THE CRUSADE FOR PEACE

bу

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A NEW EARTH

God grant us wisdom in these coming days, And eyes unsealed, that we clear visions see Of that new world that He would have us build, To Life's ennoblement and His high ministry.

God give us sense, -- God-sense of Life's new needs,
And souls aflame with new-born chivalries -To cope with those black growths that foul the ways, -To cleanse our poisoned founts with God-born energies.

To pledge our souls to nobler, loftier life, To win the world to His fair sanctities, To bind the nations in a Pact of Peace, And free the Soul of Life for finer loyalties.

Not since Christ died upon His lonely cross Has Time such prospect held of Life's new birth; Not since the world of chaos first was born Has man so clearly visaged hope of a new earth.

Not of our own might can we hope to rise Above the ruts and soilures of the past, But, with His help who did the first earth build, With hearts courageous we may fairer build this last.

-- John Oxenham.

THE CRUSADE BOR PEACE

OUTLINE

I. INTRODUCTION -- THE ADVANCE TO PEACE:

- (1) Peace is an attainable object.
- (2) It is the normal condition of mankind.
- (3) Modern warfare is vastly different from the warfare of the past.
- (4) The world must submit to a rule of law.

IL. THE CAUSES OF WAR :

- (1) They may be classified in many different ways.
- (2) Sir Arthur Salter's classification analyzed:
 - a) religious causes:
 - b) dynastic causes;
 - c) nationalistic causes;
 - d) economic causes.

III. ALTERNATIVES TO WAR:

- (1) The struggle for peace is now an organized world movement.
- (2) The acceptance of a rule of law is the moral equivalent for war and an alternative to it.
- (3) There are four great institutional expressions of this alternative now in existence:
 - a) The League of Nations;
 - b) The Permanent Court of International Justice;
 - c) The Locarno Treaties:
 - d) The Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact.
- (4) These institutions give ample opportunity for Conference, Conciliation, and Arbitration in the settling of disputes.

IV: WILL THESE ALTERNATIVES WORK?

- (1) Their effectiveness will increase as time goes on.
- (2) It has already been demonstrated in world politics.
- (3) Examples of their success in actual practice:
 - a) The Corfu case:
 - b) The Greco-Bulgarian case:
 - c) The Bolivia-Paraguay case.
- (4) The alternatives to war will work.

V. STRENGTHENING THE ALTERNATIVES :

- (1) The machinery at present in existence is sufficient to maintain peace.
- (2) But it must have the support of the peoples of the world.
- (3) Such support depends upon a favourable public opinion.
- (4) The world must cultivate a passionate desire for peace.

VI. THE CHRISTIAN BROTHERHOOD OF MAN:

- (1) The spirit of peace must reign in human hearts if permanent world peace is to be achieved.
- (2) The Christian Church must take a definite stand against war.
- (3) It must assume the leadership in moulding a favourable public opinion.
- (4) The Christian spirit of brotherly love is the only enduring basis for world peace.

THE CRUSADE FOR PEACE

I. THE ADVANCE TO PEACE

This is the first age in the history of the human race in which any large body of public opinion has come to regard the establishment of permanent peace on earth as a practical possibility. Always, in the past, in fact up till the end of the Great War, war has generally been looked upon as something inevitable, a necessary evil which, along with plagues and earthquakes and the poor, we would always have with us. Permanent peace? The conception of it was never real, but only a dream which idealists praised and about which poets wrote beautiful verse. It is true, of course, that men down through the ages have longed for peace and prayed for it, but their hopes and prayers have never been powerful enough to move them to definite action nor to motivate national policies. There was no dynamic force in the human desire for peace, and the reason was simple enough - men never really believed that peace could actually be attained. They viewed it as a possibility, but not as a practical possibility. Now psychologists and social reformers are agreed that the fundamental and primary need for the success of any enterprise is to believe in its ultimate and actual success. It is plain, therefore, that the most important development of the Great War and the years that have ensued with regard to the Crusade for peace is this - that the old belief in the inevitability of war has been largely destroyed, and has been supplanted by the increasingly strong belief that the elimination of war and the establishment of permanent peace on earth are attainable objects within the reach and grasp of the present generation.

But what has this change in outlook accomplished? We stand to-day at a distance of eighteen years since the outbreak of the Great War, and fourteen years from its close, and yet at this very moment we find the chief concern of the nations of the world is the ending of another conflict, this time in the East, which, although it has not, as yet at least, reached worlds wide proportions, is nevertheless real war, bloody, awful, bringing death and destruction and sorrow to thousands of Chinese families who were as innocent as were the peasants of Belgium in 1914. Surely this must give us pause -- can it be that, despite all the "talk" that has flooded out upon our eager ears to tell us that another war is "unthinkable", we have accomplished nothing? Can it be, indeed, that war is the normal and natural condition of this human race? No, our greatest statesmen of post-War days cannot have been all wrong -- we must not be discouraged on our Crusade for Peace, and even in the face of this latest rebuff, we must reaffirm our belief that peace -- permanent peace -- can and will be established by men.

Peace -- not war -- is the normal condition of the human race, both individually and as a whole. It is true that war is as old as history, but in almost all civilized communities down through the ages we find it looked upon as an evil, even though in some cases a necessary evil. The only exception to this rule that the modern world has seen was Prussia, whose militarists preached that war was the highest expression of national life and whose philosophers taught that war was a biol-

ogical necessity. It is yet too early to add Japan as a second exception, though in the words of Dr. John MacNeill, "even giving Japan the benefit of every doubt, it is difficult to acquit her of the charge of militaristic nationalism."

There will, of course, always be those who tell us that because man has a pugnacious instinct he has always fought, and will continue to fight, and that, therefore, there can never be any permanent peace. Mr. Norman Angell has offered a convincing refutation of this line of argument in his famous book "The Great Illusion", and we agree with him that such an argument is psychologically unsound.

But even supposing that man has always been pugnacious and will always be so in the future, are we to conclude that war as we know it to-day, is nothing more than the ancient method of settling disputes that sufficed hundreds of years ago? On the contrary, modern warfare is modern in every way. It differs from war in the past in three fundamental respects: (see "The British Empire and World Peace", by Newton W. Rowell, p. 5):

- (1) in the destructive character of the means of making war:
- (2) in the magnitude of the forces engaged;
- (3) in the scope of the areas and peoples involved in the conflict.

If we read history -- and there is a sense in which history has been merely the story of man's wars against man -- we find that the weapons used have naturally varied according

to the stage of development reached by civilization at the particular time a war was fought; and, although these weapons have grown more dangerously effective with the growth of man's inventive genius, yet until modern times their effectiveness was confined to the immediate theatre of the conflict. But now, with new and more deadly instruments of destruction being turned loose almost every day, and with the investigating minds of many of our best scientists under financial obligation to produce still more effective weapons, — there is absolutely no limit which can be placed upon the destructive power and upon the area of effectiveness of the weapons of warfare which man, may have at his command for the next war.

In this world of inexplicable complexes, we have seen many of our leading men turn from the God of their fathers to worship at the shrine of a new goddess called Science, heralding Science as "the handmaid of civilization", a panacea of all human ills, which would lead us to a better social and industrial order than men had ever dreamed of before. And science has in fact done much that its followers predicted. But it has also brought artillery guns with a range and capacity for destruction also undreamed of, with power to wipe out human lives and great cities scores of miles away from the point where the shells are released. Science brought us the submarine, the areoplane, the tank, liquid fire, and poisonous gas. It has placed in human hands the power to utilize and control the forces of nature in such a way as to endanger the very existence of civilization. The result of these new methods of making war is that "man's control over physical forces

is in great danger of outstripping his sense of moral responsibility for their use" and yet some men still decry all efforts to provide a substitute for war.

Modern warfare differs from the wars of the past also in the magnitude of the forces engaged. In the past, war was fought between two armies of more or less limited numbers, and the people at home waited patiently for news of either victory or defeat of their forces. But to-day it is no longer only a conflict between uniformed soldiers, but rather a gigantic struggle between the organized man-power and centralized resources of one alliance of nations against another. These nations must perforce stake their very existence on the outcome of the struggle, and everything and every person at their command is thrown into the battle. Knowing this, surely we can see that nations cannot afford to settle their disputes by war as they have done in the past. "One more world war, fought with the latest instruments of technology, will blast western civilization from centre to circumference." \$

The third respect in which modern warfare differs from the warfare of the past is that whereas in the past the area of conflict might be confined to the actual parties to the dispute, to-day this is no longer possible. This is tremendously important because so long as war could be localized and limited to

^{* (}Rowell, "The British Empire and World Peace," supra, p.6)

^{5 (}Charles A. Beard, reported in the Toronto Globe, February 29,1932.)

the actual parties concerned in any particular contest, it was still a possible method of settling national disputes. Neutral nations could still stay outside the boundaries of the war arena, and often even profited rather than suffered from the quarrels of their neighbours. But to-day the neutrals may suffer almost as much as the combatants, and indeed strict neutrality is virtually am impossibility in our modern world of complex international and economic relationships. It is, therefore, undeniable that modern war is world-wide in its effects and all humanity is dragged into its cauldron in one way or another.

Those who say that because there always has been war, therefore, there will always be war, may ask what difference is made by these great distinctions between ancient and modern warfare. The answer is that, just as the blood-feud and private vengeance were superseded by courts of justice and the rule of law within the development of the individual nation, because the blood-feud and private vengeance were menaces to the peace of the local community, so, with the modern organization of world society, no nation can be permitted to choose a method of settling a dispute with another nation which will inevitably bring serious loss and destruction to peaceful neighbour states. It is time for the world as a whole, for the sake of very self-preservation. to dictate to nations what methods of settling disputes they shall choose, and to say to every one of them: "You cannot and must not make war. You must substitute a rule of law for force in composing your differences."

Believing as we do, then, that war is no longer inev-

examine the various means which have been devised to take the place of force in settling international disputes with a view to deciding whether they will be equal to the task of bringing peace to a waiting world. Before we discuss these alternatives towar, however, it may be well first to find out what are and have been the causes of wars.

II. THE CAUSES OF WAR.

In attempting to discover the causes of war in modern times, we should bear in mind that although we may examine many grave causes of international disputes, we cannot by any means pretend to exhaust the details of a subject which is as wide as the world itself. There are almost innumerable angles from which the subject might be approached, and many different. ways of classifying the causes of war once we have named them. It is only when we begin to analyze wars from the viewpoint of cause and effect that we can gain any adequate realization of the seemingly endless ramifications of war and develop any full appreciation of the fundamental problems that must be faced and overcome if permanent peace is ever to be set up on earth. object here, then, will not/attempt an exhaustive treatment of the root causes of conflict, but merely to examine some of the more outstanding surface causes in order that we may be able to decide later whether any alternatives to war are possible and can be made to work effectively.

Professor Zimmern, writing at a time when there was no such body as the League of Nations, pointed out a distinction between two accusations frequently levelled at the world. The first accusation was that the world, as typified by its leading

^{* (}See list of causes of war drawn up by the Conference of the Causes and Cure of War in 1925, quoted in Appendix 1).

statesmen, was bad. The second was that it was badly organized. "The fight for peace, thus conceived, was partly a fight against wickedness in high places and partly a fight against anarchy in international relations." Mr. Hugh Dalton has expanded these into three accusations -- (1) that many of the world's leading public men, and those who influenced their policies, were bad men; (2) that their principles of policy were bad; (2) that they worked within a bad framework or with bad tools of international intercourse.

Were we to adopt this view, we should have three critical examinations to make in order to locate the cause of any war, viz., of the character of the men directing national policies, of the objectives of their policies, and of the international organization through which they had to work.

This is the method of approach to the problem followed by Mr. Lowes Dickinson, who has made an outstanding contribution to our understanding of the causes of war. He traces the beginning of the Great War primarily to a lack of international organization. It is well to remind ourselves at this point that this lack has been largely filled since the War. But as Dickinson points out, the character and objectives of statesmen also played a large part in bringing on the conflict in 1914, for too many of them were willing, for the sake of "na-

^{* (}Nationality and Government," pp. 37 ff).

^{§ (&}quot;Towards the Peace of Nations", p. 7).

o ("War, Its Nature, Cause and Cure").

tional honour", to plunge a multitude of lives into suffering and sorrow.

The best classification of the causes of war, however, that I have found, is that given by Sir Arthur Salter.*

He says that the causes of wars in the past fall into four main groups -- (1) religious; (2) dynastic; (3) nationalistic; (4) economic. Salter believes that the first and second of these causes have no longer any real significance, that the third is rapidly passing into the same stage, and that it is the fourth that is the most dangerous in our modern world. I am inclined to agree with him in part, but I believe he has underestimated his third group to some extent. His opinion merits close examination, and in analyzing it, we should be able to get a fairly broad perspective of the chief causes of war.

There can be no doubt that religious wars belong largely to the past. We live in a day of religious tolerance, when fanaticisim is at a very low ebb, and when, indeed, all too few of us are willing to defend our religion even when it is attacked. Men no longer will take up arms to make other men Christians or to propogate the particular view of Christianity which they hold. Christianity is not, in this sense, a militant religion. Yet we must not be too confident that there will be no more religious wars. The Moslems for example, are inclined to be very militant in spirit, and one need not stretch

^{* (&}quot;The Re-Awakening of the Orient, and other Essays"; see chapter on "Economic Conflicts as the Causes of War").

the imagination too far to envisage carnage on a large scale arising from the Moslem-Hindu strife in India. Here too we cannot overlook the dangers of a world conflict being provoked by those who have made Communisim their only religion and whose headquarters at Moscow openly preaches the doctrines of world-revolution. For the present, however, Christians and Christian countries may rest fairly well assured that religious wars are no longer to be seriously feared.

Practically the same confidence may be expressed regarding dynastic causes of war. Yet it is too soon to forget the personal responsibility that must attach, in greater or less degree, to the Ex-Kaiser, Frances Joseph of Austria, and the Czar of Russia in 1914. There surely were dynastic ambitions at work among the other and greater causes of the World War. And a new danger has arisen in the series of dictatorships that has sprung up across Europe. Suppose one of these dictators should lead his country into a war of conquest -- would it differ very much in reality from the dynastic wars of history? We are forced to conclude that dynastic causes of war, while shoved into the background, are still possibilities, though likely to be closely interwoven with many other more apparent causes.

What of Salter's third set of causes -- those arising out of nationalistic tendencies? He believes that nationalism as a cause of war is passing. In this I cannot agree with him. In the present day world, a growing spirit of independent and aggressive nationalism seems to be one of our gravest dangers.

We have only to look at Japan's action in Manchuria to see an example of the truth of this statement. In many other nations there are growing young nationalistic movements which call for watchfulness if they are to be kept within safe bounds, and in India and China the awakening idea of national unity is gathering increasing momentum with every year that passes.

"It is a positive preference for the traditional forms and institutions of our own political group, a preference which is rooted in a very complex system of sentiments, sentiments of love for the land itself, of pride in the past history of the nation, of devotion and gratitude to its institutions and great men, and of aspiration for its future." It is the most intense form of what we call patriotism, and patriotism, like all our loves and devotions, is in large measure irrational. It is the basis of a multitude of preferences or prejudices in favour of whatever is native to one's own land as against what is foreign.

During the last couple of centuries, the spirit of nationalism has grown greatly in extent and intensity. It was one of the main forces in European history in the nineteenth century, and now dominates almost every country in the world, even those in which a short while ago it was scarcely manifest.

^{* (&}quot;Janus -- The Conquest of War," by William McDougall, p. 48).

Each national group desires to maintain its independence and to make itself into a self-contained political organism. It is plain to see how this spirit breeds a constant clash of interests that may at any time break out in open warfare. As nations grow in this Chauvinistic outlook, they develop a corresponding lust for power which is apt to become nothing more than a love for power and glory for their own sakes. They become "touchy" on questions concerning their national honour and reputation, and are ready to spring to arms at the slightest offence against them. This lust for power, which is part of the spirit of nationalism, is thus a real and serious factor making for war. It plays a big part in maintaining huge armaments and it keeps constantly alive a fear of armed aggression in each nation.

emphasis upon the economic causes of war. There is, indeed, a large body of opinion which affirms that all war is at bottom caused by economic rivalry. The supporters of this view point to the ceaseless competition among nations in world markets, selfish and rataliatory measures such as tariffs effected in order to secure advantages in such competition, to the intense rivalries of industry, and to the constant pressure of expanding populations.

There is a great deal of truth in this view. But it may safely be said that direct economic rivalry of itself, while it may and does cause international friction, has not been in modern times and is not likely in the future to be a

Norman Angell has so well shown, no nation can ever hope that the economic gains to be made by a war will balance the tremendous losses that such a war would bring, the enormous expenses of conducting the war, the loss of life, the financial disturbance, the interruption of trade, the grave risk of destruction of whole cities.* But, though economic rivalry may not of itself produce a war, there still remains the danger that powerful nations may go to arms to compel smaller powers to grant them economic concessions. This is the danger of "economic imperialism." We see it at work in Shangai to-day, and nothing more than the conflict raging there is needed to show us the dangers that it conceals.

We cannot overlook, either, those groups in each nation which benefit by wars in general. The armament firms and traders are a moral outrage of long standing whose monopolistic and militaristic tendencies are always at work, sowing seeds of national discontent. There are numerous capitalistic groups whose direct interest in war leads them to seek ways and means of provoking it.

There is another economic factor which is often advanced as a cause of war. This is "the pressure of population." Many people agree with Mr. J.M. Keynes that the rapid increase in population of Europe before 1914 was one of the

^{* &}quot;The Great Illusion."

underlying causes of the Great War.* There can be little doubt for instance, that Japan's population problem is intimately bound up with her government's present program of imperialistic expansion. Professor Corrado Gini, one of the foremost economists of modern Italy, declares that pressure of population is the one root cause to which all wars in all ages of history can be traced. Without going into the detailed economic theories involved, we may safely conclude that the increase of the populations of various countries is a serious factor making for war.

There remains the great question of armaments, and undeniably the existence of huge standing armies and navies with all modern equipment is, in our modern world, a real danger to peace. The possession of these vast armaments induces the desire to use them in some practical way and breeds the lust for power and military glory. Just as a child itches to play with a new toy, so do great armies grow restless to try out all the playthings of destruction that are at their disposal day after day. And the vast mechanism of a modern war-machine, once it has been set in motion, rolls along with a momentum which makes it impossible to stop it before the fires of hatred have been kindled and blood has been shed. Each great military camp is a rival of the other, and so the race for armaments goes on, nurturing the warlike spirit under

^{* (&}quot;Economic Consequences of the Peace," pp. 10-13).

guise of the need for self-protection and preparation in case of attack.

We may now briefly summarize the causes of war that we have enumerated. We have first the threefold evil of bad men occupying positions of leadership, bad principles of action, and bad international organization. Then we have religious, dynastic, nationalistic, and economic causes, of which the last two are by far the most serious. Underlying all these, of course, are all the human failings of fear, greed, suspicion, lust, passion, etc., from which the race is never free.

The question now to be considered is, -- what practical means have we of eliminating these causes of war or at least reducing their potency?

ALTERNATIVES TO WAR

In the opening chapter I expressed the conviction that permanent peace was an attainable object within the reach of the present generation. Then what are the practical alternatives to war which exist to give a positive basis for our belief? Are there any alternatives to physical force by which national disputes may be settled? Has the world to-day any program by which to chart its course so that war may truthfully be said to be a thing of the past? I believe that there are such alternatives to war and that they can be made to work and function so as to achieve their object, and that war is consequently no longer ever necessary.

Let us remind ourselves again that the abstract, idealistic ideas of peace held by individuals in bygone days have given way to a world consciousness of the necessity for peace, and that this world consciousness has been expressing itself in collective action and that peace has slowly become organized as a universal obligation. Within the last fifteen years the world has made unprecedented progress toward its goal. The swift march of post-war events has given practical alternatives to war never before available, alternatives that nations may use without loss of their national honour. The acceptance of law and its agencies in international relations is becoming the moral equivalent for war.

Four great institutional expressions of this alter-

natives have grown up since the conclusion of the Great War, and while all of the nations have not signed all of the covenants or protocols, many have signed all and all have signed some. In other words, every nation in the world is a signatory to some kind of a solemn pledge that it will not resort to war to settle its differences in the future.

These four institutions, in the order of their origin, are as follows:

- (1) The League of Nations.
- (2) The Permanent Court of International Justice.
- (3) The Locarno treaties and similar "insurance" treaties.
- (4) The Kellogg-Briand Pact of Paris.

Now, none of these institutions is perfect, nor even complete. They are new, feeling their way in a war-made world. They have not always been successful, but they have been tried and tested, and they are becoming increasingly useful and will continue to grow in influence and power as they get an increasing measure of popular support.

What do these separate institutions offer? Taken as a whole, they offer opportunity for arbitration and conciliation to disputing states. They show that, as Professor Shotwell has said, "Peace has at last entered the realm of practical world politics," and there is hope for a war-weary world. This is the one big alternative to war, then -- Arbitration and Conciliation. We shall look briefly in turn at each of its four great institutional expressions.

(1) THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS:

The League of Nations is the most ambitious piece of international machinery that has ever been built. It is a compromise, "an inevitable transition," between the pre-war international anarchy and a World State," and it represents a concrete contribution towards the building of a world-society. As such it merits close and objective study.

Contrary to common belief, the idea of the League was not new in history. Idealists and philosophers had dreamed of it many times in the past. It stands in a direct line of historical developments which brought about the gradual formation of larger and larger areas and increasingly large numbers of people into communities whose members recognized responsibilities to one another, submitted themselves to a common system of law, and earnestly tried to eliminate the use of force among themselves. This process of combination can be traced from the primitive tribe and gens based on blood relationship, through the ancient city-state to the modern nation-state, and again to great federations of nations. Consciously and unconsciously the evolution has gone on as the search for security has made union necessary. Nor is the process at an end, for to-day more than ever before men and nations are being linked together by a variety of ties the indissolubility of which becomes more apparent as the complexities of world organization increase.

Thus, whether we look backwards over the developments of history, or whether we examine the tendencies of the present day, we can see clearly the slow but sure development towards

a world society. "No fantasy is it, nor even an achievement wholly unlike men's achievements in the past. History points towards it; present-day facts imperatively demand it."

As proof of this we need look no further than the beginnings of the League itself. Its covenant was not the product of any one mind; men of many different nations worked upon the draft. A Commission, of which President Wilson was Chairman, received valuable constructive ideas from Lord Robert Cecil of England, Leon Bourgeois of France, Orlando of Italy, Venizelos of Greece, Smuts of South Africa and Hymans of Belgium. The final draft of the Covenant containing a preamble and twenty-six articles, was drawn up by David Hunter of the United States, and Sir Cecil Hurst of Great Britain, after having been thoroughly discussed and worked over by representatives of all the countries concerned.

World Court to supersede the arbitrament of war, did not so much arise at any particular point as break out simultaneously wherever there were intelligent men, " says H. G. Wells. The leaders of world thought and action felt that no one nation should be allowed to take the law into its own hands and imperial the peace of the world. The World War and the desire of people everywhere to end its horrors had paved the way for

^{* (&}quot;Paths to World Peace," by Bolton C. Waller, p. 51).

^{\$ (&}quot;The Salvaging of Civilization").

concerted action at last. Organized cooperation had its golden opportunity and fortunately the leaders of the day were not slow to seize upon it. It was thus that the League was born -- as the culmination of a cooperative movement that dates back to the days of primitive man.

What, then, is this League of Nations? The first thing that we should get clearly in our minds is that it is not any Utopian panacea for all the world's ills. "There is no need," as Mr. Augustine Birrell has said soon after it was created, "To decorate the Covenant and the League with fine phrases. It is a business proposal having for its object to make wars difficult of commencement and to forge bands of peace in the hope that they may, if not always, at least occasionally, prove unbreakable." Too many people have looked upon the League almost as a religion or as some super-state, but it is neither of these. It is a purely political programme which offers "the conference method instead of the conflict method" where "disputes must be thought out instead of fought out."

Some mention must be made of the many criticisms which have been levelled against the League, especially since its apparent failure to produce any adequate solution of the recent Sino-Japanese conflict. There is not space here to attempt a detailed reply to the critics, but to my mind the

^{* (}Noel Brailsford, "The War of Steel and Gold").

wonder is not that the League has, in the course of its very brief existence, had occasional failures, but rather that, considering its handicaps, it should have secured such a large measure of success as it undoubtedly has achieved. Such a large scale attempt to establish a rule of law and peace between quarrelling nations is patently full of pitfalls and fraught with danger, and the League has actually surprised most people by its skilful navigation through the troubled waters of these post-war years. No apology, it is submitted, need be offered for its record to date.

Let us glance very briefly at the object and structure of the League. The preamble of its Covenant sets forth clearly its twofold aim, -- "In order to promote international cooperation and to achieve international peace and security, etc." Thus the first duty of the League is to foster and develop friendly relations between nations, and the duty of preventing war follows as a corollary. The League offers a central meeting place where disputes may be threshed out in all fairness to both parties involved. This alone is a great forward step toward the elimination of war -- and it is too often lost sight of by the League's critics.

To carry out its aims, the League has a three-fold machinery consisting of

- (a) an Assembly of all its members, which meets every year at Geneva;
- (b) a smaller Council, flexible, in nature which meets

- three times a year and is capable of being convened swiftly should a crisis arise:
- (c) a permanent Secretariat, consisting of permanent paid officials retained for purpose of study and research in all the various activities of the League.

We need not delve further here into the construction of the League. Even its most enthusiastic supporters do not claim that its structure is perfect or that it cannot be improved. Indeed, criticism of its framework is now, coming from within the League itself, which is a wholesome sign, because it demonstrates that the League has now grown strong enough to indulge in the very helpful art of self-criticism.

able achievement in connection with the League up to the present time is the very fact of its establishment. From this primary fact a number of important improvements in international affairs have resulted. Without describing the particular successes and failures of the League in actual practice, it will be useful to glance in a general way at these beneficial results.

First, the League has provided a "talking shop" for the nations of the world. The solution of a dispute is no longer left solely in the hands of the disputants and the danger of their passions and prejudices dominating the situation is thereby greatly lessened. Third parties are introduced and they meet with the disputants around a table, with the facts placed before them, to seek a workable solution of the problem. The advantage of personal discussion is this manner by responsible statesmen is so great an improvement over the old method of exchanging messages through ambassadors or by written notes, that it may well be ranked as one of the truly great achievements in the modern handling of international affairs. The League Assembly is an open forum for the frank discussion of questions in the presence of third parties who can act as gobetweens or mediators; it presents an opportunity for open declarations of policy on matters of common concern and permits statesmen to learn each others' minds. It is scarcely too much to say that even if the League had no administrative functions whatever, its value as a clearing-house for the exchange of national views would alone justify its continuance.

In addition, there is the advantage that the League is developing a "League mind" of its own. "It provides a focus for the public opinion of the world." As a consequence, nationalism is subdued because of the new psychology in international affairs. Peace, still seen to have its complexities, is seen also as having its practicalities. The clarifying atmosphere of Geneva is conducive to this new attitude among the world's statesmen.

But the League is far more than a mere "talking-shop."

Its establishment has brought into operation immensely improved methods and machinery for the conduct of international business. The methods of the old diplomacy were awkward and clumsy. The roundabout means of communication caused serious delays in times

of crisis, and the secrecy presented opportunities for sharp dealing. Any conferences that were called sometimes took years to convene, they were badly prepared and poorly managed, and even if agreements were reached, there was no means of ensuring their being carried out. The League, on the other hand, provides opportunities for direct negotiations, and by its regularly called meetings enables any country to bring any matter of grave concern before the other countries at an early date. It provides machinery by which the most intricate and technical matters may be handled efficiently and well. The Secretariat ensures careful preparation for carrying into effect whatever decisions are reached. International cooperation can generally be achieved in every way with far less trouble, much greater speed, and more satisfactory results to all concerned than was formerly possible.

Another extremely beneficial result which too often escapes emphasis is that the League has provided a long-needed rallying-point for all those forces in the world which make for peace. In former times it was difficult for individuals or societies working for peace to find any objective centre for their efforts. The League centralizes and focalizes all the scattered branches of the peace movement. Peace workers everywhere now have definite objectives in winning support for the League and urging in their own separate countries the acceptance of its decisions. They find in the League the concrete embodiment of the international spirit and outlook which is necessary to give meaning and stimulus to their endeavours.

In this chapter I have been able to give only an inadequate thumb nail sketch of a great new institution, with the object of outlining its advantages and its possibilities in the simplest possible way. The League of Nations is the greatest and best alternative to war in the settlement of disputes between nations. "It enables men to realize, besides national policies and international interests, the claims of world-policy and world-interest. It gives to the public opinion of the world a focus, a conscience, a means of expression. It gives to those forces by which the world society is being developed a local habitation and a nerve-centre."*

(2) THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE:

The modern peace programme, staking its all upon the methods of arbitration, seemed to demand a world tribunal for settling international disputes, and the Permanent Court of International Justice grew out of the inevitable necessity for an orderly world founded upon principles of law and justice, even as judicial systems and organized court procedure grew up in the history of individual nations.

Although this Court was an outgrowth of the League of Nations, it too, like the League, was not the product of any suddenly conceived idea, but rather the culmination of a thought development that extends back for centuries. Perhaps the first concrete achievement in the way of a world tribunal came with the first Hague Conference in 1899, at which a Court of Arbitration was

^{★ (}Bolten C. Waller, "Paths to World Peace," pp. 58-9).

established. This Court is still in existence, and although it is not permanent in nature and in reality is not a court at all, it has handled nineteen cases successfully since its inception. Another attempt to set up a permanent tribunal wasmade at the second Hague Conference of 1907, but it failed because the delegates could not agree on a method of selecting the judges that would be acceptable to large nations and small alike.

It was the establishment of the League of Nations that finally guaranteed the world tribunal that nations had desired for many years. The League Covenant (Article XIV) provided that the Council should formulate plans for the Court, and accordingly a Commission of Jurists, appointed by the League, met at The Hague in 1920 and drew up a plan which was adopted by the League Assembly on December 13, 1920.

The statute constituting the Court had attached to it a separate protocol which was really an independent treaty to make it possible for nations to join the Court without joining the League. This protocol has been signed by fifty-four states. The one serious drawback to the Court's practical structure has been the persistent refusal of the United States to join it, but a growing sympathetic attitude on the part of the American public promises an early removal of this difficulty.

The Court consists of fifteen judges and four deputy judges, who serve a term of nine years and are eligible for re-election. They are nominated by the nations who are members of the Court of Arbitration, and not, as many people believe, by the League of Nations. The law applied by the Court

been accumulating since the decrees of Grotius, and which are generally recognized and accepted by all civilized nations. It is true that international law has not yet been codified, but a beginning has been made upon the task by a preparatory committee at Genera, and to wait for complete codification, as Charles Evans Hughes has said, "might carry us over to the millennuim, when it would be doubtful if we should need it."

which the parties refer to it and all matters specially provided for in treaties and conventions in force." (Article XXXVI of the League Covenant). The Court has been kept busy ever since its formation. Out of sixty-seven treaties negotiated after the close of the Great War, forty provided for resort to the Permanent Court of International Justice. Article XXXVI also contains the famous Optional Clause, which allows freedom to the members of the Court in the matter of accepting compulsory jurisdiction. For many years, only the smaller nations were willing to sign this Optional Clause, but after Great Britain took the lead and signed it, other great powers followed, and to-day forty-two nations in the Court have accepted its compulsory jurisdiction.

There are many weaknesses in the theory behind the Court's establishment, as well as weaknesses in its practical

¾ "Outlines of International Law," by Charles H. Stockton.

workings. Unfortunately the world has no system of international law to which all nations can be submitted, and such a universal system lies only among the hopes of the future. The use of the term "International Law" has led to the widespread delusion that there is in fact such a system, already in existence, and this delusion has been a great obstacle to clear thinking in many instances on the subject of war and peace. It is well to get clearly in mind the fact that there is no definite body of law, put together by any international legislative body nor by any world judicial tribunal and accepted by all the nations of the world. This is not to say, that "International Law" as it now exists is not effective law, and a great moral factor in binding nations. A large part of the civilized world has endorsed and accepted certain fundamental principles of international right and justice and it is the accumulation of these principles that we call "International Law."

There can be no doubt, however, in spite of all the criticisms of the Court that can possibly be made, that its establishment was another step forward in the great process of substituting arbitration for force in the settlement of international disputes. The Court did not spring from idealism alone, but from the practical necessity of an economically interdependent world which demanded that disputing states might have their difficulties examined and judicially settled by an impartial world tribunal. Has it justified its creation? "In seven years," writes Professor Manley O. Hudson, "it has more

^{* (!!}The World Court ").

than justified the expectations of its founders. It stands to-day thoroughly imbedded in current treaty law. Resort to it becomes yearly more frequent. It is fast becoming indispensable to the international life of our time."

(3) LOCARNO: *

The signing of the Locarno Treaties in 1925 was hailed all over the world as the most important historic event since the Armistice. Peace was heralded from every pulpit and in every editorial as having at last made another real step forward. For weeks everybody talked "The Spirit of Locarno."

Nor is it any wonder, for the Locarno treaties witnessed a wondrous change of spirit in the relations between the signatory nations. In them great states voluntarily agreed to settle their disputes by arbitration. Conciliation was to be substituted for force, and good will took the place of ill will. No cries of "national honour" and "vital interests" were raised to disturb the calm. Cooperation at last seemed to have gained the victory over petty bickering and obstructionism.

But there was far more than a peaceful spirit achieved at Locarno. The Treaties brought security at last to the boundary line between Germany and France, and within ten years of the close of the Great War, these two historic enemies agreed to eliminate the Rhine as a sore spot of friction from European

^{* (}See Appendix II for the test of the Treaty).

affairs. More than this, nine documents were drawn up, binding Germany on the one side, and Belgium, France, Czechoslovakia, and Poland severally on the other, to settle their difficulties by adjudication. And finally, the condition of these agreements going into force was that Germany should enter the League of Nations. It meant that she was no longer to be a derelict among nations, a vanquished enemy outside the circle of fraternal states, but a member of the family of nations, subject to a law, but entitled also to those high privileges given by the League to all its members.

The Locarno Treaties have been said to mark "the end of the psychological aftermath of the World War." The psychology of armed force had failed, and Locarno ushered in the new psychology of peace through international agreements. And it is worthy of note that the main parties to the Treaties, France and Germany, were those upon whom the War had fallen heaviest, and that it was due largely to the forward-looking wisdom of Briand and Stresemann, Foreign Ministers of these two nations, that the Treaties were achieved.

In concluding, we should remember too that the Treaties were really another offspring of the League of Nations. The League offered a method -- the method of conciliation -- for the peaceful settlement of international disputes. Locarno was a policy -- the application of the League's method to one of the most sensitive sore spots in European diplomacy. By these Treaties, Frenchmen and Germans joined hands in saying in the words of Briand, -- "We are Europeans only."

(4) THE KELLOGG-BRIAND PEACE PACT: *

The fourth great institutional expression of the alternatives to war is the formal banishment of war as an instrument of national policy contained in the famous treaty that has become known as the Kellogg-Briand Pact.

This official renunciation of war bears an added significance that does not attach to the first three of our great alternatives, in that the first proposal for it came from the United States. the one great nation in the world which had theretofore studiously stood aloof from the task of building adequate practical foundations for peace. It is an open secret that the idea of such a treaty was first suggested to Mr. Briand by Professor James I. Shotwell of Columbia University. His plan was aimed at uniting the divergent peace groups in the United States in one central motive upon which they could all agree. The first public mention of the plan was made by Briand on April 6, 1927, just ten years after the United States had entered the World War, and strange to say, for two weeks this announcement of France's position was overlooked by the American press. It was rescued from oblivion by a letter to the New York Times from Nicholas Murray Butler which at once became the subject of numerous editorials. Public opinion began then to think favorably of the proposition. Secretary of State Kellogg proposed, instead of a bilateral treaty between France and the United States,

^{* (}See Appendix III for the text of the Pact).

a multilateral treaty which would give all nations an opportunity to sign, "renouncing war as an instrument of national policy in favour of the pacific settlement of international disputes." Then followed the interminable exchange of notes, with the result that the Pact was finally signed in Paris on August 27, 1928. War had been deprived of any legitimate existence by the nations of the world.

The weaknesses of the Pact are all too plain. lacks, in the first place, any machinery for settling disputes by peaceful means. Secondly, it overlooks all the progress toward peace that has been made by the collective action of the nations of the world since the close of the Great War. because it ignores the existence of the League of Nations, the Permanent Court of International Justice, and Locarno. By failing to consider the peace programme that had been slowly built up and was already functioning, it slurs over the fact that arbitration is becoming the new moral equivalent for war and that nations must be taught to use it. It advocates peaceful settlement of disputes, but does not provide any practical means of accomplishing this end. That is why Ramsay MacDonald termed the Pact "a castle in the air." Another deficiency is that the Pact allows wars of self-defence, and not only that, but, in the words of Mr. Kellogg, each nation "is alone competent to decide whether circumstances require recourse to war in selfdefence."

^{* (}at 10th Assembly of the League, September 10, 1929).

But the Pact was of immense moral value to the peace movement. Its open renunciation of war meant that nations would have to learn to substitute conciliation for conflict. It drew attention in a striking way to the fact that morality between nations can be built up only by institutions of law and justice binding upon all. Moreover, the signing of the Pact was a picturesque reiteration of international good faith. The educational value of the treaty can hardly be exaggerated. It was the modern world's form of repeating to all men the commandment -- "Thou shalt not kill!"

But undoubtedly the greatest value of the pact lay in the fact that it brought the United States back once more into the sphere of world cooperation in the search for peace. Europe had been bewildered by America's rejection of the Treaty of Versailles and the Covenant of the League of Nations, the child of an American President. The United States had stood persistently and stubbornly aloof in the great struggle for reconstruction following the War. Europe welcomed with open arms and a glad heart the return of the American people to cooperative endeavour in new undertakings to carry out the high purpose of establishing peace on earth.

The Kellogg-Briand Pact is more than a mere pronouncement in treaty form. It is another monument on the road to permanent peace.

IV. WILL THE ALTERNATIVES WORK?

In the previous chapters we have pointed out great practical alternatives to war -- Conference, Conciliation, and Arbitration -- and we have described four great institutions that have sprung up since the Great War as concrete expressions of the world's desire to make use of these alternatives. The large question now looms before us -- will these alternatives work? Will the machinery in existence run smoothly and successfully in times of crisis when passions run high and the public mind is enflamed? Some attempt to answer these questions must be given if we are not to lay ourselves open to the charge of being merely idealistic and theoretical.

It is only fair to preface our investigation at this point with the reminder that the League of Nations is but thirteen years old, the Court only eleven, Locarno six, and the Paris Pact a mere baby of slightly over three years. There really has not been ample time to give any of them a fair test. We are safe, therefore, in saying that the probability is that their effectiveness has only commenced to show itself and will increase as the years pass.

But even in the brief span of life that the new alternatives have enjoyed, there have been many examples that justify our conviction that they can work successfully and even now are doing so. Here again, however, it is only fair to mention, on the other side of the picture, the fact that the serious trouble

in the East may yet give the lie to all that we have been saying. We are much too close to that trouble as yet, though, to pronounce any meritorious judgment upon it or upon the way in which it has been handled by the machinery that has been described in our previous chapters. For the present, then we must leave the Sino-Japanes "war" out of the discussion, as an admitted possible refutation of all the hopes and beliefs that we have expressed in this treatise regarding world peace.

There have been many examples in the past ten years that might be cited as evidence of the success of the alternative machinery. Such are the Aaland Island dispute, successfully arbitrated; the Jugo Slavia-Albania controversy, and the Upper Silesian problem. But here we shall deal with only three of the outstanding crises since the War in which the peace machinery functioned successfully -- (1) The Corfu Case; (2) The Greco-Bulgarian Case; (3) The Bolivia-Paraguay Case.

(1) The Corfu Case:

This case is especially interesting because the incident out of which it arose was quite similar to the one at Sarajevo which provoked the outbreak of the World War in 1914.

On August 27, 1923, a commission composed of an Italian, General Illini, and four associates, were being driven in an automobile to mark out the boundary line between Greece and Albania, when they were cruelly set upon by assassins and shot to death. As no robbery was committed, the crime was ascribed to political motives, and although the nationality of

the assassins remained a secret along with their identity, the fact that the crime was committed on Greek soil caused Italian feeling to run high against Greece.

Mussolini, "the dictator of the mailed fist," at once sent a very strong ultimatium to Greece. The Grecian government complied with most of its terms, but Italy deemed the reply unsatisfactory. Mussolini promptly sent a warship to bombard the fortress on the lovely Greek island of Corfu, and many women and children were killed.

case to the League of Nations. Fortunately the Council happened to be sitting in one of its quarterly meetings, and at once the machinery of peace began to move. Geneva was the cynosure of the world's attention. This was the League's first serious crisis. A great power had violated its solemn pledges and obligations and had reverted to the old method of taking the law into its own hands. The great Mussolini had ignored the methods of conciliation offered by the League of which his country was a member. Surely the future of the League was at stake in this hour.

The League acted at once, not hastily and rashly, but quietly and thoroughly. Through a month of strained suspense the members of the Secretariat and the Council never ceased their efforts. Italy argued that the League had no jurisdiction to intervene, because the bombardment of Corfu had not been intended as an act of war, but merely as a "pacific reprisal" to show

Greece that Italy meant business. Led by Lord Robert Cecil. the Council, however, continued to deal with the case. It drafted a statement of the measures which were necessary by both Greece and Italy as a basis for settlement -- and the two nations accepted the proposals. A grave international crisis had been settled without recourse to arms, and a waiting world breathed much easier as the news of the settlement was flashed to it.

It is noteworthy that no spectacular action marked the League's procedure during the whole Corfu affair. It succeded, however, in mobilizing public opinion against Italy at Geneva in such an effective way that Mussolini's hand was forced. The Italian delegation was morally isolated throughout the Council's deliberations. The aggressive action taken by Italy was thus openly condemned. And Italy did not dare venture farther in the face of such condemnation.

The important part of this incident is that the new machinery of peace worked successfully. In 1914 the murder at Sarajevo threw the world into the worst war in its history; in 1924 a larger crime was judicially settled while the peace of the world was maintained. The League of Nations demonstrated that it was a practical instrument of world conciliation which was equal to any crisis that might arise.

(2) The Greco-Bulgarian Case:

On October 22, 1925, a Greek soldier crossed the

frontier and fired at a Bulgarian sentry. The latter killed the Greek invader, and as a result Greek troups advanced into Bulgarian territory and went about five miles over the boundary line.

In the past Bulgaria would have had to fight, but now she had an alternative. She appealed at once to the League of Nations, and a meeting of the Council was immediately convened. At the request of M. Briand, then President of the Council, both countries agreed to withdraw their troops behind their own frontiers within twenty-four hours. The Council then dispatched a commission of French, British and Italian officers to make an investigation on the spot.

The report of this commission came before the Council a month and a half later and involved the payment of about \$210,000 by Greece to Bulgaria for damage done. This money was paid. The report pointed out the great danger to peace that existed due to sentries being so close together along a border where such tension existed, and made certain recommendations to remedy this situation.

It is important that the Greek order to suspend operations, following upon the League's first intervention, reached the troops only two hours and a half before their attack was scheduled to begin. Thus a state of hostilities was narrowly averted by the prompt action of the Council.

Here again we see the new machinery of peace working out in actual practice. The Bulgarian-Greek incident was more

than a mere border riot. Professor Shotwell makes the following observation on it: "At least this much can be said, that the murder at Sarajevo seemingly held no greater potentiality of war in 1914 than the events which promised a great Balkan conflagration in 1925. But this potentiality was removed by the peace efforts of the League of Nations."

(3) The Bolivia-Paraguay Case:

The last example is different because it shows how Geneva helped to handle a crisis that arose three thousand miles away in distant South America, and offers a convincing rebuttal of the criticism that the League is for Europe alone.

Bolivia and Paraguay have for many years had trouble over boundary lines respecting the great Chaco district. In December, 1928, some Paraguay soldiers captured Fort Vanguardia in Bolivia. Loss of life resulted, both countries were roused, and immediate conflict seemed a certainty.

Again the Council luckily happened to be in session when news of this clash arrived. But neither country had appealed to the League, and if it interfered, there was danger of antagonizing the United States and her Monroe Doctrine. Cables were sent to the governments of Bolivia and Paraguay reminding them of their obligations, and world-wide publicity was given to their action. Instead of resenting this procedure, the United States welcomed it and supplemented it with an offer of mediation by the Pan-American Conference, then in session in Washington. The

^{(&}quot;Plans and Protocols to End War").

Council accepted this offer, and a neutral commission was appointed to fix responsibility for the attack at Vanguardia. From then on the incident seemed to die down, and the League's action had once more prevented a mole-hill of trouble from growing into a mountain. The result added much to the prestige of the League and built up a new respect for its methods.

The point of these three practical examples is that the alternatives to war will work if the nations want them to work. The world has now in its possession the machinery necessary to maintain peace. It remains for the peoples of the world to unite to strengthen and implement these alternatives in every way possible.

V. STRENGTHENING THE ALTERNATIVES - PUBLIC OPINION

We have now completed a brief inquiry into the progressive organization of the international peace movement. We have seen that the world in which we live is being made by science into one great community and that tremendous advances have been made by it in the art of cooperation. We have stated the problem -- how is this world community to learn to live in a condition of peace? -- and our belief that it is the most vital problem facing the present generation. We have found that the principle upon which the world is proceeding in its efforts to solve this problem is the principle of cooperation, conciliation, and arbitration. As practical outgrowths of this principle we have examined the League of Nations, the Permanent Court of International Justice, the Locarno Treaties, and the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact. And we have investigated actual examples from the realm of international affairs to show that these institutions have a machinery which can prevent wars and maintain peace.

Now what conclusions may we draw from this brief survey? We must conclude that the world is privileged to-day in having a practical peace programme such as it has never seen before in history, and that there is sufficient machinery at present in existence to maintain peace in the world, with one proviso -- it is sufficient if the world wants peace. If the peoples of the world will study the new alternatives to war, try to understand them, and lend them consistent support, in-

sisting that their governments use the alternatives in every crisis -- only if the peoples of the world will do this, can we have peace as an established fact.

But just here comes the danger point. Can we count upon such goodwill and common sense support among the citizenship of the world? Are men as a whole sufficiently keen for peace that they will do the things necessary to attain it? The chief difficulty lies not in our present peace organization, but in • the minds and hearts of men the world over. No organization can save us unless we have the resolute determination to save ourselves. And so the fundamental factor in the whole peace problem is the human factor.

It is this very human factor that gives us most cause for uneasiness as we survey the world to-day. Never before in history, perhaps, has there been so marked and perplexing a contrast between the high and lofty expressions of hope and good intentions of men on the one hand, and the low character of their deeds on the other. Vast numbers of our leading minds declare their confident belief that we have risen to heights of achievement never reached before. Yet many of the actual conditions in the world point to a serious decline rather than to an advance. The forces of destruction seem everywhere to have gained the victory over the forces of construction. What is the answer to such glaring inconsistency?

The answer is that while a new machinery of peace has done well in the few years that have passed since its establish-

ment, it is seriously in need of being strengthened and implemented by the people of the world. It has not been long enough in existence to permit it to act as automatically and as smoothly as do the processes of law and justice within the individual nation. It needs the whole-hearted support of men and women in every country before it can become thoroughly imbedded in our modern society. We cannot afford to rest on our oars at this point. "It is not enough to desire peace. -- The generation which attains peace will have won it by an intellectual passion."*

Upon what must such support depend? It must depend upon public opinion -- the strongest single force in the world to-day. Under our democratic government, public opinion is made up of the sum of mass thinking on public issues. There must be a definite public opinion formed before any real action can be taken. Eventually the will of the people must be crystallized into expression on every great question that faces the nation. And it must be crystallized into support of the struggle for peace.

Public opinion is still largely influenced by selfseeking financiers, "big business" interests, scheming politicians,
and a partisan press. It is against these insidious forces that
the rank and file of peace-loving laymen must contend if the

^{* (}H.N. Brailsford in "The War of Steel and Gold").

victory over war is ever to be gained. The mass mind must be carefully educated by the leaders of the peace movement, and this process of education, already well under way, will require time and patience. Through the schools, the pulpit, the press, literature and art, the home -- through all of these institutions the new public opinion demanding peace must be engendered, guided, and expressed, until at last the peoples of the earth have joined hands and declared: "No more War." The world needs greater clarity of mind and more widespread knowledge on the great problems involved. But above all it needs a more passionate desire to end all war and a more burning faith that peace can be achieved. With these, we shall be able to say

"THE OLD ORDER CHANGETH, YIELDING PLACE TO NEW."

VI. THE CHRISTIAN BROTHERHOOD OF MAN

No treatise on the subject of peace would be complete without some mention of the part to be played by the followers and the Church of the Prince of Peace. Especially is this true if, as we have said in an earlier chapter, there can be no permanent peace unless the spirit of peace reigns and abides in the hearts of men, and unless the practical peace movement is sustained and strengthened by the spread of this spirit throughout the masses of mankind everywhere. The nearer the world approaches to universal peace, the closer does it come to being united in that great Brotherhood which is the central idea of the Kingdom of God itself.

In the light of Jesus' teachings, it seems almost impossible to believe that men who call themselves Christian could ever support the causes of war, yet when a nation is embroiled in conflict many Christians forget their Master's words, and for the time being His great purposes are relegated to the background. The Christian Church must denounce war with all the power and influence that it can exert. Rev.

Stanley Russell gives three reasons why the Church must oppose war with "uncompromising hostility":

(1) The non-Christian and even anti-Christian moods and methods without which no war can be waged, and which pervert the whole redeeming activity of love into the concentrated

^{* (&}quot;The Church in the Modern World," p. 88)

organization of hatred.

- (2) The seeming necessity for the church in every country to assume in war-time a national complexion instead of preserving that super-national outlook which its missionary enterprise more than implies. Christianity is not merely national religion. It stands on the statement: "God so loved the world."
- (3) The clear proof, from the writing of Tertulian and others, that the original attitude of the Church was definitely anti-war, during, at any rate, the first three centuries of its history.

From these arguments it becomes plain that the Church, to preserve itself and to continue the great work that it has perpetuated through nineteen centuries, must set its face unalterably against war and all the forces that make for it.

The best practical way for the Church to give a positive impetus to this attitude is for it to assume the leadership in moulding public opinion in favour of the alternatives to war that we have already discussed. Such leadership should be easy for the Church to assume, for it already has the world outlook which the alternatives aim to build up and focus upon the struggle for peace. Christians everywhere must support, through their influence and their prayers, the opportunities for conciliation and arbitration presented by the League of Nations, the Court, Locarno, and the Paris Pact, and if they are not themselves in the saddle of government, they must let those who are at the head of the nation's business know that

they will not tolerate any policies which may lead toward another conflict.

Nothing else but the conception of the human race as one universal brotherhood can ever provide an enduring basis for permanent world peace. The Church, because of the universal appeal and application of Christ's teachings, must ever be the most influential institution in the propogation of this conception. Already the Church has made a large contribution to a good understanding between the peoples of the world. But her greatest work in this field lies directly ahead. She must herself wage war -- a perpetual war -- against all the forces of evil represented in racial animosities, nationalistic prejudices, aggressive imperialism, and international ill will. She must proclaim to all men that spirit of justice that Christ Himself proclaimed, and she must send forth to the four corners of the earth her living examples of that spirit of love that alone can conquer the world. War will have no place in a society that has yielded itself to a God of love. Peace, for nations as well as individuals, is to be found only in the religion of Jesus Christ.

"All the world is in the Valley of Decision - Who shall dare its future destiny foretell? Will it yield its soul unto the Heavenly Vision, Or sink despairing into its own hell?"

"Only by treading, in His steps, The all-compelling ways of Love, Shall earth be won, and man made one With that great Love above."

-- John Oxenham.

APPENDIX I.

The Conference on the Cause and Cure of War, held in Washington in 1925, drew up the following list of possible causes of conflict (quoted in Jerome Davis' "Contemporary Social Movements", at p. 751):

I. PSYCHOLOGICAL:

- (1) Fear
 - a) Feeling of national insecurity.
 - b) Fear of invasion.
 - c) Fear of loss of property.
 - d) Fear of change.
- (2) Suspicion
- (3) Greed
- (4) Lust for power
- (5) Hate
- (6) Revenge
- (7) Jealousy
- (8) Envy

II. ECONOMIC:

- (1) Aggressive Imperialism
 - a) Territorial
 - b) Economic
- (2) Economic Rivalries for
 - a) Markets
 - b) Energy Resources
 - c) Essential raw materials.
- (3) Government protection of private interests abroad without reference to the general welfare.
- (4) Disregard of the rights of backward peoples.
- (5) · Population pressure.
 - a) Inequalities of access to resources
 - b) Customs barriers
 - c) Immigration barriers.
- (6) Profits in War.

III. POLITICAL:

(1) Principle of balance of power

- (2) Secret treaties.
- (3) Unjust treaties.
- (4) Violation of treaties.
- (5) Disregard of rights of minorities.(6) Organization of the state for war.
- (7) Ineffective or obstructive political machinery.

IV. SOCIAL AND CONTRIBUTORY:

- (1) Exaggerated nationalism.
- (2) Competitive armaments.
- (3) Religious and racial antagonism.
- (4) General apathy, indifference, and ignorence.
- (5) War psychology created through various agencies.
 - a) The press
 - Motion pictures b)
 - e) Text-books
 - Home influences d)
- (6) Social inequalities.
- (7) Social sanctions of war.
- (8) Lack of spiritual ideals.

APPENDIX II. TEXT OF THE LOCARNO TREATY.

ARTICLE I.

The High Contracting Parties collectively and severally guarantee, in the manner provided in the following article, the maintainance of the territorial status quo resulting from the frontiers between Germany and Gelgium and between Germany and France, and the inviolability of the said frontiers as fixed by or in pursuance of the Treaty of Peace signed at Versailles on the 28th of June, 1919, and also the observance of the stipulations of Articles 42 and 43 of the said Treaty concerning the demilitarized zone.

ARTICLE II.

Germany and Belgium, and also Germany and France, mutually undertake that they will in no case attack or invade each other or resort to war against each other.

ARTICLE III.

In view of the undertakings entered into in Article 2 of the present treaty, Germany and Belgium and Germany and France undertake to settle by peaceful means and in the manner laid down herein all questions of every kind which may arise between them and which it may not be possible to settle by the normal methods of diplomacy.

ARTICLE IV.

If one of the High Contracting Parties alleges that a violation of Article 2 of the present treaty or a breach

of Articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles has been or is being committed, it shall bring the question at once before the Council of the League of Nations. As soon as the Council of the League is satisfied that such violation or breach has been committed, it will notify its finding without delay to the powers signatory of the present Treaty who severally agree that in such case they will each of them come immediately to the assistance of the power against whom the act complained of is directed.

APPENDIX III. TEXT OF THE KELLOGG-BRIAND PEACE PACT.

The President of the German Reich,

The President of the United States of America,

His Majesty the King of the Belgians,

The President of the French Republic,

His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emporer of India,

His Majesty the King of Italy,

His Majesty the Emporer of Japan,

The President of the Republic of Poland,

The President of the Czechoslovak Republic,

Deeply sensible of their solemn duty to promote the welfare of mankind:

Persuaded that the time has come when a frank renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy should be made to the end that the peaceful and friendly relations now existing between their peoples may be perpetuated:

convinced that all changes in their relations with one another should be sought only by pacific means and be the result of a peaceful and orderly process, and that any signatory power which shall hereafter seek to promote its national interests by resort to war should be denied the benefits furnished by this treaty:

Hopeful that, encouraged by their example, all the other nations of the world will join in this humane endeavour and by adhering to the present treaty as soon as it comes into

force bring their peoples within the scope of its beneficent provisions, thus uniting the civilized nations of the world in a common renunciation of war as an instrument of their national policy:

Have decided to conclude a treaty and for that purpose have appointed as their respective plenipotentiaries: . . .

Who having communicated to one another their full powers found in good and due form, have agreed upon the following articles:

ARTICLE I. The high contracting parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another.

ARTICLE II. The high contracting parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of what-ever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means.

ARTICLE III. The present treaty shall be ratified by the high contracting parties named in the preamble in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements, and shall take effect as between them as soon as all their several instruments of ratification shall have been deposited at Washington.

This treaty shall, when it has come into effect as prescribed in the preceding paragraph, remain open as long as may be necessary for adherence by all the other Powers of the world...

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