

**Gender, Migration Regimes and Frames of Deservingness:
The Gendered Management of Women's Care Migration
From Armenia to Turkey**

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THE GENDERED MANAGEMENT OF WOMEN'S CARE MIGRATION
FROM ARMENIA TO TURKEY**

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Abstract

This thesis investigates the ways in which women's international migration from Armenia to Turkey is governed by the production and re-production of appropriate femininities and masculinities by macro-level state policies, legal texts and by everyday cultural discourses. Through an analysis of policy documents, legal texts and data collected through interviews with policy makers both in Armenia and Turkey, this thesis shows that gendered norms and rituals are implicated in how states regulate, intervene or simply ignore who are allowed or denied entry. Border regulations are affected and in return discipline the ideas and norms revolving around how the deserving feminine subjects of society should act and think.

This thesis demonstrates that in focusing on a South-South migration from the perspective of gender challenges the dominant analysis of International Relations (IR) on migration, which has framed international migration mostly as a question of international security. In contrast, this thesis brings the rich political histories, social contexts and economic concerns – framed by gender, class and racial hierarchies – to bear on the flows of migrant women from Armenia to Turkey. This framework developed here has two important implications for how migration is studied in IR: one, it paints a much more complex picture of state-migrant interactions that goes beyond simplistic security/exclusion claims; and secondly, it allows for a multi-faceted conception of women's agency.

This thesis argues that migrant women develop several methods of managing their identities in order receive acceptance and legitimacy in the context of the gendered regulation of migration by Armenia and Turkey. They actively participate sometimes to challenge their characterization as “illegals”, as immoral mothers and women, and as useless workers. Their relationships with their families, employers, police officers and compatriots are carefully described and analyzed. The findings suggest that migrant women's experiences are multifaceted and cannot be subsumed under a category of “irregular” migrant.

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Introduction: Identifying the Problem, Defining the Concepts

Is the international migration of women always met, as some suggest, with strict regulation on the part of receiving states or with the blatant rejection, racialization and exclusion of migrants? What is at stake for nation-states in regulating international migration? In recent years, there has been a growing interest in the patriarchal social arrangements that are inherent within the regulatory regime that governs international migration, and this has involved a critical attempt to rethink migration through the perspective of sexuality and gender (Andrijasevic, 2009; Luibheid 2002; Spijkerboer and Walsum, 2007; Bhabha 2007; Fincher 1997; Benhabib and Resnik 2009). This research has revealed the role of the politics of gender in shaping the practices of exclusion and inclusion that characterize the responses of states towards international migration. It is argued that borders and states are gendered, relying upon delineated roles for women and men to vary opportunities for both (Resnik, 2007; 46; Schrover 2008; Kofman and Raghuram 2015). Feminist engagement with migration politics in various disciplines should inform the gender-blind accounts of migration within International Relations, in which migration is only conceptualized in relation to concerns with authority and sovereignty on the part of states, as if these were gender-neutral, and in which states seek only to exert control over irregular migrants. In this thesis, I, first and foremost, ask how we can differently understand the regulation of international migration of women if we take gender seriously at the macro and micro levels. I also ask what types of political control in the lives of migrant women can be identified if we start from a feminist perspective that takes the voices of migrant women seriously.

This thesis focuses on the international migration of women from Armenia to Turkey as domestic care workers. It argues that there is a border-crossing transnational migration regime between Turkey and Armenia and that women's migration is governed by the continuous production and reproduction of appropriate femininities and masculinities by macro-level state policies, discourses and legal structures and by micro-level everyday actors. Through an analysis of primary policy documents, I argue that in Armenia, the state-induced discourses about the appropriate roles for men and women in society, family and the market impact who goes and who stays and under what conditions. The Armenian state, as a sending country, does not have an explicitly articulated migration policy, but it is through creating gender hierarchies, norms and expectations in society that it shapes women's migration in profound ways. In order to examine how these gendered notions are produced, I engage in a textual analysis of several different policy edicts issued by the Armenian government as well as the cultural discourses concerning gender, sexuality and the nation that are primarily articulated by the Armenian intelligentsia.

In Turkey, migrant care workers (both legal and illegal) are seen as essential to the preservation of the gendered and neoliberal economic status-quo in society, and, so long as they remain as submissive workers and adopt appropriate feminine moral norms, their illegality is tolerated by the formal state officials and informal actors such as employers, families etc. I pursue this argument through a careful analysis of secondary resources on Turkey, gender and migration as well as primary sources on migration policy and interviews in which I solicit the views of relevant bureaucratic personnel. As such, what I'm engaging with in this dissertation is not only an empirical study of women's migration from Armenia

to Turkey, but also a theoretical debate about the interactions of states' migration regimes with gender regimes at the macro-level.

The key element of these migration regimes is the conditional inclusion of migrant women, which relies on women's self-conduct as moral women and submissive labourers and which renders toleration conditional upon women's commitment to the values of good feminine and submissive labour. Neither Turkey nor Armenia directly tries to control women's migration, but migrant women expect themselves and are expected by other actors to perform certain desired norms to qualify for the status of "tolerated". A significant part of this project is based on interviews, which I conducted with migrants, migrants' families, police officers, employers, and several different bureaucrats in Istanbul (Turkey), Gyumri and Yerevan (Armenia). By pursuing the interview method¹, I was able to come to grips with how these official and unofficial actors – including migrants themselves – assume different notions of femininity and masculinity and how these impact upon the experience of migrant care workers. I argue that migrant women watch their conduct, develop elaborate discourses of morality and hard work and conceal aspects of their self-identity which might contradict the desired image they want to convey. They rely on these symbols of legitimate behaviour in Turkey to legitimate themselves in the eyes of informal actors such as employers, neighbours and partners and official actors such as police officers. In Armenia, migrant women also feel the need to preserve their social ties and moral values which bind them to their families, neighbourhoods and nation.

¹ Methods used in this study and the feminist methodological approach in which they are located will be discussed in Chapter 2.

In Armenia, the good character of migrant women is measured by their fidelity to the cult of motherhood. Migrant women are under constant surveillance by their families, neighbors and even their own children, who monitor the amount of money being sent as remittances, the intimacy they maintain with men or other migrant women in their host society, their overall commitment to feminine morality and to Armenian cultural values in order to establish “deservingness” frames. Armenian migrant women, who are otherwise perceived as deserving of scorn for their defiance of such expectations, acquire legitimacy by performing good deeds. On the other hand, while the conduct of Armenian women within Turkey has an impact on how their migration is perceived at home, migrant women are also expected to increase their deservingness within their host country. Migrant women can “become less illegal” – i.e. they can gain better access to health care, move more comfortably within the city without fear of deportation, increase their chances of employment and receive the positive acknowledgement of authorities – if they remain obedient servants and moral women in the labour market and within their social setting.

It is a curious fact that although many countries in the world do not strictly regulate international migration and this occurs through porous borders, migrants are, for the most part, examined through the perspective of “illegality” within the IR and migration disciplines (Johnson 2011; Squire 2010; Sadiq 2005; Nyers 2003, 2011). These migrants, both men and women, are juxtaposed against the strict migration regimes of the receiving states and depicted as pushing against the well-gated doors epitomized in the sensational illustrations of Fortress Europe or the highly militarized Mexican-American border. The predominant conceptualization of migration regime as an exclusionary discourse and policy takes its cues

from those contexts – mainly within Europe and the US – in which international migration is increasingly securitized. I believe the IR scholars who have chosen to focus on these geographies did so because it fitted well with the traditional focus of the discipline on security and also because Western states are considered as more important than others.

In the discipline, both opponents and advocates of this securitization of migration share a number of guiding assumptions. Both frame international migration as a question of international security, whether they extol the increasing border patrolling as a “greater protection to the national community” or decry it as “violence” towards migrants. Both approach illegal migration as the main axis of international migration, whether they regard it as transgressive situation in which the will of state is being violated or as a celebratory situation in which the illegal migrants can actually alter the power of the state to control and regulate. Both fail to problematize, and indeed perpetuate, the conceptual collapse in the use of the term “migration regime”, which is applied to different state projects in a variety of different geographies, where there are varying stakes in intervening in the international migration of people.

This thesis tackles with some of these problematic assumptions of the IR literature through a focus on the women’s migration from Armenia to Turkey within the private care industry. In focusing upon the international migration of care workers, I shift the focus away from security to gender and economy as a central concern of state’s migration regimes. In contemporary analysis, the racial profiling of migrants in the US after 9/11, the refugee crises in Europe and Australia, and the rise of illegal migrants as targets of nationalist hatred and as scapegoats of economic melt-down are cited as examples of the rising security discourse in

these Western geographies (Walters 2009, 2011) . The attention has been given to the complex interactions of security discourses, policies and histories with the rise of punitive states policies against migrants (Bigo and Guild 2005; Bigo 2002; Adamson 2006; Alexseev 2006). Feminist authors have demonstrated that security discourses can also be gendered, differentiating between feminine and masculine criminality and threat (i.e. human trafficking as feminine versus terrorism as masculine; i.e. the perception of homosexual migrants as a threat to the nation) and which can lead to differential treatment of men and women on borders (Andrijasevic 2009; Bhabha 2007; Oxford 2005; Luibheid 2002). However, I shift my focus away from security because a focus on the migration of care workers from Armenia to Turkey reveals that state concerns and responses with migration and migrants are shaped through complex histories of gender social relations, gender hierarchies in respective societies and constructions of femininity and masculinity and that states' concern with migration cannot be limited to its security.

More importantly a shift in focus allows us to reveal different regimes of governance adopted by states such as subordinate inclusion, ignorance, conditional acceptance and toleration as opposed to criminalization and exclusion. The emphasis on security has created the false perception that state migration policy serves only to exclude and criminalize. Observing the existence of other regimes of governance is crucially important since it will necessarily guide how we examine migrants' experiences. So far, the assumption that migrants are primarily subject to states' punitive policies has led to an overemphasis on the experiences of migrants from the perspective of irregularity because irregular migrant are those who are most subject to state violence. Irregularity is an important dimension of

today's global flows and Armenian migrants' lives as well, but irregularity is not the only social condition that defines the experience of migrants and the response of states to them. States do not only operate as "the guardian of national-borders and the arbiter of citizenship" (cf. Kearney, 1991, 55) and states' display of power is not only limited to separating citizens from non-citizens and turning migrants into "homo-sacer", as Giorgio Agamben and others seem to suggest (Agamben 1998, 128-133; Rajaram and Grundy-Warr 2004).

Armenian migrant women also emerge as gendered subjects through their interactions with state imposed discourses and policies as well as within their social relations with other everyday actors. They appear as sacrificing mothers who are compelled to travel great distances in order to meet the cultural expectations that are incumbent upon them as the standard-bearers of moral motherhood in Armenia, as well as honorable women and submissive workers in their efforts to garner legitimacy in the eyes of their employers within Turkey. States' migration regimes are determinative in the emergence of these subjectivities.

Since the migration regime is a central theme that runs throughout this thesis, it merits operationalization. First, migration regimes are characterized by "migration policies" that govern the entry, denial and status issues of migrants – i.e. settlement and naturalisation rights as well as employment, social, political and civil rights (Williams 2010, 390). They are related to external-border crossing activities and are undertaken in both the sending and receiving states. Secondly, migration regime cannot be analyzed without examining the political histories, values and interests of nation-states that are framed by gender, racial and class hierarchies and in which states' responses to the different migration flows are

embedded. For example, in the US, the relationship between Mexican workers and US citizens tends to be couched in more racialized terms, while, in other cases, such as the plight of Algerian immigrants in France, colonial ties and religious differences assume greater prominence.

In this work, I focus on one of these political realms, namely the ‘gender regimes’ of two countries, Turkey and Armenia, to explicate the concerns, stakes and interests of states in the emerging responses towards women’s international migration for care work. In this way, I aim at broadening the focus on international migration in International Relations by bringing in “gender” as an important concern for states. Women’s movement across borders for care work demonstrate the deeply gendered character of migration regimes. Gender-regimes can be examined as more or less institutionalized gender hierarchies in a society that construct femininities and masculinities; as structures and discourses that shape gender roles for men and women in the family, economy and the nation; and as interlocking political, economic and cultural conditions that differentially regulate men’s and women’s lives (Acker 1994; Walby 2004; Fabian 2011; Peterson 1999). I argue that legal structures, various policies and cultural discourses both in Armenia and Turkey produce graded definitions of appropriate femininity and masculinity around transnational migrant bodies and citizens. Gender regimes in Armenia appropriate women for the nation-building project primarily as mothers and symbols of national morality, while men are imagined as labourers, soldiers and migrants. Women’s migration from Armenia is disapproved of culturally because of the perceived violation of cultural norms, but it is also tolerated as long as women remain as loyal to these norms. In Turkey, the gender regime intersects with migration regime, leading

to attitudes of tolerance towards irregular migrant workers. However, this is also a conditional tolerance, which depends on migrant women's performances.

In order to examine the gender regime of Turkey, I draw upon the discussions of welfare regimes, which have explored the intersection of migration regimes with central features of the international political economy of gender, including extensive research into transnational welfare regimes. In this literature, the relationship between the increasing care needs of the home countries and the adjustment of migration policy according to market-needs is explored extensively (Williams 2010; Williams and Gavanas 2008; Lutz and Mollenbeck 2010; Isaksen, Devi and Hochschild 2008). In other words, migration policies are examined in relation to the broader forces of gender relations and economic policies that affect citizens themselves rather than as an effect of states' concern with an abstract notion of sovereignty and authority. It is emphasized that far from excluding migrants or refusing them entry, states follow a mixture of inclusionary and exclusionary politics in order to serve their interests under the auspices of the existing economic and gender order. Rather than posing as "an exception" to the goals of marketization and commodification that attend the domestic realm, migrant workers are the invisible subjects at the very foundation of welfare regimes. In other words, migrant workers, whether legal or illegal, are internal to the state's projects of creating certain gender regimes and not so ironically, states are well aware of this fact.

In recent years, more and more neo-liberal reforms have been introduced in the form of market-arrangements vis-à-vis the welfare sector of states. Some states are outsourcing their welfare responsibilities to private actors, among which migrant domestic

care workers play a central role. Women migrants from underdeveloped economies now assume the main responsibilities of child care, domestic services and elderly care in their host states. Indeed, states come to depend upon the steady inflow of legal or illegal international migrant workers to transform care regimes into purely marketized forms. In this sense, the international migration of women exposes the increasing impact of the market on migration flows and points to the necessity of understanding migration not as exclusively a matter of state sovereignty. The migration regime is an essential tool with which to supply the privatized care market with women workers and labourers. For the receiving state, Turkey, the concept of the “gender regime” is useful as a means of emphasizing the gendered processes and ideologies embedded in the corporate/governmental claims to non-responsibility for reproduction (Acker 2004, 17). In their pursuit of a new responsible migrant work-force upon which they can offload the cost of reproduction, states are less concerned with excluding migrants, whether legal or illegal, and more concerned with ensuring that they remain as useful and acceptable bodies to achieve the desired ends. In this sense, we are also witnessing the rise of a new form of state – that is, the gendered migration state, in which the goals of welfare cuts increasingly depend upon a sustainable migration policy.

The concept of “gender regime” is useful in the context of Armenia to examine the nation-building efforts of Armenia and the simultaneous production of gender roles for men and women in the family and nation. In migrant sending countries, the question of who goes and who stays is clearly conditioned by the appropriate roles that are delineated for women and men. Traditionally, migration has not been perceived as an appropriate outlet for

women, as they are expected to contribute to the nation through more sedentary means, by preserving their feminine morality and conducting themselves as good mothers within the natal home (Hondagneu-Sotelo 1999; Parrenas 2001; Moroksavic 1984). In recent years, however, the re-mapping of nation-states through the assumption of neo-liberal economic imperatives and other political forces such as nation-building in the post-Communist states have also diversified the expected contributions from women towards nation-building. In the migrant receiving states too, as authors Sara Van Walsum and Mai Ngai have demonstrated, gender and sexuality play an important role in fixing who are the right kind of women (be they mothers, workers, moral agents, etc.), targeting both citizens and migrants, and who can be allowed to migrate and under what terms (Walsum 2008; Ngai 2004). The political community of the nation is constructed by hegemonic norms of gender and sexuality, and in both sending and receiving communities, migrants have often been appropriated for the purposes of gendered nation-building. In Armenia, ascriptions of particular activities as women's work, division of labour and the politics of labour market hierarchies are inseparable from the processes shaping social differentiated migration patterns, regulations and experiences (Silvey 2004, 491; cf. Ehrenreich and Hochschild, 2003).

This thesis can be best described as an inquiry into the migration regime, conceptualized in conjunction with gender regimes, from the perspective of gender and sexuality. I argue that migrant workers – as both women and labourers – are indispensable to the projects of gendered regimes of both sending and receiving states and in this case, within Armenia and Turkey. Both countries benefit from the continuous production of migrant subjects in a moral economy as the right kind of labourers and as the right kind of women.

Migration regimes are central in construing migrant workers as both ideal workers and ideal women.

Shifting the Focus Towards Gender and Sexuality in the Study of Migration Regimes

This thesis aims to make an original contribution to the study of migration and migration regimes in the International Relations discipline from a gendered perspective. Broadly speaking, I have three different objectives in seeking to broaden the interpretative framework pertaining to the international migration of women. The first is to situate the migration regime within a broader study of gender and sexuality. For both migrant receiving and sending countries, who goes and who stays, who is allowed entry under what terms and who is terminally denied from entering are questions that are heavily influenced by the social relations and hierarchies of gender. So far within the International Relations discipline, questions of migration status have been the preeminent categories through which to examine the migration regimes and how these have re-mapped nation-states by creating new categories of racial, cultural and ethnic differences (Ngai, 2004). Gender has remained in the shadows in these analyses. The reason for this is the persistent under-emphasis upon the gendered dimension of nation-states from the perspective of local country contexts. Gendered norms and the patriarchal social arrangements that inhere within immigration regulation itself signals, as Anrijasevic writes (2009, 389), “the undiminished urgency of feminist engagement to rethink migration through the perspective of sexuality and gender”.

The second aim of this thesis is to assess the adequacy of the prevailing exclusion-based models. The contemporary analysis of IR scholars remains committed to an analytical framework centered on control, and approaches border and migration regulations primarily

in terms of “exclusion”. I believe the reason for this over-emphasis is the perception that states are concerned with their borders, which is not the least of the symbols that mark state-authority. In this view, the dominant nation-state structure is argued to be shaped in relation to the sovereign power that exists in relation to violence with the non-citizen (Johnson 2011, 272). I assume a somewhat more nuanced view of migration regimes that can both include and exclude depending upon the stakes for the respective nation-states in drawing these boundaries. Emerging market needs for labour in the host states and other domestic goals such as nation-building might provide the structural impetus for the development of “inclusive policies” (Calavita 1998, 529). Illegal migrant women might be welcomed, rather than racialized and excluded. They might be seen as “deserving members” of the host state and society rather than as foreign implants subject to deportation at a moment’s notice. In this sense, I would like to emphasize the importance of studying those regimes in which states respond to the international migration of women. Social acceptance, legitimacy, tolerance and regularization represent different modalities through which the issue of international migrant women is politicized. Social acceptance and tolerance, rather than intimidation and exclusion, can be ways to transform migrant women into flexible, useful and moral labourers and feminine subjects.

The third objective of this study is to examine the experiences of Armenian migrant workers in the frameworks of social acceptance that they face in Armenia and Turkey. I see Armenian migrant workers not as representative of illegal workers in global politics, who push back against the well-protected borders of the receiving states and who are intimidated by the fear of abjection and deportation. Their accounts of living and working conditions

attest to my view. The excessive focus on the status and experience of illegality is a product of the aforementioned exclusion model. This does not mean that migrant women are free from the dehumanizing effects of migration regimes, but their experiences are shaped within the political-economic contexts which have produced these migrations and discourses. The benefit of taking the contexts of migration regimes seriously is that it allows us to hear migrants' narratives not from a perspective that focuses solely upon illegality. If not by fears of deportations and by public control and violence, how do migrants experience and negotiate the migration regime? It is this question that this thesis strives to answer. I argue that in the context of tolerance both in the home and host countries, the social control of migrant women have been based on how they perform according to the norms of sexuality, gender and work. The sorting of people into categories of otherness occurs on the basis of gender, ethnic and class markers, not on the migration statuses only.

The project of appropriating migrant women for the state projects is articulated in different ways depending upon the locality. Here, I will focus upon two distinct levels of locality. The first level consists in the study of national policies and the claims of both Armenia and Turkey as they pertain to the international migration of women (and men). An important component of this level is migration policy itself, which regulates the entry, denial, the terms of stay and the economic, political and social statuses of migrants. These predetermine the mobility of people, how long they are allowed to live in a country, which employment obligations exist and how to contend with illegality. However, migration policy qualifies as only one dimension, while the migration regime and the broader terms employed in this study, involve another set of policies and discourses that affect the international

migration of women. As Spike Peterson argues, the power of the state vis-à-vis international migration occurs not only through its claim to exercise control over its borders, but also through state activities, rituals, discourses and routines that constitute and regulate acceptable forms of social activity and gender identity (Peterson 1992, 45). Therefore, policies and discourses that regulate acceptable femininity and masculinity and that affect the movement of women across borders are also under consideration within the purview of this first level analysis.

The second level consists in the study of the everyday norms and hierarchies in both countries. Taking my cues from important work in anthropology and its recent applications in the IR/IPE fields, I argue that the encounters of migrant women with the ‘state’ must be understood in the context of everyday life, and as a result of migrants’ interactions with state-sanctioned norms, categories and laws (Willen 2007, Boehm 2012) . Both levels in both countries, I argue, are part and parcel of the overarching migration regime, and, accordingly, they are influential in efforts to create the desired migrant subject of the gendered migration states. The desired gendered subjects are not necessarily terrorized and disciplined by their status of illegality. They are not banned from leaving their home country and entering into the host state. Rather, the subjects of the gendered migration state are created by the “alliance” of social relations of gender and sexuality in both sending and receiving states, both at the first and second level of localities. When I was approaching a study of these countries, the primary questions I had in my mind were: How are gender and sexuality embodied in various policies at the national level? What are the ideas and relations of gender that frame the questions of how to approach women’s migration in both countries? How are

women migrants appropriated for neo-liberal and nationalist projects? How should the International Relations discipline approach the concept of migration regimes? And, how can we synthesize an understanding of the everyday context of migrant women's experiences in specific locales with a critical analysis of policy?

The Setting(s) of Gendered Migration Regimes: Why Turkey and Armenia?

This thesis is original both in terms of the theoretical lens it adopts as well as the distinctive characteristics of the case it examines. With respect to theory, I critique the overemphasis upon security and irregularity that characterize depictions of migration regimes and instead I focus upon the gendered organization of these regimes with an emphasis on the inclusive dimension of state policy. Theoretically, this has two important implications: one, it paints a much more complex picture of state-migrant interactions that goes beyond security/exclusion claims and secondly, it allows for a multifaceted conception of migrant women's agency, which does not simply paint them as victims of their irregular statuses. To shed light upon the gendered construction of nations, borders and migrations, I focus upon the specific case of Turkey and Armenia. This thesis, different from other texts produced in the discipline, sheds light on the politics and micro-politics of women's migration in a South-South context.

This case study was chosen for several different reasons. First, Turkey and Armenia are both located in the Global South and they exemplify a migration regime in which a strict control over borders and migrants themselves do not exist. Most of today's international migration flows take place in the Global South but these are not considered as important to the study of world politics. In addition, an empirical focus on the Global North, even when

it is carried out by critical scholars, has remained bound to analyses of security discourses and the concept of citizenship. This is understandable given the over-securitization of migration in the West and the fact that critical scholars must develop a critique of the securitized border regime, challenging the power of sovereignty and the meaning of citizenship, in order to have any political impact whatsoever. However, a study of alternate geographies can broaden the scope of our analysis and allow us to demonstrate that international migration is not limited to refugees and irregular migrants entering Europe and North America. Focusing on Turkey and Armenia allows us to redirect our critical gaze to other aspect of the state system and should also lead to important lessons for scholars whose focus is purely upon the West.

When I first initiated my field work in Armenia and Turkey, I was ready to write off state level analysis as irrelevant in the study of women's migration from Armenia to Turkey because in both of these countries the international migration of women did not seem to stir any open public debate. I was unprepared for this development since it seemed to contradict what I had learned in my survey of the literature surrounding the international migration of women, where opponents and supporters of migration were embroiled in fierce debates over issues of security, economy and culture. It is important to point out that much of this literature on migrant receiving countries was situated in the Global North and seemed less relevant to the circumstances within Turkey. In the countries of the Global North, it is fair to say that borders have featured prominently in the news media as well as in the rhetoric of political leaders and in academic works that focus on these geographies of advanced capitalism. A particular emphasis has been placed upon "illegal border crossings" and the

threat these pose to the security of the state. The academic literature on international relations, whether supportive or critical of these state interventions, tends to privilege an analytical framework based upon exclusion in which migrants are denied entry at the border, and are subject to removal through deportation or the denial of citizenship.

Secondly, in Turkey, despite the presence of large numbers of illegal migrant women from the post-Soviet countries, there does not seem to be any comparable migration-security nexus (Faist, 2006; Huysmans and Squire 2009); no open “militarization of border zones” (Nicholas and De Genova 2002) or news of the deportation of illegal migrant women. On the contrary, police, media and the public as well as state officials seem to tolerate and provide them with legitimacy both at the formal and informal levels. This degree of legitimacy and social acceptance that is afforded to illegal migrant workers represents a novel form of incorporation, rather different from the traditional “incorporation” premises involved in discussions of cosmopolitanism or multi-culturalism that are counter-posed against the advocates of stronger migration controls in the context of Europe and the United States (Shabani 2007; Appadurai 1996; Sassen 2002). Armenian migrant women are neither recognized as right-bearing subjects according to the cosmopolitan, post-national framework, nor are they celebrated as a repository of cultural wealth. Rather, Armenian migrant women, just like migrant women from other ethnic nationalities, are regarded as “deserving migrants” who embody a flexible but robust work ethic and are further valued as moral, responsible women.

This social legitimacy discourse would be difficult to contemplate in the event that the Turkish state had sought to transform its borders into what De Genova (2002) has

referred to as the “spectacle of the militarized border enforcement”. On the contrary, the migration policies of Turkey remain fairly liberal, particularly with respect to the migrant care workers. These enjoyed “more inclusion” compared to other international migrants, such as refugees, asylum seekers, sex workers or male labour migrants. Rather than invoking some all-encompassing nationalistic discourse to be applied equally to all “aliens”, the migration regime in Turkey differentiates. It separate out useful and wanted migrants from those construed as dangerous and troublesome. Migrant women from Armenia (as well as other places) become useful bodies, labourers and women for Turkey, owing partly to the conservative and neo-liberal changes in the Turkish welfare regime, which have increased the need for foreign domestic workers to take on “the dirty work” of housekeeping and child/elderly care. In this sense, the economic benefits of migrant domestic care workers to the state elites and society is obvious, and accommodating migrant women through an inclusive migration regime serves to further the abdication of any state-societal responsibility for reproduction. My analysis also reveals what is perhaps less obvious, namely, the fact that the gendered structures and ideologies of inequality that are in-built within domestic policies are also upheld on the backs of domestic care workers. This is especially true for Turkey, in which the increasing need for foreign domestics is related to the states’ discouragement of native women from participating in the labour market (Chapter 5). In this sense, the migration regime is closely connected with other plans and programs on the part of states seeking to govern the gender relations of their citizens, signalling the importance of bringing “the inside” and “outside” in closer contact within social analysis.

Third, my choice to focus upon Armenian migrant workers among all of the different groups entering Turkey, including Moldavians, Bulgarians, Georgians, Kazaks and others, was motivated by the recognition that this might have a more significant political impact. Today, when Armenia and Turkey are studied together, it is always in the context of investigations into the historic Genocide, fueling nationalist sentiments on both sides. However, rather than being restricted to foreign policy and international relations, these nationalist feelings in Armenia have an impact on the social relations of gender within the domestic sphere. It is in Armenia (as a sending state), as opposed to Turkey (a receiving state), in which the nationalist discourse and concern with state sovereignty is more influential in shaping women's international migration. Again this poses a challenge to the dominant accounts within International Relations, which examine migrant's experiences vis-à-vis the rise of security, nationalism and anti-migrant sentiments in the West. Armenian migrant women are affected by the rising security discourses and nationalist sentiments in their own country more than outside it.

In seeking to understand the role of Armenia in governing women's migration, I have faced formidable obstacles. For one thing, sending countries receive relatively little attention from the International Relations discipline, owing partly to the notion that they do not exert a significant enough impact upon migration regulation and hence are less deserving of study. Within global political economy, they are comparably more visible because of their structural position as Third World countries. More specifically, transnational care analysis has paid substantial attention to the sending country context by emphasizing the fact that Third World women's migration into the care sector of the advanced economies is a form of

domestic imperialism, in which the care deficit resulting of women's migration from their home countries is compensated for by an increasing burden of care placed upon non-migrant women within the family (Williams 2011, Hochschild 2000; Yeates 2004; Lutz and Mollenbeck 2012). This literature has been fruitful in terms of illuminating the new forms of structural inequalities and social consequences that are engendered by the extension of commoditized care to an international terrain. However, there has been less inquiry into the context of gendered migration within the sending countries, in which discourses and policies about femininity and masculinity independently shape this migration in diverse ways. This work will attempt to fill this gap by providing an analysis of the gendered migration regime within Armenia.

From the outset, Armenia is a difficult country to situate in these terms. After gaining independence from Soviet-Russia, the country's policies and discourses surrounding migration have focused on the international migration of men rather than of women. Again, the issue of women's migration has not been taken up in Armenia's public debates or policy circles. The migration regime can be characterized with an extreme anxiety and discourse surrounding male-out migration and with a considerable under-recognition, if not full ignorance, of women's migration. Yet, nation-building in Armenia, which has become an important concern post-independence, has ignited intense debates and anxieties about the role of men and women in society. Although there is not any migration policy that targets the migration of women from Armenia, the gendered discourses pertaining to nation-building shape women's international migration in unexpected ways. This thesis examines the gender relations that have emerged in the context of the nation-building project and which are

essential in understanding the international migration of women and the specific boundaries of inclusion and exclusion that they constitute. According to Yuval Davis, the contributions of women to the nationalist project can be understood primarily in terms of culture and origin (Davis 1993, 623-25). In relation to national culture, this thesis examines the ways in which women play the role of cultural transmitters as well as cultural signifiers of the Armenian national collectivity. In relation to origins, I will examine the role of women as biological reproducers of the nation and how a variety of measures are taken to ensure that this reproductive function remains within the purview of the national collectivity and does not violate the moral norms therein. As will become clear, these gendered boundaries are important for an understanding of the international migration of women.

From Illegality to Self-management: The Role of Everyday Actors in the Migration Regime

I would argue that focusing upon the international migration of women can shed important light upon some novel characteristics of the gendered migration states themselves. Most significant is the fact that these states elect not to govern certain forms of migration by prohibition, strict regulation or fear, but instead through more subtle pressures exerted upon migrant women to remain useful and deserving subjects. Instilling the fear of deportation in migrants and rendering them increasingly invisible are not the only tools in the arsenal of receiving states. In the sending states too, despite the fact that women's migration is often not viewed positively due to prevailing gender norms at the level of state and society, there is no prohibition over women's migration, except within a few states. So long as migrant women remain as the desired subjects of gendered states, their mobility is approved of,

supported and even endorsed by these selfsame states. Upon changing my focus from exclusion and the study of illegality as its center-piece to how migrants are accorded the status of legitimate subjects both in sending and receiving states, it has become clear that there should be more emphasis on what Chauvin and Mascarenas refer to as “deservingness frames” (Chauvin and Mascaranas 2012, 2014; Mascarenas 2015). In these deservingness frames, the acceptance extended to international migrant women both within migrant receiving and sending states are conditioned upon migrants’ qualifying performances defined in terms of being appropriate feminine and labouring subjects. As long as they remain as useful bodies ready to over-work themselves, be flexible and self-sacrificing, migrant women can benefit from the rewards of social acceptance in the migrant receiving state, without ever being recognized as “right-bearing” subjects. In the sending states too, so long as they preserve their identity as deserving feminine and self-sacrificing subjects, they can be exempted from the gender codes which other citizens of Armenia are compelled to abide by.

In not focusing upon illegality as the central feature of international migrant women’s mobility, the role of multiple discourses that shape this mobility and the experiences therein become visible. For subjects who become deserving of legitimacy, the experience of migration cannot be characterized as having been shaped solely by exclusion, fear of deportation or abjection. Rather, “self-management” becomes a central organizing principle through which the migrant’s experiences must be understood. (Salter 2006, 176). The expectation of official and unofficial members of society is to “re-moralize migrants” framed as capable of behaving according to a moral economy of work and femininity (Inda 2008, 19). Migrant women are expected to manage themselves appropriately in order to increase

their societal approval by furnishing the symbols of reliable economic, legal and moral conduct. The emerging migrant experiences therefore are less about fear of deportation, unemployment or civic and cultural exclusion, but that does not mean that self-management is any less political or free of social power dynamics. On the contrary, by incorporating this concept within an overall analysis of the migration regime, this work seeks to better understand the ways in which subjects of the neo-liberal gendered state are also governed by “inclusion”. Accordingly, the desired workers and women in this system are constructed not simply by instilling fear or through the exercise of crude power, but also by what Foucault calls “the conduct of conduct” – that is any (more or less) rational effort to influence or guide the comportment of others through acting upon their hopes, desires, circumstances or environment (Foucault, 1982). This thesis does not employ a full-scale “governmentality” perspective as outlined by the disciples of Foucault – mainly Rose and Miller (1992)– but I found the term “the conduct of conduct”, which is derived from the governmentality literature, very useful as a means of understanding the expectations and responsibilities that are imposed upon migrants. In addition, reading migrants’ actions and conduct through the concept of “self-management” has been more fruitful as compared to other perspectives that focus upon “agency” for the purposes of this work.

One advantage of this perspective over some of the more mainstream international relations and IPE approaches, in which the state is accepted as the only main actor shaping the conditions of migration, is that it allows us to focus on the practices of other important actors and entities involved – i.e. employers, the institution of the family, police officials and other bureaucrats – whose aim is to shape human conduct towards desired ends. From this

perspective, the state and its migration regime is only one element, albeit an important one, in the multiple networks of actors, organizations and entities that exercise authority over individuals. In this sense, my aim is to examine the conduct of everyday actors as well as the formal and informal relationships that they establish and the key role this plays in the “incorporation” of migrants as acceptable members of the society. In this way, this thesis not only aspires to move beyond the framework of exclusion and illegality to analyse the international movement of people, but also to include everyday actors and entities as important elements in the governance of migration. To this end, in Chapter 4, I examine the role of migrant sending neighbourhoods and migrants’ families in Armenia in ensuring the continuing commitment of Armenian migrant women to be deserving subjects and labourers, and in Chapter 7, I focus upon the efforts of police officers and employers to influence the conduct of migrant workers by rewarding those deemed ‘deserving’ with enhanced security and social welfare.

Situating Migrant Narratives within Global Politics

Although they have failed to gain much currency within the mainstream International Relations discipline, migrant narratives are emerging as essential sources of knowledge within migration studies (Silvey 1997; Lawson 1998; Halfacree and Boyle 1993; Johnson 2011). Migrant narratives are full of rich descriptions and detail. They sometimes reveal ambiguities and certainly temper the false promises of a bright future that are prevalent in the dominant elite discourses concerning neo-liberalism, international migration and the nation, detailing the personal insecurities and vulnerabilities that constitute the lived reality of migrants. Bhabha (2008), while unrelentingly abstract, does provide important insight into the manner

in which the negative consequences of policies are absented from elite discourses. Elites remain silent about how their various projects impinge upon the lives of the people who are most affected by them, in order to maintain the coherence of their promises and rhetoric. Silences, whenever they are articulated by people on the margins of the socio-economic order, emerge as strategic sites that reveal the ambiguities of states' projects with respect to nation, gender and economy. They have the potential to cast doubt upon the social consequences of those intended projects, which might not be as desirable as elites would have us believe.

Scholars have variously demonstrated that migrant narratives have the potential to challenge “post-colonial” nationalism, the dominant narratives of citizenship and the nation and of neo-liberal development and modernity. In this work, I will explore how the cultivation of Armenian women as moral and desirable subjects also involves a crucial act of silencing them as humans. As much as migrants are eager to self-manage in order to receive benefits and rewards and to acquire the privilege of being exempted from the norms and rules that apply to others, this comes at the expense of “hiding themselves”. Being a moral woman and an ideal worker involves suppressing their experiences of violence, insecurity and the abuses that often attend that lived reality. In this sense, focusing on the silences of women could help us to reveal the true costs of the gendered migration state. It shifts our focus from dangers associated with not having a proper identity –i.e. being deportable – to the gender and class vulnerabilities that they experience. *The political condition that generates these silences and vulnerabilities is not illegal status, but the socio-normative category of feminine deservingness.*

In the last chapter of the thesis, I also focus on some of the insecurities that emerge from migrants' efforts in conducting themselves according to the desirable subjectivities. These include silences that emerge from sexual abuse by the employers and partners; the silences that women preserve when they are exposed to over-exploitation and inhumane treatment. It should also be reminded that these silences are not only generated by women's desire to look deserving in the host society. Equally important is the silences that women perpetuate to look loyal to the moral codes about gender and sexuality in Armenia. Women remain silent about their experiences and difficulties what could be perceived as resulting from their immorality. They are fearful that revealing these can impact their legitimacy both in the host and home society.

Breakdown of Chapters

This thesis examines the migration regime governing international migration of women from Armenia to Turkey from a feminist perspective. It argues that nations, borders and migration regimes are gendered and that migrant women experience gendered forms of control and surveillance within a framework of moral deservingness.

Chapter 2: *Research Methodology and Methods: EnGendering Migration-Regimes, EnGendering Women's Experience of Mobility* provides an overview of the migration issues as they have been taken up by both critical and conventional IR scholars. I explain my methodological approach, assessing how analysis rooted in feminist IR methodology can contribute to an analysis of migration as a gendered phenomenon. This chapter criticizes the overemphasis placed on security, exclusion and irregularity in the discipline by employing a feminist methodology. I argue that assumptions and norms about gender and sexuality impacts whom

the state allows and denies entry and exit and under what terms. I also argue that migrants' experiences with mobility and social control are affected by these frames of gender and sexuality, produced by states, everyday actors and migrants themselves. This chapter outlines the merits of such an approach and justifies the methods –mainly the interview method– used for data collection in this thesis.

Chapter 3: *Armenia: Where men migrate and Women Mother* examines the gender construction of nation in Armenia through a focus on migration policies, security discourses, labour market policies and discourses on Genocide. In Armenia, women are primarily construed as mothers and cultural transmitters in the family and nation through these various discourses, while men are seen as soldiers and economic migrants. This chapter sets the stage for examining the impacts of gender hierarchies inherent in these discourses on women's migration. Although the Armenian state has not formulated an explicit migration policy, it is involved in the regulation of emigration for both and men.

Chapter 4: *Moral Deservingness and The Role of Motherhood* connects the macro-level gender discourses with the gendered experiences of migrant women in the everyday. I argue that the gender discourses affect who goes and who stays in Armenia and under what conditions. Although women are construed as non-immigrants in Armenia, some women had to migrate because of the cultural expectations from a mother. On the other hand, I examine how the mobility of women is not received well because of its defiance of gender norms, but only “tolerated” by social actors, including the families and neighbourhoods of migrant women, requiring them to perform certain feminine practices to remain deserving of this tolerance.

Chapter 5: *Welfare Regime and Gender Relations in Turkey* turns the attention to Turkey and the gendered hierarchies within it. In drawing upon the literature on gendered welfare regimes, this Chapter examines how Turkey and its welfare policies construe gender hierarchies in Turkey and how these gender hierarchies are of special importance to international migration of women to Turkey. I argue that Turkey's gendered welfare policies play two important roles in creating demand for migrant care workers. First, it prevents low-income women from participating in the formal labour market as care workers and second it pursues a policy of marketization of care needs to fill the increasing care needs of middle and lower-middle classes. This Chapter sets the stage to examine the Turkey's tolerance and "inclusive policies" towards migrant care work in the next section.

Chapter 6 *Turkish Migration Policy: The Rise of the Gendered Migration State* argues that Turkey benefits from the steady inflow of migrant care workers, both regular and irregular, in order to sustain the gender and economic status-quo explained in Chapter 5 and for this reason, its policies toward migrant care workers have been "tolerant". This chapter explains what this tolerant attitude includes and how it turns migrant women into flexible, cheap and disposable workforce.

Chapter 7: *Being Hard-Working, Modern and Loyal: Social Acceptance of Migrant Women in the Domestic Care Industry* and Chapter 8: *Self-Management: Emerging Subjectivities and Insecurities* discuss the interaction of migrant women with official and unofficial actors in everyday life in Turkey. I argue that migrant women's legitimacy is proportionate to their moral status as women and workers in the eyes of employers and police officers. Achieving legitimacy becomes further entangled with becoming the right kind of subject, in line with the aims of

the gendered migration regime. The new subjects of this regime are asked to behave responsibly and promised rights and privileges but are not fundamentally seen as “rights-bearing” subjects, but rather as “reward-seeking” actors. If they are successful, they can access to certain privileges. The last chapter also discusses the gendered insecurities that emerge while women try to become deserving subjects.

Conclusions: Importance and Implications summarize the key concept and key arguments of this thesis. I sketch out the implications of this thesis for International Relations discipline.

Chapter 2: Research Methodology and Methods: EnGendering Migration-Regimes, EnGendering Women’s Experience of Mobility

In this Chapter, I will review the literature on nation, migration and agency in International Relations, critiquing the overemphasis upon exclusion and illegality as the defining features of the migration regime, which is attributable to the dominant notion of the state as a security and power seeking apparatus. This chapter can be seen as an effort to “engender” the International Relations discipline by focusing specifically upon the international migration of women (Youngs 2004; Shepherd 2014; Ackerly, Stern and True, 2006) both at the macro and micro levels. At the macro level, I argue that assumptions and norms about gender and sexuality impact whom the state allows and denies entry and exit to and under what terms. At the micro-level, I argue that migrants’ experiences with mobility and social control are affected by these frames of gender and sexuality, produced by states and everyday actors – the families of migrants, employers, police officers, boyfriends and migrants themselves. However, the focus on control, on the distinction between inside and outside and on exclusion and irregularity within IR serves to mask the ways in which both the receiving and sending states approach migration from the perspective of gender and sexuality. The work pursued in International Relations and migration studies, both in its conventional and critical forms, has remained bound to the idea that nation states are only concerned with their security and that migration status – i.e. being defined as a citizen or non-citizen – is what matters when we are assessing the lives of migrants. Both ignore the political economy of mobility and the gendered frameworks of inclusion and exclusion,

which become visible in a gendered reframing of some of the concepts used in the discipline both at the macro and micro levels.

This Chapter begins with a brief overview of how the nation and migrants are understood within International Relations, arguing that these analyses leave some “gender questions” unasked and unanswered. In the second section, I focus upon the feminist methodology employed in this Thesis in order to analyze the migration regime of Turkey and Armenia from a gendered perspective. I also outline the different levels of analysis – the individual and macro – simultaneously to shed light upon the gendered character of migration regimes. This section aims to broaden the terms migration policy through a feminist interpretation of the concept, arguing that the migration regime is a concept that is better suited to deciphering states’ broader interests and ideologies as they are framed by gender and class hierarchies. The third section provides a literature review developed by feminist authors in different disciplines on gendered migration regimes. This literature is important to IR, because it shows that (i) nation-states are gendered; (ii) migrants are infused with gendered meaning in nationalist narratives and (iii) that states’ practices of inclusion and exclusion with regard to the international migration of women cannot be understood without analyzing the gendered construction of the states themselves. In the last section of this chapter, I demonstrate that the focus on illegality prevents us from hearing the gendered experiences of migrant women. Migrant women are gendered subjects of states and of migration regimes and their experiences should be examined from the perspective of gender. Throughout these separate section, I also outline the steps and method in data collection.

Migration in International Relations

In International Relations, international migration has been regarded as an area of low politics, and not of comparable significance to the dominant issues of security, war, and conflict. However, recently, both traditional and critical variants of International Relations scholarship have begun to take migration issues seriously and both research groups have framed its relevance to the discipline with a reference to people's unauthorized movements across borders. Scholarly discourse on migration within IR has emerged from a system of knowledge dominated by the receiving states. Both emphasize international migration as a security agenda, but whereas traditional scholarship interprets it through the lens of security and state sovereignty (Rudolph 2003a, 2003b, 2006; Weiner 1985, 1993; Goldstone 2002; Dannreuther 2007; Adamson 2006) the critical variants emphasize how immigrants are racialized, excluded and dehumanized through the emerging security discourse (Squire 2009; Doty 1998; Waever et. al 1993; Kleinschmidt 2009). Alternatively, some critical scholarship has engaged with the agency and experiences of irregular migrants with the aim of challenging and rethinking what is claimed to be "knowledge" in the discipline, revealing new ways of looking at security, the nation-state and citizenship from the perspective of irregular migrants (Nyers 2013; Johnson 2011).

The preoccupation with irregularity has been both shaped by and reflected in the political writings of the Realist theory, which is intended to be the objectivist study of social reality and a policy oriented endeavour helping states to identify and respond to security threats emanating from international migration. Theories of Realism have based themselves on fundamental and axiomatic distinction between the domestic and foreign realms, in which the former represents cultural and political unity, homogeneity and a peaceful community

and the latter signifies chaos, threats and lack of order (Walker 1993; Campbell 1992). Fiona Adamson's classic work, *Crossing Borders and International Security*, reveals the importance of safeguarding borders from undocumented migrants and refugee flows and separating those two realms: "the ability of states to maintain control over their borders and to formulate a coherent national identity are arguably necessary preconditions for the maintenance of state security in other areas" (Adamson 2006, 176). In conventional IR theory, a state's right to control movements across its borders is regarded as a fundamental element of state sovereignty because borders serve an intrinsic role in defining the state itself (Weiner 1992, 91; cf. Albert, Jacobson and Lapid 2001). As Christopher Rudolph writes in his *National Security and Immigration*, borders "remain significant because they provide social closure and symbolic separation between people and cultures and together with the institution of citizenship design both inclusion and exclusion and designate the political community"(2006, 207). It is from these discourses that policy prescriptions seeking to increase border patrols, surveillance and the criminalization of migrants flow, due to the dominant conception of migrants as potentially de-stabilizing and formidable security challenges. These theories are implicated with state interests:

The concern of such researchers with policy relevance entails presupposition through which research is effectively formulated and conducted from the standpoint of the state, with all of its ideological conceits more or less conspicuously smuggled in tow (De Genova 2002, 420).

In her study of "securitization discourses" in the IR discipline, Doty argues that formulating the "outsiders" as existential threats to the security and values of society and the

state has reproduced the classical logic of security that is based upon a false distinction between inside and outside:

Things which threaten the presumed fixedness of the inside versus outside of states and societies are sources of insecurity and this gives rise to the logic of classical security problematique. The logic is one of exclusion which depends upon an understanding of self and other that is inextricably linked with territory. Solutions/policy prescriptions for addressing security threats will rely upon an exclusionary logic that seeks to determine the criteria for differentiation between self and other (Doty 1998, 80).

Doty (1998, 75-6) argues that the obsessive focus upon “exclusion” and “security” is problematic for at least two reasons: first, this approach within IR forecloses inquiry into how states respond to international migration by practices of inclusion, and second, this also prevents a critical investigation into all other stakes – economics, domestic politics, the power of ideas and gender – that states might have invested in this matter because there is an eagerness on the part of IR scholars to patrol “the narrow, conventional understanding of the state as a security apparatus” (Zalewski 2006, 60). Doty discusses the role of the American discourse on assimilation and its sister policy “cultural pluralism” as examples of “inclusion”, which are an outgrowth of American exceptionalism, masking the need to re-affirm the racial and cultural superiority of “whiteness” and with which America as a nation identifies, vis-à-vis its immigrant population. Although Doty fails to expand upon this point, it is doubtless also true that this example of assimilation and cultural pluralism, which remained dominant at least until 9/11 in the US, also illustrates the validity of the second problematique, namely, that states have multiple and sometimes conflicting stakes in their approaches to migration, such as, for example, the program of racialized nation-building in the US through inclusive immigration discourses. As Miranda Hallett points out, the whole

project of “inclusion” in the American discourse has ultimately sought to “re-inforce ideas of the United States as exceptional, with an image of masses of the world’s poor clamouring at Heaven’s door” and to re-brand the US as a place of “improved race relations” (Hallett 2009, 20). Building upon this critique of exclusion and security discourses, I will attempt to reveal how the politics surrounding gender and the imperatives of the neo-liberal nation-building project constitute two important stakes that have shaped the responses of Turkey and Armenia towards the international migration of women. I will also emphasize the practices of social acceptance and inclusion as opposed to exclusion and criminalization, which have sometimes governed the international migration of women.

Ideas about exclusion and irregularity have also been central to the analysis of critical international relations scholars, which is opposed to more traditional IR theory judged by its radically different choices of methodology, ontology and more importantly, political position. Critical IR theorists contend that the identification of “irregular” migration as a new security threat world-wide is bound to reproduce not only the rigid disciplinary boundaries of IR, but also the nation-state, along with all its constituent notions such as citizenship and political community (Doty 2006, 2007; Johnson 2011). Critical theorists assume as their starting point the significance of migrant subjectivities and use their narratives to articulate a set of alternative “knowledge claims” that could unsettle the dominant meanings of citizenship, agency and the state. For example, Heather Johnson, examining the narratives of irregular migrants in deportation centers and border zones, argues that migrants’ differing conceptualizations of space time as well as their understanding of politics as a site of contestation reveals the active participation of irregular migrants in border politics. She

challenges the prevailing concept of citizenship as something reducible to formal rights and obligations and thereby imparts to irregular migrants a “political voice” (Johnson 2011). This might be seen as a form of resistance on the part of irregular migrants against the attempts of states to determine their conditions and subjectivities. Irregular migrants emerge as inhabiting a “transgressive” political space because they dispel the fixed notions of citizenship. There are also studies which focus less upon the narratives and agency of migrants and more upon the system of border controls and the overarching security regime that renders undocumented migrants more desperate and vulnerable. Being approached either as a victim or new subaltern subject of the international relations, the figure of unauthorized migrant remains central to the critical scholarship.

It is surprising that these two scholarly approaches, despite their contrapuntal relationship, share a set of common guiding assumptions. Among these are the focus on a unidirectional model of migration (the context of sending countries and migrants experiences in different spatial contexts are rarely given importance), an absolute focus on “securitization” and exclusion, and the dominant conceptualization of “irregular migration” either as a problem to be solved (pursued by conventional analysis) or as a politics of dissensus (pursued by critical analysis). The intellectual glue that holds together migration regulation and security has never been weakened partly because so much of the research that has been carried out within the discipline has been centred in the geographies of the West and on the male refugee flows and has attempted to universalize findings from these two specific contexts. In both approaches, the ostensible purpose of migration regulation has always been assumed to be outward oriented, and aimed at managing the population

movements from a security perspective by targeting the exclusion of irregular refugees. Irregular migrants are to be found in detention centers, border zones or within other marginalized spaces. If illegal migrants are publicly visible, their struggles are always perceived to be status-oriented, challenging the capacity of the state to control their political being or assuming the role of citizens in order to demonstrate their political agency. The conceptualization of the migration regime as a security oriented endeavour not only encloses inquiry into multiple other stakes that states might have invested in the issue (Hollifield 2004, 198) but also necessitates approaching the agency of the migrant from a limited standpoint as “the agency of the irregular”.

Feminist Methodology: From Migration Policy to Migration Regime

This thesis is based on feminist methodologies and feminist methods of data gathering. Recognizing the facts that international migration of women for care work around the world has increased and that states are gendered institutions put pressure on some of the analytical categories used to analyze migration regimes in IR. I aim to broaden the interpretative scope with respect to the questions of how states regulate international migration of women in general and of how Armenian women’s migration to Turkey is regulated specifically. I ask specifically gendered questions to achieve this. At the macro level, I ask: how changes in ideas about the social practices of reproduction, the feminine work, sexuality and mothering have shaped the states, the economy and other public institutions and how in turn these influence the ways in which states approach to women’s international migration. At the micro-level, I also examine how women and men in their everyday lives

produce gender notions of femininities and masculinities around the bodies of migrant care workers and with what implications for migrants' experiences.

Sandra Harding has argued that many of the knowledge produced in social science is motivated by the desire to answer men's questions (Harding 1989). She notes, conventional scientists might think this masculine bias is of little concern to scientific method because they are under the false impression that "it is in the testing process that we should look for science's distinctive virtues" (Harding 1989, 24). But the feminist challenges demonstrate that questions that are asked –and, even more significantly those that are not asked – are at least "as determinative of the adequacy of the total picture as are any answers that we can discover" (Harding 1989, 24). Harding argues, just as any scholarly engagement, feminists engage with different methods – interview, observation and examining historical data and records – but for them, the strength of the method is also judged by the capacity of the research question to challenge the masculine bias in the problematization of the social world (Harding, 20-21).

This project takes up the challenge to demonstrate the masculine underpinnings of a central institution in today's politics – that is, the migration regimes. Feminist theories of international relations have already revealed the masculine biases involved in a variety of institutions including military (Pettman 1996; Blanchard 2014; Cohn 1987; Enloe 1989) security policies (Tickner 1992; Stern 2006), political economy (Peterson 2003) the state and discipline of International Relations itself (Hooper 2001; Zalewski and Enloe 1995; Zalewski). In focusing upon women's migration from Armenia to Turkey and in asking feminist questions, I aim to reveal the deeply gendered character of migration regimes. To

demonstrate the gendered character of migration regimes means to reveal the implicit and explicit binaries of masculine/feminine and men/women upon which these regimes are built upon and to demonstrate how they shape femininities and masculinities that women adopt and work through in their everyday lives. However, in order to achieve this, I would like to challenge some important assumptions that guide some IR scholars' understandings of migration regime and control. The analytical concepts provided by the discipline as to the nature and purpose of the migration regime are problematic, rendering a gender reading of the politics of migration difficult. Therefore, I start from challenging from a methodological point of view the assumption that migration regulation is equivalent to migration policy.

In this thesis, I challenge the dominant characterization of migration regulation in the discipline of IR in two important ways: first, I demonstrate that state programs and policies concerning the international migration of women (and men as well) point to more comprehensive interventions, directly bearing upon questions of the nation and the status of women (and men). States might be concerned with their security, but a globally applicable “securitization discourse” is not the only driving force behind states' migration regimes. Drawing upon feminist studies, I argue that gender and sexuality play a constitutive role in the formation and definition of nation states “in so far as the reproduction and of nationhood and citizenship remain premised upon certain gender roles” (Andrejasevic 2009, 390). Maintenance and reproduction of these gendered norms and roles, rather than an abstract notion of security, are of a central concern to these states, and migration policy can be used to sustain the gendered construction of the nation. Over the duration of my field work, it has become increasingly clear that issues raised in the discourses and policies regarding migration

regimes are not exclusively about “state security” but impinge upon some central feminist concerns about labour, the gendered construction of the nation, the division between the productive and reproductive economy, notions of the nuclear family and gendered violence. What began as a rather narrow work on the specific case of women’s migration from Armenia to Turkey ended in reflections on the continuing relevance of feminist issues and of the theoretical questions raised in feminist IR/IPE.

Secondly, this thesis eschews the notion that the migration regime is outward oriented and can be sufficiently encapsulated by analysing the “migration policy” of states. Many states, including Armenia and Turkey, do not have a solid, well-formulated and well-executed migration policy. This does not mean that the international migration of women occurs in a power-vacuum. The starting point of my analysis is not an investigation into how migration policy encourages or discourages the international migration of women, nor how it punishes or excludes them, and I do not intend to read the power dynamics affecting the international migration of women from the nature of migration policy only. Instead, I rely for my analysis upon an examination of multiple policy and discursive areas, but most prominently the welfare regime and migration policies of Turkey as well as the nation-building discourses and security related policies within Armenia. These discourses and policies – namely, gender regimes- are relevant to women’s international movement. It is through these policies and discourses that women are imagined as mothers, unpaid domestic workers, and dependents in the households and as the cultural symbols and mothers of the nation-states. Migration regimes cannot be analyzed without examining the political histories,

values and interests of nation-states that are framed by these gender hierarchies and in which states' responses to the different migration flows are embedded.

My selection of these specific policies and discourses is not random, but is guided by a carefully applied feminist methodology, which, as Ann Tickner and others have observed, differs from traditional social scientific IR, in that it relies not upon models drawn from economics and the natural sciences to explain the behaviour of states in the international system but instead upon “sociological analyses that start with individuals and the hierarchical social relations in which their lives are situated” (Tickner 1992, 25). This methodology/epistemology instructs that we begin with a reading of hierarchical gender relations in both Turkey and Armenia. Upon starting from this vantage point, it quickly becomes clear that the background which seems relevant in order to analyse and understand the gendered power dynamics affecting migrant women (as well as other related social actors) are migration policies, but we must also broaden our perspective to include anything that affects the aforementioned gender relations within society. Bridget Anderson emphasizes the importance of treating migration policy as a “systemic effect” exactly because, as she claims, states do not direct the international migration of women only by policies alone (Anderson 2012, 50). The gendered norms and discourses produced by labour market policies, security policies, welfare policies and others, are as equally important for an understanding of migrants' international movement.

In examining migration regulations, classical IR theory tends to focus solely upon the behaviour of receiving states and their security concerns, leaving some central “gender questions” unasked. A gendered reading of migration regimes is therefore also an alternative

knowledge building project. As Tickner and others point out, a feminist project such as this requires taking women's constructed roles seriously as caregivers, cultural/biological reproducers and unpaid labourers and asks how these hierarchical gendered notions underlie publicly recognized features of states, their welfare policies, security relations and migration regimes (Tickner 2006, 26; Chin 1998; Prugl 1999). As she observes quite rightly (2006, 25), "Feminist understandings of state behaviour and action frequently start from below the state level – with the lives of connected individuals."

Inasmuch as I do afford attention to policy areas at the state level, it might appear as that my work does not challenge the traditional ontology of the IR discipline, but studying "up" and "down" together is a unique methodological premise within feminist scholarship. As Ackerly *et al.* notes, "feminism is not about studying women and gender exclusively. Just as states, security, institutions and globalization cannot be studied without analyzing gender, gender cannot be studied without analyzing these subjects and concepts" (Ackerly, Stern and True 2006, 4). State policies and discourses as a research site is a strategic choice for two main reasons. First, without focusing on the gendered aspects of states, it is difficult to unsettle the assumption that security considerations are the driving force behind the international migration regime. Second, this focus can also enable us to see that migration regimes do not exert force and pressure upon migrants only at exceptional moments and in specific venues such as deportation centers and border zones, but also in their everyday lives.

The international migration of women operates through border-spanning state projects that consist in complex discourses of gender and nationalism enacted by both sending and receiving states. IR scholars often identify migration regulation narrowly in

terms of institutional benchmarks such as explicit laws, overt-controls and deterring sanctions that serve to dictate the conduct of migrants and are carried out by states and other relevant actors. The absence of such rules is mistakenly assumed to be an indication of some regulatory gap pertaining to the governance of international migration (Koser 2010; Betts *et al.* 2011). I would argue, however, for a view of migration regimes, whose purpose is not only to manage the movement of populations across borders, but as one that reflects and constructs ideas about gender, the nation and labour more broadly. If the states are not unified actors that are only concerned with “security” questions as feminist IR has invariably suggested, states concerns with migration regime cannot be forced into the straightjacket of security either.

The analysis of regulation from a broader perspective is more consequential for the purposes of this thesis than the analysis of those institutional benchmarks because the latter gives a faulty image of migration regulations as if states were only concerned with the legal status of entrants. Governing migration is embedded in a process of constructing roles for men and women differently and creating gender hierarchies in and beyond the nation. Attention should be given accordingly to any policy, not only to migration policy, which constructs and perpetuates such hierarchies within society in order to decipher the role of states in governing the international migration of women (and men).

The relationship between the gendered understanding of nation-states and migration regimes (both in the sending and receiving states) has been studied by several authors before. I will present a brief sketch of some of this important work in the next section to bolster the notion that gender and sexuality are inherent dimensions of migration regimes. These

authors have argued that states do not exert control over migration only through migration policy. Of course, this logically begs the question that if states are not directing the international migration of women *solely* with policies targeting the entry and exit of migrants, how do they exercise control? My answer is by producing and reproducing gender hierarchies and gendered notions of femininity and masculinity within the nation, states are able to shape how international migrants move and under what conditions they do so. As Nana Oishi, in her study of the patterns of the feminine migration, concludes, gendered norms and social relations, more than the migration laws themselves, impact who goes and who stays: “Emigration policies for women are value-driven because women are more than just a labour force. Women not only represent the values of the state but also embody national pride and dignity.” (Oishi 2005, 102). Let us turn now to a look at the ways in which migrants’ mobile bodies have been infused with meaning in nation-state narratives and how these are reflected in and through the migration regimes of states.

Shifting the Boundaries: Building the Nation on the Body of Women

Feminist analysis has engaged in a thoroughgoing reconceptualization of nation-building as a process of discursively and materially domesticating women in the sphere of the household and assigning men to the conduct of public life (Yuval-Davis 1998; Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1989; Chatterjee 1993; Abu-Lughod 1998). This analytical frame has challenged the dominant view of the “state” as a security apparatus and as a gender-neutral formation, showing the gender hierarchies and notions on which fundamental aspects of nation-states are constructed. Feminist scholarship has identified several aspects of “gender regimes” that subordinate women to “masculinized, racialized capitalist nation-states” (Eisenstein 1998),

among which the sexual-moral regime and the gendered division of labour are the most relevant. These concepts can assist in bringing these gender regimes into contact with migration regimes, showing that the gendered construction of states, rather than a notion of abstract security concerns, has great relevance for migration policy as well. Here I will elaborate on the “sexual moral” regime and the gendered division of labour as important components of the nation-state system since it is through these regimes that the international migration of women is governed in the contexts of Turkey and Armenia.

The state plays a pivotal in the creation of gender hierarchies and norms both within the public and private sphere. Feminist scholars have demonstrated that nation states construct their identity and sovereignty, to a large extent, through subordinating women’s sexuality to a variety of masculinized nation-building projects. When they are seeking to differentiate themselves from other states and communities, issues about women’s morality and sexuality become prominent markers. Women’s sexuality is not couched in terms of personal rights or liberties but is instead associated with the honour of a household patriarch at the micro level and with men’s collective social honour at the macro level. As Hyunah Yang explains (1998, 130) “the nation becomes gendered and women’s sexuality becomes nationalized. Nation is equated with the male subject position and women’s sexuality is reified as the property of the male nation.” Being the symbol of nation and community, women’s reproductive rights, moral attitudes, marriage decisions, and mobility are always a focus of intense control and regulation by the nation. Women’s activities and behaviours can also signify important ethnic and cultural boundaries:

Often the distinction between one ethnic group and another is constituted centrally by the sexual behaviour of women. For example, a “true” Sikh or Cypriot girl should behave in

sexually appropriate ways. If she does not then neither her children nor herself may be constituted part of the community (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1989, 10).

These gendered categories serve an important purpose in drawing boundaries of inclusion and exclusion within the political community. Feminist scholars of international relations have shown how these gendered norms are reflected in several policy areas. For example, wartime rape has been widely used by invading forces, because the damage inflicted on the bodies of women belonging to the enemy nation is perceived as damage to the moral sanctity of that nation (Kirby 2012). Studies from Global Political Economy have also demonstrated that nation-states are often ambivalent about foreign direct investment because of its large potential to attract women workers from rural areas. Concerns arise about the changing gender roles and the “im-moralization” of the nation as a result of women increasingly occupying untraditional and modern roles (Kim 1997; Moghadam 2000; Lynch 2007). It is also the case that states often pursue policies that encourage women to “bear more children” so that the state can become a stronger player in the international field by increasing its population and sphere of cultural, political and economic influence.

Recently more attention has been paid to how the gender regimes of certain countries intersect with their migration regimes as migrant sending countries. Nana Oishi, for example, criticizes the predominant idea “that economic deprivation draws women to migrate” since women from poorer nations are not disproportionately represented among international migrants. Rather, women’s migration from sending countries is closely linked with the gender hierarchy within the nation and the specific roles stipulated for women (e.g. as maternal caregivers, cultural transmitters and moral exemplars) (Oishi 2005, 48). If

women's mobility is perceived as a departure from such roles, nation-states will often take measures to constrain this. One of the best examples of this is provided by Eithne Luibheid in her discussion of gender and migration in the context of Ireland (Luibheid 2006). Luibheid powerfully captures the centrality of women's reproductive sexuality to the Irish nation-building processes. Women's sexuality and bodies have become highly politicized in Ireland as the constitution has sought to differentiate the country from Britain by emphasizing its position as "pro-life" and "anti-abortion" (Luibheid 2006, 61-3). As such, the sanctioning of abortion has become a marker of Irish national identity.

Luibheid argues that the "sexual regime" of the country has played a central role in the emergence of what she calls "the abortion emigration" to Britain, which continued with the state turning a blind eye until 1992 when the Supreme Court asked Britain to repatriate a 14 year old pregnant Irish girl. The court based its decision upon the principle that the right of citizens to travel is subordinate to the court's duty to protect the life of the fetus. What Luibheid's discussion reveals is that migration policy within the country has been shaped by its overriding concern with exerting control over the reproductive rights of women who are rendered as second-class citizens. Nana Oishi raises similar arguments about the intimate link between "sexual regimes" and "migration regimes" in the contexts of Bangladesh and Indonesia, in which the construction of women as the bearers of national dignity has resulted in increasing controls over women's mobility(Oishi 2006, 91-5). In particular, anxieties over the trafficking of women seem to stem from concerns about the dignity of the nation, particularly in the event that women happen to be the victims of sexual abuse or slavery. Instead of regarding the issue as a threat to the bodily integrity of women themselves, both

of these nation-states, Oishi argues, have conceived of trafficking as a danger to the dignity of the nation and found the solution in banning women's migration.

Both Oishi and Luibheid perfectly capture the linkage between the gendered hierarchies that exist within the nation and the establishment of an overlapping migration regime. Luibheid, however, also analyzes women's subordinate inclusion within the political community as the main dynamic that drives women away from the home. In other words, she counts the state sanctioned norms and policies surrounding abortion as part and parcel of the migration regime. Accordingly, abortion migration occurs because of "the existence of a state-sanctioned sexual regime that subordinates women's bodies to childbearing for the nation" (Luibheid 2006, 67). She reveals that one's identity as a citizen is closely linked with carrying on the imposed forms of feminine identity and that the line that separates the citizen from the non-citizen is delicate.

Feminist scholars examining migration regimes and care work in the context of receiving states have had considerably more success connecting migration policy with the gender hierarchies within the receiving states. A focus on the movement of international migrant women has allowed them to effectively debunk the notion that "security" is the main concern for states in regulating international migration as well as the related idea that states are primarily concerned with excluding migrants. By adopting a feminist perspective, they have been able to adduce ample evidence that states are more lenient and more accommodating towards migrant care workers. Although their gender identity (i.e. as sex workers, 'immoral' women, undeserving rape victims, etc.) has, at times, meant exclusion for women at border zones, feminist scholars have rightly observed that low-skill and underpaid

care workers have more often resulted in their selective “inclusion” . In European countries such as Italy, Spain, Britain and Poland, for example, there are now formal policies specifically developed to regulate care worker migration (for Spain see, Leon 2010; For Poland see Lutz and Mollenbeck 2012; for Britain see Anderson 2012; for Italy see Lyon 2006). Likewise, Canada and the US also have migration schemes tailored to determine the employment conditions and residency rights of such workers (Balkan and Stasuilis 1997). In other countries like Germany and Austria which lack such formal regulations, the presence of large numbers of women migrant workers is known to the authorities, but the state does not perceive them as a security threat in the same manner that it would the entry of refugees or other low-skilled migrants (Lutz and Mollenbeck, 2010).

Sara Farris points to the increasing presence of migrant care workers in global labour markets, contrasting this with a downturn in the demand for male migrants, as an “exception to the rule”. While many male migrant workers were rendered scapegoats for the 1970s economic meltdown in Europe, the reception for migrant women has, if anything, become more welcoming (Farris 2013). The migration of women is also reaching record-high levels in Asia and South America through regional migration, without any attendant and overriding concern with border security. Feminist scholarship in this area has sought to investigate why the international migration of women has not engendered a securitization panic similar to other border-crossings, and this research can help us to better understand the complex relationship between states and migration regimes.

How is the gendered construction of nation-states implicated in the migration regimes of receiving countries? Feminist authors of migration have argued that the changing

characteristics of the gender regime under neo-liberalism in the Western states are directly related with the emergence of tolerant attitudes towards migrant care workers. States rely on migrant care workers, many of them are from the Global South, to perpetuate the gender and economic status-quo in society. The most important gender characteristic of the receiving states² is avoidance from bearing the cost of social reproduction in society and eagerness to externalize this cost onto families or private actors such as migrant care workers. For many years, feminist scholars of political economy have argued that global capitalism and the state system has been organized around this gendered division of labour between unpaid “family work” and paid “economic work”, which respectively maps onto other dichotomies such as the “feminine/masculine”, “private/public” and “personal/political”(Mies, 1998). Spike Peterson, for example, has argued that the formation of nation-states has gone hand-in-hand with the separation of the household as a devalued unit of re-production and the establishment of the public realm as the primary economic unit. According to Peterson, the separation of public and private was a gender differentiated process and it was essential to the formation of the capitalist state as we know it. She summarizes the far-reaching consequences of this process as follows:

First, the family/household sphere was associated with the natural, necessary activities of daily material maintenance, body and emotional sustenance, sexuality and the care taking of dependents. Second, economic activities –men’s work – gained in esteem: private property, the wage contract, and the free market now represented the valued sphere of productive activity. Labour associated with the household – “women’s work” – was devalued: it received no or disproportionately low wages. Third, as “family” and “work are separated, gender identities were shaped to conform to ideologies of respectability: women/femininity as care-

² There are of course several different gender characteristics of the receiving states, but I’m focusing on the most relevant to the migration policy regarding care workers.

taking, affective, responsible homemaker and man/masculinity as hard-working, responsible employee (Peterson 1992, 43)

As feminist scholars like Joan Acker have pointed out, reproduction has been essential to the functioning of the “productive economy” as well. It is in this putatively non-economic realm that children are reared to become the future workforce, and it is here that men rely upon women overwhelmingly to perform the household work (e.g. food preparation and housecleaning) upon which they also depend (Acker 2004, 23-25). Clearly, the idea of a “subsistence wage” upon which much of economic theory has been based must be modified in light of the contributions of Feminist scholarship in this regard. Women’s unpaid labour has kept the wheels of global economic profit turning, while it has been systematically de-valued in both theory and practice and remains uncompensated. The reproduction of states and their economic well-being has relied crucially upon the gendered division of labour in the household and in the nation as a whole (McIntosh 1978, 260-64).

Feminist analysis of gender nation-states has claimed that neo-liberalization of economy has re-configured the relationship between the public and private spheres (Sassen 2002). Starting from 1970s, women started entering into work force in greater numbers and the welfare support of private realm provided by the states has further decreased. In a nutshell, it is the shifts and re-configurations in reproductive realm that have precipitated the emergence of care transfers as an important policy tool for the advanced capitalist economies. Traditionally, women in the West have been rendered subordinate to men through a structured gender inequality, which was predicated on the distinction between the public and private realm and the notion that the reproductive economy, as part of the private realm, was considered the natural domain of women. The neo-liberalization of the

reproductive economy can be best understood as a function of the simultaneous processes of Western women gaining a degree of parity with men at least within the labour market and the need for migrant women to fulfill their reproductive tasks as they enter the workforce in increasing numbers. The breakdown of the gendered contract upon which the capitalist state has relied has had clear repercussions the national and global organization of reproductive labour. As women have become “emancipated” from any association with the de-valued sphere of household work, their participation in the public sphere has not in any way lessened the social necessity of tasks such as child rearing, elderly care, and household work.

According to Rhachel Parrenas (2000, 564- 568) and Nicola Yeates (2009), in order to solve this problem of care gap, many governments has also adopted an ideological doctrine, which provides support for the notion that care is an issue of personal choice, available for purchase freely on the market. Under the auspices of neo-liberal political doctrine, the supply of reproductive labour that is so essential for the survival of the real economy has been shifted from the family to the market. Governments and corporations are freed from the responsibility to care for elderly populations whose labour they relied upon to amass their great wealth and, for the care of children whose labour they will utilize in the future. This ideological aspect of the neo-liberalization is explicitly political because it de-socializes the issue of child-care, elderly care and domestic work and re-embeds it within the ideology of economic rationality. The accumulation of wealth in the advanced economies, it is argued, is enabled by the appropriation of the emotional labour of women from poorer countries of the South (Hochschild 2000). In this sense the reproduction of state’s gender ideology and

economic power – both of which are ideological dimensions of state sovereignty and nation-states- has relied on the inclusive policies towards migrant women.

The analysis of gender in both sending and receiving states demonstrate that sexuality and gender are constitutive dimensions of nation-states, that states have also gendered stakes when responding to international migration of women and that exclusion is not the only response adopted by states to exert authority. Migrant women do a lot of work for nation-states both materially and ideologically. Both in sending and receiving countries, gender regimes and migration regimes are closely connected and migrants can be assessed through and re-produced within certain categories of femininity and labour in a hierarchy of citizenship. States act upon certain understandings of feminine labour and feminine sexuality in configuring migration policies – deciding who is entering or leaving under what terms. A study of migration regime from a feminist perspective means an analysis of political forces and state policies in economic, cultural and security realms that has been shaping gendered hierarchies, opportunities and tensions in society and assessing how these are reflected in migration regimes. I argue that rather than assuming the exclusion of migrants following a security discourse, we should look for a variety of response such as differential inclusion, conditional tolerance and subordinate inclusion.

In return, I would argue, expanding the interpretative framework of migration regime would also allow us to examine migrants' subjectivities in a different light. I argue that migrants are not necessarily experiencing illegality as an important dimension of their subjectivity because states control over migrant bodies are not always achieved through taking away their agency from them by rendering them illegal. It has been long claimed that

states take advantage of migrants both ideologically and economically by rendering them vulnerable through the status of illegality. Both fears and agency of migrants are understood through their illegal status. This is certainly true, but does not give us the full picture of the entire spectrum of migrant subjectivities. In an environment of tolerance, provided by the states and society in line with their political and ideological interests, migrants' experiences and subjectivities are also shaped through "being tolerated". I will elaborate on the concept of tolerance and moral deservingness and their implications in depth after I briefly sketch my research methods in Armenia and Turkey which I conducted to decipher the relationship between gender regimes and migration regimes.

Research Methods and Data Gathering in Armenia and Turkey at Macro-Level

I will examine the gender dynamics of migration regimes through analysis of "documents, policies, places and narratives" as a way to disclose the masculine underpinning of institutions involved in global politics (Kronsell 2006). One important method to achieve this is through deconstruction of texts and discourses emerging from these institutions, "sometimes reading what is not written or what is expressed as symbols and procedures" (Kronsell 2006). For studying the macro-level state policies and discourses in Armenia and Turkey, I engage in textual analysis and interviews in addition to relying on second-hand resources when necessary. In Armenia, the most important policy areas and discourses that create gender hierarchies include security discourse, discourses about male out-migration, nationalist rhetoric on Genocide and labour market policies. In all these areas women are constructed primarily as mothers, care-givers, cultural and sexual reproducers of the nation and men as labourers, soldiers and migrants of the nation. Secondary sources on Armenia are

very limited. In order to understand security discourses and the binary constructions of gender therein, I relied on the analysis of deconstruction of several policy papers, revealing the gender binaries through which security and labour market policies is defined and pursued in Armenia. I also draw upon news-websites with a special focus on the gender, security and migration related news within the last ten years.

In Armenia, I argue that examining the migration regime is not a viable enterprise without examining the sexual regime of country – i.e. the gender binaries and inequalities – that are created by these policy areas. To decipher this macro-institutional context is the first step in the alternative knowledge production of migration states. My data gathering aims to reveal what is not being told explicitly about women’s migration, to decipher how states’ policies and cultural institutions construe notions of femininity and masculinity and how these translate into attitudes about migration.

In order to examine the impacts of discourses around male out-migration and Genocide claims, I conducted interviews with representatives of several different governmental and non-governmental institutions including International Center for Human Development, United Nations Population Fund, Caucus Research Resource Center and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. In addition, I talked with the migration scholars from Yerevan State University. In terms of the official representatives, I interviewed the head of the Migration Service at the Ministry of Territorial Administration of the Republic of Armenia. The purposes of these interviews were double-fold. First, it helped me to collect several policy documents on security, migration and gender policies. Second, it helped to decipher the gender binaries used by the large segments of society to understand

women's and men's roles in the society. I asked them questions about the effects of men's migration, how they define the central problems facing Armenia in the nation-building process, and the importance of gender roles in Armenia. Since there is not a lot of public awareness and discussion about women's migration in Armenia, these interviews are of a special importance. They helped me to understand why there is this ignorance and how this ignorance is being articulated in gender terms. It is in these moments of articulation, which otherwise remains hidden, that it becomes possible to decipher the hierarchical codes of institutions and policy making.

In order to examine the gender binaries around which labour market and everyday social relations are shaped, I also interviewed with women's organization in Armenia. I asked questions about women's migration and the local gender norms and processes that they think of as important in the formation of gender hierarchies. These women's organization includes the Women's Resource Center (WRC) and Hope and Help (HH) – an organization that deals with human trafficking.

In Turkey, the migration regime cannot be analyzed without examining the welfare policies of Turkey. As argued above, the re-organization of reproductive economy within the domestic realm has consequences for how the alien migrants are treated. Turkey has very unique characteristics which should be taken into consideration when examining its welfare policies. Turkey can not be classed as an advanced economy and it also has witnessed the rise of political-religious conservatism in the last 15 years through the AKP government. In chapter 5, I discuss the implications of these differences more in detail. Turkey's concerns with the growing care needs and its commitment to perpetuate the gender inequalities and

binaries in the domestic realm is linked with the adoption of liberal migration policies that tolerate illegal migrant workers. The persistence of gender inequalities and the construction of women primarily as housewives through welfare policies in Turkey have impacted the migration policy towards migrant workers. In examining the welfare policy of Turkey, I relied on secondary resources in addition to conducting interviews with the representatives of Social Security Institution, the Ministry of Labour and The Migration Department. These interviews have been less useful because of the reluctance of state departments to share information. However, I included some important information that reflects officials' views on household labour and work. In addition, I also develop some original analysis of certain social policies and migration policies that are recently adopted concerning cash transfers to citizen women in Turkey to hire migrant women. These help me to establish the linkages between the gender regime of the country and the migration policies.

Through the analyses of these texts and policy materials, one of the central arguments of these theses is formulated: Migration policies are deeply embedded in gender regimes of countries. Since reproduction of the status-quo in the nation and economy rest upon the perpetuation of gender hierarchies, the migration policy should also be understood as an important instrument to further this goal.

Therefore, this thesis does not remain limited to the analysis of hierarchy between the citizen and non-citizen (irregular) to examine the plight of international migrants, which seems to haunt the entire field of migration and IR discipline and which seems to be delimiting rather than opening up inquiry into several others such as the hierarchy between feminine and masculine. I demonstrate the link between the migration regime and the

gendered hierarchies within the domestic policies of the countries, with a particular focus on how states' policies and discourses on multiple different fronts reflect and construct gender hierarchies and how they in return shape international migration of women. To understand the impacts of the gendered states on migrant women is the second step in the feminist knowledge project of migration.

The study of gender regimes allows us not only to examine the migration regime as a gender differentiated process, but also to point out that gender hierarchies operate at a different level in the migration regime as well. My starting point in analyzing the migration regime in Turkey and Armenia is the everyday experiences of migrant women, however my analysis ultimately reaches into the macro realm of gender relations in both states since Armenian migrant women are affected by the constructions of femininities and masculinities in both the sending and receiving context. Certain gender hierarchies seem more important than others in this respect. For example, in Armenia, state-sanctioned gender hierarchies and ideological construction of motherhood play a central role in women's migration. These gender hierarchies do not directly shape migration policies, but they constitute the norms that regulate women's migration. In Turkey, the gender hierarchies in the domestic sphere are linked with the emergence of a demand for migrant women for which Turkey's response has been to pursue liberal inclusive policies towards these women, even where they are in technical violation of the law. In both receiving and sending states, migrant women are not routinely subject to brute force or the exercise of state sovereignty through policies designed to exclude them, but rather, they are selectively included in discourses about nation, economy and migration.

Gendering Experience: Good Women, Deserving Mothers and Hard-Working

Labour

This thesis has started the inquiry from women's lives and their experiences. The conceptualization of migration regimes as an assemblage of policies that are based on gender binaries and inequalities is the first step in this alternative research-building project. The second step is to take women's experiences seriously. Women's narratives are important sources of knowledge. Sandra Harding claims that women's lives and stories are not data collected to support our ready-made academic theories (Harding 1989, 23). Migrant women told me their stories why they migrate, their concerns and insecurities in Armenia and Turkey, their fears and hopes, their relationships with their families, police officers in Turkey and employers in Turkey. Their stories revealed that public exclusion, fear of deportation centers, exploitation and living with an irregular migrant status is not as important as IR scholars made it to be. Rather, their main struggle is achieving social acceptance both in Armenia and Turkey through performing moral femininities and submissive labour. Therefore, it is the revelations that women made about their every-day life that made me to shift my attention from focusing on exclusion as the main paradigm of states' migration regulations. As Sandra Harding notes, women's experiences should not be added to the existing frames, but should be used to a context of reality against which the hypotheses should be tested (Harding 1989, 19). Migrant women in this sense have been the co-authors of this thesis (Stern 2001, 71).

This thesis broadens the analysis points to the need to move beyond the conceptual hegemony of *the agency of the irregular* and problematizes a reading of agency in terms of

antagonism to the normative structures. It examines what makes migrant women invest in certain femininities and masculinities in several different contexts of social acceptance. Migrant women identify themselves as “sacrificing mothers”, “moral Armenian women” and “hard-workers”, all of which help them to reach legitimacy, as required by the social actors of everyday relations and the gendered migration states. The importance of attending to these new subject positions, as opposed to a subject position that is purely oppressed by the “illegal” status or that is purely subversive of normative structures, is twofold: first, it gives us an opportunity to examine the vulnerabilities and comforts that comes with the social acceptance discourse –i.e. how meeting the expectations of being useful labour and moral women increase both their vulnerabilities and their advantages. Second, it gives me a chance to give some weight on the importance of migrant women’s social relations in the host state, which is not possible within the conventional frameworks.

Women’s voices have remained invisible in the study of migration regimes in the IR mainly because women’s variegated experiences are subsumed under a category of irregular migrant. In answer to the question of whether subaltern speak, Gayatri Spivak argues: “The subaltern cannot speak. The representation has not withered away (1988, 308)”. Her criticism is directed particularly at the role of the intellectual in perpetuating the global power hierarchies by introducing a European conception of the subject even when trying to open space for the “Other” (Johnson 2011). The irregular migrant is clearly a European subject, figured through the obsession of studying big states and their security concerns. It represents the migrant “from within the familiar frameworks of subjectivity “ – namely , the migration frameworks of the receiving states, almost all of which are located in the West (Spivak 2014,

335). This literature treats the migrant as an effectively history-less object of intellectual and political activism, thereby simplifying migrant subjectivities and reasserting the centrality of the global north and the irrelevance of all places and social relations of intimacy and attachment that lie outside of it (Pratt and Rosner 2006, 15).

Many critical studies of immigration and citizenship in IR have analyzed migrants' experiences from the perspective of their status as irregular. Irregularity is defined as a "political institution", not produced by something migrants do but by migration laws enacted by states, and which restrict some traditional forms of movement and effectively criminalize a select group of people. Migration scholars have also focused upon the experiences of migrants with this political institution, citing examples from diverse situations in which they either evade or resist their status as irregular. Often this literature has counterpoised the official exclusion of migrants against their informal inclusion achieved through agency. According to Saskia Sassen (2002), for example, the demonstration of "citizenship" by migrants is not reducible to the practice of formal rights; despite the legal exclusion of migrants in the US, she points out that migrants have attained "informal citizenship" by participating in community building, church activities and civic organizations. In another example, Kyle and Sircusa (2005) have shown that illegal Ecuadorian migrants discursively challenge their categorization as illegals by remaining in Spain as "illegal yet licit", meaning that although they are deemed illegal by the state, they are perceived as legitimate by a significant segment of civil society. Migrants are here regarded as capable of practicing social dissent, challenging the meaning of non-citizen imposed upon them by the nation-states and denying the state as a legitimate authority to exclude them from socio-economic rights and

recognition: they “come out”, to use a phrase which Chauvin borrows from queer studies (Chauvin and Mascerenas 2014, 426). This form of dissent is conceivable, given that humans are active meaning-making subjects and are capable of reconfiguring the meanings imposed upon them in their lives by macro-level regulations.

However, in this work, I regard the politics of acceptance not as the outcome of acts of social dissidence in the informal sphere. The agency of migrants and the presence of sympathetic actors within civil society can, of course, lead to the articulation of different meanings of citizenship outside of the state-centric definitions. However, the politics of acceptance referred to in this work is not achieved primarily through such means but is informed by macro and micro-level regulatory norms and moral values concerning who the right kind of women and workers are.³ In Turkey and Armenia, the debates concerning social acceptance revolve around what Chauvin calls “a moral economy of deservingness”. Moral economy of deservingness recognizes that the main problem for migrants is a need to demonstrate legitimacy. Migrant women are regarded as “aberrant” in certain ways both in the receiving and sending country contexts. In Turkey, they are illegal aliens, while in Armenia, they are seen as defiant of certain gender norms, in particular through their mobility and physical separation from the household. However, migrant women are not targeted as “criminals” and “deviants” of the state, but as reformable subjects who are

³ In Turkey, there are very few organizations primarily targeting illegal workers, with the exception of Migrant Solidarity Network, which deals with mainly refugees; Women’s Solidarity Foundation, which runs a shelter for victims of trafficking; and the Household Workers Union whose main constituents are the informal native and/or foreign domestic workers. It is outside the scope of this work to explain the non-emergence of civil society actions surrounding “illegal” workers, but it could be conjectured that the widespread informality in Turkish labour markets marks illegals as simply ordinary subjects of these markets alongside other domestic workers.

expected to conduct themselves in certain ways to gain legitimacy. The conducts expected from migrants are manifold, some of which concern with notions of femininity and others with their work ethics and cultural qualities.

The social acceptance discourse, which promises legitimacy and the removal of some of the stigma attaching to their status, is not explicable in terms of the dissident agency of migrants themselves. For a researcher, it is important to examine the state context in order to determine whether the social acceptance discourse is a manifestation of dissidence against state exclusion or whether it functions in tandem with this. With respect to the migration of Armenian women to Turkey, social acceptance amounts to a set of practices and discourses that aims at the conduct of migrant's conduct, who are expected to behave according to a subject position— i.e. as hard-working, submissive, desexualized and moral. Rather than being infused with norms and values that stand against the state's exclusion agenda, social acceptance works towards setting the outer limits of the forbearance for “aberrance”, constantly reminding migrants of the possibility of a withdrawal of this purely conditional tolerance.

Drawing on Foucauldian traditions, Jonathan Inda (2008, 63-70) identifies two broad mechanisms of governance: one that believes in the reformability of citizens and tries to “re-moralize” them by asking that they conduct themselves in a civic manner – i.e. as responsible, hard-working and ethical individuals – and another that targets “migrants” as inherently backward, unethical and un-reformable, leading states to identify them as “illegal” and as social pariahs. However, following the works of Chauvin and others, I will seek to demonstrate that migrants, both legal and illegal, are treated as “reformable subjects” and are

expected to conduct themselves as responsible workers and feminine subjects (Chauvin 2012; 2014) both in Armenia and Turkey.

In this framework, it is better to examine migrant women's experiences with the practices and discourses of social acceptance via the notion of the conduct of conduct as opposed to agency. Although state-sanctioned tolerance forms the relevant context for these social acceptance practices, I will examine the micro-scale interactions of migrant women with their families and neighborhoods in their home countries as well as with police officers, employers and partners in Turkey as formal and informal agents through which the practices of social acceptance are actualized. This does not suggest the disappearance of state as an important actor vis-à-vis migration regulation and the emphasis placed on the state's role in forging appropriate femininities and masculinities in the family and society in this thesis attests to this underlying macro-dynamic in the world politics. However, I'm interested in the experiential dimension of social legitimacy. In which ways migrant women try to demonstrate legitimacy to these multiple actors? Which discourses do they use and which subjectivities emerge in this process? What happens when women fail to achieve legitimacy? These questions can only be found by an examination of the micro-level dynamics.

Scholarship on the role of micro-level actors has gained greater currency in recent years across many disciplines, including International relations and migration studies. In bringing in everyday actors, both formal and informal, I am seeking to emphasize the importance of what Enrica Rigo (2005) refers to as the "delocalization of control". Whereas control was heretofore located within border zones and codified in migration law, it is now exercised by a variety of means and by a variety of actors. As Aihwa Ong observes, neo-

liberal projects of governance are essentially depoliticized and are re-cast as non-ideological, while the act of disciplining society is increasingly displaced and privatized into the moral economies of social worlds that are not explicitly managed by the state (Ong, 2006: 14). Migrants seek acceptance and legitimacy on multiple social fronts. Migrant women seek out the continuous support of their families and children who remain in Armenia, as well as police officers and officials in Turkey and their employers. These social actors corral the behaviour of migrant women such that they remain within acceptable bounds, despite their “unauthorized” identities.

Women’s experiences are situated in the context of social acceptance and focusing on women’s lives reveals the experiential dimension of social acceptance. Armenian migrant women try to be deserving subject both in Turkey and Armenia. These experiences reveal that women become the moral women and useful workers in trying to achieve social acceptance. Feminists have claimed that knowledge based on standpoint of women’s lives, particularly marginalized women, leads to more robust objectivity, not only because it broadens the base from which we derive knowledge, but also because of the perspectives of “outsiders” or marginalized people may reveal aspects of reality that is obscured by more orthodox approaches to knowledge-building. Of course, there is no one woman experience (Mohanty 1988). There have been many divergences in the voices of migrant women too. Younger women seem to have different experiences and formulate different view of feminine and moral subjects. Some women seem more connected to their Armenian roots than others. I try to be careful, as much as I can, to reflect these nuances and to emphasize the differences within the voice. Armenian migrant women take pride in their hard-work

despite the harsh work conditions; they defined their work as “clean work” compared to sex workers; they are constantly trying to perform moral feminine values both in Armenia and Turkey. I situated these practices within the context of social acceptance toward migrant women in Armenia and Turkey.

Obviously, social acceptance is a dialogical relationship. Migrant women need to perform these deserving subjectivities in their social relations with employers, police officers, family members, in the public place and among their compatriots. The state is not present in everyday life as an institution that can control and shape migrants in direct ways. Focusing on women’s experiences also allowed me to shift my focus away from state to other everyday actors as important parts of migration regime. I examine the gender norms and values, daily interactions and identities of everyday actors vis-à-vis whom migrant women try to achieve social acceptance. These are crucially important for this thesis because migrant women became the desired workers- obedient, servile and hard-working – and women –moral, modern and mother-like – through these social relations. If they cannot become those, they have to contend with several insecurities that the last chapter of this thesis documents. I need to draw attention here to the fact that these insecurities that women experience are different than the insecurities that irregular migrants have including fear of deportation, the dangerous border-crossings, and exclusion from public spaces. In the last chapter, I will focus on the gendered insecurities of women that emerge from trying to perform deserving subjectivities.

In order to examine the social acceptance discourses and women’s experience within them, I interviewed migrant women, their employers, their boyfriends, police officers in

Armenia and their families in Turkey. I reached an Armenian migrant woman through a family connection and expanded the number of participants by the snow-ball method. In total, I interviewed 40 Armenian migrant women, but I came in contact with around 60 of them. I also shared their lives to a significant extent by visiting some of them in their workplaces for extended periods, going job hunting together, cooking and eating dinner together in their off-days, solving several problems like health issues along with them, joining their church visits, and travelling with them for 4 months. I have been present in some of their life-altering moments, and become witness to their discussion of important decisions such as changing employers, dealing with family problems, going back to Armenia or severing ties with certain people. I conducted both in-depth and focus group interviews. I try to track down their descriptions of femininities and masculinities, how they understand motherhood and how this affects their lives, how much they are affected by state discourses and how they interact with several actors in the everyday life.

I also visited Armenia for 3 weeks partly to interview with the families of migrant women. I wanted to understand how the norms and values about Armenian politics and the role of women in it affect families' approaches to women's migrants. They hosted me in their houses. I interviewed with 8 families of the migrant women with the help of an Armenian translator. These have been extremely useful interviews because it helped to see how women's behaviour is judged by the families, neighborhoods and friends and how women are expected to remain loyal to Armenian values.

In Turkey, I also interviewed with 20 employers of these migrant women, police officers and 5 of the boyfriends of migrant women. I asked different questions to each

group. But the purpose guiding all these interviews has been to find an answer to the same question: What kind of qualities they expect from migrant workers to be deserving of sympathy? What kind of feminine qualities help them to be perceived as deserving migrants? What happens if they do not remain deserving?

Overall this thesis is about examining the gendered migration states of Turkey and Armenia and investigates how actors in the everyday life shape the social acceptance discourse. I argue that exclusion is not the only way that migrants experience migration. The gendered characters of regulations and everyday norms and interactions shape migrant women's conducts in everyday life. They become the hard-working, servile and moral women in these contexts.

Chapter 3: Armenia: A Land Where Men Migrate and Women Mother

In this chapter, I will explore the role of the Armenian state and state-sanctioned gender norms in regulating the migration of women as part of a migration regime. The concept of the migration regime, as aforementioned, is not reducible to migration laws or policies which serve either to encourage or discourage the movement of individuals, as has been the overriding focus of International Relations scholars. Instead, the migration regime must be understood as bridging the gap between the various norms, practices, anxieties and interests related to gender, race, class and ethnicity that comprise the self-understanding of the nation and the legal formalisms surrounding who is permitted entry or exit and under what terms. States are actively involved in mobilizing certain gender identities, and imposing expectations upon men and women that they should serve within the family and the nation according to notions of desirable femininity and masculinity. These expectations and norms have clear repercussions with respect to structuring migration flows, and, an appreciation of this fact must ultimately lead us to reject the rather simplistic notion that migration is understandable primarily in terms of economic deprivation or absolute poverty as is implied in much of the political economy literature. I will argue that women's subordinate inclusion within the nation and the political community serves to regulate migration as part of a regime. This is despite the fact that the cultural codes and the notions of desirable femininity that are part and parcel of this gendered migration regime paradoxically construct women as mothers and associate them most strongly with a sedentary life centred around the home. The norms and values that society expects women to perform are not totally coherent and

rational and there is always a “friction” between the gendered ideologies promoted by the state and the lived experiences of women themselves.

In the case of Armenia, the migration of women can best be understood as a “motherhood” migration. Following the breakup of the Soviet Union and the establishment of an independent Armenian state, the country underwent a process of nation building which involved, among other things, a thoroughgoing emphasis upon the construction of appropriate gender roles, circumscribing women’s behavior within the family and the nation and enforcing an ethic of self-sacrifice. The status of women in Armenia continues to profoundly shape their experiences of migration. Rather than being an incidental backdrop, place exerts an influence through specific cultural histories shaped by deep histories of historical trauma, international conflict and imperialism, local hierarchies of gender and class differences, regimes of production and other conditions of possibility. Many Armenian migrant women arrive in Turkey from the outskirts of a city called Gyumri, which was struck by an earthquake in 1988. Before being able to overcome the effects of the natural disaster, Armenia was confronted with the collapse of the Soviet Union and a territorial dispute with Azerbaijan which later escalated into a fully-fledged war and whose effects are deeply felt in Gyumri. Throughout its history, from the experience of the Genocide to the Soviet occupation, and into the new millennium where Armenia is struggling between war, conflict and economic collapse, women’s behavior, sexuality and morality has been a primary arena wherein struggles surrounding the country’s survival and the construction of the nation are waged. The expectations and norms that are imposed upon Armenian women are produced at the intersections of these complex historical nation-building projects within the country.

To a large extent, the gendered regime within Armenia has been founded upon a view of women as “cultural transmitters”, as well as serving the needs of biological reproduction, and this prevalent view of women as mothers of the nation and caregivers within the family has had clear repercussions with respect to their outmigration from Armenia. Here, the state does not directly or indirectly promote or proscribe against women’s migration, but is involved in structuring the gender roles and subordinating women to the cult of motherhood within the nation and family through an emphasis upon dual work and birth policy. In Armenia, women are expected orchestrate the affairs of the family, preserving the social status of its members and carrying on the familial obligations, while men are expected to be soldiers, protectors of the community and labourers. These cultural gendered expectations have historic roots, primarily in the trauma of the Genocide, in which women were upheld as the moral symbols and bearers of the nation, and this narrative has been revived more recently by prominent intellectuals and policymakers as part of the overall project of nation building. However, as Stuart Hall (2005, 448) notes in his discussion of the diasporas’ imagination of the nation, “there is no understanding of nation waiting to be re-discovered. There is no past to be learned about, but the past is now seen and it has to be grasped as history, as something that has to be told. It is narrated. It is grasped through desire. It is grasped through re-construction. It is not just a fact that has been waiting to ground our identities”. The post-independence era in Armenia has witnessed the rise of anxieties surrounding past experiences, as the economic, demographic and military power of the country has dwindled. In the midst of these rising anxieties, the survival of nation is perceived to be ever more interwoven with the identification of women as mothers

responsible for populating and caring for the nation. The memories of the Genocide have been inscribed in the popular imagination, with clear implications for the roles and norms that are prescribed for both men and women.

In the post-independence era, at the same time as women have become a focal point in debates surrounding the family and nation purveyed by the state and intellectuals alike, they have also found themselves under increasing financial pressures. These pressures are largely attributable to the discouragement of women from participation within the labour market, again a structural feature influenced by the gendered notion that women are not primarily wage-earners. Women, especially in female-headed households, find themselves in a structural bind: on the one hand, they are confronted with the pressure to manage familial expectations and to ensure the preservation of their status as “good mothers”, while on the other hand, they lack the financial resources to meet familial and kin obligations. It is in this sense that the migration of women from Armenia can be characterized as primarily a motherhood migration, similar in some respects to the abortion migration in Ireland or the valorization of Filipino women migrants as agents of economic development (Rodriguez, 2005). In all three cases, the movement of women is in some sense a product of dominant conceptions of the nation and the appropriate role for women therein. In this chapter, I will argue that the historical/ethno-national association of women with certain financial and moral responsibilities toward the family and nation combined with certain policy measures undertaken by the Armenian state (which have also reinforced the traditional roles of women) have created pressures on *some* women to migrate abroad to fulfill these prescribed familial obligations.

One of the recurring themes throughout this thesis is the relationship between gender regimes and migration regimes. Although they are related with the movement of people across borders, migration regimes do not always correspond with formal “migration policy”, but rather constitute a loose assemblage of social policies and narratives that perpetuate dominant norms and identities within society, intersecting with a clearly defined gender regime within Armenia. This opens up questions about how to delineate the role of state, if migration policy is not the only way to regulate the international migration of women. The theoretical chapter attempted to answer this question by drawing upon feminist scholars in IR and other disciplines who have studied the policies and narratives that construct women’s role in certain hierarchies within the household and nation. The Armenian state has not invented these cultural constructions overnight, and some of these gender hierarchies are deeply embedded within the historical memory of Armenia as a political community. This chapter discusses these histories, but also places a strong emphasis upon the state’s function in constructing gender roles and hierarchies through a variety of policy measures and narratives. Specifically, I focus on the phenomenon of male outmigration and the constitution of the domestic labour market, both of which should be regarded as key arenas in which the dominant conceptions of appropriate gender roles for women and men are formulated and expressed. As Patricia Pessar notes, a gendered perspective on migration demands a scholarly engagement with those institutions and ideologies that migrant women encounter – in this case, the domain of motherhood – in order to determine how patriarchy organizes family life, work, law, public policy, and so on (Pessar 1999, 577). However, before delving into the empirical material, I would like to

further justify my focus on public discourses about male outmigration as part of the gendered migration regime.

Why Focus on Male Out-migration as a Part of the Gendered Migration Regime?

Every year, more than 100,000 Armenian men depart the country in search of employment in neighboring states (ILO 2009, p.3). Male seasonal and independent migration is a well established institution within the country, and is acknowledged in a tradition known as the *kehapan*. In contrast, the number of Armenian women migrants is much lower, with most estimates placing the figure well below 10,000,⁴ and the phenomenon of independent migration amongst women (as opposed to migration for the purposes of family reunification) remains largely invisible. Unlike the case in some neighboring countries, the feminization of migration in Armenia has not occurred to a significant extent and this may help to explain the dearth of attention paid to Armenian women migrants by academics and policymakers alike (Table..). Interestingly, although many of these women migrants originate from poor households and peripheral regions of the country, they are by no means the poorest of the poor, and their migration often aims at fulfilling non-essential economic needs such as the private education of their children, marriage and dowry rituals, and other expenses incurred within the extended family – namely, the motherhood obligations. Their concerns are less narrowly economic than they are social in nature, seeking as they often do to elevate their own status as mothers or respectable women in the eyes of the community. Above all,

⁴ There is no reliable statistics on the exact numbers of the migrants. Numbers are decided by subtracting the number of women re-entering country from the number who have exited.

women's migration is controversial⁵ in the context of Armenia (ILO, 2009), which, despite the legacy of Soviet policy promoting gender equality in the labour market, remains a starkly patriarchal society with strictly delineated roles for women, who are construed almost exclusively as 'mothers', good wives and obedient daughters (Ishkanian, 2002a; Giorgi, 2012).

To understand the role of the migration regime as it pertains to the movement of women, it is important to demonstrate that this is not simply a function of specific policies regarding people's border-crossing. However, the issues posed by migration are not only a matter of "unintended consequences" and confused or conflicting policy agendas (Anderson 2012, 46) either. When enacting emigration policies, both with respect to men and women, it is important to recognize that sending states are concerned with more than simply the inflow of foreign currencies into their reserves. In the words of Bridget Anderson, "migration policies are not only instrumental responses" to the economic needs of the country, but are important "to the state legitimacy which is, through migration policy, linked to the ideas of gender, nation building and preservation" (Anderson 2012, 47). In Armenia, it is men's outmigration as opposed to that of women which is at the center of the discourse on state legitimacy, nation-building and national security. Yet, the issues raised by male outmigration have also become a fertile ground for the production of gendered boundaries and gender roles with obvious consequences for women's migration also.

Male and female migration are interwoven in the context of Armenia. They are both organized by the hierarchical norms and values related to gender within the country. In recent years, migration scholars have begun to take seriously the notion that gender is

⁵ The ILO survey demonstrates that 78% of Armenian population regard women's migration in a negative light.

constructed and relational (Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994; Pessar 1999, 2003; Mahler 1999; Boehm 2012). This focus gained prominence within migration studies following the publication of Hondagneu-Sotelo's (1994) work on the settlement practices of Mexican migrants in the United States, which revealed the way in which the social ideas about gender relations and the actual practices of gender in households and institutions alike both reflect and structure the emigration of men and women. This perspective differs significantly from earlier research, which had depicted migrant women as simply the victims of global economic processes, and it also avoids the common fallacy of equating the concept of gender with the experience of women alone. Within the engendering perspective, the emphasis has shifted from an analysis of the experiences of women to the effects of idealized masculinity and femininity held by individuals, shaped by the culture and political institutions. Various studies, building upon the notion of "engendered migration" have demonstrated that specific power relations constructed around gender, sexuality, ethnicity and the nation intersect with mobility and migrant subjectivities and identities (Mills 1999; Reynolds 2006; Wolf 1992). Radcliff in her work on migration from peasant households in Calca, Peru, found that patriarchal socio-cultural relations exclude women from key agricultural tasks, leaving them dependent upon male labor to complete the agricultural cycle. Such ideological controls on women's labour, combined with men's economically driven migration from peasant farms, constructs women as marginal to agricultural subsistence work. This re-working of the gendered division of labour shapes the propensity to migrate for both and men. These gendered forms of control and access to certain types of work demonstrate the importance of examining the gendered hierarchies of power (Radcliff 1991).

Accordingly, my focus upon male outmigration in the context of Armenia may also shed important light upon the pattern of women's migration and the gendered self-understandings of emigrant women in Turkey. Starting from the perspective of migrants and the gendered hierarchies in which they are located raises new questions about migration regimes. Indeed, feminists have been undertaking such a gendered approach for a long time by studying the differential effects of socially constructed gender roles and the gendered division of the household on men's and women's migration practices. In drawing upon the 'cultural logics of migration' developed by Aihwa Ong (1999) they have provided an analysis of the everyday relations of power that lend social and economic legitimacy to the mobility (or immobility) of women migrants, but their focus has remained limited to the micro-context of households (Chant 1991; Chant and Radcliff 1992; Lawson 1998; Radcliff 1991). Strategically, the focus upon the household level has proven useful, as the power dynamics revolving around gender in the family have finally been incorporated into an analysis of global migration flows. Lately, however, there has been more emphasis placed upon the role of the state in structuring family life, and the gendered identity of migrants either prior to their migration or in the course of their transnational existence (Boehm 2012; Silvey 2004; Ong 1999; Fouron and Schiller 2001; Reynolds 2006; Yeoh and Williams 1999; Elmhirst 2000). When analyzing the migration practices of men and women, it is essential to provide a bridge between the micro-context and this state level context, and my research aims at exactly this.

The second perspective which I seek to elaborate upon in my research concerns the formative role of the state in engendering the migration process. While the context of

receiving states and their vision of the relationship between gender, labour, and the nation, have been addressed by many migration scholars, there is lack of research pertaining to the equally significant context of the sending states. This is partly because of the assumption that sending states cannot politically influence the global economic demand determined within the core developed countries. As a result of this commonly held but fallacious assumption within both classical migration theory as well as in some feminist-materialist work, women's migration is viewed largely through the prism of individual strategies developed as a solution to poverty and unemployment in the home states, absent the involvement of any legislative or policy action by the political authority within the sending states. At the very least, the fact that not all impoverished states are sending states should suggest the role of political regulation in shaping the flows and patterns of women's migration (Oishi 2005, 7). Nana Oishi's study of women's migration in Asia, for example, has pointed to the fact that these migratory flows do not correspond neatly to the economic push factors such as poverty and unemployment that many would assume to be the chief impetus. The major sending countries such as the Philippines and Sri-Lanka are economically better off than other countries in the region such as India, Bangladesh and Pakistan for whom female migration rates are much lower. Oishi labels this latter group as "non-sending countries" and this designation could apply with equal force to Armenia (Oishi 2005, 58).

Oishi argues that sending states have distinct advantages to promote international labour migration, but the emigration policies are often gender-differentiated. While sending states generally adopt a *laissez-faire* attitude toward male migration, emigration policies targeting women often reflect societal concerns over the social role of women within the

household and nation as well as the responsibility of the state to protect women. Thus, Nana Oishi (2005) concludes that male migration appears to be more sensitive to economic variables, whereas the responses of women to economic demands are often obstructed by the social and cultural values attaching to women's migration. While an economic perspective might prove sufficient to understand the emigration policies of the sending states with respect to men, women's migration requires a more rigorous analysis of culture, state policies and gender processes. Yet I must offer two important caveats, informed by the perspective of "engendering", concerning the importance of the sending country context in shaping the migration of both men and women migrant labourers.

First, although the term "value-driven" migration is useful in its focus on 'the sociality of migration', allowing us to scrutinize the gendered aspects of migration regimes on the part of the sending states, it is problematic that this concept is not often extended to incorporate the gendered dimensions of male migration. The fact that emigration policies regarding men are 'laissez faire' does not mean that they are unregulated or a neutral response to economic variables; rather, they are regulated by the social ideas about the gendered division of labour within the household, economy and the nation state, which construes men as an integral part of the economic sphere from which women are necessarily excluded as belonging to the domestic realm. It is not so much the global economic demand that impels the migration of men as it is men's socially accepted and idealized status as the breadwinners within the household and society, transfused into the regulatory norms of international migration. According to the engendering perspective, these ideas about men are mutually constitutive of the reverse ideas about the role of women in the household, nation

and the international labour market. Therefore, I would suggest that men's migration is also value-driven and that political responses to it on the part of states are informed equally by notions of femininity as well. The study of women's migration from Armenia cannot be conceived as separate from the policies regarding male outmigration since the political and social reactions to this latter phenomenon both reflect and help to reinforce the prevailing social ideas and relations regarding gender, labour and the state.

With respect to the context of the sending states, the studies undertaken by Yeoh and Willis lend credence to this latter argument regarding the relationship between emigration policy and the predominant social ideas about gender relations and the nation. Yeoh and Willis (1999), for example, have observed that the Singaporean state often calibrates ideals of femininity and masculinity according to the exigencies of whether or not to promote family migration to China. Their study reveals that the promotion of men's migration to China aims to increase the economic influence of the nation, while the reunification of women with their husbands is promoted by the state in order to ensure that men who are sent abroad will remain incorporated within their native land. Underlying these policies are assumptions about women and men's roles within family, society and nation. Women are regarded as primarily responsible for the care and supervision of their husbands, while men are seen as representatives of Singapore's economic superiority and development.

The second caveat which I would enter here is the notion that emigration policies are not the only means by which states can influence the migratory process – mainly because the majority of women in contemporary international circuits migrate illegally. This is also true for the Armenian women working in Turkey. Yet, this does not mean that the Armenian

state does not and cannot participate in the creation and perpetuation of hierarchical gender values and norms relevant to the migration of women. States are also involved in the more ubiquitous production of gender relations within the private domain, while connecting the households to the various nationalist projects and/or the political economic management at the national level. Policies, legislation and norms regarding birth control, women's labour force participation, marriage and household work are very carefully mapped out by states (Chin 2003, 59) Feminist scholars of nation building and nationalism have pointed out that the household is an important site for connecting men and women to the idea of the nation in different ways. States design their policies with a particular view to the appropriate role of men and women within the nation and their contribution to the national wellbeing. As transnational labour migration is a more expansive form of labour participation, the way in which women participate and move in these circuits is closely related with the household policies of states. These policies can both discursively and materially shape women's decisions to migrate and affect their experienced both prior and after migration. Armenia can be seen as a powerful example of this trend.

In the next section, I will discuss one of the gendered social categories that has assumed a key role in connecting women to the nation and family – that is, motherhood. A brief sketch of the historical importance of motherhood in the construction of the Armenian nation is provided. Motherhood and women's biological reproduction was seen as essential to the survival of the ethnic identity of the political community during the genocide. In the early years of the Republic of Armenia, anxieties surrounding the "Genocide" resurfaced, owing in part to the massive exodus of Armenians as a result of war, economic deprivation

and political instability. This thesis cannot delve into the complex history of Armenians as an ethnic group; as is the case with every nation, this history is non-linear and often incoherent, with multiple social and political processes and actors involved in its making. My purpose is rather to explicate the strong relationship that has developed between motherhood as a feminine role and popular conceptions of “Armenian-ness”. This brief sketch should help us to better understand the anxieties revolving around women’s roles in the post-independence era.

Cultural Logics of Family and Gender: a Brief History of Patriarchy in Armenia

When entering into Yerevan, the capital city of Armenia, two important landmarks catch the eye: Mount Ararat, which is sacred for many Armenian people and is often identified as the birthplace of the nation and the statue of Mother Armenia, which symbolizes the heroic resistance of Armenian women during the genocidal massacre of 1918 perpetrated by the Ottomans and Eastern Kurds. The mother Armenia statue was erected in the early 1960s when the Soviet administration of Armenia decided to permit rituals of nationalistic memory and commemoration that had heretofore been banned (Tololyan 2000). Along with constructing a Genocide Memorial which became a site of pilgrimage for diaspora Armenians, one of the other initiatives undertaken by the Armenian government was to replace a monument to Stalin that had formerly presided over the city with the Mother Armenia statue as a symbol of its abiding national identity. The statue has a real historical reference point, but it must be understood primarily as an artifact of that period – by substituting Stalin’s image with that of Mother Armenia, the Armenian people were invited to reclaim what the Soviet-regime had eradicated in terms of ethno cultural values.

The interesting point here is that in the endeavor to reconnect Armenia with its original ethnic identity, the figure that became identified with Armenian-ness was that of the mother. The history that was recovered was hence a gendered one.

The cultural parameters that define the role of women in Armenian family life and the nation have been shaped by three different historical phases: the Genocide, Soviet Armenia, and the independent Armenian Republic. These do not correspond to a series of distinct non-overlapping periods in which the role of women within the family was dramatically altered, but they can be seen as ushering in somewhat different conceptions of womanhood and femininity that accompanied the different political and socio-economic structures that marked each phase.

The Genocide of 1915 still constitutes the founding myth and the cradle within which the national identity of Armenia conceived. Stephanie Platz argues that the role of women as the nucleus of the family and the guarantors of what are seen as intrinsic Armenian values and customs was further entrenched in this period and continues today through the recirculation of stories of Armenian women refusing to accept help from Turkish men and sacrificing themselves for the sake of their extended family (Platz 1995). In her comprehensive review of literature on the Armenian Genocide, Carina Karapetian Giorgi demonstrates that whenever women's patriotism is discussed, it is in the context of sacrifices carried out for children, while men appear as "independent and fighting for the nation" (Giorgi 2012, 92-103). This founding myth has remained central to the simultaneous co-constitution of the national identity of Armenia as well as the prevailing gender roles and identities within the family.

The Armenian community has been dispersed ever since the collapse of their state in the early 11th century. They have been a “transnational entity” since then, living in Syria, Lebanon, Turkey, Russia, Poland, the US and several other countries. Diaspora scholars have noted that the identification with an ethnic or national identity is as dispersed and variegated as these groups necessarily are and that Armenian national identity within the homeland is closely connected with the changing agendas of these groups (Tololyan 1996).

Notwithstanding the complexity of this diverse identification with the nation, the role of family and of women as moral and hard-working mothers, daughters and wives has always been central in any formulation of Armenian ethnic identity, and has been closely connected with ideas about survival and superiority. In an article published in the New York Times in the late 19th century, a diaspora Armenian invoked the distinct qualities of Armenian women that hold the family and nation together, despite the persecution, fanaticism and oppression of a succession of foreign and particularly Islamic rulers. He noted that “it is the Armenian women who have preserved the Armenian nation. The patient dignity, the devoted faith and the unflinching heroism of the Armenian wife, mother and daughter are traditional among their native hills and in the archives of the race” (New York Times, 1896).

Three characteristics of Armenian women are singled out for praise in the article. First is her supreme homemaking character. While the patriarch of the household is breaking his back in the employ of his Ottoman masters, the woman at home cooks, cleans and makes the home a habitable refuge and sanctuary. Despite the horrors of living amongst the Ottoman Turks, she never compromises her “womanliness, faith and tradition”. The second point the article emphasizes is the ability of women to hold society together despite the

emerging class differences and divisions. He explains that the servant problem does not exist in Armenia because peasant women who are employed as servants “know their place, and yield all respect to their masters and mistresses”. Regardless of whether they occupy the role of servants or housewives, Armenian women are responsible for organizing wedding parties, ceremonies and rituals all of which are the distinct symbols of Armenian-ness, enabling the transmission of cultural and ethnic values. The third quality of Armenian women that distinguishes them from all other Christian women is their sexual modesty and guardedness. As the article notes, when Armenian women are captured by the “godless raffias”, they do not give themselves to them, preserving their faith and preferring to be killed rather than jeopardizing the honour of their family and nation (New York Times, 1896, August 18).

In the Armenian political community, the nation is strongly associated with the institution of the family. Armenians have been living without “a state” for a long time in dispersed communities but this connection between the family and the nation was undoubtedly furthered by the absence of a formal Armenian state during the genocide period, in lieu of which the familial structure was upheld to be the focal point of loyalty to the Armenian cultural and historical inheritance (Platz 1995). This survival strategy, which was initiated as a response to the horrors of the genocide, was based upon and served to reinforce the gendered division of labour within the society wherein women were seen as responsible for upholding and reinforcing the moral image of the Armenian family, and, consequently, of Armenian statehood as well. Following the events of 1915, many women were expected to migrate to the US in order to marry with Armenian men and to reconstruct Armenian bloodlines and culture. In order to fulfill their reproductive function vis-à-vis the

society and nation, women in large numbers were dispatched to the US to marry with men, who selected from catalogues compiled of women from various Armenian communities (Aghajanian 2015). If a woman's status was conceived as having been damaged through miscegenation with the godless Turks, she could only be suitable for marriage with a divorcee. Within the family-centric culture of Armenia, such marriages were seen as critical for the survival not only of an individual family, but the Armenian nation as a whole.

Stephanie Platz argues that this conception of motherhood not only defines and circumscribes the role of women within the family, but also within the nation. Armenians conceive of traditional kinship as an enduring model that is distinctly and uniquely Armenian and actually constitutive of what it means to be an 'Armenian' (Platz, 2000). Lavon Abrahamian (2006), in his *Armenian Identity in a Changing World*, observes interestingly that the word "azg" is the common signifier both for 'family, tribe, clan' and 'nation'. Within the context of Armenia, family and kin are closely associated with 'national values' (Abrahamian, p.1). Along somewhat similar lines, Armine Ishakian (2002b) points out that the concept of "kanatzi" or feminine work, which encompasses domestic work, care for one's family and children and the responsibilities of a good wife, is prescriptive in nature and defines what women's roles should consist of in order to further reinforce Armenian heritage and national values.

The gendered division of labour which typified the national survival strategy of Armenia was somewhat altered as a result of the Soviet annexation of the country in the 1930s. Although women's participation in the workforce on a par with that of men was introduced at this time, it did not achieve any complementarity between men and women in

household work and it did nothing to unseat the gender ideologies that have constructed women as chiefly responsible for such work (Platz 1995; Platz 2000; Abrahamian 2006). The economic contributions of women in this period might have improved the household budget, however motherhood remained the foremost benchmark of feminine valuation and all other achievements were ultimately viewed as secondary.

Ironically, the role of motherhood was further imbued with nationalist motifs and became the focal point of resistance to the Soviet state, whose policies were interpreted by the disaffected population as a concerted attempt to substitute the ethnic identity, institutions, and symbols such as familial loyalty and flourishing kinship ties with the working class clubs and a synthetic loyalty to the communist state apparatus (Platz 1999). The Soviet hostility toward nationalism in the satellite states was interpreted widely as a threat to the family and kin based structures in the context of Armenia as these were often invoked as the font of nationalist feeling. The Soviet attempts to alter the status of women in the family and labour market were hence opposed by many Armenians who feared that women might depart from their traditional role of providing the cement for family and kin. Mary Kilbourne Matossian argues that Soviet reforms providing women with equal rights in inheritance, the right to divorce and political representation were thought of as attempts to supplant patriarchal authority and to eradicate the patrilineal structure of Armenian society – all of which were thought to be crucial for maintaining an authentic Armenian ethnic identity (Matossian 1962, 59). Drawing upon the post-colonial literature, Platz argues that not everyone in society found the Soviet re-ordering of gender roles undesirable. Some men and women paid little more than lip service to the ideology of “family values”, which they saw as

a constraint on their life choices, while others identified even more strongly with these as a form of protest against the “Soviets”. Nevertheless, conformity to the patriarchal stereotypes is varied, but behaviour is evaluated with reference to “Armenian-ness” or “Soviet-ness”.

She writes:

It may be said of a young man who violates the customary signification of respect for age and authority that he is not Armenian (*hay chai*). Conversely, a young married woman may complain to her friends that her authoritarian husband is an “authentic Armenian”, meaning that he is patriarchal. Modernity, associated with Soviets, is juxtaposed against the tradition inhabited in the family (Platz 1995, 35).

Many Armenian scholars have observed that the cultural transmission of these values is achieved primarily through women’s work. Stephan Pillar notes that the marriage rituals – if organized with sufficient ostentatiousness and pomp – are regarded as representative of authentic Armenian-ness and may also improve the status and lot of women within a given family (Platz 1995). Consequently, both women’s emotional labour as well as their income are valued according to their contribution to kin relations, and the majority of women have identified these roles with service to the extended family and nation simultaneously. These rituals have, of course, been of no small importance to the men who have also contributed to financing them; however, the existing gendered division of labour, which has invested women with the responsibility of preserving and transmitting culture implies additional moral, emotional and status responsibility for women.

The displacement of women’s traditional duties to the family was feared for both symbolic and practical reasons. Because of the trauma of the events of 1915 and the subsequent bureaucratic and heavy-handed policies of the Soviet State, family and kin evolved to become a sacred and secret unit for expressing nationalist motifs and language

(Ishkanian 2002; Platz 1995). Being at the center of this kinship system, women were responsible for organizing the ritualistic marriage ceremonies, birth parties, or funerals wherein the culture and history of the Armenian nation were memorialized and re-circulated, stories of the victims of genocide were commemorated and group cohesion and solidarity was achieved (Harutunian 2001).

Notwithstanding the importance of this history, the pattern of women's contemporary migration in Armenia must be understood with reference to the third major transformation of the Armenian political economy, namely, the birth of the independent Republic of Armenia and the ensuing increase in the number of female-headed households within the country. Unsurprisingly, women have experienced the transition from socialism to the market-economy with a significant level of difficulty as the entire infrastructure of industrial production was shut down and the commitment to full-time female employment was abandoned in the new Republic. The economic renewal strategies primarily targeted the service sector, where there is rampant discrimination against older women, whose Soviet era education has made it difficult to adjust to the new trends in the economy. As I will later discuss, the Armenian state has itself contributed to the emergence of a 70% female unemployment rate by officially privileging the role of women as mothers as opposed to that of labourers in the formulation of policy, but for now it is enough to note that state policies have targeted women primarily as a means of addressing the problems associated with male-outmigration at the expense of focusing upon the plight of women in the labour market and society more broadly. In the name of securing the Armenian national and cultural legacy,

women have been restored to their original position within the family as was established in the founding myths of the Armenian nation.

The Place of Women in Armenian National Debates around Migration

The contemporary debates in Armenia concerning the problem of male emigration are preoccupied with two principal issues; on the one hand, there are honest attempts to seek explanations for the phenomenon of emigration, and, on the other hand, there are worried enunciations of the catastrophic consequences to the Armenian nation that will ensue from male emigration. In the content that follows I will focus on the gendered frame that is used to interpret the effects of male migration with respect to the socio economic situation of the country. Firstly, male migration has spurred fears of a permanent economic decline and underdevelopment in addition to international security concerns, owing to the declining population of men, who should be serving the nation as either labourers or soldiers. Secondly, the decline in the population of men has led to a lopsided sex ratio, high divorce rates and low marriage-birth rates, which have deepened fears about an impending extinction of the Armenian nation – a fear that is already entrenched in the collective memory due to the experience of the genocide. Thirdly, the fear of the loss of the Armenian nation is also expressed in terms of the loss of cultural values as a result of male emigration. Of course, these various discussions and debates are shot through with references to women's growing distrust of marriage, the duties of women to the nation, and the need to strengthen the societal role of women as mothers and to encourage them to have more children. Therefore, in Armenia as it is in many other sending countries, questions surrounding migration are

framed at the intersection of societal security, the loss of cultural identity and the disintegration of family values, and economic and national security issues.

The problematization and categorization of male emigration as such is based upon implicit and explicit assumptions about the socially constructed roles of men and women both in public and in private. Male emigration from Armenia is caricatured as a national security threat, because men are conceived of as the primary economic agents and as the soldiers of the nation. Women, on the other hand, are held responsible for preserving moral stability at home and throughout the nation just as they did during the period of the Genocide. In this sense, Armenia's formulation of the migration problematic is also a clue to the different pathways that bind women and men within the nation state (Fouron and Schiller, p. 543). Feminist studies have demonstrated that the established gender hierarchy is strongly rooted in and reinforced by government policies, and that it is gendered identities that often buttress nationalist claims (Yuval Davis 1997; Yuval Davis 1996; Abu-Lughod 1998). The mutual construction of gendered identities and the nation, according to Fouron and Schiller, occurs both within the public and private spheres. As individuals create families, they also create gendered individuals, and, to the extent that family and home are simultaneously defined as the domain of women and the site of national honour and culture, when women do women's work, they become committed to the ideas and imagery that constitute the bedrock of the nation.

A-The Formulation of the Security and Economic Problematic

The Armenian state has been, in many ways, a 'transnational entity' since its establishment as a nation state following WWI. Historically, the Armenian population was dispersed

throughout the Ottoman Empire and it retained this character even after the formation of the official state, with more than half of the population residing outside of the country in Russia, the United States, the Caucasus, Central Asian republics and the Middle East. Since gaining independence in 1990, the country has witnessed the emigration of large numbers of men seeking seasonal work abroad and has had its hopes for the Armenian diaspora to resettle within the country dashed (Darieva *et al*, 2011). As a consequence, the political construction of migration has increasingly referred to the destabilizing effects of male migration on the demographics of the country and the dangers of ‘population extinction’ this has implied (UNFPA 2001 Report; Armenia Security Strategy Paper 2009; Strategy of the Demographic Policy 2009). As is common in the context of nation building projects, population density is often perceived to be positively correlated with national power (Yuval Davis 1993), and this is especially the case in Armenia which faces a security dilemma, being surrounded on virtually all sides by rival or enemy states (e.g. Russia, Turkey, Azerbaijan). The specific framing of these issues has led Armenia to transform the issue of male migration variously into a question of nationalism. As is so often the case, questions of nation and state are also questions of gender and family.

Although there are no reliable statistics on the annual emigration from Armenia, approximately 800,000 to 1.3 million of its overall population of 4 million has left the country since the collapse of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic (ILO 2009). The most significant outmigration occurred between 1992 and 1994, when the numbers reached 600,000, coinciding with the most unstable period in recent Armenian history, as the country suffered from poor public utility provisions, the economic effects of the Nagorno- Karabakh

war with neighbouring Azerbaijan, the Spitak earthquake and the Turkish economic embargo. The widespread poverty and inequality that has attended the period following independence has provided the main impetus for this wave of emigration from the country. The coverage on the part of the news media, the policies of the Armenian government and the surveys conducted by international organizations involved with issues of migration in the country have provided the clearest corroborating evidence with respect to the overwhelming gender disparity in male versus female outmigration. Historically, Armenia has sent varying numbers of emigrants abroad, some of which were the professional and business classes which fled the country to the United States and Russia between 1991 and 1992 to be reunited with the large diaspora population already residing in those countries. Following the establishment of the Armenian Republic, emigration has been perpetually on the rise and has acquired the character of cyclical, low-skill labour migration of men seeking work in the construction sector, as well as in trade and tourism in Russia and the Caucasus republics.

According to reliable surveys, the number of ethnic Armenians residing outside of the country far exceeds the number of those residing within it, and, in this sense, Armenia fails to conform to the general rubric of the nation-state as sketched out in social sciences literature. It is also an unusual sending country when we consider the high ratio of migrants to the overall population, and it is in this overall context that we must assess the demographic concerns and anxieties regarding low birth rates.

The institutional landscape of migration is dominated by the NGO sector rather than the state writ large in Armenia. The majority of these non-governmental organizations are funded by USAID or the European community for the purposes of shoring up the process

of institution building, beginning in the transition period. There is no single organization that has a specific program, project or mandate that targets women's emigration, however the two most prominent women's organizations in the country are Hope and Help and Women Resource Center. While the former is concerned with the increasing trafficking of Armenian women primarily to Middle Eastern countries, Russia and Turkey, the latter is preoccupied with the prevention of violence toward women, which has become a more serious problem for the country in the independence era. The IOM's chief goal is the establishment more effective and efficient management of border controls for the purposes of preventing irregular migration, and its most famous project in this area was the 2002 initiated "Illegal Roads Lead no Where". The OSCE and the British Council-funded ICHD are among the most active organizations in the realm of male migration, cooperating with and assisting the government of Armenia in its Migration Management and National Action Plan 2012-2016, which consists of fourteen objectives mainly targeting the effective management of regular labour migration, the reintegration of returnees within the society and economy, and other related issues. In this action plan, there is no discussion of female emigration either among the policy officials or NGOs. The common refrain that I heard from virtually every official I interviewed from these institutions was that female migration is not regarded as a significant issue for the country.

Although there is no direct discussion of women emigration, the documents and policy proposals produced by these institutions are gendered. The migration surveys prepared by the international and national stakeholders as well as the official state reports place a dual emphasis upon low birth rates and the discontents of male migration. The IOM 2006

booklet *Perspectives on Migration* estimates that men between the ages of 20 and 44 constitute sixty percent of the overall migration figure (Yeganyan, 20). The emphasis placed upon the age-disaggregated data attests to the concern with 'birth rates.' Recently, the assistant representative for the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) in Yerevan, Garik Hayrapetyan, identified the highest migration policy priority as finding ways to contain 'this most active reproductive and economic age' group within Armenia. This assumed relationship is identified by *the National Human Development Report* prepared by the UNDP in 2009 as follows: "The obvious prevalence of able-bodied men of reproductive age in emigration flows has distorted the demographic balance in a number of areas, leading to an abrupt decline in the birth rate (compared to about 80,000 births in 1990, the birth rate fell about 2.5 times by 2001-2002, and started slowly recovering only in 2003). Not only has the number of marriages fallen, but the number of divorces has increased" (UNDP, 19). Reports prepared by the OSCE and ICHD have also placed an emphasis on the issue of birth-rates.

The formulation of the migration question in terms of the lopsided sex ratio within the country is connected with the national security problem in explicitly gendered ways, expressing the role of men in economically producing and defending the nation and women in reproducing the nation. The declining male population would, within this frame, imply that Armenia is being dispossessed of its soldiers and 'productive' elements within the public-economic realm. Yuval-Davis notes that the need for people – primarily for men – is often connected with various nationalist projects, depending upon the hegemonic discourses of nationalism at a given time and place. In the specific case of Armenia, the alarmist attitude toward male outmigration has been linked with the concerns of two nationalist projects,

namely, populating the nation for defensive purposes as well as for the purposes of economic development (Yuval Davis, 1996). Yuval Davis (1996) cites as an example of a security oriented nationalist project, the case of Israel, which has sought to encourage the resettlement of its Diaspora for the purposes of national defense and to overwhelm the indigenous Arab population. In the second category, she refers to Japan's efforts to increase its population in order to overcome the sluggish economic growth of the 'lost decade' of the 1990s. Both of these concerns were expressed in the 2007 "National Security Strategy" document as among the leading threats to Armenia. The *Migration Policy Report of 2009* considers the situation "rather dangerous and directly touch[ing] the basis of national security of the country" (Strategy of Demographic Policy 2009).

Although Armenia is not an ethnically divided country, its perception of security is correlated with its population density, which is significantly lower than neighbouring Russia, Azerbaijan and Turkey. In this sense, it displays similarities with the first category of nationalist projects that Yuval-Davis identifies. According to this discourse, an increase in population should translate into an increase in security for the Armenian state. According to Armine Ishakian (2002b), the construction of emigration as a national defence deficit is traceable to the legacy of the 'Genocide' and has been reinforced by the more recent wars of Nagorno-Karabakh (1988-1994). She points out that the tragic loss of life during the events of 1915 and the breakup of the Ottoman Empire is often juxtaposed to the declining population as a result of the emigration process now underway in the country. The current emigration from Armenia is referred to by many in Armenia and in the diaspora as the "white genocide" (*spitak chartub*). She quotes from one of her research subjects that, "What

the Turks did not do, we are doing to ourselves by fleeing the homeland.” (Ishkanian 2002 ,26) The fact that these conflicts have continued to endure, with the economic blockade applied by Turkey and the continuing conflict with Azerbaijan, further solidifies the link between national security and emigration in the popular consciousness.⁶

Male migration is regarded as a national security threat, even coded as “White Genocide”, reinforcing the notion of a patriotic duty on the part of men to propagate their ethnic group and to protect their respective nation-state. However, the migration of men is entirely congruent with another of their traditional gender roles, namely, that of breadwinner and active participant in economic development writ large. In the context of Armenian migration, male migration is *also* debated positively in terms of men’s duty to participate in the economic realm and to contribute to the overall prosperity of the nation. Although both the ruling and oppositional parties emphasize the importance of containing these men at home for the purposes of national security, the dependence upon remittances and the inability to create jobs for unskilled labour as well as for qualified university graduates makes it difficult for the government to take drastic measures curbing migration (Barsoumian 2013, *The Armenian Weekly*). As a result, migration policy has been largely restricted to the measures

⁶ The recent comments made by the President of Azerbaijan regarding the strategic benefits of a declining population in Armenia have rekindled the debate surrounding issues of emigration, leading the State Security council head to highlight, once and again, the importance of curbing emigration for Armenia. Recently, Armenia has also experienced strife with Russia over its 2012 Compatriots program, which facilitates migration from ex-USSR countries by canceling the visa requirement. This program has incurred the ire of the Armenian Prime Minister, Tigran Sargsyan, who has publicly denounced Russia’s policy, as the number of applicants has reached 26,000 (roughly 1,500 of whom have given up their Armenian citizenship altogether to relocate to Russia).

taken to improve the conditions for returning migrants. Otherwise, the migration policy remains very liberal, allowing people to leave and re-enter the country freely for seasonal work (Migration Policy Paper, 2009). Thus, between the two competing discourses regarding the contribution of men to the nation (i.e. that men should remain within the country to guard against ‘enemies’ abroad and that men migrate for sake of contributing to the economic health of the nation), the economic discourse has become dominant.

Accordingly, within this frame, men must trade off their essential duties to protect and safeguard the nation in order to fulfill their role as economic producers and to contribute to national development. The labour market and migration are hence regarded as men’s natural sphere of flourishing and the arena in which they can best demonstrate their commitment to the nation through their economic gains. In warding off critiques from the Heritage Party, the Minister of Education and Sciences, for example, emphasizes the economic contributions of migrants in terms of remittances, emphasizing the fact that they are fulfilling their duties to the nation “in another way” (Barsoumian 2013, *The Armenian Weekly*). It is widely acknowledged that the state is unable to create ideal market conditions to accommodate male workers and their migration is therefore seen as a means for them to carry out their prescribed duty to the nation by participating in foreign labour markets (*The Armenian Weekly*, 22 June 2013). This participation therefore receives positive feedback from the society and state institutions writ large.

Thus far, I have addressed the ways in which male emigration has spurred fears regarding national security and has heightened the attention paid to issues of demographics. While some of this male emigration is cyclical, there are many cases of men who move

outside the country and permanently resettle there with their families. Given the failed efforts to repatriate the Armenian population who were expelled from Turkey and the widespread recognition that the diaspora has no intention to resettle within the country, this population movement has further intensified fears of a declining population and the attendant concerns with national security. Yet, my purpose in discussing the perception of emigration within the country as a national security crisis is not to make a definitive statement on whether these emotions or policies are justified or not. What is important is to demonstrate that migration is strongly connected with questions of nationalism and the state in very explicit terms. Historical traumas are even referenced to further inflate the visibility and importance of male migration. This linkage serves as a bridge that makes it easier to appeal to the traditional roles of women and men in nationalist projects, calling upon them to act in accordance with these gendered roles, identities and behaviours to preserve the sanctity of the nation.

Nation and Women in Armenia

In the previous section, I demonstrated the ways in which male migration has been transformed into a national crisis, as men are deemed unable to fulfill both their national duty to serve as soldiers and as economic producers at one and the same time. Concern over the problem of excessive male emigration has been expressed most openly by the opposition parties in Armenia, who claim that the country will soon be left without any labour force (though the phenomenon of male remittances has served to counterbalance this discourse somewhat). While low-birth rates and the lop-sided sex ratio are regarded as a function of this male outmigration, the policy responses have remained open and liberal for economic

reasons. Rather than exerting pressure upon men to return to the country, the response of the state and intelligentsia has been to encourage women in Armenia to assume more responsibility for solving these population-related problems.

Linking the security-concerns with the decreasing population of the country has helped to further reinforce the traditional role of women as the guardians of national virtue, as homemakers and also as unpaid domestic workers. In this context, women and their actions are regarded as the salve, which can help to resolve the cultural crises ensuing from the current male exodus. In particular, two policies of the Armenian government stand out. Firstly, the Armenian state is considering on a new birth allowance policy that would allocate \$2400 for every third and fourth child and \$3600 for every fifth child, reported news.am (2012, news.am). Although it is unknown how women will respond to this new measure, the policy is clearly targeted toward them, and it is assumed that women will shoulder the responsibility for repopulating the country. This also raises serious doubts about the sincerity of policymakers who also claim to want to see an increase in women's participation in the labour market. Given that 200 to 300 dollars is the standard monthly wage, public policy is clearly weighted to encourage women to remain at home. It is also highly likely that these large families will be female-headed, as men continue to move abroad in larger numbers. Whatever else it may signal, the new birth allowance communicates clearly the expectations incumbent upon both men and women as enshrined in state policy, which dictates that they should serve their nation according to their traditional and respective gender roles.

As a second policy measure, the government is providing additional support for the flagging institution of marriage, which has suffered as a result of economic hardship and the

absence of men, by offering preferential mortgages to newlyweds (2012, *Reported in news.am*). It is widely recognized that women, especially in urban centers, often harbor more interest in diaspora Armenians or foreigners as potential partners. In Yerevan, I came across a woman who worked as a cashier in one of the high-end brand name stores and whose ultimate goal was to relocate to the United States by marrying an American. Her attitude was emblematic of the more generalized distrust in the Armenian economy and skepticism toward marriage among young women: “There is nothing here. It does not matter how hard I work, how much I sacrifice, I will remain as a cashier. If I get married here, my husband might leave to another country. I will be stuck with the kids and limited life opportunities”. The changing attitudes of women with respect to marriage and their desire to leave the country have further heightened the already existing preoccupation with the degeneration of Armenian national and cultural values. As Meline Harutunian (2001), an Armenian sociologist notes, the worst side of Armenian male migration is that it causes women to question the institution of marriage itself. Young women avoid marriage as they have come to believe that there is only a meager future for them and their families. As a result of this, the moral underpinnings of the Armenian nation, which many perceive as residing within the cult of the family, have been placed in jeopardy.

What the various measures adopted by the Armenian government to address the problem of male outmigration all share in common is the underlying construct of a gendered division of labour. In Armenia, just as issues of national security and national development are linked to the issue of male emigration, the loss of cultural values and family disintegration are regarded as women’s problems. For this reason, the popular disillusionment with the

institutions of marriage and the family amongst younger women is regarded as a significant threat to the reproduction of the national culture and values (Harutinian 2001). A migration scholar from Yerevan state university, Aram Vartikyan, stated unequivocally in our interview, that male migration is causing a corrosion of solidarity within the neighborhood and significant instability in the traditional family structures, as Armenian men have increasingly partnered with non-Armenian women and women have found it difficult to commit to marriage at all. Yet, he added that the inevitability of male migration in the current context implies that women should assume more responsibility to rehearse their historic role as the glue binding the family-nation together. Apprehensions about the negative impact of male migration have led to a situation in which both the Armenian state and the intellectual cadre of the country have placed more responsibility upon the shoulders of women to continue to reproduce the national culture and values. Vartikyan states that they are planning to establish the first academic migration institution of Armenia precisely because of the concern over the loss of the Armenian nation itself.

Here, it is important to note that the prescribed roles for women and men are legitimized by recounting the historic narrative of ethnic origin and the sense of common destiny that many Armenians subscribe to. The increasing distrust in the institutions of family and marriage reflected in the mounting divorce rates and decreasing birth rates have led to a fear of the loss of what are seen as ‘authentic’ Armenian values (Harutinian, 2001). To preserve the national and cultural values has been historically and traditionally thought of as women’s work. These historical narratives are rearticulated within the context of a loss of cultural values as a result of male emigration. The anxieties produced about the threats posed

to the Armenian family and to women's traditional role within society have become a proxy for addressing more specific apprehensions about the costs of men's outmigration both in mainstream political and cultural fora.

In her article addressing migration as a national crisis, Meline Harutinian traces the formation of this traditional perspective on womanhood to the historic period of 1915, when Armenian women resolutely protected their family honor by refusing any support from Turkish men and remained committed to what are seen as core Armenian values. Harutinian emphasizes the continuing importance of the role of women in “strengthening the sustainability and moral image of the Armenian family, and consequently, of Armenian statehood” within the context of male outmigration (Harutinian 2001). In times of economic crisis and cultural upheaval, women should not abandon their commitment to the institution of marriage, and should continue attending to their children and should preserve their love of nation. Harutinian's view, which was given formal expression in a UNDP publication of 2001, echoes some of the same vernacular used in the aforementioned New York Times publication of 1895. According to her, it is imperative that women provide the support that is needed at this time to cement kin relations and function as good mothers, providing the nation with moral succor.

The identification of women in the national imaginary with the household and men with the public or economic domain has had obvious repercussions for the labour market where the issue of unemployment rates among men continues to be privileged as a ‘national’ priority. In all of the relevant research concerning the link between ‘migration and unemployment’, men are assumed to be the primary breadwinners, and surveys conducted

amongst male migrants point to the job market as the main push factor. There is barely any mention made of how poor working conditions within the labour market might impact upon women, nor is there any effort to understand why emigration as a survival strategy is not more common amongst them. Contrary to the image that is engendered by the prevailing overemphasis upon male unemployment, women face far more precarious conditions within the domestic labour market. Following independence, the Soviet policy of full-time female employment became difficult to sustain for the young Republic. In only a few short years, women had lost the benefits of employment equality and the formerly existing safety net. They now represent the 70 percent of the unemployed in the country (ILO, 2011), and where they are employed, they earn 50 percent less on average than their male counterparts (Ishkanian 2002a). In fact, as early as 1997 women had begun to resort to the same economic survival strategy as men – first emigrating to work as traders and later as domestic workers. Yet, the relegation of women to the household as if it were their natural habitat renders their representation in the labour market and migration flows virtually invisible. They are assumed to belong to the reproductive sphere alone.

Rather than challenging this gendered discourse, which proscribes against women's participation in activities outside of the household, the labour code and labour-related reforms in Armenia seek to preserve the status of women as primarily domestic units. Motherhood is regarded as women's primary responsibility (ILO 2011).

Although Armenia was the first post Soviet state to sign onto the CEDAW and developed its own plan to increase women's participation in the workforce, these and other measures did little to unseat the prevailing assumptions regarding the gendered division of

labour in the country. In its own words, for example, the purpose of the “*National Programme of Improving the Position of Women in the Republic of Armenia and Enhancing Their Role in Society for 2004-2010*” is “to seek to create the conditions whereby women can earn income and continue to undertake domestic work”. Indeed, the labour law adopted in 2005 guarantees full paid maternity, but no paternity leave benefits (ILO 2011). Thus, the labour code positions mothers and not fathers as chiefly responsible for the protection and care of the next generation. The explicit statement that women should balance domestic duties with their working life fails to reflect a change of perception about women’s place in the household division of labour. Rather, it is a reification of women as the seat of domestic responsibility and primarily as mothers. The precarious and vulnerable position of women within the labour market receives little attention from state officials, as women’s place is assumed to be in the home, and women are assumed to be fulfilling their patriotic duty by remaining within the bounds of domestic responsibility. Yet, the unemployment of men remains very visible and quickly transforms itself into an issue of national priority. The social reaction to action plans by government to institute gender equality has also met by smear campaigns by multiple civil society actors, which argued the concept of gender is an affront to the national family values of Armenians (Maritrosyan 2013, *The Armenian Weekly*).

Even in their limited participation within the labour market, women face significant discrimination and are confronted with a state apparatus that fails to provide adequate labour protections or even enforce the most minimal standards of wage work. During my fieldwork in the capital city of Yerevan, I came across many women employed in the hotel industry and other areas of the service economy, some of whom worked in 10 hours shifts seven days a

week without any social security whatsoever. Informality is pervasive to the extent that tips substitute for wages amongst the majority of women in this sector. None of the maids at the hotel I was residing at received regular wages, whereas men working at the same hotel received a standard monthly income. The underlying assumption is that women's income could only constitute a supplement to that earned by the primary male breadwinner. Rampant age discrimination in the labour market is also a major concern. Women above 40 or 45 years of age possess only their Soviet style education and often find it very difficult to adjust to the requirements of an already oversaturated service sector, which demands proficiency in English and computer skills even for second tier jobs. Most young women pursue university diplomas primarily as a means of broadening their social horizons and ultimately marrying a wealthy husband. In Armenia, this is so widespread that women who obtain a diploma are often referred to as possessing a "dowry diploma", meaning that it is just another souvenir to be put in the dowry box of prospective brides.

The constellation of Non Governmental Organizations in the country constitutes one segment of the labour force wherein women's participation is significantly higher than that of men (Ishkanian 2000). This is partly due to the support provided to women's organizations by international donors. The younger generation of women have opportunities primarily in this NGO sector, which has been one of the fastest growing economies in the country with investments and aid coming from the US and the EU. However, Armnine Ishkanian's (2006) study on women workers within the NGO sector demonstrates that even here, women's entry into public life has provoked the ire of many public officials. One way in which women can sidestep the criticism of such officials is by recasting their activities in

the language of patriotic nationalism and portraying themselves in accordance with traditional gender roles. Ishkanian writes:

The women argue that they have entered “public life for the good of the nation” (Nor Or 1995) and describe their NGO/public activities as being extensions of their domestic child rearing and nurturing duties. By invoking the rhetoric of moral motherhood, they insist that they are participating in the honorable practice of nation building through educating future citizens about the values of democracy, civic responsibility, and self-sufficiency (Ishkanian 2006, 17).

Ishkanian notes that in order to deflect public anxieties about their role within such organizations, women define themselves as ‘feminine’ rather than ‘feminist’. While feminism is associated with alien values drawn from Western culture, the emphasis of these women upon feminine archetypes creates an association between their role as the nurturers of children and hence of the Republic also. Unsurprisingly, women who do this work for purely nationalist motives rather than for the sake of other political values (e.g. feminism) are accorded a higher status. Iskaninan notes that although Armenian women are voluntarily active within Armenia’s NGOs, this involvement does not correspond to a feminist agenda. She contends that Armenian women frequently take deep offense at being labelled as feminists and try to emphasize a commitment to a nationalist (*azgayin*) cause. Many women define their role within these institutions as an extension of their domestic responsibilities to the public realm, with the aim of assisting the nation’s moral revitalization. They often invoke the rhetoric of moral motherhood, arguing that since women are primarily responsible for child rearing and the inculcation of proper social and cultural values and morals at home, they are perfectly situated to do likewise within public institutions, nurturing the Republic as they would nurture their own children. In this sense, women continue to

define their commitment to the nation in terms of their domestic responsibilities. To the extent that they remain moral mothers, their participation in the public realm is regarded as acceptable; however, where they stray from prescribed gender roles, women find it difficult to participate in public life.

While the NGO sector has included increasing numbers of women workers, it has been under attack lately by pro-Russian groups in Armenia, like the Pan-Armenian Parents' Committee and the Armenian-Russian Union. These two organizations represent the “Sovietisation” trend in Armenia, but rather than identifying with Soviet-era socialism and anti-religiosity, they represent a rapprochement with the conservative cultural values that are the staple of the current Russian administration. In their opposition to the “Europeanization” trend, they have targeted the entire NGO economy of Armenia that is supported by American and European donors, such as the Soros foundation in the US or the various European Union projects. According to popular organs of the anti-Europeanization movement, the reasons they oppose NGOs are the same reasons they oppose migration (either from the diaspora community to Armenia or from Armenia to abroad) because both imply the distortion or displacement of what are seen as authentic Armenian values and norms.

All of these anxieties and tensions regarding the place of Armenia in the wider world were played out in the context of a local lawsuit on domestic violence initiated by a woman against her husband in 2014 (Abrahamyan 2014). Despite the more specific focus of the hearings, the case became a vehicle for impugning and undermining the legitimacy of two American and Canadian-born Armenian women activists – the head of the Women Support

Center and the Director of the Women’s Resource Center – who had been supportive of the woman’s case against her husband. These two organizations are the most active women’s organizations in Armenia, trying to make a dent, in their own words, in the well-entrenched and normalized culture of male superiority. During the hearings, the head of the Parent’s committee lashed out at the women’s rights advocates for promoting “European values” that condemn physical violence towards women. Within the local traditions of Armenia, he defended the view that, wife beating, rather than constituting a symbol of violence, was simply part of how Armenians lived, learned respect for and held the family together. He accused these activists of engaging in “European perversion”: “It is not human-rights defense or equality but calls for wives to sue their husbands, turn to the police”, which, he asserted, will ultimately lead to the breakdown of the family (Abrahamyan, 2014).

The fact that these comments were not viewed with greater antipathy and the fact that the government has refused to comment on the issue has caused extensive public debates in the media in Armenia. It is hard to tell whether the government also uses women’s bodies and identities to situate itself as distinctively anti-European. What is important in this debate is not the assertion that European values are inherently better than Russian values, but that the attempt on the part of Armenia to find a place for itself in the political, social and historical map of the world clearly involves questions about women’s morality, identity and social status as well. In the course of this chapter, I have attempted to provide a sketch of the various historical phases in the country. Gender and sexuality are essential components in the construction of nation-states, communicating stories of the past and directing the future. Next, I will examine how the gendered construction of the state has

shaped women's migration structurally and how women assimilate these femininities variously produced by the larger cultural and political debates surrounding them.

Concluding Remarks

As Deborah Boehm has observed pointedly, we should not fail to address state policies that only indirectly target women's migration since these can often reveal more about the ubiquitous production of gender relations within a given society (Boehm 2012, 35). We must look here in order to explain the gender differences and other relevant patterns in migration, rather than to a general economic decline, poverty or unemployment as more conventional analyses so often do. In Armenia, state policies have both reinforced the cultural logic of unequal gender relations and gender roles, while, at the same time, creating an environment uncondusive to the participation of women in the labour market. This has resulted in a contradiction between the economic capabilities and the cultural expectations imposed upon single mothers, who have resorted to migration as a strategy to fulfill their cultural obligations, without actually challenging the patriarchal ideologies and gender roles that oppress them.

The role of the Armenian state in these migration decisions and patterns is not direct and causal in nature unlike, for example, in the Philippines, Singapore or Haiti, which directly intervene in male and female migration through concrete policy measures, but the Armenian state has nonetheless played a key role in structuring the familial and intimate spheres of the household by: (i) trying to compensate for the problems ensuing from male-out migration by placing more pressure upon women to rehearse their traditional role as mothers, birth-givers and home-makers, (ii) focusing on male unemployment and ignoring women's low income,

high unemployment and high dependence on husbands remittances, and (iii) creating an unfavorable cultural and political milieu that discourages the presence and participation of women within the public sphere.

In the next section, I will discuss the concept of “deserving frames” which are used to control and surveil female migrants. Armenian migrant women often assume an “unauthorized” identity since their migration is not banned officially and few official proclamations are made on their behalf. However, the phenomenon of motherhood migration is formed within the existing gendered division of labour, which is, in theory, a non-hierarchical sharing of work between the sexes, but, in practice, is based upon norms and values that subordinate women to the cult of motherhood, childbearing, and assuming responsibility for all of the various tasks scorned by men. Accordingly, the pressure to comply with gendered norms is never equivalent for men and women. Men can be freed from certain expectations, which are offloaded onto women, while women are compelled to meet their financial obligations even where this contradicts the norms themselves (which they are expected to comply with in other respects). The next chapter will examine the hierarchical family dynamics – combined with the state-sanctioned policies – that place women in a structural bind between their motherly duties and the financial strain in meeting these duties and how they function together to shape the self-understandings of women as “sacrificing” mothers. I will also emphasize the importance of the control and surveillance that migrant women are subject to before they travel to Turkey and after they arrive not by direct policies of state, but through everyday notions of femininity and masculinity. Many

migrant women do not follow a trajectory predicted by the transnational migrant literature, which characterizes their movements as post-national, hybrid and liberating.

Chapter 4: Moral Deservingness and the Role Of Motherhood

In this chapter, I will examine the phenomenon of “motherhood” migration among Armenian women. While there is no lack of empirical work on the importance of motherhood in the migration of women, it is often examined in the context of either irregular migration or as a manifestation of the “emotional imperialism” that has attended the transfer of care from the Global South to the West. Bohm (2012), for example, has studied the illegal migration of Mexican women to the US in terms of its effect on the relationship between mother and child. She concludes that the state’s regulation of migration is deeply problematic because it impacts upon the intimate relationships within the Mexican family by separating various members from one another and disrupting the familial bonds. The work on emotional imperialism has highlighted the need to discuss the problems posed by women’s migration with respect to the ensuing care deficit (Hochschild 2000). Both groups of researchers have provided ample empirical findings, but in line with the purpose of this research, I emphasize dimensions of motherhood that are not often taken up in the existing literature.

Gender scholars have long emphasized the fact that men and women migrate for different reasons and the study of migrant women has largely focused upon the phenomenon of “motherhood migration” as a distinctive feature of women’s migration. Here, my usage of motherhood migration has two dimensions: the structural and the representational. In terms of the former usage, I emphasize the structural bind facing women in Armenia, who are both responsible for meeting certain gendered obligations (e.g. marriage rituals, dowry preparations, celebrations and providing their children with education, etc.), while, at the

same time, being financially unable to do so on their own. As will be discussed, all of the migrant women whom I encountered with one sole exception, were single women, who had either been divorced, abandoned by their husbands or whose husbands had perished in the Spitak Earthquake. In other words, they did not embody a traditional family structure in which men migrate in order to earn money and women care for the domestic sphere via cultural and biological reproduction. In order to meet their obligations to the family, they were compelled to migrate. The phrase “structural bind” captures this contradiction nicely. Women’s motherhood migration is not a “challenge” to the traditional family structures or to the state/society-sanctioned norms about gender roles. Rather their distinctive family structure – i.e. the absence of a male breadwinner – is the primary reason behind their migration. Otherwise, women’s solo labour migration from Armenia remains entirely peripheral.

I will argue that this emigration is primarily a “motherhood migration”, shaped by the contradictory nature of the state sanctioned roles ascribed to women in the country. Armenian women have struggled to carry on their duties as mothers, but the lack of resources, especially for women who are divorced or who are single-mothers, prevents them from meeting their household obligations. Being oppressed by the duties of motherhood as well as being associated solely with the private realm means that their opportunities within the domestic labour market are highly curtailed. A similar example of “motherhood” migration is discussed by Rachel Reynolds. Upon examining the pre-migration experience of Nigerian women migrants to the US, she discovers that Nigeria applies prohibitive clauses with regard to women’s holding independent bank accounts, thereby greatly constraining

their ability to fulfill their financial obligations to family and children as stipulated in the local culture (Reynolds, 2006). Women's migration in this context is "incited by the familial obligations and interactions, but [is] also defined by the presence of states" (Boehm 2012, 35). The fact that it is deemed unfitting for women to hold their own bank accounts is a state-sanctioned gender norm, which encourages the migration of women as a means of escaping what she refers to as "a structural bind". Women are expected to be good mothers, but they are unable to manage their own financial accounts, which is often a necessary condition for women to be able to attend to the needs of their children due to the male mismanagement of funds.

On the other hand, the representational dimension of motherhood situates migrant women and their families within "the moral economy of deservingness". As aforementioned, migrant women are ideologically unauthorized and their mobility is not well received by local people, neighbors and extended kin. Conforming to expected feminine roles entails using their remittances for the support of cultural events, conducting a morally appropriate life in Turkey and working diligently – all of which are perceived as demonstrations of loyalty to the motherland. In order to garner legitimacy that is not afforded to other women under similar circumstances, migrant women and their families strive to ensure that they are perceived as legitimate women within the larger society. It is for this reason that I emphasize the need to move beyond the agency-structure dynamic. The notions of femininity that women invest themselves in are part of the migration regime, because they affect how they conduct themselves as migrants.

To comprehend “representational strategies” it is useful to recall what Judith Butler writes in *Bodies that Matter: On the discursive limits of Sex* about gender as an assemblage of performances: “this iterability implies that ‘performance’ is not a singular act or event, but a ritualised production, a ritual reiterated under and through constraint, under and through the force of prohibition and taboo, with the threat of ostracism and even death controlling and compelling the shape of the production.” (Butler 2011, 95). Butler is careful to point out gender is a series of ritualized productions which are purposefully meant to reinforce and reproduce the culture. Here, the transnational migration of women is perceived as a transgression of gender producing rituals – they become the solo breadwinners – and the various representational strategies emerge as another gendered performance with women investing in those feminine behaviors that are perceived as legitimate. This, as Butler argues, is a form of ritual emanating from the force of prohibition and ostracism, and not from the fear of violating the law, etc.

It is not unfair to say that migrant women are, in a very real sense, subordinated to the role of “motherhood”. Andrienne Rich usefully distinguishes between the experience of motherhood as the relationship between a woman and her children and “motherhood as enforced identity and as political institution” (Rich, 1995). An unwed Black teenage mother, for example, may experience motherhood as a rare source of self-affirmation, while society views this as illegitimate and even deviant. There are features of motherhood as a political institution in Armenia that were sketched in the previous chapter. The relation of women to motherhood is a crucial nexus of power and identity. They are charged with the enormous responsibilities of child rearing, while, at the same time, their lack of financial resources to

meet these obligations is rarely problematized. They are perceived to serve not only the family by performing their prescribed duties, but also the national culture itself. Women who fail to meet the ideals of motherhood are stigmatized for violating the prevailing norms and values of the society and are considered deviant (Roberts 1993, 5).

The Family structures and migration patterns of women's migration

Among the Armenian migrant women I studied, the prescribed gender roles and patriarchal interactions within the family remained largely unaltered despite their mobility. Some research has demonstrated that migrant women can, under certain circumstances, begin to view their gender roles differently by participating in activities that are traditionally associated with the masculine sphere such as migrating and breadwinning. It is possible to imagine a scenario in which the conflicting demands placed upon women might result in the disruption of gender hierarchies as women solve their dilemma by problematizing the patriarchal division of labour. Yet, the experience of these migrant women is not atypical of many women in post-Soviet Armenia – the only significant difference being that they are single mothers, and are absent a patriarchal figure within the household. Thus, two factors have likely been instrumental in prompting them to combine their traditional role as mother with the non-traditional role of migrant wage earner: first, the increasing pressure for devotion to the family and to carry on certain cultural rituals as prescribed by the state and dominant culture. Second, unlike other women, who have migrant husbands and are only responsible for turning the financial gain into social assets, these migrant women are either lacking a husband entirely or have a less than ideal husband. Consequently, some women find themselves caught in a structural bind between their lack of financial resources (i.e. a

gainfully employed husband or job opportunities themselves) and the intensified pressures on *mothers* to materially and ideationally reproduce the notions of family, kin and nation.

There is a clear relationship between the pattern of women's migration and the household structures in which they are situated. Solo migrant women are all above age 45 and have between 2 and 3 children. They all possess college degrees and were formerly employed during the era of Soviet Armenia. They are also from female-headed households, which can be classified into three different broad types. Firstly, there are those women who do not have husbands and are solely responsible for the care of extended family and unmarried children; secondly, there are those households in which women do not have husbands but live together with their married sons and daughters; and thirdly, there are some who possess husbands, brothers, or some other male figure that could assume the role of breadwinner within the family but does not for various reasons. There was also one case in which a woman named Haytu took the primary responsibility to migrate, while leaving her husband and children behind. This is an interesting exception to the more general rule and I will elaborate upon it later.

This pattern, of course, is a reflection of the gendered hierarchy that exists within the household and which construes women's independent mobility and labour market participation as undesirable. Migrant women often expressed the sentiment that if they had a husband or other male guardian that they would likely not migrate, either because family needs would be met by male migration or because it would be too difficult to convince their husband to permit them to migrate. Working abroad as a domestic worker raises suspicion about a woman's real intentions, and is often viewed as damaging to the honour of the

family. Hodegnaou-Sotelo (1994) also reports a high incidence of migrant women originating from female-headed households in South America and associates the emergence of this pattern with the strong patriarchal family structure there. In these households, she argues, male migration is understood within the framework of male provisioning or breadwinning, while women's service is thought to lie primarily within the family and domestic realm. Women from such households may be permitted to migrate under certain circumstances such as being a certain age or given marital status. Older women, especially if they are widowed, are considered somewhat "asexual", that their migration is hence not seen as damaging to the moral order of the family. Yet, such women are still expected to justify their mobility by appealing to a sense of family obligation and by making assurances that this was not for the sake of gaining independence for oneself or posing a challenge to the hierarchical structure of the family (Sotelo, 1994). Socially constructed gender roles do play a role in the formation of different age and household structural patterns in male and female migration. According to IOM surveys, male migrants from Armenia are predominantly between the ages of 25 and 40, are married with children, and can comfortably leave their families behind without incurring any moral opprobrium; women, in contrast, are over forty years of age and are predominantly from female-headed households (IOM, 2006).

The age and marital status composition of migrant women is undoubtedly an effect of gendered norms. Absent male accompaniment, the movement of young women is viewed with scorn and disapproval by their families, leading to the overrepresentation of older women among the population of migrants. Narine arrived in Turkey in 2005. Her husband had passed away as a result of health problems, after which she began living with her two

daughters and mother and father. Her father was a taxi-driver, as are many men in Armenia; however, due to his old age, he could not work anymore. Her brother, who is also responsible for caring for her parents according to customary expectations, travelled to Russia to work, but failed to send any money home to the family. Anush, on the other hand, is representative of the second type of household structure. She lost her husband in 1990, and subsequently decided to migrate to Turkey in 1995. She was one of the first to migrate among the subjects I profiled. She initially resided with her son, wife and children. She also had a married daughter who had moved in with her husband's family. Her son was a taxi driver but the money he made was not sufficient to meet the household expenses of the extended family. Her daughter-in-law was a physicist at a university, but was diagnosed with a brain tumor and forced to leave her job. According to Anush, her son had no intention to work, leaving her as the sole breadwinner of the household: "men find it difficult to work. They want a reward when they work like respect from other people or good money to live a life they see on TV shows. They want to decorate the house to be appreciated by their wives. The money is not enough to do all these things. They think they are less than a man. My son thinks it is better to stay at home and drink rather than making a couple of dollars a day". Among the 53 women I encountered in the course of my fieldwork, only two left their husbands to migrate, 40 of them migrated solo because there was no male figure within the home, and the remainder, mainly consisting of younger women, migrated along with their husbands and children.

There are at least two important gendered patterns in the household migration dynamic outlined above. The first relates to taboos surrounding the migration of younger

women. Armenia remains a “non-sending” country for young women. Other studies that have examined the livelihood and working conditions of domestic care migrants in Turkey from countries other than Armenia have revealed that young, unmarried women are among the primary migrants. These include young women domestic care workers from Moldavia, the Ukraine, Philippines, and the Turkic Republics. Invariably, young Armenian women migrants within Turkey are accompanied either by their parents or other family members. This type of illegal family migration is very specific to Armenia. When I asked Narine for her opinion on the migration of her young daughters to Turkey, she replied: “I would never allow this to happen. I wish they were independent women, but migration is a dangerous journey. They can be deceived by a man here. Back home, their grandfather takes them to school and brings them back. They cannot go out except to school. They are going to get married with a man who deserves them and they need to build good character until then. It is only possible within the family. If she migrates, who knows what people will think of her.” Young women, especially in rural areas, are under strict surveillance to ensure that their sexual morality is not compromised, while older women are desexed, rendering their migration more permissible socially.

Young women only migrate if they are married, or accompanied by their mothers or fathers. They do not work as live-in care workers but instead as daily workers, who go to work in the morning and come back in the evening. This pattern of family migration often follows the arrival of a solo woman – a mother or mother-in-law – to Turkey. Young women typically find work through their family members’ connection within the household. Anush, whose family followed her to Turkey, explains why the only avenue available for younger

women is to take jobs through a family connection: “Her husband did not want my daughter to work in Turkey. His thinking was that she would be exposed to more dangers – you know it is dangerous for women – working outside the home. He trusts her, but we hear stories from other women sometimes that their honor is damaged by their employers who think of them as available women. Her husband was right, but I promised him that I would find a safe place for her to work.” In the context of private patriarchy within the household, Gul Ozyegin explains that the reason for locating women in familiar places is that it serves as a means of protecting the honor of the woman, and, by proxy, the honor of the family as well. Through this tight control of their interaction with foreigners, many young migrant women are seen as remaining within the moral universe of the household and thus of the nation. Of course, this also increases the control of men over women’s work, income and socialization with individuals outside the orbit of the family.

Young women migrants from Armenia are especially subject to such gendered moral controls. During a focus group interview I conducted, the tale of an Armenian girl who was blackmailed by her boyfriend was narrated, serving as a parable of the dangers that can befall naïve girls who accompany their families as migrants. In 2012, an Armenian girl committed suicide in Istanbul. Her family was residing and working illegally like many others in Turkey. According to the account of others, she had been seeing a Turkish man who took inappropriate pictures of her and threatened to give them to her brother. After a confrontation with her brother, she was found dead, resulting in the deportation of her family as well. Armenian migrant women debated the issue at length, some blaming the family for not disciplining the daughter, while some others emphasized how her

inappropriate behavior has resulted in her family's deportation. The common lesson gleaned from the story from the perspective of women was the danger inherent in allowing young women to migrate without the guardianship of their husbands. In these debates, the legal status of the young women as the cause of her death never emerged as an issue, but indeed, the fact that she was not able to report the incident to the police because of her illegal status placed her in a deathly handicap. However, the gendered moral framework through which the story was perceived prevented the migrant women from regarding the situation of the young woman's death as an issue of access to legal rights. Migrant women strongly identify with the patriarchal feminine morality, judging the suicide of the woman as a form of punishment for not complying with such norms.

In the last chapter of the thesis, I will examine the implications of their legal status as it impacts upon the experiences of migrant women leading to a new gendered organization of life. Their legal status clearly intersects with how women deal with problems concerning their access to the public sphere, their survival strategies in difficult financial straits and how they cope with feelings of loneliness. In dealing with the difficulties of their illegal status, women form partnerships with men that have gendered implications. In many cases, women find themselves in a position of extreme vulnerability vis-à-vis the men in their lives and sometimes accept a subordinate position willingly. The "dangerous" encounters of migrant Armenian women and Turkish men often take place in the context of women's illegal status as determined by the receiving state, but these are also influenced by the expectations to conform to certain types of feminine deservingness. In the final chapter, I will address the insecurity of migrant women in their everyday lives as a function of the gendered relations

cultivated with men in Turkey, their illegal statuses and the pressure that migrant women face in seeking to fulfill their moral feminine obligations from a distance within Armenia. It is in this last chapter that the transnational character of women's insecurities in their everyday life will become apparent. The tale of the young Armenian girl and its reception by the Armenian community in Turkey foreshadows this discussion in many ways.

The second gendered pattern relates to how men who do not conform to the idealized images of manhood in Armenia are treated within the family. A number of the migrant women have husbands, brothers or sons. Yet, they do not 'feel' to work, according to the women. Anush expresses her discontent with her son: "I earn money for my son, his wife and their children. He was working in Gyumri as a taxi-driver. He complained that it is too much work and not rewarding. He migrated to Turkey with his wife and children. I found a job for him in a shoe-making industry. There are a lot of Armenian men there. They all work. My son went there 3 days, had a fight with a co-worker and got dismissed. The next job he found ended up in failure too". Anush assigns responsibility for what happened to her son not to his personal failure, but to external factors such as the difficult working conditions or the lack of a sufficient reward. Similar sentiments were echoed by Suzyana, who initially left her husband to migrate to Turkey:

I used to be a singer and worked in the entertainment sector during Soviet times. After the Soviets were gone, the restaurants were closed. The opinions also changed about singing women. It was not respectful anymore, I found. Then I came here, leaving my husband and children in Armenia to try out a new job. But my husband was so worried that men won't leave me alone here that he came to Turkey after a year. There were a couple of times I was about to face sexual assault. The first time he arrived to Turkey, he worked in a restaurant cleaning the floors and washing the dishes. He found the job very degrading for a man. He said men were born to do heavy jobs. He went back to Armenia, while I continued to work as a domestic. When I saved enough money to start a small dry cleaning business in

Kumkapi, he came back to Turkey with our daughter after the shop opened. He felt better about himself then.

From a gendered perspective, it must be acknowledged that the migration experiences of Armenian women still largely conform to the hierarchical structure of the household rather than posing a challenge to it; their migration occurs mainly in cases where there is no male patriarch or breadwinner and they are often motivated to seek out work abroad out of a sense of obligation to care for an extended family that would otherwise be assumed by a man. Young women's migration is regarded as dangerous because it is believed that their morality might be damaged and their reputation as Armenian women could suffer as a result. Despite the presence of income-earning brothers (as in Annig's family) or an irresponsible son (as in Harutya's), women feel the need to compensate in the case of an unsupportive family milieu. Whereas the failure of men to conform to prescribed gender roles is regarded as somehow exceptional or attributed to structural, impersonal factors, women's non-conformity with motherhood and care giving is seen as a mark of deviance, immorality and indignity.

Motherhood as The Structural Bind: Why do women migrate?

It would be tempting to situate women's migration decisions within the context of their economic hardship and the pervasive unemployment that has made it difficult for many women to fulfill their financial obligations toward their families. Economic deprivation, poverty and the total collapse of the economic infrastructure of the country has, of course, deeply affected both men's and women's lives in Armenia. But I would argue that rather than simply adopting the economic framework and 'adding and mixing' women to it, women's

migration should be more heavily contextualized by examining the changes and continuity in gender ideologies, cultures and roles in a given context. The factors that have acted upon women's migration are not purely economic, but they are immersed within a cultural logic that renders certain financial contributions toward the family crucial for both women's gender and ethnic identity. The kinds of expenses that women want to meet are very specific – for example, dowry preparations, celebrations, family rituals, education of their children or purchasing a house for their family.

The fact that women have been adversely affected by the economic adjustment of the transition period cannot be conceived of separately from the gendered expectations imposed upon them to finance certain economic needs on the part of the family. The specific political aspect of the “financial contribution” reflects social ideas about women's and men's position within the gendered division of labour both within the family and the nation. Although research on Armenian male migrants also points to the fact that men feel responsible to earn money for the purpose of funding these expenses, it is women's duty to use the remittances sent by their husbands in rituals, ceremonies and in purchasing articles for children (Menjivar and Aganjanian, 2007). Although it is male ‘breadwinners’ who provide the money, it is the responsibility of women to transform this hard currency into social assets – in this way, they also demonstrate to their exemplary mothering. The same concern on the part of women with their social status as mothers and as authentic Armenians can be witnessed in their migration journeys both prior to departure and in the course of their life abroad.

Although almost all of the women I interviewed had adult children, however their care for and sacrifice on behalf of these children still played an important role in their self-identity and status within the community. The cultural obligations for organizing marriages and rituals, according to these women, placed an added financial burden on them, as they were lacking husbands who could finance these expenses. These women recounted experiences of terrible poverty, including scarcity of food and unbearable living conditions; however the most difficult aspect of such impoverishment from their standpoint was their inability to support their children's education and to provide the funds for acceptably lavish marriage ceremonies. "What made me sad about my economic situation", as one woman related to me, was the fact "that I was not able to put out meat on the table during the marriage ceremony. Neighbours have gossiped behind our backs and we have felt inferior to the groom's family".

Another woman, Annig, who has two daughters attending a private high school, provides additional support from her meagre income to her mother and father who have monthly pensions worth approximately forty dollars each. She remarked that her financial responsibility to her daughters would end only after she had provided them with a good education, which might not even suffice to guarantee them a good job under the current conditions in Armenia, but nevertheless she believes this will assist them in marrying well-educated and/or rich husbands. From her perspective, the foremost skills that her daughters should be investing in learning are domestic skills such as cooking and cleaning, as their primary responsibility will be to serve as exemplary wives and mothers. Marriage will also transfer the financial liabilities of her daughters onto their husbands and extended families;

yet, for now, she is using her remittances for the purpose of preparing dowries, renovating her house and organizing ostentatious birthday parties for her children. Almost all of the women I interviewed claimed that the impetus for their migration was either to repay debts incurred in the course of dowry preparation or out of a desire to fund a respectable future marriage ceremony for their children. This does not imply by any means that the households from which these women originate have only non-essential needs such as the aforementioned, but these certainly constitute an important part of their motivation to migrate.

Annush, for example, explained with effusive pride how she had organized a two weeks long ceremony for her granddaughter's marriage: "I put my golden bracelet down as debt security and borrowed money from the bank. I bought 100 bottles of booze, meat, cheese and clothing for my daughter's bridal ceremony. That is why I came here initially, to earn enough to pay back the debts and get back my bracelet". These rituals are not only a push-factor, but are also a major reason why women choose not to return to Armenia.

Anush, after 10 years in Turkey, expressed her fervent desire to return home to Armenia, but added that she was compelled to stay until she was able to assist with the marriage preparations for her second granddaughter: "We are still missing some pieces in the dowry. Her father does not earn a lot. I need to stay here to save 10,000 dollars to buy a house for her. She first needs to finish her university with the money I sent to her. Without the diploma, she cannot find a good husband". Although several women in this study stated clearly that they had initially left home in order to fulfill basic economic needs, there emerged, in the course of their life abroad, other demands such as the orchestration of

marriage ceremonies. Most women expressed a desire to return home and to resume their role as ‘real mothers’ to their own children by participating more directly in their lives. Being away from family and kin presented itself as the most alien aspect of their migration experience.

Haytuna left her husband in Armenia to become a domestic worker. Her son was doing his military service, but before he was conscripted, he eloped with his fiancé to avoid the high costs associated with a formal marriage ritual. This is a very common occurrence in Armenia and is a great source of shame for families. Haytuna, feeling ashamed, travelled to Turkey to help her son’s family to subsist. She explains her role:

He brought a bride. What can I do? I told him to wait a little more so that we can pay back our debts and prepare a good marriage for him. No, he did not listen. He went to the army afterwards. His bride gave birth, but there is no money to support them. I’m a mother to all of them. I came here for my children so that they would not have to deal with gossip from people. I cannot stand this work anymore and I think about returning everyday. I’m old and my legs are in pain. I live like an alien, with alien people. I’m imprisoned to a house that is not mine, but I stay for my children. I’m trying to save money so that they can buy a house. This will help my son to feel better about his marriage and will cover up the shame we underwent as a family.

In listening to women’s stories, what emerges again and again is the difficulty and shame they face in engaging with domestic care work. They often emphasize the long working hours, and the pain of being away from their home country, which is unbearable for many. Yet, they also find pride in their work. They think of it as an extension of their own household work, but carried on by different means in that they are serving their family through financial remittances. A common pattern emerging from the interviews is the lack of male support within the family, or, in some cases, the need to compensate for male indulgences. Armine claimed that her husband had left her for another woman in Russia: “I do not care if he goes

and stays. But he never thinks what will happen to the children. Sometimes he comes and stays here and leaves again. He spends all of his money on the other woman in Russia”.

There are two important patterns that are revealed in these interviews: first, migrant women all characterize their migration as a service to their family and children. They used phrases like “Armenian women love to work, but there is not enough at home”, “Armenian women can overcome every difficulty for their families”, “Sacrificing is in the blood of mothers. That is what we have done for years”. They often explicitly link experiences of bad marriages or poverty with their migration, emphasizing that in all these areas they have overcome great obstacles for their children. Many of them were open about the domestic abuse and violence they had suffered in their marriages, but these were always endured for the sake of their children and family honor, because “family is everything for an Armenian” (Narine). Having suffered these hardships in their past life, they could also endure the experience of migration, which did not constitute a break from their traditional roles as patient, enduring and sacrificing mothers. These women all had prior work experience within the former Soviet Union, but participation in the workforce did not alter their preexisting ideas about gender. The wages earned by women workers had always been conceived as supplementary to what was earned by men in Armenia. Because of this past experience, breadwinning is not conceived of as a “non-traditional” role for women, but this work cannot be understood as freedom from patriarchy since it is little more than an extension of the suffering they have experienced within the household.

In addition to the difficulties they face with husbands and other men within their family, migrant women can also have conflictual relationships with their daughters. The story

of Meline, a 70 year-old migrant woman living in Turkey, is illustrative of this. She is compelled to remain in Turkey because her daughter, Anna, a mother of two, refuses to migrate, preferring to reside with her children in Armenia. Anna's husband left them several years ago after he travelled to Russia and no one has heard from him since. Meline insisted for an arrangement in which Anne would migrate to Turkey to provide financial support for herself and her children in Armenia, however Anne refused, compelling Meline to migrate herself. I was very affected by my encounter with Meline, with whom I spent a large amount of time and even joined in her search for work. She was repeatedly refused work within the domestic care sector due to her old age and hearing problems, as well as by the service industry in Kumkapi for the similar reasons. Her friends often considered her a burden because they were forced to support her financially while she was unable to work. Her situation also raised debates about the meaning of "true Armenian-ness" in the migrant community. Narine noted, "What happened to us? I mean to our values, I wonder. Are they all gone because we are in a difficult situation? Her daughter is young. She can work very easily but she is so selfish. She does not want to leave her children and her comforts in Armenia. She sent her old mother to Turkey. It is shameful. In our tradition, a mother is sacred. You do not push her around."

On the other hand, when I visited Anna and her family in Armenia, she was very upset when I broached some of these issues with her and actually turned the tables somewhat regarding what constitutes a true Armenian. Before I found her in the community, she approached me in panic while I was strolling around the neighborhood. When she heard from her neighbors that someone had arrived from Turkey, she thought that I was there to

announce the death of her mother. She greatly resented the fact that the Armenian women in Istanbul were not providing more support to her mother: “My mother was one of the first migrants to Turkey. She went there to do petty trading years ago. She bought things and brought them back to Armenia to sell them. We had money by then. All these women had borrowed money and received advice from my mother before they went to Turkey. Now, my mother is old and they refuse to help her there? On top of it, they blame me for not being a good daughter, for being “too modern” in my treatment of my mother. Supporting your neighbor is what brought us through such difficult times. They went there and they forgot these values”.

Irrespective of who is right and who is wrong in these debates, sacred motherhood and its association with traditional Armenian values is a frame of reference that is used to judge the behavior of women, while men’s non-traditional behavior is attributed to the desperate state of Armenia and the unrewarding job market, which many believe is corrosive to their manhood. Contrary to these frames, it is women in Armenia who have faced the most difficult adjustment during the economic transition. The Armenian state and society has overlooked the fact that many women are abandoned by their husbands, are in families in which men evade work (because it is too degrading or humiliating), or in which men are unable to work due to a disability. These women are subsumed within and rendered invisible by the prevailing model of the nuclear family, which is used to orchestrate economic and social policies. Men continue to be upheld as the primary wage earners in the domestic market, and, even where they emigrate, this is viewed as serving to the nation by other

means. For middle-aged women, entry into the domestic labour market is completely blocked. They have no skills that are marketable within the booming NGO industry.

The second pattern that emerges from these interviews bears upon the reasons for migration and the usage of remittances. Overwhelmingly, women migrate to meet family obligations. Almost all of the stories that were recounted to me involved dowry expenses and the marriage of children as the reason for migration. Of course, there are cases where health care needs, buying household gadgets, or repairing a damaged house were the driving force for migrant women. However, in many stories, it became apparent that women's migration and the finances generated in the course of it were used to support the hegemonic gender norms. This is especially the case in the education expenses of children and marriage expenses. Some women use their remittances to subsidize their daughters' education, but the purpose of this education is usually seen as building a resume that will enable them to find a better husband. Narine, the mother of two girls, says: "Definitely having a diploma helps them to get a better husband. The better educated a girl is, the more likely that her prospective husband will be a high status man". Second the expenses are also directed to hosting a marriage celebration that is of a sufficient quality by Armenian standards. Dowries are prepared, celebrations go on for days and the families organize large festivities. These are regarded as the traditional domain of a woman's identity. In investing in these areas, women preserve their identity as good mothers and authentic Armenians.

Motherhood as a Representational Strategy: Being the Deserving Women in Armenia

In many ways, migrant women in Armenia have culturally "unauthorized" identities. Young women's solo migration is stigmatized, while older women still have to assure the

community that their migration is not for self-seeking reasons, that they remain “moral women”, and that they persist in their loyalty to the family and nation. Migrant women invest in femininities that incorporate multiple subject positions: mothers, hard-working moral women and homemakers. In seeking to earn money for the care of their families they are also investing in their own feminine identity since endurance and patience are seen as defining characteristics of the exemplary Armenian women. These investments in self-representation also increase their “deservingness” within Armenia, shielding them from criticism, ostracism and exclusion from the larger community. Although Armenian women may reside in Turkey spatially, it is fair to say that Armenia remains the moral center of their universe.

Andijasevic (2009, 403) argues that rather than making hasty conclusions and labeling certain acts as manifestations of resistance or agency, it is important to understand why individuals identify with or resist certain subject positions, and hence how they construct their sense of self-identity through them. Feminist migration scholars have often conceived of the subjectivities of migrant women as inherently “unstable” and possibly manifesting themselves as “resistance” to the dominant patriarchal norms. They have explained this transformation in terms of factors such as increasing self-respect through financial liberation, participation within their host societies and the experience of being in a freer environment, etc. I do not contest the notion that subjectivities change and can occupy multiple, contradictory positions, yet, I would emphasize that the femininities that women themselves invest in are a means of ensuring that they are not perceived as transgressing while within their host societies. Migrant women, even in their most difficult straits, attempt to ensure

that their migration is seen not only as profitable but also more importantly as a selfless act by their families, friends and the community. As such, migrant women are not only shaped by their experience as unauthorized illegal migrants within their host state. An equally important mechanism of control and surveillance imposed upon women are the norms and values pertaining to femininity. Migrant women employ at least two important representational strategies to secure their exception from the norms and values other Armenian women are expected to abide by: the first is to ensure that they spend enough money in domains that are perceived to be a part of women's feminine work (*knatzi*) such as dowry preparations and celebrations, and the second is to ensure that their work is conceived as "clean" work, and that they are never confused with sex workers or victims of human trafficking.

As part of this representational strategy, migrant women attempt to ensure that their remittances are sent periodically and that they are spent on items such as dowries, household gadgets and celebrations. Remittances and gifts such as clothing, electronic devices and cosmetics that women send to their families and children at home are emblems of their success as migrants. Anna would occasionally send coffee machines and perfumes that she would receive from her employer to her family in Armenia, remarking that this gesture would stimulate conversation amongst the entire neighbourhood regarding her hard work in Turkey. She added: "That is what Armenians do. Family is everything. I can spend years here to make sure my children have happy marriages, good celebrations and a nice house". If women's remittances are not spent in certain areas, such as ceremonies, parties, or on household gadgets, the perception on the part of these women was that their neighbours'

estimation of them would suffer. One woman remarked how upset she had been when she overheard her neighbour in Armenia gossiping that her years in Turkey had been wasted in paying down her daughter-in-law's surgery: "Nothing was gained from her migration", she said.

If remittances fall below a certain level or are not spent in these targeted areas, women's migration is not only seen as wasted, but might also provoke questions regarding the loyalty of women toward their families or their commitment to core Armenian values. During my visit to the family home of one subject in Armenia, the elderly father and mother of this migrant woman observed that when occasionally she did not send enough money for her children, neighbors and family members would often gossip that she had exchanged her life in Armenia for that in Turkey, and that she was selfishly spending the money she had earned on herself, diverging from accepted 'Armenian' morals.

Some women also stated in no uncertain terms that they would refuse to return home without substantial savings or some other recognizable token of success, as others might look upon their failure not as a function of difficult working conditions, deception on the part of employers, and/or low pay, but as a reflection of their own personal immorality. One participant noted that although she could have saved the money earned, she chose instead to host a large birthday celebration for her daughter: "100 people came to the birthday party. They thought I earn thousands of dollars in Turkey. In reality, I borrowed from a friend to host the birthday party. I had to do that; otherwise, they would think that I failed in my duties as a migrant mother. They would question what I'm doing with all the money". In the context of women's migration, success is measured according to the extent to

which women contribute to the household economy, and failure is attributed to some sort of moral or ethical lapse. Annig, for example, avoids smoking in presence of elder Armenian women when they gather together in their off-days in a one-room apartment in Istanbul. She regards it as “very un-Armenian” (meaning contrary to family values) to smoke in front of one’s elders. She is also concerned that news of her smoking might reach her family and neighbors in Armenia: “If people learn that I smoke, they will think that I’m spending all my money on bad habits instead of sending money back home. It would not reflect well on me and my family”.

Overt exploitation and difficult working conditions in Turkey are often tolerated so that migrant women can be conceived of as “sacrificing” themselves. Narine has been working in Turkey for 12 years and her employment has been precarious to say the least. On many occasions she has been unable to receive payment from employers and in some cases has been compelled to sleep at train stations. Yet, she said to me that in spite of all these difficulties she never failed to send something to her family. Once she recalled that her employer had told her that she would be unable to pay for her for the month and Narine asked for a coffee machine in exchange for accepting a belated payment. Her employer was surprised and Narine informed her that she needed to send something so that people wouldn’t be suspicious of her work ethics and morality. She said: “Everybody here works for their families. We convinced them our migration is for the good of our family. How could we explain our failure to support them?” Every month she buys a dowry item for her unmarried children.

The second strategy that women employ is to ensure that their work is perceived as “moral”. Recently, there has been a lot of publicity surrounding the issue of sex trafficking in Armenia. The news made headlines that women who are seeking jobs as domestic care workers outside of the country are deceived and sold as sex workers in Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Qatar and some other Middle Eastern countries. There are also women who engage in sex work voluntarily. In one of my first interviews with Anush, I asked her whether she knows any women who work as sex workers. She leapt from her seat in an exaggerated fashion and expressed her horror with my question: “How could you think that I know somebody like that. They cannot get close to me. If you pay attention, you will see that there are no Armenian women who do immoral things like that. They are mostly from the Ukraine and other countries”. Migrant women in Istanbul are acutely aware of the association between foreign migrant work and sex work, especially in Turkey. They strive to distance themselves as much as possible from the category of “sex work”, which they believe is practiced exclusively by other ethnic groups. In Chapter 7, I will explore the attempt on the part of Armenian migrant women to differentiate themselves from sex workers as a strategy used in Turkey by migrant women to increase their legitimacy. Marking themselves off from the perceived immorality of sex workers helps migrant women in Turkey to mitigate the illegality of their statuses, while in Armenia, it helps them to assuage suspicions about their moral corruption. The separation between immoral sex work and the morality of domestic work enables Armenian women to legitimize their unauthorized legal statuses, while in Armenia it legitimizes their unauthorized identities.

The families of solo migrant women whom I interviewed often referred to the fact that their extended family members had objected to their status as migrants. They have to be convinced about the moral purity of the work migrant women do: “We explained to everybody that she is working with somebody we know. The work she does is not the best job in the world. Some people find it degrading here. They are cleaning other people’s houses and living as servants in exchange for money. But they do honorable work. They remain dutiful to their children and family.” Some migrant women return to Armenia with pictures of their employers to show family and neighbours their working conditions. They ask that visitors from Armenia relate to people back home the difficult work conditions, the hardship women endure, how much they miss their children and how much they sacrifice for them. As Narine notes, “when the information travels, we feel comfortable. I talk on Skype with my family. Sometimes I ask the employer to say hello to them. I know they are not suspicious of me, but I want to ensure that they know where I work and for whom I work. This helps them too to feel that I’m safe and they can tell people that they spoke with me on Skype.” As much as the Internet enables migrant women to remain connected with their children, it is also used in the conduct of their moral identity.

The communication of a moral image is a difficult thing for women from a distance. The image of motherhood can be more easily managed from a distance by sending remittances and spending them in the appropriate ways, but women often attempt convey their morality through more informal means such as via gossip, the Internet and through pictures that are shared within the community. They strive to ensure that “only good gossip” is received back home. The younger members of the family sometimes share secrets,

however they are never revealed in the neighborhood and/or openly in the family as a whole. Women avoid behaviors like smoking or dressing in modern or stylish clothing in their off days when they gather together. These are both material and verbal symbols that migrant women try to amass, so that they, their parents and their children will not be “ashamed” of them. Women invest in these femininities and create a self-identity through them. They emerge as subjects who constantly surveil their own behavior so as to remain deserving members of their natal political community.

Although upholding the image and identity of the moral Armenian woman is a priority for migrants, sometimes women engage in acts and behaviors that conflict with this identity and find themselves unable to remain as “moral women”. I will discuss in the final chapter the silencing that occurs as women attempt to increase their legitimacy in both the sending and receiving society. Women often hold back information about sexual abuse by employers, the dangerous situations they find themselves in, enduring exploitation and hard working conditions in their endeavor to remain deserving members according to the dominant frame. The micro-scale actors, their expectations, views of legitimacy and the norms surrounding femininities and masculinities are important in the overall construction of the migration regime. They exert more surveillance and controls and they have more direct influence in constructing the definitions of legitimate and illegitimate women. Migrant women try to fulfill them, to demonstrate that they eschew anything “un-Armenian”. However, the state is present in women’s “motherhood migration” in its multiple forms as women are construed primarily as mothers, cultural symbols and endowed with childbearing responsibilities that structurally exclude them from the domestic labour market.

Conclusion

The combination of the policies (discussed in Chapter 3) with the already existing cultural logics have created certain patterns of female migration from Armenia: (i) the majority of independent migrant women are widowed, separated or divorced; (ii) they are between the ages forty to seventy; (iii) they are mainly migrating to fulfill their cultural obligations to their extended families, which are important for their reputation both as ‘good mothers’ and ‘respectable Armenians’ and (iv) they are less eager to return without sufficient savings as evidence of their commitment to family and an honourable life within Turkey. In women’s transnational lives, these cultural logics continue to exert pressures on (i) how they and their families spend the remittances (i.e. more geared towards the status-enabling, cultural rituals, birthdays etc.) (ii) how in both home and host state contexts they attempt to represent themselves as unselfish, self-sacrificing and respectful to traditional feminine and Armenian values.

As opposed to other perspectives on migration which emphasize either economic conditions or security considerations, feminist authors adopt the criteria of progressive change with respect to gender equality and the disruption of power hierarchies as the basis from which to judge the benefits of migration. From this perspective, women’s self-representation and narratives about their migration and the centrality of motherhood reproduces these women as mothers and homemakers. Both in the pre-migration setting and in the years spent in their host society, they remain firmly rooted in their gender roles. Even when they spend their remittances on their children’s educations, many women expressed the view that a diploma is not only for the purposes of receiving of good education but also

for enhancing their social status and increasing their daughter's opportunity to 'land a rich husband'. More interestingly, some of these women have able-bodied sons and brothers who are unemployed in Armenia, or who are irresponsible or have alcohol problems. Yet, their non-conformity with the ideal masculine image of an Armenian man is attributed to external factors, while both the society and women themselves tend to attribute their failure to conform to intrinsic moral failings.

Chapter 5: Welfare Regime and Gender Relations in Turkey

One of the purposes of this thesis has been to explore the migration regime of countries as a gendered phenomenon. In the previous two chapters, I discussed how the gendered constructions of femininity and masculinity in Armenia, in addition to the “deservingness frames” endorsed by micro-level actors, are integral to the construction of a migration regime within that country. Contrary to the arguments of IR scholars who place the emphasis on the security dynamics of migration, I have attempted to shift the focus to the gendered problematic and what is at stake for both receiving and sending states in regulating migration. In this chapter, I will turn my attention to the receiving state, namely Turkey, and examine the relationship between gender and the migration regime, primarily at the macro level.

This chapter will examine the welfare regime of Turkey from a gendered perspective, while Chapter 6 will link up the migration regime of Turkey to the gender regime, which is promoted through the various welfare state policies. Some might question why I am examining the welfare system in Turkey as an important component of the gendered regime, while I focused previously on the nation-building efforts and other policy areas in Armenia. The reason is that while the notions of femininity and masculinity that affect migrant women’s lives in Armenia are primarily shaped through the discourse on nation and motherhood, in Turkey migrant women’s lives in general, and Armenian migrant’s women lives are in particular, are shaped through the “liberal migration policy regime” of Turkey. Accordingly, I will attempt to link the emergence of these liberal attitudes towards irregular migrant workers with the gendered welfare policies and also examine its effects on migrant

workers. Welfare policies, however, have not been alone in fostering these existing gender roles. Turkey is very similar to Armenia in terms of the crucial feminine roles that it has endowed women with in the nationalist rhetoric. There has been ample scholarship documenting the constitution of the secular Republic in Turkey and how women were construed as the moral symbols positioning the nation as a bridge between the West and the East. Women have been expected to be well-educated and strong just like their counterparts in the West, but sexually modest, sacrificial mothers and caregivers just as women in the East (Kandiyoti 1997; Arat 1997; Gole 1996; Kandiyoti 2003; Sancar 2014; White 2003).

However, the relevant question for us is how the construed gender roles in Turkey are an integral part of the migration regime, and, to answer this question, my focus will be on the gendered welfare system within the country, which has profoundly shaped gender roles within the nation and created a demand for migrant domestic care workers internationally.

The purpose of this chapter is threefold: first, my aim is to discuss the role of the gendered welfare regime in constraining citizen women's participation in the labour force in Turkey. Very much like in Armenia, in Turkey too, women are primarily regarded as dependents, unpaid domestic laborers and/or part of the informal, flexible workforce. Accordingly, the primary device used to enforce the subordinate status of women has been the labour market policies and the domestic welfare regime. The second purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the welfare regime within Turkey, with special attention paid to the period of the last 15 years, wherein the religious and conservative political party, the AKP, has reorganized welfare policies along more rigid gender and class lines. Both the underemployment of citizen women in the labour market and the reorganization of the

welfare regime are closely connected with the liberal migration regime vis-à-vis irregular migrant workers. The first connection concerns the fact that the formal participation of lower-class Turkish women in the workforce is discouraged through the charitable social assistance programs built into the welfare regime. This area of domestic politics is directly related with the international migration of women, because the care work which could be carried out by citizen women has been duly restricted. The second implication of this is that middle-class families are encouraged to purchase care services – child care and elderly care – from the market in line with the overall neoliberal agenda of commodification and marketization (See Chapter 2). Rather than taking on the responsibility of providing child and elderly care and obliging the corporate world to share in the burden of reproduction, the Turkish state has turned welfare into a commodity that can be bought and sold on the market. Since lower-class citizen women are discouraged from participation in the workforce, migrant women have become the main suppliers of privatized care for lower-middle class households. Therefore, the effect of the welfare regime is double-fold: first, it cuts off the supply of native domestic care workers within the workforce and second it shifts the responsibility for elderly and child care onto families and markets.

One school of thought emphasizes the ways in which state social policies regulate gender relations and contribute to the social reproduction of gender inequality through a variety of mechanisms (Orloff 1993, 1996; Sainsbury 1996; Pascall 2000; Naldini 2004). Analysts considered the emergence of welfare states as a passage from private (personal) to public patriarchy. Sylvia Walby (1990) in theorizing patriarchy advances the view that society has evolved from private to public patriarchy over the course of the last 100 years in Europe.

In the case of private patriarchy, women are not allowed to participate in the labour force and are confined to the private sphere. In the case of public patriarchy, the capitalist extension of markets has resulted in the incorporation of women into the workforce, even though they continue to be disadvantaged and afforded little protection in the public sphere. Thus there might be a change in the form but not in the substance of gender relations. Ann Shola Orloff argues that the key mechanisms for the maintenance of gender hierarchy in welfare regimes include:

(1) gendered divisions of labor, with women responsible for caregiving and domestic labor as well as for producing babies; (2) the family wage system, in which men's relatively superior wages (and tax advantages) are justified partly in terms of their responsibility for the support of dependent wives and children, and women are excluded from the paid labor force (or from favored positions within it) and therefore are economically dependent on men; (3) traditional marriage (which implies the gender division of labor) and a concomitant double standard of sexual morality (Orloff 1996, 6).

I will try to demonstrate that all these mechanisms are operating together and that have implications for the development of certain migration regime in Turkey towards care work. In Chapter 6, I will argue that migration policy has also become a “welfare tool”, reflecting the gendered character of welfare regimes and demonstrating the willingness of states to the transfer the costs associated with the reproductive economy onto the shoulders of both unpaid and paid “women”, citizen and migrant alike. Both citizen women and migrant women continue to share these costs, because women's participation in paid employment in greater numbers within the host states is not achieved by undercutting the patriarchal structures. This is especially true for Turkey, in which the large inflow of female migrants has not resulted in any significant increase in citizen women's labour participation rate. The enormous “reproductive cost” to states, for which they want to claim non-

responsibility, has provided the primary impetus for the rise of the a gendered migration regime, which is less concerned with the “exclusion” of migrant women or with transforming migration into a “security discourse”, even where migrants flout the authority of the state by their “illegal” presence. On the contrary, migrant women, whether legal or illegal, are perceived as exploitable assets used to perpetuate the gendered structures of inequality upon which the masculine authority of the state ultimately rests. Migrant women are welcome so long as they remain as useful bodies (e.g. as hardworking and moral women) and are defined as non-intrusive to the gender hierarchies within the household and state. In this sense, the institutional nexus between the welfare and migration regime is essential to developing a nuanced view of the social relations of power that intersect with migrant women’s lives.

Here, the aim of my analysis is not to develop a typology in order to establish a causal link between the development of a particular type of welfare regime and a corresponding migration regime. Such a project has already been undertaken by other scholars extensively (Williams 2005; Koffman 2006; Hooren 2008). It is rather to demonstrate that what is at stake in the regulation of migration is not simply abstract ideas about state/societal security or the protection of the sanctity of citizenship. For many years within Turkey, the migration regime has been understood as a part of the country’s nation-building efforts. Turkey has been a decidedly closed country as concerns any kind of legal immigration and the usual rationale for this policy stance is its relation with the “ethnocentric” definitions of citizenship, national identity and political belonging that were adopted in the establishment of the state in the early 1920s (Kirisci 2000; Icduygu, Toktas

and Soner, 2008; cf. Parla 2007). However, in focusing upon the relationship between migration regulation and the existing gendered hierarchies, I am also inviting a critical reevaluation of the dominant assumptions concerning the homogeneity of the nation. A focus on the regular and irregular migration of women to Turkey and approaches of the state to this problem may serve as an important site from which to destabilize the ethnic homogeneity claims and demonstrate the gendered aspect of citizenship. The welfare regime may provide the best example in this respect since it is through this mechanism that the state intervenes in the gender hierarchies within its political community and through which the international migration of women is governed as well. The next chapter, which will explore the liberal attitude of Turkey towards migrant women should be read in the light of these reflections.

The relationship between welfare regime, citizen women and migrant women

The concept of the welfare regime was first defined comprehensively by Esping-Anderson in her *Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* (1990) and has since been used by feminists to assess women's subordination within the labour market, household and in the public domain. The model as it was initially articulated was largely free of "gender" concerns and this oversight was, in some sense, a product of the male breadwinner model that dominated state-market-family relations in Europe during the 1970s (Orloff 1993, 314). The welfare model at that time was used to evaluate the extent to which different states afforded protection for working class men from market fluctuations through pensions, social security, family support, health care and so on. Women were incorporated within the original model to a certain extent as Esping-Anderson and his followers did focus attention on the question

of whether states actively encouraged women's participation in the labour force by offering sufficient child-care support. However, it is the feminist reinterpretation of welfare regime analysis that today's migration scholars have engaged with more seriously.

The feminist scholarship on migration has connected the “welfare regimes” of various countries to the international migration of women in interesting ways (Williams 2005; Kofman 2006; Lutz 2010). Among other things, feminist scholars have established a firm link between the political situation of citizen women domestically and that of migrant workers by situating both of them in the broader context of gender transformations that have conditioned their encounter as an employer and a household employee (Daly and Lewis, 2000). Many have adopted the comparative typology developed by Esping-Anderson which divides countries into liberal, conservative-corporatist and social democratic as defined by the relationship between the state and the market in providing welfare, the effect of the welfare system on social stratification and the character of social rights (Esping-Anderson 1990). The three dimensions of the welfare state are highly influential in constituting gender relations because social provisioning profoundly affects the sexual division of labour, access to paid work and marriage and family relations.

Relying on these analyses, for example, Helma Lutz (Lutz 2010) has analyzed the relationship between the corporatist-welfare regime of Germany and the migration regime. She points out that Germany has historically relied upon the institution of family to provide care. Lately, however, as a result of emerging care needs, it has begun allowing cash transfers to families that encourage them to purchase services from “live-in” care workers (Lutz 2010, 420-21). The role of the state is negligible in the provision of care. Lutz argues that this shift

from family to market in Germany has not been accompanied by a regulated inflow of migrant women into secure, well-protected jobs. On the contrary, migration regulation has remained highly restrictive in Germany, leading to the emergence of a low-skill, low-paid, racialized illegal workforce. Lutz further argues that Germany has been complicit in this emerging system, which, through cash transfers to families, encourages a market-based solution to a widespread social problem. Here, the characteristics of the corporatist-welfare regime lead to a system in which the role of government can be present, but the distribution of benefits and social services is layered – i.e. it depends on the occupational status, the premium contributions and labour market participation. Lutz also brings forth the importance of “familism” – that is how states expect these services to be met by the family (Lutz 2010, 425-26). According to Lutz, the breakdown of the “male breadwinner” model and the increasing prevalence of adult workers in Germany has provided the chief impetus for the emergence of an incipient care gap. The increasing participation of women in the workforce and the breakdown of familism has relied crucially on the contribution of migrant workers, though it is rarely, if ever, acknowledged .

Margarita Leon (2010), on the other hand, has examined the relationship between migration regulation and the welfare regime in Spain, which exemplifies Southern Welfare regimes more generally. The Southern Welfare regime is very similar to the corporatist-welfare regime, in that the role of family is central in the provisioning of care, but it is an unfinanced and unsupported familism. The various welfare institutions in the country have never supported families through cash transfers or tax reductions for the purchase of care services (Leon 2010, 412-13). As a result, the reliance on informal family support still

remains a key dimension of the welfare regime in Spain, although a 2006 law on care provision started offering cash to families who have dependents and marked a shift from familial care to commoditized care arrangements. This encouraged an inflow of migrant women to the country, however, unlike Germany, Spain is one of the few European countries which recognizes the need for foreign care workers and which has instituted a public care worker program with explicit laws and protective clauses (Leon, 411).

These analyses have been useful in terms of demonstrating the shift from family-based to commoditized care arrangements, in which migrant women play a central role. Furthermore, these analyses have also provided valuable insight into the plight of migrant workers. Germany, for example, tolerates illegality and low-wages for migrant women, while Spain takes more responsibilities to publicly regulate their movements. Both authors emphasize the fact that domestic care workers have become the new subordinated and exploited transnational migrant workforce, due mainly to the economic restructuring of welfare regimes. However, they fail to examine in greater detail the domestic context in which migrant women are situated. The assumption underlying almost all studies on the welfare-migration regime nexus is that women have been liberated from the household and care work for which they are held chiefly responsible under the familialist regime and that the burden of reproductive labour is carried on by low-paid, illegal, non-citizen women.

Accordingly, the neo-liberal globalization of reproduction involves “outsourcing” the gender inequalities traditionally embedded in the Western nation-states to an international platform. This framework of analysis involves an assumed ‘win-loss’ scenario wherein the emancipation of Western women is purchased by depriving Third world women of the same

rights and privileges. In this framework, citizen women in the West are conceived of as privileged, white, and economically independent buyers, while third world women are invariably depicted as underprivileged migrants in their host community. The northern states are in this way thought to be involved in a new form of imperialism in which the economic savings from both productive and reproductive labour are made by exploiting the care resources of the developing countries.

This thinking is evidenced in the work of prominent migration scholars, such as Rachel Salazar Parrenas, Bridget Anderson and Nicola Yeates, leading them to conceptualize citizen women in the home country and the migrant women who replace them as caregivers within the household as “the protected” and “unprotected” respectively. For example, Bridget Anderson in her classic work, *Doing the Dirty Work*, explores the connections between the institution of slavery in the US and current conditions of domestic work, arguing that middle class women’s increasing presence within the public sphere in the West is achieved through the exploitation of the immigrant other, upon whom the management of “dirt, care and death” is imposed (Anderson 2000). Ultimately, Anderson is led to question the common bonds of womanhood that supposedly unite these two disparate groups. What Bridget Anderson is trying to get across is summarized succinctly by Lind Bosniak with the phrase the “expropriation of citizenship”, which she describes as follows:

As a structural matter, the pursuance by women in the developed world of “economic citizenship” or “equal citizenship” by way of paid work in the public sphere is often and increasingly, facilitated by the domestic employment of other women, many of whom are from third world countries and many of whom are themselves in a condition of non-citizenship as a matter of status (Bosniak 2007, 40).

Undoubtedly, the reorganization of reproductive labour has been a major factor contributing to the transfer of migrant women, but the reason for this cannot be attributed to the “emancipation of women” from gender inequalities, especially in Turkey, which differs from other advanced countries in terms of women’s very low labour participation and the continuing status of citizen women as primarily mothers and reproducers. In her discussion of the “transnational division of reproductive labour”, Parrenas points out that the rise in the demand for domestic care workers arises not from the concentration of women in well-paying and professional jobs, but also from persisting inequalities of gender within the household and within the state in the receiving countries (Parrenas 2000, 569). The transnational division of labour is not only shaped by transferring gender inequalities within the receiving states to migrant women and the sending states, but also by the persisting gender inequalities in both sending and receiving states. In the case of Turkey, I shall argue that the migration regime sustains the subordination of migrant women while failing to meet the needs of citizen women at the same time.

This chapter broadens the scope of the welfare-migration regime analyses by offering a more nuanced understanding of the role of the state in configuring the participation of women in the family and the wider society. Indeed, states can rely on migrant care workers not only to assume their economic responsibilities, but also to reproduce the subordination of citizen women within the domestic sphere. This is particularly the case in Turkey, where women’s labour participation remains relatively low and in which both the state and the dominant culture still regards women as fixtures within the family and mainly as mothers and care givers. The shift to commoditized care arrangements in Turkey signifies the country’s

intention to transform a public good into a private one by relying on the cheap and precarious labour of migrant women, but it is not an indication of its commitment to transform citizen women from domestic caregivers into full-time citizens. In other words, Turkey reproduces the gender differences and roles in its domestic politics by accommodating itself toward migrant care workers.

Turkey differs from other European countries in terms of the pattern of women's workforce participation and the reasons why participation remains low overall. The Turkish welfare regime could be characterized as a hybrid of the corporatist-welfare and Southern Welfare regime as they have been defined in the literature (Dedeoglu and Elveren 2012, 11-13). It is a southern-Welfare regime, because historically, welfare policy has been based on familism without the financial resources to back it up (Bugra 2012, 21-22). Accordingly, women within the household are expected to provide care for an extended family and not to participate in the workforce. However, these families do not receive any sort of tax reduction or cash payments for the work performed. The Turkish state has abstained from providing any support in the form of public care or encouraging women's participation in the workforce. Until more recently, it had also neglected to provide any welfare benefits in the form of unemployment insurance, poverty support or disability funds (Toksoz 2012, 52-55). Accordingly, women are seen as a sort of pressure relief valve and are expected to compensate for the lack of social assistance provided by the state.

At the same time, it can also be classified as a corporatist welfare regime access in that certain benefits such as health care, employment insurance, union participation and pensions has been predicated upon the occupational status of male breadwinners (Toksoz

2012, 54). For example, state employees and industrial workers are governed by different social security programs. Part-time and full time workers are also covered by different social security arrangements. This type of occupational stratification requires that premium payments are paid to the government, which, in return according to the ratio of premiums, grants workers health care and old-age pension benefits.. Together these characteristics combine to produce gender differentiation in access to citizenship rights and public life and reinforce the subordinate status of women as “incomplete citizens”. While the state relies on women’s unpaid care work and services for reproduction, the access to major rights and benefits are conditioned upon workforce participation. As Kathleen Jones argues, “citizenship is defined as a practice of embodied subjects whose gendered identity affects fundamentally their membership and participation to public life” (1990, 786).

Although the Turkish welfare regime can be partly understood according to this framework derived from the European context, it also differs in terms of women’s place in the labour market. In many countries in Europe, women’s workforce participation has increased as a result of activism and the changing economic landscape. Women in many Western countries have sought to enter the workforce to gain access to the welfare benefits that have only been granted to male workers traditionally. Women as mothers and unpaid domestic workers only receive certain of these benefits through their marital status. However, in Turkey, women continue to remain outside the workforce, which results in their exclusion from many social and economic rights including pensions, health care and a living wage. In the following section, I will elaborate upon the gendered character of Turkey’s welfare regime, emphasizing the division of labour between the state, family and market in

the distribution of welfare benefit as well as the stratification of the welfare regime along gendered lines and the commodification effect. I will emphasize the role of the state in reproducing women as unpaid domestic care workers, mothers and subordinate citizens. The gendered division of labour, which assigns to men the role of breadwinners and women the role of mothers and unpaid care givers has been enforced through the various organs of this welfare regime.

This brief survey of the welfare system in Turkey will set the stage for discussing the increasing care needs of Turkey in the following section of this chapter. Although the low-skill female workers who are the usual staple of the care service sector are in abundance in Turkey, the state actively encourages women to assume the role of mothers and advises women to combine part-time work with their motherhood duties. The next section of this chapter examines the role of state and the patriarchal structure of the family as a means of understanding why Turkish women do not assume “live-in care jobs” in greater numbers. I emphasize the importance of private patriarchy, the state’s refusal to recognize household work as “work” and the welfare policies which disadvantage part-time workers such as those within the household. The third part examines the increasing demand for care purposes by relying on the interviews with employers conducted in 2012. This reveals the extent and scope of increasing care needs in Turkey.

It is also important to understand that Turkey’s liberal policy towards migrant women functions as a means of constraining citizen women’s citizenship rights and relegating them to the role of motherhood and as unpaid domestic helpers. Hence, the concern of states in regulating the influx of migrant workers is neither purely security-related,

nor is it a response to labour shortages. The gendered regime within Turkey as elsewhere is buttressed by the low-paid service of migrant women.

A brief history of women's subordination in the household and labour market in Turkey

A striking fact about women's participation in the workforce is that it has remained almost unchanged since the early 1920s. In the Ottoman period, women's participation in the industrial workforce was not uncommon, but Greek, Armenian and Jewish women rather than Muslim women made up the significant portions of employees. In the years 1937, 1943, and 1947, the ratio of women in the registered economy was on average 20 percent (Makal 2012, 41-3). These figures were mainly drawn from two large cities, Istanbul and Izmir, and women seemed to coalesce in the traditionally "feminine" sectors of production such as textiles, food and the tobacco industry. In the 1950s and 1960s, women's participation in the workforce dropped sharply. This decline, which continued in subsequent years, was associated with women's lower participation in the unpaid agricultural labour force (Makal 2012, 81). In 1965, women's participation rate in unpaid agricultural work was 91 percent, while it was only 30 percent in the 2000s. This clearly suggests a negative correlation between urbanization and women's participation in the workforce. The period of the 1960s corresponds with the years in which internal migration from the rural areas to the urban centers accelerated, and those women who moved into the urban areas failed, in many cases, to secure employment (Ilkcaracan 2012, 202). Both public and private patriarchy has been influential in the low participation rates of women in the workforce.

With the onset of the 1950s and continuing into the 1960s, Turkey's rural population began to decrease. Alongside the increasing mechanization of farming, there was a steady inflow of people from the rural into the urban areas. This did not signal the end of what had heretofore been an agricultural-rural economy since state subsidies continued to support the agricultural base until the early 1980s. Many rural inhabitants still have not abandoned their property within the villages permanently but because of the lack of sufficient agricultural income from the land, they have supported themselves increasingly by working in other sectors (Bugra and Keyder 2006). Often, rural migrants lived in *gecekodu* or shanty houses, which were basic one story dwellings built by the migrants themselves in the city in which they lived, while they preserved their homes and affiliation with the village from which they came. The two houses pooled together their resources, such that in times of decreasing agricultural productivity and income, the blue collar work men do in the cities became an alternative source of revenue used to support the village household. The strategies employed by rural families supported the “development” program undertaken by Turkey in the 1960s and 1970s by providing a cheap and accessible labour force, while leaving women with more of the responsibilities of care within the household (Kandiyoti 1996, 65-68). The Turkish state was content with this dual economy developed by rural migrants and indirectly supported their strategy by tolerating the construction of more of these “illegal” *gecekodu* houses in the urban areas. However, urban poverty increased dramatically in these years as well, along with an increasing need for elderly care, which was provisioned informally by women within large extended families (Bugra 2012, 54).

It is also important to stress the role of the state in consolidating women's secondary role within the labour force and their primary role as caregivers during this period. As aforementioned, Turkey's care regime is a mixture of the Southern and corporatist welfare regimes, both of which assign to the family the primary responsibilities of caregiving. The lack of social benefits such as the unemployment insurance, universal healthcare and retirement benefits necessitates a high degree of solidarity amongst family members (Bugra 2012). Due to its corporatist structure, Turkey's social security system has been based on a layered system, in which the benefits are distributed from a financial pool formed by the premium payments of the working population. Only participants in the formal economy and their dependent family members benefit from the social security system. According to Ayse Bugra (2012, 20), the ratio of premium payers to the number of people who benefit from a dependent status is 1:4 and these numbers are compatible with the low participation rate of women into the workforce (around 20 percent on average). Participants in the informal market, which according to some estimates accounts of 30-40 percent of the overall labour force and which includes high proportions of women, are entirely excluded from the social security system. Aside from this general social security policy, which encompasses both healthcare and retirement benefits, there is very little that the Turkish state had undertaken in the name of public welfare until the 1980s in terms of either supporting the poor, redistributing income or investing in care services. In 1976, the state proposed a limited welfare policy targeting poor and disabled people, provided that they do not have a family responsible for their care (Bugra 2012, 23). According to Bugra, this signaled, above all, the intention of the state to formalize the prevailing familist care regime.

During the years of industrialization and urbanization, women's unpaid care services and domestic work had cushioned the development policies from systemic failure. The social damage wrought by the rapid economic transition from a predominantly rural economy to an industrialized one was extremely traumatic. Problems associated with poverty, long working hours, as well as the widespread informality and extremely low income of many families have been managed by women in their efficient use of scarce economic resources, their provisioning of care services for the elderly and children at home, and emotional support for working men within the household.

Although it is women who assumed the primary responsibility for managing the household economy and care services during this transitional period, the 1960s and 1970s also witnessed the increasing participation of women within the workforce as a means of coping with extreme poverty (Tokgoz 2012, 56). During these years, the macroeconomic strategy in Turkey was based on import-substitution industrialization. The ready availability of men within the workforce meant that there was relatively little demand for women workers. Tokgoz argues that the state pursued a policy predicated upon the family-wage and actively discouraged women from entering into the labour force (Tokgoz 2012, 57). Nevertheless, informal employment in areas such as home-based piecemeal work within the textile industry or housekeeping became a staple of many rural women who saw these opportunities as appealing given their situation of extreme poverty. However, it appears that women considered this work not as a financial contribution to the family economy so much as an extension of their domestic duties (White 2004, 8). So too did the Turkish state, which consistently failed to register any of these activities so that women could be included in the

formal economy and benefit from the social security system. Rather, the dependent status of women was perpetuated as they continued to rely upon men for access to social security and other welfare benefits, which were ultimately dependent on marital status. During the 1980s, with the onset of neo-liberalization policies, Turkey was incorporated into the world economy, resulting in the restructuring of industries towards export production and the accommodation of a greater number of women workers than had been the case previously. However, this work, which has primarily been located within MNCs, and has consisted of mostly low paying and “feminized jobs” characterized by informality, flexibility and insecurity. The reason for women’s increasing participation in these jobs is their willingness to accept the precarious working conditions offered by the MNCs. Nevertheless, women’s workforce participation rate has not radically changed because FDI has never reached sufficient levels in Turkey such as to absorb the large number of non-working women (Tokgoz 2012, 57).

Increasing female participation in the workforce was never a priority for state planners until 1999 when Turkey was accepted as a negotiating partner in the EU accession process. Even then, the focus of policy papers was upon the problem of “combatting poverty” rather than the inclusion of women in the workforce (Toksoz 2012, 61). Accordingly, policies aimed to create a larger number of flexible jobs for women in addition to increasing state support for female entrepreneurs so that extreme poverty could be somewhat ameliorated. Clearly, these measures were not targeted to increase women’s employment in secure and long-term jobs, but served merely to legitimize the informal and precarious status of female employment. There has been no effort whatsoever to create more

full-time jobs for women with social security rights, or to ensure that they have equal access to such jobs. The current ruling party in Turkey, which is firmly committed to neo-liberal doctrine, has sought to increase women's participation by reducing taxes for businesses who employ women between the ages of 19-20 and who are entering into the workforce for the first time (Dedeoglu, 2012, 35). The reliance on market-based incentives rather than public policy leaves the decision of whether or not to hire women within the hands of employers. Saniye Dedeoglu regards this stated policy commitment as insincere, given that the government has done nothing to increase childcare facilities or otherwise address the care burden that women are expected to shoulder (Dedeoglu 2012, 42). Women's motivation to enter the workforce rests not only upon the quality of the jobs available to them but also upon the cultural expectation that married women should remain at home.

In 2003 as part of the EU accession process, the Turkish government introduced a new clause to the existing *Is Hukuku* (labour law) which stipulated that the equality of men and women in employment practices should be respected. According to Dedeoglu, however, this measure was insufficient to address the problem of female underemployment since the government failed to make any investment in necessary childcare services. In large part, this has been due to the patriarchal assumptions that have been deeply embedded in this labour law, which still conceives of women as primarily housewives and hence fails to address the problem of how working men and women can arrange jointly for childcare (Dedeoglu 2012, 50). Until 2008, there were provisions under the existing labour law which required workplaces with more than 150 women employees to provide childcare services and breastfeeding areas. However, many companies have relied on sub-contractors in small

production facilities with only 30 employees or less in order to circumvent these requirements. In order to ease the burden of dual work, women are granted 16 weeks of maternity leave under the law, further reinforcing their role as housewives.

In 2005, the ministry of family has presented a draft bill, requesting paternal leave rights to be given to male employees, however the bill was quickly repealed as a result of pressure from employers who claimed that, while paternal leave is a legitimate right for European men, Turkish men will be inclined to abuse that right (Dedeoglu 2012, 140). Irrespective of whether this is true or not, the employers' intention was not to address the unequal domestic division of labour at home, but to ensure that their access to an inexpensive pool of male labour was not jeopardized. This further solidified the role of women as the primary caregivers in the society and attested to the greater significance vested in male employment.

Another inequality inbuilt within the law is the provision that women are permitted to leave work within a year of marriage retaining their entitlement to receive severance payment, while the same right is not afforded to men. The assumption is that marriage represents a state change for women, wherein they undergo a shift from the role of labourer to that of wife and so are not penalized for their socially mandated choice to leave the workforce. In addition to this, some social security arrangements are conditioned upon women remaining outside the labour market, such as the orphan's pension, which is granted to women until they are married or formally employed. These two legal applications demonstrate that women are not only ideologically assigned to housewifery and motherhood,

but also that the legal framework itself is predicated upon the image of women as dependent citizens.

The welfare system is crucial in terms of its impact upon gender roles within the household, the gendered division of labour and women's participation in the workforce. As an example, Ann Shola Orloff, who has mounted a rather thoroughgoing critique of traditional welfare analysis, notes that without examining the role that the state plays in shaping the gender dynamics in the household and vice-versa, the welfare character of a state cannot be judged positively or negatively (Orloff 1993). She argues that "a complete analyses of the state's effects on gender relations should not rest with 'social rights' as they are defined by mainstream researchers. Rather analyses of social rights should include an examination of social programs dealing with legal personhood and bodily integrity" (Orloff 1993, 312). Orloff stresses the fact that the division of productive and reproductive work in the household and the control over women's sexuality influences the ways "in which women struggle for and claim benefits from the state" (Orloff 1993, 313). Women and men face gender-specific threats to their bodily integrity and have different levels of control over their bodies. In sum, she argues, relations of domination based on women's bodies in the family, the workplace and public spaces undermine women's abilities to participate as "independent individuals" – citizens – in the polity, which in turn affects their capacity to demand and utilize social rights. Often the state's welfare policies either exacerbate or remedy women's subordination within the family. Sometimes, the refusal of the state to intervene within the "private realm" is also a political action biased towards the interests of the masculine hegemony.

Public patriarchy in Turkey is closely intertwined with private patriarchy. The welfare regime relies on the family, and, more specifically, on women's uncompensated care and household work to compensate for the lack of public social provisions. The state also remains unresponsive to the pervasive informality and precariousness of women's work and abstains from any effort to encourage women's active participation and access to citizenship rights. In Turkey, private patriarchy also affects women's participation in the workforce. Deniz Kandiyoti's work on rural households, for example, points out that a man's high status in the community depends on his ability to provide economic resources as well as to safeguard the moral standing of women within the family (Kandiyoti 1996, 34). In this sense, two developments might threaten the power of the patriarch within the household. The first one concerns women's inappropriate sexual behavior outside the home. The panic surrounding women's involvement in the workforce is related with anxieties about how men and women can exist as coworkers in the same physical space. Kandiyoti argues that women's sexuality is strictly associated with the honour of the family and the patriarch. Obviously, women's presence in the public sphere entails more risk and anxiety for families and can therefore lead to resistance on the grounds that it compromises women morally (Kandiyoti 1996, 34).

Secondly, Kandiyoti argues that men do not want to relinquish their primary role as breadwinners. Women's participation in the workforce might imply a decline in men's status, as this means that men cannot "fulfill" their duty to provide for the household economically (Kandiyoti 1996, 35). Jenny White, in her work on the gecekondu areas of Istanbul, concludes that women's income, which is earned through piecemeal work within the

household, is often regarded as an extension of their household work (White, 2004). This means that paid labour, which is what these women are actually engaged in, is seen as simply part of their daily routine as housewives. Their market-labour and non-market labour is easily conflated, preserving women's status as financially dependent on men. Often the income of women is managed by the patriarch of the household and the decision as to whether a woman should work is a collective decision undertaken by the family as a whole, and one in which the husbands' approval is a necessary precondition. According to research conducted by Ahmet Demirel *et. al.* (1999) among unemployed women in Istanbul during the 1990s, seventy five percent of women stated that they needed their husband's approval to work. In the event that these women were unable to convince their husbands to allow them to work, they were unequivocal that they would concede to his will.

In this sense, private patriarchy plays a crucial role in terms of the maintenance of low female labour participation. It is well documented that women's workforce participation declines rapidly after marriage and particularly after the birth of a child. According to a nation-wide 2009 data-analysis undertaken by Ipek Ilkcaracan on the household workforce, this negative relationship between marriage/children and women's workforce participation is borne out (Ilkcaracan 2010, 35). Accordingly, the likelihood of an unmarried woman with a high school education participating in the workforce is three times higher than that of a married woman under the same circumstances. Likewise, the likelihood of a married women with a high school education and children participating in the workforce is half that of a married women absent children. In Turkey, the majority of women are high-school graduates, and this data suggests that their formal employment occupies only a small sliver of

their life prior marriage and the appearance of children, after which they settle into a life of housewifery and are henceforth defined as “dependent” citizens according to the Turkish welfare system.

Domestic Care Services in Turkey

Domestic care services in Turkey are intertwined with the existing welfare policies, private patriarchy and the state’s policies regarding the protection of care workers, which together limit women’s workforce participation or constrain women’s access to formal, secure and stable jobs in the domestic care market. Clearly, the domestic care needs of households are growing in Turkey, however the existing welfare policies continue to construe women as dependents and, through social policy, provide incentives to low-income women not to work in the formal market. Although the Turkish labour market has a large pool of potential domestic care workers to draw upon, Turkey has demonstrated more commitment toward institutionalizing a foreign migrant workforce in this industry. As previously argued, Turkey has always relied upon a minimalist welfare state based upon gender and class segmentation and migrant care workers have been useful in this regard since they have enabled the state to avoid public provisioning of such services. In its reliance upon migrant care workers, Turkey has also been able to claim non-responsibility for reforming the welfare regime, private patriarchy or regulations pertaining to the domestic care market. Therefore, I shall argue that the liberal policies adopted vis-à-vis migrant women have not only served the economic interests of the country, but have also enabled Turkey to reproduce the subordination and dependent status of citizen women within the polity.

Private Patriarchy: The domestic care industry in Turkey began expanding in the 1960s and 1970s at the same time that rural women started working as daily workers in urban households throughout the country. Turkish women were and still are working as daily domestic cleaners rather than as live-in care workers (Akalin 2007, 215). Historically, the supply of daily cleaners has been very limited despite the large potential labour pool. Studies into this topic have revealed that the limited supply of such women has been related directly to the heavy responsibilities of attending to the needs of an extended family in the household in addition to the pressures exerted by private patriarchy in this realm (Ozyegin 2001). Structurally speaking, the trend toward greater urbanization has been difficult for both men and women. To compensate for the low wages and informal working conditions faced by men, women have been forced to conduct more care work within the home. The Turkish state has also predicated its development program upon the assumption that women will assume the responsibility for more of this unpaid care work. Policies such as access to health care and wage rates are designed with a view of family unit in which only men work. More importantly, however, the realities of private patriarchy within the household have also restricted the supply of care workers. Studies such as that undertaken by Gul Ozyegin(2001) have illustrated the effects of private patriarchy specifically on the supply of the household workers.

In what is widely regarded as the definitive research in this area, Gul Ozyegin (2001) in *Untidy Gender: Domestic Services in Turkey* argues that during the 1960s, the number of rural migrants employed as domestic workers by upper-middle class families in Istanbul and Ankara increased somewhat, though not to extent one would anticipate. As part of the

feminized sector, domestic work is usually regarded as unskilled and women who arrived in rapidly industrializing cities like Ankara and Istanbul from rural areas with low education levels presented themselves as the most fitting candidates to work in this industry.

Nevertheless, the participation of these women in the household workforce remained very limited. According to Ozyegin, the control of men over women's sexuality in the household (a characteristic associated with private patriarchy) has been decisive in restricting the number of women within the labour market. These women were primarily the wives of janitors who worked in the "modern" apartment buildings of these growing cities and who were responsible from the daily management and upkeep of these buildings. According to Gul Ozyegin, those women who were more active in terms of taking on domestic employment were operating within a context that was not very different from the model of private patriarchy. The key to understanding the disproportionate share of janitor's wives who were involved in this work is the reality that both husband and wife were employed together in the same space, allowing the men to continue to surveil the women in their work and behavior within the workplace. Surveilling the sexuality of women was hence enabled through this spatial arrangement.

Potentially, paid household work in the Turkish context is far more dangerous for the husband's status because of the "private" character of this work. The working environment is not a public one, and can often result in the presence of a male employer and a female employee alone together within the same space. This implies a threat to the masculine identity of the husband, which is closely associated with safeguarding the moral reputation of women within the family and limiting their exposure to other men from the

outside. However, being able to surveil their wives within the same apartment complex has cushioned janitors from the loss of their patriarchal power, enabling them to maintain their masculine identity. Gul Ozyegin points out in her work that rural women participated in this work under the auspices of their husbands who functioned as employment agents for their wives, exerting control over their periodic interactions with employers. From the standpoint of a private patriarchy, this is certainly preferable to women circulating around in an impersonal labour market in which it would be very difficult to monitor or exert direct control over women's actions. In this new patriarchal arrangement, the employers of women are also acquaintances of the husbands. According to Ozyegin, in some cases women might not receive a payment separately for their labour but rather the sum would simply be added to the husbands' wage.

In this sense, it can be claimed that private patriarchy is an essential dynamic within the paid domestic care sector in Turkey, distinguishing it from that within other industrializing countries. Studies from multiple contexts have pointed out that rural women in major industrializing countries migrate to urban centers as independent workers where their purpose is often to work as paid domestic care workers (Lynch 2007; Mills 1999; Kim 1997). In Turkey, rural women in this industry have been overwhelmingly drawn from the households of janitors. Their purpose has not been to secure work in the urban centers but to become housewives instead. The need to increase the family income has been the main driving force that has pushed these women into the workforce. The experience of these working women appears to be a special case that, in many ways, validates the assumptions of

private patriarchy as husbands are able to continue to surveil their wives and hence are more accommodating to their aspirations to work.

Ozyegin argues that patriarchal dynamics in the household have also been determinative in the formation of important features related to the care market. It is commonly known that local domestic workers are not live-in care workers, but only do daily household work. This daily household work, which is sustained by rural women, is characterized by limited supply and high wages, both of which characteristics are shaped by the forces of private patriarchy. Men's strong association with earning power and their control over women's labour and bodies have held the supply of women workers at persistently low rates. Many of these women workers are employed as daily cleaners and cooks for upper-middle class households. For married women, employment as a live-in care worker is almost inconceivable since the patriarchal dynamic has constrained women's mobility and their control over their own labour. Ozyegin's work has also demonstrated that the limited supply of women has served to raise the price of domestic labour, making these services unavailable for the vast majority of the middle-class.

Ozyegin's study covers the 1970s and there have not been any more recent studies into the changing dynamics of the household and private patriarchy. Today, it is estimated by the ILO that there are around one million domestic workers in Turkey and they still embody some of the characteristics identified by Ozyegin. They are still employed mainly as daily workers, and those who subsist as live-in care workers are few in number. The majority of them are informal care workers and hence they are unaccounted for within the social security regime. Below I will examine some of the more contemporary developments within this

sector and explore the reasons why native domestic care workers have been mainly concentrated within the informal labour force. I identify two main reasons for this phenomenon: first, the state does not recognize domestic work as “real work” and therefore does not allow household workers to benefit from full social security coverage and they are forced to rely on the limited coverage they receive as part-time workers. Second, the Turkish welfare regime instituted under the AKP government also discourages women from working part-time because in order to be eligible for many of the social benefits available, women must be outside the labour market. The combination of these two factors has prevented women from obtaining secure and well-recognized jobs within the domestic care sector.

Public Patriarchy and The Legal Regulation of Domestic Care Work: The Turkish domestic care market is highly feminized and characterized by precarious and clandestine working conditions. Domestic care service in Turkey is not covered under “labour law”, but the “law of obligations”, which means that domestic work is not a category of “work” and the labour of women is not regarded as genuine “labour” (Erdogdu and Toksoz 2013, 17-18). Rather, domestic work is treated as a “service contract” which comes with detailed mutual obligations and liabilities for both parties. However, the law of obligations is quite ambiguous. It does not specify the working hours, the specific expectations, the conditions of termination of contract, etc. Under the law of obligations, there are also no codes regarding workplace safety regulations or inspection of the workplace. In recent years, workplace safety issues have been a major focus both in the media and in relevant institutional bodies such as non-governmental organizations and the ministry of labour. Because of the lack of safety regulations, 51 women fell to their death in 2011 while cleaning

windows in a high-flat apartment, engendering some public awareness about the persistent problems in this sector (Erdogdu and Toksoz, 17). Some of these cases were investigated subsequently, implying an acceptance of responsibility on the part of Ministry of Labour to involve questions of “worker’s rights” even though domestic care work is not covered under the existing labour law. Because such work remains outside of the legal framework, no administrative fines or criminal proceedings can result from these investigations.

The patriarchal character of the state is manifest in its attitude towards domestic care work. Household work is not regarded as “real work” by the relevant authorities, requiring occupational skills such as patience, physical and emotional strength and technical knowledge. Rather, these skills are seen as “natural qualities” of women and their paid work is seen simply as an extension of their domestic responsibilities. Accordingly, such paid domestic work is household work by another name. In an interview I conducted with the Social Security director in Ankara, he characterized the official view of domestic work in his following terms: “What do they do anyhow? Cleaning, ironing, and other household chores. This is the best job a woman can expect. They do not have to work hard because these are things they already know how to do”. When they are understood in such terms as innate feminine skills, there remains no reason to treat domestic labour as labour. Of course, the rights and benefits associated with being a labourer are also negated in the process of defining women’s nature.

Foremost among such rights is the right of domestic workers to coverage under the social security system in Turkey. For domestic workers, acquiring social security is rendered difficult because of the provisions of the Social Security Law (Erdogdu and Toksoz, 18).

According to this law, only domestic workers who work on a full-time basis are eligible for security coverage. Orloff notes that, an important gendered characteristic of the welfare state concerns the manner in which it treats part-time workers because today many women prefer to enter into part-time jobs in order to balance their domestic responsibilities and working life (1995, 305). The state “reinforces the gender division of labour”, Orloff argues, in that part-time workers receive fewer social benefits vis-à-vis full time workers (Orloff 1993, 314). In Turkey, the majority of women work only on a part-time basis, because of the patriarchal norms underlying women’s workforce participation. This means that the law does not cover any of these women. According to Oguz Karadeniz (2012), this gap was addressed somewhat with the introduction of a new law in 2012, paving the way for the integration of non-continual workers to the Social Security system. However, this implies costs both for both the employer and employee, because the premium required for full coverage of thirty days work has to be funded by extra payments made by the workers themselves. For the employer, the lengthy and overly bureaucratic structure of the system makes it necessary to delegate this work to private firms, and, instead of doing so, such matters are often resolved between employee and employer by agreeing upon smaller cash payments to the worker as opposed to registering them under the system. As a result, as of 2012, there were only 5000 women obtaining these benefits of the approximately 250.000 workers employed in this sector (Dedeoglu and Toksoz 2012, 37).

The issue of non-continual work has become heavily contested since the AKP government took the initiative to “regulate” domestic care work, promising to offer better protection to domestic workers. According to the official view, the difficulties that domestic

workers face are a function of their “informality”. The solution, therefore, lies in regularizing the informal market. Under this initiative, however, no attention is given to the actual reasons why women prefer to remain “informal” within this sector. The AKP government did not acknowledge the fact that the majority of women working in this sector do so intermittently; that private patriarchy imposes limits on women’s labour; and that welfare regime of Turkey fails to adequately provide security for part-time workers, a category which accounts for the vast majority of low-skilled women workers. Rather, the new regulation clarified the definition of continuous and non-continuous work, determining the threshold for continuous work as no less than 10 days completed in a month with the same employer. However, many women do not work with the same employer for an extended duration since it is common knowledge in the industry that the majority of households only require domestic service once per week. For those who work less than 10 days, little has changed under the new law, excepting the introduction of a coupon system, which is also used in Germany and which facilitates the bureaucratic hurdles for “registering a worker” to the Social Security Institution. Under this arrangement, the employer is responsible only to pay for the premium for occupational injury, but again not for health insurance or pension benefits. In this sense, the regulation promises to “fix” the problems from the employer’s viewpoint by offering a less complex bureaucracy.

Domestic care work also remains predominantly informal because of certain features of the welfare regime itself. Many women who are domestic workers elect not to register for social security coverage and prefer to remain informal. As aforementioned, the welfare system in Turkey is instituted to benefit women who do not have social security coverage

and who do not earn more than 2/3 of the minimum wage. This encourages women to remain a part of the black economy in order to continue to receive charitable benefits from the state. The second incentive for women in this sector to remain “unregistered” is the expensive premium payments required from workers. Women who do not work are covered under their husbands’ public health insurance plan. As soon as they begin working, however, they are required to make separate payments for health coverage according to their income level. This does not constitute a problem for women who work full time, because the employer bears the cost of the coverage in this event. However, women who are employed as non-continual workers are not only unable to access their husbands’ health benefits but are also obliged to make extra payments to acquire benefits for themselves. According to the IMECE, almost 85 percent of domestic workers in the sector are non-continuous (Tahaoglu 2014, bianet.org). In this sense, informality is an income strategy for women in a welfare system that does not support “part-time” domestic work. Despite the fact that part-time work is almost ubiquitous in this sector, the regulations pertaining to it offer very little protection for women. In this sense, the state ignores the specific needs and incentives of women workers and encourages them to remain informal.

In combatting this informality, the new regulation fails to address the gendered nature of the problems that domestic workers face. Ten days threshold for eligibility to gain full coverage under social security means that many women must necessarily remain outside the scope of this plan. This law does not address the problem in question and serves to incentivize irregularity rather than preventing it. The recent law also still fails to classify domestic workers as workers. Inclusion within the labour law might increase workers’

leverage vis-à-vis their employers and grant them certain rights like unionization. It would also oblige employers to adopt safety precautions within the workplace. For this reason, two main active homeworkers organizations, IMECE women's union (Kolelik Yasasina Hayir – No To Slavery Legislation- www.petron-is.org.tr) and EVID-SEN (EVID-SEN Home Workers solidarity Union, www.evid-sen.org), regard the inclusion of homeworkers under the labour law as essential. Their efforts are directed towards pressuring Turkey to sign the ILO convention on domestic workers (2011), which includes provisions of collective bargaining and safety regulations. However, even if their rights are recognized under the labour law, the expectations from this regularization remain dubious for many women. The chances of increasing the safety regulations at home remain grim, as household privacy is protected under Criminal law, making it very difficult to inspect these homes in the same manner as a regular workplace. It would be mistaken to invest too much importance in the regularization of domestic work unless the underlying incentives to remain informal and the constraints upon women's work – i.e. from both public and private patriarchy – are addressed.

Public Patriarchy and The Welfare Regime and the Social Charity for Poor women:

One further consideration regarding women's low formal participation rates in the domestic care market is the approach to social welfare advanced under the AKP government. The current government's reforms have been interpreted from multiple frameworks. While some have regarded the AKP as a liberal revolutionary party, which has overturned the tyranny of the previous republican reforms opposed by the masses, others have regarded it as just another step in the process of consolidating political Islam within the

country. From the perspective of the welfare regime, the AKP government has sought to further reinforce the patriarchal family structure and women's roles as primary caregivers and mothers. It would be mistaken, however, to interpret the government's stance as a significant departure from the previous republican position vis-à-vis the role of women. During his tenure as head of the AKP government, Recep Tayyip Erdogan repeatedly called upon Turkish families to bear more children (three being the ideal number by his reckoning) and invoked the idea that women's primary duties should be childrearing and housewifery. Even by 2014, the government declared that they are working on a project to pay cash transfers to families with three children, of which the primary recipients will likely be middle and upper class families ("3 Çocuk Yapana Yardım Geliyor – Social Assistance for families with three children").

During the AKP years, the class and gender segregation in existing welfare policies has deepened. It would be fair to characterize the emerging framework as essentially a "two-tier" system in which charitable social assistance programs serve poor families and social security coverage with health care and pension benefits cover the working population. Stark inequalities exist between these different programs. Under the social assistance programs, the primary target is housewives, who receive cash payments to care for the elderly and infirm within the family (Sahin 2012, 149). Also families that fall below certain income level receive cash payments for their children's education. This policy is significant since it is the first time that the care needs of a specific group have been recognized in the country and that women have received some remuneration for their substantial "care work". However, the policy is also a demonstration of the strong inclination on the part of the government not to

incentivize public care arrangements and to maintain the existing familialist care regime. Second, it should be noted that this policy was developed in the context of supporting “needy” populations and the ostensible purpose has been to provide a safety net for households who earn less than 2/3 of the minimum wage, rendering it basically a support program which assumes that women’s main role is to take on the care responsibilities for the family (Bugra 2012, 28-31).

The conditions attaching to the aid recipient are illustrative of the kind of care regime that Turkey wants to establish. In most European countries, money for the care of children, elderly and the disabled is paid by the state irrespective of the economic status of that group. In other words, it is considered as a right, rather than charity that is only available for poorer populations. In Turkey, under the AKP government, there has been a move from unsupported to “supported familialism”. In her analysis of the Spanish care regime, Margarita Leon (2010) argues that some level of familialism has been present in many countries in Europe, while they differ from each other in terms of the extent to which governments support families through tax reductions, cash payments and subsidized insurance policies. Historically in Turkey, familialism was not supported financially by the state. The strong traditional family structure and the informal provisioning of care primarily by women prevented care needs from becoming a pressing issue. The economic crises of 1997 and 2001, however, revealed that poor families were unable to carry the care burden anymore. The AKP government’s solution was to rely increasingly on Islamist understandings of charity combined with the “clientelist” social help mechanisms (Bugra and Candas 2011; Bugra 2012). Therefore, the question of care in Turkey has mostly been

focused upon the needs of poor households, centered around the notion that women should remain as housewives and benefit from cash transfers in return for their household work.

While the welfare regime encourages women from poor households to remain outside of the workforce and to rely upon the meager financial cash transfers provided by the state, middle class (and lower-middle class) families are encouraged to find market-based solutions to their care needs. Middle-class professional families, in which both men and women are participants in the labour force, are covered under social security provisions. However, the state has failed to support public care services since care is still regarded as the province of the family. The liberal visa policies toward and social acceptance of migrant care workers should be considered at the intersection of this gender division of labour and the economic stratification of welfare policies of Turkey. In the following chapter, I will engage in more detail with how migration policy is used as a welfare tool. Suffice it to say that for many years, Turkey has depended on a steady supply of migrant women to fill the care gap that has emerged in the country and the liberal toleration of irregular migrants has recently evolved into a public initiative to legalize the migrant workforce. The next chapter will reveal how migration policy is connected with efforts to institutionalize a market-based care mechanism dominated by an under-protected, deskilled and exploitable pool of migrant workers.

Before proceeding further with this discussion, however, I will briefly reflect upon my interviews in order to shed light upon the main characteristics of employers. There are currently no large surveys undertaken with employers, which makes it difficult to determine which families employ migrant care workers and for what reasons. However, relying on my

small sample, I will briefly comment on the emerging care needs of middle-class families.

The data solicited through these interviews demonstrates that the lack of public care services for the elderly and children are the primary reasons behind employing migrant workers. In the interviews, it quickly becomes clear that middle class families are not the only consumers, but also the lower-middle classes are increasingly employing such workers. The interviews also demonstrate that commoditized care services do not necessarily alter the gendered division of labour within the household because not all women who employ migrant workers are themselves within the workforce.

The Demand for Cheap, Flexible and Disposable Workers

It is difficult to make generalizations about who the employers of migrant women are because of the pervasive informality in this sector. For this reason, I will present data from my own interviews with employers but with this caveat in mind. The data presented here is original and demonstrates the importance of conducting more widespread surveys and in-depth interviews with employers. I grouped my respondents into three categories based upon income – upper class, middle class and lower-middle class. Broadly speaking, the latter two groups play an important role in the rising demand for care workers, while the former is less important in this respect. Domestic care workers are employed for a variety of reasons. Studies have shown that upper class families often employ domestic workers as a token of status in order to garner respectability, to display power and accumulate social capital. However, in recent years, middle class and even lower-middle class families have begun employing domestic workers themselves, shifting the symbolic terrain that this practice represents. The interviews I conducted serve to demonstrate the diversification of

the economic background of employers and also of the income pooling strategies used to hire domestic care workers. This section sheds light on the changing composition of employers and the increasing need for cheap, flexible and disposable migrant workers in the labour market generally. Migration flows are organically linked to labour market conditions. This analysis demonstrates that the accessibility of migrant women to lower-middle class families is crucial to the expansion of the demand in the Turkish care market. Turkey's solution to expansion of its care needs has been to rely increasingly upon "migrant care workers" rather than providing a more institutionalized and public solution to the problem.

The upper class families:

Among the employers interviewed, only three were representative of the upper class segment of society. The upper class family can be defined as part of the "global elite", sharing similar inclinations with respect to consumption, lifestyle and cultural capital. They live in villa type households in upscale neighborhoods in Istanbul. In all of these three families, men were the chief breadwinners, while women were engaged either in their husband's businesses in some form or as social philanthropists. While one of the interviewees is a famous dietician in Turkey, the other two are working within international finance and trade. Their persona conforms largely to the masculine image depicted by many feminist authors who sometimes characterize them as the winners of globalization – embodying the "rational, consumption-oriented, and hyper-masculine" businessmen. In these families, men often do not become involved in the process of choosing the household worker. This job is left to the women, because it is often the assumption that women will be

responsible from instructing, disciplining and surveilling these domestic workers to ensure that they satisfy the job expectations. The women whom I interviewed explained this division of labour as natural: Men are very busy with “earning money” and men cannot select out the “useful type” as a domestic worker. Economic achievement often does not translate into a more equitable family life, but instead imparts the resources necessary to “solve” issues relating to social reproduction without having a constructive debate (or maybe a conflict).

In all of these three households, women did not work. In addition, they were either absent any children or those children lived outside of the home. The expectations from domestic workers revolve around cleaning, cooking and serving. In two of these employers’ houses, several domestic helpers worked collaboratively performing a different task such as cooking, cleaning or serving. I would characterize the upper class households that I encountered as embodying a centuries-old tradition of wealth and opulence in which employing domestic helpers has been a normative and well enshrined practice. All of these three families began employing workers in the 1990s, and hired dozens of employees over this period. A woman with whom I interviewed saw domestic helpers as indispensable because of the large household in which her family resides and because of the demands inherent in their business and social life. Interviewees often emphasized the time constraints in their lives, which did not leave enough time for them to do the necessary household work. Yet, one of the women I interviewed was also very candid about her family’s gains in terms of social status: “It just feels good not to get up to serve myself when I’m eating and relaxing. It is just a lifestyle to be able to call on somebody else to serve you”. In this case, it seems

clear that considerations surrounding social status have been an important factor for upper class families in their hiring of domestic workers.

This group of employers is largely unaffected by the welfare policies adopted by the government in two different senses. First, the practice of employing a domestic helper often has less to do with securing help for their children or elderly relatives, although in one of the households, the elderly father of the male employer lives with the family, for whom a separate migrant domestic worker was hired. In the other households I encountered, a Turkish private nurse was employed for health-related care services. Where there was a child present, migrant workers were often not entrusted with the responsibility of their care. The employer in this case informed me that there were different foreign and Turkish “nannies” that came to the house to give private courses to the child. Sometimes domestic workers were responsible from watching over the children, but this did not amount to full-time care work. Families in this economic stratum are not generally concerned with purchasing care services as much as they are with social status. Even if public care were widely available, upper class families likely would not be affected in their hiring decisions. This is why I believe it makes sense to view the hiring practices of upper class families in a different light rather than as related with the rising care needs of families more broadly.

Secondly, the women employers did not hold a position in the productive economy. Although all three of them were university graduates, they defined their primary occupation as “helping the family business”. These women belonged to the privileged segment of society in Turkey who can willingly choose not to participate in the workforce. Therefore they are

different from many middle class women, for whom hiring a domestic worker is often tied to the decision to work outside of the home. Often middle class women's involvement in the labour market is the most important factor that generates demand for migrant domestic workers. However, upper class women are unaffected by this dual responsibility. Here, what is on display is self-aggrandizement, a concern with status and a need to savour the pleasures of the idle rich by employing migrant domestic workers.

Despite their elevated economic status, upper class families are still concerned with the cost of domestic care services. Affordability of migrant domestic care workers allows these families to employ several workers at the same time. They consider the cost of this service as a major expenditure in their household budget. Although the houses are bigger and there is more household work to do, migrant women do not receive considerably higher wages. Only in one household, did the worker employed seem to receive a supplement to their wage. As one of the women explained to me, "We cannot pay them all more than 1000 TL in wages. Currently, there are four migrant workers. This is a significant cost to us. It is good that migrant workers are available at this cost". The availability of migrant workers as live-in caregivers was also seen as desirable by these families. Instead of hiring a daily Turkish housecleaner at a much higher cost, they preferred to hire a live-in domestic worker who would be available continuously. As one employer indicated, "We cannot substitute the migrant worker for the Turkish employee. Migrant workers can adapt to the flexibility that our house needs. They do not have families here and they can stay and dedicate themselves to work both day and night".

The professional families:

Professional families constitute the largest share of employers hiring migrant domestic workers in Turkey. In such families, both men and women are employed in either middle or high-income jobs. These jobs often require them to be available during extended hours and women in these households often characterize their situation as one in which they are stuck between the high cost of child care in private institutions on the one hand and their inability to give up their professional careers on the other. Six out of the ten women I interviewed indicated that their working life was indispensable to them and they were compelled to find a way to balance their career with their family responsibilities, while the other four had left their jobs until their children were of school age. For the first group of women, the need to hire a live-in care worker was a result of their extended working hours. One woman indicated that she was forced to work overtime almost every day of the week, arriving home only late in the evenings with no energy left to look after the children. While a daily domestic worker has to leave at a certain time after the parents return home, the live-in care worker can remain within the house to care for children anytime when she is called upon. Therefore, live-in care workers not only take the burden of childcare 24/7, but also manage the household work. From the standpoint of prospective employers, this is the appeal of hiring live-in domestic workers.

Hiring a domestic worker was not the first recourse for some women. They first invited their mothers to live with them, utilizing what feminists refer to as gendered social networks and the unequal generational division of labour. However, this turned out not to be feasible for most families for a variety of reasons, including the tensions that arise out of

living together with mothers or in-laws. One respondent also cited the objections of her father as among the reasons why her mother ceased to live with them as a wage-free care worker: “ My father did not like the fact that my mother is not there to cook food for him and he said the house is turning into a garbage dump. Because of the tensions arising between them, she could not stay here for any longer”. This case is also indicative of the larger tensions arising out of rapid urbanization. In Turkey, extended families used to reside (and to a certain extent still do) within the same city, however the rapid development of some cities in financial and industrial centres has created a strong attractive force that has drawn many skilled and career-seeking professionals. For women in the workforce, the former arrangement brought about easy access to family support for the purposes of childrearing. Of course, it bears pointing out that this support was always based upon unequal exchange between generations and within extended families – given that it has often been the maternal rather than paternal grandmother that has undertaken this obligation. Undoubtedly, the presence of this householding principle, to borrow Polanyi’s terminology, has prevented (and still does to some extent) the collapse of economic institutions that have never paid sufficient attention to the needs of social reproduction, and has played a further role in delaying the commoditization of care services in Turkey(Polanyi, 1944). However, many professionals now prefer to live in “global cities” in order to benefit from the greater prospects for career advancement (Sassen 2002) and a cosmopolitan lifestyle and the geographical proximity that once enabled social solidarity networks to be forged among generations is no longer possible. All ten families I interviewed had parents residing in other cities, rendering the institutions of family support for childcare unworkable.

It could be claimed that it is primarily the childcare needs of this group of women who are in the workforce that is generating the demand for foreign domestic workers. During my research, I also encountered women who had quit their jobs, but still relied upon a domestic worker to reduce their workload within the household (though these are undoubtedly a minority). Urbanization clearly has put pressure on the preexisting family network, and, although it has not led to a complete breakdown, it has made the “gender burden” of the older generation more visible inasmuch as domestic labour remained invisible within the extended families when people were living in close proximity to one another. This is certainly perceived by the older generation. In my interview with a grandmother who arrived in Istanbul to assist her daughter’s family, she explained the “visibility” of her labour compared to past work: “I looked after my elder daughter’s children as well. However, they were living in Karaman. She left the children when she was going to work and picked them up after work. That meant just a small amount of extra work for me, watching the children, feeding them, etc. without having to trade off my other household responsibilities. I was able to cook when they were sleeping, clean when they were playing. Multitasking was possible. Now, I’m apart from my own house. My husband complains now that I’m not there to take care of his needs”. The tensions arising from this changing family dynamic are exacerbated by the demands of the neoliberal occupational regime. It becomes absolutely necessary for professional families to look for market-based solutions for their care needs.

This group of women shares some similarities with the upper class women I profiled. Both groups find employing migrant domestic care workers attractive for financial reasons, but more importantly for their availability 24 hours of the day. The cost efficiency of

domestic care workers comes from their dual role as both managers of the household work and as a caregiver. Both in upper class and professional families, the gendered division of labour in the household tends to assume a very traditional form. However, there are also significant differences. Many middle class professional women are subjected to the pressures of working within the neoliberal occupational regime, which often implies flexible hours and an irregular working schedule. All ten women interviewed were working for branches of international or national companies or prominent financial institutions in Turkey where it is an established norm that many employees should stay overtime into the evenings regularly. Given that these workplaces do not provide any childcare services according to the liberal labour law in Turkey and given that the government facilities for childcare are insufficient, the neoliberal norm of flexible working hours requires professional women to make a choice between hiring a domestic worker and quitting their jobs. All ten women I interviewed were unequivocal that in the event that affordable childcare services were provided either by the government or by private institutions, they would prefer this to hiring a migrant domestic worker. They identified the main reason for hiring a migrant worker as one of “need” rather than of comfort. The extra benefits that come with hiring a domestic worker such as the liberation from household work seemed of marginal concern to these professional employees. As one respondent indicated, “I wish there were child care services. We have twin babies. To send them to a private childcare institution is 4000 Lira, which is 3/5 of my pay cheque. When you hire a domestic worker, it is only 800 Lira for both babies in addition to the extra services such as cleaning, cooking, etc. The most important help I receive from domestic workers are with children though. Other things can get done in one way or

another. Before the babies were born, my mother used to come to help with the household work. Now it is too difficult for my mother to take care of both the children and the household work”.

For this group of women, the institution of paid domestic work seems to be the mechanism that facilitates their participation in the workforce and a new government policy regarding childcare would have direct impact on them. In broad terms, professional families are the sites in which the effects of the neoliberalization of work and the lack of sufficient welfare policies provided by the government or other social actors are most visible. The neoliberalization of work is experienced in these families in terms of the unpredictability of the working schedule, highlighting a clear need for childcare, which could be resolved through either a more equal division of labour within the household, by outsourcing this labour to other women within their social network (i.e. grandmothers, aunts, sisters, etc.) or to a paid domestic care worker. In a hypothetical scenario in which none of these options were available, women indicated that their husbands might assume some of the responsibility for childcare in the short-term, but could not be relied upon in the long-term. In the event that no foreign domestic workers were available, women with one child indicated that they might consider turning to private institutions, while other women with two children deemed that option unaffordable, and were reconciled to the idea of quitting their jobs. Some women also indicated that they might think about working out an arrangement with a native live-in care worker given that she should be willing to stay overtime as well. Some women also entertained the possibility of sending their children away to live with close relatives, but this seemed like a last resort option for most.

The Lower-Middle Class Families:

Lower-middle class families often employ migrant domestic care workers for elderly care, and it is certainly no coincidence that among all families I interviewed who employ migrant care workers, the only group who did so for this purpose were families from the lower-middle class. Yet, the reverse is not true since there are also middle and upper class families whose purpose in hiring domestic workers is to meet the nursing, cleaning and care needs of the elderly. While Turkey has a large aging population and this is poised to increase in the near future, its preparedness for the impact this will have on the social and economic structure of the country is in question. The continuing reliance on family care combined with the lack of interest on the part of government to transform elderly care into an area of public concern create pressures on the younger generation to find an appropriate means to carry on their responsibilities. I interviewed 7 women from the lower-middle class, some of whom employed a migrant worker for their parents who lived either in a separate or common flat. Women living with their mothers were bachelors, while the mothers of married women lived in a separate household. There was also one case in which an elderly couple together hired a worker to receive some help with their surgical recovery. Elderly care in Turkey is often required for aged and/or infirm individuals who are in need of constant care.

In Turkey, the family is considered the central institution for providing care to the elderly. And, while this cultural practice is publicly venerated and proudly supported by the government, the material basis for its continuation is waning. This work has historically been delegated to the daughters rather than the sons of the elderly, however, with the increasing participation of women in the workforce as well as their own gendered responsibilities within

the nuclear family, cracks have begun appearing in the cultural institution of family care. Four of the women I interviewed had arranged a live-in care worker for their parents. These were married women and their parent(s) lived in a separate flat. They had their own nuclear families, held jobs and relied on a mediocre family income. Two other women were retired teachers who were bachelors and who lived with their elderly mothers. Both of these elderly women were coping with chronic diseases, such as Alzheimer's and dementia. The interesting feature of elderly care in Turkey is that even those families with a mediocre income feel pressured to purchase this service on the market. This is symbolic, in many ways, of the shifting norms surrounding domestic care, which has changed from being a form of luxury consumption to an absolute necessity for many. This shift is understandable as the dual product of cultural norms that abhor "institutional care" as a manifestation of failure in upholding familial values and the institutional norms that underemphasize the essential need for elderly care on the part of the public.

A high income is no longer necessary to hire a domestic worker, and many of the families I encountered subsisted on mediocre earnings. Resource sharing among siblings actually makes the price of domestic care easily affordable. This phenomenon is an understudied area in domestic care services, but it constitutes a very important dimension of the market as it is now constituted. It allows the spread of domestic care services to even low-income families and signals the possible increase for demand of such services among a broader segment of the population in the future. All of the women in this group indicated that market-based solutions were ideal for them. In the presence of public institutions that offered the same service, they were clear that they would still prefer home-care. The reason

for this is the strong emotional pressure concerning “family care”, which must be satisfied within the home. Live-in care workers are preferred because elderly care requires constant attention.

In this sense, family networks serve to complement, rather than being antithetical to, market-based solutions. The continuation of the informal care market, mostly composed of circular migrants entering and re-entering the country, depends on the presence of family members that can be used as substitutes. In fact, the comparatively low-cost of domestic care workers, augmented by the unpaid labour of family members, are the main supports underlying the neoliberal economy which relies on “flexible working hours” for increased productivity without taking into account the costs associated with social reproduction. Many different facets of patriarchy are manifest within Turkey’s family care arrangements: first, the male figure within the family is often the least affected by these arrangements. Men are not expected to quit their job and are rarely exercised about childcare needs. Second, the masculine underpinnings of neoliberal capitalism, whose emphasis is placed upon the productive economy and increased efficiency at the expense of the reproductive economy and whose perceived “efficiencies” are mostly an accounting trick stemming from its ability to evade any of the costs associated with this dimension of social life, reproduces itself in the care arrangements of Turkish families. The devaluation of labour applies equally to migrant workers and unpaid women within the existing family network. Third, the Turkish government has not encountered significant pressure to satisfy the care needs of families through welfare arrangements, and, therefore, is able to continue the devaluation of women’s labour by treating informal migrant workers as low-skilled, praising Turkish women for their

self-sacrifice, and ducking any arrangements that would distribute the cost of social reproduction away from women and towards other institutions and social actors including the government itself.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I addressed the subject of public and private patriarchy in Turkey, in addition to tracing the effects of the welfare and care regime of the country on women. Both public and private patriarchies have played a formative role in the construction of the dominant working conditions within the domestic care industry. Turkey has a large pool of household workers but institutions that can transform them into a well-protected workforce with social security coverage and a steady income do not exist. These women are discouraged from working within the formal market both by gendered expectations within the household as well as by a welfare regime that is organized around an understanding of women as dependents. Women in low-income families are discouraged from work formally because social assistance programs are designed to the benefit of housewives. They are also discouraged by the legal regulations concerning domestic work and the failure to recognize this as real work. The fact that women who begin working in a part-time capacity are unable to benefit from their husbands' social security coverage and the fact that household work is typically only part-time for many women clearly stymies women's participation in the workforce (leastwise within this sector). Substantial numbers of women who would otherwise be employed as workers within the domestic care sector are thereby transformed into housewives and essentially wards of the state.

Turkey currently lacks any public care program that could address the pressing need for child and elderly care on the part of much of the population. The AKP government has pursued a bifurcated care regime, which combines a market-based care model for women from the middle and upper classes with cash payments to women from the lower classes for child, and elderly care, provided that their family income is below the minimum wage and they are not part of the official workforce. It is from this latter group that many domestic workers are drawn and are channeled towards informal work in order not to lose their rights pertaining to social assistance. Therefore, lower-class women continue to be considered mainly as mothers and dependents, and, in most cases, their husbands regard their salary as merely an economic supplement. In addition, women continue to be positioned at the center of honour-driven conservatism, which has reached its peak under the AKP government. In this sense, working outside the home, especially as live-in-care workers, is regarded as an implicit threat to the honour of the patriarch and the family more generally. The cultural threshold restricts women from participation within the daily-workforce, while their reproductive responsibilities at home take center stage in defining their self-identity. On the other hand, professional women from the middle and upper classes have increasingly entered into the workforce but in the absence of public care facilities, they outsource care work onto other women, either on a daily basis or a semi-permanent monthly basis. This characteristic of the domestic care market in Turkey marks it off as different from other European countries wherein women's workforce participation is the chief impetus behind the increasing share of commodified care. The increasing need for care services and the absence

of native workers are together generating a demand for migrant women in this industry. The next chapter will explore Turkey's migration regime in the light of this development.

Migration scholars have argued that women in migrant-receiving countries outsource their care responsibilities to migrant women, but my research suggests that this is not always the case. Migrant women can only help to finesse some of the gendered tensions experienced by employers. So long as Turkey is institutionally involved in the promotion of informal care arrangements – such as familial care and informal working conditions – in the domestic market, it is also implicated in the growth of informality among migrants. The vulnerability and exploitation native women are subject to dictates the treatment meted out to migrant women also. The entry of foreign workers into the Turkish labour market does not imply the end of family based support. The coming chapter will examine the “Liberal visa policy of Turkey” that has been applied for some time now. This liberal policy has been instrumental in the incorporation of a flexible, de-skilled and informal migrant workforce within the transnational circuits of reproduction. Although it was not purposefully crafted to enhance irregular migration flows, neither was it altered when it became apparent that migrant women were using these policies to gain access to the domestic market.

Chapter 6: Turkish Migration Policy: The Rise of the Gendered Migration State

In this chapter, I will discuss the relationship between the existing care regime in Turkey and migration policy. The previous section revealed the way in which Turkey is moving towards a bifurcated care regime and I focused on the incorporation of low-income families into a form of “charitable welfarism”. This type of care arrangement is also known as supported familialism in the academic vernacular. The interesting point here is that female members of these low-income families are also employed in the domestic care sector and continue to perform primarily daily cleaning jobs in the informal market. As aforementioned, because of the force of both public and private patriarchy, many local women feel discouraged from entering into formal work. Turkey’s refusal to either finance a public care system or to ensure that there are well-protected and secure jobs available for native women as live-in care workers, has meant that the care demands from many middle class and lower-middle class families can only be met by turning to foreign workers within the labour market.

In this chapter, I will argue that Turkey is a “gendered migration state” in which migration policies specifically aim at lowering the cost of social reproduction by embracing a *politics of inclusion* vis-à-vis migrant domestic workers. Syed Ali and Doug Hartmann (2015) suggests that “inclusive policies” can take on many different forms. First, states might not recognize and grant rights to migrant workers, but tolerate their illegal work and residence within the country. In certain cases, such policies can also facilitate migration flows by applying a liberal visa regime. Alternatively, states can choose to issue amnesties at regular intervals, forgiving the trespasses of irregular migrants and providing them with rudimentary

rights – such as to work and reside – within the country. Turkey has pursued both of these policy approaches variously.

While supported familialism presents itself as a populist welfare tool targeting lower-income families, it fails to respond to the needs of either the middle classes or the lower-middle classes and serves to reinforce both private and public patriarchy. The rising care needs of these groups of families are met primarily by resorting to low-paid, under-protected and illegal migrant workers who have been growing in numbers in Turkey under the liberal visa regime. The first section of this chapter will discuss this tolerant visa regime as it has been applied in Turkey arguing that it has played a crucial role in increasing the number of irregular migrant workers in Turkey. In this sense, the liberal visa regime constitutes an important dimension of care policy in Turkey and is also embedded in the unequal domestic gender relations of the country. In the second section, I discuss the “regularization” attempts on the part of Turkey, which seek to move irregular domestic workers to a “regular status”. I will refer to the relevant legal framework, which has been designed to transform migrant workers into regular, but cheap, unprotected and disposable workforce. Turkey’s intention in regularizing such workers is not to recognize them as right-bearing subjects but to utilize this migrant workforce for its own economic benefit as well as to reproduce the underlying gender inequalities in society.

The Rise of the Migration State

Irregular migrant domestic care workers have increasingly become the norm in Turkey (Akalin 2007; Celik 2005; Eder 2007; Kaska 2009; Kumbetoglu 2005; Ataturmur 2008; Keugh 2003; Dedeoglu 2011; Unluturk-Ulutas 2010). If a person does not employ one

themselves, they know somebody who does – neighbors, friends or relatives. Despite the noticeable influx of foreign women since mid-1990s, Turkey has been silent on the issue until more recently when laws were enacted in 2013 and 2014. Broadly speaking, Turkey's attitude towards migration can be broken down into two different periods. In the first period, which begins with the inflow of migrant domestic workers and ends with the abandonment of the formerly liberal visa policy, Turkey followed a policy of tolerance. While officials knew of the presence of irregular migrants, there was no attempt either to provide them with regular working conditions or alternatively to criminalize them. Migrant women carved a niche for themselves among other local domestic care workers and normalized their presence in an already informal and unprotected labour market.

In the second period, two attempts were made by the Turkish state to actually take control of the circular migration flows and exercise control over the illegal migration of foreign domestic workers. This attempt involved the introduction of legal reforms, which offered the possibility of acquiring work and residence permits as foreign domestic workers in Turkey (The Law No. 4817 on Working Permits of Foreign Nationals in Turkey, 2003). At the same time, in 2012, the liberal border policy was rendered stricter with a regulation on Law on Passports. This implied a radical shift in Turkey's position with regard to domestic care workers from being complicit in the generation of "irregular" migration to being openly "welcoming". More significantly, this newly welcoming posture represents a departure from the formerly conservative policies of Turkey vis-à-vis foreign workers. At present, migrant women arriving for the purposes of domestic care and recreation are the only group of low-skilled workers who are permitted to work legally in Turkey. One important gap in the

existing Turkish migration literature is the fact that Turkey's attitude towards migrant domestic workers is often assumed rather than problematized. However, a thorough examination of the shift that is assumed to have occurred in Turkey's attitude towards domestic workers is central to developing a gendered reading of border policies. In doing so, it becomes clear that Turkey is committed to transforming the care sector into a market-based arrangement, in which migrant women's labour occupies a central role. At the same time, Turkey demonstrates how "border policies" through inclusion can also be functional in creating a flexible, unprotected and exploitable labour force.

Andriavejic, in her discussion of the changing logics of territoriality, suggests that models that are grounded in a strict relationship between citizen and worker cannot capture the new dynamics of global flows of migrant labour and the states' responses to these (Anrijasevic 2009, 391). In Turkey, the "citizen-worker" model is still in wide currency. At the heart of this model is the notion that labour market participation is the precondition for social enfranchisement and citizenship. However, as was discussed in the previous chapter, this model inevitably leads to the emergence of different varieties of citizenship due to the force of public and private patriarchy, which prevent or discourages some women from access to the labour market while permitting the incorporation of others within it. The care regime in the country feeds into the strength of these different types of citizenship in a discriminatory manner, serving to incorporate the first group in social charity schemes while directing the second group to a commodified market. As Andrijavic points out, a gendered reading of citizenship "inside" the country also allows us to redefine the conventional understanding of its relationship with the "outside" world (Anrijasevic 2009, 388). The

differentiation of citizenship within the country requires new varieties of workers in order to service existing labour markets and these are provided via global migration flows which supply them in abundance for the emerging migration state to incorporate by assigning them different migration statuses. In the case of Turkey, where native domestic labourers are discouraged from working formally, Turkey's relationship with the "outside" is reshaped in order to include migrant women. Contrary to the assumption that border controls necessarily exclude migrants from entering a state and finding work, borders are best viewed as mechanisms that produce "differential inclusion". When we refer to someone as "differentially included", what we mean is that migrants are incorporated only in the appropriate quantities and are afforded only the rights deemed appropriate by officials. According to McNevin (2007, 663; 2011), governments pursuing neoliberal policies, especially in the labour-market regulation, are heavily implicated in the generation of migration flows to which restrictive border policing subsequently responds. The number and manner in which they are incorporated are directly tied to labour market conditions, which themselves are structured by the prevailing gender relations among other factors.

The rise of the migration state is a relatively new phenomenon in Turkey. The concept of the migration state, according to Hollifield (2004), cuts against the traditional definitions of the state in international relations theory, which sees this primarily in terms of issues of security. The migration state represents, in many ways, a change in the *raison d'état* of borders and how to govern them. According to the traditional view, borders are sacrosanct and represent a fundamental organizational principle within the international system. By preventing the infiltration of distinct ethnicities and cultures (i.e. the unwanted

migrants) into a given country, borders function as part of what Rey Koslowski (2000) aptly describes as the “demographic boundary maintenance regime”. However, the migration state does not attempt to maintain the demographic boundary in the traditional manner – by denying entry and residence to the citizens of other countries. In the migration state, considerations of power and interest are driven by migration as much as they are by other territorial factors such as capitalism and masculinity. Accordingly, the migration regime reflects more a combination of “neoliberal governance” in which labour market needs in times of economic crisis and opportunity can be flexibly met by the introduction of foreign labour, and the gendered structure and dynamics of the political institutions within the receiving countries. In Turkey, the changing care regime and the accompanying modifications in border policies are the main sites from which we can perceive the strong relationship between gender and borders. However, it is also meaningful to examine briefly how this differential inclusion is used in ways that mark the shifting character of Turkey’s border regime and its transformation into a neoliberal governance regime.

Migration policy in Turkey’s is often characterized as naïve and not well organized, owing in part to its more recent emergence as a destination for prospective migrants. Aside from the refugee conventions and policies that have been mandated by the UN, the only significant migration policy measure was drafted to regulate touristic movements. According to Kemal Kirisci (2005, 2007), Turkey’s visa regime concerning the movement of tourists had been one of the most liberal in the world until the recent changes made in 2012, which involved a harmonization with the 90+90 European Union Schengen policy, and, even after this change, it remains relatively easy to enter in Turkey as a tourist. Migration law in Turkey

stipulates three categories for assessing the admission of foreigners as tourists. Turkey accepts tourists from a majority of countries who are in the first category without a visa for a 90 days period. Citizens of some other countries are required to obtain a visa prior to arriving in Turkey, and a third group are permitted to obtain “sticker-visas” when arriving at the border. According to Sema Erder, the liberalization of border policies was part of Turkey’s development project, which sought to attract foreign tourists and the currencies they brought with them as a means of addressing its liquidity problems (Erder 2007,21) . In order to change the views of the society, which has been stubbornly xenophobic due to the enduring effects of the nationalist discourse, the government has pursued multiple public relations campaigns emphasizing the link between the “development and welfare” of the country on the one hand and the foreign currencies brought by tourists on the other (Erder, 23). The visa regime has been likened to a benign international bank from which Turkey could acquire significant funds with small concessions.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey encountered, for the first time, economically motivated migrants who began to arrive in unprecedented numbers (Icduygu, 2006). Prior to this period, the regional legacy of conflict and continuous war brought about a significant influx of migrants, but these were mainly asylum seekers who were transiting through the country en route to Europe. Turkey’s response to the radical shifts occurring in the region combined a more traditional approach to migration with a “migration state” response. The cultural and ethnic ties that had guided Turkey’s migration policy were clearly embodied in the liberalization of border policies with two ex-Soviet countries, Bulgaria and Moldova, both of which include a significant population who are of Turkish ethnic descent.

Other Turkic countries, including Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, were also shifted to the first category on the basis of shared ethnic ties. Turkey's stated rationale for liberalizing its visa policy was to encourage populations of Turkic descent to relocate within the homeland (Kirisci 2007). However, Turkey continued to discriminate against Middle Eastern populations, even where they could rightfully claim ethnic and cultural affinity with Turkey.

On the other hand, economic interactions between Turkey and certain ex-Soviet countries began intensifying during this period, particularly within the large informal sector surrounding the textile industry. Deniz Yukseker (2002), whose ethnographic account of the transnational trade between Turkey and various ex-Soviet countries illuminates the scale and importance of individual traders in the global economy, points out that the growth of the leather industry in Laleli was a source of substantial trade revenue to the country. In the early 1990s, Turkey was a major exporter of textiles, but its export revenues were below the expected levels because of the high tariffs applied by Europe and the US. Accordingly, Turkey turned to local tourism with its neighbors as a means of promoting its economic interests through the burgeoning suitcase trade (Erder 2007, 45). Suitcase trading is essentially a form of petty trade and refers to the purchase of leather products, textiles and cosmetics from Turkey at inexpensive prices and returning them to the country of origin for sale. Women from the ex-Soviet countries became the main practitioners of this suitcase trading. Turkey, satisfied with the foreign revenues secured from this informal trade and the increased touristic movements from within Russia, further expanded its liberal border policy to the benefit of the Balkan states and other ex-Soviet countries such as the Ukraine

(Yukseker 2002). Even Armenia, despite the historical enmity and ongoing diplomatic problems, was also considered under the sticker visa category and Armenians were granted a month of visa-free stay in Turkey.

Turkey's attitude towards this petty trade has reflected its newly emerging status as a migration state. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the ensuing economic turmoil left petty trading as a unique solution pursued most notably by women. Turkey actually took this petty trade very seriously at its peak in the early 1990s because of the enormous amount of foreign exchange it brought into the country. The trade volume in terms of foreign exchange in the informal market, mainly composed of sectors like leather, textiles and manufactured goods, was as high as the remittances sent by foreign workers outside of Turkey. Upon examining the trade and employment effects of this petty trade, technocrats and economists in Ankara began to view the informal market as comparable to the formal economy (Erder 2007, 50). In 1990, the international trade secretariat actually allowed tourists to take an unlimited number of consumer products with them outside the country. The net earnings from this petty trade were included in the balance of payments accounts and recognized as a form of official trade (Erder, 52). However, the suitcase trading slowed down in the mid-1990s with the development of more formal and institutional structures of trade in the post-Soviet countries, but, in the meantime, informal trade and the pendular migration of women had become an everyday phenomenon, largely accepted by society, media and the government.

By the mid-1990s, this pendular migration had slowed down because of the declining revenues from the textile industry, but migration flows from the post-Soviet states has

continued to increase. It is hard to give a gendered breakdown of entrants, but from the trends within the Turkish labour market, it can be assumed that majority of those entering the country are women, who are arriving with the purpose of finding employment either in the “entertainment” or “domestic care” sector (Kaska 2009). In its early years, migration within domestic care industry was not an entirely independent development, but an extension of the early petty trading activities carried out by women who had been to Turkey previously as petty traders and later began moving into the domestic care sector. The networks they developed previously and their increased familiarity with the economy and culture undoubtedly helped them to establish themselves within the domestic care industry. All of the migrant women I interviewed for this study had experience in this petty trade before they began working as domestics, and, in some cases, they continued in this line of work albeit on a smaller scale. Male migrants have also entered Turkey primarily to work in agriculture, construction and the service sectors in the last two decades, but the attitude of the government and the local economy toward their low-skilled labour has not been as welcoming as in the case of migrant women.

The comparative study undertaken by Sema Eder (2007, 60-61) on petty traders and male migrant workers, surveys the negative reactions of labour unions and business interests towards the latter. Her findings suggest that both labour unions and businesses employ a nationalist and xenophobic rhetoric, claiming that migrant men cause unemployment for native Turks and that their cheap labour brings advantages to some companies at the expense of others. The ministry of the interior, influenced by lobbying on the part of unions and companies, initiated a war on informal migrant workers in 2001. Workplace inspections

became more regular and companies employing illegal migrant workers faced increased penalties. Border patrols were also rendered more restrictive. According to Sema Erder (2003, 67), this led to development of ad-hoc policing practices on the border because the policies of allowing petty traders into the country and restricting migrant men were pursued simultaneously. Border police played a crucial role in ensuring the day-to-day implementation of this semi-institutionalized double standard, “returning those men who are entering Turkey with no money and accepting those women who are arriving to conduct trade” (Erder 64-65). The line between acceptable and unacceptable migration is established by measuring the overall benefits to the economy and the existence of an already large informal market for natives in certain sectors has led the Turkish authorities to perceive migrant men as harmful to the productive economy.

De Genova (2004) argues that illegal migration does not exist outside of a regulatory framework, but instead is positioned at the center of it. This regulation is enacted by the state, which also reproduces its own authority by invoking the “woes” brought about by illegal migrants who bypass the laws established by the state. In this sense, the Turkish visa policy has also shaped the forms of “informality” that exist within the Turkish domestic care sector. There are currently two types of “irregularity” – one is circular (or pendular) migration and the second is illegal migration. Circular migration mainly refers to the continuous movement between a migrant’s home country and Turkey in order not to overstay a visa. The pendular nature of the movement is attributable to the specificities of the visa regime – i.e. to the sticker visas and those of a longer duration – and to the geographic proximity of the country to Turkey. This pendular migration has also been more

strictly associated with petty trade because of the nature of labour required for the completion of such trading activities.

Among migrant workers, continuity and permanence are both required types. Immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union, women from the Ukraine, Bulgaria, Moldova, Georgia and Poland entered Turkey and became the main practitioners in the burgeoning circular migration (Kaska 2009). They did not possess the right to work, but they maintained their “legal” right to stay in the country nonetheless. However, in subsequent years, the geography of migrants diversified, meaning that women coming from long-distances would be more willing to risk their “legal” stay instead of travelling back and forth fruitlessly (Ozbay 2012, 153). In particular, women from the various Turkic Republics and Armenians can be grouped in this category. Armenia is included in the category of migrants requiring sticker visas, however, their legal stay is limited to one month. Given that the borders between the two countries are closed, many Armenian women who are within the country illegally are placed in a difficult position. For illegal workers it is difficult to travel to their home country since this might imply a ban on reentry or a fine for overstaying their visa. The labour required within industry is continuous with little room for flexibility in the schedule, making it difficult but not impossible to engage in pendular migration. However, for many migrant workers within this sector, “irregularity” entails being deprived of both a proper residence permit and work permit.

An interesting feature of the migration state within Turkey is the fact that neither in their circular nor their illegal migration practices are women conceived of as “enemies” that need to be disciplined with economic strictures or with threats of deportation. In many ways,

this distinguishes Turkey from the advanced economies in Europe and elsewhere. The liberal visa regime can actually be seen as a form of unmanaged “circular” or illegal migration and could fairly be summarized as “differentiated informality”. There are many different reasons as to why Turkey might not perceive irregular migration as threatening. According to Kemal Kirisci (2008, 12), one important factor is that Turkish authorities are aware of the fact that this migration is demand-driven and that this demand is coming from the relatively well-off segments of society. For example, according to him, the effort of the Turkish state to introduce stricter visa regulations upon Romanians was met with intense lobbying by the tourism sector (Kirisci 2008, 10). The background was that, after being included within the Schengen visa zone, Romania introduced a visa requirement for Turkish passport holders. However, the tourism lobby placed considerable pressure on Turkey not to reciprocate, given that the entertainment sector in the South accommodates large number of Romanian women.

It is difficult to say who would lobby for the inclusion of domestic care workers since a strong lobby group representing the middle classes does not exist at present. However, as the previous chapter has demonstrated, the demand for care workers is on the rise both from the middle and lower-middle classes. It is certain that the willingness on the part of the government to use migrant women continue to plug up the gaps in the domestic care industry has played an important role in the continuation of the liberal visa policies. For example, in 2007, Turkey was forced to apply the Schengen Visa restriction to Bulgaria and the Ukraine, who are among the primary suppliers of care workers, but Georgia and Armenia immediately replaced them as the leading migrant sending countries within this sector after

Turkey lifted visa requirements. The inflow of domestic care workers has proceeded without interruption over the last two decades.

However, the EU has voiced dissatisfaction with Turkey's liberal visa policy since it is widely regarded as a major transit country for migrants en route to Europe (Kirisci 2003). Accordingly, Turkey has been pressured to harmonize its visa policies with the current Schengen system in the hopes that this might curb irregular migration from the country to other destinations in Europe. However, Turkey has only begun to show some signs of compliance with the recent law passed in 2012. The circular migration occurs within countries with which Turkey has been trying to establish good economic relations and which in return receive preferential treatment in terms of visas. Europe itself is not strictly opposed to "circular migration", but insists that this should occur in a more regulated framework. Even now, Europe is attempting to consolidate a regime that allows for pendular migration, especially targeting the areas in which they have labour shortages. However, in this, they foresee a strict regulation of "circular migration" in which unwanted migrants are not permitted entry. In addition, they would like to ensure that the migration remains "circular" and not permanent, accommodating the needs of the labour market above all. However, Turkey has remained both incapable and unwilling to compromise to such a position and has used "visa regulation" as a foreign policy and labour market tool. Informality remains the basic characteristic of the Turkish liberal visa regime (Kirisci 2003).

From Tolerance to Regularity

Many studies have pointed to the fact that receiving states often adopt a mixture of inclusive and exclusive policies towards domestic care workers. The practice of shuffling

migrants from one status to another is increasingly becoming a norm for states. In most cases, states do not attempt to wall themselves off from the outside world (either figuratively or literally), but often encourage “irregular” labour flows due to the benefits associated with lowering labour costs. Liberal border policies and “regularization acts” within host states should be seen as evidence of the state’s complicity in the continuation of these irregular flows, which are permitted by the state and treated as something akin to an “open-secret”. Yet, the state will rarely move to decriminalize irregular workers, leastwise until this irregularity is perceived as intolerable for security and economic reasons. At this critical juncture, states rarely pursue a full-fledged deportation program, but instead utilize acts of regularization as a remedy to treat the problem of widespread informality. In broad terms, “regularization” first recognizes the presence of migrant workers as a criminal problem and then attempts to shift the classification of these migrants to a “regular” status. It allows them to work and reside legally in the host country so long as the employer does not terminate their employment contract and so long as there is sufficient demand in the labour market. This means that their regular status depends on the whims of employers and the vicissitudes of the labour market, ensuring a perpetual state of uncertainty regarding their status. As such, there is no stable status for migrants who are trapped in a “legal temporariness” (Baubock 2011).

The first relevant law concerning the rights of migrant workers was passed in 2003 in accordance with the EU acquis general framework on work permits (The Law no 4817). The law allowed foreigners to legally work in certain sectors, among which education, private firms and domestic work/entertainment were most notable. The law’s purpose was to

centralize the regulation of work permits in the hands of the Labour and Social Security Ministry, and, in addition, to make the application process easier. This was the first law in Turkey that opened up the possibility for the delivery of official work permits to a low-skilled workforce. However, in practice, most of these work permits are not granted to low-skilled workers. According to the official statistics from 2011, around 16,890 work permits were granted to foreigners and one percent of them were for domestic migrant workers (Erdogdu and Toksoz, 2013, 30). This means that private firms and educational institutions applied for the vast majority of these permits.

The reasons for this are many, but foremost among them is the fact that the law did not have any real intention to “regularize” domestic care migrants. The legal procedure pertaining to the application process was extremely convoluted. In addition, the law only accepted work permit applications made from abroad. This meant that employers had to make arrangements with a future employee before they entered the country and the employees were required to make an application to a Turkish embassy from abroad in order to have their permit approved. This requirement overlooks the fact that informality in the domestic care sector in Turkey starts with the process when migrant women seek and find jobs. Migrant women travel to Turkey without having a prearranged job, initially relying on the social networks of their compatriots and only later using intermediary agencies, most of which operate informally. For this reason, the law has only served large actors within the private sector and educational institutions which are interested in employing highly qualified foreign personnel. Second, the liberal visa policy gave little incentive to either employers or

migrant workers to enter into a cumbersome legal procedure with long wait times. Given the choice, many such migrants still prefer “circular migration” or illegality to the alternative.

The law also failed to take into consideration the fact that there are also a large number of migrant women who were not “circular migrants”. Citizens of some countries such as Armenia, for example, have the right to stay only one month on a tourist visa in Turkey, making it very difficult for such workers to enter into circular migration. This is also true for migrants arriving from geographically distant countries. The law did not propose any solution for women who have already exceeded their visa period and who are stuck in Turkey as “illegal migrants”. Yet, this law was the first example of the official recognition of the feminized workforce within the country. In this sense, the government gave a clear message that they are aware of the large volume of female migrants in Turkey, but remained silent about the liberal visa policies that allow for the continuation of circular migration. In this sense, it is demonstrable that Turkey has remained complicit in the irregular migration and employment of migrant women in the country. On the one hand, Turkey has paved the way for migrant workers to attain a legal status; on the other hand, it has clearly pursued a policy of under-regulation in the domestic/entertainment work sector.

In 2012, the government further demonstrated its commitment to transforming migrant domestic care work into a formal employment sector in Turkey. In The Law on Passports, the visa policy was made compliant with the European Union’s Schengen agreement, which allows for a limited stay period of 90 days in every 180 on a tourist visa. While this regulation aims at curbing the circular migration primarily involving domestic migrant workers, a circular issued by General Directorate of Security following the Law on

Passports seeks to facilitate the residence/work permit application procedure. The circular, for example, allows domestic migrant workers to make their work permit applications from within the country in concert with their employers. This means that the law bears relevance for many migrant women who search for jobs only after they enter into the country. The legal procedure pertaining to the application is also simplified, requiring fewer documents to be filed and submitted to the Ministry of Labour. The regulation grants a one-year working permit, with a possibility of extending this for another two years conditional upon the interest of employers. In addition, the law also attended to the problem of non-circular migrants (e.g. who are already in violation of the relevant visa regulations). For this group of workers, it issued an amnesty and promised to grant a residence permit for 6 months given that they pay fines due for past violations in regard to visa issues. The law, therefore, does provide an avenue for illegal migrants to change their status.

In adopting this regulation, Turkey was implicitly acknowledging the undesirable character of the existing circular migration and was seeking to curb it by emulating the regulatory framework within Europe. However, by the same token, it represents one of the first examples of regularization in Turkish migration history. With this law, Turkey moved away from its policy of differential inclusion to a more regulated migration regime. The first period symbolizes a politics of tolerance towards the irregular movements of domestic care workers. In the second period, Turkey officially acknowledged the widespread “illegality” within the domestic care market and elsewhere. However, illegal migrants are not hunted down or deported systematically. Rather Turkey attempted to shift domestic migrants into a temporary migration status by encouraging all parties – particularly the employers – to abide

by the regulation. It is too early to judge the effects of this regulation, but the Ministry has indicated that the number of applications for domestic care work is not as high as anticipated (Interview). The effects of this policy will directly influence the experiences of migrant women on the ground, but as the next section demonstrates, the success of this program is a distant possibility.

What is most important to recognize here is the fact that this law constitutes a clear break from earlier migration policy that largely ignored the low-skill workforce. The tweaking of this conservative migration policy does not, however, reflect Turkey's movement from a "closed society" to an "open society". On the contrary, the law is aimed only at the inclusion of domestic care/entertainment sector workers, simplifying the procedure to employ foreigners in these two sectors, while the possibility of legalization in the two other low-skilled groups – male migrant workers and female migrant sex workers – is never alluded to in the documents. It is well known that the arrival of sex workers from Romania, Moldova and the Ukraine is becoming increasingly common. Although it is legal for Turkish citizens to engage in sex work, the Passport law bans foreigners from engaging in the same work. Neither are the migrant men who are employed primarily in the construction and agricultural sectors considered within the purview of the "Work Permits for Foreigners". In the words of Andrejasevic (2009), what Turkey applies to domestic care workers, is "differential inclusion". She emphasizes the importance of investigating this "inclusion", which brings to the fore the changing logics of governance, sovereignty and citizenship, and allows us understand these changes from a gendered perspective. In Turkey, the inclusion of migrant workers in formal terms also marks a change in the logic of the governance of migration. It

marks the rise of the “gendered migration state”. In Turkey, the attempt to include foreign women also represents a step towards officially “feminizing” the working conditions that migrant care workers are subject to. As Miranda Hallett (2009, 11) notes, legal inclusion and labour exploitation might seem contradictory, but in fact they can be and often are simultaneous processes. The “regularization” act will help to constitute a workforce that is ultimately “flexible”, “dependent” and “disposable”.

Enclosure in Temporariness and De-Skilling

The most significant hallmark of the gendered migration state has been the incorporation of migrant women into the domestic care market as an unskilled, low-paid and dependent workforce. Under the new immigration law that was passed in 2003, the wage rate for migrant care workers was initially set as 1.5 times the minimum wage in Turkey, but in response to the negative reaction of employers, it was scaled back to simply the minimum wage. The law does not regulate the working hours, the expectations from employees/employers and does not include any provision for increasing the wage commensurate with experience or seniority. It is entirely left to employers how many hours these workers will be employed and what the expectations will be. Flexibility – the assumption that workers can possess many skills simultaneously and apply them when and where necessary – is invoked explicitly in the regulation. Deskilling is inherent in any discourse of flexibility, but it is less visible in the domestic care industry because of the assumed “similarity” among skills. All women are regarded as naturally suited to performing the various tasks associated with household work. The pervasiveness of attributing skills – skills which, in fact, often require a lifetime of training and patience to acquire – to women’s

underlying “nature” is apparent in the comments of one official from Ministry of Labour and Social Security who argues in favor of the lower minimum wage: “Migrant workers receive a lot of money for what they do. They work in the safety of the home and do ironing and cooking. They do these in their home countries and live in poverty. Turkey gives them the opportunity to get paid for doing household work.”

In this scheme, migrant women are also “enclosed in temporariness” in the face of a 2 year contract that is only renewable by employers (“Yabancı Hizmetçi Calıstırmak” – To Employ a Foreign Maid -).The notion of temporariness is taken up by several migrant scholars to describe the impact of this status upon migrant women’s lives. This temporariness is undoubtedly the most effective way to incorporate migrants at “just at the right amount”, making it possible to dispose of them promptly if necessary. The temporariness of migrant women stipulated in the law allows the state to preserve a social and judicial legitimacy – as a state that responds to the needs of citizen women and one that does so through benevolent acts of “regularization” – while producing a disposable labour force. Migrant women inhabit what Hiroshi Motomura (2008, 2048) has referred to as a “twilight status” that ranges from those who are undocumented to temporary work permits. The regulation gives employers far-reaching powers, such as the right to terminate the contract if necessary, in which case the temporary visa of the migrant worker would be invalid within 15 days. In addition, migrant women have to work for 5 years uninterrupted, in order to be eligible for an independent work permit.

The regularization attempt should be interpreted as a part of creating the officially regulated “twilight laborers” of the reproductive global economy, who are imbued with

subjectivities such as hard-work, flexibility, and loyalty/fidelity. This attitude is conveyed clearly on the website of one of the “work permit” consulting agencies:

Migrant women are now a reality of our everyday life. Employing them through official channels offers great advantages to the employers. The law makes sure that employer can lay off the workers who are underperforming, which will practically mean “a deportation” for migrant women; for the duration of residence permit depends on a continuous employment by the same employer. Instead of facing this consequence, the worker would work harder and display loyalty. The fact that temporary status might become an independent work permit in the future incentivizes more discipline and love on the part of migrants for their work (<http://www.yabancicalismaizni.com/hizmetler/yabanci-hizmetci-calistirmak.html>).

In the following section, I will refocus attention on the domestic societal implications of the care regime and connect these with the current regularization movement by emphasizing two policy measures that have recently been proposed by the Turkish government. This section demonstrates how the construction of gender roles within society for middle class women actually goes hand-in-hand with the feminization of migration. Existing gender roles and the position of middle class women within society are not independent of the construction of a feminized low-skill migrant workforce in Turkey, but the two mutually constitute each other. What we have witnessed in Turkey is the emergence of a flexible labour force consisting of native Turkish women, who are still designated primarily as mothers, and, at the same time, the creation of a feminized migrant workforce which is intended to complement rather than to substitute for the maternal duties carried out by Turkish women. In this process, the efforts of the Turkish government have been directed towards freeing the public and private sector from any possible burden associated with the reproductive sphere. This, combined with the dominant norms concerning the gendered division of labour, results in two consequences: one is the reaffirmation of the

sacrosanct role of motherhood for Turkish women and second is the creation of surrogate mothers that are drawn from a pool of cheap, dependent, and temporary female migrant workers. In this sense, the art of harmonizing migration regulation and the family-based care regime depends on the ability of governments to manage this tension, which is captured succinctly by Barbara Rothman (2000, 24) who points out that “when performed by mother we call it mothering, when performed by hired hands we call it unskilled.”

Re-Producing Patriarchy?

The increasing care needs in Turkey become clearly visible we turn to individual interviews and explore the family structure in any depth. It is still wrongly assumed that migrant workers are only the province of the wealthy and those who have sufficient means to invest in status-related consumption. The interviews in Chapter 6 revealed that social reproduction is a growing need and people are increasingly inclined to treat it as an “essential” service. Income-pooling strategies have emerged as a response to recognition of these care needs as nothing less than an absolute necessity. However, as Shirin Rai (2011, 3-4) impresses, neither international organizations nor states have sincere intentions to measure the aggregate depletion in social reproduction in macroeconomic terms. The emphasis upon economic competition and growth results in a reflexive inclusion of data, statistics and predictions concerning paid labour and finance, which are the sectors most strongly associated with the masculine sphere. Interviews and small surveys like mine can only provide an ad-hoc approach to this depletion, but, on the macro level, the unpaid work of women and the resources necessary to continue to reproduce human beings, families and society as a whole are sidelined.

In Turkey too, the depletion in social reproduction is only marginally recognized or understood. From my interviews, both child care and elderly care seem to be the major sites wherein this depletion is most recognizable. It is hard to make global claims about how this phenomenon is connected with the changing structure of the economy in Turkey, given that we are absent aggregate data concerning household employment practices. Relying on the given interview data, however, we can point to two important relationships between the phenomenon of resource depletion and the changing economic structure: first, the formation of global cities has increased tensions in the family-based care arrangements as it has become more difficult for family members to do the care work themselves. The working conditions in these global cities are also “flexible” in the sense that many employees are asked to stay overtime, and this poses an additional strain. Second, elderly care is emerging, as a more serious problem in Turkey, but the recognition of this fact remains at fairly low levels, due to the fact that elderly people, unlike children who are regarded as the future labour force and population of the country, are seen as burden and not worth caring for. This fact should also be viewed in the light of the age hierarchy in any market-based economy.

The participation of professional women in the workforce and the resulting difficulty surrounding childcare arrangements has been on the agenda of the government for the last few years. Several action plans have been suggested by the conservative AKP government. The two most recent are the “5000 thousand care workers for 5000 mothers” (5tocarefor5) – also known as “The project to Support Registered Female Employment through Paid Domestic Care Work” and the “Family Social Support Program” (FSSP) – also known as the Action Plan to Protect the Family and Dynamic Population Structure of Turkey. Both of

these programs have currently been proposed and the former has been implemented as a pilot project, and both reveal the concern with providing for the care needs of professional families in which women are participating within the workforce. The common theme in these programs is the open acknowledgement of diminishing child care resources in society with no mention whatsoever of elderly care. According to the Prime Minister, the purpose of FSSP is to support the demographic wellbeing and sustainability of the country in the coming years (“Annelik Kariyerine Tesvik” (Supporting the Motherhood Career <http://haber.sol.org.tr/turkiye/krese-degil-annelik-kariyerine-tesvik-104962>). The program promises a cash payment to new mothers with increasing amounts for each additional child and a possibility for mothers to work part-time in a flexible fashion until their children start school. According to the Prime Minister, in this way, women can continue to work without neglecting their children, who are “the future hopes of Turkey”. The project emphasizes the role of women in bringing strength to the country through giving birth to more children for whom the “state promises to provide generous financial support” (Prime Minister, Davutoglu’s Press Release). Additionally, the program also promises more “benefits” for women who are able to combine their maternal obligations with a working life.

The flexible working scheme is interesting, and, at first sight, it seems positive, especially considering the fact that for the first three months, the state promises to augment the salary of working mothers, paying a full-time wage for part-time work. However, after the initial period, the scheme allows women to engage in flexible work – i.e. to continue to work for a few hours each day – without any further compensation by the state. Employers are also allowed to rely on flexible contracts rather than employing full-time workers in order

to fill in the gaps in their labour force resulting from the “extensive rights” afforded to mothers. FSSP also promises to increase the paternity leave for fathers from 3 days to 5 days. When we examine this pilot program from a gendered perspective, it becomes apparent that little is being done to alter the gendered division of labour in child care and that “family care” continues to be defined as “women’s care”. The task of balancing a working life and family care is put squarely on the shoulders of women; as the Prime Minister explains, the rationale for the FSSP is to allow women to “carry on their family responsibilities without experiencing psychological tensions concerning job loss” (“Anneye Yari Zamanli Calisma Hakki”, Flexible Work Opportunity for Women). The reaction of business chambers to this project has been mixed, with most supporting the “flexible” working scheme for women but opposing the increase in paternity leave. As Joan Acker (2004) observes, it is standard corporate practice to claim non-responsibility for the production and reproduction of human life. Also, the fact that corporate interests seem comfortable with the “flexible” working regime for women should be interpreted in light of the benefits that such work brings to employers. As the head of the Chamber of Trade explains: “We support the participation of women on a half time basis provided that the cost of paying the full wage belongs to the government and provided that we can employ substitute workers flexibly in their absence” (Milliyet.com.tr). In contrast, the two days increase in paternity leave is strongly opposed by the business community: “who is going to pay for this? If the cost of paternity leave is going to be ours, we cannot support men leaving work for five days”.

The care program proposed by the government offers no solutions for the existing care deficit, which is primarily the result of overtime work required by employers, in addition

to the lack of any institutional support for working mothers such as a publicly funded daycare system. The project does not state who is going to care for the children when mothers are working part-time. Despite its stated intentions, the project is geared more towards reinforcing the role of motherhood and creating an increasingly feminized, informal and flexible labour market for women where stable and protected jobs do not exist. The reason employers are pleased with regard to the “flexible” working conditions instituted for women and opposed to the two days increase in paternity leave is their aversion to bearing any of the costs associated with reproduction. Employers not only want to duck the cost of employing mothers on a half-time basis, but they also want to amass a larger pool of informal female workers. Ultimately, the government program does not address the root of the problem, which is the concern on the part of many women with respect to who will meet their care needs when they are working on a part-time basis and with lower wages than previously. The implicit suggestion is that they should either hire a paid domestic worker or rely upon family support.

The 5tocarefor5 program, which was initiated as a pilot project in 2014 and is supported by the European Union and implemented by the Social Security Institution (SSI) of Turkey, is intended to complement the FSSP . The purpose of the program is to encourage the formalization of domestic care workers and is applicable to both migrant and native domestic workers. In this way, SSI explains, “in the near future, our hope is to “institutionalize this line of work” (Social Security Institution, Press Release, 2014). The main mechanism through which SSI aims to generate this consequence is to make cash payments to women who have a child between the ages of 0 and 2 and who will be returning to formal

employment after the maternal leave period of 4 months elapses. The key here is the “formal work” requirement, which means that unemployed women or women employed informally cannot benefit from this support (Soyseckin 2014). Clearly, the target of the project is the middle-class professional women. The cash payment is conditional upon the registration of the household worker within the formal economy through their inclusion within the social security system. This project is important in that it recognizes the care deficit arising among middle class families and the fact that these families often employ migrant workers informally. It is important that domestic care workers are afforded this formal recognition, but as Idil Soyseckin notes, the government demonstrates that it has no intentions to take responsibility for the reproductive economy with this project.

The program is ostensibly seeking to create an institutional domestic care market. However, in actuality, it aspires to create a thoroughly commodified care market. In a genuinely institutional care regime, the domestic care workers would be employed by the state and made available to households at a cost that would be conditioned upon the income of the household (implying state subsidies for many families). Alternatively, the state could administer child care facilities or make it obligatory for employers to do so. Additionally, there would have to be clear standards regarding the employment terms. The project does not specify working conditions, wages, or employment relations, except in seeking to encourage family-based hiring. In other words, it entrusts families to act like “rational actors”, finding the most efficient way to use the cash transfers. The likely result of this is that either employers will negotiate with a family member – most probably with a mothers-in-law – to assume the responsibility for such care, dividing up the cash transfer and ensuring

that the money remains within the family or they will attempt to get the maximum utility with the available cash transfer, which will entail employing a migrant care worker to do the job in many cases.

The 5tocare for5 program does not specify any requirement, leaving hiring and contract decisions to the prospective women employers. The program, however, promises a marginal increase in the cash transfer (the equivalent of approximately 50 dollars) if the employers prefer to work with native domestic workers who have completed the government's official "Care-giver Training Program". The SSI also suggests that the attempt to regulate foreign and native care workers could be more effective after the 5tocarefor5 becomes more widespread. They seem to believe that Turkish employers will prefer to employ local women. However, many of these local women trained in the official program are young women who would not like to work as "live-in" care givers. Given that employers in Turkey prefer to hire live-in care workers, this cash payment could be thought of as a subsidy to middle-class families who are planning to employ migrant workers. The fact that the law does not specify how many hours the workers should be employed means that the employers would almost certainly prefer live-in-care workers who also work as cleaners and cooks. In this regard, the project promises formality and social security, but fails to specify the rights and conditions of such work. Will the cash allowance be used to hire a worker for 5 hours or for 24 hours? These questions occupy a central place in understanding what kind of domestic care market that government is trying to construct. The 5tocarefor5 program seems to encourage flexible, low-paid and under protected jobs for domestic workers, most of which will be occupied by foreign migrants.

These two programs represent an attempt on the part of the government to transform childcare into a commoditized service, in which migrant women will undoubtedly play a significant role. However, the emphasis on family care has not vanished in Turkey. The current care deficit does test the limits of women's capacity for flexibility and self-sacrifice, but it does not entail the breakdown of the system. Rather as Rachel Kunz indicates, social care crises produce new social forms – in this case new market actors and new ways to undertake social reproduction activities. We cannot characterize the changes in the care regime in terms of a shift from public to private actors, as Turkey has never been a prominent governmental actor in provisioning care. However, the inflow of migrant women seeking out employment in the domestic care sector and the high demand from families of varying income levels have compelled the government to recognize the care crisis as a serious problem. The two programs discussed above were initiated after the attempt on the part of the Turkish government to regularize migrant domestic care workers. So, it could be claimed that while family care still occupies a central place in the social thinking of government actors, it is also increasingly recognized that women's capacity for care is not infinitely elastic.

Chapter 7: Being Hard-Working, Modern and Loyal: Social Acceptance of Migrant Women in the Domestic Care Industry

The previous two chapters traced the complex interconnections between gender inequalities in different localities, and, more broadly, between the transnational and the local. I have argued throughout that border policy is profoundly gendered and have also challenged the prevalent view within the literature on “irregular migration” that equates migrant illegality with absolute exclusion, emphasizing instead that “formal exclusion often results in subordinate inclusion” (Chauiven and Mascarenas 2014, 423). In this chapter, I will examine other gendered, ethnic and class based norms that suffuse the everyday lives of domestic care workers and which provide them a measure of legitimacy and acceptance within Turkey. In other words, I will shift the focus away from a macro-level analysis to a study of the everyday.

Throughout my fieldwork and the process of writing my Thesis, I have been regularly queried as to why I chose to focus upon the social conditions of Armenian women workers among many other ethnic groups who have migrated to Turkey following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Generally speaking, ordinary people both in both countries seem largely unaware of the phenomenon of women’s migration from Armenia to Turkey as low-skill migrant workers. One of the first comments I typically receive upon revealing the subject of my research is that it must somehow relate with the ongoing controversy surrounding the Armenian Genocide and whether Armenian migrant women in Turkey are brutalized by the police, the Turkish state and citizens of Turkey. Far from constituting uninformed commentary by ordinary people, the questions raised about “ethnic Othering”

have a strong relevance for the dominant frameworks in International Relations that are used to analyze questions of international migration, especially if the countries involved are sharing a history of economic imperialism, military intervention or some other form of political entanglement, as is the case between Turkey and Armenia.

Indeed, this was partly the reason that I first chose to focus upon Armenian migrant women in Turkey. I presumed at the time that this specific case could be examined in the context of nationalist hostility in both countries and situated in terms of the peripheralization of Armenia by the nationalist designs of the Ottoman Empire in the early 20th century, epitomized in the tragic deportation of Armenian minorities out of Turkey. This dark episode in our collective history has contributed to the economic marginalization of Armenia, from which I assumed it would be impossible to separate out the economic difficulties that citizens of Armenia are facing today as well as the ensuing marginalization that they experience as “illegal” migrant workers within Turkey. My further assumption was that Armenian migrant women would be subject to ethnic and cultural subordination, and that Turkey, in attempting to privilege its own political community, would construct these migrant workers as “illegal” and that they would suffer from the effects of racialization and exclusion because of their ethnic origins. However, I soon realized that my presumptions and the framework of analysis within which I was labouring has been shaped by the disciplinary boundaries of the International Relations discipline.

The scholarly work on migrant workers has mostly emphasized the “racial and ethnic hierarchies” that discursively support their dehumanization, exclusion and alienation. The literature emphasizes the systematic discrimination that ensues from the “ethno-racial” and

“ethno-national” classification of migrant workers and the way in which these derogatory classifications are used to police the boundaries of the nation-state and citizenship. A case in point is the criminalization of Latino migrants in the US, with accompanying metaphors of disease and invasion that are often connected not so much with their legal status but with their cultural difference (Hallett, 2009). In accounting for the conditions faced by migrants as racialized bodies, scholars have often pointed to the conflation of racial and cultural difference with legal status, which, in turn, is confused with criminality (Holmes, 2007). However, in a somewhat different vein, this chapter will attempt to shed light upon the practice of social acceptance (as opposed to “cultural othering”) which is afforded to migrant women on the basis of gendered norms and categories which migrant women are thought to embody. Being perceived as “modern” and “moral” elevates migrant women above other workers in Turkey, especially native domestic care workers, who are often perceived to be dirty, backward and traditional by employers.

Studies on migrant domestic care work often emphasize the link between racialization and cultural bigotry on the one hand and the neoliberal practices of flexibilization and the legal subordination of migrant workers by the state on the other. Accordingly, governments, the media and society as a whole can render migrant workers invisible as “right-bearing” subjects, while simultaneously contributing to their hyper-visibility as “cultural others”. It would be a mistake to claim that this context is entirely absent in Turkey. Studies have shown that migrant women are often racialized and being accused of liars, thieves and immoral on the basis of racial categories. For example, Ozbay argues, while media depicted Moldovan workers as a sexual threat to the society because of their

attractiveness, Bulgarians are viewed as less beautiful and less threatening. In 2014, anneyiz.biz (we are mothers) web-site which is used to share information about migrant workers by their employers is closed by a court decision because of the racist comments it involved. I do not deny the existence of racialization and criminalization of migrant workers on the bases of this, but in this chapter I address a different local variation. Addressing local variations in the construction of cultural boundaries can help to reveal the impact of the “gendered othering” that reflects the emergent moral and cultural economy of deservingness and ultimately demonstrate how these moral categories play a role in the incorporation of migrant women within society. Even where their status has been regularized and they are perceived as “rights-bearing” subjects, Armenian migrant workers continue to occupy a subordinate role within society, though this does not seem to be function of any ethno-racial othering. Instead, their subordination appears to flow naturally from the inherent logic of the gendered migration state – which openly construes migrant women as a low-skill and flexible workforce – and the gendered cultural logics of boundary drawing.

Why is this analysis important and what does it bring to the study of international migration? This chapter tells a different story than what we are accustomed to hearing in the migration studies and international relations literature, in which the migrant is persistently racialized with the mutually reinforcing accusations of “cultural backwardness” and “illegality”. The narrative presented here centers upon the perceptions of migrant women as performing highly-valued feminine tasks, which are prized above the “primitive femininity” of the native domestic care workers and the “immoral femininity” of migrant sex workers. Despite the long-history of ethnic conflict and animosity between Armenia and Turkey,

which in many other places would undoubtedly feed into the process of cultural othering and lead to virulent ethno-racism directed against migrants, Armenian domestic care workers (as well as other migrant women) are treated as part of the nation in many respects. In the last several years, scholars from various disciplines have elaborated upon the social-scientific concepts of membership and inequality, by showing that the distinction between citizen and non-citizen is not a dichotomous one, but rests upon a reversible gradation often connected with ethno-racial hierarchies. I follow in the footsteps of this literature, but, and without denying the importance of ethnic-based differentiation, this chapter focuses more upon how the definitions of legitimate belonging also rest upon gradations connected with the moral and political gender hierarchies in everyday life.

In this chapter, I will focus on what Chauvin (2012) refers to as the “moral economy of illegality” – the discourse policy nexus regulating the construction of migrants as more or less illegal. The following discussion reveals that the two overarching qualities that are most often attributed to Armenian migrant women – their *morality*, which entails values such as self-sacrifice and fidelity to family, and their *modernity*, which implies their high degree of literacy, distance from village life, and cleanliness – actually represent a kind of negative identity which pit migrant women against other groups of women within society. While the morality of domestic migrant women is actually defined against the migrant sex worker, the modernity of migrant women is defined against native women. Following the work of Chauvin and Mascarenas (2012), this chapter argues that illegality does not always function as an absolute marker of illegitimacy, and, as Seth Holmes (2007) points out, sometimes local hierarchies of ethnicity, suffering and labour can work to erase the criminality attaching to

some people and some statuses, transforming them into legitimate subjects. In Turkey, it is certainly fair to say that illegal migrant women are considered as legitimate subjects of society and the state, even though they reside and work illegally within the country.

The previous chapter explored the legitimacy that is afforded to irregular migrant women on the basis of a neoliberal instrumental rationality which knowingly tolerates “illegal workers” because they lower the cost associated with social reproduction for the state (McNevin 2007). In other words, it was a step towards “unveiling the ethics of contemporary states when it comes to evaluation of difference” (Fassin, 2012). It also revealed the way in which a liberal migration policy and tolerance towards migrant workers functions as a tool that simultaneously reproduces the subordination of citizen women in the gendered division of labour and migrant women also. Related to this, I discussed how the discourse-policy nexus regulating the construction of migrant women is directly related to the efforts on the part of the Turkish state to transform care work into a commodified service shouldered on the backs of an “under-paid, de-skilled and disciplined” migrant workforce on the one hand, and, at the same time, to fortify the role of “informal care networks” and motherhood for citizen women on the other.

In this chapter, the discussion moves away from the legal and institutional policy-discourse nexus towards “more immanent logics” that generate the multidimensional scale in which migrant deservingness is being defined and measured – by the employers and police officers, by Social Security officials and by the Armenian denizens of Turkey as well. In prioritizing the micro-scale, this chapter examines the development of more subtle ways in which everyday actors draw the boundaries between deserving femininity and undeserving

femininity. These boundaries are important for at least three reasons: first, migrant women are treated as the legitimate subjects of the host society through these categories; second, the gendered discourse within which this legitimacy is produced is based on pitting different femininities against each other, thereby creating inequalities beyond the question of legal status; and third, the discussion here provides the context for a larger discussion of migrant subjectivities in the coming chapter.

As a theme that has been continually emphasized in this thesis, the migration regime includes norms, moral claims and histories of nationhood that are based upon gender discrimination and ideas of femininity and masculinity. In discussing everyday norms and hierarchies as part of the migration regime, Williams and Gavanas (2008) for example have pointed to the development of different attitudes towards migrant care workers in Spain and Sweden on the one hand, and in Britain on the other. They argue that, in the case of the former countries, exclusivist conceptions of what it means to be “Swedish” or “Spanish” have underpinned the racist and patronizing attitudes of employers in Stockholm and Madrid, whereas in London, a more cosmopolitan context and a greater awareness of the problem of racial discrimination has given rise to a more defensive “I’m not a racist, but...” attitude. In a similar vein, I discuss how the construction of migrant care workers as different from other women – primarily from native household workers and from sex workers – has impacted the attitudes of employers and police officers respectively.

The chapter begins with a discussion of the views of employers with respect to migrant women and demonstrates that these women are actually preferred by Turkish employers and privileged to an extent over Turkish women, whom employers often regard as

“unreliable”, “trouble-makers” “backward” or “rural” (Bora, 2005). In the foreignness of migrant domestic workers, employers see a greater degree of sophistication and a proximity to their own cultural and class positions, even though they still treat these women as their “servants” in an unequal class relationship (Ozbay 2012, 46). The hierarchy established between the rural and backward Turkish workers and the modern foreign workers acts to legitimize irregular domestic workers to no small extent. Following this discussion, I will examine the moral discourse on migrant sex workers and why are they not regarded as legitimate subjects of society.

The Deserving Migrant Women and the Construction of an “Ideal Femininity”

Virtually all the employers interviewed in the course of this study had previously worked with a native domestic care worker, however were dissatisfied with their performance. One of the common themes that emerged during these interviews was the constant invocation of comparisons between migrant women and native domestic care workers. Employers attributed three characteristics to migrant women, which they saw as lacking in native domestic care workers; these were a strong work ethic, a modern femininity and a sacrificial devotion to motherhood. All of these, according to employers, were sufficient justification for the legitimate acceptance of migrant women within society. They all recognized that, according to the existing law, migrant women were illegal denizens within the country, but for many employers this formal status was nonsensical: “There are many men and women who steal, who betray the country and who choose not to serve the interests of Turkey. Migrant women are more loyal than many of these other people of Turkey. They look after our children. Why are they illegal?”

For them, there was no alternative to hiring migrant women. Undoubtedly, their preference was partly a function of their lower labour cost as well as their continuous working hours, but these were not the only reasons. Twenty out of twenty five employers I interviewed remarked that they had worked with a Turkish care worker before, but their dissatisfaction with them led them to consider employing migrant women. Indeed, many of them had harboured anti-immigrant sentiments before encountering these migrant workers. As one employer pointed out: “In the beginning, I was hesitant to give my money to a foreigner, while there are many Turkish women in need of that money. It is my belief that money earned within the country should remain within the country. I used to question why Turkey should be the savior of other nations.” Similarly, another noted that, “I used to criticize my friends who employed migrant women for childcare. I was very suspicious. How could you trust someone that is not rooted in your own culture, community or language? I never imagined my views of migrant women would change so radically”. Obviously, their illegal status was also a concern for many employers who were suspicious of their motives: “If one does not obey the rules set by the state, you could possibly imagine that they would steal from you also. I used to strongly support their deportation and was angry with the authorities for allowing them to take advantage of our economic resources”. In most cases, the initial attitudes of employers seemed to be based on a perception of migrant women and migrant workers as radically different in their cultural makeup, as essentially lawless or as parasitic on the national economy. However, this nativist backlash against migrant women workers did not seem to survive the encounter and most employers modified their views considerably in the direction of becoming appreciative of these women over time. Employers

often invoked their past experiences with Turkish native domestic care workers as a means of affirming the value of migrant women to their families and to the society. Despite all of the similarities in their working and living conditions, migrant women and Turkish native workers occupy different positions in a hierarchical ordering. In contrast with the native domestic worker, who is vilified as an inferior member of society, the hardworking, modern and self-sacrificing migrant woman is singled out for praise and portrayed as a valuable and legitimate member of society.

Work ethics

Employers often pointed to hard work as one of the qualities exemplified by Armenian care workers. Hard work was identified not only with domestic skills such as cooking and cleaning, but also with less tangible qualities such as flexibility and initiative. According to employers, these features served to distinguish migrant women from native domestic workers. Suzan, a professional woman with two children, employed three separate domestic care workers before hiring an Armenian. The way in which she framed the difference between these two categories of workers is instructive with respect to how the deservingness of migrant women is evaluated according to their feminine performance in the conduct of household work. According to Suzan,

Native domestic care workers are lazy. All of the undesirable qualities of Turkish society are manifest in these native workers. They pretend to work, but they cannot finish the simplest of cleaning jobs in working hours. We used to go to a shopping mall as a family. Instead of watching the children, which is why she was hired, she spent her time shopping. You know, they have little money and they go for tasteless stuff (giggling)... I thought I would never hire a domestic worker again. However, thanks to Gohar, I can see that not all domestic workers are the same. She dedicates herself to the children. She is not preoccupied with shopping, travelling, going out, etc. I tell her what to do and she does it. I do not have to repeat my demands constantly as I did with my native worker”.

Flexibility and taking the initiative were also seen as important qualities expected of migrant workers. In her study on the construction of domestic care workers in Turkey, Ayse Akalin (2007) argues that employers see “flexibility” as a non-negotiable requirement and one which native-workers are disinclined to submit to because of the priority they place upon the care of their own families. According to Akalin, this may account for the preference of Turkish employers for migrant workers, who can more readily conform to 24/7 working schedule and who are generally more obedient and deferential toward their employers. The qualities of flexibility and self-initiative, however, are also seen as lacking among live-in native care workers. Selma, who had employed a Turkish live-in care worker previously, said the following:

I need to admit that I hated my old helper. The fact that she was an older woman caused me to think she would be skilled. She had a daughter who is going to university and she needed the job to support her needs. We expected that she would take care of the children and do some household chores. If she cooked, she did not change the beds. If she fed the kids, she did not wash their clothes. Everything she did was half-finished. Later, she admitted that she did not believe the expectation was reasonable that she would do the cleaning, cooking and daily chores in addition to childcare. Doing the daily chores is part of this work. I do not ask her to do heavy household work everyday, but Turkish women are “inflexible”. They think they should be paid separately for each task.

Flexibility is repeatedly demanded from migrant workers. The daily chores are often not regarded as “real work”. Tasks such as cleaning a sink full of dishes or doing the laundry are regarded as simply the work a woman does and not as demanding extra remuneration. This is, as Selma notes, “...what many women automatically do. If there are dirty dishes, you just wash them. Women who are at home all day should not fail to do the dishes because they are looking after the children. They all come together as a package, right (giggling)?” Many employers perceive migrant women as acting more in the manner of a Turkish

“housewife”, while Turkish domestic care workers only involve themselves in “heavy cleaning” once a week or so. Employers of migrant workers expressed a positive attitude toward the daily functioning of the household under their care. “My helper does not complain”, one other employer noted, “even when I ask them to stay up at night and look after my mother. My Turkish employer used to sleep while my mother was awake. Nadya is awake even if my mother is sleeping. I do not even ask it from her. She knows how to take care of someone. This is the difference in dedication between the two”.

There is undoubtedly a relationship between the strong work ethic and occupational dedication attributed to migrant workers and their acceptance and perception of legitimacy. Where the former are seen to be lacking, the latter must also suffer. During my fieldwork, I recall an incident in which a migrant worker had to travel back to Armenia suddenly on account of an emergency and did not have an opportunity to inform her employers. The employer immediately dialed acquaintances within the police department to report that the migrant worker she had formerly employed was, in fact, an “illegal”. She was immune to any repercussions for her part in employing someone illegally because of her close personal associations with the police. However, the migrant worker’s name was registered at the station and she was labeled a “transgressor”. Later, in an interview, the employer attempted to justify herself for having reported her former worker: “She had been a great employee for me. But lately, she was having a lot of private issues and I could never forgive her for leaving me, an elderly woman, all alone in the house without prior notice. If she is not going to work, what is she doing here? She should go back to her country”. Although the situation is not generalizable, the case is certainly indicative of the strong connection between the social

legitimacy afforded to migrants and perceptions of their dedication to the work in which they are engaged.

Employers are often effusive in their praise for migrant workers, whose hard work and scrupulous diligence in managing the household work differentiates them from Turkish care workers, who are perceived as both greedy and lazy. Migrant women are seen as “housewives”, prepared to assume many burdens without complaint, while the apathy on the part of native workers is resented by employers. These qualities can garner migrant women a degree of social legitimacy, so long as they do not become implicated in any criminal activity. The criminality associated with illicit border crossings or working illegally within the country is excused on the basis of their dedication to hard work and obedience to employers. In fact, many employers regard migrant women as more deserving members of society on account of their strong work ethic, while they distance themselves somewhat from native domestic workers, who they see as “lazy, greedy and demanding”.

Modernity

Often, it is assumed that the pejorative term “unmodern” – meaning culturally backward, dirty or illiterate – constitutes the main discursive bulwark used to culturally vilify “migrant workers”. Somewhat paradoxically, in Turkey, employers use the term to refer to native domestic workers instead. As discussed in the previous chapter, native domestics often originate in rural areas, which are associated with low-culture and which have followed a much slower developmental trajectory compared to the urban centers in Turkey. In her analysis of the changing academic discourse surrounding rural people living within the urban areas over time, Tahire Erman (2001) asserts that this group has been consistently depicted

as the “inferior other”. The cultural category of modernity has policed the boundary between the poor native workers of Turkey and poor foreign workers. Native workers are perceived as the “internal others” who have remained resistant to modern values, while migrant women, though similarly poor, are regarded as more adaptable to the contemporary conditions of modernity. In Turkey’s cultural imaginary, the urban is associated with the West, which embodies the values of “propriety”, “uprightness”, “productivity” and “modernity”. In this sense, the special treatment afforded to domestic care workers in Turkey is related with the construction of a local hierarchy between native domestic care workers and migrant domestic workers. This dichotomy is contrary to the conditions that prevail elsewhere as migrant women are persistently codified as the racialized and backward other – actually privileges migrant women over Turkish domestic workers. Over time, as Anwan Tormey suggests (2007, 86), these local ideologies and local hierarchies have become “laminated” upon the bodies of native domestic workers, whose embodied otherness and exclusion renders them vulnerable to charges of primitiveness, while, on the other hand, they assist migrant domestic workers in attaining a modicum of social legitimacy which can mitigate their illegality.

When modernity becomes a reference point in the everyday relations of domestic workers and employers, the definitions of this inevitably involve gradations of femininity. Among the most oft cited examples of the backward femininity of native domestic workers concerns their large family structures, which are seen by some in Turkey as a manifestation of the “ignorance of rural women” who often do not know how to use birth control methods. One employer remarked, “Turkish women have too many children. They have large families and

their problems never cease. I employed a Turkish woman as a live-in caregiver for my elderly mother. But her family always called her home with some emergency situation. They either got sick, wanted money, or something else. That is why I would not hire a Turkish care worker again”. Another employer expressed resentment about her previous native helper: “during the daytime, when I was out at work, the helper’s family frequently visited my home. Sometimes rural people cannot appreciate the meaning of a workplace where they work as “a professional” and instead they treat it as if it were their own home where they can socialize. She saw it as acceptable for her to invite people over to somebody else’s house as if this were not our family’s private home. They are used to behaving this way in the village, I think, where the doors of all houses are open to the public”. Once again, we see the recurrence of a modern versus backward dichotomy in the narratives recounted by Turkish women employers. Less important than judging the truth of these claims or evaluating what they entail for feminist politics, is the fact that these claims make visible the gender hierarchy involved in hiring a domestic care worker.

However, the definition of modernity, as employers use it, is not incompatible with images of the ideal woman and the ideal worker who is construed as less “troublesome” and more “hardworking”. Employers often characterize migrant women as more docile than Turkish rural women, who are seen as loud, controlling and full of problems that affect their job performance negatively. Foreign women, on the other hand, are favoured for their isolation and are seen as free from family problems and hence able to accommodate themselves to the employer’s needs. Despite the fact that migrant women have families whom they long for, one employer remarked of her Armenian employee, “She is a more

modern mother. She does not ignore her professional work for her children. We know she misses them and sometimes she cries for them. But she does not share these problems with us, because she understands this work is professional”. Migrant women are regarded as the embodiment of “modern motherhood”, who retains an emotional core but is also simultaneously cool and professional.

This idealization of modernity does not involve a blind privileging of foreign women simply because their foreignness is deemed superior in some sense. On the contrary, the modernity of migrant women is neatly compatible with the sort of care worker that employers would prefer to hire – docile, hardworking, literate, clean, and hassle free. Where the foreignness of a migrant worker is seen as undesirable for whatever reason, this formerly valuable asset quickly depreciates. As the most “sensitive” issue for employers, sexuality and promiscuity emerge as an aspect of foreignness that needs to be excluded. Employers often referred to the lenient attitude some foreigners might have towards sexuality – a culturally inappropriate quality – in order to emphasize the importance of being selective when hiring. In my interviews with the intermediary agents, they emphasized that employer women are very careful about the private relations of prospective care workers. During one such interview, I had the opportunity to hear the demands voiced by employers who arrived at the office to seek out a candidate. Among the first praiseworthy qualities listed was the worker’s initiative and hard work, followed by a guarantee that she was family-friendly and had no interest in men. “As an intermediary agency whose job is to “sell” migrants to the employers, we need to highlight several times that migrants are here to earn money for their children. This helps prospective employers to see their role in society as positive”.

Among the employers I interviewed, many were careful to differentiate between women who were already mothers and younger domestic care workers, whose purposes in coming to Turkey might be very different. Employers voiced a clear preference to work with elderly women because they are especially in need of money and they are more reliable when it comes to “not being immodest”. Immodesty, as it concerned migrant women, was often identified with “unlawfulness”. As one employer indicated, “we employed a young woman once from the Ukraine. She introduced herself as a babysitter, but her intentions were different. She used to talk to the young men in the apartment. We not only fired her, but also spoke to the police to inform them that she was earning her money in a dishonourable way”.

According to the intermediary agency, employers’ preference is towards hiring middle-aged women who have children rather than younger women who are more open to relationships. The reason is both practical and moral from the viewpoint of employers. In an interview with one such employer, she claimed that she was forced to fire a previous worker who was looking after her mother because, despite her dedication and hard work, “she was attracting a lot of attention from men, even from my own sons and the boys in the neighborhood”. From a practical viewpoint, employers regard male attention as a potential problem in the sense that unwanted love affairs can disturb the peace within their own home. From a moral point of view, migrant women are regarded as the standard-bearers of modernity only insofar as their sexuality remains veiled. In the event that it is not, employers ensure that they are excluded from the society by refusing to hire them. Sexuality in other words also polices the boundary between deserving migrant women and undeserving migrant women at the level of the everyday. While the foreignness of migrant women is upheld as

morally and culturally fitting, and even as preferable to the mores of rural Turkish women, it is also construed as “asexual foreignness”, which is equated with “social acceptance” and “legitimacy”.

Of course, the attitudes of employers and the local hierarchy they mobilize should not be sufficient to fully legitimize an illegal element if states are determined to combat against it. However, the Turkish state has also deemed these women innocent “domestic workers”, who are in Turkey to work “honourably” and “in the service of Turkish families”. The local hierarchy is not only established between native and foreign care workers. At the official level and especially for the institutions that are involved in policing illegality, such as the police and border patrollers, there is also a clear distinction between women who cross the border illegally for the purposes of partaking in honorable jobs such as care work and others who seek to earn money through “dishonorable” means, such as sex work. According to Chauvin and Mascarenas (2014) , illegal migrant women are incorporated within the host society not only through the intervention of informal actors, but also by formal ones such as agencies and individuals representing the authority of the state. According to the bureaucrats I interviewed, the characteristic of being a “deserving woman” can render women “less illegal”. The forthcoming discussions demonstrate the fact that a sense of deservingness and propriety can mitigate the problem of illegality in two ways: by decreasing the likelihood of deportation and by increasing the likelihood of legalization. Despite its effect in terms of ameliorating somewhat the risks associated with their illegal status– i.e. living with the constant fear of deportation – the discourse equating migrant domestic workers with

“deservingness” functions to conceal from view a variety of abuses that domestic migrant women are exposed to.

Mothers versus Immodest women: Official Incorporation

At both the societal level and the official level, there is a firm distinction between sex workers and domestic workers regarding their “illegal statuses”. Sex workers are considered “dangerous” to the social order due to their hazardous occupations and behaviors, while migrant women are characterized as helpful foreigners who enhance the societal wellbeing. The general consensus among employers and officialdom is that migrant women are self-sacrificing mothers who do not deserve “deportation”, whereas sex workers pose an inherent danger to the society by dint of their role in spreading sexually transmitted diseases, contributing to the breakdown of the Turkish family structure and attracting “danger”. In this section, it is important to emphasize that officials routinely and continually distinguish between different varieties of criminality.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, one of the first groups of migrant women that arrived in Turkey was the category of sex workers. While some of these women have arrived voluntarily, others have been smuggled within human trafficking networks. Yet, irrespective of whether they have been forced into the work or have engaged in it voluntarily, numerous surveys have revealed that both in the media and society a sensationalized image of these foreign sex workers has become widespread. The popular image is of “hot and blonde” women from the former Soviet countries who are dubbed as “Natashas”, meaning they are always available for sex. Pinar Illkarcan and Leyla Gulcur (2002) point out that the labelling of Soviet women as sexually available Natashas has had an adverse effect on all migrant

workers, including petty traders, resulting in many migrant women rerouting to other destination countries for work.

The presence of a large number of “Natashas” has caused a major societal backlash both from within the media and society. Newspaper surveys suggest that sex workers are regarded as a “societal threat”, responsible for the increasing incidence of AIDS/HIV and for causing the “breakdown of the family”. It has also been noted that in several cities, disaffected local women have formed associations to struggle against these migrant sex workers (Gulcur and Ilkcaracan 2002, 414). On the other hand, domestic care workers have received approval for what they offer to families by caring for young children and the elderly and by contributing to the strong family traditions within Turkey. Although some Internet forums and discussion threads used by prospective employers searching for a migrant worker are known to be “racist” and have been sued for this reason by feminist organizations, the general opinion on the part of the public is that migrant workers are indispensable to families. Even many police officers and state staff that were interviewed for this study admitted that they employed irregular migrant women and that they did not believe that migrant women would participate in anything “criminal. In contrast to the popular image of sex workers as oversexed, reckless and criminal, domestic migrant women are coded as “mothers” who sacrifice themselves to assist their own children. During an interview with a police officer, a friend called to learn whether it was risky to hire a migrant care worker and his response demonstrated the level of normalization and legitimacy attributed to such workers: “They are officially illegal, but I cannot tell you not to hire one. Even high level bureaucrats, who pass the laws that make them criminals, employ them”

The sacrificial image of migrant care workers carries emotional weight for both the police officers and employers who are responsible for assessing their degree of criminality. The work these women do acquires moral significance through its gendered character. My interviews with employers revealed that domestic workers are regarded with a great deal of esteem because of what they do for their children. The representatives of the Social Security Institution also associated migrant women with poverty and sacrifice more than with criminality. As one official explained: “What are they doing to deserve deportation? They are coming from poor countries, trying to look after their own children and helping Turkish families to have an orderly family life. There are some among them who do unlawful things. The other day one employer filed a complaint about a migrant because she was abusing an elderly woman. You can find bad people everywhere, but generally Turkish people are pleased with these migrants”.

The distinction between “good mothers” and “immodest women” is also a means of distinguishing between women who are trafficked into sex work and those who do this voluntarily. Turkey has signed the Palermo protocol and is currently engaged in anti-trafficking campaigns. The most successful campaign in Turkey was initiated by the IOM, named “Did you see my mother?” The message of this campaign was to underline ‘the innocence’ of women who are trafficked into sex work, emphasizing that it is not the immorality of women that leads them into this line of work, but the criminal networks that entrap them. Of course, trafficking poses serious risks for both men and women and represents nothing less than modern day slavery. The more interesting point about this campaign, however, is that it received a record number of calls from the male customers of

trafficked sex workers in Turkey compared to other countries. The IOM staff explains the success of the campaign by appealing to the feelings of pity and empathy that were evoked in the male customers after realizing that these women are innocent women like their mothers, wives and sisters and do not deserve to be abused in this dishonorable line of work. As Nukhet Sirman notes in a newspaper interview, it is the notion of violence directed against “innocent woman” that disturbs the sensitivities of customers, but not the even more horrific reality of “forceful work and debt bondage” that human trafficking often entails. In Turkey, like a majority of countries around the world, trafficked women are placed in protection centers where they await return to their home countries. According to Kemal Kirisci (2007), among all migrants, sex workers receive the harshest treatment from police officials.

Chauvin (2012, 248) points out that in the Netherlands, the local police departments have learned to make practical distinctions between “the law-abiding undocumented migrants”, who are simply regarded as a nuisance and “the criminal illegal” whose capture is a priority for police. It could be that the local police departments also use these distinctions in Turkey. For police officials, domestic workers are often seen as the law-abiding undocumented migrants, while the sex workers are seen to induce crime in society. From the perspective of police officers, sex workers are more prone to criminal activity because of the nature of their work. One police officer explained why there is less tolerance towards sex workers in the following terms: “Sex workers are more dangerous to the society. They regularly fight with their customers since they want more money. In addition, sometimes customers attack them or their pimps become involved. Then, there is more work for us and

the order of the society is disturbed.” While the abuse and violence women face in the course of sex work is regarded as something akin to normal, police regard migrant domestics as less dangerous to society because of their “safer working conditions”. Another police officer explained the difference as follows: “From our perspective, both groups of women are illegal, but we cannot apprehend every illegal migrant in Turkey. When we are discriminating, we discriminate according to who provokes more problems in society and engages in more criminal activities. Domestic helpers work in the secure conditions of the household and so they rarely create problems for us. However, sex workers are beaten, fight with each other or fight with customers. They constantly create problems because of the nature of their work.” The discrimination between moral women and immoral women determines the deportability of migrants. A migrant woman recounted a story of how she saved herself from deportation:

One day I was outside and wearing a skirt. You know, I like them as a young woman. A police officer stopped me and asked for my ID. I said, I do not have an ID since I’m a migrant. They took me to the office and examined my passport. The police officer looked at me and he said: “Be honest with me. What are you doing in Istanbul? Are you a prostitute or working honourably?” I told him that I work as a housecleaner and live with friends my hometown in Armenia. He was suspicious and he offered me to save me from deportation if I spent a night with him. I angrily told him that I would rather be deported than do what he asked. He gently smiled, congratulated me and gave me my passport back. He became a friend of mine and I call him if I need help with anything.

The social acceptance of domestic workers is realized through their simultaneous production as ideal workers and as ideal women. They are no more criminals in a strict sense and are recognized as such both by informal and formal circles within Turkish society. Nevertheless, the discourse that mitigates their criminality and affords them some degree of legitimacy also increases the invisibility of migrant women as right-bearing subjects. Their good behavior

and display of ideal femininity has proven to be a valuable asset that secures the continuation of their acceptance in the host society.

Before I turn to a discussion of the subjectivities arising out of this context, I would like to revisit the ways in which the image of the ideal worker and the ideal woman are produced through cultural acceptance discourses, helping to construe domestic workers as unthreatening. The social acceptance discourse solidifies the perception of migrant women as obedient, sexless and unproblematic when they perform their work in an acceptable and appropriately “feminine” manner. Migrant women attempt to accumulate these assets and uphold a high standard in these areas. Despite their precarious position within the society and the fear surrounding deportation and the rise of anti-illegal sentiments in society, migrant women manage their appearance in ways that allow them to appear more unthreatening. The next chapter will examine how women’s lives are shaped more by self-management than fear of deportation. While these self-management strategies are closely connected with the discourse of the ideal woman and the ideal worker, they also render the persistent “insecurities” in the everyday lives of migrants invisible. The next chapter will investigate these dimensions of migrants’ everyday lives.

Chapter 8: Self-Management: Emerging Subjectivities and Insecurities

It was during my fieldwork in 2012 when Turkey passed the law on the regularization of illegal migrant workers. In a regular visit to the run-down apartment building in Kumkapi, where the migrant workers spent their off-days socializing, I realized that the news had not made a significant impression on them. It seemed entirely unimportant to them, and they were preoccupied instead with other issues: “Somebody should tell the governments to reopen the borders. It is too much time to travel through Georgia. This is the main problem for us”. The most senior migrant worker among them, Anush, nodded her head and explained why she did not find the new regulation especially relevant: “I have been in Turkey for 15 years. Did I ever get deported? No. We have problems with employers sometimes, but then we find another employer. Sometimes they do not pay us, but we wait with patience. What is this new law going to do for? Is it going to make our journey home easier? No. Is it going to increase our wages? No. They say that the law will help us by protecting our rights. Is it going to give us a house, holidays, money? No. After so many years spent in Turkey, why should I bother to take ‘papers?’”. Four other women in the room nodded their heads in approval.

Indeed, the migrant workers I interviewed were entirely skeptical of any of the promised benefits in the new law and not because they were ignorant of its content. Rather, they found it far too mired in bureaucracy, requiring them to pay off old fines, amass documents and contend with the overall “technocratic murk” involved in acquiring work permits. Migrant women were aware that, at least with this new regulation, they would be legally recognized as residents and labourers, and could therefore benefit from health care

and other public programs, becoming eligible for social security coverage and the like. Yet, they were unable to appreciate how the new legal regulation would improve their situation in real terms. The women spoke of their friends who had acquired the temporary work permit, only to learn that this bound her to a specific employer and had an expiry date, after which time she could be deported and would become a target of surveillance by the state.

“Luckily”, one of the migrants noted, “she has worked for the same employer for a long time. They love her and she knows she is not going to be fired”. As Coutin (2007, 118) argues, the benefits of work permits in enhancing the status and improving the lot of migrant workers are often dubious at best. Upon witnessing my surprise at their reaction toward the new law, which seemed almost akin to opposition to their legalization, the migrant women pointed out that they already behave in public as they wish, that they can access health care if needed and that they receive bonuses from their employers regularly. In addition, they were not afraid of the official authorities who they felt would more likely protect them than prosecute them, unless they became involved in serious criminal activity.

At first blush, the attitudes and opinions of these undocumented migrants might appear as an agentive response to the new law, posing a deliberate challenge to state actions by refusing to be “legalized”. It is, however, the “moral economy of social acceptance” and the protection it affords migrant women that provides the fuel for such assertions. Thus, if it is going to be labeled resistance, it is a particular embodiment of it, which Salter, inspired by Foucault, was referred to thusly: “It is not simply that the international population is managed, but we come to manage ourselves through the confessionary complex” (Salter, 180). To be rendered fearless, these women need to perform certain “subjectivities” that the

employers and the various state officials adduce as evidence of their status as deserving subjects. In order to obtain the benefits and rights that their illegal status makes inaccessible to them, migrants practice self-management in a variety of ways, and, most notably, by appealing to employers and state officials as “hard working”, “moral” and “deserving”. These are not rights or entitlements in the normal sense but are conditional upon migrants’ right behaviour. In this sense, migrant women are not transgressive of the “gendered migration state”, which seeks to reduce them to a disposable and flexible labour force, nor of the “social acceptance discourse”, which tries to shape them into deserving women. Instead, they largely conform their behaviour to the expectations of what constitutes a good migrant and a good woman in order to safeguard themselves and to gain increased access to the public sphere. While there are those who defy the prevailing social conventions and expectations (e.g. sex workers) it is difficult to conceive of these women as mounting any substantive resistance, and, by and large, the experience of Armenian migrant women in Turkey seems to contribute to the overall commodification of care and the gendered discourses surrounding it.

Moral Claims

The bipartite image of the ideal woman subscribed to by employers was detailed in the previous Chapter as consisting of a woman who works hard and looks modern, but who does not transgress the boundaries of the moral, asexual woman. From the perspective of employers, these characteristics ensure the physical safety of the household and also promote their own economic interests. From the perspective of migrant women, conforming to this image buttresses their claims to legitimacy and provides a means of accessing the benefits

associated with a formal citizenship status, such as health care for example. Armenian migrant women regarded their Turkish employers as “extremely good” people and certainly preferable to employers within Armenia. All of the migrant workers who had worked for wealthy Armenian families felt that they had been treated like “animals”. “They did not let us eat at the table”; “they constantly scolded us for not working hard enough and doing things correctly”; “They were continuously insulting us as people lower than themselves”; “They made fun of our clothes and poverty” were some of the common complaints migrant women voiced. According to them, the popular view of Armenia as a poor and backward country coloured their Armenian employers’ views of migrants who were seen as somehow “subhuman”. On the contrary, Turkish employers, despite the long-standing disputes between the two countries, afforded them the opportunity to become “ideal workers” and to be part of the local community. Whether this perception on the part of migrant women is correct or not, it was certainly widespread.

Migrant women self-identify as hard-working and resilient and attribute these qualities to their Armenian identity. During my conversations with migrants, a major recurring theme was their endurance and stamina and their ability to perform both men’s and women’s duties simultaneously within the household. In possessing “great intelligence,” superior to that of other migrant groups, Armenian women quickly learned and adjusted to their surroundings, adapting to life in a foreign country. They all took pride in labouring for their children back home and any additional work they were forced to shoulder was not seen as a cause for complaint but rather as a mark of superiority. All of the migrant women recounted stories of how they were able to work without becoming fatigued, how they

assumed added work even when it is not expected of them and sometimes worked shifts in in two different households. “When she (the employer) needs me at her mother’s house, I go there and cook dinner. When she needs me at their aunt’s house, I go there to clean. I even do work at her neighbour’s house. Exhaustion never gets to me.”

Migrant women often essentialize their endurance and labouring skills as Armenian, transforming it to a source of “ethnic pride”. They use it sometimes to claim their superiority over other migrants and sometimes over Turkish employers depending on what is at stake. The underlying theme remains, however, that the self-identity of migrants as moral women manifests itself in their dedication and hard work. They did not regard the issue of work as something to be shirked, although serving strangers rather than their own families unsettled them somewhat. The diligence and care they show toward the elderly and the children in Turkey is a perceived as a “comforting experience” in which they feel themselves useful and occupying a position that is essential for the livelihood of all people. Migrant women approach their hard work, overtime and discipline not as something that needing amelioration or remedy by government action or official protection.

Moral Claims and Paternalism

At first glance, it would be possible to conceive of migrant women’s women assertion of moral superiority through hard work and diligence as a form of overcompensation owing to their legal subordination and subaltern class position. It is well documented in many anthropological studies that migrant women “forge identity-projects” as a defense mechanism in order to contest the superiority of the host-society and employers (Thomas *et al.* 2004, Sawecki 2001). Migrant women constantly invoked a sense of ethnic

pride that is generally lacking in Turkish people and asserted their superiority in many realms. However, these claims are not made as a way of rendering themselves more visible as right-bearing subjects. On the contrary, migrant women often objected to their need for protection from exploitation, bondage or other indignities. Their somewhat Pollyannaish view is not accidental, but is part and parcel of the overall strategy of self-management by which they seek to transform themselves into the “the proper subjects” desired by employers. As a result, migrant women do not harbor the fears of “improper subjects” who suffer because of their immoral misdeeds from the threat of deportation, unemployment and inaccessibility to the public sphere.

Migrant women often rely on exaggerated displays to demonstrate their submissiveness and work ethic to employers. When I was visiting Narine at her workplace where she cared for an elderly woman, her employers (the daughter and son-in-law of the woman) came to pay an unexpected visit to their mother. Narine, who seemed ever prepared for such an eventuality, got up in a brisk move and welcomed her “miss” and “sir” at the front door with gestures of great respect and submissiveness. We all sat together in the living room to speak sip coffee while Narine refused to sit down and stood next to us like a soldier ready for her next command. When they finally left, I was curious about her inflated deference toward her employers. She remarked that she had been unable to receive her full wage for the last two months because one of the sons of the elderly woman was not contributing his share to the income pool. In addition, she was having difficulties with her health, for which she absolutely needed to receive medical attention. In order to convince her employers to assist her, she needed to communicate how hard working and deferential

she was: “This family is an important family. They have been very good to me. When I need health care, they assist me. They take me to the hospital and deduct the cost of the private care from my wage. Without them, it is not possible for me to gain access to a doctor. Apparently, the Armenian hospital was previously accepting migrants, but it is more difficult now.” Migrant women are acutely aware that their access to certain public institutions depends crucially on their good conduct by means of which they can increase their social recognition.

Narine is not alone in behaving this way, but all of the migrant I interviewed and observed conducted themselves likewise as a means of shoring up their position. Migrants believe that good conduct can earn them protection, which is ample reason to show patience, obedience, subordination and hard work. “My employers love me a lot” Armine remarked, “because I do everything for them. My employer once told me that she could never repay me for my services, but one day she did. There was a night that I went out to have fun with my friends at a disco. We were not doing anything immoral, just having fun and dancing. All of a sudden, police officers appeared to search for a criminal and figured out that we did not have IDs. I immediately called my boss and she paid some money for my release. I was free in a couple of hours”.

All migrant women have similar stories to tell about how employers have intervened on their behalf or on the behalf of their acquaintances to rescue them from deportation; how they take care of their health care needs; or how they do not give up on them easily. What is interesting is that none of these protective gestures are regarded as rights belonging to migrant workers, but as privileges to be earned through migrants’ proper self-management.

Migrants have to be respectful and moral to increase their deservingness in the host society. Younger migrant women know that they cannot openly date boyfriends, which would make them appear as immodest and older women know that they cannot cry or complain about how much they miss home, which would make them appear as “nuisances” similar to native domestic workers. They even need to show patience when their dignity is slighted by verbal insults from their employers. However, all of these proper behaviours are not imposed on migrants by official authorities or employers and are not perceived by migrants as a function of their exclusion. Rather, migrants combine their own understandings of morality, derived from the context of Armenia and the local cultural hierarchies in Turkey, to develop a story of how they must become loved and be protected by their employers. The overriding emotion is not one of fear or a sense of exclusion, but of honour and discipline reached through proper self-management.

Migrant women are also quick to divine the local hierarchies that exist between urban modern and rural, backward women and often seize upon this critical posture towards “rural women”. Narine told me once how she was able to position herself as a modern woman: “I realized that when I got my hair done at the coiffeur or when I wore brand name clothes, my employers thought better of me and would praise me for my appearance. I felt more like one of them. You know the village women. They do not know how to behave in society; they talk curtly, disturb people and often are dirty. We might not have a lot of money but we are not like them. We Armenians had a great civilization once”. Migrant women often emphasized their great attention to table manners, hygiene and not appearing impolite or ignorant as a part of their overall self-management. Having realized that acceptance within

society is not related with their legal status, but is a function of displaying proper feminine and modern norms, migrant women are eager to distance themselves from both the image of the sex worker and of the backward rural woman. In return, they receive “protection” in the form of access to public institutions. Haytunian went so far as to state that “if an Armenian is fired, probably she did something wrong. If you work hard honestly, your employer protects you. When you keep them happy, they keep you forever”.

The protections extended by employers are important, but those extended by the local enforcement agencies, like the police, are crucial since they provide migrants with official recognition and shape migrants’ subjectivities in the direction of proper expectations. The next section examines how migrant women strive to be legitimate subjects in the eyes of officialdom.

The Encounter with Police Officers and the Performance of Proper Femininity

Migrant domestic workers understand that they are not a frequent target for police action. Deportation, according to migrant women, should constitute a form of punishment against groups such as sex workers, who earn their money by immoral means and whose work in Turkey is actually harmful and criminal. As described in the previous Chapter, the separation between “law-abiding” undocumented migrants and “bad illegals” is utilized by the officials as well. Migrant women construct their self-identity as different from these women by drawing upon this cultural-legal discourse in Turkey as well as from the moral codes of their own culture in Armenia.

These Armenian migrant women had not been confronted with assaults or threats by the police. The area in which they spent their off days is at Kumpkapi, which is situated nearby

Istanbul's largest department concerning foreigners. Police officers do routine controls and surveil the ethnically divided neighborhood, which has attracted many Kurds from Southeastern Turkey into its developed underground economy organized around restaurant businesses and small shoemaking outfits. In this neighborhood, there is also a large Armenian church, which serves both as a religious center for the community and an elementary school for the children of illegal migrants. Migrants feel comfortable to stroll through the streets, shopping at the bazaar and purchasing cheap Armenian cigarettes arriving from abroad. There are also local bus companies which the migrants use for the purposes of sending money and goods back to Armenia. The police officers are visible on almost every street corner, doing their usual routine checks and conversing with the migrants and the local business owners. Their illegal presence is plainly obvious to the authorities.

While walking the street with Narine on one of her off-days, she pointed out the deportation center in which captured illegals are held by the police before their return journey to their home country. She remarked that all the criminals ended up there, but she has never heard of an Armenian migrant taken into the deportation center. "God protects us from those places" she noted, in a tone of voice which initially came across as fearful, before regaining her composure: "This won't happen to me unless I get involved in some criminal enterprise. Armenian women often do not do these things. Even if we were dying of poverty, we would not do something as immoral as sleeping with men for money". The confidence in being endowed with such morality – thanks to the cultural values of Armenian-ness – erases the fear of being deported and helps Narine to self-identify as "un-deportable". This sort of confidence is common to all migrant women. The belief that police would never deport one

of them unless some misdeed was committed is intuitive to many Armenian migrant women and reflected in their gratitude toward the Turkish state: “They ask us whether it is difficult to work in Turkey given the hatred between our countries. I told them it is the government’s own business, not mine. I worked here for 15 years. All the police officers know here that I’m Armenian and they have never told me to go back to Armenia. This is thanks to the government that allows us to earn our money in honest ways”.

Migrant women were anxious not to be identified as “immoral” women and paid careful attention to how they reflected themselves in public. They avoided engaging in friendships with women who were known to engage in sex work; they paid attention to wearing the proper clothes and would scrupulously avoid in any situation in which there was the appearance of impropriety. It is important not to go out after certain hours as well as being respectful towards one’s employers. Anush notes that, “Our motto is to stay away from trouble. If I see a fight, I flight. One day, I encountered a man who was about to attack his wife with a knife. I did not call the police in order not to be identified with the incident. It is very important to be silent and to mind your own business”. Silence and remaining in the shadows emerge as some of the means through which migrant women demonstrate their loyalty and assume the mantle of “law-abiding” migrants in Turkey. Of course, the performance of submissiveness and silence which are enacted in order to solicit the image of deserving womanhood are a pathway to protection or security for migrant women, but instead lead to greater gendered vulnerability. Indeed, if one important insight is to be gleaned from this focus on self-management, it is the recognition that this brings with it the enhanced vulnerability of women. Accordingly, it is necessary to shift the focus in migration

studies and international relations away from migrant deportability and issues of status and more towards other aspects of gendered vulnerability and victimhood.

From fear to Self-management through Stratified Women-ness

As I have already emphasized, it is not only by means of their hard work, but also by enacting a moral, submissive and silent self that migrants achieve “deservingness”. By assuming the role of the flexible and hardworking migrant that local women are unable to be, and by not flouting convention and avoiding criminality as sex workers are unable to do, migrant domestic workers establish their superiority vis-à-vis these other local and foreign subjects. In exchange, they seek recognition within the formal and informal communities in Turkey. Migrants are aware that the continuation of their acceptance within the community depends upon performances, which are not imposed from outside, but have become internalized as a part of an overall strategy of self-management. Fears of deportability, instability, unemployment and lack of access to public institutions which define the existence of many undocumented migrants are less relevant to the lives of these Armenian domestic workers. Instead, these migrant women take upon themselves “the principal responsibility to manage their own security and adopt a calculative and prudent disposition toward risk” (Inda 2006, 16).

Migrants’ assertion of validity and moral worth is functional in Turkey because of the existence of the “gendered migration state” and because of the local hierarchies surrounding different kinds of women-ness. The Turkish state, in an effort to uphold the role of domestic women as mainly mothers and to consolidate commercialized care in a market-based economy, has promoted liberal visa regimes and a lenient attitude towards illegality in the

country. In addition, as a result of the micro-level intervention of the employers and of officials, migrant women can access the public realm and begin to feel un-deportable. This does not flow from a recognition of illegality as a state-engineered category and the contestation of it as violent and abusive, but from a context that constructs migrants as self-managers. However, by the same token, this self-management requires the use of dualistic constructions that involve good versus bad women; submissive versus recalcitrant workers; deserving versus undeserving illegals. Armenian migrant women come to identify themselves with the former in each binary. Armenian migrant workers' construction of themselves as hard-working, submissive, moral and asexual contributes to the reproduction of gendered migration state and the neoliberal care regime that underpin migrants' subordinate status. In this process, stratified women-ness is valorized and further consolidated as a measure of the "acceptability" or "unacceptability" of migrants determining their access to basic rights in society. Social acceptance and recognition thus comes with a performance requirement on the part of the migrants.

The world in which Armenian migrant women live their daily lives is a post-social world in one sense. The concept of the post-social citizen as subject plays an important role in Foucauldian analysis and has been applied in the field of migration studies by authors such as Jonathan Inda(2004), Chauvin (2007) and Stern (2006). In defining the new subjectivity of the citizen in the post-social government, Inda argues that:

The political subject is less a social citizen whose security is guaranteed through the bonds of collective social life and the receipt of public largesse than an individual whose citizenship is derived from active self-promotion and the free exercise of personal choice. The post-social citizen is thus an to be an entrepreneur unto him – or herself: "each person is to conduct his or her life, and that of his or her family, as a kind of enterprise, seeking to enhance and

capitalize on existence itself through considered acts of initiative, and through investment – of time, emotion and energy – that are calculated to bring future returns (Inda 2004, 11-12).

Following Rose and Mitchell, Jonathan Inda names these as “technologies of citizenship”, which construct citizens as prudential, ethical and capable of self-management and distinguishes these from “anti-citizenship technologies”, aimed at illegal citizens as irresponsible, unethical and reckless. Illegal citizens – often racialized – are configured as anti-citizens incapable of or reluctant to exercise responsible self-government. Therefore, they are not governed through requests to self-manage, but rather by “criminalizing” them through the increased “used of law” and taming them by threats of deportation. However, as I have pointed out, migrant women are not always targeted by the latter. On the contrary, the “technologies of citizenship” are delegated to illegal Armenian migrants themselves, who are seen as capable of self-management and prudential behavior.

I have focused on this theoretical concept here because of its usefulness in the proceeding section of this chapter. Understanding whether it is fear or self-management that governs the “illegal” migrants in their behaviour has important implications with respect to grasping the nature of the vulnerabilities that migrant women face. When we listen to migrant women, fear, non-belonging and racialization do not emerge as significant dimensions of their (illegal) work and life experiences. Reflecting on this point, a majority of scholars have reached the conclusion that “migrant women” manifest an agentive response to both employers and the state, which is manifest in their display of ethnic and feminine pride vis-à-vis their host society as well as in their refusal to accept being labelled as illegals. There may be some validity in the assertion that ethnic and feminine pride constitutes some

implicit challenge to employers or to the larger society but I disagree with the view that this is a clear manifestation of agency for a number of reasons.

Claims of ethnic pride and superiority undoubtedly reinforce the sense of self-valuation on the part of Armenian domestic workers who consider themselves in their social relations as devoted mothers, honorable workers, or as exemplifying other idealized ‘feminine’ traits. These self-identifications involve a number of agentive themes such as “sense-making”, subjective interpretation of disadvantage – i.e the interpretation of laboring selves not as a marker of subordination, but as a marker of superiority – and countering the power of employers, who are often described as “helpless”, unskilled and lazy. However, these self-attributed identities are often coupled with performances of submissiveness, overwork and deference. The aim of migrant women in these instances is to win the figures of authority such as officials and employers over to the discourses of the “right kind of femininity” which increases their odds of social acceptance in both official and unofficial circles. What is more important to realize, however, is that this discourse is *not* developed by the migrant workers to purposefully reshape the dominant discourse in their favour, but rather it is employed by the migrant workers to “fit in” with the dominant discourse with expectations of greater acceptability.

Different from other developed countries, Turkey, with its large informal economy and the need for cheap, flexible employees that can occupy it, has not been a hub for anti-migrant, nativist sentiments. On the contrary, so long as migrants achieve a standard of “deservingness”, they can escape the consequences that other illegal migrants are subject to. The criteria for deservingness is established by the requirements of the migration regime, in

addition to local hierarchies of femininity in Turkey, as described in previous chapters. The essential dimension of this form of government is that it fosters the self-managing capacities of migrant women rather than controlling or threatening them with punitive measures. The system engenders an understanding among migrant women that basic rights such as access to health care, financial resources, security and freedom from the threat deportation, exist outside of the formal state apparatus, which means that they cannot be provided to migrants by the state. Rather, migrants are rewarded with these rights, if they perform the gender roles correctly by “responsibilizing themselves”.

Invocations of ethnic pride and superiority should not be understood in terms of active agency either; after all, migrant women are not seeking to recover from a racial and working-class subordination in their host society by asserting the superiority of the cultural and ethnic values of their home countries since they are more subordinated by the Armenians of Istanbul than they are by their Turkish employers. During my interviews, a few pointed to their “culture” as having inculcated in them values associated with hard work. Others said that their culture prized “family values” and feminine morality. Such iterations reify a highly essentialized mode of difference “in which attitudes and behaviors emerge from a primordial culture of origin” (Miranda 2011, 164). These narratives made sense for migrant women in the new social field in which these qualities were rewarded. The iterations also served another crucial purpose for Armenian migrant women, namely, to “maintain” their reputation as “moral mothers” that would serve the purpose of shielding migrant women and their families from criticism and accusations within their home town. This became very clear to me upon realizing that these iterations of ethnic pride were more

pronounced within a group setting rather than in private interviews. Armenian migrant women pay very careful attention to the circulation of rumors that may reach their homes in Armenia. They avoid smoking, revealing their secrets and talking about money among compatriots. In this sense, Armenian migrants' self-conduct and responses are less about agency and more about becoming proper neoliberal and gendered subjects, both within their home and host societies. In this constitution of subject-hood, situating themselves within "local geographies of value" also plays a crucial role. While I am unable to further examine the implications of this here, it should suffice to point out that the survival of local values in a global context might not necessarily entail "agency", but could be very well contribute towards promoting the formation of desired workers and women globally. Local geographies can be the very stuff of global politics.

Creating the Desired Subjects: Silences and Vulnerabilities

This section concludes the discussion of migrant women's self-management and discusses how this is conditioned by the experience of insecurity in the everyday lives of Armenian migrant women as they attempt to perform the role of the moral woman and deserving migrant. These are subjectivities that have emerged in the context of macro-level and micro-level gender discourses both in the sending and receiving countries. Migrant women invest in certain understandings of deserving femininities and masculinities. These bring advantages to women in terms of accessing certain rights such as health care and worker protection through informal means. Yet, at the same time, migrant women are rendered vulnerable as a result of this performance. It is simultaneously the climate of tolerance (one that does not recognize migrants as right-bearing subjects but is concerned

with their incorporation within society as an informal and disposable labour force) and the possibility of protection and legitimacy in Turkey that elicits the performance of the hyper moral feminine and hard-working woman. It is also the moral feminine norms and the climate of increased pressure on women's roles in Armenia that structure these responses. Is this quest for legitimacy making women more secure?

Surely, migrant women find a refuge in asserting their sense of self-worth and pride. However, they also ally with their employers in the process, who treat them as a cheap and exploitable labour force. The working conditions are quite dreadful in the domestic care industry. Women, legal or illegal, have no protection as concerns job security or domestic abuse. Accordingly, tolerance is only shown to those illegal women who do not complain and problematize these issues. Yet, migrant women have a lot of stories to tell about the abuse, inhumane treatment and deception they face in Turkey. Narratives of ongoing and chronic abuse were a recurring theme in my interviews and observations. Narine, for example explained how she was treated by her Turkish-Armenian employers when she first arrived in Turkey: "I came to Turkey with the hope of finding a good job and earning money for my children. The first house I went to did not let me sleep in a bedroom. I slept on the kitchen floor for days. They did not give me full dinners either. One night they piled together the leftovers from their plates in front of me". Similarly, another woman observed that, "I lost a lot of weight since I arrived here. I look after an elderly man in his apartment. He does not give me money to buy food for the house because he is very stingy. We eat pasta every day and he sometimes even saves half the package for the next day." Another complained about how she was caught taking an apple from the fridge and reprimanded by her

employers for this. In some cases, they did not receive their wages for long periods of time, but remained silent with in the hopes that submission and deference would be rewarded.

According to Benedict Anderson (2000), employers within the domestic care industry do not hire a labourer in the conventional sense, but rather seek to own the entire personality of the worker. However, migrant women do not regard such intrusions as a violation of their rights. On the contrary, they take pride in their capacity to endure all of the travails and hardships that they face in the course of their job. Every individual migrant seems to have their own struggles and their own path to salvation. Migrant women are often motivated by the desire to satisfy their employers (often a rather Sisyphean task). Miranda Hallett (2009, 50) notes in her analysis of Salvadorian migrants in the US that social acceptance and subordination often go hand in hand. Illegal workers in chicken factories are welcomed by the rural residents of Arkansas and factory owners mainly because they constitute a cheap and an under protected workforce. She describes the marriage between these two forces as “subordinated inclusion” in which migrants “disappear as right-bearing subjects”. In this context, migrants are individuated. Their salvation is a question of appropriate self-conduct and upholding the tenets of hard work and silent resignation. Illegal migrant women are constituted as subjects unworthy of protection, low-skilled and disposable. Unfortunately, a registered or temporary worker status does little to mitigate these effects.

Armenian migrant women, however, must be given credit for not having internalized the expectations of proper conduct completely and retaining some core of autonomy from this deservingness discourse. They take pride in what are regarded as moral and deserving attitudes, but they are also tempted to remain “invisible” when they know their actions and

behaviors could be open to critique or vilification. Armenian migrant women recounted to me stories of sexual abuse, violence and deception. They wanted to make their silences heard but only by me as an outsider. I promised that I would not share their names when retelling their stories and this gave them more confidence in divulging some of this information. They could not have shared these secrets with most of their compatriots, employers or families back home because of the fear of this being regarded as a breach of feminine morals. Both Narine and Armine related that their most fearful moments had been with their partners.

Narine had been working in Turkey for eight years. The lack of a family who could afford her protection in Turkey and the need to feel safe, she said, compelled her to do things that would likely be seen as inappropriate by her family. She started dating a married Turkish man, Ahmet, who promised to take care of her. Narine was pleased that he took her to the hospital, shopped for her, did some errands for her and gave money when she needed it. However, Narine was obliged to follow rules of his:

He did not let me go out or wear a t-shirt, but the worst part was that he forced me to take abortion pills. I was bleeding for days. He was married and he did not want to have a child by me. He is a very religious man. He said he loved me. He did not let his wife even look outside the window. He struck me several times for asking questions about his wife. Finally I chose to separate from him. But he said to me that only death could separate us.

Narine established a relationship with Ahmet out of the sheer vulnerability associated with living in a foreign country. She was seeking protection in the midst of a sea of unknowns. Narine cited various moments when she was fearful for her life, such as when she felt was bleeding to death, but could not do anything out of her fear of being deemed an “immoral woman”: “I locked myself in the bathroom for hours. I was about to pass out. I did not come out or tell the employer that she should take me to the hospital. If it were my

teeth or something, I would have told. How could I say that I got pregnant by a married man? They would fire me in the same second. I could not call any of my friends either. What would they tell my family back home?”

Although she was fearful of being labeled an immoral woman, Narine did not perceive herself as such because, according to her, the difficulty of living without a family and the need for a man’s protection led her to be with him. Narine also showed great deference toward Ahmet. She did not speak much, did not complain or defend herself against his violence. She sometimes reasoned with me about her behaviour: “You know, we do not ask questions to men. I cannot place demands on him. Turkish women are too loud. I cannot understand how men here put up with it.” As much as it was protection that Narine sought from the relationship, it is also the “vulnerability” of migrant women that attracts some men. Men often feel a sense of entitlement over migrant women, because, as Ahmet notes, “they do not even belong to Turkey.” He says: “These women come here alone. I protected one of them. I gave her money and looked after her. She relied on me in her most difficult times... Violence? Yes, sometimes she does not listen to me, and I lose my temper”.

Although an irregular status is not something that generally provokes fear amongst migrant women, Ahmet was quite aware of the fact that these women will avoid unnecessary encounters with the police. Narine told me that he often threatened to report her to the police if she decided to separate: “He says I’m Armenian and it is enough to tell the police that I’m a prostitute. If the police call me in, they won’t listen to me. He could tell them that I received money in exchange for sleeping with him.” One day during my field work, Narine left Turkey hurriedly without announcing her departure to anyone. Later, I found out that

Ahmet had stabbed another man who he believed was flirting with Narine. Months later, I found Narine again and she spoke of her desperation during those times: “One day Ahmet called me. He said he is coming to kill me as well. I could not go to the police because they will prevent me from reentering the country. My employer would have immediately called the police. My family does not know any of these things because I do not want to tell them I’m with a man here. I was scared. I slept at train stations for days with no money or food. Finally I made my way back to Armenia. I never spoke about the issue with anyone since they would not have allowed me to return here to earn money.”

Narine’s desperation points out to some of the obvious pitfalls of an illegal status. Her silence and suffering was partly a function of her status which prevented her from seeking shelter with the police. Her employability depends upon her avoiding any association with criminality. The fact that she was seeking help from a partner who inflicted abuse and violence is also not unrelated with her status. However, Narine’s framing of her desperation also reveals a significant dimension of gender-specific vulnerability. Her silence and invisibility are also a result of her efforts to remain as a “deserving” feminine subject within the local geographies of value (both in Armenia and Turkey). She could not afford to seek help from her family, employers or the police because of the implications of revealing her perceived unfeminine morality.

Narine is certainly not the only migrant woman who has suffered in this way. Migrant domestics often remain silent about the sexual abuse carried out by their male employers, which is rampant. The fact that migrant women are unable to seek help from anyone and are perceived to be dependent upon the goodwill of their employer encourages men to engage

more easily in acts of violence and abuse. Sometimes, migrant women claim, employers justify their actions by the rightfulness of harming a woman from a hostile nation. When Armine arrived in Turkey she took a job working for an elderly man. One night, he called her into his bed claiming that the money she received should entitle him to sex. When she refused, he claimed that his father was killed by Armenians and that he would be justified in raping her. She could not shout or ask for help, because of the fear of being discovered: “I thought, what if he told to the police that I was stealing from him or trying to poison him? Who would believe me, if I told them that this old man was trying to rape me? They would think I flirted with him. I felt hopeless and jumped off the balcony located on the first floor. Luckily, I survived and ran away without looking back”.

Many women feel that they are judged by police and employers according to a standard of propriety rather than one of legality. Migrant women are not regarded as right-bearing subjects, either in the event that they are merely tolerated by the state or regulated by some legal means. Because of Turkey’s concern with managing the gender regime and the privatization of the care sector and its reluctance to provide work safety or protection to migrants, their employability and migratory status in Turkey has remained dependent upon their ability to satisfy the expectations of employers and other social actors. “The vague expansiveness and evocative fear factor” associated with the term “immoral woman” creates a climate of fear that serves the purpose of silencing women. The irregular status of migrant women and their inability to speak out has emboldened men and employers alike to abuse and mistreat them. Migrant women often perform the role of the deserving woman without any trouble and garner the benefits of social acceptance both within Armenia and Turkey.

However, on those occasions where they find themselves facing abuse, threat and physical danger, the fear of being perceived as immoral silences them further. Women are frightened to be blamed, when, in actuality, it is they are the victims of abuse and violence.

Conclusions: Importance and Implications

This thesis has sought to investigate how we can understand the regulation of international migrants differently if we take gender seriously and has advanced six main arguments throughout the eight chapters. In this final chapter, I will elaborate on these points and will discuss the implications of this thesis for International Relations, concluding with a brief assessment of what is generalizable and what is unique about the arguments advanced throughout.

Main Arguments

Firstly, I suggest that the study of migration should be broadened to take account of the importance states put on gendered social relations. This thesis argues that nation-states are not operating through an obsession with abstract notions of security – at least, not all states and not in relation to all types of migration flows. States are gendered and these gendered characteristics are reflected in the articulation of their migration regimes. Different gender regimes exist in different countries and these can influence migration flows in a variety of different ways. Since the primary focus of this thesis has been upon migrant care workers, I have examined the relevant regimes in Turkey and Armenia that influence the movement and experiences of such migrants. In Armenia, I focused upon the “sexual-moral” regime, while in Turkey, I discussed the welfare regime at some length. In Turkey, the demand for care workers is shaped through the gender roles produced for citizen women in and through welfare policies in addition to the marketization of care services. In Armenia, the question of who goes and who stays and under what conditions is shaped through the constructed notions of women as child bearers and cultural symbols of the Armenian nation.

Secondly, as I have emphasized throughout, a wide range of policies in both sending and receiving states are important in shaping gendered migration regimes. Instead of focusing solely upon migration policy – which, in any event, does not exist in isolation – I focused upon a cluster of policies and discourses in the realm of security and economy that entail specific notions of appropriate femininities and masculinities for men and women within the family and the nation. The central focus of the third chapter was upon the macro-level policies of the Armenian state and this consisted of a detailed analysis of the gender regime that is primarily shaped through policies concerning men's migration, security concerns, the revival of anxieties surrounding the historic Genocide and economic difficulties. In the case of Turkey, I examined the labour laws regarding both native domestic care workers and foreign care workers as well as the welfare policies and their historical genesis.

Third, it is also important to emphasize that the intersection of gender and migration regimes can serve to reinforce patriarchy. This thesis has stressed that what is at stake in accepting migrant women in Turkey is not only economic concerns regarding the cost of reproduction to the state, but the fact that the steady inflow of women also feeds into the public and private manifestations of patriarchy within Turkey for citizen women. In Turkey, the participation rate for low-skilled women workers in the workforce remains very low because it is actively discouraged by the state and by cultural norms. It is interesting that the rights that have been secured for temporary migrant workers are actually more extensive (at least in theory) than the protections afforded to citizen women. The government encourages the employment of migrant women more than citizen women. In other words, migrant care workers not only assist in reproducing the gendered economic arrangements within the

country, but also the patriarchal norms for citizen women. It is difficult to say whether this situation is unique to Turkey or whether the preferential treatment accorded to migrants has been adopted elsewhere, and answering the question would require more detailed research into other geographies of migration. In Armenia, it is important to note that women's migration has not challenged the cultural norms and expectations for women within society. Women migrants migrate not in spite of such expectations and pressures, but because of them. After they migrate, the success and failure of migrants continues to be assessed through such gendered frames.

Fourth, notwithstanding the insecurity and exclusion faced by many migrants, it is also important include acceptance and toleration alongside these when examining gendered migration regimes. Social acceptance and toleration have often been adopted and promoted by macro-level actors as they allow states to better pursue their interests in many cases, furthering the project of nation-building, promoting their imperial goals in the international arena and reproducing their economic and military sovereignty. Therefore, instead of approaching this accommodation as a transversal space of post-national citizenship or expression of multiculturalism or cosmopolitanism, two things need to be analyzed: first, what is it that this social acceptance and toleration discourse does for the nation states which adopts it? In addition, how are the subjects of social tolerance perceived and used both ideologically and materially?

Fifth, social acceptance and toleration has an everyday dimension as well and it is important to examine this if we want to understand migrants' experiences with respect to gender. Migrant women find themselves caught up in a web of relations consisting of both

official and unofficial members of their host and home society. I have argued that Armenian migrant women experience social acceptance and tolerance in a transnational field, trying to pursue the goal of being deserving of this toleration in both contexts. Women conduct themselves in certain ways to receive rewards, avoiding social ostracism and criticism in Armenia and gaining access to guarantees of employment, wages, access to health care and gifts, and forgiveness and protection from police and other public officials in Turkey. In this context, it is necessary to point out that it is not only states that manage the international migration flows, but migrants also come to manage themselves according to certain local hierarchies in social settings. Migrant women pick up on cues about social propriety which they encounter and experience in their everyday lives, and according to which they conduct themselves. Migrant women in Armenia have sought to demonstrate their commitment to feminine morality and the cult of motherhood, while in Turkey they attempt to manage their 'illegal yet tolerated' status by amassing symbols of legitimacy. In this sense, my thesis suggests that everyday social actors, their definitions of femininity, morality and deservingness are crucial in shaping these women's experiences.

Sixth, new subjectivities emerge and old ones can be reinforced in these processes. The shift from a focus upon border violence and the deprivation that occurs within deportation centers to the everyday efforts of migrant women as they seek to buttress their claims to legitimacy sheds new light upon migrants' subjectivities. Women become invested in certain notions of femininity and work-habits, appealing to cultural norms and nationalist ideology, reproducing hierarchies such as the good versus bad woman, moral mothers versus immoral sex workers, and hard-working Armenians versus lazy Turkish domestics. In this

process, the hierarchical moral codes concerning gender are conflated with migration status, leading to the further criminalization of certain femininities as unauthorized by the state.

On the other hand, migrant women also contribute to their own effacement as right-bearing subjects, making it difficult to address issues of overwork, violence and their illegal status. Migrant women strive to represent themselves as submissive, modern and hardworking women to their employers; as modest and upright mothers to police officers; and as committed to the values of Armenian-ness to their compatriots. In this way, they become the desired subjects of the migration state. They embrace a strong work ethic and they take refuge in the moral image of domestic work, remaining loyal to the values of ethnic identity. As such, fair treatment and access to the public sphere are conceived as rewards based on their performance as it is assessed by various actors within society. The literature on migrant identities and subjectivities has argued that these assertions and practices can potentially reshape the manner in which the nexus between migrant and nation is imagined, thus redefining notions of citizenship. There may be some validity to this claim insofar as these women are acting like citizens in many ways, claiming health care, a public presence and a voice for themselves. However, these transformations are not necessarily in the direction of cosmopolitanism and may, in fact, represent a move towards a privatized version of minimal citizenship that draws upon neoliberal rationality instead.

Implications for International Relations

This thesis is primarily a feminist critique of IR and IPE's approach to the migration, however some of the concepts I rely upon have broader implications. They could be generalized, for example, to the study of the other contexts and other migration flows.

Firstly, I will address some of the wider applications of the concept of the migration regime as it has been advanced in this thesis. Secondly, I shall emphasize the importance of studying power within frameworks of inclusion, not only exclusion. Thirdly, I will emphasize the urgency of moving beyond the framework of illegality in order to better understand the experience of migrants. And lastly I summarize why it is important for IR and IPE to take gender seriously in global migration studies. In this section, I will address what is generalizable about my insights into gender and migration and what is unique to the specific case of Turkey and Armenia.

First, the concept of the migration regime is useful inasmuch as it allows us to connect the broader ideologies and interests of states and their simultaneous constitution as nation states to the global flows of people. The notion of a migration regime involves an examination of the political histories, values and interests of nation states as they are framed by gender, racial and class hierarchies and in which states' responses to the different migration flows are embedded. For example, we have witnessed historical periods wherein the international mobility of people has been strongly supported across borders corresponding with political interests motivated by nation-building, imperialism and/or industrialization. Slaves moved from Africa to the Americas during the colonial period along with their European masters; Third World populations later travelled to Germany, France and Austria to satisfy the labour shortages within these countries necessary for further industrialization and development. For the purposes of nation-building, people have often been shuffled around in such a way as to achieve the desired ethnic homogeneity of the given states. The formation of the inter-state system, the construction of nation-states and

the conduct of global economy has been closely intertwined with the forced and voluntary or regular and irregular movement of people. The development of class and race relations in the domestic politics of nations, as well as related definitions of citizenship and national identity have been connected with the ideological and material appropriation of the figure of the migrant.

The discipline of International Relations, however, has limited its analysis to the study of “security” – which is of particular concern only for some Western geographies and has only become a significant concern in the post-9/11 period. Accordingly, mainstream IR approaches have thus far assumed that the migration regime is shaped predominantly by the forces of national security in world politics. To put it differently, states’ concerns with their territorial sovereignty, with the homogeneity and protection of their political community and with the boundaries of citizenship are privileged as analytical sites within which the politics of international migration flows should be situated. Surely, it is important to account for this trend because it has certain implications for racialized groups such as Middle Eastern migrants, who are often coded as “terrorists” and remain subject to biometric border controls and state surveillance in the US and Europe. The rising conflicts in Africa and Middle East are creating more refugees and asylum seekers every day, who mount a courageous and often perilous journey from their home countries only to encounter this toxic climate within their new host countries. Furthermore, there has been a growing trend, identifiable in International Institutions, such as the UN, the International Organization for Migration and regional migration commissions, for a stricter control of borders, refugee flows and the regulation of irregular migration. The mobility of people is now assessed

through two dominant and competing frames: the sovereign right of states to control their borders and the right of humans to move freely. The latter is typically made subordinate to the former, rendering many migrants' lives less important compared with the right of states to exercise power. Critical IR scholars have played an important and constructive role here in critiquing and problematizing both states and international institutions.

Yet, as much as it is useful, too much of a focus on security can prevent us from examining other interests, stakes and ideologies that shape the behavior of states with respect to migration flows. In International Relations, there is a need to engage with the emerging phenomenon of the “migration state” and to dispense with the “security state” that has been so often invoked in order to understand states' responses to migration. I believe there is a strong need in IR first to examine states as gendered, racialized and class-based entities – and remember that they have become so through a particular configuration of migration and migration policies – and situate emerging national and global responses to migration flows at the nexus of these hierarchies. As Mai Ngai discusses in her work *Impossible Subjects*, the migration policy of the US during the 19th and 20th centuries defined the contours of race relations, definitions of citizenship and state authority. This thesis has attempted to contribute to this project by examining the migration regime of nation-states from a gendered perspective and seeking to understand the relationship between the migration regime and gender relations and how this fixes the limits of tolerance for certain labour and class performances.

Ontologically, this thesis has also sought to address the need to focus more upon non-Western geographies and on different flows of people – such as domestic care workers,

sex workers, tourists, retirees and others – so as to identify, analyze and compare the interests and ideologies states promote in relation to different groups. Migration constitutes an incredible reservoir of knowledge concerning international relations. Focusing on these different flows is necessary, because it can enable us to ask different kinds of questions: for example, what explains the increasing number of migrant care workers from South to the North? Why do states and international institutions recognize touristic flows as a legitimate expression of popular mobility but restrict refugee flows? Why do migrant sex workers seem to coalesce around US military bases in the world? What are the implications of “retirement flows” (i.e. individuals who work in the North and retire to the South) for IR? What alternative histories of international relations and the nation state system can be revealed in emphasizing these flows? All of these various questions can and should be addressed by broadening the interpretative scope of frameworks based on exclusion and security.

Second, one of the important implications of this thesis for IR concerns my emphasis upon different modalities of state responses to migration and the recognition that states can foster the desired social and material effects within the nation by adopting inclusive policies toward migrants. I have demonstrated that migrants are not necessarily prevented from entering or leaving the country, even if their “unauthorized” movements are read by states as a violation of their “sovereignty”. IR scholars have pointed out that the practice of excluding migrants is one way in which states reproduce their privileged notions of citizenship, the sanctity of their political community and their authority to control their borders. In this framework, the encounter between the migrant and the detention or deportation center represents the ultimate display of states’ sovereignty. However, the study I

have engaged in has sought to demonstrate that within the nation, the political community, borders and citizenship are all gendered constructs. The reproduction of states, their economic, military and sovereign power, is based upon the reproduction of gender hierarchies within the nation. I argue throughout that migrants can do the ideological and material work for states as they seek to achieve their domestic and/or global objectives. They can be used to fashion a desired national identity, to promote capital accumulation or to perpetuate the gender hierarchies within the nation and at a global scale. Migrants can be included as subordinate members through law or their illegality can be tolerated. This thesis demonstrates that social acceptance and tolerance, rather than intimidation and exclusion, can transform migrant women into a flexible, useful and moral labour force and the desired feminine subjects so that they could be employed for the material and ideological reproduction of the nation state.

Third, this thesis has demonstrated that migrants' experiences are not only determined by their illegal statuses, although it is certainly one of the hallmarks of their everyday experience of life. The illegal migrant, whether the focus of conventional or critical scholars, has been central to the study of migration in IR. However, I have argued that migrants' subjectivities are shaped and experienced within the context of social acceptance and tolerance both in their home and host countries. To focus on the multifaceted "unauthorized identities" of migrants today is extremely pertinent because being a citizen or non-citizen is only one form of belonging in current circumstances. Sometimes gender, class and race assume more significance in the practices of exclusion, violence and abuse and subjects struggle to position themselves in accordance with these identities. The discipline of

IR should pay more attention to this social acceptance discourse in the context of migration studies and should afford more weight to the importance of migrant women's social relations in their home state. The current approaches seem to listen to migrants' voices only when they have something to say about their "illegal" statuses. As Gayatri Spivak tells us, Western intellectuals hear them as long as they speak to their concerns. The concerns for critical IR have been to critique states' power to exclude and to critique the securitization discourse and focusing the experience of the illegal has therefore furthered this agenda.

My focus upon the specific context within Armenia and Turkey and the local histories, interests and identities developed therein clearly makes it difficult to generalize some of the insights I have gleaned to other settings; nevertheless, the overarching notion that the nation and the international system is gendered and that subjects have agency is a global phenomenon. In chapter 2, I argued that the division between reproductive and productive labour is an important ideological and material base underpinning the nation state and international system. The global accumulation of economic wealth, the global wars for empire, and the global cities and borders that define the nation are themselves gendered and women migrants can be appropriated in several different ways in these various fora. Specifically, I examined the way in which Armenian migrant women have been appropriated for the nation building project in Armenia and the welfare regime in Turkey. These two gendered regimes were chosen because they directly impact upon migrant women's mobility. From the outset, my methodology has been grounded in the recognition that the best way to "know" which policies, discourses and institution are shaping women's (and men's) migration is to look to the lives of migrants and other everyday actors (families, employers,

women in Turkey, etc) who are more directly affected by these policies. I scrutinized the role of women as reproducers, mothers, national symbols and the property of men within the nation and household and examined how states' rituals, discourses and policies about appropriate feminities have shaped women's international migration for care work. Sexuality and gender, in its intersection with class, is a key to understanding the complexity of states practices of inclusion and exclusion towards migrants.

It is important to reiterate that gendered migration regimes are embedded in states' regulations and affect multiple groups beyond migrant care workers. Sex workers, for example, are subjected to different gendered regimes, based on the norms of appropriate sexuality, heterosexuality and morality, while refugee women's applications have been assessed for admission based on how closely they conform to the stereotyped Western image of the "victim woman". Male migrants from the Middle East have been asked to look at the photographic images of homosexual intercourse by migration officers in the Netherlands in order to determine their level of modernity. This thesis has drawn attention to the multiple ways in which gender regimes affect migrant care workers within Armenia and Turkey, and, just as the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion are conditioned by these regimes, so too are the experiences and subjectivities of migrant women

As a general principle underpinning world politics, this thesis also challenges the notion that there is any straightforward relationship between the state and its citizens and the state and its migrants. The thesis complicates the picture of state-migrant interactions and state-citizen interactions. The assumed relationship between the territorially sovereign nation state and the well-defined citizen within IR does not exist anymore (if it ever did). States'

gender regimes and neoliberal economic transformations are creating different classes of citizen, excluding some from the labour market, social rights and basic feelings of security. On the other hand, states might afford foreigners more rights and opportunities than citizens themselves in some cases. This means that the line separating what lies inside and outside the state has been blurred (if not it has always been). Both Turkey and Armenia have unique characteristics in terms of how this blurring effect has occurred. Turkey's welfare regime is very different than many other Western countries, which has implications for how we conceptualize the relationship between citizen women and migrant women. I have argued that in Turkey, the "emancipated citizen and subordinated migrant" framework does not make sense and that both groups are under comparable pressures within society. I even went so far as to argue that in comparison with native domestic care workers, migrant workers are more privileged. This situation is unique to Turkey and in order to broaden these findings, comparative studies could be pursued to identify the relationships between gender regimes and migration regimes and the nature of hierarchy (and porosity) between the category of the citizen and non-citizen in different contexts. Within Armenia, the trauma of the Genocide has clearly shaped the predominant discourses on women as stationary and immobile, whereas in other sending nations, such as the Philippines, migrant women have been valorized as the epitome of the nation's development project. All these different historical trajectories and pressures can lead to different configurations of gender, citizen and migrant subjectivities.

This observation also brings some taken-for-granted assumptions about where inequality lies in global politics under critical scrutiny. The national differences in wealth and

power have been the dominant mode of explanation to account for the migration flows and the plight of migrant workers. However, as this thesis demonstrates, within the nation, not everybody has equal opportunities, rights and access to voice. Immigration restrictions and allowances are definitely reinforcing asymmetrical globalization, but it remains an important task to conceptualize and work on what these asymmetries are.

Lastly, this thesis draws attention to the importance of everyday actors in the regulation of global migration flows. The study of social control as it is enacted by everyday actors and the importance of the discourses they adopt about moral deservingness has been privileged in this thesis as vital to the management of migration. These definitions of morality provide migrant women with legitimacy or illegitimacy both in Turkey and Armenia. As I have argued, this does not efface the importance of migrants' illegal status, but the struggles and experiences of migrant women are conditioned by their status as "tolerated". Everyday actors' definitions of deservingness are important determinants of migrants' legitimacy and illegitimacy and they can shape migrants' subjectivities in significant ways. This does not mean that state sovereignty is an irrelevant concept when we are seeking to understand migration regimes, but this thesis suggests that control is now exercised by multiple actors in everyday life and through multiple competing discourses revolving around gender, class, ethnicity and race. These clearly need to be situated and examined alongside state discourses of sovereignty when examining the experiences of migrants and social control.

Migrant women in many circumstances act like agents. Their management of identity sometimes makes use of and reinforces the gendered and class bigotry that have targeted

other social groups, like sex workers and Turkish domestic workers. This attests the importance of examining migrants' as agents in world politics: the decisions they made and discourses they use to reinforce their own legitimacy can become part and parcel of the larger discourses that targets other groups. They can also contribute to make them disappear as subjects who have rights. Yet, this study clearly demonstrated that migrants cannot be left out in our analysis of world politics, because they contribute to the construction and reproduction of various binaries themselves.

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