrand, “Langue grecque et administration romaine”, 170-172; see also above, p 63f.} elected by the Roman people and empowered with \textit{imperium} to administer its possessions, fulfill its obligations, and expand its power in the best interest of the Republic.\footnote{On the means of administration, see infra. On Rome’s obligations, see Chapter 3. It appears from literary accounts that, by the late Republic at least, a magistrate was expected to increase the extent of Roman power while in his \textit{provincia}: Cic. \textit{de Rep.} 3.24 (\textit{finis imperii propagare}); \textit{de Off.} 2.85 (\textit{ut rem publicam augeant imperio agris vectigalibus}); \textit{de prov. cons.} 29; Phil. 13.14; Brunt, “Laus Imperii”, 162-164. A magistrate was commonly charged by the Senate and the people to carry out their will “as seems to him to be keeping with his own good faith and in the best interest of the Republic” (\textit{ita ut ei e re publica fideque sua videbitur esse = οὕτως καθὼς ἄν αὐτῷ ἐκ τῶν δημοσίων πραγμάτων πίστεως τε τῆς ίδιας φαίνηται}): e.g. \textit{lex agr.} lines 33, 35; \textit{RDGE} 2, lines 12-13; no. 10, line A.11, B.14, no. 18, lines 121-122; \textit{Aphrod.} 8, lines 92-93.} Often considered by modern historians to be something like a king in his
province, he had considerable authority. While in his *provincia* a magistrate’s *imperium* was not subject to the constraints of collegiality as at Rome, nor in some cases even the limitation of a single year. While more recent works tend to eschew the monarchical analogy, it is not entirely unwarranted in the context of the East. Not only did the provincial magistrate hold *imperium* — itself a derivative of the original power of the Roman *rex* that included arcane royal symbols like *lictores* with their *fasces* — but in the East the provincial magistrate often took up (with varying degrees of willingness) the affectations of a Hellenistic king: at times speaking from a dais, receiving a royal reception on his arrival, establishing his headquarters in a former royal residence, and receiving cultic worship. For many Greeks, the experience of Roman rule rested

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166 Cic. *Verr*. 2.12.30: *dubium nemini est quin omnes omnium pecuniae positae sint in eorum potestate qui judicia dant et eorum qui judicant ... praetor improbus, cui nemo intercedere posit, det quem velit judicem, index nequam et levis quo praetor iussisset iudicet* (‘no one doubts that all the wealth of every man is placed in the power of those men who grant trials and of those who judge them. ... A dishonest praetor, against whom there is no power of intercession, might assign any judge whom he chooses, and the worthless and corrupt judge might judge however the praetor orders him.’); *Q Fr.* 1.1.22: *ubi (sc. in provincia) nullum auxilium est, nulla conquestio, nullus senatus, nulla contio* (‘where [i.e. in the provinces] there is no appeal, no means of complaint, no senate, no public assembly’). By the first-century, it became increasingly less rare to find men administering the same province for more than a single year; thus, e.g., C. Verres was propraetor of Sicily for three years (73-71), M. Fonteius three years in Gaul (74-72), Q. Cicero was proconsul in Asia for four years (62-58) and L. Lucullus held the same rank in Asia and Cilicia for eight years (74-66).

167 Livy 45.29.3.

168 Cic. *Att*. 5.13.1; 5.15; *Verr*. 2.1.86; Plut. *Cat.* 13.1. The ἀπάντησις was common of kings in the Hellenistic period and perhaps also survived into the imperial period to include elaborate reception outside the city, a parade into the town centre, public *eulogia* in the theatre and sacrifices to the gods (A.-V. Pont, “Rituels civique [apantèsis et acclamations] et gouverneurs à l’époque romaine en Asie Mineure” in C. Witschel, ed., *Ritual Dynamics and Religious Change in the Roman Empire* [Heidelberg 2007], 185-211).

169 Cic. *Pts*. 91; Livy 38.9.13; Caes. *B.Civ.* 2.21.4; Strabo 3.4.7; Apg. 23, 35.

170 On the cultic worship of individual Romans, see Chapter 3, n. 259.
on this man, who, while in his province, had ultimate authority on issues of law, finance, and administration.

Official state documents, nevertheless, demonstrate that Greeks knew the provincial magistrate to be less than a royal figure. While in his provincia the Roman official was one appendage of the Roman polity. The Greek terms used for the titles of provincial officials often reflected the function of the official in the res publica: the traditional provincial officer, a praetor, was a στρατηγός (commander), a propraetor was an ἀντιστρατηγός (equivalent to a commander), a consul was a στρατηγός ὑπάτος (supreme commander), a proconsul was στρατηγός ἀνθύπατος (equivalent to a supreme commander), a quaestor was a ταμίας (treasurer), and collectively these magistrates were ἄρχοντες (officers). Moreover, in the official correspondence, the provincial magistrate often made his decisions with references to decrees or wishes of the Senate or the Roman People or reported (vividly, if formulaically) the outcome of a meeting before the Senate. Greeks, in turn, routinely petitioned provincial magistrates to help them gain access to the Senate – thus demonstrating the understanding that while he might be a

171 By the end of the second century the word ὑπάτος alone came to be used of a consul, and by the first quarter of the first century we find ἀνθύπατος alone being used to refer to a proconsul, though στρατηγός ἀνθύπατος appears in documents down to Augustus. See, M. Holleaux, ΣΤΡΑΤΗΓΟΣ ὙΠΑΤΟΣ (Paris, 1918); Mason, Greek Terms, 155-163. A unique exception to this orthodoxy is the reference in the lex prov. praet. to an ἔπαρχος (Delphi frg. C, line 11), which seems to explicitly refer to one who manages an ἑπαρχεία, and which Crawford (RS no. 12, p. 251 and 268) has suggested translated the Latin periphrasis qui provinciis praesunt (‘he who is in charge of the province’), though Mason (138-140) rejects this suggestion and supposes it is some kind of praefectus, which ἔπαρχος later came to translate under the Empire; cf. IG Bulg I² 314a, lines 3-4, where ἐπὶ τὰς πόλιος [ἐ]παρχοῖς refers to a subordinate (praefectus?) of M. Terentius Varro Lucullus (procos. Macedonia 72). The same word is used to refer to the Athenian administrator of Delos in RDGE 5, line 28 (164 BCE) and is found in earlier Hellenistic documents (see: G. Tibiletti, “Governatori romani in città provinciali” RIL 86 [1953], 64-100).

172 RDGE 1, 33, 34, 38, 42, 43, 48, 49, 54, 58, 70; Aphrod. 3; cf. F. Millar, “The Political Character of the Classical Roman Republic, 200-151” JRS 74 (1984), 4. In some cases provincial magistrates promised to make efforts on behalf of cities when they returned to Rome, or advise the Senate of some good deed (RDGE 4, 34, 48; Aphrod. 3), on which see further Chapter 3.
locus of authority in the province,\textsuperscript{173} he was also simply a gateway to the ultimate authority of the Senate.\textsuperscript{174} It was the Senate, after all, whither Greeks travelled to petition for privileges, or arbitration of disputes with one another, the publicans, or magistrates themselves.

Nowhere do the Romans themselves explicitly define the powers of a provincial magistrate – there was, after all, no written constitution of the province (or the Roman state); however, a passage from the \textit{lex de provinciis praetoriiis} is illuminating.

According to this law,

If the praetor holding the province of Asia and Macedonia should resign from his magistracy ... he is to retain power in all matters relating to his jurisdiction, just as it existed in his magistracy, to act, punish, coerce, administer justice, give judgement, appoint judges and recovery officials (\textit{recuperatores}), and handle registrations (?) of guarantors, securities and emancipations; and he is to be immune from prosecution (?) until he returns to the city of Rome.\textsuperscript{175}

The passage demonstrates the breadth of authority the Romans gave to their magistrates \textit{in provincia}. It illustrates, more particularly, if unsurprisingly, that a provincial magistrate’s primary responsibilities were to do with justice and administration. This is consistent with the evidence of the provincial laws looked at earlier, which themselves demonstrate the scope and nature of Roman jurisdiction over the cities in a \textit{provincia}.

The \textit{lex Rupilia}, for example, laid down legal procedures in Sicily, prescribing in detail in what court and under what laws cases between various parties (e.g. resident, non-resident,

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  \item \textsuperscript{173} \textit{Claros} Polemaios col. II, lines 7-8, 52-63.
  \item \textsuperscript{174} \textit{RDGE} 4, 7, 8, 14. The provincial magistrate might also pass along legal suits to be handled by international arbitration: A.J. Marshall, “The Survival and Development of International Jurisdiction in the Greek World under Roman Rule” \textit{ANRW} II.13 (1980), 654-660.
  \item \textsuperscript{175} Cnidos, col. IV, lines 31-39: ἐὰν οὖδ’ [ὁ] στρατηγὸς ὧν τῆς Ἀσίας Μακεδονίας τε ἐπαρχεῖα ἐγένετο τῆς ἀρχῆς αὐτὸν ἀπείπη ἢ ἀπείπηται, ὡς ἐν ἐπίταγῇ ἔξοισια πάντων πραγμάτων πρὸς ἰστορφήν τε ποιεῖσθαι κολάζειν δικαιοδοτεῖν κρείσαν κρίτας κἀκεῖτάς διδόναι ἀναδόχων κτημάτων ... ἀπελευθερώσεις ὕσαυτός κατὰ τὴν δικαιοδοσίαν ἔστω καθὼς ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ ὑπῆρχεν οὔ[τ]ός τε τὸ ἀνθύπατος ἐως τούτου ἐως ἕν εἰς πολ[ή] ἡ Ῥώμην ἐπιανέλθη ἔστω.
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Roman citizen) could be heard; however, it left residual jurisdiction in the hands of the provincial magistrate.176 In many ways similar to these leges, the provincial magistrate’s edictum provinciale published at the beginning of his tenure outlined the legal arrangements for the province and gave the grounds for whatever actions he was prepared to hear.177 Cicero’s edict touched upon city finances, debts, interest, contracts, tax-collection, and private law relating to possession.178

To administer his provincia, the Roman magistrate travelled to major regional urban centres (conventus) to hold court.179 There he heard petitions of criminal and private suits, generally giving judgement himself on the former and passing on private cases to local juries of Roman residents or local citizens. Cicero’s detailed account of Verres’ proconsulship of Sicily illustrates the extraordinary degree to which provincial magistrates could affect their province and the scope to which they could interfere in the lives of the cities.180 But as many would point out, Cicero’s invective against Verres is so

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176 Cic. Verr. 2.32: ceterarum rerum selecti iudices ex civitum Romanorum conventu proponi solent (‘in all other matters judges chosen by the magistrate shall be appointed from the Roman citizens in the district’); cf. above, n. 67.


178 E.g. Cic. Att. 6.1.15: unum (genus) est provinciale, in quo est de rationibus civitatum, de aere alieno, de usura, de syngraphis, in eodem omnia de publicanis (‘the first part [of my decree] is provincial, which concerns the affairs of cities, foreign debt, usury, bonds, and everything concerning the publicans’); cf. above, n. 88. We can compare these edicta with the leges provinciae to get an idea of the breadth of Rome’s influence over its subjects: Hoyos, “Lex Provinciae and Governor’s Edict” Antichthon 7 (1973), 47-53.


180 Cic. Verr. 1.40.
damning precisely because his example violates the norms and expectations of how a provincial magistrate was to act. Not only do Cicero’s arguments against him rely on demonstrating his illegal actions, but more generally his disregard of the magistrate’s responsibility not to overburden the cities and to impugn their autonomy as little as possible. Practical considerations of time and distance – intensified by the paucity of any bureaucracy or administrative support – meant that a provincial magistrate was severely constrained in how many cases he could hear and how much time he could devote to administration. As such, in large part, provincial administration relied on local communities to govern themselves as far as possible (discussed further in §5.2), and it required the magistrate in the territory, when not on campaign, to settle those disputes brought to him as best as possible.

Within the realm of his province, a provincial magistrate was not at complete liberty. Requirements were established by laws and senate decrees at Rome, which prescribed how and by what means he might administer his province, including prohibitions and their consequences.\(^\text{181}\) We have already noted that the *lex de provinciis praetorii* outlined the broad extent of a governor’s administrative scope, but the same law also contained explicit instructions directing his action and charging him with specific tasks: he was, for example, to assume the Chaenic Chersonesus as part of his *provincia*, spend no less than sixty days in the region, and establish revenue

\(^{181}\) E.g. Cic. *Fam* 15.2.4; Caes. *B. Gall.* 1.35. It is possible, too, that a magistrate heading off to a foreign *provincia* was assigned distinct *mandata* from the Senate before leaving (*lex de prov.praet.* Cnidos IV, line 33: ἐπιτάγματα; *Claros* Polemaios col. III, line 44: ἐπίταγμα; *RDGE* 18, line 61: ἐντολαὶ). Certain mechanics of the Roman constitution also held him in check: the Senate, for example, determined the size of his military force and the funds he took with him (Polyb. 6.13), required regular updates (Cic. *Pis.* 38), and demanded a reckoning of accounts on his return (Cic. *Pis.* 25). It was also the prerogative of the Senate to award him a triumph or not (Polyb. 6.15.8; Cic. *Prov. cos.* 7; *Pis.* 19).
boundaries.\footnote{Cnidos col. IV, lines 5-30; cf. the praetor, or propraetor, or proconsul of Asia was to send off letters to the cities of Asia and neighbouring kings, advising them of Rome's efforts to curb piracy (Delphi B, lines 20-24).} The same legislation also reminded provincial magistrates that they were to abide by the *lex Porcia*, which forbade movement beyond the *provincia* except for transit, reasons of state, or when explicitly authorized by the Senate.\footnote{Cnidos col. III, lines 6-15; cf. *lex Ant.Term.*, col. II, lines 13-17.}

Similar constrictive legislation was passed throughout the Republic: the *SC de vectigalis Hispanarum* (171) forbade Spanish magistrates from setting the price of the 1/20 grain *stipendium*;\footnote{Livy 43.2.12.} the *lex Cornelia* (81) limited the amount of money spent in praise of a provincial magistrate;\footnote{Cic. *Verr.* 2.2.146-148.} the *lex Antonia* (68) forbade magistrates from wintering troops in Termessus Maior;\footnote{Crawford, *RS* no. 11.} the *lex Julia* (59) forbade provincial magistrates from interfering in disputes of loans to free cities and laid down what requisitions could be compelled from provincials.\footnote{Cic. *Pis.* 37, 90; *Fam.* 8.8.3; *Att.* 5.10.2, 16.3, 21.5; Pliny *Ep.* 4.9.7; Crawford, *RS* no. 55.} One of the most potent - even if *post eventum* - constraints on a governor's action was his liability to prosecution upon return to Rome. As early as 173 the Romans had prosecuted M. Popilius Laenas in response to complaints from the Statellates,\footnote{Livy 42.7-9.} and beginning in 149 had created a standing recovery court (*quaestio de repetundis*) for provincials. At least since Sulla there had been a standing court for treason (*maiestas*), where provincials or Roman citizens could prosecute magistrates for abuses beyond theft, including bribery, extortion, and other
mistreatments. Thus, while a provincial magistrate had extraordinary individual powers, there were strong legal and institutional mechanisms that curtailed his full potency.

Once in a *provincia*, furthermore, a magistrate became part of a network of social norms and regulations on the form and extent of his power. These have been recently enumerated and discussed by R. Schulz. As Schulz demonstrates, the governor was at the centre of a thick web of social, political and economic obligations between citizens at Rome, citizens in the province, and local elites; each of these parties pushed and pulled him in competing directions: friends in Rome demanded a variety favours, which, if seen as odious by provincials, were prosecutable when he returned. Roman citizens in the *provincia*, largely *negotiores* and *publicani*, on whom the provincial magistrate relied for money, information, advice and other kinds of material support, likewise made demands; these same men, moreover, might bring the governor up on retaliatory


191 While proconsul of Cilicia, Cicero received numerous pleas from Caelius Rufus, a current aedile, to send exotic animals like jaguars from the province for his games (Cic. *Fam.* 8.4.5, 6.5, 8.10, 9.3; cf. 2.11.2).

192 M. Brutus (in)famously petitioned Cicero for troops to help him collect on debts from the Salamanians on Cyprus (Cic. *Att.* 5.21.10-13; 6.1.3-7). Cicero walked a fine line when confronted with Brutus’ extraordinary interest rate (48% p.a.), which he eventually reduced to the legally allowed 12% provided it was paid off by the end of the year (Cic. *Att.* 5.21.10; 6.1.5, 2.7, 3.5).
charges after his term of office if they remained unsatisfied or the worse off. Marcus Cicero famously advised his brother, Quintus, then proconsul of Asia:

The publicans present a great difficulty to all your goodwill and diligent duty; if we oppose them, we shall alienate from us and from the republic an order that has deserved well from us; but if we accede to them in everything, by acquiescing we expose to ruin those whose well-being and interests we are bound to protect.

These measures, of course, then, were often at odds with the interests of locals, who were important for gathering and disseminating information, the smooth execution of levies, accommodations, board, and general administration; by the first century, Greek cities also often had a Roman patronus looking out for their interests in Rome, who, if not himself the provincial magistrate, was a senator in Rome and could apply pressure on whoever was in command of the province. As an agent of the Roman people, moreover, every provincial magistrate was compelled to act in the interests of the state, which was bound by not only legal treaties, but also important social bonds like friendship, which espoused important norms and rules of obligation and reciprocity (Chapter 3). So, while provincial magistrates—which is to say Rome—had sizeable theoretical authority and power in the province, the smooth operation of empire often put limitations on the practical execution of that power. Moreover, the power of a magistrate

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193 The upright Q. Mucius Scaevola and his legate, P. Rutilius Rufus, drew the hatred of the equites (to which class most publicani belonged and, after the lex Sempronia, which class comprised the juries at Rome) after their administration of Asia and were brought up on charges (sources in MRR II.7-8).

194 Cic. Q.fr. 1.1.32: *Atqui huic tuae voluntati ac diligentiae difficultatem magnam afferunt publicani; quibus si adversamur ordinem de nobis optime meritum et per nos cum re publica coniunctum et a nobis et a re publica diiungemus; sin autem omnibus in rebus obsequemur, funditus eas perire patiemur, quorum non modo saluti, sed etiam commodis, consulere debemus.*

195 Cic. Fam 15.3.2; Schulz, *Herr. u. Reg.*, 129-130, 138-139.

equally operated outside the institutions of his courts and administration; it functioned in the personal networks he created with cities and the leading citizens within them.

1.4 – THE COERCIVE APPARATUS OF ROMAN RULE (AND ITS LIMITS)

Perhaps what remains most striking about the Romans' rule, particularly in the East, is the limited role of coercive force (i.e. the army) in enforcing obedience over the cities in their imperium. Mithridates’ successful invasion of the provincia Asia in 88 is owed in no small part to the few Roman troops he had to contend with. As noted above, after victory in his provincia, a Roman commander returned to Rome with his troops, without leaving behind any sort of occupying force. So it was that under the Republic the Romans had no routine imminent coercive force in their provinces – despite their perceived monopoly; that is, there was nothing institutional to ensure obedience to Roman rule: no city garrisons, no standing provincial army, no provincial policing force, etc. While only diagnostic, it is representative of the Romans’ aversion to occupational force that Livy’s account of the Isthmian Proclamation of 196 follows

197 Above, p. 29. Note the similar success of Aristonicus in Asia (133-127 BCE; Strabo 14.1.38; Justin 36.4; Orosius 5.10; I.Metrop.; Robert, Claros, p. 29-35; F. Daubner, Bellum Asiaticum [Munich 2003]), or much later Q. Labienus and the Parthians (41-40 BCE; Livy Per. 127; Vell. 2.78.1; App., B.Civ. 4.63; 5.65; Syr. 51; Magie RRAM I.429-431), or Sex. Pompeius (36-35 BCE; Livy Per. 131; App. B.Civ. 5.133-135; Vell. 2.79.5; Magie, RRAM I.437-8).

198 E.g. I.Macc. 8.2-12; Polyb. 29.27.4; Livy 45.12.4 (C. Popillius Laenas threatens Antiochus IV in Egypt in 168 with making a decision before he leaves a circle drawn around him.).

199 During their Italian expansion in the fifth to third centuries, the Romans had employed coloniae civium Romanorum as something of military outpost, to defend the coastline of natural harbours and havens near Rome (E.T. Salmon, Roman Colonization under the Republic [London 1969]; A. Sherwin-White, Roman Citizenship*, 76-94). The East received very few colonies before the time of Caesar, who established a handful, though by no means many, and even under Augustus, coloniae in the East were still few. These colonies, furthermore, were no longer conceived as pseudo-garrisons, but rather autonomous civic entities created for veterans of the legions, who had come to expect land as a retirement bonus (B. Levick, Roman Colonies, esp. 1-6).
Polybius' account verbatim except in the translation of ἀφρουρήτοι (free from garrisons), which he simply omits;\(^{200}\) this Polybian passage, furthermore, is the last where we find ἀφρουρήτος mentioned in the literary and epigraphic accounts of the Republic.\(^{201}\) The Romans' policy is in direct contrast, for example, to the previous hegemons of the East, the Hellenistic kings, who established city-garrisons (φρουραί), military districts (φυλακαί), forts (φρούρια) and military colonies (κατοικίαι) over their subject states; it is also distinct from their own later practices during the Empire when provincial legions and military garrisons would become common.\(^{202}\) During the Republic a magistrate often had no more than a cadre of personal bodyguards and whatever support he could muster from among settled veterans or native partisans.\(^{203}\) It is true that in some particularly volatile provinces, notably Spain and Gaul, the Senate would regularly assign a legion or authorize a supplementum to buoy the numbers of troops;\(^{204}\) but these were predominantly unsettled regions whose indigenous population or neighbouring tribes opposed Roman rule and threatened Roman assets (as in the Spanish mines) or security (as in the Gauls on the northern Italian border). And still, even in these territories,

\(^{200}\) Polyb. 18.46.5: ἦ σύγκλητος ἡ Ῥωμαίων καὶ Τίτος Κοίντιος στρατηγὸς ὑπατος, καταπολεμήσαντες βασιλέα Φιλίππου καὶ Μακεδόνας, ἀφιάσαν ἐλευθέρους, ἀφρουρήτους, ἄφορολογήτους, νόμους χρωμένους τοῖς πατρίσις, Κορινθίους, Φωκάς, Λοκρούς, Εὐβοῖας, Ἀχαιών τοῦ Φθιώτας, Μάγνητας, Θεσσαλούς Περραϊβοὺς = Livy 33.32.5: Senatus Romanus et T. Quinctius imperator Philippo rege Macedonibusque devictos liberos, immunes. suis legibus esse iubet Corinthios, Procenses, Locrensesque omnes et insulam Euboeam et Magnetas, Thessalos, Perrhaebos, Achaeos Phthiotas.

\(^{201}\) The only exception I know of is Diod. 31.8.6, writing in the late first century CE.


\(^{203}\) E.g. Cic. Verr. 2.4.8: in provinciam cum imperio ac securibus misimus (‘We sent Verres into the province with command and guards’).

\(^{204}\) Brunt, Italian Manpower, 422-519, esp. 422-429.
provincial commanders typically focused their troops on the periphery of the province and did not garrison them in towns or use them for local or provincial policing duties.

In the East, the *provincia Macedonia* is the only territory that seems to have warranted treatment similar to Spain and Gaul in the West.\(^{205}\) Here it was the neighbouring Thracian tribes that provoked concern and made the Romans anxious. These had proven provocative in the face of Rome since the late 150s, sponsoring Andriscus, and similar “pretenders”, and even inflicting a significant defeat on Roman forces in 141, five years after regular Roman presence in the region.\(^{206}\) In fact, various isolated events mentioned in the surviving record reveal a history of recalcitrance in the province down to the Mithridatic wars. In the mid 130s, the proconsul M. Cosconius fought the Scordisci ‘in Thrace’ – that is, on the northern fringes of the province – and perhaps even followed them into the Troad just before Aristonicus’ campaign to recover his alleged Attalid patrimony.\(^{207}\) A dedicatory inscription from the Macedonian city of Letae relates that in 119 the praetor Sex. Pompeius died while fighting the Gauls (i.e. Scordici) “with his own troops” and his quaestor, M. Annius, was praised for defeating them and other Thracians without making demands on provincial cities for troops.\(^{208}\) At the end of the century, the *lex de provinciis praetoriis* records a victory by T. Didius in the Chaenic Chersonesus and instructs future provincial magistrates to spend at least sixty days north of the Hebrus River. Literary sources relate that fighting continued in the


\(^{206}\) Zon. 9.28.2-5; Diod. 32.15.5-7; cf. Florus 1.30.4; Porph. Tyr. *FGrH* 260 F 3.19; Walbank, *Comm.Polyb*. III.664 (Andriscus); Varro *R.R.* 2.4.1-2; Livy *Per.* 53 (Pseudo-Philip); cf. Kallet-Marx, *Hegemony*, 34-36.

\(^{207}\) Livy *Per.* 56; *IGRP* IV 134, lines 7-11 with the comments of Magie *RRAM* II. 1038, n.13.

\(^{208}\) *SIG* 700, lines 10-31. Annius was subsequently honoured by Letae with a laurel crown and an annual festival (lines 38-40).
north of the province down to 87, at which point the meagre troops remaining were used against Mithridates.\(^{209}\)

Macedonia, though, was exceptional for its instability and intractability and, as such, for the frequency with which Roman troops were in the province. Typically, military force was not a part of the instruments of provincial government.\(^{210}\) As noted above, a commander allotted a particularly unstable provincia might bring with him a legion or two (depending on his rank), or at times of unrest he might have troops sent to him, which he would quarter or winter in towns, but these were withdrawn after victory.\(^{211}\) This was the case in provincia Asia, where, after the victory over Aristonicus, no legions are known to have been present until those brought over to combat Mithridates in 86.\(^{212}\) The situation was similar in Africa, which, after the settlement in 146, received no legions until the campaigns against Jugurtha forty years later (111-104). After this victory the legions were withdrawn and Africa did not see another until the Civil Wars.\(^{213}\)

In the East, the Romans' aversion to occupation force dovetailed with an existing

\(^{209}\) *lex prov. praet.*, Cnidos col. IV, lines 8-9, Delphi frg. B, lines 28-29; Obsequens 43 and 48; *App. Mith.* 35.


\(^{211}\) E.g. *SIG*\(^1\) 762, line 16 (Dionysopolis quarters the troops of C. Antonius). Evidence of the ubiquity of the practice of quartering or wintering troops can be seen in the joy that cities take in earning immunity from such obligations: *lex Ant. Term.* col. II, lines 4-9; *RDGE* 57, line 14; *RDGE* 58, line 35; *Aphrod.* 8, line 34; *Jos. Ant.* 14.202; cf. M. Rostovtzeff, *SEHHW* III.1561.

\(^{212}\) In fact, the earliest efforts against the Pontic king by M'. Aquillius and Q. Oppius in 87 were undertaken with almost exclusively local levies and allied troops *App., Mith* 41; cf. Memnon, *FGrH* 434.22.7, records that C. Cassius was supported by a few Roman soldiers, and these may have been part his praetorian cohort, or a small contingent that accompanied the legate M'. Aquillius.

\(^{213}\) Brunt, *Italian Manpower*, 430.
discourse of Greek freedom that had dominated interstate relations of the Hellenistic era, and which Rome continued to employ to the end of the Republic (Chapter 2 §3).

The absence of a provincial military contingent is directly related to the absence of a general standing army, which itself was a product of the instrumental realities and socio-political norms of the Roman res publica. Rome’s army had traditionally been a citizen militia comprised of propertied citizens (the assidui), who were called up for a particular campaign in defence of the state at the beginning of a consular year, and who (ideally) returned to their land upon its completion. The prevailing ethos that the army be manned by landholding citizens reduced not only the pool of potential soldiers, but also the possibility of extended terms of service. The career of Sp. Ligustinus, whom Livy celebrated for having served most of his adult life in the legions, was extraordinary for its longevity but also underscores the ephemeral nature of second century legions as he was annually dismissed and recalled as needed. The institutions of the state, as well as the socio-political mores that developed and supported them, made unthinkable the

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214 E.g. Livy 15.18 (Scipio’s conditions to Hannibal); Polyb. 18.46 (196); Livy 34.49.4; Diod. 28.13 (194); Livy 45.26 (167).


216 According to Polybius (6.19.2), these men served a maximum of sixteen campaigns, though Brunt (Italian Manpower, 399-401) has argued that six years was a more normal length of service. The lowest census class (proletarii / capite censi) could be called upon in extraordinary cases of tumultus – the last such instance was the result of Hannibal’s threats in 214-212.

217 Livy 42.34. On Ligustinus, see F. Cadiou, “À propos du service militaire dans l’armée romaine au IIe siècle avant J.-C.: le cas de Spurius Ligustinus (Tite-Live 42, 34)” in P. Defosse, ed., Hommages à Carl Deroux (Brussels, 2002), 76-90.
notion that cities or (later) provinces would be regularly garrisoned; the massive territorial extent of the empire made it impossible.\textsuperscript{218}

Admittedly, after Sulla, Roman legions became more regular in the East as a result of the large scale military campaigns that marked the first century.\textsuperscript{219} As an extreme example, a legion levied by L. Valerius Flaccus in 86 to combat Mithridates was still active in the East twenty years later when Pompey took up his command against the Pontic king.\textsuperscript{220} These sorts of long terms of service were a consequence of C. Marius’ practice of using landless \textit{proletarii} to create his legions, foregoing property requirements that had defined the Roman citizen army to this point.\textsuperscript{221} After Marius, legions, increasingly comprised greater numbers of landless soldiers who did not have to return home to tend to their harvests, became increasingly long-term entities with their own identity and history, bound less to the \textit{res publica} than to the commander who provided their livelihood; and the commanders themselves, men like Sulla, Lucullus, Pompey, Caesar, Antony and Octavian, increasingly found means and justifications to hold

\textsuperscript{218}E. Gabba, \textit{Republican Rome, the Army and the Allies} (Berkeley 1976), 23: “This was the main factor in the grievous situation in which the Roman state found itself: to match the constant increase of territory and of the political and economic demands which followed, there had been no corresponding progress in Rome’s structural organization which continued to be that of a city-state”. Legions in the second century ranged from 4,500 to 5,500 men (Brunt, \textit{Manpower}, 671-676), meaning that standing armies in the province would have required a commitment of roughly 36,000 - 44,000 citizens (and twice as many Italian allies) by the end of the second century. More citizen-soldiers would need to be drawn up in case of an emergency – which the Romans faced annually. To give some context: Hannibal’s presence in Italy led to the levying of as many as twenty-five legions at the height of the threat to Rome, representing some 130,000 citizens in arms (240,000 including the fleet); later, while fighting wars on three fronts in 146, the Romans required twelve full legions, numbering perhaps as many 66,000 men; the war against Mithridates drew roughly eight legions (44,000). Brunt (\textit{Italian Manpower}, 422-428) has reckoned that in every decade for the years 225-146 at least eight percent of eligible citizens was called to arms, provincial garrisons would have added substantially to that figure.

\textsuperscript{219}Brunt, \textit{Italian Manpower}, 452-463.

\textsuperscript{220}Cic. \textit{Leg. Man.} 54.

\textsuperscript{221}Sall. \textit{Jug.} 86.2; Plut. \textit{Mar.} 9.1; Gabba, \textit{Republican Rome}, 1-69; cf. N. Rosenstein, \textit{Rome at War. Farms, Families, and Death in the Middle Republic} (Chapel Hill 2004). Marius’ decision, it should be noted, was not radical, but the final stage of an evolution begun a century earlier (Gabba, \textit{op. cit.}, 1-13).
imperium beyond their one year in office. Ultimately, under Augustus, a proper financial arrangement was established to support a standing army and individual legions were regularly stationed in the provinces.²²²

Still, even during the Late Republic the legions operating in a province were not a policing force. Just as with the troops in Spain, Gaul and Macedonia, these men were regularly stationed on the frontiers of the province, looking outward – playing the role of Cicero’s spears.²²³ Even under the arrangement of Augustus the heaviest concentration of troops was on the periphery of the empire (Spain, Rhine, the Balkans, Africa, and Syria) where, as in the second century, their objectives were to protect the provinces from external threats and extend the borders.²²⁴

One legion of Roman soldiers (roughly 5500 troops at full strength) was not always enough, even if at full strength, and a provincial magistrate often had to rely on local communities to fill out his ranks. We noted above that M. Annius was praised by the people of Letae for defeating the Thracians without levying troops from local cities, which implies such an action was possible. This, in fact, is confirmed by a number of

²²² According to his Res Gestae (3) Augustus commanded 500,000 men after the Battle of Actium, 300,000 of whom he de-commissioned with rewards of land or cash bonuses. He also set minimum terms of service at sixteen years (later increased to twenty, then twenty-five years) plus four years in reserve (Dio Cass. 54.25; cf. Polyb. 6.19), as well as standard pay for the soldier. He established an aerarium militare initially with his own funds (170,000,000 HS; R. Gest. 17), which was replenished by a new one percent tax on sales at auction and five percent inheritance tax (Dio.55.25.2-5; cf. Suet. Aug. 49.2); J. Campbell, The Emperor and the Roman Army 31BC – AD 235 (Oxford 1984), 157-175, esp. 160-161; C. Wells, The Roman Empire (Stanford 1984), 77-79, 136-139.

²²³ See above, n. 116. During the Late Republic a Roman commander in his province was expected not only to protect but also to expand Roman territory: Cic. Rep. 3.24 (finis imperii propagavit); Prov.cos. 29 (finum imperii propagatio); Phil. 13.14 (finis imperi propagabis); cf. De off. 2.85: ut [magistratus] rem publicam augeant imperio agris vectialibus. Brunt, “Laus Imperii”, 162-164.

²²⁴ According to Tacitus (Ann. 4.5) in 23CE there were a total of twenty-five legions distributed as follows: two in Spain, eight on the Rhine, six in the Balkans (two each in Moesia, Pannonia, Dalmatia), four in Africa (two each in Africa and Egypt) and four in Syria; cf. Strabo 17.3.25; J.C. Mann, “Frontiers of the Principate” ANRW II.1 (1974), 508-533.
other inscriptions, such as a Bargylian decree recounting the city’s obedience to Q.
Caepio’s requisition for soldiers to combat Aristonicus; a dedication from a statue base in Elis recording the names of fifteen Achaean cities whose men fought with Cn.
Domitius against the Gauls; or an award of ἀστρατευσία (freedom from military obligations) from M. Antonius to the council of Victors in the Sacred Games. A Roman magistrate was well within his power to request troops from local communities to support a campaign, just as was required of any allied state. An inscription from Aphrodisias, however, reminds us that such requests were not always assured, as we find Q. Oppius pleading for locals to free him from a siege at Laodicea in 88. Even a full legion could not hold a territory that actively resisted Rome. This is part of the reason for

\[225\] _Iasos_ 612, lines 16-18, 21-27: ἀντιστράτηγον Γναίου Δομέτιον Γναίου ... ἔξαγαγόντος δὲ τοὺς ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου ἀποσταλέσατας κατὰ συμμαχίαν [στρατιώτας] ... [Κοίνων Καισάρων - - - διαδεξάμενος τὴν ἐν[κεχειρισμένην] τῷ [Γρηγορίῳ, πλὴθος ἰκανὸν στρατιστῶν ἐξῆτει, τῇ δύναμιν] ταὐτῷ ἀναληφθομενῷ [εὐστάντος τε πάλιν τοῦ πολέμου, συνεβέβαιες θυλαξὶ διὰ τὸ ἐκ] τῆς Κοίνου Καισάρων ἐπίταγης κατὰ τὸ συνεχὲς [Ῥωμαίοις ἡμᾶς συστατεύουσα], ἐξαπεστάλθη δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου καὶ ἀπο[γεγραφῆ περί τοι] τῆς τοῦ πολέμου καὶ πλείονας, ἐπὶ ἔνδομεν τὴν οὖσαν [ὅτι ἐπορίαν] (‘Cn. Domitius ... [led out the soldiers] sent from the city according to the alliance. ... Quintus Caepio, succeeding to the [command] from Gnaeus, sought a [large number] of soldiers in order to take this [force] into the field; [and when again] war broke out our city was [heavily] burdened by our continual campaigns with the Romans in accordance with the requisition from Q. Caepio, and even more [soldiers] were sent off by the people and were registered for the war and many other things, and a difficult time followed thereafter.’).

\[226\] _ISE_ II.60: Ἀχαϊῶν Πατρείς Δυμαιῷ Φαραιεῖς | Θριάσιοι Ἡραιεῖς Θελφοῦσι Ψωφίδιοι | Κλειτόριοι Κυναιεῖς Καλλιστᾶταί | Ἀσχείς Λεοντήσιοι Τριταεῖς Αἰγιεῖς | Αἰγυράται Πελαινεῖς Βούριοι | Φενεάται Καρυενεῖς οἱ στρατάρχαι | μετὰ Γναίου Δομέτιον στραταγόν ὑπάτου | Ῥωμαίοι ἐπὶ Γαλλάταις Δάμωνα Ἀλκισθένεος | Πατρήν τὸν αὐτῶν ἀγεμόνα ἀρετάς ἔνεκεν | Ἰδι Ολυμπίῳ (‘The Achaeans from Patrae, Dyne, Pharaea, Thriasae, Herae, Thelphousiae, Psophidia, Kleitoria, Kynaithes, Kallistate, Aschea, Leontesa, Bouria, Pheneatea, Karynea, who fought with Cn. Dometius, consul of the Romans against the Gauls (dedicate) to the Olympian gods (this statue) of Damon son of Alkisthenes leader of Patrae on account of his virtue’).

\[227\] _RDGE_ 57, line 14; cf. _RDGE_ 49b, line 12.

\[228\] See Chapter 3.

\[229\] _Aphrod._ 2; cf. no. 3 (Oppius’ letter of thanks).
the remarkable speed with which Mithridates was able to overwhelm Asia.\textsuperscript{230} Upon news of his invasion, the Roman force mustered to meet him was a small handful of legionaries held over from the previous year, heavily supplemented by troops from neighbouring principalities and auxiliaries from the Bithynian king.\textsuperscript{231} As one scholar has recently observed, a provincial force of one or two legions could hardly have been intended to police the interior of a \textit{provincia} as well as meet the threats on the periphery – Rome’s was not an army of occupation.\textsuperscript{232}

Looking at this from the other viewpoint, recent research on the survival and function of the \textit{polis} during the late Hellenistic era has affirmed that security and policing remained a local concern. Not only did the Romans not garrison towns, but they also did not take measures to remove the military impetus or capacity from communities upon ‘provincialization’, apart from often de-commissioning royal troops.\textsuperscript{233} Greek cities maintained a military culture (e.g. discourses, ideas, symbols, as well as institutions, traditions, and commemorations) during the Republic that had been central to their identity since the Classical era.\textsuperscript{234} In fact, even under the Empire, the Romans cannot be said to have disarmed their subjects, though one does find evidence after the Augustan period of the abolition of local military officials like \textit{στρατηγοὶ} and \textit{ἱππάρχοι}, and the re-

\textsuperscript{230}See above, p. 29.

\textsuperscript{231}App. \textit{Mith.} 11, 17; Magie, \textit{RRAMI}.210-211; cf. App. \textit{Mith} 41 (Sulla relying on local levies).

\textsuperscript{232}Kallet-Marx, \textit{Hegemony}, 40.

\textsuperscript{233}Brélaz, \textit{La sécurité publique}, 25. Exceptional is the treatment of Carthage in 149 whereby the city was obliged to surrender all weaponry by Roman settlement. However, shortly thereafter realizing the odium of capitulating to Rome the city began replenishing its supplies such that it could withstand Rome for another three years, which as Brunt ("Did Imperial Rome Disarm her Subjects?" \textit{Phoenix} 29 [1975], 258-259) points out only emphasizes the futility of a general policy of disarmament.

\textsuperscript{234}C. Brélaz, "L’adieu aux armes, 166-184; J. Ma, "Une culture militaire en Asie Mineure hellénistique?" in J.C. Couvenhes and H.L. Fernoux (eds.), \textit{Les Cités grecques et la guerre en Asie Mineure à l’époque hellénistique} (Tours 2004), 199-220.
orientation of military authority around Rome. In any case, the capacity to defend itself remained central to the ideology of the independent *polis* throughout the second and first centuries. Inscriptions reveal ephebic oaths to defend the *polis* and combat its enemies, panboeotian festivals that included military teams competing in good use of arms (*eudoplia*) and discipline (*eutaxia*), benefactors for the upkeep of the city wall, Pergamenes granting citizenship to former Attalid garrison troops and military settlers when Aristonicus threatened, and the survival and operation of civic-military institutions (forts, offices, armies, *gymnastia*, *euthenia*, etc.).

Throughout the Republic, *poleis* continued to raise their own troops, which, as the Mithridatic War demonstrated, could be to Rome’s advantage or disadvantage. The (military) autonomy of the city-states meant that they could, and had to defend themselves without Roman support against (e.g.) pirates, whom the Romans did not

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237 Rhodes & Osborne, *GHI* 88 (= Tod, *GHI* no. 204), lines 5-11: οὐκ ἀἰσχυνῶ τὰ ἱερὰ ὁμαδὰ οὐδὲ λείψω τὸν παραστάτην ὅπου ἀν στειχήσω ἀμυνώ δὲ καὶ ὑπὲρ ἱερῶν καὶ ὀσίων, καὶ ὃκ ἐλάττω παραδῶσῳ τὴν πατρίδα, πλείω δὲ καὶ ἀρείω κατὰ τὸ ἐμαυτὸν καὶ μετὰ ἀπάντων (‘I will not dishonour the sacred weapons and I will not abandon the comrade on the flank, whomever I may be placed next to; and I will fight to defend the sacred and holy; I will not deliver the fatherland diminished, but larger and stronger’); cf. *Staatsverträge* no. 545.

238 *SEG* III.355; *SEG* XXVI 551.

239 F. Maier, *Griechische Mauerbauschriften* I, no. 52; cf. Hellenistic epigram in which it seems the city’s wall is referred to as “the crown of free children” (*ISE* 100); Ma, “Fighting Poleis”, 339-343.

240 *OGIS* 338, lines 12-19 grant citizenship to (i.a.) οἱ τῶν στρατιωτῶν κατοικοῦντοι, οἱ ἀναφερόμενοι ἐν τοῖς φρουρίωι καὶ οἱ παραφυλακίται; cf. *I.Eph.* 8, lines 20-62, which grants citizenship to slaves and foreign residents, as well as various sorts of debt relief, to anyone who would take up arms to defend the city against Mithridates.

seriously combat until the last years of the second century, and did not prove successful against until the mid 60s. Before these Roman efforts, city-states of the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean were on their own: various Greek dedications recount a city’s gratitude toward their citizens of another polis for their aid against pirates. Security within and between poleis was left to the city-states; the Romans only got involved in extreme cases and often only post eventum to arbitrate between parties. We know from a magistrate’s letter to Dyme that in 143 that city suffered something of a coup, in which a certain Sosus had gained power, and which seems to have caused quite an uproar including the destruction of the state archives. The Romans played no role in suppressing Sosus, but only in upholding his and his co-conspirators’ convictions, presumably after their appeals. Even during the Principate, there was no noticeable security force in the provinces. Brélatz has recently studied the infrastructure of public security in the Roman province of Asia and meticulously detailed the continued role played by local officials such as εἰρήναρχος (policing agent), παραφόλαξ (policing agent focused on

242 M. Antonius’ command against pirates in 102-101: Cic. De or. 1.82; 2.2; Livy Per. 68; Just. Epit, prol. 39; Obseq. 44; CIL 1.2.2662; IGRP IV 1116; I.Delos 4.1700; T. Broughton, “Notes on Roman Magistrates” TAPA 77 (1946), 35-40; Pompey’s command was established by the lex Gabinia (67): Cic. Leg. Man. 15, 44, 52-58; Livy Per. 99; Vell. Pat. 2.31-32; Plut. Pomp. 25-26; Broughton, MRR II.144-146; cf. M. Antonius Creticus’ command in 74; Vell. Pat. 2.31.3-4. On piracy in the Roman world, see: H. Ormerod, Piracy in the Ancient World (Chicago, 1967 [1924]), esp. 190-241; P. de Souza, Piracy in the Greco-Roman World (Cambridge, 2002).

243 IGRP IV, 1029 (Ephesus praises citizens of Astypalae for saving them from pirates); IG II² 3218 (Athenians praised for their efforts off the coast of Cilicia.), with Kallet-Marx, Hegemony, 306 n. 55; OGIS 552-554 (series of Lycian inscriptions concerning a pirate expedition with no mention of the Romans).

surveillance), ὀροφύλαξ (territorial guard), and μαστιγοφόροι (security for special occasions such as festivals).\(^{245}\)

Roman authority over its subjects was not, then, compelled (or even supported) by a routine coercive infrastructure; without any town or provincial garrisons, standing provincial armies, etc., the empire could not rely on the presence of an immanent coercive force to compel its Greek subjects.\(^{246}\) In fact, security remained the responsibility of local communities, on whose support the Romans could draw, but whose forces could generate their own crises if appropriately mobilized. While there may have been increasing numbers of soldiers in the East during the second half of the first century, they continued to be pre-occupied with the frontiers or, during the tumultuous civil wars, domestic strife.

1.5 – LIMITS OF THE PROVINCE

1.5.1: Free Cities (Civitates Liberae)

Many of the limitations in the imperial apparatus stem from the citizen-state arrangement of the Roman res publica – the Romans were simply unable to dedicate more officers, more administration, or more legions to the provinciae without fundamentally changing their own governing structure. Because of this, the Roman empire relied on the traditional self-government of the Greek poleis, and can be said to

\(^{245}\) Brélaz, Securité, 90-182.

\(^{246}\) Brélaz, Securité, 26: “En définitive, la sécurité et la tranquillité des provinces anatoliennes sous la République dépendent largement de la loyauté des cites formant ces provinces et de la bienveillance des dynastes des multiples royaumes limitrophes avec lesquels Rome nourrit des relations diplomatiques versatiles.”
have been structured upon a high degree of local civic autonomy. Thus Lintott introduces his monograph on the *imperium Romanum* with the admonition not to overestimate the quality and extent of the Romans’ control in their empire; the strength of the Roman empire, he reminds us, lay in the autonomy that it afforded its subjects.\(^{247}\) In this section we want to consider the role of local autonomy in the structure of Roman rule.

Some cities and people, as alluded to above, were specifically recognized as free (*libera*) and therefore “outside the province”.\(^{248}\) The reference comes from a celebrated dedicatory decree to Menippos of Colophon, which also contained a Roman decision confirming that the city’s autonomy (*αὐτονομία*) was distinct from the province.\(^{249}\) As is so often the case during the Republic, the Romans do not seem to have established a definition for a free state (*civitas libera*);\(^{250}\) rather, the autonomy of a *civitas libera* was

\(^{247}\) Lintott, *Imp. Rom.*, 2-3; cf. p. 54: “Roman government would have been impossible without immense delegation of administration”.

\(^{248}\) *Claros*, Menippos col. II, line 4: τῆς ἐπαρχείας ἐκτος. Compare also the *lex port.*, which makes exceptions in the application of the custom dues for cities outside the *forumula* of one of the twelve *conventus* (ἐξω διοικήσεως, lines 88-89) that made up the province, which the most recent editors of the text assume means “free” (Cottier, *Customs Law of Asia*, 137-138).

\(^{249}\) *Claros*, Menippos, col. I, lines 39-40: τῆς ἐπαρχείας ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτονομίας χωρισθείσης; Bernhardt, *Imp u. Eleuth.*, 19-32; Ferrary, *Philhellénisme*, 211-218; idem, “La liberté des cités et ses limites à l’époque républicaine” Med.Ant 2 (1999), 71. This distinction is also found in evidence from the Late Republic (e.g. Cic. *Balb.* 4.9: quem provinciae nostrae, quem liberi populi, quem reges, quem ultimae gentes...viderunt), the Principate (Strabo 17.3.24; cf. 12.3.1) and the High Empire (*Aphrodisias* 14 [Trajan] & 15 [Hadrian], acknowledging that the city was outside the *formula provinciae*).

\(^{250}\) On *civitates liberae*, see: A.H.M. Jones, “civitates liberae et immunes” in W. Calder and J. Keil, eds., *Anatolian Studies* (Manchester 1939), 103-117; Dahlheim, *Gewalt u. Herrschr.*, 217-27; Berhardt, *Imp. u. Elueth*, passim; Sherwin-White, *Roman Citizenship*, 175-182; J.-L. Ferrary, “le statut des cités libres dans l’empire romain à lumière des inscriptions de Claros” CRAI 1991, 557-577. In his monograph on the free-state, Bernhardt has identified as many as one hundred and fifty *civitates liberae* at various points throughout the Republic, which are well indexed (pp. 259-265). Caution, however, should be taken with some of his identifications, particularly those based solely on the testimony of Pliny, for whom *libera* was a technical status. See below, p. 101.
described by, but not limited to, the aggregate of privileges awarded by particular decrees of the Senate or legislation of the People.\textsuperscript{251} In the Colophonian decree honouring Menippos, for example, we find the city describing its free condition in terms of rights acknowledged by the Romans:\textsuperscript{252}

(Menippos) gained for the people better guarantees of the full ownership of coastal territory, preserving the ancestral frontiers, the ‘Narrows’ and Prepelaion; he freed the city’s inhabitants from their pledges and the power of the magistrate; the province was distinguished from our autonomy; and he maintained the authority of our laws for all legal actions even against the Romans themselves.

The list of rights is impressive:\textsuperscript{253} full possession over traditional territory, independence from the power of the Roman magistrate, and the continued use of local laws, even against Roman citizens. This example is striking for the multiplicity of privileges and the straightforwardness with which they are presented, but most are not unique to Colophon; similar liberties were enjoyed by many other free-states, and as such we can make some general observations.

\textsuperscript{251} On the importance of active assertion of the privileges, see below p. 103.

\textsuperscript{252} Claros, Menippos, col. I, lines 34-42: τῆς μὲν παραλίου χώρας τὴν πανκτησίαν βεβαιώτεραν πεποίηκε τῷ δήμῳ, τῆς δὲ κατὰ τὰ Στενὰ καὶ τὸ Πρεπέλαιον τοὺς πατρίους δροὺς τετήρηκεν, τοὺς δὲ κατοικοῦντας τὴν πόλιν ἐλευθέρωσε κατεγγυθέωσιν καὶ στρατηγικὴς ἔξουσιας, τῆς ἐπαρχείας ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτονομίας χωρισθείσης κυρίους δὲ τοὺς νόμους τετήρηκεν ἐπὶ παντὸς ἐγκλημάτως καὶ πρὸς αὐτοὺς Ἦρωμαίους.

\textsuperscript{253} Compare the various rights awarded to the Aphrodians (Aphrod. 8), who earned “freedom and immunity from taxation in all matters” (lines 52, 62), after 38: i) removal from the Romans’ revenue books (lines 30-31); ii) freedom from quartering and wintering Roman troops (lines 32-34); iii) freedom from levies of soldiers, material and victuals (line 35); iv) inviolability for the Temple of Aphrodite (lines 55-56); v) possession, control, use, and enjoyment of fields, places, buildings, villages, estates, forts, pastures and revenues held previously (lines 58-59; borders defined at line 63); vi) immunity from custom and pasture dues (line 64); vii) immunity from any other public tax that a provincial magistrate might levy (lines 65-66); viii) position outside the governor’s jurisdiction (lines 68-69); ix) use and enjoyment of traditional laws (lines 70-71).
In the first place, *civitates liberae* enjoyed full ownership of their lands. The text of the *lex Antonia de Termessibus*, which acknowledged the freedom and land claims of Termessus Maior in Pisidia after the First Mithridatic War, records how these rights appeared in the legal jargon of the mid-first century:

> Whatever fields, places or buildings – public or private – of Termessus Maior in Pisidia are, or were, within their borders when L. Marcius and Sex. Julius were consuls [i.e. 91], whatever islands are, or were, theirs in the time of the aforementioned consuls ... all these the citizens of Termessus Maior in Pisidia shall hold and occupy ... use and enjoy.

The reference in this law to the city's maritime possessions – highly unlikely given that the *polis* was land-locked – suggests that the language might not have been uniquely written for the Antonian law, but follow a set text, and that by the early first century the acknowledgment of territorial rights for free states was standard.

Full legal ownership meant that within its territory the free state had full sovereignty to continue to apply its legal, administrative, and fiscal systems (including

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254 Menippos’ third embassy (col. I, lines 22-23; col. II, lines 33-37) was to assert the city’s claim to key areas on its border (Roberts, *Claros*, 89 with the observations by Ferrary, “la liberté des cités”, 565). Polemaios likely travelled abroad to assert the same right (col. II, lines 34-43).

255 *Lex Ant. Term.*, col. I, lines 12-26: *quei agrei quae loca aedificia publica preiutaue Thermensium Maiorum Pisidarum intra fineis eorum sunt fuertunue L. Marcio Sec. Julio co(n)s(ulibus), quaeque insulae eorum sunt fuertunte iei consolibus, quei supra scriptei sunt, quodque earum rerum iei consolibus iei habuerunt possederunt uset fructeie sunt, quae de iei rebus lobata non sunt ante hanc legem rogatam quaeque de iei rebus, [quom ante hac locata sint, post] hac ne locentur [cautum est in locatione q]uae facta est e[x] l[ege Ciliciae locandae dicta (?), e]a omnia Ther[m]eses Maiores Pisidae habeant possideant ieiisque [omnibus iei utantur fr]uantur; cf. lines 27-35. Compare a decree of 38 from Aphrodisias (*Aphrod.*, 8, lines 58-60): οἱ πολείται οἱ Πλαρασίων καὶ Αφροδησίων μεθ’ ὧν ἀγρῶν, τόπων, οἰκοδομῶν, κωμῶν, χωρίων, ὁχυρωμάτων, ὄρων, προσόντων δ' τῷ τὴν φύλαν το[θ] θήμου τοῦ Ρωμαίων προσήλθον ταῦτα πάντα ἐξω[θίσθαι]ν, κρατώ[ντα]ν, χρῶντα, καρπίζοντα τε, πάντων τῶν προγάμτων [[N]] ἐ[λ]ξεθεροὶ ἀτελείς τε καὶ ἀδημοσιωνητοί ὀ[στίν· ("Plarasa and Aphrodisias are to have, control, use, and enjoy the fields, places, buildings, villages, estates, strongpoints, pastures, (and) revenues which they had when they entered into the friendship of the Roman People and are to be free, immune, and not subject to the publicani"); *lex agr.* lines 74-77, which mentions “land within the borders of a free people” (*ager intra finis popolorum leibororum*).

levying and collecting its own taxes) over not just its own citizens but others subject to them. This last point is significant, for it means that these civitates liberae—cities under Roman hegemony (though outside the provincia)—could be said to have their own subjects and enjoy their own laws. For proof of the importance of territorial ownership (and its attendant tertiary rights), one need only recall that Menippos twice made the arduous journey to Rome to preserve them; more striking still is the recently published mid-first century treaty between the Romans and the Lycian League (acknowledged as free since 167), which devotes more than a dozen lines to scrupulously listing the boundaries of the land which the Lycians “shall possess, control and enjoy in perpetuity”.

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257 e.g. RDGE 18, lines 53-56, 95-112; RDGE 20, frg. E, lines 13-17; Crawford, RS no. 19, col. II, lines 31-36.

258 RDGE 21 col. I, lines 16 and 18; col. II, line 7.

259 The acknowledgement of subjects was not unique to free cities alone, but applied also to allies of the Romans. The standard language of treaties included clauses that the Greek ally “shall not permit an enemy of the Roman people to pass through its territory or the territory which it controls (διὰ τῆς ἰδίας χώρας καὶ ἥς ἄν ὁ δήμος ὁ δεινός κρατητῆ)’’ while the Romans similarly swore “not to make war on the people and those under their rule’’ (ὦστε [μὴ] τῷ δήμῳ τοῦ δεινός καὶ τοῖς ὑπ’ αὐτοῦς ταξομονεύουσιν πόλεμον ἐπιφέρον). cf. RDGE 21, lines 15-16. On the structure and content of Roman treaties, see now S. Mitchell, “The Treaty between Rome and Lycia of 46 BC (MS 2070)” in R. Pintaudi, ed., Papyri Graecae Schoyen (Florence, 2005), 164-243; Chapter 3, §3.1.

260 Mitchell, Pap. Gr. Schoy., lines 52-64: οἱ πόλεις, κώμαι, όχυρώματα, φρούρια, ἦτε χώραι καὶ οἱ λιμένες ὁ ἐν τοῖς τῆς Λυκίας ὅρισι ὑπάρχοντες, δοῦσα τε μετὰ ταύτα Λυκίων δεδομένα τα καὶ ἀποκαθεσταμένα ἤταν, Τελμησσός, Χώμα, Φάσηλις, Σίλοια, Σερρα, Λίσσα, οἴ τε τόποι καὶ οἱ οἰκισμοί ἦτε χώραι καὶ οἱ λιμένες οἱ ἐν τοῖς τούτων τῶν πολεμείπων ὡστε μετὰ Λυκίων ἔστωσαν, Ὀλινασσός, Ὀξύλιδος, Ἕρεμνα, Ἀσταγάλου κώμη, Μουμλάνα, χωρία το ἐν Ναυλισσώι, Κιλλαραϊ, Μομίρου, Τυμίμα, Μασα Όρος, Μαρακάνδα, Ουάστα, Τετραπύργη, Ἑλησσός, Ἀκαρασσός, Φιλεττα, Τερπονέλλα, Τερπις, Κοδόπτα, Μεικρόν Ὀρος, Λακασσός· οἱ τε τόποι καὶ οἱ τούτων οἰκισμοί ἦτε χώραι δοὺς τα ἐν τούτων τῶν ὄρισι Λυκίων ἔστωσαν· Λυκίων τα ταύτα κατεκτάσαν κρατεῖτασαν κατασκεύασαν διὰ παντός καθὼς Γαῖας Καύσαρ ὁ αὐτοκράτωρ ἐκρίνετο ἢ τε σύνκλητος δογματίσασα συνεπεκδύσαε· (’The cities, villages, strongholds, forts, lands and harbours presently within the borders of Lycia, and whatever afterwards is given and restored to the Lycians are as follows: Telmessos, Choma, Phaselis, Silva Serra, and Lissa: the places and buildings, lands and harbours belong to the following communities are also the Lycians’: Olinassos, Oxyolithos, Eremona, Astagalou Kome, Moulanda and the estates at Naulissos, Killara, Mermura, Tymema, Masa Oros, Marakanda, Vauta, Tetrapyrgia, Elbessos, Akarassos, Philletta, Terponella, Terpis, Kodoppa, Meikron Oros, Akarassos; the places, their buildings, territories and whatever
Territorial sovereignty seems also to have meant that within the borders of a free state (or over those who lived within its borders) a provincial magistrate had no jurisdiction. In the decree for Menippos, the Colophonians assert not only that he “freed the inhabitants of the city from the power of the governor” but, recounting the words of the Roman senate itself, affirm that “outside of his province, a Roman magistrate can neither be judge, nor meddle in such matters [sc. boundary disputes]”. 261 A Sullan era senatus consultum concerning Chios states much the same, pronouncing that Chians were “in no way (subject) to any act of a magistrate or pro-magistrate.” 262 A generation later, Cicero excoriated L. Calpurnius Piso (procos. Macedonia, 57-55) for “administering justice over free states contrary to the law and decrees of the senate” and P. Clodius for imprisoning these free people and handing them over to Piso. 263 This immunity from a

is inside their boundaries, shall be the Lycians’. And these the Lycians shall possess, control, and enjoy in perpetuity just as Gaius Caesar Imperator decided and as the Senate passed a resolution and jointly confirmed.’). The Lycians were free until the time of Claudius, when they became the provincia Lycia-Pamphylia (Suet. Claud. 25.9; Dio Cass. 60.17.3).

261 Col II., lines 4-5: διότι τῆς ἐπαρχείας ἐκτός οὔτε κρίνειν οὔτε πολιταρχεῖν τῷι στρατηγῷ καθῆκε. The Colophonians also relate (lines 6-7) that “this decision is one that conforms to democracy and is good” (ἰδιότατον τῇ δημοκρατίᾳ καὶ κάλλιστον ἐνέγκας ἀπόκριμα). This decision stems from Menippos’ first two embassies to Rome, which seem to have concerned the right of the Roman governor to dictate boundary settlements between Colophon and its neighbour, Metropolis (col. I, lines 20-21 and lines 50-54 – col. II, lines 1-5).

262 RDGE 70, lines 16-17: ἵνα τε ὑπὸ μηθ' ὀτιν[οῦν] τυπω δοσὶν ἀρχόντων ἢ ἀρχόντων. This portion of the text is preserved in an epistula of Augustus dating to probably 4/5 CE. (A.J. Marshall, “Romans under Chian Law” GRBS 10 (1969), 257-258, has pointed out that here τύπος refers to “a ruling or directive issued in writing by the governor to treat a legal matter”, which in light of the Colophonian decrees, refers to a general freedom from magisterial decisions.); cf. L. Peppe, Sulla giurisdizione in populos liberos (Milan 1988), 24-27, employing literary material exclusively.

263 Cic. Prov. cons. 3.6: omittu iuris dictionem in libera civitate contra leges senatusque consulta (‘I say nothing about [Piso’s] administration of justice in a free state contrary to laws and decrees of the Senate.’); 4.7: emisti grandi pecunia ut tibi de pecuniis creditis ius in liberos populos contra senatus consultum et contra legem generi tui dicere liceret (‘You [Piso] bought for a large sum of money the right of administering justice over free states in matters of debt contrary to decrees of the Senate and a law of our son-in-law [i.e. Caesar].’); Dom. 9.23: homini taeterrimo, crudelissimo, fallacissimo ... L. Pisoni, nomine nominatim populos liberos, multis senatus consultis, etiam recenti lege generi ipsius liberatos, vincetos et
Roman magistrate's decision might sometimes be expressed in more particular terms: at Termessus, the governor was specifically forbidden from wintering his troops in the city;\(^{264}\) at Aphrodisias he was forbidden from drawing citizens for his military levy or wintering his troops in the city;\(^{265}\) while the *lex Iulia de repetundis* forbade governors from administering justice over free states specifically in the matter of debt.\(^{266}\) In any case, these examples suggest that such free states were regularly beyond the legal reach of the provincial magistrate.

In a broader sense still, a free state was often said to enjoy the unencumbered use of "those of its own laws and customs that it had formerly enjoyed", which probably regularly also included laws passed afterwards too, as is found explicitly expressed in a number of *senatus consulta*.\(^{267}\) On the one hand, this right was not much different than the independence from a provincial magistrate's interference (a positive, rather than negative liberty).\(^{268}\) more than a decade or two after being recognized as free, Colophon successfully petitioned the proconsul of Asia to invalidate a Roman judgment against one

\(^{264}\) Col. II, lines 6-13; cf. Livy 43.8.7.

\(^{265}\) *Aphrod.* 8, lines 32-34.


\(^{267}\) *RDGE* 18, lines 91-2: [οὗ] τε νόμοις ἐθισμοῖς τε ἰδίαις πρότερον [ἐχρώντο, τού]τοις χράσθωσαν; *Aphrod.* 8, lines 61-2: νόμοις τε ἰδίαις π[ατρ]ίοις καὶ οὕς ἀν μετὰ ταῦτα ἐν ἐαυτοῖς κυριωτέρας φύλαξαν; cf. *Claros*, Menippos, col. II, lines 24-25, 40-41; *Claros Polemaios*, col. II, lines 56-62; *RDGE* 17, lines 10-12; *RDGE* 18, line 49; *RDGE* 70, lines 15-16; *RDGE* 21, line 17; *lex Term.* col. I, lines 8-10; *Aphrod.* 8, lines 47 and 70; *IGRR IV* 38, line 12.

of its citizens, thereby "preserving unharmed our own decisions, citizens, and laws";\(^{269}\) and Mytilene appealed all the way to Caesar himself to rescind earlier grants of immunity to local elites because it violated their laws.\(^{270}\) On the other hand, the right of a state to use its own laws meant that illegalities committed within its territory, even when committed by or against a Roman citizen, could be tried within the state by local law.\(^{271}\) Twice this right is found among the Colophonian texts, and the aforementioned decree concerning Chios likewise asserts that "those Romans living among them are to be subject to Chian law".\(^{272}\)

By far the most tangible privilege accorded to the free state was immunity (\textit{immunitas}) from direct Roman taxation.\(^{273}\) Since the Isthmian Proclamation (196), the Romans had proclaimed Greeks free and immune, and numerous references to immunity

\(^{269}\) \textit{Claros}, Polemaios, col. II, lines 51-58: ἐνὸς δὲ τῶν πολιτῶν κατακρίτου γενομένου ἑυμῆκος κριτήριοι ἐν τῇ ἐπαρχείᾳ, προσβέβοιας πρὸς τὸν στρατηγὸν τὸν γενόμενον ἀκυρων ἐποίησεν καὶ τὰ κρίματα καὶ τὸν πολέμησιν καὶ τοὺς νέμους ἀβλαβεῖς ἐτήρησεν ("When one of our citizens was condemned by a Roman court in the province, Polemaios conducted an embassy to the praetor and arranged that this court decision should become invalid, preserving unharmed our judgements and our citizen and our laws"); cf. col. II, lines 60-63.

\(^{270}\) \textit{RDGE} 26b, lines 28-30. It was common practice in the first century to reward those who had shown remarkable loyalty to Rome with grants of ἀλειτουργηρία, ἀτελία or ἀνείσφορία: e.g., \textit{RDGE} 44, line 6; \textit{RDGE} 22, line 12.

\(^{271}\) The discovery of Menippos Decree makes moot many earlier discussions on the subjectivity of Romans to local laws; these earlier discussions are summarized in Marshall, "Romans under Chian Law", 259-262, whose own arguments are likewise now superceded by those of Ferrary, "statut des cités libres". The new Roman treaty with Lycia (Mitchell, \textit{Pap. Gr.Schoy}) indicates this was not the case with \textit{civitates foederatae} of the Late Republic (lines 34-37), although about earlier times we cannot be certain.

\(^{272}\) \textit{Claros}, Menippos, col. I, lines 42-44: τῆς συγκλήτου δεδομιστικῆς καὶ τῶν ἀδικοῦτα καὶ τῶν ἐνκαλοῦτα τινὶ τῶν εμετέρων πολιτῶν ῥωμαίον κρίνεσθαι παρ’ ἑμῖν ("it was decreed by the Senate that any Roman, whether defendant or plaintiff against one of our citizens, should be judged among us"); Polemaios, col. II, lines 51-58 (text at n. 269); \textit{RDGE} 70, lines 17-18: οἳ τε παρ’ αὐτοῖς ὄντες ῥωμαῖοι τοῖς Χείων ὑπακούσαι νόμισι.

\(^{273}\) For other immunities, see Appendix V.
are found in the epigraphic and literary record throughout the Republic. That tax immunity regularly accompanied recognitions of freedom is suggested by a handful passages, the most commonly cited of which comes from Appian’s *Bellum Civile*. This passage informs us that owing to the Sullan wars, not just allies, kings and tributary states had to remunerate the Romans and obey Sulla, but also those who were “autonomous and not subject to tribute”. The implication here is that free states routinely did not pay Roman taxes, but had to in this case – the tautology “autonomous and immune (ἀυτελείς)” presumably meant to emphasis that everyone had to pay the indemnity (πᾶσαι συντελεῖν). Appian, though, is writing in the second century CE and his accuracy is often not above reproach. From the very end of our period, however, comes contemporary and less ambiguous evidence in the form of a letter of Augustus to the people of Samos, published in Aphrodisias. In the letter, the Princeps explains to the Samians that he has rejected their appeal for *libertas* because they had done nothing to earn it, assuring them that it had nothing to do with the money he might lose by making

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274 E.g. *RDGE* nos. 34 (193), 1 (189), 44 (mid 2nd C), 53 (1st C), 49 (81), 22 (78), 57 (42), 58 (42-30); *Aphrod.* 8 (38); *ISE* 42 (170); *IGRP* IV.194 (90); App. *Mith.* 57; Cic. *Verr.* 2.3.13 (certainly employing Late Republican language); cf. Polyb. 18.44.5 (196); Livy 38.39.9 (188).

275 App. *B.Civ.* 1.102: ἡθῆν τε τάρ πάντα καὶ βασιλεῖς, δοσὶ σύμμαχοι, καὶ πόλεις, οὔ δασι μόνον ὑποτελεῖς, ἄλλα καὶ δοσὶ ἐαυτὰς ἐγκεχειρίκεαν ἐπὶ συνθήκαις ἑνορκοὶ καὶ δοσὶ καὶ συμαχίαν ἤ τινα ἄρετὴν ἄλλην αὐτόνομοι τε καὶ φόρων ἦσαν ἀτελεῖς, τότε πᾶσαι συντελεῖν ἐκελέυοντο καὶ ὑπακούειν (‘All the allied nations and kings, and not only the tributary cities, but those which had delivered themselves to the Romans voluntarily under sworn agreements, and those which by virtue of their furnishing aid in war or for some other merit were autonomous and not subject to tribute, all were now required to pay and to obey.’); cf. *B.Civ.* 5.6: καὶ τέλος παρακαλοῦντες ἔτυχον ἐννέα ἐτῶν φόρους ἔσενεγκειν ἔτει δύο. βασιλεύσει δὲ καὶ δυνάσταις καὶ πόλεσιν ἔλευθεραις ἄλλα ἐς ἑκάστων δύναμιν ἐπιτάχθη (‘Finally, the Greeks prevailed by their entreaties that the amount should be reduced to nine years’ taxes, payable in two years. It was ordered that the kings, princes, and free cities should make additional contributions according to their means, respectively.’); Dahlheim, *Gewalt u. Herrsch.*, 255-261; R. Bernhardt, “Die Immunitas der Freistädte” *Historia* 29 (1980), 190-207.
them free.\(^{276}\) The implication here seems clear: the Samians would have become immune by virtue of their freedom. It would seem, then, that by the time of Augustus those enjoying the recognition \textit{libera} also enjoyed \textit{immunitas} as a matter of course.

It is important to understand, however, that these characteristics of a free state – full territorial possession, freedom from the jurisdiction of the provincial magistrate, use of local laws, and immunity from direct taxation – are generalizations and not rigid rules. Modern scholars, for example, vigorously debate whether \textit{immunitas} was always granted to a \textit{civitas libera} – a result of references, like the Appian example discussed above, from the Late Republic that a state was free and immune (\textit{libera ac immunis}), which might suggest the pair was divisible.\(^{277}\) In some respects, this line of inquiry is a red herring. Freedom, for most of the period under discussion here, was a fluid notion, not a rigidly delineated technical status, and certainly not necessarily incompatible with paying \textit{tributum} to the Roman state – Macedonia was left free but tribute-paying in 167, and we have already seen that free states could pay taxes under Sulla.\(^{278}\) Citizens of all free states, furthermore, probably continued to pay indirect taxes (e.g. \textit{portoria, scriptura}) to

\(^{276}\) \textit{Aphrod.} 13, lines 6-7: συνε γὰρ τῶν χρηματῶν μοι μέλει ἀ εἰς τὸν φόρον τελεῖται ἀλλὰ τὰ τειμώτατα φιλάνθρωπα χωρίς αἰτίας εὐλογοῦ δεδοκέναι συνε διότι δεῦμα ("It is not that I am concerned about the money which you pay in tribute, but that I would not wish the most valued privileges to be granted to anyone without good cause"); cf. \textit{Aphrod.} 8, lines 50-52: τὴν ἐλευθερίαν καὶ τὴν ἀτέλειαν αὐτοῦς πάντων πραγμάτων τούτων τοῦτῳ τῷ δικαίῳ ἐχειν, διακρατεῖν τοῦ καθάπερ καὶ τις πολέμωσιν τῷ καλλικάτῳ δικαίῳ, καλλικάτῳ τῷ νόμῳ ἑστίν, ἣτις πολεμίη παρὰ τῆς συνκλίτου καὶ τοῦ δῆμον τοῦ Ῥωμαίων τὴν ἐλευθερίαν καὶ ἀτέλειαν ἔχει, φημὴ τῇ καὶ σὺ[μ]αχος τοῦ δημου τοῦ Ῥωμαίων ἑστίν. ("freedom and immunity from taxation in all matters by this right, holding it exactly as any community with the greatest right, and the greatest law that has its freedom and immunity from the Senate and the People of Rome, and is friend and ally of the Roman people").

\(^{277}\) E.g. Cic. \textit{Verr.} 2.13; Paus. 10.34.2; Strabo 13.1.27; \textit{GIBM} 792; Pliny lists some communities as only \textit{immunis} without mention of \textit{libera} (e.g. \textit{N.H.} 4.7.8; 5.124).

\(^{278}\) Livy 45.29.4 (text at n. 288); cf. 26.12-13 (Illyria). Equally untenable is the supposition that \textit{civitates liberae} were themselves divided into two categories according to whether a state was free before Roman intervention or because of a Roman grant (Dahlheim, \textit{Gewalt u. Herrsch.}, 213-217).
Rome, and *immunitas* did not always mean freedom from obligations (*munera / λειτουργίαι*) to Rome.²⁷⁹ Strabo, for example, when describing the situation in Sparta after the death of Nabis (192), asserts that “the Lacedaemonians were held in particular honour, and remained free, contributing to Rome nothing else but friendly obligations (*φιλικάι λειτουργίαι*).²⁸⁰ As Bernhardt suggests, these obligations might be the same *sumptus, labor* and *militia*, which Verres is said to have waived for Messana in exchange for the city’s help in building him a ship for his ill-gotten provincial booty.²⁸¹ Yet, so too might these friendly obligations be those owed by virtue of being in a state of friendship (*amicitia*) or alliance (*societas*) with Rome, a relationship which many in the *imperium Romanum* – free and tax-paying alike – would have had and which was grounded in the sense of reciprocity and mutual obligations.²⁸²

Thus it is important not to schematize these free states into rigid legal-administrative categories, with standard privileges in the imperial state. By the early Empire the *civitas libera* – which Augustus himself once called “the greatest privilege of


²⁸⁰ Strabo 8.5.5: ἀναλαβόντες δὲ σφαῖρα ἑπιμήκησαν διαφερόντως καὶ ἐμείναν ἐλεύθεροι, πλὴν τῶν φιλικῶν λειτουργιῶν ἄλλο συντελοῦντες οὐδὲν (‘But when they had recovered themselves, they were held in particular honour, and remained free, contributing to Rome nothing else but friendly services’). *Pace* Bernhardt, “Immunitas”, the evidence of Cicero and Strabo is not enough to assume a distinct status of *plenissima immunitas*, which is nowhere mentioned in the ancient sources.

²⁸¹ *Verr.* 2.4.23: *pro hisce rebus vacatio data est ab isto sumptus, laboris, militiae, rerum denique omnium* (‘in exchange for these services he granted an exemption from expense, labour, military service – in short, from everything.’); cf. 2.5.51.

²⁸² Discussed in Chapter 3.
all” 283 – had probably come to exist as something of a status within the imperial framework: Pliny the Elder, for example, labeled more than a hundred communities of the East *civitates liberae* or free people (*liberi populi*) in his *Historia Naturalis*, likely reflecting an Augustan-, or even Caesarean-era, technical usage. 284 Yet there is not much evidence that it was any sort of legal category under the Republic, and in fact the phrase *civitas libera* appears in only four Roman state documents of the period. 285 The earliest indication that these might have been conceptualized as an institutional status in the empire comes from the *lex Iulia de repetundis* (59), by which provincial magistrates were forbidden from interfering in disputes over loans made to *populi liberi*, which would seem to define *liberi* at law as a distinct category of subject peoples. 286

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283 *Aphrod.* 13, line 4: οὐ γάρ ἔστιν δίκαιον τὸ πάντων μέγιστον φιλάνθρωπον εἰκή καὶ χωρίς αἰτίας χαρίζεσθαι; *cp. line 7* (آخر تأسيس ثكنة فلادنثرما، χωρίς αἰτίας εὐλόγου δεδομένη σωθεν βουλομαι); *cf. Aphrod.* 14, lines 2-3 (Trajanic date): οὐδένα βουλομαι ἐκ τῶν ἐλευθέρων πόλεων ἀναγκάζεσθαι εἰς ὑπετέραν λειτουργίαν καὶ μάλιστα ἐξ Ἀφροδεισάδος, ἐξηρμημένης τῆς πόλεως καὶ τοῦ τύπου τῆς ἐπαρχεῖας ("I do not want any citizen from a free city to be forced fulfill your liturgies, especially those from Aphrodisias, which has been removed from the formula of the province.").

284 Pliny, *HN*, Books IV and V, *passim*. On the sources for Pliny’s geography section (particularly Africa), see B. Shaw, “The Elder Pliny’s African Geography” *Historia* 30 (1981), 424-471, esp. 431-436, who sees V.29-30 as an official Caesarian-era administrative survey (*formula provinciae*) as Pliny’s ultimate source. Even this evidence should not be pushed, though, since Livy, writing only a few years before Pliny, uses the phrase *civitas libera* to describe the Roman state in his first decade (3.38.9; 6.20.14, 40.6).

285 The earliest reference to a free state comes from the *lex agraria* of 111 (lines 76-79), which refers to *liberi populi*, but these are contrasted with *civitates stipendiariae*, and are clearly not included in the empire at all. Later, a *senatus consultum* of 78 (*RDGE* 22) rewards three foreigners who served as captains during the Social War with the right (*i.a.*) to be judged before a πόλεως ἐλευθέρα (lines 18-19). Here the Romans are using language similar to that found in earlier Hellenistic decrees concerning arbitration, suggesting that they might merely be following a traditional usage and not necessarily implying a status, *per se* (*RDGE* 7, lines 47-48; no. 58, lines 52-55; *SIG* 633). The *lex portorii Asiae* seems to refer to land of the ἐλευθέρα πόλεως as well as the former royal kingdom, ἔδην and δῆμοι, which would seem to imply a status (so, Merola, *Autonomia locale*, 183-193; Mitchell, “Geography, Politics, and Imperialism”, 183-186), but which surely reflects the arrangement found in the kingdom shortly after the Attalid bequest rather than a technical status of Rome’s own making.

For most of the period under discussion, the freedom of these cities – indeed, as we shall discuss, of all the Greek cities in the East – was a dynamic political arrangement negotiated through interaction with the Romans. Rome had been declaring Greeks free since the early third century and any references to explicit freedoms merely confirmed and validated these assertions. In Paullus’ settlement of Macedonia, for example, “it was laid down that the Macedonians were to be free, possessing their cities and fields as before, enjoying their own laws and customs and electing their annual magistrates.”

These were the same conditions laid out thirty years earlier at Corinth (Polyb. 18.46) and essentially the same privileges enjoyed by the *civitates liberae* discussed above.

As part of this negotiation, free cities had to actively assert their privileges – as the Colophonians did by sending their leading citizens more than nine times to the provincial magistrates and the Senate itself to substantiate their rights. Even Colophon, though, did not always make the effort to rigidly assert its autonomy.

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This, of course, is happening at roughly the same time that *provincia* is taking on an abstract quality (above, p. 43). Unfortunately nothing more is known about this *lex* and it is impossible to say whether it went on to further define the privileges of these free states.

287 See Chapter 2.

288 Livy 45.29.4: * omnium primum liberos esse iubere Macedonas, habentis urbes easdem agrosque, utentes legibus suis, annuos creantis magistratus.*

289 Menippos travelled to Rome five times (col. I, lines 19-35), while the decree for Polemaios indicates multiple trips to Rome (col. II, lines 11-16) and officers in the province (col. II, lines 5-8), though it details only one to the former (col. II, line 33 [same trip as lines 25-27?]) and two to latter (col. II, lines 52-56 and 60-62). Also relevant here is an honourary decree of the free city of Alabanda (Bernhardt, *Imp. u. Eleuth. 67-70*) for Pyrrha[−], who travelled to Rome “about the tribute” and after explaining to the Senate the city’s current rights (τὰ ὑπάρχοντα τῇ πόλει δίκαια) obtained immunity (ἀμφιστάτα) (*ISE* III.169, lines 25-32; Gruen, *HWCR II.733-735*; Canali de Rossi, *Ambascerie*, no. 282); cf. Ferrary, “la liberté des cités”, 76-79 (“la liberté était le fruit d’efforts constants, qu’il s’agisse de la définir ou de la preserver”); Kallet-Marx, *Hegemony*, 129 (“the judicial autonomy of a ‘free’ city was not something simply granted but continually won and rewon”); cf. F. Millar, “Civitates liberae, coloniae and the provincial Governors” *MedAnt 2* (1999), 109 (“The status of ‘free city’ and the consequential rights [under the Empire], it is clear needed constant re-affirmation and protection”).
According to the Menippos decree, for example, the people welcomed the provincial proconsul Q. Mucius Scaevola into the city and paid his costs, evidently genuinely satisfied with his presence.\textsuperscript{290} Indeed we know of more than one free community that participated in Scaevola’s eponymous games and therefore participated in a broader provincial culture.\textsuperscript{291} The \textit{polis} of Apollonis likewise welcomed Q. Cicero while proconsul of Asia and permitted him to exercise judicial authority. In this case, practical considerations motivated the Apollonians: Cicero heard a legacy suit involving a pair of Roman citizens and the city probably did not care to get embroiled in the matter.\textsuperscript{292}

Proximity to Roman authority sometimes induced free states not to push their claims to autonomy: Colophon, for example, was situated well off the governor’s normal assize route. Even though they may have notionally been outside the \textit{provincia}, some states proclaimed \textit{libera} nevertheless served as \textit{conventus} centres (e.g. Pergamum, Miletus, Ephesus, Mylasa and Alabanda) and, in the case of Ephesus, even \textit{caput provinciae}.\textsuperscript{293} Ephesus, moreover, both a free state and capital city of Asia, did not stir

\textsuperscript{290} \textit{Claros}, Menippos, col. II, lines 42-46: παραγενομένου δὲ εἰς τὴν πόλιν οὖχ ἄπαξ καὶ τὸν Ἱωμάιων στρατηγὸν Κοιντοῦ Μουκίου καὶ τοῦ ταμίου καὶ χιλιάρχων πάντας ὑπεδέξατο, τὰς παρὰ τῆς πόλεως διδομένας διατάσσας ἀναπέμψας τῇ πόλει (‘When there would come into the city, and more than once, Quintus Mucius (Scaevola), a Roman governor, along with his quaestor and military tribune [Menippos] received them and gave back to the city the money that it had given him for the expense.’). The explicit reference to the celebrated Asian proconsul, the only governor named in the lengthy text, would seem to confirm that the community was honoured by his presence.

\textsuperscript{291} RDGE 47, lines 1-6, 26-29; cf. \textit{OGIS} 438, lines 4-5; no. 439, line 4; Cic. \textit{Verr.} 2.2.51; ps.-Asc. 202, 262 (Stangl.); K. Rigsby, “Provincia Asia” \textit{TAPhA} 118 (1988), 145-149. On the development of a provincial culture, see Chpt 4.

\textsuperscript{292} Cic. \textit{Q.Fr.} 1.2.10-11; Lintott, \textit{Imp.Rom.}, 63. Note that here Cicero is criticizing his brother for acting more a \textit{iudex} than praetor, the implication being that the free state of Apollonis had the right to its own \textit{indices}.

\textsuperscript{293} Pergamum was freed by Attalus III in his will (\textit{OGIS} 338) and recognized by the Romans; Ephesus (below, n. 294); Miletos, Mylasa and Alabanda had all been recognized as free in the Treaty of
an embassy to protect one of its citizens, Pericles, who was tried at Rome for stopping the
proconsul from removing a slave from the inviolate Temple of Diana.\textsuperscript{294} This does not
mean that Ephesus or Apollonis or Pergamum were not ‘free’ – or less free than
Colophon – but rather that the division between ‘free state’ and ‘provincial state’ was not
always clear, and that we get ahead of ourselves before the Late Republic if we
conceptualize these \textit{civitates liberae} as a rigid technical status within the empire. Even
by the Late Republic, when to be free was to have a special relationship in the empire, the
\textit{civitas libera} was at best a quasi-technical relation, predicated on the capacity of the city
to negotiate its rights, have them acknowledged by the Romans, and actively assert them
when transgressed.\textsuperscript{295}

1.5.2: Autonomy of Provincial Cities (\textit{Civitates Stipendiae})

In many ways, there was little that differentiated a ‘free state’ from a ‘provincial
city’.\textsuperscript{296} When considering the Romans’ rule it is crucial to understand that the practical,
institutional empire was constructed (from its infancy) upon a high degree of local
autonomy, and that this extended beyond just those who carried enough weight or

\textsuperscript{294} Cic. \textit{Verr} 2.1.84-85; Rigsby, “Provincia Asia”, 137-141; cf. R. Haensch, \textit{Capita Provinciarum},
312-317 (with reservations). Ephesus had been a free city since 134/33 when it struck a new civic era on
its coins to mark the occasion (K. Rigsby “Era of the Province of Asia”, \textit{Phoenix} 20 [1979], 39-47); its
privileges were removed by Sulla in 85, after the city had participated in the Asian Vespers of 88 and
subsequently sided with Mithridates (cf. App. \textit{Mith.} 61).

\textsuperscript{295} See further Chapter 2, §3.5.

\textsuperscript{296} Ferrary, “la liberté des cités”, 71-76; cf. \textit{idem}, “Rome et les cités grecques d’Asie mineure au
II\textsuperscript{e} siècle” in Bresson & Descat (eds.) \textit{Les Cites d’Asie Mineure occidental au II\textsuperscript{e} Siècle} (Bordeaux 2001),
103-104; earlier noted by Jones, “\textit{civitates liberae}”, 109.

To a Roman, the difference between a “free state” and a subject state was not the absence of independence, but the liability to regular Roman financial levies (\textit{vectigal}). Thus, in contrast to \textit{civitates liberae}, cities within the Roman administrative system were officially “tribute paying cities” (\textit{civitates stipendiae}) – they are never referred to as ‘provincial cities’ or ‘subject cities’.\footnote{E.g. \textit{lex agr.} lines 76-80, which contrasts land allotments to \textit{populi leiberi} and \textit{populi stipendiarieis}; cf. Pliny, \textit{N.H.}, III-VI. The adjective \textit{provincialis} appears in Cicero, who uses it twenty-four times, usually as shorthand for \textit{in provincia} (e.g. \textit{Sest.} 7, 13; \textit{Fam.} 2.7.4; 15.15; 15.20.2), though sometimes in a more administrative sense (e.g. \textit{edictum provincial}: \textit{Verr.} 2.1.112, 118; \textit{Att.} 6.1.15; cf. \textit{Q.Fr.} 1.1.20; \textit{Fam.} 16.4.3). Caesar (\textit{B.Gall.} 7.7.4), Augustus (\textit{RG} 16) and Livy (28.21.10; 39.31.15; 40.31.1; 40.32.4) each use it to refer to land, people, or troops in a province. Even in the imperial authors, one never finds the phrase \textit{civitas provincialis} (e.g. Pliny \textit{N.H.} 8.135; 17.43; 29.22; 36.116). Jones, “\textit{civitates liberae}”, 110: “It may be noted that no satisfactory term for the non-free cities was ever evolved – it would be difficult indeed to find one which was not invidious.”} And while these communities did indeed pay tribute to the Roman state, it is worth remembering that many had paid taxes to a larger state for generations and that the Romans were often not imposing on them anything novel: the Sicilians, for example, continued to follow the tax scheme established under King Hiero (\textit{lex Hieronica}), while the Asian tax scheme followed the old Attalid system (\textit{lex Sempronia} and \textit{portoria});\footnote{Above, p. 51, with nn. 80-81.} in some cases, furthermore, such payments were not even at odds with the Greeks’ notion of freedom: we can look again to the Macedonians, who in 167 were left free by the Romans but continued to pay them the tribute they had earlier paid to Antigonid kings (though now at half the rate).\footnote{Livy 45.29.4: \textit{omnia primum liberos esse iubere Macedonas, habentis urbes easdem agrosque, utentes legibus suis, annuos creantis magistratus; tributum dimidium eius, quod peependissent}}
In fact, aside from a few high-profile abuses by the publicani in Asia and Greece, one wonders to what degree poleis might have noticed any change in their financial obligations since much of the tax burden continued to fall on communities to collect locally and then transport to the provincial magistrate or the tax collecting agency in the province.\(^{301}\) Beyond tax collection, the financial system did not necessarily in many cases change radically or even noticeably under the Romans' governance. In fact the basic monetary system of the Hellenistic East remained largely unchanged during the Republic: the traditional currency standards continued – the Athenian tetradrachm in Greece, the Attalid cistophori in Asia Minor – and many local mints continued to produce these series rather than Roman coin; some states, like Ephesus, even continued to mint their own local coins, based on their own local calendar.\(^{302}\) In any case, as discussed above, it is not entirely clear that civitates liberae were always immune from paying levies to the Romans; certainly their citizens were subject to indirect taxes like import duties.

\(^{301}\) Rostovtzeff, *SEHHW* III.965-7, 1561 & 1567-68 n.46; Lintott, *Imp. Rom.*, 78. Asia, subject to the lex Sempronia of C. Gracchus, was the exception; by this law, the chief taxes on the province (custom, pasture, and tithe) were farmed out at Rome to publican organization; more minor taxes (on slaves, doors, windows, the poll), however, were probably still collected locally (Broughton, “Roman Asia Minor” in T. Frank (ed.), *An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome* (Baltimore 1938), IV.511-512, 567-568.

One of the rights of free-states, we noted, was immunity from the jurisdiction of the provincial magistrate who otherwise managed the cities within his provincia. In many ways, however, the civitates stipendiae also enjoyed a large measure of civic autonomy. We have already observed, for example, the continued obligation of the polis to supply its own military force and look to its own security measures. Similar autonomy was enjoyed in foreign affairs, such that provincial cities continued to interact with one another without any reference to the Romans or their administrative machinery. We noted in the introduction to this chapter that the Ephesian decree makes no reference to the Romans when declaring war on Mithridates, but rather refers only to its own institutions and authorities. Similarly, a long inscription from Priene at the end of the second century records that a certain Moschion travelled on various embassies to states within the provincia Asia, and even to the kings of Egypt and Syria, without any indication that he first consulted the Romans or even looked to Roman interests. International treaties, of course, continued to be made between poleis without necessarily mentioning the Romans, while interstate arbitrations, although often employing the Senate as the final arbiter, could still be, and were, handled without involving Rome.

303 Above, p.88.
304 Above, p. 29.
305 I.Priene 108. Inscriptions also reveal that Priene had good relations with the kingdom of Cappadocia (I.Priene 109, lines 103-??, 171); cf. Bernhardt, Polis u. Herr., 211 (further examples).
306 e.g. RDGE 47 (Ephesus and Sardis); Ager, Arbitrations no. 165; Bernhardt, Polis u. Herr. 212. We might contrast these with treaties between Greek cities in which either party was committed to upholding friendship with the Romans (Chapter 3, §2.1).
Even when Rome did involve itself, the Senate would often direct the matter to a neighbouring third party, following traditional Hellenistic practice.308

In the judicial realm the provincial magistrate had extensive powers, but in practice his authority was limited by time, distance, and manpower. He was often able only to hear cases during the military off-season, and his assize route meant that he never visited the smaller communities of his provincia, whose citizens had to undertake significant journeys to have their suits heard.309 Cicero was in such a hurry to reach his eastern border after arriving in Cilicia in July of 51 that he spent only a handful of days in the conventus centres of Laodicea (July 31 – Aug. 3), Apamea (Aug. 5-9), Synnada (Aug. 10-14), Philomelium (Aug. 16-20), and Iconium (Aug. 23 – Sept. 3) before setting off to Tarsus to combat the Parthians.310 With only one curule magistrate and a handful of officers in the province, furthermore, the magistrate was limited as to how many cases he could hear;311 recall that Cicero had to send a legate to administer Cyprus, which was a

308 Ager, Arbitrations, p. 27, citing nos. 120 (=RDGE 7), 131 (=RDGE 4), 159 (=SIG 683) and 164, to which might be added RDGE 47 (=I.Pergamon 2.228).
309 Although Cicero himself held court throughout most of the year, his earliest efforts upon landing in late July were to proceed to the eastern borders as soon as possible (Marshall, “Governors on the Move”, 239-241); cf. Cic. Verr. 2.5.10.26 (Verres’ administrative neglect over the winter); Caes. B. Gall. 1.54.3; 5.1.5; 5.2.1; 6.44.3; 7.1.1 (Caesar spending the winter administrating).
310 Marshall, “Governors on the Move”, 243. Cicero later returned to Laodicea where he stayed for four months to hear cases from the remaining six assize districts (Att. 5.21.4, 9): Cibrya, Apamea (Feb. 13 – Mar. 15), Synnada, Pamphylia, Lycaonia, Isauria (Mar. 15 – May 15). These dates are derived from the copious letters written by Cicero to his various friends back at Rome. Those that concern his time while governor of Cilicia are collected in S. Treggiari, Cicero’s Cilician Letters (Hatfield, 1972).
311 Verres, of course, famously resorted to using his comites as jurists: Cic. Verr. 2.2.10; 2.3.69; cf. 2.3.28; 138-139; 2.2.33, 2.2.33, 75.
precarious solution as the magistrate himself was ultimately liable for his subordinates’ actions.  

For these reasons, many states continued to administer justice by their own laws, often with the explicit sanction of Rome. The so-called *lex Rupilia* laid down the procedures for judicial suits in the province of Sicily: cases between citizens of the same state would be heard in that state by local laws; suits between citizens of different states (or individuals and states not their own) within Sicily would be assigned a panel of *iudices* from a third city; and suits between Roman citizens and a Sicilian would be settled by *iudices* of the defendant’s nationality. We know, too, that Cicero’s edict included the provision that Greeks were to decided controversies between each other according to their own laws – he boasts that the Greeks considered his arrangements *libertas* and *autonomia*. His edict, of course, had been based on Scaevola’s forty years earlier, which the Senate had deemed a model and standard of administration, and was no

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313 Cic. *Verr.* 2.2.32: *Sculi hoc iure sunt ut quod civis cum cive agat domi certet suis legibus; quod Siculus cum Siculo non eiusdem civitatis, ut de eo praetor iudices ex P. Rupilli decreto, quod is de decem legatorum sententia statuit, quam illi legem Rupiliam vocant, sortiatur. Quod privatus a populo petit aut populus a privato, senatus ex aliqua civitate qui iudicet datur, cum alternae civitates reiectae sunt. Quod civis Romanus a Siculo petit, Siculus iudex, quod Siculus a cive Romano, civis Romanus datur. Ceterarum rerum selecti iudices ex conventu civium Romanorum proponi solent. Inter aratorem et decumanos lege frumentaria, quam Hieronicam appellant, iudicia fiunt.

314 Cic. *Att.* 6.1.15: *multaque sum secutus Scaevolae, in ipsis illud in quo sibi libertatem censent Graeci datam, ut Graeci inter se disceptent sui legibus ... Graeci vero exsultant quod peregrinis iudicibus utuntur. “mugatoribus quidem” in iuques. quid referit? tamen se αὐτο νομί μαν adeptos putant* (‘I have followed many of Scaevola’s provisions, among others that one which the Greeks consider as freedom given them, namely that they shall dispute cases between themselves by their own laws ... indeed the Greeks are very happy because they are using non-Roman judges. “Braggarts, certainly” you will say. What does it matter? They still think, at any rate, that they have earned *autonomia*’) cf. above n. 88.
doubt followed by others. Indeed, in his monograph on free states, Bernhardt demonstrated that independent jurisdiction “was basically guaranteed in all the provinces as a part of the civic self-government” and “most lawsuits in a province were carried out before a civic court.

In provincial cities, local assemblies remained authoritative over domestic matters (though councils became increasingly dominant in lieu of popular assemblies) and states continued to enjoy sovereignty in domestic affairs. In this respect, the Ephesian decree waging war against Mithridates is typical and illustrative: despite its explicit reference to Roman hegemony, the only officials found in the text are Ephesian; the text, furthermore, reveals the continued operation of civic agents and institutions in deliberating, legislating, and executing matters of security, finance, religion, and other domestic affairs. So crucial, in fact, was the city-state system of self-government that during his settlement of Pontus Pompey had to create eleven new poleis to serve as civic centres for the provincia. What had previously been a series of villages, outposts and forts in the

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315 Cic. Att. 6.1.15 (above note); Val. Max. 8.15.6: Ac ne Q. quidem Scaeuolae, quem L. Crassus in consulatu collegam habuit, gloria parum inlustris, qui Asiam tam sancter et tam fortiter obtinuit, ut senatus deinceps in eam provinciam ituris magistratibus exemplum atque normam officii Scaeuolam decreta suo proponeret (‘Not even Scaevola, whom L. Crassus had as his consular colleague, his glory equal to his nobility, who ran Asia so inviolably and so strongly that the Senate thereafter set him forth by decree as a model and standard of the office to those magistrates travelling into that province.’). Scaevola was much honoured by provincials (OGIS 437-439; Cic. Verr. 2.2.51) for his numerous good deeds to the provincials (Cic. Att. 5.17.5; Div. in Caec. 57; Verr. 2.2.27; Diod. 37.5.1-4).

316 Bernhardt, Polis u. Herrsch., 236.


318 See above, Introduction, p. 29.

319 Strabo 12.3.1; cf. Magie RRAM II.1232-33, n.35; Sherwin-White, RFPE, 230: “The Pompeian organisation lays bare the principle that a Roman province was an effective system of administration only in areas where local government was established. Since Pontus was to be annexed it was necessary to create the substructure of civic autonomy”; A.H.M. Jones, The Greek City (Oxford 1940), 58; R. MacMullen, Romanisation in the Time of Augustus (New Haven 2000), 9-10, 19-20.
kingdom were grouped together with enough local administrative structure to support the loose Roman-style governance.\textsuperscript{320} It is worth noting, too, that in other cases where there was a strong monarchic tradition and no infrastructure to accommodate the Romans' limited bureaucracy, freedom was begged off, as in Cappadocia in 96 or Cyrene in 74, in favour of direct monarchic rule.\textsuperscript{321}

As many modern studies have demonstrated, the \textit{polis} structure (and the self awareness of that structure) survived during the Roman era.\textsuperscript{322} It survived not only because the Roman ruling system did it no damage, but in fact because the Romans relied on the continued operation of the self-sufficient \textit{polis} in their own imperial rule. In those parts of the West where there was no real city-state tradition, the Romans had to create towns (\textit{civitates, municipia} or \textit{coloniae}) precisely along the republican city-state model in order to effectively rule and administer the territory. They created municipal charters (\textit{lex municipalis}) that established the foundations of the community and created a civic apparatus along the city-state model – though in the Roman aristocratic tradition it included censors, property requirements for office-holding, lifetime senatorial

\textsuperscript{320} Sherwin-White, \textit{RFPE} 229; cf. above pp. 38-39. After their victories in the East, both Pompey and Marc Antony employed local kings (newly created, or otherwise beholdant to Rome) to govern much of the Anatolian hinterlands and Levant (Magie, \textit{RAM} I.351-378, 427-439).

\textsuperscript{321} Cappadocia: Justin 38.2.7; Strabo 12.2.1, 11; Sherwin-White, \textit{RFPE}, 107 (“The proposal for the freedom of Cappadocia was misconceived [by the Romans]. Cappadocia lacked the basis of widespread regional or civic self government that enabled ‘freedom’ to work in Greece and Asia.”). Cyrene: Plut. \textit{Luc.} 2.3-4; \textit{de mul. virt.} 19; Polyaenus, 8.38; A.H.M Jones, \textit{Cities of the Eastern Roman Provinces}\textsuperscript{\textregistered} (Oxford 1971), 358.

appointments, and strong executive offices. In many parts of the Hellenistic East, where the citizen-state tradition was highly developed, this was unnecessary. The political arrangement of small, self-sufficient city-states melded perfectly with the Romans’ style of (limited) imperial rule. To return to Lintott again, the limited institutions of the *imperium Romanum,*

only made sense when they were the superstructure on a strong foundation of local autonomy, whether the communities in question had the privilege of freedom or not.

Not every state was explicitly recognized as a ‘free state’, but this was not always *practically* significant. Even the provincial cities, the *civitates stipendiae,* enjoyed a high degree of local autonomy within the provincial apparatus. As we shall see in the following chapter, furthermore, all Greek cities were said to enjoy freedom, which was part of a powerful political language in the Romans’ relations with the East, indeed the central narrative that informed and directed the interaction between Romans and Greeks.

1.6 – CONCLUSION

This chapter has been concerned with the structure of Roman rule over the provincial subjects in the East. In this discussion three central and inter-related themes have emerged. First, the Roman provincial apparatus – which is to say the imperial state – was a logical and natural extension of the citizen-state. The Romans took no extraordinary measures to create a larger imperial state with a more complex bureaucracy, but rather ruled the East (and the West) through the same civic officials that...

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managed the *res publica* itself, increasing their numbers when it became impossible not to, but not adding new offices or changing the basic responsibilities of the existing offices.

The *provinciae* followed this same evolutionary development. Originally simply military spheres of action assigned to Roman commander, they slowly and inconsistently evolved into civic units run by those same generals – now administrators. They had no clear ‘start date’, no clear boundaries, nor did they represent an area of homogenous Roman control. Theirs was a processual development, not necessarily following a central pattern, but relying heavily on the institutions in the territory and annual edict of the magistrate himself. Administratively, moreover, they were discontinuous units, dotted with autonomous city states technically outside the reach of the magistrate.

The city-state style governance of the imperial state, furthermore, meant that – and this is the second major theme – the Romans’ ruling structure was sparse. There were very few officials in the provinces and the provincial apparatus was skeletal. A lone magistrate, with a retinue of half a dozen advisors/military officers and maybe a dozen support staff, travelled to a few major cities in a provincial territory when not on campaign in order to hear disputes that were largely passed on to juries, whether local Romans or citizens. The financial system was the most developed provincial apparatus (not surprisingly), but in many cases expediency led Rome simply to adopt or modify the local traditional scheme into its own system, dealing in local currency and collecting revenue gathered by communities. Particularly striking is the absence of any standard military force, apart from those troops sent over to deal with particular campaigns. Macedonia was probably an exception, but nevertheless demonstrates that the activities
of Roman forces in a province were directed toward its borders and were not concerned with or necessary for internal security, which was left to the Greek city-states themselves.

This brings us to the third theme of the chapter: the large degree to which the Romans relied on Greek poleis to run themselves and thereby supplement the Romans’ limited imperial structure. The paucity of men and administrative apparatus meant that the Romans’ republican empire was quite literally structured upon local autonomy. The Romans spoke of some communities as “free states” and others as “taxable (i.e. subject) states”, but even the latter enjoyed many (if not more) of their traditional liberties under the Romans. Greek poleis continued to make treaties, settle disputes, travel on embassies to foreign powers, wage wars, all without reference to Rome. Domestically, traditional democratic institutions remained and flourished, local laws remained valid – even applicable to Roman citizens – local juries heard cases, and traditional customs remained. Rome not only showed no interest in reconfiguring the polis model, but introduced it to non-Hellenic territories because it was pivotal to their imperial administration.

Granting a high degree of local autonomy – including the capacity to raise troops – to one’s subject obviously came with significant risks to Rome. Autonomy and freedom, though, were more than just an imperial structural element, they were a central political discourse that had shaped the Greek world for more than three hundred years before Rome’s arrival. In the next chapter we shall discuss the meaning of the concept of freedom to the Greek world and the significance and impact of the Romans’ use of it to shape their empire in the East.
2.0 – INTRODUCTION

In the previous chapter we explored the imperial apparatus that structured the relations between the Romans and the poleis of the East, and observed especially its inherent limitations. The Romans' provincial system was directed by their own traditional republican institutions and military experiences, developed contingently and expeditiously, often using whatever local arrangements were in place. By the late-second century there were institutionally fixed provinces, yet still even in the first century the limited administrative infrastructure that supported them and their operation was striking. Roman resources in the provinces were neither numerous nor ubiquitous, and Roman military presence was inconsistent and ad hoc. All of this meant that the Romans relied to a great degree on the continued successful operation of the autonomous poleis; even after the establishment of the provinces, cities were still given a large measure of control over their internal and foreign policy. Some, of course, were specifically identified as free, and outside the province, but even those not so labelled enjoyed considerable degrees of local autonomy. This leads us here to consider more closely the notion of freedom in Greco-Roman relations of the second and first centuries.

The relationship between freedom and Roman rule is front-and-centre in the Ephesian decree. Arguably the most striking aspect of the document is the Ephesians' assertion to have taken up war against Mithridates on behalf of the Roman ἡγεμονία.
and the common freedom.\textsuperscript{1} We noted in the Introduction that by conceptualizing the text along the lines of Habermas' theory of communicative action and its attendant understanding of intersubjective rationality and meaning, the claim must have some rational meaning.\textsuperscript{2} One aspect of the text immediately supports this approach. As noted earlier, the Ephesians present themselves as an autonomous city-state in the decree, making their own decisions through their own organs of government. The decree was passed (ἔδοξε) at the will of the people (δῆμος) through their assembly (ἐκκλησία) and council (βουλή), and concerns matters both of foreign affairs and security (i.e. making war), as well as domestic concerns (i.e. awarding citizenship, forgiving debts), without any sign of interference or domination from the Romans.\textsuperscript{3} Indeed there are no Roman agents or institutions mentioned in the decree. Building on these observations, then, one must ask: what did the Greek poleis and the Romans (intersubjectively) mean by Greek freedom?

Part of the answer to this question must address how freedom could have had any meaning in light of (and in the Ephesian example, in conjunction with) Roman hegemony. How did these two ideas relate to one another, and, more significantly, how did the latter develop in light of the former? Again, the Ephesian text hints at an answer in the contrasting portrayal of Mithridates and the Romans. Note how the Ephesians pointedly refer to Mithridates as "king" (βασιλέας, line 3) and, more significantly, explicitly label him a "master" (κύριος, line 5) – placing themselves and others in the position of subjects and slaves. Furthermore, the Pontic king is said to have used fear,

\textsuperscript{1} \textit{I.Eph.} 8, lines 11-12: ὑπὲρ τῆς Ῥωμαίων ἡγεμονίας καὶ τῆς κοινῆς ἐλευθερίας.
\textsuperscript{2} See above, Introduction §3.
\textsuperscript{3} See above, Introduction n. 16 (text) and n. 23 (discussion of lines 2-3).
trickery and force: he violated treaties with the Romans (line 4), seized and controlled land not belonging to him (line 5), not only deceitfully (ἀπάτη, line 7), but also by enormous force (δύναμις, line 8) and assault (ἐπιβολή, line 8), which the Ephesians claim was terrifying (καταπληξάμενος, line 7).\footnote{It might be pointed out, too, that one of the catalysts for the Ephesians' turn against Mithridates had been the Pontic king’s forced deportation of the Chians from their territory a few months earlier – a clear demonstration of force and violation of local autonomy (App. Mith. 46-47; Memnon 33; Nicolaus and Posidonius ap. Athenaeus 6.91 = F. Gr. Hist. II.249-51; Magie, RRAM I.224).} Though not in the text, we might add that Mithridates, in contrast to the Romans, cast a large administrative footprint and ruled his subjects through garrisons and a hierarchy of royally appointed officials: Appian relates that Ephesus had been subject not only to a royal στρατηγός (commander), but also an ἐπίσκοπος (foreign overseer), and a σατράπης (governor).\footnote{στρατηγός and ἐπίσκοπος: App. Mith. 48 (note that in other places the latter was called a τύραννος; Strabo 9.1.20; 14.1.42; Plut. Luc. 3.3.); σατράπης: SIG\textsuperscript{3} 741 iii and iv; App. Mith. 21. This last term was no doubt particularly odious given its Persian origins and the Greeks’ history with the Medes (see below, p. 124): undoubtedly the Ephesians were drawing attention to this fact when they referred to Mithridates as the ‘King of Cappadocia’, the name of the old Persian satrapy in which his Pontic kingdom was located.} Freedom, then, could expose the deep opposition between monarchic rule and the Romans’ governing regime, and a mechanism which cast Roman rule in a positive light. Whereas Mithridates was a royal master and described by a host of attendant negative characteristics, the Romans were εὐεργέται (benefactors) who could restore the common freedom and whose role was integral to the common interest (lines 10-11). It is important in what follows, then, to investigate not simply the meaning of freedom in Greco-Roman relations, but also its operation in regard to Roman rule. That is, in addition to our question in the previous paragraph, we must also enquire as to what either side did when speaking of Greek freedom.
This chapter begins by contextualizing the general discussion with a brief overview of the significance of freedom to the Greek and Roman citizen-states and its development in the Roman context. Freedom was central to the citizens’ relation to the state, and more broadly to his identity and that of the polis itself, and was a principal discourse in interstate relations when the Romans entered the Hellenistic world. The notion of freedom played a less central role in the Roman res publica; however, upon entering the East, Rome engaged actively in the local discourse of freedom – indeed, to a great degree its interactions with the Greek poleis were constructed around a narrative of Greek freedom. In the third section we shall investigate just what Greeks and Romans mutually understood when they spoke of freedom with one another – that is, what freedom meant in the communications between ruler and ruled. Finally, in the fourth section, we shall consider how freedom functioned in interstate dialogue to facilitate the development of the Romans’ empire.

2.1 - THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF FREEDOM

Before discussing the significance of freedom in Greco-Roman interaction and its significance in the functioning of the Roman empire, let us contextualize the discussion by considering Greek and Roman traditions of freedom. To anticipate the discussion, the salient points will be: (i) that freedom was central to the individual Greek citizen, the community (polis), and its relationship with the wider world; (ii) that the Greek concept of freedom was understood as an interdependency, and that within this framework it was resilient and flexible; (iii) that the concept was comparatively less significant in Roman imperial development; but nevertheless (iv) that the complex Greek and the more inchoate Roman notions of freedom were congruous and compatible, and can be usefully
expressed by the Roman-inspired—but recently expostulated—republican theory of liberty.

2.1.1: Freedom in the Greek Context

Freedom was a central and complex idea to the Greek polis. The polis was a collective of autarkic citizens—men who were their own masters and masters of their household (oikos)—who participated directly in their collective self-government.6 In this way, each citizen was a member of the government and had a say in the actions of the community of which he was a part, and to that extent participated in his own self-determination. As a member of the government, each private citizen was also a public official, so that his private life and interests were inextricably linked with those of the public; correspondingly, the individual private citizen was responsible for the common good.7 As a result, each citizen was expected to subordinate his private self-interest to the superordinate public interest. A citizen of the polis, therefore, was foundationally his

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6 The polis has been the subject of much research, particularly over the last twenty years, and the bibliography is correspondingly immense. The best access points on the topic are the works by (and two distinct approaches of) M. Hansen, The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes (Oklahoma 1991), with the various essays in the seven volumes published by the Copenhagen Polis Centre under his direction (Papers from the Copenhagen Polis Centre, 1994-2004), and J. Ober, Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens (Princeton 1989) and Athenian Legacies: Essays on the Politics of Going on Together (Princeton 2005), investigating the socio-politics of the polis and the culture of democracy. I would like to thank Dr. S. Corner for his help in working through the material in this section (he is not, of course, to be held to account or even in agreement with what follows).

7 Here we might think of the example of Timarchus (Aesch. In Tim.), who forfeited the right to speak in public because of his personal profligacy and debauchery. His indulgences demonstrated both his lack of self-mastery (his slavery to his passions and excess) and his lack of self-restraint and selfishness (in following through on those passions); and, whereas every citizen was also a member of the government (and a potential executive through sortition), such that his private life bore inexorably on his public role, Timarchus was judged áρτια and exiled from participating in the public sphere.
own master, while also subject to a larger collective will, to which he willingly submitted and of which he was a part.

Scholars since the Enlightenment have traditionally seen liberty in this form of society as participatory, political, and positive ('free to'), in that it was related to the citizen's capacity for self-realization. That is, a man was free because he enjoyed the liberty to participate in decisions of the state and thus to have a say in and to affect directly his own governance; by contrast, freedom in the modern world tends to have a greater concern for the individual's personal protections against ('freedom from') the arbitrary acts of the state and its agents, i.e. his/her own immunities and rights within the state.\(^8\) This distinction between ancient and modern freedom is a useful heuristic tool for beginning to conceptualize Greek ideas on freedom, though, as we shall see, it is not an entirely satisfactory model and cannot be rigidly applied to the *polis*.

The foundation of Greek freedom lies in its distinction from slavery, where the slave is subject to the mastery of another.\(^9\) The free man, by contrast, is master of himself and his household (*oīκος*); he is himself able to produce or acquire his necessities (e.g. food, shelter, security) and thus needs rely on, and thereby subject himself to, no other man. He is self-sufficient—is idealized as having *autárkeia*—and enjoys the capacity to determine and to pursue his own self-interests. Such an ideal, though, naturally stands in contrast to the development of a community, which requires one to give up a measure of self-determination by submitting to the will of the collective. In the *polis*, this was settled by having the autarkic individual play a direct role in his own self-

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\(^8\) See, however, the next section on Rome.

governance and creating an *interdependency* between the individual and the community. As Ostwald has observed, following Aristotle, each citizen had a share in the community, his freedom existing in his privilege to "share in the ruling" (τοῦ ἀρχεῖν μετέχειν), to have access to the pool of offices that governed the state;¹⁰ as part of this share, he was expected and obliged to yield to decisions of other free and equal (ἐλευθέροι καὶ ἵσσοι) members of—and participants in—the community.¹¹ From this interdependency is derived Aristotle’s famous formulation that in the *polis*, comprised of free and equal members, "to rule meant being ruled in turn".¹²

Freedom in this arrangement was not a right that was granted or protected by a law – a possession one felt entitled to – but rather was a condition predicated on one’s status as citizen, which afforded and obliged one to participate in the common weal. Citizenship implied that one realized his own self-interest was indissolubly related to the interests of the *polis*, and that in his (short-term, allotted) mastery over others he had already mastered himself and his own selfish impulses and interests. In this arrangement, it is important to understand that freedom of the citizen existed not in his participatory action, but more simply in his status as citizen; citizenship itself was what acknowledged him as free and his own master and afforded him the right to participate in his own self-determination through a share in the common government. In this way, personal

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independence entailed a high degree of communal interdependence. In order for the *polis* to function practically, every free citizen had to freely submit himself to the will of the collective, which in turn worked toward his (and the community’s) best interest.

There are, of course, qualifications to this model since not all *poleis* held the same ideal, and there is always slippage between any ideal and practical reality. Athens, for example, is now thought of as having a less thick (e.g. homogeneous and unified) political culture (*πολιτεία*) than other contemporary Greek city-states. Furthermore, in some respects we might think of certain Athenian laws (e.g. that against ὑπρίς) as protective rights, some of which were extended not just to citizens but also to metics, women, and slaves. Even at Athens, however, despite the claims of critics, an individual never had the freedom to just do as he pleased. He was subject to the many varied sorts of socio-political obligations and legal requirements of a citizen in democratic *polis*. Pericles’ *epitaphios logos* expresses the Athenian ideal: citizens obeyed the laws and showed obedience to those in positions of authority, those who did

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not share in anything (τὸν μὴ δὲν τῶν δὲ μετέχοντα) were worth nothing, while all citizens were willing to undergo the hardships necessary to defend the polis.\footnote{Thucyd. 2.37.3, 40.2, 41.5.}

More significant to our study (but no less important to the Greek idea of freedom) is the liberty of the polis itself within the larger interstate world. This idea of the collective freedom of the state became central during the Persian Wars, when, in contrast to traditional and ritualized agonistic Greek warfare, all of Hellas was threatened by a non-Greek tyrant.\footnote{Raaflaub, Discovery of Freedom, 58-117. On ritualised hoplite warfare, see J.-P. Vernant (ed), Problèmes de la guerre en Grèce ancienne (Paris 1968); V. Davis Hanson, The Other Greeks (New York, 1995), 221-289.} By the 470s, the war was already presented as one waged for the freedom of the Greeks, a theme that grew more entrenched as time passed.\footnote{Pindar, Pyth. 1.71-80; Isthm. 8; Aesch. Pers. 402-405; Htd 5.78; Thucyd. 2.71.2; cf. R. Seager and C. Tuplin, “The Freedom of the Greeks of Asia: on the origins of a concept and the creation of a slogan” JHS 100 (1980), 141-154, who traces the prominent hellenistic discourse on Greek freedom back to this period.} The Delian League, for example, had originally been set up to punish the Persians and defend the freedom of Hellas against foreign enslavement.\footnote{Thucyd. 3.10.3: ξύμμαχοι μέντοι ἐγενόμεθα οὐκ ἔπι καταδουλώσει τῶν Ἑλλήνων Ἀθηναίων, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ ἐλευθερώσει ἀπὸ τοῦ Μέδου τοῖς Ἑλληνικοῖς (‘We did not ally ourselves with the Athenians for the enslavement of the Hellenes, but rather with the Hellenes for the freedom from the Medes’); cf. 1.96.1; 6.76.3-4. On the Delian League see P.J. Rhodes, “The Delian League to 449 BC”, CAHII V, 34-40.} Of course, as is well known, allies in the Delian League shortly became subjects in the empire of the Athenians, who, by compelling tribute, coercing loyalty, forcing regime changes, etc., became (in their own words) the freest city (ἐλευθερωτάτη polis) in Greece, but also the enslaver of the Hellenes.\footnote{Freest City: Thuc. 6.89.6; 7.69.2; enslavement: see examples in above note.} In proper fashion, the Spartans and their allies were urged to take up war against the Athenians for the freedom of Hellas.\footnote{Thucyd. 1.68-71, 88, 120-124; 2.8.4; 6.92.5.}
The Athenians' empire of the fifth century had been the first instance of a Greek polis exercising widespread hegemonic control over other poleis, which not only elevated discussions of the freedom of the state, but also sparked a deeper criticism of hegemonic power and a sharpening of the idea freedom. If Raaflaub is correct, for example, then with the advent of the Athenian Empire, and its coercive interference in the domestic affairs of other poleis, a new notion of αὐτονομία (autonomy) emerged as a means for poleis to express their freedom of self-governance by their own political regime and laws. This issue had already been earlier raised by the Persian Wars, as the domination of the Persian King threatened to reduce the individual Greek to the status of a slave; his power was unassailable and threatened the egalitarianism (ισονομία and ισηγορία) that defined relations between citizens of the polis and permitted each to have an equal share and voice in his own governance. In contrast to new threats of foreign and Greek tyranny, democracy (and still in the fifth century, oligarchy) institutionalized, represented, and expressed the capacity of each citizen, who had willingly submitted himself to the rule of the community, to share (equally) in his own self-governance.

With its spread under the Athenians' empire (who not only willed δημοκρατία upon their

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24 Raaflaub, Discovery of Freedom, 158. On the development and conception of αὐτονομία (as freedom of the state in the domestic sphere to use and enjoy its own laws free from outside interference), see E. Bickerman, "Autonomia sur un passage de Thucydide (I,144,2), RIDA 5 (1958), 313-344; M. Ostwald, Autonomia: its Genesis and Early History (California 1982); S. Carlsson, Hellenistic Democracies: Freedom, Independence and Political Procedure in Some East Greek City-States (Stuttgart 2010), passim (p. 66-69 for historiography of discussion).

25 Raaflaub, Discovery of Freedom, 89-102.

26 Δημοκρατία embodied the idea of the equality of citizens (ισονομία) and their freedom to speak freely (ισηγορία) and openly (παρηγορία) within the community. The central ideas and sources, and two different approaches to the notion, can be found in M. Hansen, Was Athens a Democracy? and idem, Athenian Democracy; and Ober, Mass and Elite and idem, The Athenian Revolution (Princeton 1996).
allies, but drove it home by threatening the autonomy of the *polis* by their hegemony),
democracy became the normalized political regime (*πολιτεία*) of the free *polis* in the
course of the late-fifth and fourth centuries. Though not without criticism, cities were
turning to the ideal of democracy and the principles of egalitarianism to express their
domestic autonomy, while simultaneously individual citizens were coming to
acknowledge democracy as their own fullest exercise of freedom within the state, in
contrast to the limitations imposed on them by the ‘rule of the few’ (or a tyrant).\(^\text{27}\) In the
course of the fourth century and particularly during the Hellenistic period the distinction
between *dēmokratia* and *oligarchia* blurred as democracies embraced traditionally
oligarchic elements as a means to adapt to (and balance) the new powerful monarchies of
the Diadochs.\(^\text{28}\) In any event, by the Hellenistic era *δημοκρατία* had become a central
element in a *polis*’ identity of itself, and its citizens’ own self-identity, as free. What
remains most important for our study, is that by the time the Romans emerged in the
Greek sphere in the late third century, *δημοκρατία* was not just a form of political
regime, but was a political ideal that in practical terms meant participatory self-
government, in contrast to monarchy.\(^\text{29}\)

Finally, the absolute independence was never a *sine qua non* of the free *polis*. A
community of citizens could still be considered a *polis* – by definition free and
autonomous – while under varying degrees of control, as argued by Hansen, who

\(^{27}\) It should come as no surprise that in a society of autarchic individuals who willingly
subordinated themselves to the community for a share in the decision-making process, the radical self-
government found in *dēmokratia* would find popularity: Arist. *Pol.* 6.1317a40-b17. See N. Loraux, *The
Invention of Athens: The Funeral Oration in the Classical City* (Harvard 1986), 172-219; Ober, *Mass and
Elite*; Ober and Hedrick (eds.), *Dēmokratia*.

\(^{28}\) See below, p. 151.

\(^{29}\) See below, §3.3.
identifies fifteen types of dependent *poleis*, including those that were members of a federation (e.g. Boeotian League), a hegemonic League (e.g. Delian League), or controlled by an empire or kingdom (e.g. under Persians, Athenians, Alexander III). Like the citizen who willingly gave up a measure of his own personal freedom to the community, the *polis* (as an aggregate of individual citizens) could willingly yield a measure of self-determination to a collective body of *poleis* (e.g. a συμμαχία, κοινόν, συμπολιτεία) without compromising its autonomy. If the Boeotian League is any indication, then in many cases joining one of these larger political units required a *polis* to surrender a measure of self-determination in foreign policy to a small cadre of elected officials, or even a hegemonic state, as well as make fiscal contributions (φόρος, σύνταξις) to a common fund. To compensate, these new supra-polis political units had an open assembly (ἐκκλησία) for citizens of any state, a council (βουλή, συνέδριον) for elected or allotted men of each state, and (in the case of κοινά) civic rights in member states (and new collective citizenship in a συμπολιτεία). The *polis*, therefore, shared in its own governance, and, moreover, maintained its own internal autonomy, while the individual citizen preserved his role in making decisions that most affected him.

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31 Andoc. 3.13,20; Xen. Hell. 3.5.18; 5.1.32-36; Isoc. 14.10

32 Thucyd. 7.57.3-5; cf. 1.97.1.

33 Xen. Hell. 5.1.31; Rhodes & Osborne GHI 54; I.Priene 2.

34 Thuc. 4.86.1 & 88.1; cf. 1.97; 5.79.1; 7.57.3.

In these arrangements a city-state, though a part of a larger (even hegemonic) organization, was not subject to the arbitrary power of another and enjoyed a condition free from not only interference, but also domination. Under such an arrangement, however, cities did not always remain free: we might contrast the Boeotian example above, with the autonomous poleis of the fifth century Delian League, who became subject poleis when the Athenians began arbitrarily compelling supplies, tribute, military action, etc., without their consent.\textsuperscript{36} In this case, the cities were no longer αὐτόνομοι and ἐλεύθεροι, but now ὑπῆκοοι. Not surprisingly, then, the question of the freedom of the state – of its capacity for self-determination and freedom from another’s mastery – became of great significance during the Hellenistic period, when small, autonomous poleis increasingly became members of larger leagues, royal kingdoms and empire-states (e.g. Carthage, Rome).\textsuperscript{37} In this environment, freedom emerged as a central discourse between states and hegemons (ruler and ruled), as poleis worked to have their freedom and autonomy acknowledged by the great Hellenistic rulers, who often did recognize (or fought on behalf of) that autonomy as a means to attain legitimacy and acquire support.\textsuperscript{38}

\textsuperscript{36} E.g. contrast Thuc. 1.97 (“[the Athenians were] leaders of allies who were at first autonomous and made decisions in general meetings”) with 1.117, where the Byzantines are described as ὑπῆκοοι for having been forced to submit to Athens; cf. Thuc. 1.77, where Athenian speakers defending their ἄρχη before the Peloponnesian League by arguing that their ὑπῆκοοι overly complain about what is really quite a moderate rule (though Thucydides himself is raising the point that compulsion of any sort creates subordination and hostility); cf. Lys 2.14 (discussing the Athenians’ gift of asylum to the sons of Heracles): ἡγούμενοι ἐλευθερίας μὲν σημείον εἶναι μηδὲν παῖν ἄκοντας (‘believing it a sign of freedom to do nothing unwillingly’); Hansen, “Autonomous City State”, 32-33.


\textsuperscript{38} For examples, see below p. 141.
If anything, by the coming of Rome to the East, the polis’ sense of its liberty was more acute and the actions (and potential) of the Romans proved all the more significant.39

2.1.2: The Roman Tradition of Freedom

In contrast to the Greek, the native Italian-Roman concept of freedom (libertas) appears less theoretically developed and less prominent in domestic and interstate politics.40 The Roman res publica was in many ways similar to the Greek polis,41 and Roman libertas was not entirely dissimilar from its Hellenic counterparts – to the point,

39 G. Shipley and M. Hansen, “The Polis and Federalism”, 62-64 (esp. 62: “Now at the very time when most poleis were dependent rather than independent, autonomia became the explicit ideal and goal of the polis”).

40 On Roman libertas, see: C. Wirszubski, Libertas as a Political Idea at Rome during the Late Republic and Early Principate (Cambridge, 1950); J. Bleicken, Staatliche Ordnung und Freiheit in der römischen Republik (Kallmünz, 1972); K. Raaflaub, “Freiheit in Athen und Rom: ein Beispiel divergierender politischer Begriffsentwicklung in der Antike” H.Z. 238 (1984), 529-67; P. Brunt, “Libertas in the Republic” in idem, The Fall of the Roman Republic and Related Essays (Oxford, 1988), 281-350. A nuanced understanding of the Roman concept before their wholesale interaction with the Greek world (e.g. before ca. 200) is difficult to attain owing to the paucity of sources before the Late Republic. The earliest authors date to the second century and, where they comment on the history of early Rome, these must be assumed to be filtered through the experiences of the author’s own time – when the notion of libertas was mature and influenced by interaction with the Greek world. The first century CE historian Dionysius of Halicarnassus, for example, is certainly retrojecting Hellenistic language into seventh century Italy, when he claims that Tarquinius Priscus promised to “impose no garrisons or tributes upon any of your cities, but permit each of them to enjoy its own laws and its ancient form of government” (τὰς τε πόλεις ὑμῖν ἀφήμι πάσας ἀφρουρήτους καὶ ἀφορολογήτους καὶ αὐτονόμους πολιτείας τε κόσμου ἐκάστης φυλάττειν συγχωρῶ τὸν ἀρχαῖον, 3.60.2) when the defeated Tyrrhenians. There are passing references to libertas and its cognates in fragments of early Roman authors, and these do perhaps reflect some public discourse of the idea, but they are few, decontextualized, and highly fragmentary and as such do not provide much help (e.g. Enn. Am. fr. 317; Accius, Brutus frg. 4; Ap. Claudius Caecus fr. 11 [Malcovati]; Cato Maior frgs. 162, 164, 252 [Malcovati]).

41 Surprisingly little attention has been paid by scholars to the structure of the Roman res publica as compared to that of the Greek polis; even less has been written on the similarities of Rome’s evolution as a state with that of the Greek polis. T.J. Cornell’s recent contribution on the subject (“The City-States in Latium” in Hansen, ed, 30 City States [Copenhagen, 2006], 209-228) has persuasively argued that the communities of sixth and fifth century Latium (including Rome) indeed meet the modern sociological definition of “city-state”, though, in contrast to the Hellenic example, they often operated under sharper vertical stratification within the state and closer horizontal relations between (particularly elite) citizens of neighbouring states; cf. T.J. Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome (Routledge, 1995), 81-118 (“Rise of the City-State”); C. Ando, “Was Rome a ‘polis’?”, ClAnt. 18 (1999), 5-33, arguing that the Greeks indeed considered the Roman state to be a polis.
at least, where both cultures could communicate meaningfully about liberty at their earliest interactions in Sicily, Illyricum and, ultimately, Greece. Naturally, however, owing to the unique conditions of the Italian peninsula, there were key differences. First was the strong relationship between *libertas* and legal institutions, and the correspondingly negative orientation (i.e. "freedom from") of *libertas*. Contrasting it with the Greek case, Raaflaub observes:

> The Roman concept [of freedom] focused closely on institutions and rights and was connected with individual laws. In fact, it is possible to delineate the content of *libertas* by referring to relevant laws, and it is only logical that freedom could be identified with the validity of, and respect for, law and justice (*lex et ius*). This striking need for legal support was the result of concrete experiences: in Rome freedom was almost without exception—for aristocrats and commoners alike—protection against (excessive) power, force, ambition, and arbitrariness.

The earliest and fundamental conception of *libertas* was its contradistinction to the condition of the slave (*servus*), who existed at law in another’s power (*in alius potestate*) and under another’s rights (*alieni iuris*). By contrast, *libertas* existed where one enjoyed or had the capacity to enjoy the rights of his own person (*persona sui iuris*).

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42 Shortly after the Second Punic War the Romans acknowledged the immunity and freedom (*immunes ac liberae*) to five Sicilian communities (Cic. *Verr*. 2.3.13); in the settlement of Illyricum in 229, the Romans left their supporters, Corcyra and Apollonia, free (*eleutheroi*; App. *Ill.* 8); and of course at Corinth in 196 they proclaimed the Greeks “free, ungarrisoned, and autonomous” (Polyb. 18.44). For a comparison of Greek and Roman freedoms, see Raaflaub, “Freiheit in Athen und Rom”.

43 Raaflaub, *Discovery of Freedom*, 267.

44 E.g. Twelve Tables (= Crawford, *RS II*, no. 40), I.14 (distinguishing between the *liberus* and *servus*); Dig. 1.5.3: *summa itaque de iure personarum divisio haec est, quod omnes homines aut liberi sunt aut servi* (the chief distinction in the law of persons is this: that all men are either free or slaves); Gaius. *Inst.* 1.51-52: *ac prius dispiciamus de iis, qui in aliena potestate sunt. In potestate itaque sunt servi dominorum* (‘let us first discuss those who are in another’s power; those in another’s power are slaves of a master’); Wirszubski, *Libertas*, 1; Brunt, “Libertas”, 283-291. In this case, the Roman and Greek concepts of freedom developed similarly (cf. Raaflaub, *Discovery of Freedom*, 23-57).

45 Wirszubski, *Libertas*, 1. It is worth noting that, like the Greeks, the Romans were aware that freedom was not just the ability to do as one wishes (*potestas vivendi ut velis*: Cic. *Parad*. 34; cf. *Off*. 1.70), but required *moderatio* lest it become *licentia* (Cic. *Flac.* 16; Livy 23.2.1; 34.49.8). Unlike the Greeks, however, the Romans relied heavily on laws to delinate the limits of action and to that extent, as Cicero
Libertas, therefore, was equated with citizenship (civitas), which, aside from basic participatory rights (i.e. suffragium), afforded the citizen well-defined personal rights (e.g. ius commercii, ius connubii, ius migrationis) and protections against the arbitrary use by a magistrate of his imperium (e.g. auxilium and provocatio). This orientation toward individual freedoms was forged by the unique socio-political conditions of the early Romans, who, under constant threat of annihilation from their neighbours, relied upon the strong leadership and community service of the aristocracy, whose members traditionally filled the strong executive (magistracies) and deliberative (Senate) bodies.

This negative orientation meant that, unlike Greek ἄλευθερία, the concept of libertas at Rome was not as tied up in concerns for equal access to, and participation in, one’s own government. Although equality under the law was a central tenet of libertas, it was nevertheless functionally compatible with social stratification and therefore fully compatible with an aristocratic governing structure. Whereas the Greek concept of observed (Clu. 146), they were all slaves to the law so that they could be free (legum idcirco omnes servi sumus ut liberi esse possimus; cf. Livy 2.1.1; Sall. Hist. 1.55.4M).

Wirszubski Libertas, 3-4, 9-15, 24-27; Brunt, “Libertas”, 297-298. Wirszubski (pp. 3-4) observed “the essentially civic character of libertas” which he argued was “coterminous with civitas”, but Brunt (Fall of the Republic, 296 and 518-519) reminds us that this equation is valid only in the political context. Livy (3.45.8) refers to auxilium and provocatio as the “two bulwarks for guarding freedom” (duae arces libertatis tuendae).


48 This is not to say that there was no element of participatory freedom in libertas. The so-called ‘struggle of the orders’ was precisely related to the patriciate’s monopoly over executive offices and the opening up of these to the plebeians (see recent discussions in K. Raaflaub [ed.], Social Struggles in Archaic Rome [New York 2005]), while the secret-ballot law became an important aspect of freedom by the first century (B.A. Marshall, “Libertas Populi: The Introduction of the Secret Ballot at Rome and its Depiction on Coinage” Antichthon 31 [1997], 54-73).

49 Bleicken, Staat. Ord., 28-31; Wirszubski, Libertas, 9-15; Nicolet, The World of the Citizen in Republican Rome (London 1980), 320-321; Raaflaub, Discovery of Freedom, 266: “The liberty of the Roman people was not their ability to govern and participate actively in public deliberation but their
freedom was indissolubly related to direct self-government (best demonstrated in the normalization of δημοκρατία by the fourth century), Roman libertas operated in relation to, and depended upon, timocratic government. Leading citizens accrued dignitas (social prestige) through their protection and guidance of the community, which was itself enabled by the inherent auctoritas (authority) in that prestige. While Greek freedom was predicated on the equality among citizens, Roman freedom was bound up with dignitas and auctoritas and eschewed notions of socio-political equality.

Freedom to the Romans, therefore, was consistent with social stratification and aristocratic government – their own republic had clear social distinctions between patricians and plebs, nobiles and humiles, and government offices were over-represented by elite families and were difficult for novi homines to breach, and the same appears to have been true for most of the neighbouring Italian states. Since one’s freedom existed in his distinction as citizen, central to concept of freedom was the organization of the state of which he was a part. In short, freedom existed for those who lived in a state arranged under a republican style political regime; monarchies and closed factional sovereignty to make decisions in the assembly (to the extent that such authority was not limited by the powers and traditional prerogatives of the senate and magistrates).

50 Bleicken, Staat. Ord., 25-26 ("die res publica lebt in der Verbindung der Vorstellungen, die in den Begriffen (libertas-dignitas/auctoritas) gedacht werden."); cf. Cic. Leg. 3.25.38 (ipsa aequalibilitas est iniqua, cum habet nullus gradus dignitatis); Rep. 1.53. Dignitas was naturally part of a feedback loop of control whereby one had prestige because he led and he led because he had prestige. Although not an entirely closed system, one entered the cycle of dignitas through one’s lineage, which is what made it so difficult for new men to breach the highest social and political ranks of the state. On the consequences of the libertas-auctoritas relationship in the foreign sphere, see T. Yoshimura, “Zum römischen Libertas-Begriff in der Aussenpolitik im zweiten Jahrhundert vor Chr.”, AJAH 9 (1984), 1-22, and the subsequent discussion in text.


52 Cornell, “City-States in Latium”, 221-224.
governments were inconsistent with a free state since their capacity to act arbitrarily upon the state made its citizens un-free by removing their ability to do or forbear according to their own autonomous will.⁵³ The free individual had to be part of a free community, which meant he had to live within a res publica—a civic organization in which members of the community (cives) had a share in the collective power over themselves since the state (civitas) was literally a “public thing”.⁵⁴ And so the Romans considered themselves to have become free after expelling Tarquinius Superbus and abolishing the monarchy;⁵⁵ similarly, during the so-called Struggle of the Orders, the plebeians worked to free themselves from the patricians who controlled the government; and even in the Late Republic autocrats like Sulla and Caesar were labeled by some as destroyers of liberty.⁵⁶

⁵³ Cic. Rep. 2.43: desunt omnino et populo multa qui sub rege est, in primisque libertas, quae non in eo est ut iusto utamur domino, sed ut nul<lo> (‘Many things are entirely lacking to a people living under a king—in the first place, freedom, which consists not in having a just master, but in having none’); cf. Cic. Ad Brut. 2.5.1; Dig. 49.15.7 (text below, n.59). So, in the voice of Scipio, Cicero (Rep. 2.33) identifies Athens and Rhodes as liberi populi. Cf. Livy 2.15.3; Wirszubski, Libertas, 5; Brunt, “Libertas”, 291.

⁵⁴ Cic. Rep. 1.25.39: Est igitur... res publica res populi, populus autem non omnis hominum coetus quoquo modo congregatus, sed coetus multitudinis iuris consensu et utilitatis communione sociatus (‘A res publica is therefore a “public thing”, but a populus is not any collection of humans brought together in any sort of way, but an assemblage of people in large numbers associated in an agreement with respect to justice and a partnership for the common good’). Note also that civitas was the term for both ‘citizenship’ and ‘state’. On these terminologies, see Cornell, “City-States in Latium”, 214-215.

⁵⁵ E.g. Cic. Flac. 25 (regibus exterminatis libertas in re publica constituata est); Sall. BC. 7.1-3 (ea tempestate [sic. regis expulsis]... sed civitas incredibile memoratu est adepta libertate quantum brevi creverit); cf. Livy 1.17.3; 2.1.1-2; Tac. Ann. 1.1.1. Note, too, Cicero’s comment (de Rep. 1.31.61) in a discussion of libertas: “I pass over, of course, the citizens in a monarchy, for there the subjection of the people is neither concealed nor questionable” (omito dicere in regno, ubi ne obscura quidem est ut dubia servitus).

⁵⁶ Struggle of the Orders: Livy 4.6.11 (contentio libertatis dignitatisque); Sulla: Sall. Hist. fr. 1.44.5 (Speech of Lepidus), passim; Caesar: Macrob. Sat. 2.3.11; 2.7.4; Cic. Att. 7.5; Suet. Jul. 30.5; 80.2-3; Nic. Dam. fr 130.96; cf. Cicero’s Philippics against the triumvir M. Antonius. Cicero himself received the label of king (and thus destroyer of freedom) by Torquatus (Cic. Sull. 21-25) and P. Clodius (ad Att. 1.16.10; Sest. 109), who erected a temple to libertas on his estate while in exile (W. Allen, “Cicero’s House and Libertas” TAPhA 75 [1944], 1-9).
Moving our perspective from the freedom of the individual within the state to the liberty of the state itself, a free republic was one that, like the free individual, had the capacity to enjoy its own laws (suis legibus uti). The exact meaning of this phrase is unclear, perhaps purposely so, but it seems generally to correspond to the sovereignty of the community to propose, deliberate, pass, amend and adjudicate its own laws by itself, free from the domination of another state (republican, monarchic, or otherwise). Thus it was the opinion of the Julio-Claudian jurist Proculus that: "a people is free, who is not subject to the power (potestas) of another people" and even in those instances where a state concluded a treaty with Rome bearing a clause upholding the Romans' supremacy (maiestas) that people is still free, just as one's client (though not equal) is free.

Here, like the slave (who was in alius potestate and not persona sui iuris), a republican state

57 Owing largely to the struggle for survival and the consequent drive for expansion and predominance, libertas had less political significance in interstate relations than its Greek counterparts. The notion was almost certainly not a part of the political discourse between Italian states, nor, correspondingly, was it an issue in the development of the Romans' early empire in Italy. (There are a handful of exceptions, chiefly Livy 8.4.1, who relates that leading up to the war with Rome, a speaker for the Latin League asked his compatriots whether their hearts yearned for freedom [sin autem tandem libertatis desiderium remordet animos] -- for other examples, see n.40. The obvious difficulty is that we have every reason to suppose that the language of the speech is Livian, reflecting his own Augustan perspective of what the Latins may have said. In any case, such examples cannot demonstrate a clear political significance to freedom before the interaction with the Greek world.).

58 Libertas and leges were restored to the Hernici in 305 (Livy 9.43.23), Rhegium in 270 (Polyb. 1.7.10; Livy 31.31.7), Syracuse in 214 (Livy 24.33.6; Plut. Vit. Marc. 23.7), Locris in 204 (Livy 29.21.7), and Carthage in 201 (Polyb. 16.18.2).

59 Dig. 49.15.7.1: liber autem populus est is, qui nullius alterius populi potestati est subjectus: sive is foederatus est <sive non foederatus>, item sive aequo foedere in amicitiam venit, sive foedere comprehensum est, ut is populus alterius populi maiestatem comiter conservaret. hoc enim adicitur, ut intellegatur alterum populum superiorem esse, non ut intellegatur alterum non esse liberum: et quemadmodum clientes nostros intellegimus libros esse, etiam si neque auctoritate neque dignitate neque viribus nobiles sunt, sic eos, qui maiestatem nostram comiter conservare debit, libros esse intellegendum est. ('That people is free, which is subject to the authority of no other people, whether it is bound by treaty <or not>, and also whether it has entered into friendship (i.e., with Rome) through an equal treaty, or a clause has been included in its treaty stipulating that the people in question must courteously preserve the majesty of the other people (i.e., the Romans). For this clause is added so that it may be understood that one of the peoples is superior, not that the other is not free. Just as we understand that our clients are free men, even though they are equal to us neither in authority nor in rank nor in power, in the same way it should be understood that those peoples are free, who must courteously preserve our majesty').
could be considered free (though subordinate) in so long as it was not under the arbitrary power (potestas) of another state.  

This last observation might seem at odds with the development of Roman authority over Italy, but in fact the idea of suis legibus uti naturally dovetails with the character of Roman expansion. The great advantage (and unique aspect) of the expanding Roman state was its inclusivity, which was a product of the strong horizontal relations between Roman elites and their social peers in Latium and, later, Italian communities. As has been well documented, Romans were liberal with the extension of their citizenship—and its attendant legal rights and protections—to the extent that citizens of conquered and annexed Italian territory (when not killed or sold into slavery) usually became members of the Roman state as municipia. Each municipium owed certain military and financial obligations to the Romans, but enjoyed many of the legal protections (and rights) afforded by Roman citizenship as well as a high degree of

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60 Compare: Cic., Pis. 37-38 (excoriating L. Piso for using his consular army to plunder Greece): nam lege Caesaris iustissima atque optima populi liberi plane et vere erant liberi, lege [sic. lex cupiditatis] autem ea quam nemo legem praeter te et conlegam tuum putavit omnis erat tibi Achata, Thessalia, Athenae, cuncta Graecia addicita (‘By that just and admirable law of Caesar [i.e. lex Iulia de provinciis] free peoples were really and truly free; but by that law that no-one except you and your colleague considered a law at all [e.g. your covetousness], nearly the whole of Achaea, Thessaly, and Athens – the whole of Greece! – was given to you.

61 Rights such as the ius commercium, ius coniubium and ius migrationis probably represent Latin traditions of inter-communal relations and suggest a tradition of interpenetration between citizens of different communities, particularly among the elite. Sherwin-White, Roman Citizenship, 14-15, 31-32; Cornell, “City-States in Latium”, 221-224, who characterizes the Latin city-states as “open cities” for the porous character of their socio-political boundaries.

62 In this the Romans were following the model developed by the Latin League in the early sixth century. On Roman colonia, see: E.T. Salmon, Roman Colonization (Hamilton 1963); Sherwin-White, The Roman Citizenship, 76-94; for a sociological approach, see the work of Cl. Nicolet, The World of the Citizen in Republican Rome (London, 1980 [Gallimard, 1976]). The inclusive nature of Roman citizenship is well known and can be found in its earliest myths: the synoekismos of Trojans and Latins through the marriage of Aeneas and Livia, of Romans and Sabines facilitated through the captured Sabine women, etc. (Sherwin-White, Roman Citizenship, passim).
internal autonomy (*suis legibus uti*). The Greeks, it seems, were aware of this Roman practice of inclusive citizenship: Philip V remarked in a letter to the Larissans, who were then trying to rebuild their *polis* after suffering massive losses in the Social War, that they had to extend their citizenship in order to grow strong, just like the Romans “who receive into their state even slaves—when they have freed them—giving them a share in the magistracies, and in such a way not only have they augmented their own fatherland, but they have also sent out colonies to almost seventy places”. The Romans, however, were late in extending their citizenship to the cities of the East, which did not begin until the last decades of the Republic and then only rarely (and only to individuals, not entire cities). The Romans expanded their empire into the East without extending their citizenship; their hegemony came to co-exist with the freedom and autonomy of the Greek *poleis*.

Roman *libertas* and Greek *éleuθeρία* are often conceptualized as different sorts of freedom, or as concerning different qualities of freedom. Greek freedom, with its

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63 Gell. *NA* 16.13.6: *munipices ergo sunt cives Romani ex municipiis, legibus suis et suo iure utentes* (‘munipices’, then, are Roman citizens from towns, using their own laws and enjoying their own rights); cf. Salmon, *Roman Colonization*, 48-49; Sherwin-White, *Roman Citizenship*, 53; Lintott, *Imp. Rom.*, 130-131. Some *municipia* were given a modified Roman citizenship that denied them the right to vote (*civitas sine suffragio*), which may have caused these cities some displeasure, but entitled them to all the other privileges of citizenship.

64 *SIG* 1, lines 31-34: οἱ ῥωμαῖοι ... οἱ καὶ τοὺς οἰκέτας ὥσπερ ἐλευθερώσωσιν προσδεχόμενοι εἰς τὸ πολίτευμα καὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων μεταδίδοντες, καὶ διὰ τοῦ τοιούτου τρόπου οὐ μόνον τὴν ἰδίαν πατρίδα ἐπηνυχήσαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀποικίας (σ)χεδόν [eι ε]βδομήκοντα τόπους ἐκπεπόμασιν. For the translation, see R. Bagnall and P. Derow, *The Hellenistic Period* (New York 2004) no. 32.

65 It seems that Rome stopped enfranchising foreigners after the first quarter of the second century until after the Social War, when it was forced to extend its *civitas* to most of Italy (Sherwin-White, *Roman Citizenship* [Oxford 1973]; cf. Badian, *FC*, 150 & 302-308). Even then, citizenship was only rarely extended eastward: e.g., Cn. Pompeius Theopomphus of Mytilene (*Cic. pro Arch.* 24; *SIG* 1, 755; Robert, *CRAI* 1969); C. Julius Theopompos, C. Julius Artemidorus, C. Julius Hippocrates (*I.Knidos* 33); Seleucus of Rhous was enfranchised by Augustus for his service to the triumvir as an admiral in his fleet (*RDGE* 58); by contrast, Asclepiades of Clazomenae, Polystraton of Carystiae, and Meniscus of Miletus, who had commanded ships for the Romans during the Social War (?), were acknowledged as *socci* of the Roman people but not enfranchised (*RDGE* 22).
emphasis on political, public participation and self-mastery, is said to be “positive”; while Roman freedom, focusing on the individual’s rights and protections enshrined under law, similar to our own modern practices, is said to be “negative”. These have proven to be useful heuristic distinctions, but they have not gone uncontested by modern political theorists (some of whom have begun to argue that all freedoms are negative), and by modern ancient historians (who rightly observe that such a dichotomy is too schematic to distinguish Greek from Roman thought). Without minimizing their different emphases on participatory and personal liberties, we can say that both cultures shared similar notions of what it meant to be free and the fundamental contradistinction between the free man and the slave. In this way, a useful conceptual tool in thinking about Greco-Roman freedom is the republican (or neo-Roman) theory of freedom expounded by Pettit and Skinner.

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67 This is the position of many of the authors found in preceding notes. As just one example, observe the comments of Wirszubski (*Libertas, 1*) on *libertas*: “Freedom [is] compris[ed] of …two different concepts, namely “freedom from” and “freedom to”, neither of which admits of any but general definitions…. [*Libertas*] comprises both the negation of the limitations imposed by slavery and the assertion of the advantages deriving from freedom.” For the view that all freedoms are negative, see E. Nelson, “Liberty: One Concept too Many?” *Pol. Theory* 33 (2005), 58-78.

As its alternate name suggests, this theory draws its inspiration from Roman legal texts and follows the simple, but powerful, idea of freedom as non-domination. A man is free so long as he is able to do or forbear doing according to his autonomous will. The slaves, for example, lack freedom not because he is restrained or is interfered with, but because he is subject to a master who can arbitrarily impose his will. Thus in both the Greek and the Roman notions of freedom, the individual was free in having the capacity to share in his own governance and thus consent to his own subordination (in Rome this liberty was further protected by laws, which the citizen had a role in crafting and to which he consented); likewise, the free state was one that was not subject to the domination of a monarch or tyrant, but rather a polis or res publica that was free to enjoy its own laws (autovoumi a or sui legibus). In both cultures, the common denominator of liberty is the absence of arbitrary power, or non-domination.

Before moving on to Greco-Roman freedom, let us summarize their independent traditions: freedom was a central concept in the identity of Greek citizens and the polis itself; it was a highly complex notion underlined by the willing subordination of the individual as part of a superordinate whole and the participation in a superordinate common interest; at the level of interstate relations, this did not preclude the community’s participation in political organizations larger than itself. These supra-polis organizations, furthermore, were becoming increasingly common in Greece as the Hellenes appear to

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69 Though the republican theory is a modern label, its neo-Roman values were espoused and elaborated in the Anglophone world during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, especially during the English interregnum and American revolutionary period. See Skinner, *Liberty before Liberalism*, passim; idem, “Classical Liberty and the Coming of the English Civil War” in Skinner and M. van Gelderen (eds.), *Republicanism: A Shared European Heritage* (Cambridge 2002), 9-28.

70 Because the slave is subject to the domination of his master, even the slave who is well treated and may be able to act without the least interference, is still unfree; by the same token, even the man who willingly submits himself into the domination of another is said to be unfree.
have become more comfortable with a political landscape that was no longer exclusively dotted with the *polis*.  

However, within this world, freedom emerged as an important political discourse, formulated in the language of ἐλευθερία, αὐτονομία, and δημοκρατία that expressed, broadly, a sense of self-direction in the absence of domination. Roman *libertas*, though less intellectually developed, and defined principally by personal protections against a greater authority, followed the same republican model of freedom: a state was free that was arranged along republican lines (which could admit to social inequality) and free from the coercive power of another to make its own laws. In this, the Greek and Roman notions of liberty were complementary, though (significantly) not parallel: at the time of meeting one another in the late third century, freedom, for the Greeks, admitted being ruled so long as ruling themselves; for the Romans, ruling admitted freedom so long as it respected autonomy. Under these conditions we can begin to see how the notion of Greek freedom and Roman constraint might also have been complementary.

2.2 – THE DISCOURSE AND NARRATIVE OF FREEDOM

Let us turn, now, to freedom as it was expressed and understood in the official communications between the Roman *res publica* and the *poleis* of the Greek East.

We noted in the Introduction that the primary purpose of communication is to reach consensus, and that, when initial attempts at this fail (when the implicit claims to validity

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72 A useful bibliography of modern scholarship can be found in R. Bernhardt, *Rom und die Städte des hellenistischen Ostens* (Munich 1998), esp. 11-35.
are rejected), interlocutors resort to discourse. 73 Discourse, then, is communication about communication wherein a speaker must justify his claims to truth, normative rightness, and sincerity by recourse to both the real-world and the social world of shared knowledge, normative values, taken-for-granteds, etc (i.e. Lifeworld). 74 To that extent, when one state attempted to communicate its relationship with another, often to justify some action it often turned to a discourse of freedom. 75 Thus, to anticipate the discussion somewhat, when the Romans defeated Philip V in 196 they justified their war-making and coercion of the region through the discourse of freedom: they had worked to free the Greeks from the Macedonian king (not, e.g., to protect their own interests and advance their own security). Indeed, as we shall see, the Romans defined their relationship toward the poleis of Greeks in terms of freedom, granting them ἐλευθερία and immunity from garrisons and taxes and acknowledging their right to self-determination through their own laws. 76 Because of not just the frequency, but also the centrality of the discourse of freedom in orienting and directing Roman action among the Greeks, we can observe a narrative of freedom in the history of Greco-Roman relations during this period.

73 See above, p. 15.

74 Habermas, TCA I.42. I leave out here any discussion on Habermas’ rules of discourse, which parses the conditions under which a discourse can be carried out (J. Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action [Cambridge 1990], 85-95).

75 In this regard, Habermas’ concept of discourse ethics, though multifaceted and relating more directly to his theory of modernity, is relevant insofar as it addresses how claims to normative rightness can be justified by recourse to shared social knowledge. See, Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action (Cambridge 1990); Outhwaite, Habermas, 38-57; Eriksen and Weigård, Understanding Habermas , 54-87.

76 Polyb. 18.46 (text at n. 179).
That the Hellenistic world had a discourse of freedom is worth establishing first. As noted in the previous section, freedom is found expressed in the sphere of interstate relations already by the fifth-century, when Athens established, and subsequently had to defend, its empire over other Greek poleis. In their second empire (379-338), the Athenians explicitly asserted their allies’ rights to be “free (ἐλεύθερος) and autonomous (αὐτόνομος), arranged under whatever form of government they wish, neither receiving a garrison, nor submitting to a governor, nor paying tribute”. Similar language had been used earlier in the King’s Peace of 387, and later in the rhetoric of the Thebans against Macedonia and of the Athenians against Antipater. Philip II, for his part, had claimed that the Greeks were ἐλεύθεροι καὶ αὐτόνομοι in his Common Peace, and to that end is said to have restored freedom and autonomy to several cities after driving out the Persians.

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78 Rhodes-Osbourne, GHI 22, lines 19-23: ἔξειναι αὐτῷ[ι ἐλεύθεροι· ἄντι καὶ αὐτόνομοι, πολιτ[ειαν]ὶ πολιτείαν ἢν ἄν ἄνήληται, μὴ[τε [φρο[πλαν εἰσδεχομένης μὴ[τε ἄρχοντα ὑπο[δεξ]ομένωι μὴ[τε φόρον φέροντι; cf. lines 9-11. Note, however, that the same language is absent from the decrees of the League council recording Methymna, Corecyra, Acarnania, and Cephallenia as new allies (Rhodes-Osbourne GHI 23 & 24), suggesting perhaps dictation rather than dialogue at this point.

79 King’s Peace: Xen. Hell. 5.1.31-32 (τὰς δὲ ἄλλας Ἑλληνιδὰς πόλεις καὶ μικρὰς καὶ μεγάλας αὐτόνομους ἀφεῖναι); cf. Diod. 14.110.3; Isoc 8.16; by this Peace, of course, the Greeks had to concede that Asia was subject to the Shah. Thebæs: Diod 17.9.5 (οἱ δὲ Θηβαιοὶ διαφορολογηθέντες ἀντικήρυξαν ἀπὸ τινός ψηφιλοῦ πύργου τὸν βουλόμενον μετὰ τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέως ἱερὸς (sc. Shah) καὶ θηβαῖον ἐλευθεροῦν τοὺς Ἑλλήνας καὶ καταλῦειν τὸν τῆς Ἑλλάδος τύραννον παριέναι πρὸς αὐτοὺς; cf. Arr. 1.7.2; Plut. Alex. 11. Athens: Diod. 18.10.2 (οἱ ήπτορες ... ἑγράψαν ψήφισμα τῆς κοινῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐλευθερίας φροντίσα τὸν δήμον καὶ τὰς μὲν φρουρουμένας πόλεις ἐλευθερώσασι; cf. 18.9.1, 12.3.

80 Philip II and Common Peace 338: [Dem] 17.8 (ἔπιτάττει ἡ συνθήκη εὐθὺς ἐν ἀρχῇ ἐλευθεροὺς εἶναι καὶ αὐτόνομοὺς τοὺς Ἑλλήνας), and 17.9 where in rejecting the treaty he still urges the Athenians to fight for their liberty (ἀλλὸν ἄρα τινὰ χρόνον ἀναμίμητε τῆς ἱδίας ἐλευθερίας ἄμα καὶ τῆς τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων ἀντιλαβέσθαι); two earlier Common Peaces also contained ἐλευθερία or αὐτονομία, those of 375 (Diod. 15.38) and 371 (Xen. Hell. 6.3.18; 6.5.5; Diod. 15.40.5); see Ryder, Koine Eirene (London...
It was under Alexander’s successors, though, that freedom emerged as a central discourse in relations between states and between states and the new dynastic families. The historical record is replete with examples from the late fourth and third centuries in which the diadochs declared their Greek subjects to be free, and the Greek subjects, in turn, proudly proclaimed their own freedom. The seminal event was Antigonus Monophthalmus’ proclamation at Tyre that “all Greeks are to be free, without garrison, and autonomous”, which he backed up with an extensive ‘liberation’ campaign in the Levant and continental Greece in the following years. In 311 the importance of Greek liberty was acknowledged by all the major rivals and enshrined in their compact for the division of Alexander’s empire. Thereafter one can give lists of wars fought for the

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1965), App. I-XI. Alexander: Diod. 18.24.1 (μάλιστα δ’ ευφέργεται τάς Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις, ποιῶν αὐτὰς αὐτὸνόμους καὶ ἀφορολογήτους, προσεπλέγων ὅτι τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐλευθερώσεως ἕνεκα τὸν πρὸς Πέρας πόλεον ἐπανηγήσατο); cf. 16.91.1 and Plut. Alex. 34.2 (all cities free and autonomous after the Battle of Gaugamela). Freed cities: Sardis and other Lydians (Arr. 1.7.4; ἐλευθερία, τοῖς νόμοις τοῖς πάλαι χρήσθαι), Ephesus (Arr. 1.17.10: δημοκρατίαν κατέστησε), Ionia & Aeolia (Arr. 1.18.2: δημοκρατίας δὲ ἐγκαθιστάναι καὶ τοὺς νόμους τοὺς σφῶν ἐκάστους ἀποδυνάμως, καὶ τοὺς φόρους ἀνένειμαι), Miletus (Diod. 17.22.4-5; Arr. 1.19.6: ἐλευθερία), Amisos (Arr. 1.19.6: δημοκρατία), Erythrae (OGIS 223, line 22: ἐπὶ τῇ Αλεξάνδρῳ καὶ Αντιγόνῳ αὐτὸ[ν]ῳς ἰδίᾳ καὶ ἀφορολόγητος), Colophon (AJP 56, p. 361, lines 6-7: παράδεικτέν τοὺς Ἀλέξανδρου ό βασιλεύς τῇ τῇ ἐλευθερίᾳ), Caria (Diod. 27.24.1), Iasus (SIG 169; Rhodes-Osborne GHI 90, line 20, ἀπελάθ), Priene (Rhodes-Osborne GHI 86b, lines 3-4, αὐτῶν νόμους εἶναι κα[λ] ἐλευθ[έ]ρους, and line 14, συντάξεως ἀφίμυ), see Badian, “Alexander the Great and the Greeks of Asia” in idem, ed., Ancient Society and Institutions (Oxford 1966), 37-69, and A. Bosworth, Conquest and Empire: The Reign of Alexander the Great (Cambridge, 1988), 250-259.

81 Numerous examples can be found in Gruen, HWCR 1.133-142.

82 Proclamation at Tyre: Diod. 19.61.3 (τοὺς Ἑλλήνας ἐπαντάς ἐλευθερούς, ἀφορολογούς, αὐτόνόμους). Liberation Campaign: Diod. 19.66.3;74.1-2; 77.2; 78.2-5; 87.3; ISE 71. Polyperchon had actually been the first of Alexander’s successors to use the notion in his diagramma of 319 (Diod. 18.55-56; 69.3), to which the Athenians responded with a lengthy decree (SIG 3 317) celebrating their liberation (τὴν πόλιν ἐλευθ[έ]ρωσας, line 13) and “return to (ancestral) laws and democracy” (καὶ τοῦ νόμους καὶ τῆς δημοκρατίας ἀ[πε]ιλ[φ]ε, lines. 21-2).

83 Diod. 19.105.1 (τοὺς δὲ Ἑλλήνας αὐτόνόμους εἶναι); OGIS 5 (= Wells, RC 1, Letter of Antiochus I to Scopesis), lines 1-2 ([πολλὰν δὲ σπουδὴν] ἑποιοῦσα[σ] [περὶ τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐλευθερίας] and lines 53-56 (γεγράφαμεν δὲ ἐν τῇ ἦμᾳ ὁμολόγῳ ἀδύνατον τοὺς Ἑλλήνας πάντας συνδιαφυλάσσειν ἀλλήλως τὴν ἐλευθερίαν καὶ τὴν αὐτο[ν]ομίαν); OGIS 6, lines 12-17 (ἐπανέστησα μὲν Ἀντίγονον καὶ συνήθησαν αὐτῶν ἑπὶ τοῖς προπραγμένοις συνήθησαν δὲ τὴν πόλιν καὶ τοῖς Ἑλληνον ἄτι ἐλευθερο[ὶ] καὶ αὐτόνομοι ὄντες ἐν ἐπιφνητί [εἰς] τῷ λοιπὸν διάξοιου).
sake of freedom and examples of declarations of liberty to Greek communities from each
dynastic house.\textsuperscript{84} In the closing years of the third century, Philip V had granted freedom
to Mylasa (ca. 220-215), Elis (218), Dyme (ca. 215-205), Thasos (203), and Nysiros
(201), while Antiochus III had restored δημοκρατία to Teos and Alabanda (203).\textsuperscript{85} In
these examples, we can plainly see the presence of a discourse on freedom that helped
justify the relative positions of states in the Hellenistic world.

The Romans fully engaged in this discourse beginning in Illyricum in 227 and
more spectacularly at Corinth in 196.\textsuperscript{86} Indeed, as noted above, we can follow a narrative
of freedom that appears at nearly every major watershed moment in the East thereafter: it
was a \textit{casus belli} in the wars against Philip V (201-196, especially after 197), Nabis (195-4),
Antiochus III (192-188), Perseus (172-168), the Achaeans (148-6), Aristonicus (133-
128) and Mithridates (89-84).\textsuperscript{87} In the aftermath of these conflicts freedom was routinely
granted to the Greeks as a whole or to individual communities. In the Late Republic, the
liberty of the Greeks, or, by now, individual \textit{poleis}, remained a central avenue of
interaction between the Greek world and the various leading men of Rome—Sulla,

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item E.g. Antigonids: \textit{SIG}\textsuperscript{3} 344 (Antigonus I, ca. 306-2); \textit{SIG}\textsuperscript{3} 342, 409 (Demetrios Poliorcetes, 304; 287); Polyb. 2.70, 4.22, 5.9 (Antigonus Doson, ca. 220s); Polyb. 4.25.6-8 (Philip V, 220). Seleucids: \textit{IG}\textsuperscript{II}, 2.672 (Seleucus I, 280/79); \textit{OGIS} 222 (Antiochus I, 265); \textit{OGIS} 226 (Antiochus II, 259); \textit{OGIS} 228 & 229 (Seleucus II, ca. 242); Ma, \textit{Antiochos III} nos. 17-19 (Antiochus III, 204-3); Ptolemies: Diod. 19.62.1; \textit{ZPE} 18 (1975), pp. 193-198 (Ptolemy I, 315; 305); \textit{SIG}\textsuperscript{3} 390, lines 12-15 (Ptolemy II, ca. 280s); \textit{SIG}\textsuperscript{3} 463 (Ptolemy III, 245). Achaean League: Polyb. 2.42.3-6.
\item Philip V: Crampa, \textit{Labraunda} 5, line 34; no. 7, lines 9-10 (Mylasa); Polyb. 4.84.4-5 (Elis); Livy 32.22.10 (Dyme); Polyb. 15.24.1-3 (Thasos); \textit{SIG}\textsuperscript{3} 572, lines 15-18 (Nysiros). Antiochus III: Ma, \textit{Antiochos III} nos. 16 (Alabanda), 17-19 (Teos).
\item Illyria: App. \textit{Illyr.} 8. Corinth: Polyb. 18.46; Livy 33.32; Plut. \textit{Flam.} 10.4; and below, p. 171ff.
\item Philip V: Polyb. 16.27.2-3, 34.35; 18.1.13, 44.2; Livy 32.10.3-8, 33.3; and above, n. 85; Nabis: Livy 33.46.3; 34.22.7-13, 41.3; Gruen, \textit{HWCR} II.450-55; Antiochus: Polyb. 21.9; 25.4.5; Livy 35.33.8; 38.10.1-8; Seager “Freedom of the Greeks”, 106-112; Perseus: Livy 43.8.2-4; 45.18.29; Diod. 31.8; Plut. \textit{Aem.} 28.6; \textit{RDGE} 40; Achaean: Zon. 9.31; \textit{RDGE} 43; Aristonicus: Livy, \textit{Per.} 59; \textit{I.Metrop.}; Mithridates: Paus. 10.34.2; App. \textit{Mith.} 61; Plut. \textit{Sert.} 24.4.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Lucullus, Pompeius Magnus, Caesar, M. Antonius, Augustus. The discourse was relevant in the quotidinan as much as the extraordinary, and is found in the standard communications between ruler and ruled.

The central terms in this Greco-Roman discourse were those used in the earlier Hellenistic period: ἐλευθερία (freedom), αὐτονομία (autonomy), δημοκρατία (democracy), τοῖς ἰδίοις νομοῖς χρεῖν (to use one's own laws), as well as the various sorts of immunities: ἀνεισφορία / ἀφορολογήσια, (from tribute), ἀτέλεια (from taxes), ἀλειτουργία (from public obligations), ἀνεπισταθμεία (from billeting), ἀστρατε(υ)ία (from military service), ἀπαροχή (from supplies), ὑπεξειρημένον (simply 'exemption').

The Romans, for whom freedom was less well-developed and parsed, had fewer words for these ideas than the Greeks, but they too could speak of freedom (libertas), autonomy (suis legibus uti), and immunity (immunitas) in an international context. Once aware of the terms that comprise the discourse, one can generate sizeable lists of documents from both Greek and Roman sources. The term ἐλευθερία (or the adjectival ἐλευθέρος), for example, appears in no fewer than twenty epigraphical documents from our period of discussion – thirteen derive ultimately from senatus consulta or epistulae magistrorum

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88 Sulla: RDGE 17, 18, 20, 21, 70; Lucullus: App. Mith. 83; Plut. Luc. 19; Cic. De imp. Cn. Pomp. 21; Pompey: Plut. Pomp. 42.4; Strabo 13.2.3; Dio 37.20.2; App. Mith. 83; Plut. Luc. 19.4-5; SIG 751, 752; Caesar: RDGE 54, 58, 73; Antony (often negatively): Strabo 12.3.14; 14.5.14; Bernhardt, Polis und Herrschaft, 161; Brutus & Cassius: App. B.C. 4.10; Augustus: Aphrod. 13; RDGE 26.

89 E.g. SIG 613a (186); RDGE 43 (143); Claros, Menippos & Polemaios texts, (late second century); lex Ant. Term. (68); OGIS 449 (44); Aphrod. 8 (38), and 13 (Augustan).

90 See Appendix V.

91 They could even introduce new immunities into the Greek lexicon: e.g. one might be ἀδημοσιώνητος: free from the Roman publican (Aphrod. 8, line 60).

92 See Appendices I-IV.
and seven from the Greeks themselves. Similar lists can be compiled for the other terms, which likewise demonstrate their continued use by both parties throughout the period under consideration.

In some examples we can see the dialogic nature of the interaction and witness the negotiation in action. In the case of the Colophonian temple-city of Claros, for example, a certain Menippos undertook a series of embassies to Rome to assert the city’s autonomy to act in certain spheres; on his return, he is praised by his people for bringing back responses that conform to δημοκρατία (i.e. freedom). An earlier example regarding Delphi is more illuminating still: according to a letter of Sp. Postumius (pr. 189), ambassadors from the polis approached the Roman senate in that year and sought recognition of their freedom and immunity; the Senate responded by recognizing them as “independent, free, and immune, living and governing themselves by themselves”. Here we see the process of negotiation within the discourse, where the terms themselves are being defined in the course of the communication. We have now to attempt to

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93 See Appendix I. This, of course, is in the political context of the state and excludes references to the emancipation of slaves and freedmen.

94 Claros, Menippos, col. II, lines 3-7: ἀλλὰ καὶ προσγεγραμμένον ἑνεγκε τῇ ἄποκρίσει διότι τῆς ἐπαρχείᾳς ἐκτὸς οὔτε κρίνειν οὔτε πολυπραγμονεῖν τῷ στρατηγῷ καθήκει, ἰδιώτατον τῇ δημοκρατίᾳ καὶ κάλλιστον ἑνέγκας ἀπόκριμα (‘and again he brought back an addition to the response of the Senate that outside of the province, the governor can neither be judge nor meddle in such matters; it is a response that conforms to democracy and is very good’).

95 RDGE 1, frg. A, lines 3-5; frg. B, lines 3-5. It might be noted that a few years later Postumius sent a letter to the Amphictyonic League advising it of Delphi’s freedom, which perhaps spurred other members to appeal to Rome; later we find the Amphictyony comprised of “independent tribes and democratic (i.e. free) communities” (τῶν ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτονόμων ἑθνῶν καὶ δημοκρατουμένων πόλεων), suggesting that members of the Amphictyony had accepted Rome’s panhellenic (and perhaps individual) grants of freedom (SIG² 613 [= CID IV, 106], lines. 3-4). As an indication that freedom was normatively understood as absolute, note that in speaking of “other Greeks who have chosen freedom and democracy” (τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἠλλησιν τοῖς άρουμένοις τήν ἐλευθερίαν καὶ δημοκρατίαν, lines 18-19), the Amphictyony does not admit the Romans a role in this freedom. See below, p. 177ff (on “restoration”).
understand the meaning of these terms, and their evolution, in the context of the communicative interaction between the states.

2.3 - THE MEANING OF FREEDOM

The traditional position of modern historians on Greco-Roman freedom is articulated by Larsen, who in 1935 wrote an article entitled "Was Greece Free between 196 and 146 BC?". In it he argued that although the Romans proffered liberty to the Greeks, it was a precarious freedom, based entirely on Roman goodwill and, moreover, could be and often was impinged upon by the Romans. To that end, Greece was not free, or "if Greece was free, she was free only to conduct her affairs as Rome desired".

Larsen's study, furthermore, concluded with the year 146 because while "Greece was not at the time organized as a province, and officials still talked about the freedom of the Greeks...the crushing of the strongest state in Greece [sc. Achaea] and the utter dependence of the country makes it clear to all that from this date on the freedom of the Greeks is nothing but an empty phrase." But, if this were true and freedom was an 'empty phrase', why did the officials (from both sides) continue to talk about Greek liberty down to the period of Augustus?

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97 Larsen, "Was Greece Free?", 209; cf. p. 206: "it is hard not to agree with Polybius that the Greeks after 167 were virtually subjects of Rome".

98 Larsen, "Was Greece Free?", 193-194; cf. M. Cawkwell, "The End of Greek Liberty" in Badian, et al. (eds.), Transitions to Empire (Oklahoma 1996), 98-121, who likens the independence of the polis after 330 as a medical patient kept alive by machinery, "who for all practical purposes...is as good as dead" (98). Compare also: Jones, Greek City, 115 ("a qualified freedom by the grace of their liberator"); Badian, FC; W. Harris, War and Imperialism in Republican Rome (Oxford 1979); Eckstein, "Polybius and 'Freedom of the Greeks'", 45-71; Gruen, HWCR, (Chapter 4: 'Slogans and Propaganda').

99 So Gruen, "Polis in the Hellenistic World", 342: "The Hellenic crowds obviously reckoned the language of autonomy as meaningful and telling, no mere empty posturing or political mirage."
We have observed already that freedom was a discourse used by states to identify their mutual relationship, their positions relative to one another, and to justify their past or future actions. Discourse, furthermore, as a means (as well as form) of communication, was concerned with helping interlocutors reach a shared understanding (the telos of speech). To that extent, insofar as it was used discursively, freedom had meaning. No doubt, though he was not employing our conceptual framework, Larsen would agree; his larger point was that freedom meant nothing because Rome could revoke it at anytime, and in that sense was an empty phrase. This approach is itself flawed: those, like Larsen, who see freedom as meaningless political pap do so by approaching its meaning from an external position; by evaluating references to liberty outside their context, one only evaluates them by one’s own criteria, assuming an objectivity of meaning in a historically and socially contingent notion. ¹⁰⁰ A better approach is to understand meaning as an intersubjective phenomenon – a state of shared understanding between interlocutors about a given idea reached through the putting forward of implicit claims to its truth and normative rightness, which must be accepted or rejected, which in the latter case leads to a negotiation (a discourse). A successful communicative act, in this approach, presupposes a shared understanding of terms and ideas. ¹⁰¹ To that end, the question at hand is not, pace Larsen, “were the Greeks free”, but rather i) did the Greeks and Romans think they were free; ii) to what end; iii) why;

¹⁰⁰ E.g. A.H.M. Jones’s (“Civitates Liberae”, 103) explicit starting point that, a priori, “free” should mean “sovereign”.

and iv) what does this imply about what they thought about freedom? Or, simply, what did the Greeks and Romans mean by 'freedom'?\textsuperscript{102}

2.3.1: ἔλευθερία and αὐτονομία are Indistinguishable

We can begin with an observation made frequently of liberty in this period: in the Classical period ἔλευθερία and αὐτονομία expressed external/negative (freedom from oppression) and internal/positive (freedom of self-determination) orientations, respectively, but that in the Hellenistic period these distinctions had weakened and both terms were synonyms for "freedom".\textsuperscript{103} The same remained true in Greek relations with the Romans; in documents from the second and first centuries ἔλευθερία and αὐτονομία seem to be largely interchangeable. For example, in the epistula de Perseo rege produced by the Romans in 171, ἔλευθερία is used to express the freedom of the Greeks from King Perseus of Macedon, whereas in the Colophonian honourary decree for Menippos published at the end of the same century, ἔλευθερία clearly means the freedom of the community to govern itself;\textsuperscript{104} by the same token, as it is used in a letter of Glabrio to the Delians (191/0) αὐτονομία represents the city’s freedom from Antiochus III,

\textsuperscript{102} Our focus, naturally, is limited to the meaning of freedom as it was used in the sphere of interstate relations, and as it was understood in the communications between states. We are not here concerned with the entire spectrum of freedom (e.g. philosophical, economic, social, interpersonal, etc.) in the late Hellenistic era.

\textsuperscript{103} E.g. Jones, Greek City, 96-102; Gruen, HWCR I, p. 135. On the orientation of these terms as inward and outward looking, see above p. 125 f. with Raaflaub, Discovery of Freedom, 154 and M. Ostwald, Autonomia: Its Genesis and Early History (California 1982), passim.

\textsuperscript{104} RDGE 40, lines 20-21 (regarding Perseus’ aggressions): τὸ τὴν ἔλευθερίαν διὰ τῶν ἠμετέρων στρατηγῶν δοθέασαν ἀφανίζεται τῷ ἄλων τὸ ἔθνος εἰς ταραχὰς καὶ στάσεις ἐμβάλλειν ("[he is doing away with] the freedom [given through our generals?] by throwing the whole (Greek) race into disruption and stasis"); Claros, Menippos, col. I, lines 37-40: τοὺς δὲ κατοικοῦντας τὴν πόλιν ἔλευθερως κατεγυρήσων καὶ στρατηγικῶς ἐξουσίας, τῆς ἐπαρχείας ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτονομίας χωρισθείσης ("He freed the inhabitants of the city from their pledges and from the power of the governor; the province was distinguished from our autonomy").
while in an Amphictyonic decree six years later it implies the community’s self-governance.\textsuperscript{105} An early-second century Roman senate decree concerning Delphi is a rare case where the two terms appear together: in it the Delphians are acknowledged by the Romans as “autonomous and free people” (αὐτόνομοι καὶ ἐλεύθεροι), who “managed and governed themselves by themselves”.\textsuperscript{106} Here we can see that ἐλεύθερία and αὐτονομία are near synonyms, which, depending on how we interpret the second phrase, contrast or elaborate the city’s self-government. In sum, the two commonest terms for freedom during this period were effectively synonymous and could mean freedom in either an internal or external sense.

Trying to access the Greco-Roman understanding of freedom through only the terms ἐλεύθερία and αὐτονομία, then, is a frustrating endeavour. If we were to follow only these words we might conclude that freedom was indeed an ill-defined notion and its status effectively vacant; they are used so commonly and with such apparent imprecision that it is difficult to detail their meaning. The Romans, furthermore, whose notion of libertas did not traditionally distinguish between a state’s external freedom and its internal autonomy, would not have brought any change in the now common synonymity

\textsuperscript{105}RDGE 37, lines 8-10: πειράσομαι ἐν Ἄρωμη; κατὰ τὰ ἐμ[α][υ]τοῦ φροντίζαι ἵνα ὑμῖν κατάμονα ἣ τὰ ἐξ άρχης ὑπάρχοντα πάτρια, σωζομένης; τῆς τῆς πόλεως καὶ τοῦ ἱεροῦ αὐτονομίας (‘I will try [in Rome?] what I can to see to it that the ancestral conditions that have been yours from the beginning remain yours alone, and to protect the autonomy of the polis and the temple.’); SIG\textsuperscript{4} 613a, lines 2-4: ἔδοξ[εν τῶι κοίνῳ] τῶν Ἀμφικτίονων τῶν ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτονόμων ἐθνῶν καὶ δημοκρατουμένων πόλεων (‘declared by the League of Amphictyons from free peoples and democratic poleis’).

\textsuperscript{106}RDGE 1, frg. B (=CID IV 104), lines 4-7: γινώσκετε οὐδὲν δεδομένων τῆι συγκλη[τ]οι το τέ ἱερὸν τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος τοῦ Πυθίου[ ἀριστόν εἶναι καὶ] τήν πόλιν τῶν Δελφῶν καὶ τήν χώραν, καὶ Δ[ελφοὺς] αὐτονόμους καὶ ἐλευθέρους καὶ ἀνεισφόρους, οἰκον[ή]τας καὶ πολιτευόντας αὐτούς καθ’ αὐτοὺς καὶ [κυριεύον]ντας τῆς τῆς ἱερὰς χώρας καὶ τοῦ ἱεροῦ λιμένος, καθ’ς πάτριων αὐτοῖς ἐξ ἀρχῆς [ἡ] (‘Know, therefore, that it was decreed by the Senate that the temple of Apollo Pythias is to be inviolate and that the city of Delphi and its territory, and that the Delphians are to be autonomous, free and immune from taxation, living and governing themselves by themselves and having control of the sacred territory and the sacred harbour, just as has been their ancestral right from the beginning.’).
of the terms. In any case, as ἐλευθερία became the more common term for 'freedom' after the late second century, στοιχεῖα largely ceased to be used. Fortunately, these are not the only terms in which the Greeks and Romans discussed freedom, and others provide a better opportunity for detailing a comprehensive understanding of the Greco-Roman notion of liberty.

2.3.2: Freedom and δημοκρατία

A more profitable entry point to Greco-Roman freedom is provided by a brief dedicatory inscription found on the Capitoline Hill in the sixteenth century, now lost but well attested. As is typical of these sorts of documents, the text is brief:

The Lycian League, having been restored to its ancestral freedom, (dedicates this statue) of Roma to Capitoline Jupiter and the Roman People on account of their excellence, kindness and benefaction toward the Lycian League.

The dedication was inscribed in both Latin and Greek. There has been much debate about whether this dedication relates to the Lycians' removal from Rhodian control in 167 or their treatment by Sulla after the Mithridatic conflict. Fortunately, for our

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107 See Appendix II.
109 Date of 167: Magie, RRAM II.955 n. 67; Larsen, “Representation and Democracy” CPh 40 (1945), 88; Ferrary, Philhellenisme, 185-186. Sullan date: Mommsen, Ges. Schrift. IV, 69-80; A. Degrassi, “le dediche di popoli e re asiatici al popolo romano e a Giove Capitolino”, BCAR 74 (1951-2), 19-47; L. Moretti, IGUR I. 5, and p. 15. It is also possible that the dedication relates to Lycia’s exclusion from the provincia Asia in 129 (Sherwin-White, “Rome, Pamphylia and Cilicia”, JRS 66 (1966), 3, n.7; Kallet-Marx, Hegemony, 109; contra Justin 37.1.2, though he has probably mistakenly written “Lycia” for “Cilicia”). The document is part of a larger group of sixteen dedications made by eastern kings, leagues and poleis to the Roman People from roughly the 160s to the 80s (collected with photographs in IGUR nos. 5-20) that seem to have been re-inscribed sometime in the early first century, perhaps after the fire that destroyed the Temple of Jupiter in 83 BCE (Mellor, ΘΕΑ ΡΩΜΗ, 203-206, and subsequently elaborated by Lintott, “The Capitoline Dedications to Jupiter and the Roman People” ZPE 30 (1978), 137-144).
purposes, the exact context of the dedication is less important than its content. For its bilingual transmission allows us to see that its author(s) used the Latin *libertas* to translate the Greek Δημοκρατία.110 *Libertas*, of course, was commonly used to translate ἐλευθερία or αὐτονομία, and its use for Δημοκρατία reveals a close relationship between democracy and the freedom of the state.111

Undoubtedly, δημοκρατία continued to convey the sense of a popular self-government still during the Hellenistic era:112 the Athenians, for example, characterized their constitutional position after the tyranny of Aristo in 88/87 as ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ, clearly addressing the restoration of popular government.113 But there was a shift in emphasis during the Hellenistic period away from δημοκρατία describing a domestic political regime toward an enunciation of the freedom of the state. The above Athenian example was not unambiguous, nor is an Amphictyonic decree of 186, in which the League described itself as “the League of the Amphictyons comprised of autonomous

110 Latin, of course, had only one word for freedom (*libertas*), but it stands to reason that if Δημοκρατία had been meant as a reference to the political regime, the Latin translator would have chosen *res publica* (‘state’), or even *constitutio* (‘constitution’), as the most suitable word (Mason, *Greek Terms for Roman Institutions*, s.v. Δημοκρατία [p. 34]). It also stands to reason that the original dedication was made in Greek and that the Latin was supplied because it was set up at Rome on the Capitoline. Had the original dedication been made in Latin, there would not have been any reason to supply the Greek. Of course, if the original inscription had, counter-intuitively, been in Latin, the translation of libertas by Δημοκρατία makes the association between freedom and democracy all the more clear.

111 Thus E. Domingo, *Latismos en la Koiné* (Burgos, 1979), s.v. ἐλευθερία; cf. s.v. αὐτονομία, for which he suggests sui iuris, but (see below) libertas is just as possible in many cases.


peoples and democratic city-states.\footnote{114} Here δημοκρατία seems to carry a double meaning of both the participatory political regime of a polis (a people by contrast can only be autonomous) and more broadly a condition of liberty.\footnote{115} Numerous examples like, i.e. in which δημοκρατία is used to complement ἐλευθερία or further define αὐτονομία, exist from the early Hellenistic period, and by the late third century the term could stand on its own as a synonym for either.\footnote{116}

Part of this has to do with the realities of domestic politics in the fourth and third centuries. During the Hellenistic era the radical citizen self-government of the earlier Classical period (defined above all by the extraordinary use of sortition) became diluted by traditionally ‘oligarchic’ provisions like elections for magistracies and a strengthened council (e.g. βουλή, Areopagus).\footnote{117} Popular government regimes (as we have seen) were still called democracies, but oligarchic elements had slipped in as a mechanism of reaction and counter-balance to the extraordinary power of major royal dynasties.\footnote{118}

\footnote{114} SIG\textsuperscript{3} 613a (= CID IV 106), lines 3-4: κοινὸν τῶν Ἀμφικτιών τῶν ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτονόμων ἑθνῶν καὶ δημοκρατουμένων πόλεων. Similar language is found in an Athenian decree of 185/4 published by Ch. Habicht, *Hesperia* (1987), 59-71 (=SEG XXXVII 92), lines 19-20: τὸ συν[ἐδριο]ν ἕκ τῶν αὐτονόμων ἑθνῶν καὶ τῶν δημοκρατου[μένων] πόλεων; cf. SIG\textsuperscript{3} 591, lines 34 & 75.

\footnote{115} Later in SIG\textsuperscript{3} 613a, lines 17-19 (text at n. 127) δημοκρατία is used as a complementary to ἐλευθερία.

\footnote{116} Instances from the pre-Roman period: SIG\textsuperscript{3} 322, lines 2-4 (Miletus, 313/312); IG XII 9.192, lines 4-5 (Eretria, 308/7); SEG XXXVI 164, lines 14-15 (Athens, 304/3); IG II\textsuperscript{3} 559, lines 13-14 (Athens, 303/2); I.Lion 45, lines 6-7 (Lion, 281-260); IG II\textsuperscript{3} 682, lines 38-40 (Athens 276/5); I.Erythrai 29, lines 10-14 (Erythrae, 270-260); I.Erythrai 504, lines 14-18 (Erythrae, 268-262); OGIS 229 II, lines 65-68 (Smyrna, 240s); Labraunda 40, lines 13-15 (Labraunda, 235). See D. Geagan, “Greek Inscriptions” *Hesperia* 40 (1971), 104 n. 29.


\footnote{118} While the primary assembly remained open to all citizens and often remained the sovereign body in a technical sense, most of the deliberation was done in the Council, and the Assembly’s agenda
Thus, since the third century, the arrangements of these two political regimes had begun
to bleed together, and references to political organizations had begun to drop the classical
tripartite distinction (e.g. democracy, oligarchy, monarchy) and became increasingly re-
oriented around the simple contrast between monarchy and democracy (as in the Polybian
passage below). 119 So, in as much as δημοκρατία could mean a particular sort of political
regime, by the second century and throughout the remainder of the Late Hellenistic
period it was also considered the condition of a polis free from autocratic control (as in
the Lycian example above).

Thus Polybius, who applied the traditional tripartite political division to the
Roman constitution, nonetheless held that "the interests of democratic cities
(δημοκρατία) and kings are by nature hostile to one another". 120 He elaborates this point
in an earlier passage: "every monarchy is by nature an enemy of equality, and all those
who live under anything but a government of the many [i.e. dēmokratia] are subjects to

was dictated by this body, or even smaller bodies of στρατηγοί, τάγμα, or an individual magistrate, who
were often elected from among the wealthiest men (Jones, Greek City, 158-169). None of these
conditions, it should be noted, necessarily violates the three central criteria of democracy laid out by
Aristotle (Pol. VI 1318b4-29): popular control over (i) the selection of magistrates, (ii) political decision in
politics, and (iii) judicial decisions.

119 Daux, F.Delphes, p. 283 n.4; Larsen, "Hellenistic Federalism", 88; Musti, Lo Stato dei
Seleucida (Pisa, 1966), 138-214; J-L. Ferrary, "les romains de la république et les démocraties grecques”
(Maryland, 1995), 103-107. There are cases where democracies are explicitly contrasted with oligarchies,
as at Athens (examples from before 287 are collected in Chr. Habicht, Athens from Alexander to Antony
[Cambridge, 1997], 90), Erythrae (I.Erythrai 502 = SIG3 284; ca. 300), Cos (Tituli Calymnii T XII; ca.
205-200), Ilion (I. Ilion 25 = OGIS 218; early third century); in two of the cases (Ilion and Kos) διλαχρία
is associated explicitly with τάγμαν as an undesirable regime, in the other cases, it probably refers to
property qualifications (but it is unclear). The tripartite division, of course, remained strong in theoretical
and philosophical discussions (e.g. Polybius’ meditations on the Roman constitution in Book VI of his
Histories).

120 Polyb. 22.8.6: τῶν δὲ πραγμάτων ἐναντίαν φύσιν ἔχοντων τοῖς βασιλεύσι καὶ ταῖς
δημοκρατίαις. Polybius’ own distaste for monarchies comes out in 15.24.4-5, where the author, in propria
persona, chastises their manipulation and abuse of ἔλευθερία.
monarchs and obey their authority."  

Here any distinction between democracy and oligarchy is abandoned and democracy is used as a synonym for a free polis. The same usage is found in Livy, who tells us that during the war against Perseus, the Macedonian king sent letters to Eumenes II and Antiochus IV, in which he conceded that "there is a natural hostility between the free state (civitas libera) and a king (rex)". Livy's language is almost certainly borrowed from Polybius, and, supported by his passages above and the Lycian dedication, we can confidently assume that Livy's libera civitas is a translation for Polybius' δημοκρατία. Livy, then, has picked up on Polybius' dilution of δημοκρατία and has reoriented democracy (i.e. a domestic popular political regime) to mean republic (i.e. a city-state). According to the literary account, then, by the second century, to both Greeks and Romans, democracy was a free state.

Epigraphic sources—that is, the communications bearing the dialogue between the Greek poleis and the Romans—complement this impression. In 196, the Lampsacenes, under pressure from Antiochus III, appealed to T. Flamininus to protect their 'autonomous and democratic polis', thereby directly contrasting their αὐτονομία

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121 Polyb. 21.22.8: φύσει γὰρ πάσαν μοναρχίαν τὸ μεν ἵσον ἔχοιερειν, ζητεῖν δὲ πάντας, εἰ δὲ μὴ γ' ὡς πλείστους, ὑπηκόους εἴναι σφίζει καὶ πειθαρχεῖν; in the passage just prior to this one (21.22.7), the Rhodian ambassadors have just affirmed that granting freedom to the Greeks of Asia is an action most noble and worthy of Rome. In many other passages, Polybius compares the free state to one under the authority of a tyrant: 2.43.3, 44.4, 59.8, 69.1; 10.22.3; 11.10.9; 18.14.9, 45.9; 21.21.10; but not always a monarch: 5.9.9; 9.33.6; 18.14.6.

122 Cf. Polyb. 6.57.9, in which Polybius argues that "freedom and democracy" (ἐλευθερία καὶ δημοκρατία) are the finest sounding politeia, though it can quickly devolve to mob rule (δυσλογικατία); note also that Polybius considers the oligarchic constitution of Lycurgus to have secured the freedom of the Spartans: 6.10.11, 48.2-6, 50.1-5.

123 Livy 44.24.1: natura inimica inter se esse liberam civitatem et regem.

124 Oakley, Commentary on Livy, s.v. 44.24.1.

125 While a democracy was a free state, the opposite was not true: a free state did not have to be a democracy (in the sense of the Classical political regime).
and δημοκρατία with the royal power of the Seleucid king. The same Amphictyonic decree cited earlier, furthermore, speaks of the members of the Amphictyony and “other Greeks who have chosen freedom and democracy” rather than the rule of Philip V.

Later, in the 120s, Pergamum described the death of Attalus III with the participial clause “when the government had changed into democracy”, and the Athenians characterized their constitutional position after the tyranny of Athenion in 88/7 as democratic.

Official Roman documents similarly use δημοκρατία in this sense of the state free from autocratic rule: in their manifesto against Perseus, they warned the Greek communities

126 I.Lampsakos 4 (=SIG² 591), line 34: διατηρήσεις τὴν δημοκρατίαν καὶ τὴν αὐτονομίαν καὶ τὴν εἰρήνην. The decree goes on to praise the honorand for returning with letters bearing the Senate’s decision “to the kings”, re-confirming that monarchs were causing the city’s anxieties. And with good reason: shortly after this embassy Lampsacus was besieged by Antiochus III, who was looking to make an example of them to others who resisted his authority (Livy 33.38.1-7). Livy asserts that the Lampsacenes – along with the Smyrnans – had been “announcing their claim to be freed” (libertatem usurpabant) (on the meaning of the verb usurpo as used here, see Briscoe, Commentary, s.v.); cf. Ma, Antiochos III, 94-96.

127 SIG³ 613a, lines 17-19: ἐπετελεσθεν πάντα τὰ κοινὴ συμφέροντα τοῖς τῇ Ἀμφικτύον καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἐλλήνας τοῖς ἄφορομένοις τὴν ἐλευθερίαν καὶ δημοκρατίαν. “This looks anti-Macedonian”, H. Mattingly, “Athens between Rome and the Kings: 229/8 to 129 BC” in P. Cartledge, et al. (eds.), Hellenistic Constructs (Berkeley 1997), 121; cf. Ferrary, Philhellénisme, 161-163. The Amphictyonic League had been dissolved during the Aetolians’ war with Rome in 191, before which time it had been dominated by the Athenians and Thessalians, and recently the Aetolians. This inscription records its renewal, and probably Athenian and Thessalian efforts to clarify their autonomy from Philip V’s control (Chr. Habicht, “The Role of Athens in the Reorganization of the Delphic Amphictyony” Hesperia 56 (1987), 60-62; Ferrary, Philhellénisme, 162 n. 117, with bibliography). There is some question as to the meaning of “the other Greeks” in line 18, which Lefèvre (CID IV, p. 258) observes could be the amphictyonic members in general or just the executive council; it seems just as likely, though, that the Amphictyony, deploying the discourse of freedom, means Greeks generally.

128 Wörle, Chiron 30, line 11: μεταπέσοντων τε τῶν πραγμάτων εἰς δημοκρατίαν.

129 Geagan, “Greek Inscriptions”, 101-108, no. 8, lines 6-8 [ἐπειδῆ ὁ δῆμος ὁ Ἀθηναίων ἐν δημοκρατίαι καὶ ἐλευθερίαν - - - - καὶ τὰ ἐπιτάγματα τῶν κληρων καὶ χειροτονίαι αἱρεθέντων ἀρχόντων κληθεῖσι]. The restorations supplied by J. Oliver (“A Peripatetic Constitution” JHS 100 [1980], 199-201), though novelly constructed from Aristotle’s Politeia, are on the whole less convincing for this passage than those of Geagan, particularly line 7, which Badian (“Rome, Athens and Mithridates” AJAH 1 [1976], p. 127 n. 55) has endorsed. On the dispute surrounding the date of the document, see Ch. Habicht, Athènes hellénistique (Paris, 2000), 352-353, whose own position is somewhat pessimistic of the source, which surely relates to the Mithridatic wars and the Sullan settlement.
that the Macedonian king was plotting "against all democracies of Greece" and looking to enslave them and do away with their ἔλευθερία.¹³⁰

Democracy, then, during the second and first centuries meant the freedom of the state (increasingly in contrast to a monarch, below), without necessarily making any implications as to the domestic arrangement of the state. In the Greco-Roman negotiation of freedom, then, the Roman perspective has become dominant: dēmokratia represented the Roman notion of the free state as simply a republic, i.e. a self-governing city-state that had the capacity to enjoy its own laws (sui legibus). In this (now Greco-Roman) conception, a free state (res publica/civitas, πόλις/δημοκρατία) could embrace aspects or entire regimes that were timocratic or oligarchic. Significantly, in this new orientation of democracy we can begin to see how Greek freedom and Roman constraint might be squared: the Greek city-states could uphold their traditional and idealized value of δημοκρατία—redirected from radical citizen self-government to the absence of monarchic power—under the hegemony of the Roman res publica.

2.3.3: Freedom as a Condition in Contrast to an Autocratic Subject

The foregoing discussion of dēmokratia raised the idea that freedom was something in contrast to autocratic rule, which is found in many other sources. Polybius,

¹³⁰ The reference to democracies is found in SIG³ 613b, which Bousquet ("Le roi Persée et les Romains", BCH 105 [1981], 407-416) has demonstrated is the praescripta to the decree against Perseus (RDGE 40); accepted by Ferrary, Philhellénisme, 170-171. Also from Pergamum is an honorary decree (OGIS 449) to P. Servilius Isauricus, proconsul of Asia 46-44, naming him 'saviour and benefactor' for restoring to the community its ancestral laws and unencumbered democracy (text at n. 210). Here δημοκρατία is modified by the uncommon adjective ἀδούλιτος, meaning 'unencumbered' but quite obviously containing the sense of 'un-enslaved', as one typically was a slave in the rhetoric of monarchy (e.g. supra RDGE 40); cf. OGIS 337, which probably relates to Isauricus' restoration of freedom, praising Athena for returning the community's πατριῶν δημοκρατίαν.
for example, considered the four Macedonian republics carved from Perseus’ kingdom after his defeat in 167 to have been “free” (ἐλευθεροί), though they not only had a constitution arranged for them by the Romans that probably privileged the wealthy, but they also paid tribute to Rome. This has always proven a problematic example of freedom for modern scholars, but in the eyes of Polybius (and those of his contemporaries), the new Macedonian states were free because they were no longer subject to King Perseus. One can also point to the letter of Q. Fabius Maximus to the Peloponnesian city of Dyme in 144, which speaks of ἐλευθερία in opposition to the actions of a certain Sosus, who “wrote laws contrary to the constitution restored to the Achaeans by the Romans”. In the letter, Sosus is cast as a tyrannical force, having created a disruption in the polis as he set about working to create the “worst state of affairs and disorder”. The language in the letter is remarkably similar to the Romans’ own manifesto against Perseus in 171 and Polybius’ description of the Achaean troublemakers Critolaus and Diaeus, who brought the koinon to war with the Romans five years later. The restoration of ἐλευθερία, furthermore, certainly refers as much to the

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131 Polyb. 36.17.3: κοινή μὲν πάντες ἀπολυθέντες μοναρχικῶν ἐπιγατμάτων καὶ φόρων καὶ μεταλαβόντες ἀπὸ δουλείας ὀμολογημένως ἐλευθερίαν (’[The Macedonians] as a whole had been released from the arbitrary rule and taxation of monarchy, and, as all acknowledged, now enjoyed freedom in place of servitude’); cf. Livy 45.26.12-14; Gruen, HWCR II.428. On the settlement, see Gruen, HWCR, 423-429, esp. n. 154.

132 RDGE 43, lines 8-10, 17-19 (with comments and alterations of Kallet-Marx, “Quintus Fabius Maximus and the Dyme Affair” CQ 89 [1995], 129-153): ὁ καὶ τοὺς νόμους γράψας ὑπεναντίος τῇ ἀποδεθείση τοῖς Ἀλκαίοις ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων πολιτείας: and νομογραφήσαντα ἐπὶ καταλύσει τῆς ἀποδοθείσης πολιτείας. The reference is to Mummius’ settlement of Achaea in 146 (Polyb. 39.4-5; Paus. 7.16; Diod. 33.26; Gruen, HWCR II. 523-527).

133 RDGE 43, lines 8 and 12-13; Bernhardt, Polis u. Herrschaft, 223.

134 Kallet-Marx, “The Dyme Affair”, 154, pointing out ταραχή and ἀκριβία (Polyb. 38.12.1, 15.8, 17.9, 18.7; 39.5.5; cf. 3.4.12), ἡ χειρίσθη καταστάσις (Polyb. 38.9.4; 39.4.1), and ἀσυλλαξία; cf. Ferrary, “romains et les démocraties grecques”, 210-11. Fabius’ description of Sosus’ disruption (ταραχή) is the
state of affairs before the ‘tyrannical’ rule of Critolaus as to the natural condition of the polis.\textsuperscript{135}

A decree from Metropolis in Asia Minor during the Aristonican conflict conveys the same sense of traditional freedom. In it, upon learning of Attalus’ bequest, the Romans are said to have “restored freedom to all cities formerly under the control of Attalus.” \textsuperscript{136} Here freedom is strikingly juxtaposed with the Attalid kingdom.\textsuperscript{137} Moreover, the decree goes on to characterize Aristonicus as one “who had crowned himself”, without the consent of the people, and the honorand, Apollonius, as one who gave his life to preserve ἔλευθερία, just as the people wanted.\textsuperscript{138} According to this Greek decree, Aristonicus was a would-be king, whose actions were directly in contrast to the will of the people. His objectives, furthermore, were cast in the familiar refrain: ‘he wanted to remove the freedom restored to us’.\textsuperscript{139} In our Ephesian decree, of course, the Ephesians presented Mithridates VI in a similar light: he was one who used brute force in

\textsuperscript{135} Ferrary, \textit{Philhellenisme}, 197-199. Polybius (38.13.7) specifically attributes Critolaus with monarchic characteristics (τις μοναρχική ἔξουσια).

\textsuperscript{136} \textit{I.Metrop.}, line 14-15: [Ῥωμαίων] ἀποδόντων ... τὴν ἔλευθερίαν πάσιν τοῖς πρότερον τασσομένοις ὑπὸ τὴν Ἀττάλου βασιλείαν.

\textsuperscript{137} The genitive absolute (\textit{I.Metrop.}, line 13) describing Attalus’ death is immediately followed and paralleled by the same construction describing the Romans’ decree of freedom in lines 14-15; the ἔλευθερία restored by Rome is directly contrasted with the βασιλεία that Aristonicus would seize for himself (lines 16-17).

\textsuperscript{138} \textit{I. Metrop.}, line 17: περιτεθεικότος ἔαυτῷ βασιλείαν; lines 18-19: κατὰ τὴν τοῦ δήμου πρόθεσιν τῆς ἔλευθερίας.

\textsuperscript{139} \textit{I.Metrop.}, line 16: βουλομένου παραπείδησαι τὴν ἀποδεδομένην ἡμῖν ἔλευθερίαν.
his attempt to become master (κύριος) of Ephesus “which did not belong to him”, and the efforts raised against him were done on behalf of the common ἐλευθερία.\(^{140}\)

The Romans, it seems, could be liable to similar accusations of impugning a state’s freedom.\(^{141}\) We have already seen the case of the Lycian League, whose dedication on the Capitol thanked the Romans for restoring freedom. Implicit in the decree is the assumption that the Romans might have imposed their rule on the League and had that been the case the latter would no longer have enjoyed their freedom. This is explicitly the case in the Menippos Decree, passed in the late second century. In a passage relating to Menippos’ first embassy to Rome, the Colophonians praised as “conforming to democracy” a Roman senatus consultum forbidding their governors from meddling in the judicial affairs of the city.\(^{142}\) The Romans, for their part, to judge from the writings of Cicero, believed wholly in this sort of definition of freedom (libertas). For Cicero, speaking of the disadvantages of monarchy (reges), comments that “libertas consists not in having a just master (dominus), but none whatsoever.”\(^{143}\)

In the preceding discussion we have seen that during the second and first centuries “democracy” was reduced to meaning simply “republic”. In the domestic sphere, traditional notions of self-government were rendered as the absence of monarchic and autocratic rule rather than positive self-government. On the international scale, this

\(^{140}\) *Lev.* 8 (discussed above, p. 117).

\(^{141}\) E.g. Polyb. 3.7.3; Livy 35.33.8; 36.46.6, 48.8. Note, for comparison, a pair of Anatolian decrees from the Empire, in which ambassadors are said to have travelled eἰς τὴν βασιλίδα Ρώμην (G.Bean and T.Mitford, *Journeys in Rough Cilicia* [Vienna 1970], no. 1, line 13) and a man is said to have died ἐν τῇ βασιλίδῃ Ρώμῃ (*ASΔ* 3 [1916-1920], 149 no. 84).

\(^{142}\) *Claros*, Menippos, col. II, lines 5-7 (text at n. 94). On the embassies of Menippos, see J.-L. Ferrary, “Le statut des cités libres dans l’Empire romain à la lumière des inscriptions de Claros” *CRAI* 1991, 557-77.

\(^{143}\) *Cic. de Rep.* 2.43 (text at n.53).
meant that the freedom of the state existed in non-domination (consistent with the Roman notion of *libertas*). And so in the last two cases of the Lycians and the Colophonians, it was clear that δημοκρατία was used in the sense of the state’s freedom from the domination of an external power;¹⁴⁴ but democracy in these cases was merely a shorthand. As we have seen in this section, we can more generally follow Livy’s formulation: a free state is one which stands on its own strength and is not dependent on the arbitrary will of another.¹⁴⁵

### 2.3.4: Freedom as Self-Government

As we have seen in the Roman notion of *libertas*, freedom as the absence of arbitrary power (*in alius potestate*) entailed the authority of the individual to do or forbear as according to his own will (*sui iuris*). At the state level, this meant that the state had the capacity to enjoy its own laws, a condition recognized by both the Romans (*suis legibus uti*) and the Greeks (αὐτονομία). As we have seen, αὐτονομία can still be found (though less frequently) in communications of the second and first centuries, but had lost its traditional distinction as self-government. Instead, ἐλευθερία generally came to be used when speaking of freedom in both a domestic and foreign sense. So, in a letter to Heraclea ad Latmum in 190, Lucius and Publius Scipio appear to define ἐλευθερία as the ability of the community “to govern all your own affairs by yourselves according to your

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¹⁴⁴ Thus Ferrary, “Cités libres”, 564: “On a ici un exemple incontestable de δημοκρατία au sense d’ἐλευθερία, αὐτονομία, ne caractérisant pas le régime politique de la cité mais impliquant qu’elle n’est pas directement soumis à un pouvoir extérieur”.

own laws”. While a fragment of a treaty between the Romans and the Maroneans speaks of the latter as having been judged by Aemilius Paullus to be “free and self-governing.”

The significance of self-governance remains throughout the second and first centuries, though the language changes. The awkward Latinate circumlocutions for αὐτονομία disappeared and were replaced by the metonymic emphasis on the community’s use of its own laws, often expressed by some variation of the formula τοῖς ἰδίοις νόμοις χρεῖν (to enjoy one’s own laws). The association between self-government and the enjoyment of one’s own laws is natural and logical. The term αὐτονομία, after all, quite literally breaks down as the laws (νόμοι) of oneself (αὐτός).

Moreover, from the Scipionic letter cited above, it is clear that governing one’s own affairs meant that the state acted by its own laws. The change in the terminology itself reflects the growing influence of Rome on the language in which freedom was expressed. The Romans’ own traditional notion, of course, was grounded in the right of the community to create and exercise its own laws (suis legibus uti) and the new language of the documents perfectly reflects this: the Greek τοῖς ἰδίοις νόμοις χρεῖν is a literal translation of the Latin in which the Senate would have composed its decisions.

146 RDGE 35, lines 10, 11-12: συνχωροῦμεν δὲ ἡμῖν τὴν τε ἐλευθερίαν ... ἔχουσιν ψ[φ'] αὐτοὺς πάντα τὰ αὐτῶν πολιτεύεσθαι κατὰ τοὺς ὑμετέρους νόμους.

147 I.Thrac.Aeg. 168 (=SEG LIII 658), lines 8-10: ἐλευθεροὺς καὶ πολιτευομένους με[θ'] αὐτ[]τῶν.

148 See Appendix IV. The term αὐτονομία did not disappear entirely: as governor of Cilicia in 51-50, Cicero allowed the Greek communities of his province to be judged by their own laws, which, he records, they considered their αὐτονομία (Cic. Att. 6.1.15, text at n. 157).

149 RDGE 35 (see n. 146).

150 E.g. RDGE 18, lines 49 and 91; Aphrod. 8, lines 47, 61 and 70. Sometimes the idea is expressed with the first or second person plural possessive or reflexive adjective, ‘our / your own’ (ὁι ὑμετέροι / ύμετέροι νόμοι, e.g. RDGE 35, line 12), or simply by the article with an implicit modifier.
The evolution also reflects the changed political reality brought about by the creation of formal *provinciae* after 146. Now, the operation and efficacy of the community's laws became foregrounded because they had become a political issue. Prior to the establishment of the provinces, the Romans, according to the internal logic of the discourse of freedom, had no legitimate right to amend, regulate, or impose laws on a Greek *polis*. After the creation of the provinces, which represented an acknowledged extension of the Roman state over the majority of Greek communities within its boundaries, the question of Roman interference became more immediate and exemptions from that interference needed to be made explicit.\(^\text{151}\) Again, to illuminate this point we can turn to the Claros texts: the Colophonians rejoiced when Menippos successfully asserted the validity of the city's own laws after the Romans had first applied their own, and they later praised Polemaios for preserving the community's laws by having a provincial court decision overturned.\(^\text{152}\)

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\(^{151}\) See the discussion of *civitates liberae* in Chapter 1 §5.1. References to the community using its own laws vis-à-vis the condition of freedom do appear before the provincial era, but are usually expressed in either the narrowly particular or oblique. So one finds the Romans acknowledging the capacity of the Delphians to "evict whom you wish and permit you to settle among you those pleasing to the league of Delphi" (*RDGE* 38, lines 18-20: ἐχεῖν ὑμᾶς ἐξουσιάν ἐφήκεν ἢ σύγκλητος, ἐξοικίζειν [α]ὐς ἀμβούλησε καὶ ἐὰν κατοικεῖν παρ’ ὑμᾶς τοὺς αὐταρετοῦντά τοι [κ]λοινῶι τῶν Δελφῶν) (particular); or references to traditional laws and ἕθος ἀρχῆς (oblique).

\(^{152}\) Claros, Menippos, col. I, lines 40-42: κυρίους δὲ τοὺς νόμους τετήρηκεν ἐπὶ παντὸς ἐγκλήματος καὶ πρὸς αὐτοὺς Ἄρωμαῖος ("he preserved the validity of our laws in all cases, even with regard to the Romans"); cf. lines 24-5; Polemaios, col. II, lines 54-58: πρεσβεύσας πρὸς τὸν στρατηγὸν τῶν ὄρων ἔγνωκεν ἔποιήσεν καὶ τὰ κρίματα καὶ τὸν πολείτην καὶ τοὺς νόμους ἄρβλαβευς ἔτηρεν ("he travelled to the governor and had the court decision rendered invalid, preserving intact our courts, citizens and laws."); cf. lines 59-61.
the Romans had issued their directives contrary to Colophonian law.\textsuperscript{153} The Colophonians clearly equated their freedom with their right to deliberate, legislate, execute and enforce their laws.\textsuperscript{154}

The Romans appear to have understood the same: the \textit{lex Antonia de Termessibus} passed by the Roman Assembly in 68 acknowledged the Termessians as free (\textit{liberi}), and as part of that status they enjoyed the right to use all their own laws (\textit{suis legibus uti}).\textsuperscript{155} Other examples from the Sullan period support this example. In his settlement of Asia in 84, the Roman \textit{imperator} explicitly acknowledged the freedom of Stratonicea, Tabae and Chios (among others), by stating their capacity to enjoy their own laws.\textsuperscript{156} Later still, in 51, as governor of Cilicia, Cicero followed the celebrated governor of Asia, Q. Mucius Scaevola, by including in his provincial edict the provision that the Greeks of the province might adjudicate their disputes on their own and by their own laws (\textit{suis legibus}); the cities, he relates, rejoiced at this particular aspect of his edict, which they

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\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{153} \textit{Claros}, Polemaios, col. II, lines 58-62: πάλιν τε προστάγματος ἐνεχθέντος ἐναντίου τοῖς νόμοις κατὰ τινῶν, ἐπεξεύρησε τοὺς ἡγουμένους ως δεῖ τα κριτήρια ('and again when an edict was promulgated against certain individuals that was contrary to our laws, he appeared before the governor and persuaded him that the decision [was inappropriate]'); cf. Roberts, \textit{Claros}, 38-40 and Ferrary, "cites libres", 572, with n. 48. Note here that the Colophonians have used προστάγματα to describe Roman orders; προστάγμα is the standard word for a king's edict and reflects the appearance of the Romans as treading near royal identity.
\item \textsuperscript{154} The community also rejoices in the same decree in being "outside the province" — that is, outside its power structure (τῆς ἐπαρχείας ἐκτός, col. II, line 4) — the significance of which is the proximity it draws between a community governed by its own laws and one that is fully outside the Roman state apparatus.
\item \textsuperscript{155} \textit{Lex Ant. Term.}, lines 5-10: \textit{iei omnes postereique eorum Thermes Maior in Pisidia leiberi amicei socieique populi Romani sunt, eique (sc. Termessiani) legibus suis ita utunto, itaque iei omnibus suis legibus... utei liceto} ('all the citizens of Ternessus Maior in Pisidia and their descendants are to be free men, friends, and allies of the Roman People, and are to in this way enjoy their own laws, and thus it shall be permitted to all those citizens of Ternessus Maior in Pisidia to enjoy their own laws'). On the date, see J.-L. Ferrary, "la lex Antonia de Termessibus" \textit{Athenaeum} 63 (1985), 439-442.
\item \textsuperscript{156} \textit{RDGE} 17, line 11; no.18, lines 49 & 91; no. 70, lines 15-16.
\end{itemize}
held to be αὐτονομία. A dozen years later the Aphrodisians were declared by Caesar to be free (ἐλεύθεροι) and to have the right to enjoy their own traditional laws and whatever they passed among themselves thereafter.

It is important to observe the ambiguity in the meanings of αὐτονομία or suis legibus uti: while they were part of the discourse of freedom, expressing a particular aspect of that condition as self-government, the extent of that freedom is never made explicit. Did the idea of using one’s own laws, for example, exclude the possibility of help from the Romans in setting up those laws? Did it mean paying no heed to Roman decisions that interfered in domestic affairs? Clearly not, on both counts. The gap between a grant of suis legibus uti and the practical operation of that status was filled with negotiation by the respective parties. Left undefined, self-government meant whatever either side was willing to give up and accept in any given situation, which was frequently very little, until the autonomy of a community became directly threatened.

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157 Cic. Att. 6.1.15: multaque sum secutus Scaevolae, in iis illud in quo sibi libertatem censent Graeci datam, ut Graeci inter se discipent suis legibus.... Graeci vero exsulant quod peregrinis iudicibus utuntur. “mugatoribus quidem” inquies. Quid referit? tamen se αὐτονομίαν adeptos putant (‘I have followed Scaevola on many points, among them this—which the Greeks hold to be their freedom—that the Greeks are to settle disputes among themselves by their own laws.... Indeed the Greeks rejoice because they enjoyed their own judges. ‘It’s nothing’, you will say. What does it matter? They at any rate consider themselves as having autonomia.’); cf. Verr. 2.2.90, in which Sthenius of Therma is alleged to have forged a document that included the stipulation:“whereas the Senate and the people of Rome, considering the unbroken friendship and loyalty of the people of Thermae, have restored to them their city, lands, and their own laws”. Whether the document was or was not forged, it seems that having one’s own laws was considered a privilege worth forging.

158 Aphrod. 8, lines 46-47: (ἐλεύθεροισ εἶναι τῷ (τε) δικαίῳ καὶ ταῖς [ίδιαις κρισεῖσιν ἕνεκεν τού] δήμου τοῦ Ῥωμαιῶν τῇ[ν] πολειτῆα γην Πλασασέων καὶ Αρφοδεισεῖων χρήσθαι) and lines 61-62: ἐλεύθεροι καὶ ἀτελείς ὡσιν, νόμοις τε Ἰδίοις π[ατρίς]ιοις καὶ οὔς ἄν μετὰ ταῦτα ἐν ἑαυτοῖς κρυβοντις κρυπτοντις κρυπτοντις κρυπτοντις κρυπτοντις κρυπτοντις κρυπτοντις κρυπτοντις κρυπτοντις κρυπτοντις κρυπτοντις κρυπτοντις κρυπτοντις κρυπτοντις κρυπτοντις κρυπτοντις κρυπτοντις κρυπτοντις κρυπτοντις κρυπτοντις κρυπτοντις κρυπτοντις κρυπτοντις κρυπτοντις κρυπτοντις κρυπτο
This is the context in which we must treat the question of fiscal immunities. Immunity is a contentious topic in modern discussion of freedom, particularly, as we saw, in relation to the *civitas libera*. The controversy discussed there can be avoided here. Immunity was never a *sine qua non* of freedom. The Classical and Hellenistic eras have numerous examples of cities proclaimed free who paid regular contributions to a larger authority. As in the case of the Delian League in the fifth century or the Second Athenian Confederacy in the fourth, or the Nesiotic League in the third century, cities might contribute extraordinary or regular funds to a superior power. The degree to which this was a contribution and not tribute – that is, the decree to which tribute was onerous – was related to the city’s willingness to pay it (which was related to the degree of domination by which they felt constrained). Under the Roman provincial structure, immunity often accompanied recognitions of freedom; there were times, though, where freedom could exist while the community paid taxes to the Roman state. This scenario of the free state paying funds to another state suggests one last central element to the meaning of freedom in Greco-Roman relations.

2.3.5: Freedom and Hegemony

We have thus far observed how political freedom meant self-rule in the style of the *polis*, free from the influence of autocratic powers, and free to govern oneself by

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161 See above, p. 98.

162 E.g. *RDGE* 1, 22, 26, 53, 54, 58; *Aphrod*. 8, 13; *lex Ant. Term*.

163 This is certainly the case by the time of Augustus, who, in refusing freedom to the Samians, explained: “I am not interested in the money which is paid into the tribute, but I do not plan to give anyone the most honoured privilege (e.g. freedom) without reasonable cause” (*Aphrod*. 13, lines 5-7 [text at n. 230]).
one’s own laws. But, if this were all, Roman authority would indeed have been hard
pressed to develop systematically in the Greek East without resistance; and we have seen
in Chapter 1 that Roman authority did develop systematically in the region alongside the
meaningful existence of Greek freedom. Therefore, we can make one more key claim:
freedom was not absolute, but could operate with an admission of subordination to the
superior (i.e. Roman) power.164 This much is evident in the Ephesians’ declaration of
war against Mithridates for both Roman rule and Greek freedom, and from Polybius’ own
references to Greek freedom in his investigation of the development of Roman ἀρχή.165

Liberty was compatible with forms of limitation and constraint. Naturally, one
could not be fully free to do as one liked without comprising the freedom of another.
Such a situation was anarcheia and threatened everyone in the state. As we have seen,
there were different ways to limiting freedom: the Greeks chose to rely on the citizen’s
own self-mastery and his understanding that his own self-interest entailed the interest of
the community;166 at Rome, self-mastery was bolstered by legal rights, immunities and
protections, which were produced and consented to by the free citizens.167

In the state communications we are considering, a measure of constraint is present
every time the Roman senate granted liberty to a Greek polis. To this point in the
discussion, I have consciously avoided characterizing the Romans’ actions as “granting”
or “bestowing” freedom, instead preferring more power-neutral terms like
“acknowledging” or “recognizing”. The Romans themselves could avoid the conflict by

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164 The discussion that follows is a sketch of the limits of freedom. Many of the points raised here
are elaborated in Chapters 3 and 4.

165 Polyb. 18.45-46, 51.9; 21.14.8, 22.7, 23.7-10, 24.12; 25.5.4; 30.5.12, 30.7; 36.4.4, 17.13.

166 See above §1.1.

167 See above, §1.2.
simply using the adjectives ἐλεύθερος or αὐτόνομος to describe the condition of the poleis. Generally, though, these expressions of freedom were contained within a subordinate clause governed by a verb like “decree” (δόκεωθα), or even more ambiguous power words such as “restore”, “return”, “yield” or “concede”. But even in these there is an implicit sense that the Romans have acknowledged (or “granted”, if one prefers) the freedom of a city from a position of superior authority. We might turn back to socio-linguistics for a conceptual framework: the condition of freedom comes about as the perlocutionary effect of a Roman speech-act; freedom is realized by the illocutionary act of its recognition. Put another way, when a Greek polis accepted (or even petitioned for) its freedom from the Romans, it was implicitly accepting their superior authority to make such a grant; for the speech-act to have efficacy (be felicitous) the polis must accept the illocutionary force of the utterance. Of course, at the same time Rome must ground and perform such an act in a manner agreeable to the polis – power was a two-way street.

Even before period of regular Roman provinces, Greek freedom was often accompanied by an explicit acknowledgement of Roman authority. In 190, Lucius and Publius Scipio granted freedom to Heraclea “just as to other cities that gave to us power to decide over them”; here freedom and subordination co-exist, but importantly, the

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168 E.g. RDGE 37; Rigsby, Asylia, 179; lex de Termessibus.

169 E.g. δόκεωθα: RDGE nos. 1 and 40; Aphrod. 13; cf. SEG LIII 658 (κρινεῖν); ἀποδίδοναι: (below Chapter 2 §4.1): IGRP I, 61; RDGE 43; I.Metrop.; συνχωρεοθα: RDGE 1; no. 17; no. 35. The latter verb is commonly translated as simply ‘to grant’, although the meaning is something more subtle in these cases. The origin of the term is ‘to come together’ or ‘combine’, which evolved into generally “agree”, or, in contexts of debates, “give way” or “concede”. In diplomatic language it often means “yield”, “acquiesce” or “allow”, which in diplomatic context must mean “yield” or “concede”, and becomes expressed through modern conceptions of power as “grant” (LSJ, s.v. συγχωρέω, with examples).

170 RDGE 35, lines 10-11: συνχωρούμεν δὲ ὑμῖν τὴν τε ἐλευθερίαν καθότι καὶ [ταῖς θ]ἀλαίς πόλεσιν, ὃσι ὑμῖν τὴν ἐπιτροπὴν ἐδωκαν (‘We granted freedom to you just as to other poleis, who gave us authority to decide over them’).
Romans’ power over the city is said to have been given by the city. To that extent, the city was not being dominated by the Romans, but had freely given over a measure of its self-determination. This is not the only example: in a decree of 151 from Iasos the Dionysiac Artists recorded their freedom while simultaneously proclaiming that all their decisions were made “according to the ordinances of the Romans, our saviours”, by mid-century the Thessalian League had acquired its freedom but acknowledged, after renewing its friendship, that its πολιτεία arose from an earlier Roman settlement. Similar explicit constrictions appear in the early provincial era: the two most famous being Fabius’ letter to the Dymaeans (where freedom was restored by the Romans, who also established the city’s πολιτεία) and the decree of the Metropolitans (who rejoiced at their new status “restored by the Romans...just as the Senate had decreed”). In each of these examples, Roman power was equivocated: it was done in role of saviour, as friend, or as liberator.

171 I. Iasos 152, lines 5-7: [διατηρούντες δὲ καὶ τὰ δεδομένα τοις κοινώι τῶν περὶ τῶν Διόνυσον τεχνητῶν ύπο[κρίνομε]ναν κατὰ τὰς [διαγραφὰς τῶν Ῥωμαίων τῶν κοινών τῶν ἔχον]των Ἁσ[ίας] σωτήρων (‘They always preserved what had been decreed by the Association of Dionysiac Artists, who made their decisions according to the edicts of the Romans, the saviours of the Association of Artists in Asia.’). The exact word for the Roman orders is missing from the text, but the context seems to suggest that the Association was passing resolutions according to some sort of Roman issuance; see also, Michel, Recueil d’Inscriptions Grecques, 1014.

172 RDGE 9, lines 46-54: [καὶ γὰρ] μετὰ τὰ[ύτης] τῆς χώρας εἰς τὴν [φιλίαν] τὸ δῆμον τῶν Ῥωμαίων Ναρθακίες παραγεγονέ·[λα], καὶ περὶ τῆς χώρας καὶ τῶν ιερῶν κριτηρίων [νεν]ικήθεν·ναι κατὰ νόμους τοὺς Θεσσαλίων, οἷς [νόμοις] ἔτως τὰ [ν]ύμ[ν] χρῶν[τ]αι, οἷς νόμοις Τίτως Κοίνκτος ὑπατος ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν δέκα πρεσβευτῶν γνώμης ἐξοθεν κατὰ δόγμα συγκλητῆτο (‘The Narthacians [claimed that they] had entered into friendship with the Roman people with this territory, about which—including its sanctuaries—they had won judgements in the past according to the laws of the Thessalians, which to this day they use, and which Titus Quinctius, consul [in 198] gave on the advice of his ten legates and according to the decree of the Senate.’); cf. Livy 42.38.6.

173 RDGE 43 (text at n. 206) and I. Metrop (text at n. 136); see also below, p. 177.

174 On these relations, see Chapter 3.
As fixed *provinciae* became more common and Roman authority became institutionalized (and normalized), the freedom of the *poleis* was expressed in the same breath as Roman control. The Ephesian decree is a prime example: the Ephesians claimed to take up war against Mithridates “for the sake of Roman hegemony and the common freedom”.  

175 We can see now that the reference to freedom is both logical, within the norms of the discourse of freedom, and apt— the Ephesians were taking up arms against a king who had demonstrated his disregard for their city-state government, and they passed the resolution and declared war under the authority of their own self-government. This case, however, also demonstrates that freedom was compatible with explicit limitations (bounded by Roman *hêgemonía*); the Ephesians appear perfectly comfortable expressing their autonomy and admitting of Roman constraint in the same breath. We find a similar example in a contemporary document from Aphrodisias, a *civitas libera* at the time, recording the community’s decision and effort to help a Roman general besieged by Mithridates’ forces in neighbouring Laodicea. In the decree, the citizens of the free-state make clear that their decision to support the Romans was freely chosen (*αἱρέσις*)—emphasizing not only their external but internal autonomy—and yet the decree concludes with the eulogium: “without the *hêgemonía* of the Romans we would prefer not even to live”.  

176 Fifty years later, the community’s freedom was re-confirmed by Caesar, at which point it was described as having “come from the

175 *I.Eph.* 8 (text at Introduction n. 16).

176 *Aphrod.* 2, line 13-14: χωρὶς τῆς Ῥωμαίων ἡγεμονίας οὐδὲ ζῆν προαναρφόμεθα. See the discussion of this text at p. 196.
Romans". In all of these cases freedom still has an operative meaning despite the explicit recognition that the city was subject to Roman ἥγεμονια.

Freedom was not always accompanied by such explicit limitations; often they are more implicit. Consider, for example, the lex Antonia de Termessibus, in which the citizens of Termessus Maior in Pisidia were acknowledged as free (liberi) and having the use of their own laws (suis legibus uti). In as much as the citizens of Termessus were to have full property rights over what had been taken from them in the third war against Mithridates, they had to use Roman courts to recover their possessions (col. II, lines 1-5); they were free from the winter billeting of Roman soldiers, unless otherwise stipulated by the Roman senate (lines 6-13); they were in no way subject to the orders of a provincial governor, insofar as it was limited by the Roman lex Porcia (lines 13-17); and they had every right to apply taxes and duties within their lands, except on Roman publicani (lines 31-36). In countless other similar ways freedom came to be bounded by Roman rule (discussed in the following chapters).

In the foregoing, we have tried to recover the shared Greco-Roman understanding of freedom in the sphere of interstate relations. In sum, we observed that there were three important aspects: i) freedom was closely related to the notion of δημοκρατία, a governing regime in contrast to monarchy, and to that extent being free meant not being under the control of an autocratic ruler; ii) more positively, freedom was the capacity of the city-state for self-determination and self-government through its own laws; and iii) insofar as these two conditions were met, freedom could meaningfully co-exist under the

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177 Aphrod. 8, lines 53-54: παρὰ τῆς συνκλήτου καὶ τοῦ δῆμου τοῦ Ῥωμαίων τῆν ἔλευθερ[ε]ίαν καὶ ἀτελειαν ἔχει.

178 Lex Ant. Term. col. I, lines 6-10 (text at n. 155).
authority of the Romans. Far from being blinded by anything like meaningless or vacant political propaganda, the Greeks participated in the shared development and understanding of freedom, which they continued to use to help define their relationship vis-à-vis the Romans. It remains now to understand just how this freedom operated in the development of Roman rule in the East.

2.4 – FREEDOM IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF ROMAN RULE

2.4.1: Rome as the Restorer of Liberty

The development of Roman authority in the East, its sustainability, and its transformation into an ordered empire succeeded because of the successful operation of freedom under Roman rule. At the heart of this process was the so-called Isthmian Proclamation, the senatus consultum read during the Isthmian Games held at Corinth in 196 after the Roman victory in the Second Macedonian War, which, as the first diplomatic exchange between the Roman State and the whole of mainland Greece, set the terms of interaction. By this decree, Rome acknowledged the Greeks as “free, ungarrisoned, not subject to tribute and governed by their traditional laws”, which

179 Polyb. 18.46.5; Livy, 33.32.6: senatus Romanus et T. Quinctius imperator Philippo rege Macedonibusque devictis liberos, immunes, sui legibus esse iubet Corinthios, Phocenses, Locrensesque omnes et insulam Euboeam et Magnetas, Thessalos, Perrhaebos, Achaeos Phthiotas – percensuerat omnes gentes quae sub dicione Philippi regis fuerant; Plut. Flam. 10-11; App. Mac. 9.2; Val. Max. 4.8.5.

180 Polyb. 18.46.5; Livy, 33.32.6: senatus Romanus et T. Quinctius imperator Philippo rege Macedonibusque devictis liberos, immunes, sui legibus esse iubet Corinthios, Phocenses, Locrensesque omnes et insulam Euboeam et Magnetas, Thessalos, Perrhaebos, Achaeos Phthiotas – percensuerat omnes gentes quae sub dicione Philippi regis fuerant; Plut. Flam. 10-11; App. Mac. 9.2; Val. Max. 4.8.5.
immediately located Roman action in the traditional framework of Hellenistic liberator, and within a set of norms and expectations – which were about to be challenged. Naturally, the Romans had acknowledged Greek freedom from a position of power – the act of liberation representing a speech-act par excellence – and Polybius himself suggests that the proclamation drew its legitimacy from the Romans’ military victory over Philip V and the Macedonians.\(^{181}\) Still, any concerns that might have arisen were diffused by the language used to express the liberation (e.g., ἀφιέναι [to leave], a remarkably neutral verb) and the shock of hearing freedom pronounced where some measure of occupation was expected. We shall return shortly to the former point (that Rome ‘left’ the Greeks free), but the counter-expectation of freedom first deserves comment.

Simply, the Roman decision to leave the Greeks free was entirely unexpected and therefore all the more psychologically impressive.\(^{182}\) According to Polybius, who avowedly drew on contemporary accounts for his History,\(^{183}\) the leading men of Greece

\(^{181}\) Polyb. 18.46.5: καταπολεμήσαντες βασιλέα Φιλίππον καὶ Μακεδόνας; so, Walbank, Commentary, s.v.

\(^{182}\) Polyb. 18.46.6-8: κρότου δ' ἐν ἀρχαῖς εὐθέως ἐξαισθον γενομένον τινὲς μὲν οὐδ' ἦκουσαν τοῦ κηρύγματος, τινὲς δὲ πάλιν ἀκούειν ἐβουλόντο. τὸ δὲ πολὺ μέρος τῶν ἀνθρώπων διαπιστούμενον καὶ δοκοῦν ὧς ἂν εἴ καθ' ὑπὸν ἀκούειν τῶν λεγομένων διὰ τὸ παράδειγμα τοῦ συμβαίνοντος, πάς τις ἐξ ἀλλης ὀρμής ἐβούλετα προδέχεται τὸν κήρυκα καὶ τὸν σαλπικτὴν εἰς μέσον τὸ στάδιον καὶ λέγειν πάλιν ὑπὲρ τῶν αὐτῶν, ὡς μὲν ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, βουλομένων τῶν ἀνθρώπων μὴ μόνον ἀκούειν, ἄλλα καὶ βλέπειν τὸν λέγοντα διὰ τὴν ἀποστίαν τῶν ἀναγορευμένων (‘Since an extraordinary applause broke out immediately, at the very beginning, some did not hear the decree, while others sought to hear it again. But the greatest part of the men believed and thought that what they heard spoken was a dream because of the unexpectedness of the event; each man of his own accord shouted for the herald and the bugler to advance to the middle of the stadium and repeat themselves for those, it seems to me, wanting not only to hear, but to see the speaker because of the incredible character of what was being proclaimed’); Gruen, “The Polis in the Hellenistic World”, 342: “the reception is telling and needs to be emphasised because it shows that the language of autonomy (was still) meaningful and telling, no mere empty posturing or political mirage”. Perhaps it was all the more unexpected because just the year before the Romans had set about ‘provincializing’ the Spanish provinces (Richardson, Hispaniae [Cambridge 1986]).

\(^{183}\) Polybius himself asserts that he begins his history in 220 “because the period thereafter coincides with my own and the preceding generation, so that I have been present at some of the events and have the testimony of eyewitnesses for others” (4.2.2; cf. 12.4c.2-5). Polybius was born probably in the
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assumed that they would become subject to some degree of Roman occupation, even the optimists anticipated that Rome would withdraw from only some of the more symbolically important poleis as a token gesture. Thus the proclamation of freedom was all the more unbelievable; indeed, “most believed that what they heard spoken was a dream”, as the declaration of liberation by the Roman senate seamlessly matched the Greek ideal. The theatricality of the event, and Polybius’ well read encomium of it, heightened the significance and mythology of the Romans’ actions; the Eleuthera Games were established in Larissa, statues and cults of Flamininus the Saviour sprouted last decade of the third century – the common date is 208 (Mommsen, Rom. Gesch. 2.449; Walbank, Commentary. 1.1, is non-committal; a succinct biography of Polybius can be found in Walbank, Commentary I.1-6). Walbank, Polybius (Berkeley 1972), suggests that Polybius “may just have remembered Flamininus’ proclamation of Greek freedom at the Isthmian Games of 196, and the departure of the legions two years later” (p. 7).

184 Polyb. 18.46.1-2.

185 Polyb. 18.46.7-8 (text above n. 182), and 10: ώς δὲ ποτε κατέληξεν ὁ κρότος, τῶν μὲν ἀθλητῶν ἄπλως οὖδεις οὐδένα λόγον εἶχεν ἔτι, πάντες δὲ διαλαλοῦντες, οἱ μὲν ἄλληλοι, οἱ δὲ πρὸς σφᾶς αὐτοῖς, οὖν εἰ παραστάτικοι τὰς διανοίας ἔσαν (’when the applause died down, not a single person gave any thought to the athletes, but everyone talked about it – some to other people, others just to themselves, as if desperate for understanding). According to Polybius, the same formula – ἐλευθέρως, ἀφρουρήτους, ἀφορολογήτους, νόμοις χρωμένους τοῖς πατρίοις – is to be found in the Symmachy shortly before the breakout of the Social War in 220 (4.25.7).

186 Polybius’ account (18.46), which is essentially paraphrased by Livy and others, captures, and expresses, the political theatre at work. The Proclamation itself was not read by Flamininus, we are told, but by a herald, introduced by the heavy sounds of the trumpeter. “An extraordinary applause broke out immediately, at the very beginning” (κρότου δ’ εν ἄρχαις εὐθέως ἔξαιριον γενομένου) of the herald’s address. (Polybius’ syntax here is worth noting: κρότος is the first word following the senatus consultum, underlining the significance of the applause, which is modified by the adjective ἔξαιριος separated from the noun and placed at the end of the genitive absolute, a hyperbaton emphasising the extraordinary applause. The successive temporal terms, ἐν ἄρχαις εὐθέως, emphasize the immediacy of the reaction, which itself underscores the ebullience of the crowd). The crowd’s reaction was a mixture of disbelief, astonishment, and joy, which Polybius brilliantly plays on to create an ethos of confusion and expectation. The decree is re-read, but not before the herald is again rushed into the centre of the stadium and the trumpet again ritualistically blown. At last there is a crescendo of joy (though still an uncertainty and struggle for διάνοια), as the rambunctious crowd (θόρυβος) – no longer merely a multitude (πλῆθος) – broke out into an applause so great ‘that it cannot easily be conceived by those listening to the tale today’. The scene concludes with the ironic imagery of Flamininus himself being nearly trampled by those running to thank him – or in the language of Polybius, “such was the situation after the games that the Greeks nearly put an end to Flamininus with their thanks and excess (ὑπερβολή) of joy”, his own hyperbole aping, but not surpassing, the ὑπερβολή of the crowd’s joy.

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up, and the cult of Roma was established in the region as a direct result. Roman action in the following years, furthermore, culminating in the complete withdrawal of their troops from the ‘fetters’ of Greece after the defeat of Nabis in 194 (itself a venture for Arcadian liberty), validated the language of their proclamation and generated a new taken-for-granted in the discourse of freedom that held Rome as the legitimate restorer of freedom among the Greeks. A contemporary poet, Alcaeus, no doubt reflected the common mood of the times when he contrasted the efforts of Xerxes in the early fifth century to yoke the Greeks in bondage, with those of Flamininus to finally end Greek slavery. Polybius’ account is itself an amalgam of contemporary sentiments and his own perspective a generation later, so that when he asserts that “even that excessive joy could not compare to the greatness of the act itself” we should not doubt that his observation was as valid for 196 as it was for 146. The story is retold by other ancient authorities (Livy, Plutarch, Appian), and perhaps nothing better exemplifies its impact than the emperor Nero’s decision, nearly two hundred and fifty years later, to play a Flamininus reborn in proclaiming the provincia Achaea to be free at the Isthmian Games.

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187 Eleuthera Games: SIG3 613a (Larissa); Flamininus as Saviour: Polyb. 18.46.12; Plut. Flam. 16.3 (Chalchis); SIG3 592 (Gytheum); J. Bousquet, “Inscriptions grecques concernant des Romaines” BCH 88 (1964), 607-615; G. Daux, “Concours des Titeia dans un décret d’Argos” BCH 88 (1964), 569-576; cf. Livy 34. 50.9 (Acrocorinth); cult of Roma: Mellor, ΘΕΑ ΡΩΜΗ (Göttingen 1975); below p. 273.

188 Livy 34.49.4; 51.1-4; see below on restoration.

189 Alcaeus (ap. Anth. Pal.) 16.5: 'Αγαγε καὶ Ζέρξης Πέρσαν στρατόν Ἐλλάδος ἐς γαν, / καὶ Τίτος εὐφρείας ἄγαγ ἀπ’ Ἰταλίας / ἄλλ’ ὁ μὲν Εὐρώπη δουλὸν ζυγὸν αὐχένι θῆσαι / ἠλθεν, ὁ δ’ ἄμπασων Ἐλλάδα σουλοῦνας (‘Xerxes marched the Persian army to Greek soil, and Titus led one of far reach from Italy to toil; one came to Europe to don its neck with slaves’ yoke, the other looked to end Greek’s slavery then in choke.’).

190 18.46.13: δοκούσης δὲ τῆς εὐχαριστίας ὑπερβολικῆς γενέσθαι, θαρρῶν ἄν τις εἶπε διότι πολὺ καταδεστέραν εἶναι συνέβαινε τοῦ τῆς πράξεως μεγέθους.
of 66 CE,\textsuperscript{191} the performance would have been meaningless were the memory of Flamininus’ action in 196 not still alive.

The theatricality and substance of the Proclamation created a remarkably powerful image of Rome as a liberator. As noted, it was confirmed and normalized over the following decades and generations as the Romans repeatedly professed their support of the Greeks’ freedom, and demonstrated their sincerity by following the norms described in the previous section. Indeed, the Romans were seen as following a policy or political principle of Greek liberation. Polybius mentions in his account of the proclamation that that by their action the Romans had followed through on their προαίρεσις to “submit to any expense and every danger for the sake of Greek freedom”.\textsuperscript{192} This same term is also found in a contemporary epistle to the people of Heraclea from Flamininus himself, who asserts that recent actions had made clear his

\textsuperscript{191}Plut. Flam. 12.8: τῇ δ’ οὖν Κορινθίων πόλει πρὸς τοὺς Ἑλλήνας τὸ αὐτὸ δι᾽ ἡδυ συμβέβηκε· καὶ γὰρ Τίτος ἐν Κορίνθῳ τότε καὶ Νέρων ἀθῆς καθ’ ἡμᾶς ἐν Κορίνθῳ παραπλησίως Ἰσθμίων ἀγομένων τοὺς Ἑλλήνας ἑλευθέρους καὶ αὐτονόμους ἀφήκαν, ὃ μὲν δὰ κήρυκος, ὡς εἰρήτη, Νέρων δὲ αὐτὸς ἐπὶ τῆς ἀγορᾶς ἀπὸ βήματος ἐν τῷ πλῆθει δημηγορίας (‘So at the city of Corinth there has twice been the same event before the Greeks; for it was at Corinth that Titus back then and Nero again in Corinth in our own time – both during the Isthmian Games – pronounced the Greeks to be left free and autonomous, the former through a herald, the latter himself on a tribunal in the marketplace before a multitude’); Suet. Nero 24.2; Dio 63.11.11 (grouping him with Flamininus, Mummius, Agrippa and Augustus, “liberators” of Greece, 8.1); SIG 814 (= IG VII 2713; decree of Acraephia recording Nero’s liberation address at Corinth); Neronian coin issues from Sicyon bearing the obverse inscription Νέρων Καίσαρ Ζεύς Ἐλευθέριος (in Levy 1991, below); cf. Plut. De sera 32; Paus. 7.17.3-4; Philostr. VA 5.41; P. Gallivan, “Nero’s Liberation of Greece” Hermes 101 (1973), 230-234. Vespasian later returned Achaea to provincial status with Roman administrative and fiscal apparatus two years later claiming "Greeks had forgotten how to be free" (Paus. 7.17.4; Philostr. VA 5.41). On the theatricality of Nero himself, see generally E. Champlin, Nero (Cambridge, Mass, 2003) and p. 232 for a different congruity between Nero and T. Flamininus.

\textsuperscript{192}Polyb. 18.46.14: θαυμαστὸν γὰρ ήν καὶ τὸ Ῥωμαίους ἐπὶ ταύτης γενέσθαι τῆς προαίρεσις καὶ τὸν ἤγουσαν αὐτῶν Τίτον, ὥστε πᾶσαν ὑπομείναι διαπάνη καὶ πάντα κίνδυνον χάριν τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἑλευθερίας· μέγα δὲ καὶ τὸ δύναμιν ἀκόλουθον τῇ προαίρεσι προσενέγκασθαι (‘For it was a wonderful thing for the Romans and their leader, Titus, to have this principle, that they would undergo any expense and every danger for the sake of Greek freedom; and even more it was great that they brought forward the power to follow through on that principle’). For more on προαίρεσις, see p. 259f.
own and the Romans’ προαίρεσις. The Romans’ principle is mentioned in the
documents of states thereafter, including the letter of Q. Fabius to the Dymaeans in which
it is directly associated with the restoration of Greek freedom (see below). The
prevalence of the term speaks to a new normative value in the shared social world, by
which the Romans were understood to regularly take action in the interest of Greek
freedom; their actions toward the Greeks were socialized as a process toward protecting
and promoting Greek freedom.

We can now return to the second observation made above regarding the Isthmian
Proclamation: its language and tone. According to the senatus consultum, the Romans
left the communities of mainland Greece free. The verb ἀφιέναι (‘to discharge;
release; let go’) seems to suggest something less than a grant of freedom, where freedom
would be like a status of Rome’s making, conferred from a position of authority; instead,
the verb conveys a more power-neutral arrangement. In fact a series of three inscriptions
from the mid-second century suggest that the Romans subscribed to and supported
something of an atavistic sense of liberty – a traditional liberty that was rightfully owed

193 RDGE 33, lines 2-4: ἐπεί καὶ ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς πᾶσιν φανερῶν πεποίηκαμεν τὴν τε ἱδίαν καὶ τοῦ
dήμου τοῦ Ῥωμαίων προαίρεσιν ἤν ἔχομεν εἰς ύμᾶς ὀλοκλήρως (‘Since even in all other matters we have
made clear our personal principle and that of the Roman people toward you entirely.’). Here a principle “to
undergo any expense and all danger for Greek freedom” would fit well the tenor of letter, which is to “to
display ourselves in all parts the champions of honour so that those who are not accustomed to conduct
themselves in the best manner might not slander their actions” (lines 4-8).

194 RDGE 43, lines 14-16: ἀλλὰ καὶ τῇ ἡς ἀποδεδομένης κατὰ [κ]οινὸν τοῖς Ἑλλήν[οιν
ἐ]λευθερίας ἄλλοτρια καὶ τῇ[ε] ἡμετέρας προαίρεσις (‘...but also (Sosus’ actions) were at odds with the
freedom restored to the Greeks and our policy.’). Other examples: ISE 42, line 4; SIG 613a, lines 5-8;
RDGE 18, line 45.

195 In Livy’s Latin account (33.32.6) we find the verb iubere (‘to order’) employed, which is
certainly his own interpellation of Polybius’ account, which he otherwise faithfully follows (text above n.
180). Plutarch (Flam. 10-11) and Appian (Mac. 9.2) both follow Polybius’ account and thus record the verb
ἀφείνατι.
the Greek poleis.\textsuperscript{196} In the Metropolis text discussed earlier, the people declare that “the Romans...restored freedom to all those cities formerly under the control of Attalus.” \textsuperscript{197}

The verb used here is ἀποδιδόναι, which is found in two other places in the text modifying ἐλευθερία.\textsuperscript{198} Dreyer, who provided a historical commentary for the editio princeps of the text, naturally believed that this implied Metropolis had previously been free at some point; however, the decree itself, significantly, makes no mention of when that might have been.\textsuperscript{199} In fact, ἀποδιδόναι carries the double sense of not only “to restore”, but also “to give to someone what is rightfully theirs”, as in the standard language of giving thanks (χάριν ἀποδιδόναι) or of an ambassador handing over a decree of his people to a foreign council (ψήφισμα ἀποδιδόναι).\textsuperscript{200} In light of its frequency, absent referent, and alternative sense of restoring something owed, the meaning is almost

\textsuperscript{196} For a more detailed argument of this point, see M. Snowdon, “Memory and Freedom: I.Metropolis and the ‘Restoration’ of Freedom”, Mouseion III.8 (2008), 377-393.

\textsuperscript{197} I.Metrop. lines 14-15 (text at n.136).

\textsuperscript{198} I.Metrop. lines 14-15: ἀποδοντων...τὴν ἐλευθερίαν; line 16: τὴν ἀποδεδομένην ἡμῖν ἐλευθερίαν; line 31: τὴς ἀποδεδομένης ἐλευθερίας ἅγωνισάμενον; cf. lines 21-22 (ἀποδεξάμενος τὴν ἐλευθερίαν), where the Metropolitans have used the verb ἀποδέχομαι, which can also mean ‘to receive back’ or ‘to recover’ (LSJ, s.v. ἀποδέχομαι II). Similar language is found in prostagmata of the Hellenistic Kings: SIG\textsuperscript{4} 322, lines 1-5; SIG\textsuperscript{4} 390, lines 10-16; I.Prusia 1001, lines 8-13; Ma, Antiochos III, no 26a, lines 8-9.

\textsuperscript{199} Dreyer, I.Metrop., 28-29 n.72, would hesitatingly place it at the Treaty of Apamea. Far too little of Metropolis’ history is preserved, though, to guess when this might have taken place, and in any case, everything we do know of the community’s status suggests that it was continually under the authority of a greater power: it seems to have been under the control of Lysimachus until 281, when it came under Seleucid authority, and then likely to Pergamene kingdom by the Treaty of Apamea. It was certainly part of the Attalid kingdom in 142, when it secured tax concessions from Attalus II or one of his officials (I.Metrop., Nebenseite, lines 18-22; C.P. Jones, “The War with Aristonicus and the New Metropolis Inscription” JRA 17 (2004), 476-477). On Metropolis in general see, Keil, s.v. ‘Metropolis’ in RE 15.2 col. 1497; R. Meriç, Metropolis in Ioniien: Ergebnisse einer Survey-Unternehmung in den Jahren 1972-1975 (Königstein 1982), 13-20; idem, Metropolis: City of the Mother Goddess (Izmir, 2004), 42-43; B. Dreyer, I.Metrop. p. 13-14.

\textsuperscript{200} LSJ s.v. ἀποδίδωμι I.1. The latter was brought to my attention by J.-L. Ferrary. On the formula of receiving a decree, see, e.g. RDGE 15, line 33; no. 35, line 5; no. 36, line 7; no. 38, line 4; no. 56, line 4; no. 67, line 7; no. 68, line 25; no. 69, line 13; on giving thanks, e.g., I.Iasos 82, line 47; I.Knidos I.232, line 6; I.Priene 531, line 13; Robert, Amyzon 15, line 18.
certainly a “return to the freedom that is properly due the polis”, particularly in contrast to the previous condition under Attalus III.\textsuperscript{201}

The language here is not unique, but appears also in the bilingual Capitoline dedication from the Lycian League to the Roman people, which (to recall) gave thanks to the Roman people for “restoring democracy”. The Latin \textit{restituti in maiorum leibertatem} translates the Greek \textit{κομισάμενον τὴν πάτριον δημοκρατίαν} and suggests that Rome too upheld the idea of restoring Greek freedom.\textsuperscript{202} The restoration of the Lycians’ freedom was part of the larger Roman settlement of the East after Pydna, the highlight of which was the liberation of Macedonia and Illyria.\textsuperscript{203} The Lycians were recovering their freedom from the Rhodian Republic, who had treated as slaves “people who were born free”, according to the Roman Senate.\textsuperscript{204} One suspects that similar language may have appeared in mainland Greece, though Polybius’ contemporary account of the settlement is unfortunately lost.\textsuperscript{205}

We can also point to a third inscription, introduced earlier, for similar language: in his letter to the Dymaeans, Q. Fabius condemned Sosus for looking to destroy the

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\item It is unclear whether the Metropolitans have here recorded (in translation) the actual text of the senatus consultum or interpolated its meaning. Two points suggest the former: the adverbial phrase \textit{καθάτερ πέδινα} ("just as the Senate decreed") and the two other examples (\textit{infra}) from Roman documents. Even if, however, the words are not those of Rome, the argument does not lose its effect; it simply loses one step (Roman initiation). It is worth noting that the Metropolitans were not the only polis who conceptualized the Roman defeat over Aristonicus as an act of liberation; the Elaeans concluded a treaty with the Romans shortly after the war and stipulated that it “be engraved on two bronze plaques and set up both in the Temple of Demeter and in the \textit{bouleuterion} beside the statue of Democracy”. (SIG\textsuperscript{3} 694 [=IGRP IV 1692], lines 27-31).
\item \textit{IGUR I 5 (= ILLRP 176; IGRP I, 61), text at n. 108.}
\item Livy 45.18, 26.12-15, 29.
\item Livy 41.6.12.
\item This would not have been true of the Macedonians themselves, whom Polybius (31.2.12) describes as “unaccustomed to democratic and republican operations”.
\end{enumerate}
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πολιτεία and ἐλευθερία restored to the Greeks by the Romans. Interestingly, Pausanias would later excoriate L. Mummius, the Roman consul who managed the post-war settlement, for “having suppressed democracies”. But the contemporary inscription from Dyme tells a different story. The πολιτεία was not imposed on the Greeks, or given to the Greeks, but restored to the Greeks. Far from avoiding the awkwardness of having given freedom but imposed a governing regime, Fabius unabashedly refers to it three times in just twenty-five lines. The πολιτεία that the Achaeans received was a positive, not a negative, affirmation of Rome’s commitment to Greek liberty. So sus was the tyrant who had attempted to undo the traditional civic self-government idealized by the polis. This was the argument that the Dymeaean embassy had presented to Fabius; they had accepted the validity claims of the Romans in constructing their petition.

206 RDGE 43 (with improved reading by Kallet-Marx, “Dyme Affair”), lines 8-10, 15-16: Σωσίς Ταυρομένεος ὁ καὶ τοὺς νόμους γράφας ὑπεναντίας τῇ ἀποδοθείᾳ τοῖς Ἱππαισις ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων πολιτείαις ... ἀλλὰ καὶ τῇ ἀποδειγμένῃ κατὰ κοινὸν τοῖς ἑλληνειαῖς ἀλληλείπεια καὶ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ προαρέσεως (‘Sosos son of Tauromenes also wrote laws contrary to the governing regime restored to the Achaeans by the Romans ... but also alien to the freedom restored in common to the Greeks and our [i.e. Roman] policy’).

207 Paus. 7.16.9: ὡς δὲ ἀφίκοντο οἱ σὺν αὐτῷ βουλευόμενοι, ἑνταῦθα δημοκρατίας μὲν κατέπαυε, καθόστατο δὲ ἀπὸ τιμιμάτων τὰς ἀρχὰς (‘When those who wished to meet him arrived, [Mummius] put down democracies and established magistracies on the basis of property qualification’). The claim must be taken with a grain of salt: Pausanias is wholly hostile to the actions of Mummius, who has clearly transgressed the norms of the victor by setting Corinth ablaze, killing the men, selling the women and freedmen, despoiling the city’s rich art, and leaving recalcitrant cities impotent, without walls or weapons, putting down democracies, imposing tribute, and dissolving the traditional confederacies (7.16). In his estimation, after 146 “Greece sank to the lowest depths of weakness” (ἐξ ἀπαν δὲ ἀσθενείας τότε μάλιστα κατάληθεν ἡ Ἑλλάς, 7.17.1).

208 In his eagerness to discredit Mummius, Pausanias appears to have misrepresented some facts. For example, no other literary or epigraphic source suggests that the Romans imposed property requirements on the Achaeans; nor is there any indication that the federations of Greece were discontinued (as Pausanias himself admits [7.16.10]); Gruen, HWCR II.525-526; the Romans, we noted above (p. 69j), found the κοινὸ useful.

209 Thus Ferrary, Philhellenisme, 186-209, has argued that the Mummius settlement was a return to traditional democracy after a period of tyranny.
Admittedly, unlike the Metropolis case, these last two examples have likely referents— the freedom of the Lycians from Rhodian control in 167 (or Mithridatic control in 84) and Mummius' settlement in 146—but both are not unambiguous (lacking internal referents as they do), and certainly also carried the implication of a restoration of freedom as a traditional condition. The Lycians affirm as much in speaking of their return to an ancestral (πάτριον / maiorum) freedom. Similar references to the granting of customary land or (more frequently) time-honoured laws are scattered throughout the epigraphic record and complement the notion that the Romans looked to restore or maintain the status quo (ante). In these communications, the Senate did not impose a new set of terms (whether they be laws, rights, or territory) on the particular polis, but simply returned, or preserved, something that was traditionally held by and owed to the Greek cities. In these instances, and three cases illustrated above, freedom was assumed to be something innately due to the polis; the Romans, for their part, are represented as agents restoring what was taken but due to be restored.

210 Compare this with a Pergamene decree of 44 (OGIS 449) to P. Servilius Isauricus, who is praised for “restoring the ancestral laws and democracy unfettered” (ἀποδεδωκότα τῇ πόλει τοὺς πατρίους νόμους καὶ τὴν δημοκρατίαν ἄδουλωτον, lines 4-6); and a letter of M'. Acilius Glabrio (RDGE 37), who promised to preserve for the Delphians “the ancestral conditions that they have always had” (τὰ ἡξ ἄρχης ὑπάρχοντα πατρίας, line 9).

211 Cf. RDGE 11 (and 13 = Drew-Bear, NIP nos. 1 & 2), which was passed in the wake of the death of Attalus III and the bequest of his kingdom to the Romans, and which stipulated that anything that had been “arranged, given, exempted or punished up to the king’s death” was to remain valid (κύρια μένη). Note, too, the Senate’s common preference in arbitrational decisions to uphold earlier decisions: (e.g. RDGE 9, 10, 15) and traditional possession (defined by entry into Roman friendship [below p. 208]); cf. Kallet-Marx, Hegemony, 169. Also interesting in this regard is a passage from the Menippos Decree of Claros (col. I, lines 24-26), which seems to indicate, in a clearly disgruntled tone, that the processes of provincialization changed the court system (κριτήρια) from their laws (ἀπὸ τῶν νόμων) into Roman jurisdiction (ἐπὶ τὴν ἰδίαν ἐξουσίαν), in this case altering the status quo.
2.4.2: Freedom and Roman Rule

Simply put, the Roman state was conducive to the logic of freedom sketched out in the previous section, particularly in contrast to the monarchic regimes that had previously controlled the region. The great advantage enjoyed by the Romans in this process was their republican (city-state) government, in contrast to the previous two hundred years of monarchic dominance in the East. Although the Romans communicated with the Greek poleis in a language and manner similar to the Hellenistic monarchs, and even were accorded some of their royal trappings, their res publica had its own symbolic and practical features that eased their reception among the Greeks and shaped the character of freedom. As one author has observed:

Rome was the free state fighting on behalf of the Greek cities to keep them free from the kings, the opposite of ... freedom. Rome may have been adopting traditional Hellenistic liberation propaganda, but because Rome was a constitutional state and not a monarchy this propaganda acquired a new perspective.

The Hellenistic kings had presented themselves as liberators and benefactors of the poleis, and achieved notable success in doing so. But declarations of freedom made by kings were inherently paradoxical: in as much as a king might affirm a community's freedom, he was simultaneously in the awkward position of confirming the un-naturalness of his own monarchic regime before the community and the illegitimacy

\[212\] In not a few ways the Romans came to fill the vacuum left by the disassembly of the Hellenistic monarchic states. Thus, for example, the Romans quickly attracted the traditionally royal epithet 'saviour and benefactor' for their many efforts on behalf of Greek communities (see below, Chapter 3 §2.2); they also, of course, became the decisive arbitral court for Hellenic disputes (Ager, *Interstate Arbitrations* [Berkeley 1996]). Even the remaining monarchs viewed the populus Romanus (as state) as their peer, sending their children to be raised in the city and leaving them as heir to their kingdoms (both roles traditionally filled by a king's royal peers) (D. Braund, *Rome and the Friendly King* [London 1984]).

\[213\] McGing, *Foreign Policy of Mithridates*, 57.

\[214\] See above, p. 141.
of his authority over them. Bertrand has drawn attention to this point in her discussion of
the power of political discourse in the Hellenistic world; she illustrates the measures
taken by the Greek polis to adapt its own autarchic identity to communications with the
Hellenistic kings by recasting royal edicts (διαγράμματα and προστάγματα) within the
framework of their own civic decrees (ψηφίσματα), thereby preserving the appearance of
independent action. 215

The Romans, with their republican government, naturally complemented the
internal logic of the discourse of freedom in a way that the Hellenistic monarchs simply
could not. To the citizen of the Greek polis, the Romans were a kindred citizen-state,
with a popular assembly and elected council, who employed annual magistrates with
executive authority that were ultimately responsible to the state. 216 The official
documents explicitly state that decisions came from the Senate (senatum consuluit; τῇ
συνκλητῳ συνεβουλεύσατο); even in cases where a decision was made by a magistrate,
the language of the epistula frequently refers to an earlier decision of the Senate. 217
Senate decrees published in Greek cities, furthermore, were not just about
communicating decisions; if this were the case an abridged version of the decree would
have been sufficient. The full reproduction of senatus consulta preserved the

215 J-M. Bertrand, “forms de discours politiques: décrets des cites grecques et correspondance des
rois hellénistiques” in Cl. Nicolet, ed, Pouvoir dans l’Antiquité: les mots et les réalités (Genève, 1990),

216 Ando, “Was Rome a Polis?” 9: “Prolonged engagement with, and repeated applications of,
polis-based understandings of Rome induced Greeks to make an ontological commitment to their models
[the polis]: they ceased to employ them as heuristic devices and came to regard them existentially.”

217 Typical examples are found in RDGE 1a, line 4; no 4, lines 10-20; no 14; no. 18, 17-18; no.
20; no. 38, line 7-8; no. 39; no. 42, lines 17; no. 49, lines 12-13; no. 70, lines 12-19. Sententia: SC de
Oropus; committee: RDGE 12 (+ I.Eph. 578), lines 21-54.
administrative process that demonstrated the working citizen-state apparatus.\textsuperscript{218} The Roman documents present that process of decision-making as transparent, as was the case in Greek decrees, in contrast to the opaqueness of royal edicts.\textsuperscript{219} Each Roman decree included the date, location, and presiding magistrate, witnesses, the motion presented, sometimes even competing \textit{sententiae}, the decision proper, and even on occasion the names of members of any senate sub-committee involved in the process.\textsuperscript{220} In this way, the Greeks could see the republican operation of the Roman state re-enacted in their decisions just as their own decrees reflected conditions of the \textit{polis}.

Senate decrees, moreover, formulaic and explicitly reported to the \textit{polis} that its requests and concerns had been cordially received and that its ambassadors had spoken before the Senate “according to (the community’s) decree”, frequently recording their petition in the published \textit{consultum} itself.\textsuperscript{221} Such an inclusion, whether deliberately or not, leaves the impression that the city’s concerns had been considered, debated and

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\begin{enumerate}
\item The point is made by J-M. Bertrand (“\textit{formes de discours politiques}”, 103-104) of Greek decrees, but the same is certainly true of Roman \textit{senatus consultum}. For Bertrand, a decree is important not for what it says, but for its construction – its careful attention to the process that demonstrates the working apparatus of the \textit{polis}. So, when an Athenian decree includes all the various amendments added to it by individuals, the significance lies not in the various amendments and proposals, but in the demonstration of ἱσηγορία that forms the basis of the freedom of the individual within the community. See further, Chapter 3 §1.1.

\item e.g. Bertrand, “\textit{formes de discours politiques}”, \textit{passim}; cf. R. Osbourne, “Inscribing Performance” in Goldhill & Osbourne, eds., \textit{Performance Culture and Athenian Democracy} (Cambridge, 1999), 341-358. The transparency of senatorial procedure presented in the \textit{senatus consultum} has been crucial to the modern understanding of Senate practice and procedure: e.g. Lintott, \textit{The Constitution of the Romans} (Oxford, 1999), 75-85; above, Introduction §5.

\item See above, Introduction §5.

\item Where a petition was not recorded in the published \textit{consultum}, the \textit{scriptor} of the decree will explicitly state that the ambassadors “submitted their community’s decree and spoke according to what was contained in it with all energy, eagerness and leaving out nothing’ (τὸ \ψηφίσμα ἀνέδοσαν καὶ αὐτοὶ διελέγησαν ἀκολούθως τοῖς ἐν αὐτοῖς κατακεχωρισμένοις μετὰ πάσης σπουδῆς, φιλοτιμίας οὐθέν ἐλλείποντες). E.g. \textit{RDGE} 34, lines 7-8; no. 35, lines 5-6; no. 9; no. 38, lines 4-5; cf. the Greek response to these, as in \textit{SIG} \textsuperscript{591}; Wörle, \textit{Chiron} 30, lines 18-22. The dialogue between the Greek communities and the Hellenistic kings also included this diplomatic courtesy (e.g. Wells, \textit{RC}, nos. 2 & 7).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
\end{quotation}
that its representatives had participated in affairs that affected their community. When so much of the meaning of freedom was based on the absence of a royal power, the res publica of the Romans had a much easier time positioning itself as an agent working on behalf of the Greek poleis against the oppression of dynasts and tyrants. Supported by this basic contrast with royal powers, the Romans could employ language similar to that of the kings, but in accordance with the logic of freedom. Moreover, the limited institutions of their own government, and dependence on the practical (as well as normative) capacity of the poleis to govern themselves, justified Roman claims to restoring Greek freedom and warranted their sincerity to future claims.

This is not to say that the Romans did not interfere in the arrangements of Greek cities – as of course they did in, e.g., the settlements of Corinth or Apamea, the division of Macedonia, and the very establishment of provinces; nor is this to say that Rome did not interfere in individual poleis (e.g. the imposition of a πολιτεία to the Thessalians, to the Achaeans, immunities for individuals – even ones of free states like Rhosus or Termessus Maior.222 There were accusations of enslavement or abuse of power, and some were legitimate and significant.223 There are, for example, a number of reasons why Mithridates managed to gain a measure of control in the East (not the least of which was the inability of the Asian poleis to protect themselves against the Pontic forces),224 and at least part of the reason for his success was that the Roman publicans had pierced

222 Thessaly: RDGE 9; Polyb. 18.43; Livy 33.27-29; 34.51.4-6; Achaea: RDGE 43; Plut. 7.7.1; Rhosus: RDGE 58; Termessus Maior: lex Ant. Term. Ferrary, “Rome et les cités grecques”, 70-71.

223 Besides, those mentioned at p. 35 f. above, see: Livy 35.31.8-16; 44.6; Livy 35.23.7-11 (Antiochus); Polyb. 21.22-23; Cato ap. Gellius NA 3.6.16 (Rhodes); Polyb. 27.4.7; Cato Orig. 5.3b (Perseus); Achaean War: Paus. 7.16.9-10 (Achaean); Diod. 40.1.3; App. Sic. 6.1-2 (Crete).

the veil of objectivity surrounding Greek freedom by ruthlessly exploiting the communities of Asia:\textsuperscript{225} from the perspective of communication, the domination exercised by the Romans’ tax collectors made it impossible for Rome to justify its claims to the truth of working toward Greek freedom. Paying taxes to a hegemonic state, we have seen, was not ideologically inconsistent with \( \epsilon\lambda\varepsilon\nu\theta\varepsilon\rho\iota\alpha \), so long as it was not onerous: the rapacity and greed of the Romans’ tax collectors had violated the normative rules of \textit{liberi Graeci}.

All the same, the Mithridatic Wars also demonstrate the viability and success of the discourse of freedom and its regular operation under Roman rule. Indeed, while Roman control over the region became clearly incontestable throughout the course of the second and first centuries, the Romans simultaneously developed a monopoly on the recognition of freedom.\textsuperscript{226} An interesting anecdote from Mithridates’ third war against the Romans (72-66) suggests, for example, that he had trouble making any of his own grants of freedom meaningful. In 72, as part of his pact with the rebellious Roman general Sertorius, the Pontic king received at his court M. Marius, who helped the king regain control of Asia. Part of his strategy was to communicate with the \textit{poleis} through the discourse of freedom, but interestingly it was not Mithridates who offered freedom to the communities of Asia, but Marius himself, while the Pontic king followed behind.

\textsuperscript{225} Memnon frg 22.8; Justin 38.7.8; Diod. 37.26.1, 27.1; Florus 1.40.6. Mithridates is said to have developed his plan to expand into Asia Minor while travelling the Asian province \textit{incognito}, learning of the discontent of the provincials with the greedy Roman tax collector and money-lenders (Justin 37.3.4); on the dating of these travels, see Magie \textit{RRAM} I.196, II.1093, n.55.

\textsuperscript{226} Note, for example, an inscription of Antiochus VIII (\textit{OGIS} 257) in which he grants freedom to Seleucia, and then sends copies of the decree off to Rome.
Furthermore, while there are indications that Mithridates may have granted financial immunities to some cities, little evidence exists that he was accepted as a liberator – because he was a monarch the Greeks refused to accept the implicit validity claims supporting any offer of liberty he proffered. The Romans, by the first century, held a monopoly on the granting of freedom – the very thing that Antiochus III had tried to prevent a hundred years earlier.

Now discourses are neither monolithic nor static; they are based on the well of shared knowledge and experience of interlocutors, and to that end can change as new experiences are had and new knowledge is accrued; they are constantly being tested, questioned, negotiated, confirmed, and reproduced at each iteration. The normative values understood in, and represented through, the discourse of freedom naturalized the structural development of the Romans’ empire and their role as restorative liberators, but through the course of time the values of freedom were negotiated such that a new shared knowledge took hold (such that Rome could have a monopoly on granting freedom).

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227 Plut. Ser. 23.3-4: ὥς (sc. Μάριος) συνεξελών τινάς πόλεις τῶν Ἀσιάδων ὁ Μιθριδάτης εισελαύνοντι μετὰ βάρβων καὶ πελέκεων αὐτός ἔπετο δευτέραν τάξιν καὶ σχήμα θεραπεύοντος ἐκουσώς ἀνειληφώς. ὁ δὲ τὰς μὲν ἡλευθέρους, ταῖς δὲ ἀτέλειας γράφων χάριτι Σερτορίου κατήγγελεν (‘Mithridates was helped by this man to capture certain cities of Asia; when he entered them with fasces and axes, Mithridates would follow him in person, voluntarily assuming second rank and the position of a vassal. Marius gave some of the cities their freedom, and wrote to others announcing their exemption by grace of Sertorius’).

228 In fact, his cognomen, Dionysus (see: Durrbach, *Choix d’Inscriptions de Délos* no. 133 & 134), whose Roman equivalent, Liber, would have given him an ideal opportunity to claim himself a divine liberator (Cic. Flacc. 60: *illum Euhium, Nysum, Bacchum, Liberum nominabant*). Some scholars have been too liberal with the evidence in this regard (e.g. McGing, *Foreign Policy of Mithridates*, 89: “it was in large part as the champion of Hellenism that he came forward to fight the barbarian Romans”; cf. Magie *RRAM* I.214). There is nothing in the epigraphic or numismatic material to indicate that Mithridates ever actively styled himself (or was styled by Greek communities) as “liberator” of the Greeks in a mode similar to, say, Antiochus III or Perseus. Tax immunities: App. Mith. 18, 21 (Magnesia, Ephesus); Cic. pro Flacc., 59 (Tralles); Justin 38.3.8; Strabo 14C641 (Ephesus); Justin 38.3.9 (give all surrendered cities tax exemption for five years and cancel their debt).

229 Polyb. 18.51.9; cf. Livy 34.59.4-5; cf. *I.iasos* 4, lines 41-48.
this end, we can contrast the ancestral sense of freedom found in the second century
documents with a letter of Augustus to the people of Samos.

You yourselves are able to see that I have given the privilege (φιλάνθωρπον) of
freedom (ἐλευθερία) to no people except the Aphrodisians, who after taking my
side in the war [against M. Antonius] were forcibly occupied because of their
goodwill toward us. It is not right that the greatest privilege of all (τὸ πάντων
μέγιστον φιλάνθωρπον) be rewarded at random and without cause. I think well
of you and I would like to show favour to my wife, who is active on your behalf,
but I will not abandon my custom. I am not interested in the money which comes
to the treasury, and I do not plan to give to anyone the most honoured privilege
without reasonable cause (αἰτία εὐλογος).\textsuperscript{230}

While demonstrating the continued significance of freedom still in the Augustan era, this
text also illustrates a shift away from a sense of absolute, ancestral Greek liberty. Here
we see ἐλευθερία as something like an imperial status, whose chief advantage is the
immunity it affords the city from Roman taxation. Freedom has been re-oriented from
the ancestral right of Greek communities to a privilege (φιλάνθωρπον) rewarded for a
reason (αἰτία) by the Roman imperial state. Augustus’ rescript, it should be noted, was
recorded on the great stone monument in the agora of Aphrodisias – not Samos, to whom
it was addressed – and was published by the Aphrodisians to demonstrate their preferred
status in the empire. They earned their freedom, we are explicitly told, through their
loyalty to the Roman State and Augustus himself. The Samians, by contrast, were denied

\textsuperscript{230} \textit{Aphrod.} 13: Αὐτοκράτωρ Καίσαρ θεὸς Ἰουλίου νῦν ὁ Ἀγγυστος Σαμίως ὑπὸ τὸ ἄξιόμα ὑπέγραψεν ἔξεστιν ὑμεῖν αὐτοῖς ὅραν ὅτι τὸ φιλάνθωρπον τῆς ἐλευθερίας οὐδὲν δέδωκα δήμῳ πλῆν τῶν Ἀφροδεισίων ὡς ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ ταῦτα ἔμαρτσασας δορὰλωτος διὰ τὴν πρὸς ἡμᾶς εὔνοιαν ἔγεντο· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν δίκαιον τὸ πάντων μέγιστον φιλάνθωρπον εἰκῇ καὶ χωρίς αἰτίας χαρίζεσθαι· ἐγὼ δὲ ἤμεν εὐνῶς καὶ βουλούμην ἐν τῇ γυναικὶ μου ὑπέρ ὑμῶν σπουδαζόμενη χαρίζεσθαι ἄλλα οἷς ὡστε καταλύσαι τὴν συνήθειαν μου· οὐδὲ γὰρ τῶν χρημάτων μοι μέλει ὡς εἰς τὸν φόρον τελεῖτε ἄλλα τὰ τειμώντα φιλάνθωρπα χωρὶς αἰτίας εὐλογοῦ δεδωκέναι οὐδένι βουλομαι. Reynolds has dated the letter
to sometime between 38-20 BCE.
the status of freedom because they had not demonstrated goodwill (εὔνοια) or faithfulness (πίστις) worthy of reward.\(^{231}\)

Naturally, there had always been a relationship between grants of freedom and loyalty to Rome. Implicit when receiving one’s freedom was that it came in response to past, and with the expectation of future, faithfulness toward the *populus Romanus*; it was part of the reciprocal mode of interaction that directed Greco-Roman relations.\(^{232}\) By the time of the Mithridatic Wars this had become explicit. Sulla’s grant of freedom to the Stratoniceans was prefaced with a motivation clause highlighting the city’s goodwill (εὔνοια), loyalty (πίστις), friendship (φιλία), and alliance (συμμαχία) toward Rome, as well as its actions taken in the name of Roman interests – as it had always done (κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν) – and its spirited and zealous efforts (προθυμότατα) against Mithridates.\(^{233}\) Here, if προαίρεσις still preserves any vestigial Polybian notion of Rome undertaking ‘every expense and danger for the freedom of the Greeks’, it now also encompasses a sense of working in Rome’s interest. In any case, a generation later, in the aftermath of the Battle of Philippi, the Aphrodisians were rewarded with various freedoms and immunities, which, we are told, were a direct result of their exceptional goodwill (μεγίστη εὔνοια) and extraordinary loyalty (ἐξοχώτατα πίστις) to the Republic.\(^{234}\) Even the efforts of individual citizens could secure freedoms for their

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231 The significance of εὔνοια and πίστις is discussed in the following chapter, on their relationship with one another, see p. 200.

232 On the reciprocal mode of interaction, see Chapter 3 §1.1.

233 *RDGE* 18, lines 44-48; cf. 3-7, 78-80; cf. *RDGE* 70, in which is found an earlier epistle of Sulla concerning the autonomy of the Chians, who received their privilege as a reward for their suffering and loyalty to the Romans against Mithridates (lines 10-20).

community, as in the case of the autonomous Rhosians, whose φιλάνθρωπος Augustus promised to protect because of the efforts of one of their citizens, Seleucus son of Theodotus, an admiral in Augustus' fleet who had "distinguished himself and always demonstrated his εὐνοον and πίστις".\(^{235}\) Here again we see that freedom was integrated into Roman rule; indeed, that the discourse of freedom was also a part of a discourse on Roman rule.

2.5—Conclusion

Freedom was a central aspect of a polis' identity stretching back to the Classical era and still very much alive at the coming of Rome. The Romans, with similar notions of liberty, engaged the Greeks in their traditional Hellenistic discourse of freedom at their first major point of contact with the panhellenic community in 196, which set the terms of their interaction in the following two centuries. After the Isthmian Proclamation we can follow a narrative of Greek freedom through the course of Greco-Roman interaction of the next two centuries. This freedom had, above all, two central tenets: the city's capacity for self-direction and self-governance, and its freedom from monarchic domination. The Romans and their style of governance met these conditions: they were self-evidently not a monarchic state, and their hegemonia in the region had the most limited of institutional organization. Over the course of time, moreover, while rooted in the sense of working toward the restoration of Greek liberty, the discourse of freedom

\(^{235}\) RDGE 58, lines 80-84. Seleucus himself was personally rewarded with citizenship and other privileges for his efforts "on behalf of the Republic" (lines 12-71); cf. the personal liberties and immunities rewarded to Asclepiades of Clazomenae, Polystratus of Carystus, and Meniscus of Miletus, for their "courageous and faithful" efforts during (probably) the Italic War (RDGE 22).
came to embrace the Romans' own ἡγεμονία: the recognition of freedom by Rome became paramount and freedom became a special relationship with the hegemon.

Roman hegemony, then, could and did meaningfully co-exist with Greek freedom: indeed, by the end of our period Greek freedom and Roman constraint might be said to follow the same trajectory – where Greek freedom meant support for the Roman state, and the Roman state meant the protection of Greek freedom – and to culminate in the proposition that a Greek could be free within and while subject to Roman rule. Having come, then, to understand the meaning of Greco-Roman freedom and its relationship to the development and operation of Roman rule, it remains now to consider more carefully Roman rule itself. Turning back to our Ephesian decree, we have solved half of the equation – we can understand what they meant by ἐλευθερία – and we must now consider what the city had in mind when it spoke of ἡγεμονία. For it was something, clearly, that went beyond the institutional arrangement of the imperial state, while also being a notion consistent with the discursive narrative of freedom which circumscribed Greco-Roman relations more generally.
- III -

RECIPROCITY: EMPIRE AS INTERACTION

The declaration of the Ephesians to fight ‘on behalf of Roman hēgemonia and the
common eleutheria’ has now become both less and more troublesome. Having now
addressed the arrangement of the empire (and its inherent limitations) in Chapter 1 and
parsed and contextualized the meaning (and significance) of freedom in Chapter 2, we are
left to wonder at precisely what the Ephesians meant by Rome’s hēgemonia when they
undertook to combat Mithridates for the common freedom and the Romans’ hegemony.¹
A focus on the text of the Ephesians’ civic decree leads us away from imperial
administration and institutions – as observed in Chapter 1 the state structures found in the
decree are wholly local and affirm the legitimacy and sovereignty of the Ephesians to
deliberate, legislate and execute their own will.² Instead, the expressions of power found
in the decree are those of an empire of interaction – an empire of reciprocity and
negotiation.

While the Ephesians make no mention in their decree of Roman administrators or
laws, they are at pains to make clear their εὔνοια (goodwill) toward Rome. In line 9
goodwill is said to have been “preserved from the beginning”, which, if we accept the
standard reconstruction of the text, repeats the earlier assertion in lines 1-2 “to have
preserved the ancestral εὔνοια toward the Romans”.³ In fact, if the participle at the
beginning of the surviving text is read circumstantially as part of the standard motivation

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¹ I.Eph. 8, line 12: ὑπέρ τῆς Ῥωμαίων ἡγεμονίας καὶ τῆς κοινῆς ἔλευθερίας.
² See above, p. 29.
³ I.Eph. 8, lines 9-10: [ὁ] δὲ δῆμος ἡμῶν ἀπὸ τῆς ἄρχης συνφιλάσσων τὴν πρὸς Ῥωμαίους
eὔνοιαν.
clause, Ephesus would seem to be claiming that Mithridates attacked them *because* of their goodwill toward Rome.⁴ All of this suggests that goodwill is a kind of loyalty to Rome, an implication which is made explicit in lines 2-3, where it is directly coordinated with the Ephesians’ assertion to have “complied with what was asked of us (by the Romans)”.⁵ Not only can we see in this the close affinity between ἐνυποτα and Ἰγιμονία, but implicit here is the assumption that because they have upheld their goodwill toward the Romans, the Ephesians expect to be supported by them (and attain the ἔλευθερία they anticipate and have thereby prescribed themselves). This retrospective affirmation of goodwill and prospective expectation of freedom speaks to a system of interaction, within which either party could negotiate its position with the other through various forms of mutually acceptable language and action.

As this document hints, besides being a legal-administrative structure, the Romans’ empire must also be viewed as a process of exchange. As Ma writes of the Seleucid empire under Antiochus III: “the reality of interaction between ruler and ruled is a process of reciprocity, rather than simply a vertical relationship of control and exploitation”.⁶ Romans themselves seem to have understood this fact. In discoursing on expediency (*utile*), and emphasizing the importance of eager and voluntary co-operation (*studium*) from others, Cicero explains that the Romans’ empire was held together by its *beneficia* (good services) toward others, such that it might be better described as a

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⁴ *I.Eph.* 8, lines 1-2: [ἐπειδὴ τοῦ δὲ δῆμου φυλάσσον]τος τὴν πρὸς Ἑρωμαίους τούς κο[ινούς σωτήρας παλαιὰν εὐνοίαν. When viewed in this way, the Ephesians have also created a logical proof for their εὐνοία in the very fact of Mithridates’ assault on them. On the motivation clause, and the standard organization of Greek civic decrees, see above Introduction, p. 26.

⁵ *I.Eph.* 8, lines 2-3: ἐν πᾶσιν τοῖς ἐπιτασσομέ[νοις προθύμως πειθαρχ]οῦντος. On the reconstruction of this passage, see above Introduction, n. 23.

patrocinium (a protective patronage) than an imperium;" Cicero’s contemporary, the Sicilian-Hellene Diodorus, furthermore, lamented that in his own time terrorism and destruction were common where previously rule (ἡγεμονία) had been gained by treating even conquered people as benefactors (εὐεργήται) and friends (φίλοι), which won over the voluntary allegiance of kings, cities and nations. Modern authors, too, have acknowledged this fact. In his important study of Roman imperialism in the Hellenistic East, Ferrary comments that the exchange of benefits and corresponding obedience was the principle on which Roman hegemony was founded and in which form it was accepted by the Greeks.

The image of Rome’s empire adduced to this point has undoubtedly demonstrated an asymmetry in the power arrangement between Rome and the Greek poleis, but

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7 Cic, de Off. 2.26-27: Verum tamen, quam diu imperium populi Romani beneficiis tenebatur, non iniuris, bella aut pro sociis aut de imperio gerebantur ... nostri autem magistratus imperatorisque ex hac una re maximum laudem capere studebant, si provincias, si socios aequitate et fide defendissent; itaque illud patrocinium orbis terrae verius quam imperium poterat nominari ('In truth, as long as the imperium of the Roman people was maintained by benefits and not injustices, and war was waged for our allies and our imperium ... our magistrates and generals strove to achieve the greatest praise in defending the provinces and allies equally and faithfully; this could more truly be called a protectorate of the world rather than imperium'). In light of what is to follow, Cicero’s comments (2.21-22) on the motives of cooperation are of some interest: the first and most noble motives are kindness (gratia, benevolentia) and good services (beneficia) (see below §2.2), the status (dignitas) of the ruler and the hope of the ruled for a useful return (see below§2.3), and more basely by fear (metus), promises of largess (largitio) and bribery (mercecede conductus).

8 Diod. 32.4.4-5: ἐν δὲ τοῖς νεωτέροις χρόνοις Ἡρωιοῦ τῆς τῶν δῆλων ἡγεμονίας δραχθέντες συνεστήσαντο μὲν αὐτὴν διὰ τῆς τῶν ὀπλῶν ἀνδρείας, πρὸς αὐξήσειν δὲ μεγάλην ἤγαγον ἐπιεικέστατα χρώμενοι τοῖς καταπολεμηθέσιν. τοσοῦτον γὰρ ἀπέσχον τῆς κατὰ τῶν ὑποπεπτυκτῶν ὑμότητος καὶ τιμωρίας ὡστε δοκεῖν μὴ ὡς πολεμίοις ἀλλ᾽ ὡς εὐεργέταις καὶ φίλοις προσφέρεσθαι. οἱ μὲν γὰρ κρατηθέντες προσεδόκοι τῆς ἐσχάτης τεῦξεσθαι τιμωρίας ὡς πολέμιοι γεγονότες, οἱ δὲ κρατοῦντες υπερβολὴν ἐπιεικείας ἐτέρως οὐ κατελείποντο ... τοιαυτῷ διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τῆς ἡμερότητος οὐ τε βασιλεῖς καὶ αἱ πόλεις καὶ συλλήβδον τὰ ἔθνη πρὸς τὴν Ῥωμαίων ἡγεμονίαν νῦν τομέλησαν ('In more recent times, the Romans, when they sought after their extensive hegemony, brought about by the valour of their arms, extended it greatly by the kindest treatment of the defeated. So far indeed did they abstain from cruelty and revenge of those who fell to them that they treated them not as enemies but as benefactors and friends; for while the defeated expected to meet with reprisals as former enemies, the victors could not be surpassed by anyone in the extent of their equity ... And so because of their unsurpassed civility, kings, cities and whole nations willingly came into the Romans’ hegemony.').

9 Ferrary, Philhellénisme, 131.
documents like the Ephesian decree demonstrate that the Romans were more than a central authority that issued top-down directives and the Greeks were significantly more than passive recipients. The documents themselves reveal a system of interaction between ruler and ruled that encourages us to look beyond each text in isolation.

3.1 – COMMUNICATION, INTERACTION AND RECIPROCITY

3.1.1: Reciprocity - The Mode of Interaction

Greek and Roman state documents were a primary medium for Greco-Roman diplomacy and as such preserve not only the language but also the mode of interaction between imperial power and subject. While a *senatus consultum*, for example, was strictly speaking the Senate’s advice to whatever magistrate had summoned the body for a consultation (*senatum consulere / τῇ συνεκλήτῳ συμβουλεύειν*), outside the domestic sphere, senate decrees were usually made in response to petitions from foreign envoys.¹⁰ Indeed, what remains striking about these decrees (and can be forgotten in the monotony of the formulary) is that they are arranged in a way that vividly preserves the performance of interstate diplomacy. Typical of this is the *SC de Narthaciensium et Melitaensium litibus*, in which the Senate passed a judgement on a long-standing territorial dispute between the two cities of Narthacium and Melitaea in Thessaly around

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¹⁰ E.g. *RDGE* 1, 2, 9, 10, 11, 18, 19, 22. Often the phraseology of the documents reflect the advisory nature of these opinions with the Senate softening its tone to the magistrates with *placere* (‘it is pleasing’) and phrases like *si ei videbitur* (‘if it should seem good to him’) or *ita uti ei e republica fideve sua videatur* (‘in such a way that it should seem to him in keeping with the good of the republic and his own good faith’). Of course, as noted in the previous chapter, magistrates often legitimated their own actions with reference to the Senate (or *populus Romanus*), thus creating a closed loop of power such that it is impossible to distinguish whether authority at Rome stems from the magistrates (to whom the Senate is merely an advisory *consilium*, e.g. Mommsen *Si.R*) or the Senate (which directs magistrates on how to act; e.g. F. de Martino, *Constitutione*, I.140); as Lintott (*Constitution*, 66-68) observes, even the Romans themselves did not have a clear answer.
following the formulary of the preamble (lines 8-14), the decree recounts the speeches of the Melitaean envoys, who renewed their goodwill, friendship and alliance with Rome, summarized their dispute with the Narthacians and submitted their petition and proposal to the Senate (ll. 15-35); it then records the speech of the Narthacian envoys, who likewise renewed relations with Rome, summarized their claim and cited earlier arbitral victories (ll. 35-59); and finally the decree conveys the Senate’s actual decision concerning the dispute—in favour of the Narthacians—including its own statement of friendship and goodwill to both parties, its rationale, and the assignment of viaticum to the envoys (ll. 60-72).

A document such as this one reminds us that decrees of the Roman senate were not produced in isolation. The very format of the senatus consultum preserves the system of petition-response that ordered the relations between Rome and the East: in the example above, although the praetor C. Hostilius had consulted the Senate, the senators addressed themselves to, and directed their response to, the envoys from the two Thessalian poleis. Decisions like this of the Senate (or a Roman magistrate) were routinely made in response to the appeals of embassies that descended on Rome annually, only a fraction

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11 RDGE 9; cf. Ager, Arbitrations nos. 32, 79, 154, 156 for a history of the disputes between these two poleis; Canali de Rossi, Ambascerie, nos. 165-166.

of which are mentioned in the surviving records and yet still number over seven hundred in the course of the second and first centuries.\textsuperscript{13}

4.1.3: Syntax

Further still, more than just products of a mode of interaction (petition-response), the actions expressed in state documents exist in a reciprocal world of past and future action.\textsuperscript{14} Commonly a Greek petition was substantiated in the claim to have previously done something for Rome; the Romans, consequently, made their decision in light of this past action; their decision was then publicly memorialized by the appellant city; that public decree thereafter stood as proof of the city’s past benefaction and the basis of future requests, but also as evidence of the Romans’ own good services should they themselves ever need help. These exchanges, furthermore, were more than mere reactions to benefactions or goodwill, they were part of a system of exchange regulated

\textsuperscript{13} Canali de Rossi, \textit{Le Ambascerie dal mondo Greco a Roma in età repubblicana} (Rome 1997). Sometimes, perhaps often, embassies first appealed to the praetor or consul (presumably while in Rome, though possibly in \textit{provincia}), who gave them access to the Senate (\textit{dare senatum}); e.g. RDGE 4, lines 5-10: προσέβιται Ἀμβρακίων καὶ Ἀθαμάνων ἔμοι προσήλθοσαν ἐν' αὐτοῖς σύγκλητον δῶ ἑγὼ αὐτοὶς σύγκλητον ἔδωκα (‘the ambassadors of Ambracia and Athamana approached me so that I might give them a meeting with the senate; I have given them a meeting with the senate’); cf. RDGE 7, line 36-38; no. 8, line 5; and no. 14, line 92. On the actions of the Greek envoys once in Rome, see J.-L. Ferrary, “Les ambassadeurs au Sénat romaine” in J.-P. Caillot and M. Sot (eds.), \textit{L’Audience: Rituels et cadres spatiaux dans l’Antiquité et le haut Moyen Age} (Paris 2007), 113-122.

by a host of normative conventions and rules that directed the actions of the Romans and
the Greek poleis toward one another.

A pair of Mithridatic-era documents from Aphrodisias illustrate this process
clearly. The first is a civic decree of the Aphrodisians, which records a plea from the
Roman proconsul Q. Oppius, then besieged at Laodicea by the forces of Mithridates, and
the city’s decision to help him.\(^{15}\) The text explains that the Aphrodisians sent envoys,
along with the soldiers, to inform Oppius of their continuing αἰρεσίς (which implies a
consistent course of past action and sentiment) toward the Romans, whom they refer to as
their savours and benefactors (which alludes to the hegemon’s past benefactions, and
which serve as the reason for the city’s αἰρεσίς and present efforts), and their promise to
provide for anything else Oppius may request (i.e. a pledge of future support).\(^{16}\) The
second document is a response from Oppius thanking the Aphrodisians for their goodwill
and for acting in a manner consonant with a good ally and friend (i.e. performing past
actions that justify their current requests), about which he undertakes to advise the Senate
and the Roman people upon his return to Rome (i.e. publicly relaying the city’s efforts so
that they might be taken into consideration in future dealings), and pledging in the future

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\(^{15}\) Reynolds, *Aphrod. 2*, pp. 11-16. For the historical circumstances, see: Livy *Per.* 78; App. *Mith.* 17, 20, 112; Magie, *RRAM I*. 212-214, II. 1164-5; Sherwin-White, *RFPE*, 112-119; Kallet-Marx, *Hegemony*, 250-260. Despite the claims of the Aphrodisians, Oppius was given up by the Laodiceans to Mithridates,
and, though unharmed, was not returned until after Sulla’s victories in 85.

\(^{16}\) *Aphrod. 2*, lines 3-5 (repeated at lines 7-8): ἀναγκαίον δὲ ἐστὶν ἐξαποστείλαι καὶ πρεσβευτὰς
toὺς ἐνφανιοῦντας τῷ ἀνδυπάτῳ περὶ τῇ αἰρέσεως ἣς ἔχει ὁ δῆμος ἡμῶν πρὸς Ῥωμαίους ὄντας
σωματικὰς καὶ εὐεργετὰς καὶ ἐὰν τι ὁ στρατηγὸς ἐπιτάσσῃ καὶ ἔτεροι τῇ πόλει, διεξαφανές ὥστε
dιασαφηθῆναι καὶ γένεσθαι; cf. lines 11-13, which emphasises the conviction of the people: ἐνφανιοῦσιν
dὲ αὐτῷ δὲ πᾶς ὁ δῆμος ἡμῶν σὺν γύναιξί καὶ τέκνοις καὶ τῷ πάντι βίῳ ... παραβάλλεσθαι ὑπὲρ Κοιντοῦ
καὶ τῶν Ῥωμαίων πραγμάτων ('the envoys are to make clear to him that our entire dēmos, together with
the wives and children and household is ready to fight on behalf of Quintus and Roman affairs.'). The
preamble of the decree (fragment A) is recorded in larger letters centred on the stone, emphasising that the
decision was made autarchically by the boulē and dēmos, a point which underscores the Aphrodisians’
claim to have freely chosen to support Oppius.
to do what he can to benefit the polis as their patron (the ultimate reward for their principle of goodwill and friendship and the assurance of future benefactions).  

17 In this pair of documents we can observe the mutually implicating cycle of reciprocity between ruler and ruled, with no real beginning and where each action acknowledges or assumes a past action, and looks forward to a future action.

While not all documents have companion pieces like the Aphrodisian example, most are syntactically structured in a way that presuppose past and future benefaction in a cycle of reciprocity. By their very nature, for example, honorific decrees of Greek cities are texts that have been passed because of a past good done for the community. Consider a decree of the Samians inscribed on a massive marble base that once held a statue of the Roman people, probably from the first half of the second century: “The people of Samos (dedicate this statue) of the Roman people to Hera, on account of their excellence and services toward the people”.  

18 Here we learn that the Samians set up the massive statue to the Romans because of some benefaction they did for the city, which, as is typical, is

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17 Aphrod. 3, lines 1-57: Κόιντος ὁ Ὀπτιος Κοίντου | υίός ἀνθύπατος Ῥωμαίων | ὀικητής Πλαρασέων καὶ | Ἀφροδεισίων ἀρχουσιν, || βουλή, δήμῳ χαίρειν [[- -]EΔθ[- -]], Ἀντιπατρος | Ἀδριαίστου, Περείτας Απολλω[νίο], Ἀρτεμιδωρος Μόνωνος,|| Διονύσιος Μήνιδος, Μειμοκλῆς Ζήνωνος, πρεσβευταὶ | ὑμετέροι, ἄνδρες καλοὶ καὶ ἁγαθοὶ, συνετύχον μοι ἕν | Κω καὶ συνεχάρησαν, τό τε ἀπέδωκαν ἐν ὡς διεσαφεῖτο χαίρειν υμᾶς μεγάλως ἐπὶ τῇ ἐμῆ παρουσίᾳ, ὁπερ ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ τῆς υμετέρας | θελήσως εἰς με τῇ δημοσιᾳ πράγματα ὑμετέρα αὐσταλλὼς πιστεύω καθ’ ὅν γὰρ καὶρὸν ἐκ Λαοδίκης πρὸς υμᾶς ἔπεμψα γράμματα ὅπως[i] στρατιώτας πρὸς μὲ ἀποστέλλων, ἐν πρώτοις ἀποστέλλων, τοῦτο δὲ ἐποίησαν καὶ ὑμῶν ἀγαθῶς καὶ φίλῶς Ῥωμαίων ποιήσαι, || τῶν τε ἀποσταλέντων | πρεσβευτῶν ἐργασία | καλὴ καὶ πλείστῃ ἐχρησάμην δι’ ἀς αἰτίας | [? πᾶσιν πολύμοιροι | φροντίδα καὶ ἐν ὀρῷ] [καὶ ἐως ὃ] περ ἐν σωκομονής] τῆς ἐμῆς πιστεύως υμείς | υμείς δύναμαι τοῖς τῇ δημοσίοις πράγμασιν ὑμείς ἑυχρηστήσατε, καὶ ἀκόμη τὸν ἀγαθὸν | παρατίθεται | ὑπὸ τῇ συνκλητῇ | τῷ τῇ δήμῳ τὰ ἅρπ. υμῶν | ἐπηρεμένη ἑστὶν | ὅταν εἰς Ῥώμην παραλάβοιναι διασφάλισθα | οὐκ, τοῦτον ἐποίησαν ὑμείς ἑξῆς τῇ | ἐμῆς πατριωτικῆς καὶ | υμείς | χρησάντος τούτοις ἐγὼ | ἀνεδεξάμενη, καταλογίζῃς ἕνεκεν τῆς υμετέρας πόλεως, ἐμὲ τῷ δήμῳ τοῦ υμετέρου πάλιρων ἐσέβεσθι.

18 SEG XL 736 (= IG XII 6, 350): ὁ δήμος ὁ Σαμίων | τόν Δήμου τοῦ Ῥωμαίων | ἄρετῆς ἑνεκεν | καὶ εὐεργεσίας τῆς εἰς ἑαυτὸν | “Ἡρη. For more on this decree and the worship of Rome, see below §3.2 in this chapter.
seen as a moral virtue (ἀρετή). It has been suggested that the dedication might stem from the decision of Manlius Vulso and his legati in 189 to side with the city in its long-standing territorial dispute with Priene, but it is an important point that the context remains unwritten and thus universalized – that is, though it might have been prompted by a discrete Roman benefaction, it is memorialized as part of a system of exchange, without beginning or end.¹⁹ For this same reason, we typically find both Greeks and Romans asserting benefactions or sentiments of goodwill in terms of perpetuity, employing the future tense, words like always, continually, and traditional, and phrases like from the beginning.²⁰

4.1.4: Language

Two of the earliest Roman communications with eastern poleis are unique for the openness in which this reciprocal arrangement is expressed and can be used to illustrate the language of reciprocity. The earliest is a letter of M. Valerius Messala (pr.193), who, writing on behalf of the tribunes and Senate, advised the people of Teos that “we shall try to increase the honours (τίμια) for Dionysus and privileges (φιλάνθρωπα) for you, while you too preserve goodwill (εὔνοια) toward us in the future”.²¹ Likewise, in a letter of L. Cornelius Scipio (cos. 190) to the Heracleans we find the following:²²

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²⁰ See n. 249.
²¹ RDGE 34, lines 21-24: τα τε εἰς τὸν θεὸν τίμια καὶ τα εἰς υμᾶς φιλάνθρωπα πειρασόμεθα συνεπαύξειν, διατηροῦντων υμῶν καὶ εἰς τὸ μετὰ ταύτα τὴν πρὸς ἡμᾶς εὐνοίαν.
²² RDGE 35, lines 7-10, 14-15: ἡμ[ε]ῖς δὲ πρὸς πάντας τοὺς Ἑλλήνας εὐνόως διακείμενοι τυχχάνωμεν καὶ πειρασόμεθα, παραγενομένων ὑμὼν εἰστὶν ἡμετέρα[μίστιμ], πρόνοιαμ ποιεῖται τὴν ἐνδεχομένην, ἀεὶ τινὸς ἁγαθὸν παρα[ίτου γενόμενοι ... ἀποδεχόμεθα δὲ καὶ τὰ παρ’ ἡμῶν φιλάνθρωπα καὶ τὰς [πίστεις, κ]αὶ αὐτοῖ δὲ πειρασόμεθα μηδὲνος λείπεσθαι ἐγ χάριτος ἀποδόσει.
As it happens we are well disposed (ευνόμως) to all the Greeks, and we will try, while you are in our good faith (πίστις), to take necessary forethought (πρόνοια) for you and always to be the authors of some good (ἀγαθόν) for you; ... and we accept the benefits (φιλάνθρωπα) from you and the good faith (πίστις), and we ourselves will try to leave out no favour (χάρις) in return.

While there may be some ambiguity as to whether the sentiments in this last example are personal or made on behalf of the Roman state, the system in which they are expressed is clear. In these texts the mutual rewards and expectations are laid bare: in so long as Greek poleis act in a manner that demonstrates goodwill and loyalty, Rome will provide benefactions and look upon them with favour; in so long as the Romans continue to show favour the Greeks will continue to reciprocate with benefactions and good faith. The language of the cycle of reciprocity that develops in the course of the next two centuries becomes standardized around these conditions, but henceforth encoded in the language of diplomacy such that the sort of quid pro quo arrangements explained by Messala and Scipio remain implicit. Thus we find similar references to ευνοια, πίστις and φιλάνθρωπα in the Aphrodisian examined above, as well as, significantly, the varied relations of friend, benefactor, and patron, which come to embody these virtues as a sort of conventional shorthand, but no similarly explicit demands of reciprocity.

Based on these examples, and the system that developed subsequently, Greco-Roman relations might be characterized as follows. First, both parties looked to exist in a state of friendship (φιλία / amicitia) with one another. Regularly a Greek embassy

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23 The ambiguity arises from the fact that RDGE 35 is generally reconstructed as a letter of L. Cornelius Scipio (cos. 190) and his brother, P. Scipio ([Λευκίας Κορνήλιος Σκιπίων] στρατηγὸς ὑπάτος Ῥωμαίον [καὶ Πόπλιος Σκιπίων ἄδελφος] (see Sherk, RDGE p. 218; cf. RDGE 36). Letters of Roman magistrates were typically written in the first person plural – reflecting the sense that the author was speaking on behalf of the Roman people – though there are cases (largely from the Late Republic) where the first person singular might be used, which makes it possible that the plural used here represents the personal sentiments of Lucius and Publius.
before the Senate began by renewing its city’s friendship with the Romans, who would in turn acknowledge the envoys and their city as friends, and the dialogue itself was routinely grounded in the demonstration of, or praise for, continued friendship with the Romans.24 “Friendship” was a condition recognized in response to and with the expectation of future goodwill (εὐνοία / salus) and good faith (πίστις / fides), virtues regularly asserted or renewed by Greeks before addressing the Roman senate and frequently praised by the latter.25 Demonstration of these meritorious qualities – or the consistent application of them in the past (προαίρεσις)26 – was rewarded with benefactions (φιλάνθρωπα, εὐεργεσία / beneficia) and favour (χάρις / gratia), such as freedom, immunity, protection, financial support, etc, which were products of Rome’s own εὐνοία and evidence of its ἄρετή (moral excellence).27 By turns, the populus Romanus was praised by Greeks as benefactor (εὐεργετης) and saviour (σωτήρ) of both an individual polis or the Greeks in common (κοινοὶ εὐεργεταί τε καὶ σωτῆρες).28 Later in the Republic, the emphasis shifted somewhat as individual Romans played an increasingly larger role in the functioning of the empire, represented by an individual’s

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24 See below §2.1 in this chapter.

25 Eg., RDGE 18, lines 44-46: ἔπει δὲ δῆμος [συνετήρησαν ἀεὶ τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν αὐτῶι] εὐνοιαν καὶ πι[στιν] καὶ συμμαχίαν πρὸς τὸν δῆμον τὸν Ῥωμαίων, τὰ [διὰ] πράγματα κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν ἀ[ὑτῶν διοικήσα]$^\text{a}$ (‘Since the people of Stratonicaea have always preserved their present goodwill, loyalty and alliance toward the Roman people, conducting their own affairs in keeping with this principle ... ’); renewal of goodwill: RDGE 9, 10, (12), 15, 16, 18, (20), (21), 26. On the relation of φιλία and εὐνοία, see L. Mitchell, “Φιλία and Interstate Relations”, 32-37.

26 For examples and discussion of προαίρεσις, see below p. 259.

27 Typical is IGUR 5 (= ILLRP 174); Λυκίων τὸ κοινὸν κομισάμενον τὴν πάτριον δημοκρατίαν τὴν Ῥώμην διὰ Καπετωλίας καὶ τῶν δήμων τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἅρετής ἔνεκεν καὶ εὐνοίας καὶ εὐεργεσίας τῆς εἰς τὸ κοινὸν τῷ Λυκίων$^\text{b}$; cf. Kallet-Marx, Hegemony, 288.

28 See below §2.2.
undertaking to act as patron (*patronus* / πάτρων) for a city that had demonstrated its goodwill and excellence.

This language was well-defined, stable, and institutionalized with a history grounded in Hellenistic interstate relations and a spatial extent that covered the eastern Mediterranean. The clearest demonstration of this is the sixteen or so well-known Capitoline dedications. These are dedications made to Rome by eastern powers (cities, leagues and kings) throughout the course of the second and early first century. As Kallet-Marx explains:

The recurring themes of the monument are Rome’s high moral character (*virtus* or ἀρετή), its goodwill (*benevolentia* or ἐὐνοία), the expression of these qualities through the conferral of benefits upon others (*beneficium* or εὐρέγεια), and indeed Rome’s activity for their salvation (*salus*, hence σωτηρία) and recovery of their freedom (*libertas*, ἔλευθερία, or δημοκρατία).

What for Kallet-Marx are “themes” are for us conditions in the discursive field of reciprocity. This language is a part of – constructively – the system of empire and therefore must be treated as more than courtly niceties and formalities.

3.2 – INSTRUMENTAL FUNCTION

The language employed in these documents reflects and constitutes real relations that directed the interaction between the Romans and the Greek cities of the East. It

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remains now to consider more carefully how exactly these relations operated and to place their instrumental functions in the larger context of the developing empire.

3.2.1: Roman Power as Friend

In Greco-Roman interstate relations, friendship was a central form of diplomatic association – between states, but also between states and groups or individuals within states – and, like freedom looked at in the previous chapter, with its own normative conventions that shaped and reinforced social roles. That friendship was more than just diplomatic courtesy or even protocol is illustrated by the state documents themselves, particularly when the formulary is broken: an early first century letter of Q. Mucius Scaevola to the Ephesians, for example, refers to them as “having been judged in (Roman) friendship”, a phrase repeated in a response decree of the people and tribes of Asia, which reveals for us the deliberated condition hidden in the diplomatic protocol. 31

Significantly, these roles have their roots deeper in the Hellenic tradition than the Roman tradition, such that as a “friend” and in speaking of “friendship” the Romans entered a traditionally Hellenic interstate institution. 32 As Gruen has shown, φιλία had played an

31 RDGE 47, lines 28-29: [ἐν τῇ] φιλίᾳ κριθέ[ντων] δήμων τε καὶ ἐ[θνῶν]; also restored in line 5; IGRP IV 188 (= OGIS 438), lines 1-3 and IV 291, line 1: οἱ ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ δήμῳ καὶ τῇ ἐθνη [καὶ οἱ κατ’ ἄνδρα κεκριμένοι ἐν τῇ πρὸς Ῥωμαίους φιλίᾳ; cf. RDGE 2, lines 5-8, in which a group of envoys from Thisbae are referred to as “those who had remained in the friendship” of the Roman people (οἵτινες ἐν τῇ φιλίᾳ τῆς ἡμετέρας ἐνέμειναν); a similar expression is used of a certain Hermadorus of Oropus in 73 (RDGE 23, lines 50-51): Ἐρμοδώρου Ὀλυμπίχου υἱοῦ ἱερέως Ἄμφιρασα τοῦ διὰ τέλους ἐν τῇ φιλίᾳ τοῦ δήμου τοῦ Ῥωμαίων μεμενικότος (‘Hermadorus the son of Olympichus, priest of Amphiaras, has remained forever in the friendship of the Roman people’). On these two documents, see also below, p. 210. Note similar attitudes found in 1 Macc. 8.12 on the Romans: “with friends and those who rely on them they have kept friendship”.

important role in Hellenistic interstate relations before Rome entered the East and much of Rome’s own policy of amicitia, which appears to have emerged in the international sphere during the early third century, seems to be a product of Hellenic influence.33 In the Hellenistic period, references to friendship are found frequently in various sorts of interstate institutions, including agreements of ἰσοπολιτεία34 and ἄσυλια35, as well as ὀμβολα,36 and peace treaties37, or simply standing alone in international intercourse.38 Even in the Late Hellenistic period, during the Roman era, friendship continued as a form of interstate relations between Greek city-states without any mention of the Romans.39 Broadly, then, as “friends” the Romans were being plugged into an existing social relationship that existed in the Greek East before and beyond their presence in the region.

Roman influence on the development of Greco-Roman friendship, see the discussion of amicitia et societas below, p. 252ff.

33 Gruen, HWCR I.95: “Carthaginians and Greeks brought ϕιλία to Rome’s attention as an element of international accords. Until the late third century it appears but sporadically and insignificantly in her diplomatic relations, and always on the initiative of other powers.” As Gruen points out, most early references to amicitia seem to come in relation to, and at the urging of, an eastern state: e.g., Alexander of Molossia: Justin 12.2.12; Livy 8.17.9-10. Pyrrhus: Plut. Pyrrh. 18.2-4; 20.4; Ptolemy: App. Sic. 1; Eutrop. 2.15; cf. Livy Per 14; Zon. 8.6.11. Seleucus II: Suet. Claud. 25.3. Messana: Polyb 3.26.6. Syracuse: Polyb. 1.16.5-8. Illyrian cities in 220s: Polyb. 2.11.5-17. Carthaginian treaties: Polyb. 1.62.8; 3.22.4, 24.3-8, 27.4; cf. 7.9.4-12. Massilia: SIGI 591.

34 E.g. Milet I.3.137, lines 11-13; no. 141, line 8; no. 142, lines 3-4 & 11-13; no. 143, lines 46-47; OGIS 229, lines 34-35; SIGI 433, lines 3-4; SIGI 472, lines 19-21.

35 SIGI 522, lines 1-2; no. 563, lines 3-8; no. 554, lines 6-11; IG IX 12 189, lines 1-2; IG XII 2.15, lines 15-17 & 25-26. On the institution of asylia, see K. Rigsby, Asylia: Territorial Inviolability in the Hellenistic World (Berkeley, 1996).

36 SIGI 273, lines 3-5; IC I.8.6, lines 11-15.

37 SIGI 421a, lines 3-5; Diod. 19.75.1; 97.4; Ap. Syr. 55; Polyb. 4.52.6; 15.25.13.

38 E.g. I.Priene 61, lines 4-6 & 32-33; I.Erythrai I.122, lines 16-17. Commonly these were expressed as general renewals of friendship: ISE I 52 (317 BCE), lines 5-8, 11-13, 32-34 (publication of stele too); IG XII 9.1186 (232-220 BCE), line 13; ISE II120 (late third/early second century), lines 8-12; IG IX 12 2.582, line 12 (207 BCE); I. Magnesia 32 (late third/early second century), lines 21-22; I.Magnesia 61 (193), lines 34-35; I.Magnesia 31 (189), line 12; Milet I 3.142 (=I.Eph. 3110), lines 3-4.

39 IG VII 4139 (178-146), lines 1-3; Habicht, AM 72 (1957), 62 lines 19-20 (166); I.Lasos 152, lines 3-4, 33 (151); SIGI 683, lines 7-8, 16-18 (140); IG II 12 1135 (111/110), lines 8-9.
The significance of this observation should not be underestimated. The Romans’ status as φίλοι gained them entry into a traditional Hellenistic institution and allowed them to express power through a format traditional to Greeks, much as their use of freedom had positioned them within a traditional Greek discursive framework. In fact, the close association between friendship and freedom in Greek tradition – a point discussed in more detail below (§3.1) – is worth pointing out here. Since the Classical period, if not earlier, relations of φιλία operated on the notion of equality between φιλοί – which is clearest in the democratic ideology of frank speech (παρρησία) and equality at law (ισονομία) but was true also of oligarchies and monarchies – and the expectation of mutual good feelings and support. This same sense of equality is still clearly evident during the Hellenistic era in documents of ἴσοπολιτεία and treaty arrangements, mentioned above; friendship was understood to be a voluntary relation between equals founded on the expectation of mutual well-being and well-doing beyond merely one’s own self-interest, but for the pleasure, advantage, and good of another, in what Aristotle called a “reciprocal affection” (ἁντιφίλησις). For their own part, when the Romans


41 Arist. Eth. Eud. 7.1236a14-15: φίλος δὲ γίνεται ὅταν φιλούμενος ἀντιφιλή, καὶ τοῦτο μὴ λανθάνῃ πως αὐτὸς ('a man becomes a friend whenever he is befriended and befriends in return and this is known to both’); Eth.Nic. 8.1155b28; 1156a8; cf. Eth. Nic. 1155b30-35: τοὺς δὲ βουλομένους οὕτω τάγαθα εὐνοῦσι λέγοντι, ἐν μὴ ταῦτα καὶ παρ’ ἐκείνου γίνηται: εὐνοιαν γὰρ ἐν ἀντιπεπονθότι φιλίαν εἶναι ('persons who wish another good for his own sake, if the feeling is not reciprocated, are merely said to feel goodwill for him: only when it is mutual is such goodwill termed friendship’); the similarity in Cicero’s definition of friendship in Inv. rhet. 2.166: amicitia voluntas erga aliquem rerum bonarum illius ipsius causa, quem diligent, cum eius pari voluntate ('Friendship is a desire to do service to any one for the
sought Greek support against Perseus they reminded them of their own goodwill toward the Greeks, and appealed to them along the lines of friendship,\footnote{SIG 613b (with Bousquet, \textit{BCH} 105 [1981], 407-416); \textit{RDGE} 22, lines 7-8.} the Aphrodisias-Oppius exchange, discussed above, in which the Aphrodisians were acknowledged by the Roman proconsul as good and proper friends for their support against Mithridates, illustrates that this sense continued on into the first century.\footnote{\textit{Aphrod.} 3 (text above, n. 17).} Following these prescriptions, Roman hegemonic power became de-problematized as a series of actions taken in the interests of their Greek friends motivated by goodwill; and by the same token, a polis’ subordination to Rome – i.e. its loyalty – could be framed as the moral obligation (i.e. duty) of a friend.

In order to disentangle these two ideas, let us again consider the \textit{SC de Narthaciensium et Militaeensium litibus} and focus on the assumed truths and implicit assumptions contained in the text. To recall, this decree records the Senate’s arbitration of a long-standing territorial dispute between Narthacium and Melitaea. Despite its decision in favour of the Narthacians, the Senate describes both cities’ envoys as “good and fine friends” and both cities as “a good and fine people, who are our friends and allies” – common language throughout the period.\footnote{\textit{RDGE} 9, lines 16-19, 39-41: ἄνδρες καλοὶ κάγαθοι καὶ φίλοι παρὰ δήμου καλοῦ κάγαθοῦ καὶ φίλου οὐμάχου. This formula is also found in \textit{RDGE} 7, lines 41, 43; no. 9, 16-18; no 10b, lines 5 and 8; no. 12, lines 3-4; no. 15, lines 8-9, 55-56; no. 16, lines 3-4; no. 18, lines 69-72; no. 20d, lines 1-5; no. 21, line 3; no. 26b, lines 20-21; \textit{Aphrod.} 8, lines 21-22.} The envoys had already begun their petition to the Senate by renewing the φιλία, εὐνοια, and χάρις toward the Romans (lines 18-19, 41-42), and the Senate itself subsequently declares that the same should be
renewed with the cities (lines 60-62) such that friendship and goodwill literally frame the interaction.\(^{45}\)

So, as the text (interaction) begins, the Romans are acknowledged as friends by the Thessalians, who indeed even renew their friendship before submitting their petition and learning the outcome of the arbitration. The sequence is significant, as it places the initiative of friendship squarely with the Thessalians, whose speech-act of renewing (even if just now creating) friendship not only admits of past friendship with Rome – and their satisfaction that the Romans have to this point acted in a manner befitting a ‘friend’ – but also the expectation that the outcome of the present petition will likewise be friendly. Before having made a decision, the Romans have already been fit into a mould that expresses their past actions toward Thessaly as friendly and expects their future decisions to be the same. This makes the successful argument of the Narthacian envoys all the more intriguing: they claimed that the disputed land should be theirs by virtue of their earlier successes in tribunals held according to Thessalian law, “which had been established by the consul T. Quinctius Flamininus and his ten commissioners (in 196) according to a decree of the Senate.”\(^{46}\) Here the Narthacians – perhaps all Thessalians – describe the imposition of laws upon them by a greater power as the good service of a

\(^{45}\) For the arrangement of this document, see above p. 194.

\(^{46}\) *RDGE* 9, lines 48-54: \(\text{περὶ τῆς χώρας καὶ τῶν ἱερῶν κριτηρίων [νεν]ικη[ε]ναι κατὰ νόμους τοὺς θεσσαλῶν, οἷς [νά]μοις ἐξὸς τα[ν]ὺν χρῶν[τ]αι, οὖς νόμους Τίτος Κογκτικος ὑπάτος ἀπό τῆς τῶν δέκα πρεσβευτῶν γνώμης ἔδωκεν καὶ κατὰ δόγμα συγκλήτου (’[they argued] that they too had won suits over this land and the sanctuaries according to the laws of Thessaly, which had been established by the consul T. Quinctius (Flamininus) and his ten commissioners according to a decree of the Senate’); and the Romans’ decision at lines 63-67: \(\text{ὅσα κεκριμένα ἐστίν κατὰ νόμους, οὗς Τίτος Κογκτικος ὑπάτος ἔδωκεν, ταύτα καθὼς κεκριμένα ἐστίν, οὕτω δοκεῖ κύρια εἶναι δειν, τούτο γὰρ εὐχερές εἶναι ὅσα κατὰ νόμους κεκριμένα ἐστίν ἀκραὶ ποιεῖν (’whatever had been decided according to the laws that the consul, T. Quinctius, had established should remain valid as they are – for it is not an easy thing to invalidate what has been decided according to the laws’).
friend. By the same token, they expect that the Romans’ decisions in their dispute with Melitaea will be grounded in their goodwill (the same spirit, naturally, in which the suit was heard). It follows, furthermore, that if the Thessalian cities accept the Senate’s decision, then they must also accept that the Romans have acted in the manner of friends motivated by εὐδοκία – thus reproducing the arrangement and reciprocal cycle.

While Narthacium used its victories under Flamininus’ laws ultimately to win its case, both it and Melitaea had first used an argument that they thought was a stronger claim: that their people had possessed the disputed land “when they entered into the friendship of the Roman people”.\footnote{Lines 21-22 (μεθ’ ἡς χώρας εἰς τὴν φιλίαν τοῦ [δῆμου τ]οῦ Ῥωμαίων παρεγένοντο), and 46-48 (μετὰ τα[ῦτας] ἡς χώρας εἰς τὴν [φιλίαν] τοῦ δῆμου [τοῦ Ῥωμαίων Ναρθακείς παραγεγονέναι]).} In this we see friendship as something of an imperial status. The Thessalian poleis were not alone in using this argument; there are more than a dozen other examples in the epigraphic corpus ranging from the first third of the second to the late-first centuries in which the mutually-agreed ownership of property is defined by its possession upon entering Roman friendship.\footnote{RDGE no. 2, lines 22-23; no. 3, lines 1-4; no. 7, line 54; no. 14, lines 54-55(?); no. 21, col. II, line 3; no. 24b, lines 5-6; no. 28b, lines 13-14; no. 70, lines 16-17; Aphrod. 8, lines 24-25, 60-61; lex agr., line 79; SIG² 683, lines 53-55, 63-66; cf. below, n. 251.} The significance of these arguments to the re-orientation of the polis’ sense of time and its memory is discussed in more detail below (§3.2); what bears emphasis here is the growing equation of friendly relations with loyalty to the hegemonic power. In this sense, even civitates liberae – which were technically outside the imperial state\footnote{See above, Chapter 1 §5.1.} – could be positioned within the Romans’ hēgemonia as friends: the senate decree rewarding important privileges to Asclepiades, Polystratos, and Meniscos for their efforts on Rome’s behalf during the Social War.
included the right to have any future suit heard by a ‘free city that has continually remained in the friendship of the Roman people’. The implication would seem to be that a free city could exist outside the institutional structures of the empire, but that as a friend, that city was within the broader confines of the Romans’ hēgemony (and thus morally obliged to acquiesce to Rome’s decision and hear such a suit).

Under the same rubric fall the instances, beginning as early as 191, in which the cult of Roma (Ῥώμη) was known to have been conducted alongside Πίστις/Fides; in that year, the Chalcidians performed a public paean to the πίστις (good faith; loyalty) of Roma, Zeus and T. Quinctius Flamininus, and associations of Roma and πίστις are found elsewhere at Delos and Teos. More telling still in this regard is a decree of an unnamed Carian city made shortly after the war with Aristonicus, during which, we discover, it had become burdened ‘because of disorder in the urban and rural lands and the goodwill spent on the Romans’.

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50 RDGE 22, lines 19-20 (Grk): ἐπὶ πόλεως ἐλευθέρας τῶν διὰ τέλους ἐν τῇ φιλίᾳ τοῦ δήμου τοῦ Ῥωμαίων μεμεντικοῦ = lines 8-9 (Latin): [in civitate libera aliqua earum, quae perpetuo in amicitia p(opuli) R(omani)].

51 Plut. Flam. 16.7: Πίστιν δὲ Ῥωμαίων σέβομεν τὰν μεγαλευκτότατὰν δρκοὶς φυλάσσειν-μέλπετε κούραι. Ζήμα μέγαν Ῥώμαν τὸ Titon θ’ ἀμα Ῥωμαίων τις Πανών, ὁ Τίτος οὕτως; cf. BMC p. 365 no. 15 (Locris; ca. 204); I.Delphes 1761 (Delos; ca. 98); BCH 19 (1895), 554 (Teos; first century?!); Mellor, ΘΕΑ ΡΩΜΗ, 132-133; below, pp. 273f.

52 P. Briant, P. Brun and E. Varinglioglu, “Une inscription inédite de Carie et la guerre d’Aristonicos” in A. Bresson and R. Cagnat, eds., Les Cités d’Asie Mineure Occidentale au IIe Siècle a.C. (Bordeaux 2001), 241-259 (= SEG LI 1495), lines 12-21: Μανίου τοῦ γάρ Ἀκυλλίου ὑπάτον [στρατηγοῦ] Ῥωμαῖον γράψαντος πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἐπιστάθμους προσδέξασθαι καὶ τοῦ δήμου οὕτως διὰ τῇ περισσαν τῆς χώρας καὶ τῆς πόλεως καὶ διὰ τὸ ἔδεσμανησθαι εἰς τὴν πρὸς Ῥωμαίων εὐσκοι καὶ ταραχῆς καὶ προσδοκίας μεγάλης οὕτως κατὰ τῇ τῆς πόλεως καὶ τῆς χώρας, ὑπερετῶν καὶ τὰ ἵδαι λυστέλλον οὔτα καὶ μενῆται [καὶ διόνυσον τῶν ἄδημος] ἀπόδημον ἐπερεύθησαν δὲ πρὸς τὸν ὑπάτον ἐπηλθὲν πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ ἀγωνισάμενος ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀνέπιστθῆ μενοῦ γενόεσθαι τῇ πάτρῳ, ἔπεισεν [μή] ἀποστείλαι[τοῖς στρατιώτασι] (when Manius Aquillius, the Roman consul, wrote us to accept quarter (for his troops), the people were pressed on account of a disorder of the countryside and the city and because of the goodwill spent on the Romans, such that trouble and expectation was great throughout the city and the countryside, and neglecting his own interest and the great danger in his sojourn, he went on an embassy to...
troops (the mechanism of loyalty during the war) as something morally due to the Romans, and yet simultaneously speaks of it as an unavoidable burden and praises one of their citizens lavishly when he convinces M'. Aquillius to relieve the polis of the obligation. It is important to stress that this inchoate notion of friendship as imperial status did not violate any of the conventional norms of φιλία, but developed in the space created by the notion of mutual support and moral obligation: thus free cities were subject to hear suits directed to them by Rome only so far as they wanted to and felt Rome would reciprocate in some fashion; while the πίστις Ῥωμαίων cherished by the Chalcidians speaks to a reciprocal arrangement after Flamininus saved the city from ruin, and enjoys a not insignificant ambiguity depending on whether one takes the genitive objectively (i.e. good faith directed at the Romans) or subjectively (i.e. the Romans’ good faith).

To continue, within a generation of the Isthmian Proclamation, preserving friendship with the Romans became an important civic objective. In a senate decree of 171, a group of envoys from Thisbae are referred to as “those who had remained in (Roman) friendship”, and their faction was permitted to fortify the acropolis. More fascinating still is an inscription uncovered from the Black Sea region and dating to just a decade after Manlius Vulso’s victories over Antiochus III, which records an oath of alliance between king Pharnaces of Bithynia and the city of Chersonesus by which each swore to come to the defence of the other provided that they had preserved their own

\[ \text{RDGE 2, lines 5-8: } \text{περὶ δὲν θεό[βε]υς λόγους ἔποιησάντο περὶ τῶν καθ’ αὐτ[το]ὺς πραγμάτων, οἵτινες ἐν τῷ φιλίᾳ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ἐνέμειναν (‘whereas the Thisbaeans, who remained in our friendship, spoke about their affairs’). The city, however, was not permitted to be re-walled.} \]
mutual amity *as well as* their friendship with the Romans.\(^{54}\) The Delphic Amphictyony spoke in similar terms in 182, when they proclaimed always to consider worthy and honourable "those kings who by maintaining their friendship toward the Romans, the common benefactors, are always responsible for some good to the Greeks."\(^{55}\) Many other examples of this sort can be adduced for the second century as *poleis* came to understand, as the Oropians pointed out to the Achaean League, that cities in the friendship and good graces of Rome should not be mistreated or underestimated, no matter how small they may be.\(^{56}\) By the first century, little had changed except the intensity with which communities claimed to have preserved their friendship with Rome, particularly after the First Mithridatic War. It is from this period that we find the Thasians making the extraordinary assertion that they "had decided to swear to destroy themselves, their children and their wives, and stand against the forces of Mithridates ..."

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\(^{54}\) *IOSPE* I.402, lines 1-5, 22-28: [συνιαφυλαξὼμεν τὰν αὐτοῦ βασιλείαν κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν, ἐμμενόντιος ἐν ταῖς ποθείς φιλίαι, τάν τε ποτὶ Ῥωμαίοισ φιλίαν διαφυλάξοντος καὶ μηδὲν ἕναντίον αὐτῶς πρᾶσσοντος] ... συνιαφυλαξὼν τὴν δημοκρατίαν κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν, ἐμμενόντων ἐν τῇ πρὸς ἐμὲ φιλίᾳ καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ὄρκον ἀμοσάντων, τήν τε πρὸς Ῥωμαίοισ φιλίαν διαφυλασσόντων καὶ μηδὲν ἕναντίον αὐτῶς πρασσόντων.

\(^{55}\) *SIG* 630, lines 16-18: [οἱ Ἀμφικτιῶνες φαίνονται ἑπακουοῦντες τοῖς ἀξίουμενοις καὶ τιμῶντες τῶν βασιλέων, ὡσι διατηροῦντες τὴν πρὸς Ῥωμαίοις τοὺς κοινοὺς. [ἐυεργέτας φιλίᾳ] ἅ ἐν τίνος ἀγαθῷ παρατίτο γίνονται τοῖς Ἐλλησιν; cf. *Aphrod.* 1, lines 1ff., in which the people of Aphrodisias, Tabae and Cibyra made a treaty requiring each to swear an oath to remain allies with the others and the Romans.

\(^{56}\) *SIG* 675, lines 8-12, 20-22: παρεστήσατο τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς τὴν πᾶσαν πρόνοιαν ποιῆσαι ὅπερ τῇ πόλεως ἡμῶν καὶ τοῦ ἱεροῦ τοῦ Ἀμφιαράου, ἐπει καὶ ἐν τῇ Ῥωμαιίᾳ φιλίᾳ καὶ πίστει διατελοῦμεν ὑπάρχοντες ... παρεστήσατο τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς μὴ περιεδ[ίν] πόλιν Ἑλληνίδα ἐξανακαιδοθείσαν, οὕτων γε ἐν τῇ Ῥωμαιίᾳ φιλίᾳ καὶ πίστει ("he reminded the Achaeans that they should give every forethought to our city and the temple of Amphiarao since we too were in the friendship and good faith of the Romans ... and he advised the Achaeans not to underestimate a Hellenic polis reduced to slavery and in the friendship and good faith of the Romans"); cf. *ISE* 42, lines 5-7, in which the Romans themselves, soliciting help against Perseus, appeal to Greek cities on grounds of friendship.
rather than in some harried circumstance abandon their friendship with the Roman people.\footnote{RDGE 20, frg. C, lines 2-5: συνομο[σασθα]έαυτοις, τέκνα, συνβίους ἀνελεῖν καὶ ταῖς τῶν πολεμίων δυνάμεσιν παρατάξεθαι καὶ τὰ πνεύματα ὑπὲρ τῶν δημοσίων πραγμάτων ἡμετέρων ἐν τῇ χρείᾳ ἀποβαλεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τίνι καρπῷ ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ δήμου τοῦ Ῥωμαίων φιλίας ἀπεστατηκέναι δόξωσιν.}

Certainly for the \textit{poleis} who were acknowledged as being in – or in this sense of status, ‘admitted into’ – Rome’s friendship, it was a highly important civic event. In 170, Argos awarded Cn. Octavius extraordinary honours – including Argive citizenship and the right to purchase and own property in the city – not only because of his earlier forethought and goodwill toward the city, but because as envoy he conveyed the importance of Achaea’s friendship with Rome in appealing for aid against Perseus.\footnote{ISE I 42, lines 6-10: ἐπείδη ... [ἵει] τοῦς Ἀχαιοὺς παρακαλῶν διαφυλάσσειν τὰν τε φιλίαν καὶ συμμαχίαν τὰν πολλὰ Ῥωμαίων ἕδεξε τῶν δῆμων ἐπ[ανέδαι] [Γ]ναίων Ὀκτάιων Γναίων Ῥωμαίων ἐπὶ ταῖς προσφέρεις ἠν [ἔχει] πρὸς τὰν πόλιν καὶ τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν. (Since ... he has come to call upon the Achaeans to preserve their friendship and alliance with the Romans, it has been decreed by the people to praise Gnaius Octavius, son of Gnaius, a Roman, for the affection which he has toward the city and the Achaean League’.)}

More clear still, after having been judged to be in Rome’s friendship by Q. Mucius Scaevola, the Ephesians established elaborate and significant civic games. Though the decree is fragmentary, the fragments of the text makes it clear that the Ephesians set up these games after, if not \textit{because}, they had been deemed friends of Rome.\footnote{RDGE 47, lines 28-29: τῶν [ἐν τῇ] φιλίαν κριθ[εν των] δήμων τε καὶ ἐ[θνῶν]; also restored in line 5.} The Elaeans elaborately celebrated their φιλία καὶ συμμαχία with the Romans after the Aristonican conflict had settled in the early 120s, declaring:

\begin{quote}
the \textit{stephanēphoros}, priests and priestesses, and the archons on behalf of the citizens shall open up the temples of the gods, offer frankincense and pray: “For the good luck and safety of our people, the Romans and the Association of the Artists of Dionysus Cathegemon (we pray that) there will remain to us for all time the friendship and alliance with the Romans.” And they shall present a
\end{quote}
sacrifice, as beautiful as possible, to both Demeter and to Kore, the presiding goddesses of our polis, and likewise to Roma and all the other gods and goddesses; and the day is to be holy, the children are to be exempt from their studies, and the household slaves from their duties. After the sacrifice there shall be a parade for all of the boys and young men under the supervision of the paidonomos and gymnasiarch.\footnote{Transl. Sherk, \textit{RGEA} 44 (modified). \textit{SIG} 694, lines 40-58: [τὸν στεφανηφόρον καὶ τοὺς ἱερεῖς καὶ τὰς ἱερείας καὶ τοὺς ἀριστοντας ὑπὲρ τῶν ολίτων, ἀνοίξαντας τοὺς ναοὺς τῶν θεῶν ἐπιθυμιάν τὸν λιβαντοτόν, ἐσχιομένους’ ἐπὸ ἀγαθὴ τοῦ τινὶ καὶ σωτηρία τοῦ τε [ἡμετέρου δήμου καὶ τῶν Ῥωμαίων καὶ τοῦ κοινοῦ τῶν περὶ τὸν Καθηγεμόνα Διόνυσον τεχνῶν] μενεῖ ἡμῖν εἰς ἄπαινα τὸν χρόνον τὴν πρὸς [Ῥωμαίους φιλίαν καὶ συμπαθείαν. παραστάθηκε δὲ καὶ θυσίαν ὅς καὶ] λίστην τῇ τῇ [Δήμητρι καὶ τῇ Κόρης ταῖς προκαθημέναις [θεῖαις τῆς πόλεως ἡμῶν, δυσλίως δὲ καὶ τῇ [Ῥώμης καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις θεοῖς πάσι καὶ πάσαις. [ἐν]ιαὶ δὲ καὶ τὴν ἡμέραν ιερὰν καὶ ἄνεθήκαν τοὺς τε παιδας τῶν μαθημάτων καὶ τὴν οἰκε[τε]ιαν τῶν ἔργων. ἐπι[τελεσθήκε]Νε δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς [θυσίας διαδρομήν τοῖς] τε παιδι[σιν καὶ τοῖς νέοις, τῇ]ν ἐπιμελείαν ποιε[σαμένῳ]ν τοῦ τε παι[δονόμου [κα] τοῦ γυμνασαρχ[ου]].}

The importance of Roman friendship to Greek cities is clear. But the Romans themselves also memorialized such events. There is some evidence that the Romans may have kept a public list of their friends at Rome, which adds further to the sense of a new imperial status. The senate decree of 78 honouring Ascelpiades, Polystratos, and Meniscos, looked at above, mentions that they were entered into a ‘register of friends’ (\textit{formula amicorum} / φίλων διάταγμα).\footnote{\textit{RDGE} 22, line 12 (Latin) and lines 24-25 (Greek).} The phrasing calls to mind the \textit{formula sociorum} mentioned in an Aphrodisian decree of the triumviral period, and a Livian passage that relates senatorial orders to enrol newly deemed friends and allies into a \textit{formula sociorum}.\footnote{\textit{Aphrod.} 8, line 32; Livy 43.6.10; 44.16.7; cf. App. \textit{Mith.} 61 and I.\textit{Macc.} 8.20 in which Rome is said to “inscribe” or “register” (ἀνεγράφησιν) cities as φίλοι at Rome; Magie, \textit{RRAM} II.960-961 n. 76; Badian, \textit{FC}, 12 \textit{(pace} p. 143 n.1, it was more than ‘a convenient list kept by the Romans for themselves’); Sherwin-White, \textit{RFPE}, 65-66, whose broader argument that those recorded on this list were of inferior status (either through defeat in war or as provincials) to \textit{amicī et sociī} (who could only be free states), is overly schematic.}
Senate, which stands as an important symbolic act of public display. And toward their friends, the Romans felt – or, at least, publicly professed – a sense of obligation to protect them: the aggressive measures taken by Rome against the Cilician pirates at the very end of the second century were done, according to the *lex de provinciis praetorii*, in order to protect the safety (ἀσφαλεία) and rights (δικαία) of their citizens, allies, the Latins, and any nation in their friendship; the *lex repetundarum*, likewise, seems to have been directed at allies, Latins, and foreign nations in the ambit of Roman power or in the Romans’ friendship. The net effect was that this moral obligation to protect their friends (and allies) was to introduce those same friends into the sphere of Roman *imperium* alongside its own citizens, federates and subjects.

As noted above, it is significant that while this status was developing, there continued the sense of equality and mutual goodwill by which friendship had been traditionally defined throughout the Hellenistic era. As friendship increasingly became associated with loyalty, the corresponding growth of Roman power continued to be de-problematized among the Greeks by the sense that loyalty to Rome was the moral

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63 Recall that part of the formulary of the Senate was to publicly address (προσαγωγεῖν) foreign envoys “good and fine friends, from a people good, fine and friendly (above, n. 44); cf. *RDGE* 14, line 11. Compare, too, the promise of Q. Oppius to the Aphrodians (*Aphrod. 3*) to relate their friendship and allegiance to the Senate immediately upon his return to Rome (above, p. 196).

64 Lex prov. praet. col II, lines 6-11: ói te politai Ῥωμαίων ói te σύμμαχοι, ὄνομα τοῦ Λατίνου, δυνατὸς τὸν έθνῶν οίτινες ἐν φιλία τοῦ δῆμου Ῥωμαίων εἰσίν, ὅπως μετ’ ἄσφαλειας πλοῖοι θυσίαι δύνανται καὶ τῶν δῆμων τινὰς τυνχάνωσιν; col. III, lines 32-35 (same language); A. Marshall, “The Survival and Development of International Jurisdiction”, 650; Kallet-Marx, *Hegemony*, 173-174; cf. col. III, lines 16-21, in which the Romans take pains to affirm the autonomy of their friends to govern their own subjects: οίτινες δήμοι αἱ τῇ έθνῃ ὅταν τούτων τὸν νόμον ὁ δήμος κυρώσῃ βασιλεύσει βασιλεύσον δήμοις τε πρὸς οἰς φιλία συμμαχία τῶν δήμων Ῥωμαίων ἐστιν φόρους προσόντων τε στρατηγότατος τε καὶ ἐλασσόν τελώσιν, ἐν τούτω τῷ νόμῳ οὐκ ἡρώτηται (‘About those people and nations who paid taxes, revenues or troops when this law was passed to a king, kings, or people in the friendship with the Romans this law has no effect.’).

65 Lex rep., line 1: [Quoic socium non]minisve Latini exterarumve nationum, quoive in arbitratu dicione potestate amicitiae populi Romani].
obligation of εὐνοία toward a friend. A letter of Sulla to the people of Stratonicea (reproduced as a preamble to the SC de Stratonicensibus) is an instructive example in this sense and expresses many of the points made in this section. Of the people of Stratonicea, Sulla observed:

We are not unaware that from the time of your ancestors you have acted with all justice (δίκαιον) toward our ἀρχή, that at every opportunity you have conscientiously preserved your loyalty (πίστις) to us, and that in the war against Mithridates you were the first of those in Asia to oppose him; and for these reasons you have faced many different dangers – both public and private – that you most readily took these upon yourselves on behalf of our Republic because of your friendship (φιλία), goodwill (εὐνοία) and kindness (χάρις) toward us.

The equation of loyalty (πίστις) with friendship (φιλία) is plainly visible here as Sulla asserts that the Stratoniceans have taken up the cause of the republic – indeed the Romans’ ἡγεμονία – because of their friendship, goodwill, and kindness, which is repeated later in the senate decree as well. We can see, too, (and should not be surprised to find) that Sulla has expressed the polis’ actions as something taken up readily and willingly (προθυμοτάτα ... ἀναδεδεγμένους), recalling the sense of volition inherent in the conditions of φιλία, εὐνοία and χάρις – a point emphasised later by the Senate in characterizing the Stratoniceans’ good actions as part of their regular course of action.


67 It is perhaps of some note that in the cited text when Sulla speaks of the Stratoniceans’ πίστις toward Rome he uses the word ἡγεμονία, but when referring to their φιλία he chooses δημοσία πραγμάτα (res publica). The language reflects the natural relation of leadership-loyalty, but also seems to imply the continued sense that friendship was made among equals (republic: polis).

68 RDGE 18, lines 75-79: [γνωστὸν εἶναι Ῥωμαίοις κατὰ τὰς ἀποσταλείς παρὰ τῶν Ἀσιάν τὴν τε Ἑλλάδα [διακατασχότων τῶν τε ἐν ταύτας ταῖς ἑπαρχεῖσι προβεβλημένων ἐπιστολαῖς τοὺς] Στρατονικεῖς τὴν τε φιλίαν καὶ πίστιν καὶ εὐνοιαν πρὸς τὸν δῆμον τῶν Ῥωμαίων διὰ τέλους [ἐν καρπῷ εἰρήνης πολέμου].
Meanwhile, πίστις (which above we translated as 'loyalty') is ambiguous enough in this context to equally mean 'good faith' to the Stratoniceans, such that the city's actions in fighting for the Romans' hegemonia can be understood as based on the Romans' own prior goodwill or good deeds for them, and thus merely one more stage in the reciprocal system. The Romans, for their part, as friends, reciprocated goodwill toward the Stratoniceans by acknowledging various rights including their legal autonomy (ll. 49, 91-92), an increase in their territory and corresponding revenue (ll. 53-56, 96-110), the inviolability of their temple of Hecate (ll. 57-59, 113), support in recovering property and citizens captured in the war (ll. 61-64, 114-120), and extraordinary access to the Senate (ll. 65-66, 130-131).

Reciprocity (friendship) in this example is tied up in the larger narrative of freedom, but also important are the themes of a growing imperial ideology. Notice in the first clause how the Romans claim the moral authority to speak of justice (δίκαια) and characterize the Stratoniceans' defence of their empire as conscientious (εἰληφρινώς), confirming the sense of the moral obligation of the friend but now explicitly equating it with loyalty toward an explicit Roman superiority (ἡγεμονία). Sulla has also inserted the Romans within the polis' sense of time, as the Senate roots the city's sense of justice and loyalty – and ultimately its friendship – in the earlier acts of their ancestors (i.e. the farthest extent of the civic memory), which for cities eager to demonstrate their friendship with Rome is a welcome truth statement, but nevertheless re-orders Rome to the centre of polis life much as the formula for the restoration of property does. In a

69 Cities routinely spoke before the Senate in terms of "preserving" their friendship with the Roman people "continually" or "always" or "for all time" – recall the that Ephesians (I.Eph. 8) had preserved their εὐνομία from the beginning (ἐξ ἀρχῆς). See below, n. 249.
similar way, the second clause arranges the city’s efforts against Mithridates (and each of
the dangers its many citizens faced) entirely along the lines of friendship, goodwill and
kindness (i.e. loyalty) to the Roman Republic and its supreme power (ἡγεμονία). As a
result, as we find it in the text – as Sulla expressed it, and as the Stratoniceans (who by
his claim have earned their privileges) have implicitly accepted it – the many different
dangers faced by the citizens both individually and collectively stem entirely from their
(voluntary) loyalty to Rome, to the exclusion of any other motives; the Romans, in effect,
make it impossible for the Stratoniceans to have a self-interest beyond the preservation of
Roman rule, and thereby bond the polis’ interest with their own interests and those of the
their hēgemonia.\footnote{See also Chapter 4, p. 288 ff, on the development of a language of Roman hēgemonia during
this period. We shall have more to say on the capacity of friendship to integrate and normalize Roman
authority in §3 below.}

To summarize, in speaking of their φιλία with Greek cities, the Romans entered a
traditional interstate institution, forged in and consistent with the narrative of freedom
central to the Greeks’ understanding of their own history and traditional relations. There
was, however, enough space within the discursive norms and rules of friendship to
warrant volition and loyalty, egalitarianism and inequality, autonomy and subordination.
This institution of friendship assigned attributes to the Roman people and expressed their
action in a framework of utility and mutual goodwill that managed to de-problematize the
accretion of Roman authority. Over time, the asymmetry of the relationship becomes
increasingly clear to the modern analyst, but to the Greek actors living (always already)
within the discourse it was oriented along traditional terms of friendly interaction. As a
friend, Rome could expect reciprocal goodwill from the Greeks, which indeed was the
manner in which they presented the Greeks’ loyalty toward their growing *hégemonia*. Increasingly φιλία became the default relation within the empire – friend became a *de facto* status which many ‘free’ Greeks (subjects) enjoyed – and the relationship became something less special and therefore less prominent in the communications between states. This is not to say that friendship lost meaning – indeed the Aphrodisians in 38 could still be rewarded for their friendship and goodwill⁷¹ – but that there was space in the discourse to allow for such ambiguity that, through constant communication, was negotiated to produce new norms consistent with a new (by the first century) and nascent imperial discourse.⁷²

### 3.2.2: Roman Power as Benefactor

At the same time that the Romans were φιλοί and Greco-Roman relations were framed in terms of φιλία, the Roman people were also honoured as benefactor (*eúdoργετής*) in the East.⁷³ The massive statue base from Samos looked at above, for example, was dedicated to the Roman people “on account of their excellence and their benefactions (εúdoργεσία) toward them.”⁷⁴ Recall, too, that while the precise date of the

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⁷¹ *Aphrod.* 8, lines 16-24, 54-60, 72.

⁷² See further Chapter 4.

⁷³ The title οὐστήρ (saviour) was often included with *εúdoργετής* dating back to the early Hellenistic period and continued through the Roman-era. The Romans, however, were rarely referred to simply as “saviour” – in contrast to “benefactors” – and as such this particular epithet will be treated as it relates to the Romans’ role as benefactor; *SIG* 592 (Gythaühonors Flamininus as saviour); no. 760 (Caesar is the ‘common saviour of human life’). I have thus emended *I.Eph.* 8, lines 1-2 (τοὺς καινοὺς οὐστήρας παλαιὰν εὔνειοιαν) to read τοὺς καινοὺς εúdoργετὰς παλαιὰν εὔνειοιαν, which adds only two additional letters to line 1 and keeps the line length well within the range of the rest of the text (in fact still shorter than some).

⁷⁴ *SEG* XL 746: ὁ δήμος ὁ Σαμίων τὸν Δήμον τὸν Ῥωμαίων ἀφετής ἐνεκέν | καὶ εúdoργείας τῆς εἰς ἑαυτῶν Ἡρη (‘The people of Samos dedicate to Hera this statue of the Roman people, for their excellence and good services toward them’). The inscription was carved on an eight meter base that almost certainly carried a statue of the δήμος Ῥωμαίων.

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dedication is unclear, it was likely prompted by a Roman decision to side with the city against Priene in its long-standing territorial dispute over the Batinetis and adjoining regions.\textsuperscript{75} It is worth noting that despite the fact that the decision was reversed by the Senate in 135, the dedication remained standing in the city afterward – it was still proof of Samian-Roman reciprocal relations that might be used in future interactions.\textsuperscript{76} From roughly the same period comes the bilingual dedication of the Lycian League at Rome, in which the Romans were praised for their "excellence, goodwill and benefactions (εὐεργεσία) toward the koinon".\textsuperscript{77} This dedication had likely been in response to the Roman’s liberation of the Lycians from Rhodian control in 167.

So commonly were the Romans considered benefactors that εὐεργεσία was often associated with the cult of Roma such that many cities of the East worshipped Roma Benefactor or the "Romans as Benefactors" during the second and first centuries.\textsuperscript{78} A decree of the neoi of Thessalonica, for example, refers to honours made "to the gods and the Roman benefactors" (οἱ θεοὶ τε καὶ Ῥωμαίοι εὐεργέται). The decree dates to 95, but it is thought that the apotheosis of οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι εὐεργέται might date back to 146 and the

\textsuperscript{75} RDGE 10b, lines 4-7; Habicht, "Samos weiht eine Statue des populus Romanus" MDAI(A) 105 (1990), 259-268. On the history of the dispute, see Ager, Arbitrations nos. 27 (Lysimachus; 283/2), 74 (Rhodes; 197-190), 99 (M’. Vulso; 189/88), 160 (Senate; pre- and post-135); this chronology, however, has been recently contested by E. Famerie, "une nouvelle édition de deux sénatus-consultes adressés à Priène (RDGE 10)" Chiron 37 (2007), 88-111, esp. 104, who follows Habicht in believing that Rhodian arbitration closely followed Vulso’s decision by a matter of months (p. 103-104). He further advances the idea (suggested by Canali de Rossi, Ambascerie 255) that the earlier Senate decree on fragment A has nothing to do with the Samos-Priene dispute recorded in the second decree on fragment B (see. p. 105).

\textsuperscript{76} RDGE 10b, lines 7-11.

\textsuperscript{77} IGRP IV 1.61 (= ILLRP 174), lines 6-7: ἀρετής ἔνεκεν καὶ εὐνοίας καὶ εὐεργεσίας τῆς εἰς τὸ κοινὸν τὸ Ἀιών; cf. lines 2-3 in Latin: [v[irtutis] benivolentiae beneficique causa erga Lucios ab comun[i]).

\textsuperscript{78} See in general, R. Mellor, ΘΕΑ ῬΩΜΗ: The Worship of the Goddess Roma in the Greek World (Göttingen 1975), passim; S. Price, Rituals and Power: the Roman Imperial Cult in Asia Minor (Cambridge 1984), 40-47; below §3.2 of this chapter.
victory over the last Macedonian pretender-king. The examples of the cult can be multiplied: an inscription from 112 reveals that the Isthmian guild of the Dionysiac Artists made sacrifices to “Dionysus, other gods, and the Romans as common benefactors” (οἱ κοινοὶ εὐεργέται Ῥωμαῖοι) during the late second century; at the end of the century Posidonia dedicated a statue at Delos to Ὑδωρ θέα Εὐεργέτης; probably shortly after the First Mithridatic War the Strattoniceans established civic games in honour of Hecate and Ὑδωρ θέα Εὐεργέτης; the Lycians honoured Ὑδωρ θέα Ἐπιφανή Εὐεργέτης at Xanthus, which certainly dates back to the same period, if not back to 167; and even still during the Principate a statue at Assos in the Troad was dedicated to Θέα Ὑδη Εὐεργέτης τοῦ κόσμου.

Euergetism, as is well known, had a great tradition in the Hellenic East, and proclaiming someone a benefactor of the people continued as a traditional practice of the Hellenistic polis relating to individual citizens and non-citizens, particularly royal powers. According to Aristotle, kingship (βασιλεία) – in contrast to tyranny – was

79 IG X.2.1.4; Mellor, ΘΕΑ ῬΩΜΗ, 107-109.
80 RDGE 15, lines 45-46: τὰς θυσίας καὶ σπονδάς ἐκώλυσον ποιεῖν καθώς εἰθισμένον ἢν τῇ συνόδῳ τώι τε Διονύσῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις θεοῖς καὶ τοῖς κοινοῖς εὐεργέταις Ῥωμαίοις.
81 I.Delos 1778 (= Mellor, ΘΕΑ ῬΩΜΗ, no. 72).
82 OGIS 441, line 135.
83 Balland, F. Xanthos VII 18-19.
85 Ph. Gauthier, Les cités grecques et leurs bienfaiteurs (1985), 39-53; P. Veyne, Bread and Circuses (London 1990), 70-200; K. Bringmann, “The King as Benefactor: Some Remarks on Ideal Kingship in the Age of Hellenism” in A. Bulloch, et al., eds, Images and Ideologies: Self-Definition in the Hellenistic World (Berkeley 1993), 7-24; Billows, Kings and Colonists (Leiden, 1995), 71-79 (at p. 74: “The pose of the king as being a friendly and generous benefactor was, in short, a wonderful way for both ruler and city to cover the naked fact of domination, and so get along without overt conflict despite the incompatible desires of the kings to control the cities and of the cities to be free of control”); Ma, Antiochos III, 179-242.
established through merit, an important aspect of which was εὐεργεσία: "for it is just those who have done, or have the capacity to do good service (εὐεργετείν), either for states or for foreign nations, that have been honoured with the position of king." 86 Polybius’ accounts of royal actions similarly reveal the importance, and frequent performance, of good services toward subjects and allies 87 and inscriptions from the Hellenistic period record the transactions of these benefactions from the points of view of cities and kings alike. 88 To take just one example, in the last years of the third century Queen Laodice (wife of Antiochus III) wrote a letter to Iasos in which she spoke of her husband’s continual help for the city and her own intention "to act in accordance with his zeal and eagerness, and, because of this, to confer some benefaction (εὐεργεσία) on the poor among the citizens, and a general advantage to the whole people" by supplying the

86 Arist. Pol. 5.10 (1310b35-36): ἀπαντες γὰρ εὐεργετήσαντες ή δυνάμενοι τὰς πόλεις ἢ τὰ έθνη εὐεργετείν ἐτύγχανον τὴς τιμῆς ταύτης (transl. Sinclair, modified); cf. Pol. 3.15 (1286b11): ἔτι δ' ἀπ' εὐεργεσίας καθίστασαν τοὺς βασιλείς, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἔργον τῶν ἁγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν; 1285b12. It is worth noting that Aristotle’s examples of such good service include saving people from slavery (δούλευειν) and working for their liberty (ἐλευθερεῖν). Note, too, the Hellenistic view popularized by Euhemerus of Messene that the Olympian gods were previously good kings, who had been apotheosized for their good services to mankind (διὰ τὰς εἰς ἀνθρώπους εὐεργεσίας, Diod. 6.1.2).

87 E.g. Polyb. 5.11.6 (referring to Philip V): τυράννων μὲν γὰρ ἔργον ἐστὶ τὸ κακῶς ποιοῦντα τῷ φῶβῳ δεσπόζειν ἄκουσιν, μισοῦντο καὶ μισοῦντα τοὺς υποτατημόνους βασιλέως δὲ τὸ πάντας εὖ ποιοῦντα, διὰ τὴν εὐεργεσίαν καὶ φιλανθρωπίαν ἀγαθῶμεν, ἐκόπτων ἥγεοθαι καὶ προστατεῖν (‘It is the part of the tyrant to do evil in order to become master over the unwilling by fear, thereby being hated by, and in turn hating, those he rules; but it is the part of a king to do good for all and thus rule and preside over the willing, becoming loved through his benefactions and kind actions); cf. 5.88-90 (Rhodes receiving benefactions from most of the eastern kings after a major earthquake in 224); 10.3.1 & 5.6 (where Scipio Africanus proves himself a εὐεργέτης to the Spanish) and 10.40 (where this makes it appropriate that he might be a βασιλικός); Dionys. 4.32.1.

88 E.g. cities: Wells, RC 34, lines 13-16 (Magnesia’s mindfulness of the good actions of Attalus I earns them his future support for their civic games); ΟΓΙΣ 270, lines 10-14 (Aptera honours Attalus II among its εὐεργεταί); I. Byz. 5-6 (= SIG1 350; Byzantium includes Antiochus I among its civic benefactors); ISE 86 (Aetolian League honours Ptolemaic kings for their ἄρετή and εὐεργεσία). Kings: Wells, RC 9 (Seleucus I has his governor Sopatrus remind Athymbriani of his good services to the Greeks); no. 14 (Ptolemy speaks of his past zeal and actions to Miletus and promises to do future εὐεργεσία); no. 15 (Antiochus speaks of his past kindnesses and benefits to Erythrae); no. 22 (Seleucus II speaks of his εὐεργεσία toward Miletus and asks them to remember his favours).
city with 1000 *medimnoi* of wheat for the next ten years.\(^{89}\) Given the importance of euergetism to the operation of royal power in the Hellenistic period, it is no surprise that we find ruler benefactor cults such as those to Lysimachus at Samothrace or Eumenes II at Pergamum, or the surname ‘Benefactor’ often used of kings: Ptolemy III Euergetes, Ptolemy VII Euergetes II, Antiochus VII Euergetes, or Mithridates V Euergetes. Just as was the case with friendship, as a ‘benefactor’ the Roman people were arranged within an existing Hellenic (royal) power model.

Yet the Romans were not being simply fitted into a pre-existing mould *tout à fait*. We discussed in the previous chapter how the Romans, as a republic, were importantly distinguished from monarchies in the discourse of freedom, and the same is true here. For the Romans were not just benefactors, but were regularly and uniquely described as common or universal benefactors (κοινοὶ ἐυεργέται).\(^{90}\) In no fewer than eighteen documents do we find the Romans described as such.\(^{91}\) The earliest example comes from 182, when the Delphic Amphictyony praised Euemenes II as one “who preserved

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\(^{89}\) Ma, *Antiochos III*, no. 26 (=*I.iasos* 4 with modifications), lines 11-15: προαιρουμένη δὲ καὶ ἕγω ἀκόλουθα πράσειν τῇ σπουδῇ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἔκτενει καὶ διὰ τούτῳ καταθέσαθι εἰς ἐνεργείας μὲν εἰς τοὺς ἀπεδειχθέντας τῶν πολιτῶν, εὐχρηστάν δὲ κοινὴν τῶν σύμπαντι δῆμων. Ma has treated this document in great detail and highlighted its syntax and discourses in light of royal benefaction (pp. 196-199).

\(^{90}\) Before the Roman era the only epigraphic attestations of the phrase come from the papyrus archive of the Arsinoite nome of Ptolemaic Egypt (O. Guéraud, ed., Ἐπιγραφές: *requêtes et plaints adressées au roi l’Egypte au IIe siècle av. J.-C.* [Cairo 1931-2]) dating to the period 222-218 in which petitioners to the royal officials regularly began with a plea to “the king, common benefactor of all” (βασιλεῦ, τῶν πάντων κοινὸν ἐυεργέτην): nos. 4, 11, 15, 28, 38, 60, 70, 71, 78, 79 86, 106; petitions discussed in N. Lewis, *Greeks in Ptolemaic Egypt* (Oxford 1986), 56-58; Erskine, “Common Benefactors”, 75-76; cf. Ma, *Antiochos III*, no. 17, lines 6-8 (see n. 97). During the Roman period the phrase is found in a modified form in reference to Eumenes II (*OGIS* 763, lines 7-8: κοινὸς ἐυεργέτης τῶν Ἑλλήνων; *RivFil* 60 [1932], 446), however these seem to be self-consciously reacting to the Roman epithet; cf. Polyb. 31.6.6; Robert, “Theophanes”, 58-59; Ferrary, *Philhellénisme* 129 n.290; Erskine, “Common Benefactors”, 74; Gruen, *HWCR* I.186 n. 174 (rejecting the association).

\(^{91}\) In this same vein is an inscription on a statue found at Delos but originally from Assos (*I.Délos* 1778), in which the goddess Roma is described as ἐνεργείτις τοῦ κόσμου (benefactor of the world).
friendship with the Romans, the common benefactors." Within a generation the people of Samos, Myrina, Delphi, Eresus, Chalchis and the Ionian guild of the Dionysiac Artists all refer to the Romans as common benefactors. The bulk of the references, however, come from the last third of the second century, when we find the phrase in documents produced by Magnesia-on-the-Maeander, Metropolis, Gordos, Mylasa, Athens, the Delphic Amphictyony, and Dionysiac Artists again. The epithet continued into the first century when it appears in a Cyrenean honorary decree, the Ephesian civic decree declaring war on Mithridates, and a well-known Mytilenean dedication to one of its citizens, Cn. Pompeius Theophanes, who recovered the city's ancient liberty from the Roman common benefactors. The phrase was common enough to be parodied by Mithridates, who during his first campaign for Asia put a price on the head of a certain


Chaefer for providing information to “the Romans, common enemies” (οἱ κοινοὶ πολεμίοι Ῥωμαῖοι). 96

Two things are immediately striking about the use of this epithet. First, it appears only in Greek documents; the Romans never appear to have referred to themselves directly or indirectly as οἱ κοινοὶ εὐεργέται. This is in direct contrast to one of two examples of the phrase from the pre-Roman period, when Antiochus III spoke to the Teans of his resolve “to become the common benefactor of all the Greek poleis”. 97 The fact that the phrase never appears in Roman documents almost certainly relates to its Hellenic roots—the Romans had a traditional language in which to express euergetism (e.g. patronage) 98—but it also reflects the familiarity Greeks had with the notion of the Romans as universal benefactors. This brings us to the second point: the Romans are never the subject of the decree in which they are referred to as common benefactors. 99 As Erskine has observed, it is often the case that κοινοὶ εὐεργέται is syntactically superfluous in these Greek decrees such that the epithet could be removed without any ill effects to the understanding of the text. 100 When the Ephesians declared war against Mithridates, they did so in the security that they had preserved their goodwill toward the Romans, the common benefactors—here the epithet could be excised and the basic


97 Ma, Antiochos III, no. 17, lines 4-8: καί διὰφ[ω]λάσσω[ν . . . ]ἈΡΑΠ[ - - - ]γε καὶ ἐκείνω διὰ πρ[γόνων]ν ὑπάρχουσαν εὖ[μενον καὶ] - - - τασθαὶ προαξιοῦμενος πολαπλασ[ε]ν, κοινὸς [εὐεργετὴς πρ]οειρημένη γίνεται τῶν τῶν ἑλληνίδων [πόλεων καὶ τῆς πόλεως τῆς ἰμετέρας (‘and preserving ... the goodwill which was his from his ancestors and ... choosing to ... manifold ... , he has resolved to become the common benefactor of all the Greek cities and especially of ours’ — transl. Ma).

98 See below, §2.3 of this chapter.

99 Ferrary, Philhellenisrne, 130; Erskine, “Common Benefactors”, 76-78.

100 Erskine, “Common Benefactors”, 77-78.
meaning of the sentence would not be affected (i.e. ‘Ephesus had preserved its goodwill toward the Romans’).\textsuperscript{101} Again, we might contrast this with the Antiochene example, in which κοινὸς εὐεργέτης is the predicate of the verb γίγνεσθαι (to become) and cannot be removed from the sentence without leaving the utterance entirely senseless.\textsuperscript{102}

While removing the phrase may not affect the understanding of the text, it would certainly affect the meaning of the decree. As Robert observed, “the expression [κοινὸς εὐεργέτης] is neither empty, nor bombastic, nor disgraceful: it is well due to one who brings about or returns liberty”.\textsuperscript{103} In some instances where the epithet Universal Benefactor is employed, such as the Metropolis decree that records the Romans’ liberation of the former Attalid cities, the relationship between Rome and freedom is plain. Following Robert, we might say that the epithet recalls the Romans’ policy of liberating the Greeks.\textsuperscript{104} In this and other, less obvious ways, the epithet κοινὸς εὐεργέται is always meaningful. The people of Magnesia, for example, claimed to have “obeyed everything written (γραφομένα) by the Romans, the common benefactors”;\textsuperscript{105} here again the epithet is grammatically extraneous, but in the larger context of the decree and interstate discourse it acts as a palliative to, and justification of, the city’s obedience to Rome: the γραφομένα by the Romans are presented as benefactions and framed in the larger schema of their universal good deeds and their role as international mediator;\textsuperscript{106} while complementarily, the identification of Rome as a common benefactor frames the

\textsuperscript{101} I. Eph. 8, lines 1-2: ἡ πρὸς Ῥωμαίους τοὺς κοινοὺς σωτῆρας εὖνοια.
\textsuperscript{102} Text above, n. 97.
\textsuperscript{103} L. Robert, CRAI 1969, 61.
\textsuperscript{104} On freedom as a Roman policy, see Polyb 18.46.14 (text and discussion at Chapter 2 n. 192).
\textsuperscript{105} SIG\textsuperscript{2} 685, lines 21-22 (text above, n. 94).
\textsuperscript{106} Cf. I. Iasos 152 (Iasos); IG XII.9.899 (Dionysiac Artists).
city’s fulfillment of the Roman mandate as being a free act, taken because the city chose
to fulfill its moral obligation in response to Rome’s universal goodwill toward Greeks.
The same holds for the Ephesian decree, in which the city claims to have freely chosen to
follow everything asked of it by the Romans, common benefactors.107 The underlying
sense is doubtlessly the same in other cases, whether it is the Eresians framing their
embassy to Rome, the Gordians their loyalty and friendship to Rome, or the Cyreneans in
honouring one of their citizens. By labeling Rome as universal benefactor, furthermore, a
dēmos implicitly draws attention not only to all of the republic’s past good services
toward it and others, but also anticipates future benefactions as a function of that role.
Within this discourse, then, a city is predisposed to interpret Roman actions in positive
terms and in their own interest.

Roughly half of the instances of Κοινοὶ εὐεργέται come from honorary decrees
(not, of course, for the Romans), and these examples demonstrate how the epithet could
express the supremacy of the Romans in a hierarchy of world power. When the members
of the Delphic Amphictyony praised Eumenes II with a crown, a bronze statue, and other
rewards, they did so, principally, to honour “those kings who by maintaining their
friendship toward the Romans the common benefactors are always responsible for some
good to the Greeks.”108 Here, the benefactions performed by Eumenes – benefactor to
the Greeks – are subordinate to those of the Romans, universal benefactors (and thus his
benefactor also). In fact, earlier in the decree, the Amphictyony actually makes this
point, observing that because of his policy of goodwill and friendly actions Eumenes had

107 I.Eph. 8, lines 1-3: [ἐπειδή, τοῦ δὲ δήμου φιλάσσον]τος τὴν πρὸς Ἰουμαίους τούς κο[ινοὺς
108 SIG$ 630, lines 16-18 (text at n. 55).
his kingdom increased by the Romans in 188. The context, furthermore, implies that Eumenes, who is grouped together and generalized with other kings (ὁσιν τῶν βασιλέων), operates under the auspices of the Romans, who have judged him worthy of friendship and endowed him with their own goodwill and good services, without which circumstances he might himself not be honoured.

In effect, when the dēmos inserts “the Romans the common benefactors” into an honorary decree for one of its own citizens, it is creating a hierarchy of benefaction – with the Romans at the top – which positions the good services of the man being honoured relative to those of the Romans. The Roman people, as εὐεργέτης, were never included on the list of civic benefactors in a city; they were instead acclaimed and acknowledged obliquely as common benefactors – never, we noted, as subjects – such that their status is beyond that of the average benefactor. When the Metropolitanoi honored Apollonius for fighting and dying on behalf of the freedom of the city—restored by the Romans the common benefactors—they were of course praising their fallen citizen, but so too were they presenting his benefaction in reference (and subordination) to the Romans’ initial and superior good services in restoring that freedom.

109 Lines 6-10: δὴ ἂν αἰτήσαν καὶ Ἄρωμαίοι θεωροῦντες αὐτὸ τὴν προαίρεσιν ἐπευξηκαὶ τὴν βασιλείαν, νομίζοντες [δεῖν καὶ τῶν βασιλέων ὅσοι μὲν ἐπιθυμεῖσσοιν [τοῖς Ἑλλήσσαν τυχάνειν] τῆς καθηκοντῆς] ἐπιπλῆξεος, ὅσοι δὲ μηθενὸς γίνονται κακοῦ [παρατίθειν] τούτους τῆς [μεγαλῆς] [ἀξίος] ἄρα τὰ ἐαυτοῖς πίστεως ("for this reason even the Romans, observing his policy, have increased his kingdom, considering it necessary that those kings who plot against the Greeks obtain fitting censure and those who are the authors of no evil be thought worthy of their highest trust").

110 By the Late Hellenistic era (e.g. after ca. 150) there is very little evidence for the survival of large scale royal benefaction, with many dynasties having fallen away or become overshadowed by the Romans. See Ph. Gauthier, Les Cités et Bienfaiteurs (Paris 1985), 53-56.


112 As observed by Gauthier, Cités et Bienfaiteurs, 49-53, of Hellenistic royal benefactors in the third and second centuries; cf. his comments on royal εὐεργεσία in the polis context, which he sees as "une nouvelle catégorie d’évergetes, auxquels les cités doivent manifester une bien plus grande reconnaissance qu’à leurs bienfaiteurs étrangers d’autrefois" (p.44).
This hierarchy of benefaction – and others’ subordination to it – is created by the adjective κοινόν, which universalizes the Romans’ power (as benefaction) in time and space. The large geographic scope envisioned by the adjective is evident from those instances where the Romans are described as common benefactors “of all” or “of the Greeks”, yet still as a matter of course the Romans were simply styled common benefactor with a vagueness that emphasizes the ubiquity of the republic’s reach over all the Greeks. As benefactors, Roman power had no geographic limits. The cyclicality of benefaction, furthermore, which was envisioned as an ever continuing process, created a timelessness to Rome’s actions. These points are discussed in more detail below, but here it is enough to underscore the impact of this phrase in orienting Roman action, spreading its power, and integrating it into the world of the polis.

It should be pointed out, before moving on, that individual Romans – not just the state – were also be praised as εὐεργέται, much as poleis had traditionally honoured citizens and non-citizens. Commonly, these Romans were honoured for their ἀρετή and εὖνομα or εὐεργεσία, which reminds us again that goodwill and good works were tightly associated and seen as moral excellence. Like the Roman state, the individual εὐεργέτης could be benefactor of a great number of people, particularly by the Late

113 “Of all” (πάντων): Habicht, AM 72 (1957), 65; IG II² 1224; SIG 3 685; “of the Greeks” (’Ελλάνων): SIG 3 702.

114 The corpus of Roman benefactors of Greek cities is immense and to my knowledge has not been systematically compiled or treated. The following examples are given for chronological, linguistic and social variety—not completeness—to which can be added others in the following notes: M’. Acilius honoured for his εὐεργεσία ἣ ἐλς τὸ ἱερόν καὶ τὰν πόλιν (SIG 3 607; Delphi, 191/0); L. Mummius honoured ἀρετῆς ἐνεκεν καὶ εὐεργεσίας ἢς ἐξων διατελεῖ εἰς τε αὐτὴν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Ἐλλήνας (SIG 3 676; Olympus, 140s); M. Minucius honoured ἀρετᾶς ἐνε[κεν] καὶ εὐεργεσίας τᾶς [εἰς αὐτὰν] (SIG 3 710; Delphi, 107); L. Lucullus praised by the Aelianian League as εὐεργέτης in 80s (SIG 3 743); Q. Caecilius Metellus and his daughter honoured as εὐεργέτα of Pergamum in 49/48 (SIG 3 757, 758); P. Servilius Isauricus praised as σωτῆρ καὶ εὐεργέτης τῆς πολέως (OGIS 449; Pergamum, 48); M. Agrippa praised as συνγενέα καὶ πέτρωνα τῆς πόλεως καὶ εὐεργέτην ... ἐπὶ τῇ πρὸς τὸν δήμον εὖνοια (SIG 3 776; Ilium).
Republic: Pompey, for example, was praised by the people of Miletopolis as “saviour and benefactor of the people and all Asia”; Q. Cicero was “benefactor of the Greeks”; Caesar was praised by the Delians as “benefactor of all the Greeks” and at Samos for the “common good services (εὐεργεσία) he had continually performed for all the Greeks at his own expense”; and Octavian was similarly praised for his common good services to the panhellenai. It is equally noteworthy that before the Late Republic the epithet κοινὸς εὐεργέτης was never applied to individual Romans; it was a term reserved exclusively for the populus Romanus (the Roman state per se), not its leaders. The epithet, though, is used once of Caesar by Pergamum after his victory at Pharsalus, and the three references to Augustus suggest that it may have become common to speak of the Princeps as universal benefactor. The epithet became one of the ways that the power of the political potentates of the Late Republic was expressed and demonstrates

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115 I.Kyzikos 24, lines 4-6: σωτήρ καὶ εὐεργέτης τοῦ τε δῆμου καὶ τῆς Ἀσίας πάσης; cf. SIG2 749, 752.

116 Ferrary, BCH 124, no. 6: εὐεργετὴν ὅντα τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ πάτρωνα τοῦ δῆμου; cf. M. Iunius Decimus was proclaimed σωτήρ καὶ εὐεργέτης by the League of Boeotians, Euboeans, Locrians, Phoceans, and Dorians ca. 33 (SIG2 767).

117 I.Delos 1587: [κοινὸς (?) εὐεργέτης τῶν Ἑλλήνων; IGRP IV 970: ἄρετῆς ἐν(ε)κεν καὶ ε(ὐ)νοιας ἐς ἔχων διατελεῖ καὶ κοινῶς πρὸς πάντας τοὺς Ἑλλήνας καὶ κατ’ ἱδίαν εἰς ἑαυτόν; cf. IGRP IV.305: τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἀπάντων σωτήρα καὶ εὐεργέτην; IG XII.5.557: σωτήρα τῆς οἰκουμένης.

118 Ferrary, BCH 124 no. 8: εὐεργετής τάς εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἡμῶν [καὶ κ]οινῶς εἰς τοὺς Πανέλληνας.

119 The case of C. Flavius Fimbria — legatus to L. Valerius Flaccus (cos. suff. 86 assigned against Mithridates), and the man who killed the proconsul and seized control of his troops — is an exception, though one with caveats. Fimbria is said by Diodorus (38/39.8.2) to have been elevated to extraordinary powers by his troops, who were buoyed by hopes of booty and thus loved him as a κοινὸς εὐεργέτης. The phrase was clearly attributed to him by his soldiers — not a Greek city — and Diodorus (writing in the late first century BCE and therefore familiar with the phrase) uses the common phrase to characterize the soldiers’ pecuniary motives.

how their own powers replaced those of the Roman state in interstate discourse. The evolution of the phraseology from Roman state to individual Roman is clear at Mytilene, where in 62 the city spoke of the *populus Romanus* as its ‘common benefactor’ and roughly a generation later declared Augustus their κοινὸς εὐεργέτης.\(^{121}\) In much the same way—and increasingly through the course of the first century—a new form of relations between Romans and Greek city-states emerged along the lines of benefactor: patron, a traditional Roman institution now applied to eastern interstate relations, to which we shall now turn our attention.

### 3.2.3: Roman Power through Patronage

Increasingly after the late second century, Greek city-states honoured Roman citizens as their patron (πάτρων – transliterated from the Latin *patronus*) and patronage came to be a part of the register of reciprocal interstate relations.\(^{122}\) By the Late

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\(^{121}\) Robert, *CRAI* 1969, 52 (text above, n. 95); *Bull. Ep.* 1970 no. 422; cf. Philo *Leg.* 149: καὶ μὴν εἰ τινὶ καὶ παρεῖτος ἔδει ψηφίσεσθαι τιμᾶς, ἐκείνῳ προσῆκον ἢν, οὐ μόνον ὅτι τὸν Σεβαστὸν γένος ἁρχὴ τις ἐγένετο καὶ πηγὴ, οὐ μόνον ὅτι τὸν Σεβαστὸν γένους ἁρχὴ τις ἐγένετο καὶ πηγὴ, οὐδέ ὅτι πρῶτος καὶ μέγιστος καὶ κοινὸς εὐεργέτης, ἀντὶ πολυάρχιας ἐνι κυβερνήτη παραδόξω τὸ κοινὸν σκάφος οἰκονομοῦν ἐαυτῷ, θαυμάσιω τὴν ἡγεμονικὴν ἐπιστήμην (‘And yet if ever there was a man to whom it was proper that new and unprecedented honours should be voted, it was certainly fitting that such should be decreed to him, not only because he was as it were the origin and fountain of the family of Augustus, not because he was the first, and greatest, and universal benefactor, having, instead of the multitude of governors who existed before, entrusted the common vessel of the state to himself as one pilot of admirable skill in the science of government to steer and govern’ – transl. Yonge).

\(^{122}\) A corpus of these references has been compiled by C. Eilers, *Roman Patrons of Greek Cities* (Oxford 2002), Appendix 1, who has identified 164 examples (148 of which are inscriptions); cf. F. Canali de Rossi, *Il ruolo dei patroni nelle relazioni politiche fra il mondo greco e Roma in età repubblicana ed augustea* (Munich 2001), 131-196, with whose corpus Eilers provides a useful register of concordance (Appendix 2, pp. 269-279). On the patronage of cities, especially in the east, see also: L. Harmand, *Un aspect social et politique du monde romain: le patronat sur les collectivités publiques des origines au Bas-Empire* (Paris 1957); J. Touloumakos, “Zum römischen Gemeindepatronat im griechischen Osten” *Hermes* 116 (1988), 304-324; J. Nicols, “Patrons of Greek Cities in the Early Principate” *ZPE* 80 (1990), 81-100; cf. the essays collected in K. Lomas and T. Cornell, eds., *Bread and Circuses*: *Euergetism and Municipal Patronage in Roman Italy* (London 2002).
Republic, many cities likely had at least one Roman patron, and provincial magistrates often became the patron of some community within their *provincia*.¹²³ So common did patronal relations become that Greeks could use the Latinisms *patronoeía* and *patronoeüeiv* to express the abstract condition of having a patron (*patrocinium*) and the actions he was expected to perform; the latter was also regularly expressed by a present participle and predicate (e.g. ὄντα πάτρων), which nicely articulates the habitual and repetitive aspect of the relation between a *polis* and its patron.¹²⁴ Unlike the appellation ‘benefactor’, the Roman state itself – as the aggregate of individual citizens – was never identified as ‘patron’, although some in the Late Republic appear to have felt that Rome had *patrocinium* over the Greeks.¹²⁵ Not everyone, however, who provided *patrocinium* was a patron *per se* and, in any case, such a claim does not appear in the dialogue between states.

¹²³ App. B.Civ. 2.4.14: οἱ δὲ Ἀλλοβρίγιες ἐνδοιάσαντες ἑκοινώσαντο Φαβίῳ Σάγγα, δέξάντες ἄλλων Ἀλλοβρίγιων προστάτες, ὕπερ ἀπάσχολα πόλεις ἔστη τις ἐν Ἄρμη προστάτης (‘The Allobroges, being in doubt made Fabius Sanga aware of their situation, since he was their patron – for every city had some patron in Rome’); Mommsen, *StR* III.1203, n.1; Gelzer, *Roman Nobility*, 87; Badian, *FC*, 158; Eilers, *RPGC*, 146-150, who doubts the veracity of Appian’s claim that every city had a Roman patron but concedes that many cities are known to have had patrons.

¹²⁴ *patronoeía*; Eilers, *RPGC* 46, 84 (= *Claros* Polemaios, col. II, line 30/31), 107 (= *Aphrod*. 3, line 51; where *patronoeía* χρήσκατι is perhaps a translation of the idiomatic *patronicio uti*); *patronoeüeiv*: Eilers, *RPGC* 16 (= *SGDI* 2688), 31, 87 (= *I. Eph*. 630b); ὄντα πάτρων: Eilers, *RPGC* 78, 81, 82, 88 (= *I. Eph*. 663), 122 (= *I. Strat*. 509); cf. no. 87 in which we find the verb *patronoeüeiv* in the aorist, indicating simple aspect, and therefore suggesting that L. Calpurnius was perhaps a *patronus causa* (see below) for Ephesus rather than a civic patron *per se*.

¹²⁵ Cic. *de Off* 2.27 (text above, n. 7); Livy 34.58.11: *populus Romanus susceptum patrocinium libertatis Graecorum non deserere fidei constantiaque suae ducit esse* (‘the Roman people believe they have an undertaking not to abandon the *patrocinium* of the liberty of the Greeks because of their own faithfulness and consistency’); 37.54.17 (below n. 143). For a discussion of these texts, see J.-L. Ferrary, “The Hellenistic World and Roman Political Patronage” in P. Cartledge, *et al.* (eds.), *Hellenistic Constructs* (Berkeley 1997), 114-116, who argues against the interpretation of Touloumakos, “Zum römischen Gemeinpatronat”, 318; cf. J. Bleicken, review of Badian’s *Foreign Clientelae in Gnomon* 36 (1964), 176-183.
That the populus Romanus itself was never conceptualized as a civic patron – or patron of the Greeks – is perhaps due to the success and survival of the discourse of κοινός εὐεργέτης, but in any case is perfectly consonant with the Roman tradition of individual patrons, as well as the trend in the Late Republic toward the accumulation and concentration of power around influential politicians and generals. Despite, however, the fact that patronage did not involve Greek cities and the Roman state per se, the frequency with which we find patrons mentioned in state documents, the role that these men performed within a reciprocal system, and the importance that leading politicians and generals came to play in imperial politics all require us to consider the function of patronage in the growth and operation of the interactive empire.  

That is, although the Romans’ empire in the East should not be (and was not) modeled on patronage, patronage itself was a part of the interactive, reciprocal system that comprised the Romans’ ἡγεμονία and an important component in the development of the consensus of that empire that marked the Principate.

The earliest epigraphic testimony of a Roman patron of a Greek city dates to the end of the second or beginning of the first century, after which it is well attested (with over ninety examples). The πάρων, it is worth pointing out, did not replace the

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127 Eilers RPGC, 109-144. As Eilers has argued, the earliest example is probably the honorary decree for Menippos of Colophon (p. 124-132), which he dates to the 90s based on the identity of Q. Mucius (II.42-46) with Q. Mucius Scaevola the celebrated proconsul of Asia (see below, 4.3.2); contra L. and J. Robert, Claros, 99, and Ferrary, “le statut des cités libres,” 557, who identify the man as Q. Mucius the Augur and date the document to the 120s or 110s.
benefactor or saviour; though Romans might be honoured as simply patrons, they were more often recorded as a benefactor and patron. The conjunction of these two terms in state documents suggests a close relationship, and their use in documents produced in response to a good service done for the city reminds us that a patron played his role within the larger reciprocal system and, in many ways, in a manner not unfamiliar from other Hellenistic forms of interstate interaction (e.g. προξενία). To that end, like a ἐυεργέτης – or a φίλος, for that matter – the πάτρων of a city was routinely honoured for his εὐνοία and εὐεργεσία: thus the patrons of Colophon, whose dedications Ferrary has recently published, were honoured “because of their excellence and goodwill toward the community” (πάτρωνα τῆς πόλεως ἀρετῆς ἐνεκεν καὶ εὐνοίας τῆς εἰς ἑαυτὸν). By the same token, the Nysans were not unique in honouring P. Licinius Crassus as their

128 Eilers, RPGC, 4-6, 13, 16, 17, 19, 21, 23, 24, 26, 29, 31, 35, 37-39, 42-45, 48, 55, 57, 59, 60, 63, 68, 73, 75, 77, 78-88, 90, 93, 108, 117, 118, 133, 144, 147, 149, 152, 154, 156-158.

129 Eilers, RPGC, nos. 1, 3, 4b, [7], 8, [9], 10, 11, 14, 18, 20, [22], [25], 27, [30], 32-4, 36, 40-2, [49], [50], [52], 53, [54], [56], [58], 61, 64-7, 70-1, 74, 76, 78, [89], 91-2, 94-7, [98], 103-4, [105], 109-16, 120-24, 127, 129, 130-2, 134-5, 145, [146], 147-8, [151], 161, 163. (Square brackets denote a restoration of one of the terms).

130 At Lilybaeum in Greek Sicily a bilingual honourary decree translates εὐεργέτης with patronus perpetuus (IG XIV 277); cf. Bowersock, Augustus in the Greek World, 12-13. The two terms, however, were not strictly synonymous (below n. 135).

131 Gruen, HWCR I, 162-172, for example, places Roman patronage in the context of Hellenic traditions of προξενία and εὐεργεσία and argues that “the idea that Rome transplanted her clientela system to the East misconceives both the direction and the structure of Graeco-Roman relations” (199); Ferrary, Philhellénisme, 119-124, arguing against (e.g.) Badian, Foreign Clientelae (Oxford 1958). Compare, too, the definition and description of Roman patronage by Saller, Personal Patronage, 1-3, 8-40, with the description of Hellenistic euergetism presented by P. Veyne, Bread and Circuses (transl. B. Pearce; London 1990), 101-131, esp. 102-107. Greek cities, of course, had previously used their friendship with important Romans to affect the outcome of a dispute or appeal: e.g. Polyb. 21-29.10-12 (Aetolians appeal to C. Valerius Laevinus to help get them lenient terms in 189); Polyb. 23.5.1-18 (Deinocrates of Messene tried to exploit his friendship with T. Quinctius Flamininus for advantages in the Peloponnese); Polyb. 24.5.1-7 (Eumenes plies his friends at Rome to help wage war against Pharmaces); Polyb. 30.4.5-9 (Rhodes appeals to its friends to stave off a declaration of war in 167). On the difference between friendship and patronage, see (e.g.) D. Konstan, “Patrons and Friends” CPh 90 (1995), 328-342.

132 Ferrary, BCH 124, nos. 1, 2, 5, 11.
benefactor and patron not only because of his goodwill and excellence but also for the “benefactions that he had performed for the polis” (διὰ τὰς εἰς τὸν δῆμον εὐεργεσίας). 133

Perhaps the clearest example is a dedication of the Mesambrians to C. Cornelius, a legate of M. Lucullus in 72, who “performed many great benefactions (εὐεργετεῖν) for the people, co-operating fully with the embassies sent to Lucullus and acting as a patron (πατρωνεύειν) of the city.” 134

It is, however, important not to lose sight of the fact that πάτρων was not the same as εὐεργέτης 135 and that patronage, which was a distinctly Roman institution with its own idiosyncrasies – something which the Greek transliteration of the Latin term suggests that Greeks themselves understood 136 – had important differences from the traditional Greek civic benefactor. In the first place, πάτρων was not simply an honourary title awarded by a community to a Roman in response to the performance of good service, but more particularly it was a role played by a Roman after first accepting a city into his patronage. That is, a Roman became the patron of a city only after he had

133 Eilers RPGC no. 120: ὁ δήμος καὶ ἡ βουλή Πόπλιου Λικίνιον Ποπλίου υἱόν Κράσσου· ἦσαν καὶ εὐεργετὴν καὶ πάτρων διὰ τὴν εὐνοίαν αὐτοῦ ἀρετὴν τῆν τῆς καὶ τὰς εἰς τὸν δῆμον εὐεργεσίας; cf. nos. 31, 53, 66, 68, 108, 118-120, 122, 151.

134 Eilers, RPGC 31 (=IG Bulg. 1.314a), lines 5-9: πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα [τὸν δήμον εὐεργετήκη] ταῖς τε ἐξαιτομελλομέναις ποτε τῶν αὐτοκράτορα προσβείαις ὑπερηφάνων ἐν πᾶσιν καὶ πατρωνεύων [τὰς πόλιος.

135 The distinction becomes clear if we consider a Pergamene dedication to Caesar (IGRP IV 305), in which the latter is described as πάτρων καὶ εὐεργέτης of the city, but σωτὴρ καὶ εὐεργέτης of all Greeks; patronage was a formal arrangement predicated on a request by the city and thus Pergamum could not by any rights claim Caesar was patron of all Greeks; a benefactor, by contrast, was an honorary appellation based on previous benefactions and in this right could be given to Caesar by the Pergamenes on behalf of all Greeks; cf. RPGC 78 (Q. Cicero is εὐεργέτης of the Greeks and πάτρων of Colophon); Eilers, RPGC no. 64 (=IGRP IV 200) (Augustus is said to be συγγενὴς, πάτρων and σωτὴρ of the people of Ilium and εὐεργέτης of all). Eilers, RPGC 184-185; contra n. 130.

been petitioned by the city and after it had proven its goodwill toward him or the Romans. The clearest evidence for this procedure comes from the exchange between Aphrodisias and the Roman general Q. Oppius discussed earlier. From Oppius’ letter (Aphrod. 3), we learn that Aphrodisian envoys met with the Roman proconsul sometime after his release from Pontic control in 85 or 84, bringing with them a decree rejoicing at his safety and, apparently, a request that he become patron of their city. In Oppius’ words:

these same envoys petitioned that you too might be able to enjoy my patronage (πατρωνήγη); I received them and because of my regard for your city I undertook to become the patron of your people.\textsuperscript{137}

Here, in what Eilers has called “the single most important piece of evidence on this subject [of civic patronage]”, it is clear that the process of patronage begins with a Greek petition.\textsuperscript{138} It follows that the city had to justify its request; and so Oppius states that he became patron of the city out of his regard (καταλογής ένεκεν) for them, alluding to their earlier support at Laodicea, which he cites as the reason (αίτια) for his other efforts on their behalf.\textsuperscript{139} The same model can be observed in the Colophonian decree for Polemaios, who it is said first proved his friendship to the Romans and then gained their patronage.\textsuperscript{140} Thus in creating bonds of patronage, the onus fell to the Greeks to petition and prove their worth to potential Roman benefactors.

\textsuperscript{137} Reynolds, Aphrod. 3, lines 49-57 (text at n. 17).

\textsuperscript{138} Eilers, RPGC, 23-27 (quotation at p. 24); cf. Canali de Rossi, Il ruolo dei patroni, 47-54, who is somewhat too eager at identifying these petitions from the surviving corpus of examples.

\textsuperscript{139} Lines 33-43.

\textsuperscript{140} Claros, Polemaios, col. II, lines 24-31: ἐνέτυχεν μὲν τοῖς ἡγουμένοις ἱππολαίοις καὶ φανείς ἄξιος τῇς ἐκείνων φιλίας τὸν ἄπο ταύτης καρπόν τοῖς πολείταις περιποίησεν πρὸς τοὺς ἄριστους ἄνδρας τῇ πατρίδι συνθέμος πατρωνείας (‘He obtained an audience with the Roman leaders and appeared worthy of their friendship. The benefits of this friendship he won for the citizens by arranging patronal relations for his city with the best men.’).
This arrangement is somewhat different to the closed cycle of reciprocity described in the previous section — wherein it was impossible and, significantly, unimportant to determine which party first performed kindly actions to the other. If the Oppius-Aphrodisias exchange and Polemaios decree fairly represent the process of establishing civic patronal relations,\(^{141}\) then it also demonstrates the asymmetry of the relation in favour of the Romans. As the burden fell on the Greek \textit{poleis} to demonstrate their εὔνοια, φιλία, πίστις, etc., and the Romans simply to accept their claims, patronage afforded the Romans a form of relation with the Greek world predicated on their superiority.\(^{142}\)

This point, however, should not be exaggerated; for it is not to say that through patronage Greeks cities were emasculated as powerless \textit{clientes} — a term that significantly does not appear in any official document, Roman or Greek, translated, transliterated or otherwise.\(^{143}\) Patronage was a voluntary reciprocal relation\(^{144}\) predicated on good works.

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\(^{141}\) Traces of this petition-response procedure in patronage can be found in the epigraphy of the empire such as the \textit{tabulae patronatus} in which one co-opted as patron also had to \textit{accept} the city into his cliente (\textit{eos in fidelem clientelamque suam recepit}; J. Nicols, “Tabulæ Patronatus: A Study of the Agreement between Patron and Client-Community”, \textit{ANRW} II.13 [1980], 535-561, esp. 550-551), and is implicit in the Caesarian \textit{lex Ursonensis}, §97; Eilers, \textit{RPGC}, 25-27. To some extent, in the last two generations of the Republic, the patronal model described in the Aphrodisias-Oppius exchange breaks down as a patron might be said to have inherited his position (\textit{a maioribus / διὰ προγόνων}; on which see Eilers, \textit{RPGC}, 60-81, esp. 78-81, and nos. 52, 59, 81, 88, 103, 105, 110, 112, 114, 116, 119-21, 124), however as Eilers notes, in all but a few instances, the language is likely descriptive (e.g. cases where a son was persuaded to take on the patronage of his father) rather than prescriptive (requiring all sons to take on the roles of their fathers); cf. Cic. \textit{ad Fam.} 13.64.2 (discussed below). For context, we might compare inherited patronage with contemporary decrees for εὐθεργέται \textit{διὰ προγόνων} (e.g., \textit{IGRP} IV 293, line 45; \textit{SIG} \textit{IV} 730, lines 27-29; \textit{I.Pergamon} 425 [= \textit{IGRP} IV 410]) and ἄρετα προγονική (\textit{I.Priene} 108, lines 19-20, 30; \textit{I.Kyme} 13, col. III, line 66 and II.86-87; \textit{IG XII} 9.236, lines 1-3; \textit{IGRP} IV.159, lines 18-19; no. 292, lines 21 & 30; no. 293, line 28; \textit{SIG} \textit{IV} 730, lines 27-29).

\(^{142}\) Badian, \textit{FC}, \textit{passim}.

\(^{143}\) The notable exception comes from Livy (37.54.17), who has Rhodian envoys argue before the Senate in 189 that it was only proper that Rome should guarantee forever the \textit{patrocinium} of a whole race taken into its loyalty and \textit{clientela} (\textit{hoc patrocinium receptae in fidem et clientelam vestram universae gentis perpetuum vos praestare decest}). The language, however, is clearly Livy’s own, since we can compare it with his source, Polybius (21.23.4-12), who speaks of a world under Rome’s ἐξοικονία.
(i.e. loyalty), but also promising tangible benefactions from the Roman patron. In the example above, Oppius' undertaking to become the city's patron is part of a larger series of undertakings – to do what he can for the city (l. 38), to perform for them good services (l. 41) and to be the author of some good (ll. 42-43) – the performance of which would then be praised by the Aphrodisians as εὐνοία or εὐεργεσία, as was common. Of course the same interaction when looked at from the other perspective illustrates that Oppius felt obliged to reciprocate the Aphrodisians' demonstration of goodwill and friendship.

Indeed, a passage from one of Cicero's letters makes it clear that the Romans themselves knew they had to live up to their end of the arrangement in order to enjoy the gloria of foreign clientela. Writing to P. Silius, then propraetor in Bithynia, Cicero asks that he support his friend, T. Claudius Nero, for “if he has you as a supporter ... he will be able to strengthen the large clientele he has inherited from his ancestors and oblige them through his benefactions.”

Clearly the young Nero, who had as yet done nothing for his client cities, had to perform good services for them before he could secure their counter-services and justify himself as their patron. Ultimately, we must keep in mind that Roman patronage existed within the Greco-Roman reciprocal system, and was often closely aligned with both friendship and benefaction. Thus a polis like Pompeiopolis

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144 A Samian dedication (IGRP IV 968) to Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus (RE 21; cos. 96) stating that the consul had been “assigned to them as a patron by the senate” (δοθέντος υπὸ τῆς συνκλήτου πάτρων τὰς δῶμι δήμωι) has led some to argue that the Senate imposed patrons on cities. But the reference must rather be to Ahenobarbus' capacity as patronus causae (below, p. 238), as proposed by Eilers (“Cn. Domitius and Samos: A New Extortion Trial” ZPE 89 [1991], 167-178; RPGC 121-124) and accepted by Ferrary (“The Hellenistic World and Roman Political Patronage”, 107); cf. lex rep., lines 9-11(sei eis volet sibei patronos in eam rem darei...); i.Eph. 630b.

145 Cic. Fam. 13.64.2: quare, si te factore usus erit, sicuti profecto et utetur et usus est, amplissimas clientelas accepitas a maioribus confirmare poterit et beneficiis suis obligare.
could describe itself as “free and autonomous” while honouring its eponymous patron;\(^{146}\)
or Colophon, which could do the same, and even orient the agency in the procedure of creating a patron along civic lines by asserting that its own citizen had himself “made (certain) men patrons.”\(^{147}\)

All the same, in the letter of Oppius to the Aphrodisians patronage is treated separately from – and thus distinguished from – the traditional formalities of reciprocity; it is expressed in the final of three independent clauses, following a lengthy series of subordinate clauses in which are contained the euergetical formalities, such that patronage is literally distinct from them and was perhaps even the real reason for the embassy to Oppius;\(^{148}\) Cicero, meanwhile, for his part, makes clear that in as much as his young friend Nero must prove himself to his clients, his patronage is their utmost protection.\(^{149}\) The importance that the Aphrodisians and Cicero placed on obtaining a patron underlines the asymmetry of the relationship – that is, a situation in which the Greek city needed a patron – the normalization of which helped to reproduce Roman legitimacy and extend the Roman state into the world of the \textit{polis}. Greek cities, we know, by Roman law were assigned patrons in their extortion (\textit{de repetundis}) cases

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\(^{146}\) Eilers, \textit{RPGC} 149: [\textit{Γναῖον Πομπῆιον Γναῖοι υἱὸν Μέγαν}] τῆς αὐτοκράτορας Πομπηιοπολιτῶν τῆς ιερᾶς καὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐλευθέρας καὶ αὐτονόμου ὁ δῆμος τὸν κτίστην καὶ πάτρωνα τῆς πόλεως (‘The people of the sacred, immune, free and autonomous Pompeiopolis honoured Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus, three times imperator, as founder and patron of the city’).

\(^{147}\) Claros, Menippos, col. III, line 10-13: τῆς τε πόλεως γνησίως αὐτοῦς πεποιηκὼς πάτρωνας χρησιμώτατος παρὰ τοῖς ἡγουμένοις γέγονε τῷ δήμῳ παρ’ ὅλως ἀναγκασταται πᾶσιν εἰσὶν ἀνθρώποις χρεία (‘He made these men genuine patrons of the city, and was most useful for the people before those leaders to whom are brought the most pressing concerns of all men’).

\(^{148}\) Following the preamble of the decree, lines 10-21 are subordinate clauses predicated on \textit{ψήφυμα ἀπέδωκαν (ἐν ὃ...)}, lines 24-46 are a series of lengthy subordinate clauses based on \textit{ἐπεμψα γράμματα δώσω}, and the remaining third independent clause begins with what was requested by the envoys (οἱ αὐτοὶ πρέσβεις παρεκάλεσαν...) at line 48.

\(^{149}\) Cic. \textit{Fam.} 13.64.1: \textit{in Neronis patrocinio summum esse praesidium}. 

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against odious provincial magistrates; Cn. Domitius was one of these *patroni causae* given by the Senate, who was praised at Samos for (what must have been) a successful prosecution *in a Roman court*. Less formally, but no less significantly, patrons were also useful – if not politically necessary – advocates for Greek cities in the Senate: among other accomplishments, Menippos of Colophon is said to have become associated with the most important Romans (οἱ μεγίστοι ῥωμαίων) whom he made “genuine patrons of the *polis*, and as such became extremely useful to the *dēmos* before the Roman authorities (ήγουμένοι), to whom are brought the most compelling of men’s affairs”. These *patroni*, we must assume, had helped Menippos achieve his various benefits for Colophon in his five embassies to Rome. Moreover, we can see how in describing Menippos’ important accomplishment at co-opting patrons for the city, the Colophonians have conceded that (a) the Romans are ήγουμένοι (lit. ‘leaders’) and (b) they are people to whom the most important human issues are directed and by whom they are decided.

The ήγουμένοι certainly refer to senators – and by extension the Senate itself – and the powerful elite at Rome, such that through patronage (and the reciprocal arrangement that it embodies) these became accepted and legitimized as centres of power.

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151 Claros, Menippos, col. III, lines 8-13: τῆς τε πόλεως γνησίους αὐτοὺς πεποιηκὼς πάτρωνας χρησιμώτατος παρὰ τοῖς ἠγουμένοις γέγονε τῷ δήμῳ παρ᾿ οίς ἀναγκαῖόταται πάσιν εἰσὶν ἀνθρώπων χρείαις; cf. Polemaios decree, col. II, line 24-31: ἐνέτυχεν μὲν τοῖς ἠγουμένοις ῥωμαίοις καὶ φανεῖς ἄξιος τῆς ἐκείνων φιλίας τὸν ἀπὸ ταύτης καρπὸν τοῖς πολείταις περιποίησαν πρὸς τοὺς ἀριστοὺς ἀνδρας τῇ πατρίδι συνθεμένους πάτρωνειας (‘[Polemaios] met with the leading Romans and as he appeared worthy of their friendship he won its advantages for the citizens by arranging patronage for the city with the best men.’).


153 Note also, as a counterbalance, my comments above (p. 238) concerning Colophon making its own patrons.
beyond the *polis*. Their role is strikingly demonstrated in an Abderite decree from Teos, which honours certain Tean citizens for travelling to Rome in the early decades of the first century to secure help for Abdera against the claims of Cotys of Thrace on their ancestral territory. Their actions while in Rome are described as follows:

They met with the leading men among the Romans and won them over by their daily perseverance, and induced the patrons of the city to help our people. When some preferred our adversary and championed his cause, they won over their friendship by their explanation of the affair and by daily calls at their *atria*.

The process alluded to in the Colophonian decree above is fleshed out in this unique account of Greco-Roman international relations. Exposed are the lengths to which envoys went to find a sympathetic ear at Rome, participating in daily *salutationes* at the houses of senators and other forms of daily perseverance. Of more interest to us, though, is the way in which the Teans used their patronal relations to gain access to the leading men of Rome, win over their friendship, and bring about Roman action in their own self-interest. The description of power at Rome presented in this text is not the Senate *per se*

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156 Compare, as a literary example, [Caes.] *B.Hisp.* 42.2: *a senatu petisse et eius pecuniae provinciam liberasse simulque patrocinio suscepto multis legationibus ab se in senatum inductis simul publicis privatisque causis multorum inimicitias susceptis defendisse* (“Caesar had sought from the senate both to free the province from this expense and likewise, having undertaken their *patrocinium*, to defend them with many legations into the senate for both public and private suits, for which he had earned numerous enemies”).
but the individual senators, some of whom were their patrons, and before whom they had
to make their case and play individual politics.

Thus practically, the functions of these patrons were built around Roman
institutions like the Senate, but also the Roman courts (as in the case of Samos) or the
provinces (like Ti. Claudius Nero). Patronage represented, but also reproduced, conduits
of interaction centered around these institutions and powerful Roman citizens. It thus
reinforced the legitimacy of these bodies, and helped to normalize them in interstate
relations. Through patronage, the Roman state was able to enter the world of the polis,
where its power was de-problematized as benefaction and protection. Thus in the
Menippos example above, the people of Colophon – who had fought fiercely for, and
were eager to preserve, their independence from the province (ἡ ἐπαρχεία ἀπὸ τῆς
αὐτοκρατορίας)¹⁵⁷ – welcomed their new Roman patrons, who helped to guide Menippos
through his dealings with the provincial administration and the Senate, i.e. the Roman
ἡγουμένοι. The juxtaposition, in fact, between their autonomy and their self-professed
subordination to Roman ἡγουμένοι is in a category similar to the Ephesians’ claim to
have fought for “freedom and Roman hegemony” and speaks to the important discursive
role of reciprocity, and patronage as one of its forms. The free city of Colophon was
independent of the province and yet was still subject to the decisions of the Roman senate
(whose speech-act had in any case made them free), and anticipated further dealings with
Roman officials for whom they now had patrons. Colophon, though outside the province,
was clearly within the Roman imperial system and interacted with it – and legitimated it
– through its patrons.

¹⁵⁷ Claros, Menippos, col. I, lines 39-40. On this passage, see also pp. 59 and 92.
3.2.4: Greek Diplomacy and Manipulation

Let us turn now from the Roman to the Greek vantage of the reciprocal system of interaction. In this discussion it is important to bear in mind that the reciprocal nature of the Romans’ empire resulted in instances of power negotiation; that is, despite the asymmetry of power in favour of the Romans, Greek cities were not without measures to achieve advantageous ends through the communication of reciprocity with Rome. As J. Pocock has written:

Language consists of a number of already formed and institutionalized structures. These embody and perform speech-acts, but they perform the intentions of the user only through words formed by sedimentation and institutionalization of the utterances performed by others. Language gives me power, but power which I cannot fully control or prevent others from sharing. In performing a verbalized act of power, I enter upon a polity of shared power.\(^{158}\)

Pocock’s sedimentation and institutionalization are what for Habermas was the social knowledge of the Lifeworld that warranted a validity claim – the norms and expectations of the social world that can be drawn on by both interlocutors to discursively negotiate a claim to truthfulness.\(^{159}\) When Rome communicated with the East in the character of friend or benefactor, or its leading citizens in the guise of patrons, it engaged in a power negotiation expressed through a diplomatic language, whose process is dialogic and content is reciprocal, and to that extent is at once outside its control and part of a shared mechanism of language. Once engaged in this established discourse, Rome is subject to all its manifold sedimentation – and to that extent, for Pocock even its speech-acts cannot be said to be fully autonomous – which its Greek interlocutor will manipulate to achieve


\(^{159}\) See above, Introduction p. 15ff.
its own self-interested ends. As Pocock goes on to point out, "the players of (this) language game are performing the linguistic equivalent of Aristotle's 'ruling and being ruled', meaning that in order for the communication – which is to say interaction and, by extension, the empire – to operate effectively, both sides have to give up a measure of autonomy and share in the 'polity' of the language.\textsuperscript{160}

Ma has used this approach to explore how Hellenistic poleis used diplomacy and manipulation in their communications with the Seleucid royal state, and his procedure is broadly applicable to our study of Roman-polis communications (and thus interactions). He identifies three primary functions of the communications between the polis and monarch from the perspective of the former: i) to demonstrate loyalty, even submission to the ruler-king; ii) to facilitate petitions for benefits; and iii) to promote norms and expectations through the publication of the dialogue, which bound the king to carry through (continually) his benefactions for the city.\textsuperscript{161} Greek communications with Rome performed the same general functions, but with different emphases owing to the fundamentally different narrative informing their relationship: in contrast to the Greco-Roman narrative of freedom, a polis' relations with Antiochus III – indeed the whole Seleucid, if not also the Antigonid, dynasty – were predicated on the king's ancestral right (and obligations) to the cities of the East.\textsuperscript{162} Thus, whereas Ma was drawn to the royal language of giving and the civic language of receiving (i.e. euergetism) that

\textsuperscript{160} Pocock, "Verbalizing a Political Act" Pol.Th. 1 (1973), 36. Note the similar conclusions of Billows (Kingship and Colonies, 74) for the Hellenistic era: "Simply put, by espousing the posture of benefactors of the Greek cities and advertising themselves in that role, the kings laid themselves open to having moral pressure applied to make them live up to their own propaganda" – though I disagree with his assertion that the king thus "had to allow himself to be manipulated" (p. 78); cf. L. Mitchell, "Rules of the Game", esp. 30-32, for similar conclusions on friendship.

\textsuperscript{161} Ma, Antiochos III, 201-206.

\textsuperscript{162} Ma, Antiochos III, passim (esp. 26-52).
complemented the narrative of Seleucid (re)conquest, Greco-Roman official documents are framed around reciprocity consonant with the narrative of Greek freedom.

The petition-response model of Greco-Roman interaction meant that cities had to make their appeal to the decision-making bodies of the Romans. For most of the period under discussion, this was of course the Senate, though increasingly by the first century it came also to include ηγουμένοι who carried political weight in the state or patroni who could advocate to either on the city's behalf.163 According to Ma's schema, the initial function of Greek communiqués was to demonstrate goodwill, loyalty, and even submission, particularly by advising the ruler of any honours the city had bestowed on him. In some cases the same is true with regard to Rome and individual Romans, especially in the early second century (when relations were young and with little 'sedimentation') and the last three quarters of the first century (as Rome's government came increasingly to take on the affectations of a monarchy). In the earlier period, for example, we find the Heracleans awarding privileges and expressions of good faith to Lucius and Publius Scipio, who accepted both claims and in return promised to do them every favour.164 From shortly after the first Mithridatic war there are a handful of

163 E.g. Aphrod. 3 (with the emendations of Bowersock Gnomon 56 [1984], 51), lines 33-48 (Greek text above at n. 17): "for these reasons, I will make every effort both in my public and private life to do what I can, while preserving my good faith, to benefit your polis, and to continually be the author of some good; and also that I shall make known to the senate and people what you have done as soon as I return to Rome"; Claros, Polemaios, col. II, lines 11-16: καλλίστας δὲ καὶ περὶ ἀναγκαιοτάτων τετέλεκεν προσβείας συμφερόντως πρὸς αὐτούς τοὺς ἡγουμένους ἱστορίας καὶ τὴν σύνκλητον ('the best embassies and those concerning the most urgent matters he carried out to the leading Romans and the senate'); cf. Aphrod. 8, lines 26-30; RDGE 18, lines 75-80, 87-88; no. 48, lines 10-12.

164 RDGE 35, lines 14-15: ἀποδεχόμεθα δὲ καὶ τὰ παρ᾽ ὑμῶν φιλάνθρωπα καὶ τὰς [πίστεις, καὶ αὐτοί δὲ πειρασόμεθα μηδὲνὸς λείπεσθαι έγχάριτος ἀποδόσει ('we accept your kindnesses and [good faith] and ourselves promise to do everything to return our gratitude'); cf. RDGE 38, lines 6-7: ἐνεργάνοιτοι δὲ καὶ δὲ οἴστι τὸν τε ἄγων αὐτῶν γυμνικόν καὶ τὴν θυσίαν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν συνετελέσατε ('your envoys made clear that you had carried out gymnastic games and sacrifices in our honour'); RDGE 47, col. II, lines 29-31: δήμων τε καὶ ἔθνων ψηφισαμένων τιθέναι θυμελίκοις καὶ [γυμνικός ἄγων ερασα]
instances in which a city begins its petition with a request to make a sacrifice on the Capitoline Hill to the Roman people. In later texts, it is not uncommon to find a petition to (say) Augustus begin with references to his past benefactions or news of some honour given him by the city.

More often however – even during these periods – cities were eager simply to convey their goodwill and/or friendship. The examples are so ubiquitous that they hardly need to be catalogued. Many have already been discussed in the course of this chapter and these have usually demonstrated the importance of these reciprocal relations in Roman senatus consulta – that is, Greek envoys would assert their εὐνοία, φιλία, πίστις, etc., which the Senate, in turn, would acknowledge and reciprocate. However, Greek honourary decrees – that is, language that is a part of the grand interstate dialogue, but not always directly dialogic – illustrate this same modus operandi. Take for example an early-second century honorary decree from Lampsacus for a certain Hegesias, who secured the support of the people of Massalia to help them petition the Senate to be included among the signatories of the treaty with Philip V in 197. Before the Senate, the Massaliot envoys “made clear the goodwill and esteem which they had continually had toward the Romans” before renewing their friendship and pronouncing their εὐνοία; Hegesias himself later did the same for Lampsacus in his address to the Senate.
Similarly, an Alabandan decree of the late-second or early-first century summarily recounts the charge it gave its envoys travelling to Rome: renew current familiar and friendly relations with the Romans, remind them of the victuals given their army (against either Aristonicus or Mithridates), and obtain an alliance. Of course, we have also noted the efforts to which the Ephesians went in their decree to convey their continued sense of goodwill and friendship to Rome.

These decrees had nothing to do with Rome directly, and yet we find them repeating what is recorded in the programmatic senate decrees: the envoys’ first task was to convince the Romans of their goodwill and friendship. For, as we have discussed, proving one’s goodwill and friendship toward the Romans was tantamount to expressing loyalty to them; that is, in as much as loyalty could be expressed in the language of reciprocity, the reverse was also true: speaking in terms of friendship, goodwill, gratitude, benefactions, etc., was a way of expressing faithfulness. These expressions (leaving aside their naturally consequent actions) were a symbolic fee offered to the Romans for past benefactions and a down payment for future good services, expected according to the rules of reciprocity.
Given, therefore, its significance as a currency in the empire, it is not surprising to find the Greeks renewing friendship or goodwill with the Romans on their own initiative as a first stage of interaction – as can be seen, for example, in the Lampsacene and Alabandan cases discussed above. It is clear from these examples, and the temporal arrangement of senatus consulta (see Introduction), that an embassy's first act before the Senate was always to 'renew' its friendship and/or goodwill with the Romans – whether such a condition had been acknowledged earlier or not. This is an important point. For it means that Greek cities initiated, and thereby set the terms of, the mode of interaction (e.g. in the reciprocal register). By engaging the Romans in this form, Greek cities bound the Romans to respond similarly, according to the rules of reciprocal exchange. To that extent, following such renewals, the Senate declared the envoys 'fine and good friends of a friendly people' and renewed Rome's friendship with the city.

Asserting faithfulness and setting the terms of interaction in the reciprocal register, Greek communications with Rome then typically expressed a request of the city, thus acting as a medium for the petition of Rome. Sometimes these requests could be quite dense, such as the itemized requests submitted by the Thisbaeans in 170 or the Stratonicaeans in 84, or the Aphrodisians in 39. Regularly, however, the requests were concise and addressed an immediate concern, be it a privilege, land dispute, civic

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171 The practice can also be found in exclusively inter-polis communications of the period, e.g, SIG\(^3\) 683, lines 7-8; I. Iasos 152, lines 30-35.

172 RDGE 2, which were submitted by "those envoys who had remained in the friendship of the Romans" (lines 7-8); RDGE 18, on which see below, n. 247; Aphrod. 8.

173 E.g., RDGE 1, 20, 25, 26, 30, 34-36, 44, 48, 49, 55, 57, 69, 70; Tyche 9 (1994), 113-130.

174 E.g. RDGE 7, 9, 10, 14.
dispute,\textsuperscript{175} recovery of property,\textsuperscript{176} or complaint against the publicans.\textsuperscript{177} In some cases a city might simply request of the Senate or (more commonly) Roman magistrates that they do something “advantageous” for them, or keep them in mind, as the Lampsacenes did of L. Flamininus after the victory over Philip; interestingly here, the Lampsacenes felt that it fell to the Romans to continually champion their interests because of their metropolis, Messene, whose citizens were kinsmen and friends in good standing of the Romans, which made themselves kinsmen and friends of Rome.\textsuperscript{178} In any of these cases, ‘friendly’ Greek petitions regularly requested, anticipated and received not just present, but future benefactions. The people of Tabae, for example, appear to have asked the Romans to look out for them generally, judging from the Senate’s response that “everything now and in the future should be the best for them and the Senate and people of Rome should keep them in mind.”\textsuperscript{179} In fact the people of Letae, after establishing games and civic honours for M. Annius, asked that he might accept the goodwill of the people and in the present and future look to be the author of some good.\textsuperscript{180} It was with some frequency that Roman

\textsuperscript{175} E.g. \textit{RDGE} 5, 43, 45, 59, 66, 67.

\textsuperscript{176} E.g. \textit{RDGE} 3, 6, 15, 21, 33, 37, 38, 61.

\textsuperscript{177} E.g. \textit{RDGE} 12, 23, 54.

\textsuperscript{178} \textit{SIG}\textsuperscript{3} 591, lines 18-27: [ἀπελογίσατο αὐτῷ] διὰ πλείωνων διότι οἱ συγγενεῖς ὑπὸν καὶ φίλος ὁ δῆμος τοῦ Ῥωμαίων δῆμον ἔξαπέστειλεν αὐτούς πρὸς αὐτόν, καὶ διότι ἀξίοις αὐτόν καὶ παρακαλοῖς μετὰ τῶν συμπεριφερέντων, ὄντων ἡμῶν συγγενῶν τῶν Ῥωμαίων, προνοεῖν περὶ τῆς πόλεως ἡμῶν, ἓν συντελεῖ[α ἃν εἶναι δοκή] άν τοί δῆμοι ἐπιβάλλειν γὰρ αὐτοῖς δεί προϊότασθαι τῶν τῇ πολεί συμφερόντων διὰ τε [τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν] ἡμῖν πρὸς αὐτοὺς συγγένειαν, ἵνα καὶ ἁποδέξασθαι αὐτούς, καὶ διὰ τὸ Μασσαλίτας εἶναι ἡμῖν ἀδελφούς, οὗ εἰς φίλοι καὶ σύμμαχοι τοῦ δήμου τοῦ Ῥωμαίων; cf. \textit{ISE} 42, lines 4-5.

\textsuperscript{179} \textit{RDGE} 17, lines 3-7: ἅρπεσθαι τῇ συν[περ]φερέντῳ καὶ τοῖ δῆμοι [πάντα] αὐτοῖς ὄπως ἅρπεσθαι εἶναι ἐξεσθαι τε, τὰ[ν τὸ σύνκλητον καὶ τὸν δῆμον τὸν Ῥωμαίων αὐτούς διὰ] μνήμης ἔχειν ἔξειν τε; cf. \textit{RDGE} 20, frg. C, lines 10-12: [ἄρπεσθα] τε εἶναι καὶ ἐξεσθαί ταῦτα τε [- - διὰ μνήμης ἔχειν ἔξειν τε δῶσειν τε [- -] ('the senate)... do and continue to do the best things and these ... to hold and continue to hold in their memory and give in the future ...').

\textsuperscript{180} \textit{SIG}\textsuperscript{3} 700, lines 44-45.
magistrates promised cities “to be continually the authors of some good” and look to improve the city’s condition, an undertaking which, of course, became explicit among patrons. 181

The final function of these texts (and the system of which they are a part) is the promotion of norms and expectations through their publication. 182 It was rare that Rome compelled a city to publish a document – more commonly the texts we find inscribed on marble are made on the authority of the cities themselves (one further sign of the city’s autonomy). The state sanction and public display of these texts – both Greek and Roman – in the polis reinforced and reproduced the norms and expectations of the reciprocal system, both to the citizens themselves and Roman visitors. It demonstrated the terms by which the polis was prepared to engage the Romans by assigning them a mutually understood role, and in this role assignment demonstrated their expectations and the norms to which the Romans should adhere. The most obvious example of this is the Greeks’ frequent description of the Romans as common benefactors. By employing this language, the Greeks are, in effect, accepting the hegemony of the Romans in so long as it was expressed in terms of benefaction: “The practice expressed Roman powers but also

181 RDGE 15, lines 47-48; no. 26b, lines 4, 35; no. 33, lines 5-6; no. 34, lines 22-24; no. 35, lines 7-10, no. 37, lines 9-10, no. 38, lines 21-23; no. 58, lines 79-80; no. 63, lines 8-10; SIG5 591, line 38; no. 700; Aphrod. 3, lines 41-43.

182 Greek civic decrees were naturally published autonomously. Regularly, decisions of the Roman senate or Roman magistrates were published on the initiative of the cities themselves, however there are rare cases where a senatus consultum includes a passage such that a polis may set up a copy in their city (e.g. RDGE 37, lines 1-2; no. 26, lines 22-23) or as relates to treaties (e.g. RDGE 16, line 12 [refering to a lex Rubria Acilia, which seems to have concerned the publication of treaties]; Aphrod. 8, lines 92-94). The only Republican-era document containing explicit publishing instructions is the SC de Bacchanalibus (ILLRP 511 = FIRAd 1.30), lines 22-30 (cf. the recently discovered early principate-era SC de Cn. Pisone Patre [D. Potter and C. Damon in AJPh 120 (1999), 13-42], lines 166-172); Sherk, RDGE p. 11-13.
an ideology of empire and its acceptance by the Greeks." Thus we observed above that the epithet could be something of a palliative to obeying Roman requests.

Such a function, however, appears throughout the correspondence and diplomacy with Rome more generally. Again, we can return to an earlier observation that Greeks regularly began their dealings with Rome by renewing friendship with them – even if such a condition had not otherwise been admitted earlier. The effect was to cast the Romans in the role of φίλος, which came with the expectation of kindness and goodwill – which in practical terms meant accession to their request. While the system was self-perpetuating, Greek envoys routinely initiated communications along these lines and to that extent can be said to have set the terms of each interaction in the format of reciprocity; the Romans regularly replied in kind, proclaiming envoys and city likewise to be their friend and renew their own goodwill, etc. Actions such as this, and the regular assertions of goodwill and friendship with Rome, promoted the reciprocal system as the orthodox medium for interaction, which was in the interest of the polis. For such a system had acknowledged rules, which the city was confirming, reproducing, and proclaiming its commitment to, that bound the Romans (and themselves) to follow. It remains now to extend this line of inquiry and consider, in setting and repeatedly committing to this discourse, how the Greek polis contextualized Roman power.

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183 Ma, Antiochos III, 214.
184 Above on page 225.
185 Ma, Antiochos III, 213: “civic statements about kings, diffused by various means, were efficient in defining actors and behaviour, promoting the euergetical discourse as the orthodox medium for interaction between ruler and ruled, publicizing moralizing norms and commitments to these norms, and hence enforcing behaviour desired by the local communities.”
3.3 – ROMAN POWER IN THE POLIS CONTEXT

Turning now from the instrumental function of the reciprocal system, let us consider how the polis, through this same system, received, ordered and normalized Roman power. That is, how did Greek cities internalize the dominant power of the Romans and how did the discourse and system of exchange facilitate it? Or, looking at the problem from a different angle, how did the promotion of the Romans as friends and benefactors rather than, say, as victors or conquerors help to shape the polis’ conception of Roman power and integrate it into their own identity and ideology?

3.3.1: Freedom, Autarchy and the Traditional Polis Narrative

Ferrary rightly observes that by framing the Romans as friends and benefactors, rather than victors and conquerors, the Greeks avoided the stark realities of Roman power, especially its potential to act through brute force alone, which would have exposed the poleis of the East patently as subjects; instead, Greek cities conceived of the Romans much like any other foreign power with whom they interacted (i.e. by exchanging good services), thereby positioning Rome within their own existing ideology of power, which they of course initiated and reproduced in their dialogues with the hegémon.\(^{186}\) Above all, it must be understood that the system of reciprocity in which the Romans and Greek cities interacted had at its core the notion that the polis was an autonomous unit conceived of as having the capacity to freely choose its own course of action. We have discussed this at length in the previous chapter, and in the context of reciprocity alluded to it in several places in this chapter thus far. In order to bring the

\(^{186}\) Ferrary, Philhellénisme, 117-131, esp. 130-131.
discussion into focus, I shall concentrate particularly on the identity of the Romans as friends.

The discourse of friendship corresponded to the narrative of freedom that circumscribed Greco-Roman relations more broadly. Drawn as it was from the Greek tradition, Greco-Roman friendship was characterized not only as a voluntary and mutually beneficial relationship, but one that was predicated also on a measure of equality.\textsuperscript{187} Often in diplomatic literature one finds φιλία/amicitia closely associated with συμμαχία/societas such that – as we have seen intermittently to this point – cities, kings and individuals were often described as “friends and allies” of the Roman people or were said to exist in a state of “friendship and alliance” with them. These doublets appear in the Hellenistic literature,\textsuperscript{188} but during our period doubtless also reflect the strong Roman-Italian tradition of interstate relations based around societas – an alliance traditionally cemented by a formal treaty (foedus).\textsuperscript{189} More than a century ago now, though, Matthaei demonstrated that the doublet amicitia et societas in Greco-Roman relations was conceptually closer to the informal and egalitarian amicitia than the formal and rigidly structured societas; nor was it a unique diplomatic category in its own

\textsuperscript{187} Above, p.203.

\textsuperscript{188} E.g. \textit{Staatsvertr.} III, nos. 445, line 1 (Athens and Sparta; 303); 446, lines 8-9 (Hellenic League; 302); 476 (= SIG\textsuperscript{2} 434/5), lines 35-41 (Athens and Sparta; 267-5); 486, lines 7; 11 (Antiochus II and Lyttos; 250); 492 (= \textit{OGIS} 229), lines 15-22 (Smyrna and Magnesia; c. 243); 498, lines 13, 24-25 (Demetrius II and Gortyn; 237); 545, lines 18-20 (Kos and Kalymnium; c. 205-201); 549, line b7 (Philip V and Lysimacheia; ca. 202-197); cf. Polyb. 4.15.10 (Achaeans and Messena; 220); 4.29.2 (Acheans and Scerdilias; 220); 7.9.6 (Philip V and Hannibal; 215); Gruen, \textit{HWCR}, 69-76.

Thus, for example, the people of the small island of Astypalaea were regarded as "fine and good friends" (καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς καὶ φίλος) by the Roman senate, even after completing a formal treaty, which itself contained the phrase, "let there be peace, friendship and alliance for all time on land and sea". In fact, formal treaties with eastern poleis regularly included an exhortation for the maintenance of the new amicitia et societas in perpetuity. This close association between amicitia and societas in the East underscores the mutually supportive expectations among "friends", just as among allies.

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190 E.g. Livy 36.3.8 (Senate asking the Fetal College) num prius societas et amicitia eis renuntianda esset quam bellum indicendum ("whether they had to renounce friendship and alliance before declaring war"), with the observation that the declaration of war would dissolve the treaty; the theoretical and temporal distance between the Romans' renunciation of friendship with Antiochus III in 172 (se amicitiam et societatem renuntiasse, Livy 42.25.12) and their declaration of war in 171 (Perseus ... adversus foedus ... sociis populi Romani arma intulisset, Livy 42.30.10). Perhaps of some note, in RDGE 10b the Senate addresses the Samians as "friend and ally" (lines 4-5) but the Prienians as only "ally" (lines 7-8; cf. frg. A, line 3). L. Matthaei, "On the Classification of Roman Allies" CQ 1 (1907), 185-190, with further examples; cf. Magie, RRAM II.960-961 n. 70; Horn, Foederati, 10-12; D. Baronowski, Treaties of Military Alliance between Rome and Hellenistic States (Diss. Univ. Toronto 1982). Contrast Mommsen, Röm.Staatsr. III.590-592.

191 RDGE 16a, lines 3-7: ἄνδρα καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν [παρὰ δήμου] καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ φίλον προσαγ[ένθηκεν τούτω]ς [φιλανθρώπως άποκριθήναι ἐδοξεν καὶ] ὡτὶ Πόπλιος ὑπάτος χάλκωμα συμμαχίας [ταύτης ἐν τῷ] Καπετωλίῳ κατηλωθήναι φροντίσῃ ("The envoy should be publicly addressed as a fine and good man, from a people fine and good, and our friend, and a kind response should be given him. Decreed. The consul, P. Rufus, should see to it that a bronze plaque of this alliance is nailed up on the Capitol").

192 SEG LIII 658, lines 6-11: π[ρὸς τὸν δήμον τῶν] Ῥωμαίων καὶ τὸν δήμον τῶν Μαρ[ωνίτων καὶ τῶν] Αἰνίων ... μὲθ' αὐτῶν φιλία καὶ συμμαχία καλὴ ἔστω καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν εἰς τὸν ἄπαντα χρόνον ("let there be friendship and alliance between the people of Rome and the people of Maronea and the people of Aenos ... on both land and sea for all time"); RDGE 16, lines 26-29; SIG 732, line 10; I. Knidos 33, line 10; Mitchell, Pap.Gr.Schoy, lines 6-8; cf. SIG 694, lines 44-48, which reveals that the treaty was followed by a prayer "for the good luck and safety of our people and the Romans ... that the friendship and allegiance with the Romans will remain with us for all time."

193 There is at least one case in the sources that suggests that even socius could be an informal epithet: in the SC de Itanorum et Hierapyttoniorum litibus (RDGE 14) the Itians are explicitly "not publicly proclaimed as allies" ([ο]ὗτος συμμάχως αὐτῶς προσηγορεῖσθαι, line 11) by the Roman senate, which would have been indisputable had there been a formal foedus between the two states, which would have been inscribed on bronze at set up at Rome on the Capitol as a matter of course; cf. RDGE 23, lines 18/19 in which the Hermadorus, priest of Amphiaros, was explicitly said to have been "previously addressed by the Senate as ally" (δησὶς πρώτον ὑπὸ τῆς συνκλήτου σύμμαχος προσηγορεμένος ἔστιν).
Foedera themselves between Rome and Greek city-states do not seem to have been common, but where texts survive they make clear that such treaties were bilateral agreements conceptualized and produced on the basis of equality. The standard language of the Greco-Roman treaty included three relevant instrument clauses: i) the prohibition that either party allow the other’s enemy through their (or their subjects’) territory; ii) an interdiction against providing victuals and supplies to the other’s enemy; and iii) the supply of aid if war were made against either side or its subjects. In these bilateral defence treaties Rome and the Greek cities are envisioned as equals with their own territories, subjects and peoples, who have mutually bound themselves to support one another – even a small island state like Astypalaea. Amendments to the treaty

194 Texts of Roman treaties with the East: ISE 87 (Aetolian League, 211); OGIS 762 (Cibyra, second half of the second century); SEG LIII 658 (Maronea & Aenus, 167? 84?); Avram, JGSLIII.1 (= ILLRP 516; Callatis, 140-69); Chr. Schuler, “Ein Vertrag zwischen Rom und den Lykiern aus Tyberissos” in idem (ed.), Griechische Epigraphik in Lykien (Vienna 2007), p. 59 (Tyberissus, Lycia; 167-46); SIG4 693 (Methymna, ca. 132-129); RDGE 16 (Astypalaea, 105); SIG4 377, 732, with IG IX 1.2.242 (Thyrnium; 94); Mitchell, Pap.Gr. Schoy. 2005 (Lycian League, 46); RDGE 26d-e (Mytilene, c. 46); IKnidos 33 (Knidos, ca. 45); RDGE 73 (Mytilene, 25); cf. 1Macc. 8.23-30. Other treaties mentioned, but without verbatim copies of the treaty itself can be found in: SEG XXIII 489(?) (Pharos; late third century [see Derow, “Pharos and Rome” ZPE 88 (1991), 261-270]); SEG LIII 659 (Maronea; 167); SIG4 694 (Elaea; c. 129); ISE 184 (Epidaurus; 111); lex prov. praet., col II, lines 21-24 (Byzantium; 106-101); Memnon ap. FGrHist. 343 F.18 (Heraclea; 106-101); RDGE 18 (Stratonicea; 81); Aphrodiasias 8 (Aphrodiasias; 39). For literary references to treaties, see: Horn, Foederati, passim; Gruen, HWCR I.731-744; Canal de Rossi, Ambascerie, passim. For further discussions, see Sherwin-White, RFPE, 58-70; P. Derow, “Pharos and Rome”, ZPE 88 (1991), 261-270; Kallet-Marx, Hegemony, 184-197.

195 Two other standard clauses are those for amending and publishing the document. The best preserved example of a Greco-Roman treaty comes from Maronea (SEG III 658), containing almost thirty-five undamaged lines, edited and commented on by D. Triantaphyllos, “Συμφωνία Ρωμαίων καὶ Μαρώνιτών” in Θρακική Ἑπετηρίδα 4 (1983), 419-446; cf. Ferrary, “Traitést domination”, 222-223. However, see now the Roman-Lycian treaty published by S. Mitchell (Pap.Gr.Schoy., esp. 195-211), which includes clauses not found in other eastern treaties, including provisions for the import and export of forbidden goods in and out of Rome and Lycia (ll. 26-32), managing capital and non-capital legal suits between Romans and Lycians at Lycia and Rome (ll. 32-43), pledges, hostages and ransomed prisoners (ll. 44-52), and a formal definition of the geography of the Lycian koinon (ll. 52-64). On the general structure of these treaties, see Täubler, Imp.Rom., 14-29; Baronowski, Treaties of Military Alliance, 109-121; and Mitchell, Pap.Gr.Schoy., 185-194.

196 In fact, most of the known Roman treaties in the east are with smaller poleis: e.g. Byzantium, Callatis, Cibyra, Elaea, Heraclea, Maronea, Methymna, Thrasyrhum; Kallet-Marx, Hegemony, 193-194.
were to be valid only if both parties mutually agreed (κοινὴ βουλή ἐκατέρων βουλομένων ἔξεστω). Thus some Roman authors speak of treaties as equal (foedus aequum), while Memnon, drawing on contemporary material, describes his own city’s condition in its treaty with the Romans as equal (ἴσος) and identical (ὁμοια). An exception to this is a clause found in the recently published treaty between the Romans and Lycian League (46 BCE): “the Lycians should maintain the power (ἐξουσία) and eminence (ὑπεροχή) of the Romans [firmly?], as is proper, for all time in a manner worthy of themselves and the Roman people.” The condition would seem to be an early example of the so-called maiestas clause, which the Julio-Claudian era jurist, Proculus, described as “stipulating that the people in question must courteously preserve the majesty (maiestas) of the other people.” The phrasing might go back to the post-war settlement with the Aetolian League in 189, and was perhaps included in a treaty with the Spanish city of Gades in 78. These are the only Republic references, which

197 E.g. SEG LIII 658, lines 36-41: εάν τε πρὸς ταύτην τὴν συμμαχίαν προσσκεινα ἡ ἔξοδειν ὁ δήμος ὁ τῶν Ῥωμαίων καὶ ὁ δήμος ὁ τῶν Μαρωνίτων βούλονται, κοινῇ βουλῇ ἐκατέρων βουλομένων ἔξεστω καὶ ὁ ἰσομετροῦσι τοῦτο ἐν τῇ συμμαχίᾳ ἐνέστω, ὁ δὲ ἐν ἀξέλωσιν, τοῦτο ἐν τῇ συμμαχίᾳ μὴ ἐνέστω; cf. OGIS 762, lines 10-13; Schuler, Gr.Epigr.Lyk., lines 13-14; SIG6 693, lines 17-20; RDGE 16, lines 45-48; Mitchell, Pap.Gr.Schoy., lines 69-73; I.Knidos 33, lines 6-10; ILLRP 2.516, lines 16-20 (Latin).

198 Memnon, FGrH 434 F18.10: καὶ τέλος συνθήκη προήλθον Ῥωμαίοις τε καὶ Ἡρακλεώταις, μὴ φίλους εἶναι μόνον ἄλλα καὶ συμμάχους ἄλληλοις, καθ᾽ ὑπὲρ ὑπὲρ ὑπὲρ ἐν συνομολογίᾳ ἰσοίς καὶ ὁμοίας ἔφερον, ὦν ὁ μὲν παρὰ Ῥωμαίοις ἐν τῷ κατὰ τὸ κατὰ τὸ μεταξὺ Ἰερὰ τοῦ Δία τῆς καθήλωσι, ὁ δὲ τῆς τῆς Ἡρακλείας καὶ αὐτοῦ ἐν τῷ τοῦ Δία τοῦ Ἰερᾶ (‘At last there came a treaty between the Romans and Heracleans declaring them not only friends but also allies with one another, against and on behalf of whoever the other party requested. And two bronze plaques bore the equal and identical agreement, which among the Romans was set up in the temple of Jupiter on the Capitol, and among the Heracleans in the Temple of Zeus.’). See also below, n.204.


200 Dig. 49.15.7.1: is populus alterius populi maiestatem comiter conservaret.
would suggest that such language was rare. Some scholars, following Taubler, would also reconstruct two fragmentary Augustan-era texts from Mytilene and Cnidos with similar language, although the Mytilenean treaty is not without other, better, alternatives and the Cnidos text is hopelessly fragmentary. Nevertheless, based on Proculus’ comments and now the Lycian treaty of 46, it does seem that by the Late Republic a new clause was introduced into Greco-Roman treaties that required a Roman socius to recognize and uphold Rome’s superiority. Given the development we have begun to see toward an imperial consensus, this is not surprising; but Proculus’ own comments demonstrate that such a condition did not violate a city’s freedom: “For this clause is added so that it may be understood that one of the peoples is superior, not that the other is not free ... it should be understood that these peoples, who must courteously preserve our

201 Aetolians: Polyb. 21.32.2: ὁ δῆμος ὁ τῶν Ἀιτωλῶν τὴν ἄρχην καὶ τὴν δυναστείαν τοῦ δήμου τῶν Ῥωμαίων (‘the people of the Aetolians should preserve the rule and power of the Roman people’); cf. Livy 38.11.2: imperium maiestatemque populi Romani gens Aetolorum conservanto sine dolo malo. It is important to recall that this Aetolian example is a post-war agreement and its language – if Polybius is accurate, and if Livy is correct to translate by maiestas (compare M. Dubuisson, Le Latin de Polybe [Paris 1985], 92-94 with J.-L. Ferrary, “Traités et Domination romaine”, 227 n. 25) – reflects the Romans’ particular concern with the Aetolians, who in the First Macedonian War had shown ingratitude toward the Romans’ beneficia and impugned their fides, and had done the same again recently by inviting Antiochus III into Greece to ‘free the Greeks’ (Gruen, HWCR I.30-32). Gades: Cic. Balb. 35: maiestatem populi Romani comiter conservante (‘Let them rightly preserve the majesty of the Roman people’). Note that similar language is found in domestic politics, such as the SC Ultimum of 100: ut imperium populi Romani maiestasque conservaretur (Cic. Rab. perd. 20).

majesty, are free". In fact Proclus is clear that allies are free and those who come into Rome’s friendship enjoy an equitable alliance (aequum foedus).

The late introduction of a *maiestas* clause – particularly with Proclus’ comments about it – and the consistent and standard presentation of equality in Greco-Roman treaties stand in stark contrast to those made with Rome’s Italian federates. These *foedera* regularly included obligations of the Italian ally to provide troops annually to the Romans to support their campaigns and obliged them to supply victuals and other aids to the Romans when called upon. In this regard, there existed at Rome the *formula togatorum*, a list maintained by the Romans for the purpose of determining the annual military contributions of the Italian allies. The Eastern-style *foedera*, therefore, correspond to and thereby confirm the equitable character of the *amicitia* that modelled

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203 Dig. 49.15.7.1: *hoc enim adicitur, ut intellegatur alterum populum superiorem esse, non ut intellegatur alterum non esse liberum ... eos, qui maiestatem nostrum comiter conservare debent, liberos esse intellegendum est.*

204 References, like Proclus’ (cf. Livy 34.57.7), to a *foedus aequum* led Täubler (*Imp. Rom.*, 62-66) and others (e.g. A. Heuss, *Die volkerrechtlichen Grundlage der römischen Aussenpolitik* [Leipzig 1933]; Dahlheim, *Struktur und Entwicklung*, 49, 69; modified by Baronowski, “Sub Umbris foederis Aequi”, 345-369; summarized in Sherwin-White, *RFPE* 58-59) to imagine a contrary *foedus iniquum* from which it might be distinguished for enshrining the liberties of the ally. The phrase *foedus iniquum*, however, is found only in Livy (35.46.10: *nullam enim ciuitatem se in Graecia nosse quae aut praesidium habeat aut stipendium Romanis pendat aut foedere iniquo adligata quas nolit leges patiatur* ['Mycithio (an Achaean leader) knew of no city in Greece that held a Roman garrison, paid tribute to the Romans, or suffered unwanted laws bound by an unfair treaty'], where it is certainly not being used in a technical sense. Such a rigid schema of alliances was not envisioned by the Romans of the Republic and is best abandoned; cf. the more nuanced treatment in Gruen, *HWCR* I.28-33. In any case, the limited evidence for *foedera iniqua* stands in stark contrast to the common presentation of equality in bilateral treaties between Rome and Greek poleis.

205 *lex agr.* lines 21 & 50: *nominis Latini, quibus ex formula togatorum [milites in terra Italia inperare solent] ... [nominis Latini, quibus ex formula togatorum milites in terra Italia inperare solent* (‘those of the Latin name, from whom (the Romans) are accustomed to order troops in Italy according to the list of *togati*’); Polyb. 6.21.4 τας ὑπάτους ἄρχας ἔχοντες παραγγέλλουσι τοῖς ἄρχοντες τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν συμβασίδων πόλεων τῶν ἐκ τῆς Ἰταλίας, ἕν ὧν δὲ βουλλοῦνται συστατεῖν τοὺς συμμάχους, διασαφούντες τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τῆς ἡμέραν καὶ τὸν τόπον, εἰς δὲ δεηούμενοι τοὺς κεκριμένους (‘the consuls send their orders to the allied cities in Italy that they wish them to contribute troops, stating the numbers required and the day and place at which they must present themselves’); cf. Livy 22.57.9-10; 27.9, 10.2-4; 34.56.3-7; A. Toynbee, *Hannibal’s Legacy* (London 1965), 424-437; P. Brunt, *Italian Manpower*, 545-548; D. Baronowski, “The Formula Togatorum”, *Historia* 33 (1984), 248-252.
Greco-Roman relations; this relation, furthermore, clearly operated within the confines of the narrative of freedom in that, at the very least, it did not imply one’s subjection to (and certainly not domination under) another and other conditions described in Chapter 2.

Above all, what remained significant about φιλία (καὶ συμμαχία) was its basic voluntary nature down to the end of the Republic. Often cited in this regard is a passage of Livy commenting on events of 198:206

The Senate ordered that the following response be given to the envoys: that the assistance which King Attalus has given the Roman commanders with his fleet and other forces has been very gratifying to the Senate. The Romans will not themselves send assistance to Attalus against Antiochus since he is an ally and friend (socius et amicus) of the Roman people, nor will they detain the auxiliaries which Attalus is furnishing longer than suits the king's convenience. When the Romans have made use of the resources of others they have always left liberty of action to others. If any wish to render active assistance to the Romans, it rests with them to take the first step as it does to take the last.

Here it is clear that amici et socii could freely provide help to or request help from the Romans, just as they were at liberty to accept or reject requests made of them by the Romans (in contrast to the Italian socii).207 Thus toward the end of the second century we find a decree of the neoi of Methymna refer to the city’s longstanding goodwill, friendship and alliance with the Romans, with whom they had recently “shared in

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206 Livy 32.8: Senatus legatis ita responderi iussit: quod rex Attalus classe copiisque aliis duces Romanos iussisset, id gratum senatui esse; auxilia nec ipsos missuros Attalo aduersus Antiochum, socium et amicum populi Romani, nec Attali auxilia retenturos ultra quam regi commodum esset; semper populum Romanum alienis rebus arbitrio alieno usum: et principium et finem in potestatem ipsorum qui ope sua uelint adiutos Romanos esse; cf. Matthaei, “On the Classification of Roman Allies” 191, 194-196; E. Badian, “Rome and Antiochus the Great: A Study in Cold War” CPh 54 (1959), 82-83, who questions the language of Livy here (following Holleaux Études d’epigraphie et d’histoire grecques v. 3 [Paris, 1938], 331ff.) but finds that “it is in plausible official style and may well go back to good material ... there is the noticeable absence of the Roman blustering that often characterizes annalistic fabrications... in fact, it is hard to see why anyone should ever have doubted the truth of this report.”

207 By contrast, when Rhodes wanted an absolute assurance of support after its fallout with Rome, it petitioned the senate for a formal treaty (Polyb. 30.31.1-20).
common the war in Asia” against Aristonicus.\footnote{SEG III 710, lines 9-12: έτι δὲ καὶ διὰ τὴν οὖσαν αὐτῶι ἀπὸ τῆς ἁρπαγῆς πρὸς Ὀρμαίους εὖνοιάν τε καὶ φιλίαν καὶ διὰ τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν πρὸς αὐτοὺς συμμαχίαν κοινωνοῦντος τοῦ συνεστώτος αὐτοῖς ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ πολέμου.}

It is worth drawing attention to the language of partnership in this passage, the context of which is the financial strain faced by the city because of a bad harvest and the cost of the war: the polis acts in partnership (κοινονεῖν) and has joined in (συνίσταται) with the Romans in an act of common interest.\footnote{The same was true of the Romans: when drumming up support against Perseus, the Romans urged all Greeks to remember their past friendship: \textit{ISE} 42, lines 5-8: ἀποσταλεῖς δὲ καὶ προσβευτὰς \[μετὰ\] γὰρ ἑνὸς ἔχου τοῦ ὑπάτου στραταγοῦ τῶν Ῥωμαίων \[ὃκεὶ\] τοῦς ἀχαιοὺς παρακαλῶν διαφυλάσσειν τὰν τε φιλίαν καὶ συμμαχίαν τὰς πολὶ Ῥωμαίως (‘since Cn. Octavius was sent as envoy with Caius \[sc. Popilius Laenus\] by Aulus \[sc. Hostilius Mancinus\], consul of the Romans, he has come to call upon the Achaeans to preserve their friendship and alliance with the Romans.’); cf. \textit{SIG} 613b (with Bousquet, \textit{BCH} 105 [1981], 407-416).}

Far from blaming their current financial hardships on any onerous obligations demanded by the Romans to prosecute the war, the people of Methymna speak only of their desire to fulfill their role as friend and ally.\footnote{\textit{SIG} 693 seems to be the text of the \textit{foedus} between Methymna and the Romans.} Similarly, while Q. Oppius deemed the Aphrodisians’ help against Mithridates as something “befitting a good friend and ally of the Roman people”, implying that he expected the city to support him (ἐπιβαλλεῖν),\footnote{\textit{Aphrod.} 3, lines 26-29; \textit{LSI}, s. v. ἐπιβαλλεῖν Π.7} he nevertheless described it as εὖνοια, and conveyed his genuine gratitude toward the Aphrodisians, who themselves presented their action as one of choice and part of their long-standing policy (αἰρέσις).\footnote{\textit{Aphrod.} 2, (text above, n. 17). Note particularly ἐκφράσειν (line 2), ἐλατο (line 2), δεδοχθαὶ τῷ δήμῳ ἐλέονθα (line 5), ἐλάλημεθα (line 8), προσαρρομέθα (line 14); cf. Reynolds, \textit{Aphrod.}, p. 15.}

Often, in fact, Greek cities promoted their friendly actions as part of their προσαρρομέθα – a word whose verbal force (αἰρέσθατι) is grounded in choice, and refers to a consciously chosen course of action, a \textit{principle or policy}. If we look back at the...
Methymna document we find the *neoi* claiming to have based their decision to help the *polis* on the city’s *προαιρέσις* toward the Romans. Elaea, which had supported the Romans in the conflict with Aristonicus, claimed that in this “the Roman People witnessed the *προαιρέσις* of its people, accepted our goodwill, and favourably received our people as friend and ally”. Similar sentiments are littered throughout the documents of the second and first century, emphasising not just a consistent course of action, but underscoring that such action was freely taken.

By characterising their actions as a choice, Greek *poleis* framed actions that might otherwise be thought of as taken in the interests of Rome in traditional terms of *polis* autarchy. While in many cases they were making a decision based on political expediency – viz. not supporting Rome would bring negative consequences – they nevertheless framed it as a decision made freely by the people in the best tradition of the (autonomous) *polis*. Their *προαιρέσις*, furthermore, was one made out of *moral* obligation placed upon them by the norms of traditional *φιλία*, not a coercion by a greater power. The Romans, too, for their part, were constrained by the rules of Greek friendship and had to profess mutual goodwill with individual Greek *poleis* and Hellenes in general, whom they were obliged to address and act toward with a strong measure of equality (in contrast to Italian friendly allies). Framing relations with Rome within the discursive

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213 SEG III 710, lines 14-16.


215 RDGE 18, line 46; no. 33, line 4; no. 40, line 24; no. 43, lines 14-16; SEG III 710; SIG 630, line 7; no. 694, lines 14, 20; ISE 42, lines 3-5; I. Metrop. line 22; Claros, Menippos, col. III, line 14; Aphrod. 2, lines 4 and 9.
field of φιλία – that is, a voluntary arrangement that implied mutual obligations between nominal equals – can be said to have deproblematized the accretion of Roman authority in the eyes of the polis. By casting their obedience to Roman wishes in the framework of the dutiful friend performing morally obliged εὔνοια (a friend who expected similar considerations in return), the Greek polis remained an autonomous political unit.

3.3.2: Honouring Those Who Deal with Rome

In honourary decrees to their own citizens, Greek cities not infrequently made reference to Rome or Romans. In these instances, Roman power, though often peripheral to the subject of the decree, is expressed and even drawn into the foreground as a means for the city to emphasize its own relation with the ἡγεμόν. A striking, though common, example is an Oropian decree for a certain Hieron, who spoke on the city’s behalf before the Achaean League and earned the Oropians’ release from Athenian control some time after 160. The Oropian-Athenian dispute was a Greek affair, and the description of Hieron’s efforts is fairly brief (seventeen of thirty-five lines), and yet twice the Oropians record Hieron’s successful argument – to judge from the remaining text his only argument (surely untrue) – that cities in the friendship of the Romans ought not to be mistreated. Other similar examples can be cited: a Bargylian decree honours

216 On the Athenians’ seizure of Oropus, see Polyb. 32.11.5-6; Paus. 7.11.4-8; E. Gruen, “The Origins of the Achaean War” JHS 96 (1976), 51-53, finding Pausianas’ account incredulous and reconstructing a more plausible account based around SIG² 675 (below).

217 SIG² 675 (= I.Oropus 307), lines 18-22: πρὸς τε Ἀθηναίους καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς ἀντιπρεσβεύοντας ὑπὲρ σας καὶ παρεστήσατο τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς μὴ περιδε[ν] πόλιν Ἐλληνίδα ἐξανδραποδισθείσας, οὕτως γε ἐν τῇ Ῥωμαίων φιλίᾳ καὶ πίστει (‘He opposed the Athenians and others who had gathered in opposition to his cause and submitted to the Acheans that they should not overlook a Greek polis thoroughly reduced to slavery yet still in the friendship and good faith of the Romans’); cf.
Posidonius for a life of devotion to the city, particularly his efforts at securing immunity from supplying Rome against Aristonicus, the background to which is discussed for over fifteen lines and emphasizes the Romans’ strength and military superiority;\(^{218}\) Aristoteles of Troezen was praised by the Delphians for his historical readings and encomia for Rome;\(^{219}\) Diodoros Pasparos of Pergamum received his cult and other extraordinary civic privileges more for his embassies to Rome than his benefactions for Pergamum;\(^{220}\) an unknown Chian was praised for helping stage a festival for the Romans, welcoming Roman representatives to the city, and erecting a votive offering for the goddess Roma, which he is said to have done so that “the city might do what was proper for the glory and honour of the Romans” and so that the Romans “might know the city’s goodwill toward them”.\(^{221}\)

Examples like these can be multiplied many times over, though we could imagine a counterfactual world where cities minimized or wholly omitted the Romans from their civic honourary decrees: Oropus need not have recorded Hieron’s argument, Bargylia could have focused on any other aspect of Posedonius’ work for the city, Delphi did not have to specify Aristoteles’ encomium for Rome (or could have mentioned any other of his ρέγαματευμένα), and the Chians could have simply summarized their citizen’s lines 8-12. Oropus had earlier appealed its capture to the Romans, who passed along the dispute to Sicyon, whose decision the Athenians later appealed to Rome, and was ultimately ignored. See Polyb. 32.11.5-6; Paus. 7.11.4-8; E. Gruen, “The Origins of the Achaean War”, 51-53, observing that “Rome’s role in all this is minor and distant” (p. 53).

\(^{218}\) *Iasos* 612, lines 13-27.

\(^{219}\) *SIG*\(^3\) 702, see below p. 268.

\(^{220}\) *IGRP* IV 292, 1, 17, 36; no. 293, col. II, line 11; no. 294, lines 29-30; L. Robert, *Études anatoliennes* (Paris 1937), 49 n.4; Pasparos’ rewards are laid out in *IGRP* IV 292, lines 4-15.

\(^{221}\) Derow & Forrest, *ABSA* 77 (1982), 79-80, lines 23-25 (text below, n. 265).
accomplishments as civic liturgies. Yet to do so in any of these cases would have been to lose the opportunity of drawing the city closer to the Romans; by introducing the Romans in local civic honourary decrees, cities found yet another format to emphasize their relationship and support for (and from) the Romans, and continue the cycle of reciprocity. A by-product of this practice was the normalization of Roman power in local civic ideology—a power that was repeatedly expressed, reproduced, and integrated as consistent with civic autonomy and governed by the rules of reciprocity.

Often, for example, citizens were praised for making the dangerous journey to the Senate or to a Roman provincial magistrate and bringing about some good for the city, their honourary decrees, naturally, stand as testaments to their concern for the city, but they also foreground the Romans as powerful benefactors of the polis—the goodwill and benefactions of the envoy were, in a broad sense, merely (if significantly) transitory relative to those of the Romans, the ultimate locus of (universal) benefaction. In this way, we find the Romans again playing the role of common benefactors. A clear example of this is a short Rhodian dedication to an unnamed πρόξενος and εὐεργέτης for his embassies to at least five Roman magistrates, whose names and offices are listed in full. The dedication is initially striking from a visual perspective with more than two

[222] Danger: SIG 591, line 13; SIG 656, line 20; SEG LI 1495, lines 17-18; ISE 169, line 20; Aphrod. 5, line 18. Journey to Rome (apart from those not discussed): SIG 613, lines 13-19; Ager, Arbitrations, 78; SEG LI 1495; SEG XXXIV 1198; ISE 169; SIG 656 (with Eilers, RPGC for new reading and date); IG IV.2.1.63; Canali de Rossi, Ambascerie, passim.

thirds of the civic honourary decree addressing Romans; more significant still, for our purposes here, is that two of the magistrates, L. Licinius Murena (propr. 83-82) and A. Terentius Varro (leg. 82-83), are recorded also as πρόξενοι and εὐεργέται of the Rhodian people, recalling their earlier honorific titles from the city. Thus, while our unknown benefactor is the subject of the dedication, the bulk of the text is consumed by the names of Romans, two of whom are acknowledged as benefactors of the people such that the good actions of the honoured Rhodian citizen are placed relative to these Romans, and, indeed, Roman power is again couched according to the model of reciprocity.

Of the many embassies carried out by Menippos and Polemaios on behalf of Colophon, those carried out to ‘the very senate of our ἡγουμένοι’ and the leaders themselves were often characterized as “the best (μεγίσται) and concerning the most pressing affairs (ἀναγκαίωτάτα)” 225 This was both a positive statement – the privileges these men preserved were important to their city – but also a normative attitude, expressing a common understanding that the Roman senate was the place that heard the most important disputes or issues. Travelling to the Roman senate came at great risk and

went on embassy to ...] and to L. Cornelius son of Lucius Sulla, proconsul of the Romans, and to L. Cornelius son of Lucius Lentulus proconsul, and to L. Licinius son of Lucius Murena, imperator, proxenos and benefactor of the people, and to L. Licinius son of Lucius Lucullus, proquaestor, and to A. Terentius son of Aulus Varro, legate of the Romans, proxenos and benefactor of the People, for his goodwill and benefactions toward the people. Dedicated to the gods.’).

224 See IG V 1.1454 (Murena); I.Kalchedon 8 (= IG XII 8.260) (Terentius).

225 Claros Menippos col. I, lines 12-19; col. III, lines 11-13: χρησιμότατος παρὰ τοῖς ἡγουμένοις γέγονε τοῖς δήμοι παρ’ οἷς ἀναγκαίωταται πάσιν έλειν άνθρωποι χρεία (‘Menippos became most useful to the people before the (Roman) authorities, to whom are brought all the most important affairs to men’); cf. Polemaios, col. II, lines 11-16: καλλίτατας δὲ καὶ περι ἀναγκαιοτάτων τετελεκήν πρεσβείας συμφερόντως πρὸς αὐτούς τοὺς ἡγουμένους Ρωμαίοις καὶ τὴν σύνκλητον (‘but the best embassies and those concerning the most urgent matters were those carried out to the Roman magistrates themselves and the senate’); cf. IGRP IV 293, col. II lines 11-20.
cost to the envoy and concerned issues relating directly to the security, prosperity, or autonomy of the state. As such, the act of going on embassy to Rome became an avenue for civic elite to perform their traditional liturgical role and to demonstrate their goodwill and concern for the community. This is aptly captured in a decree of Alabanda:

Since the people are eager to renew their current familiarity and friendship with the Romans, to remind them of the supplies we offered their army, and to make an alliance with them, it was decided to send an embassy to the Senate .... When he was called upon by the people, Pyrrhicus eagerly responded, avoiding no danger to himself, and while abroad he successfully accomplished the purpose of his embassy to the advantage of the country. When he returned from this expedition and the people learned what he had accomplished, as well as his noble character, they recognized his course of action with all goodwill and honoured him with a bronze statue.²²⁶

The relationship, as we should expect, is presented in the language and form of reciprocity, while also evident here is the importance of Pyrrhicus’ embassy itself to the Senate and his own high rank among the citizenry prior to leaving and his even more vaunted status upon returning. Indeed those chosen to go on embassy to Rome were often drawn from the elite: when the koinon of Asia sent an embassy to the Senate in the mid-first century to dispute the actions of the publicani it chose from among the men of first rank and most highly honoured.²²⁷ As with other liturgies, civic leaders were not always eager to serve as envoy, though for our purposes this does not diminish the

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²²⁷ Aphrod. 5, lines 6-7: ἐκ τῶν πρώτων καὶ μάλιστα τιμω[μένων]; cf. Aphrod. 2; SEG LI 1495; Sardis VII 1.8.
manner in which such a trip was conceptualized within the world of the *polis*. At Lampsacus, despite being promised an honourary decree from the βουλή upon their return, many men declined to go to Rome before Hegesias volunteered, nobly of course "considering his own affairs of less regard than those of the community".\(^\text{228}\) Though Hegesias seems not to have been his people’s first choice – perhaps owing to his inexperience in public life – he succeeded in his mission and was lavishly praised upon his return.\(^\text{229}\) Indeed, it would seem that some could use an embassy to Rome to initiate a public career: at Gordos, we find an honourary decree for an unknown citizen that praises the honorand’s successful embassies to the Romans before relating his subsequent good services as agonothete, *stratēgos*, and archon.\(^\text{230}\) More than likely, however, as with the Alabandans and Asian *koinon* above, cities would have chosen from among their elites to carry out such important activities for the city, and in this fulfill their traditional roles as benefactors. What remains significant for our purposes is the way in which a trip to Rome could be normalized within the domestic politics of the Greek city-state such that one could perform one’s civic duty by interacting with the Romans, universal benefactors.\(^\text{231}\)

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\(^\text{229}\) Hegesias is otherwise unattested and the decree itself is without any formulary describing his earlier work on the city’s behalf.

\(^\text{230}\) *SEG* XXXIV 1198; Canali de Rossi, *Ambascerie* no. 297.

\(^\text{231}\) See also recent discussions in R. Schulz, “Vermittler, Patrioten oder Opportunisten? Die griechischen Eliten und ihre Kommunikation mit Rom 133-49 v. Chr.” *Historische Zeitschrift* 28 (2008), 341-357; B. Dreyer, “City Elite and the Administration of the Attalid Kingdom after the Peace of Apameia
And, of course, the more these (elite) men travelled to Rome, or interacted with leading Romans, the likelier they were to gain personal friendships among them, which produced further bonds of friendship for the city, further benefactions for the city, further honours for the individual, and further expectations of him and other elites, all in a spiral of interaction. Polemaios, for example, was said to have become "worthy of the friendship of the leading Romans" and received a testimonial (μαρτυρία) from the Senate to that effect.232 Menippos became even closer to certain Romans through his embassies such that he even served as ambassador on behalf of the Romans themselves to other Greek states. Needless to say, he became famous among many communities.233 But more importantly, it was through these friendships that he was able to establish relations of patronage between his city and important Romans and bring about the most advantageous conditions and privileges for Colophon. Not surprisingly, the closer that one got to powerful Romans, the more he might benefit his own city. Theophanes of Miletus became a close friend of Pompey (indeed earning Roman citizenship from the triumvir), and was considered after him a "founder of the city" by his people for earning the city its ancestral freedom from the Romans (the common benefactors).234 Caesar

232 Claros, Polemaios col. II, lines 26-28; cf. I.Iasos 612, in which we learn that Posidonius, who was said to have performed 'a great kindness' (line 38), was recorded among the ancestral friends of Q. Caepio by his sons, which was recorded by the people of Bargasa in their honourary decree for him as an indication of his worth (to the people).


234 SIG 752-755, esp. 753: Θεόδοτος: πατρίδος: μεγάλος, δικαίως, δοκιμως, δειπνησαι, τω σωτηρια και ευεργεται και κτισε δευτερω τας πατριδος: CRAI 1969, 52; cf. Cic. Arch. 24: quid? noster hic Magnus qui cum virtute fortunam adaequavit, nomine Theophanem Mytilenaenum, scriptorem rerum suarum, in contione militum civitate donavit? ("What, did not our own [Pompeius] Magnus, whose valour has been equal to his fortune, present Theophanes the Mitylenaean, a relater of his actions, with the freedom of the city in an
granted civic privileges to Pergamum because of his friendship with Mithridates, Marc Antony granted privileges to the guild of Victors of the Sacred Games because of his friend and trainer, Artemidoros, while Augustus pardoned Alexandria after the battle of Actium at the urging of his dear friend Areius and benefitted Rhosos on account of the goodwill of his admiral, Seleucus.235

3.3.3: Social Memory – Time, Cults and Festivals

Sometime before 157 a certain Aristotheus son of Timotheos travelled from his native city of Troezen in the Peloponnese to spend time at Delphi where, according to a decree of the Delphians, he passed a life worthy of the temple and his native city and was rewarded with the highest civic honours.236 While at Delphi, and as yet another reason (επειδή) for the city’s decree in his honour, the historian (Ιστοριογράφος) “spent many days giving recitations of his works, heaping praises upon the Romans, the common benefactors of the Greeks”.237 What is interesting here is the relationship between time, the Delphians’ social memory, and the Romans. Aristotheus is said to have lectured the assembly of the soldiers?). On Theophanes, see R. Laqueur, RE 5 (1922), coll. 2090-2127, s.v. “Theophanes”; Robert, “Théophanes de Mytilène à Constantinople” CRAI (1969), 42-64 (= Choix d’Écrits [Paris 2007], 603-621); B.K. Gold, “Theophanes of Mytilene and Pompey” AJPh 106 (1985), 312-327; V. Anastasiadis and G. Souris, “Theophanes of Mytilene: a new inscription relating to his early career” Chiron 22 (1992), 377-383.


236 SIG 702. The honours were awarded to himself and his descendants, and included the position of proxenos, first counsel with the Delphic oracle (προμαντεία), the right of first hearing (προδίκια), inviolability (ασυλία), immunity from local taxes (άτέλεια), first chair (προεδρία) in all competitions which the polis puts on, and anything else given to other proxenoi and euergētai (lines 7-9).

people for a number of days (ἐπὶ πλείονας ἀμέρας); these recitations were so successful they earned him an equestrian statue in the city and immortality on the brief inscription at its base. His lectures, we are told, were on his histories (πεπραγματευμένα), yet the Delphians relate nothing of their content except that they included encomia for the Romans. So, of all the numerous and varied topics treated by Aristotheus, the only ones that the Delphians recalled—or saw fit to publicize and preserve in perpetuity—regarded the Romans. In effect, the dedicatory decree creates and preserves an account in which Aristotheus lectured for numerous days on the excellence of the Romans, which the Delphians rejoiced at and rewarded with high honours. Again we find Roman power presented and depoliticized as benefaction, the universal quality of which (κοινός) was mirrored and justified by the prominence of the Romans in the historian’s wide-ranging study; and we see the extent to which that power could be expressed within the time and space of the polis, and normalized as a public good.

This text illustrates just one of the many ways in which Roman power (as benefactor) was incorporated into the living social memory of a Greek polis and normalized within its history. There were of course more grandiose ways. Following the Hellenistic tradition dating back to the Athenians’ honour to Demetrius Poliorcetes, some cities renamed months after the Romans or leading Romans. If we accept Fränkel’s interpretation of seal stamps from Pergamum, the former Attalid capital had a month of

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238 Aristotheus of Troezen is otherwise unattested in ancient sources; the original suggestion by L. Couve, “Inscriptions de Delphes” BCH 18 (1894), 76 n. 3, that he might be Zenodotus of Troezen (who did write a Roman history and is referenced by Dionysius and Plutarch [FHGr. v.5, 531]) is untenable upon Dittenberger’s discovery of the left half of the stone which clearly records the name Ἀριστοθέως Τιμοθέου [Τρο]ζάνιος. It seems unlikely that his work was devoted exclusively to the Romans, given the use of the vague πεπραγματευμένα to describe them and the silence of the decree to that effect.

239 Plut. Dem. 12.2; see also Chr. Habicht, Gottmenschentum und griechische Städte² (Munich 1970), 155.
Rhomaios;\textsuperscript{240} Mytilene probably had a month called Pompeiai;\textsuperscript{241} and Paphos on Cyprus had months named after the Roman state and the imperial family.\textsuperscript{242} The most famous example is the decision of the cities of the koinon of Asia to re-arrange their civic year to begin on Augustus’ birthday.\textsuperscript{243} By the same token, cities or groups of cities were known to initiate new civic eras corresponding to their liberation (e.g. Achaea 146/5 or Ephesus 133),\textsuperscript{244} the beginning of a regular provincia (e.g. Macedonia 148) or victories by Roman generals (e.g. Sullan, Pompeian, Caesarian, or Augustan eras).\textsuperscript{245} In this case, the polis’ sense of time became expressed in Romano-centric terms such that it was literally recalibrated to begin with Roman actions – which, naturally, were benefactions.

What remains interesting, above all, about the Delphian decree is the subtle way in which Roman power is internalized and then reproduced by the polis. We observed a similar phenomenon in the previous chapter when discussing the Greeks’ sense of their

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item IG XII.2.59, line 18: μὴνυνος Πομ[ - - - ]; Samuel, \textit{Chronology}, 129.
\item Samuel, \textit{Chronology}, 183-186. Paphos had two calendars of this sort, both established under Augustus: the first (dating to around 15 BCE) contained the months Sebastos, Agrippaios, Libaios, Oktabios, [Iulaios], Neronaios, Drusaios, Aphrodisios, Ankaiaios, Romaios, Aeneaioi, and Kapetolios; the second (introduced 12 BCE – ca. 2 CE) removed imperial family members to focus on Augustus, his lineage, and Rome: Aphrodisios, Apogonikos, Aineios, Iul(i)os, Kaisarios, Sebastos, Autokratorikos, Demarcheaios, Ples(is)thypatos, Archiereus, Hestai(os), Romaios.
\item RDGE 65. Also relevant in this regard are instances where poleis have used Roman consular dating: \textit{SIG} \textsuperscript{3} 683; \textit{RDGE} 16, 24, 27, 65.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
own freedom. Recall from that discussion how the Romans were viewed as agents working to “restore” a freedom for the Greeks that was theirs by tradition, and we can now see how this confirmed and reproduced the discourse of the Romans as common benefactors. In much the same way, through their broad role as friend and benefactor, the Romans became normalized in the memory and history of the polis. Consider, for example, Sulla’s letter on behalf of the Stratoniceans after the first war against Mithridates, discussed earlier: speaking before the Senate, he affirmed that the people of the city had preserved continually from the time of their ancestors their goodwill, friendship and alliance with Rome. That these words are Sulla’s and not the city’s is of little consequence; we know the city accepted Sulla’s claim (why would they not?), and subsequently petitioned the Senate on the basis of having always preserved goodwill and friendship. For the people of Stratonicea, the history of their polis was inexorably tied to Rome through friendship and goodwill.

Many similar examples can be given in which communities claim to have preserved ([συν]πηρείων - a word presupposing the existence of and emphasizing an active effort to maintain) their goodwill or friendship “from the beginning” or “continually” or

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246 See above, p. 121 ff.
247 RDGE 18, lines 1-13 (text above, n. 66); cf. lines 78-80 (Senate’s decree): Στρατονικεῖς τήν τε φιλίαν καὶ πίστιν καὶ εὐνοίαν πρὸς τὸν δῆμον τὸν Ῥωμαίων διὰ τέλους [ἐν καιρῷ εἰρήνης πολέμου τε] <ἄρ>ει συνετήρηκέναι (‘the Stratoniceans always preserved their friendship, loyalty and goodwill toward the Roman people continually in times of peace and war’).

248 RDGE 18, lines 36-37: ἐπεὶ τὸ δῆμος ἐν τοῖς καιροῖς τῆς εἰρήνης συνετήρησεν τὴν ἰδίαν [εὐνοίαν τε καὶ πίστιν καὶ φιλίαν] πρὸς τὸν δῆμον τὸν Ῥωμαίων (‘since the people preserved in times of peace their goodwill, loyalty and friendship with the Roman people...’); and lines 44-45: ἐπεὶ ὁ δῆμος [συνετήρησεν ἄριτὴν ὑπάρχουσαν αὐτῶν] εὐνοίαν καὶ πίστιν καὶ συμμαχημα[αν πρὸς τὸν δήμον τὸν Ῥωμαίων] (‘since the people always preserved the present goodwill, loyalty and allegiance with the Roman people...’).
as an "ancestral" tradition toward the Romans;\textsuperscript{249} and the Romans, given the perpetuity of the reciprocal system, could use similar language.\textsuperscript{250} This helps to contextualize the regular assertion by Greek envoys of "renewing" their friendship with Rome: a city like Stratonicea cannot – and for its diplomatic purposes does not want to be able to – conceptualize its past without Roman friendship. The unilateral renewal of friendship is a linguistic code in this case that in effect says ‘we were your friends previously and we have always been your friend’. These speech-acts demonstrate that the farthest reaches of living social memory are often set in relation to the Romans, whose authority and power are conceptualized in terms of a reciprocal relationship.

Friendship, we have seen, brought real benefits to the city, and proving longstanding friendship toward Rome was leverage for future benefactions. An interesting example of this is the common Roman mediation formula for land disputes: rightful ownership of land should fall to whoever possessed it at the time they entered Roman friendship. This phraseology turns up in numerous documents.\textsuperscript{251} Significant here, though, is the way in which a city’s territorial ownership was defined in relation to its historical dealings with Rome; that is, again, the history of the \textit{polis} begins with (its friendship toward) Rome. On a practical level, as Ager points out, there are fundamental

\textsuperscript{249} "From the beginning": \textit{SEG} III 710, line 10 (\textit{ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς}); \textit{I.Metrop.}, line 20 (\textit{ἀπὸ ἀρχῆς}); \textit{SIG}\textsuperscript{3} 694, lines 11 (\textit{ἀπὸ ἀρχῆς}); \textit{I.Eph.} 8, line 9 (\textit{ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς}); "continually": \textit{RDGE} 18, line 79 (\textit{διὰ τέλους}); no. 22, line 20 (\textit{διὰ τέλους / perpetuo}); \textit{Aphrod.} 8, line 24 (\textit{διηνεκῆς}); \textit{SIG}\textsuperscript{3} 591, line 53 (\textit{διηνεκούσι}); \textit{I.Metrop.}, line 39 (\textit{διετέλει}); "ancestral": \textit{RDGE} 18, line 3 (\textit{διὰ προγόνων}); \textit{SEG} XXIII 489, lines 5 (\textit{ἐκ προγόνων}).

\textsuperscript{250} E.g. \textit{RDGE} 17, line 5; no. 26, frg. B, line 35; no. 35, lines 9, 13; no. 58, line 83; no. 63, line 9; \textit{SIG}\textsuperscript{3} 613b (= prescript to \textit{RDGE} 40), line 4; \textit{Aphrod.} 3, line 42.

\textsuperscript{251} Examples collected in n. 48 above; cf. \textit{RDGE} 10a, lines 3-5 (distributed by Manlius and legates?; \textit{contra} restoration in Famerie, \textit{Chiron} 37 [2007], 99-100); no. 11, lines 9 and 15-16 (one day before death of Attalus III); no. 14, lines 20-21 (when Cretan conflict began); \textit{SIG}\textsuperscript{3} 683, col. III, line 53-55 (when Mummius was in the province).
problems with this arrangement – both the Meletaeans and Narthacians, for example, claimed to have possessed the same territory when they entered Rome’s friendship, and very well may have. Yet as Ager also points out, by phrasing the restitution formula in this way, “Rome denied any responsibility for anything that had occurred before its appearance on the scene.” While such a formula did not, as Kallet-Marx has observed, reward loyalty as a friend, it did play a practical role in subtlety and effectively re-orienting the polis’ sense of time and its memory around Roman power. The polis could, of course, recall and cite pre-Roman precedent (thus Melitaea referred to earlier decisions in Thessalian and Macedonian courts to buttress its claim), but before an arbitral hearing of the Senate both parties knew how they had to prove ownership and thus framed their argument around the chronology of Roman friendship.

Time thus became a means of establishing an imperial consensus, setting Rome at the centre of the life of the polis, but it was not the only public way in which the polis contextualized and normalized Roman power. Another important – and emphatically polis-driven – mechanism was the public worship of Rome and the Romans. This included not only the cult of Roma (as the Roman state personified), but also the cults,

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252 RDGE 9 (above p. 206).

253 Ager, Arbitrations, 27; note, however, Kallet-Marx, Hegemony, 173, who argues that Roman legal formula like this provided more leeway than we might assume by requiring judges to determine not just who possessed the land at a particular temporal terminus, but who had the legal right to it at that time; RDGE 9, lines A.20-23 (Melitea) and B.12-13 (Narthacium); on the dispute, see Ager, Arbitrations, nos. 32, 79, 154, 156.

254 Kallet-Marx, Hegemony, 175.

255 See R. Mellor, ÆA POMH, who has assembled an epigraphic corpus of references, p. 207-228; cf. idem, “The Goddess Roma” ANRW II.17.2, 950-1030; C. Fayer, Il culto della dea Roma (Rome, 1976). A cult of the Senate is noticeably absent during the Republican era (A. Erskine, “Greekness and Uniqueness: The Cult of the Senate in the Greek East”, Phoenix 51 [1997], 25-37), though the example of Prusias’ prostration before the senators and his deeming them θεοὶ Σωτῆρες (Polyb. 30.18.5) and a
sacrifices, dedications, festivals, etc., to the People of Rome,\textsuperscript{256} the Romans,\textsuperscript{257} Roman Common Benefactors,\textsuperscript{258} and individual Roman commanders and administrators.\textsuperscript{259} These derivations of the Hellenistic ruler cults situated the Romans yet again within a traditional historic and civic framework, moving them from the periphery to the centre of \textit{polis} life, and reinforcing the political discourse of their power in reciprocal terms.\textsuperscript{260} We noted earlier how the Elaeans elaborately celebrated their φιλία καὶ συμμαχία with the Romans by a public holiday, with sacrifices to their patron deity and Roma, and a parade through the city.\textsuperscript{261} Even more detail comes from a contemporary Milesian decree that established sacrifices and games in honour of Roma and the people of Rome "out of

\textsuperscript{256} Hesperia 40 (1971), p. 308 no. 9; SEG XL 736; IG II.2.3547; IG IX 1.282; I.Délos 465 C20, 1807; Milet. I.7.203; OGIS 479; ILLRP 174, 177, 180.

\textsuperscript{257} I.Délos I.549; RDGE 38; SGDI 2680; IG X 2.1.31, 133, 226.

\textsuperscript{258} RDGE 15, lines 45-46 (text at n. 263).

\textsuperscript{259} In roughly chronological order: C. Marcellus (Plut. Marc. 30, 32, 42; Syracuse); T. Quinctius Flamininus (Plut. Flam. 12; IG XII 9.233, 931; SIG\textsuperscript{2} 592; the East); M'. Aquillius (IGRP IV 292, line 39 ; 293, col. II line 23; Pergamum); M. Annius (SIG\textsuperscript{2} 700; Letae); Q. Mucius Scaevola (IGRP IV 188, 291; OGIS 439; Cic. Verr. 2.2.51; Asia); L. Cornelius Sulla (IG II 2.1039; SEG XII.279; Athens); L. Lucullus (Plut. Luc. 23; Asia); C. Verres (Cic. Verr. 2.2.52, 114, 154; 4.24; Sicily); Cn. Pompeius (SEG XII 270; I.Side 101; Asia); Ap. Claudius Pulcher (Cic. ad Fam. 3.7.2; 9.1; Cilicia); P. Servilius Isauricus (Ephesos I.49; III. 149; Ath. Mitr. 32 [1907], 254; Ephesus); C. Iulius Caesar (IGRP IV 28; Mytilene); L. Munatius Plancus (BCH 12 [1888], 15 no. 4; Mylasa); M. Iunius Silanus (IG 9.916; Chalcis); Cn. Domitius Calvinus (IGRP III 108; Zela); M. Vipsanius Agrippa (SIG\textsuperscript{3} 1065; Dio 54.24.7); Paulus Fabius Maximus (I. Alex. Troas 53; Alexandria Troas); Vibius Postumus (OGIS 469 with Tuchelt, Denkmäler Roms, p. 106; Samos); C. Marcus Censorinus (SEG II 549; ZPE 34 [1979], 215-16 no. 3; Mysla); L. Vaccius Labeus (IGRP IV 1302; Cyne); Geminus (IG V 2.435; Megapolis); Cn. Vergilius Capito (Hellenica 7 [1949], 209); cf. L. Valerius Flaccus (Cic. Flacc. 55); Q. Tullius Cicero (Cic. ad Q. Fr. 1.1.26; Asia – refused); M. Tullius Cicero (Cic. ad Att. 5.21.7; Cilicia – refused).

\textsuperscript{260} During the Hellenistic era rulers were commonly apotheosized for their benefactions, and if Euhemerus of Messene can be said to represent the \textit{Zeitgeist}, it was even commonly felt that the Olympian gods themselves had previously been great men who attained a place in the pantheon because of their services to mankind (διὰ τάς εἰς ἀνθρώπους εὐεργεσίας, Diod. 6.1.2). 

\textsuperscript{261} SIG\textsuperscript{3} 694, lines 40-58 (text at n.60).
gratitude for the Romans” (discussed below).\(^{262}\) We have also addressed at length the honours paid to the ‘Romans common benefactors’, who, as such, received sacrifices and libations from at least the Dionysiac Artists, if not others.\(^{263}\) We have also observed that Roma herself at times had the epithet εὐεργέτης, or was worshipped alongside Roman εὐεργέται, but so too was she commonly contextualized within a system of exchange.\(^{264}\)

Consider in this regard an early-second century decree from Chios, which records that

\[\text{since [the honorand] wanted to make clear in every way the goodwill and gratitude of the people and to provide for the citizens, who protect and together increase what is proper for the glory and honour (of the Romans), he made at his own expense a votive offering to Roma of a thousand Alexandrian drachmas comprising [a history] of the origin of Romulus the founder of Rome and his brother Remus.}\(^{265}\)

This decree, like the Elaean and Milesian decrees above, orients an offering to Roma in the context of reciprocity. This was common: the Smyrnians established their cult to Roma in response to Rome’s liberation of Greece in 196, Chalcis did the same in 191,\(^{266}\) Rhodes built a colossal statue to Roma in 164 upon obtaining a treaty with the Romans,

\(^{262}\) Milet. I.7.203 (= LSAMI.49). Lines B.6-8, ἀκολούθως ἀκολούθως τῇ πρὸς Ἐρμαιόν εὐχαριστίᾳ.

\(^{263}\) RDGE 15, lines 45-46: τὰς θυσίας καὶ σπονδὰς ἐκάλυψαν ποιεῖσθαι καθὼς εἰθαμένον ἦν τῇ συνόδῳ τῷ τὴ Διὸν[ν] ὡσι καὶ τὸ ἄλλος θεός καὶ τοὺς κοινοὺς εὐεργέτας Ἐρμαιόν; cf. Price, Rituals and Power, 41-42 (who perhaps overstates his case – it seems unlikely that the encomia in SIG\(^{3}\) 702 [above] are used in the technical, cultic sense); Erskine, “Common Benefactors”, 79-80.

\(^{264}\) Epithet: ZPE 13 (1974), p. 280 (θεά[ν Ἐρμαιόν [τὴν εὐεργέτην τοῦ κόσμου]); OGIS 441, line 132 (Ἐκάττη Σωτείρα ἐπιφανεί καὶ Ῥώμη θεά εὐεργέτηδι). Roma and Roman euergetai: IG X.2.1.4, 31-32, 133, 226; Robert Ed 448 n.3 (Thessalonica); Eph. III.66 (Roma worshipped with the benefactor P. Servilius Isauricus); Plut. Flam. 16 (worshipped beside T. Flamininus); CIL III.399 (Roma et Salus); Mellor, ΘΕΑ ΡΩΜΗ, 129; above, p. 219.


\(^{266}\) Tac. Ann. 4.56; Livy 33.38.3-4 (Smyrna); Plut. Flam. 16 (Chalcis).
while the Alabandans built a temple for urbs Roma in the hopes of soliciting benefits from the Senate. At Thessalonica and Abdera, Roma was linked with Zeus Eleutherios, while the Athenians collocated Roma with the cult of the Demos and Graces, which had originally been established in the late third century to mark the city’s freedom from the Macedonian kingdom. Indeed Mellor has argued that many of the cults of Roma were established as a direct result of Rome’s various successes at liberating the East in 196, 189, 168 and 133. In many cases, too, Greek cities placed the Romans at the centre of the polis simply by worshiping them alongside the principal civic deity – Apollo at Delphi, Amphiaraos at Oropus, Athena at Rhodes – or, like Athens above, with the cult of the δημος of the city. This placed the Romans firmly at the centre of the city’s religious life, which naturally permeated the civic calendar; this is particularly true when the priest of the cult of Roma was the eponymous or co-eponymous civic official, 

267 Polyb. 30.5.4; 31.4.4; cf. IG XII 1.46 & 730 (Rhodes); Livy 43.6.5 (Alabanda).
268 IG X.2.1.32 (Thessalonica); BCH 37 (1913), p. 138 no. 42 (Abdera); HSCP 51 (1940) p. 131 n. 6 (Petres); cf. SIG 753 with Robert, CRAI 1969, 49-51 (Mytilene); Robert, Rev. Et. Anc. 1960 p. 168 n. 6 (Augustus); See Edson, HSCP 51 (1940) 131, no. 6, 134 for a similar decree from Macedonia in the second or first century. Mellor (USA PQMH, 107-8) suggests there might have been a common point of origin for the cults of Zeus Eleutherios and Roma at Abdera, Aenos (BE 1972, no. 275), Maronea (IGRP 1.831; SEG XXIV 636), Petra, and Thessalonica, and that it might stem from the liberty of 168. According to Plutarch (Flam. 16), the city of Chalcis wrote a paean to Roma, Zeus and T. Quinctius Flamininus when they absented the city – the last of the three ‘fetters’ of Greece.

269 See Mellor, USA PQMH, 27-110, who argues that many of the cults began on these dates; cf. id., ANRW II.17.2, 950-1030. While I am sympathetic to this view – it would very much support my current and general arguments – it must be said that only a handful of cults to Roma can be dated with certainty: at Smyrna in 195 (Tac. Ann. 4.56), Chalcis in 191 (Plut. Flam 16), Rhodes in 164 (Polyb. 30.5.4), Alabanda ca. 170 (Livy 43.6.5) and Miletus ca. 130 (Milet. I.7.203).

270 Local Deity: RDGE 23.48-49; I.Priene 232-233 (Amphiaraia & Romaia; Oropus); IG II.2.5047 (Roma, Demos, and the Graces; Athens); Polyb. 31.4.4 (Rhodes builds colossal statue of Demos of Rome in T. of Athena); cf. SEG XXII 350 (Romaia Letaia for Lycian koinon); IGRP IV.1556 (Roma, Zeus Ktesios, Zeus Kapetolios, Agathos Daimon; Teos); Aphrod. 1 (Zeus, Homonoia & Roma; Aphrodisias); SEG XII 466 (Leto and Roma; Caunus); TAM III.1.108-110, 153, 156 (Roma and Dionysus; Termessus); TAM III.1.113-114 (Roma and Zeus Solymeus; Sidyma). Demos: IG II.2.3404 (Roma and Demos; Eleusis); IG II.2.3547 (Senate, Roma, Demos and the Graces; Eleusis); I.Delos 1807 (Athena Nike & Demos of Romans; Delos); I.Delos 1877, 2605 (Hestia, Demos and Roma; Delos); Bean, Inscriptions of Side (1965) 111, 112, 127 (Roma & Demiourgos; Side).
as was common by the Late Republic – such that, again, we find that polis time literally began around Rome, and in these cases on an annual basis.\footnote{Eponymous official: \textit{I.Metrop.} (Metropolis); \textit{OGIS} 437 (Sardis); \textit{MAMA} VI 53 (Tripolis); \textit{IGRP} IV 1304 (Thyatira); \textit{SEG} XIX 710 (Nakokome); Mionnet \textit{Suppl.} V p. 446, no. 1040; \textit{MDAI(A)} 32 (1907), p. 432, no. 282 (Pergamum); Sherk, \textit{ZPE} 88, 249-251 (Ephesus). Co-eponymous official: \textit{IG} X.2.31 (Thessalonica); \textit{SIG} 781 (Nysa); \textit{IGRP} IV 1302 = \textit{I.Kyme} 19 (Cyme); \textit{IGRP} IV 1087 (Cos); \textit{BCH} 37 (1913) 138 (Priene). See, in general, the evidence collected by Sherk in his five-part study on the eponymous officials of Greek cities for \textit{ZPE}: v.83 (1990), 249-288; v. 84 (1990), 231-295; v. 88 (1991), 223-272; v. 96 (1993), 267-295.

Turning back to the Miletus decree, it is clear that the dēmos was establishing a permanent cult and festivals and that it would play a prominent role in the community. The decree set out that the new priest should have a tenure of three years and eight months – one assumes this was because the year was four months old, and the next priest would hold office for a full four years – and the text refers to the construction of a temple and sacred precinct (\textit{Rhōmaion}) for Roma.\footnote{\textit{Milet.} I.7.203, lines B.18-22. The term length is discussed in lines A.7-10.} It further outlines that there should be six annual sacrifices to Roma and the Roman people, and that these public sacrifices should be subsidized by the public treasury.\footnote{The dates of the sacrifices can be summed up as follows: 1\textsuperscript{st} Taurion (A.18); 11\textsuperscript{th} Taurion (A.19-20, 24-25); 1\textsuperscript{st} of [unknown month] (B. 23); 7\textsuperscript{th} Thargelion (B. 27-29); 12\textsuperscript{th} Metageitnion (B. 31-32); 18\textsuperscript{th} Boiedromion (B. 38-40); on the calendar of Miletus, see Samuel, \textit{Chronology}, 114-118. The decree sets out that the priest might draw 60 drachmas from the treasury for the sacrifice on the first day of the month of Taurion (lines A.14-17) and 10 drachmas on first of an unknown month (lines B.25-26).} The decree then proceeds to illustrate the extent to which the city-state took part in the cult and its festivals, which, although newly established, drew on existing civic officials and institutions: sacrifices were prescribed not just for the new priest of the cult, but for the incoming and outgoing gymnasiarchs and their ephbe charges (line A.20-22, 24-26), the αἰσιωμνήτης (B.28-29) or προσέταιρος of the god (B.33-35), and the fifty archons (B.39-41); the first of the Romaia festivals, furthermore, was to be managed by the priest and gymnasiarch (B.9-10), while another
was run under the ministry of ἀθλοθέτης and the παιδονόμοι (B.16-17).274 At Miletus, the city’s time and space was literally given over to the Roman (universal) benefactors and their worship.

In fact, while cults of Rome were more common in Asia Minor, where the tradition of ruler cult was centuries old, these festivals (Romaia) were common throughout the East.275 Through them, Roman power not only became a part of civic ritual, but was also expressed and reproduced through it. At Oropus, the city put on games “for the victory and hegemony of the Roman people” after the defeat of Mithridates and the Senate’s decision to leave the territory of their patron deity, Amphiaraos, immune from the publicans. This linked the games not just with Roman victory and power, but ἡγεμονία. The Romaia, furthermore, was combined with the celebrated annual games for Amphiaraos and thereafter was known as the Romaia-Amphiaraia.276 Like the cults themselves, the Romaia games were often joined to traditional prominent institutions.277 In all, through the re-orientation of time – not just interstate, but intra-polis –, social memory, and the cultic worship of the city-state around the Roman republic, the power of the latter became internalized and in many ways centralized in the polis, normalizing it, of course, along the lines of benefaction, but also as hegemonic and divine.

274 It might be noted, too, that the Romaion was temporarily established in the gymnasium of the νέοι (B.21-22) before the new Temple of Roma was complete.

275 Mellor, ΘΕΑ ῬΩΜΗ, 97, 165-180; see the map in K. Tuchelt, Frühe Denkmäler Roms in Kleinasien, vol. I (Tübingen 1979).

276 RDGE 23; cf. IG VII 416, 419, 420; I.Priene 232-233; SIG3 1064.

277 E.g. OGIS 441, line 132 (Stratonicea’s pentaeteric festival to Hecate Soteria Epiphanes was expanded to include Ἄρωμα θεᾶ εὔεργέτης); SEG XII 466 (Caunus celebrates a quinquennial festival to Leto and Roma); IG II2 1064 (Athens joins Romaia with Boeotian Erotideia festival); Mellor, ΘΕΑ ῬΩΜΗ, 177-180.
3.3.4: Socializing Romans and Roman Officials

In the Greek polis, though, Roman power was also individuated, made more immediate and personalized through the actions of, and honours given to, those who had specifically helped the community. Such honours and recognition for individuals integrated the Roman imperium into the local community in a tangible and concrete form. That Roman citizens frequently became benefactors of Greek cities has already been adumbrated above; the themes are well illustrated by the example of the Letaeans, who passed a decree praising M. Annius for defending them against a fierce Gallic assault, and awarding him the title of εὐεργέτης and an annual equestrian contest. The decree illustrates how a patent demonstration of Roman force could be socialized in the city as a reciprocal act by the discourse of benefaction. Naturally, the Romans had used their superior force here for good (i.e. to defend the city) and framing it in reciprocal terms helped to deproblematize its negative potential, further naturalizing Roman superiority and normalizing it as a beneficent power. That power is reified and personalized in Annius himself, who now was included among the Letaeans’ other civic benefactors, with the stipulation that he receive with goodwill their preference for him, and presently and in the future look to benefit the city.

The degree to which men like Annius might be socialized into the life of a polis and the effect that had on the presentation and normalization of Roman power is significant. A typical example is a decree of the Acamanian league dating to sometime in the first half of the second century, which proclaimed Cn. Baebius and his descendants προξένοι and εὐεργέται “for all time” and stipulated that their person and property should
be secure and inviolable in times of war and peace.\textsuperscript{278} Not only, then, did Baebius become an acknowledged civic benefactor and προξένος (a patron of sorts), but, as was standard, he was to be so titled in perpetuity, along with his descendants, such that his (benef)actions doubly permeated the temporal register of the polis and normalized themselves. A Delphian decree from the beginning of the same century further elaborates on the extent to which Roman benefactors became integrated into civic institutions: the Delphians admitted M'. Acilius, who resided in the city in the early-second century, even into their administrative apparatus, by, in this case, awarding him the office of θεωροδόκος as well as other civic privileges normally awarded to προξένοι and εὐεργέται of the city.\textsuperscript{279} These last awards included high-status rights like first consultation with the Oracle, first seating, inviolability, etc., which, as the decree explicitly states, were the common reward for benefaction to the community, thereby normalizing Acilius (and by extension Roman power more broadly) within the sphere of regular inter- and intra-polis relations.

Of course, in some cases, a city might completely embrace a Roman and not only title him ‘benefactor’ and award him the standard civic privileges, but also enroll him as a

\textsuperscript{278} P. Funke, H.J. Gehrke and L. Kolonas, “Eine neues Proxeniedekret des Akarnanischen Bundes” \textit{Klio} 75 (1993), 131-144 (text at p. 132), lines 9-11: προξένοι εἰμεν καὶ εὐ[εργέταιν] τῶν Ἀκαρνάνων τὸν πάντα[a χρόνον] Γαίτων Βαιβίων αὐτὸν καὶ[ι ἐκγόνους] εἰμεν δὲ αὐτοὶ καὶ ἐκγόνοις[ις ἀσφαλείαν καὶ ταξιλιαν καὶ αὐτοὶ[ις καὶ χρήματι] καὶ πολέων καὶ εἰρήνη[ις καὶ κατὰ γᾶν καὶ] τὰς ἅλασσαν καὶ γάς καὶ οίκιας ἔγκτησιν καὶ τὰς ἄλλα τίμια καὶ φιλάνθρωπα πάντα, καὶ τὰς ἄλλους προξένους καὶ εὐεργέτας τοῦ κοινοῦ τῶν Ἀκαρνάνων ὑπάρχει (‘Gnaeus Baebius is to be proxenos and benefactor of the Acarnians for all time, along with his descendants; and he and his descendants shall enjoy [safety] and inviolability, for themselves and their [property], in times of war and peace by land and sea, [as well as their land, house, buildings, and all other honours and privileges, which the Acarnanian League bestows upon its proxenoi and benefactors’).

\textsuperscript{279} \textit{SIG}\textsuperscript{3} 608; cf. \textit{SIG}\textsuperscript{3} 607. On \textit{theorodokia}, see P. Perlman, \textit{City and Sanctuary in Ancient Greece} (Göttingen 2000).
citizen, granting him full rights to purchase and own land inside the *polis*. This was the reward given by Argos to Cn. Octavius, who in 170 demonstrated his goodwill toward the community and called on it to remember its friendship with the Romans and join them against Perseus of Macedonia. In a reverse fashion, a decree from the small city of Gythea in 71 reveals the role that resident Romans might play in the life of a *polis* as benefactors. This decree honours a pair of local Ἀρωμαῖοι, the Cloatii, for liaising with Roman officials, and, by employing their personal connections, obtaining various privileges and immunities for Gythea.

While some, like the Cloatii, were simple Roman businessmen, many of those honoured by, and socialized into, the community were state agents of Rome, like Annius, Acilius, Baebius and Octavius. It was this socialization of Roman officials into the world of the *polis*, and their new place in a local context, that helped to concretize the benefits of Roman power and demonstrate the ability of the Greeks to negotiate within Roman rule. Consider, for example, that many, if not most, provincial magistrates became patrons of provincial cities during the course of their term of office and were honoured by communities for their benefactions. These naturally corresponded to the ideology of Roman power (as benefaction) – in Greek, the ἡγεμόνες became πάτρωνες, who performed εὐεργεσία for the community – but so too did they personalize Roman *imperium* beyond the cold legal, financial and administrative apparatus of the empire. These men not only gave the local community access to the administration of the empire

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280 *ISE* 142.
281 *SIG* 1 748.
283 On the language, see, e.g., *Claros*, Menippos.
(as representatives in the courts and advocates in the Senate), but became a real, concrete means for the performance of Roman power – power through patronage. Texts such as these illustrate an atomized Roman government – an imperial system where different internal forces could be at odds with one another – and where the polis could harness a powerful element to its own advantage.

Extraordinary actions (or extraordinary individuals) could earn extraordinary honours like cult worship and civic games. Thus paeans were sung to T. Flamininus after 196, as he was worshipped beside Roma and Zeus, and Titean games were celebrated for this saviour of the Greeks; we know too that there were also Mucieia in honour of Q. Mucius Scaevola, Sulleia for Sulla, Luculleia for Lucullus and Pauleia for Paulus Fabius Maximus. Pompey was regarded by the people of Side as god-like (ισόθεος) and received sacrifices at Chalium, while Caesar was regarded as manifestly a god (θεὸς ἐπιφανὴς) at Ephesus, and was similarly held divine at Ceus and Demetrias. These titles matured and culminated ultimately in the cult of the Emperor established under Augustus, whose benefactions for mankind surpassed not only any man born before him but even the Olympian gods themselves, such that as the father of the inhabited world his coming was the beginning of all things and a common benefit to

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284 For a corpus of these instances, see above n. 259.
285 Plut. Flam 16; SIG² 592, line 11.
286 OGIS 438 (=IGRP IV 188), 439; Cic. Verr. 2.2.51 (Scaevola); IG II 2.1039; SEG XXXVI 135 (Sulla); Plut. Lucull. 23 (Lucullus): οἵ δ' ἀμειβόμεναι Δουκοῦλλειά τε ἦγον ἐπὶ τιμὴ τοῦ ἀνδρός καὶ τῆς τιμῆς ἡδίων τὴν ἀληθὴνν εὐνοιαν αὐτῷ παρεῖχον ('the cities, in response, celebrated the Luculleia to honour that man, and betstow upon him what is sweeter than honour: their genuine goodwill'); IGRP IV 244 (Paulus). Verres, it might be noted, is said to have suppressed the Marcelleia festival at Syracuse (in honour of the great Punic war commander, M. Claudius Marcellus), and established his own Verria in Sicily (Cic. Verr. 2.2.51-52, 154; cf. Verr. 2.4.86, 151; Plut. Marc. 23.7).
287 SIG³ 760 (Ephesus); IG XII 5.557 (Ceus); SEG XIV 474 (Demetrias); Raubitschek, JRS 44 (1954), 74-75.
The effect of these games and festivals in honour, or even worship, of Roman individuals was the same as those for the Roman state detailed above. Civic time and space were re-tasked for Romans, whose actions were brought from the periphery into the very centre of public life, memory, and performance. These actions, regularly demonstrations of Roman military superiority and victory, were contextualized in a narrative of freedom and integrated into the regular discourse of reciprocity as benefactions on behalf of the state. Pompey, for example, was praised by the people of Miletopolis and the Ionian League not only as a benefactor, but "overseer of the land and sea" because of his goodwill, at Mytilene, besides being simply a civic benefactor, he was praised as having "destroyed those who had seized the inhabited world by wars by both land and sea" and counted as 'founder of the city' for (personally) restoring the city's ancestral liberty. Caesar was praised by the Ephesians, likely just after his

288 RDGE 65; I. Olymp. 53; Price, Rituals and Power, 54-56; Bowersock, Augustus and the Greek World (Oxford 1965), 112-121. Augustus, it would seem, was eager to control others' access to such civic honours and under his regime the titles saviour (σωτήρ) and founder (κτίστης) become reserved for only the emperor and his family, the title benefactor (ἐυγεέτης) becomes a more modest acclamation, and honours to men holding provincial office were forbidden (Bowersock, Augustus and the Greek World, 119).

289 I.Kyz. 24 (Miletopolis): ὁ δῆμος ἐν τῇ ναῷ του Πομπηίου Γαίανος οὗτος οὐδὲν δόθησιν τῷ τε δῆμῳ καὶ τῇ Ασίᾳ πάσῃς, ἐπόθηκαν γῆς τε καὶ θαλάσσης ἀρετῇς ἐνεκαὶ ἐν πολλοῖς ἐξ ἐναυστοῦ ('The people dedicate this to Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus, son of Gnaeus, imperator for the third time, saviour and benefactor of the people and of all Asia, overseer of the land and sea, because of his excellence and goodwill toward them.'); Ferrary, BCH 124, no. 4 (Ionian League): Τὸ κοινὸν τὸ ἱερὸν ἐν τῷ ναῷ του Πομπηίου Γαίανος οὗτος τὸν αὐτοκράτορα γῆς καὶ θαλάσσης ἐποίησαν τὸν εὐεργέτην καὶ πατέρων τῶν ἱερὸν ('The League of Ionians dedicates this to Cn. Pompeius, son of Cn., imperator, overseer of the land and sea, benefactor and patron of the Ionians.').

290 SIG 3 751, lines 4-7: καταλύσαντα τοὺς κατασχόντας τὰν οἰκισμένην πολέμοισι καὶ κατὰ γὰν καὶ κατά βάλασαν; no. 752: Γαίανος Πομπηίου Γαίανος οὗτος κἀσεμάζη, αὐτοκράτορα, τὸ εὐεργέτη καὶ σωτήρι καὶ κτίστης; cf. nos 753 and 754 (from the same base as 752) awarding similar honours to Cn. Pompeius Theophanes ('second founder') and Potamon ('founder'); IGRP IV 21 (M. Agrippa).
victories at Pharsalus, as benefactor and a god clearly sprung from Aphrodite and Ares, the war god, and the common saviour of all mankind.\footnote{SIG\textsuperscript{3} 760, lines 5-7: τὸν ἀπὸ Ἀρεώς καὶ Ἀφροδίτης θεὸν ἐπιφανῆ καὶ κοινὸν τοῦ ἄνθρωπον βίου σωτῆρα.}

Such individual honours not only integrated the Roman *imperium* into the city, but did so in a manner that, however indirectly, helped to facilitate the evolution of the Roman imperial state from republic to principate and later formed a significant ideological and structural basis for its continuation. The individuated high honours for Sulla, Pompey, Caesar, etc., laid the groundwork for the cult of Augustus and Roma, or simply the cult of Augustus, which under the Caesars became an important provincial organization and a piece of the imperial administrative apparatus.\footnote{Mellor, "The Goddess Roma" *ANRW* 17.2 (1981), esp. 976-1004; Price, *Rituals and Power*, esp. 54-77.} Eventually, to be the chief priest of the imperial cult was the highest office (outside the Roman senate) attainable by a provincial, and it became an important civic position; that is, the office served as another means by which local civic elites competed for a role within an imperial framework, thereby confirming and reproducing the authority of the Romans.

In this, and all of the foregoing, discussion we have witnessed a growing sense of a larger community centered around Rome and the development of a growing discourse to express and frame it. This new imperial discourse, born through the slow transformation of the Hellenistic discourses of friendship and benefaction and the practical negotiation of power in the reciprocal mode of interaction, was the manner in which power was transacted in the Roman empire. This new order did not radically depart from the old -- it was still grounded in the tradition of freedom and framework of reciprocity -- and over the course of the first century allowed for a clearer expression of
Roman power (ἡγεμονία). In these new, but increasingly more common, open expressions of Roman ἡγεμονία we find a consensus on the permanence and regularity of Roman power, and by it we can chart a shift in perception of the Roman rule from a loose federation of autonomous cities interacting with Rome, to a new permanent organization within which those cities fought for position and, especially by the Late Republic, created a collective identity. This development remains to be treated in the final chapter.
CONCLUSION: IMPERIAL DISCOURSE AND ROMAN HEGEMONIA

The Ephesians’ decree of 85 has proven a remarkably informative document for the discussion of the Romans’ empire in the East. It presents a complex picture of empire that exists not just as a set of legal administrative arrangements, but as a series of discursive interactions and reciprocal exchanges between ruler and ruled in which both sides negotiated their respective positions of power. In it we find the continued operation of the autarchic polis, whose sense of civic autonomy is reflected in the very language of the decree to fight on behalf of the common freedom. This freedom is at once about self-determination (on domestic matters like laws, finance and citizenship, as well as matters of war and security), and fiercely anti-monarchic. Whereas the royal power of Mithridates is presented as one of violence, force and deceit,¹ the Romans are styled as the common benefactors, toward whom the city has had a longstanding sense of goodwill and sound relations, and whose advice and requests the city has consequently been eager to take up as part of an on-going process of reciprocal exchange.² To that extent, along with its own freedom, and the freedom of the Greeks, the Ephesians seek to preserve and defend Roman hegemony.

And so in these few lines of text we find a multifaceted and nuanced expression of power and empire, at the heart of which lies the claim to fight Mithridates on behalf of the

¹ See above, p. 117.
² See above, p. 191.
“hegemony of the Romans and common freedom”. Rather than blithely dismissing this expression as hypocrisy, propaganda, or sycophancy, in the foregoing we have accepted it as a rational and meaningful statement (a validity claim proffered, warranted, and discursively redeemable by recourse to the shared well of social knowledge)\(^3\) and taken it as an opportunity to explore what these concepts meant within Roman and Greek political cultures and in their interaction, in order to give us insight into deeper socio-political realities of this important period. Freedom was a dominant political discourse, indeed a driving narrative that circumscribed Greco-Roman (inter)actions in the East and provided conditions for the operation not only of the limited structural apparatus of the nascent imperial state but also of the reciprocal interactions by which the Roman empire was transacted in the East during the second and first centuries.

This text also exemplifies an evolution in Greco-Roman interstate communications: toward a new focus on a permanent Roman hegemony, increasingly prominent during the Late Republic, and becoming dominant under the Principate and Empire. The decree looks back to a vision of empire as a loose amalgam of (free) cities submitting themselves to Roman hegemony within a larger system of reciprocity – a world of communication in which freedom and the reciprocal modes of interaction are foregrounded – but in its acknowledgment of that Roman authority at the same time reflects the coalescing of identity and consensus around Roman power, and increasing efforts on the part of Greek cities to claim a position within the imperial state. When the Ephesians claimed to be fighting for the Romans' hegemony and Greek freedom they were not just demonstrating that this \textit{prima facie} paradox could meaningfully exist, but also accepting that there was

\(^3\) See above, p. 15f, for the language of methodology.
something called a *hegemonia* of the Romans and that to fight for it was also to fight for Greek freedom. The expression of a ἡγεμονία ῥωμαίων speaks to a new open acknowledgment of Roman authority, which included the protection of *polis* freedom, and was to that end part of the common interest (τὰ κοινὰ πράγματα) of Greeks and thus worth protecting.⁴

Expressions of the Romans’ superior power were, of course, not unknown before the Late Republic. Antiochus III speaking of the Romans’ yoke over the Greek world, Achaean statesmen remarking on Roman authority, pre-eminence and superiority and Polybius’ own investigation into how the Romans’ had secured an ἀρχή over the known world by 167 are just some examples.⁵ Similar expressions are, not surprisingly, rarer in state documents, in which utterances were confined by the discursive norms of freedom and reciprocity outlined in Chapters 2 and 3. Still, in 190 we find L. and P. Scipio referring (in the context of granting freedom) to certain Greek cities that had given them the power make decisions over them;⁶ later still, Thessalian cities speak (positively) of laws given them by Flamininus;⁷ while numerous documents preserve appeals to the Senate as the ultimate *locus* of arbitral authority.⁸ We have seen, too, that expressions of friendship and alliance became something of a shorthand for expressing the Romans’ hegemony in the course of the second and first centuries. The clearest example of this

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⁴ *I.Eph.* 8, lines 10-12: ἔσχηκώς καυρὸν πρὸς τὸ βοηθεῖν τοῖς κοινοῖς πράγμασιν κέκρικεν ἀναδείξαι τὸν πρὸς Μιθραδάτην πόλεμον ὑπὲρ τῆς ῥωμαίων ἡγεμονίας καὶ τῆς κοινῆς ἔλευθερίας (‘with the opportunity to help the common interest, the people decided to proclaim war against Mithridates on behalf of the Roman hegemony and the common freedom’).

⁵ See Chapter 1 §1.

⁶ *RDGE* 35, line 11: ὅσαι ἡμῖν τὴν ἐπιτροπὴν ἔδωκαν.

⁷ *RDGE* 9.

⁸ E.g. *RDGE* 6, 7, 9, 10.
comes in the *lex de provinciis praetorii* where the Roman people express a concern and sense of obligation to protect not only their own citizens, but also the Latins, allies, and friends, from the pirates that plagued the Cilician coast.\(^9\) We have also discussed more subtle means by which friendship and benefaction could convey power in the Greek world and how these relations came to express and to expect loyalty to the Romans.\(^10\)

These oblique and often subliminal expressions of Roman power are, however, in marked contrast to the open expression of Roman *hegemonia* in the Ephesians’ decree, which is closer to the manner of Polybius himself. Their claim, of course, was naturally still made within the narrative of freedom and the mutually understood rules of interstate interactions, but employing a word like ἡγεμονία also acknowledged Roman superiority and conveyed an expectation of its continuity into the future. The earliest example of this language in formal state dialogue may be traced back to the late-second century and the honorary decrees from Colophon that speaks of Menippos’s important embassies “to the very senate of our ἡγούμενοι”.\(^11\) Here the participle ἡγούμενοι, which in subsequent texts comes to refer regularly to “the leading men of Rome”\(^12\) – i.e. senators and men who had influence with the Senate to whom a city might appeal, as described in the well-known Abderite decree\(^13\) – might also refer to the Roman people generally such that the Colophonians meant that the most important affairs were heard by ‘the senate of the

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\(^9\) *lex prov. praet.* col II, lines 6-11; col. III, lines 32-35; texts at Chapter 1 n. 125.

\(^10\) Above, Chapter 3 §4.

\(^11\) *Claros*, Menippos, col. I, lines 17-19: μεγίστας δὲ καὶ περὶ ἀναγκαιοτάτων πρεσβείας τετέλεκε πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν τῶν ἡγουμένων σύνκλητον (‘he conducted his most important embassies, of most pressing concerns, to the very senate of our rulers’).

\(^12\) IGRP IV 293, col. II, line 14; Eilers, *RPGC* 101 (= *SIG* \(^3\) 656); *IG* XII 3.7; *Aphrod.* 5, lines 17-20; *SIG* \(^3\) 748, lines 21-25; *Sardis* 7.1.8, lines 57-60.

\(^13\) Eilers, *RPGC* 101 (= *SIG* \(^3\) 656), lines 19-22 (text above Chapter 3, n. 155).
Romans, our leaders'. This seems to be the sense behind their later praise of Polemaios as worthy not only of the city but also of the ήγούμενοι Ρωμαίοι themselves, which must refer broadly to the Romans.

The Colophonian example is not without some ambiguity, but in any case by the first third of the first century Greek poleis had begun to openly and directly express the Romans’ hegemony over them, as the Ephesians did. In this, the first war with Mithridates (89-85) seems to have been a watershed event, as it was in so much of Republican history. Mithridates had been the Romans’ most intractable and successful enemy since Hannibal, managing to conquer most of the Asian province, threaten continental Greece, and strain (and often break) the ties of friendship and loyalty that bound the poleis and the Romans. In the aftermath of the war Sulla imposed a large indemnity and other onerous reprisals on the Greeks of Asia and cities went to great lengths to prove their historical friendship and loyalty to earn benefits, or at the very least avoid further punishment. It is during this time, for example, that we find the people of Thasos promising to annihilate themselves before breaking from the Romans’ friendship. Still after this first Mithridatic War, as we have observed, freedom remained an important reward and element of interstate discourse and the reciprocal mode of interaction continued, but in light of the

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14 Note the comment of Robert (Claros, p. 70): “ce sont les Romains qui sont les hégouménés”. Compare the language found in col. III, lines 10-13: τής τε πόλεως γνησίους αὐτοὺς πεποιηκὸς πάτρωνας χρησιμότατος παρὰ τοῖς ἠγουμένοις γέγονε τοῖ δῆμοι παρ’ οἷς ἀναγκαίωταται πᾶσιν εἰσίν ἀνθρώπως χρεία (‘He made these men genuine patroni of the community, and became extremely useful to the people before the authorities, to whom are brought the most compelling affairs to all men.’).

15 Claros, Polemaios col. III, lines 2-5: ἀναστραφείς δὲ καὶ τής πόλεως καὶ αὐτῶν ἠγουμένων Ρωμαίων ἀξίως. This is to be contrasted with three other uses of the term in the text which seem more obviously to refer to senators or even magistrates: col. II, lines 11-16, 24-27, 58-62.

16 For sources, see Introduction, n. 17.

17 App. Mith. 62-63; Plut. Sull. 25; Lucull. 4.1, 20.

18 RDGE 20, frg. C, lines 2-5 (text at Chapter 3 n. 57).
widespread acquiescence to Mithridates and the Romans’ desire to re-assert authority in the region, a marked development took place that instead seems to have elevated and foregrounded expressions of the Romans’ authority and Greeks’ loyalty toward it.

And so, a year or so before the Ephesians’ bellicosity on behalf of the Romans’ *hēgemonia*, the Aphrodisians had proclaimed to Oppius that they would prefer death to life without Roman hegemony.19 Shortly after the war, Sulla himself openly expressed the new Roman order when he proclaimed that the Stratoniceans had always acted justly toward Roman *hēgemonia* and remained ever loyal – doubtlessly the Stratoniceans were eager to agree, since such acknowledgement earned them the privileges of civic autonomy.20 Within a decade of the war the Oropians had collocated their celebrated Amphiaraia games with festivities to recognize the Romans’ victory and *hēgemonia*.21 Later, we find Caesar, who negotiated a treaty with the Lycians that obliged them to preserve the “power and pre-eminence” of the Romans (the earliest example of the so-called *maiestas* clause),22 speaking to Mytilene of Roman *hēgemonia* and friendship while

19 *Aphrod*. 2, lines 13-14: χωρίς τῆς Ῥωμαίων ἡγεμονίας οὔδε ζῆν προσαρμοσθέναι.

20 *RDGE* 18, lines 3-5: [οὐκ ἀγνοοῦμεν ὅμαι] διὰ προ[γ]όνων πάντα τὰ δίκαια [πρὸς τὴν ἡμετέρα]ν ἡγεμ[ονίας]ν πεποιηκότας καὶ ἐν [παντὶ καρπῷ τὴν πρὸς ἡ]μᾶς πίστιν εἰλικρινῶς τετηρηκότας (‘we are not unaware that from the time of your ancestors you have acted most justly toward our leadership and at every opportunity have conscientiously preserved your loyalty to us.’); cf. below, n. 21.

21 *RDGE* 23, lines 45-49: τοὺς ἀγώνας καὶ τὰς θυσίας, ὡς Ὀρωπίωνι συντελοῦσιν θεῷ Ἀμφιαράῳ, ὡμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄς ἀν μετὰ ταῦτα ὑπὲρ τῆς νίκης καὶ τῆς ἡγεμονίας τοῦ δήμου τοῦ Ῥωμαίων συντελέσουσιν (‘... games and offerings which the Oropians put on for the god Amphiaraos, and likewise those which afterwards they will put on for the victory and leadership of the Roman people ... ’). On the collocation of the Amphiaraia and Romaia, see Chapter 3 n. 276. The Stratoniceans are thought to have had a similar festival, reconstructing a lacuna in the *SC de Stratonicibus* (*RDGE* 18, lines 32-33) on the passage in the Oropus text we find: [θυσίαν τε ἐν τῷ Καπετῶλῳ δῷς] ποιήσας ἑξῆ ὑπὲρ τῆς νίκης [καὶ τῆς ἡγεμονίας τοῦ δήμου τοῦ] Ῥωμαίων (‘... that they be permitted to perform a [sacrifice on the Capitol] to celebrate the victory [and authority of the People] of Rome.’).

22 Mitchell, *Pap.Gr.Schoy.*, lines 9-11: τὴν τὲ ἔξοψαν καὶ ὑπεροχὴν τὴν Ῥωμαίων [βεβαί]τις καθὼς πρέπον ἐστιν διατηρήτωσαν Λύκιοι διὰ παντὸς ἀξίως ἐαυτῶν τε [καὶ τοῦ δήμου τοῦ Ῥωμαίων (‘let the Lycians observe the power and pre-eminence of the Romans [securely], as is proper in all circumstances in a manner worthy of themselves and the Roman people.’). See above, p. 255.
granting the city various benefits. During the triumvirate the Aphrodisians twice more
declared their loyalty to Roman hegemony along with their traditional friendship, once
even in the context of receiving extensive privileges (including freedom, autonomy and the
use of their traditional laws) from the Senate. After Actium and the secure entrenchment
of the principate the phrase became more common and we find the Delphians honouring C.
Sulpicius Galba as worthy (i.a.) of the Romans’ hegemony, the Olympians promising to
uphold the hēgemonia, and the Maroneans speaking of Claudius as the Ruler of the
Hēgemonia.

In each of these we can see the continued (if increasingly vestigial) discursive
narrative of freedom and full operation of the reciprocal mode of interaction, but also an
open expression of the permanence, or at the very least expected longevity, of the Romans’
power in the East. This, of course, is only a development by degrees, not a novelty: earlier
we noted that eras defined by ‘provincialization’, eponymous Roman months, Roman

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23 RDGE 26b, lines 9-12: [βουλομένος] εὐεργετεῖν τὴν πόλιν καὶ οὐ μόνον φυλάττειν τὰ
φιλάνθρωπα ἔδειπναξαθεὶ δι’ ἡμῶν ἀλλὰ καὶ συναὐξάνειν αὐτῆς - - - ἐς τὴν ἡγεμονίαν, φιλίας
δόγματος τοῦ ὑμῶν συγκεκωρισμένου διαπέπομμα πρὸς ὑμᾶς τὸ ἀντίγραφον (’[wishing] to benefit your
city and not only [to protect the benefits which you] acquired through us but also to increase [them] ... the
authority, I have sent to you a copy of the decree passed by us.’).

24 Aphrod. 8, lines 23-26: καὶ ἐπειδὴ συμμορφωνεῖται τὴν πολειτείαν τὴν τῶν Πλαρασέων καὶ
’Αφροδεισεων ἀφ’ οὗ πρὸς τὴν φιλιὰν τοῦ δήμου τοῦ Ῥωμαίων προσήλθεν διηνεκέ - - - τῇ ἡγεμονίᾳ τοῦ
dήμου τοῦ Ῥωμαίων μετὰ μεγίστης εὐγενίας - - - ὥστε ὑπάρχειν (’and since it is agreed that the [community of
Plarasa and Aphrodisias from (the time) when] it entered into the friendship of the Roman People
continuously ... to the leadership of the Roman People with the greatest goodwill ... exist;’); Aphrod. 7, lines
2-3: [ἡπειδὴ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐμπορεύειν χρόνοις ἐξ ἑυς ἄξιον πρὸς τὸ δῆμον τοῦ Ῥωμαίων ἡγεμονίας
πλείστην σπουδὴν εἰσφέρομενοι καὶ μ[ή]λοιστα τοῖς ἡμετέροις μέρεσι[ν] προ[σενόμενοι?] (’[Since even in
former times as regards the hege]mone]ny [of the Roman People], the [Rhodians, Lycians, Ta]rsians,
Laodicans and also the Plarasans and Aphrodisians have shown the greatest zeal and being especially
attached to our party’).

25 FD III 438, lines 6-8: [ἀξία] φρο[ν]όων τῆς τε Ῥώμη[ν] ἡγεμονίας καὶ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἐν
δεξιότητας; I.Olympia 53, lines 9-11: βλέψαντος καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐξελθοῦσαν ὁ ὑμεῖς-καὶ-συν-λεγέ-ἐν
δεξιομενήν, παρετοιοῦν τινὰ τῆς οἰκίας αὐτοῦ πε- - - δικαιότατον ἔν τι[το] [-] καὶ ὑπαρ. τὸ τῆς Ῥωμαίων ἡγεμονίας
μὴ περιμενῶν ἐπὶ ἐδάφους ἐς ήκεν[ - - εὐ]ρεσίαις; SEG XLIII 659, lines 38-40, 48-49, b.9-10
(προοιμίως τῆς ἡγεμονίας).
consular dating, and other Romano-centric expressions of time made by Greek *poleis* conveyed an implicit sense of gravity and endurance to Roman authority. Arbitral formulas, furthermore, that defined the ownership of territory in relation to Roman friendship likewise carried within them a sense of continuity to Roman power, and one that encouraged its continuity lest the victorious *polis* lose its possession, and either party its mutual friend. In fact, friendship and the reciprocal interstate system, through which we have explored the normalization of Roman authority, operated as a self-replicating perpetual cycle that always expected future action. We observed the important implications that this had for establishing the Romans in the history, tradition, and memory of the Greeks, but so too did this system implicate Roman power in the cities' future. Friendships were expressed in perpetuity, promises were made beyond the present, and decisions were made with an eye to future leverage. Formal expressions of *hēgemonia* are a part of this larger context, but also represent a new stage in the normalization of Roman rule.

By the time of Augustus the perpetuity of the Romans' power – the Roman *hēgemonia* – was taken for granted and related closely to the personal power of the *princeps* himself. In the so-called Calendar Decree passed by the *koinon* of Asia in 9 BCE we learn that Augustus was the saviour and benefactor of mankind, and not just for those of the present era, but also all those to come.26 His birth marked a new period of life for those under him. As such, on the suggestion of the proconsul, the provincial calendar was rearranged so that New Year's day henceforth began on Augustus' birthday (September

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26 *RDGE* 65d, lines 32-39 (text below, n. 65); cf. frg. A, lines 4-11.
23) and the Roman arrangement of the year was to operate beside the traditional Greek divisions.\(^{27}\)

Moving from the temporal to the geographic scope of the Romans’ hegemony, we might recall that from its earliest period in the region, as universal benefactors, their reach was regarded as ubiquitous and they stood at the top of a hierarchy with even the Hellenistic dynastic powers beneath them. The Ephesian decree describes the Romans as such (lines 1-2) and contrasts the scope of their universality with that of Mithridates, whose kingdom has been reduced to merely Cappadocia.\(^{28}\) From the first half of the second century we find texts that speak of Roman authority in one manner or another over “all Greeks” or even “all men”.\(^{29}\) Polybius, of course, considered the Romans’ empire to have covered the entire known world (οἰκουμενή) by the middle of the century.\(^{30}\) This comes out practically in, for example, those oaths between poleis that contained stipulations that either side remain in Rome’s friendship, or invalidated an action made against the Romans, or in any other inter- or intra-polis communication in which the polis subordinated itself to Rome.\(^{31}\)

Such statements as these gradually disappear in the course of the evolution of an imperial discourse; statements about the broad scope of Roman authority were superfluous.

\(^{27}\) RDGE 65d, lines 48-51: τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς ἑκεῖνου γενέσεως ἄρχειν τῷ βίῳ τὸν χρόνον· διὸ τόχη ἀγαθή καὶ ἐπὶ σωτηρία διέδοχαι τοῖς ἐπὶ τῆς Ἀσίας Ἑλληνικοῖς, ἄρχειν τὴν νέαν νουμηνίαν πάσαν τῇ πόλεως ἀπὸ ἐννέα καλανδῶν Ὀκτωβρίων.

\(^{28}\) On the significance of titling Mithridates the King of Cappadocia (the old Persian satrapy), see Chapter 2, n. 5.

\(^{29}\) E.g. RDGE 35, line 7; SIG\(^{1}\) 613, lines 28, 34; SIG\(^{1}\) 630, line 15; I.Metrop., line 15; SIG\(^{1}\) 700, lines 7-8.

\(^{30}\) Polyb. 1.1.5, 2.7, 4.1; 3.1.4; 7.2.4; 39.8.7. See Richardson, “Polybius’ View”, 1-6.

\(^{31}\) E.g. I.OSPE 1, 402; IG IX 2, 920; SIG\(^{1}\) 587, lines 27-28; SIG\(^{1}\) 613, lines 24-27; I.Iasos 152, lines 1-5; SIG\(^{1}\) 685 (=Arbitration 158); SIG\(^{2}\) 692, lines 60-61; SIG\(^{3}\) 704f.
given the assertions of the previous century and the patent superiority that the Romans held over the Mediterranean basin, particularly after the submission of Mithridates in the mid-60s. One does still find grandiose claims during the Late Republic, but regularly these were in relation to the achievements and power of an individual Roman commander, like Pompey (overseer of land and sea), Caesar (universal saviour of human life), or Octavian (divine actions toward all Greeks). By the time of the pax Augusta, the scope of the Roman hegemony was coterminous with the authority of Augustus himself, who, we noted above, was acknowledged as the ‘benefactor of mankind’ and universalized as “the father of us all, of the entire human race”. In this new development, cities accepted and normalized the reality of an expansive and inescapable Roman hegemony and tried to carve out a position within it.

This represented a new stage in a long evolution. From the second century, freedom, as we discussed in Chapter 2, evolved to become something of a privilege within a large world order, while the free city (civitas libera) became something of a status within the inchoate imperial state. Although civic autonomy remained an important political value down to the end of our period, the recognition of a city’s freedom increasingly became used as a reward for loyalty, as it was for the Stratoniceans, Thasians, and Aphrodisians following the Mithridatic War. Under Augustus it was explicitly “the greatest of all privileges” that the Romans – or now the Roman princeps – could grant to a

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32 Pompey: I.Kyzikos 24; Ferrary, BCH 124 (2000), 341-345 no. 4 (ἐπόπτης γῆς τε καὶ θαλάσσης); Caesar: SIG3 760 (κοινὸς τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου βίου σωτὴρ); Ferrary, BCH 124 (2000), 359 no. 8.

33 RDGE 65d; Sardis 7.1.8, line 100-102: Αὐτοκράτορος Καίσαρος θεοῦ υἱοῦ Σεβαστοῦ, ἀρχιερέως μεγίστον καὶ πατρὸς τῆς πατρίδος καὶ τοῦ σύνταγμας τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένους (‘...of the divine Imperator Caesar Augustus, son of the divine [Julius], pontifex maximus and father of the country and of us all, the entire human race...’).

34 See above p. 101.
city. Friendship, for its part, similarly came to express something like an imperial status as it too became closely bound to expressions of loyalty, and a position of privilege within a Roman state. We observe here a growing consensus around an imperial state – a nascent imperial ideology that helped the Romans to channel the energies of the ruled to work within the existing system rather than attack it; that is, rather than question the Romans’ right to grant freedom, Greeks sought to get their freedom acknowledged or, later, to earn it; friendship provided a framework in which to negotiate loyalty and benefits, rather than fight against the Romans to assert and recover their freedoms.

After 146, the Romans’ hegemonia in the East was structured around provinces that located cities within the legal and administrative imperial apparatus. Just what precisely a province was, and the extent to which it afforded the Romans control over a particular region is a serious question for Roman imperial studies, the answer to which must surely lie in foregoing over-generalizations, embracing a gradual evolutionary development shaped by local institutions, and is underscored by the limitations of the institutional arrangements. There is a thirty year gap, for example, between the establishment of the Macedonian province and the first reference to the province in a Letean state document from 117. One might attribute this to the accidents of document survival; however, there

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35 *Aphrod*. 13, line 4: τὸ πάντων μέγιστον φιλάνθρωπον.

36 See above, p. 208.

37 SIG3 700, lines 31-36: καὶ ἐκ τοῦ τοιούτου τρόπου διακατασχῶν τὰ πράγματα εὐφύχως [π]επείραται τοῖς διαδεξαμένοις τὴν ἐπαρχείαν ἀκαταφθόρους πάντα[το]ς τοὺς ἐν τῇ τοῦ διατηρήσας ἐν εἰρήνῃ τε καὶ ἐν τῇ καλλιστῇ παραδοθοῦν ὅντας καταστάσει (‘holding affairs in good spirits [M. Annius] tried to hand over the province to his successor, having kept all those in the region unharmed, in peace and in the very best condition, these he set up.’). There is an earlier reference to ἐπαρχεία in SIG3 683 (140 BCE), lines 54-66, but the word is used in a senatorial arbitral formula awarding possession to the one who possessed the land “when L. Mummius, proconsul, was in that province” and surely uses provincia in the sense of a military sphere of activity, since the disputants, Sparta and Messenia, were never part of the provincia Macedonia. The phrase ἡ Ῥωμαίων ἐπαρχεία found in RDGE 44 has been attributed by some to
are at least six known documents from this period that could, but do not, mention the Romans’ province. Nevertheless, what is clear from the Letae example is that the city understood the *provincia* as a long-term, stable unit governed by a Roman magistrate that, interestingly, was intended to protect the city from tribal incursions from the north. It understood and accepted the existence of a bureaucratic unit, and worked within that system. We find a similar acknowledgment of the provincial structure in the contemporary Colophonian documents from the *Asia provincia*, in which Menippos famously asserted that city was distinct from the province. Here the Colophonians have clearly defined their independence from the administrative organ of the Roman imperial state, even while, as we noted above, acknowledging the Romans as *ηγούμενοι*.

There are more than a dozen references to *provincia / ἐπαρχεία* in the corpus of state documents for this period that demonstrate the significance of provinces to the Romans’ hegemony. It is noteworthy that with the exception of the documents from Letae, Colophon, Mithridatic-era Pergamum (which refers to “those living in the province”), and mid-century Aphrodisias (wherein we discover the Asian *koinon* petitioned the Senate for the creation of a Greek province in 146, however the text is heavily mutilated and the Roman magistrate in line 10 ([…………….]ς) remains insecurely identified (see Kallet-Marx, *Hegemony*, 349-352).

38 E.g. *IGRP* IV 134 (Cyzicus 134), lines 7-11; *JG* IV 2 1.63 (Epidauros; 115); *SIG* 1 680 (Olympus; 143); *SIG* 1 676 (Olympus 140s); cf. Roman documents such as *RDGE* 9 and 43. This does not include the numerous documents from Delphi that are also silent on the matter of a Roman province at the time.

39 *Claros*, Menippos col. I, lines 39-40 (text at Chapter 1 n. 249); cf. col. II, line 4 (text at Chapter 1 n. 248).

40 *IGRP* IV 292, lines 2-3, 15-16: [πάσιν] τοῖς τῇν ἐπαρχείαν κατοικοῦσιν (‘to all those living in this province’); lines 15-16, σωτηρίων δύνατον καὶ οὐ μίλον τῇ τῶν ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ εὐεργετημένων πόλει, πάση δὲ τῇ ἐπαρχήια (‘being a saviour not only to the city benefitted by him, but the whole province’). On the date of the document, see C.P. Jones, “Diodoros Pasparos and the Nikephoria of Pergamon” *Chiron* 4 (1974), 183-205, and *idem*, “Diodoros Pasparos Revisited” *Chiron* 30 (2000), 1-14.
to look out for the province), these statements are made by Rome. In one sense, this makes very little difference because we know that both Greeks and Romans used the term ἐπαρχεῖα to refer to a province, which was a concept both seem to have understood. Thus in 140 the Milesians, following an arbitral formula set by the Roman senate, decided a land dispute between Sparta and Messenia in favour of the latter, whom they judged “possessed the land when Lucius Mummius, as consul or proconsul, was in that province”. As Bertrand has reminded us, ἐπαρχεῖα was a word with a history and meaning independent of the Romans – regularly expressing an area controlled by a political power in the genitive case (ἡ τοῦ δείνος ἐπαρχεῖα). Under the Romans, ἐπαρχεῖα continued to express an area of control, but by the first century ἡ ἐπαρχεῖα could be used alone to mean a Roman province. More interesting still, under the Romans’ ἡγεμονία when a genitive did appear with ἐπαρχεῖα it regularly expressed the territory ruled and not the name of the ruler: thus ἡ Μακεδονία ἐπαρχεῖα was the provincia Macedonia. In the new world order of the Roman empire, a territory could simply be referred to as ἡ Μακεδονία

41 Aphrod. 5, line 8 (with commentary, p. 30): [καὶ αὐτοῖς ἀξίωσοντας ἀντιλαβέσθαι τῆς ἐπαρχῆς καὶ ὑπερασπίζειν; θειομείης αὐτήν (‘[and] to beg them to help [and protect?] the province [which has been ruined?]’); cf. RDGE 65a, lines 25-26.

42 See the sources cited in nn. 45-47, below, to which should be added the lex XX quaest. I, lines 1-4.

43 SIG 683 lines 63-66: ἐκρίθη κατειχήσθαι ἢ χώρα ὅποι Μεσοπόταμος οὗ πριν ἐπέλθῃ Μόμμιος ὑπατος ἢ ἄνθυπατος [ἔ]ν ἄκεινῃ τῇ ἐπαρχείᾳ ἐγένετο, καὶ ὅπως οὕτωι οὕτως κατέχοντος; cf. lines 54-55. Here, pace Bertrand, ἐπαρχεῖα / provincia must certainly be used in the more archaic sense of ‘an area of a magistrate’s task’ rather than a fixed province, which Greece did not become until under Augustus (see Chapter 1, pp. 38 and 50).

44 Bertrand, “Langue grecque et administration romaine”, 167-169, citing Staatsvertr. III 468 (Magas of Cyrene: εἰ τις κα ἐπὶ τῶν Μάγα ἐπαρχεῖαν ἐπιστρετεύῃ βοᾷς ὑπὸ τῶν Ὑφίτων), Polyb. 1.15.10, 3.22.10 (with 22.5 and 24.15) (Syracuse and Carthage), Strabo 17.1.5 (Egypt), Jos. AJ 15.349 and 352 (the robber-baron Zenodorus).

45 E.g. RDGE 20g, line 10; no. 31, lines 77 and 95; no. 58, line 68; no. 61, line 4; no. 65a, line 26 and frg. d, line 44; lex port., lines 32-33, 39-40, 43; Aphrod. 8, line 68.

46 lex prov. praet. Cnidos col. II, line 15.
These new expressions not only imply a certain permanence to the Romans’ power and arrangements, but allowed the provinces to have their own sort of identity, expressed within the Romans’ imperial state.⁴⁸

Provincial identity is a topic worthy of its own study; however, we might make a few observations on the matter as it relates to the state documents. As we observed in Chapter 1, by the early first century there is clear evidence of the cities of the provincia Asia, for example, speaking with one voice, as a provincial council of sorts, under the formal arrangement of the Federation of the Greeks in Asia (τὸ κοινὸν τῶν ἐπὶ τῆς Ἀσίας Ἐλλήνων).⁴⁹ It had been this body, for example, that created the Mouseia games in honour of Q. Mucius Scaevola, that sent embassies to Rome regarding the provincial tax collectors and to honour Augustus, and that re-ordered the provincial calendar to begin on Augustus’ birthday.⁵⁰ In Asia, therefore, where the epigraphic evidence is most plentiful, we can observe the development of a body to work with the Romans, inside the Roman provincial system. That is, by the end of our period we can begin to see a growing sense of a new imperial identity.

⁴⁷ lex prov. praet. Delphi frg. c, line 8 (ἡ Ἀσία Ἑλλάδα ἐπαρχεῖα); RDGE 18, lines 76-78 (Ἀσία Ἑλλάδα ἐπαρχεῖα); RDGE 22, line 29 (Ἑλλάς ἐπαρχεῖα); RDGE 22, line 29 (Ἀσία Μακεδονία ἐπαρχεῖα = Asia Macedonica provincia [line 15]); cf. RDGE 58, line 48 (Ἀσία καὶ Εὐρώπη ἐπαρχεῖα); cf. RDGE 44, line 2 ([--:] ἤ ρωμαίων ἐπαρχεῖα καὶ ἤ ἐπάρχους[ιν - - -]), which employs the older form with Rome in the genitive. Sherk, among others, dates this to the second half of the second century (supposing that the ἐπαρχεῖα is the formal province of Macedonia established in 146 – an unstable assumption (above n. 37), but owing to the language of this passage, in concert with the title στρατηγὸς ύπατος Ῥωμαῖων (line 10) – which is an earlier translation of consul that had disappeared by c. 120 (see Chapter 1, n. 171) – perhaps an earlier date is warranted. On this text, see Kallet-Marx, Hegemony, 349-352.


⁴⁹ See above, p. 69.

⁵⁰ OGIS 438 (with RDGE 47); Aphrod. 5; Sardis 7.1.8; RDGE 65.
Still, it is worth recalling that in these documents of the koinon of Asia we rarely find a reference to provincia.\textsuperscript{51} Rather, the provincial cities of Asia have chosen to express themselves in the traditional Hellenistic language of the koinon.\textsuperscript{52} Even in abbreviated format—as ‘the Greeks of Asia’, ‘men in Asia’, ‘the Greeks’, or ‘Asia’—there is a continuity with a past before and without Rome, if also an implication of “(the province of) Asia”.\textsuperscript{53} One is tempted to see in this an eschewing of the province, at least in language, in favour of the preservation of a sense of autonomy and traditional ethnic identity. Doubtless there is something of this at play. Yet the fact remains that these bodies operated within the provincial regime, which was an instrument of the Romans’ hēgemonia. The appearance and use of the language of the provinces, furthermore, as well as the evolution of conditions such as freedom and friendship into imperial statuses, reveals a nascent sense of imperial identity developing in the East from the mid-second century.

In fact one of the themes of this study has been the steady development of a consensus around the Romans’ rule. The communication between the Romans and cities of the Greek East, of course, already presupposed a measure of consensus: a successful communication requires interlocutors to have reached a mutual understanding of the rules and norms of the social world, and resulting action is taken within the world because both parties submit themselves to those rules and know that either feels the same sense of

\textsuperscript{51} The one exception is Aphrod. 5, in which we find the koinon of Asia begging the Romans to protect the province (line 8); cf. Sardis 7.1.8, lines 78, 80, 82, 86, 96, 110, where “Asia” seems to refer to the province rather than the koinon itself.

\textsuperscript{52} On the history of these federations, see J.A.O. Larsen, Greek Federal States (Oxford 1967); H.Beck, Polis und Koinon (Stuttgart 1997).

\textsuperscript{53} οἱ ἐπὶ της Ἀσίας Ἑλλήνες: RDGE 65, lines 31, 78; Sardis 7.1.8, lines 77, 80, 85, 87, 89, 96, 99, 110, 115; OGIS 470, line 9; οἱ ἐν τη Ἀσίᾳ: OGIS 438, lines 1-3; Aphrod. 5, lines 23-24, 28; οἱ Ἑλλήνες: Sardis 7.1.8, lines 43, 51, 94, 125, 131, 136; Ἡ Ἀσία: RDGE 65d, lines 26, 41, 59, 62, 66, 81.
obligation; the legitimacy of any expression (or social action) – be it a claim of goodwill, or friendship, freedom or hegemony – relies upon its consensual validity.\textsuperscript{54} Thus when Greek communities submitted a petition to the Roman senate they were acceding to its capacity to make decisions that bound it – this is what gave the Senate’s speech-acts their illocutionary force. By the same token, the Senate’s response could not transgress certain norms if it expected to be followed: threats of violence, references to conquest, assaults on polis autonomy, for example, were justifications that were beyond the pale of normal discourse that would have (both immediately and over time), as Ando observed, “dissolved the veil of objectivity that rationality [as a basis of communicative interaction] granted to their domination.”\textsuperscript{55}

A contemporary of Polybius, the Stoic philosopher Panaetius – whose work heavily influenced Cicero’s \textit{de Re Publica} – argued that empire could be justified when it was in the interest and to the benefit of its subjects.\textsuperscript{56} We have observed that the Romans’ empire operated by means of reciprocal action that allowed both themselves and their Greek subjects an opportunity to negotiate their positions with one another through goodwill and friendship. As Polybius commented, the downfall of the Carthaginians’ empire was in treating their subjects as enemies instead of friends and allies; for superiority is easier to acquire than maintain, and can be preserved only if rulers follow such a policy.\textsuperscript{57} Thus Critolaus, a vocal opponent of Rome during the Achaean War, riled

\textsuperscript{54} See above, p. 15f.

\textsuperscript{55} Ando, \textit{Imperial Ideology}, 77.

\textsuperscript{56} Cic. \textit{de Rep.} 3.36-37, which is drawn certainly from a Stoic source, likely Panaetius (see A. Erskine, \textit{The Hellenistic Stoa: Political Thought and Action} [London 1990], 192-204).

\textsuperscript{57} Polyb. 10.36.4-6: τοιγαροσον ἀντὶ συμμάχων καὶ φίλων πολεμίως ἔσχον τοὺς ὑποταττομένους ... οὐκ ἐμαθην διότι κάλλιστα φυλάττουσι τὰς ὑπεροχὰς οἱ κάλλιστα διαμείναντες ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν προαιρέσεων, αἰς ἐξ ἀρχῆς κατεκτήσαντο τὰς δυναστείας, καίτοι γε προφανοὺς ὄντος καὶ ἐπὶ πολλῶν ἡδη
up the *hoi polloi* for war by claiming that, while he wished to be a friend of the Romans, he would not suffer to be the subject of a despot. To that end, in the language of this interactive empire, the Romans were styled as universal benefactors, who, for reasons of goodwill and past action, strove to benefit the cities of the East, affording the region protection and security.

We might recall that in fighting for both their freedom and the Romans’ hegemony, the Ephesians were fighting for the common interest (*τὰ κοινὰ πράγματα*). This was an explicit statement of what was a common understanding: that to fight together with the Romans – those who worked to restore Greek freedom and those designated as common benefactors – was to labour for autonomy and other local interests. To fight for Roman interests was to fight for one’s own self-interest. Freedom, as we discussed, had a pragmatic meaning during the second and first centuries that included conditions of domestic self-government free from autocratic control, but also a sense of self-interest that was generally not dissimilar from Panaetius’ observation. Freedom and hegemony were not inconsistent – indeed, the nature of Greek freedom and of Roman hegemony were complementary and interrelated – and Greeks came to look upon the Romans’ hegemony

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58. Polyb. 38.12.8: *φαίνοντον, ὅτι τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἀγαθήν ἔλιπέν τις πλῆθυς·* (*Consequently, instead of allies and friends [the Carthaginians] treated their subjects as enemies ... they had not learned that those who best preserve their supremacy are those best adhere to the same principles by which they originally established their power, and although it is evident and has been observed by many to date that men acquire their prosperity by acting kindly and preferring good hope to their neighbours*).

59. Other Greek expressions of developing identity with Rome: *SIG* 694, lines 44-48, which relates an Elaean prayer after a treaty of alliance with Rome “for the safety of the δῆμος and the Roman people”; *I. Metrop.*, lines 39-40, honouring Apollonius for the *eunoia* he showed to Roman interests and the city” in the war against Aristonicus; *Claros*, Polemaios, col. III, lines 2-5, who carried himself in a manner worthy of Claros and the Romans.
as a part of their own self-interest; that is, a power to whom they gave up a measure of their absolute autonomy in exchange for benefits (including the protection of their autonomy from other, autocratic powers) and with whom they increasingly came to consider themselves indissolubly related in a greater Roman imperial state. Freedom retained a pragmatic meaning that helped to define the terms of the Romans’ hegemony as one that eschewed notions of subjection in favour of mutual goodwill, benefit and self-interest.

I have tried to demonstrate that the other side to the discourse and narrative of freedom as well as the reciprocal mode of interaction was the gradual development of an imperial discourse, of a growing consensus about the superiority, longevity and operation of Roman power, and an identity with and within it. In looking to the latter, one might note discreet examples such as Menippos of Colophon having been chosen not only as an envoy by his city on their behalf, but also by the Romans as their agent in the region, thereby drawing their interests closely together with Colophon;\textsuperscript{60} or the decision of a Delian priest in 101 to dedicate a statue to Mithridates Eupator on behalf of his city and the Roman people, apparently confident in knowing and speaking for the interests of the Romans;\textsuperscript{61} or the Elaeans’ characterization of the war against Aristonicus – a war Rome took on to defend the freedom it had just awarded the cities of the former Attalid kingdom – as a joint venture.\textsuperscript{62} By the Mithridatic war, of course, Ephesus was fighting for the common interests of Roman hegemony and Greek freedom, while Stratonicea was said to

\textsuperscript{60} Claros, Menippos, col. III, lines 6-9.

\textsuperscript{61} I.Délos 1562.

\textsuperscript{62} SIG\textsuperscript{2} 694, lines 44-48; cf. the Metropolitans rejoiced at fighting with the Romans (I.Metrop).
have fought for the Roman *res publica* and its own interests.\(^{63}\) Throughout the period, more generally, we have seen the significance of friendship and goodwill to the development of a sense of loyalty to a new Roman world order; how patronage linked individual cities to the dynamics of domestic power politics at Rome; the evolution of traditional *koina* into the apparatus of the imperial state; and that in all of this there developed a shared conception of time and space calibrated around Roman hegemony.

By the time of Augustus, in fact, we can see a marked shift away from the us/them dichotomy toward a collective sense of ‘we’. This consensus was made possible by the singular charismatic authority of Augustus himself, who was a focal point for Roman citizens and subjects alike and with whose person citizen and non-citizen alike had a shared relationship. Thus in the Calendar Decree of 9 BCE we find the provincial magistrate and the provincial *koinon* jointly coming to the decision that Augustus might be best honoured by starting the provincial new year on his birthday. Not only do both sides employ the first person collective pronoun, implicating one’s self and the other in the same interest (not always, admittedly, unambiguously), but more telling still each has justified their decision in a manner that collectivizes them: for the proconsul Fabius, Augustus’s birth was “the beginning of all things” and a “common good fortune for mankind” for he accomplished great things for the “whole global order” of things;\(^{64}\) for the *koinon* of Asian

\(^{63}\) *I.Eph.* 8; *RDGE* 18.

\(^{64}\) *RDGE* 65a, lines 4-9: [πότε]βον ἢδείων ἡ ὡφελίμως·[έρα έ]στιν ἡ τοῦ θειοτάτου Καίσαρος γενέθλιος ἡμέρα, ἡν τη τῶν πάντων ἁρχή ἵκτε δικαιώς ἄν εἶναι ὑπολάβοιμεν, καὶ εἴ μὴ τῇ φύσει, τῶι γε χρησίμω, εἴ γε συδὲν οὐδ’ ἐπανεύρεσθαι καὶ εἰς ἄτυχες μεταβαθηκαί σχήμα ἀνώρθωσον, ἔτεραν τε ἔσωκεν πάντι τοῦ κόσμου ὀψιν, ἡδίστα ἄν δεξαμένων φθόραν, εἴ μὴ τὸ κοῖνον πάντων εὐτύχημα ἐπεγεννηθή Καίσαρ (‘...whether more pleasant or more beneficial is the birthday of the most divine Caesar, which we must justly compare to the beginning of all things. If there is nothing which had fallen to pieces and into misfortune that he has not changed or restored – if not in nature, at least in utility – he has given a different appearance to the whole cosmos, which would have accepted ruin sweetly, if as the common good fortune of all mankind Caesar had not been born.’).
Greeks, Augustus, whose birth was “the beginning of glad tidings for the world,” had come “for the benefit of mankind” and was endowed with such virtue by Providence that neither past, nor even future benefactors could exceed him. Augustus, and his imperial successors, of course, solidified their positions through the institution of the imperial cult, which would see them worshipped as divinities. Yet, as we have seen, this sense of charismatic and divine individual power had its roots firmly in the first century (and before that a collective Roman power in the second century) that saw collectivizing around leading figures like Pompey, Caesar, Antony, and the young Octavian.

Ando has recently argued that the longevity of the Roman empire was due to its success in creating and sustaining a consensus – an imperial ideology. He investigates the development, operation and implications of this consensus in transforming the imperium of disparate and conquered territories into a vast communis patria of like-minded denizens. His work is a self-confessed “essay”, a sketch of a different way to look at the Roman Empire, to understand Romanitas in a more potent and complex form, through different forms of written and visual communications. I hope to have added something to Ando’s discussion, to have demonstrated that by looking at the communications of the

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65 RDGE 65d, lines 32-41: ἐπε[ἰδὴ ἡ θείως] διατάξασα τὸν βίον ἡμῶν πρόνοια σπουδῆν εἰσεν[ενκαμ]ένη καὶ φιλοτιμίαν τὸ τελήσατον τῷ βίῳ διεκόσμ[ησεν ἁγάθῳ] ἐνενκαμένη τὸν Σεβαστόν, ὃν εἰς ἐυεργεσίαν ἀνθρώ[πων] ἐπέλησεν ἄρετής, <ὡ->οπερ ἦμεν καὶ τοῖς μεθ' ἡ[μᾶς σωτήρα χαρισμένη] τὸν παύσαντα μὲν πόλεμον, κοιμήσαντα [δὲ εἰρήνην, ἐπιφανείς δὲ] δὲ Καῖσαρ τὰς ἐλπίδας τῶν προλαβόντων [ἐναναγέλλα τῶν ἑπερατηθήκης, οὐ μόνον τούς πρὸ αὐτῶν γεγονότας ἐυεργετάς ὑπερβαλόμενος, ἀλλ' οὔτ' ἐν τοῖς ἐμφάνεις ἐλπίδα[σα ὑπολίπων ὑπερβολῆς] ἦρξεν δὲ τοῖς κόσμωι τῶν δι' αὐτῶν ἐναναγέλλ[ῶν ἡ γενέθλιος ἡμέρα τοῦ θεοῦ ("Since divine Pronoia, which has arranged our lives, employing zeal and ardor has also arranged the very end of our life as good by producing Augustus, whom for the benefit of mankind she has filled with virtue, as if [to favour] us and those after us with a Saviour, who stops war, arranges [peace; (and since) with his appearance] Caesar exceeded the hopes of [all] those who received good tidings [before us], not only surpassing those who had been [benefactors] before him, but not even [leaving any] hope [of surpassing (him)] in those who will come; and since the beginning of glad tidings on his account for the world was [the birthday of the god ... ").

66 C. Ando, Imperial Ideology and Provincial Loyalty in the Roman Empire (Berkeley 2000).

67 Ando, Imperial Ideology, xiii.
Republic we can contextualize his general claim for the development of a consensual empire, even uncover its genealogy in the second and first centuries BCE. Using the communications contained in the documents of state we can better understand how the Romans' hegemony in the East developed, how it transcended state apparatus to be transacted as a series of dynamic actions and exchanges between ruler and ruled, how this in itself structured relations, how consensus developed around the hegemony of the Romans, and how (at the very least) the Ephesians could speak of upholding the κοινὰ ἔλευθερία and the ἡγεμονία Ῥωμαίων.
\section*{APPENDIX I: \textit{έλευθερία} and \textit{libertas} in State Documents}

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<tr>
<td>42-30</td>
<td><strong>RDGE 58, 1.55</strong></td>
<td>Rhosus (Syria)</td>
<td>grants Seleucus the right to give suit or hear his suit in a ἐν πόλεσιν ἐλευθέραις</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
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<td>------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td><strong>Aphrod. 8, ll. 46, 52, 54, 60, 61</strong></td>
<td>Aphrodisias</td>
<td>Aphrodisias is acknowledged as being ἐλευθεροι, ἀτελεῖς τε καὶ ἀδημοσιώνητοι</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td><strong>Aphrod. 13, 1. 2</strong></td>
<td>Aphrodisias</td>
<td>Augustus refuses Samos ἐλευθερία which he describes as τὸ πάντων μέγιστον φιλάνθρωπον</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sub Caesare?</td>
<td><strong>RDGE 73, (B.6)</strong></td>
<td>Mytilene</td>
<td>fragmentary reconstruction ἐλε[υθερία]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>post 28</td>
<td><strong>Aphrod. 7, 1. 9</strong></td>
<td>Aphrodisias</td>
<td>Caesar and Antony reward loyalty, likely ἐλευθερον refers to a freeman</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### APPENDIX II: *αὐτονομία* in State Documents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Reference</th>
<th>Findspot</th>
<th>Language &amp; Context</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>196</td>
<td>SIG³ 591, ll. 34, 75</td>
<td>Lampsacus</td>
<td>honorand got assurances from L. Flamininus that when a treaty was made with Philip, he would look to preserve their [δημοκρατίαν καὶ τὴν αὐτονομίαν καὶ τὴν εἰρήνην]; later at Corinth he approached the 10 legates and looked to get assurances about their [αὐτονομομενήν] καὶ δημοκρατομενήν.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>191</td>
<td>RDGE 37, l. 10</td>
<td>Delphi</td>
<td>M’. Acilius Glabrio promises to work in Rome(?) to protect the αὐτονομία of the polis and the temple.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>189</td>
<td>RDGE 1, A.3, 5; B.3, 5; C. (4)</td>
<td>Delphi</td>
<td>Senate proclaims the Delphians αὐτονόμους καὶ ἐλευθέρους.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>186/4</td>
<td>SIG³ 613a, ll. 3-4</td>
<td>Delphi</td>
<td>preface speaks of Amphictyonic League ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτονόμων ἑθνῶν καὶ δημοκρατουμένων πόλεων.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>182</td>
<td>Asylia 179, l. 6</td>
<td>Delphi</td>
<td>Eumenes II is praised for efforts for the sake of preserving the ὑπάρχουσα[αν αὐτόν]ομίαν.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>167</td>
<td>SEG LIII 658, l. 9</td>
<td>Maronea</td>
<td>Maronea and Aenos are judged by L. Aemilius Paullus as ἐλευθέρους καὶ πολιτευουμένους με[θ’ αὐ]τῶν.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120s</td>
<td>Claros Menippos, Col. II, ll. 39-40</td>
<td>Colophon</td>
<td>Menippos succeeds in freeing the inhabitants from the power of the governor, and τῆς ἐπαρχείας ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτονομίας χωρισθεῖσης.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>RDGE 25, l. 5</td>
<td>Mytilene</td>
<td>fragmentary reference to perhaps [αὐτόν]ομίαν.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-44</td>
<td><em>Ath. Mitt.</em> 1909, pp. 329-340, no. 2</td>
<td>Mytilene</td>
<td>Pergamum praises Caesar as saviour and benefactor for restoring the city as ἱερὰ [καὶ ἃσυλον καὶ αὐτόνομον]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
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<td>------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>post 48</td>
<td><em>RDGE</em> 54, ll. (7), (36)</td>
<td>Pergamum</td>
<td>Caesar confirms rights to the city and ἐλεύθερα, αὐτόνομα, ἀνείσφορα and ἀφορολόγητα have been suggested as reconstructions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42-30</td>
<td><em>RDGE</em> 58, l. (4)</td>
<td>Rhosus (Syria)</td>
<td>is addressed as Ἄρωσέων τῆς ἱερᾶς καὶ ἅσυλου καὶ [αὐτόνόμου] ἄρχουσι, κτλ.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sub Augusto</td>
<td><em>RDGE</em> 26, E.14</td>
<td>Mytilene</td>
<td>fragmentary conclusion of the treaty speaks of ἀτινα φιλάνθρ[ωπα - - - αὐτο]νόμου δήμ[ου - - - ]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### APPENDIX III: δημοκρατία in State Documents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Reference</th>
<th>Findspot</th>
<th>Language &amp; Context</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>196</td>
<td>(SIG^3) 591, ll. 34 &amp; 75</td>
<td>Lampsacus</td>
<td>honorand got assurances from L. Flamininus that when a treaty was made with Philip, he would look to preserve their ([\text{δημοκρατία}]) and (\text{τήν αὐτονομίαν καὶ τήν εἰρήνην}); later at Corinth he approached the 10 legates and looked to get assurances about their ([\text{αιτονομουμένη}]) καὶ (\text{δημοκρατουμένη})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>186</td>
<td>(SIG) 613a, ll.A. 4, 19; B.2</td>
<td>Delphi</td>
<td>Amphictyony claims to be composed of (\text{απὸ τῶν αὐτονόμων ἑθνῶν καὶ δημοκρατουμένων πόλεων; and later on refers to advantages gained for the Amphictyony and τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔλλησιν τοῖς αἱρουμένοις τήν ἐλευθερίαν καὶ δημοκρατίαν})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>179</td>
<td>(IOSPE) 402, l. 23</td>
<td>Chersonesus</td>
<td>oaths given by Pharnaces to Chersonesus oblige him to “protect the (\text{δημοκρατία as much as is in my power})”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>170</td>
<td>(RDGE) 40, praescr. 2 [= (SIG^3) 613b]</td>
<td>Delphi</td>
<td>vitriol against Perseus suggests he was plotting (\text{πᾶσι τοῖς δημοκρατουμένοις τῶν Ἑλλήνων})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>167</td>
<td>(IGRP) 1.61, l. 4</td>
<td>Rome</td>
<td>Lycian League sets up honorary inscription at Rome praising them for restoring (\text{maiorum leibertatem and τήν πάτριον δημοκρατίαν})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>143</td>
<td>(RDGE) 43, ll. 9-10</td>
<td>Dyme</td>
<td>seems to suggest that Sosus was setting up something of a tyranny, which was “contrary to the ἔλευθερία and πολιτεία restored to the Greeks by the Romans”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Page</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Text</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------</td>
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<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>130</td>
<td>*I. Metropolis</td>
<td>Metropolis</td>
<td>ἔλευθερία of those formerly under the rule of the Attalid kingdom is contrasted with Aristonicus, who looked “to crown himself contrary to the decree of the Romans and the will of the people”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>129</td>
<td>SIG³ 694, ll. 30-31</td>
<td>Elaea</td>
<td>seems there may have been a treaty b/n Elaea and Rome, which was set up beside the statue of Demokratia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>125</td>
<td>Wörre, Chiron 30, I.11</td>
<td>Pergamum</td>
<td>speaks of “when things changed into δημοκρατία”, which seems to be a reference to either the death of Attalus or defeat of Aristonicus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88-84</td>
<td>SEG XXX 80</td>
<td>Athens</td>
<td>fragmentary popular decree that mentions ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ, probably in the sense of a political regime after the tyranny of Aristion in 88 and anarcheia of 87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120s</td>
<td>Claros, Men., col. II, ll. 5-7</td>
<td>Colophon</td>
<td>refers to the Senate’s decision that outside the province the governor cannot meddle as “a response made to conform to democracy and very good” (ιδιώτατον τῇ δημοκρατίᾳ καὶ κάλλιστον ἐνέγκας ἀπόκριμα)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>OGIS 449, ll. 5-6</td>
<td>Pergamum</td>
<td>Pergamum honours P. Servilius Isauricus for “restoring the ancestral laws and democracy unfettered” (ἀποδεδωκότα τῇ πόλει τοὺς πατρίους νόμους καὶ τὴν δημοκρατίαν ἀδούλωτον)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### APPENDIX IV: Enjoying one’s own Laws

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Reference</th>
<th>Findspot</th>
<th>Language &amp; Context</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2\textsuperscript{nd} C</td>
<td>\textit{RDGE} 41</td>
<td>Eresus (Lesbos)</td>
<td>highly fragmentary document that contains the words κατὰ λόγον ἔγ[---]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>190</td>
<td>\textit{RDGE} 35, l. 12</td>
<td>Heraclea ad Latmum</td>
<td>Scipio gives the community ἡλευθερία, which he seems to define as ἔχουσιν ὃ[φ' αὐτούς πά]για τὰ αὐτῶμ πολιτεύεσθαι κατὰ τοὺς υμετέρους νόμους</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>189/88</td>
<td>\textit{SIG}\textsuperscript{3} 611, ll. 17-20</td>
<td>Delphi</td>
<td>the Senate claimed Delphi had the following powers: “to evict whom you wish and permit you to settle among you those pleasing to the League of Delphi”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>167</td>
<td>\textit{SEG} LIII 658, l. 9</td>
<td>Maronea</td>
<td>Maronea and Aenos are judged by L. Aemilius Paullus as ἡλευθέρους καὶ πολιτευομένους με[θ'] αὐ]τῶν</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>144</td>
<td>\textit{RDGE} 43, ll. 9-10, 18-19</td>
<td>Dyme</td>
<td>Sosus is reprimanded for “writing laws contrary to the πολιτεία restored by the Romans”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>140 (?)</td>
<td>\textit{RDGE} 9, ll. 59-54</td>
<td>Narthacium</td>
<td>Narthacium argues that they had already won a positive verdict in their land claim, κατὰ νόμους τοὺς θεσσαλῶν, οἰς [νό]μοις ἐως τα [ν]ον χρῶν[τ]αι, οὐς νόμους Τίτος Κοίντιος ὑπατος ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν δέκα πρεσβευτῶν γνώμης ἐδωκεν καὶ κατὰ δόγμα συγκλήτου</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120s</td>
<td>\textit{Claros Men. col. I, ll. 24-25, 40-41}</td>
<td>Claros</td>
<td>Menippos maintained the κυρίος δὲ τοὺς νόμους; and earlier Colophon spoke of a time when Romans “transferred jurisdiction from our laws to their own power”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Line</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Comment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>110s</td>
<td><em>Claros Pol., Col. II, ll. 56-62</em></td>
<td>Claros</td>
<td>Polemaios made a trip to the governor and preserved τὰ κρίματα καὶ τὸν πολεμότιν καὶ τοὺς νόμοις ἀβλαβεῖς; later another actions is taken ἑναντίου τοῖς νόμοις</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81</td>
<td><em>RDGE 17, l. 11</em></td>
<td>Tabae</td>
<td>Sulla granted people of Tabae αὐτῶις τοῖς νόμοις αἱρέσειν</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81</td>
<td><em>RDGE 18, ll. 49 &amp; 91</em></td>
<td>Stratonicea</td>
<td>Senate grants Stratonicea ὑπὸς χρώνται δικαίοις τε καὶ νόμοις καὶ ἔθισμοί τοῖς ἰδίοις πρότερον [ἐχρῶντο]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td><em>RDGE 70, ll. 15-16</em></td>
<td>Chios</td>
<td>Senate decreed that νόμοις τε καὶ ἔθεσιν καὶ δικαίοις χρῶνται ἐ ἔσχον ὅτε τῇ Ἄρμαίῳ φιλία προσήλθον</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80-78</td>
<td><em>RDGE 21, l. (17)</em></td>
<td>Thasos</td>
<td>the Senate συνεχώρησεν ἴνα χράσθῃ - νόμοις? - - - τοῦτοι τοῖς [- - -]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td><em>Lex Ant. Term. ll. 8, 9-10</em></td>
<td>Termessus Maior</td>
<td><em>eique (sc. Termessiani) legibus sueis ita utunt, itaque iei omnibus sueis legibus...utei liceto</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td><em>OGIS 449, ll. 4-6</em></td>
<td>Pergamum</td>
<td>Pergamum honours P. Servilius Isauricus for “restoring the ancestral laws and democracy unfettered” (ἀποδεδωκότα τῇ πόλει τοὺς πατρίους νόμους καὶ τὴν δημοκρατίαν ἀδούλωτον)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td><em>Aphrod. 8, ll. 47, 62</em></td>
<td>Aphrodisias</td>
<td>Aphrodisias made ἐλεύθεροι and τῷ δικαίῳ καὶ ταῖς [ἰδίαις κρίσεις] ...χρῆσαι (47); and νόμοις τε ἰδίοις π[ατρί]οις καὶ οὐς ἄν μετὰ ταύτα ἐν ἑαυτοῖς κυρώσωσιν χρῶν[ται]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td><em>IGRP IV 38, l. 12</em></td>
<td>Mytilene</td>
<td>context unclear, but there is a mention of ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων λόγων</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### APPENDIX V: Immunities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Reference</th>
<th>Findspot</th>
<th>Language &amp; Context</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>άνειοφορία (immunity from tribute)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>189</td>
<td>RDGE 1, ll. A.3; B.3</td>
<td>Delphi</td>
<td>Senate grants άνειοφορία to Delphi; and <em>asylia</em> to the Apollo Temple, and έλευθερία και αυτονομία to the city</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150-100</td>
<td>RDGE 44, l. 6</td>
<td>Thebes</td>
<td>Roman magistrate grants Theban city άνειοφορία (as well as άτελία, άνεπισταθμεύτος, άλειτουργία)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84</td>
<td>RDGE 49, l. 10</td>
<td>Cos</td>
<td>Sulla confirms the privileges given to the Artists of Dionysus, including μήτε τινά [εύσφοράν ἢ δαπά]νας είσφέρετε</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78</td>
<td>RDGE 22, l. 12</td>
<td>Rome</td>
<td>Senate grants άνειοφορία καὶ άλειτουργία to Asclepius et al. and to their descendants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>*RDGE 54, l. (7)</td>
<td>Pergamum</td>
<td>Caesar seems to be confirming Pergamene privileges for the sake of Mithridates, and άνειοφορία has been hesitantly reconstructed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>RDGE 57, ll. 14-18; B.9, 12</td>
<td>Tralles</td>
<td>M. Antonius grants τιμίων καὶ φιλανθρώπων τῆς ἀσφαλείας καὶ άλειτουργίας πάσης καὶ άνεπισταθμείας καὶ τῆς περί τὴν πανήγυριν ἐκεχειρίας καὶ οὐσίας καὶ πορφύρας to the ‘Guild of Worldwide Wreath-Wearing Victors in the Sacred Games’; other fragments mention μήτε εὐσφοράς, [μήτε] εὐσφοράς στρατείας, καὶ τὴν άνειοφορίαν</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42-30</td>
<td>RDGE 58, ll. 10, 20</td>
<td>Rhosus (Syria)</td>
<td>Caesar grants Roman citizenship and άνειοφορία to Seleucus of Rhosus and his family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>*Aphrod. 13</td>
<td>Aphrodisias</td>
<td>Augustus refuses to grant Samos έλευθερία, claiming it has nothing to do with the revenues that come to the state treasury</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \text{άτέλεια} ) (immunity from taxes)</td>
<td>( \text{άφορολογήσια} ) (immunity from tribute)</td>
<td>( \text{άλειτουργήσια} ) (immunity from public/civic duties)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>170</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>150-100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( ISE , 42, , l. , 13 )</td>
<td>( RDGE , 34, , ll. , 20-21 )</td>
<td>( RDGE , 44, , l. , 5 )</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argos</td>
<td>Teos</td>
<td>Thebes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>proxeny decree for Gn. Octavius, whom the</td>
<td>M. Valerius makes the city and their temple</td>
<td>Roman magistrate grants Theban city ( \text{άνεισφορία} ) (as well as ( \text{άτελία} ), ( \text{άνεπισταθμεύτος} ), ( \text{άλειτουργία} ))</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argives declare ( \text{άτέλεια} )</td>
<td>( \text{άσυλον καὶ} , \text{άφορολόγητον} , \text{άπό τοῦ} , \text{δήμου} , \text{τοῦ} , \text{Ῥωμαίων} )</td>
<td>(as well as ( \text{άτελία} ), ( \text{άνεπισταθμεύτος} ), ( \text{άλειτουργία} ))</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150-100</td>
<td>164?</td>
<td>150-100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( RDGE , 44, , l. , 6 )</td>
<td>( ISE , 169, , l. , 31 )</td>
<td>( RDGE , 44, , l. , 5 )</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thebes</td>
<td>Alabanda</td>
<td>Thebes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roman magistrate grants Theban city ( \text{άνεισφορία} ) (as well as ( \text{άτελία} ), ( \text{άνεπισταθμεύτος} ), ( \text{άλειτουργία} ))</td>
<td></td>
<td>Roman magistrate grants Theban city ( \text{άνεισφορία} ) (as well as ( \text{άτελία} ), ( \text{άνεπισταθμεύτος} ), ( \text{άλειτουργία} ))</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47-6 ?</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>193</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( RDGE , 26, , B. , 28-30 )</td>
<td>( RDGE , 34, , ll. , 20-21 )</td>
<td>( RDGE , 53, , l. , 5 )</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mytilene</td>
<td>Teos</td>
<td>Ilium</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caesar assures Mytilene that he will not</td>
<td>M. Valerius makes the city and their temple</td>
<td>fragmentary references to ( \text{[έλειτ]ούργητον} )</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>grant ( \text{άτελία} ) to any of their</td>
<td>( \text{άσυλον καὶ} , \text{άφορολόγητον} , \text{άπό τοῦ} , \text{δήμου} , \text{τοῦ} , \text{Ῥωμαίων} )</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>citizens and thereby deprive the community</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of its revenue</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>54, 61</td>
<td>84?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( Aphrod, , 8, , ll. , 30, , 30, , 54, 61 )</td>
<td>Aphrodisias</td>
<td>Alabanda</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senate grants ( \text{άτέλεια} ) to</td>
<td>local man travels to Rome, probably</td>
<td>local man travels to Rome, probably asserting</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aphrodisias</td>
<td>asserting Alabanda’s claim to immunity, and</td>
<td>Alabanda’s claim to immunity, and was successful in</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>was successful in getting their ( \text{άφορολόγησια} ) recognized by the Senate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( RDGE , 69, , l. , 12 )</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nysa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>local citizen honoured for restoring sacred</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>writings and evidence of its ( \text{asylia} ) and ( \text{άτέλεια} )</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

317
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>78</td>
<td><em>RDGE 22, l. 12</em></td>
<td>Rome</td>
<td>Senate grants ἀνεισφορία καὶ ἀλειτουργία to Asclepius <em>et al.</em> and to their descendants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42-33</td>
<td><em>RDGE 57, l. 15</em></td>
<td>Tralles</td>
<td>M. Antonius grants ἀλειτουργησία along with a host of other immunities (above) to the ‘Guild of Worldwide Wreath-Wearing Victors in the Sacred Games’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td><em>Aphrod. 8, l. 44</em></td>
<td>Aphrodisias</td>
<td>Senate grants ἀλήθερη ἀνεισφορίαν ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀνεισφοροῦν τε to Aphrodisias</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ἀνεπισταθμεύτια (immunity from billeting)**

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<tr>
<th>Page</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>150-100</td>
<td><em>RDGE 44, l. 5</em></td>
<td>Thebes</td>
<td>Roman magistrate grants Theban city ἀνεισφορία (as well as ἀτελία, ἀνεπισταθμεύτος, ἀλειτουργία)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>127</td>
<td><em>SEG LI 1495</em></td>
<td>Bargas/ Pigidna</td>
<td>Apollonius convinces Aquillius not to quarter his troops in their loyal city</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84</td>
<td><em>RDGE 49, B. 12</em></td>
<td>Cos</td>
<td>Sulla confirms the privileges given to the Artists of Dionysus, including ἀνεπισταθμεύτια</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72</td>
<td><em>lex Ant. Term. col II, II. 4-13</em></td>
<td>Termessus Maior</td>
<td>law forbids magistrates from wintering troops in the town (unless by explicit order of the Senate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42-33</td>
<td><em>RDGE 57, ll. 15-16</em></td>
<td>Tralles</td>
<td>M. Antonius grants ἀνεπισταθμεύτια and various other immunities (above) to the ‘Guild of Worldwide Wreath-Wearing Victors in the Sacred Games’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td><em>Aphrod. 8, ll. 33-34</em></td>
<td>Aphrodisias</td>
<td>magistrates are forbidden from billeting, quartering or requesting victuals</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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**ἀστρατευσία (exemption from military contributions)**

<table>
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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>84</td>
<td><em>RDGE 49, B. 12</em></td>
<td>Cos</td>
<td>Sulla confirms the privileges given to the Artists of Dionysus, including those from ἀστρατευσία</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDGE 57, l. 14</td>
<td>Tralles</td>
<td>M. Antonius grants ἁγίστρατευσία and various other immunities (above) to the ‘Guild of Worldwide Wreath-Wearing Victors in the Sacred Games’</td>
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<td>---</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDGE 12, l. 8</td>
<td>Pergamum, Smyrna, Ephesus</td>
<td>Senate exempts (ὑπεξειρημένον) Pergamene land from Roman publicani</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDGE 23, ll. 20, 25, 33, 35, 66</td>
<td>Oropus</td>
<td>Lands were exempted (ὑπεξειρημένον) from the publicani in the law of contracts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>SIG</em>³ 748, l. 29</td>
<td>Gythea</td>
<td>Gythea was exempted (οὐκ εἰσηνέκαμεν) from giving victuals to the Roman army against Mithridates</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aphrod. 8, l. 60</td>
<td>Aphrodisias</td>
<td>Aphrodisians were deemed not liable to the publicani (ἀδημοσιώνητος), as well as being ἔλευθεροι καὶ ἀτελή</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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