REID AND PERCEPTUAL ACQUAINTANCE

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ABSTRACT

In the recent literature, there is some debate over Reid's theory of perception. Commentators are divided on whether or not Reid's theory is consistent with an acquaintance model of perception. I will show that Reid's views are not consistent with an acquaintance model, but that he nevertheless had good reasons to subscribe to this model. There is, therefore, an interesting tension in Reid's theory of perception. I then develop a modified Reidian acquaintance model of perception as a way of resolving these tensions in light of an argument contained in Reid's *Philosophical Orations*, and defuse recent objections to the acquaintance interpretation in the process.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

During the writing process I benefited greatly from the guidance and support of my Supervisor, Dr. Brigitte Sassen. Her keen understanding of the historical and philosophical context of Reid's philosophy, and uncompromising demand for clarity, formed the backdrop of the development of this dissertation. I am also indebted to my second reader, Dr. Richard T.W. Arthur, who offered astute commentary, patience, and direction during the writing process (including its raw initial stage), as well as moral support. I am also very grateful for my third reader, Dr. Mark Johnstone, whose meticulous, exacting eye had a significant influence on the refinement of my work, particularly in its later stages. Others who have helped me in one way or another during the writing period include: Daphne Kilgour, Kim Squissato, and Rabia Awan, all of whom were very patient and always willing to lend a hand in matters, administrative or otherwise; Dr. Nicholas Griffin, who offered valuable feedback on my project at a preliminary stage; and Dr. Violetta Igneski, who was always there to provide fine program related advice.

I am deeply indebted to my immediate family for all their love and support: my parents, Vladimir and Marion, my brother Bennett, my Grandmother Anne, and my Uncle Paul. I would also like to thank all of my friends, and my closest companion.

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DEDICATION

For Anne, and in loving memory of Tati, Margaret, and Robert

Instinct, so far from being an inferior reason, is perhaps the most exalted intellect of all. It will appear to the true philosopher as the divine mind itself acting *immediately* on its creatures. – *Edgar Allan Poe*

INTRODUCTION

Thomas Reid is a well-known and influential philosophical figure, even if his philosophy might have originally been eclipsed by his philosophical adversaries, most notably David Hume and the other major figures in the empiricist tradition with which his philosophy interacts. Any careful study of Reid's views shows he was an astute thinker and critic of the tradition of Hume, Berkeley, and Locke considered, as they often are, as chief proponents of the "theory of ideas". Reid and the Scottish common sense school of philosophy have exerted a powerful influence over many prominent philosophical figures and enjoy a legacy of their own. However, given the weight and influence of Reid's common sense realist critique, the push in recent times to revisit Reid is a welcome counterbalance to the vast attention given to his foremost philosophical adversaries.

The present investigation aims to sort out what is viable in Reid's theory of perception from within a contemporary framework of assumptions or set of issues, which is to say these issues in conjunction with the thinker's primary texts. This is not purely an exegetical exercise if that is defined as something which concerns only what the thinker in fact maintained (consistently or inconsistently), when this is placed exclusively, as much as one can, in the thinker's own historical context. Jonathan Bennett's intuition that one job of doing history of philosophy is to figure out what is left, living, or redeemable in the philosophy of historical figures, captures the essence of my approach. Take a look at the following opening passage from the preface of his work on Kant, *Kant's Analytic* (1966). Bennett writes:

> [This work] is in some sense an 'introduction', but a selective one which does not expound all the Critique's most important themes. What I hope it provides is one fairly unified way of viewing a

> good part of Kant's achievement. To this end I have freely criticized, clarified, interpolated and revised. I make no apology for adopting this approach, for fighting Kant tooth and nail. Had I instead indulged him, or even given him the benefit of every doubt, I could neither have learned from his opaque masterpiece nor reported intelligibly on what it says…I have no feelings about the man Immanuel Kant; and in my exploration of his work I have no room for notions like those of charity, sympathy, deference, or hostility. (viii)[1]

The two primary texts that are consulted throughout my investigations into Reid's theory of perception and related theses are his *Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man* (EIP), published in 1785, and *An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense* (*Inquiry*), published in 1764. These are the two most important works for the study of Reid's philosophy of perception and related theses, but one auxiliary text that is consulted to supplement the discussion is *The Philosophical Orations of Thomas Reid*. *Oration III*, delivered in 1759 at the graduation ceremony of King's College, Aberdeen, provides a concise formulation of some of the key themes that were later written for publication in the *Inquiry* and EIP.

My investigation begins by assessing the coherence of a thesis entertained in the secondary literature, namely, that Reid's views are consistent with an *acquaintance* model of perception. The acquaintance interpretation of Reid which is entertained in this literature[2] is, I argue, a desirable interpretation. This is because under the anti-

[1] There are inherent dangers in articulating on a thinker's views from the vantage of a contemporary discussion or set of interests, however perhaps unavoidable it may be. The danger lies in committing excessive anachronisms, and burying the thinker's actual views in a shroud of extraneous analysis which disengages us from their views almost entirely. I have taken care not to commit objectionable anachronisms, or, in places where they are unavoidable, to make the reader aware of them, and carry on with the discussion for sake of interest.

[2] See: William Alston (1989), Nicholas Wolterstorff (2001, 2006) for objections to this interpretation, and James Van Cleve (2004) for a reply to some of these objections. For Wolterstorff's more detailed discussion and limited defence of the acquaintance interpretation of Reid, see: Wolterstorff (2006). For an elliptical discussion of the acquaintance model of perception, discussed under the name "the Traditional Position", and Reid's rejection of this model, see: Norton Nelkin (1989). For a rejoinder to Alston's general objection to the anti-acquaintance model given in his 1989 paper, and the appeal of anti-acquaintance models, see Ryan Nichols' (2007) discussion of Reid's "anti-sensationalism". For a brief

acquaintance interpretation, Reid's theory of perception does not, it seems, capture the nature of our perceptual experiences. Moreover, I argue that it is only on the acquaintance interpretation that Reid's theory of perception is truly set apart from the Lockean view, at least under one interpretation of it.[3] Yet, there are critical difficulties with the acquaintance interpretation of Reid's theory of perception, and I think it ultimately fails.

In the last section of chapter 1 I provide some account of why the acquaintance model is a desirable view for Reid if he is taken to offer a theory which is a definitive repudiation of the Lockean view. However, for brevity's sake I omit the detailed treatment of the question of its attractiveness from a contemporary perspective. I do however offer some intuitive considerations in support of the acquaintance model.[4]

The investigation is subdivided into four chapters. In chapter 1, there is a general discussion of the distinction between representational (indirect) realism and direct realism. The acquaintance model of perception is also explicated. These discussions define the central theoretical context of the investigation.[5] In the remainder of chapter 1 I examine Reid's theory in relation to Lockean representationalism. The central Lockean position, namely that we do not perceive external objects directly, or "immediately", should, I claim, be interpreted as the thesis that we are not perceptually acquainted with

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discussion of how Wolterstorff's notion of acquaintance (2001) is a non-starter as an interpretation of Reid, see Buras (2008).

[3] See: J.L. Mackie *Problems from Locke* (1976).

[4] I take advantage of Nicholas Wolterstorff's (2006) remarks on its behalf.

[5] Bluntly, to be acquainted with an object means for that object to be (ontologically) *present* in, and (epistemically) *presented* by one's awareness. For perception to be a matter of acquaintance means that physical mind independent objects are present in and presented by our apprehension of them in the senses previously indicated. I will explicate the general notion of acquaintance in chapter 1 and make further refinements to the notion in chapter 4.

external objects. There is consequently some imperative for the success of the acquaintance interpretation of Reid's position insofar as his position is taken to directly repudiate the central negative claim of Lockean representationalism.

Chapter 2 demonstrates the incompatibility of perceptual acquaintance with Reid's perceptual theory proper, and thus demonstrates the failure of the perceptual acquaintance interpretation of Reid. In chapter 2, I establish the negative thesis that there is no way to understand Reid as having held an acquaintance view of perception, given his nonsubstantivist doctrine of sensation.[6] To this end, I comprehensively consider and systematically eliminate all possible ways to understand Reid as an acquaintance theorist which might conceivably be offered on his behalf.

My objective in chapter 3 is to expose a tension in Reid's theory of perception which results from his doctrine of sensation. A tension exists between Reid's commitment to common sense realism regarding the objectivity of colours, tastes, sounds, smells, and hot/cold, and what is entailed by his doctrine of sensation and connected views regarding these properties. I argue that the common sense realist view on the nature of these properties is inconsistent with Reid's views on these properties, and that his attempt to reconcile his views with common sense on this point fails. This fact should cast serious doubt on his doctrine of sensation, given the supreme methodological importance common sense intuitions play in his philosophy. In conjunction with the desirability of the acquaintance model, chapter 3 should motivate us

[6] I borrow the terminology "nonsubstantive" and "substantive" sensation from a paper by Edward Madden (1986) entitled: "Was Reid a Natural Realist?". This distinction will be discussed in chapter 2 section B. II. Sensation nonsubstantivism is the negative thesis that sensations have no non-reflexive intentional structure. That is, they are not intentionally directed at anything distinct from themselves (e.g., retinal or mental *images*, bodily locations, physical objects).

to find a ground for revising Reid's theory of perception so that it conforms to the acquaintance model.

Chapter 4 offers a provisional groundwork for a modified Reidian acquaintance theory of perception. The chapter begins with three questions: 1) Is there a plausible hypothesis available which explains how Reid's doctrine of sensation is mistaken? 2) If we dispense with Reid's doctrine of sensation, are we left with anything which may properly be called a "Reidian" view?, and 3) Are there other obstacles to an acquaintance interpretation of Reid's theory of perception besides his doctrine of sensation? I provide grounds for answering (1) and (2) in the affirmative, and (3) in the negative, and this constitutes good provisional grounds for a modified Reidian acquaintance view of perception. Here, I rely on a distinction inspired by the contemporary conceptualism/nonconceptualism division. Once it is supposed that perception is a state conceptual acquaintance-type apprehension, then one has a viable explanation of how Reid erroneously arrives at his doctrine of sensation. Likewise, a state conceptualist[7] understanding of perceptual acquaintance is the solution for reinterpreting Reid's analysis of sensation such that its central epistemological significance is preserved. And finally, a state conceptual model of acquaintance resolves some contemporary objections to the perceptual acquaintance interpretation of Reid other than the objection I develop in chapter 2. Thus, what chapter 4 provides is a provisional groundwork for an acquaintance model *reconstruction* of Reid's theory of perception. I am *not* arguing for

[7] State conceptualism is a technical term found in contemporary philosophy of perception (e.g., see: Richard G. Heck Jr. (2000)). I reserve the detailed examination of the distinction between state conceptualism/nonconceptualism for chapter 4. Bluntly, for a mental operation to be "state conceptual" means that one must possess the concepts that accurately characterize the content (object) of that operation in order to undergo the operation.

the acquaintance interpretation of Reid. I establish in chapter 2 that this interpretation fails. What I am providing is a revisionist reconstruction of Reid's theory of perception which preserves essential elements of his theory while at the same time dispenses with what makes his theory inconsistent with the acquaintance model, i.e., his doctrine of sensation. To begin with, it is necessary to have a general understanding of the distinction between two terms which the entire investigation turns on, namely, "sensation" and "perception". This is first on the agenda.

CHAPTER 1: THE CONTEXT OF INVESTIGATION

A) Reid and Direct Realism: An Overview

"Perception" in the context of my discussion may generally be understood as a mental operation which apprehends or grasps presently existing features of physical, mind independent reality. This is a maximally general gloss, and it is in this sense that perception is a principle explanandum for Reid and Locke. The precise nature of this apprehension, and its causal or metaphysical requisites, is the matter at hand.

"Sensation" is a much slipperier notion, at least in philosophical discourse. Sensations are thought to be as ubiquitous as perceptual operations. They are considered mental realities which must be mentioned in the theoretical account of perception, supplying a portion of our subjective experience during perceptual states. However, sensory apprehension, in this context, is, properly speaking, distinct from the apprehension of presently existing objective features of the external world. A *sensation*, in maximally broad terms, is an apprehension of a subjective modification. Through sensation we are conscious of some feature or quality of our state of mind. The experiential quality of pain has traditionally been proposed as the paradigm case of sensation – e.g., the sensation of getting burned – but other types have been proposed which correspond to the five ordinary perceptual modalities. What perception and sensation connote for Reid will be further refined over the course of my discussion, but this general understanding of the terms should suffice for my immediate concerns.

It is standard to classify a perceptual theory under one of two antithetical epistemological categories: the model is either consistent with the "immediacy" of

physical objects in the perceptual relation, or it is not. If the former, then it may be classified under the heading of "direct realism"; if the latter, then the theory may be classified under the heading of "indirect realism" or "representational realism". But this classification is too coarse to track the nuances which define the conversations occurring in the secondary literature on Reid's theory of perception; matters are, predictably, more complicated.

One article in the secondary literature which, I think, holds a key insight into a more sophisticated theoretical approach to the classification of perceptual theories under the categories of direct and indirect realism is a piece by Edward H. Madden (1986). Madden identifies a fallacy in the early Reid commentator Sir William Hamilton's argument against conceiving of Reid's perceptual theory as a species of direct realism. Hamilton contended that the nature of the relation between sensation and perception that Reid asserts undermines perceptual directness.

In characterizing Reid's view, Hamilton writes:

> … [T]he mind, when a material existence is brought into relation with its organ of sense, obtains two concomitant, and immediate, cognitions. Of these, the one is the consciousness (sensation) of certain subjective modifications in us…the other is the consciousness (perception) of certain objective attributes in the external reality itself...Of these cognitions, the former is admitted, on all hands, to be subjective and ideal: the latter, the Natural Realist maintains…to be objective and real. *But it is only objective and real, in so far as it is immediate; and immediate it cannot be if—either, 1. dependent on the former, as its cause or its occasion—or, 2. consequent on it, as on a necessary antecedent. But both of these conditions of a presentative perception Reid and Stewart are seen to violate; and therefore they may be held, virtually, to confess, that their doctrine is one only of representative perception* [my emphasis]. (820)[8]

Thinking that the metaphysical or causal priority of acts of sensation over acts of perception is sufficient to negate *perceptual directness* is misconceived, or at least

[8] *The Works of Thomas Reid, D.D.: Now Fully Collected, With Selections From His Unpublished Letters* (8th edition). 2 Vols. (Edinburgh: Maclachlan and Stewart, 1895).

contentious. To understand this, I have devised two sets of definitions for direct realism and representationalism. If Hamilton's argument is valid, we must think that, in my terminology, the mere *external* indirectness of perception is sufficient to render it representational. That is, representational realism$_2$ below is, according to Hamilton's argument, properly speaking a species of representationalism. Inversely, Hamilton's argument asserts that, in my terminology, the mere *internal* directness of perception is insufficient for direct realism – i.e., that direct realism$_1$ is not a valid form of perceptual directism.

Let me now stipulate two sets of definitions for direct realism and representational realism. The first set is the following:

> ***Direct Realism*$_1$**: the view that there are no *epistemic intermediaries* in perceptual acts; that is to say, no intentional object is interposed between the subject and the perceived object in the act of perception itself (i.e., internal directness).
>
> ***Representational Realism*$_1$**: the view that there *are* epistemic intermediaries intrinsic to the act of perception; that is, in perceptual states, the subject apprehends an intervening object in virtue of which the subject is cognizant of external reality (i.e., internal indirectness).

Representational realism$_1$ has two formulations. First, take its strong formulation, namely, representational realism$_{1.1}$: on this formulation, the intentional relation to external reality is merely transitive. That is, it is only in virtue of apprehending some intervening object which the subject intentionally relates to directly, and which is somehow itself related to the external world, that the subject is related to the external world. The subject here is related to external reality only in virtue of being related to its proxy. The external world is, on this view, apprehended always second hand, as a

mediate object that is never cognized in itself, but always captured only through its image. This is the view Reid takes of Lockean representationalism. Reid writes:

> Modern Philosophers, as well as Peripatetics and Epicureans of old, have conceived, that external objects cannot be the immediate objects of our thought; that there must be some image of them in the mind itself, in which, as in a mirror, they are seen. And the name *idea,* in the philosophical sense of it, is given to those internal and immediate objects of our thoughts. The external thing is the remote or mediate object; but the idea, or image of that object in the mind, is the immediate object, without which we could have no perception, no remembrance, no conception of the mediate object. (EIP, 1. I., pg: 31)

On this view, the act of apprehending external reality is a transitive relation. The subject is immediately related to the idea; the idea, in virtue of resemblance or causal relations (objective relations), is related to the external world; and the subject is transitively related to the external world by being connected to the idea. Ideas or sensations are, on this view, representational intervening entities which are the only immediate objects of cognition. As a result, the external world is always once removed from the subject in its apprehension.[9]

On the second (weak) formulation of representational realism$_1$, i.e., representational realism$_{1.2}$, perception is a compound operation consisting of more than simply the intentional relation to external reality. Rather, an act or state of perception intrinsically contains an act of apprehension intentionally directed towards a subjective modification, something in addition to the apprehension of external reality. Our intentional grasp of external reality here is itself not merely transitive. Rather, in some sense other than the perceptual sense, we are intentionally related to external reality

[9] This is, however, an uncharitable view of Lockean representationalism, as I shall suggest below.

immediately. This is the view of Locke I term "Lockean judgment directism". I will examine this view in the next section.[10]

We might instead adopt a narrower definition of direct realism and a correspondingly broader definition of representational realism.

> ***Direct Realism₂***: the view that perception is *internally direct* – i.e., there are no epistemic intermediaries in acts of perception – *and* is **not** preconditioned (initiated) by an act of apprehension that is distinct from this perception (i.e., external directness).
>
> ***Representational Realism₂***: the view that perception is preconditioned (initiated) by an act of apprehension distinct from the act of perception (i.e., external indirectness**)**.

The difference between direct realism and representational realism, on either of the two sets of definitions, lies in whether or not physical, mind-independent features are *immediate* objects of cognition. However, on one understanding of what it means to be an *immediate* object of cognition, this does not preclude the possibility that the apprehension of subjective modifications is metaphysically or causally prior to the cognition of external reality.

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[10] The resemblance relation between the subjective modification and physical object is a requirement of Lockean representationalism's positive doctrine, and I include it in the figures of representational realism$_{1.1}$ and representational realism$_{1.2}$. My claim is that Reid's theory of perception, understood as structurally identical to representational realism$_2$, is not substantially distinct from representational realism$_{1.2}$, except in a couple negligible respects. The first is the latter's commitment to resemblance (or causal) relations between the physical object and subjective modification (sensation). These resemblance relations are, in representational realism$_1$, supposed to have an epistemological function, according to which the second intentional relation (i.e., the relation to the physical object) is somehow empirically derived from the first (i.e., the relation to the sensation or subjective modification) in virtue of them. The second negligible difference between representational realism$_{1.2}$ and representational realism$_2$, again, the former considered as Locke's view and the latter Reid's, is that Reid offers a nonsubstantive theory of sensation and, presumably (as we shall see), Locke a substantive one. If this is true, then the nature of sensation is a differentiating feature of the two views. Both of these differences are negligible differences, however. The structural similarities of representational realism$_{1.2}$ (i.e., "Lockean judgment directism") and representational realism$_2$ (i.e., Reid's semiotic theory of perception) are made strikingly clear through the figures below. Observe that both have the same structural elements, the only difference is where the boundary of the operation of perception is drawn. If the two are not distinguished by the nature of the intentional relation to the physical object, then their differences seem quite negligible indeed. This will be discussed in section C below.

On the broader notion of representational realism$_2$, representational or indirect perception is compatible with a "two movements" of cognition scenario. On this scenario, in one cognitive act, associated with but distinct from the act of perception, there is an apprehension of internal representations or mere subjective modifications (sensations). This act preconditions or initiates the act of perception. In the second movement, there is the cognition of physical reality, and this alone is the act of perception.[11] However, each movement or act may be called *internally direct*: that is, in each intentional instance, there is no epistemic intermediary between the cognizer and the object of cognition. Rather, one cognitive movement distinct from though annexed to perception immediately intentionally grasps a subjective modification, while the other, utterly distinct *perceptual* act, apprehends external reality. Thus, representational realism$_2$ does not preclude the *internal directness* of our cognition of mind-independent things. That there is some additional intentional act initializing the cognition of external objects is a distinct point from there being an intentional act interposed between the mind and such objects *in its cognition of them* – i.e., an epistemic intermediary. For ease of reference, I shall represent the distinctions diagrammatically in the figures below.

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[11] Depending on one's perceptual theory, one might consider the sensory act and the perceptual act as simultaneous or successive. In the context of interpreting Reid's account of perception, whether sensation and perception are simultaneous, or instead if in the first instance sensation precedes perception is unclear. Todd Buras (2009) argues that "…when Reid describes the etiology of perception, early and late in his career, sensations are sandwiched in between the 'physical impressions' bodily qualities occasion in our central nervous system and the acts of conception and belief constitutive of perception." (334) However, there is at least one passage in which Reid indicates otherwise. Reid writes:

> "The perception and its corresponding sensation are produced at the same time. In our experience we never find them disjoined." (EIP, 2. XVII., pg: 210)

Even if one is constrained into thinking that the sensation and perception are perfectly concurrent, it seems at least prima facie plausible to distinguish the two phenomenologically on the basis of a difference in their respective intentional objects (or lack thereof…).

Figures[12]:

Direct Realism$_1$:



Representational Realism$_1$:

Representational Realism$_{1.1}$: Strong Formulation



[12] Regarding representational realism$_1$, in either variant, I do not rule out that, in principle, some other objective relation between the subjective modification and physical object may be appealed to besides resemblance (e.g., causal relations). Traditionally representational realism has cashed this relation out – at least insofar as it is thought to ground the intentional relation to the physical object – in terms of resemblance.

Representational Realism$_{1.2}$: Weak Formulation



Representational Realism$_2$:



Direct Realism$_2$:



Madden believes that Reid's view of perception, on which perceptual states are innately suggested by sensory apprehension[13] commits him to representational realism$_2$, and this can be observed in his rejoinder to Hamilton's charge. Madden writes:

> Since sensation is the occasion for activating the native perceptual capacity, it is clearly a condition but not an intermediary of perception. Perception, again, is a new mental act utterly different from sensation. (1986, 261)

What Madden's argument against Hamilton thus boils down to (in my terminology) is that representational realism$_2$ is a misnomer, and direct realism$_2$ is an unnecessary qualification on "direct realism". That is, direct realism is properly speaking the thesis that our cognitions of mind-independent things are *internally* direct (i.e., involve no epistemic intermediaries). If representational realism$_2$ does not exclude such internal

[13] The exposition of this view is provided in chapter 2, section B.I.

directness – and it does not – then, by Madden's account, it is not representational realism, but direct realism. Madden presumes that the internal directness of perception is a sufficient condition for classifying Reid's perceptual theory as a case of direct realism. I am inclined to agree.[14] Thus, the semiotic relation between sensation and perception Reid stipulates alone is surely not the issue.

There are some points of contact between this discussion of Reid's direct realism and other commentators' discussions on this topic. I think there is much overlap between Rebecca Copenhaver's article "A Realism for Reid: Mediated but Direct" (2004) and Madden's analysis, though she articulates the point in slightly different terms. She writes:

> …[C]ausal mediation is not the sort [of mediation] to which Reid's direct realism is opposed. Reid opposes the idea that perception requires an internal relation between mediating mental entities and [perceptual] objects…the controversy of Reid's direct realism cannot be settled by deciding whether sensations are signs. Those who understand Reid as a direct realist and those who disagree can agree on this. (72-3)

Copenhaver's point is well taken. I take it that for Reid, sensations are not *constituents* of perceptual apprehension (perception does not instantiate, e.g., representational realism$_{1.1}$ or representational realism$_{1.2}$). Sensations are instead *extrinsically* related to perceptions, and this makes their mediating role unproblematic as far as direct realism goes.

Madden's view of Reid presumes that sensations are *externally* related to perceptions; they are not ingredients in perceptual episodes. Perception is just *triggered* by sensation; the two may occur contemporaneously[15], but are not intrinsically related. Conceiving of sensation and perception as two externally related operations, where

[14] Representational realism$_2$ is classified here under the name "representational realism", but because it does not conflict with direct realism$_1$, this is not a proper classification. We may instead consider it a configuration of direct realism$_1$.
[15] e.g., see: EIP, 2. XVII., pg: 210

sensation has no constitutive involvement in the resulting perceptual event (call this the *accompaniment interpretation*) has its advantages, but it also has its weaknesses. It has the advantage of clearly showing that sensations are not *epistemological* intermediaries of perception. However, it seems not to do justice to our intuition that what is traditionally considered "sensuous content" (appearances of colours, sounds, smells, tastes, hot/cold, and tactile *feel*) are properties of objects of perception. I take it that perceptions appear, from our naïve standpoint, to be virtually filled with so called *sensuous* content.

However, the *accompaniment interpretation* is only one of two potential interpretations of Reid's theory of perception. Another possible interpretation is that sensations for Reid are conceived as "…somehow ingredients in perceptual events…" (Pappas 1990, 763). I will call this the *constitutive interpretation*. George Pappas claims that the textual evidence for determining which account Reid held is inconclusive (1990, 763). The constitutive interpretation permits us to think that perceptual experiences have sensuous content, while the accompaniment interpretation does not (Pappas, 1990, 763). The accompaniment view may be considered an "anti-sensational" theory of perception, and the constitutive interpretation (loosely) a "sensational" theory of perception.[16] Although the accompaniment view may in fact have been Reid's view – and I think it was – there is something amiss about it, at least from the naive or pre-theoretical standpoint. If Reid was in fact committed to the accompaniment view, I think this is a deficiency of his theory, not a virtue.

[16] This phrase is borrowed from Keith DeRose (1989). The view is, loosely, that there is no intrinsic connection between the contents of sensations and our perceptions of external objects. This is tantamount to what I have called "the accompaniment view" since according to anti-sensationalism, sensations are not ingredients in perceptual events.

The problem with an anti-sensational theory of perception is that it strips the world we perceive of all "appearance" properties of colour, sound, smell, hot/cold, etc.. The appearances of colour, sound, smell, and the like, are, if one goes the anti-sensational, accompaniment route, proper only to the operation of sensation, and are as such mere subjective modifications. Thus, they cannot be considered aspects of the figures and bodies we perceive. Once one subtracts the complete illustration of the appearances of colours, sounds, smells, tastes, etc., from the perception of physical objects, what is one left with? I concur with William P. Alston's (1989) sentiments here: a perceptual theory which is anti-sensational leaves the "perceiving" (at least insofar as it is conventionally understood) out of the account altogether. It seems that if perception as Reid has it is anti-sensational, then the phenomenology of perception is reduced to nothing more than the phenomenology of adventitious belief.[17]

Some (e.g., Nichols (2007), Nelkin (1989)) have argued that anti-sensationalism is, in fact, a virtue of Reid's view. Of the various cases they raise in support of this assertion, one that is particularly salient is the clinical case of blindsight. Here, visual tests are done on subjects with some neuro-physiological dysfunction. The dysfunction, so it is claimed, is not in the eye itself, but in the visual system beyond the sense organ. And so, the organ may receive stimulus, yet the stimulus does not, as a result of some deficit in visual processing, produce any (sensory) appearance of colour, light, and in short, visual *appearance* for the subject whatsoever. These subjects, when presented with visual stimuli (e.g., figures, motions) claim not to see anything, yet surprisingly have

[17] i.e., beliefs about external objects that are incorrigible, neither the effect of will nor rational thought.

some degree of accuracy in guessing or choosing which shape, figure, or object was in front of them. It seems, then, that some perceptual registration or contact between the mind and presently existing extra-mental reality is possible in the absence of the conscious awareness of sensuous appearances or properties (e.g., colors). This, it seems, lends some credence to the accompaniment view, and Reid's view so interpreted thus appears to gain some traction from a contemporary perspective. To extrapolate, one might consider perception itself to consist simply of a propositional thought or belief under the appropriate causal context, and then conclude that whatever sensuous content one apprehends, it has no intrinsic (constitutive) connection with this perceptual state. I think this is precisely how Reid's theory of perception is portrayed under the anti-sensationalist interpretation favoured by Nichols and Nelkin.

Now, it is true that the blindsight patient presumably registers (at some level, in some way) the present existence of some external object in his vicinity, without being consciously aware that he does so. This registering of the presence of a physical object occurs without any sensation. However, this perceptual registration also doesn't seem to involve any beliefs. Blindsight patients don't believe that they have perceived an object at all, even though they might behave as if they have. Reid defines perception, in part, if not exclusively, in terms of having certain conscious beliefs about presently existing extra-mental things.[18] The point I am making is that the exclusion of sensory contents from the perceptual operation (i.e., anti-sensationalism) is not totally implausible, and that the clinical case of blindsight seems to lend credence to this hypothesis. Moreover,

[18] e.g., see: EIP, 2.V., pg: 96

if one interprets Reid in anti-sensationalist terms, one possible consequence of this is that perception amounts to no more than the registration of propositional facts or beliefs regarding external objects in one's vicinity. And thus, the only real difference between blindsight perception and Reidian perception so conceived is that in the former this registration is unconscious, and in the latter, it takes the form of conscious belief.

I admit that there is no straightforward recourse to phenomenological considerations to rule out the anti-sensational view of perception. This is largely a result of the concurrent nature of sensation and perception. It is possible for those defending anti-sensationalism to construe the natural appeal to the appearance phenomenology of perceptual experience in defence of a sensational view in terms of a tendency to conflate what is sensed with what is perceived. Indeed, Reid does stress that this sort of fallacy is common.[19] According to the anti-sensationalist, then, what gets misconstrued as the colour appearance of bodies is, in reality, attributable to the sensory operation alone.

However, in my view there is something deeply unsatisfying about thinking that perception is simply adventitious belief under the appropriate subjective and/or objective conditions (modifications). This dissatisfaction lies in a tacit commitment to perception being, if I may now introduce some vocabulary employed in the contemporary discussion[20] with which I engage, *presentationally direct*.

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[19] For example, Reid writes:

> "The perception and its corresponding sensation are produced at the same time. In our experience we never find them disjoined. Hence we are led to consider them as one thing, to give them one name, and to confound their different attributes. It becomes very difficult to separate them in thought, to attend to each by itself, and to attribute nothing to it which belongs to the other." (EIP, 2. XVIII., pg: 210)

[20] e.g., Alston (1989) and Van Cleve (2004).

B) Preliminary Exposition of Perceptual Acquaintance

Presentational direct realism is the thesis that we are *acquainted*[21] with mind-independent, physical objects in our perception of them. Apprehension by acquaintance is in contrast to mere *conceptual* apprehension. Conceptual apprehension is non-intuitive, and is merely the intentional grasping of a thing through an entertaining of its concept or proposition. Merely believing something about material objects, then, is different from their literally *appearing* to us. Apprehension by acquaintance, in contrast to conceptual apprehension, involves, with some metaphysical hand waving here, *encountering* the object *itself*; it is closely related to the notion of *givenness*. It is intuitive, in contrast to "conceptual". The discussion here is multifaceted; however, I think Alston offers a good general definition of presentational directness in the following:

> In our perception an external object is directly 'presented' to our awareness; it is 'given' to consciousness. We are immediately aware of it, as contrasted with just thinking about it, forming a concept of it, or believing something about it. Our awareness of it is 'intuitive' rather than 'discursive'. This is 'knowledge by acquaintance' rather than 'knowledge by description'. (1989, 36)[22]

[21] For more on this notion of acquaintance as it occurs in connection with Reid, see: Nicholas Wolterstorff (2001), 19-22.

[22] Here I follow Alston in his convention of not providing the further subdivision of discursive thought into apprehension by description (indefinite and definite) and apprehension by singular reference (i.e., proper names). Wolterstorff does offer this further dissection in his more detailed discussion of acquaintance and discursive apprehension, calling apprehension by description "conceptual apprehension" and apprehension by proper names "nominative apprehension" (2001, 19-22). However, whether one is speaking of descriptions, or the basic units of reference (proper names), the kind of apprehension one achieves in semantic thought is a matter of "aboutness". Discursive thought has propositional structure and referential content (singular terms) in virtue of which it is about external things, or secures some, as Wolterstorff says, "mental grasp" or apprehension of such things. However, the subdivision of discursive thought may for present purposes be ignored. "Nominative" and "conceptual" apprehension are the types of semantic thought, and we all very well comprehend that merely thinking of things or entertaining propositions of things is a way of appending them that is utterly unlike having the brute awareness of the thing when it is encountered. Thus, I shall use "conceptual" or "discursive" apprehension broadly to cover both referential and denotative thought.

One may here defer to Russell's definition of acquaintance given in his 1910–11 paper "Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description", since the acquaintance model derives from Russell's tradition. He writes:

> I say that I am *acquainted* with an object when I have a direct cognitive relation to that object, i.e., when I am directly aware of the object itself. When I speak of a cognitive relation here, I do not mean the sort of relation which constitutes judgment, but the sort which constitutes presentation. In fact, I think the relation of subject and object which I call acquaintance is simply the converse of the relation of object and subject which constitutes presentation. That is, to say that S has acquaintance with O is essentially the same thing as to say that O is presented to S. (108)

This view should be carefully distinguished from the general category of direct realism, namely, what has been coined by James Van Cleve *perceptual direct realism*. *Perceptual direct realism* is the thesis that perception involves no *epistemological intermediaries*. This is simply the thesis of direct realism$_1$. That is, it is not the case that our awareness of external objects consists of the awareness of something other than those physical objects (e.g., ideas). If perception is acquaintance-type apprehension – i.e., is presentationally direct – then it is likewise perceptually direct. Perception by acquaintance is therefore a species of the broader category of perceptual direct realism; it is one kind of internally direct perception. However, perceptual direct realism can take other forms besides presentational direct realism, insofar as there are distinct types of internally direct apprehension.

The acquaintance model discussed in the contemporary literature on Reid[23] loosely fits the picture of knowledge by acquaintance offered by Russell. It is in the tradition of Russell's knowledge by acquaintance. It does seem, however, that the notion of acquaintance discussed by these Reid scholars differs from Russell's in important

[23] i.e., Alston (1989), Wolterstorff (2001, 2006), Van Cleve (2004), Nichols (2007), Buras (2008)

respects. I shall consider this momentarily. Moreover, it is worth noting that there is a contemporary theory of knowledge by acquaintance which likewise may be considered (loosely) to belong to Russell's tradition. Some of the features of Russell's view of acquaintance preserved in this "acquaintance approach"[24] found in contemporary epistemology are also preserved in the acquaintance model of perception entertained by the abovementioned commentators. As a result, there are points of contact between these two contemporary discussions of acquaintance. It is therefore instructive to contrast Russell's view of acquaintance with the acquaintance model of perception as it occurs in the literature on Reid, and what has been called the acquaintance approach of various contemporary epistemologists. This exercise will also be of use for the purposes of underscoring some of the key features of what an acquaintance view of the perception of physical objects entails. For this reason it will be of assistance to the discussion of later chapters.

A good exposition of the contrast between Russell's theory of acquaintance and the acquaintance approach to which some contemporary epistemologists subscribe is provided by Brie Gertler (2012), an advocate of the contemporary approach.[25] There are notable points of comparison between Russell's theory of acquaintance, as interpreted by Gertler, the notion of perceptual acquaintance entertained in the Reid literature, and the neo-Russellian theory of acquaintance to which Gertler and company subscribe.

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[24] Gertler, B. "Renewed Acquaintance". *in*: *Introspection and Consciousness*. pp. 93-128. (eds.) Smithies, D. and Stoljar, D. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

[25] Other proponents of the view include: Laurence BonJour (2001, 2003), Richard Fumerton (1995, 2001), David Chalmers (2003, 2010), Timothy McGrew (1995, 1999), Ali Hasan (2011, 2013), Evan Fales (1996), Richard Feldman (2004), Paul Moser (1989), and Terry Horgan and Uriah Kriegel (2007).

The first most obvious point to make is that Russell denies that physical objects may be objects of acquaintance. Russell writes:

> When we ask what are the kinds of objects with which we are acquainted, the first and most obvious example is *sense-data*. When I see a colour or hear a noise, I have direct acquaintance with the colour or the noise. (1910-11, 109)

And again, in his concluding remarks, Russell makes the same point:

> We began by distinguishing two sorts of knowledge of objects, namely, knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by *description*. Of these it is only the former that brings the object itself before the mind. We have acquaintance with sense-data, with many universals, and possibly with ourselves, but not with physical objects or other minds. (1910-11, 127)

The acquaintance approach Gertler endorses likewise denies this possibility. For Gertler, acquaintance relations do not obtain in the case of our perception of physical objects. She writes that "…the acquaintance approach is exclusively concerned with introspective knowledge."(95) The acquaintance approach of contemporary epistemology asserts that acquaintance relations obtain in the case of our introspective awareness of phenomenal properties (i.e., instantiations of experiential events). Gertler interprets acquaintance to be incompatible with an acquaintance with physical objects in principle because acquaintance relations are not only *epistemically* but also *metaphysically direct*. On these two conditions, she writes:

> It seems clear that Russellian acquaintance has both an epistemic and a metaphysical dimension. When I am acquainted with an object, my awareness of that object is epistemically direct: it is noninferential and does not epistemically depend on an awareness of anything else. My awareness is also metaphysically direct: there is no object, fact, event, or process that mediates my access to the object. (2012, 95)

According to Gertler, our perception of physical objects is not "metaphysically direct", and this is why, on Russell's and her view of acquaintance, physical objects are not objects of acquaintance. Gertler writes:

> On Russell's view my awareness of the table I see before me is metaphysically indirect; it is mediated by a causal process (involving light reflecting off of the table, striking my retina, and

> causing a visual experience). The presence of this mediating factor enables me to doubt the existence of the table, since I can recognize that, for all I know, my visual experience has an aberrant cause. The idea that awareness can be both metaphysically and epistemically direct is the basis for the acquaintance approach developed here. (2012, 95)

If the acquaintance model of perception entertained in the literature on Reid isn't incoherent in principle, the possibility of being acquainted with physical objects must not be ruled out by the definition of acquaintance. And if acquaintance with physical objects is possible in principle, obviously the metaphysical directness condition must be given a different gloss than the one Gertler offers. As far as I can tell, the problem Gertler's formulation of the metaphysical directness condition poses regarding the possibility of *perceptual* acquaintance has not been addressed by Reid commentators, and I cannot address it on their behalf.[26] Nevertheless, this appears to be a fundamental discrepancy between Russellian acquaintance and Gertler's acquaintance on the one hand, and the acquaintance model of perception entertained by Alston, Wolterstorff, and Van Cleve. On this point, one may observe Gertler's refinement of the metaphysical directness condition. Gertler writes:

> What allows judgments constituting knowledge by acquaintance to be especially strongly justified is that the justification for such judgments is directly tied to the truthmaker [i.e., the object of knowledge]. By contrast, in other types of empirical knowledge (memory, perception, etc.) justification is linked with the truthmaker through a less direct, merely causal relation. Because of this difference, the latter justification is vulnerable to defeaters (such as aberrant causes) from which the former justification is immune. (2012, 115)

Alston and company must construe the metaphysical directness condition of acquaintance relations differently. They must construe it in such a way that it is compatible with the

[26] Though it strikes me that since they take their model of acquaintance from Russell, and they are all therefore surely quite aware that Russell rejects the possibility of physical objects being objects of acquaintance, they must have worked out for themselves some response to this difficulty.

existence of causal intermediaries, since there are (as everyone admits) causal intermediaries in our perception of physical objects.

We might construe the "metaphysical directness" condition as the *ontological* condition of acquaintance. The language of "presentation" here is helpful, since it captures both the epistemic condition and ontological condition of acquaintance. Objects of acquaintance must be *present* in an ontological sense within their apprehension. There must be an encountering of the object ontologically, in itself. But it must likewise be *presented* by that awareness, i.e., its (ontological) presence is immediately epistemologically accessible. One sees this distinction in Gertler's following remarks on the nature of acquaintance in Russell. Gertler writes:

> The best way to identify Russell's epistemological position as regards knowledge by acquaintance is to ask what makes acquaintance with an object sufficient for knowing the object. That is, what makes this relation to an object truly epistemic rather than, say, a matter of brutely metaphysical contact with the object? Russell's answer seems to be that acquaintance with an object involves—or perhaps simply consists in—that object's being *immediately present to consciousness*, where such presence is an epistemic matter. This is not very illuminating as an analysis of acquaintance. But the salient point for our purposes is that Russellian knowledge by acquaintance is epistemically grounded exclusively in the presence of certain objects to consciousness. (2012, 97-8)

Reconsider the table example. Here, if one is to be acquainted with the table, it itself must be ontologically present within awareness, but also presented by awareness, or made immediately epistemologically accessible by such awareness.

Gertler thinks one of Russell's criteria for metaphysical directness is an indubitability condition: one cannot doubt the existence of objects of metaphysically direct apprehension (2012, 95). If the table is ontologically encountered within my awareness of the table, then, if its presence is directly epistemically accessible, I have *apodictic certainty* of its existence. If the causal intermediaries of perception undermine

metaphysical directness, this amounts to doubt that physical objects are ontologically *present* in perception. This may be explained in the following way: since the awareness of the table depends on a causal intermediary, it seems we cannot be sure that the table exists, since what is in our awareness is something that is *generated* from the causes of perception. It cannot be the table itself, it seems, because it is unintelligible that the table itself is reproduced in our awareness in virtue of the causes of perception. Rather, the table exists independently of the causes of perception, under its own network of causal conditions. There seems to be, then, in virtue of the causal intermediaries of perception, a division of the table itself from that which is the immediate object of perception. The immediate object is, it seems, something generated from causes other than those producing the table.

However, this is only true on the assumption that the causal conditions of perception themselves produce or generate the object that is ontologically present to awareness. Perhaps, instead, the causal conditions of perception do not produce the immediate object of perception itself, but rather produce a mere (transparent) medium through which we apprehend the physical object. On this alternative hypothesis, I see no reason why such causal intermediaries need undermine the brute ontological presence of physical objects in perception. This alternative hypothesis may be appealed to by Alston and company in order to make the metaphysical directness condition of acquaintance compatible with the existence of causal intermediaries.

Finally, suppose, as Gertler suggests, that metaphysical directness entails the elimination of doubt regarding the existence of the object of acquaintance. So, recall the

two metaphysical alternatives proposed above: 1) the causal intermediaries of perception are the generative conditions of the immediate object of perception itself, or 2) the causal intermediaries generate a (transparent) medium by which the external object is conveyed to awareness. The sceptic may place his doubt on the disjunction of these two possibilities. Thus, one might urge that we have no way of knowing whether (1) or (2) is true, and therefore, since only if we know (2) obtains can we rule out the problem of aberrant causes, we can doubt the external object's existence. However, if the sceptic is consistent in his doubt, he'll admit that we likewise cannot know whether or not the external object is ontologically given. But if this is the case, then we have already tacitly admitted as a logical possibility that the existence of the external object may be doubted and yet the object be ontologically given. If indubitability is a necessary condition of metaphysical directness, and we are engaged in doubting the existence of the external object, it follows that the apprehension of the external object cannot be metaphysically direct. But, doubt cuts both ways. For all we know, (2) might be true. Thus, I think we have good reason to suppose that the ontological givenness of the external object in awareness component of metaphysical directness is extricable from an indubitability criterion.

I therefore propose that it is one thing to be acquainted with something, and quite another to *know* that one is acquainted with it, and inversely, that it is possible to question the existence of an object while being acquainted with it. In other words, I think Russell's indubitability criterion of metaphysical directness is inessential, and that

therefore acquaintance with external objects is not ruled out just because we are able to doubt their existence.

There is a second crucial matter that requires attention, and it involves the nature of the, in Gertler's words, "…intersection between phenomenal reality and my [epistemic] grasp thereof." (2012, 121) This is the defining characteristic of knowledge by acquaintance. Gertler writes:

> … [A] central and distinctive component of Russell's theory [of knowledge by acquaintance] will be preserved if reality intersects with the epistemic to some extent. (2012, 125)

According to Gertler, the acquaintance approach of contemporary epistemology diverges from Russell's view in its construal of the nature of this intersection. Gertler writes:

> The acquaintance approach takes introspective knowledge to consist in occurrent judgments, whereas on Russell's theory knowledge by acquaintance is a nonpropositional knowledge of things. (2012, 95)

I think Alston and company follow Russell's tradition of acquaintance insofar as they consider acquaintance to be a non-propositional awareness. For instance, Alston writes:

> Presentational directness…has to do with a non-conceptual, non-propositional mode of awareness. (1989, 36-7).[27]

Somehow, then, on this traditional formulation, acquaintance does not involve an act of belief or judgment. Recall Gertler remarks on this point:

> On Russell's view knowledge by acquaintance does not consist in belief or, for that matter, anything that bears a truth value… Russell's answer seems to be that acquaintance with an object involves—or perhaps simply consists in—that object's being *immediately present to consciousness*, where such presence is an epistemic matter. This is not very illuminating as an analysis of acquaintance. But the salient point for our purposes is that Russellian knowledge by acquaintance is epistemically grounded exclusively in the presence of certain objects to consciousness (2012, 97-8)

[27] In chapter 4 I will provide reasons for considering Wolterstorff as advocating the same view, and a more detailed examination of the nature of the traditional and contemporary acquaintance views.

Thus, one may say that whereas for Russell, the intersection of "reality with the epistemic" exists between the reality given or presented and the subject full stop – without any act of judgment – reality and the epistemic, for Gertler and company, "…intersect in a judgment." (2012, 125)

Returning to my previous discussion, it is precisely acquaintance-type apprehension that seems to be missing in the blindsight case. Blindsight involves no intermediaries within the act of apprehension, and is thus consistent with *perceptual* direct realism, but the apprehension appears entirely discursive, a bare registration of propositional fact. But normal perception, I contend, is *not* just a discursive state, whether this is some unconscious registration of propositional fact or a conscious belief state. Rather, it involves some real encountering, where the object "appears" to us, or is there in itself as a sort of brute presence within our (conscious) perceptual field.[28]

[28] Perceptual acquaintance as it is used in the Reid literature I engage is defined as some form of conscious apprehension (e.g., see Wolterstorff (2006)), and so, the possibility of unconscious acquaintance is ruled out by definition. However, even if one allows that an unconscious perceptual acquaintance is possible in principle, this possibility surely has no bearing on Reid's theory of perception, since Reid categorically repudiates the possibility of unconscious mental operations. Reid writes:

> "As consciousness is the only power by which we discern the operations of our own minds, or can form any notion of them, an operation of mind of which we are not conscious, is, we know not what; and to call such an operation by the name of perception, is an abuse of language…What men are not conscious of, cannot therefore, without impropriety, be called either perception or thought of any kind." (EIP, 2. XV., pg: 191)

Thus, for my present purposes, this possibility can be ignored. But if I am forced to respond to the possibility that perceptual acquaintance might occur unconsciously – and that perhaps blindsight is an example of this – then I think I have available the following sort of response. Yes, perhaps it is possible for the object of perception to be ontologically present to the mind at an unconscious level, but it seems less likely that this ontological presence may meaningfully "intersect" with the epistemological without this intersection occurring at a conscious level. That is, it seems likely that unconscious mental operations might satisfy the ontological condition of presentation, namely the presence of the object itself is *in* the unconscious awareness, but not the epistemological condition, namely, that the object is *presented* by this awareness.

At most, the phenomenon of blindsight demonstrates that there is a registration of propositional fact that is associated with the excitation of the sense organ which is entirely independent of the intuitive appearances normally following these excitations. But we might think that ordinary perception consists not merely, or not at all, of the original propositional content or belief of visual perception, but the brute appearance of the object. And if we do, then a purely discursive, or anti-acquaintance model of perception leaves the "seeing" out of account altogether.

After concluding that Reid's theory of perception is inconsistent with an acquaintance model of perception, Wolterstorff (2006) explains why he thinks anti-acquaintance models are generally problematic, and I share his intuitions on the matter. He writes:

> The perceiving self, on Reid's account, is almost empty of attentive awareness [for Wolterstorff this is a synonym for acquaintance (see: 2006, 113)]. This cannot be right, can it? Surely it is the case that when we perceive, there is a rich array of phenomenal content to which we attend. Something has gone wrong. No reader of my book can be oblivious to my admiration for Reid. But we will have to think for ourselves if we are to achieve a fully satisfactory theory of perception. There will be much to take over from Reid's theory along the way. But we cannot just take over Reid's theory. If the theory were true, we would be much less attentive when we perceive than we are. (2006, 124)[29]

Alston (1989) also provides us with an argument against the intelligibility of considering Reidian perception as presentational, and I agree with his thesis. However, he does not, as we shall see, go far enough, since his argument hinges on the mere externality of perception from sensation. On the basis of a suggestion raised to him by George Pappas, he asserts that if the boundaries between the two operations were to be

[29] Van Cleve (2011, 293-5) offers his own remarks on the deficiencies of Reid's theory of perception which, given that their comprehension presupposes a background of exposition that I offer later on, I will only mention here. For reasons that will become clear in subsequent discussion, his remarks reflect the view that perception is a matter of acquaintance.

capable of being blurred, then we could make Reid's theory consistent with presentational direct realism. In contrast, I argue that there is a more fundamental conflict at play between Reid's theory and presentational direct realism. *There is simply no reconciling Reid's view of sensation per se with the presentational directness of perception*, even if the lines between perception and sensation are softened. Chapter 2 is a systematic and comprehensive explanation of why this is so. As far as I have seen, there is no such treatment found in the secondary literature. The story is complicated, but to put it crassly, presentational direct realism presupposes that sensuous properties play a critical role in perceptual relations, and this role is undermined by Reid's doctrine of sensation.

In the last two sections I have explicated the general framework of inquiry for this dissertation. I have distinguished the various forms of direct realism and representational realism, and have suggested that Reid *can* be considered a direct realist. This is so insofar as direct realism merely affirms the internal directness of our intentional relation to external objects. The real matter concerns what *species* of direct realism Reid's theory of perception exemplifies. Direct realist theories of perception may be subdivided into mere perceptual direct realist views, and presentational direct realist (i.e., acquaintance) views. The acquaintance model was further articulated via a comparative exposition of the traditional acquaintance view of Russell, the contemporary neo-Russellian acquaintance approach of Gertler, and the perceptual acquaintance model entertained by Alston and company. I discussed some of the difficulties which emerge regarding the possibility of perceptual acquaintance given the views of Russell and Gertler, and show

how such difficulties may be overcome. Finally, the clinical case of blindsight was discussed in relation to the acquaintance model of perception. Acquaintance views are, I contend along with Wolterstorff, better suited to capture our naïve views on the nature of perceptual experience. These remarks are meant to provide some initial motivation for pursuing the acquaintance interpretation of Reid's theory of perception. Next I will strengthen the case for pursuing this interpretation.

C) The Motivation for the Acquaintance Interpretation of Reid

I have suggested that we have some intuitive grounds for preferring acquaintance over anti-acquaintance models of perception, and that an acquaintance interpretation of Reid is preferable. As we have seen, such intuitions are appealed to by some of the commentators who entertain the acquaintance interpretation of Reid. However, as far as I can tell, there has not been much more in the way of a rationale offered for pursuing the acquaintance interpretation of Reid by these commentators.[30] For the most part, they seem content with the task of determining whether the acquaintance interpretation is coherent, leaving aside the matter of what makes the success of this interpretation important. Thus, I will now seek the most persuasive sort of ground for pursuing this interpretation, namely some *internal* rationale. That is, I will now attempt to construct a rationale for pursuing the acquaintance interpretation of Reid out of textual considerations, or using theoretical resources from his own conceptual context.

To understand why Reid's own theoretical context should compel him to endorse the acquaintance model of perception, one must understand how Reid conceives of the

[30] e.g., Alston (1989), Wolterstorff (2001, 2006), Van Cleve (2004).

diametrical opposition of his views on perceptual immediacy with those of the Lockean representationalists. The Lockean representationalist, according to Reid, maintains that any perceptual immediacy requires a contiguity of mind and object. For the Lockean representationalist, perceptual immediacy is ruled out on the basis of metaphysical dualism. Reid takes himself to offer a position that any proponent of the Lockean thesis that perception is indirect must categorically deny. The considerations of this section suggest that, under an anti-acquaintance interpretation of Reid, a Lockean indirectist should not be all that distressed by Reid's counter-thesis that perception is direct.

First, though, I will address a preliminary issue regarding the acquaintance model in relation to Reid. One might ask: "Are we not committing some objectionable anachronism by pursuing the matter of acquaintance in Reid?" Much of the contemporary literature on Reid threatens to supply an extraneous dimension of analysis to his theory here. Attempting to reformulate Reid's views in the terminology of contemporary philosophy might, in fact, lead to the distortion of those views.

There are grounds to consider that the acquaintance interpretation of Reid is fundamentally misconceived. The acquaintance interpretation posits some technical notion of intuitive givenness, and it is in terms of this notion of intuition that perceptual immediacy is explicated. However, Reid takes the relation of immediacy in perception as logically primitive, incapable of being further analyzed under more fundamental categories. Perceptual apprehension – like all apprehension – is fundamentally inexplicable, logically primitive (at least as far as we know…), and hence mysterious.

Reid writes:

> Logicians define 'simple apprehension' to be the bare conception of a thing without any judgment or belief about it. If this were intended for a strictly logical definition, it might be a just objection to it, that conception and apprehension are only synonymous words; and that we may as well define conception by apprehension, as apprehension by conception; but it ought to be remembered, that the most simple operations of the mind cannot be logically defined. To have a distinct notion of them, we must attend to them as we feel them in our own minds. He that would have a distinct notion of a scarlet colour, will never attain it by a definition; he must set it before his eye, attend to it, compare it with the colours that come nearest to it, and observe the specific difference, which he will in vain attempt to define. (EIP, 4. I., pg: 295)

In *Oration III*, we observe related considerations regarding the definition of simple operations of mind. Reid writes:

> …[T]here are many activities relating to the human mind of which we will try only in vain to render an account. How the mind thinks, in what way it is conscious of its thoughts and operations, completely escapes us. By no hypothesis shall we be able to explain or to give an account of these faculties. Surely, therefore, the same statement must be made about the perception of external things and the memory of objects that have passed away. Surely these faculties are, in truth, primary and simple, not composed of, nor to be reduced to, other faculties but implanted in our minds by God who is mightiest and best and to be exercised according to the laws and within the limits established by him. For in the mind, no less than in the material world, there are first principles of which no explanation can be given; there are other secondary principles that have arisen from and are bound with the first principles and that are to be brought to light by analysis. (60)

Whatever perceptual apprehension ("conception") is for Reid, it seems it is an offense to try to classify it under more general categories or types, as if defining it could provide us with any further clarification. It seems that on Reid's account, the analysis of the notion of immediacy into discursive and intuitive kinds cannot offer any further explication of intentional relations. It seems that at most, one may compare species of conception in virtue of phenomenological kinds, but not in virtue of hard-lined analytical divisions.

Nevertheless, the fact that there is some push in the literature to assess Reid's view in terms of this dichotomy of intuition and conceptual or discursive apprehension[31] makes my discussion of the matter tolerable, at least to those interested in contemporary

[31] e.g., Alston (1989), Wolterstorff (2001, 2006), Van Cleve (2004).

literature on Reid. My goal is to determine the coherence of a contemporary interpretation of Reid's views. Therefore, I will bracket off the matter of the apparent tension between Reid's views on the logical primacy of intentionality and the discursive/intuitive apprehension distinction. For the sake of argument, let us suppose that there is some (overlooked) reply to this difficulty available to the acquaintance model interpreter. Otherwise, this interpretation is ruled out in the first instance by the logical primacy of perceptual conception.

If one is to analyze the nature of perceptual immediacy in relation to the more recent technical notion of acquaintance, this may lead to an uncomplimentary picture of Reid. Reid considers his theory of perception to be diametrically opposed to the accounts given by his idea theorist adversaries (e.g., Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume). Whereas the idea theorists take "ideas" to be the only immediate objects of perception, Reid takes the physical objects themselves to be the immediate objects of perception. However, the intricacies of Reid's metaphysical views do not make the matter easily handled. If Reid did not subscribe to an acquaintance theory of perception, his perceptual account does not substantially challenge the Lockean claim that physical objects are *not* immediate objects of perception. Reid merely calls "perception" what one may, as a sort of immediacy purist[32], call *perceptual belief*. I submit that Reid's theory of perception must be consistent with the acquaintance model if he offers an account which disturbs the

[32] There is particular ambivalence in the contemporary literature on Reid on the attractiveness of the sensational/acquaintance view; it has been considered both empirically falsified and dogmatic (see: Nichols, 2007; Nelken, 1989). There is much to say about the attractiveness of defining perception as intuitive and sensational; but this is another matter. My thesis proceeds on the assumption that intuition is required for perceptual acquaintance; whether or not one dismisses the relevance of perception by means of such acquaintance altogether is another matter entirely.

Lockean thesis that the immediate objects of perception are not the external objects. Otherwise, it appears that Reid attacks this thesis in name only, or at a superficial level.[33]

The following concluding remarks of Alston's (1989) paper on Reid capture precisely the sort of rejoinder open to someone defending the Lockean negative position that external objects are *not* the immediate objects of perception. However, this rejoinder is only open if perception for Reid is not a matter of acquaintance. Alston writes:

> If perception according to Reid is solely a way of believing, then Reid has not only left no room for a direct perception of external objects; he has left perception out of account altogether. For perception is distinguished from thinking and believing precisely by incorporating an intuitive, sensory element…So Reid has escaped a representational, ideational theory of perception only by talking about something else [i.e., something else other than perception] altogether. (38)

According to this objection, Reid's perceptual theory does not substantially undermine the thesis that perception is indirect. This is so, since it would not assert that we are immediately acquainted with external objects through *perception*, but only that such objects are the immediate objects of *belief*. It is rather uncontroversial to suppose the aboutness relation of belief involves a different, weaker, sense of immediacy than immediacy in the acquaintance sense. As a result, using the contemporary distinction between acquaintance and mere discursive apprehension, the central Lockean indirectist position might be shuffled to accommodate Reid's critique. This is because the Lockean may reduce Reid's claim of perceptual immediacy to a triviality: Reid claims no more than that our perceptual beliefs are *about* the external objects themselves. But this is not a matter of perceptual immediacy, the Lockean might say, something which involves an intuitive apprehension of the object, and not merely the apprehension involved in belief. Therefore, Reid's "perceptual" immediacy may be considered to not really disrupt the

[33] Recall the structural comparison of figures for representational realism$_{1,2}$ and representational realism$_2$.

Lockean from his negative position that the immediate objects of perception are not the external things themselves. One may better understand this rejoinder open to the Lockean by providing a general account of the Lockean position Reid has in mind, and by making use of an insight found in J.L. Mackie's, *Problems from Locke*.

First let me make clear that I am not suggesting that Locke, as Reid conceives him, is immune to Reid's critique of the theory of ideas, or at least, the cogency of this critique is a separate matter from what I am discussing here. It may well be that Reid's Lockean representationalist is forced by Reid's critique of ideas to reject the correspondence theory of perception and any relevance of "ideas" conceived as *epistemic intermediaries*. In short, Locke's positive claims about the nature of perception may well be undermined by Reid's critique of the theory of ideas. On Reid's understanding of Lockean representational theory of mind, Locke presumes that resemblance relations like pictorial relations between a thing and its image exist between intra-mental objects (ideas) and their physical correlates. This correspondence relation between the ideas and the physical things purportedly grounds our mediate apprehension of these outer things. Locke writes:

> It is evident that the mind does not know things immediately, but only by the intervention of the ideas it has of them. Our knowledge therefore is real only so far as there is a conformity between our ideas and the reality of things. (EHU, 4. IV. 3., pg: 96)

The ideas, on this view, are immediately available to the mind while the extra mental entities are the *mediate* objects. But the posited correspondence relation between ideas and physical things, and the epistemological relevance of intermediary "ideas", is, quite

plausibly, undermined by Reid's critique. Rather, I claim that it is the central *negative* position of the Lockean representationalist which remains fundamentally undisturbed.

In the following passage of the EIP, Reid sets out the central thesis of the theory of ideas, as he understands it. He writes:

> Modern Philosophers, as well as Peripatetics and Epicureans of old, have conceived, that external objects cannot be the immediate objects of our thought; that there must be some image of them in the mind itself, in which, as in a mirror, they are seen. And the name *idea,* in the philosophical sense of it, is given to those internal and immediate objects of our thoughts. The external thing is the remote or mediate object; but the idea, or image of that object in the mind, is the immediate object, without which we could have no perception, no remembrance, no conception of the mediate object. (EIP, 1. I., pg: 31)

And in *Oration III*, Reid writes:

> There is an old belief accepted, as far as I know, by all ancient and modern philosophers, namely, that the human mind does not immediately perceive objects that are external and absent but perceives them through certain images or likenesses depicted in the mind that are called ideas. Whatever men think, about whatever thing they reason or pass judgment, these philosophers contend that ideas existing in the mind itself are the immediate and nearest object of thought. Plato asserts that ideas of all things have existed in the Divine Mind from eternity. Malebranche, a most shrewd philosopher, and his followers maintain that we perceive all things in God by contemplating the ideas in the Divine Mind in as far as God wishes to reveal them to us. The rest of the philosophers believe that the ideas by which we perceive things exist in the human mind itself. All Platonists, Peripatetics, and Cartesians, Malebranche, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume agree that no perception is possible without ideas. (58)

As one can observe, Reid attributes this view wholesale to the modern philosophers to whom he is referring, including Locke. Reid might here refer to Locke's opening remarks in Book 2 of his *Essay*, in which he writes: "Idea is the object of thinking." (2. II. 1., pg: 17). Reid provides other examples of Locke's remarks on ideas which, he thinks, commit Locke to the view that "…every object of thought must be an idea, and can be nothing else."[34] However, I will show that this is not true of our imaginary Lockean interlocutor. This is because for the Lockean, aboutness relations of belief and judgment are a type of intentional relation which, unlike acquaintance relations, imply no

[34] This discussion occurs in EIP, 2. IX., pg: 133.

contiguity of mind and object, and thus do not imply object-ideas. Reid was in fact cognizant of this possibility in Locke, as is clear by his further remarks on the same page. He writes:

> I am persuaded that Mr LOCKE would have acknowledged, that we may think of ALEXANDER the GREAT, or of the planet Jupiter, and of numberless things, which he would have owned are not ideas in the mind, but objects which exist independent of the mind that thinks them. How shall we reconcile the two parts of this apparent contradiction? All I am able to say upon Mr LOCKE's principles to reconcile them, is this, That we cannot think of ALEXANDER, or of the planet Jupiter, unless we have in our minds an idea, that is, an image or picture of those objects….But instead of giving light to the question proposed, it seems to involve it in greater darkness. (EIP, 2. IX., pg: 133)

By interpreting Lockean perceptual immediacy as an acquaintance relation, one comes closer to dissolving this apparent contradiction Reid notes in Locke's view. If Locke's dictum that ideas are the only immediate objects of thought is taken without qualification, then one must admit that intentionality is never internally direct except in the case of our apprehension of the ideas themselves. Therefore, it seems on this interpretation, Locke subscribes to representational realism$_{1.1}$ as an accurate representation for thought in general. On this view, extra-mental realities are grasped only transitively, not only in perception but in all other operations of thought. The representational realist$^{1.2}$ interpretation of Locke holds that in perception there is an internally direct relation to extra-mental reality vis-à-vis the operation of judgment. If Locke's dictum that ideas are the only immediate objects of thought only pertains to acquaintance-type immediacy, then it is consistent with our having direct intentional relations to extra-mental reality, even if such realities are never (perceptually) "immediate" to the mind.

For Reid's Locke, ideas are (substantive[35]) mental entities, intra-mental *objects* that serve as the immediate objects of our cognition. They are objects which are in contiguity with the cognitive operation through which they are apprehended insofar as they are a non-reflexive object (i.e., the object is not the act of apprehension itself). But they are also not those things normally taken as the intentional objects of most, if not all, of our cognitive operations – i.e., extra-mental realities: things, events, places, and facts, what have you. Rather, they are some fourth term, as Reid goes onto write, something in addition to those three things which are ordinarily thought to be implied by cognition or thought generally, namely, "…a mind that thinks; an act of that mind which we call thinking, and an object about which we think." (EIP, 1.I., pg: 31)[36]

Reid thinks that the idea theorist's reason for introducing intervening ideas is the supposition that perception implies contiguity of mind and object. The central motivation behind the idea theorists' invention of ideas is that they regard intentional contact as analogous to physical contact. They maintain (falsely, according to Reid) that perception involves the mind acting on the object, or the object acting on the mind. Since action cannot take place at a distance, this implies that the mind and its object in perception are contiguous (see: EIP, 2. XIV., pg: 176-7) – i.e., that they are literally side by side. Reid writes:

> Whether, therefore, you say that perception is the action of the perceived thing on the mind or of the mind on the perceived thing, it is necessary that the mind and the object be together both in time and place in order that the object can be perceived immediately, since otherwise they cannot mutually affect each other. (*Oration III*, 64)

[35] This will be explicated shortly. For my discussion of sensation substantivism, see chapter 2 sec. B.II. below.
[36] See: EIP, 2. II., pg: 163

On the basis of this model, since, given mind/body dualism, physical objects cannot be contiguous with the mind, the idea theorists postulate the existence of something which can, namely object-ideas. However, Reid calls into question the explanatory value of such contiguity between mind and object within an account intentionality. He writes:

> [T]hough we are conscious of perceiving objects, we are altogether ignorant how it is brought about; and we know as little how we perceive objects as how we were made. And if we should admit an image in the mind, or contiguous to it, we know as little how perception may be produced by this image as by the most distant object. (EIP, 2. XIV., pg: 178)

And again,

> This power of perceiving ideas is as inexplicable as any of the powers explained by it: And the contiguity of the object contributes nothing at all to make it better understood, because there appears no connection between contiguity and perception, but what is grounded on prejudices… (EIP, 2. XIV., pg: 185)

Reid therefore repudiates idea theory. On Reid's model, there are no non-reflexive intentional objects of cognition that are not either just those mental operations which are apprehending the extra-mental things or the extra-mental objects of those operations.

However, if one considers in more detail what the Lockean idea theorist is committed to, one finds that the intentional relation we have to ideas based on their model is quite plausibly considered an exemplary case of acquaintance. If anything is to count as an acquaintance relation, surely it is that relation we have to the original sensory contents or ideas which for the idea theorist stand as the immediate objects of cognition. Perhaps for this reason, Wolterstorff (2001) holds that the acquaintance model is at the heart of the *Way of Ideas*. He writes:

> In contrast to those present-day theorists who profess to deny all presence, the seventeenth and eighteenth century proponents of the Way of Ideas unambiguously held that items of reality are presented to each of us for our acquaintance. However, from within the totality of reality, only items of a few, very limited, sorts can ever be present to any of us. Assuming the tenability of the ontological distinction between mental entities and all others, the Way of Ideas held that, at any moment, that with which one has acquaintance consists at most of oneself, of one's present mental acts and objects, and of those of one's present mental states that one is then actively aware of—

> along with various facts, contingent and necessary, consisting of the interrelationships of these. (24)

I am not particularly concerned about the accuracy of the idea theory interpretation of Locke, since here I am talking about Reid's Locke. Thus, for present purposes one can assume that Locke was committed to both substantive ideas and the negative thesis that external things are not the immediate objects of perception. My point is that the Lockean view of the intentional relation we have to original sensory (or perhaps even reflective) contents or ideas is quite plausibly consistent with an acquaintance model of intentionality.[37] Moreover, it is not unintelligible for the interpreter of Locke to consider that precisely this type of relation is what is being denied in the claim that external objects are not immediately given in perception. These affectations or substantive ideal entities are immediately encountered, or *presented* to us in, to appropriate some provocative Lockean terminology, "the mind's presence room" (EHU, 2. III., 1, pg: 23); somewhere where physical objects are not. The locus of presentation is internal, and we never immediately encounter physical objects as brute ontological presences.

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[37] It is interesting that in his 1910-11 paper "Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description", Russell writes that "[w]hen we ask what are the kinds of objects with which we are acquainted, the first and most obvious example is *sense-data*. When I see a colour or hear a noise, I have direct acquaintance with the colour or the noise. (109). In the conclusion, Russell writes:

> "We began by distinguishing two sorts of knowledge of objects, namely, knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by *description*. Of these it is only the former that brings the object itself before the mind. We have acquaintance with sense-data, with many universals, and possibly with ourselves, but not with physical objects or other minds." (127)

The nature of Russell's sense-data is a complicated matter too dense to be discussed here. Nevertheless, there is a striking fit in this passage from Russell's 1910-11 paper with Wolterstorff's description of the *Way of Ideas* given above, which suggests that drawing parallels between Russell and Locke here is not entirely absurd.

Reid's Locke affirms that physical objects are not "immediate" objects of perceptual relations in the sense that *ideas* are immediate objects to the mind. That is, we are intimately *acquainted* with ideas only, and not with external objects at all. The Lockean asserts this on the supposition that acquaintance-type immediacy presupposes contiguity between mind and object. If Reid's claim that perception is direct does not imply that external objects are immediately present to the mind in the acquaintance sense, then his claim that we directly perceive external objects appears to the Lockean to be more bark than bite.

First, suppose the Lockean, by force of Reid's critique of ideas, must abandon the existence of ideas. This does not remove him from a more basic commitment, namely, that the mind's relation to, *per impossible*, ideas is exemplary of perceptual immediacy. Whatever is (perceptually) "immediate" to the mind, he may urge, can only be something contiguous with the mind, and only ideas, mental images, or things like them in the relevant respect fit this bill. It is entirely open for the representationalist to admit the inexistence of ideas and thus denounce the positive content of his doctrine, while maintaining the central negative thesis that physical objects are not "immediate", in his sense of the word, in perception. If there is nothing like the apprehension of substantive ideas, then in virtue of the contiguity considerations, *no* object is, for the representationalist, ever immediate to the mind. It therefore seems to me that the central negative claim of the Lockean representationalist goes fundamentally unchallenged by Reid's critique of ideas. The Lockean denies the immediacy of physical objects in perception, and this he takes himself to do consistently on the basis of his mind/body

dualism. Reid asserts that they are "immediate", but is talking about something else entirely.

Here, I wish to bring attention to what J.L. Mackie says in his *Problems from Locke* (1976) regarding the Representationalist thesis that perception of external things is indirect. Providing a more palatable interpretation of this thesis that perception is indirect, or that the immediate objects of perception are not the extra mental things themselves, Mackie writes:

> …[W]e do not normally make judgements (verbal or non-verbal) about what retinal images etc. we have and thence infer, by some explicit process of reasoning, what the outside world is like. Our naïve judgements are already about external things, and, I imagine, were so already before we learned to speak. We can sum up the truth of this matter by saying *that our perceptions of material things are causally mediated but judgementally direct* [my emphasis]. (43)

This is, with some parsing, the sort of strategy our Lockean may employ against Reid, on any anti-acquaintance interpretation of Reid's view. Accordingly, Locke may be understood as offering an instance of a perceptual theory represented by figure *representational realism*$_{1.2}$.[38] If Reid reduces perception to the original beliefs or naive *judgments* about physical objects we have during perception, then Reid's view that we

[38] Admittedly, Mackie's point regarding judgment directism is phrased in terms of causal intermediaries, the paradigmatic case of which is retinal images. However, Mackie's point has a more general scope than he indicates, as much the same point may be made in the case of epistemic intermediaries (e.g., sensory ideas). Mackie suggests that retinal images and the other causal intermediaries of perception are not ordinarily the objects of perceptual belief, but rather the external objects are. By the same token, it is plausible that although sensory ideas are, for Locke, the first intentional objects in perceptual relations, our default perceptual beliefs are nevertheless about external reality, and not intra-mental sensory ideas. I take it that perceptual beliefs may be epistemically derived from sensory ideas, but that these beliefs are not about sensory ideas. Thus, I take the liberty of here offering in place of Mackie's formulation of representationalism, which holds that our perceptions are *causally* mediated but judgmentally direct, a similar though distinct representationalist thesis, namely, that our perceptions are *epistemically* mediated but judgementally direct. This is just to say that, in my terminology, our perceptual beliefs are an internally direct form of apprehension. Locke's section *Of Perception* (EHU, 2. IX., pg: 31-3) strikes me as consistent with this suggestion; for instance, how else, under Locke's view, could we explain the perception of things in three dimensions through vision except by endorsing this judgmentalist thesis?

are "immediately" intentionally directed to extra mental reality is a non-issue. Beliefs are uncontroversially *about* extra mental reality. But this reality, given the above assumption that acquaintance presupposes contiguity between mind and object, is never immediately *present*. External reality is only ever apprehended conceptually, not intuitively.

Imagine a dialogue between Reid and Locke on this point.

> **Locke**: "External objects are not immediate objects of perception, because we are not acquainted with them, and we are not acquainted with them because this presupposes contiguity between the mental and the physical. Such contiguity is unintelligible on the basis of mind/body dualism."

<Here Reid has two conceivable responses>

> 1) **Reid**: "External objects *are* immediate objects of perception, because we are acquainted with them, and your assumption that acquaintance presupposes contiguity between object and mind is false."<On this alternative, Reid is in a real or substantial tension with Locke's indirectism.>

OR

> 2) **Reid**: "External objects are immediate objects of perception, because perceptual immediacy is not a matter of acquaintance."

<Locke may respond the second alternative as follows>:

> **Locke**: "What is perceptual immediacy then, if it is not a matter of acquaintance?"
>
> **Reid**: "External objects are immediate objects of perception in the sense that when we have beliefs about such objects, it is these objects themselves and nothing else of which our beliefs are about."

<To this Locke may reply:>

> **Locke**: "If what you are talking about under the heading of "perceptual immediacy" is the type of immediacy of the external object involved in the aboutness relations of belief, then I have already granted this type of immediacy. The dispute centers on whether *perceptual* immediacy requires acquaintance-type immediacy. I say it does, you say it does not. But your rejection of my claim that perception is indirect contributes

> nothing which I have not already fundamentally admitted in my epistemological picture. If you choose to define perception in terms of belief, and perceptual immediacy in terms of judgment directness, then our supposed disagreement regarding the perceptual immediacy of external objects is quite superficial: you simply identify "perception" with what I consider to be mere perceptual *judgment*."

To conclude this chapter, I submit that if Reid's theory is consistent with the acquaintance model of perception, it should not fundamentally disturb Locke. Locke does not deny that extra-mental objects can be immediate objects of belief. Rather, he claims that acquaintance relations with external reality are, on the basis of the contiguity thesis, in principle impossible. If one thinks claiming that perceptual directness does not require acquaintance is a sufficient refutation of Lockean indirectism, then my argument here will have no purchase. However, if one thinks, as I do, that a sufficient refutation of Lockean indirectism requires a picture of perceptual immediacy that cannot be accommodated by Locke, then this implies that Reid offers an acquaintance view of perceptual immediacy. I think, therefore, that these considerations supply some reason for interpreting Reid's theory in terms of an acquaintance model of perception. This is because the anti-acquaintance interpretation of Reid compels us to consider his view as a rather trivial challenge to Lockean perceptual indirectism, contrary to what Reid apparently thought he offered.

Locke denies the possibility of the mind being perceptually acquainted with extra mental reality on the basis that such acquaintance presupposes a contiguity of mind and object, something that is impossible on the supposition of metaphysical dualism. Since Reid is committed to mind/body dualism, my analysis of the coherence of the acquaintance interpretation of Reid begins with the question of how he may overcome

Locke's picture of the nature of perceptual acquaintance. There is much to be said about the intelligibility of the perceptual acquaintance interpretation of Reid, and what follows in the next chapter is a concerted effort to thoroughly address the matter.

CHAPTER 2: THE PROBLEM OF PERCEPTUAL ACQUAINTANCE IN REID

A) Mind/Body Dualism and the Possibility of Perceptual Acquaintance

In this chapter I argue that Reid's actual theory of perception is inconsistent with the acquaintance model of perception previously considered. The acquaintance model, recall, is the view that in perception we encounter the object itself, rather than merely believing something about it, imagining it, or entertaining its concept. That is, the object is *given*, or actually *presented* to the mind. Reid's theory of perception is incompatible with the acquaintance model due to his doctrine of sensation. This section provides the theoretical context of this negative claim. Sections B I. & II. then outline Reid's theory of perception and sensation, respectively, and in section B. III. I establish the negative claim. My argument for this claim may broadly be called "Berkeleyan" given that it relies on Berkeleyan qualifications on the nature of perception. I establish the negative claim by systematically eliminating all conceivable ways to understand Reid as an acquaintance theorist which might be offered on his behalf.

However, given the discussion of the preceding chapter, before going any further we must first understand how Reid might handle Locke's suppositions regarding acquaintance – namely, that acquaintance with external objects is impossible in principle because it implies contiguity between mind and object. The case has been made (by e.g., Nichols 2007) that Reid's mind/body dualism has no necessary function in his account of perception, or, more broadly, in his explanatory framework. However, there is no doubt

that mind/body dualism is one of Reid's fundamental ontological commitments.[39] If the acquaintance interpretation of Reid's theory of perception is viable, then perceptual acquaintance must not conflict with mind/body dualism.

To reiterate, according to Reid, the root of the "invention of ideas" is the following hypothesis: an (immediate) apprehension of the object implies a literal contiguity between the object and the mind. This is required on the supposition that the mind acts on, or is acted upon by, the object of perception. If the mind is immaterial and the object is material, this contiguity is ruled out *ex hypothesis*. According to Reid, the most basic error behind the idea theorists' invention of ideas is that they model intentional contact on physical contact. They maintain – falsely, according to Reid – that perception involves the mind acting on the object, or the object acting on the mind. Since action cannot take place at a distance, this implies that the mind and its object in perception are contiguous – i.e., that they are literally side by side.[40]

For Reid, the appeal of the contiguity view is explained by the tendency to reason or philosophize erroneously about non-physical relations from the case of physical relations. The stipulation that perceptual immediacy presupposes that the object be contiguous with the mind is derived from a physical sense of immediate relation, i.e., "contact".[41] Ideas, according to the view Reid attributes to his opponents, play a

[39] On dualism, e.g., see: EIP, 2. IV., pg: 87-9. Reid writes: "…[I]f we conceive the mind to be immaterial, of which we have very strong proofs, we shall find it difficult to affix a meaning to *impressions made upon it*." (89) For a more definitive example of Reid subscribing to mind/body dualism, see the manuscripts for his *Three Lectures on the Nature and Duration of the Soul*, reprinted in the Brookes' edition of the EIP (the edition I use throughout).

[40] See: EIP, 2. XIV., pg: 176-7. Also, recall the previous passage from *Oration III*, 64.

[41] Reid goes on to conjecture as to the nature of the analogical reasoning leading to the contiguity thesis more precisely in EIP, 2. XIV., pg: 177-8. He believes that the mistake lies in conceiving perceptual

necessary mediating role between us and the external world. Unlike material things, they may be contiguous with the mind inasmuch as they are mental entities. The immediate objects of apprehension are ideas, and they relay us to the external world in a way such that we are only epistemically related to material objects in virtue of being related to these ideas. On the presumed Lockean picture, ideas are related to the external world, apart from causally, in virtue of bearing some resemblance to the external objects they relay. Perceptual relations to external objects, then, are mediate.

The fact that Reid considers the idea theorists' presupposition a fundamental error shows that for him either i) perception by acquaintance does not presuppose contiguity of material and mind, or ii) perception does not require acquaintance. Whether Reid would endorse (i) or (ii) is an open question. If he maintained the idea theory assumption that acquaintance involves contiguity of material and mind, and if he is an acquaintance theorist, he is forced to admit an absurdity. The possibility of the ontological givenness or presence of external objects in perceptual acts is metaphysically ruled out by substance dualism as such. What is clear is that Reid thought contiguity did not *explain* the possibility of perception.[42] On this point, again, one may interpret Reid's claim in one of two ways. It may be interpreted as saying that 1) contiguity of mind and object is explanatorily bankrupt, and therefore, since acquaintance requires this contiguity, acquaintance is explanatorily bankrupt. Alternatively, it might be interpreted

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immediacy on the model of the physical immediacy involved in the relation of the proximal cause of sensory stimulation and the sense organ. For instance, the proximal cause of the retinal image must make physical contact with the sense organ – it must be "immediately present" to the organ. This, a wholly material process, presupposes spatial contiguity.

[42] Recall the passage above from EIP, 2. XIV., pg: 185.

as meaning that 2) acquaintance is a viable explanatory hypothesis, and hence logically extricable from the contiguity criterion of immediacy.

Thus, one is confronted here by two possibilities, only one of which preserves the viability of the acquaintance interpretation of Reid. If one supposes that Reid's anti-contiguity remarks are tantamount to anti-acquaintance, then the acquaintance interpretation of Reid must be rejected. Conversely, one may take Reid's critique of the contiguity thesis as not simply a critique of the acquaintance model. The acquaintance model, one might think, is presupposed, and as such, Reid's anti-contiguity remarks may be taken to imply that non-contiguous acquaintance is metaphysically possible. On this alternative interpretation, mind/body dualism and perceptual acquaintance are mutually consistent hypotheses. Thus, if the first interpretive alternative is correct, I have already succeeded in establishing the conclusion of this chapter, namely, that Reid was not an acquaintance theorist. For the sake of argument, then, I will entertain the second interpretive alternative, *viz*., that Reid thinks non-contiguous acquaintance is metaphysically possible. I will argue that the acquaintance interpretation of Reid fails for reasons which are distinct from his views on the contiguity thesis discussed.

B) The Sticking Point: The Presentative Function of Sensuous Properties

I) Overview of Reid's Theory of Perception

In this section I will explicate some of the central defining characteristics of Reid's theory of perception. I will reserve the more detailed exposition of his (connected) theory of sensation for a separate treatment in the next section. There is a useful linguistic analogy through which one may understand Reid's view of the relation

between sensation and perception, one he himself uses frequently. The two are distinct operations, for Reid, and sensations function in perception as words do in semantic understanding. That is, both sensations and words function as "signs", or marks which stand for or signify something else. A word stands as a sign for a concept, whereas a sensation "stands for" or signifies an external object or state of affairs. On the appropriateness of the notion of a "sign" used in characterizing the function of sensations, as he understands them, Reid writes:

> …[B]ecause the mind passes immediately from the sensation to that conception and belief of the object which we have in perception, in the same manner as it passes from signs to the things signified by them, we have therefore called our sensations *signs of external objects*; finding no word more proper to express the function which Nature hath assigned them in perception, and the relation which they bear to their corresponding objects. (*Inquiry*, 6. XXI., pg: 177)

Call this Reid's *semiotic view* of perception. Just as one passes immediately from the word to the concept which it signifies in the case of language use, so too in perception we pass immediately from the sensation to that object/state of affairs which it suggests. Typically, we care not to direct our attention to the sensation as itself an intentional object.[43] The fundamental difference between these two cases, however, is that words are related to their concepts through custom or habit (i.e., artificially). This is opposed to what Reid considers as "natural language" (i.e., "…modulations of voice, gestures, and features" (*Inquiry*, 4.II., pg; 51-2)). Natural language is something which we understand solely in virtue of the constitution of our mind. Sensations qualify as a natural language. What sensations stand for or signify *is naturally suggested* to us by them. In the case of sensation, "…the suggestion…is not the effect of habit, but of the original constitution of

[43] Though this is, Reid thinks, possible (see: e.g., *Inquiry*, 5. II., pg: 56-7).

our minds." (*Inquiry*, 5. III., pg: 59) Perceptual apprehension, in other words, is a function of innate suggestion.

This analogy deserves a closer examination. In the case of our cognition of concepts by means of words, when one reads and understands a sentence under ordinary circumstances, it is not as though the objects of one's thought are the words of the sentence. This would be the case were one studying, say, spelling, pronunciation, or familiarizing oneself with the various letters of the alphabet. Rather, the words merely act as indications of the various component concepts of the complex thought being expressed. At the same time, it is not as though one is carried from the word to the respective concept by means of inference. There is no process of inference that may carry one straightaway from the noun "cat" to the concept of a cat. Rather, words are understood through custom to indicate or *stand for* various concepts. Although the words initiate one's cognitive contact with the various concepts customarily related to them, they are not themselves the objects of such cognition.

Much the same, I think, may be said of Reid's view of sensations. For Reid, sensations function as initiators of our perceptual contact with external objects; they do not however constitute the objects of our perceptual cognition. They are not themselves a case of *perceptual* apprehension at all. Rather, sensations trigger perception by innate suggestion: upon the registration of sensations, the mind conceives of the objects that are suggested by them, and is put into an immediate intentional relationship with these objects. Perception, then, is simply that state which is semiotically implicated by the

registration of sensation. It is a complex operation, consisting of the immediate conception of, and belief in the present existence of some external object. Reid writes:

> If…we attend to that act of our mind which we call the perception of an external object of sense, we shall find in it these three things. First, Some conception or notion of the object perceived. Secondly, A strong and irresistible conviction and belief in its present existence. And, thirdly, That this conviction and belief are immediate, and not the effect of reasoning. (EIP, 2. V., pg: 96)[44]

By no process of inference may these objects be inferred straightaway from the registration of sensations – for reasons that are bound up with Reid's critique of conceptual empiricism.[45] Rather, the sensations merely *stand for* the present existence of various things, because such things, due to the natural constitution of our minds, are *suggested by* them. Just as words do not ordinarily constitute the objects of our thought when one reads a sentence, the mind likewise passes over the sensations to the conception of the various objects they indicate.[46] Of course, one may turn one's attention to the sensation *per se*, but normally sensations are not the objects of cognition. Reid writes:

> We are so accustomed to use the sensation [Reid is speaking with the sensation of hardness in mind] as a sign, and to pass immediately to the hardness signified, that, as far as appears, it was never made an object of thought, either by the vulgar or by philosophers; nor has it a name in any language. (*Inquiry,* 5. II., pg: 56)

Sensations, for Reid, serve as natural signs: upon the occasion of having sensations, the mind immediately engages in correlated perceptual acts. The two acts of the mind are discrete and the relation between them is metaphysically contingent. The

[44] See also: *Inquiry*, 6.XX., pg: 168

[45] Reid writes: "I think it is evident, that we cannot, by reasoning from our sensations, collect the existence of bodies at all, far less any of their qualities." (*Inquiry*, 5. IV., pg: 61)

[46] Reid here departs from idea theory insofar as he purports to show that idea theorists conflate sensation with perception, and treat sensations as epistemic intermediaries – that is, the Lockean representationalist considers the perception of external things to be internally indirect, something which Reid denies (e.g., see: EIP, 2. IV., pg: 134).

sign (sensation) has no intrinsic or rational connection with the epistemic content of the resulting perception (i.e., some external state of affairs). Its relation to what it signifies – this or that external state of affairs – is arbitrary. The production or conjuring of certain kinds of perceptual states following the occurrence of certain kinds of sensory states is, according to Reid,

> …a natural kind of magic…[T]his connection [between a sensation and a perception] is the effect of our constitution, and ought to be considered as an original principle of human nature, till we find some more general principle into which it may be resolved. (*Inquiry*, 5. IV., pg: 60-1)[47]

[47] It has been proposed that Reid's theory of perception in the EIP takes a shift away from the semiotic view of sensation found in the *Inquiry*. John Immerwahr in his paper entitled "The Development of Reid's Realism" (1978) argues that whereas in the *Inquiry*, sensory apprehension is (metaphysically or causally) prior to the perception of external objects, in the EIP, Reid abandons the semiotic view. In EIP, Immerwahr argues, Reid considers that both the perception of the external object and the sensation follow straightaway from the "material impression" of the external object on the sense organ, and that there are no semiotic relations between the sensory and perceptual states (249). "Material impressions" is a phrase Reid uses to denote the actual physiological stimulation or imprint of the impinging object on the sense organ, e.g., a retinal image, and the neuro-physiological changes associated with this event (e.g., see: *Inquiry*, 6. VIII., pg.100; XXI., pg. 176-7). This change in view, Immerwahr argues, marks a shift from indirect realism to direct realism (250). He provides a useful diagram to represent the shift in view. Let me reproduce this diagram now:

INDIRECT REALISM
(*Inquiry*): External Object → Physical Impression → Sensation → Conception and Belief (Perception)



Immerwahr notes textual complications with his thesis, the most crucial of which is that the "…sign-thing signified theory of suggestion still appears…" in EIP (253), and that eyesight is made out to be an outlier with respect to the other perceptual modalities precisely in virtue of its having not this semiotic structure (this is discussed in sec. B.III.a below). If vision is an outlier perceptual modality insofar as it involves no semiotic relation between the original perception and visual sensation, then this is an affirmation of the semiotic structure of the other perceptual modalities. I am willing to concede, for the sake of argument, that there is a shift in Reid's thought from the *Inquiry* to EIP in the way Immerwahr describes. However, I believe that this is irrelevant to the question of direct realism, since I maintain, along with Madden (1986), that the semiotic relationship between sensation and perception does not obstruct perceptual directness. Despite the fact that sensory apprehension is metaphysically or causally prior to perceptual apprehension, perceptual apprehension is *internally direct*. Thus, for the purposes of my present discussion, this debate may be ignored. For objections to Immerwahr's views on Reid's shift in perceptual theory from the *Inquiry* to EIP, see: A.E. Pitson's paper "Sensation, Perception and Reid's Realism" (1989), and Buras' (2009) paper "The Function of Sensations in Reid" pg: 333-6.

Reid's developed view of semiotic association is given in chapter 6 of the *Inquiry*, section XXI entitled, *On the process of nature in perception*. By semiotic association, I mean the cognitive association between the sign and the thing signified, whereby the mind passes "…from the appearance of the sign…to the conception and belief of the thing signified…" (*Inquiry,* 6. XXI., pg: 177) Without this cognitive association, Reid writes, "…the sign is not understood or interpreted; and therefore is no sign to us, however fit in its own nature for that purpose." (177)

According to Reid, there are two distinct classes of signs, i.e., natural and artificial signs. The two classes are distinguished by the respective way in which the sign is associated with its significate. In the case of artificial signs, the association is built entirely by convention – "…by the will and appointment of men…" (177), as Reid says. The connection between, say, the red traffic light and the directive "stop", and written or spoken words and their referents, are all examples of artificial signs. That red is semiotically associated with "stop" rather than "go" is arbitrary and due entirely to our conventions.

The case is different with respect to natural signs, where the connection between the sign and its significate is established "…by the course of nature." (177) Reid here notes the following examples of natural signs: smoke is a natural sign for fire, and certain facial features naturally signify anger. Other examples of natural signs are the following: certain impressions in the ground are a natural sign for an animal having recently trodden that path; ringing in the ears is a natural sign for damage to one's ear; coughing is a natural sign for sickness; the leaves beginning to fall is a natural sign for the changing of

the season; certain groans and vocalizations are a sign that an individual is in pain; stratification of rock deposits is a natural sign for the sequence in which the rocks were deposited, and so forth.

The phrase "…by the course of nature" here is purposely ambiguous. Reid means for this phrase to accommodate three sub-classes of natural semiotic association. In each class, the sign is associated with the significate "by the course of nature" in a different sense than the other. For Reid, natural signs and their significates may be cognitively associated in virtue of 1) being a first principle of the human mind, 2) being formed through habit or (Humean) custom, or 3) being formed through establishing a causal connection between them vis-à-vis inductive reasoning. Reid writes:

> There are three ways in which the mind passes from the appearance of a natural sign to the conception and belief of the thing signified; by original principles of our constitution, by custom, and by reasoning. Our original perceptions are got in the first of these ways, our acquired perceptions in the second, and all that reason discovers of the course of nature, in the third. (*Inquiry*, 6. XXII., pg: 177-8) [48]

In (1), the semiotic association is established by "the course of nature" in the sense that the cognition of the significate upon the appearance of the sign *is itself* a natural order.

[48] For Reid, original perceptions are only those innately suggested by sensations (*Inquiry*, 6. XXIV., pg: 191). The objects of acquired perception are suggested by "…either sensations, or things we perceive by means of sensations." (191) – See also: EIP, 2. XXI., pg: 237 – According to Reid, in both original and acquired perceptions, the sign/significate relation is "…established by nature…". Nevertheless, in the case of acquired perception, we "…discover this connection…[with] the aid of our original perceptions, or those…[perceptions] which we have already acquired." (*Inquiry*, 6. XXIV., pg: 191). A condition of the mind's taking the sensory or perceptual data as a sign for x in the case of acquired perception depends on already having had repeated perceptual experiences. This is not the case with respect to the signs of original perceptions. Objects of original perception are innately suggested by the sensory sign *in the first instance*, without any dependence on any further empirical input. Thus, for Reid, a particular sensation of sound, for instance, is a natural sign, and compels the conception and belief in the present existence of an objective cause of the sensory sound (i.e., perceptual sound), and this is an original perception. A particular sensation of sound, after having occurred in conjunction with the apprehension of other, furry four-legged perceptual objects, for instance, may compel the mind to conceive of a cat whenever it is heard. This is an example of an acquired perception. Similarly, seeing the "red hot" glow of the burner may eventually compel the conception of heat through a repeated experience of the conjunction of tactile sensations/perceptions of heat and visual sensations/perceptions of redness; this is an acquired perception.

Sensations are natural signs for the objects of *original* perception in this sense. That sensations function as signs for primary and secondary qualities, for instance, is simply due to an innate or natural disposition of the mind to take them as such signs in the first instance. In (1), the semiotic association is established by the course of nature in the sense that it is itself a natural sequence of events. In (2), the semiotic association is established by "the course of nature" in the sense that it is a *function* or effect of our observing natural sequences. Nature presents the sign and significate to us in a repeating temporal order. The cognitive association between the sign and significate in the case of (2) is habitual. It is acquired by observing the sign and significate to be in a repeating succession within the natural order of things, or "the course of nature". In the case of (2), the cognition of the sign/significate's repeating temporal order creates a psychological compulsion such that whenever the sign appears, the mind immediately passes to the conception and belief in the significate. This, Reid tells us, is how *acquired* perceptions are gotten.[49] In (3), on the other hand, the semiotic association is acquired through an inductively reasoned judgment of causal relation between the sign and its significate.[50]

Reid considers all acts of mind to be or involve what he calls "conception". He considers this an original, logically simple, and therefore inexplicable, act of the mind. A logical definition of conception is impossible. Such definition would require a logical analysis of the activity into its constituents. We may however comprehend the nature of conception through attending introspectively to it in our mind (EIP, 4. I., pg: 295). In the case of imagination, we have bare conception, or the "simple apprehension" of a thing,

[49] More on the acquired/original perception distinction will be given in section B. III. a.
[50] See: *Inquiry*, 6. XXI., pg: 177; 6. XXIV., pg: 198-200

that is, we conceive something without any judgment or belief. This is not to say that we have no accompanying belief or judgment in such cases; we have a belief in the existence of the act of *imagining*, though this is not the same as having a belief in the existence of the object imagined. If imagination was a principle of belief, then we would believe in the existence of *what* we imagine, and not simply believe *that* we imagine. Sensation (sensory conception, properly speaking[51]) is "…necessarily accompanied with a belief of its [i.e., sensation's] present existence…" (*Inquiry*, 2.III., pg: 27) Reid states: "When I feel pain, I am compelled to believe that the pain that I feel has a real existence." (EIP, 4. II., pg: 311).

As Reid notes, we may have or feel, imagine, or remember a sensation. In the first case, we believe in the present existence of sensation, in the second, we believe in the past existence of a sensation, and in the last, we have no belief in the existence of a sensation (*Inquiry*, 2. III., pg: 27). It is a mistake to consider conception as being the same in kind across all acts of mind, as if the act of conceiving in the case of imagination were the same in kind as the act of conceiving in the case of sensation, and the two operations were distinguished in virtue of some additional differentiating feature.

The logical simplicity of acts of conception requires that we locate belief outside of sensory *conception*, and consider the operation of sensation a compound operation. Though imagination and sensation may conceive the same object (this is presumed by Reid), they are understood to do so through utterly distinct species of conception or

[51] The operation of sensation is a compound operation, just as the operation of perception. Reid writes: "…Neither sensation, nor the perception of external objects, is simple apprehension. Both include judgment and belief, which are excluded from simple apprehension." (EIP, 4. III., pg: 326)

modes of apprehension. The distinction between the two is not comprehended through conceptual marks or differentia, but rather must be understood ostensively, just as, to borrow Reid's analogy, one must see the scarlet colour in order to have a distinct notion of it.[52] Reid writes:

> But though the object of my sensation, memory, and imagination, be in this case the same, yet these acts or operations of the mind are as different, and as easily distinguishable, as smell, taste, and sound. I am conscious of a difference in kind between sensation and memory, and between both and imagination." (*Inquiry*, 2. IV., pg: 28-9)

It is clear Reid is talking about sensory *conception* and imaginative *conception* here, and not "sensation" and "imagination" considered as complex acts consisting of the abovementioned beliefs along with the core act of conception. On the same page, Reid writes:

> Why sensation should compel our belief of the present existence of the thing, memory a belief of its past existence, and imagination no belief at all, I believe no philosopher can give a shadow of reason, but that such is the nature of these operations: They are all simple and original, and therefore inexplicable acts of the mind. (28)[53]

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[52] Recall: EIP, 1. IV., pg: 295.

[53] This remark shows that the terms "sensation" and "memory" here refer to the (logically simple) acts of conception at the core of each operation. Sensory *conception* is the apprehension of sensations, memory *conception* the apprehension of past events. These terms in the above passages do not properly refer to the operations or faculties of sensation or memory. Otherwise "sensation", for instance, would already contain the belief it is supposed to compel, and thus the question of its compelling the relevant belief would be nonsense. Additionally, Reid admits here that memory, sensation, and imagination, as he is considering them, are "all simple and original, inexplicable acts of the mind." It is the act of sensory conception here, following my previous convention, which Reid is claiming is a principle of belief. Regardless of what the above statements superficially suggest, "sensation" and "memory", for Reid, refer to the faculties – i.e., composite operations. Sensation contains an act of sensory *conception*, which qua conception is logically simple – though not a simple apprehension, since it is necessarily accompanied by judgment or belief. "Conception" is considered an *ingredient* in sensation and perception. For instance, Reid writes:

> "[The ideal system] teaches us that the first operation of the mind is simple apprehension…[T]his appears to me to be all fiction, without any foundation in nature: for it is acknowledged by all, that sensation must be before memory and imagination; and hence it follows, that apprehension accompanied with belief and knowledge, must go before simple apprehension…So that here, instead of saying, that the belief or knowledge is got by putting together and comparing the simple apprehensions, we ought rather to say that the simple apprehension is performed by resolving and analysing a natural and original judgment. And it is with the operations of mind, in this case, as with natural bodies, *which are indeed compounded of simple principles or elements*. Nature does not exhibit these elements separate, to be compounded by us; she exhibits them mixed and

For Reid, "consciousness" denotes nothing more than that operation of mind through which we are aware of the present operations of our mind; but it is also, it seems, necessarily coupled with the belief in the existence of such operations.[54] Again, the act of conception intentionally grasping mental states is itself a constituent of the complex operation. Carrying on with the above convention, *conscious conception* (i.e., the act of conception involved in the compound operation of "consciousness") is a principle of belief. It produces original beliefs about the existence of its intentional object (i.e., mental states). Reid writes:

> *Consciousness* is a word used by Philosophers, to signify that immediate knowledge which we have of our present thoughts and purposes, and, in general, of all the present operations of our minds. (EIP, 1. I., pg: 24)
>
> … [B]y consciousness we know certainly the existence of our present thoughts and passions..." (EIP, 2. I., pg: 42)
>
> We know our own thoughts, and the operations of our minds, by a power which we call consciousness… (EIP, 3. II., pg: 257)

According to this definition, the intentional objects of consciousness are strictly the operations of the mind themselves.[55]

It is important to note that "operation" here is synonymous with "act". Reid considers the mind to be essentially active (e.g., see: EIP, 1. I., pg: 20-1). Take the phrase "impression on the mind", which is adopted most notably by Hume, and the thesis found in conceptual empiricism generally, namely that the mind has a receptive faculty. These ways of speaking and thinking about the mind are problematic, according to Reid.

> compounded in concrete bodies, and it is only by the art of chemical analysis that they can be separated [my emphasis]." (*Inquiry*, 2. IV., pg: 29-30)

[54] Reid writes:

> "That consciousness which we have of the operations of our own minds implies a belief of the real existence of those operations." (EIP, 4.I., pg: 311)

[55] See: EIP, 1. I., pg: 24

The mind, he thinks, cannot be a passive recipient of change through agents from without (e.g., from material forces). The mind cannot be "impressed upon" in any meaningful sense, simply because it cannot receive change from without. Such postulations are, Reid says, erroneously derived from theorizing about the mind by analogy from the physical case. The mind, for Reid, is an active principle. He writes:

> Mr. LOCKE…ascribes to the mind a very considerable hand in forming its own ideas. With regard to our sensations, the mind is passive, 'they being produced in us, only by different degrees and modes of motion in our animal spirits, variously agitated by external objects:' These, however, cease to be, as soon as they cease to be perceived… (EIP, 2. IX., pg: 130)

He goes on:

> [T]his phrase of the mind's having impressions made upon it by corporeal objects in perception, is either a phrase without any distinct meaning, and contrary to the propriety of the english language, or it is grounded upon an hypothesis which is destitute of proof…All that we know about it [i.e., the mind] shows it to be in its nature living and active, and have the power of perception in its constitution… (EIP, 2. IV., pg: 87-90)

For Reid, there are many distinct operations of mind – e.g., perception, sensation, memory, judgment, belief, conception, reflection – some of which are complex, some simple. These, if you will, states of operation are the intentional objects of consciousness. And indeed, it stands to reason that even consciousness itself is an object of consciousness. According to Reid, acts of mind (except, perhaps, sensation) are intentionally directed to an object, and the object is, except perhaps in the case of sensation, always something other than the act itself. That is to say, the operation does not take itself for its object.

There is a troubling issue worth noting about Reid's account of consciousness. The problem centers on what seems to be one possible instance of consciousness, namely, a consciousness of one's own consciousness. Does the act of being conscious of, for example, an act of perception, imply that we must likewise be consciously aware of

this consciousness of perception? And if this is so, is there a token distinction between the act of consciousness *of which* we are aware, one which takes for its object some other operation of mind (e.g., perception), and the consciousness *by which* we are aware of this act of consciousness? Or is it rather that the latter is merely a reflexive property of the former? Reid is, after all, committed to our being conscious of all operations of mind (see: EIP, 2. XV., pg: 191). Reid is committed to the *transparency* of mind. But if this entails that we must be conscious of acts of consciousness, it seems we have no alternative but to take the conscious awareness of acts of consciousness to be a reflexive operation. This is so, since otherwise we are led into an infinite regress: every act of consciousness implies that there is another act which consciously apprehends it, and so on *ad infinitum*.

But this interpretive strategy to avoid the regress fails, or at least is put into jeopardy by Reid's following remarks:

> Sensation is a name given by Philosophers to an act of mind, which may be distinguished *from all others* by this, that it hath no object distinct from the act itself. [my emphasis] (EIP, 1. I., pg: 36)

Reid claims here that the object to which an operation is intentionally directed is, in all cases except sensation, something other than itself. As a result, we must it seems understand consciousness and its object as always being distinct. But if this is so, and we must be conscious of all acts of consciousness, then we are caught in an infinite regress. The consciousness of an act of consciousness cannot be a reflexive property of the latter, insofar as this supposes that an operation other than sensation takes itself as its intentional object.

This problem with Reid's account of consciousness was first noted by Keith Lehrer (1986). Lehrer's suggested solution to this problem is that Reid did not think consciousness apprehends acts of consciousness. Lehrer writes that Reid "…simply thought that consciousness supplied us with a conception of the *other* operations of mind" (1986, 51). This prevents the regress of acts of consciousness without requiring that consciousness is, at least when it apprehends acts of consciousness, reflexive. However, it strikes me that this solution seems to be at odds with the transparency of mind, since it, to use Rebecca Copenhaver's (2007) phrasing, "…save[s] [Reid] from the regress by making consciousness blind to itself." (630) But what is the difference between being blind to a mental operation and that operations occurring unconsciously? Furthermore, at least on the reflexive interpretation of Reid's theory of sensation (see next section), Reid has already admitted an instance in which a mental operation is reflexive. Thus, perhaps it is best to consider consciousness' apprehension of acts of consciousness a reflexive operation in order to get around the regress problem in Reid, despite the textual difficulty with this strategy mentioned above.[56]

II) Sensation Nonsubstantivism

In this section I will provide a more detailed treatment of Reid's theory of sensation. For my later purposes it is crucial to have a basic understanding of the nature of sensation according to Reid. In the next section, I argue for an inherent incompatibility between his doctrine of sensation and the acquaintance model.

[56] For a detailed treatment of Reid's theory of consciousness in connection with contemporary first and second order theories of consciousness, see: Copenhaver (2007).

The interpreters agree that Reid is a sensation nonsubstantivist. Sensation nonsubstantivism is the negative thesis that sensations have no non-reflexive intentional structure: they are not intentionally directed at things distinct from themselves (e.g., retinal or mental images, bodily locations, physical objects). However, interpreters are divided on what form of sensation nonsubstantivism Reid endorsed. This is because his characterizations of the view are ambiguous with respect to two possible nonsubstantive accounts. One possibility is that sensations are reflexive modes of thought, i.e., modes of thought which only take themselves as their intentional objects. The other possibility is that sensations are referentially empty modes of thought, i.e., modes of thought which have no intentional objects whatsoever (Buras 2005, 222). The former view may be called the *reflexive view*, while the latter may be called the *adverbial view*.[57]

However, there is yet another interpretive possibility here: it has been suggested that perhaps Reid was non-committal as far as the two positive formulations of sensation nonsubstantivism go (Buras 2005, 222). And indeed, some have offered evidence in favour of the view that Reid never really developed his nonsubstantive account of sensation, or, for that matter, found a place for it in his overall theory of perception.[58] Thus, what one has here are two distinct metaphysical alternatives as far as sensation nonsubstantivism goes – the reflexive and adverbial view. However, there are three *exegetical* alternatives of Reid's nonsubstantive considerations, namely, the reflexive, adverbial, and *non-committal* interpretation. Reid's texts are, it seems, ambiguous with

[57] Proponents of the reflexive view include: Buras (2005) and Cummins (1975). Proponents of the adverbialist view include: Beanblossom (1983), Pappas (1989), Bary (2002), Copenhaver (2000), Sosa & Van Cleve (2001).
[58] e.g., see: Madden (1986), 271

respect to these three interpretive alternatives. Nevertheless, a negation of sensation substantivism implies – assuming we do not dispense with an ontology of sensations all together – that either the adverbial or the reflexive view obtains. Thus, I shall concentrate on the adverbial and reflexive alternatives in relation to Reid's metaphysical picture and set aside the mere exegetical matter of determining which view, if either, Reid actually held. With the interpretive difficulty regarding his sensation nonsubstantivism noted, I will now examine Reid's definitions of sensation.

One observes Reid characterizing his view of sensation on many occasions, the central of which are the following. In the *Inquiry*, Reid writes:

> The form of the expression, *I feel pain*, might seem to imply, that the feeling is something distinct from the pain felt; yet, in reality, there is no distinction. As *thinking a thought* is an expression which could signify no more than *thinking*, so *feeling a pain* signifies no more than *being pained*. What we have said of pain is applicable to every other mere sensation. (*Inquiry*, 6. XX. pg: 168)[59]

And in EIP, he writes:

> Sensation is a name given by Philosophers to an act of mind, which may be distinguished from all others by this, that it hath no object distinct from the act itself. (EIP, 1. I., pg: 36)[60]
>
> …[T]here is no difference between the sensation and the feeling of it; they are one and the same thing…[I]n sensation, there is no object distinct from that act of the mind by which it is felt[61]… (EIP, 2. XVI., pg: 194)

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[59] In this first formulation, we have an interesting linguistic analogy between the phrase, "thinking a thought", and the phrase, "feeling a pain". There really is more than a linguistic analogy here, however, insofar as having a pain, or being pained, is a species of thought. But any strict *de re* analogy here between thinking a thought and feeling a pain militates against the adverbialist view (see below) insofar as thinking a thought has a non-redundant sense, i.e., it may designate a reflexive act of consciousness.

[60] The phraseology here is a bit perplexing for the adverbialist reading, insofar as the thought is not that "sensations have no object" *full stop*, but that "they have no object *distinct from the act itself*". Certainly some acts of mind are reflexive, and thus "no object distinct from the act itself" does not preclude having an object. Surely the phasing does not negate the adverbialist reading; "no object distinct from the act itself" could be a long winded way of saying that there is no Act-Object structure in sensation. I shall not wade into the exegetical debate on this point, though I do question why Reid would introduce such ambiguity in his definition of sensation if he had a firm commitment to the adverbialist view.

[61] This formulation really seems to imply that there in fact is an object in sensory apprehension. For, the "it" in "…by which *it* is felt" implies that there is an object in sensory apprehension. The adverbialist may merely appeal to the deceptive nature of the grammar of sensations here, but again, were Reid to have

> Sensation and desire are different acts of mind. The last, from its nature, must have an object; the first has no object. (EIP, 2. XVI., pg: 196)[62]

The "adverbial" view is so-called because on it a particular sensation functions as a qualifier on the activity of sensing – it is a *way* or *mode* of sensing, just as briskly is a way of jogging, or recklessly is a way of driving. Sensations qualify the act of sensing, and the proper grammatical form of sensation is that of an adverb. "Seeing red", for instance, is really a misleading grammatical construction, and what is more accurate is, as they say, "seeing redly". The grammatical construction "seeing red" suggests an act/object distinction between "the seeing" and "the red" where in reality there is none – it erroneously "objectivizes" the red. However attractive or unattractive the adverbial theory of sensation may be, there are major theoretical obstacles to attributing it to Reid consistently (see: Buras 2005).[63]

Reid considers his theory of sensation to be a radical departure from the Lockean view of sensation. Locke's view, for Reid, involves thinking of sensations (*qua* substantive ideas) as themselves immediate objects of the mind that are, in some important sense, distinct from the operation which apprehends them. However, the grounds for supposing that Locke (or Berkeley) maintained more than what amounts to the reflexive view of sensation has been disputed. For example, Todd Buras (2005) argues that Reid's nonsubstantive theory of sensation, under the reflexive interpretation,

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subscribed to adverbialism, given that he was aware of the grammatical bugbear, why would he introduce this ambiguity into his definition of sensation? It would have been so simple to have eliminated it by cutting off the thought at "…no object", as Reid has done in the next statement above. Also, consider Reid's following remark: "Memory must have an object…In this, memory agrees with perception, but differs from sensation, which has no object but the feeling itself." (EIP, 3. I., pg: 253)

[62] Prima facie, this passage most certainly supports the adverbialist reading.

[63] e.g., see: *Inquiry*, 2.III., pg: 28-9, where Reid refers to "…the object of my sensation…", and writes that "[s]ensation implies the existence of its object…"

is simply a reiteration of Berkeley's view of sensation.[64] It has been argued on much the same grounds that Locke's view of sensation is also a reflexive view. These grounds are each thinker's commitment to the thesis (traditionally associated with Berkeley) that a sensation's *esse* is its *percipi*. The applicability of Berkeley's ontological principle to sensation, it is thought, is tantamount to a nonsubstantive view of sensation. This is so since it seems to entail that the object of apprehension and the act of apprehending are numerically identical, and thus that what is apprehended is not something over and above that act doing the apprehending.

In my view, Buras is right that Reid adheres to Berkeley's ontological principle in the case of sensation. Reid, quoting Berkeley, writes:

> …[B]y the ideas of sense, [Berkeley]…means sensations. And this is indeed evident from many…passages, of which I shall mention a few, Princip. sect 5. 'Light and colours, head and cold, extension and figure, in a word, the things we see and feel, what are they but so many sensations, notions, ideas, or impressions on the sense, and is it possible to separate, even in thought, any of these from perception? For my part, I might as easily divide a thing from itself'…This therefore appears certain, that, by the ideas of sense, the author meant the sensations we have by means of our senses. I have endeavoured to explain the meaning of the word sensation, Essay 1. chap.1. and refer to the explication there given of it, which appears to me to be perfectly agreeable to the sense in which Bishop Berkeley uses it. (EIP, 2. XI., pg: 155-6)

Regarding Berkeley, and the indistinctness of his view of sensation from that of Reid's, Buras (2005), who is a proponent of the reflexive interpretation, writes:

> Reid…notes his agreement with Berkeley's claim that 'the very essence [of a sensation] consists in its being felt' and with the consequence that sensations cannot exist un-sensed. Reid does not explicitly attribute to Berkeley the claim that sensations are reflexive mental acts. But they are for Berkeley, and Reid clearly recognizes this. (226)

I turn now to look at Locke's view of sensation, which is the view of sensation Reid considers to be diametrically opposed to his own.

[64] I think EIP, 2. XVI., pg: 194 provides some good textual support for this interpretation.

In his work entitled: *The Intellectualism of Locke*, Thomas Webb, carrying on in the tradition of Thomas Brown (a 19th century Locke interpreter), addresses the nature of ideas according to Locke. On his interpretation, Locke's view of sensation appears to be equivalent to a Buras-type nonsubstantive reflexive view of sensation. S.A. Grave, in his paper, "The 'Theory of Ideas'" (1976) sums up the interpretation proposed by Brown and Webb. Grave writes that "[t]he ideas in perception and thought, on the interpretation of Locke proposed by Brown and Webb, are somehow to be identical with operations of the mind." (57) By "somehow identical", here, Grave must mean that the apprehending and the apprehended are ontologically homogeneous.

But if Reid charges anyone with maintaining an objectionable theory of ideas, it would have to be Locke. Suppose Buras is correct that the ontological homogeneity of act and object is sufficient for sensation nonsubstantivism under the reflexive view. If Locke maintained this ontological homogeneity, then one must conclude that Reid's only consistent objection to Locke's sensory ideas is that they are supposed to bear attributes which resemble external properties.[65] This is impossible straightaway, Reid argues, since their object is reflexive: mental operations that are inherently active, fleeting, and immaterial cannot intelligibly be said to resemble inert spatially extended material things. Thus, Reid's intolerance to Lockean ideas, mental images, or object-ideas resides, fundamentally, in their bearing resemblances to external things. A preliminary conclusion that may be drawn from the preceding is the following. It appears that the only thing which differentiates Reid's views on sensation from Locke's, under the

[65] This thesis will be explored in more depth in chapter 3.

reflexive interpretation, is that Locke thinks sensations resemble features of material objects and Reid doesn't. Thus, what makes Locke's sensations *substantive*, if they are in fact substantive, is that they bear properties which resemble external things. This conclusion is, as we shall see, a good outcome for the argument of the following section. However, there is something missing from this picture.

Reid objects to Locke's view of sensation on grounds other than its reliance on the existence of resemblance relations between ideas and mind-independent reality. The argument of Reid's *Oration III*, which I examine in chapter 4, is meant to be something more than a rehashing of the Berkeleyan critique of the Lockean resemblance theory of perception. Moreover, I have already covered the more basic critique against the theory of ideas contained in *Oration III* and EIP. Ideas, Reid writes, are considered as "…intermediate object[s] joined or connected to the mind" (*Oration III*, 65-6) on the erroneous assumption that *immediate* objects must be contiguous with the mind. It therefore appears that Reid thinks Locke is mistaken about the nature of sensation in some fundamental way, namely, insofar as Locke posits ideas as *immediate* objects. Grave writes:

> For Locke, the ideas must have a[n] [explanatory] role in perception and *thought*. Their role is to be objects, "immediate" objects of perception and thought. What Reid calls in question is the existence of anything functioning as an object in the manner in which ideas are supposed to function. (57)[66]

[66] e.g., Reid writes:

> "The ideas, of whose existence I require the proof, are not the operations of any mind, but supposed objects of those operations. They are not perception, remembrance, or conception, but things that are said to be perceived, or remembered, or imagined…[P]hilosophers maintain, that, besides…[real external objects], there are immediate objects of perception in the mind itself: That, for instance, we do not see the sun immediately, but an idea; or, as Mr Hume calls it, an impression, in our own minds…" (EIP, 2. XIV., pg: 171)

It is entirely possible that Reid illegitimately attributes to Locke a substantival (non-reflexive) view of sensory ideas.[67] If Locke offers a truly nonsubstantive account of ideas, then this means that a sensation's bearing properties which resemble features of physical reality is consistent with sensation nonsubstantivism. This would undermine my argument against the acquaintance interpretation of Reid's theory of perception offered in the next section, since it hinges on the incoherence of nonsubstantive sensations bearing geometrical predicates. I think Grave provides us with plausible grounds to suspect that Lockean ideas are somehow more than just reflexive, nonsubstantive acts. Thus, a brief look at Grave's argument against the reflexive interpretation of Locke's theory of ideas is important for the purposes of my next section.

For Locke, ideas are meant to explain the possibility of thought and perception. Thus, insofar as they are simply identical to the acts of mind through which they are apprehended (i.e., they are reflexive modes of apprehension), it seems that they fail to have any explanatory power straightaway. For if they are simply equivalent to that apprehension *per se*, how may they contribute to the explanation of the possibility of that

[67] It must be admitted, however, that Reid was cognizant of the nonsubstantive interpretation of Lockean ideas – not by name of course. He writes:

> "…[W]e see, that the word *idea* has three different meanings in the Essay…ideas being supposed to be a shadowy kind of beings, intermediate between the thought, and the object of thought, sometimes seem to coalesce with the thought, sometimes with the object of thought and sometimes to have a distinct existence of their own…and the author seems to have used it sometimes in one, sometimes in another, without being aware of any change in the meaning…I have met with persons professing no slight acquaintance with the Essay on human understanding, who maintained, that the word *idea*, wherever it occurs, means nothing more than thought; and that where he speaks of ideas as images in the mind, and as objects of thought, he is not to be understood as speaking properly, but figuratively and analogically: And indeed I apprehend, that it would be no small advantage to many passages in the book, if they could admit of this interpretation." (EIP, 2. X., pg: 136)

apprehension? Let us return to the passage in Grave's paper quoted in piecemeal fashion above. Grave writes:

> The ideas in perception and thought, on the interpretation of Locke proposed by Brown and Webb, are somehow to be identical with operations of the mind. But this identity must not be a mere truism; when Locke maintains that perception and thought are by way of ideas, he is not maintaining merely that perception is necessary if there is to be perception, and thought if there is to be thought…Brown and Webb leave the strong impression that they think the merging of the idea with an operation of the mind makes the Theory of Ideas invulnerable to Reid's attack. They do not indicate how this might be so, not bringing Reid's attack to bear upon some approved form of the Theory. Nor do they seem to feel that the merging of idea and operation threatens…to trivialize the Theory – perception and thought by way of ideas being reduced to a philosopher's locution for perception and thought. (1976, 56-7)

I have proposed above that it is plausible that what makes Locke's theory of sensations a substantive view is his commitment to sensations bearing properties or attributes which resemble the qualities of bodies. This is what renders his account inconsistent with the reflexive view of sensation. But something is somewhat amiss with this picture, since it seems not to capture the apparently more fundamental objection Reid has to Lockean ideas. Reid objects to Lockean ideas because they are considered to be immediately present to the mind in the dubious sense that they are contiguous with it, or that intentional immediacy presupposes contiguity of mind and object. This, Reid thinks, is the central fallacy of idea theory, insofar as such contiguity fails to have explanatory force. The question, then, is whether there is any plausible connection between the contiguity-type immediacy presupposed by the theory of ideas, according to Reid, and the furnishing of sensation with attributes which resemble bodily attributes. I submit that there is such a connection. The, if you will, "spatialization" of the object of sensation, i.e., the furnishing of an idea or subjective modification with properties that resemble properties of body, is, I claim, a sufficient condition of its contiguity-type immediacy to the mind. That is, the spatialization of the object of sensation is sufficient for the object's

standing in contiguity-type immediacy to its apprehension. If this is right, Reid's critique of the Lockean resemblance thesis coalesces, or is congruent, with his critique of the contiguity thesis.

III) A Berkeleyan Critique of the Acquaintance Interpretation of Reid

a) Introductory Remarks: the Visual Case

The real difficulty with understanding Reid as holding an acquaintance theory of perception[68] hangs on what may be called the *presentative function* of sensuous properties. By "sensuous properties" I mean, to borrow Van Cleve's (2011) words, "…the occurrent…aesthetically significant qualit[ies] that most of us mean…" (276) by "colour", "taste", "smell", "sound", and "hot/cold". Here, Van Cleve is referring to the ordinary naïve view of these properties, as he understands it. On the naïve view of colour, he later writes:

> It seems to me, however, that there is something the man in the street believes that Reid, along with the philosophers denies. It is this: there is *sensuous color* in external objects.[69] A good emblem for naïve realism (as I once heard George Pappas say) is the 'cover the earth' logo of the Sherwin-Williams paint company, in which red paint pours out of a tilted bucket and coats the globe. (2011, 289)

To this list of sensuous properties I add the phenomenological feelings or qualia of tactile experience (the qualitative datum, or appearance phenomenology experienced during the perception of shape and hardness). Berkeley's argument against the Lockean primary/secondary properties distinction[70] has application against the acquaintance interpretation of Reid's theory of perception. Reappropriating this argument, I will say

[68] I shall deal with what I take to be a couple of insufficient or defective objections to the acquaintance interpretation (i.e., Wolterstorff's (2006)) at the end of chapter 4.
[69] Naïve objectivism regarding the sensuous properties will be explored in detail in the next chapter.
[70] Locke's and Reid's respective formulations of the distinction will be addressed in detail in chapter 3.

that the sensuous properties are integral to the acquaintance-type apprehension of bodies. That is, they play a constitutive function in any acquaintance-type apprehension of body. After expounding this hypothesis, I will show how Reid's theory of perception cannot accommodate for the presentative function of sensuous properties. I argue for this claim by systematically eliminating the only two ways in which sensuous properties, on Reid's account, could fulfill this proposed presentative role.

In Berkeley's *Principles*, we have a detailed discussion regarding the intelligibility of the Lockean primary/secondary properties distinction. Berkeley writes:

> Those who assert that figure, motion and the rest of the primary or original qualities do exist without the mind in unthinking substances do at the same time acknowledge that colors, sounds, heat, cold, and secondary qualities of a similar kind do not – which they tell us are sensations existing in the mind alone that depend on and are occasioned by the different size, texture, and motion of the minute particles of matter. This they take for an undoubted truth which they can demonstrate beyond all exception. Now, if it is certain that those original qualities are inseparably united with the other sensible qualities and not, even in thought, capable of being abstracted from them, it plainly follows that they exist only in the mind. But I desire anyone to reflect and try whether he can, by any abstraction of thought, conceive the extension and motion of a body without all other sensible qualities. For my own part, I see evidently that it is not in my power to frame an idea of a body extended and moved, but I must in addition give it some color or other sensible quality which is acknowledged to exist only in the mind. In short, extension, figure, and motion, abstracted from all other qualities, are inconceivable. Where, therefore, the other sensible qualities are, these must be also, namely, in the mind and nowhere else. (1., X., pg: 140)

The crux of the problem Berkeley identifies here with Locke's distinction seems to have something to do with the presentative role of secondary properties in the apprehension of the primary properties. The visual case is most vivid to the imagination. Berkeley claims that one cannot have visual perception of extension without it (i.e., extension) *appearing in* sensuous colour. If we are to suppose that perception is possible in some non-intuitive sense (e.g., a doxastic theory of perception, or the case of blindsight perception), this thesis is clearly false. On the other hand, if what we mean by perception is that operation through which we are acquainted with external objects, I think the Berkeleyan

considerations have traction. On this interpretation, since bodies must appear in the garb of sensuous colour and other sensuous properties, the primary properties must be, in some sense, in the same place as the sensuous properties, as Berkeley asserts.

The problem is that Reid's doctrine of sensation appears to, in Van Cleve's (2004, 120) phrasing, "drain away" the sensuous properties from the bodies. But if sensuous colour, or the appearance of colour, is not objectively predicable of bodies, and if it is instead, as Reid seems to hold, a mere subjective modification, how could it have a presentative function? Alston writes:

> Most crucially, if the conception [apprehension] involved in perception is the direct [presentational] awareness of an external object, how is that object presented to that awareness? There would seem to be no alternative to holding that it is presented as exhibiting 'sensible' or 'phenomenal' qualities – colors, shapes, heat and cold…and so on…But this construal is not open to Reid. For, as noted earlier, he places all the qualitative distinctness of perceptual consciousness (except for visual extension) in the sensations, which he takes to involve no awareness of any object other than itself. What it is natural to refer to as an awareness of colors, warmth, and odours (or of objects as colored, warm, and odorous) Reid construes as modes of feeling (awareness), as ways of being aware, directed on to no object beyond themselves. (1989, 44)

I argue that if we accept the Berkeleyan intuitions behind Alston's critique of Reid, there are only two responses one might employ in an attempt to overcome the objection on Reid's behalf; neither, however, is viable. I will refer to the two potential responses as the *projectionist* and *non-sensory acquaintance* strategies. There has been some elliptical discussion of both strategies in the literature I engage.[71]

I take the liberty of carrying on in terms of sensuous appearances of colour and the visual case, since it is more accessible to the imagination. However, the same difficulty for the acquaintance interpretation of Reid holds generally for all perceptual

[71] Alston invokes some version of the former in his penultimate remarks in the paper I mention, and in James Van Cleve's (2004) rejoinder to Alston, from which I borrow the phrase, "presentational direct realism", there is some pretence to the latter.

modalities. Crucially, the objection may be formulated in terms of our apprehension of bodies by tactile perception. How else could a figure be presented or appear tactilely but by the qualitative content or sensuous properties which, it seems, Reid considers *mere sensation* (e.g., "pressure" sensation or feeling of hardness, hot and cold)?

However, I use the visual case as a sort of dummy or prop to help the imagination to grasp the nature of the general problem with the acquaintance interpretation of Reid – i.e., to understand why both the projectionist and non-sensory acquaintance strategies fail. The acquaintance interpretation of Reid's theory of vision faces its own unique difficulties which his accounts of the other sense modalities do not. The projectionist strategy, as we shall see, assumes that sensations or sensory appearances themselves play a presentative function in our perceptual acquaintance with bodies. For this reason, this strategy is ruled out of hand by Reid's theory of vision. This is so, since Reid asserts that visual perception without the sensory appearance of colour is metaphysically possible, and in fact does not differ in manner or kind from perception accompanied by the sensory appearance of colour. For Reid, the sensory appearance of colour cannot play the presentative function required, since nothing about the addition of the sensory appearance of colour changes the nature of our visual perception per se. That is, our actual visual perception may, conceivably, carry on in the exact same manner when divorced from the sensory appearance of colour. Thus, for Reid, the nature of visual perception is not consistent with sensory colour playing a constitutive role. Hence, whereas in the case of the other sense modalities there are potentially two strategies for reconciling Reid's theory with the acquaintance model of perception, in the case of vision, I am straightaway

limited to one, i.e., the non-sensory acquaintance strategy. Before I continue on, then, let me examine the unique difficulties for the acquaintance interpretation of Reid's theory of vision.

Firstly, Reid's theory of vision poses prima facie difficulties for all kinds of perceptual direct realism, not only presentational direct realism. This is the case, since according to Reid the immediate objects of *original* visual perception are *visible* magnitude, shape, and position. [72] The *original* objects of perception are the immediate, primary, and non-inferential contents of the perceptual modality itself. By contrast, according to Reid, the acquired objects of perception are not the intrinsic objects of the perceptual modality itself, but rather are objects habitually associated with such original objects. On Reid's view, recall, acquired perceptions depend on learning and experience which habituates the mind to conceive of an object distinct from the original object upon the registration of the original object of perception or its sensory sign. In the case of vision, these acquired objects are the Euclidean three dimensional entities of real space. Reid writes:

> Some of our perceptions by the senses may be called original, because they require no previous experience or learning; but the far greatest part is acquired, and the fruit of experience. (EIP, 2. XXI., pg: 235)

In the case of visual perception, for Reid, the two-dimensional non-Euclidean "visibles" are the *original* objects of perception, but through experience, these original objects of perception eventually trigger in us a conception of the associated external objects of real Euclidean space.

[72] For the original/acquired visual perception distinction, see: *Inquiry*, 6. XX., pp: 171; see also: EIP, 2. XIV., pg: 181-2, & 2. XXI., pg: 236.

Reid writes:

> We must likewise attend to this, that though the real magnitude of a body is not originally an object of sight, but of touch, yet we may learn by experience to judge of the real magnitude in many cases by sight. We learn by experience to judge of the distance of a body from the eye within certain limits; and from its distance and apparent magnitude taken together, we learn to judge of its real magnitude…And this kind of judgment, by being repeated every hour, and almost every minute of our lives, becomes, when we are grown up, so ready and so habitual, that it very much resembles the original perceptions of our sense, and may not improperly be called acquired perception. (EIP, 2. XIV., pg: 181-2)

The original objects of vision are entities that obey a non-Euclidean two-dimensional geometry of visibles[73], which takes as its topological (projective) strata a concave surface. They are, thus, incongruent with real Euclidian figure, position, and magnitude, despite the fact that, in virtue of relative position, they are in part a function, and correlative, of such Euclidean properties.

On Reid's original objects of vision, R.C. Sleigh Jr. (1976) writes:

> According to Reid, visual appearances are the proper objects of original visual perception (sight, for short). They are two dimensional, hence, not material objects nor qualities thereof, nor sensations. (79)

Pursuing this matter, Giovanni B. Grandi (2006) encapsulates the prima facie difficulty with Reid's view, as far as direct realist visual perception is concerned. He writes:

> To discover a non-Euclidean geometry means to discover *genuinely* non-Euclidean facts. In different terms, it means to discover a domain of objects that have non-Euclidean properties as their intrinsic properties. But visible objects do not have non-Euclidean properties as their intrinsic properties, since at most they only have these properties as relativized properties, that is, as properties that they do have in relation to the point in space where the eye is located. Therefore, either Reid has not discovered a non-Euclidean geometry, or he can speak of visibles as having genuine and intrinsic non-Euclidean properties only at the cost of abandoning his direct realist theory of perception in the case of vision. (229)

Since I think we must admit that acquired perception in the Reidian sense cannot be presentational, we are barred from considering sensations as performing a presentative role for the visual perception of bodies or primary properties *per se*. But let us set this

[73] For the distinction between *visible* and *real* figure and magnitude, see: EIP, 2. XIX., pg: 224.

aside for the moment. Suppose, for the sake of discussing the prospect of acquaintance in the other senses by analogy with vision, that original visual perception is of bodies, or, more properly, is of primary properties when they are considered relationally qua perspectival properties.[74] Thus, let us assume that it is unproblematic to take the discussion of the presentation of bodies through the other sense modalities as interchangeable with a discussion of the presentation of visible properties. In either case, one is dealing with the presentation of real external properties, though in the case of vision, the properties being presented are perhaps not, properly speaking, the primary properties of body.

But there is another matter that confronts us in the visual case, one which I mentioned above. It has to do with the fact that Reid posits that visual perception of visible figure is initiated straightforwardly from the physiological event of sensory stimulation, or what Reid calls the "material impression"[75], alone. That is, unlike the other perceptual modalities, visible figure is not semiotically related to sensory appearances (sensations). Reid writes:

> [T]here seems to be no sensation that is appropriated to visible figure, or whose office it is to suggest it. It seems to be suggested immediately by the material impression upon the organ, of which we are not conscious… (*Inquiry*, 6. VIII., pg: 101)

But then it seems as though Reid thinks it is metaphysically possible that visual perception may occur in the absence of sensation, and thus, that visual perception is

[74] On the perspectival realism of visibles, see: *Inquiry*, 6. VIII., pg: 98; 101-102. Reid writes:

> "…[T]he visible figure of bodies is a real and external object to the eye, as their tangible figure is to the touch". See also: EIP, 2. XIX., pg: 225

[75] "Material impressions", as I have mentioned in a previous footnote, are the actual physiological stimulation or imprint of the impinging object on the sense organ, e.g., a retinal image, as well as the consequent neuro-physiological changes (e.g., see: *Inquiry*, 6. VIII., pg.100; XXI., pg. 176-7; EIP, 2. II., pg: 75-6).

entirely extricable from sensuous properties. This cuts against the possibility that the sensory appearance of colour plays a presentative role in our acquaintance with the objects of vision. Thus, it seems that Reid flatly denies what is almost a conceptual truth for Berkeley: that objects of vision can only be perceived in the garb of sensuous colour.

But again, is the Berkeleyan insight really undermined? Perhaps Berkeley's point holds only about an acquaintance-type seeing, and Reid is here speaking about something else entirely. We may find some material relevant to this last prospect in *Inquiry,* 6.VII. This section is pertinent to issues surrounding Molyneux's problem. As is well known, William Molyneux posed a provocative question to Locke. The question concerned whether a blind person who learned to distinguish through tactile perception the shape of a cube and the shape of a sphere, could correctly identify the same cube and sphere by merely visually perceiving them were his power of sight restored. Here is the question[76]:

> *Suppose a man born blind and now adult, and taught by his touch to distinguish between a cube and a sphere of the same metal and nearly of the same bigness, so as to tell, when he felt one and the other, which is the cube, which the sphere. Suppose then the cube and sphere placed on a table and the blind man be made to see. Quaere, whether by his sight, before he touched them, he could now distinguish and tell which is the globe, which the cube?* (EHU, 2. IX., 10, pg: 32)

And here is Molyneux's answer (an answer which Locke is quoting and endorsing):

> No. For *though he has obtained the experience of how a globe, how a cube affects his touch, yet he has not yet obtained the experience that what affects his touch so or so must affect his sight so or so. Or that a protuberant angle in the cube that pressed his hand unequally shall appear to his eye as it does in the cube*. I [Locke] agree with this thinking gentleman, whom I am proud to call my friend, in his answer to this problem; and am of opinion that the blind man at first sight would not be able with certainty to say which was the globe, which the cube, while he only saw them…(EHU, 2. IX., 10, pg: 32)

Reid's answer to this question is complicated, and we need not go into the matter here. What is of concern here is that, according to Reid, a "mathematical blind man" is

[76] For a detailed examination of Reid in relation to this problem, see: Van Cleve's (2007) article: "Reid's Answer to Molyneux's Question".

capable of having notions of visible figure, magnitude, and position by working towards them mathematically from his notions of tangible or real figure, magnitude, and position. But whereas visible figure, magnitude, and position are, as Reid says, "presented" by the power of sight, the mathematical blind man must, instead, deduce them "…from the real" magnitude, figure, and position of the body in relation to the eye (*Inquiry*, 6. VII., pg: 95). Reid writes:

> The blind man forms the notion of visible figure to himself, by thought, and by mathematical reasoning from principles; whereas the man that sees, has it presented to his eye at once, without any labour, without any reasoning, by a kind of inspiration. (*Inquiry*, 6. VII., pg:97)

Thus, again one observes Reid asserting that visible figure and magnitude are, in their conception, extricable from the sensory appearance of colour. The blind mathematician arrives at such notions without any experience of colour. Reid writes:

> …[O]ur blind man's notion of visible figure will not be associated with colour, of which he hath no conception. (*Inquiry*, 6. VII., pg:97)

However, the fact that for Reid perceptions of visible figure, or, evidently, bare *notions* of visible figure, are extricable from the sensory appearance of colour does not necessarily undermine the Berkeleyan point. It does not do so if we read it as a point about *presentational* visual perception, and not about mere notions of visibles, or about a metaphysically possible non-acquaintance visual perception. And so, the relevance of the prospect of the appearance of colour's presentative function, and the possibility that Reid's theory of vision is consistent with this prospect, is not disproven by these considerations so far. We may suppose that visual perception of visible figure, or conceptual or theoretical grasping of visible figure through notions, is, for Reid,

possible[77] in the absence of a sensory appearance of colour[78], but that sensory appearances of colour are nevertheless required for *presentational* visual perception.

This sort of manoeuvre may at first glance be read into materials contained in the following remarks, some of which were already covered. Reid writes:

> Visible figure is never presented to the eye but in conjunction with colour: and although there be no connection between them from the nature of the things, yet having so invariably kept company together, we are hardly able to disjoin them even in our imagination….[O]ur blind man's notion of visible figure will not be associated with colour[79], of which he hath no conception; but it will perhaps be associated with hardness or smoothness, with which he is acquainted by touch… (*Inquiry*, 6. VII., pg: 97)

Here I think one must consider Reid's position to be that the sensation of colour is not, properly speaking, semiotically related to visible figure, and that both colour and visible figure are gotten straightforwardly and independently from the material impression alone. Nevertheless, for Reid, they are, in visual perception, always accompaniments. So be it if the relation between visual sensation and perception is metaphysically contingent. But if visibles cannot be visually perceived without colour sensation accompaniments, the logical space is left open for the presentative function of the sensation of colour. Our mode of visual perception in this world may well be a matter of acquaintance, since despite the fact that the perception of visibles without sensory colour is metaphysically possible, in this world the two are always, it seems, conjoined. This means that it could

[77] metaphysically in the former case and in the actual world in the latter…

[78] That is, that it may be gotten straightforwardly from the material impression itself, or deduced from mathematical principles and general knowledge, respectively.

[79] I take it that Reid is here referring to perceptual colour (i.e., the unknown causes of our sensation of colour) – Reid's account of the perception of colour and secondary qualities will be covered in detail in the next chapter. However, that here he refers to (objective) colour is of no consequence to my present purposes, since if the blind man has no perception of colour, then it follows, by the rule of transposition, that he has no sensation of colour either. This is so, since if one has the sensation of colour, it follows on Reid's analysis that one consequently has the conception of and belief in the present existence of the unknown cause of one's sensation of colour (i.e., the perception of colour).

be possible for the sensory appearance of colour to be a constituent of visual perception in the actual world. [80]

Yet again one is met with resistance arising from Reid's analysis in sec. VIII of the *Inquiry*'s chapter on vision. As a thought experiment, Reid considers the possibility that the material impression of vision may deliver only visible figure and not the sensory appearance of colour, and that, therefore, one may see the one without seeing the other. But one might insist here that while Reid admits that visual perception is possible without the sensation of colour, we are nevertheless open to posit the distinction in question, where the perception annexed to sensory colour is a matter of acquaintance, and the one without sensory colour is not. Doing so would permit that visual perception according to Reid is consistent with the presentative function of sensory colour in visual perception.

The problem of proceeding in this way is that Reid permits no intrinsic qualitative difference between the perception of visible figure in isolation from the sensation of colour and the perception of visible figure accompanied by the sensation of colour. In the penultimate paragraph of the thought experiment, Reid writes:

> If we suppose, last of all, that the eye hath the power restored of perceiving colour, I apprehend that it will be allowed, that now it perceives figure in the very same manner as before, with this difference only, that colour is always joined with it. (*Inquiry*, 6. VIII., pg: 101)

But then sensory colour cannot have a presentative role in visual perception for Reid, not only because it is metaphysically unnecessary (since it has no semiotic function) but also because it is entirely extrinsic to the qualitative nature of visual perception, in his sense,

[80] On this reading, the two modes of conception, the blind man's and that of visual conception, though having the same intentional object, may be distinct forms of conception, the latter being original and presentational, the former being non-presentational – a mere conceptual grasping derived from (demonstrative) judgment.

per se. The upshot of Reid stating that visible figure is perceived in exactly the same manner with or without sensory colour is that either vision is not a matter of acquaintance, or that visual acquaintance is possible without the sensation of colour. Thus, any acquaintance interpretation of Reid's theory of perception which posits that the sensory appearances themselves play a presentative function in perception – as the projectionist strategy does – fails in the visual case.

Wolterstorff (2001, 2006) claims that Reid's theory of vision is consistent with the acquaintance model. His grounds for thinking that, for Reid, our apprehension of visible figure is a matter of acquaintance-type apprehension are interesting, though I think unsatisfactory. Wolterstorff's grounds for his claim are given in the following:

> In perception of visible figure there's no sensation functioning, on the one hand, as a sign of an external object, and on the other, as an entity to be interpreted so as to extract from it the information it bears concerning the perceived object. Yet there is intuitional content. Hence the apprehension of the external object has to be in, in this case, apprehension by acquaintance. (2001, 138)

The problem with Wolterstorff's argument here is that the intuitional content of visual experience may be accounted for in virtue of colour sensation even if our perception of visible figure is independent of such sensation. Nothing about the independence of our perception of visible figure from sensation prevents visual sensory intuition from supplying the intuitional content of visual experiences. Wolterstorff's argument would work if for Reid visual sensations did not *accompany* our perception of visible figure, but it is clear that Reid thinks they do.

Nevertheless, I think that since for Reid sensation is a necessary accompaniment to perception by means of the *other* sense modalities (since those correlated sensations perform a semiotic function), it is a live possibility that sensations play a presentative

function in other modes of perception. I argue that it is Reid's doctrine of sensation that is inconsistent with the acquaintance interpretation. This point can be articulated in terms of vision and visual sensations, since it is the nature of sensation in general which militates against the acquaintance interpretation. But the projectionist strategy fails for an independent set of reasons in the case of his theory of visual perception, as I have shown. Thus, one must keep in mind that I use the visual case as a heuristic device to articulate the general failure of the projectionist strategy.

Both strategies that may conceivably be employed in pursuit of the acquaintance interpretation of Reid, namely the projectionist strategy and the non-sensory acquaintance strategy, have the same goal. That is, both attempt to explain how, for Reid, external objects appear in and through the garb of sensuous properties, given the parameters of Reid's theory. The sensuous appearance of colour, on my Berkeleyan hypothesis, "presents" the primary properties of extension and bodies. The projectionist and non-sensory acquaintance strategies form a dichotomy. On the projectionist interpretation, the sensory appearances themselves provide the sensuous content which (somehow) presents external objects. In this case, one must reconcile the apparent contradiction in mere subjective modifications presenting objective things, i.e., bodies. Projectionism seeks to evade this difficulty by supposing there is an (accidental) unity between bodies and sensory appearances in perceptual apprehension. This is how projectionism satisfies Berkeley's claim that the "sensible qualities" (or sensuous properties) must be where the

bodies are.[81] However, this move presupposes that a "subjective unity" (unity only for the subject, or mere perceived unity) is sufficient for the sensory appearances to fulfil the requisite presentative function. This is prima facie problematic. The non-sensory acquaintance strategy, on the other hand, locates the, now merely so called, "sensuous"[82] (presentative) properties in a non-sensory mode of (perceptual) intuition. In so doing, it bypasses the whole philosophical bugbear of sensation in this context altogether. The non-sensory acquaintance strategy is compatible with the sensuous properties being predicable of bodies per se. I will now address the projectionist strategy.

b) Failure of the Projectionist Strategy

As I have mentioned, the projectionist strategy proceeds on the assumption that a mere subjective unity, or even better, a unity only for the subject, is sufficient for the integration of sensuous properties and bodies required in light of my Berkeleyan premise, for the latter's *presentation*. The projectionist thesis is the hypothesis that the sensory appearance of colour is imposed by the mind onto objects *in the visual field*, but is not *objectively* (or in reality) predicable of them.

[81] The reverse, I suppose, is equally true for Berkeley: i.e., visible colour cannot be apprehended except as (visually) extended. Both points are consistent with the acquaintance model of the perception of visible extension. The perception of visual extension and appearance of colour, then, are co-dependent. In another vein, the candidate presentative features of tactile experience are the qualitative contents of our feelings of pressure. In order for hardness to be, as it were, wrapped in the phenomenal clothes of tactile feelings of pressure in the requisite sense being assumed here, it seems the attribute of felt pressure must somehow be coextensive with the hardness. Reid relegates the relevant (phenomenological) feeling of pressure to the category of nonsubstantive sensation, things, I argue, which cannot coextend with primary qualities (even virtually, or merely within the subject's apprehension). Apart from Reid, whether an idea substantivism regarding the phenomenological quality of felt pressure would be sufficient for the requisite (virtual) binding of the presentative property with the primary quality (hardness), I do not pretend to know.

[82] Now "merely so called sensuous", because the relevant "sensuous properties" are here not delivered through a sensory manifold, but rather originate from a non-sensory manifold of intuition.

For Reid, the visual sensations of colour are "apparitions" of the mind. Reid writes:

> When a coloured body is presented, there is a certain apparition to the eye, or to the mind, which we have called *the appearance of colour*. Mr. Locke calls it *an idea*; and indeed it may be called so with the greatest propriety. This idea can have no existence but when it is perceived. It is a kind of thought, and can only be the act of a percipient or thinking being. (*Inquiry*, 6. V., pg: 86)

It is clear that the sensuous properties of colour, smells, taste, sound, hot and cold, and the sensuous appearances of tactile experience, insofar as these are all sensory appearances for Reid, are mere apparitions, subjective modifications, or mental phenomena. How then can they present physical bodies, things which are external and mind-independent? A projectionist thesis might be proposed to account for the "binding" of sensory appearances of colour to bodies (or rather visible figure and magnitude, which, recall, are nevertheless by Reid's account objective properties).

Perhaps, then, the sensory appearance of colour subjectively "binds" to bodies in perception in virtue of some, in a Humean spirit[83]*, projective capacity of the mind*.

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[83] Here we may recall Hume's aetiology of what he called the "vulgar" view:

> " 'Tis a common observation, that the mind has a great propensity to spread itself on external objects, and to conjoin with them any internal impressions, which they occasion, and which always make their appearance at the same time that these objects discover themselves to the senses." (*Treatise*, 1.III.14., pg: 112)

The vulgar view, which hypostatizes mind-independent existences of what are, from the philosophical view, mere composite impressions, is a function of the belief in the continued existence of such things. This belief is the result of the natural tendency of (falsely) attributing to a present impression the residual vivacity of an impression that precedes it. The mind fails to notice the change in impression in virtue of the "…smooth transition and the propensity of the imagination", and thus, takes the impression to persist throughout a succession of perceptions, even though it is, in reality, a discrete existence. From this it is, within Hume's analysis, but a hop skip and jump to positing their mind-independent existence. Hume writes:

> "Here then we have a propensity to feign the continu'd existence of all sensible objects; and as this propensity arises from some lively impressions of the memory, it bestows a vivacity on that fiction; or in other words, makes us believe the continu'd existence of body." (*Treatise*, 1. IV. 2., pg: 138).

Could, then, the presentative function of sensory appearances of colour be preserved even in the face of their ideality *qua* mere subjective modifications? In short, is presentation by means of projection possible? This question is complicated for a number of reasons.

This sort of hypothesis is alluded to in a promissory tone in the final paragraph of Alston's discussion, where, after dispensing with the possibility of interpreting Reid as a presentational direct realist, he writes:

> To be sure, as George Pappas has suggested to me, one might try to develop a modified Reidian view by softening the boundaries between sensation and perception, allowing the phenomenal character of sensation to appear simultaneously, and without apparent distinction, as features of the external object of direct awareness. This would be something like H. H. Price's suggestion that perception 'is, as it were, a dreamy half-awake state, in which we are unaware of a difference between the sense-datum and the ostensible physical object'…And it is even more like Moreland Perkins' recent suggestion that phenomenal qualities are instantiated in our sensory consciousness but also function as the content of a 'sensuous attribution' to the physical object we perceive…But, however promising these suggestions, they clearly go beyond anything that can be found in Reid's works, and so they leave that thinker without any resources for embracing presentational direct realism. (1989, 45)

One might even find some thin textual basis for Pappas' suggestion in some of Reid's remarks, as follows:

> The perception and its corresponding sensation are produced at the same time. In our experience we never find them disjoined. Hence we are led to consider them as one thing, to give them one name, and to confound their different attributes. It becomes very difficult to separate them in thought, to attend to each by itself, and to attribute nothing to it which belongs to the other. (EIP, 2. XVIII., pg: 210)[84]

Moreover, it is one thing to claim that Reid did not *actually* subscribe to a projectionist thesis, and quite another to claim that his theory could *not* have supported it. The thesis may go "beyond anything that can be found in Reid's works". However, exactly how far beyond Reid's theoretical resources it goes is not obvious, since it is at least initially

[84] Indeed, Reid's analysis of the "sensations of primary qualities" (something which will be tangentially considered in the next chapter) assumes that these sensations evade common thought (see: *Inquiry*, 5. II., pg: 55-6; *Inquiry*, 5. V., pg: 62; EIP, 2. XVIII., pg: 212; EIP, 2.XVI., pg: 197; EIP, 2. XVII., pg: 204-5). He thinks a pre-reflective awareness of tangible properties fails to notice tactile sensations, and tends to conflate what is felt (pressure sensation) with what is perceived (the resistance and cohesion of bodies). This strikes me as rather fertile prospective theoretical ground for the projectionist thesis.

plausible that the projectionist thesis might be "read in" to passages like the one previous. Since Alston (if not Pappas) speculate that a projectionist thesis would resolve the inconsistency between Reid's theory of perception and the acquaintance model, it is worth taking a closer look at the projectionist strategy.

One must inquire as to what sort of projection could perform a presentative function. The requisite projection cannot be a matter of hypostatization, a "feigning" of sensory appearances as mind-independent properties. This is a kind of error, or false belief, not a merging of perceptual with sensory contents within one's perspective during perceptual states. Rather, the objects of vision must actually be presented *through* or *in the garb of* colour.[85] I suppose there is a brute empirical analogy to the projection thesis here in the visual case of afterimages: redirecting one's gaze from a bright light to, say, a white wall will make the afterimage be seen as if it was colouring the wall. This is crudely analogous to the projectionist thesis of the sensory appearance of colour. For another crude analogy of the projectionist strategy, consider putting on red coloured spectacles. The external objects seen will appear in the garb of red, yet the red is not objectively predicable of the objects. Suppose now that the red spectacles were, as it were, internalized as spectacles of the mind. The red colour of the mind's lens would then appear infused in the objects of vision, and the objects would be presented in the colour red. That is, objects of vision pass through, as it were, colouring mental filters and

[85] i.e., perceived as if the sensory appearance of colour is built into the object or content of perceptual states. This presupposes the "objectivization" of sensory colour, and drags us, I claim, into some substantive act/object distinction, and thus militates against Reid's sensation nonsubstantive view.

are presented to us as in color – that is, they, qua objects of perception, are seen as possessing sensuous color.

The projectionist strategy fails if one proceeds on the following assumption which clarifies what is meant by a property's having a presentative function. Continuing with our colour example, in order for sensuous colour to be presentative, it must be that objects presented by sensuous colour appear "in the garb" of sensuous colour.[86] But then I think it follows that that which presents spatial things (i.e., ostensibly defines them) must have some geometrical continuity with those spatial things in the visual field. [87] That is, that which presents spatial things must possesses geometrical predicates. The projectionist doctrine of sensory appearances involves the, albeit virtual or phenomenal, spatialization of sensations.

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[86] One may also put this assumption in terms of tactile perception. Here again if tactile sensations (feelings of pressure or hot/cold) are to *present* the tangible object, so my assumption goes, they must ostensibly define the object. The object must appear "clothed", as it were, by sensory tactile appearances, or various sensations of warmth, cold, and pressure.

[87] Incidentally, this sort of view, according to which sensations (in this case bodily sensations like pain) take up a phenomenological space that in some way corresponds with the physical space of body (in this case one's own body) in the loose sense that sensations have expanse in a "somatic field" which "maps onto physical space", has been argued. Murat Aydede (2014) writes:

> "A…popular way of handling the location problem [of pain, namely, that pains feel as though they have bodily locations] is to say that even though pains cannot literally be located in *physical* space, they can have location in a *phenomenal* space or field that is somehow isomorphic or systematically related to their counterparts (say, tissue damage) in physical space. In fact, this move would also work for visual sense-data that require some spatiotemporal framework. In the case of bodily sensations, this phenomenal space is sometimes called one's somatic field by analogy to a visual field that maps onto physical space (Price, 1950)." ("Pain", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2014 Edition)*, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/pain/>.2014)

The fact that Aydede goes on to credit H.H. Price for anticipating this sort of strategy within Price's discussion of a "somatic field" akin to a visual field (1950, 232-3) – Price is surely "Mr. Sense-data" if there ever was one – corroborates my view given below, namely, that this strategy presupposes substantive ideas. Price considers sense-data to have "spatial characteristics" (1950, 248), and this, I have argued, is the principal criterion of sensation substantivism.

Perhaps, then, bodies are conveyed and presented with sensible colour for us in virtue of taking on the characteristics of a subjective modification. But if this is the case, as I have said, then in order for the colours to bring the object into view, they must have (virtual) extension within the visual field. They must "overlay" the body, and occupy the same place in the visual field as the body itself. Thus, a projection thesis of sensory colours presupposes an ideal space insofar as the sensory colour must appear as having geometrical properties.[88]

Perhaps one may appeal here to Reid's geometry of visibles, and consider the appearance of colour as having a proper extension along with visible figure and magnitude within the two dimensional space of visibles *per se*. And indeed, this view might be read into the following remarks. Reid writes:

> I have entered into this long detail, in order to shew, that the visible appearance of an object is extremely different from the notion of it which experience teaches us to form by sight; and to enable the reader to attend to the visible appearance of colour, figure, and extension, in visible things, which is no common object of thought, but must be carefully attended to by those who would enter into the philosophy of this sense, or would comprehend what shall be said upon it. (*Inquiry*, 6. IV., pg: 84)

But while Reid seems to include the appearance of colour among the features of visible (spatial) things, it is entirely unclear how he is permitted to do so. As I have noted above, Reid thinks that "…the visible figure of bodies is a real and external object to the eye, as their tangible figure is to the touch." (*Inquiry*, 6. VIII., pg: 101) But the appearance of colour is, for Reid, an ideality (recall *Inquiry*, 6.V., pg: 86). Simply taking the appearance of colour to be, as Lorne Falkenstein (2000) writes, "…localized on the visual

[88] Colours as patches of visual extension with 2 dimensional predicates is, I think, an intuitive sort of notion of colour appearances. If we aren't going with the naïve objectivist view of colour, what is left of colour if it is not some quasi extended patch located in the visual field? But if colour is built into the objects of vision even 'virtually', visual sensations must engender the act/object structure of perception itself, that is, of a substantive mental operation. Sensations are, I claim, substantivized by their presentative function.

field…" (322) alongside visible objects is problematic. On the one hand we have visible figure, magnitude, and position, which are real external things, albeit relational properties, and on the other hand, we have the appearance of colour, a mere apparition of the mind. Thus, we cannot equate the space of visibles with the (supposed) space of the appearance of colour. Falkenstein's (2000) following remarks reflect this point nicely:

> Once Reid's peculiar use of the term 'colour' is exposed, it is hard not to conclude that his position does not reflect what we think we see. We think we see the qualities exhibited by our sensations of colour to be localized on the visual field. We do not think that the objects immediately perceived to be placed on the visual field differ from one another *only* in shape, size, position, and the hidden qualities they are believed to possess, and that our sensations of colour are no more painted on the surfaces of these objects than a stabbing pain is infused through the metal of a sword. (322)

But we cannot simply be mistaking sensory contents as bearing geometrical extension, since then not only is the perceived unity accidental, but it is not even a perceived unity in the requisite sense – it is merely, if one will permit, a believed, but not a visually apparent unity. There must be some sort of overlaying of the sensory content atop the object within the visual field, and this, I claim, "objectivizes" the sensory content in lock-step with a substantive theory of ideas.

But then according to the projectionist thesis, the sensation is most certainly a mental datum which intrinsically possesses geometrical predicates. Recall Buras' contention that the bare ontological inseparability of act from object in the case of sensation implies that sensations are reflexive, nonsubstantive states. To Buras, then, I ask: Would sensations still be nonsubstantive reflexive states even if they possess geometrical predicates? If, in virtue of the ontological homogeneity of act and object, the sensation, now with geometrical attributes, still qualifies as a nonsubstantive state, I think there is no intelligible meaning to "substantive ideas". Moreover, I have given reason to

consider the "spatialization" of ideas to be flatly incompatible with the reflexive view of their nature in the preceding analysis of sensation nonsubstantivism. If, on the other hand, sensation is not a reflexive act, yet still intrinsically apprehends geometrical entities, then we have already admitted substantive ideas, since sensations have geometrical objects, and thus are not objectless (adverbial) states. On the other hand, perhaps sensations have no intentional orientation to phenomenally extended colour appearances, but rather possess phenomenal extension that gets apprehended by the (second order) consciousness of the sensation. Perhaps, in this way, by some act of imagination sensory colours get conflated with perceptual objects in the requisite sense. But if this is not the definition of substantive mental objects or images, I know not what is.[89]

Finally, I submit there is a further reason why Reid's sensation nonsubstantivism is incompatible with attributing a presentative function to sensory appearances. Berkeley has a strong presence in Reid's critique of conceptual empiricism. In particular, this

[89] My thesis regarding the incoherence of the projectionist strategy converges with Van Cleve's (2011) view on the matter. He writes:

> "Reid allows that under our present constitution, color is always 'joined with' figure in our perception of figure…But we must note what this 'joined with' amounts to. It certainly does not mean that sensuous color is spread out over objects or is co-located with any of the object's surface points. The closest things we can get to instantiators of sensuous color in Reid's philosophy are color sensations, but it would be a category mistake on his view to think that color sensations take up any area or are located at any point…some contemporary 'error theories' of color have it that we mistakenly paint objects with colors or project colors onto them. The error itself (if we take the description of it literally) is an impossibility on Reid's view, as it is contrary to the nature of color sensations to be projected onto any surface…*Without sensuous color, I do not see what satisfactory account Reid can give of seeing boundaries* [my emphasis]. While agreeing with Reid, then, that the world might be a locus of primary qualities without being a locus of sensuous colors, I cannot believe that we could ever *see* objects in a world like that. " (294-5)

Here, I think Van Cleve's sentiments are copacetic with Wolterstorff's (2006), Alston's (1989), and Falkenstein's (2000) abovementioned intuitions.

critique belongs to a lineage that originates in Berkeley's arguments against the Lockean correspondence or resemblance theory of sensation. According to Reid's interpretation of Locke's representational realism, our perceptions of the primary qualities of objects (e.g., extension, figure, and solidity) depend on resemblance relations between sense-data and the external properties or things that cause them. Consider the following passage that highlights Berkeley's remarks against the resemblance theory of perception:

> But, you say, though the ideas themselves do not exist without the mind, yet there may be things like them of which they are copies or resemblances, which things exist without the mind in an unthinking substance. I answer, an idea can be like nothing but an idea; a color or figure can be like nothing but another color or figure. (*Principles*, 1. VIII., pg: 140)

Reid agrees with Berkeley's point (e.g., see: *Inquiry*, 6. VI., pg: 90-5). Indeed, as we have seen, the ontological homogeneity of act and object in the case of sensation appears to straightforwardly negate such resemblance relations. However, if sensations of colour possess visual extension congruent with the objects they present (i.e., visibles), then it seems they must resemble visible figure and magnitude (two dimensional geometrical entities). Now, Reid writes that "[t]here is certainly a resemblance, and necessary connection, between the visible figure and magnitude of a body, and its real figure and magnitude…" (*Inquiry*, 6. VII., pp: 95). But then sensations of colour, in virtue of their taking up some visual space, resemble visible figures and magnitudes, and visible figures and magnitudes resemble the figures and magnitudes of real Euclidean space. It seems to follow straightforwardly from this, by transitivity, that the sensations of colour resemble real figures and magnitudes. But this is impossible on Reid's account.[90] Thus, I submit

[90] My argument here reflects a point which Lorne Falkenstein (2000) articulates. This is observed in his following remarks:

that the presentative function of the sensation of colour, and, by analogy, of all other sensory appearances, is impossible under the parameters of Reid's theory of sensation. The upshot of this is that even if one wanted to read the projectionist thesis into Reid's theory of perception, one could not do so, given Reid's doctrine of sensation. Thus, despite there being some thin textual support for the projectionist thesis, the thesis is unavailable to Reid. It is likewise unavailable to anyone who wants to pursue some modified Reidian acquaintance view and still maintain Reid's opposition to idea substantivism.

c) Failure of the Non-sensory Acquaintance Strategy

Perceptual acquaintance involves some intuitive, not merely discursive, content. I have argued that sensory intuition cannot play the desired role. However, perhaps Reid subscribed to an acquaintance model of perception, but posited a non-sensory kind of intuition. In order to conclusively show that Reid did not hold an acquaintance model of perception, it is therefore necessary to show that he didn't have available a notion of non-sensory intuition.

Perhaps Reid's perception itself carries with it its own species of intuition. However, if one is not to altogether dispense with my initial hypothesis that sensuous properties have a presentative role, then this is problematic.

"…[Reid's] crucial experiment consists in examining the deliverances of the senses in order to determine whether we have any sensations that are extended or located in space, and that could give us ideas of the primary qualities of bodies by resembling those qualities. Were it admitted that our sensations of colour are in fact disposed alongside of one another and aggregated into extended and shaped patches, Reid's claim that none of our sensations contain information about primary qualities, and that this information must therefore be learned through a distinct act of mind, that Reid calls 'perception', would be called into question." (323).

An objection to the non-sensory intuition strategy may be found in Alston's penultimate remarks in the abovementioned paper. After noting the impossibility for Reid of sensory content per se playing a presentative function in perception, Alston writes:

> Thus, since Reid has placed sensible qualities in a different aspect, indeed a different stage, of the perceptual transaction, he is debarred from taking them to be ways in which external objects appear to that 'conception' of those objects that is partly constitutive of our perceiving them. That is, he is debarred from this unless we are aware of a colour or a sound twice in one perceptual episode, once as a mode of sensing and once as the way a physical object presents itself to us. But this is clearly not the way perceptual consciousness is structured. (1989, 45)

Alston's objection is well taken. Sensory contents are "debarred" from playing the requisite presentative function. Yet sensuous properties, by hypothesis, have a presentative function in any acquaintance-type awareness of body. On Reid's account, during perception we undergo nonsubstantive sensations of colour. But if visual perception is an acquaintance-type apprehension of body, the body must appear in sensuous colour. Thus, it seems that were Reid committed to an acquaintance view, he would be forced to admit some dual sensuous appearance of colour. This is contrary to the singular nature of the appearance phenomenology of perceptual experience. The same point can be made in tactile terms. If during tactile perception we experience a single manifold of intuition, then Reid must either give up his theory of tactile sensation, admit a dual tactile appearance phenomenology, or subscribe to a non-acquaintance model. Since the first option requires revisionary measures, and the second appears to be an absurdity, it follows that the acquaintance model is unavailable to Reid.

Finally, one might suppose that a non-sensory manifold of intuition supplies the sensuous content required for the acquaintance-type apprehension of bodies. In that case,

one would have to consider such content as an objective feature or predicate of bodies. This is so, since otherwise we are dragged back into a projectionist thesis. Recall that I argued that sensuous content with a presentative function must be geometrically extended, or possess geometrical properties. If the sensuous content was not objectively predicable of bodies, we have little alternative but to consider it mental data. But then what is being considered here is in effect a sanctioning of substantive mental data. This, however, Reid cannot accept.

But if the relevant sensuous content is an objective feature of bodies, then it seems to me that we are forced into a naïve objectivism regarding such sensuous content. Recall Van Cleve's remarks on the naïve view:

> It seems to me, however, that there is something the man in the street believes that Reid, along with the philosophers denies. It is this: there is *sensuous color* in external objects. A good emblem for naïve realism (as I once heard George Pappas say) is the 'cover the earth' logo of the Sherwin-Williams paint company, in which red paint pours out of a tilted bucket and coats the globe. (2011, 289)

Thus, the non-sensory intuition strategy not only commits one to an untenable dual-appearance phenomenology, as Alston suggests, but is also in violation of Reid's anti-naïve objectivist views on colour, taste, smell, sound, and hot/cold.[91] For these reasons, I think the non-sensory acquaintance strategy fails.

C) Conclusion

In this chapter I have argued against the acquaintance interpretation of Reid's theory of perception. In chapter 1 I provided some intuitive considerations for preferring acquaintance models over anti-acquaintance models of perception. These considerations

[91] As for why Reid's view on sensations and secondary qualities is incompatible with the common sense view of the sensuous properties, this matter requires a comprehensive analysis too broad to be tacked on here. I will reserve this matter for next chapter.

should provide some initial motivation for seeking the acquaintance interpretation. I also argued there that if Reid did not subscribe to an acquaintance model of perception, this undermines the diametrical opposition he thinks exists between his position and Locke's on perceptual immediacy. If Reid did not subscribe to the acquaintance model, it appears that his disagreement with Locke on whether external objects are immediate objects of perception is merely verbal. This is so, since Reid's notion of perceptual immediacy would be reduced to the immediacy of the aboutness of belief, something which Locke, at least by Mackie's suggestion, may already concede.

However, Locke's notion of immediacy, which I argued is plausibly an acquaintance-type immediacy view, poses prima facie difficulties for the acquaintance interpretation of Reid, insofar as Reid subscribes to mind/body dualism. This is because on Locke's view, acquaintance-type immediacy presupposes that the mind and the object are contiguous. If perceptual acquaintance implied mind/body contiguity, then Reid could not subscribe to the acquaintance model. Thus, I needed to show how Reid might overcome Locke's picture of perceptual immediacy. At the beginning of this chapter I argued that Reid's anti-contiguity considerations leave logical space for the metaphysical possibility of non-contiguous acquaintance.

With this preliminary discussion in place, I proceeded to outline the basic features of Reid's theory of perception. This involved describing the semiotic relationship between sensation and perception, according to Reid, where perception is thought to be innately suggested by sensations, and the nature of sensations *qua* natural signs. I articulated the defining characteristics of Reid's notion of "conception" – that logically

simple operation which is an ingredient in all acts of mind – and explained how Reid considers sensation and perception as compound operations. Moreover, I noted a prima facie difficulty with Reid's views on consciousness, and suggested a couple of ways in which this difficulty may be overcome.

I then discussed Reid's theory of sensation in more depth, in particular, the nature of his sensation nonsubstantivism. I considered the various definitions of sensation Reid provides, and noted the interpretive debate regarding the particular form of sensation nonsubstantivism, i.e., the adverbial or reflexive view, if either, to which he subscribes. I examined Buras' (2005) reflexive interpretation of Reid's sensation nonsubstantivism. Buras maintains that Reid's reflexive view of sensation is a restatement of Berkeley's theory of sensation. The reflexive view is implied by the act/object ontological homogeneity of sensation, according to which the act of apprehension and the object apprehended are numerically identical. This act/object homogeneity likewise explains why, for Reid, Locke's resemblance thesis is incoherent: mental acts cannot, at least literally, resemble features of external objects. I suggested that one may interpret Reid's critique of Locke's resemblance thesis and his aforementioned critique of Locke's contiguity thesis regarding intentional immediacy as theoretically congruent. It is plausible that a sufficient condition of a sensation's standing in contiguity-type immediacy to the mind is its bearing geometrical properties, or its "spatialization". It is clear that a defining feature of Reid's sensation nonsubstantivism is its incompatibility with the view that sensations bear geometrical properties or attributes which resemble the qualities of bodies. I maintain that a sufficient condition of a substantive view of

sensation is that sensations bear geometrical properties. Such a view "objectivizes" sensations in lock-step with idea substantivism.

After examining Reid's sensation nonsubstantivism, I began my argument against the acquaintance interpretation of Reid. I proposed that Berkeley's objection to Locke's primary/secondary qualities distinction can quite plausibly be thought of as a qualification on the nature of perception by acquaintance. Sensuous properties, I claimed, have a presentative function in any acquaintance-type apprehension of extension or body: in order for bodies to "appear", they must be presented in the garb of sensuous properties. If one accepts this hypothesis, there are two possible strategies for bringing Reid's views in line with the acquaintance model, namely, the projectionist and non-sensory acquaintance strategy. However, neither alternative is viable, given Reid's doctrine of sensation. Reid's sensation nonsubstantivism is incompatible with the projectionist strategy because this strategy entails that sensations bear geometrical properties. Reid's doctrine of sensation is incompatible with the non-sensuous acquaintance strategy, since our perceptual experiences admit only a singular appearance phenomenology. If the non-sensuous acquaintance view was upheld, then, given Reid's theory of sensation, he must concede a dual appearance phenomenology of perceptual experience. This is untenable. The projectionist and non-sensuous acquaintance strategies exhaust the possible ways in which Reid's theory of perception could be brought into line with the acquaintance model, under the aforementioned Berkeleyan hypothesis. Therefore, it follows that, given the Berkeleyan qualifications on acquaintance-type perception, perception, for Reid, cannot be a matter of acquaintance.

For this reason, I think one must abandon the prospect of presentational direct realism in Reid *proper*.

I have provided reasons in chapter 1 for thinking Reid should have subscribed to the acquaintance model of perception. In the next chapter, I will provide reasons for thinking that the central obstacle to the acquaintance interpretation of Reid, namely, his doctrine of sensation, causes him further theoretical hardships. Therefore, the next chapter adds to the arsenal of good reasons he had for reconsidering his doctrine of sensation.

CHAPTER 3: A TENSION IN REID'S THEORY OF PERCEPTION AND SENSATION

A) Introduction

In the previous chapter, I argued that Reid could not have held an acquaintance view of perception. It is vital that sensuous properties are considered features of the external world for any Reidian account of perception that is consistent with perceptual acquaintance, given the analysis of chapter 2. Reid's doctrine of sensation is inconsistent with the objectivity of sensuous properties. However, I have provided reasons why one might think Reid should have held an acquaintance theory of perception. In this chapter, I argue that Reid's doctrine of sensation has other undesirable consequences for him, and that these consequences provide some grounds for him to seriously reconsider the doctrine.

Reid's doctrine of sensation is, I argue, in tension with common sense on the subject of the objective reality of the sensuous properties of colour, sound, taste, smell, and hot/cold. This is an intolerable consequence for him, given the central methodological role he assigns to such common sense intuitions and views. Reid's attempt to reconcile the common sense and theoretical view of colour, taste, smell, etc. fails to take into consideration compelling Berkeleyan intuitions regarding the common sense view on the perception of these properties. Berkeley's understanding of the common sense view on the perception of colour, taste, smell, etc. accords with the acquaintance view of perception. But Reid conceives of objective colours, taste, smell

etc. as the unknown micro-level causes of sensation, and these are not things with which we could possibly be acquainted.

If I am correct in thinking that Reid's strategy for reconciling the common sense view of colour, taste, smell, etc. with his theoretical views on sensation is problematic, then this forces him to make a decision. That is, Reid must either admit that the common sense view is false, or he must side with common sense, and admit that his doctrine of sensations of secondary qualities is false. I argue that Reid cannot abandon common sense in this regard. I suggest that this provides a good reason for him to reconsider his doctrine of sensation in general, something which I do in the next chapter.

B) Reid's Doctrine of Sensation and Common Sense

I) The Methodological Framework of Reid's Study of Mind

It is important to understand that Reid's positive doctrine of the mind has two principal starting points: common sense and introspection (i.e. "attentive reflection").[92] This is important to grasp for my present purposes, since one must understand why it is crucial for Reid to make his theoretical views cohere with common sense views. Reid believes that theorizing about the mind on the basis of either introspection or common sense alone cannot provide us with a complete picture. According to Reid, one of the key lessons of the tradition of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume is that the testimony of consciousness alone cannot give us a complete picture of the nature of the mind or world.[93] For Reid, certain truths about the mind are simply not captured by a purely

[92] On this point, Wolterstorff writes that "…Reid's reflection is a synonym for 'introspection.'" (2001, 21) For Reid on "attentive reflection", e.g., see: (EIP, 1.V., pg: 58-9)
[93] e.g., cf. EIP, 6.V., pg: 471 & EIP, 6. VII., pg: 518-19.

introspective account.[94] Reid's methodological commitment to common sense is largely what sets his study of the mind apart from those of his predecessors.

Reid embraces the spirit of the Cartesian study of mind, insofar as that means concentrating the study on the "…accurate reflection of the operations of our own mind…" (EIP, 2.VIII., pg: 118). Reid writes:

> …[F]rom this source of consciousness is derived all that we know, and indeed all that we can know, of the structure, and of the powers of our own minds… (EIP, 6. VI, pg: 471)

> Descartes must be allowed the honour of being the first who drew a distinct line between the material and intellectual world…One obvious consequence of this distinction was, that accurate reflection on the operations of our own mind is the only way to make any progress in the knowledge of it…We may...truly say, that, in that part of philosophy which relates to the mind, Descartes laid the foundation, and put us into that tract, which all wise men now acknowledge to be the only one in which we can expect success. (EIP, 2. VIII., pg: 118-9)

The bottom line is that Reid and Descartes are aligned in their conviction that the nature of the mind is irreducibly first person. Reid is a substance dualist[95], and his ontology of mind extends no further than first person experience. According to Reid, just as for Descartes, we are conscious of all of our mental operations. As such, "attentive reflection" is the only inlet to the nature of mental operations.

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[94] For example, see Reid's discussion on Hume's denial of a substantial mind contained in *Inquiry*, 2.VII., pg: 36-8. Reid is here responding to Hume's sceptical considerations regarding the existence of a substantial self or mind, a good expression of which is the following. Hume writes: "… [W]hat we call a *mind*, is nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions, united together by certain relations, and suppos'd, tho' falsely, to be endow'd with a perfect simplicity and identity." (*Treatise*, I. IV. 2. pg: 207) Responding to this view, Reid writes:

> "It appears then to be an undeniable fact, that from thought or sensation, all mankind, constantly and invariably, from the first dawn of reflection, do infer a power or faculty of thinking, and a permanent being or mind to which that faculty belongs…[T]his opinion preceded all reasoning, and experience, and instruction…it is impossible to show how our sensations and thoughts can give us the very notion and conception either of a mind or a faculty…it is impossible to discover, by reason, any tie or connection between the one and the other." (37)

[95] For a discussion of Reid's mind/body dualism in relation to his methodology, see: Nichols (2007), pg: 35-8.

For Reid, attentive reflection refers to the critical inward gaze of reflective consciousness, where the mind holds its own operations in view, and exercises its intellectual powers to determine their nature and characteristics. Attentive reflection is distinct from mere consciousness. Reid thinks that consciousness apprehends operations of mind transiently, involuntarily, and without an intellectual grasping of the object. He writes: "…consciousness is involuntary and of no continuance, changing with every thought." (EIP, 1.V., pg: 59) According to Reid, *attentive* consciousness goes a step further; it is a voluntary bringing of an operation of mind into view. This consists of turning one's *mental gaze* or focus away from the objects of concurrent mental operations and redirecting it (inward) to the stream of consciousness that accompanies them. He writes: "[a]ttention is a voluntary act; it requires an active exertion to begin and to continue it; and it may be continued as long as we will…" (EIP, 1.V., pg: 59). For Reid, *reflective* consciousness goes yet a step further: not only does one concentrate one's gaze on the mental operations, but one also inspects them intellectually or through the understanding. Reid writes:

> This power of the understanding to make its own operations its object, to attend to them, and examine them on all sides, is the power of reflection, by which alone we can have any distinct notion of the powers of our own, or other minds…[U]ntil a man has got the habit of attending to the operations of his own mind, he can never have clear and distinct notions of them, nor form any steady judgment concerning them. (EIP, 1.V., pg: 58-9)

However, Reid's praise does not extend to another of Descartes' legacies, namely, in Reid's terminology, the "Cartesian system". This, Reid writes, is the system of those who

> …admit...[of] no other first principle with regard to the existence of things but their own existence, and the existence of those operations of mind of which they are conscious, and

> require…that the existence of the material world, and the existence of other men and things, should be proved by argument. (EIP, 6. VII., pg: 525)

This system is untenable according to Reid chiefly because it terminates in radical *epistemological scepticism*. For Reid, the system ultimately offers no philosophical validation of our ordinary beliefs about ourselves and the world. Such sceptical consequences of the Cartesian system have nowhere been "…so fully displayed as they have been by Mr. Hume", Reid writes (EIP, 6. VII. pg: 526).[96] For Reid, it is the omission of the first principles of common sense in the philosophy of mind that makes possible the radical epistemological scepticism of Hume. Reid thinks this omission is unfounded and radically misconceived. He writes:

> …[I]n reality, Common Sense holds nothing of Philosophy, nor needs her aid. But, on the other hand, Philosophy (if I may be permitted to change the metaphor) has no other root but the principles of Common Sense; it grows out of them, and draws its nourishment from them; severed from this root, its honours wither, its sap is dried up, it dies and rots. (*Inquiry*, 1. IV., pg: 18)

> If there are certain principles, as I think there are, which the constitution of our nature lead us to believe, and which we are under a necessity to take for granted in the common concerns of life, without being able to give a reason for them – these are what we call the principles of common sense; and what is manifestly contrary to them, is what we call absurd. (*Inquiry*, 2. VI, pg: 33)

Reid's principal charge against the Cartesian system is that it suffers from arbitrariness in its admission of the testimony of consciousness as a first principle at the exclusion of other candidate first principles (e.g., the testimony of perception). The testimony of consciousness is admitted as a first principle on the dubious basis that it is an infallible source of truth for the existence and character of what it apprehends – i.e., mental

[96] In the introduction to the *Inquiry*, Reid writes:

> "It seems to be a peculiar strain of humour in this author [Hume], to set out in his introduction, by promising, with a grave face, no less than a complete system of the sciences, upon a foundation entirely new, to wit, that of human nature, when the intention of the whole book is to shew, that there is neither human nature nor science in the world." (*Inquiry*, 1. VI., pg: 20)

operations. For example, Hume, being a good Cartesian in Reid's sense[97], expresses this view succinctly in the following remark:

> …For since all actions and sensations of the mind are known to us by consciousness, they must necessarily appear in every particular what they are, and be what they appear. Everything that enters the mind, being in *reality* a perception, 'tis impossible any thing shou'd to *feeling* appear different. This were to suppose, that even where we are most intimately conscious, we might be mistaken. (*Treatise*, 1.IV. 2., pg: 127)

And in his *Discourse on Method*, the same view is expressed, perhaps more elliptically, by Descartes, when he writes:

> …[F]or although I might suppose that I was dreaming and that all I saw or imagined was false, I could not at any rate deny that the ideas were truly in my consciousness. (27)

Without the claim of the infallibility of consciousness[98], Reid thinks that the rationale for adopting the Cartesian system is undone, and the logical space is made for the principles of common sense to be first principles of knowledge.[99]

Reid's doctrine of common sense is a central aspect of his philosophy. On the nature of Reid's common sense, Wolterstorff (2004) writes:

> The doctrine of common sense has its home, in Reid's thought, in his understanding of the limits of philosophical thought and in his radical picture of the task of the philosopher which emerges from that understanding. (77)[100]

For Reid, common sense is not to be mistaken for mere "vulgar opinion". Opinions generally received that are based on ratiocination rather than self-evidence are not proper

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[97] …aside, of course, from Hume's sceptical considerations regarding the existence of the self. Hume may be thought a Cartesian in the Reidian sense, insofar as here he does not deny the existence of the mind, but merely redefines it.

[98] The matter of exactly how Descartes should be interpreted, and whether he was an *infalliblist* in the sense in which Reid thinks he is is too dense to be discussed here.

[99] For Reid's discussion on the epistemic circularity of Cartesian infalliblism in particular, see EIP, 6. V., pg: 480-1. For Reid's general discussion on epistemic circularity and scepticism, see: EIP, 7. IV., pg: 571-2. I will not assess the merits or demerits of Reid's falliblist foundationalism, or foundationalism more generally.

[100] For further discussion of Reid's doctrine of common sense and related themes, see also: Wolterstorff (1987) "Hume and Reid", and: Somerville (1987), "Reid's Conception of Common Sense."

to common sense. The domain of intuitive (instinctual) judgments under which our way of life is made possible constitutes the cannon of common sense first principles. [101] Here are a few examples of Reid's common sense first principles (taken from the section in EIP entitled, *The first principles of contingent truths*):

> …[T]he thoughts of which I am conscious, are the thoughts of a being which I call *myself*, my *mind*, my *person*… (6. V., pg: 472)
>
> …T]hose things did really happen which I distinctly remember… (6. V., pg: 474)
>
> …[T]hat the natural faculties, by which we distinguish truth from error, are not fallacious… (6. V., pg: 480)
>
> …[T]here is life and intelligence in our fellow-men with whom we converse… (6. V., pg: 482)

However, the methodological scope of common sense is not merely an enumeration of these first principles. Common sense is the very faculty of intuitive judgment that is presupposed by human life and conduct, insofar as it is, Reid writes, common sense which "…entitles [human beings]…to the denomination of reasonable creatures." (EIP, 6. II., pg: 433)[102] But then the epistemic import of common sense, *qua* faculty of intuitive judgment, goes beyond those opinions identifiable in common discourse which inform our way of life. It extends beyond these first principles to all propositions, insofar

[101] See: EIP, 6. II., pg: 433

[102] On just how we are to understand Reid's first principles of common sense, I think Patrick Rysiew (2001) offers a good interpretation. Rysiew thinks that the first principles of common sense are, for Reid, "constitutive principles", which means that they "…create the very possibility of cognizing at all." (449). Rysiew interprets Reid's first principles as analogous to Kant's "transcendental conditions of experience", though he notes one important difference. The important difference is that whereas for Kant, the transcendental conditions of experience are universal and metaphysically necessary conditions of any possible experience, for Reid, first principles are "contingent". That is to say, for Reid, but not for Kant,"…our constitution (and so our view of what is essential to cognition as such) might have been very different from what it is…" (449). According to Rysiew, "[t]he first principles are constitutive principles: they are beliefs that do and ought to guide the rest of our belief-forming and belief-revising practices; for, given our constitution, they really are, at least for us, the axioms or laws underlying any activity of forming and revising beliefs at all." (456). Rysiew's interpretation of Reid's first principles of common sense makes it possible to interpret Reid's position as more than simply a restatement of Hume's doctrine of natural belief, i.e., as a purely descriptive enumeration of psychologically necessary belief.

as their truth or falsity may be discovered intuitively.[103] This is why it is important that Reid's doctrines do not appear patently absurd to the vulgar: the vulgar are agents of intuitive judgment, and as such can recognize self-evident falsity in a given metaphysical proposition.[104] Thus, it is clear why Reid must be careful not to assign any error to "the vulgar" on the basis of philosophical dispensation. He writes:

> …[T]he province of common sense is more extensive in refutation than in confirmation. A conclusion drawn by a train of just reasoning from true principles cannot possibly contradict any decision of common sense, because truth will always be consistent with itself. (EIP, 6. II., pg: 433)

Now, since Reid's doctrine of sensation is not captured by the cannon of common sense principles[105], common sense cannot deliver its positive ground – one cannot simply read this doctrine off by enumerating the principles of common sense. Thus, its positive ground must rest on the deliverances of introspection. But Reid's doctrines must not appear patently absurd to the vulgar, common sense view. Reid goes to great measures to reconcile his doctrine of the sensations of secondary qualities with the vulgar view.

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[103] Indeed, Reid takes common sense as synonymous with "common judgment" (EIP, 6. II., pg: 427). See also: EIP, 7. IV., pg: 572, where Reid calls the belief in first principles "…an act of pure judgment without reasoning…"

[104] See: EIP, 6. II., pg: 433

[105] The considerations behind this claim are manifold, but it may suffice to take notice of the following passage. Reid writes:

> "SENSATION, and the perception of external objects by the senses, though very different in their nature, have commonly been considered as one and the same thing. The purposes of common life do not make it necessary to distinguish them, and the received opinions of philosophers tend rather to confound them…" (*Inquiry*, 6. XX., pg: 167)

But it is precisely the purposes of common life from which the cannon of common sense first principles are necessarily derived. And thus, it cannot be said that the bifurcation of sensation from perception in need of theoretical substantiation may be captured by the common sense view on the faculties of the mind. Thus, Reid's doctrine of sensation escapes common sense. If anything is a technical notion in Reid, one that may not be extrapolated from common sense intuitions on the mind, it is sensation. The vulgar view of pain experience likewise does not distinguish between the perception of pain and the sensation of pain. They go under one and the same name (e.g., see: EIP, 2. XVIII., pg: 213). Indeed, there is a vulgar notion of sensation, like our notion of pain, but the full blown nonsubstantive view of sensation is something absent from this notion.

However, his proposed reconciliatory strategy is problematic. Let me now examine the difficulties with his reconciliatory strategy, and add some further detail regarding the importance of this reconciliation for Reid's project.

II) The Tension Between Reid's Sensations of Secondary Qualities and Common Sense

In this section I argue against Reid's purported reconciliation of the philosophical and common sense view on the objective reality of colour, smell, taste, sound, and hot/cold. Reid does not adequately address the tension between his view on the objective reality of colour, smell, taste, sound, and hot/cold and common sense naïve objectivism regarding these properties. Given the methodological role common sense plays in Reid's philosophy, something I've explained above, this is a problem. If Reid does not offer a satisfactory account of how his views on sensations of secondary qualities cohere with common sense views, then this should be taken as a point against his views. The discussion of this section provides a theoretical basis for rejecting Reid's views regarding sensations of colour, smell, taste, sound, and hot/cold.

According to Reid, recall, perception, i.e., the conception of and belief in the present existence of extra-mental objects, is triggered or initiated by our awareness of sensations. Sensations are subjective modifications. Our perceptions of extra-mental reality are innately "inspired" by sensory appearances in the mind.[106]

Reid's ontology of sensation consists of two general types, which may be called *paradigmatic* and *non-paradigmatic* sensations, respectively. Both have their own

[106] Recall chapter 2, sec. B.I.

respective semiotic function. The first are what is ordinarily referred to as sensations, namely, tickles, aches, pains, shivers, titillations, erotic sensations, etc.; in short, bodily feelings. It is proper to call these "paradigmatic" sensations for Reid insofar as he thinks they exemplify the general features of sensation per se and are referred to as "sensations" in common language. Thus, such sensations serve as the least controversial example of sensation throughout Reid's discourse. Reid writes that "[w]hat has been said of the sensation of pain may be said of all mere sensation." (EIP, 1. I., pg: 37) On the other hand, Reid's sensations of the sense modalities, i.e., sensory appearances of sound, smell, color, tastes, and hot/cold and the other "sensations of touch"[107] are more controversial. They are properly "non-paradigmatic" because they are, for Reid, either not referred to, or at least not unambiguously referred to, in common language, and their existence is more controversial to common opinion.

In chapter 2, I mentioned that Reid uses some provocative phrasing in referring to the visual sensations of colour as "apparitions" of the mind, and as "ideas". Reid writes:

> When a coloured body is presented, there is a certain apparition to the eye, or to the mind, which we have called *the appearance of colour*. Mr. Locke calls it *an idea*; and indeed it may be called so with the greatest propriety. This idea can have no existence but when it is perceived. It is a kind of thought, and can only be the act of a percipient or thinking being. (*Inquiry*, 6. V., pg: 86)

It is clear is that the sensuous properties of colour, smells, taste, sound, and hot and cold, insofar as these are all sensory appearances for Reid, are mere apparitions, subjective modifications, or mental phenomena. But then it seems to follow, as it had (notoriously) for Locke, that the external world is devoid of all colours, smells, sounds, tastes, and hot/cold.

[107] This is Reid's terminology (e.g., see: *Inquiry*, 5. III., pg: 58). The sensations of touch include the natural sensory signs of our tactile perceptions of bodies, i.e., "pressure sensations".

The question that should be asked at this point is how Reid evades being committed to Locke's idealism of colour, sound, smell, taste, and hot and cold? This is very important, since Reid thinks that colour, sound, smell, etc. idealism is part of the (descending) logical sequence of the theory of ideas, spanning from Descartes to Hume. Reid considers it one of the seminal offenses to common sense committed by the ideal system. He thinks this is a system whose terminus, recall, is the complete theoretical erosion of all epistemic warrant for our naïve, common sense beliefs.

Reid writes:

> The Cartesians…beginning to give attention to their sensations, first discovered that the sensations corresponding to secondary qualities, cannot resemble any quality of body. Hence, Des Cartes and Locke inferred, that sound, taste, smell, colour, heat, and cold, which the vulgar took to be qualities of body, were not qualities of body, but mere sensations of the mind. Afterwards the ingenious Berkeley, considering more attentively the nature of sensation in general, discovered, and demonstrated, that no sensation whatever could possibly resemble any quality of an insentient being, such as body is supposed to be: and hence he inferred, very justly, that there is the same reason to hold extension, figure, and all the primary qualities, to be mere sensations, as there is to hold the secondary qualities to be mere sensations. Thus, by reasoning upon the Cartesian principles, matter was stript of all its qualities; the new system, by a kind of metaphysical sublimation, converted all the qualities of matter into sensations, and spiritualized body, as the old [i.e., the Peripatetics] materialized spirit. (*Inquiry*, 7., pg: 210)

Thus, Reid considers it a virtue of his view that he avoids the colour, sound, smell, etc. idealism of Locke and the idea theorists. But there is more than just a superficial similarity between Reid and Locke on the subject of colour, smell, taste, sound, and hot/cold. Reid does endorse a variant of the primary/secondary qualities distinction, a distinction which for Locke is intimately connected with the ideality of colour, sound, smell, taste, and hot/cold. Precisely how Reid may distance himself from the colour, sound., smell, etc. idealism of Locke is not immediately obvious. Reid compares Locke's view of primary/secondary qualities with his own primary/secondary distinction in his

discussion of how he avoids colour, smell, sound, etc. idealism. In order to understand Reid's position here, a digression into Locke and the original distinction is in order.

The primary/secondary distinction is a complicated matter in Locke, though here I am concerned, once again, with Reid's Locke, and therefore the central point of the distinction can be unpacked uncontroversially. I take the liberty of filling in some of the finer details of Locke's account for consistency's sake, though these details are meant to be a refinement of Locke's view as Reid understands it.[108]

In EHU 2. VIII. 9-26., pg: 27-31, Locke discusses his theory of primary and secondary qualities at length. First, one must have a general understanding of what Locke means by "qualities". "Qualities" are principally distinguished from "ideas". An *idea* for Locke, recall, is "…the immediate object of perception, thought, or understanding…" (*Essay* 2. VIII. 8., pg: 27). "Qualities", on the other hand, are the powers[109] or characteristics in the objects that are the causes of our sensory ideas. Elaborating on this point, Locke writes:

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[108] They are refinements on Locke's account as Reid understands it insofar as Reid is committed to the literal interpretation of Locke's resemblance thesis, and the view that Lockean qualities are powers. Both of these views are explicated below.

[109] Even primary qualities, then, are "powers". They are not "bare powers", however, unlike the secondary qualities (as I will explain below). Vere Chappell's (2007) paper in The *Cambridge Companion to Locke's "Essay"* entitled: "Power in Locke's Essay" makes this point. He writes:

> "Locke doesn't explicitly say that they [i.e. primary qualities] also are powers, some scholars have supposed he does not take them to be. But that is a mistake. Not only has Locke said [in the passage given above] that qualities in general are powers, but in later passages he makes it explicit that primary qualities too cause simple ideas in perceivers, for example 'These…*original* or *primary Qualities* of Body…produce simple *Ideas* in us,' and so must be powers to do so. The difference between primary and secondary qualities, apart from the fact that a body may lack one or more species of the latter, is that secondary qualities are nothing but powers [i.e., 'bare powers'], whereas primary qualities are powers and something besides. What this extra something might be, Locke never explicitly says, though some scholars have tried to work out what he must have had in mind…" (134-5)

> Whatever the mind perceives in itself or is the immediate object of perception, thought, or understanding, that I call idea, and the power to produce any idea in our mind I call a quality of the subject in which that power is. Thus, a snowball having the power to produce in us the ideas of white, cold, and round, the power to produce those ideas in us as they are in the snowball I call qualities; and as they are sensations or perceptions in our understandings I call them ideas… (EHU, 2. VIII. 8., pg: 27)

This passage is obscure. Reid himself comments on the entanglements of this passage (as well as a passage preceding it which I have not discussed). Reid writes:

> I believe it will be difficult to find two other paragraphs in the Essay so unintelligible. Whether this is to be imputed to the intractable nature of ideas, or to an oscitancy in the author, with which he is very rarely chargeable, I leave the reader to judge. There are, indeed, several other passages in the same chapter, in which a like obscurity appears; but I do not chuse to dwell upon them. (EIP, 2. XVII., pg: 208)

Most importantly, there is a pernicious ambiguity in the use of "they". Locke *does not* mean that *ideas* are in the snowball, and that *qualities* are those powers the snowball possesses which produce these same ideas in our minds. Rather, "as they are in the snowball" I take to be a roundabout way of saying that the relevant powers are predicable of the snowball; the referent of "they" is the causal power in the object. There is an inverse confusion regarding the referent of "they" in *...and as they are sensations or perceptions in our understanding*... At first glance, it appears that the word refers to the powers that produce our sensations or perceptions. But this is absurd, since the statement would therefore be that the powers in the object responsible for producing our sensations and perceptions are themselves sensations and perceptions. We mustn't confuse Locke's *qualities*, which are causal powers in the extra-mental object (e.g., the snowball) that produce sensory data in the mind, with those very ideas produced in the mind by such

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The relevant distinction is not one between secondary qualities conceived as powers, and primary qualities conceived as something else. The distinction consists in the type of power the quality is: as I interpret it, for Locke a quality is "bare" when its effect is not an instantiation (qualitatively) of the same property or attribute in the object that causes it. Primary qualities produce ideas in us which are property instantiations of these qualities that cause the idea.

powers. Qualities are subdivided into primary and secondary qualities (the latter are a subset of "bare" powers), and this subdivision will be explained below. The key is that primary and secondary qualities are first and foremost categories of the causal powers of extra-mental objects that produce sensory ideas.

I think Locke is at fault for the subsequent bastardization of his distinction between ideas and qualities on the part of one of his staunchest critics, namely Berkeley; and this confusion is even repeated, to some extent, by Reid. Ideas in the mind are produced by qualities in the object. We mustn't confuse qualities, primary or secondary, which are attributes of physical objects, for the ideas these qualities produce. Yet, perhaps due to the obscurity and lack of precision Locke is prone to in his discussions of qualities and ideas, Berkeley equated Locke's secondary qualities with colours, sounds, smells, tastes and hot/cold. For example, Berkeley writes:

> Those who assert that figure, motion, and the rest of the primary or original qualities do exist without the mind in unthinking substances do at the same time acknowledge that colors, sounds, heat, cold, and secondary qualities of a similar kind do not—which they tell us are sensations existing in the mind alone that depend that depend on the different size, texture, and motion of the minute particles of matter. (*Principles*, 1. X., pg: 140)

Likewise, the confusion, at least in letter, is repeated by Reid. He writes:

> Every one knows that extension, divisibility, figure, motion, solidity, hardness, softness, and fluidity, were by Mr LOCKE called *primary qualities of body*; and that sound, colour, taste, smell, and heat or cold, were called *secondary qualities.* (EIP, 2. XVII., pg: 201)

Yet, Reid does not really maintain this position. Over the course of his treatment of Locke's primary/secondary distinction and doctrine of resemblance he is more careful to distinguish the ideas produced by secondary qualities and the secondary qualities per se. Reid recognizes Locke's proneness to obscurity in this matter (e.g., see: EIP, 2. XVII., pg: 209-10).

Enumerating the qualities he calls primary, Locke lists *solidity*, *extension*, *figure*, and *mobility* (EHU, 2. VIII. 9., pg: 27). These qualities, he writes,

> …may be properly called *real*, *original*, or *primary qualities*, because they are in the things themselves, whether they are perceived or not. And upon their different modifications it is that the secondary qualities depend. (EHU, 2. VIII. 23., pg: 30)

These are, for Locke, the essential properties of bodies. They are "… utterly inseparable from the body in whatever state it is; such as in all the alterations and changes it suffers…" (EHU, 2. VIII. 9., pg: 27). It is manifest that (most) primary qualities are instantiated at the macro-level of perceptible organization of bodies as well as at the micro-level of organisation. John Yolton (2000) writes:

> Primary qualities belong to macro as well as micro objects…On the corpuscular theory accepted by Locke and others, the causal power affecting perceivers is located with the insensible particles. The *perceived* primary qualities are not the qualities of the corpuscles, although the corpuscles have some of those qualities, e.g., hardness, size, and motion. (138)

The key to the division between primary and secondary qualities lies in Locke's resemblance thesis. Locke writes that "...the ideas of primary qualities of bodies are resemblances of them, and their patterns do really exist in the bodies themselves." (EHU, 2. VIII. 15., pg: 28) It is a matter of controversy exactly how Locke's resemblance thesis should be interpreted.[110] However, it is clear that Reid interpreted it as a matter of literal resemblance, likeness, or "real resemblance" (EIP, 2. IX., pg: 131).[111] Any literal

[110] According to Michael Jacovides (1999), there are "…three rival interpretations [of locke's resemblance thesis]." (463) According to Jacovides, on the first interpretation Locke's resemblance thesis is explained in terms of a rejection of the scholastic theory of perception. On this interpretation, Jacovides writes: "By denying that the ideas of secondary qualities resemble anything in bodies, Locke intends in part to reject the scholastic theory of perception." (463) On the second interpretation, Locke's notion of resemblance is interpreted "…so that an idea 'resembles' its quality just in case the quality explains the production of its idea." (464). On the third interpretation, "[a]n idea of a quality resembles that quality in a body just in case the body has that quality." (465). Jacovides (463-5) identifies the respective deficiencies of each interpretation. Addressing these alternative interpretations of Locke's resemblance thesis goes beyond the scope of my present discussion.

[111] Recall the discussion of chapter 2 sec. B.II. Also, see: *Inquiry*, 5. VIII., pg: 73-5.

resemblance or similitude must instantiate some aspect or property of what it resembles, that is, precisely that aspect or property which makes the two things resemble each other. That ideas literally resemble extra-mental objects is precisely the view on which much of Reid's criticism of Locke is focused.

The literal interpretation of Lockean resemblance is now perhaps held in disrepute[112], though Michael Jacovides (1999) argues for the literal interpretation of Lockean resemblance. He writes:

> Locke implies that resembling ideas represent by exemplifying, which is to say that they represent in virtue of sharing or nearly sharing some attribute with the body they depict…'[R]esemblance' itself connotes that the resembling objects share or come close to sharing some attribute. (469)
>
> Locke explicitly asserts that figures exist in ideas just as they exist in bodies. At 2.8.18 he writes, 'A Circle or Square are the same, whether in *Idea* or Existence." At 4.4.6 he writes, 'Is it true of the *Idea* of a *Triangle*, that its three Angles are equal to two right ones? It is also true of a *Triangle*, where-ever it really exists.' These passages imply that our ideas have shapes and that these shapes have geometrical properties. If it is a mistake to say that images have figures in the same sense that bodies do, then Locke makes that mistake." (476)
>
> On my reading of the texts and the gaps in the texts, Locke wants to assert that ideas literally resemble bodies with respect to shape, and he wants to reserve judgment on whether they literally resemble bodies with respect to solidity. If this reading is right, then he is making conceptual room for a new thing, a mental image that is both literally shaped and incorporeal. (480) [113]

Thus, on this interpretation, our ideas of primary qualities literally resemble the primary qualities, which is to say that sensory ideas of a particular shape, for instance, possess geometrical properties or attributes.

The notion that qualities are "powers" needs to be squared with the notion that, in the case of ideas of primary qualities, there exist literal resemblance relations between the

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[112] e.g., see: Bennett (1971), 106; Yolton (1984).

[113] Incidentally, Jacovides provides an account of how the idea of motion literally resembles, or instantiates, the attribute of motion. Jacovides writes:

> "An idea of motion is an aspect of a succession of ideas representing the positions of a body. If the ideas of position resemble the relevant positions—if the individual frames are reasonable likenesses with respect to position—and the elapsed durations are about the same, then the idea of motion accurately represents and literally resembles the motion out in the world." (1999, 478)

quality and the idea it produces. There is one difficulty here, as far as I can see. Solidity, extension, shape, and mobility are properties of macro-level objects, or objects in a perceptible organization, as well as micro-level entities. But the primary qualities, insofar as they are those causal powers in the objects that produce our sensory ideas of primary qualities, are, as Yolton above states, "located with the insensible particles". But if so, then how can our ideas of primary qualities literally resemble the primary qualities of objects, thus conceived? Our sensory idea of a particular shape, for instance, is of a macro-level shape. Were this idea to literally resemble a shape out in the world, the shape it resembles must, it seems, be a macro-level shape. But if the relevant resemblance holds between the sensory idea of shape, and a macro-level shape, then it seems to follow from Yolton's thesis that the idea does not resemble the power causing that idea.

Apart from abandoning the view that primary qualities are the causal powers responsible for the production of our ideas of primary qualities, there are two ways to circumvent this difficulty. First, one might maintain that our sensory idea of shape bears (general) resemblance relations to micro-level primary qualities. The idea and object both instantiate (recall Locke's terminology, "exemplify") the attribute of *shape*, even if perhaps not the same shape. Thus, one may challenge the claim that the relevant resemblance relation concerns the resemblance of the shape of our idea and a macro level shape. Second, one might consider macro-features to factor into the production of our sensory ideas in a way which does not challenge Yolton's thesis. This may be done in the following way: if macro-level primary qualities are simply features of the aggregative whole of micro-level entities, then they are ontologically reducible to the micro-level

entities. If one takes a reductionist view of macro-level primary qualities, then I see no tension between Yolton's thesis and thinking macro-level primary qualities are causal determinants.[114] I therefore submit that the literal resemblance interpretation, even if it asserts a resemblance between our sensory ideas and macro-level shapes, squares with the central Lockean position that primary qualities are "powers". This is just to say that aggregates of micro-level entities have some causal import.

Accordingly, it is consistent with the literal resemblance interpretation that the shape of a tangible cube is itself a causal determinant within the production of our tactile sensory idea of that shape when I touch the cube. Similarly, the quality of rectangular figure (my computer screen, for instance) is a quality in the object in part responsible for producing my visual sensory idea of that figure when the screen is before my eyes. So, this is to say that an object produces the sensory idea of a particular shape by actually being a (macro-level) instantiation of that shape. Primary qualities like shape, etc., are "powers" thus conceived, and moreover, the ideas of primary qualities literally resemble these powers in the object.[115]

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[114] When we are speaking of qualities, we are not speaking of subjective or environmental conditions of perception, but the powers *in the object* which play their part in the production of sensory ideas. On Locke's corpuscularian view, sensory ideas require bodies acting through "impulse" on the sense organ. Take the case of vision. The ideas of primary qualities are visually perceivable, and yet the objects which produce these ideas are at a distance from the eye. Locke believes that the impression the object makes on the eye is transmitted via "insensible particles" travelling through the air from the object and striking the eye (EHU, 2. VIII. 12., pg: 27-8). Thus, the object must have the power of transmitting or directing insensible particles to the eye, and these are micro-level powers. Nevertheless, the object's macro-level shape or figure is, as an aggregate of the micro-level particles, responsible for the particular organization or *grouping* of the insensible particles which it reflects toward the eye. Thus, it seems the structure or organization of the impression these insensible particles make on the retina would be, in part, a function of the macro-level shape or figure of the object from which they originate.

[115] Two further questions one might raise regarding this interpretation are the following: 1) According to my view, shape and the other primary qualities are powers. But then how could an idea instantiate a shape without consequently instantiating a power? To this I say that a thing's macro-level shape is a causal determinant in the production of sensory ideas, but only insofar as this shape is considered an aggregation

For Locke, things are quite different in the case of secondary qualities and the sensory ideas they produce. Locke writes that a secondary quality is

> …the power that is in any body *by reason of its insensible* primary qualities to operate after a peculiar manner on any of our senses and thereby *produce in us* the *different ideas* of several colors, sounds, smells, tastes, etc. (EHU, 2. VIII. 23., pg: 30)

Colours, sounds, smells, tastes, and hot and cold are the ideas produced by the secondary qualities of bodies or objects. But unlike the case of primary qualities, an object produces sensory ideas of colour, sound, smell, taste, or hot and cold not in virtue of its actually instantiating these sensuous properties. That is to say, how a lemon produces the sensory idea of yellow, or sourness, for instance, is not by its actually being yellow or sour. Secondary qualities are what Locke calls "bare powers". Locke gives what he takes as an uncontroversial example of bare power, and draws an analogy to the case of secondary qualities and the ideas they produce. He writes:

> …[W]hen we consider the sun in reference to wax which it melts or blanches, we look on the whiteness and softness produced in the wax, not as qualities in the sun, but effects produced by *powers* in it. Whereas, if rightly considered, these qualities of light and warmth, which are perceptions in me when I am warmed or enlightened by the sun, are no otherwise in the sun than the changes made in the wax, when it is blanched or melted, are in the sun. (EHU, 2. VIII. 24., pg: 30)

For Locke, secondary qualities are powers in objects which produce sensory ideas that do not instantiate the quality in the object causing them, just as the liquidation of the wax

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of micro-level entities. Sensory ideas instantiate macro-level shapes, but not in their intrinsic constitutions, just as a picture or drawing of a pear may instantiate the geometrical shape of the pear, without instantiating the material constitution of the shape of the real pear, considered as identical with the aggregation of micro-level particles. 2) According to my view, sensory ideas are instantiations of shapes, figures, etc. But then it appears one is committed to thinking that sensory ideas possess primary qualities! Thus, the firm distinction I provided above, i.e., that ideas are in the mind and qualities are in the object, appears to be put in jeopardy by the literal resemblance interpretation. Indeed, Jacovides appears content in considering ideas to possess primary qualities, given the literal resemblance interpretation of Locke (see: 1999, 474). However, it appears that if Locke's primary qualities are powers, then we have a way out of thinking that ideas possess primary qualities, even on the literal resemblance interpretation. They do not possess primary qualities, since though they possess shape, for instance, their shape is not, given the preceding, a power. And thus, ideas do not possess primary qualities, since qualities are defined as powers in the object. Only shapes in objects qualify as powers.

caused by a power in the sun does not instantiate that power in the sun producing this change. This is what it means to be a "bare power". A bare power is a type of power we impute to a causal agent that effects change in other objects without the resulting effect instantiating the properties of the causal power in the agent. This is the kind of causation we see in the great range of ordinary cases, but also comprises the powers of objects to cause us sensations of pain and pleasure. The power of an object to cause pain is a bare power, since the pain we feel is never considered an instantiation of, say, the quality of sharpness in the sword that brings us this pain.

But this commits Locke to a controversial, and for Reid intolerable, thesis, namely, that sounds, smells, colours, flavours, and hot and cold are not objective features of the world, but are only sensory ideas in the mind. The sensory ideas of solidity, extension, motion, and figure instantiate properties that really exist in the objects producing these ideas. Shapes, figures, motions, etc. all exist in mind-independent reality. By contrast, the ideas produced by secondary qualities, just like sensations of pain, instantiate no property of the external world whatsoever. Locke writes:

> The particular *bulk*, *number*, *figure*, *and motion of the parts of fire or snow are really in them*, whether anyone's senses perceive them or not. And therefore they may be called *real qualities*, because they really exist in those bodies. But *light*, *heat*, *whiteness*, or *coldness are no more really in them than sickness or pain is in* manna. Take away the sensation of them; let the eyes not see light, or colors, nor the ears hear sounds; let the palate not taste, nor the nose smell; and all colors, tastes, odors, and sounds as they are such particular *ideas* vanish and cease, and are reduced to their causes, i.e., bulk, figure, and motion of parts. (EHU, 2. VIII. 17., pg: 28-9)

This goes against common opinion, which treats colours, sounds, tastes, smells, and hot/cold as "real" properties. By contrast, for Locke, colours, sounds, smells, tastes, and hot/cold are for Locke ideas (sensations) *only*. They are not predicable of objects, and are utterly distinct from the secondary qualities of objects which produce them. The

secondary qualities are powers which depend on the object's composition of primary qualities. Secondary qualities, then, are not colours, sounds, smells, tastes, and hot/cold, but rather are bare powers the object has in virtue of its primary qualities (EHU, 2. VIII. 24., pg: 30).

How does Locke account for the erroneous common opinion? Locke gives us the following consideration to account for this error: colours, sounds, and the ideas produced by secondary qualities – just like pain sensations – do not represent bulk, figure, motion, or extension. Nor do they have any "…apparent congruity or conceivable connection…" with primary qualities (EHU, 2. VIII. 25., pg: 30). No trace of the primary qualities is apparent in the properties of ideas produced by secondary qualities, and there is no conceivable connection between them. In virtue of this fact, so Locke says, we are apt to think that the properties of these sensory ideas are *not* the effects of primary qualities. But the sensuous properties of colour and scent, for instance, must have some causal relation to the physical object that we apprehend when we experience instances of colour and scent. It appears that the only things that can be congruent, or have any conceivable connection, with sensuous properties of colour and scent are other instances of colour and scent. Thus, what can cause our idea of colour must, it seems, be a colour inhering objectively in the extra-mental objects. That is, we believe that the sensory idea of blue is produced by a quality in the object which instantiates the colour blue. (EHU, 2. VIII. 25., pg: 30-1)

Now, Reid adheres to some form of the primary/secondary qualities distinction. He writes:

> The distinction betwixt primary and secondary qualities hath had several revolutions. Democritus and Epicurus, and their followers, maintained it. Aristotle and the Peripatetics abolished it. Des Cartes, Malebranche, and Locke , revived it…But Bishop Berkeley again discarded this distinction…Yet, after all, there appears to be a real foundation for it in the principles of our nature. (*Inquiry*, 5. V., pg: 62)

The "real foundation" for the primary/secondary distinction Reid observes is a complex matter which requires careful unpacking. In crucial ways Reid's views radically diverge from Locke's, yet in other ways they do not. Nevertheless, Reid's position is defined in large part by contrast with Locke's, and so, it is important to explicate these differences for my present purposes.

First, Locke thinks that the sensations produced by the secondary qualities (e.g., the sensation of colour) do not resemble those qualities inhering in the external object which, in part, produce them. I have interpreted this to mean that that quality in the object which produces the sensory idea of blue, for example, is not itself an instance of the property of blue.[116] For Locke, things are different in the case of those sensations produced by the primary qualities. The sensations of primary qualities instantiate the attribute in the object which produce them (i.e., figure, solidity, and so forth). Thus, for example, on Locke's view, it is in virtue of an object's being square that we have a sensory idea of squareness. Thus, the difference between primary and secondary qualities for Locke has to do with the difference in the respective sensations produced by them. Sensations produced by primary qualities resemble primary qualities, whereas sensations produced by secondary qualities do not.

[116] Inversely, we may say that the property of blueness contained in the sensory idea, on the Lockean picture, is not (qualitatively speaking) an instance of that quality in the external object producing this sensation.

This basis for the distinction is unavailable to Reid, since by Reid's account no sensation whatsoever can resemble (i.e., instantiate) any extra-mental (physical) property. He writes:

> We need not have recourse to any hypothesis to know what our sensations are, or what they are like. By a proper degree of reflection and attention we may understand them perfectly, and be as certain that they are not like any quality of body, as we can be, that the toothach is not like a triangle. (*Inquiry*, 5. VIII., pg: 74)

And in EIP, he writes:

> …[H]ad Mr LOCKE attended with sufficient accuracy to the sensations which he was every day and every hour receiving from primary qualities, he would have seen that they can as little resemble any quality of an inanimated being, as pain can resemble a cube or a circle. (2. XVII., pg: 200)

For Reid, sensations are all on a par in this respect. Reid, recall, is a sensation nonsubstantivist, which means that sensations have no intentional object, perhaps other than themselves. This entails, as was shown in chapter 2, that sensations bear no resemblance to physical, mind-independent objects. So, Locke's basis for the primary/secondary distinction, construed in terms of the properties of sensations resembling or not resembling the qualities in physical objects which cause them, is prohibited.[117]

At most, any categorization of the sensations of the five sense modalities with reference to the primary/secondary qualities distinction for Reid must be in terms of a difference regarding the respective *perceptions* the sensations suggest. For Reid, the

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[117] In some closing remarks within his analysis of the primary/secondary distinction, Reid writes:

> "Upon the whole, Mr LOCKE, in making secondary qualities to be powers in bodies to excite certain sensation in us, has given a just and distinct analysis of which our senses discover concerning them; but, in applying the theory of ideas to them, and to the primary qualities, he has been led to say things that darken the subject, and that will not bear examination." (EIP, 2. XVII., pg: 209-10)

sensations of the sense modalities are differentiated by the types of perceptions they suggest. The epistemic distinction in the respective perceptions themselves is the root of Reid's primary/secondary distinction. For Reid, the perception of primary properties immediately suggested by the sensations of primary qualities consists of a "….direct and…distinct notion of the primary properties…[which] informs us [of] what they are in themselves….". For Reid, the perception immediately suggested by the sensations of secondary properties consists of "…a relative and obscure notion…" of the secondary properties (EIP, 2. XVII., pg: 201). Thus, the nature of our (original) perceptual conception of primary properties[118] is such that it intentionally captures the objective qualities *in themselves*, in the particular, or in their intrinsic natures. This is not so in the case of our (original) perceptual conceptions of the secondary qualities, which captures secondary qualities *generally, relationally*, and not in their intrinsic natures. In illustration of the difference between our (original) perceptual conceptions of primary and secondary qualities, respectively, Reid writes:

> …[T]here are many objects of thought, and of discourse, of which our faculties can give no better than a relative notion…[O]ur notion of primary qualities is not of this kind; we know what they are, and not barely what relation they bear to something else. It is otherwise with secondary qualities. If you ask me, what is that quality or modification in a rose which I call its smell, I am at a loss to answer directly. The quality in the rose is something which occasions the sensation in me; but what that something is, I know not. My senses give me no information upon this point…The relation which this unknown quality bears to the sensation with which nature hath connected it, is all I learn from the sense of smelling; but this is evidently a relative notion. The same reasoning will apply to every secondary quality. (EIP, 2. XVII., pg: 202)

According to Reid, sensory appearances of colour, odour, flavour, etc. all *suggest the perception of their corresponding secondary quality*, i.e., that quality in the object

[118] For Reid, the category of primary qualities consists of the same list of qualities Locke classified as primary – (tangible) figure, extension, divisibility, motion, and solidity.

which cause them. For Reid, these secondary qualities are, in their scientific conception, just as Locke conceived them. Pressure waves or vibrations in the air cause sensations of sound, various textures on the surfaces of objects cause sensory appearances of colour. However, as Keith Lehrer (1978) notes, these scientific notions of the objective causes of sensations of secondary qualities are "…*not* what is immediately suggested by sensation but what is hypothesized in philosophical and scientific reasoning." (189).[119] Things are different in the case of the perception of primary qualities. Tactile sensations of hardness and shape suggest perceptions of the primary qualities which cause them, and the resulting perception apprehends them in their intrinsic nature. That is to say, sensations of primary qualities suggest the conception of and belief in the present existence of solidity or cohesion, etc..

To reiterate, for Reid, the difference in the kind of original perception we have of primary and secondary qualities, respectively, is what constitutes the "real foundation" of the primary/secondary distinction. Our perceptions of secondary properties consist of the obscure or general notion of the extra-mental cause of sensory appearances of color, sound, taste smell, and hot and cold. On the other hand, our perceptions of the primary qualities consist of a distinct and non-relational conception of extra-mental qualities, i.e., quite apart from any conception of their corresponding sensations. As such, the

[119] As Jennifer McKitrick (2002) notes, "…the perception of the intrinsic nature of a primary quality is immediate, but the perception of the intrinsic nature of a secondary quality, if it occurs at all, is mediated…" (492) The distinction involves Reid's original/acquired perception distinction (recall previous discussion in: chapter 2, sec. B. I & III.). McKitrick writes:

> "I understand Reid to be saying that one can have acquired perceptions of primary and secondary qualities, and one can have original perceptions of primary qualities, but one cannot have original perceptions of secondary qualities, except as unknown causes of sensations [and not in their intrinsic natures]." (493)

perceptual conception of secondary qualities has as part of its referential content the sensation by which it is suggested, whereas our perceptual conception of primary qualities does not. Reid writes:

> [The sensations of the secondary qualities] are not only signs of the object perceived, but they bear a capital part in the notion we form of it. We conceive it only as that which occasions such a sensation, and therefore cannot reflect upon it without thinking of the sensation which it occasions: We have no other mark whereby to distinguish it. The thought of a secondary quality, therefore, always carries us back to the sensation which it produces." (EIP, 2. XVII., pg: 204) [120]

[120] This view, namely that the sensory appearances are referentially built into the semantics of secondary quality terms, has been called into question. In particular, it appears to be inconsistent with another of Reid's key views, namely, that the sensations of secondary (and primary) qualities "…are only contingently related to the things that precede and follow them in the perceptual process." (Chappell (1989), 58-9) – e.g., see: *Inquiry*, 6. XXI., pg: 176; EIP, 2. XX., pg: 227) Thus, for instance, Reid writes:

> "We know, that when certain impressions are made upon our organs, nerves, and brain, certain corresponding sensations are felt, and certain objects are both conceived and believed to exist. But in this train of operations Nature works in the dark. We can neither discover the cause of any one of them, nor any necessary connection of one with another. And whether they are connected by any necessary tie, or only conjoined in our constitution by the will of Heaven, we know not… That any kind of impression upon a body should be the efficient cause of sensation, appears very absurd. *Nor can we perceive any necessary connection between sensation and the conception and belief of an external object*. [my emphasis] (EIP, 2. XX., pg: 227).

This last point proves problematic. It appears that this entails that that which is understood for Reid as the unknown cause of the sensory appearance of sour flavour, may not have been the cause of the sensory appearance of sour flavour, but rather the cause of sound sensation, or the sensation of hardness, etc. And so, were the pairings of sensations with their corresponding perceptions interchanged, as Reid suggests is possible above, it appears that our perceptual conceptions of secondary qualities would become incoherent. If the sensory appearance of sour flavour is to play a "capital part" in the perceptual conception of our objective sense of sour flavour, something entailed by Reid's analysis of the sensations of secondary qualities, then it seems to be a conceptual truth that the quality designated by "sour" "…cannot be identified, apart from its relation to that very sensation." (Chappell 1989, 59) Thus, it appears that if, as McKitrick (2001) writes, "…[s]ensations are semantic constituents of the meanings of secondary-quality terms…" (488), then there is a necessary connection between the sensations and the secondary qualities they suggest. There is, however, a way of reconciling these two positions. McKitrick's solution to this difficulty is to take our notions of secondary qualities, e.g., "the unknown cause of the sensory appearance of sour flavour", as rigid designators. Thus, instead of "the unknown cause of the sensory appearance of sour flavour" being taken as a definite description whose scope includes anything whatsoever that meets this description in all possible worlds, it is taken to rigidly designate the particular in this world which meets this description (489). Under this interpretation, it is coherent that objective sour flavour, i.e., this quality in the object that causes the sensory appearance of sour flavour, might not in fact be the cause of the sensory appearance of sour flavour in another possible world.

As Jennifer McKitrick (2002) states, for Reid "…sensations are semantic constituents of the meanings of secondary-quality terms." (488) Both primary and secondary qualities are "immediate" objects of perception, however.[121]

Although we now have a general picture of how Reid's primary/secondary distinction and related views differs from Locke's account, it is still unclear how Reid avoids embracing Locke's idealism about colour, sound, taste, smell, and hot/cold. Recall that the vulgar conceive of hot/cold, color, sound, smell, and taste as real external (objective) properties, while the Lockean makes the claim that they are mere modifications of the mind. On the absurdity of this view to vulgar thought, Reid writes:

> Suppose that…a man meets with a modern philosopher, and wants to be informed, what smell in plants is. The philosopher tells him, that there is no smell in plants, nor in any thing, but in the mind; that it is impossible there can be smell but in a mind; and that all this hath been demonstrated by modern philosophy. The plain man will, no doubt, be apt to think him merry: but if he finds that he is serious, his next conclusion will be, that he is mad; or that philosophy, like magic, puts men into a new world, and gives them different faculties from men. And thus philosophy and common sense are set at variance. (*Inquiry*, 2. VIII., pg: 39)

Reid provides additional considerations to accommodate this vulgar view.

According to Reid, the vulgar's apparent hostility to the philosophical view of Locke, which maintains that colours, smells, flavours, etc. are sensations and not objective properties, is based on a confusion perpetrated by the philosopher, who uses ordinary terminology in a technical way. For Reid, the ordinary semantics of "sound" "smell" "taste" and "hot/cold" is ambiguous: the distinction between the sensation and cause of the sensation is not captured by the ordinary semantics of these terms. Reid

[121] Reid writes: "Besides primary and secondary qualities of bodies, there are many other *immediate* objects of perception." [my emphasis] (EIP, 2. XVIII., pg: 211)

thinks that the vulgar, when confronted by the true meaning of the philosopher's assertion[122], will readily accept it. On the subject of heat, he writes:

> The Philosopher says, There is no heat in the fire, meaning, that the fire has not the sensation of heat. His meaning is just, and the vulgar will agree with him, as soon as they understand his meaning. But his language is improper; for there really is a quality in the fire, of which the proper name is heat…[The vulgar] know as well as the Philosopher, that the fire does not feel heat; and this is all that he means by saying there is no heat in the fire. (EIP, 2. XVII., pg: 206)

According to Reid, the ordinary and proper sense of "heat" is one in which the term has a dual signification, according to which the sensation of heat, and the causal source of that sensation are compounded under the same name. As such, ordinary thought does not err in using the phrase: "the fire is hot", simply because it does not discriminate between the sensation of heat, and the quality of the fire that produces that sensation. Both are referentially captured by the ordinary sense of "heat". Reid thinks that the two things, i.e., the sensation and the cause of the sensation, need not be distinguished for the purposes of ordinary life. The same may be said of sound, smell, and taste.

Reid, like Locke, does not believe that the properties of sensory appearances of secondary qualities are instantiations of attributes which extra-mental objects possess. Reid avoids Locke's sound, smell, taste, and hot and cold idealism by broadening the semantics of the term "heat", for example, so that it refers not only to the sensory appearance of heat, but also to the objective causes of the sensory appearance. To encapsulate the point, for Reid, the fight between the vulgar and the philosopher on the subject of "heat", and, by analogy, "sound", "taste", and "smell", is a mere dispute of words. The philosopher simply needs to make explicit that when he says the heat is not

[122] See: EIP, 2. XVII., pg: 205.

in the fire, all he really claims is the trivial assertion that our *sensation* of heat is not an objective property of the fire.

Reid thinks things are somewhat different in the case of colour. According to Reid, the common usage of colour terminology has it that "colour" only refers to the objective cause of the sensory appearance of colour (i.e., the secondary quality), and never to the sensory appearance. He writes:

> I conclude then, that colour is not a sensation, but a secondary quality of bodies…that it is a certain power or virtue in bodies, that in fair day-light exhibits to the eye an appearance, which is very familiar to us, although it hath no name. Colour differs from other secondary qualities in this, that whereas the name of the quality is sometimes given to the sensation which indicates it, and is occasioned by it, we never, as far as I can judge, give the name of *colour* to the sensation, but to the quality only…We have shown, that the word *colour*, as used by the vulgar, cannot signify an idea in the mind, but a permanent quality. We have shown, that there is really a permanent quality of body, to which the common use of the word exactly agrees. (*Inquiry*, 6. V. pg: 87)[123]

In all cases aside from the case of colour, not only do secondary quality terms refer to the causes of sensory appearances, they also refer to the sensory appearances. And Reid avoids colour idealism simply by considering colour terminology to have a univocal semantics according to which the terms only refer to the objective causes of our sensory appearances of colour.[124] Through these linguistic considerations, then, Reid evades

[123] For an interesting discussion of how Reid's univocal semantics of colour is capricious, arbitrary, and poses difficulties for his analysis of how colour factors into our acquired perception of distance, see: Falkenstein (2000), pg: 321.

[124] There is a distinct vexing aspect of Reid's doctrine of sensation which confronts us, namely the, supposed, sensations of the primary qualities. These sensations, Reid admits, are mysterious for the vulgar. They are not the primary qualities, nor the perceptions of these qualities; but what else is ordinarily taken to be involved in our tactile experiences of primary qualities? On this point, Reid writes that "…you can hardly persuade [the common] man that he feels any thing but the figure and hardness of the body…" (EIP, 2. XVII., pg: 205). I shall not press Reid on the tension between the vulgar view and his proposal that there are sensations that are semiotically related to the perception of primary properties. – For Reid's explanation of why sensations of primary qualities evade common thought, see: *Inquiry*, 5. II., pg: 55-6; *Inquiry*, 5. V., pg: 62; EIP, 2. XVIII., pg: 212; EIP, 2. XVI., pg: 197; EIP, 2. XVII., pg: 204-5. – In this case, Reid does assign an error to the vulgar, namely, that they fail to acknowledge the existence of such sensations, and tend to conflate what they feel (pressure sensation) with what they perceive (the resistance and cohesion of bodies).

being committed to the overtly objectionable position that colours, sounds, flavours, etc., are not real, mind-independent properties, but things only in the mind.[125]

In order to determine whether Reid's understanding of the naïve or vulgar view here is compelling, it is helpful to consider alternative understandings of the naïve or vulgar view. We should look back to Locke's picture regarding the vulgar view on sensory appearances of secondary qualities, since it is on Locke's formulation that the view is falsified by philosophy. It is not merely that Locke thought "heat" was an ideality, and that this is simply what must be overcome in order to reconcile the vulgar with the philosophical view on heat. Were this the case, the linguistic considerations Reid provides really would resolve the tension. For Locke, however, the vulgar suppose that the attribute instantiated in the sensation of heat is an objective quality, i.e., that the attribute of heat which is the content of sensation is also an attribute of the fire.

If the vulgar view is construed along Lockean lines, then Reid's conception of colour is incompatible with the vulgar view straightaway. For Reid, it is simply not the case that the attribute we sense (i.e., the sensory appearance of colour) is the same

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[125] It seems there are even anticipations of a similar semantic solution in Locke. The curious phrasing contained in the following passage is an illustration of this. Locke writes:

> "…[L]et the eyes not see light, or colors, nor the ears hear sounds; let the palate not taste, nor the nose smell; and all colors, tastes, odors, and sounds as they are such particular *ideas* vanish and cease, and are reduced to their causes, i.e., bulk, figure, and motion of parts." (EHU, 2. VIII., XVII., pg 28)

The "as they are" in "…colors, tastes, odors, and sounds *as they are* such particular *ideas*…" might be thought to suggest that colours and tastes, etc. may also be considered under some other description, and it seems natural that this other category of description would be colours, tastes, etc., *as they are considered objective causes of sensation.* Moreover, we need look no further than Berkeley's *Dialogues* to see the seedling of Reid's solution. That there are two meanings of the term "sound" – i.e., the sensation of sound, and the objective "philosophic" sense of sound – was proposed, and ultimately abandoned by Hylas, Berkeley's materialist interlocutor (see: *1st Dialogue*, pg: 182-3). Hylas proposes a dual semantics of sound much the same as Reid's. We might, then, consider Reid's solution, in certain respects, *Hylasian*.

attribute as the attribute in the object causing this sensation. However, I think Reid circumvents any difficulty the Lockean construal of the vulgar view poses in the case of smell, taste, sound, and hot/cold. He does so, again, because of his semantic theory of these terms. Take the case of heat. The exchange between the philosopher and vulgar on the subject of heat, Reid might argue, occurs at a necessary level of abstraction, and thus it is silent on Locke's more nuanced interpretation of naïve objectivism. For instance, perhaps we might try to formulate the philosopher's position to the vulgar as follows: "the philosopher maintains that the attribute of heat we "feel" is not an attribute of the fire, or that the heat we feel is not the same attribute as the attribute in the fire causing us to feel heat." Would the vulgar's rejection of this proposition clearly reflect a repudiation of Reid's view? It would not, since Reid believes there is a semantic ambiguity in the verb "to feel", and the same holds of "to hear", "to taste", and "to smell", and these semantic ambiguities correspond to the semantic ambiguities he observes in secondary qualities terminology. On the dual significations of "to feel", Reid writes:

> I shall add an observation concerning the word *feeling*. This word has two meanings. *First*, it signifies the perceptions we have of external objects, by the sense of touch. When we speak of feeling a body to be hard or soft, rough or smooth, hot or cold; to feel these things, is to perceive them by touch…*Secondly*, The word *feeling* is used to signify the same thing as *sensation*, which we have just now explained; and, in this sense, it has no object; the feeling and the thing felt are one and the same." (EIP, 1. II., pg: 27-8)

Thus, "feeling" may refer to either an act of sensation or perception. But then the expression "the attribute of heat we feel" does not unambiguously refer to the *sensory* attribute of heat. But it is only if it does refer to the sensory attribute of heat that the denial of the above proposition is a repudiation of Reid's view. Thus, Reid may interpret the vulgar interlocutor's claim that the attribute we feel is an instantiation of the attribute

in the fire causing this feeling as referring to perceptual rather than sensory feeling. One might think that this sort of manoeuvre is open for Reid in any case where one attempts to formulate the naïve objectivist position on heat in terms which contradict his theoretical views. Reid's semantics of secondary quality terminology make his view on hot/cold, odour, flavour, and sound slippery and difficult to formulate in terms such that Locke's vulgar interlocutor would definitively reject Reid's view.

Be that as it may, there is one way in which Reid's view could be clarified to the vulgar interlocutor, such that they would reject it wholesale. It is on Berkeley's interpretation of the common sense view that Reid's view is flatly denied by the vulgar. Berkeley (ironically) takes himself to be a champion of vulgar common sense intuitions (e.g., see: *1st Dialogue*, 177). Recall the exposition of Berkeley's argument against the primary and secondary qualities distinction in chapter 2. The argument claims that the perception of primary qualities is dependent on the "sensible [sensuous] properties". That is, perceivable extension cannot fail to be coextensive with a sensuous appearance of colour. I've argued that this claim is in lock-step with the acquaintance model of perception, and that this model most accurately reflects the Lockean idea theorist's notion of perceptual immediacy. It is no surprise that Berkeley conceives of perceptual immediacy, qua idea theorist, along much the same lines as Locke.

Now, at the beginning of Berkeley's *1st Dialogue*, Philonous (who represents Berkeley) sets forth the boundaries of the inquiry. One crucial move he makes is to delineate the causal grounds of the appearance of colour, sounds, heat, and the other sensuous properties as imperceptible. We observe this in the following:

> *Phil*. It seems then, that by *sensible things* you mean those only which can be perceived immediately by sense.
> *Hyl*. Right.
> *Phil*. Does it not follow from this that though I see one part of the sky red, and another blue, and that my reason does then evidently conclude there must be some cause of that diversity of colors, yet that cause cannot be said to be a sensible thing or perceived by the sense of seeing?
> *Hyl*. It does.
> *Phil*. In like manner, though I hear a variety of sounds, yet I cannot be said to hear the causes of those sounds.
> *Hyl*. you cannot. (*1st Dialogue*, 178)

The position regarding the imperceptibility of the causes of sensory appearances of colour – understood in the Lockean sense as micro-level properties – goes uncontested by Hylas. But then surely both Philonous and Hylas would object to Reid's position that the unknown causes of sensory appearances of heat or colour are objects of sight and tactile feeling, respectively. This is so, since Reid conceives them in the same way as Locke: i.e., as micro-level properties. It is clear that the vulgar position on perception, as Berkeley conceives it, is aligned with the acquaintance view of perceptual immediacy, and this places limits on what sorts of things may be (immediately) perceived. For Reid, the phenomenological appearance of heat, or the sensuous property of heat, is located in sensory feeling. But sensory feeling cannot reflect the vulgar's objective realism on heat, since what is felt in this case is not an external quality but a mere subjective modification. Reid's position that the feeling of the external quality of heat is equivalent to having a general obscure notion about a certain cause appears to Berkeley's agent of common sense as nonsense. In short, Reid asserts that there are two distinct types of *feeling* heat and two types of heat felt. However, to the vulgar, the external heat is construed as something which cannot possibly be *felt*, and the heat that is felt is construed as something which cannot possibly be external. The same considerations apply to Reid's views on the perception of sound, smell, and flavour. The absurdity of Reid's view on

the perception of colour is even more simple. For Reid, perception of colour is perception of an unknown cause of some particular sensory appearance. However, unknown causes cannot, on Berkeley's interpretation of the common sense view, possibly be something *seen*.

At the very least, Reid must show why Berkeley's interpretation of the common sense view is false. To the best of my knowledge, Reid nowhere takes up this matter. Therefore, it seems to me that we have good reason to be sceptical that Reid does justice to the vulgar's naïve objectivism about colour, smell, taste, sound, and hot/cold. The difficulty lies in Reid's position that unknown causes of colour may themselves be seen, or that unknown causes of heat may themselves be felt. The vulgar object to such hypotheses because they, like Berkeley, think things seen or felt are sensuous properties, or things which have visual or tactile *appearance*. But unknown micro-level causal properties simply are not the sort of things which may *appear* to us.

I am in favour of Berkeley's construction of the common sense view. I therefore think Reid must account for a *real* discrepancy between his views and the views of his vulgar interlocutor on the subject of the objective reality of colour, sound, smell, taste, and hot/cold. He can only do this by considering the vulgar view as erroneous. And if this is the case, the reconciliation Reid finds between philosophy and common sense on the subject of colour, heat, smell, taste, and sound here is feigned.[126]

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[126] Here, I agree with both Lorne Falkenstein (2000) and James Van Cleve (2011). For example, Falkenstein writes:

> "Reid is really denying that visible figures are 'coloured' in the truly common sense of the term." (322)

III) Upshot of the Preceding

Reid considers objectivism about colour, sound, smell, taste, and hot/cold to be a core tenet of common judgment. Regarding scent, he writes:

> I resolve, for my own part, always to pay a great regard to the dictates of common sense, and not to depart from them without absolute necessity: and therefore I am apt to think, that there is really something in the rose or lily, which is by the vulgar called *smell*, and which continues to exist when it is not smelled…" (*Inquiry*, 2. VIII., pg: 39)

Colour, sound, odour, etc. idealism is for Reid a seminal offence committed by the ideal system. Common judgment dictates that such things are objective properties. However, Reid does not adequately address the tension involved in relegating the sensuous properties or appearances of colour, sound, flavour, etc. to sensation. The perception of colour, for Reid, is an apprehension of the unknown causes of the sensory appearance of colour. But does this cohere with the common sense view of the perception of colour? Locke's view of the vulgar position precipitates out of his resemblance thesis. According to Locke, in the case of the secondary qualities, the vulgar believe that the attribute they sense is in fact an instantiation of the attribute in the object which causes the sensation. Thus, on Locke's formulation of the vulgar view, Reid's notion of colour is incompatible with the vulgar view. Reid's semantics in the case of smell, sound, taste, and hot/cold allow him to circumvent the challenge Locke's interpretation of the vulgar position

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However, I think I have provided some further detail to the account as to why Reid's views on colour oppose the common sense view, apart from asserting that the common sense realist view on colour considers what Reid thinks of as the sensible appearance of colour to be an objective property. Moreover, I have given some further detail as to why Reid's views are incompatible with the common sense views on heat/cold, smell, sound, and taste. I have connected the explanation of how Reid's views oppose the common sense view with Locke's account of the primary/secondary distinction, and both Locke's and Berkeley's respective accounts of the common sense view.

poses. It does so by making Locke's formulation of the vulgar view incapable of being put into terms that go against Reid's view.

The real tension between the vulgar view and Reid's theory of secondary qualities can be articulated with reference to Berkeley, a self-proclaimed champion of common sense. To vulgar thought, it appears patently absurd that unknown causes (which happen to be microscopic properties) are things seen, heard, smelled, etc. This is because, if we accept the Berkeleyan intuitions here, the common sense view accords with an acquaintance view of perception. Unknown, micro-level properties are things with which we cannot possibly be acquainted. But then, just as in the case of Locke's formulation of the vulgar view, it follows that Reid's reconciliation of his view and the vulgar view on colour is problematic straightaway. But whereas Locke's interpretation of the vulgar view cannot conclusively pose a difficulty for Reid on the subject of hot/cold, sound, smell, and taste, Berkeley's interpretation of the vulgar view does. To reiterate, in these cases Reid asserts that there are two distinct types of apprehension, one sensory, the other perceptual. Thus, in the case of heat, for instance, Reid asserts that there are two types of feeling heat, and two types of heat felt. But, Reid construes the external heat as something which cannot possibly be felt, and the heat that is felt is construed as something which cannot possibly be *external*. Reid therefore ignores the Berkeleyan account of the common sense view, thereby making his purported reconciliation of the vulgar and his views unsatisfactory. The failure of this reconciliation means that Reid's philosophy is fractured on the subject of secondary qualities.

Since, "…[i]t is absurd to conceive that there can be any opposition between reason and common sense…because truth will always be consistent with itself…" (EIP, 6. II., pg: 433), the question is whether Reid should abandon naïve objectivism about colour, smell, flavour, etc. in favour of his theoretical views. That is, should Reid consider naïve objectivism of colour, sound, flavour, etc. to be merely vulgar opinion, and not rather an edict of common judgment? This is a steep price to pay, given the role played by naïve colour, sound, flavour, etc. objectivism within his analysis of Locke and the theory of ideas. Moreover, if anything should be considered a dictate of common judgment for Reid, surely it is that colours, odours, sounds, flavours, and hot/cold are objective features of the world. Reid's theory of sensations of secondary qualities flies in the face of common sense. I think this fact provides him with a powerful reason to dispense with his sensations of secondary qualities, given his methodological commitments.

C) Conclusion

In chapter 2, I argued that Reid's doctrine of sensation makes his theory of perception incompatible with the acquaintance view of perception. There are no considerations that might be offered to bring Reid's unrevised views in line with an acquaintance model of perception. In this chapter, I have shown how an aspect of Reid's doctrine of sensation poses difficulties for him. Reid ignores Berkeley's construction of the common sense view on the perception of colour, sound, taste, smell, and hot/cold. According to Berkeley's agent of common sense, objects of perception cannot, contra Reid, be unknown micro-level causes of sensation, and to think that objective colour,

sound, taste, smell, and hot/cold are such things is to put them out of the perceptual domain. Reid's doctrine of the sensation relegates the appearance phenomenology of colour, sound, taste, smell, hot/cold, and tactile feeling to sensation. As a result, his theory is inconsistent with the acquaintance model of perception. This is bad enough in itself, for reasons I discussed in chapter 1 and 2. However, it is even worse if the common sense view of our perception of colour, sound, flavour, odour, and hot/cold is consistent with an acquaintance model of perception. If this were the case, then Reid's anti-acquaintance model militates against common sense, and therefore, should appear unsightly to him. But this is in fact what we find in the case of the common sense view on the perception of colour, sound, smell, taste, and hot/cold. These considerations provide Reid himself with compelling reason to revisit his own doctrine of sensation.

In the next chapter, I argue that we can dispense with Reid's doctrine of sensation without thereby abandoning the philosophically prodigious elements of his analysis of sensation. That is to say, one can preserve the main epistemological insights of Reid's analysis of sensation in a reconstructed form without being thereby committed to his objectionable sensation nonsubstantivism. Moreover, I will argue that one can reject Reid's doctrine of sensation and yet still endorse a Reidian view of perception.

CHAPTER 4: A REIDIAN VIEW OF PERCEPTUAL ACQUAINTANCE

A) Pure and Mixed Nonconceptualism and Perceptual Acquaintance

This chapter will be organized around the following questions: 1) Is there a plausible hypothesis available which explains how Reid's doctrine of sensation is mistaken? [127] 2) If we dispense with Reid's doctrine of sensation, are we left with anything which may properly be called a "Reidian" view of perception? 3) Are there other obstacles to an acquaintance interpretation of Reid's theory of perception besides his doctrine of sensation? If I can provide grounds for answering (1) and (2) in the affirmative, and (3) in the negative, then this will constitute good grounds for the development of a modified Reidian acquaintance view of perception. I will address all three questions by relying on an insight that is anticipated by Reid's argument against the representational theory of mind succinctly given in *Oration III*. The insight to which I refer may be phrased in contemporary terms as the distinction between state conceptual and pure nonconceptual acquaintance-type apprehension. In the case of the former, being acquainted with an object depends on possessing the concepts which accurately characterize that object; in the case of the latter, being acquainted with an object does not require the possession of such concepts. I will explain this distinction in this section. This distinction will then be relied on throughout all subsequent discussion. First,

[127] I am here focusing on Reid's doctrine of non-paradigmatic sensation, since it is the sensations of secondary and primary qualities, or the sensations of the five ordinary sense modalities, where the relevant sensuous properties, according to Reid, reside. I must here omit the detailed reconstruction of Reid's doctrine of paradigmatic sensation (e.g., tickles, aches, and pains) for brevity's sake, though I take it that much the same reconstructive strategy may, mutatis mutandis, apply to Reid's doctrine of paradigmatic sensations and their corresponding perceptions. Nevertheless, the prospect of developing a Reidian acquaintance view of, for instance, pain perception, according to which one's own body is presented to (inner) awareness through pain, goes beyond the scope of this dissertation. It will be addressed separately in a subsequent paper. For Reid's discussion of pain sensation and its semiotically related perception of disorder in one's body, see: EIP, 2. XVIII., pg: 211-13.

however, let me restate the problem with the acquaintance interpretation of Reid, and what is required if one is to bring his views in line with an acquaintance model of perception.

For the sake of argument, let's assume that our perception of the physical world is acquaintance-type perception. According to the analysis of chapter 2, phenomenal qualities like sensuous colour or tactile (sensuous) feeling play a necessary function in an acquaintance-type apprehension of body. If physical objects are to be presented to our awareness, they must be presented in the garb of sensuous properties. As Wolterstorff (2006) states, if we are perceptually acquainted with external objects, "…external objects are items in 'the manifold of intuition'." (111) However, I have argued this demands that the relevant sensuous properties are objective, geometrically extended features or aspects of the external world which we perceive. If they were mental phenomena, then one sanctions substantive ideas.[128] This cannot be conceded by any Reidian, since an essential aspect of Reid's philosophy is his rejection of substantive ideas.

The relevant sensuous properties, then, must be objective features of the external world. However, this is problematic for Reid. Reid provides no notion of sensuous properties such that they may intelligibly qualify external objects. The only account of sensuous properties Reid provides has it that they are the contents of sensations, and as such, by his account they reside entirely in our minds. Working in the reverse, one must understand Reid as *mistaking* the sensuous properties of colour and tactile feeling (the phenomenal feeling of hardness, hot/cold) for nonsubstantive sensations, since it is only

[128] See Chapter 2, sec. B. III. b. & c.

if the sensuous properties are the objective features of physical objects that they may *present* such objects.[129] To this end, let me now introduce a four-fold distinction articulated by T.M. Crowther (2006) in his paper entitled: "Two Conceptions of Conceptualism and Non-Conceptualism".

Crowther outlines four possible positions on the nature of perceptual apprehension, although I take it that the same considerations apply to apprehension of any sort. The four possible positions hinge on the distinctions between "possessional" conceptualism and "compositional" conceptualism. Other perhaps less idiosyncratic terminology sometimes used for Crowther's "possessional" conceptualism/nonconceptualism and "compositional" conceptualism/nonconceptualism is "state" and "content" conceptualism/nonconceptualism, respectively.[130] I shall substitute for Crowther's terminology this alternate, more orthodox terminology. **State conceptualism** is the view that a subject's undergoing a particular state requires that they possess the concepts that characterize the content of that state. **State nonconceptualism**, on the other hand, is the view that a subject's undergoing a particular state *does not* require that they possess the concepts that characterize the content of that state (252). **Content conceptualism** is the view that *the content of a particular state is composed of*

[129] This follows from the discussion in chapter 2 sec. B. III. Since the projectionist strategy commits one to substantive ideas, and no Reidian can admit the existence of substantive ideas, a Reidian acquaintance view must adopt the non-sensory acquaintance strategy. But the barrier to this strategy, recall, is Reid's doctrine of sensation, since if objects are presented by a non-sensory intuition, then sensuous properties are given through sensory and non-sensory intuition, and we have effectively admitted a dual-appearance phenomenology of sensuous properties. This is implausible. Thus, in order to make room for the non-sensory acquaintance strategy, one must not only consider the sensuous properties to be objectively predicable of physical objects, but one must also dispense with Reid's doctrine of sensation.

[130] See: Bermúdez, José and Cahen, Arnon, "Nonconceptual Mental Content", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2012/entries/content-nonconceptual/>.

concepts. **Content nonconceptualism**, on the other hand, is the view that the content of a particular state is *not* composed of concepts (250). On these distinctions, Crowther writes:

> ...[W]hether the truth-evaluable contents of perceptual experience are composed of concepts or not is – at least on the face of it – a different issue from that concerning whether a subject's undergoing an experience with a certain content entails that they possess the concepts that characterize it. (252)

Thus, on the basis of these distinctions, Crowther derives four "combined" positions. First, there are two "pure" positions, namely, 1) state conceptualism paired with content conceptualism, and 2) state nonconceptualism paired with content nonconceptualism. And then there are the two "mixed" positions, namely, 3) state conceptualism paired with content nonconceptualism, and 4) state nonconceptualism paired with content conceptualism. Crowther sketches theories of perception which exemplify the two pure and two mixed positions, respectively, and outlines the respective virtues of the mixed positions.[131]

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[131] See: pg: 252-8. Crowther first considers a doxastic theory of perception, or "'…'belief-analysis' of perceptual experience'", on which "…a subject's having an experience with the content *p* is to be analyzed as a case of the subject's perceptually believing that *p*. Under a Fregean framework regarding the content of beliefs, the content of perceptual experience on this theory is content conceptual. Moreover, in order to be in a state of belief, one must possess the concepts which accurately characterize the content of the belief. And so, the doxastic theory of perception under a Fregean framework is a pure conceptualist position (252-3). Crowther considers "…a primitive species of a causal or informational account [of perception] according to which the contents of perceptual experiences are taken to be Russellian propositions and on which a subject's undergoing a perceptual experience with the content a is **F** is taken to consist in the fact that the relevant perceptual event is caused by some particular object, a, and instance of the property **F**." (253) Crowther offers this as an example of a pure nonconceptualist position. Third, as an example of a state conceptual/content nonconceptual position, Crowther considers a view according to which the content of perceptual experience is a Russellian proposition, where "…the content of the informational event…involves objects and properties as opposed to concepts of those items." (253) Nevertheless, one might also suppose that the subject's access to the content depends on possessing beliefs about that content. Crowther writes that "…the role of concept possession within such an account is simply to make available to the thinking, reasoning, and concept-applying subject the Russellian contents of events within the visual system." (254) Finally, Crowther also describes a case in which the content of perception is "…composed of Fregean modes of presentation...[and] the conceptually composed content of one's perceptual experience is also a perceptible fact: it is 'how things are'; an 'aspect of the layout of the world…" (255-6) On this

This categorization of perceptual theories is relevant to discussions of acquaintance models of perception. However, there is no room for the pure or mixed content conceptualist views (i.e., 1 and 4) in any acquaintance model of perception. At least, I have stipulated that *perception* is the apprehension of physical mind-independent physical objects or their features[132], and thus, that the intentional *content* or object of perception is not some conceptual entity. There are two things to say in this regard. Acquaintance-type apprehension puts limits on what sorts of things one may, intelligibly, be acquainted with. As Van Cleve (2004) writes, acquaintance is "…an irreducible cognitive relation with nonpropositional objects." (113) Concepts, or a thing composed of concepts, are things reasonably excluded from the class of objects with which one may be perceptually acquainted. Moreover, for Reid, the *content* of perception is going to be some quality of material objects or their processes.[133] Surely such things are not composed of concepts. Hence, for my present purposes, the content conceptualism thesis

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view, "…experience is a mode of perceptual sensitivity to the conceptually composed facts: to the judgeable or thinkable aspects of the layout of the world." (256) However, it may be supposed that "…infants and animals, as well as mature human beings, are capable of sensitivity to aspects and features of their environment…[T]hey do not possess concepts…[but] infants and animals nevertheless possess information-processing capacities of certain kinds…" (256) Crowther thinks one may hold a state nonconceptual/content conceptual view here, according to which "…the content of the perceptual experience of a nonlinguistic infant or animal is just the same compositionally conceptual content that we mature human beings can be perceptually sensitive to in our own conceptually mediated way..." (257)

[132] see: chapter 1, section A.

[133] Perception, for Reid, is always of some quality or feature of the material world. For example, the primary or secondary qualities of bodies are objects of perception for Reid; "…[c]ertain states or conditions of our own bodies…" are likewise objects of perception (EIP, 2. XVIII., pg: 214). Reid also lists as possible objects of perception the "…Mechanical powers or forces…Chemical powers…Medical powers…[and] Vegetable and animal powers." (EIP, 2. XVIII, pg: 211). For Reid, the object of perception is never some entity composed of concepts. It is rather a non-propositional object or *quality* in the material world. Admittedly, in *Inquiry* 2. III., pg: 27, the term "perception" is used more loosely, since in this passage Reid speaks as if sensations are perceived. On this point Philip Bourdillon (1975) writes: "incidentally, when Reid says that sensation cannot exist but in being perceived [as he does in the abovementioned passage], what he means is precisely what Berkeley meant in saying that their esse is *percipi*." (23) Bourdillon notes that in EIP Reid rejected this manner of speaking (1975, 22). In EIP, sensations are for Reid never "perceived"; we are aware or conscious of them, but it is a gross abuse of the term to say we "perceive" them (e.g., see: EIP, 2. IX., pg: 137; EIP. 4. I., pg: 297-9).

in both its pure and mixed form is irrelevant, since here "perception" concerns the apprehension of nonconceptual objects or contents.

In chapter 1 section B, I sketched the distinction between Russell's view of acquaintance and the contemporary acquaintance approach, as Gertler (2012) conceives it. For Russell, the intersection of "reality with the epistemic" exists between the reality given or presented and the subject full stop, without any act of judgment. For Gertler and the contemporary acquaintance approach, on the other hand, reality and the epistemic "…intersect in a judgment." (125) In other words, on her view,

> [t]he acquaintance approach takes introspective knowledge to consist in occurrent judgments, whereas on Russell's theory knowledge by acquaintance is a nonpropositional knowledge of things. (95)

This central differentiating feature between the contemporary acquaintance approach and Russell's view of acquaintance marks a shift from, in Crowther's schematic, a pure nonconceptual theory of apprehension (i.e., 2) to a state conceptual/content nonconceptual theory of apprehension (i.e., 3).[134]

Having sketched the distinction between state nonconceptual/content nonconceptual acquaintance and state conceptual/content nonconceptual acquaintance, I

[134] One might object here that in admitting a state conceptual form of acquaintance, I have undermined the intuitive/discursive distinction set forth from the outset (see: chapter 1, section B). To this I say, acquaintance relations are necessarily a matter of the intuitive apprehension of x (e.g., sense data, experiential states, external objects…). However, this does not rule out that an act of conceptualization or judgment preconditions this intuitive apprehension such that in order for it to count as an intuitive apprehension of x – in order that content x be epistemically accessible – one must apply the concept of x. Thus, while the state conceptualist formulation of acquaintance does challenge the view that acquaintance relations are merely intuitive operations – state conceptual acquaintance holds an act of conceptualization to be an intrinsic feature of acquaintance type apprehension – it does not undermine the intuitive/discursive apprehension distinction. I propose that state conceptual acquaintance involves an intuitive apprehension of content x, and this content is made epistemically accessible by an act of judgment or conceptualization which accurately characterizes that content *as* x. In other words, it is plausible that in order that one is acquainted with x, one must apprehend x *as* x – i.e., as a member of a specific type – and thus, to be acquainted with x presupposes concept application.

will now rely on this distinction to develop answers to the three questions set forth at the beginning of this chapter. My discussion of Reid's views in relation to this distinction begins by explaining the nature of sensory apprehension according to Reid.

B) Reid on Sensory Apprehension as Pure Nonconceptual Acquaintance

In the previous section, I suggested that there are two possible formulations of acquaintance type apprehension, namely, pure nonconceptual acquaintance and state conceptual acquaintance. The content conceptual position, in its pure and mixed forms, is ruled out, since, given the present context, concepts are things reasonably excluded from the class of objects with which one may be perceptually acquainted. In this section, I argue that Reid's theory of sensations has it that sensory apprehension is pure nonconceptual acquaintance-type apprehension. The importance of this point to my strategy for addressing the three questions posed at the outset will become clear in section D.

The pure nonconceptualist position is consistent with the traditional model of acquaintance espoused by Russell. The content of Russellian acquaintance relations is not a conceptual entity but a brute existent (sense data), and our being acquainted with this content does not presuppose any discursive act, judgment, or conceptualization whatsoever. Recall Gertler's remark:

> On Russell's view knowledge by acquaintance does not consist in belief or, for that matter, anything that bears a truth value…acquaintance with an object involves—or perhaps simply consists in—that object's being *immediately present to consciousness*, where such presence is an epistemic matter. (2012, 97)

It is, I think, uncontroversial that for Reid sensory apprehension is a matter of acquaintance type apprehension. Sensory contents are appearances or intuitive data;

regarding the sensation of smell, Reid writes that "…[the sensation of smell] appears to be a simple and original affection or feeling of the mind, altogether inexplicable and unaccountable." (*Inquiry*, 2. III., pg: 26-7) Original affections or feelings of the mind are not discursive apprehensions of a thing, but intuitive apprehensions of the thing. When one feels the sensation of pain, one does not do so through an act of conceptualization; the pain is rather presented or given to consciousness. On the nature of sensory conception, according to Reid, Alston (1989) remarks:

> Unless Reid thinks that one cannot feel pain without thinking of it as an instance of a type, and I see no indication of this, it is clear that [in the case of sensation] he takes conception to be present where no general concepts are being deployed. (43)

Sensory conception[135] is, for Reid, an ingredient within the compound operation of sensation, and thus never occurs apart from a particular belief state, namely, the belief in the present existence of sensation. Thus, Alston's remark is perhaps misleading. As I have stated in chapter 2[136], Reid thinks sensation is a compound operation consisting of sensory conception – the apprehension of the sensation of smell, for instance – and a belief in the present existence of the sensation of smell. However, he also speaks of sensation as a principle of belief, and as a logically simple and original act of the mind. In these instances, one must understand "sensation" to refer to the act of sensory conception or apprehension, and not the operation of sensation considered as a compound operation. Sensory conception, for Reid, is a principle of belief. He writes:

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[135] Recall the discussion in chapter 2 sec. B.I on distinguishing between "sensory conception", i.e., the sensory *feeling*, or, in Reid's terminology, "original affection" considered apart from sensory beliefs, and the operation of "Sensation" considered as a whole, which comprehends the feeling as well as sensory beliefs. For Reid's discussion on "the sensation considered abstractly", i.e., qua "original affection", see: *Inquiry*, 2. II., pg: 26-7.

[136] See: section B. I.

> Why sensation should compel our belief of the present existence of the thing…I believe no philosopher can give a shadow of reason, but that such is the nature of … [this] operation…Sensation and memory therefore are simple, original, and perfectly distinct operations of the mind, and both of them are original principles of belief... Sensation implies the present existence of its object… (*Inquiry*, 2. IV., pg: 29)

Should we consider sensory conception, according to Reid, to involve state conceptual rather than state nonconceptual acquaintance? I think not. It seems true that the belief in the existence of some original sensory affection (or *content*) x implies that one possesses the concepts that characterize x. Therefore, it would be true on Reid's account that undergoing the act of sensory conception with content x implies that one possesses the concepts characterizing x. But it is *not* true on Reid's account that the belief state associated with the sensory conception of content x is necessary for undergoing the sensory conception. State conceptual acquaintance holds that an act of conceptualization makes possible, in some sense, acquaintance with the content. If sensory conception is considered a principle of belief, i.e., initiates the belief in the existence of what it apprehends, then the sensory conception has a priority over the associated belief state or conceptualization of sensory content. Thus, it follows that our access to the content of sensory conception is not intrinsically dependent on the conceptual act involved in the belief state associated with it, even though it cannot occur without it. Given these considerations, I think I can safely say that sensory apprehension, for Reid, is an instance of pure nonconceptual acquaintance, a matter of brute affectation. This is to say that, according to Reid, sensory conception is an intentional act which apprehends nonconceptual contents entirely nonconceptually.

C) Reid on the State Conceptualism of Symbolic Representation

Many central themes of the *Inquiry* and EIP are contained in Reid's *Oration III*. Happily, *Oration III* contains a concise statement of one of Reid's arguments which is salient to preparing the ground for a Reidian acquaintance model of perception. Reid's critique of the idea theorist's representational doctrine of perception in this text contains a clue to a reconstructive solution for the problem of perceptual acquaintance in Reid. In this section, I will explicate this critique. My goal here is not necessarily to evaluate the cogency of the critique considered as a refutation of the representational doctrine. Rather, I am concerned here simply with sketching the critique for the purpose of showing how it relies on the distinction between state conceptual and pure nonconceptual acquaintance-type apprehension.

Before I examine the relevant argument of *Oration III*, let us recall[137] what exactly Reid thinks the proposed explanatory role of ideas is for the idea theorist. It is clear that Reid thought the notion of an "idea" was originally invoked as an explanatory device. He writes:

> …[I]n the perception of an external object, all languages distinguish three things, the *mind* that perceives, the operation of that mind, which is called *perception*, and the *object* perceived…Philosophers have introduced a fourth thing in this process, which they call the *idea* of the object, which is supposed to be an image, or representative of the object, and is said to be the immediate object. The vulgar know nothing about this idea; it is a creature of philosophy, introduced to account for, and explain the manner of our perceiving external objects. (EIP, 2. II., pg: 163)

Reid thought that "ideas" were originally postulated to explain how the mind achieves cognitive contact with the external world, and also how it conceives non-existent objects (Grave 1976, 57). The original place of ideas is within a *representational* theory of

[137] Recall the discussion of chapter 1. sec. C. and chapter 2 sec. A.

perception, a theory which was proposed in light of the intuition that the mind cannot immediately apprehend that which does not exist in the mind. Given that physical objects cannot exist in the mind, mental objects were created to plug what appeared to be a gap in the explanation of our perception of external objects. The problem, according to Reid, is that bringing the mind into immediate (cognitive) contact with the external object is, given mind/body dualism, prima facie incoherent. Thus, the possibility of perceiving external reality is salvaged by interjecting representational intermediaries into the perceptual relation, i.e., "ideas". Ideas as sensory data are objects with which we are immediately acquainted, and the external objects they represent are then inferred, or are, in some sense, *mediate* objects of perception. Reid writes:

> The doctrine of ideas maintains without any manifest proof that perception and memory are not primary faculties but have their origin from another faculty, namely, from the consciousness of the ideas that are present in the mind itself. This doctrine alleges, without any manifest proof, that every man shut in, as it were, in a *camera obscura* perceives nothing outside but only the images or ideas of things depicted in his own *camera*. (*Oration III*, 60-1)

Now, the relevant argument in *Oration III* concerns the incoherence of the proposed explanatory function of ideas in the perceptual case: according to the idea theorist, our apprehension or intentional grasp of external perceptible qualities is a derivative of the apprehension of ideas of sensation. Reid's argument concludes that it is metaphysically impossible to derive empirical concepts from ideas. There is no conceivable way in which ideas may represent external objects such that through apprehending ideas we could arrive at a conception of external things. Idea theory fails as an explanatory hypothesis regarding perception.

The argument begins by laying out three possible modes of representation by which we may understand the representational power of ideas. Reid writes:

> I review in my mind in how many ways one thing could represent another, whether as a *substitute*, as an *image or effigy*, or as a *symbol*, but I meet with no success. [my emphasis] (61)

According to Reid, modeling the representational capacity of ideas on any of these three modes of representation is incoherent. Let us consider each these modes of representation in more detail.

The first mode of representation Reid considers is what might be called "representation by substitution". This is, I think, the most obscure of the three modes of representation, and Reid doesn't do much within its treatment to shed light on the matter. Reid's remarks against representation by substitution here are quite terse. He writes:

> Sometimes I conceive of ideas as being an interchange for things and playing a role, but I look for their credentials, and nowhere do I find compelling documents. (61)

It is arguable whether representation by substitution is a coherent notion. The notion of substituting one thing for another is easily understood. Consider the example of a sugar substitute. Here, whether it is aspartame, honey, stevia, or what have you, there is a substance that performs the same function as sugar, i.e., that of a sweetener, and we use it instead of sugar. A substitute teacher likewise fills the role of the regular teacher, acting as a stand in. However, what does it mean to say that one thing *represents* another *in virtue of* its being a substitute for that thing? Perhaps a political analogy is appropriate here.

It is commonly supposed that a congressional representative or member of parliament represents their electoral cohort; perhaps here what we have is representation by substitution. Given that the electoral cohort cannot participate in the parliamentary or congressional operations themselves, they elect a representative, and this representative is a substitute or a stand in for them, so she acts on their behalf. She performs the function

they would perform were it possible for them to be present in parliamentary or congressional operations, and she does so by communicating their interests and goals.

However, the political analogy here is flawed. The congressional representative or Member of Parliament is only a representational substitute in virtue of expressing the desires of their electorate; they are substitutes for their electorate in virtue of their likeness to their electorate. That they are substitutes does not explain their representational capacity, it presupposes it. I confess I cannot conceive of a way for one thing to represent another in virtue of substitution per se. In all candidate cases of representation by substitution I can think of, the substitution itself does not explain the representational relation. The fact that Reid's treatment of this matter is terse suggests that he did not consider representation by substitution a serious possibility.

The second possibility Reid considers is the image model of representation. According to this view, ideas represent external things in the same sort of way that an image or picture of a thing represents that thing. This I take to be equivalent to the literal interpretation of Lockean resemblance I covered in chapter 2 and 3.[138] Reid raises two objections to this here. The first concerns the unintelligibility of employing the image analogy in the account of non-visual representation. He writes:

> Sometimes I conceive of ideas as images or effigies of things, but then, in truth, the difficulties are increased both in number and size, since there are many existences of which no image or likeness can be conceived. What would be the image of sound or taste or smell, I should like philosophers to state. (61)

The idea theorist, it is supposed, is committed to things other than sounds (i.e., ideas) being like sounds, things other than tastes being like tastes, things other than smells being

[138] See: chapter 2, B. II.; chapter 3, B. II.

like smells; but this is, so the objection goes, unintelligible. Nothing other than another sound could be like a sound, nothing other than another taste could be like a taste, and so forth. There is no such thing as an image of sound, or an image of smell.

Obviously, Locke evades this difficulty in virtue of his primary/secondary distinction. The objection is only valid if we presuppose a naïve objectivist view of sounds, tastes, smells, etc. If we take a Lockean position, and consider that what Reid means here by sound, taste, and smell is what Locke would consider the ideas of sound, taste, and smell, then the question of representation is incoherent. Locke already concedes that the ideas of sound, taste, and smell do not bear resemblance to any external quality. In short, Reid's criticism here depends on taking a naïve objectivist position on sounds, smells, and tastes, and this is something that neither he, nor Locke, maintains.

Reid goes on here to formulate the (Berkeleyan) argument that he later employs in the *experimentum crucis* of the *Inquiry*.[139] Reid writes:

> As far as those things are concerned that have shape, extension, and color, I can easily conceive of images of these painted in a picture, but by what skill they can be painted on the mind, which is without extension and immaterial, goes beyond my understanding. (61-2)

This argument is really the linchpin of Reid's critique of the image model of representation. The following passage highlights Berkeley's remarks against the resemblance theory of perception, which anticipate Reid's thought:

> But, you say, though the ideas themselves do not exist without the mind, yet there may be things like them of which they are copies or resemblances, which things exist without the mind in an unthinking substance. I answer, an idea can be like nothing but an idea; a color or figure can be like nothing but another color or figure. (*Principles*, 1. VIII., pg: 140)

[139] See: *Inquiry*, 5. III., pg: 57-8; 5. VII., pg: 70

The point, bluntly, is that insofar as the things we immediately apprehend are mental realities, a resemblance between the content of sensation and the primary qualities of things is impossible. Our concepts of extension, figure, and, in short, the primary qualities, cannot be epistemologically derived from the apprehension of sensations, precisely because unextended, transient, mental things (sensations) can be nothing "like" three-dimensionally extended physical things.

The next portion of Reid's critique of the image model of representation takes a different line of attack. He writes:

> If, finally, I allege with Aristotle that there is a certain passive intellect in which, just as in a *camera obscura*, images are received, I am still pressed by a most grievous difficulty. For, by what divination could I be taught that these images painted in my *camera obscura* are representations? How am I to be taught that the forms present and imprinted on my mind represent things that are external or that have passed out of existence? In fact this hypothesis of ideas does not loose the knot but twists together several others that are most difficult. (62)

The argument, I think, does not turn on the reference to Aristotelian sensible or intelligible species and the passive intellect, and thus we need not engage such abstruse topics. Reid's point is rather that even if we suppose that the mind receives images of external things, they must be interpreted as representations of the things they represent if they are to perform their representational function. However, there is no intrinsic property an image possesses from which we could learn to interpret it *as* a representation of an external thing. Our interpreting the image *as* a representation of some external thing depends on a) our already possessing the concept of that thing, and b) knowledge of the representational relation that holds between the image and the thing.

On this point, Keith Lehrer writes:

> …I must have some conception of O, the object represented or signified by S in order for the sign to signify or represent the object to me. If I have no conception of O, a rose, or any quality of the

> rose, for example, then I cannot interpret or even learn to interpret the sign, S, a sensation, impression or idea, as representing or signifying the rose, or any quality of the rose…*Representation presupposes conception of the object represented and cannot explain conception of the object. On the contrary, conception of the object is required to explain representation*…We must presuppose some original conceptions of objects in order to account for our learning the meaning of any signs. [my emphasis] (1987, 386-7)[140]

While Lehrer phrases the point in terms of signs instead of images, the point holds likewise for the image model of representation.

Reid's last argument against the image model of representation adopts the same strategy as his argument against the symbolic model of representation which I shall now consider. On the symbolic model, he writes:

> Finally, let us suppose that ideas represent things like symbols; in this way, words and writing are known to express everything. Let the intellect, therefore, be instructed by ideas, not in the manner of a camera obscura with painted images but like a written or printed book, teaching us many things that are external, that have passed away, and that will come to be. This view does not solve the problem; for who will interpret this book for us? If you show a book to a savage who has never heard of the use of letters, he will not know the letters are symbols, much less what they signify. If you address someone in a foreign language, perhaps your words are symbols as far as you are concerned, but they mean nothing to him. *Symbols without interpretation have no value*. And so, if ideas were symbols of things, the art of interpreting ideas, in truth, would be the beginning and source of human wisdom, and yet about such an art neither philosophers nor grammarians nor critics nor lawyers, no not even the interpreters of dreams, have ever dreamed. [my emphasis] (62)

Under the image model of representation, one may say that an image represents an external thing in virtue of instantiating attributes which are also instantiated by the external thing. On the symbolic model, ideas are considered as signs or symbols, like words. The difference from the image model, I take it, involves the arbitrariness of a symbol. It is entirely arbitrary that this referring expression, say, "cat" symbolizes this furry creature rather than that scaly creature, or that a red light means stop and a green

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[140] Lehrer makes the same point in a more recent paper. He writes:

> "…Reid [thinks]…that we require a general conception of the objects represented or we will not understand what the particular impression [sensation] represents. Moreover, when we have the general conception, the particular impression [sensation] becomes superfluous." (1998, 18)

light means go. An image, on the other hand, considered as a literal resemblance of what it represents, is not arbitrarily related to its object. A symbol instantiates no attribute of that which it symbolizes, whereas an image is thought to do so. However, symbols do not carry their own interpretation: one cannot merely read off from the apprehension of the symbol that which it signifies; symbols have no intrinsic representational capacity. Thus, the representational capacity of ideas, considered under the symbolic model of representation, leaves the acquisition of our concepts of external properties radically unexplained.

Reid's argument against the view that our intentional grasp of external things is epistemologically derived from the apprehension of symbolically representational ideas can be cashed out in terms of the distinctions previously discussed. The idea theorist appeals to our apprehension of sensations to explain how we arrive at our conceptions of external things. The conceptions are derivative from, or secondary to, the apprehension of sensation. However, in order for something to symbolically represent something else, it must be appreciated as a symbol for that thing. However, this presupposes that one already possesses the concept of the thing symbolized. In the *Inquiry*, Reid, recall, repeats this point. He writes:

> …[A] requisite to our knowing things by signs is, that the appearance of the sign to the mind, be followed by the conception and belief of the thing signified. Without this the sign is not understood or interpreted; and therefore is no sign to us, however fit in its own nature for that purpose. (*Inquiry*, 6. XXI., pg: 177)

So, the symbolic formulation of representational perception presupposes what it purports to explain.

Essentially, Reid argues that symbolically representational mental operations cannot be forms of state non-conceptual acquaintance-type apprehension. If sensations

are symbolically representational, then they are not simply apprehended, but apprehended as symbols of the things they signify. But this is an interpretive matter. The state of apprehending a symbolically representational sensation cannot be one of state nonconceptual acquaintance. If sensations are symbolically representational, then their apprehension is a matter of state conceptual acquaintance. But this fact completely undermines the explanatory force of sensations under the symbolic representationalist's perceptual account.

D) Reid on Perceptual Acquaintance: A Reconstruction

In the previous section, I examined Reid's arguments against the symbolic and imagistic formulations of representational perception. I argued that these should be viewed as a repudiation of the view that our conception of external qualities is derived from a state nonconceptual apprehension of idea-symbols or images. If ideas are to represent external qualities by being symbols for or images of these qualities, one must interpret them as such. Thus, symbolic or imagistic representation is necessarily a case of state conceptual apprehension. In order for us to apprehend images or intuitive data as symbolic or imagistic representations of external qualities, we must first possess the concepts that characterize that intuitive content as symbolic or imagistic representations. One concept involved in the characterization of the idea as a symbolic or imagistic representation will be the concept of the external thing the idea purportedly represents. Therefore, the symbolic or imagistic model of representation presupposes what it intends to explain, namely, how we acquire our conceptions of external qualities.

Reid's criticism of the symbolic representation model of perception embodies, more or less, a manoeuvre that is also available for one who desires to reconstruct his theory of perception so that it is compatible with the perceptual acquaintance model. What is required by any "Reidian" perceptual acquaintance model, by force of Reid's opposition to idea substantivism, is that sensuous properties are objective features of physical objects. Reid's theory locates the sensuous properties in nonsubstantive sensory (not perceptual) operations, and this, combined with his opposition to idea substantivism, is the obstacle to any acquaintance interpretation of Reid. To revise Reid's theory so that it is consistent with perceptual acquaintance, one must make intelligible how Reid mistook the sensuous properties, most notably the appearance of colour and tactile feeling (the phenomenal feeling of hardness, hot/cold) for nonsubstantive sensations rather than viewing them as objective properties. Is it possible to explain how (and why) Reid mistook intuitive contents of perception for nonsubstantive sensations?

I propose, as a reconstructive hypothesis, that just as the apprehension of an idea-symbol as a symbol is necessarily an instance of state conceptual apprehension, so too the perceptual apprehension of the intuitive contents of perception is necessarily an instance of state conceptual apprehension. That is, a subject's having epistemic access to extra-mental sensuous properties like colour requires that these objective features be, in their apprehension, conceptually construed as such. Reid's mistake, then, was to think about the nature of sensuous properties as if their apprehension was an instance of state nonconceptual type acquaintance.

I am now in a position to address the first question I posed at the beginning of the chapter, namely 1) Is there a plausible hypothesis available which explains how Reid's doctrine of sensation is mistaken? I believe there is. It is entirely understandable that the intuitive contents of perceptual acquaintance appear to introspective observation as nonsubstantive sensory states, once it is supposed that their apprehension is a case of state nonconceptual acquaintance. The content of an episode of state conceptual acquaintance, when separated from the conceptual construal which accurately characterizes it, is, in some sense, inaccessible. In this case, our acquaintance with features of the external world (e.g., colour, tactile phenomenological qualities) is inaccessible. One can understand how sensation nonsubstantivism gets generated by considering the intuitive content of perception in abstraction from its conceptual construal. If the content of the apprehension is inaccessible apart from its conceptual construal, then considering its apprehension in abstraction from this conceptual construal would obscure the nature of this content. Abstracting the intuitive content of perception from the perceptual belief in which the content is seen or taken as outer content, leaves this intuitive content in some sense epistemologically inaccessible. *But it is clear, given the discussion of section B, that Reid thought of the apprehension of sensuous intuition precisely in terms of pure nonconceptual acquaintance-type apprehension.* Under the assumption that perception is state conceptual acquaintance, a nonconceptual apprehension of the content of perception could not intentionally relate us to the content; it does not deliver an apprehension of outer things. If the content (object) of the apprehension is inaccessible apart from its conceptual construal, then when one

introspects on it in a way which abstracts it from this conceptual construal, naturally what will be manifest is an act of apprehension without an object. Perhaps the apprehension, considered in abstraction from the conceptual construal, would appear as if it lacked act/object intentional structure all together, and consequently would seem to be a monadic state. On this formulation, one approaches an adverbialist view of sensation. Alternatively, the intentional structure of the act of consciousness which, for Reid, accompanies all acts of mind might be smuggled into the apprehension, or considered as its intentional structure, so that the apprehension would seem to be a reflexive operation. In this way, one approaches the reflexive view of sensation. In short, it is plausible that Reid was led to his nonsubstantive theory of sensation because he conceived of the intuitive contents of state conceptual perception as contents of state nonconceptual apprehension. If my hypothesis is correct, we have grounds to reject Reid's doctrine of sensation. In this case, Reid's doctrine of sensation is erroneously generated from conceiving the intuitive content of perception as an object of state nonconceptual apprehension.

At this point, a response to the second question posed at the beginning of this chapter is available. Recall question 2) If we dispense with Reid's doctrine of sensation, are we left with anything which is properly called a "Reidian" view? I propose that if some central epistemological insight of Reid's analysis leading him to his doctrine of sensation can be salvaged, then this will allow us to answer question two in the affirmative.

I propose that there is such an insight contained in Reid's analysis of sensation. The insight is that a pure nonconceptual acquaintance-type apprehension contains no intrinsic representational capacity; it cannot relate us to anything except perhaps our own consciousness. Reid's sensation nonsubstantivism here can be considered a thought experiment of sorts. It is an answer to the following question: what epistemological role can we assign to state nonconceptual acquaintance-type apprehension? The answer is that such apprehension is epistemologically bankrupt. The only thing we may become aware of through it is some aspect of our own subjective experience. Reid's analysis surrounding his sensation nonsubstantivism can therefore be reinterpreted as a repudiation of a state nonconceptual acquaintance model of perception. This tactic is open for those who wish to provide a deflationary interpretation of Reid's doctrine of sensation. In this way, one retains the spirit of Reid's analysis of sensation without committing one's self to his problematic *doctrine* of sensation – for the analysis of sensation can be understood to function as a *reductio ad absurdum* of a state nonconceptual model of perceptual acquaintance rather than as a demonstration of sensation nonsubstantivism.

There is a final matter regarding question two that needs to be addressed here. Reid's semiotic account of perception[141], on which sensations causally trigger our perceptions through innate suggestion, is quite plausibly thought of as a defining feature of his theory of perception. But how am I to capture this semiotic account in my perceptual account once I have dispensed with Reid's doctrine of sensation? There must

[141] Recall: chapter 2. B. I.

be a way to salvage Reid's semiotic account, in some reconstructed form, if one is to answer question two in the affirmative.

I think one can preserve the spirit of Reid's semiotic account of perception even though one dispenses with his doctrine of sensation. Under my reconstruction of Reid's analysis of sensation, what Reid is referring to as a distinct sensory operation is really the intuitive content of perception considered as the content of state nonconceptual apprehension. But the content considered in this way has no intrinsic representational capacity, given my reconstruction of Reid's sensation nonsubstantivism. Nevertheless, one might still salvage the thrust of Reid's overall theory by supposing that this content is first received by the mind in a nonconceptual apprehension – an inaccessible form. That is, it is first received or carried by the perceptual system as a preconceptual intuition. Next, this first apprehension, in virtue of innate suggestion, actuates the interpretive activity which takes up this content in an act of perception. On this view, the epistemic relation between the preconceptual apprehension of intuitive content and the perceptual apprehension of this content is, by force of Reid's analysis of sensation as I reinterpret it, an extrinsic one. Thus, the relationship between the preconceptual apprehension of intuitive content and the perceptual apprehension of this content embodies the same sort of relationship that exists between Reid's sensory signs and his notion of perceptual apprehension. On this view, the preconceptual apprehension of the intuitive content has no intrinsic representational capacity.

However, does this strategy succeed in preserving some semblance of Reid's semiotic account only by bringing his nonsubstantive sensations in through the back

door? To this objection I say that indeed, a preconceptual apprehension of the intuitive contents of perception, though initiating the perceptual taking of such contents, is a nonsubstantive operation. However, this form of nonsubstantivism is benign with respect to the possibility of perceptual acquaintance, since it does not strictly relegate the sensuous properties to non-perceptual, sensory operations. This is so, since the content of these nonsubstantive operations is not mind-dependent. The content is not merely a modification of the mind or consciousness. Rather, given the epistemic bankruptcy of state nonconceptual acquaintance, the preconceptual apprehension of the intuitive content of perception simply cannot penetrate into the nature of the content – it cannot reveal the content as anything other than a modification of consciousness. Thus, on this view, the same intuitive content is shared by the two operations, one a nonsubstantive state nonconceptual acquaintance-type apprehension, the other a state conceptual act of perceptual acquaintance. The latter operation is the only one which has epistemic access to the content, while the former, while not intrinsically having access to the content, initiates this access. Thus, it is plausible, given my reconstructive hypothesis, that perception proceeds in a two-stage process analogous to Reid's semiotic account of perception, and that it does so without admitting Reid's *sensation* nonsubstantivism.

At this point, I am in a position to address the third and final question I posed at the outset of this chapter, namely 3) Are there other obstacles to an acquaintance interpretation of Reid's theory of perception besides his doctrine of sensation? I will approach this question by responding to objections to the acquaintance interpretation of Reid articulated by Wolterstorff (2006) in his paper entitled: "What Sort of

Epistemological Realist was Thomas Reid?" This paper is a full length treatment of the anti-acquaintance reading of Reid first given in his book entitled *Thomas Reid and the Story of Epistemology* (2001). The arguments Wolterstorff makes against the acquaintance interpretation of Reid are inadequate, given the preceding discussion. Showing why they are so clarifies how the basic contours of Reid's theory of perception, once we set aside his doctrine of sensation, are consistent with an acquaintance view of perception.

Recall Reid's definition of perception. Reid writes:

> If…we attend to that act of our mind which we call the perception of an external object of sense, we shall find in it these three things. First, Some conception or notion of the object perceived. Secondly, A strong and irresistible conviction and belief in its present existence. And, thirdly, That this conviction and belief are immediate, and not the effect of reasoning. (EIP, 2.V., pg: 96)

The debate regarding the acquaintance interpretation of Reid centres on whether the "conception" of the perceptual object Reid takes to be involved in perception can be understood as an acquaintance-type apprehension rather than a merely conceptual or discursive apprehension. Wolterstorff writes:

> …[R]eid says that he will use 'conceiving' as a synonym of 'apprehending'…A conception of something is thus not a concept of it but an apprehension of it, a mental grip on it…An important question that emerges from the foregoing is, what sort of apprehension (conception) of an external object does Reid think perception gives us? Is it apprehension by acquaintance or apprehension by means of a singular concept?...If the conception of an external object that, on Reid's view, is a necessary component of perception, were apprehension by way of attentive awareness [for Wolterstorff this is a synonym for acquaintance], the external object would be part of the intuitional content of the mind. So here's a way of formulating the basic question: is it Reid's view that, in perception, the perceived object is part of the intuitional content of the mind? (2006, 112-3)

Wolterstorff answers this question in the negative. He writes:

> …[W]ith the exception of his account of our perception of visible figure[142], Reid is best interpreted as holding that in perception we do not gain acquaintance with external objects; the

[142] I dealt with Wolterstorff's claim that the perception of visibles is for Reid a matter of acquaintance in chapter 2, section B. III. a.

> conception of the external object is not conception by acquaintance…[I]f a condition of a theory of perception's being a direct realist theory is that it hold that perception yields acquaintance with external objects, so that those objects are present to consciousness, then Reid's theory, so I contend, is not an example of direct realism – with the exception, to say it again, of his account of our perception of visible figure. (2006, 113)

In support of this claim, Wolterstorff offers two textual considerations, as well as two further considerations which he thinks show that Reid's account of perception would have been "exceedingly odd" had he held an acquaintance view (2006, 120). I will now deal with these objections, beginning with the two textual considerations.

The first objection to the acquaintance interpretation of Reid's theory of perception Wolterstorff offers is contained in the following passage. He writes:

> If Reid had been of the view that the conception of the external object that is an ingredient in perception were apprehension in the acquaintance mode, then surely he would have said that the sensation suggests the conception and that this in turn suggests or evokes the belief…[C]ertainly he would have said that the conception of the external object evokes a belief about the object…[O]ne cannot be acquainted with something – attentively aware of it – without such acquaintance evoking beliefs in one about the object of acquaintance. In fact, however, Reid never speaks of the conception that is an ingredient in perception as suggesting a belief about the external object. Over and over he says that the sensation suggests a conception and belief of the object; never does he dig inside that pair to say that the conception evokes the belief. Reid treats perceptual conceptions as mute – which they would not be and could not be if they were conceptions by acquaintance. (2006, 117-8)

Essentially, Wolterstorff's point is that acquaintance-type apprehension of an object necessarily evokes beliefs about that object. But nowhere do we see Reid assigning this function to the conception involved in the operation of perception. Both the conception of and the belief in the object of perception are, for Reid, evoked solely in virtue of the sensory sign alone. But this is inconsistent with an acquaintance reading of Reid's perceptual conception.

My response to this objection is that it fails to take into consideration the distinction between pure nonconceptual acquaintance and state conceptual acquaintance. If the type of acquaintance we are considering were a pure nonconceptual acquaintance,

then it should appear absurd that Reid does not assign to perceptual conception the power of evoking the belief in the object of perception. However, if one endorses a state conceptual acquaintance model, then it makes sense to think of the acquaintance-type apprehension of an object as not delivering the relevant original belief in the object. This is so, since under the state conceptual acquaintance model, the acquaintance-type apprehension of the object might be considered to be dependent on the original perceptual belief. The original perceptual belief might be considered the necessary act of judgment or conceptual construal, which makes the content of perceptual conception epistemologically accessible. Hence, it is intelligible on the state conceptual acquaintance model that the original beliefs of perception are never a consequent of the conception (apprehension) of the object – i.e., that they are not evoked by this conception. If Reid held a state conceptual acquaintance view of perception, then it is perfectly possible to understand why he treats perceptual conceptions as "mute" in the sense Wolterstorff notes. Reid could consistently maintain that the relevant beliefs condition the perceptual conception of the object, and that these beliefs and the perceptual conception thus must occur in tandem. Thus, it makes sense for Reid to maintain that both are suggested solely by the sensory sign.

Wolterstorff also offers a second textual consideration against the acquaintance interpretation of Reid. This concerns Reid's views on the nature of our acquisition of the concepts of the primary qualities. Given Reid's sensation nonsubstantivism, our acquisition of the concept of hardness – or our concept of any external quality for that matter – cannot be epistemologically derived from our sensory apprehensions. For Reid,

recall,[143] there is a sensory feeling that precedes and initiates our apprehension of hardness, and our general concept of hardness, but there is no intrinsic connection between the sensation and hardness, such that the concept may be "read off" from the content of the sensation. Reid writes:

> I think it is evident, that we cannot, by reasoning from our sensations, collect the existence of bodies at all, far less any of their qualities…[B]y all rules of just reasoning, we must conclude, that this connection [between the sensation initiating our concept of hardness and our concept of hardness] is the effect of our constitution, and ought to be considered as an original principle of human nature, till we find some more general principle into which it may be resolved. (*Inquiry*, 5. III., pg: 61)

Thus, while for Reid the concept of hardness is not an innate concept, sitting actualized in our mind prior to sensory experience – it is instead activated by our sensory experience – it is nevertheless an a priori concept. On this point, Wolterstorff writes:

> One possibility, abstractly speaking, is that these concepts [of hardness and other primary qualities] are innate in us, waiting to be employed. That is definitely not Reid's view. His view is rather that we are 'programmed' by our Maker that, upon touching a hard object, the resultant pressure sensation calls forth in us whatever concepts may be necessary for apprehending the object's hardness with the singular concept, the hardness of the object I am touching. This would of course include the general concept of a hardness… Though the general concept of a hardness is not an innate concept, it is an a priori concept…Reid's view, in short, was that the mind is conceptually creative in a manner and to a degree that no empiricism would concede…(2006, 119)

Wolterstorff thinks that Reid's commitment to the a priori nature of our concept of hardness and the other primary qualities is inconsistent with an acquaintance interpretation of our perception of primary qualities. He writes:

> …[S]uppose it were Reid's view that perception incorporates acquaintance with the external object perceived. Then Reid's argument that our concept of hardness is, to use Kant's language, a priori, would be totally undercut. If, when we touch a hard object, we gained acquaintance with the object's hardness, then we could derive the concept of hardness by the usual processes of abstraction and generalization… (2006, 120)

Again, Wolterstorff's objection fails to recognize the distinction between pure nonconceptual acquaintance and state conceptual acquaintance. If perceptual conception

[143] See: chapter 2, sec. B.I.; chapter 3, sec. B. II.

was a nonconceptual acquaintance-type apprehension of hardness, then certainly it would appear absurd to think that the concept of hardness was a strictly a priori concept. However, if the perceptual conception of hardness was state conceptual acquaintance-type apprehension, then it is intelligible that the concept of hardness is a priori. This is so, since one might hold that the concept of hardness is a necessary component in the act of conceptualization which conditions the state of being acquainted with hardness. If we must possess the concept of hardness in order to become perceptually acquainted with hardness, then certainly it could not be said that the concept of hardness is acquired through a perception of hardness.

Wolterstorff offers two further considerations against the acquaintance interpretation of Reid. These are not meant as knock down arguments against the acquaintance interpretation of Reid. Rather, they are meant to show how Reid's theory of perception would have been "exceedingly odd" had he held an acquaintance view.

First, Wolterstorff considers what he takes to be the "central oddity" of an acquaintance interpretation of Reid's theory of perception. Wolterstorff explains that were Reid committed to an acquaintance view of perception, he'd be committed to an odd "double information theory". On the nature of Reid's theory of perception under the acquaintance interpretation, he writes:

> [According to the acquaintance interpretation of Reid's theory of perception,]…sensations yield information about external objects upon being subjected to the interpretational mode of belief-formation, and [also]…evoke acquaintances with those external objects…[which] yield information about those external objects. All the beliefs about external objects evoked by interpreting one's sensations would also be evoked by one's acquaintance with those external objects…And every belief evoked by acquaintance with an external object would also be evoked by one's interpretation of the sensation which evoked that acquaintance… (2006, 120-1)

Wolterstorff goes on to remark on the implausibility of such a view. He states:

> I find this very odd. Not necessarily false, so far as I can see; but very odd. Given acquaintance with external objects, sensory experience functioning as a source of information about those objects is otiose; given sensory experience functioning as a source of information about external objects, acquaintance with those objects is otiose. (2006, 120-1)

Much the same strategy I've used in my response to the abovementioned objections may be employed again here. The double information problem Wolterstorff presents as a consequence of an acquaintance interpretation of Reid's theory of perception only holds for a pure nonconceptual acquaintance reading of Reid's theory, and not for a state conceptual acquaintance reading. In accordance with a state conceptual acquaintance model, our perceptual acquaintance with external objects, conceivably, depends on an act of judgment or belief – e.g., an interpretive construal of intuitive content. If it is supposed that the original beliefs about the perceptual object which are immediately evoked by the sensory sign are the conceptual conditions of our state conceptual acquaintance with that object, then Wolterstorff's double information problem dissolves. No longer can our acquaintance with that object be thought to produce or initiate the original perceptual beliefs about that object, and thus, this function can be consistently assigned to the sensation alone.

The final consideration Wolterstorff provides against the acquaintance interpretation of Reid's theory of perception is that it is implausible that an acquaintance theorist would consider perceptual beliefs to be an essential ingredient in perception. Recall Reid's definition of perception above; he defines perception, in part, as a state of having certain kinds of beliefs regarding the object of perception. For Reid, the essence of perception consists, in part, of having an immediate (non-inferential) belief about the present existence of some external quality, and this belief is initiated straightforwardly by

the apprehension of a sensory sign. On this point and the difficulty it poses for an acquaintance interpretation of Reid's theory of perception, Wolterstorff writes:

> Had Reid held that perception incorporates acquaintance with external objects, then a second oddity of his theory would be the centrality in the theory of beliefs. Surely the person who held such a view would regard the essence of perception as consisting in acquaintance with external objects, not in beliefs about those objects. Or rather: the person who held such a view would most naturally regard the essence of perception as consisting in an external object appearing to one, constituting part of the intuitional content of the mind…Perception without a corresponding perceptual belief would be a live possibility. There can be no doubt, however, that perceptual beliefs, and the conceptions (apprehensions) they presuppose, constitute the very core of perception as Reid understands it. Reid's theory of perception is a doxastic theory…Mating an appearance [acquaintance] theory of perception with a doxastic theory of perception would be miscegenation. (122-3)

Once again, however, Wolterstorff's criticism fails to take into consideration the possibility of a state conceptual model of acquaintance. It is conceivable for a state conceptual acquaintance theory of perception to hold that our acquaintance with external objects is predicated on having certain beliefs about those objects. Under a state conceptual acquaintance theory, we may say, as Gertler does, that "…reality and the epistemic intersect in a judgment" (2012, 125). But then it makes perfect sense why perceptual beliefs play such a central role in a state conceptual acquaintance view of perception: they are the essential conceptual/interpretive machinery that make possible the appearance of the object.

If one assesses the compatibility of Reid's theory of perception with perceptual acquaintance in terms of a state conceptual acquaintance model rather than in terms of a pure nonconceptual acquaintance model, Wolterstorff's criticisms have no purchase. In responding to Wolterstorff's objections to the acquaintance interpretation of Reid's theory of perception, I have shown how the basic contours of Reid's theory of perception pose no real difficulty for the acquaintance reading. I submit that this constitutes good

grounds for provisionally answering question (3) in the negative. Thus, in light of my reconstruction of Reid's analysis of sensation, I think one can arrive at a modified Reidian theory of perception which conforms to an acquaintance model of perception rather straightforwardly.

E) Conclusion

Reid's doctrine of sensation is the principal aspect of his theory of perception that makes it inconsistent with an acquaintance view of perception. The fact that Reid's theory of perception is inconsistent with an acquaintance view does not bode well for him, given both that a) acquaintance views are more plausible than non-acquaintance views[144], and b) it jeopardizes the substantial distinction that he considers exists between his views and Locke's.[145] In chapter 3, I examined Reid's doctrine of sensation within the context of his revised primary/secondary qualities distinction, and placed this distinction in juxtaposition with Locke's version of the distinction. Chapter 3 showed how Reid's doctrine of the sensations of secondary qualities is in tension with common sense on the subject of the objective reality of colour, sound, taste, smell, and hot/cold. This should strike Reid as an intolerable consequence of sensation nonsubstantivism. These considerations further undermine the viability of his sensation nonsubstantivism.

In the present chapter, I provided provisional grounds for a modified Reidian acquaintance theory of perception. I approached my objective by assuming at the outset that perception was a matter of acquaintance. By force of my arguments in chapter 2, this meant that the intuitive appearances Reid identified as mere sensations were actually

[144] See: chapter 1, section B.
[145] See: chapter 1, section C.

objective features of the external world. Thus, working in the reverse, it becomes possible to explain how, and why, Reid mistook the intuitive contents of perception for nonsubstantive sensations.

I articulated this hypothesis under a guiding question, namely 1) Is there a plausible hypothesis available which explains how Reid's doctrine of sensation is mistaken? I answered this question in the affirmative by relying on a contemporary distinction between state conceptual acquaintance and pure nonconceptual acquaintance. This is not anachronistic, since the distinction between state conceptual and pure nonconceptual acquaintance-type apprehension is already implicitly contained in Reid's argument in *Oration III* against the representationalist doctrine of perception. If perceptual apprehension is a state conceptual acquaintance-type apprehension rather than a pure nonconceptual acquaintance-type apprehension, one can understand how Reid mistook the intuitive contents of perception for nonsubstantive sensations. It is conceivable that Reid's doctrine of sensation was generated as a result of his illegitimately construing the intuitive content of perception as the content of a pure nonconceptual acquaintance-type apprehension.

However, answering question (1) in the affirmative is not enough to provisionally ground a "Reidian" acquaintance view of perception, since one might doubt whether any view which does not incorporate Reid's doctrine of sensation could deserve to be called a "Reidain" view at all. I address this matter under the guiding question (2). If we dispense with Reid's doctrine of sensation, are we left with anything which may properly be called a "Reidian" view? I answer this question in the affirmative, since I take it that

the central epistemological significance of Reid's analysis of sensation can be reinterpreted in a way which does not commit one to his actual doctrine of sensation. Reid's proof for sensation nonsubstantivism can be reinterpreted as a critique of the viability of a pure nonconceptual acquaintance account of perception. Moreover, Reid's semiotic account of perception can also be preserved in a reconstructed form. This is so, since one may suppose that the intuitive contents of perception are first received or carried by the perceptual system in a nonconceptual apprehension, and that this apprehension immediately or instantaneously suggests the conceptual act which conditions our perceptual access to this content. In this way, the basic two-stage form of Reid's semiotic account of perception, as well as the inherent metaphysical arbitrariness of the sign/significate relation, are preserved.

Yet, answering questions (1) and (2) in the affirmative is still insufficient to provisionally ground a Reidian acquaintance view of perception, since there may be other aspects of his theory of perception, besides his sensation nonsubstantivism, which militate against an acquaintance view. This matter was addressed under my third guiding question, namely 3) Are there other obstacles to an acquaintance interpretation of Reid's theory of perception besides his doctrine of sensation? I answer this question in the negative. To address this question, I looked at Wolterstorff's 2006 paper, which presents his thoroughgoing case against the acquaintance interpretation of Reid. I argued that all of Wolterstorff's objections to the acquaintance interpretation of Reid hinge on taking acquaintance to be pure nonconceptual apprehension, and that once one considers the

possibility that perception for Reid could involve state conceptual acquaintance-type apprehension, they all fail.

It should strike the reader that there is a considerable degree of continuity or unity in my strategy for answering all three of the questions posed. My answers to all three questions ultimately rely, in various ways, on the distinction I articulated at the beginning of this chapter, namely, the distinction between pure nonconceptual and state conceptual acquaintance. Moreover, my use of this distinction in this context is supported by the fact that (as I have argued) the distinction is one that Reid himself employed. I conclude that there is a relatively straightforward way to adapt Reid's views to accommodate an acquaintance model of perception. Moreover, it is not implausible that Reid himself, given that he was a staunch defender of common sense, would have elected to abandon his doctrine of sensation and adopt the view I've described, had he seen a straightforward way to do so without abandoning central features of his theory.

CONCLUSION:

I have investigated Reid's philosophy of perception with a particular question in mind, namely: is Reid's perceptual theory consistent with an acquaintance model of perception? In order to adequately address this question, it was important to first address a series of preliminary matters. First, what is an acquaintance view of perception, and is it a coherent position? Second, is it anachronistic to consider Reid's philosophy of perception in relation to the more recent notion of acquaintance? And third, what, if anything, motivates this interpretation? Chapter 1 was devoted to these questions.

I have argued that the acquaintance model of perception, according to which physical, mind-independent reality is both ontologically present in, and epistemologically presented by our perceptual awareness, is a coherent and intuitively plausible thesis. Moreover, I have argued that the notion of acquaintance is not foreign to Reid's historical context. It is rather a notion plausibly thought to be implicit in Locke's and the idea theorists' view on intentional immediacy. Reid thinks a central way in which his theory departs from Locke's is that he affirms something Locke denies, namely, that physical objects are the immediate objects of perception. However, the central negative Lockean position, as I interpret it, is that we are not *acquainted* with physical objects. On this reading, Locke does not deny that physical objects can be immediate objects of apprehension in some other non-acquaintance sense. And if Reid's notion of perceptual immediacy amounts to no more than the view that certain beliefs are directly *about* external objects, then Locke has reason to consider it a trivial challenge to his negative position. If Reid's account of perceptual immediacy fundamentally disturbs the central

negative Lockean position, then I think it must be consistent with an acquaintance view of perceptual immediacy. I maintain that these considerations, in conjunction with the intuitive appeal of the acquaintance model of perception, are sufficient to make the project of examining in detail whether Reid's theory is compatible with an acquaintance model of perception worthwhile.

Chapter 2 was devoted to explaining why Reid's actual account is not compatible with the acquaintance model. The incompatibility consists in the following: sensuous properties play a necessary presentative role in any acquaintance-type apprehension of body. Sensuous properties are for Reid articles of "sensation", i.e., nonsubstantive modifications of mind. If the sensuous properties are articles of nonsubstantive sensation, it follows that they cannot fulfill a presentative role, since to do so they must bear geometrical properties, and this is something ruled out by Reid's sensation nonsubstantivism. But on Reid's account, sensations contain sensuous properties. Thus, we cannot remedy matters by locating alternative sensuous properties suited for fulfilling a presentational function in a non-sensory operation. This would commit Reid to a dual appearance phenomenology of sensuous properties, which is contrary to the nature of perceptual experience. Moreover, this proposed remedy also effectively commits one to a naïve objectivism regarding the sensuous properties, which is inconsistent with Reid's account of the perception of secondary qualities. Given these considerations, Reid's actual doctrine of sensation is incompatible with the acquaintance model of perception.

In chapter 3, I examined Locke's and Reid's respective accounts of the primary and secondary qualities, and Locke's, Reid's, and Berkeley's respective accounts of the

common sense view of colour, sound, smell, taste, and hot/cold. I began by outlining Reid's methodological framework, according to which common judgments are epistemologically weighty. The colour, sound, smell, etc. objectivism of common judgment is something Reid desires to validate philosophically. Indeed, his derisive analysis of philosophy from Descartes to Hume involves conceiving the ideal system as a progressive falsification of the world, beginning with the idealization of colour, taste, sound, smell and hot/cold, and ultimately ending with the denial of the external world and self. Reid writes:

> Ideas have something in their nature unfriendly to other existences. They were first introduced into philosophy, in the humble character of images or representatives of things; and in this character they seemed not only to be inoffensive, but to serve admirably well for explaining the operations of the human understanding. But since men began to reason clearly and distinctly about them, they have by degrees supplanted their constituents, and undermined the existence of every thing but themselves. First, they discarded all secondary qualities of bodies; and it was found by their means, that fire is not hot, nor snow cold, nor honey sweet; and in a word, that heat and cold, sound, colour, taste, and smell, are nothing but ideas and impressions. Bishop Berkeley advanced them a step higher, and found out, by just reasoning, from the same principles, that extension, solidity, space, figure, and body, are ideas, and that there is nothing in nature but ideas and spirits. But the triumph of ideas was completed by the *Treatise of human nature*, which discards spirits also, and leaves ideas and impressions as the sole existences in the universe. What if at last, having nothing else to contend with, they should fall foul of one another and leave no existence in nature at all? (*Inquiry*, 2. VI., pg: 33-4)

As I interpret him, Locke denies the objective reality of colour, sound, smell, etc. in virtue of his negative resemblance thesis, according to which the sensory ideas of colour, sound, etc., fail to instantiate any external property. I argued that the common sense view on the perception of these properties is quite plausibly construed along Berkeleyan lines, i.e., in terms of an acquaintance model of perception. To consider, as Reid does, objective colour, sound, smell, etc. as things which cannot possibly be objects of acquaintance creates a significant tension between his views on objective colour, sound, smell, etc. and common sense. Reid's views on the perception of objective

colour, sound, smell, etc. simply do not do justice to the common sense beliefs he seeks to philosophically validate. It is the appearance phenomenology of sensuous properties which "the vulgar" consider as the perceptible qualities of colour, sound, smell, taste, and hot/cold.[146] But as we have seen in chapter 2, Reid conceives these properties as articles of sensation. Thus, Reid's doctrine of sensation has the effect of committing him not only to an anti-acquaintance view, but also, it seems, to an anti-common sense view. We have good reason to doubt that either of these ramifications of the doctrine would have been acceptable to Reid, had he been made fully cognizant of them. These considerations further motivate reassessing Reid's doctrine of sensation.

In chapter 4 I developed a modified Reidian view of perceptual acquaintance which dispenses with his actual doctrine of sensation, but preserves central insights of his analysis of sensation in a reconstructed form. To do so, I drew on an epistemic distinction found in contemporary philosophy of perception, one which is implicit in Reid's thinking on the symbolic representational model of perception. The distinction is between "state conceptual" and "state nonconceptual" acquaintance. State conceptual acquaintance is the view that in order for the subject to be acquainted with x, he must possess the concepts that accurately characterize x. State nonconceptual acquaintance is the view that in order for the subject to be acquainted with x, he need not possess the concepts that accurately characterize x.

Once one supposes that perception is a state conceptual acquaintance-type apprehension, one can understand how Reid might have mistaken the intuitive contents of

[146] At least, Reid gives no compelling reason for us to think otherwise, and Berkeley provides compelling intuitive considerations in favour of the view.

perception for articles of nonsubstantive sensation. If Reid's doctrine of sensation results from misidentifying the intuitive contents of perception in this way, the sensuous properties can be reclaimed as objective attributes of physical objects, and we can thereby satisfy the presentative role of such properties.

Moreover, the modified Reidian view I propose salvages the central epistemological insight of Reid's analysis of sensation, namely, the extrinsic representational capacity of state nonconceptual acquaintance-type apprehension. Reid's sensation nonsubstantivism is well suited for being reinterpreted as an exposition of the epistemic poverty of state nonconceptual acquaintance-type apprehension. Thus interpreted, the Reidian rejects a crude state nonconceptualist view, according to which we are straightaway, without any conceptual mediation, presented with physical objects.

I explored objections to the acquaintance interpretation of Reid offered by Wolterstorff (2006). These objections are distinct from the Alstonian objection to the acquaintance interpretation which I have advanced. Wolterstorff's objections presuppose a crude state nonconceptualist model of perceptual acquaintance. I argued that once the acquaintance interpretation of Reid is considered in relation to a state conceptualist acquaintance model, Wolterstorff's objections are found to be deficient. Barring, then, any other unforeseen difficulties with Reid's doctrine as far as the acquaintance interpretation goes, my modified Reidian acquaintance view is theoretically stable.

A necessary condition of any defensible Reidian acquaintance view of perception, by force of chapter 2, is the adoption of a naïve objectivist view of the sensuous properties. Thus, my reconstruction of Reid's position renounces his doctrine of primary

and secondary qualities and their perception. However, given the argument of chapter 3, I see no reason why we should not think that this is an acceptable consequence, that is, one that results in a stronger view and that Reid himself would (or at least should) have been happy to accept.

There has been a recent resurgence of interest in Reid's philosophy, and in particular, in his epistemological views and account of perception. I have examined these topics with the aim of understanding Reid's views on their own terms, but also in connection with a set of contemporary issues. My project contains an element of revision and reconstruction, though unapologetically so. I can only believe that showing that, and how, Reid's theory of perception may be made consistent with the acquaintance model of perception through one simple revision can only contribute to our understanding of his doctrine and to our appreciation of its philosophical importance.

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