THE GEOGRAPHY OF INTERMUNICIPAL RELATIONS:
A CASE STUDY IN THE GRIMSBY AREA, ONTARIO
THE GEOGRAPHY OF INTERMUNICIPAL RELATIONS:
A CASE STUDY IN THE GRIMSBY AREA, ONTARIO

by

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The thesis examines the causes of intermunicipal cooperation and noncooperation in Grimsby, North Grimsby, Saltfleet, and South Grimsby. After reviewing the geographical literature on municipal government and the literature on interlocal relations, the thesis records the territorial and functional evolution of the study area's municipalities. The thesis then examines specific examples of intermunicipal cooperation and noncooperation in the Grimsby area. Stress is placed on identifying those variables that play a key role in producing agreement and disagreement between local governments. The final chapter attempts to rank the factors thus identified into categories of their relative importance and to evaluate the methodology of the thesis. Two appendices discuss the Regional Municipality of Niagara and present the master interview schedule used in the thesis.
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In spite of the above assistance, any errors appearing in the thesis are, of course, the sole responsibility of the author.

Roderick MacKenzie Logan

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CHAPTER I

INTERMUNICIPAL RELATIONS

Although intermunicipal relations are an integral part of municipal systems, the phenomenon is virtually ignored by political geographers. This thesis attempts to establish the extent of intermunicipal relations in the Grimsby area of southern Ontario, to identify and to understand the variables which lead to intermunicipal cooperation and noncooperation, and to develop a methodology for examining the intermunicipal process.

Intermunicipal relations are as neglected by other social scientists as they are by political geographers but a somewhat related process, integration, receives great attention. The concept of integration was developed in the functionalist school of sociology. The functional approach assumes that every system must solve certain problems or meet certain needs in order for the system to survive. These needs are referred to as functional requisites or functional imperatives. According to the leading proponent of functionalism in sociology, Talcott Parsons, integration is "the means by
which systems bring individual behaviour into line with the collective goals and values of the system."\(^4\)

While political scientists are in general agreement that the notion of integration constitutes a useful theoretical framework, there is no consensus as to the precise definition of the term. Some political scientists view integration as a state of mind among system members and therefore stress the importance of subjective variables. Others see integration in much more objective terms and focus on rates of interaction or transaction. Still others describe a system as integrated when the system is able to perform its functions, i.e. "integration equals successful performance."\(^5\)

One of the more thoughtful, and widely accepted, perspectives is provided by Haas, who defines political integration as "the process whereby political actors (e.g. governmental units) are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations, and political activities toward a new center."\(^6\) In a penetrating analysis, Kaplan argues that this type of definition may be too restrictive since "members may support a system because it...fulfills some limited purpose...by skillfully manipulating payoffs....without the members developing emotional ties to the system and without the membership
being subordinated" to the system.\(^7\) With respect to local government, Wheaton also adopts a limited view of integration; \(\textit{e.g.}\) integration is a "minimal consensus."\(^8\) In other words, integration is a relative concept and may not necessarily involve the actual amalgamation of local governments.\(^9\)

In general practice, however, political scientists have considered integration in the context of the actual amalgamation of previously separate governmental units. The key integrative mechanism is labelled institutionalization, which is defined as the establishment, transmission, and enforcement of values, norms, and role expectations. The product of this process is solidarity or morale. A system is well integrated when members have internalized the norms and role expectations of the new (\(\text{i.e.}\) amalgamated) system and view the new system as legitimate, self-evident, and even sacred.\(^{10}\)

While the present study is marginally concerned with the process of integration in the sense of amalgamation, as represented by the provincially imposed Regional Municipality of Niagara, and does examine some of the variables that possibly assisted the involuntary integration of three quarters of the study area in 1970, the thesis views intermunicipal relations primarily in
the limited context suggested by Kaplan. There is evidence that municipalities do not cooperate with one another under normal circumstances with the object of amalgamating, i.e. integrating to form a new system with fewer constituent units. The available evidence indicates that municipalities cooperate, in part, to preserve the status quo. In Kaplan's terms, "members (local governments) may support a(n existing) system (inter alia by cooperating with one another) because (the system)...fulfills some limited purpose (the preservation of the administrative and territorial status quo, perhaps)....without the members (local governments) developing emotional ties to the (existing) system and without the membership (the municipalities) being subordinated (suffering a loss of autonomy)" to the existing system.

The Importance of Studying Intermunicipal Relations

When viewed within the Parsonian context of system maintenance, intermunicipal relations assume considerable practical and theoretical importance. Interlocal relations are one method by which established systems attempt to solve their problems and to meet their needs and thus help the systems to survive. As an established feature of man's municipal behaviour,
interlocal relations possess intrinsic interest and therefore merit the attention of scholars. So much of the literature dealing with local government is either reform oriented or concerned with recently created systems that scholars tend to stress what they think man's municipal behaviour ought to be rather than what it actually is. There is a possibility of minimizing bias if one examines the conduct of intermunicipal relations in a long standing system than if one focuses on some proposed or new system. The pre-1970 Grimsby area presents such an opportunity. Some acts of intermunicipal cooperation date back to the first decade of this century.

Quite apart from the academic interest and value inherent in studying any aspect of man's politico-geographical behaviour, there is a real need to identify the positive and negative results of past interlocal relations in the thesis area. Southern Ontario's entire system of local government is undergoing revision at the present time. The new system should take into account the past performance of all aspects of local government, including intermunicipal relations. Otherwise, there is a danger that the baby will be thrown out with the bathwater, i.e. valuable
interlocal mechanisms may be rejected out of hand in some new system.

Interlocal relations deserve more attention because they are likely to be a continuing feature of local government systems despite the current emphasis on reform. Integration in the sense of amalgamation is undoubtedly a valuable reform tool but territorial integration is not a panacea for all municipal ills. Carried to its logical conclusion, total integration would result in gigantic municipal governments coterminous with the next highest level in the politico-territorial hierarchy. Obviously, the integrative (reform) process has practical limits. No matter how well municipal areas are redesigned, questions requiring intermunicipal dealings will remain. Indeed, they will increase with the passage of time as society once more evolves in ways that tend to ignore local boundaries. Senior governments can not continuously redraw the borders because the economic and political costs are too great. Some attention must be given to interlocal mechanisms but, as yet, this aspect of local government is almost completely ignored by political geographers. Hopefully, the present study may help to redress this imbalance.
From a theoretical point of view, intermunicipal relations constitute a portion of the integrative process. Our knowledge of the integrative process at the municipal level can not be complete until all facets of the municipal system are studied carefully. While the thesis is not directed toward integration per se, any insights into intermunicipal relations achieved by the dissertation should add to our understanding of the total integrative process. This is especially true of the identification of the variables which influence cooperation and noncooperation among municipalities. Jacob and Teune point out that integration can operate at four levels of the politico-territorial hierarchy: international, national, metropolitan, and local. They speculate that ten factors may exert an "integrative influence" and point out that some, though not all, variables may apply to the same extent at each level of the hierarchy. Jacob and Teune's sovereignty-dependency factor, for example, is not of much consequence at the international (nation-nation) level but can be crucial at some subnational (e.g. municipal-provincial) level. By focusing upon the intermunicipal level, the thesis attempts to add to our understanding of integration in general, and local government in particular.
The Research Site and Data Sources

Prior to 1970, the study area comprised four municipalities: the town of Grimsby, and the townships of North Grimsby, Saltfleet, and South Grimsby. (See Figure No. 1.) With the exception of Saltfleet, which continues to occupy Wentworth County's northeastern corner, the local governments in the study area were reorganized in 1970. Lincoln County was dissolved and replaced by the new Regional Municipality of Niagara. Grimsby and North Grimsby were amalgamated to form the enlarged town of Grimsby. South Grimsby was amalgamated with Caistor and Gainsborough to become a part of West Lincoln township. (See Figure No. 2.) These changes reflect the current state of flux in Ontario's municipal system and indicate the transitional nature of the political milieu within which intermunicipal relations operated in the years leading up to 1970. The thesis concentrates on the two decades preceding 1970.

Information on the nature and extent of intermunicipal relations was determined by consulting a wide range of sources. Two sources proved invaluable for determining the official positions of local governments: (1) interviews with a broad spectrum of municipal, mainly appointed, officials, and (2) newspaper files. The role of the provincial government
THE GRIMSBY AREA 1969

FIGURE NO. 1
was established by consulting provincial legislation, local and provincial officials, the reports of local government review commissions, the rulings of the Ontario Municipal Board, municipal files, newspaper records, and other sources.

The Social Science Literature

Political geographers have paid relatively little attention to local government and have almost completely ignored intermunicipal relations altogether. A survey of major textbooks reveals almost no references to local government.15 Pounds is the only author to devote a full chapter to the "Geography of Administrative Areas" but more than half the discussion really concerns nonmunicipal units such as special purpose administrative areas and electoral divisions.16 While Kasperon and Minghi do not dwell on the subject extensively, their book contains municipally-oriented readings.17

Several writers have noted the general neglect of local government.18 The Science of Geography comments that except for work on subnational boundaries, municipal government is "otherwise treated only sparsely in political geography."19 In a review article dealing exclusively with boundary studies, Minghi is unimpressed
even with the amount of work on local boundaries. 20 Both sources account for the inattention by postulating an overemphasis on national and international questions. Kasperson concurs and adds, with respect to urban areas, that they have traditionally been the preserve of economic, not political, geographers. 21 This conclusion also applies to rural municipalities since the countryside has long been the bailiwick of agricultural, land use, and settlement geographers.

The political geographical literature provides indirectly some clue to the reasons for cooperation and noncooperation between municipalities. This is especially true with respect to the rapid growth of urbanization and the overall role of municipal government within a nation's total system of government, i.e. the municipality's raison d'être. 22

Municipal systems are nearly universal in their distribution. Pounds stresses that "all states, with the exception only of the very smallest, are divided... into smaller unit areas." 23 Even some micro-states, notably Andorra and Liechtenstein, are so divided. 24 As for their raison d'être, Pounds states simply that local governments exist for administrative purposes. 25 Massam refines this definition by observing that the execution of legislative acts is facilitated by the division of a
state into semiautonomous units. In a more elaborate explanation, Douglas suggests that the achievement of efficient management, orderly rule, and rational planning by use of areal administrative systems enables a state to meld diverse cultural and physical regions into a coherent whole. Concurring with Douglas, Freeman adds that municipalities exist to contribute to the welfare of the entire nation and also to preserve and protect individual rights.

In conceptual terms, municipal systems are the politico-territorial solution to the dual problem of simultaneously serving local and national interests. These interests often conflict, particularly when municipal systems are no longer in accord with current conditions. This situation creates what the Science of Geography calls "disequilibria...in a political system caused by nonconformities between land occupancy and the existing legal system." The presence of disequilibria usually produces change in municipal systems. Pounds and Whittlesey note dryly that there is invariably a considerable time lag between the reason for local government revision and its accomplishment.

Works in several disciplines, including geography, examine the root causes of disequilibria. After reviewing works by Fawcett, Gilbert, Taylor, Whittlesey,
and others, Prescott concludes that population movements are the key to understanding areal administrative obsolescence. Shifts are caused by urban growth, rural depopulation, the development and exploitation of new resources, and the extensions of conurbations beyond their legislative limits. These conclusions are certainly in agreement with studies by political scientists and sociologists.

Wheaton blames disequilibria on "the rapid growth of urban areas, the high degree of mobility within them, and the consequent expansions in demand for public services." These demands "generate conflict...and ultimately changes." Lithwick and Paquet account for disequilibria by congested cities "suffering costly urban sprawl at the fringes, as individuals and firms attempt to...balance...proximity to the city centre...and...larger amounts of land" found "only at the fringe." These "spatial changes wrought by development" create "conflicts between political and geographic boundaries." The conflict is further exacerbated "as the shift to the consumption of (government) services proceeds" and all urbanites demand an equality of services regardless of local boundaries. With special reference to Canada, Rowat states that the "old-fashioned way of drawing a boundary around...the
"built-up area" is "out-modeled" because cities have "spilled over" their boundaries.34

On the infrequent occasions when geographers have studied municipal areas, attention has usually focused exclusively on dysfunctions (i.e. disequilibria) in local government systems. Nelson's study of the impact of local boundaries on land use and transportation patterns in California's Vernon area is a major exception.35 More typical are works by Burghardt, Fawcett, Gilbert, Van Burkalo, and others, which all emphasize the lack of coincidence between political and socioeconomic communities and their legal boundaries.36 Nongeographers often share the same focus. Lithwick and Paquet stress "the growing estrangement between the boundaries of the legal entity and the functional entity."37

Accordingly, the geography literature is heavily reform oriented with special emphasis on the identification of functionally ideal municipal core areas and their separation by the careful redrawing of local borders. This morphological bias assumes that municipal problems will largely disappear if local governments are made spatially more in attune with human geography.
Proposed revisions are based on increasingly complex analyses of selected distributions. Douglas concentrates on the dynamic spatial patterns of journeys to work, school, and shopping and recreational facilities. According to Douglas, following Deutsch, the common limits of these patterns reflect shared attitudes which collectively constitute and areally define a social community. At the national level, the notion is very much akin to the circulation fields discussed by Jones and Gottmann.

The value of much municipal research by geographers is vitiated by an overemphasis on local boundaries. Prescott suggests that border problems are symptoms rather than causes of municipal tribulations. He therefore calls for more work on core areas and less on boundaries. The *Science of Geography* strongly endorses Prescott's thinking by stating that investigations between geographic area and political process, whatever the governmental level, are the essence of political geography.

A few geographers have examined the extent and type of municipal responsibilities. Burghardt discussed Burgenland's *gemeinde* (minor civil divisions) and mapped the various service areas of key functions. Gilbert's 1939 study of Britain's internal political organization
demonstrated that different governmental functions often require varying spatial limits for optimum efficiency. Nongeographers have made the same observation. Rowat states that "it is clear that different functions require different areas and populations." Gilbert never considered the possibility of utilizing interlocal agreements to achieve varying optimum service areas for different municipal services.

In 1948, Gilbert again considered local government reform and reiterated the importance of creating units large enough to operate efficiently. Grafted on to this admonition was the concept of freeing local governments from complete central control, and a fervent desire for the preservation of neighbourhood feeling or spirit. Gilbert again failed to show how enlarged municipalities could be made spatially to correspond with all the differing limits of optimum efficiency required by different municipal services. Rowat explains that "because of specialization... many existing municipal services would be performed more efficiently" by regional or provincial governments but "the participation of citizens in government is keener and government services are likely to be more responsive to local needs and desires when... performed at the local level." Rowat concludes that it is "practically
impossible to fix upon an all-purpose self-governing unit which will be ideal."46

Minghi is one of the few political geographers to consider municipal functions in conjunction with politico-territorial fragmentation. Key municipal services with area-wide application in Washington, D.C. and adjacent parts of Maryland and Virginia are examined. Actual planning, sewage removal, transportation, and water supply patterns are compared to a hypothetically ideal situation devoid of political and topographic barriers to free circulation. Minghi concludes that local boundaries disrupt the integration of governmental services to an extent that portends dangerous consequences unless corrected by changes in boundary functions.47 Regrettably, intermunicipal arrangements receive little attention from Minghi or the other geographers reviewed above. The thesis must turn elsewhere for guidance on interlocal theory and practice.

The political science and sociology literature contains a wealth of material on local government, especially in urban areas. Until recently, with respect to political science, the bulk of these works adopted either an institutional or a reform approach. The former concentrated upon the legal structure and
operation of municipal government while the latter proposed solutions to municipal problems, usually by advocating regional governments. Canadian classics exemplifying these two styles were Crawford's *Canadian Municipal Government* (institutional) and Rowat's *Your Local Government* (reformist).

Social scientists are increasingly using a behaviouralist approach, focusing upon political processes such as conflict resolution, decision making, elections, interest group activities, and integration. Some behaviouralists utilize municipalities as laboratories to test experimental assumptions; others simply possess an intrinsic interest in local government. Dahl's *Who Governs?* is an outstanding example of the laboratory thesis; Banfield and Wilson's *City Politics* typifies the less theoretical tack.

Works on interlocal cooperation by Marando and on integration by other political scientists constitute the most useful scholarly literature by nongeographers in so far as this thesis is concerned.

Marando's study examines the effectiveness of interlocal cooperation as an agent for providing municipal services, and for solving metro-wide problems in the Detroit, Michigan area. The author tries to quantify the study of intermunicipal relations using 58
local governments in three counties. Three indices of municipal socioeconomic status (median family income, the total number of laborers and service workers expressed as a percentage of the labour force, and the percentage of people with less than eight years schooling) are correlated with four types of interlocal agreement: joint, contractual, having social implications, and having economic implications. All seven variables also are correlated with municipal tax resources, as measured by per capita assessed valuations.

Marando found that cooperation was greatest for policing, public works, and utilities, and least for forestry, housing, parks, planning, recreation, and urban renewal. Agreements entailing heavy capital expenditures were strictly on a contractual basis, with benefits and costs to participating governments explicitly stated. This type of agreement mainly involved jails, sewage removal, and water supply. Municipalities were not unduly hesitant about entering into arrangements where the distribution of costs and benefits were difficult to ascertain, as long as the costs were relatively minor.

Certain services conformed to the widely held assumption that municipalities cooperate only for
economic reasons. Fire protection, jails, libraries, police, sewers, and water supply all adhered to the economy of scale concept. In such cases, Marando finds that per unit service costs decline as the number of participating units increases. When provision of a particular service proved to be prohibitively expensive for a single municipality, some type of cooperative action became the only means possible for securing the service.\textsuperscript{52} Jacob and Teune refer to this type of economic consideration as a "shared functional interest" and agree that it may exert "an integrative influence."\textsuperscript{53}

Marando found little intermunicipal cooperation for most services having social implications, and none at all for the important functions of housing, planning, urban renewal, and zoning. The few agreements having social implications only involved municipalities of nearly identical social status. Local governments were loath to abjure jurisdiction over functions that affect their residents' life styles. In most instances where economies of scale could be attained through cooperation, but with a resultant loss of municipal identity, local governments preferred to either work alone and absorb the higher costs or simply forego the service. While the social status indices used in
Marando's study did not specifically measure a municipality's "blackness," the desire to avoid racial mixing as a consequence of any agreement, was nevertheless implicit in many interlocal decisions.\textsuperscript{54} Toscano describes a similar situation in the Philadelphia area.\textsuperscript{55} Jacob and Teune refer to this characteristic as the homogeneity factor and believe that it may be an important variable in the intermunicipal equation.\textsuperscript{56}

Marando demonstrates that differences in municipal social status do not inhibit cooperative endeavors involving mundane services such as sewage removal and water supply, since these do not appreciably influence life styles. The tax resources (\textit{i.e.} corporate wealth) of potential municipal partners was of far greater importance than social status when interlocal agreements involved utilities and public services. Cooperation for these types of basic services was often routinized and long standing—up to sixty years. In such cases, uniform service standards resulted which one would reasonably expect only from one metropolitan government, rather than from dozens of small units.\textsuperscript{57}

The Detroit study also showed that decisions on whether or not to enter into agreements did not apparently vary according to the degree of
professionalism of municipal officials. This is interesting because the training levels and experience of appointed and elected officials varied greatly both within and between municipalities. 58

Marando concludes that intermunicipal agreements solved the local problems of providing services but that they did not represent a satisfactory solution to major urban ills such as slum housing and poor schools. 59 If intermunicipal cooperation is regarded as a form of incipient integrative behaviour, Marando's work suggests that, in so far as local governments themselves are concerned, a long period of cooperation does not lead to voluntary integration. Marando demonstrated that collaboration enabled local governments to remain separate and independent. Cooperation in one functional area did not necessarily lead to increased cooperation for other services. Not one agreement led to political unification. In fact, Marando decides that interlocal endeavors spurred geographical fragmentation since adequate services could be maintained by small units through a process of selective intermunicipal arrangements. 60

Marando chose to examine the interrelationships of over fifty communities and decided that this was practicable only by using quantitative techniques. He
soon determined that not all his variables could be quantified, e.g. the desire for local autonomy, and the attitudes of municipal officials. These factors were investigated by interviewing one official each in a majority of the local governments. Marando acknowledges that his analysis of non-quantitative variables was not as comprehensive as he would have preferred. In particular, Marando was never certain that one interview reflected accurately the official position of every community in his study area or explained fully the genesis of that position. Due to the large number of municipalities in his study area, Marando lacked the time to conduct more interviews or to consult other sources, such as historical documents, newspaper files, and government reports. Furthermore, some unquantifiable variables of great potential significance were ignored completely, e.g. the role of the Michigan state government, the impact of county boundaries, and Michigan's municipal history. The possibility that these and other variables may be of significance is raised by Jacob and Teune.

Jacob and Teune suggest that ten factors may exert "an integrative influence...: (1) geographical proximity; (2) homogeneity; (3) transactions, or interactions, among persons or groups; (4) knowledge of
each other; (5) shared functional interests; (6) the 'character' or 'motive' pattern of a group; (7) the structural frame or system of power and decision-making; (8) the sovereignty-dependency status of the community; (9) governmental effectiveness; (10) previous integrative experience." Several of these variables, often in greatly modified form, are relevant to this thesis.

Jacob and Teune's proximity factor is interesting. Their proximity hypothesis states that the closer communities are, the more likely they are to integrate. In an observation that Kasperson and Minghi regard as an implicit criticism of political geographers, Jacob and Teune present the proximity hypothesis only as a "rough geopolitical equation" because "curiously, this assumption has not been subjected to rigorous testing." They further qualify their statement by concluding that "geography (i.e. the distance factor of proximity) becomes significant only as it engages the motivation of human behaviour. Its integrative impact is indirect and must be mediated through other factors (e.g. homogeneity, interactions, and mutual knowledge)." Marando's findings support this formulation. On the other hand, two nongeographers, Russett and Merritt, have developed a tentative, positive link between
proximity and integration. Soja states flatly that the chances of integration are increased by close proximity.

Jacob and Teune's factor of previous integrative experience relates to the element of time. Jacob and Teune speculate that if previous integrative experience was beneficial, future integration is very likely; if unfavourable, the reverse reaction would be expected. Marando's findings seriously question the validity of this assumption. With regard strictly to intermunicipal relations, Deutsch tends to agree with Jacob and Teune. He argues that a consideration of history is "essential" because "...information about the results of...past (interactions)..." are recalled and "...thus may modify...further action." Deutsch is referring to functional, as opposed to territorial (e.g. amalgamation), matters.

Jacob and Teune's sovereignty-dependency factor takes into account the hierarchical nature of man's politico-territorial organization. Municipalities are not sovereign entities. Local governments are the creatures of senior governments and Jacob and Teune expect these senior governments to influence all aspects of municipal behaviour, presumably including interlocal relations.
The geographical literature suggests that an historical analysis often is useful for determining the role played by senior governments with respect to the form and function of municipal government. Studies by Hall on early Japan and Ginsburgs on modern Mongolia and Vietnam show that senior governments often erect centralized municipal systems designed to further national goals at the expense of local interests. The works by Hall and Ginsburgs also indicate that authoritarian controls do not necessarily disappear once the need for them has passed. In the case of Japan, Steiner demonstrates that municipal boundaries even of ancient origin may persist into the present. Japanese prefectures were designed spatially to allow a horseman to reach the prefectural capital in one day from anywhere within the unit. Research by Freeman, Osborne, and Roberts dealing with Rutland, England's smallest county, illustrates how a very old civil division resists all attempts to alter either its territory or status. In the midwestern United States, Pounds demonstrates that the congressional township, although originally intended solely to facilitate land settlement, continues to function as a unit of local government, despite the fact that it is now too small to perform this task efficiently.
The studies on Britain's Rutland county indicate that county boundaries may retard cooperation between minor civil divisions. Rutland proved unwilling to cooperate with neighbouring municipalities for certain matters that would have had an unwanted impact on the small county. Smallwood's study of metropolitan reform in London, England showed that local governments may be willing to cooperate in matters associated with the functions of municipalities but, at the same time, be most unwilling to cooperate voluntarily in changing local boundaries. Long-established municipal borders tend to be viewed as sacrosanct. The supposed barrier effect of local boundaries is primarily an historically-based phenomenon.

In addition to considering history as an "essential" variable in the study of intermunicipal behaviour, Wheaton stresses the need to take into account the stage reached in any unification process that may be underway in a particular study area. Kasperon and Minghi make the same point. Wheaton's observation is predicated upon the fact that senior governments exercise much influence over municipal government, that the nature of this influence may change over time, and that "most important innovations in administrative systems are externally motivated."
While political geographers are in general agreement concerning the potential value of placing current research in its proper historical perspective, there is some disagreement as to the validity of geographers working in a field (the division of power) that traditionally has been regarded as the preserve of political scientists. Pounds identifies two broad foci for the study of local government: the division of territory, and the division of power. He comments that the former is "more geographical." Prescott rejects this conclusion and states that it "might be worth while for geographers to pay more attention to the division of responsibility" because "the authority which may be exercised" by local governments, as decided in broad outline by a senior government, can have great "political geographical significance." In effect, Prescott states that senior governments constitute an important variable in the study of municipal behaviour.

The political scientist, Kaplan, shows in his work on metropolitan Toronto that a combination of the two approaches is most productive. Kaplan's study of intermunicipal relations in metropolitan Toronto takes into account not only the horizontal aspect of interaction between municipalities (municipal-municipal) but also encompasses the vertical element of relations
between the minor civil divisions and Queen's Park (municipal-provincial). Soja's work on human territoriality showed that the notion of hierarchy is a most important consideration in political geography.

This review of the scholarly literature brings to light a number of variables that possibly affect cooperation among municipalities and also suggests some useful approaches for the study of intermunicipal relations.

The Theoretical Framework

The number of municipalities in the thesis area was deliberately restricted to facilitate a thorough examination of all aspects of intermunicipal relations. The potential disadvantage of a small sample is that the interlocal behaviour of the minor civil divisions selected for study may be atypical. The only solution to this problem would be to increase greatly the number of municipalities considered in the thesis as Marando did in his Detroit study. As Marando himself acknowledges, the examination of many local governments precludes the depth of analysis that is possible with a limited sample size.

A compact study area also has the advantage of easily allowing the analysis of variables which are not
susceptible to rigorous forms of measurement. Marando demonstrated that several variables of great potential significance in influencing interlocal relations were of this kind. The notion of municipal autonomy is a case in point. Furthermore, Marando ignored several factors that may significantly influence cooperation between municipalities (e.g. the policies of senior governments, and the possible barrier effect of county boundaries).

In order to evaluate these little-studied variables as comprehensively as possible, the present thesis greatly limits the size of its study area. By doing so, this work on the Grimsby area intends to build upon and complement Marando's seminal dissertation on intermunicipal relations.86

It is assumed that every municipality possesses interests which are manifested in interlocal relations and that there is a specifically local basis to the conduct of intermunicipal affairs. However, it also is recognized that the municipalities in the study area are not sovereign entities. In Canada, the British North America Act assigned exclusive jurisdiction over local government to the provinces, which then organized their own municipal systems.87 The government of Ontario created the system in effect in the study area and often established rules or guidelines concerning interlocal
relations. To understand the geography of these relations, it follows that the provincial government's role must be considered. This is done by adopting a two-dimensional conceptual framework which takes into account not only the horizontal aspect of interaction between municipalities (municipal-municipal) but also encompasses the vertical element of relations between the minor civil divisions and Queen's Park (municipal-provincial).

The politico-geographical relevance of the vertical, or hierarchical, dimension may best be illustrated by reference to a hypothetical example. If a provincial government creates incentive grants to foster intermunicipal cooperation for the construction of a municipal facility, an administrative interrelationship is established between the province and the civil divisions that wish to erect the facility but can not afford to do so on their own meagre resources. When two municipalities actually decide to avail themselves of the incentive grants and cooperate in the building of the facility in question, a politico-geographical interaction between municipalities occurs. A hierarchical relationship that is essentially spaceless is thereby transformed into a concrete spatial interaction of some significance.
Due to the attention given to historical considerations in the municipal literature, the thesis adopts what is really a three dimensional conceptual framework. The formative era and any period of fundamental reorganization seems especially critical in determining the nature of a municipal system. This is also true of intermunicipal relations since they function as an integral part of a municipal system. This approach accords with Wheaton's advice that municipal studies take into account the stage reached in any unification process and the past evolution of intermunicipal relations. Accordingly, the history of Ontario's local government is surveyed, with special emphasis on three crucial time periods: (1) the origin of the first administrative areas, (2) the years surrounding the passage of the Municipal Act, which formed the basis of the modern system of local self-government, and (3) the last few decades, which witnessed the initiation of the only major reform of the municipal system in more than a century.

Particular emphasis is placed upon the post World War II years from approximately 1945 to 1969. Intermunicipal relations during this period are considered in a transitional context between the happy time when municipalities took their territorial
integrity and local autonomy for granted and a more recent phase of uncertainty, characterized by strong pressures for municipal consolidation and functional realignment. For the Grimsby area, a provincially encouraged integrative process culminated in the establishment of the Regional Municipality of Niagara in 1970.

When viewed in a transitional context, it seems reasonable to speculate that intermunicipal relations may be affected by attempts on the part of local governments to modify, or even thwart, provincial reforms. Close intermunicipal relations could be intended as much to preserve the territorial status quo from imposed unions by a senior government, as they are meant to improve municipal service standards. If municipalities can jointly provide good government while at the same time maintaining their functional and territorial integrity, a higher government might be persuaded to drop plans for new regional governments. Marando's work on metropolitan Detroit supports this speculation.\textsuperscript{89}

The review of the scholarly literature suggests that a number of factors influence cooperation between municipalities: (1) urbanization, (2) provincial policy, (3) a desire to preserve municipal autonomy and
territorial integrity, (4) the costs of providing local services, (5) history, (6) the attitudes of appointed and elected municipal officials, and (7) the possible barrier effect of county boundaries. Although the factors are not listed here in any particular order of relative importance, it is possible in the final chapter to group these, and one other factor, into two broad categories: those variables which are of major importance, and those variables which are of marginal, or unconfirmed, importance. In addition, it must be reiterated that the thesis is concerned with cooperation and noncooperation. It is entirely feasible for the same variable to spur intermunicipal cooperation in one instance and to retard cooperation in another instance; i.e. tend to produce intermunicipal noncooperation. For example, urban sprawl across a local boundary may very well induce two adjacent municipalities to cooperate in providing some vital local service while, at the same time, lead to strenuous objections to amalgamation or annexations which would be directed toward making the administration of the service more centralized and efficient.

The dichotomous role of several key variables in interlocal relations makes it very difficult, if not impossible, to state with any degree of certainty that a
particular factor expressed in the form of a hypothesis, will always produce cooperation or noncooperation. Intermunicipal relations are too complex, and previous research on the subject too limited, for the thesis to prove or disprove a set of finely drafted hypotheses. At the present stage of intermunicipal research, it is more reasonable to work toward the identification of crucial variables. Once scholars possess a significant body of case studies and are reasonably certain of the key factors, then theorists may proceed to prove or disprove a set of sophisticated hypotheses.

The literature demonstrates clearly that urbanization influences relations between municipalities. Urban areas require a greater number and variety of local services than rural areas. Small urban civil divisions and recently urbanized municipalities may not be able to afford the cost of providing the required services and thus look to some form of intermunicipal cooperation to meet local needs. However, it does not necessarily always follow from this logic that urban development will be a positive (i.e. cooperative) influence. Urban sprawl across local boundaries often leads to pressure for the amalgamation of minor civil divisions which some municipalities welcome and others may resist. Noncooperation also may occur in the form
of competition for particular types of urban development and demands for annexations rather than amalgamations. In such cases, urbanization has a negative (i.e. noncooperative) influence. This dissertation confirms the duality of the urban impact on intermunicipal relations noted previously in the literature.

The present study moves beyond this conclusion by identifying the conditions whereby urbanization tends to result in cooperation or noncooperation. Preliminary observations in the Grimsby area indicated that urbanization per se did not account for cooperation or noncooperation among local governments. Other factors seemed to be at work. Rather than concentrating on deriving some careful quantitative measure of urbanization, it is suggested that the location of urban development is more important than the amount of urbanization in each municipality. The literature hints at this notion when it speaks of urban sprawl across local boundaries and the lack of coincidence between legal and socioeconomic boundaries but no one pursues the idea that location may be as critical as the actual presence of urbanization in intermunicipal relations.

It is assumed that urbanization has an impact upon intermunicipal relations and that the impact may be either positive or negative, (i.e. may tend to induce
cooperation or noncooperation. With respect to functional cooperation between local governments, the location of urban development in each municipality is expected to be a significant factor. Specifically, it is anticipated that there will be more functional cooperation between neighbouring municipalities when built-up areas in adjacent civil divisions are located in close proximity to each other on either side of a common municipal boundary than when urban areas in adjacent municipalities are separated by a considerable extent of nonurbanized land. If intermunicipal relations are regarded as a form of integrative behaviour, this supposition provides an opportunity to test partially Jacob and Teune's idea that proximity is a key variable in the integrative process.90

As non-sovereign entities, local governments are expected to be influenced greatly by the province of Ontario's municipal policies. Because it possesses jurisdiction over local government, Queen's Park has the power to compel the municipalities in the study area to cooperate with one another, to amalgamate, and to accept annexations. The province possesses this authority by virtue of the British North America Act. The province may exercise its power over the municipalities in a number of ways: by legislative acts, special agencies
such as the Ontario Municipal Board and the Ontario Water Resources Commission, and provincial departments such as the Department of Municipal Affairs. The province of Ontario, in conceptual terms, constitutes the hierarchical element in intermunicipal relations. Due to its senior position, Queen's Park is expected to encourage interlocal cooperation.

It is assumed that every municipality possesses a set of interests and that every municipality acts in a manner intended to preserve or further these interests. Municipal interests include a desire to maintain the existence of the municipality, to preserve its territory intact, to provide local services at the lowest possible cost, to preserve a certain local character or identity with respect to the socioeconomic status of its people, the quality of buildings, and related facets of the quality of life, and to control future development. The desire on the part of the municipalities to preserve these interests, considered collectively, is referred to as a desire to preserve municipal autonomy. The concept is roughly analogous to Marando's life style idea.

The literature suggests that local autonomy matters spur interlocal cooperation. Marando concluded that local governments cooperated with one another in order to remain separate entities. However, it is entirely
conceivable that considerations of local autonomy could lead to intermunicipal noncooperation. Municipalities may be expected to resist strenuously annexation proposals by neighbouring civil divisions. Local governments can also be expected to compete for certain types of high value assessment. It is therefore anticipated that local autonomy will be an important variable in influencing intermunicipal relations and that the influence may be either negative or positive, depending upon the particular circumstances.

The functions of municipal government require money. Very often the cost of providing municipal services is expected to be beyond the capacity of individual municipal governments. Therefore, high service costs are expected to encourage municipalities to cooperate with one another for the provision of local services. This line of reasoning conforms with the literature on municipal government. However, Marando does point out that cost is not necessarily the only factor at work in interlocal calculations. Marando also stresses the difficulty a municipality may experience in determining an actual or proposed agreement's cost/benefit ratio. For example, how are two municipalities that use the same police patrols, to determine the proportion of shared costs? Municipal
governments can not utilize direct user charges to determine precisely their share of benefits because citizens pay for (and benefit from) police patrols collectively, not individually. On the other hand, when individuals use (benefit from) certain other interlocal services, such as water supply or libraries, local governments can precisely determine the proportions of their respective benefits. These calculations can be made by metering water consumption or noting the municipal address of each book borrower. The precisely determined ratio of interlocal benefits is then adopted as the ratio of intermunicipal costs. Since costs and benefits can not be determined exactly in every instance, costs are often shared on the basis of population. In other cases, this type of uncertainty may discourage intermunicipal cooperation because municipalities are never quite certain that they will receive "their money's worth." In general though, high service costs are expected to foster intermunicipal cooperation.

The temporal factor, history, is considered in a broad context. The literature posits two basic views of the time element. With regard to the recent past, Wheaton suggests that previous integrative experience will help to determine the direction of future
intermunicipal relations. If past experience was perceived unfavourably by a municipality, then future cooperative interlocal undertakings are more likely than if previous experience was perceived in an unfavourable light. This formulation has relevance if it is assumed that intermunicipal relations are a form of integrative behaviour. With regard to the entire history of a municipal system or individual municipality, the literature seems to imply that the longer a municipality has been in existence, the greater will be its resistance to territorial changes. Presumably, a lengthy history imbues a local government with an identity, tradition, and a vested interest in the maintenance of the territorial status quo. Historical events apparently possess the potential to be either a negative or a positive influence on interlocal affairs.

In his study of metropolitan Detroit, Marando hypothesized that the attitudes of local officials would influence greatly the conduct of interlocal relations. Subsequent research disproved the hypothesis. In the present study, the same hypothesis is retested by ascertaining the attitudes of local officials toward intermunicipal cooperation.

There is some evidence in the literature on local boundaries to suggest that county boundaries may be a
barrier to cooperation between municipalities located on either side of a county boundary, i.e. municipalities which are adjacent but which also are located in different counties. This possibility was taken into account in the thesis, basically by asking local officials what impact they thought the Lincoln-Wentworth county line had on intermunicipal relations.

Preliminary investigation of the study area's intermunicipal relations indicated that the geographical configuration of minor civil divisions may influence interlocal relations. Specifically, prior to 1970, the town of Grimsby was surrounded on three sides by the township of North Grimsby and these two municipalities appeared to engage in an unusually large number of intermunicipal arrangements. The thesis attempts to discover what impact, if any, this geographical arrangement had upon intermunicipal behaviour.

The Research Design

The research area consists of four municipalities: Grimsby, North Grimsby, Saltfleet, and South Grimsby. Saltfleet is located in Wentworth County; until 1970, the other three civil divisions were located in Lincoln County (now the Regional Municipality of Niagara). The entire area occupies the eastern suburban and rural
fringe of the city of Hamilton. Grimsby is almost completely urbanized; Saltfleet and North Grimsby are experiencing considerable urban development. Except for the small hamlet of Smithville, South Grimsby is rural. Settlement dates from the early part of the nineteenth century. The Niagara escarpment is the most prominent physical feature in the study area.

The study area was chosen for the diversity and varying intensity of its intermunicipal relations. Before their dissolution, Grimsby and North Grimsby cooperated with one another to a "remarkable" extent, even to the point of seriously considering voluntary amalgamation. In contrast, North Grimsby and South Grimsby remained mutually aloof. South Grimsby's unwillingness to share with North Grimsby the cost of installing an inexpensive traffic light at a locally important crossroad was typical of this aloofness. Saltfleet cooperated with its municipal neighbours to a greater extent than South Grimsby but to a lesser extent than the Grimsby-North Grimsby relationship. The search for an explanation of these policies forms the bulk of this study. North Grimsby's common presence in all three relationships lends a degree of consistency and continuity to the study.
The study gathers together a wide range of data. Due to the supposition that history exerts an influence on intermunicipal relations, the evolution of Ontario's municipal system, the development of individual municipalities from their origins to the present, and the growth of interlocal relations are all described. The historical sections are directed toward establishing links, if in fact they exist, between the age of local governments and consequent resistance to cooperation, the impact of past intermunicipal experience on more recent interlocal proposals, and the influence of the county boundary on interaction among minor civil divisions. Specific information is presented concerning the chronology of the municipal map, the municipal system, settlement, urbanization, and local economies. The basis of local and county boundary origins and changes also are described as is the nature of the past hierarchical relationships between the provincial government and the local governments. The latter is directed toward understanding the influence of the senior government on intermunicipal relations.

The influence of the provincial government upon interlocal relations may take many forms. Data is presented that shows how the province can exert influence. Specific examples are presented from
legislative acts, provincial agencies such as the Ontario Municipal Board, and the recent, provincially initiated, thrust for local government reform.

Data is provided on the evolution, extent, and location of urbanization with a view to analyzing the impact of built-up areas upon intermunicipal behaviour. Urbanization and its attendant problems are considered from both the individual municipal and regional perspectives. Information on the cost of local services, a variable intimately related to the urban factor, also is presented.

The attitudes of local officials toward various forms of interaction between local governments appears throughout in conjunction with other variables.

The data was collected from a great variety of sources. The historical information was obtained primarily from secondary sources such as Ph.D. and Master's dissertations, and reports from the provincial archives. The works by Aitchison, Fraser, McGaughey, Patterson, Watson, and Whebell were particularly valuable for material on the functional and territorial evolution of the study area and the development of Ontario's system of local government.97 Material from the files of the municipalities was used to determine the nature of specific intermunicipal agreements.
Municipal sources proved somewhat inadequate for determining the details of several long standing agreements due to the disarray of files. This problem was frequently overcome by consulting the files of neighbouring local governments and by interviewing local officials with many years of experience.

Information on the recent past was obtained from three basic sources: the data books and reports of the Hamilton-Burlington-Wentworth Local Government Review Commission and the Niagara Region Local Government Review Commission, newspaper files, and interviews with local officials. These sources yielded much information concerning the extent of intermunicipal cooperation and noncooperation, and the impact of specific variables on the conduct of intermunicipal relations. Additional information on the official positions of municipalities and other groups was garnered from briefs presented to the local government review commissions. The brief of Wentworth County to the Hamilton-Burlington-Wentworth Local Government Review is an outstanding example.98

The interviews conducted during the research were intended to gather information about specific aspects of intermunicipal cooperation and noncooperation and to ascertain the general attitude of municipal officials toward interlocal relations. Letters requesting an
interview were sent to 65 officials in Grimsby, North Grimsby, Saltfleet, and South Grimsby. The contents of the letter are presented in Appendix No. 2. Each letter contained a stamped, self-addressed postcard which was to be returned by recipients who agreed to be interviewed.

Forty nine per cent of the postcards were returned. However, several of the replies indicated that the respondents were unwilling to be interviewed. One councillor stated that he was tired of being the object of research by provincial government commissions and departments, social scientists, and graduate students. Only a handful of elected officials agreed to interviews. One reeve pointed out that his views were readily available in the press and elsewhere. The point was well taken. The attitudes of most elected officials could be determined by a careful reading of press clippings or the report of the Mayo Commission.

The decision was made to concentrate upon interviewing appointed officials. The opinions of these people were not available in the press. They possessed an intimate knowledge about the detailed workings of intermunicipal relations and were, on a percentage basis, more willing to answer questions than their elected counterparts. The year 1969, the period when
the interviews were conducted, was an extremely hectic time for appointed and elected officials alike. The period was particularly trying for the local politicians because they had to work at their normal jobs in the daytime and then spend their evenings at countless meetings concerned with the advent of regional government in Niagara, the Steele Commission hearings, and related matters. The decision was finalized by the advice of a very senior official in the Ontario Department of Municipal Affairs, (who absolutely refused to be identified in the thesis). In an interview in Toronto, the official suggested that appointed municipal officials were likely to be more knowledgeable and candid than their elected counterparts.

The questions asked in each interview were selected from a master list of inquiries. The most productive interviews are listed in the bibliography. The master list of questions is given in Appendix No. 2.

The influence of the provincial government was established by consulting many sources. Various provincial statutes spell out in considerable detail the relationship between Queen's Park and the local governments with respect to interlocal relations. It often is more difficult to determine the influence of the Ontario Municipal Board, which is a provincial
agency, because the Board does not always publish its decisions, or the rationale for the decisions, in written form.\textsuperscript{99} The Board's impact usually had to be evaluated by reference to secondary sources such as newspaper accounts and interviews with local officials. A unique insight into the operations of the Ontario Municipal Board was obtained with reference to the water agreement between the Grimsby Water Commission and North Grimsby when the Commission permitted the author to scan correspondence between the Commission and its lawyers concerning an unsuccessful hearing before the Board. Various manifestations of Ontario's campaign for local government reform, such as speeches by provincial cabinet ministers and the Regional Municipality of Niagara Act, also provided evidence of the province's impact upon intermunicipal relations. Another valuable source of data on the provincial role was contained in the Department of Municipal Affairs document, \textit{Provincial Assistance to Municipalities and Boards}.\textsuperscript{100}

**The Thesis Outline**

A sense of history permeates the regional population's attitude toward both the configuration and function of local governments. There are strong attachments to familiar territorial patterns, especially
among the older residents of less urbanized municipalities. The provincial government, ever conscious of its own rural origin and strength, pays close attention to these intangible, but very real, emotions. Accordingly, Chapter II traces the study area's territorial evolution from the time it was a politically undifferentiated wilderness, to the present. The discussion is organized on a two-level hierarchical basis: town and township in the lower tier, district and county at the upper level. The origin of the Lincoln-Wentworth County line also is discussed.

Chapter III completes the historical background by briefly recalling the functional development of local government. The discussion is organized around the same hierarchical framework as used in Chapter II. Together, Chapters II and III examine the provincial government's strong role in interlocal relations. The two chapters also show how the municipalities have reacted toward each other under a variety of conditions. The influence of urbanization and attendant servicing costs are particularly noteworthy.

Chapter IV examines the various intermunicipal agreements consummated within the area. This chapter is therefore concerned with interlocal cooperation and the reasons for it. Again, urbanization looms as a key
factor. Viewed as a whole, the chapter is a review of previous integrative experience at the local, largely voluntary, level. The proximity of urban areas in adjacent municipalities, the attitudes of local officials, the geographical configuration of minor civil divisions, and the influence of the province's municipal policies all receive considerable attention. Chapter IV deals almost exclusively with functional cooperation because the local governments never implemented any voluntary territorial agreements. The chapter also attempts to measure the impact of the Lincoln-Wentworth line on interlocal affairs.

Chapter V focuses on the overall record of noncooperation between local governments in the thesis area. Considerable attention is paid to the region's abortive attempts to make voluntary territorial adjustments. The general failure of the four civil divisions in the research site to fulfill their functional responsibilities to the maximum extent is discussed. Special attention should be given to the notion of local autonomy, the absence of urbanization in portions of North Grimsby and Saltfleet, and most of South Grimsby, and the great cost to local governments of meeting high service standards on a region-wide basis.
Chapter VI summarizes the findings of the thesis, formulates conclusions concerning the reasons for cooperation and noncooperation between local governments, and discusses the effectiveness of the research design. Methodological improvements are speculated upon and suggestions made for future research. Two brief appendices discuss the new regional municipality of Niagara and set forth the interview schedule utilized during the preparation of the thesis.
1. For thesis purposes, the phrase intermunicipal relations refers to agreements and disagreements between local governments, particularly encompassing services for which they are directly responsible. These services (functions) constitute the core of municipal government and include such basic activities as garbage collection, sewage disposal, and water supply. Intermunicipal relations also involve attempts by local governments to agree voluntarily on territorial revisions. To avoid repetition, interlocal occasionally is substituted for intermunicipal.

2. Cooperation is defined as the collaboration of two or more local governments to achieve some common goal.


5. Ibid., p. 154.


9. Southern Ontario's modified two tier municipal structure presents a definitional problem. The province stands at the apex of a complex political territorial hierarchy while towns, townships, and villages occupy its base. The minor civil divisions are grouped into larger units called counties and
regional municipalities which, technically, are local governments but this designation is somewhat inappropriate given their large size and intermediate position in Ontario's political territorial hierarchy. Counties and regional municipalities are essentially highly formalized intermunicipal devices interposed between the province and the truly local governments. Throughout the thesis, therefore, municipality refers only to towns, townships, and villages. For variety, local government, community, and minor civil division are used as synonyms.

Perhaps the term community requires some further comment. The concept of community holds a prominent place in the sociology literature but sociologists "who study communities do not share a precise definition of community, nor do they agree how observations about community phenomena are to be incorporated into sociological theory." As used in the present study, community is simply a surrogate for municipality. Following Reiss, the thesis is concerned with community as it "arises through sharing a limited territorial space for residence and for sustenance and functions to meet common needs generated in sharing this space by establishing characteristic forms of social action." According to this definition, political action is subsumed implicitly under the social action rubric. In politico-geographical terminology, the thesis is concerned with the collective intermunicipal behaviour of individuals gathered together in a community (local government) to protect their common needs. The community is defined legally, politically, and spatially by municipal boundaries. The common interests of the community are determined and articulated by appointed and elected officials. See Albert J. Reiss, Jr., "The Sociological Study of Communities," Rural Sociology, XXIV, No. 2 (June, 1959), p. 118. Italics added.


11. Ibid., pp. 154-155.


16. Norman J.G. Pounds, *Political Geography* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), pp. 193-221. Due to their critical importance, great cost, and/or highly specialized nature, several public services which formerly entailed frequent interlocal relations have been effectively removed from local control by the creation of unifunctional entities that are properly called special purpose administrative areas. Conservation authorities, emergency measures organizations, and health units are excellent examples. The initiative for the establishment of these agencies usually came from the provincial government and not the municipalities. Because local governments have little, if any, real say in the establishment and management of special purpose administrative areas, such areas are largely excluded from the study. For a full discussion of Ontario's special purpose administrative areas, see Susan J. Dolby, "Inter-Municipal Special Purpose Bodies in the Province of Ontario" (unpublished M.A. thesis, Queen's University, Kingston, 1965).


29. The Science of Geography, p. 37; in the thesis, disequilibria refer to imbalances between the existing municipal system and the demands made upon that system. The use of the word disequilibria usually suggests that the municipal system is outmoded and incapable of functioning as an effective local government.


46. Rowat, *op. cit.*, pp. 139, 141.


50. Marando, *op. cit.*, pp. 185-200; for a more complete discussion, see Vincent L. Marando, "The Political Integration of a Metropolitan Area" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, East Lansing, 1967).

51. The types of intermunicipal agreements identified by Marando are especially helpful and are adopted, with some modification, in the present study. Contractual agreements are defined as the outright purchase of a service by one municipality from another. Joint agreements involve the combination of two or more local governments to provide a specific service. Participating municipalities share both the cost and management of the service. An agreement has social implications for life styles when different social status populations could conceivably be brought into closer contact with one another as a result of cooperation. Education, planning, recreation, and zoning are the most significant services that may potentially alter life styles. Marando classifies cooperation
as having economic implications when a municipality experiences difficulty in assessing an agreement's cost/benefit ratio. For a discussion of this last point, see supra, chapter i, pp. 40-41.

52. Marando, "Inter-Local Cooperation," op. cit., p. 196.
53. Jacob and Teune, op. cit., pp. 11-12.
54. Marando, "Inter-Local Cooperation," op. cit., p. 188.
55. James V. Toscano, "Transaction Flow Analysis in Metropolitan Areas: Some Preliminary Explorations," The Integration of Political Communities, p. 117.
56. Jacob and Teune, op. cit., pp. 11-12.
57. Marando, "Inter-Local Cooperation," op. cit., p. 187.
58. Ibid., pp. 194-195.
59. Ibid., p. 197.
60. Ibid., p. 199.
61. Jacob and Teune, op. cit., pp. 11-12.
64. Marando, "Inter-Local Cooperation," op. cit., p. 190.
68. Supra, chapter i, p. 23.

70. If a municipality was sovereign, it would possess absolute and total control over its own governance. Municipalities never possess this total freedom. Any powers possessed by a local government derive from a devolution of power delegated downward by a senior government. In Ontario, the province has sovereignty over local governments. Civil divisions only exercise whatever authority Queen's Park chooses to assign them.

71. Jacob and Teune, op. cit.


75. Pounds, op. cit., p. 195.

76. See footnote No. 74 for references.

78. Wheaton, op. cit., pp. 120-142.
84. Queen's Park is the name given to the legislature of the province of Ontario.
85. Soja, op. cit.
86. See supra, chapter i, pp. 23-24.
87. For administrative purposes, sovereignty is divisible into a bundle of jurisdictions. At the national level, local government is just one of many governmental concerns. The B.N.A. Act acknowledged the fact that Canada was too large and diverse to be governed completely from Ottawa; hence, the provinces acquired jurisdiction over local government. At the provincial level, the provinces possess sovereignty (absolute control) over local government. The provinces then delegate some of this authority downward to the municipalities. Within Canada, in other words, sovereignty and jurisdiction are relative concepts. At the national level, local government is merely one of many jurisdictions to be apportioned between the provinces and Ottawa. At the provincial level, jurisdiction over local government tends to be regarded as sovereignty because the province possesses complete control over this function.
89. Marando, "Inter-Local Cooperation," op. cit., p. 198.
91. Marando, "Inter-Local Cooperation," op. cit., p. 199.
92. Ibid., pp. 196-197.
93. Ibid., p. 188.

96. Interview with Mr. Geoffrey Lawrence, Clerk of North Grimsby, March 21, 1969.

97. Infra, chapters ii and iii.


100. Ontario, Department of Municipal Affairs, Municipal Organization and Administration Branch, Provincial Assistance to Municipalities and Boards (Toronto, 1969).
CHAPTER II

THE ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE MAP

Intermunicipal relations form an integral part of any municipal system. To understand fully the nature of interlocal relations, one must therefore first comprehend the municipal system in its entirety because this system strongly influences the conduct of intermunicipal affairs. Such comprehension may be gained by examining the municipal system's roots and subsequent evolution. Much that seems incongruous in the workings of present-day intermunicipal affairs may best be understood by studying the past, since many current practices were developed to deal with past problems or situations. While the historical basis for the municipal system may no longer be valid, the system persists due to a process of administrative inertia which is frequently elevated to the status of tradition or simply designed to protect various vested interests. The retention of outmoded behaviour accords with Whittlesey's observation that the need for change usually predates the accomplishment of change by a considerable time period.¹
The study area's pre-1970 municipal system dates from a time a century ago when the region had a marked rural aspect. Each local government was relatively self-contained and able to meet its own modest local government needs on an individual basis. Rural dwellers traditionally require fewer municipal services than their urban counterparts. Post-1950 rapid urbanization and suburbanization forced local governments to provide a growing number of services. This growth often placed too great a strain on municipal tax resources for the burden to be met individually. Heightened interlocal cooperation was one possible response to the demand and need for increased municipal services. If successful in providing an adequate level of services, intermunicipal cooperation would enable the long-established civil divisions to preserve their territorial integrity and maintain some degree of autonomy over local government.

The Undivided Land

Each unit at every level in a politico-territorial hierarchy possesses two basic characteristics: area, and function. While at any given moment in time, these areal and functional elements operate as a completely integrated whole, they quite frequently develop at different times. The development of Ontario's townships
is typical; the townships first appeared in 1781 but did not really serve as units of local government until 1850. Because the political and territorial components of the thesis area's municipalities developed at differential rates, these factors can be conveniently isolated for separate analysis, as is done in Chapters II and III, respectively.

The lengthy aboriginal and shorter French periods influenced subsequent human geography in a number of ways but left no mark on the present political landscape. France never erected a civil administration in the study area. The origin of the current political map dates from the late eighteenth century, after the conquest of Quebec. The British governed their newly won colony according to the 1774 Quebec Act which introduced British criminal law but continued the prevailing French feudal land tenure system unchanged in order to placate the numerically dominant Canadien population. Since the Niagara peninsula, indeed practically all of Quebec west of the Ottawa River, was initially devoid of Europeans, no municipal system was necessary and none existed.

This situation changed when the United States War of Independence brought a flood of refugees, called the United Empire Loyalists, into western Quebec where they
produced two problems for the British. First, no orderly method of land settlement existed to accommodate the influx. Second, the Loyalists found feudal land tenure most objectionable. A majority of the Loyalists came from quite well settled parts of New York and Pennsylvania. These areas had strong traditions of private land ownership and local self-government. Self-government was achieved by holding frequent town meetings. The meetings were organized within a spatial framework of townships. Britain responded to these circumstances by gradually building a hierarchy of politico-administrative divisions, commencing at the lowest level with the township.

Spatial Aspects of the Township

The township was selected at an early date as the means for settling non-French Canadians although there is some confusion in the literature concerning the original nomenclature. Fraser cites 1763 instructions regarding land matters, sent to Quebec governors-general by the home government, to the effect that townships were to be created. These orders noted that "townships" had permitted "advantageous and effectual settlement" of planters in the United States by providing security from Indians and fostering
cooperative endeavors. McGaughey points out that the planter of the southern United States used a county system of local government; the township was a New England device. Aitchison explains that the Colonial Secretary wanted the Canadian township to be considered strictly as a territorial survey unit no different from a lot or concession and divorced of any local self-governmental function. The British blamed the American Revolution, in part, upon an excess of democracy via town meetings and wished to avoid a repetition of that disaster in Canada.

Toward that end, the first blocks surveyed above the Ottawa River were not called townships but given the royal designations of fief or seigneury. In addition, these blocks were assigned impersonal numbers, in the French fashion, and not officially granted names. The Loyalists named them anyway and also held town meetings, much to the annoyance of the authorities. Probably to offset the shock of these practices and to assure the British of their loyalty, the Loyalists shrewdly utilized regal appellations. These deliberately-perpetuated relics of the French past gradually faded away; the surveyed lands received officially sanctioned names rather than numbers, and were referred to as townships, not fiefs or seigneuries.
Ontario's first townships appeared along the upper St. Lawrence from 1781 onward. They were laid out according to specific instructions that later exerted a strong influence on the form of townships surveyed elsewhere in the colony, including the study area.

Ideally, the townships were to be of uniform size; in this case, 20,000 acres. Each unit was supposed to contain a town plan. These towns were to front on navigable water. Since land communications were abominable, the pioneers invariably tried to locate on lakes and rivers. Individual lots had to be rectangular, with their long sides placed perpendicular to the shore. This maximized the number of people with easy access to good transportation. As far as possible, surveyors also were to seek natural boundaries. Although it proved impractical always to adhere completely to all these instructions, the surveyors followed them as much as possible. The townships were numbered consecutively from east, the survey's starting point, to west.

In 1789 these prototype guidelines were modified and detailed plans prepared for future use. Whebell suggests that the adoption of rigidly standardized plans, which ignored the terrain, was necessary given the paucity of qualified surveyors. Ontario's
relatively level surface aided the successful application of the new stereotypes.\textsuperscript{11} Henceforth, townships were made as contiguous as possible. A distinction was introduced between coastal and inland position because the anticipated immigrants could not all settle close to navigable water. Landlocked townships now measured ten miles square while coastal blocks had nine mile fronts and twelve mile sides to allocate fairly relatively scarce shores. Every township now required a one mile square town plan. In coastal units, the town was situated in the middle of the water frontage; inland blocks had towns sited at their geographical centres. The new regulations specifically permitted deviations if local circumstances warranted modification for the convenience of settlers.\textsuperscript{12}

Because the fundamental purpose of the township was to provide a ready means of subdividing land cheaply and quickly for settling pioneer agriculturalists, attention focused upon internal, rather than external, organization. In theory, townships were laid out as follows: The surveyor began by marking out a base line. If a township bordered a lake or river, the base line paralleled the general trend of the coast leaving an irregularly shaped strip of land, called a broken front,
between the base line and the shore. The base line is often referred to as the front line or first concession line. A series of concession lines were then surveyed parallel to the base line at intervals of one and a quarter miles, creating bands of territory called concessions. These were numbered in order from the front to the rear. Road allowances were left between each concession. The first concession road allowance was sixty feet; the remainder were forty feet. The concessions were divided into rectangular lots at right angles to the concession lines. Each lot measured eighty rods (1,320 feet) by four hundred rods (6,600 feet) with the narrow fronts facing concession roads. All lots contained two hundred acres. Forty foot side road allowances perpendicular to the concession lines appeared at two to three mile intervals. Town lots held one acre. Usually, the lots within each concession were numbered consecutively starting from the direction where the township's base line originated. In most townships, a complex pattern of crown and other reserves was surveyed that later retarded the growth of compact settlement.\textsuperscript{13} Since the internal structure of the townships is only of marginal importance to the thesis, the subject is not pursued further. However, it does seem remarkable that the township has survived to the
present day as a unit of local government given its humble origin as a mere surveying device.

In reality, townships throughout southern Ontario display considerable variation in size, shape, and internal organization due to topographical adaptations, a desire for natural boundaries, and historical desiderata. Townships surveyed prior to 1789 were not altered to conform to the new plans. In cases where settlement predated surveying, the crown reserves were consolidated into blocks at the township's rear or placed in another, unsettled unit. As an economy measure, the townships were rarely marked out completely at one time. Typically, only the base line and one or two concession lines were surveyed. The subdivision of concessions into lots was expressly forbidden unless justified by population pressures. After 1793, a town site was no longer included automatically in every township. From that date, towns were only laid out where conditions strongly favoured urban growth.14

Most boundaries were approximately aligned to natural features, particularly those associated with the drainage pattern, and then squared off. Natural divisions, such as moraines, ravines, and swamps, which acted as obstacles to land communications, were easily identified and not thought likely ever to become densely
populated. Considering the crudity of surveying methods and the attendant likelihood of cadastral errors, township boundaries located in such uninviting terrain were undoubtedly calculated to reduce future intertownship frictions. Many of these natural phenomena are now obscured by the works of man but at the time of boundary demarcation they were important parts of the perceived landscape.

**Territorial Origins of Grimsby and Saltfleet**

The study area's township boundaries were first delimited on May 20, 1790 when orders were issued to survey partially a range of townships from the Niagara River to Coote's Paradise. This initial project was completed on November 16, 1791. (See Figure No. 3.) The total demarcation of townships, concessions, and lots gradually progressed over a much longer period according to the exigencies of population growth, but the current outline of the township map was firmly established by the end of 1791. The original survey's extent was extremely limited. The lateral township boundaries were only marked for one mile back from the base lines. Very few concessions appeared on the ground and subdivision into lots was prohibited unless necessitated by the presence of settlers. The survey
THE FIRST SURVEY OF THE GRIMSBY AREA

began in the eastern part of the peninsula and advanced westward. As each township was laid out it was given a number. On December 18, 1793 the numerals were replaced by names as follows: Township No. 5 became Clinton Township; Township No. 6 became Grimsby Township; Township No. 7 became Saltfleet Township; and Township No. 8 became Barton Township. At that time, Grimsby included the municipalities of North Grimsby and South Grimsby. Barton occupied the site of modern Hamilton. The names were derived from places in Lincolnshire, England. 15

Precise boundary locations can best be understood within the wider areal context of the entire Niagara peninsula because Grimsby and Saltfleet were not surveyed in isolation but in conjunction with other units. Many of these townships were oriented toward lakes and rivers since waterways served as the main summer and winter transportation routes. 16 Such an orientation determined one border by definition. In the cases of Grimsby and Saltfleet, both focused on Lake Ontario, which acted as their northern boundary. Base line declination and distance from shore varied according to the general trend and configuration of the coast line, frequently causing abrupt interruptions to the surveyed road patterns at the boundaries of adjacent
Grimsby and Saltfleet were largely spared this nuisance due to the regularity of Lake Ontario's shore line in their vicinity.

The lateral boundaries of Grimsby and Saltfleet were directly related to the lower courses of small creeks flowing into the lake. The Clinton-Grimsby border commenced at the mouth of Thirty Mile Creek; the Grimsby-Saltfleet boundary started near the outlet of Fifty Mile Creek; the Saltfleet-Barton line followed the Mt. Albion re-entrant. The southern portion of the Grimsby-Clinton line was not surveyed for a very long time because the area consisted of poorly drained land. The lack of parallelism between Grimsby's two sides can probably be accounted for by the fact that Clinton was surveyed and squared off first. Grimsby's shape simply adjusted to Clinton's western limit, which was drawn perpendicular to the shore at a point just before the coast line changes direction and veers slightly northward.

The location of the southern boundaries depended upon several factors. Although the Niagara escarpment made an excellent natural boundary farther east, it could not be so used in Grimsby and Saltfleet because the Iroquois plain was too narrow in the west to support viable townships. To achieve the desired depth of
twelve miles, the blocks had to extend across the scarp for a considerable distance. After the requisite number of concessions were measured, the southern boundaries were approximately aligned to suitable natural features. The Saltfleet-Binbrook and eastern Grimsby-Caistor lines generally coincided with the Elfrida moraine. (See Figure No. 4.) The western half of the Grimsby-Caistor border followed Twenty Mile Creek.

**Territorial Evolution 1791-1969**

During the interval 1791-1969, three types of change occurred to the township map. In 1882, Grimsby split into two townships: North Grimsby, and South Grimsby. The old Grimsby township and Saltfleet both lost territory due to the incorporation of the villages of Grimsby and Stoney Creek in 1876 and 1930, respectively. Numerous annexations by neighbouring urban municipalities removed territory from North Grimsby and, to a much greater extent, Saltfleet. (See Figure No. 5.) In each instance, the reasons for these alterations varied.

Grimsby township operated smoothly as a single entity so long as a three-part community of interest existed between the northern and southern areas. The mountain brow was originally settled by the offspring of
pioneering families located below the escarpment, which meant that powerful blood ties bound the north and south together. Until the appearance of Highway No. 20, the area above the escarpment, especially in the west, relied upon Grimsby village for supplies, reflecting Lake Ontario's early importance as a shipping route. Goods were landed at Hamilton and taken to Grimsby by wagon, from whence they were distributed to the entire township. The final link in the trinity of common interests concerned the uniformity of the agricultural economy which was everywhere based upon grain growing, primarily barley and wheat. Nothing better illustrated this community spirit than the practice of alternating township council meetings between Grimsby and Smithville until partition.

The community of interest slowly declined. Family bonds weakened as immigrants arrived from distant points. The construction of Highway No. 20 disrupted the transportation system's north-south orientation by enabling southerners to eliminate the Grimsby middlemen and deal directly with Hamilton merchants at cheaper prices. The expansion of prairie wheat production during the years 1870-90 destroyed the local grain economy, causing farmers to seek substitute products. In the course of this economic rationalization,
significant differences were discovered in the ability of the land above and below the escarpment to support various activities. Eventually, the north developed profitable specialities in vegetables and particularly, fruits. Above the scarp, farmers turned to dairying, though at a slower and less lucrative pace. 22

The community of interest was sundered and dissatisfaction set in, notably in the north. Councillors grumbled about having to travel long distances to either Grimsby or Smithville to attend township meetings. Below the mountain, the south came to be regarded as a millstone since tax collections there scarcely balanced the cost of its servicing. Northern Grimsby felt that it could function more efficiently shorn of its poor southern cousin so the township was finally partitioned in 1882. 23 Whebell notes that such partitions were not uncommon and identifies three basic causes: First, adjustment to some serious internal physical barrier. Second, division along a change in the resource base, specially where one part of the township became prosperous and the other part poor. Third, cleavage resulting from fierce intra-township political factionalism. The Grimsby case clearly falls into the second category of this classification. Whebell observes that the North
Grimsby—South Grimsby line generally approximated the division of the Twenty Mile Creek valley's poor general farming clay soil and the better drained morainic soil a little to the south of the scarp. The gap between North and South Grimsby, originally based on differences in soil quality, has continued to widen as will become evident later in the thesis.

For many years, the town of Grimsby was called Forty because it occupied the crossing point of Forty Mile Creek. The town site is located approximately at the midpoint of North Grimsby's water frontage although the built-up portion is set back from the shore on a well drained relic beach bar, originally to protect the coastal roadbed from lake erosion. The lake plain's narrowness and the clay soil, which was ill suited to pioneer farming, retarded the town's population growth for a long time. Yet, unlike many places in the Niagara peninsula, Grimsby managed to dominate every change in its local environment by successively attracting industries intimately related to surrounding economic activities such as sawmills, flour mills, and a fruit growers' cooperative.

By 1876, enough urbanization existed to permit incorporation as a village. Expansion continued and Grimsby became a town in 1921. The community possessed
two prime advantages. First, the narrowness of the lake plain forced east-west communication routes below the escarpment to converge in Grimsby's vicinity. Had the plain been wider, the town could well have been bypassed by some new road or railway and allowed to atrophy. This never happened. The town was on the original coach route between Hamilton and Niagara and has maintained its accessibility ever since by straddling the Canadian National Railroad, Highway No. 8, and the Queen Elizabeth Way. Second, Grimsby was shielded from domination by Hamilton and St. Catherines due to its position midway between these larger urban centres. A small but viable business establishment has therefore been able to survive extra-local urban competition.  

Stoney Creek developed as a wealthy suburb of Hamilton to the point where a municipal water system was required to service the population concentration. Saltfleet refused to build the necessary apparatus. In order to install and operate its own municipal water supply, Stoney Creek was incorporated as a village in 1930. The village became a town in 1956.  

Saltfleet's largest territorial losses were directly related to the urban development of adjoining municipalities, particularly Hamilton. The city's growth is rooted in its excellent harbour and position
Astride land routes forced to converge on the head of the lake before turning eastward to Toronto. The escarpment's proximity to the coast channels growth laterally. For a long time, Barton Township acted as a buffer protecting Saltfleet by absorbing a lengthy series of annexations by Hamilton dating back to 1846 when the city's eastern boundary shifted from a small creek now occupied by Wellington Street, to Wentworth Street. Eventually, Hamilton arrived at the Saltfleet line where the annexations continued until 1960, when the Ontario Municipal Board promised the township relief from further cessions until at least 1980.

Saltfleet always bitterly fought these annexations but to no avail. A 1956 annexation, which included 900 acres of prime industrial land along Highway No. 20, was particularly resented. This action plunged the township's assessment ratio to 92 per cent farm/residential and eight per cent commercial/industrial. The ratio, crucial in municipal taxation matters, has since been nursed back to a healthier 75:25 balance. A Saltfleet politician once described the event as "so obviously just an industrial land grab it was sickening." Clearly, annexations are never very popular with the municipality that suffers reductions in size. In a very real sense, territorial losses by this
means represent the ultimate in intermunicipal noncooperation. Saltfleet has also experienced a minor annexation by Stoney Creek and North Grimsby lost two strips of land to the town of Grimsby.

**Origin of the District**

The district was Ontario's first territorial division resembling a local government area, although its raison d'être was primarily confined to the administration of justice. Despite a sparse population, western Quebec (i.e. the present-day Ontario) was too vast and remote to be adequately governed from Montreal or Quebec City. Until districts appeared, a legal dispute even as far away as the Windsor area could only be settled by an arduous journey to the Montreal courts. In recognition of this situation, the "upper country," as it was known, was divided into four districts on July 24, 1788: Hesse, Luneburg, Mecklenburg, and Nassau. (See Figure No. 6.)

Several reasons account for these particular names. Spragge believes they were mainly intended to honour the British royal family's German connexions. Luneburg was the former principality of Brunswick-Luneburg, a part of the Hanover kingdom; George III's queen was Charlotte Sophia of Mecklenburg-Strelitz; a Countess of Nassau and
a Duchess of Hesse-Darmstadt were among the ancestresses of George III. Tyrrell supports this explanation, stressing the royalist and protestant connotations deliberately conjured up by these designations. Patterson states that the appellations may have also acknowledged "the large German element in the United Empire Loyalist population." Whebell doubts this contention, but does acknowledge that there were a few disbanded German soldiers in the colony. Most of these ex-soldiers were Hessians living in the Luneburg District. Patterson is probably correct because many of the New Yorkers and Pennsylvanians were of German extraction.

The districts were roughly centred on the four main population clusters of the day: Cornwall, Detroit, Kingston, and Niagara. The boundaries ran due north from the mouths of the Gananoque and Trent rivers and Long Point's furthest extremity in Lake Erie. These astronomical lines frequently cut through preexisting townships, causing their inhabitants to be unsure which district exercised jurisdiction over them.

The entire study area lay within Nassau. The district capital was at Niagara. In 1792, the districts were renamed during the opening session of Upper Canada's first parliament. Nassau became the Home District.
Territorial Evolution of the District

The first districts were patently temporary in nature. The British always intended to create new units as population increased and dispersed. In fact, the course of Ontario's settlement and economic development can be inferred with a fair degree of accuracy from the order in which new districts were established. When districts first appeared, little was known about western Quebec's physical geography away from the major waterways. The meridional boundaries were merely an arbitrary administrative device born of necessity.

Within a decade, a better subdivision was required. While the province was still largely unoccupied, more immigrants had arrived. In addition, a considerable body of knowledge about the interior had accumulated. This new knowledge provided a sounder basis for territorial division. The provincial government hoped to group the new districts around central places such that no settler would be more than an easy day's journey from his district capital. Successful fulfillment of this wish would have required an immediate and massive high quality road building programme far beyond the means of district treasuries. Establishment of new districts before, rather than after virgin lands were peopled, eliminated the possibility of resistance to
terrestrial revision by entrenched interest groups based upon local loyalties and tradition. 42

In 1789, four new districts were carved out and all boundaries made coterminous with township limits. (See Figure No. 7.) This latter action removed the previous jurisdictional ambiguities. For some unexplained reason, the changes were not officially proclaimed until 1801. 43 Perhaps the delay resulted from poor communications between Upper Canada's capital and London, since the Colonial Secretary had to sanction all legislative acts before they became law. In addition, the new districts probably could not function properly until the requisite courthouses and other facilities were built and the appropriate officials appointed. 44

The study area was now situated entirely within Niagara District. Partition of the Home District proved necessary when Upper Canada's capital shifted from the town of Niagara to York in 1796. The decision to relocate the provincial seat was based on strategic considerations. Niagara lay too close to the United States; York's position seemed more defensible. The site was also chosen for its access to cheap water transport and an abundance of shipbuilding calibre timber and its good harbour. However, the Niagara peninsula remained the province's most densely populated
DISTRICTS IN SOUTHERN ONTARIO

1802

HOME

LONDON

NIAGARA

LAKE ERIE

LAKE ONTARIO

NEWCASTLE

MIDLAND

JOHNSTOWN

EASTERN

HOME - DISTRICT

--- District boundary

area. If these people constantly had to visit York in order to transact their official business, great hardships would result. While Niagara lost its provincial role, it retained its function as a district capital.

The reformed districts proved no more permanent than their predecessors. In addition to being highly undemocratic, the districts exhibited several negative structural aspects which helped assure their eventual demise. Due to the dearth and poverty of Ontario's population, the districts needed huge areas to finance costly municipal services. While providing a vast areal extent partially resolved the revenue accumulation question, the problem of poor access to the seats of municipal power, the district capitals, continued. The capitals invariably were eccentrically located at the district fronts, where people had first settled. Practically all business of a local governmental nature had to be conducted at these points. This requirement worked a particular hardship upon settlers residing in rear townships, given the universal wretchedness of the roads. For such folk, a trip to the district seat constituted a major undertaking that was arduous, expensive, and time consuming. Back township residents also frequently complained that their interests were
neglected by the magistrates who presided at the Quarter Sessions, since these officials rarely lived away from the district towns. In a spatial sense, the early district governments were clearly not very local governments.

Territorial flexibility was the district's major physical defect. The prospect of eventual subdivision retarded the development of any community feeling. Long range planning with a degree of certainty was impossible. The formation of a new district required the passage of a legislative act which often sparked bitter political wrangling, especially over the location of the new district's capital. Due to the great size of the district, the widely scattered population, and the terrible roads, there was constant pressure for more districts. However, the cost of maintaining a separate jurisdiction acted as a powerful deterrent. Proposals to erect each new unit provoked prolonged controversy between the parent district and the area seeking separation; the former usually claimed that it needed the revenue of the undivided district, and the latter complained about its remoteness from, and neglect by, the old capital. Since the number of districts kept increasing, the second argument obviously won out as a rule. Townships were frequently shuffled from one
district to another during these periods of territorial revision.

The Niagara peninsula could only be administered as a single unit while it was dominated by one urban centre, Niagara. The town's influence began declining in 1796 when York became Upper Canada's capital. By 1798, the entire isthmus was being settled in a regular fashion. Population growth was particularly rapid around the head of Lake Ontario. People living there had to make lengthy pilgrimages to either York or Niagara to conduct official business. The need for a new lakehead-oriented district was recognized but its establishment was delayed by the War of 1812. In 1816, the District of Gore was finally carved out of the western extremities of the Home and Niagara districts. (See Figure No. 8.) The new entity was named after the province's Lieutenant Governor, Francis Gore. Hamilton became the capital. For the first time, the thesis area's upper level administration was divided between two jurisdictions. The district boundary followed the Grimsby-Saltfleet line, a situation that has persisted to the present.50

Conceptually, the proliferation of districts was analogous to the township map's development because the territorial evolution of the politico-administrative
GORE - DISTRICT

HALTON - COUNTY

HALDIMAND

WENTWORTH

LINCOLN

TALBOT

BROCK

LAKE ERIE

LAKE ONTARIO

THE DISTRICT OF GORE 1816

hierarchy represented a geographical response, however belated, inadequate, and limited, to the need and demand for more accessible and functional structures. In this respect, the response was positive. Districts served as the senior tier of local government until December 31, 1849, when they were abolished and replaced by counties. By 1849, there were twenty districts, many of them coterminous with a single county. (See Figure No. 9.) Interestingly, a 1961 plan for local government reform in southern Ontario suggested 23 units as the ideal arrangement. The year 1849 may very well be repeated with respect to the number of third order governments in the 1970's since Queen's Park has already embarked upon a numerically similar regional government scheme.

Territorial Origin and Evolution of the County

Ontario's first counties arose as a direct consequence of the 1791 Canada Act which partitioned Quebec into Lower Canada and Upper Canada. This Act was designed to replace French law in regions not occupied by French Canadians and to introduce more representative institutions in British North America. The latter goal was achieved by granting each province a lieutenant governor, an appointed executive council, and an elected legislative assembly. In Upper Canada, the legislature
was assigned sixteen seats. On July 16, 1792 the province's four districts were divided into nineteen counties, whose primary function was to act as electoral constituencies for the new legislative assembly.\(^5^2\) (See Figure No. 10.)

Why nineteen counties were selected to fill a sixteen seat house is not recorded. Perhaps the government was anticipating future assembly growth. In any event, county boundaries were determined more by the distribution of population than by a desire to gain areal equality.\(^5^3\) Possibly because the borders were hastily delimited during the brief interval, July 10-15, population parity was not obtained. The more populous counties had to be further divided into ridings, which then elected one member each. The less populous counties were combined into units called united counties. Each united county sent one member to the legislature.\(^5^4\)

Some ambiguity surrounds the actual territorial extent of the first counties. At one point, Patterson states that only the surveyed portion of the province was subdivided into counties.\(^5^5\) However, maps published by Spragge, Whebell, and Patterson himself, suggest that southern Ontario's counties included much unsurveyed land within their borders.\(^5^6\) Since most electors lived
on surveyed lands, the uncertainty is of minor importance.

As with the townships, counties were generally aligned to navigable waterways. Consequently, county and district boundaries at first crossed each other. In 1798, county boundaries were made coterminous with township lines, as were district borders. This automatically made county and district limits coterminous. This general administrative revision removed the jurisdictional chaos that enveloped many settlers. Henceforth, the township was used as the basic building block for all higher government levels so any resident of southern Ontario, merely by knowing his township's name, could easily discover which county and district controlled his destiny. The riding boundaries also coincided with township lines. To the west of Hastings, the counties were named in the order of the English counties bordering the North Sea from Scotland to the Straits of Dover.

At its inception in 1792, Lincoln County occupied the southern portion of the Home District. In 1798, when the entire peninsula was being settled in an orderly fashion, the county was divided into four ridings. (See Figure No. 11.) The study area lay in the First Riding, which encompassed the county's
Figure No. 11  
northwestern corner and comprised Ancaster, Barton, Binbrook, Caistor, Clinton, Gainsborough, Glanford, Grimsby, and Saltfleet townships. The creation of Gore District, which contained the new counties of Halton and Wentworth, removed much of Lincoln County's First Riding and completed the administrative map in the immediate thesis area. (See Figure No. 8.) Lincoln and Wentworth underwent several other territorial changes but these did not affect the status of the Grimsby-Saltfleet line.

On January 1, 1850 counties replaced districts as Ontario's senior local governments, creating a situation that persists in Wentworth but not in Lincoln. Lincoln disappeared on January 1, 1970 when it was fused with Welland County to become the Regional Municipality of Niagara.

Conclusion

Internally, Ontario has experienced a long and varied politico-territorial history from 1781 to 1969. Beginning with an administratively virgin surface of vast size, successive senior governments created a bewildering array of territorial units arranged within several multi-layered political hierarchies. With respect to the thesis, several significant themes emerge.
The various types of spatially organized areas were deliberately focused upon urban cores. The early townships all contained town plans. The District of Nassau centred on the tiny Niagara settlement; later, the District of Niagara did likewise and Gore was oriented toward Hamilton. In some cases, as in Saltfleet, urban centres failed to develop. Moreover, urban growth was often territorially disruptive. The growth of Grimsby, Hamilton, and Stoney Creek led to reductions in the size of surrounding townships. Only Smithville seemed able to live in harmony within a township, perhaps because the hamlet was so small and located far away from urban places in neighbouring civil divisions. The political separation of rural and urban areas reduced intramunicipal strife while, at the same time, increasing the scope for intermunicipal relations.

Emphasis was originally placed upon the erection of self-contained civil divisions, thereby minimizing the necessity of establishing interlocal mechanisms. An early manifestation concerned the placement of township boundaries in unpleasant areas such as swamps—places thought unlikely ever to be densely settled. Improvements in southern Ontario's transportation system gradually eroded the basis of municipal isolation. Municipal isolation was further eroded by the
The municipalities in the study area are old by Ontario standards. The local governments are proud of their long histories and anxious to preserve their territorial identities intact. In the same tradition, the municipalities are also anxious to preserve their hard won local (functional) autonomy. As southern Ontario evolved from a virgin wilderness into a densely settled region, the raison d'etre of the various civil divisions changed accordingly. The lowly township began life as a utilitarian device for ordering land settlement but gradually assumed an increasing number of political chores. At the opposite end of the hierarchy, the district just as slowly lost its judicial functions to the county, which in turn was at first designed as a parliamentary constituency. These functional changes, intimately related to territorial shifts, are discussed in Chapter III.
FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER II


17. Loc. cit.
18. Ibid., pp. 333, 342.
19. Ibid., p. 341.
20. Ibid., p. 156.
22. Loc. cit.
27. Ibid., p. 327; Ibid., II, p. 487.
28. Ibid., pp. 502-505.
32. Aitchison, op. cit., p. 2.
34. Tyrrell, op. cit., p. 73.
36. Whebell, op. cit., p. 60.
37. Spragge, op. cit., p. 34.
38. Aitchison, op. cit., p. 3.
42. Whebell, op. cit., p. 74.
43. Ibid., pp. 72-73.
44. Ibid., p. 95.
45. Ibid., pp. 69, 75.
51. Ibid., p. 217.
53. Tyrrell, op. cit., p. 74.
55. Loc. cit.
57. Whebell, op. cit., p. 72.
58. Spragge, op. cit., p. 36.
CHAPTER III

THE FUNCTIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF ONTARIO'S MUNICIPALITIES

The Rise and Fall of the District

Districts served as Ontario's first local governments although, given their vast areal extent, the adjective local seems somewhat inappropriate. Each district was governed by a Court of General Quarter Sessions of the Peace, composed of magistrates (also called justices of the peace) appointed by Quebec's Governor or, after the creation of Upper Canada, the Lieutenant Governor. The courts usually met four times a year in the district capitals. In addition to their legal duties, the Quarter Sessions administered a broad range of activities such as the appointment of township constables, the licencing of liquor outlets, and road construction and maintenance. Since the magistrates were chosen by nonelected officials, these quasi-municipal regimes were essentially undemocratic.

Similar systems operated in the United Kingdom until 1835, and in the southern United States before independence. In the pre-Revolutionary South, Quarter Sessions depended upon conditions fundamentally
different from those in the township-dominated North. The southern States possessed a much stronger rural gentry than the North. The southern upper class occupied large, isolated estates very much akin to the British landed aristocracy's situation. The economy was based on plantation agriculture and black slave labour which meant that the middle class was smaller and less vigorous than in the North and Upper Canada. Finally, the South contained a larger, more deferential, mass of lower class whites than in Upper Canada. The South's socioeconomic environment readily lent itself to autocratic local government by Quarter Sessions.

The British obviously hoped to establish a kindred scheme in central Canada as an antidote to the perceived threat of democratic republicanism which was close at hand in the northern United States. Because Canadian circumstances differed radically from those obtaining in the South, the attempt ultimately failed. Ontario was farmed by rugged, self-reliant smallholders, not slaves owned by wealthy country gentlemen on huge rural fiefdoms. A large, vocal, and independently-minded middle class emerged, especially in the urban centres. Most importantly, the United Empire Loyalists transported a powerful affinity for local self-government to Canada, which doomed Britain's attempt to create an
undemocratic municipal system to eventual failure. Despite the distaste of most Upper Canadians for autocratic government, there can be no gainsaying that the four original district courts were a marked improvement for western Quebecers over the preexisting complete governmental centralization in Montreal and Quebec City. In any event, the Quarter Sessions represented the maximum degree of administrative decentralization that the colonial authorities would initially tolerate.

To supplement the courts, district land boards were established. Some confusion attends the precise date of their formation. At one point, Fraser states that the boards were appointed on February 17, 1789, but later he asserts that Lord Dorchester constituted the Nassau unit on October 13, 1788. Tyrrell notes that the Nassau board's first meeting occurred in 1789 in Niagara at the Navy Hall, (which later acted as Upper Canada's first parliament building). The boards administered most matters pertaining to land settlement including surveying, land distribution, resolving disputes, and examining the character and loyalty of applicants. They also appointed road commissioners and recommended welfare measures to the senior government. The boards convened immediately after the conclusion of the Quarter
Sessions, because more people were likely to be present in the district capitals then than at any other time.\textsuperscript{6} Apparently, this decentralization of land administration denoted a genuine effort by the government to reduce delays and expenses for settlers living, or intending to live, far away from the district seats.\textsuperscript{7}

The district land boards were Ontario's first special purpose administrative areas. To eliminate jurisdictional disputes between adjacent units, the districts and the land boards were made coterminous. The practice of erecting special purpose bodies still continued but, unfortunately, their boundaries were not always made coincidental with municipal limits. This noncoincidence often created administrative chaos. Ontario's school boards became the most persistent culprits in this regard. School board boundaries consistently ignored municipal boundaries. The spatial organization of school boards grew so bewildering that Queen's Park was recently forced, at considerable political cost, to rearrange them into units largely coincident with counties.

The land boards offered the first recorded example of extensive intermunicipal cooperation. The interaction involved simple exchanges of mail, investigating the legality of land applications, and checking the
character and loyalty of applicants. Some immigrants tried to obtain more acreage than they were entitled to by applying for deeds in several districts. In addition, the British were anxious to discourage entry of any people from the United States bearing republican proclivities, since it was feared that such newcomers might lead an anti-British movement.  

The district land boards were superceded by county boards in 1792. These, in turn, were abolished on November 6, 1794. All applications for land were then made directly to the Clerk of the Legislative Council in Niagara. This recentralization may have been an attempt to curtail fraudulent applications. Whatever the reason, the system was quickly changed once again on August 21, 1795. After that date, title deeds were deposited with clerks of the peace (county level officials) in the Eastern, Midland, and Western Districts; in the Home District, they were deposited with the Attorney General.  

Considered together, the Quarter Sessions and the land boards constituted the kernel of Ontario's local government. The boards' more turbulent history and early demise probably reflected the relative decline in importance of land matters as the colony matured and other municipal concerns were thrust forward. While the
districts experienced great territorial change, they retained their cluster of administrative and judicial functions intact to a much greater extent than the land boards, and outlived these by half a century.

The district court system possessed several basic and interrelated faults which no amount of tinkering could overcome.\textsuperscript{10} First, the quality of the magistrates, on which the system's efficiency depended, was chronically low. The provincial government could never find enough qualified men for the bench. Numerous appointees refused to serve because they could not afford to make the long trips to the district capitals four times a year. This meant that many undesirable justices were appointed. The interests of the rear townships were neglected because the Quarter Sessions were conducted, and therefore invariably dominated, by magistrates living in the immediate vicinity of the district seats. This situation led to increasing demands for the election of justices, which demands culminated in the abortive 1837 rebellion.\textsuperscript{11} Second, the courts were undemocratic. There was no way for people to remove incompetent magistrates. Third, administrative efficiency was further debilitated by the immense size of the districts and their abysmal road networks. Fourth, the rapid growth of population,
particularly in urban communities, and the dispersal of 
the population, generated a tremendous volume of local 
government needs that completely clogged Quarter 
Sessions machinery designed for much less demanding 
times.

The Quarter Sessions underwent many minor changes 
from 1788 to 1850 but the most significant political 
refinement occurred in 1841 when elected district 
councils were introduced. For the first time, the 
districts were incorporated and granted the power to 
tax. Upper Canada was in desperate financial straits 
and required additional revenue sources. The provincial 
authorities realized that increased taxation would not 
be accepted by the frugal populace without direct 
representation, hence, the elected councils.¹²

A considerable amount of central control was 
retained. The Lieutenant Governor appointed the 
district clerk, treasurer, and warden from three choices 
nominated for each position by the council. The 
provincial Board of Works had to approve all local 
improvements costing more than 300 pounds. One author 
suggests that the controls were not very onerous. In 
1846, they were reduced even farther when the councils 
won the right to select their own officials. The prime 
advantage of the new councils involved the removal of
much petty business from the provincial legislature, where it could not be intelligently handled due to ignorance of local conditions. The great interest aroused by the 1842 elections demonstrated the popularity and importance of assigning significant powers to local governments. The experiment ended in 1850 when the districts were replaced by counties as the senior level of local government. Even the democratized districts had been too centralized for the efficient operation of municipal affairs, but for eight years the elected councils had provided valuable training for the inception of real local self-government.

The Functional History of the County

The counties were originally created to serve as electoral constituencies in Upper Canada's Legislative Assembly. As such, they were clearly not units of local government but additional duties were occasionally assigned to them. Lieutenant Governor Simcoe attempted to utilize counties as the territorial basis for establishing a landed aristocracy by appointing county lieutenants who were somewhat equivalent to Lords Lieutenant in English shires. The lieutenants named by Simcoe were committed to organizing and commanding county-based militia regiments. Because of their
reputed local knowledge, they also nominated magistrates for appointment to the Quarter Sessions. This scheme was aborted by the Colonial Secretary on the ground that the multiplication of offices permitted too much decentralization of executive power. All appointments ceased in 1807.\textsuperscript{15} County land registration boards operated from 1792 to 1794, as previously mentioned. Sometime after 1795, the counties acquired this duty permanently.

Prior to the advent of full local self-government in 1850, few other functions filtered down to the counties. Simcoe was responsible for most of the functions originally assigned to the counties. He supposedly detected the development of distinct district identities based on specific regional interests which the Governor feared might eventually lead to demands for the separation of the districts from Upper Canada.\textsuperscript{16} By beefing up the county's role, Simcoe reasoned that these pressures could be defused. Subsequent administrations in London and York evidently disagreed because the creation of inferior county courts in 1827 constituted the only significant change in the county's duties between 1795 and 1850.\textsuperscript{17} The Quarter Sessions and the provincial and British governments were normally loath to devolve any more power to lower levels than was
absolutely necessary.

By the 1840's, the desire for complete local self-government could no longer be resisted. The fulfillment of this desire was achieved with the passage of the Baldwin Act, which took effect on January 1, 1850. The Baldwin Act (known officially as the Municipal Act) liquidated the autocratic Quarter Sessions and their territorial containers—the districts. Most of the districts' legislative functions passed directly to the townships. The county's status was also elevated. The county court became the senior judicial unit and the county council received wide powers, especially of a coordinating nature. The county councils were indirectly elected, comprising the reeves, deputy reeves, and mayors of the county's constituent townships, villages, and towns. The county councillors selected a warden from among their own group. An instance of the county's coordinating role involved the stipulation that all intertownship roads and bridges automatically came under the county council's exclusive jurisdiction. Such measures greatly reduced the need for myriad intermunicipal agreements.

The transition from districts to the county system was smoothed by the provision of united counties in cases where a district contained more than one
counties. Whenever the junior county demonstrated an ability to be financially independent, separation occurred, as when Wentworth left Halton in 1853. In instances where a district was coterminous with a single county of different name, the county's name was retained.20 The counties were the districts' logical successors since eleven of the twenty districts were composed of only one county as early as 1845. (See Figure No. 9.) Baldwin simply substituted the one for the other in 1850.21 The simplicity and uniformity of Ontario's new municipal system was well suited to Canadian conditions in the mid-nineteenth century. The municipal system was also an excellent training ground for politicians seeking higher office in the provincial and federal governments.22 Generally speaking, the Baldwin Act apportioned more political power to towns, townships, and villages than to counties. Many people therefore tended to regard the county as an unnecessary redundancy in Ontario's politico-territorial hierarchy.

The Functional History of the Township

The township was originally created to act as an administratively convenient device for organizing pioneer land settlement. Because the British rejected the entire concept of democracy in their Canadian
colonies, the townships were never intended to serve as the territorial basis for local self-government. Britain's distaste for local self-government stemmed from her colonial experience in the United States. According to the British analysis, the American colonies revolted as a result of too much, rather than too little, democracy. Therefore, township powers in Canada were severely circumscribed and the dictatorial Quarter Sessions system implemented.

Despite strong British disapproval, the Loyalists frequently held township meetings to deal with locally important matters such as fence heights and loose animals. The colonial authorities regarded these illegal gatherings as dangerous manifestations of excessive popular democracy, akin to events that preceded the American Revolution. These meetings signaled the start of a long battle between the British and the settlers over the right of Canadians to practice local self-government. The struggle, which the British eventually lost, was not finally settled until the passage of the Baldwin Act in 1849.

The British had to respond to the existence of unsanctioned assemblies either by outlawing or regulating them. The latter course was chosen. As a concession to the Loyalists' democratic bent, Simcoe
passed a township act in 1793 which legalized the convening of annual township meetings. These gatherings were assigned one minor legislative function—the regulation of fence heights. The meetings also elected a large number of township officers: a clerk, two assessors, one collector, two to six overseers of roads and highways, two wardens, and a poundkeeper. Single townships could convene meetings only if they contained thirty or more households. If a township had fewer than thirty households, it could hold a joint gathering with the adjacent township having the smallest population. This was rarely done, possibly reflecting the extremely limited powers of such assemblies.  

The authority of the annual township meetings and their elected officials was rigidly prescribed by provincial statute and the Quarter Sessions magistrates until the 1830's. A vocal band of reformers had constantly urged the provincial authorities to grant more power to the townships. These efforts were rewarded to a certain extent in 1834, when locally elected road overseers obtained the right to arbitrate boundary and drainage disputes. One year later, the reformists won a major victory. The powers of the township meetings were greatly expanded while, at the same time, the powers of the Quarter Sessions were
correspondingly reduced. The residents of each township elected three men to a Board of Commissioners, which met quarterly. The Boards were granted a considerable amount of authority over township officials. The Boards supervised local road and bridge construction, regulated pits, quarries, and other hazards to travellers, and conducted weed control measures. The Boards also levied fines or made forfeitures when the laws of the townships were violated. To finance their new responsibilities, the townships acquired the requisite taxation powers. Township clerks gained the right to administer oaths of office, call township meetings, and supervise the election of Boards of Commissioners. 

The 1835 reforms resulted from a breakdown in the Quarter Sessions system. To a great extent, the successful operation of this system had relied upon the individual magistrates. Upper Canada never had enough magistrates to conduct adequately the affairs of the province. Moreover, many of the magistrates were totally incompetent due to a lack of education, corruptness, senility, or an unwillingness to perform their duties. Worse, numerous townships were completely devoid of resident magistrates. In some cases, this was due to the lack of qualified individuals. In other instances, suitable candidates existed but were not
appointed to the bench because of their personal or political differences with provincial authorities. Anyone wishing to conduct official business in a township that lacked a magistrate had to travel a considerable distance to reach the nearest judge. Almost every facet of pioneer life required the attention of a magistrate, including the registration of births, deaths, marriages, and land titles. Even elected township officers could not legally perform their duties without first swearing an oath before a magistrate. Given the dismal roads of the day, many isolated people simply refused to make costly and difficult treks to appear before far away magistrates. One result was the massive neglect of local public works such as roads and bridges.

The 1835 reforms went a long way towards correcting the worst aspects of the Quarter Sessions system by greatly reducing the pioneers' reliance upon magistrates. However, the new freedoms were very short-lived. Due to the 1837 rebellion, the provincial government completely rescinded the two year old reforms. The township's powers reverted almost to the 1793 level. The reinstated wardens were practically powerless. The long struggle for local self-government continued. A reformist faction in the
provincial legislature, led by Baldwin, vigourously pressed for drastic changes. The provincial government responded by introducing district councils in 1841. These councils decided virtually all township matters, including the opening or closing of roads, the building of halls by special tax levies, and the site of meetings. 27 This system of local government was still too centralized. Baldwin continued to demand freedom from central control, release from hampering statutory restrictions, and elected representatives with real political power at the township level. 28 For truly effective local government to develop, Baldwin realized that Upper Canada required a large downward devolution of political power. This could not be achieved until the reformers assumed power at the provincial level.

When Baldwin finally won the premiership, he quickly passed a Municipal (Baldwin) Act in 1849. This landmark Act made the township the fundamental unit of local self-government in Ontario. All townships with more than one hundred households were incorporated and vested with wide tax powers. Townships of less than a hundred households united with the smallest adjacent unit for political purposes. Separation occurred when the junior township contained one hundred homes. These standardized rules governing incorporation eliminated
much political jockeying for provincial favour. Each township elected five councillors, one of whom became reeve and sat on the county council. Units with over 300 homes also elected a deputy reeve, who joined the reeve at county council meetings. 29

The townships soon abused their broad financial powers, and Baldwin was forced to check them in 1859. One common type of abuse involved fiscal mismanagement. Most communities in southern Ontario were desperately anxious to attract railroads, which were regarded as essential for economic development. Many municipalities issued bonds, guaranteed by the local governments, as inducements to railway companies to build lines into their communities. These ventures frequently fell through, bankrupting the municipalities. 30 Baldwin had no choice but to curtail municipal financial powers to a certain extent.

Ever since 1859, townships experienced a steady erosion of their local powers. The process begun by Baldwin has continued to the present day. In some cases, the functions of township governments were transferred to provincial agencies or special purpose administrative areas. In other instances, municipal by-laws became subject to stringent review by other bodies. The Ontario Municipal Board (O.M.B.), created
in 1932 as a result of Depression difficulties, was vested with wide regulatory powers over the township councils. The Board can even veto municipal financial measures. Under the 1946 Ontario Planning Act and subsequent amendments, the O.M.B. can also arbitrate local planning disputes and appeals. Clearly, the townships only enjoyed unfettered local self-government in the interval 1850-59.

Probably the most significant process as far as townships are functionally concerned, involved the territorial encroachment and political ascendancy of urban municipalities. Annexations either eliminated townships entirely or reduced their fiscal resource bases. Ultimately, urbanization lowered the priority of township problems in the locus of supreme political power, Queen's Park. As a result, townships have lacked really effective control over their local affairs for a long time.

The Ascendancy of Urban Municipalities

Urban areas possess special governmental needs. Simcoe partially recognized this fact in 1792 when the Quarter Sessions were authorized to make regulations and appoint firemen and other officers for fire prevention in any place containing forty homes and storehouses
within one square mile. The obvious danger of ruinous conflagrations forced the provincial government into this slight decentralization but it strongly resisted further transfers of authority to built-up areas. Despite the remarkable uniformity of Tory and reform demands for special urban bodies, the government particularly opposed local autonomy in Ontario's towns and villages.

In 1818, this opposition relaxed to the extent that the Midland District Quarter Sessions received the authority to regulate the policing, lighting, and paving of Kingston. The magistrates also obtained the authority to impose local taxes to defray the added costs. McGaughey believes that this action constituted the first move toward the formal establishment of an urban community in Ontario. Several other towns soon received similar special consideration, although the details varied in each case. A major reduction of Quarter Sessions control over urban government took place in 1832 when Brockville won an incorporated Board of Police vested with considerable authority. It was a successful experiment designed to lessen the powers of the unpopular Quarter Sessions and was quickly repeated in Hamilton one year later. Soon, many towns acquired police boards; some, especially
Toronto, gained much freedom of action. Again, the specific powers varied, causing each municipality to lobby furiously for more authority than other towns. The only common features of the many police boards were annual elections by secret ballot and the acquisition of significant functions.36

The inability of the Quarter Sessions adequately to administrate built-up areas, which possessed more complex problems than rural regions, spurred the growth of urban autonomy. In effect, urbanization generated governmental decentralization. The town's greater autonomy also reflected the traditional independence of British boroughs and the absence of wild land problems. In 1837, towns were given control over markets held within their borders. In the 1840's, villages were allowed to build their own small jails, and to elect councillors responsible for a variety of local duties.37 This trend culminated in the 1849 Municipal Act.

While the Municipal Act wrought great changes in the politically deprived rural areas, urban government also experienced important modifications. Uniform rules governing incorporation and the extent of municipal responsibility eliminated the political jockeying at Queen's Park for local favours. The Municipal Act created four types of urban municipalities: cities,
towns, villages, and police villages. (The amount of power possessed by these civil divisions declines as one passes from cities to police villages.)

Cities were physically detached from, and made roughly equal politically to, the counties. Towns closely resembled townships politically but elected a mayor who possessed police magistrate powers. Towns could incorporate when their populations reached 3,000. Urban areas desiring incorporation as towns had to petition Ontario's Lieutenant Governor. Politically, villages were also very much like the townships, even to the point of having a reeve. An unincorporated hamlet of 750 people could incorporate if 100 electors petitioned the county council, (not the Lieutenant Governor). This difference in the petition procedure symbolized the village's lower political status as compared to towns. Once incorporated, a village separated from its township but could enter into intermunicipal agreements with it, where necessary. Police villages remained a part of the townships but elected trustees for certain spatially limited urban functions. In certain respects, the towns, villages, and police villages were all subordinate to the county.

The 1849 Municipal Act's basics have remained to the present but many technical changes have occurred.
Some alterations were minor; others were of major import. Density requirements for town and village incorporation became more complicated in 1873. After 1873, no incorporation was possible if a population of less than 1,000 was spread over more than 500 acres. If the population was more than 1,000, a community could incorporate as long as its area increased by less than 200 acres for each additional 1,000 people.39

Special purpose commissions took over an increasing number of functions from municipal councils. In 1859, all cities acquired police commissions. The 1882 Free Libraries Act set up library boards supervised by library commissions. Under the terms of the Municipal Water Works Act, any municipality could regulate its water supply either by a committee of council or a special commission. The Grimsby Water Commission was an excellent example of the latter choice. Whebell notes that municipal incorporations were particularly frequent in the period 1870-90. Competition to attract railroads was fierce during that era. One device used by the municipalities was to issue debentures and bonds to help finance railway construction, as mentioned previously. This could only be done by incorporated units. Fiscal mismanagement often resulted in ruin for the unfortunate local governments.40 The situation was similar to
current intermunicipal competition for industrial development.

Eventually, so many adjustments were made to Ontario's entire municipal system that fundamental territorial dislocations and functional inefficiencies set in which rendered the whole structure obsolete and in need of basic reform.

**Early Intermunicipal Relations**

Examples of early intermunicipal relations are relatively scarce. Interlocal mechanisms were never intended to be key features of Ontario's municipal system. The provincial government traditionally sought self-contained units so as to minimize the necessity for intermunicipal cooperation. Policy coordination was assigned to higher levels of government such as the counties or provincial departments. Nevertheless, some external relations were unavoidable. It should be noted that intermunicipal activities may be labelled positive or negative, indicating cooperation or noncooperation, respectively.

The earliest recorded instances of interlocal relations occurred during the late 1780's. The relations involved exchanges of mail between district land boards. The land boards cooperated closely with
one another in order to check the validity of land claims and the character of the applicants. Because of the high degree of cooperation between the land boards, their interrelationships are described as positive. Had the district boards not cooperated, their interrelations would be described as negative. The districts also collaborated in operating schools serving students from more than one district. School trustees received supporting funds from each district in proportion to the number of their pupils attending shared schools. 41

Formal rules governed relations between Quarter Sessions and subordinate legal jurisdictions. By law, district magistrates were denied jurisdiction over offences committed in Toronto. However, warrants issued by either Toronto or district justices of the peace were enforceable anywhere in the district and the city. 42

The Quarter Sessions often arbitrated disagreements between communities, especially between rural and urban places. In fact, the magistrates frequently protected the rural areas from urban pressures. For example, until 1837 the district courts decided on the location of markets in built-up areas. In this case, the magistrates were protecting the interests of rural dwellers dependent upon the markets for their livelihoods. The farmers lacked a vote in town meetings
and so could not protect their own vital interests in marketing matters. After 1837, careful arrangements, satisfactory to buyer and seller, were worked out, making district coordination of market locations unnecessary.43 By codifying arrangements for resolving many other interlocal matters, the provincial government has continued to perform a coordinating function with reference to intermunicipal relations; since 1859, the amount of such intervention has steadily increased.

By assigning a coordinating role to county councils, Baldwin's Municipal Act further reduced the scope for direct intermunicipal relations between municipalities. Under the Municipal Act, county councils automatically assumed control over all intermunicipal roads and bridges.44 The Act did not attempt to prevent all interlocal dealings, however. A county and city, after their legal separation, frequently continued using the same courthouse and jail due to the great cost of building separate facilities. Any city (or town) utilizing these county buildings paid annual fees, arrived at by negotiations.45

One of the more interesting examples of intermunicipal relations involved joint township meetings. From 1793 onward, adjoining townships could hold officially sanctioned joint annual meetings.
Adjacent townships occasionally convened unsanctioned joint meetings due to special geographical circumstances. This normally happened when both halves of each adjoining township were separated by some obstacle to internal township communication, such as a lake. This situation existed in the townships of Leeds and Lansdowne in Johnstown District. Due to the presence of a lake straddling their common boundary, communications within each township were much more difficult than movement between each unit to the north and south of the lake. As a result, the northern halves of Leeds and Lansdowne often held informal (i.e. illegal) meetings to deal with common problems. The southern halves did likewise. The provincial government was eventually forced to realign the townships' borders to form elongated east-west oriented townships on either side of the lake. For the most part, other townships with similar difficulties were too timid to convene unsanctioned meetings. These townships simply waited patiently for the provincial government to act. The senior government usually obliged them but only after very long delays. 46

**Conclusion**

Except for a brief interval in the 1850's, the local government of Ontario was closely supervised by
senior governments. The British were originally very reluctant to grant the right of local self-government and maintained an extremely tight rein on almost all aspects of local affairs. After a lengthy struggle, strong municipal government was finally established with the passage of the Baldwin Act in 1849. In the following decade, the municipalities quickly lost much of this hard won local autonomy due to fiscal mismanagement. The erosion of municipal powers continued to the present. Municipal responsibilities were sometimes transferred to other levels of government. In other cases, the local governments retained their functions but were required to perform these duties according to increasingly complex regulations laid down by the provincial authorities. In short, Ontario's municipal governments traditionally possessed very little local freedom of action. With respect to intermunicipal relations, this meant that municipalities operated within rather narrow, provincially-defined limits. Institutional control of interlocal affairs was, and still is, pervasive; therefore, provincial regulation is expected to play an important role in the intermunicipal behaviour discussed in Chapters IV and V.

From the functional viewpoint, local governments were meant to be self-contained. For this reason,
relatively few examples of intermunicipal relations were unearthed in this chapter. Whenever the need for specialized municipal services reached beyond the confines of a single civil division, the coordinating function often passed to nonmunicipal entities such as special purpose administrative areas. Other interlocal concerns were automatically assigned to the county governments. However, Ontario's municipal system never entirely excluded the possibility of direct interlocal relations, as evidenced by provisions of the Free Libraries and Waterworks Acts. The province does provide some scope for intermunicipal relations.

Chapter III demonstrated the great role that urbanization played in generating changes in southern Ontario's municipal system. Built-up places required a more complex local government than rural ones. Chapter II showed that the spread of urbanization could be territorially disruptive. The growth of urbanization into rural areas may legitimately be expected to also generate functional changes in local government. Concomitantly, urbanization may be expected to heighten the scope for intermunicipal relations. The following two chapters show this to be true.

2. Ibid., p. 36.


9. Ibid., pp. cviii, cx.

10. The erosion of the Quarter Sessions' powers resulted in the growing importance of lesser units in Ontario's politico-territorial hierarchy. This process will be treated in greater detail under the headings of county, township, and urban places.


15. Ibid., pp. 90-96.

17. Ibid., p. 113.

18. Ibid., p. 116; Landon, op. cit., p. 5.


22. Landon, op. cit., p. 5.


29. Ibid., p. 75.


31. Ibid., p. 195.


34. Loc. cit.


47. *Infra*, chapter iv. In order to study together all current intermunicipal relations, a few agreements of long standing are not discussed in Chapter III.
CHAPTER IV

A STUDY OF FUNCTIONAL COOPERATION

Intermunicipal relations encompass many activities which can be broadly classified as being either functional or territorial in nature. Intermunicipal relations are of a functional nature whenever government services, such as fire protection and planning, are involved. The functions of local government are defined by the services performed by local government; hence, functions and services are synonymous. Territorial relations concern changes in the areal extent of municipalities by amalgamation or annexation.

Functional and territorial relations may exhibit cooperative (positive) or noncooperative (negative) tendencies. Functional cooperation is manifested by the existence of interlocal agreements for the provision of municipal services. A failure to reach intermunicipal agreement for the provision of local services signifies a lack of functional cooperation. Territorial affairs are more difficult to analyze within this theoretical positive-negative framework because they are even more closely controlled by the provincial government than
functional affairs.

The study area provides two examples of locally initiated territorial relations. Several local governments occasionally expressed a willingness to unite voluntarily with neighbouring municipalities. Two civil divisions once seriously considered transferring from Niagara to a proposed metropolitan Hamilton regional government. Other local governments opposed these moves. The interlocal territorial relations in question exhibited a mixture of positive and negative elements. To the extent that the proposed changes were of local origin and mutually agreed upon, the relations were of a positive nature. Since local efforts to achieve territorial realignment of municipal boundaries ultimately failed, the results were negative. Because territorial relations were negative, they are discussed in Chapter V. The present chapter focuses upon functional cooperation.

What factors produced intermunicipal cooperation in the study area? In Chapter I, it was suggested that nine variables play a key role in influencing interlocal behaviour: (1) provincial policy, (2) history, (3) the geographical arrangement of minor civil divisions, (4) the presence of urbanization in close proximity on either side of local boundaries, (5) the
cost of providing municipal services, (6) the existence of rural areas in adjacent municipalities, (7) the attitudes of appointed and elected officials, (8) the desire for local autonomy on the part of municipalities, and (9) the county boundary. This chapter seeks to determine which of these factors most accounted for the study area's high level of intermunicipal cooperation.

The most concrete evidence of interlocal cooperation was the intermunicipal agreement. The pattern of interlocal agreements in the study area was somewhat irregular. At the governmental level, Grimsby and North Grimsby cooperated extensively while South Grimsby remained aloof from its neighbours. Saltfleet occupied an intermediate position between these two extremes. Cooperation involved a broad spectrum of services including water supply, sewage and garbage disposal, police, fire protection, planning, and recreation. These arrangements were finalized by various means ranging from formal contracts approved by the Ontario Municipal Board (O.M.B.), to very informal verbal understandings between local council members. An analysis of all intermunicipal arrangements follows. The discussion is organized by municipality.
Grimsby

Within the study area, Grimsby was unique in that it bordered only one other municipality—North Grimsby. A complex network of agreements existed with this neighbour for eight services: community centre, fire protection, garbage dump, library, museum, planning, police, and water. In addition, the town had a fire protection agreement with Saltfleet. There had been other instances of cooperation but these were not of a continuing nature. All but two agreements (water, and garbage dump) were classified as joint rather than contractual. In a joint agreement, municipalities share in the administration and financing of a service. In a contractual agreement, one municipality simply purchases a service from a neighbour. Interestingly, though of no importance for the thesis, five agreements were considered "formal" by Grimsby's clerk/treasurer whereas only one (water) merited this label from North Grimsby's clerk. 2 There is apparently no standard definition in southern Ontario of what constitutes a formal agreement. Generally speaking, a formal agreement had received explicit approval from the O.M.B. while an informal one had not.

The oldest continuing cooperative measure dated from 1905 when the town (then a village) established the
Grimsby Water Commission (G.W.C.), constructed a $40,000 water works, and began selling water to North Grimsby. Provincial legislation allowed municipalities to create special commissions to operate water systems but these agencies remained entirely the creatures of local councils. Thus, the G.W.C. had to obtain the town council's approval before floating debentures.

Consequently, the interface between Grimsby and North Grimsby with respect to water sales was technically indirect because the township purchased water from the G.W.C. and not the town of Grimsby itself. In reality, however, the G.W.C. represented the opinions of the Grimsby town council as far as water sales to North Grimsby were concerned.

The G.W.C. records are very incomplete so it is not possible to trace definitively the origin and evolution of the water agreements. Since the thesis concentrates on the last decade, this deficiency is but a minor drawback. The earliest reference to sale terms appears in a 1906 by-law which stated that water rates outside the village had to be twice those charged inside Grimsby. Outsiders were required to pay all costs of water main extension and connexion. While the detailed terms and cost of water sales changed considerably, the agreement's contractual nature remained constant to the
dissolution of the Grimsby Water Commission in 1970. Employing Marando's terminology, the water arrangement may be classified as "routinized."\textsuperscript{7}

The oldest water contract that could be located, dated from 1937. The contract replaced a 1932 agreement. The terms were already very detailed with the responsibilities of both parties exhaustively enumerated. Only a portion of the township, Electoral Subdivision No. 1, could receive G.W.C. water.\textsuperscript{8} Another extraterritorial application of municipal by-law appeared in the stipulation that North Grimsby subscribers were subject to the same water regulations as those enforced in Grimsby. The contract's tenure was five years, with renewal thereafter on an annual basis. Six month's notice was required to void the agreement.\textsuperscript{9}

While cooperation was long standing, there was constant disagreement over water rates. According to integration theory, one would ideally expect such routinized cooperation to lead to greater integration of (1) intermunicipal water service, (2) other municipal services, and (3) entire local governments, in that order.\textsuperscript{10} At the very least, interlocal water arrangements could legitimately be expected to shift from contractual to joint operation. In the case of Grimsby-North Grimsby water sales, practice did not
conform to this theory. Admittedly, cooperation readily expanded to include other services, and the two local governments are now involuntarily combined into a new town within Niagara by provincial fiat, but precisely the opposite trend developed with respect to water supply.

In 1956, North Grimsby applied to the Ontario Municipal Board for permission to build its own waterworks at an estimated cost of $440,000. The Board refused permission and called for further negotiations between the squabbling municipalities. New talks were unsuccessful, culminating in Grimsby's application to the O.M.B. for permission to construct an extension to the town's water plant at a projected cost of $238,000. This request was conditionally approved with the proviso that solid evidence of a long-term contract with North Grimsby be quickly forthcoming. Failure would result in hearings before the O.M.B. which would then unilaterally set a water rate.

The requisite agreement failed to materialize, necessitating hearings. Although Grimsby and North Grimsby brought in expert witnesses armed with a plethora of data on costs and benefits to bolster their respective cases, the Board stated, that in its judgement, no useful purpose would be served by detailed
cost/benefit analyses. This seems rather odd. How else could the O.M.B. possibly set a fair water rate, if not by a detailed examination of costs and benefits? From the conflicting evidence presented at the hearing, an impartial analysis would certainly have seemed justified and even necessary.

Witnesses for the municipalities arrived at widely divergent conclusions concerning equitable water rates. The most interesting example involved a Mr. Jocelyn, auditor for both Grimsby and North Grimsby. At one point, this witness advocated a rate of 25¢ per 1,000 gallons but later called for a 42.93¢ rate! This was apparently a case where one individual successfully served two masters simultaneously. A Hamilton chartered accountant experienced in municipal water operations, concurred with the 25¢ price when testifying for North Grimsby. Using a highly complex formula, Grimsby's consulting engineers recommended a much higher rate—42.1¢.

The Board, obviously unimpressed with Grimsby's arguments, strongly favoured North Grimsby by setting a 30¢ rate and ordering the G.W.C. to pay the hearing's total costs ($1,060.30). Interlocal water service cooperation then continued primarily due to the compulsory arbitration of an extralocal authority, the
Ontario Municipal Board. In the Board's considered opinion, the G.W.C. was guilty of trying to exact an undue profit from its intermunicipal dealings. According to the settlement, major emphasis was placed upon the percentage of total water consumption by municipality. During the years immediately preceding the judgement, as indicated in Table No. 1, North Grimsby's share had steadily increased. This rise in North Grimsby's water consumption reflected the township's growing urbanization. Grimsby had almost completely occupied its area. Commercial, industrial, and residential development could occur only in the adjacent township, which had much vacant space.11

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Grimsby</th>
<th>North Grimsby</th>
<th>North Grimsby %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>25.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>45.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>42.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*(000,000 gallons)
The Board's decision stunned Grimsby and the Grimsby Water Commission. The Commission's solicitors summed up this astonishment by pointing to the welter of conflicting evidence presented at the hearing, particularly Mr. Jocelyn's testimony. The lawyers were especially bitter about the Board's refusal to take into consideration the rates North Grimsby charged its water subscribers (that is, for water purchased from the G.W.C.), both internally and externally. Domestic township users paid $1.25 per 1,000 gallons for the first 20,000 gallons and, thereafter, 50¢ for each additional 1,000 gallons. Saltfleet paid North Grimsby 40¢ per 1,000 gallons for water that originated from the G.W.C. Consequently, Grimsby residents naturally felt that they were subsidizing water users in not one, but two, neighbouring townships.

In its 1963 findings, the Ontario Municipal Board stated that the logical solution to the eternal quarrelling was establishment of a joint water system. All voluntary efforts to enact this suggestion failed. As a result, the provincial government wisely abolished the Grimsby Water Commission in the legislation that established the Regional Municipality of Niagara. The new Grimsby town council now directly operates the water system, under the close guidance of the Ontario Water
Resources Commission (O.W.R.C.) and other provincial bodies. Judging from the 65 year history of the Grimsby Water Commission, it is highly unlikely that such functional integration would have resulted from voluntary efforts. This case study supports Marando's conclusion that limited interlocal cooperation for essential services, rather than fostering more cooperation and eventual integration, enables the pattern of local government to remain highly fragmented.¹³

Functional cooperation in the form of water sales between Grimsby and North Grimsby originally depended upon four main factors: (1) the geographical arrangement of the two municipalities, (2) the concentration of urbanization in—and immediately adjacent to—Grimsby, (3) the primarily rural nature of North Grimsby, and (4) the prohibitively high per unit cost of installing a separate waterworks in North Grimsby to service the township's small built-up area. Changes in the status of the latter two variables later eroded the basis of voluntary interlocal cooperation for the supply of water.

The spatial arrangement of the civil divisions facilitated intermunicipal water cooperation in two ways. First, Grimsby's near encirclement by North
Grimsby limited the village's potential clients to one possibility—North Grimsby. Second, Grimsby was also an urban enclave within North Grimsby and served as a focal point for the township's own urban growth. The physical connexion of the two local governments' urbanized zones meant that both built-up areas could be serviced most logically by one water plant.

When water sales began in 1905, North Grimsby was almost entirely rural except for some very minor urban development adjoining the built-up portion of the village of Grimsby. While North Grimsby's urbanized area required a municipal water system, it was not large enough to justify the expense of building a separate waterworks. If Stoney Creek's experience is any guide, the North Grimsby council was probably dominated by councillors who represented rural interests and were therefore unwilling to pay for a costly water system to service such a small part of the township. The least expensive and most convenient solution was for North Grimsby to purchase water from the nearest available waterworks, which was located in the far more urbanized community of Grimsby. As North Grimsby's built-up area slowly expanded over the next 50 years, and as the need for more water grew, a process of administrative inertia simply led the township to purchase its additional water
requirements from Grimsby.

Eventually a point was reached in the late 1950's and early 1960's when North Grimsby's need for more water was matched by an ability to pay for the installation of a township-owned water system. The need for more water was generated by the rapid urban development of the township during this period. That North Grimsby could afford to pay for its own waterworks was evidenced by the township's application to the Ontario Municipal Board for permission to construct a water plant. A breakdown in the pattern of routinized cooperation followed. North Grimsby failed in its bid to build a municipal water system. The attempt was foiled by the O.M.B. Thereafter, intermunicipal cooperation for the distribution of water continued only due to the intervention of a powerful provincial agency, the Ontario Municipal Board.

After 50 years of relatively voluntary cooperation, North Grimsby wished to reduce, rather than increase, its level of interlocal relations. Voluntary cooperation for this basic municipal service—vital for planning future urban growth—was apparently possible only as long as North Grimsby could not afford its own municipal water supply. Despite the township's belated desire to operate an independent system, the provincial
government would not tolerate such a wasteful duplication of effort. When Queen's Park reorganized the Niagara peninsula's local governments in 1970, Grimsby and North Grimsby were amalgamated. The amalgamation eliminated the need for provincially-imposed interlocal water cooperation. After 1970, water supply in the Grimsby area ceased to be an interlocal concern and simply became an intramunicipal matter.

The remainder of Grimsby's intermunicipal endeavors caused much less acrimony than the water contract, possibly because less money was involved. This conclusion again parallels Marando's findings. Since Grimsby lacked sufficient empty land, the town had to use the adjoining township's dump. Although covering a very mundane municipal function, the garbage dump agreement possessed a complex blend of joint and contractual characteristics. When first signed in 1962, the agreement obliged Grimsby to pay North Grimsby a $100 rental fee per annum. The purchase of a service—in this case, the use of a garbage dump—by one local government from another, gave the agreement its contractual cast. The two municipalities shared the following, carefully defined operating costs equally:

1. all direct township costs for supervising, excavating, filling, levelling, burning, and otherwise
disposing of garbage, (2) all direct costs of insuring persons employed by the township to do these tasks, (3) all direct telephone, electric power, and other costs incurred by supervisory staff, (4) all other costs for any other work of any nature required for proper dump operation, and (5) all direct costs caused by any liability for damages to any person or property from dump operations. All Grimsby residents were granted the same rights and privileges to use the dump enjoyed by North Grimsby residents, subject to the township's by-laws. This clause was another example of the extraterritorial application of municipal by-law. The dump was operated by a joint management committee consisting of two township and one town resident appointed annually by their respective councils. The accounts had to be approved by this committee, which usually met four times a year. The sharing of operating costs and dump management by Grimsby and North Grimsby gave the arrangement the character of a joint agreement. Any failure to agree over costs was settled by North Grimsby's auditor. The contract was for five years. 17 Prior to amalgamation, only two changes were made in the 1968 agreement. The rental fee increased by $900 and Grimsby henceforth had to also share fifty per cent of all equipment depreciation costs. 18
The town and township jointly operated a volunteer fire fighting organization since at least 1935. Most costs were shared equally. Cooperation was very close indeed, essentially because of the vital function performed by firemen in built-up areas. In 1960, when a new firehall and equipment were desperately needed, both local governments decided to share the heavy replacement costs on a strictly fifty-fifty basis. Grimsby expropriated land (never a politically popular move) worth $16,500. A $51,000 firehall was built on the site and a new fire engine purchased for $16,000. The total investment of $83,500 was shared equally. In addition, all other expenses were split on a fifty-fifty basis, including maintenance and the permanent fire chief's salary. Only one expense was not divided equally. Volunteer firemen's salaries were paid proportionally, depending upon which community used their services. If 60 per cent of the fires occurred in North Grimsby, then the township paid 60 per cent of the volunteers' wages.

Under the Ontario Public Libraries Act, two or more municipalities may establish a union public library for the mutual benefit of their respective citizens. Grimsby and North Grimsby took advantage of this Act by creating a nine man Grimsby District Public Library
Initially, the costs of establishing, maintaining, and operating the library were shared as follows: Grimsby—55 per cent, and North Grimsby—45 per cent. These proportions were revised annually according to the addresses appearing on the loan slips. Each council appointed one of its members to the Library Board. Grimsby annually appointed four non-council members and North Grimsby, three. The Board's composition varied by the same formula used to determine proportional expenses. Thoughtfully, the agreement was made binding upon the successors of the town and township in any future regional government scheme.

The library agreement worked smoothly. Municipal cost ratios were adjusted by one percentage point in 1968; i.e. Grimsby paid 54 per cent, and North Grimsby 46 per cent, of the library's expenses in that year.

The two municipalities cooperated on a wide range of recreational projects. The most important agreement concerned a combination artificial ice arena, swimming pool, and recreation centre called Peach King Gardens, built in 1957 under provisions of the 1951 Community Centres Act. This Act permits contiguous municipalities to jointly operate community centres. In 1966, the two communities cancelled an earlier arrangement concerning the Garden's capital and maintenance costs.
immediately signed a new contract on financing future Garden's development. All expenditures were henceforth shared equally and the centre's title was registered in the names of both local governments. A seven man board, composed of two citizens and one councillor from each municipality plus a mutually agreed upon resident of either community, operated the building. The town's mayor and the township's reeve sat on the board as ex officio members. All books and records were kept by North Grimsby. The fruits of an earlier cooperative endeavor, a centennial park, was also incorporated into the community centre agreement; again, with all costs on a fifty-fifty basis. The centennial park, incidentally, was one of only five similar projects conducted throughout the entire Niagara peninsula in connexion with Canada's one hundredth birthday. In addition to the above, the board jointly operated a very extensive recreational programme. Beginning in 1965, both communities jointly managed, under a separate agreement, a small historical museum with all expenditures divided equally.

Starting in 1952, Grimsby and North Grimsby sponsored the Grimsby and Suburban Planning Board, which attempted to advise both local councils on regional planning matters. The Board was very active, consisting
mainly of citizens keenly interested in rational community development but reluctant to stand for public office. Expenses were very light. The $600 a year chairman, North Grimsby's Clerk, conducted frequent evening sessions. The discussions dealt mostly with the township's future development since Grimsby lacked much vacant land available for growth.\(^{27}\) The planning board's efforts, while well intentioned, were candidly described as "rather ineffective" by a source who must remain anonymous.

One other minor act of cooperation existed between Grimsby and North Grimsby. In 1969, the town's police agreed to synchronize police radio frequencies with those used by the township's constabulary.\(^{28}\) From time to time, other municipal functions required ad hoc interlocal cooperation. According to local officials, such intermunicipal cooperation usually was easily forthcoming. A recent example concerned a tri-partite arrangement involving the West Lincoln Hospital, Grimsby, and North Grimsby to connect a new hospital wing to Grimsby's sewer system.\(^{29}\) Grimsby signed only one intermunicipal agreement with a municipality (Saltfleet) other than North Grimsby. In 1965, the town agreed to allow its fire department to assist the Saltfleet fire brigade in an emergency. The decision to
permit equipment to leave the town's limits rested entirely with the Grimsby fire chief. Little use was ever made of this essentially emergency measure. It is noteworthy that the agreement involved the crossing of municipal and county boundaries. This exhausts Grimsby's interlocal functional relations.

What factors led to functional cooperation between Grimsby and North Grimsby for fire protection, a garbage dump, a library, a museum, planning, police radio frequencies, and recreation? Provincial policy clearly played a leading role in the cases of the community centre and the library. Provincial legislation was designed to foster interlocal cooperation. The Community Centres Act and the Public Libraries Act recognized the fact that many small municipalities, alone, could not afford adequate library and recreational facilities due to high construction costs. By encouraging the construction and operation of community centres and libraries on an intermunicipal basis, the province ensured economies of scale at the municipal level. When Grimsby and North Grimsby took advantage of the interlocal provisions of the Acts, the local governments achieved lowered per municipality costs and acquired jointly, library and recreational services that they could not, in all probability, have
afforded separately.

The high cost of municipal services that require extensive facilities, such as community centres and libraries, was also crucial in fostering the fire prevention agreement. Built-up areas must have effective fire fighting organizations. To obtain the best possible fire department, Grimsby and North Grimsby pooled their fiscal resources. The community centre, fire prevention, and library agreements all conformed to Marando’s findings that economic factors spur intermunicipal cooperation for services that entail heavy capital expenditures.31

As was the case with the water contract, most of Grimsby’s other intermunicipal relations with North Grimsby stemmed, in part, from the presence of continuous urbanization and the location of the town inside the township. The concentration of population in and around Grimsby required municipal services. These services could usually be provided most economically and effectively by the combined efforts of the two local governments. Grimsby could have utilized a garbage dumping site beyond North Grimsby but to have used a more distant site would have unnecessarily increased transportation costs. The synchronization of police radio frequencies surely heightened the effectiveness of
the police forces in both communities.

In his Detroit study, Marando pointed out that municipalities were often unwilling to cooperate for regional planning because shared planning eroded local autonomy over the control of municipal lifestyles. The ineffectiveness of the Grimsby and Suburban Planning Board supports Marando's conclusion. Both communities went through the motions of joint planning but neither municipality really adhered to the Planning Board's recommendations.

Cooperation for a small museum reflected the long historical association between Grimsby and North Grimsby. Economics was a minor factor because the museum cost very little to operate. The museum agreement bears out Marando's finding that local governments are not overly reluctant to enter into interlocal arrangements where exact benefits to each municipality are difficult to assess as long as the costs are small.

North Grimsby

North Grimsby's intermunicipal relations with Grimsby were reviewed above and need not be mentioned further. The township shared a common boundary with three other municipalities (all townships): Clinton,
Saltfleet, and South Grimsby. The boundary with Saltfleet was also a county line, separating Lincoln and Wentworth counties. As such, it was intuitively expected to act as an inhibitor of intermunicipal relations. What follows may cast some doubt on this supposition. According to North Grimsby’s Clerk, pre-1964 municipal records were "in a hopeless state" and, therefore, unavailable for consultation. Prior to 1964, the records were kept in various private homes because the township lacked a municipal hall.34 From 1964 onward, temporary offices were rented in Grimsby. Documentary gaps produced inconvenience for the researcher but were not an insuperable obstacle, since agreements could be crosschecked in the offices of neighbouring municipalities. The township’s rapid growth in the 1960’s caught councillors by surprise, causing records to fall into disarray in the rush to cope with the booming development.35

In contrast to North Grimsby’s many intermunicipal endeavors with Grimsby, only one agreement existed with another municipality. Water obtained from the G.W.C. was sold to Saltfleet for 40¢ per 1,000 gallons. The agreement was probably illegal since Saltfleet also purchased water from Hamilton and, under the terms of that contract, Saltfleet was prohibited from buying
water from any other source. The consequences of any illegality were deemed unimportant because the amount of water resold to Saltfleet constantly declined in recent years and was expected to cease entirely in the near future.

No agreement existed whatsoever between North Grimsby and its other neighbours, Clinton and South Grimsby townships. The intermunicipal inactivity was a function of the rural nature of the lands on either side of North Grimsby's borders (excluding the boundary with Grimsby). This supports Marando's observation that one important circumstance governing the intensity of interlocal cooperation is the relative degree of urbanization in adjacent municipalities. The more urban development, the greater is the need for intermunicipal cooperation to meet urban service requirements. Farming areas generally require less local government services than their citified counterparts.

The city and suburbanite's traditional contempt for their country cousins may have also played a role in this intergovernmental isolation. There was a feeling in North Grimsby that the more rural municipalities were governed by a 1930's mentality as far as interlocal cooperation was concerned. Except for a well qualified clerk/treasurer, South Grimsby was regarded as a "hick
operation" by a senior North Grimsby official. This evaluation was supported by reference to a badly needed street light at a township line road junction. South Grimsby refused to share the installation costs, forcing North Grimsby to bear the full expense alone, even though South Grimsby residents shared its benefits. South Grimsby's clerk/treasurer had recommended to his council that the southern township share the cost of installing the traffic light. The elected officials demurred. In his Detroit study, Marando ascertained that the quality and attitudes of appointed and elected officials varied widely but that these differences did not appreciably influence interlocal behaviour. The present thesis differs with Marando's findings in this respect. The attitudes of South Grimsby's councillors did restrict the township's intermunicipal dealings to a certain extent.

When the provincial government announced definite plans to establish a Niagara regional government, Grimsby and North Grimsby launched close, but highly informal, consultations to cushion the blow financially. Once Grimsby and North Grimsby realized that they would be amalgamated under regional government, both municipalities closely coordinated municipal purchasing to avoid wasteful duplication. Grimsby abandoned plans
to buy a light truck because North Grimsby's motor pool was ample for future, combined needs. North Grimsby likewise decided not to acquire a new electric typewriter since Grimsby owned an adequate supply. The two clerks coordinated these decisions. Both bureaucracies also wanted to build a new town hall after amalgamation since the old facilities were antiquated and terribly overcrowded. Rather nebulous plans by both local governments to construct new halls separately were buried. Although this type of interlocal cooperation was laudable and voluntary, the original impetus (provincial policy) was not, which rendered the whole exercise atypical and, therefore, somewhat misleading as a guide to normal intermunicipal behaviour. The coordination of municipal purchasing was extraordinary. Marando did not find one instance of similar action in metropolitan Detroit. The following reviews of South Grimsby and Saltfleet return the thesis to less extraordinary goings on.

**South Grimsby**

Of the four municipalities comprising the study area, South Grimsby had the most municipal neighbours: Binbrook, Caistor, Clinton, Gainsborough, Saltfleet, and North Grimsby. The boundaries with Binbrook and
Saltfleet were also county lines. Two contractual agreements existed, both for fire protection: one with Caistor, and the other with Gainsborough. The contracts' terms were identical. South Grimsby also worked out two very informal arrangements for the maintenance of townline (i.e. boundary) roads with Caistor and Binbrook, respectively. The township councils agreed to alternate townline road maintenance every five years under the direction of their respective road superintendents. These arrangements were eminently sensible and, using Marando's terminology, could be classified as a form of "joint intermunicipal cooperation."

The 1967 fire prevention agreement between Caistor and South Grimsby replaced a series of very similar contracts dating back to 1950. The arrangement was strictly contractual and extremely detailed. The South Grimsby Volunteer Fire Department fought all Caistor fires, except those involving burning vehicles on highways. The fire brigade did not conduct fire prevention work in Caistor. Nor was South Grimsby obligated to provide the services of all or part of its men and equipment since South Grimsby's interests were paramount. South Grimsby's fire chief or his designated officer made the decision on whether or not to answer Caistor fire calls and no appeal or court action could
question the decision. Full control and direction of fire fighting was vested exclusively with South Grimsby's fire chief. South Grimsby assumed no liability or responsibility for death, injury, or property damage resulting from fire fighting in Caistor through negligence or otherwise. Clearly, Caistor's rights under this agreement were severely circumscribed.

For the South Grimsby Volunteer Fire Department's services, Caistor paid an annual $700 fee plus $200 for each fire alarm answered, including false alarms, except those involving motor vehicles. In addition, Caistor had to pass fire prevention by-laws and procure any permits necessary for South Grimsby's fire brigade to operate in Caistor, specifically including the use of red lighted headlamps. The agreement was annually renewable with three months notice required for termination. If terminated, the appropriate proportion of the $700 fee had to be paid. Late payment suspended the agreement until such time as the bill was paid. Apart from one item, South Grimsby's fire protection contract with Gainsborough was identical to the one with Caistor. Only a portion of Gainsborough's territory was involved because another fire department looked after the township's remaining area.
Saltfleet

Alone among the study area's municipalities, Saltfleet lay in Wentworth County. It bordered five other local governments: North Grimsby, South Grimsby, Binbrook, Hamilton, and Stoney Creek. The latter three communities were also situated in Wentworth County, although Hamilton was legally separated from the county government. Relatively giant-sized Hamilton loomed very large in Saltfleet's intermunicipal affairs. Nowhere was this better illustrated than in the 1960 water agreement between the city and Saltfleet. The contract replaced a 1950 agreement.48

The water agreement was almost completely devoid of any joint characteristics; the township simply bought water supplied by the city. Unlike the previously discussed water sales involving Grimsby, North Grimsby, and Saltfleet, Hamilton demanded, and obtained, a long term contract of twenty years duration. Within this tenure, however, rates could be varied, confirmed, or fixed by the O.M.B. upon application by either party. The applicant was required to give the other party notice of such an application six months in advance. The pre-1970 water rates were 30.5¢ per 1,000 gallons for the first 60,000 gallons, 23.5¢ per 1,000 gallons for the next 546,000 gallons, and 18¢ for each
additional 1,000 gallons beyond 600,000 gallons. These rates compared very favourably with those charged by the Grimsby Water Commission and North Grimsby. Water had to be supplied at pressures ample for all usual public and private uses within Saltfleet's Water Area No. 4. This was just one of many limitations imposed by Hamilton on Saltfleet. The city had to supply a minimum of 500,000 gallons daily. In the event that Saltfleet built a new reservoir, necessitating increased water pressure, the township agreed to pay Hamilton for the cost of providing extra pumping equipment.49

To operationalize the contract, both governments had to construct extensive waterworks. Their respective obligations were spelled out in great detail. At its own expense, Hamilton built a 24 inch diameter water main along Barton Street from Woodward Avenue to Lake Avenue, a 20 inch main from there to the township boundary near Grey's Side Road and a meter at the junction with Saltfleet's 16 inch main. These works were completed in 1956. The township's many projects were constructed according to conditions significantly different from those in effect in Hamilton.50

All township works required approval by the city's engineers. While there were possible practical reasons for this stipulation, such as insuring engineering and
health standards, there was no reciprocity whereby Saltfleet could check Hamilton's installations, even though the township would be very dependent upon them. Presumably, the city knew best. It is unlikely that one municipality's engineers would have sought similar control over the details of waterworks construction by another local government if the two units had been more nearly equal in size and power. At any rate, in line with the contract, Saltfleet built a system of feeder and distribution mains, including a 16 inch main through the entire length of Water Area No. 4, a reservoir with a minimum capacity of 250,000 gallons, and a meter chamber where Hamilton's water main entered the township. The entire construction programme was subjected to close scrutiny by the city's engineers, even to the point where they determined the exact location of the meter chamber.\(^5\)

The only constraint on the city's extraterritorial authority concerned the need to obtain the Ontario Municipal Board's approval before actual construction began. In addition, the O.M.B. was to arbitrate any disputes between Hamilton and Saltfleet. Just why the township was willing to abrogate so much jurisdiction over waterworks planning and construction within its own borders is unclear. Such detailed restrictions were
certainly not present in the water contracts between the Grimsby Water Commission and North Grimsby or between North Grimsby and Saltfleet. Apparently, the terms were convenient for Hamilton and the city simply dictated them to a much weaker Saltfleet, which meekly concurred. Intermunicipal cooperation almost assumed the proportions of intermunicipal coercion. The remainder of the agreement adopted a similar, though frequently more muted, tenor.

Meter readings were prima-facie evidence of the amount of water supplied. The meter and its valves were under Hamilton's exclusive control although they were open to the township's inspection at all reasonable times. In the event of a meter mal-function, defective operation was assumed to have occurred on the first day of the current quarter year, unless it could be proved otherwise. Any surcharge upon, or allowance due, the township by Hamilton was made accordingly. Saltfleet normally paid for its water quarterly plus a master meter rental fee mutually agreed upon by the respective municipal engineers. If the meter was out of order for repairs, Saltfleet paid a daily rate equal to daily average rates for the preceding three months. Hamilton bore no responsibility for non-supply of water due to circumstances beyond its control but agreed to give
warnings in reasonable time of temporary repairs or maintenance.\textsuperscript{52}

While some of the above contract obligations borne by Saltfleet may not have seemed very onerous, others had very important long-term implications and represented a serious reduction in township autonomy. The contract specifically stated that purchased water was intended for future commercial, industrial, and residential development in Saltfleet on a planned basis. Saltfleet had to adopt an official plan within one year of signing the agreement. This official plan had to be based upon Hamilton-Wentworth Planning Area Board recommendations. Approval of the plan and any amendments had to be submitted to the O.M.B. for final authorization. Saltfleet also had to adopt a draft zoning by-law approved by the O.M.B.\textsuperscript{53} Marando notes that municipalities are extremely reluctant to lose control over their planning prerogatives since these largely determine a community's future character or "life style."\textsuperscript{54} The validity of Marando's observation was supported by the ineffectiveness of the Grimsby and Suburban Planning Board.\textsuperscript{55} Despite the importance of planning, Saltfleet abdicated its internal planning freedom to a remarkable extent. The township was forced into this action by the great disparity in power between it and Hamilton.
The final nine clauses of the water contract really constituted a separate intermunicipal agreement since they dealt exclusively with sewers. This arrangement was more even-handed. The contract was designed to facilitate construction of a sanitary sewer system in Saltfleet. Toward this goal, Hamilton permitted township sewers to connect with the city's system. This generosity was tempered by the fact that the connexion could not occur until Hamilton extended its own system to those parts of the city adjacent to Saltfleet. Until Hamilton actually built the necessary extensions, Saltfleet agreed to prohibit installation of additional septic tanks or private sewage disposal systems unless they were constructed in strict accordance with the Public Health Act. Hamilton's Medical Officer of Health gained the right to inspect all such installations.56

At this point, a considerable degree of reciprocity appeared. If Saltfleet built sewers and the city did not, the township could apply to the Ontario Municipal Board and demand that Hamilton take action by building trunk sewers to the township's boundary. If the situation was reversed, Hamilton had the same right of appeal, with the proviso that the provincial Department of Health had to certify that sewers were required for health protection. All such appeals required prior
notice of intent. This proviso was the one instance where Saltfleet gained an apparent advantage over Hamilton.

Under a very informal arrangement, Saltfleet received considerable assistance, free of charge, from Hamilton's fire department. The township's fire brigade utilized the city's central dispatcher. Prior to the start of this practice, Saltfleet had to hire its own dispatcher. Saltfleet's firemen also used the specialized training facilities of the Hamilton fire department free of charge. In addition, the city provided training manuals at cost. Under a separate agreement, all the municipalities in Wentworth County and Hamilton agreed to come to each other's assistance in an emergency. During such an emergency, Hamilton's fire chief served as a district deputy fire marshall and fire coordinator for the city and the entire county. Mr. Swanborough pointed out that this latter arrangement benefitted communities like Saltfleet much more than Hamilton because it was very unlikely that the small local governments would ever have to aid the city.

The need for Saltfleet's intermunicipal agreements stemmed primarily from actual and anticipated urbanization in areas adjacent to Hamilton, especially along east-west arterial thoroughfares. Hamilton's
growth was simply sprawling into Saltfleet. The emphasis on future development in the Hamilton-Saltfleet water contract showed that the urbanizing process was expected to continue. Saltfleet could not afford to install costly waterworks and sewage treatment facilities to handle the demands of its rapidly expanding built-up areas; it was much cheaper to purchase the required services from Hamilton. Continuous urbanization astride a local boundary and the high cost of providing municipal services were the major factors that produced Saltfleet's cooperation with Hamilton.

Conclusion

Several factors—or, more precisely, combinations of factors—produced cooperation between municipalities in the study area. A combination of the high cost of many services and the proximity of built-up areas in adjacent municipalities certainly fostered interlocal cooperation. The urban areas required municipal services, which local governments could not always afford to provide on an individual basis. The cost per municipality of supplying the necessary services were then reduced to manageable levels by some form of intermunicipal cooperation. The close proximity of
urbanization in neighbouring communities aided cooperation because it enabled two local governments to utilize conveniently one service facility—such as a library, community centre, or fire station—instead of two separate facilities. Urbanization astride local boundaries was especially important in sewer and water agreements since these services demanded the actual physical connexion of municipal facilities (i.e. sewers or water mains, as the case may be).

The high cost of building a waterworks originally led North Grimsby to purchase water from the Grimsby Water Commission. Once the township could afford to construct its own water purification plant, North Grimsby was prohibited from doing so by the Ontario Municipal Board. The Board believed that it would be less costly for North Grimsby to continue using Grimsby's water plant. Saltfleet clearly thought that its western built-up area could be serviced cheaper by purchasing water from Hamilton than by constructing a new township waterworks. The same rationale applied to the Hamilton-Saltfleet sewer agreement; the township could not afford to build its own sewage treatment plant. In the same vein, Grimsby and North Grimsby jointly acquired fire fighting, library, and recreational facilities of a high quality that the two
communities probably could not have afforded separately.

Provincial policy played a leading role in producing intermunicipal cooperation. A provincial agency, the Ontario Municipal Board, forced Grimsby and North Grimsby to continue their water arrangement. However, provincial sponsorship of interlocal cooperation was usually more subtle. Queen's Park enacted legislation specifically designed to encourage intermunicipal cooperation for libraries and community centres by providing incentive grants for joint action. Grimsby and North Grimsby took advantage of such legislation when they jointly built a new library and a community centre to serve both communities. Ontario's decision to amalgamate Grimsby and North Grimsby caused the town and township to coordinate their municipal purchasing in 1969.

The remaining variables were either of less importance or their role in producing intermunicipal cooperation was difficult to evaluate with a high degree of certainty. The spatial arrangement of local governments did not, in itself, induce cooperation between communities. While North Grimsby's partial encirclement of Grimsby limited the town's choice of intermunicipal partners, it was the common presence of urbanization in both civil divisions that generated the
need for joint action. The close historical bonds shared by Grimsby and North Grimsby were an important factor in their co-management of a small museum. As a general rule, however, long historical associations did not apparently produce significant interlocal cooperation; the lack of agreements between North Grimsby and South Grimsby was indicative. Rurality also helped account for the dearth of cooperation between North Grimsby and South Grimsby since rural areas, such as South Grimsby, required fewer municipal services than their urban counterparts. Built-up areas were notably absent along the boundary between the two communities.

To what extent was a desire to preserve local autonomy behind intermunicipal cooperation? The impact of this factor was difficult to assess because no one in the study area ever suggested that interlocal cooperation was a means of preserving the autonomy of municipal governments. Nevertheless, cooperation between municipalities did, in effect, allow communities to supply services and thus justify their continued existence. The influence of official attitudes upon cooperation was equally difficult to ascertain but, generally speaking, most officials seemed in favour of functional cooperation. Some officials wanted more cooperation, others less. South Grimsby's clerk argued
for increased joint action; the township's councillors disagreed, as shown by the traffic light episode. Judging from the number of functional intermunicipal arrangements in the study area, the councillors' negative attitude probably represented a minority view. With respect to territorial relations, Chapter V will demonstrate a similar range of attitudes toward interlocal cooperation.
FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER IV

1. Supra, chapter i, pp. 30-43.


5. Interface implies contact. The thesis uses interface in a limited sense to refer to contact between municipal officials rather than the mere fact of physical contact of municipalities along a shared local boundary.


8. Similar areal limitations occur in many water agreements between other Ontario municipalities, possibly in a futile attempt to control costs by restricting rampant, unplanned subdivision growth.


12. Memorandum from the G.W.C.'s solicitors, Seymour, Goldring, Young, and Nicholls, to the Commission, 1963 (in the files of the Commission).


15. Lawrence, op. cit.
20. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Lawrence, op. cit.
25. Lawrence, op. cit.
27. Lawrence, op. cit.
29. Loc. cit.
32. Ibid., p. 191.
33. Lawrence, op. cit.
34. Ibid.
35. Loc. cit.
36. Saltfleet, By-laws (1960), No. 1826.
37. Interview with Mildred Bentley, Secretary/treasurer of the G.W.C., March 18, 1969.
38. Lawrence, op. cit.; interview with J.G. Killins, Clerk/treasurer of South Grimsby, March 18, 1969.
39. The speaker, a senior North Grimsby official, for obvious reasons, does not wish to be quoted and must remain anonymous.
40. Lawrence, op. cit.
41. Killins, op. cit.
42. Bracher, *op. cit.*; Lawrence, *op. cit.*
47. Killins, *op. cit.*
55. *Supra*, pp. 155-156.
58. Interview with R. Swanborough, Fire Chief of the Hamilton Fire Department, February 24, 1969.
60. Swanborough, *op. cit.*
61. Interview with Joseph Brezina, Deputy clerk of Saltfleet, March 17, 1969.
63. Brezina, *op. cit.*
CHAPTER V

THE LIMITATIONS OF INTERMUNICIPAL RELATIONS

In addition to the functional cooperation discussed in Chapter IV, the study area's intermunicipal relations exhibited many negative aspects. The municipalities failed to reach any agreement on territorial changes at either the local or county level. Interlocal relations also failed to solve many region-wide (i.e. functional) problems such as pollution abatement, the provision of adequate park facilities, and urban sprawl. What factors caused local governments not to cooperate with one another? In Chapter I, it was suggested that nine variables were crucial in explaining intermunicipal behaviour: (1) provincial government policies, (2) the presence of urbanization in close proximity on either side of local boundaries, (3) Ontario's municipal history, (4) the cost of providing municipal services, (5) the desire for local autonomy, (6) the geographical arrangement of minor civil divisions, (7) the existence of rural areas in adjacent municipalities, (8) the attitudes of appointed and elected municipal officials, and the county boundary. ¹ Chapter IV discussed the
impact of these factors on functional cooperation. The present chapter examines the role of these variables in producing interlocal noncooperation. The first half of the chapter studies unsuccessful attempts to attain territorial changes by voluntary intermunicipal cooperation. The last half of the chapter documents the study area's general failure to solve regional problems. Both situations merit attention because they collectively indicate the politico-territorial limits of interlocal behaviour.

Attempted Territorial Reorganizations

Prior to the inauguration of regional government in Niagara and the serious consideration of similar action being taken in the Hamilton region, numerous proposals were advanced for the spatial reorganization of the study area's local governments. Several of these plans were little more than poorly thought out press releases; others were much more elaborate and actively pursued by their protagonists. A few observers had recognized the inappropriateness of pre-1970 local boundaries at an early date. As long ago as 1964, the annual meeting of the Niagara Regional Development Council was told that the peninsula's local boundaries were "antiquated." This type of criticism reflected a growing awareness,
not just in the Niagara peninsula or Ontario, but right across Canada and around the world, that long-established municipal systems had generally failed to respond constructively to the momentous changes unfolding upon twentieth century landscapes. Not everyone agreed that there was a need for a change.

Early proposals to establish a commission charged with studying local government in the Hamilton area, with a view to suggesting reforms, met strong opposition. The city of Hamilton first asked Queen's Park to create a local government review commission in 1962. The provincial government turned down this request when Wentworth County's smaller municipalities objected. One year later, the province rejected Hamilton's request that the mandate of Goldenberg's metropolitan Toronto study be extended to include the head-of-the-lake region. When the city again asked for a provincially operated local government review in 1965, the proposal was simply referred back to Hamilton and Wentworth County. Nothing was done until two years later, when the county finally acquiesced to the establishment of a review commission. From this brief historical outline, the Hamilton Spectator mistakenly concluded that the Steele Commission came into being due to local initiative and intermunicipal cooperation.
In reality, the smaller municipalities in Hamilton's vicinity simply recognized the futility of trying to thwart further efforts designed to study and recommend improvements in their local government system. The inevitability of change was clear. Since 1953, metropolitan government had been a reality in Toronto. By 1967, provincially sponsored local government review commissions had already released their reports for regions as distant as Ottawa-Carleton and as close as adjacent Peel-Halton and the Niagara peninsula. In the case of Ottawa-Carleton, provincial planning was well advanced for the establishment of a regional government, (although the new region was not actually inaugurated until 1968). The Niagara Region Local Government Review's Report (Mayo Report) was issued in August, 1966 and was apparently viewed with considerable favour by provincial officials. Ontario's influential legislative Committee on Taxation's 1967 Report (Smith Report) stated that a reorganization of Ontario's municipal system was a "fundamental condition for the creation of a sound and equitable system of municipal provincial finance."  

By the time the Steele Commission was established in 1967, it was patently obvious to the local politicians in Wentworth County that, whether or not
they agreed, their comfortable little jurisdictions were slated for basic reform. When local political leaders, including the county warden, the mayors of Hamilton, Burlington, and Stoney Creek, and the reeves of Ancaster, Saltfleet, and West Flamborough, trekked to the Minister of Municipal Affairs' Toronto office requesting a local government review, they were merely acknowledging the inevitable. Therefore, once this realization was formally consumated with the passage of identical resolutions by Burlington, Hamilton, and Wentworth County calling for the establishment of a local government review, this could hardly be characterized as a shining example of wholly voluntary intermunicipal cooperation, as implied by the Hamilton Spectator and even the Steele Report itself. Local officials did no more than shrewdly, albeit belatedly, climb aboard the regional government bandwagon in the hope of influencing the ultimate decisions sure to issue from Queen's Park, by working inside, rather than outside, the machinery being erected to recommend change.

A somewhat similar train of events and rationale preceded the imposition of regional government in the Niagara peninsula. In 1966, a group of North Grimsby residents, including the reeve, advocated the
amalgamation of Grimsby and North Grimsby. They also proposed that this new entity become associated with a metropolitan Hamilton regime.\textsuperscript{10} The reasoning behind this type of proposal became clear in 1968 when Grimsby's reeve advanced a similar scheme to amalgamate Grimsby and North Grimsby. The reeve stated that this action would enable the two units to design their own new local government before regional government was arbitrarily implemented.\textsuperscript{11} In theory, Queen's Park would presumably accept the fait accompli and simply incorporate the reformed unit holus-bolus into the expected Niagara regional government. The plan failed but it suggests that many voluntary territorial reorganization attempts were coloured by the anticipation of inevitable, and imposed, change. While this possibility called the motives of those seeking locally initiated change into some question, it does not necessarily entirely exclude a voluntary element from all schemes advanced by local bodies.

The most imaginative plan originated with Stoney Creek's town council. The council suggested that Binbrook, Grimsby, North Grimsby, Saltfleet, and Stoney Creek merge to form either a new regional government or a borough within some future provincially designated, larger regional government. A meeting called to discuss
the proposal only attracted four representatives from Saltfleet, three from Grimsby, two from Binbrook, and none at all from North Grimsby. As hosts of the gathering, the entire Stoney Creek council attended. Opinions were divided at the meeting. The province's regional government intentions, though unknown for either the Niagara peninsula or Wentworth County at the time, exerted a powerful influence on the delegates. Some thought that the municipalities should act immediately, thereby preventing any unwanted provincial action in the future; others cautioned delay until either Toronto's plans were announced, or a Wentworth County-wide united front could be forged vis-a-vis future regional policy recommendations.12

Reaction to the meeting was immediate and condemnatory. Most criticism centred on Stoney Creek's unwillingness to cooperate fully with Wentworth County's constituent municipalities in formulating common policy recommendations for regional government. The reeve of Dundas charged that Stoney Creek had jeopardized the potential effectiveness of Wentworth County's brief then being prepared for submission to the Steele Commission. The reeve also viewed the proposal as a ploy to ensure continued use of Stoney Creek's name in any future regional government. Saltfleet's deputy reeve termed
Stoney Creek's action in even calling the meeting as "foolish." Binbrook's reeve was more charitable, stating that Stoney Creek's intentions were "meant for the best" but noted that 1968 was "an election year." In the end, the idea of a Stoney Creek-centred borough or region—containing Grimsby, North Grimsby, and Saltfleet—died almost at birth.

Second Tier Territorial Composition

Much greater attention was devoted to the study area's upper level orientation than to lower tier reorganization. From a politico-territorial point of view, regional governments either have unitary or federal structures. All four municipalities in the study area were agreed that any new regional governments should follow the two-tier system. However, no unanimity existed concerning the ultimate resting place of Grimsby, North Grimsby, and South Grimsby, all of which shared a peripheral position on Lincoln County's western boundary. Saltfleet's inclusion in a Hamilton-centred regional government, on the other hand, was never really questioned.

Historically, the study area had straddled a county line since 1816. Saltfleet was attuned toward Wentworth County while Grimsby, North Grimsby, and South Grimsby
were oriented toward Lincoln County. These directionally opposed orientations tended to limit intermunicipal partner selection to local governments located within the same county. According to several municipal officials, the county boundary acted more as a psychological than a legal barrier to interlocal relations. Grimsby's clerk/treasurer stated that he was always much more involved with Lincoln County matters than with affairs in Wentworth County. He was constantly talking to his fellow clerks in Lincoln County and the county warden but rarely talked to officials in Saltfleet or Wentworth County. Mr. Bracher was quick to point out, however, that this eastward emphasis did not prevent intermunicipal cooperation with Saltfleet if it was needed.\textsuperscript{14}

Saltfleet's deputy clerk echoed the Grimsby official. Mr. Brezina stated that it almost never even occurred to him to consult with the local governments in Lincoln County. When asked the reason, he thought that "it was probably just traditional" that Saltfleet confined its intermunicipal relations almost completely to Wentworth County.\textsuperscript{15} The chairman of the South Grimsby Library Board noted that, in so far as his Board was concerned, county boundaries presented no major legal obstacle to interlocal cooperation. As proof, the
chairman cited a very informal agreement between libraries in Haldimand, Lincoln, and Welland counties for the supply of library books. Under the arrangement, a large box of recent books was circulated among area libraries every three months. Mr. Lewis admitted that the agreement was of a rather modest nature and that, for the most part, South Grimsby confined itself to Lincoln County affairs. South Grimsby's senior appointed official concurred and stated that he had only limited contacts with his counterparts outside Lincoln County. The spatial structures (i.e. the counties), inside which the local governments daily operated, clearly worked to channel interlocal thought—and hence, action—within long-established county lines.

When Queen's Park began the process of dismantling Ontario's century old county system by creating regional governments, some communities located beside county lines seriously questioned their future upper level orientation. Due to such doubts, local government review commissions were forced to grapple with the problem of delimiting regional boundaries. Because of a peripheral location in Lincoln County and close functional ties with metropolitan Hamilton, very real doubts arose as to the Grimsby area's proper second tier assignment. Should the region continue its traditional
political association with the Niagara peninsula or should its political orientation shift westward?

Two local government review commissions considered the problem. Not surprisingly, the Mayo Commission, which conducted the Niagara study, recommended that Grimsby, North Grimsby, and South Grimsby all be included in the proposed Regional Municipality of Niagara, thus preserving their traditional eastward political cast. This conclusion followed a very cursory examination. Mayo acknowledged that Niagara's proposed western boundary would be the least obvious of its four sides and that "something of a case could be made for redrawing the boundary line" because the Grimsby area "to some extent" lay within Hamilton's orbit. However, no supporting evidence was given. In the final analysis, Mayo decided that all government boundaries were "to some extent arbitrary, and there would be minimum dislocation, at least for some years ahead, if the present western boundary were retained." This view was endorsed by a Grimsby official who noted that it would be "a tremendous job" to transfer records from the registry office in St. Catherines to Wentworth County. The same confusion would attend a transfer of school board records.
In contrast to the Mayo Report, the Steele Commission devoted considerable energy to the problem of regional boundaries, including those in Grimsby's vicinity. Within the general study area, Steele specifically considered four border municipalities: Caistor, Grimsby, North Grimsby, and South Grimsby. The commissioner recommended that Caistor and South Grimsby remain in Niagara but that Grimsby and North Grimsby be detached and included in the proposed metropolitan Hamilton region. Steele disagreed with Mayo's notion that the Grimsby area could always be transferred to a Hamilton-centred unit in the future if conditions warranted. Steele rejected any provision for a statutory review after ten years of regional government because this would not be conducive to the development of an aura of permanence and stability within peoples' minds. 20

Steele's decisions were based upon three general principles: A regional government should (1) be large enough to ensure effective planning and provision of services, (2) comprise all those municipalities sharing a discernable community of interest, and (3) have a strong financial base. The commissioner thought that it was especially important to define correctly the community of interest, whose spatial limits should
include the area within which most people live, work, shop, and seek recreation. According to the Commission's research, all four Niagara municipalities were clearly tied, in socioeconomic terms, more closely to Hamilton than to the peninsula.

The Steele report's conclusions with respect to Grimsby and North Grimsby were based, in part, on the following indicators: Eighty per cent of the interzonal traffic originating in these two communities was destined for the Hamilton area while only ten per cent was destined for peninsular points, as per the Niagara Peninsula Planning Study. Steele carefully enumerated that study's shortcomings. It was seven years old and therefore perhaps no longer valid. Worse, the study was based on only a one day series of roadside interviews that did not gather statistics on travellers' home and work addresses. Despite these inadequacies, the data indicated that close organic ties existed with Hamilton and vicinity. This conclusion was corroborated by other findings.

Recent surveys of hospital patients and the parents of school children determined that approximately 55 per cent worked in the Hamilton region while only 15 per cent were employed in the Niagara isthmus beyond Grimsby and North Grimsby. Hamilton Real Estate Board sales
figures for 1968 showed that two thirds of the home
buyers in Grimsby, North Grimsby, and South Grimsby were
from the Hamilton region. This suggested that
Hamiltonians were settling in the Grimsby vicinity while
presumably retaining their jobs in the city.\textsuperscript{23}
According to one informant, it was mainly these newer
residents who favoured the inclusion of the Grimsby area
in a Hamilton-centred regional government.\textsuperscript{24}

Hamilton's daily newspaper, the \textit{Spectator} was
delivered to 92 per cent of the homes in Grimsby and
North Grimsby. The nearest Niagaran alternative, the
\textit{St. Catherines Standard}, only achieved eight per cent
penetration. A Grimsby and District Junior Chamber of
Commerce resolution contended that 90 per cent of its
members did their non-Grimsby shopping in Hamilton,
listened to that city's radio stations, read the
\textit{Spectator}, and, most importantly, worked in Hamilton.
This was substantiated by four Grimsby bank managers'
estimates that their pay check clearances favoured
Hamilton by a ten to one ratio. In terms of days spent
in extralocal hospitals, Grimsby area residents chose
Hamilton institutions over those in St. Catherines by a
four to one margin. Finally, a bus user survey showed
that twice as many persons travelled to Hamilton from
Grimsby than from Beamsville. The situation was
reversed with respect to journeys to St. Catharines, suggesting that the dividing line between the umlands of Hamilton and St. Catharines fell somewhere between Grimsby and Beamsville, that is, practically coincident with North Grimsby's eastern boundary.\textsuperscript{25}

Less quantitative factors further guided Steele's decision. Great stress was placed upon the physical connexion of services between Grimsby and North Grimsby and North Grimsby and Saltfleet.\textsuperscript{26} Steele's praise of these voluntary interlocal arrangements was tempered by his previous observation that "the provision of water services cuts across municipal boundaries...because of the drainage pattern" as "evidenced by the many intermunicipal agreements" in the study area.\textsuperscript{27} The report also noted that the Ontario Water Resources Commission planned to install sewage treatment facilities that would functionally bind the border line communities still closer together. Lastly, Steele expected the Grimsby area's abundant vacant land and rail, road, and water facilities to attract considerable industrial and residential development from the west, thereby creating a critical need for coordinated planning and expansion of municipal services.\textsuperscript{28}

Overriding all these past, present, and future indications of a community of interest between the
Grimsby area and metropolitan Hamilton, was the simple presence of a jointly approved resolution of the Grimsby and North Grimsby councils that stated:

Resolved, that the Hamilton-Wentworth (sic) Local Government Review Commission be asked to include Grimsby and North Grimsby in their study without prejudice and without cost to either municipality.

In a letter transmitting this resolution to the Hamilton-Burlington-Wentworth Local Government Review Commission, the joint meeting unequivocally added that "both municipalities should certainly be included" in a Hamilton-centred regional government "if and when regional government becomes a reality." In the face of such intimate intermunicipal cooperation, the Steele Commission could hardly have recommended otherwise.

However, officials in the Grimsby area soon changed their minds about the desirability of joining a Hamilton-centred region. Five months after the submission of the above resolution to the Hamilton-Burlington-Wentworth Local Government Review Commission, the councils of Grimsby and North Grimsby "accepted without comment" the following resolution of the Grimsby and Suburban Planning Board:

Resolved, that this Board recommend to the township and town councils
that the area should not become a part of any Metro area including that of Hamilton-Burlington-Wentworth.\textsuperscript{30}

In hearings before the Steele Commission a few months later, the reeve of Grimsby stated that union with Hamilton was unacceptable because the city "could not help but dominate the region."\textsuperscript{31} With the advent of regional government in 1970, official opposition in the newly enlarged town of Grimsby solidified. The new council completely repudiated its predecessors' original joint resolution that advocated the inclusion of the old Grimsby and North Grimsby in an anticipated metropolitan Hamilton region. Westward association, it was now feared, would alter Grimsby's character (a concept roughly equivalent to Marando's "life style").\textsuperscript{32}

The reversal in official attitudes toward the upper level disposition of the Grimsby area was apparently caused by a misreading of local public opinion. Grimsby area residents who favoured association with a Hamilton-based region were more vocal and better organized than opponents of the westward shift. Many advocates of the change formed the Greater Grimsby Civic Study Group in 1958. By 1969, the Group had about fifty members. A three man delegation of the Study Group presented a comprehensive brief to the Steele Commission. This illustrated the organized nature of
the pro-Hamilton lobby in the Grimsby vicinity. The Study Group argued that a Niagara regional council would retard development in the Grimsby area to combat rising education costs. A very extensive survey conducted in 1970 by sixty high school students in Grimsby indicated that the views of the Greater Grimsby Civic Study Group were not shared by a majority of area residents. The students surveyed 62 per cent of the households in the newly enlarged Grimsby and found that 57 per cent of the people were in favour of remaining in the Niagara region. Opposition to a Hamilton link centred on a fear that municipal taxes would soar as money was spent to solve the city's pollution and redevelopment problems.

Opposition to the Hamilton link was probably triggered by the release of four proposals concerning regional government in the Niagara peninsula and the Hamilton area: the briefs of (1) Hamilton and (2) Wentworth County to the Steele Commission, (3) the Steele Report itself, and (4) the provincial government's intentions concerning the new Niagara regional municipality. Hamilton believed that a "one tier government should be the ultimate aim" of municipal reform but suggested that a two tier system be established during a five year transitional period. Grimsby's mayor—who, at that time, favoured joining
Hamilton—stated that a one tier system "would be bad" because Grimsby would lose its local autonomy and elected representatives would no longer be "close to the people." Although Hamilton later expressed a willingness to modify its proposal in order to mollify outlying municipalities, which considered the city to be a "dominating monster," it seems unlikely that Grimsby area residents were convinced of Hamilton's concern for their interests.

Comparisons made between the various plans led Grimsby area officials to opt for continuation of the Niagara link at the regional level. The reeve of Grimsby noted at the Steele hearings that, according to provincial legislation, a combined Grimsby and North Grimsby would hold two of the 29 regional council seats in Niagara. The two communities "would fare much worse under the single tier regional government" advocated by Hamilton and "not much better" (than the Hamilton plan) under "the two tier system being sought by Wentworth County." The best the Grimsby area could hope for on a Hamilton-Wentworth regional council "would be a shared seat, or one seat." In pre-1970 Grimsby, the matter of regional representation was considered to be important by local officials because it determined the degree of local
control over the molding of municipal "character." A comparison of Grimsby's relative influence on regional councils proposed by Steele for metropolitan Hamilton and instituted by the province in Niagara, demonstrated that the town would be better represented in the eastern regional government. Under the Steele plan, Grimsby would be amalgamated with Saltfleet, Stoney Creek, and a small portion of Binbrook to form a borough represented by three members on a 25 man regional council. Grimsby would contain 35 per cent of the borough's population and could reasonably expect only one of the three regional councillors to be especially Grimsby-oriented.

In Niagara, on the other hand, Grimsby would have two members on the 29 man regional council, both of whom would be exclusively concerned with Grimsby's interests. Although the town would contain only 4.5 per cent of Niagara's total population, Grimsby would control seven per cent of the regional council. In the Hamilton region, Grimsby would have three per cent of the population and control only four per cent of the regional council. Niagara possessed the added advantage of not being dominated by any single municipality whereas to the west, Hamilton would loom very large indeed. Grimsby councillors concluded that
Niagara offered a much better opportunity for forming alliances in the regional council to combat urban domination than would be the case in any conceivable Hamilton-centred region.

Opposition in the Grimsby area to a union with Hamilton was of long standing. The publication of various reform schemes and survey results demonstrated this fact to local politicians. Opposition focused on a belief that municipal taxes would soar in a Hamilton-centred region. Grimsby's councillors feared that their area would be unfairly forced to share in Hamilton's costly projects for improved mountain access, pollution abatement, and urban renewal. This rationale blithely ignored the fact that Grimsby residents utilized the city and its specialized facilities very heavily. In this respect, Grimsby's attitudes supported Marando's findings that municipalities only cooperate voluntarily to solve local problems and, consequently, ignore wider, regional problems.

South Grimsby's links with Hamilton resembled those of Grimsby and North Grimsby but were less intense. The Niagara Peninsula Planning Study indicated that 51 percent of all trips begun or ended in Smithville (South Grimsby's seat) and vicinity had either their origin or destination in metropolitan Hamilton, Grimsby, or North
Grimsby, 35 per cent elsewhere in Niagara, and twelve per cent in Haldimand County. Ontario Hospital Services Commission data for 1968 showed that 76 per cent of South Grimsby's residents not using the Grimsby hospital chose Hamilton facilities; ten per cent opted for the St. Catherines hospital. Despite these ties, Steele felt that South Grimsby's rural aspect, small population, and southern natural drainage warranted the area's exclusion from his proposed metropolitan Hamilton regional government. This decision was clinched by the lack of any official communication from South Grimsby expressing a desire to join such a Hamilton-centred region. The people of South Grimsby were especially worried that their area's rural interests would be totally ignored by an urban-dominated regional council; South Grimsby would lose its local autonomy. Area residents also feared that municipal taxes would rise.

Informants--in Grimsby, North Grimsby, and South Grimsby--suggested other, less tangible, reasons for their reluctance to join in regional government, especially one that included Hamilton. Regional government would inevitably involve a reduction in the number of civil divisions and, therefore, a loss of municipal identity. By Ontario standards, all three municipalities had long histories of which they were
proud. The letterhead on South Grimsby's stationery prominently displayed the fact that the municipality was incorporated in 1883. North Grimsby's letterhead proclaimed that it was "Ontario's First Municipality." (Ontario's earliest known town meeting occurred on April 5, 1790 in Township No. 6, which later became Grimsby Township.) North Grimsby's claim was somewhat resented in South Grimsby. The clerk/treasurer of South Grimsby carefully explained that since South Grimsby was a part of the original, unpartitioned township of Grimsby, the southern community had as much right to the claim of "first municipality" as North Grimsby. The official further pointed out, that when the old township of Grimsby was partitioned, South Grimsby managed to retain possession of the original copies of the old municipality's records. History definitely seemed important to all three municipalities. Grimsby boasted an active historical society. Grimsby and North Grimsby cooperated in the creation and operation of a small historical museum. Restored buildings and historical plaques dotted the entire area. The region's history was viewed as an integral part of each community's identity. Regional government—by submerging all three municipalities in a huge, Hamilton-centred unit—would rob each local government of its historical individuality.
The attitudes of local officials were interesting. Everyone agreed that "in the long run," regional government would improve the quality and quantity of municipal services. Enlarged school boards could afford to hire experts in specialized disciplines. A better quality of elected official would be attracted to local office. A South Grimsby official stated that the local school board contained "a lot of deadwood" who would never get elected to an enlarged unit. Over time, regional government would eliminate much wasteful duplication. A Grimsby Water Commission commissioner thought that a united Grimsby and North Grimsby would save money by consolidating their small local services such as fire fighting, police, and waste disposal. The combined unit could also afford to raise salaries and, therefore, hire better qualified officials.

Agreement about the benefits of regional government in the short run was not so general. Several people thought that regional government was being unduly rushed. In South Grimsby, it was suggested that regional government be delayed while Ottawa-Carleton's initial problems were carefully studied. In this way, similar problems could be avoided in Niagara. On the other hand, a G.W.C. commissioner stated that regional government should have occurred years ago. The main
objection of local officials to the immediate imposition of regional government was that municipal taxes would soar right away with no corresponding, immediate, rise in benefits. In other words, the economies of scale expected from regionalization would take years to filter down through the new system to the local level. South Grimsby thought that its neighbours, Caistor and Gainsborough, would unfairly benefit from amalgamation. Parts of Caistor could use Smithville's sewer system. Neither Caistor nor Gainsborough possessed libraries. Both communities would be able to use South Grimsby's handsome facility but, as with the sewer system, would not have helped pay for the construction of either the library or the sewage works. The only way South Grimsby could benefit immediately from regional government was to be selected as the new unit's administrative centre.

Few officials mentioned the fact that regional government would reduce the number of places for politicians and civil servants. Since local politicians usually had other sources of income, this problem was not of critical importance to them. The livelihoods of appointed officials, on the other hand, depended upon their municipal positions. While the senior employees all favoured regional government, they understandably
worried about their own futures. South Grimsby's clerk/treasurer pointed out that the amalgamation of Caistor, Gainsborough, and South Grimsby would automatically reduce the number of positions of clerk from three to one. His future was most uncertain. A similar situation existed in Grimsby and North Grimsby. Grimsby's clerk/treasurer hoped that the problem could be solved by appointing one man as full time clerk and the other as full time treasurer. Most officials accepted the inevitability of regional government and wished to see it succeed. A Grimsby District Library Board member summed up the attitude of most officials by stating that "regional government is here. It is up to us to make it work." 

Functional Limitations of Intermunicipal Relations

According to the Steele Commission, the study area's municipalities responded to the ever increasing demands made upon them in three ways: (1) by conducting a series of annexations, (2) erecting numerous special purpose administrative areas, and (3) making interlocal agreements, all of which ultimately proved inadequate. Steele omitted a crucial fourth response: The local governments often accomplished nothing, either because intermunicipal efforts failed or were never attempted in
the first place. In any case, three further possibilities existed: the provincial government (1) stepped into the resulting vacuum and usurped the ignored function, (2) forced the municipalities to do something either singly or in tandem, or (3) no remedial action was taken by any government at any level of the politico-territorial hierarchy. In the latter event, bad situations simply worsened. This section examines representative examples of interlocal inaction and its consequences.

The Mayo and Steele reports catalogued many problems that resulted from massive intermunicipal noncooperation. While not always applicable to the thesis area, the commissioners' remarks offered an accurate portrayal of shortcomings in most of the communities. Although the municipal failings were all interrelated, for analytical purposes they may be grouped into fiscal inequalities, inadequate land use planning, and growing pollution.

The lack of area-wide planning and regulated development created problems in all communities. Mayo found a dearth of publicly owned parks and other recreational facilities. The Niagara peninsula's four cities provided only three acres of parkland per 1,000 residents, whereas ten acres is generally considered to
be the accepted standard. An earlier report on Lake Ontario's shorefront, which traverses the thesis area, indicated an acute shortage of publicly accessible beaches and other lakeside recreational facilities. The report calculated that approximately one inch of public shoreline per person was available to the regional population. Steele suggested that the future provision of adequate open spaces and public recreation services was probably beyond individual municipal capabilities. Both the Niagara and Hamilton-Burlington-Wentworth local government review commissions concluded that the pre-1970 municipal system was incapable of providing effective remedial action and that, if the system was not basically restructured, bad situations would further deteriorate.

Similar deficiencies in most other municipal services were found for reasons that closely paralleled the parks and recreation situation. In most cases, small municipalities could not afford to purchase expensive parklands and shorefronts. Neither could they pay the high construction and maintenance costs of more elaborate projects such as arenas, community centres, and scenic drives. The remarkable intermunicipal cooperation between Grimsby and North Grimsby for provision of a centennial park, combination ice rink and
community centre, and a historical museum therefore represented a signal accomplishment and was an exception to the general regional trend. However, neither Grimsby nor North Grimsby provided public beaches for their residents.

In addition to financial problems, the paucity of leisure-oriented services arose because their procurement was "not the definite responsibility of any single municipal authority...since they benefit more than local residents." In Marando's terms, individual municipal costs greatly exceeded benefits. The area's fragmented spatial framework retarded the ability of local governments to finance leisure-oriented projects. Lincoln and Welland counties possessed seven classes of authority responsible for recreation: (1) the Niagara Parks Commission, (2) the Parks Branch of the Ontario Department of Lands and Forests, (3) the Niagara Peninsula Conservation Authority, (4) the St. Lawrence Seaway Authority, (5) local municipal councils, (6) local boards of park management, and (7) private operators of parks and beaches. The number of units directly concerned greatly exceeded seven. A similar numerical jungle existed in the metropolitan Hamilton area. In both cases, coordination of services within regional land use plans was absent. Typically, Lincoln
County had no Board of Park Management, which might have acted as an effective coordinating agency, as allowed by the Ontario Public Parks Act since at least 1950. Each municipality simply tried to meet the needs of its own citizens, usually unsuccessfully, and, as a result, regional requirements were never met.

Many municipalities lacked adequate sewage disposal facilities. Some communities relied on intermunicipal agreements to overcome the problem but usually achieved only partial coverage of their total area (20 per cent in North Grimsby's case). Some places (e.g. Smithville) managed to meet their own sewage disposal requirements in a limited fashion. Many other built-up areas, particularly new housing subdivisions, failed dismally and had to resort to septic tanks, even where natural conditions were most unfavourable. Mayo observed that even when "septic tanks are installed...the characteristically clay soils overlying limestone rock...lead to disposal problems after a few years." Even within the sewered parts of Grimsby, North Grimsby, and South Grimsby, the Ontario Water Resources Commission strongly recommended increased sewage treatment and plant capacity. So certain was the Water Resources Commission that the provision of truly adequate sewage facilities was beyond either municipal
means or inclination, that the provincial agency has usurped this function and will construct trunk lines to ensure proper servicing of anticipated urbanization on Hamilton's eastern fringe.70

The poor situation with regard to sewage disposal was symptomatic of other basic waste removal problems which all added up to massive, and growing, pollution levels. Alone, financially weak and splintered municipal jurisdictions could not resolve the condition. In fact, independently-minded local governments constantly exacerbated pollution difficulties. No municipality in Lincoln County passed a by-law to control industrial waste emissions for fear of alienating prospective industrial concerns.71 Cutthroat intermunicipal competition for scarce new industrial assessment reflected the weak fiscal resource base of most communities.

Mayo lashed out at the necessity for municipal "planning for assessment" or "fiscal zoning" policies under the pre-1970 system.72 For the most part, local government revenue derived from real property taxes. Municipalities strove to attain what was widely considered an ideal 60:40 ratio between farm/residential and commercial/industrial assessment. The latter was particularly prized for its high value in municipal tax
terms and low cost service requirements. Smithville was especially bitter at its inability to compete successfully for light industry due to its scarce promotional funds as compared to its more populous neighbours. All municipal officials admitted that they actively competed for high value assessment with little regard for the consequences in adjacent civil divisions. In addition, local governments endeavored to do nothing that would increase local taxes any more than absolutely necessary so that their bids to attract new industry could not be undercut by neighbouring municipalities. No community wished to host low cost housing development because of its meagre assessment valuation and need for expensive municipal services—such as schools, sewers, water, and welfare—all of which would necessitate higher taxes.

Inadequate regional planning lay at the root of most municipal problems. Local governments refused to cooperate in the formulation of area-wide land use master plans. Marando pointed out that planning was one of a number of life style functions over which municipalities were loath to share jurisdiction on an interlocal basis. Even the joint planning efforts of Grimsby and North Grimsby proved highly ineffectual. Mayo and Steele concluded that noncooperation stemmed
from the need for maximum municipal flexibility in attracting high value industrial and residential assessment. According to Mayo, this in turn was caused by (1) a multiplicity of small local governments with (2) poor financial resource bases and (3) easily swayed local council members. Several appointed officials, off the record, expressed particular concern about the third point. Councillors were accused of altering official plans and zoning by-laws to help their friends. One senior civil servant believed that the provincial government should remove all responsibility for planning from local councils in any future regional government. In any event, planning was certainly of a poor quality; the unfortunate consequences were highly visible. Many communities lacked planning staffs. Zoning and subdivision control was, at best, sporadic. There was no area-wide uniformity of building by-laws and engineering standards. Even something as basic as sewer pipe dimensions varied between adjoining communities.

Almost every local government review published to date acknowledged the dangers inherent in not having overall regional land use plans and therefore recommended that this function be deposited with regional, rather than local, governments. Mayo and Steele both concluded that lower tier councils were
incapable of laying down farsighted regional land use plans. As a result, both commissioners recommended that regional planning authority be vested in proposed regional councils. In Niagara's case, the provincial government implemented this advice and assigned comprehensive land use planning to the upper level council, although purely local (i.e. minor) matters remained with local boroughs. This decision should spell the end to planning chaos in the thesis area. There is no reason to believe that the provincial government will act differently in metropolitan Hamilton.

That improper planning was probably more responsible for inadequate municipal services than any lack of fiscal resources, was indicated by the overall economic health of the Niagara and Hamilton regions when considered in their entirety. A Hamilton-centred regional government, as proposed by the Steele Commission, would boast a farm/residential to commercial/industrial assessment ratio of 62:38 which was considered "very satisfactory compared to most municipalities in Ontario." In addition, the combined net debenture debt of the proposed unit (using December 31, 1966 figures) would be approximately 4.28 per cent of the region's total equalized taxable
assessment. As a general rule of thumb, an area's outstanding capital debt should not exceed eight per cent of total equalized taxable assessment. For comparative purposes, note that in 1966, metropolitan Toronto's net debenture debt stood at 7.88 per cent of equalized taxable assessment. While illustrating these points with different formulas, Mayo reached similar conclusions.

Not surprisingly, many individual municipalities displayed far less healthy economic symptoms. All four local governments in the thesis area possessed less than ideal farm/residential to commercial/industrial assessment ratios, indicated as follows: Grimsby 77:23, North Grimsby 93:7, Saltfleet 77:23, and South Grimsby 71:29. While these ratios only gave an indication of fiscal health, they generally conformed to other measures. The important point is that regional government will level out the fiscal peaks and valleys and should allow relatively poor communities to better share the resources of their more fortunate neighbours. There was little likelihood that prosperous municipalities would have ever voluntarily joined intermunicipal efforts to solve regional problems. The cost of such regional cooperation to the wealthy local governments would have been out of all proportion to the local benefits.
Conclusion

The study area exhibited a great deal of interlocal noncooperation. With respect to territorial relations, not even the two most likely candidates for voluntary amalgamation, Grimsby and North Grimsby, achieved this relatively modest goal of their own volition. In the end, the two communities were amalgamated due to provincial, not local, initiative. Unlike Grimsby and North Grimsby, South Grimsby never even seriously contemplated union with any of its neighbours. Although Saltfleet was occasionally touted as a possible member of proposed new boroughs or regions, nothing ever came of the speculation.

The record of upper tier territorial relations was mixed, but largely negative. Saltfleet's continued upper level political orientation toward Hamilton was never really in doubt. However, with the establishment of the Mayo and Steele commissions, serious questioning arose concerning the regional orientation of Grimsby, North Grimsby, and South Grimsby. Doubts about the continued eastward political association of Grimsby and North Grimsby were especially acute. Grimsby and North Grimsby twice reached agreement on the matter of their upper level disposition. The two communities first agreed that they should join a Hamilton-centred regional
government; the town and township later reversed their position and opted to remain in Niagara.

In one respect, the latter two mutually agreed upon decisions were clearly examples of territorial cooperation. In another respect, the final decision (not to join a Hamilton-centred region) was an act of intermunicipal noncooperation. The decision was made despite overwhelming evidence that Grimsby and North Grimsby were closely linked socioeconomically to the Hamilton area. Hamilton's press, radio, and television achieved a very high degree of penetration in the Grimsby area. Many people living in the Grimsby vicinity worked in the Hamilton region. The future development of Grimsby and North Grimsby was closely connected to the Hamilton area's growth. Many city dwellers were moving eastward but retaining their jobs in Hamilton. City-based industry was increasingly being attracted by North Grimsby's abundant flat land and good external communications. That these organic connexions were expected to intensify, was shown by the Ontario Water Resources Commission's plans to install major new sewer and water facilities to handle growth in Saltfleet and the Grimsby area. The socioeconomic interactions between the Grimsby area and the Hamilton region were clearly slated to increase; despite this, Grimsby and
North Grimsby decided to orient their regional politics toward the opposite direction. By opting for an eastward link, Grimsby and North Grimsby were refusing to share their regional responsibilities while, at the same time, knowing that they would continue to reap the benefits of their regional location adjacent to the economically dynamic Hamilton area.

In common with most communities in southern Ontario, the local governments in the thesis area displayed an unwillingness to share really basic decision making powers with neighbouring municipalities. Functional noncooperation was particularly evident with respect to regional planning. Even the Grimsby and Suburban Planning Board proved ineffective. The Steele and Mayo reports catalogued a host of unfortunate consequences arising from the lack of regional planning, including rampant urban sprawl, growing industrial and residential pollution, and inadequate public recreational facilities. The ability of individual local governments to solve these, and other, problems was retarded by intermunicipal competition for new, high value commercial, industrial, and residential assessment. Municipalities could not afford to increase taxes to solve regional problems because this would deter the construction of high value assessment.
Interlocal competition for valuable assessment was itself an excellent example of noncooperation between communities.

Noncooperation was rooted in a desire to maintain local autonomy over the character of municipalities. Local governments wished to preserve some measure of control over local development. Truly effective regional planning was viewed as a threat to such control, especially by smaller municipalities, which feared domination by larger neighbours. Due to Hamilton's great size, Grimsby, North Grimsby, and South Grimsby clearly regarded political association with the city as a threat to their local autonomy. On a smaller scale, South Grimsby viewed political association with the more urbanized North Grimsby in much the same manner. As a largely rural community, South Grimsby also had relatively little need for services at the local level.

The other major factor behind noncooperation was a desire to avoid paying for very costly region-wide services. This was especially true where local governments thought that the benefits of increased taxation would accrue disproportionately to other communities. If included in a Hamilton-centred regional government, Grimsby, North Grimsby, and South Grimsby
all believed that their local taxes would go to solve the city's myriad problems. This conclusion was supported by the student poll of Grimsby residents, which showed that the major reason for local opposition to political association with Hamilton was the fear that municipal taxes would soar. This attitude supported Marando's finding that municipalities only cooperated to solve local problems.

With respect to territorial relations especially, one other, rather intangible, factor fostered noncooperation (i.e. nonamalgamation at the local level and nonassociation with Hamilton at the regional level). All municipalities were reluctant to merge their areas into a larger union because this action would result in a loss of local territorial identity. Spatial identities were rooted in long histories which, in turn, were regarded with considerable local pride.
FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER V

1. Supra, chapter i, pp. 30-43.
8. Ibid., p. 2; "Regional Progress," op. cit., p. 6.
15. Interview with Joseph Brezina, Deputy clerk of Saltfleet, March 17, 1969.
16. Interview with J.E. Lewis, Chairman of the South Grimsby Library Board, August 19, 1969.
21. Ibid., p. 23.
22. Ibid., pp. 60-61, 64.
23. Ibid., p. 61.
24. Interview with Ada Bromley, member of the Grimsby District Public Library Board, August 22, 1969.
26. Ibid., p. 62.
29. Ibid., Appendix A, p. 261.


44. Killins, op. cit.; Lewis, op. cit.

45. Ibid. Taxes would rise in Niagara also, but not as steeply. By way of example, Lewis pointed out that under the Niagara Regional Municipality Act, South Grimsby would lose the services of the provincially subsidized Ontario Provincial Police and would, therefore, face increased policing costs.


47. Killins, op. cit.


49. Historical plaques: (1) The Engagement at the Forty 1813, (2) First Town Meeting 1790, (3) Col. Robert Nelles, The Manor 1798, and (4) St. Andrew's Church and Graveyard 1794; historical sites: (1) The Old Stone Shop, pre-1800, (2) the Nelles Mill Site 1792, and (3) Beamer Memorial Park. For details, see Grimsby Historical Society, op. cit.

50. Brezina, op. cit.

51. Bromley, op. cit.

52. Lewis, op. cit.


54. Lewis, op. cit.
55. Lawson, op. cit.
56. Lewis, op. cit.
57. Killins, op. cit.
58. Ibid.
59. Bracher, op. cit.
60. Bromley, op. cit.
65. Mayo Report, op. cit., p. 3.
66. Ibid., p. 5.
67. Loc. cit.
68. Ibid., p. 9.
70. Steele Report, op. cit., p. 112.
72. Ibid., p. 23.
73. Killins, op. cit. This overworked official, besides his duties as clerk and treasurer, also acted as an industrial promotion public relations man. Several wealthier neighbouring communities had officials in the latter capacity on a full time basis.
75. Lawrence, op. cit.
77. Brezina, op. cit.
78. Mayo Report, op. cit., p. 64; Steele Report, op. cit., p. 113.
81. For Grimsby, North Grimsby, and Saltfleet see Hamilton-Burlington-Wentworth, Data Book, pp. 6-21 -- 6-22; for South Grimsby see Niagara, Data Book, p. 66.
CHAPTER VI

THE GEOGRAPHY OF INTERMUNICIPAL RELATIONS

This study examines the extent of intermunicipal relations in the Grimsby area of southern Ontario, identifies the variables which influence cooperation and noncooperation among municipalities, and develops a methodology for examining the intermunicipal process. This chapter discusses the effectiveness of the thesis in meeting these goals.

Factors of Cooperation and Noncooperation

Functional cooperation in the Grimsby area encompassed the following matters: fire protection, a garbage dump, a library, library books, municipal purchasing, a museum, planning, police radio frequencies, recreation, sewage disposal, town line road maintenance, and water supply. In addition, three neighbouring municipalities reached understandings concerning their future upper tier disposition in proposed regional governments. Functional noncooperation was evident in an almost total disregard for area-wide problems, such as the need for pollution
abatement and the provision of greatly enlarged recreational opportunities, and the fierce interlocal competition for high value assessment. Territorial noncooperation was evinced by numerous annexations, the lack of voluntary amalgamations, and the opposition of Grimsby, North Grimsby, and South Grimsby to their inclusion in a Hamilton-centred regional government.

The study establishes the fact that intermunicipal relations are a significant part of local government by demonstrating the extent of interlocal cooperation on the one hand, and by exposing the unfortunate consequences of noncooperation, on the other hand. The three-dimensional theoretical framework proved useful in highlighting the intermunicipal system's complexity and in analyzing the influence of the eight variables developed in Chapter I. The framework's hierarchical element shows that an understanding of relations between local governments is really not possible without a consideration of the influence of a senior government. In this respect, the study added to Marando's pioneering work on interlocal relations, which did not take into account the influence of the Michigan government.\footnote{This work identifies and evaluates eight factors which may influence cooperation and noncooperation among local governments, listed here in no particular order of}
their relative importance: (1) a desire to preserve local autonomy and territorial integrity, (2) the extent and location of urbanization, (3) provincial policy, (4) the cost of municipal services, (5) municipal history and previous intermunicipal experience, (6) the possible barrier effect of a county boundary, (7) the attitudes of municipal officials, and (8) the geographical configuration of municipalities. It is not possible to state precisely the rank order of the relative importance of each of these factors. However, it is possible to categorize the variables into two broad groups on the basis of a comparison of the findings of this, and Marando's, work. Certain factors are more important than others. Without more research, it is not possible to estimate with any degree of precision the relative importance of the variables within the two general categories: (1) those factors of great significance, and (2) those factors of unique or marginal significance. This is due to the complex relationships between the variables themselves. Often, the influence or impact of one factor is mediated through the operation of another factor, as hypothesized by Jacob and Teune.² For instance, the desire to preserve local autonomy may have to be balanced by considerations of service costs and the existence of
provincial incentive legislation.

Four variables emerge as critically important in the Grimsby area's intermunicipal relations: (1) the desire to preserve local autonomy and territorial integrity, (2) the extent and location of urbanization, (3) provincial policy, and (4) the cost of municipal services.

Local Autonomy and Territorial Integrity

Grimsby, North Grimsby, Saltfleet, and South Grimsby strove to retain as much autonomy as possible. The notion of local autonomy, as developed in Chapter I, encompasses not only the legalistic formulation that the provincial government should not intrude into local matters that the province has assigned to the local governments but also includes such subjective considerations as the desire to preserve a municipality's character and identity. Intermunicipal relations considered a threat to municipal authority were strenuously resisted. Reluctance to share local control was evident especially with respect to territorial relations. To a large extent, the retention of a local government's functional powers depended upon the preservation of its territorial integrity because the municipal area was the vehicle through which autonomy
was exercised. There could be no local control, either in the legal or the subjective sense, if there were no local governments. Consequently, municipalities were particularly suspicious of boundary changes because the territorial status quo was regarded as a fundamental imperative for the preservation of municipal autonomy.

Two types of spatial changes were accomplished or considered at the local level during the past few decades: amalgamation and annexation. No voluntary amalgamations occurred, although Grimsby and North Grimsby seriously considered the possibility. Given more time, the town and township might have merged of their own volition but this seems unlikely in light of North Grimsby's attempt to sever the long standing water arrangement between the two civil divisions. The amalgamation proposals, which emanated from Grimsby and North Grimsby, were a response to the threat (as perceived by the town and township) of provincially imposed municipal reform. The municipalities reasoned that a locally initiated consolidation would minimize the impact of reform on the Grimsby area's autonomy. In the final analysis, the amalgamation attempts failed because neither municipality could really bear the idea of voluntarily submerging its identity within a larger unit.
The most obvious manifestations of territorial noncooperation at the local level involved several annexations by Hamilton, Stoney Creek, and Grimsby from Saltfleet, and North Grimsby. Saltfleet, in particular, lost large acreages to Hamilton. Annexations were never welcomed by the municipalities that lost territory because the ceded land usually had a high assessment value. The loss of valuable land reduced a civil division's ability to finance its functional obligations. Any municipality that incurred too many annexations stood in grave danger of disappearing entirely, as happened to Barton township. Saltfleet was especially worried that it faced a similar fate if annexations by the city continued unchecked.

From a spatial viewpoint, regional government presented the gravest threat to municipal autonomy since it entailed a reduction in the number of municipalities. For this reason, the municipalities in the Grimsby area originally opposed the comprehensive reform of local government. Once it became obvious that Queen's Park was determined to impose regional government, the municipalities then made a concerted effort to minimize the erosion of their authority under the new system. Grimsby and North Grimsby considered a preemptive amalgamation. South Grimsby, Caistor, and Gainsborough
prepared a joint brief—described as "ostrich-like" by the Mayo Report—that argued against the need for extensive municipal reform. Despite close socioeconomic ties with metropolitan Hamilton, Grimsby, North Grimsby, and South Grimsby all wanted to retain an eastward political association. From the point of view of local autonomy, Niagara was regarded as the lesser of two regional evils. The entire thesis area pressed for two-tiered regional governments because these would ensure more autonomy than giant, one-tiered regional structures. A two-tiered regional government would enable the new minor civil divisions to minimize the encroachment of what they regarded as the negative aspects of Hamilton—industrial pollution, costly urban renewal, and expanding welfare rolls—while at the same time maximizing the benefits of being located on the fringe of this urban giant. Territorial relations were clearly directed toward the preservation of municipal autonomy and identity.

With respect to functional relations, the desire to protect local authority was evident in a number of ways. Several agreements enabled local governments to provide services of a variety and standard which, due to the high costs involved, would not have been possible on an individual basis. The community centre and library
operated by Grimsby and North Grimsby, and Saltfleet's Hamilton-assisted water and sewage capabilities were the prime examples. In this respect, cooperation was an important means of preserving autonomy. Had the services provided as a result of cooperation not existed, the survival of the local governments in the thesis area might have been seriously questioned long ago.

Functional noncooperation was also aimed at protecting municipal authority. Truly effective regional planning was minimal. Typically, the Grimsby and Suburban Planning Board was most ineffectual. Since planning could mold a municipality's future character or identity, local governments were unwilling to share this "life style" function, as Marando calls it, in any meaningful way. Fierce competition for new high value assessment was a related form of functional noncooperation. In order to survive as viable entities, local governments required high value assessment to finance rapidly expanding services. New assessment was ruthlessly pursued, with no thought given to the needs of neighbouring municipalities.
Urban Contiguity

The presence of contiguous urbanization across local boundaries was associated with every major intermunicipal arrangement, i.e. agreements that involved large sums of money. There were six important agreements, four between Grimsby and North Grimsby (community centre, fire department, library, and water), and two between Hamilton and Saltfleet (sewage disposal, and water). Urban contiguity was also a factor in four relatively minor Grimsby–North Grimsby agreements for a museum, planning, police radio frequencies, and a recreational programme.

The presence of built-up areas on either side of local boundaries greatly facilitated the more important functional arrangements because municipalities could share such expensive structures as a community centre, fire hall (and equipment), library, sewage treatment plant, and waterworks. This illustrates the complexity of determining precisely the extent of the influence of any particular variable on intermunicipal relations. In this instance, the influence of proximity is mediated (to use Jacob and Teune's terminology) through the cost factor.5

Urban contiguity was particularly significant when cooperation required the physical connexion of local
works such as sewer pipes or water mains. The cost of connecting nearby systems was much less than the cost of joining distant points. Moreover, places that were close together were more likely to share a common drainage basin than places far removed from each other. To take advantage of gravity flow, municipal sewerage and water systems conformed to natural drainage basins. Due to the great cost involved, it was impractical to connect systems that were distant from one another and which occupied different drainage basins.

The impracticability of joining distant municipal water or sewage systems was recognized by Steele when he recommended that South Grimsby be excluded from a Hamilton-centred regional government. The township's built-up area, Smithville, was located far away from urban places in Steele's proposed region, most of which had northern drainage; Smithville drained to the east. South Grimsby did not cooperate with any municipality for either the supply of water or the disposal of sewage primarily because Smithville was an isolated urban island situated in the midst of a broad rural sea. The circumstances of the civil divisions involved in sewer and water agreements were altogether different. In each case, the cooperating municipalities shared a common drainage basin because their built-up areas were located
close together. North Grimsby's urbanization was concentrated around Grimsby; Saltfleet's actual and anticipated urban development was concentrated in the vicinity of Hamilton.

Marando observed that the rural municipalities in metropolitan Detroit cooperated with adjacent local governments to a much lesser extent than was true of urbanized municipalities. In the Grimsby area, South Grimsby was the most rural municipality and also the unit least active on an interlocal basis. The township's relations were not only limited in number, but modest in scale; i.e. South Grimsby's agreements involved small amounts of public money. The arrangement whereby South Grimsby's library received "a large box of books" every three months was typical.

The basic reason for the limited relations of rural municipalities was that they required fewer services than urban municipalities. However, no municipality in the thesis area was completely rural. South Grimsby contained the hamlet of Smithville, which boasted its own sewage and water systems. Conversely, much of North Grimsby and Saltfleet was rural in nature; yet, these townships cooperated with adjacent municipalities to a considerable extent. The difference in the degree of external collaboration undertaken by South Grimsby on
the one hand, and by North Grimsby and Saltfleet on the other hand was accounted for by the relative location and extent of urban areas within each unit. South Grimsby's urban development was small and isolated; North Grimsby and Saltfleet possessed larger built-up zones, both of which were situated close to similar places in adjoining municipalities.

The Cost of Municipal Services

Many intermunicipal agreements came about, in part, because individual local governments could not afford to finance all their own service requirements. Until the early 1960's, North Grimsby could not bear the full cost of a waterworks and so purchased water from the Grimsby Water Commission. Saltfleet decided that it was cheaper to buy water and sewer service from Hamilton than to construct a waterworks and sewerage plant in the township. Caistor and Gainsborough could not support fire departments; consequently, both townships relied on the South Grimsby fire brigade. The joint operation of a fire department, library, museum, and recreational complex by Grimsby and North Grimsby permitted both units to achieve a high standard of service at a reduced cost per municipality.
The impact of the cost factor on intermunicipal relations was identical in the Detroit and Grimsby regions. Collaboration reduced the cost per municipality for services that required large capital outlays.\textsuperscript{10} Expensive projects that would assist adjacent civil divisions but produce few local benefits, on the other hand, were simply ignored. Thus, local governments in metropolitan Detroit which required assistance for urban renewal received no help from more fortunate neighbours.\textsuperscript{11} One reason Grimsby, North Grimsby, and South Grimsby did not want to join a Hamilton-centred region was the fear that local taxes would go to finance the city's expensive mountain access, pollution abatement, and urban renewal projects.

The Provincial Government

Although Queen's Park could legally compel municipalities to work together, in practice, outright compulsion was rare. The only instance occurred in the early 1960's, when a provincial agency, the Ontario Municipal Board, forced Grimsby and North Grimsby to reach a new accord on the distribution of water.

Provincial encouragement of interlocal cooperation was usually more subtle and in the form of incentive grants. Queen's Park paid a higher percentage of the
construction costs of community centres and libraries built jointly by two or more municipalities than of the cost of facilities erected by a single local government. Grimsby and North Grimsby took advantage of these grants by jointly building and operating the Grimsby and District Public Library and the Peach King Gardens.

The decision of Queen's Park to reform municipal government inspired several acts of intermunicipal collaboration. The councils of Grimsby and North Grimsby twice passed identical resolutions concerning their upper tier political orientation. The first resolution favoured union with a Hamilton-centred region; the second reversed the earlier decision and opted for continued association with the Niagara peninsula. South Grimsby, Caistor, and Gainsborough presented a joint brief to the Mayo Commission. Once Grimsby and North Grimsby definitely learned of their involuntary consolidation, the two local governments coordinated municipal purchasing. There is little doubt that provincial policy spurred much intermunicipal cooperation in the Grimsby area.

The remaining variables appeared to exert either a lesser influence upon intermunicipal relations than the preceding factors or else were unique in occurrence to a specific relationship. Further research very well may
alter this conclusion but the thesis did not indicate that history, official attitudes, or the county boundary exerted a decisive influence in spurring or retarding cooperation among local governments. In the case of relations between Grimsby and North Grimsby, the thesis does support the idea that the geographical configuration of these two civil divisions had a positive influence upon their interrelationship.

The Attitude of Local Officialdom

With the possible exception of South Grimsby's councillors, the attitudes of local officials did not materially influence the course of intermunicipal relations. Decisions were based generally on considerations other than the personal whims of municipal decision makers, e.g. the impact of cooperation on the municipal budget, or on local autonomy. It is significant to note that Marando reached a similar conclusion in his metropolitan Detroit study. 12

The County Boundary

County boundaries certainly did not constitute an insurmountable obstacle to intermunicipal collaboration: North Grimsby sold water to Saltfleet; Grimsby agreed to
assist Saltfleet in a fire fighting emergency; the South Grimsby public library exchanged books with sister institutions in Haldimand and Welland counties; South Grimsby and Binbrook rotated the maintenance of a boundary road every five years. However, none of these intercounty undertakings was very significant when compared to the bulk of the area's interlocal agreements, most of which were confined within county boundaries. Local officials indicated that the Lincoln-Wentworth line was a psychological barrier to cooperation between the municipalities located on either side of the boundary. There was little contact between officials across the county line; the deputy clerk of Saltfleet stated that it rarely even occurred to him to confer with his counterparts in Lincoln County. On the other hand, the barrier effect of the county line should not be overestimated. The lack of major intermunicipal activity may have been also caused by the relative absence of urbanization in border areas. The rural aspect of the border zones simply did not generate much demand for municipal services. What demand there was, could usually be met by the local governments on an individual basis. A minor concentration of urban development in eastern Saltfleet was the only real exception. It was this portion of the
township that had obtained water from North Grimsby. The agreement was being phased out in accordance with the Hamilton-Saltfleet water contract which stipulated that the township could not purchase water from any municipality other than the city.14

Municipal History

Historically, the municipal policies of successive provincial governments retarded the development of cooperative intermunicipal relations to a certain extent. Ontario's first municipalities were given boundaries that coincided with so-called natural boundaries, i.e. features that were easily recognizable and often obstacles to communications. The northern section of the Clinton-Grimsby border, which traversed a swamp, was typical. This territorial separateness was reinforced by the Baldwin Act which was designed to make civil divisions as self-sufficient as possible. Matters of concern to more than one community, such as interlocal roads and bridges, were automatically assigned to the counties. Municipal isolation worked reasonably well when most of Ontario was rural and when urbanization rarely extended across local boundaries. A long period of separateness and self-sufficiency fostered a strong tradition of local autonomy, a climate
within which intermunicipal agreements were not entered into lightly. The detailed nature of many of the contracts referred to in the body of the thesis bears witness to this fact.

Once the province's land use pattern began to change, the need for intermunicipal cooperation grew. Urban development spilled over municipal boundaries. Civil divisions that had been rural were ill equipped to provide the many local services that newly built-up areas demanded. In the absence of provincial guidelines, the municipalities had to devise ways of collaborating with one another on an ad hoc basis. This process was time consuming, and therefore also retarded cooperation to a minor extent.

With respect to territorial relations, cooperation was inhibited, in part, by sheer historical inertia. By Ontario's standards, the local governments in the research site possessed lengthy histories. Local residents developed strong attachments to their comfortable and familiar municipalities. Over a long period of time, the municipalities acquired traditions and a historical justification for their continuation. As with their reluctance to erode local autonomy, municipalities did not willingly foresake their territorial identities. Changes in the municipal map
had to be achieved by provincial, not local, action. This conclusion accords with Wheaton's observation that change (innovation) is usually externally motivated and Burghardt's conclusion that "regional government...must be imposed from above,"¹⁵ i.e. by the provincial government.

The influence of history was subtle. As a general rule, history fostered noncooperation—especially in so far as spatial changes were concerned. Only one agreement stemmed directly from history. The museum that Grimsby and North Grimsby operated jointly symbolized the close historical connexions of the two municipalities. The lack of collaboration between North and South Grimsby showed that a shared history was not necessarily a sufficient basis for forging interlocal links. When intermunicipal relations are considered in the context of integration, it is clear that previous interlocal experience, even when highly successful, did not lead necessarily to greater cooperation. North Grimsby's attempt to build its own waterworks is a good example.

The Geographical Arrangement of Municipalities

There was a possibility that the spatial arrangement of two municipalities fostered interlocal
cooperation. North Grimsby's partial encirclement of Grimsby meant that the centres of both units coincided in downtown Grimsby. The concentration of North Grimsby's population around Grimsby provided people in both municipalities with convenient access to many common facilities. This common functional and spatial centrality, which resulted from Grimsby's semi-enclosed nature, caused the residents of the town and the township to develop numerous socioeconomic links. Local people shared the same downtown shopping district, high school, and hospital. North Grimsby rented an office in the town. The intimacy of these and other ties probably spurred the two local governments to closer cooperation than was usual between adjacent civil divisions.

The urban proximity of Grimsby and North Grimsby on three sides of the town apparently produced an intangible feeling that a common bond existed between the town and the township. While the existence of such a bond can not be proven, several circumstances suggested that the relationship was somehow special. Grimsby and North Grimsby were the only local governments in the study area that jointly operated municipal services. The recreational complex, fire department, garbage dump, library, museum, and planning board were all basically joint, rather than contractual,
ventures; i.e. the town and township shared the cost and management of these services. The periodic calls for the amalgamation of Grimsby and North Grimsby, which emanated from local officials, also suggested the presence of a special bond between the two civil divisions—a bond that was based partly upon the proximity of the urban populations of the two communities and partly upon the location of Grimsby in the middle of North Grimsby.

Since Grimsby's central location within North Grimsby was a unique situation in the thesis area, the configuration of local boundaries should not be overemphasized as a producer of cooperation. Interlocal collaboration was already based firmly upon other factors (e.g. contiguous urbanization, high costs, and provincial encouragement). However, the spatial arrangement of the two communities definitely appeared to augment the positive thrust of these variables, thereby intensifying cooperation between Grimsby and North Grimsby.

The Study of Intermunicipal Relations

The literature review in Chapter I suggested that the eight variables discussed above were the prime influences upon intermunicipal relations. However, it
is possible that other factors, not considered in the thesis or paid only marginal attention, may have significant influence upon the conduct of intermunicipal relations. The whole concept of territoriality, which is just now receiving attention from political geographers, may offer a promising avenue of investigation. Territoriality is a complex concept and the thesis actually does consider some aspects of the notion, most notably, hierarchy, and to a lesser extent, the feelings that people have for their home turf—the minor civil division. A more complete analysis of the influence of territoriality awaits a clearer definition of the concept than has yet appeared in the literature. The full utilization of the concept of territoriality perhaps awaits also a political geographer much better versed in political psychology than the present author. 16

Other variables may not have been so much ignored in the thesis as not developed to their fullest potential. From the vantage point of hindsight, it seems possible that the idea that the attitudes and interactions of local officials constitute a significant variable could be expanded fruitfully to include a consideration of other segments of municipal society. The thesis assumed, as did Marando, that the interest
group of greatest importance in intermunicipal relations was the municipality's appointed and elected bureaucracy. There may be value in pursuing research into the attitudes and actions of nongovernmental groups in municipal society because these groups may lobby municipal and provincial officials to formulate interlocal policies favourable to the interests of nongovernmental groups. In this regard, perhaps the hierarchical factor should be pursued further up the scale to include a consideration of the potential impact of federal government policies upon interlocal decisions. Although the federal government is not supposed constitutionally to have a role in local government, federal policies concerning such matters as regional economic development, pollution abatement, and transportation conceivably could have an influence on intermunicipal behaviour.

Despite the possible omission of certain variables, the findings of the dissertation substantiate and add to the political geography literature in a number of ways. The thesis reaffirms the fact noted by Prescott and others that spreading urbanization (a form of population shift) generates politico-geographical conflict (disequilibria) when legal and functional boundaries are no longer in accord. The thesis moves beyond this
conclusion by demonstrating that urbanization also may be a force for cooperation between municipalities. In fact, the thesis shows that a number of variables exhibit this dualism. Depending upon the specific circumstances, a factor may tend to influence local governments to cooperate or not to cooperate with one another. Surely there is value in recognizing the dual nature of the variables which influence intermunicipal relations. Instead of viewing a factor such as urbanization negatively, perhaps municipal reformers should alter their perspective and regard the phenomenon in a positive light and search for ways to harness constructively the cooperative potential that may be inherent in urbanization. The thesis also substantiates the observation of Gilbert and others that the desire for local autonomy, often deeply rooted in history, is a force in resisting change. As was the case with urbanization, this factor too may be utilized to foster cooperation among local governments.

This study attempts to add to the political geography literature by undertaking one of the first comprehensive investigations of intermunicipal relations in the discipline and thereby focusing attention on the importance of municipal government as a fruitful field of study for political geographers. As recently as the
22nd Congress of the International Geographical Union, geographers were reminded of the great need to examine local government. The thesis provides the literature of political geography with a systematic analysis of the influence of eight variables in the geography of intermunicipal relations. When considered as a whole, the study provides a base for future research.

Although the study of intermunicipal relations is in its infancy, several tentative conclusions emerge from the thesis. Interlocal relations constitute an important part of local government systems, at least in Ontario. When viewed as a form of integration, such relations clearly assist local governments to perform their functions. Certain variables appear to be more significant than others in influencing relations among municipalities. The extent and location of urbanization, the desire for municipal autonomy and territorial integrity, municipal service costs, and provincial policies appear to be of greater significance than the attitudes of local officials, the possible barrier affect of county boundaries, and the historical experience of municipalities in guiding the outcome of intermunicipal relations. The relative importance of the geographical arrangement of municipalities seems to be of some consequence but a more definite conclusion
awaits further research.

The research design of the thesis proved effective in establishing the extent of intermunicipal cooperation and noncooperation in the study area. Municipal officials were most willing to be helpful in this regard. The literature review provided a comprehensive list of variables to focus upon but, at the same time, illustrated the woeful lack of substantive research on interlocal behaviour. Marando's work on metropolitan Detroit was useful for comparative purposes. The thesis built upon Marando's work by considering variables which he ignored (history, spatial configuration, county boundaries, and provincial policy). Marando's framework was two dimensional; the present study added the hierarchical and temporal dimensions.

The use of a smaller research area than Marando's, permitted a greater depth of analysis into interlocal behaviour. However, it should be possible to refine the analysis by sharpening the focus on specific agreements and disagreements. This work tended to spread itself too thinly by studying every intermunicipal agreement and disagreement. Perhaps future researchers should limit themselves to a few of the most important interlocal relations and examine exhaustively whatever decisions are reached by local governments. Special
effort could be made to interview all governmental and nongovernmental people and groups involved in the decision-making process. This study may have suffered, for example, by not being able to talk to elected municipal officials. If such an approach were adopted, a new interview schedule would have to be written, with the particular addition of more specific questions directed at specific relations.

The lack of intermunicipal research in Ontario necessitated comparisons with a United States example. It might have been more useful to select two research areas separated from each other by a considerable distance within southern Ontario. Such a procedure would have been especially useful in checking the influence of the geographical configuration of municipalities. Southern Ontario contains several situations similar to the spatial arrangement of Grimsby and North Grimsby and a comparative analysis might have permitted a more definite conclusion than was possible in the thesis due to the uniqueness of the Grimsby-North Grimsby situation in the research site.

Many questions concerning the geography of intermunicipal relations await further study. The first priority should be research into other urbanizing areas to create a body of case studies on which to build a
general politico-geographical theory of interlocal relations. There is a need for the development of new approaches for examining the phenomenon. Perhaps a theoretical framework based upon integration theory is not the best approach; future work could be based upon conflict resolution theory or interest group theory. Certainly, the concept of territoriality could be applied to the investigation of interlocal behaviour. Further thought could be given to Marando's lead in developing more sophisticated quantitative techniques for studying intermunicipal relations. Mathematically trained political geographers could no doubt devise ways of measuring the influence of certain variables which Marando neglected, such as the possible barrier effect of county boundaries, and provincial involvement in the interlocal decision making process. A quantitative approach would require a study area comprised of many municipalities located throughout southern Ontario in order for the results to be statistically valid and for patterns among the variables to be identified.

In a less theoretical vein (i.e. in the realm of applied political geography), future research could profitably be much more problem oriented. The study of intermunicipal relations need not be viewed solely as an academic exercise. The thesis has shown that interlocal
cooperation is a vital part of local government for certain municipalities. An understanding of the intermunicipal phenomenon should be sought with a view to maximizing the effectiveness of cooperation among local governments. This type of knowledge could prove most useful in devising reforms of local government systems. Most municipal systems seem intent upon creating self-contained units of local government. Functions that can not be performed at the local level are transferred typically to higher levels in the politico-territorial hierarchy. As long ago as 1939, Gilbert showed that different municipal functions often require different service areas for optimum efficiency. Intermunicipal agreements seem to be an ideal method of achieving optimum service areas for different municipal functions.

In his unpublished study of metropolitan Washington, D.C., Minghi suggested, indirectly, just such a need for this type of research. Minghi stated that more attention should be paid to adjusting the functions of local boundaries than to adjusting the local boundaries themselves. Although Minghi did not propose interlocal cooperation as a means of achieving his goal, it is likely that increased use of interlocal agreements could greatly heighten the efficiency of
local government and, at the same time, solve a problem raised, but left unanswered, by Gilbert. Gilbert pleaded for the reform of Britain's municipal system by redrawing local boundaries. He also pleaded for units of government small enough to permit communication between the governed and the governors at the local level, but never explained how these two goals could be achieved. In local government reform theory, efficiency tends to be equated with enlarged units of local government but governmental responsiveness to municipal inhabitants with small municipalities. The classic solution to this problem is usually the creation of an extra tier of "local" government, such as Ontario's counties or the new Regional Municipality of Niagara. The problem with this type of solution is that the lowest level of local government is left with very few functions of importance; the major functions of municipal government are shifted up the politico-territorial hierarchy to a large spatial unit which seems remote from, and unresponsive to, the individual taxpayer. To this writer, a much better solution to the problem that besets local governments would be to retain the small municipalities and to increase greatly the utilization of intermunicipal agreements in a more effective way to solve both local
and regional problems. Just how this may be achieved should be the subject of much future research.

This type of problem oriented research should lead eventually to solutions that would be of benefit to two levels of government. The provincial government would not have to implement politically embarrassing drastic reforms and local government would operate efficiently and still maintain close rapport between the governed and the governors. Comparative analyses of Ontario's new regional municipalities and the units they replaced might be an excellent test of the above supposition.

On a more theoretical level, at some point in the future, thought should be given to using interlocal relations as an analog for international relations. This work would be directed toward the formulation of a general politico-geographical theory of interaction between politically organized territories within any level of a hierarchy of governments. The development of such an analog model would not be easy due to the significant differences between the nature of national and municipal units, most notably the sovereignty of the former. However, the effort in developing a successful analog would be well worth the struggle. Political geographers will never be able to bring the primary object of their attention--units of politically
organized space--into a laboratory for analysis under carefully controlled conditions but intermunicipal relations operate at a much more manageable scale than international relations. The United States and Canada, with their many similarities, would seem to be an ideal location for this type of futurist research. 23

The Future of Intermunicipal Relations

Intermunicipal relations appear destined to remain a significant part of local government systems for a long time to come. Hopefully, as knowledge of the nature and importance of intermunicipal relations increases, senior governments will seek ways to harness the full potential of cooperation among local governments. The thesis demonstrated that interlocal cooperation is an effective means of providing certain local services. There is no reason why an imaginative senior government could not devise ways to increase cooperation at the local level so as to permit municipalities to remain small, and therefore relatively responsive to the desires of the individual citizen, and simultaneously enable local governments to perform their duties efficiently and effectively in the best interests of both municipal and regional populations.
Senior governments traditionally have sought to devise municipal systems comprised of self-contained and self-sufficient units. Matters of concern to more than one local government usually were transferred to some higher level of the administrative hierarchy. At best, intermunicipal agreements were viewed as little more than stop-gap measures to be tolerated or, on occasion, encouraged on a transitional basis in an ad hoc manner until a basic reform of the municipal system could be implemented. Even if senior governments continue with this attitude, interlocal relations will remain firmly entrenched because new municipal systems begin to be outmoded the day they are established. Municipal fortunes fluctuate as economic activities change and population and settlement patterns shift. This is especially true in a rapidly urbanizing place like southern Ontario. Municipalities will continue to grapple with their changing problems by arguing over annexations, competing for high value assessment, ignoring regional—as opposed to local—needs, and agreeing to cooperate with their neighbours for specific purposes. The political geographer interested in intermunicipal relations is guaranteed a continuing source of raw material in either event.
FOOTNOTES—CHAPTER VI


3. Supra, chapter v, pp. 196-201.


5. Jacob and Teune, op. cit.


8. Interview with J.E. Lewis, Chairman of the South Grimsby Library Board, August 19, 1969.


11. Ibid., p. 197.

12. Ibid., p. 195.


14. As with the spatial arrangement of civil divisions, Marando did not evaluate the role of county boundaries. Perhaps he overlooked their potential importance or, perhaps, county boundaries were of no consequence in Michigan's intermunicipal relations.

15. William L.C. Wheaton, "Integration at the Urban Level: Political Influence and the Decision Process," The Integration of Political Communities, eds. Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano


APPENDIX 1

THE REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF NIAGARA

On January 1, 1970, the Regional Municipality of Niagara replaced the counties of Lincoln and Welland as the senior level of municipal government in the Niagara peninsula. At the same time, the number of minor civil divisions in the region was reduced from twenty six to twelve. (Compare Figures No. 1 and No. 2.) The territorial consolidations occurred in conjunction with a realignment of regional and local responsibilities and the elimination of many special purpose bodies, such as the Grimsby Water Commission. The regional government assumed responsibility for assessment, the regional tax levy, capital borrowing, area-wide planning, water treatment and distribution, sewage treatment, regional roads, welfare, health, parks, recreation, and conservation. The minor civil divisions retained control of services of a purely local nature, such as local parks, streets, sidewalks, garbage collection, and local planning. Wherever feasible, the duties of the dissolved special purpose commissions passed directly into the hands of the elected local and regional municipal councils.
Niagara was designed to conform, as closely as possible, to the criteria that the provincial government established for the reform of municipal government throughout southern Ontario: (1) A region should exhibit a community of interest in terms of where people live and work, socioeconomic and ethnic composition, or a shared history. (2) A region should have a balance of interests. No single municipality, or economic or social group should totally dominate a region. (3) The regions must possess adequate financial resources to perform regional services at a satisfactory level. (4) A region should be large enough for efficiency in the handling of municipal responsibilities, but not so large that it becomes difficult to have quick communication with all areas of the region. (5) Regional boundaries should permit a maximum degree of cooperation with neighbouring regions in matters of mutual concern. (6) Regional boundaries should be useable by other institutions, e.g. the administrative units of provincial departments. (7) When a regional government has two tiers, the minor civil divisions are supposed to be designed according to the same criteria as the regional governments.²

The provincial government acknowledges the fact that no region can adhere completely to all the
guidelines.3 The establishment of every regional municipality involves a certain degree of compromise between the various criteria. Due to its rich history and peninsular configuration, Niagara does possess a measure of community of interest. In addition, most of the region's population lives and works within Niagara. The Grimsby area is an exception in this respect. The regional municipality is not dominated by a single municipality and contains a balance between rural and urban interests. According to the Mayo Report, Niagara has the financial resources to provide an adequate level of municipal services.4 The region appears to be a suitable unit for the administrative purposes of provincial departments. Several of Niagara's new minor civil divisions also conform to the criteria laid down by Queen's Park. Post-1970 Grimsby spatially defines a local community of interest that is rooted in a common historical experience, urban focus, and partially integrated municipal services. The new local government also has an ample financial base and a rough balance between rural and urban interests.

2. Darcy McKeough, "Regionalism," Speech to the 56th annual meeting of the International City Management Association, San Diego, California, September 21, 1970.

3. Ibid.

APPENDIX 2

INTERVIEWS

During the preparation of the thesis, the following letter was mailed to 65 local officials:

I am a graduate student at McMaster University writing my Ph.D. thesis on intermunicipal relations. A key part of the research project involves interviewing people who have a thorough working knowledge of how Ontario's local governments interact across municipal boundaries.

This letter is written to request your help. I would greatly appreciate being allowed to interview you about your own experience in local government as well as your thoughts and ideas about regional government.

Should you be willing to be interviewed, please return the enclosed self-addressed and stamped postcard indicating your agreement.

Thank you very much for your cooperation.

The master list of interview questions follows:

I. Intermunicipal communications

1. Do you have contacts with your counterparts in neighbouring municipalities? If so, by what means and how often?
2. What, if any, local governments do you feel it is important to have regular communications with?
3. Are you responsible specifically for knowing what is going on in neighbouring municipalities?

4. Are there any ways in which intergovernmental concerns are formally dealt with such as joint committees or boards?

5. Do you ever represent your municipality or board at intergovernmental meetings?

6. Does the provincial government foster intermunicipal exchanges of information, ideas, or cooperation by any means?

7. Do you feel that there is enough interaction across local boundaries by members of government?

II. Intermunicipal arrangements

1. What aspect of intermunicipal relations are you specifically involved with?

2. What intermunicipal arrangements exist covering this particular function(s)?

3. Which municipalities are involved?

4. What is the extent of the agreement, i.e. what does it do?

5. Could you describe how the agreement was initiated and its general history to date?

6. How does the agreement operate in practice?

7. If the arrangement involves financial cost, how are the various shares arrived at?

8. What advantages does your municipality gain by participating in the agreement?

9. Are there any disadvantages in participating in the agreement for your government?

10. Have any agreements been discontinued?
11. Does the provincial government exert pressure on your government to cooperate with neighbouring municipalities?

12. Generally, has it been your experience that it is more economical to cooperate with neighbouring local governments? If so, why is there not more cooperation?

13. What problems arise to disrupt the smooth functioning of intermunicipal arrangements?

14. Are these problems caused by other municipalities or do they stem from conditions within your own municipality?

15. Is the voluntary trend in intermunicipal cooperation rising or falling?

III. Intermunicipal reflections

1. Do you feel that intermunicipal cooperation can be a more effective means of handling local problems than the creation of regional governments?

2. Do you think that it is important to have good communications with your sister governments?

3. What effects, if any, does the proximity of Hamilton have upon cooperation between your municipality and its neighbours?

4. Does your municipality face problems that fundamentally differ from those faced by your neighbours?

5. Do you feel that you have any obligations to help solve regional problems?

6. Do you feel that there are any service deficiencies in this municipality?
7. Do you think that this municipality can provide all the services at the local level that people want without any help from other local governments?
8. Is this municipality in competition with other municipalities?
9. Do you feel that regional government will be good or bad for your particular municipality and the region in general?
10. What worries you most about regional government?
11. What are the main factors inhibiting intermunicipal cooperation at the present time as far as this municipality is concerned?
12. What do you see as the greatest advantage of regional government?
13. What effect does the county boundary have on intermunicipal cooperation?
14. With respect to the present state of intermunicipal cooperation in this area, which statement best characterizes your attitude?
   a. The area should merge into one unit.
   b. There should be more intermunicipal cooperation in a greater number of functions to solve regional problems.
   c. The present level of cooperation is good enough.
   d. Although increased cooperation would solve problems, it is probably not worth the effort because the area will (might) lose its independence.
   e. I have not given the matter much thought.
   f. Other comments.
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