

INDIVIDUAL AND COMMUNITY STRATEGIES IN PUBLIC ISSUES

INDIVIDUAL AND COMMUNITY STRATEGIES
IN PUBLIC ISSUES

By

JONATHAN ANTHONY LONG, B.Sc. (Soc. Sci.)

A Research Paper

Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies

in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements

for the Degree

Master of Arts

McMaster University

December 1975

MASTER OF ARTS (1975)
(Geography)

McMASTER UNIVERSITY

TITLE: Individual and Community Strategies in Public
Issues

AUTHOR: Jonathan Anthony Long, B.Sc. (Soc. Sci.) (Bristol University)

SUPERVISOR: Dr. M.J. Dear

NUMBER OF PAGES: vi, 81

ABSTRACT

This paper aims to produce a paradigm of community dissent. The main argument revolves around the actions of residents who are dissatisfied with either the conditions in their neighbourhood, or with proposed changes to it. Thus far fundamental types of strategies are identified for such residents and these take the form of 'exit', 'voice', 'resignation' and 'outlaw activity'.

In using a conflict approach, the constraints which bear upon the initial choice decision and subsequent implementation of the strategies are constantly emphasised. The strategies and their attendant constraints then form the basis for the construction of a dynamic model with which to view the development of community conflicts.

In order to provide some substantive basis for the assertions made in the model the major hypotheses derived from the model are tested in an empirical example of community conflict in Victoria Park, Hamilton.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I should like to take this opportunity to thank the following:

Dr. Michael Dear for his stimulating guidance and voice,
Tim Gingell for providing someone to argue with,
Mr. James Wilson (realtor) and the Hamilton Housing
Department for access to their records.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

<u>CHAPTER</u>	<u>Page</u>
1. Introduction	1
1.1 The Nature of Public Dissent	1
1.2 The Scope of the Paper	3
2. Earlier Insights and New Departures	7
2.1 The Economic Approach	7
2.2 The Sociological Approach to Conflict	15
2.3 Attempts to Incorporate Conflicts into Geography	16
3. The Choice Options Presented as a Basic Framework	18
3.1 Exit	19
3.2 Voice	24
3.3 Resignation	27
3.4 Outlaw Activity	29
3.5 The Additional Concepts of 'Threat' and 'Slack'	31
4. Towards a Dynamic Model	34
4.1 Problems encountered in implementing strategies	34
4.2 Temporal aspects infringing upon the strategies	40
4.3 A consideration of the sequential development of strategies	43
4.4 The differential impacts of choices upon the individuals and the community	47
5. A Pilot Empirical Examination of the Model	51
5.1 Requirements of an empirical test, the methods used and problems encountered	51
5.2 Findings from the Study in Victoria Park, Hamilton	53
5.3 The Implications of these findings for the model	63
6. Conclusions and Reflections	67
6.1 Suggestions for further research	68
6.2 Comparing and contrasting exit and voice	71
6.3 The conflict approach revisited	74
Bibliography	77

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

		<u>Page</u>
Figure 1	The Choice Options	18
2	The Dissenting Individual's Path Through a Public Conflict	35
3	The Individual and One Issue	44
4	Decisions and Constraints	50
5	Display of Part of the BMD 07M (Discriminant Analysis) Print Out	56
6	Houses Sold in the York Street Area Since January 1973	59

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 The Nature of Public Dissent

The much talked about flight to the suburbs, the rapid increase in the number of citizens groups, and the continuing groundswell of community protest can all be seen as indicators of residents' dissatisfaction with conditions within their neighbourhood. And a short survey of the newspapers will provide contemporary evidence of this social current as well as any academic journal. Such dissatisfaction may be caused by deterioration within the area, including a falling standard in the provision of a public service, or by a proposed change which is unwanted by the residents of the area. It should be noted that the feeling of dissatisfaction can result from some absolute measure of deterioration, or from a feeling of relative deprivation derived from a comparison with another area.

It is obvious from casual observation that in these circumstances different residents may choose from a variety of courses of action in response to the foreseen deterioration. This variation cannot (at least wholly) be attributed to chance even in situations where a calculated, chess-like decision indicates the superiority of one particular course of action in its ability to induce the desired outcome. This elusive 'desired outcome' may take the form of an improved environment. If that proves too

difficult for the residents to reach agreement upon, the 'desired outcome' may be represented by the blocking of something which is unwanted.

If the different decisions made are not purely the result of chance, their source must lie in the make-up of the social, economic and political structure, whether it be real or perceived, in which the individuals operate. The effects of the many constraints involved in the choice of action offer a major line for investigation. Also of prime importance here is the impact the choice has on the local government. The concern with this particular impact simply reflects an acknowledgement of the major part played by the public sector in determining the condition of urban areas, whether directly in its role as the provider of services, or less directly as monitor and controller of private development, through legislation, sanctions or planning controls.

Quite apart from these considerations, the link between residents and government officials is an obvious one to examine in such circumstances, since the latter supposedly represent the former. Because of this representative link the persistent conflict between the two elements is cause for concern, and one is forced to ask why such conflict should exist. Part of the answer can be attributed to personalities, and part to the authorities being held accountable for some things over which they have little effective control, like the institutional and jurisdictional forces for neighbourhood change. However the key to the issue lies in the fact that, since most of the objects involved are public goods, they are a means by which redistribution can be effected, and they thus provide enormous scope for arguments over who should receive what.

The choice of action is further complicated because the effectiveness of some courses depends upon the number of residents willing to pursue

them. If the potentially most fruitful approach requires collective action on the part of a large number of people, there is a not-insignificant probability that it will never be adopted. This will shortly be investigated further, as will the claim that the action which appears to yield the greatest net benefit for the individual pursuing it, may not fulfil the same role for the community as a whole, and in certain cases can even prove harmful.

The problem of how a residential group may secure the reversal of an undesirable trend possesses a variety of facets which ties it to many issues. For example, elements of efficient resource allocation, the ethical debate over the extent of government powers in the name of the public interest, community participation in decision-making, and the urban power structure, are all in evidence. Unfortunately this does not mean that the problem, as it is envisaged here, has been approached from all these angles, but instead has been skirted, avoided, not recognised, and previously has fallen between any number of stools.

1.2 The Scope of the Paper

The primary concern of this paper is to develop a coherent, conceptual framework suitable for the study of public action in the face of what residents consider an undesirable change in their neighbourhood. This will be investigated by: (a) surveying previous attempts to cast light on the problem, (b) explaining the concepts which provide the backbone of this paper's analysis, (c) endeavour to cast these concepts in a dynamic model, and (d) consider the model in the light of a pilot empirical investigation. I intend to demonstrate that in pursuing such a course

it is always necessary to distinguish between the course of individual action and that of group action, both in terms of the choice mechanisms and impact on the outcome involved.

By implication the development of the framework suggested in this paper was prompted by a dissatisfaction and general uneasiness with existing approaches. The best of these are felt to require improvement; the worst, forgetting; and some re-directing, to make them more appropriate to my field of interest. Many of the more intriguing offerings come from the field of economics and thus tend to have the advantage of being endowed with a formal analytical framework. Unfortunately many aspects of the political world sit very uncomfortably in the economic theories of democracy. This can largely be attributed to the fact that the planning field, far from being one working through the operations of competition and exchange, is characterised by coercion and conflict. Because of the intrinsic differences in procedural mechanisms, the validity of applying market models is questioned. However the apparently more realistic conflict approach as yet lacks the systematic approach of the economic models.

Having assessed the earlier contributions to the field I hope to rescue elements from the flotsam which will enable the molding of the two types of model, since the conflict approach is seen to be in need of the same kind of systematic treatment that has hitherto been the preserve of the economic approach. It is felt here that the work of Hirschman [24] may point the way to one possible bridge between the two.

The choice of approach is of more than academic interest since it inevitably affects the conclusions one reaches in endeavouring to reach an understanding of the processes involved. And if one uses the suggestions of these approaches as the basis for the implementation of policy, the

social and physical structure of the city can be expected to differ. For example, the difference between the plan rational and the market rational approaches discussed by Dahrendorf [12] would be expected to result in markedly different government policies.

As already suggested, the central problem to be addressed in this paper is, "What will residents choose to do when confronted with a deterioration in their neighbourhood, and what are likely to be the consequences of their choice?" Naturally their awareness of the answers to the latter question will influence their choice in the former. Part of the alternative approach suggested here involves an investigation of the different types of strategy that the individual can adopt in his attempt to cope with the problem. It is here maintained that there are four fundamental types of alternative, and particular concern is shown for the kinds of constraint operating on each. It is hoped that, having attempted to systematise this inspection of choice behaviour, it will be possible to advance to the stage of a dynamic model to help explain the sequential development of neighbourhood conflict.

The consequences of the choice of action made by the residents will be discussed in the light of how it is viewed by those who have the power to act on the basis of it, and its effectiveness in producing a successful outcome. A successful outcome would be one which produced an environment of increased appeal for the residents, but what is successful for the individual may not be so for the community as a whole. One of the major questions to be addressed is whether each of the four types of action occurs in characteristically unique sets of circumstances. And also whether, when more than one action is chosen in response to a certain situation

there is any consistency in their development. Once placed in a dynamic context it may be that some of the alternatives change in their value, their validity as a reasonable choice, and their impact.

The model derived from such a conceptual approach inevitably presents a series of relationships which can be formulated as hypotheses to be investigated in empirical examples. By examining a particular local planning issue it is hoped to be able to evaluate the validity of such an approach in analysing this kind of problem. Because of limited information this can only partially serve its purpose and so a discussion is provided on how the techniques used could be improved. In addition to supporting the validity of the approach this section also proves suggestive of further hypotheses and also shortcomings of the current development which will aid in structuring the basis of future research on the topic in search of a more comprehensive model.

CHAPTER II

EARLIER INSIGHTS, AND POINTS OF DEPARTURE

The problem outlined in the previous chapter is essentially one of a sector of the public disagreeing with the allocation of resources designated for their area, and attempting to change it. The aim at this stage of the paper is to assess the contributions of different fields to this kind of problem, and to show how some of the obstacles encountered can be circumvented.

Unfortunately a large proportion of the work claiming a sociological approach has been characterised by 'one-off' studies of the problems of one particular area, instead of attempting to extract the critical dimensions of such issues. Nevertheless, at the societal level sociologists have offered rather more which is pertinent to the present paper. But I shall leave a consideration of these contributions until after a brief investigation of the more systematic approach provided by political economists. These are typically of a general theoretical nature, and offer a wide variety of appeal as means of tackling the problem at hand. Even those with which I disagree raise points of interest, the negation of which will provide additional information about the character of the approach I shall presently recommend.

2.1 The Economic Approaches

The government becomes implicated in the issue as soon as it is acknowledged that collective action is often required to satisfy individual

demand. But this invariably leads the researcher into the tangled web woven by the frequent conflict between individual and social goals. For example the Dahl and Lindblom approach [10] postulates a social rationality, which is the pursuit of goals consistent with the collective benefit of the group. Since this is based on the presumption that the goals of collective action are commonly shared, it offers little guidance for an analysis of political action when significant individual and group differences are involved.

Having stressed that their approach is essentially 'methodologically individualistic', and acknowledging that men's interests differ, Buchanan and Tullock [6] attempt to avoid the same quandary by making the peculiar assertion that, "throughout our analysis the word 'group' could be substituted for the word 'individual' without significantly affecting the result" - a rather striking effort to thwart logic. If men's interests differ how do they become combined to represent a group interest? Certainly not by the simplistic transfer implied here, nor, I would argue, through the competition of the market model.

In trying to analyse the calculus of the rational individual faced with questions of constitutional choice, they endeavour to construct a theory of collective choice (which must be seen as a fundamental element of any community action) by following a methodology similar to that adopted in this paper. Their approach was designed as an attempt to "reduce all issues of political organisation to the individual's confrontation with alternatives and his choice among them [so that] his 'logic of choice' becomes the central part of the analysis".

However in their analysis this led to a series of shortcomings,

partially because it was combined with a decision to make no specific assumptions concerning the extent of equality or inequality, and to ignore imposed constitutions that embody the coerced agreement of some members. They are then limited to deriving the lower bound of public activities, rather than defining their proper domain, because of their insistence upon the principle of unanimity. And they are forced to admit a further shortcoming:

"The individual participants must approach the constitution-making process as 'equals' Therefore our analysis of the constitution-making process has little relevance for a society that is characterised by a sharp cleavage of the population into distinguishable social classes or separate racial, religious or ethnic groupings sufficient to encourage the formation of predictable, political coalitions and in which one of these coalitions has a clearly advantageous position at the constitutional stage." (p. 80)

Although they then try to make light of this, they would seem to have described the make-up of North American society (and indeed most others) quite faithfully with this caricature.

Since the model to be developed here is essentially one of dissent and protest, the debate over how decisions should be made, in which Buchanan and Tullock became ensnared, can be relegated to a position of lesser importance since however it is done, some will object, and it is more important here for us to be aware of characteristic bias which may occur in particular polities. Of greater concern here are the consequences of the decision once it has been made, and the reactions it prompts, since I would contend that there is no urban decision-making system which does not create dissatisfaction amongst some of its constituents. Thus, it is less important for this model (at least at an elementary level) to concern itself with why, how, and on what, a group of residents can agree, as initially the residents' action can be carried by an agreement

on what to oppose.

Another form of the individual versus group quandary has been identified elsewhere by Buchanan [5] (amongst others). There, he posed a dichotomy between organismic and individual conceptions of a group (in that case the 'group' in question was the state). He highlighted the distinction between the view that the state has its own ends which are not necessarily related to those of individuals, and the one that only individuals have end structures. The latter insists that the state cannot have a welfare function of its own since it is only a means by which individuals can satisfy some of their wants collectively.

A similar dichotomy appears here, but in a rather different context; that of reaction strategies to attempted policy implementation (including the implementation of non-action) by the state's designated decision-makers. However, the individual versus community interest dichotomy is not seen here as a source of problems to be skated over in order to produce a deterministic model, but as a fruitful centre of turbulence, which if adequately investigated can provide explanatory insight into societal mechanisms.

Both the approach of Buchanan and Tullock and that of Downs [17] operate on the basis of rational action toward self-centred ends. However, Downs makes a far more explicit analogy between government processes and market processes by concentrating his attention on political parties. Following Downs' approach, the government will pay heed to the cries of residents since it wishes to maximise voter support to ensure re-election. However, any attempt to treat the political arena as a perfect market with the vote as its unit of currency, inevitably founders

on a number of issues that are more than technicalities. By way of demonstrating my point of view I shall do no more than list a few here, since some will be investigated further, later, and others are examined elsewhere (e.g. Steiner [44]).

The vote must be acknowledged to be of relatively low value in the face of competition from other political, social and economic pressures, since most voting is only infrequent and a representative may feel himself to be more indebted to those who financed his campaign, than to the electorate. Individuals voting in a like manner need not have the same views partly because it is conventional to vote on a bundle of policies rather than on individual issues, and since many voters' preferences are undeveloped, it is often possible for political leaders to lead their followers on issues. Quite apart from this, it would be unrealistic to expect that the issues voted on at an election will remain the sole issues throughout the period of office.

Since this list of complications is by no means a complete set it can be seen that the vote does no more than constrain politicians within fairly broad limits, and the second element in policy decisions - the professional advisers - is beyond public control. In addition, Downs explains that uncertainty forces governments to regard some voters as more important than others (significantly those who act as intermediaries between the government and the public), and by doing so it modifies the equality of influence which universal suffrage was designed to insure."

Tiebout [46] provides an argument which goes beyond the analogy and insists that, since we know that the market system is a more efficient distributor of scarce resources than government action, the nature of residential areas should be determined by the market. In simple terms he

suggests that an optimal expenditure on local public goods would be attained if managements of a large number of areas each offered a certain combination of facilities, and families moved to the area which best suited them. This 'voting with the feet' thesis unashamedly attributes votes in proportion to financial resources, and ignores a vast range of constraints which would operate to prevent a 'just' solution by many definitions of the concept. I shall further demonstrate my distrust of such a solution in the role of policy recommendation, later.

Isard's attempt [26] to introduce factors not normally considered in the workings of the market represented a welcome voice from the 'objective' field of economics. However, the approach he chose, invoking c-nontangibles as commodities, would appear ripe for an Andreski-style [1] criticism for clouding the issue in social science jargon. By forcing such abstract concepts into an alien framework (which is still market-oriented) and assuming that they can be exchanged in the same manner as conventional goods, I feel he does nothing to clarify the situation.

The most promising approach offered so far from an economist has come from Hirschman [24]. His concern was with situations in which individuals, groups and organisations lapse from efficient rational behaviour, and with how they can be warned of this so that they can return to an optimal state of the most efficient production. Deterioration in the quality of the good produced is seen as inevitable, at one time or another, and recovering from such lapses as being desirable so that major social losses can be avoided. In order for the recuperation to be effected it is necessary for some message of consumer dissatisfaction to be transmitted to the producer. According to Hirschman's framework the way in

which this discontent is revealed is either through 'exit' or 'voice'.

Exit is what is assumed to happen in the market situation where, if a consumer is dissatisfied with a product, he ceases to purchase it, and either does without the commodity or finds an alternative supply. If everyone chooses to exit it is naturally disastrous for the firm since it then has no opportunity to try and recover. Because of this, Hirschman suggests that the optimal conditions would be ones in which the clientele is composed of a mixture of 'alert' and 'inert' individuals, such that the alert would exit, providing the warning, and the inert would remain to provide the necessary income for the firm to remain in business and correct its course. Hirschman's terminology is rather unfortunate in this instance when applied to the problem under consideration in this paper, since those who are inert may be no less alert and aware of the circumstances, but simply be subject to different constraints.

If the quality of the good supplied by all producers declines, then exiting has no impact, since the different firms simply swap their clientele (assuming the customers continue to try and find a superior product rather than cease consumption all together - and only in extremes will people cease to consume residential locations). On the other hand if there is only one firm supplying the good the clients are forced to find some other means of expressing their dissatisfaction.

This is also the case when a number of other constraints are operational, resulting, Hirschman suggests, in the dissatisfaction being registered by voice. In resorting to this the consumer tries to change the deteriorating conditions by articulating his interests, rather than by trying to escape from the problems. Traditionally this has taken the

form of complaints directly to the management, representation made through an intermediary, or some form of demonstration.

Although Hirschman touched upon the urban scene only in passing, his analysis would seem readily applicable to the kind of problem under consideration. It is capable of offering a more comprehensive and readily adaptable model, than for example that of Tiebout, for amending government allocations of resources. However problems inevitably arise if such a transfer is attempted. Probably the most immediate difficulty arises as a result of Hirschman's assumption that the management would be both willing and able to respond to the warnings provided by its customers, and even that it was manifestly in its own interest to do so. Because of the multitude of conflicting interests within an urban area however, it is by no means certain that the government will be willing to accommodate the demands of a particular group. Even when willing to act the government may lack the wherewithal to do so. In the United States the blacks have been confronted by both unsympathetic and impotent governments. The unsympathetic are commonly found when a system of metropolitan government means that the black, inner-city vote is overwhelmed by that of the white suburbs. On the other hand a decentralised metropolitan power structure leaves the poor inner-city areas without the resources necessary to enable the implementation of desired improvements, since such areas typically have a low tax base.

This is really part of a larger issue and reflects the difficulty of applying economic theories of the market to what is so fundamentally a conflict situation. If an elite chooses to use its power to improve what it sees as the quality of the environment in its neighbourhood it cannot really be said that they have depleted any of their

resources in order to 'buy' this improvement, as would be the case in a market.

2.2 The Sociological Approach

More which is pertinent to this has been discussed in the societal context, particularly in the debate between the 'consensus' and 'conflict' schools. The former has been espoused by structural functionalists like Parsons [36] who presents a view of society being a stable, well-integrated structure based on a consensus of values among its members. By contrast the latter approach developed by sociologists from the work of Marx insists that societies are subject to constant change, with ubiquitous conflict as the result of the coercion of some members by others. Conflict is seen as the norm rather than the exception, and as the force which leads to social change.

A predominantly (though by no means wholly) conflict model of society has been elegantly outlined by Dahrendorf [11] who criticises the "complacent acceptance, if not justification, of the status-quo by the structural functional school" [12]. However, as in this paper he did not deny an integration element. It is, after all, necessary to allow a consideration of group conflict. However Dahrendorf seems to restrict his concept of conflict by assuming it to be always authority-oriented. Here conflict is more commonly portrayed as being issue-oriented, though admittedly this often results from the nature of the polity.

In the past the model accepted by most Western geographers and economists has been, at least implicitly, predominantly that of the consensus approach, as demonstrated for example by the 'equilibrium' school. Yet for a system supposedly based on competition, a model of

conflict would seem a far more logical development. Then why the almost pathological aversion in the past to a conflict approach? Presumably, partly because the notion of conflict is unpleasant and disturbing and the belief that acknowledgement of its existence is somehow an admittance of failure for a society expressing humanitarian intentions. Of course it may also result because a conflict approach is rather less tractable analytically, and less susceptible to mathematical analysis than the various market approaches.

Vickers [47] claims to adopt a position between the conflict and consensus schools, but tries to push aside a conflict approach, inclining far more towards a belief in the coherence of society and co-operating for mutual benefit, than does Dahrendorf. Yet his main interests are in the regulative processes in society and he stresses the need for control and authority, two of the prime elements of a conflict situation. Because this paper wishes to invoke the concept of power its emphasis lies in the conflict arena, since power always implies non-power, and therefore resistance [12].

Similarly the phenomenon of alienation, which is becoming increasingly recognised, particularly in the political sphere, and because of its causes [25 and 38] cannot fit comfortably into a societal model emphasising integration.

2.3 Attempts to Incorporate Conflict Into Geography

In recent years, the conflict theme has been used as a vehicle for examining rather more issues in the sphere of urban geography. One of the most comprehensive statements in this vein has been provided by Harvey [23], who expands from a liberal to a Marxist basis, to consider the nature of social justice and urbanism, and analyses the socio-spatial

implications of this. In a slightly more pragmatic treatise, Williams [48] considered locational conflict as the battle for 'social access', which he sees as the socio-spatial key to explaining the urban process. Similarly Cox [8] maintains that "conflict has become endemic in metropolitan areas", and uses the concept to examine the locational patterns which social and territorial conflict assume in the city. Although there is ample scope for criticism of detail in all these works, the underlying approach seems inherently more appealing, and provides greater insight into urban affairs, than the more traditional socio-geographic approaches.

The Mumphrey/Seley/Wolpert triumvirate (amongst others) have made attempts to reconcile the 'conflict' and the 'market' approaches [31 and 40]. They acknowledged that buying-off, with side-payments and political placation of those most likely to mobilise against a proposed change, is an integral part of the urban planning process. Although the details of the approach used here differ from those of the Pennsylvania group, the basic concept is the same; to blend the greater reality of the 'conflict' style of approach of some sociologists with the systematic elegance of the economic models.

CHAPTER III

THE CHOICE OPTIONS PRESENTED AS A BASIC FRAMEWORK

The aim of this section is to sketch the outline of an alternative paradigm within which to assess individual and community reaction to neighbourhood trends. A basic framework for this can be provided by examining the options open to residents faced with undesirable developments in their district, and the constraints which operate to restrict decisions. In these situations four fundamental alternatives have been identified: 'exit', 'voice', 'resignation', and 'outlaw activity' which are shown in figure 1.




Figure 1: The Choice Options

Obviously this figure is very simplistic and will become inadequate as the model develops and it will be superseded. However for the time being it serves its purpose in presenting the alternatives available to each resident.

Because of the direct or indirect influence of the government on all neighbourhood environmental considerations, one of the main criteria by which a course of action should be judged is its effectiveness in conveying the residents' ideas of the neighbourhood's faults to the government and in causing them to act in a manner approved by the residents.

3.1 Exit

This course of action is analogous to the process described by Hirschman under the same title. Instead of customers ceasing to consume a marketed good, exit is here considered to be the course of action adopted by those who decide to leave their district for one they feel more nearly satisfies their needs. Classically this exodus has taken the form of a flight to the suburbs, but is in no way limited solely to that. From the individual's point of view, this type of action is almost certainly an improvement in the environment for himself. However, it can have disastrous repercussions for the forsaken community, since if pursued on anything more than a minimal scale it can rapidly cause the area to become devoid of the 'quality conscious' people most likely, and often most able, to protest and make a success of the second option (voice). These are typically the sort of people who possess the financial and social resources vital to the success of a citizens' movement.

This 'siphoning-off' represents a key element of neighbourhood change, and has conventionally been associated with the processes of 'filtering', 'arbitrage' and neighbourhood succession' [9]. One of the best documented examples of this kind of development (see for example [43]) is that of racial change in residential areas. As the racial group increases in size the probability of exit by the original residents is

increased, and in addition the likelihood of generating a potent voice is reduced because of the racial division. Of course in this case the process of exit merely exacerbates, for those who remain, the problem which the exiters are protesting.

Although exit is an atomistic form of solution, it will not suggest to the government that something about the area is undesirable until a large number take this course. This limitation on exit's ability to produce a general solution might be insignificant were it not for the fact that some residents are restricted in their ability to exit. Moreover it must be remembered that, in a role of information generator for the government, exit is dependent upon the action of a considerable number of individuals. There are four further facets of exit which make it unsuitable as a way of serving the community by prompting government action.

(1) If the metropolitan area is composed of a large number of jurisdictions and the move is from one of these to another, then exiting, if it is pursued on a sufficiently large scale, may indeed provide a warning to the government of the unsatisfactory nature of their area of origin. However, the subsequent decline in the tax base could well hinder the implementation of any remedy by reducing the government's ability to spend money on improvements even should it wish to.

(2) In certain circumstances, it would seem that the 'message' might not be as clear as it might otherwise have been, because it is dampened by an apparently never-ending stream of families who arrive to occupy the vacated accommodation, no matter how bad it is. While this is the case, and exit is considered the only legitimate protest, inaction on the part of the government can be justified on the basis that the area is obviously

serving an important need and should therefore not be changed. However, this is the fault of mistaking revealed preference for true preference. In fact, the two may be quite different, since the latter has a multitude of constraints operating on it before it becomes the former. After all, it has long been accepted that there is not a direct transfer from attitudinal preference to behavioural decision [16].

(3) Alternatively, if the whole metropolitan area falls under the same jurisdiction, or at least the move is within the same jurisdiction, the family exits from the problem district, but not from the government's authority. Thus the authority does not have its coffers depleted, and so the move is unlikely to transmit the desired message, or at least, one that will be acted upon according to the arguments of market theory.

(4) Furthermore the exit option is very inexplicit. If a person leaves an area it may well be a signal of dissatisfaction with the area, but can hardly be expected to provide any detailed information as to the exact nature of what is considered to be the problem. Obviously a move may be prompted by reasons other than dissatisfaction (e.g. a change in utility function or work place) but unless these occur with dramatic consistency from a particular area, government action would not be required anyway.

In addition to these aspects there are constraints operating against exit, just as against any of the other options. What might be expected to be important considerations in determining the course of action will be assessed in each of the appropriate sections. Each of those considered in this section, if operational, represent an argument against the market system being a suitable means through which to expend public finances, and thus provide further criticism of Tiebout's approach (for a fuller

criticism of Tiebout, see Margolis [30] and Barr [4]). Any factor which inhibits mobility falls into this category and serves to constrain the exit option.

The importance of such constraining factors was recognised by Greenberg and Boswell [20] in New York where they were able to "demonstrate the importance of neighbourhood deterioration as a potential spur to migration", but commented that "the desire to move is not always paralleled by necessary financial and social requirements." Because of the emphasis of their paper, little attention was paid to these requirements as their concern was with pushes and pulls rather than constraints.

However as they hinted, the financial constraint is the one which most obviously rushes to the fore. Not only is the physical operation of moving home and all the attendant fees for assistance a costly business, but a lack of finances restricts the number of areas to which a family could relocate. After all, if one is to move to a 'better' area it is almost certain that the rent or house price will be higher. Tied very closely to this are restrictions imposed by zoning ordinances, which as effectively as any directed action, have excluded blacks and the poor from the suburbs of major North American cities: see the Taeubers [45] and Bailey [3]. Another aspect, which is closely tied to the financial theme, is the need for certain social groups to be located close to their place of employment. Undoubtedly this applies with varying force to different economic strata in society.

Particularly in the United States race can impose severe restrictions upon whether one can relocate, and where. If prejudice confines blacks to the inner city area it is unrealistic to consider that a process dependent upon feedback from exit decisions to give it guidance, will

produce an optimum. In addition, the areas to which one might conceivably exit may be unknown to the individual. Again we are confronted with the problem that an individual's knowledge is anything but perfect, and to complicate matters further the level of shortfall is not consistent across the social spectrum.

Also operating against the mobility of households is the feeling of inertia that many have. The costs of a move are not purely financial, but are also represented by a psychological cost connected with the 'effort' involved. This may sometimes be due to a feeling of loyalty (see Hirschman for a more formal definition of the concept [24]) to the area, which induces affection even in the face of decline. This is a common phenomenon and has been described by Fried [18] in extreme circumstances when special attachments to an area had developed.

It would seem intuitively likely that a feeling of 'loyalty' such as this would dissuade people from both exit and resignation (one of the strategies expounded below), and activate instead one of the alternatives. However findings running somewhat counter to this were published by Orbell and Uno [34], who suggested that social integration into an area (as measured by whether or not friends lived in the area) does not make one more likely to stay and fight when problems arise there. This appears somewhat counter-intuitive, and perhaps needs corroboration, but may be explicable in terms of faith (or rather lack of it) on the part of the residents, in the effectiveness of voice. A partial explanation of the results may also be provided by the approach adopted. The measures used were designed only to reflect an emotional loyalty, and did not deal with the kind of loyalty which may be induced by a financial 'stake' in the area, which is a powerful consideration. In addition, those respondents

who revealed that they had friends living both in the neighbourhood and elsewhere, were counted as having their friends in the neighbourhood, whereas since they had friends elsewhere the break with the area would not be so difficult to make. Thus Orbell and Uno's concept of 'social integration' is not quite analagous to 'loyalty' as it is considered here.

Since these constraints all have the effect of militating against the choice of the exit strategy, the greater the importance they have for a dissenting resident, the more likely he is to consider one of the alternatives.

3.2. Voice

Like the exit option discussed above, the voice option as conceived here is similar to that outlined by Hirschman. He suggested that by voicing, one complained about the deterioration rather than ceasing to consume the good. Translated into more appropriate terms for the current analysis this means that the residents stay to fight the problems of the area, rather than forsaking it. Characteristically, this has taken the form of gathering signatures for a petition, lobbying members of parliament, councillors or aldermen, writing letters to newspapers, and forming local residents groups to present a united front. Whereas it was suggested that exit was rather inexplicit, in that it merely demonstrated a dissatisfaction with something in the neighbourhood, voice can be quite specific in pinpointing that something; even to the point of embarrassing the local authority. And this must be counted a major advantage. However voice can also, like exit, hinder recovery if it is pushed to such an extent that perpetual harassment prohibits the government from executing the necessary policies, and becomes purely obstructionist. Despite this danger, it would seem an inherently more profitable

and effective way of achieving better urban conditions.

Inevitably, expectation of the success voice will enjoy is an important determinant in the decision on what course of action will be taken. If the probability of voicing is considered the dependent variable, one of the independent variables will inevitably be the expected probability of a successful appeal. This is inextricably bound up with the distribution of power, and its organisation, with the lack of power being a major constraint on the use of voice. The only element in the political sphere which is equally distributed is the vote, which in municipal affairs is probably the least important of the elements. Additionally, even the significance of a vote may not be evenly distributed. A lack of income, education, social contacts and experience acts as a severe constraint on the amount of political power possessed by an individual or a group, and thus upon the power of voice. This almost inevitably means a spatial differential in the ability to voice.

Hence the seeming tautology that the power of voice is dependent, in part, upon the power of voice. This can have several unfortunate implications. If voice is seen as the only, or the most appropriate, course of action available, and yet produces no results, a severe degree of political alienation is likely to result, which will reduce the chance that suitable corrective measures will follow.

Such alienation can be engendered either by a government, which refuses to pay heed to residents' voices, or which, although heeding the voice, is impotent. At a very simplistic level, one might expect that the former case would be more likely to occur in a system of centralised metropolitan government, and the latter in a decentralised system (see Ostrom, Tiebout and Warren [35] for a discussion of the relationship between the centralise/decentralise debate the the provision of public

goods). Whatever the cause, the result is the disillusionment of a potentially constructive sector of the population willing to contribute to the running of the area. Where political alienation is apparent, and exit for some reason precluded, it is likely that a new, extreme position will be adopted. Depending upon the psychological disposition of the individual, and the nature of the particular situation, either complete despair and despondency in the 'resignation' group, or guerilla violence in the 'outlaw' group might be expected. In large part these conditions can be seen as being analogous to what Schwartz has termed 'passive alienation' and 'strident alienation' respectively [38].

One of the major aspects of political alienation is that once it has been bred in the individual, it is unlikely to be confined to the one issue, but will probably carry over to many subsequent ones; frustration in one issue induces an unwillingness to participate again.

I have already suggested that one of the main causes of an inability to exit is that of financial restraints, yet it is quite likely that overall, exit is the cheaper option. Although when moving households the cost of exit cannot be considered zero, as would be the case in the classical model of the perfect market, it may still prove cheaper than staying to voice. Voicing requires the expenditure of time, effort and resources, and whilst staying in a deteriorating area the individual is foregoing better opportunities elsewhere, as well as paying taxes for inferior public goods. In the meantime, the value of his property is also likely to decrease as a result of the unfavourable factors external to his own holding. Thus a situation is generated whereby those who cannot afford to exit may find themselves in the paradoxical position of having to pay more just to provide themselves with a possibility of satisfaction.

The cost involved, and the likelihood of the use of voice, are both affected by the length of time over which the voice would have to be sustained to have the desired result. Whereas exit, as far as the individual is concerned, will have an almost instantaneous effect on the nature of his environment, voice will take much longer. Even after voice has been effective and a decision has been made to improve the individual's surroundings, he still has to wait for this decision to be implemented before he benefits. This is probably one of the reasons why voice seems to be used more commonly to prevent something happening in a neighbourhood, than to promote change which will bring improvement.

Further issues related to time and development will be pursued in the next chapter, as will the ways in which voice may be frustrated once it has been decided to adopt the option.

3.3 Resignation

Just as exit can be expensive, voice is a process which consumes time and other scarce resources, hence one would not expect an individual resident necessarily to use either strategy on every occasion he disapproves of some aspect of the neighbourhood. Thus on all bar the most important issues a very large number will simply resign themselves to the situation. However, on these more important issues there are two further reasons (apart from being purely apathetic) for people falling into this category: alienation, and free-riding.

Many people who disapprove of plans, or dislike 'the way an area is going' come to see the use of voice as a futile waste of time, and so resign themselves to having to adapt to new circumstances. This is a direct function of the political alienation which has already been mentioned in passing. The apathy demonstrated by the community, which is so often

decried by planners trying to introduce public participation projects, can be attributed in large part to the actions of their predecessors, who managed to create the popular belief that it did not matter what the people thought, the professional planners and the planning board would end up doing what they wanted to anyway. This is a belief that even seemingly well-intentioned planners do not feel disposed to dispel. It is not surprising that a community whose voice is regularly ignored, and is overruled should 'learn' resignation.

The second reason, based on the concept of 'free-riding', revolves around the peculiar nature and properties of the link between the individual and his participation in collective action. Persuading people to participate in an attempt to secure a public good is fraught with difficulties if coercion is impossible, as is effectively the case in these circumstances. It is all too easy for the individual to adopt the following style of argument. If the voice is likely to be a success, the individual feels there is no point in himself acting since he will receive the same benefits whether he acts or not, and so he may as well save his time and effort. On the other hand if the voice is going to fail, the individual may believe that his contribution would make no difference anyway. Olson [32] has pursued this theme to demonstrate how individuals will discontinue their participation before the optimum for the group is attained, and the larger the group the greater the shortfall. This is particularly important when it is remembered that political power is generally assumed to increase the larger the number supporting the movement.

Although not active in either voicing or exiting the resigned group can play a significant role since their acquiescence is invariably

interpreted by the government as approval of their policies.

3.4 Outlaw Activity

The last alternative considered here is that of illegal activities, which might be considered a sub-set of voice (analogous to screaming instead of polite gentlemanly debate), since it can be quite an eloquent means of displaying dissatisfaction, and is undoubtedly designed to draw attention to the grievance in question. However, I feel it deserves to be in a distinct class of its own, since voicing is generally considered socially acceptable, but the activities grouped here cannot be classified so. This alternative was originally conceived under the banner of 'violence', but since its primary distinguishing characteristic (to set it apart from voice) is its illegality, it eventually came to be under its current, broader title.

The category now includes personal violence, violence to property, sit-ins and squatting, and also encompasses what Goodman [19] has termed 'guerrilla architecture'. He has advocated the use of direct action in the face of the law, such as squatter movements, or operations like the creation of 'People's Park' in a Berkeley parking lot, and the spontaneous creation of Tent City in a parking lot in Boston. The shortcomings of such action are obvious, particularly as most people are reluctant to break the law even when fully appreciating the injustice of the situation, thus making it difficult to generate mass support. On the other hand, it gains much when contrasted with the failings of more 'acceptable' approaches. Goodman points out how "this direct action counters the usual feeling of hopelessness in poor neighbourhoods", and provides a rallying banner. He goes on to say of it, that:

"Its usefulness, however, is as a strategic tactic in an ongoing struggle for change. It sometimes makes possible short-term success while often publicly exposing the need

for sweeping changes in housing policies [Goodman's main concern]. It illustrates that the only way the environmental needs of the disenfranchised will be met in our present society is through the process of struggle. And it is a process not easily co-opted by the existing institutions."

The importance of this last point will become more apparent later when the problems encountered during the implementation of the choice are considered later.

Because such activities are beyond societal norms, an additional set of constraints comes into operation. These revolve around the danger of provoking a reactionary backlash, and the loss of an 'air of respectability' and for most middle class, credibility. Therefore, unless this option is used carefully it may jeopardise a group's negotiating position, and thus becomes particularly important in considering the sequence of strategies. However, if they had no negotiating position to start with they will have lost little. A particularly invigorating discussion of the use of political violence is provided by Gurr [21] who highlights many of these issues.

In the majority of cases in which outlaw activity would come under consideration as a tactic in the urban sphere, it would probably not be considered as a means by which to bring about the desired improvement (though Goodman's guerilla architecture approaches this), but as a means by which a group's bargaining platform can be improved. An obvious exception to this, though not one which is common in the Western World is provided by the actions of urban guerilla groups like the Symbionese Liberation Army. It might be argued that this is aimed primarily at a national political level rather than at local urban issues, but many have argued (e.g. Da idoff [13]) that this is the most appropriate level at which to seek answers to urban problems. However

the predominant role of outlaw activities seems to be to act as a threat of what could follow.

3.5 The Additional Concepts of Threat and Slack

The interlinkages between threats and the outlaw/voice duo are sufficiently intriguing to merit expatiation here. It has already been suggested that one of the flaws in a Hirschmanesque approach to problems over the delivery of public goods is that there is far too little inducement for the 'management' to seek to implement a mutually beneficial solution. However, the issuing of a threat by the public group could possibly return the situation to the type considered by Hirschman, since there will once more be an incentive to reach a mutually satisfactory outcome.

Schelling [37] has emphasised that in order for a threat to be effective, the party issuing it must be seen to be irreversibly committed to carrying it out. In such circumstances the very lack of resources which precluded exit, and dulled voice, may prove to be an asset. This group can now be seen as one with very little to lose (but their chains) by following a course normally unacceptable to 'society', and so is free to threaten a sequential use of progressively more damaging strategies.

A further point made by Schelling which is of interest here, is that it is essential to try and ensure that the 'last clear chance' falls to the other party, so that the emphasis is left on them to retreat to a mutually beneficial solution. This is, of course also important where it is necessary to win popular support for the cause.

This inevitably raises the question as to what threats the public has in its repertoire. The one considered most frequently is that of the threat of political sanctions at election time. Even if a supposed rep-

representative of the residents' interests is in government it is still possible for the residents to threaten to vote for the opposition, because one of the components of a successful threat is that it is not carried out, yet they must be able to demonstrate a willingness to carry it out if necessary. However this needs the concerted action of a relatively large number, and even then will probably influence the outcome in only one ward.

Apart from this it might also be possible to withhold payment of rates or rents (e.g. the Clay Cross rent strike in England). The next step in the escalation of threat is violence, but in some cases the use of this poses the problem of at whom it should be directed. Certain events may not be designed specifically as a threat, but may be construed as such. For example, in nineteenth century Britain, it was the threat posed by the slums as a health hazard which prompted reform. Perhaps in the twentieth century, the threat of crime and violence issuing forth from the inner city may act as a spur to further reforms.

A further concept which it is useful to consider in relation to these choices is the economist's notion of slack which is present whenever a component of the system is not working to the limit. This may occur, for example when, even with a deteriorating neighbourhood, not all the residents choose to protest (it has already been pointed out that the expense of exit and voice makes it unlikely that they will be used on every occasion for which they might otherwise seem appropriate). This is caused by those who resign themselves to the situation and thus provide the governing authority with room to manoeuvre since there is less pressure to be brought to bear when the position becomes particularly bad, and these further resources are brought into play. Thus the resigned group

represent an important reservoir of potential support which, if the citizens' groups can contrive to tap it, will lend considerable strength to their bow.

In the other camp, the governing authority is likely to operate at some sub-optimal level, and only take up the slack in their economy and operations when pressed. It must be remembered that because of the differential distribution of political power, for most people (the 'ordinary' individuals who lack the officially unrecognised elements of socio-political influence and economic power) the benefits which they should be able to accrue through the removal of the slack in the system, can only truly be accrued in election years when it is easier to apply pressure. Many politicians are capable of displaying a social conscience only in certain years.

So far, I have described the options placed before an individual who is confronted with the need to make a decision on his course of action to deal with the problems of a deteriorating neighbourhood, and the constraints upon each option. The alternatives, presented represent a fairly comprehensive set, and therefore at the conceptual level this classification may be considered a 'theory' of reaction. However, in a more positive sense, I have done little more than show the sorts of situation in which the individual is likely to choose each option. Nevertheless, in attempting to specify the surroundings of what Buchanan and Tullock call 'the individual calculus' in this respect, it is possible to draw some implications for a more enlightening interpretation of real world issues.

In short, this section has served to introduce six concepts which play an important role in this problem field: exit, voice, resignation, outlaw activity, threat, and slack. These form the basis of later developments in a move towards a dynamic model.


CHAPTER IV

TOWARDS A DYNAMIC MODEL

To avoid Dahrendorf's criticism of utopian social scientists concerning themselves with a static society, this section examines the problems facing the community in operationalising their choices of strategy, and analysing the changing complexion of the strategies over time. The purpose of this chapter can best be seen in relation to figure 2, which represents how a dissenting individual proceeds through a public conflict. So far, the discussion has dealt with the section up to the selection of a strategy. Now I shall first consider some of the constraints which come into operation as the strategy is pursued, and, in the second section, one particular subset of these is given special attention; that pertaining to specifically temporal aspects of the conflict. The third section recognises that at some time the individual is going to evaluate the success to date of his and the community's actions. If there has been little success a process of re-assessing the strategies available will be carried out, and one of the alternatives chosen. Once the additional dimension of time has been added to the strategies, it again emphasises the differing impacts on individual and community.

4.1 Problems Encountered in Implementing Strategies

In the previous chapter it was noted how, even when exiting proves successful for the individual, there are many obstacles which may militate



The links marked thus - - - - are the results of expectations or perceptions.

Figure 2 : The Dissenting Individual's Path Through A Public Conflict.

against its inducing a course of action by the government designed to improve matters. However, even if the residents decide to stay in the area and voice, other problems arise which often serve to frustrate a successful outcome. Because of the residents' dissatisfaction, it is obvious that the government's policy is in some way counter to their wishes, and there are a number of factors which are likely to prevent the forcing of a policy change. In contrast to the choice constraints considered earlier, these factors represent operational constraints. Awareness of these may of course add them to the list of choice constraints, as is represented diagrammatically in Figure 2.

One of these aspects of the power game has been identified by Bachrach and Baratz [2] as a "non-decision". This they define as being "a decision that results in the suppression or thwarting of a latent or manifest challenge to the values or interests of the decision-maker." The aim is to prevent potentially contentious issues ever entering the decision-making forum, by employing some kind of pre-emptive action. This can be done by invoking force, an existing bias of the political system, or the threat of sanctions. Although the first of these occurs only rarely in relation to urban problems, the second and third represent quite common, though often unrecognised, ploys.

An example of the second course being taken is when demands are branded as being "socialist" which may often bring them into disrepute, and provides an excuse for not giving the issue the consideration it merits. Alternatively the demands can be declared to be in violation of existing procedure, and the decision makers hide and delay behind a smokescreen of 'ritualistic routines'. Frequently, citizens' groups are thwarted when

confronted by a wall of bureaucratic formalities of which they have little experience, and which they find difficult to comprehend [14, 19, 42]. This was one of the reasons behind the call for community advocates. If this wall is breached, the decision-maker can always retreat to a committee of enquiry.

One of the most common elements of the third kind of pre-emptive action recognised by Bachrach and Baratz is that of co-optation, a fate that has befallen many community participation movements. This involves the public being persuaded to become formally involved in the existing planning structure, where they then have to play by the rules or forfeit the 'privilege'. Because of this 'concession' the residents now have something to lose, and have thus put themselves in a position where they can be more easily threatened by the authorities. Threat was earlier portrayed as one of the tactics in the public's repertoire, but obviously it can be utilised by either side. The magnitude of the threat can be increased by making the loss appear great, through portraying minor concessions as major ones.

It was this process that David Ley observed [28] in Philadelphia where the public were allowed (and encouraged) to argue over the name of a future school, rather than the design, and the philosophy it would provide. As Selznick explains [41], in circumstances such as this the community is given the illusion of voice, without the voice itself, and so opposition is stifled without the policy having to be altered in the least. It is the removal of this illusionary power which represents the sanction Bachrach and Baratz discussed.

Co-optation, through the processes of public participation projects and the use of advocate planners is a well recognised tactic, and one

increasingly used by official planning units because of the number of advantages it possesses from the establishment's point of view. First, it is rather insidious in that it is difficult to unambiguously put the finger on what is happening, in a manner which will reveal the process to the whole community. Second it allows the favourable impression to be created that the planning process is becoming more just and democratic, and so at the same time provides a scapegoat should anything go wrong. Third, once the community has accepted such channels they are then restricted in the issues they can tackle and the approaches which are considered for obtaining a solution. In considering aspects which are not really of primary importance to them, their original aims are deflected in an arena not designed to even consider them.

The power of voice can further be blunted by a policy that Seley and Wolpert [40] have called 'purposeful ambiguity' which takes the form of deliberate deception and vagueness, and the granting of concessions which are later ignored, or modified so as to be unacceptable to the community. Such a policy has the advantage for the planners that no direct target against which they can fight is presented to the public. Issues can be further clouded by not making data on the expected impact available, and generally presenting a lack of information on important details. This can be an especially effective ploy if the planners maintain that the paucity of details is due to the fact that they simply do not have them to make available. The situation can be further aggravated by poorly (or in extremes, wrongly) advertising meetings. All such vagueness tends to produce frustration and bewilderment, rather than anger with the planners.

Also in this vein, Dennis observed a strategy of "deliberate misunderstanding" by the planners in Sunderland (England) [15]. The planners

attempted to discredit a local community group by accusing them of deliberately misunderstanding information provided by the planning department, whereas Dennis suggests that it was in fact the planners who were deliberately misunderstanding in order to present this idea. And in this case the residents' association was informed of a participatory meeting after it had been held, and were then told that it was their fault that their views had not been expressed since they had not turned up.

Voice of course isn't always muffled by 'baddies' in City Hall; sometimes the problems lie within the community organisations. Particularly destructive is the kind of internal status-seeking that Ley has called 'idolatry' [28]. This causes goal displacement through an internalised power struggle and the community group becomes its own justification for being, rather than emphasising the needs of the community. Whilst the members of the group are thus involved the government can continue with its plans without any effective challenge. And all too easily this status seeking can be the cause of group fragmentation which weakens the voice further because of the group's inability to present a united front.

The very existence of a community group designed to oppose the government's plans may have unfortunate repercussions due to the problem of trying to generate collective action, which were examined by Olson [32]. Input from individuals who might otherwise be prepared to act will be precluded if they are quite prepared to leave the burden of voicing to a semi-formal group when one exists. Yet on the other hand it is a commonly held belief that governing bodies are unlikely to take any notice of individual complaints (except where the individual has a disproportionate amount of power), and that only an organised group can expect to be given an audience.

Since all these factors can serve to muzzle voice it is not surprising that Schwartz [38] concluded that to become involved means, in large part, to become politically alienated.

4.2. Temporal Aspects Infringing Upon the Strategies

Being predominantly concerned with spatial manifestations of processes, geographers often overlook their temporal aspects. The life of the conflict or the time-span involved must inevitably affect the combatants' perceptions, enthusiasm and choice strategies. Of particular importance would seem to be what Cohen [7] has called the subjective nature of time, especially since the future can be seen to offer both hope, and despair because of uncertainty.

The nature of a conflict will inevitably change over time. Both stress and inducements are going to affect an individual's position. Within the community the degree of solidarity is likely to be subject to constant flux as different coalitions materialise and disintegrate under pressure. And the nature of the conflict itself must be expected to change as a result of interaction between the parties, and changing expectations. For instance, if the conflict is protracted it may well be that from the residents' point of view the most appropriate solution to the neighbourhood's problems changes, and so it becomes necessary to change their position. Yet as Schelling appreciates [37] any shifting of ground in a bargaining situation is seen as a weakness, allowing the opponent to interpret it as uncertainty and a sign of the residents being either unsure of what they want, or else not very committed to their position.

Closely tying this and the previous section together is the way in which the authorities can use different time scales to confound community opposition. Community groups tend to be restricted in two directions. First, if they make any pretence at pursuing a more democratic procedure

than is characterised by the existing polity (which is one of their justifications for being), it is difficult for them to move quickly and make snap decisions. Second, it is difficult to sustain interest in the issue within the community over a prolonged period of time, as interest tends to wane if 'major events' aren't regularly forthcoming, and if they are the whole process becomes wearing and energy is drained. Again this is particularly pertinent if a sizable group is involved.

The first of these limits can be exploited by the authorities (or a group with the backing of the authorities) if they are capable of mobilising rapidly [e.g. 39]. By contrast, the authorities can counter an initially powerful group by 'dragging out' the proceedings surrounding contentious issues. It is difficult for community groups to continue a protracted fight because of the cost, both in terms of personal input and of such necessities as legal retainers. Attempting to sit out the storm is a common ploy [see for example 14], which in some circumstances has the undesirable effect of inducing blight, because of the uncertainty created, and therefore causing the neighbourhood to deteriorate further.

Either of these courses is likely to produce political alienation. And both the quick, surprise strike catching the opposition unprepared, and the war of attrition creating delay costs are likely to act more forcefully against the community's position than against that of the authorities. Thus, for example, the longer a conflict is expected to last, the less likely people are to choose the voice option, and are more likely to opt instead for one of the others.

Yet conversely, if the deterioration is gradual, people might be more prepared to voice rather than exit, since it generally appears more feasible to halt a slow decline. However, in exactly these circumstances

the lack of an obvious issue may make it difficult to arouse the majority (or even a significant number) in opposition.

So far most of the arguments have suggested that over time voice will become hoarse, making the voicers less likely to continue this course of action. In addition the planners and politicians may come to a stage where they are conditioned to accept voice from a particular group simply as background noise, adopting the attitude of "its only them again".

Although these sorts of reaction may be the most common, where the voices become fortified by a small amount of success to encourage them to continue, their actions may improve with practice as they become familiar with political and bureaucratic intricacies. This is a theme developed by Mumphrey, Seley and Wolpert [31] who suggest that groups gain experience from early battles, which can aid them in future confrontations. They consider this to be of such significance that they maintain a planner should discount predictable changes in effective opposition to minimise long-run implementation costs over the location of many facilities. Naturally such a gain to the residents will be greater if they are a natural community rather than simply a coalition formed to fight the development (as conceived by Williams [48]).

A further, even less tangible, gain might be represented by the production of an improved social network as the result of having worked against a common 'enemy' together. In such cases this might be expected to increase the degree of 'loyalty' felt for the neighbourhood, which has already been identified as a constraint operating against exit, and thus making voice a more natural choice in the future.

The development of a violent course of action over time is rather more difficult to assess. It would seem however that protracted violence

is almost certain to lead to an escalation of violence (a violent act tends to provoke a violent reaction and thus the initial violence is doubled), and thus to a breakdown in hitherto conventional societal relations. Because of this, and the general disapproval of illegal actions, it is generally used quite sparingly and intermittently. Just as it is possible to become entrenched in a course of violence it is easy to become progressively more resigned to the state of affairs, thus making it easier to adopt the same course of action as the situation worsens even further. In such circumstances it takes some dramatic event to shake the individual from his chosen course, and since it is important for a citizens group to increase its support, it is their task to dramatise events to try and encourage the discarding of the 'resigned' mantle.

In the case of exit the impact is most noticeable at the community level. If exit is a common choice amongst the residents of a neighbourhood then the development of a stream of exiters will gradually deplete the area of its resources [27]. This has a particularly unfortunate side to it in that those who exit are likely to be those most capable of voicing since they are what Hirschman has called 'quality conscious' [24].

4.3 A Consideration of the Sequential Development of Strategies

Not only does one course of action change and develop over time, but in addition the initial choice, and the way in which the action unfolds (which is what has effectively been considered so far) has an important bearing upon the likelihood of making a particular choice on each subsequent occasion in the conflict. Thus this section will be concerned with the 'loop' on the right-hand side of figure 2, and examples of the kind of sequence which is envisaged as occurring are, shown in figure 3.




Figure 3 : The Individual and One Issue

At the individual level, the pursuit of the exit option will have a different effect from that upon the community (except for it being expensive to both). If the individual repeatedly exits it would seem likely that he will become 'fatigued' (tired of persistently having to act in this way) and so, if subsequently presented with the problem of a deteriorating neighbourhood, they may choose to voice rather than face uprooting again. In an effort to demonstrate this Orbell and Uno [34] collected data which would seem instead to refute, at least partially, this suggestion.

The concept of fatigue would also seem applicable to voice. If the ineffectiveness of voice is continually demonstrated to a resident he will eventually exit in desperation. Should the other choice constraints still preclude exit he will probably voice a bit longer before adopting one of the other alternatives.

Using what has previously been discussed, it is possible to suggest the likely sequence of choices over time (if the problem remains to be dealt with) given the initial decision. Supposing the first time the problem arises the resident chooses to exit, then if required to deal with a similar decision-making problem at some subsequent time his most likely choice would be to exit again. Voice would be a not very close second (unless he no longer sees a suitable alternative), followed by resignation and outlaw activity, probably in that order. Although there are many uncertainties induced by the many intervening constraints this kind of ranking would seem to have some intuitive validity.

In this case the exit has effectively dealt with the first problem and the subsequent decisions relate to a different though related problem. However, with the other options there is, besides this contingency, the problem of subsequent decisions relating to the same conflict. For example

if voice leads to a successful outcome then, as with exit, it is likely to be chosen again when a similar problem arises in the future. If, on the other hand, it is unsuccessful it may still be chosen in later situations, but the probability of any of the other options being chosen is increased. More difficult to deal with is a change of strategy in an on-going struggle as the result of a lack of success derived from the initial decision, and this is what figure 3 is concerned with.

Those who are resigned to the deteriorating conditions may change their stance if their financial position improves to allow them to exit. Whilst this would seem the most likely change of course, they may alternatively decide to voice if they become aware of a particularly offensive development. Outlaw activity would seem a big step from a position of resignation, yet if the resignation was induced by political alienation it becomes rather more logical.

Because of the unsanctioned nature of most outlaw activity it is difficult to use in conjunction with the other alternatives. If the outlaw activity is seen as an end in itself it is not necessary to have society sanction it. However if it is a means to the end of improving one's bargaining position public opinion may be important. This may well be the case when outlaw activities are used prior to an attempt to voice, and may cause a refusal by the opposition to negotiate. The corollary of this course, is that the authorities may refuse to negotiate until after a suitable show of force, through violence for example, has exerted pressure. In addition the use of outlaw activities can either remove or strengthen the threat of them as a resource. If they have been comfortably withstood they can no longer serve as a threat, but on the other hand if their effect has been severe the threat of resumption is powerful.

When used after the failure of voice, outlaw activities may result purely from frustration, or else be designed to force the authorities to take more notice should a similar situation arise in the future. This course of action may also be used concurrently with voice as a constant reminder to the authorities, and to demonstrate a refusal to allow their (the residents') bargaining position to be weakened.

Earlier it was assumed that if a resident exited, then that was the end of his direct participation in that issue. However this need not be the case. Although probably not very common it is possible for a resident to exit first and then voice on the same issue. This might be the case with social workers in the area who decide to leave, but continue to work in the area. Similarly people who have their property expropriated, and are therefore forced to exit, but still feel strongly about the area, might be expected to continue voicing. In such circumstances though, there tends to be a certain credibility gap [e.g. 42] between those who are voicing from outside the neighbourhood, and both the remaining residents and the authorities. A not unnatural suspicion of exiters who continue to voice ascribes them a variety of ulterior motives, this reducing the effectiveness of their voice. This tends to be the case even if their voice is partially legitimised through their remaining within the same jurisdiction (despite having left the residential neighbourhood in question) and expressing concern over the expenditure of their tax dollar.

Because of the difficulty of voicing after exit, a government policy of enforcing exit serves an additional purpose to simply preparing the way for a proposed new development. Redlining, blockbusting and expropriation all cause disruption of local community organisations,

depriving the area of some of the resources necessary for an effective voice.

An early decision to exit then hampers further participation on the same issue, whereas an initial decision to voice leaves all the options open. Theoretically an initial resignation to the state of affairs also does this, but in practice the adoption of other alternatives seems unlikely.

4.4. The Differential Impacts of Choices on Individuals and the Community

Some of the options indicated above are likely to have a different impact, as a result of their implementation, when considered from the individual's point of view as opposed to that of the community. For instance, if an individual resigns himself to the unsatisfactory situation, he is likely to reduce the problems from his point of view since emotional stress is thereby reduced without the expenditure of any resources (at least in any conventional sense). However because of his resignation the community has effectively had its resources depleted with the loss of one more person who could have formed part of the group attempting to rectify the situation, and the problems remain, probably worsening.

Similarly, in the case of exiting, the departure of a 'quality conscious' individual to a more salubrious area is likely to cost the forsaken community more in terms of lost resources than it will cost the individual. Meanwhile the problems in the forsaken neighbourhood remain, and are only likely to be addressed by the government when a large number follow this course (and even the likelihood of this has been questioned here). By this time, a further problem has been added to the neighbourhood's list with the breakdown of local social networks.

Just as the discrepancies between personal losses and gains, and

those of the community are recognised here, so they may be by the residents, and it cannot be assumed that individuals will always pursue the course they see as being personally optimal when it means flying in the face of neighbourhood action. This would be particularly so in the kind of area where there is a well-developed 'sense of community'.

The three figures presented in this chapter represent summary statements of some of the ideas expressed within the chapter. Although the first of these dealt only with the dissenting residents it could be expanded to encompass those who support the changes in the area, but it must be remembered that agreement does not necessarily mean inaction. If a strong opposition develops, supporters of the government may become both vocal and violent. One of the purposes of this figure is to demonstrate the way in which operational constraints can become choice constraints. It may well be that to be forewarned is to be forearmed; in which case a knowledge of the potential operational constraints will help to minimise them. However the knowledge of such problems may also serve to dissuade the individual from making that choice.

The end of chapters 3 and 4 would seem an appropriate place for a summary of the constraints seen to be operating on each of the alternative strategies (figure 4). It must be remembered throughout that the crux is seen to be conflict between those in authority and the neighbourhood residents. This is so because of the, at least implicit, endorsement of conditions within the neighbourhood, by the government through direct, indirect or no action. Thus the primary aim of the residents is to persuade the government to change its stance.

<u>Initial Decision</u>	<u>Choice Constraints</u>	<u>Operational Constraints</u>
EXIT	Inertia Race Finance Loyalty Zoning Information	Decline in tax base Revealed Preference \neq True Preference Message non-specific & low volume
VOICE	Political Clout Government Willing- ness to Help Government Ability to Help Protracted Cost Time	Co-optation Internal Status- seeking Non Decisions Ambiguity Time Group Organisation
RESIGNATION	No objective improvement	Cognitive Dissonance
OUTLAW ACTIVITY	Social norms Public opinion Likelihood of punishment	Reprisal (Police power)

Previous Experience
 Expectation of Success
 Knowledge of Operational Constraints

Figure 4 : Decisions and Constraints.

CHAPTER V

A PILOT EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF THE MODEL

Having suggested the basis for a model, the time has come to assess its 'real-world' applicability. Through an examination of substantive empirical examples it should be possible to judge whether there is a sound basis for the arguments of the previous chapters. It would be ludicrous to suggest that, in any given conflict of the kind considered here, all the suggested components would appear, linked in a precise way. However it should be the case that a sufficient part of the model be observable in order to justify this approach to analysing conflicts on this residents/authority interface. This chapter attempts at least a partial demonstration of the model's veracity, suggestions for how such models can be tested, and also the model's ability to generate further hypotheses. The basis for this pilot study was provided by the conflicts arising in the Victoria Park area of Hamilton.

5.1 The Requirements of an Empirical Test, the Methods Used, and Problems Encountered

In pursuit of this verification, the focus will fall upon the initial choices of the residents, the development of the conflict, the changes of strategy associated with that development, and the potency of the strategies pursued. Obviously some of these are less amenable to forms of statistical analysis than others, and may therefore be better assessed through a more phenomenological approach. In effect each element and its

associated linkages in the figures presented in the previous chapter represent an informally stated hypothesis. Even these represent only a portion of the suggestions which have been explicit or implicit in chapters 3 and 4. However it is necessary to concentrate on just a few areas.

First of all, if exit, voice, resignation and outlaw activity are observable, in what kind of situation do they occur, and by what kind of person are they chosen? In other words are the constraints outlined in figure 3 in fact those which determine the choice of strategy? For example, if earlier suggestions are correct, low income, a highly developed zoning policy and membership of an ethnic minority would all tend to make exit less likely. It should also be noted that the presence of a particular constraint working against one of the choice options does not make each of the other three equally likely alternatives. Should the protracted cost of voice be one of the foremost constraints it would tend to produce a bias towards resignation and violence rather than exit (which is itself subjected to a financial constraint, albeit of a different kind).

It is also necessary to assess the importance of the three types of constraint which are portrayed as affecting all four choice options: past experience in similar situations from which parallels can be drawn; expectation of the success a particular course will enjoy; and knowledge of the problems likely, or expected, to be encountered in pursuing that course.

Whereas the impact of most of the choice constraints could be estimated from information elicited from questionnaires, the only realistic way of identifying most of the operational constraints is by observing the progression of specific conflicts.

Similarly the development of the conflict itself, and the potency of each kind of strategy (i.e. a sort of abstract "success ratio") pose problems in their inappropriateness for being assigned numbers. However, the change of strategies adopted as circumstances change should also be possible to investigate with questionnaires. The major problem surrounding that of course is the difficulty of contacting an appropriate set of respondents.

Recently some research was carried out in Hamilton (Long et al. [29]), which although not designed for this specific purpose, nevertheless still provides an interesting scenario and limited related statistics to cast some light on the pertinence of the suggested approach.

Because the people interviewed were still in the area of deterioration, then by definition they had not exited to escape the problem then under consideration. However some information about those who exited was obtained by questioning the residents who were interviewed and from an examination of real estate records and those of City Hall.

5.2 Findings From the Study in Victoria Park, Hamilton

The Victoria Park area is one of Hamilton's inner-city neighbourhoods, and has been a centre of controversy now for several years. This area would conventionally be considered to be deteriorating in many sectors as the result, partly of its inherent characteristics, and partly of the general planning malaise which has induced 'blight'. Dissatisfaction with the action of the local government has been displayed at two levels. First, as a result of a feeling that the area is not getting a 'fair deal' over the provision of public services and facilities. Second, a vehement battle has long been underway to prevent the widening of York Street, which is the major road running through the neighbourhood.

Planning proposals for the area have been numerous, and in 1966 the whole area was earmarked for urban renewal, but this proposal was eventually cut-back until it became no more than a large road-widening scheme. Almost without exception (according to our survey), the residents feel the area is in need of some kind of improvement, but not all of them feel that such an end would be best served by the proposal to widen York Street. So the York Street Opposition Union came into being to counter these schemes.

One particularly interesting development came about as the result of struggles between different factions, within the neighbourhood, over who truly represents the local community. It was during a particularly vehement conflict between the two major groups that the authorities moved in to demolish half a dozen buildings which lay in the path of the proposed wider street (one of the quick strikes discussed above). There seems to have been a definite policy of divide-and-rule (a tactic whose power has long been recognised) on the part of the government who managed to add fuel to the flames. One local businessman owning property on York Street, who was initially opposed to the plans for street-widening, changed his opinion, and, being the most prominent member of the local Italian community, was able to swing a large portion of the residents into line with his new views. Popular information suggests that he was promised a 'good deal on his property', and it seems highly unlikely that the government were totally unaware of his status within the community. Obviously voice is important for the management too; their advantage being that they can afford to pay for elocution lessons and a public address system to improve their position.

Again it is interesting to see the different aspects of time as

they have been perceived by the different parties in the conflict. For City Hall the emphasis is on future grandeur with an impressive boulevard providing access to Civic Square. By contrast, many of the residents wanting to stay have an attachment to the past. And there are a few businessmen with holdings along York Street who have visions of the past in the future. This group would attempt to euphemistically 'preserve' the street, which means renovations and making the area chintzy, and is of as little use to the majority of the current residents as the wider road.

So far two indicators of exit have been obtained. The first of these came from the original questionnaire. Those interviewed were obviously not in the exit category since they still resided in the area. However of those interviewed 38% said that they knew of families who had left the area as a direct result of the proposals. While this provides no definite quantitative estimate of the families choosing to exit (the 38% might conceivably have all known the same family), it is a clear indication that even in a 'low class' area exit is still an important component.

Subsequent research using the records of a local real-estate agent and those of City Hall provided the information displayed in figures 5, which illustrates the number of houses which have been sold between January 1973 and August 1975 on York Street itself, and within an estimated four hundred feet of the widened road. It must be pointed out however, that this covers nowhere near the whole period of conflict; that exit may be prompted by considerations other than deteriorating conditions; and that the decision to exit is made before the house is actually sold. In relation to this last point, the real-estate agent suggested that a house would normally be sold within six or eight weeks of its appearance on the private market, so it can be assumed that the decision to exit was made approximately two months before the sale date of the property.

The date of the decision to exit is more difficult to infer from




Figure 5 : Houses Sold in the York Street Area Since January 1973.

the sales to the city. And how often this represents exiting as a protest rather than as a feeling of the acceptance of the seemingly inevitable is difficult to interpret. With only two or three exceptions the purchases by the city are on York Street itself, and with only one exception have taken place since the hearing of the Ontario Municipal Board which in May 1974 upheld the proposals to widen York Street, and thus gave the City authority to expropriate property on the street. Something not indicated here is that on walking around the neighbourhood in early August, no less than 14 houses within four hundred feet of the proposed road had real estate agents' boards outside, and so too did two properties on York Street itself. These last two properties presumably represent a refusal to accept that the government's proposals will be implemented despite the growing momentum of the machine.


The other 14 properties, and the higher number of sales on the private market during the summer of 1975 would seem to suggest that it was not the Ontario Municipal Board's decision in May 1974 which triggered the exits as one might have expected. Instead that impetus seems to have been provided by the sight of the first houses being demolished in the spring of the following year. It might also indicate that 'the bottom has dropped out of the market', making it difficult for those who wish to leave to do so (a rather fundamental failing of the market system for those who wish to argue as Tiebout does). This represents in only a minor form the situation which arises in many U.S. cities where, instead of the market constantly finding a use for areas in the city through the supposed processes of filtering and succession, abandonment is experienced, exacerbating the conditions of multiple deprivation in the area.

Since outlaw activity has not (to my knowledge) been used in this

particular issue, those who were interviewed, and expressed objections to the current proposals, fell into either the 'voice' or 'resignation' categories, depending upon whether or not they said they had done anything to demonstrate their objection. Of the 26 objecting 15 came from York Street itself, with 13 voicing and 13 resigning themselves to the situation. Only the former are recognised by the government as objecting to the current proposals, whereas in fact the true number is twice that. It should also be noted that those who support the current proposals as a means of halting deterioration in the neighbourhood might also support proposals which would be acceptable to those currently opposed.

The kind of data culled from the questionnaire was of a kind suitable for subjecting to discriminant analysis, and in this case the BMD 07M program was used. Figure 6 represents part of the print out produced by the program. The graph represents the discriminant space within which the respondents are plotted on the basis of a discriminant function derived in this case from the variables, age, income, and length of residence. In this, those who indicated that they had voiced are denoted by an 'A' and those who had resigned themselves to the situation by an 'R', and it can be seen that although there is a certain amount of discrimination it is not particularly distinct. The inset table shows how the 22 respondents who disagreed with the government proposals were originally split between those who voiced and those who resigned themselves to the situation, and how the discriminant function generated by the three variables split the respondents.

When analysing the differences in the background to the choices made a discriminant analysis seems to provide a particularly suitable approach. Once it has been determined through the questionnaire what



Group Means Indicated by *

Number of Cases Classified into Group -		
Group	Active	Resigned
Active	9	3
Resigned	3	7

Figure 6 : Display of Part of the BMD 07M (Discriminant Analysis)
Print Out.

course of action was chosen the individuals can be assigned to the appropriate group, and the power of individual variables and groups of variables, to discriminate between the four groups (i.e. exit, voice, resignation, and outlaw activity) can be assessed. For this kind of analysis to be justified there has to be reason to believe that the initial assignment is to characteristically distinct groups. Considerable evidence has already been presented to suggest that this is indeed the case.

Whilst using the discriminant analysis procedure it was established that none of the variables representing the residents' age, income or length of residence in the area, proved significant discriminators. All three variables showed a wide range in both groups, so could not be said to affect the decision to voice or accept unpopular proposals. One of the more interesting aspects was the lack of significance income had in distinguishing between the two groups (nor was it correlated with any of the other variables considered - tenant/owner, sex, age, length of residence in the area, ownership of a business on York Street). This must however be said rather guardedly because of the refusal of some respondents to answer the question relating to their income.

Our original survey was designed to examine the psychological dimensions underlying opinions held by different groups (including the planners) on this issue of conflict. The dimensions then considered were:

- i) a parochial vs. a systemic view
- ii) beliefs about the outcome of the widening
- iii) perceptions of the area
- iv) attitudes towards planners and planning.

Those proved to be extremely successful discriminators between the groups then under consideration (residents and planners; those living nearby, and planners; those living on York Street, and those living nearby;

and those residents who agreed and those who disagreed with the proposals). For the groups presently being considered both variables (ii) and (iv) proved to be successful discriminators at, at least the 95% level. Thus it would seem that the more pessimistic people are in their beliefs about the outcome if the plan for widening proceeds, the more likely they are to voice. Whether those who are less pessimistic do not voice because of this, or whether they have persuaded themselves that 'things won't be so bad after all' because they have decided not to voice, is impossible to say from this data, and both alternatives seem quite plausible.

The less sympathetic attitude towards planners and planning of those voicing, can similarly be attributed to two facets. It could be that as a result of their abortive efforts to be heard, those trying to voice have lowered their opinions of planners and planning. On the other hand it may be that because they already had such opinions they felt it all the more necessary to voice, whilst the other group, with slightly more faith in the planners might feel that perhaps, after all, the planners know what is best. However from further computing the second alternative appears rather less likely in this instance.

The superiority of the psychological variables as discriminators over the kind of variable more usually investigated in such issues corresponds with Schwartz's findings. He showed that perceptions of the polity are far more powerful factors in producing alienation than social background variables. Whether or not the same lack of correspondence with socio-economic variables would arise if all four groups were represented remains to be seen.

Although outlaw activity was not witnessed in relation to this issue it did arise over a separate issue in the same area. There is a

public park (Victoria Park) in the neighbourhood which has a baseball diamond and stand in one corner, which is used by a fastball team playing in a provincial league. This team is sponsored by a Hamilton businessman (Mr. Waxman), who wanted to put a wooden fence around the diamond to ensure that those wishing to see the game would have to pay an admission charge, thus guaranteeing that the fastball team would obtain better finances. Waxman offered to donate an electronic scoreboard in return for this concession ("donate" being a rather dubious word, since it would primarily be his team who would benefit from it), and maintained that this was necessary to bring good baseball to Hamilton.

However the opinion of the local residents differed, and simply rested on the basis that a public park should remain public. They voiced their opinions vehemently at city meetings and warned that accidents can happen to fences. Shortly afterwards the part of the fence that had already been erected was found lying on the ground. On re-erection it was again torn down. This was a case where outlaw activity was used to bolster and add volume to a voice already signing petitions and attending public meetings. One of the advantages of such outlawed actions is that when they are coupled with voice it is easily understood and makes a dramatic point. It is also likely to gain media coverage which provides a further platform for the accompanying voice. However the amount of outlaw activity must be carefully calculated if it is not to have the effect of causing this voice to be discounted as coming from irresponsible cranks. On this occasion such illegality proved an 'easy option', both in physical terms, and also in that it was unlikely to engender a feeling of self-righteous indignation from the rest of the public. In this respect the middle class has a certain edge, in that society as a whole is likely to sanction

a greater degree of illegality from them than from, for example, the ghetto blacks.

5.3 The Implications for the Model of These Findings

Using only two substantive examples one can hardly hope to provide examples of all elements of the model, and as has already been stated these are intended only to provide indications. This is particularly obvious when it is remembered how the context of each issue is so important both through the perceptions of the problem, and through the constraints involved. Further issues of conflict which might provide a broadening of the substantive base from within the local region might be the Jamestown development and the Trefan Court renewal in Toronto, the Pickering airport, and the opposition of Westdale residents to further university expansion in Hamilton.

However these two empirical examples did allow the four different strategy choices (of exit, voice, resignation and outlaw activity) to be identified. Even though these were not always observable in quite the same situations and amid quite the same constraints as initially suggested, the general basis seemed confirmed. What elementary analysis was possible also indicated that the techniques used could be used in a more comprehensive analysis, which would include the suggestions presented in the next chapter when future developments in this avenue of research are considered. Already the observation of the development of the conflict has enabled the lending of supportive strength to some comments made earlier.

When talking to people in the York Street area, whether pro- or anti-the road-widening scheme, it becomes apparent that a conflict framework is indeed appropriate for an analysis of the developments in the protracted struggle. Countering strategies by the officials were well-displayed

in the prolonging of the conflict; the quick strike to demolish a group of houses, the policies of divide-and-rule and at times that of purposeful ambiguity.

In the York Street area there does appear to have been a change in strategy choices over time. Through 1975 it was obvious that fewer people were bothering to voice, and that even those who did were becoming rather tired. What really seemed to take the wind out of their sails was the demolition of some of the houses, and this also seems to have prompted the attempts of more to exit, as the opinion advanced that "it doesn't make any difference what we say, they're going to do it anyway".

It is interesting to speculate that although the residents' efforts over the York Street issue were to no avail it provided them with the experience necessary to protest the Victoria Park fence issue with more success, because the core of the York Street Opposition Union also participated in this later issue. The use of outlaw activity in the latter example apparently paid dividends, yet was not used to counter the road-widening scheme, even when voice appeared to be failing. Examples of outlaw activity were, after all, not beyond the bounds of imagination. Taking a cue from Goodman, it would be quite feasible for a small group to close off York Street traffic overnight and establish a York Street Mall, complete with seats and trees, even if only paper ones.

Why then was no such course adopted here, when it was elsewhere? The first point is one of the degree of organisation necessary. It takes little to pull a fence down; to do something more constructive to protest against a road scheme is more complex. Secondly the expected degree of unfavourable reaction varied. Over the fence issue the 'enemy' was not so organised and extensive, and general public opposition to the outlaw

the success of different strategies once they are being pursued, and an insight into the course and development of conflicts, cannot adequately be provided by conventional geographical techniques. Instead, what seems more appropriate is a critical analysis of other conflicts within the framework suggested, to enable the presentation of a scenario style research of the kind typified recently by the work of Ley and Wolpert. However such a procedure must not lapse into mere story-telling, but must concentrate on the extraction of critical, common elements, which is hopefully facilitated by analysis within a common model of the type propounded here.

activity could be expected to be less on this, a 'softer' issue. In addition something on the scale suggested for protesting the widening of York Street would be more likely to exact reprisals through courtroom action. This serves to emphasise the fact that the authorities, if pressed, can always utilise the ultimate sanction against opposition by employing police power. The knowledge of this serves to curb tendencies to outlaw activity considerably, and even sometimes to voice.

It should also be noted that here, exit would be unlikely to act as a serious message of disapproval which would change the course of government action. Exiting would simply facilitate the efforts of the city to accumulate the land necessary for the road construction, or else enable developers to acquire land close to the new arterial for speculative ventures. And in any case most of those exiting would move to other areas of Hamilton, thus purchasing public goods from the same jurisdiction and providing no financial 'message'.

From this kind of investigation, it is apparent that the model is subject to some of the problems which have plagued urban geographers in the past. Having said that more empirical data is necessary for the verification of the model a very obvious difficulty emerges in the shape of the problem of aggregating data. Since the issues, the setting and the people involved vary from case to case the complexity of trying to aggregate such varied information for a general model, is considerable. Carried further this problem develops into that of trying to apply the model to issues in other social and cultural settings with some other form of polity.

An assessment of the realism of the elements of the model and their importance, the existence and working of the problems which inhibit

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS AND REFLECTIONS

The paradigm of community opposition which has been developed in this paper started from the basis that each individual can protest his disapproval of his neighbourhood through four fundamental strategies. From the outset it was stressed that all the alternatives of 'exit', 'voice', 'resignation' and 'outlaw activity' were subject to a range of constraints. In fact constraints were identified at two levels. 'Choice constraints' serve to determine which strategy the individual will adopt, and 'operational constraints' make themselves felt by reducing the likelihood of a successful outcome from the strategies once implemented. Naturally the two kinds of constraints are interlinked, as for example in the case of 'fatigue', which is a phenomenon whose impact serves to influence the individual's choice, yet can only be created through action in response to community conflicts.

Of the more important concepts that of 'loyalty' represents one of the choice constraints, lessening the likelihood of a particular strategy (exit) being chosen. However, most of the other prime concepts enter the paradigm at a later stage. The use of 'threat' can be used by both sides in the conflict to improve their position, but it would seem to be more to the advantage of the government to maintain a certain level of 'slack' in the system, whilst the residents are more likely to

benefit by applying pressure for the slack to be taken up.

In addition to the frequently quoted parade of strategies the authorities can call upon to combat community dissent, the notion of 'enforced exit' was introduced. Apart from making it physically easier for the government to carry out change it was shown to serve two further purposes. The likelihood and effectiveness of a voice coming from those who move, is reduced, and so are the resources available to the remaining community.

Having developed a model and then attempted an empirical verification it has become obvious that the pilot study carried out in Hamilton was wanting in some respects, and so too is the model at its current stage of development. Thus, in the traditional manner, suggestions will be made as to how both might be improved. Despite the shortcomings it is felt that the model has been sufficiently vindicated to justify the comparative conclusions relating to exit and voice, and also the reconsideration of the conflict approach, which are subsequently presented.

6.1 Suggestions for Future Research

Of the deficiencies in the original survey, paramount was the failure to get responses from representatives of all choice categories. Even where there is a group who choose outlaw activity, it may well be difficult to persuade them to complete a questionnaire. They would probably see no point in doing so, and might be concerned about incriminating themselves. As has already been seen, those who choose to exit are also difficult to encompass.

To overcome a similar problem Orbell and Uno [34] assessed the individual's 'proneness' to pursue a particular course of action (and proneness to move from the area was not necessarily related to dissatis-

faction with the area, as they measured it). However the validity of using this technique must be questioned since most people are less than perfect at empathising and tend often to act differently when 'the crunch comes' from what would be indicated by their previous utterances.

If a surrogate like proneness is considered inadequate, then the only alternative is to interview residents who have actually exited: a difficult task, since by definition the birds have already flown the nest. There would then appear to be two alternatives. First, when interviewing, people could simply be asked if they had moved recently and what were the main reasons for their move. Unfortunately this has the draw-back that it might not be appropriate to group together those who had exited through dissatisfaction, since the situations from which they had exited might be very different. If this necessitated further differentiation the number of respondents necessary would inevitably increase. The second alternative would seem rather laborious, but may in the long run prove the simplest. By using street directories for the conflict period and telephone directories for the present it might then be possible to locate those who had exited from a particular neighbourhood conflict.

Although it has been hypothesised that certain formal demographic differences will in some circumstances operate to preclude some strategies (see figure 3), it has also become evident that this type of variable on its own is inadequate to make a comprehensive discrimination (as in the case of the voice/resignation distinction on York Street). Thus I would suggest that additional, less tangible concepts along with certain psychological dimensions should be investigated. Within this sphere would fall:

- a) variability in the identification of the most salient

aspects of the issue, and beliefs about the consequences of current government policy if implemented (or unchanged in some cases),

b) ability to see alternatives, both to the governments conception of how the area ought to be, and to the type of action that they have taken,

c) their attitudes towards the concept of planning and the current polity,

d) information drawn from their personal past experience and the related hearsay evidence of others.

Hopefully this kind of combination would provide an explanation, not only of why one particular choice was made, but also, by something more than implication, why others were not.

This information would be culled primarily for the purpose of examining a decision, but the importance of a decision to change strategy has also been indicated. Thus it would be important to try and elicit information about more than one strategy being adopted for dealing with an issue.. Such information would be used to test the hypotheses that such a change is due to: a change in stress, for example, of the kind which would make resignation no longer a tenable strategy; a change in resources, which may, for example, then permit exit; disillusionment with the ability of the course initially chosen as a means to exact a suitable outcome.

At frequent intervals through the paper, the individual/community distinction has been emphasised to remove some of the paradoxes which would otherwise appear. However the exact linkages between the individual and the community were nowhere examined, since it was felt to be beyond

the scope of this paper. Nevertheless if the model is to be developed further this kind of problem must be treated. Although some relationships are quite straightforward, like that which causes alienation of the community to be dependent upon the alienation of the individual residents, others are painfully complex. The prime questions of when individual action becomes group action, and how individual decisions and group decisions are interlinked, must be addressed.

6.2 Comparing and Contrasting Exit and Voice

A concern with the problem of allocating resources to residential neighbourhoods, and the observation that very commonly residents become dissatisfied with the kind or quantity of resources allocated to their neighbourhood, produced the suggestion that they could demonstrate this dissatisfaction by either exiting from the neighbourhood, staying in the neighbourhood and voicing their discontent, resigning themselves to the situation, or demonstrating their dissatisfaction through illegal actions. Resignation is unlikely to encourage a redistribution of resources which would meet with the approval of the individual concerned. And outlaw activity is still only rarely chosen, because it is likely to be subject to the ultimate sanction of police power. Thus the main weight of the comparative issues falls on the duel between exit and voice.

From the discussion developed above, it would seem that exit is essentially an individualistic solution (for those who can take it), and I do not have Tiebout's faith in it as a means through which an optimal allocation of resources can be attained at a higher level. On the other hand, voice potentially offers a societal solution, which is necessarily intrinsically political. In the sphere of the urban neighbourhood instead of the more conventional kind of economic good Hirschman was dealing

with, it is exit and not voice which provides a "messy" solution if the aim is to 'improve' the city.

I would object to a Tiebout style approach as a means of solving our urban ills on the grounds of both social justice, and of exit being an inadequate way (in the circumstances) of conveying a message to compel action from the authorities. The first set of objections arises from the fact that families do not possess identical access to resources (financial or informational), and so have different degrees of mobility. This effectively contradicts the first two assumptions necessary for Tiebout's model ((i) that the consumer voters be fully mobile and move to the area best for them, (ii) consumer voters have full knowledge and act accordingly).

One reason why exit may be ineffective as a warning signal leading to corrective measures from a duly alerted government is the violation of Tiebout's third assumption (consumer-voters can choose to live in any of a large number of communities), since people may exit to avoid a particular neighbourhood problem, yet still remain within the same jurisdiction. In this case the jurisdiction still receives their taxes; no message. If there were in fact a large number of jurisdictions then the authorities would be faced with the same kind of prisoner's dilemma as Harvey [22] has revealed exists for the individual investor. This combined with the attraction of what Olson has termed free-riding means that the least risk strategy will result in no investment in certain areas. This has been shown to produce neither the profit maximising solution, nor the welfare optimum solution [9]. In a system dependent upon market processes for resource allocation 'benign neglect' would be encouraged, resulting in the acceleration of deterioration.

If residents do leave the municipality when they exit the financial

impact will probably be cushioned by others (although they may not be so taxable) moving in. Hirschman also suggests that public agencies exhibit a certain insensitivity to exit since they can draw on a variety of financial resources which are independent of their tax revenue. There is some doubt as to the validity of this in view of the recent experience of inner-city areas, where an argument at the other extreme would seem to be more appropriate. It suggests that the financial impact on the central areas, as a result of the declining tax base arising from the flight to the suburbs, has been so severe that the authorities have been unable to respond to the message they have received.

Even if Tiebout's model were perfectly operational and the impact of a particular allocation could be measured by increased land values this would simply mean that rents would ration access. Quite apart from the inequities of the situation it cannot even be maintained that the greatest potential has been realised, since those consumers who would have created the greatest externality benefits would be displaced by those able to pay.

Whilst many of Tiebout's assumptions can be attacked as being too simplistic, they show a far more disturbing property of the model as they demonstrate how, if such a process be deemed acceptable, its implementation would serve to re-emphasise class and income differentials; all from initial assumptions which at first sight appear totally devoid of class bias, or even content.

One advantage which both exit and resignation enjoy over the other two options is that they can be pursued in isolation, whereas voice and outlaw activity really need to be pursued as a group (one can voice or be violent on one's own, but it does become rather more difficult, and also

in the latter case makes it less easy to escape reprisal measures being taken), and so run the danger of being split.

However it seems that voice should be a more desirable means by which local governments receive their cues for amending policies. It appears to offer better hope for improving society as a whole rather than the lot of the individual. In addition it is far more informative than exit could ever hope to be, and provides a more realistic expectation of preventing an undesirable development, since exit, at the best could only hope to encourage a cure.

At present, there are many problems besetting those who endeavour to use voice as a means of overcoming urban problems. Most of these are derived from the seemingly ubiquitous conflict of interests which means that, unlike in Hirschman's theoretical development in market analysis, it is not necessarily in the management's best interests to heed the voice. This can in part be attributed to the uneven distribution of political power, even in a system of universal suffrage. Where the vote is of little importance, there is correspondingly little need to listen to those lacking resources, except through the promptings of altruism. The good of one, it seems, does not necessarily enhance the good of all. It was because of acknowledged shortcomings such as these that the market model of democracy using the vote as the marketed commodity were rejected at the outset. And underlying the whole paper has been the belief that we are dealing with a system based more on coercion and constraint than upon competition and compromise.

6.3 The Conflict Approach Revisited

In an attempt to develop a more suitable paradigm for investigating dissenting reaction to the allocation of resources to a particular neigh-

bourhood, the emphasis here has been on an approach which both implicitly and explicitly acknowledges the role of conflict in society. In contrast to Dahrendorf's formulation many of the conflicts of the type considered here are issue-oriented rather than arising through a challenge to the structure of authority. However, many of the conflicts which do not arise over authority relations do in fact occur as a direct result of them.

Just as Dahrendorf (and many others) recognised conflict as being the vital force in changing society, so it has been portrayed here. But what Dahrendorf seemed to overlook, and has been emphasised here, is that part of that change is represented by the changing nature of each conflict as it progresses.

Because of the emphasis of this paper the phenomena such as non decision-making, co-optation, deaf ears and purposeful ambiguity have been portrayed as obstructions to community protest. However they are initially conceived within the conflict framework as deliberate responses from the power body to particular community strategies. Thus, in a gaming context, this is not a situation with one party playing against a random opposing strategy, but one of calculated counter strategies. Hence the importance of bargaining, threats and the other constraints so persistently emphasised.

It should be re-emphasised that the existence of consensus is not denied (to do so would be foolhardy) but it is strongly held that in situations such as those considered here it plays a subservient role to the coercive relationships. Once the conflict nature of these types of situation has been accepted it becomes particularly important not to view the choices independently of constraints. To do so is to fall into the same trap as positivist geographers who conveniently choose to ignore Marx's observation that "men make their own history, but not in circum-

stances of their own choosing." As Harvey [22] (and Olsson in rather more prosaic terms [33]) maintains, it is necessary to understand social process to be able to understand social form, and I feel that an approach centred around a recognition of conflict is more likely to produce such an understanding than the alternatives in the field (whether they emphasise competition or consensus). Given the prevailing set of constraints a conflict-oriented approach is more capable of revealing how systems using primarily exit or voice (or any combination of the two) to encourage corrective measures, will produce cities of differing complexions.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Andreski, S., Social Sciences as Sorcery. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973.
2. Bachrach, P. and M.S. Baratz, Power and Poverty. New York: Oxford University Press, 1970.
3. Bailey, M.J., 'Notes on the Economics of Residential Zoning and Renewal'. Land Economics, August 1959, pp 288-290.
4. Barr, J., 'Tiebout Models of Community Structure'. Papers of the Regional Science Association, Vol. 30, 1973, pp 113-140.
5. Buchanan, J., 'The Pure Theory of Government Finance: A Suggested Approach'. Journal of Political Economy, Vol. LVII (Dec. 1949) pp 496-505.
6. Buchanan, J. and G. Tullock, The Calculus of Consent. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962.
7. Cohen, J., 'Subjective Time' in J.T. Fraser (ed), The Voices of Time. New York: George Braziller, 1966.
8. Cox, K., Conflict Power and Politics in the City. New York: McGraw Hill, 1973.
9. Cox, K.R. and M.J. Dear, Jurisdictional Organisations and Urban Welfare. Ohio State University, Department of Geography, Discussion Paper No. 47, 1975.
10. Dahl, R.A., and C.E. Lindblom, Politics, Economics and Welfare. New York: Harper and Row, 1953.
11. Dahrendorf, R., Class and Class Conflict in an Industrial Society. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1959.
12. _____ Essays in the Theory of Society. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1968.
13. Davidoff, P., 'Normative Planning', in S. Anderson (ed) Planning for Diversity and Choice. Cambridge, Mass.: M I T Press, 1968.
14. Davies, J.G., The Evangelistic Bureaucrat. London: Tavistock Publications Ltd., 1972.
15. Dennis, N., Public Participation and Planners' Blight. London: Faber and Faber, 1972.

16. Deutscher, I. What We Say/What We Do. Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Co., 1973.
17. Downs, A., An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper and Row, 1957.
18. Fried, M., 'Grieving for a Lost Home: Psychological Costs of Relocation', in L.J. Dull (ed.) The Urban Condition. New York: Basic Books Inc., 1963.
19. Goodman, R., After the Planners. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971.
20. Greenberg, M.R. and T.D. Boswell, 'Neighbourhood Deterioration as a Factor in Intra-Urban Migration: A Case Study in New York City.' Professional Geographer, Vol. 24, 1972, pp 11-16.
21. Gurr, Ted, Why Men Rebel. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1970.
22. Harvey, D., 'Society, City, and the Space-Economy of Urbanism'. Commission on College Geography, Resource Paper No. 18, Washington D.C.: AAG, 1972.
23. _____ Social Justice and the City. London: Edward Arnold, 1973.
24. Hirschman, A.O., Exit, Voice and Loyalty. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970.
25. Hoopes, N.E. (ed), Who Am I? New York: Dell, 1969.
26. Isard, W., General Theory. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1969.
27. Jacobs, J., The Death and Life of Great American Cities. New York: Vintage Books, 1961.
28. Ley, D., 'Problems of Co-optation and Idolatry in the Community Group' in D. Ley (ed.) Community Participation and the Spatial Order of the City. Vancouver: Tantalus Research Ltd., 1974.
29. Long, J.A. et al, 'An Analysis of the Perceptual and Attitudinal Background to a Planning Conflict: The York Street Saga.'
30. Margolis J., 'The Demand for Urban Public Services' in H.S. Perloff and L. Wingo (eds) Issues in Urban Economics, pp 527-565. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968.
31. Mumphrey, A.J., J.E. Seley and J. Wolpert, 'A Decision Model for Locating Controversial Facilities.' Journal of the American Institute of Planners, Vol. 37 No. 6 (1971) pp 397-402.
32. Olson, M., The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965.

33. Olsson, G. 'Inference Problems in Locational Analysis', in K. Cox and R. Golledge (eds) Behavioural Problems in Geography: A Symposium. Evanston; Northwestern Studies in Geography, No. 17, 1969, pp 66-74.
34. Orbell, J.M. and T. Uno, 'A Theory of Neighbourhood Problem Solving: Political Action Versus Residential Mobility.' American Political Science Review, Vol. 68 (1972), pp 471-489.
35. Ostrom, V., C.M. Tiebout and R. Warren, 'The Organisation of Government in Metropolitan Areas: A Theoretical Inquiry.' American Political Science Review, Vol. 55 (1961) pp 831-842.
36. Parsons, T., The Structure of Social Action. Glencoe: Free Press, 1949.
37. Schelling, T., The Strategy of Conflict. New York: Oxford University Press, 1963.
38. Schwartz, D.C., Political Alienation and Political Behaviour. Chicago: Aldine, 1973.
39. Seley, J., 'Towards a Paradigm of Community Based Planning, in D. Ley (ed) Community Participation and the Spatial Order of the City. Vancouver: Tantalus, 1974.
40. Seley, J. and J. Wolpert, 'A Strategy of Ambiguity in Locational Conflicts', in K.R. Cox, D.R. Reynolds and S. Rokkan (eds) Locational Approaches to Power and Conflict. New York: Sage Publications, 1974.
41. Selznick, P., TVA and the Grass Roots. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1949.
42. Sewell, J., Up Against City Hall. Toronto: J. Lewis and Samuel, 1972.
43. Smolensky, E. et al, 'The Prisoner's Dilemma and Ghetto Expansion.' Land Economics, Vol. 44, No. 4 (1968) pp 419-430.
44. Steiner, P.O., 'The Public Sector and the Public Interest', in R.H. Haveman and J. Margolis (eds) Public Expenditure and Policy Analysis. Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1970.
45. Taeuber, C.E. and A.F. Taeuber, Negroes in Cities, Residential Segregation and Neighbourhood Change. Chicago: Aldine, 1965.
46. Tiebout, C.M., 'A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures'. Journal of Political Economy, Vol. LXIV (1956) pp 416-24.
47. Vickers, G., Freedom in a Rocking Boat. London: Penguin, 1970.
48. Williams, O.P., Metropolitan Political Analysis. New York: Free Press, 1971.

49. Wolf, E.P., 'The Tipping Point in Racially Changing Neighbourhoods'. Journal of the American Institute of Planners, Vol. 29 (1963) pp 217-222.
50. Wolpert, J., A. Mumphrey and J. Seley, Metropolitan Neighbourhoods: Participation and Conflict Over Change. Commission on College Geography, Resource Paper No. 16. Washington D.C.: AAG, 1972.