

FEELING LIKE A CITIZEN

FEELING LIKE A CITIZEN: INTEGRATION EXAMS, EXPERTISE AND SITES OF RESISTANCE IN  
THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE NETHERLANDS

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## ABSTRACT

This thesis focuses on the implementation of state-administered integration exams as part of the naturalization and settlement process in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. Through analysis of key government documents and interviews with public servants and the experts involved, I argue that the actualization of the exam is a critical point in the policy process through which to understand how particular norms become embedded in not only the content, but the different requirements of each exam. In particular, I consider the role language-education experts, settlement experts, and the notable absence of migrants in the actualization of the exams under consideration. More importantly, I argue that while the state employs expert advice as a means through which to depoliticize the issue, the mechanisms through which this is done can in fact create spaces for the contestation of ideas. Drawing on the governmentality literature I argue that the British and Dutch borders are constructed and reified through the developing of test content, while also pointing to the ways in which non-state actors can mobilize their expertise to push for alternative, more open imaginings of the border. Through my comparison I also consider how integration has been framed as a problem with immigrants who do not have the right kind of orientation toward their 'host' community. The solutions to issues within immigrant communities (i.e. unemployment, poverty, poor health outcomes) rest in individuals moving from outsider to insider because these problems stem from the community's position on the periphery of society. I argue that the immigrant's affective orientation towards society becomes viewed as the source of these problems, and not the communities or societies orientation towards them. I then argue that the integration exam becomes a suitable solution because it solves multiple problems at once. The exam works as the mechanism through which desire is manufactured by making tangible the object of desire in the first place and by making society itself more exclusive. In this sense, the exam not only seeks to "ensure that those who desire 'us' are desirable to 'us'" (Fortier, 2013, 3) by making immigrants prove themselves worthy, but also serves as a mechanism through which the state reasserts its authority over society.

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## DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated in loving memory of my grandparents.  
*Nonno Luigi, Nonna Pia, Nonna Ma, and Nonno Pasquale*

Between 1948 and 1963, they left their small farming village of Goriano Sicoli, Italy for the much larger industrial city of Hamilton, Ontario. My academic interest in the immigration and citizenship policy is rooted in the experiences of my grandparents, who knew little of the country they arrived in, and their struggle to make a new and stable life for themselves, and for me. I am eternally grateful for their sacrifices, and equally proud of their achievements. The support of my extended ‘D’Ambrolli/Merosio’ family throughout this process is simply a reflection of the loving and caring atmosphere my grandparents worked to create in their new home.

I also wish to dedicate this thesis to the memory of my inquisitive, kind, thoughtful, endlessly supportive, ‘second-favourite’ uncle.  
*Anthony Merolli*

The words of encouragement he shared during our last conversation have stay with me throughout the more trying moments of my academic career. I draw comfort and inspiration from those last few memories with him, and only wish he was here to share in the culmination of this process. Thank you Uncle Tony for always believing in me, and for sharing your enthusiasm for knowledge and life-long learning with me.

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABNI	Advisory Board on Naturalization and Integration
ACOM	<i>Advies Commissie Onderzoek Minderheden</i> (Advisory Committee on Minorities Research)
Bikker	Euro RSCG Bikker
BNA	British Nationality Act, 1981
BSNAA	British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, 1914
CBS	Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (Central Bureau of Statistics)
CDA	Christian Democrats
CEFR	Common European Frame of Reference on Languages, Learning, Teaching, Assessment
CIA	Commonwealth Immigration Act, 1964
CRM	<i>Ministerie van Cultuur, Recreatie en Maatschappelijk Werk</i> (Ministry of Culture, Recreation and Social Work)
CRE	Commission for Racial Equality
CUCK	Citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies
CCV	Customs, Values and Norms section of KNS Eindhoven
EPE	Elektronisch Praktijkexamen
ESOL	English for Speakers of Other Languages
KNA	Kennis Nederlandse Samenleving
LPF	Pim Fortuyn List
LUKAG	Life in the United Kingdom Advisory Group
NIACE	National Institute of Adult Continuing Education
PE	Praktijkexamen
RN	<i>Rijkswet op het Nederlanderschap</i> (Netherlands Nationality Act), 1984
RRA	Race Relations Act
RRB	Race Relations Board
TGN	Toets Gesproken Nederlands
VVD	People's Party of Freedom and Democracy
WRR	<i>Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid</i> (Scientific Council for Government Policy)
WI	Wet Inburgering (Integration Act), 2006
WIN	<i>Wet Inburgering Nieuwkomers</i> (Newcomer Integration Act), 1998
WNI	<i>Wet op het Nederlanderschap en het ingezetenschap</i> (Dutch Citizenship and Residency Act), 1892

## Chapter 1 Introduction

These questions are an example of government interfering in how people organize their social relations. And by making this test and these kinds of the exam, they give you impression that there is a standard for how to behave, or how to conduct well. I think that is wrong. The government should not interfere in how people organize their social relations. It's up to people themselves.

....

When I did the in-takes,<sup>1</sup> and I was confronted with Mr. husband, I got so fed up with the guy that I started ignoring him, and made sure I only interacted with the women who need to take the course. It also happened that we'd put the husband out of the office. You wait outside because you are not invited.<sup>2</sup>

This thesis is about government-sponsored integration exams. It is about the norms and values that are imbedded within such exams. It is also about the role of non-state actors in the production and management of the physical and imagined borders of the state and nation. The comments above were collected during an interview with an integration course provider in Amsterdam. Like many of the service providers I interviewed, he was skeptical of the inclusion of norms and values into requirements for naturalization and permanent settlement, arguing that courses needed to focus on the skills immigrants actually needed, literacy and language. From his perspective, immigrants would learn the values and norms of society once they had the language skills to get a job or participate in their community. He explained that while integration course providers are contracted to provide certain material, the courses his organization ended up providing tried to focus on what was most relevant to the students lives. He saw himself as someone who was helping immigrants move through the process of settlement, and develop the skills they actually needed to be part of society. He was helping them move across the borders of the state and nation. However, the second set of comments reveals more complex dynamics. Here he explains how he dealt with

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<sup>1</sup> In-takes refer to the initial meeting between *Inburgeringscursussen* ('Integration course') providers and students. Under the system active between 2007-2012, *inburgeraars* ('integrators') were called to participate in courses by their local government, and assigned to a service provider. During the in-take meeting, *inburgeraars* register for their courses and are assessed for the Dutch language and literacy skills.

<sup>2</sup> 'Floris' (former *Inburgeringscursus* provider), interview by author, May 27, 2011.

immigrant women who came to his organization with their husbands. He described how many Turkish and Moroccan men would speak for their wives, and demand that female instructors teach their wives. His response to these situations reveals important differences in how he views his role versus that of the state. Whereas it was inappropriate for the state to structure social relations, he did see it appropriate for his organization to intervene in such relations. In his view, intervention was required to ensure the women that came to his office could actually learn the language, and in his words, become independent from their husbands.

My focus when I started the research for this thesis was on what the content for integration exams reveals about how the state defines ‘good’ citizenship. I was interested in how the state came up with content for the exams, and how this content related to gendered and racialized notions of belonging. These questions are still central to the analysis presented here. However, the sentiments expressed in the interview above pushed me to expand the scope of the thesis to consider how non-state actors are implicated in the process of naturalization, and what this reveals about their role in the production and management of borders. How did ‘Floris’ come to see himself as someone who could make judgments about what was acceptable and not acceptable behavior for successful integration? Where did his authority to require certain kinds of behaviors from immigrants come from? Upon what basis or knowledge did he come up with the material he thought was relevant? Why and how did he see his actions as different, and also more appropriate than those of the state?

The standardized exam for naturalization was first introduced in the Netherlands in 2003, but evidence of integration had been a requirement under for much longer. In 2007, the *Inburgeringsexamen*, a single exam for naturalization and permanent settlement, was introduced, and included four distinct components including a spoken language exam, a Knowledge of Dutch Society exam, practical knowledge exam, and an integration portfolio. It is the implementation of four components that is the focus on this thesis. In the United Kingdom, the *Life in the United Kingdom* exam officially launched in 2005, but the legislative basis for it was included in amendments to the British Nationality Act in 2002. Since 2007 applicants for indefinite leave to remain must pass the *Life in the United Kingdom* exam as well. The introduction of integration exams in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands was marked in both cases by a high degree of activity from non-state actors in the initial development of exam content and requirements, and in the direct provision of the exams and related courses. While this thesis focuses primarily on the development of the exam content and requirements, it provides insights into how the policy implementation process

can become an important site of politics, with state and non-state actors drawing on different sources of power to influence change. It is also an intervention into the literature on citizenship. Throughout I argue that non-state actors are important, and understudied actors in the production of border regimes, especially in terms of the literature on the integration and social inclusion of immigrants.

### **Citizenship, Integration Exams, and Spaces of Contestation**

Citizenship in the most abstract sense is about belonging, and what that status confirms upon subjects in terms of rights, and responsibilities. It is produced through acts by a multiplicity of actors. Most often the analysis of citizenship regimes has focused on the relationship between the state and its citizens. For example, Marshall's (1950) intervention into the expansion of citizenship rights over time is ultimately about the expansion of services by the state. With the waning of the welfare state, citizenship rights are lost because the state no longer acknowledges them. At the same time, the authority of the state to wield unilateral power over this system of belonging and bordering has been challenged by the forces of globalization, and the related increased mobility of people. In this sense, the modern state can be seen to be doing less for citizens, while also losing some of its control over who counts as a citizen.

In the face of these challenges to its authority, the state draws upon a variety of tools. Controlling access to citizenship is not only about naturalization or citizenship policy. It has important links to both immigration policies, by controlling access through the physical border of the state, and integration policies, by managing who is included into the imagined community of the nation, and excluding all others. Whereas immigration policy differentiates between classes of immigrants, citizenship and integration policy is increasingly shaped by a one-size-fits all approach. The effect of a singular approach is to increase the burden in attempting to secure citizenship for some, while decreasing it for others. For example, the initial the introduction of standardized language requirements for naturalization and permanent settlement in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands was met with (successful) resistance from integration service providers and language experts, because of the high burden it would place on already marginalized immigrants like refugees, or family-class immigrants.

The introduction of integration exams as part of the naturalization process is a tool that states are using to both manage inclusion in the state and reassert its authority over

the nation. On the one hand, as Kostakopoulou explains, naturalization is about nation building:

Naturalization is thus a nationalizing practice. Through the naturalization ‘filter’, the national community allegedly ensures its cultural survival, that is, the preservation of its character, its rules of belonging and the strong communal ties. At the same time, naturalization recreates, re-enacts and sustains the national character of the community. Naturalization laws are seen to sustain a strong sense of national identity and to revitalize the values of loyalty and of individual sacrifice for the common good. By so doing, they enhance the symbolic significance of citizenship. This explains why possible relaxation of naturalization requirements is criticized for leading to the devaluation of citizenship (Kostakopoulou 2006, 89).

In other words, naturalization policy is about drawing up borders about what makes the nation distinct, different, and important, in order to continually justify and reify the very existence of those borders. However, it is not only about the nation. As Fortier (2013) argues, it also about reifying the state, both as the body responsible for protecting the nation from intruders, and as something to be respected, and loved. Integration exams are about testing would-be citizens about what makes the nation unique, and protecting linguistic integrity. Their civic content is also intended to convey to immigrants what makes the state great. Principles of democratic equality, rule of law, order, and social rights can be read as a celebration of the state, distinct from the qualities of the nation. The exams are also about communicating who belongs and who does not, by making clear that access to the benefits of the state is not for all, but rather for those deemed worthy of inclusion.

This opens up important questions about who exactly is deemed worthy. As Löwenheim and Gazit (2009) argue integration exams are an important window into the mind of the state in terms of how it defines the ideal or good citizen. This thesis turns to an analysis of the introduction and development of integration exams in two countries. The *Life in the United Kingdom* exam was introduced in 2005, following recommendations that explored the root causes of race riots in 2001 in Bradford, Oldham, and Burnley. In the Netherlands the *Inburgeringsexamen* was introduced in 2007 within the context of increased political attention on the integration of immigrants following the murder of Theo van Gogh by a Muslim youth. In both cases, the exams were not the first tool employed by the state that linked integration with naturalization policy. However, the introduction of integration exams marked a more concerted effort on the part of both states to increase the requirements for citizenship and permanent settlement, in response to increase public awareness and concern over the problems within immigrant communities, especially in terms of what those problems meant for the internal security of the state.

One of the core arguments I advance in the thesis is that the introduction of the integration exams in question cannot be understood independently of the context for their introduction. Throughout the thesis I differentiate between the problematization of integration, and integration policy. Integration policy encapsulates a wide range of tools employed by the state to facilitate the inclusion of immigrants into political, civic, and social institutions. This could include everything from official multiculturalism, anti-discrimination laws, and more recently things like integration exams. The problematization of immigrant integration refers to the production of knowledge about immigrant communities, and the framing of problems within those communities as separate and distinct from those in non-immigrant communities. I argue that the way in which knowledge is produced about immigrants, including decisions as to who counts as an immigrant, and how inclusion and integration is measured, informs the framing of the problem and thus who becomes the target of policies meant to address the problem. In the United Kingdom, the shift in framing from a race relations frame to one of social cohesion, resulted in a shift in focus from eliminating discrimination within social and political institutions, to a more individualized process of producing citizens who were suitable for the existing social and political institutions. In the Netherlands, I argue that the post-war period has been marked by a problematization of integration as an issue of cultural clashes and incompatibility, with policy focused on helping individuals manage difference through adaptation to Dutch norms. Rather than the Dutch integration exam being seen as a radical shift, it is better understood as an intensification of an existing logic.

While I begin with an analysis of the problematization of integration from the perspective of the state, I consider how the development and implementation of the exam opens up opportunities for policy contestation, precisely because the introduction of the exams considered here were introduced within the context of the politicization of the processes of immigration and integration. Both states turned to non-state experts to develop the actual content of the exams as a means through which to manage criticisms that the content was either too exclusionary or too characteristic of the governing parties' political orientations. As Pykett (2011) shows in her analysis of citizenship material for secondary school students, the development of the content for the integration exams introduces an important site for contesting the ideas and logics that informed the introduction of the exam in the first place. In my analysis of the role of non-state actors I draw upon the insights from the literature on governmentality to explore how non-state actors deploy their status as experts to successfully challenge the Ministerial directions given to them. In doing so, I add



to the growing body of literature demonstrating how the production and management of borders around the state, nation, and community are made possible through the overlapping but distinct authority of multiple actors, including but not limited to the state.

I begin in Chapter 2 with an exploration of the existing literature on citizenship and integration policy, drawing out important insights on the role of public discourse and national philosophies in helping to explain the adoption of integration exams. I also draw on insights from the governmentality literature in order to problematize the tendency to present the state as the final arbitrator in the bordering practices associated with naturalization and integration. Throughout my analysis I highlight how non-state experts and the policy implementation process have been understudied, and present my own approach that is informed by the works of Foucault, among others. In doing so, I argue that the integration exam is a form of sovereign, disciplinary, and bio-power, and as such resets on the authority of multiple actors who gain their power from sources beyond the state.

In the core empirical chapters on the United Kingdom (Chapter 3) and the Netherlands (Chapter 4), I apply the methodological framework I discuss in Chapter 2, by first exploring the relationship between citizenship, immigration, and integration policy in the production of borders. In the Netherlands I find that the boundaries of inclusion have been historically tied to affective notions of loyalty and love, and discuss the important racialized aspects codified in citizenship and integration policy. In the United Kingdom, I demonstrate how citizenship policy has been employed as a tool through which to slowly close off access to the physical space of the state for racialized colonial subjects. I then turn to a discussion of the problematization of integration in the post-WWII period. Again, I find evidence of a continuity of practice in the Netherlands by highlighting how problems within immigrant communities have been framed around cultural incompatibility, even within the ‘multiculturalist’ era. In particular, I focus on how the production of knowledge about immigrant communities, and the codification of certain immigrants as non-Western *allochtoon* is important to our understandings of why cultural values play such an important role in Dutch integration policy, and the exam eventually adopted. In the United Kingdom, I demonstrate how the shift in policy framing away from race relations, to one of social cohesion under the Blair-Labour government marks dramatic rupture in approach, which led to a more individualized integration process.

I end both chapters with an account of how the experts involved in the implementation of the exams in question used their status as experts to influence the policy

outcomes. In the Netherlands, I explore how the experts used the language of test reliability to resist heavy emphasis on the behavioral and cultural value content of the exams. In the United Kingdom, I explain how ESOL experts used best practices of language instruction and the language of equity to successfully push for a less difficult ESOL with citizenship course option. In Chapter 5, I turn to a comparative analysis of the cases, focusing specifically on the important role of affective orientation in the problematization of integration, and explore how affect became embedded in different ways into the content and requirements of the exam. I then turn to a discussion of problematization of immigrant women, and how this relates to gendered norms embedded within the exam content, particularly in the case of the Netherlands. I conclude with an exploration of the exams impact on the inclusion of immigrant women into the imagined and physical borders of the state and community. In Chapter 6, I reflect on the contributions this thesis makes to the literatures on comparative public policy, governmentality, and affective citizenship.

## Chapter 2

### Methodology & Literature Review

#### Introduction: Citizenship as Idea and Institution

As outlined in the previous chapter, this work seeks to explore how the United Kingdom and the Netherlands have implemented integration exams as part of the naturalization and settlement process for migrants. Further, it considers the adoption of this policy as a way in which to understand how the state frames its understanding of citizens more generally and how these tests seek to shape citizens' behavior in particular ways. Finally, with an eye to the development and implementation of the tests, this thesis considers the role of non-state actors in the policy making process. Traditional approaches to the study of public policy have focused on the role that actors, institutions, and ideas have in shaping the direction of policy development and the possibility of change. One of the difficulties in studying citizenship policy (and change) from a traditional public policy position is that one must account for citizenship as both an institution and an idea, and the mutually constitutive relationship between the two. Citizenship as an institution can be understood as the rules and regulations that determine who is included or excluded, and the rights and obligations associated with state membership. It is through and by the state that citizenship as rules and regulations are enforced. However, it is also citizenship as an institution that makes the state possible by inscribing over whom the state has authority to govern and a responsibility to protect. At the same time, citizenship as an idea informs and shapes these rules and regulations. *Why* the institution of citizenship includes some people over others is a reflection of how citizenship is understood as an idea.

In the literature on comparative public policy, the analytical concept of an 'idea' is used by some to explain the specific policy changes that are taken up by actors or the values that motivate actors' strategies within a particular policy field (Ostrom 1990; Simon 2000), while for others ideas are the value systems that inform the selection of one policy over another. In the latter use of the word, authors often draw on the work of Hall (1993) who discusses the importance of paradigms in shaping the boundaries of policy change. The adapted use of Kuhn's (2012) orders of change has grown into a substantial and diverse literature that has tended to focus on the incremental change and general resilience of neoliberalism as the dominant paradigm shaping all policy change (for a variety of perspectives see: McBride and Merolli 2013; Graefe 2007). In contrast, 'institution' refers to

the rules, practices, norms, and relationships that shape the strategic actions of those involved in policy change. Different approaches to policy analysis place varying degrees of emphasis as to how ideas, institutions, and actors influence policy change, or the lack thereof. While analytically distinct, ideas and intuitions are intricately tied to one another. We can, for example, think of paradigms as ideas that have become institutionalized through policy decisions, programs, and state practices that actualize them, and thus render them tangible and stable.

The difficulty in teasing out the institution of citizenship from the idea of citizenship is complicated further by the fact that legally codified definitions of citizens are incomplete. As a legal category that defines membership within a political community, citizenship is often presented as a legal contract between the state and individuals. In her book, *The Citizen and the Alien*, Bosniak (2008) employs this basic definition while highlighting the incompleteness of the legal concept through the example of the territorially present alien, that is non-citizens living within the state who may or may not have status as legal residents. Bosniak's work is heavily entrenched in the legal scholarship framework and her analysis of citizenship focuses on both the border regime and individual rights of all territorial present persons protected by the constitution in the United States. Through an analysis of alienage and Supreme Court decisions, Bosniak challenges the idea that there is a clear division between those included and excluded from the practices and institutions of citizenship. She demonstrates how the idea that the state has no obligation to non-citizens becomes untenable in the face of other aspects of citizenship, namely the equality between persons that is codified in the constitution. Her analysis emphasizes the way in which citizenship as an idea is both reified and challenged through individual and state practices, including border control, the provision of social services and state protection, and the claiming of rights. In doing so, Bosniak opens up opportunities to reassess how the idea and institution of citizenship is both a stable and fragile concept.

Similarly, Joppke points out that citizenship is a more complex concept, which goes beyond legal membership. He argues that citizenship has three distinct features:

... citizenship as *status*, which denotes formal state membership and the rules of access to it; citizenship as *rights*, which is about the formal capacities and immunities connected with such status; and, in addition, citizenship as *identity*, which refers to the behavioral aspects of individuals acting and conceiving themselves as members of a collectivity classically the nation, *or* the normative conceptions of such behavior imputed by the state (Joppke 2008b, 38).

Joppke emphasizes the importance of the state in relation to each of these three aspects. From this perspective, states are responsible for defining and administering membership regimes and the rights associated with membership, which in turn shapes the ideas and identities of citizenship. Others have argued that while states have tried to hold the monopoly on determining state membership, other forces at play have undermined their ability to act in isolation. For example, Soysal (1994) aptly shows that global ideas can and do influence the state's ability to exclude some from the rights traditionally associated with citizenship, by tracing out how non-citizen migrants lay claim to certain social and political rights. Still, the point here is that while ideas and international organizations might constrain the actions of the state, one way in which citizenship is made material is through the authority of the state over citizens and non-citizens alike. Indeed, from this perspective Arendt's seminal work on statelessness and the centrality of the state in analyses of citizenship and rights remains pertinent. For Arendt, without the state, citizens have no one to recognize and protect their rights and as such "the loss of national rights was identical with the loss of human rights"(Arendt 2001, 292). In this thesis, the centrality of the state in relation to the institution of citizenship is unsettled by my arguments of what the idea of citizenship and the practices associated with those ideas look like. Similarly, urban citizenship movements (Siemiatycki 2014; Nyers 2011; Bauböck 2003), and cosmopolitan political thought (Ingram 2013) point to new ways of thinking about citizenship that displace the state's authority over systems of inclusion and exclusion.

In the face of these alternatives, the introduction of integration exams should be read as an attempt by states to reassert themselves as the arbitrator of citizenship as status, rights, and identity. What is interesting is that in the cases considered here, governments have relied on third-party expert organizations to operationalize citizenship as identity so as to create an exam. Despite the growing role of non-governmental actors in public policy associated with the neoliberal hollowing out of the state, in the field of citizenship studies, the state has remained the central focus of analysis and has been seen as the final arbiter of citizenship. Yet, at the same time, by bringing non-state actors into the implementation of integration exams, it becomes necessary broaden the field of inquiry to include the role of non-state actors.

A traditional public policy approach might ask why states pursue naturalization policy changes? Which actors were involved? How did paradigmatic ideals shifted to allow change? What limits did past policy direction place on change? While these questions are valuable in

their own right, they are not the primary goal of this work. As described in the introductory chapter, this work focuses on the adoption of a very specific policy option, namely a state-administered exam for permanent settlement and naturalization. Rather than asking why states have adopted this measure, the focus here is on what the exam allows us to understand about how the state has come to view citizenship as both an idea and institution. Further, the emphasis placed on the development and implementation of the various tests, provides fertile ground for investigating how non-state actors have become instrumental in the management of borders, migrants, and citizens, opening up new possibilities for resistance and change. This chapter begins with an overview of the theoretical insights gained from the governmentality literature for studies of policy change. I then move to consider the rapidly expanding literature on integration exams, mapping out important gaps in our understanding, and exploring how governmentality as a methodological approach can respond to these gaps. I conclude with a detailed discussion of the methodological tools used for this research project.

### **Governmentality: a methodological approach**

Governmentality is a useful conceptual tool for understanding the purpose and effects of integration exams as this concept seeks to capture the interrelations between the techniques of governing and the mentalities of governing. Most critically, Foucault advances an understanding of governing which is far broader than more traditional statist approaches. By thinking about governing as “the conduct of conduct” rather than just state-administered policies and laws, Foucault (1995) calls attention to the varied systems of power that conduct or shape everyday life. Further, by recognizing the multitude of authorities at play, such an approach also calls us to be attuned to how different rationalities come to dominate, while others are marginalized. Thus any given system of governance is not understood simply as the ‘natural’ or ‘rational’ outcome of various institutions, actors, and ideas at play, because at stake in such an approach are a very different set of questions. Rose (1999, 35) explains that an analytics of government stands in contrast to other approaches that ask why something did or did not happen, writing:

This stems from their preoccupation with a distinctive family of questions, arising from a concern with our own present. How did it become possible to make truths about persons, their conduct, the means of action upon this and the reasons for such action? How did it become possible to make these truths in these ways and in this geographical, temporal and existential space? How were these truths enacted and by whom, in what torsions and tensions with other truths, through what contests, struggles, alliances, bribes,

blackmails, promises and threats? What relations of seduction, domination, subordination, allegiance and distinction were thus made possible? And, from the perspective of our own concerns, what is thus made intelligible in our present truths.

Similarly, for Dean (2009, 33) an analytics of government requires four dimensions, which although distinct “are co-present within each regime of practices, that each constitutes a line of continual transformation and variation, and that each presupposes the others without being reducible to them.” These dimensions are visibility, knowledge, techniques and practices, and identities. Visibility refers to what remains in the purview or scope of a regime and asks “by what kind of light it illuminates and defines certain objects and with what shadows and darkness it obscures and hides others”(Dean 2009, 41). The point here is that the way in which a regime sees and makes things visible or understandable, shapes which, what and how subjects and spaces will be governed and to what end.

While in traditional public policy work, the way in which the material and social world is represented is often taken for granted, the work of Scott (1999) in *Seeing like a State*, highlights the important ways in which these representations both advance certain knowledges and truths, while simultaneously obscuring others and, by Scott’s account, to sometimes devastating ends. If we accept the goal of the exam is to foster ‘integration’ and inclusion into society, an analytics of government approach might ask *not only* how we measure integration, but also upon what representations of the immigrant and their relation to the citizen does integration come to be *seen* as a problem that needs to be solved. This project seeks to consider how the immigrants in the United Kingdom and Netherlands have been categorized as such regardless of their citizenship status, and how they thus become understood as a problematic group within society.

Closely related but distinct from visibility are the forms of knowledge that inform a regime of government. Dean (2009, 42) asks:

What forms of thought, knowledge, expertise, strategies, means of calculations, or rationalities are employed in practices of governing? How does thought seek to transform these practices? How do these practices of governing give rise to specific forms of truth?

The point here is to consider how both systems of knowledge and truth-making shape the possibilities of action within a regime. In the case of an integration exam, we might ask upon what systems of knowledge and networks of expertise does the exam rest? Who exactly is called upon to provide this expertise as authorities? What are the relationships between these

authorities? These are the important questions at stake in such analysis. As Rose (1999, 44) notes, “It is thus a matter of analyzing what counts as truth, who has the power to define truth, the role of different authorities of truth, and the epistemological, institutional and technical conditions for the production and circulation of truths.” While the problematization of integration itself rests on the production of knowledge and information that details the social exclusion of immigrants, the introduction of integration exams also requires the state to call on a number of specialists, from test-making experts to language instructors. Thus questions arise as to who was included in the process? How their expertise was weighted? And, perhaps more critically, who was excluded? The point here is to consider how knowledge itself is a political and contested concept, and that decisions as to what counts and who bears that knowledge makes certain policy ideas and responses possible, while rendering others unknowable.

The third element to consider in this analysis are the technologies of government, meaning the “means, mechanisms, procedures, instruments, tactics, techniques, technologies and vocabularies” through which authority is constituted (Dean 2009, 42). This dissertation considers the integration exams in the United Kingdom and Netherlands as a disciplinary technique that seeks to transform the individual immigrant into a particular kind of citizen. Furthermore, it asks upon what ‘assemblages of authority’ the exams rest, and tries to diagnose its effect. In other words, it considers how the problematization of immigrant integration, and the experts involved in the development of the instrument are central to our understanding of how and why the content, scope, and requirements of the two exams vary. We must consider the integration exam as a technique used to control access to full citizenship rights that is also linked to vocabularies of exclusion and technologies of surveillance that cast immigrants as the ‘other’ who must be transformed for the security of the self, the state, and society.

Finally, we must consider the various identities at play in the policy process. In the case of citizenship, it is not enough to ask how a regime defines and makes possible particular conceptions of the citizen and non-citizen As Dean (2009, 43) argues, an analytics of government asks:

What statuses, capacities, attributes, and orientations are assumed of those who exercise political authority (from politicians and bureaucrats to professionals and therapists) and those who are to be governed (workers, consumers, pupils and social welfare recipients)? What forms of conduct are expected of them? What duties and rights



do they have? How are these capacities and attributes to be fostered?  
How are these duties enforced and rights ensured?

The point here is also to consider how the identity of the ‘expert’ is developed, how individuals or organizations are identified as such, and made to relate to each other and the political authorities who engage them. Focusing on the formation of these ‘expert’ identities helps to reveal how those involved draw upon their status as an ‘expert’ and their duties to uphold certain values and standards within their field of expertise to push for policy change.

From the perspective of several scholars (Bertossi and Duyvendak 2012; van Houdt, Suvarierol, and Schinkel 2011; Schinkel and van Houdt 2010) the literature on integration exams has missed a vital avenue of investigation. While existing studies have made significant contributions to our descriptive understanding of integration exams, they have tended to focus largely on normative assessments of the exams within liberal-democratic states and the exam’s fit with national models of integration. However, the approach promoted by scholars of governmentality rejects this type of inquiry, broadening the questions asked about policy to focus on how certain bordering regimes and the techniques they employ are made possible. And relatedly, what possibilities are foreclosed? Such an approach calls us to abandon thinking of the integration exam as a singular policy decision, which may or may not fit within a particular citizenship policy of a specific state, or that may or may not be consistent with liberal ideology. Instead, it calls us to consider how such a technique became possible. Upon what system of knowledge and expertise does the exam rest? How does this shape the problem the exam is meant to solve? How has the problem come to be understood as something that needs to be acted upon? Who is the target of the exam? Who are the targeted population meant to become? And how does the test come to be seen as the way to achieve this end?

The approach taken here is to consider citizenship as part of a bordering regime and the integration exam as one of many techniques of government. Together with immigration policy and integration policy, citizenship policy is a set of practices that the state employs to manage the movement of bodies across the physical and imagined borders of the state. Further, the exam itself and more specifically, the actualization of the exam, provides a key moment through which we can begin to unpack and understand citizenship, not simply as a set of legal categories or collection of ideas, but as a system of rationalities and techniques which seeks to condition and transform citizens and non-citizens alike into self-regulating subjects who act in ways that are deemed desirable by the state. More specifically, the

governmentality approach allows us to consider in what ways the citizenship-bordering regime might be changing or challenged. As Rose (1999, 25) points out, governmentality as a scholarly method, “encourages an attention to the humble, the mundane, the little shifts in our ways of thinking and understanding, the small and contingent struggles, tensions and negotiations that give rise to something new and unexpected.” Thus, this work places the technical execution and actualization of two systems of testing integration as the central point of investigation. It is through the analysis of this particular moment that this work seeks to focus on the expertise and systems of knowledge upon which tests are based. It considers how the inclusion of non-state actors in policy-making can open up space for resistance and re-imaginings of what citizenship can mean, even within state apparatus.

### **Regimes of Citizenship: Seeking New Questions from Old Answers**

While the approach here is to consider a different set of questions than those that have been asked traditionally in relation to citizenship policy, the contributions of other scholars to current debates on citizenship, and indeed the debates themselves, remain important to the analytical focus of this work. The scholarly work on citizenship and integration remains vast and plentiful and so to manage this scope and scale, I organize my analysis of such work along the questions asked by the authors, rather than methods employed, although the two are certainly related.

*Do states vary in their approach to citizenship and integration? Why?*

There exists a vast literature in the field of citizenship studies that calls us to consider the ways in which different states have approached the legal and social category of citizen. Scholars engaged in this debate have developed systems for categorizing different states among several categories of ‘ideal-types’ or regimes of citizenship. Regime refers to a particular system of institutional characteristics and ideological positions that shape citizenship policy in one way or another.<sup>3</sup> These studies have tended to be based on a historical analysis of each regime.

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<sup>3</sup>This is in contrast to governmentality literature, which uses regime to refer to the organized ways that knowledge and power are produced and the associated practices of governing.

In their book, *Contested Citizenship: Immigration and Cultural Diversity in Europe*, Koopmans *et al* (2005) create a matrix of citizenship regimes based on two measures: (1) accessibility of citizenship to foreign nationals and; (2) tolerance of cultural difference. The first measure reflects earlier work by Brubaker (1998), who argues that citizenship regimes are not simply legal arrangements, but also reflect how a given state understands the relationship between the citizen and the nation. Brubaker points to France and Germany as the ideal models of the civic-territorial and ethnic models of citizenship respectively. In the first instance, the boundaries of the nation align with the physical boundaries of the state and thus membership is based on residency (*jus soli*). Alternatively, under the ethnic model, the boundaries of the nation extend beyond the physical space of the state and thus membership is granted through blood (*jus sanguinis*). On a normative level, France's civic-territorial model is presented as more open and thus inclusive of immigrants. While Brubaker provides a detailed historical analysis of the development of citizenship laws in France and Germany, his model has been criticized for its inability to account for the reality of overt racism and social exclusion experienced by foreigners within both states.

The second criteria used by Koopmans *et al* is intended to address this criticism of Brubaker's work. On this measure, states are assessed based on the extent to which cultural rights are granted to different ethnic groups. Under this measure, they consider multicultural rights and anti-discrimination rights, in order to categorize states on a continuum from cultural monism to cultural pluralism. Using these criteria, Koopmans *et al* develop four ideal citizenship-regime types; (1) Segregationist, typified by Germany, which grants citizenship rights along ethnic lines (*jus sanguinis*) but does not require foreign nationals to assimilate; (2) Assimilationist, which also grants citizenship along ethnic lines, but does not tolerate cultural difference; (3) Universalist, typified by France, which conceptualizes citizenship along civic-territorial lines, while requiring cultural monism and; (4) Multiculturalist, typified by the Netherlands and Britain, which combine civic territorial citizenship with cultural pluralism. In this sense, multicultural states are presented as *de facto* the most inclusive, as they have the fewest restrictions in terms of legal membership, and provide political space for the expression of individual and cultural identities.

Koopmans *et al* and Brubaker's works provide an orderly way of categorizing states' citizenship and anti-discrimination legislation. Their analyses take into account the historical development of legal citizenship and how it relates to discourses of belonging and fraternity, and thus how citizenship as an idea has shaped the legal institutions of state membership. From a more traditional public policy perspective, this approach highlights how both ideas

and institutions can be ‘path dependent.’<sup>4</sup> Yet, Favell (2002) notes that ideas can only provide part of the story. Taking up Brubaker’s argument regarding the role of liberal democratic ideology in shaping citizenship regimes, Favell compares the United Kingdom and France to try to understand why their approaches to immigrant integration have been so different. Favell argues that in part the differences rest in the particular variants of liberalism (and their key historical figures), which inform public debate. However, while the UK’s policy might be informed by the supremacy of individual rights and an aversion to interference in the private sphere, according to Favell, policy outcomes are also a reflection of politicians and bureaucrats utilizing political philosophies to justify practical responses to the realities of immigration. Rather than suggesting that path dependency prevents change, Favell argues that it is a requirement of policy change. He writes:

The path dependency of institutions is therefore not just a negative feature of institutional inertia; it is quite literally a necessary property of any constructive politics. All new policies and institutions have to be built on old ones; moreover, the language and culture of a particular problem and its political environment is not going to change overnight (Favell 2002, 248–9).

Thus by his account, rather than simply being the rational outcome of the dominant political discourse, a policy is the result of identifying options that can be justified and made to fit within dominant discourses.

The way in which each of these works places emphasis on the role of political discourses is useful for understanding how a particular citizenship regime became and continues to be possible. However from the perspective of an analytics of government approach, it is only part of a much larger story. While Brubaker and Koopmans *et al* call on the local variants of liberal-democracy to help explain why particular countries adopt different strategies for citizenship and integration, we do not get a full sense of *how* such philosophies remain salient. Although we get some idea of the rationalities at play and techniques employed in the development of citizenship regimes, it remains less clear upon

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<sup>4</sup> In his analysis of British shift from the welfare to neoliberal state, Hall (1993) provides an account for how paradigms, or dominate theories which inform policy development; are resistant to change. Similarly, Triadafilopoulos (2012) builds on Hall’s approach to account for policy change in the field of citizenship and multicultural policy in Canada and Germany. Like Hall, he finds that the paradigms or theories of belonging which inform citizenship as an idea, are resistant to change, leading policy makers to try to adapt and adjust current policies in order to respond to new material or ideological changes.

what systems of knowledge and expertise they lay and are reproduced. Favell for his part tries to show how the dominance of race-relations legislation in the UK, intended to foster integration, is in part a reflection of the legacy of colonialism, characterized by entrenched systems of organizing and identifying persons based on race. He also illustrates how Burkian understandings of collective representation are linked to the local and civil society character of British integration. Moreover, he takes time to consider how important philosophical thinkers like Marshall, and studies such as Rose's analysis of institutional racism in *Colour and Citizenship: A Report on British Race Relations*, shaped how public servants and individuals thought about the problems and appropriate solutions to managing ethnic diversity in the United Kingdom. These are important insights into the rationalities in the development integration policy in United Kingdom. However, focusing on the question of how to manage ethnic diversity and immigrants, obscures the way in which citizenship and integration policy reflect understandings of what it means to be a citizen generally. These systems of political inclusion and exclusion cannot be understood outside of the context of other techniques and practices deployed by the state in other policy areas, which also seek to shape citizens. The aim of this thesis is to consider how the neoliberalization of the state not only reforms how governments function, but also changes what citizenship means.<sup>5</sup> This does not mean that the liberal ideologies that Brubaker and Favell point to are no longer relevant, but that we must assess how these rationalities are adapted and redeployed in ways that compliment the neoliberal project.

Another cluster of research attempts to categorize states based on the mix of existing policy in order to trace trends overtime. Research produced by the Migration Policy Group ('MPG') normatively assesses existing policy on its ability to facilitate inclusion. The Migrant Integration Policy Index developed by MPG considers a range of policies that are likely to have an impact on social inclusion, including citizenship requirements, family reunification rules and anti-discrimination legislation. Here states are organized on a scale from unfavourable to highly favourable for integration. Other scholars, such as Goodman (2010), seek to provide a categorization that rejects linear assessments of integration policies and

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<sup>5</sup> The neoliberalization of the state is typically associated with the retrenchment of rights for citizens. However, the reforms are also often associated with merit-based support, tying social rights to economic, social, and political contributions to the community. For a discussion on the emancipatory potential of the neoliberal meritocracy logic for immigrants see Schmidtke (2012).

highlights how different constellations of citizenship and immigration policy, and civic integration requirements, create distinct models for integrating migrants. Goodman proposes to consider “who has access” and “under what conditions does someone with eligibility obtain citizenship” as the two intersecting vectors of analysis. Under access, Goodman includes indicators such as *jus sanguinis* and *jus soli*, settlement requirements, acceptance of dual nationality, and subsequently ranks states on a continuum of restrictive to liberal. On the vector of conditions for citizenship, Goodman provides a scale of ‘thick’ to ‘thin’ requirements based on indicators of language testing, citizenship exams and ceremonies, while also accounting for the stage at which these requirements are necessary, arguing integration exams at early stages are more cumbersome. By plotting the results Goodman identifies four clusters or regime types, prohibitive, conditional, insular and enabling.<sup>6</sup> Goodman provides some discussion on what may have led to the particular mix of policies, for example calling on Brubaker’s earlier work to explain Germany’s identification as prohibitive despite the modest liberalization of access rules. Yet, approaches to citizenship based on categorization of states fail to provide deeper understandings of how states have come to see whatever mix of policy they employ as appropriate and possible. The work on categorization is more useful, however, in considering the second key question at stake in current debates.

*Are states converging or remaining distinct?*

Closely related to the literature on citizenship and integration models is the ongoing debate over whether states are converging onto a similar approach, particularly within the context of the European Union. Indeed, as states across Europe have moved to adopt integration requirements with eleven countries employing formalized exams,<sup>7</sup> this debate has

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<sup>6</sup> While Goodman finds 4 distinct groups, a response by Michalowski and van Oers (2012) take issue with Goodman’s choices of indicators and the way in which those indicators are coded. Using the more elaborate MIPEX indices for integration and citizenship access, Michalowski and van Oers are unable to produce similar results to Goodman. In part they argue this is explained by the way Goodman operationalized her indicators. They argue that Goodman fails to consider integration requirements within the context of how liberal or restrictive access to immigration is for migrants, and note that the scoring of the Dutch case is misleading. In other words, what Goodman’s assessment does not capture is how integration requirements have been explicitly used in the Netherlands as a means to limit immigration in the first place.

<sup>7</sup> As of March 2015, according to the EUDO CITLAW Index, Denmark, Estonia, France, Luxemburg, Lithuania, Netherlands, Switzerland, Australia, Germany, Hungary, Latvia and the United Kingdom have all adopted a formalized integration exam as part of the naturalization process. This includes cases where the integration exam is required earlier as part of the permanent settlement process. An additional nine countries

become the key site of scholarly work. Implicit in these debates is a second question. Are integration tests consistent with the national model under consideration? Or do they mark a departure from the traditional approach toward a new global norm? For his part, Joppke has argued that framing citizenship regimes as national models was never a particularly useful way to investigate citizenship and integration, and writes in the context of the convergence around exams “[t]he notion of national models no longer makes sense, if it ever did” (Joppke 2007b, 2). From Joppke’s perspective, the issue is not that states have adopted similar policies, but rather that the particularities of each country’s integration exam are inconsistent with what would be expected of them based upon what is laid out within typologies of national models. For instance, comparing Germany, the Netherlands, and France, Joppke argues that the most ‘multiculturalist’ in practice, the Netherlands, has adopted a version of an integration test that is the most restrictive and assimilationist in terms of its focus on cultural norms.

In a direct response, Jacobs and Rea (2009) acknowledge the challenges that convergence around certain policies places on defending various typologies. Yet, they argue models remain pertinent as ideal types against which to measure change. While Jacobs and Rea concede to Joppke that the Netherlands has generally abandoned multiculturalism, they argue that elements of that approach remain relevant, suggesting that situating this rupture within the literature of models helps illuminate both change and continuity with the Netherlands. Further, they argue that despite the convergence around integration exams, states remain distinct along several features, including political opportunity structures of ethnic minorities, approaches to the statistical measurement of foreigners, the identities of ethnic and racial minorities that are territorially present, and lastly the approach to addressing religious conflicts. Similarly, Goodman’s typology seeks to show that while civic integration requirements appear similar, in practice they are very different. Further, she notes that their effect on integration must be considered within the context of other naturalization requirements. By ranking states along two axes, integration requirements and rules of access, Goodman concludes that in fact there remain four distinct approaches to integration, despite convergence on a specific technique, namely the integration exams.

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have adopted an integration requirement, but do not use a standardized assessment, this includes Croatia, Greece, Italy, Kosovo, Moldova, Romania, Slovakia, Spain and Turkey. Finally, Luxemburg requires applicants to complete a mandatory course, but does not formally assess integration using an exam (CITLAW 2015).

In the same special edition of the *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, Vink and de Groot (2010) supplement Goodman's quantitative analysis. They provide a qualitative comparison of 15 countries on various aspects of citizenship policy, including: extension and limitation of *jus sanguinis* and *jus soli*, acceptance of multiple citizenships, integration requirements, and naturalization procedures. In doing so they argue that although there remains significant diversity in the rules and regulations, "a number of broad trends can be distinguished which, overall but certainly not always, tend to converge national policies rather than the opposite" (Vink and de Groot 2010, 731). Conversely, for Bertossi and Duyvendak (2012) the literature on convergence itself is misguided. They argue that models presented by Koopmans *et al* fail to adequately capture both how policies and approaches shift over time and how different policy spheres, besides citizenship and anti-discrimination, can be informed by different understandings of integration, and subsequently affect immigrant integration.

From an analytics of government perspective, the debates around convergence can distract from the type of questions at the heart of such an analysis. This is because states are assessed based on the presence or absence of similar policy, which can obscure the ways in which the same policy can be redeployed for new purposes and informed by new rationalities. Alternatively, it fails to account for how states use different policies for similar ends. While some authors try to explain convergence, these accounts often casually implicate forces of globalization (Wright 2008), the internationalization of policy developed in the EU (Goodman 2011; Vink and de Groot 2010), and the securitization of immigration in their explanations (Howard 2010), suggesting inevitability instead of showing how changes rest upon deliberate problematizations of integration. Others look to the policy-learning literature that seeks to trace how policy-makers learn from each other across jurisdictions, without first considering how expertise itself is constituted (Michalowski 2004).

Notwithstanding this, there remain elements of the work on convergence that are useful to this project. Firstly, there is a vast literature in the public policy field that explores how exactly convergence happens. Whether from states spontaneously reacting to similar political problems, pressure from international organizations (Stone 2004), or looking to others for policy ideas (McBride and Teeple 2011), the general convergence literature has tried to account for the role of experts and international knowledge-networks (Slaughter 2004) in the dissemination of common ideas and standards. Oddly enough this analysis has



not extended to the study of integration exams. Although there is a fair amount of work trying to seek out *if* convergence is occurring, there is very little detailed attention to *how* convergence happens. The few exceptions include scholarship which examine the role of the EU Framework in giving legitimacy to integration requirements (Goodman 2011), and some relatively superficial discussions of how Germany and Belgium have tried to emulate the Netherlands (Michalowski 2004) and how Britain has looked to its commonwealth partners, Canada and Australia (Cerna and Wietheoltz 2011). Thus while the study of integration policy has not yielded much insight into the mechanisms of convergence, it does provide grounds upon which to push the line of questioning to consider the role of international networks of experts and bodies of knowledge in disseminating common practices. Top of mind here is the particular focus on language skills in the integration exams and the international and domestic organizations that oversee, develop, and implement language assessment tools and standards. Worth questioning is how these standards shape the realm of possibility in terms of the techniques that are made available and the construction of the problem of integration itself.

Critics of the integration convergence literature highlight persistent variation, which opens up an opportunity to consider how those differences occur. While there surely is a trend towards organizing the problematization of integration around the Muslim community and their supposed threat to security (Turner 2014; Bowen et al. 2013; Haque 2010; Razack 2004), precisely *how* this is done reflects particular ways of thinking about immigrants, Muslims, citizens, and their relationships with the state that precede the events of 9/11 (or in the cases considering here the 2001 British race riots, London 7/7 bombings, and the assassination of Pim Fortuyn and murder of Theo Van Gogh). Further, an analytics of government requires that we also consider how immigrant integration policy is linked to rationalities that give rise to particular ways of governing. In other words, it illuminates how integration exams are reflective of the state's presumed power over borders, while also providing analytical tools for investigating how borders are practices that include a multiplicity of actors. In this particular case, an analytics of government approach helps to highlight the important role played by experts in language learning and test-making in the management of the imagined borders of the state.

*Are current integration exams consistent with liberalism?*

The third major cluster of work on integration exams focuses on their fit within liberal democracies and whether they are consistent with liberal norms. Here, there are two

main positions, the first maintains that exams are not consistent with liberalism, and the second establishes that consistency with liberal norms depends on the content of the exams and/or their effect. On the far end of the debate is Carens (2013) who argues that naturalization should have very few barriers besides a residency requirement and therefore finds integration exams inconsistent with liberalism. Others argue that the content and effects of such exams impacts whether they are consistent with liberalism. For example, Joppke (2010) uses a Rawlsian definition of liberalism and concludes that so long as integration exams only test what is ‘right’ and not what is ‘good’, they are consistent with liberal democratic values. In a response, which finds integration tests completely consistent with liberalism as he defines it, Hansen (2010) points out that part of the problem with this debate is that everyone employs a different conception of liberalism.<sup>8</sup>

On this point, the work of Rose and Brown is particularly useful for reframing the question of whether integration tests are consistent with liberalism. Brown’s work on how tolerance is deployed as a tool by the state problematizes the presumed neutrality of ‘tolerance.’ In providing a genealogy of tolerance as a concept that arises out of religious conflict in Western Europe and which seeks to privatize and individualize difference as a means to manage diversity, Brown (2008) shows how tolerance is employed to justify illiberal practices which reify liberalism without calling into question liberal values. She argues that tolerance discourse is used to regulate both the external and internal Other, and “often it forms a circuit between them that legitimates the most illiberal actions”(Brown 2008, 8). Tolerance is about protecting the erosion of liberal values of the state, from those who are seen to threaten it. In her discussion of the relationship between tolerance and (neo)colonialism, Brown highlights how tolerance discourse provides justification for state intervention. She writes:

The dual function of civilizational discourse, marking in general what counts as “civilized” and conferring superiority on the West, produces tolerance itself in two distinct, if intersecting, power functions: as part of what defines the superiority of Western civilization, and as that which marks certain non-Western practices or regimes as intolerable. Together, these operations of tolerance discourse in a civilizational

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<sup>8</sup> An interesting and lively overview of this debate can be found on the EUDO Citizenship website. An online open forum debate initiated from Joppke yielded responses from several key scholars in the areas of citizenship and integration. See: Rainer Bauböck and Christian Joppke (eds.) *How Liberal are Citizenship Tests: EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2010/41*, (Florence: European University Institute, 2010).

frame legitimize liberal polities' illiberal treatment of selected practices, peoples, and states. They sanction illiberal aggression toward what is marked as intolerable without tarring the "civilized" status of the aggressor. (Brown 2008, 178–9)

Similarly, in his work on freedom, Rose (1999) argues that rather than being seen as the opposite to government, analyzing freedom as a tool of government allows us to see the ways freedom is deployed to create (neo)liberal subjects, sometimes through illiberal or coercive means. Both Rose and Brown draw from Foucault's earlier work on discipline (with its target the individual) and bio politics (with its target the population), calling attention to how techniques are used by the state (and other authorities) to create governable subjects, or in this case neoliberal subjects. From this perspective the question is not whether the integration exam is or is not consistent with liberalism but rather, how such exams are deployed as a tool by and for the liberal state. How does the exam reify the neoliberal state? To what end is the exam used in shaping governable subjects? Such an analysis calls for an account of the exam that distinguishes between questions that assess what is "right" and what is "good", and suggests that both types of questions are important for understanding the type of citizen subject the exam seeks to produce.

### **Foucault Revisited**

As described above, the literature on integration tests can be useful in situating on-going changes to the naturalization process within the context of public discourses (Brubaker 1998; Favell 2002) and practices (Goodman 2012; Joppke 2007b; Koopmans et al. 2005) of belonging. Further, while the debate on convergence is far from settled, the different approaches to classifying changes helps to highlight some of rationalities that inform the policy change, the intended goals of the policy changes, and their impact on migrant communities (Bertossi and Duyvendak 2012; Goodman 2012; Michalowski and Oers 2012). An analytics of government approach is useful for exploring a different set of questions than have been considered in the literature. As a methodological approach, it provides us tools to consider how the process of making visible the 'problems' in and with immigrant communities makes possible certain kinds of policy interventions. Further, it allows us to consider how non-state actors become seen as experts, and how such an identity can empower them to resist the state's policy direction, or reify it. In other words, an analytics of government seeks to uncover how certain discourses come to dominate over others through an analysis of the systems of knowledges at play. However, it is also useful to consider how the works of Foucault can further add to this analysis of integration exams, and more

specifically to consider his work on discipline and normalization. As a genealogy of the modern state, Foucault's varied works provide an account of the development of new techniques of government and their relationship with systems of knowledge. Throughout his works, Foucault visits many sites, including, the school, asylum and most famously, the prison, in order to show how the goals and apparatuses or techniques of government have been transformed.

In *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault describes the rise of discipline as a technique through which the modern state governs not through sovereign power of exclusion and corporal punishment, but through transforming individuals into governable subjects. In other words the state uses discipline, or the exercise of power, including the ordering and regulation of individuals in order to create and sustain subjects who can and will function within the state. This is achieved not through punishment by the sovereign, but through self-regulation. Foucault's analysis of discipline rests heavily on its relationship to normalization, which begins with the development of *a priori* norms, followed by action taken to transform individuals to meet the norm. Self-regulation is achieved through observation of the individual and assessment. He writes,

The examination combines the techniques of an observing hierarchy and those of a normalizing judgment. It is a normalizing gaze, a surveillance that makes it possible to qualify, to classify and to punish. It establishes over individuals a visibility through which one differentiates them and judges them (Foucault 1995, 187).

But rather than thinking about the examination as one which separates the normal and abnormal, Foucault calls us to consider how in the examination, both reward and punishment are equally important. It is through the reward that the 'abnormal' might be called to work on him- or herself, to transform and become normal.

In later works Foucault (2010) points to the development of bio-power, which more explicitly focuses on the management of the population than disciplinary power. Foucault revisits his use of the term 'normalization' and substitutes 'normation' as the more appropriate term. In highlighting the difference between discipline as a technique (with its focus on the individual) and bio-power (with its focus on population), Foucault suggests that each technique uses a particular approach to norms. In the case of the disciplines, norms are set based on a prearranged ideal. In the case of bio-power, the norm is based on the observed cases, and action is taken to bring those below the norm within the proper range. This means that in the latter case the norm is consistently changing. The advent of bio-

power is important for understanding the diffuse nature of power in modern society. It is not the elected official who sets the norm, but rather the experts and the administrators who observe and collect data on the population upon which norms are developed. While bio-power has a different rationale than sovereign power, it is exclusionary nonetheless. As Stone (Stone 2013, 353) succinctly put it: “Whereas sovereignty uses power to make die and let live, bio-power makes live and lets die.” While Foucault draws out the development of new kinds of power, he does not suggest that one form of power replaced the other. Instead, in thinking about the state he calls us to consider how different kinds of power – sovereign, disciplinary and bio – are drawn on in order to control and order populations.

The integration exam provides a fruitful opening for investigating power in modern society because it is illustrative of how the intersections of different kinds of power produce systems of inclusion and exclusion. The integration exam is an example of disciplinary power not only because it sets a predetermined norm, but also because it is part of a larger system of rituals and scripts, which those charged with determining integration must follow. The state official or test-provider is called on to assess the immigrant’s ability to internalize and adapt to the norm. The integration exam is also emblematic of bio-power in the sense that it rests on a set of knowledge practices that render immigrants as problematic in terms of their measurement against non-immigrants across a host of factors, including employment, political engagement, educational attainment, among others. It is a technology used to control populations by determining who counts as a citizen, and who does not, and who can call on the state and who cannot. Finally, the integration exam is illustrative of sovereign power in that the state is implicated as ultimately responsible for enforcing the boundaries of inclusion and of protecting ‘us’ from a dangerous ‘them’ through physical, legal, and symbolic exclusions. But upon what norms is this system of inclusion and exclusion based? How does the state determine what marks the immigrant worthy of status from the immigrant who is not worthy? Or in other words, if the test is based on an imagined ideal citizen, what does this imagined body look and act like?

### **The Normal Citizen: Affect, Race, and Gender**

In looking at the integration exam as a technique for both identifying and excluding ‘abnormal’ immigrants from the full rights of citizenship, and transforming those successful into a predetermined ‘normal’ or ‘good’ citizen, we must consider the norms imbedded into the exams themselves. Much of the literature to date has considered the exams to be culturally and racially neutral because they have tended to focus on what has been termed

civic integration. Such authors (and governments alike) argue that the exams and associated study material simply provide migrants with information on the political institutions and history of the state (Joppke 2012; Ersanilli and Koopmans 2010; Hansen 2010). However, this project seeks to problematize this assumed neutrality. While some authors have noted that integration exams do constitute a shift in the approach to integration, which shifts the burden of responsibility onto that of the migrant (Michalowski and Oers 2012; van Oers, Ersbøll, and Kostakopoulou 2010), there has not been sustained attention of how such a shift is also reflected in what constitutes civic integration within the exam itself. Far from simply describing economic and political institutions, the exam and associated materials promote particular ways of engaging with the state, the market, and society. In doing so, they seek to transform the exam-taker. Further, history as told through the exam, is marked by erasure as much as it provides light to specific moments and characteristics of a state's past, as any singular narrative of history necessarily does. These highlighted moments have a political purpose in that they are part of a particular narrative of the state, the market, and society that the exam disseminates. I draw on the literature on affective citizenship, critical race theory and its intersection with feminism, in order to capture the different dimensions along which immigrants are assessed as either integrated or not. Although some have noted how integration exams are emblematic of a 're-ethnicization' of citizenship (Vink and de Groot 2010), the importance of affect, race and gender in assessments of integration exams has often been limited to public debates that have led up to their introduction and other changes to naturalization and immigrant (Fortier 2013; Mullally 2013; Johnson 2010). I seek to extend the insights of these authors to consider how these dimensions become embedded in the test content and requirements.

Although the literature on governmentality is particularly useful in considering questions on how states seek to control, discipline, and shape citizens, Isin (2004) points to an over-emphasis on rationality. He describes a shift in how states govern, focusing on the role of neurosis in both the production and management of citizens. He argues that the modern state does not seek to create 'bionic citizens' who act based on rational calculations of risk, but instead that the state works to produce citizens who "eliminate various dangers by calibrating its conduct on the basis of its anxieties and insecurities rather than rationalities" (223). Similarly Walter (2004) draws upon the image of the 'home' in considering the tensions between what he terms *domopolitics*, that is the governing of the state as a home, and *oikos*, that is governing in the name of the economy and utility. He argues that

economic rationalities, which lend themselves towards free mobility of persons, are in tension with those of domopolitics. He writes:

Domopolitics implies a reconfiguring of the relations between citizenship, state, and territory. At its heart is a fateful conjunction of home, land and security. It rationalizes a series of security measures in the name of a particular conception of home. Of course there is a history to the understanding of homeland and a notable variance in its meaning across countries. However, in a great many of these uses it has powerful affinities with family, intimacy, place: the home as hearth, a refuge or a sanctuary in a heartless world; the home as our place, where we belong naturally, and where, by definition, others do not; international order as a space of homes—every people should have (at least) one; home as a place we must protect. We may invite guests into our home, but they come at our invitation; they don't stay indefinitely. Others are, by definition, uninvited. Illegal migrants and bogus refugees should be returned to 'their homes'. Home as a place to be secured because its contents (our property) are valuable and envied by others. *Home as a safe, reassuring place, a place of intimacy, togetherness and even unity, trust and familiarity.* (Walters 2004, 241 emphasis added)

Both Walters and Isin are pointing to the affective dimensions of management of borders and subjects by focusing on how feelings of unease and comfort are used to rationalize the exclusion of certain people, or behaviors.

Building on Walters' concepts of domopolitics, Fortier's analysis of the problematization of integration and multiculturalism in the United Kingdom reveals much about *whose* feelings of unease matter. Moreover, she illustrates how immigrant's performances of appropriate affective feelings towards the state and community become seen as necessary to appease the fear of others. She writes,

Citizenship ceremonies are a fitting example of the entanglement of technologies of reassurance with technologies of enmity within the fantasy of national unity, as they demarcate a distinction between the good established citizens who need reassuring, the new citizens who need confirmation of their propriety, and the failed citizens – those who do not 'choose to be part of the family' or who fail to 'act British' (Fortier 2008, 101).

I build on Fortier's contribution to consider how the integration exam contributes to the problematization of integration as an affective issue, a problem with immigrants who are perceived to not desire inclusion enough. Further, I consider how the exam tries to both stimulate and assess that desire. I draw on critical race theory and feminist theory to capture how race and gender intersect with the affective dimensions of citizenship to produce the non-integrated immigrant, and the always-already integrated native.

As Foucault shows through his work, the examination requires a singular narrative in order to effectively identify and eliminate particularity. In transforming test-takers the integration exams seeks to create homogeneity. For critical race scholar Goldberg ethno-racial homogeneity is required by the state to justify its existence and boundaries. At the same time, ethno-racial homogeneity is only possible through systems of domination such as the sovereign state. He writes,

Ethnoracial, cultural and national homogeneity is sustained throughout modernity accordingly not because it is the ‘natural condition,’ the very assumption of singularity (‘it’) rhetorically advocating as presumption what it requires *repressive acts of material imposition to effect*. Such homogeneity is achieved and reproduced, it ought to be emphasized, through repression, through occlusion and erasure, restriction and denial, delimitation and domination. In the final analysis, such terms and conditions of reproduction are unsustainable without the order(ing) of the state. (Goldberg 2001, 22 emphasis added)

While the exam surely rests on the authority of the state to accept and deny citizens, the ethno-racial norms imbedded within the exam rest upon certain ways of thinking about race, gender, ethnicity, and citizenship. Critical race theory asks us to reflect on how racism has become embedded in both political and social institutions. In her seminal book, *Understanding Everyday Racism*, Essed (1991, 3) argues that “the crucial criterion distinguishing racism from everyday racism is that the latter involves only systematic, recurrent and familiar practices.” In other words, the focus is not on racism at an individual level, but rather how race and racism is infused into everyday practices. The point here is not to necessarily reject the notion that liberal-democratic states have worked to remove obvious barriers to the inclusion of racialized persons (see Kymlicka 2010), but rather to consider how race remains an important lens through which to understand *who* is seen as a problematic citizen. Essed’s work is particularly relevant to this project’s focus on integration exams, as the material for the tests are meant to assess the extent to which migrants possess the skills and capacities required for everyday life. In this way, critical race theory provides a framework through which to ask whether the capacities, knowledges, and behaviors deemed necessary to be integrated are informed by racialized notions of the ‘good’ citizen. Further, by focusing on the everyday nature of racism, we are able to expand the analysis to move beyond just the state and to consider how non-state actors are bound up in systems of knowledge formation that reproduce racialized bodies and racism.



In the cases considered here, race and religion are tightly bound, with much of the discourse on immigrant integration focused on the perceived immutable differences between Muslim immigrants and their host community (Bowen et al. 2013; Mullally 2013). For example, the growing literature on the securitization of immigration focuses on how particular racialized bodies are treated as security risks (Bigo 2002), and how this shapes their relationship with the state, at the border (Epstein 2007; Salter 2004) within it (Isin & Rygiel 2007), and beyond it (Doty 2009; Dow 2007). Fortier offers the concept of ‘moral racism’ to capture the ways in which “beliefs, values, and morals are the primary site for the marking of absolute difference, rather than ‘cultural practices’ such as customs, traditions, and ‘lifestyles’” (Fortier 2008, 6). This dissertation focuses on the management of relationships between immigrants and the state within the physical borders of the state, by considering how the imagined border of society is used to exclude certain people from the full rights of citizenship. Or as others have put it, it documents how the border follows immigrants inside the state. It draws on the securitization literature in considering how Muslim immigrants (and citizens) are problematized within the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, and asks whether racialized notions of the ‘good’ citizen are embedded within test content.

The intersection of race and gender is particularly relevant to understanding the problematization of immigrants and Muslims in particular. This is because in liberal-states, gender-equality values have become an important marker between the integrated and non-integrated, with veiled-Muslim women coming to symbolize the failures of multiculturalism. As Mullally (2013, 412) notes:

Muslim women, in particular, have been placed at the center of a human rights versus Islam dynamic, appearing as liberalism’s ‘other’, as culture-laden, markers of a ‘parallel cultural bloc’ that is both threatening and destabilising. In contrast, the ‘perfect citizen’ of liberal democracy is presented as the universal subject, culture-free and unburdened by religious beliefs or practices.

In other words, Islam is not only at odds with liberal-democratic values because it is based on values incompatible with liberalism, but also because Muslim people become the embodiment of their religion and culture, unable to keep neat distinctions between the private and public spheres. Or as Brown (2008, 151) asserts, “We’ have culture, ‘they’ are culture; ‘we’ are citizens, ‘they’ are a people.” I consider how the problematization of immigrant women as a particularly vulnerable group is reflected in the exams that are eventually adopted. I focus on how attempts to help and stimulate immigrant women to

integrate into the community not only reflects racialized assumptions about immigrant men, but also gendered understandings of both immigrant and non-immigrant women.

Accordingly, this project analyzes the actualization and implementation of state-administered integration exams for permanent settlement and naturalization. It critically assesses how such exams allow us to better understand how different states' understandings of citizenship as both an idea and institution, and how non-state actors also work to manage borders through their practices of knowledge production. I begin with an account of the problematization of immigrant integration in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. Here I focus on how immigrants are identified as problematic communities through comparisons to the white majority in terms of 'normal' levels of unemployment, education and reliance on social assistance. While much of the literature to date has described and tried to document how onerous (or not) integration exams are, I argue that the use of the exam as an exclusionary mechanism is only one element to consider. If we consider the exam, alongside the preparatory materials and courses, it becomes apparent that integration exams constitute a technique for transforming would-be citizens into particular types of citizens. As such, this process requires the state to develop and prescribe the norms to which the new citizens will be asked to ascribe. It is this particular moment, the implementation and actualization of the exam that forms the of focus this project.

By considering how and who defines the 'good' citizen, I argue that the integration exam rests upon a variety of authorities, some of which operate outside of the state. In particular, I consider the role that language-education and test-making experts play, and how knowledge-systems operate to shape each of the exams under consideration. More importantly, I argue that the impact of language education and test-making experts is not simply on the level of language skill migrants are meant to possess, but rather that they bring with them a particular understanding of what constitutes integration and the 'normal' citizen, that at times clashes with that of others involved in the policy-making process. It is through these clashes and conflicts that we begin to see how the 'normal' citizen emerges and subsequently is quantified through the exam. In this sense, this dissertation considers the way in which the integration test is bound in overlapping systems of sovereign, disciplinary and bio-power. The next section of this chapter presents the methodological framework employed to address the questions at hand, starting with an explicit focus on the policy implementation process as a unique and important moment of policy contestation and change.

## **Methodology**

### *Research Questions*

The core research questions of this thesis are as follows:

- 1) What does the content and requirements of the integration exam reveal about the kinds of citizens the state seeks to produce?
- 2) How did the integration exam come to be seen as a suitable solution? What problem is it meant to solve?
- 3) What does the role of expert advice in the development of exam content reveal about the nature of power and bordering practices in modern society?

### *Case Selection*

This project employs the comparative method in order to understand the varied ways in which integration exams impact the process of inclusion and subject formation. The purpose of this project is not to uncover whether there is convergence around integration models, nor is it intended to add to the existing literature of national models described earlier. Moreover, the theoretical framework informing this project does not seek to produce generalizable conclusions for predictive purposes. Rather, the purpose of using two cases is to explore and understand how the test is employed in different contexts and in different ways by the state and the implications of this on the kind of citizens the exams seek to produce. In this sense, the project could compare any two cases.

Notwithstanding this, I have chosen to study the UK and the Netherlands for a variety of reasons. Firstly, both of these cases have employed a similar model of integration and are often considered liberal in terms of the requirements of naturalization. This project seeks to destabilize this supposition by highlighting how the exam component of the process can act as a coercive requirement that shapes subjects into an idealized model of the ‘good’ citizen. Secondly, while the integration exam in general is premised on the assumption that immigrants can be judged objectively on their ascription to a national identity, both the UK and the Netherlands are multi-ethnic, multi-lingual states, and this complicates the process for creating a clearly defined idealized citizen. Thirdly, the time of the exams introduction provides an opportunity to problematize the direct link often drawn between the post 9/11 securitization of immigrant and strict integration requirements. The Netherlands has a longer history of including integration requirements in the naturalization and settlement process, having introduced a version of the integration courses in 1992. In 2003 a citizenship exam

was adopted, and by 2007 it was replaced by the *Inburgeringsexamen* ('Integration Exam') for permanent settlement and naturalization. In contrast, the United Kingdom has a first added the requirement for integration in 2004, with the test finally launching in 2007. Finally, in both cases, the state turned to non-state actors to develop both the content and requirements of the exams, and again for the exam and course delivery. Thus each provides an opportunity to explore the role of non-state actors in the management of borders.

### *Data Collection*

In order to answer the questions state above, I conducted an initial round of fieldwork in both countries from January 2011-June 2011, followed by a second round in February 2012. During my fieldwork I conducted semi-structured interviews with the experts involved in the development of the exam, as well as with services providers who were responsible for delivering the courses and administering the exams. I also visited drop-in sessions, participated in social and political orientation workshops, and attended events organized by migrant rights organizations. Between the two rounds of my fieldwork I took Dutch language courses offered through the University of Toronto, while also following the official curriculum for the Integration Abroad exam required of some for immigration to the Netherlands. While these engagements with integration service providers and migrant rights organizations do not fall directly into the purview of the analysis conducted in this thesis, these experiences provided important context in terms of the experiences of individual immigrants with the integration and settlement services, and for understanding the relationships between people working 'on the ground' and the state. Further, it also provided some limited insight into how well the integration exams were achieving the ends sought by the state. Explicitly included in the analysis for this thesis are the 27 interviews conducted with the experts involved in the production of exam material and requirements. These included interviews with language experts, test-making experts, settlement experts, and key ministry bureaucrats involved in the implementation of the integration exam.

The participants for the semi-structured elite interviews were identified through a variety of methods. In the United Kingdom, the members of the Life in the United Kingdom Advisory Board ('LUKAG'), and Advisory Board on Naturalization and Integration ('ABNI') were identified using the list of members included in the various reports published by both

groups.<sup>9</sup> Contact information was collected through publically available databases and websites. Information on the public servants involved was collected through the ABNI website, which also provided contact information. Relevant services providers were identified through websites developed by local councils for immigrants, and by a public invitation to participate that was sent to ESOL service providers via a list-serve managed by the Centre for Language Education Research School of Education, University of Leeds. In the Netherlands, I relied more heavily on snowballing. As contact information for public servants is not published openly, I initially contacted the general inquiry email for the Department of Integration, and for the organizations involved (CINOP, CITO, and Bureau ICE). In the case of the ITTA, the individuals involved were contacted directly because their contact information was available publically on the University of Amsterdam website. My request to the Ministry of Integration was forwarded and accepted by one of the persons directly involved in the *Wet Inburgering* project, who subsequently connected me directly to the individuals within CINOP, CITO and Bureau ICE involved in the project. Service providers in Amsterdam were identified using a list published by the local government for integration candidates. In all cases potential participants were contacted via email. For the experts directly involved in the development of exam content, emails were followed up with phone calls where that information was available.<sup>10</sup>

The interviews with the experts involved in the development of exam content focused on questions pertaining to the formal process that was used to make decisions and their relationship with the Minister and ministerial staff. It also included questions on how the experts viewed their role in the policy-making process, and the goals they hoped to achieve through the exams in question. Finally, participants were asked about how they viewed the issue of integration, and how that shaped their perspective on the exam. Interviews with service providers centered on similar issues, but focused more explicitly on what aspects of the exam were difficult for clients to grasp, and how their organizations worked to assist applicants as they moved through the process. Participants were also probed

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<sup>9</sup> As will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3, LUKAG was the group initially charged with providing recommendations to the Minister on how to implement the new naturalization requirements set out in 2001 (See Appendix B). The establishment of ABNI was one of LUKAG recommendations. ABNI was charged with developing the actual content for the naturalization exam.

<sup>10</sup> See Appendix C, E and F for details on the members of ABNI, LUKAG, and the organizations involved in the Netherlands.

to discuss what they thought of their role in the governance of immigration and citizenship. The discussions that led from these questions highlighted the important ways in which those involved in the implementation of integration exams saw themselves as distinct actors, and as having a role in checking the power of the state. Participant responses highlighted the contestation that occurred within interactions with the state, and the strategies employed to resist state directions. As a result, I adapted my analytical framework to focus more specifically on the role of expertise in the policy process, drawing on the literature on governmentality to capture the political nature of expertise, and diffuse nature of power.

In line with applying governmentality as a methodological approach, this thesis also considers the problematization of integration leading up to the adoption of the integration exam. As such, I also draw on analysis of key government documents and non-governmental research relevant to the policy area. I selected key documents by identifying an initial report from the relevant Ministry that first laid out the policy change, namely, *Secure Borders, Safe Haven: Integration with Diversity in Modern Britain*, and *Integratiebeleid Nieuwe Stijl* (“New Style Integration”). Following the interviews I conducted, I used these documents to identify other reports, policies, and studies that the reports had drawn on in order to trace how the problem was identified and addressed over time. I supplemented this mapping exercise with reports and documents identified through reviews of existing academic literature on the topic, and based on discussions from the interviews I conducted (See Appendix H for full list of documents consulted). In reading these selected documents, I employed discourse analysis methodologies to identify the particular rationalities, and practices of knowledge production at play. In particular, I focused how practices of identifying and studying immigrant communities are linked to particular ways of seeing and addressing the problems within those communities. I also focused on how gender, race, and affect are used to identify the integrated and non-integrated.

Using these two methods, the next two chapters of this thesis provide an analysis of the problematization of immigrant integration over time. They both begin with an account of citizenship policy over time, and its role in managing the imagined borders of the nation-state. They then move onto a more explicit account of how integration policy has changed over time, and how particular understandings of the problems within immigrant communities led to the adoption of the integration exam. Finally, based on the interviews conducted, they close with an analysis of the role of expert advice in the development of the

exams, and draw tentative conclusions about the ability of non-state actors to resist government policy by engaging in the policy implementation process.

## Chapter 3

### The United Kingdom

#### Introduction

The development of the *Life in the United Kingdom* exam must be understood within the broader context of a series of changes to immigration and citizenship policy, and the rhetorical emphasis that the Blair Labour government gave to social cohesion. This chapter considers the exam as being informed by a new way of thinking about the ‘problem’ of integration. In the latter part of the 20<sup>th</sup> century race relations was the lens through which ethnic diversity was largely managed. By 2001, the discourse had shifted to one of social cohesion, or the lack thereof. While government rhetoric easily slipped between the social, community, and national cohesion (Worley 2005), I argue that the identification of cohesion as both the goal of and measurement for integration resulted in a dramatic shift in the target population of integration policies. The *Life in the United Kingdom* exam is illustrative of this shift. I follow with an account of the implementation of the exam, and consider the role of non-governmental actors in the development of exam content and requirements.

The intention to develop a citizenship exam was first formally announced in the 2001 Home Office white paper on immigration *Secure Borders, Safe Haven: Integration within Diversity in Modern Britain*. In it, the Labour-led government promoted reforms to citizenship policy that would foster a “sense of civic identity and shared values” and argued that “knowledge of the English language (or Welsh language or Scottish Gaelic, which are provided for in the British Nationality Act 1981), can undoubtedly support this objective” (Home Office 2001b, 38). Although the requirements of language knowledge had been set out in the British Nationality Act (‘BNA’) of 1981, the requirement for “sufficient knowledge about life in the United Kingdom” was added in 2002 (*Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002*, sec. 1.1). Until that point the knowledge of English language requirement had been assessed informally through the interviews and general engagement with government staff that was necessary to complete the naturalization process. The revisions set forth in 2002 also included the allocation of ministerial power to approve the means by which language and knowledge of British society would be assessed.



Although the Labour government indicated interest in a Canadian-style exam (and immigration system),<sup>11</sup> the statutory changes in 2002 set out very broad parameters, leaving the Minister with a number of possible tools at his disposal. The amended BNA set out the following Ministerial powers for naturalization:

- (1A) Regulations under subsection (1)(ba) or (bb) may, in particular—
  - (a) make provision by reference to possession of a specified qualification;
  - (b) make provision by reference to possession of a qualification of a specified kind;
  - (c) make provision by reference to attendance on a specified course;
  - (d) make provision by reference to attendance on a course of a specified kind;
  - (e) make provision by reference to a specified level of achievement;
  - (f) enable a person designated by the Secretary of State to determine sufficiency of knowledge in specified circumstances;
  - (g) enable the Secretary of State to accept a qualification of a specified kind as evidence of sufficient knowledge of a language.

The scope of possible provisions was quite broad, resulting in a slow moving implementation process. In fact, the Home Office did not present any new requirements for naturalization until 2004 when the *Life in the United Kingdom: A Journey to Citizenship* study guide was released. Based on recommendations from the Life in the United Kingdom Advisory Group ('LUKAG'), and subsequently the Advisory Board on Naturalization and Integration ('ABNI'), a study guide was developed, which laid out the material that would be covered by a multiple choice naturalization exam starting in 2005. The exam consisted of 24 multiple-choice questions, with a passing score of 18 or 75%. However, at that time a second stream

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<sup>11</sup> In 1992 the Canadian government introduced a multiple-choice exam as part of the naturalization process, which included questions about the political institutions and political history of the Canadian state. Upon successful completion applicants participated in a citizenship oath administered by appointed judges as the culmination of the naturalization process. The system remains largely in place as of 2015. In contrast, the points-based immigration system introduced in the 1967, which allocated potential immigrants with varying scores based on their education levels, and English and French language skills, among other attributes, has undergone major reform in 2015. Where Canada's previous immigration system stood out against others was both in its ability to attract highly skilled workers, and in its provision of permanent residency upon arrival.

to naturalization was also available.<sup>12</sup> New applicants with English language skills below Entry Level 3 on the National Standards<sup>13</sup> were eligible to enroll in English for Speakers of Other Languages (‘ESOL’) courses with citizenship content. Improvement from one level to another was accepted as equivalent to completing the naturalization exam. For applicants residing in Scotland and Wales, it was also possible to prove proficiency in Scottish Gaelic or Welsh through similar courses.

The Labour government framed this policy change as part of their ongoing commitment to social cohesion and active citizenship policy in other fields. Prior to serving as Home Secretary, David Blunkett was Minister of Education, where he was instrumental in developing new citizenship curriculum for primary and secondary schools.<sup>14</sup> Central to Blunkett’s thinking in both cases was the need to make British citizenship more meaningful, as a means to foster social cohesion. In a speech which discussed the challenges to social cohesion Blunkett (2004, 9) argued:

...the symbolic and celebratory aspects of acquiring British citizenship must also be underpinned with *practical support* for new citizens to integrate. The requirements to have an adequate understanding of English needs to *mean something*, and needs to be supplemented by a level of knowledge of what it means to be a citizen of modern, democratic Britain (emphasis added).

For Blunkett the new requirements were consistent with the goals of a two-way integration model, in that immigrants would be required to learn about British citizenship, while the state would support that learning process.

Some authors have argued that the exam constitutes a drastic shift in Britain’s approach to the relationship between integration and citizenship (Waite 2012; van Houdt, Suvarierol, and Schinkel 2011; Kostakopoulou 2010; Turner 2014). Their arguments point to the critical role that the legacy of colonialism plays in understanding the British approach to

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<sup>12</sup>In 2013 a new exam and study guide was introduced. Along with these changes, the ESOL with citizenship course option was eliminated. The passing score remains 18/25.

<sup>13</sup>The National Standards are derived from the Adult ESOL Core Curriculum developed by the Department for Education and Skills. Entry 3 is equivalent to B1 on the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages: Learning, Teaching, Assessment (‘CEFR’). See Appendix A for more detailed information on CEFR.

<sup>14</sup>For a detailed account of the education reforms and the norms embedded within education material see: (Pykett 2010; Pykett 2007; Olsen 2008; Mitchell 2003).

immigrant integration. The fact that many of Britain's post-war migrants arrived with either citizenship or extended right to abode, meant that integration was a process that happened after naturalization, if not completely separately from it. Therefore, the introduction of the naturalization exam, first for citizenship in 2005 and then in 2007 for indefinite leave to remain, marks a shift in when integration takes place. Citizenship became the reward for successful integration, rather than one of the foundations for it. Indeed, elevating citizenship to a reward and privilege was an explicit goal of Blunkett's strategy as both Home Secretary and Minister of Education. He argued that new requirements would help make naturalization and citizenship a meaningful process, rather than the administrative process necessary to get a British Passport that it had become.

The focus of this chapter is not to pass judgment on the normative appropriateness of the introduction of the exam, either as being consistent with past policy or with liberal democratic value, as has been the focus of previous work. Rather, I ask what problem was the exam meant to solve and how did it become seen as the desired solution? In the first part of this chapter, I seek to historically contextualize the exam within the broader development of citizenship and integration policy in the United Kingdom and consider how the exam compares to other policy tools developed as to achieve social cohesion. At the same time, I consider how integration, or the lack thereof, has come to be measured and how that has shaped government responses to the problems associated with a deterioration of social cohesion in British society. In this last section, I consider the role played by the members of ABNI and LUKAG and how they mobilized non-state networks of expertise and power to shift the direction of the policy. In doing so I consider how the actualization of the exam provided opportunities to resist the particular articulation of the problem of integration advanced by Home Office.

### **A History of British Citizenship Policy**

In comparison to its continental neighbors, the UK is considered to have a liberal approach to citizenship – historically relying more heavily upon *jus soli* as a basis of citizenship than *jus sanguinis*. In his post-war comparison of the UK and France, Favell (2002, 99) argues that political rhetoric around the “nation's *ad hoc*, pragmatic, evolutionary method of dealing with social and political dilemmas” has led to a reading back of the evolution of citizenship policy as the natural, progressive expansion of rights. Favell notes that Marshall's work on the gradual expansion of political and social rights of citizenship has become the key lens through which the evolution of citizenship is understood by British politicians and

scholars alike. However, as in the case of France, Favell argues that this obscures the real conflict and debate that arose in Britain around how to integrate immigrants. He writes,

One is the way it reads history, looking back from the present and arranging the past as a progressive, evolutionary continuum passing up to and through the present day. Change is thus read as internal and organic; it is never the product of a rupture or the intercession of unexpected new or external factors. The Marshall framework thus reads the expansion of membership to ethnic minorities as the 'natural' partisan response of the enlightened political and institutional framework to ethnic minorities' protests for inclusion and representation: the same old 'success' story, repeating the inclusion of women or of the working classes (Favell 2002, 99).

Taking up Favell's assertion that citizenship and integration policy was in fact highly contested, this next section considers how citizenship policy has evolved in the post-WWII period, with particular emphasis on the debates and conflicts at stake in those instances of change. The point here is to consider how various problematizations of the immigrant and integration have yielded different policy responses.

*From Subject to Citizen: The evolution of citizenship legislation*

In the absence of a constitution, scholars have traced the development of legal citizenship in the UK to feudal arrangements between subject and Monarch, which were bound up in questions over ability to own land. Therefore, as Dummet and Nicol (1990, 30) point out, "legal distinctions between subject and alien had little direct connection with anyone's sense of Englishness or foreignness." The Calvin case of 1608, serves as a watershed moment that established *jus soli* as the principal basis upon which a subject could be made. An important aspect of the common law decision was that it addressed concurred lands, stating that when the Crown acquired new territory, the persons living in that territory became subjects of the Crown. As the British Empire expanded throughout the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> century, this principal extended the rights of British subjects to inhabitants of the colonies as well. These implications were not likely anticipated in 1608, a period in which mobility was generally unrestricted, but difficult.

Notwithstanding the gradual expansions beyond landowners, the category of the subject was relatively stable into the 20<sup>th</sup> century despite having no statutory foundations.<sup>15</sup> Indeed, it was not until 1914 that the first comprehensive set of regulations for immigration and political membership were introduced under the Alien Restrictions Act and British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act ('BNSAA'). The BNSAA Act codified the common law rule of *jus soli*, and granted to all those born in the dominions of the Monarch status as a British subject. Interestingly, the BNSAA was a failed attempt by the UK to develop a common set of procedures and values upon which British naturalization would be based across the Empire (Dummett and Nicol 1990, 123). At issue were policies adopted by the Dominions of the UK, namely Canada and Australia, which restricted the freedom of movement rights for certain British subjects from other colonies. The problem was that such limits on non-European subjects did not fit with the political liberal ideologies that were used to rationalize colonialism. However, the desire of Canada and Australia to maintain their white-settler national identity resulted in a reaffirmation of the Dominions' ultimate authority to exclude other British subjects. So while British subjects could not necessarily move freely across the Empire, they did have the right of entry into the UK.

Again, Westminster was forced to revisit its nationality laws, after Canada indicated it would introduce its own bill for Canadian citizenship, effectively opting out of British subjecthood as the basis of political membership in Canada. In response, the UK passed the British Nationality Act ('BNA') in 1948, which introduced the category of citizen. The BNA created the status of Citizen of United Kingdom and Colonies ('CUKC'). Under the BNSAA, the status of British subject was shared by all members of the Commonwealth and this status was retained. Member-states of the Commonwealth that introduced legislation to create independent citizenship regimes were not included under CUKC. Thus under the BNA, CUKC status was obtained through birth in the United Kingdom or its colonies, regardless of the legal status of the parents (i.e. unrestricted *jus soli*). It also set up two naturalization processes, one for commonwealth citizens and another for all other foreign residents. The length of residency was one year and five years respectively. During this time, migration from non-Commonwealth countries remained highly restricted, with the exception of the immediate post-war period where provisions were made for labour migration primarily

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<sup>15</sup>This is not to say that *jus soli* rights were always recognized by the state, most notably during WWII. Nor was the expansion of rights to include all persons natural.

from Poland and Italy (Sawyer 2009). However, migration from the UK's colonies was almost completely unrestricted, as CUKC status included the right of mobility. This resulted in large influxes of migration from the West Indies, India and Pakistan. By 1961, residents originating from these three countries amounted to 171,800, 81,400 and 24,900 respectively (Boswell 2003, 13).

*Non-Citizens: The gradual erosion of rights for Commonwealth Citizens*

In the post-war period, the question as to how immigrants would be integrated into society was raised by the Labour government. From the onset, the issue of immigration was tightly bound-up with race and the rising welfare costs associated with migrants arriving with citizenship and being eligible for all the related social entitlements. Boswell explains that limiting migration was “considered to be too politically damaging to already sensitive relations with colonies and Commonwealth countries (Boswell 2003, 13). The problem Labour faced was that while maintaining Commonwealth citizens as British helped temper uneasy colonial relations, it was creating a domestic political problem. The emphasis on immigrants ‘taking’ social entitlement that they had ‘no right’ to despite being citizens, highlighted how legal political membership was in no way connected to membership in imagined white-British community. Two key events, the 1958 race riot organized by white-extremist in Notting Hill, and the 1963 Bristol Bus Boycott organized around the issue of racist hiring practices, brought national attention to the reality of discrimination and racism being experienced by non-white British citizens.

Eventually, in 1962, the Conservative government responded to domestic pressures to control immigration and introduced the first Commonwealth Immigration Act (“CIA”), which created a voucher system aimed at controlling non-white migration. Under the Act, any CUKC citizen that was not issued their status in the United Kingdom was subject to being allowed or denied entry on the basis of the voucher system which had three categories: (1) persons with a specific job; (2) persons with special skill in short supply and; (3) other. In 1965, a quota of 8500 migrants from all colonies was introduced and the 3 categories were eliminated. Preferential treatment for Commonwealth citizens was virtually eliminated with the introduction of the 1971 Immigration Act, which eliminated the voucher system and replaced it with work permits that did not carry any right to permanent residency or right of entry for dependents. Only colonial migrants who had a ‘close connection’ with the United Kingdom were exempt from migration controls, which included persons born in the United Kingdom and their direct decedents. These restrictions created a tenuous situation, in which

the rights normally associated with citizenship, in this case mobility, were eroded for certain groups of citizens from the colonies. While the rights of mobility were equally shared across the colonies prior to these changes, it was the specific problematization of non-white migration from the West and East Indies that pushed Labour to adopt these general restrictions. The exemptions for colonial subjects born to parents or grandparents born in the United Kingdom reflects the fact that white-colonial subjects were not the target of the legislation, and that their status within the imagined British community was not in question.

The non-citizen like status for some CUKCs was rectified through the 1981 British Nationality Act, which eliminated CUKC and replaced it with three new categories of citizenship on 1 January 1983:

1. British citizenship, former CUKCs who had a close relation with the United Kingdom and Islands (i.e. those who possessed right of abode under the Immigration Act 1971);
2. British Dependent Territories citizenship (BDTC) former CUKCs with a close relationship with one of the remaining colonies, renamed Overseas Territories; and
3. British Overseas citizenship (BOC), former CUKCs who did not qualify for either British citizenship or British Dependent Territories citizenship.

Layton-Henry explains that this move to clearly delineate citizens with ‘close relation to the United Kingdom’ from citizens of its colonies, “confirmed Britain’s intention to divest itself of its imperial legacy and obligations” (Layton-Henry 2004, 306). The intention to signal this clearly to Commonwealth citizens was exemplified by Lord Trefgarne’s response to an amendment that defined the above three categories of citizenship as British nationals. He argued that such a term “would serve only to generate confusion...raise expectations among the less well in-formed which in the event could not be realized...imply some sort of eventual immigration commitment in the minds of some less informed people” (cited in Layton-Henry 2004, 306). Interestingly, despite the fact the legislation did not affect permanent residency rights of migrants already in the UK, naturalization rates dramatically increased the following year (Layton-Henry 2004, 304).

As of 2015, the 1981 BNA remains in effect. It has been subject to several amendments, including the ones related to the naturalization procedures under consideration here. In some cases the amendments resulted in formalizing requirements set out in the 1981 Act (i.e. language requirements, oath, citizenship ceremonies) and in others added new

requirements (i.e. integration exam). Still other amendments have introduced restrictions of citizenship rights, including the ability to revoke citizenship in certain circumstances.

The evolution of British subjecthood and citizenship law reveals an important shift in the articulation of the relationship between the citizen-subject and the state. Subjecthood was deeply tied with notions of allegiance to the monarch, and so as the Empire spread so too did the definition of British subject. As a consequence there was not a clear relationship between subjecthood and ethnic or racial identity. British subjects were defined by their legal and political relationship with the monarch, which ultimately entitled them to certain rights, including mobility across the dominion. However, each subsequent act of citizenship introduced limitations to the value of British subjecthood for the colonial subjects, primarily by slowly eroding rights of mobility. In this way, citizenship policy in the UK has been primarily a tool of exclusion of racialized Commonwealth subjects from the physical space of the United Kingdom. However, this is not to say that the policy is marked only by exclusions. As Favell points out, the model adopted in the UK was, on one hand, aimed to severely limit immigration by eroding the rights of ‘undesired’ immigrants, while simultaneously arguing against the exclusion of racialized immigrants already in the United Kingdom. The next section of this chapter considers how the British government tried to manage inter-racial tensions that arose following the mass arrival of racialized immigrants in the post-war period. In particular it considers how the Race Relations Act led to a particular way of understanding the problem of integration as indicative of systemic racism, and how the reframing of integration within the context of social cohesion has resulted in the rejection of racism as an explanatory factor.

### **Immigration Patterns in the United Kingdom**

The patterns of immigration in the United Kingdom are heavily influenced by its colonial history. As noted above, together with already strict immigration regulations, it was largely citizenship legislation that was used to control migration in the post-war period and more specifically, non-white migration. By 1971, 27% of foreign-born residents of the United Kingdom were from the Indian subcontinent and a further 4% from the Commonwealth Caribbean (See Table 3.1 below). However, once controls on colonial immigration were established through the 1970 and 1980s, the proportion of immigrants from these regions dropped off. Between 1981-2011, the Indian Subcontinent provided roughly the same number of immigrants as Canada and the USA, and New Zealand and Australia. While the proportion of the foreign-born population from the Indian



Subcontinent was fallen to 21%, it remains the largest group nonetheless. This is largely the result of emigration trends. Between 1981-2001, more than half of new arrivals to the United Kingdom left within five years, a trend that continues today. However, there is large variation across source countries. Whereas a full two-thirds of immigrants from the EU, Canada and the USA, and New Zealand and Australian emigrated within five years of arrival, only 15% of those born in the Indian subcontinent did.

Table 3.1: Foreign Born Population by Select Country of Birth<sup>16</sup>

	Foreign Born Population (1971)		Immigration In-flow (1981-2001)		Foreign Born Population (2001)	
	(000)	%	(000)	%	(000)	%
EU <sup>17</sup>	-	-	726	22	729.8	15
Indian Subcontinent <sup>18</sup>	478.9	27	429	13	1021.8	21
Commonwealth Caribbean <sup>19</sup>	78.2	4	33	1	243.3	5
Canada & USA	237	13	363	11	243.3	5
New Zealand & Australian	192.2	11	429	13	194.6	4
<b>Total</b>	<b>1759.5</b>		<b>3300</b>		<b>4865.6</b>	

Unlike many of its European counter-parts, generally liberalized naturalization laws have resulted in high rates of citizenship acquisition amongst immigrants, especially from the Indian subcontinents and Caribbean Commonwealth. Amongst long-term immigrants, a full 88% hold British citizenship; with residents from the Indian Subcontinent and Jamaica having the highest rates. Over time, this trend holds true (See Table 3.2 below). Still in 2011, only 54%, those who had immigrated to the United Kingdom held British citizenship, suggesting that over time newer immigrants are less likely to naturalize. This in part is

<sup>16</sup>These figures are drawn from the report Immigration, emigration and the ageing of the overseas-born population in the United Kingdom (Rendall and Ball 2004). The figures for Foreign Born Population are based on the 1971 and 2001 Census, and include only people whose parents were not born in the United Kingdom. The figures for Immigration In-flow are based on the 1977 to 2002 International Passenger Survey, which were conducted in the major intentional airports in the United Kingdom to capture both immigration and emigration trends.

<sup>17</sup> Excluding Ireland

<sup>18</sup> Indian subcontinent includes: India, Bangladesh and Pakistan.

<sup>19</sup> Commonwealth Caribbean includes: Jamaica,

reflective of the shift of source countries of EU-member states and away from the Commonwealth. Lower British nationality numbers between 2001-2006 are also partly explained by the residency requirement of 5 years. However, even here, we see a much higher rate amongst residents from the Indian Subcontinent and Jamaica. This pattern holds true for other countries from the Global South.

Table 3.2: National Identity by Year of Arrival (Selected Countries of Origin)<sup>20</sup>

	Arrived before 1981		Arrived between 1981-2000		Arrived between 2001-2006	
	Total residents	% British Citizen	Total residents	% British Citizen	Total residents	% British Citizen
EU <sup>21</sup>	152,968	59	244,827	39	143,616	10
Indian Subcontinent <sup>22</sup>	426,145	89	381,860	82	308,285	39
Jamaica	77,314	83	19,863	62	20,461	43
USA	26,490	63	15,606	48	25,958	20
Oceania	28,378	81	429	13	38,813	23
<b>Total</b>	1,836,359	88	1,835,993	64	1,703,977	28

The aforementioned patterns of immigration and citizenship rates are important for two reasons. They demonstrate the shifting sources away from colonial migratory patterns, while also providing evidence that immigration from the EU and white-colonies is less permanent, and even when it is, immigrants from these areas are less likely to naturalize. Second, the high rate of citizenship amongst immigrants from former colonies in the Global South is a fundamental element of the recent problematizations of integration. In the initial response to increasing diversity, the high rates of citizenship were considered an important starting point to integration. As citizens, immigrants were able to access social services and

<sup>20</sup> This data is collected from the 2011 Census for England and Wales. Scotland and Northern Ireland are not included.

<sup>21</sup> Includes all member states as of 2001.

<sup>22</sup> Indian subcontinent includes: India, Bangladesh and Pakistan.

had the right to fully participate in society. In more recent public discourse, this has been framed as the root of current problems within immigrant communities. The rationale is that it is precisely because immigrants were able to access citizenship without proving their integration that the problem of segregation, and everything else related to it, exists. This next section traced the development of policy responses to increased diversity by focusing on the problematizations of immigrant integration and rationalities that policies are designed to respond to. I begin with the race relations framework and end with an analysis of the rationalities that inform the social cohesion model.

### **Problematizing Immigration Integration**

#### *The rise and fall of Race Relations*

Tracing the evolution of the initial proposal for an anti-discrimination bill, Bleich (2002) argues that the first Race Relations Act in 1965 was introduced as a measure to address concerns about issues arising from immigration, specifically non-white immigration. Anti-immigrant sentiment was a major concern among key members of the Labour government, with specific attention being paid to how the United Kingdom might avoid the problems in the United States that had become apparent through the civil rights movement. Although parallels were made to the United States, the issue of how to manage race relations was closely linked to changing the white-British public's attitude, as most migrants arriving before 1971 were already British subjects that arrived with full political and social rights, including access to the growing welfare state. Under Prime Minister Harold Wilson, the Labour government elected in 1964 capitulated to apparent resentment towards Commonwealth migrants by maintaining the restrictions on non-white commonwealth migration established by the Conservative government in 1962. As an opposition party Labour had openly criticized the CIA, with then party leader Hugh Gaitskell calling it, "cruel and brutal anti-colour legislation" (Bashford and McAdam 2014, 350). Bleich argues that maintaining restrictions on migration left Labour in an uneasy political position, as the party stood for an ideological commitment to the liberal values of freedom of mobility and equality of treatment. Therefore even at this early point, Race Relations and anti-discrimination were framed in relation to tougher immigration policies as an attempt to balance the values of the party with the demands of the public. Like later Labour governments, tough immigration legislation was to be coupled with policies aimed at facilitating integration. The 1965 Race Relations Act established an arms-length Race Relations Board ("RRB") to adjudicate individual complaints of discrimination in public

spaces based on race, relegating infractions to civil law, not criminal. It notably did not address discrimination in employment nor housing, and excluded religious discrimination.

The subsequent move three years later to expand the scope of legislation to include employment and housing, was driven by the RRB itself. Although the Race Relations Act was introduced to address perceived problems around integration, the extent of the problem of the integration of immigrants was not quantifiable. Civil unrest in 1958 and the electoral success of Patrick Griffith, who campaigned on an anti-immigration platform, served as signs there was a problem, in terms of anti-immigrant sentiment and discrimination but provided no sense of how bad it was. What the RRB made possible through its appeal process was a way for the state to see and measure acts of discrimination. More importantly, the RRB used this documentation to show how the current Race Relations Act was failing to address the problems presented to them. In one report, the RRB showed that 70% of the complaints they received did not fall within the purview of the Act, not because they didn't meet the criteria to constitute discrimination, but because they were in the area of employment and housing. In 1968, these areas were added to the scope of the RRB. Similarly changes to the Act in 1976 were also driven by the documentation by the Board itself of, due to the failures of the 1968 Act. The 1976 Race Relations Act added to its purview policies that were discriminatory in effect, if not intent. This opened up the possibility to explore institutional racism, that is norms and everyday practices within institutions that work to limit access, exclude, or punish racialized minorities. The 1976 Race Relations Act also created the Commission for Racial Equality ('CRE'), which was charged with promoting integration and better relations between racial and ethnic groups. It was also empowered to conduct research and launch independent investigations on discrimination within public agencies and the private sector.

Despite the body of knowledge amassed by the RRB, and the 1976 focus on the effects of discrimination, there was limited knowledge about the racial or ethnic composition of the British population, as the census did not include any questions of ethnic or racial origin until 1991. As such, throughout the 70s and 80s, research on the status of racial and ethnic minorities was largely conducted by the CRE and other private organizations like the Runnymede Commission. As a result, information was ad hoc and often narrowly focused. The CRE for example headed investigations into particular occupations, like accounting and medicine, and found discriminatory procedures in the application processes (Anwar 1999, 60). The 1991 census made it possible to measure more comprehensively the effects of racial

and ethnic disadvantage and discrimination. Despite issues with the categorization within the census, notably the absence of certain ethnic categories and limited and narrowly defined ‘mixed’ categories<sup>23</sup>, clear patterns emerged. Ethnic and racial minorities were found to be more likely to be unemployed, live in inadequate housing, and have a lower income.

The increased visibility of the problem of race and ethnic inequality was coupled with a shift in how the problem of integration was understood. In contrast to the 1960s, when anti-discrimination legislation was first introduced, the problems associated with the failure to integrate immigrants were no longer part of a possible future, but rather were seen to be part of the present. In other words, whereas legislation was driven in the post-war period in part to avoid falling into the same trap as the United States, civil unrest in 2001 forced the UK to come to terms with the effects of failed integration. The Race Relations Acts established a particular means through which to manage ethnic diversity by trying to eliminate barriers for racialized minorities, if only on a case-by-case basis. The underlying rationale to the Race Relations approach was that the community that needed to be ‘worked on’ was the ‘British’ community and its institutions. While inquiries commissioned by the Home Office into cases of civil unrest and highly publicized deaths of racialized youth pointed to persistent systemic discrimination and racism in the educational, political, and criminal justice institutions, by the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the problem of integration had been reframed.<sup>24</sup> Under this new framework, the community that needed to be ‘worked on’ was that of the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> generation immigrant.

*From Anti-Discrimination to Anti-Segregation: Social Cohesion as a tool for the management of diversity*

The riots that took place in Bradford, Burnley, and Oldman in 2001 were not the first race related riots to occur in the United Kingdom. As noted earlier, the anti-immigration riots in 1958 led to important legislative changes. Further, the 1981 Brixton Riots,<sup>25</sup> sparked

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<sup>23</sup> While the government has responded to problems with the categorizations, the issue now is one of comparability of data over time in the UK (see: Apsinall 2009).

<sup>24</sup> The Scarman Report, (1986) investigated police and community practices to help understand both the causes of and reaction to the Brixton Riots in 1981. The Macpherson report (1999) was released several years after the 1993 murder of a black youth, Steven Lawrence, by white supremacists, and dealt most directly with institutional racism in the police services.

<sup>25</sup> The most violent episodes related to the Brixton civil disturbances took place on Saturday April 11, 1981 in the area surrounding Brixton Road, in South London. During the conflict 279 policemen and at least 45 members of the public were injured, and private property was damaged. Although the Scarman Report (1986)

by black youth protesting police treatment of their community led to the Scarman Report, which confirmed that “unwitting discrimination against Black people” did exist (Scarman 1986). Although the authors stopped short of acknowledging institutional racism, they did provide several recommendations for better police training.<sup>26</sup> While Scarman did not excuse the illegal acts committed in the riot, much of the report focused on the root causes of frustration and disillusionment that led young racialized men to turn to violence. The report argued that more needed to be done to eliminate barriers to decent housing, better jobs and access to higher education, and that the state had a responsibility to address these issues. Twenty years later, the ‘race-riots’ were not only different in terms of the catalyst and who was involved, but more critically, the response from Home Office marked a shift in how the ‘problem’ of integration was framed and who was responsible for the ‘solution.’

The 2001 riots stemmed from conflicts between racialized youth and white youth. However, physical conflict between groups quickly escalated into attacks on property and arson. The riots were immediately condemned as criminal acts, but were also framed around the issue of race. The catalyst for each of the riots was clashes between racialized communities and anti-immigrant, neo-Nazi organizations like the National Front. Although the participants in the riots were racially diverse, disproportionate media and political attention was given to the role that second generation Bangladeshi and Pakistani youth played. The response from Home Office was to immediately condemn the acts as criminal in nature with Home Secretary Blunkett stating, “I don’t think last nights riots and violence and destruction of a community that has been putting itself back together has anything to do with institutional racism whatsoever” (quoted in Bagguley and Hussain 2008, 62) However, in the aftermath of the riots, Home Office and Blunkett conceded to a need to understand more deeply why *British citizens* had turned to such violence.

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investigated some of the more systemic causes of the unrest, the catalyst was the stop and search of a black youth who had been stabbed.

<sup>26</sup>In contrast the Macpherson report focused on the Metropolitan Police force’s investigation of the 1993 murder of black youth Steven Lawrence. Although charges were laid, prosecutors dropped the case sighting insufficient evidence, despite several eye witnesses. The report provided a scathing review of police practices and provided several recommendations to address institutional racism within the police services generally (Macpherson 1999). Two of the five men involved in the murder were convicted in 2012 as a result of the implementation of recommendations from the report.

The result was a series of commissions and reports into the events that lead to the riots. The most prominent of these was *Community Cohesion: a report of the Independent Review Team*, otherwise known as the Cattle Report. Following consultations with community members in six locations across the UK, the Community Cohesion Review Team (‘review team’)<sup>27</sup> identified 67 recommendations across 14 themes, including housing, policing, government relations, and most notably segregation and integration. While segregation is noted as a separate theme, it is in fact one that binds the whole report and recommendations together. The report opens with:

Whilst the physical segregation of housing estates and inner city areas came as no surprise, the team was particularly struck by the depth of polarisation of our towns and cities. The extent to which these physical divisions were compounded by so many other aspects of our daily lives, was very evident. Separate educational arrangements, community and voluntary bodies, employment, places of worship, language, social and cultural networks, means that many communities operate on the basis of a series of parallel lives. *These lives often do not seem to touch at any point, let alone overlap and promote any meaningful interchanges* (Home Office 2001b, 9, emphasis added).

The heavy emphasis on segregation as a key determinate factor in explaining civil unrest was not new to the UK. As pointed out earlier, the Race Relations Board and Commission on Racial Equality had pointed to similar issues in terms of discrimination in housing, which they maintained results in racially segregated neighborhoods. Similarly, the Scarman Report identified segregation as an important factor in explaining the race riots. Where the Cattle report differed was on its assessment of the causes of segregation in the first place. Past reports had pointed to xenophobia, discrimination, and institutional racism as the causes of segregation and thus had recommended anti-discrimination legislation, affirmative action programs, and institutional reform, particularly of the police services.

From the Cattle review teams’ perspective, while such issues remained pertinent, the more critical factor contributing to tensions was self-selected segregation. The Cattle Report acknowledged that some segregation was voluntary and reflected individual choices. However, they saw inherent risks in this continued practice without some intervention to foster interaction across groups, writing:

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<sup>27</sup> The Community Cohesion Review Team was led by Ted Cattle, and consisted of 10 other members with expertise in public policy, community development and race/ethnic relations within the United Kingdom. For a full review of the member, see: (Home Office 2001a, 7–8)

Such divisions are unlikely to be problematic in themselves and will reflect individual preferences in some cases. However, difficulties are more apparent when the separation is multi-faceted – eg [sic] when geographic, educational, cultural, social and religious divisions reinforce each other to the extent that there is little or no contact with other communities at any level. This appears to *allow ignorance* about each community to develop into fear, particularly when *fostered by extremists attempting to demonise a minority* (Home Office 2001b, 28, emphasis added).

For the review team, the risks of segregation were not simply isolation and lack of opportunity that could lead to resentment and violence. Nor was it simply that segregation limited the opportunities to dispel the myths upon which discrimination were based. Rather, segregation was seen as the basis upon which fear was made possible by providing “extremists” with a situation ready for exploitation. Further, by emphasizing the role that minority groups played in segregating themselves, through everything from their individual choices of residence, to schools, and even employment, the report made minority groups responsible, at least in part, for the discrimination and racism they faced. In other words, the report posited that minority groups have a responsibility to interact with the dominant group so as to counter their ignorance and reduce fear. Such an assessment of the ‘problem’ of segregation rests on an assumption that fear of the unknown is natural and therefore relieves the dominant group of fault.

The recommendations of the Cattle group focused on policies that should encourage people of different ethno-racial backgrounds to interact with each other. The report went so far as to recommend that if separate religious schools were to continue, schools should be required to have a certain percentage of their students to be of a different religion. In such recommendations the relationship between race and religion become more apparent, as the underlying assumption here is that Muslim schools result in further segregation of those communities. Interestingly, the group linked the lack of interaction between members of the local community, with the lack of a common identity at the national level. The review team recommended that;

The rights – and in particular – the responsibilities of citizenship need to be more clearly established and we would expect to see some or all, of the above considerations strongly featured. This should then be formalised into a form of statement of allegiance (Home Office 2001a, 20).

However, they also noted that there was need for an open debate on a national citizenship identity and that the government and individuals should no longer “‘tiptoe around’ the



sensitive issues of race, religion and culture” (Home Office 2001a, 18). Yet the review team was clear that some things could not be negotiable, including the importance that speaking a common language plays in allowing communication across groups.

### **Finding Solutions: The Introduction of the Life in the United Kingdom Exam**

The Cantle report stands out against previous reports because of its emphasis on the recommendations for how racialized minorities themselves needed to change in order to prevent segregation. Not only did the report set out specific recommendations that were followed by Home Office, such as an oath of allegiance, and making the language requirements for citizenship more robust, but the report also informed the logic behind the citizenship exam. From the perspective of Home Office, the naturalization test was one component of a larger ‘jigsaw puzzle’ to address segregation, that spread across ministries including the Department for Education, tasked with developing citizenship curriculum for schools; the Department for Communities and Local Communities, charged with addressing urban decline, housing segregation and physical environment, and; the Goldman Citizenship Review which was an attempt at open debate on what citizenship meant in modern Britain. In particular, the problem of second-generation immigrant segregation and isolation was central to the rationale behind some of the changes pursued by Home Office. Chris Hedges, a Home Office employee and secretariat for ABNI, explained:

If you take Bradford as a classic example...The situation in Bradford was pretty unique because they had significant numbers of migrants from Pakistan and Bangladesh in the late 50s, early 60s. In the cotton *trade* the work force was 100% ethnic and nobody spoke English. As you would have found out, they closed down and that left a huge number of people with no language skills, fairly limited work skills, looking for work. And their kids formed a real sense of resentment, that their parents has been dumped, in their view, by UK society and really not helped at all. And the second generation, those kids of the 60s migrants, have very different aspirations than their parents. They didn't want to work in the cotton mill, they didn't want to make curry, you know, they wanted to do different things and they really thought they were being let down, and their parents were being let down. So that was one of the triggers, If you like. So, as I say, the whole idea was to start somewhere. You have to start somewhere.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> Chris Hedges (Home Office public servant and ABNI Secretariat), interview by author, March 2, 2011.

The introduction of the exam was meant as a starting point to prevent future episodes of the kind of community detachment experienced by racialized second-generation British citizens, and more specifically Muslim youth. Following the recommendations in the Cattle Report, the Life in the United Kingdom Advisory Group ('LUKAG') was established in September 2002, chaired by Sir Bernard Crick<sup>29</sup> and instructed to "advise the Home Secretary on the method, conduct and implementation of a 'Life in the United Kingdom' naturalization test" (LUKAG 2003, 3). The first report of the group was published one year later and entitled *The New and the Old: A Report by the Life in the United Kingdom Advisory Group* not in reference to new and old citizenship policies, but rather the two target groups of the policy project, new and old immigrants. This particular way of defining the project as one that should address the need of both new and old arrivals is apparent throughout the text and reflects the rhetorical commitment, as well as the political commitment, to facilitating the integration of both newcomers and 'oldcomers.' The exam was intended to prevent newcomers from becoming segregated, while also attempting to integrate those already segregated. In practice, because the vast majority of immigrants who had been identified as problematic groups – namely South Asian and Black Caribbean – already had citizenship, the material effect on these groups would be marginal. In this sense, the exam was as much a symbolic gesture designed to reassure the white-British majority that something was being done to address the problems within racialized communities (see: Fortier 2008), as it was a practical solution designed to facilitate integration.

*The New and the Old* report itself drew on the findings of the Cattle Report. In particular, *The New and the Old* echoed the report's concern that conflicts had arisen out of racialized economic and social segregation between residents of the UK.

'Integration' is a word used by many but often understood very differently. When we use it we mean neither assimilation nor a society composed of, as it were, separate enclaves, whether voluntary or involuntary. Integration means not simply mutual respect and tolerance between different groups but continual interactions, engagement and civic participation, whether in social, cultural, education, professional, political or legal spheres. The basis of good citizenship is how *we behave towards each other collectively* and this is what

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<sup>29</sup> Sir Bernard Crick had also served as an advisory for developing citizenship content for Elementary and Secondary School curriculum. He was a political theorist and argued in defense of citizenship education as integral to maintaining fair and effective democratic institutions. For more details on his academic works see: (B. S. Turner 2009)

binds us together, rather than assertions of national, ethnic or religious priorities or particular interpretations of history (LUKAG 2003, 29; emphasis added).

From the point of view of the LUKAG, interaction between groups was critical as, “Parallel lives like parallel lines only meet at infinity” (LUKAG 2003, 11). Like the Cattle Report, LUKAG expressed a concern about allowing either new or old immigrants to voluntarily choose to remain isolated from the larger community. Similarly, both groups argued that the ability to communicate through a common language was essential. The LUKAG wrote, “Use of the English language itself is possibly *the most important* means of diverse communities participating in a common culture with key values in common” (LUKAG 2003, 11; emphasis added). In other words, the communication necessary to avoid segregation and isolation could only be possible through immigrants learning to speak English. The emphasis on language reflects the general shift in placing the responsibility of integration onto the immigrant, leading to what Fortier (2013, 12) calls the “fantasy of English fluency.” Language is not simply a “pathway to integration” but becomes a marker for how committed the individual immigrant is to the nation and community. It becomes a marker for their desire to pull *themselves* into society (see: Schinkel 2013).

While English language skills were seen as a necessarily condition of integration, especially in terms of the labour market, LUKAG acknowledged that for some immigrants, the English language might be irrelevant to their daily lives, particularly if they worked in non-English environments. However, again the report cautioned against this, noting: “they [immigrants] should not feel trapped in it [non-English workplaces] by reason of not having English”(LUKAG 2003, 12). From the perspective of several group members the idea that not speaking English trapped immigrants into ethnic enclaves was particularly relevant for immigrant women. What is more, women were seen as particularly hard to reach, and hence to integrate. One LUKAG and ABNI member explained:

It was felt that people needed to be *empowered* to take control of their lives and women are a *particularly vulnerable* group and the only thing that could actually make a difference to the situation because of cultural issues is an *external force*, that the cultural would have to relent because there was legislation (emphasis added).<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> “Elaine” (Member of LUKAG and ABNI) interview by author, March 8, 2011.

This passage is particularly revealing of the way in which the group understood the purpose of the integration requirements set forth in the *Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act* ('NIAA') 2002 (see: Appendix B). The exam was seen as a way to force certain segments of the population, in this case women, to engage with the state and community, even if the requirements being imposed were personally or culturally inappropriate to them. As such, while the legislation and the group used the rhetoric of 'empowerment' as their goal, the mechanism to achieve this had to be coercive. In describing his experience on ABNI, "George" pointed to the need for policy to "help women escape from under the thumb" of their husbands. From his point of view, the target population of the new naturalization requirements were Muslim immigrants.<sup>31</sup> Although not addressed explicitly in the text, the central role played by the figure of the disempowered female migrant in the design of the integration exam reveals the subtle but powerful ways that the perceptions of non-Western and Muslim values as anti-liberal became embedded within the requirements of the exam. The LUKAG reinforced the idea that segregation and isolation were, at least partially, the fault of the immigrants themselves and the perceived incompatibility between their cultural values and those of British society. By emphasizing the role that 'cultural issues' *within* immigrant communities played in isolating immigrant women, the LUKAG's report deflected attention from how failures to accommodate difference on the part of British institutions also lead to exclusions and isolation.

As noted in Chapter 2, there has been a substantial body of academic work produced that considers how citizenship and integration exams have generally shifted the responsibility of integration onto the migrant. However, the above discussion of the framing of integration reveals that the responsibility for social cohesion and security has also been shifted onto the immigrant. In other words, it is not simply for their own personal social, political and economic inclusion that immigrants must learn English and how to engage with the British state. They must also do so in order to challenge the social, political and economic institutions that exclude them in the first place. Through the emphasis on the need to 'interact' with British society, dispel myths of the 'other' and therefore eliminate the ignorance upon which prejudice and racism are based, the reframing of the integration problem as voluntary segregation worked to mask other systemic causes of exclusion. The

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<sup>31</sup> "George" (Member of LUKAG), interview by author, March 8, 2011.

next section of this chapter considers how the framing of the issue of voluntary exclusion shaped the content and character of the exam and the new kind of citizen-immigrant it intended to create. It also considers the role of non-state actors in the implementation of the exam, and how the process of consultation opens up space for resistance.

## **Policy Implementation and the Role of Expert Advice**

### *Laying Foundations: Coalition Forming and Resistance*

While the NIAA 2002 amendments to the BNA which set out the new integration requirements did not actually stipulate the introduction of an exam (see: Appendix B), the LUKAG was instructed by the Minister to develop recommendations as to how to implement a naturalization exam, which were eventually shared in the 2003 report (See: LUKAG 2003). Despite the clear directive, some members of the LUKAG openly objected to any requirements that necessitated individuals meet an absolute level of either language or knowledge of British society. For many LUKAG members integration was framed as a process that requires interaction and engagement between immigrants, the community and institutions. However, there was deep skepticism among members regarding Home Office's requirements that there should be an exam, as they did not see this as a suitable solution to the problems facing immigrant communities. Annette Zera, who was principal of Principal of Tower Hamlets College,<sup>32</sup> explained:

My whole attitude is based on the word integration and how do you *feel like* and become integrated? It's through experience. Its not through memorizing dates, or even, or being told information. Its about having different sets of experiences, so you can judge yourself if you *want* to be a citizen of a country and the country can judge if you have put enough *effort* into it. You know, it's just like going and being part of something (emphasis added).<sup>33</sup>

Her sentiments regarding the usefulness of the exam were echoed in several of the interviews conducted. In fact, the initial recommendation for a test in the New and the Old report was *not* the standardized multiple-choice exam that was eventually adopted. Rather, the LUKAG recommended that two options should be available. For applicants who were assessed at

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<sup>32</sup> Tower Hamlets College is a vocational school based in East London serving several immigrant communities and offers ESOL courses.

<sup>33</sup> Annette Zera (member of LUKAG and ABNI), interview by author, February 16, 2011.

above an Entry 3<sup>34</sup> level of language skill, a short course on citizenship content would be offered at a qualified academic institution *or* a distance education course, which included a portfolio element of evidence of participation. Both options would require a teacher or mentor and would culminate in a short written test. Those with weaker language skills would be required to attend an ESOL with citizenship course and show progress in terms of the language skills at the end of the course. This compromise reflected the fact that even amongst the dissenters, there was a general acceptance of the idea that citizenship should require some level of effort on the part of the applicant.

The New and the Old report set out two other significant recommendations. The first was to establish a national mentoring program for immigrants. The rationale was that if immigrants were expected to interact with the community, this expectation needed to be met with resources to facilitate that interaction. Annette Zera recounted several intense debates on whether making a mentor-tutor relationship mandatory was viable. While she recalled consensus amongst the LUKAG members that such an arrangement would be the best way to address the root problem of segregation, they eventually agreed that it would be virtually impossible to monitor and verify.<sup>35</sup> As such, they recommended funding to a voluntary program. The last recommendation to Home Office was to set up a permanent body for oversight of implementation of their recommendations. While Home Office did take that recommendation, establishing the Advisory Board on Naturalization and Integration (ABNI) again appointing LUKAG's Bernard Crick as the chair, it did not follow through with other recommendations.<sup>36</sup> Although an ESOL with citizenship course option was adopted, ABNI was mandated to oversee the development of a study guide and multiple-choice exam for applicants with English Entry 3 level or higher.

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<sup>34</sup> Entry 3 level in the National Standards for ESOL is approximately equivalent to B1 in the CEFR (see Appendix A).

<sup>35</sup> Annette Zera (member of LUKAG and ABNI), interview by author, February 16, 2011.

<sup>36</sup> Most notably Home Office did not extend funding to ESOL, and did not lift the one-year exclusion from ESOL funding for dependents. The report also recommended the development of a multilingual informational guide to be provided upon arrival in the United Kingdom to aid with initial settlement and to connect newcomers with essential services, including ESOL education. While the guide was developed, it was never released (Chris Hedges, Home Office and ABNI Secretariat public servant, interview by author, March 2, 2011).

The members of LUKAG had been selected based on their expertise in the field of citizenship, integration and settlement, and although the group was unable to completely change the Minister's policy direction, they were able to gain some important concessions from Home Office, primarily the addition of the ESOL with citizenship option for those with weak language skills. Having realized early on in the process that Home Office had clear intentions regarding the introduction of a Canadian-style exam, several members of the group formed an informal alliance. In particular, members of the committee with backgrounds in immigrant settlement and ESOL provision were wary that new requirements in naturalization might actually further marginalize immigrants already on the fringe of society *because* of their weak language skills. The argument against a standard test for all was framed around an issue of equity. Elaine, a member with experience running language-training programs explained:

That was a practicality. There was no other way. You *cannot* expect a person that is at an entry two, one even, to have the same level of knowledge and information retention of a person who is fluent in English and is just reading a book for information. They are trying to learn the language *and* access the information. So their challenge is that much greater. So in terms of fairness, in terms of a just way to take this forward that was the balance that was struck really. *It was to make sure there was justice here, that there was equity* (emphasis added).<sup>37</sup>

By framing it in this way, the group successfully lobbied for this option. Notwithstanding their expressed concern with equity, and the likely positive impact this measure had on the success of some immigrants, what is most interesting about the interviewees' analysis is that it is still premised on an acceptance that the applicant has some responsibility for their own integration. In this way, the idea of the citizen and their responsibilities is seen to shift from one wherein the institutions must change to accommodate and integrate racialized immigrants, to acceptance that immigrants themselves must change. They must prove themselves to have certain qualities of Britishness. So while the ESOL with citizenship option might have provided an alternative that was more realistic for many immigrants in the UK, it was primarily an assessment of effort. This distinction is important since the link between social cohesion and the demonstration of effort is not obvious. In part, the emphasis on effort reflects the inability of the group or Home Office to develop effective, reliable and cost-effective assessments of an applicant's behavior toward or engagement with

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<sup>37</sup> "Elaine" (Member of LUKAG and ABNI) interview by author, March 8, 2011.

the community. Effort became the basic requirement because it could be used to indicate how much an applicant *desired* citizenship. In this sense, the ESOL with citizenship option is much more about the affective orientation of the applicant than it is about their knowledge of the United Kingdom or language fluency (see also: Fortier 2013).

*Creating the Exam: Defining the 'ideal' citizen*

Once ABNI was formed and instructed to develop an exam, the emphasis on effort as the outcome being measured was further reinforced. While the ABNI saw the study guide as an opportunity to provide immigrants with information that would make interaction with the community and the state easier, the test itself was seen as a means for ensuring that naturalization was more than a bureaucratic procedure. Patrick Wintour, member of ABNI and Chair of the Business subgroup, explained:

If the book's got factual information, the test is going to have facts that either people are going to have forgotten or have never learned. But I think it's more of an expression of about your *willingness* to make an *effort* to learn the stuff and I don't think that invalidates the exercise. If in a democracy like the UK or Canada there is an expectation amongst the population as a whole, that newcomers should make some sort of an *effort*, than this is an *expression* of the effort they are willing to make, not just writing a cheque but learning the language and learning about the country. And you could become cynical about that and say you've been born here and you haven't had to make an effort, but that's another problem. That's another problem for government, so that the state of its host population is something that needs to be tackled anyway but it shouldn't be confused with what you are doing and your policy of integration and naturalization (emphasis added).<sup>38</sup>

In fact, because group members agreed that individual effort was *the* critical attribute the test needed to assess, debates on the actual content of the exam was minimized. From all the accounts collected through interviews and documents for this project, none of the members of the ABNI could recall deep divisions among the group on the material for the study guide. The only exception was on the topic of history. There was substantial debate as to whether it should be included at all because it would require a breadth of knowledge that was beyond what native-born British citizens held. Interestingly, despite the fact that British domestic history is highly contested between the four nations of the state, there was less

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<sup>38</sup> Patrick Wintour (member of ABNI & Vice-Chair of Business subgroup), interview by author, March 2, 2011.



debate about how to handle this issue. The group decided the best way to manage the problem of developing a definite account was to exclude history from the testable material for the exam.<sup>39</sup> Further, the section on history in the official preparatory guide for the exam begins with a disclaimer that history is never neutral and any telling of history necessarily highlights one point of view while obscuring another.

On the other sections of the study guide, the members recounted no real conflict amongst members. According to the interviewees, by keeping the text of the exam preparation at a relatively high level of abstraction and testing only on factual information, the committee avoided having to clearly define what was meant to *be* British. Yet, a closer examination of the content of the study guide published in 2007 reveals a clearer vision of the ideal British citizen as one who is self-sufficient and committed to life-long learning.<sup>40</sup> In this sense, the test's focus on measuring effort was reinforced by the guide's content that identified personal effort as a critical marker of the 'good' citizen. The next section of this chapter considers two sections of the study guide, employment and community, and explores how they develop a narrative of the ideal citizen who may be ethnically ambiguous while being unmistakably normatively neoliberal.

In contrast to the other case under consideration in this dissertation, the *Life in the United Kingdom: A Journey to Citizenship* text is an active attempt by the authors to avoid linking British identity with ethno-cultural characteristics or attributes. The goal of the authors was to create a document that covered information that an immigrant might need when he or she arrived and if not, at least provide resources to find that information. As a result, most of the guide reads as a description of the various services available in the United Kingdom. It covers topics from everyday life, including how to buy a house to how to return items purchased on the Internet. However, there are two sections which deal with more normative

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<sup>39</sup> While initially excluded from the testable material, following the release of an updated 2013 version of the study guide, history was added to the scope of material included in the exam.

<sup>40</sup> ABNI published the first version of *Life in the United Kingdom: A Journey to Citizenship* in 2004. However, this version had several factual errors and was written at a level of language higher than Entry 3 level. Almost immediately after publishing the guide, ABNI reconvened to update the original material to an appropriate level of English and to correct factual errors. While there were some changes to the original content, they were minor. However, the 2007 guide added two additional chapters. Since the two documents are based on the same discussions and debates at ABNI, and ultimately present the same material with the 2nd Edition being more comprehensive, for the purposes of this dissertation the 2007 version will be considered.

claims regarding what a ‘good’ citizen should do, namely Chapter 6: Employment, and Chapter 9: Building Better Communities (Home Office 2010).

Members of ABNI saw employment as one of the many natural facets of an individual’s life in the United Kingdom, and as such it was included in the guide content with no debate. However, the perceived obviousness of work in UK life was not the only reason that employment figured so highly in the content. Patrick Wintour, Chair of the Business subgroup, identified himself as one of the resident ‘experts’ in the field of employment and explained:

I would imagine that employment, you know, if we look at sort of key constituent parts about what life in Britain is about people work, its sort of a central part about life in Britain, life in Canada ... But also, because of the political discourse, you know, you have concern that migrants coming to Britain, sponging off the welfare state. So *you have to make clear to populations at home* that migrants are very much a part, of the 40% working age population of London for example, so about 9 million people. So you know, 40% of the people that get up to go to work today are migrants. In terms of the political discourse about whether immigration is a good thing or bad, the fact is that work and employment and the contribution that migrants make to the economy is very key. And so, I guess, in terms of the sort of politics, you certainly want to make it clear that you expect, that there is an expectation of migrants to settle in Britain will become part of the work force and not expected to become sort of passive observers (emphasis added).<sup>41</sup>

It is in this account that we see how the ABNI saw the study material and the exam as sending a message both to immigrants and native-born citizens. From the point of view of Wintour, the material had to include a section on employment to reassure native-born citizens that immigrants were being sent a clear message that self-sufficiency through employment was expected of all citizens. At the same time, through the inclusion of this section, the group was acknowledging that employment is a central feature of British life for citizens or non-citizens alike. The section includes information on employment insurance, anti-discrimination laws, health and safety requirements, minimum wages, and other rights. Some have argued that instead of meeting the objective of making clear to immigrants they are expected to work and contribute to the community through work, Journey to Citizenship

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<sup>41</sup> Patrick Wintour (member of ABNI & Chair of Employment subgroup), interview by author, March 2, 2001.

is a guide to social rights and benefits.<sup>42</sup> This emphasis on the rights available to citizens (and non-citizens) might read as having a Marshallian social-democratic conception of citizenship as its basis. However, a closer examination of the guide content reveals its much more deeply individualized and neoliberal character to the guide.

While the chapter on employment emphasizes rights, it also lays out that individual workers are responsible for ensuring their rights are respected. Even in sections that discuss worker safety, the guide suggests that it is the worker's responsibility to report infractions and demand safe working conditions from his/her employer. While the chapter lays out state organizations that the worker can contact for support and refers to the legislation that sets out the rights, the role of the state in enforcing and monitoring working conditions is notably absent. Such an approach to working conditions falls in line with what others have called the 'responsibilisation' of risk and personal security (Clarke 2005; Gray 2009). What this chapter makes clear to the reader is that ultimately, the individual is responsible for ensuring his or her rights are not violated. Moreover, the tool of its delivery reinforces the message. The citizenship exam is itself a policy that requires the individual to take on the responsibility of his or her own integration.

The last chapter of the guide on 'Building Better Communities' provides an explicit list of the responsibilities, based on the UK Citizenship Survey from 2005. They include the responsibilities to: obey and respect the law; raise children properly; behave responsibly; help and protect your family; respect and preserve the environment; behave morally and ethically; treat all races equally; work to provide for yourself; help others, and; vote. The remainder of Chapter 9 provides a list of ways in which an immigrant could be a 'good citizen'. This included: volunteering at local schools, acting as a school governor, joining political parties and volunteering in different organizations, a number of which are noted in the text itself. Members of the ABNI saw this as value-neutral information because it was behavioral, not cultural. Further, from their point of view, all of these activities benefited both the immigrant and the community at large. In fact, several interview participants pointed out that

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<sup>42</sup> In fact, in 2013 the guide and the exam were completely rewritten precisely along of this line of argument. *Life in the UK: A Guide to New Residents*, 3rd edition places emphasis on the responsibilities of citizenship (i.e. employment) and not the rights (i.e. social benefits).

immigrants tended to engage in these activities at a higher rate than British-born citizens without the encouragement of the guide.

Calls from the state to be ‘active citizens’ are not politically neutral, however. They fit in and are clearly informed by the discourses around social cohesion in the UK at the time. While several members of the ABNI were critical of the political reasoning behind the introduction of the exam, they saw ABNI as an important vehicle to ensure the exam remained depoliticized and a useful exercise for applicants. When ABNI was disbanded in 2009, Crick wrote a scathing forward in the group’s final report, arguing that without the oversight of the ABNI the government would be able to use the exam as a means of exclusion and assimilation. This sentiment reflected the group’s perspective that they had effectively resisted anti-immigrant pressures and created fairness through the two options available to applicants. However, implicit in the content of the guide is a particular way of thinking about what the relationship between the citizen and the state *should* be and how citizens *should* engage in the public and private sphere.

As Rose argues, in the neoliberal state “Citizenship is not primarily realized in a relation with the state, nor does it involve participation in a uniform public sphere; citizenship, rather, entails active engagement in a diversified and dispersed variety of private, corporate and quasi-corporate practices...” (2000, p327). Thus when immigrants are told that volunteerism is a virtue of a good citizen, it cannot be read only as something which is personally valuable. Volunteers are a critical component of the successful scaling back of the welfare state. Therefore, when immigrants are called to be school trustees, they also being sent the message that the ‘good’ or ‘ideal’ citizens is one who make possible through his or her activities the new forms of governance associated with the neoliberal state. Embedded in the idea of volunteerism are also particular divisions between the public and private, and more specifically what constitutes the boundaries of the public sphere. These divisions are not given, but rather reified through a multiplicity of policies, programs, and interactions with the state. While ABNI and LUKAG successfully resisted more restrictive changes to the naturalization process, the citizenship guide presented an ideal citizen that was in line with the ideal being promoted by Home Office, across various policy fields.<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> Activating citizens was a core component of the reforms to school curriculum (Kennelly 2011), social assistance (Clarke 2005), and the local community development agenda (Wallace 2007).

In the development of the content for the ESOL with citizenship curriculum there is stronger evidence of the ability of experts to deploy their identity as experts to resist government direction. While ABNI was responsible for overseeing the development of the course content, the curriculum, which is much more detailed and comprehensive than the citizenship guide, was produced by the National Institute of Adult Continuing Education ('NIACE') and LLU+ at the London South Bank University.<sup>44</sup> These organizations were commissioned to develop lesson plans for language instructors and embarked on a year process to do so. Since the *A Journey to Citizenship: Life in the United Kingdom* guide had not yet been produced, the content was developed simultaneously but independently. Whereas much of the guidance for the guide came from ABNI and Home Office staff, the citizenship course material went through several stages of development. First, ESOL teachers were asked to submit content they were already using which was relevant to the broad topics set out in *The New and the Old* report. Staff at NIACE and LLU+ used this material, together with guidelines from ABNI to produce a set of materials. The materials were piloted by 18 ESOL providers and instructors were solicited for feedback. NIACE used the information they gathered on what was effective in the classroom to improve the materials. They released the official material in 2006. The process of developing materials was largely left to NIACE and LLU+, with very little input from the Minister or even ABNI. Further, because of the nature of ESOL education, the content covered in actual ESOL courses varied substantially. In fact, this was by design. Rather than produce a set of mandatory lesson plans for classrooms, NIACE and LLU+ developed a variety of lesson plans that could be adapted for both the local context and the learner's language skills and interests. Further, ESOL course instructors were not expected to address all of the themes addressed in the exams. Proper language instruction was placed at a higher priority, and the citizenship content was designed to support language learning, not the other way around.

The importance that NIACE and LLU+ placed on effective language instruction is further highlighted in the conflicts that arose during revisions to the 2006 content. When NIACE and LLU+ were commissioned to update the material once the second edition of

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<sup>44</sup> NIACE is an independent think-tank and curriculum development organization specializing in adult and life-long learning. NNU+ was a consultancy division of the London South Bank University that specialized in literacy, family education and ESOL.

the study guide was released, the instructions from Home Office included adding material on counter-terrorism, religious diversity, and volunteering. The first of these two changes followed from Home Office's revised PREVENT strategy, which itself was only one stream of the CONTEST counter-terrorism strategy. The PREVENT agenda sought to root out the causes of domestic extremism, particularly among Muslim youth, through a variety of tactics. This included funding partnerships with local government agencies and community organizations providing services that complimented the aims of the project. One element of the strategy was to engage in strategic communications with persons and communities "vulnerable to radicalisation" (Home Office 2008, 29). Staff at NIACE and LLU+ effectively resisted the inclusion of anti-radicalization content by arguing that such content was inappropriate for a language classroom because it would result in distrust and suspicion between instructors and students. These concerns have since been echoed by several studies of the Prevent agenda, which demonstrated that the program led to a deepening of distrust, particularly among Muslim youth, who felt unfairly targeted and further stigmatized by the rhetoric of radicalisation (Gutkowski 2011; O'Toole, DeHanas, and Modood 2012). In this sense, NIACE and LLU+ staff used the status as experts in the field of ESOL education to resist a part of the Ministerial directive they found personally problematic, or in the words of one LLU+ staff member, racist.<sup>45</sup>

### **Assessing the Expertise in Policy Making: The British Case**

As this chapter has tried to show, leading up to the introduction of the exam there was a marked shift in how integration was framed in the UK. By shifting the focuses away from the barriers of integration (racism, institutional discrimination, religious intolerance) towards voluntary segregation, immigrants have become responsible for not only their own integration, but for social cohesion. Within this context, the *Life in the United Kingdom Exam* was presented by Home Secretary David Blunkett as an important tool for stimulating the kind of self-work necessary to integrate. The simultaneous (and related) hollowing out of the welfare state (Clarke 2005; Newman 2011; Mooney and Law 2007) reinforces the message of the exam: good citizens are actively employed and actively engaged at multiple sites; and do the work that is necessary, such as learning English, to ensure they have the capability to do so. Erased from this conception of citizenship is the role of the state in eliminating barriers.

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<sup>45</sup> Helen Sutherland (LLU+ staff member) interview by author, February 16, 2012.

Tasked with developing content for the citizenship exam, members of both LUKAG and ABNI demonstrated how expertise can be mobilized in particular moments during the policy implementation process to challenge ministerial direction. Interviews with members revealed how those with backgrounds in ESOL education were able to successfully complicate the idea of a standardized test. Their ability to do so was shaped in part by the kind of relationship the group had with the Ministry. As an independent board, with permanent staff and regularized meetings, members were able to form coalitions over time and use their networks outside of the board to amass and present knowledge that supported their position. The important role played by ABNI as a check to Ministerial directive was made more obvious once ABNI was dispensed. While there were complications in the administration of the ESOL with citizenship courses, ABNI worked to address the problems and maintain pressure on the government to expand ESOL funding. Without this oversight, the ESOL with citizenship option was eliminated, at the same time that funding for ESOL was cut, a double blow to immigrants with weak language skills.

The elimination of the ESOL with citizenship option also dismantled the important work done by NIACE and LLU+ in the development of content for the courses. In this process, both organizations demonstrated effectiveness in resisting government policy that they deemed inappropriate in the context of language learning. Further, while ABNI sought to develop citizenship content that was relevant to the lives of immigrants, the nature of ESOL courses created increased flexibility in terms of matching content to learner's needs and preferences. Thus in both cases, expertise is shown to be an important tool of influence in the policy process. However, in the long term the effectiveness of resistance by experts depends on their ability to remain involved in the implementation process. As a quasi-public creation of Home Office, ABNI's authority was ultimately at the discretion of the Minister. Once that authority was removed, the ability of ABNI members to influence future policy directions was eliminated.

## Chapter 4 The Netherlands

### Introduction

The development of the *Inburgeringsexamen* (Integration Exam) must be understood within the broader context of the rhetorical emphasis within Dutch integration policy on cultural clashes and the incompatibility of non-Western culture with Dutch culture. This chapter considers the exam as informed by a particular way of thinking about the ‘problem’ of integration, which was first codified in the Minorities Policy. It traces the shift in logic, not in terms of the ‘root’ problem, but in terms of the appropriate solutions. Whereas in the 1970s and early 1980s policy focused on capacity building within immigrant communities and paid at least some attention to the rhetoric of accommodation, by the 1990s the discourse had shifted to one that focused on individual effort and assimilation. Further, this chapter considers how affective orientation towards the state has been central to citizenship policy in the Netherlands. Thus I argue that the *Inburgeringsexamen* is not a shift in a particular approach to managing immigration and diversity, but rather is best described as an intensification of an existing logic. I follow with an account of the implementation of the exam, and consider the role of non-governmental actors in the development of exam content and requirements. In particular I trace how test-making and language experts used their expertise to resist the inclusion of certain norms and requirements.

The *Inburgeringsexamen* in the Netherlands was formally introduced in 2006 under the direction of Rita Verdonk, then Minister of Integration. However the act, *Wet Inburgering* (“WI”, Integration Act) was not the first piece of legislation that linked proof of integration with naturalization. In fact, the integration requirement for naturalization was established with the 1984 *Rijkswet op het Nederlanderschap* (“RN”, Netherlands Nationality Act). This Act set out that applicants needed to have reasonable knowledge of the Dutch language and must have been accepted into Dutch society, in order to become citizens (see Appendix E). The RN left the requirements to administrative orders, however in practice a clear standard was not adopted for another 17 years. Initially, the language and integration requirements was assessed through an interview with a government. This led to highly variable requirements across the country, particularly because the naturalization process was done at the municipal level. To remedy this, in 2002 a royal decree set out that applicants had to demonstrate knowledge of Dutch society and the ability to read, write, speak and understand Dutch at the



basic/elementary level of entry level A2 on the Common European Framework of References (see Appendix A). A separate and early act, *Wet Inburgering Nieuwkomers* ('WIN', Newcomer Integration Act) passed in 1998 introduced an obligation for newcomers to participate in integration courses and pass a test. However, there were no sanctions for non-compliance with this requirement. The effect of WI was to make participation and completion of integration courses mandatory by establishing the possibility of sanctions for non-compliance, while also requiring newcomers to pass an integration exam within three years of residency in order to remain legally in the country. WI also replaced the naturalization exam launched in 2003<sup>46</sup> with a single integration exam which would be completed both by newcomers applying for permanent settlement and residents applying for naturalization.

The exam was officially launched in 2007 and consisted of two elements, the central test, which was broken up into three components, and a practical test. The central test consists of a (1) Toets Gesproken Nederlands ('TGN'), a language test at entry level A2; (2) Kennis Nederlandse Samenleving ('KNS') a knowledge of Dutch society and values test and; (3) Elektronisch Praktijkexamen ('EPE') which tested knowledge of practical situations such as how to register a baby or get medical care. The practical element, Praktijkexamen ('PE'), required applicants to create a portfolio of 'proof' that they have sufficient knowledge to complete certain tasks in Dutch society. The themes of the proofs included, seeking employment, civic engagement, having a job, social participation, education, health, and raising a family. Alternatively, applicants could opt to pass a role-playing test in which they were put in certain situations and be judged on how they dealt with the task at hand.<sup>47</sup> Notably, the Dutch government never released study materials for the exam, only lists of topics and learning goals covered by the EPE and KNS. Applicants were expected to learn

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<sup>46</sup> The original naturalization exam consisted of two parts: (1) a 45 minute societal orientation test which focuses on questions relating to employment, income, finance, health care, transportation, traffic and civics and; (2) a four hour language test which tests reading, writing and speaking. Van Oers et al (2010) points out that the actual exam went far above the requirements than for which legislators were advocating at the time. While the development of this policy is interesting in its own right, it is not the period under consideration. This thesis focuses on the development of the integration exam that replaced the naturalization exam in 2007.

<sup>47</sup> Subsequently in 2013, the Dutch government introduced what is perceived as a simplified version of the exam. The new exam eliminated the more controversial practical components of the exam (EPE and PE). The new exam still includes the KNS but TGN is replaced by 4 separate language exams; speaking, reading comprehension, listening and writing.

the required material through the integration courses in which they were now obliged to actively participate.<sup>48</sup> The passing score for each component of the exam is different.

Table 4.3: Passing Score for Inburgeringsexamen, 2007

Component	Minutes	Max Score	Passing Score	In %
<b>KNS</b>	45	40 <sup>49</sup>	31	78
<b>TGN</b>	15	80	37 <sup>50</sup>	46
<b>EPE</b>	60	40 <sup>5</sup>	30	75
<b>PE</b>	n/a	n/a	Pass/fail	n/a

Much of the literature on the Dutch citizenship model has focused on the impact of the radical shift in approach in the Netherlands, proof of which is found in the complicated and difficult integration exams, and extensive mandatory integration courses introduced in the past 10 years (Joppke 2007a; Michalowski and Oers 2012; Winter 2013). In this reading, while the Netherlands had experienced similar guest worker led migratory patterns to other Northern European countries, rather than responding with a highly restrictive/assimilatory policy, the Dutch were relatively early adopters of multicultural policy. Thus described, the introduction of strict cultural and norm-based integration requirements would mark a dramatic turn in the Dutch approach to integration.

However, this reading has been challenged on several fronts. As noted in Chapter 2, the Netherlands is often pointed to as a case that undermines any attempt to create typologies for integration, precisely because it is difficult to categorize. On the one hand, while the Netherlands officially adopted a multicultural-like policy in the late 1970s, the Minorities Policy, this did not result in liberal naturalization policies. In particular, except for a brief period in the 1990s, the Netherlands has always required migrants to renounce their previous citizenship upon becoming Dutch, except in cases where their other citizenship did

<sup>48</sup> After 2 years, example questions were released for the KNS and EPE. The examples were questions that had been removed from the exams. Since the model adopted in the Netherlands was to develop an exam that participants could not study for by rote, the organizations responsible for making the exams remove questions periodically and replaces them with new questions to ensure the validity of exams results.

<sup>49</sup> The actual number of questions varies for the KNS and EPE because the exams consists of randomly generated scenarios that include several questions.

<sup>50</sup> This score is equivalent to an A2 level on the CEFR. A score of 47 is equivalent to a B1, and 57 to B2, and so on.

not allow renunciation.<sup>51</sup> Further, access for 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> generation migrants<sup>52</sup> to citizenship through *jus soli* is managed through a requirement to proclaim Dutch nationality at the age of 18. Political debates on changes to the 1985 Netherlands Nationality Act have focused on issues of loyalty and ‘feeling Dutch’ (van Oers, de Hart, and Groenendijk 2010), which resulted in the adoption of an integration clause at an earlier point than most other European countries. On the other hand, up until 2003, the integration requirement was liberally interpreted. Further, in cases where naturalization was difficult or impossible for some categories of migrants, the rights associated with citizenship like access to the welfare state, representation within the political system, and in some cases voting rights, are accessible to migrants. As a result of these inconsistencies, some scholars argue that the Netherlands has never really followed a liberal-multicultural model (Vink 2007), while others maintain that recent changes constitute a substantial change in policy direction (Entzinger 2006). The purpose of this chapter is to put aside these debates and consider a new set of questions.

This chapter focuses on the actualization and implementation of the new test requirements set out in the 2007 *Wet Inburgering*. In particular it considers how the state went about developing an exam to assess knowledge of Dutch society. The chapter focuses on the role of four expert and non-state organizations (CITO, ITTA, CINOP and Bureau ICE) in developing different components of the exam. Like the previous chapter, it considers the integration exams in relation to citizenship policy and how such exams are a means through which to manage inclusion. Instead of asking whether the introduction of the exams marks a radical departure of the “Dutch model”, this chapter asks how integration became understood as a particular kind of problem, with the integration exam as the solution. Further it considers how the framing of the problem and solution was either taken up or challenged by the experts charged with the actualization of the exam. How was expert knowledge mobilized by the actors involved to shape the exam in different ways? What conceptualizations of the migrant and citizens were used and resisted by experts? How did this change both the ‘target’ group and desired outcome of the policy?

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<sup>51</sup> In some situations, applicants are granted an exception from renunciation if doing so would require the applicant to complete mandatory military service, as is the case for many Turkish immigrants to the Netherlands. Other exemptions include: spousal applicants, refugees, applicants born in or who have lived for 5 years as a minor in the Netherlands, or renunciation would result of loss of rights (*e.g.* inheritance).

<sup>52</sup> 2nd and 3rd generation migrants are persons born in the Netherlands to parents who are not citizens but have legal or permanent residency in the country.

The first part of this chapter considers the introduction of the integration exams as part of the longer historical development of citizenship and integration policy in the Netherlands. This section questions the assumed linear development from restricted to liberalized policy (and back again). Further it argues that the particular way that the Dutch government has come to identify and measure integration is critical to understanding how an integration exam became seen as an appropriate solution to the problems identified by governments about migrant communities. By considering the exam in relation to past policies, this section also challenges the tendency to read the changes in Dutch citizenship and integration policy primarily through the lens of anti-terrorism. The second part of this chapter more explicitly considers the role of expertise in actualization of the exam and how expert knowledge is employed by the state in an attempt to depoliticize a highly contestable idea – what it means to be Dutch. In considering the role of experts, this chapter highlights how experts can mobilize expert knowledge to effectively take on a much more political but subtle adversarial role in policy development.

### **A History of Dutch Citizenship Policy**

Like the United Kingdom, the Netherlands migratory patterns have been shaped, in part, by its colonial legacy. Whereas British citizenship policy was gradually restricted in order to stem off migration from former colonies, the development of Dutch citizenship policy was marked by a two-tiered system of rights much earlier, with the expansion of rights for certain colonial residents and the elimination of rights for others. The Dutch Civil Code, passed in 1838, stipulated that all persons born in the Netherlands or its colonies were Dutch citizens. Unlike the UK, the Netherlands retreated from this liberal position of unrestricted *jus soli* much earlier. The 1850 *Nationaliteitswet* (Nationality Act) designated only those born in the Netherlands or descendants of such individuals as holding political rights. So although native inhabitants of the colonies were still citizens of the Netherlands, they were stripped of the key political rights normally associated citizenship. Subsequently, the *Wet op het Nederlanderschap en het ingezetenschap* ('WNI', Dutch Citizenship and Residency Act) passed in 1892 eliminated *jus soli* as the basis of citizenship and replaced it with paternal *jus sanguinis*,<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>53</sup> Citizenship was passed on only through the paternal bloodline in the Netherlands until 1984. Marrying a non-Dutch man resulted in the automatic loss of Dutch citizenship.

in part as a way to limit dual citizenship for child born to non-citizens (Böcker and Thränhardt 2007). The act granted citizenship to all inhabitants of the Dutch West Indies, while limiting citizenship in the Dutch East Indies to inhabitants of Dutch descent. Jones explains that the inconsistency between the colonies reflected the different approach to colonial rule. Whereas the Dutch government attempted to create an assimilated linguistic community in the East Indies, in the West, inhabitants were purposefully distinguished as either ‘European’ or ‘native’ with European inhabitants holding positions of power within the colonial administration (Jones 2013, 32). The result was the creation of stateless people in the East Indies, who in 1910 were given the status of ‘Dutch subject, non-Dutch citizen’ (van Oers, de Hart, and Groenendijk 2010, 3).

The WNI also laid out naturalization requirements for immigrants, including a five-year residency period and renunciation of any previous citizenship. Further, because there was no *jus soli* basis for citizenship, children of immigrants yet to naturalize were subject to the same requirements.<sup>54</sup> While on paper the requirements were not overly restrictive, other requirements such as financial stability, and public behavior were major barriers (van Oers, de Hart, and Groenendijk 2010). Further, each act of citizenship acquisition was achieved through an individual act of parliament. As such, naturalization rates remained low until the post-WWI period. In 1929 legislation was introduced that tied the right to work to Dutch citizenship, meaning foreign nationals could no longer legally work in the Netherlands unless they naturalized. Subsequently applications for naturalization, primarily from German citizens, grew exponentially, from 330 in 1930 to 1648 in 1933 (van Oers, de Hart, and Groenendijk 2010, 3). This drew concern over the motivations of applicants, with the loyalty of applicants a major concern. In 1930, applicants were required to complete a questionnaire which focused on the motivations of applicant, their participation in Dutch society and political parties, their level of education, and questions aimed to determine the likelihood the applicants would become a burden on society. Furthermore, the residency requirement was *de facto* increased to 15 year. In other words, restrictive citizenship laws became the means through which to control access to work, and by extension control immigration.

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<sup>54</sup> However, because citizenship was based on paternal *jus sanguinis*, women and dependents automatically became citizens when their husband was granted citizenship.

The changes to citizenship law in 1953 re-introduced *jus soli* for 3<sup>rd</sup> generation children born to non-citizen fathers with legal residency, who were in turn born to non-citizen mothers in the Netherlands. While citizenship rights for 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> generation migrants would become a contested issue in 1990s, at issue in 1953 were not the children of migrant-workers from Turkey or Morocco who later became the focus of debate. Rather the change was to facilitate the inclusion of the large number of 3<sup>rd</sup> generation Belgian-Flemish immigrants living in the Netherlands. The rationale at the time was that these 3<sup>rd</sup> generation immigrants spoke the language and were already integrated into Dutch society and as such should be considered citizens (Böcker and Thränhardt 2007). Further liberalization through the 1960s, in terms of the administration of the naturalization process, was justified by global norms on the ‘right’ to citizenship established by the UN Convention on Human Rights. For persons with a close connection to the Netherlands (second generation immigrants, former Dutch citizens, and former Dutch subjects, non-Dutch citizens) naturalization would be conducted at the ministerial level and by the 1977 clear descriptions of the requirements were released to the public. There were three main requirements; (1) there were no objections to indefinite residency of the applicants; (2) the applicant was judged to be socially integrated by virtue of language acquisition and involvement with Dutch society and; (3) the applicant was not a threat to public order. The second requirement was judged based on an interview with a police official. However, any applicant that maintained a sense of connection to their home country, was deemed not integrated, even if he or she was an accepted member of the Dutch community, as all such other citizenships had to be renounced.

In 1984, the *Rijkswet op het Nederlanderschap* (‘RN’, Netherlands Nationality Act), eliminated gender discrimination in *jus sanguinis*, and established new requirements for naturalization (see Appendix E). Permanent residents, 18 years or older, living in the Netherlands for 5 years, who were not a danger to public order, and who had made an effort to renounce their other citizenship were eligible under the act, so long as they could prove knowledge of the Dutch language and integration into society. The last clause was assessed by an interview with a public servant, until the introduction of a standardized naturalization exam in 2003. Except for a period of six years (1991-1997), dual citizenship has not been possible, except in certain situations where a person is unable to renounce their other citizenship. The RN also codified an avenue for acquisition of citizenship for 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> generation immigrants, who could acquire citizenship through the right of option at age 18 until age 25. This reflected the belief by legislators that simply being born in the Netherlands was not sufficient evidence of “feelings of connection to the country” (van Oers, de Hart,

and Groenendijk 2010, 19). Initially, this was an important change for 3<sup>rd</sup> generation immigrants, as the previous law had granted them *jus soli* citizenship upon birth. However, the target of the previous law had been Belgian and other European immigrants. By the 1980s, the ethnic make-up of immigrants was much more diverse, with the country drawing immigrants primarily from Turkey and Morocco. While the issue was debated, two years later, *jus soli* rights were reestablished for 3<sup>rd</sup> generation immigration. Critically, the right of option avenue to citizenship did not require anything further than a declaration, and did not require the renunciation of other citizenships. As of April 2015, the RN remains in effect, although additional changes have been made, including the introduction of an oath of allegiance (2008), withdrawal of citizenship in cases of terrorism (2010), and mandatory renunciation for 2<sup>nd</sup> generation applicants who opt for Dutch citizenship at 18 (2010).

The above account of the evaluation of Dutch citizenship policy stands in contrast to a reading of it as a process of liberalization, marked more recently by drastic change (see: Entzinger 2006; Joppke 2008a). A long-term analysis demonstrates that Dutch citizenship policy has been marked by racialized and gendered notions of belonging. Even at its most 'liberal', loyalty and 'closeness' to Dutch culture and identity has remained a central requirement, codified in the requirement for renunciation for immigrants, but not for *jus sanguinis* citizens. While the 1990s included a short period where dual nationality was allowed, this period was also marked by a growing concern over the integration of 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> generation immigrants, resulting in the adoption of several integration requirements. As such, citizenship and naturalization policy cannot be considered outside of the context of the problematization of immigrant integration. This next section traces out the phases of immigration to the Netherlands, as well as initial policy responses to the various communities of immigrants. It focuses on the relationship between research agendas and how the visibility of the immigrants shapes how integration has become problematized over time.

### **Immigration Trends in the Netherlands**

Indonesian independence in 1945 resulted in substantial migration from the colonies. Approximately 300,000 citizens arrived in the Netherlands from the Dutch West Indies. However, Jones (2013) argues that despite having the legal status of citizen through paternal *jus sanguinis*, the *Indische Netherlanders* (Indo-Dutch) were considered by the Dutch government to be too culturally different and therefore undesirable immigrants, leading the government to develop programs to encourage their repatriation to Indonesia. In contrast, Dutch citizens of full European descent living in Indonesia were able to access loans to assist their

migration back ‘home.’ Ultimately, the ‘discouragement’ policy was abandoned in 1956 when it became clear the political, social and economic status of the Indo-Dutch in Indonesia had become untenable. At this point, even those who had opted for Indonesian citizenship were able to reclaim their Dutch citizenship and migrate to the Netherlands. By the 1970s, however, the commitment to facilitating the migration of colonial citizens had eroded. In fact, the rapid decolonialization of Surinam was in part driven by a desire to prevent mass migration to the Netherlands before citizenship status was transferred to the Republic of Suriname. This is because, unlike the colonial subjects of the East Indies, those living in Suriname had full Dutch citizenship rights. Notwithstanding this, pre-independence immigration from Suriname amounted to about 180,000. Through to the 1990s, a further 90,000 colonial citizens arrived from the Dutch Antilles, driven by economic factors (Bosma 2012, 10).

Table 4.4: Population By Country of Origin, 2007(CBS 2015b)

	<b>Total</b>	<b>1<sup>st</sup> Generation</b>	<b>2<sup>nd</sup> Generation</b>
<b>Total population</b>	16,357,992	1,601,194	912655
<b>Foreign background</b>	3,170,406	1,601,194	912655
Indonesia <sup>55</sup>	389,940	126,048	263,892
Germany	381,186	101,221	279,965
Turkey	368,600	195,113	173,487
Suriname <sup>56</sup>	333,504	186,025	147,479
Morocco	329,493	167,893	161,600
Netherlands Antilles & Aruba <sup>56 56</sup>	129,965	78,907	51,058
Belgium	112,224	36,126	76,098
Former Yugoslavia	76,465	52,857	23,608
United Kingdom	75,686	42,604	33,082

<sup>55</sup> Although these groups are accounted for as foreigners, as noted earlier most of the persons with origins in Suriname, Indonesia, and the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba arrived with full citizenship. As such, they fall largely outside of the purview of the integration requirements.

<sup>56</sup> This category includes the islands of Aruba, Curacao, St. Maarten, Bonaire, and St Eustatius & Saba. As of 10 October 2010, the Netherlands Antilles no longer exists. Together the countries Aruba, Curaçao, St Maarten, and the Netherlands form of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. St. Maarten, Bonaire and St Eustatius & Saba function as special municipalities of the country of the Netherlands.



Up until the 1970s the focus on Dutch citizenship policy was clearly on how to manage the full inclusion of ethnically Dutch individuals and the exclusion of all others. While the Netherlands had seen many citizens emigrate in the immediate post-war period, by the 1960s it also saw a rise in migrant workers from Southern Europe and the Mediterranean. In 1977, ‘recruitment countries’ such as Spain, Portugal, Turkey, Greece, Morocco, Tunisia and Yugoslavia accounted for 180,150 of the temporary residency holders. Of that Turkish and Moroccan residents numbered at 82,931 and 47,089 respectively (WRR 1979, 94).<sup>57</sup> By 2007, when the *Inburgeringsexamen* was introduced Turkish, Surinamese and Moroccan accounted for the three largest 1<sup>st</sup> generation immigrant groups in the Netherlands (See Table 4.2 below). Interestingly, by 2007 these ‘traditional’ non-EU sources of immigration were no longer providing the majority of immigrants to the Netherlands, with China (3,667) and the USA (3,477) providing the most non-EU immigrants, followed by Netherlands Antilles and Aruba (3,187) Turkey (2885) and much further down the list, Morocco (1,774)(CBS 2015a) .

Although the *Inburgeringsexamen* is technically required of all immigrants wishing to naturalize or gain permanent residency, the problematization of integration has focused on non-Western immigrants, which includes colonial-migrants (excluding the Indo-Dutch). With only 2% of the total population born in Turkey and Morocco, and many of these immigrant having already naturalized, these numbers demonstrate how small a proportion the persons most likely to fall under the requirements of the *Inburgeringsexamen* actually was, as they do not apply to EU-migrants, nor to colonial immigrants.<sup>58</sup> This opens up the following questions: how did these communities come to be seen as a problem, how was the problem framed, and how was the integration exam framed as a solution? In order to answer these questions, we must first consider how the Dutch government responded to post-WWII migratory patterns.

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<sup>57</sup> These numbers include all temporary permit holders from ‘recruitment countries’, including temporary work-permit holders and their dependents. The total number of temporary foreign residents in 1976 was over 360,000 with 113,000 coming from member-states of European Economic Community.

<sup>58</sup> Following a 2011 court decision, all Turkish residents are now exempt from integration requirement.

## Problematizing Immigrant Integration

### *Making the Immigrant Problem Visible through Research*

Despite shifting from a country of emigration to immigration in the late 1960s, the following decade was marked by very little action on the part of the *Ministerie van Cultuur, Recreatie en Maatschappelijk Werk* ('CRM', Ministry of Culture, Recreation and Social Work) responsible for immigrants, in terms of supporting their settlement. For colonial subjects, their connection with the Dutch language and culture meant that settlement support was not necessary, even if their full inclusion into Dutch society was complicated by discrimination. For migrant workers, integration was simply not a priority because it was assumed that their residency in the Netherlands was temporary, and they would eventually return home. As a result, even academic analysis of labour migration was focused on programs of repatriation and facilitating temporary settlement (Scholten 2011, 81). The year 1979 marked a watershed moment in the way of thinking about non-European and non-colonial migration. Two reports, one by the *Advies Commissie Onderzoek Minderheden* ('ACOM', Advisory Committee on Minorities Research)<sup>59</sup> and the other by *Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid* ('WRR', Scientific Council for Government Policy) challenged the underlying assumptions of Dutch integration policy. The WRR report, *Ethnic Minorities* contended:

The assumption that minorities would remain only temporarily in our country has proven to be wrong [...] [and] policy should take into account the possibility of permanent residence in the Netherlands, [...] accepting the fact that in Dutch society ethnic and racial diversity have increased permanently (WRR 1979, XXXIX).

Similarly, the report by ACOM *Minorities research advice* also released in 1979 named the Netherlands as a *de facto* country of immigration, and over time ACOM developed a particular research focus on uncovering discrimination (Scholten, 2011). Although they did not receive much attention from the general public the WRR and ACOM reports had a profound and lasting impact on how the government not only view integration, but also the role that experts had in defining the problem and proposing solutions.

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<sup>59</sup> ACOM was established in 1979 as an expert-lead research organizations charged with the oversight and coordination of research projects and to report back policy recommendations to CMR. WRR was established in 1972 to advise government from a multidisciplinary perspective with a long-term outlook on the effect of policy.

In his analysis of expert policy networks in the Netherlands, Scholten (2011) argues that changes over time in integration policy reflects how ethnic diversity was framed and the relationship between experts and government. In what might be called the multiculturalist period (1979-1989), the integration of ethnic minorities was not politically salient. Combined with the development of organizations like WWR and ACOM, which took on advisory roles in policy development, academics experts engaged in research on integration were able to influence the direction of policy. Scholten's argument is twofold. First, he argues that there is no such thing as singular Dutch model of integration, instead he considers four distinct phases. Secondly, each of his phases corresponds with certain experts taking on very specific roles in the development of policy. Scholten's work advances a deeper understanding on how these quasi-independent academic policy research networks shaped the general framing of integration as a policy-field in the Netherlands. However, his account does not thoroughly address how the framing resulted in certain policy problems and solutions being given credence. As such, we must consider how experts were able to *see* immigrants and their (lack of) integration, and how that relates to the proposed techniques designed to the problem(s) identified.

*The reluctant multicultural nation: The rise and fall of the Minorities Policy*

Prior to the 1970, there was very little attention paid to immigrant integration from outside the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Further, it was the WRR report and ACOM reports in 1979 that introduced the term ethnic or cultural 'minorities' to categorize migrants from the colonies and non-Western countries. In fact, until that point because of the various migratory paths and varying types of status within the Netherlands, each of the three main groups of migrants fell under the purview of three different ministries. Further there had been very little research, both in academia and within government on immigrants. A terrorist attack by the Molucaan immigrants in the 1970s drew attention from the CRM who had been responsible for this particular group of immigrants. The Molucaan community had arrived in the Netherlands following the independence of Indonesia. As a minority within Indonesia, who had sided with the Dutch during the war of independence, the Molucaan immigrants had sought temporary refuge in the Netherlands until an independent Molucaan state was established. Since the Molucaan were only temporarily in the Netherlands, the Dutch government provided housing and social services largely in isolation from the general community. This was meant to help preserve their ethnic traditions so that repatriation later would be easier. However, after 25 years in the country, and no real hope for an independent state, the CRM shifted its policy toward facilitating integration.

This was a radical change for CRM, which had commissioned a study in 1971 on migrant populations, but resisted the initial title *Immigrants in the Netherlands* because the term immigrant suggested permanency (Scholten 2011, 110). The report instead used the term *allochtoon* is an encompassing term for all migrants – both temporary and permanent. While *allochtoon* would later become a deeply political term in the discourse on immigrant integration, initially it was used because it was seen to be a value neutral scientific term, rooted in geology terminology.<sup>60</sup> The heavy reliance on ‘scientific’ knowledge and research reflected the general positivist approach to immigrant integration at the time. From the point of view of the various actors involved, because this was a new field of government intervention, politics had to be kept out. What was required was scientifically based policy advice on how to address the needs of immigrant communities. Because so little research had been done of these communities, the first step was to identify the target populations and identify their needs. Molleman, who was head of the Minorities Policy Directorate at WRR, which was responsible for the 1979 report, explained his approach:

It was still not a party-political issue then, and I have always attempted to gain the widest possible support from Parliament. [...] My opinion has always been that this is not a party-political issue. [...] With political arguments you will not be able to achieve broad support for policy in this area. *This is a policy that has to be developed and that has to remain for years.* And therefore it must not be associated with a particular party so that later on other parties can dissolve it once again. Then a yo-yo effect would be created, that in some cases can be good, but not with this type of policy (cited in Scholten 2011, 114, emphasis added)

The WRR report established a particular way of thinking about immigrant integration that shaped policy throughout the 1980s. In its recommendations based on research conducted by Pennix on the current status of immigrants in the Netherlands, the WRR argued that intensive intervention was required in order to close “the social and economic gap and for participation on an equal footing in Dutch society” (WRR 1979, XII). What is interesting is that the WRR equated the low socio-economic status of immigrants with that of other groups in the Netherlands to highlight the needs for a concerted and committed effort to addressing greater opportunities.

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<sup>60</sup> *Allochtoon* is a geological term used to describe rock formations and literally means ‘of different or foreign earth’. *Autochtoon*, used to refer white, ethnically Dutch residents, means ‘of this earth.’

From the perspective of the WRR, if immigrants were a permanent but disadvantaged group in Dutch society, the state had an obligation to intervene to improve their situation. More specifically, the interventions taken needed to address isolation. The problem was twofold; firstly, the report argued that isolation “acts as an impediment to the development of contacts with and optimal participation in the host society” (WRR 1979, XIII). Second, isolation would lead to differences between the groups becoming more pronounced, and could ultimately lead to hostility. The recommendations by the group emphasized the need to create space for immigrants to maintain their ethnic identities, while adapting to Dutch culture – assimilation was not on offer. The WRR also recommended that more effort be made to address the ‘backwardness’ of immigrants groups in terms of their educational attainment and social and labour market positioning. Here discrimination in the workplace and the education sector were of particular importance.

While the WRR’s recommendations were based on the study they commissioned written by Pennix, the full *Ethnic Minorities* report did not incorporate all of Pennix’s recommendations. The WRR interpreted his results in their own way. In reference to Pennix’s recommendations, the report noted,

A number of concepts which the Council believes to be of fundamental importance are not included in these strategies, which are directed towards emancipation through the individual and through the group respectively: for example the belief that not only minorities' cultures but also the culture and structure of the recipient society should form the focus of attention, and that both the majority and minorities should be drawn into the decision-making process (WRR 1979, XXII).

Indeed, the report did result in a fundamental shift in how immigration was perceived in the Netherlands, in particular to need for the dominant culture to also change. Further, it successfully drove home the idea that immigrants were a permanent part of Dutch society and therefore their poor socio-economic position needed to be of concern.

With a different lens, however, the report also reified a particular way of thinking about ‘the Dutch’ and ‘the immigrant’ and their relationship to citizenship. Pennix’s research focused on three immigrant communities, namely: the Moluccan; the Suriname and Antilleans, and; Mediterranean workers. What is critical to note here is the inclusion of the Suriname and Antillean communities under the category of ‘immigrant.’ These communities were named as immigrants despite the fact that virtually all such persons were Dutch citizens

who had arrived in the Netherlands with that status.<sup>61</sup> While the report noted that ethnic minorities in the Netherlands had similar outcomes to similarly educated and working-poor white Dutch citizens, citizens from Suriname and the Netherlands Antilles were not associated with those groups. Instead, they were classified as immigrants, and grouped not only with non-citizens, but also with migrant workers who had an even less stable status in the country. The material point here is that by including Dutch citizens with immigrants, the WRR set a political agenda and program that was premised on a very closed conceptualization of ‘citizenship as identity’, one that maintained a close link between race, ethnicity, and Dutchness.

From the perspective of the WRR the ‘problem’ with Surinamese and Antillean immigrants was:

unequal opportunities and discriminatory treatment in the Netherlands, contributory factors to these problems being *racial differences and a strong cultural orientation towards Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles*, which, however, does not result in any appreciable return migration (WRR 1979, XI, emphasis added).

While the report acknowledged discrimination on the part of indigenous Dutch as a cause of some of the isolation of the Surinamese and Antillean Dutch, the report also criticized their orientation toward their ‘home’ culture, which despite being legally part of the Kingdom of Netherlands, was culturally and racially different. Implicitly, the report defined Dutch culture as including only the culture of the European parts of the Kingdom.

Further, despite the report’s emphasis on the fact that immigrants were ‘here to stay,’ the recommendations from the WRR were mixed in terms of the liberalization of naturalization requirements. The WRR acknowledged that it was “desirable that as few people as possible who intend living in the Netherlands permanently should remain classified as foreigners” and emphasized the importance of granting access to citizenship, especially for those who were born in the Netherlands (WRR 1979, XXVII). However, the WRR also expressed concern that there would be “disadvantages in extending Dutch citizenship too

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<sup>61</sup> While the Caribbean islands that form Netherlands Antilles remains part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Suriname gained independence in 1975. It was only upon independence that Dutch citizens living in Suriname lost their Dutch citizenship and became Surinamese. However, as noted above and in the WRR report, the vast majority of Suriname immigrants in the Netherlands at the time arrived before independence and so had been Dutch citizens since birth.

quickly, e.g. the possibility of dual nationality” (WRR 1979, XXVII). The framing of dual nationality as disadvantageous highlights how the boundaries of citizenship that informed WRR report were defined by the affective orientations towards the state and local community. Becoming Dutch necessitated leaving behind both legal and cultural allegiance with one’s home, even if that home was part of the Kingdom, as in the case for Antillean immigrants.

Although the issue of loyalty was not overtly addressed by the report, the problematization of dual nationality points to the important link between undivided loyalty and citizenship in the Netherlands. This is further highlighted by the report’s explanation of the precarious position of second and third generation immigrants. The report explains,

Growing up in two worlds having different social status and divergent attitudes, and which display little understanding for one another and are indeed sometimes *hostile towards each other*, but which also both lay a claim *on loyalty*, confronts this generation with great *problems of identity*, and this can lead to a certain lack of standards of conduct. (WRR 1979, XIII, emphasis added).

Thus the problem is not simply divided loyalties, but that the division is between cultures that are “hostile toward each other.” And further that this division of loyalty leads to unacceptable conduct within Dutch society. Here again, we can see the how the affective orientations of individuals, or in the case feelings of confusion and unease, are instrumental in the understanding of the problems in immigrant communities. Further, the implication here is that second and third generation immigrants are at least partially responsible for their own social exclusion when they fail to deal with these emotional obstacles to integration. The critical point here is that while the WRR report was the catalyst for a cohesive and less assimilatory integration policy, the analysis of the ‘problem’ of integration and its relation to citizenship rested on a very narrow, racially based conceptualization of what constituted a Dutch citizen. Further, the focus on the loyalty of colonial citizens reflects the important role that affect played in the creation and maintenance of the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion.

The 1979 report by the WRR is often considered the catalyst of the ‘golden age’ of Dutch multiculturalism. Largely because the last 15 years have been marked by volatile public discourse on the failure of multiculturalism, there is a tendency to overlook the debates around multiculturalism that took place throughout this ‘golden age.’ In 1983 the Dutch government adopted an official Minorities Policy, which rather than providing a general

definition of minorities, identified specific groups as the targets of the policy. The specific groups were Moluccans, Surinamese, Antilleans, foreign workers, gypsies, caravan dwellers and refugees. Despite the lofty goals of encouraging the open expression of various ethnic identities in public spaces and the elimination of barriers to education, employment and housing that were set out by the WRR in the 1979 report, in practice the Minorities Policy was limited in its scope (Scholten 2011; Essed & Nimako 2006). Marked by the legacy of the pillarization<sup>62</sup> system used to manage Protestant and Catholic divisions in the Netherlands, the Minorities Policy focused on identity and capacity building for specific ethnic minority groups. This meant funding separate institutions for education, news and media, and civil society organizations. The rationale here was that in order to be integrated into Dutch society, ethnic minority groups first had to organize themselves in a coherent way, and this required at least some support of cultural identity formation. In this sense, integration policy was almost synonymous with cultural policy, with very little emphasis on anti-discrimination or anti-racist programs. However, it is also important to note that cultural funding was always limited and short-lived, declining rapidly by the late 1980s (Vink 2007). Further, while the Minorities Policy framed the reality (or possibility) of a multi-ethnic Netherlands as positive, it also set clear limitations to multiculturalism, particularly “when values and norms of minorities from their original culture clash with those of the established norms of our pluriform society and when these are considered as fundamental for Dutch society” (Minorities Memorandum cited in Scholten 2011, 74). Of course the implication of such approaches to managing clashes is that it frames the norms and values of Dutch society as beyond contestation or debate by newcomers.

*Disrupting the myth of Dutch Multiculturalism: Creating the non-integration Other through research*

While the Minorities Policy may have been weak in some ways, what it did do was set out a way through which to identify and study the socio-economic outcomes of immigrants and ethnic minorities. While there may not have been much in the way of actual policy or programs, the 1980s marked a period of rapid expansion in terms of research on the target

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<sup>62</sup> Pillarization refers the institutional arrangements developed in to manage conflict between Protestant and Catholic citizens. The state supported the development of separate political, educational, and civil society organizations for each group. This included separate media, unions, and schools, amongst other arrangements. Conflict and compromise between the groups was managed through the elite members of each group. While a process of depillarization began in the post-WWII period, the legacy of the system is still observed in the education system, media, and political parties.



groups identified by the Minorities Policy. As Scholten (2011) argues, the relationship between researchers and policy makers during this period was extremely close. Experts were meant to speak ‘truth to power’ so as to ensure that scientifically informed policy could be possible. The policy-research nexus was defined by positivist ontology, where once the problems associated with minorities could be known, they too could be acted upon in a non-political, objective manner. This in part explains why public debate on integration was limited at this time.

However, as Essed and Nimako (2006) point out, despite the rapid expansion of research institutes on ethnic minorities in the Netherlands, there has been a systematic under-representation of studies that focus on race and racism. One part of their explanation is the framing of the problem around *ethnic* minorities. They argue that research agendas that focused on the deficit or difference models of explaining varied outcomes between indigenous-Dutch and immigrants received more government support. The ‘deficit’ studies sought to explain the disadvantaged socio-economic status of immigrants along the lines of their deficit in various skills or values (education, language, religion, etc.). Studies focusing on difference acknowledged that very real differences existed between cultures and pointed to the need for negotiation and communication across those differences. The critical point for Essed and Nimake has been that culture has been the dominant lens through which clear differences in socio-economic status have been explained. Even in cases where discrimination is considered, it is rarely through the lens of racism.

The treatment of ethnic identity as an objective category has had a second, perverse effect on how the Dutch government identifies minorities and measures integration. As early as the 1979 report by WRR, concern was expressed over identifying the children of immigrants as immigrants. Indeed, the 1989 follow up report by the WRR suggested that the Minorities Policy had been unsuccessful because it had sought to support and reify ethnic identities by simply making them visible as distinct groups. However, one of the problems with research had been the absence of a standard and cohesive definition of who could be considered a minority and what is more, how shifting patterns of immigration since the introduction of the Minorities Policy called into question how ‘minorities’ has been operationalized. Further, debates began to arise as to how to differentiate 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> or 3<sup>rd</sup> generation immigrants, as the focus on minorities has conflated the terms ‘immigrants’ and ‘ethnic minorities.’

In 1992 the Dutch government rejected self-identification and opted for a model of ethnic origin which was based on: (1) country of birth; (2) father's country of birth and; (3) mother's country of birth. Self-identification was rejected for practical reasons – the Netherlands does not have a national census – but also for fear that the ability to self-identify might make the measurements used to assess integration ineffective. The goal of the Minorities Policy was not, for example, to eliminate poverty among ethnic minorities, but rather to make participation in key institutions (labour market, education, government etc.) proportional to migrants' share of the Dutch population. In this model, self-identification becomes problematic because minorities with high levels of education and labour market integration, where also more likely to identify as Dutch. Thus, allowing them to identify as 'Dutch' would result in making the 'problem' of integration appear bigger than it actually was at any given point in time (Verweij and Bijl 2012). The category of *allochtoon* was further differentiated between 'Western' and 'Non-Western.' Western *allochtoon* had foreign lineage in Europe (excluding Turkey), North American, Japan, Oceania, or Indonesia. The inclusion of the Indo-Dutch reflects the legacies of colonization in the East and West Indies. Whereas Indo-Dutch were considered to be culturally close because of the mixed ancestry, citizens from the West Indies were framed as culturally different (Bosma 2013). The codification based on country of origin and distinction between Western and non-Western, made it possible for racialized persons with Dutch citizenship to remain visible as different from those who were ethnically Dutch.

The adoption of these terms by the Ministry of Internal Affairs (then responsible for integration policy) and then by the *Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek* ('CBS' Central Bureau of Statistics) was further informed by the individualized approach to integration that the WRR was advocating by the 1990s. While the goal of the 1979 report was to facilitate the emancipation of immigrants, by 1989 the WRR argued that the policies adopted had instead created dependency on the state. However, blame was also placed on government. The report stated:

As far as the latter are concerned, the Council believes that the government tends to view these groups too much in the light of welfare categories instead of providing them with opportunities to stand on their own feet. Many members of minority groups have become directly or indirectly dependent on the state in the form of social security benefits, welfare services and facilities and housing. This leaves them in a particularly vulnerable position when it comes to spending cuts. At the same time, *one of the reasons for this dependence on the state consists of the comparative lack of accessibility that minorities tend to have to many agencies and facilities in sectors other than those just noted. In some cases*

*this may reflect direct or indirect discrimination; in others it may be traced to cultural differences (WRR 1990, 10).*

Thus the critical problem was the over-representation of minorities in institutions of ‘dependency’ (i.e. welfare) and their under-representation in institutions of independency (i.e. labour market). Further, while the report acknowledged discrimination was one barrier to full inclusion into Dutch social and political institutions, cultural difference was also identified as a separate factor. The rationality at play here is that race is not a choice, whereas individuals choose to identify with certain cultures over others. As such barriers related to culture are reflective of individual choice, not institutional barriers.

While the solutions posed 10 years earlier were framed around the need to help minorities manage their divided identities by recognizing their differences as a group, the WRR was now advocating a new approach that focused on the individual. From their perspective, one of the problems with focusing on the minority groups was that it obscured differences within and between groups. Coupled with the heavy dependence on the welfare state, the WRR argued that this policy led to a paternalistic understanding of the appropriate role of the state vis-à-vis minorities. The report stated:

The government's current minorities policy finds its primary legitimation in its blanket, group-oriented approach: 'The Netherlands as a multi-ethnic society'. *In doing so, however, ethnic origin tends to be linked over-readily and broadly with social deprivation*, while insufficient account is taken of the inherent dynamics of the integration process. Rather than a coarse-meshed, group-oriented approach towards combatting deprivation, based on ethnic variations, what is required is a fine-meshed approach focusing on individual integration, in which allowance is made for the differences between and within the immigrant groups (WRR 1990, 55).

The recommendation of the WRR was not to abandon all programs specifically targeted to minorities, but rather to focus attention on programs that would open up access to education, the labour market and government institutions irrespective of ethnic minority identity. This meant a decoupling of cultural policy from integration policy. From the perspective of the WRR it was no longer appropriate or desirable for the state to support the development of ethnic minority civil society organizations or identity. So while cultural difference was still the problem, the solution by the 1990s was to focus on the individual capacity building instead of ethnic minority capacity building (Scholten 2011).

Within this proposed framework of an individualized approach to integration, the terms *allochtoon* and *autochtoon* gained traction because they de-emphasized ethnic identity of

the *allochtoon*. More importantly, the *allochtoon* designation has been distinguished by the birthplace of ones parents or grandparents, not legal residence or citizenship in the Netherlands – even from birth. In other words, although used as a neutral, scientific term, the adoption of *allochtoon* and *autochtoon* in the field of integration policy by the state and its partners is an important discursive practice, which sought to erase race from public debates of belonging. The problem of integration was cultural, which unlike race could be changed, amended, and worked on. Paradoxically, this classification system simultaneously made questionable the Dutchness of the *allochtoon* precisely because of their racial and ethnic background, especially in the case of 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> generation immigrants who may have grown up immersed in Dutch culture but whose belonging needed to be proven. While official statistics did not identify 3<sup>rd</sup> generation as *allochtoon*, public discourses on the problem within immigrant communities tied them to the category (Yanow and van der Haar 2012; Essed and Trienekens 2008). In contrast the *autochtoon*, invokes a primordial sense of territorial belonging that is automatic based on ancestry and thus an identity the *allochtoon* can never share.

In practice the state has denied that the *allochtoon-autochtoon* division is racially or ethnically exclusive. As van Reekem (2012) argues, part of the reason this is possible is because of how Dutch identity is imagined. Nationalism in the Netherlands is defined by a civic, anti-ethnic nationalism, rooted in pillarization and thus ‘naturally’ marked by progressive and open attitudes towards difference. In theory, identification with these *autochtoon* values is possible. In practice, identification with these values does not change one’s status as an *allochtoon*. In other words, if your parents were born in Turkey, no amount of identification with Dutch values can ever change your status as *allochtoon*. As mentioned earlier, this was a purposeful choice made by the Dutch government. As the public discourses on integration became increasingly individualized and framed around personal effort to pull one’s self into mainstream institutions (Schinkel 2013), integration became framed as a transformative process for the *allochtoon*. Integration required the shedding of one’s old cultural identify for the new, (neo) liberal Dutch identity. At the same time, because an immigrant can never completely shed the *allochtoon* label, this new identity must be constantly proven, though overt expression of Dutch cultural values and adherence of cultural normal (van Reekum 2012).

*Finding Solutions: forcing integration through naturalization*

It was within this context that the first integration courses were introduced in the Netherlands, at first for those on social assistance in 1992, and in 1998 for all new immigrants. The 1998 *Wet Inburgering Nieuwkomers* ('WIN', Newcomer Integration Act) established the Social Orientation Courses, which were obligatory but did not include sanctions for non-compliance. While the 1989 report by the WWR acknowledged the need for Dutch institutions to 'open up' to immigrants, in practice policies since 1990 have focused on training and preparing immigrants to use and engage with the political, social and cultural institutions of the Netherlands, as they are. Implied in the process is the adoption and allegiance to the cultural norms. Many accounts of rationality informing the *Inburgeringsexamen* link it directly to the rise of far-right and nationalist parties led by Pim Fortuyn and Geert Wilders. They point to the meteoric rise of Fortuyn (and eventual assassination) and the murder of Theo van Gogh by a Muslim extremist as critical tipping points for a new approach to integration (Entzinger 2006). However, what the above longer term analysis of the development of integration policy and integration exams and courses reveals is that the way of thinking about the problem of immigration and integration that informs the 2007 exam was established long before these events. While Fortuyn and Wilders have been able to draw on these specific discourses to promote anti-immigrant, and more specifically anti-Muslim policy, they could only do so precisely because the way of thinking about immigrants as illiberal *allochtoon* and the Dutch as progressive *autochtoon* was already well established.

Notwithstanding this, the 2002 national elections marked an important shift in the public discourses on integration, in that they moved the issue of immigrant integration from the realm of experts into the public sphere. With the meteoric rise of the LPF (*Lijst Pim Fortuyn*, Pim Fortuyn List) and the assassination of its leader Pim Fortuyn right before the election, integration policy became *the* critical issue in those national elections. Fortuyn campaigned on an explicitly anti-Islam platform. He argued that the Netherlands had been too accommodating, and that the problems within immigrant communities stem from the incompatibility of Western and non-Western values. Within his rhetoric, the categories of Muslim, *allochtoon*, and non-Western became conflated with each other. Indeed, as immigrant integration became increasingly politically salient, the image of the non-integrated Muslim woman became symbol of the failures of the Minorities Policy generally (Korteweg and Triadafilopoulos 2013).

In the short time between the May 2002 and January 2003 elections, the parliament commissioned a special parliamentary committee to report on the status of integration in the Netherlands. A year later, under a new governing coalition, the Blok Committee reported its findings. From the perspective of members, the Minorities Policy has been a success, as immigrant inclusion in key political and social institutions was improving over time. The findings by the committee were overwhelmingly rejected by parliament and in the media as out of touch with reality. By time the Blok Committee completed its initial investigation, the coalition government formed by the center-right CDA (Christian Democrats), supported by the center-right liberal party the VVD (People's Party of Freedom and Democracy) and center-left D66, had included addressing the failures of past integration policy as one of the priorities set out in the coalition agreement. Rita Verdonk, an outspoken critic of the Minorities Policy, was appointed as Minister of Immigration and Integration. Indeed, much has been said about Verdonk's influence on the policy direction taken in the Netherlands.

The general sentiment was that the Minorities Policy had failed because it supported the maintenance of cultural values that were incompatible with Dutch society, and more specifically painted Islam as inherently incompatible with Dutch culture. Earlier policies requiring attendance in integration courses did not go far enough, as they did not ensure the participants had truly changed through the process. Moreover, the variation in standards in terms of the integration requirement for naturalization, had already led the previous coalition to establish a naturalization exam as a way to standardize the procedure. Requiring integration at the point of naturalization was not seen as a sufficient response, as many *allochtoon* either already had citizenship, or lived for long periods in the country before, if ever, applying. Verdonk arrived with a very clear vision for her Ministry, which she made explicit in a report to parliament entitled *Integratiebeleid Nieuwe Stijl* ('New Style Integration'). Verdonk proposed a two-sided approach to dealing with the problems non-integrated minorities created in the Netherlands. First, her report indicated that immigration requirements would be strengthened through: pre-entry integration requirements for family reunification entrants, more strict application of asylum requirements, and enforcements of deportations. On the other hand, those wishing to remain in the Netherlands would be required to prove a certain level of Dutch language skills, demonstrate knowledge and understanding of Dutch values, and demonstrate active participation in society. Most

controversially, Verdonk argued that *oudekomers*<sup>63</sup> (old-comers) and Dutch-citizens from the colonies should also be required to participate in integration courses and pass an exam, even when they had permanent status in the country (Strik *et al*, 2010). Although Verdonk would prove to be a controversial figure in Dutch politics, her plan was well received. However, the adoption of integration requirements that included more explicit reference to the values and norms of the Netherlands opened up debate as to what those actually were.

According to Scholten, (Scholten 2011), public discourse in the aftermath of Blok Commission focused on the multiculturalist bias of researchers, with politicians and public intellectuals arguing such a bias led researchers to ignore or misinterpret outcome measures. This led to new relationships between experts and government, with political considerations becoming more important than to evidence-based policy. Notwithstanding these changes, expert consultation remained an important part of the policy process in the Netherlands, albeit with a shift in how experts were viewed as contributing to government policy. Scholten argues that experts were no longer ‘speaking truth to power’ but rather were responsible for the neutral execution of government policy. This next section of this chapter considers how the use of non-government experts in the development of the *Inburgeringsexamen* also served to legitimize the policy itself. While this frame supposes the neutrality of expert advice, I argue that through this legitimizing mechanism, experts were able to shape policy and take on a more political role in the process. Further, it considers how the timing of the advice, before the introduction of the legislation that codified the requirement, was central to the amount of influence the experts were able to exert over the final exam content and requirements.

## **Policy Implementation and the Role of Expert Advice**

### *Laying Foundations: Ministerial Independence, Forced Cooperation and Resistance*

In order to manage the debate and increase the legitimacy of her policy plan, Verdonk first established the Franssen Committee, which was charged with reporting on the feasibility of such a system. By 2004 the committee had produced two reports, one on the

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<sup>63</sup> Although the term *oudekomers* (‘old-comer’) is used often in policy documents, there is not a precise definition of who can be included in this group. Typically it refers to immigrants with permanent status within the country but can include those who have already naturalized.

pre-immigration integration exam<sup>64</sup> and a second on the integration requirements for permanent residency. In the case of the later report, the committee had the following instructions from Verdonk:

1. Should all five language skills be tested?
2. Which language skill level is or should be required for integration exam in the Netherlands?
3. What topics in the field of social orientation, history and politics should be tested in the integration test, and what standard should be applied here?

It was the final position of the committee that the requirements of the integration exam should not be set at a level that would act as a barrier for immigrants. In light of this, it proposed two levels of language skill should be assessed. The report argued that for newcomers who became immigrants following the adoption of the Integration abroad exam, it was reasonable to expect immigrants to meet an A2-minus level in all of the language skills (listening, reading, interviewing, speaking and writing). On the other hand, because *oudekomers* became immigrants under different requirements, the report argued it would be unreasonable and unfair to require the same level of skill from this group. For this group the commission recommended setting the standard at A1. These requirements could only be applied to those who had not already become citizens.

On the final question, pertaining to the level of knowledge of Dutch society the exam should test, the commission considered the content covered in the Social Orientation courses required under WIN, as well as the emphasis the government was placing on active citizenship. The committee recommended that this section of the exam should cover 5 key themes of knowledge: basic necessities, history and facts of the Netherlands, helpful resources, self-sufficiency, and values set out in Article 1 of the Constitution. Verdonk generally accepted the recommendations from the Franssen report. However, on some points, especially on the intention to test immigrants who already had citizenship, the Minister remained steadfast in her vision. Although the policy was subsequently deemed

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<sup>64</sup> The Franssen Committee released a report on Integration Abroad in February of 2004. For this report, the committee was asked to comment on: (1) Should all five language skills be tested; (2) What standard of language skills should be used, and; (3) What level of knowledge of Dutch society, history and civics should be required?



unconstitutional and never pursued formally, it pointed to a persistent way of thinking about the problem of integration in the Netherlands. Legal membership in Dutch society was not a marker of integration and did not correspond with membership in the imagined community.

While the Franssen Committee set out some of the basic requirements of the exam, the development of the exact content and requirements of the exam occurred in two distinct phases. First, research was commissioned by non-state actors into what content the test needed to cover, and then again private actors were called to formulate a standardized test based on that content. In 2006, Euro RSCG Bikker ('Bikker') was tasked with considering the content already covered by the integration courses and naturalization exam and asked to provide advice for on what the exam should cover. In part, the suggested content was developed through consultation with three groups: *autochtoon* Dutch citizens (11 men and women in one session); *allochtoon* citizens and residents (20 men and 20 women in separate sessions) and; civil society and private sector service providers. Focus groups were established with each group and participants were asked to comment on what they thought would be useful material to assist in integration. They were not asked what should be included on the integration exam (Euro RSCG Bikker 2005). This in part explains why some of the most controversial aspects of the exam, such as questions about social customs, are based on feedback from the focus groups with immigrants. Further, a ministry staffer, who attended the focus groups with *autochtoon* participants, reported that it was difficult to get any constructive commentary from group members. She explained that when participants were asked, what they would need to know if they immigrated to another country, many responded, "Well, I would have prepared and done my research, so I would not need to be told anything."<sup>65</sup> Such responses are consistent with the particular logic informing integration policy because it assumes the responsibility of integration rests firmly with the immigrant.

However, there are two aspects of the reports' content that stand out. Following the focus groups, a survey was conducted that asked the 1,350 respondents to rank the themes identified for importance and difficulty immigrants faces acquiring the relevant knowledge. In line with the focus groups, work, and the norms and values of the Netherlands ranked the highest. However, there was a correlation between what respondents thought was difficult

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<sup>65</sup> "Antonella" (Ministerial staff), interview by author, May 10, 2011.

content and their own knowledge of the topic. This drew Bikker to conclude that the test needed to assess an individual's ability to gather information on a given topic, not their absolute knowledge. Another important theme emerged in all of the focus groups: discrimination. In particular, participants in the *autochtoon* group discussed how Dutch people needed to change in order to facilitate integration. Although the recommendations for self-sufficiency were ultimately picked up in the next stage in policy development, discrimination remained beyond the purview of the exam.

*Writing the Exam Content: Resistance through precision*

Following above consultation phase for the content of the exam, the Ministry of Justice, now responsible for integration, issued a request for proposals for the exam development. In line with Verdonk's plan presented to parliament, separate bidding processes were established for the language test, and the knowledge of Dutch society exam. Four organizations were involved in developing core elements of the exam, CITO, Bureau ICE, and ITTA. CITO is an independent test and exam developer, most well known in the Netherlands for producing and administering the exit exams from elementary school, as well as the national final exams for high school. Similarly, the Bureau ICE develops exams, training material, and assessment programs for both the educational sector and private sector. Bureau ICE also developed the framework to assess Dutch language skills based on the European Framework (*NT2 examen*). In contrast to these two private partners, the ITTA is an institute housed within the linguistics department at the University of Amsterdam, which specializes in Dutch language development for both first and second language learners.

For the knowledge of Dutch society component, ministry staff requested the three organizations submit a joint proposal that included different components from each original proposal. This resulted in three organizations ('the consortium') with different perspectives on integration working together to develop a cohesive exam. Further, in the case of ICE and CITO, it brought together organizations that often competed for the same projects. Critical for understanding how the process developed is the fact that all three organizations come from the field of education – not immigrant integration or settlement expertise. A fourth agency, CINOP, responsible for the development of the Integration Abroad exam, won that bid for the language exam. The end result was 4 different components: (1) *Toets Gesproken Nederlands* ("TGN"), a spoken language test at entry level A2; (2) *Kennis Nederlandse Samenleving* ("KNS") a knowledge of Dutch society and values test and; (3) *Elektronisch*

*Praktijkexamen* (“EPE”) which tested knowledge of practical situations such as how to register a baby or get medical care; and (4) *Praktijkexamen* (“PE”), which included a portfolio or role playing option.

CITO and Bureau ICE were responsible for the development of test questions for the KNS. The consortium was instructed to create a list of *eindtermen* (learning goals) that the examination would assess; the intention was that this list would be used to inform the content for a liberalized of mandatory integration courses. For the KNS portion of the exam, the consortium consulted the Franssen Commissie report, Bikker’s report, and *eindtermen* for the previous Social Orientation courses published in 2001.<sup>66</sup> In order to operationalize the knowledge the KNS was meant to test, the consortium connected each theme with critical actions. This approach to developing questions was informed by the values each organization held in terms of how individuals learned and what kind of knowledge could be fairly tested. Rather than testing immigrants on abstract concepts, the consortium identified specific tasks an immigrant may need to complete within the various themes, and then identified the knowledge they would need in order to complete the task. The members of the consortium openly acknowledged that their role in the process was to depoliticize the policy and create a perception that the content was scientifically supported. One member of the consortium explained,

It was important to appear that you had really the best partners working together. Because it was so politically sensitive. In 2007 we had a controversial minister who said she wanted tests for people. And we had a really leftist government and so everyone was looking to her and saying what is she going to do...They wanted to show there was knowledge from a very scientific part, well [CITO and Bureau ICE] are very known...<sup>67</sup>

Laying out the requirements using the same standards and approach the organizations would have used for any exam was one of the ways the consortium legitimated the exam content

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<sup>66</sup> The 2001 *Eindtermen Maatschappijoriëntatie* (Social Orientation Learning Goals) was produced by CINOP and Forum for the integration courses. Again, the services were contracted out to a third party. These learning goals were updated from the 1997 *eindtermen*, and were based on student and teacher experiences in the classrooms since the introduction of the mandatory courses. The goals were divided between need-to-know and nice-to-know. Interestingly value laden goals like “is aware that homosexuality is generally accepted in the Netherlands,” was categorized as nice-to-know. The need-to-know goals were largely focused on information immigrants needed to meet their immediate material needs. By 2005, the value and norms goals were seen as the highest priority, reflection the problematization of immigration.

<sup>67</sup> “Afra” (consortium member), interview by author, May 27, 2011.

because it created a sense of objectivity to the content. However, interviews with those involved suggest that expertise in test-making was used to shape the exam to be more in line with their particular understanding of integration, which saw more value in testing immigrants on their knowledge of practical information, and not on values or behaviors.

While the ITTA had a strongly held belief that language could only be learned through practice in real life situations, they were not actually involved in the development of the *eindtermen* for the KNS. One member explained,

Well we didn't agree with testing them severely cultural. We were always on the focus of functional. Can you manage? Can you get the information if you don't know how to do or what to do? Can you resolve this problem by acting, by having strategies? That is our idea because you always find new information you don't understand or you have to do new things you didn't do before, so you need strategies to function. That is what we think. Of course you can tell a little about your country, of course you can do that. But better is to let people compare their own cultural background with the new one and see what the differences are and talk with people and get to know it. But to get a specific content of topics and say, 'you have to know this, you have to know this'. *It doesn't make you function better.* You must realize where the problem is in acting. So well, it didn't really fit with some other organizations and the government too, because it was a very political item, a very vulnerable item. We were not in the position to have the influences because politically some powers were very strong (emphasis added).<sup>68</sup>

While the ITTA opted to express their discontent and lack of support for the KNS portion of the exam by opting out of the process, the other members of the consortium used the process itself to challenge at least some elements of the government's vision of the KNS.

The first step in the operationalization of the KNS content was to develop a general framework for each component or piece of knowledge the exam would assess. The content was organized along 3 points, Critical Practical Situations, Critical Knowledge and Critical Acts. The Critical Practical Situations are based on the 4 areas immigrants are expected to be able to function: the labour market (*functioneren op de arbeidsmarkt*); the community (*functioneren in de eigen leefomgeving*); government institutions and authorities (*functioneren in contacten met instanties en overheid*) and; as a citizen (*functioneren als burger in Nederland*). Reflecting the consortium's

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<sup>68</sup> Femmy Witte (ITTA employee), interview by author, May 20, 2011.

partiality towards testing situated language learning, the practical situations were further organized into specific themes, within which one or more of these situations might arise (See Appendix G). Once the Critical Practical situations were identified, the consortium developed specific Critical Acts that a would-be citizen would need to be able to complete in order to demonstrate functional skills. These Critical Acts are then associated with pieces of Critical Knowledge, which a candidate would need to know in order to complete the Act. The exam produces questions based on the knowledge.

To help elaborate how this process is used to in a politicized way, we can consider a specific (and controversial) Critical Act within the theme of Customs, values and norms ('CCV'). The CCV section is broken into critical acts: interpreting and applying various social customs; dealing with unusual or clashing customs, values and norms; participating in social networks, and everyday social interactions. Focusing on the second critical act, the following associated knowledge is organized as follows:

Table 4.5: Select KNS Eindtermen

Critical Acts	Critical Knowledge	Indicators of Successful Behavior
<b>2.2 Dealing with unusual or clashing habits, values and standards</b>	2.2.1 Knows the relationship between men and women, including domestic violence, is equivalent	Treats women as equals in accordance with the prevailing standards in the Netherlands
	2.2.2. Knows (unmarried) cohabitation, including people of the same sex, is accepted in the Netherlands	Is not concerned by other forms of cohabitations that are not marriage.
	2.2.3 Knows the most important Dutch holidays and their religious or historical content / background	Is aware of what is expected at school, in the neighborhood, and at work, for the celebration of these festivals
		Allow others to freely in celebrate important religious and political Holidays (Christmas, Easter, Ramadan, Eid, Christmas, Queen's Day, May 4 and 5, etc.) and the backgrounds of the use belonging

While the Critical Knowledge that test-takers are required to have are based in fact, the Indicators of Successful Integration point to behaviors. It is a subtle but important distinction for two reasons. First, unlike many other countries that have introduced integration requirements, very few lay out in such detail the expected behaviors of successful integrators. While political rhetoric in the Netherlands has been dominated by discourses of ‘feeling Dutch,’ the actual content of the exam was actually clearly laid out and avoided ambiguity through the detailed instrumentalization of the criteria. Secondly, the actual questions for the exam are largely drawn from the Critical Knowledge section. This is an important distinction. By laying out the criteria for the exam in this way, the consortium was able to effectively satisfy Minister Verdonk, who wanted to use the exam as a blunt instrument to exclude those immigrants whose behaviors were deemed to be un-Dutch. The indicators point to the ‘desired’ or ‘ideal’ behaviors of a Dutch citizen. Yet due to the multiple choice test model, test-takers were not tested on behaviors. Questions which aimed to evaluate behaviors were not testable using the computer-based multiple choice test model. From the perspective of the consortium, which held expertise in test-making, the validity of questions was paramount. With no way to track behaviors after the exams, there was no way to develop questions to assess or predict behavior. As one member of the consortium explained, questions needed to reflect facts. She further noted that, the consortium was able to resist the inclusion of specific questions and scenarios they did not think were relevant to integration. For example, they vetoed questions on Sharia Law by arguing that such questions required background knowledge on Sharia law that not all immigrants would have or need.<sup>69</sup> Again, they used the language of reliable and efficient testing to challenge instructions from the ministry.

In practice the questions developed did in fact have behavioral assumptions built into them. Antonella, one of several government employees involved in integration policy explains,

The problem with Dutch people looking at those questions, we have found over the years, is that they tend to analyze it in a different way than people from abroad. We have this famous example where in KNS where your neighbor has a baby and they put the announcement of the birth in your letterbox. Now what should you do? Should you send a card, should you ring at the door and talk to them, should you

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<sup>69</sup> “Afra” (consortium member), interview by author, May 27, 2011.

give a present? And Dutch people will say, well that really depends on how well I know my neighbor. And the women who developed (inaudible), she is in charge of one of the organizations...she'll say, that's the wrong way to look at. You should look at it, what is the acceptable way in Holland to deal with this. She says the acceptable way is that you acknowledge the announcement with a card.<sup>70</sup>

Such a question is designed to assess if the test-taker knows the particular customs in relation to the birth of child and other special occasions (*Eindtermen* 2.4.1). From the perspective of the consortium, it does not matter how one might actually respond in real life, but that the person taking the exam knows which behaviors would be acceptable. However, 'should' also implies a particular orientation towards the community. Still there is no way to actually police or ensure the authenticity of the responses from candidates, only that they are aware or have the knowledge required to act in the 'appropriate' matter.

The consortium itself pointed out that the exam did not simply assess knowledge but also worked to assess certain capabilities. As one consortium member noted, "There is something under this model. It's not *only* about language. It's not *only* about knowledge of society. It's *also* about literacy and computer literacy."<sup>71</sup> Beyond this, one of the goals of the exam was general self-reliance. As the *eindtermen* pointed out:

There are a number of goals that apply to all situations and themes. We expect that candidates can apply their knowledge, regardless of the situation they face. These are the goals of general self-reliance. The following goals are applicable to general self-reliance:

- Selects information
- Uses information
- Uses formal and informal opportunities for assistance.
- Acts in time, i.e. leaves no deadline expired.

These goals are not explicitly tested on the exam but inform how questions were developed. The questions in the KNS and other parts of the exam rely on scenarios. Candidates are provided with a scenario, which requires them to apply one or several pieces of critical knowledge to identify the correction answer. It is not enough for a candidate to know a fact. The candidate must also be able to apply the knowledge in the appropriate setting. In this

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<sup>70</sup> "Antonella" (government staff), interview by author, May 10, 2011.

<sup>71</sup> "Afra" (consortium member), interview by author, May 27, 2011.

sense, there is an added layer of cognitive and cultural interpretive ability imbedded in the exam.

At the same time, because the consortium recognized that the exam would also test computer literacy by virtue of the medium being used, they took steps to minimize the level of skill that would be required. Special computers were developed with large screens and the test was designed to require very little or no mouse movements, with large buttons to reduce accidental errors. In approaching the test in this way, the consortium also aimed to ensure that each test had validity, in that they tested only what they were meant to test and nothing more. This was particularly important in the case of the KNS. The KNS was meant to test knowledge of Dutch society, not language skill. One participant explained:

Especially with the knowledge of Dutch society, because you are not testing the language, and still the test is in a language. So how to test knowledge of society without being able to use the language of B1 is very difficult ... It is at the same level, A2 but we used even more pictures... Here with every alternative you also had a picture.<sup>72</sup>

Indeed, one of the unique features of the exam in the Netherlands is the use of multimedia as part of the exam. Video clips, audio and pictures are used to demonstrate the scenarios laid out in the KNS and along with pictures for each possible answer. This was to avoid testing candidates on language again and was particularly important because of the model of situated language testing employed in the Netherlands.

While the consortium has been reluctant to explicitly test immigrants on certain behaviors or traits in the KNS or EPE, the exam was clearly meant as a tool to stimulate certain kinds of behaviors prior to taking the exam. This goal is particularly transparent in regards to the Portfolio element of the *Praktijkexamen* ('PE'), which was designed to encourage applicants to engage with their local community. To pass this section applicants need to produce 'proofs' in 8 of 24 categories. This portion of the exam was advocated by the ITTA and following the launch of the exam, the ITTA also developed training for the assessors of the portfolio. Like other components of the exam, the portfolio was informed by the belief that language is best learned in real-life situations. The portfolio was designed to stimulate applicants into engaging directly with Dutch institutions. Members of the

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<sup>72</sup> Ibid.



consortium quite openly discussed how this particular part of the exam was targeted at immigrant women, who were cast as dependent, homemakers with little opportunity to engage with the outside world. Two consortium members explain,

It's the ideal situation and it does happen because we do see that people are really proud of what they do and women who have difficulty getting the language contacts in their surroundings because they stay at home too much, that they really are stimulated to go outside and get their proofs.<sup>73</sup>

It works. It really works. They got all the immigrant women from behind the windows ... it worked. We got the weak groups into society, and that was really the purpose of this.<sup>74</sup>

While other components of the exam were intended to stimulate better teaching practices in the integration courses, the portfolio was the most explicit in its goal.

The expectation embedded within the Portfolio section was that teachers would work with students on the language skills they needed to collect the proofs and that students would practice their language in the real-life situations. While this did occur in some places, over time the members of the ITTA interviewed for this thesis became skeptical of the effectiveness of this element of the exam. One member noted:

What we say in the first few years was that people sort of collect the proofs, like a stamp, been there, done that. Instead of what is the idea behind it? How can you use this situation or how can you get your language.<sup>75</sup>

In practice, because the new WI set the rules so that integration course providers could only collect their fee from students who were successful on the *Inburgeringsexamen*, course providers had an incentive to prepare students for the exam and not for integration or engagement with the community. It was more important to ensure the student collected the proof than to ensure he/she actually had the knowledge and language skill the activity was meant to stimulate.

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<sup>73</sup> Femmy Witte (ITTA employee), interview by author, May 20, 2011.

<sup>74</sup> "Afra" (consortium member), interview by author, May 27, 2011.

<sup>75</sup> "Eloise" (ITTA employee), interview by author, May 12, 2011.

The other major component of the central exam is the Electronic Practical Exam section. This section tests situated listening, speaking and reading skills, an aspect of the Portfolio that appealed to the Verdonk. In line with her overall goals for integration policy, she directed the consortium to develop a standardized exam. This again reflects the overall shift in the framing of integration. Whereas in 1998, effort was considered enough of a standard, by 2005 immigrants were expected to reach an absolute level, which in Verdonk's mind necessitated an exam. It consists of multiple-choice questions. While the passing score is the same across the EPE, applicants do not in fact take the same test. Applicants choose tests that draw from themes that relate to their lived experiences. When the exam was first launched, applicants were required to write in the theme of Citizenship and then choose between the themes of Employment, and Parenting. On the one hand, the themes reflected the emphasis that both the ministry and consortium member placed on the outcome of self-sufficiency. Further, they reflected a particular expectation of the orientation on needs to have towards society. One member noted, "You need to know your rights, and you need to know what you want, but also what you bring and can contribute."<sup>76</sup> On the other, the choice of fields reflected a particular way of thinking about the persons who would be taking the exam. Rather explicitly, the theme of parenting was geared towards female immigrants, who were seen by test developers to be particularly vulnerable to social exclusion.

Situated language was central to the consortium's way of thinking about effective learning, particular for the members from the ITTA group. The ITTA had specialized expertise in teaching language in the workplace and the effectiveness of this approach over other more traditional models of teaching a language. Like other parts of the exam, the Practical Situations language component was designed to stimulate a particular kind of learning and preparation for the exam. While questions were also never released, EPE *eindtermen* were developed using the slightly different method than used for the KNS. Rather than focusing on the Critical Knowledge that an applicant would require to perform a task or complete a goal, the *eindtermen* for the EPE Critical Practical Situations laid out the language skills, which would be needed to achieve the goal. The expectation was that integration

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<sup>76</sup> "Nathalie" (Bureau ICE employee), interview my author, May 30, 2011.

course providers would begin to teach the knowledge and the language in a more integrated fashion.

Once the exam was launched, the way in which themes had been identified quickly became problematic. The Ministry was pushing the theme of employment because “the government wants everybody in Holland to work or to be able to look for work. So they don’t have an excuse: Yeah, but I don’t know how to write an application for a job.”<sup>77</sup> This top down approach to developing the themes led to a mismatch between the language people actually needed in their daily lives and what they were being tested on. As one participant explained:

So sometimes it wasn’t so much from what people really *need* in daily life, but what we think they should need or should know or should do. So what we found after a few years, we found out that not everyone fit into the 3 domains ... So sometimes you would have a 60-year-old man who is unemployed, he wouldn’t get a job anyway. He would have to do the upbringing one end of course that doesn’t fit... It’s not what he needs and doesn’t give an idea of how someone really functions in society. So we made two more domains, participation in the society and entrepreneurship.<sup>78</sup>

While adjustments were made later to accommodate different populations, the above statement identifies two important assumptions that were made about the people who were likely to take the test. Firstly, the target population of the exam was imagined to be young and new to the country. Secondly, the original and new themes reveal an assumption of the division of labour within immigrant households and how the test was meant to disrupt this division. The participant went on to explain:

So that gives a better situation for people to collect the things and also *to stimulate a woman*, for example, who works in the company of her husband, to also think about how can I deal with the, not the retailer, but the distributor and taxes and things like this.

This image of the immigrant woman, who was dependent and possibly oppressed by her partner was often central to the way of thinking about what the test was designed to do.

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<sup>77</sup> “Eloise” (ITTA employee), interview by author, May 12, 2011.

<sup>78</sup> “Eloise” (ITTA employee), interview by author, May 12, 2011.

The final component of the exam was the TGN, the language listening and speaking skill section. While perhaps less controversial than the other elements of the exam, there was some debate between the groups involved with the EPE, KNS and PE. TGN was developed by CINOP independently from the other aspects of the exam. It is a 15 minute phone test that requires applicants to complete 4 types of activities; repeat sentences, respond to questions, name opposites, and retell a story. The debate here was largely between the organizations involved in setting the test as to whether a phone test was a fair and accurate way to assess speaking and listening skills. A member of the ministry explained:

With the telephone test that we use now, there was been, I don't know we've has problems with all kinds of people ... But, it's a very small world in Holland, the number of organization who can develop test. So, because CINOP did the one with the telephone test, the others have a tendency to say, well of course it's not really a very good test. Then CINOP of course turns around and tells us, well you know the other exams that you have now, nobody know if they actually test what they are supposed to test. And I say, well it's probably true.<sup>79</sup>

She went on to note that in the end the Ministry had to trust the expertise of CINOP, which is a highly regarded testing organization. The adoption of the TGN, along with the other components of the exam suggests two things. First, it highlights the level of unquestioned authority the organizations had when developing the exam. In fact, across the exams the Ministry was never able to review the questions because the consortium argued this would undermine the rigorousness of the exam. Second, it draws attention to the conflict that occurred between organizations, making clear that the processes of engaging experts in policy making is far from a depoliticized process

### **Assessing the Expertise in Policy Making: The Dutch Case**

The experts involved in the development of the *Inburgeringsexamen* in the Netherlands had a functional approach to the exam's actualization. The IITA members in particular recognized the opportunity that the exam presented for stimulating better language learning experience in integration courses. From their perspective if integration courses were mandatory, they needed to serve some purpose and be a meaningful learning experience for immigrants. They mobilized their expertise in language education within the workplace to push for a portfolio component for the exam and to develop a situated language test in the

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<sup>79</sup> “Antonella” (Ministerial staff), interview by author, May 10, 2011.

form of the EPE. In part, the ITTA was able to advance this particular element of the exam because it fit well with the dominant discourse around the ‘problems’ with integration. Integration in the Netherlands had been framed from a very early point as an issue of cultural clashes and by 2005 with a clear emphasis was on immigrants preparing and adjusting themselves to Dutch institutions as they were.

While situated language learning fit within this dominate framing of the integration problem, the ITTA members also saw the Portfolio as a means through which to promote a two-way approach to integration. Members of the ITTA has a more fluid understanding of the norms of Dutch life, they balanced this with their practical experience and expertise in language learning. From their perspective, requiring immigrants to engage directly with Dutch intuitions both helped immigrants understand what was required and expected of them, while forcing them to practice the language they were learning in class. Moreover, it would encourage teachers to teach language using a thematic approach over a grammar-based approach, something the ITTA found to be more effective. More importantly, if the exam required immigrants to engage directly with Dutch institutions, those institutions would need to be prepared to accommodate these interactions. From the perspective of the ITTA, all of these elements helped justify the exam and helped to ensure it was not used simply as a blunt instrument of exclusion.

Further, while the ITTA did not participate in the development of the *eindtermen* for the KNS, CITO and Bureau ICE members shared a similar utilitarian approach to the exam content. While ensuring that immigrants learned and understood that cultural norms were a central tenant of the policy from the Minister and Ministry’s perspective, it in fact forms a very small part of the exam. The one section which focuses on norms incorporates both less controversial norms, like public holidays and how to respond to birthdays, with more clearly political ones such as attitudes toward homosexuality and the rights of women. These items in particular were pushed down from the Minister, however they did not become central components of the exam. Further, these items are not a covered in one question, but rather they are integrated into the broad scenarios developed about which applicants are asked several questions. The cultural orientation questions are just one of a series of question in any given scenario. The consortium limited the weight of these items, in part, by arguing that reliable test questions could only assess a person’s knowledge of the norm. This is important in two ways. First, it limits the number of questions that can be developed around any particular norm. Second, it created space to develop learning goals that focused on functional

knowledge, items one might typically learn from living in the Netherlands. Further, the consortium's refusal to provide the Ministry and Minister with the actual exam questions also limited the extent to which either could skew the content of the exam towards cultural norms. As such, while the consortium resisted too much emphasis on cultural norms and beliefs, its emphasis on functionality created an exam that was really about encouraging certain kinds of behaviors. In the minds of the members, these behaviors – namely active engagement with the community and Dutch instructions – would both facilitate integration and be effective training for the exam itself.

In the literature on integration exams, there has been little attention to how the content of the exams themselves are developed. While some scholars have commented on the norms embedded within the exam, and may point to an illiberal turn in integration policy, they do not account for how the norms are chosen or instrumentalized. The purpose of this chapter was to explore how experts in the Netherlands were engaged in this process and how they shaped the exam's content. The first part of this chapter considered how integration has historically been framed in the Netherlands. It argued that despite different solutions to the problem, there is relative consistency in the framing of integration as a problem of cultural clashes and not one framed around race or racism. The perceived failure of the accommodation based Minorities Policy, did not lead to any consideration that the problem may be racism, but rather that the proposed solutions were misguided. The problem was still cultural but the solution would be found in requiring immigrants to learn and adapt to Dutch culture.

The interviews conducted with those involved in the development of the *Inburgeringsexamen* reveals that there was no open resistance to this particular framing of the problem of integration. In the 15 interviews conducted there was no mention of race or the fact that the integration exam could only capture a small minority of immigrants living in the Netherlands. The other groups, namely Antillean and Surinamese migrants, were left largely untouched by the policy because they were already citizens. However, because these groups had been cast as *allochtoon* and not 'real' Dutch, their socio-economic status vis-à-vis Dutch *autochtoon* was not seen as inconsistent with the framing of the problem as a cultural one. After all, Antillean and Surinamese Dutch citizens were also from another culture.

Where the consortium did challenge the dominant framing, it was on the relative weight placed on cultural norms over other more functional knowledge. They were able to

focus the exam on specific pieces of knowledge and resisted any attempt to have the exam assess behaviors. While in some ways this is an important achievement in terms of providing useful information, in practice it has had a limited impact on reducing the difficulty of the exam for the people taking it. Further, by focusing on the image of the non-integrated immigrant women in both the problematization integration *and* the actualization of the exam, this chapter demonstrates how certain racialized notions of motherhood were embedded within the exam's content and requirements. On the one hand, information and content relevant to motherhood was used as a means through which to engage women. On the other, it was precisely their perceived traditional gender roles within their families that had identified immigrant women as not integrated. This problematization of motherhood for immigrants might best be understood as the racialization of motherhood, where immigrant women's role as mothers and caregivers is always suspect and their agency must constantly be proven.

At all stages of the exam development, it was clear that consortium members believed the exam would result in better integration course provision. In practice, the roll out of the new liberalized course system was marked by confusion on the side of the municipal governments who were not responsible for enforcement of the integration requirements and assessing eligibility for government support. Service providers were left unsure as to what content their courses should cover because the new exams consisted of both language skills and social orientation. The result was that courses simply prepared students to pass the exam by rote. Service providers sidelined the changes to integration course provision that the consortium had hoped to stimulate. This was because their payment rested on successful completion of the exam, not an effective learning environment. As one provider noted, this new system resulted in several providers closing or ceasing course provision because there was no profit to be made.

More recently, the Dutch government has abandoned both the EPE and Portfolio elements of the exam and replaced the integration exam with a more extensive language test and the KNS. The exam changes have been coupled with radical defunding of integration courses and increases in application costs. These changes mark a move away from trying to make the exam useful, in terms of facilitating integration and toward using the exam more explicitly as a tool of exclusion. The changes also reveal the complicated nature of the influence experts can yield in the development of policy. On the one hand, they can be influential in policy development, especially when being used to defuse or legitimize a policy,

as in the case of integration exams. On the other hand, if they want to maintain this role, they cannot engage in public debates on the issue. As a result, in the case of the Netherlands, the consortium has been less able to influence the general direction of policy since the launch of the exam.



## Chapter 5

### Comparative Analysis

#### Introduction

The literature on integration exams has focused rather narrowly on how to understand exams in relation to citizenship models. As outlined in Chapter 3 and 4 the cases considered here, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, have drawn attention because the new requirements for naturalization seem inconsistent with their multiculturalist approach to managing ethnic and racial diversity. In the United Kingdom, immigrant integration was initially approached through the lens of race relations, with access to citizenship framed as the starting point of integration. In the Netherlands, while the problematization of immigrant integration was always framed in relation to the incompatibility of cultural values, the 1980s were marked by greater attention to capacity building in immigrant communities, and accommodation in political and social intuitions. The intensification of pre-existing integration requirements through the *Life in the United Kingdom Exam* and the *Inburgeringsexamen* mark a shift towards seeing full civic, political, and social membership as a reward to integration. Further, the moving forward of the integration requirements to the stage of permanent residency, seems to give credence to the arguments that the securitization of immigration in Europe has led to a convergence around policy options (Geddes 2008). Some authors point to variation within exams in terms of the cost, level of language skill and knowledge being tested, in order to demonstrate that policy distinctiveness remains prevalent (Joppke, 2007; Michalowski & Oers, 2012; Migration Policy Group 2010) and how public philosophies and institutional boundaries have limited rapid convergence around common naturalization requirements (Joppke 2012; Michalowski 2013). While useful for comparing requirements, these explanations only provide limited insight into the specifics of the integration exam content and requirements, and how those requirements came to be because they focus largely on either political debates or the final outputs.

This thesis shifts the sight of investigation to the actualization of the exams in question. By focusing on who was involved and how in developing the content and the actual requirements of the exams, I open up opportunities to ask what the exams reveal about how the state defines the ‘good’ citizen, and what the process for developing the content reveals about the nature of state power. Finally, I ask how the policy implementation

process becomes an important site of conflict, influence, and policy formulation, and how this shapes the final policy outcomes. The purpose of this chapter is to develop a framework for how we can look for answers to such questions through a comparison of the introduction of integration exams in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. I argue that in order to understand both the type of exam and the content being assessed, we must consider both how the problem of integration has been framed *and* the how the exam is actualized, with specific focus on the role of expert advice. Through the analysis of these cases, I seek to demonstrate that the policy implementation process is critical to our understanding of policy outcomes by considering how non-state actors deploy knowledge and expertise to challenge ministerial direction. Rooted in the logic of scientific neutrality, experts are often engaged in policy implementation as a tool of depoliticization. Through analysis of these cases, I argue that experts can and do engage in strategic resistance to achieve their own political ends.

### **Framing Integration: The United Kingdom and Netherlands as Multicultural Failures**

#### *The United Kingdom and the neoliberalization of citizenship*

In most European focused comparative analyses of integration policy, the UK and Netherlands are identified as multiculturalist leaders and one of the critical factors used to explain their approach to managing immigrant diversity is the central role that liberalism plays in national identity. As noted in Chapter 3, in 1608 common law practice set out the principle *jus soli* as the basis of subjecthood in the United Kingdom. By the 19<sup>th</sup> century as liberal values of individual rights and equality took hold in the occident, one of the ways the imperial project could still be justified was through the extension of those rights to colonial subjects (Dummett and Nicol 1990, 30). However, the system of granting equal rights across the empire became untenable in the post WWII period. Decolonialization and greater mobility led the perceived risk of massive inflows of non-white immigrants from the colonies to England. In his account of the early framing of integration policy in the UK, Favell (2002) argues that the Labour Party needed a way to reconcile its ideological values with an urgent need to respond to growing racial tensions arising as a result of colonial migration. The compromise struck was one that limited the mobility of British subjects through the creation of different tiers of subjects and the introduction of policies to promote the inclusion of racial minorities already in Britain.

The particular approach taken in the United Kingdom was shaped by the racial conflict occurring in the United States in the 1960s and a desire among particular Labour Party members to try to avoid the pitfalls of their former colony. As such, policies were framed around issues of racism and discrimination, both on an individual and systemic level. Starting in the 1970s, Race Relations became the dominant, although contested, lens through which problems associated with ethno-racial diversity were understood. It is critical to note that the United Kingdom never officially adopted multiculturalism as a policy, at least not at the national level (Tolley 2011). Policies which one might consider evidence of official multiculturalism were features of the Race Relations framework established in the 1970s. However, the rhetoric of multiculturalism was often central to debates about immigrant social inclusion, and in the field of education, multicultural teaching became an important ethos in more left-leaning councils.<sup>80</sup>

The race riots in 2001, and later the bombing of the London underground in 2005, precipitated a new way of thinking of the problem of immigrant social inclusion. The Cattle Report (Home Office 2001a) argued that past policy had failed because it had resulted in ethnic minorities and white Britons living ‘parallel lives.’ In order to prevent problems like the riots, government policy needed to foster social cohesion. Whereas the Race Relations framework focused on how institutional racism and discrimination shaped the lived experiences of ethnic minorities, social cohesion places emphasis on individual behaviors.<sup>81</sup> This shift in framing fit well with the Blair-Labour governments approach in other policy areas, including social assistance, unemployment and education, which was premised on a particular understanding of the ‘good’ citizen that at its core is neoliberal. The Thatcher-Major Conservative governments promoted a narrow conception of citizenship based on civil and political rights, instituted reforms to dismantle the social rights, and shifted focuses onto the responsibilities of citizenship (Greenwood and Robins 2002). While Thatcher declared society dead, the ‘Third-Way’ rhetoric brought New Labour electoral success and a

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<sup>80</sup> As Tolley (2011) notes this is because education is a devolved power, leaving local authorities with the ability to shape curriculum in important ways. At the same time, Olssen (2004) argues that the extent to which multicultural teaching found its way into the classroom has been limited and inconsistent.

<sup>81</sup> Despite its focus on embedded forms of discrimination, the Race Relations framing of integration was always limited in its scope. However, there were some notable achievements in the documentation of institutional racism in education, police services and some private sector occupations. For an account of the effect of the Race Relations framework across policy fields see: Blackstone, Parekh, and Sanders (1998).

new way of thinking about the relationship between society, citizens, and the state. As several scholars have argued, Third-Way policies are not about a return to the Keynesian welfare state, but rather focus on policies that make citizens more suitable to the neoliberal economy (Clarke 2005; Miller and Rose 2008; Peck 2001). Social cohesion, or as the New Labour government termed it, Community Cohesion, was essential to a more efficient and prosperous United Kingdom.

Blair acknowledged that Thatcherism and the brutal hollowing out of the state had left citizens disaffected and disengaged with the state and each other, creating a breeding ground for inter-group conflict and economic stagnation. However, the solutions would not be found in a rebuilding of the welfare state, but rather in a state that takes on the role of a broker, managing the interactions between individuals and the market. Using the rhetoric of empowerment, citizens are called to be active participants not only through their labour but also through the consumption of goods, including those produced by the state (Clarke 2005). For New Labour, citizenship was not only about rights, but also about responsibilities. But in contrast to Thatcher's emphasis on responsibility being focused only on the self, the Blair-Labour government operated on the belief that individuals and communities are also responsible to and for each other. Further, as Hickman *et al* (2012) point out, New Labour had recognized that traditional sites of solidarity, like class and labour organizations, were less salient in the context of the neoliberal economy. Community, as both a vague and familiar concept, was an accessible site from which to rebuild solidarity lost under Thatcher, without challenging neoliberal orthodoxy. Rather than provide services, government policy needed to 'activate' individuals to behave in particular ways for towards each other and their community.

If community cohesion was the ultimate goal, the Cattle Report opened up two debates. Firstly, what is the community and what defines its borders? Secondly, how can cohesion be achieved? According to the report, if community was the socio-political space of inclusion, a common British identity was necessary to create the basis upon which community cohesion could be achieved. The premise of the report was that a single British Community did not exist, but rather several parallel communities marked along ethno-racial lines had developed, suggesting that multicultural policy had failed in its promise of social cohesion. Segregation, both physical and emotional, between ethno-racial communities had to be eliminated. One of the ways to achieve a single community was to make the shared identity of British citizen more meaningful for ethnic minorities. Further, immigrants had to

be encouraged (and ultimately required) to integrate into the community, through the adoption of and adaption to British values, with particular attention to developing the skills and self-sufficiency necessary to succeed in modern Britain. What is critical here is that the target of intervention becomes problematic ethnic communities, with the focus on institutional racism lost.

*The Netherlands and the culturalization of citizenship*

Similarity, the political discourses on the problem of immigrant non-integration arose out of the perceived failures of multiculturalism in the Netherlands. Many accounts of integration policy in Dutch politics point to columnist Paul Scheffers' anti-multiculturalism article in 2000 as a critical tipping point for a new approach to integration. The meteoric rise of Pim Fortuyn (and his eventual assassination) and the murder of Theo van Gogh are then seen as important moments that provided further proof of the failure of past policy and the need for radical change (Entzinger 2006). The integration exam was part of a set of policies introduced that sought to fix the problems multiculturalism had supposedly produced. However, what a longer term analysis of the development of integration policy and integration exams and courses reveals is that the way of thinking about the problem of immigration and integration that informs the exam was established long before these events. While politicians and public intellectuals alike have been able to draw on these specific events to promote anti-immigrant, and more specifically anti-Muslim policy, they could only do so precisely because of the way integration had been previously framed as a problem of cultural incompatibility.

If Scheffer's article marked the end of multiculturalism in the Netherlands, the 1979 report *Ethnic Minorities* by the WRR marked what one might consider the 'golden age' of Dutch multiculturalism. Prior the 1970s there had been very little academic or governmental attention given to the issues related to integration, primarily because immigrants were thought to be temporary. The 1979 report was important to the development of any kind of integration policy because it introduced the notion that immigrants were a permanent part of Dutch society, and that the government had a moral responsibility to try to address the problems faced by ethnic minorities and to facilitate their emancipation. While the 1979 WRR report pointed to several factors, including discriminatory treatment and racism, cultural differences figured heavily into the analysis. Even Surinamese and Antillean immigrants, who were citizens, were describe as having "a strong cultural orientation towards Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles," which became an obstacle to their full inclusion

(WRR 1979, XI). In particular, 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> generation immigrants were described as being torn between two worlds, that of Dutch culture and that of their parents.

Where the 1979 report differs from the current direction of integration policy is in how the state was expected to respond. The solution to these cultural clashes was not only to help immigrants adapt to the expectations and norms of Dutch society, but also to consider how the state might adapt its own policies to accommodate the needs of each particular ethnic group. However, by 1989 the WRR argued the group-oriented approach had in fact done little to help bring immigrants into Dutch society (WRR 1990). While integration exams are generally seen as a shift toward a more individualized integration process, by the 1990s integration policy in the Netherlands had already become more focused on the individual. It was at this point that the terms *allochtoon* (not of this land) and *autochtoon* (of this land) gained traction. Whereas ethnicity and race can be seen as an immutable part of one's identity, values can change and cultural practices can be adapted or left behind. Together with the emphasis on self-sustainability, this dichotomy frames integration as a transformative process, where one sheds one's old cultural identity for the new, neoliberal Dutch identity. At the same time, because one can never completely shed the *allochtoon* label, this new identity must be constantly proven, through overt expression of Dutch cultural values and norms, and through independence from the welfare state (van Reekum 2012, 597).

The failure of multiculturalism became equated with the failure of immigrants to adopt Dutch cultural norms in order to pull themselves into society, leaving them dependent on the state. While there is some vague understanding of what constitutes Dutch cultural norms, the boundaries of belonging have largely been defined in opposition to the norms ascribed to *allochtoon*. Although the *allochtoon* population is culturally and ethnically diverse, gender equality values played a critical role in differentiating the integrated from the non-integrated. Schaffer, Fortuyn and Ayaan Hirsi Ali, among others, openly criticized Islam as rooted in patriarchy and thus a threat to the Dutch society, which was presumed to have achieved gender equity. In parliamentary debates and reports *allochtoon* women became conflated with Muslim women (Korteweg and Triadafilopoulos 2013). In discussing the obstacles to integration Minister Verdonk explained:

Many allochthone women bring a life pattern with them that does nothing to further integration. They have little or no education, *are subordinate to their husbands*, and have no opportunity to participate in public life (Cited in Korteweg and Triadafilopoulos 2013, 124, emphasis added)

In other words, for *allochtoon* women and men, the primary obstacle to integration is their patriarchal culture. The inherent logic in this particular framing of the issue is that Dutch society is liberal and egalitarian, which means the obstacles to integration rest solely within immigrant communities.

*Individualizing Integration: Pulling yourself into Society*

In both cases considered here the problems associated with ethnic diversity stem from ethnic minorities who refused to join society or the community. Integration policy is meant to respond to the failures of multiculturalism, which encouraged or at least provided the institutional support for immigrants to remain insular and segregated from society. The solutions to problems within ethnic minority communities (i.e. unemployment, poverty, poor health outcomes, high dropout rates), which lead to dependency on the state, rest in moving from outsider to insider. This is because the problems stem from the community's position on the periphery of society. As Schinkel explains,

As soon as problems are seen to exist (e.g. crime, cultural conflict), it appears that these can be attributed to persons remaining outside society. Society is defined and refined on the basis of a tautology: society is the realm without problems; problems ensue from persons outside society. Integration is the symbol of the good will to pull these persons inside society, to have them cross a bridge which is often a cultural crossing but all the while, the very thematization of integration reproduces the pivotal image of the difference between society and its environment, designated as outside society (Schinkel 2013, 1146).

If the problem rests outside of the Dutch and British society, it becomes critical to identify what defines each, and thus what outsiders need to change about themselves in order to join the community. While the framing of the problem of ethnic minority exclusion and the ultimate goals of policy are important elements of the story, it does not fully explain the kind of exams eventually adopted. This next section considers how the concept of affective citizenship can be used to better understand how the framing of integration as issues of community cohesion and cultural clash produced different kinds of exams.

### **Clashing Cultures, Community Cohesion, and Affective Citizenship**

Following from Fortier's analysis of changes in naturalization policies in the United Kingdom, I consider the integration exams as a means of understanding "how citizenship is

constituted as a ‘big deal’; that is, how citizenship constitutes a site of emotional investment not only on the part of applicants and ‘new’ citizens but also on the part of the state” (Fortier 2013, 1). Through a semi-ethnographic analysis of her own naturalization experience in the United Kingdom, Fortier argues that naturalization is an important site for understanding how the state itself becomes desirable, as opposed to the nation, typically the site of primordial and affective ties. What Fortier’s analysis draws attention to, is the need for the state to (re)produce itself as something to be desired in the first place. Since integration exams in liberal states have focused heavily on civic content, they can rightly be seen as another mechanism through which the state makes itself desirable. The cases under consideration here suggest that desire to be part of society was central to the problematization of integration in both the United Kingdom and the Netherlands.

Both Fortier (2010) and Johnson (2010) draw on the British case to map out how affect is mobilized to create systems of inclusion and exclusion. Looking at the way that the Labour government understood the problem of integration, Fortier argues that the discourse not only normalized the need to have certain affective orientations towards the community and state, but also differentiated between whose feelings matter. In her account of the veil debate, Fortier (2008) argues that discomfort and unease white Britons feel around a veiled woman is given precedence over the feelings of discomfort and unease she might feel being forced to remove the veil. The Cattle Report reifies the primacy of white Britons’ feelings by suggesting that the unease they feel towards racialized communities is understandable, justifiable and ultimately the fault of those communities who choose to be separate. Johnson (2010, 501) adds:

The politicians’ statements are a form of normalising discourse that encourages both forms of self-government by some citizens and forms of casual surveillance by those who feel they belong. So, citizens are expected to demonstrate that they feel loyal, patriotic and integrated. Those citizens are to be welcomed. People who are suspected of not having the correct feelings, including those accused of making a point of their difference (for example, by wearing a veil, or even preferring to speak a foreign language), are problematised and identified as legitimate subjects for critique, fear or suspicion.

The Cattle Report’s call to make naturalization more meaningful by making it more difficult is informed by a simple logic: that which is more elusive is made both real and more desirable. In making naturalization more difficult, new citizens would find pride, self-worth, and even happiness through their new status, feelings which would lead them to act as ‘good’ citizens do, as contributors to the economy and civil society, not as dependents on the



welfare state. Further, a proud Briton would be less likely to partake in riots. The emphasis on the segregation of ethnic minorities in the Cantle Report problematized language fluency as *the* fundamental obstacle to ‘meaningful’ interactions with other citizens. In what Fortier (2013) calls the ‘fantasy of English fluency’ the inclusion of linguistic requirements as part of naturalization is emblematic of the belief that language skills could solve the problem of integration. Language fluency then becomes not only a necessary condition of full integration, but also the marker of an individual with the right kinds of affective orientation towards his/her community and the state. At the same time, it casts those without language fluency as suspect because their weak linguist skills are emblematic of their lack of desire to pull themselves into the community. Thus, their exclusion from full political, social, and civic rights and protections provided by the state are justified.

In contrast, while the introduction of new integration requirements in the Netherlands is often viewed as a dramatic rupture, the framing of the problem of integration more explicitly around issues of culture highlights some of the persistent characteristics of Dutch nationalism that have been typically discounted in the literature. Like the United Kingdom, the relationship between citizenship and nation is not as straightforward as in other cases where the boundaries of the state are seen to align more or less with that of the nation. The legacies of Protestant and Catholic conflict, pillarism, and linguistic diversity have resulted in a strong anti-nationalist basis for Dutch national identity. Dutch nationalism has typically been viewed as thin, open, and anti-ethnic, with a common identity founded in a common legal citizenship. Dutch civic-nationalism is defined by the ‘uniquely progressive’ Dutch values of tolerance, liberty, and equality. The focus on Dutch values versus *allochtoon* values in the debates leading to the introduction of new integration requirements has been characterized as a re-nationalization or re-ethnicization of Dutch citizenship. This characterization of Dutch nationalism and the more recent changes fail to account for how the legal status of Dutch citizenship has been closely linked to ethno-racial Dutch ancestry as highlighted in Chapter 4. While the anti-nationalist civic-nationalism of the Dutch is often read as open, when we put aside the typologies developed to understand cases in relation to each other, it becomes more apparent that Dutch nationalism, is ethnic and exclusionary. It is not just that Dutch nationalism “extends to how one thinks, feels and acts: in short, how one lives one’s daily life as a member of Dutch society” (van Reekum 2012, 594) but the way in which Dutch distinctiveness is enacted through opposition to what it is not; the *allochtoon*.

Whereas in the British case, affective citizenship relates to how the potential citizen feels towards the community generally, the framing of integration more explicitly on issues of culture, meant that the Dutch integration exam was presented as a way to judge and assess if a person had adopted Dutch values. According to the Minister Verdonk, applicants would know they were ready to take the test when they “felt Dutch.” In both cases, the immigrant’s affective orientation towards society became viewed as *the* problem, not society’s orientation towards them. What is most interesting about the way in which the non-integrated immigrant has been problematized in each case is that on the one hand it is the immigrant’s attachment to his or her ethno-cultural identity that forms the obstacles to integration, an attachment that becomes framed as irrational as a result. This is illustrated by the civilizing discourses embedded within public debates on integration (Brown 2012; de Leeuw and van Wichelen 2012; Razack 2004). On the other hand, it is precisely the rational calculating immigrant who fakes his or her way through integration requirements in the past who is the principal target of policy. While the exam may not be able to fully exclude those accessing citizenship for strategic reasons, the logic is that the requirements will transform them none-the-less. The rational being that through being exposed to the benefits of Dutch and British society, and by making citizenship more difficult, immigrants naturally develop the right kind of emotional attachments to the right kind of society and culture. In this sense, the framing of the integration exam as necessarily transformative demonstrates the underlying logic of Western superiority that informs the whole policy area.

An integration exam becomes a suitable solution to this problem because it solves multiple problems at once. The exam serves to: (a) work as the mechanism through which affect is developed by making membership elusive; (b) work as normalizing technology that ensures both the population and the object of desire remains pure through exclusions, and; (c) makes tangible the object of desire in the first place through the development of exam content. While the integration exams are openly designed to encourage particular kinds of neoliberal behaviors, the stimulus of these actions is not rational calculation you might expect from the ‘bionic’ citizen (Isin 2004). Instead, the exams seek to produce citizens who act as ‘good’ neoliberal citizens based on affects: love, desire and anxiety, and not rational calculations.

If we can now see why integration exams become seen as suitable tools to manage immigrants, in order to understand how the exams came to be in their final form, we must turn to a discussion of the role of expertise in policy-making. The interviews conducted with

those who developed the content and questions for the exams revealed how the policy implementation process provides an opportunity to shift policy, and how expert knowledge is deployed in order to resist or influence the final policy outcome. The next section of this chapter considers how the different mechanisms through which experts were engaged in the policy process, both opened up and limited their ability to challenge the directives from the state.

### **Expertise, Power and the Policy Making Process**

Analysis of the ‘macro politics’ of the integration debates and policy-making occurring in public venues has been the site of much academic work (Barbero 2012; Bleich 2002; Fekete 2006; Korteweg and Triadafilopoulos 2013; Penninx 2006). Indeed these studies provide important context for understanding the larger social and political forces that are shaping the policy area. However, little attention has been given to ‘micro politics’ of the policy-making process,<sup>82</sup> in particular, how the tests become actualized once they are resolved to be a solution for a particular problematization of integration. By shifting toward the policy implementation process in the UK and Netherlands, I argue that the decisions made regarding who was included in the process and how, had an effect on the requirements and content of the tests. While the tests can be considered a direct communication from the state to citizens and non-citizens alike as to how the state defines the ideal citizen, the way in which that script is developed can provide opportunities for actors outside the state to successfully challenge the state’s understanding of both the framing of the ‘ideal’ citizen and the concept of ‘integration.’

#### *Shifting Venues and Changing Frames*

The policy-making process involves a variety of actors, intervening at different stages and through different mechanisms in order to effect change in the policy domain. In the case of immigration and immigrant integration (and other policy domains alike), the dominant

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<sup>82</sup> While ‘micro-politics’ is underexplored in the field of integration exams, there are some notable exceptions in the field of immigration and citizenship generally. See: Arcarazo and Geddes (2014), Howell (2008), Essed and Nimako (2006), Scholten (2011), Scholten and Timmermans (2010), and Triadafilopoulos (2012). Also see work by Mae Ngai (2004) who examines the bureaucratic state’s interaction with immigrants and other social actors in the construction of illegality and alien status in the U.S. See, in particular, her examination of the construction of a “loyalty questionnaire” by administrators managing the Japanese interns

policy frame, which defines both the problems and thus possible solutions, has been subject to considerable scholarly work (Bleich 2002; Boswell, Geddes, and Scholten 2011; Roggeband and Verloo 2007; Vink and de Groot 2010). The first part of this chapter explored how the particular problematization of integration linked with notions of affective citizenship to produce a very particular idea of what the problem integration exam was meant to solve. While this focus on the public debates on integration can help us to understand how various policy options become possible, Scholten (2011) provides an important correction to the model. In particular, he shows how the policy-expert nexus in the Netherlands, that is the relationship between the state bureaucrats and external expertise (namely academics), has shaped the policy area in general. He argues that the shift in the framing of immigrant integration from a multiculturalist to an increasingly assimilationist model, reflects both the shift in the venue to public political arenas, and the resultant mismatch between the results and prescriptions being advanced by experts and the emerging frame of the time. As such, he argues that experts who continue to advance the multicultural frame, have increasingly been sidelined and ignored in the policy making process. In other words, so long as immigration and integration remained depoliticized issues, experts were able to control the framing of the issue itself and thus the policy responses. As integration became increasingly contested, so too did the ability of experts to provide research and advice. Over time, their position as ‘insiders’ in the policy subfield was eroded. From an analytics of government approach, Scholten’s analysis helps to highlight how the problematization of integration in a particular way not only shapes the solutions possible, but also who is seen to possess the relevant knowledge to make policy and as a consequence who is included in policy decisions.

While Scholten’s work traces out the erosion of expert-led policy change over time, it also points to the importance of alternative venues of policy change. Indeed, Guiraudon’s (1997) work on the use of domestic courts and Soysal’s (1994) work on the use of international venues for the advancement of rights to immigrants, also points to the significance of venue shifting as a means through which to achieve policy change.<sup>83</sup> Equally

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<sup>83</sup> In the case of the Netherlands, organizations representing Turkish immigrants effectively used the court system and EU agreements with Turkey to challenge the integration requirements for all Turkish Immigrants in the Netherlands. In 2012 the national court ruled in favour of the organizations and the government was forced to repeal the integration requirements for Turkish residents and repay those who had already completed the requirements.

important to consider is how expert advice is employed and at what stage. In the field of integration, much of the work on experts considers their role in issue framing, but does not consider how experts are engaged at later stages in the policy-making process. Indeed, the implementation of a policy provides a unique opportunity to shape the policy itself. In the case of integration tests, while the framing of integration in particular ways might lead a state to adopt a test requirement as a solution, the actualization of the test is another moment for challenging or reifying the dominant frame, through the new sites or venues of policy-making it creates.

In both the cases considered here, the governments turned to independent expert advice to develop the exams precisely *because* the issue of immigrant integration had become so politicized. While the public debates that advanced particular understandings of the problem of integration had made possible the adoption of integration exams, the decisions as to what could and would be included on the exams were made beyond the sphere of public debate. In both the UK and the Netherlands, the legislation that set out the exams in question were left relatively broad in scope and left the Minister with ultimate approval on the final content and requirements of the exam. On first glance, this might suggest that the Minister had absolute power over the final outcome. However, Chapter 3 and 4 outlined how the experts involved in the development of the exams were able to mobilize their expertise to challenge the authority of the Minister and government's policy direction. The ability of the experts involved to resist the Minister's direction was shaped both by the model of expert consultation and who was consulted.

#### *Neoliberal Policy Making and Expertise*

While traditional approaches to understanding the role of non-state actors in the policy making process, such as those that focus on the venue-shifting and issue-framing, can help us to understand who and how particular actors are involved in a particular time and place, they do not account for how the interactions at this micro-level are part of a governmental assemblage informed by a particular political rationality. For Rose and Miller expertise is a means through which to reconcile the competing goals of the liberal state, where on the one hand government must be limited, and on the other, the private must be managed and organized in such a way as to support government ends. Experts can establish the “vital links between socio-political objectives and the minutiae of daily existence in home and factory” (Rose & Miller 2010, 285-286). In this understanding of expertise, experts do not simply produce knowledge that can be deployed by governments when it aligns with

their political motivations. Nor can it be only understood in terms of its symbolic use by governments that seek to legitimate their policy directions (see Boswell, 2009). Rather, an analytics of government approach situates expertise within what Dean calls ‘regimes of practice’ that “involve practices for the production of truth and knowledge, [which] comprise multiple forms of practice, technical and calculative rationality” (Dean 1999, 19). Regimes are the taken-for-granted way of doing things and seeing things. They give rise to particular kinds of knowledge and expertise, but are also shaped and reformed by knowledge and expertise.

This analysis of expertise is informed by a particular understanding of political power that emphasizes the diffuse and productive nature of power. Political power is not only coercive. Nor is it the sole purview of state institutions. Rose and Miller write,

A powerful actor, agent or institution is one that, in the particular circumstances obtaining at a given moment, is able to successfully enroll and mobilise persons, procedures and artifacts in the pursuit of its goals. Powers are stabilised in lasting networks only to the extent that the mechanisms of enrolment are materialised in various more or less persistent forms – machines, architecture, inscriptions, school curricula, books, obligations, techniques for documenting and calculating and so forth. (Rose and Miller 2010, 281).

This way of thinking about power as existing in a single moment is useful to understanding how non-state actors find ways to influence policy. It help us to understand the role that expert advice played in the actualization of the integration exams in the United Kingdom and Netherlands, and how those involved were able to exert influence over the final outcome, even within a relationship with the state that would appear submissive. It also helps us to understand how some actors become understood as ‘experts’ and others as the ‘objects’ of the integration exam. I turn first to the question of who is identified as an expert and how this relates to particular rationalities of what constitutes knowledge. I then turn to an analysis of the relationship set out between the respective Ministries and the experts involved in the actualization of the exam. Here I argue that an analysis of the micro-politics of policy formation highlights the way in which the experts involved drew on multiple and sometimes conflicting knowledges as a strategy for advancing an alternative problematization of integration.

### *Identifying “Expertise” in Integration Exam Making*

Instrumental approaches to understanding the role of expert advice in policy-making help highlight how expertise was used in the cases under study here as strategy for

legitimation or depoliticization. As noted earlier, the problematization of integration had framed the core issue as the absence of the right kind of affect towards society. The integration exam was seen as a tool that could both stimulate the appropriate feelings, while also ensuring those with the wrong ones would be excluded. To work as an exam, it required the state to define both what society is and operationalize affect, or how applicants might demonstrate affect. But what does it actually mean to *feel* British or Dutch? As multilingual and diverse states, even if one were to focus on the ‘facts,’ debates emerge as to who’s history is told, which government institutions are given precedent over others, which cultural norms are identified as the most important. The problematization of integration had clearly laid out what being British or Dutch *is not*, but had successfully avoided dealing with what it *is* by focusing on the failings of the immigrant. While the governments of the day could have opted to develop exams and content based on party ideology, for the exams to be justified in the first place, there had to be some semblance of objective content to test. For if a British community did not exist, how could immigrants be excluded from citizenship on the basis they did not have the desire to be part of it? As Rose and Miller note, “Experts hold out the hope that problems of regulation can remove themselves from the disputed terrain of politics and relocate onto the tranquil yet seductive territory of truth” (2010, 286). Expert advice legitimizes the policy through both the identification of experts on subject of British or Dutch society, and experts who can develop tests on said subject. Thus experts make the object of affect real in two ways; by being experts on the object of affect; and by using that expertise to develop measurements of affect toward the object.

This leaves us to consider *who* was identified as an expert relevant to the actualization of the exam. In both cases, only national citizens were included in the process. In the UK, the Minister appointed representatives from Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, to ensure representation of the other nations. In the Netherlands, Ministerial staff used the exceptions for education policy in EU agreements to ensure that only Dutch companies could bid on the RFP. One of the notable differences between the two cases considered here is the role that immigrants played, or didn’t, in the actualization of the exam. While immigrants were engaged in later stages in the United Kingdom as part of the pre-testing of the exam, there was no substantive consultation with immigrants on what would be suitable content for the exam. Immigrants after all were not members of the British community; that was the problem in the first place. As illustrated in Chapter 3, what is notable about the British case was the way in which 2<sup>nd</sup> generation immigrants who were born in the United Kingdom played a central role in the problematization of integration. Like new immigrants, older ones,

regardless of their citizenship status, were living parallel lives from the British community. As such, they could not have the knowledge necessary to participate. This is not to say that no immigrants were involved, rather that the method through which immigrant voice was incorporated was through other experts.

On ABNI and LUKAB, immigrant voice was represented in two ways. First, immigrants were represented through the inclusion of board members with immigrant backgrounds. For example, Sir Gulam Noon served on both on ABNI and LUKAB. The appointment of such persons to the group could be dismissed as party politics and patronage for loyal Labour Party supporters.<sup>84</sup> However, such explanations alone fail to address why the CEO of a food-manufacturing empire would be seen as having the requisite skills to serve on a board tasked with developing the content and requirements for the integration exam. How did Sir Gulam Noon come to be seen as an expert and other immigrants as the targets of the policy? Noon's inclusion in the group was based on his expertise in employing immigrants, not his lived experience as an immigrant. Noon was not the only member of the groups who was an immigrant or racialized minority, and like the others, his status as an expert was based on his professional experiences and work with immigrants, not as an immigrant *per se*. Noon had integrated ESOL classes into his workplace training and had quantifiable evidence of the success of this program, both in terms of their language improvements and how the program made them feel. This distinction is important because it points to a particular understanding of what constitutes knowledge.

The other way in which immigrant voice was represented on the two boards was through members with work experience in the immigrant-service sector. The members' experiences ranged from ESOL instructors to refugee support workers. The ESOL instructors were particularly successful on the LUKAB in advancing the proposal to have an ESOL with citizenship course. The strategy they used to advance this proposal was to draw on their expertise as language instructors as a means through which to challenge the government's proposal to introduce a standardized exam. Part of that strategy was to speak for the most vulnerable immigrants, those persons who would be further marginalized by a

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<sup>84</sup> In his final defense of ABNI following its dissolution, Chair Bernard Crick directly addressed the claim, arguing he had selected members based on the expertise, and sought also to have equal representation from immigrants and non-immigrants alike (ABNI 2008).



standardized exam. The reason they were successful is precisely because they were accepted as having expert knowledge on this group of the immigrant population. The question here is how did they come to be seen as experts in this regard? What mattered was not that an integration exam might actually be too difficult for some immigrants, but that the experts involved could lay claim to a body of knowledge that supported that claim. They were experts in the field of integration because of their personal experience with observing and managing the integration of others. They were able to aggregate, summarize, and identify ‘best practice’ in the field. In other words, they could make the integration process intelligible and therefore actionable.

This process of making the lived experience intelligible through expert observation was also seen in Dutch case. Immigrant voice was more systematically included in the actualization of the exam in the Netherlands, but only through the analysis of an expert organization, Euro RSCG Bikker (‘Bikker’). While Bikker had no experience in integration research, they were experienced in developing corporate identity through consultation with stakeholders. In corporate terms, a clear identity was what the Netherlands lacked. Bikker was engaged to produce information content upon which the exams would be based. They did so through consultation with several focus groups, including immigrants, but also with *autochtoon*. The results from the consultation were organized by experts around themes and generalized to capture the essentials of what it meant to be Dutch. Those results were then validated through a random-sample survey. Through both qualitative and quantitative methods, the intangible was to be made real, definite, brought into the realm of truth. The point here is that in both cases, immigrant voice is only made intelligible by the expert, who first applies systems for organizing, interpreting and evaluating the information. It is only true once the information is verified through the expert’s analysis of it.

The point here is to consider the identification of expertise as a political exercise beyond just the strategic maneuverings of political parties or governments. Expertise is tied to systems of knowledge, which operate both within and beyond the state. These systems of organizing information and what counts as truth have a material impact on the content and requirements of the integration exams considered here. The silencing or exclusion of non-citizens’ voice in the process is not only a result of the problematization of integration, but also reflects the way in which ‘lived experiences’ must be made intelligible through a system of aggregation and organization for it to have any relevance to the policy-making process. On the other hand, we cannot discount the critical role that the problematization of

integration played in identifying non-immigrant citizens as automatic experts in the field of Dutch and British identities. Unlike the experiences of immigrants, their lived experiences were not subject to standards of scientific rigor and validity. Their knowledge was intrinsic because they were implicit members of the very society they were charged with defining.

### *Engaging Expertise in Policy Making*

The specific problematization of integration in the UK and Netherlands, together with a critical analysis of the construction of expertise helps us to understand how those involved were identified as relevant experts. However, in order to fully account for the impact expert advice had on the final outcomes, we must also consider the mechanism through which expert advice was sought. As noted earlier, the legislation in both cases had left the relevant Minister with unilateral legal authority to approve new integration requirements within the stated framework of relatively vague clauses approved in the legislatures. Further, both Ministers at the time had very clear and public visions for what they intended to achieve with the legislation. In this section I consider how the mechanisms through which the experts were engaged opened up space to successfully challenge the Ministerial direction.

In both cases, the particular method for engaging experts was consistent with the general approach of the governments at the time. The neoliberal restructuring of the Dutch government has been marked by public sector retrenchment and a booming non-profit sector that became a central component of new public management reforms in service delivery of education, health care, and eventually immigrant integration services. Similarly under the auspice of ‘Modernizing Government’ New Labour looked to create a more inclusive policy process through the incorporation of consultation mechanisms and partnerships with service providers, NGOs and volunteer organizations on policy development. Much of this was tied with New Labour’s focus on community development and the devolution of policy responsibility to local authorities. While we can consider the engagement of non-state experts by governments as part of the general neoliberal restructuring of the state, both countries realized this goal in different ways.

In this particular policy area, the Dutch government contracted out vast portions of the research and test development to independent expert organizations. In the first stage of the process, Euro RSCG *Bikker* conducted consultations with various stakeholders regarding what information should be required for immigrants to be considered integrated. Based on

this research, the government released a second request for proposals to develop a new exam. After their initial bids were rejected, ITTA, CITO and Bureau ICE developed a joint proposal for the knowledge of Dutch society components that was accepted by the government. CINOP was contracted to complete the spoken language component. In the United Kingdom, an Advisory Group was formed for each stage of the policy's development. The Life in the United Kingdom Advisory Board was responsible for deciding what the new requirements for naturalization would be. Following the adoption of some of their recommendations, the Advisory Board on Naturalization and Integration was formed to oversee the development and administration of the citizenship exam and ESOL with citizenship courses.

In the case of the Netherlands, the three organizations charged with developing the actual core components of exam brought to the process a unique perspective. ITTA based out of the University of Amsterdam specializes in Dutch as second language learning and in particular in developing language skill through practice in the workplace. Bureau ICE and CITO are both independent test and exam developer, involved in standardized testing in schools and the private sector. Each organization became an advocate for a different approach to the exam and this is ultimately reflected in the final requirements of the exam. As noted in Chapter 4, applicants were required to complete 4 components, in any order. Two components, the Knowledge of Dutch Society ("KNS") and Electronic Practice Exam ("EPE") were multiple choice computer exams, with the primary purpose of testing being the applicants' general knowledge of Dutch history, political institutions and culture (KNS portion) and skills for everyday situations including open bank accounts and accessing social services (EPE portion). The TGN test was a telephone test designed to assess the applicant's oral and listening language skills and was developed separately by a fourth organization, CINOP. The final practical element requires applicants to create a portfolio of 'proof' that they have sufficient language knowledge to complete certain tasks in Dutch society by actually completing the tasks. The themes of the proofs include, seeking employment, civic engagement, having a job, social participation and lastly education, health and raising a family.

The mix of core components was developed through consensus among the main three organizations. Similarly, the questions for the multiple choice computer exams (KNS and EPE) were developed through consensus. However, each organization has left its unique mark on the test, in particular the portfolio requirement developed by the ITTA. They

argued that the exam should be structured so as to require applicants to engage with their community in the Dutch language. This had long been ITTA's position on the best way to learn a language. Further, through making this a requirement of the exam, ITTA experts believed this would force government office, schools, banks and other organizations in the community to engage with otherwise marginalized people. In this way they argued, the test would be used to reinforce a two-way process of integration. The original intention was for this to become homework exercises in the integration courses. ITTA saw the exam as a way to improve the quality of these courses through the portfolio. Under the new system of funding, providers were only reimbursed if their clients passed their exams. As such, consortium members felt that including components that would require providers to integrate situated-language into training would lead to for immigrants.

While the Minister accepted the portfolio on this basis, she insisted that applicants be tested on the content to ensure it was not fraudulent. The Minister's emphasis on preventing fraud reflects the overall framing of the 'bionic' immigrant as a particularly problematic subject that was to be excluded through the exam. Although the language teachers and scholars from ITTA advised against this, as a contracted service provider, they were obliged to not only agree to these terms but also develop the system through which the portfolios would be tested and the mechanisms for training the panels conducting the testing. The consortium objected to re-testing the applicants language skills related to the task, because it would undermine the integrity of the portfolio and other elements of the test that were already designed to assess this. Further, the portfolio was not set at a specific level of language. Instead by virtue of collection of proof, the applicant was deemed to have a level of language sufficient to participate in that specific task in society. The interview questions focus on how the applicant completed the task, how they felt during the process, when it occurred, and what other things were happening at the same time. This was an attempt by consortium members to reduce the level of difficulty, although in practice this was not achieved.

On other points the consortium was more successful in resisting the Minister's direction. As noted in Chapter 4, the Minister and Ministry staff were not able to view the questions developed for the exam. They only received examples of test questions once they had been retired from the bank. This was a source of frustration from the point of view of Ministry staff, however they deferred to the expertise of the consortium. This was an important strategic move by the consortium members, as they wanted to protect the exam

questions from political manipulation, particularly by the Minister. From their point of view, it helped ensure the overall integrity of the exam, and by extension protected their respective reputations. At the same time, it ensured that flawed questions trying to assess affective orientations were excluded from the exam. This was an important limit that the consortium put on the exam from the outset. They made clear that test questions could only assess knowledge of information. This was another way to ensure the exam would not become overly exclusionary.

In contrast, while the British government did outsource certain aspects of the exam to private organizations, the bulk of the exam's implementation was conducted and approved by the Advisory Committees, which reflected the overall approach to expert consultation at the time. The central government had already engaged in several Commissions on the social exclusion of various groups in the UK, one focusing specifically on active citizenship. In 1998 Dr. Bernard Crick was called upon to strike an advisory council for citizenship education in schools in order to encourage the social inclusion of youth. A second advisory council, again led by Crick was struck to provide advice on the development of a naturalization test. These initiatives were driven largely by the Minister Blunkett, originally the Minister of Education and then as Home Secretary. Unlike in the Netherlands, the Advisory Board was given full control over the development of the test and preparatory material. The *Life in the United Kingdom Advisory Board* ("the Board") was given permanent ministerial staff and authority to call on Home Office staff for research, as they deemed necessary. The sessions were closed to allow for frank discussion, as some aspects of the book and test, specifically history, were particularly controversial.

However, what is most interesting about the process in the UK, is the way in which the ESOL educators were able to use their positions on the Board to advocate for an alternative to the test. Generally the group agreed that naturalization and the symbolic and real rights that went along with it were important for the successful inclusion of immigrants. Further, the group agreed that all citizens should be equipped with general knowledge about British social and political institutions. However, much like the ITTA in the Netherlands, ESOL educators in the UK were critical of the effectiveness of a multiple-choice test in encouraging 'true' integration. In fact, the ESOL representatives argued that such a test would further marginalize the most vulnerable, those with the weakest language skills by creating an insurmountable obstacle for naturalization. Indeed, the ESOL teachers were successful in making this argument and were responsible for designing a course-based

alternative to the test. Students below an A-2 level in one of the official language were able to attend language courses with citizenship content as an alternative to the test. Further, they are only required to make progress in the course and there is no set target for that improvement. While the alternative ESOL experts advanced acknowledged that integration was a process, they successfully challenge the idea that integration could or should be measured. In the later revisions to course content, again ESOL experts working at NIACE were able to prevent the inclusion of content they found personally problematic by leveraging their status as experts in language education. However, this is not how they framed their position. When asked to include anti-terrorism content, NIACE staff argued that such content would lead to a breakdown in the student-teacher relations and would undermine language learning. Again, their ability to challenge the state's directive stemmed directly from the identity as experts.

#### *Gender Norms and the Integration Exams*

Whereas in the Dutch case *allochtoon* women were cast as both the target and a tool of integration policy, the problematization of integration in the UK around issues of physical segregation did not put immigrant women at the center of the issue. However, this does not mean that image of the non-integrated (Muslim) immigrant women did not play heavily in the formation of the actual exams adopted. In both cases women were identified as a particularly vulnerable group, one most likely to be physically and socially segregated from society and this in turn was the marker of their non-integrated status. The difference lies in the way in which each set of experts responded to the identified (and assumed) needs of this group.

In the Dutch case, the consortium tried to respond to the risk that new requirements would only further isolate *allochtoon* women by developing content, which would relate to their lived experiences. The content was designed to tap into their experiences as mothers and caregivers for their families, the very roles that had marked them as non-integrated in the first place. However, it quickly became apparent that this very closed idea of what might be relevant to *allochtoon* women was misguided, leading to the development of two other themes. The second strategy was to provide mechanisms through which to facilitate women's engagement with the community and to help them develop their language skills, such that they would pass the exam and ideally remain engaged. The Portfolio was designed for this purpose. Further, the test was not seen to be operating in isolation from other integration strategies. The consortium and Ministry were very clear in their desire to improve the quality

of mandatory integration classes through the requirements they had drawn up. In particular, the Portfolio was designed to help ensure women moved beyond their classrooms and into the broader community. In contrast, the strategy in the UK was to develop a less difficult option for all applicants below a certain level of language skills, with very little attention paid to the actual content. Further, while ABNI tried to lobby for increased financial support for language instruction courses, and even childcare, there was less of a concerted effort to use the requirements of the exam to improve course provision quality. While NIACE and LLU+ were contracted to design the official course content, individual instructors were given the flexibility to integrate material as they saw fit. As noted in Chapter 3, despite extensive free course material and training, the quality of the ESOL with citizenship courses was often low, requiring further legislative changes to improve them.

What was common between the cases was the perceived need to require immigrant women to leave their homes. Left to their own devices, and because they were perceived as disempowered, the state needed to force them to become part of society. In doing so, the fact that immigrant and *allochtoon* women have agency is denied, and not just in the particular moment they were obliged to participate or complete the different components. In casting their culture, families and homes as obstacles to their full emancipation, integration policy has implications for how any future act is interpreted. The underlying logic to such requirements is that if and when women are exposed to liberal-Western values, they will abandon their old, illiberal ones. Thus, even after completing the requirements of integration, the recognition of a woman's agency to choose how she lives her life, expresses herself and relates to society is conditional on her adoption of a certain set of values over others. This is further complicated by the role that motherhood and care giving played in identifying immigrant women as non-integrated. On the one hand, information and content relevant to motherhood was used as a means through which to engage women. On the other, it was precisely traditional gender roles within their families that had identified immigrant women as non-integrated. This problematization of motherhood for immigrants might best be understood as the racialization of motherhood, where immigrant women's role as mothers and caregivers is always suspect and their agency must constantly be proven. At the same time, the agency of non-immigrant women is assumed because they are integrated by virtue of birthright. Of course, this discounts the pervasive role that patriarchy plays in shaping the choices of all women. As a result, the integration exams considered here, reify patriarchy not only through their content and requirements, but also through the way in which they obscure and deny gender inequality in Western 'liberal' society.

## Conclusions

Introducing citizenship tests was largely designed to make settlement and naturalization process more difficult and therefore force immigrants to ‘earn’ their new rights. It is a process that requires the instrumentalization of conceptually messy ideas such as society, community, identity, and so on. What it means to be and *feel* Dutch or British is not clear, even to those who hold that legal status as citizens. Both of the cases considered in this thesis have turned to experts as a means through which to depoliticize a highly contested and debated policy area. However, who is included in the process as an expert, created or erased opportunities for resistance against the state’s objective. The LUKAB and ABNI was given full discretion in terms of the test requirements and content, as they were responsible for writing the citizenship guide upon which the test was based. Further, the respective boards met regularly and this provided opportunities for certain actors, particularly ESOL experts, to form a united front against the idea of the test itself. In the Netherlands, while the tendering process did provide some room for resisting the test, the commercial relationship ultimately resulted in conforming to the government’s demands. Where the experts were able to push back is on the actual test questions. By using their status as experts in test-making, the consortium was able to prevent Ministerial intervention and influence on the actual questions developed. They did this by preventing the Ministry from ever seeing the questions in the test-bank to ensure reliability and by limiting the kinds of questions they could develop to be based on knowledge, not feeling or sentiment, to ensure validity.

Further, while the rationale for introducing the exams seems similar in each place, the process for developing the test had a marked impact on the content of the questions and preparatory material. In both the UK and Netherlands, the content ended up being more expansive. Both tests included information on the ‘rights’ of citizenship and in particular, the ‘social’ rights including how to access housing support, social assistance, unemployment insurance and public health care. This reflects the fact that in both the UK and Netherlands, experts from settlement and immigrant organizations were consulted. However, it is important to note that direct engagement with immigrants at the test-development phase did not occur. This meant that the voice of immigrants was only heard through a second party, namely ESOL teachers and Dutch language experts. While in both the Netherlands and the UK the language-learning experts were more sensitive to the additional burden the test might place on immigrants, they were still speaking from a position of privilege as accepted members of Dutch and British society. In the end, their suggestions, although rooted in teaching experiences, still reflect what they thought was best for immigrants. Beyond the



variations in the actual tests and materials, the above analysis shows how in some cases the policy implementation process can result in new (closed) venues through which to challenge the assimilationist turn in the policy framing of integration. In the case of the UK, the formalized venue of the Advisory Board provided an opportunity for ESOL experts to successfully present an alternative policy. Similarly, though to less successful ends, the Dutch model of fee-for-service consultation also empowered experts to present an alternative framing of integration by mobilizing their expertise to challenge the Minister.

## Chapter 6 Conclusion

This study began with a rather narrow focus on the state's management of the imagined borders of the nation through naturalization policy. The original questions I posed were how is the integration exam used as a tool of exclusion? What does it reveal about the way that the state defines the nation, belonging, and its citizens? The interviews I conducted with those involved in the implementation of integration exams revealed a great deal of influence non-state actors had during this stage of policy. As such, over the course of my interviews and archival research a new set of questions emerged. What is the role of non-state actors in the management of borders, and where do they gain their legitimacy? Are the actors engaged in the policy implementation process simply agents of the state with delegated authority to make policy? Or does their power to influence policy stem from non-state sources? What effect does this have on the type of citizens the integration exams are meant to produce? The implementation of integration exams provides an interesting opportunity to explore these questions, while engaging with distinct but interrelated fields of research within the discipline of political science. This thesis is about citizenship and what it means to belong, at least from the perspective of the state. It is also about expertise in policy formation and contestation.

Through an analysis of the current state of the literature on integration exams, I draw on insights from the field of governmentality to highlight the gaps in our understanding of how borders are produced and managed. In particular, I argue that traditional accounts of the policy process focus too heavily on the public debates of integration, and role of institutional factors in explaining integration exams. By shifting the focus of investigation to the actualization of integration exams, I demonstrate that we need to account for influence of non-state experts. Further, I suggest that the methodological approaches developed by governmentality scholars provide the tools necessary to account for the diffuse nature of power that is at play in the integration exam. I seek to challenge the account of expertise in policy making as simply a tool of legitimization, and argue that experts engage in politics by drawing on the language of expertise in order to challenge government policy in seemingly neutral and apolitical ways.

The core empirical chapters on the Netherlands and the United Kingdom situated the adoption of integration exams within a historical account of the development of

integration policy. In both cases, I argue that the production of knowledge about immigrant communities, and how integration is measured, is central to our understanding of how integration exams come to be seen as a viable solution to the problem. I account for how immigrants are made visible through citizenship, immigration, and integration regimes that constitute them as such, and how the identities of immigrants are constructed in opposition to white British, or white-Dutch residents, regardless of their status as citizens. In the UK, I argue that the shift in framing of the problem of integration to issues of community cohesion mark an critical rupture, resulting in a more individualized policy response focused on language proficiency and affective orientations towards the community. In contrast, I argue that there is a great degree of continuity in approach in the Netherlands, challenging the account of others. By focusing on the problematization of integration, and not necessarily the solutions, I demonstrate the centrality of cultural incompatibility and loyalty in the logics that has informed integration policy in the Netherlands, including during the 1980s multiculturalist golden era.

Following the discussion of the rationalities that informed the adoption of the integration exams, I turn to the role of non-state actors in the implementation of the exams. Through this account I demonstrate how the experts involved deploy their status as experts to challenge the state in terms of policy tools, but not necessarily the underlying logic. In the UK there is greater evidence of challenging the logic informing the exam, as ESOL experts used the language of equity and their expertise in teaching to push for the adoption of an ESOL with citizenship option. For those involved in this initiative, an exam was seen as an unjust obstacle to ‘true’ integration. Policies needed to support immigrants in making connections to the community, not create insurmountable barriers. Although an important achievement, the ESOL with citizenship option reveals the ways in which the construction of immigrant communities as backwards, and illiberal remained central to the logic of many of those involved. After all, the course option was designed for women locked “behind their windows.” The exam developed in the Netherlands shares similar rationalities about immigrant communities, which was made apparent in the content of the exams. In the Dutch case we see how the more general language of test reliability was used to prevent the inclusion of content that was deemed by the experts as too culturally biased. At the same time, we see how racialized gendered assumptions about immigrant communities were embedded into the content and the different requirements of the exam, through the inclusion of women-relevant content (childrearing, volunteerism, etc.).

In both cases I situated changes to integration policy in relation to the neoliberalization of the state generally, and draw out how the content of the exams are linked with particular understandings of what it means to be a good citizen. In particular, I focus on the importance of self-sufficiency and link this to how affect becomes an important dimension of the problematization of immigrants. Creating loving subjects becomes linked with producing good citizens who do not abuse the benefits of citizenship. In Chapter 5, I turned more specifically to an analysis of the role of affective orientation in both the problematization of integration, and in terms of our understanding of what the integration exam is actually meant to do. Here we see less variation in the logic that informed experts and state-actors in the British case, and more variation between experts and the state in the Dutch case. The emphasis placed on practical language skills and information amongst the experts involved in the Dutch case, is reflected in their subtle resistance of cultural value questions. For those involved in the development of the British exam, measuring effort and demonstrating desire to be included was ultimately the goal they sought to achieve through the exam. Thus here again, we see the influence of experts in policy outcomes. Based on these conclusions, this thesis contributes to three distinct literatures within the field of Political Science, comparative public policy, governmentality, and citizenship studies. In particular, the focus on experts and affect provide new and important insights into how policy change occurs, and how borders are produced.

### **Expertise and Policy Making**

One of the central arguments of this thesis is that the policy implementation process is an important but under-theorized part of policy-making analysis. In Chapter 2, I explore the current state of the literature on integration exams, highlighting the gaps in our understandings of how the norms included in the exams come to be. While there is a substantial body of work trying to work out what those norms are, and how they fit with our understandings of particular approaches to integration, our understanding of who and how those norms are developed is under-researched. Where there is attention to how these norms are developed, it is focused on the public discourse at the time, or on parliamentary debates. These are important insights, and form a part of the story presented here. Where they stop short is in their assessment of the discrete decisions made regarding the actual content and requirements of the exams. At least for the cases of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, this thesis is a significant contribution to this particular gap in empirical knowledge. More importantly, through my analysis of the role of expertise in the developed

of the exams, I present a methodological framework for assessing the political nature of policy implementation.

In the field of comparative public policy, our understandings of the way that non-state actors engage in the policy process tends for focus on their lobbying efforts of political parties, or in more complicated studies on their role in knowledge production and norm formation within a particular policy domain. Studies that look at the role experts play in policy formation often focuses on how governments use expertise as a source of policy legitimization. This too is part of the story here. Both the Dutch and British governments of the day turned to non-state actors as a means through which to de-politicize and legitimize a policy area that had become deeply contested. Experts provided legitimacy to the claim that there was a British or Dutch community about which immigrants could be tested. However, in trying to make sense of the interviews I conducted, I found the traditional tools of policy analysis insufficient, in part because it conceded too much to the state. I first turned to the literature on governmentality, in order to account for how the experts engaged in the policy processes deployed their status as experts to shape policy. With its emphasis on the diffuse nature of power in modern societies, and on the relationship between knowledge and power, governmentality provided me with the analytical tools to account how the political nature of policy implementation is obscured through the language of expertise. In other words, this study works to uncover how political ends were framed as issues of test-reliability or effective language instruction. As I traced out in Chapters 3 and 4, the actualization of the integration exam demonstrates that bordering work is not only the purview of the state. Experts engaged in settlement support, language training, and integration research are also actively engaged in the process of creating borders, both real and imagined, through the knowledge they produce about immigrants and their integration. As such, the integration exams considered here, should not be seen as emblematic of only the state's power to define and produce borders. Rather, this thesis presents a narrative of borders as resting on multiple and diffuses systems of knowledge production and power, within and beyond the state.

The analysis of expertise in the policy making process presented here adds to both the traditional literature on policy analysis, and governmentality. In the case of the latter, the thesis contributes an ever-growing body of empirical work that focuses on “the humble, the mundane, the little shifts in our ways of thinking and understanding, the small and contingent struggles, tensions and negotiations that give rise to something new and unexpected” (Rose and Miller 1992, 25). In focusing on the subtle ways that experts in the

Netherlands and the United Kingdom worked to resist against ministerial directives, I present a more full account of how the exams took the form they did. In this sense, this dissertation can be read as both a celebration and caution against incremental resistance. It is a celebration because as states increasingly turn to evidence-based policy making, this thesis traces how the implementation process has been used as an important site for influencing policy outcomes. In doing so, it adds to the literature on policy analysis by demonstrating that the implementation process is an important site of study, especially for understanding the contestation of ideas and state interests. The analysis presented here also complicates accounts of expert advice as simply legitimatizing forces for existing policy (Boswell 2012). It does this by highlighting how the power that experts deploy is rooted in what Slaughter might call ‘epistemic communities’, not in delegated power from the state. This can make them powerful actors, if they are strategic in how they articulate their political demands. However, the thesis also outlines limits to this strategy for change. In both cases considered, the power to influence outcomes was only possible so long as the experts were engaged in the process. Once policy was brought back under the purview of the Minister, as in the UK, or revised through another round of expert advice, as in the Netherlands, the ability of the expert actors to influence policy was muted, if not lost.

### **Affective Citizenship**

This thesis is also about how borders are practices that are realized in multiple spaces, both real and imagined. Citizenship policy is one practice that manages the imagined border of belonging to and with the state. However, we cannot understand the effect of citizenry inclusion and exclusion without also considering the practices that manage other overlapping and distinct borders. Integration policy manages the borders of social, political and economic inclusion. Immigration policy manages the physical border, within, beyond, and at the border. The analyses in Chapters 3 and 4 of the development of citizenship and naturalization policy in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands reveals how these practices of bordering are informed by each other, and how they produce systems of exclusion based on gendered and racialized norms. In the United Kingdom, changes to the relatively liberal *jus soli* basis for citizenship rights was shown to be driven by a desire to keep certain kinds of colonial immigrants out. The full rights of mobility were retained only for those with a ‘close connection’ to the United Kingdom, that is, for white colonial migrants. In the Netherlands, citizenship and integration policy have been more explicitly overlapping projects, with the terms of social, political, and economic inclusion increasingly focused on the adoption of Dutch values and norms. The introduction of a pre-immigration integration exam from

abroad, and integration requirements for permanent settlement reveals the way in which integration, or the lack thereof, has been used to manage both the physical and imagined borders of belonging.

Further, the analysis of the problematization of immigrant integration helped to reveal what it means to be a good citizen. As argued in Chapter 5, the problematization of immigrant integration has increasingly been framed around the issue of physical and emotional segregation. The problems within immigrant communities stem from their exclusion from society, and that exclusion is emblematic of a lack of desire to pull themselves in. The introduction of integration exams in both cases is meant to solve this problem, first by clearly outlining the boundaries of inclusion, that is, what it is that immigrants need to change about themselves, and learn about in order to be good members of society. Second, the exam is meant to be a means through which to stimulate affect; that which is more difficult to attain, it is more desirable. For the experts involved in the implementation of both exams, the ability to use the exam to stimulate disengaged immigrants was a paramount concern. In the United Kingdom, the emphasis was placed on the amount of effort requirement, not necessarily the content of the exam. ESOL experts advanced the argument of equity across different language and cognitive levels in order to include a less difficult ESOL with citizenship course option. In the Netherlands, aspects of the EPE content, and the portfolio option were designed specifically with immigrant women in mind.

While these were important ‘wins’ in the minds of the experts engaged in the policy implementation process, in line with the general problematization of immigrant integration, the ESOL with citizenship option in the UK, and EPE and portfolio requirements in the Netherlands were designed to stimulate affective responses. In considering both the problematization of immigrant integration, and the actualization of the exam, this study reveals the ways in which the state seeks to produce citizens who act, not solely based on rational economic calculation, but also based on feelings of love, duty, and desire. Citizens who love their state, do not abuse the benefits of citizenship. Citizens who love their community, feel a duty to protect it, and do not engage in riots or civil disobedience. Or so the logic goes. This, however, is only one possibility. If integration exams are designed to make inclusion more difficult, and therefore more desirable, appreciation, pride, and love are only one possible set of outcome once the requirements are met. The integration exams are meant to communicate to immigrants with what they need to know, and what they need to

change about themselves in order to be included. But, what happens when doing everything right does not lead to the expected result. Desire can create great expectations, and also great disappointment.

This study has been about what message the integration exam is trying to communicate to immigrants. It does not consider how immigrants take up that message, or how they make sense of it in light of their experiences with exclusion, discrimination, and institutional racism. It leaves unanswered, what kind of affect does the exam actually produce? It opens up other important questions about the relationship between affect and ‘good’ citizens. Is love required to be a ‘good’ citizen? Or can ‘good’ citizenry behaviors outlined in the integration exam content also be driven by hate for and fear of the state? This study then, should be read as one part of the story of producing citizens. It privileges the narrative of the state, and of experts in the field of integration. However, if we are to take seriously the contention that power is diffuse, and resistance occurs in multiple sites, we must also make room for the narratives of immigrant.



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**Appendix A**  
**Common European Frame of Reference for Languages**

<b>Proficient User</b>	<b>C2</b>	Can understand with ease virtually everything heard or read. Can summarise information from different spoken and written sources, reconstructing arguments and accounts in a coherent presentation. Can express him/herself spontaneously, very fluently and precisely, differentiating finer shades of meaning even in more complex situations.
	<b>C1</b>	Can understand a wide range of demanding, longer texts, and recognise implicit meaning. Can express him/herself fluently and spontaneously without much obvious searching for expressions. Can use language flexibly and effectively for social, academic and professional purposes. Can produce clear, well-structured, detailed text on complex subjects, showing controlled use of organisational patterns, connectors and cohesive devices.
<b>Independent User</b>	<b>B2</b>	Can understand the main ideas of complex text on both concrete and abstract topics, including technical discussions in his/her field of specialisation. Can interact with a degree of fluency and spontaneity that makes regular interaction with native speakers quite possible without strain for either party. Can produce clear, detailed text on a wide range of subjects and explain a viewpoint on a topical issue giving the advantages and disadvantages of various options.
	<b>B1</b>	Can understand the main points of clear standard input on familiar matters regularly encountered in work, school, leisure, etc. Can deal with most situations likely to arise whilst travelling in an area where the language is spoken. Can produce simple connected text on topics which are familiar or of personal interest. Can describe experiences and events, dreams, hopes and ambitions and briefly give reasons and explanations for opinions and plans.
<b>Basic User</b>	<b>A2</b>	Can understand sentences and frequently used expressions related to areas of most immediate relevance (e.g. very basic personal and family information, shopping, local geography, employment). Can communicate in simple and routine tasks requiring a simple and direct exchange of information on familiar and routine matters. Can describe in simple terms aspects of his/her background, immediate environment and matters in areas of immediate need.
	<b>A1</b>	Can understand and use familiar everyday expressions and very basic phrases aimed at the satisfaction of needs of a concrete type. Can introduce him/herself and others and can ask and answer questions about personal details such as where he/she lives, people he/she knows and things he/she has. Can interact in a simple way provided the other person talks slowly and clearly and is prepared to help.

*“Table 1 Common Reference Levels: global scale”* reproduced from report of the Language Policy Unit, Council of Europe (2001).

**Appendix B**  
**Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002**

Part 1 (Nationality) – Section 1

1. Naturalisation: knowledge of language and society
  - (1) The following shall be inserted after the word “and” after paragraph 1(1)(c) of Schedule 1 to the British Nationality Act 1981 (c. 61) (requirements for naturalisation)—

“(ca) that he has sufficient knowledge about life in the United Kingdom; and”.
  - (2) In paragraph 2(e) of that Schedule (waiver)—
    - (a) for “the requirement specified in paragraph 1(1)(c)” there shall be substituted “either or both of the requirements specified in paragraph 1(1)(c) and (ca)”, and
    - (b) for “expect him to fulfil it” there shall be substituted “expect him to fulfil that requirement or those requirements”.
  - (3) The following shall be inserted after section 41(1)(b) of that Act (regulations)—

“(ba) for determining whether a person has sufficient knowledge of a language for the purpose of an application for naturalisation;

(bb) for determining whether a person has sufficient knowledge about life in the United Kingdom for the purpose of an application for naturalisation;”.
  - (4) The following shall be inserted after section 41(1) of that Act—

“(1A) Regulations under subsection (1)(ba) or (bb) may, in particular—

    - (a) make provision by reference to possession of a specified qualification;
    - (b) make provision by reference to possession of a qualification of a specified kind;
    - (c) make provision by reference to attendance on a specified course;
    - (d) make provision by reference to attendance on a course of a specified kind;
    - (e) make provision by reference to a specified level of achievement;
    - (f) enable a person designated by the Secretary of State to determine sufficiency of knowledge in specified circumstances;
    - (g) enable the Secretary of State to accept a qualification of a specified kind as evidence of sufficient knowledge of a language

**Appendix C**  
**Life in the United Kingdom Advisory Group**

<b>Member</b>	<b>Position (2005)</b>	<b>Area of Expertise</b>
<b>Sir Bernard Crick</b>	Birkbeck College, University of London	Citizenship, British History
<b>Sir Tim Brighouse</b>	Commission for London Schools and VP Institute of Education, London University	Language Education, Skills and Employment Training, Test Making
<b>Joseph E. Brown</b>	Principle Care Manage, City of Bradford	Immigrant Integration
<b>Mary Coussey</b>	Independent Immigration Race Monitor reporting to	Immigrant Integration, Race Relations
<b>Satpal Hira</b>	Head of Education Equalities, Birmingham Education Department	Language Education, Skills and Employment Training, Test Making
<b>Samina Khan</b>	Head of Essential Skills, Cardiff	Immigrant Integration, Language Education, Skills and Employment Training, Community Development
<b>Dina Kiwan</b>	Research, Institute of Education	Immigrant Integration, Citizenship
<b>Dr. R. David Muir</b>	Diversity Consultant, Chairman of the Home Secretary's Steering Group's Race and Diversity sub-group	Race Relations, Immigrant Integration, Community Development
<b>Ashok Ohri</b>	Director Federation of Community Work Training Groups	Skills and Employment Training, Community Development

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<b>Alex Porter</b>	N/A	
<b>Dr. Lis Statham</b>	Hampshire Ethnic minority achievement service	Immigrant Integration
<b>Selina Ullah</b>	Chair Asian Women's Centre, Keighley	Immigrant Integration, Language Education
<b>Annette Zera</b>	Principal, Tower Hamlets College	Language Education, Testing Making

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**Appendix D**  
**Advisory Board on Naturalization and Integration**

<b>Member</b>	<b>Roles on Board</b>	<b>Position (2008)</b>	<b>Area of Expertise</b>
<b>Sir Bernard Crick</b>	Chair (2003-2005) Chair – Scottish, and N. Ireland Subgroup	Birkbeck College, University of London	Citizenship, British History
<b>Mary Coussey</b>	Chair (2005-2008) Chair of Test Subgroup	Independent Immigration Race Monitor reporting to	Immigrant Integration, Race Relations
<b>Patrick Wintour</b>	Vice Chair and Chair Training and Employment Subgroup	Director, Employability Forum (for refugees)	Employment & Skills Training
<b>Mary Curnock Cook</b>		Director of Qualifications and Skills, at the Qualifications and Curriculum Authority (QCA)	Employment & Skills Training
<b>Sally Daghlian</b>	Scottish Sub-Group	Chief Executive of the Scottish Refugee Council, Trustee of the British Refugee Council	Immigrant Integration, Employment & Skills Training, Community Development
<b>Celine Castelino</b>	Welsh Subgroup	Former Head of ESOL Developing at Basic Skills Agency	Language Education, Citizenship
<b>Sir Robert Dowling</b>		Headteacher, Sir Georges School, Birmingham	Skills and Employment Training, Immigrant Integration
<b>Samina Khan</b>	Welsh Subgroup	Head of Essential Skills, Cardiff	Immigrant Integration, Language Education, Skills and Employment Training, Community Development

<b>Janet Luff</b>		Curriculum Manager, Liverpool Community College (2006)	Language Education, Test Making
<b>Abeeda Malik</b>		Deputy Chief Office of QED	Immigrant Integration, Skills and Employment Training, Language Education
<b>Dr. Elizabeth Meehan</b>	N. Ireland Subgroup	Prof Emerita, Law at Queen's University Belfast, Adjunct at School of Politics and IR University College Dublin	Citizenship
<b>Dr. R. David Muir</b>		Diversity Consultant, Chairman of the Home Secretary's Steering Group's Race and Diversity sub-group	Race Relations, Immigrant Integration, Community Development
<b>Gulam Noon</b>		Chairman of Noon Group, Noon Foundation and Noon Products	Skills and Employment Training
<b>Ashok Ohri</b>	N. Ireland Subgroup	Director Federation of Community Work Training Groups	Skills and Employment Training, Community Development
<b>Maeve Sherlock</b>		Chief Executive of Refugee Council	Immigrant Integration, Skills and Employment Training
<b>Julia Onslow-Cole</b>		Head of Global Immigration, PricewaterhouseCoopers Legal LLP	Immigration and Citizenship Policy
<b>Jean Wilson</b>		Scottish Qualifications Authority as ESOL Development Officer	Language Education, Scotland, Test Making
<b>Annette Zera</b>	Test Subgroup	Principal, Tower Hamlets College	Language Education, Testing Making



## **Appendix E**

### **Dutch Integration Legislation Excerpts**

#### **Rijkswet op het Nederlanderschap, 1984 ('Netherlands Nationality Act'), Article 8**

1. Only the following applicants shall be eligible for the grant of Netherlands nationality pursuant to Article 7:
  - d. who may be deemed to have been assimilated into the Kingdom and the country of principal residence on the ground that he or she has a reasonable knowledge of the Dutch language to be determined by general administrative order of the Kingdom and —if he or she has his or her principal place of residence in Aruba, Curaçao, Sint Maarten or the public bodies of Bonaire, Sint Eustasius and Saba— of the language in common use on the island on which he or she has his or her principal place of residence in addition to the Dutch language, as well as knowledge of the political system and society of the European part of the Netherlands, Aruba, Curaçao, Sint Maarten or the public bodies of Bonaire, Sint Eustasius and Saba, and who has also otherwise integrated in one these societies; (emphasis added)

#### **Wet Inburgering, 2003 (Integration Act), Article 7**

1. The applicant acquires within three years oral and written skills in the Dutch language at least at the level A2 of the European Framework for Languages and knowledge of Dutch society.
2. The applicant has fulfilled the integration requirement if he:
  - a. has passed the examination established by the Minister, or
  - b. obtains diploma, certificate or other document referred to in Article 5, paragraph c, has achieved.

#### **Besluit Inburgering, 2006 (Integration Decree)**

##### **Article 2.9**

1. The civic integration acquires these skills in the Dutch language at level A2 of the European Framework for Modern Languages:
  - a. fluency;
  - b. listening skills;
  - c. conversation skills;
  - d. writing;
  - e. reading skills.

2. Notwithstanding the first paragraph, under d and e acquires oldcomers, not being a religious leader, the listed written skills in the Dutch language at the A1 level of the Common European Framework for Languages.

**Article 2.10**

1. The integration officer acquires knowledge of Dutch society at the level of the learning outcomes to be determined by Our Minister. To acquire the knowledge of Dutch society in any case cover:
  - a. Work and Income;
  - b. Manners, Values and Norms;
  - c. Housing;
  - d. Health care;
  - e. History and Geography;
  - f. Government Agencies and Services
  - g. Constitution and Rule of Law;
  - h. Education and Childrearing.

**Article 3.7**

1. The practical part of the naturalization exam includes assessing the language skills referred to in article 2.9, in a number of practical situations derived from the domains of citizenship, employment as well as education, health, and education.
2. The practical part of the civic integration examination consists of an assessment, a portfolio or a combination thereof.
3. The assessment or the combination of an assessment and a portfolio examination is conducted by a body designated in accordance with Article 3.14 paragraph 1
4. The portfolio is assessed by an examining body designated pursuant to Article 3.13, paragraph, or the Management Group.
5. The result of the practical part is determined by the examination institution and expressed in “successful” or “unsuccessful”
6. *By order of Our Minister further rules may be set about the practical part of the integration examination*

**Article 3.9**

1. The central part of the integration exam consists of:
  - a. an electronic practical,
  - b. a spoke Dutch exam, and
  - c. an exam in the knowledge of Dutch society.
5. *By order of Our Minister further rules may be laid down concerning the examinations referred to in the first paragraph.*

## Appendix F

### Inburgeringsexamen Consultants

Component	Consultant	Process
Preliminary Research on Integration and Knowledge of Dutch Society Exam Goals	Euro RSCG Bikker	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Survey &amp; focus groups with <i>allochtoon</i> and <i>autochtoon</i></li> </ul>
Knowledge of Dutch Society Exam (KNS)	Bureau ICE CITO	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Development of Critical Acts, Knowledge based on Bikker Report</li> </ul>
Situated Language Knowledge Exam (EPE)	Bureau ICE CITO ITTA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Development of Critical Acts and Knowledge based in own expertise</li> </ul>
Practical Exam (Portfolio)	Bureau ICE CITO ITTA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Development of Critical Acts and Knowledge based in own expertise</li> </ul>
Language Speaking Exam (TGN)	CINOP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Adapted existing technology for phone English exam in the USA</li> </ul>

**Appendix G**  
**Excerpts from Knowledge of Dutch Society Learning Objectives**  
'Kennis van de Nederlandse Samenleving Eindtermen'

**Chapter 2**

We distinguish four basic situations where it is important for immigrants to function in the Netherlands. These so-called 'Critical Practice Situations (CPs)' are:

- I      Functioning in the labor market
- II     Functioning in their own environment
- III    Functioning in contacts with authorities and government
- IV    Functioning as a citizen in Netherlands

The study conducted by Euro RSCG Bikker identified corresponding eight themes:

1      Work and Income

The participant is able to take steps to seek and retain employment, and provide for themselves.

2      Manners, values and norms

The participant is able to deal with the Dutch manners, values and norms.

3      Housing

The participant is able to find suitable accommodation and register for utilities. He is responsible for safety in the home and clean living space.

4      Health Care

The participant is able to follow the rules and procedures of the Dutch health care system and is able to access health care.

5      History and Geography

The participant is able, by knowing the history and geography of the Netherlands, to be involved in Dutch society.

6      Government Agencies and Services

The participant is aware of the services provided by the local government, the tax authorities, the police, and authorities for social and legal services. He is able in some cases to ask for information or use help desks for Legal Aid and / or social assistance.

7      Politics and law

The participant is able, by knowing the state organization of the Netherlands, to be involved in Dutch society.

8 Education and Childrearing

The participant knows Dutch the education system and recognizes the importance of education in the Dutch knowledge economy. Participants let their children participate in education and know parents are expected to play a role.

The various themes may play a role in several crucial practical situations. For example, a theme such as ‘Values’ is relevant to all four of the crucial practical situations. After all, in any situation an integration candidate is expected to adhere to the norms and values associated with the situations. A theme like ‘Work and Income’ is relevant only to the critical situation ‘Performance in the labor market.’ This implies that in the exam some themes can come up in several situations and other themes are linked to a single situation.

The summary below shows which topics are important for any situation.

Critical Practical Situations Themes	Functioning in the labor market	Functioning in their own environment	Functioning in contacts with authorities and government	Functioning as a citizen in Netherlands
Work & Income	X			
Manners, values and norms	X	X	X	X
Housing		X	X	
Health Care		X	X	
History and Geography				X
Government Agencies			X	X
Politics and Law				X
Education and Childrearing		X	X	

## **Chapter 4      Crucial knowledge and indicators for successful understanding**

Contingent learning outcomes: General Self-Reliance

There are some goals that apply to all situations and themes. We expect that participants to apply knowledge of themselves and certain acts, regardless of the situation they find themselves. The final objective is general self-reliance. The following learning outcomes for general self-reliance are:

- Selects information
- Uses information
- Makes use of formal and informal opportunities for assistance.
- Completes act in a timely manner

These standards are not tested separately but integrated offered into other standards. Below we will continue in related crucial knowledge and indicators for successful trading the crucial actions.

## Appendix H List of Key Reports

### United Kingdom

- ABNI. 2006. *First Annual Report Advisory Board on Naturalization and Integration*. London: Secretariat to ABNI.
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## The Netherlands

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- Bureau ICE & CITO. 2006 *Eindtermen KNS*. The Hague: Ministerie van Justitie.
- CINOP. 2001. *Eindtermen Maatschappijoriëntatie*. s-Hertogenbosch: CINOP.
- Euro RSCG Bikker. 2005. *Onderzoeksverslag En Eindtermen Inburgeringsexamen Kennis in de Nederlandse Samenleving*. Rotterdam: Euro RSCG Bikker.
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- WRR. 1979. *Ethnic Minorities (English Translation)*. The Hague: Scientific Council for Government Policy.
- . 1990. *Immigrant Report [English Translation and Summary]*. The Hague: Scientific Council for Government Policy.
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- . (2007). *Identificatie met Nederland. (Identification with the Netherlands)*. The Hague/Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
- . 2012. *The Netherlands as Immigrant Society*. The Hague: Scientific Council for Government Policy.