

ZONING REGULATIONS:

A LOCATIONAL IMPEDIMENT TO THE PROVISION
OF LOW-INCOME HOUSING UNITS IN HAMILTON

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For Grandpa Pat

ZONING REGULATIONS:
A LOCATIONAL IMPEDIMENT TO THE PROVISION
OF LOW-INCOME HOUSING UNITS IN HAMILTON

by
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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this paper is to determine whether zoning regulations constrain the builder in his or her ability to provide low-income housing units in Hamilton. It critically reviews five impediments to the provision of low-income housing and the application of urban managerialism to the low-income housing supply problem. An explanation of the degree to which the zoning revision process impedes large and small builders is given. An examination of three specific dimensions of zoning and the extent to which these dimensions constrain the builder follows. These dimensions are (i) inflexibility, (ii) the procedural and temporal framework and (iii) "full-up" zones. The analysis showed insufficient evidence existed to substantiate or falsify the hypothesis that zoning regulations impede the builder's ability to provide low-income housing units.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Recent studies have shown that there is an inadequate supply of housing for low-income families in Canada. The inadequate supply of housing for low-income families is also evident in Hamilton.

There appears to be justification for the argument that this insufficiency results in part from the federal government's reliance on the private sector to provide low-income housing. This paper argues that local land-use regulations are also impeding the provision of new low-income housing units in Hamilton. The purpose of the paper is to examine the role of a specific land-use regulatory mechanism - zoning.

The concern for examining local land-use regulatory mechanisms is based primarily on the need to depart from the tendency of the literature to examine the problem of low-income housing provision from the macro-perspective of federal policies and programs while ignoring the relevance of specific constraining factors found at the municipal level. Federal policies and programs vary over time as dictated by political and economic conditions. Zoning regulations are less vulnerable to extraneous factors.

This investigation, as operationalized, has two

objectives. The first objective is to examine the zoning district revision process as it affects a single agent involved in low-income housing provision - the builder. It is the builder who is directly responsible for the production of the housing unit. Consequently, it is the builder who is constrained by the regulatory mechanism. The second objective is to examine the zoning process as it operates in Hamilton. By doing so, the impeding role of zoning on low-income housing provision can be explained.

The term locational impediment refers to a land-use regulatory mechanism which inhibits the physical construction of a housing unit within a specifically defined spatial area. Consequently, zoning, as a land-use regulatory mechanism, is hypothesized by the paper to be a constraint on the provision of low-income housing units. From this general hypothesis emerge three specific hypotheses which propose ways in which zoning hinders low-income housing provision. First, zoning regulations are inflexible. Attempts to change zoning classifications are rarely successful. Therefore, new low-income housing units are restricted to those areas appropriately zoned. Second, the procedural and time framework for a proposed zoning district revision is such that low-income housing units will not be provided. The builder will choose to build

other building types which do not require a change in the zoning district classification. Third, those zones which allow for low-income type housing units are filled. Consequently, the lack of appropriately zoned areas with available vacant land obstructs the provision of low-income housing units.

In order to examine locational impediments to low-income housing provision four tasks must be completed. Chapter Two is a literature review. The first section reviews a variety of identified constraints to low-income housing provision. From this section, it will be evident that land-use regulatory mechanisms are a major constraining factor on low-income housing provision. The second section evaluates several theoretical approaches which have been used in the study of low-income housing provision. From this section, it becomes clear that urban managerialism is the theoretical framework within which the builder can best be studied.

Chapter Three will provide a detailed description and analysis of the effect of the zoning district revision process on different classifications of builders. It will explain the process from the initial application through to the possible Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) hearing. Due to the complexity of the zoning revision pro-

cess and its variable impact on different types of builders, great care will be taken to define which agents or institutions are involved in each stage, to provide a temporal framework, and to give relevant explanatory examples.

From this chapter, it will become clear that zoning, although affecting different types of builders differently, is an impediment to low-income housing provision in general.

Chapter Four will examine the three specific dimensions of zoning hypothesized to impede the builder. First, the flexibility of zoning will be examined. Second, the temporal and procedural framework of zoning will be explained. Third, the concept of "full-up" zones and the use of appropriate zones will be examined. The purpose of this chapter is to show that each of these three dimensions serve to constrain the provision of low-income housing, and therefore that the hypotheses made are substantiated for the case of Hamilton.

Finally, Chapter Five will summarize the research findings and recommend how and in what direction research must proceed.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

The study of low-income housing provision has been examined using several theoretical approaches (e.g. ecological, neo-classical, Marxist and urban managerialism) with respect to several focuses of concern (e.g. spatial patterns of residential structure, utility maximisation, consumer choice, housing as a commodity, and housing constraints). This review focuses on the literature most relevant to the proposed research question. Section 2.1 discusses the nature of locational impediments to the provision of low-income housing. Section 2.2 justifies the choice of urban managerialism as the theoretical framework for the discussion of builders.

2.1 Impediments To The Provision of Low-Income Housing

Hulchanski (1982), in his study of Toronto from 1961 to 1982, identified several constraints to the supply of low-income housing. Among the constraints cited by Hulchanski were the industrial structure, the local regulatory framework, community attitudes, and the program and policy framework. Achtenberg (1977), cited land availability, government housing programs, zoning by-laws and the general health of the economy as having significant impacts on housing provision. Clearly, the reasons for the inadequate supply of housing are many.

Consequently, the purpose of this subsection is to review five dominant impediments to the provision of low-income housing. The following are to be examined: the building industry, land banking, community opposition, government policies and programs, and the local land-use regulatory framework.

2.1.1 The Building Industry

Checkoway (1980) compared the prewar to the postwar housing industry in the United States. During the 1940s characteristics of the residential construction industry accounted for the inadequate supply of housing (Checkoway, 1980). The residential construction industry was dominated by small, local firms lacking both the financial and labour resources to meet the housing demand. Postwar housing supply increases could be attributed to the increasing number of large builders involved in the residential construction industry. These large builders had a distinct competitive advantage. Large builders could buy materials directly, maintain large inventories of building materials, develop efficient subcontractual relationships, and carry a specialized labour force (Checkoway, 1980). As seen in Levittown, these factors reduced the total costs of large builders.

Hulchanski (1982) describes the industrial structure of housing in Canada between 1961 and 1973. As seen in

the American context, the industrial structure affects housing supply. Spurr (1976, p. 191) shows that in Hamilton, between the years 1961 and 1973, large builders have been increasingly responsible for the provision of housing units.

During the 1940s, large builders dominated the construction of rental units. Currently, large builders are mainly involved with the construction of condominiums and commercial projects. This tendency is to the detriment of low-income rental unit construction in Hamilton (Social Planning and Research Council, 1982). Two implications of this situation must be noted. First, present market conditions favour suburban development which is largely inaccessible to low-income families. Second, small builders being better suited to the construction of housing for infill, redevelopment, conversion and intensification, cannot supply the necessary volume of low-income housing units required (Social Planning and Research Council, 1982). Clearly, the current building industry's structure is a major impediment to the provision of low-income housing units in current economic conditions.

2.1.2 Land Banking

Land banking practices are a further constraint (Rose, 1980, p. 151). The land holdings of corporate and development organizations impede low-income housing pro-

vision by maintaining a shortage of available land in Canadian cities. Spurr (1976) in his study of the trends in land markets, land development and public land assembly activities in Canadian cities between 1961 and 1973, showed that private developers, with their dominance and profit motives, decrease land availability.

Governments are also involved in land assembly practices (Rose, 1980). Furthermore, government objectives often prevent the efficient provision of low-income housing units. First, government land banking is aimed at reducing the land prices thereby making the eventual construction of low-income units less costly for either a private or public construction program. Unfortunately, land is not likely to be developed unless a specific housing program is available. Consequently, in the absence of a housing program, the land will not be developed and the immediate need won't be met. Second, government land banking allows for the control of urban spatial expansion in support of planning goals (Rose, 1980). Third, government land banking is aimed at facilitating the provision of land for social needs not being met by the private sector. Although "cheap" land may be available for low-income housing projects, subsidized housing programs may not be timed to make use of that land. Hence, this land may not be put to use. Furthermore, the need for a cooperative and coordinated program between local and senior levels of

government in Canada become obvious. Land banking practices, be they implemented by the private or public sector, are an impediment to low-income housing provision.

2.1.3 Community Opposition

Community opposition can be a constraint (Hulchanski, 1982). Two aspects of community opposition are evident. First, The Canadian Council on Social Development (1981) noted that although the need for low-income housing in Ontario is obvious, few groups are working to force governmental policies to be modified. A strong, vocal and well organized group can be effective in changing government policy direction. Second, low-income housing projects are often stigmatized (Bourne, 1981, p. 216). Consequently, community opposition may result in preventing a proposed low-income housing project from locating in a specific neighbourhood. If a builder is forced, as a result of community opposition, to go through an Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) hearing, he or she may choose to abandon a given project. Moreover, the builder may choose to change his or her construction preferences.

2.1.4 Government Policies

The relationship between the economic situation and government priorities are manifested in government policies (Bassett and Short, 1980, p. 103). During periods of economic recession there is an increased burden of housing

costs. Short (1982) in his study of post-war housing in Britain, stated that during economic slumps builders have greater difficulty getting money. The lack of money causes both the private and public sector to decrease housing construction activity. Inversely, in periods during which the economy is prospering, both the private and public housing sectors take increased interest in housing provision (Canadian Council on Social Development, 1981).

The private sector provides housing for those best able to obtain a housing unit (Rose, 1980). Based on the behaviour of the private housing sector, the government must react by intervening on behalf of low-income families. The vigor of government intervention depends, primarily, on the current economic situation. However, Harloe (1981) in his study of housing under capitalism noted that as the housing market becomes increasingly dominated by individualized owner occupation, there is a decreased practice of subsidized, non-profit or council housing.

Hulchanski, as cited by McQuaig (1985) points out that the most recent Canadian housing programs have been delivered through the tax system thereby favouring upper income groups. Furthermore, indirect housing subsidies (valued at \$5 billion in 1979) exceed the direct subsidies (valued at \$1.6 billion in 1979) by \$3.4 billion. Given the priorities of indirect subsidies, and governmental dependence on private housing sector provision, adequate increases in low-income units are

unlikely. Consequently, the building industry's tendency towards housing construction for higher income groups is reinforced.

Government policies take many forms, some of which may constrain the provision of low-income housing. Rent control was introduced in Ontario in 1975 as a means by which housing could be kept affordable. Olson and Walker (1981) and Kalymon (1981) identify rent control as an obstacle to the construction of new apartment units. Kalymon (1981) described rent control as being aimed at short-term objectives and causing long-term disruption. Olson and Walker (1981) assert that rent control actually worsens the housing shortage. Furthermore, the profitability of private investment in rental housing decreases. As a result, although the demand exists, the private sector does not find it feasible to improve the supply situation. Barnard (1976) states that the current policy environment is not conducive to apartment investing. The lack of investment results from the builder's uncertainty regarding the direction of rent control.

Other policies can influence the entrepreneurial activity of the private sector in the housing market. Rose (1980), in his study of Canadian housing policies between 1935 and 1980, sees the formation of new legislation, the strengthening of existing legislation, and basing the administrative decision upon strict interpretation of the laws in

Canada as being important here. For example, land-use regulations control and direct the spatial impacts of land-use development. The stricter the rule enforcement, the greater the constraint.

2.1.5 Municipal Regulatory Framework

The regulatory framework of a municipality can be a constraint to the provision of low-income housing. In a document published by the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC) in 1983, government intervention in the regulation of land-use is said to occur at both the production and development stage. During the production stage (i.e. the development of undeveloped land), land-use regulation takes the form of subdivision control. During the development stage (i.e. the construction of an actual building), land-use regulation takes the form of zoning regulations and building codes. In Canada, local governments have the major responsibility for land-use control.

Mills (1979) lists building codes and subdivision controls as examples of land-use regulations. The purpose of building codes is to regulate housing construction, maintenance and use of structure (Mills, 1979, p. 513). These land-use regulations impede the actual physical construction of the housing unit. Subdivision controls are imposed on those builders and developers who intend to subdivide and develop a tract of undeveloped land.

Mills (1979) also defines zoning as the designation of a set of zones within which certain activities are permitted. The goal of zoning is to segregate adversely interdependent land-uses spatially (Mills, 1979; Klodawsky et al., 1984). Klodawsky (1984), in her research of housing for single parent families, concludes that zoning can be an impediment to lower income housing. For example, given the zoning regulations of a municipality, the degree of zoning flexibility may or may not allow for low-income housing construction. Appendix A shows the zoning classifications used in Hamilton. Although there is no specific category for low-income housing, low-income units are typically found in multiple-residential type zoning districts (i.e. either "DE", "RT", or "E").

2.1.6 Summary

This section has examined several impediments to low-income housing provision. For the purpose of the paper, zoning is hypothesized as being a constraint to low-income housing provision. Particularly, zoning as it obstructs the builder will be examined. Now, a theoretical framework from which the analysis of builders and the zoning revision process can be completed, must be explained.

2.2 Urban Managerialism

Section 2.1 reviewed five constraints to the provision of low-income housing. Land-use regulatory mechanisms were identified as major constraining factors on low-income housing provision. Having hypothesized that zoning constrains the builder, a theoretical framework from which the zoning revision process and its impact on the builder can be examined must be identified. The purpose of this section is to justify the choice of urban managerialism as the theoretical framework to examine the locational impediment to low-income housing provision.


Urban managerialism arose out of the inadequacies of the ecological and neo-classical perspectives on housing (Bassett and Short, 1981, p. 44). Three criticisms of the ecological and neo-classical perspectives were provided by Bassett and Short (1980). First, the traditional approaches concentrated on household choices and preferences subject to budget constraints (Muth, 1969; Alonso, 1964) while ignoring the importance of supply constraints. As has been shown by Dennis and Fish (1972) for Canada, the provision of housing can be either facilitated or constrained by economic, political or social factors. The consideration of institutional structures in housing markets, and the constraints on housing supply they make, is fundamental to the urban managerial approach.

Second, the ecological and neo-classical approaches tend to focus on individual households (Muth, 1969; Alonso; 1964). By concentrating on individual households, the influences of many agents and institutions (see figure 1) involved in the housing market are neglected. Figure 1 shows planners, landowners, builders, developers and finance institutions as being involved in the production of new housing. Clearly, these five agent types have varying interests in the housing market. Variation in interests serve as an impetus to conflicts between agents or institutions. Urban managerialism recognizes the conflicts between agents or institutions. Urban managerialism recognizes the conflicts between agents or institutions with varying interests in the housing market (Bassett and Short, 1980).

Finally, the ecological and neo-classical approaches assume that social harmony exists. Urban managerialism recognizes that conflicts exist both at a societal level and within the housing market. As hypothesized, zoning constrains the ability of builders to provide low-income housing. Consequently, there is conflict between the builder who is proposing a change in the zoning of an area, and the agents or institutions who direct the zoning revision process. Urban managerialism's concern for the relationship between various agents or institutions and the power they command as well as the resulting conflicts between interest groups, justifies its use as a method for examining

FIGURE 1

THE INTERACTION BETWEEN AGENTS AND INSTITUTIONS IN THE PRIVATE HOUSING MARKET



Source: Bassett and Short (1980)
Figure 6.1

the inadequate supply of low-income housing.

Those who influence the distribution and allocation of resources are called urban managers (Bassett and Short, 1981, p. 50). For the purpose of this paper, the urban manager to be studied is the builder. Bassett and Short (1980) present two tasks when applying the managerialist approach to housing. First, the relevant individuals, agents or institutions which supply and allocate housing must be identified. Second, the rules and procedures of those individuals, agents or institutions allocating housing units must be identified.

Badcock (1984) makes the distinction between public and private sector institutions in the control of access to housing. Although the builder is a private sector agent, his or her involvement in the production of new low-income housing units is constrained by a set of public sector procedures (i.e. zoning regulations).

Gray (1976) emphasizes that in a situation of housing scarcity, the various institutions which operate in the urban system are fundamental in dictating both the opportunities for and the resources available to individual households. Furthermore, urban managers have a greater degree of power over those families and individuals seeking low-income housing than over those families and individuals who can afford more expensive housing. In Hamilton, all low-income housing units are allocated to those families

and individuals on the Hamilton-Wentworth Housing Authority's (HWAH) waiting lists. Table 1 shows the number of family, handicapped and senior applicants on the HWAH waiting lists from January 1980 to January 1985. Although the number of total applicants varies from year to year, the need for family low-income housing units is the most obvious. However, to be considered for low-income housing in Hamilton, the family must be registered on the HWAH waiting list.

TABLE 1
HAMILTON-WENTWORTH HOUSING AUTHORITY WAITING LISTS
(January 1980 - January 1985)

MONTH/YEAR	FAMILY	HANDICAPPED	SENIOR	TOTAL
Jan. 85	544	109	60	713
June 84	565	72	66	703
Jan. 84	702	85	50	837
June 83	816	102	60	978
Jan. 83	659	101	73	833
June 82	582	106	109	797
Jan. 82	452	132	90	674
June 81	487	167	301	955
Jan. 81	481	160	227	868
June 80	315	150	219	684
Jan. 80	389	141	157	687

The urban managerial approach has been used in the examination of low-income housing provision in various ways. The following are some examples: the role of the builder in house construction (Ambrose and Colenutt, 1975); the restriction of money lent to inner city areas in which many low-income households exist (Boddy, 1976); inequality in urban land and housing market (Badcock, 1984).

2.3 Summary

This chapter reviewed five impediments to low-income housing provision and identified a theoretical framework from which the analysis could proceed. More specifically, zoning was identified as limiting the builder's involvement in the production of low-income housing. The theoretical framework that will be used to examine the research question is urban managerialism. Chapter 3 will show how different classifications of builders are affected by the zoning revision process.

CHAPTER THREE

THE IMPACT OF THE ZONING REVISION PROCESS ON BUILDERS

Having identified zoning as a constraint on the builder's ability to provide low-income housing units in the previous chapter, the purpose of this chapter is to examine the impact of the zoning revision process on different classifications of builders. Clearly, urban managers differ in the resources they command (Bassett and Short, 1980).

Several studies have examined various classifications of builders and their ability to provide housing units (Hulchanski, 1982; Checkoway, 1980; Spurr, 1976). Hulchanski (1982) identifies four groups of builders in Toronto based on the number of units produced annually. The large builder (completes more than 101 housing units annually), between the years 1961 and 1973, has been res-

possible for the majority of new housing units in Canada (Spurr, 1976, p. 191). The small builder, as shown by Hulchanski (1982) is suited for infill, redevelopment and conversion activities. Clearly, the large and small builder differ in the resources they command (i.e. financial and labour) and the number of projects completed annually. Consequently, each stage of the zoning revision affects the large and small builder differently.

3.1 Application For Zoning Change

Table 2 shows the steps involved in the zoning revision process. The first stage is the application. In general, both the small and large builder are affected in the same way. However, one major difference exists. The second section of the application identifies the applicant's choice of agent (i.e. lawyer). By nature of their size and diversity of their building activities, the large builder would employ a full-time agent while the small builder would have to hire an "outside" agent if the zoning revision situation arose. Logically, the large builder's agent would have a more intimate knowledge of the zoning revision process.

3.2 Review and Report

The review and report stage takes one week to complete. During this time the builder is not allowed to start work on the land in question. The small builder, having less resources (i.e. labour and financial) and fewer projects,

spends this time inactive. Conversely, the large builder has other projects to work on.

3.3 Notification to Ontario Municipal Board Hearing

The final three stages of the zoning revision process are: notification, public meeting and council decision; preparation and circulation of the new zoning by-law; and appeal to the Ontario Municipal Board. As Appendix B shows, the final three stages of the zoning revision process take close to a year to complete. Hence, the critical concern to the builder is time. By nature of their size and availability of resources, large builders are minimally affected by the final three stages of the zoning revision process. However, the small builder cannot afford to remain inactive for the more than nine months that the zoning revision process takes. Consequently, the small builder may either avoid initiating projects which require a revision in zoning or choose to become involved in projects after the zoning revision process has been completed by another agent or institution.

3.4 Summary

It is obvious that the small and large builder are affected differently by the zoning revision process. Critical factors modulating the impact of the revision process are resource availability and the time between revision stages. The large builders, by nature of their size, do not

adopt the avoidance strategy that the smaller builders do. Clearly, the small builder is more likely to be constrained by the zoning revision process than is the large builder. However, large builders are not involved in low-income housing projects. Accordingly, chapter four examines the impact of zoning regulations on the provision of low-income housing in Hamilton.

TABLE 2
THE ZONING REVISION PROCESS

- A) Application Received
 - a) applicant
 - b) agent
 - c) applicant's interest
 - d) land affected
 - e) present/proposed use and zoning
 - f) official plan designation
 - g) adjoining land owned by applicant
 - h) justification of request
 - i) statutory declaration
- B) Review and Report
 - a) application circulated to other departments
 - b) other departments submit report to planning department
 - c) planning department drafts comprehensive report
- C) Notification, Public Meeting and Council Decision
- D) Preparation and Circulation of By-Law
 - a) review all information up to stage four
 - b) yellow cards sent out to surrounding property owners
 - c) preparation of technical report
 - d) by-law re-circulated to property owners only
- E) Appeal to O.M.B.
 - a) final decision

Sources: City of Hamilton Application
For Zoning Change
Government of Ontario, Planning
Act, 1983

CHAPTER FOUR

ZONING AS AN IMPEDIMENT

The previous chapter compared the impact of the zoning revision process on both the large and small builder. Clearly, the zoning revision process constrains the small builder more than it constrains the large builder. The purpose of chapter four is to examine zoning as an impediment to low-income housing provision in Hamilton.

The examination of zoning as a constraint has three relevant points of focus as hypothesized by the paper. First, zoning regulations are hypothesized to be inflexible. Second, the procedural and time framework for a proposed zoning district revision is hypothesized to constrain the provision of low-income housing units. Third, those zones which allow for low-income type housing units are hypothesized to be full.

4.1 Flexibility

Zoning regulations are hypothesized to be inflexible. One way to measure if zoning has been a locational impediment is to identify the ratio between successful zoning revision applications and those applications which have failed over a given time period.

The zoning revision application has four possible facets. The application can either be accepted, rejected, withdrawn or tabulated. The acceptance or rejection can

occur at one of two stages. If the proposed new zoning by-law is passed by city council and if, during the by-law circulation process, no surrounding property owner objects to the proposal, the new zoning by-law will be passed. Conversely, if one surrounding property owner objects, the proposed can only be approved if an Ontario Municipal Board hearing rules in favour of that change. The changing of the zoning by-law in either of these two cases means acceptance. Rejection is the opposite outcome of the same process. The primary reason for rejection is incompatible land-use.

The third possible fate of the application is withdrawal. This occurs when the applicant and his or her agent approaches the planning department and states that the proposed change is no longer desired. Tabulation is the fourth possible fate of an application. This is different from withdrawal in that the result of the application is not specified at this time by the planning department.

Clearly, an index of flexibility is required to measure the degree to which zoning is a locational impediment. Logically, the ratio between the number of zoning district revision applications accepted or rejected provides this index. Table 3 shows the number of zoning district change applications approved between 1980 and 1984 (see Appendix C for the number of zoning district change applications approved each year). Table 4 shows the number of zoning district change applications rejected from 1980 to 1984 (see

TABLE 3

INCIDENCE OF ZONING DISTRICT CHANGE APPLICATIONS APPROVED: 1980-1984

TO FROM	A	AA	B	C	D	DE	RT	E	CR	G	H	HH	HI	J	K	M	L	TOTAL
A	5	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	8
AA	3	10	5	0	33	4	3	1	0	13	1	8	0	0	0	5	1	91
B	1	0	5	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	10
C	1	0	0	24	9	1	2	1	0	6	6	3	0	1	0	0	0	54
D	0	0	0	28	24	0	4	0	0	10	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	73
DE	0	0	0	2	0	3	0	0	0	3	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	11
RT	0	0	0	10	5	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	17
E	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	16	2	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	21
CR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	7
G	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
H	0	0	0	7	14	5	0	9	3	2	21	1	0	1	0	0	0	63
HH	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	0	0	0	0	0	8
I	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
J	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	3	0	0	12	0	0	0	18
K	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	5	1	0	0	9
M	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	4	3	7
L	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	4	0	0	8	2	0	0	0	0	2	19
Total	10	10	10	79	86	15	10	32	12	41	52	25	1	20	1	10	7	421

Source: CITY OF HAMILTON COUNCIL MOMENTS, REPORTS
FROM THE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE

TABLE 4

INCIDENCE OF ZONING DISTRICT CHANGE APPLICATIONS REJECTED: 1980-1984

TO FROM	A	B	C	D	DE	RT	E	G	H	HH	M	TOTAL
A	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	3
AA	0	1	1	3	2	5	1	3	2	3	1	22
B	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	2
C	0	0	6	0	1	1	0	3	2	3	0	16
D	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	3	3	0	0	7
G	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	2
H	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	3
HH	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
TOTAL	3	1	7	4	4	7	1	10	12	6	1	56

* 1984 data was only available up to June 26, 1984.

** Diagonals represent applications for zone modifications.

*** Only those combinations of zoning district change applied for have been included in this matrix.

Source: CITY OF HAMILTON COUNCIL MOMENTS, REPORTS
FROM THE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE

Appendix D for the number of rejected applications each year). Of the 477 applications received and put through the zoning revision process, there were 421 cases of acceptance (88%) and 56 cases of rejection (12%). In general terms, zoning is flexible. However, the examination of zoning flexibility as it constrains agents or institutions in general, and builders in particular must also be made.

Table 5 disaggregates the success or failure of a zoning application according to whether applicants are agents or institutions. As table 5 shows, builders made a total of 41 applications for zoning changes between 1980 and 1984. Of these 41 applications, 38 (93%) were approved while 3 (7%) were rejected. Clearly, the builders have found zoning to be flexible.

Table 6 shows the type of land-use changes proposed by builders. Of the 41 applications made by builders, 31 (76%) applications proposed a change to single dwelling unit residential zoning areas. Each of these applications were approved. Consequently, zoning does not constrain the provision of single family housing units in Hamilton. Moreover, the 31 applications may reflect the present construction preference of builders. Builders made 4 applications in changing from a single dwelling zoning classification to a multiple dwelling classification. These applications were not aimed at the provision of low-income housing.

TABLE 5

APPLICATION FOR ZONING CHANGE BY AGENT OR INSTITUTION (1980-1984)

	Change		Modification		Total	
	Approved	Rejected	Approved	Rejected	Approved	Rejected
City Initiatives	36	0	10	0	46	0
Landowners	184	41	96	8	280	49
Builders	34	3	4	0	38	3
Developers	8	0	4	2	12	2
Financers	35	1	3	1	38	2
Other	7	0	0	0	7	0
Total	304	45	117	11	421	56

Source: CITY OF HAMILTON COUNCIL MOMENTS, REPORTS
FROM THE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE

TABLE 6

APPLICATIONS FOR ZONING CHANGE BY BUILDERS (1980-1984)

TO FROM	Agricultural	Single Dwelling	Multiple Dwelling	Commercial	Industrial	Total
Agricultural	3 (1)	9	0	0 (1)	0	12 (2)
Single Dwelling	0	15	3 (1)	0	0	18 (1)
Multiple Dwelling	0	7	0	0	0	7
Commercial	0	0	0	0	0	0
Industrial	0	0	0	0	1	1
Total	3 (1)	31	3 (1)	0 (1)	1	38 (3)

* Figures in brackets represent the number of rejected applications

Source: City of Hamilton Council Moments, Reports
From the Planning and Development Committee

Table 7 shows the zoning districts of existing low-income housing units. As table 7 shows, 4262 (63%) of Hamilton's 6742 low-income housing units offered through the public housing, rent supplement and private non-profit programs, are found in multiple dwelling type zoning districts (i.e. "DE", "RT", or "E"). A further 768 (11%) existing low-income housing units are found in residential type zoning districts (i.e. "C" or "D"). The location and zoning designation of existing low-income housing units depends on the size (i.e. number of units) of the housing project.

However, 1712 (26%) of the existing low-income housing units are not found in residential type zoning districts. The definition of a zoning district identifies the principal permitted land-uses and does not define exclusive land-uses. For example, although a zoning district may be classified industrial (e.g. "K") it may have some provision for other land-use types.

Hamilton's zoning policy is flexible in that it allows for change and for land-uses other than the principal permitted land-use specified by by-law 6593. The index of flexibility, as indicated by the ratio between revision applications that have failed against those that have been accepted, allows us to make this generalization especially when considering the situation for low-income housing projects. More specifically, Hamilton's zoning policy is flexible in

TABLE 7

ZONING DISTRICTS OF EXISTING LOW-INCOME HOUSING UNITS (1981)

PROJECT (FAMILY/SENIOR)	ZONING DISTRICT						TOTAL
	"C"	"D"	"DE"	"RT"	"E"	OTHER	
PUBLIC HOUSING (FAMILY)	149	365	1375	50	0	0	1939
PUBLIC HOUSING (SENIOR)	0	16	369	0	1635	1021	3041
RENT SUPPLEMENT (FAMILY)	0	4	99	0	135	9	247
RENT SUPPLEMENT (SENIOR)	0	0	0	0	262	0	262
PRIVATE NON-PROFIT (FAMILY)	0	218	104	0	60	0	382
PRIVATE NON-PROFIT (SENIOR)	16	0	0	0	173	682	871
TOTAL	165	603	1947	50	2265	1712	6742

SOURCES: SOCIAL HOUSING PROFILE
 HAMILTON ZONING BY-LAWS: NEIGHBOURHOOD
 MAPS

that it allows for the provision of low-income housing projects in areas where the principal permitted use is not multiple dwelling residential.

The hypothesis of zoning inflexibility cannot be substantiated. Although zoning regulations do not constrain the builder or the provision of low-income housing units, there is insufficient evidence to suggest that zoning regulation constrain the builder's ability to provide low-income housing units.

4.2 Procedural and Temporal Framework

The procedural and temporal framework of the zoning revision process is hypothesized to impede the construction of low-income housing units. The number of withdrawals compared to the number of applications indicates the impact of the temporal framework on the builder and on low-income housing provision. The instances of application withdrawal is not documented by the planning and development committee. Consequently, a definitive conclusion regarding the constraining impact of the zoning revision procedures and the temporal framework cannot be made. As chapter three explained, the temporal framework affects different types of builders differently. For the large builder, the temporal framework may not be an impediment in that the large builder may be involved in several projects at the same time. The time spent waiting for an application to go through the zoning

revision is not time wasted to inactivity. For the small builder, having fewer resources (i.e. labour and financial) and being involved in fewer construction projects (at any one point in time), the temporal framework of the zoning revision process is a constraint. The small builder cannot afford to be inactive. Consequently, the small builder avoids instances where a property must be rezoned before construction can proceed.

Another option available to the builder is to become involved in a housing project after a successful zoning revision initiative has been achieved by another agent or institution. For example, the Hamilton and District Home Builders, although willing to construct low-income housing units in Hamilton, prefer non-profit organizations to assure the appropriate zoning before becoming involved in a low-income housing project.

Insufficient evidence is available to substantiate or falsify the hypothesis that the procedural and temporal framework of the zoning revision process constrains the construction of low-income housing units. There are several problems relating to data availability and accessibility. First, those zoning revision applications which are withdrawn are not recorded in the Planning and Development Committee's reports to city council. Second, the number of zoning applications approved, rejected, or withdrawn are not tabulated for the end of each year. Third, individual

applications are not available for public scrutiny.

4.3 "Full-up" Zones

Those zones which allow for low-income type housing units are hypothesized to be full. Table 8 shows the zoning districts in which Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation non-profit housing commitments are found. Table 8 provides an index of "full-up zones. As table 7 shows, 63 per cent of existing low-income housing units in Hamilton are found in multiple dwelling type zoning districts. Table 8 shows that 58 per cent of the proposed low-income housing units in Hamilton are found in multiple dwelling type zoning districts. One possible interpretation is that those zones which allow for low-income type housing units are full. However, other interpretations are possible.

The slight increase in the number of proposed low-income housing units in single dwelling residential areas may indicate that less land is available for low-income housing units. Moreover, Hulchanski (1982) identified small builders as being better suited to infill, redevelopment and conversion. Consequently, if most low-income housing builders are small and only able to produce a few units each year, then low-income housing units may be increasingly situated in single dwelling type residential zones.

Another possible interpretation is that financial subsidies are not presently available for multiple dwelling low-

TABLE 7

ZONING DISTRICTS OF EXISTING LOW-INCOME HOUSING UNITS (1981)

PROJECT (FAMILY/SENIOR)	"C"	"D"	"DE"	"RT"	"E"	OTHER	TOTAL
PUBLIC HOUSING (FAMILY)	149	365	1375	50	0	0	1939
PUBLIC HOUSING (SENIOR)	0	16	369	0	1635	1021	3041
RENT SUPPLEMENT (FAMILY)	0	4	99	0	135	9	247
RENT SUPPLEMENT (SENIOR)	0	0	0	0	262	0	262
PRIVATE NON-PROFIT (FAMILY)	0	218	104	0	60	0	382
PRIVATE NON-PROFIT (SENIOR)	16	0	0	0	173	682	871
	165	603	1947	50	2265	1712	6742

SOURCES: SOCIAL HOUSING PROFILE
 HAMILTON ZONING BY-LAWS: NEIGHBOURHOOD MAPS

TABLE 8

ZONING DISTRICTS OF C.M.H.C. COMMITMENTS UNDER S.56.1 (HAMILTON)

YEAR	COMMITMENTS	"C"	"DE"	"D or DE"	"RT"	"E"	OTHER	TOTAL
1984	PRIVATE NON-PROFIT (FAMILY)	60	50	75	0	0	0	185
1984	CO-OPERATIVE (FAMILY)	0	0	0	48	0	0	48
1983	PRIVATE NON-PROFIT (FAMILY)	34	0	87	0	0	12	133
1983	PRIVATE NON-PROFIT (SENIOR)	0	0	0	0	0	75	75
1983	CO-OPERATIVE (FAMILY)	0	0	0	0	64	50	114
TOTAL		94	50	162	48	64	137	555

SOURCES: C.M.H.C.

HAMILTON ZONING BY-LAWS: NEIGHBOURHOOD
MAPS

income housing programs. Consequently, infill, redevelopment and conversion practices are catered towards providing single dwelling units.

Clearly, there is not enough evidence to substantiate or falsify the hypothesis that these zones which allow for low-income housing units are full. Moreover, given that zoning regulations are flexible in Hamilton, the "full-up" hypothesis is not appropriate.

4.4 Summary

Three dimensions of zoning were hypothesized to constrain the provision of low-income housing in Hamilton. The hypothesis that zoning regulations are inflexible cannot be substantiated. The hypotheses that the procedural and temporal framework impedes the provision of low-income housing units and that those zones allowing for low-income housing are "full-up", given the lack of evidence, cannot be substantiated or falsified. Therefore, more evidence is required to examine those two hypotheses.

The following information would assist the examination of hypothesis two: the number of withdrawals made by each classification of builder, the stage of the zoning revision process in which a withdrawal is made, the reasons given for a withdrawal. Given the data accessibility problem, this information would best be obtained through interviews with builders who are active in Hamilton. Further examination of

"full-up" zones, given that zoning in Hamilton is flexible, is not required.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This paper set out to accomplish two tasks in order to answer the research question. The first task was to examine the zoning district revision process as it constrains the builder in Hamilton. Particularly, it was hypothesized that zoning regulations impede the builder. The second task was to examine the zoning process as it operates in Hamilton. This task was necessary in order to determine the constraining role of zoning on low-income housing provision.

Chapter 2 examined the literature on the impediments to low-income housing provision and the use of urban managerialism in the housing context. From this literature review zoning regulations were then hypothesized to constrain the provision of low-income housing units. Also, the choice of urban managerialism in examining the research question was justified.

Before examining the research hypotheses in chapter 4, chapter 3 discussed how zoning regulations constrained different classifications of builders in Hamilton. Zoning regulations were shown to impede the small builder more than the large builder.

Chapter four examined the three hypotheses which were presented to determine whether or not zoning regulations constrain the provision of low-income housing in Hamilton. The first hypothesis was that zoning is inflexible in Hamilton. This hypothesis was not substantiated. The second hypothesis was that the procedural and temporal framework of the zoning revision process constrains the provision of low-income housing in Hamilton. Insufficient evidence was available to substantiate or falsify the second hypothesis. The third hypothesis was that those zones which provided for low-income housing in Hamilton were "full-up". There was not enough evidence to substantiate or falsify the third hypothesis.

Zoning was examined both in the general sense and as to how it would affect the builder specifically. In discussion with the president of the Hamilton and District Home Builders Association, zoning was not mentioned as an impediment. Lack of funding from senior levels of government was primary reason given for the inadequate supply of new low-income housing units in Hamilton. Moreover, the Hamilton and District Home Builders Association, although willing to build low-income housing units, were not willing to sponsor such projects. At least two inferences can be made from this statement, to guide further research on the types of questions raised in this thesis. First, other agents or institutions may be more directly involved in determining that

low-income housing units will be built. Hence, the builder should not be the only focus of the urban managerialist analysis. The willingness of builders to construct but not sponsor such projects suggests that the analysis of low-income housing provision should focus on other agents or institutions. The Social Planning and Research Council of Hamilton and District (1982) showed that the only low-income housing programs currently active in Hamilton are non-profits (both private and municipal). Consequently, those organizations involved in non-profit housing should be identified. The constraint of zoning regulation on the activities of these organizations should then be studied. Second, different size builders may react differently to zoning regulations. Those builders who were involved in the provision of low-income housing units in the past must be identified. These builders would then be questioned regarding their past experience with zoning regulations and their reasons for no longer being involved in the provision of low-income housing units.

Finally, it must be realized that the inadequate supply of low-income housing in Hamilton is the end result of many constraining factors interacting with each other. Although a single impediment may be a constraining factor, it is not the sole causal factor. Also, the significance of different constraining factors varies over time and in different places. As stated by local builders, it may be the lack of government subsidies which most inhibit the provision of

low-income housing units in Hamilton in the early 1980s.

APPENDIX A

ZONING DISTRICTS: CITY OF HAMILTON

<u>DISTRICT</u>	<u>• PRINCIPAL PERMITTED USES</u>
"A"	Conservation, Open Space Park and Recreation
"AA"	Agricultural
"B"	Suburban Agricultural and Residential
"B-1"	Suburban Agricultural and Residential
"B-2"	Residential (Single Family)
"C"	Residential (Single Family)
"D"	Residential (One and Two Family)
"DE"	Low Density Multiple Dwellings
"DE-2"	Multiple Dwellings
"DE-3"	Multiple Dwellings
"RT-10"	Townhouses (3-6 units)
"RT-20"	Townhouses and Maisonettes
"RT-30"	Street Townhouses
"E"	Multiple Dwellings
"E-1"	Multiple Dwellings
"E-2"	Multiple Dwellings
"E-3"	High Density Multiple Dwellings
"F"	Special Waterfront

<u>DISTRICT</u>	<u>PRINCIPAL PERMITTED USES</u>
"U"	University (Special Regulations for McMaster University)
"G"	Neighbourhood Shopping
"G-1"	Designed Shopping Centre
"G-2"	Regional Shopping Centre
"G-3"	Public Parking Lots
"G-4"	Designed Neighbourhood Shopping Centre
"H"	Commercial
"HH"	Restricted Commercial
"I"	Central Business
"HI"	Civic Centre Protected District
"CR"	Commercial - Residential
"J"	Light and Limited Heavy Industrial
"JJ"	Restricted Light Industrial
"K"	Heavy Industrial
"KK"	Restricted Heavy Industrial
"L"	Planned Development
"M"	Prestige Industrial Districts

Source: Hamilton - Neighbourhood Maps

APPENDIX B

THE ZONING REVISION PROCESS

Step 1: Application For Zoning Change

The first stage in the zoning revision process is the application. The actual application is made up of nine parts.

Part one identifies the applicant or applicants. The basic information of who the applicant is and where the applicant resides is given.

Part two identifies the agent. The applicant chooses an authorized agent to represent his interests throughout the zoning revision process. This agent has a sound legal knowledge of Hamilton's by-laws and represents the applicant at public meetings. The agent is also responsible for assuring that the information given in the application is accurate.

Part three states the applicant's interest. The applicant must identify himself as an owner, prospective owner or leasee. If the applicant does not own the property or land, he must obtain a written statement from the actual owner. This affidavit must show that the owner is aware of the applicant's request and agrees to the application proposals.

Part four of the application identifies the property affected and provides a detailed description of that property.

Part five specifies the present use of subject land and buildings and the present zoning of the subject land. The proposed use of subject land and buildings and the proposed zoning of the subject land are also specified.

Part six describes the present designation of the subject land according to Hamilton's Official Plan. The difference between an official plan designation and a neighbourhood plan designation is that the official plan designation specifies the general land use for a larger area while the neighbourhood plan identifies a specific zoning district within a specific neighbourhood. Consequently, it is possible for the official plan designation not to be consistent with the neighbourhood plan designation. Part six specifies whether or not the present designation of the subject land requires a redesignation or does not require a redesignation.

Part seven identifies any neighbouring land which the applicant has a legal interest. This serves as a "check" against detrimental land assembly practices.

Part eight allows the applicant to provide additional information. Furthermore, it is possible for the applicant to argue that his proposal, while not being consistent with existing land-use designations, is not detrimental to surrounding properties.

Part nine is a statutory declamation of the truth of all information contained in parts one through to eight. It

may be signed by either the applicant or agent.

Step 2: Review and Report

Within two to three weeks of receiving the application, the application is passed into the review and report stage. The first part of this stage (co-ordinated by the planning department) is to circulate the application among other relevant municipal departments.

The planning department deals with the responses from other participating departments. The circulation of an application serves several purposes. First, different departments have different areas of specialized knowledge of by-law provisions. Consequently, the revision co-ordinator obtains a detailed description of potential problem areas.

Second, the circulation provides verification of the applicant's statement concerning the present zoning of the subject land. Although a statutory declaration completed the application stage, it is possible for the present zoning district to be wrongly recorded.

Third, different departments may have different recommendations concerning the acceptance or rejection of an application.

Fourth, different departments have different rules of flexibility according to the nature of the proposed development.

The review and report stage takes one week. The

resulting report, as written by a member of the planning and development department, must be prepared thirty days in advance of the public meeting.

Step 3: Notification, Public Meeting and Council Decision

Stage three provides that all property owners and tenants within 400 feet of the subject land are notified about the proposed zoning district revision and told when and where a public meeting will be held. The notification document is made as specific as possible to decrease potential opposition.

The notification document also contains a statement of consistency or inconsistency with the neighbourhood plan. The task of surrounding property owners and tenants is simply to reply in favour or not in favour. The public meeting which follows allows the surrounding tenants or property owners to express their concerns.

Part two of stage three involves the planning and development committee holding a meeting with the applicant and his agent. The purpose of this meeting is to collect recommendations to be presented to a political committee (made up of city alderman). Following this, the political committee takes its recommendations to council.

Step 4: Preparation and Circulation of By-Law

The fourth phase of the zoning district revision process is the most technical.

Part one involves the review of all information collected up to stage four. The purpose is to prepare a technical report.

Part two involves the sending out of yellow cards to surrounding property owners. Data is recorded with respect to the number of cards sent out, replies in favour, and replies against.

The third part of this stage is the preparation of a technical report. The technical report contains five major sections. First, the validity of the application is confirmed. Second, comments with respect to the compliance with the Official Plan. Third, the degree of compliance with the Neighbourhood Plan is stated. Fourth, comments are made with respect to zoning regulations and existing by-laws. Finally, the report states whether or not a proposed change in a zoning district and the corresponding site-specific by-law and provides justification.

Part four involves the passing of the by-law by city council. Any proposed change in a by-law must be passed by council.

Part five involves the re-circulation of the revised by-law to surrounding property owners. There are two possible outcomes. In the case of no objections, the revised by-law is automatically passed. If there is one objection to the re-circulated by-law there is an O.M.B. hearing.

Step 5: Appeal To The Ontario Municipal Board

The zoning district revision process is greatly prolonged if it reaches the fifth stage. It takes six to nine months to get a hearing date. The hearing and decision process takes four to six weeks. The decision made by the O.M.B. is final.

APPENDIX C

INCIDENCE OF ZONING DISTRICT CHANGE APPLICATIONS APPROVED (1980-1984)

TABLE 3.1 APPROVED APPLICATIONS: 1984

TO FROM	A	AA	B	C	D	DE	RT	E	CR	G	H	HH	M	TOTAL
A	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
AA	3	3	2	8	1	1	1	0	0	2	0	2	0	23
B	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
C	1	0	0	5	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	8
D	0	0	0	4	3	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	9
DE	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	4
RT	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
E	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
G	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	2
H	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	4	0	0	5
M	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
L	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	3
TOTAL	6	3	3	20	4	2	2	4	1	5	7	4	3	64

TABLE 3.2 APPROVED APPLICATIONS: 1983

TO FROM	B	C	D	DE	RT	E	G	H	HH	J	M	TOTAL
AA	0	9	1	1	1	0	2	0	1	0	1	16
B	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
C	0	4	2	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	8
D	0	12	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	0	15
DE	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2
RT	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
G	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
H	0	5	0	4	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	12
K	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	4	0	5
M	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
L	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
TOTAL	1	34	3	5	1	1	8	4	2	4	2	65

TABLE 3.3 APPROVED APPLICATIONS: 1982

TO FROM	A	AA	B	C	D	DE	RT	E	G	H	HH	CR	J	L	M	TOTAL
A	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2
AA	0	1	2	4	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	12
B	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
C	0	0	0	7	2	1	0	1	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	13
D	0	0	0	8	5	0	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	16
DE	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
RT	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
E	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	7
G	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
H	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	3	0	0	0	8
CR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	4	0	0	0	5
J	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	3	0	0	4
L	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	2	0	0	0	1	0	5
TOTAL	1	1	2	23	7	3	2	10	5	9	3	7	3	1	2	79

TABLE 3.4 APPROVED APPLICATIONS: 1981

TO FROM	A	AA	B	C	D	DE	RT	E	CR	G	H	HH	J	JJ	L	TOTAL
A	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
AA	0	2	0	6	0	2	0	0	0	3	0	1	0	0	1	15
B	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2
C	0	0	0	5	3	0	1	0	0	2	2	0	1	0	0	14
D	0	0	0	0	8	0	1	0	0	3	2	0	0	0	0	14
DE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
RT	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
E	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	3	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	6
CR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
H	0	0	0	2	14	1	0	7	0	0	5	1	0	0	0	30
HH	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	0	0	0	7
I	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
J	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	3	0	0	5
K	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	2
L	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	6
TOTAL	2	2	1	15	26	4	2	10	4	8	17	10	4	1	2	110

TABLE 3.5 APPROVED APPLICATIONS: 1980

TO FROM	A	AA	B	C	D	DE	RT	E	G	H	HH	HI	J	JJ	K	M	L	TOTAL
A	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
AA	0	4	1	3	5	0	0	0	3	1	3	0	0	0	0	3	0	23
B	0	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
C	0	0	0	3	2	0	0	0	4	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	11
D	0	0	0	4	8	0	2	0	2	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	19
DE	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
RT	0	0	0	1	3	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	6
E	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	7	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	9
H	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	6	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	8
HH	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
J	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	5
JJ	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	4
K	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	2
M	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
L	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	4
TOTAL	1	4	3	14	20	1	3	7	12	15	6	1	5	3	1	3	4	103

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APPENDIX D

INCIDENCE OF ZONING DISTRICT CHANGE APPLICATIONS REJECTED

TABLE 4.1 REJECTED APPLICATIONS: 1984

TO FROM	A	C	D	DE	RT	E	H	TOTAL
A	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	2
AA	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	4
B	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
C	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	3
D	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	3
TOTAL	1	2	2	2	2	1	3	13

TABLE 4.2 REJECTED APPLICATIONS: 1983

TO FROM	DE	G	HH	TOTAL
AA	0	0	1	1
C	1	0	0	1
D	0	1	0	1
TOTAL	1	1	1	3

TABLE 4.3 REJECTED APPLICATIONS: 1982

TO FROM	B	G	HH	TOTAL
AA	1	0	0	1
C	0	1	2	3
TOTAL	1	1	2	4

TABLE 4.4 REJECTED APPLICATIONS: 1981

TO FROM	A	C	D	G	H	HH	TOTAL
A	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
AA	0	0	1	1	1	1	4
C	0	3	0	0	1	0	4
D	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
G	0	0	0	1	1	0	2
H	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
TOTAL	1	3	1	3	4	1	13

TABLE 4.5 REJECTED APPLICATIONS: 1980

TO FROM	A	C	D	DE	RT	G	H	HH	M	TOTAL
AA	0	1	1	1	4	2	1	1	1	12
B	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
C	0	1	0	0	0	2	1	1	0	5
D	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	2
H	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	2
HH	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
TOTAL	1	2	1	1	5	5	5	2	1	23

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