BOTSWANA'S NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT & GEOPOLITICAL SITUATION
BOTSWANA'S NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND GEOPOLITICAL SITUATION: A POLITICO-GEOGRAPHICAL STUDY OF AN IDEOLOGICAL FRONTIER

By

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ABSTRACT:

The concept of ideological frontier and boundary, familiar in the context of 'Cold War' politics, is applied to Botswana, as a case study in political geography. The study works from two basic assumptions. Firstly, that there is an inverse relationship between economic dependence and political independence (which in this study is further related to the hostility in the ideological conflict). Secondly, that in a conflict between national interest and ideology a state gives priority to the former. These assumptions are used in the context of Botswana's national development and that state's contemporary geopolitical situation in southern Africa. This situation is characterised by the ideological conflict of racial confrontation. The development of Botswana as a strategically important state is traced by reference to past political and economic dependencies on other states. An evaluation of the present day dependencies and their effect on Botswana's national goals depends in part on understanding that state's geopolitical situation along an ideological frontier.
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CHAPTER I

A. INTRODUCTION.

Botswana¹ situated in southern Africa, is a state saddled between two conflicting political ideologies,² which by their nature and associations can influence the degree of political and economic independence of that country. Underlying the ideological conflict is the paramount question of race relations. On the one hand there is the ideology of apartheid³ (racial segregation) and associated with it the fact of a 'white'⁴ minority-rule government. On the other hand there is the ideology, or rather ideologies, less well defined, of multi-racialism and non-racialism, and associated with it the ideal of majority-rule government.

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1. Botswana is the post independence name for Bechuanaland Protectorate.

2. Ideology is defined here as, "ideas at the basis of some economic or political system", see Concise Oxford Dictionary.


That there is a conflict between the ideals of race relations represented by apartheid and multi-racialism is not in doubt.\(^1\) The problem becomes complicated because of the nature and associations of the ideologies. The ideologies can influence a country's political and economic situation because representatives of both types of ideology attempt to convert peoples of uncommitted or conflicting ideology. The ideologies as represented by certain states and organisations reflect differing politico-geographical conditions. In addition, the efficacy of a particular ideology in influencing people will depend upon the 'power' of a state representing that ideology, which in turn is dependent upon all the economic, political and social factors which control communication.\(^2\) That Botswana has economic, political and social communication with her international neighbours suggests that she will be influenced, willy-nilly, by the ideologies of her neighbours.

Botswana, like any other newly independent African state, is preoccupied with national development. Located in an important strategic area it is not surprising that Botswana's national development goals are influenced by its

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1. For example, see General Assembly Debates 19th Sess. Over 50% of the UN delegates criticised South Africa.
2. Communication here meaning social as well as physical communication.
strategic relations. The purpose of the study is to determine the significance of Botswana's geopolitical situation upon her national development goals. Such a study entails an examination of Botswana's strategic relations which may be defined as those political, economic, military and psychological forces, both internal and external to the state, which impinge upon that state to influence its national development and ideological orientation.¹ This development and orientation will be largely influenced by the condition of her economic dependence and political independence.

In this first chapter Botswana's historical background and her present strategic situation in relation to the ideological frontier are briefly presented. Chapter 2 reviews the literature. Chapters 3 and 4 examine respectively the political and economic factors affecting Botswana's national development, and strategic relations. Chapter 5 examines the ideological frontier. Chapter 6 summarises the main findings and draws out some tentative conclusions.

¹ The author is acutely aware of the difficulty of pursuing academic neutrality in a study of this nature.
The Strategic History of Botswana.

For the first half of the 19th century Bechuanaland\(^1\) was strategically important as a route or corridor from the South to the interior of southern Africa, the hinterland of the Cape Colony. Control of the route was not only important to the Cape Colony for trade, but also for the work of missionaries. Threatened by Boer expansion from the east and filibustering from the south and east, and the discovery of diamonds, the British found it expedient to define Bechuanaland's eastern boundary in 1871.\(^2\) At this time no power threatened from the largely uncharted west or north. By the 1880's the strategic situation had changed. The chief forces impinging on Bechuanaland were Germany (from the west); Transvaal (from the east); Cape Colony (from the south); and the British South Africa Company and indirectly, the Portuguese (from the north). British interests in East Africa were developing which gave increasing importance to the Cape-Cairo concept.\(^3\)

1. To avoid misunderstanding "Bechuanaland" will be used to refer to pre-independence Botswana.


Bechuanaland became a corridor and advance base for colonization to the frontier north, and was described at this time by Rhodes as the Suez canal for trade to the north,\(^1\) the 'neck of the bottle'.\(^2\) In 1885 Britain declared a Crown Colony over British Bechuanaland\(^3\) and a Protectorate over an area to the north,\(^4\) so defining a southern, western and northern boundary to Bechuanaland. "Germany had been warned, Boer aggression had been checked and access to the north preserved."\(^5\) The declaration of a Protectorate had recognised Bechuanaland as a strategic area, a block of territory linking British imperial and colonial interests in the north and south, and separating anti-British interests in the east and west. By 1890 it would also appear that Bechuanaland was serving as a base for an 'Imperial presence' next to the growing power of the colonial British South Africa Company.\(^6\)

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1. CHBE, op.cit., p.523.


3. British Bechuanaland was later transferred to Cape Colony in 1895.


5. CHBE, op.cit., p.525.

6. Eric A. Walker, A History of Southern Africa, Longmans, 3rd ed., London, 1964. For many years before a Protectorate was proclaimed, the missionaries had fought to keep out the colonial Cape Colony and British South Africa Company for fear that they may exploit the tribal peoples.
EVOLUTION OF BOTSWANA AS A STRATEGIC AREA

(To Show Forces Competing for Control or Interest in Botswana)

I. 1890-1923

- GERMAN [Imperial]
- South Africa Co. [Colonial] (post 1914)
- British Imperialism
- TRANSVAAL [Colonial] (post 1909)
- Cape [Colonial] (post 1909)
- British Bechuanaland
- Anti-British interests
- Direction of desired expansion of interest.

2. POST 1966

- Black 'majority' government
- White 'minority' government (S.A. controlled)
- White 'minority' government (other)
- BOTSWANA
The British Government had willy-nilly been drawn into declaring a Protectorate over Bechuanaland, a country poor in natural resources. Britain had hoped to keep the area 'neutral' of any power contrary to its interest, without itself exercising power. Such a power-vacuum could not exist when competing interests were present.¹ British power had to be exercised in order to keep out competing foreign power alien to its own imperial and colonial interests. "The declaration of a Protectorate in 1885 which only involved Britain in a nebulous external protection was insufficient to protect the native peoples from colonial and foreign interference. In 1891 then, legislation was enacted which provided the constitutional foundations, virtually unchanged up to 1960, by which Britain assumed responsibility for the internal administration of all the peoples of the territory."²

The first half of the 20th century saw changes in Bechuanaland's neighbours to the south and east, for the competing forces of the Cape Colony and the Transvaal State now became one force, the Union of South Africa. Following the First World War, Bechuanaland's German

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¹. See, CHBE, op.cit., pp.526-529, and A. Sillery op.cit., p.236.
². A. Sillery, op.cit., pp.156-158.
neighbour to the west was replaced by Union administration. Her remaining boundary to the north east, neighbouring on Northern and Southern Rhodesia thus surrounded Bechuanaland by a British suzerainty for the first time, a fact which did not, however, lessen the threat to her of incorporation by neighbouring countries who generally resented the 'Imperial' factor in their midst.

The significance to Bechuanaland of her new sole southern neighbour, the Union of South Africa, may be indicated by quoting Curtis of the difficulty facing the leaders at the National Convention in 1908:

"Their greatest difficulty lay in the conflict of principles, the principle of the colour bar in the north and the principle of equal rights for all civilised men in the south."

It should be noted here that 'north' refers to the Transvaal, with its illiberal race laws, and the 'south' refers to the more liberal Cape Colony. That this distinction should be lost with the passage of time was due to the ascendancy of Afrikaner ideology in Union politics, particularly during the 1930's. By this time it had already been noted that

1. Article by Lionel Curtis in The Times (London), 13th May, 1935.
2. For the new connotation of 'north' and 'south', vide infra, p.12.
the High Commission Territories\(^1\) were more or less essential to solve the Union's race problem, which was essentially to segregate the 'Natives' from the whites and give them more land.\(^2\) Bechuanaland was now strategically significant as a large area of land to redistribute as need be to implement the ideology of **apartheid** in South Africa.\(^3\) Since the British established a Protectorate in Bechuanaland there had remained a firm distinction between the 'native' policies of that territory, where native interests were paramount, and those predominant in South Africa where white interests were paramount.

The greater significance of Bechuanaland after the Second World War, as a defence liability to the Union, was due in part to the arrival of the global 'Cold War' - the threat of communism, both internal and external to the Union.\(^4\)

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1. This was the collective name for Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swaziland.


but more particularly to the developments towards political independence of African states to the North.\(^1\) In addition, with the increasing internal opposition to the Union's 'apartheid' policy, and the consequent need for increasingly harsh domestic legislation, Bechuanaland and the other High Commission Territories, were turned into refuges for political refugees.

It was now clear that a new strategic factor had entered the scene of Bechuanaland-Union relations. Until the 1950's it could be said generally, that Bechuanaland had always played the role of the threatened, never the threatener. It should be noted that Bechuanaland's native policy had for long been vexing to the Union, but not because of any aggressive role on the part of Bechuanaland to export its native policy. That Bechuanaland could now play an active role as a base for an openly hostile ideology gave the Union a new concern.\(^2\) Bechuanaland's role had always been defensive, a resistance against encroachment. Now the role could be that of a base for opposition to the Union of South Africa. Contrariwise, to South Africa's traditional 'aggressive' role of demand for

1. W. van Heerden, *SABRA* op.cit. states, "...what seemed immeasurably far away from us in 1939, or even in 1945, is now upon us. In the wake of the 2nd World War followed a revolution which has within a dozen years driven the white ruler out of Asia, and which now is hammering at him in Africa." p.127.

incorporation of Bechuanaland, could now be added her
'defensive' role of the need to defend against an actively
hostile ideology to the north. The danger which political
developments in the late 1950's and early 1960's posed for
South Africa has been described by van den Berghe:

"Since 1958 the meteoric collapse of European
colonialism in Africa has isolated South Africa
at the tip of a hostile continent. While South
Africa is still protected from the 'winds of
change' by a cordon sanitaire of colonial or
White-settler controlled territories to the
north (Angola, Mozambique, and Southern
Rhodesia), such a protection will certainly
be short-lived. The disintegration of the
Central African Federation is now an accom-
plished fact, leaving only Southern Rhodesia
under precarious White control, and the break-
down of the Portuguese empire appears imminent.
The liberation of Southern Rhodesia, Angola,
Mozambique and the High Commission Territories
will leave South Africa with a wide-open,
hostile frontier of over two thousand miles."¹

During a period of about 100 years Botswana has evolved as
a strategic area and corridor, at first to protect British
imperial interest against foreign and colonial encroachment,
but now to protect its own sovereign and national interests
against encroachment from ideologies alien to these interests.
The original strategic corridor, the 'Road' to the north,
which is now followed by the railway, still serves an
economic function. Another equally significant 'corridor'
today however is that which passes through Kasane and
Kasungula, and is the product of the ideological conflict
which has emerged in the mid 20th century.

¹. Pierre L. van den Berghe, South Africa, a Study in
Conflict, Wesleyan Univ. Press, Middleton, Conn.'65, p.250.
B. Basic Elements and Concepts Behind the Present Problem

The problem of national development confronting Botswana which is a consequence of her geopolitical situation has in essence three elements. Firstly there is the ideological conflict in southern Africa, and the frontier position of Botswana in this conflict. Secondly, the political independence of Botswana which allows that country, in theory at any rate, to choose between ideologies; and thirdly, the economic dependence of Botswana, which in reality circumscribes her domestic political policy and foreign policy options. If these three elements did not conflict Botswana's international problem would probably not exist. However, it is the contention of this study that they do conflict.

It is assumed that economic dependence and political independence are related inversely.¹ The greater the economic dependence the less the political independence and vice versa. Although a move towards greater economic dependence may not be exactly matched by a loss in political independence, even if it could be measured, it will lessen to some degree the political independence. The ideological frontier is related to the economic and political dependencies in that any change in the position of Botswana of greater economic and political dependence to one ideological side will arouse the hostility

¹. This assumption is widely acknowledged and thus no attempt is made in this study to prove it.
of the other ideological side. The relationship between the three basic elements may be shown diagrammatically.

**DIAGRAM TO SHOW THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE THREE BASIC ELEMENTS OF THE PROBLEM.**

Explanatory notes:

1. An increase in economic dependence by Botswana on the 'North' or 'South' will be matched by a decrease in political independence, and vice versa. The model excludes the possibility of an overall concurrent increase (or decrease) in both political independence and economic dependence.

2. The movements of Botswana, 'North' or 'South' will be considered in general, a reaction (effect) to the action (cause) of actors external to Botswana in the ideological conflict.

3. Botswana's position on the ideological frontier is dependent on the condition of the political and economic dependencies.

4. In time 1 (T1) movement of Botswana towards the 'North' increases hostility by the 'South'.

5. In time 2 (T2) movement of Botswana towards the 'South' increases hostility by the 'North'.

6. Although the changes in economic and political dependency refer to Botswana, that country is a political sub-system acting with other political sub-systems, within one world.
political system, so that any political and economic changes in Botswana will have their effect on other political sub-systems.¹

7. 'South' is defined as those countries which are ruled by White-minority governments and so includes the following countries: South Africa, South West Africa, Angola, Mozambique and Rhodesia (Southern Rhodesia).

8. 'North' is defined as those countries which may be described as 'independent Black African states', excluding for analytical purposes Botswana. 'North' also includes the Organisation of African Unity (OAU).

Economically Botswana is a weak state neighbouring on powerful South Africa. Her historic connection with South Africa developed an economic dependence which threatens her political independence. Economically linked to South Africa and Rhodesia by the pervading influence of the railway and much else besides, and yet aspiring to the nationalism of the independent Black African states to the north², Botswana is confronted with a political tension.

In developing its own polity it cannot ignore its external association with a most powerful neighbour, whose very

1. The terminology of system and sub-system for describing political units in international relations will not be pursued, as reference to the various states and international organisations will imply reference to their systems and not merely to their nominal structures. For use of systems terminology in the African context see, I. William Zartman, "Africa as a Subordinate State System in International Relations," International Organisation, Vol.XXI, No.3, Summer, 1967.

2. Seretse Khama as Prime Minister of Bechuanaland stated, "although the sympathies of my people may lie with the states to the north of us, it must be admitted that our geographical position forces us to remain within the complex of the South African economy." See, "Address by the Prime Minister of Bechuanaland on October 28, 1965 at the African Studies Association Annual Meeting". African Studies Bulletin, 1X, No. 1, April 1966.
difference in political ideology has created mutual antagonism. During the early part of the 1960's political development was an exceedingly difficult task as a consequence of developments outside Botswana which made that country part of a wider 'ideological frontier.' The forces developing and defining the frontier were those of Black nationalism, Pan-Africanism and multi-racialism on the one hand, and the forces of white nationalism and apartheid on the other. These forces have been identified in the ideological literature,¹ and their reality is attested to by the guerrilla activity reported around Botswana,² fought in their name and aimed at the overthrow of the white regimes, and also in the increased military preparedness of the Republic of South Africa's armed forces.³ The concepts of 'bridge-head', 'cordon sanitaire', 'buffer state', and 'battleline', have signified the strategic importance of Bechuanaland, and continue to do so for the new state of Botswana. It is important to see how far these concepts


3. For a recent description of armed forces in South Africa see, UN document ST/PSCA/SER.A/3. (Military and Police Forces in the Republic of South Africa, UN, N.Y., 1967.)
are valid for Botswana, for they indicate the potential role that that country can play in the international relations of Southern Africa.

In political geography a 'bridgehead' has been defined as "an extension of territorial control by one state across a river." Interpreted literally Botswana is not a 'bridgehead' by this definition. However, if the 'racial line' of the Zambezi is acknowledged, with independent Black African states to the north and white-ruled states to the south, (excluding Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland), then it is easy to see how an 'optimistic north' could imagine Botswana as a 'bridgehead' of Black nationalism. After all, Botswana is an independent Black African state extending south from the Zambezi into a 'white' domain. Botswana is at least a potential 'bridgehead'. The strategic advantage of a 'bridgehead' goes to one side, in this case the north, provided that the force in control on the north of the river, is in control south of the river: this is a condition which is apparently not met in the case of Botswana.

As a 'corridor' Botswana has in the past been strategically important in linking commercial and political

interests to the north and south. In the past however the immediate north was Southern Rhodesia. Through Bechuanaland passed the Great North Road, where today passes the railway. This route, though never the only route to the north, nor perhaps even the main route in the past,\(^1\) still retains a vital function. At no time in the past, however, was there a route to the north via Kasane and Kasungula.\(^2\) Whatever route or 'corridor' exists today between Botswana and the 'North' is entirely the creation of the boundary makers in 1891 and the recent political events which have given rise to the ideological conflict. This 'corridor' exists and plays a vital role in the movement of political refugees, and others. Since UDI in Rhodesia (1965) this corridor has even provided a convenient land route for British officials wishing to move from Zambia to Botswana without touching Rhodesian soil.\(^3\) To the Black nationalists in the north, the route across the Zambezi at Kasungula may indeed be the vital corridor needed for any offensive against the south, and South Africa in particular, if they


2. Kasane and Kasungula are two villages on either side of the Zambezi river where the Botswana and Zambian boundary meet.

envision using Botswana as a **base**. To the south, however, the corridor is a potential threat to be guarded against, but it does not provide, as for the north, a route to be used for penetration of the adversary's domain. The control by South Africa of the Caprivi Strip (South West Africa), and its close association with Rhodesia provides the 'South' with its routes to the 'North'.

Botswana forms only a part of the 'ideological frontier'. This frontier, which corresponds closely to Nielsen's 'Battleline',\(^1\) stretches from the Atlantic through Angola, along the Zambezi, separating Zambia and Rhodesia, to Mozambique and the Indian Ocean. Where Botswana has common boundary with Zambia the ideological frontier becomes more complex. According to Nielsen, Botswana is south of the 'battleline',\(^2\) but according to the concept of the "ideological frontier" this is not so obvious. Of ideological frontiers Alexander states,\(^3\) "These frontiers exist for the most part as completely closed systems" in that they restrict circulation between ideological blocs. Such a restriction on ideological grounds has inhibited much 'natural' circulation between southern Africa and the rest of the African continent.

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The 'Iron Curtain' in Europe is the ideological frontier between the West and the East. Insofar as the 'Iron Curtain' is identified along definite international boundaries the ideological frontier has the appearance of a line rather than a zone, and can be termed as 'ideological boundary'. If the ideology is expansionist, as for example communism, and the conflicting ideologies in Southern Africa, it will only be an ideological boundary in a temporary sense as its 'organic' quality gives it the nature of a frontier.\(^1\) It is important to bear in mind at this point the difference between an ideological frontier and other geographic frontiers. Ideological frontiers are "less of a geographic (spatial) phenomenon that traditional frontiers were...Moreover, modern man is, in general more literate and sophisticated, and as such less 'geographical' and more intellectual. And 'to the intellectual the frontier is not the land but the mind'.\(^2\) However, it is more realistic to look at the ideological frontier where the conflict is taking place manifestly and not merely mentally. The ideological frontier is more clearly drawn at the Zambezi despite the incursions by guerrilla fighters on the

\(^{1}\) Ibid.

Rhodesian side of the Zambezi. In asking where the ideological frontier lies in Botswana a dilemma is revealed. On the one hand Botswana represents with her independent African majority government the ideological opposite to South Africa's white minority ruled government. On the other hand as South Africa is a much closer neighbour in geographic terms than the 'North' the possibilities of successfully campaigning ideological war against South Africa are very circumscribed.

1. It is true also that sabotage has taken place in Zambia which most probably was inspired by elements from the 'South'. The international boundary then does not exactly match the ideological boundary, as saboteurs from opposing ideological sides infiltrate each others territory. For a discussion of the Zambezi valley as a physical barrier see, Harm J. de Blij, A Geography of Subsaharan Africa, Rand McNally, Chicago, 1964, pp.144-148. Note also, in contrast to say Europe, the relative difficulty of physical control of boundaries in southern Africa - a region where communications are poorly developed, the population sparsely distributed and much of the area densely forested.

2. Although small and isolated from the main political and economic centres Botswana's narrow physical access to the north holds great significance. In political geography it is important to bear in mind the distinction between physical or geographic distance and functional distance. The former may be small and the latter great, "this concept is particularly relevant to studies of human interaction in boundary zones," D.R. Reynolds & M.L. McNulty, "Political Boundaries, Barrier Effects and Space Perception", Paper presented at the Annual Meeting, Association of American Geographers, St. Louis, 1967, pp.6-7.

If then Botswana is not ideologically in the system of apartheid, and is not actively part of the ideological offensive of the north, is she a 'buffer state' or part of a 'cordon sanitaire'? As a result of modern systems of communications 'buffer states' are considered less important today.\(^1\)

If buffer states still have a role in international relations it would appear that it is within a more local context that it is to be found.\(^2\) The struggle in southern Africa is at least a continental problem and perhaps global in that the UN is directly involved in the conflict.\(^3\)

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   "'Buffer states' were a purely mechanical device of international politics: they separated physically two potential warriors, making it more difficult for them to exchange blows. The 'grey areas' of the ideological frontiers of today are capable of a more sophisticated intellectual-political role. In contact with and willing to internalise currents from both poles, they are not merely transitive but also transformative."

2. cf Ladis Kristof, *Ibid*, p.280, "Buffer states were... a private geopolitical arrangement among the neighbour­ ing powers."

3. For example in the debates in the Fourth Committee, the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Special Committee on Apartheid, and the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration in the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, (known more generally as the Committee of 24.)
Botswana occupies only a part of the area around which the conflict is developing. It is then insufficient to describe Botswana's situation as a 'buffer state'.

The basic concept behind a 'cordon sanitaire' is the neutralisation of a zone of territory of influence of two neighbouring states, and is thus related in concept to a 'buffer state'. Given the publicly expressed policies of the majority of the African states and the OAU, ";...to rid the African continent of White racism",¹ it would seem that no 'cordon-sanitaire' is envisaged by the 'North'. Yet the more defensive posture of South Africa² has made the attainment of a 'cordon-sanitaire' appear a more likely foreign policy objective for the 'South'.³

1. Or, in the words of the Summit Conference of Independent African States, "...it is the duty of all African territories to support dependent people in Africa in their struggle for freedom and independence", Colin Legum op.cit. p.294.

2. Though this has been the general attitude of most writers on South Africa, (and until recently made sense), most recently several writers have expressed view that apartheid is extending northwards, e.g. see The Economist, (London), 27 July-2nd August 1968, "The Race in Rhodesia."

3. "Few assertions could be wilder than the one often hurled by some members of the Afro-Asian bloc that South Africa plans aggression against the newly-independent African states and is thus a threat to world peace. Such a course is recognized as fatal. The immorality of it would have tremendous repercussions within the Nationalist Party and in South Africa generally. Not only has South Africa not been Machiavellian in its foreign policy, it has been so formally correct and gentlemanly in the methods it employs abroad, as to fail to match the efforts of its opponents." E.S. Munger, Notes on the Formation of South African Foreign Policy, The Castle Press, Pasadena, California, 1965, p.97.
In order to understand the strategic significance of Botswana in the ideological conflict between the 'North' and 'South', it is important to know which politico-geographic concept is most appropriate to her situation. It would appear that several concepts are valid depending on which viewpoint is taken. Seen from the 'North', Botswana functions, actually or potentially, as a 'bridgehead' for penetration to the 'heartland of apartheid'. From the 'South', and viewed negatively, Botswana functions as a 'cordon-sanitaire' to neutralize any 'bridgehead' function. Viewed positively, Botswana functions as an ideological frontier which may eventually become a boundary to South Africa's advantage. In both cases, that is from a 'North' and a 'South' point of view, Botswana is part of an ideological frontier stretching from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean. Botswana is a country 'in contact with and willing to internalize currents from both poles'. The implications of this conclusion are important

1. As a 'cordon-sanitaire' will only function on the basis of a mutual agreement to a status quo between the conflicting powers, it would appear that such a negative viewpoint of Botswana's strategic function by South Africa, if ever it existed, is not realistic. It is therefore contended that Botswana is viewed as part of the ideological frontier by both the north and the south.

2. Note J. Kristof, op.cit. p.280, "Though frontier conditions may sometimes be deliberately created by governments, the state tends to view frontiers and frontiersmen as a temporary expedient; as appropriate to a period of transition. The ultimate goal is a boundary, not a frontier."

3. Ladis Kristof, op.cit., p.279
for where the ideological frontier corresponds with a state and not an international boundary the possibility of international armed conflict appears less. Thus at present where the ideological frontier corresponds to the international boundary, that is, where the 'North' and 'South' meet along a line, there is armed conflict, as in Angola, Rhodesia and Mozambique. Botswana and Malawi, both refuse to harbour 'liberal fighters' or 'terrorists' and consequently there is no fighting along their boundaries shared with the 'South'. Botswana's peace will most likely be threatened if she no longer is able to remain a frontier state, but has to draw her frontier to either her northern or southern boundary. Whereas for the most part the ideological frontier across southern Africa has not territorial dimension but is a confrontation of 'North' and 'South' along an international boundary, in the case of Botswana, it has territorial dimension in the form of the sovereign area of Botswana.1 The basic images which are conjured up by these concepts can be illustrated.2

1. This is not intended to convey the idea that ideological frontiers can be clearly defined in such terms (vide supra, p.17). However a government is able to control certain physical manifestations of the ideological frontier, eg. the establishment of guerrilla training camps and refugee camps.

SKETCH MAPS TO ILLUSTRATE THREE IMAGES OF BOTSWANA'S STRATEGIC POSITION

1. Botswana north of Ideological Frontier
   ('Bridgehead' Function for the 'North')

2. Botswana south of Ideological Frontier
   ('Cordon Sanitaire' for the 'South')

3. Botswana as part of Ideological Frontier
   and Ideological Boundary
CHAPTER 2.

THE FIELD AND METHOD OF STUDY

AND A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE.

The field of study embraces geography, in particular political geography, and political science, especially the aspect of international relations. It is felt that the particular problem studied can best be interpreted by an inter-disciplinary approach. The fundamental problem is political, but without constant reference to the map of southern Africa, showing the basic geographic distributions of international boundaries, population, communications, physiography, and the like, it would be impossible to evaluate realistically the political problem. In reality the two prime aspects, of politics and geography, merge and interact so that it is false to separate them, though perhaps to do so is analytically expedient.¹

¹. See, Lewis M. Alexander, op.cit. In the preface he states, "In any study of the political units of the world there are many elements of common interest to both fields, although the student of political geography approaches the material from the standpoint of the geography of political areas, while the student of international affairs is concerned primarily with the interactions which take place between states. It seems unnecessary to superimpose an artificial boundary through the area of study common to both disciplines".
A strong politico-geographical interdisciplinary link is suggested by Jones' link-chain analogy of, political idea-decision-movement-field-political area,¹ whereby political ideas, with which this study is directly concerned, are related to political areas.

The method of study is dictated by the nature of the problem to be investigated, and secondly, by the type and quantity of data available pertinent to the problem. The problem deals largely with the nature of conflicting ideologies and the efficacy of these ideologies on national development in Botswana. Where an idea leads to a decision which is implemented with a resultant change over a previous condition, the efficacy of the initial idea can be measured. If ideas remain only ideas then clearly measurement of their efficacy enters the realm of prediction. Although the political geographer is concerned with the reasons behind decision-making, without intensive field work, unavailable in this study, it is necessary to concentrate on the more overt manifestations of political decisions such as government policy, legislation and administration. The type of data available on Botswana fall mainly into three categories: historical and anthropological; current political; and current economic.

Of the historical studies the source of data available are largely based on archives of the following: government documents, including correspondence; private and public organisations, e.g. the London Missionary Society, and the British South Africa Company; and newspapers. The anthropological studies, of which Schapera's\(^1\) are the most comprehensive, give an insight into the tribal organisation of the Batswana\(^2\) through descriptive analysis.

The current political studies, such as those by Munger,\(^3\) Halpern,\(^4\) and Stevens,\(^5\) are descriptive or journalistic in style, providing little, if any, additional quantifiable data, other than that available through Government and United Nations publications.

Most useful sources on current economic data are the Bechuanaland Annual Reports\(^6\) which were discontinued after 1965; the occasional economic mission reports; and the post-

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1. For relevant works by I. Schapera see footnotes to text, especially in Chapter 3.
2. The people of Botswana are called Batswana (singular form, Motswana).
independence Statistical Abstracts and National Development Plans for Botswana. The United Nations and related agencies such as the Economic Commission for Africa, in general quote from statistics supplied from British Government sources, or more recently from Government departments of the Republic of Botswana. Bank reviews such as the Standard Bank Review, and Barclays Overseas Review, provide current data.

The available statistics are useful for obtaining a general picture of the economy and the external relations of Botswana, but provide little in the way of a detailed breakdown of the type of internal and external communication. For example, it would be helpful to have recent data on the readership of foreign newspapers, particularly from South Africa and Rhodesia; the number of shopping visits and entertainment trips to neighbouring countries; volume and destination of telephone calls, and such like. Such information, which is only avail-

able from field work would be invaluable in estimating the attitudes of different communities in Botswana towards neighbouring states; their feelings of nationalism, and of race relations, all of which impinge on this study. Although no field work has been carried out by the author, he had the opportunity of travelling through the region during 1967, providing him with a first hand experience of the environment.

The study relies then to a large extent on secondary sources for data, but the author wishes it to be understood that this situation cannot be avoided, and should be no reason for not attempting the present study. New developments have outdated, at least to some extent, even the most recent published work on the subject, and so there is a need not only for evaluation of these events but also for a reappraisal of former events.

Boundary studies are relevant, particularly bearing in mind the change in their function as a result of the change in political status involved with Botswana achieving independence. Little literature exists on this aspect, as was only recently pointed out by Minghi. In his own study he


hypothesised that the processes created by both boundary changes and independence will have "similar spatial expressions".\textsuperscript{1} An earlier study by Shaudys,\textsuperscript{2} emphasised the significance of the "chronology of independence." Many useful ideas have been developed on how to measure the function of boundaries and their barrier effect.\textsuperscript{3} Such measurements however presuppose data unavailable to the author, and therefore the concepts are acknowledged rather than used. This study with its aforementioned limitations in data, draws attention to the differences in the "fixed facilities" on either side of boundaries, aware that although this "approach may be satisfactory in suggesting possible influences of political factors upon the spatial structure of certain fixed facilities it is not particularly efficacious in determining the nature of a political boundary as a barrier."\textsuperscript{4}

From a political viewpoint, on the actual change in political status from a Protectorate to an independent state, little has been written relevant to Botswana, besides the general descriptive legalistic works represented by Lord Hailey.\textsuperscript{5} Schaffer\textsuperscript{6} has examined the whole concept of "preparation" for independence and his conclusions would seem to apply

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textit{Ibid}, p.1.
\item David R. Reynolds & M.L. McNulty, \textit{op.cit}.
\item \textit{Ibid}, p.2.
\item Hailey, \textit{op.cit} and also \textit{An African Survey}, OUP, London 1957.
\end{enumerate}
On the ideologies in the conflict there are many studies. Most useful for an understanding of the evolution of Pan-Africanism and its ideals is Colin Legum's work.\textsuperscript{1} The sources of the ideals forming the basis of the African ideology in the conflict, are concepts of democracy, equality and freedom, as enshrined in the UN Charter and the Charter of the OAU, as well as derivative concepts such as non-racialism or multi-racialism, anti-colonialism and nationalism. Nationalism, where it means 'Black nationalism' may be no more 'multi-racial' in practice than the pre-nationalist period, but such a distinction should not blur the significant one of anti-apartheid, and anti-white-minority government, ideologies, against which all these above concepts are pitched. Of the contemporary ideological conflict between the western capitalist powers and the communist powers, it need only be noted here, that both camps, in theory at any rate, are anti-apartheid, and give at least verbal support in the United Nations, to the independent African states in the latter's resolutions condemning apartheid in South Africa.

Much has been written on the ideology of apartheid.\textsuperscript{2}

If apartheid appears the more doctrinaire ideology of the two

\textsuperscript{1} Colin Legum, \textit{op.cit.}

\textsuperscript{2} See for example, H. F. Sampson, \textit{op.cit}, also Paul Giniewski, \textit{The Two Faces of Apartheid}, Henry Regnery Co. Chicago 1965.
in conflict, it is perhaps because it is formulated by a smaller more compact and coherent community, the Afrikaner nation, who represent what one authority states as, "the most extreme, fierce and radically egocentric nationalism on the entire African continent". In practice there are shades of opinion within South Africa as to the implementation of apartheid, even amongst the Afrikaners. Opposition however, to the ideology of apartheid in South Africa is weak and apparently ineffective.

Allied to South Africa by their common identity as white-rulled countries, are the Portuguese territories of Angola and Mozambique, and Rhodesia. These countries do not profess to share South Africa's views on race relations, though the situation, particularly in Rhodesia is in flux. In the Portuguese territories Africans may achieve full citizenship, the vote and virtual equality with whites, providing they attain certain standards of education, and conform to standards of loyalty, but such 'assimilated' Africans are a very small minority. Whether or not one accepts the viewpoint that the majority of Africans are beyond such 'privileges' because of the "cultural racism and inequality" of the Portuguese rule, it remains a fact that the Portuguese territories are ruled by a white-minority government.

1. Waldemar A. Nielsen, op.cit., p.60.
Events in Rhodesia since the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI), in 1965, have highlighted the determination of the Rhodesian Government to maintain white-minority rule. It may be readily appreciated then, that despite the variety of systems of government between the Portuguese territories, Rhodesia, and South Africa, as far as the independent Black African states, and a good number of other countries are concerned, these southern states are all birds of the same feather, commonly identified and condemned by their insistence on white domination.

Strategic considerations of the present conflict potential in southern Africa have been receiving greater notice since about 1960, largely as a result of the increasing apprehension of internal developments in South Africa, the growing military threat in Angola and Mozambique, the situation in Rhodesia and the changing constitutional status of the High Commission Territories towards independence, and the status of South West Africa. The apparent development of a more clearly defined confrontation between the ideologies of apartheid and anti-apartheid along the line of meeting between the independent Black African states and the white-ruled states prompts one writer to suggest a developing 'battleline'.

1. W. A. Nielsen, op.cit., p.10
"The process of decolonialisation in Africa has so far been remarkably bloodless. Algeria was a major and tragic exception; but on the whole, African independence has been agitated, argued, and negotiated for. It has not had to be battled for. In southern Africa this is not likely to be uniformly the case ....[in] ...Angola, Mozambique, and South Africa, the possibility of peaceful change is debatable."

If the author of the above had written a few years later, no doubt Rhodesia too, would be included.

Several works dealing with Botswana make reference to the strategic position of that country. The titles to many of the works convey immediately to the reader the essence of the problem, at least as viewed by the authors. Thus, Munger¹ polarises the potential outcome of conflict to Botswana as either, 'Pan-African Outpost' or 'Bantustan'. To Halpern² Botswana is one of South Africa's 'hostages'.³ In the former case, as a Pan-African outpost, Botswana is seen as a potential base for the activities of the anti-apartheid forces against South Africa. As a Bantustan, Botswana would form an economic and political unit in association with the other Bantustans and the white Republic of South Africa. The suggestion of Botswana as a 'hostage'

1. E. Munger, op.cit.
2. J. Halpern, op.cit.
3. Though both these authors use titles suggestive of the situation found or expected in Botswana, their quotation here is not meant to imply that they are unaware of the actual complexity of the possible number of courses which could be followed by Botswana.
to South Africa is reference to the close economic links between the two countries, and the consequent loss of political independence.

There is no literature specifically studying Botswana's position as a land-locked state, although general references are found in most of the recent works on Botswana. This study makes reference to three works on land-locked states, neither of which is specifically related to Botswana.¹

There is not so much a shortage of ideas and concepts in the literature available on Botswana as a scarcity of studies which examine these concepts through to their conclusion to see how far they are valid. In fairness to the studies already attempted it must be noted that political events have changed so rapidly in the past five years in southern Africa that most of the available works on the subject are already somewhat outdated. In the light of most recent events then, this study may help to throw light on those concepts which are proving to be valid.

CHAPTER 3.

THE POLITY

This chapter opens with a discussion of the question of political priorities as an essential prerequisite to understanding any state's behaviour. This is followed by a brief review of the pre- and post-independent situation of Botswana's polity relevant to that state's national development and strategic relations. To understand Botswana's national development it is necessary to examine both the internal and external political forces impinging on the state.

The Question of Priorities

Before independence the paramount goal of a territory is to achieve independence.

Having achieved formal political independence the two paramount goals of any state are, the maintenance of political independence and economic development.¹ Often the maintenance of political independence means also in

practice the maintenance of the Government against internal opposition and not merely the maintenance of the system from external interference. The goal of economic development may compete or concur with the goal of 'system maintenance'. Economic development may be the measure by which Governments stand or fall by popular judgements,\(^1\) so that in practice the two goals may be seen as one, the maintenance of the state as a viable economic and political unit, and this may be termed the national interest.\(^2\)

The two elements of national interest, the political and the economic, may conflict in an essential way. As Cowan points out, "without the prospect of substantial economic aid for development, the problem of maintaining internal political stability becomes little short of insoluble."\(^3\) Yet, political independence, except perhaps in the formal, legal sense, is endangered by economic dependency, and economic dependence itself may hinder

1. At least one author questions the popular notion that economic frustrations in African states are a major cause of political instability, see A. Oberschall, "Rising Expectations, National Unity and Political Turmoil", Paper read at African Studies Association 10th Annual Meeting, 1967, N.Y.

2. "National interest policy is geared to the perceived good of the state; it does not seek to transfer allegiances and justification to a larger unit such as religion, race, creed or continent." I.W. Zartman, "National Interest and Ideology" in Vernon McKay, op.cit., Chapter 2, p.31.

economic development. In such a situation it is probably in the national interest to increase economic independence,¹ by means which minimize political dependence.²

The maintenance of political independence and economic development, as internal priorities, may definitely clash. On the other hand, they may together form one 'national interest' goal. All countries have in addition external goals (foreign policy) which are a mixture of national interest (internal priority) and ideology (external priority). If the foreign policy seeks to appeal to a larger concept than the 'nation' it leaves the realm of national interest and becomes an external ideology. Many African states are committed to the goal laid down in the Charter of the O.A.U, "...to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa".³ This external goal is distinctly an external ideology in that it seeks to transfer allegiance and justification to a larger concept than the 'nation'.


2. Ibid, The authors suggest means.

In order to execute the resolutions of the OAU and similar resolutions by the UN, on such matters as: assistance to guerrilla forces; support to refugees; and sanctions, demands a political posture and an economic sacrifice.

For Botswana such a commitment would seem to present a question of external priorities as distinct though not independent of, her internal priorities. The choice becomes whether or not to sacrifice national (economic and political) development in order to adhere to the resolution of the OAU and the sentiments in general of the independent African states in cutting loose its ties with white-rulled states, or to continue and perhaps develop the existing economies and political links it has with these countries and thereby sacrifice perhaps ideological principle for national expedient.

Given the choice between external priorities and

1. Guerrilla forces may also be termed, 'liberation' or 'terrorists' forces depending on one's viewpoint.

2. At the Summit Conference of African States in 1963, resolutions were passed recommending that African states should impose trade boycotts on South Africa and withdraw diplomatic relations. The resolutions were adopted unanimously. The effect was minimal, however, as most of the states had no trade, or very little with South Africa. That subsequently, the later independent states of Malawi, Zambia and more recently, Lesotho and Botswana should find it impossible to act on the resolutions is not surprising as to do so presents an economic sacrifice which they are unwilling to endure.
internal priorities, there can be little doubt that the Governments of independent African states will place their first priority on internal goals, that is, maintenance of their political independence and economic development.¹ If the external priority is considered to be the ideology and the internal priority the national interest,² it is reasonable to conclude that national interest will predominate over ideology.³ Notwithstanding the order or priority, African states are forced to adopt a more ideological stance than might be otherwise expected because of their weak power base; poorly developed infrastructure; poorly developed national inventories of resources, and relatively highly personal intra-African relations at Heads of State level. In addition, and partly as a consequence of the above, African states are especially concerned with nation-building.⁴

In practice the policy options of a state represent

1. It may be course, that an external threat necessitates as priority an active external goal, but in such a case the motivation will still be national self-defence.

2. For discussion of this viewpoint see, I. William Zartman "National Interest and Ideology", op.cit.

3. The dilemma of having to take an 'anti-ideological' decision in the short-run in order to support the ideology in the long-run is described by I. William Zartman, Ibid,p.40.

a mixture of both ideology and national interest. A diagram can be used to illustrate these points. To distinguish between the two options Zartman suggests that the question, "Will it help the State... or the ideology?" should be asked. Clearly, the action adopted by the state can be in complete accord with the policy stated; or diverge from the policy. An example of the latter being a state which verbally supports the trade boycott on South Africa and yet continues to trade with that country. Here action taken is less than the policy stated. There are, in short, three possibilities of action open to a state in pursuing its policy, and these are summarized in the typology of foreign policy options.2

From the above discussion on priorities, the following main points may be stated. African states have internal and external priorities. The internal priority is here defined as national interest, and the external priority as ideology. States do not act entirely on national interest, nor ideology, but on a mixture of both. However, where priorities clash states act primarily in their national interest.

1. I. William Zartman, op.cit, p.50

2. If it were not for the fact that it may be in the national interest of Botswana to become more independent economically of South Africa, and thereby to redirect trade on non-ideological grounds, one could obtain some measure of the importance of ideology in foreign policy by comparing the level of trade expected, considering economic links, and the level of actual trade. The difference would help indicate the 'barrier effect' of ideology. As it stands, such a comparison would be misleading unless one was able to distinguish between trade reduced on ideological grounds and trade reduced in the national interest.
### Typology of State Foreign Policy Options & Action Possibilities for Policies Pursued Between External and Internal Priorities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Foreign Policy Options</th>
<th>Action Possibilities B for Policies Pursued:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. All in national interest.</td>
<td>(1) b1 c1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Mainly national interest some ideology.</td>
<td>a2 b2 c2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. National interest and ideology equal.</td>
<td>a3 b3 c3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Mainly ideology and some national interest.</td>
<td>a4 b4 c4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. All for ideology.</td>
<td>a5 b5 c5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A. In option 1, the component part of national interest which is ideology is included. For example it may be shown that the Prime Minister of Botswana has a vested interest in an anti-apartheid ideology. In option 5, the ideology may include the national interest, as an integral and subordinate component. This is distinct from option 4, where national interest is a distinct though subordinate concept. Option 5 is highly theoretical and is included only to complete the typology.

B. In column (1) action equals policy stated. In column (2) action taken is less than policy stated. In column (3) action taken is greater than policy stated.

NB. The typology is presented as a conceptual framework to guide a clearer qualitative assessment of policies and actions according to their motivation, that is to say, whether the motivation is for an internal national interest or an external ideology.
interest and only secondarily for an ideology. It may well be a measure of Botswana's geopolitical situation that its foreign policy is less ideological than neighbours to the north who can adopt antagonistic ideological goals without destroying their national interest.

In order to achieve its national development goals the Bechuanaland (and later the Botswana) Government has had to implement distinct policies. These policies which are manifested in the legislation, programmes and projects of the Government, may influence or be influenced by those strategic relations which derive from Botswana's geopolitical situation. Only those policies and local geographical, political and economic factors which have significant relationship to Botswana's geopolitical situation are considered. There are many minor relationships which in some/may create a considerable influence on Botswana's strategic relations with neighbours, such as the provision of veterinary officers and cattle vaccine to Botswana from South Africa, but which in themselves add little against the more overwhelming evidence of economic and political contacts. This study then concentrates on the most important factors of national development affected by Botswana's geopolitical situation, although recognising that other more minor factors exist which have strategic significance.
Nationalism and Nationhood.

The Prime Minister of Botswana, Seretse Khama, stated that the primary object of his Government was to create a strongly united nation.\(^1\) In pursuing this national development goal, however, Botswana is greatly handicapped in that she has achieved statehood, but not yet nationhood. Even with a strongly developed national consciousness Botswana's autonomy and development may be easily lost; without a national consciousness the risk is greater.

Of paramount importance in realising the national interest is to become a nation-state. A nation-state is more able to defend its autonomy, at least from internal enemies and may develop more effectively, than a state which is not a nation. In this chapter and the next, it is proposed to show by what components Botswana falls short of being a nation-state.

Before examining the factors of nationalism in the light of conditions in Botswana,\(^2\) it is first necessary to elucidate on the terms nation-state and nationalism. The relationship between nationalism and nations is that the

\(1. \) Vide infra, pp.103-104.

former is the force of ideas and the resulting actions which creates nations. Nationalism creates self-consciousness which in turn creates nations. In building up this 'national' awareness communication of ideas becomes the most important means. As Deutsch says, in his functional definition of nationality:

"Membership in a people essentially consists in wide complementarity of social communication. It consists in the ability to communicate more effectively, and over a wider range of subjects, with members of one large group than with outsiders."

Nationalism is itself created by the need for growth or change. If the need for change is not widely felt, the popular base for support of nationalism will be weak.

The term 'nation' is sometimes used synonymously with tribe or state. However, a modern nation is a real phenomenon with specific characteristics. The modern nation is character-


2. Deutsch, was no doubt reflecting this viewpoint when he observed that nationalists, "...... often .... have been political beneficiaries of a process of social mobilisation which they had not created and over which they had little influence. They were riding a wave, not channeling a river, and they would drift as far as they were carried by the current." Many of the events behind the recent political development of Botswana would seem to bear out the above opinion. Nationalism and Social Communication, John Wiley, N.Y., 1953, p.192.
ised, inter alia, by, "... the fact that membership of large anonymous 'nations' is direct, and not mediated by intervening sub-groups."¹ In most general terms a nation has the following characteristics:² a common territory; common language; common culture; and common economy.

Botswana has, with qualifications, a common territory and a common language. It is mainly in broad anthropological characteristics that Botswana can be said to have a common culture largely because awareness through territorial and literary communication is still undeveloped for the majority of people. It is on the last characteristic, a common economy, that Botswana fails most to match up to the requirements of a 'nation'.

The term 'nation' applied to Botswana's condition is a misleading description. More appropriate is the term 'narodnost', which describes the conditions between tribal state and nation state.

Botswana's territory was delimited in such a way

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² The subsequent definition of 'nation' and 'narodnost' are adopted from I. Potekhin, "The Formation of Nations in Africa", in Social Change. The Colonial Situation, Ed. Immanuel Wallerstein, John Wiley, N.Y. 1966, pp. 560-571. Although describing the characteristics of a nation is a relatively static approach, compared with a functional approach, it nevertheless stresses implicitly the role of communication in all four characteristics.
that in some places ethnic boundaries were cut. In fact, more
Batswana (or Tswana) live outside Botswana than in it,
excluding the migrant workers.\(^1\) It is possible that where
the international boundary divides an ethnic community, as
for example the Tshidi-Rolong community, separate nationalisms
could emerge. The language of Botswana is Setswana. However
its usefulness in nation-building is circumscribed by: the
ethnic diversity of the Batswana; the European community;
and the use of English as the official language in secondary
schools and in government.

Some folklore has been written down which is a basis
for a common culture.\(^2\) The majority of the Batswana however
are illiterate.

It has been said\(^3\), "... if there is no national
market there is no nation", and in the two senses that if
there is little domestic production sold, and that most of
the trade is for external markets, a typical colonial situation,
it has more than a ring of truth to it. Botswana is mainly a

\(^1\) Vide Infra, p.53 n.

\(^2\) Schapera states that, "...much has been written and pub-
lished in Tswana" through the work of the Missionaries,
including religious works, school readers and folklore,
see, I. Schapera, Southern Africa, Part 3, The Tswana,
Ethnographic Survey of Africa, ed. C. D. Forde, Inter-
national African Institute, London, 1953, p.17. In 1946,
Schapera estimated that about 20% of the Tswana could read
in the vernacular, including many who had never attended

\(^3\) Potekhin, op.cit., p.570.
subsistence economy, and industry is almost entirely directed to serving external markets.

The above factors controlling the efficacy of nationalism and the development of a nation-state may be shown diagrammatically.

**CONTROLLING FACTORS OF NATIONALISM**

**AND THEIR RELATION TO NATION-STATE.**

![Diagram showing controlling factors of nationalism and their relation to nation-state.](attachment:image.png)
Political Independence.

The remainder of this chapter attempts to determine the significance of the pre- and post-independent political elements in the strategic relations of Botswana which relate to its geopolitical situation and influence its national development goals.

As will become apparent from the discussion on the ideological frontier in Chapter 5, the most pertinent political factor to the problem is the proximity of South Africa's system of government which emphasises by its policy of apartheid and Bantustans,\(^1\) racial separation and strong chieftanship for tribal authorities. Similar influences are to be found in Rhodesia and South West Africa.

One of the most important single political features of Botswana's recent history was its tribal structure. Unlike the other two High Commission Territories, Botswana has no Paramount Chief. Instead there are eight main tribes each with its own chief, several small tribes with sub-chiefs and smaller tribal communities with headmen as recognised rulers. It may be argued that the absence of a Paramount

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\(^1\) For a discussion of Bantustans and an understanding of the reasons for the South Africans wishing to link the Tswana homelands to Botswana see, Bantustans: The Fragmentation of South Africa by Christopher R. Hill, London Institute of Race Relations: OUP, London, 1964.
Chief has delayed the forging of a national consciousness.

The eight main tribes occupy Tribal Areas (Reserves) which have been statutorily defined. Culturally these tribes and the smaller ones form, in general, a fairly homogenous group of peoples. Most of the Batswana are related to the Sotho group of Bantu-speaking peoples. The exceptions are the Bamalete (Nguni) who have assimilated the Tswana (or Setswana) culture; Hottentots; Bushmen, and the 1904-8 refugees from (German) South West Africa, the Herero and the Mbandieru. A feature of some importance in tribal custom with relevance to developing nationhood has been the relative ease by which 'foreign' tribesmen may be accepted into a tribe. Schapera states, 3

"... membership of a tribe is defined not so much in terms of birth as of allegiance to the Chief. People become members of a tribe by submitting to the rule of its Chief; and it is primarily through their allegiance to the same Chief that the different communities and individuals making up a tribe give expression to their unity."

1. Botswana has the following land tenures: Tribal Areas; Freehold Blocks and State Lands.

2. "The Tswana themselves seem on the whole to be sufficiently homogeneous to be classed as a single group in relation to other peoples in Southern Africa", I. Schapera, The Tswana, op.cit, p.9.

3. I. Schapera, Handbook of Tswana Law and Custom, 2nd Ed. International African Institute, OUP., London, 1955, p.5. Note for example among the Ngwato, the largest tribe in Botswana, about for-fifths of the tribal population consists of 'foreigners'. 
# LAND TENURE AND AREA BY DISTRICTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DISTRICT</th>
<th>STATE</th>
<th>TRIBAL</th>
<th>FREEHOLD</th>
<th>TOTAL AREA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. KGATLENG</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,795</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2,798</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. KWENENG</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14,719</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14,719</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. NGWATO</td>
<td>5,902</td>
<td>45,600</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>51,512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. NGWAKETSE</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10,053</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10,053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. CHOBE</td>
<td>7,997</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7,997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. FRANCISTOWN</td>
<td>5,865</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,062</td>
<td>7,927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. GABERONES</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. GHANZI</td>
<td>36,608</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3,835</td>
<td>40,443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. KGALAGADI</td>
<td>41,122</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,430</td>
<td>42,552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. LOBATSI</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. NGAMILAND</td>
<td>7,133</td>
<td>43,582</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50,715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. TULI</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,993</td>
<td>1,993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL AREA:</strong></td>
<td><strong>102,715</strong></td>
<td><strong>107,603</strong></td>
<td><strong>9,682</strong></td>
<td><strong>231,805</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


NB 1. The reserve of 300 square miles is included under Freehold in Francistown.

NB 2. The areas are estimates made by the Department of Geological Surveys.

Of the estimated 270,000 Batswana in 1946, 103,500 were described as "peoples of alien origin living under the rule of Tswana Chiefs."¹ However all the mixing and absorption has not taken place without friction so that still in

¹ Schapera, *The Tswana*, op.cit, p.11
1952 it could be stated that rivalry for paramountcy and loyalty, "still constituted one of the main issues in local tribal politics."¹

It has not helped matters that the international boundary of Botswana cuts across ethnic divisions. For example most of the Tshidi-Rolong live in the Republic of South Africa in the Northern Cape Province, where their Chief resides. Other Tswana live in the western and central districts of the Transvaal; and in the Thaba Nchu District of the Orange Free State; Southern Rhodesia (Plumtree district); and South West Africa (Gobadis district)². Although the tribal pattern has been relatively stable since the 19th century, in 1914-18 several thousand Seleka-Rolong came to the Protectorate from the Orange Free State.³

The role of the chief at the time of Independence was still an important one in the government of the country,


2. Schapera, The Tswana, op.cit, p.11. Using the 1946 census he estimates the total Tswana population at 852,000 (including aliens under Tswana chiefs) of which Transvaal has 43%; the Protectorate 32%; Cape Province 20%; and the Orange Free State 5%. The figures are rounded and do not allow for the 1-1/2 - 2% living in South West Africa and Rhodesia, about 1,700 persons.

though the role had been changing for a number of years.\(^1\)

The chief's position in the mid 1950's was described as follows:\(^2\)

"His formerly undivided control over virtually every aspect of tribal life has thus been diffused through various Government Departments with superior authority. But he remains the central figure of the tribal government, and without his approval and backing no major enterprise among his people can be initiated or successfully accomplished."

The position of the chief in Botswana today has not radically changed from the above description, he is still essential for the harmonious relations between the tribal structure and the central Government. In the constitutional discussions proceeding Independence there was obvious antagonism between the politicians and the chiefs. The former say the chiefs as committed to the interests of their tribes instead of the nation, whereas the latter saw that the new constitution would result in a loss of authority.\(^3\)

The ethnic diversity in Botswana is complicated by the important European minority which is mainly concentrated

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in four areas: The Tati or Francistown District, (and of which Lord Hailey stated, has "in some respects a closer affinity with Southern Rhodesia than with Bechuanaland" as a result of its earlier history); Tuli; Lobatsi; and Gaberones Blocks. The latter three arose out of the areas ceded to the British South Africa Company in 1895, and all except for the Tuli Block have had restrictions on non-Europeans buying land in these areas. 2 There is also a small Asian and Coloured (racially mixed) population. The table below presents the population of Botswana by race.

**POPULATION OF BOTSWANA CLASSIFIED BY RACE.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>1946</th>
<th>1964</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFRICAN</td>
<td>292,755</td>
<td>535,275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUROPEAN</td>
<td>2,379</td>
<td>3,921</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASIAN</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIXED</td>
<td>1,082</td>
<td>3,489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHERS</td>
<td></td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>296,310</td>
<td>543,105</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Republic of Botswana Statistical Abstract, 1967, Table No. 6.

a. The figures for 1946 may contain a wide margin of error. The figures for 1964 are from the census report of that year.


2. Ibid., p.238 and p.281
By mid-1950 no conscious preparation for independence had been attempted. The tribal system was still strong and a functioning part of government.

Although the promise of 'self-government' had been held out to African territories for many years, it was also a fact, as Hailey pointed out, that, "the term 'self-government' has no precise connotation in British constitutional practice." Little prospect was held out in the 1950's for the High Commission Territories achieving Independence in the foreseeable future. How far the threat of incorporation into the Union of South Africa stifled the manifest development of nationalism in Bechuanaland, at least up to 1961 is hard to determine but that it had an influence is without doubt. Talking of the High Commission Territories as a whole, Hailey commented

"Africans, following the spirit of the times, are ready to press the British Government for a greater measure of self-rule, but they also seem to be very alive to the threat which absorption in the Union might bring to the maintenance of their national identity. That is a consideration which sets limits to the lengths to which they might be prepared to carry the concept of nationalism."

1. In the early 1950's proposals for political advancement were centred around the creation of a Legislative Council. For Tshekedi Khama's important contribution, see Tshekedi Khama by Mary Benson, Faber & Faber, London, 1960.


3. Ibid.
Much of the impetus for a Legislative Council from such leaders as Tshekedi Khama, was it appears motivated by a desire to create a device by which African opinion could be made effective against incorporation into South Africa, should such action be contemplated by the South African and British Governments. It is questionable then to see the creation of a Legislative Council as a result of a conscious effort to lay the foundations for future independence.¹

How uncertain was Bechuanaland's future political development is suggested by a speech made by the High Commissioner in January 1959, when he said²

"I have no doubt that the Bechuana and Swazis will also play an increasing part in their own affairs, but how and when I cannot say at this stage."

It was during the latter 1950's that influential and progressive minded personalities came together producing an atmosphere more conducive to political advance. Following the modernising efforts of Tshekedi and Seretse Khama were added the fortuitous appointments in 1959 of Sir John Maud as High Commissioner, and Peter Fawcus as Resident Commissioner.³

In 1958 a Legislative Council was formed.⁴ Following this came the first manifest step towards preparing for independence,

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1. Hailey, Native Administration, op.cit., p.334
   Also, M. Benson, op.cit., p.262.


3. For a description of their admirable qualities see, R.P. Stevens, op.cit., p.139.

the Constitution of 1961, which gave the Territory 'representative' government.¹

If a date must be chosen which is significant as the beginning of a conscious effort towards achieving independence, 1961 seems to be the most appropriate date. For 1961, by coincidence, was significant politically to Bechuanaland for reasons other than just the new Constitution. In that year the Union of South Africa left the Commonwealth and became the Republic of South Africa. Consequently the High Commissioner became the British Ambassador. This in turn necessitated the removal of an anomaly in Bechuanaland's (and the other two High Commission Territories) administration, in that responsibility for its affairs was removed from the Commonwealth Relations Office and placed under the Colonial Office. With South Africa's changed status, Bechuanaland became a 'foreign' country, as it was no longer able to enjoy automatically the advantages of a Commonwealth relationship. Under the Commonwealth Relations Office Bechuanaland's internal political development has suffered.

"...the Territories [Bechuanaland, Basutoland, and Swaziland] were placed in the anomalous position of being the worse off than other British colonies and protectorates in so much as these could theoretically evolve towards independence. The High Commission Territories remained in a political limbo without prospect of change except in the direction of incorporation into South Africa. Even the development of local government was therefore twenty to forty years behind the times as compared with other British African territories."²

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¹ For a definition of 'representative' government see, R.B. Schaffer, op.cit., p.47.
² R.P. Stevens, op.cit., p.4.
In addition, with few exceptions it is probable that the quality of the Administration in Bechuanaland would have been higher under the Colonial Office. Instead, the Bechuanaland Administration was "... bedevilled by second-rateness and cheap South African recruitment."¹

The rise of political parties in Bechuanaland came late in the day compared with other African countries.² The first significant political party with a definite programme was the Bechuanaland Peoples' Party (BPP) formed at the end of 1960. This party with its modern nationalistic and anti-tribalist outlook, suffered from internal rivalries and within a short time had split into two groups. The Bechuanaland Democratic Party formed in 1962 under the leadership of Seretse Khama, was more moderate than the other parties. Though the potential influence of the modern nationalistic BPP was curtailed by the internal rivalry in the party, its radical policies, compared with those of the BDP were sufficient to worry the white community in the Protectorate; in South Africa, and the British Administration.

The white community in Bechuanaland did not show much enthusiasm towards the prospect of an independent Bechuanaland under an African government. During 1964 white

farmers in the Tuli Block, led by Mr. Mynhardt, petitioned for secession. They sought the support of South Africa, then Rhodesia and later the United Nations. The reaction of the Africans was varied. Seretse Khama warned against fragmentation of Bechuanaland, and Mr. Mpho, the leader of the BIP, demanded a complete take-over of white owned land. Africans organised boycotts against white traders who were accused of discriminatory practices. By 1964 the vice-President of the BPP, Mr. Matante, had testified twice at the UN on racial discrimination in the Protectorate. During 1962-65 tension mounted in race relations. Whites not holding or taking out British passports, were to be disenfranchised for the General Election in 1965, and this affected the majority of the whites. No special privileges were incorporated into the newly proposed constitution unlike the 'racially balanced' Legislative Council established in 1961.¹

The General Election of March 1965 resulted in a strong government for the winning BDP, led by Seretse Khama.²

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1. R. P. Stevens, op. cit., p.143

2. NB. No postal voting was allowed for the Batswana working in South Africa. "Thus one-eighth of the electorate has effectively been disenfranchised in order to appease Dr. Verwoerd." Halpern, op.cit., p.296. An alternative view is that if Britain allowed postal voting it would give support to South Africa's system of giving the vote to her 'migrant' Black workers in 'White' urban areas, for elections in the Bantustans.
The success of the BDP had perhaps already been foreshadowed by the strong position Seretse Khama had established for himself in the Legislative Council and with the British Administration. To the whites in the Protectorate, South Africa, and the British Administration, the success of the moderate BDP over the more radical parties was welcome.

The South African Government indicated its willingness to consider exchanging South African territory adjacent to Bechuanaland forming the proposed Tswana Homelands, for 'genuine' cooperation in a Southern Africa regional grouping of states. South Africa's moves to encourage closer relations with Bechuanaland were met with caution by an African government determined to loosen its dependence on the Republic and yet at the same time declaring its policy to be Bechuanaland's

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interest above all others. Following his election win, Seretse Khama had optimistically stated his belief that economics and politics could be kept distinct.\(^2\)

**Integrating the Nation: Developing the Polity.**

Since independence the most important internal political changes involve: (a) the restructuring of tribal loyalties; (b) localisation and Africanisation in the Government service; (c) race discrimination and (d) the role of the Parliamentary Opposition.

Tribal authority has been steadily eroded as the Government inevitably extends its influence and services, in pursuance of its programme of national development. The Government has met with limited success. On the one hand tribal authority has declined in favour of the national Government's authority. On the other hand there has been some tribal reaction to this adjustment in power between national and tribal authority.\(^3\) Shortly after independence the President had made the policy of his Government towards

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1. For a good view of South Africa's problems in establishing relations with the High Commission Territories on the eve of their independence, see, Republic of South Africa, House of Assembly Debates, Vol. Cols. 2550-2654, 21 September 1966.

2. R. P. Stevens, op.cit. p.156: A view not shared by a political opponent, Dr. Koma, who maintains that independence is an 'illusion' while Bechuanaland is economically dependent on the Republic.

tribal authority and loyalty clear. In his Presidential address he said,¹

"This change in the role of the traditional Chiefs of Botswana of course reflects the progress of the country from a collection of tribes with local loyalties and aims to a nation state with a common national pride and a common national interest. My Government will foster and promote this national spirit at every opportunity and looks forward to the day when the people of this country will think of themselves first as Batswana rather than members of a particular tribal group. Local loyalties will of course continue to exist but they must give way to a loyalty to the nation state of Botswana."

More than two years later the President found it necessary to warn chiefs who wished to dabble in politics, that to be so engaged would require their resignation from tribal office.² There developed a 'fiery debate' in the House of Chiefs following the President's warning.³

It would appear that some of the opposition members are becoming more concerned with upholding the cause of the discontented chiefs, as the rift between the Government and the chiefs continues. It seems unlikely however in the present situation of strong government, that the chiefs can


threaten the Government even with backing from the
Opposition parties.

The Minister of Agriculture, Mr. Tsheko, in
asking rhetorically why the Africans have not lost their
identity as tribes and tribal troops, said:

"All of us, including hon. members of the Opposi-
tion come from tribal or communal areas, and that
is how we keep our identity... We are building a
nation without making anyone lose his identity...
In tribal areas or reserves... the Chief's control
settlements of people, no one, African or White,
can settle in any tribal reserve, ...without the
permission of the Chief."

The difficulty of assimilating the Bushmen into
the 'nation' is only an exaggerated form of the general pro-
blem of integrating a tribal society in achieving nationhood.

Although it would be misleading to overemphasise the
tribal rivalries which have existed in Botswana, at least
up to Independence, account should be taken of the sometimes
unharmonious ethnic, as well as racial, relations.

In extending its services and pursuing its national
development, the Government has necessarily encroached on
parochial interests where they were obstacles to achieving
the national goals. A good example of this is provided by

1. Vide infra, p. 77.
3. For an enlightening debate on the Bushmen problems see
Hansard 22, 2nd Reading, "The Anthropological Research
the debate on the Mineral Rights in Tribal Territories Bill, and the Mines and Minerals Bill, both of 1967. The Government introduced legislation to control the future prospecting and mining of national mineral resources.\(^1\) To achieve this it was necessary to ask the chiefs to relinquish their sovereign claims to mineral resources, in their respective Tribal Reserves. This they did unanimously. Not however without a member of the National Assembly raising the question why the private land holders, such as Tati Concessions did not likewise surrender their private rights for the public benefit.\(^2\)

The problem of expatriate and alien workers in Botswana has created tension leading to public and parliamentary controversy, as well as threats of strikes. The number of expatriates in Botswana in 1968 had increased over the number before independence due to the increased development and which has taken place.

Although it is the Government's policy to increase the rate of localisation and reduce the dependence on expatriates, the development of the economy and the importance of education in the process, has required, at least in the

\(^1\) It should be noted that the Mines and Minerals Bill 1967, allows for two categories of ownership of mineral rights, namely state ownership and ownership on private land.

short-run\(^1\), an increase in expatriates in the public service. As the Government has stated,\(^2\)

"The unspectacular progress towards the goal of localisation in Botswana must be attributed primarily to the unavoidable lag between the development of education and the increased output of qualified manpower. Indeed, the priority which has been given to education has itself retarded localisation and recruitment problems, since greatly increased numbers of Batswana who would otherwise be absorbed into the Public Service are now continuing with their formal education and training."

The degree of progress in localising the public service must be seen against the already dominant position of the expatriate. The figures given below show the degree of progress achieved between 1967-68.

EXPatriates in the Botswana Public Service showing selected cadres for 1967 & 1968.\(^a\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total officers in Public Service</th>
<th>2,987</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total expatriate officers in Public Service</td>
<td>704  (23.6% of total officers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African expatriate officers from neighbouring states in Public Service</td>
<td>266  (37.8% of expat. officers)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) Source: National Development Plan, 1968-73, op.cit., p.68

1. It is planned to achieve internal self-sufficiency in high level manpower in 1990. See National Development Plan 1968-73, op.cit., p.68.

2. Ibid, p.68
\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
\% \text{ OF EXPATRIATE TO LOCAL OFFICERS:} & 1967 & 1968 \\
\text{Expatriates in Senior (superscale)} & 83\% & 80\% \\
\text{Expatriates in Administrative} & 62\% & 60\% \\
\text{Expatriates in Prof. & Scientific} & 95\% & 92\% \\
\text{Expatriates in Technical} & 90\% & 83\% \\
\end{array}
\]


It should be remembered that in the case of obtaining expatriates for the public service, in theory Botswana does not have to depend on the 'South'. The Government is free to obtain expatriates from the international community at large. In practice though the field is restricted, a situation revealed by the dominance of United Kingdom and South African expatriates.¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE OF SCHOOL</th>
<th>TOTAL TEACHERS</th>
<th>EXPATS.</th>
<th>PERCENT (1)of(2)</th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1967</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>1651</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>1713</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>19.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>89.4</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>83.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Training</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>77.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


b & c source, next page.

¹. The Government is also concerned with localisation in the private sector of the economy, see, Nat. Dev. Plan. op.cit., p.59.
b. Source: Figures for teachers (1) in 1967 are taken from Statistical Abstract 1967, Table No. 13(a), and figures for expatriates in 1967 are from Correspondence, Ministry of Education, Health and Labour, 10th February 1969.

c. NB. Most of the expatriates are from the UK and South Africa. Of the latter most are Africans (see National Development Plan, op.cit., p.55.)

### DEPENDENCE ON EXPATRIATE STAFF

#### IN PRIMARY EDUCATION (1965).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>National</th>
<th>Expatriate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary school teachers</td>
<td>1,651</td>
<td>1,335</td>
<td>316 (mostly from South Africa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>at all schools</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary school teachers</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>at Moremi III school.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### DEPENDENCE ON EXPATRIATE STAFF

#### IN SECONDARY EDUCATION (1965).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>National</th>
<th>Expatriate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secondary school teachers in all schools</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary school teachers at Moeding school</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10 (6 South Africans)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary School teachers at Molefi school</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4 (4 South Africans)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary school teachers at Moong school</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12 (12 South Africans)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### EXPATRIATE VOLUNTEERS IN SECONDARY SCHOOLS AND IN TEACHER TRAINING (1965)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of volunteer</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary Service Overseas Cadets</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Voluntary Service Graduates</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Volunteers</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Source: Bechuanaland Report op. cit., p. 90

Despite the 75% or so "localisation" of the Civil Service, by 1967 it was clear from the House of Assembly debates, that there was considerable discontent by many Civil Servants and Parliamentarians at the rate of localisation, and the 'Africanisation' of the Civil Service. Of the latter, the Leader of the Opposition, Mr. Matante, stated,¹

"Right now .... quite a number of expatriate civil servants are taking Batswana citizenship and immediately they succeed in becoming Batswana's therefore they are entitled to be localised, which is stifling or setting the clock back that the African with all his qualification, with all his profession, with all his knowledge, cannot be localised....."

More importantly, Mr. Matante drew the distinction between localisation and Africanisation, when questioning the Government's wisdom in choosing a policy of localisation. He said,²

"..... what is important now after Independence is not localisation but Africanisation. The civil service should in actual fact be Africanised instead of localised. If the Government is going to insist on localising the civil service then in the latter end this country will still not be independent, because of localisation."

² Ibid, p. 175.
The threat posed to the African's political advance, by the so-called, 'white Batswana', (as distinct from expatriates) keeping the Civil Service posts has been publicised. The Opposition party showed itself concerned with criticising the Government on its failure to Africanise as distinct from localise the Civil Service. The Government viewed Africanisation as inappropriate in a multi-racial society, and saw localisation as inevitably a slow process. On the other hand the Government defined Africanisation as meaning the people of Africa, and localisation as meaning the people of the State, which was a different definition to that implicit in the Opposition's arguments. The Minister of State, Mr. Nwako, stated the Governments position clearly,¹

"We are not to localise, ......at the expense of efficiency." By about mid-1967 the degree of localisation was as follows:

**LOCALISATION OF THE CIVIL SERVICE MID 1967**

- Superscale .................17% of the service.
- Administrative .............38% of the service
- Professional ............... 5% of the service
- Technical ..................10% of the service
- Executive ..................59% of the service
- Clerical ....................93% of the service
- Junior Technical ...........82% of the service

Secretarial and
School Matrons
Police ......................85% of the service
Prisons ......................97% of the service
Nursing ......................82% of the service
Established Teaching
and Instructor Posts
Security guards .............100% of the service

Taking one of these categories, Police, the breakdown of the
nationalities in the Police Force in April 1967 was as follows:

NATIONALITIES IN THE BOTSWANA POLICE FORCE: 1967

77 citizens of Botswana,
10 citizens of Rhodesia ..... (2 applying for
Botswana citizenship).
8 citizens of South Africa.. (1 applying for
Botswana citizenship)
2 citizens of South West Africa,
12 citizens of U.K. & Colonies (1 applying for
Botswana citizenship)
1 citizen of Zambia.


During the debate on the Luke Report Government members
voiced suspicions about nepotism in Government service accord-
ing to tribal bias.\(^1\) It is doubtful if this is a serious
problem, otherwise the Opposition would presumably have taken

\(^1\) For example Mr. Chibana's doubts, see Hansard 22, "Motion
p.180. Also Mr. Koma's concern, Ibid.
up the matter. However, it is a potentially disintegrative factor in the process of nation-building.

A major issue facing the Government, resulting from the debates on the rate of localisation, is the question of the political impartiality of the Civil Service. Fourteen months after independence Sir Seretse Khama found it necessary to address the Botswana Civil Service and warn against the growing discontent in the Service. The fear was expressed that the Opposition would capitalise out of the discontent arising from the pace of localisation. Concern was also expressed at the discriminatory attitude which wished to exclude expatriates who wanted to become citizens and secondly, the discrimination of expatriates against their new political masters.

The warnings have not been heeded. Addressing the annual conference on the Botswana Civil Servants Association Mr. Allison, Senior Government Adviser, stated,

"...it is immensely disheartening to meet an attitude both so anti-government and so anti-expatriate....I feel grieved that the future of Botswana, which will depend for many years on the sympathetic assistance of non-locals, may be jeopardised because the expatriate is unhappy here and feels that he is so unwelcome."

Beyond the question of tense relations between expatriates and locals, the development of a political pressure

---

group within the Civil Service was seen as a great danger. Mr. Allison warned,¹

"You [the non-expatriate Civil Service] are in grave danger of becoming, if you have not already become, a political pressure group."

Efforts have continued to remove racial discrimination in the country by legislation.² A more obvious difficulty has been the reaction of some whites to the racial integration of schools. Since 1964 all educational institutions have been open to all races.³ Discrimination in education was marked. In 1960 expenditure was £134.2 per white child per year, and £7.4 per African child per year. It must be borne in mind however that these figures also reflect the different tax burdens of both communities. Difficulties are encountered in discrimination which is apparently practiced on the Rhodesian Railways operating through Botswana, but control of the administration and operation of the railway is virtually entirely a matter for Rhodesia to decide.⁴ The small white population is not evenly distributed throughout Botswana but shows marked concentration in a few districts. This regionalisation is shown in the table below.

1. Ibid.

2. For example, The Immovable Property (Removal of Restrictions) Bill, 1967.


4. See next page.
## Resident Population by Race and District: 1964

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>African</th>
<th>European %b</th>
<th>Mixed</th>
<th>Asian</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chobe</td>
<td>5,066</td>
<td>25 (0.49)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francistown</td>
<td>33,583</td>
<td>770 (2.29)</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francistown Crown Land</td>
<td>1,044</td>
<td>7 (0.67)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaberones</td>
<td>21,695</td>
<td>464 (2.14)</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghanzi</td>
<td>15,891</td>
<td>292 (1.84)</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kgalagadi</td>
<td>14,455</td>
<td>71 (0.49)</td>
<td>1,854</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kgatleng</td>
<td>31,950</td>
<td>78 (0.24)</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kweneng</td>
<td>72,756</td>
<td>44 (0.06)</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lobatsi</td>
<td>19,513</td>
<td>670 (3.43)</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngamiland</td>
<td>42,155</td>
<td>160 (0.38)</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngwaketse</td>
<td>70,855</td>
<td>116 (0.16)</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngwato</td>
<td>200,128</td>
<td>541 (0.27)</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuli Block</td>
<td>5,528</td>
<td>317 (5.73)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total:** 534,619 3555 (0.67) 3,479 382 37

**a.** Source: Adapted from Table VIII in 1964 Census, op.cit., p.79

**b.** Percentage of Europeans to Africans.

---

On the relations between the Government and the Opposition parties¹, reference has already been made to the latter's support of the chiefs, who were discontented with

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4. For a good idea of the control exercised by the Rhodesian Railways over the line through Botswana see, Hansard 22, Question Time, 30th August 1967, pp. 240-242.

1. For main differences according to official party policy, see Appendix.
the erosion of their authority by the Government, and secondly, to their capitalising on the discontent in the Civil Service on the rate of localisation.

One of the opposition parties, the National Front, has recently gained considerably in strength by an alliance of the radicals who are disappointed over the slow pace of 'Africanisation' in the Civil Service, and the conservatives led by the influential ex-Chief Bathoen of the Bangwaketse, who seeks to restore the authority of Chiefs in government.¹ This alliance in Botswana's geopolitical situation will produce complex results. The radical element of the National Front will present a threat to better relations with South Africa, while the conservative element stressing tribal leadership will be more in accord with South Africa's Bantustan policy and will frustrate the nationalists ideologically oriented to the 'North'. The policy of the Government towards refugees has also given the Opposition further room for criticism in a sensitive spot for the Government.

The opposition attacked the Government on its refugee policy before independence.² Since independence its attitude has sometimes appeared contradictory. On the one

¹. For this alliance in the National Front see, The Star 6th September 1969, p.10.
hand it is showing concern least South African refugees take jobs from the Batswana, and on the other hand has criticised the Government over its control of refugees.

In summary, a variety of internal and external political pressures mounted in the later 1950's and early 1960's to influence Britain to progress with constitutional developments. The nationalistic force behind the demands for change in political status was neither of long-standing nor strong and united at least not until the early 1960's. The popular ties to a strong tribal structure mitigated the narrowly based, and South Africa shy, nationalism. Statehood had been achieved on the transfer of power, as much by the wish of Britain to devolve her responsibilities as the demands from the nationalists in Botswana. Since independence, the Government has in general maintained a steady policy of national integration by extending national services and reducing tribal authority and loyalties. There has been a reaction to this by the Opposition parties. The most serious threat is from the alliance of radical intellectuals discontented with insufficient 'Africanisation' of the public service, which in Botswana's geopolitical situation becomes a racial issue, threatening a multi-racial policy, and also the conservative chiefs discontented with the loss of power. This discontent in Botswana's strategic relations becomes tribalism versus nationalism.
CHAPTER 4.

ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE

This chapter examines the economic factors in Botswana's strategic relations which relate to its geopolitical situation and influence its national development goals. The Government's major development goals in the economic sphere include: raising the level of salaried employment and distributing incomes more equitably; raising agricultural output; developing an industrial and mining base, and establishing financial viability.

An examination of Botswana's economic dependence on the 'South' will illustrate the paramount influence of Botswana's geopolitical situation on the realisation of these goals. At the same time three themes are developed they are:

1. That changes in the economy are bringing about greater economic integration with South Africa, and the 'South' in general,

2. That the possibility of developing greater links with the 'North' are slight, and

3. That foreign and international aid is important but tends to increase dependence on South Africa rather than lessen it.

Each of these themes has political implications for Botswana.

Mainly because Botswana is at a low level of economic development and relies almost entirely on a cattle industry, with secondary support from mining,¹ the physical environment circumscribes to a large extent the country's development. The people and the cattle industry rely upon adequate water to survive,² and the mining prospects depend upon the inherited and known geology of the country.

The economy is still basically a subsistence economy.³ In 1954 there were approximately 10,600 African wage earners. In 1966 it was estimated that there were about 29,000 persons in salaried employment out of a working population of over 250,000.⁴ In addition most of the money

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1. The only significant mining, that of manganese and chrysotile asbestos, had ceased in 1965, and only stockpiles were being sold in 1966. There was however considerable mining prospecting in progress.

2. The drought of 1961-66 destroyed about 400,000 cattle with an estimated loss of about R8-10 million in revenue, out of a pre-drought population of about 1,400,000 cattle. (See UN Document, S/7781/Add.2., p.5) As by far the largest employer and provider of income is cattle ranching, the calamity necessitated relief measures to the larger part of the population between 1965-67.

3. "The transition from a subsistence economy has barely begun", Bechuanaland Report for the Year 1965, p.19

economy is in the hands of non-indigenes.¹ In 1964, agriculture, (including cattle, forestry, hunting and fishing) employed 227,649 workers out of a total working population of 250,678. Of the 9 out of every 10 workers thus occupied in agriculture the majority are engaged in cattle ranching.² The importance of cattle ranching is further emphasised by the fact that the only large industrial enterprise in Botswana is the abattoir.³ Physically, Botswana is mainly a flat country with a mean elevation of 3,300 ft. asl. To the east the landscape is hilly; to the west flat or undulating. Climatically, the country may be generally described as 'sub-tropical' with summer rainfall. All parts of the country have a long dry season and over much of the country conditions are semi-arid. Vegetation ranges from dense mopane⁴ forest, and open woodland in the north and east, to thorn bush and scrub, and open grass veldt over the drier central, southern


2. In terms of market value crop production is probably as important as cattle, although most of the produce is grown on a subsistence basis. This view is expressed and elaborated on in the Report on the Financial and Economic Position of the Bechuanaland Protectorate. (Pim Report), London, HMSO, 1933.

3. For a list of other industrial enterprises in Botswana (up to 1966) see, UN Document, E/CN.14/AS/111/1/1. 4th June 1965. "Report on Small and Medium Industries Operating in Bechuanaland."

4. Also spelt mopani. (Copaifera mopane).
and western parts of the country. Thornveldt gradually replaces grassveldt where rainfall is less than 15% p.a.¹

Three broad physical regions may be distinguished. Each has distinct economic characteristics,² which have been summarized by the words 'sterile', referring to the 'Central and Southern Region' of the dry Kalahari sand plain; 'dormant', referring to the north where rainfall is higher and there is permanent surface water; and 'dominant', referring to the eastern lands of Botswana where rainfall is fairly high and Kalahari sands thin out giving better soils.

The climatic situation of Botswana circumscribes to a large degree the distribution of settlement. In 1964 Botswana had an estimated population of 543,105 in an area of 231,805 square miles, giving an average population density of 2.3 per square mile.³ The population

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though is very unevenly distributed, being concentrated in two main areas:¹ the eastern strip of country bordering Rhodesia and the Transvaal where 80% of the population live, and secondly Ngamiland in the northwest. In both these areas the most influential factor for settlement is the availability of surface water.²

Water shortage is a major problem in Botswana,³ and impinges on practically every aspect of economic development.⁴ The only major sources of surface water are the rivers Linyanti and Limpopo, and the Okovango swamp. The two rivers are on the borders of the country, and the

---


². It is a long-standing characteristic of Tswana settlement to concentrate in large central villages. The ease of administration which this affords is an advantage to a developing nation (see A. Sillery, The Bechuanaland Protectorate, OUP, London 1952, p.201. In recent years though there has been a tendency for villages to become less centralised (Bechuanaland Report 1965, p.201.)

³. See Pim Report, op.cit., p.110.

⁴. See A. Mountjoy and C. Embleton, op.cit., p.549. However, it should be noted that even during the bad 1965 drought good results were achieved by progressive farmers which in the words of the Annual Report, "proved again that Bechuanaland's 'Kalahari image' derives rather from the low level of social and economic development of the country than from any insuperable natural barrier," Bechuanaland Report for the Year 1965, p.16.
Note: after 1964 census
swamp is in a tsetse fly and malaria infested area. Other rivers and lakes are seasonal or exist only in terms of excessive rainfall. Furthermore, the country suffers from very unreliable rainfall. The most recent drought afflicting Botswana lasted from 1962 to 1966, a period of five years of poor rainfall. In this context then of limited and fluctuating surface water supplies, underground water supplies are of great importance.

Figures calculated for the 'water balance' in Botswana indicate the extent of the problem of water supply. All stations have an average climatic water balance deficit.  

A good deal of the length of Botswana's international boundary is demarcated by reference to rivers. Because of the importance of water conservation and utilization to the economy, and the international nature of Botswana's major rivers, the Morse Report made reference to the need for international consultation with the riparian powers.  

In analysing the facilities for development, Green and Fair used four basic facilities: railways and road services; electric power; water supplies; and urban centres.

1. See chart "Rainfall for the year 1965 with comparative figures for 1961 to 1964 and norm".

2. See chart, "Water Balance for Bechuanaland Protectorate."


### RAINFALL IN BOTSWANA FOR THE YEAR 1965 WITH COMPARATIVE FIGURES FOR 1961 TO 1964 & NORM.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TSABONG</td>
<td>6.15</td>
<td>6.97</td>
<td>12.96</td>
<td>8.48</td>
<td>18.57</td>
<td>11.10</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>156.21</td>
<td>177.04</td>
<td>329.18</td>
<td>215.39</td>
<td>471.68</td>
<td>281.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GABERONIES</td>
<td>9.93</td>
<td>15.83</td>
<td>13.75</td>
<td>15.89</td>
<td>18.80</td>
<td>21.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>252.22</td>
<td>402.08</td>
<td>349.25</td>
<td>403.61</td>
<td>477.52</td>
<td>540.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSHANE</td>
<td>6.07</td>
<td>4.28</td>
<td>17.08</td>
<td>6.11</td>
<td>17.65</td>
<td>10.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>154.18</td>
<td>108.71</td>
<td>433.83</td>
<td>155.19</td>
<td>448.31</td>
<td>278.89</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAHALAPYE</td>
<td>7.02</td>
<td>9.33</td>
<td>14.40</td>
<td>12.46</td>
<td>16.46</td>
<td>20.25</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>178.50</td>
<td>236.98</td>
<td>365.76</td>
<td>316.48</td>
<td>418.08</td>
<td>514.35</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>226.57</td>
<td>372.11</td>
<td>431.55</td>
<td>310.13</td>
<td>536.45</td>
<td>468.38</td>
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<tr>
<td>GHANZI</td>
<td>11.77</td>
<td>6.75</td>
<td>30.86</td>
<td>9.84</td>
<td>15.00</td>
<td>17.85</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>298.96</td>
<td>171.45</td>
<td>783.84</td>
<td>249.94</td>
<td>381.00</td>
<td>453.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRANCISTOWN</td>
<td>4.44</td>
<td>8.51</td>
<td>14.92</td>
<td>16.91</td>
<td>18.42</td>
<td>17.71</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>112.78</td>
<td>216.15</td>
<td>378.97</td>
<td>429.51</td>
<td>467.87</td>
<td>449.83</td>
</tr>
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<td>MAUN</td>
<td>9.22</td>
<td>11.11</td>
<td>21.11</td>
<td>17.42</td>
<td>27.58</td>
<td>17.80</td>
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<td></td>
<td>234.19</td>
<td>282.19</td>
<td>536.19</td>
<td>442.47</td>
<td>700.53</td>
<td>452.12</td>
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<td>SHAKAWE</td>
<td>11.89</td>
<td>12.50</td>
<td>22.35</td>
<td>22.48</td>
<td>20.66</td>
<td>25.45</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>302.01</td>
<td>317.50</td>
<td>567.69</td>
<td>570.99</td>
<td>524.76</td>
<td>646.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KASANE</td>
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<td>13.58</td>
<td>23.82</td>
<td>23.63</td>
<td>33.48</td>
<td>27.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>360.68</td>
<td>344.93</td>
<td>605.03</td>
<td>600.20</td>
<td>850.39</td>
<td>707.14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**NB. l" = 25.399978 mm.** The inches have been converted to mm. by multiplying by 25.4.
### ANNUAL WATER BALANCE FOR BOTSWANA.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>PE</th>
<th>P</th>
<th>ST</th>
<th>AE</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>S</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DIKGATON</td>
<td>1055</td>
<td>448</td>
<td>448</td>
<td>607</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>984</td>
<td>461</td>
<td>461</td>
<td>523</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>GABERONES</td>
<td>966</td>
<td>518</td>
<td>518</td>
<td>448</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1172</td>
<td>660</td>
<td>660</td>
<td>512</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>438</td>
<td>438</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1107</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>699</td>
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<tr>
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<td>522</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>381</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1016</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>570</td>
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<td>1136</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>401</td>
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<td>MOLEPOLOLE</td>
<td>980</td>
<td>495</td>
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<td>485</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEROWE</td>
<td>943</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>564</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---


**NB.**
- PE = Potential evapotranspiration
- P = Precipitation
- ST = Storage of moisture in the soil
- AE = Actual evapotranspiration
- D = Water deficit
- S = Water surplus.
Although these criteria are only a rough measure of infrastructure they are nevertheless revealing. Using these criteria it was shown that Botswana had only two areas with access to one facility for development. These were: the eastern strip following the railway line to a depth of 25 miles; and the Okavango Delta with its adequate water supplies. Virtually all the remaining area was categorised as having none of the four basic facilities for development.
INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY, MAJOR RIVERS
AND RIPARIAN NEIGHBOURS OF BOTSWANA.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RIVER</th>
<th>INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY (MILES)</th>
<th>RIPARIAN NEIGHBOURS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OKAVANGO (enters boundary at right angles)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>ANGOLA: S.W.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHOBEB</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>S.W.A.: RHODESIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHASHI (Ramaquabane)</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>RHODESIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIMPOPO</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>S. AFRICA: MOZAMBIQUE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOLOPO (Ramatlabama)</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>S. AFRICA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor Rivers, (inc. rivers Kwando; Nosop; and Matengwe)</td>
<td>290</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,380</td>
<td>Total boundary demarcated by rivers (approximate).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>Total international boundary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>58% % of total international boundary demarcated by rivers.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Author's calculations.

The provision of adequate physical electrical and literary communications between people separated by hundreds of miles of difficult terrain has implications not only for economic development but also for political development. The development of a national identity is hindered if it is easier to communicate with neighbouring states than across Botswana itself.¹

Botswana's poorly developed internal communications become even more of a handicap in its land-locked situation. "A paucity of railways and roads heightens their/African land locked states/ land-locked positions and contributes large measure to the degree of underdevelopment." The choice of alternative routes is more circumscribed.

Communications generally in Botswana in the mid 1960's were in a state of relatively rapid development. Physical communications were beginning to link the country and people more effectively. During the first half of the 1960's the symbols of a nation were being created: the national magazine; national radio programmes and a national airline. In important respects though the existing communication structure and recent developments to it, have emphasised Botswana's dependence on its 'South' neighbours.

The only railway in the country passes along the eastern boundary of Botswana, fortuitously serving the most densely populated area. This single track, 394 miles long,

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1. Edmund H. Dale, op.cit., p.493. The dependence of Botswana on her neighbours for her communications may be illustrated by reference to her railway, roads, telecommunications and the press.

2. For example exports from Ghanzi in western Botswana pass conveniently via the transport system of South West Africa. If that export route was blocked Ghanzi could only use alternative export routes via Rhodesia or South Africa with great difficulty as east-west communication within Botswana are poor.
is the only direct rail link Rhodesia has with South Africa. It is owned and operated by the Rhodesian Railways. In the early 1950's there was revived interest in the prospect of building a railway line to link the Rhodesian Railway system with that in South West Africa,¹ but political factors have weighed heavily against taking positive steps. As Randall shows,²

"The Rhodesian Railways for political reasons of their own, have never completed a strategic railroad connection of ninety miles to meet the line which the South African Railways built to the border of Southern Rhodesia at Beitbridge. This means that traffic between the Transvaal and Central Africa has to travel a much longer route. This has been a point of contention between the two countries, so it is likely that South African permission for a railway corridor from Rhodesia to the Atlantic may be held up until there is some agreement on the completion of this other railway connection. This is an illustration of the type of political bargaining which becomes a factor for consideration when planning for a railway that may serve the Okavango Delta."

Although the economic advantages of an additional railway are many for Botswana, the Government of that country cannot plan its communications infrastructure solely on its own economic and political criteria. Its communications are of strategic importance to its neighbours. In the context of 'North-South' hostilities an integrated transport system is seen as a basis of defence strategy and


Botswana has been justifiably concerned about the consequences of a direct rail link on South Africa's and Rhodesia's dependence on the Botswana line.\footnote{The break on the dependence on the Botswana line was first considered as a concrete idea in 1963. See, the South African Financial Gazette, 25th Feb. 1966, p.11.} A Rhodesia Railway Report submitted to the Beit Bridge Rail Link Commission in 1967 considered the Botswana line as having adequate capacity to handle any traffic in the foreseeable future.\footnote{Report of the Beit Bridge Rail Link Commission, 1967, Government Printer, Salisbury, 1967, para. 1, 14, pp.6-7.} On more general economic grounds, and not only on the basis of rail-economics, the Commission considered it desirable to establish a direct rail link between Rhodesia and South Africa. The fear was expressed to the Commission that the Botswana line could be sabotaged. On such a prospect the Commission reported.\footnote{Ibid, para. 3.7, p.11.}

"This possibility is of the utmost importance not only to Bulawayo but to the country as a whole because, in such event, Rhodesia would be without..."
any effective rail connection with South Africa. This possibility... is regarded as a remote one..." 

In evidence though before the Commission, the Financial Secretary of the Government of Botswana stated that under no circumstances would the existing line be interfered with by his Government.¹

How important the railway is to the Botswana economy may be gathered from the fact that over 90% of the value of her exports leaves the country by rail.² The line is vital to the internal working of the economy, but as the table below indicates, the internal traffic carried by the railway is only a part of the total traffic carried.

GOODS CARRIED BY THE BOTSWANA RAILWAY LINE: 1966-67ᵃ

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IMPORTS:</th>
<th>1966</th>
<th>1967</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>From Rhodesia, Zambia and</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese territories</td>
<td>66,879</td>
<td>140,662</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From South Africa</td>
<td>146,097</td>
<td>96,977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXPORTS:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To all countries</td>
<td>40,203</td>
<td>41,076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERNAL TRAFFIC:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>50,752</td>
<td>32,665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRAND TOTAL TONNAGE HANDLED:</td>
<td>303,931</td>
<td>311,380</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ᵃ Source: Republic of Botswana, Statistical Abstract 1968, From Table No.53, p.64 NB. For the 1966 figures see, Ibid., 1967.

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¹ Ibid., para.1.15, p.7.

² For a vivid description of the cardinal importance of the railway to Botswana see, UN document, S/7781/Add.2. In conclusion, in Memorandum by the Government of Botswana to Security Council Resolution 232 (1966) 27 February 1967, the Memorandum states, "it is abundantly clear that Botswana could not survive without the railway..." para.28, p.14.
In addition to the tonnage shown in the above table there is the important traffic between South Africa and Rhodesia. In 1965 a total of 665,900 tons passed along the Botswana line as South Africa-Rhodesia trade.¹ And to these tonnages must be added the traffic to Central Africa. In 1965, 1,295 tons of meat was shipped by rail to Zambia and 3,284 tons to the Congo, also by rail.² In addition passenger traffic is important. In 1967 passengers departing from stations in Botswana totalled 398,293 providing the railways with a revenue of R551,971.³ Botswana also receives over R500,000 in direct revenue from way leave and mail transit payments from the Rhodesian Railway.⁴ The Rhodesian Rail Link Commission estimated that if a new link between Rhodesia and South Africa were built as much as 68% of the Rhodesia and South Africa rail traffic would be susceptible to diversion, which could mean a significant loss of revenue to Botswana.⁵

³ Statistical Abstract 1968, op.cit., from Table No.52, p.63.
⁵ Report of the Beit Bridge Rail Link Commission, op.cit. para. 8.5, p.39. This % does not take into account non-Rhodesian-South African trade, e.g. Zambian traffic, which may not be significantly diverted from the Botswana line.
Road communications in Botswana are poor. In many parts of the country it is easier to communicate with neighbouring states than to cross within the country. For example, Ghanzi's 'natural economic connection', except for cattle exports, is to the railhead at Gobabis in South West Africa, a distance of 180 miles, compared to 400 miles to Lobatsi. A further example is the proposed improvement to the road communications between Lobatsi and the Molopo farms, as at present most traffic travels of necessity via South Africa.\(^1\)

Significantly, between 1969-71, it is proposed that R1,670,600 be spent on the Nata-Kazungula Road,\(^2\) which is presently of poor grade. Although the road is not being built solely to link Botswana more firmly with Zambia, nor even mainly for that purpose, it will nevertheless provide an alternative to the present routes with Central and East Africa.\(^3\)

The Kalahari sands make road construction difficult and maintenance expensive. Also, the small widely scattered population makes provision of better roads economically unfeasible, but which may be essential for administrative efficiency and national integration.\(^4\)

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2. Ibid, Table XIII, Project No. PW 18, p.152.
3. Ibid., p.45.
## ROAD IN BOTSWANA:

### MILEAGE AND TYPE.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>ROADS TRUNK (class)</th>
<th>ROADS MAIN</th>
<th>ROADS DISTRICT</th>
<th>ROADS TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>742</td>
<td>562</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>1212</td>
<td>351</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Source: Republic of Botswana Statistical Abstract 1968, taken from Table No. 45.

NB. Between 1962 and 1966 the total classified road network only increased by 100 miles for the whole country. However, the trunk roads, class A were increased by 470 miles, an increase of over 60%.

The importance of radio communications in integrating a nation which is characterised by low population density, large areas, poor physical communications and a high level of illiteracy is obvious. Regional differences in literacy are quite marked and could have an effect on the geographic success of the Government's implementation of national development projects. In recognition of the importance of radio in national development, the Government is broadcasting

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1. See chart, "Regional Differences in Literacy in Botswana: 1964". This "high rate of illiteracy" has hindered economic development, and national integration. Some recent research shows the importance literacy plays in raising the level of a person's political identity from a sub-national group, such as a local community, or ethnic group to the nation, and also in making people more receptive to change. See. H. Schuman, A. Inkeles, & D.H. Smith "Some social psychological effects and noneffects of literacy in a new nation", Economic Development and Social Change Vol. 16, No. 1, October 1967, p.5 and p.9.
programmes for schools, farmers and women's organisations.¹

RADIO AND WIRELESS STATISTICS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commercial Radio stns.</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amateur Radio stns.</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Licensed Radio Listeners</td>
<td>1,566</td>
<td>2,801</td>
<td>4,061</td>
<td>5,206</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


b. NB. Includes Radio Botswana.

Improvements in telecommunication links with neighbours have strengthened communications with South Africa and Rhodesia. The improvement to the international telephone service now gives a 'carrier system' connection for Lobatsi with Mafeking and Zeerust in South Africa, and Francistown with Bulawayo in Rhodesia. In addition, teleprinters link Francistown with Bulawayo, and Gaberones with Johannesburg.² It was recently announced that the number of telephone circuits from Gaberones and Lobatsi to South Africa had been doubled and that operators at these exchanges

1. See, Kutlwano, Vol.7, No. 4, April 1968, for article, "School Broadcasting Making Impact in Botswana". For article on women's groups listening to specialised radio programmes, see, Ibid., Vol. 6, No. 4, April 1967, and for article on role of Radio Botswana in developing and preserving culture, see Ibid., Vol. 6, No. 6, June, 1967.

could dial directly into the Republic of South Africa's telephone system. In the reverse direction Johannesburg operators can dial Lobatsi, Gaberones and Francistown numbers without the intervention of a Botswana operator.¹

In 1965 Bechuanaland National Airways was formed taking over from Bechuanaland Airways as the sole public airline with scheduled services. Such a 'national' air service is an important step in relieving the isolation of such communities as those at Ghanzi and Maun, and can make a major contribution towards a sense of Botswana nation.²

Besides the increasingly important role Botswana National Airways is performing in linking the dispersed townships of Botswana, its airspace is becoming important as an intermediary in providing the necessary air links between Zambia and the 'South' where direct routes have been severed. The newly established Zambia-Francistown air service provides passengers between Zambia and Rhodesia with their only continuous air link.³ Similarly, Zambia no longer has a direct

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## REGIONAL DIFFERENCES IN LITERACY IN BOTSWANA: 1964

Residents present of 10 years of age and over by literacy and district.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DISTRICT</th>
<th>LITERATE IN SOME LANG.</th>
<th>LITERATE IN SETSWANA</th>
<th>LITERATE IN ENGLISH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHOBÉ</td>
<td>1,328</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>1,168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRANCISTOWN</td>
<td>12,627</td>
<td>55.5</td>
<td>10,443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CROWN LAND</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GABERONÉS</td>
<td>6,686</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>6,286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GHANZI</td>
<td>1,628</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>1,462</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KGALAGADI</td>
<td>3,062</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>2,449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KGATLENÉ</td>
<td>8,817</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>8,740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KWENENG</td>
<td>10,440</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>10,338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOBATSI</td>
<td>6,363</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>5,835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGAMILAND</td>
<td>5,162</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>5,015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGWAKETSE</td>
<td>13,490</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>13,394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGWATÔ</td>
<td>43,990</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>42,502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TULI BLOCK</td>
<td>937</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>813</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**a.** Source: Census Report 1964, op. cit. From table XV1, p. 94. NB. Figures for Mafeking are not included.
air connection to South Africa, since the cancellation of Alitalia's weekly flights from Lusaka. Passengers then must fly via Gaberones in Botswana, or via Blantyre in Malawi, or cross by road into Rhodesia.\textsuperscript{1} Besides its increasing function of 'air space intermediary', bilateral air schedules between Botswana and South Africa have increased. Since early 1968 restrictions on the number of flights and number of passengers per week imposed on air services between Gaberones and Johannesburg have been lifted and there is now no official limit on the frequency of flights operated by Botswana National Airways or South African Airways. In addition it can be noted that the best and busiest airport in Botswana is the private airfield at Francistown, where the South African WNLA organisation operates flights handling about 100,000 passengers a year.\textsuperscript{2}

Besides the physical links with the 'South' provided by the communication systems, Botswana is linked to South Africa in a currency union and a Customs Agreement. With the customs agreement presently under review Botswana is negotiating with South Africa for a larger share in the

\begin{enumerate}
\item Kutlwano, Vol.VII, No. 6, 1968. This is almost the number of passengers handled by all the public flights into and from Botswana. e.g. in 1966 total passengers 80,018. See Statistical Abstract 1968, \textit{op.cit.}, Table No. 51, p.62.
\end{enumerate}
customs duties. In addition it seeks a currency agreement which will give it some control over South Africa's fiscal policy where it affects Botswana's interests. All this is important to a Government trying to achieve financial viability. For the relatively small costs involved, it is clearly in South Africa's advantage to conclude the negotiations to Botswana's satisfaction thereby assuring that country of a greater vested interest in maintaining stable and 'friendly' relations with the 'South'.¹ At present Botswana receives 0.27622% of the total customs revenue collected by South Africa.² Though the Agreement has some disadvantages, for example in restricting Botswana's right to protect infant industries, on balance, it (and similar agreements with Rhodesia, Zambia and Malawi) has worked to her advantage.³

1. For further details see, The Star, 6 September, 1969, p.9.

2. For 1966/67 it was estimated that Botswana would receive about R850,000 as her share of South African Customs and Excise. See House of Assembly Debates, (Republic of South Africa), Vol. 17, August 31, 1966, Col. 1768. Note also that the Customs Agreement is presently under review.

3. For some of these advantages see, UN Document E/CN.14/AS/111/1/1, p.3.
ESTIMATED REVENUE FROM CUSTOMS & EXCISE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR:</th>
<th>(R.000)</th>
<th>% OF TOTAL INTERNAL REVENUE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968/69</td>
<td>1,007</td>
<td>17.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969/70</td>
<td>1,083</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970/71</td>
<td>1,165</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971/72</td>
<td>1,254</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973/74</td>
<td>1,351</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Notes A: Although a relatively important source of revenue to Botswana, it should be noted that in developing countries it is usual to derive a much higher proportion of internal revenue from Customs and Excise.

B: Changes in the revenue collected are mainly dependent on the South African economy and not the Botswana economy. See, National Development Plan, 1968-73, op.cit., p.12, and p.81.

Since independence the major preoccupation of the Botswana Government has been to formulate and implement development plans,

"...to create a strongly united nation, to overcome all parochial, tribal and racial rivalries"
and to safeguard the territorial integrity and sovereign independence of our country. We will continue to be alert against all forms of racial discrimination and will work to preserve the stable and democratic environment essential for economic progress. ¹

The Government then is acutely aware of the need to maintain a favourable political climate as the essential pre-requisite for economic progress. With economic development the land-locked status of Botswana can only assume greater significance. ² Although Botswana's external trade, in value and in tonnage, is almost the lowest of any country in the world, it is nevertheless vital for national development. Furthermore, as all Botswana's external trade must be

BOTSWANA'S EXTERNAL TRADE BY VALUE: 1961 & 1966

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Exports (Rand)</th>
<th>Imports (Rand)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>6,301,159</td>
<td>5,773,580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>10,772,171</td>
<td>18,824,979</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


NB The heavy deficit in 1966 on Balance of Trade is partly due to improved methods of collection of import statistics.

² Only in the extreme situations of either a subsistence or an autarkic economy would a land-locked status lack significance.
carried through or over her neighbours it is important that neighbour relations are cordial.\(^1\) Even though it is generally conceded that land-locked states have a 'right' of access to the sea,\(^2\) guarantees of such access are found only in bilateral and multilateral treaties with neighbouring states. No such treaties or agreements have been made between Botswana and South Africa, South West Africa or Rhodesia.\(^3\)

Although Botswana has a frontage on the river Zambezi (recognised as an international river by the Brussels Act of 1890), the Convention of 17 June 1950 between the British and Portuguese Governments which, \textit{inter alia}, sought to give access to the sea for Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), Nyasaland (Malawi) and Southern Rhodesia (Rhodesia), excluded Bechuanaland (Botswana).\(^4\) However, except for the ferry across to Zambia,\(^5\) the Zambezi river has no present transport use for Botswana.

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1. Recognition of this situation may also contribute towards the establishment of a 'state-idea'. For discussion see E.H. Dale, \textit{op.cit.}, pp.503-505. Also D. Knight, \textit{The Raison d'Etre of Botswana}, unpublished MA thesis, East Michigan University, 1967.

2. For discussion of whether such a 'right' exists see UN document A/CONF.13/43, \textit{op.cit.}


5. The ferry consists of a motorised pontoon capable of carrying a maximum of two medium sized motor cars at one time, correspondence, Botswana Information Service, Letter 17th December 1968.
Two aspects of economic development vital to Botswana's economic prosperity are the cattle industry, on which most of the country's exports depend, and mineral development on which so much hope rests. An examination of both of these aspects of recent development illustrate the limitations on freedom from dependence on the 'South'.

The economy of Botswana centres on the cattle industry. When it is borne in mind that over 90% of the working population are engaged in agriculture, and that livestock and livestock products account for approximately 90% of national exports, a good measure of where the national interest lies must be revealed in the direction of exports of cattle products. The dependence of this industry on neighbouring states is illustrated by the figures for export markets by value for animal products in 1964 and 1965, and the export of beef carcasses for 1966 and 1967.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Markets</th>
<th>1964</th>
<th>1965</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overseas countries</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>47.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>31.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhodesia</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other African Countries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(mainly Congo)</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL EXPORT OF ANIMAL PROD.</strong></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**EXPORT OF BEEF CARCASSES: 1966-67.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1966</th>
<th>1967</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>17,465</td>
<td>37,672</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other African markets</td>
<td>13,813</td>
<td>14,567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas (mainly UK)</td>
<td>97,287</td>
<td>34,839</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**NB:** Figures can vary widely between countries from year to year.

The above figures reveal the importance of the 'South' as a market for Botswana's main export. The dependence on the 'South' however is greater than these figures can show. South Africa is the principal market for by-products of the abattoir,¹ and Johannesburg is the principal export market for whole carcasse meat.² Most important of all perhaps, is the extent to which the cattle industry depends upon the Rhodesian owned and operated railline in Botswana and the railway systems of Rhodesia and South Africa. In 1966 over 75% of cattle were moved to the abattoir by rail, and over 90% of exports of meat and meat products leave the country by rail.³

2. See, UN document E/CN.14/AS/111/1/1. NB. In addition it can be noted that recent hopes of establishing a dairy industry in Botswana are a result of the changed market conditions for butter in South Africa. See, National Development Plan 1968-73, op. cit., p.21.
3. See UN document S/7781/Add.2 para. 16 & 22.
Botswana's two most important markets in the 'North', Congo and Zambia, received their meat supplies via the railway system of Rhodesia.\(^1\) Since the end of 1967 all cattle sales to Zambia are from the Lobatsi abattoir. Live cattle sales sent formerly via Kaungula have been terminated under a new agreement under which Botswana supplies 20,000 carcasses to Zambia.\(^2\) This means the export trade between these two countries relies even more heavily than before on the Rhodesian Railways. It was reported recently that a shortage of railway trucks had restricted export of beef to Zambia and Congo.\(^3\) The market to Zambia, Botswana's main market to the 'North' is not only difficult from the transport point of view, it is also a competitive market. Although President Kaunda in his State visit to Botswana in May 1968 stated that Zambia would buy all the meat Botswana could produce,\(^4\) under her own national development plans Zambia's beef production is to be expanded to eventually meet the national market\(^5\).

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4. *Financial Mail* (South Africa), May 30, 1968, p.785. NB. It is of course true, that even if Zambia reaches self-sufficiency in beef production, beef trade with Botswana could continue, if there was a comparative advantage in such trade, or if it was politically expedient.
Also Zambia has been developing alternative sources of supply for her beef. It was reported recently that South West Africa is to supply 20,000 tons of canned meat to Zambia per month. Swaziland also concluded a trade agreement with Zambia in December 1967 to supply the latter with beef products. Some of the Swazi beef will be trucked to Johannesburg and then railed through Botswana to Zambia due to a shortage of refrigerated trucks on the Mozambique route. However, it is unlikely in a situation where Botswana herself has to limit supplies of beef to Zambia and Congo due to a shortage of refrigerated trucks that Swaziland beef will get preference.

According to the National Development Plan mining is to play a major role in the country's economic development. A recently published United Nations Development Programme report estimated that Botswana would need about R50 million for basic development of the mineral discoveries focusing around the so-called 'Shashi-complex' project.

1. It has been suggested that Zambia's reason for seeking other more distant (and expensive) sources of beef, is the drought-prone nature of Botswana's own beef industry. See, Financial Mail (South Africa), Feb. 2, 1968, p.329.


at Selibe/Phikwe, for diamonds at Letlhakane and for coal at near Palapye. All the developments will be financed by external capital, much of which will come from South Africa, as South African companies and subsidiaries are among the leading prospectors in the field.¹

The possible large scale exploitation of minerals in Botswana again,² raises the question of an outlet to the Atlantic. One view expressed implies that Botswana would benefit greatly from such an outlet. Gross states,³

"...constructive planning for the region as a whole requires an end to the artificial and coerced estrangement of Botswana from South West Africa. Such a need is heightened by the recent discovery of important potential copper reserves in Botswana and the possibility that they extend in both Rhodesia and South West Africa."

However, the only railway construction envisaged for the near future is one to link the 'Shashi-complex' with the existing Rhodesia Railway system. Thus mining development will inevitably impose further dependence on the transport system of the 'South'.


Although mining development offers relatively good prospects for increasing salaried employment it will still be insufficient to affect the vitally needed labour migrations to South Africa. Outside cattle ranching or Government employment, the only major alternative source of paid employment is to be found by migrating.¹ Unofficially hopes were entertained that an expanding economy in Botswana would reduce the need to export labour. This has not been the case. The Government has recognised that despite increased job opportunities arising out of the present and proposed economic development, a continuation of migratory labour to the mines and farms of South Africa is indispensable. The Government's policy on this matter is unequivocal.²

"The Government has... no intention of interfering with this flow of labour to the Witwatersrand; on the contrary it recognises that the mines offer vitally needed employment to men who would otherwise be without work."

There are many advantages and disadvantages to this practice of labour migration,³ but one advantage to Botswana


3. Nationally, the migrants are a loss of young able men to the economy, and yet on the other hand represent a kind of capital export. Locally, it has added problems to tribal discipline and yet repatriates bring a much needed modernising influence. They return trained and probably more nationalistic than tribalist. For those who have been to the mines, the urbanising experience will make them more receptive to changes at home. Vide supra, p.97n, for research findings of H. Schuman, A. Inkeles, and D.H. Smith.
entering upon a new and important programme of mineral exploitation must be the skills acquired by Batswana in the mines of South Africa.¹

It is important to remember also that drought may be regarded as almost an inevitable part of Botswana's way of life for the foreseeable future. In such times as drought it is almost traditional for Batswana to seek work in South Africa. During the severe drought from 1961-1966, a 'record-number' of Batswana sought work in South Africa.² During droughts labour migrating to South Africa relieves the threatened and meagre subsistence resources of Botswana by shifting some of the burden of consumer demand on other countries.

At present Botswana is only able to provide salaried employment to about one-fifth of its male labour force and about one-ninth of its total labour force.³ The table below illustrates the importance of migratory labour to Botswana in 1964. The figures since independence have not basically changed.⁴ To expand employment Botswana needs to remain competitive and attractive to investment. This requires limiting its wage levels to those generally just below those of its neighbours. The heavy dependence on expatriates with their inflated salaries does not help the Government in this respect.⁵

Perhaps the most crucial dependence for Botswana's economy is that of financial dependence. Without massive Grants in Aid from Britain and foreign aid and investment, Botswana's

¹ For example a shortage of local skilled labour requires the RST company, presently prospecting in Botswana, to import African as well as white expatriate labour. See "Major Riches for Botswana?" by Fran Judd, Venture, June 1968, p.13.
³ Statistical Abstract 1968, op.cit., Table No.29, p.37.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>SECTOR OF EMPLOYMENT</th>
<th>LABOUR FORCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>Salaried employment</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Subsistence economy</td>
<td>73,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>23,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>9,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhodesia</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL MALE BATSWANA LABOUR FORCE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: 156,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ESTIMATED REMITTANCES TO BOTSWANA FROM BATSWANA LABOUR IN SOUTH AFRICA: 1964/5.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SECTOR</th>
<th>RAND.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>1,360,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>1,495,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>424,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>R2,279,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


b. Ibid., Table VI, p.52.
economy could not survive in its present form let alone stand development. In 1968/69 and 1969/70 United Kingdom Grants in Aid will provide an estimated 51.1% and 45.9% respectively of the total Recurrent Budget.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>British Aid to Botswana in Form</th>
<th>1964/5 and 1965/6</th>
<th>1964/65</th>
<th>1965/66</th>
<th>% increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grants in Aid</td>
<td>R3,740,000</td>
<td>R5,320,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonial Development &amp; Welfare Grants</td>
<td>R1,726,000</td>
<td>R2,597,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contrib. of UK. to salaries of expatriate Civ. Serv. under Overseas Aid Scheme</td>
<td>R130,000</td>
<td>R203,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK Aid in Form of Grants</td>
<td>R5,596,000</td>
<td>R8,120,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Source: Bechuanaland Report for the Year 1965, pp.19-20

NB. The total budget for 1964-65 was R8,247,000 and in 1965/66 was R10,631,000.

In addition to its dependence on the United Kingdom to balance its budget, the Government has difficulty in financing its development projects. For 1968/69 and 1969/70 the estimated shortfall of revenue on the Development Budget is 10% and 82% respectively. For these years external sources of revenue will exceed 90% of total revenue for development.¹

### ESTIMATED REVENUE FROM EXTERNAL SOURCES.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEVELOPMENT BUDGET:</th>
<th>1968/69</th>
<th>1969/70</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(R,000)</td>
<td>(R,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K. GOVERNMENT</td>
<td>2,108</td>
<td>2,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DANISH</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWEDISH</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NETHERLANDS</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O.X.F.A.M.</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K.F.F.H.C.</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O.D.M. RESEARCH</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BARCLAYS DEV.CORP.</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Development Budget: 2,731 2,583

### RECURRENT BUDGET:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1968/69</th>
<th>1969/70</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.K. GRANT IN AID</td>
<td>6,102</td>
<td>6,102</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Grand Total: 8,833 8,684

---

The great dependence on external funds imposes a premium on preserving a stable political climate to encourage investment and loans. The dependence of Botswana on the 'South' does not emerge from such financial figures. But as has already been shown by reference to the cattle and mining developments this dependence is more implicit than explicit.

In translating financial assistance into physical development, generally some South African interests are involved. For example, the new R500,000 abattoir by-products plant was designed, constructed and installed by a South African firm,¹ and the newly installed R97,000 generator for Gaberones power station was supplied from South Africa.²

The United Nations had grown increasingly perturbed at the dangers which existed to Botswana in her position as a dependent neighbour of South Africa.³ Recognising that unless economically independent of South Africa, Botswana and the other High Commission Territories would be politically compromised, the General Assembly requested that additional economic, financial and technical assistance to these countries should be furnished to them through United Nations programmes.

3. In General Assembly resolutions adopted in 1962, 1963 and 1965, South Africa was solemnly warned that any attempt to annex or encroach upon the territorial integrity of the three High Commission Territories would be considered an act of aggression.
of technical co-operation and the specialised agencies.¹ In the 1965 Resolution² there was established a 'Fund for the Economic development of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland' to be made up of voluntary contributions. On the eve of Botswana's independence nine months after the Fund has been established, it was noted that³ 

"....the contributions so far pledged had not been sufficient for the Fund for the Economic Development of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland,.......
to be brought into operation."

UNITED NATIONS OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES FOR DEVELOPMENT IN BOTSWANA: 1966.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROJECT COSTS (US$)</th>
<th>NO. OF EXPERTS PROVIDED</th>
<th>NO. OF FELLOWSHIPS AWARDED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>For UNDP</td>
<td>For REG.PROG.</td>
<td>Under UNDP Under REG.PROG.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200,813</td>
<td>14,568</td>
<td>15 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In the early part of the 1960's United Nations commitments in Botswana were small and generally short-term projects,⁴ but by 1965, partly because of the country's imminent independence and partly because of the drought disaster, greater

1. See UN document A/6700/Add. 10., p.2.
4. For details see, UN document, E/TAC/L.284.
technical and financial assistance was being made available.¹
In 1965 the UN sent an Economic Mission to Botswana, and
increased aid under the United Nations Expanded Programme
for Technical Assistance.² Other agencies such as UNICEF,
WHO, and FAO, also extended assistance. In 1966 the UN
established a sub-regional office of the UNDP, in Gaberones,
to cover the three High Commission Territories, under the
aegis of the UNDP Regional Office in Lusaka, Zambia.

Despite the general hostility of the UN to the South
African and Rhodesian Governments, the UN has had to seek the
cooperation of those countries in order to assist Botswana.
In 1966 of three World Food Programme (WFP) projects for
Botswana, two involved the specific cooperation of Rhodesia
and South Africa.³ One project required the transport facili-
ties of South Africa and Rhodesia for importing the emergency
food, and the second project proposed the processing of
emergency maize feed by South African manufacturers.

The dependence on the 'South' should be looked at
from the perspective of the alternatives open to Botswana.

1. Individual countries responded to Botswana's drought
disaster with increased aid. For details see, Bechuanaland
Report (1965), p.15 and pp.19-21. See also, South Africa
Digest, October 21, 1966 for further South African Assistance.

2. From Jan. 1, 1966 this programme has become a component
of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), by
being merged with the UN Special Fund.

3. See, UN document WFP/IGC:9/10 Add. 17., projects No.1,
"Community Development and tse-tse fly control", and
No. 3, "Livestock Feeding Scheme".
The Botswana Government envisages using her 'frontier' position between 'North' and 'South' to extend the markets for her products. In the National Development Plan it states,¹

"Through her membership in the Southern Africa Customs Union and through her Trade Agreement with Rhodesia, Botswana alone has free access to the richest single market in Africa. In addition, because of Botswana's friendly relations with countries north of the Zambezi, manufacturers in Botswana can sell their products without suffering discrimination in East, Central, and West Africa."

It is open to question however how successfully Botswana may develop markets to the 'North'. To the suspicions of some African governments that the ruling Government in Botswana is not the true representative of the people will be added the suspicion that South African manufacturers are using the 'Made in Botswana' facility to open 'Northern' markets for themselves.² Already it has been shown that physical links with the 'North' are poorly developed. The Government's policy is that road and ferry links with Zambia will be improved as increasing traffic makes this economically feasible. And although new patterns of air traffic have increased the accessibility of Botswana to Zambia they have not significantly affected the pattern of trade flow. The

¹. National Development Plan, 1968-73, op.cit., p.34.

². This point has been made with reference to industry in Swaziland, see, Financial Mail (South Africa), Feb. 2, 1968, p.329.
market to the 'North' is limited too, by the policy of Zambia and other African states of import substitution and greater self-sufficiency in basic foodstuffs. In addition Zambia is tending to orient her economy towards the East African Community. In the near future it may be important that Botswana hopes to be mining copper on a large scale, a mineral also of great importance to the Zambian economy.

To conclude this chapter it would be useful to recall the recommendations made to the United Nations Development Programme and other international agencies by Seminar XXI, to give urgent consideration to the provision of adequate assistance for the strengthening of the economies of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, so that their dependence on racist and colonial regimes is reduced."

It is difficult, if not impossible to see how Botswana can develop without becoming more economically dependent on South African and the 'South' in general. The Morse report in its Preface, foresaw this,

1. See, This is Malawi, Vol. 5 No. 2, Feb. 1969, p. 15.
3. Recently Botswana was invited as an observer to a copper producers conference in Zambia. See Financial Mail, May 30/68 p. 786, for implications of Zambia's interest in Botswana.
4 and 5 - see next page.
"...the Mission early became aware that economic relations between the Union of South Africa and the Territories, already close, must become more numerous and complex if their recommendations were put into effect."

Economic development over the past decade has not reduced the basic external economic dependence. On the contrary, external dependence is even more crucial, for economic and political survival.

The existing physical, infrastructural and commercial links between Botswana and the 'South' largely by way of the long common boundary, common rivers, the railway, better roads and telecommunications and the common financial institutions, must be set alongside the economic links which exist with the 'North' and the rest of the world. The configuration of the economic links with the 'South' almost invariably involve the 'South' in transactions with the 'North'. The opportunity of developing what little direct links as exist between Botswana and the 'North' are limited by competing economic interests. Even development aid from outside the 'South' to foster greater economic independence for Botswana has so far only increased that country's dependence on the 'South'.

Refs. 4 and 5 continued from previous page.

4. UN document A/6818, op. cit.
5. Morse Report, op. cit., p.16
CHAPTER 5.

THE IDEOLOGICAL FRONTIER.

To some degree all states today are politically and economically interdependent with neighbouring states. For some states this external dependence can be sufficiently great and one-sided as to be a major influence in that state's national development. If one adds to the political and economic dependencies, the implications of a state as an ideological frontier between conflicting ideologies, the effect of these dependencies is greatly enhanced.

The theme developed in this chapter is that ideological interests representing the 'North' and the 'South' are at interplay within Botswana. Though conflicting ideological interests, as distinct from political and economic interests, may be found in any state in southern Africa, in the case of Botswana, functioning as an intermediary is more vital to its national development, because of its more important strategic location. Botswana's strategic importance over other states in southern Africa, is due largely to the following: its direct physical and sovereign access to the 'North', coupled with the proximity of its S.E. border to the industrial 'heartland' of South
Africa; its neighbourhood relations with UN antagonists, South West Africa and Rhodesia, in addition to South Africa; its role as the most important refugee corridor from the 'South' to the 'North'; and its intermediary position in the transport system of South Africa and Rhodesia.

Strategically, the late 1950's and early 1960's was a period when Botswana's location assumed growing importance and its international boundary increased in barrier effect. An 'ideological frontier' best describes the strategic position of Botswana. To the North and South the political ideologies had been growing ever more sharply defined.

The ideological ecumene of the South was South Africa. On the east in Rhodesia the White minority government was sufficiently in control to fall into the 'South' camp of political ideologies. On the west in South West Africa the political evolution of the country was in the hands of the South African Government. Angola in the west and Mozambique

1. Botswana has been described as one of the most strategically important countries on the African continent, see, E. Munger, op. cit., pp. 76-77

2. Term adopted from Ladis D. Kristof, see, W.A.D. Jackson op. cit.

3. In replying to the critics the South African Government stated, "The notion of extension to South West Africa seems to imply that 'apartheid' or 'separate development' is something of the nature of a doctrine or ideology as Communism or Hitlerism or the like..... In truth the policy is nothing of the kind". (italics in original). See, South West Africa: Measures taken to combat terrorism (Text of letter dated 15th February 1968, and annexures, addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations by the South African Min. of For. Aff). Dep. of For. Aff., Repub. of S.A., Gov't Printer, Pretoria 1968, p. 20, Ann.'A'.


in the east, with their White minority governments, also fall into the 'South' camp.¹

The 'South' camp became more clearly defined after 1960.² Although political co-operation between the Governments of South Africa, Rhodesia and Portugal have been developing for some time, new developments have been occurring in the economic and military fields.³

With the increasing number of independent African states and their more powerful voice in the United Nations, Botswana's own protectorate status became more obsolete and difficult to support, during the late 1950's and early 1960's. At the same time South Africa was reappraising her increasing vulnerability against the demands for change for her own Black people and the African states to the North.⁴ In 1961 the

1. For the Portuguese Provinces 1961 was a significant date, following the Bakongo insurgency of that year. See, The South African Financial Gazette, 11th Feb. 1966, p.4. Also for UN concern, see, UN document A/6300/Add.5, p.38, which reports Mr. P. Raboroko's petition (A)AC.109/PET.⁴61.


4. The prevailing political climate and political developments in Bechuanaland were followed closely by South Africa. The Republic's concern was at least twofold: how to protect against the risk presented by a state emerging towards independence with direct access to Black Africa; and secondly, how to accommodate and perhaps redirect the political evolution of Bechuanaland to a goal more in line with the country's Bantustan policy. In Sept.1963 Prime Minister Verwoerd offered economic union for Bechuanaland as a Bantustan in a federated South Africa, instead of majority rule as an independent state as offered by Britain.
House of Assembly in South Africa debated the question of guarding the borders of South Africa neighbouring the High Commission Territories.\(^1\) For the following two years border patrols and passport checks increased, and on South Africa's withdrawal from the Commonwealth in 1963 travel restrictions were imposed on persons crossing the Botswana-South Africa border.\(^2\) In that year Rhodesia had established five police posts along its border with Botswana to help control South African refugees.\(^3\)

The ideological 'North' was likewise developing during the early 1960's. This was the period of the 'independence explosion'. Between 1960 and 1963 twenty-four African states became independent.\(^4\) 1963 marked a significant step in the evolution of the 'North' ideology. This was the year of the 1st OAU Conference.\(^5\) Although there had been precedents for


2. See, Statement by Min. of For. Affairs, on the 'Control of the Movement of Persons Between the Republic and the High Commission Territories', House of Assembly Debates, April 29, 1963, Cols. 4913-4918, Vol.6, See also Ibid., Vol.8, June 18, 1963, Cols. 8182 & 8178.


4. It is significant to note that Zambia achieved independence in 1965 thus delaying the active role it has since played as part of the 'North'.

5. Technically, this was the 1st summit of African heads of state at which the OAU Charter was approved. The 1st Assembly of the OAU Heads of State came in July 17-21, 1964, at Cairo.
the gathering of independent Black Africans states, from 1958 on, previous meetings had been marked more by discord than accord over common goals. As Colin Legum pointed out,¹

"For the first time, the independent African states were unified behind an activist programme of support for the liberation struggles in the Portuguese territories, South Africa, South-West Africa, the British High Commission Territories and Southern Rhodesia."

Thus by 1963 the two ideological camps were in an advanced stage of formation. From the members of the two ideological ecumenes there was growing pressure to gain the loyalty of the government, political parties and the people of Botswana. The 'sophisticated intellectual-political role' of ideological frontiers, aided by the diversity and frequency of social communication, and Botswana's multi-ethnic and multi-racial population, has allowed the two ideological currencies to intermingle across Botswana's international boundary.² Were this not the case Bechuanaland would have endangered her political development in the early

2. Cf. Ladis D. Kristof, in W.A.D. Jackson op.cit., p.142, for his discussion on ideological ecumenes.
1960's\(^1\), and since independence, her national interest goals of 'system maintenance' and national development. Equally, it was and still is unlikely that South Africa would cut communications with Botswana.\(^2\) As Munger pointed out,\(^3\)

"On balance, South Africa is unlikely to be provoked into a hasty closing down of the Bechuanaland border. Such a move would cast Bechuanaland adrift to fend economically for itself and almost inevitably it would then become an armed base against the Republic..."

South Africa would prefer to extend the ideological frontier at least as far as the River Zambezi.\(^4\) Sealing-off

1. The future of Botswana was in question, not because Britain had not given assurances, but because in the face of South African interest in Botswana, these assurances might be insufficient to guarantee realising U.K's stated wishes. Also of particular importance here is the potential source of conflict from the white minority who command considerable influence in Botswana. Note also during the period 1963-65 there was a general rising in the radical element in politics in Bechuanaland, plus some violent political demonstrations in the country, which convinced the British Administration of the need to hasten constitutional review. Constitutional delay could only strengthen the 'extreme' nationalist parties in Bechuanaland and risk adverse South African-British relations (See, R.P. Stevens, op.cit., p.150.)

2. This is not to deny that South Africa has enforced control over certain communications. However controlling the 'quality' of communications in any of their manifestations, whether physical, electrical, press or social, is different to blocking communications.


4. South African diplomacy in most recent years appears to be wooing Zambia into its sphere of influence, which if successful, would put the ideological frontier as far North as the Republic of Congo, Vide infra., p.150
the boundary at Botswana would bring the ideological frontier onto South Africa's doorstep. The ideological frontier becomes coincident with the international boundary and may be described as an 'ideological boundary.'\(^1\) The diagram below illustrates the two concepts of ideological frontier.

**TWO CONCEPTS OF IDEOLOGICAL FRONTIER**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concept 1</th>
<th>Concept 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLACK</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOTSWANA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ideological frontier.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHITE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**KEY:**

- .-.-.-.-. = International boundary
- = 'South' ideology.
- = 'North' ideology.

**NOTES:**

a. In concept 1, Botswana has adopted the 'North' ideology and confronts the 'South' ideology along the international boundary. Potential threat to country 'White' of ideological clash within and along its own borders is increased.

\(^1\) This term is used by Lewis M. Alexander, op.cit., pp.70-71.
In concept 2, Botswana allows a filtering of both 'North' and 'South' ideologies. Potential threat to country 'White' of ideological clash within and along its own border is reduced.

b. A third concept is implied, which is the reverse of concept 1, that is, where the 'White' ideology is adopted by Botswana and the ideological boundary confronts country 'Black'.

A typology may be constructed in order to illustrate the characteristics of the ideological frontier of Botswana. It indicates the concept underlying the approach in this chapter. The essential point about the typology is that it brings out the frontier role of Botswana. Botswana to survive as an ideological frontier cannot have characteristics in common with only one side, but must have characteristics common to both sides, or else make compromises to the side it cannot fully comply with. The empirical evidence in political speeches, legislation, and more concrete manifestations such as refugee and military camps, suggests four main characteristics for the typology.

The demands of the conflicting ideologies on the Botswana Government have been most manifest over the problem of political refugees from South Africa, South West Africa, and more recently Rhodesia and Angola. The reactions to these demands are what characterises the ideological frontier. They are summed up in the foreign policy of Botswana which is a clear compromise directed to those countries on which Botswana depends.
TYPOLOGY TO ILLUSTRATE THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THEIDEOLOGICAL FRONTIER OF BOTSWANA.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHARA.</th>
<th>SOUTH AFRICA</th>
<th>BOTSWANA</th>
<th>ZAMBIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type 1.</td>
<td>A (eg. armed forces)</td>
<td>- (no armed forces)</td>
<td>A (armed forces)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type 2.</td>
<td>- (eg. political refugees exit)</td>
<td>b (political refug. mainly in transit)</td>
<td>B (Pol. refug. in permanent camps and schools).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type 3.</td>
<td>C (eg. accepts migrant workers from Botswana)</td>
<td>c (workers migrate to S. Africa).</td>
<td>- (pol. control to stop workers going to S.A.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type 4.</td>
<td>D (eg. Pol. speeches express Botswana as friendly neighbour; but hostility to Zambian foreign policy).</td>
<td>d (Pol. speeches express Zambia &amp; South Africa as friendly: asks for understanding of need to live with all neighbours).</td>
<td>D (Pol. speeches express Botswana as friendly neighbour: but hostility to South African foreign policy, and domestic pol.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Minor symbols eg. a, represent characteristics of main feature modified by compromise.

NB.2. The construction shows that either Botswana does not manifest features of ideological significance displayed by its neighbours or else it manifests such features in compromised form. In either case Botswana acts as an ideological frontier.
Shortly after independence the President stated his Government's foreign policy,¹ which was to be dictated by the interests of the Batswana, and not any world political ideology. Towards South Africa there was to be a policy of 'good neighbourliness'. Refugees would be accepted, if they were genuine, but they would not be allowed to use Botswana as a base from which to direct attacks against South Africa or any other country.

Refugees from the 'South' form, numerically, the minor part of the total refugee problem in Africa.² Yet, as far as the 'North' is concerned they are a specially important category as they come from White controlled states. It would not therefore be inconsistent to the 'North' to waver the principle of asylum³ in certain respects, when refugees were required for training as 'freedom fighters'.⁴

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2. For details of refugees in Africa see, UN document E/4201, 23 May, 1966.

3. Two important points asserted by the principle are that granting asylum should not be regarded as an unfriendly act, and secondly, that refugees must not become instruments of policy directed against their country of origin. See International Conciliation, Sept. 1966, No. 559, p.110, for resolutions on refugees and subversion passed at the OAU Conference, Accra, Oct.1965. See also, UN document, A/C.3/SR 1359, 3 December 1965, p.6.

4. A threefold classification of southern African refugees has been suggested: freedom fighters; other 'political' refugees; and persons who have left their home country seeking a better life. For further distinctions see, Refugee Students from Southern Africa, AAI, April 1967 pp.3-5.
After the 'Sharpeville massacre' in 1960 and the subsequent State of Emergency in South Africa, the movement of refugees into the High Commission Territories increased. Of the three High Commission Territories Botswana provided the easiest escape route for refugees as the route to the 'North' was more direct. The location of vital communication, the physical features of the landscape and the common ties of the inhabitants in the land bordering South Africa-Botswana, were seen as factors aiding the political refugee.¹

The attempted kidnapping of refugees in Bechuanaland in 1963 and the explosion in a friend's Land-Rover, and a later sabotage to a plane in Francistown, indicated that Botswana was not a safe refuge for refugees.² Occurring at the time of preparation for internal self-government, the administration could not ignore these incidents.³

How easily the South African police could enter into

1. For a description of these factors see, Republic of S.A. House of Assembly Debates, Vol.8, Col.8179, 18th June 1963. NB. E. Munger, op.cit., p.76, states that the open country would make 'surprise and concealment' difficult compared with say the route through Mozambique.


3. Note that in 1961 the Protectorate Government had expressed concern at the high per capita ownership of weapons and the potential threat this posed to internal security, especially in the advent of future independence. See, Bechuanaland Legislative Assembly Debates, 26th Oct. 1961, p.59.
Botswana and abduct refugees was illustrated in August 1963 when a Dr. Abrahams was kidnapped. His abduction created an 'unprecedented crisis' in South African-Botswana relations. Not only did it show the ease with which South African police could enter the territory, but also the willingness of some White residents to assist them. Although the British authorities successfully demanded his release the South African Government accused Botswana of providing a 'red carpet' treatment for 'saboteurs from Lobatsi to Northern Rhodesia' (Zambia), adding:

"Bechuanaland is not only a haven for political refugees but a base for sabotage against South Africa.... The Bechuanaland authorities must be 100% aware of what is going on".

Shortly after the British authorities passed the Prevention of Violence Abroad Proclamation which partially controlled refugees. And in September 1963 the South African Government unilaterally limited freedom of overflights between the High Commission Territories in its own attempt to control the exit of refugees.

The action taken by the Bechuanaland administration to control the activities of refugees did not go unpraised in South Africa. In the editorial of one important South African Sunday newspaper the following viewpoint was stated,

1. Ample evidence exists that South African plain-clothes police moved freely in all three High Commission Territories; see, J. Halpern, op.cit., p.30.

2. Note that since November 1962 the Rhodesian authorities had taken to returning South African refugees direct to South Africa (via. Beit Bridge) rather than risk them being intercepted en route in Bechuanaland.

Footnotes 3 and 4 see next page.
"We believe that these good gestures of neighbourship have been actuated mainly by considerations of economic self-interest although their security value for the Republic cannot be denied."¹

Again, in 1965, the South Africa Minister of Foreign Affairs praised the 'more realistic approach" of neighbouring African states in their relations with South Africa.²

The requirement that refugees sign a 'no politics' declaration, together with the expressed desire of all political parties³ to extend assistance to the political refugees was an indication of Botswana's role as an ideological frontier. For as the International Commission of Jurists pointed out in a memorandum to the United Nations Special Committee on Apartheid, supporters of apartheid residing in Botswana did not have to sign the 'no-politics' declaration.⁴

(Footnotes from previous page)


4. It is possible that pressure from the UN and the OAU played some part in restraining Britain from co-operating further with South Africa. For further comment on this viewpoint see, speech by Mr. B. Coetzee, House of Assembly Debates, Vol.13, 26 Jan. 1965, Col.74, and speech by Prime Minister Ibid., 5th Feb. Co's. 630-631.

3. The political parties only differ in degree of aid they see proper to extend.

4. J. Halpern, op.cit., p.34.
By 1963 Botswana's usefulness as a forward base for guerrilla fighters had been limited by the imposition of refugee control. Botswana was a country of 'first asylum' where refugees could expect, in most cases, only temporary refuge. Refugees would have to make their way further north, away from the ideological frontier.

With independence the refugee problem did not abate. In fact it may have become more complex with increasing guerrilla activity bordering Angola, Zambia, Rhodesia and South West Africa. ¹ Because of the refugee problem the Botswana Government has had to introduce legislation to regulate their status and control their activities. ² The Government has not found it possible to adhere to all the terms of the Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951. ³ Under an amended Act, the Government still reserves its position on the following inter alia⁴

1. Note for example, the encounter with 10 guerrillas in March 1967 at Sironga (See Kutlwano, Vol.7, No. 1, Jan. 1968, p.2) and the arrest of 10 unlawful immigrants at Maitengwe in August 1967 (See Ibid, p.3.)


4. Ibid., p.77.
"...complete freedom of movement for refugees, the assimilation of refugees in our society, the treatment of refugees on an equal basis as that of aliens lawfully in the country on their normal lawful occasions, complete freedom for refugees on an equal basis with nationals to seek employment and so on".

Recently the Government has found it necessary to sign an extradition treaty with South Africa, which allows, inter alia, ¹ "...for the reciprocal exchange of fugitive offenders in serious criminal cases and contains the usual safeguards relating to crimes of a political nature".

Criticism from the 'North' that Botswana was co-operating with the 'South' over refugees and guerrilla fighters, has been denied by the Botswana Government. In the Minister of State's address to the United Nations in 1968, the Hon. M.P.K. Nwako stated, ² "...I wish to refute very strongly the false allegations that my government collaborates with the South African government or Southern Rhodesia by deporting genuine refugees to these countries. There is not one such case on record."

Outside the African ideological ecumenes pressure was being brought to bear on South Africa and her allies from the United Nations. This had both direct and indirect repercussions on Botswana. South Africa complained that UN


resolutions were harming her good relations with the High Commission Territories. The South African Representative to the United Nations complained to the Secretary-General of the...".... crude attempt by the sponsors of the resolutions, /A/AC.109/126;A/AC.109/127 and A/AC.109/128 Rev. 1/ to disturb the existing good relations between the Republic of South Africa and Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland/which/violates those provisions of the Charter which are designed to promote good-neighbourliness between states." 1

The efforts of the Special Committee of 24 to reduce the control of South Africa over Botswana were such as to raise concern from some members of the possible interference in the affairs of a state shortly to become sovereign.

During Mr. P. Raboroko's petition to the Special Committee of 24, 2 the Italian delegate referred to the possibility of action by the Committee constituting 'interference'. 3 During the 1599th Meeting of the 4th Committee, the Netherlands delegate stated 4

1. UN document A/5993 "Letter dated 15th Sept. 1965, from the Permanent Representative of the Republic of South Africa to the UN addressed to the Sec-Gen." At the 1600th Meeting of the 4th Committee of the G.A., the South African delegate stated that the draft resolution before the Committee was "...inspired by ulterior political motives which had nothing to do with the interests of the elected Governments and of the inhabitants of the three Territories", see UN document, A/C.4./S.R.1597-1601 (21st Session). The draft resolution in question proposed, inter alia, the establishment of a Fund for Economic Development of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland, (operative para.7), and the appointment of resident representatives in the three Territories (operative para. 9). The resolution was adopted by the G.A. on 16th Dec. 1965, as Resolution 2063 (XX).

2. See, UN document A/AC.109/PET 461,p.58.
"...a debate on their [the High Commission Territories] might prejudice matters which they would soon be in a position to decide for themselves. By adopting the Special Committee's recommendations the 4th Committee would be interfering in what would very shortly be the domestic affairs of Basutoland and Bechuanaland. It seemed inappropriate to act in that way without first hearing the views of the two countries."

Sounding a similar warning the United States delegate said:

"...the Committee and the General Assembly should certainly refrain from any attempt to dictate the terms under which they should face the future."

Despite the efforts of the OAU and the United Nations to provide protection and guarantee to the territorial integrity of Botswana and the other two High Commission Territories as they became independent, no such requests came forth from the Territories themselves. Botswana has no army and asked for no military protection from Britain after independence.

The refugee problem has focused attention on South Africa-Botswana relations in their ideological context. Even though refugees pose political and economic problems their existence and direction of movement in southern Africa conforms to the ideological conflict. With refugee control in hand relations between South Africa and Botswana have grown more co-operative. Officially relations between the two countries is described

1. Ibid., 1600th Meeting.

2. See Statement by Mr. Brown, UK delegate to the Special Committee of 24, UN document A/AC.104/5R.466 (14 Sept. '66).
as 'polite' or 'co-operative' rather than 'friendly'. In the unofficial level however much 'friendly' contact is maintained. For example there are frequent visits to Botswana of Black South African football teams and musical groups.

In one way or another the United Nations was directing efforts against South West Africa, South Africa and Rhodesia. The Special Committee of 24, which was concerned with South West Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Angola, Mozambique and the three High Commission Territories, met in Africa in 1965 and 1966, to be closer to the problem. The same committee asked for UN and other international assistance organisations to co-operate with the liberation movements and withhold any assistance to South Africa and Portugal. UN involvement in southern Africa was heightened by the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in Rhodesia in November 1965. Botswana's involvement and reactions to the post 1965 Rhodesian crisis illustrates its frontier position in the overall ideological conflict. On the 20th November, the Security Council passed a resolution to effect the isolation of Rhodesia from the international community. Operative paragraph 8, of the

1. It is noteworthy that the ruling BDP invited a representative of the opposition Progressive Party of South Africa to address its Annual Party Conference. It is the nearest party in South Africa with a 'multi-racial' policy, which is represented in Parliament. See, Sixth Annual Conference of the Botswana Democratic Party, at Gaberones, 26 Mar.'67.

resolution was particularly significant to Botswana as it called upon all states,¹

"...to refrain from any action which would assist and encourage the illegal regime and, in particular, to desist from providing it with arms, equipment and military material, and to do their utmost in order to break all economic relations with Southern Rhodesia including an embargo on oil and petroleum products."

Efforts in 1965 and 1966, both in the OAU and the United Nations to commit Britain to using military force if necessary to bring about a change in the Rhodesian situation were frustrated, amongst other things, by the strategic strength of Rhodesia's location. Both her rear and flanks were protected by the Portuguese controlled territories of Angola and Mozambique and by the Republic of South Africa. Facing 'hostile' Zambia, Rhodesia was protected by the gorges of the Zambezi, the Kariba Lake and the well wooded hillsides. There are only three crossing points by road and one by rail.

It is significant that Gutteridge² in his evaluation of


Rhodesia's strategic location made no mention of Botswana. A reasonable interpretation from this is that Botswana already surrounded by White controlled states, with no army and a weak economy, and on the threshold of statehood was in no position to be a threat to Rhodesia's security. It should be remembered however that Britain made good use of the territory to broadcast BBC propaganda into Rhodesia. Since 1966 sanctions have been applied to Rhodesia, at first voluntary but later mandatory. Botswana has been largely unable to comply with the sanctions for fear of the consequences upon her own economy.\(^1\) Although the Botswana Government has expressed its sympathy with African states condemning the Smith regime, it has stated it does not advocate the use of force.\(^2\)

Botswana's reactions to the Rhodesian situation are clearly ambiguous. On the one hand the Government is publicly denouncing the Smith regime and officially refuses to recognise the Rhodesian Government\(^3\) or have any official correspondence with the Government, and allows the BBC to operate a radio station from within its borders to broadcast propaganda into Rhodesia. On the other hand, it cannot comply with sanctions against Rhodesia, it returns guerrilla fighters over the border,\(^4\) and allows normal trade and social visits.

1. UN document, S/7781/Add. 2., op.cit.
3. See Statement by Min.of State, Mr. M.P.K.Nwako, at 23rd Session of UN Gen.Assembly, in Kutlwano, Vol.8, #1, Jan.'69.
4. See next page.
between the two countries. Again at the border, conditions are unchanged for post UDI Rhodesians leaving and entering Botswana.\(^1\) This contrasts with the stricter control imposed by Zambia on Rhodesians entering and leaving that country.\(^2\)

Considering the control which Rhodesia exercises over Botswana by virtue of the railway alone, one may question why Botswana risks as it does antagonising the Rhodesian Government. If the basic hypothesis of this study is firmly applied the answer is straightforward. It has already been shown how the UK provides over half the recurrent budget and most of the development budget for Botswana. Considering that the UK's own policy, \textit{vis a vis} Rhodesia, is to discredit the Smith regime, it is doubtful that Botswana could adopt an independent line. Without British pressure on Botswana it is conceivable that Botswana's anti-Rhodesian posture would be even more circumscribed by neighbouring strategic considerations than it is already.

South West Africa became a centre of UN interest following the decision of the International Court of Justice

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4. (From preceding page)
Botswana has received criticism for its alleged control of Rhodesian refugees and co-operation with the police forces of S.A. & Rhodesia with respect to guerilla fighters. See Africa Institute Bulletin, Vol.5, No. 10, p.311.


to dismiss the claims against South Africa.\(^1\) Apartheid had not been given a decisive judicial condemnation hoped for by many.\(^2\) It should be noted that this decision was made just two months prior to Botswana's independence. Any involvement in the South West Africa dispute by either the British or Bechuanaland Governments could have jeopardised the imminent transfer of power to the latter territory.

As late as 1965 the absence of military bases in South West Africa had been remarked upon.\(^3\) Since the Court's decision however, South Africa has built several military bases in that country. In order to facilitate closer scrutiny of developments in South West Africa and the three High Commission Territories, the Special Committee of 24 recommended on 9th June 1966 the establishment of two sub-committees.\(^4\) The sub-committee for the High Commission Territories was established,\(^5\)

1. Note in a statement by the Chairman of the Spec. Comm. of 24 on 25th Aug. 1966, it was pointed out that some UN members had cautioned against any positive action by the UN in order not to prejudice the case before the International Court, See, Yearbook of the UN 1966, p.599.

2. The events concerning the abortive UN efforts to establish a presence in South West Africa during 1968 probably give a good indication of the way South Africa would have reacted, irrespective of which way the Court decision went.


5. See, UN document A/AC.109/L/326.
"...with a view to studying and suggesting all necessary measures for securing the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the three Territories."

In the General Assembly on 27th September 1968, a draft resolution was introduced, which inter alia asked for United Nations presence in South West Africa.¹ South West Africa (Namibia), tried unsuccessfully to enter South West Africa. Zambia agreed to provide air transport. The South Africans however refused landing rights. Gross has suggested that the UN Council for South West Africa,²

"...might establish a presence in the area... preferably in Botswana, ...so that international assistance to both these contiguous lands could be jointly planned,"

He added realistically though, that Botswana might find this unfeasible at the present time.

There is evidence to suggest that the ideological North is not always ready to sympathise with Botswana's alleged need to compromise with the South from sheer economic necessity. At the 3rd Assembly of Heads of State of the OAU in Accra, 1965, the representatives of the High Commission Territories were given a cool reception.³ At the 4th OAU

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Assembly in Addis Ababa in 1966, the External Affairs Minister of Botswana asked African leaders to realise his country was vulnerable because of its economic dependence on South Africa and could not therefore fulfil all obligations involved in OAU membership, which included, inter alia, boycotting South African goods.¹ Neighbouring Zambia has shown more sympathy for the predicament of the Botswana Government, a reflection at least in part, no doubt, of the fact that it too is strongly tied to the economies of the 'South'. Since 1963 when the Presidents of Botswana and Zambia first met, friendly relations between the two countries have developed.² In the Government controlled magazine, Kutlwano, the friendly relations with Zambia have been well publicised compared with similar state visits by the Heads of State from Malawi³ and Lesotho. In 1965, Botswana served as diplomatic intermediary for Malawi and South Africa when it admitted a Malawian representative appointed to look after the interests of Malawians working in South Africa.⁴

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3. Note in Kutlwano, Vol.6, No.8, Aug.1967, President Khama's visit to Malawi is only reported with a picture but no news. Note further that in the article, "Looking back on 1967" a review of the 'main Botswana news items of 1967' no mention was made of the Malawi visit. See Ibid, Vol.7, No.1, Jan.'68.
It is important to note that because of Malawi’s diplomatic and trade relations with South Africa, that country is unpopular with many Black African states. A similar unpopularity has been shown by the majority of Black African states towards the present Governments of Lesotho and Swaziland. On the other hand, as with South Africa, there are many social meetings, such as sports meetings which make for 'friendly' relations at least on the unofficial level. Also, and most importantly, there is the University of Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland in Lesotho. In 1968 by far the largest number of Batswana students outside the country were in Lesotho.

<table>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL:</strong></td>
<td>115</td>
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a. Source: Correspondence, Botswana Information Office, 17th December 1968.
Almost in contrast to Botswana's equivocal attitude to the 'South' is Zambia's relatively unequivocal attitude. In 1965 Zambia's imports from Rhodesia amounted to 34% of the total imports. By 1968 the figure was 6% of the total.¹ Some of the diversion of trade has admittedly gone to South Africa, but to a large extent these figures reflect the increasing orientation of Zambia away from the 'South'. Zambia, unlike Botswana, is able to offer greater facilities to refugees from the 'South', and has actively supported guerrilla fighters engaged in anti-'South' activities. President Kaunda has allowed also the establishment of a 'liberation centre' where leading nationalist parties from Rhodesia, South Africa, Angola and Mozambique have offices.²

The Zambian Government is strong in its vocal condemnation of the 'South'. In a letter to the Secretary-General, the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Zambia stated,³

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² Ibid, 12th October 1968.
³ UN document, A/AC.109/295/Add 7. 2nd October 1968, "Compliance of member states with the declaration and other relevant resolutions on the question of decolonisation particularly those relating to territories under Portuguese administration, Southern Rhodesia and South West Africa". Report to the Secretary-General.
"The Government of the Republic of Zambia is actively applying OAU and UN resolutions concerning foreign minority, racist, colonial regimes in Africa, especially territories under Portuguese domination, the Rhodesian illegal regime and the South African illegal rule on Namibia.

"It is the hope of the Government of the Republic of Zambia that other States, Members of the United Nations especially those which can effectively influence the racist regimes will join their efforts in the liquidation of the remaining oppressive colonial regimes in Africa and assist the oppressed people to realise their right to self-determination and independence."

The solidarity and strength of the Zambian frontier facing the 'South' has been questioned in view of the internal troubles in that country. There is the problem of the White community whose loyalty is often more to the 'South' than to Zambia. And there is the problem of the geographic distribution of the Opposition ANC party in Zambia. In recent national elections in Zambia, the ruling UNIP lost seats to the ANC in particular along the southern third of Zambia. This could have strategic significance to Southern Africa. As one newspaper reported

"The decline in UNIP influence along the southern third of Zambia as manifested by the voters there has considerable significance in the sub-continent as it is the sensitive area bordering the White southern states."

1. The Star, 28th December 1968.
It should be noted though that Livingstone, the largest town near the Botswana boundary is a strong UNIP area. Barotse province in western Zambia has a long history of secessionist tendencies. The significance to Botswana and southern Africa, as Caplan has pointed out, is that the area could be a potential 'fifth column' in any conflict between the 'North' and the 'South'.

In the context of increasing guerrilla activity centering around Rhodesia, it appears that whereas Botswana is confined to a firm anti-Smith rhetoric and the role of 'first asylum' for refugees, and little, if any, assistance to guerrillas, Zambia's rhetoric against Smith, and also South Africa, is stronger, her support for refugees and guerrillas more active, and her trade discrimination against Rhodesia very positive. Does this suggest a hardening of the ideological frontier along the Zambezi?

To answer this it is necessary to look at the attempts by the 'South' to influence the ideological frontier north of the Zambezi. During the last few years attention has been drawn to the apparent spread of apartheid northwards. In

support of this contention is the evidence of: more 'segregationist' legislation in Rhodesia; the alliances between South African and the Portuguese territory; and the creation of Bantustan type authorities in South West Africa. At the opening of the 5th OAU Conference in Kinshasa, Congo, in 1967, President Mobutu attacked apartheid as

"A method of government.... spreading into South West Africa, the Rhodesia of Ian Smith, and the so-called Portuguese territories."

At the same Conference Botswana, Lesotho and Malawi caused dissent as examples of the success of the Vorster Government's diplomatic offensive in Africa. A report presented to the session of the International Trade Union Committee of Solidarity Secretariat, which met in Dar es Salaam in April 1968, stated that racial discrimination and apartheid had become expansionist and had infiltrated beyond the borders of South Africa. In the case of Rhodesia it is probably more accurate to say, not that apartheid has spread north, but that latent prejudice in the multi-racial communities are

2. Ibid, p.475.

NB. Recently Prime Minister Vorster twice spoke of Zambia as included in his concept of 'Southern Africa', in spite of repudiations from the leaders of Zambia. See, The Star, 28th September 1968.
being forced more to the surface and are being exposed. In South West Africa, the South African Government has controlled political development. As yet, South African apartheid has not influenced a visible change in the Portuguese policy in race relations, despite the closer economic and political links between the countries.

If apartheid is the dynamic ideology it is pointed out to be, then Botswana's own multi-racialism is endangered. Here though, as in other countries, the ideology of multi-racialism has also its practical side. In the case of Botswana an economically powerful White minority cannot be ignored without serious threat to the stability of the State. With the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965 Botswana-Rhodesia relations received a further strain. Many Whites in Botswana sympathised with the new regime and thus threatened the political stability of Botswana.\(^1\) The situation strained Botswana's desire to maintain a modus vivendi with her economically vital neighbours.

If there is a hardening of the ideological frontier between the 'North' and 'South' the nature of counterinsurgency warfare is not irrelevant. In a situation of increasing guerrilla activity a greater premium is laid on making hazy frontiers into firm boundaries. As the Guardian stated,\(^2\)

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1. R. Stevens, *op.cit.*, p.158
"For the Portuguese, Rhodesian, and South African police and security groups there is the need to obliterate each 'push' completely, so that there is nothing left for succeeding infiltrations to build on. They cannot afford that any front, however hazy, should be established."

The introduction of at least token South African forces into Rhodesia has, as far as the 'North' is concerned moved the 'White supremacist frontier' from the Limpopo north to the Zambezi. It should be noted though that President Khama of Botswana recently asked for the withdrawal of South African forces operating in Rhodesia. It has also been reported that both land and air incursions from Rhodesia have been made into Zambia, and that for the first time in November 1968, Zambian troops were in direct action against Portuguese troops. The reaction of Zambia has been to build up her military strength.

The ideological frontier it would appear is being firmly held at the Zambezi in the case of Rhodesia's confrontation with Zambia, and is likewise being held in South West Africa along the Caprivi Strip, and in Angola along the Zambian border. For Botswana however the ideological frontier is not also an ideological boundary. President Kaunda, during his state visit to Botswana in May 1968, condemned South Africa's racial policies in firm

terms, only 12 miles from the South African border. And although President Khama’s response was more restrained, as one reporter observed:

"[Kaunda] ... may be satisfied enough at having been the first to really fly Black Africa’s flag right on South Africa’s doorstep."

In other ways there have been attempts by the Government of Botswana to fulfill its role of intermediary between the 'South' and the 'North'. In a statement to the General Assembly in 1968 the Minister of State criticised the manner in which resolutions on South West Africa, have been passed, and stressed the need to bring the South African Government in on decisions affecting South West Africa.

Criticism of the Botswana Government for its relation with the 'South' is not confined to African states. The Movement for Colonial Freedom (MCF), which considers that Botswana was rushed into independence with 'indecent haste', stated it had taken up with the Botswana Government the question of the arrest and imprisonment of refugees from South


2. Statement by Minister of State, Mr. M.P.K. Nwako, at 23rd Session of the General Assembly. See Kutlwano, Vol.8, No.1, 1969

Africa and Rhodesia. It is significant that the MCF supports the opposition Lesotho Congress Party and its aims, and not the present Government in Lesotho. If the slightly less compromising attitude of the Botswana Government to South Africa is even in part a reflection of its slightly more favourable geo-political situation, this suggests that the MCF is rather less than sympathetic to the predicament of Lesotho.

To summarize, Botswana is all but encircled by South Africa, South West Africa, and Rhodesia, on which she so heavily depends, at least economically. These three countries are all centres of United Nations critical attention and action. The policies pursued in these countries are antagonistic to the ideals of the 'North' and thus results in an ideological conflict in which Botswana is saddled. As part of an ideological frontier, bordering on areas of increasing international tension Botswana's own internal stability has been more difficult to maintain. Ideological conflict with Botswana has been resolved by compromise, maintaining the

1. Ibid.
frontier characteristic. This has been shown with reference to refugee control and attitudes to the adoption of OAU and UN resolutions. If internal stability is lost then the possibility of external interference from either the 'South' or the 'North' is greatly increased.

Opinion is divided on South Africa's intentions towards Botswana. The threat of annexation exists but is generally regarded as remote.¹ One authority considers otherwise, and gives as the restraint on South Africa, the wish to avoid a clear-cut legal justification for UN intervention in Southern Africa.² The need for the 'North' to exploit any internal situation in Botswana to its own advantage is also clear. It would only be consistent with their behavior to date, if the more radical elements in the 'North' supported the more radical opposition parties in Botswana. As the tension increases around Botswana's borders the need to adopt a more national orientation, with even less ideological component, is strong. The tendency is for the Botswana Government to maintain internal security by

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becoming more conservative politically. Its commitment to the ideology of the 'North' can hardly grow in such a situation.

Botswana is astride an area of ideological conflict but is not the referee. She does not make the rules. And here is the crux of Botswana's strategic situation. For whatever the Botswana Government stand for, it can do little, if anything, to influence events in Zambia, Rhodesia, South West Africa and South Africa. Yet these countries by virtue of their greater 'power' and firmer commitment to ideology, can influence the internal situation in Botswana.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this study has been to determine the significance of Botswana's geopolitical situation upon her national development goals. The approach has been interdisciplinary in that the problem is considered to be primarily political, and yet the viewpoint is largely geographical as the emphasis has been on the spatial configuration of strategic relations.

The declaration of Bechuanaland as a British Protectorate in the 1880's was an early mark in the history of Botswana as a strategically important area, for the protection of British colonial and imperial interests. The 20th century has seen the waning of British interest and the waxing of South African interest in Botswana. In the 1950's with the emergence of independent African states and growing United Nations interest in Africa, an ideological conflict emerged in southern Africa in which Botswana plays a strategic role.

Economically and politically dependent on an ideologically antagonistic neighbour, Botswana's national development was and is pursued under political tension. The extent of the ideological conflict in southern African and the diplomatic, political, economic and military offensives
employed by the parties to the conflict, rule out any local 'buffer-state' role, or neutral 'cordon-sanitaire' function, and leave Botswana to function as an ideological frontier. This function exists as a result of an ideological conflict between the White 'minority' ruled states of the 'South', and the Black 'majority' ruled states of the 'North'.

The review of literature revealed adequate general-descriptive works covering the area, but found little primary data. The main shortcoming was felt to be in the lack of any recent evaluation of events relevant to Botswana's geopolitical situation. No work has specifically attempted to examine the influence of Botswana's geopolitical situation on its national development goals. This study has tried to fill that need.

Two fundamental post-independence priorities of developing states are (a) the maintenance of the state and (b) welfare (economic and social development). Together these form the national interest. Stated as domestic policy this becomes the national development goals. These goals become policy under the Government and are implemented by legislation, general programmes and specific projects. All countries have in addition external goals (foreign policy) which are a mixture of national interest and ideology. If the foreign policy seeks to appeal to a concept larger than the 'nation' it leaves the realm of national interest and
becomes an external ideology. It is normal for states to put national interest before ideology if the two are in conflict.

Botswana's national development goal is primarily to create a nation, overcome tribal and racial rivalries, safeguard political independence and preserve a stable climate for economic progress. Distinct policies have to be implemented to realize these goals. These policies will influence and be influenced by the strategic relations derived from Botswana's geopolitical situation. Only the most significant factors are considered. At all times it is assumed that economic dependence and political independence are inversely related.

In order to realise the national development goals premium is laid on creating a nation-state, using nationalism as the transforming agent. In four essential respects Botswana falls short of being a nation-state. It lacks a common territory for its people insofar as a large proportion of the Batswana live outside the territory, and 'alien' people live inside. It lacks a common language insofar as the people are ethnically and racially diverse in background and speak predominantly languages other than the official English. It has no common culture insofar as the majority of the people are illiterate and have little folklore written down. Most significantly, the country lacks a common economy in that it is mostly subsistence and what industry
there is, exists mainly for export and not for domestic consumption.

One of the most important single political features of Botswana's recent history has been, and remains tribalism. This derives from the ethnic divisions within the country and tribal ties outside, and in the antagonism between Chiefs and nationalists. South Africa's Bantustan policy in contrast to the anti-tribal nationalism to the north, as in Zambia, are relevant to these sources of conflict. Similarly, the racial apartheid policy of the 'South' and the 'multi-racial' policies of the 'North' exacerbate the racial tension between the Africans and Europeans in Botswana, the latter who significantly, are mainly concentrated in a few strategic locations.

Botswana's constitutional development was both hindered and aided by developments outside its borders. Fear of incorporation into South Africa hindered the rise of nationalism and muted the success of the extreme parties and yet this fear was the force behind the creation of the Legislative Council. The 'independence explosion' to the north has left Bechuanaland in the minority of colonial anomalies. In all this Britain's granting of rapid constitutional reforms was largely motivated by the wish to avoid precipitating a crisis in South Africa-Bechuanaland relations. The election of the moderate Bechuanaland Democratic Party
subdued the dissident Whites in Bechuanaland, pleased the 'South' and Britain, and displeased the radical African leaders of the 'North'.

Following independence the Government has been criticised for its slow pace of 'localisation'. Demands from the discontented Civil Servants who want 'Africanisation' bring a racial element into the controversy and so threaten the multi-racial policy of the state. The Opposition parties have criticised too, the employment of Black South African refugees, and have voiced complaint of tribal nepotism in government.

The discontent and discriminatory attitude of some Civil Servants and their alliance with the discontented Chiefs, under the Opposition party, the National Front, with the prospect of ideological support from both the 'North' and the 'South', threatens the Governments national development goals.

Efforts of the Government to remove discrimination by legislation have not been entirely successful as links with the 'South', such as the Rhodesian owned railway through Botswana on which discrimination is practiced, hinder progress.

The economic factors relating to Botswana's geopolitical situation were examined in the light of their influence on national development goals. Those goals were principally:
raising employment levels and distributing incomes more equitably; raising agricultural output; developing an industrial and mining base and, establishing financial viability.

The physical environment circumscribes to a large extent the country's development because of its low level of economic development. Shortage of water in disease free areas is a major handicap, and settlement consequently is concentrated mainly in the East, bordering on South Africa and Rhodesia. Rainfall in unreliable and periodic drought a hazard. In a situation where water is a vital natural resource and much of Botswana's international boundary is delimited by rivers shared with the 'South', cordial relations are important.

The poor internal communications of Botswana are matched by the better communications between Botswana and its neighbours of the 'South', which make it often easier to travel between places in Botswana by going outside the country. Development of radio, telecommunications and a national airway, is helping create a nation, and develop stronger links with the 'South'. The national airways also acts as an intermediary for 'North'-'South' air traffic. The most important communication link is the vital railway. The threat of a direct South Africa-Rhodesia rail-link by-passing Botswana, assures the 'South' of Botswana's
cooperation. Furthermore any extension of Botswana's railway to the Atlantic would require South Africa's approval and probably Rhodesia's cooperation. As the economy develops so Botswana's land-locked status becomes more significant and good relations with neighbours more vital.

The cattle industry vital to Botswana's prosperity illustrates the geopolitical influence on the country's development goals. The 'South' is Botswana's main market for meat products. But overseas and the 'North' markets also rely on the transport system of the 'South'. Botswana's mining development will impose further dependence on the railway and thus on the 'South', as well as invite predominantly South African mining interests into the country. Labour migration important in normal years becomes vital in periods of drought. Wage levels are largely determined by those in the 'South'. Furthermore, the Government's wage bill is inflated by dependence on expensive expatriates.

The financial aid of the U.K. adds indirectly to dependence on the 'South' as translating financial aid into physical development frequently involves South African interests. Even the UN at times finds it necessary to cooperate with the 'South' in order to aid Botswana.

As much for economic reasons as ideological,
Botswana is seeking to foster trade links with the 'North'. The present volume of trade is low and the possibility of increasing it is circumscribed by unfavourable economic factors such as limited physical access, small markets and competing economies. The ideological advantages Botswana can exploit in the 'North' as a Black state in furthering its trade, are mitigated by the suspicions held by the 'North' of Botswana's compromise with the 'South'.

The economic and political dependencies of a state are greatly enhanced by ideological conflict. Botswana's important strategic location in the ideological conflict in southern Africa derives from: its physical links with both ideological camps; proximity to South Africa's major industrial complex; neighbourhood to UN antagonists (Rhodesia and SWA and South Africa) its role as a refugee corridor, and its intermediary position in the transport system of the 'South'.

The 'South' became more clearly defined after 1960 when it became security conscious with the developing antagonistic ideology of the newly independent 'North'. Over the question of refugees Bechuanaland - South Africa relations deteriorated in the late 1950's and early 1960's, as revealed by increasing border security between the states.

The attempt by both ideologies to win the loyalty of the Botswana Government was a success for both in that
Botswana's 'natural' sympathies as a Black state lay to the 'North' but its practical interests lay with the 'South'. Thus Botswana assumed the character of an ideological frontier. However the Botswana Government has been suspicious of efforts to use Botswana as a base for activities directed against its neighbours. The strategies of South Africa to woo Botswana into closer cooperation, and the strategies of the UN and the OAU to establish a presence in Botswana have been identified in such a light. More radical elements in the 'North' are critical of Botswana's degree of compromise with the 'South'. Zambia's less strategic situation allows it a less compromising policy with the 'South' than is the case for Botswana.

In fulfilling its 'frontier' role as intermediary the Botswana Government has asked for UN recognition of the need to talk to South Africa over South West Africa; permitted the President of Zambia to speak against South Africa from Botswana; permitted the British to operate radio broadcasts against the Rhodesian Government and yet allow normal Rhodesian traffic across its borders.

The compromises of the Botswana Government in its foreign policy characterises that country as an ideological frontier. The policy towards refugees illustrates well the role of a frontier. Before independence Bechuanaland accepted refugees as growing risk to its own security with acts of
sabotage from Whites. After independence, political stability took priority and refugee control became necessary. Elements of the 'North' inside and outside the country criticise this control, but the Government it appears there is less hazard to its internal security than the previous situation of 'South' dissention, and White sabotage within its own borders.

Attempts by the UN to 'protect' Botswana were criticised by South Africa as using that country for wider interests than the people of Botswana themselves, and for harming their mutual relations. The UN's intention of guaranteeing the political future of Bechuanaland, has likewise been criticised by other countries, as constituting 'interference'. With refugee control in hand, relations between South Africa and Botswana have improved.

UN efforts against South West Africa, South Africa, and Rhodesia have involved Botswana insofar as it has in most cases not been able to comply with UN resolutions for fear of the national consequences by economic retaliation from its neighbours.

In conclusion certain trends in Botswana's present direction of development will be noted and from this future likely trends can be deduced. Botswana's primary, overall, development goal is to create a nation-state where none exist. The genesis of this problem dates back to the arbitrary
delimitation of Bechuanaland's boundaries in the 19th century which paid little, if any, attention to tribal affiliations. But more than that, the problem also derives from the economically poor environment inherited by the Batswana. Only the most recent mineral discoveries in Botswana appear to justify some hope that its physical inheritance is not so impoverished. Such obstacles to national development are not insuperable but in the case of Botswana they are made much more difficult because of its low state of economic-technological development. These three features of lack of a nation-state, a poor physical environment and a low level of economic-technological development have combined to create in the Government of Botswana a sense of urgency in national development which it is not willing to sacrifice for an external ideology where the two are seen in conflict. A primary, pre-requisite for national development is security. It was with its security in mind that the Botswana Government decided it could not risk being used as a 'battleground' in 'North'- 'South' conflict. With its national development given priority over any external ideology it is clear Botswana's security rested on where her economic and political dependence lay. South Africa, and to a lesser extent Rhodesia and South West Africa, control virtually all Botswana's external economic communications, and provide a multitude of other economic benefits deriving from its relatively advanced
state of industrial development. The Botswana Government's legislation to control refugees, enacted in order to maintain its 'national interest' pleased the 'South' but displeased the 'North'.

As development has proceeded since independence, ties with the 'South' have grown. When the new Customs Agreement and Customs Union have been renegotiated Botswana hopes for a bigger share in the South African economy. Trade developments with the 'North' have been relatively small. Communication however is more than physical exchange of goods. Besides the public speeches of Heads of State and their representatives, and the trade exchange there is little other data available to measure communication. Especially valuable would be data on the communication between the Batswana and neighbouring people on an individual level. The explanation by the Government of Botswana that it must put national development before ideology has not satisfied all of Botswana's critics from the 'North'. Perhaps the most significant dissent is from the elements of the 'North' in Botswana. That part of the opposition which opposes the Governments policy of cooperation with South Africa, to the degree followed by the present Government, has been criticised by Government on the grounds that it is undermining the national development goals. Much of the support for this opposition has been removed by the Bills passed controlling the activities of refugees. The unpopularity of the Governments present course of cooperation
with South Africa with people inside as well as outside the country has been made known.

Attention may be drawn to certain tendencies and their possible future consequence, in the adaptation of Botswana to new strategic relations in pursuance of its national development goals, which are a consequence of its geopolitical situation.

According to the threefold relationship of economics, politics and ideology, the loss of political independence, which is a consequence of economic dependence, is a gain in political control by the state exercising economic control. Furthermore, whenever national interest clashes with ideology the former predominates, creating an adjustment in ideological relations. This adjustment can be one way, an ideological pull towards the ally of the state's 'national interest', which is, according to Government criteria, where economic and political dependence lie.

A state, however, between conflicting ideologies in which it has an interest in both sides will wish to maintain a frontier position. To do otherwise will endanger its security as where the ideologies are separated by a line and not a zone conflict potential appears greater. The tendency is, though, to make 'hazy frontiers into 'firm' boundaries by gaining the definite loyalty of the 'frontier' state.
Faced with a conflict of priorities Botswana (as a frontier state) will define its national interest less in ideological terms and more in terms of national development goals. These goals are more economically than ideologically defined so that Botswana will be increasingly drawn to the ideological side in which it has the greater economic interest. The 'North's' hostility to the Botswana Government will increase the more it sees that Government as part of the 'ideological South'. Increasing hostility from the 'North' and matching security reaction from the 'South', including Botswana's concern for internal security, will test the Government's popular support for its national development policies. The lack of a nation-state will hinder, however, evaluation of the national interest. Elements of the 'North' in Botswana will grow increasingly discontented with the growing association with the 'South'. The 'North' can be expected to exploit this dissidence to its advantage. The Botswana Government's most probable reaction will be to become more conservative and this too will be exploited to the advantage of the 'South'.

What are the solutions out of Botswana's predicament? Assuming Botswana's goal of national development, greater economic integration with South Africa is seen as inevitable. An examination of Botswana's geopolitical situation revealed that the possibility, so often suggested, of increasing aid to Botswana to reduce its dependence on the 'South', offers
little hope. In the first place aid is insufficient to significantly reduce Botswana's dependence on the 'South', and appears unlikely to increase radically for at least the foreseeable future. Secondly, the main aid donors, Britain and the U.S., by increasing their investments in Botswana, are investing even further to maintain the status quo in the ideological confrontation, which works to the advantage of the 'South'. Thirdly, when aid is forthcoming it tends to increase, rather than decrease, dependence on the 'South'. Fourthly, even aid which ultimately increases trade with the 'North' generally requires the use of the communication systems of the 'South'. Fifthly, the continuing economic integration of Botswana into the 'South' economy gives the latter a greater interest in maintaining a stable and 'friendly' Botswana.

The significance of ideological systems as 'closed systems' becomes apparent. An ideological frontier by definition has communication with both ideological ecumenes. As the frontier position becomes more difficult to maintain there is a relative fall-off in communication with one ideological side. This is a step towards the frontier becoming a boundary and the state becoming enclosed within the ideological system.

What relevance does this conclusion have for elsewhere? Within southern Africa there are other examples, such as
Malawi, where the concept of 'ideological frontier' provides a useful approach to studying the influence of geopolitical situation upon national development. Malawi's closer association with South Africa has raised hostility with the ideological 'North' and has consequently reduced its communication with that bloc. Without a change in strategy from the 'North' a further breakdown in communication can be expected until Malawi is no longer a 'frontier' state but is firmly in the 'South' camp. When the frontier role is lost and ideological opponents meet at the international boundary, the possibility of greater conflict is enhanced. Other ideological frontiers exist outside the African continent where, it is suggested, a similar approach as used in this study, may illuminate better the effect of geopolitical situation on national development.

Finally, it is considered that this study has added to the field of political geography in at least two important respects. Firstly, substance has been given to the concept of 'ideological frontier' as a tool of geopolitical evaluation. It is regrettable that for a concept with seemingly greater relevance with the passing of every day, only fleeting references may be found in standard political geography texts. Secondly, emphasis has been given to the importance of the geopolitical approach to an understanding of problems of national development. These contributions may be restated as working concepts:
1. The ideological frontier is a concept which can aid measurement of the efficacy of strategic relations on national development.

2. The geopolitical situation, with its economic and political dependencies, helps define the 'national interest', where national interest and ideology are in conflict.

Finally, to clarify the arguments of South Africa that the 'North' is endangering its friendly relations with Botswana, and the 'North's' arguments that South Africa is endangering Botswana's independence, two points can be noted. Firstly, Botswana's 'fault', if it is a fault, lies in putting its national interest before ideology when the two are in conflict. Secondly, considering Botswana's interest in keeping communication open with both 'North' and 'South', its move further into the 'South' camp must be seen not only as the obvious pull from the 'South', but also, as the less obvious push from the 'North'. The question should be asked 'Which is easiest?', to dissolve the vital economic ties between South Africa and Botswana?, to expect the Botswana Government to put ideology before national interest?, or to expect the 'North' to change its strategy to allow Botswana a 'frontier' role, communicating with both sides. Only opinion can answer this, but if this study is valid then the 'North' must accept a great responsibility if Botswana becomes closed-off from the 'North' in the ideological system of the 'South'. 
APPENDIX

The Botswana Democratic Party, which forms the Government, in reply to the question "What are the main differences between [its] policy and that of the other political parties?", replied,

"a. Other parties support the idea of freedom fighters using Botswana as a base.
b. they are against trade with South Africa and Rhodesia.
c. they are for fast indiscriminate localisation and
d. they are irresponsible in their utterances in relations to local and external issues."

The Botswana Independence Party (BIP), which has no seat in Parliament, in answer to the question, "What were the main differences between [its] own policy and that of the ruling BDP?" stated that the main differences were:

"a. Theirs is not a political Party, but Chieftainship;
b. Their policy [is for a] multi-racial nation, while ours is non-racial;
c. Their sale of land even to non-indigenous companies and individuals;

1. Correspondence, Botswana Democratic Party, Executive Secretary, 24th September, 1968.
2. Correspondence, Botswana Independence Party, Secretary-General, 25th June, 1968.
d. Their friendly relations with the notorious white minority ruled neighbours even in police and security matters;

e. Their silence to every major issue in the UNO, to please the minority ruled white neighbours, and

f. Their economic dependency on the white Republic of South Africa."
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