AN ANATOMY OF THE SOUL
AN ANATOMY OF THE SOUL IN ENGLISH RENAISSANCE RELIGIOUS POETRY

By

JOHNATHAN H. POPE, B.A., M.A. (HISTORY), M.A. (ENGLISH)

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AUTHOR: Johnathan H. Pope, B.A. (Memorial University of Newfoundland, Sir Wilfred Grenfell College campus), M.A. (University of New Brunswick), M.A. (McMaster University)

SUPERVISOR: Dr. Mary V. Silcox

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines the centrality of the soul-body relationship to the construction of identity in English Renaissance religious poetry. The expanding field of ‘body criticism’ has greatly increased our understanding of the early modern body, but critics have rarely considered how Christianity influenced the ways the early moderns thought about their bodies and their embodied souls at a time when the science of anatomy flourished in Europe. Consequently, our current perception of the early modern subject is skewed. This dissertation addresses this critical gap by exploring the persistence of Christian narratives in discussions of both the body and the soul throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The first two chapters address two interrelated question: how did early modern anatomists understand the soul, and how did early modern religious writers understand the body? This dissertation begins by examining the religious perspectives that are evident in English anatomical writing and then moves on to explore the presence of anatomical perspectives in English religious writing on the soul in order to discuss the intimate relationship between corporeality and spirituality. The final two chapters focus on the devotional poetry of An Collins and the devotional emblems of Francis Quarles in order to demonstrate the integration of a Christianized sense of corporeality into meditations on religious subjectivity. Both writers draw on the issues discussed in the first two chapters but represent corporeality differently. On the one hand, Collins transforms physical suffering into a sign of her salvation. On the other hand, Quarles expresses anxiety over the world’s ability to infect the soul through the body. In
both cases, the relationship between body and soul is a central concern, and their representation of that relationship is indebted to a Christianized sense of embodiment.
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Introduction

But by the way of nourishment and strength
Thou creep’st into my breast;
Making thy way my rest,
And thy small quantities my length;
Which spread their forces into every part,
Meeting sin’s force and art.

Yet can these not get over to my soul,
Leaping the wall that parts
Our souls and fleshly hearts;
But as th’ outworks, they may control
My rebel-flesh, and carrying thy name,
Affright both sin and shame.
(George Herbert, “The H. Communion,” ll. 7-18, 1633)

Each hour, a myriad of trillions of little live things – microbes,
bacteria, the peasants of nature – are born and die, not counting for
much except in the bulk of their numbers and the accumulation of their
tiny lives. They do not perceive deeply, nor do they suffer. A hundred
trillion, dying, would not begin to have the same importance as a

In the two passages quoted above, we can see two very different literary
perspectives on corporeality and the inner self, separated by approximately 350 years. In
the first, the speaker describes the ingestion of the material of the Holy Communion and
its interaction with both the physiological and spiritual selves. George Herbert’s poem
offers a perspective of the inner self primarily as a spiritual space – somewhere inside the
body, the “fleshly heart” gives way to the soul. However, the question that arises in the
poem is, how are body and soul capable of interaction? At what point does physiological
process give way to spiritual progress? The speaker understands that such a relationship
or exchange exists, but it is difficult to conceptualize without hitting “the wall” that separates the two. Although the bread and wine of the Holy Communion cannot physically reach the soul, they are able to do the soul’s work in the “outworks” of the body by spreading God’s name throughout the body and taming, at least temporarily, the “rebel-flesh” and frightening away sin and shame. The body remains a physical space, but it is also the playground of virtue and vice, a space that has a profound relationship with – and impact on – the soul. For writers like Herbert, thinking about the body outside of a Christianized context was perhaps impossible and certainly senseless. In contrast, the body as it appears in Greg Bear’s science fiction novel *Blood Music* is vastly different in many ways. In this case, the unknown or mysterious aspects of the inner self are cellular rather than spiritual, as a scientist invents an intelligent and self-aware cell that evolves independently of the host body, acting outside the control of the individual. The passage at the outset of the novel that is quoted above establishes a scale for our nervousness as the text progresses – the “peasants of nature” do not possess an appreciable intellect, but it is their accumulated work that enables the body to function. What would happen if these trillions of tiny workers were suddenly allowed to move beyond their minute assigned tasks and enjoy a self-directed evolution, eventually capable of communicating with the innumerable cells outside the body? Bear’s novel suggests that, once liberated, the cells that comprise the body would have little use for the individual, ultimately disposing of the human body in favour of more efficient complex organisms. In a general sense, in both Herbert and Bear we can see a similar perspective on the corporeal self in that it elicits anxiety over a sort of unwilling self-betrayal. In “The H. Communion,” the
“rebel-flesh” can assist in the salvation of the soul, or it can turn on the soul and become at least partly responsible for its damnation, a common perspective in early modern devotional literature.¹ In *Blood Music*, however, it is at its most extreme interiority and smallest level – the cell – that the body can turn on itself and the individual as a whole. Despite their shared sense of anxiety, these texts suggest very different views of the inner self: in one, it is the soul and its relationship with the body as a whole that defines the nature of our existence, whereas in the other we are defined by the relationships between the microscopic organisms that inhabit our bodies – the cell has replaced the soul.

The difference between these two perspectives partly stems from the evolution of anatomy – among other scientific innovations – and its increasingly accurate portrayal of the human body over the past four centuries. In many ways, the seventeenth-century body and the twenty-first century body essentially constitute two *different* bodies. Although Bear writes about the body in the context of science fiction, his description is very familiar to the modern reader raised in an objectivist scientific culture – the self-aware cell might be the work of science fiction, but a body composed of trillions of living organisms is not. Rather, it is a long-established fact. Over the past 350 years, the body has gradually become the property of scientific inquiry, and it is difficult for the modern reader to transcend this paradigm. However, in the years preceding and immediately following the publication of Herbert’s poem, this was not the case – a body composed of microbes and bacteria was still a relatively long way off, as was science’s claim of exclusivity over the body. The ways in which we now think about the body were

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¹ Here, and throughout this dissertation, I am using the term ‘devotional’ broadly to mean the practices and processes involved in the expression of religious faith and in praise of God and His works.
beginning to emerge as early as the sixteenth century, as anatomical investigation became more and more common – putting the bodily interior on display and subjecting it to detailed scrutiny – but at this time, anatomical investigation was still closely connected to other forms of discourse. When Herbert discusses the inner self as a spiritual space comprised of both flesh and soul, he is not alone. Christianity exerted a pervasive influence over virtually every aspect of early modern English culture, and natural philosophy was no exception. In many ways, religion laid claim to both the soul and the body, and thinking about the body without reference to the Christian master narrative was nearly impossible. It is this mode of thought that my dissertation seeks to explore and articulate.

My study fits into and expands upon two growing bodies of historiography and literary criticism that deal with early modern corporeality and subjectivity. At their core, these two strains of criticism are linked by their focus on interiority and a desire to understand the significance of contemplating the inner self to the early modern mind. For the critic of corporeality, the inner self is literally just that, the physiological inner space of the body that experienced radical change during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as anatomical investigation flourished in England and in Europe more broadly. These critics have often discussed how such changes – the ‘discovery’ of the circulation of the blood, the increased scrutiny of the humoral model, and a more accurate understanding of the sexual organs – affected the way early moderns thought about the body and its relationship with the rest of the social and natural/created world. Unsurprisingly, the fields of criticism interested in corporeality and subjectivity
frequently overlap, often within the same critical text; body and self are hardly discreet entities and early modern theories of corporeality and theories of subjectivity were bound to influence one another. How one thought about the body undoubtedly impacted how one thought about the self, and vice versa.

For the critic of subjectivity, the inner self typically represents the complex and contested terrain on and through which identity is formulated, and a great deal of work has been done trying to determine just what kinds of subjectivity were available during the period under the influence of religious, political, economic, and cultural changes. However, this description belies the general lack of a critical consensus regarding the definition of ‘self’ and the parameters of selfhood during the period. As Christopher Pye points out, even the pursuit of the early modern self is fraught with anachronistic desires:

because that transformation [from a communal subject to an autonomous self] entails the binding of human subjectivity to its temporal historicity, to an always fictitious tale of its genesis, an account of the early modern subject can never amount to one instance among others of historicizing the subject. It would be more accurate to say that historicism and the early modern subject derive from the same ground. . . . [T]he historicity of the early modern subject cannot be separated from the force entailed in giving it a genetic, narratable form. (Pye 11)

With this caution about anachronism in mind, Pye and many other critics have embarked on numerous examinations of selfhood and subjectivity. Despite the proliferation of theories of subjectivity, the criticism is largely united by a series of interrelated questions, yet divided over the answers: when and how did the modern sense of the autonomous self begin to emerge, as distinct from a medieval self that was more “fluid, volatile, and vulnerable to outside influence” (Marshall 9)? Was its emergence smooth or characterized by tension, anxiety, or even violence? Did it overlap or compete with
preexisting or now-lost models of subjectivity? What kinds of texts best exemplify this emergence? The answers to these questions are as varied as the number of critics who seek to answer them.²

Although new historicism has frequently become the rented mule of contemporary criticism on subjectivity, particularly among those who prefer a psychoanalytical approach, its methodologies are very helpful in any attempt to recover or reconstitute the early modern subject. A primary contention of this dissertation is that the self is largely constituted by institutions – in this instance, Christianity – and that we can find evidence of this in the anatomical, religious, and poetic writings from the period.³ While Christianity certainly is not the only determining factor in the formation of subjectivity, its importance cannot be overstated.

Of course, central to the Christian self is the soul. In *Gods Valuation of Mans Soule* (1632), the vicar Moses Capell writes about “the breath of our lives, that invisible Essence, and spirituall substance: Divines most commonly call the Soule: we may, our

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³ Since Protestantism was the dominant strain of Christianity in England during this period, the analysis that follows draws almost exclusively on texts written by Protestants. I certainly acknowledge that Protestant and Catholic (or other) subjectivities are not wholly interchangeable, but I use ‘Christian’ and ‘Christianity’ as terms of convenience when referring to early modern English culture. Undoubtedly, many of the ideas that influenced Protestant thinkers also influenced their Catholic counterparts, and both also draw on the same Christian narratives, thus making any definitive separation between Protestant and Catholic a largely futile exercise.
selves” (Capell 6, emphasis added). Life, “Essence,” “spirituall substance,” and, most importantly, the self are all brought to bear on that single term, “Soule.” Although the vast majority of early modern writers refrain from making such explicit connections, the linkage and even interchangeability between ‘soul’ and ‘self’ is often implied, and it is with Capell’s useful definition in mind that I proceed. To clarify, it was generally understood that the subject was comprised of both a body and a soul – as John Donne preached in 1619, “In the constitution and making of a natural man, the body is not the man, nor the soul is not the man, but the union of these two makes up the man.”

Subjectivity and selfhood, however, tend to be located firmly in the soul, as in Capell’s discussion. ‘Soul’ commonly stands for the essence and significance of experience, central to any understanding of early modern selfhood and self-articulation. Writers like Capell tend to conflate self and soul as the essence of the individual. Self and soul partake in (and are influenced by) the body but are not defined by the body. In contrast, I will use the term ‘subject’ to refer to the individual who is comprised of a body and a soul and is engaged in the world around him or herself. Although the self is a feature of the subject, the two are not interchangeable. This distinction, I believe, best reflects the co-presence of Platonic and Aristotelian theories of subjectivity in early modern England, which I discuss in more detail in Chapter Two. Briefly, the Platonic perspective sees the immortal soul as the determinant of subjectivity at the expense of the body – the body is simply matter that is ultimately irrelevant to the soul. In contrast, the Aristotelian

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perspective contends that it is the unification of body and soul that establishes the individual – the subject is neither wholly body nor wholly soul but rather a composite of the two. Although early modern English writers often expressed a preference for one perspective or the other, both philosophies existed in relative harmony in the intellectual culture of the period, largely because Plato’s emphasis on the soul and Aristotle’s emphasis on embodiment could be reconciled in a Christian framework that recognized the significance of embodiment while still prioritizing the soul. My distinction between self/soul and subject/individual thus helps articulate – perhaps anachronistically – how many early moderns thought about what we now call ‘subjectivity’ and ‘selfhood.’

Recent criticism on subjectivity has largely been concerned with the contentious issue of the emergence of a recognizably modern, autonomous self and either asserting, disputing, or establishing the parameters for such an emergence. For example, in The Shattering of the Self (2002), Cynthia Marshall comments on some early modern expressions of a desire for both autonomous self-assertion and self-dissolution or ‘self-shattering,’ suggesting that, “An emergent sense of the autonomous self, individually operative as never before in the spheres of politics, religion, and commerce, existed in tension with an established popular sense of the self as fluid, unstable, and volatile” (Marshall 3-4). Like Marshall’s, my own approach accepts, or at least does not contest, the emergence of modern selfhood in this period, but my emphasis is more on difference than similarity. This is primarily because the two English Renaissance paradigms that are

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5 My understanding of early modern interpretation of Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy regarding the soul is heavily indebted to Rosalie Osmond’s Mutual Accusation (1990) and Imagining the Soul (2003). See my Chapter Two for a more detailed discussion of these issues.
central to my project – anatomical/natural philosophy and the Christian religion – are so different from our own twenty-first century culture. By saying this, I do not wish to overstate the alienity of the period. Without a doubt, the self, the body, and the religious mind that are evident in early modern England are more recognizable to us than are their predecessors in the medieval period, and in retrospect it is certainly easy to see a version of selfhood that anticipates our own to varying degrees, an argument most prominently championed by Stephen Greenblatt (Greenblatt, *Renaissance Self-Fashioning* 1-9).

However, and as we will see, Renaissance writers also elucidate understandings of the interaction between the corporeal and spiritual parts of the self that stand in stark contrast to our own modes of thinking. Throughout the period under examination here, an emerging sense of individual autonomy competed with a self that was persistently viewed in the context of general Christian narratives that were woven into the experience of embodiment. It is this second manifestation of subjectivity, the self continuously viewed in relation to God and Christian ideals, that is the focus of this dissertation.

Critics have frequently asserted the centrality of Christian perspectives to early modern English culture and the formation of identity, even if they have not been quick to explore this influence in detail, particularly as it relates to the body. Indeed, commenting on the “ever-expanding body of body criticism,” Maurizio Calbi notes that contemporary interest in the early modern body

has already produced a number of critical works focusing on bodies as disparate as ‘bodies tremulous,’ ‘bodies single-sexed,’ ‘bodies enclosed,’ ‘bodies intestinal,’ ‘bodies consumed,’ ‘bodies carnivalized,’ ‘bodies effeminized,’ ‘bodies embarrassed,’ ‘bodies sodomized,’ ‘bodies emblazoned or dissected,’ ‘bodies castrated,’ or simply ‘in parts.’

(Calbi xiii)
To this list I might also add (at least) ‘bodies dismembered’ and ‘bodies politicized.’

However, ‘bodies religious’ and ‘bodies devotional’ are noticeably absent from Calbi’s succinct overview of ‘body criticism,’ or any subsequent lists we might make. The result is a critical paradox, a concurrent recognition of the importance of religion in understanding both the self and the body and a failure to address the nature of that importance. Drawing on Jonathan Sawday’s work, Marshall emphasizes that

the idea of dissolving or destroying selfhood was a desirable goal within orthodox religious discourse. . . . In its strongest form, dissolving the self through submission to God is actually constitutive of identity. . . . We need to keep in mind the extent to which religious discourse shaped ideas about the body and the self in the early modern era and how regularly both Protestant and Catholic churches encouraged individual humility, submission to authority, and incorporation within the community.

(Marshall 20)

Likewise, in his article on Shakespearean entrails, David Hillman suggests that, “Religion has always positioned the body’s inner realm as the ultimate site of faith” (Hillman “Visceral Knowledge,” 85). In both Marshall and Hillman, religion occupies an important role in the formation of identity and in the understanding of the body, but such assertions remain vague and undeveloped. They offer some further comments on the subject as a matter of establishing context rather than exploring the connection itself. The same can be said of Sawday as well, who, although he presents a more sustained focus on the Christianized understanding of corporeality than do most critics, offers this discussion as

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a context for his emphasis on the emergence of the mechanistic Cartesian body, which he argues displaced the religious understanding of the body in the mid-seventeenth century (Sawday 98). Since the publication of Sawday’s *The Body Emblazoned* (1995), critics have frequently followed his cue, reiterating his argument about the emergence of the Cartesian body. Marshall, however, argues that critics – particularly new historicist critics – have perhaps ‘jumped the gun’ in locating the emergence of the autonomous self as early as they have (Marshall 1-12), and I would argue that the same is true regarding the Cartesian usurping of the Christianized body. A detailed examination of anatomical and literary discussions of corporeality reveals that Christianity continued to exert a significant influence on how early modern writers thought about their inner selves. These discussions commonly amalgamated religious and physiological discourses in order to represent the experience of embodiment.

Critics who have commented on the role of religion in the process of identity formation have often focused on points of conflict and tension such as dissent, heresy, violence, and martyrdom (Maus 74-85; Marshall 85-91; Pye 38-74). While these are certainly productive venues for investigation and can reveal interesting instances of self-representation and self-articulation, they do so within the heightened or exaggerated context of persecution or articulation by force. As a consequence, such assertions tend to be defiant declarations that assert a vast difference between self and other under extraordinary conditions. As Judith Maltby points out in her work on the Book of Common Prayer, studying conformity is hardly a simple task, primarily because conformity does not appear much in the historical record unless it is being explicitly
challenged (Maltby 3). Like Maltby, I am interested in exploring the norm more than the unusual. Anatomical and Christian narratives were not integrated into each other wholly without comment or controversy, but there are many instances in which such normalization is evident. This fact is unsurprising when we consider the religious character of the period.

Debora Shuger has been at the forefront of the push to explore the pervasive influence of Christianity during this period, and much of her work addresses the critical gap that exists in our understanding of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century religious culture. Although Shuger rarely comments on issues of corporeality, my own work is heavily indebted to her efforts to counteract what she sees as the anachronistic secularization of the period in contemporary criticism. As she notes, much of modern scholarship “brackets off religious materials from cultural analysis and vice versa,” a division that tends to obscure the fact that “the Bible remained the primary locus for a good deal of what we might classify as cultural, psychological, or anthropological reflection” (Shuger *The Renaissance Bible*, 2, 4). Likewise, Shuger contends that “if no unchanging human nature exists, and what ‘man’ is cannot be separated from his culture, then we cannot approach a given period or its texts by disregarding the self-interpretation of that period” (Shuger *Habits of Thought*, 3-4). If Christian perspectives were as central to English Renaissance culture as Shuger suggests, a claim that I certainly agree with, and if the discussions of body, soul, and self that are evident in devotional poetry constitute a method of “self-interpretation” and self-representation, then the intersection of the discourses of religion and physiology merits examination. However, we must also keep in
mind that the exchange between Christian and anatomical narratives was not simply unidirectional – just as discussions of the body integrated religious narratives, so too did religious meditations on the soul and the self integrate anatomical narratives.

Ostensibly, and perhaps most reductively, anatomical and religious texts focus on two different things – one deals with the body while the other deals with the soul. As we will see, this distinction is largely maintained in the critical writing about the body, with critics such as Sawday and Gail Kern Paster focusing almost exclusively on anatomical and scientific writing in their discussions of the early modern self, in which religious writing occupies a peripheral status. Likewise, critics who have focused on early modern religious subjectivity have often done so at the expense of scientific writing, partly as a result of the general lack of attention paid to religious identity in critical writing. Shuger, who is arguably the most prolific writer on early modern religious subjectivity, comments on this critical gap in *Habits of Thought in the English Renaissance* (1990):

The almost total neglect of society’s religious aspects in favor of political ones – a reaction against the theological bias of earlier Renaissance criticism – has produced in recent literary scholarship a curiously distorted picture of the period. But while no one would deny that the dominant culture of the Renaissance was (in some sense) religious, the relation between religion and culture needs careful explication if religion is not to be confused with society itself or narrowed into theology.

(Shuger, *Habits of Thought* 5-6)

In response to the secular bent of contemporary criticism, she rightly emphasizes the centrality of religion in the dominant culture of early modern England:

Religion during this period supplies the primary language of analysis. It is the cultural matrix for explorations of virtually every topic: kingship, selfhood, rationality, language, marriage, ethics, and so forth. Such subjects are, again, not masked by religious discourse but articulated in it; they are considered in relation to God and the human soul. That is what it
means to say that the English Renaissance was a religious culture, not simply a culture whose members generally were religious.

(Shuger, *Habits of Thought* 6)

Although modern criticism tends to bracket off religion and culture from one another, Shuger emphasizes that early modern English culture could accommodate (sometimes drastic) differences of opinion, often within the same self or text and without being perceived as conflictual.

I believe that this perspective on the flexibility of English culture can and should be applied when reading early modern anatomical texts. Critics often read this discourse for evidence of the beginning of the split between science and religion. But focusing on our own perception of contentious world views falls into the trap of suggesting that these anatomical textbooks demythologize Christianity and foster secularism. Such views foster an anachronistic sense of subversion, one that traces the emergence of the modern self when, as Shuger notes, both “mystical” and “demystifying” elements actually coexisted during the period (Shuger, *Habits of Thought* 23-24). As we will see in Chapter One, a commingling of ideas is apparent in anatomical writing, a genre that often happily accommodated religious perspectives.

Shuger’s work, as I have indicated, lays the groundwork for my approach through this dissertation. Yet even as she does admirable work in bridging the gap between the secular and the religious, she rarely delves into scientific/anatomical writing in her discussions of religious subjectivity. Although we cannot demand that a text do something that it does not intend to do, for the purposes of my work this lack in Shuger’s writing means that she reinforces, in a way, the segregation of religion that she seeks to dismantle, particularly
when we consider that religious and anatomical writing often drew on or at least referenced the same sources, from Galen to Aristotle to the Bible. In short, Shuger’s argument about the centrality of religion can be applied even more broadly in order to more accurately reflect the Christianized underpinnings of many works of natural philosophy written during the English Renaissance.

A division between religion and science is even more explicitly reinforced in the work of Rosalie Osmond, whose writing often focuses explicitly on the soul. For example, in *Mutual Accusation* (1990) Osmond explores the body and soul dialogue genre and argues that these dialogues are “[c]omplex and subtle” and do not “equate a simple dualism with moral good and evil. Rather, their arguments depend ultimately on the definition of body and soul and the point of division between the two” (Osmond, *Mutual Accusation* xi-xii). In addition, she notes that the idea of body and soul has importance in philosophy, science, and theology and that, “Until at least the seventeenth century, the three disciplines were not separated as they are today, but were often the concern of the same person. Not infrequently, therefore, the demands of one discipline, such as theology, played a large part in determining a writer’s attitude to other branches of knowledge” (Osmond, *Mutual Accusation* 3). Although Osmond explores the nuances of the evolution of thinking about the soul from Pythagoras onward, she limits her discussion to philosophical and religious texts despite her emphasis on the importance of the body-soul dialectic to science. ⁸ The importance of the “definition of body” to the debate is asserted but left unexplored in favour of the definition of soul. She does not

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⁸ Osmond reiterates much of *Mutual Accusation* in her more recent and broader text *Imagining the Soul* (2003) which discusses representations of the soul across numerous cultures and time periods.
examine any purely anatomical works but focuses instead on writers who straddled the boundary between science and religion or science and philosophy such as Sir Thomas Browne or Francis Bacon. Absent are those scientific writers whose work engages with and is relevant to religious and philosophical discussions of the soul. Consequently, her assertion that, “Attempts at a truly scientific explanation [of the soul] come only later in the period with Descartes and the Cambridge Platonists” ignores, for example, Helkiah Crooke’s careful deliberation over the soul in his early seventeenth-century anatomical work (Osmond, *Mutual Accusation* 25-26). Descartes may have been the most prominent philosopher to combine scientific and religious understandings of the soul, but he was by no means the first to do so. Like Shuger, Osmond emphasizes the centrality of religion to early modern English culture and identity and its influence over science, but refrains from detailing that connection. If we accept her assertion that the body-soul dialectic was important to science as well as to religion and philosophy, then it stands to reason that we should explore this relationship as well.

More recently, Gary Kuchar has asserted the interconnections between early modern religious subjectivity and writing about the body in his chapter on John Donne in *Divine Subjection* (2005). Kuchar draws extensively on recent critical material on the body - such as the work done by Sawday and, particularly, Michael Schoenfeldt - in his focus on “the metaphysical and therapeutic stakes inherent in the idea that by interpreting the state of one’s body one can arrive at a deepened understanding of one’s relationship with God’s word” (Kuchar 154). Kuchar, however, accepts and relies on critical characterizations of the nature and impact of early modern anatomical writing without
examining the anatomical works themselves, and as I have been suggesting, the critical literature on the body rarely explores issues of religious subjectivity despite its presence in the original texts. Such reliance is problematic for a text that uses this critical material as a backdrop to discuss religion and the body in literary works. Although this does not necessarily take away from the validity of Kuchar’s conclusions about Donne and the body, it highlights an endemic critical separation and segregation of writing about the body and writing about the soul. Consequently, although many critics struggle against the anachronistic secularization of the English Renaissance by reclaiming the cultural centrality of religion, both science and religion still remain largely separate, resulting in a divide between writing about the corporeal and the religious self.

Of course, not all critics have implicitly reinforced the division between science and religion. In *Infinity, Faith, and Time* (1997), John Spencer Hill engages in a project similar to Shuger’s in *Habits of Thought* when he argues that, “while the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries opened much that was new in the way man interpreted his world, they were also centuries when he was able, with more success than in succeeding times, to make room for new ideas without rejecting old beliefs” (Hill xi). Hill argues against the perceived incompatibility between faith and reason as he traces the rise of the Christian “rational spirituality” that was prevalent during the English Renaissance and that saw faith and reason as mutually supportive rather than exclusive (Hill 5). Focusing particularly on developments in astronomy as well as concepts of time and infinity, he argues that early modern science typically sought to foster a clearer understanding of God and His work and that even as late as 1700, “the professed intention of English science
was to accommodate reason to faith, to employ rational inquiry not to supplant but to supplement revealed truth” (Hill 36). Essentially, religion was the lens through which science was filtered during the period. Although this is not necessarily a new argument, Hill goes further than most critics by examining the scientific and philosophical theories and texts themselves in order to demonstrate the far-reaching impact of religion, a move that avoids reinforcing any clear division between science and religion. Like Hill, I believe that by bringing religious and scientific – or, in my case, specifically anatomical – texts into contact with one another, we can more fully appreciate the wide-ranging influence of Christianity on early modern English culture and subjectivity.

A substantial amount of the work done on early modern subjectivity has focused on drama, and this is hardly surprising. Richard Hillman suggests in his study of the soliloquy that drama “was the most widely and variously practised genre in England over the period, as well as the one most directly concerned with the fictional representation of human beings” (Hillman, *Self-Speaking* 3). The complete veracity of this claim is certainly debatable – other literary genres such as lyric poetry were undoubtedly as widely practiced as drama – but the immense popularity of drama during the period is incontestable. The cultural pervasiveness of drama and its performative nature have led critics such as Katharine Eisaman Maus to explore the “afflictions and satisfactions that attend upon the difference between an unexpressed interior and a theatricalized exterior: the epistemological anxieties that gap generates, the social practices that are devised to manage it, and the socio-political purposes it serves” (Maus 2). At their core, such studies emphasize the relationship between inner self and external other and the attendant
fractures, unities, and anxieties produced by this relationship, whether between the characters on the stage or between those characters and the audience.

I choose to focus on devotional poetry rather than drama particularly because devotional poetry often emphasizes the issues that are central to this dissertation—sustained meditations on the self, the relationship between body and soul, and corporeality—differently than does drama. Devotional poetry offers a productive venue for the study of the early modern self. Like the dramatic soliloquy, devotional poetry frequently explores the expression of an 'I' in isolation, contemplating his or her own inner self. However, unlike in drama, this 'I' is normally discussed in the absence of a physically present 'other.' Drama places an actor on stage interacting with the other actors and audience members who are there with him or her—drama is, by its very nature, social and communal. In contrast, to read devotional poetry from this period is to experience a largely unpopulated terrain. The 'other' still exists but in the form of the reader and, most importantly, God—the voice of the poet/speaker calls out but rarely receives a response in return. Although the speaker's relationship with these 'others' is certainly significant, it differs considerably from the relationship established between the actor and his various audiences in early modern drama. Effectively, interpersonal conflict is replaced with intrapersonal conflict, manifested in the contemplation of disputes between body and soul, virtue and vice, conversations with God, or the persistent anxiety regarding salvation. Consequently, devotional poetry often elicits an intense self-scrutiny conducted within the confines of the body and premised on an intensely personal relationship between self and God that is not beholden to the dictates of plot progression.
in the same way that drama is. Put another way, my choice to focus on devotional poetry as a fertile ground for the exploration of issues of subjectivity follows the reverse logic employed by Maus in her justification of her choice of drama as a focus. She writes:

Theater tends to be an art of collectives: groups of actors playing before large and varied groups of auditors. It would not be surprising if the complexities of intersubjective comprehension should be closer to the surface here, presented more immediately by the conditions of the performance, than they are in literary forms composed with particular patrons in mind, or designed to be enjoyed without any direct encounter between purveyor and consumer. (Maus 31)

While we might take issue with the suggestion that theatre is without patronage, this passage offers a salient point that can be applied to my choice of literary genre: theatre is an “art of collectives” while devotional poetry tends to be an art of individuation; theatre is intersubjective while devotional poetry is intrasubjective; theatre is designed to be experienced in the company of others while reading (and writing) devotional poetry tends to be a solitary activity. For all the reasons that Maus uses to prioritize the value of drama in her discussion of inwardness, we can say that the opposites are equally true regarding the value of devotional poetry to the same pursuit.

Drama has also been the focus for a significant proportion of the literary criticism on corporeality, and, again, for good reason. Drama literally puts bodies on display as live actors perform the texts, a fact which the early modern playwrights themselves were keenly aware of. As Elizabeth Hanson points out, “The Renaissance English stage is notorious for its violent corporeality, its displays of stabbings, dismemberments, eye gougings, boilings, and other atrocities” (Hanson 55). The very nature of drama thus made it conducive to meditations on corporeality, which were often demonstrated
through representations of sex or violence, or the intersection of the two. The early modern stage was filled with bodies engaged in a variety of corporeal acts ranging from mundane and everyday gestures to more extreme acts of violence that explicitly foregrounded the body. Critics have rightly noted the striking parallels between drama and the anatomy theatre. Both put the body on public display, directing the gaze of an audience to a series of performative gestures. This is perhaps nowhere more evident than in Shakespeare’s *King Lear*. The parallels between the playhouse and the anatomy theatre are indicated in Act 3 when Lear suggests, “let them anatomize Regan. See what breeds/about her heart” (3.6, ll. 75-76). Although this request is never fulfilled in the play, the audience is immediately treated to another kind of anatomy in the next scene. When Goneril commands of Gloucester, “Pluck out his eyes” (3.7, l. 5), the eye itself becomes the subject of intense and violent action as Cornwall essentially vivisects Gloucester, binding him before taking his eyes in front of a crowd of onlookers. Presumably, at this instant the attention of all of the characters on stage as well as the audience is directed toward Gloucester’s eyes as they are removed. The dissection of a human body in an anatomy theatre invites a similar observation of a body on a stage, subject to the penetrative gaze of both the audience and the anatomist. One can easily imagine the bodies that are paraded on stage at the end of *King Lear* being sent directly to the

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anatomist for another kind of performance.\textsuperscript{10} It is perhaps because of this undeniable relationship between early modern theatre and anatomy that drama has arguably become the dominant genre in studies of corporeality.\textsuperscript{11} However, we must not forget that devotional poetry frequently contemplates the body and its significance and can often offer a more sustained consideration of corporeality than can drama because it is not bound by the limitations of plot and performance. There is, for example, no dramatic text that approaches the nuanced corporeality evident in Phineas Fletcher's Christian anatomical epic, \textit{The Purple Island} (1633).

The first two chapters of this dissertation seek to contextualize the intellectual climate within which devotional poets wrote by exploring the question: how was the relationship between the body and the soul understood? In Chapter One, I examine sixteenth- and seventeenth-century English anatomical textbooks, works that are explicitly focused on the body and which were not generically required – unlike devotional poetry – to comment on or integrate Christian perspectives. As mentioned earlier, although many critics have written about Renaissance corporeality, they also frequently reiterate Sawday’s assertion that a religiously informed understanding of the body dwindled after the mid-1630s, replaced with a Cartesian understanding that likened

\textsuperscript{10} For an extended discussion of \textit{King Lear} and anatomy, see Hodges 68-88.\textsuperscript{11} An underlying assumption of this dissertation is that anatomy is, in fact, violent. Although the orderly treatment of bodies in the anatomy theatre might have been, in part, designed to circumvent the appearance of violence, the bodies themselves are inextricably linked to violence. Since bodies were normally obtained from the hangman’s noose, violence is a precondition for the anatomized body, both for the criminal’s violent past (petty thieves, for example, were not usually hanged), and for the criminal’s violent and public death. In addition, this sense violence is augmented by the criminal’s normally unwilling participation in both the execution and the anatomical demonstration. Finally, I believe anatomy is linked to violence through its association with state-sanctioned acts of punishment and torture, such as the hanging, drawing, and quartering of some criminals (particularly those found guilty of treason). Just because the body on the anatomist’s table did not scream as its stomach was removed before a crowd of onlookers does not, in my mind, make the action much, if any, less violent.
the body to a machine more than a microcosm of divine creation. However true this may be in a broader European context, I demonstrate that this theory has been misapplied to the English example. A close reading of the anatomical works of Thomas Vicary (1548/1577), John Banister (1578), Helkiah Crooke (1615), and Samuel Collins (1685) reveals the promotion of a consistent and often expanding Christianized perception of the body throughout the seventeenth century. Even as anatomical knowledge about the body grew increasingly precise, evolving from Vicary’s brief depiction of a humoral body to Collins’ discussion of a chemically-based body that is more recognizable to the modern reader, Christian perspectives were integrated and adapted to changing ideas about corporeality. Many of these anatomists wrote about the soul as a part of the body and discussed the relationship between the two in terms of the religious narrative of the fall, redemption, and salvation, and they often saw their work as a way to reveal God’s intentions in the construction of the body. These Christian associations were frequently carried over into the description of various body parts and bodily functions, such as the sexual organs and the process of generation, the nature and dispersal of the blood, the operation and significance of the brain, and even the movement of the eyes. Although physiological details were constantly debated in these anatomical texts, the Christianized understanding of the body proved to be impressively resilient.

Chapter Two builds on the work done in the previous chapter by examining a selection of religious texts. If anatomists explored the soul in their books about the body,

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was the reverse also true? Did scholars of the soul address the details of corporeality? In order to answer these questions, this chapter examines a variety of religio-philosophical texts that approach the self and its more intangible qualities from a Christian point of view. Although critics of English Renaissance religious culture such as Shuger have done excellent work toward reasserting the cultural centrality of religion, they have not offered a sustained examination of discussions of the physiology of the body. Consequently, I begin this chapter by discussing the methodological similarities between anatomical and religious texts, which share an emphasis on the health of the inner self that is achieved through intense scrutiny and particularization. Although anatomy focuses on corporeal interiority and religion on spiritual interiority, we can often observe one carrying over into the other. Religious philosophers such as John Woolton and William Cowper not only promote a dissective form of self-examination that mirrors – or is mirrored by – anatomical investigation; they also deal often with corporeal issues that are indebted to anatomical perspectives of the body. For example, the physiological connection between body and soul, the process of ensoulment, the location of the soul in the body, and the functioning of the senses are issues that are often dealt with by these writers. Consequently, a roughly similar sense of corporeality can be seen in both kinds of writing as the body and the soul are situated within the Christian master narrative.

Given the vast importance of such a Christian perspective in English Renaissance culture, it is not surprising that the literature from the period reflects this importance. As I argue in Chapter One and Chapter Two, religion and the body were intimately connected, but was this a discussion held just by natural philosophers and theologians, or did it have
a wider ranging influence on the culture as a whole? Did anatomical and religious arguments about the body and soul permeate other areas of English intellectual culture?

The final two chapters explore just how pervasive was the Christianized sense of corporeality examined in the first two chapters. By beginning with anatomy books on the one hand and ending with devotional poetry on the other, we will see that a relatively consistent, devotionally inflected perspective is evident in both types of writing. These texts transcend simple divisions of 'secular' (which we often associate with 'scientific') and 'religious' (which we often associate with 'spiritual'). Even in those places where we might least expect to find biblical allusions and religious justifications, they surface again and again.

Although devotional poetry is frequently relegated to the periphery in the field of body criticism, it has not been entirely ignored. George Herbert and John Donne in particular have attracted the attention of scholars of corporeality. Schoenfeldt, for example, devotes a chapter to Herbert and John Milton in his influential study, *Bodies and Selves in Early Modern England* (1999), focused on devotion and digestion. Schoenfeldt suggests that Herbert’s poetic meditation on the consumption of food, particularly the Holy Communion, functions as a contemplation of inwardness and the mysterious relationship between the corporeal and spiritual features of the self. Ultimately, he argues that “Food nourishes the devotional imagination of Herbert and Milton by offering them a kind of radium isotope that could trace, when consumed, the inner lineaments of the Christian devotional subject” (Schoenfeldt, *Bodies and Selves* 130). Schoenfeldt also writes about the stomach, digestion, and physiological/spiritual
boundaries in his earlier contribution to *The Body in Parts: Fantasies of Corporeality in Early Modern Europe* (1997), an essay entitled "Fables of the Belly in Early Modern England." This essay (which is not focused exclusively on Herbert) similarly suggests that in "The H. Communion," the stomach acts as "the receiving chamber in which God is welcomed into the temple of the self" (Schoenfeldt, "Fables of the Belly" 255). James M. Bromley has also written about "The H. Communion" in his discussion of the "disembodied intimacy" between Herbert's speaker and a physically absent God or Christ (Bromley 18). Bromley suggests that in this poem, and in Herbert's poetry more generally, the speaker expresses a desire for an "Adamic intimacy with God" that is impeded by the sinful body, but a fully realized "embodied intimacy" is delayed until after Judgment Day (Bromley 19, 22). Bromley, however, deals with the body in very broad terms as it relates to Herbert. Between Schoenfeldt and Bromley we can see the two general approaches to corporeality in Herbert's writing, focused on either a specific part or function such as the stomach and digestion or on the body/flesh and interiority in general and without much physiological detail.13

My own approach has more in common with but also responds to recent scholarship on Donne, who has attracted more attention in the field of body criticism than Herbert, largely due to Donne's direct engagement with anatomy and anatomical details in some of his work, such as his "Anniversary" poems and *Devotions*. Kuchar suggests

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13 Although there are very few works similar to Schoenfeldt's treatment of Herbert, Bromley's approach is not uncommon and frequently emphasizes Eucharistic consumption. See also Robert Whalen, *The Poetry of Immanence: Sacrament in Donne and Herbert* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002); John N. Wall, *Transformations of the Word: Spenser, Herbert, Vaughan* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1988). Likewise, Sawday has commented on Herbert's persistent concern regarding the signification of the body (Sawday, *The Body Emblazoned* 87).
that “the emergence of anatomical science complicated representations of the body’s natural order” as it displaced analogical humoralism, and he explores Donne’s coming to terms with the “loss of the body’s coherence” (Kuchar 152, 153). According to Kuchar, Donne copes by turning to language:

> the sacramental work of conjoining temporal to eternal that Donne’s language in the *Devotions* seeks to perform derives much of its revelatory power, its capacity for sublating the spiritual out of the physical, the universal out of the particular, from the language of embodiment.

(Kuchar 153)

In other words, the language of embodiment becomes a path to experiencing God as the experience of embodiment began losing its religious coherence. Kuchar uses Donne to examine the perceived growing tension between early modern anatomy and Christian subjectivity. This focus on tension or anxiety over the body has characterized critical approaches to Donne and corporeality. In *The Body Emblazoned*, Sawday similarly discusses “the battle-lines between material and immaterial existence” that are evident in Donne, particularly regarding the “treasonous” sick body (Sawday, *The Body Emblazoned* 20, 32). While I do not argue against the presence of tension or anxiety in Donne’s work, I suggest that the vast literary weight of Donne tends to overshadow other writers and perspectives. As critics focus on his comments about anatomy, the body, and

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14 For a detailed analysis of Donne’s general representation of the body as a microcosm of ‘salvation history,’ see Felicia Wright McDuffie, *To Our Bodies Turn We Then: Body as Word and Sacrament in the Works of John Donne* (New York: Continuum, 2005). Although McDuffie offers very few comments about Donne and anatomy (and draws heavily on Sawday in the process), she does offer a comprehensive account of what she sees as a relatively coherent and consistent religious perspective on the body throughout Donne’s work. If, as Kuchar and others suggest, Donne was anxious about the threat anatomy posed to the body, then the threatened analogical body is likely very similar to the one described by McDuffie.
the soul, we must be careful not to let Donne speak for all devotional poets because, as we will see, not all of them express the same kinds of anxieties that he does.  

In part, the final two chapters of this dissertation attempt to bring new poets into the discussion about religion and corporeality that is often – but not always – limited to Herbert and Donne. Chapter Three deals with An Collins and Chapter Four deals with Francis Quarles. In addition to bringing often-marginalized poets into a discussion of faith and corporeality, the choice of these writers also serves a broader purpose. These writers represent two very different genres of poetry within a devotional context. Collins authors what we might consider a more traditional form of devotional poetry; her 1653 collection entitled *Divine Songs and Meditacions* contains a variety of poems, often semi-autobiographical in nature, that offer a devotional perspective on subjectivity and the experience of embodiment that is often connected to personal experience. In contrast, Quarles’ examinations of the evolution of the Protestant self in *Emblemes* (1635) and *Hieroglyphikes of the Life of Man* (1638) are examples of emblematic literature, a genre that combines images and words in order to create meaning, not unlike anatomical texts themselves. Like Collins, Quarles explores the experience of a Christianized subjectivity that emphasizes the soul-body dialectic. These authors also represent varying degrees of access to contemporary anatomical ideas. On the one hand we have Collins, who, as a

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15 Ramie Targoff offers one of the most recent and eloquent discussions of Donne’s anxieties in *John Donne, Body and Soul* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008). She argues that the eventual parting of body and soul, the two constitutive parts of the self, is “the great subject of Donne’s writing” (Targoff 2). According to Targoff, the relationship between the two and the impending rupture of that bond informs Donne’s often-anxious approach to, and interpretation of, the world around him. As Targoff points out, Donne wrote about worked through many of the philosophical and theological debates surrounding the body and the soul well beyond what we often see in other writers from the period. Consequently, Donne is unique rather than representative in this respect.
woman, would not have been allowed to attend anatomical demonstrations and who was likely housebound with a debilitating illness, a situation that precipitated her meditations on her body and her faith. Everything we know about Collins is contained in her one book of poetry, which can only leave us to infer which other writers she may have read. On the other hand we have Quarles, a contemporary and friend of Phineas Fletcher, whose contact with anatomy was probably made through either The Purple Island, a text to which he contributed two dedicatory poems, or through his formal education at Cambridge.

In any event, similarities of perspective between Collins and Quarles cannot be reduced to a shared educational background. The differences between these two writers are indicative of the pervasiveness of Christianized perspectives on the body and the soul – an infirm woman writing autobiographical poems and a prolific emblematist and devotional poet express roughly similar perspectives on embodiment and the status of the body in the Christian master narrative. With the exception of a few of Quarles’ emblems, neither he nor Collins set out as practitioners of the body-soul dialogue genre, and yet the relationship between these two halves of the Christian subject is a prevalent concern throughout their writing. Their differences, however, also emphasize that the religious understanding of the body and the soul was not interpreted the same by all people, even if their general interpretive framework was the same. Both writers see the flesh as weak even though they interpret the significance of that corporeal weakness differently. As we will see in Chapter Three, Collins reads her religion through her body, applying the Christian master narrative to her own circumstances in such a way that valorizes her
illness and suffering as her own devotional tools. As both a woman and an invalid, Collins holds a particular subject position that binds her relentlessly to her weak body. By drawing on the medieval anchoritic tradition, however, Collins turns this corporeal weakness into devotional strength and a basis for asserting her own authority as a Christian subject and a writer. For Quarles’ speaker in *Emblemes*, illness and disease become metaphors for all of the worldly concerns – wealth, fame, and pleasure – that constantly threaten to infect the soul through the body, and he does not struggle with the intersection of corporeality and authority that Collins does. As we will see in Chapter Four, corporeality emerges in Quarles’ emblems as a metaphor for devotion. By dealing with just a few writers rather than with early modern devotional poetry as a whole or with a discreet genre such as body-soul dialogue poems, I am able to examine in detail some of the nuances of the Christianized sense of corporeality that are established in the first two chapters of this dissertation.

Ultimately, the self that is described in these texts, from the anatomical to the philosophical to the devotional, is complex and imagined on a grand scale. And yet this self is – or these selves are – confined to the comparatively small and restricted space of the corporeal body. In all these cases, Christian narratives and justifications establish the significance of and logic behind the body, the soul, and their relationship to one another. It should be noted that the following chapters do not seek to map out, once and for all, The Renaissance Self, which is indeed an elusive prey that has frustrated many critics. Rather, I proceed with Maus’ assertion in mind that “‘Subcivity’ is often treated casually as a unified or coherent concept when, in fact, it is a loose and varied collection
of assumptions, intuitions, and practices that do not all logically entail one another and need not appear together at the same cultural moment” (Maus 29). Absent from this dissertation are discussions of interpellation, Lacanian psychoanalysis, or Foucauldian notions of power/knowledge, critical models and perspectives that – as useful as they can be – often encourage a totalizing perception of the self. The sense of religious subjectivity that is articulated in these anatomical and religious texts does not represent the sum total of early modern selfhood. Instead, the understanding of the relationship between body and soul, and a devotionally informed sense of corporeality, constitute a significant feature of early modern selfhood, one that informs how these writers understand just what ‘the self’ means.
Chapter 1: “[R]eceiv’d every where, and by all persons”: The Christianized Body and Soul in Early Modern English Anatomies

This chapter seeks to outline the scientific and, specifically, anatomical backdrop in England during the late medieval and early modern period in order to establish part of the intellectual-religious paradigm within which writers operated. The temporal parameters for this study have a fairly concrete beginning but a rather loose end point. In 1543, Andreas Vesalius published *On the Fabric of the Human Body*, pushing Europe into a new relationship with the human body, what Jonathan Sawday calls the “culture of dissection” (Sawday 3). Although human dissections had certainly taken place in Europe prior to the mid-sixteenth century, Vesalius initiated a systemic and detailed approach to the bodily interior that weakened the cultural and religious taboos against cutting into and exploring the human body for purely intellectual reasons. His work, and much of the work that follows him, is accompanied by detailed descriptions and images of bodies and parts, more recognizable to the twenty-first century reader as ‘scientific’ than those of his medieval counterparts. In this period, we can observe a *gradual* (and I do not think we can over-emphasize ‘gradual’ here) move away from medieval conceptions that focused on the body as a microcosm that mimicked the world around it, maintaining humoral balance, and that also emphasized a distinction between the medical elite that dealt in abstract, philosophical notions of medicine and healing and the less respected manual labour of the surgeon. In fact, and as we will see throughout this dissertation, this movement was so gradual that many so-called ‘medieval’ ways of looking at the body
persisted through to the seventeenth century. The early modern period witnessed an explosion of advancements in anatomical knowledge and saw the discovery and promotion of much of what would eventually become our contemporary knowledge about the body and its systems.

Although the mid-sixteenth century is thus a logical starting point for this study, the end point is much more vague. Around the mid-seventeenth century, a number of changes took place that altered the theoretical, methodological, and even linguistic approaches to the body in Europe and, more specifically, in England. The English Civil War, for example, politicized the language of the body. This is not to say that the language of the body was apolitical prior to the Civil War – the anatomical work from our period of study is often inextricably linked to the language of hierarchy that saw, for example, the brain or the heart as the sovereign of the other inferior parts that did its bidding. However, the Civil War brought the language of the body into a new realm, disrupting such previous easy associations between, say, ‘head’ and ‘king.’ In addition, the development of a view of the body as more mechanistic than microcosmic, influenced by such things as the developments in anatomy and the philosophical development of the Cartesian mind-body split, marks a transition into a different intellectual and scientific approach to the body. However, determining exactly when a new conception of the body coalesced is virtually impossible since many of the older ways of thinking still exerted a strong influence even as new theories began circulating. Consequently, even though subsequent chapters of this dissertation will not necessarily extend into the late-seventeenth century, this chapter will reach as late as 1685 in order to demonstrate the
persistence of religious ways of thinking about the body. Further, I end with the late-seventeenth century because my focus is the era of pre-cellular understandings of the body. Although microscopes were in use in the early sixteenth century, these early microscopes were little more than glorified magnifying glasses. Consequently, when early modern anatomists looked at the body they did not see it as comprised of a mass of cells and microscopic organisms, and moving beyond the limitations of the naked eye was not really fathomable. Certainly, the idea of atoms was not inconceivable to the early modern mind, but their understanding of atoms as tiny bits of matter – an atom was basically something that was incomprehensibly small – and our own understanding of atoms being made up of measurable parts in the form of electrons, protons, and nuclei are vastly different. When an early modern anatomist examined things like blood or semen, for example, he saw red and white liquids that were quantifiable in terms of colour, thickness, and temperature, not as millions of red and white blood cells or as a teeming school of swimming creatures, only one of which would be capable of burrowing into an egg to produce life. References to the use of microscopes and “optick glass[es]” appear early in the sixteenth century, but only as a form of slight magnification (Harvey, *Anatomical Exercises* 18).

Early modern England is consequently a point of intersection for many ways of thinking about the human body, and the anatomist was faced with numerous and not always compatible theoretical models. In true Renaissance fashion, anatomists often based their work on the ‘truths’ established by classical writers, most notably Galen and, to a lesser extent, Aristotle. In many cases, early modern anatomical work – particularly
during the sixteenth century – often sought to simply verify or reiterate Galen’s findings, even at times when Galen’s work seemed incorrect to the anatomist staring into the bloody cavity of a dissected human body. Although many of his ideas gradually lost their grip, anatomists were particularly hesitant to abandon the more philosophical Galenic or Aristotelian theories about the body that were less visible to the naked eye, such as the mirroring of male and female genitalia or their ideas about conception and the generation of human life. In addition, medieval humoral theory also influenced anatomists, particularly in the sixteenth century, as did the anatomical work done by their continental contemporaries, both filtered through various influences. In fact, references to humoral theory can been seen up until the end of the seventeenth century and, as Gail Kern Paster has pointed out, can still be seen in our own descriptions of the body (Paster, *The Body Embarrassed* 7).

One further discursive framework greatly influenced early modern discussions of the body: Christianity. As noted in my Introduction, Christianity was one institution that influenced virtually every aspect of English intellectual and cultural life. In fact, it would be impossible to separate religion from the fabric of early modern English society; the echoes of Christian beliefs were everywhere and constituted many – or most – of the unquestioned and even unspoken truths that informed the ways people thought about themselves, their lives, and the world around them. Silence on issues of religion or a failure to discuss the connection between a particular idea and Christianity was not an indication of a lack of faith or an implied profession of atheism – some things were such commonly held beliefs that they simply did not need to be articulated. This was no less
the case for the anatomist. In the twenty-first century, we normally think of science and religion as two separate entities often locked in a contentious relationship. However, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Christianity formed the basis of many scientific beliefs, and it was not uncommon for anatomists to force their findings into conformity with their religion or, in cases where findings and faith were incompatible, to favour a biblical interpretation over their own observations. The Bible was often viewed as a text to be read in conjunction with Galen, Aristotle, and Vesalius as a guide to understanding the body and is often cited as such an authority by the anatomists themselves.

During the past twenty years in particular, a great deal of critical attention has been paid to the body and to early modern and medieval anatomical work. Although much of this work is illuminating and rewarding in its own right, it is my contention that, when it comes to exploring the relationship between the body and religion, the critical material is incomplete for one of two reasons. First, many critics and historians have acknowledged the omnipresence of religion in early modern intellectual life without a detailed examination of the degree to which science and anatomy were indebted to Christian perspectives on God, the universe, and the body. Second, some writers have downplayed this connection and suggest instead that science and religion constituted separate and potentially competing entities. One such critic, Peter Elmer, enthusiastically insists that theological knowledge and religious morality were seen as irrelevant by Galenists who, he says, separated themselves from religion (Elmer 13-17). This anachronistic perspective is dangerous because it forces the early moderns into a contemporary paradigm of thought within which they would not have been comfortable. I
believe that in order to broaden and deepen our understanding of the early modern body we must not only accept the fact that religion formed the dominant intellectual paradigm for English culture, but we must also explore the nature and content of the inseparability of the body from religion during the period. The critical work that has been done to this point has dramatically improved our understanding of the body itself, but this work must be extended into the realm of religion for a more complete and rigorous perspective that addresses not only the material understanding of the body but the theological understanding as well.

The touchstone for contemporary work on the early modern body has been Jonathan Sawday’s aforementioned work on the “culture of dissection” in *The Body Emblazoned* (1995). Sawday examines European anatomical work beginning with Vesalius in relation to mostly English literature up to the late seventeenth century that witnessed the ‘Cartesian split.’ He seeks to map the emergence of disinterested science, as well as fragmentation and particularization as a mode of thinking. As Devon L. Hodges similarly notes, but in less detail, in *Renaissance Fictions of Anatomy* (1985), Sawday argues that the anatomical impulse to categorize, parse, and fracture was carried over into the literature and art of the period, a methodology that employs violent destruction as an impetus for the creation of knowledge. Sawday suggests that, “In its corporeality and its fragility, in its median nature linking the human and the divine, in its concentration of opposites – pleasure and pain, salvation and damnation, eros and thanatos – the body almost disappeared under the sheer weight of poetic tribute of which it was the recipient” (Sawday 86). Consequently, as anatomists tore into the body,
literature and art inherited numerous metaphors and images to add to the already overflowing storehouse of figurative language surrounding or drawing on the body. Additionally, Sawday acknowledges the intimate connection between the body and religion, noting that,

> In the west, prior to the ‘new science’ of the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the body’s interior could not be understood without recourse to an analysis of that which gave its materiality significance – the essence contained within the body. A belief in the presence of that essence, a belief, that is, in the existence of an *anima*, a soul or a thinking entity necessarily informed any possible perspective of the body. To consider the body in isolation was not merely difficult but, strictly speaking, impossible, since the body’s primary function, it was held, was to act as a vessel of containment for the more significant feature of the soul. (Sawday 16)

Sawday helpfully extends the influence of religion over the body into the early modern period, yet the nature of the relationship is largely relegated to the background of his work. Sawday explores the literary discussion of the soul-body relationship, drawing on authors such as John Donne and Andrew Marvell, as well as the Christian emphasis on the corporeal body of Christ and the presence of Christian images in anatomy theatres, but he leaves largely unexplained the anatomist’s dialogue with and reliance on religion. In fact, he argues that,

> the history of the representation of the body in science in the early-modern [sic] period was a negotiation between these two irreconcilable positions. In one position, we may understand the body as still existing within a theologically ordained universe. But in the alternative position, one which, with hindsight, seems to have been the inevitable consequence of the methodologies of ‘new science,’ the body was liberated from theology, only to be made subject to the equally stringent demands of scientific method. (Sawday 98)
Certainly the lure of hindsight is powerful, but as my examination of early modern anatomical work will demonstrate, the "irreconcilable positions" of science and religion actually cohabited harmoniously and were often explicitly described as mutually supportive by the anatomists themselves.

Like Sawday's work, David Cressy's discussion of early modern life-cycle rituals falls into the trap of anachronism when it comes to discussing the perceived tension between science and religion:

The Christian culture of early modern England provided the master narrative for understanding the mystery of childbirth. Other systems of explanation - especially the learned traditions of ancient science, medieval medicine, and renaissance anatomy - addressed the physiology of childbearing, but fell short in describing its deeper spiritual significance.

. . . For the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the miracle of reproduction was swathed in religious meaning. (Cressy 16)

Cressy is correct in emphasizing the central importance of Christianity in establishing the 'master narrative' that encompassed and gave meaning to the individual life in early modern England. Even if tensions or dissent surrounded the specific events or rituals that marked the beginning, passage, and end of the Christian subject, the master narrative itself was rarely questioned or subjected to the type of scrutiny familiar to the twenty-first century reader. However, Cressy - like Sawday - often discusses science, anatomy, and medicine as alternatives to religion and as less satisfying discourses because they were incapable of commenting on the deeper meaning of, say, childbirth, a perspective that likely would not be endorsed by the anatomists themselves. In fact, as we will see, many early modern English anatomists such as Thomas Vicary, John Banister, Helkiah Crooke, and Samuel Collins describe their own work as an aspect of the accepted Christian master
narrative rather than in competition with it, designed in part to illustrate the divine plan mapped onto every surface and every organ of the human body.

Similarly, the contributors to the collection of essays edited by David Hillman and Carla Mazzio and entitled *The Body in Parts* (1997) largely discuss the status of the body part or member in isolation from the Christian master narrative and the all-encompassing influence of religion over conceptions of the body. The individual essays themselves do important work in broadening our knowledge of the early modern understanding of the parts in question, such as the tongue, joints, and eyes, and their relation to the body as a whole, but few of the contributors explicitly engage with the religious discourse that informed the conceptualization of the body part. Katherine Rowe, for example, discusses the anatomist’s hand as a symbol of Christian agency, and Scott Manning Stevens writes about the conflict between the anatomical understanding and prioritization of the brain, and the religious – normally Catholic – emphasis on the heart as the core of the subject. Hillman’s own essay focuses on the bodily interior, noting that it was both the site of belief and faith, but also the focus of the anatomical and scientific gaze: “the two modes of understanding, incompatible in terms of the kind of access to the body’s interior they deem possible, jostled against each other,” a conflict that he sees manifested in Shakespeare’s plays (Hillman 86). Like many other critics, Hillman anachronistically emphasizes the incompatibility of anatomy and religion. In their introduction to the volume, Hillman and Carla Mazzio propose that in reading these essays, we must recognize that parts – by definition – exist in relation to a whole and cannot be entirely autonomous; separation and unity coexist (Hillman and Mazzio xiv). However, in
stressing the relationship between the body part and the body whole, what the contributors often neglect to discuss is the extent to which the body itself was seen as a part of the religious whole. If we accept that the part cannot be seen as entirely separate from the body, then we must also recognize that the same held true for the Christianized body, which was anchored to the divine by the incorporeal soul. Additionally, given the persistent belief in the eventual resurrection of the body in early modern England, this connection becomes even more important.

Other analyses of early modern anatomy published in the past decade offer interesting insights into anatomy as a whole but without any sustained focus on English examples. Andrew Cunningham’s *The Anatomical Renaissance* (1997) and Roger French’s *Dissection and Vivisection in the European Renaissance* (1999) both address the connections between theology and anatomy to an extent, but their work is focused on continental Europe. French, for example, argues that continental anatomists rarely engaged in specific theological debates and that “anatomists very rarely cite the authority of the Scriptures, the Church fathers or theologians” (French 10, 129). As we will see, this was not the case for many English anatomists. Cunningham goes further by suggesting that the resurgence of anatomy during the late medieval and early modern periods can be connected to the rise of Protestant self-analysis, but he focuses primarily on parallel methods of inquiry through particular case studies, comparing, for example, Vesalius’s and Martin Luther’s approaches to the self in order to suggest the influence of the Reformation on continental anatomy (Cunningham 236). He argues against separating religion and science “into two piles” and that “It is time to attempt to put the religion
back into sixteenth century anatomizing” (Cunningham 202, 208). I wholeheartedly agree
with this statement, yet as valid and rewarding as the work of Cunningham and French is,
their conclusions cannot be imposed in total onto England. It is obvious but necessary to
note that sixteenth-century Padua was not seventeenth-century London.

In addition, relatively little sustained work has been done on the early modern
English anatomists themselves. Certainly, the names of John Banister, Helkiah Crooke,
and William Harvey flit in and out of the critical literature on the body, but they normally
do so as a background to other work, and their work as both anatomists and authors has
rarely received detailed attention. This is quite possibly due to the very nature of their
work. Early modern anatomical texts tend to be meticulously indexed and partitioned into
books and sections just as the body itself is parsed and divided. Anatomical texts are thus
designed to act as reference books to be consulted for information about a specific body
part, illness, or procedure. This layout, however, invites the twenty-first century reader to
dip into these texts haphazardly, to turn to relevant sections and dissociate them from the
whole. Furthermore, even the most unscientific reader will find it difficult not to
anachronistically judge the findings of these anatomists, whether it is Thomas Vicary’s
assertion that hair is produced by the hot rising fumes of a humoral body or the many
now-antiquated notions about procreation and birth that persisted throughout the
seventeenth century. However, if we continue to approach these texts in this way,
fragmenting them, then we will continue to miss the authors themselves as they appear in
their own work, failing to note Crooke’s persistent devotional awe over the body, for
example, or Samuel Collins’ moral anxiety over bodily temperance, issues which garner
much critical attention in the recognized ‘literary’ texts that these anatomists are normally read as a backdrop to, as part of the cultural noise buzzing in the ears of poets and playwrights.

It is the work of Gail Kern Paster and Michael C. Schoenfeldt that informs my approach to the Christianized body. Even though these two authors are often at odds with one another, they promote a similar, productive approach to understanding the period in question. Paster has pointed out in her recent work on the materiality of emotions and the “premodern ecology of the passions” in early modern humoral theory that there is a crucial distance between ‘us’ and ‘them’ in terms of thinking about the body (Paster, *Humoring the Body* 9). Paster notes that many of the aspects of the self that we label as intangible and psychological, such as the emotions, the early moderns thought of as physically present in the body and engaged in a complex material dialogue with the world outside the body. She characterizes this as the “psychophysiology” of the early modern subject, a paradigm that requires modern readers to “look for evidence of emotions and the subjectivities they help constitute elsewhere than simply within the traditionally privileged ground of noncorporeal inwardness, that fictional space created and maintained by criticism’s dematerialized understanding of early modern psychology” (Paster 28). Likewise, although Schoenfeldt writes against Paster’s earlier work *The Body Embarrassed* in his book *Bodies and Selves in Early Modern England*, he embarks on a similar project as he explores the “materialist psychology” of the early modern period and seeks to “recover as much as possible this earlier understanding of the self” through his focus on the consuming subject and the processes of ingestion and excretion
This deceptively simple-sounding paradigm leap, or act of historical recovery, is a necessary part of the present study as well. Certainly, stepping outside our twenty-first century psychologically-grounded conception of subjectivity is no easier than dissociating ourselves from our intellectual culture that clearly separates religion and science as antithetical. Consequently, some things are bound to be lost in the transition. As Schoenfeldt says, he is trying to reconstruct a historically-distant mode of thinking “as much as possible,” a recognition that no matter how rigorous our efforts might be, a complete and total understanding of the early modern mentality is quite possibly impossible. Nevertheless, it is my goal here to begin the work of recovering and foregrounding some of the period’s religio-scientific understandings of the body in order to broaden our understanding of the early modern subject. Paster states in *The Body Embarrassed* that, “I want to outline the difference humoralism, or *any other* influential account of human physiology, makes to the subjective experience of being-in-the-body” (Paster, *The Body Embarrassed* 3). It is my contention that, not unlike humoralism, the Christianized understanding of the body and the soul evident in early modern English anatomical work constitutes one of these other “influential account[s] of human physiology” that informed conceptions of the self. As we will see, thinking about the body and thinking about the soul were rarely separate acts, even in anatomical work where we might least expect to find such a dialogue.

Two English anatomists from the earlier part of our period will help illustrate the impact of many of the intersecting influences on as well as demonstrate the evolution of English anatomies from pre-Vesalian to post-Vesalian theory. Thomas Vicary, surgeon to
Henry VIII and a contemporary of Vesalius, published his *Anatomie of Mans Body* in 1548. This text was reprinted in 1577 in a “newly reuyued, corrected” form by the surgeons of St. Bartholomew’s hospital in Smithfield and dedicated to Queen Elizabeth and Sir Roland Hayward, president of the hospital (Vicary, title page). In 1578, just a year after Vicary’s reprint appeared, John Banister published his anatomical work, *The Historie of Man*. Although they appeared nearly simultaneously, these texts are quite different and testify to the changing state of anatomical study during the period.¹

Although Vicary’s *Anatomie* was originally published in 1548, the surgeons of St. Bartholomew’s saw fit to reprint the text with very few corrections or changes, an indication perhaps of the lasting appeal of Vicary’s ideas thirty years later. Vicary’s work, they say, is “grounded vpon reason and experience, which are two principal rootes of Physicke and Surgerie” (Vicary §iv), and they offer to help “defende agaynst the rauening Iawes of enuious Backbyters, which neuer cease by all vnlawful meanes to blemishe and deface the workes of the learned, expert, and well disposed persons”

Certainly, any surgeon who subscribed wholly to Vicary's work would have felt under attack by more recent anatomical texts. Although Vicary wrote around the same time as Vesalius, he was either unaware of or did not care for Vesalius' work; Vicary's *Anatomie* contains no references to Vesalius at all, nor to any of his contemporaries. Instead, Vicary draws most of his reasoning and authority from either Galen or humoral theory, although Aristotle does make some brief appearances. When Vicary describes a part of the body, he typically first outlines the humoral composition of the part -- the bones, for example, are cold and dry, the brain is cold and moist -- and much of the body is organized around balancing the excessive heat produced by the heart. For example, he says that an artery carries air from the lungs to the heart in order to "temper the fumous heate" of the heart, and we expel the "fumous superfluities" (Vicary Biii\(^v\), Iv\(^v\)) of the heart when we breathe out. The liver occupies a privileged space in Vicary's humoral model; as the organ responsible for the flow of nutritive blood (as opposed to vital blood, which will be discussed later), the liver is also responsible for distributing the humours to their respective parts -- choler to the gall bladder, melancholy to the spleen, phlegm to the lungs, and blood to itself. Citing Galen, Vicary compares the relationship between the stomach and the parts of the body to the relationship between the earth and all living things, and Galen is frequently invoked when Vicary is faced with the task of rationalizing the placement, function, or even appearance of a particular member or organ. Vicary represents the body as a miniature society, governed by the sovereignty of the heart or the brain, all of the parts of which contribute, hierarchically, to the preservation and maintenance of harmony within the body. Each part is typically
addressed as 'he' or 'she,' and each part has a role to play. For Vicary, this helps explain why some organs exist in pairs; the eyes and lungs are in pairs of two so that if one of the organs fails, the other can take on the workload (such as sight or breathing) and maintain a functioning, harmonious subject.

Additionally, Vicary's prose is indebted to Christianity and devotional language. Before he begins his anatomy, Vicary discusses what makes a good surgeon, combining humoral and religious theory. It is important, he argues, to choose the right kind of man for the job of surgeon, "And in this point al Authors doo agree, that a Chirurgion should be chosen by his complexion, and that his complexion be very temperate, and al his members wel proportioned" (Vicary Aii'). In other words, to successfully undertake a job that is focused on bringing a patient's humours back into balance and reestablishing bodily harmony, it is important that the surgeon himself is humorally balanced – running neither too hot nor too cold – and physically symmetrical. However, according to Vicary, surgical skill and humoral balance were not enough; it was also important that the surgeon was a good Christian, "that he be a good lyuer and a keeper of the holy comaundements of God, of whom commeth al cunning and grace" (Vicary Aii³). Surgeons should be virtuous men, even outside their professional life, "And amongst other thinges they may neither be flatterers, nor mockers, nor priuie backbiters of other men. Likewise they must not be proude, nor presumptuous, nor detracters of other men" (Vicary Aiv'). The surgeon should never seek praise, nor should he lust after women, particularly in a patient's house. Vicary thus maps out the necessary preconditions for becoming (and identifying) a good surgeon, emphasizing both external and internal
strength and balance. The ideal surgeon would be a representative of the ideal microcosmic body, physically and humorally proportioned, spiritually and morally pure.

This moral cleanliness would come in handy when working on the human body, the functioning of which Vicary describes in religious terms. Divine ordination is a central tenet of this system. When he describes why something is the way it is, he discusses why it was 'ordained,' or, perhaps more accurately, that it was ordained – the why can often be reduced to the will of God, which is often manifested as a combination of both human logic (explainable) and divine logic (unexplainable) and is normally the endpoint of any and all debate. Although the OED lists a number of non-religious definitions for 'ordain,' the key element in most of those meanings is the transitive nature of the verb. In either a secular or religious context, to ordain means to transfer power or purpose, to dictate function and form. In Vicary’s anatomy, ordination clearly carries religious connotations because God is the source of that ordination. For example, when Vicary comments on the distinction between the thickness of arteries and veins, he notes that arteries carry more precious blood, “and therefore God and nature haue ordeyned for him to be closed in two cotes, where the Veine hath but one” (Vicary HIiiv). The rationale is explicit – arteries are stronger than veins and deeper below the skin because they perform a more important, vital function. However, the logic behind this rationale is placed in God’s hands. What the anatomist or surgeon sees when he cuts into the body or examines its surface in detail is a divine plan woven into every feature and organ of that body, and witnessing that plan gives the observer a clearer understanding and awe of the mind of God. The fact that the body adheres to an all-encompassing logic is not as
important as the fact that God has established that logic in the first place, whether or not humanity can find it.

Likewise, Vicary sometimes invokes Christian allegories when he describes parts of the body. For example, he describes the breast or torso as "the Arke or Chest of the spiritual members of man" (Vicary Hiiti'). According to the Bible, the Ark of the Covenant was built at the command of God, a sacred container for the Ten Commandments, the core principles of Christianity (Exodus 16:34; Hebrews 9:4). By representing the human body as another Ark, Vicary emphasizes the body as a divine object and sacred vessel, also constructed as the command of God at Creation, according to His specifications, as a physical container for spiritual things. Whenever the Ark was carried around, it was covered in animal skins and cloth, obscuring it from sight just as human skin cloaks our own physical interior. Access to the Ark was permitted only once a year and then only to the high priest. In this metaphor, the anatomist performs a taboo but sacred action, opening the ark of the body to read the divine laws contained within, and Vicary's invocation of the Ark raises the status of the anatomist to a supremely religious position. Opening the body may have been a taboo just as opening the Ark was, but Vicary's anatomist was no layperson – he was the high priest of the human body, sanctioned by God to do His work and preach from the text within. Certainly, having a surgeon who is a virtuous Christian would be important in this respect because the act of delving into the body brings one into contact with God. Additionally, this metaphor extends the definition of the body beyond the physical by describing the breast as a container for the "spiritual members," those parts that perform the essential operation of
sustaining life and whose functions blur into the intangible realm of the soul by bridging the gap between humanity and divinity.

John Banister's *The Historie of Man* differs greatly from Vicary's work, particularly in his methodological approach to the body. If the surgeons at St. Bartholomew’s hospital reprinted Vicary’s text in 1577 as a response to the emerging trends and challenges in anatomy, then Banister’s work would likely have been seen as the opposition. The appearance of these two vastly different texts within a year of each other testifies to the variety of perspectives that influenced English anatomists during the late sixteenth century. Whereas Vicary gives no indication that other anatomists had done any meaningful work in the past thousand years, or that he himself has even dissected a human body, Banister’s work is populated by many of his contemporaries’ theories and his own experiences as an anatomist. Vesalius and Renaldus Columbus (also known as Matteo Realdo Colombo) make frequent appearances, as do Galen and Aristotle. Banister proclaims that his goal is not simply to regurgitate the findings of one particular anatomist but rather to pick “from all their Gardens” (Banister Aiv) in order to provide a comprehensive survey of the profession, noting that “no English Authour” has compiled a satisfactory anatomy up to this point (Banister Aiv).

Banister’s work also differs from Vicary’s in that Banister allows for anatomical differences between – or anomalies within – individuals. Vicary’s humoral and microcosmic perspective on the body forces him to generalize about the body, and the sense one gets from reading his text is that all bodies are essentially interchangeable. When he talks about the heart or the lungs or the bones, he is speaking about The Human
Body as a totalizing concept. In contrast, Banister emphasizes that although there are certainly things that are generally true about the body, it is important to recognize that unique characteristics are often manifested in individual bodies. Through the dissections he has performed, he has found much of what Galen says to be true, but there are variations from person to person that might account for some of the deficiencies in Galen’s work. As he says, “It may fall out to be no new saying, that almost in all bodies, some varietie is to be sene” (Banister Biv’). However, a potential problem with this perspective is that it runs the risk of validating virtually any anatomical finding by reducing it to the peculiarities of a particular body. For example, he notes that some of Galen’s theories of the back have been disproved by other anatomists (for example, regarding the number of bones in the tailbone), which leads some to believe that Galen never dissected a body in his life and had only worked on apes. Banister rejects this, saying he has a skeleton in his house that conforms to Galen’s description, which he chalks up to the variations from body to body – “euen in one region, great difference, and sundry alterations in natures shapes are found” (Banister 22”). Although Banister wants to assemble a more accurate anatomy than was currently available in England, he is hesitant to abandon Galen’s ideas or to wholly reject the findings of his contemporaries, even when his own work seems to contradict them.

Although Banister might not share Vicary’s methodology, he does express a similar sense of the religious nature of, and explanation for, his work. In fact, Banister actually offers a more explicitly Christian framework for his text than Vicary does; the religious ideals that are often visible in Vicary’s text as shadows or as an unspoken set of
shared assumptions with the reader are regularly discussed by Banister in detail. His book is for the practical use of godly surgeons and, for the general reader, “the obtainyng of a better mynde in Christ Iesu”, an echo of Vicary’s comments that he is observing God’s plan when he looks inside the body (Banister Aiii”). Just as Vicary emphasizes the need for virtuous surgeons, Banister hopes that

we may seeke the aduauncement of the glory of God, in healyng our afflicted brethren, whereto his diuine power shall (so oft as it pleaseth him) suborne, and appoynt us Ministers, that (I say) with the testimonie of a cleare conscience, we may render our vauntaged talentes unto the high Auditour, in the day of commyng, which, we know not how nere, approacheth.

(Banister Bi')

Banister sees healing as a religious service to God, one which he envisions the surgeon performing even at Judgment Day, helping God sort the sinners from the virtuous Christians through the surgeon’s privileged ability to literally look inside another person. The spiritual omnipotence of God is mirrored by the corporeal omnipotence of the surgeon in his capacity as God’s minister. Given this parity that he establishes, it is not surprising that Banister calls the surgeon a “Godly Artist” (Banister Bi’). Additionally, just as Vicary describes the torso as an “Arke” containing the spiritual members of the body, so Banister represents aspects of the bodily interior as a religious text and instills in the anatomist a privileged religious status. Commenting on the necessity for the anatomist to memorize the bones in the body, Banister writes,

And this doctrine of the iountes, and composition of bones, I doubt not (after you haue once entred into the midest therof) but you wilbe moved to thirst, in delite of often readyng the same, and neuer cease till such tyme, as you haue made it as perfect as the Pater noster: so may you, with more expedient celeritie read ouer, the particular description of bones.

(Banister 4')
Whereas Vicary transforms the vital organs into the Ten Commandments, Banister transforms the bones into the Pater Noster, memorized and recited by the surgeon-minister as a religious text. Whether as a high priest or minister, the anatomist does his service to God through his anatomical investigations, increasing our knowledge of God’s work in the body and preaching to those below him. We can also see in his text an absolute willingness to read the Bible as an authoritative source on the body:

> For first, that the magnitude of our body is greatly diminished, it is a thing in readynes to euery man, not onely by the authoritie of auncient writers, but also that dayly, and (as I suppose) throughout the world, the stature of man in all pointes decreaseth: especially in those regions wheras matrimonie is ouer liberally, & before the iust age, permitted. Who is so ignoraunt, to whom the Scriptures haue not ere now testified, how much longer then in these dayes, the age of man hath bene in times past?

(Banister Biir)

Not only does Banister accept scriptural proof that humans once lived much longer lives than they do now and that bodies were once much larger, he also scoffs at those who suggest otherwise, labeling them “ignoraunt.” For Banister, a well-rounded anatomical education necessitates reading the Bible in conjunction with Galen, Aristotle, and Vesalius.

Additionally, Banister describes the reader’s progression through the text – with his guidance – as “our journey or pilgrimage,” further establishing the religious nature of the anatomist’s work (Banister 4r, my emphasis). In a religious context, pilgrimages were often undertaken for the purpose of healing or addressing a moral wound. The journey itself was just as important as the holy site that was the destination, but it is also important to note that the pilgrimage itself did not represent the end of the process of repentance. A pilgrimage might redress a particular sin, but it did not absolve the pilgrim
from the need to repent for future sins; a pilgrimage was thus part of a lifelong process of penitence, one that was seen as never complete. Similarly, the pilgrimage of anatomy was directed toward the holy site of the body, a journey that helped heal the body but which also held it up as a devotional object, one constructed by God. Like religious pilgrimages, the anatomical pilgrimage was seen as constantly moving forward. Banister might have viewed his text as authoritative, but he did not see it as the end point of all anatomical work but rather as a continually evolving journey. Just as a pilgrim knew that he or she would likely lapse into sin again, Banister understood that more work needed to be done before humanity could stand before the body and see the entirety of God’s plan mapped onto its flesh and bones. The anatomist’s pilgrimage could help heal the body, but it could not prevent disease and sickness from ever existing again; like the religious pilgrimage, it was aimed more at redressing than preventing.

The anatomical images that accompany Banister’s text also complement the religious nature of the language he employs. The first image that appears in his text, preceding his discussion of the bones, is a more detailed version of a similar image that opens Vicary’s *Anatomie* and depicts a skeleton standing in a sparse landscape, flanked by vegetation and leaning on a spade with its right arm (fig. 1.1).2 Its left arm is bent slightly, palm toward the viewer, and its head is raised, with its empty eye sockets directed upwards. The pose is that of a weary farmer who has – quite literally – worked

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2 This image, like the rest of the images in Banister’s *Historie*, is either copied directly from Vesalius’ *On the Fabric of the Human Body* or, at least, copied from copies found in Thomas Geminus’ 1545 adaptation of Vesalius published in London (STC 11714) (Luborsky and Ingram 52-53). There are, however, some differences between the Vesalian originals and the copies that appear in Banister’s text, most notably in the addition of a lily to “The Sceleton of the Backe” (fig. 1.3). The lily does not appear in Vesalius’ image nor does it appear in Geminus’ copies of the image.
Figure 1.1: Banister, “The fore part of the Bones,” Historie of Man (1577), p. *ii*
Figure 1.2: Banister, "The forepart of the Muscles," Historie of Man (1577), p. 43
Figure 1.3: Banister, "The Sceleton of the Backe," *Historie of Man* (1577), p. 38
himself to the bone. At his right stands a largely leafless tree, analogous to the fleshless body beside it. A similar figure in a similar setting appears in an image at the beginning of Banister’s description of the muscles and depicts a skinless muscleman facing the viewer (fig. 1.2). His arms are lifted slightly from his sides, and his head lolls to his left with his eyes clearly open, looking skyward. The final image that I will be discussing appears at the end of the author’s ‘history of bones’ and portrays a skeleton with its back to the viewer and its knees bent (fig. 1.3). Its head is bowed slightly, forehead lowered toward the interlocking fingers of both hands. Although the landscape is obviously different from the landscape surrounding the first skeleton, most noticeably absent is the leafless tree, which has been replaced with a tree stump.

In many ways, these three images serve a very functional purpose in an anatomical text, designed to give the viewer a clear image of the bones and muscles of the body in a relatable context. The posture of the muscleman, for example, allows us to see the muscles of the arms from two different perspectives (both palm forward and arm turned) and the angle of the head enables us to see the muscles of the neck and the side of the head in a way that a forward-facing figure would not permit. However, as Sawday points out in his discussion of anatomical drawings, these images also employ devotional gestures or even evoke the image of the crucified Christ (Sawday 119). Certainly, Banister’s muscleman is posed in a suitably Christ-like fashion. However, outside of the general positioning of the body, there is little else to make such a connection. For example, the violence, suffering, and copious bleeding that is almost always connected to Christ’s passion are noticeably absent. In fact, I would suggest that Banister would be
hesitant to make such a connection. If anything, Banister sees the surgeon himself as the Christ-like or exalted figure, not the body that he works on; as we have seen, Banister seems to fantasize about standing alongside God on Judgment Day, using his knowledge to assist in the separation of the saved and the damned. Perhaps these figures are more representative of the resurrected bodies that the surgeon will help sort through with God.

The poses of the figures certainly demonstrate some devotional gestures, an interpretation that is illuminated by some of Banister’s comments in his anatomy. Both the first skeleton and the muscleman look up, in a recognizably devout gesture, toward God and Heaven. In his discussion of the eye, Banister valorizes this specific gesture. Speaking specifically about the muscle under the eye that allows us to lift our eyes and turn them about, he says, “And peraduenture this is the vse of that marueilous Muscle, that by the helpe therof we behold the heauens, and work of his Diuine maiestie, whereto we be borne, to the fullillyng wherof, this sayd Nerue is no litle, or meane helpe” (Banister 4r). He returns to a discussion of this muscle later in the text when he says that it is partly the ability to raise our eyes that separates us from the animals, evidence of God’s love for humanity. He writes that this muscle, “is not to be despised or with slight regarde beholden, since the motion therof is not onely exquisite, but accordyng to the prouidence of God ordained, whereby the countenaunce of man, is different from beastes. . . . by the benefite of [which] . . . we behold the heauens, and directly cast our countenaunce upward” (Banister 102v). Although we cannot see the eyes of the skeleton whose head is raised because they are not there, the eyes of the muscleman are clearly visible, raised in a posture similar to the one described in Banister’s discussion of the eye,
a posture of admiration of the divine being. Likewise, the figure in ‘The Sceleton of the Backe’ has his hands together as ‘prayer hands’ with his head bowed and mouth open, turned away from us in what looks like a moment of silent and private prayer. Significantly, the figure is bowed toward a lily, a flower often used as a Christian symbol of chastity, the Virgin Mary, or the church itself. In addition, the religious significance of this image is emphasized by the textual content of the facing page, on which Banister concludes his discussion of the bones on a religious note. He ends this section by discussing the “Sefamine bones,” small round bones under the joints of the hands and feet, which he suggests strengthen the joints. According to Banister, the largest of these bones are found under the joint of the big toe, and he takes this opportunity to address a religious controversy about this particular bone,

Which the followers of hidden, and Philosophicall misteries, haue affirmed subject to no corruption: feinyng that it is kept in the earth untill the day of resurrection, when, as a seede it shall srypt, and renew the body agayne, So that I perceiue the godly Martyrs, whose bodyes, for the profession of Christ haue bene burnt to death, shall neuer rise agayne. For well I am assured, that what seede soeuer is once confounded by the force of that element [ie, fire], the same shall no where after be found to take roote: which doctrine, together with the Doctours, is to be shunned, and detested of all true beleuers of Christ, his death, and resurrection.

(Banister 37")

Banister rejects what he sees to be a heretical understanding of the body, one that maintains that humans will grow from these ‘seed bones’ in the foot and sprout a new body at Judgment Day, and he likewise advises all true believers to reject this view. In the context of these comments and Banister’s stance on a religio-scientific controversy, the praying skeleton could be a representation of his own piety as a proponent of what he perceives to be true Christian faith.
Approximately four decades after Vicary's *Anatomie of Mans Bodie* was reprinted and Banister published his *Historie of Man*, arguably the most influential English anatomical text was printed, Helkiah Crooke's expansive *Mikrokosmographia* (1615). Running over a thousand pages in length, Crooke’s ambitious text discusses almost every conceivable feature of the body and incorporates an exhaustive array of opinions from the ancients to his own contemporaries, and he appends a ‘Controversies’ section to the end of many of the thirteen books that engages with current debates or unresolved issues in the anatomical community. *Mikrokosmographia* is an original work, but it is also a compendium of scientific thought, a commentary on the state of anatomical research in the early seventeenth century. Like Banister, Crooke sees his work as part of his devotion to God, and the text overflows with Christian references and religious justifications that demonstrate this anatomist’s belief in the inseparability of science and faith. This is emphasized by the fact that Biblical citations stand alongside references to other anatomists and natural philosophers in the marginalia of Crooke’s text (Crooke 3, 649). Just as his predecessors did, Crooke also carves out a privileged space for anatomy and its connection to the divine, noting in the preface to the first book that “all Arts are indeed originally from God,” and that the study of the body of man is the ultimate art because,

> whereas in the creation of the Heauens and the Earth, and the furnitures and armies of them both, the great Architect wrought them all by his thought, worde, and deede, all falling into one instant of time: when he was to make Man, he holds a Councell, *Come let vs make Man according vnto our owne Image*; summoning thereunto, not only himselfe and all his attributes, as his power, his wisdome, his iustice, his loue and mercy, if not to cast in some part, yet to lend some influence of their diuine Natures toward his creation, but also his Son and the blessed Spirit: as if Man were a kinde of production of the whole Deity. (Crooke 2)
Consequently, “the admirable structure, and accomplished perfection of the body, carrieth in it a representation of all the most glorious and perfect workes of God, as being an Epitome or compend of the whole creation, by which he is rather signified then expressed. And hence it is, that man is called a *Microcosme* or little worlde” (Crooke 2).

This concept of signification versus expression – indirect observance versus direct observance – is key to the religious prioritization of anatomical work. Because we cannot witness or worship God directly in His presence, we must witness and worship Him indirectly through his works on Earth, of which the body of man is the most perfect example, the epitome of Creation. Crooke expands on this perspective in a chapter entitled “How profitable and helpfull Anatomy is to the knowledge of God”:

> That high Father and creator of all things, who onely by himselfe hath immortality, whom no man can either see with his eyes, or comprehend with his minde, that eternall Father (I say) cannot be knowne but by his effects; and all the knowledge of God that can be had, must be deriued not *à priori*, but *à posteriori*, not from any cause or matter preceding, but from the effects and thinges subsequent. . . . So we reade in the sacred Scriptures, that Moses could not endure the bright shyning face of God, his eyes were so dazled therewith. *The invisible things of God* (saith the Apostle) *are knowne by those things that are visible*. Who is it therefore, that will not honor, reuerence, and admire the author and workman of so great a worke, if he do attentiuely advise, with himselfe, how wonderfull the fabricke and structure of mans body is? (Crooke 14)

Just as Vicary and Banister paint the anatomist as a high priest or minister with privileged access to God, Crooke places him in proximity with Moses, the recipient of the Ten Commandments who also heard the voice of God. Like Moses, the anatomist cannot look on the face of God, but he can transmit the word of God that is written onto the body.

Finally, Crooke modestly concludes that,
When I compare Divine things with Humane and in like manner Humane with Divine, and with a thorough examination do diligently view the properties of them both; I can finde no man so nere a kin to the mysticall Nature of God, as those which make good use of that Oracle of Apollo, . . . Know thy Selfe. For seeing that admirable Architect and Maker of all things did make the bodie of man according to his owne Image, it cannot be but he which is well skilled in the Fabricke and Workemanshippe of himselfe, vnto him I say will the Nature of the Creatour and the Arche-tipe more plainly appeare, because hee which is well read in his owne body, shall see in all euen the least operations of his minde or actions of his bodie a liuely Impression and infallible markes of Diuinity. (Crooke 646)

Clearly, Crooke has a high regard for his profession.

In addition to continuing the tradition of raising the status of the anatomist to an almost divine level, Crooke also ties the evolution of anatomy into the biblical Fall and the gradual recovery of the perfect knowledge lost by Adam by stating that it is only by forging new paths of knowledge that we can begin to undo the damage that was done:

The first man (saith the Divine story) saw all the Creatures, and gaue them names according to their Natures, but that Sun-shine was soone clouded, that Image defaced, that stampe battered by his fall. Afterwards, as a Marchant that had lost all his inheritance in one bottome, he was to begin the world anew, and to gather an estate or stocke of knowledge, by the trauell and industry of his soule and body; yet was not his soule Abrasa Tabula, a playned Table, there remained some Lineaments which the Scripture calleth The Lawe of Nature; not such as could exhibite any sufficient originall knowledge, but such as whereby, hauing gotten knowledge from without himselfe, might make him again acknowledge the darke and defaced foot steppes that remained in himselfe, and to polish and refresh them somewhat, though it was impossible to reduce them to the former perfection. Thus the soule by discourse of reason, that is, by her owne acte, knewe her naturall immortality, and by induction of particulars, came to informe her selfe of the Natures of other things: not as she knew before, from the vniuersall to particulars, but by gathering particulars together to frame generall and vniuersall notions. (Crooke 36)

This loss of knowledge meant that men in the ‘first age’ misunderstood God and worshipped false beings and were confused about the true nature of the world; the
Egyptians, for example, turned “the fall of Adam and Eve into the Fable of Isis and Osyris,” and turned the world into a superstitious place (Crooke 37). Only through Christianity and the true understanding of the Christian self could humanity recuperate accurate self-knowledge. The explicitly Christian and devout nature of his work is evident when he writes that, “there is in the soule of Man something Metaphysicall, transcendent aboue Nature, vnknowne to the ancient Philosophers, who groaped but in the darke, and were inwrapped in a mystic or clowdy veile of ignorance; and is revealed onely to Christians, to whom the light of the Gospell hath shined” (Crooke 4). Crooke takes the reader through the history and development of anatomy, arguing that the progress made from the ancients to his own time represents the recovery of some of the original knowledge lost by Adam. As Sawday points out, in the context of Protestant early modern England, anatomies and theologies could coexist as the anatomist traced and mapped God’s design and the Creation: “The dissection of the human form was not a challenge to theology. When properly understood, it was a sanctified process which was akin to theological reasoning which opened the scriptures to human interpretation” (Sawday 106). Crooke explicitly discusses his work in terms of his faith, as part of a Christian project that increases humanity’s admiration for God, and he is certainly more than just “theologically accommodating” (Paster “Nervous Tension” 113).

For Crooke, the hand of God is visible throughout the whole structure of the human body, and he takes a number of opportunities to emphasize this point. Because man was created in the image of God, his special status is clearly evident, especially to the anatomist. As the title of his text suggests, Crooke repeatedly returns to a discussion
of the body as a microcosm, analogous to the hierarchical structure of the universe in
which the soul presides over the body just as God presides over the world. In addition,
Crooke resorts to a sort of bio-religious logic to discuss the form of the body, why it
stands upright, and why our head is the highest point on the body:

The reason of this forme or Figure, is meerely Philosophicall, as
depending vpon the efficient, materiall, and finall causes. The efficient is
two-fold, Primary and Secondary: The primary is the soule, which
comming from without, and being infused into the body from heauen,
whilst she is building of her selfe a mansion fit for such functions and
offices as shee hath to performe, as mindfull of her owne Originall, lifteth
her building vp on high. The Secondary efficient of mans bodie is heate,
wherewith man aboue other creatures aboundeth, especially the parts
about his heart. (Crooke 5)

Since man is so hot, he grows upward, the direction that heat tends naturally to travel in,
which Crooke calls the “material cause” of man’s frame. In addition,

The finall cause of the frame of mans body is manifolde. First, man had an
vpright frame & proportion, that he might behold and meditate of
heauenly things. . . . Finally, to conclude this point, man onely had an
vpright frame of bodie, because hee alone amongst all Creatures had the
Hand giuen him by God, an Organ or Instrument before all organs, and
indeede in stead of all. Now, if the figure of man had been made with his
face downward, that Divine Creature should have gone groueling vpon his
handes, as well as vpon his feete, and those worthy and noble actions of
his Hand, had been forfeited, or at least disparaged. For, who can write,
ride, liue in a ciuill and sociable life, erect Altars vnto God, builde shippes
for warre or trafficke, throw all manner of Darts, and practise other infinite
sorts of excellent Artes; eyther groueling with his face downward, or
sprawling on his backe with his face vpward? Wherefore, onely man had
the frame of his body erected vpward towards heauen. (Crooke 5)

Just as Banister does, Crooke employs a circular logic that relies on the motivation of
God for its final justification. For example, he starts with a central assumption: God gave
man a nimble hand that allows him to perform acts that raise him above all other
creatures. Consequently, humans had to stand upright or else they would not be able to
fully use this gift and pay proper homage to God. The kinds of questions that Crooke and the other anatomists never ask are, Why do we have hands? Are there biological reasons for the structure and systems of the human body? Instead, the hegemonic assumption that acts as the starting point for thinking about the body is that God created man in His own image, and everything in the body is connected to and evidence of divine reasoning. The anatomist simply works forward with that presupposition in mind and, as a result, everything that separates us from the animals is an indication of our preferred status. Crooke explicitly states this when he notes that everything in the body has a logic, “so that nothing in the frame of mans body, doth thrust it selfe in by chance, nothing there is, that doth not exhibite and represent vnto vs the maiesty of the highest & most heauenly wisdome” (Crooke 8). He draws on this logic to explain everything from why the body is naturally vulnerable and unarmed—“how incommodious and vnseemely had it bin for man, being made for contemplation, alwaies to haue borne armes?”—to why the head is round—“Now we know, that the Soule was infused into vs from Heauen, which euen to our sense is round and circular: seeing then her heauenly habitation is round before shee be indused, it was likewise requisite, that her mansion heere below should be orbicular also” (Crooke 9, 10). God’s divine intention and infallible logic in creating every aspect of the body simply goes without saying; in many ways, it was the anatomist’s job to study the body and to seek out a greater understanding of why God made the body the way that He did.

By the time Samuel Collins published A Systeme of Anatomy in 1685, the field of anatomy had gone through many changes. William Harvey’s discoveries about the
circulation of the blood, published in Latin in 1628, had, for example, gained a secure foothold in anatomy, and many of the controversies addressed by Crooke in *Mikrokosmographia* had seemingly been resolved. A more mechanistic and chemically-based body is visible in Collins' work, in which he describes the muscles as "so many Engines of Motion" and the body as analogous to a clock (Collins ix). This representation of the body was not entirely new – long-standing discussions of the body as the "workemanshyp" of God invoked the idea of body-as-object/mechanism (Banister 112\(^r\)) – but by the time Collins was writing, the language of the machine was spreading throughout the body. In addition, his text is filled with references to particles, cells, and atoms that have been made visible "by the helpe of a Microscope," and he discusses the importance of sulfur and saline to the body in a way not dealt with by our earlier anatomists but which is more recognizably ‘scientific’ to the twenty-first century reader (Collins xvii). Nevertheless, *A Systeme of Anatomy* still applies familiar theological interpretations to the body and emphasizes the unity of science and religion, but with a significant difference. After praising the Church of England as the true church of Christianity, Collins writes that,

Natural and Christian Philosophy, although they seem at first to be great opposites by reason of their different principles and dispositions, as the one is natural, and the other supernatural, yet upon more deliberate thoughts, they are very much akin, as near relatives to each other, in reference one belongeth to the structure, and the other to the superstructure of the same subject, whose essence they do not innovate, but only refine in qualifications, and both terminate into the same end, the preservation and accomplishment of Man’s life and health. . . . Although Natural and

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\(^3\) Although Harvey’s discoveries were first published in 1628, the public lectures and demonstrations that he conducted brought his ideas into the public sphere as early as the mid- to late 1610s. Nevertheless, establishing exactly when Harvey developed and began lecturing on his theory of the circulation of the blood is a continuing source of debate (Mitchell 335-345).
Christian Philosophy (of which Physick is a Branch) seem to be at as great a distance as Earth and Heaven, Nature and Grace, Grace and Glory, yet they may be well reconciled, and comply with each other, as the Body is the Organ of the Soul, as Nature is the Subject of Grace, and Grace the Perfection of Nature, and Glory the Consummation of both.

(Collins xxx-xxxi)

Even with the new ways of thinking about the body, the theory of the overall health and structure of the body were not uncommonly harmonized with religious perspectives. Collins' need to deny the apparent incompatibility of natural and Christian philosophy indicates that such ideas were circulating in the intellectual culture, though rejected by this English anatomist. 4

Collins repeatedly emphasizes the primacy of the soul over the body and the whole text is permeated with the theme of temperance and Christian morality. He writes that, “The Soul being acted with spiritual graces and divine perfections, doth highly improve the Body in giving it salutary rules of Justice and Temperance, which confine the irregular and sensual Appetites within their due limits, in order to the fruition of Peace and Health” (Collins xxxi-xxxii). He even goes so far as to comment on some of the Seven Deadly Sins, such as pride, envy, gluttony, anger, and ambition, which he says

4 Samuel Collins was not the only late seventeenth-century anatomist to invoke a Christian perspective on the body in this changing intellectual climate, although such an outlook was certainly in decline. Thomas Gibson, for example, does not go to the same lengths as Collins in his text The Anatomy of Humane Bodies Epitomized (1682), but he occasionally moralizes the structure of the body like Collins does, echoing religious perspectives. Writing about the location of the womb, Gibson says, “In this cavity it is placed between the Bladder and the streight Gut; so that Man being bred betwixt piss and dung, if he would but consider his origine, might hence draw an argument of humility” (Gibson 145). In addition, when addressing the question of how a fetus knows when to emerge from the womb, he writes that he is “content with resolving all into the wise disposal of the great Creatour, whose power and wisdom were not more eminent in creating Man at first out of the Dust of the Earth, than out of those principles and in that method whereby he is produced in ordinary generation” (Gibson 206). In addition, Collins is listed as one of four ‘Censors’ for the text. Likewise, John Ireton’s 1670 translation of Johann Remmelin’s An Exact Survey of the Microcosmus is complete with biblical passages, a cloud-enthroned tetragrammaton, and an Edenic serpent winding through a skull, carrying an apple to a female anatomical figure.
distort the “fine Oeconomy of Soul and Body” (Collins xxxiv). In contrast to these sins, he suggests that “it is my humble Advice, to espouse, as our good, the salutary precepts of Piety, Justice, and Temperance, which being of a Spiritual temper, make us akin to the Great Heavenly Mind, in stamping his Image upon us, which giveth a Blessing in the Temporals of this life, as being a defensative against Sickness and Death” (Collins xxxiv). He also suggests that sometimes God reprimands vain or prideful people with disfiguring diseases in order to teach them humility, self-denial, and reverence, and that venereal diseases punish sexual misconduct, “which make Offenders examples of Gods Justice” (Collins 513). If sin throws the body out of order and invites illness, virtue and devotion restore the balance and promote bodily health, an indication of the physiological importance of the soul and the religious self, even into the late seventeenth century. In addition, Collins ends many of the sections of his book with a prayer that normally includes familiar devotional tropes such as, “O most Gracious Lord, hide us under the shadow of thy Wings, as in a safe Covert, till the Tyranny of Sin be over-past” (Collins 195). However, they also often include lines like, “Thou hast formed the Lungs as a rare Systeme of Membranous Pipes and Bladders of Air, to fann and exalt the vital Liquor with its cool and nitrous Particles” (Collins 861). This commingling of anatomical detail and religious faith continues the project promoted by earlier anatomists such as Vicary and Banister, that is, the worship of God through the advancement of knowledge about the body, even though Vicary and Collins saw vastly different things when they peered inside. Despite this drastic scientific difference, these anatomists – separated by almost a
century and a half – rely on similar modes of filtering their understanding of the body and their own work through faith.

The religious understanding of the body that is observable in early modern anatomical texts can also normally be found in discussions of specific parts or features of the body. Bodily fluids, for example, are often interpreted through a Christian paradigm, regardless of the increasingly precise understanding of the body that developed throughout the period. As Sara Mendelson and Patricia Crawford point out, “One of the great strengths of religious doctrine was its virtual immunity from empirical contradiction; theological truths were not considered susceptible to disproof in the same way that scientific theories might be overturned” (Mendelson and Crawford 33-34). Consequently, when religious theories influenced medical theories they became very resilient. Furthermore, bodily fluids were revered in humoral science as well as religion. Early modern anatomies regularly connected blood to the soul and the essence of life, a link that has biblical roots. Marie-Christine Pouchelle notes that this association between blood and soul contributed to the taboo against dissecting bodies or even practicing surgery in the Middle Ages, since handling blood brought one into contact with the divine essence of the body, and “the surgeon felt the body’s vital forces, even the soul itself, flow through his fingers with its blood. It was just as risky to interfere with a living body as to open up a dead one” (Pouchelle 84). However, as we have seen, early modern

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5 Some commonly cited passages were Genesis 9:4 (“But flesh with the life thereof, which is the blood thereof, shall ye not eat”), Leviticus 17:12 (“Therefore I said unto the children of Israel, No soul of you shall eat blood, neither shall any stranger that sojourneth among you eat blood), Leviticus 17:14 (“For it is the life of all flesh; the blood of it is for the life thereof: therefore I said unto the children of Israel, Ye shall eat the blood of no manner of flesh: for the life of all flesh is the blood thereof: whosoever eateth it shall be cut off”), and Deuteronomy 12:23 (“Only be sure that thou eat not the blood: for the blood is the life; and thou mayest not eat the life with the flesh”).
anatomists attempted to transcend this taboo by representing and understanding their work as a service to God and themselves as preachers and ministers.

Vicary distinguishes between two different kinds of blood in the body – the blood carried by the arteries and the blood carried by the veins. The blood in the arteries is granted a religiously significant status, evident when he discusses the operation of the heart. The right ventricle brings blood into the heart, where it is purified and “is ingendred in it a spirit that is clearer, brighter, and subtiller than any corporal or bodely thing that is ingendred of the foure Elementes: for it is a thing that is a meane betweene the body and the soule,” and becomes more like heavenly things than earthly things (Vicary Iiv-Iiir). In this figuration, the arterial blood that links the soul and the body transcends the often strictly humoral model of the body that is employed by Vicary throughout his Anatomie. This blood carries with it distillations of the human soul that are carried throughout the body, “bringing from the harte to euery member blood and spirite of lyfe,” and all arteries have two coats, “because one cote may not withstande the might and power of the spirit of life” (Vicary Biii`). The left ventricle carries this blood to the rest of the body, “for by him is vnified and quickeneth al the members of the body. For the spirite that is reteyned in them, is the instrument or treasure of al the vertue of the soule” (Vicary Ii`-Iii`). An artery carries this blood to the brain, and the brain “digests” the spirit of life to produce animal spirits, which are responsible for movement and the senses. Whereas the arteries carry spiritual life throughout the body, the veins carry nutritive life to all regions of the body, blood that is produced through the combined efforts of the stomach and the liver that transform food or “chile” into nutritive blood.
Blood flows beneath every aspect of Vicary’s work: flesh is blood congealed by heat; fat is blood congealed by cold; sperm is blood digested by the testicles; milk is filtered nutritive blood; spit is the excrement of blood found in the mouth. At the core of the human body flows vital, spiritual, arterial blood, and the further we move away from that pure blood, the murkier and less recognizable it becomes.

This emphasis on the spiritual quality of blood persisted throughout the period, even as physiological theories of the blood changed. When William Harvey’s discovery of the circulation of the blood was published in 1653 in English (it was originally published in Latin in 1628), the printer appended a diatribe written by James Deback in which he viciously attacks the whole idea of the animal spirits as implausible. Deback begins his rejection of the notion of the spirits by defining them:

The Etymologie of *Spirit* is diversly taken, but that which is here to be considered, is Defin’d by some to be, a very thin and subtle body, hot and most pure, begotten of the thinnest and most sincere part of the blood, or according to others, It is a substance very thin and small, made up of air and the vapour of our blood, being the first and nearest instrument of the Soul in undergoing its functions. (Deback 8)

However, Deback asks, has anyone found such a substance in their experiments on the blood or the heart? No such things have ever been “confirm’d by any demonstrations” to exist in the body, and any attempts to find the spirits in the heart or arteries where they are said to be most present will only find blood and more blood (Deback 9). According to Deback, those who persist in their belief in the spirits do so out of a misguided notion that the incorporeal soul “could not agree with a solid body but by the intervening of something more subtle” (Deback 12). Nevertheless, after reducing the spirits to an absurd notion based largely on anatomists’ inability to find any physical evidence of them, he
confidently proclaims that, “I believe that the body being enlivened is driven to contraction by the Soul, the moderator of it, which is the efficient cause of all actions, according to the opinion receiv’d every where, and by all persons” – this despite his earlier comments on the inorganic (and thus, unobservable) nature of the soul, “of whose nature we are forc’d to confess that we are ignorant” (Deback 76, 88). He contends that the soul acts directly on the blood without the need for the intermediary spirits:

> Albeit the blood be dispos’d to motion, yet because it is destitute of life . . . it is no wayses able to move it self; for all action proceeds from the Soul, nor can anything but that which has a Soul move it self, or be sensible, it only vivifies the body and its parts, which being orderly fitted, it empowers them with its faculties.

(Deback 97-98)

In *Anatomical Exercitations, Concerning the Generation of Living Creatures*, Harvey likewise asserts that the soul resides in the blood, citing Leviticus in the margins as proof of this assertion that, “Life therefore consists in the blood, (as we read in *Holy Scripture*) because in it the *Life* and *Soule* do first dawn, and last set” (Harvey 277). Similar to Deback, Harvey also contends that because the spirits cannot be physically separated from the blood, “the *blood* is sufficient, to become the proportionate and immediate instrument of the *Soul*; because it is every where present, and doth fly to and fro with an admirable agility,” arguing also that the blood, like the soul, is not elemental but rather heavenly in nature (Harvey 451-52). Even though these men chastise their contemporaries for blindly following the work of others rather than observing the body with their own eyes and coming to their own conclusions, both accept the presence of the soul and its connection to God without the same demand for visible proof, an indication of just how ingrained religious notions of the body and the soul were during this period.
When Collins wrote *A Systeme of Anatomy* he refused to accept the ‘death’ of the animal spirits, choosing instead to describe the blood as “enobled with spirits” and, consequently, “a fit Minister for the operations of the Soul” (Collins vi-vii). With or without the spirits, blood was viewed as a pseudo-sacred fluid during this period because of its assumed connection to the soul.

The understanding of sperm and other generative fluids – and the whole generative process – was also filtered through a religious perspective. As we have seen, Vicary represents sperm as digested or filtered blood, which is itself a sort of materialized soul. It is important to note here that when we discuss sperm in an early modern context, we cannot apply a twenty-first century model of thought. Vicary and many others drew on Galen’s ‘two seed’ theory that suggested that an embryo was formed through the mixing of both male and female sperm, which is itself connected to Galen’s insistence that male and female bodies were mirror images of one another (Greenblatt 78).

Essentially, the female body was an inverted male body that contained an internal and reversed penis (cervix and vagina), scrotum (uterus), and testicles (ovaries). The hot humoral temperature of men necessitated external sexual organs, whereas the cold humoral temperature of women required internal ones. Within this understanding, female seed and, later, menstrual blood provided the matter for the child whereas male seed provided the spirit of life, the active principle. The mirroring of the genitalia is evident in Vicary’s *Anatomie* when he describes the womb or “matrix” of a woman as “a yarde [ie, penis] reversed or turned inwarde”, and in his discussions of the womb and the “paps” of men (Vicary Mil'). In this understanding, the genitalia of both men and women are a
meeting point of the essential parts of the physical and spiritual subject, connected to the brain, heart, and liver by sinews, arteries, and veins, and the sperm itself is made from the “best and purest drops of blood” (Vicary Miii\textsuperscript{r}). In fact, the production of sperm requires the consent of the entire body, and Vicary suggests that the “seede of generation commeth from al the partes of the body both of the man and the woman, with consent & wyl of al members,” a perspective also endorsed by Crooke who says that the sperm contains the “idea” of all the parts because it falls from all of them in a sort of condensed essence of the body (Vicary Mii\textsuperscript{r}, Crooke 200). Active, hot, and strong male sperm works on the passive, cold, and weak female sperm to produce what is essentially a religious event, “made by the might and power of God, in the mothers wombe a chylde” (Vicary Miii\textsuperscript{r}). In addition, Vicary goes as far as to note the exact day when an embryo receives its soul, which is not until after all the bones and organs have been formed: “then it receyueth the soule with life and breath, and then it beginneth to moue it selfe alone” (Vicary Miv\textsuperscript{r}). Here, movement reveals the presence of a soul. According to Vicary, there are exactly forty-six days “from the day of conception vnto the day of ful perfection and recyuing of the soule, as God best knoweth” (Vicary Miv\textsuperscript{r}). In addition, Crooke also argues that placement of the womb “between the excrements and the vrine” should be a deterrent to pride, a constant reminder of the debased nature of the flesh and evidence of vast difference between the nature of the soul and the nature of the body (Crooke 223).

The degree to which Christianity influenced science and anatomy is also evident in the early modern understanding of gender. For many, the inferiority of women was an established fact, based largely on the story of Adam and Eve. Although God created
Adam from nothing, Eve was created from an anatomical superfluity of Adam’s body, the rib that represents both her material and hierarchical inferiority; woman was the imperfect reflection of the perfected humanity represented by man. These readings of the Bible also normally blamed Eve alone for violating God’s laws by eating from the Tree of Knowledge, which resulted in humanity being cast out of paradise, a consequence of the weak feminine mind and body. This established what Anthony Fletcher calls “an ideology of ancient scriptural patriarchy” in the early modern period (Fletcher 295; he argues that this scriptural patriarchy evolved into a secular patriarchy by about 1800). When anatomists examined the female body, they normally approached it with a paradigmatic understanding of the natural inferiority of women. Consequently, the humoral model finds that women are cold and moist and thus weak, as opposed to men, who are hot and dry and thus strong. Similarly, as Mendelson and Crawford note, “Medical theories gave substance to the Old Testament view that a menstruating woman was polluted and polluting” and that women’s inefficient bodies either accumulated excesses of blood or were incapable of purifying their own blood through the heat found in men, and these superfluities or impurities were regularly purged (Mendelson and Crawford 21). It was also generally understood that women bore the punishment for Eve’s disobedience through the pain of childbirth, and that “women’s actual sufferings in childbirth served as a frequent reminder of Eve’s transgression and its consequences for the female sex, while contemporaries of both sexes cited female labour pains as ‘proof’ of the logic of female inferiority” (Mendelson and Crawford 32-33). Taking such understandings into account, Sawday suggests that,
Every female body which found its way into the anatomy theatre was . . . a potential second Eve, just as every male body was a potential second Adam. To be an Eve, however, was very different from being an Adam within the patriarchal structure of early-modern culture. If the Renaissance anatomy theatre, in its modes of ritual and representation, offered the suggestion of redemption to the male cadaver, what it offered to the female was the reverse: a demonstration of Eve’s sin, a reinforcement of those structures of patriarchal control which, so the argument ran, were necessary to avoid the repetition of that first act of rebellion in the garden of Paradise. (Sawday 224)

If the early modern anatomist was seeking objective knowledge about the human body, there were certain ‘truths’ that he expected to find once he opened up that body, such as those reinforcing biblically-informed notions of gender.

When Banister begins his discussion of the generative parts, he draws on this biblical determinism. He writes that, “euen from the beginning, the almighty creator made ii. men: the Male, to reach out the effectuall begynnyng of generation: the Female, aptly to conceive the same, and to nourish the infant begotten of that matter. To the which giftes, both the man, and the woman, obtaine fit, and peculiar instrumentes” (Banister 85r). Even though reproduction requires both men and women, the male is granted the active, “effectuall begynnyng of generation” whereas the female passively receives that active property and nourishes it with her body. Life travels from man into woman because “the omnipotent maker hath given a member [to men] . . . most fit for the effusion of seede into the wombe,” and, like Vicary, Banister describes sperm as comprised of “the best portion of the bloud, and spirite” (Banister 87r-87v). However, although he describes male genitalia in his text, Banister says that he will not write about women’s generative organs because, “by liftyng up the vayle of Natures secretes, in womens shapes, I shall commit most indecencie agaynst the office of Decorum”
(Banister 88\textsuperscript{v}). Whereas the penis is discussed in terms of the divine will of God, an aura of lewdness, indecency, shame, and sexual danger surrounds the female genitals so much for Banister that he cannot bring himself to describe them.

Crooke does not avoid discussion of the female sexual organs; nevertheless, he recognizes and addresses the anxiety expressed by people like Banister. Crooke writes that he considered avoiding a discussion of the generative parts on the grounds that such descriptions could enflame men’s minds to vulgar thoughts, but he rejects this line of thinking:

 But what is this I pray you else but to araigne vertue at the barre of vice? 
Hath the holy Scriptue [sic] it selfe (the wisdome of God) as well in the old Law particularly, as also in many passages of the new, balked this argument? God that Created them, did he not intend their preseruation, or can they be preserued and not knowne? or knowne and not discoursed? 
Indeede it were to be wished that all men would come to the knowledge of these secrets with pure eyes and eares, such as they were matched with in their Creation: but shall we therefore forfet our knowledge because some men cannot contenine their lewd and inordinate affections? (Crooke 197)

Crooke invokes a familiar argument often used in the defense of literature and drama, that to learn virtue we must also learn to recognize vice. Crooke would likely agree with John Milton’s statement in *Areopagitica* (1644) that, “evill manners are as perfectly learnt without books a thousand other ways which cannot be stopt” (Milton 520). Since Crooke’s ultimate goal was to increase the reader’s knowledge of God’s work in the body, this was a risk he was willing to take, even though he prefers that it be read with a “chaste \ldots heart” (Crooke 202). However, he has taken precautions so that readers can make their own decision regarding the section on the sexual organs, writing that, “we haue so plotted our busnies, that he that listeth may separate this Booke from the rest and
reserue it priuately vnto himselfe” (Crooke 197). Like Banister, Crooke invokes the story of Creation at the beginning of this book, emphasizing that woman was created to be the receptacle of man’s seed. He also addresses the belief that likened women to animals and thus denied women the same soul as men. He argues instead that men and women are both the perfection of humanity and that, “as the soule of a woman is the same diuine nature with a mans, so is her body a necessary being, a first and not a second intention of Nature” (Crooke 258). However, despite the spiritual equality of men and women, Crooke falls back on traditional humoral theory to assert the natural coldness and thus weakness and inferiority of the female body. Women menstruate, he argues, partly because their bodies are not hot enough to sufficiently process the excrements of the blood, necessitating a regular voiding of that blood.

Crooke also argues that sexual desire is a gift from God, and that this desire is God’s way of enabling men to overcome the knowledge that sex is a debasement of our divine nature, and women to overcome the knowledge of the pain and difficulty of childbirth in order for humanity to carry out the divine command to procreate (Crooke 200). Nevertheless, Crooke is careful to distinguish between virtuous and godly sexual desire and sinful lust, pointing to a scriptural injunction against indiscriminate desire. In lust, “all these things are forgotten [ie, our duty to God], and wee [are] ouertaken with an extasie . . . and the holy Scripture veileth vnder the name of a senselesnesse in Lot, who neyther perceiued when his daughters lay downe, nor when they rose vp” (Crooke 200). In this section, Crooke frequently moralizes against immodest lust and the dangers of excessive ejaculation, arguing that not only does it weaken the procreative power of
sperm and reduce the pleasure of sex but, more terrifyingly, “those men who are very immoderate in the use of Venus” will often ejaculate bloody seed or even pure blood because it has not had time to be perfected by the testicles (Crooke 259). Similarly, Crooke’s discussion of the foreskin addresses the pleasures of virtuous desire as well as the revulsion of lust:

> It also furthereth the profusion of seede, communicating by the Canale motion and heate to the prostate glandules which conteine the seede ready for eiaculation. For oftentimes in lustfull disports or imaginations, if this bridle be but lightly moued, the seede will incontinently issue foorth; euen as after a full meale, if a man but touch the end of his throate with him finger, the stomacke by reason of the continuity of the parts, contracteth it selfe and returneth the crapus or undigestted gobbers into the lap by vomit. (Crooke 215)

In this figuration, the lustful man is constantly at risk of vomiting sperm and blood through his penis at any time, a bio-religious injunction against indiscriminate carnality.

In contrast, sex within a marriage is more virtuous, pleasurable, and fruitful:

> The man therefore and the woman ioyned together in holy wedlocke, and desirous to raise a posterity for the honour of God and propagation of their family; in their mutual imbracements doe either of them yeeld seede the mans leaping with greater violence. The woman at the same instant doth not onely eiaculate seede into her selfe, but also her womb snatcheth as it were and cacheth the seede of the man, and hideth it in the bottom and bosome thereof. (Crooke 262)

Although Crooke is primarily concerned with describing the body, he does so within the framework of religious morality rather than leaving commentary on such things as the sanctity of marriage up to the theologian.  

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6 Similar to Crooke, Collins verbally chastises indulgent and gluttonous people and emphasizes that sex is best enjoyed, and is actually more pleasurable, in marriage: “Persons of sobriety transcend them in true sensual delight, and have their Appetites more high, as eating and drinking with greater gust when hungry and thirsty, and enjoy Venereal pleasures with greater and more chaste flames (according to our Saviours institution in Marriage)” (Collins xxxii).
Like his predecessors, Collins also stresses humanity's duty to God through a discussion of Creation. After God created the animals, He created man, “And Man, being the Masterpiece of the Creation below, God ordained him to a noble end, and gave him parts of his Body and Powers of his mind commensurate to it, inspiring him with a reasonable Soul, as a Particle of his Divine Nature” (Collins xxxv-xxxvi). He also gave man natural appetites for pleasure and the ability to contemplate his own actions and refuse evil. Consequently, it is man's duty to follow God's will, “either written by Nature in the Tables of our Hearts, or revealed by His Spirit in Holy Writ” (Collins xxxvii).

Collins argues that there are two kinds of religion, “intrinsical” and “extrinsical,” one natural and the other taught (Collins xxxviii). The three natural laws of religion are temperance, justice, and piety, and external religion is meant to augment and bring us closer to the perfection of these dictates. In Eden, humanity understood these laws without the need for external religion, but because of the disobedience of Adam and Eve, “we were justly rendered liable to the greatest natural evil, the separation of Body and Soul; which did occur to us not by a multiplicity of acts, but by one single act of high disloyalty flowing from the prevarication of the first superinduced Sanction in Paradise” (Collins xlvii). Because of the separation of the body and soul our perfect understanding of the three natural laws of religion was obscured, and we have been attempting to work our way back toward that understanding ever since through the evolution of religion, culminating in Christianity which, more than any other religion, unites the natural laws with external laws to achieve happier, “more elevated and perfect” people (Collins li). Collins goes on to define and stress the need for faith:
Faith is a substance of things hoped for, and an evidence of things not seen; Faith is no shadow, no mere notion, whose essence is not merely objective in our Conception . . . [Faith] is a substance of things to come, which though now only in possibility, and in their Causes, yet in due time will be as truly reduced into Act, as if they did now, according to God's determination, subsist in the nature of things. And upon this account Faith is named an Evidence of things unseen, because it hath a greater evidence than that of Sense, which is obnoxious to Error; but this of Faith cannot err, as it is founded upon a better evidence then that of outward Objects.

(Collins lii-liii)

Faith gives us the evidence we need to understand the Trinity, the incarnation and resurrection of Christ, and the reunification of soul and body at Judgment Day, things that are "incredible to natural reason," but we can be confident that God will "certainly make good whatsoever he hath said unto us, in his Holy Writ, in order to our Eternal Felicity, if we observe Faith and Repentance, the conditions of the Covenant, and pay a duty of thanks and obedience to him" (Collins liii). It seems unusual to the modern reader to see a scientist prioritize faith over personal observation, but this devotional imperative buttresses much of the anatomical work done in England from the mid-sixteenth century to the late-seventeenth century.

In addition, Collins draws on what Fletcher calls the "ideology of ancient scriptural patriarchy" in his discussion of women. According to Collins, Man's "first appetite" is to "be like his Maker" and his "second appetite" is to beget life, appetites given to man by God (Collins 511). God "created a Woman as an Instrument of Propagation," designed primarily to be the object of man's procreative desire, "full of all Graces of Soul, and handsomeness of Body, to render her lovely in her Husband's Eye," but also "as a meet help to assist him in all good and friendly Offices, in a discreet Conduct of his Domestick Affairs during the whole course of his Life" (Collins 512, 559). Consequently, God
created women to be wives and not mistresses, evident in His punishment of promiscuous
women (and men) with disfiguring venereal diseases. Like Crooke, Collins also argues
that God gave us the gift of sexual pleasure in order for women to overcome the fear of
the pain of childbirth, a gift that we must use responsibly within the confines of marriage
for procreation. However, whereas Crooke describes menstrual blood as excrement but
notes that it is not excrement in the same sense as urine and feces, Collins characterizes
this blood as “a Secretion . . . made of the faeces of the Blood from the more pure parts”
(Crooke 260; Collins 570). Collins also invokes a religious justification for menstruation:

Our most Gracious Maker and Judge, out of his infinite loving kindness to
Women, hath appointed a Monthly Sickness attended with Pain, as a
frequent Monitrix of her primitive Aberration in the state of Innocence, to
cause her to make often reflections upon her great Guilt in the glass of
Punishment, To make repeated Confessions of her fault in Paradise, and
crave Pardon of her Maker in the Name of the Holy Jesus, our Glorious
Mediator, who once offered himself upon the Cross as an All-sufficient
Sacrifice for the Sins of the whole world. (Collins 576)

This “loving gift” was meant to be a constant reminder of Eve’s betrayal in Eden, a sign
of woman’s responsibility for the loss of paradise and an encouragement for the never-
ending need for female repentance.

Given these and other frequent devotional pronouncements made by anatomists
themselves, it is not surprising, then, that these writers often discuss the soul in their
work. In anatomical texts, the soul typically represents two things – God’s presence in the
body, and also the unknowable or unexplainable – and these two things were not
contradictory in the early modern mentality. Because the soul is inherently intangible, it
is also inherently unknowable, and it is at this point where anatomical investigation
willingly transforms into religious mystery. In essence, the soul represents the limits of
human knowledge, the barrier that separates us from a perfect understanding of the mind of God. In short, there are certain things that humanity is incapable of knowing, and even if the goal of anatomical work were to obtain a clearer understanding of God and a reverence for His work, the anatomist accepted that some things transcended our capacity for understanding. Vicary, for example, alludes to these limits before he begins his discussion of the embryo, noting that “And forasemuche as it hath pleased almightie God to geue the knowledge of these his mysteries and workes vnto his Creatures in this present worlde, Here I purpose to declare what thing Embreon is, and his creation” (Vicary Miissi). In this passage, Vicary clearly accepts that there are certain things that we are perhaps not meant to know in our present fallen state, even if it is important to use our imperfect understanding to bring us closer to God through his creations.

Accepting or even reveling in these intellectual limits is a recurring theme in early modern English writing, and it can be found in many different genres from the period, not just in anatomical writing. Sir Thomas Browne, for example, makes a number of similar comments in Religio Medici (1643), in which he notes that God resists our total comprehension and that “we behold him but asquint upon reflex or shadow” (Browne 21). To try to fully understand God is folly, but we honour him by studying his creations. Browne professes a love for religious mysteries, pointing out that we must submit to our faith when we reach an intellectual impasse, noting that, “I am now content to understand a mystery without a rigid definition in an easie and Platonick description” (Browne 19). Likewise, when Raphael meets with Adam in Book V of Paradise Lost, he responds to Adam’s request for knowledge by saying that it is not humanity’s place to know the mind
of God in their current fleshy state. A time may come when humans can transcend their flesh, when “Your bodies may at last turn all to spirit” like the angels, but he suggests that, “Meanwhile enjoy/ Your fill what happiness this happy state/ Can comprehend, incapable of more” (5.497, 503-505). Later, in Book VIII, Raphael tells Adam that “Heav’n is for thee too high/ To know what passes there” (8.172-173). Robert Burton attempts to define the soul in Anatomy of Melancholy (1621-51) by breaking it down into three types – vegetal, sensitive, and rational – but he concludes that, “How these three principal faculties are distinguished and connected . . . is beyond human capacity” (Burton 98).7 Clearly, many early modern English scientists and writers (not unlike their medieval predecessors) accepted their own intellectual limitations as a consequence of our inability to truly know the mind of God while trapped in humanity’s imperfect state, and a complete and objective understanding of the soul was an accepted field of unknowing.

Citing Crooke, Paster suggests that he dealt with the unknowability of the soul by discussing the lower, perceptible functions of the soul, normally described as the “spirits” or “animal spirits” that governed movement and the senses, even if they were themselves equally intangible. Paster writes,

But, just as soul by itself could have no connection with medical practice, it had no explanatory force in physiological description. . . . By definition, soul could not be found in anatomical dissection. For anatomy and for physiology, however, the spirits in their ‘middle Nature’ . . . could not be so readily dismissed, either logically or practically. As properties animating, even defining the living body, they, like soul, eluded the anatomist; but, unlike soul, they mattered to his work because they were

7 See Chapter Two for more on the philosophical and religious divisions of the soul.
thought responsible for some of the body’s most important structures of visible behavioral difference, inside and out.

(Paster, “Nervous Tension” 113)

Understanding movement and the senses was a way to understand the soul indirectly, to receive and witness the communications of the soul even if the source and nature of those communications were invisible and beyond the human capacity for observation and comprehension. When Crooke describes the nature of the spirits, however, he allows for a certain degree of tangibility for the spirits in order to cope with the absolute intangibility of the soul:

the distance is not so great betwenee the highest Heauen and the lowest Earth, as is the difference betwixt the Soule and the Bodye. It was therefore verie necessarie that a spirite should bee created, by whose intermediate Nature, as it were by a strong though not indissoluble bonde the Diuine soule might bee tyed to the bodie of Earth. Wherfore there are some that say it is an Aetheriall body, the seat and band of heate and faculty, and the prime instrument whereby all the functions of the soule are performed. But to say as the truth is, it is called Aetheriall onely Analogically, because of his tenuity and diuine manner of working, for by his nature and in his originall he is meerely Elementary. Our definition of a spirit shall be this, A subtle and thinne body alwayes mouueable, engendred of blood and vapour, and the vehicle or carriage of the Faculties of the soule.

(Crooke 173-74)

According to this definition, animal spirits are made up of blood and vapour and constitute a very subtle but physical part of the body. For Crooke, then, suggesting that the inorganic soul works in the body through the intangible spirits is simply too abstract, and he chooses instead to understand the spirits as equally substantial (blood) and insubstantial (air), a more satisfying bridge between the body and the soul. Paster describes this as being “material but invisible, [and] hence dangerously hybrid”, but I would characterize this hybridity as necessary and even comforting for early modern
thinkers (Paster 114). The anatomist might not be able to see the spirits, but the presumed
dual nature of them avoided the risk of further distancing the soul from the body that
understanding them as purely physical or purely ethereal would entail. Too much
abstraction would simply create more room for anxiety.

Given the assumed intangibility of the soul, it seems logical to agree with Paster
when she writes that the soul “had no explanatory force in physiological description. . . .
By definition, soul could not be found in anatomical dissection” (Paster 113). After all,
early modern anatomists unanimously agreed that the soul could not be seen or touched
and that, as Crooke states above, although the soul resides in the body, it is so far distant
from the flesh that it defies spatial description. However, Crooke does in fact anatomicize
the soul as much as is possible, devoting the opening pages of *Mikrokosmographia* to
describing and analyzing the soul as if it were another, albeit divine, part of the human
body. Paster suggests that Crooke “feels obliged” to begin his text with a discussion of
the soul, but any evidence that indicates that he does so against his own will or because
he feels that it is expected of him is absent from the text itself. Crooke writes that,

> the Soule, it carrieth a deepe stampe of diuinity in the simplicity, inuisibility, & immortality thereof: That it is incorporeall and diffusiue, quickning, sustaining, gouerning and moouing the whole body, and euer part therof, euen as God supporteth and ruleth the whole world, being by a diffusiue nature, or rather infinite omni-presence, at all times, in euer place: That as the Deity is but one in essence, yet distinct in persons, according to the Relatiue qualities therein, which yet hath neither different matters, nor formes (as we say) but are all one and the same essence; so the soule of man is but one, yet that one, consisting of three essensiall and distinct Faculties or powers, intellectual, sensitieu, and vegetatiue; which yet make no difference in the substance thereof, that it should not bee one and an entire soule. Againe, in the intellectuall part or power, there are two essensiall attributes resembling their prototype or originall in God, to wit, Knowledge and Will. As for the qualities of the soule, they are either
internall, or externall. The internall, carry the image of the Creator, as S. Paul interpreteth it, in heauenly wisdome, iustice, and sanctity; the externall, in maiesty, dominion, and soueraignity ouer the creatures.

(Crooke 2)

In addition, the soul is the “store-house of all the species or kinds of things,” a repository for the original knowledge lost by Adam at the Fall that anatomy is beginning to reconstruct (Crooke 4). Although Crooke ends the section by resigning himself to the impossibility of anatomizing the soul in the same way that he can the body, he has attempted to apply anatomical methodology to describe the incorporeal self, partitioning it into its constitutive parts, even if the language used is much more abstract and figurative than in, say, his descriptions of the bones or the stomach. The placement of this discussion at the beginning of the text suggests that the soul does in fact have a place in anatomy, and a very privileged place at that, coming as it does before any part or fluid of the body is dealt with. In his anatomy, Crooke describes the soul first and the body second.

Despite the many changes that the anatomical field went through in England during this period, a relatively consistent understanding of the soul and its relationship to the body persisted, and I would like to put forth a tentative definition of the early modern soul from these works. At its most basic, the body is the organic part of the subject while the soul is the inorganic part, and the soul is invisible and connected to the divine while the body is corporeal and connected to the physical world. Most anatomists agreed that the human soul was made up of three parts – nutritive, sensitive, and rational – which together constituted a whole indivisible soul, responsible for governing everything from digestion to the intellectual and moral life of the self. As we have seen in Crooke, the
connection between body and soul is normally seen as a spatial paradox; even though they are intimately connected, there is more distance between them than the human mind can conceive. Harvey likewise touches on a material paradox when he writes, “such is the soul, that it is not altogether a body, nor yet wholly without a body; it comes partly from without, and is partly born at home: in some sort it is a part of the body, and in some the beginning and cause of all things which are contained” in the body (Harvey, Anatomical Exercitations 459). This somewhat cryptic discussion of the soul encapsulates the difficulty in thinking and writing about something so elusive yet so central to the self during this period. The soul is and is not physical, it is both internal and external to the body, it is partly human and partly divine, and wholly unseen. Although the soul is the core of the self, it cannot be observed. However, we can make contact with it indirectly through the senses, which Crooke calls “the intelligencers betweene the body and the soule” (Crooke 6). The soul is basically understood as an incorporeal body within our physical body, a sort of second body. Just as the body has organs and limbs to communicate and operate in the world, the soul has the ‘organs’ of the senses and the spirits, but they are significantly more passive than the body’s organs which are actually filled with agency. The senses communicate with and delight or offend the soul, but the movement is normally understood as unidirectional – the soul perceives through taste, smell, sight, sound, and touch but it cannot return communication through the same pathways. Motion is generally seen as a sign of the soul (for example, an infant is understood to be ‘ensouled’ once its movements can be felt in the womb) and the soul is often connected to the cognitive functions of the brain, such as reason. In many ways, the
understanding of the operation of the brain and the mind, the mental life of the self, were tied to the understanding of the soul. As many of these anatomists suggest, it was God’s gift of reason, will, and understanding – the rational soul – that separated humanity from the animals. Based on this assumption, and the common belief (which is invoked by all these anatomists either implicitly or explicitly) that all art and intellect also came from God, the intellectual life of humans was connected to divinity, to which end Deback defines “Psychologie” as “the doctrine of the soul” (Deback H7v). The sensitive body is a collector of information for the soul which, through understanding, “apprehendeth [it] . . . under the notion of Good and Evil” (Collins 46). It is evident through these texts that the soul clearly has an anatomical presence within and impact upon the body even if it does not have a material presence.

The concerns of the body often interfere with the concerns of the soul, however, meaning that things like motion and touch or thought are not purely ingrained in the divine. The soul can make its presence felt, but it seems that it can never take complete control of the body – it can make suggestions, but the final decision on whether to act on those suggestions is left up to the body. These anatomists sometimes call upon the familiar theological trope of the body as the decaying prison of the soul. Crooke, for example, argues that the “prison of the Bodye” impedes the natural functions of the soul which, when it is freed from the body, “can see without an Eye, heare without an Eare and by her own simple act discourse without the help of spirits” (Crooke 428). As long as the soul is anchored to the body, it is forced to conform to the limitations and even demands of that body, only able to enact total agency once the body has died.
Consequently, there is a clearly divisible subject visible in anatomical texts. Because of the Fall, the harmonious unity of body and soul has been severed and the soul now exists as the essential but silent and divine part of the subject, observable only indirectly through motion, the actions of the senses, and the intellectual and artistic productions of the mental self. The soul as it appears in early modern English anatomies constitutes a second ethereal body with its sensitive and rational appendages, quietly waiting for its release. The soul was often figured as a sort of puppet master over the body, but the strings it held were connected to an already animate object, one that could accept or reject the desires of the ‘divine spark.’

An examination of early modern English anatomical texts reveals just how pervasive a Christianized understanding of the body was. As we can see from Appendix 1, the anatomists discussed in this chapter represent some of the earliest (Vicary, Banister, and Crooke) and most influential (Harvey) English anatomical work. Rather than expressing the tension between science and religion that is suggested by many modern critics, these anatomists actually view the body through the constitutive lens of religion, often using biblical truths or theological arguments as the unquestioned starting point for their work on the body. The importance of this religious perspective is perhaps most evidenced by the fact that although later anatomists were keen to build on or discredit their predecessors, religious justifications were rarely subject to the same scrutiny. Christian perspectives were, if anything, typical in early modern English anatomies. Even as writers such as Harvey and Deback criticize others for blindly following existing medical theories and not demanding visual proof, they do not see the
same need to interrogate religious suppositions about the body that are equally, if not more, unobserved, such as the presence of the soul and the nature of its relationship to the body. Such ideas were, as Deback almost dismissively points out, "receiv’d every where, and by all persons" (Deback 88). While anatomists debated the existence of animal spirits, the circulation of the blood, the presence of humours, the nature of the brain, the process of generation, the possibility of female sperm, and a litany of other things, the nature of the soul and the religious understanding of the body remained relatively constant.
Chapter 2: Corporeality, Anatomy, and the Soul in Early Modern English Religious Texts

As we have seen in the previous chapter, Christian narratives were very influential in establishing the significance of early modern English anatomical narratives, providing the body with meaning and offering a justification for anatomy as a venue for knowledge of God. Body and soul were intimately connected in the imagination of the period, even within intellectual paradigms that we might expect to be explicitly about the body. Discussions of the soul were so tied into understandings of human physiology—particularly the brain, blood, and heart—that English anatomists rarely wrote about the body without some direct comments on the soul. However, was the reverse also true? Did religious narratives also draw on anatomical narratives and, if so, how did these writers interpret corporeality and how did they apply anatomical theories in their writing? In this chapter I focus on early modern religious writing about the soul and the Christian subject and, as we will see, the body is not the exclusive property of anatomical texts just as the soul is not the exclusive property of religious texts. William Cowper, John Woolton, Moses Capell, and Simon Harward are just a few of the many English Christian writers who take the soul or the 'Christian man' as their subject of choice and who draw on physiological understandings of corporeality that transcend generalized discussions of 'the body.' Many early modern theories regarding the soul were themselves influenced by both contemporary and classical perspectives on physiology. Discussions of the soul often focus on embodiment and just how the soul functions within a complex corporeal vessel. If the soul is present in the body, how is it connected to that body? Where in the
body does the soul reside? Does it control – or is it controlled by – the body? Can the
body be conformed to the wishes of the soul? Is a harmonious relationship between body
and soul even possible in this lifetime? Questions such as these surface repeatedly in
religious writing about the soul and the Christian subject, and the details of corporeality
are often a part of the answer. By looking closely at the relationship between anatomical
and religious perspectives on and approaches to the subject, we can more accurately
assess the pervasiveness of religious ideals during the period. In both anatomical and
religious texts, self-knowledge – whether physiological or spiritual or both – functions as
a path to the knowledge of God.

Anatomical and religious texts – particularly those dealing with the soul and the
reform of the Christian subject – share many more similarities than differences,
particularly when we examine their intent, structure, and methodology. My purpose in
asserting this parity, however, is to establish similarity, not sameness. I believe that
anatomical works draw on the form and stylistic conventions of religious writing that
were conventional long before the early modern vogue for anatomies began. Anatomical
books tapped into an existing model and worldview and borrowed heavily from it to
create a narrative of the body that was compatible with the Christian master narrative that
permeated English society and culture.

At their core, both anatomical and religious texts are aimed at promoting the
health of the individual, largely through an examination of interiority. Although anatomy
deals primarily with the physiological interior and religion with the moral or spiritual
interior, to suggest that these two ‘selves’ are distinct and separate would be inaccurate.
Thomas Vicary, John Banister, Helkiah Crooke, and Samuel Collins all draw on religious narratives in their discussions of the physiology, often noting that immoral behaviour and even thoughts can have a negative impact on the body, and that virtue is conducive to good health. These anatomists repeatedly insist that the soul affects the body and its well-being, an assertion that denies any clear separation of the two interior spaces. Likewise, although religious writers normally focus primarily on the soul, this focus is rarely maintained without some reference to the body. The Christian subject does not exist entirely in the mind or the soul but is rather lived through the body, and even the most devout writers are forced to reconcile theology and corporeality to some extent.

Consequently, spiritual concerns such as the Seven Deadly Sins are also bodily concerns, a persistent issue in the medieval period as well as the seventeenth century. As Caroline Walker Bynum has demonstrated, medieval spirituality was often very corporeal in nature, whether in the cult of relics that surrounded the body parts of martyrs, the practice of self-flagellation as a venue for devotion, or even the contact with and holy consumption of the skin or pus of the sick (Bynum 183-184). I believe we can see a similar form of corporeal devotion (or, perhaps, devotion represented in corporeal terms) in Robert Mannyng of Brunne’s fourteenth-century spiritual guide *Handlyng Synne*. One of his primary goals is to teach the Christian reader how to live in a material world. The ideas under discussion in *Handlyng Synne* are not new, but Mannyng’s text effectively represents a medieval religious approach to interiority that can be seen as a predecessor to early modern anatomy in terms of form and structure. He writes that, "We handyl synne every day/ Yn wrde & dede al that we may./ Lytyl or mochyl synne we do:/ The fende &
For Mannyng, ‘handling’ sin is both a physical and spiritual action, one that combines the dual meaning of ‘handling’ as both physically touching with one’s hands and, more abstractly, ‘dealing with’ something in some mental/spiritual capacity. Sin is both of the flesh and of the soul. Writing about pride, for instance, he frequently points to examples that have a strong physical component, such as women who adorn their bodies with make-up and fashionable clothing. Of the limbs of the body, Mannyng writes that, “They are nat thyne, but they beyn hys [ie, God’s],” and God can do what He wants with the body (Mannyng l. 3316). Similarly, his discussions of wrath, sloth, gluttony, and particularly lust all contain numerous references to the body. In a way, sin results from a misguided sense of ownership of the body, claiming for our own what only belongs to God.

Anatomical texts and religious guides also share two important and connected beliefs that are central to their purpose and structure. The first is that there is an ideal self or subject, whether moral/spiritual or physical, and this ideal self or subject serves as the template from which these writers work. The second shared belief is that particularization and dissection are the most effective ways to achieve or at least approach that ideal self. By breaking the self down into its component parts, we can rebuild a better, stronger, and more virtuous self in its place. Both of these convictions figure prominently in representations of the body and representations of the soul.

The first belief, that there is an ideal self or subject against which the individual can measure him or herself, is the foundation on which both types of writing are built,

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1 Medieval letters, such as the thorn, have been have been modernized here (ie, ‘th-’).
and the efficacy of both anatomical and religious approaches can be threatened by excessive subjectivity. For the early modern English anatomist there is The Body, a structure built by God that comes in one of two varieties, male or female, and any deviation from these two types – such as the hermaphrodite – is generally seen as an aberration or monstrosity. From these archetypes, often understood in anatomical texts with reference to Adam and Eve, generalities are drawn that are meant to be applicable to any reader and any body. The anatomist finds comfort in the predictability and repetition of bodily parts and systems across humanity. An anatomist or surgeon who has read his Banister or Crooke can reasonably expect to know what he will find once he has cut through the skin – something that conforms to an established order. As we have seen with Banister, who notes that “almost in all bodies, some varietie is to be sene,” some anatomists allowed for a degree of variation between bodies and a divergence from the norm, but too much differentiation threatened to make the anatomist irrelevant, a specialist of a body, not The Body (Banister Biv). Consequently, physiological distinctiveness is normally phrased in terms of deviation from the norm rather than varieties of a type. Humoral theory, for example, relies heavily on an excess or lack of heat and an overabundance or shortage of a particular humour as causes for illness. To

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2 As I suggest in the Introduction to this dissertation, I am maintaining a distinction between ‘self’ (associated with the soul and subjectivity) and ‘subject’ (associated with embodiment, the joined body and soul that constitute the individual). This distinction, I believe, best captures the way many English writers from the period represent the soul, the body, and the relationship between the two. It should also be emphasized here that my discussion of an ‘ideal’ or ‘objective’ self does not refer to a Cartesian sense of self but rather to a belief that the self should be modeled on godly ideals. Although my assertion that the medieval sense of a communal self or self-in-relation persisted into the seventeenth century may seem to contradict critical claims about the emergence of a more individuated (and recognizably modern) self, I do not believe that this is the case. As I point out in the Introduction, I believe that early modern English culture could accommodate both perspectives, and that even as we see the emergence of the modern, autonomous self during this period, that self did not simply displace and overwrite other ways of thinking.
speak in terms of excess and lack implies an objective norm by which 'more' or 'less'
can be judged. Likewise, Crooke emphasizes the importance of universals when he
discusses the senses:

\[
\text{wee cannot come perfectly vnto the knowledge of man, vnlesse first wee}
\text{doe well see into the Essence both of the body and the soule. Now the}
\text{knowledge of the soule cannot be made manifest but onely by her}
\text{operations, which also seeing she doth not performe without the helpe of}
\text{corporall organs, there is a necessity imposed, that wee also understand}
\text{the exact composition of the body. But because in the deliuerie of the}
\text{method of Arts we ought alwayes to procede from vniuersals and such as}
\text{are better knowne vnto vs, vnto particulars, and that the faculty of}
\text{sensation is as it were an vniuersall thing, as being dispersed through the}
\text{whole Systeme and frame of the body, the order of Nature requireth that I}
\text{treate of it in the first place.} \quad (\text{Crooke 647})
\]

Even when writing about something with as much variety as the senses, Crooke chooses
to work from universals rather than, say, emphasizing the subjectivity of personal
experience or preference. In fact, Crooke presents this methodology as the only way to
proceed and undoubtedly believes that his readers will all agree that one should follow
the same progression from universals to particulars.

Correspondingly, religious writing normally relies on a similar belief in the
objective ideal self. On a very basic level, for example, religious sectarianism is
essentially competition between different worldviews that are believed to be objectively
true by their proponents. Without these perceived objectivities it would be impossible to
think in terms of Catholic, Protestant, Anabaptist, or Puritan, and the stakes of the
difference between them were not taken lightly – after all, the points of departure
between Protestant and Catholic could mean either eternal salvation or eternal damnation.
Although I will not deal with the nuances of theological variations, it is important to note
that each one effectively represents – or at least encompasses – a different version of the ideal self that conforms to a prescribed set of beliefs and activities, the deviation from which leads to sin and, potentially, damnation. As Gary Kuchar notes, “While the cultural work that devotional literature performed in the early modern period is vast, one of its primary functions was to teach readers how to experience themselves as properly desiring subjects” (Kuchar 2). Not surprisingly, this didactic form of self-experience came with a set of rigid boundaries and supposedly objective truths. For example, the Protestant rejection, or Catholic endorsement, of purgatory was not just a rhetorical exercise but rather constituted a core tenet of denominational belief. Quite simply, a Protestant soul could not go to purgatory after the death of the body because purgatory did not exist. Although Protestants were aware of the Catholic belief in purgatory, it had no place in the narrative of the Protestant subject. As Stephen Greenblatt indicates, any definition of self “requires both an enabling institution, a source of power and communal values . . . and a perception of the not-self, of all that lies outside, or resists, or threatens identity” (Greenblatt, Renaissance Self-Fashioning 177). Multiple versions of the ideal religious subject existed in early modern English society and culture, but each was touted by its proponents as ‘the one,’ at the expense of the others. Consequently, when writing about the subject, whether in physiological or moral terms, the anatomist or the theologian relied on his denomination’s ‘universal’ template to judge health and happiness, recovery and salvation.

In both cases, particularization and dissection – either physical or metaphorical – assists in achieving the ultimate goal of creating a balanced, healthy individual. The
English anatomies that followed Vicary grew more and more detailed in an effort to be the most complete and accurate description and inventory of the human body. Some of these texts, such as Crooke's *Mikrokosmographia*, are so detailed that they threaten to shatter the body into thousands of connected but also distinct pieces, each with its own name, identity, and accompanying narrative of function that is woven into the overall master narrative of the body. By the time Collins was writing in the late seventeenth century and the majority of the body had been satisfactorily mapped, new forms of particularization were emerging in the chemical composition of the body, aided by emerging microscope technology. By the late seventeenth century, the body was not only divisible in terms of muscles, veins, and nerves, but was also broken down into nitrates and sulfates. Nevertheless, the belief was – as it is now – that the more accurately detailed the image of the body was, the more effectively it could be treated and its health promoted. As a corollary, it is implied that this detail also assists in prevention, not just reaction; by identifying the possible outcome of harmful behaviour or damaging external circumstances, one could, when possible, avoid the cause altogether. As we have seen, some of these causes were moral in nature, such as when Collins argues that venereal diseases are God's punishment enacted on the lustful body. Consequently, by shunning the temptations of lust, an individual could avoid many disfiguring ailments. Within humoral theory, if excess and lack lead to illness, then more effectively maintaining humoral balance is preferable to reacting to imbalance, even as anatomies enabled this reaction. In short, by understanding the body in as much detail as possible, the individual could extrapolate on the narrative of his or her actions to, presumably, witness the
endpoint of drinking liquor or eating in excess, for example. The experience of consequences was not necessary when the narrative of consequence could be accessed beforehand.

Similarly, religious writing often ‘dissected’ the moral or sinful self in order to promote a virtuous self. Returning to the discussion of the Seven Deadly Sins in Mannyaing’s *Handlyng Synne*, we see sin parsed and categorized in much the same way as an anatomist deals with physiological parts of the body. For example, when Mannyaing writes about lust and lechery, he breaks it down into seven categories – fornication, adultery, incest, breaking a religious vow of chastity, raping a virgin, raping another man’s wife, and having sex with a prostitute (Mannyaing ll. 7353-7430). Writing about greed, he distinguishes between covetousness and avarice, arguing that “Coueytyse ys desyryng of thoght,/ But auaryce wolde that noun hadde oght” (Mannyaing ll. 5333-5334). Each sin is defined in general terms before being broken down into clearly defined parts with examples provided for clarification. In this way Mannyaing is not unlike anatomists, who generally begin the discussion on a general region of the body, such as the head, before moving into a discussion of specific parts, such as the brain, eyes, and tongue. In both instances, the text is a resource whose particularization is meant to eliminate confusion over the physiological or spiritual interior and promote its health. Just as an anatomist could turn to Crooke’s discussion of the heart to prepare himself for what he would observe, so too could Mannyaing’s reader – either clerical or lay – use *Handlyng Synne* to accurately identify sins according to rank and severity and respond accordingly.
The methodology of anatomy was at home in the methodology of manuals for religious self-examination.

Of course, this perspective was not limited to medieval religious texts; *Handlyng Synne* provides one of the best examples of the parity of form and style between anatomical and religious guides but certainly not the only example. In 1613, the second edition of William Cowper’s *The Anatomy of a Christian Man* was published (the first appeared in 1611), one of Cowper’s many religious tracts. The author writes in response to ‘hypocritical’ Christians, those people who maintain the outward appearance or performance of a Christian but who actually ‘love’ sin. He encourages self-examination in the context of the word of God: “It were happy for these men, if they could learne in time to examine themselves according to that word, by which one day they will be judged, for not every one that saith Lord, Lord, will enter into the kingdom of God” (Cowper B2v). In order to assist the reader, Cowper has culled Scripture for relevant passages and compiled them in this text with commentary and explication. Like Mannyng and many anatomists, he prefers the universal over the specific:

> let vs studie to prowe our new generation by our new manners, conforming our selues to the rule of a Christian conversation. A patterne and example whereof I haue gathered out of holy Scripture, and proposed vnto thee, wherein thou shalt see first how the Christian who by his first birth was borne a Naturall man, by his second becomes a Christian, with such other things as with his new birth he receiues to make him a new man. Secondly, what is the disposition of his inward man, by which hee walkes with God. And thirdly, the disposition of his outward man, by which he walkes among men, and that in all the points of his conversation both inward and outward. . . . [C]ompare thou thy selfe with this ensample: thy minde, thy will, thy affections, thy words, thy actions with these of the new man: where thou findest a conformitie, giue thanks to God for the beginning of the worke of his grace in thee: where not, pray to God further
to quicken thee, that thou mayest grow in an holy similitude and conformitive with him. (Cowper B3'-B4')

Conformity is a persistent theme in this passage, which emphasizes the need to bring the individual into compliance with the universal notion of The Christian Man, one not entirely dissimilar to the ideal anatomical body. Certainly, the focus on conformity is tied into the Protestant emphasis on ‘common prayer’ as well. In *Common Prayer* (2001), Ramie Targoff argues that, “what emerges in the aftermath of the Reformation is less a triumphant embrace of the individual’s private and invisible self than a concerted effort to shape the otherwise uncontrollable and unreliable internal sphere through common acts of devotion” (Targoff 6). She suggests that English Protestants believed that by bringing the external self into step with the universal self through common and public prayer and devotional gestures, the inner religious self would follow. Cowper’s efforts in *The Anatomy of a Christian Man* fit into this regulatory impulse as he dictates the act of conformity and its impact on dismantling the hypocritical self. In addition, Cowper’s call to “compare thou thy selfe with this ensample” is echoed by the comparative impulse of anatomies which, as we have seen, are meant in part as references to compare the individual with the universal. Both the anatomized body and the ‘Christian man’ could be judged in relation to their textual counterparts as an example of the success or failure of conformity. By encouraging the examination of the inner self as well as providing the language for understanding that self with reference to an objective norm, both types of writing engage in a similar project.

One of the most striking anatomical impulses of Cowper’s text – apart from the title – can be found in the image that precedes the main text (fig. 2.1). The image depicts
Figure 2.1: Cowper, The Anatomy of a Christian Man (2nd ed., 1613), pp. B5–B7
a naked man (*sans* genitals) with his hands pressed together in prayer. Scriptural passages can be found in the marginalia of the pages as well as surrounding the body and even written directly onto the skin of the praying body. Each body part has a relevant passage inscribed on it. For example, “My armes are strengthened by the mightie God of Jacob. *gen. 49.24*” appears on the right shoulder and bicep, “My knees are weake through fasting. *psal. 105*” appears on the right knee, and “My feet are shod with the praeparation of the gospel of peace. *eph. 6*” appears above the left foot (Cowper B5v-B7r). The passages inscribed onto the absent genitals make reference to sin and the crucifixion of Christ. We can observe many striking similarities – and some differences – between this image and the anatomical images that accompany a text like Crooke’s *Mikrokosmographia* (fig. 2.2). In both instances, body parts are labeled and contextualized within a broader narrative of either Christianity or anatomy that relies on the authority of that narrative. The Greek and Latin names, for example, applied to the parts in Crooke’s images rely on the authority of his classical and contemporary predecessors as much as Cowper’s interpretation of the parts in his image relies on the authority of the Bible and the culture of Scriptural commentary. Both figures are effectively swarmed and surrounded by the evidence of this narrative authority, not just in the explanation of the image itself but also in the entire accompanying chapters of the text. Additionally, the figures in both texts are posed in contextually appropriate ways, with devotional ‘prayer hands’ in Cowper and with a revelatory stance in Crooke that exposes the body in as much detail as is possible. As I have been suggesting, both of
these figures represent an idealized objective subject, one religious and one anatomical.

Despite the fact that no reader could reasonably expect to see him or herself perfectly represented in either image or text, both present an ideal from which all others are deviations or imperfect variants. Cowper insists on the need for the reader to conform to this model self as closely as possible and to "pray to God further to quicken thee, that thou mayest grow in an holy similitude and conformitive with him" for those aspects of the self that do not conform. The passages in the left-hand margin under the category, "Watch-words for the Christian, remember him at all times, of his duetie," underscore
the importance of conformity, emphasizing the need to resist the lure of personal desire and submit instead to the divine will (Cowper B5'). Significantly, failure to conform risks damnation. Similarly, Crooke construes deviation from the norm, such as "monsters" (i.e., the disfigured) or hermaphrodites, as abnormality and aberration (Crooke 299).

One of the most significant differences between the two figures is the lack of visually penetrated flesh in Cowper and the prevalence of it in Crooke which is, of course, largely a consequence of their differing genres. The figure in *Mikrokosmographia* is one of the few places in the text where a whole body, complete with skin, is available. After this early point in the book, the body is subject to violent verbal and visual reduction as it is skinned, dismembered, and reduced to a collection of organs and bones. In contrast, the *visible* body in *The Anatomy of a Christian Man* is left whole and intact. However, this figure is still verbally dissected and subjected to some form of violent reduction in ways that are not so easily represented in an image. Crooke – and many other anatomists – divides the body into three regions, the upper, middle, and lower, or head, chest, and belly, with the legs and arms relegated to a more general discussion of joints, separate from the three regions (Crooke 62). Of course, this makes sense in an anatomical context as Crooke subdivides the body into categories which are themselves further subdivided. Cowper also divides his text and, by extension, the subject into three categories. First is the generation of the natural body and the necessity of conforming that body to Christian precepts. In this section, Cowper focuses on the "regeneration" of the corporeal subject into the Christian subject, emphasizing man's "natural misery" but also God's willingness to work with it (Cowper 1-2). He represents this as a regeneration,
simultaneously both a rebirth and a double birth, one physical and one religious
(baptism). Because natural or “first” generation does not lead to salvation, a second
generation or regeneration is required:

Regeneration is a mutation of the whole man, both soul and body, from
one thing to another; namely, from sin to sanctification, from darkness
to light, from death to life, from the power of Satan to God. . . . [I]n this
generation; that which dies, is corrupted nature, called the Old man: that
which is quickened, is renewed nature, called the New man. (Cowper 8)

Cowper goes on to discuss the Christianized physiology of the “New man,” to which I
will return shortly. Second, he writes about the inner Christian self, which essentially
consists of the mental and moral aspects of an individual. In this section he focuses on the
mind, the will, conscience, emotion, and sin. Third, he deals with the outward Christian
subject, the physical (and, consequently, social) exterior of the body by which a Christian
man is known and through which sin can enter the body, primarily through the senses.
Cowper insists here on the need to conform the physical and social actions of the body to
his Christian ideal, a continual act of corporeal regulation. For example, it is important
that the Christian man listens to and observes virtuous sounds and sights and shun sinful
ones in order to protect the self—“if we take pains to fortify our selves against the
enemies that is without, and to slay the corruption that is bred within vs, so soon as it is
conceived, we shall possess our souls in peace” (Cowper 210). This tripartite division of
the subject can be generally categorized as the inner physical body, the mental and moral
self, and the external physical body, a division that locates selfhood in the soul’s
mediation of communications sent from the body. As with Crooke’s partitioning of the
body into head, chest, and belly, none of the elements of the Christian subject exist
entirely independent of one another but are rather engaged in a persistent dialogue and communication with each other. Just as the veins, nerves, and muscles unite the corporeal body as a whole, so too do to senses, the mind, and the soul unite the Christian man.

Cowper's text spends a great deal of time discussing the physiological aspects of the Christian subject, further emphasizing the importance of reading anatomical and religious manuals together. Although Cowper employs an anatomical discourse primarily as a metaphor for the operation of religious reform in the individual, his familiarity with this discourse demonstrates the ease with which some writers were able to combine devotion and corporeality. Cowper is primarily concerned with regulating the body, which he initially represents as a conflict between the "old man," the subject primarily defined by corporeality, and the "new man," the regenerate religious subject primarily defined by the soul. In differentiating the "natural man" from the "Christian man," he emphasizes the importance of the senses and draws on theories of conception and birth:

The Naturall man liues not till fourtie and fiue daies after his conception bee expired, but the Christian begins to liue as soone as he is conceiued... . The principal effects of life are Sense & Motion: & the more excellent the life is, the more excellent the Sense & Motion is. In the Naturall man, Motion goes before Sense, at least before the use of the Senses; but in the Christian, Sense goes before Motion. For it is the new Sense which causes the heart to mooue and stirre in a new manner. Therefore it is, that first wee will speake of the Christians Senses, and then of his Motion or disposition. (Cowper 17)

As we saw in the anatomical texts in Chapter One, there is a close association here between movement and the soul. Cowper's reference to life beginning at forty-five days after conception is a reference to the time it was believed that the soul entered the body,
roughly synchronized to the first movement of the child in the womb. Additionally, his perspective on the senses is indebted to the persistent cultural belief that the soul was connected to the outside world through the senses that, as a consequence, are imbued with significant religious importance because they are essentially the arbiters and carriers of experience. Anatomists frequently referred to the senses as analogous to the organs of the soul, and Cowper elaborates on this in his prioritization of them over motion through his application and reinterpretation of generation. In the “new man,” the re-generated Christian subject, the physiological progress of generation is applied to a metaphorical Christianized gestation and rebirth. In this second generation, the Christian develops “sense” prior to motion, and this sense “causes the heart to moue and stirre in a new manner.” It is important to note here that Cowper seems to be distinguishing between ‘sense’ and ‘senses’; the sense that precedes motion in the development of the “new man” is not sight or hearing but rather something more akin to identity and understanding – the soul. This dormant, reawakened self then goes on to reform the physical body and activate the senses in these new ‘infants,’ the “children of God” (Cowper 17).

Cowper goes on to rank the senses in a Christian context. The ‘child’ can hear before it can see because “if we refuse to heare the Lord wee shall neuer see him” – it is through hearing that we learn clarity of sight (Cowper 18). Hearing is the principal sense, he argues, because it is the first arbiter of sin and virtue, our first mode of learning and, consequently, conformity. As Targoff points out, this prioritization of hearing was particularly important in a Protestant context:

3 See my discussion of conception in Chapter One on pp. 74-75 for more on this belief.
At the heart of the liturgical changes introduced during the Reformation was the shift of emphasis from a visual to an auditory register. In place of the Latin Mass, whose crucial moment of collective experience was the sight of the elevation of the Host, the Reformed English service was designed specifically to be heard. The Protestants’ decision to eliminate the raising of the Host reflected a systematic effort to stress the ears and not the eyes as the vehicle for the laity’s interaction with the priest. (Targoff 22-23)

Proper hearing leads to proper sight, and “the eyes of Christs spouce are two; by the one we know our misery, which causeth vs to denie our selues: by the other we know his mercies, which causeth vs to runne vnto him” (Cowper 21). Following hearing and sight in order of importance are smell, taste, and touch. Although these senses are also important to the Christian man, they are subordinate to the other two. Cowper insists that the re-Christianized body brings the senses into harmony: “In Nature, that which is the obiect of one Sense, is not alway [sic] the obiect of another: as for example; a voyce is heard by the eare, but is not seene by the eye: but in the Christian renewed by grace, that which is the obiect of any one Sense is also perceiued by all the rest” (Cowper 25). A lack of faith, then, throws the body out of harmony, making it disjointed and disconnected from itself. As he puts it, “Sinne hath not taken away the members of mans body, but the right motion & vse of them; for the eye still lookes, the tongue speaketh, the hand moueth; but not as they should” (Cowper 221).

Once the inner experience of the subject has been re-Christianized, the outer body must also be reformed, “for the motion or gesture of the body is a certaine voyce or speech of the soule” (Cowper 195). This leads to Cowper’s discussion of the religious justification for the structure of the body, a perspective commonly found in anatomies as well. For example,
God hath giuen vnto man two eares, which being at one time affected by the voyce, receiue the sound coniunctly: they are not set within the head as is the tongue, but set without on eyther side of the head, continually open; to teach man how by all occasions he should be swift to heare, saith S. James, such instructions as may make him swifte toward God. . . . Therefore also hath hee made them vpright toward heauen, because they should bee open to those thinges which are of God. (Cowper 201)

Cowper also draws on aspects of humoral theory that are illuminated by Gail Kern Paster’s recent critical discussions of humoralism in *The Body Embarrassed* and *Humoring the Body*. Paster argues that humoral theory saw the body as a sort of transitional space, engaged in a constant dialogue between internal and external worlds. In this model, the body is under the constant threat of infecting and infection, a perspective that is evident in Cowper’s comments on the permeability of the self through the senses and the transmission and reception of sin and virtue. He argues that, “it is evident with what continuall care the senses are to be obserued, that from without euill come not, to make the heart worse then it is; and from within euill come not, to infect others that are without” (Cowper 210). Establishing the “new man,” he explains, requires a continual act of negotiation between interiority and exteriority: “if we take paines to fortifie our selues against the enemie that is without, and to slay the corruption that is bred within vs, so soone as it is conceived, we shal possess our soules in peace” (Cowper 210). Finally, Cowper also uses physiology to justify religion and vice versa. For example, he argues that God gave us two ears but one tongue so that we would be more willing to listen than to speak, and that He has placed the tongue in a double cage of flesh (lips) and bone (teeth) and tied it to the throat in order to encourage the regulation of speech (Cowper 233). Similarly, God gave man hands in order to pray, work, and to
"extendeth them to doe the workes of mercy and compassion toward the needie" (Cowper 252). This perspective emerges in anatomy as well, such as in Crooke’s similar discussion of the stature of the body, in which the physiological logic of the body is placed in the hands of God. Essentially, the body emerges in Cowper’s text as the devotional tool of the soul as detailed physiological processes are adapted as metaphors for the rebirth of the Christian man.

However, just as anatomists dealt primarily with the body (even if it was in a Christian context), no matter how much attention religious writers paid to the body, it was the soul that was normally their primary concern. And just as early modern anatomies drew on a history of ideas that extended back to the classical period, writing about the soul was indebted to the ancients and many subsequent Christian philosophers. It should be noted that the religious climate of early modern England was conducive to a debate about the soul and, as a result, our ability to witness that debate. As Judith Maltby points out, studying conformity and the unspoken beliefs of a given culture is difficult because shared assumptions are rarely articulated unless they are being challenged (Maltby 5). When these points of friction emerge and a debate ensues, we can glimpse some of these beliefs. However, we must also be cautious in approaching these debates because they often deal with extremes. Members of opposing religious groups, for example, often referred to each other as ‘atheists,’ which could colour our perception of the prevalence of atheism during the period if we are not careful when we approach such accusations (Maltby 13). The sectarian fragmentation initiated by the Protestant

\[4\] See Chapter One, pp. 65-66.
Reformation encouraged both the self-definition of emerging and established denominations and the reaction against each other’s definitions as they sought to carve out a religious space for themselves. In other words, if, for example, Anabaptists and Calvinists were to establish separate identities, they were required to illustrate the virtues of their own beliefs while concurrently condemning the ‘heresies’ of the other, akin to Greenblatt’s ‘self’ and ‘not-self.’ Although this chapter will not delve into the finer points of denominational doctrines, it is the consequence of this conflict between competing theologies that is of interest here, that is, an open discussion of the soul, particularly among members of the established church who sought both to define themselves against Catholicism and to defend themselves against the threat of other extant or emerging theologies, particularly Anabaptism.

Rosalie Osmond’s work has greatly increased our understanding of the intellectual history of the soul leading up to the seventeenth century and beyond. In both Mutual Accusation (1990) and Imagining the Soul (2003), she traces the complex history of the soul beginning with Pythagoras and moving through Plato and Aristotle, Augustine and Aquinas, and many others. As Osmond points out, Plato and Aristotle emerged in the Renaissance as the two most frequently cited philosophers regarding the soul. She notes that,

For Plato the whole universe is divided into two distinct realms, the ‘real’ world of intelligible Forms, and the world of appearances, of change and flux. The former is the perfectly realized realm of Being; the latter is the state of ‘becoming.’ . . . The soul is most frequently seen as allied to the

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5 The following discussion of Plato and Aristotle draws heavily on Osmond’s work but undoubtedly oversimplifies her detailed discussion of the history of the soul. My interpretation of Platonic and Aristotelian perspectives on the soul is entirely indebted to her work.
According to Plato, the immortal soul – governed by morality, and comprised of appetitive, sensitive, and rational functions – constitutes the self. The imperfections of the material world are, for Plato, the faults of materiality itself. The purpose of the soul as a mediator between the world of Forms and the material world is to “impose form on recalcitrant matter,” but this matter is, arguably, irrelevant to the soul (Osmond, *Mutual Accusation* 6). As Osmond tells us, Aristotle promotes a different perspective, seeking a more scientific or rational description of the soul and its relationship to the body by emphasizing the necessary state of embodiment within which the soul exists. Because the subject consists of both a soul and a body and because the soul experiences the material world through the body and the senses, he stresses that the individual is the “true substance,” and that “The universal abstracted by the mind remains real, but real as embodied in the substance, not in a transcendental world” (Osmond, *Mutual Accusation* 6). Consequently, in contrast to the Platonic insistence that the flesh is simply a burden to the soul, Aristotle argues that

> The body is not the tomb of the soul. On the contrary, it is good for the soul to be united to the body since only through the body can it function. . . The soul is the first actuality of an organic body. This means that, in the case of a human body, neither body nor soul can be conceived of existing independently, since its potentiality cannot be separated from actuality.

(Osmond, *Mutual Accusation* 6)

Both Plato and Aristotle prioritize the intellectual/rational features of the soul, but whereas Plato argues that the entire soul is immortal, Aristotle insists that only the rational or intellectual soul lives on after death. While Plato locates identity wholly in the
soul at the expense of the body, Aristotle maintains that the individual is a product of embodiment, the compulsory dialectic of the body-soul relationship. Osmond summarizes Aristotle’s perspective as follows: “Just as body remains mere potentiality without the addition of soul, so soul’s capacity to activate matter cannot be realized without the existence of that matter” (Osmond, Imagining the Soul 26). Subsequent philosophers adapted, modified, refuted, merged, and sometimes misunderstood Plato and Aristotle, but their philosophies constitute the two most prominent theories of the soul during the Renaissance, the former emphasizing the soul as the core component of the self and the latter focusing on embodiment, the conjoining of body and soul.

The early moderns themselves were aware of this heritage of debates over the soul, and a number of texts appeared during this period that sought either to illuminate the general understanding of the soul or to argue in favour of or against particular points of the controversy. Published around the same time as John Banister’s anatomical text Historie of Man, John Woolton’s A Treatise of the Immortalitie of the Soule (1576) surveys ideas about the soul in much the same way that Banister deals with the body. Woolton, the Bishop of Exeter, chooses to write about the soul because it leads simultaneously to self-knowledge and knowledge of the divine through an understanding of the work of God. As he says, “The contemplation of the soule letteth vs see God” (Woolton [i]. Like Banister, who comments on the dearth of significant anatomical writing in English, Woolton also sees his text as an effort to rectify a similar lack in writing about the soul; despite the importance of the topic, he is concerned that, “none haue hitherto written any thing in our Englishe toung of so worthy an Argument”
(Woolton 4vi'). Consequently, he attempts to bring together numerous theories regarding the soul in a single, authoritative, English text. However, Woolton also identifies one of the central problems facing anyone who chooses to write about the soul – its status as a religious mystery and its general resistance to linguistic representation. He notes that it is commonly believed that we can only see divinity – of which the soul partakes – by reflection and not directly, so his writing is an effort to capture this reflection as best as is possible. He notes that, “I haue oftentimes conceyued more then I could well vtter,” an indication of the difficulty in writing about something that was both essential and intangible (Woolton 3vi'). Despite the absolute importance of the soul to the self, “amongs all the workes of creation, there is almost none more secrete and hidden from carnall and fleshly reason, then the substancie and operation of mans Soule” (Woolton 2v). A Treatise of the Immortalitie of the Soule is the first English text that seeks to contextualize and negotiate the early modern understanding of the soul from a Protestant perspective.

Woolton notes that, as a result of the ultimate unknowability of the soul, numerous theories have been proposed in order to understand the soul. After narrowing the debate by rejecting the idea that the soul is corporeal and mortal, he points out that even among those who believe the soul is incorporeal and immortal, “there are suche diversities of opinions and judgemenettes, that you shall scarsly finde two that agree in one sentence, and say consonantly one thing” (Woolton 3v). With this diversity of opinion in mind, Woolton divides theories of the soul into three primary strands – Plato and Aristotle, physicians, and Christian theology. He acknowledges the contribution of these
first two categories to the understanding of the soul, but it is not surprising that a bishop in the Church of England would prioritize explicitly Christian theories. Between Plato and Aristotle, Woolton prefers Plato’s definition of the soul as “an incorporeal Essence, settled in living bodies, which both moueth them and him selfe, with a temperate number and Harmonie. Vnto whom the power of mouing is ascribed . . . [in the] action and operation in bodies” (Woolton 4v). Part of Woolton’s preference for Plato arises from his admiration for the philosopher’s ability to make something as abstract as the soul understandable by likening it to number and harmony. The soul is like a number because, “as wee imagine Numbers in thought and cogitation onely, without any addition of bodily substance: even so we doe conceyue and understande of the soule,” and it is like harmony because it “obserueth an exacte way and order in all actions and dooings” (Woolton 4v-5v). However, he does not approve of Plato’s tripartite division of the soul that, according to Woolton, suggests there are three distinct and separate souls, “which are not so in deede, but only natural powers of the three principall members of the body” (Woolton 8v). Although he does not wholly reject the division of the soul into three faculties, he is concerned that such divisions often rely too much on the functions of the body to explain the soul. This was a persistent concern in many religious texts about the soul, a concern that mirrors the common medieval anxiety regarding the possible misinterpretation of the Trinity as three separate beings rather than aspects of the singular divine being. In Gods Valuation of Mans Soule (1632), for example, the vicar Moses Capell stresses the “Three in one and one in three” similarity between the Trinity and the soul in order to clarify the tripartite functions of the unified soul (Capell 11-12).
Likewise, Woolton criticizes Aristotle and classical physicians such as Galen for overly corporeal theories of the soul by associating the reasonable soul too closely with the brain and the perception of the senses, which comes dangerously close to blurring the boundaries between humans and animals. According to this corporeal understanding of the soul, “The Actions of the Reasonable Soule are impared and diminished, when the brayne is distempered, or the Animale spirite is dysquieted” (Woolton 10). In contrast, Woolton suggests a greater distance between the reasonable soul and the brain and senses. He argues that the soul judges what is presented to it by the senses through the mind, which is itself a feature or function of the reasonable soul. When writing about the differences between man and beast, he argues that one point of separation is the reasonable soul, which “consisteth of two partes, that is of the Mind vnderstanding, and of the Will working voluntarely” (Woolton 9). Woolton cautions the reader not to confuse these higher functions of the rational soul with the “intelligence sensitiue” present in beasts that allows animals to “apprehendeth onely singuler and simple obiectes” (Woolton 9). The senses themselves can be corrupted, causing them to misrepresent the external world to the mind. The distinction here is fine but important. Woolton connects the rational soul not to the corporeal brain but to the more abstract concept of mind and understanding that works through the brain and the senses. Because the soul is inherently virtuous and incorruptible, sin results from the corruption of the vehicles of perception themselves, with the soul making decisions based on bad information. In response to these problematic understandings of the soul, Woolton offers his own definition based on his interpretation of the Scriptures:
The reasonable Soule of manne, is a spirituall or incorporall Substance, and the one parte of manne created of God, beeing powred and spreade throughout the body as the lyght is in the ayer to be the breath of lyfe, and a lyving soule, understanding, reasoning, iudging, discerning good from euyll, vertue from vice, apprehending and feeling by certaine organes or instruments all sensible thinges styrring, mowing, and quickening the body, not subiecte to corruption, but immortall and eternall, disposed neuerthelesse to good or euill, whereby it procureth eyther euerlasting death, or beeing justified by faythe in the Sonne of God, obteyneth eternall life, whiche being separated from the body suruiueth, and sleepeth not, but eyther is in ioy or payne, and looketh for the resurrection of the dead, at at [sic] what time the spirite shall returne to his owne proper bod ye, and dwell eyther with the blisfull Lorde, or with the cursed feend perpetually. (Woolton 12\textsuperscript{r}-12\textsuperscript{v})

To this effect, the body is "the instrument or orgayn of the soule," the tool through which the soul operates, a perspective similar to Cowper's understanding of the soul-body relationship (Woolton 12\textsuperscript{v}).

Like the anatomists, Woolton also struggles with the idea of incorporeality, suggesting that although the soul is intangible, it is also a "substance." Paradoxically, although the soul is a substance, it is not comprised of any of the four elements; rather, "This incorporall substaunce is called a spirite," and he cites a number of biblical passages that conflate "soul" and "spirite" (Woolton 13\textsuperscript{v}). Whereas anatomists sometimes discuss the soul as a kind of fifth humour, Woolton represents it as a fifth (superior) element. Although the human soul is a spirit, it is more perfect than any other kind of spirit or element because it is derived from God, and as such, "cannot be coneyued by the phantasie or imagination of any corporall similitude: nor yet set out exactly and worthily with the penne or tongue of any mortall man" (Woolton 14\textsuperscript{v}). Like many who have chosen to write about the soul, Woolton is faced with the rhetorical impossibility of describing the indescribable. The definition that he provides above is focused almost
entirely on what the soul does, its function, and not on what the soul is. It is perhaps a necessary paradox of the indescribable that the only satisfactory descriptions are themselves also paradoxical, such as the incorporeal corporeality of the soul.

Woolton goes on in his text to address some of the many controversies regarding the soul, and in the process he reveals a very detailed and nuanced debate. He tells us, for example, that some people believe that soul is a part of God placed in the body while others argue that God creates it and places it there. Woolton describes the debates over the origin of the soul: does God create new souls every day and infuse them in bodies, or have all souls already been created and are sent into bodies by God, or is the soul transmitted into an infant through generation by the parents? After dismantling the various opinions regarding the origin of the soul – to suggest that the soul is transmitted by the parents is to ultimately suggest that it is mortal, he argues – he cites St. Augustine’s opinion that there is no danger in man not knowing exactly where the soul comes from:

Let vs rather content and conforte oure selues with this knowledge, that as we certenly feele and know by our life, sence, vnderstanding, and choyse of thynges, that wee haue an immortall Soule nowe inclosed in oure bodyes: So that after the resolucion of the soule from the bodype, the soules shall returne to God that gaue them, in whose handes they shall so reste and bee kepe, that the paynes of hell shall not take holde vppon them. (Woolton 285)

Woolton also addresses the question of where the soul resides in the body, noting that there are two general opinions on the matter, that the soul either resides in a specific body part or organ, or that it is dispersed throughout the whole body. His own opinion on the matter draws as much from religion as it does from physiology and scientific theory:
“albeit I doe thinke that the Soule cannot be sayde properly to be in a place as a thing that may be circumscried & measured, yet because the soule is a substaunce fynite, it must needes be lymited within some space and place” (Woolton 41v). Galen and many of his followers argue that the brain is the seat of the soul because the brain is the source of motion and sense, which are perhaps the two most important features attributed to the soul as well. However, Woolton dismisses this opinion because, “surely all suche argumentes to proue the soule to reste in the head or brayne, haue in them more probabilitie then euidencie, & are rather grounded vpon likely and probable guesses of humayne reason, then vpon sacred and diuine authoritie” (Woolton 44v). Others, such as Aristotle, have argued that the soul resides in the heart, which leads Woolton to a discussion of the relationship between the liver, heart, brain, and movement of blood throughout the body. He concludes that because the heart is physiologically responsible for the transmission of vital blood, heat, and animal spirits throughout the body, it is the most important organ in the body,

By whiche consideration wee may see the Brayne too receyue her lyfe from the Harte, whome nature her selfe chiefly and especielly of all other partes of the bodye defenceth and fortifieth, as that member wherein the moderator and gouernour of man, the Reasonable soule hathe hys princely place and principall mancion. (Woolton 47v)

Woolton combines this anatomical understanding of the heart with a scriptural understanding, citing biblical passages (Romans 1 and 10) that suggest that the heart is the fountain of intellect and that cognition comes from the heart first. Biblical authority settles the matter: “And thus I end this disputation, for my parte inclining to their Judgementes, that with the Scripture acknowledge the hart to be the mancion and palace
of the Reasonable soule” (Woolton 48r). Hoe goes on to say that this is not a frivolous debate and that by better understanding the body we better understand the soul and how best to follow virtue and avoid vice:

And for as much as it is moste euident that by the mixture of humours and qualitie of temperaments, there do arise alterations, not onely of the spirites in the braine and hart, but of all the actions and operations of the same: We knowing the causes of these things shall (if our natures be not to wilde) keepe oure selues within an honeste measure and compasse. . . . An earnest consideration of our spirites, will moue vs to temperancy and modesty in life and conuersation: For he that obserueth the passages of the spirites, and knoweth their entercourse betwene the brayne and harte, will not willingly quench or weaken those flames and lights of lyfe, & motions, eyther with intemperate dyet, or with violent and raging affections.

(Woolton 48r-49r)

Significantly, Woolton here draws on the dialogue between anatomy and theology that the first two chapters of this dissertation have been establishing. Just as early modern anatomists drew on religious understandings of the soul in their discussions of the body, Woolton here draws on the scientific understanding of the body in his theological discussion of the soul. The perceived intimacy of soul and body necessitates this dialogue and ensures its persistence in an era of contemporaneous religious turmoil and scientific innovation.

A number of works on the soul followed Woolton’s Treatise and similarly sought to define the soul and illuminate our understanding of its nature and function. However, given the many differences of opinion on the matter indicated by Woolton, such texts were rarely carbon copies of each other. In A Discourse Concerning the Soule and Spirit of Man (1604), Simon Harward begins by discussing the etymology of the words ‘soul’ and ‘spirit’ to demonstrate their interchangeability. According to Harward, these words
are generally used in reference to three things, “the spirit of life in every living creature,” “the affections of man,” and, most importantly, “the principal part of man, that rational soul and understanding spirit, which being part of man’s substance here, doth remain still immortal, when the body is extinguished” (Harward 2'-4'). In addition, ‘soul’ is sometimes used to refer to the whole person while ‘spirit’ is used to refer to a phantasm or ghost. However, Harward emphasizes that the words ‘soul’ and ‘spirit’ are used interchangeably in the Bible and are not separate entities or substances, which Woolton also believes. Not everyone shared this opinion. The stress on this conflation of terms was a response to an interpretation of the Bible that understood ‘soul’ and ‘spirit’ as divisible, an interpretation that was one of the core tenets of mortalism, the belief that the soul was corporeal and, thus, mortal. Although he was not the founder of this perspective, John Brayne summarizes it nicely in his *The Unknown Being of the Spirit, Soul, and Body; Anatomized* (1654). Brayne argues that “the Spirit, Soul and Body, are three distinct essential parts of Man,” and that numerous poor translations of the Bible have lead to the perceived equivalency of ‘soul’ and ‘spirit’ (Brayne 1). He contends that, “As the soul is to the body, so the spirit is to the soul; the soul is in the blood as its seat, and the spirit in the mind as its seat, being the sublimest part of the soul, informing and leading the soul and body” (Brayne 5). Within this configuration, both the body and the soul – both of which are transmitted “out of the loins by propagation” – are mortal and it is only the spirit that will live on (Brayne 15). Given the elevated status of the spirit, Brayne attacks its popular debasement in physiological references to the animal, vital, and natural spirits, which suggest that the spirit is divisible and connected to the fleshy
machinations of the body. He accepts that the blood is the seat of the soul, which is partly
why it is inferior to the spirit; because the soul is connected to the blood, it is subject to
the desires and corruption of the body. In contrast, Brayne connects the spirit purely to
the understanding and will, functions of the self that are not anchored to the demands of
the body. Although this point of view on the soul – which was generally associated with
Anabaptism – never gained much traction in the popular imagination, it was persistent
enough that most Protestant writings on the soul, such as Woolton and Harward’s work
as well as many anatomical texts, confront and refute the belief in the mortality of the
soul. Harward addresses interpretations like Brayne’s:

But say they, there are many places in the holy Scriptures, wherein the
worde soule and spirit are both ioyned together in such sort, that they
seeme apparrantly not to signifie one thing. Indeed, when they are ioyned
both together, all the Fathers of the Church, generally doe make a
difference betwixt them, but not such a difference as they doe imagine: as
when the Apostle saith, the God of peace sanctifie you, who by that your
spirit being perfect, & your soule and bodie may be kept vnblamably vntill
the comning of our Lord Iesus Christ: the meaning is not that there shuld
be a perfect coniunction of the Spirit to the bodie by the soule as a meane
or middle, that so the spirit & the bodie might the better continue long
together, but the praier of the Apostle is, that the spirit of the
Thessalonians, that is, their reason & vnderstanding, & their soul, that is
their wil and affections: and thirdly their body should be kept vnblamably
vntill the comning of Christ. (Harward 2ont)

Essentially, Harward rejects this position because it ignores the similar contexts within
which both words are used.6

6 This debate persisted throughout the period. For another example, see Jack Jackson’s The Sovie is
Immortall (1611). In this text, Jackson explicitly refutes Anabaptist perspectives on the soul by offering a
number of short translated Latin works in order to prove the immortality of the soul. He outlines the goals
of his text as, “First, that the Soule is not (as they say) mortall, but immortall: Secondly, that the Soule is
not a forme, perfection, temperament, force, power, or agitation arising out of the temperature of the Body;
but a substaunce incorporeall, liuing, vnderstanding, dwelling in the Body, and susteining and mooing it”
Like Woolton, Harward also draws on Plato, Aristotle, and Augustine, as well as Galen and other anatomists/physicians, in his discussion of the soul. Harward similarly devotes a significant amount of space to the question of where the soul resides in the body. He accepts the biblical perspective, citing passages from Genesis and Deuteronomy for proof that, “In the holy scriptures, the word anima is giuen to the bloud,” noting also the general conflation of blood, life, soul, and spirit, a perspective that he says is visible in the physiological understanding of the animal spirits (Harward 7r, 7r-8r). Harward outlines a number of theories on where the soul resides, from the Greek and Arabian physicians who believed that it dwells in the brain (a debate that itself is divided over exactly where in the brain the soul is located), to Hippocrates’ proposal that it resides in the left ventricle, and the Psalms’ similar but more general suggestion that it inhabits the heart. After addressing all these perspectives, he cites Galen’s belief that every part of the body communicates with every other part of the body in some respect before illustrating his own conclusion that

howsoever the anima or soule is said in respect of her chief animall facultie, to haue seate in the braine, and by her vitall facultie, to haue place in the heart, and by her naturall facultie to possesse the liuer: yet the first by sinewes, and the second by arteries, and the third by veines, doe with such societie, harmonie, and neere conjiunction, worke continually together in all the bodie, that the soule it selfe (which ruleth and gouerneth them al) may bee said in, and by them, to bee present in all the bodie, although in her owne essence and substance, shee hath her proper place appointed by God, & being the chiepest part of man, it is most likely that she hath it in that part which is the chiepest beauty, & as it were the very maiestie of this earthly creature. (Harward 32r-33r)

(Jackson A4'). Like Woolton and Harward, he also stresses that ‘soul’ and ‘spirit’ are used interchangeably in the Bible.
Although he does not explicitly say so, “that part which is the chiefest beauty, & as it were the very maiestie of this earthly creature” is most likely a reference to the head and, consequently, the brain. Like Woolton, Harward combines theological and physiological understandings of the body and soul in his conclusion.

One of the most important issues in early modern discussions of the body and soul is the chronological placement of the subject along the timeline of the Christian master narrative. Although this was hardly a new debate, it was central to the early modern understanding of the self. After all, soul and self are intertwined, evident when Moses Capell uses the word ‘soul’ “to signify the breath of our lives, that invisible Essence, and spirituall substance: Divines most commonly call the Soule: we may, our selves,” also commenting that to lose your soul is to lose your self – “So it is a Christian may lose his soule and himselfe” (Capell 6,7). Capell’s discussion of the soul and the self emphasizes an important contention that is evident – often implicitly – in many Christian texts: while the subject undoubtedly consists of both a soul and a body, subjectivity, the “invisible Essence” of the self, is located firmly in the soul. In Chapter One, we saw writers on anatomy employ a number of allusions to the prelapsarian subject as well as to the approaching Judgment Day to frame discussions of the subject existing in this life. It is not surprising that these allusions are expanded in theological texts. Woolton, like many others, argues that the union of body and soul was perfect in Eden and that in this original configuration the senses and the appetites of the body conformed to the demands of the reasonable soul. However, following original sin, “mans seelye soule is caried with an vnequal flight, much like a Goose that laggeth after her fellowes with a broken wing. Yet
in this great deformitie of nature, god hath yet left in the soule certayne sparkes and seedes, which doe admonishe vs of the originall excellencie of mans soule” (Woolton 30\textsuperscript{3}). Likewise, Harward notes that although we now have to work hard to be the image of God, this imitation was natural in Adam and Eve (Harward 53\textsuperscript{3}). Essentially, the easy correspondence between body and soul was lost with the Fall. Prior to that historically distant point in time, body and soul were cooperative agents, capable of clearly knowing one another. The Fall, however, has disrupted this communication; the soul still contains the stamp of divinity, as well as the essence of original knowledge discussed by Crooke in *Mikrokosmographia*, that allowed Adam to know and name the world around him, but the soul has been muted by and imprisoned in the body. As Osmond points out in her discussion of the idealized hierarchy of soul over body:

This was the essence of the harmonious relationship between body and soul before the Fall, and its absence is the mark of fallen man. Within the Christian framework of Renaissance England, the basic incompatibility . . . of two dissimilar substances is seen specifically as a result of original sin. Once the soul rebelled against God, the body rebelled against the soul.

\begin{footnotesize}
(\textit{Osmond, Mutual Accusation 27})
\end{footnotesize}

Writing in 1608, Nicholas Breton contrasts the fallen subject with the prelapsarian subject, illuminating the perceived disparity between the two in his *Divine Considerations of the Soule*:

\begin{footnotesize}
Pryde hath defiled humilitie, couetousnesse charitie, lecherie charitie, wrath patience, sloath labour, enuie loue, and murther pity: so that whereas man was before in these vertues a creature of Gods loue, and in whose presence hee tooke pleasure, now through these vices is hee become a most vglye and hatefull creature in the sight of the Creator.
\end{footnotesize}

\begin{footnotesize}
(Breton F8\textsuperscript{3}-F9\textsuperscript{5})
\end{footnotesize}
Breton takes an extreme and rhetorically dramatic position on the qualities of fallen humanity, regularly employing the language of filth, decay, and disgust, but he reiterates a persistent belief in the religious understanding of the soul. The devout Christian must work very hard throughout his or her life to ‘hear’ the soul and act according to its virtuous wishes while simultaneously recognizing that we cannot completely recapture the lost unity and harmony of soul and body.

The belief in original sin also raised an important set of questions that impacted and complicated early modern understandings of the soul: To what extent is the soul implicated in original sin? Is the guilt of original sin passed to the individual through the soul or the body? If it is passed through the soul, then is the soul naturally sinful or divine in nature, or does God place sin in the soul as an act of vengeance against humanity?

Religious writers struggled with these questions repeatedly and the debate itself witnesses the intersection of many of the differing theories about the soul that have been discussed in this chapter. However, because of the multiplicity of perspectives that informed the argument over the soul’s relationship with original sin, identifying a unified cultural perspective on the matter is impossible. Harward, for one, argues that God does not create the soul with sin because that would make God the author of evil. Rather, he suggests that the soul is infected with sin at the moment that it is placed in the body:

Having therefore in it selfe, though a purity, yet also a weaknesse and imbecility, it is no sooner ioyned to the body of man, but it is presently infected with the pollution thereof, even as the purest spirite of wine or best quintessence that can be made in the world, if it be powred into a filthy poisoned and vnsaury vessel, it doth in a moment become partaker of the corruption thereof: yet we must not imagine the soules to haue for some time a being before they bee vnited with the bodies, for at one and
the selfe same time, the soules are both created and also vnited to the bodies. (Harward 38'-39')

Of course, this perspective relies on the belief that God continually creates souls and infuses them in the body. However, for someone like John Brayne who believes that the soul is transmitted to the infant through copulation, sin is passed from parent to child, connecting the soul itself to original sin (Brayne 10-12). As Osmond points out, the numerous differing opinions on the matter meant that either the body or the soul or both could be implicated in sin depending on which version of the soul-body relationship was endorsed (Osmond, Mutual Accusation 33).

All agree, however, that the success or failure of such a difficult act of conforming the desires of the body to the demands of the soul remains a mystery in this life. This is knowledge that is only available at death and, finally, Judgment Day when body and soul are reunited, destined for either eternal joy or eternal torment. A great deal of anxiety surrounds the loss of clear communication between body and soul and the fact that the soul is inaccessible to total observation and understanding. As Capell notes, the common assumption was that one could not view the soul directly and, as a result, just as "yet may wee behold the Sunne by reflection: [we may behold] even our selves in a glasse, as it were, by observing the operations of our Soules; and those sundry transcendent inventions of their wit" (Capell 15). As we saw in early modern anatomies, it was generally believed that communication flowed into the soul through the senses unidirectionally. Although the operations of the soul could be seen by reflection, the soul did not return approval, disapproval, or commentary on the information it gathered, even as it spent its entire time in the body doing just that – gathering information, compiling a
record of sin and virtue that would ultimately be presented to God after the death of the body. Consequently, the Christian subject is stranded between two temporally distant and unreachable points of perfection. The unity between body and soul that was available in Eden and will again be available after death is entirely inaccessible during the lived life. Time – or the lack of it – is thus an important issue in the relationship between body and soul as each operates along a different temporal narrative. Whereas the body is associated with decay and quickness, the soul is associated with immortality and timelessness.

According to Edward Popham in *A Looking-glasse for the Soule, and a Definition thereof* (1619), for example, corporeal time has no real impact on the soul, “for life is more to be measured, by goodnesse then number of daies, seeing most men by many daies doe but procure many deaths; and others in short space of time doe attaine the life of infinite Ages” (Popham 7). Unfortunately, the actions of the body during this brief life affect the eventual experience of timelessness by the self, to be spent either in Heaven or in Hell. Although one does not need to spend many decades achieving salvation in this life, the reverse is that one could also earn damnation and “many deaths” rather quickly. However, without any feedback from the soul, one cannot know his or her ultimate fate, even though the soul seems to contain that information.

The importance of Judgment Day and the never-present future in these texts indicates a Christian perspective on time, one that is discussed by John Spencer Hill. He argues that because of this linearity of time (or “spiraling helix” of time winding upwards, as he sometimes characterizes it) passing through Creation, Christ, and Judgment Day, “Christians made the significance of both past and present, conditioned
by promise and expectation, dependent for their meaning largely on the future" (Hill 75). Certainly, references to Judgment Day as a culmination of the narrative of the subject – corporeally and spiritually – permeate both anatomical and religious literature as the temporal point at which body and soul are once again merged. Hill also argues that, “Events in time are neither definitive nor self-contained: the past of the still-future reality of a divine order that encompasses all that has been and will be, and that, in the fullness of time, will gather past, present, and future into the eternal ‘now’ of the concrete providential reality toward which all time and history are moving” (Hill 98-99). Although I agree with Hill regarding the vast importance of the future in the Christian conception of time, I also believe that we cannot underestimate the importance of the past in Christian thinking and identity. The past, specifically the Fall, defines the present and instigates the future. If Judgment Day ultimately provides the meaning for the progression of biblical history, the Fall establishes the parameters through which meaning is made – without the shattering of body-soul unity, there can be no restoration of it. The interrelated importance of both Judgment Day and the Fall is evidenced by their concurrent appearance in the texts that we have been examining in these first two chapters; rarely do we find references to one without references to the other. Even though Banister, for example, emphasizes the importance of the Resurrection, he also invokes Creation and the prelapsarian body in his physiological discussion. Crooke likewise stresses the loss of original knowledge at the Fall, and its status as the starting point for the movement back to that knowledge, as well as God’s promise of salvation for the
faithful (Crooke 1011). Similarly, references to Judgment Day and Creation/the Fall can be found in Woolton, Harward, Cowper, Capell, and undoubtedly many others. The narrative of the religious subject moves simultaneously away from the Fall and toward Judgment Day, and that individual is defined by his or her relationship to both an irretrievable past and an unrealized future.

As I have demonstrated in this chapter, both anatomical and religious understandings of the body, soul, and self were connected to one another in early modern England. Consideration of the divine and the corporeal contributes to the creed cited by Helkiah Crooke, to “Know thy Selfe” (Crooke 646). This self-knowledge was achieved through a negotiation of faith and reason in what Hill calls a form of “rational spirituality” (Hill 5). Since both anatomists and religious writers understood the subject to be comprised of a soul and a body, discussions of the body almost invariably drew on debates about the soul, debates that were themselves steeped in physiological theories. This is perhaps not surprising when we consider the shared classical roots of many of the strands of thought, with Plato, Aristotle, Galen, and, additionally, the Bible all emerging as sources of authority in both fields of inquiry. Perhaps as a consequence of this shared intellectual heritage, both types of writing often employ a similar approach to selfhood, an approach that is predicated on the existence of an objective and idealized self by which all others are judged through the process of dissection, whether physical or spiritual. In theological texts, this ‘perfect self” could differ depending on the denominational loyalty of the author, but this ideal still existed and did so at the expense

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7 See also Chapter One, pp. 63-64.
of other denominationally determined perfect selves. Consequently, identifying the understanding of the soul in these texts would be unfeasible, particularly between those who could not agree whether the ‘divine spark’ resided in the soul or the spirit or whether or not the soul was actually immortal. Further factioning can be seen regarding issues such as the origin and nature of the soul. Although we can say with confidence that the majority believed that the soul was in fact the site of the “essence” (as Capell puts it) of self and that it was immortal, the repeated attacks on the Anabaptist position and numerous defenses of the immortality of the soul that were written indicate that at least the perception was that this belief was threatened throughout the period.

In addition, just as we saw in Chapter One where English anatomists rarely challenged the hegemony of the Christian master narrative, religious writing on the soul from this period rarely attacked anatomy as a dangerously secularizing force. Certainly, some anxiety was expressed over issues such as the tripartite division of the functions of the soul – vital, sensitive, and rational – in theories of the body, but primarily as a caution to the reader to avoid erroneously attributing the three functions to three separate souls within the individual. Since the anatomists themselves seldom, if ever, posited the presence of three souls and instead stressed the existence of a single soul with multiple functions, any such charges would have been unfounded. Rather, because religious writers normally accepted the Aristotelian importance of the necessary embodiment of the soul – and ensoulment of the body – to create a recognizable subject, emphasis was placed on a devotional understanding of corporeality. This did not mean that such writers valorized or praised the flesh – the opposite was often true, to varying degrees – but they
generally recognized that, because of the Fall and until the Resurrection, the individual was made up of two often contentious halves. Try as one might, one could not exist as ‘all soul’ in this life or achieve a perfect union of soul and body, conditions that were only available before birth and after death. The lived life thus emerges as a sort of unresolved debate, a continual effort exerted toward a delayed and inaccessible solution. This debate, its lack of resolution, and its cultural importance provided fertile ground for the devotional literature of the English Renaissance.
Chapter 3: Devotion and Corporeality in An Collins’ Divine Songs and Meditacions

The often-overlooked work of An Collins offers an excellent example of the persistence of discussions and debates about the body and the soul in early modern devotional literature. Her Divine Songs and Meditacions (1653) integrates a description of physiological details in her discussion of the Christian subject in a way that is sometimes consistent and sometimes paradoxical but always Christianized. Of course, we cannot demand that a devotional poet establish a perfectly unswerving perspective on the body and how it works, as constant as what we might expect from an anatomist like John Banister or Helkiah Crooke: it is not Collins’ goal to demonstrate how the Christianized body works from top to bottom, inside and out. It is not surprising, then, that despite an overarching theme of humoral balance throughout the poems we can observe potentially competing influences on her understanding of anatomical details, and in her discussion of the heart, which, depending on the poem, seems to represent a Galenic humoral heart or a Harveian circulating (and non-humoral) heart. Likewise, although she discusses the animal spirits responsible for “moving and sence” radiating out from a “center” in the poem “A Song shewing the Mercies of God to his people, by interlacing cordiall Comforts with fatherly Chastisments,” whether this center is the heart or brain is unclear (ll. 24, 25). In other words, Collins incorporates a discussion of physiological details and systems without endorsing a single, unified anatomical theory. However, the fact that she includes these details at all emphasizes just how pervasive were early modern discussions and debates about the body during the proliferation of anatomical writing in the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries. As a woman, Collins would not have been allowed to observe anatomical demonstrations first hand or to attend a university where anatomy was being hotly debated. Instead, she would have been exposed to these ideas through various other cultural sources – an understanding of anatomy (perhaps even of the very recent work of William Harvey), no matter how cursory, was not the sole property of the intellectual elite.

Regardless of how complete Collins’ understanding of anatomy was, she uses her religious views to ultimately provide the necessary consistency. The understanding of the body that emerges in *Divine Songs and Meditations* is one that is filtered through Christian beliefs, which imbues the body, the soul, and the relationship between the two with meaning. Humoralism, the operation of the animal spirits and the senses, the functioning of the heart, and all other corporeal processes are tied back into the Christian master narrative leading toward salvation or damnation, the relationship between God and the Christian subject, and the integration of sin and virtue into that same subject. In part, Collins’ meditations on the body stem from her struggle with an unspecified lifelong illness that forces her to reconcile her weakened physical body with her intense religious devotion, and even this attempt at reconciliation occasionally produces anxiety as a result of the ultimate unknowability of God. While Collins frequently suggests that her illness is a gift or test from God that authorizes her to speak and elevates her to a special status, for which she is thankful, she is also eager to leave her weakened body behind. Struggling with her own corporeality throughout these verses, she finally puts the body to death in the concluding poem, instigating an engagement with the mortalism controversy that
questioned whether the soul remained with the body after death or if it ascended to
Heaven to await Judgment Day. Collins sometimes praises her ill body and at other times
derides it. Consequently, although a harmonization of sick body and faithful soul
ultimately triumphs in these poems, this harmony is occasionally challenged. W. Scott
Howard is right to note that “Collins turns private losses into spiritual gain,” but this
equation is not without its complications and anxieties (Howard, “An Collins and the
Politics of Mourning” 178). Finally, corporeality also emerges as a central issue in *Divine
Songs and Meditacions* when we consider Collins in relation to not only seventeenth-
century women’s writing but medieval anchoritic literature as well. As we will see, the
cultural expectations surrounding female writers force women like Collins to, in some
form or another, address their gendered bodies. Both the physical enclosure forced on
Collins by her illness and the devotional nature of her poetry are illuminated by the
heightened corporeality of the feminized expectations surrounding the medieval
anchoress. Ultimately, Collins’ Christianized understanding of body and soul is nuanced
and shows evidence of the influence of the debates that emerged in the preceding
chapters of this dissertation.

In order to fully access Collins’ contribution to our understanding of early modern
subjectivity and corporeality, however, we must first move beyond the critical limitations
that surround the author and her text. These limitations stem from the marginality of her
poetry in contemporary literary studies and the paucity of biographical information on
Collins, both of which can be said to inform the two general veins of writing about her.
First, as a relatively unknown female poet, Collins has received numerous introductions
(not unlike this one) and passing comments. These prefatory comments normally reiterate briefly what we know – or think we know – about Collins, that she was housebound with some debilitating illness, that this is her only known piece of writing, and that her political and denominational affiliations are extremely difficult to pin down.¹ As has been noted by almost every critic who has written about Collins, everything we know about her is contained in this one book of poetry written during a time of great political and religious upheaval in England and her comments on these debates are alternately clear and confusing, and sometimes seemingly contradictory. This has led to the second category of criticism, which attempts to unravel the difficulties of the text in order to lay bare Collins’ true political and religious sympathies. Consequently, she has been confidently identified as a Calvinist, an anti-Calvinist, a Roman Catholic, a Quaker, a Puritan, and a Particular Baptist, as well as potentially belonging to either Royalist or Parliamentarian political sects.² As a result, scholarship on Collins tends to be either panoramic and general or intensely microscopic. When taken together, a set of (relatively short) articles by Sarah E. Skwire, Patricia Demers, Ann Hurley, and Helen Wilcox has


sought to place Collins in a broader literary and cultural context by examining issues of disease, melancholy, and literary influences, but our understanding of this poet is still far from complete or comprehensive.³

Helen Wilcox, for one, recommends a way of reading Collins that is particularly useful. Wilcox suggests the possibility that Collins was influenced by the poetry of George Herbert. Wilcox observes in Collins' work elements of the faith and sincerity of Herbert’s “A true Hymne” and the self-awareness of his “Jordan” poems, a combination that identifies the source of Collins’s poetic heritage, perhaps caught at ‘two removes’ since there is no direct reference to The Temple in her small volume. The fundamental similarity of Herbert’s work lies in attitude rather than poetic technique. Her autobiographical discourses and lyrics serve to convey, in the words of the author, ‘an image of her mind,’ words which cannot fail to remind us of Herbert’s own reported description of The Temple as ‘a picture of . . . many spiritual conflicts.’

(Wilcox “Entering The Temple” 201).

Here, Wilcox offers a productive approach to Collins’ writing, tracing the influence of other authors or styles of writing at “two removes” (in other words, reasonable conjecture in the absence of direct acknowledgement). This approach is absolutely necessary when dealing with an author who never discusses or even alludes to other writers or poets, with the exception of some general comments on writing in “The Preface” and “The

Discourse” and her frequent references to the Bible. As a result of Collins’ silence regarding what she has read or how she was educated, any discussion of her cultural and intellectual influences must be done at “two removes.” In the discussion that follows, I read Collins in relation to contemporary anatomical and religious theories regarding the body and the soul, examining how she uses them to understand and represent her own sense of corporeality and subjectivity.

My discussion of Collins is also based on the assumption that her writing is at least semi-autobiographical, an assumption that, although it is uniformly accepted among Collins’ scholars, is not without its potential pitfalls. In “The Discourse,” the author invites the reader to formulate an image or idea of the poet through her verses, writing that:

in regard of any one,
Who may by accident hereafter find,
This, though to them the Author bee unknown,
Yet seeing here, the image of her mind:
They may conjecture how she was inclin’d. (ll. 50-54)

This invitation is certainly an intriguing one because the author here seems to step outside her text and assert its autobiographical validity for anyone who does not know her – the ‘accidental’ reader can access the ‘real’ author through these poems. In the context of this invitation, the speaker’s comments on her childhood, her illness, and her life in general become potentially transparent, windows through which we can observe Collins herself. However, it should be noted that the text contains numerous suggestions – through both style and content – that it cannot be read as purely autobiographical. For example, suffering – both mental and physical – was a common trope in devotional writing, which
opens up the possibility that Collins' discussion of her own pain could be embellished as a literary device. Although I agree with Sidney Gottlieb that "one senses that illness, weakness, and bodily pain were more than devotional or expressive devices for Collins," the extent to which this is true is persistently open to debate (Gottlieb "Introduction" viii). This chapter progresses with Skwire's counsel in mind that, "In the complete absence of any other description of her life, all one can do is take An Collins -- cautiously -- at her word" (Skwire 12). And yet, it is this very absence of information that also liberates the text to a certain degree. Because we know so little about the author, critics are free to explore any and all responsible interpretations of this collection of poems and suggest numerous possible influences on its writing and its author based on what we can glean from the poems themselves.

Based on the text we can suggest a number of things about Collins, primarily -- and most importantly for the present chapter -- that she suffered from a lifelong illness that affected her body and possibly meant that she was bedridden when she wrote these poems. This is highlighted in the opening lines of the prose "To the Reader," where she states "I inform you, that by divine Providence, I have been restrained from bodily employments, suiting with my disposicion, which enforced me to a retired Course of life" (p. 1). She reiterates this point again in the opening line of "The Preface," stating that she is "through weakness to the house confin'd," and numerous references are made throughout the poems to an unnamed affliction that severely affected her body but not her mind (l. 1). That the illness was lifelong is hinted at in "The Discourse" when she writes that, "Even in my cradle did my Crosses breed,/ And so grew up with me, unto this day"
(ll. 57-8). Later in the same poem she also notes that she grew up in a physically weak state:

So (to be briefe) I spent my infancy,
And part of freshest years, as hath been sayd
Partaking then of nothing cheerfully
Being through frailty apt to be affraid,
And likely still distempered or dismayd,
Through present sence of some calamity,
Or preconceipt of future misery. (ll. 85-91)

Her “freshest years,” we are told, were spent worrying about the dangers posed to a frail body, and she suggests that she was guided by a sense of pending or future “calamity” or “misery.”

The centrality of the body in *Divine Songs and Meditacions* is evident throughout the text as Collins meditates more generally on a variety of religiously-informed corporeal issues such as a Christianized understanding of time that was very much tied to the body and its relationship with the soul. Temporally stranded between the Fall and the soul-body split on one end, and Judgment Day and the reunification of the soul and body on the other, the Christian self is left in a conflicted, if necessary, state of existence, pursuing ideals that are impossible to achieve in this lifetime. Anatomists such as Helkiah Crooke drew on this narrative in order to emphasize the devout nature of their own work, arguing that anatomy helped us regain some of the original knowledge – such as the self-knowledge that results from an unimpeded dialogue between body and soul – that was lost at the Fall (Crooke 36-37). Others such as John Banister frequently looked ahead to Judgment Day and the reunification of the body and soul in order to understand their own
work. In short, the Christian master narrative gave anatomy meaning and purpose within 
an intensely religious culture.⁴

It is not surprising, then, that An Collins taps into Christianized time – and the 
Christian master narrative – in order to understand her own work and life. In “The 
Discourse,” Collins discusses the importance and temporal distance of the Fall:

As all men in the state of nature be,
And have been ever since mans wofull fall,
Who was created first, from bondage free,
Untill by sinn he thrust himself in thrall. (ll. 267-70)

In other words, ever since the Fall, humanity has been stranded in a sinful natural state.

Collins then goes on to detail the subsequent effect of the Fall on the soul and the body:

The Soul who did her makers Image bear,
Which made her amiable fair and bright,
Right Orient and illustrious to appear,
To his omniscient eye and pure sight,
Who doth the inward Purity delight,
Lost all her beauty, once so excellent,
As soon as unto sinn she did consent.

The eye of understanding was so bleared,
That no spiritual thing it could behold,
The will corrupted, and the conscience ceared,
And all th’affections were to goodness cold,
But hot to evill, not to be contrould;
The members of the body then proceeds [sic]
As instruments to execute bad deeds. (ll. 274-87)

Collins here contrasts the pre- and post-lapsarian subjects, one characterized by freedom, 
unity, and beauty, the other by bondage, fracture, and corruption. The unified subject 
found in Eden remains unreachable since the contemporary subject is located firmly in

⁴ In Chapter Two, I examined the early modern theological discussion of Christianized time in more 
detail in order to demonstrate the extent to which this perception of temporal dislocation influenced the 
way the self was understood and its pervasive impact on English intellectual culture. See pp. 127-133.
the time of "ever since" (l. 268). Since the Fall, no one has been able to achieve the absolute unity and harmony of body and soul – except Christ. In "The Discourse," Christ represents the ultimate, ideal (but unachievable) Christian subject, the unification of humanity and divinity, "So that two whole and perfect natures were,/ In the same person joyned really./ . . ./ Both perfect God, and perfect man was he" (ll. 316-22). Christ’s sacrifice combined with faith helps to disable our natural corruption resulting from the Fall and allows the self to engage in the perpetual struggle between "Gods image" and "Sathans image," even though any successful resolution of that struggle is delayed until after death – "Though in the end the worst shall be subdued:/ Yet in this life it wil in no wise yeeld" (ll. 666-71). "The Discourse" thus encapsulates the internalization of Christianized time, demonstrating how it plays out within the self.

Collins draws on a number of devotional and physiological understandings of the body and soul in her text, an indication of the pervasive impact of such discussions in early modern English culture. A close examination of *Divine Songs and Meditacions* reveals a detailed discussion of the internal and external body, one indebted as much to anatomical theories as it is to theology. Collins comments on body parts and systems, the operation of the animal spirits, the senses, the humours, and the nature and faculties of the soul, often from multiple perspectives, and she ultimately invokes a harmonized approach to corporeality and devotion even though Collins sometimes brings this harmony into question.

First, Collins draws on the devotional centrality of the heart. As we saw in Chapter Two, this was a common religious perspective inherited largely from Aristotle’s
argument that the heart was the seat of the soul and, thus, the core of the self, a perspective that easily combined with the biblical emphasis on the heart as well. Collins clearly places Christ in the heart, noting that, "there/ Hee raignes, and by his spirit doth beare" ("The Discourse" ll. 355-56). In "The Preface" she argues that Christ provides a sort of special allowance for the weak, enabling them to be devout and strong Christians despite their deficiencies through their active, faithful hearts: "Where Christ thus ruleth, I suppose remaines/ No heart that hankers after Novelties/ Whose ground is but the Scum of frothy braines" (ll. 57-59). In these lines, Collins contrasts heart and brain, invoking the debate over the location of the religious self. Whereas an active heart is associated with faith, a suggestion that the heart is naturally inclined toward devotion, an active brain is associated with "Scum." In the context of Collins' later comments about her own devout state of mind and her poetry as "the ofspring of my mind," she seems to be distinguishing between mind and brain in her poems, just as John Woolton does in A Treatise of the Immortalitie of the Soule ("The Preface" l. 79). Woolton argues that because the brain is corporeal, it is subject to corruption and can mislead the senses, whereas the incorporeal mind is more closely associated with the soul. Collins' representation of the "frothy" brain suggests a similar potential for corrupting the senses, noting that the "Scum" can form "Glosses to deceive the eyes" ("The Preface" l. 61). In contrast, she repeatedly makes a faith-heart-soul connection, writing in "The Discourse" that

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5 The 'scummy brain' also has humoral implications that will be discussed later in the chapter. See pp. 175-176.

6 For a more detailed discussion of Woolton's perspective, see Chapter Two, pp. 116-123.
Faith is a Grace which doth the soul refine,
Wrought by the Holy-Ghost in contrite hearts,
And grounded on Gods Promises divine,
Things superexcellent this same imparts,
To those that have it planted in their hearts:
But ere this faith is wrought, the heart must be,
Made capable of it, in some degree. (ll. 372-78)

God prepares the heart for faith and grace by breaking it with the “hammer of his Law,”
which also serves to seduce the soul that seems to reside in the heart (ll. 379-81).

Collins combines her devotional understanding of the heart with a physiological understanding. Although Collins certainly sees the poetic fruits of the garden of her mind as important, so too are the fruits of faith in the heart, spread throughout the body like blood:

grounds of truth are sought
New Principles are wrought
Of grace and holinesse,
Which plantings of the heart
Will spring in every part,
And so it selfe expresse.
("A Song expressing their happinesse who have Communion with Christ"
ll. 87-96)

The “fruits of Righteousnesse” that grow or “spring up” in the “Sanctifide” heart can be spread through “conversacion” just as the fruits of her mind are spread through publication ("The Discourse" ll. 653-55). Clearly, the heart is the core of the Christian self in Collins’ text, grounded in the metaphor of natural growth. However, in “A Song exciting to spiritual Alacrity,” a slightly different image of the heart appears. Collins begins the poem by stating that “Discomforts will the heart contract/ And joy will cause it to dilate;/ That every part its part may act,/ A heart enlarg’d must animate” (ll. 1-4). This is not the same sprouting heart that appears in many of the other poems. Rather, it is a
contracting and dilating organ responsible for animating the body, albeit an organ integrated into a devotional and emotional context. At the core of this image of the pumping heart is a sense of cyclicality – the beating heart requires both expansion and contraction, which Collins associates here with joy and discomfort, respectively, suggesting the necessity and inevitability of both. Whether this cyclicality is also meant to suggest circulation is unclear but the possibility is intriguing. *Divine Songs and Meditaciones* appeared in the same year as the first English translations of William Harvey’s work on the circulation of the blood and many years after Harvey’s ideas had themselves been circulating in English intellectual culture. Robert A. Erickson describes the difference between the Galenic or humoral heart and the Harveian or early modern heart as follows:

The Galenic heart is essentially *attractive* in its motive power, drawing in the blood in diastole and distributing it to the body in a complex process, originating in the liver, of repeated makings and remakings of the blood. The overall image is of the heart as a four-chambered structure, a receptive vehicle of the blood. Despite the great heat modified by the lung and air, the overall architecture of the Galenic heart is open, attractive, and receptive. The action of the Harveian heart is just the opposite of this. For Harvey the essential action of the heart is *ejaculatory* in systole, driving the blood in continuous cycles through the lungs and the outermost parts of the body. The architecture of the Harveian heart is that of a constricting and expanding muscle, analogous to the structure and action of a gun, a comparison Harvey actually makes. (Erickson 8-9)

In the Galenic model, blood is constantly being made by the liver and distributed throughout the body, eventually dissipating as heat and vapour released through the skin, lungs, or – according to Thomas Vicary’s accounts that we saw in Chapter One – as hair.

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7 Erickson offers a very detailed description of the differences between these two theories of the heart. For a more comprehensive discussion, see Robert A. Erickson, *The Language of the Heart, 1600-1750* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997): 1-88. Erickson is particularly interested in the gendering of the heart.
Erickson describes the Harveian circulation of “recycled or renewed” blood as a “more stable and consistent internal economy of the body” than the humoral model because of its predictability, regularity, and general resistance to the ever-present threat of imbalance that plagues the humoral body (Erickson 10). While the sprouting heart found in “A Song expressing their happinesse who have Communion with Christ” could be suggestive of a humoral heart (for example, sprouting is not conducive to a return journey but rather seems analogous to the humoral concoction and rising dissipation of the blood through vapours and hair, and suggesting the humoral exchange between internal body and external world), the repetitive circularity of discomfort-joy-discomfort-joy found in Collins’ image of the heart in “A Song exciting to spiritual Alacrity” certainly makes a connection to Harvey’s work attractive and probable, if ultimately inconclusive.8 The point worth stressing, here, is that the pumping physiological heart, whether circulating or not, is integrated as a working organ into a poem about faith and grace.

Although Patricia Demers is correct in asserting that devotional rather than humoral instigators are responsible for melancholy in Collins’ poems, humoralism is present throughout Divine Songs and Meditacions, particularly evident in a persistent concern over the regulation of heat and moisture (Demers 190). In effect, Collins appropriates humoralism and applies it to an understanding of how faith and devotion work within the subject; the regulation of corporeal heat and moisture and the importance of maintaining internal balance become metaphors for the stability of the Christian subject. As we saw in Chapter One, humoralism was most prominent in sixteenth-century

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8 Erickson likewise loosely associates the metaphor of the fertile heart with the Galenic/humoral model (Erickson 17-18).
English anatomical texts such as Thomas Vicary's *Anatomie of Mans Body* in which the excessive heat produced by the heart and the necessity of venting and cooling that heat is of central concern. In the same poem in which the pumping heart appears, Collins also discusses the internal flux of hot and cold, and the ‘cooling’ effect of faith and Christ. She represents the self embroiled in “fruitlesse greife,” “planted in sorrow’s shade,” and besieged by “the blasts of cloudy care,” images of unmediated cold and moisture that makes sinful souls “unfit for action” ("A Song exciting to spirituall Alacrity" ll. 5-9). In contrast, faithful souls – although exposed to variations in temperature and moisture – are characterized by balance, capable of finding it in God’s shade:

Having a hiding place secure,
And covert from the stormy wind,
And streames of water perfect pure
To vivify and cheare the mind.

If scorched with afflictions heat
They to their shady rock may fly,
And be in safties bosome seat
And lap of true felicity. (ll. 21-28)\(^9\)

The humoral importance of hot, cold, dry, and moist factors are all invoked in this passage, once again within a devotional context and with an emphasis on maintaining balance in the face of inevitable flux. Just as the pumping heart in the first stanza requires discomfort and contraction as well as joy and dilation in order to achieve complete

\(^9\) Although both Christ/God and sin cool the soul in these quotations, the difference lies in the extremity of the coldness. Whereas the cooling shade offered by Christ and God provides a respite from things like the heat of affliction, thus restoring or promoting balance, the temperature fluctuations brought about by sin are brought about without regard for balance. The self “planted in sorrow’s shade,” for example, is assaulted with more cold, accentuating imbalace.
animation, so too is a humoral balance necessary for the soul. The remainder of the poem is focused on this theme of balance, one that is grounded in a humoral understanding of the body.

Similar references to the importance of balanced temperature can be found in “This Song sheweth that God is the strength of his People, whence they have support and comfort.” This poem explores the metaphor of God as a rock, discussing familiar issues of steadfastness, strength, and defense. It begins, however, with the statement that “God is a Rock first in respect/He shadows his from hurtfull heat” (ll. 16-17). The heat of affliction found in “A Song exciting to spirituall Alacrity” becomes much more dangerous in this poem, evolving into “That scorching heat of Discontent” that “Would all into combustion turn/And soon our soules with anguish burn” were it not for the “Rock” of God (ll. 28-30). Just as there are large rocks in “some dry desart Lands” that provide shade and comfort to weary, overheated travelers, so too does our Rock preserve us still,
Whose Spirit, ours animates,
That wind that bloweth where it will
Sweetly our soules refrigerates,
And so distructive heat abates. (ll. 21, 31-35)

In addition, “our Rock” produces “living streames” that “Releives the soule which scorched lies” (ll. 37-38). In these passages we again see the humoral extremes of hot, cold, dry, and moist regulated and brought into balance by faith and God. Collins argues in this poem that extremes beget extremes in order to achieve that necessary balance.

10 In *Humoring the Body* (2004), Gail Kern Paster discusses at length the early modern importance placed on humoral balance – particularly as it relates to the external world, a relationship that she describes as humoral ‘ecology.’ Jonathan Gil Harris likewise notes that “The humoral model does not cut the body off from the world. If anything, it stresses the impossibility of separating the body from the external elements on which it depends – air, food, drink, even astrological influences” (Harris 14).
Even as the heat of discontent increases to burning, combustible strength, "our Rock" generates equally strong refrigeration to temper the violence of that heat.\(^{11}\)

Collins also integrates faith and humoral medicine in "The fourth Meditacion," which is again focused on the theme of balance. In this poem, Collins compares the maintenance of the self to regulation of health through humoral purgations administered by a physician:

\begin{verbatim}
If Physick for our Bodies health be tane,
We hinder not the working of the same,
Strong Physick if it purge not, putrifies,
And more augments than heales our malladies,
And as is sayd, our manifold Temptacions,
Are nothing but thy scouring Purgacions,
Wherin a dram too much, hath not admission,
Confected by so Skilfull a Physician
Who will not have their bitterness abated,
Till thy ill humors be evacuated;
Then loose it down for thy Humiliacion,
And hinder not its kindly Oppercacion,
As thou mayst by untimely voyding it. (ll. 21-33)
\end{verbatim}

Addressing her soul, Collins says that God, the "mercyfull Physician," gives us "strong purgacions" in the form of "daily molestacions" for the health of the soul (ll. 4-6). In order to properly deal with these harsh medicines, the soul must traverse a "middle course" between "too light takeing thy Distresse" and "hopelesse Greife or Pensivenesse" (ll. 9-12). Discussing the first extreme of ignoring the medicine of temptation and tribulation or taking it too lightly, she says that the dosage can be increased, "Confected

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\(^{11}\) Collins primarily discusses the cooling effects of faith and God, and examples where God warms the self are much less common. Heating is implied in some poems such as "The Discourse," in which Collins writes "The Sun of righteousnesse reveald his light/ Vnto my soule, which sweet refreshings brings,/ Because he coms with healing in his wings" (ll. 124-126). Similarly, the 'sun' of Christ rejuvenates us in "the Winter/ of sharp Afflictions" ("A Song shewing the Mercies of God to his people" ll. 11-12). This second quotation is also discussed below.
by so Skilfull a Physician/ Who will not have their bitternesse abated./ Till thy ill humors be evacuated" (ll. 28-30). However, ingesting the medicine of temptation without ultimately purging that medicine along with sin runs the risk of putrefaction – temptation that is not expelled can settle in the subject, turning the medicine into a poison. Although Collins does not follow this medicinal metaphor through to the end of the poem, it is of central importance for the first forty lines. As she does in the poems that draw on the importance of the regulation of heat, the author again assimilates a humoral understanding of the body and balance into her representation of a properly functioning devotional self.

Collins’ poetry also articulates an understanding of the relationship between the senses, motion, the animal spirits, and the soul that draws on the anatomical and theological debates discussed in the first two chapters of this dissertation. For example, in “A Song shewing the Mercies of God to his people, by interlacing cordiall Comforts with fatherly Chastisments,” Collins plays with the multiple early modern meanings of the word ‘spirit’ at the same time that she plays with both the Christian and astrological duality of son/sun. The poem begins with the sun returning heat and life to the Earth after the cold winter and “Drawing superfluous moisture away” (another humoral conceit) (l. 6). In the second stanza, the sun becomes the “Son of Righteousnesse” who similarly shines on us to revive us from “the Winter/ Of sharp Afflictions” and warm the heart, a common devotional trope linking God, Christ, and sun (ll. 11-12, 15). As it does in many of Collins’ other poems, the revived heart begins to sprout the “flowers of piety” and “fruits of righteousnesse” (ll. 18-19). She also writes that this sun “Shall make Summer
with us, our spirits to cheer," using "spirits" here as a generic, interchangeable term for something like 'self' or 'soul' (l. 16). However, by the third stanza, another meaning of "spirits" enters the poem:

And as when Night is passed,  
The Sun ascending our Hemisphear,  
Ill fumes devouers, and opes the powers  
Which in our bodies are, and there  
He drawes out the spirits of moving and sence  
As from the center, to the circumference;  
So that the exterior parts are delighted,  
And unto mocion and action excited,  
And hence it is that with more delight  
We undergo labor by day then by night. (ll. 21-30)

The spirits in this stanza are the animal spirits discussed in anatomical texts as responsible for, as she says, "moving and sence." These are the same spirits that, despite being derided by William Harvey and James Deback, had incredible staying power in the understanding of the operation of the body, appearing in English anatomical texts as late as Samuel Collins' *A Systeme of Anatomy* in 1685. As they do in such anatomical descriptions of the body, the spirits in An Collins' poem move "from the center, to the circumference," carried by the blood to the "exterior parts." The "center" here is likely a reference to the heart, the organ responsible for propelling the blood to the outer reaches of the body.  

That the spirits in the poem are "excited" by the sun/God reflects the belief that the animal spirits were essentially the arbiters between the divine and corporeal aspects of the self, the servants of the soul. Collins makes this connection relatively clear later in "The first Medetacion" when she addresses the soul: "Each member of thy body

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12 The 'center' could also be a reference to the brain. In "Verses on the twelvth Chapter of *Ecclesiastes,*" Collins mentions "The head whereas the animals reside," another reference to the animal spirits that locates them in the head or brain (l. 41). Nevertheless, the spirits would still be transmitted from the brain to the heart in order to be dispersed by the blood.
thou dost guide,/ Then exercise them in Gods service most/ Let every part be throughly sanctified” (ll. 79-81). By the fourth stanza of “A Song shewing the Mercies of God,” she begins to transition back to her original usage of ‘spirit,’ writing that the sun “Shall open the faculties of our mindes,/ Stirring up in them that spiritual motion/ Whereby we make towards God with devotion” (ll. 36-38). The quite literal motion that was connected to the spirits in the third stanza becomes “that spiritual motion” in the fourth stanza, something more akin to faith, devotion, and prayer than actual movement. By the sixth stanza, ‘spirit’ comes to encompass both meanings and more when Collins prescribes a remedy for despair:

So soon as we discover
Our souls benumbed in such a case,
We may not stay, without delay
We must approach the Throne of Grace,
First taking words to our selves to declare
How dead to goodness by nature we are,
Then seeking by him who for us did merit
To be enliven’d by his quickening Spirit,
Whose flame doth light our Spark of Grace,
Whereby we may behold his pleased face. (ll. 51-60)

The “Spirit” thus ‘enlivens’ and ‘quickens’ the body (words that connote movement), essentially bringing it to life and transforming it from inanimate flesh into a moving being. The flame of that same spirit also lights “our Spark of Grace,” a line that carries with it multiple religious possibilities. The passage of this flame from God could easily be a reference to the ensoulment of the body, since the soul was often referred to as the ‘divine spark’ placed in the self by God, and as we will see in the discussion of mortalism at the end of this chapter, Collins emphasizes that ‘soul’ and ‘spirit’ are essentially the
same thing. The “Spark of Grace” could also represent humanity’s knowledge of God and potential for salvation after a life of faith and devotion, “Whereby we may behold his pleased face” (l. 60). Finally, through the use of the word as a proper noun, “his quickening Spirit” could also be a reference to the Holy Spirit, responsible for passing the flame from God to “our selves.” Consequently, the early modern understanding of ‘spirit’ emerges in this poem in all of its complexity, variously used to refer to physiological motion, the soul, and the Holy Spirit, all of which become purposefully entangled in these lines as Collins plays with these multiple means in order to comment on the operation of faith and devotion within the Christian subject.

Similarly, Collins often discusses the senses as the organs of the soul, comparable to how the senses are represented in both anatomical and religious texts. Sensitive perception is of vast importance in the text, and she locates it in both the soul and the body. For example, in “A Song expressing their happinesse who have Communion with Christ” she describes the soul’s experience of Christ in sensitive terms: “But tasting once how sweet he is,/ And smelling his perfumes,/ Long can she not his presence misse” (ll. 65-67). Likewise, she says we can “tast and see” the “beams of comfort” shone forth by the ‘sun’ in “A Song shewing the Mercies of God to his people” (l. 63). Even as she derides the corruption of the flesh in “A Song expressing their happinesse who have Communion with Christ” – she describes the body as “a place so low” deserving of

13 “ev’ry member hath its sev’ral name;/ So Soul and Spirit is one entire thing,/ Immortall by the vertu of its Spring” (“Verses on the twelvth Chapter of Ecclesiastes” ll. 70-72). Although she does not explicitly state this, it is evident that Collins does not mean that the soul and the animal spirits are interchangeable, even though they are linked. The idea that the soul originates with God and is passed to the Christian subject is also referenced in Collins’ “A Song manifesting The Saints eternall Happinesse” in which she discusses her pursuit of heavenly rewards, “To which my Soule aspired still/ And cannot setled be,/ Till shee returns againe to him/ That gave her unto me” (ll. 128-32).
crucifixion – the senses emerge unscathed, presumably because they are associated with the soul more than the body (l. 131). “She” (the soul) metaphorically ingests Christ through taste and smell (ll. 65-67). This is not to say that the senses cannot be put to immoral uses, such as in the satisfaction of carnal lust that Collins frequently scorns, but rather that they provide the most direct access to the soul, being the pathways through which the soul perceives the outside world. The senses receive their most detailed and systematic treatment in “The Discourse.” As she describes her life and her realization of her devotional calling to the reader, she says she wants to “proceed Methodicall” in her discussion of how she took a more devout path (l. 99). She writes that

When first the restlesse wanderings of my minde,  
Began to settle, and resolve with all  
No more to be desturb’d with every winde  
It such a pleasing exercise did finde,  
Which was to ponder what Worth ech day,  
The sence of Heareing should to it convoy. (ll. 99-105)

Collins’ prioritization of hearing above the other senses – it is the first one discussed in her “Methodicall” narrative – is consistent with the Protestant emphasis on the sense of hearing. As we saw in Chapter Two, William Cowper argues that hearing is more important than sight because it is only through hearing that we learn how to see properly. Through hearing, he notes, we first learn how to be good Christians, and the conformity of the other senses will follow later.¹⁴ In accordance with this belief, Collins describes the instruction she received first “by the benifit of hearing” in her opening address to the reader (“To the Reader” p. 1). Only after her hearing has been reformed in “The

¹⁴ See Chapter Two, pp. 110-111, for a more detailed discussion of hearing and Targoff’s description of the primary importance of hearing to Protestant services.
Discourse” is she able to see the “Sun of righteousness” who then “reveal’d his light/
Vnto my soule” (ll. 124-125). Like Cowper, Collins here prioritizes the senses of hearing
and sight above smell, taste, and touch, which are generally only alluded to briefly in
Collins’ poems, such as when the soul tastes Christ or smells his perfume. Her ability to
taste or smell Christ comes only after her hearing and sight have been reformed. Aural
and visual observations transmit more important information to the soul than do the other
three senses.

The importance of corporeal awareness – particularly in a religious context –
extends beyond explicit references to bodily parts and processes. Corporeality is also
foregrounded when we consider the actual production of the text or, perhaps more
accurately, the cultural expectations surrounding female authors, expectations that would
have heightened Collins’ bodily self-awareness beyond just her illness. As we saw in
Chapters One and Two, religiously-informed notions of female inferiority reinforced
views on the ‘natural’ inferiority of the female body. Women were essentially defined by
their bodies: women were punished for their instigating role in the Fall through
menstruation and the pain of childbirth; they were naturally colder and thus weaker than
men; their intellectual faculties were similarly inferior and, consequently, their bodies
could not be trusted, guided as they were by a weak mind and will. Early modern English
women were expected to be silent and private individuals, removed from the public
sphere, and any entry into this sphere could be seen as a transgressive act. Women
writing for publication, for example, were associated with promiscuity (Price, “Women’s
Poetry” 283). As Wendy Wall points out,
Constrained by the norms of acceptable feminine behavior, women were specifically discouraged from tapping into the newly popular channel of print; to do so threatened the cornerstone of their moral and social well-being. The rampant idealization of chastity acted as a linchpin that precariously linked female bodily and spiritual integrity with a coherent cosmic and social order that was continually threatening to slip into chaos. An outpouring of published injunctions sought to secure that order by privatizing women, directing them to remain safely enclosed within the home rather than engaged in the circulation of social signs or events.

(Wall 280)

A woman writing to be read was essentially putting herself on display, allowing her text to be indiscriminately and physically handled by numerous anonymous readers, the majority of whom were men. We know that Collins intended to publish her work, since she explicitly states in “The Preface” that the superior skill of other writers and the possibility that her own poetry will be criticized will not stop her “From publishing those Truths I do intend” (l. 93).

Collins certainly would have been aware of the injunctions against women writing and the implications they had for her own body. In essence, women’s writing was never a purely mental activity because it opened the author’s body up to public scrutiny and even criticism. In effect, women’s writing was as much corporeal as it was intellectual. As it did in the Middle Ages, religious devotion and humility before God helped legitimize some women’s writing, but so too did illness. In this sense, Collins’ text responds to one set of corporeal expectations – that publication equalled promiscuity – with another, that sickness authorized women to speak publicly. Writing specifically about medieval and early modern prophetic authors, Diane Watt notes that, “For such women, illness and physical suffering signified their liminal status between this world and the next and their physical submission to the divine, while at the same time emphasizing the disjunction between the prophetic voice and the sinful female flesh” (Watt 61). As we will see, Collins can be connected to the proliferation of women’s visionary writing in the 1640s and 1650s, and her lifelong illness would have helped legitimize her millennial predictions. However, as Wall notes, this connection between women’s agency and illness was not limited to visionary writing; illness often allowed women more generally to transcend the hegemonic boundaries placed on them. Pointing particularly to increased agency granted to dying mothers to issue commands to their husbands and children as a result of their “imminent spirituality,” Wall argues that, “By evoking the horizon of death, the Renaissance woman writer had a chance to undertake what was considered an exceptional feat: to take control of the frightenedly precarious circumstances of her life, to articulate her beliefs and desires, [and] to display her mastery of moral precepts and
knowledge” (Wall 291, 293). Although Collins never suggests that she is on the verge of
dying, death and mortality are present throughout her poems, particularly through her
repeated anticipation of her own demise and passage into the next life. This makes
Collins’ text a legacy of sorts, akin to those discussed by Wall. This perspective is
strengthened by Collins’ reference to her relatives reading her work in “The Discourse”
when she says that she is partly writing for “some neare Kindred, who survive mee may”
in order to encourage them to read the scriptures (l. 44). Hobby likewise extends the
legitimizing aspects of female illness or suffering to Collins herself, arguing that “The
overriding assertion of the Songs and Meditacions, is that the poet, the Christian woman,
having suffered greatly in the world from conflict and physical constraints, has found the
wisdom to willingly abandon worldly concerns and fence herself into a narrow domain
which allows, in practice, greater freedom” (Hobby, Virtue of Necessity 62). In this sense,
Collins’ illness and suffering in general sanction her didacticism, just as they help
authorize her intent to publish her devotional verses.

Collins’ attacks on lust and carnality can be read as a response to the cultural
expectation of authorial promiscuity. Her discussion of the Ten Commandments, for
example, often emphasizes a strict stance against sexual behaviour and even thoughts.
Writing about the commandment against adultery, she casts a very wide net:

All thoughts impure this Command'ment breaks,
So lewd pastimes, light gesture, wanton looks,
Wearing apparell contrary to Sex,
Ill company, vain talk, lascivious books,
And all that may entice like baitez or hooks,
To Fornication or Adultery. (“The Discourse” ll. 449-54)
Impure thoughts, cross-dressing, and various looks and gestures are all construed as violations of this commandment or, at least, the “baites or hooks” that can awaken sexual desire and lead one astray. Similarly, Collins argues that the commandment to “keep the Sabbath” is broken by engaging in “carnal recreations” (ll. 429, 433). Finally, her discussion of the commandment against coveting a neighbour’s wife and possessions focuses exclusively on the lust that stems from “the rebellion of the flesh . . . / . . . we have by sinne Originall” (ll. 472-73). Although she recognizes that humanity’s fallen state means that no one is entirely immune from the desires of the flesh, carnal thoughts and actions ultimately have no place within the ideal devout subject. She details the numbing effects of sex on the self:

To lightning, carnall merth we may compare,  
For as a flash it hastes and soon is gon,  
Fortelling of a Thunder clap of care,  
It also blastes the heart it lighteth on;  
Makes it to goodnesse, senceless as a ston:  
Disabling every part, and faculty,  
Of soul and body unto piety. (ll. 183-89)

Carnality and piety are thus represented as antithetical; bodily pleasure violently disrupts and obscures the devotional pleasure of the soul. Whether or not these lines are meant to counteract charges of promiscuity resulting from her pursuit of publication, Collins has essentially created a rhetorical framework within which sexuality and the pious nature of her text cannot coexist. What we see here is that the body – either through its virtuous suffering or its negation and denial of fleshy pleasures – maintains a central importance in these devotional poems.
Collins’ illness and relative isolation, and her comments on herself, her writing, and God/Jesus make a compelling case for reading her as a sort of early modern anchoress. Watt has briefly suggested that Collins’ combination of “autobiographical narrative with contemporary and biblical history” is reminiscent of the medieval mystic Margery Kempe, but the connection between Collins and the medieval anchoress has been left largely unexplored (Watt 127). Indeed, as Watt points out, one effect of the periodization of history has been that medieval and early modern literature are normally segregated from one another, particularly when it comes to prophetic female authors (Watt 11-14). Although the Reformation was an extremely important event, it does not wholly represent the end of one history and the beginning of another, as is evident in the many anchoritic features of Collins’ poetry. Exploring Collins’ connection to the medieval anchoritic tradition serves a very important function in the context of this dissertation. The primary focus of the preceding chapters has been on negotiating the points of contact, as well as the degrees of separation, between the corporeal and spiritual features of the subject. Anchoritic and visionary texts are rewarding in this respect because they often promote a heightened awareness of body and soul within an intensely devotional context. Richard Rolle and the anonymous Ancrene Wisse author, who wrote two of the most popular anchoritic handbooks, both rely on the division of the subject into external and internal – corporeal and spiritual – halves, and Rolle goes so far as to adopt a two-part structure in The Form of Living (1348-49) that reflects this division.

Two of the most important features of the anchoritic life – physical isolation and spiritual contemplation – can be observed in Collins, and often to the same ends. Collins
is confined to the house and, as I mentioned above, is a very solitary figure, making no
direct mention of any contact with the outside world aside from her allusions to
contemporary political or religious debates. However, she contrasts her corporeal solitude
and restricted movement with her “inlargednesse of mind, and activity of spirit” (“To the
Reader” p. 1). This was, of course, the express purpose of anchoritic enclosure during the
medieval period; by separating herself from the world and its distractions, the anchoress
was encouraged to focus on devout contemplation of religious matters. Addressing the
anchoress, Rolle assures her that, “The condition of life in which you live, in other words,
solitude, is the most suitable of all for the revelation of the Holy Spirit,” noting that in the
Bible, God typically reveals himself to those who are alone and receive no
encouragement from the world (Rolle 158). Likewise, the Ancrene Wisse author points to
biblical examples in order to emphasize how good it is to be alone, arguing that, “God did
not show his dearest friends his hidden counsels and heavenly secrets in a crowd of
people, but did so when they were alone by themselves” (Ancrene Wisse 105). The
perceived benefits of Collins’ own ‘enclosure’ can be seen in “Another Song (The Winter
of my infancy)” when she contrasts the barren wasteland of her body with the vibrant
fertility of her mind:

Yet as a garden my mind enclosed fast
Being to safety so confind from storm and blast
Apt to produce a fruit most rare,
That is not common with every woman
That fruitful are. (ll. 26-30, emphasis added)

Although “enclosed” is used here primarily as a reference to the garden of the “Song of
Songs” (associated with female interiority and fertility) it also carries anchoritic
connotations. In either case, enclosure produces a similar effect, shielding the garden/anochoress/mind from “storm and blast” in order to encourage uncommonly bountiful growth. Collins sets herself apart from other women as her own enclosure produces rare fruit “[t]hat is not common with every woman,” and other women must be content to generate the comparatively ordinary offspring of children.16

Collins also sets herself apart from other women by valorizing her illness, a conception of physical suffering as a test of faith and a venue through which to see God more clearly. Although certainly not unique to medieval anchoritic literature, a similar perspective on illness and its devotional value does emerge in this earlier type of writing. The late medieval anchoress Julian of Norwich goes as far as praying in her youth to God to give her the gift of a “bodily sickness” so severe “that I might myself believe I was dying and that everyone who saw me might believe the same” (short text 3-4). She received this ‘gift’ at age thirty, and that illness is the first trigger to her revelations, the visionary state that she writes about for the remainder of the text. The second trigger is another symbol of suffering, the crucifix placed before her eyes by her confessor that makes Christ’s Passion present and instigates her visions. Julian’s desire to witness and experience suffering is granted as she both survives in a near-death state and is transported to the Crucifixion to recount it in bloody, torturous detail. Similarly, Collins associates her personal illness with a general sense of the Crucifixion by repeatedly

16 Skwire reads this passage in relation to what she sees as evidence of Collins’ reproductive barrenness in the same poem. She argues that “Collins does not see her creativity and writing as compensatory activities, filling the void left in her life by her inability to bear children. Instead, these literary productions are somehow better, more ‘rare’ than mere human reproduction. Her poems cannot be produced by just ‘every woman,’ and they possess a strength and virtue that stands against the strongest forces of nature. Barrenness has become, through careful re-framing, a way to become uniquely powerful as well as spiritually and poetically productive” (Skwire 15).
describing her sickness and debilitation as “my Crosses” (“The Discourse” 1. 57).

Although I do not think Collins is trying to conflate herself with Christ in these passages, ‘cross’ would have carried with it a specific Christian understanding, particularly in a volume of early modern devotional poetry that discusses suffering. By drawing on the Christianized meaning of ‘cross,’ Collins further valorizes her own suffering by invoking the Crucifixion’s cycle of pain, death, and rebirth experienced by Christ that makes her illness meaningful both to herself and to her readers. Ann Hurley argues in favour of a similar sense of religious meaning evident in “The Preface,” in which Collins discusses her own illness but “quickly moves on to set her own history within the larger context of God’s ‘history’ as implied by Scripture, seeing her own physical disability simply as an instance of trials suffered at the hands of the wrathful Old Testament God and her spiritual ecstasies as correlative with New Testament mercies” (Hurley 236). Whether through the narrative of the Crucifixion or through a broader sense of biblical history, Collins emphasizes that her illness has meaning. Writing about medieval mysticism, Ellen Ross notes that suffering can function as a tool through which to learn the love of God: “The experience of pain functions as a way to God, as a means to religious understanding. . . . [U]nderlying the manifestations of spiritual and physical duress in medieval authors, there is a recognition that the believer’s Jesus-identified emotional and physical suffering is not an end in itself” (Ross 50). As Margaret Healy notes in Fictions of Disease (2001), the religious significance of suffering (even when suffering is part of a cure) is not limited to the medieval period: “Early modern medicine and surgery could be extremely painful affairs, providing perfect analogies for explaining God’s torturous
'crosses.' This kind of suffering is discussed by some writers as "a sign of 'adoption,' of being one of the elect" (Healy 46). This didactic suffering can be observed in both Julian and Collins, and in both instances writer and reader are encouraged to move past the experience of suffering through to the meaning of suffering. In "A Song expressing their happinesse who have Communion with Christ," Collins invokes an intimate, Christocentric sense of devotion. Christ, she says, helps the faithful "beare their Crosse also," an explicit association between her own suffering and the Crucifixion (1. 41).

Although the biblical passage is not referenced directly, the suggestion here is that just as Christ received help from Simon of Cyrene carrying his cross, so too will Christ help the faithful sufferer carry his or her own metaphorical cross. Using Christ as the entryway to God would invoke a sense of suffering as meaningful, in a way that speaking to or relating directly to God the Father (who has very little association with suffering) would.

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17 Healy comments further on the connection between early modern medicine, religion, and disease: "the activities of the body and soul are so thoroughly intertwined that any attempt to separate 'medical' from 'religious' matters would be erroneous and impossible. The boundaries between discourses and professions concerned with 'disease' are inevitably weak in a medical schema where body and soul are intimately related and restraint of bodily pleasures is construed as fundamental to health with implications for society (and its controlling mechanisms) as well as the individual. The early Protestant movement – with political, economic, social, as well as religious reforming designs – was arguably well served and even empowered by emergent 'medical' fictions which could simultaneously embrace and (by prescribing prevention and cure) intervene in multiple areas of life helping to fashion the unstable, fragile body of the evolving Protestant nation" (Healy 47). Likewise, Skwire comments on the common inseparability of religious and secular views of illness during the period: "The distinction between secular and religious views is blurred, as pious sufferers often consulted with medical practitioners and took medicine, and scientific individuals tried prayer and magic charms for healing" (Skwire 1). Purkiss discusses a similar issue with specific reference to women, noting that "In the seventeenth century, illness and bodily weakness were feminized. Women were thought to be particularly prone to illness, and illness and weakness were in turn negative signs of femininity, underwriting women's subordination." As a result, however, "Illness and physical incapacity stage the body as the passive prey of external forces, hence an authentic site of divine intervention" (Purkiss 144). In the broadest sense, then, early modern religion and medicine often combined to explain the cause, effect, cure and significance of illness. Finally, in his study of disease and infection motifs in representations of economy in early modern England, Harris notes that "Exogenous models of disease were part of medical lore, and religious rhetoric customarily embodied sin as a pathogenic spiritus mali that invaded the body through its sensory apertures" (Harris 16).
not. In addition, she establishes an intimate, sensitive perception of Christ by the feminized soul, who “tasting once how sweet he is,/ And smelling his perfumes,/ Long can she not his presence misse” (ll. 65-67).\(^\text{18}\) Finally, in the most violent passage in the collection of poems, she writes that,

They that are Christs, truly,  
The Flesh do Crucifie  
With its affections vile  
Then grounds of truth are sought  
New Principles are wrought  
Of grace and holinesse. (ll. 88-92)

Here, Collins appropriates the Crucifixion and its sense of redemptive suffering as it is re-enacted by the individual in order to elevate the shining soul before Christ himself, who sees the soul as “his beloved” (l. 129).

Although Collins does not approach Julian’s graphic portrayal of the Passion – in fact, Collins’ discussions of Christ are surprisingly bloodless – much of what I have been discussing is actually prescribed by medieval anchoritic handbooks such as Ancrene Wisse and Rolle’s The Form of Living, two of the most prolific texts of their kind during the medieval period. The Ancrene Wisse author, for example, indicates that the anchoress has need of bodily sickness to help her devotions because, “If neither the body nor the spirit were sick, as seldom happens, pride would awaken, which is the most dreadful sickness of all” (Ancrene Wisse 113). He says that sickness sent by God does six things: it cleanses sins that have been committed, protects you against sins that are threatening, tries your patience, keeps you humble, increases your heavenly reward, and makes the

\(^{18}\) For more on the related genre of early modern ‘mystical marriage’ texts (and their debt to their medieval predecessors) see Erica Longfellow, Women and Religious Writing in Early Modern England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
patient sufferer equivalent to a martyr. Consequently, “In this way sickness is the soul’s health, a salve for her wounds and a shield against receiving more” (Ancrene Wisse 115). Additionally, sickness contributes to self-knowledge, and it works like a “goldsmith” to fashion the sufferer’s crown that is worn in the next life. The endurance of physical suffering on its own is valorized, a position that would have been very appealing to someone like Collins, suffering through a lifelong illness. Likewise, Rolle argues that the devil has the authority to “inhibit” a person in three ways: by damaging the body through handicaps and retardation, by encouraging sin, and by tormenting the body. By enduring these largely corporeal ordeals, the strong and faithful are separated from the weak because, if the devil “does not deceive you inwardly, you need not be afraid of what he can do outwardly, because he can do no more than God gives him permission to do” (Rolle 157). The Ancrene Wisse author also encourages the anchoress to take refuge in Christ’s Passion, to essentially assimilate his suffering. He tells the aspiring recluse to, “Plead by [Christ’s] pain, by his precious blood, by his death on the cross. Flee into his wounds. . . . Creep into them with your thought – are they not entirely open? – and bloody your heart with his precious blood” (Ancrene Wisse 155). Suffering, whether experienced or contemplated, thus spurs on devotion.

In fact, Collins spends a great deal of time in her poems looking ahead, a perspective that I believe is informed by her infirm condition. Collins frequently represents death as the end of physical pain and discomfort, anticipating a time when the body is no longer an impediment. This perspective is perhaps most evident in “A Song manifesting The Saints eternall Happinesse,” a meditation on faith, sin, and corporeality
that carries a tone of weariness. Faith, she says, helps establish a sound mind, and “Their spirits doe sustain./ In thinking on the Rest which for/ Gods peeple doth remain” (ll. 5-7).

This future rest is contrasted with the experience of life when she notes that, “Some for weaknesse are dismayd,/ And some are comfortlesse,/ Because of some defect of sence,/ Or want of comlinesse” (ll. 21-24). In these lines, she emphasizes the difficult condition of the weak, the sick, and even the physically unappealing or perhaps deformed, again referencing the “crosses corporall” that she frequently uses in discussions of herself (l. 40). She goes on to say that even those who have “proporcion so compleat” and “correspondency of parts” – the balance and symmetry that was indicative of health and virtue in humoral theory\(^{19}\) – are susceptible to infections of the soul by sin. In other words, even those who are not so clearly burdened by the flesh have their own afflictions to contend with. The organization of the poem seems to prioritize the physical suffering of the sick who also have to deal with the affliction of sin – sin is not the sole property of the fit, but physical distress is the sole property of the infirm. Collins copes with her condition by looking ahead to the rewards for a faithful life that are granted after death:

Bodies which here
Are matter thick and grosse,
Attaining to this happinesse,
Are freed from their drosse:
And as the Sunn
Appeares in brightest Sky,
So every body glorifi’d
Shall be for clarity,
And likewise be impassible,
Uncapable of pain
Having agility to move,
Whose vigour shall remain. (ll. 73-84)

\(^{19}\) See my comments on Vicary in Chapter One, pp. 46-47.
After death, even the sick body regains its agility and becomes impervious to physical pain. Although she goes on to detail some of the other benefits of residing in Heaven – endless joy, dwelling with Christ and the angels – she emphasizes the end of physical pain first. Collins personalizes the desire for “Eternall heavenly” rewards, “To which my Soule aspired still/ And cannot settled be,/ Till shee returns againe to him/ That gave her unto me” (ll. 128-32, emphasis added). Collins might be offering her consolations to the reader, but she is also offering them to herself as well.

Further references to death as the end of physical suffering can be found in “Another Song exciting to spirituall Mirth,” another poem emphasizing the need for patience and faith in this lifetime in order to achieve the rewards of Heaven. Collins draws on a seasonal metaphor, invoking a sense of linear time progressing toward death and salvation. Just as day predictably follows night and “The Winter being over/ In order comes the Spring” (ll. 1-2), so too does death bring an expected release from worldly and corporeal grief:

He therefore that sustaineth
Affliction or Distresse,
Which ev’ry member paineth,
And findeth no relesse;
Let such therefore despaire not,
But on firm Hope depend
Whose Griefes immortall are not,
And therefore must have end. (ll. 14-21)

Once again, the suffering found in this life is closely associated with physical pain, the “Affliction or Distresse” that affects “ev’ry member.” She chastises those who add to their pain by “faint[ing]/ With complaint,” emphasizing the need for patience (ll. 22-23).
By keeping the ultimate goal of salvation in mind along with the transience of the corporeal life, “They might refreshing find,/ To sweeten all their Crosses/ That little time they ‘dure” (ll. 30-32). An understanding of Christianized time is of dual importance to Collins. First, the Fall helps explain why she experiences pain, which is a consequence of the disunity of soul and body and the resulting punishment and testing of humanity. Second, Christianized time valorizes or at least neutralizes the experience of that physical pain. The faithful “neither murmur nor repine/ When God is pleas’d with Crosses them to try” because they know the reward for their endurance is unending happiness and the eternal release from pain (“The second Meditacion” ll. 61-62). As she repeatedly points out, “Although the body suffer misery,/ Yet from the second death thou shalt be free” (“The first Meditacion” ll. 93-94). Christian writers often suggested that physical pain would resume for the damned once their bodies and souls were reunited at Judgement Day – being sent to Hell to experience eternal torment thus constituted a second death that the saved would be exempt from.

What I am arguing here is that Collins provides a narrative of her own life that suggests that she reads her religion through her body rather than reading her body through her religion. I do not believe that this undermines the strength of her devotion or that we should adopt a cynical reading of the text. Rather, her autobiographical poems narrate the intersection between faith and corporeality in a way that is rarely commented on by other early modern writers. In Collins, we see a woman struggling with a lifelong illness, what could be seen as a rebellion of the body against the self, and her interpretation of Christianity is one that embraces her circumstances. This is evident, for
example, in “The Discourse” when Collins defines faith and describes what a faithful person should be doing. Her idea of faith is largely internal; you must recognize your need for a saviour, you must have a desire to be like Christ and to do God’s work, and you must pray and be humble and be sincere in your faith (ll. 491-511). Not surprisingly, none of these criteria exceed Collins’ abilities. Although she allows that good actions are certainly Christian actions, the soul does not need the body in order to achieve salvation. Many of her contemporaries struggled with reconciling the purity of the soul with the sinful nature of the flesh and either sought to find ways to make the flesh more like the soul or simply lamented the difficulty with which the soul was able to express itself in the flesh. George Herbert, for example, sends the body to school while the soul does her faithful duty in the poem “Church-monuments”:

While that my soul repairs to her devotion,
Here I entomb my flesh, that it betimes
May take acquaintance of this heap of dust;
To which the blast of death’s incessant motion,
Fed with the exhalation of our crimes,
Drives all at last. Therefore I gladly trust
My body to this school, that it may learn
To spell his elements, and find his birth
Written in dusty heraldry and lines;

Dear flesh, while I do pray, learn here thy stem
And true descent; that when thou shalt grow fat,
And wanton in thy cravings, thou mayst know,
That flesh is but the glass, which holds the dust
That measures all our time; which also shall
Be crumpled into dust. (ll. 1-9, 17-22)

In this poem, the body has a sense of agency and can be reformed or educated, brought into line with the soul’s devotional desires. As we will see in Chapter Four, Francis Quarles constructs dialogues between the soul and the body, grudgingly recognizing the
need for a synthesis of the two to emerge in the formation of a faithful subject in which the body and soul can cooperate – or the soul can overcome the body – to achieve the expression of faith.\(^{20}\) In contrast, Collins largely rejects the body as irrelevant, dismissing it as “matter thick and grosse” (“A Song manifesting The Saints eternall Happinesse” l. 74). Although her soul is given a voice, her body is not, and she essentially represents the body as inanimate clothing completely separate from the soul.

Indeed, Collins repeatedly rejects the flesh to the extent that it becomes irredeemable while body and soul are confined to the physical world. Throughout “The Discourse,” for example, she notes the problems of the flesh resulting from the Fall – “The members of the body then proceeds/ As instruments to execute bad deeds” (ll. 285-6). Similarly, near the end of the poem she represents the body as incompetent:

\begin{quote}
To leave all sin which causefull sorrow breeds
And not to give allowance or consent
To break Gods Law, or at least Commandement:
But walk exactly there-unto,
Though to the flesh it seemes too much to doe. (ll. 660-65)
\end{quote}

In both of these instances, the body seems incapable of doing any good, being either limited in what it can do or simply acting to commit “bad deeds.” Her disappointment in the failure of the body is evident in the ‘Meditations’ section of the text in which we see abundant references to physical sickness or suffering; she mentions “loathsom Leprocy,” “Hunger, Thirst, . . . Sicknes, Pain,” and “plagues” in “The first Meditacion,” all of which refer to physical pain or deterioration (ll. 38, 41). Even though Collins ultimately elevates

\(^{20}\) Quarles was not, of course, the only author of body-soul dialogues. Quarles, Andrew Marvell, and many others wrote such dialogues. For a critical discussion of the body-soul dialogue genre, see Rosalie Osmond, \textit{Mutual Accusation: Seventeenth-Century Body and Soul Dialogues in Their Literary and Theological Context} (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990).
illness and suffering to positive experiences that contribute to the salvation of the Christian subject, she also appears to repeatedly struggle with her own sickness, which sometimes results in a conception of the flesh as a traitor of sorts, manifested in a disdain toward corporeality in general. Consequently, her God – “Of whom I frame no Image in my mind” – is figured entirely in non-physical terms as the source of all grace and salvation, “But body, parts, or passions hath he none” (“The Discourse” ll. 240, 214). By representing God in these terms, she is creating an image of her saviour that idealizes the rejection of the body: if God takes no physical shape, then what is the value of our own fleshy vessels?

Collins seems to be suggesting that, due to the extremely sinful nature of the body, a complete lack of physical action could be seen as an ideal state of being, because it would allow one to focus entirely on spiritual concerns and working toward salvation. In fact, she prioritizes a lack of movement as a near-perfect state in both the physical and non-physical sense. When she describes the negative traits of the “carnallist” in “The Discourse,” she notes that he “deprives himself of rest,” suggesting a negative regard for movement (l. 263). Similarly, in “The Preface” we are presented with a negative image of an overactive brain:

Where Christ thus ruleth, I suppose remains
No heart that hankers after Novelties
Whose ground is but the Scum of frothy brains. (ll. 58-9)

This passage represents negatively the mind in motion; a “frothy brain” would be in constant, uncontrolled motion, generating a scum that rises to the top. Collins notes that
in her own life, she has transitioned from this type of mental activity to a mind that is stable:

When first the restlesse wanderings of my minde,
Began to settle, and resolve with all
No more to be desturb'd with every winde
It such a pleasing exercise did finde,
Which was to ponder what Worth ech day,
The sence of Heareing should to it convey. ("The Discourse" 100-05)

Such a lack of movement is idealized throughout the poems as she chides herself for "My straying thoughts," presumably those thoughts that question God's design for her own circumstances ("This Song sheweth that God is the strength of his People, whence they have support and comfort" I. 1). "A setled pious mind" is one that accepts the will of God, whatever it might be, and this mental struggle indicates a previous wavering of faith in her role on Earth from which she has, presumably, emerged ("Another Song exciting to spirituall Mirth" I. 63). This distinction between frothy brains and settled minds also recalls Collins' use of humoral metaphors to emphasize the importance of balance within the Christian subject. A frothy brain generating scum suggests the flux and imbalance that threatens humoral harmony and the health of the subject, whereas a mind that is settled suggests just the opposite, the very sense of balance that humoral medicine constantly pursues but rarely maintains for any significant length of time.

She notes that by turning to a purer godly life, "Therefore I would establish inward peace,/ How-ever out-ward crosses do increase" ("The Discourse" ll. 146-7). This again seems to be a retreat to the interior resulting from her illness; as her "crosses" or external suffering increase, so too does her spiritual health. Her references to persistent and recurring sorrows, despite her faithful turn of mind, indicate an internal struggle
regarding her external suffering: “Yet am I not so firm I must confess/ But many times discomforts will intru’d” (“The Discourse” ll. 155-6). Through these passages, Collins reveals in herself a perpetual anxiety regarding her illness which she attempts to resolve by repeatedly referring to Jesus as the saviour of the weak and the healing properties of divine love. God and Christ, “who doth thy weaknesse view,” recognize those who suffer and grant them a privileged position as a result of that suffering, and both are described regularly in healing terms (“The fourth Meditacion,” l. 89). In Christ “is healing found,” and “sweet refreshings brings,/ Because he corns with healing in his wings” (“A Song expressing their happinesse who have Communion with Christ” l. 121; “The Discourse” ll. 126-27). Whether or not Collins is truly comforted by her assertions about God and religion is impossible to say, but the effort that she exerts to validate her own situation indicates a persistent anxiety regarding the limitations enforced upon her by her body. By reading her religion through her body and by applying the progression of Christianized time to her own situation, Collins essentially refashions her own life story as a narrative of salvation.

Finally, the issues of Christianized time and corporeality culminate in “Verses on the twelvth Chapter of Ecclesiastes,” the final poem of Divine Songs and Meditacions, in which Collins engages in the mortalism controversy. Generally speaking, mortalists believed that the soul and the spirit were two distinct entities and that the soul was linked to the body and died with it, to be resurrected and reunited with the immortal spirit at Judgment Day. This belief was largely based on an interpretation of the Bible that saw ‘spirit’ and ‘soul’ used in different ways and referring to different things. Some mortalists
went so far as to argue that ever since the Fall, man has contained no immortal essence at all that ascends to Heaven – whether soul, spirit, or otherwise - and only at the Judgment Day will immortality be restored. Mortalism essentially corporealized the soul, which many believed was a heretical interpretation of the accepted relationship between the soul and the body that was fundamental to the understanding of the self. Collins’ “Verses on the twelfth Chapter of Ecclesiastes” engages with this hotly debated issue that had been vehemently argued for decades in both anatomical texts and religious tracts. Arguing against mortalism, the anatomists John Banister and Helkiah Crooke dismiss it in their discussions of the sefamine bones in 1578 and 1615 respectively. John Woolton and Simon Harward offer more detailed theological arguments against mortalism, contending that ‘soul’ and ‘spirit’ were interchangeable terms in the Bible, even though the two terms could be applied in different ways in modern usage. However, despite the numerous attacks leveled at mortalism, the belief persisted throughout the seventeenth century, and Collins’ poem – and its privileged placement at the end of the text – is a testament to its staying power and the ire it raised in those like Collins who rejected mortalism and its implications.

Collins’ poem responds to the mortalist belief that the spirit and the soul are separate entities, a belief endorsed by her contemporary John Brayne, a millenarian and minister whose text The Unknown Being of the Spirit, Soul, and Body; Anatomized was printed in 1654, shortly after Collins’ collection of poetry was published. Brayne
published a number of millenarian treatises in the 1640s and 1650s before he brought his mortalism beliefs to press. Whether or not Collins was responding directly to Brayne is unclear and largely irrelevant. Collins’ poem may have appeared prior to Brayne’s work, but she writes in response to many of the ideas and arguments that he promotes, ideas that were not original to his text. As I discussed in Chapter Two, Brayne argues – as other before him had done – that “the Spirit, Soul and Body, are three distinct essential parts of Man” (Brayne 1). He contends that poor translations of the Bible have led to a fallacious conflation of ‘soul’ and ‘spirit,’ which he seeks to rectify through a detailed linguistic examination of important scriptural passages in their original languages. Collins’ “Verses on the twelvth Chapter of Ecclesiastes” begins as a meditation on death as she again invokes the humoral body, drying up as it grows old: “Naturall heat having no more repaire,/ Desires fayle, as flames wanting fuell, dy,/ Nothing remayning wherby strength's suppli'd/ The marrow wasted, and the moysture dri'd” (ll. 33-36). These stanzas are focused on the death and decay of the corporeal body as she describes failing veins, shrinking sinews, and the slowing of the animal spirits (ll. 37-42). However, as the body dies in the poem, Collins’ verse transforms into a rejection of mortalism that goes on for five stanzas:

The Body thus out-worn and quite decayd,
The dust returneth to the Earth again;
To God who gave it, is the Soul convayd
Who doth with it as he did preordain,
   How ever som to vent their falacy
Conclude the Soul doth with the Body dy.

Which if were truth, why did our Saviour say?
Fare him not whitch the Body kils alone,
And hath no might the Soul for to destray,
If with the one the other must be gone;  
But that they may declare imposters skill  
Twixt Soul and Spirit they distinguish will.

The Soul (say they) doth with the Body dy,  
Then there’s a third part which they Spirit call,  
Who doth return to God immediatly  
Leaving the Dead till judgment-generall,  
And then returning breathing doth infuse  
In Soul and Body, wherby life ensues.

For which they have no Scripture (I suppose)  
Save what they wrest unto theyr own Perdicion,  
As this, where ’tis said, the word with power goes  
Twixt Soul & Spirit by divine commission  
Twixt joynts and marow it doth penetrate,  
Seeing all secrets, heart can meditate.

The joynts and marrow of the Body be  
Not sev’rall species, but of kind the same,  
The Body to support, each part agree,  
And ev’ry member hath its sev’rall name;  
So Soul and Spirit is one entire thing,  
Immortall by the vertu of its Spring. (ll. 43-72)

In these stanzas Collins explicitly contests the assertions made by Brayne and others like him, accusing them of “wrest[ing]” and twisting scripture to suit their needs (l. 73). In doing so, Collins interjects her argument into a theological debate dominated by male theologians, many of whom possessed a detailed knowledge of the Bible, philosophy, and languages. In doing so, Collins points to scriptural passages that support her argument or that have been misappropriated by her adversaries (ll. 50, 64).

In addition to Brayne’s work, a number of other entries in the mortalism debate appeared in print relatively contemporaneous to Collins’ Divine Songs and Meditacions. Richard Overton’s confrontational Mans Mortalitie was first published in 1643 under the initials ‘R. O.’ and elicited immediate debate. Drawing on a wide rage of scriptural
passages, Overton argues that Adam was stripped of his immortality when he ate from the Tree of Knowledge. As a result of the Fall, all of man became mortal, not just his body but his soul as well, and, as a consequence, he will not achieve immortality again until the final resurrection (Overton 1-3). Until that time, “during this Death [ie, after the death of the body] there is no more present Being to man than to an hidden abortive Embrio in this life” (Overton 6). Here, Overton offers a striking comparison between a dead body and an aborted embryo, which mirror one another through both their corporeality and lack of “Being.” The rest of Mans Mortalitie offers a detailed dismantling of the “fancy” that the soul is immortal by appealing to both rational logic and scriptural evidence. Overton’s text was expanded and reprinted a number of times over the next few decades, but it was also received with quick condemnation. Overton writes in his address to the reader that “I expect an Answer,” a debate regarding what he has to say, and he got what he expected (Overton A2r). In 1645, two texts were published that attacked Overton’s position – Thomas Hooker’s The Immortalitie of the Soule and the anonymous but explicitly titled The Prerogative of Man: Or His Soules Immortality, and high perfection defended, and explained against the rash and rude conceptions of a late Authour who hath inconsiderately adventured to impugne it. The anonymous text was printed again in that same year with a copy of Mans Mortalitie attached to it. Hooker’s text engages relatively briefly with some of Overton’s points, such as Overton’s assertion that the sinful soul does not reside in Hell while awaiting the Resurrection, but

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23 As in the title of Brayne’s text, Overton’s use of the word “Being” here seems to play with the multiple significant meanings of the word. “Being” could refer to almost any kind of existence in either material or immaterial terms, the “essential substance” akin to the soul or spirit (depending on one’s perspective), or “That which exists or is conceived of as existing” up to and including God as the Supreme Being (OED).
it is the anonymous *The Prerogative of Man* that attacks Overton most fully (Hooker 14-18). Like Overton, the author appeals to both scriptural evidence and rational thought to argue that, “the soule of man after the departure of it from the body must either alwaies live or never, and so by consequence seeing the soule must live once more it must live alwaies, that is to say, not only at the resurrection, as this Author saith, but continually from the time of the separation to the time of the reunion, and so after everlastingly” (Anon. A2v). The author then proceeds to go through Overton’s argument piece by piece in order to demonstrate its false scriptural and rational basis, mimicking Overton’s rhetorical style as he does so before dismissing him as a “poore worme” (Anon. 45). However, the fact that *Mans Mortalitie* was reprinted thereafter demonstrates that the matter was far from settled. Collins’ poem is participating in a very public and very contentious religious debate.

The importance of the placement of this poem at the end of *Divine Songs and Meditacions* cannot be overstated. Many of the early poems in the collection, such as “The Preface” and “The Discourse,” focus on narrating the past, illustrating how the poet came to her vocation as a devotional poet and learned to live with her debilitating illness. As the poems progress, concerns of the present become more palpable as Collins writes about religious turmoil and the Civil War. As W. Scott Howard points out, the title of the poem “A Song composed in time of the Civill Warr, when the wicked did much insult over the godly” suggests a strong sense of being in time, a part of the historical moment that “does not have the benefit of hindsight” (Howard “An Collins” 188). Collins writes about the present in this poem with the impending Apocalypse firmly in mind. Finally,
the 'Meditacions' become much more future-oriented as each poem addresses the soul, preparing it for "the Life to com" ("The first Meditacion" l. 99). Although this is certainly a feature of some of the earlier poems, in the 'Meditacions' the anticipation of the next life becomes more urgent, just as the concerns of the present and the past become less so. In this context then, "Verses on the twelvth Chapter of Ecclesiastes" is a fitting end to a series of poems structured loosely on the progression of Christianized time, initiating the death of the body, the passage of the soul to Heaven, and the final resurrection of body and soul at Judgment Day, the resolution of Christianized time.

This poem represents the culmination of Collins' extended negotiation of a devotional self within a corporeal context. Collins demonstrates a heightened awareness of the body and its consequences for the soul, stemming primarily from her own unnamed illness. The isolation imposed by this illness makes the poet an early modern anchoress of sorts, taking advantage of her corporeal solitude as a venue for devotional expansion that provides her with a privileged access to the divine. As much as Collins wishes to transcend the flesh, she recognizes that in this life, one must confront one's own corporeality. Collins has nothing positive to say about the body, dismissing it as thick and gross matter, and in "Verses of the twelvth Chapter of Ecclesiastes" she puts the body to death. Nevertheless, a sense of corporeality characterizes the entirety of Divine Songs and Meditacions. Collins might denigrate and devalue the flesh throughout her poems, but in doing so she comments frequently on aspects of the body ranging from individual parts such as the heart, to physiological processes such as the operation of the animal spirits. We see in these poems a woman trying to make sense of the soul-body
dialectic, drawing simultaneously on anatomical and theological perspectives that, as we have seen in the preceding chapters, were intertwined to begin with. Even as Collins dismisses the body, she explicates an understanding of the religious self that is firmly grounded in the very corporeality that the soul must transcend.
Chapter 4: Anxious Corporeality in Francis Quarles' *Emblemes* and *Hieroglyphikes*

In Francis Quarles' emblems, the Protestant subject occupies center stage, subjected to a lifetime of temptations, stresses, victories, and defeats before being presented with the possibility of salvation. This Protestant subject evolves throughout the emblems, and even the most casual reader of Quarles will see that the relationship between body and soul is essential to the functioning of the subject and receives sustained and repeated contemplation in both *Emblemes* (1635) and *Hieroglyphikes of the Life of Man* (1638). Like An Collins, Quarles is drawn to humoralism and its themes of balance and regulation as a dominant metaphor through which he explores the relationships between soul and body, internal world and external world, and humanity and divinity. As he makes clear, the pursuit of salvation must take into account the demands of the body, and he often appeals to a humoral reading of the body that emphasizes the exchange between the inner self or soul and the external world through the bodily senses. Like Collins, Quarles is not attempting to offer a comprehensive theory that governs the human body – he is not, after all, an anatomist or surgeon – but we can see in his emblems the corporeal and embodied nature of the religious subject. However, Quarles also departs from Collins in that he attributes a greater degree of agency to the body than she does. In Collins' poetry the body is like a millstone tied around the soul's neck – the body has its own demands, desires, and limitations that must be overcome, but these are simply weights carried by the soul that can become signs of the soul's eventual salvation. Body and soul are united out of necessity, but Collins frequently objectifies the body as
her cross to bear, as matter, and suggests that the endurance of corporeal suffering –
whether in terms of illness or lust – can lead to salvation. In contrast, the body in
Quarles’ emblems plays a much more active role in impeding the soul’s efforts to
overcome it. Whereas the flesh is silent in Collins’ poems, it is often personified and
given voice in Quarles’ emblems as it colludes with the external world to distract and
tempt the soul. Although both writers discuss the religious experience of embodiment and
situate the corporeal subject within the chronology of the Christian master narrative,
Quarles’ subject is part of a larger and more interpersonal world than is Collins’ subject.
This world constantly threatens to infect the soul through the body, and Quarles thus
emphasizes the difficulty in guarding the soul against such infection throughout his
emblems. Consequently, Quarles far exceeds Collins’ impatience with the flesh in his
anxiety over the flesh.

Quarles’ discussion of the devotional experience of embodiment and the
“progress of the soul,” as Michael Bath describes it (Bath, Speaking Pictures 214), is
assisted by his choice of the emblem genre. Emblems themselves – or emblematic modes
of thinking – often correspond with the Christianized perspective observable in early
modern English anatomical texts that view the body as a pathway to the knowledge of
God. Anatomical textbooks and emblems, particularly devotional emblems, are unified in
regarding both the Book of Nature and the Book of Scripture as central in creating and
hiding meaning. This belief was not uncommon in other early modern fields of inquiry,
but these two genres share a number of similarities, the most significant being that they
possess similar functions, relying on an interaction between picture and word and the
relation of the part to the whole in an analogical world created by God. An anatomical part was rarely just a part, whether organ, bone, or fluid, just as emblems normally focus on the deeper meanings of natural objects or creatures – a pelican, for example, was never just a pelican. In addition, the relationship between image and text in an emblem was believed to be analogous to the relationship between body and soul. The image provides the outward and visible structure, the body of the emblem, whereas the text provides the meaning and significance, the soul of the emblem (Daly, Emblem Theory 34; Manning 269-270). In an emblem, neither image nor text is independent of the other, just as the Christian subject requires both a body and a soul to be complete, and each ultimately relies on God for meaning. As Thomas Heffernan puts it in his discussion of Quarles, “Like man, an emblem has a body and soul, and God’s truth is hidden there” (Heffernan 15). As we saw throughout Chapter One, early modern English anatomists expressed a similar belief when they wrote about reading God’s plan in the structure and systems of the moralized human body that they helped decode.

Although critics are well aware of the pitfalls involved in attempting to offer any sort of airtight definition of an emblem (John Manning suggests that “What is an emblem? is not even a good question”), Daly’s “neutral description” will suffice here: “emblems are composed of symbolic pictures and words; a meaningful relationship between the two is intended; the manner of communication is connotative rather than denotative” (Manning 21; Daly, Literature in the Light of the Emblem 8). An individual emblem is normally made up of three parts: a pictura or image, frequently populated by allegorical figures or objects; a motto, which is normally a short and often enigmatic
phrase appearing above or below the image; and a subscriptio or explanatory poem written by the emblematist. Although this tripartite structure is arguably the most recognizable form for an emblem to take, variations on this structure are relatively common – Quarles’ emblems, for example, are comprised of five parts. In the most general sense, the validity of the relationship between emblematic image and text was based on the pervasive Renaissance sense of an underlying order that united the world of creatures and objects to a divinely-inspired creation and veiling of meaning. This perspective is heightened in devotional emblems. Nevertheless, as many emblem scholars have pointed out, symbols were not necessarily fixed in their meaning, often embodying multiple meanings concurrently or undergoing change over time. To choose just two of many examples, Clifford Davidson has written on the changing meaning of the symbol of the fountain of life, and John Horden has done the same for the symbol of the pelican (Davidson 5-37; Horden 71-101). As Davidson writes, “It is characteristic of the Renaissance emblem and of emblematic literature that the iconographic meaning of visual images is dependent on no absolutely stable system of signification; hence traditional meaning is capable of being altered, radically transformed, or even inverted” (Davidson 5). Consequently, despite the perceived relationship between emblems and veiled truths, this relationship was not always static.

This perspective on the world was not, of course, limited to emblems. Many anatomical textbooks, particularly English ones, explicate a view of the human body that represents it as a symbol of divine truths that grant corporeality a meaning transcending a

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1 See Note 4 for a full description of the various parts of Quarles’ emblems.
simple, objectivist discussion of form and function. As Banister notes at the outset of *The Historie of Man*, his book is for the use of godly surgeons and, for the general reader, “the obtainyng of a better mynde in Christ Iesu” (Banister Aiii'). He frequently invokes a divine plan in his discussion of various body parts. For example, he says that by contemplating the bones and action of the hand, we are “beholdyng the handy worke of the incomprehensible Creator: who not one mite, or portion of a part hath fited any where, that serueth no end, or vtilitie to the body” (Banister 31'). Likewise, the eyes allow us to appreciate what was “wrought by the omnipotent creator,” with muscles underneath that allow man alone of all earth’s creatures to look upward and contemplate heaven (Banister 102r-102v). This devotional understanding of the body is endorsed and expanded significantly by Crooke in *Mikrokosmographia*. In his preface, Crooke says that the body “carrieth in it a representation of all the most glorious and perfect workes of God, as being an Epitome or compend of the whole creation, by which he is rather signified then expressed. And hence it is, that man is called a *Microcosme* or little worlde” (Crooke 2). Crooke thus reads the body as a signifier, imbued with meaning *beyond* itself rather than as an end *in* itself. Daly suggests that the medieval allegorist and the renaissance emblematist were united by the belief that “everything that exists points to meanings beyond the things themselves,” and this belief was certainly shared by early modern English anatomists (Daly, *Literature in the Light of the Emblem* 38). Crooke often represents the body in ways that will sound familiar to the emblem scholar. For example, on the uses of the tongue, he writes,

> although it be but a little Member yet it is of great vse, because it expresseth all the conceits of the minde, wherefore our wise Creator hath
defended it with many Teeth, with Lippes, and restrained it with a Bridle, that beeing so carefully attended it might not runne before the minde, which first ought to consule and deliberate before the Tongue pronounce any thing. (Crooke 628-29)

Such descriptions complicate a purely denotative understanding of the relationship between image and text in Crooke’s anatomy, invoking as it does a moral perspective that transcends the bare facts of the image on the next page of Crooke’s work (fig. 4.1). A similar representation of the tongue can be found in Emblem 42 of George Wither’s A Collection of Emblemes (1635), which depicts a winged tongue and warns against the dangers of unregulated speech (fig. 4.2). Wither emphasizes that “We should be slow to Speake, and swift to Heare” in order to avoid the winged tongue’s proclivity for lying.

Figure 4.1: Crooke, Mikrokosmographia, London, 1615, figure of the tongue, p. 630
swearing, and gossiping, echoing Crooke’s comments above regarding the need for deliberation “before the Tongue pronounce any thing.” In many ways, then, early modern English anatomists discussed the body emblematically as an index of divine truths, tying it into the Christian narrative of fall, redemption, and future salvation as they sought to understand the meaning of the body. Nevertheless, there are tensions between some

Figure 4.2: Wither, *A Collection of Emblemes*, London, 1635, Emblem 42
sections of text and image in Crooke’s anatomy. The visual image of the tongue and its accompanying descriptors, as seen in Figure 4.1, strip away the figurative interpretation of the part itself quoted above, reducing it to objective categorizations. In the almost twenty features and muscles of the tongue that are detailed in the image, the reader is confronted with bare descriptions such as, “H. The flesh consisting of the Glidules, or the ninth Muscle of the Tongue according to Vesalius” (Crooke 630). Nowhere in the figure does Crooke point to the moralized “Bridle” with which the tongue is kept in check and prevented from committing immoral speech acts. Consequently, neither the textual discussion of the ‘meaning’ of the tongue nor the figure of the tongue itself offers a complete, definitive description of the tongue. In order to achieve a complete understanding, the reader must engage in an emblematic negotiation between word and image, a creation of meaning through a dialectic process. Both emblems and anatomical texts rely on an analogical way of looking at the world and the body that emphasizes perceptible, if obscure, meaning instilled in all of Creation by God that requires reading Scripture along with the Book of Nature in order to understand that meaning.

In this way we can see that Quarles’ project as an emblem writer and the project of the English anatomists were very similar in their goals and execution: both looked beyond materiality in search of greater truths. As Bath points out, Quarles’ emblems often emphasize the convergence of “sensual awareness” and “spiritual insight” (Bath, Speaking Pictures 203). In particular, this chapter is interested in Quarles’ evocation of the body as a devotional object and the way in which sensual awareness or, more broadly, corporeal awareness is filtered through spiritual insight in the emblems. However, despite
Karl Höltgen’s assertions that Quarles’ *Emblemes* is both “the most important” and “the most successful English emblem book,” many aspects of the text have been overlooked in literary and emblem criticism, including the significance of corporeality in the emblems (Höltgen, *Aspects of the Emblem* 23; “Francis Quarles’s *Emblemes and Hieroglyphikes*” 1). In fact, Quarles scholarship throughout the past sixty years or so has arguably grown stagnant, often reiterating the biographical details of the author, the emblems’ relationship with *Typus Mundi* (1627) and Herman Hugo’s *Pia Desideria* (1624) (the two continental emblem books from which Quarles borrowed most of his plates), and the Protestant meditative nature of the emblems. Although these approaches have undoubtedly deepened our understanding of and appreciation for Quarles’ emblems, there is still a great deal of room within which scholars can operate in order to bring Quarles into critical discussions beyond emblem studies.

Writing in 1948, Rosemary Freeman published *English Emblem Books*, the first modern work that focused exclusively on the titular subject. Her dismissive approach to the English emblem, however, has raised the ire of many subsequent critics as she persistently derides her chosen texts. She writes that “The work of the English emblem writer is not in itself of any great bulk or merit. Compared with that of Continental authors their output was small and, if judged by any absolute standards, rarely of any permanent value. It is impossible to claim for even the best of them anything more than minor distinction as poets” (Freeman 1). Clearly, Freeman sees herself as the arbiter of the “absolute standards” by which English emblems are to be judged. She characterizes Quarles as one of the least offensive emblematists who has some legitimate literary
claims, despite the “wearied . . . monotony” of his verse (Freeman 115). In spite of these offenses, Freeman contends that Quarles does offer something new to English emblems through his representation of the struggle between Divine Love and Anima, the two central figures in most of the emblems that have been carried over from his continental sources. This struggle elicits a sense of psychological complexity through the Protestant individual’s pursuit of sanctification.

Following Freeman, critics have expanded on the devotional interiority of Quarles’ emblems. Barbara Kiefer Lewalski – who only briefly considers Quarles and emblems as a small part of Protestant poetics – argues that Emblemes encapsulates the uneven Protestant progression toward salvation, characterized by a variety of successes and failures along the way (Lewalski 192). Höltnen has gone much further in exploring the meditative qualities of Quarles’ work and its debt to Joseph Hall’s Arte of Divine Meditation (1606), which was “the first systematic tract on meditation in post-Reformation England, attempting to reconcile Calvinism with the Catholic meditative tradition” (Hölten, “Francis Quarles’s Emblemes and Hieroglyphikes” 4). However, Hölten has remained primarily attentive to the material production of the emblems themselves, discussing, for example, the text’s sources and engravers and attempting to situate the text within the history of the emblem genre as accurately as possible. The

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2 Lewalski also argues that Quarles changed the order of the emblems as they appeared in his sources in order to make a doctrinal point, to make them ‘more Protestant,’ something that Bath rejects (Lewalski 192; Bath, Speaking Pictures 201). Bath also debates Lewalski’s ideas about the nature of Protestant meditation but, for our purposes, it is primarily important that the emblems are meditative, an assertion that is not under debate.

3 Hölten had been developing his ideas regarding Quarles since at least the publication of his Aspects of the Emblem (1986), and even earlier in his German-language work. This 1996 article simply represents the most current iteration of his ideas.
meditative aspects of the emblems have also been discussed by critics such as Thomas Heffernan, who suggests that the emblems encourage contemplation and meditation by bridging the gap between the bodily eye and the eye of faith, merging what we can see in the Book of Nature with what we can infer and understand from the Book of Scripture (Heffernan 9-11). Access to the spiritual meaning produced by the interaction between these two "books," he argues, requires a reformed Christian reader: "this meaning cannot be spiritually seen unless the soul experiences re-formation from its old self in Adam, who fell into temporal death, into a new self in the cross of Christ, who rose into eternal life" (Heffernan 12). Consequently, Quarles’ text is aimed at assisting such a reformation of the Christian subject.

Michael Bath likewise examines Quarles’ emblems within the context of Christian allegory and "the use of sensory images as signs of spiritual truths" (Bath, *Speaking Pictures* 201). Bath notes that the emblems often represent an internal dialogue – corresponding to the frequent visual depiction of the two central figures – but that the nature of this dialogue is complex: "Because the voices in this dialogue are both, in some sense, those of the Christian conscience debating with itself, it is often difficult to say whether what we are listening to is one speaker or two, for though there are two voices they are part of a single self or subject" (Bath, *Speaking Pictures* 212). This multiplicity of voice is further complicated by the often-striking difference between the voice – and, sometimes, voices – of the verse and the voice of the epigram, with the epigrammatic voice normally speaking with more authority, occasionally correcting or even mocking
the speaker of the verse. For Bath, the inner self that emerges in these emblems is multifaceted, alternately conflicted and complacent, consistent and contradictory. Correspondingly, the text as a whole traces the progression of the soul through Christianized time, beginning with the Fall and moving toward— but never fully reaching— eternity and salvation, in what Bath sees as a “pattern of postponed closure” (Bath, Speaking Pictures 216). The final two emblems bring readers within sight of eternity, providing a glimpse of God in Heaven in the pictura of the penultimate emblem before returning us back to the fallen world that must first be traversed in Book 5, Emblem 15.  

Ultimately, Bath argues that

the organisation of the sequence seems to be sending out contradictory signals to the reader— of sameness, yet change; spiritual progress, yet stasis; transcendence, yet failure. The two concluding emblems sum up this ambivalence perfectly, even as they explain it, for though spiritual meditation may be a habit of perfection, the image of the soul it presents remains an image of the soul in this world, and not the next, torn between truth and veiling, shadow and substance.

(Bath, Speaking Pictures 217-218)

As we have seen in previous chapters, this condition of being in between, or being stranded in time, is central to the sense of self that emerges in religious and even

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4 Quarles’ individual emblems follow a five-part structure. In addition to the pictura, motto, and verse, Quarles also includes relevant quotations from, or paraphrases of, various (often religious) authorities and a four-line epigram following the verse. In most cases, the epigrammatic speaker comments on what has been said by the verse speaker. In my discussion of these emblems, I will use ‘the speaker’ to refer to the speaker of the verse, and the epigrammatic speaker will be identified as such. Emblemes consists of five books of fifteen emblems apiece, along with “The Invocation” that opens Book 1, “The Entertainment” that opens Book 3, and “The Farewell” that closes Book 5. These three emblems do not follow the five-part structure of the rest of the emblems in the collection, but instead follow the three-part structure described above.

5 In the analysis that follows, emblems from Emblemes are referred to by book and emblem number (ie, Book 3, Emblem 4 is referred to as 3.4), whereas emblems from Hieroglyphikes of the Life of Man appear as H.# (ie, Hieroglyphikes Emblem 12 is referred to as H.12).

6 John Manning makes a similar argument about Quarles in The Emblem (2002), focused on the importance of Christianized time (particularly the belief in the impending proximity of the Apocalypse) for the emblems (Manning 279).
anatomical texts from the period. The approaches taken to Quarles by Freeman, Lewalski, Höltgen, Heffernan, and Bath represent, almost entirely, the sum total of the critical perspectives on *Emblemes*.\(^7\) Other critics have occasionally dealt with particular aspects of one of Quarles' emblems in more general works, but rarely in any detail. Bath is absolutely correct in pointing out the importance of Christianized time in the emblems, and I will now move into a more detailed examination of the actual *experience* of such a temporal stranding. As we will see, and as we have seen in other writers from the period, corporeality is an important part of the religious subject's experience of Christianized time.

For Quarles, between the Edenic world and the world to come after the Apocalypse, the Christian self finds itself in a dangerous, tempting, and deceptive material world that must be constantly negotiated if salvation is to be achieved. In *Emblemes*, Quarles gives the reader a glimpse of salvation without making it a fully realized condition within the text itself. As Bath notes, although Quarles provides an “unmediated vision” of eternity in 5.14, even going so far as to provide a visual depiction of God and His angels shining on the subject, he backs away from such a direct representation in the final emblem, which "returns to the sensual world of shadows" (Bath, *Speaking Pictures* 217). Emblem 5.15 even concludes with the speaker of the verse begging for the kind of clarity offered by the previous emblem: "O leave me not, nor turne thy beauty from me;/ Looke, looke upon me, though thy flames ov'rcome me" (5.15). Finally, “The Farewell” leaves the reader in a state of unfulfilled anticipation,

\(^7\) The criticism that deals with Quarles' second emblem book, *Hieroglyphikes of the Life of Man* (1638), will be dealt with separately as it becomes relevant in this chapter.
appealing for faith, devotion, and patience as the blinding presence of God begins to fade, emphasizing again that it was mankind's sins that killed Christ. The sense of expectancy and lack of closure is heightened by the absence of an epigram in this emblem, and the fact that one of the final comments that the speaker of the verse makes is "we strive" invokes a sense of continuation rather than fulfillment ("The Farewell").

The central anxiety that is apparent in Quarles' Emblemes is the immense difficulty of such a successful negotiation in a "Crocadilian world" populated by "dunghill worldlings" that offers so little for the devotional subject to work with (1.4, 1.9). However, the flesh itself is a part of – and partakes in – this fallen world. In other words, embodiment and the experience of embodiment are key components of the "progress of the soul" that Bath identifies as the central concern of the collection. The soul might fight against the "dunghill" in pursuit of salvation, but it must do so both through and in defiance of the body. Consequently, the devotional experience of corporeality is very significant; sensual awareness emerges as a bridge between body and soul. The overall structure of Emblemes' five books emphasizes that the soul's progress is not linear, and the emblems themselves often capture the complexity of the devotional subject who strives for salvation and does not simply ascend a staircase rising toward heaven. Books 1 and 2 focus on the corrupting influence of the fallen world that constantly threatens to overtake the self. The final emblem of Book 1, for example, finds the speaker in a state of hopelessness as he contemplates the devil's reign in this world, and most of Book 2 does little to encourage hope in the speaker. By the end of Book 2, however, a clearer sense of progress – even if irregular – begins to emerge. The speaker
tells us that “The Righteous man falls oft,/ Yet falls but soft” (2.14). The righteous man prays to God and picks himself up, “Whereas the leaden-hearted Coward lies,/ And yields his conquer’d life; or cravend, dies.” Books 3 through 5 continue to stress the dangers of the fallen world, but place more emphasis on the reformation of the devotional subject as the speaker now spends more time praying, weeping, and (at times) cowering before God and Christ as he curses “These fleshly fetters, that so fast involve/ My hampred soule” (3.15). The speaker emphasizes his internal conflict in Book 3 and in Book 4, noting that “I feele two flames, and yet no flame, entire:/ Thus are the Mungrill thoughts of mixt desire/ Consum’d between that heav’nly and this earthly fire” (4.1). Much of Book 4 deals with the speaker searching for the path to God but having a great deal of difficulty following that path, emphasizing that “So hard’s the task for sinfull flesh and Blood/ To lend the Smallest step to what is Good” (4.8). Book 5 is characterized by desire and anticipation, similar to what we saw throughout Collins’ poetry. God and Christ are frequently represented throughout the final book as the speaker’s beloved, and the speaker repeatedly expresses a longing to leave this world behind, going so far as to lament,

Is there no charitable hand will sever
My well-spun Thred, that my imprison’d soule
May be deliver’d from this dull dark hole
Of dungeon flesh? (5.7)

In 5.6 the speaker admits that the world is, perhaps, not wholly evil and that it is in fact a divine creation, but everything is still nothing without God’s presence – “Without Thee, Lord, things be not what they be,/ Nor have they being, when compar’d with Thee” (5.6). Although Emblemes generally – and Book 5 specifically – describes movement toward
God, we can see from the passages above, the “fleshly fetters” constantly nag at the soul with their needs and desires, hindering the soul’s progress and forcing the devotional subject to consider his or her own embodiment.

As we have seen throughout this dissertation, body and soul are perpetually intertwined in both the English anatomical and theological texts from the period, particularly through the senses. The senses were generally seen as the limbs or organs of the soul, enabling it to experience the outside world through sensitive perception. This experience was rarely – if ever – neutral; in conveying the external world to the soul, the senses could act as conduits for virtue as well as sin, a permeability of self that reflected a humoral understanding of the body. As we saw in Chapter Two in our discussion of humoral theory and devotional understandings of the body, the permeable nature of the humoral body is reflected in the way that religious writers such as William Cowper represent the body: “it is evident with what continuall care the senses are to be obsuered, that from without euill come not, to make the heart worse then it is; and from within euill come not, to infect others that are without” (Cowper 210). According to Cowper, negotiating the exchanges between interiority and exteriority is of the utmost importance when seeking to sustain the Christian subject. Essentially, the body emerges in Cowper’s text as the devotional tool of the soul, but one that can be harmful as well as helpful because it can invite both sin and virtue.

A similar view of the body is apparent in Quarles’ emblems. In 1.1, Quarles recounts the story of Eve and the Tree of Knowledge as a narrative of the sensitive ingestion of sin. The poem begins with the serpent appealing to Eve’s senses – “Not eat?
Not tast? Not cast an eye/ Vpon the Fruit of this faire Tree?," he asks. The serpent continues by imploring her, “Woman, Do but cast an eye,” “Do but tast,” and “Do but touch” (1.1). Sin and death thus enter the world and the body through Eve’s inability to properly guard her senses. This lack of sensitive regulation also produces a heightened corporeal awareness in the following emblem (which takes place after Eve has eaten the apple) as the speaker, addressing Adam, commands, “Looke, looke, by doing, how thou art vndone.” In the final stanzas, the speaker again instructs Adam to “Behold” how the experience and interpretation of the body have changed as a result of the Fall. Nakedness has become shameful, and the speaker asks, “Poore man! Are not thy Ioynts grown sore with shaking/ To view th’effect of thy bold undertaking,” evoking a new experience of the post-lapsarian body (1.2). Even in Eden, the senses could deceive, and Quarles suggests throughout his emblems that part of the price of this deception is further corporeal deception. In fact, in 1.15 sense and the soul remain connected, but sense has blinded faith: “See how she [Faith] flutters with her idle wings;/ Her wings are clipt and eyes put out by Sense:/ Sense-conq’ring Faith is now growne blind, and cold” (1.15). The body becomes the prison of the soul, impeding its progress toward heaven by trying to tie it more firmly to the earth through sensual delight. Although some religious writers suggested a more negotiated and even potentially cooperative relationship between body and soul, Quarles often seems to view the relationship with almost complete hopelessness – the soul can only overcome the flesh with the greatest of effort, and even then, the body offers very few positives to the relationship.
In focusing on the permeable nature of the humoral body, Quarles continually evokes a sense of negative exchange between the inner and outer subject and the ever-present infecting potential of sin. The senses transmit the experience of the outside world to the soul, but even in Paradise, the senses are capable of deceiving the soul and leading it into sin. The result is Quarles' inherent mistrust of the body and difficulty in overcoming its demands or transcending its bonds. Consequently, the metaphors that Quarles uses to depict the relationship between body and soul are often such that the soul lacks agency, unlike in Collins' poetry in which these roles are often reversed. With Quarles, the stress, both visually and verbally, is on separation and contention. 3.11, for example, draws on the familiar representation of the body as a ship tossed on the waves of the world, propelled by the gusts of "worldly Lusts" as it carries a freight of "Corruption":

The world's a Sea; my flesh, a ship, that's man'd
With lab'ring Thoughts; and steer'd by Reasons hand
My heart's the Sea-mans Card, whereby she sailes;
My loose Affections are the greater Sailes:
The Top-saile is my Fancy; and the Gists
That fill these wanton Sheets, are worldly Lusts.

The speaker continues by explaining the various parts of the seafaring metaphor – the anchor represents his hope, tied to the ship by the "Cable" of prayer, for example – and notes that the soul is merely a passenger bound for the port of heaven with no actual control over the progress of the vessel. Instead, the ship is guided by the will, "th'unconstant Pilot," and reason, and is under the constant threat of running aground on the sands of sin. The speaker asks God to help direct the ship and "Refresh the sea-sick passenger," but the soul itself seems unable to take the wheel. In fact, this option is never
offered to the soul at all. According to the epigrammatic speaker, the best the soul can do is to try to raise the sea level with her tears in an effort to submerge the threatening rocks as they appear:

My soule; the seas are rough; and thou a stranger
In these false coasts; O keep aloofe; there’s danger:
Cast forth thy Plummets; see a rock appears;
Thy ship wants sea-room; Make it with thy tears.

The jolting cadence of these lines, broken up by punctuation after roughly every four words, mimics the rough seas but also emphasizes the epigrammatist’s comment to the soul that “thou art a stranger/ In these false coasts.” Discord and disunity rather than cooperation and harmony characterize the relationship between soul and body/world in this emblem.

Figure 4.3: Quarles, Emblemes, London, 1635, Emblem 5.10
The discussion of the soul-body relationship in 5.10 (fig. 4.3) similarly denies agency to the soul and any appreciable degree of cooperation between the soul and the body (5.10). “My Soule is like a Bird; my Flesh, the Cage,” says the speaker, and just as the soul cannot take control of the ship in 3.11, so too she cannot use the cage of flesh to further her own goals – she can only sing from within, awaiting the release of death. Just as the senses bring the outside world to the soul, so too can this caged soul feed on the Eucharistic bread and wine passed through the bars, but the cage of flesh itself does not participate in this act; the Eucharist passes through the cage, but not with the help of the cage. While awaiting the freedom of death, the soul, “Th’afflicted Captive, that can find no peace,” is left to jump back and forth between the perches within the cage that represent sense, reason, faith, hope, doubt, and despair, clearly associating the features of the inner self with the faculties of the soul. The contention between body and soul is heightened by the image itself, which visibly distinguishes between the soul or Anima and the cage. In addition, the image also emphasizes the humoral exchange between interior and exterior; the cage itself is made up of bars rather than a single, unbroken piece of material. By extension, although the body is a barrier between the inner self and external world, it is similarly permeable, allowing for both reception (sensitive perception and ingestion) and transmission (song/prayer).

This emblem is also notable due to the association drawn between the soul and selfhood. As I suggested in the introduction to this dissertation, although the subject is comprised of a body and a soul, subjectivity or a sense of self is often located in the soul itself in the early modern English mind. This is particularly evident in the vicar Moses
Capell’s description of the soul as “that invisible Essence, and spirituall substance:
Divines most commonly call the Soule: we may, our selves,” and a similar representation of the soul can also be seen in Quarles’ emblem 5.10 (Capell 6, emphasis added).
Following the description of the soul/bird as an “afflicted Captive” locked in the body between birth and death, the speaker comments, “Thus am I coop’d within this fleshly Cage” (5.10, emphasis added). In this emblem, the “I” stands for the soul, distinct from the “fleshly Cage” of the body. While embodiment is clearly a necessary condition for the subject, subjectivity and the arbitration of experience is primarily a feature of the soul.

Another representation of the soul-body relationship that emphasizes the division between the two can be found in 5.8. In the pictura of this emblem, Anima is depicted

![Figure 4.4: Quarles, Emblemes, London, 1635, Emblem 5.8](image)
standing inside the imprisoning ribcage of a seated skeleton. Anima’s eyes are raised and her hands are folded in prayer (fig. 4.4). Again, this emblem stresses the discord between body and soul. This is initially established visually by the differing postures of the two figures in the image; Anima stands praying and looking upward toward Heaven while the skeleton maintains a traditionally melancholic pose, eyes – or eye sockets – directed toward the reader. In a rare instance of agreement, both the speaker of the verse and the epigrammatic speaker offer a unified perspective on the general incompatibility of the body and the soul. The speaker of the verse cautions the soul against seeking to satisfy the wants of the body, noting that the body does not return the love of the soul but rather abuses that love:

Behold thy darling [ie, the body], who, when clad by Thee [ie, the soul],
Derides thy nakednesse; and, when most free,
Proclaims her lover, slave; and, being fed
Most full, then strikes th’ indulgent Feeder dead:
What means thou thus, my poore deluded soule,
To love so fondly?

The speaker tells the soul to remember that she is “borne/ Of royall blood” and that Christ paid a dear price to release the soul from slavery. Given this hard won freedom, why would the soul choose enslavement again by trying to satisfy the body, which only offers honour, pleasure, and wealth, the three worldly glories that Quarles derides throughout Emblemes? The epigram further heightens the paradoxical relationship between soul and body, presenting them as largely antithetical:

What need that House be daub’d with flesh and blood?
Hang’d round with silks and gold; repair’d with food?
Cost idly spent! That cost does but prolong
Thy thraldome; Foole, thou mak’st thy Iayle too strong.
The desires of the flesh run counter to the desires of the soul and vice versa – to give in to one is to deny the other. The anxiety that results from such a contentious relationship and existence is captured in the quotation from the fourth-century theologian Gregory of Nazianzus that Quarles includes before the epigram: “How I am joyned to this body, I know not . . . It is a pleasant Foe, and a perfidious friend: O strange conjunction and Alienation! . . . Before I enjoy peace, I am at variance” (5.8). Embodiment is characterized throughout all the sections of this emblem – and throughout many of the other emblems in the collection – by polarity, conflict, and tension. The soul resides inside the body and receives communications from – and can be infected by – the external world, but she has great difficulty in acting through the body to pursue her own virtuous ends.

In addition to his emphasis on the potential for exchange between the inner and external worlds evident in humoral theory that we saw in 5.10, Quarles also stresses the humoral themes of maintaining the balance of the four humours and of regulating heat, both in a physiological context and as a metaphor for properly structured faith and devotion. Certainly, such a perspective would not have been unique to Quarles during the period, but it is nevertheless a perception of corporeality promoted at a time when alternative models were available. In 1.8, Quarles’ speaker warns against the dangers of imbalanced humours:

The world’s a popular disease, that raignes
Within the forward heart, and frantick braines
Of poore distemper’d mortals, oft arising
From ill digestion, through unequall poysing
Of ill-weigh’d humors to maligne Effects:
One raves, and labours with a boyling Liver;
Rends haire by handfuls, cursing Cupids Quiver:
Another with a Bloody-fluxe of oathes,
Vowes deepe Revenge.

This passage emphasizes the corporeal turmoil that results from, in part, "ill-weigh’d humors," an imbalance that is itself influenced by the "ill digestion" of the corrupting power of the diseased world. This imbalance, in turn, leads to chaos and disorder within the individual who begins to "hugg as our delight" what we should instead seek to cure as "our disease." The speaker extends the metaphor of humoral discord to show how far mankind has fallen from God since Christ’s sacrifice helped restore balance out of sin. According to the speaker, we have been led so far down the path of sin that "bold-fac’d Mortalls, in our blushlesse times,/ Can sin and smile, and make a sport of Crimes" even up to the point of death and the "familiar knell" of the "Soule-departing Bell" (1.8). The imbalance that plagues "false-joy’d fooles" who "triumph in disease" can only be remedied through faith and devotion.

Digestion is very important in humoral theory since the stomach is a site where the external world is physically assimilated into the internal body and thus a place where humoral balance can be most easily disrupted or restored. The metaphor of "ill digestion" is extended beyond the body to the religious subject – and the soul in particular – in Emblemes. Indeed, the soul is sometimes represented as a consuming force or stomach-like organ that ingests the external world. In "The Invocation," Quarles addresses his soul and encourages it to "Scorne, scorne to feed on thy old bloat desires," a reference to the many negative influences found in the sinful world. The speaker of 1.12 describes the flesh as "a trembling Bogge, a Quagmire full of humors," in an emblem that depicts two
figures drawing milk from the “earths full breast” (fig. 4.5). Rather than providing nourishment, “Earths milk’s a ripned Core/ That drops from her desease, that matters from her Sore” (1.12). Addressing the corpulent figure sucking directly from the breast, he warns that “Thou swallow’st at one breath/ Both food and poyson down; Thou drawst both milk & death.”

The speaker also points to the second, gaunt figure who is depicted straining his milk in a sieve that catches nothing. The milk of the world – personal honour, wealth, and pleasure – is without value or nourishment, regardless of whether

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Figure 4.5: Quarles, *Emblemes*, London, 1635, Emblem 1.12

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8 The gluttonous nature of this figure is also emphasized by the fact that Quarles likens the figure to an overeager infant that takes “Vnholsome Gulps compos’d of wind and blood” (1.12). This emblem alludes to the belief often held in – but not limited solely to – humoural theory that breast milk is actually blood from the womb that has been transformed “through the digestiue vertue” into milk (Vicary Hivr’). If an infant is sucking blood from the breast, this could be an indication that the blood has not had enough time to be ‘digested’ into milk and thus a sign of the feeder’s gluttonous appetite. Moreover, Crooke tells us that the reason that the child needs milk is because it has been fed by blood in the womb, and “it had need of such a nourishment, as should not be too remote from the nature of blood” (Crooke 160).
one is indiscriminate or careful in its procurement. A similar caution against ingesting the food of the sinful world can be found in 1.3, which compares trying to obtain nourishment for the soul from this world to searching for “Hony from a nest of wasps” (1.3). The speaker wonders at “What bitter Pills,/ Compos’d of reall Ills,/ Man swallowes downe, to purchase one false Good!” Whether the soul is seeking sustenance from the world’s milk or honey, it will ultimately be frustrated in its efforts. Ingesting this food into our humoral quagmire invites imbalance and disorder. Some of the effects of this internal discordance are evident in the bowlers of 1.10 whose “mingling Humors in a mad confusion” lead them to emotional extremes as they alternately “woope” with joy and curse to the “blushing Skies” (1.10). In addition, a soul glutted on this food is apt to burst like an overfull stomach:

Wee gape, we graspe, we gripe, adde store to store;
Enough requires too much; too much craves more;
Wee charge our Soules so farre beyond our stint,
That wee recoyle or burst. (2.3)

Imbalance and excess continually threaten to destroy – or damn – the devotional subject who must remain ever vigilant.

The regulation of heat, which is also very important in humoral theory, appears throughout *Emblemes* as a metaphor for the restoration of balance within the devotional subject. In 3.3, in which Jesus and the soul are engaged in a dialogue, Christ is represented as a physician diagnosing the ailment of the soul (fig. 4.6). The soul complains to Jesus about excessive heat, proclaiming “O I burne, I fry” and asking Jesus to “Quench, quench my flames, & swage these scorching fires.” When Christ asks the
soul, "How old's thy griefe?," the soul responds, "I tooke it at the Fall/ With eating Fruit."
Jesus concludes that "Thy blood's infected, and th'Infection sprung/ From a bad Liver," and he prescribes bloodletting as a solution, offering his own blood as a "cordiall" to cleanse the speaker's veins (3.3). The liver appears again in Book 5 as the speaker looks toward the "everlasting Pleasure" in Heaven, where "No liver-scalding Lust shall,}

there, incense/ Our boyling veines" (5.13). Religious devotion and faith become ways to restore the metaphorical excesses of heat and humoral imbalances in the individual. Similarly, Quarles offers a representation of Christ as a regulator of heat in 4.14, not unlike what we found in some of Collins' poems, particularly "A Song exciting to spirituall Alacrity."
In this poem, Collins describes God as a rock for the faithful, providing a cooling shade to protect the weary traveler against combustive heat. In

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9 See Chapter Three, pp. 149-151.
Quarles' emblem, the speaker compares his soul to sheep wandering out into the burning sun, away from their shepherd:

Ev'n so my wandring Soule, that has digrest
From her great Shepheard, is the hourely prey
Of all my Sinnes, . . .

I hunt from place to place, but find no rest;
I know not where to go, nor where to stay:
The eye of vengeance burnes; her flames invade
My sweltering Soule: My soule has oft assaid
But she can find no shrowd, but she can feele not Shade. (4.14)

In this emblem, unlike in Collins' poem, this excess of heat comes from God, whose unmediated rays threaten to destroy the speaker – "Thy Godhead, IESVS, are the flames that fry me," he says. In the end, it is the crucified body of Christ, whose sacrifice has

Figure 4.7: Quarles, *Emblemes*, London, 1635, Emblem 4.14
produced “A Cloud of dying flesh” that interposes between the soul and “the Sun-beames of thy just Creator,” and the pictura depicts a figure sitting in the shade cast by the body of Christ nailed to a tree (fig. 4.7). A comparable depiction can be found in Emblem 7 of Hieroglyphikes, which also deals with the intensity of the sun (God) when compared to the relative weakness of the candle flame (soul). The speaker laments that, “Thy Sun-beames are too strong for my weake eye:/ If thou but shine, how nothing, Lord, am I!” (H.7). Conversely, the speaker is worried that if the sun is obscured or if night falls, his own candle will shine too brightly. Stuck between these two extremes, the speaker finds a solution similar to 4.14: “O let the streame of my Redeemers blood,/ That breaths fro’ my sick soule, be made a Cloud,/ T’ interpose these Lights, and be my shroud” (H.7). In these emblems, the extreme heat produced by both sin and God that can engulf the subject is quenched by Christ. Humoralism thus persists throughout Quarles’ emblems as an ideal metaphor for the maintenance of – and difficulty in sustaining – the devotional subject. Even as the individual turns to Christ for shade, balance, and regulation, the external world never refrains from trying to upset that balance. And, according to Quarles’ emblems, the world frequently succeeds in infecting us with its diseases of wealth, personal honour, and pleasure.

The potential for cooperation between body and soul that we witnessed William Cowper suggest in his own humorally-inspired interpretation of the relationship\textsuperscript{10} is much less probable in Quarles’ emblems, a condition that is established as early as “The Invocation” to Book 1. Here, the speaker contrasts the soul, “Our heav’n-blowne fire,”

\textsuperscript{10} See Chapter Two, pp. 112-113
with the flesh and earth. Just as the devout soul tries to rise above materiality and corporeality, the frail flesh tries to “stop thy flight” and imprison the soul in “dungeon earth,” where the sinful man “drink’st full draughts, wherein/ Thy Childrens leprous fingers, scurf’d with Sin/ Have paddled” (“The Invocation”). The material world is characterized as constantly threatening to contaminate the soul, and Quarles uses the metaphor of contagious disease throughout *Emblemes* to describe the nature of the relationship between the two. However, it is impossible for the soul to simply avoid the contagion altogether and remove the potential for infection. Since the body is part of this material world, the only solution lies in the speaker’s paradoxical request of God: “O teach me stoutly to deny/ My selfe, that I may be no longer I” (“The Invocation”). Significantly, the speaker here recognizes the necessity of corporeality in the construction of the religious subject and selfhood. The only way to truly transcend the flesh would involve the impossibility of self-erasure, an unachievable state that the speaker struggles with throughout the entire text.

Quarles returns to the question of the nature of the soul and the relationship between it and the body in 3.5. In this emblem, which depicts Divine Love building man on a potter’s wheel (fig. 4.8), the speaker begins by asking what separates man from the rest of the natural world – some animals have more acute senses and some trees have longer lives, so what makes mankind so much better? The answer, as it often is for devotional writers of all kinds, is the nature of the soul, particularly in the identification of the higher faculties of the soul. As the speaker says, “my great Creator did inspire/ My chosen earth with that diviner fire/ Of Reason; gave he Judgement, and a Will;/ That, to
know good; this to choose good from ill.” However, despite this “diviner fire,” mankind has been debased by the Fall. The judgment and will have become corrupted, and now

“That [i.e. judgment] knows no good; and this [i.e. the will] makes choice of ill.” The body is the temple for the soul, but “Her vessels are polluted, and disdain’d/ With loathed lust; her ornaments prophan’d;/ Her oyle-forsaken lamps, and hallow’d Tapours/ Put out.” This clay temple is now apt to leak and break, easily susceptible to corruption and destruction, and the epigrammatist characterizes man as “earth, cast from the wombe, to th’ urne.” Many of these emblems – particularly 3.5 – reiterate Quarles’ familiar theme of the antithetical relationship between soul and body, but they also touch on issues that frequently surface in the anatomical and religious texts examined in Chapters One and
Two: the nature of the soul and the process of ensoulment, the secrets of generation and the womb. In those chapters we saw anatomists and religious writers grapple with the issues surrounding the initial joining of corporeal matter and the soul, a debate that Quarles wades into in his second emblem book.

The question of ensoulment and generation appears in a more concentrated form in Quarles' *Hieroglyphikes of the Life of Man* (1638) than it does in his previous emblem book. Unlike *Emblemes*, this is a wholly 'original' text, in that the plates were devised specifically for Quarles rather than having been borrowed from existing continental emblem books. *Hieroglyphikes* is comparatively short, containing just fifteen emblems, approximately the size of one of the five books that comprised his previous emblem book. It is also more focused, centered on the theme of the Life of Man and the value of self-knowledge. Each emblem depicts a candle in an urn, a symbol for the individual. The candle itself represents the corporeal body, and the flame – once the candle is lit in the second emblem – represents the incorporeal soul. The metaphor emphasizes both difference and dependence; like the body, the candle is physical and tangible, and like the soul, the flame is insubstantial yet present. In the first eight emblems, the candle and its flame are subjected to various trials and torments in order to demonstrate the ordeals of corporeal existence and the fragility of life. The final seven emblems symbolize the Seven Ages of Man from infancy through to old age, and as these emblems progress the candle burns shorter and shorter, marked in Roman numerals for each decade that passes. These candles are surrounded by symbols of the age that they represent, such as the saplings and crib in Emblem 9 (Infancy) or the implements of hunting and sport in
Emblem 11 (Youth). The message of *Hieroglyphikes* is that properly structured – that is, devotionally-informed – self-knowledge can lead us to better knowledge of God, something that “men of Nature” alone cannot achieve, because without faith and devotion, we look “But through a Mist” (H.1). After all, as the speaker notes, “Man is mans ABC: There is none that can/ Reade God aright, unless he first spell Man” (H.1). Such an assertion of the value of self-knowledge echoes similar contentions commonly found in both religious and anatomical texts. Anatomists such as Banister and Crooke justify their work in part by noting that the human body is a divine (and the most perfect) creation and that by studying it, we come closer to knowing the mind of God. As we saw in Chapter One, Crooke invokes the maxim ‘know thyself’ in his discussion of the anatomist’s work as a pathway to a better knowledge of God, emphasizing that “hee which is well read in his owne body, shall see in all euen the least operations of his minde or actions of his bodie a liuely Impression and infallible markes of Diuinity” (Crooke 464). Likewise, the religious writer John Woolton argues that “The contemplation of the soule letteth vs see God” (Woolton §.vi.r.). In *Hieroglyphikes*, an emblem book wholly focused on the relationship between body and soul, the proclamation “Man is mans ABC” invokes a Christianized perspective on self-knowledge that unites early modern English writing about both the body and the soul. As the speaker of H.1 reminds the reader, “This golden Precept, *Know thy selfe*, came downe/ From heav’ns high Court” (H.1).

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11 Hereafter, emblems from *Hieroglyphikes* will be referred to in text as H.#.
Quarles' discussion of the candle (body) and flame (soul) in *Hieroglyphikes* draws on a devotional understanding of the self and corporeality. At its most basic, this not-uncommon metaphor represents the unification of dissimilar elements, the material and destructible flesh (the candle itself) with the intangible yet present soul (flame) that together form the individual self. Both elements are required, because an unburned candle does not serve its purpose, nor can a flame burn without fuel; in our corporeal existence, body and soul require each other, because without both together, the individual ceases to exist. As we saw in Chapter Two, this perspective on the centrality of embodiment to selfhood is Aristotelian in origin. However, it is the soul, the "diviner fire" passed on from God, that ultimately gives the body meaning because, alone, the candle's substance is

sordid, and impure,  
Vseless and vain, and (wanting light) obscure:  
Tis but a Span at longest, nor can last  
Beyond that Span; ordain'd, and made to wast:  
Ev'n such was Man (before his soule gave light  
To his vile substance) . . .  
. . . by nature, borne to burne. (H.1)

In directing the reader's attention to the image of the unlit candle with a looped wick in the first emblem (fig. 4.9), the speaker and the engraver highlight the superior workmanship of God in the fashioning of the body. As John Horden notes,

Candles were often made in the home from mutton fat or from various other waste fats. But the best candle, one giving the warmest, softest, and kindest light, was the expensive wax candle. Because it was necessary to dip and re-dip the twisted flax or cotton wick in the molten beeswax in order to build up the necessary thickness of wax the wick was looped at the top to make its suspension easier. Therefore, in depicting the unused candle in the slender shape of a taper, and in giving it a looped wick, the
The body might be "born to burne," but it is still a divine creation, crafted with the greatest of care and made from the purest materials.

The second emblem in the collection deals specifically with the contentious issue of ensoulment. As we have seen, Quarles discusses ensoulment at various points in *Emblemes*, such as when the soul is locked in the cage of flesh in 5.10 or in those emblems in which God is depicted as a potter, spinning man out of clay. However, whereas ensoulment is only implied in these emblems, in H.2 Quarles explicitly discusses the transference of the divine fire to the body. Quarles addresses a variety of theories
regarding when and how the soul is placed in the body, but this inquiry ultimately represents the limits of human knowledge, which is indicated by the motto “Nescius Vnde” – ‘whence unknown’ (Bath, Speaking Pictures 224-225). In the pictura, the unlit candle of H.1 now burns (fig. 4.10). The hand of God extends from a cloud holding fire or lightning near the wick of the candle. On the ground next to the urn lie a tinderbox and a two-faced figure. Although the exact nature of the figure is unclear, Höltgen suggests that it is “the moulded or sculptured double head of the male and female Repis figure (from res bina), symbol of the body in hermetrical treatises” (Höltgen, “Francis Quarles’ Emblemes and Hieroglyphykes 13). We might also consider the possibility that it is a

Figure 4.10: Quarles, Hieroglyphikes, London, 1638, Emblem 2
Janus figure. As the god of gates and doorways, Janus presides over the passage of the soul into the body in this emblem. As the god of beginnings and endings, he presides over the commencement of life and its subsequent journey toward death, a journey central to *Hieroglyphikes* as a whole – the body that is “borne to burne” in H.1 has begun its inevitable destruction in the second emblem.

Some questions initially raised by the image in H.2 are: Who is responsible for lighting the candle? Has it been lit by a spark from the tinderbox or by the hand of God? Or, perhaps, has God used the tinderbox to create a spark? The positioning of the hand of God, holding fire so close to the flame of the candle that they almost touch, suggests that the engraver has caught God in the act of lighting the candle. However, the presence of the tinderbox hints at alternative interpretations. Perhaps the tinderbox – a man-made object – is emblematic of the belief in a mortal soul – a “propagated Spark” – that originates in the parents of the child, a belief that the speaker of the verse ultimately rejects (H.2). If this is the case, then the peripheral positioning of the tinderbox in the very corner of the image and the fact that it shows no explicit signs of being used to light the candle could be representative of this rejected belief. While the flame of the candle leans gently toward the flame held by the hand of God, as if caught in the draft of the hand as it pulls away, we do not see any smoldering tinder in the image or any indication that the tinderbox has recently been used, despite the fact that the candle has just “Received fyre; and, now, begins to burne.” Although the verse deals primarily with the complexities and paradoxes that beset contemporary theories of the origin of the soul, the image and, as we will see, the first stanza appear to refute the soul’s mortal origin.
Höltgen suggests that this emblem “reveals one of the reasons for Quarles’ s popularity and success as an emblematist: he directly translates theoretical concepts of the origin of the soul, whose adequate verbal explanation would be too difficult for most of his readers, into visual symbols” (Höltgen, “Francis Quarles’ Emblemes and Hieroglyphykes 13). However, we must ask whether this visual representation makes the theories any easier to understand because, as the verse points out, the available theories are beset by contradictions and paradoxes that cannot, in the speaker’s mind, be unraveled.

The poem begins in the womb after the child has received its soul, and the speaker seems to answer the question of where the flame came from immediately in the first stanza: “It was a gracious hand that thus endow’d/ This snuffe with flame: But marke, this hand doth shroud/ It selfe from mortall eyes, and folds it in a Cloud” (H.2). As we are told in the previous emblem, God is the “great Originall of Light,” so it is not surprising that He is responsible for lighting the candle in the second emblem (H.1). Although the majority of the poem will deal with fraught questions regarding the soul, the speaker sees one thing as beyond debate, that the movement of the child in the womb generally denotes its ensoulment: “Thus man begins to live; An unknowne flame/ Quickens his finisht Organs; now, possesst/ With motion; and which motion doth proclaime/ An active soule, though in a feeble brest” (H.2). Although the speaker refrains from providing an exact timeline for this ensoulment, what we see here is an assertion that conforms to long-established perspectives on the process of generation: the presence of the soul in the body is indicated by motion, a process that takes place after the organs have developed. As we saw in Chapters One and Two, this perspective both transcended
and united purely physiological or theological understandings of the body. The speaker protests, “ask not my Pen,” regarding the “how” and “when” of this process, claiming that for such answers, “Here flyes a Cloud before the eyes on men:/ I can not tell thee, how; nor canst thou tell mee, when.” The speaker or Quarles has outlined some of his own beliefs about ensoulment with a degree of confidence but then begins to deal with the difficulties and paradoxes of the prevailing contemporary theories. Within the first two stanzas, then, the speaker seems to have settled the matter for himself – that the origin of the soul is a \textit{divine} mystery – before being tempted to pursue what are ultimately “vainely striving thoughts” in a search for definitive answers.

In the third stanza, the speaker provides a compact summation of many of the current theories of ensoulment, several of which have been discussed in Chapter Two. The speaker addresses these theories as a number of questions regarding the origin of the soul:

\begin{quote}
Was it a parcell of celestiall fire, 
Infus’d, by Heav’n, into this fleshly mould? 
Or was it (thinke you) made a soule entire? 
Then; was it new created? Or of old? 
Or is ‘t a propagated Spark, rak’d out 
From Natures embers? While we goe about, 
By reason, to resolve, the more we raise a doubt.
\end{quote}

The poem continues by addressing each of these beliefs in turn and essentially reducing them to self-contradictory paradoxes. If the soul comes from Heaven then it must be as free from sin as Heaven itself, so how can it be culpable in original sin? If it is pure and sent from Heaven then the body cannot defile it, nor can it defile itself. If all souls are created by God, then when during the six days of Creation were they created, because the
Bible tells us that all creation ceased prior to the day of rest? By that logic, if souls are newly created for individuals as they are born, this runs contrary to the Creation story and suggests that “Heav’n did not all, at first, he had to doe.” Consequently, a newly created soul must come from Nature, a product of the acts of intercourse and generation between a man and a woman. But if this is the case, then the human soul must be mortal because “All that’s borne must die.” The verse ends with the speaker advising himself to lay down his “puzzl’d quill,” and the whole emblem ends with the rejection of such vain intellectual pursuits; the speaker of the epigram concludes that it is “No more accompt but this, to say, I burne!” In other words, what is important is that we have souls, not how we acquire them.

As we saw earlier in this chapter, humoral theory plays an important role in Quarles’ devotional emblems, even though he could have drawn on alternative physiological models. The English anatomist William Harvey had published his theory of the circulation of the blood in 1628, which pushed the understanding of the body into new directions moving away from humoral theory and the body-as-microcosm and towards a more mechanical view of the body. Interestingly, Quarles does occasionally draw on machine metaphors, but in relation to the soul rather than the body. In 4.8, we read a familiar representation of the body as a clay vessel spun by the divine potter that is sluggish but can be (and has been) enlivened by God. In contrast to the clay body, Quarles writes, “My Soule’s a Clock, whose wheeles (for want of use/ And winding up, being subject to th’abuse/ Of eating Rust) wants vigour to fulfill/ Her twelve houres task, and show her makers skill,” and the poem concludes by imploring God to wind up the
soul “with thy soule-mooving kayes” (4.8). The epigram ultimately rejects this plea, chastising the speaker of the verse for “Expecting motion from thy Makers hand,” arguing that God has “wound thee up, and cleans’d thy Coggs with blood:/ If now thy wheeles stand still; thou art not good.” The responsibility for maintaining this divine mechanism is thus left up to the individual. In some ways, this representation of the body and the soul creates a startling image, a clock encased in clay (which is not portrayed in the *pictura* of the emblem). Why would Quarles choose to use a mechanical metaphor that was increasingly applied to the body? The answer, I believe, lies in the connection established between clock, soul, and motion. As the epigram notes, the speaker of the verse stands “Expecting motion,” a divine winding of his soul-clock, because it has grown rusty and sluggish, but the clock has already been wound once. Motion, then, has been initiated, and the clock will not be wound again.

By uniting the soul and the clock metaphor through motion, Quarles is effectively drawing on an understanding of the physiological or animal spirits. Generally speaking, the spirits were believed to be the arbiters between the body and the soul, responsible for sense and, important in this context, motion or movement and were typically believed to reside in the blood so that they could be transmitted throughout the entire body. The anatomist Helkiah Crooke defines the spirits as “*A subtle and thinne body alwayes mouueable, engendred of blood and vapour, and the vehicle or carriage of the Faculties of the soule*” (Crooke 173-74). The animal spirits were most commonly believed to originate in the brain, a belief that Quarles seems to allude to in 1.7, in which Divine Love attempts to invigorate a slumbering or sluggish Anima: “Is this a time to steepe/
Thy braines in wastfull slumber? up and rouze/ Thy leaden spirits” (1.7). The motion of Quarles’ soul-clock thus reflects the motion of the animal spirits throughout the body – a wound clock like a ‘wound’ soul is imbued with motion, motion that is transmitted by the wheels to the rest of the mechanism. Motion is a key component of the emblem, stranded as it is between immobility and the desire for animation. “My God, I cannot move,” proclaims the speaker at the outset, lamenting that he does not have “pow’r to will; nor will to rise!” (4.8). The poem ends with the speaker declaring that once his soul is wound, “Her busie wheeles shall serve thee [God] all her dayes;/ Her Hand shall point thy pow’r; her Hammer strike thy praise,” further connecting the soul to features of the body such as movement and voice which are actually transferred from the soul to the body. The clock metaphor thus emphasizes the soul’s relationship to the body through the animal spirits; although the soul is ultimately incorporeal, it does – according to Crooke and other anatomists – have a physical presence in the body via the spirits. The internal machinations of the clock/soul achieved through winding become the external movement of the hands of either the clock or the body, for example. Additionally, the winding is done by an external force; movement might be a faculty of the soul, but without the hand of God to wind it, it merely has the potential for motion, requiring animation from without. Through this metaphor, then, Quarles unites anatomical and religious interpretations of corporeality, connecting the soul to physiological processes.12

12 Quarles may have drawn some of his perspective on corporeality from The Purple Island, the anatomical epic poem written by his friend, Phineas Fletcher and published in 1633 but largely completed between 1608 and 1610. The Purple Island is a theologically-justified dissection of the corporeal and moral subject that lays bare the features of fallen man while simultaneously detailing the path to ‘his’ salvation. Fletcher goes so far as to model his epic after anatomical textbooks, and his marginalia swarm with references to medical and anatomical theories and authorities. Although we do
Corporeality, then, plays a significant role in Quarles’ representation of the devotional subject in his emblems since embodiment is a necessary, if lamentable, feature of that subject. Like Collins, Quarles draws on physiological perspectives that combine Christianity and anatomy in order to evoke a sense of self that is as coherent as it is conflicted. In the process of combining “sensual awareness” with “spiritual insight” in order to detail the soul’s progression through an embodied existence, Quarles integrates a subtle discussion of the relationship between the body and the soul that transcends a purely religious perspective, even as such a perspective frames the dialogue (Bath, *Speaking Pictures* 203). His choice of the emblem genre to depict this narrative is particularly apt, sharing, as it does, many of the features of early modern English anatomies that are prepared to read the human body as an index of divine truths, not unlike the emblematic perception of the created world. Employing the analogical perspective of emblematic literature, Quarles uses corporeality as a metaphor for religion and devotion. The animal spirits, the senses, generation, embodiment, and ensoulment are all incorporated into Quarles’ Christian narrative of fall, redemption, and eventual salvation, and he is particularly attracted to humoral metaphors in his representation of the relationship between the internal and external worlds. In the end, the permeability of the individual invites an almost unlimited potential for his or her infection by the diseases of worldly wants and desires such as pleasure and fame, which throws the subject into a

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not know whether Quarles read anatomical textbooks or attended anatomical demonstrations, we do know that he read *The Purple Island*, having contributed two dedicatory poems to the prefatory material.
state of imbalance. Balance can only be restored through the regulatory effects of rigorous faith and devotion – effects that are much harder to obtain than the disease itself.
Conclusion

By looking at how a handful of devotional writers combined religious and physiological narratives in their representations of the body and the self, I have emphasized a larger need to re-evaluate our understanding of early modern corporeality. In some respects, this project is already underway. William W. E. Slights has recently published *The Heart in the Age of Shakespeare* (2008), in which he focuses on a single anatomical part in an effort to reconstruct the many (sometimes competing, sometimes cooperating) narratives that influenced the understanding of the heart during the period. Slights examines Galenic humoral theory, Renaissance anatomy, biblical representations of the heart, Catholic discussions of the ‘sacred heart,’ and representations of the heart in devotional poetry, drama, and visual art. He rightly argues that “no single way of representing the human body – no single ‘scientific’ or religious model – dominated the early modern world. This world was, in many ways, more open to contending views of corporeality than is our own” (Slights 40). By examining the heart alone, Slights succeeds in demonstrating just how intricate early modern perspectives on the body could be. Certainly, this was not the case for all anatomical parts. The heart, like the brain, captured the early modern imagination due in part to its physiological complexity and its role in maintaining life, features not shared by, for example, the forearm or the knee. Taken as a whole, however, the early modern body was a mysterious place where many narratives intersected, and this body was also many things – a house, an island, a machine, a container, a book, and a little world, to name just a few. Christianity played a significant role in decoding the meaning of the body and the logic behind its construction,
and this role persisted throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in England, despite rapid changes in anatomical theories throughout the period. In the early modern mind, the metaphor used did not in one important way matter; God built the house, created the island, designed the machine, filled the container, wrote the book, and populated the microcosm.

What should also be evident at this point is that there was no single, unified perspective on the body and the Christian subject in early modern English writing. Throughout this dissertation – particularly in the first two chapters – I have argued that not enough critical attention has been paid to the Christianized understanding of the body and I have sought to shed new light on this understanding. However, we must be careful not to oversimplify this understanding by reducing it to a single omnipresent belief. Just as there was no single uncontested anatomical perspective on the body, there was no single religious perspective either. As we have seen, anatomical theories were in flux during the period. Humoral theory, the circulation of the blood, the operation of the animal spirits, and the process of generation and birth are just a few examples of processes and beliefs that were debated during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Although the Galenic humoral body died a gradual death throughout the period, it was hardly jettisoned by anatomists at the first signs of weakness. Vesalius may have begun the process of displacing the Galenic model during the mid-sixteenth century, but even as late as 1685 Samuel Collins – a member of the Royal College of Physicians – could simultaneously promote Harvey’s theory of the circulation of the blood and prescribe bloodletting as a cure for both measles and smallpox (Collins 63). Likewise, religious
writers debated numerous corporeal issues, particularly those surrounding the location of the soul in the body, generation, ensoulement, and the fate of the soul after the death of the body. These writers, like the anatomists who themselves often considered similar questions regarding the soul, drew on a variety of sources from the biblical and classical to contemporary, and they did not limit themselves to specifically religious texts. John Woolton and Simon Harward, for example, both include Galen along with Plato, Aristotle, and biblical sources in their discussions of the soul.

Despite the variety of opinions and theories that propagated in response to the issues listed above, and the impossibility of pinning down a single dominant perspective, one belief does emerge as a constant – the soul is a part of the body. While this might seem like a surprising statement, it is important to note that the early moderns meant this quite literally. Like a hand or an eye or a heart, the soul is, in many ways, an anatomical part of the body and is treated as such by many early modern anatomists, theologians, and poets. However, unlike the hand, eye, or heart, the soul is not perceptible nor measurable even though it is physically present. For this reason, the debates are often philosophical and paradoxical even though they have very real implications. Consequently, anatomists like James Deback could scoff at the longstanding theory that the soul is connected to the body through the animal spirits in the blood and argue instead that the soul acts directly on the blood with no need for intermediary spirits.

As we continue to study this period, we need to be attentive to the soul’s connection to the body and also to its status as an anatomical part imbued with the core of subjectivity and selfhood. Although the dialectic between body and soul is an
unassailable feature of the Christian subject during the period, there is a persistent sense that the self resides primarily in the soul even as it is affected by the body. In some cases, the association between ‘self’ and ‘soul’ is made explicit, such as in Moses Capell’s comment in 1632 that the two terms are essentially interchangeable. In other cases, this relationship is established implicitly. In An Collins’ *Divine Songs and Meditations*, for example, the poet repeatedly discusses the importance of the relationship between body and soul, but the body is ultimately reduced to “matter thick and grosse” and is rarely given a voice of its own (Collins, “A Song manifesting The Saints eternall Happinesse” l. 74). While the body certainly influences the self and can help shape it in Collins’ poems, subjectivity is located firmly in the soul. In Francis Quarles’ emblems the body plays a more active role through its persistent attempts to corrupt the soul, but the religious self emerges as the product of the soul’s negotiation of the corrupting influence of the body. In Emblem 5.10 of *Emblemes*, an emblem focused on the relationship between body and soul as analogous to a bird (soul) in a cage (flesh), “Soule” and “I” are interchangeable when the speaker comments, “Thus am I coop’d within this fleshly Cage” (5.10). After all, Quarles’ emblems detail the progression of the soul, not the progression of the body. Unlike the body, the soul is something that can ‘progress,’ even if that progression is extremely difficult. As I have argued throughout this dissertation, this belief that the soul mediates experience, that it is the core of the devotional subject, stresses the centrality of the soul to the self. Although the soul-body dialectic contributes to the construction of the Christian subject, emphasis on the special interiority of the soul suggests it is the locus of subjectivity.
Of course, making such a division between self and subject based on the Christianized understanding of the relationship between body and soul and the impact of religious narratives on that relationship will require further work. In this dissertation I have examined in detail the work of only two arguably marginal poets. However, the choice of these two particular poets cuts across a variety of discourses, allowing my conclusions to speak beyond the confines of just a few texts. Although both the literary texts that I have examined in this dissertation can be characterized as devotional poetry, each represents a different genre within that broad category, from Collins' 'songs' to Quarles’ emblems. In Collins' *Divine Songs and Meditations* we read a sick woman’s perspective on her illness, her gendered body, and her eventual (or hoped for) salvation, as well as her engagement in religious debates such as the mortalism controversy. In Quarles’ *Emblemes* and *Hieroglyphikes of the Life of Man* we read an extended meditation on the progress of the Protestant soul and its struggle with corporeality, using a genre that combines word and image toward an effect similar to that of anatomical textbooks. Quarles’ use of visual metaphors to depict the relationship between body and soul offers a layer of representation not available to Collins. Although corporeality and the relationship between body and soul are not the primary focus of either of these texts, the self’s negotiation with the flesh is central to the subject developed in both. Despite the differences between Collins and Quarles, both turn to Christian narratives in order to understand the body, the soul, and the relationship between the two. Collins, Quarles, and many other poets, I suspect, engaged in the discussions that I have examined in Chapter
One and Chapter Two: such meditations on the Christian subject were hardly the sole property of anatomists and theologians, nor were the details of their various debates.

The work I have done here is just the proverbial drop in the bucket and, in many ways, represents the starting point for future scholarship. By looking, for example, at the apparent extremes of anatomy and spirituality, I have been able to explore the exchange of ideas between natural philosophy and religion. From the anatomists John Banister and Helkiah Crooke, to the Christian writers John Woolton and William Cowper, to the devotional poets An Collins and Francis Quarles we see the presence of a Christianized body, a sense of corporeality that is imbued with meaning through the application of Christian narratives. I have looked exclusively, however, at texts that deal with the body, the soul, or both. Certainly, since such discussions revolve around issues of life and death, it seems particularly relevant to acknowledge the master narrative that exerts a significant influence over the Christian subject. While a Christianized understanding of the world was never very far removed from most early modern English writing, is the perspective on the body that I have been discussing as evident in more secular texts? That is to say, when the mysteries of life and death are not some of the core concerns of the author, does the Christianized body still play a significant role? My expectation is that the Christianized body will still play an important, if less prominent, role. I am encouraged, for example, by Slights' assertion that — in matters of the heart, at least — Shakespeare is indebted to both anatomical and religious (among other) narratives, even when the Christian subject is not the primary focus of the given play or poem (Slights 165-172). After all, as Debora Shuger points out, "the English Renaissance was a religious culture,
not simply a culture whose members generally were religious” (Shuger, Habits of
Thought 6). The early modern understanding of the body is evidence of the centrality of
religion, and by looking at texts and genres that are not as explicitly religious as
devotional poetry, I believe that the Christianized body will continue to surface again and
again in unexpected places. Returning to Jonathan Sawday’s argument in The Body
Emblazoned (1995), I would undoubtedly agree that the mid-seventeenth century
witnessed the proliferation of the ‘mechanical’ body, but such a proliferation did not
mean the death or even the displacement of the Christianized body, which proved to be
both resilient and adaptable. The understanding of the human body underwent significant
and dramatic transformations from the time of Thomas Vicary in the mid-sixteenth
century to the time of Samuel Collins in the late-seventeenth century and yet both
anatomists could agree that Christian narratives offered an interpretive framework for
corporeality regardless of the discrepancies in anatomical detail.

More critical work still needs to be done, as well, on the uniqueness of English
anatomical textbooks. Renaissance body criticism is often dominated by continental
anatomists such as Vesalius, his student Columbus, and Fallopius, their revolutionary
‘discoveries,’ and the impact of their ideas across Europe and England. More often than
not, Harvey is the only English anatomist included in these discussions because of his
influential work on the heart and circulation. However, while anatomists such as Banister
and Crooke might not be personally responsible for pushing the practice of anatomy in
new directions, this alone does not negate the value of examining their writings. These
texts seek to make sense of the human body through an English perspective, and the more
we continue to dip into these texts haphazardly rather than looking at them as a whole as we would other early modern genres, the more we are going to miss how anatomists, and English anatomists in particular, respond to and engage in early modern culture. Sawday has commented on Crooke's integration of the House of Alma episode of Edmund Spenser's *The Faerie Queene* into his *Mikrokosmographia*; for at least one anatomist, his work and Spenser's are united in the formation of English culture (Sawday 167-170). Many of the published English anatomists such as Vicary, Crooke, and Harvey worked at the behest of the monarchy and were consequently connected to the political, religious, and cultural changes in England during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. How did anatomists respond to the Elizabethan Settlement and tensions between Protestants and Catholics? Or to the religious and political turmoil of the Civil War and, later, the Interregnum and Restoration? Although these questions have not been entirely ignored by critics, we have only begun to scratch the surface of the cultural engagements made by English anatomists. The pursuit of absolute and detached objectivity in science and natural philosophy was still many decades away, and proto-scientists like these English anatomists willingly engaged with the cultural and intellectual debates of their historical moment. The more attentive we are to the fact that these anatomists belong to more than just the history and evolution of anatomy, the better we will be able to appreciate the complexity of the early modern body. Religion was the bright burning sun around which most early modern English debates revolved, and the closer we look at these anatomical texts, the more we will see religion move to the forefront.
APPENDIX 1:
A Select Bibliography of Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century English Anatomical Texts


Anon. *The anatomie of the inward parts of woman, very necessary to be knowne to physicians, surgians, and all other that desire to know themselues.* London, 1599.


Anon. *Pyretologia, or, A history of feavers composed according to such use of the parts, circulation of the blood and the various offices both of the lympid liquor and nervous juice, as have been the happy discoveries of modern anatomie.* Printed for Robert Clavel, 1674.


Beddevole, Dominique. *Essayes of anatomy in which the construction of the organs and their mechanical operations are clearly explained according to the new hypotheses.* Translated by J. Scougall. Edinburgh: George Mosman, 1691.

Berengario, Jacopo. *Mikrokosmographia, or, A description of the body of man being a practical anatomy, shewing the manner of anatomizing from part to part, the like hath not been set forth in the English tongue.* Translated by H. Jackson. London: Printed for Livewell Chapman, 1664.

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1 This list includes a selection of English language anatomies printed from the mid-sixteenth century through 1700. Not included in this list are texts printed in Latin or other languages. Additionally, English translations of continental sources are included, some of which translate much older texts (ie, Berengario). By focusing on English language texts, this bibliography seeks to highlight those works accessible to the widest possible reading public in Britain. Additionally, the translation of texts into English indicates the demand for specific works in the vernacular. Finally, some texts have been included because they include anatomical discussions, such as certain guides for midwifery.
Blankaart, Steven. *A physical dictionary in which all the terms relating either to anatomy, chirurgery, pharmacy, or chymistry are very accurately explain'd.* London: J. D., 1684.


Charleton, Walter. *Natural history of nutrition, life, and voluntary motion containing all the new discoveries of anatomist's and most probable opinions of physicians, concerning the oeconomie of human nature.* London: Printed for Henry Herringman, 1659.

Charleton, Walter. *Three anatomic lectures concerning 1. the motion of the bloud through the veins and arteries, 2. the organic structure of the heart, 3. the efficient causes of the hearts pulsation.* London: Printed for Walter Kettilby, 1683.


Cooke, James. *Mellificium chirurgiae, or, The marrow of chirurgery much enlarged to which is now added Anatomy.* London: J.D. for Benjamin Shirley, 1676.

Cowper, William (1666-1709). *The anatomy of humane bodies with figures drawn after the life by some of the best masters in Europe.* Oxford: Samuel Smith for Benjamin Walford, 1698.

Cowper, William. *Myotomia reformata, or, A new administration of all the muscles of humane bodies wherein the true uses of the muscles are explained, the errors of former anatomists concerning them confuted, and several muscles not hitherto taken notice of described.* London: Samuel Smith for Benjamin Walford, 1694.


Graaf, Reinier de. *De succo pancreatico, or, A physical and anatomical treatise of the nature and office of the pancreatick juice shewing its generation in the body, what diseases arise by its vitiation*. Translated by Christopher Pack. London: Printed for N. Brook, 1676.


Harvey, William. The Anatomical Exercises of Dr. William Harvey Professor of Physick, and Physician to the Kings Majesty, Concerning the Motion of the Heart and Blood. Francis Leach: London, 1653.

Harvey, William. Anatomical Exercitations, Concerning the Generation of Living Creatures: To which are added Particular Discourses, of Births, and of Conceptions, &c. London: James Young, 1653.

Haworth, Samuel. Anthropologia, or, A philosophic discourse concerning man being the anatomy both of his soul and body. London: Printed for Stephen Foster, 1680.

Helmont, Jean Baptiste van. Van Helmont's works containing his most excellent philosophy, physick, chirurgery, anatomy. Translated by J. C. London: Printed for Lodowick Lloyd, 1664.

Jewel, Edward. A brief discourse of the stomach and parts subservient unto it of the generating of blood and humors, their degenerating into diseases, how and by what means they are wrought up in the body. London, 1678.

Keill, James. The anatomy of the humane body abridged, or, A short and full view of all the parts of the body together with their several uses drawn from their compositions and structures. London: Printed for William Keblewhite, 1698.


Molins, William. Myskotomia, or, The anatomical administration of all the muscles of an humane body, as they arise in dissection as also an analitical table, reducing each muscle to his use and part. London: John Field for Edward Husband, 1648.


Read, Alexander. The manuall of the anatomy or dissection of the body of man containing the enumeration, and description of the parts of the same, which usually are shewed in the publike anatomicall exercises. London: John Haviland for F. Constable, 1638.

Remmelin, Johann. *An exact survey of the microcosmus or little world being an anatomie, of the bodies of man and woman*. Translated by John Ireton. London: Joseph Moxon, 1670.


Riolan, Jean. *A sure guide, or, The best and nearest way to physick and chyrurgery that is to say, the arts of healing by medicine and manual operation*. Translated by Nicholas Culpeper and W. R. London: Peter Cole, 1657.


Vesling, Johann. *The anatomy of the body of man wherein is exactly described every part thereof in the same manner as it is commonly shewed in publick anatomies*. Translated by Nicholas Culpeper. Peter Cole, 1653.


Willis, Thomas. *Two discourses concerning the soul of brutes which is that of the vital and sensitive of man*. Translated by S. Pordage. London: Printed for Thomas Dring, 1683.

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Harvey, William. *Anatomical Exercitations, Concerning the Generation of Living Creatures: To which are added Particular Discourses, of Births, and of Conceptions, &c.* London: James Young, 1653.


Woolton, John. *A Treatise of the Immortalitie of the Soule: Wherein is declared the Origine, Nature, and Powers of the same, together with the state and condition thereof, both as it is conioyned and dissolued from the body*. London: John Shepperd, 1576.

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McDuffie, Felecia Wright. *'To our bodies then we turn': Body as Word and Sacrament in the Works of John Donne*. New York: Continuum, 2005.


