ALFRED SCHUTZ

AND

THE PROBLEM OF INTERSUBJECTIVE UNDERSTANDING

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ALFRED SCHUTZ AND INTERSUBJECTIVE UNDERSTANDING
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SCOPE AND CONTENTS: Our intention is to provide an account of Alfred Schutz's phenomenological investigations of intersubjective understanding (Verstehen) as it occurs in the life-world (Lebenswelt). After finding the inference by analogy and the behaviorist positions wanting, we develop Schutz's position as an alternative to account for this problem and find that he successfully avoids the difficulties and pitfalls associated with these traditional formulations.
Our concern in this thesis is to investigate the epistemological problem of intersubjective understanding as it is found within our everyday life-world. This involves examining the basis of our everyday belief in the existence of the Other's conscious processes and the way in which these processes are revealed.

Chapter One involves a summary of Alfred Schutz's investigation of the structures of the life-world. Within this context the epistemological problem of intersubjective understanding is formulated. In Chapter Two two traditional approaches to this problem are formulated and each evaluated according to its merits and shortcomings. Chapter Three and its Appendices centre around Schutz's formulation and solution of the epistemological problem within the context of the life-world. The final chapter involves a comparison and an evaluation of Schutz's position in the light of that of his adversaries outlined above.

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AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM OF INTERSUBJECTIVE UNDERSTANDING

Like such philosophers as James, Whitehead, Bergson and Husserl, Alfred Schutz believed that the common-sense knowledge of everyday life is the "unquestioned but always questionable background" within which inquiry must begin and be carried out, and to which it must be referred back. Husserl referred to this world of everyday life as the Lebenswelt or life-world, the world of lived experiences in which to "live as a person is to live in a social framework, wherein I and we live together in community and have the community as a horizon." This life-world is a subjective formation resulting from the activities of the experiencing common-sense life. And as such, the basis of meaning in every science is the common-sense life-world which is the one and unitary life world of myself, of you and us all.

From the outset our everyday world is an intersubjective world of culture:

since human beings are born of mothers and not concocted in retorts, the experience of the existence of other human

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beings and of the meaning of their actions is certainly the first and most original empirical observation man makes."

This is an intersubjective world because I live in it as a man among other men, tied to them through common work and influence, as well as understanding others and being understood by them. It is a world of culture presenting itself as a universe of significance, namely, as a framework of meaning which I have to interpret in order to find my bearings and come to terms with it. This texture of meaning, which originates in and has been instituted by human action, distinguishes the realm of culture from that of nature. And "world of culture is of a limited kind of objectivity"¹ which may be investigated by the social sciences. It is a world of culture because I am always conscious of its historicity which is encountered both in tradition and habituality. As the "already-given" this historicity refers back to my own activities or to those of Others of which they are a sediment: "I, the human being born into this world and naively living in it, as the center of this world in the historical situation of my actual 'Now and Here'; I am the 'null point toward which its constitution is oriented.'"² In other words, this

³Schutz, "Concept and Theory Formation", Collected Papers, 1, 57.

¹Schutz, "Phenomenology and the Social Sciences", Collected Papers, 1, 126.

²Schutz, "Phenomenology and the Social Sciences", Collected Papers, 1, 133.
world has significance and meaning first of all by me and for me. For everything I encounter has reference to my actual historical situation, or to my pragmatic interests belonging to the situation in which I find myself.

Cultural objects, whether they be tools, symbols or language systems, by their very origin and meaning point back to the activities of human subjects. This is due to the fact that I am always conscious of the historicity of these objects. A cultural object cannot be properly understood without reference to the human activity from which it originated. For example, a tool is understood only if we know the purpose for which it was designed, a sign or symbol only if we know what it stands for in the mind of the person using it, an institution only if we understand what it means for the individuals who orient their behavior with regard to its existence. Here we have uncovered the origin of the so-called postulated of the subjective interpretation of the social sciences in the life-world.

For each of us this is the everyday world of living and working which existed long before our birth and which has been experienced and interpreted as an organized world by Others. From the outset we experience this as a meaningful world presenting itself for interpretation. The resulting interpretations are founded upon our "stock of knowledge at hand" and in accordance with our "purpose at hand". In our possession is a stock of previous experiences as well as those handed down to us in the form of "knowledge at hand" which function as a scheme of reference. To this stock of experiences be-
long/our knowledge that this is a world of well circumscribed objects with definite qualities. We experience this world in the mode of typifications, that is, even "unique objects and events given to us in a unique aspect are unique within a horizon of typical familiarity and pre-acquaintanceship."6 There are mountains, trees, fellow-men, dogs, and so on. There are cairn terriers, and in particular there is Buster. I may either consider him as a unique individual - my faithful companion, or just as a typical example of a "cairn terrier", "dog", "mammal", "animal", "organism", "object" in the outer world. How I consider him depends on my actual interest and system of relevances involved.

I may have never seen an animal of the kind I am now seeing, but I recognize it as an animal and in particular, as a dog. I have grasped this newly experienced object as a dog because it shows all the typical features and behavior of a dog, and not those of a cat. The "dissimilarity of this particular dog from all other kinds of dogs which I know stands out and becomes questionable merely by reference to the similarity it has to my unquestioned experiences of typical dogs."7 From the beginning such unquestioned experiences are experienced as typical ones, carrying along open horizons of anticipated

6 Schutz, "Concept and Theory Formation", Collected Papers, 1, 59.

7 Schutz, "Choosing Among Projects of Action", Collected Papers, 1, 74–75.
similar experiences. This taken for granted knowledge has a highly
socialised structure and is characterised by an objective and anony-
mous character. And yet because it is taken for granted, it also has
the character of indeterminateness.

The consistency of this system of knowledge is not that of
natural laws, but rather that of typical sequences and relations.
We are provided with a knowledge of trustworthy recipes for interpret-
ing the social world and for handling things and men in order to obtain
the best results in each situation. I take it for granted that by
waiting on the corner, I shall be able to take a bus going to the
university. On the one hand, these recipes function as a precept for
action and also serve as a scheme of expression: whoever wants to ob-
tain a certain result will have to proceed in accordance with the rec-
ipe provided for that purpose. I know how to catch a bus and, once on
it, how to conduct myself as a typical bus passenger. On the other
hand, the recipes function as a scheme of interpretation: whoever pro-
ceeds as specified by a particular recipe is supposed to intend the
correlated result. Observing someone standing on that corner I may
assume that he is standing there waiting for a bus.

There is no guarantee of the reliability of the assumptions
governing our life. And yet these rules and experiences are suffic-
ient for us to master life. The ideal of this knowledge is likeli-
hood, not certainty or probability as in the mathematical sense.

\[8\] Schutz, "The Stranger", in A. Brodersen, ed., Collected
Papers, Volume Two, Studies in Social Theory (The Hague: Martinus
Normally we must act and not reflect in order to meet the demands of the moment and most of the activities of our daily life are of this kind. They are performed by following recipes which have been reduced to automatic habits or unquestioned platitudes: "This kind of knowledge is concerned only with the regularity as such of events in the external world irrespective of the origin." On the one hand, because of its regularity it can be reasonably assumed that the sun will rise tomorrow morning. On the other hand, we consider it just as regular that if we choose the right bus, have the correct fare and conduct ourselves accordingly, it will bring us to the university. Although Schutz tends to give the impression that the reliability of these two events is synonymous, it must be stressed that the regularity of these two events belongs to different systems of knowledge. The regularity of the bus is not that of mathematical probability, but it is probable in the sense that we will organize our day's activities upon its dependability.

These typifications depend upon my problem at hand for the definition and the solution of which the types have been formed. Some aspects of our biographically and situationally determined systems of interests and relevances are subjectively experienced in our everyday thinking and constitute systems of motives for action, decision making, the

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carrying out of projects and the attaining of goals. I may intend to catch a downtown bus in order to apply for a job and, if I am accepted, it will enable me to finance my future education. Here we see the actor's motives and goals which depend upon his biographically determined situation and his purpose at hand. Here we have the "subjective meaning which the actor 'bestows upon' or 'connects with' his action."  

Strictly speaking, only the actor knows what he is doing, why he is doing it, where and when this action begins and ends. It must be emphasized that the postulate of subjective meaning and subjective interpretation is not necessarily a form of subjectivism for Schutz wanted to keep the social sciences objective in the sense that they would be intersubjectively verifiable.

The question of what determines my purpose at hand at this particular moment leads to a second set of experiences upon which the practicability of our future actions is based. This is the experience which I, the actor, have of my biographically determined situation at the moment of the projecting of my future actions. This biographically determined situation is comprised not only of my position in space, time, and society but also my experience that some of the elements of the world taken for granted are imposed upon me, while others are either within my control or capable of being brought within my control and, thus principally (sic) modifiable.

10 Schutz, "Concept and Theory Formation", Collected Papers, 1, 60.

11 Schutz, "Choosing Among Projects of Action", Collected Papers, 1, 76.
What was once in my grasp is no longer within my reach, but this can be brought back within my reach. For example, last spring I had a job offer which would have enabled me to finance my studies, but I also know that it is possible for me or for anyone to obtain a job in the near future. And yet in my biographically determined situation I am concerned with sections of the world both within and outside of my control. My prevailing system of interests will determine the nature of my selection, for example, whether I seek a better-paying job as a labourer or a poorer-paying office job. These are not isolated interests and possibilities of action for they are akin to such factors as the availability of each type of employment, the salary, the distance from my residence and my financial need. All these comprise a segment of my system of interests. To sum up, there is a selection of things relevant to me at any given moment, whereas there are other things which are either out of reach or of no concern to me at the present: "All this is biographically determined, that is, the actor's actual situation has its history; it is the sedimentation of all his previous subjective experiences."  

For the actor these are not experienced as anonymous but rather as unique and subjectively given to him alone.

As we have suggested above (see page 5) the knowledge of our everyday life is socialized in many aspects:

First, it is structurally socialized in the sense of what Schutz calls the idealization of the reciprocity of perspectives. This fundamental idealization consists of the assumption that if I

were to change places with my fellow-man I would experience the same sector of the world in substantially the same perspectives as he. For our practical purposes at hand we consider our individual biographical circumstances irrelevant. And such knowledge is conceived as both objective and anonymous. The news broadcaster with the special reports by on-the-scene observers is an example of the reciprocity of perspectives.

Second, the greatest part of our knowledge is genetically socialized. That is, the content and particular forms of typification under which it is arranged is socially derived, and this is in socially approved terms. When we name an experienced object, for example, a dog, we are relating it by its typicality to pre-experienced things of a similar typical structure. We are assuming that its open horizon will continue to refer to future experiences of the same type and that we will still be able to give it the same name. If an object is relevant enough for us to give it a separate name, it will be the outcome of a prevailing system of relevances and interests. To a member of a kennel club, that animal is not just a dog, but it is a particular type or pedigree: a terrier, or more precisely, a cairn terrier. This could have been illustrated better if Schutz would have selected an artifact; a dog is always a dog whereas an artifact depends more on our interests. Only a small portion of our knowledge of the world originates from our personal experience. Most of it is handed down to us by others in such forms as: how to define the environment, how typical constructs are "formed in accordance with the system of relevances accepted from the
anonymous unified point of view of the in-group."\(^{13}\) This socially
derived knowledge is transmitted in the typifying medium of the vocab-
ulary and syntax of everyday language. Schutz suggests that this "pre-
scientific vernacular can be interpreted as a treasure house of ready
made pre-constituted types and characteristics, all socially derived
and carrying along an open horizon of unexplored content."\(^{14}\)

In a third sense this knowledge can be considered socialized
due to its social distribution. The stock of actual knowledge at hand
varies from individual to individual. At each moment in our daily life,
each one of us is simultaneously an expert, a well-informed citizen and
a man on the street in regard to a different province of knowledge. We
also know that this holds true for each of our fellow-men, and that "this
very fact codetermines the specific type of knowledge employed."\(^{15}\) It
is enough for the man on the street to know that there are lawyers avail-
able for consultation concerning a legal matter.

The above are a few of the major features of the constructs in-
volved in our common-sense knowledge of the intersubjective world in
daily life. We shall be referring to this common-sense intersubject-
ive understanding as Verstehen.

\(^{13}\) Schutz, "Common-Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human

\(^{14}\) Schutz, "Common-Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human

Following the example of Husserl, Schutz maintained that the concept of the life-world is "revealed in its entire and central significance as the basis of meaning of all sciences."\textsuperscript{16} For him the prime task of the social scientist was to obtain and to organize the knowledge of the social reality of human actors. By the term "social reality" Schutz meant the "sum total of objects and occurrences within the social cultural world as experienced by the common-sense thinking of men living their daily lives among their fellow-men, connected with them in manifold relations of interaction."\textsuperscript{17} As an intersubjective world it is both shared and common to all, that is, it is either actually or potentially accessible through communication and language. From the beginning the world presents itself as meaningful. For example, the body of the Other is experienced not as an organism but as a fellow-man. His body is spatial – not merely in the sense of being a physical or physiological object – but as a psychophysical object, and more precisely, as a field for the expression of his subjective experiences.

I do not only consciously experience the Other, but I also live with him and we grow older together. Just as I am able to attend to my own stream of consciousness, I am able to attend to yours and thereby become aware of what is going on in your mind. This happens in a face-to-face we-relationship with a consociate, but although my under-

\textsuperscript{16} Schutz, "Phenomenology and the Social Sciences", \textit{Collected Papers}, 1, 133.

\textsuperscript{17} Schutz, "Concept and Theory Formation", \textit{Collected Papers}, 1, 53.
standing of Others is not restricted to consociates, the way that I understand contemporaries, predecessors and successors differs. In the living intentionality of this experience, I am capable of understanding the Other without necessarily paying any attention to the understanding itself. Living in the same world as you, I live in the acts of understanding you. The Other and his subjective experiences are not only "accessible" to me, that is, open to my interpretation, they are also taken for granted together with his existence and personal characteristics.

However this may be changed by bringing these acts into the focus of my gaze - by asking you, for example: "Have I understood you correctly?", "What do you mean by such and such an action?" The moment that such questions are raised I have abandoned my simple and direct awareness of the other person. And my attention has shifted to the deeper levels that have been unobserved and taken for granted. I am now "thinking about him": "Is this the meaning he intended his action to have?" When I subject my understanding of another to reflection, I am in a sense acting like a social scientist since "there is a difference of kind between the type of naive understanding of other people we exercise in everyday life and the type of understanding we use in the social sciences."18 The social scientist gains access to the subjective experiences of Others by treating them as objects of thought rather

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than by immediately grasping them as they occur. Our concern in these
two spheres is to gain access to the meaning that this action has for
the actor, that is, we must gain access to the subjective experiences
of the Other and attempt to understand these activities in the context
of his own experiences. In order to properly understand the Other, I
must interpret the meaning of his activities in the context of his ex-
periences and not my own. As this suggests, "the whole problem of the
social sciences and their categories has already been posed in the pre-
scientific sphere, i.e., in the midst of life in the social world... it is posed here in a very primitive form."\(^{19}\) But the methods and con-
cepts utilized by the social scientist are quite different from those
of the ordinary person simply understanding the Other. Although our
knowledge of the world in common-sense and scientific thinking involves
mental constructs, syntheses, generalizations and idealizations - spe-
cific to the respective level of thought organization, scientific con-
structs are designed to supersede the constructs of common-sense thought.

In the strict sense, there is no such thing as a pure and simple
fact. All facts must be interpreted facts selected - either by an art-
ficial abstraction or by a consideration of the particular setting -
from a universal context by a mental activity: "In either case, they car-
ry along their interpretational inner and outer horizon."\(^{20}\) But it

\(^{19}\)Schutz, *The Phenomenology of the Social World*, p. 141.

\(^{20}\)Schutz, "Common-Sense and Scientific Interpretation of
Human Action", *Collected Papers*, 1, 5.
would be a mistake to conclude that we are unable to grasp reality.

Rather, we grasp certain aspects of it, namely, those relevant either for our purpose at hand or our rule of procedure. This is true whether it is the life-world or the world of science.

The prescientific life-world is the basis of meaning; for example, the classical concept of nature symbolized by a machine was abstracted from such objects as watches. This abstraction, both on principle and of course legitimately, excludes people with their individual lives as well as all the cultural objects originating from human activities. However, it is exactly this layer of the life-world from which the natural sciences have abstracted that the social sciences must investigate.

The physicist in his pursuit naively uses certain "obvious data" from everyday life. To give an example, when Einstein was repeating Michelson's experiments using instruments that he had copied from Michelson, he already knew what a scientific institute was, exactly what an instrument was as well as its human use. In repeating the experiment, he had to know what Michelson had observed, what the goal of his inquiry was, why he had thought the observed fact was worthy of being observed, and how it was relevant to the scientific problem at hand. 21 This knowledge is commonly called understanding. Einstein knew all of this not on the basis of his physics-mathematical knowledge

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but on the basis of his pre-scientific knowledge. This naive knowledge of human achievements, human cultural products and language is the foundation of all scientific pursuits.

The instruments which Einstein copied from Michelson were constructed in such a way that the crucial observations were reduced to a "pointer reading". Ultimately, therefore, what was observed - the pointer on the scale - was nothing else than a figure against a background. This observation takes place in a "subjectively relative way", and the resulting observational judgment in its turn becomes the premise for further physico-mathematical conclusions.

Let us suppose that one and the same instrument is first used to measure $A$, and then $B$. In order to do this double measurement, the physicist has to identify the instrument. And yet this act of identification is not essentially different from the one enabling a housewife to put a pot on the fire and then to remove the same pot from the fire. Now, let us suppose that a fellow professor not familiar with the symbolic language of modern physics visits Einstein and wants to know the meaning of Einstein's investigation. In this case he is forced to explain the meaning of his symbols in the ordinary language of everyday life as it is understood in Germany, France or England.\(^{22}\)

A principal difference between the natural and the social sciences becomes apparent. For the natural scientist concerned with a

sector of the physical universe, his facts and events are neither pri-
marily pre-selected nor pre-interpreted, and as such, they reveal
no intrinsic relevant structures. That is, the determining of what is
relevant in a physicist's investigation of gravitation is not inherent
in nature as such. Instead, it is the result of a selective and inter-
pretative activity within or of observing nature. The facts and data
which he organizes in his observational field are in accordance with
his purpose at hand. And yet this field within which he operates "means"
nothing to his data, for example, the tide and the moon.

But the facts, data and events of the social scientist are dif-
ferent. His observational field is the social world which is not struct-
ureless for it has particular meanings and relevant structures for the
human beings living, thinking and operating within it:

They have preselected and preinterpreted this world by a
series of common-sense constructs of the reality of daily
life, and it is these thought objects which determine their
behavior, define the goal of their action, the means avail-
able for attaining them — in brief, which help them to find
their bearings within their natural and socio-cultural en-
vironment and to come to terms with it.23

Thus, the social scientist's concepts refer to, and are founded upon,
the thought objects constructed by the common-sense thought of men liv-
ing in the life-world. As such the constructs employed by the social
scientist are constructs of the second degree, that is, they are "con-
structs of the constructs made by the actors on the social scene."24

23 Schutz, "Common-Sense and Scientific Interpretation of
Human Action", Collected Papers, 1, 6.

24 Schutz, "Common-Sense and Scientific Interpretation of
And it is the behavior and action of the actors which the social scientist must observe and attempt to explain.

In our common-sense thinking we take for granted our knowledge of the meaning of human actions and their products. And this is what a social scientist like Weber wants to express when he refers to interpretative understanding (Verstehen) as a technique of dealing with human affairs. Sociology is described as a "science which attempts the interpretative understanding of social action in order thereby to arrive at a causal exploration of its course and effects." That is, it attempts to understand the meaning an act has for the actor himself and not for the observer. Such an explanatory understanding seeks the "total character of the intentional framework of the actor, which alone provides the key to the meaning of the specific act he performs. A particular act is referred back interpretively to the intentional meaning." According to Weber, Verstehen is the method concerned with explicating the subjective interpretation of meaning.

Verstehen does not only signify a method utilized by the social sciences, primarily it is the way common-sense thinking finds its bearings

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Human Action", Collected Papers, 1, 6.


within the social world and comes to terms with it. Schutz distinguishes at least three different levels of its application: "as the experiential form of common-sense knowledge of human affairs... as an epistemological problem, and... as a method peculiar to the social sciences." 27

The failure to distinguish these three different levels has given rise to misconceptions and criticisms which have been leveled against Weber's postulate of the subjective interpretation of meaning. Schutz contends that Verstehen is not primarily a "method used by the social scientist, but the particular experiential form in which common-sense thinking takes cognizance of the social cultural world." 28 This operation of Verstehen is not confined to the life-world for it constitutes a part of the long forgotten foundation of the natural sciences. But underlying both the common-sense and the social sciences applications of Verstehen is the epistemological problem which is of concern to the philosopher. In this thesis we must investigate the nature of our belief in the existence of the Other's conscious processes and how these processes are available to us.

27 Schutz, "Concept and Theory Formation", Collected Papers.
1, 57.

28 Schutz, "Concept and Theory Formation", Collected Papers.
1, 56.
THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEM OF INTERSUBJECTIVE UNDERSTANDING

The problem of Verstehen or intersubjective understanding may be separated into three major aspects: as it is found in our everyday life; as a peculiar method of the social sciences; and, as an epistemological problem. Our concern is primarily with this third aspect of Verstehen, namely, the epistemological problem of how this understanding is possible in the life-world. In accounting for this understanding we must address ourselves to the following questions:

1. How am I, the author of these lines, "well-founded in my belief that other people and their conscious life do really exist?"

2. How "is the reality of another's consciousness accessible to me"?\(^1\)

The problem of Verstehen is a relatively new arrival on the philosophical scene and only recently has it occupied the centre of the stage. With the exception of the phenomenon of telepathy, it is generally agreed that intersubjective understanding, and a related problem — which in some circles is referred to as our knowledge of other minds — is "possible only through the intermediary of events occurring on or produced by another's body."\(^2\) But here agreement ends and philosophical

\(^{1}\) Schutz, "Scheler's Theory of Intersubjectivity", *Collected Papers*, 1, 156.

\(^{2}\) Schutz, "Symbol, Reality and Society", *Collected Papers*, 1, 313.
conflict begins. And yet ironically the problem of Verstehen is taken for granted and practically solved in our everyday life and activities. The philosophical issues arise only when an attempt is made to clarify the meaning of intersubjective understanding, to concentrate on what this understanding of our fellow-man consists of and how this understanding is obtained and warranted. "That I have knowledge of Others is not contested; the nature of that knowledge together with the very possibility of there being knowledge of Others as a matter of profound conjecture." Numerous conflicting philosophical positions emerge which attempt to account for our understanding of the Other's conscious processes. Unfortunately we must restrict our investigation to the antagonistic positions of the inference by analogy theorists who deny any direct access to the other's conscious life and the behaviorists who minimize or deny the existence of private conscious processes. After evaluating these two positions we will then formulate and locate Schutz's position along a range of typical answers to the epistemological problem of Verstehen.

We must first turn our attention to the inference by analogy theorists who argue that we must indirectly infer the existence of the other's mind from what we know about our own mind and body. Their position is based on the principle that "if a given phenomenon A has been found to be associated with another phenomenon B, then any phenomenon

\[3^\text{N. Katano, The Journeying Self, A Study in Philosophy and Social Role (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1970), pp. 27-28.} \]
similar to A is very likely to be associated with a phenomenon similar to B. We are able to discover the other's thoughts and feelings through reasoning by analogy. We infer from the other's expressive bodily gestures (A) his state of mind (B) which is considered analogous to our own state of mind (B) if we were to perform the same gestures (A). Consequently, if the other behaves in a manner similar to how we, the observer, would behave in similar circumstances, we are entitled to ascribe similar mental processes and states of consciousness to the other person. And if he has behaved as we would have behaved under similar circumstances, we are able to understand them. If not, he must remain unintelligible.

According to the inference by analogy theorists we are aware of the other's mental existence only in terms of our own prior self-knowledge. John Stuart Mill writes: "We knew the existence of other beings by generalization from the knowledge of our own". Underlying this is the sometimes implicit supposition that we are composed of two distinct entities, a mind and a body. Before we are able to understand the other, we must observe that there is an association between our mental states on the one hand, and our behavior and the physical state of our body on the other hand. This association results when phenomena "which have either been experienced or conceived in close

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contiguity to one another, tend to be thought of together." Our outward overt gestures and acts are signs produced through and on our body by our covert inner feelings. "Each of these bodies exhibits to my senses a set of phenomena (composed of acts and other manifestations) such as I know, in my own case, to be effects of consciousness, and such as might be looked for if each of the bodies has really in connection with it a world of consciousness." Mill's account of the bodily gestures and the inner feelings indicates a "causal" relationship between the two - thus suggesting, for example, the model of smoke as a natural sign of fire. For example, if we were happy this inner feeling would produce facial gestures known as smiling. Or if we were embarrassed this inner feeling would produce a reddening of our cheeks which is recognized as blushing.

Recognition of the other as similar to us is only possible in terms of an "antecedent condition" and this implies that we must have perceived our own body as the other presents his body to our perception. It is only in terms of our "self-knowledge" that we are able to recognize the other's body and its behavior as being similar to our own. And that we are able to recognize the other's facial gestures as a smile necessitates that sometime in the past we must have seen and recognized our smile as an expression of our inner happiness.

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Since our perception of the other reveals only one entity—the other's body and its gestures, we can only infer by analogy from our own self-knowledge and experience that the other is similar to us, namely, that the other is composed of a mind as well as a body. Furthermore, we must infer by analogy that mental states like the ones we experience are associated with the other's body in the same manner as our mental states are associated with our body. From this we may generalize and conclude that other human beings have feelings like me, because, first, they have bodies like me, which I know, in my own case, to be the antecedent condition of feelings; and because, secondly, they exhibit the acts, and other outward signs, which in my own case I know by experience to be caused by feelings.8

Let us now examine a concrete example in which we are able to understand another. With a toothache we usually notice that we have a decayed tooth and are likely to groan, complain and hold our jaw. Perceiving the other's body we notice that he too has a decayed tooth and that his body also behaves as ours would if we had a toothache. Since we can only experience our own toothache and are not able to experience the other's pain, all we can do is to observe his gestures and listen to his groans. But it is only if we have already experienced a toothache that we can understand the other's pain. These gestures that we perceive are only a sign of the other's inner feelings because we have direct access only to our own inner feelings and the other's outward

8 Mill, *An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy*. 1, 256
gestures.

In the case of the other human beings I have the evidence of my senses for the first (the decayed tooth) and last links (the overt gestures) of the series, but not for the intermediate link (the covert inner feelings). . . . In our own case I know that the first link produces the last through the intermediate link, and could not produce it without.

From this we may conclude that this body, which is similar to our own, also belongs to a "person" who has a toothache.

We must now evaluate the claim that the inference by analogy theory is able to account for intersubjective understanding. This argument, as we will illustrate, is founded upon numerous fundamental errors. Briefly, it underestimates the difficulties of self-perception and self-knowledge while it over-estimates the difficulties of understanding the other's thoughts.¹⁰

A number of fundamental and far from evident assumptions underlie the inference by analogy argument. It presupposes that the first thing given to us is our own self and that in terms of this "self-knowledge" we are able to understand the other.

1. The question arises: How do we first acquire this "self-knowledge" of our own body and its gestures as required by the inference by analogy argument? In the strict sense, this requires perceiving our own body and its gestures just as we are able to perceive the other's

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body. We would have to perceive our own body as an object in the world in order for us to claim that his body and its gestures are analogous to our own. But how is it possible for us to perceive our body as we are able to perceive the other's? Excluding the use of a mirror for the moment, at best we are only capable of perceiving a very small portion of our own body whereas we can grasp the whole of the other's body, walk around it, and so on. We have only a very minimal and partial knowledge of our own body because we are not aware of its appearance— for example, our facial gestures are not available to us. With this incomplete knowledge of our body, how are we able to recognize the other's body as being similar or analogous to our own?

2. It may be objected that we can have empirical knowledge of our own body just as we have knowledge of the other's body by using a mirror. But it must be pointed out that primitive man did not have the mirror and yet the other existed for him just as he does for us. It may be said that there were calm streams and ponds in which he could see his image. But there are areas where it seldom rains and yet the other existed for him. Attempting to account for this "self-knowledge" in terms of mirrors, that is, the seeing of one's reflection is both misleading and false. Children and primitives are not able to recognize their reflection as their own and still they are able to understand others. In fact, mirrors were treasured by European explorers because they fascinated the primitives—on the flat surface of this "looking-glass" there appeared a man's image which the primitive did not recognize as his own. Most primitives had never seen themselves and saw this image as belonging to another man. It is also questionable if we are
able to recognize parts of our body. Van Den Berg relates the results of Wolff's discovery that out of ten persons, "only one on the average recognises his hands out of a small series of photos of which they were told that it would contain the likeness of their own hands." This would indicate that "self-knowledge" of our body is neither as available nor as necessary as the inference by analogy theorists would lead us to believe.

3. Overlooking the above problem of "self-knowledge" of our body for the moment, the inference by analogy theorists argue that we must see the other's body as analogous to our own. On what grounds do we consider the other's body analogous to our own: its colour, size, position? Because his body is a different colour from our own, can we infer that his mind must be somehow different from our own? Also, since the female body is different from that of the male, are we to infer that her mind is similarly different from that of a male? It may be argued that our bodies are only generically similar, but can we infer that the contents of our minds are generically similar? Is this the same as saying that because this philosophy book is generically similar to that book, then their contents must be generically similar? These books may be generically similar, but there is no reason to infer that their contents will be also. In fact, although it may resemble a book, the one inferred to say actually be a cigarette case constructed in the

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shape of a book. In a similar vein, we have no reason to infer that just because those other bodies are generically similar to our own the contents of their minds will be generically similar.

It is not necessary to have perceived one's own body as we perceive the other's body in order to recognize the other as another and to understand him. The following incident will illustrate the error of emphasizing self-knowledge as a prerequisite for understanding the other. A Negro youngster was adopted by a white family. One day while out with his mother he noticed a woman with a Negro baby and remarked: "Look at the cute chocolate milk baby." His mother told him that he was the same colour as the baby, but he replied that he was not. She affirmed that he was and that he should look at himself. He shook his head and retorted: "I am not - look at my brothers and sisters." Rather than understanding the other in terms of himself, it would seem that he understood himself in terms of others.

4. Underlying this position is the conception of the mind and body existing in what is referred to as dualistic psycho-physical parallelism. The other's mind is conceived as a solipsistic entity while his body is a "representative of a private world to which we have no direct access."12 The body is assigned the role of the "selector and analyst for the contents of all our outer and inner perceptions"13 and

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from the signs it exhibits the other must infer by analogy to what is behind the given. The result of this conception is that man is thought of as confined to a psychical prison where he must wait to see what will be projected on its walls through some sort of metaphysical causal nexus. According to this account, when we perceive someone smiling, for example, there are actually two distinct processes occurring on different levels - a covert one of being happy and an overt one of smiling. And from the overt one we must infer by analogy to the covert, namely, of the other being happy. But this account of understanding the other is inaccurate and overly complicated. Children and primitives, for example, are not capable of performing inferences by analogy and yet they are immediately able to understand the other’s conscious life. An inference by analogy is not necessary for intersubjective understanding.

Besides the errors we have just pointed out, there are inconsistencies and weaknesses underlying this position:

1. According to the advocates of the inference by analogy argument the other’s mind is closed and inaccessible to our perception. Our observation of the other reveals only one entity - the other’s body - and from our own experiences we must infer by analogy that the other is similar to us, namely, that he is also composed of a mind as well as a body. Accepting their reasoning for a moment, on what grounds can we suppose that the other has a mind? The only mind we can directly experience is that of our own. And it is from this self-experience, from only this one example, that we must infer by analogy that the other has not just a mind, but a mind similar to our own. As well as this, we
must infer that the other has similar feelings and thoughts. Because the other has a similar body, why should he have similar covert thoughts and feelings? Why should we ever make the inference that the other is similar to us, not to mention the generalization that all others have conscious processes similar to our own? Why should this be true for anyone else? The argument may be able to account for how it would be possible to make an inference once we first presuppose that the other has a mind; however, it provides little evidence why we should ever make this presupposition.

2. Let us examine the presuppositions required in recognizing the other's facial gestures as a smile and the resulting inference by analogy that the other is happy. Three components must be present in order to make the inference by analogy: the observation of the other's facial gestures; our "knowledge" and "remembrance" of performing the same facial gestures some time in the past; and, our remembering the way we felt - happy - when we performed these facial gestures. Let us try and remember the feeling of the experience of being happy, of being sad, of being in pain. It is easy to remember occasions when we were happy, for instance, yesterday afternoon while visiting a friend, but is it possible to remember what it was like to be happy, to recall the pain "experience" of having a toothache? It is possible to remember having a swollen jaw with a toothache, the occasion of "being-in-pain", but not the felt-pain. Similarly, it is possible to remember the occasion of happiness, but not the feeling of "being-happy". How can we identify the memory of one happy occasion with the memory of another? Furthermore, because the feelings of happiness are covert and inner,
and the circumstances of these occasions are different from the present one of perceiving the other’s signs of happiness, how can we identify the memories of these happy occasions with that of the other? There would seem to be no way of determining whether we have made a correct or incorrect identification of our covert inner feelings, and of the other’s feelings in terms of our own.

3. According to Mill our covert inner feelings are associated with our overt external bodily gestures and acts, for instance, the overt smile is a sign of inner happiness and the two are associated together. But since we can only experience our own inner feelings, why should this association hold for anyone else? We may angrily wave our fist at another as a threat, but why should this hold for another, particularly for someone from another culture? Mill believed that there was a causal relationship between the “sign” and what it “signifies”; this would imply that these external gestures are universal and natural signs of internal feelings. But a comparison of different cultures does not lead to this conclusion, for example, Werton Labarre writes: “the expression of emotion in one culture... is open to serious misinterpretation in another; there is no ‘natural’ language of emotional gesture.”

It would be a mistake to hold that our bodily gestures are natural signs of our inner feelings.

4. The analogical argument requires that we be presented with

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at least two similar phenomena: our body and its gestures as well as the other's body and its gestures. And on the basis of their similarity we conclude that a mind is also associated with the other's body and gestures. But as we saw above (pages 24-28) the other's body is more accessible to our perception than is our own. In principle as well as in practice we know the other's body and its gestures better than and prior to our own. Consequently, the possibility of establishing a similarity between our bodies is greatly diminished.

5. We must now examine how we acquire the knowledge of the movements of our own body as well as those of the other. The knowledge of our own movements and gestures is primarily derived from the movements, sensations and the various positions of our body. In other words, we feel our own body from "within". Although it is sometimes possible to observe some of our movements and gestures, for example, the movement of our hands, we are always able to feel these movements from "within". But what we observe and feel of the other's body is its exteriority, its alien form, its "without". Although we can observe the movements and gestures of the other's body, we cannot feel the movement from "within" as we do in regard to our own. Here we see a primary difference between ourselves and the other. There is a difference "in kind" between the way we experience the movement of our own body and the movement of the other's body. With the sense of touch we are able to experience our own hand differently from all the other senses because two things are always presented to us at once: "the body that we touch, and our body with which we touch
This relation differs from visual perception, for example, because touch is not between a possible phantom and our body, but rather between a foreign body and our own. Through the hardness of another body we experience its presence as resistance to us. And through touch our body is given to us in a manner that the other's body is not given to us. The inference by analogy theory depends upon our bodies and their gestures being analogous, but we are given the other's gestures only through vision and our own as a direct internal experience and partially through vision. Consequently, the analogy between our own body and its gestures — and that of the other's — is very weak.

Some advocates of the inference by analogy argument would welcome our criticism for they would claim that the analogical argument renders, at best, dubiously probable our belief that the other has a mind and that we are able to understand him. Bertrand Russell, for example, writes: "The hypothesis that other people have minds must... be allowed to be not susceptible of any very strong support from the analogical argument." Rather it is as we have attempted to show, the inference by analogy argument is both wrong and inconsistent. Our conclusion is neither that there is no evidence that the other has a mind nor that understanding the other is not possible. But rather that the inference by analogy argument does not account for either our belief in the other's

16 Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World, p. 79.
conscious processes or our capacity to understand the Other. A typical conclusion of the inference by analogy argument is scepticism or solipsism. But our everyday belief in the existence of the Other's conscious processes is not a hypothesis as Russell would have us believe. Our belief in evolution is an example of a hypothesis which has been acquired from the scientific community. But the hypothesis of evolution is different than our belief in the Other's conscious processes. This hypothesis has only become widespread since Darwin whereas our everyday belief in the Other's conscious processes has been taken for granted by men of all ages. The hypothesis of evolution is acquired from formal schooling, but from a very early age we believe in and are able to understand the thoughts and feelings of Others. Scientists are still attempting to determine the validity of the evolution hypothesis while our belief in the conscious processes of the Other underlies our everyday activities. The writing of this thesis presupposes that Others have conscious processes and that intersubjective understanding is possible. Your reading and questioning of this thesis provides evidence that you share this belief.

We have examined the attempt of the inference by analogy theorists to account for our belief in and our understanding of the Other's conscious life. An extreme and antagonistic alternative is that of the behaviorists who deny the existence of a private realm of consciousness to which the other has only indirect access. They attempt to account for our understanding of the other merely in terms of pure objective bodily behavior. Because of the diverse forms of behaviorism, we shall concern ourselves with two advocates of this position.
Gilbert Ryle rejects the mind-body dualism proposed by the inference by analogy theorists. It is a mistake, Ryle argues, to speak of a mind as inside of us or as a permanent observer of an internal scene. The human mind is not a hidden substance and it would be a mistake to refer to it apart from the body's overt behavior. Whereas I may speak of my eyes and nose as organs of sense, "my mind" does not stand for another organ. It signifies my ability and readiness to do certain sorts of things and not some piece of personal apparatus without which I could or would not do them."17

Ryle's position may be illustrated by considering a clown's clumsy movements which amuse and impress his audience. His clumsiness is an act, it is put on: "Tripping on purpose is both a bodily and a mental process, but it is not two processes, such as one process of purposing to trip and, as an effect, another process of tripping."18 The manner in which he performs his act is the mental-factor and it demonstrates his ability to observe, his training as well as his mastery of each of these gestures. A man's mental slackness appears from his demeanor and conduct, for example, the acumen of the chess player becomes apparent in his moves. The spectator is directly given what is happening - since the mind is intermingled with what is done and is not isolated from the behavior. According to Ryle, one can no more say

that the mind is something besides what is given in observation than one can say that the British constitution is something existing apart from the Crown, the legislature and the judiciary.

The question: "what knowledge can a person get of the workings of his own mind?" invites an absurd answer which suggests peering into a windowless chamber to which only he has access. Rather than consciousness being some sort of an interior drama, it is the grasping of what has just been experienced. In short, introspection is retrospection. Ryle's primary concern is with the how, that is, the manner of obtaining this knowledge. And by rejecting the possibility of a private realm of consciousness, he can maintain, at least in principle, that A knows himself exactly as B has knowledge of A. "John Doe's ways of finding out about John Doe are the same as John Doe's ways of finding out about Richard Roe." Again, he writes:

on the account of self-knowledge that I shall give, knowledge of what there is to be known about other people is restored to approximate parity with self-knowledge. The sorts of things that I can find out about myself are the same as the sorts of things that I can find out about other people, and the methods of finding them out are much the same.

And yet he admits that in practice there is a certain discrepancy between self-knowledge and our knowledge of the other. Sometimes it is easier for me to find out what I want to know about you than it is for me to find out the same sort of things about myself. In other respects

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19 Ryle, The Concept of Mind, p. 156.

20 Ryle, The Concept of Mind, p. 156.

it is more difficult. On the one hand, I am able to grasp my silent
dialogue directly afterward even when it is concealed from others; but,
on the other hand, it is sometimes possible for another to sense that
about me of which I am not aware - such as when I am humming a tune and
another may notice my suppressed nervousness. By accepting this "ap-
proximate parity" or discrepancy between principle and practice, Ryle
argues that we are compensated by the benefits of abandoning the claim
of a "privileged access" as well as "epistemological isolation". 22

In terms of Ryle's account the usual question of "How do I
discover that I know that the other has a mind?" does not arise. In-
stead, he must consider the intelligent behavior of human beings in
terms of their pure behavior. And in this account there can be no ref-
erence to a "consciousness" beyond or behind the immediately given be-
behavior. Consequently, the crucial question becomes one of "how we es-
ablish, and how we apply, certain sorts of law-like propositions about
the overt and the silent behavior of persons." 23 These "law-like pro-
positions" can be formulated only after watching, noticing, listening
to and comparing the behavior of other persons. "The intelligent per-
former operates critically, the intelligent spectator follows critical-
ly. Roughly, execution and understanding are merely different exer-
cises of knowledge of the tricks of the same trade." 24 The skill and

22 Ryle, The Concept of Mind, p. 156.


intelligeuce of the chess master can only be appreciated and understood by following his game and comparing his performance with that of the more or less competent chess players. This also applies to evaluating our own skill at playing chess.

George Mead provides a modified version of what has been called "social behaviorism". For Mead, the "psychical" is not the "content of consciousness", rather, it is the cognitive act of the mind. The mind is neither a substance nor is it located in the brain, instead, it is "a process within...". A field of conduct between a specific individual and the environment, in which the individual is able, through the generalized attitude he assumes, to make use of symbolic gestures, i.e., terms, which are significant to all including himself. The mind is the functioning of significant symbols and these symbols arise only in the social process. The psychical process is social in character and there is no signification without reference to both self and others. But the psychical process is restricted to human social behavior which involves the use of language. In short, the mind is socially constituted at the level of cooperative behavior.

Although Mead believes that the mind can be explained in behavioristic or non-mentalistic terms, he recognizes that there is an aspect of inner experience which is not revealed in outer behavior. Mead writes:

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The external act which we do observe is a part of the process which has started within. . . . There is a field within the act itself which is not external, but which belongs to the act, and there are characteristics of that inner organic conduct which do reveal themselves in our own attitudes, especially those connected with speech.  

while admitting that these internal experiences can be explained in terms of external behavior, he denies that these internal experiences can be reduced to external behavior, which would thereby explain them away and ultimately deny their existence as such. "Mental behavior is not reducible to non-mental behavior. But mental behavior or phenomena can be explained in terms of non-mental behavior or phenomena, as arising out of, and as resulting from, complications in the latter."  

Mead conceives conscious mental behavior functionally in terms of a cognitive act of the mind and as a natural - rather than as a transcendental - phenomenon. An exploration of what goes on in conscious behavior must not only consider the complete social act, but also take into account "what goes on in the central nervous system as the beginning of the individual's act and as the organization of the act."  

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27 Mead, *Mind, Self and Society*, p. 11. Although Mead does not want to reduce internal experiences to external behavior because this would involve denying their existence, has he not done this by accounting for internal experiences in behavioristic terms? We must leave the question open whether it is possible to explain mental behavior in behavioristic terms without denying their existence as mental experiences.  

This, of course, takes Mead beyond direct immediate observation. When he attempts to uncover the conditions from which the individual’s experiences arise, he finds that a person approaches an object with reference to what he shall do when he arrives there.

There is an organization of the various parts of the nervous system that are going to be responsible for acts, an organization which represents not only that which is immediately taking place, but also the later stages that are to take place. . . . The later stages of the act are present in the early stages – not simply in the sense that they are all ready to go off, but in the sense that they serve to control the process itself. They determine how we are going to approach the object.29

This can be illustrated in the example of a person familiar with riding horses who will approach them as one who is going to ride them. In advance the innervation of cells in the central nervous system has already initiated the later parts of the act. The act as a whole is there to determine the process.

Instead of beginning with individuals and working out to society, Mead begins with an objective social process and works inward through the importation of the social process of communication to the individual. The individual’s mind involves the internalization of the social process out of which meaning emerges. This involves the ability to indicate to one’s self the response and implicated objects that his gestures would indicate to others, and to control the res-

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29Mead, Mind, Self and Society, p. 11. It must be pointed out that Kyle does not consider this in his account of the clown’s behavior (see above pages 30–35). But does Mead do justice to this orientation by accounting for it in terms of external behavior in reference to the central nervous system?
ponse itself in these terms. According to Mead thinking is implicit speech, namely, the internalized conversation of gestures and attitudes with one's self playing a dual inner role. "It is through the ability to be the other at the same time that he is himself that the symbol becomes significant."\textsuperscript{30} The significant gesture is itself a part of the social process which is internalized and thereby makes available to the individual the meanings which have emerged in the earlier, non-significant stages of the gestural communication. The individual must then take the social act into himself. His mind remains social because thought goes on by assuming the roles of others and controlling his behavior in terms of role-taking. As a result, Mead writes: "the behavior of an individual can be understood only in terms of the behavior of the whole social group of which he is a member."\textsuperscript{31} Rather than consciousness being a precondition of the social act, the social act is a precondition of consciousness. Consciousness emerges from social behavior.

In this function the mind is conceived as an "instrument" in the service of the organism's better adjustment to his environment. Intelligence on the human level is conceived as the "adjustment to one another of the acts of different human individuals within the human


\textsuperscript{31} Mead, \textit{Mind, Self and Society}, p. 6.
social process.”

This adjustment takes place through communication. Crucial to this adjustment is the “meaning” which arises and lies within this relation between a human being and his subsequent behavior as it is indicated to another by that gesture. The structure of meaning involves a triadic relationship of the gesture, the adjective response to that gesture, as well as the resultant of the given social act. “Response on the part of the second organism to the gesture of the first is the interpretation — and brings out the meaning — of that gesture, as indicating the resultant of the social act which it initiates, and in which both organisms are thus involved.”

Meaning is not simply a connection or relation of ideas within private experience, but rather it is the gestural relation whereby the adjective response by one organism is the interpreted meaning of the gesture. Both the interpretation of the gesture as well as the basis of meaning are not processes necessitating a mind. They are external, overt, physical or physiological processes occurring in the actual field of social conduct.

Hall considers the physiological mechanism underlying experience as basic to all social acts, for example, bees act the way they do because of their physiological structure. Although their gestures call out responses, they have not developed into a conversation of gestures. Gestures involve the mutual adjustment to changing social

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32 Hall, *Mind, Self and Society*, p. 75.

stimulation and it is only on the level of mammals that physiological
development permits a conversation of gestures to occur. In a dog
fight, for example, the action of each dog becomes the stimulus to the
other dog to respond. As one dog changes his position or attitude,
this in turn produces a change in position or attitude of the other
dog. There is a play back and forth, advance and retreat, attack and
defense, namely, "a field of palaver within the social conduct of an-
imals."36 This involves glances, growls, cries — which in turn change
with the answering glances, growls and cries. The first gestures call
forth responses which lead to the readjustment of the act already begun,
and this readjustment in turn leads to others. It is in this way that
social behavior involves an intricate system of stimulus and response
in which an anticipated response serves also as a stimulus. Although
an animal's play and gestural interaction is merely instinctive and not
thought out, the human mind eventually emerges from this interplay of
gestures and symbols. "The conversation of gestures is not significant
below the human level, because it is not conscious, that is, not self-
conscious (though it is conscious in the sense of involving feelings
or sensations)."35 Since human consciousness arises through a com-
munication of gestures in a social process — and not communication
through consciousness, the consciousness of gestures becomes unneces-
sary for the presence of meaning in the social experience. The meaning constituted in the conversation of gestures is objectively there as a relation between certain aspects of the social act and thus it is not something "psychical". The mechanism which distinguishes man from animals is essentially communication and at the basis of this communication is linguistic communication which develops with social intercourse. "Language implies organized responses; and the value, the implication of these responses, is to be found in the community from which this organization of responses is taken over into the nature of the individual himself." 36 According to Mead language is the principle of social organization and as such, it has made possible a distinctly human society.

We must now evaluate the behaviorist's account of self-knowledge and our understanding of the other. All knowledge is characterized as empirical objective knowledge which can only be established through empirical objective observation. By attempting to make self-knowledge equivalent to our knowledge of the other, the self is reduced to another and all knowledge of the other (including myself) requires an empirical objective investigation. In other words, "my behavior is an object for the Other's perception and vice versa, but I have no access or only indirect access to my own behavior. . . . consciousness is translated into behavior." 37 This may be caricatured in the story of

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36 Mead, Mind, Self and Society, p. 269.

the two behaviorists who met in a hall and one said to the other: “You’re feeling fine, how am I feeling?” But is this the way we normally acquire knowledge about ourselves? I know that I am excited without having first to observe that my hand or voice is trembling. And I know that I am looking for my glasses without having to compare my present behavior with past behavior which terminated in securing my glasses.

Similarly, when I say “I am about to go to class”, I am not making a prediction on the basis of observation of internal or external events. Instead, I am announcing an intention. I am able to acquire self-knowledge and be aware of my intentions without having to observe my behavior as if it belonged to another. I know what my intentions are, all I can do about another’s intentions is to speculate upon his behavior. He may be sincere in claiming to be sick or he may be just putting on an act in order to avoid helping me with the work.

Part of the claim that self-knowledge is equivalent to our knowledge of the other is the presupposition that all psychological sentences are translatable into sentences about spatio-temporal events since “a sentence about other minds states that the body of the person in question is in a physical state of a certain sort.” This gives rise to the claim that first-person sentences are translatable into second- or third-person sentences. But J. L. Austin argues that in

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regard to performative utterances there is "a clear difference between
the first person indicative active, and the other persons and tenses." 39
A first-person sentence such as "I run" is translatable into the third-
person sentence "he runs" without any real change in the logic and mean-
ing of the sentences. But this is not the case in regard to perform-
ative utterances without a fundamental change both in the logic and
meaning of the sentences. Let us consider the following two sentences:
"He apologizes" and "I apologize". The former describes the performance
of an act and is either true or false. But this is not the case with
the performative utterance "I apologize". It neither describes nor
reports that he is apologizing, it is used to apologize. In other words,
it is used to perform an act and is neither true nor false. The use of
the sentence "I apologize" is my apologizing. If the performative utter-
ance is translated into another tense, for example, the simple past, - "I
apologized" - it is no longer a performative utterance and is used to
describe an act and as such, it is either true or false. Similarly,
this applies to the other performative utterances such as: "I swear",
"I name", "I invite", and so on. Here is a class of first-person psycho-
logical sentences which cannot be translated into sentences of other per-
sons and tenses. This undermines the behaviorist's thesis that self-
knowledge is equivalent to knowledge of another and that the subject
does not have privileged access to his conscious processes. I may not
be sincere in apologizing, but the other can only speculate in regard

to my sincerity. My experiences and thoughts are mine and mine alone, and it is possible for me to conceal from others what they are. This possibility of concealment indicates that behavior is not the whole story about the mind.

Is it possible, even "in principle", to know the other as I can know myself? Let us try and determine what Ryle can mean by "in principle". A few years ago we could speak of it being possible in principle to explore the other side of the moon, but our technology had not developed enough to facilitate this endeavour. Or, it is possible in principle to build a nuclear-powered aircraft, but at present the cost would be prohibitive. But this is not the same thing as saying that it is possible "in principle" to know the other as I know myself. In the first two examples we are aware that what is now in principle can be put into practice, namely, that it can be achieved. But this is not the case in regard to Ryle's usage of "in principle" for I cannot know the other as I know myself - unless I am the other. Whereas the whole of your stream of experiences is not open to me, it is potentially open to you. Although I may be able to observe your behavior, it is not possible to determine whether the particular meaning-contexts of yours in which I arrange your lived experiences are the same as those which you are using. In other words, I can never be sure if the meaning I give to your behavior is the same as that which you give to it, for instance, you may be showing all the symptoms of being sick, but I suspect that you are/just faking sickness - knowing how much hate to do this particular job. There is no ground for maintaining that even "in principle" there is an "approximate parity" between self-
knowledge and our knowledge of the other.

Underlying the behaviorist position is the belief that we perceive men and their actions in the same manner as when we perceive physical objects. It may be asked whether we know and understand ourselves in the same manner as we do another person, or an object. Does this watching, noticing, listening and comparing differ if the behavior is mine, or that of another person, a flower, a dog, or even a combustion engine? Certainly Nyle provides no evidence for thinking otherwise and other behaviorists do not hesitate to equate self-knowledge and knowledge of the other with knowledge of a physical object.\(^{40}\) In their zeal to overcome psycho-physical dualism the behaviorists have tossed the baby out with the bath-water. By denying (or at least considering irrelevant) the existence of a private realm of consciousness, they must confine themselves to rules as the criteria for distinguishing the mental from the physical. As a result, they are only able to speak of the mental as it is revealed in and through empirical objectively

\(^{40}\) Carnap asserts that there is a "parallelism of sentences about other minds; sentences about some past conditions of one's own mind, and sentences about the present condition of one's own mind, with the physical sentences about the wooden support." "Psychology in Physical Language", Logical Positivism, p. 192. On the other hand, there is reason to believe that Nead does not equate knowledge of the other (including myself) with that of physical objects. But Nead seems to equate self-knowledge with knowledge of the other. Although there are passages where he speaks as though there is a private aspect of the self, I believe that in the final analysis it can be shown that Nead loses the individual in the social. For example, there is no account of the specific meaning that an action would have for the subject. We have already shown (see pages 43-44) that we have in a sense "privileged access" to our own experiences and that performative utterances cannot be translated into other sentences without a change in the logic and meaning of the sentence (see pages 45-46).
observable behavior. Since the behaviorists characterize intelligent behavior as rule-governed behavior, it may be asked why should not such rule-governed activities as: a flower turning toward the sun, a dog salivating at the sound of a bell, the expansion of a metal when heated, or, the power-output of a combustion engine - be all considered examples of intelligent behavior? To be sure, their "behavior" is more rule-governed and predictable than the behavior of human beings. Should we not then say that they are more intelligent than human beings? Few, if any would agree to this, but it seems to be the conclusion derived from such a position if it is followed consistently. The use of rule-governed behavior as a criterion to distinguish intelligent human behavior from other behavior is inadequate.

In **Appendix III** we shall argue that intuitive perception is different from signitive perception. It is in terms of signitive perception that we are able to understand another. The perception of objects does involve syntheses, but additional syntheses on a higher level appear in regard to our perception of another. Certain data of observation are interpreted as indications of the existence of people at certain places or of the presence of human action. For instance, the perception of the behavior of buyers and sellers in a market place is not just the perception of the movements of physical bodies in space. But rather, the observed "physical facts" must be correlated with psycho-physical facts, they must be interpreted as the actions of people buying and selling merchandise. This is not the case in regard to the perception of a physical object, such as a red ball or a combustion engine.
Let us consider the example of observing two men who emerge from their respective homes, one going to a wedding and the other to a funeral. If we were to ask "is there any difference in their orientation?" a behaviorist would reply that it is not meaningful to speak of mental orientation apart from the behavioristic criteria and that we must confine ourselves to their empirically observable behavior. For instance, Smith is smiling and walking buoyantly while Jones has a serious expression and is shuffling along. But is this the only meaningful difference, namely, the difference that is grasped from an empirical objective observation of their behavior? From such an observation one would expect that Jones is on his way to a funeral while Smith is going to a wedding. But this is not the case. The thought of his niece's wedding reminds Jones of his recently deceased wife who had been looking forward to the marriage of their favourite niece while Smith is expecting to receive his uncle's estate. Let us say that we again observe the two men as they near their respective destinations. From an empirical objective investigation it would seem that they have changed roles. Jones has a smile on his face and walking buoyantly while Smith is shuffling along, a serious expression on his face and tearful. Are we to conclude that Jones has been overcome by the happiness of the occasion while Smith has been moved by the death of his uncle? Quite the contrary, Jones is attempting to hide his sorrow and to put on a cheerful front while Smith is concealing his delight at his expected good-fortune and is playing the part of a sorrowful nephew. By restricting themselves to an empir-
ical objective observation and by denying (or at least considering irrelevant) that there is a private realm of consciousness to which the subject has privileged access, the behaviorists cannot adequately account for our understanding others. The question may be raised: is it necessary just to understand what this action means for me - the observer, or, must I know what it means for the other in order to understand him? The behaviorists are not concerned with the meaning that the action has for the actor, his intentions, goals, projects, fears, and so on. Such questions as: "What does the death of Smith's uncle mean for Smith?" and "Is Smith's "act of grief" sincere or is it just put on?" do not arise when studying the behavior of physical objects and cannot be asked by the consistent empirical objective observer. Because it is to be an objective empirical observation, no reference can be made to what the event may possibly mean for the actor. And since I am to be such an observer, my only concern is with this action, for example, the death of Smith's uncle and what it would mean for me - the observer. In order to understand what a particular action means for another, is it enough to know what it would mean for me, or even what is the accepted meaning of the action? Surely not! We would at least require a knowledge of the other's past and his intended future.

\[41\] In regard to a related item, Carnap writes: "For the comprehension of meaningful behavior the special method known as "intuitive understanding" (Verstehen) is said to be required. Physics allegedly knows nothing of this method." "Psychology in Physical Language", Logical Positivism, p. 181.
A knowledge of Smith's past, for example, would reveal his deep hatred for his uncle, the uncle's wealth, Smith's extravagant tastes and his meagre salary, his gambling debts, etc. And this knowledge might also provide an insight into his future plans and projects, for example, the payment of his debts, a world cruise, a business venture, a chance to start anew. We could never be sure which of Smith's past experiences and anticipated actions are relevant and necessary for understanding the meaning of his present action. To be sure, all of this and more is accessible to the actor and is not revealed in his overt behavior. An empirical objective observation is sufficient to understand the behavior of a combustion engine and in the context of such an investigation, the question does not arise "what does this action mean for the engine?" But in order to understand the actions of another, we must attempt to understand what meaning this action has for the other.

Ryle believes that we are able to understand what people are up to and what they are doing in a way closely analogous to the way we understand what they may say or mean. We may agree that understanding and speaking a language are perfect examples of understanding and speaking being "merely different exercises of knowledge of the tricks of the same trade" but by no means is this a unique example. For not only are we able to make sense or fail to make sense of conduct, situations and events, we are also able to refer to them as significant or insignificant and regard them as rational or senseless. Meaning,

for Ryle, is only what established expressions have and he is only concerned with logical grammar and conceptual analyses of terms. But this is not adequate to help us to understand the meaning the action has for the actor on the social scene. Ryle has neglected the aspect of meaning known as intentionality.

Hedg acceptsthe existence of a semantic system as something which is provided from the beginning and he leaves the problem of significance unquestioned and unexamined. It would seem that he has based his description of "meaning" on the stimulus-response model found in the physiological reflex arc and has attempted to account for all meaningful behavior in terms of this physiological model. This involves presupposing that the gestures as well as the responses to those gestures are merely biological phenomena which are given "intrinsically without meaning and with no meaning-endowing quality, yet constituting the matrix from which meaning arises." The meaning of the gesture is the response to that gesture and the "objective thereeness" of meaning occurs in the actor's overt behavior. For example, the other's shaking his fist at me is given meaning only with my response to it. But at this point a number of difficulties arise. If the interpretation of gestures is merely a physiological process, how is it meaning-endowing? And if it is meaning-endowing, the gestures cannot be fundamentally physiological in nature - even though they may have a physiological substratum. It would seem that Hedg is identifying the

vehicle of communication, namely, the semantic system with the communicated meaning itself. Alone or in itself the physical hand says nothing. But instead of turning to the overt physical activity on its own and by itself as Mead believes, I "attend to the one who performs it; I turn to the human agent who is the source of the act." The clenched fist expresses the actor's intentions and it is to the actor's intentions I must respond. Deprived of the intentions, the hand is merely an appendage that anatomists study. Instead of the observer being responsible for translating the meaning of the action, he must grasp the situation of the social action as it is defined primarily by the actor. In Firth's example (see footnote 44) the anthropologist must interpret the meaning of the clenched fist in terms of the situation as it is defined by the actor, that is, in the context of the actor's intentions. Even in our mundane realms we must attempt to understand and interpret activities in terms of the other's intentions. Although every wink involves a blink, not every blink is a wink. As a human action, did she mean something by winking at me? It may have been flirtatious, the result of a facial tic or sensitivity to light.

We are not denying Mead's thesis that meaning arises in and

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44 Katasono, The Journeying Self, p. 39. Raymond Firth writes: "If the anthropologist is travelling in the Plateau of Northern Nigeria, he may meet men from the Ben and other pagan tribes living there. They will probably shake their clenched fists in the air as he approaches. According to his fears or his politics, he may interpret this as a symbol of anger or of solidarity among fellow-workers. In time he will find it is merely the normal greeting", quoted in Ibid., pp. 187-188.
because of the social process and, in particular, in a communication of gestures. It is agreed that we are only able to live and work together because communication (through its primary vehicle - language) occurs in our world. But rather we are concerned with the foundation of the social process, and especially, with the contention that linguistic communication is this foundation. We must inquire whether the communicative process is really the foundation of all possible social relationships, or whether, on the contrary, all communication presupposes the existence of some kind of social interaction which, though it is an indispensable condition of all possible communication, does not enter the communicative process and is not capable of being grasped by it.\[55\]

This question is important not only for this thesis, but for the social sciences and philosophy in general. If linguistic communication is the foundation of the existence of the social world, then all investigations must assume some form of a "linguistic" analysis.

In order to communicate with another person, the other's existence as a possible recipient and interpreter of the communicated meaning must be presupposed. But how is the other recognized as another? We must be sure that the other is not a picture of a man, but rather that he is a living man capable of grasping our gestures. Since communication can only occur in the reality of the outer world (excluding the possibility of telepathy), a series of events must be presupposed which will function, on the one hand, as a scheme of expressions


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of the communicated thoughts, and on the other hand, as a scheme of interpretations of these thoughts by the addresser. The shaking of our fist is expressive of our thoughts and we presuppose that the other will understand it as a threat. To describe the other's body merely as a "field of expression" is inadequate since this description is applicable both to paintings and persons: "To be a 'field of expression' is not a quality inherent in things, but is rather an intentional characteristic, something meant, or intended, as such." 46 It is the intended meaning of human actions which is taken into account when we understand the other. To give an example, if I were to point a book out to you, you may ask: "Do you mean the book on technology?" and I reply: "No, I mean the one on Hölderlin". The book that I have in view is the book I intend or mean and the referring description which I use "the book on Hölderlin" has this sense or meaning. By using it to refer to the book before me I am expressing my meaning. In other words, I mean it, meaning what I said. Similarly, the threat communicated or expressed by the shaking of one's fist must be understood as the intended meaning. The interpretation of gestures is not merely a

46 Zaner, "Theory of intersubjectivity". Social Research, p. 78. The term "intentional" does not mean planned or purposeful thought in the sense that one may say "Henry intentionally tripped Mary in the hallway". Intentionality primarily refers to the phenomenological structure of the acts of perception. Acts of intentionality are not to be confused with psychological events or the apprehensions of any other order. It is the underlying eidetic character of all apprehensions, namely, consciousness or, that is of interest to the phenomenologist.
physiological process as Mead would have us believe. Neither is Carnap
correct in maintaining that "both our understanding of meaning and the
particular forms it takes are, in effect, completely determined by the
physical processes impinging on our sense-organs".\textsuperscript{47} The behaviorists' account of intersubjective understanding is not adequate.

If we are willing to admit intentionality – that the subject – in a sense, has a privileged access to his conscious processes and that self-knowledge is not equivalent to our knowledge of the other, are we forced to adopt the inference by analogy theory? Or is there a third alternative?

\textsuperscript{47}Carnap, "Psychology in Physical Language", \textit{Logical Positivism}, p. 162.
A PHENOMENOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF INTERSUBJECTIVE UNDERSTANDING

In the previous chapter we have examined two traditional attempts\(^1\) to account for our belief in, and our understanding of, the Other's conscious processes. On the one hand, the inference by analogy theorists argue that we infer from observable physical facts to the occurrences of conscious processes in our fellow-man as being similar to those that we have found in ourselves - since they accompany physical events of a similar kind. On the other hand, the behaviorists deny (or at least consider irrelevant) the existence of a private realm of consciousness and attempt to account for our understanding of the Other in terms of observing his behavior in accordance with the behavioristic criteria. The inference by analogy theorists are mistaken in their claim that a person's conscious processes are indirectly accessible to another because (1) we do not have available to us the material needed to generate the analogy claimed, and (2) our understanding of Others is, at least on occasion, much closer and less tenuous than the analogy theory would warrant. The behaviorists are mistaken in denying the existence of a private realm of consciousness.

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\(^1\) We have concerned ourselves with these two approaches only for to have examined others would have rendered this thesis unbearably long.
ness and in attempting to reduce our understanding of the Other to objective empirical knowledge of observable behavior. Since consciousness is private, my conscious processes are not directly accessible to you, in the sense that you and I cannot feel a single feeling or think a single thought. There are always two feelings and two thoughts, even if they are qualitatively the same. And in order to account for the basis of everyday understanding of the Other, we must find another alternative. This will require an investigation of the core of intersubjective understanding as it occurs in the social and cultural world of our everyday living - what Schutz, after Husserl, calls the Lebenswelt.

Alfred Schutz formulated an alternative position to that of the behaviorists and the inference by analogy theorists. An early statement of his position is found in *The Phenomenology of the Social World* while later developments are scattered throughout his numerous papers. We shall attempt to bring these together to constitute a statement of his position.  

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2 In formulating Schutz's position, we have not had access to his yet unpublished *Die Strukturen der Lebenswelt* which he was in the process of writing at the time of his death as a final systematic statement of his position. We have no reason to believe, however, that his final position concerning intersubjective understanding will be different from that given in our presentation. Throughout his published works, which cover a period of nearly thirty years, there is continuity in all his works. We find, for example, his key concepts basically unchanged. This view is shared by Arvid Brodersen who writes: "the book and the numerous subsequent papers are, in a sense, variations on a grand theme. Taken together they form a unity which, though highly diversified, possesses the beauty and force of a well-rounded system of thought." in "Editor's Note", *Collected Papers*, 11, XI-XII.
Schutz was influenced by Bergson and especially Edmund Husserl. And upon receiving a copy of Schutz's *Per sinhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt,* Husserl wrote in a letter to Schutz:

'Ve am anxious to meet such a serious and thorough phenomenologist, one of the few who have penetrated to the core of the meaning of my life's work . . . and who promises to continue it as representative of the genuine *Philosophia perennis* which alone can be the future of philosophy.'

But it would be unjust to portray Schutz as anything but an innovator. In respect to this Spiegelberg writes: "he became not only one of his (Husserl's) most perceptive students, but also one of his most acute critics, especially as far as Husserl's social philosophy of intersubjectivity was concerned."¹ Schutz's account of intersubjective understanding presupposes a phenomenological analysis of the stream of consciousness which would include such important concepts as: action, intentionality, meaningful lived experiences and the structures of internal time-consciousness — and an outline of this analysis of consciousness can be found in Appendix I of this thesis.

From the outset we experience the world of daily life as an


intersubjective world which has existed long before our birth, experienced and interpreted by Others - our predecessors - as an organized world. Our interpretations of this world are based upon a stock of knowledge comprising a sedimentation of all our experiences of former definitions of previous situations, experiences which might refer to our own world in previously actual, restorable, or obtainable reach, or else to fellow-men, contemporaries, or predecessors."

In the world of everyday life we have an eminently practical and not a theoretical interest. This world is the scene as well as the object of our actions and interactions. We have both to dominate and change it in order to realize the purposes we pursue within it among our fellow-men. We work and operate not only within but also upon the world and a pragmatic motive governs our natural attitude toward this world of daily life. A discussion of the other "finite provinces of meaning" can be found in Appendix I1.

In order to understand the nature of our actions and interactions with Others in the world, we must examine Schutz's account of conduct. He designates all subjectively meaningful experiences emanating from our spontaneous life as conduct - whether they are of the inner life or geared into the outer world. Conduct is the "subject-

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6 Schutz uses the term "conduct" rather than the term "behavior" in order to avoid the latter's tendency to refer also to subjectively non-meaningful manifestations of spontaneity - such as reflexes, nervous habits, etc.
ive meaning man bestows upon certain experiences of his own spontaneous life." It is opposed to pain, for example, which is merely suffered and also contrasted to manifestations of involuntary spontaneity such as reflexes which do not receive subsequent interpretation. If we are permitted to employ "objective" terms to describe "subjective" experiences, we may say that conduct can be either overt or covert.

The former is designated as _more doing_ and the latter as _more thinking_.

Conduct which is based upon a preconceived project is referred to as **action**. And in regard to covert action a distinction is made as to whether or not there is an intention to carry the project through. If such an intention prevails, the forethought is transferred into an aim while the project becomes a purpose. Or, if such an intention is lacking, the projected covert action remains a phantom, for instance, a day-dream. But if it subsists, it may be referred to as a purposive action or a **performance**. The attempt to solve a scientific problem "in one's head" is an example of a covert action which is a performance in the process of projected thinking. Concerning actions geared into the outer world by bodily movements, it is not necessary to distinguish between actions with and without an intention to realize them because it follows from Schutz's definition that overt action is a performance.

But in order to be able to distinguish covert performances of mere thinking from the overt bodily movements, the latter are designated **working**. Working is "action in the outer world, based upon a project and char-

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acterized by the intention to bring about the projected state of affairs by bodily movements." Of all the various forms of spontaneity, that of working is the most important for the intersubjectivity which characterizes the life-world:

the wide-scope self integrates in its working and by its working its present, past, and future into a specific dimension of time; it realizes itself as a totality in its working acts; it communicates with Others through working acts; it organizes the different spatial perspectives of the world of daily life through working acts.\(^9\)

Here we see the importance of the concepts of action and working for the problem of intersubjective understanding. Through his working acts the actor gears his phantasied projects into concrete intersubjective acts. That is, his projects in \textit{durée} or internal time-consciousness are transformed into cosmic time to form a single temporal flux, the \textit{vivid present} which is "defined at any moment by the span of the projects conceived."\(^10\)

In our interactions with Others in the life-world we are not only concerned with our consociates and contemporaries, but also with predecessors and successors. To each of these derived social relationships there belongs

a particular type of time perspective... derived from the

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\(^8\) Schutz, "On Multiple Realities", \textit{Collected Papers}, 1, 212.


vivid present. There is a particular quasi-present in which I interpret the mere outcome of the Other's communicating - the written letter, the printed book - without having participated in the ongoing process of communicating acts.

In our natural attitude we are able to adopt different perspectives, bringing them into and out of operation by shifting from one to another and by transforming one into the other, and so on. But regardless of how different these temporal perspectives and their mutual relations may be, they all originate in an intersection of durée and cosmic time:

In and by our social life within the natural attitude they are apprehended as integrated into a single supposedly homogeneous dimension of time which embraces not only all the individual time perspectives of each of us during his wide-awake life but which is common to all of us.\(^{12}\)

This common, all embracing, intersubjective temporal dimension is referred to as civic or standard time. It is an intersection of cosmic time and "of a peculiar aspect of inner time - that aspect in which the wide-awake man experiences his working acts as events within his stream of consciousness."\(^{13}\) Since standard time partakes of cosmic time, it is measurable by clocks and calendars, and coinciding with our inner sense of time in which we experience our working acts (only if we are wide-awake), it governs our plans under which we subsume our projects. Being common to us all, standard time provides an intersubjective coor-

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dination of different individual plan systems. As a result, for the 
natural attitude standard time is "in the same sense the universal tem-
poral structure of the intersubjective world of everyday life within 
the natural attitude, in which the earth is its universal spatial struc-
ture that embraces the spatial environments of each of us." Standard 
time is the universal temporal structure of the intersubjective world.

Before going any further we must examine the meaning of the 
term "awake self". According to Bergson our conscious life shows 
a "multiplicity of conscious states" or planes which may range from the 
plane of action to the plane of dreams. Each of these planes is char-
acterized by a specific tension of consciousness with the plane of ac-
tion showing the highest tension and the plane of dreaming the lowest 
degree of tension. Bergson writes that this tension, by its "very 
definiteness seems like a choice between an infinity of possible dur-
ations." The various degrees of tension of our consciousness are 
functions of our varying interest in life. Action represents our high-
est interest in meaning reality and its requirements whereas dreaming 
is a complete lack of interest. Schutz agrees with Bergson that at-

\[\text{attention à la vie is the}\]

basic regulative principle of our conscious life. It de-

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\[14\] Schutz, "On Multiple Realities", Collected Papers, 1, 222.

fines the realm of our world which is relevant to us; it articulates our continuously flowing stream of thought; it determines the span and function of our memory; it makes us ... either live within our present experiences, directed toward their objects, or turn back in a reflective attitude to our past experiences and ask for their meaning. 

By the term "wide-awareness" Schutz denotes a plane of consciousness "of highest tension originating in an attitude of full attention to life and its requirements." It is only the performing and working self which is fully interested in life and thus can be said to be wide-aware. The wide-aware working self lives within its acts while its attention is directed exclusively to carrying its projects into effect, that is, executing its plans. The wide-aware self is characterised by its active attention and its concern with meaningful manifestations of spontaneity. Put somewhat differently, it is concerned with living in its acts and with meaningful spontaneity - the "effort to arrive at other and always other perceptions." In the lowest form of wide-awareness this leads to a alienation of certain perceptions and a transformation of them into apperception. In its highest form it involves the performance of work geared into the outer world and thus modifying it.

16 Schutz, "On Multiple Realities", Collected Papers, 1, 212-213.

17 Schutz, "On Multiple Realities", Collected Papers, 1, 213. The term "wide-awareness" does not involve an evaluation, it is devoid of value. It does not mean that life as such has a higher dignity than theoretical thought.

18 Schutz, "On Multiple Realities", Collected Papers, 1, 213.
Our knowledge of the Other's mind is only possible through the intermediacy of events occurring on or produced by the Other's body. Our task is now to uncover how the Other's conscious processes are grasped in our everyday encounter with the Other, especially in respect to a special case of the social relationship known as the "we-relationship" which underlies all the other social relationships. A fellow-man is directly experienced only if and when he shares a common sector of time and space with me. It is only in the form of the "Thou-orientation" that I become aware of a fellow-man as a human being confronting me in person. The face-to-face relationship presupposes this orientation which is constituted by the fact that something within my direct experience is recognized as a living, conscious human being. Schutz writes:

"Becoming aware of a human being confronting me does not depend upon an imputation of life and consciousness to an object in my surroundings by an act of reflective thought. The Thou-orientation is a prepredicative experience of a fellow-being. In this experience I grasp the existence of a fellow-man in the actuality of a particular person who must be present here and now. The Thou-orientation presupposes the presence of the fellow-man in temporal and spatial immediacy. The essential feature of the Thou-orientation is the recognition that a fellow-man is before me; the orientation does not presuppose that I know what are precisely the particular characteristics of that fellow-man."

Schutz contends that the formal concept of the Thou-orientation refers to the "pure" experience of another as a live and conscious human being whereas the specific content of his consciousness remains undefined. And yet another self is never confronted in such a "pure" experience.

But rather a particular fellow-man is always confronted as having his own particular thoughts and living his own particular life. In fact, the Thou-orientation is never realized in its purity, but is always "actualized in different degrees of concreteness and specificity." 20

The Thou-orientation may be either one-sided or reciprocal: if I turn to you and you ignore my presence - it is one-sided; but if I am oriented to you and you take my experience into account, it is reciprocal. In the latter case there is constituted out of the Thou-orientation a face-to-face relationship or a directly experienced social relationship. A "pure We-relationship" involves a "face-to-face relationship in which the partners are aware of each other and sympathetically participate in each other's lives for however short a time". 21 Like the pure Thou-orientation, the pure We-relationship is a limiting concept for in our social relationships it is concretized and actualized to a lesser or greater degree and filled with content.

In the *pure* We-relationship I apprehend only the existence of a fellow-man and the fact that he is confronting me. For a concrete social relation to become established, however, I must also know how he is oriented to me. In the face-to-face situations I gain knowledge of this specific aspect of my partner's conscious life by observing the concrete manifestations of his subjective experiences in the common stream of the We-relationship. 22

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The different degrees of this relationship can be illustrated by the examples of a casual conversation and sexual intercourse, but Schutz does not elaborate on how it is possible to break through the social roles and experience the Other in his "uniqueness". We would expect him to maintain that there would be a decrease in typification and a resulting increase in fullness as well as a "consequent intimacy of the relationship." 23

Only when I am engaged in a concrete we-relation, face-to-face with a fellow-man do I "participate" in the conscious life of another self. This relationship involves a community of time and space among consociates - it is not necessary that there be any degree of intimacy between them. The clue to the occurrence of this relationship is found in its complex time structure and my interpretation of the events occurring on or produced by the Other's body. Let us consider the example of verbal communication - listening to a lecturer we seem to participate immediately in the development of his stream of thought. It must be emphasized that in so doing our attitude is quite different from that adopted in turning to my own stream of thought in reflection. The Other's thoughts are caught by me in his vivid present whereas my own thoughts are experienced in the past. That is, I catch the Other's thoughts as a "Now" and not as a "Just Now". The Other's speaking and my listening are experienced as a vivid simultaneity.

Examining this in detail we find there is a series of processes going

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on within the Other's inner durée. He articulates his thoughts step-by-step (polythetically) into verbal expressions which are manifested by a series of bodily movements occurring in the outer world in spatial time. These events, that is, the single phases of the speaker’s articulated thought, are polythetically co-performed or re-performed by the recipient and thus a quasi-simultaneity of both streams of thought take place. It is only in and by the bodily movements of working acts that the transition from inner durée to spatial time is accomplished, and these working actions partake of both. In simultaneity we are able to experience working action as a series of events in inner and outer time unifying both dimensions into a single flux, namely, the *living present*. In the living present my fellow-man and I simultaneously live through a pluri-dimensionality of time. This sharing of the Other’s flux of experiences in inner time and the living through a vivid present in common constitutes the mutual tuning-in relationship. Schuts writes:

> all possible communication presupposes a mutual tuning-in relationship between the communicator and the addressee of the communication. This relationship is established by the reciprocal sharing of the Other’s flux of experiences in inner time, by experiencing this togetherness as a ‘we’. Only within this experience does the Other’s conduct become meaningful to the partner tuned in on him – that is, the Other’s body and its movements can be and are interpreted as a field of expression of events within his inner life.

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24 A discussion of the transition from internal time-consciousness to the resulting intersubjective temporal dimensions can be found on pages 63–64.

The mutual tuning-in relation involves three aspects:

1. It involves a series of events in which the other's thought is articulated polythetically and in which the listener polythetically re-performs or co-performs the thought built up in the speaker;

2. The communicative process is an event in outer time which presupposes a face-to-face relationship to unify the fluxes of inner time and warrant their synchronization into a living present; and,

3. There is thus constituted a "we-relation" in which you and I, "we" share a living present. This relation transcends both of the individually unique biographical situations: "the we-relation as such transcends the existence of either consociate within the paramount reality and can be apprehended only by symbolisation."26 By friend is to me and I to him an element of the reality of everyday life, yet our friendship surpasses our individual situation within the finite province of meaning of paramount reality. The we-relation is the origin of intersubjectivity and as long as this relationship lasts, we are simultaneously partaking in each other's inner and outer temporal dimensions. In short, "we are growing older together."27

It is only by means of the mutual tuning-in relation that communication is possible and it is only by means of it that the other's

26 Schutz, "Symbol, Reality and Society", Collected Papers, 1, 353.

27 Schutz, "Symbol, Reality and Society", Collected Papers, 1, 317. For Schutz, to be with another is to grow older with another.
body and its movements can be interpreted as a field of expression of events within his inner life. All the other social relationships are derived from the We-relation, and a particular temporal structure which is itself derived from the living present belongs to each of the derivative forms of the We-relation. These other social relationships based on the mutual turning-in relation may pertain to my contemporaries, successors as well as my predecessors. The peculiarity of the We-relation is that through their mutual biographical involvement con specifics are able to experience each other as unique individuals. In the other dimensions of the social world, a fellow-man is not experienced in his individual uniqueness but rather in terms of his typical behavior patterns, typical motives, typical attitudes and in various degrees of anonymity. 28

As we have already seen in Appendix I, two different attitudes are possible: we may live in our acts directed toward the objects of our acts, or, we may reflect on our other acts. The stream of concrete experiences which fills the We-relation with "content" is very similar to my continuous stream of consciousness. However, there is one fundamental difference: whereas my stream of consciousness is interior and in "pure" duration, the We-relationship consists not only of a community of time but also a com-

28 We must leave the investigation of intersubjectivity in the context of these other social dimensions and various levels of the We-relation for another study – for to pursue it here would make this chapter too long.
munity of space involving the bodily and exterior presence of a fellow-
man face-to-face with me. Strictly speaking, we may say that the ex-
perience of a fellow-man in a We-relation is "mediate": "I apprehend
his conscious life by interpreting his bodily expressions as indica-
tions of subjectively meaningful processes." 29 Of all the self-trans-
cending experiences, the We-relation most clearly resembles the tem-
porality of my stream of consciousness. As long as I am engaged (or
immersed) in the We-relation, that is, participating in the common
stream of our experiences, I am able to experience directly the fel-
low-man. If I think and reflect about our experience, the directness
is broken. "While I was engaged in the We-relation, I was busy attend-
ing to you; in order to think about it, I must break off the immediate
rapport between us." 30 Straightforward engagement in the We-relation
is possible only in the ongoing experiences of a face-to-face situ-
tion while reflection is ex post facto.

Only in the straightforward relationship am I able to appre-
hend the Other as himself present, or in other words, the subjectiv-
ity of the Alter Ego in its vivid present, whereas I can grasp my own
self only by a reflection on my past. By the Alter Ego Schutz means
the "subjective stream of thought which can be experienced in its vivid
present. . . . (that is,) that stream of consciousness whose activities

29 Schutz, "The Dimensions of the Social World", Collected
Papers. 11, 26.

30 Schutz, "The Dimensions of the Social World", Collected
Papers. 11, 27.
I can seize in their present by my own simultaneous activities. This experience of the Other’s stream of consciousness in vivid simultaneity is called the general thesis of the Alter ego’s existence. According to Schutz this thesis implies that:

this stream of thought which is not mine shows the same fundamental structure as my own consciousness. This means that the Other is like me, capable of acting and thinking; that his stream of thought shows the same through and through connectedness as mine. . . . It means, furthermore, that the Other can live, as I do, either in his acts and thoughts, directed towards their objects or turn to his own acting and thinking, that he can experience his own Self only modo praeferente, but that he may look at my stream of consciousness in a vivid present; that, consequently, he has the genuine experience of growing old with me as I know that I do with him.32

But this does not mean that the same experiences are given to each of us. Rather, my lived experiences of you as well as the environment I ascribe to you, has the mark of my own subjective here and now and not the mark of yours. As well, I ascribe to you an environment33 which has already been interpreted from my own subjective standpoint. Thus, I am presupposing that at any time we are both referring to the same objects which transcend the subjective experience of either of us.


33 Our use of the term “environment” involves that part of the external world which I can directly apprehend. This includes not only the physical but also the social environment with all its cultural artifacts, language, etc.
This is at least so in the world of the natural attitude, the world of everyday life where we have direct experience of our fellow-men and where I can assume that I am seeing the same table as you are seeing. This must be seen as part of the "unquestioned but always questionable background of our experiences" and is related to what Schutz calls the "epoché of the natural attitude", he writes:

Phenomenology has taught us the concept of phenomenological epoché, the suspension of our belief in the reality of the world as a device to overcome the natural attitude by radicalizing of the Cartesian method of philosophical doubt... man within the natural attitude also uses a specific epoché, of course quite another one than the phenomenologist. He does not suspend belief in the outer world and its objects, but on the contrary, he suspends doubt in its existence. What he puts in brackets is the doubt that the world and its objects might be otherwise than it appears to him. We propose to call this epoché the epoché of the natural attitude.

The positive side of this epoché of doubt is our natural belief in the world, in its reality, its being there, its having a past and the likelihood of a future as well as its being given to us in such the same way. This belief constitutes the philosophical foundation of the common-sense world.

The self-explication of my own lived experiences occurs within the total pattern of my experience. This total pattern is comprised of meaning-contexts developed throughout my previous lived experiences, and at least in principle all the lived experiences comprising these meaning-contexts are potentially present. In principle, the continuum of my total stream of lived experience is open to my self-explication. But in regard to the Other, his whole stream of lived experiences is

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34 Schutz, "On Multiple Realities", Collected Papers, 1, 229.
not open to me, I can only catch sight of disconnected segments of it. In addition, even with an ideal knowledge of all your meaning-contexts by which you arrange your experiences, there is no way of determining whether the meaning-contexts in which I would arrange your lived experiences are the same as those which you use. Your manner of attending to your experiences would be different from my manner of attending to them. We may conclude that "everything I know about your conscious life is really based on my knowledge of my own lived experiences." 35

My lived experiences of you are constituted in simultaneity or quasi-simultaneity with your lived experiences to which mine are intentionally related. And because of this, when I reflect I am able to synchronize my past experiences of you with your past experiences, whereas my stream of consciousness is given to me discontinuously and in only "interpretive perspectives". Schutz also points out that the Other's experiences are never grasped in their completeness, there is always a selection from the Other's conscious processes as they are given in simultaneity. As a result, Schutz argues that "our knowledge of the consciousness of other people is always in principle open to doubt, whereas our knowledge of our own consciousness, based as it is on immanent Acts, is always in principle indubitable." 36

At this point one is inclined to assume a sceptical position and to conclude that the Other's lived experiences are in principle

inaccessible to our understanding. But Schutz rejects this conclusion and contends that all we can conclude from this is that "the meaning I give to your experiences cannot be precisely the same as the meaning you give to them when you proceed to interpret them."  According to Schutz, there can be no doubt about the occurrence of the Other's experiences although there can never be certainty that I have interpreted them as he has. In principle, my interpretation of your lived experiences in the strict sense does not (except by accident) render the same subjective meaning as that assigned by your interpretation to your lived experiences.

Schutz contends that it is necessary to realize that we are speaking of two types of subjective meaning: one resulting from self-explication, and the other from the interpretation of another's experiences. The basis of this is Husserl's differentiation between immanent and transcendent acts (including perceptions), or, if we are permitted to use such language, inner and outer acts (including perceptions):

Under acts immanently directed, or . . . under intentional experiences immanently related, we include those acts which are essentially so constituted that their intentional objects, when these exist at all, belong to the same stream of experiences as themselves. . . . Intentional experiences for which this does not hold good are transcendentally directed acts, as, for instance, all acts directed towards. . . . the intentional experiences of other Egos with other experience-streams, likewise all acts directed upon things. 36


38 Husserl, Ideas, General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology.
In regard to our experience of the existence of Others, we may say that it is "an inner experience in the radical meaning of Husserl, as our Self participates likewise in the vivid simultaneity of the ’We’ which belongs...to our stream of experiences."\(^3^9\) As the reader will recall, this involves the We-relationship proper and the general thesis of the Alter Ego’s existence. On the other hand, we may say that our knowledge of the Other’s specific thoughts or his subjective configuration of meaning is a "transcendental one, and our belief in the existence of these [particular] thoughts...is principally dubitable belief."\(^4^0\)

Now we can understand Schutz’s warning that "the process by which I apprehend the subjective configuration of meaning in which my fellow-man’s experiences stand for him must not be confused with the We-relation proper."\(^4^1\) What is open to doubt is not our belief in the existence of the Other’s conscious processes, but rather our understanding of the Other’s thoughts. For, in principle, we interpret and render

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\(^3^9\) Schutz, "Scheler’s Theory of Intersubjectivity", Collected Papers, 1, 176.

\(^4^0\) Schutz, "Scheler’s Theory of Intersubjectivity", Collected Papers, 1, 176.

\(^4^1\) Schutz, "The Dimensions of the Social World", Collected Papers, 11, 26. The reader will recall (above pages 66-67) that the We-relationship as a pure relation is without content. As well, apperception and representation are characterized as transcendent and the motivational connection between the indicating and the indicated is opaque. These latter concepts are amplified in Appendix III.
meaningful our lived experiences in terms of the whole content of our stream of consciousness, and it is impossible for our streams of consciousness to contain the same content.

The ordinary notion of understanding another person is ambiguous for it may involve understanding my experiences of you, or, understanding your subjective experiences. Indeed, the ambiguity becomes that much greater when such things as the arrangement of lived experiences into meaning-contexts and the usage of signs are brought into consideration. To grasp the various levels in the meaning of the term "understanding" or "Verstehen" Schutz offers a generic definition. "Understanding", he writes, "is correlative to meaning, for all understanding is directed toward that which has meaning and only something understood is meaningful."\(^2\) In Appendix I we examined the implications of the concept of meaning for the sphere of the solitary Ego and we are now able to say that the intentional Acts involving the interpretation of one’s own subjective experiences can be called Acts of understanding. The lower spheres of meaning comprehension upon which self-explication is based can also be designated as understanding. We are now in a position to view some of the various levels of understanding:

1. In the natural attitude the world is understood by interpreting one’s own lived experiences of it. It is immaterial at this level whether these experiences are of inanimate objects, animals or

of fellow-men. In regard to the other self, this initial concept of understanding involves an explication of our lived experiences of the Other as such; that is, the Other is discovered as having duration and consciousness only by explicating my own lived experiences of him.

2. Although changes in the external object known as the Other's body are perceived, these changes are interpreted in the same way as changes in inanimate objects, namely, by interpreting one's own lived experiences of these events and processes. His understanding of the occurrence involves appealing to his own past experiences, he does not consider what is going on in the observed person's mind. 43

3. This is also true in regard to the perception of the Other's expressive movements and of the signs he is using, namely, as long as he is "referring to the general and objective meaning of such manifestations and not their occasional and subjective meaning." 44 In regard to the example of a word as the sign of its own word meaning, the observer must connect the word "table" with the idea of a definite piece of furniture capable of being pictured with approximate accuracy - as a type. As long as he is not concerned with the why or how the word is being used by the Other, his interpretation remains on the level of self-interpretation - the interpreter is only "concerned with the meaning of the word, not the meaning of the use of the word" 45 that is,

43 These interpretations presume the acceptance of the general thesis of the alter ego, according to which the external object is understood as animated, namely, as the body of another self.


his intended meaning. Designating these interpretations as self-inter-
pretations, we are not overlooking the fact that the interpreter's pre-
vious knowledge of the Other belongs to his total configuration of ex-
perience, that is, to the content from whose perspective the interpre-
tation is made; and,

4. This sphere of interpretation is transcended when the per-
ceived processes are considered as lived experiences belonging to an-
other consciousness exhibiting the same structure as my own. The Other's
perceived bodily movements will be grasped not only as my lived experi-
ences of these movements within my stream of consciousness, but also
"it will be understood that, simultaneous with my lived experience of
you, there is your lived experience which belongs to you and is part of
your stream of consciousness."46 I do not know the specific nature of
your experiences for I do not know the meaning-contexts that you have
employed in classifying your lived experiences - provided that you are
even aware of the bodily movements I perceive. For instance, in the
distance we simply perceive a man falling, getting up and falling again -
and knowing nothing else about the man (about his meaning-context, his
intentions, etc.,) - we do not know if this man is sick, drunk, a clown,
or stuntman practicing his act, and so on.

Although I may know the meaning-context by which I classify my
own lived experiences of you, this is not your intended or subjective
meaning in the true sense of the term. All that is comprehended in an

"approximate value" of the limiting concept "the Other's intended meaning". The meaning-context into which the Other orders his lived experiences is vague for the observer - because the question of whether a particular bodily movement is purposive or only reactive can only be answered in terms of the Other's context of meaning. Furthermore, we may inquire about the Other's schemes of experience, about his motivational contexts. We see how complex it is to understand another and that it is only possible by interpreting "lived experiences belonging to other people in terms of our own lived experiences of them."

By "genuine intersubjective understanding" Schutz means much more. This much more "is really the only strict meaning of the term, involves grasping what is really going on in the other person's mind, grasping those things of which the external manifestations are mere indications." This genuine understanding is possible only after a self-interpretation of these indications and signs. From the total context of his own experiences, the interpreter will know that "corresponding to the outer objective and public meaning which he has just deciphered, there is this other's inner, subjective meaning". Let us consider the example of a woman going into a furniture store and ask-

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ing the salesman if he has any tables. The salesman will not be satisfied that she merely means any type of table at all. He will have to attempt to determine what type of a table she desires, and his questions may take this general form: "What does this person mean by speaking to me in this way, at this moment? Why does she do or say this? (What is her in-order-to motive?) What circumstances does she give as the reason for this? (What is her genuine-because motive?) What does her choice of these words indicate?" Because this is a furniture store where people buy furniture and the salesman's function is to sell furniture, he will presume from what she said that she is interested in seeing his tables and he may be able to convince her to buy one. He may first determine if the table is for herself, what kind of a table - for instance, what style - Scandinavian, Colonial, and so on, and then, is it to be a dining room table, a coffee table, etc. These questions are concerned with conscious experiences: they attempt to establish a context of meaning in which the speaker (the salesman) understands the words she (the prospective buyer) is speaking as well as to establish the motive for the utterance. These questions refer to the Other's own meaning-contexts as well as to the complex manner "in which his own lived experiences have been constituted polythetically and also to the monothetic glance with which he attends to them."50 It must be emphasized that the meaning of the Other's activities for herself (the prospective buyer) does not necessarily have to be identical with

the meaning which her perceived external conduct has for the observer or interpreter (the salesman). The woman may not be at all interested in purchasing a table - she may only be pricing them, just "killing time" while waiting for a friend, or seeking shelter from the rain.

We must now expound Schutz's account of intersubjective understanding by considering it first without communicative intent and then with communicative intent. In this latter section we shall consider his account of indications and signs.

In regard to action performed without any communicative intent, let us consider the example of a man cutting wood and the task of determining what is going on in his mind. To question him would require entering into a social relation involving the use of signs, that is, communicating. So let us imagine that all we know about the woodcutter is what we see in front of us. Interpreting our perceptions we know that this is a fellow human being whose bodily movements indicate that he is involved in the activity known as cutting wood.

But how do we know what is going on in his mind? Assuming as our starting point the interpretation of our perceptual data, we can plot out exactly how we would carry out this action. We can actually imagine ourselves performing this action. In situations like this we may project the Other's goal as if it were our own and imagine ourselves performing it. The action is projected in the future perfect tense as if it were completed while our imagined execution is accompanied by the usual retentions and reproductions of the project.

On the other hand, instead of imagining the execution of the Other's goals, we may recall in concrete details how we have already
carried out a similar action. But this procedure is merely a variation of the same principle.

In these cases we have put "ourselves in the place of the actor and identify our lived experiences with his." It may be objected that this is merely a repetition of the "projective" theory of empathy whereby we read our own experiences into another's mind and thus we only discover our own experiences. But there is only one point in common with this empathy theory - that is, the general thesis of the Thou as the "Other I" whose experiences are constituted in the same manner as my own. And yet even here Schutz's position differs for while he begins with the general thesis of the Other's flow of duration, the projective empathy theory jumps from the mere fact of empathy to the belief in the Other's mind by an act of blind faith. Schutz uncovers what is involved in the self-explanative judgment "I am experiencing a fellow human being". The Other's subjective experience of his own actions is in principle different from our own imagining of what we would do in the same situation - for the intended meaning of an action is in principle always subjective and accessible only to the actor. The mistakes of the empathy theory are that it pretends to be a

knowledge of the other person's mind that goes far beyond the establishment of a structural parallelism between that mind and my own... it naively tries to trace back the constitution of the other self within the ego's consciousness to empathy, so that the latter becomes the direct source of knowledge of the other.  


As these actions have no communicative intent, the most that can be said about them is contained in the general thesis of the alter ego which asserts a structural parallelism between that mind and my own.

Before examining intersubjective understanding with communicative intent, we must turn our attention to Schutz's account of indications and signs. In our everyday activities we experience the world within our actual reach as an element or phase of our unique biographical situation and this involves transcending the Here and Now to which it belongs. We expect that what is now within our actual reach will go out of our reach, but we anticipate that we shall then be able to find our bearings in the world and shall be able to come to terms with it. This presupposes that we shall be able to recognize what we now found relevant. Thus we are motivated to single out and mark certain objects as relevant. Upon our return we expect to find these marks useful as "subjective reminders" or "mnemonic devises". It does not matter what these marks may be, a string tied around my finger or a check on the margin of a page. The important thing is that "all these marks, themselves objects of the outer world, will from now on be intuited not as mere 'selves' in the pure apperceptual scheme. They entered for me, the interpreter, into an appresentational reference." The string functions as a subjective reminder to purchase typing paper at the bookstore while a check on the side of a page is to draw attent-

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53 Schutz, "Symbol, Reality and Society", Collected Papers, 1, 309. An amplification of the apperceptual scheme and the appresentational reference can be found in Appendix III.
ion to an important passage in regard to a paper being written. In their function as subjective reminders, marks are detached from any intersubjective context. The object was selected arbitrarily to serve as a mark: "The mark has 'nothing to do' with what it should remind me of, both are in an interpretational context merely because such a context was established by me." Later we may not be able to remember what the string was to be a reminder of, or fail to recognize the relevance of the marked passage.

We must now distinguish between the general concept of "indication" or "symptom" and the concept of "sign" or "symbol". By an indication is meant

an object or state of affairs whose existence indicates the existence of a certain other object or state of affairs, in the sense that belief in the existence of the former is a nonrational (or 'opaque') motive for belief in the existence of the latter. The important fact is that there exists a relationship between the two solely in the mind of the interpreter and it may be called a context of meaning for him. This may involve observing that event B usually follows event A and we assume that there is "a manifestation of a typical and plausible relationship existing between A and B.""56

54 Schutz, "Symbol, Reality and Society", Collected Papers, 1, 309.


56 Schutz, "Symbol, Reality and Society", Collected Papers, 1, 310.
though nothing is known regarding the nature of this relationship. Yet we usually take it for granted that future occurrences of the type of event A will be followed in typically the same way— a recurrence of the type of event B. The indicating member of the pair is not merely a "witness" for the indicated one and points to it, but as well it suggests that the other member exists. The particular nature of the motivational connection must be opaque; for if "there is clear and sufficient insight into the nature of the connection between the two elements, we have to deal not with the referential relation of indication but with the inferential one of proof." Schutz subsumes under the relation of indication most of what are commonly referred to as "natural signs", such as the halo around the moon indicating rain, the smoke fire, as well as the gas gauge on the dial indicating an empty gas tank. In addition he states that "the perceived movements of the other person's body are indications for the observer of what is going on in the mind of the person he is observing." With a knowledge of indications the individual is able to transcend the world within his actual reach by relating elements within it to elements outside of it.

57 Schutz, "Symbol, Reality and Society", Collected Papers, 1, 311. Schutz then states that this eliminates the "possibility of calling the footprint of a tiger (recognized as such) an indication or 'sign' of his presence in the locality." Ibid., p. 311. But it is not at all clear how this is any different from calling smoke an indication of fire. As well, Schutz does not provide any criterion enabling us to recognize what constitutes a "clear and sufficient insight into the nature of the connection".

Like marks, indications are representing objects not necessarily presupposing the existence of fellow-men and the possibility of communication with them. But this is not to deny that they may, and often do, function in an intersubjective context.

Disregarding telepathy, comprehension of the Other's thought requires

as vehicle, carrier, or medium the apprehension of an object, fact, or event in the outer world, which, however, is not apprehended as a self in the mere apperceptual scheme but appresentationally as expressing cogitations of a fellow-man. . . . We propose . . . to use the term 'sign' for designating objects, facts, or events in the outer world, whose apprehension appresents to an interpreter cogitations of a fellow-man. 59

There is a change in terminology from the previous quotation in which Schutz referred to another's movements as an "indication" of what is going on in his conscious processes. In this quotation he refers to them as a "sign". In _The Phenomenology of the Social World_ from which the former quotation is taken Schutz regarded a sign as a particular type of indication, but in the article "Symbol, Reality and Society" he regards a sign as a new type of representing object. An indication is now restricted to refer to what was traditionally known as a "natural sign" whereas a sign designates the appresentation of another's cogitations.

Fink argues that the "appresentation, in which the Other is given [according to Husserl], . . . is an appresentation which essent-

ially cannot be redeemed". 60 Schutz replies that it is difficult to demarcate between apperceptions which can and those which cannot be converted into perceptual presentations. An example of an apperception which cannot be converted into perceptual presentation is the centre of the earth, but this is not the same with the perception of the Other. He maintains that Fink's thesis must be modified and in agreement with Scheler, Schutz argues that we "directly perceive in the smile of the Other his joy; in his folded hands his praying." 61 As well, it can be added that "I can apprehend the Other's inner life only by means of indicative symbols (his gestures, his facial expressions, his language, his actions), that I can apprehend it only by apperceptions." 62 The symbolic relationship is peculiar in the sense that whereas the symbol is alone present, that which is symbolized is only apperceived.

Representation is the relationship between the sign and that which it signifies. In a broad sense, a symbol is always an external object, but it is not looked upon as an object but as a representative of something else. The essence of the signitive relation is that "the

60 Schutz, "The Problem of Transcendental Intersubjectivity in Husserl", Collected Papers, 111, 35.


62 Schutz, "The Problem of Transcendental Intersubjectivity in Husserl", Collected Papers, 111, 87. But Schutz is careful to note that this does not apply to the transcendental experience of the Other.
This relation is a particular relation between contextual or interpretive schemes applicable to the external objects—signs. In order to understand a sign, it is not interpreted through schemes adequate to it as an external object, but through schemes adequate to whatever it signifies. Speech is more than mere vocal sounds, these vocal sounds are perceived as words and as expressing meaning. There is a fundamental ambiguity in the saying: "a sign is always a sign for something". The sign is what it means or signifies, its "sign meaning" or "sign function". But as well, the sign is also the "sign for" what it expresses, namely, the "subjective experiences of the person using the sign". The peculiarity of a sign is that it expresses subjective experiences. Consequently, in the world of nature there are only indications and not signs. Here we find the triadic character of the sign- or symbol-relation which involves not only the sign or symbol and the object for which it stands, but also the "mind of the interpreter (or the interpretant's thought) for whom the significative or symbolic relation exists." And ultimately, the "sign always refers back to an act of choice on the part of a rational being—a choice

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64 Schutz, The Phenomenology of the Social World, p. 119.

65 Schutz, "Symbol, Reality and Society", Collected Papers, 1, 343.
of this particular sign - the sign is also an indication of an event in the mind of the sign-user. 66 This may also be referred to as the expressive function of the sign.

According to Schutz, symbols are a creation of appresentational references of a higher order, they are in contradistinction to the terms "marks", "indications", and "signs". As an appresentational relationship the symbolic relationship involves "entities belonging to at least two finite provinces of meaning so that the appresenting symbol is an element of the paramount reality of everyday life." 67 The symbolic reference is characterized by its transcending the finite province of meaning of everyday life in the sense that only the appresenting member of the related pair pertains to this realm whereas the appresented member has its reality in another finite province of meaning. Examples of symbols are the scientific model, the poetic metaphor, the religious painting - just to mention a few examples. They have their grounding in the world of everyday reality which enables communciation of the appresenting elements, whereas their referential scheme very often belongs to the symbolized finite province of meaning.


67 Schutz, "Symbol, Reality and Society", Collected Papers, 1, 343.
of the work of art:

the interrelationship of the symbols as such is the essence of the poetic content and (that) it is unnecessary and may even be harmful to look for the referential scheme which the appropresenting elements of the symbolic relationship would symbolize, if they were indeed objects of the world of daily life. But their connection with these objects has been cut off; the use of the appropresenting elements is just a means of communication; whereas poetry communicates by using ordinary language, the ideas symbolized by this language are real entities within the finite province of poetical meaning. As well, scientific theory utilizes symbols to apprehend realities within its realm and operates with them, presupposing that their usefulness and validity are independent of reference to everyday common-sense thinking and its realities.

The reader will recall from Appendix 11 that communication occurs only in the reality of the outer world and because of this it constitutes the core of the everyday world - paramount reality. This presupposes that in order to have communication, there must be a scheme of experience - in a double sense:

1. It must be an "expressive scheme" in the sense that we have "at least once used the sign for that which it designates, used it either in spontaneous activity or in imagination"; and,

2. It must also be an "interpretative scheme" for we have "already in the past interpreted the sign as the sign of that which it designates." 69


For example, when two wrestlers confront each other in the ring, the events occurring on the body of one are the events occurring in the outer world which are perceived and interpreted by his opponent as events of such and such a kind having such and such a meaning and calling out in him these responses. In general, it may be said that:

For each partner the other’s body, his gestures, his gait and facial expressions, are immediately observable, not merely as things or events of the outer world but in their physiognomical significance, that is, as symptoms of the other’s thoughts.

We must now turn our attention to actions with a communicative intent. The Other’s body, unlike a mere physical natural object such as a stone or a stick, is a "field of expression for the life-experience of that psychophysical unity... the other self." It may be said that every action of another can be interpreted as an expression of his experience, but there is a fundamental ambiguity involved in the term "expression". It may either mean that:

1. The Other’s external behavior functions as an indication of his inner subjective experiences; or that,

2. The Other is deliberately attempting to express something by acting in a certain manner.

What may be expressions in the first sense, for instance, the reddening of the Other’s face with anger, are not expressions in the second sense.

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70 Schutz, "Common-Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action", Collected Papers, 1, 16.

It may also happen that the actor will attempt to express something and fail to "get it across"; thus the interpreter has no true indication of the Other's subjective state. It may be said that the body is a field of expression to the extent that these changes can be interpreted as the subject's inner consciousness "coming to expression" in the first sense. But this does not imply that these bodily changes are "voluntary" expressions or that the Other is "expressing an intention". These expressive movements do "not aim at any communication or at the expression of any thoughts for one's own use or that of others...[they are] no genuine action in our sense, but only behavior". Merely from the Other's blushing it cannot be said that she is expressing her embarrassment.

Every expressed intention is a message which presupposes a recipient of the message. It is only when the actor seeks to gear or project outward the contents of his consciousness that it is known as an expressive action or working. His bodily movements which I apprehend as a threat are given to me directly only as an objective state of affairs to be interpreted. By interpreting the shaking of his fist as a threat, I am bringing in a highly structured context of meaning without being aware of it. There is no apparent subjective meaning denoting why he is exhibiting the attitude he does. We have no intuitive knowledge of the Other's subjective meaning. As an observer I am presented with the Other's body as a field of expression in which I am

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able to "watch" the flow of his lived experiences.

It is only through a further Act of attention involving myself intimately with the Other and regarding his subjective experiences as flowing simultaneously with my subjective experiences of him, that I am really able to grasp his anger. In brief, by means of the Thou-orientation which we have described above—see page 66. "This turning to the genuine understanding of the other person is possible for me only because I have previously had experiences similar to yours even if only in phantasm, or if I have encountered it before in external manifestations."73 Expressive movements are distinct from expressive actions for the former have meaning only for the observer whereas the latter have meaning for the actor as well. Whereas the actor is unable to render his own expressive movements meaningful as they occur for they are merely prephenomenal, he can of course subsequently give meaning to his expressive movement, for example, his blush. As it is occurring, it is only for the observer that the expressive movement enters into a meaningful context for it is a sign of the Other's lived experiences. From the mere occurrence of a piece of external behavior the interpreter has no basis of knowing whether this is an expressive movement or action. This can only be determined by appealing to a different context of experience. A person's features and gestures in everyday life may be no different from those of an actor on the stage, but the latter's expressions and gestures are viewed as set signs to

73Schutz, The Phenomenology of the Social World, p. 117.
express certain subjective experiences. In everyday life we are never certain whether the Other is acting or not — unless certain factors other than his immediate movements are taken into account: he may be imitating someone, playing a joke, and so on. We see the clown only as a clown because of his situation in the circus ring.

In regard to the interpretation of the use of signs, it will be recalled (page 90) that they are interpreted according to schemes not adequate to themselves but rather belonging to other objects. The connection between the sign and its corresponding non-adequate scheme depends upon the interpreter’s past experience: “reciprocal understanding and communication already presupposes a community of knowledge”.

The applicability of the scheme of what is signified to the sign is an interpretative scheme based on experience:

A sign system is a meaning-context which is a configuration formed by interpretive schemes; the sign-user or the sign-interpreter places the sign within this context of meaning.

. . . In a strict sense. . . meaning-connections hold, not between signs as such, but between their meaning. . . between the experiences of the knowing self establishing, using, or interpreting the signs.

We are only able to understand these “meanings” in and through signs. For those understanding the sign system, for example the English language, it is a meaning-context of a higher order between previously established signs. Understanding a sign, or more precisely, the pos-

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75 Schutz, The Phenomenology of the Social World, pp. 120-121.
sibility of interpreting it within a given system, involves a previous decision to accept and use this sign for the meaning it denotes. In order for intersubjective understanding to occur, the significance of the connection of a meaning with a sign within a given sign system must be understood by both the user and the interpreter of the sign.

A sign has "an 'objective meaning' within its sign system when it can be intelligibly coordinated to what it designates within that system independently of whoever is using the sign or interpreting it." In other words, regardless of who is using the sign or the connection in which it is used, someone who has mastered the sign system will interpret the sign in its meaning-function to refer to what it designates. The interpreter must refer the sign to some previous experience(s) and be able to repeat the syntheses that have constituted this interpretative or expressive scheme. The sign-interpreter grasps the objective meaning as a part of his interpretation of his own experience.

In a dictionary we find the objective meanings of words, namely, meaning depending neither on the user nor the circumstances of their use. But the total of all the words in the dictionary is hardly the language. Schutz contrasts the objective meaning of a sign to the sign's expressive function, that is, "its function as an indication of what actually went on in the mind of the communicator, the person who used the sign; in other words, of what was the communicator's own meaning-context.""
Over and above their objective meaning, all expressions have a meaning which is both subjective and occasional - both for the user and the interpreter.

We must now consider the subjective component. Associated with the sign is a "certain meaning having its origin in the unique quality of the experiences in which he once learned to use the sign (or, perhaps, of the experiences in which he later came to use the sign - or even of the experiences in which he is only now using the sign). This added meaning is a kind of aura surrounding the nucleus of the objective meaning."\(^{73}\) It may even be said that an attempt to understand the objective meaning is an unrealisable ideal, but this does not mean that language is not precise. Rather, it is precise whenever the subjective meaning is sufficiently explained according to the circumstances and the purpose at hand. Schutz gives the example of Goethe's usage of the word "demonic" which can only be deduced from a detailed study of all his works. But in order to be able to "study" the word, we must be familiar with how the term has been used by others. Over and above the objective typical meaning, the interpreter must take into account the experiences of the user of the sign when he connected the sign and the signatum if a true understanding is to be accomplished. As well as being subjective, the meaning is also occasional, that is, it "always has in it something of the context in which it is used."\(^{79}\) Besides understanding merely the Other's words, we also under-

\(^{73}\text{Schutz, The Phenomenology of the Social World, p. 124.}\)

\(^{79}\text{Schutz, The Phenomenology of the Social World, p. 125.}\)
stand the total articulated sequence of his syntactically connected words, in short - "what he is saying". "In this sequence every word retains its own individual meaning in the midst of the surrounding words and throughout the total context of what is being said." But in order to understand the Other, we must grasp the meaning of the whole statement. At the moment of interpretation I require the whole context of my experience. Step by step a synthesis is built up in which we can view the individual acts of meaning-interpretation and meaning-context. Schutz suggests that this distinction underlies the distinction in German between Wort (unconnected words) and Wort (discourse). Discourse is a meaning-context which slowly emerges for both the interpreter and the speaker.

The superimposed meaning-context serving as an interpretive scheme is the unity belonging to every act arising from the sign-user's own plan or project of action. The interpreter is unable to grasp this until the act is completed - he must wait until the end to grasp it as a whole. Until then all he can do is arrive at an approximation based upon previous knowledge. This limitation applies equally well to the objective and subjective meaning. Only when the last word has been spoken can we arrive at an effective interpretation. Then these polythetic acts are synthesized into a monothetic act and we grasp the meaning of what he said.

We have already seen (page 92) that a sign has two different

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functions. The interpretative function involves an ordering of the sign into a previously learned sign system. This is merely another aspect of what we referred to as self-interpretation. We must also inquire into the expressive function of a sign which involves interpreting its subjective and occasional meaning acquired within its context of discourse. When the subjective meaning is our own, we must go back in memory to our experiences at the moment of using the sign and establish its meaning, for instance, what was my objection to the marked passage? Or in regard to another, we must find out about the Other's subjective experiences when he used the sign. For example, what does he mean by marking this passage as obscure? Its meaning seems perfectly obvious to me. In either of these cases there are two components: the objective - the meaning of the sign as such, its kernel; and the subjective - the aura or fringe emanating from the subjective context in the sign-user's mind.

In a conversation between two people, the speaker's thoughts are gradually built up in his mind while the listener follows each step just as the thoughts occur. The thoughts do not emerge prefabricated; rather, they are gradually constructed by the speaker as well as gradually interpreted by the listener. The speaker and the listener both "live through the conversation in such a manner that on each side Acts of meaning-establishment or meaning-interpretation are filled in shaded with memories of what has been said and anticipations of what is yet to be said." 31 These Acts may be focused upon in reflection or

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analysed as a unit. For both of them the sentences function as the meaning-contexts for the words while the whole discourse provides the meaning-context for the separate sentences.

In principle (when there is maximum intersubjective understanding), the Other's conscious Acts communicated by signs are understood in a manner no different than our own. As an interpreter we situate ourselves in the place of the Other and imagine ourselves selecting and using these signs. The Other's subjective meanings are interpreted as if they were our own. This will require drawing upon our knowledge of the Other and the peculiar way he expresses himself. This personal knowledge is acquired throughout the conversation. The speaker selects his words with the intention of being understood by the listener. In the case of the letter writer, he selects his words in the light of his knowledge of the receiver - he re-reads it to see if the sender will understand what he meant. The speaker strives to communicate not only the objective meaning, but also his personal attitude. Just like any other act, his communicative aim will be sketched out in the future perfect tense. His selection of words will depend on his habits acquired from interpreting Others, but also it will be influenced by his knowledge of the listener. When the speaker focuses on what is going on in the Other's mind, he can only estimate how much is actually getting across. His purpose or aim is to have his listener or reader re-think his thoughts.

The listener is in a different position. The actual establishment of the words' meaning has already occurred and he can start from the objective meaning and attempt to establish the speaker's subjective
meaning. This involves starting from the already spoken words and attempting to imagine what project the speaker had in mind. Whereas the speaker pictured something future in terms of something present, the listener must picture something pluperfect in terms of something past. As well, the speaker begins with his project as datum and attempts to determine whether it is going to be fulfilled by the listener's future interpretation while the listener begins with the words which either have succeeded or failed to fulfill the speaker's project and he attempts to uncover the project. Since the words chosen by the speaker may or may not have expressed his meaning, the listener may always doubt if he has adequately understood the speaker. The speaker's project is "always a matter of imaginative reconstruction for his interpreter and so is attended by a certain vagueness and uncertainty."

Until now we have been concerned with the content of communication, but it must be emphasized that the "actual communicating is itself a meaningful act and that we must interpret that act and the way it is done as things in their own right." Once the objective and subjective meanings of the content have been determined, the interpreter may proceed to inquire why the communication was first made, that is, what is the speaker's in-order-to motive. It is essential for every communicative act to have an extrinsic goal, for every "act

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of communication has...as its in-order-to motive the aim that the person being addressed takes cognizance of it in one way or another."

The recipient of the communication must seek the "plan" behind the communication. This may be done either by a participant or a non-participant observer. This applies even to acts without communicative intent, as we saw in the example of the woodcutter (pages 83-85); the completed act is interpreted as the fulfillment of the in-order-to motive. The Other's subjective experiences can only be grasped if we find out the Other's in-order-to motive, and a knowledge of this motive is presupposed in any attempt to uncover the Other's because-motive: the "subjective meaning-context which is the in-order-to motive must first be seen and taken for granted as an already constituted object in itself before any venture into deeper levels is undertaken." For instance, we may say that he committed the crime in order to obtain money, and later we may also say that he committed the crime because of the influence of his friends. The former is in terms of the actor's project or meaning-context (to obtain money) while the latter attempts to explain his action in terms of past experiences, that certain past experiences created a disposition on his part to achieve his goal through crime rather than by honest labour. Because of the influence of his friends he had a disposition to obtain money through crime. It is not


85 Schutz, *The Phenomenology of the Social World*, p. 130. A further discussion of motives can be found in Appendix I.
at all necessary that the Other have experienced these deeper levels as meaning-contexts. Usually the Other is not at all aware of the because-motive of his action; but whenever he is, he is no longer an actor. We may say that this man understands himself. This involves a "separate intentional Act independent of and detached from the action it is interpreting". Essentially, self-understanding is the same as understanding another - with the exception that we usually have a richer array of information at our disposal about ourselves and our past than Others do.

We must recapitulate the complex structure involved in understanding the Other in regard to communication and the use of signs. We must separate the factors involved when the sign stands in a particular meaning-context:

1. In a sign system, the lived experiences signified by the sign are in a meaning-context. Since these experiences have been constituted into a synthesis, they may be signified as a unit.

2. In order for me to use a sign, it must already be part of a sign system and it must have been interpreted. For example, unless the term "Verstehen" belonged to the German language and I was aware of its meaning, I would neither be able to use it nor to understand it. Understanding a sign requires a complicated synthesis of lived experiences which results in a type of meaning-context. Two elements are involved in this meaning-context: the sign as an object in itself

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and the signatum. Each of these has its own separate meaning-context in its own right, and embracing these is a new meaning-context referred to as the coordinating scheme of the sign.

3. The Act whereby the sign is selected and used involves "a special meaning-context for the sign-user to the extent that each use of a sign is an expressive action." Every action comprises a meaning-context because the successive lived experiences of that action are viewed as a unified act, and, consequently, we can say that every expressive action is a meaning-context. For instance, my replacing the typewriter ribbon can be seen as part of my total act of applying for a scholarship. It is not necessary that every use of a sign be a case of communication; for instance, I may sing a few bars of a song to myself.

4. The meaning-context "sign-using as an act" may function as the foundation for a superimposed meaning-context "sign-using as communicative act" and not consider the particular person addressed, for instance, the sign "bus stop".

5. This superimposed meaning-context may enter a higher and wider meaning-context in which the addressee is taken into account. The goal of the communicating act is not merely that someone take cognizance of it, but that it would motivate the tuned-in Other to a particular attitude or behavior. To give an example, in a restaurant when we give our order, we expect that our order will motivate others

to prepare our meal.

6. Since we are communicating with the addressee in a "here, now, and in this way", the sign-act can be placed in a yet broader context of meaning by uncovering the in-order-to motive of the communicative act. For instance, my neighbour may be knocking at my door to ask me to move my car so he can get his car out and thus go to work.

The depth to which the interpreter will go into the other's meaning-context will be determined by their situation and purpose at hand. For instance, a personnel manager interviewing a prospective employee will delve much deeper into the latter's reason's for wanting to work for this company than would an ordinary employee who may be satisfied merely by discovering that the other needed a job. Or, in a trial the court will attempt to judge whether the defendant is innocent or guilty of a particular crime; this involves a rigorous examination of his motives, the meaning-contexts of his actions, and so on; in particular - why did the defendant visit the deceased on the night of the shooting? Such a rigorous investigation would hardly be conducted to determine, for instance, why we are having fish for supper.
AN EVALUATION OF SCHUTZ'S ACCOUNT OF INTERSUBJECTIVE UNDERSTANDING

In Chapter One we presented a summary of Alfred Schutz's investigation of the Life-world. There we uncovered a theme crucial both in the Life-world and for this thesis, namely, intersubjective understanding or Verstehen. And of the three levels of application of Verstehen we selected to make problematic the epistemological problem of intersubjective understanding and particularly to concentrate on the following questions: "How well-founded is my belief in the Other's conscious processes?" and "How are these accessible to me?" Our concern in Chapter Two was to examine the responses of two traditional approaches to the epistemological problems of Verstehen. We found the positions advocated both by the inference by analogy theorists and the behaviorists to be untenable and inadequate in accounting for intersubjective understanding. Chapter Three and the Appendices were devoted to an exposition of Schutz's account of the epistemological problem. In this concluding chapter we must determine the following: whether or not Schutz was successful in avoiding the pitfalls associated with the above mentioned positions, the advantages and difficulties of his account, and a final evaluation of his position.

In his account of intersubjective understanding Schutz is careful to distinguish the two different and yet related aspects of the epistemological problem. As a result, the question of our belief in
the existence of the Other's conscious processes is not dependent upon
the question of our access to these processes and our understanding of
their nature. And by so doing Schutz is able to avoid the conclusion
of the inference by analogy theorists who maintained that our belief
in the Other's conscious life is subject to doubt since we do not have
direct access to the Other's processes. Schutz argues that although
our understanding of the Other's conscious processes may be open to
doubt, in the natural attitude we do not simply take for granted the
existence of his conscious life for our belief in its existence is found-
ed in the pure We-relationship. This belief, as it is found in the
natural attitude, is referred to as the "General Thesis of the Alter
Ego" and implies that the Other is also conscious and that his stream
of consciousness is similar to mine. ¹ Although the Other may be mis-
understood, our belief in his conscious processes is not altered. In
fact, this misunderstanding reveals how firmly this belief is held.
To ask the Other: "Have I understood you correctly?" presupposes that,
on the one hand, by addressing me you take for granted the existence
of my conscious experiences, that they are similar to yours and that I
would be able to understand you; on the other hand, that I expected to un-
stand you and that by addressing you, I take it for granted that you will understand my question. I am also taking for granted the existence of your conscious processes and their similarity to mine. Your attempt to explain your position again affirms what both you and I took for granted; it confirms that our minds are similar, that you understand my question (my misunderstanding you) and that you may attempt to resolve this misunderstanding. But even if you were to concern yourself with someone else, I would probably conclude that you did not think it worth your while to clarify yourself, or that you were rebuffing me for not paying closer attention. There would be no reason for me to question the existence of your conscious life.

Schutz argues that we have a "privileged" access to the Other's conscious life but in a different sense than the inference by analogy theorists argue. Whereas the latter would maintain that we only have an indirect access to the Other's conscious processes, Schutz argues that we have direct awareness of the existence of the Other's conscious processes in the pure We-relationship while our understanding of what those processes are is always indirect or mediate. But unlike the behaviorists who would maintain that thoughts, feelings and experiences can be analyzed into overt behavior he argues that there are always two thoughts and two feelings - even if they are qualitatively the same. Thus, it can be said that Schutz is proposing a position between that of the inference by analogy theorists and the behaviorists. By formulating this third position Schutz is able to avoid the difficulties associated with the other positions, for example, he avoids the difficulties of having to infer that the Other is similar to myself and of
attempting to account for the Other's conscious processes in terms of his empirical observable behavior. He is rejecting the latter's claim that another's conscious processes are completely available to me while also denying the former's contention that they are only indirectly available. Although I am able to experience the Other's anger, the meaning that this action has for him is not grasped or comprehended by me. I can only interpret his action - not certain that my interpretation will correspond to his interpretation. This was denied by the behaviorists who were only concerned with what was revealed in an objective empirical observation and thereby denied - or at least considered irrelevant - a subjective meaning for the subject which was not revealed in such an observation. We are never certain of the Other's intentions - is he attempting to intimidate me into accepting his testimony or is he insulted that I did not agree with him? Although in our everyday activities my understanding of your actions may correspond to your understanding to the extent that we are able to carry out this common project, it cannot be concluded that in principle my knowledge of you is equivalent to your self-knowledge. This would mean that I would have to be you! There is a "crucial distinction between understanding our own experiences of the other person and understanding the other person's experiences."² The source of this difference is that each of us interprets his experiences in terms of his whole stream of consciousness and this background is not directly revealed or available

to anyone else. The meaning of your action is available to you and in order for me to understand (in the full sense of the term) you, I must attempt to interpret your action in terms of your experiences and meaning-contexts - and not mine. That is, I must attempt to interpret your action in terms of what it means for you and not myself. But this means that I cannot achieve any more than an approximate understanding of you.

We must now carefully examine Schutz's account of the epistemological problem of intersubjective understanding. In his account of experiencing the Other he writes: "I experience a fellow-man directly if and when he shares with me a common sector of time and space." How are we to understand him when he also explicitly maintains that the Other's bodily movements are interpreted as indications of his inner life? But how can we directly experience our fellow-man when all that we apprehend are indications which must be interpreted as signs of his conscious processes? Schutz argues that these processes are geared into the external world and are revealed in an intersection of internal and cosmic time - the vivid present where they may be mediat­ely grasped and interpreted. Consciousness is understood as "confront­ing a world and (being) engaged in human action" while the "Other is not outside the acts of consciousness which present him as loving or fierce but the very content of these acts." When Schutz speaks of

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4 Natanson, The Journeying Self, pp. 2-3. He writes: "the
this directness he refers to a direct awareness of the existence of
the Other's conscious processes. However, our understanding of what
those processes are is always indirect or mediate because our attention
- in regarding his body as an indication - is focused not on his body
but rather on that which is appresented by it, namely, his conscious
experiences. This latter part of his position would differ from the
inference by analogy theorists in the sense that signitive apprehen-
sion is neither an inference nor a judgement. But this direct aware-
ness of the existence of the Other's conscious experiences must be
restricted to a face-to-face We-relationship. He is thereby excluding
this directness from all the other derivative relationships. In this
relationship the
sharing of a common sector of time implies a genuine simulta-
enity of our two streams of consciousness: my fellow-man
and I grow older together. The sharing of a common sector
of space implies that my fellow-man appears to me in person
as he himself and none other. His body appears to me as a
unified field of expressions, that is, of concrete symptoms
through which his conscious life manifests itself to me
vividly. 5

5Schuts, "The Dimensions of the Social World", Collected
Papers, 11, 23.
For Schutz the uniqueness of this concrete We-relation is that I seem to "participate" immediately in the development of the Other's stream of thought. In other words, the "alter ego... is that stream of consciousness whose activities I can seize in their present by my own simultaneous activities." This grasping of the Other's conscious activities as they are formulated would seem to be what Schutz means by experiencing the Other directly, but this is misleading since he must concede that we can never apprehend the Other non- mediated. This is supported by his claim that

the Thou-orientation can... be defined as the intentionality of those Acts whereby the Ego grasps the existence of the other person in the mode of the original self... This originality is, of course, not "primary", since the conscious life of the other person is in principle inaccessible to me in direct perception. It is... a 'secondary' originality."

I apprehend my fellow-man's conscious life by interpreting his bodily gestures as a sign that he is having certain lived experiences which he is expressing through those movements. My intentional gaze is directed right through my perceptions of his bodily movements to his lived experiences lying behind them and signified by them... what is involved is a certain intentional Act which utilizes an already established code of interpretation directing us through the bodily movement to the underlying experience.

6 Schutz, "Scheler's Theory of Intersubjectivity", Collected Papers, 1, 174. Elsewhere he writes: "it is only within the We-relationship that I can concretely experience you at a particular moment of your life." The Phenomenology of the Social World, p. 166.


I am thereby able to apprehend and to understand the "objective" meaning of this action, that is, the meaning that it would have if it were performed by anyone in any situation:

this bodily movement which I have apprehended as a threat is directly given to me only as an objective state of affairs, as something to be interpreted. Now, when I interpret the shaking of a fist as a threat, I bring in a highly structured context of meaning without noticing it. But even if the awareness of the threat were as direct and immediate as you please, it would still fall short of intuitive knowledge of the other person's subjective knowledge.

But while I interpret the Other's gestures as a threat, I am in the dark as to why he is shaking his fist at me, what this gesture means for him, his intentions in acting this way. Next, I may attempt to interpret the Other's "subjective" meaning, that is, what are the underlying intentions? This is possible to the extent that I am able to picture our streams of consciousness running side by side. Within this picture I must interpret and construct your intentional Acts as you choose your words.9 But I can only interpret them in terms of my own lived experiences and by necessity the content of our streams of experiences is different. Since I only apprehend signs and indications of his consciousness and not consciousness itself, how can I be certain that the Other has a consciousness? If there is only an "opaque" relation between the sign and that which it signifies, can he be deceiving me? Or if he is not attempting to fool me, cannot our


understanding of the signs be different, for example, for me it may be a sign of hostility while he meant it as a sign of welcome? Since Schutz speaks of the face-to-face relationship as only implying that the Other is similar, it may be asked if Schutz's account of intersubjective understanding has avoided the problems of scepticism and solipsism associated with the inference by analogy position.

Schutz's account differs from that of the inference by analogy theorist in many important aspects and in so doing avoids many of its pitfalls. As we saw above, consciousness is in the world even if it is grasped medially. Like Schutz, Husserl asserts that we "behold the living experiences of others' through the perception of their bodily behavior... The other man and his psychical life is indeed apprehended as 'there in person', and in union with his body, but, unlike the body, it is not given to our consciousness as primordial."11 Although this perception is not a source of "absolute" knowledge, we do have knowledge of what is apperceived by the symbol because consciousness is not some mysterious, hidden entity to which only the subject has access. A source of scepticism for the inference by analogy theorists was their claim that no direct access was possible to the Other's conscious life and therefore its existence could only be inferred after

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11Husserl, Ideas, pp. 51-52. It would be interesting to compare the soul-body in the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition with its counterpart in Phenomenology. Our perception of the Other's bodily movements is only one source of our knowledge of another and not the most important. "Other experiences, the knowledge of a system of interpretable signs, for instance, are sufficient for the belief in the existence of other persons" Schutz, "Scheler's Theory of Intersubjectivity", Collected Papers, 1, 159.
a comparison of our bodies. But a comparison of our bodies followed by an inference by analogy is not necessary in order to recognize the existence of the Other as a person. Through the Thou-orientation which is a prepredicative experience - and not a conscious judgment - I grasp the existence of the Other as a person. In other words, "it is precisely the being there of the Other toward which the Thou-orientation is directed, not necessarily the Other's specific characteristics."¹² Hesitation or doubt may occur, for example, when I am not sure if that car is a 1970 or a 1971 model, but this doubt leaves untouched my identification of that object as a car. Similarly, in our everyday activities there is no question of whether or not you are a person - I perceive you as one.

The question of doubt or scepticism does not enter into our belief in the existence of the Other's consciousness. This lived belief is so firmly grounded in our experiences that it is "prior to doubt, and in that unique sense, absolutely certain, that is, neither dubitable nor indubitable."¹³ Our belief in the existence of Others may be questioned in regard to the evidence I have of their existence, but just to formulate these thoughts would be to utilize evidence of the existence of Others. Indeed, to write a book propounding scepticism or to discuss solipsism with another - requires presupposing as

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existing what one intends to deny - and is thereby self-refuting. Silence would be the most convincing argument for scepticism or solipsism. Of course one may object that Hume wrote his Treatise and in it established a case for scepticism. But there are fundamental errors and inconsistencies in his position, for example, we do not merely have "ideas" and "impressions"; for as we saw in Appendix 1 the field of perception reveals objects against a background of other objects to which they are related through their horizons and fringes. He is similarly mistaken in affirming that a person is a continually changing bundle of data - in Appendix 1 we also saw that there is continuity in our stream of consciousness. 14

While the question of doubt does not occur concerning our belief in the Other's conscious existence, we may doubt the possibility of intersubjective understanding. But we can only doubt in detail our understanding of the Other's subjective meaning - always assuming that the understanding of the Other is in principle possible. One may object that this unquestioned but always questionable belief that intersubjective understanding is in principle possible conflicts with Schutz's argument that my explication of your subjective meaning will not in principle correspond with your comprehension. But an examination of the structures of the natural attitude will support Schutz's

14 For a discussion of the errors which gave rise to Hume's conclusions, see Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, pp. 84-91. A critique of Hume must be left to a later study.
contention and reveal that, in fact, they are compatible. Our everyday activities are governed by the "epoché of the natural attitude" whereby all doubt in regard to the possibility of intersubjective understanding is suspended. Only with the occurrence of some (extraordinary) incident which provides evidence for us to question this assumption - will the epoché be partially suspended and the question of understanding this Other here and now be made problematic. But even by calling into question this belief our inquiry will still be governed by the pragmatic interest of our everyday activities and our underlying assumption of the possibility in principle of intersubjective understanding will be left unquestioned. This pragmatic motive is also important in our everyday understanding since it is not governed by the striving for the precision that characterizes the mathematical sciences. It is often necessary that I understand you only to the extent that we are able to carry out this project. It is not necessary that I understand what being a sales clerk means to the one fulfilling that function as long as I am able to be served. There are different levels of intersubjective understanding in our everyday life-world and, although doubt may be entertained in detail on one level, the other levels are left unaffected. One may agree with our ability to function in these activities without a precise understanding of the Other's subjective meaning, but then he may object that the only conclusion we can arrive at as a philosopher is scepticism in regard to understanding another. But to know that the Other's subjective meaning differs from my comprehension of it only presupposes a more fur-
demental level of intersubjective understanding in that I am able to comprehend you as different from myself.

We must now turn our attention to a claim Schutz makes in one of his papers. He contends that in the We-relationship our experience of the Other's existence is "an inner experience in the radical meaning of Husserl, as our Self participates likewise in the vivid simultaneity of the 'We' which belongs...to our stream of experiences."\(^{15}\) This would seem to imply that the We-relationship is not an external relationship between my stream of experiences and yours, but rather it involves a temporary merger of our streams of experience into one.

We must first examine this passage as it occurs in the context of a discussion of Husserl's and Scheler's interpretations of what each understands by the term "inner experience or perception". While Husserl argues that inner perceptions involve the "objects of perception which pertain to the same stream of experiences as the perceptions themselves", Scheler argues that they include "all the objects of psychical or mental life."\(^{16}\) Schutz says that the perceptions of the Other's thoughts are inner experiences in Scheler's sense because their objects are psychical, but outer in Husserl's sense because their objects belong to another stream of consciousness. In regard to the question of the merging of our streams of consciousness, we must con-


sider the following passage concerning communication presupposing a mutual tuning-in relationship: "This relationship is established by the reciprocal sharing of the Other's flux of experiences in inner time, by living through a vivid present together." From this it would seem that there is a merging of the streams of consciousness, and the nature of this merging can be seen in his contention that "all my experiences of the other self's experiences are still my own experiences." It is a merging of the form rather than the content of our streams of consciousness. In suffering with another, this suffering in the sense of the suffering of Others is reproduced by me.

We must now consider some objections which may be raised against Schutz's position. According to Schutz the General Thesis of the Alter Ego, the We-relation proper and the Thou-orientation proper are "pure" in the sense that they are without content - in other words - they are "intellectual constructs" or "ideal limits" which cannot be actualized. Little evidence is found in his published writings about


19 Concerning "ideal limits" Husserl writes: they "cannot on principle be found in any sensory intuition, to which on occasion morphological essences 'approximate' more or less, without ever reaching them, this ideation is something essentially and radically different from the apprehension of the essence through simple 'abstraction', in
how this knowledge about some Other is concretely worked out into
knowledge of the Other. In regard to the General Thesis of the Alter
Ego Zaner suggests that this thesis is concretely worked out in-the
various aspects of the socialization of knowledge (above pages 8-10),
that is, the reciprocity of perspectives, the social origin of know-
ledge and its social distribution. They are what he calls "movements"
of the General Thesis. 20 Underlying this is the theme shared with
Scheler that there is a distinction "between the empty knowledge about
the existence of some alter ego and some community as such and the
knowledge of one or more concrete fellow-men and social groups." 21
It is only in the face-to-face relationship that I am able to appre-
 hend my fellow-man as a unique individual while in all the other re-
lationships he is apprehended as "typical" in regard to his attitudes,
motives and action. But even in the face-to-face relationship we only
apprehend a part of his personality in terms of "social roles". Can
we experience the Other as an individual rather than in terms of so-
cial roles, and, if so, how? There is little evidence in his already
published writings that Schutz addresses himself to this and other

which a selected 'phase' in the world of essences is set up as some-
thing intrinsically vague, as simply typical." Ideas, p. 206.

20 Zaner, "Theory of Intersubjectivity: Alfred Schutz", Social
Research, pp. 85-87.

21 Schutz, "Scheler's Theory of Intersubjectivity", Collected
Papers, 1, 158. See also Scheler, The Nature of Sympathy, trans. F.
related problems, but we anticipate his yet unpublished *Die Struk-
turen der Lebenswelt* where we expect that he has worked out a solu-
tion. We believe that a solution can be very well worked out within
his position and without violating his already formulated structures.

One may object that Schutz should have provided concrete formulations
of such concepts as the General Thesis of the Alter Ego, the Thou-ori-
entation and the We-relationship - rather than as "ideal limits". The
reader will recall (page 113) that the Other's conscious activities
are only given mediately in "secondary originality" and that these
concepts which classify our lived experiences must encompass the in-
finite number of various forms of encountering the Other. And one
must agree with Husserl that the "versatility of the concepts, the cir-
cumstances that they have mobile spheres of application, is no defect
attaching to them; for they are flatly indispensable to the sphere
of knowledge they serve...they are within this sphere the only con-
cepts justified."23

Underlying Schutz's position are important and yet contro-
versial presuppositions which are far from self-evident. He accepts
many of Weber's reductions without inquiring into their validity, for
example, that it is possible to reduce "all kinds of social relation-
ships and structures, all cultural objectifications, all realms of

22 A possible solution to this problem is outlined in Zaner, "Theory of Intersubjectivity: Alfred Schutz", *Social Research*, pp. 89-93.

It is on the basis of his acceptance of this presupposition that Schutz formulates the mutual tuning-in relationship and the We-relationship. Another controversial assumption is that the individual is more basic than social. This is evident from his acceptance of Weber's "interpretive sociology" founded on the principle that "it is only by such understanding of individual action that social science can gain access to the meaning of each social relationship and structure, constituted as these are, in the last analysis, by the action of the individual in the social world." This assumption of the priority of the individual is reinforced by his use of transcendental phenomenology in his analyses of the constitution of meaning which were so important in his investigation of human action. We are not challenging the validity of these assumptions, but rather what seems to be his acceptance of them without first rendering them problematic.

As early as 1932 Schutz recognised the "notoriously difficult problems which surround the constitution of the Thou within the subjectivity of private experience." But the existence of these problems did not prevent him from investigating such important themes for intersubjectivity as meaning, action, etc., from within the sphere of


the transcendental phenomenological reduction. The results of these analyses provided the foundation not only for his investigation of intersubjective understanding, but also for some of his later investigations of the structures of the Life-world. In the early 1940's he suggested that the problem of transcendental intersubjectivity was a pseudo-problem and that Husserl’s concept of the transcendental Ego was "a term incapable of being put into the plural." At Royaumont in 1957 he delivered a paper entitled "The Problem of Transcendental Intersubjectivity in Husserl" in which he elaborated on the numerous fruitless attempts made by Husserl to resolve this most perplexing problem and personally admitted the existence of "difficulties involved in the theory - difficulties which I could not overcome in the twenty-five years of studying this theory of my highly respected teacher." And yet in the face of these insurmountable difficulties (which we cannot discuss here) Schutz remained firm in his conviction that Husserl had "established once and for all the principle that analyses made in the reduced sphere are valid also for the realm of the natural attitude." This parallelism should hold also for the problem of


29 Schutz, "Husserl’s Importance for the Social Sciences", Collected Papers, 1, 149.
intersubjectivity. If Schutz is correct in claiming that Husserl had been unsuccessful in resolving the pseudo-problem of transcendental intersubjectivity, it is difficult to see how Schutz could still take for granted the parallelism between the transcendental and the mundane realms without at least making this parallelism problematic. It is not as if transcendental phenomenology was widely accepted and followed by phenomenologists. On the contrary, Spiegelberg speculates that unless some basic clarifications can be achieved soon, transcendental phenomenology with its doctrines of reduction and constitution has a dubious future. . . . there is ample reason for expecting that phenomenology as a whole will survive the difficulties encountered by transcendental phenomenology, perhaps by elimination of its most controversial concepts and by an increasing return to an unencumbered phenomenology of the Lebenswelt and its phenomena.30

Without supporting his claim for the parallelism of these two realms, on what grounds can we accept the analyses performed in one realm as valid for another? If intersubjectivity is not possible in this reduced realm, can the results be transposed to an intersubjective sphere? Is it possible to do justice to sociality or individuality in a transcendental phenomenological investigation? These and numerous other problems force themselves upon us once we admit Schutz's criticism. It would be too easy to respond negatively to the above questions and thereby in one swoop discard Schutz's account of intersubjective understanding. But these problems require very careful and painstaking investigations for which, at present, we can only ex-

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30. Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement, 11, 641-642. A similar course had been followed by Schutz many years before.
press the need. We shall bracket these problems although we believe that Schutz's account will remain valid since we believe that the investigations conducted in this realm are applicable to the mundane realm. But we are not prepared to defend this view in this thesis.

With the intention that these structures would provide a foundation for a scientific investigation of human action, Schutz uncovered the structures of intersubjective understanding from carefully selected examples which involved the maximum amount of understanding. This was evident concerning the phantasied projection of completed states of affairs for this structure had to be somewhat modified when it was applied to the various types of human action. For example, Schutz describes the situation of the letter writer who carefully formulates the letter in the light of his knowledge of the receiver, re-reading it to be certain that he has communicated his personal attitude. It is easy to imagine a situation where one pays little attention to the attitude he is expressing or his knowledge of the receiver. But this involves only a modification since he would be taking for granted his intentions and the attitude he was expressing as well as assuming that the Other could read. Rather than being a weakness of Schutz's account it is one of its merits since these broad structures can be applied to a wide variety of activities of the same type with only minor alterations.

We must conclude that Schutz has formulated an alternative position which successfully avoids the pitfalls to which the positions of the inference by analogy theorists and the behaviorists are suscep-
tible. On the one hand, his account of intersubjective understanding avoids scepticism in regard to the existence of the Other's conscious processes. This difficulty could not be resolved by the inference by analogy theorists. On the other hand, Schutz does not follow the behaviorists in attempting to account for intersubjective understanding in terms of empirical observable behavior. As well as avoiding the weaknesses characterizing these other positions, Schutz's account provides an accurate description of intersubjective understanding as it occurs in the life-world. We believe that there are no serious objections which can be levelled against his position.
APPENDIX I

Two different attitudes are possible in our stream of consciousness: either,

1) We can live in our acts directed toward the object of these acts; or,

2) We can adopt the reflective attitude by which we turn to our acts and grasp them by other acts through internal perception.\(^1\) The natural attitude is primarily characterized by this living within our acts, but by reflection we may turn away from this attitude and concentrate upon the "purified sphere of conscious life, upon which all our beliefs are founded."\(^2\) Later we can turn back from this sphere to the mundane one.

The structure of our experiences will vary according to whether we surrender ourselves to the flow of consciousness or stop to reflect upon it. While our behavior is actually taking place it is a \textit{phenomenal experience}. Only after it has already happened (or, if it occurs

\(^1\)\textit{Every lived experience is "in the significant sense internally perceived" but this does not lead to an infinite regress - for "internal perception" is not a "lived experience" and thus it cannot be again internally perceived.}\textbf{\textit{Russerl, The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness}}, ed. H. Heidegger, trans. J. Churchill (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1966), p. 175.

\(^2\)\textbf{\textit{Schutz, "Some Leading Concepts of Phenomenology"}, Collected Papers, 1, 104.}
in successive phases, only after the initial phases have resulted) does it stand out as a discrete item from the background of our experiences. This is phenomenal experience. Phenomenal experience is never one of ourselves behaving but always of our having behaved. We may say that prephenomenal experience is experienced as now while phenomenal experience is just now. The significant differences of these attitudes are illustrated in the following example. Motion can be experienced either as a divisible event in homogeneous space or as a continuously changing manifold as a phenomenon of our inner life. Expressed somewhat differently - the experience of motion can be conceived either as frozen, spatialized and already completed acts or as enduring conscious processes. Two different "temporal fields" also become apparent: "there is present to us an Objectivity in Objective time, the authentic temporal field as opposed to the temporal field of the stream of lived experiences."

This peculiarity of consciousness is found in our bodily movements which can be simultaneously experienced on two different levels: inasmuch as our movements are in the outer world we are able to view them as events occurring in space and spatial time; and inasmuch as we experience them together from within as occurring changes, that is, as manifestations of our spontaneity pertaining to our stream of consciousness, they partake of our inner time or durée. It is only in and by our bodily movements that we make a transition from our durée to cosmic time.

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Our working acts partake of these two dimensions: "In simultaneity we experience the working action as a series of events in outer and inner time, unifying both dimensions into a single flux. . . the vivid present." Working acts participate in these two dimensions while the vivid present originates in the intersection of cosmic and internal time.

The difference between the flowing experiences in pure duration and the discrete discontinuous images in the spatial-temporal world is a difference between two levels of consciousness in duration, there are no distinctions between the earlier — and the later — Now, except that we know what has just been is different from what now is: "I experience my duration as a uni-directional, irreversible stream and find that between a moment ago and just now I have grown older." But we are not aware of this while still immersed in the stream. Our awareness of an experience changes into a remembered having-just-been-thus. The remembering removes the experience from the irreversible stream and modifies the awareness by rendering it a remembrance.

With every act of spontaneity something new emerges. This act functions. . . in every moment of its flux as a primal

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4 Schutz, "On Multiple Realities", Collected Papers, 1, 216. Schutz uses the term "simultaneity" in the same precise senses as Bergson. "I call simultaneous two fluxes which are for my consciousness either one or two indifferently according as my consciousness perceives them together as one single flux if it pleases to give them one undivided act of attention, or, on the other hand, distinguishes them in their full length if it prefers to divide its attention, but without cutting them in two." Bergson, quoted by Schutz, "Scheler's Theory of Intersubjectivity", Collected Papers, 1, 173.

sensation which undergoes its shading-off. . . . The spontaneity which sets about its work in steps in the flux of consciousness constitutes a temporal Object, namely, an Object of becoming, a process, essentially only a process, and not an enduring Object. And this process sinks back into the past.

Examining this sinking "back into the past" we find the after-consciousness of the primal impression — "primary remembrance or retention" followed later by "recollection or reproduction". The role of retention and/or reproduction is to recall experiences. The former is characterized by the Now continuously changing from retention to retention whereas the latter is secondary remembrance. Retention is compared to a comet's tail joined to the actual perception and it refers back to earlier Now points. Recollection is entirely different from this — for as soon as primary remembrance is past, a new memory of this motion can emerge.

An experience cannot be adequately grasped either in regard to its wholeness or its full unity:

It is essentially something that flows, and starting from the present moment we can swim after it, our gaze reflectively turned towards it, whilst the stretches we leave in our wake are lost to our perception. Only in the form of retention or in the form of retrospective remembrance have we any consciousness of what has immediately flowed past us.

With the attending glance of attention lived experience acquires a new mode of being. It is comprehended and becomes the object of a directed glance of attention; this presupposes an elapsed, passed experience.

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7 Husserl, Ideas, p. 140.
"Only the already experienced is meaningful, not that which is being experienced. For meaning is merely an operation of intentionality, which . . . only becomes visible to the reflective glance." Only those that have been presented to the reflective glance can be termed meaningful. It would be incorrect to say that our experiences have meaning for meaning does not lie in the experience. Rather, experiences are meaningful when they are grasped reflectively. Meaning is the way the Ego regards its experiences. Meaning lies in the attitude the Ego assumes toward the part of the stream of consciousness which is already past. The singling out of an elapsed lived experience by a reflective glance constitutes the experience as meaningful.

Russerl argues that on principle every experienced act can be grasped in reflection. But Schuts disagrees with him on this point and argues that these are essentially actual experiences of our spontaneous life which are experienced while they occur but do not leave any trace in our memory. They are such intimate internal perceptions as the experience of the "corporeality of the Ego" (physical pain and sexual sensations) as well as the "psychic phenomena" (moods and anxieties) which

lie close to the absolute private core of the person (. They)

8 Schuts, The Phenomenology of the Social World, p. 52. We must distinguish between: "the subjective meaning: a situation has for the person involved (or the one a particular action has for the actor himself), and the objective meaning, that is, the interpretation of the same situation or the same action by anyone else." Schutz, "Equality and the Social Meaning Structure of the Social World", Collected Papers, 11, 227.
are irrecoverable as far as their How is concerned, and their That can be laid hold of only in a simple act of apprehension. . . . That which is irrecoverable - and this is in principle always something ineffable - can only be lived but never "thought": it is in principle incapable of being verbalized.

Although it is not possible to experience the other's pain, we can directly experience and "share" the attitudes he assumes toward these experiences.

We must distinguish between Schutz's usage of the terms "action" and "act":

1. The term "action" designates human conduct as an ongoing process devised by the actor in advance, that is, it is based upon a pre-conceived project; and,

2. The term "act" designates the outcome of this ongoing process, namely, the accomplished action.

Action is a spontaneous activity oriented toward the future, but this future-orientation is not only peculiar to action. It is a property of all primary constituting processes - for contained within each such process are intentionalities of lived experience directed toward the future:

At first there comes in the immediate 'protention' . . . ; the exact counterpart of immediate retention, and then the anticipation (reproductive in the more proper sense of the term) which re-presents in quite another way, and is the counterpart of recall.

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Anticipation or foreseeing expectation must be distinguished from immediate protention. Whereas protention "presents", anticipation "represents".

Protentions appear as empty and unfulfilled only in the constitutive process of unreflected-upon-action in the gradual unrolling of experiences constituting spontaneous activities. But as soon as the action is contemplated as if it was already over and done with, the situation changes. If only one phase of the action is fixed upon in reflection, then this phase appears as completed. In the case of remembering, protentions are never expectations which are still empty, determinable and unfulfilled. Rather, they bear the marks of fulfillment - for due to the transformation of this Now into a Has Been, this Has Been is now viewed from a new vantage point. What was an empty expectation for the actor - is either fulfilled or unfulfilled for the one who remembers. The act points from the present to the future, yet for the one who is remembering, it points from the past to the present - while still retaining the temporal character of the future. Reflection is only concerned with the act and not with action. And as such, acts are always fulfilled protentions.

An analysis of action reveals that it is always carried out in accordance with a more or less implicitly preconceived plan: "In every action we know the goal in advance in the form of an anticipation that is 'empty', in the sense of vague, and lacking its proper 'filling-in', which will come with fulfillment".¹¹ In principle, the

projection of an action is carried out independently of all action. This projection involves a phantasying of action, that is, a phantasying of the spontaneous activity but not the activity itself.\textsuperscript{12} All anticipations of future action (including projections) are quite vague and indeterminate compared to the real thing which will finally occur.

What is projected is the act which is the goal of the action and this goal (projected act) is brought into existence by the action. Only the completed act can be pictured in phantasy. For if the act is the goal of the action and if the act was not projected, then the picturing of the action would be necessarily abstract - it would be an empty protention without any specific content. It might be objected that in ordinary language we speak of imagining our actions. Let us imagine ourselves getting up from our chair and walking over to the window to close it. What is pictured here is neither a series of specific steps to the window nor a series of muscular contractions and relaxations. Rather, we picture the completed act of having gone over to the window in order to close it. If we were to concentrate on each step, what we have pictured is a completed act: the act of having taken step one; the act of having taken step two, and so on. This would hold true if we were to analyse it still further.

We must examine Schutz’s account of projection as the phantasying or picturing of a completed state of affairs. He writes:

\textsuperscript{12} Projecting is more than mere phantasying; projecting is motivated phantasying, motivated by the anticipated supervening intention to carry out the project.
I have to visualize the state of affairs to be brought about by my future action before I can draft the single steps of my future acting from which this state of affairs will result. Metaphorically speaking, I have to have some idea of the structure to be erected before I can draft the blueprints."

According to this it would seem that before undertaking any deliberate action, that is, one with an end in view, we must form an image before our minds of the state of affairs which will result when the action is completed. But is it necessary to picture or imagine the state of affairs to be brought about? It may be necessary for an architect to have an idea or picture of the school for which he must design blueprints, but does this model apply to all our actions?

Hardly not! We can intend to bring about a state of affairs and carry out this intention without forming an image or a picture of that state. We need only conceive of it. The door bell rings, I get up and answer the door—it is not necessary to have a complete picture of that state. Of course, such a picture could be phantasied and projected if the situation required it. Furthermore, we sometimes act in order to avoid a certain state of affairs rather than to bring one about, for example, slamming on the brakes to avoid hitting a child. But if anything is pictured here before acting, it is undoubtedly the state of affairs to be avoided, namely, injuring the child rather than the state of affairs to be achieved. We are confident that Schutz would have agreed with these modifications.

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Schutz, "Choosing Among Projects of Action", Collected Papers, 1, 68.
Projection is possible only in reflective thought and not in our immediate or spontaneous activities. Immediate experience is surrounded by an aura of expectations which are merely empty pretensions. These pretensions may sometimes seem to be "filled-in," but these experiences have been actually influenced by the plan or project we have in mind. The project is carried over from moment to moment - thus rendering each momentary expectation quite concrete - even though this concreteness is derived from and is the result of the "feeding" of the project into this particular moment.\(^{14}\)

We may say that an action is "conscious in the sense that, before we carry it out, we have a picture in our mind of what we are going to do."\(^{15}\) Our actions are conscious only if we have previously mapped them out in the future perfect tense, that is, we project them as if they were already over and done with and lying in the past. It is an actualized event which the actor pictures and assigns to its place in the order of experiences given to him at the moment of pro-

\(^{14}\) The project is in no sense reified. When it comes to putting content into these terms, a given content can be either the project or the action - and it may change from one to the other. One may object that we are not continually "aware" of having the project before our mind as we are carrying out the project. This objection seems to imply that we must continually "say" to ourselves or have the picture continually before our mind as we are crossing the room: "I am going to close the window, I am..." This is not what Schutz means. While carrying out our project we usually live in our experiences and do not reflect on the goal of our actions. The projected goal is merely intended by the consciousness of the Ego and not an actual part of his stream of awareness.

\(^{15}\) Schutz, The Phenomenology of the Social World, p. 63.
jection. Since it is pictured as if it is simultaneously past and future, we say it is thought of in the future perfect tense. It is not only the projection, but any expectation and anticipation may be the "thing" which will have been done. His attitude toward his project will differ from his attitude toward the finished act since the past or present perfect acts show no such empty anticipations. In retrospection he remembers them in terms of his past anticipations - which have or have not come true.

Let us briefly examine how an Act of attention turns toward an elapsed lived experience, for example, in the field of experienced sensuous perception. Although the visual field is revealed as homogeneous, certain data within this field "stand out". All our experiences of given objects have these two characteristics:

1. From the outset all the objects of experience have the character of typical familiarity; and,

2. The process of apperceiving these objects by originary intuition is permeated by anticipations of not actually apperceived but preintended features.

Both of these characteristics are closely connected with each other and with the typicality of our experiences. Through an interplay of passive synthesis (of association) the data refer to other data already experienced. Since the data "stand out" they exercise an affective tendency upon the Ego - they impose themselves upon my attention - they interest me. This is the pre-predicative stratum of our experience.
within which the intentional objects and their qualities are not at all well circumscribed; ... we do not have the original experiences of isolated things and qualities, but ... there is rather a field of our experiences within which certain elements are selected by our mental activities as standing out against the background of their spatial and temporal surroundings; ... within the through and through connectedness of our stream of consciousness all these selected elements keep their halos, their fringes, their horizons; ... an analysis of the mechanism of predicative judgment is warranted only by recourse to the mental processes in which and by which pre-predicative experience has been constituted. 16

This passive attention and interest is nothing else than the turning of the Ego toward the intentional object. But this turning of the Ego to the interesting object is merely an abbreviation for a very complicated process. New expectations (both actual and potential) are aroused by the interesting object and the awakened interest demands to be satisfied, thus proceeding from one perceptual phase to another empty expectation which will have to be fulfilled. These expectations and their fulfillments refer to previous perceptual experiences either retained or recollected.

Another aspect of the constituted object in our stream of consciousness is revealed here:

Every perception of a 'detail' refers to the 'thing' to which it pertains, the thing to other things over against which it stands out...its background. There is no isolated object as such, but a field of perceptions and cogitations with a halo, with a horizon, or...with fringes relating it to other things. 17


What is perceived is only one aspect of a thing against its background of other aspects and things. The aspect of the thing caught in my Act of attention suggests other possible aspects: the front side of a house suggests its back, the roof the unseen foundation, and so on. Together, all these movements may be referred to as the inner horizon of the perceived object. There is also an outer horizon: the house refers to the trees, the trees to the garden, the garden to the street, to the city, to the country, and so on. These collections of implications designate the inner and outer horizons and are concealed within the noema itself and may be "systematically explored by following the intentional indications within the noema itself."18 If we were to follow its intentional implications the noema would seem to be changed whereas the noetic, the perceiving act, does not change. The noetic may be modified by changing the perceiving act itself, for instance, changing from originary experience to recollection. This leads to the distinction between the originary experience of the experienced thing and the experiences based upon retention or recollection of previous experiences. This distinction is based upon the interconnectedness of the stream of thought in inner time: the present cogitation is surrounded by fringes of retentions and protentions connecting it with what just now happened and with what may be expected to happen immediately, and refers to cogitations of the more distant past by recollection and to the future by anticipations.19


This distinction is of primary importance in relation to "self-knowledge" and "knowledge of the other".

From the outset our experiences are fundamentally articulated according to types. Even novel experiences refer to a horizon of preacquaintanceship against which they must stand out as novel experiences, for example, this strange animal may be recognized as a dog. Although our actual experiences are characterized as carrying along an infinite open horizon, our anticipations of these experiences are "typically determined by their typical prefamiliarity, as typically belonging, that is, to the total horizon of the same and identifiable objectivity, the actually apperceived properties of which show the general type." This horizon is in continuous flux - yet with each new step that which has been anticipated in a typical way becomes more precisely determined, so that eventually the dog may be seen as a "cairn terrier". This stock of pre-experienced material is always in our possession to arouse other actual associations. Interest leads to an appropriation, that is, a retaining of the interesting object. This appropriation results not through act of logical judgment but

according to a certain typicalness of the appropriated object, by reason of which it is experienced as being in relation (of overlapping, of superimposition and concealment, of similarity and dissimilarity, and so on) with other objects of the same familiar type, and by reason of which all

20 Schutz, "Type and Eidos in Husserl's Late Philosophy", Collected Papers, 111, 94.
anticipateds adhering to this typical experience come to have a typical character.21

Our world is neither experienced as a sum of sense data nor as an aggregate of individual isolated objects standing in no relation to one another. We do not experience coloured spots and contours, but rather things, people, animals - in particular as dogs, birds, fish, and so on. Briefly, we experience types.

Typifying consists in passing by what makes the individual unique and irreplaceable. . . all typification consists in the equalization of traits relevant to the particular purpose at hand for the sake of which the type has been formed, and in disregarding those individual differences of the typified objects that are irrelevant to such purpose.22

Types are not pure and simple, but rather they are relational terms which carry a subscript referring to the particular purpose for the sake of which the type has been formed. This claim must be seen in the light that "typification takes place according to the particular structures of relevancy".23 By necessity judgments of the form "s is p" are elliptical for the "s" is never exclusively "p", because it is also such things as "q", "r", "s", "t", as well as "p". In the biographical moment, the Here and Now under consideration when the


judgment is made that "s is p", "g-being-p" is thematically relevant for me, because it is thus constituted by the motivational relevancies which in their totality are referred to in abbreviated form by the expression 'in the biographical moment under consideration'. This dog may be typified as a terrier and entered into the dog show because of his showmanship, training ability to perform manoeuvres flawlessly whereas he is used for breeding because he is male, registered pure-bred, good with children and of suitable colouring. But modification is even greater when we consider typifications of the different finite provinces of meaning; especially evident is the difference in purpose of the pre-scientific and the scientific attitude and their typifications. On the level of pre-predicative typification in the pre-scientific attitude a whale is conceived as a member of the fish family because of its bodily shape and its living in the water. But in the scientific attitude a whale is conceived as a mammal and related, for example, to the terrier because females have mammae to nourish their young, whales are warm-blooded and so forth. The different purposes of the natural (pre-predicative) and the scientific attitudes stress and ignore different qualities in the formation of their types. And within these attitudes the typical structures I choose will depend on the thematic relevancy which these objects have for my purpose.

At every moment in our conscious life, we reach into the fu-

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ture by pretentions and expectations, and into the past by retentions and recollections. The structure to which these typifications and their appropriate use belongs is an inseparable element of the socio-cultural heritage handed down through the broad processes of education to the infant by his parents and teachers, and they in turn by their parents and teachers, and so on. These typifications are socially derived, socially distributed, and socially approved - for the attainment of typical results by the typical application of typical means.

"The socially approved system of typifications and relevances is the common field within which the private typifications and relevance structures of the individual members of the group originate." The sum-total of these structures of typification constitutes a frame of reference and interpretation in terms of which solutions can be found for our problems in regard to both the social and the physical world.

Because of the social character, both of these typifications and of our knowledge, we may take it for granted that we may change places with our fellow-man and experience the world in substantially the same perspectives as he.

Discrete lived experiences do not appear from the pure stream of duration until the reflective glance of attention begins to operate. Before this there is continuity by the fact that they are mine. To this primal unity another unity is added at a higher level, this is

the unity conferred by the reflective glance which is the unity of meaning. With this the content of consciousness is raised from the status of prephenomenal to phenomenal experiences. There is still a higher unity within experiences consisting in the gathering of the separate Acts into a higher synthesis which in turn becomes an "object" in consciousness: "(w)hat was polythetic and many-rayed has now become monothetic and one-rayed." 26 This is a configuration of meaning or meaning context defined by Schutz as follows:

our lived experiences \( E_1, E_2, \ldots, E_n \) stand in a meaning-context if and only if, once they have been lived through in separate steps, they are then constituted into a synthesis of a higher order, becoming thereby unified objects of monothetic attention. 27

Configurations of meaning already consist of meanings created in more elementary Acts of attention. This can be illustrated in the example of a project which is sketched out in an intentional Act, and then brought to fulfillment by action. The completed act provides the unity to the intentional Acts as well as to the actions involved in its performance, this act is itself a meaning-context. Higher and more complex meaning-contexts can be constructed out of the individual acts. We may see the closing-of-the-window as the completed act providing unity and a meaning-context for the various actions involved in its performance. All our experiences of the world consist of polythetical

26 Schutz, The Phenomenology of the Social World, p. 75.

Acts which can be synthesized, with the resulting synthesized experience becoming the unified object of monothetic attention.

It is possible to look back upon our elapsed experiences monothetically even though they have been constituted through numerous intentional Acts in many phases. The total content of our experience is brought together and coordinated in the total context of our experience. With every new lived experience this total context becomes enlarged. There is an ever-enlarging core of accumulated experiences. We usually take for granted both the objects in this reserve supply and the fact that they have undergone a complex process of constitution. These experiences are potentially available for a reflective glance of attention, but they are usually allowed to "slip-back" into the "depths" of consciousness no longer penetrated by the reflective glance. In principle we can uncover all the products of spontaneity which were once constituted, and in the light of this, Schutz defines the total context of experience as "the content of all the Acts of attention which the Ego...can direct at any given moment of its conscious life toward those of its elapsed lived experiences that have been constituted in step-by-step syntheses."28 The specific meaning of a lived experience and the particular mode of the Act of attention to it involves the ordering of the lived experience within the total context of experience, that is, the stock of knowledge at hand.29

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29 By the term "stock of knowledge" Schutz refers to the passive "possession" of experience, but he excludes their reconsti-
From all this we can say that the intended (subjective) meaning of a lived experience is the self-interpretation of that lived experience from the point of view of a new lived experience.

We must now examine what is involved in "self-interpretation". In our stream of consciousness we encounter the object in terms of how it is constituted out of its appearances. A context of meaning holds these appearances together and as they succeed one another in a regular succession, our experience of the object is thus built up. And by a monothetic glance we are able to grasp these polythetical Acts in a unity as an object in the outer world. At this level the analysis is complex and the deeper we go the more complex it becomes. When a lived experience is constituted as a total object, it is surrounded by a halo of retentions and protentions. It is the peculiarity of the synthesis that the different phases be linked in this way: "the later lived experience occurs within a Here and Now whose intrinsic quality is partially determined by the retention of the earlier lived experience." Underlying this level is the more basic configuration constituting the "mineness" of all our lived experiences. Whereas it is possible to start down from the object of our experience and dig

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downward into ever deeper levels of the process by which it is constituted, it is also possible to go the opposite way. We can proceed upwards from the table itself to the level of symbolism, namely, from the table to the talk about "the table". Schutz asserts that "the judgment 'This is a table' (and a judgment is implied in every act of name-giving) refers back to one's previous experience of other tables."\(^{31}\) When our attention catches a lived experience we may inquire into the origins of this lived experience and carry our analysis right back to its constitution in the inner time form of pure duration.

But our stock of knowledge does not directly refer back to its origin. The meaning-configuration of past experience is a higher-level configuration constituted of lower-level configurations which have been already experienced and are taken for granted. They lie so deep that they usually are not penetrated by a reflective glance. It requires an act of strictly philosophical reflection to trace them back to their original constitution, and this type of reflective act presupposes a particular type of attention a la vie.\(^ {32}\)

\(^{31}\) Schutz, *The Phenomenology of the Social World*, p. 79.

\(^{32}\) Natanson writes: "Philosophy is, in fact, a reversal of the underlying attitude of common-sense life, a primordial glance at what the mundane eye has simply accepted without even the intimation of serious question. Within the 'natural attitude' of daily life epistemology and metaphysics have no status, their fundamental problems are unadmitted because they are unrecognized, and their implications for a philosophy of human existence are simply and ingeniously excluded." Natanson, "Alfred Schutz on Social Reality and Social Science", *Social Research*, XXXV (1968), 219.
For the man in the everyday world the patterns of syntheses of past experiences are experiences of external world and its objects. He "has" a stock of knowledge of physical things, of fellow-men, of social collectives and of artifacts. In the syntheses of inner experiences are the results of his previous Acts of judgment as well as the products of his mind and will.

All these experiences, whether internal or external, enter into meaning-contexts of a higher order for the man in the natural standpoint, and of these, too, he has experience. Within his Here and Now...belong all his experience of the ordering procedures of both theoretical and applied sciences.33

Their constituting process is ignored and the objectivity constituted by it is taken for granted.

The schemes of experience are important in constituting the specific meaning of a lived experience for they explicate to the Ego what it has already lived through in terms of a later Here and Now. This involves the ordering of a lived experience within the total configuration of experience by a synthesis of recognition. The lived experience is referred back to an objectification which is already on hand and then identified with the objectifications. And when we look back on it, perception and recognition seem to have taken place immediately.

The interpretation of a lived experience involves the ordering of lived experiences into a scheme through synthetic recognition. Interpretation is thus the "referral of the unknown to the known, of

that which is apprehended in the glance of attention to the schemes of experience." 34 Included in this is the connection of a sign to what it signifies. These schemes are the completed meaning-configurations which are present in the form of "what one knows" and consist of the material already organized under categories. As our lived experiences occur, they are referred back to these schemes for interpretation. In the encounter of a novel experience, it has been referred back to the scheme, followed by a "failure to connect"; it may be only recognized as a "strange object". Whenever a phenomenon is unexplainable, there is something wrong with our schemes. The Ego undergoes modifications of attention in regard both to the lived experience to be ordered and to the stock of its past experiences; it can be said that the lived experience itself decides the scheme by which it must be ordered.

It may be asked how the lived experience becomes the centre of attention. Schutz replies that the Act of attention is a free Act of the Ego which selects the lived experience and chooses it as its problem. In regard to the reasons of the choice, we shall see them shortly as the genuine because-motive. It would seem that we are presented with a case of circularity: how can an interpretive scheme be partially constituted by what is to be interpreted? Schutz replies that this appearance of circularity is caused by "two fundamentally different modes of observation (which) are confused and by the way

34 Schutz, The Phenomenology of the Social World, p. 34.
in which the problem set up in one sphere is confronted by its mirror image in another."\textsuperscript{35} The two spheres are those of formal and transcendental logic which are involved in the equivocation of the term "scheme of interpretation". This equivocation is another illustration of the fundamental opposition between the modes of awareness proper to life and thought.

Action is constituted from the project of the corresponding act and the action derives its unity from the scope of this project. The unity of an action is subjective in its foundation and depends upon the actual Here and Now in which the project was formulated. We must now examine the equivocation of the term "motive", for instance, we may say: "I got up \textit{in order to} close the window \textit{because} it was cold."
The "in-order-to" motive of our action is future oriented whereas the "because-motive" is in relation to past lived experiences. Since the plan to close the window was devised in advance, it was phantasied in the future perfect tense. The "motive" of the successive acts is the project of my closing the window and all the other acts are "immediate" units directed to the final one. All the action leading to this goal is within a meaning-context for me. Therefore, it can be said that

\textsuperscript{35}Schutz, \textit{The Phenomenology of the Social World}, p. 85. He also writes: "When we think of the interpretive scheme as something ready to be applied to some datum of lived experience, then we are thinking of it as an already constituted 'logical objectification', an ideal object of formal logic. . . . When we think of the interpretive scheme as itself something dependent upon a particular Here and Now, then we are thinking of it in terms of its genesis, in terms of its constitution, . . . we are dealing with it in terms of transcendental logic." \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 85-86.
"the act thus projected in the future perfect tense and in terms of which the action receives its orientation is the 'in-order-to motive' for the actor."\(^{36}\) It is presupposed that the act is only being phan-tasied in the form of an anticipation. It is characterized by empty protentions into the future and the total action can be grasped in a reproductive operation. The goal of an action can be chosen as such by the actor himself.

Although we said that the goal of an action always has the temporal character of futurity, it does not have to be literally in the future. Let us suppose that on our way back from the window we were asked why we were up. Although our closing of the window is in the past, we would answer: "I got up in order to close the window". The time expressed by the phase "in order to close the window" is future whereas the event is past in terms of the utterance. We are actually referring to it as a project still with empty protentions. This distinction is usually obscure in ordinary language usage for such "in order to" statements are usually translated into "because" statements like: "I got up because I wanted to close the window". Schutz proposes that we call "any because-statement which is logically equivalent to an in-order-to statement a 'pseudo because-statement'."\(^{37}\) The in-order-to statement expresses the goal as future while the pseudo because


statement expresses it as a project occurring in the past. This stems from the double relational sense of action which involves a background reference to the past as well as an orientation toward the future.

If there is to be a meaning-configuration, there must be a monothetic apprehension of the actions in themselves as steps pictured as completely constituted. How is this possible in the case of a project where the actions to constitute the means are not established? The project must refer back to past acts analogous to those projected. We must be acquainted with how the same types of act have been carried out in the past: "the in-order-to motivation is . . . a context of meaning which is built on the context of experience available in the moment of projecting." This is seldom explicit. The means-ends sequence is a context of past experiences which involves the successful realization of certain ends by using certain means:

according to my present knowledge the projected action, at least as to its type, would have been feasible, its means and ends, at least as to their types, would have been available if the action had occurred in the past.

The in-order-to motivation presupposes an idealization referred to

38 By "analogous" we mean that "there is an identical nucleus of meaning (in the phenomenological sense) between the two acts that are being compared." Schutz, The Phenomenology of the Social World, p. 90. This "nucleus of meaning" is actually the "objective meaning" of the acts.


40 Schutz, "Choosing Among Projects of Action", Collected Papers, 1, 73.
by Husserl as the "I-can-do-it-again", that is, "I may under typically similar circumstances act in a way typically similar to that in which I acted before in order to bring about a typically similar state of affairs."41 The project and the goal of the action are usually taken for granted and ignored until, for instance, we are asked "why" and forced to take account of them. Then we will reply in terms of either an in-order-to or a pseudo because-statement.

The "genuine because" statement is distinct from the pseudo because-statement by the fact that the former cannot be translated into an in-order-to statement. For instance, we may say that a murderer perpetrated the crime for money, this is an in-order-to statement. On the other hand, we may also say that he became a murderer because of the influence of his friends. There are different types of meaning-contexts involved here, and it would be a mistake to say that the pseudo because-statement is the complete explanation of the deed. It is an explanation only to the extent that certain past experiences created a disposition for the would-be-murderer to obtain his goals by violence rather than by honest labour. The difference between these two types of motives is that "the in-order-to motive explains the act in terms of the project, while the genuine because-motive explains the project in terms of the actor's past experiences."42 In the genuine

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41 Schutz, "Common-Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action", Collected Papers, 1, 20.
because-motive, the motivating as well as the motivated lived experiences have the temporal character of pastness. A genuine why-question can be formulated usually only after the motivated experience has occurred and when it is possible to view it as something complete and whole. The "motivating experience in turn is past once again in relation to the motivated one, and we can...designate our intentional reference to it as thinking in the pluperfect tense."\(^3\) The pluperfect tense enables us to talk about the genuine "because" of a lived experience, it is an explanation after the event, and is constituted only in a backward glance. This backward glance presents both the motivated action as well as its motivating experience - with the latter in the pluperfect. And the meaning-context is different with each backward glance from a new Here and Now.

The actor takes for granted the meaning of his action (its relation to the project) and this meaning is independent of the genuine because-motive. The actor views the relation of his action to the project as the meaning of his action, but this is not the process whereby the action was constituted from the genuine because-motive. The comprehension of a genuine because-motive requires a special kind of Act of attention; he must "investigate the origin of that project which, considered simply as a product, is 'the meaning of his action.'"\(^4\)

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\(^3\) Schuts, *The Phenomenology of the Social World*, p. 93.

This involves a special type of self explication, beginning with the in-order-to motive, that is, the project of the concrete action. All genuine because-motives are contemplated in the pluperfect tense in relation to the project which is a constituted and complete meaning-context. The project is never related to the genuine because-motive as that which fulfills or fails to fulfill the latter; since the because-motives are pictured in the pluperfect tense, they are free from all pretentions or anticipations; they are simply memories and have received their perspective-horizons, their highlights and shadows, from a Here and Now always later than the one in which the project was constituted.

In the case of choice, there are not two or more possibilities from which we may select. What appear to be co-existing possibilities are successive acts of running through different projects. It is only after an action is begun that there seem to have been co-existing possibilities. These possibilities and the determining grounds, which appear to have led to a selection of a certain project, are disclosed to the backward-looking glance as a genuine because-motive. They did not exist as discrete experiences as long as the Ego lived in them and only prephenomenal experiences. These are only interpretations performed by the backward-looking glance directed upon these conscious experiences which precede (in the pluperfect tense) the actual project.

since every interpretation in the pluperfect tense is determined by the Here and Now from which it is made, the choice

of which past experiences are to be regarded as the genuine because-motive of the project depends on the core of light which the Ego lets fall on its experiences preceding the project.

The choice of the problem and the constitution of the relevant interpretive schemes can be understood as a motivational context. If we wanted to know the intended meaning of one of our lived experiences, we would place the latter within the total context of our experience. We would project the structure of an "in-order-to" while the choice of interpretive schemes is itself conditioned by the mode of attention we render to our just completed lived experience and to the total context of our experience. After the choice of the problem by a free Act of the Ego and assuming this as our vantage point, we may inquire into the "because-motive" of a particular choice and picture that ground in the pluperfect. Whenever we attempt to order a concrete lived experience within the whole context of our experience, we are actually ordering this procedure according to an in-order-to motive of interpretation. This is done by choosing the interpretive scheme which is relevant for the solution of the problem. Yet the constitution of the in-order-to motive of self-interpretation, that is, the formulation of the problem itself, occurs as the result of a genuine because-motive revealed only in the pluperfect. When we inquire about the intended meaning of one of our lived experiences, we are first interested in it as an already constituted problem, as an "in-order-to" interest. Yet we are also interested in the problem itself, which is a "because" interest.

APPENDIX II

Although our concern is with the world of work, we must not neglect William James' advice that the "total world of which the philosophers must take account is... composed of the realities plus the fancies and illusions."¹ According to James the origin of reality is subjective: whatever excites and stimulates one's interest is real. A thing is real when it stands in a certain relation to ourselves. "The word 'real' itself is... a fringe."² He argues that there may be an infinite number of various orders of reality and that each of these "sub-universes" has its own special and separate style of existence.

Instead of adopting James' phraseology concerning the "sub-universes of reality", Schutz preferred to designate them "finite provinces of meaning" in order to free them from their psychologistic setting. It is the "meaning of our experiences and not the ontological structure of the objects which constitutes reality."³ Schutz attempts


² James, The Principles of Psychology, 11, 320. James contends that our distinction between real and unreal is founded on two mental facts: "first, that we are liable to think differently of the same; and second, that when we have done so, we can choose which way of thinking to adhere or which to disregard." Ibid., 11, 290.

³ Schutz, "On Multiple Realities", Collected Papers, 1, 230. They
to ground his interpretation of the experiences as members of finite provinces of meaning in one facet of Husserl's thought, for it may be said:

that **all real unities are 'unities of meaning'.** Unities of meaning presuppose: a sense-giving consciousness, which, on its side, is absolute and not dependent in its turn on sense bestowed on it from another source. . . . Reality and world. . . .are just the titles for certain valid unities of meaning. . . .the whole being of the world consists in a certain 'meaning' which presupposes absolute consciousness as the field from which the meaning is derived.4

Schutz does not follow Husserl in attempting to establish various regional ontologies in the sense that: "To every sphere of individual Being which can be separated off as a region - the term 'Being' is here given its widest logical meaning - there belongs an ontology. . . .Over against the material ontologies stands the 'formal' ontology."5 But rather, Schutz argues that their reality is constituted by their meaning for us and not by their ontological structure.

A certain set of experiences can be said to be a finite province of meaning if they all show a specific cognitive style and are - in accordance with this style - not only consistent in themselves but also compatible with one another. Within each of these finite provinces of meaning: "all propositions, whether attributive or existential, are believed through the very fact of being conceived, unless they clash

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5 Husserl, *Ideas*, p. 175.
with other propositions believed at the same time, by affirming that their terms are the same with the terms of these other propositions.  

There are countless examples of such finite provinces of meaning: the world of dolls for a little girl - as long as she is not disturbed - is her reality; in the world of art and pictorial imagination, Duerer's "Knight, Devil and Death", for example, have "real" existence as entities within the realm of artistic fantasy; during a play we see Hamlet really as Hamlet and not Sir Laurence Olivier "portraying" Hamlet; and, for the theoretical physicist the realm of nature is an ideally constructed reality. "Each world whilst it is attended to is real after its own fashion; only the reality lapses with the attention." Each of these finite provinces of meaning is characterized by a specific tension of consciousness (varying, for instance, from wide-awakeness in the reality of everyday life to sleep in the world of dreams), a specific time-perspective, a specific form of experiencing oneself, and, a specific form of sociality. These finite provinces of meaning are not separate states of mental life, but are merely names for different tensions of the one and the same consciousness. It is the same life, the mundane life which is attended to in different modifications. For James the sub-universe of senses, of physical things, is what he refers to as paramount reality: "Sensible objects are thus either our realities or the tests of our realities. Conceived objects

6James, The Principles of Psychology, 11, 290.

7James, The Principles of Psychology, 11, 293.
must show sensible effects or else be disbelieved." But Schutz prefers to take the reality of our everyday life as paramount reality - for this includes not only the world of nature as experienced, but also the socio-cultural world in which we live. The importance of the natural world is illustrated in the following passage:

The arithmetical world is there for me only when and so long as I occupy the arithmetical standpoint. But the natural world, the world in the ordinary sense of the word, is constantly there for me, so long as I live naturally and look in its direction... there is no need to modify these conclusions when I proceed to appropriate to myself the arithmetical world, and the other similar 'worlds', by adopting the corresponding standpoint. The natural world still remains 'present', I am at the natural standpoint after as well as before, and in this respect undisturbed by the adoption of new standpoints.

Schutz conceives the world of everyday life as paramount reality because:

1. We always participate in it by means of our body, which is itself a thing in the outer world;

2. Outer objects resist our actions and thus delimit our possibilities; it is only through an effort that we are able, if at all, to overcome them;

3. By our bodily activities we are geared into this realm in order to change or transform it; and,

4. It is only in this realm that we are able to communicate with others.

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8 James, The Principles of Psychology, 11, 301.

9 Husserl, Ideas, 104.
Schutz argues that paramount reality

seems to us to be the natural one, and we are not ready to abandon our attitude toward it without having experienced a specific shock which compels us to break through the limits of the 'finite' provinces of meaning and to shift the accent of reality to another one.10

These "shocks" occur frequently in the midst of our daily life and themselves pertain to its reality. During a single day or hour we may run through several: the inner transformation occurring with the rise of the curtain and a transition to the world of the stage; falling asleep as a leap into the dream world; or the scientist's decision to replace all passionate participation in "this world" by a disinterested contemplative attitude.

10 Schutz, "Symbol, Reality and Society", Collected Papers, 1, 343-344.
APPENDIX III

In our perception of a physical object in the outer world, the object is not completely given as that which it is itself. It appears only "from the front side", "perspectively shortened and accentuated", and so on. However, the object as it is in itself is not entirely different from that which perception, although incomplete, realizes. This perception is the self-appearance of the object, or how the object presents itself to our perception. Apperception occurs in such perception, for the seen front side of a physical object, for instance, a cube, "always and necessarily presents a near aspect and prescribes for it a more or less determinate content."¹ This involves appresentation or making "co-present" which is described by Husserl as a "certain mediacy of intentionality... going out from the substratum, 'primordial world'... and making present to consciousness a 'there too', which nevertheless is not itself there."² The perception of the visible front side of the cube involves apperception by analogy to previously perceived cubes of the unseen backside. This apperception is a more or less empty anticipation of what we might

²Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 109.
perceive if we were to view the other side. The anticipation is found-
ed on our past experiences of normal objects of the same type. Ap-
perceiving the front side we believe the cube to be wooden, red in
colour, and we expect the unseen backside to be of the same colour,
shape and material. It is always possible that this anticipation will
be mistaken; the unseen backside may turn out to be green, deformed and
made of glass. But regardless of whatever the unseen backside may turn
out to be, it will have some colour, some shape and be made of some
material. We may say that:

the frontside, which is apperceived in immediacy or given
to us in presentation, appresentsthe unseen backside in
an analogical way, which, however, does not mean by way of
an inference by analogy. The appresenting term, that which
is present in immediate apperception, is coupled or paired
with the appresented term. 3

According to Husserl, pairing or coupling is a general feature of
consciousness and a form of passive synthesis commonly referred to
as association. However, pairing is not identification. In the most
primitive cases the pairing association is characterized by the fact
that

two data are given intuitionally, and with prominence, in
the unity of a consciousness and that, on this basis - es-
sentially, already in pure passivity - as data appar-
ing with mutual distinctness, they found phenomenologically
a unity of similarity and thus are always constituted pre-
cisely as a pair.

3 Schutz, "Symbol, Reality and Society", Collected Papers,
1, 295.

4 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 112.
As a passive synthesis it is not necessary to attend to the two phenomena. And underlying this passive synthesis is a "grouping under types that arises in experiential life and the familiar forms of flow and combination." Perception may also be signitive 6 in character and, in regard to this type of perception, Schutz suggests that:

Husserl's theory of apperception... can be fruitfully applied to the relationship between the sign and the signification, the symbol and the symbolised, and also to the analysis of the constitution of the great symbolic systems such as language, myth, religion, art, etc., all of which are essential elements of the Lebenswelt.

Signitive relations are special cases of the analogical apperception based upon the general form of pairing. Smoke is a physical object we can intuit, it may be seen, examined and analyzed; but it does not have to be merely a physical object for it can be an indication of fire. In this case smoke is manifesting something other than itself - fire. Husserl cautions that intuitive and signitive perception must not be equated:

5 Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, p. 110.


7 Schutz, "Husserl's Importance for the Social Sciences", *Collected Papers*, 1, 148.
Between perception . . . and . . . the presentation of a symbol in the form of an image or meaning there is an unbridgeable and essential difference. With these types of presentation we intuit something, in the consciousness that it copies something else or indicates its meaning; and though we already have the one in the field of intuition, we are not directed towards it, but through the medium of a secondary apprehension are directed towards the other, that which is copied or indicated. There is nothing of all this in perception.8

Unlike acts of signitive perception, a "self" is intuited in acts of immediate intuition. Apprehensions of a higher order are not built up on the basis of these apprehending acts of intuition because there is nothing known for which the intuited "self" might serve as a "sign" or "indication". Consequently it is immediately intuited only as a "self"; this cube is recognized only as a cube and does not point to anything beyond itself. But through apprehension we intuitively experience something as significantly indicating something else, for instance, smoke indicating fire.

Experiences by apprehension have their own form of confirmation: "each apprehension carries along its particular apperceived horizons, which refer to further fulfilling and confirming experiences, to systems of well ordered indications, including new potentially confirmable syntheses and new nonintuitive anticipations."9 Neither in immediate nor in analogical apprehension are we able to have isolated experiences of an isolated object. Every object is an object within

a field and every experience carries along its own horizon. They both belong to an order of a particular style. We may say that a physical object is interconnected with all the other objects of Nature - with those past, present and future - by spatial, temporal and causal relations. Similarly, it may be said of a mathematical object, for example, an equilateral triangle, that it refers to all the axioms and theorems by which it is defined, and so on, eventually covering all geometrical figures in general. This holds true for all the other realms constituted as finite provinces of meaning. 10

Within every presentational situation Schutz distinguishes four orders:

1. The **presentational scheme** involves the "order of objects to which the immediately apperceived object belongs if experienced as a self, disregarding any presentational references." An example of this order of objects is a piece of cloth or, more generally, a physical object;

2. The **presentational scheme** is the "order of objects to which the immediately apperceived object belongs if taken not as a self but as a member of an presentational pair, thus referring to something other than itself." A flag or perhaps a national symbol is an example of this scheme;

3. The **referential scheme** involves "the order of objects to which the appresented member of the pair belongs which is apperceived

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10 An explanation of this concept can be found in Appendix ii.
in a merely analogical manner." The country for which the flag stands is an example of this order; and,

4. The contextual or interpretative scheme is the "order to which the particular appresentational reference itself belongs, that is, the particular type of pairing or context by which the appresenting member is connected with the appresented one; or, more generally, the relationship which prevails between the appresentational and the referential scheme."\(^{11}\) In the flag example, the interpretive scheme would involve a reference to the procedure by which countries choose flags and other national symbols.

Schutz believes that the controversy surrounding the use of such terms as "signs" and "symbols" is not entirely a terminological one. It results, partially at least, from the "possibility of choosing either the apperceptual or the appresentational, the referential or even the interpretational scheme involved as a basic order from which the others have to be explained."\(^{12}\)

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\(^{11}\) Schutz, "Symbol, Reality and Society", Collected Papers, 1, 299.

\(^{12}\) Schutz, "Symbol, Reality and Society", Collected Papers, 1, 302.
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