



Centre for Health Economics  
and Policy Analysis

## CHEPA WORKING PAPER SERIES

Paper 11-02

# The Response of Ontario Primary Care Physicians to Pay-for-Performance Incentives

April 21, 2011

Jeremiah Hurley, PhD<sup>1,2,3</sup>

Phil DeCicca, PhD<sup>1,2</sup>

Jinhu Li, MA<sup>1,2</sup>

Gioia Buckley, MA<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Department of Economics, McMaster University

<sup>2</sup> Centre for Health Economics and Policy Analysis, McMaster University

<sup>3</sup> Department of Clinical Epidemiology and Biostatistics, McMaster University

## **CHEPA WORKING PAPER SERIES**

The Centre for Health Economics and policy Analysis (CHEPA) Working Paper Series provides for the circulation on a pre-publication basis of research conducted by CHEPA faculty, staff and students. The Working Paper Series is intended to stimulate discussion on analytical, methodological, quantitative, and policy issues in health economics and health policy analysis. The views expressed in the papers are the views of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Centre or its sponsors. Readers of Working Papers are encouraged to contact the author(s) with comments, criticisms, and suggestions.

**NOT FOR CITATION WITHOUT PERMISSION**

## Table of Contents

Acknowledgements	iii
Executive Summary	iv
1. Background	1
1.1 Ontario's Primary Care Performance-based Incentive Payments	1
1.2 The Research Questions	1
2. Pay-for-Performance: Definition, Use and Evidence of Effectiveness	2
2.1 Pay-for-Performance: What is it?	2
2.2 Pay-for-Performance: Its Use	2
2.3 Evidence on the Effectiveness of Pay-for-Performance	3
3. Pay-for-Performance in Ontario	5
3.1 Service Enhancement Payments for Preventive Care	6
3.1.1 Contact Payment	6
3.1.2 Cumulative Preventive Care Bonus Payment	6
3.2 Special Payments for Defined Sets of Services	7
3.3 Basket of 57 Services Included in the Family Health Network Capitation Rate	7
3.4 Primary Care Reform Practice Models	8
3.5 Bonus Payments, PCR Models and Program Evaluation	9
4. Research Design	9
4.1. Responses of Incentive Payments	9
4.1.1 The Basic Research Design	10
4.1.2 The Regression Framework	12
4.2. Changes in the Provision of 57 Services Covered by Capitation	13
5. Data, Analysis Sample and Variable Definitions	13
5.1 Data	13
5.2 Selection of the Analysis Sample	14
5.3 Defining the Practice Population for each FP	14
5.3.1 Physicians not Participating in a PCR Model	14
5.3.2 Physicians Participating in a PCR Model	14
5.4 Dependent Variables for the Incentive Analysis	15
5.4.1 Preventive Care Bonuses	15

**Table of Contents (continued)**

5.4.2 Special Payments.....	16
5.5 Dependent Variable for the Analysis of 57 Codes.....	16
5.6 Independent Variables.....	17
6. Results.....	17
6.1 Incentive Payments: Descriptive Results.....	17
6.1.1 The Sample.....	17
6.1.2 Utilization.....	18
6.2 Incentive Payments: Multivariate Regression Results.....	19
6.2.1 Preventive Care Incentive Bonuses.....	19
6.2.2 Special Payments.....	20
6.3 Incentive Payments: Sub-group Analysis by Physician Age, Practice Size and Baseline Compliance.....	20
6.4 Basket of Capitated Services.....	21
6.5 Sensitivity Analyses.....	22
7. Discussion.....	23
Tables.....	26
Figures.....	41
References.....	48

**Appendices**

Appendix A: Services that Count Toward Reaching the Special Payment Thresholds.....	Appendices-1
Appendix B: List of 57 Fee Schedule Codes Defined as Core Services Provided by Family Health Networks.....	Appendices-3
Appendix C: Ontario Primary Care Reform Models.....	Appendices-6
Appendix D: Data Sources.....	Appendices-10
Appendix E: Assigning Patients to Primary Care Physicians’ Practices...	Appendices-11
Appendix F: Construction of Dependent Variables.....	Appendices-14
Appendix G: Specification of the Independent Variables.....	Appendices-16
Appendix H: Full Set of Regression Results.....	Appendices-18
References to Appendices.....	Appendices-151

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

This research was funded by the grant from the Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care to the Centre for Health Economics and Policy Analysis as part of their collaborative research program. We thank Marsha Barnes for initially sponsoring this project. We are greatly indebted to Delia D'Amore of the Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care for sharing her time and expertise answering our many questions regarding the data and the Ministry's administrative processes related to payment policies and regulations. We thank Arthur Sweetman for helpful comments and advice, as well as participants at the annual meeting of the Canadian Health Economics Study Group (CHESG), at the bi-annual meetings of the International Health Economics Association (iHEA), at the conference of the American Society of Health Economists (ASHE), the conference of the Canadian Association for Health Services and Policy Research (CAHSPR) and participants at the annual conference of the Canadian Economics Association (CEA). We also thank the following individuals from the MOHLTC whose assistance has been instrumental at various stages of this work: Teo Honrado, Mike Collisson, Terry Stevens, Jiahui Wong, Alex Firby, Mahroo Afrashteh, Kathryn Doresco, James Gonneau, Carol MacIsaac, Barry Monaghan, Patricia Durnford, Amy Johnston, Alana Salmon and Paul Kaufman. We thank Charles Sagoe of Cancer Care Ontario for his assistance in helping us obtain data extracted from CCO's Ontario Breast Screening Program Database. We thank Dr. Leslie Solomon for his expertise and helpful advice and Andrea Ruskova, Ji Li, Sumangala Shanmuganathan and Wendy Ho for excellent research assistance. None of the above bears any responsibility for the contents of this work.

## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

Beginning in 1999, Ontario introduced pay-for-performance incentives for selected preventive primary care services and defined sets of other services provided by family physicians, with the goal of improving the quality of patient care. These performance incentives were considerably expanded in 2004. At the request of the Ministry and as part of the collaborative research program between the Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care (MOHLTC) and the Centre for Health Economics and Policy Analysis (CHEPA), CHEPA researchers undertook an evaluation of the effect of performance incentives on service provision in Ontario. This report presents the results of that evaluation.

## **Research Questions**

This evaluation addresses two primary research questions:

1. Have the performance-based incentive payments for five preventive care services and for six defined sets of physician services increased the provision of these services in the target populations?
  - The preventive care services are: senior flu shots, toddler immunizations, cervical cancer screening (Pap smear), breast cancer screening (mammogram), and colorectal cancer screening (Fecal Occult Blood Test).
  - The six sets of physician services include: obstetrical services, hospital services, palliative care services, office procedures, prenatal care and home visits.
2. Among family physicians enrolled in a Family Health Network (FHN), how has the provision of services within and outside the basket of 57 services funded by capitation payment changed since 2002 (or the date they joined a FHN after 2002)?

## **Research Design and Data**

The performance incentives for the provision of these services were available only to physicians working in Ontario's Primary Care Reform (PCR) practices. Hence, only a subset of Ontario family physicians was eligible to receive the performance incentives, and among these physicians the date of eligibility differed across the various PCR practice models. This creates a natural experiment that allows us to identify the impact of the incentives on service provision by comparing the service provision of those eligible to receive the incentive against those who were not eligible.

The evaluation identifies the impact of the performance incentives using a before-after design with a concurrent control group (sometimes called a difference-in-difference design). The study period covers the fiscal years 1998-99 to 2007-08. The date of the introduction differed among the incentives, but all incentives in this study were introduced at various points from 2002 or later. In the analysis, the "treatment group" — family physicians who were eligible for performance incentives during the study

period — includes physicians from four PCR practice types: Family Health Networks (FHNs), Family Health Groups (FHGs), Comprehensive Care Models (CCMs) and Family Health Organizations (FHOs). The control group includes family physicians who were not eligible for the performance incentives during the study period. The core control group is family physicians who remained in traditional fee-for-service practice throughout the study period (i.e., did not convert to a PCR practice).<sup>1</sup> The analysis focuses on family physicians whose practice was not specialized, who practiced in Ontario during the entire study period, and whose annual billings were at least \$30,000 each year.

The data used for the analysis consisted of individual-level data drawn from four MOHLTC administrative databases for the fiscal years 1996-2008, linked by an encrypted patient health number or an encrypted physician number. The *Registered Persons Database* provided basic information on each OHIP beneficiary; the *OHIP Claims Database* provided information on all OHIP-funded services received by an individual each month of the study period; the *Corporate Provider Database* provided basic information on each physician and his or her practice; the *Client Agency Program Enrolment (CAPE)* file provided information on the patient roster for each physician in a PCR practice. These core data were supplemented with data from other Ministry databases and other sources as was required.

The unit of analysis is an individual physician. Using validated methods, we constructed the practice population for each study physician at March 31 of each year. The measure of utilization for each of the preventive care bonuses was the proportion of a physician's eligible patients who had received the preventive service during the relevant time period. The measure of utilization for the special payments was an indicator of whether a physician's pattern of service provision exceeded the level required to qualify for the special payment. The analysis included independent variables to control for characteristics of a physician and the physician's practice, general time trends, and the status of the performance-incentive policy.

The features of the implementation of the policy and the nature of the data available enable us to control for a number of possible sources of bias when estimating the impact of the incentives:

- The use of a concurrent control group adjusts for secular trends common to all physicians with respect to the provision of these services;
- The inclusion of a number of physician and practice characteristics allows us to control for certain aspects of self-selection by physicians into the PCR practices. The longitudinal nature of

---

<sup>1</sup>The precise definition of the treatment and control groups differed by incentive because eligibility for the incentives differed by PCR practice model. In addition to fee-for-service physicians, the control group for some incentives also included PCR physicians from some PCR models.

the data (annual observations for a 10-year period) enables us to control for unobserved physician-specific effects through the estimation of fixed-effects models;

- Many family physicians joined PCR practices before becoming eligible for performance incentives. This allows us to separate possible effects on service provision of joining a PCR practice (which includes certain practice features not present in most fee-for-service practices) from the impact of the incentives.

The analysis also employed a difference-in-difference design to test for changes in the provision of the basket of 57 capitated services to rostered patients by FHN physicians. In the analysis, physicians in traditional fee-for-service constitute the control group and physicians in FHNs constitute the treatment group who were paid by capitation for these 57 services from 2002 (or the date they joined a FHN after 2002). Once again, the difference-in-difference approach was implemented using a regression framework that also controlled for a number of physician and practice characteristics and general utilization trends among study physicians.

## **Results**

The results indicate that incentives led to an increase in the provision of 4 of the 5 preventive care services: senior flu shot, Pap smear, mammogram and colorectal cancer screening. The magnitudes of the responses over baseline levels of provision are as follows: 5.1% for senior flu shot; 7.0% for Pap smear; 2.8% for mammogram, and 56.7% for colorectal cancer screening. These findings are robust to alternative specifications of the control group. Although not a consistent finding across all preventive care services, we find that younger physicians respond more than older physicians, and that those with lower baseline levels of provision respond more than those with high baseline levels of provision. We do not find a strong relationship between practice size and response to the incentives.

The results for the special payments for different sets of services indicate no response to these incentive payments. The estimates are, in general, small and not statistically different from zero.

The analysis of provision of the 57 codes funded by capitation payment for physicians in FHNs indicates no change in the provision of these services over time compared to physicians for which these services are not funded by capitation.

## **Discussion**

The results indicate that performance incentives were effective in increasing the provision of preventive



care services, but were not effective for targeted baskets of services. These results are broadly consistent with findings from other studies, though our finding for colorectal cancer screening is surprisingly large. This finding for colorectal cancer screening may be due in some way to the broader, provincial-wide initiative regarding cancer screening (though it is not clear why this would differentially affect physicians eligible for the incentive payments). The difference in the results between the preventive care services and the special payments may be due to several factors:

- The preventive services are documented to be effective and are well established as part of high-quality primary care while the special payments targeted services and patterns of care less strongly associated with quality;
- The cost of responding to the special payments was likely higher for many physicians than the cost of responding to the preventive care services (which nearly all family physicians provide);
- The response to the preventive services may be complementary to other aspects of PCR practices, such as electronic medical records, and activities required to respond to the different preventive care services are also complementary.

The study suffers from limitations that should be noted. It measures only the effect of the incentives on provision, and does not consider any impact on health outcomes; we cannot identify the extent to which physicians may have engaged in strategic gaming that would lead to an over-estimate of the real effect of the incentives; the study was not able to fully control for all sources of selection bias and confounding when estimating the effects of the incentives.

## 1 BACKGROUND

### 1.1 Ontario's Primary Care Performance-based Incentive Payments

Ontario first introduced performance-based incentives for selected primary care services in the late 1990s within the funding scheme for the Primary Care Network (PCN) practices. Similar incentives were incorporated into the funding arrangements for the Family Health Network (FHN) practices introduced in 2002, and the 2004-2008 Memorandum of Agreement between the Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care (MOHLTC) and the Ontario Medical Association, which expanded both the number of such incentives and the set of practices eligible to receive them. Throughout this period the performance-based incentives targeted a small number of preventive care services: senior flu shot, toddler immunization, cervical cancer screening, breast cancer screening, as well as the 2004 agreement that introduced a set of special payments for the delivery of specified office-based and hospital services [1]. These performance-based incentive payments, available only to Ontario family physicians participating in Primary Care Reform (PCR) practices, are intended to improve the quality of care provided to residents of Ontario.

The MOHLTC has an interest in ensuring that the payments have improved performance in the way intended. The Ministry therefore requested that the Centre for Health Economics and Policy Analysis (CHEPA), working in collaboration with the MOHLTC, evaluate the response of Ontario family physicians to the performance-based incentive payments.

### 1.2 The Research Questions

This evaluation addresses two primary research questions:

1. *Have the performance-based incentive payments for five preventive care services and for six defined sets of physician services increased the provision of these services in the target populations?*
  - The preventive care services are: senior flu shots, toddler immunizations, cervical cancer screening, breast cancer screening, and colorectal cancer screening.
  - The six sets of physician services are: obstetrical services, hospital services, palliative care services, office procedures, prenatal care, and home visits.<sup>2</sup>
2. *Among family physicians enrolled in a Family Health Network, how has the provision of services within and outside the basket of 57 services funded by capitation payment changed since 2002 (or*

---

<sup>2</sup> The set of special payments also includes one related to serious mental illness, but data limitations precluded its inclusion in the analysis.

*the year they joined a FHN after 2002)?*

## **2. PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE: DEFINITION, USE AND EVIDENCE OF EFFECTIVENESS**

### **2.1 Pay-for-Performance: What is it?**

“Pay-for-performance” refers to a wide variety of payment schemes — such a wide variety, in fact, that it can be hard to know what is meant by the term. We adopt a relatively narrow interpretation: pay-for-performance is the explicit use of financial incentives to encourage specific behaviors intended to improve quality of care. This still includes a wide variety of designs, but it emphasizes that the incentives are explicit, financial, and designed specifically to change quality-related behaviours. Pay-for-performance can be used for funding individual providers, provider organizations or health care facilities such as hospitals and long-term care institutions. We focus on pay-for-performance schemes for physicians and physician practices.

### **2.2 Pay-for-Performance: Its Use**

Since the late 1990s, pay-for-performance has been touted by many as the key to improving quality in health care [2, 3]. Although pay-for-performance is now used in many countries, it is most widely implemented in the UK National Health Service (NHS) and in both public and private health plans in the US.

The UK first introduced elements of pay-for-performance with the 1990 fund-holding reforms, one part of which provided extra payments to general practitioners (GPs) whose practices exceeded coverage thresholds for a set of selected screening services [4]. The NHS implemented pay-for-performance on a large scale with the 2004 General Medical Services contract. The contract provides financial rewards to primary care practices that meet quality standards with respect to 134 indicators<sup>3</sup> in four areas: clinical (e.g., heart disease, diabetes, cancer, mental health), organizational (record system, training), patient experience (e.g., consultation length) and additional services (e.g., screening and contraceptive services) [5]. Each practice is graded, given a score (out of 1000 points<sup>4</sup>), and incentive payments are based on the practice’s score. Large amounts of money are at stake: in its first year of implementation, payments under the performance incentive scheme increased the average GP income

---

<sup>3</sup> When first introduced, the number of indicators included was 146.

<sup>4</sup> When first introduced, the number of points was 1050; 50 points were removed when the GMS contract was revised in 2006.

by about 30% [6]. The pay-for-performance scheme is one part of a larger NHS quality initiative, the Quality of Outcomes Framework (QOF).

In the US, pay-for-performance schemes were estimated to be used in 2005 by over one-half of commercial health maintenance organizations (HMOs), affecting care delivered to over 80 percent of HMO enrollees [7]. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services have several ongoing pay-for-performance demonstration projects. The Physician Quality Reporting Initiative (PQRI) was introduced in 2007 and is a voluntary pay-for-performance scheme for physicians who provide care to Medicare beneficiaries and report their performance on predefined quality measures [8]. More recently, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, signed into law in March 2010, extends the PQRI making quality reporting mandatory by 2015 [9]. Pay-for-performance incentives in the US are targeted at a broader set of physicians and health care organizations than the UK scheme, and generally constitute a smaller share of overall funding to a practice than in the UK scheme — seldom more than 5-10% of gross income and often less — though some more recent initiatives include larger incentive payments [10]. But pay-for-performance has penetrated many aspects of care and, as noted by one prominent commentator on the American health care system, has reached the “tipping point.” [11]

Pay-for-performance has not penetrated far in the Canadian health care system. As noted, Ontario initially introduced elements of pay-for-performance in primary care in 1999, and expanded it within primary care in 2004. In 2006, both British Columbia and Manitoba introduced a primary-care-based pay-for-performance. The British Columbia scheme, called the Full Service Family Practice Incentive Program [12], focuses on preventive care services, obstetrics, mental health and chronic disease management. Manitoba’s scheme, called the Quality Based Incentive Funding program, was introduced in participating demonstration sites and focuses on the provision of chronic disease management and preventive care services [13]. In 2009, Alberta introduced the Performance & Diligence Indicators, a voluntary initiative for primary care physicians; however, implementation has been delayed [14]. Also in 2009, Nova Scotia introduced the Chronic Disease Management Incentive Program for Family Physicians [15], an incentive paid yearly for every eligible chronic condition managed by family physicians.

### **2.3 Evidence on the Effectiveness of Pay-for-Performance**

While pay-for-performance has many vocal proponents and the amount of published literature on this topic is quickly growing, evidence on the effects of pay-for-performance on behaviour and quality of care is limited, comes from a small number of pay-for-performance schemes, and is often based on studies with relatively weak research designs. Because of this, it is not possible to make definitive

statements regarding the effectiveness of pay-for-performance. But empirical evidence to date indicates that pay-for-performance has mixed, generally weak effects and is not cost-effective. Following a systematic review of the evidence, Rosenthal and Frank [16] concluded that “. . . the empirical foundations of pay for performance in health care are rather weak.”

Rigorous evaluation of the UK primary-care pay-for-performance scheme is compromised by two factors: because it was implemented throughout the NHS, there is no concurrent control group against which to compare changes in service provision following the introduction of the incentives; in addition, because it is only one part of a broader quality initiative, it is impossible to separate the effects of pay-for-performance from other changes [17, 18]. Campbell et al. [19] provides perhaps the best evidence to date on the effects of pay-for-performance in the NHS. The study assessed the quality of care provided for asthma, coronary heart disease and type 2 diabetes by a representative sample of general practices at four points in time, two before pay-for-performance was introduced (1998, 2003) and two after (2005, 2007). The authors conducted an interrupted time series analysis to assess whether the introduction of pay-for-performance had an effect on the pre-existing trend in the level of quality of care. The study found that in 2005 the rate of improvement in quality increased for diabetes care and asthma but remained unchanged for coronary heart disease; by 2007, the rate of improvement for all three conditions had slowed down.

Two US-based studies of pay-for-performance within a large network HMO failed to find important effects [2, 10]. Both studies compared the changes in the provision of services targeted by pay-for-performance within California-based physician groups affiliated with the Pacific-West HMO against Pacific-West-affiliated physician groups in Washington and Oregon not subject to the pay-for-performance incentive scheme. The early study examined utilization of preventive services (cervical cancer screening, mammography and hemoglobin A1c testing) and found evidence of an effect for only cervical cancer screening (increase of 3.6 percentage points (or 10%) increase in Pap smear coverage-rate). Because the plan paid performance bonuses to all practices that met the target, most of the bonuses were paid to practices that were already performing well at baseline and the cost per unit change was high. A second follow-up study expanded the set of services analyzed and included a more generous pay-for-performance scheme affecting a larger set of California-based physician groups. The analysis found evidence of a positive effect only for cervical cancer screening; it found evidence of possible negative effects on asthma medication and antibiotic usage. As expected, the response was larger the more generous the performance bonus. Overall, the analysts concluded that the pay-for-performance scheme resulted in neither a major improvement in quality nor a notable disruption in care (which some hypothesized would be a negative side-effect).

These findings are consistent with recent systematic reviews of studies regarding responses to pay-for-performance schemes and targeted financial incentives more generally [16,20-24]. Although most of the studies examined used relatively small incentives (though still large compared to programs in Canada), the general consensus is that the evidence to date documents inconsistent, modest responses to pay-for-performance incentives with virtually no evidence of ultimate health effects.

Although not the focus of this analysis, commentators have criticized pay-for-performance schemes along a number of dimensions. Pay-for-performance, it is argued: rewards physicians for what they already do or should already do [20, 25, 26]; can create negative effects by diverting attention from aspects of care not targeted by incentives [10]; induces gaming by physicians through strategic coding of patient diagnoses and exclusion of patients from counting in performance rating [27]; and can create a negative effect on morale within a primary care team when the full team (e.g., physicians, nurses, assistants) work to achieve the pay-for-performance targets but only physicians receive the rewards [16, 27].

### **3. PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE IN ONTARIO**

As noted, Ontario first introduced preventive care bonuses to capitation-funded PCNs in 1999 and expanded their use through the 2004 Physician Services Agreement, making them available to general/family practitioners (FPs) enrolled in the various PCR models subsequently introduced. The 2004 Agreement included a large number of incentives targeting various aspects of the organization of PCR practices and the care delivered by physicians in those practices. Further, as discussed below, the specific incentives and dates of eligibility differ across the various PCR models

This analysis is limited to a set of five preventive care incentives (referred to as the “Cumulative Preventive Care Management Service Enhancement Codes”) and six “Special Payments” of particular interest to the MOHLTC. It examines the responses of FPs in the following PCR models that became eligible for these incentive payments at some point since 2002: Family Health Groups (FHGs), Family Health Networks (FHNs), Comprehensive Care Models (CCMs), and Family Health Organizations (FHOs). We first describe the performance-based incentives and then the eligibility of physicians in the various PCR models to receive the incentive payments.

Table 1 lists the five performance-based incentives for preventive care services and the special payments for designated sets of services in six areas of care.

### 3.1 Service Enhancement Payments for Preventive Care

The service enhancement payments for preventive care include two components, one that rewards PCR practices for contacting patients to schedule an appointment to receive a targeted preventive service and a second that rewards PCR practices for achieving high rates of coverage for the preventive service in the target populations.

#### 3.1.1 Contact Payment

The PCR practice receives \$6.86 for each eligible patient that it contacts in an attempt to schedule an appointment for a designated service and for which it provides the Ministry the required documentation.

#### 3.1.2 Cumulative Preventive Care Bonus Payment

Each preventive care bonus payment rewards a PCR practice when one of its physicians achieves specified levels of coverage for a targeted preventive service in the physician's practice population. Each preventive service incentive can be described by three key characteristics: the *target population*, the *time period*, and the *threshold coverage levels*.

- The target population (e.g., for the senior flu immunization, rostered patients aged 65 or older) forms the denominator in the calculation of the coverage rate.
- The bonus payment is calculated on March 31 of each year, and is based on services received by rostered patients during a specified time period prior to March 31. For the senior flu immunization, for example, the time period is the previous season for flu immunization (generally August 1 – December 31); for cervical cancer screening the time period is the previous 30 months.
- The bonus payments are based on a graduated set of coverage thresholds whereby the amount of the bonus payment increases with service coverage. For the seniors' flu shot, for example, the lowest level of coverage eligible for payment is 60%, which earns a bonus of \$220; at the high end, coverage of 80% or more earns a bonus of \$2,200. The bonus payment is based on the proportion of a physician's rostered and eligible patients who received the service in the defined time period; the physician with whom the patient is rostered on March 31 need not have provided it. For example, if a physician provided a Pap smear to a patient on February 1 and that patient changed physicians on March 1, the patient's receipt of the Pap smear would count toward the second physician's bonus calculation on March 31.

Lastly, it should be noted that, although the payment is based on the performance of individual physicians, the payment is made to the physician's PCR practice for FPs in a FHN; how the practice

uses the funds received is determined by the practice.<sup>5</sup> Physicians in FHGs, CCMs and FHOs receive the payment directly; it does not go to the PCR practice.

The payments are of modest size by international standards. A physician who reached the highest level of coverage for all five preventive services would earn the practice \$11,000. In addition, the physician would be eligible for contact payments for which the maximum possible payment is less easy to calculate, but assuming 1.5 claims per eligible patient and about 1,000 eligible patients per family practice, at \$6.86 per claim, this translates to an additional \$10,000 per FP. Assuming a typical rostered patient population of about 1,600 for a physician participating in a PCR practice, the combination of the two represents approximately about \$13 annually per rostered patient.

### **3.2 Special Payments for Defined Sets of Services**

The special payments are structured differently. In each case, the bonus payment is based on reaching a minimum absolute level of service provision during the preceding fiscal year, where that minimum is defined in terms of number of services, dollar value of services, number of patients, or a combination of these factors. For each incentive there is also only a single threshold level: if it is reached, the physician receives the special payment; if it is not reached, the physician does not receive the payment. For the obstetrical services special payment, for instance, if a FP attended 5 or more births for 5 or more women during the previous fiscal year, the physician would receive a bonus of \$3,200 (\$5,000 after October 2007). The specific services eligible to count toward receiving each special payment are listed in Appendix A. Unlike the preventive care bonuses, the services had to be provided by the physician and, for all FPs (even those in a FHN), the payments were made directly to the physician, not to the physician's PCR practice.

### **3.3 Basket of 57 Services Included in the Family Health Network Capitation Rate**

A large component of income for FPs enrolled in a FHN PCR model derives from capitation payments associated with a "core" set of 57 services to rostered patients. Services not included in this basket of core services, provided to either rostered or non-rostered patients, are paid on a fee-for-service basis. Appendix B lists the 57 services covered by the capitation payment.

---

<sup>5</sup> Beginning in 2006, if there is unanimous agreement among the physicians in a PCR practice, the practice could request that the payments be made directly to its individual physicians rather than the PCR practice. We have no information on the number of practices that have exercised this option. For ease of exposition, for all incentives we refer to "whether a physician receives a payment" even in those instances when the payment was made to the practice rather than the physician.



### 3.4 Primary Care Reform Practice Models

The primary care sector in Ontario evolved considerably during the study period. The analysis includes FPs practicing in traditional fee-for-service practices and FPs practicing in four different PCR models (Table 2). A fuller description of the different models can be found in Appendix C.

*Traditional Fee-for-Service (FFS).* Physicians in a FFS practice did not join a PCR model at any point during the study period. Fee-for-service FPs do not roster patients, do not have to meet any defined practice criteria regarding size or practice features, are paid by fee-for-service throughout the study period, and are not eligible to receive the performance-based incentive payments under study.

*Family Health Networks (FHNs).* FHNs were introduced in 2002, require a minimum of 3 FPs, are paid by a blended capitation formula, and are eligible for all the performance-based incentive payments at some point during the study period (Table 3). The number of FPs enrolled in FHNs grew from 130 participating in 15 groups on March 31, 2003 to 1,085 participating in 93 groups on March 31, 2008.

*Family Health Groups (FHGs).* FHGs were introduced in 2003 and require a minimum of 3 FPs; formal rostering is voluntary (but required to obtain certain payments)<sup>6</sup>; and FHGs are paid by a blended formula in which fee-for-service is dominant. Physicians in FHGs are eligible for all the preventive care performance incentives and some of the special payments at some point in the study period (Table 3). The number of FPs in FHGs grew from 2,009 in 176 groups on March 31, 2004 to 4,351 in 304 groups on March 31, 2008.

*Comprehensive Care Model (CCM).* CCMs were introduced in 2005, include physicians in solo practice, require patient rostering, and funds practices through a blended formula in which fee-for-service is dominant. Physicians in CCMs are eligible for all the preventive care bonuses at some point in the study period; they are not eligible for the special payments (Table 3). The number of FPs in CCMs was 345 on March 31, 2006 and 331 on March 31, 2008.

*Family Health Organizations (FHOs).* FHOs were created in November 2006, primarily by the conversion of existing Health Service Organizations (HSOs) and Primary Care Networks (PCNs), though some FHOs were created from scratch. FHOs require a minimum of 3 FPs<sup>7</sup>, require patient

---

<sup>6</sup> A practice could “passively roster” whereby the Ministry created a roster based on the individuals for whom the practice submitted claims. Alternatively, it could formally roster patients as required by the other PCR models.

<sup>7</sup> Existing HSOs with fewer than 3 FPs that converted were grandfathered under this regulation.

rostering, and are funded through a blended capitation model. Physicians in FHOs were eligible for all the preventive care bonuses and all the special payments beginning in November 2006 (Table 3). The number of FPs in FHOs grew from 340 in 59 groups on March 31, 2006 (these were still HSOs and PCNs on March 31, 2006) to 1,057 in 114 groups on March 31, 2008.

In addition to the incentive payments under study, these PCR practices were eligible for a larger set of targeted payments and subject to regulations regarding selected aspects of practice. Table 4 lists some of these features.

### **3.5 Bonus Payments, PCR Models and Program Evaluation**

For purposes of the evaluation, three things are critical about the implementation of the performance-based incentives in Ontario. First, FPs in the traditional fee-for-service model were never eligible for such incentives. FPs in traditional fee-for-service practices therefore form a natural control group for the evaluation. Second, even among FPs who joined PCR models there is variation in eligibility for a number of the bonuses and special payments. Not all PCR practice models are eligible for all the incentives and in some cases, different PCR practice models became eligible at different points in time. Third, eligibility for the incentive payments is not perfectly confounded with joining a PCR: some FPs joined a PCR model before they became eligible for bonus payments (unaware that they would later become eligible for such payments). This enables the evaluation to distinguish the effects of the incentive payments from the effect of joining a new practice model.

## **4. RESEARCH DESIGN**

### **4.1 Responses of Incentive Payments**

#### *4.1.1 The Basic Research Design*

The implementation of the incentive payments in Ontario provides a natural experiment by which to evaluate their effect on service provision. As described in section 5.1 below, the data available for the evaluation allow us to identify individual physician practice populations and service delivery for each fiscal year during the ten-year period FY1998/99 – FY2007/08. The basic strategy for identifying the effect of the incentive payments is to compare changes in service provision of FPs exposed to the incentives (the “treatment” group) against changes in service provision of FPs not exposed to the

incentives (the “control” group). The design must control, to the extent possible, for two fundamental sources of bias: selection and confounding.

The ideal control group represents what the treatment group would have done in the absence of the incentives. When exposure to treatment is voluntary, however, as is the case for the incentive payments, self-selection may make those who were not exposed to the incentives systematically different from those who were exposed, thereby leading to bias in the estimated impact of the incentives.

Confounding refers to the possibility that factors other than the incentives themselves, but correlated with exposure to the incentives, contribute to observed changes. Failure to control for confounding may falsely attribute to the incentives effects that were caused by the other factors. For instance, because only physicians who joined PCR models were exposed to the incentives, it is possible that another feature of the PCR models is partly responsible for observed changes in service provision.

To mitigate these sources of bias we use a difference-in-difference (DID) design with suitably chosen control groups. A DID design estimates the effects of the incentives as follows. Let Util represent a relevant measure of utilization, “NI” the control group of FPs not eligible for the incentives, “I” the group of FPs exposed to the incentives, “pre” the period before incentives were implemented and “post” to the period after the incentives were implemented. The effect of the incentives on service provision is estimated as:

$$(Util_{I,post} - Util_{I,pre}) - (Util_{NI,post} - Util_{NI,pre}) \quad (1)$$

This research design, combined with features of the program design, allow us to control for a number of potential sources of bias.

*Selection.* Three strategies reduce the potential for selection bias. First, alternative definitions of the control group reduce the chances of selection bias. The core control group consists of physicians who remained in FFS during the entire study period. However, for some incentives physicians in some of the PCR models were also not eligible; for these incentives the control group includes a mixture of FFS and PCR physicians. Further, some of the PCR models paid FPs by a variant of FFS and allowed them to remain in solo practice. Physicians in such practices may be quite similar to those who remained in traditional fee-for-service. If so, this implies a more valid comparison and, hence, better estimates of the effects of interest. We compare whether the results differ for this sub-set of PCR physicians from those obtained for the whole sample of PCR physicians. Second, we implement the DID approach

within a regression framework, which allows us to control for a number of physician and practice characteristics that may differ systematically between the treatment and control physicians. To the extent that these characteristics drive differential responses among physicians, their inclusion reduces potential bias in the estimates. Third, we estimate a DID model with physician-specific fixed effects, which controls for any characteristic (including those that are unobserved) of a physician that does not change during the study period. This helps control for baseline differences between the control and treatment groups.

*Confounding.* We are particularly concerned about two types of confounding: a PCR-practice effect and the effect of separate initiatives that influence the level of utilization of the services being analyzed.

Potential confounding from a PCR-practice effect can arise because PCR practices have features not found in traditional fee-for-service practices. Since only FPs in PCR practices are eligible for the incentive payments, if these other practice features influence the provision of the services in question, the analysis may falsely attribute to the incentive what is really an effect of another PCR practice feature. The analysis can control for this in two ways. First, the majority of physicians eligible for the incentives joined a PCR practice before they became eligible for incentive payments. Hence, we observe their level of provision before joining the PCR, while in the PCR but before being exposed to the incentives, and then while in the PCR practice while eligible for the incentives. This allows us to identify separately the impact of the PCR practice itself from the incentives. Second, for a number of the incentives the control group includes at least some FPs practicing in PCR practices whose FPs were not eligible for the incentive payments.

Potential confounding from other initiatives that influence receipt of the preventive care services is of greatest concern for the senior flu shot, breast cancer screening and colorectal screening. The province has invested heavily in its universal flu vaccination program since 2000, both in making the flu shot available through special clinics and in promoting the up-take of the flu shot. Flu shots obtained through a flu-shot clinic rather than in the FP office are not recorded in the OHIP database. Similarly, women can obtain a mammogram through the Ontario Breast Screening Program, which offers specialized clinics for mammograms. Mammograms obtained through these clinics are also not recorded in the OHIP claims database. Finally, beginning in 2004 Ontario launched a pilot program to encourage colorectal cancer screening program, and in 2007 launched a population-based colorectal cancer screening program (“ColonCancerCheck”) in collaboration with Cancer Care Ontario.

None of these initiatives are specific to patients in PCR practices: they offer services to all eligible Ontario residents. Consequently, the inclusion of the fee-for-service control group controls for the general impact of these programs on the receipt of the respective services through FP offices, as long as they affected provision equally for physicians in the control and treatment groups. One concern for flu shots and mammograms is that physicians eligible for incentive payments may have differential incentive to encourage their patients to receive the service through the FP office rather than one of the specialized clinics (thereby ensuring that the service is recorded and counts in the bonus calculation). If there is such a differential incentive, it would lead to an over-estimate of the effect of the incentive payment. We can address this potential problem explicitly for mammograms using data from the Ontario Breast Screening Program that allow us to include in the analysis mammograms obtained through that program.

Finally, while the DID approach allows for baseline differences between the treatment and control groups, it assumes that trends in service provision were the same across the two groups during the period preceding the introduction of the incentives — that the pre-intervention changes in provision were the same across the treatment and control groups. In addition to our primary analysis, we implement statistical approaches that relax this assumption.

Table 5 describes the FPs who constitute the control and treatment groups in the analysis of each performance incentive.

#### 4.1.2 *The Regression Framework*

Implementing this research design in a regression framework is complicated by the fact that physicians in different PCR models became eligible for the incentives at different dates, so there is no single, common date at which people switched from “no-incentive” to “incentive.” The basic regression model we estimate is as follows:

$$Util_{itj} = \beta_j X_{it} + \gamma_j T_t + \rho_j D_i + \delta_j (T_t D_i) + \theta_{tj} + \varphi_{ij} + \mu_{itj} \quad (2)$$

where:  $Util_{itj}$  is the utilization of service  $j$  by physician  $i$  in year  $t$ ;  $X_{it}$  are physician and practice characteristics of physician  $i$  in year  $t$ ;  $T_t$  is the treatment dummy variable indicating whether year  $t$  is before or after exposure to the incentive (0 = pre; 1 = post);  $D_i$  is a dummy variable indicating whether a physician is a member of the treatment group or the control group (0 = control, 1 = treatment);  $T_t D_i$  is an interaction term indicating if physician  $i$  was exposed to the incentive in year  $t$  (0 = no; 1 = yes);  $\theta_{tj}$  represents the secular time trend in the utilization of service  $j$  (enabling us to separate the effects of secular time trends, to which both treatment and control groups are exposed, from the effects of the

treatment).;  $\varphi_{ij}$  represents the individual-specific effect for physician  $i$  in providing service  $j$  (enabling us to control for fixed, unobserved effects associated with each physician); and  $\mu_{itj}$  is a random error term with the usual assumed properties. The parameter of interest is  $\delta_j$ : this represents the impact on the provision of service  $j$  of being exposed to the incentive.

We estimate this model using pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and cluster the standard errors by the individual physician. Although it would have been desirable to cluster by practice group, since unexplained aspects of utilization patterns may be correlated among physicians in a single group, data limitations precluded us from doing this.<sup>8</sup>

## 4.2 Changes in the Provision of 57 Services Covered by Capitation

We also employed a difference-in-difference design to test for changes in the provision of the basket of 57 capitated services to rostered patients by FHN physicians. In the analysis, physicians in traditional fee-for-service constitute the control group<sup>9</sup> and physicians in FHNs constitute the treatment group who were paid by capitation for these 57 services from 2002 (or the date they joined a FHN after 2002). The impact of capitation funding on provision of these services is measured as:

$$(\text{Util}_{\text{FHN,post}} - \text{Util}_{\text{FHN,pre}}) - (\text{Util}_{\text{control,post}} - \text{Util}_{\text{control,pre}}) \quad (3)$$

where Util is a measure of utilization of the 57 services relative to all other services, FHN indicates that the observation is for a FHN physician, “control” indicates that the observation is for a FFS physician, and “pre” and “post” refer to the observation being before or after joining the FHN and being funded by capitation for the 57 services. Once again, the difference-in-difference approach was implemented using a regression framework that also controlled for a number of physician and practice characteristics and general utilization trends among study physicians.

## 5. DATA ANALYSIS SAMPLE AND VARIABLE DEFINITIONS

### 5.1 Data

---

<sup>8</sup> To the extent that error terms are correlated among physicians in a practice group, the failure to cluster results in standard errors that are biased downward, increasing the likelihood that we will find statistically significant effects.

<sup>9</sup> As a sensitivity test we also ran analyses in which the control group included FPs in FHGs and CCMs, who were also paid by fee-for-service for these services.

The core data used for the analysis consisted of individual-level data drawn from four MOHLTC administrative databases for the fiscal years 1996-2008, linked by an encrypted patient health number or an encrypted physician number. The Registered Persons Database provided basic information on each OHIP beneficiary; OHIP Claims Database provided information on all OHIP-funded services received by an individual each month of the study period; the Corporate Provider Database provided basic information on each physician and his or her practice; the Client Agency Program Enrolment (CAPE) file provided information on the patient roster for each physician in a PCR practice. These core data were supplemented with data from other Ministry databases and other sources as was required. Details are provided in Appendix D.

The unit of analysis is an individual physician. Using methods we describe below, we constructed the practice population for each study physician at March 31 of each year. This allowed us to identify the rates of coverage for the preventive care services for the relevant period each year and the number/value of services and/or the number of individuals to whom services had been provided that were eligible for special payments.

## **5.2 Selection of the Analysis Sample**

We are interested in evaluating the response of established FPs who might plausibly respond: primary care physicians providing a broad range of primary care services to their patients and who do not specialize in a particular area such as psychotherapy or sports medicine [28]. We applied three types of inclusion/exclusion criteria in selecting the analysis sample: (1) criteria to ensure that a physician is a FP in an established practice and engaged regular service provision over the period of the analysis; (2) criteria to ensure that the FP provides a broad range of services, including a minimum level of core primary care services such as visits and assessments; (3) criteria to ensure that all required data are available. Table 6 lists the criteria, their rationales and the impact they had on the number of physicians in the analysis sample (when applied to the population of physicians in order listed in the table). As noted, the analysis excludes physicians practicing in settings other than the five identified above in section 3.4. The exclusion of physicians in these other settings, some of which are types of PCRs, reflects the fact that insufficient data was available for physicians in these practice settings (e.g., HSO physicians submitted encounter forms only, not detailed claims data; others submitted shadow billings whose validity was not established). Our analysis included only FPs who, once in the treatment group, remained in the treatment group until the end of the study period. FPs who were in the treatment group but, at any point later in the study period, became affiliated with a group that was not eligible for the incentive were dropped from the sample. After applying the inclusion/exclusion criteria,

we had 2,185 physicians in our analysis sample. Table 7 presents the distribution of the analysis sample across the primary care models at the end of each fiscal year.

### **5.3 Defining the Practice Population for each FP**

Because each of the preventive care bonuses is defined with respect to the proportion of a FP's practice population that has received a specified service as of March 31 each year, analyzing the impact of the bonus payments requires that we identify each FP's practice population on March 31 of each year. The method used to define a FP's practice population depended on the practice model in which the FP practiced.

#### *5.3.1 Physicians not Participating in a PCR Model*

FPs in traditional fee-for-service practices do not roster patients. We defined their practice populations using the validated methodology described in Hutchison et al. [29]. On March 31 of a given year, a FP's practice population is defined as: all individuals for whom the physician billed OHIP for at least one visit during the previous fiscal year; and all additional patients for whom the physician billed OHIP for at least one visit in each of the two preceding fiscal years. Patients who met these criteria for more than one physician were assigned to the physician who billed for the largest number of visits; if the number of visits was equal, assignment was based on the physician with the most recent visit. (Details are provided in Appendix E).

#### *5.3.2 Physicians Participating in a PCR Model*

The practices of physicians in PCR models include both rostered (the majority) and non-rostered patients. The practice of a FP in PCR model was defined on March 31 of a given year as the set of rostered patients (as indicated by the Ministry CAPE database) plus non-rostered patients as assigned by the Hutchison et al. algorithm.

In the core sample of 2,185 FPs the average patient population was approximately 1,600 per FP.

### **5.4 Dependent Variables for the Incentive Analysis**

Details regarding the construction of all dependent variables can be found in Appendix F. We briefly describe them below.

#### *5.4.1 Preventive Care Bonuses*



The dependent variable for the analysis of each of the five preventive care bonuses is defined, as of March 31 each year, as the proportion of a FP’s practice population that received the service in question during the relevant period prior to that March 31st. For PCR FPs, this variable is constructed using data from rostered patients only because MOHLTC’s criterion for payment of the bonus is defined in reference to rostered patients only. We conduct a sensitivity analysis (see section 6.5 below) using an alternate dependent variable that includes both the rostered and non-rostered patients for family physicians in PCR models so as to obtain a measure that is more consistent across traditional FFS and PCR physicians.

A further complication is that PCR physicians can bill a “tracking code” for patients who receive a flu shot at specialized clinics rather than the FP’s office, an option not available to FFS physicians. We conduct sensitivity analyses regarding the use of such codes to define flu shot uptake among PCR practices to test the robustness of our findings to this potential problem.

#### *5.4.2 Special Payments*

The dependent variable for the analysis of each of the special payments is defined dichotomously, taking on the value of 1 if the physician’s service provision met the criteria for the special payment of interest, and 0 if it did not.

### **5.5 Dependent Variable for the Analysis of 57 Codes**

We assessed changes by FHN FPs in the provision of the 57 capitation-funded services by comparing changes in the proportion of total activity represented by these services for FHN rostered patients of FHN FPs with changes in the proportion of total activity represented by these services for physicians not paid by capitation for these services. The treatment group included FPs from our core sample who converted to a FHN between 2002 (year FHNs were introduced) and 2008 and who stayed in a FHN until March 31, 2008 (the end of the study period). The dependent variable is defined as:

$$\text{Prop}_{\text{FHN},57} = (\$ \text{ Value of 57 services, rostered patients}) / (\$ \text{ Value of all services, rostered patients})$$

The control group for our baseline analysis includes the FFS FPs from our core sample.<sup>10</sup> The dependent variable for the FFS FPs was defined as:

---

<sup>10</sup> We also ran analyses in which the control group included FPs in FHGs and CCMs, who were also paid by fee-for-service for these services.

$$\text{Prop}_{\text{FFS},57} = (\$ \text{ Value of 57 services, all patients})/(\$ \text{ Value of all services, all patients})$$

## 5.6 Independent Variables

The analysis includes independent variables to control for characteristics of a physician and the physician's practice, general time trends, and the status of the performance-incentive policy. The physician characteristics include age, sex, and years in practice. Practice characteristics include location (urban/rural, metropolitan areas), size of practice population, measures of the age-sex distribution of the practice population, activity levels (days worked per year, number of visits, number of patient visits per working day) and practice model (FFS, FHN, FHG, CCM and FHO). Additional variables include year dummies to represent secular time trends, geographical dummies (Census Divisions), a dummy variable to indicate if a physician is in the treatment or control group, a dummy variable to indicate if an observation was a pre- or post-policy, a dummy variable to indicate if the physician was exposed to the incentive that year, and relevant interaction terms. Details regarding the specification of the independent variables are presented in Appendix G.

## 6. RESULTS

### 6.1 Incentive Payments: Descriptive Results

#### 6.1.1 *The Sample*

Table 8 presents sample descriptive statistics at the pre-intervention baseline, defined as of March 31, 2003, disaggregated by the control group and the treatment group exposed to the incentives.<sup>11</sup> Comparing the incentive and control groups for the analysis of the five preventive services and palliative care service reveals that the physicians in the incentive group are slightly younger, more likely to be female, have been practicing for a shorter period of time, have practices that are larger, have a higher proportion of female and infant patients, have a lower proportion of elderly patients, and tend to work more days and provide more services. Comparing the control and incentive groups for the other five special payments reveals a similar pattern with the exception of practice size (incentive-group physicians have smaller practices), average patient average age (incentive-group physicians have slightly older patients) and workload (incentive-group physicians tend to work more days but provide

---

<sup>11</sup> As noted above, the definition of the control groups differs slightly across some of the incentives, but the patterns are so similar across the cases that we have collapsed them into one table.

fewer services). The standard deviations for the various characteristics indicate that the treatment groups for both sets of services are more homogenous than the control groups. Overall, both comparisons reveal, not surprisingly, that the control and incentive groups differ at baseline, highlighting the need to control for such characteristics in the analysis and for other fixed, unobserved characteristics of physicians.

### 6.1.2 Utilization

#### *Contact Incentives*

We can only document the extent to which family physicians contacted patients to arrange the receipt of preventive services for the period after the relevant codes were introduced in the fee schedule. Table 9 presents the proportion of eligible physicians who submitted at least one claim for contacting a patient to arrange an appointment to deliver a preventive care service. Two things are notable: (1) the rate of uptake is relatively low — with the exception of a couple of years for the senior flu shot, less than 45% of eligible physicians submitted even a single claim; (2) and there is no noticeable upward trend — in fact, the proportion has been falling in recent years for 4 of the 5 services. Figure 1 presents the mean number of claims per eligible physician for each service. For all services except senior flu shot, the mean number of claims per eligible physician is less than 20; even for senior flu shots the mean exceeds 100 for only one year during this period. Overall, there appears to have been little response to these contact incentive payments.

#### *Provision of Health Care Services*

Figure 2 to Figure 12 present unadjusted trends in the utilization of each service. The horizontal axis in each graph represents the 10 years of analysis (March 31, 1999 – March 31, 2008). For the preventive care services, the vertical axis is the mean proportion of patients who received the targeted services each year among practices in each of the respective groups; for the special payments the vertical axis represents the proportion of physicians who met the payment threshold. The different lines represent the control group and each of a set of treatment groups defined in terms of when they were first eligible for the incentive (e.g., incent2003 were first eligible during FY2002-03, so the observation for 2003 on the graph represents the first full year after being eligible).

Among the preventive care services, the baseline levels of compliance tend to be higher for the treatment groups than for the control group. The trends for two services, Pap smear and colorectal cancer screening, suggest possible effects of the incentive payments: rates of compliance increased in the incentive groups after exposure but the control groups show no corresponding trend. Two services, senior flu shots and toddler immunization show no evidence of a response to the incentives.

The fifth service, mammogram, displays equivocal evidence. Overall, the trends for three of the incentive groups are consistent with a response while the trends for the other two are not. For special payments, the general pattern is again one in which the baseline levels of compliance are higher for physicians in the incentive groups. The trends display substantial year-to-year variability in the proportion of practices that meet the criteria. This partly reflects the smaller sample sizes in the incentive groups (physicians in CCMs and FHGs were not eligible for many of the special payments). The trend for only one of the six services — palliative care — suggests a possible response to the special payments.

## 6.2 Incentive Payments: Multivariate Regression Results

### 6.2.1 Preventive Care Incentive Bonuses

Table 10 summarizes the main results for the regression analysis of the five preventive care bonuses (full regression results are presented in Appendix H). In the table, column (a) presents the baseline proportion of patients who had received the service in question. The next three columns present the estimated marginal effect of the incentives, which indicates the estimated change in the proportion of the target population who received the service as a result of the incentive. Column (b) presents the marginal effect for an analysis based on the full sample; columns (c) and (d) present the marginal effects for sub-samples as indicated.

The estimates are interpreted as follows. The 0.028 in the first row (Senior Flu Shot) of column (b) says that the incentive payment is estimated to have increased the proportion of seniors who received a flu shot by 0.028 (2.8 percentage points). This is the absolute increase. To get a sense for the relative increase, this predicted impact is on a baseline level of 0.554, so it represents an increase of 5.1% over the baseline level of provision. Other estimates presented in the table are interpreted analogously.

Continuing to focus on the “Full Sample” analysis, we see that for four of the five preventive services the bonus payments are estimated to have increased the rate of service provision. The only service for which this is not the case is toddler immunizations. The service with the largest estimated relative impact to baseline is colorectal cancer screening (56.7%), followed by Pap smear (7.0%), senior flu shot (5.1%), and mammogram (2.8%).

The results in columns (c) and (d) represent a type of sensitivity analysis. Column (c) presents the results when the analysis is conducted only on physicians who joined a PCR before the incentives were introduced. This adjusts for the possibility of selection bias (some physicians joined the PCR just to

become eligible for the bonuses) and for confounding (the dates at which PCR-related changes in practice occurred differs from the date of the introduction of the incentives). The results are nearly identical to those for the full sample. Column (d) presents results estimated only over those PCR physicians in practices funded primarily by fee-for-service. Among PCR physicians, this sub-group is most similar to the control group who remained in traditional fee-for-service. Again, the results are virtually identical to the full-sample results.

These analyses control for baseline differences between the control and incentive groups, but assume that pre-incentive trends in utilization were the same across the groups. Estimates that relax this assumption to allow for different pre-incentive trends confirm the results presented here (see Appendix H for details).

### 6.2.2 *Special Payments*

Table 11 presents the results of the analysis of special payments.<sup>12</sup> The coefficient estimates in this table are interpreted slightly differently than those in Table 10. The baseline level indicates the proportion of FPs whose pattern of service provision at baseline exceeded the special payment target level. The marginal effect estimate indicates the absolute change in the proportion of physicians whose service provision is predicted to exceed the target level as a result of the special payments. Overall, the results suggest little if any response to the special payments: all the estimates are small and not statistically different from zero. Even if we were able to increase the precision of the estimates (causing them to become statistically significant), the small effect sizes mean that the responses are still be too small to be of policy significance.

## 6.3 Incentive Payments: Sub-group Analysis by Physician Age, Practice Size and Baseline Compliance

Table 12 presents the results for preventive care bonuses conducted for sub-groups defined by physician age, practice size and baseline level of compliance.<sup>13</sup>

---

<sup>12</sup> These estimates are from models that do not include physician-specific fixed effects. There is insufficient within-individual variation to estimate such a model. For the preventive service analysis, estimates for the difference-in-difference estimator with and without physician-specific fixed effects are very similar, so we have reason to believe that this is not a major problem for these special payment results.

<sup>13</sup> We had planned to conduct analyses for practices defined by group size, but it was not possible because of data limitations. Further, sample sizes were too small to conduct sub-group analysis for five of the six special payments. Results for palliative care (not shown) revealed no differences by physician age or practice size.

*Age*

For three of the five bonuses — Pap smear, mammogram and colorectal cancer screening — the results reveal a clear age-related gradient in responses; younger physicians respond more than older physicians. The results for senior flu shot indicate that middle-aged physicians are most responsive; those for toddler immunizations display no age gradient.

*Practice Size*

The results for three of the five prevention care bonuses — senior flu shot, mammogram and colorectal cancer screening — indicate that physicians with larger practices tend to be more responsive to the incentives. We observe no gradient for Pap smear and toddler immunizations.

*Baseline Level of Compliance*

For two of the five preventive services — senior flu shot, mammogram — the response is greatest for those physicians with the lowest levels of baseline provision. For colorectal cancer screening, the response is greater for the low and middle levels than those with the highest baseline compliance. For Pap smear, physicians in the middle quartiles responded the most. For toddler immunization, there are no statistically significant differences. Overall, the results suggest larger responses by those with low or middle levels of baseline service provision than by those with the highest baseline level of provision. (Note that in no case was the baseline level in the top quartile so high that it precluded physicians in that group from displaying the largest response).

**6.4 Basket of Capitated Services**

Table 13 presents summary statistics on the proportion of all activity constituted by the basket of 57 capitated services for each of FPs in FHNs and FPs in FFS. Three things are notable:

- The basket of 57 services constitutes a higher proportion of total activity for FPs in FHNs than for FPs in FFS practices;
- There is less variation in the proportion among FHN physicians (perhaps because the measure is limited to services provided to rostered patients rather than all activity);
- There is no trend in the proportion for FHN FPs; there is at most a very slight trend for FFS, whereby the basket of 57 constitutes a slightly rising proportion of all activity.

Regression analyses (results shown in Tables H79, H80 and H81) that controlled for physician characteristics, practice characteristics and other variables as in previous regressions fail to find any evidence of a differential trend in this proportion between FPs practicing in FHNs and FPs practicing in FFS practices.

## 6.5 Sensitivity Analyses

To test the robustness of our results we conduct four sensitivity analyses for each of the five cumulative preventive care bonuses: 1) exclude all shadow-billed tracking Q-codes<sup>14</sup> used by PCR FPs; 2) revise the dependent variable to include, in addition to rostered patients, non-rostered patients assigned to PCR FPs, 3) exclude FPs who did not reach the minimum roster size of 450 or 650 while being affiliated with CCMs or FHGs as they were ineligible for the bonus, and 4) drop the first year during which a FP became eligible for the bonuses. For all five bonuses, the results for each of the four sensitivity analyses confirm our main base-case results. The main findings are not sensitive to these aspects of the analyses. The only thing we would note is that for the second of our four sensitivity analyses, the marginal effect is slightly larger than the base case for the four bonuses for which we find a significant response in the baseline case: senior flu shots (marginal effect is 0.043 versus 0.028 in the base case), Pap smears (0.042 versus 0.041), mammograms (0.027 versus 0.018) and colorectal cancer screening (0.089 versus 0.085 in the base case). This difference may arise partly due to a selection effect associated with the assignment of non-rostered patients to FPs. The assignment was based on visits to family physicians. Non-rostered patients assigned to a PCR physician using this method are therefore more likely to obtain such services than many rostered patients since they: (a) definitely had at least one visit; and (b) are more predisposed to obtaining health care services. Hence, their addition to the PCR physician practice population increases compliance compared to the practice population defined only in reference to the rostered individuals.

Because there was so little evidence of a response to the special payments and some data limitation precludes clean sensitivity analyses, we did not conduct sensitivity analyses on the six special payments.

We conduct two sensitivity analyses for the basket of capitated services. The first sensitivity analysis expands the control group to include FPs who were also in CCMs or FHGs and we define the dependent variable as the proportion of services provided to all patients (rather than just rostered patients). The second sensitivity analysis includes FPs in FHGs and CCMs in the control group and revises the dependent variable for FPs affiliated with CCMs or FHGs by including services provided to rostered patients only. Results (found in Tables H80 and H81) confirm the base case results.

---

<sup>14</sup> These Q-codes can be found in Appendix F.

## 7. DISCUSSIONS

This analysis finds evidence of a response by FPs to performance-based incentives for four of the five preventive care services. It fails to find evidence of a response to performance-based incentives for the special payments.

The response to an incentive payment for cervical cancer screening is consistent with the broader literature on pay-for-performance — this service is one for which effects are most consistently observed [2, 10]. The estimated effect size for this service is larger than any other service and is consistent with findings from other studies [2]. Colorectal cancer screening has been less studied than cervical cancer screening, but our measured response is substantially larger than that documented in other studies [23]. This may in part be due to the broader provincial initiative to increase colorectal cancer screening.<sup>15</sup> The results for seniors' flu shot must be interpreted with caution because of limitations in our ability to capture utilization of these services through separate provincial delivery programs. In this case, we expect any bias to be in the direction of finding an effect.<sup>16</sup> Hence, correction for any such bias would reduce the estimated effect. Since the introduction of the Universal Influenza Immunization Program in 2000, MOHLTC estimates that for the eligible population of age 6 months (rather than just seniors aged 65 or over) approximately 70% of seasonal flu shots are provided in physicians' offices and thus are included in the claims data, while 30% are provided in community clinics [30].

What might account for the different responses to the preventive service bonuses and the special payments? A number of factors may contribute to this.

- The preventive services are well documented to be effective and are well established as consistent with providing high-quality care to patients. Providing such services are unquestionably consistent with professional standards and expectations. In contrast, the services subject to special payment bonuses have no strong link to quality of care and are more likely to be associated with aspects of professional practice subject more strongly to preferences over practice styles.

---

<sup>15</sup> One might expect an interaction between the broader provincial initiative and the colorectal cancer screening incentive. The provincial program may lower the cost of getting patients to comply with the screening protocol, providing FPs exposed to the incentive particular incentive to encourage patients to obtain the FOBT.

<sup>16</sup> Following introduction of the incentives, physicians in PCR practices had incentive to encourage their patients to obtain the services through an OHIP-funded source rather than one of the specialty programs because this meant that the service would automatically count toward achieving the incentive threshold. FFS physicians had no such incentive. The incentive may, therefore, have simply changed the setting in which some people obtained the service. Because of our data limitations we are not able to capture the diversion from these other flu shot programs.



- The cost of complying differs substantially in some cases. The five preventive services are all commonly provided by FPs and are within the expected competency of an FP. There should be no learning costs. None of them require special equipment. And some (e.g., immunizations) can be provided by non-physician staff. In contrast, at least some of the services targeted by special payments are not easily re-integrated into a practice if they have not been provided in a long time (e.g., obstetrical deliveries, certain office procedures). Some have large fixed costs (e.g., insurance premiums for doing obstetrical deliveries, perhaps some equipment for some of the office procedures). Some have time and re-organization costs (e.g., for obstetrical deliveries: re-organizing one's schedule for hospital visits and home visits).
- The response for preventive services actually represents the response to a combination of two incentive payments: one to contact patients and a second to the bonus payments.
- Unlike most of the special payment services, the preventive care payments are complementary to other features of the PCR practices, especially electronic health records and non-physician providers. Those joining were eligible for financial support to adopt electronic medical records, support not available to traditional fee-for-service physicians. The software for many electronic medical record systems enables automatic reminders when a patient should receive a regularly scheduled service, such as many of the preventive services. Hence, the response we observe may represent the joint introduction of subsidies for adoption of electronic health records and performance-based incentives. We do not have any information on the use of electronic medical records by study physicians.
- As a set, the preventive care services are also complementary, utilizing some of the same technologies to increase rates of coverage.

We should also note that the incentives included in a study are only a subset of all the incentive payments for which physicians in PCR practices are eligible. We do not know how attractive these incentives are relative to others. In addition, PCR practices were more generally generously funded so that many physicians who joined PCR practices increased their incomes even in the absence of any changes to practice, which may have lessened responsiveness to specific incentives.

This study suffers from a number of limitations that should be noted.

- The evaluation examines only one aspect of the potential effects of pay-for-performance incentives. A fuller analysis would need to consider the ultimate health effects and potential negative side effects.
- As we have emphasized, some of our analyses suffer from important data limitations, most notably

the analyses of senior's flu shot for which at present we do not have data on receipt of these services outside a FP office through a complementary provincial program.

- We also are not able to assess the extent to which strategic gaming occurred. Such gaming is possible given that the FPs themselves exercised considerable discretion in identifying patients to be excluded from the relevant patient populations and in identifying some patients who received certain services when rates of compliance were calculated for the services.
- We were not able to fully control for possible selection effects into the PCRs and for all sources of confounding with the incentives.

**Table 1: Description of the Performance-based Incentive Payments being Evaluated**

Service	Payment Criterion	Bonus Payment <sup>a</sup>
<b>Preventive Care Service Enhancement Payments</b>		
<i>Payment for Contacting Eligible Patients to Obtain the Preventive Service</i>		
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>\$6.86 for each documented contact for eligible patients</li> </ul>
<b>Cumulative Care Preventive Service Bonus<sup>b</sup></b>		
Seniors' influenza immunization	Proportion of a FP's rostered patients aged 65 or over who received a flu shot during the previous flu season (generally August to December)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>60% of target population: \$220</li> <li>65% of target population: \$440</li> <li>70% of target population: \$770</li> <li>75% of target population: \$1,100</li> <li>80% of target population: \$2,200</li> </ul>
Toddler immunization	Proportion of a FP's rostered children aged 30-42 months who received a set of 5 child immunizations by the age of 30 months	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>85% of target population: \$440</li> <li>90% of target population: \$1,100</li> <li>95% of target population: \$2,200</li> </ul>
Pap smear	Proportion of FP's rostered female patients aged 35-69 who received a Pap smear for cervical cancer screening during the previous 30 months <sup>c</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>60% of target population: \$220</li> <li>65% of target population: \$440</li> <li>70% of target population: \$660</li> <li>75% of target population: \$1,320</li> <li>80% of target population: \$2,200</li> </ul>
Mammogram	Proportion of FP's rostered female patients aged 50-69 who received a mammogram for breast cancer screening during the previous 30 months <sup>c</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>55% of target population: \$220</li> <li>60% of target population: \$440</li> <li>65% of target population: \$770</li> <li>70% of target population: \$1,320</li> <li>75% of target population: \$2,200</li> </ul>
Colorectal cancer screening	Proportion of FP's rostered patients aged 50-74 who received a colorectal screening test by Fecal Occult Blood Testing during the previous 30 months <sup>c,d</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>15% of target population: \$220</li> <li>20% of target population: \$440</li> <li>40% of target population: \$1,100</li> <li>50% of target population: \$2,200</li> </ul>
<b>Annual Special Payments<sup>e</sup></b>		
Obstetrical deliveries <sup>f</sup>	5 or more specified obstetrical services to 5 or more patients in a fiscal year	\$3,200 (increased to \$5,000 in October 2007)
Hospital services <sup>f</sup>	Specified hospital services totaling \$2,000 in any fiscal year provided to all patients	\$5,000, increased to \$7,500 in April 2005 for those with a Rurality Index of Ontario score greater than 45
Palliative care <sup>f</sup>	Specified palliative care services provided to four or more palliative care patients in a fiscal year	\$2,000
Office procedures <sup>g</sup>	Specified office procedures totaling \$1,200 in a fiscal year provided to rostered patients	\$2,000
Prenatal care <sup>g</sup>	Specified prenatal care services provided to five or more rostered patients in the previous fiscal year	\$2,000
Home visits <sup>g</sup>	100 or more home visits provided to rostered patients in the previous fiscal year	\$2,000

<sup>a</sup> Payments as of 2006. Minor changes to aspects of the payments occurred during the study period.

<sup>b</sup> All payment criteria assessed as of March 31 each fiscal year. Payments are made to the PCR practice, not the physician for FPs in a FHN.

<sup>c</sup> Although agreements with specific PCR models (e.g., FHN contracts) indicate that the eligible time period is the previous 24 months rather than the previous 30 months, our understanding is that MOHLTC has always calculated the eligible time period as the previous 30 months.

<sup>d</sup> Two additional thresholds (\$3,300 at 60% and \$4,000 at 70%) were introduced in FY2008-09, after the end of our study period.

<sup>e</sup> Payments are made directly to physician.

<sup>f</sup> Eligible services can be provided to any patient, not just rostered patients.

<sup>g</sup> Eligible services must be provided to rostered patients.

**Table 2: Selected Characteristics of Primary Care Reform Models Included in this Study**

<b>Model</b> (Year Introduced)	<b>Size/Rostering</b>	<b>Funding</b>
<b>Traditional Fee-for-service</b> (whole period)	No size regulation No rostering	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Fee-for-service</li> </ul>
<b>Family Health Network</b> (2002)	<i>Physician:</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• At least 3 FPs</li> </ul> <i>Rostering:</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Minimum total roster of 2,400 for group of 3</li> <li>• Financial penalty for average rosters &gt; 2400 per FP</li> </ul>	Blended Capitation: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Age-sex adjusted capitation for rostered patients for 57 core services (about 80% of gross income)</li> <li>• 10% of FFS rate for core services to rostered patients</li> <li>• Access Bonus: 20.65% of the base capitation payment less value of outside use by rostered patients</li> <li>• Monthly comprehensive care capitation payments for formally rostered patients, since 2005</li> <li>• 100% of FFS rate for core services to non-rostered patients up to \$45,000 per physician</li> <li>• 100% of FFS rate for excluded services to either rostered or non-rostered patients</li> </ul>
<b>Family Health Group</b> (2003)	<i>Physician:</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• At least 3 FPs</li> </ul> <i>Rostering:</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Voluntary</li> </ul>	Blended fee-for-service: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 100% FFS as usual</li> <li>• 10% premium on FFS rate for specified comprehensive care services provided to rostered patients (Ministry-assigned and formally rostered)</li> <li>• Comprehensive care premium</li> <li>• Monthly comprehensive care capitation payments for formally rostered patients since 2005</li> </ul>
<b>Comprehensive Care Model</b> (2005)	<i>Physician:</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Solo practice</li> </ul> <i>Rostering</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Required</li> <li>• No size regulation</li> </ul>	Blended fee-for-service: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 100% FFS as usual</li> <li>• Monthly comprehensive care capitation payments for rostered patients</li> </ul>
<b>Family Health Organization</b> (2006)	<i>Physician:</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• At least 3 FPs</li> </ul> <i>Rostering</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Required</li> <li>• No size regulation</li> </ul>	Blended capitation: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Capitation for core services to enrolled patients</li> <li>• Access bonus: maximum of 18.59% of the base rate payment less outside use by rostered patients</li> <li>• 100% FFS for excluded services to all patients and for non-enrolled patients</li> <li>• Monthly comprehensive care capitation payments for formally rostered patients</li> <li>• 100% of FFS rate for core services to non-rostered patients up to \$45,000 per physician</li> <li>• 100% of FFS rate for excluded services to either rostered or non-rostered patients</li> </ul>

Note: Some of these elements were present for different periods for the different PCR models.

**Table 3: Eligibility for Preventive Care Bonuses and Special Payments**

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
<b>Preventive Care Bonuses</b>							
<b>Senior Flu Immunization, Toddler Immunization, Pap Smear and Mammogram</b>							
FHN	April						
FHG						April	
CCM						April	
FHO						April	
<b>Colorectal Cancer Screening</b>							
FHN					April		
FHG					April		
CCM					April		
FHO						April	
<b>Special Payments</b>							
<b>Obstetrical Services, Hospital Services, Office Procedures, Prenatal Care and Home Visits</b>							
FHN	April						
FHG				- never eligible -			
CCM				- never eligible -			
FHO					November		
<b>Palliative Care</b>							
FHN	April						
FHG		July					
CCM				- never eligible -			
FHO					November		

Note: Date PCR models introduced: FHN: April 2002; FHG: July 2003; CCM: October 2005; FHO: November 2006.

**Table 4: Selected Other Payments and Features of PCR Practices**

Feature	Eligibility			
	CCM	FHG	FHN	FHO
<b>Other Payments Linked to Care Provision/Roster</b>				
Long-term Care Capitation for Patients in LTC facility	n	y	y	y
Comprehensive Care premium	n	y	n	n
Comprehensive Care Capitation	y	y	y	y
New Patient Fee	n	y	y	y
Unattached Patient Fee	y	y	y	y
New Born Episodic Fee	n	n	y	y
New Graduate Patient Fee	y	y	y	y
Complex Care to Seniors Premium	y	y	y	y
Diabetes Management Incentive	y	y	y	y
Heart Failure Management Incentive	y	y	y	y
Initial Smoking Cessation Fee	y	y	y	y
Smoking Cessation Counseling	y	y	y	y
<b>Management and Programmatic Funding</b>				
Group Management and Leadership Payment	n	n	y	y
Income Stabilization	n	n	y	y
Enrolment Payment	n	y	n	n
Per patient enrolment fee	y	y	y	y
THAS on-call payment	n	y	y	y
Office Practice Administration	n	n	y	y
<b>Other Practice Features</b>				
Patient enrolment required	y	n	y	y
24 hour telephone access (nurse-staffed Telephone Health Advisory Service and on-call FP)	n	y	y	y
After-hours block coverage	y	y	y	y
Option of solo practice	y	n	n	n
Option to hire a Nurse Practitioner for the provision of some services	n	n	y	y

**Table 5: Definition of Control and Treatment Groups for each Performance Incentive**

<b>Preventive Care Incentives</b>	
<b><u>Senior Flu Shot, Toddler Immunization, Pap Smear, Mammogram</u></b>	
Control Group	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• FFS</li> </ul>
Treatment Group	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• FHN starting from April 2002</li> <li>• FHG starting from April 2007</li> <li>• CCM starting from April 2007</li> <li>• FHO starting from April 2007</li> </ul>
<b><u>Colorectal Cancer Screening</u></b>	
Control Group	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• FFS</li> </ul>
Treatment Group	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• FHN starting from April 2006</li> <li>• FHG starting from April 2006</li> <li>• CCM starting from April 2006</li> <li>• FHO starting from April 2007</li> </ul>
<b>Special Payments</b>	
<b><u>Obstetrical Care, Hospital Services, Office Procedures, Prenatal Care, and Home Visits</u></b>	
Control Group	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• FFS</li> <li>• FHG</li> <li>• CCM</li> </ul>
Treatment Group	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• FHN starting from April 2002</li> <li>• FHO starting from November 2006</li> </ul>
<b><u>Palliative Care</u></b>	
Control Group	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• FFS</li> <li>• CCM</li> </ul>
Treatment Group	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• FHN starting from April 2002</li> <li>• FHG starting from July 2003</li> <li>• FHO starting from November 2006</li> </ul>

**Table 6: Criteria for Selecting the Sample of FPs for Analysis**

Criterion	Rationale	Resulting Sample Size
All Ontario physicians present in claims data at any point between April 1998 and March 2008		37,422
Exclude physicians not present in all 10 years of the study period	Exclude physicians who began to practice later than April 1998 or who interrupted their practice or left the province during the study period	- 21,415 = 16,007
Exclude physicians whose specialty is not general/family practice during entire study period <sup>a</sup>	Only FPs are eligible for incentives; we exclude those billing as FP while attaining specialization	- 8,533 = 7,474
Exclude physicians who billed less than \$30,000 annually	Exclude part-time physicians	- 1,304 = 6,170
Exclude physicians without two consecutive years of practice before start of study (i.e., April 1996 to March 1998)	Exclude new FPs who are newly establishing their practice at the start of the study period	- 3,835 = 2,335
Exclude FPs for which billings for A001, A003, and A007 constitute less than 70% of activity, and FPs for which billings for A001, A003 and A007 constitute less than 50% of all activity and a single "non A-code" category constitutes over 15% of activity <sup>c</sup>	Exclude FP specialists whose main activity is other than providing traditional family medicine visits and consultations <sup>b</sup>	- 95 = 2,240
Exclude locums <sup>d</sup>	Locums are not eligible for the incentives <sup>e</sup>	- 19 = 2,221
Exclude FPs affiliated with the following primary care groups during the study period: RNPGA, HSO, PCN, SEAMO, GHC or ICHA <sup>f</sup>	Such FPs did not submit claims data or submitted only shadow billing claims; available data are insufficient for the analysis	- 32 = 2,189
Exclude FPs who converted to FFS for more than one time during our study period	Such FPs do not represent typical observations in service provision behaviour	- 4 = 2,185

<sup>a</sup> A physician's specialty was defined as the specialty under which the largest share of services were billed (based on the fee approved).

<sup>b</sup> An additional criterion whereby a FP with more than 25% of billings for K-codes was classified as a GP psychotherapist was rendered superfluous by this 70% rule.

<sup>c</sup> The following ophthalmology codes are treated as a "non A" category: A009A, A110A, A111A, A112A, A114A, A115A, A237A, A238A, A239A, A240A, E077A.

<sup>d</sup> Locums were identified using information on the Group Type in the Corporate Provider Database. We were able to identify locums only imperfectly.

<sup>e</sup> FPs in walk-in-clinics do not regularly provide the services eligible for the financial incentives under study and should therefore be excluded from the analysis. We considered excluding FPs with a high proportion of billings for code A888 (Emergency Department Equivalent – Partial Assessment); however, once all of the above criteria were applied, this criterion was redundant.

<sup>f</sup> RNPGA: Rural and Northern Physician Group Agreement; HSO: Health Service Organization; PCN: Primary Care Network; SEAMO: Southeastern Ontario Medical Organization; GHC: Group Health Care; IHCA: Inner City Health Associates.



**Table 7: Breakdown of Analysis Sample by Primary Care Model**

<b>Date</b>	<b>FFS</b>	<b>FHN</b>	<b>FHG</b>	<b>CCM</b>	<b>FHO</b>
March 31 1999	2,185	-	-	-	-
March 31 2000	2,185	-	-	-	-
March 31 2001	2,185	-	-	-	-
March 31 2002	2,185	-	-	-	-
March 31 2003	2,172	13	-	-	-
March 31 2004	1,643	23	519	-	-
March 31 2005	1,248	47	890	-	-
March 31 2006	551	85	1,402	147	-
March 31 2007	477	153	1,412	143	0
March 31 2008	458	120	1,371	136	100

Note: “-“ indicates that the model was not yet introduced.

**Table 8: Sample Descriptive Statistics: Control and Treatment Groups**

	Control Group			Incentive Group			Equal Means	Equal Variance
	Mean	Median	St.	Mean	Median	St.	p-value	p-value
<b><i>Preventive Care Incentives for Senior Flu Shot, Toddler Immunization, Pap Smear, Mammogram, Colorectal Cancer Screening and Special Payment for Palliative Care</i></b>								
<i>Physician Characteristics</i>								
Age	54.0	54.0	10.8	49.0	49.0	8.4	0.000	0.000
Female	0.213	-	-	0.270	-	-	-	-
Years Licensed	22.1	20.0	11.6	18.1	16.0	8.8	0.000	0.000
<i>Practice Characteristics</i>								
Size	1,408	1,345	668	1,605	1,572	573	0.000	0.000
Patient Age	39.7	39.3	8.5	38.6	38.0	6.2	0.000	0.000
Proportion Female	0.528	0.493	0.121	0.544	0.506	0.111	0.000	0.000
Proportion Infants	0.016	0.014	0.014	0.023	0.021	0.014	0.000	0.009
Proportion Elderly	0.144	0.119	0.111	0.135	0.119	0.079	0.000	0.000
<i>Workload</i>								
Annual Workdays	250.6	249.8	44.2	263.7	261.8	38.8	0.000	0.000
Annual Visits	7,663.0	7,337.8	3,531.0	8,466.2	8,307.5	3066.3	0.000	0.000
Visits/Workday	30.3	29.1	12.8	31.9	31.0	10.2	0.000	0.000
<b><i>Special Payments for Obstetrical Care, Hospital Services, Office Procedures, Prenatal Care and Home Visits</i></b>								
<i>Physician Characteristics</i>								
Age	50.2	50.0	9.3	47.8	47.0	8.1	0.000	0.000
Female	0.255	-	-	0.284	-	-	-	-
Years Licensed	19.1	17.5	9.6	17.8	15.0	8.8	0.000	0.000
<i>Practice Characteristics</i>								
Size	1,571	1,526	608	1,497	1,491	478	0.000	0.000
Patient Age	38.8	38.2	6.9	39.1	38.8	5.3	0.091	0.000
Proportion Female	0.538	0.500	0.114	0.565	0.528	0.102	0.000	0.000
Proportion Infants	0.021	0.019	0.014	0.027	0.025	0.013	0.000	0.000
Proportion Elderly	0.136	0.117	0.088	0.151	0.147	0.069	0.000	0.000
<i>Workload</i>								
Annual Workdays	260.8	260.3	40.4	264.2	261.8	38.9	0.000	0.018
Annual Visits	8,392	8,209	3,230	7,424	7,383	2,415	0.000	0.000
Visits/Workday	31.9	31.0	10.9	27.8	27.8	7.4	0.000	0.000

**Table 9: Proportion of Eligible Family Physicians who Submitted at Least One Claim for a “Contact Incentive Payment”**

	<b>Pap Smear</b>	<b>Mammogram</b>	<b>Senior Flu Vaccine</b>	<b>Toddler Immunization</b>	<b>Colorectal Cancer Screening</b>
2003-04	0.43	0.30	0.22	0.17	-
2004-05	0.28	0.19	0.62	0.13	-
2005-06	0.44	0.36	0.62	0.06	0.02
2006-07	0.37	0.27	0.47	0.06	0.18
2007-08	0.30	0.25	0.40	0.04	0.19

Note: Only physicians in FHNs were eligible from 2003-04 to 2005-06 for the contact incentive payments; FHN and FHO physicians were eligible for 2006-07 and 2007-08; FHGs and CCMs were never eligible during the study period; they became eligible April 1, 2008. FFS physicians were never eligible during the study period.

**Table 10: Main Results: Preventive Care Bonuses, Estimated Marginal Effects, Difference-in-Difference Estimator with Physician-specific Fixed Effects<sup>a</sup>**

	Full Sample				FPs who joined PCR before introduction of bonuses			FPs in PCR models funded primarily by FFS		
	(a) Baseline Compliance in 2003	Marginal Effect (St. Error)	(b) Sample size: # obs (# FPs)	R <sup>2</sup>	Marginal Effect (St. Error)	(c) Sample size: # obs (# FPs)	R <sup>2</sup>	Marginal Effect (St. Error)	(d) Sample size: # obs (# FPs)	R <sup>2</sup>
Senior Flu Shot	0.554	0.028*** (0.007)	19,866 (2,029)	0.47 0	0.028*** (0.007)	19,073 (1,948)	0.46 8	0.024*** (0.007)	18,550 (1,893)	0.471
Toddler Immunization	0.543	0.011 (0.011)	16,826 (1,999)	0.35 6	0.010 (0.011)	16,162 (1,919)	0.35 6	0.010 (0.011)	15,669 (1,863)	0.352
Pap Smear	0.589	0.041*** (0.004)	19,926 (2,029)	0.11 5	0.041*** (0.004)	19,130 (1,948)	0.11 7	0.040*** (0.004)	18,607 (1,893)	0.111
Mammogram	0.646	0.018*** (0.005)	19,888 (2,029)	0.15 8	0.017*** (0.005)	19,093 (1,948)	0.15 2	0.018*** (0.005)	18,569 (1,893)	0.163
Colorectal Cancer Screening	0.150	0.085*** (0.005)	19,918 (2,027)	0.37 3	0.079*** (0.006)	13,158 (1,341)	0.36 4	0.085*** (0.006)	17,778 (1,808)	0.355

\*\*\* Indicates statistical significance at the 1% level; \*\* indicates statistical significance at the 5% level; \* indicates statistical significance at the 10% level.

<sup>a</sup> Pooled OLS. Standard errors are clustered by individual physician. Full regressions results can be found in Appendix H.

**Table 11: Main Results: Special Payments, Estimated Marginal Effects, Difference-in-Difference Estimator (No Physician-specific Fixed Effects)<sup>a</sup>**

	(a) Baseline Compliance in 2003	FPs Eligible for Special Payments in 2005			FPs Eligible for Special Payments in 2006			FPs Eligible for Special Payments in 2007		
		Marginal Effect (St. Error)	(b) Sample size: # obs (# FPs)	Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	Marginal Effect (St. Error)	(c) Sample size: # obs (# FPs)	Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	Marginal Effect (St. Error)	(d) Sample size: # obs (# FPs)	Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>
Obstetrical Services	0.043	-0.0004 (0.005)	19,934 (1,998)	0.302	-0.004 (0.004)	20,187 (2,025)	0.308	0.013 (0.024)	20,196 (2,028)	0.302
Hospital Services	0.272	-0.013 (0.035)	19,777 (1,985)	0.481	-0.005 (0.074)	20,052 (2,012)	0.482	-0.019 (0.037)	20,138 (2,021)	0.482
Office Procedures	0.405	0.006 (0.064)	19,897 (1,995)	0.167	0.075 (0.127)	20,175 (2,022)	0.171	-0.141*** (0.053)	20,209 (2,026)	0.165
Prenatal Care	0.544	0.314*** (0.107)	19,857 (1,991)	0.295	0.106 (0.070)	20,109 (2,016)	0.295	0.184 (0.127)	20,151 (2,020)	0.294
Home Visits	0.045	0.007 (0.007)	18,814 (1,893)	0.225	0.003 (0.012)	19,251 (1,934)	0.230	0.084 (0.078)	19,557 (1,961)	0.226
		FPs Eligible for Special Payments in 2003			FPs Eligible for Special Payments in 2004			FPs Eligible for Special Payments in 2005		
Palliative Care	0.011	0.009 (0.012)	9,681 (1,078)	0.305	0.004 (0.005)	8,495 (946)	0.347	0.032 (0.031)	9,928 (1,104)	0.301

\*\*\* Indicates statistical significance at the 1% level.

<sup>a</sup> Pooled OLS. Standard errors are clustered by individual physician. Full regressions results can be found in Appendix H.

**Table 12: Estimated Marginal Effects: Preventive Care Bonuses by Physician Age, Practice Size, and Baseline Level of Compliance, Difference-in-Difference Estimator with Physician-specific Fixed Effects<sup>a</sup>**

	By Age					Practice Size					Baseline Compliance				
	FP Age	Baseline level in 2003	Marginal Effect (St Err)	# obs. (# FPs)	R <sup>2</sup>	Size of Roster	Baseline level in 2003	Marginal Effect (St Err)	# obs. (# FPs)	R <sup>2</sup>	Quartile	Baseline level in 2003	Marginal Effect (St Err)	# obs. (# FPs)	R <sup>2</sup>
Senior Flu Shot	< 40	0.549	0.024 (0.022)	2,320 (237)	0.48	< 1K	0.547	0.025 (0.016)	3,270 (336)	0.44	Q1 (Lowest)	0.304	0.036*** (0.014)	4,887 (503)	0.42
	40-55	0.577	0.049*** (0.010) -	10,508 (1,073)	0.47	1K-1.5K	0.572	0.017 (0.012)	5,935 (606)	0.46	Q2 and Q3	0.593	0.027*** (0.010)	9,908 (1,009)	0.51
	> 55	0.537	0.001 (0.010)	7,038 (719)	0.47	> 1.5K	0.557	0.031*** (0.010)	10,661 (1,087)	0.49	Q4 (Highest)	0.747	0.020 (0.015)	5,071 (517)	0.49
Toddler Immunization	< 40	0.527	0.027 (0.026)-	2,044 (234)	0.56	< 1K	0.496	0.014 (0.034)	2,402 (313)	0.28	Q1 (Lowest)	0.217	0.026 (0.025)	3,810 (455)	0.40
	40-55	0.577	0.010 (0.015)	9,095 (1,065)	0.39	1K-1.5K	0.560	0.004 (0.021)	5,042 (601)	0.32	Q2 and Q3	0.558	0.012 (0.014)	8,795 (1,023)	0.44
	> 55	0.503	0.037* (0.020)	5,687 (700)	0.26	> 1.5K	0.552	0.021 (0.014)	9,382 (1,085)	0.43	Q4 (Highest)	0.838	0.015 (0.024)	4,221 (521)	0.30
Pap Smear	< 40	0.620	0.060*** (0.014)	2,334 (237)	0.20	< 1K	0.630	0.040*** (0.010)	3,301 (336)	0.11	Q1 (Lowest)	0.374	0.024** (0.010)	4,949 (505)	0.18
	40-55	0.612	0.053*** (0.006)	10,541 (1,073)	0.14	1K-1.5K	0.617	0.038*** (0.007)	5,944 (606)	0.12	Q2 and Q3	0.594	0.050*** (0.006)	9,944 (1,013)	0.13
	> 55	0.549	0.020*** (0.007)	7,051 (719)	0.09	> 1.5K	0.564	0.037*** (0.006)	10,681 (1,087)	0.14	Q4 (Highest)	0.800	0.038*** (0.010)	5,033 (511)	0.14
Mammogram	< 40	0.653	0.045*** (0.016)	2,322 (237)	0.26	< 1K	0.682	0.017 (0.011)-	3,284 (336)	0.11	Q1 (Lowest)	0.438	0.034*** (0.009)	5,031 (515)	0.25
	40-55	0.671	0.016** (0.007)	10,532 (1,073)	0.16	1K-1.5K	0.673	0.003 (0.008)	5,937 (606)	0.20	Q2 and Q3	0.672	0.018*** (0.006)	9,873 (1,007)	0.16
	> 55	0.625	0.014*** (0.007)	7,034 (719)	0.16	> 1.5K	0.632	0.028*** (0.006)	10,667 (1,087)	0.19	Q4 (Highest)	0.829	0.014 (0.010)	4,984 (507)	0.17
Colorectal Cancer Screening	< 40	0.187	0.147*** (0.019)	2,197 (224)	0.48	< 1K	0.159	0.068*** (0.015)	3,243 (330)	0.37	Q1 (Lowest)	0.015	0.091*** (0.007)	4,918 (502)	0.41
	40-55	0.164	0.081*** (0.008)	10,744 (1,092)	0.39	1K-1.5K	0.145	0.079*** (0.010)	6,059 (617)	0.38	Q2 and Q3	0.078	0.102*** (0.007)	9,938 (1,012)	0.45
	> 55	0.116	0.067*** (0.008)	6,977 (711)	0.30	> 1.5K	0.150	0.090*** (0.007)	10,616 (1,080)	0.39	Q4 (Highest)	0.428	0.071*** (0.015)	5,062 (513)	0.43

\*\*\* Indicates statistical significance at the 1% level; \*\* indicates statistical significance at the 5% level; and \* indicates statistical significance at the 10% level.


<sup>a</sup> Pooled OLS. Standard errors are clustered by individual physician. Full regressions results can be found in Appendix H.

**Table 13: Proportion of Activity Constituted by Basket of 57 Capitation-funded Services**

Fiscal Year	FHNs			FFS		
	# FPs	Mean	St. Dev.	#FPs	Mean	St. Dev.
1998-99	-	-	-	2,185	0.901	0.077
1999-00	-	-	-	2,185	0.912	0.072
2000-01	-	-	-	2,185	0.916	0.071
2001-02	-	-	-	2,185	0.918	0.071
2002-03	-	-	-	2,171	0.921	0.068
2003-04	1	0.582	-	1,641	0.922	0.069
2004-05	23	0.995	0.023	1,246	0.927	0.068
2005-06	45	0.999	0.004	543	0.926	0.075
2006-07	84	0.998	0.012	470	0.928	0.075
2007-08	89	0.990	0.031	432	0.930	0.073


Note: #FPs refers to FPs who were is in the respective practice for the full fiscal year. The single physician in a FHN practice for 2003-04 is an outlier, both in its proportion and in its total level of activity.

**Figure 1: Mean Number of Claims for Contact Incentive Payments per Eligible Physician**







**Figure 2: Share of Target Practice Population Receiving Targeted Service — Senior Flu Shot**




**Figure 3: Share of Target Practice Population Receiving Targeted Service — Toddler Immunization**




**Figure 4: Share of Target Practice Population Receiving Targeted Service — Pap Smear**




**Figure 5: Share of Target Practice Population Receiving Targeted Service — Mammogram**




**Figure 6: Share of Target Practice Population Receiving Targeted Service — Colorectal Cancer Screening**




**Figure 7: Proportion of Physicians Achieving the Targeted Performance Level of Service — Obstetrical Deliveries**




**Figure 8: Proportion of Physicians Achieving the Targeted Performance Level of Service — Hospital Services**




**Figure 9: Proportion of Physicians Achieving the Targeted Performance Level of Service — Palliative Care**




**Figure 10: Proportion of Physicians Achieving the Targeted Performance Level of Service — Office Procedures**



**Figure 11: Proportion of Physicians Achieving the Targeted Performance Level of Service — Prenatal Care**



**Figure 12: Proportion of Physicians Achieving the Targeted Performance Level of Service — Home Visits**



## References

1. Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care and the Ontario Medical Association. *2004 Physician Services Framework Agreement (Memorandum of Agreement between the Ontario Medical Association and the Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care)*. Toronto: MOHLTC, 2005.
2. Rosenthal M, Frank R, Li Z, et al. Early Experience with Pay for Performance: From Concept to Practice. *Journal of the American Medical Association* 2005;294(14):1788-93.
3. Epstein A. Paying for Performance in the United States and Abroad. *The New England Journal of Medicine* 2006;355(4):406-8.
4. Department of Health. *Working for Patients*. London: HMSO; 1989.
5. National Health Service. The Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF). NHS - The Health and Social Care Information Centre; 2011. (<http://www.ic.nhs.uk/statistics-and-data-collections/audits-and-performance/the-quality-and-outcomes-framework>). (Accessed Jan 17 2011).
6. Doran T, Fullwood C, Gravelle H, et al. Pay-for-performance programs in family practices in the United Kingdom. *The New England Journal of Medicine* 2006;355(4):375-84.
7. Rosenthal MB, Landon BE, Normand S-LT, et al. Pay for Performance in Commercial HMOs. *The New England Journal of Medicine* 2006;355(18):1895-902.
8. The Centres for Medicare and Medicaid Services. Physician Quality Reporting Initiative. 2011. (<http://www.cms.gov/PQRI/>). (Accessed Jan 17 2011).
9. Davis PA, Hahn J, Hoffman GJ, et al. Medicare Provisions in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA): Summary and Timeline. CRS Report for Congress, June 30, 2010.
10. Mullen KJ, Frank RG, Rosenthal MB. Can you get what you pay for? Pay-for-performance and the quality of healthcare providers. *The RAND Journal of Economics* 2010;41(1):64-91.
11. Epstein A. Pay for Performance at Tipping Point. *The New England Journal of Medicine* 2007;356(5):515-7.
12. British Columbia Ministry of Health Services. Full Service Family Practice Incentive Program. 2009. ([http://www.primaryhealthcarebc.ca/phc/gpsc\\_incentive.html](http://www.primaryhealthcarebc.ca/phc/gpsc_incentive.html)). (Accessed August 10, 2009).
13. Manitoba Health. 2010. (<http://www.gov.mb.ca/health/phc/pin/index.html> and <http://www.gov.mb.ca/health/phc/pin/qbif.html>). (Accessed Jan 17 2011).
14. Government of Alberta, Alberta Medical Association, Alberta Health Services. Performance and Diligence Indicator (PDI) Fund for Family Physicians. 2011. (<http://www.albertapci.ca/AboutPCI/pdi/Pages/default.aspx>). (Accessed Jan 17 2011).
15. Nova Scotia Department of Health and Wellness. Medical Services Insurance Programs (MSI) Physician's Manual 2010.

16. Rosenthal MB, Frank RG. What Is the Empirical Basis for Paying for Quality in Health Care? *Medical Care Research & Review* 2006;63(2):135-57.
17. Coutts J, Thornhill J. Service-Based Funding and Pay for Performance: Will Incentive Payments Give Canadian Healthcare the Quality Boost It Needs? *Healthcare Quarterly* 2009;12(3):18-21.
18. Vaghela P, Ashworth M, Schofield P, et al. Population Intermediate Outcomes of Diabetes Under Pay-for-Performance Incentives in England From 2004 to 2008. *Diabetes Care* 2009;32(3):427-9.
19. Campbell SM, Reeves D, Kontopantelis E, et al. Effects of Pay for Performance on the Quality of Primary Care in England. *The New England Journal of Medicine* 2009;361(4):368-78.
20. Christianson JB, Leatherman S, Sutherland K. Lessons From Evaluations of Purchaser Pay-for-Performance Programs: A Review of the Evidence. *Medical Care Research & Review* 2008;65(6\_suppl):5S-35.
21. Petersen LA, Woodard LD, Urech T, et al. Does pay-for-performance improve the quality of health care? *Annals of Internal Medicine* 2006;145 (4):265-72.
22. Town R, Kane R, Johnson P, et al. Economic Incentives and Physicians' Delivery of Preventive Care. *American Journal of Preventive Medicine* 2005;28(2):234-40.
23. Armour B, Pitts M, Maclean R, et al. The Effect of Explicit Financial Incentives on Physician Behavior *Archives of Internal Medicine* 2001;161(10):1261-6.
24. Giuffrida A, Gosden T, Forland F, et al. Target payments in primary care: effects on professional practice and health care outcomes. *Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews* 1999(4).
25. Lewis S. Pay for Performance: The Wrong Time, the Wrong Place? *Longwoods Publishing, Essays* 2009.
26. Timmins N. Do GPs deserve their recent pay rise? *British Medical Journal* 2005;331(7520):800.
27. Hutchison B. Pay for Performance in Primary Care: Proceed with Caution, Pitfalls Ahead (Editorial). *Healthcare Policy* 2008;4(1):5.
28. Tepper J. *The Evolving Role of Canada's Family Physicians, 1992-2001*. Ottawa Canadian Institute for Health Information; 2004.
29. Hutchison B, Hurley J, Birch S, et al. Defining the Practice Population in Fee-for-Service Practice. *Health Services Research* 1997;32 (1):55-70.
30. Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, Public Health Protection and Prevention Branch. Special Data Request. 2010.



## **Appendix A: Services that Count Toward Reaching the Special Payment Thresholds**

This list includes all fees that were billable and that counted toward the special payment thresholds at any point during the study period. Some codes may have been discontinued and are no longer billable.

### **Special Payment: Obstetrical Deliveries**

P006	Vaginal delivery
P009	Attendance at labour and delivery
P011	Attend labour same phys assts/anaes at C-section/operative delivery
P018	Caesarean section
P020	Operative delivery, i.e. mid-cavity extraction or assisted breech delivery
P038	Attendance at labour when patient transferred to another centre for delivery
P041	Caesarean section including tubal interruption

### **Special Payment: Hospital Services**

A933	On-call general assessment
C002	Subsequent visits to 5 weeks
C003	General assessment
C004	General re-assessment
C005	Consultation
C006	Re-consultation
C007	Subsequent visits 6 <sup>th</sup> to 13 <sup>th</sup> week
C008	Concurrent care
C009	Subsequent visits after 13 <sup>th</sup> week
C010	Supportive care
C121	Further fees for visits due to intercurrent illness
C777	Pronouncement of death
C905	Limited consultation in hospital
C933	On-call admission general assessment
H001	Newborn Care

### **Special Payment: Palliative Care**

K023	Palliative care support
------	-------------------------

### **Special Payment: Prenatal Care**

P003	Prenatal general assessment
P004	Minor prenatal assessment

### **Special Payment: Home Visits**

A901	House call assessment
A902	House call assessment - Pronouncement of death in the home

## Appendix A (continued)

### Special Payment: Office Procedures

Services that count toward this special payment are 117 fee codes that include the following types of services:

Ear syringing and/or extensive curetting or debridement

Incision: Abscess or Hematoma

Excision (with or without biopsy) of verruca, keratosis, pyogenic granuloma

Excision (with or without biopsy) of nevus

Excision (with or without biopsy) of plantar verruca

Excision (with or without biopsy) of cyst, hemangioma, lipoma:

- Face or neck
- Other areas

Excision (with or without biopsy) of other lesions:

- Malignant Lesions including biopsy of each lesion – single or multiple sites
- Face or Neck – simple excision
- Other areas – simple excision
- Face or neck – curettage, electrodesiccation or cryosurgery
- Other areas - curettage, electrodesiccation or cryosurgery

Treatment of nasal hemorrhage:

- Cauterization
- Packing
- Injection - joint

Operation on the Musculoskeletal System:

- Reduction – Fractures
- Reductions- Dislocations
- Casts
- Suture of Lacerations (IOP)
- Finger or Toe-nail (IOP)
- Simple, partial or complete, nail excision requiring anaesthesia
- Chemical and/or cryotherapy treatment of minor skin lesions

Operations on the breast

Endoscopies (IOP)

Stomach – Endoscopies (IOP):

- Gastroscopy
- Intestines (except rectum) – Endoscopy (IOP)
- Endoscopic Sigmoidoscopy (with rigid scope) with or without anoscopy (IOP)

Vulva and introitus – Incision:

- Abscess of vulva, Bartholin or Skene's gland (IOP) – incision and drainage: Local anaesthetic
- Vulva and Introitus – Excision – Condylomata – single or multiple (IOP)

Cornea – Incision:

- Removal imbedded foreign body (IOP) – local anaesthetic

Eyelids - Incision

Eyelids - Excision

External Ear - Endoscopy

External Ear - Excision

Gynecology

## Appendix B: List of 57 Fee Schedule Codes Defined as Core Services Provided by Family Health Networks

Fee Schedule Code	Description
A001A	Minor assessment
A003A	General assessment
A004A	General re-assessment
A007A	Intermediate assessment/well baby care
A008A	Mini assessment
A110A	Periodic oculo-visual assessment, patient aged 19 & under
A111A	Periodic oculo-visual assessment – patient aged 20 to 64 years
A112A	Periodic oculo-visual assessment – patient aged 65 yrs +
A114A	Periodic oculo-visual assessment – additional assessment
A903A	Pre-dental/pre-operative general assessment (maximum of 2 per 12-month period)
A990A	Special Visit to Office or Other Similar Facility – Daytime (07:00h – 17:00h) Monday to Friday – First patient seen
A994A	Special Visit to Office or Other Similar Facility – Evenings (17:00h – 24:00h) Monday to Friday or daytime and evenings on Saturdays, Sundays or Holidays – First patient seen
A996A	Special Visit to Office or Other Similar Facility – Nights (00:00h – 7:00h) – First patient seen
E070A	Geriatric general assessment premium – patient aged 70 or older
E071A	Geriatric intermediate assessment premium – patient aged 70 or older
E075A	Geriatric general assessment premium – patient aged 75 or older
G001A	Laboratory Medicine in Private Office – Cholesterol, total
G002A	Laboratory Medicine in Private Office – Glucose, quantitative or semi-quantitative
G004A	Laboratory Medicine in Private Office – Occult blood
G005A	Laboratory Medicine in Private Office – Pregnancy test
G009A	Laboratory Medicine in Private Office – Urinalysis, routine (includes microscopic examination of centrifuged specimen plus any of SG, pH, protein, sugar, haemoglobin, ketones, urobilinogen, bilirubin)
G010A	Laboratory Medicine in Private Office – Urinalysis, one or more parts of above without microscopy
G011A	Laboratory Medicine in Private Office – Fungus culture including KOH preparation and smear
G012A	Laboratory Medicine in Private Office – Wet preparation (for fungus, trichomonas, parasites)
G014A	Laboratory Medicine in Private Office – Rapid streptococcal test
G197A	Diagnostic and Therapeutic Procedure – Allergy – Skin testing – professional component, to a maximum of 50 per year
G202A	Diagnostic and Therapeutic Procedure – Allergy – Hyposensitisation, including assessment and supervision – One or more injections
G205A	Diagnostic and Therapeutic Procedure – Allergy – Hyposensitisation, including assessment and supervision – Insect venom desensitization (immunotherapy) – per injection (maximum of 5 per day)

**Appendix B (continued)**

<b>Fee Schedule Code</b>	<b>Description</b>
G212A	Diagnostic and Therapeutic Procedure – Allergy – Hyposensitisation, including assessment and supervision – when sole reason for visit
G271A	Diagnostic and Therapeutic Procedure – Cardiovascular – Anticoagulant supervision – long-term, telephone advice
G365A	Diagnostic and Therapeutic Procedure – Gynaecology – Papanicolaou Smear – periodic
G372A	Diagnostic and Therapeutic Procedure – Injections – Intramuscular, subcutaneous or intradermal – With visit (each injection)
G373A	Diagnostic and Therapeutic Procedure – Injections – Intramuscular, subcutaneous or intradermal – Sole reason (first injection)
G375A	Diagnostic and Therapeutic Procedure – Injections or Infusions – Intralesional infiltration – One or two lesions
G377A	Diagnostic and Therapeutic Procedure – Injections or Infusions – Intralesional infiltration – 3 or more lesions
G379A	Diagnostic and Therapeutic Procedure – Injections or Infusions – Intravenous – Child, adolescent or adult
G384A	Diagnostic and Therapeutic Procedure – Injections or Infusions – Intralesional infiltration – Infiltration of tissues for trigger point
G385A	Diagnostic and Therapeutic Procedure – Injections or Infusions – Intralesional infiltration – For each additional site (to a maximum of 2)
G420A	Diagnostic and Therapeutic Procedure – Otolaryngology – Ear syringing and/or extensive curetting or debridement uni - or bilateral
G435A	Diagnostic and Therapeutic Procedure – Ophthalmology – Tonometry
G462A	Diagnostic and Therapeutic Procedure – Injectors or Infusions – Administration of oral polio vaccine
G481A	Diagnostic and Therapeutic Procedure – Laboratory Medicine in Private Office – Haemoglobin screen and/or haematocrit (any method or instrument)
G482A	Diagnostic and Therapeutic Procedure – Venipuncture - Child
G489A	Diagnostic and Therapeutic Procedure – Venipuncture – Adolescent or adult
G525A	Otolaryngology – Basic diagnostic hearing tests – Professional component
G538A	Active immunization – Injection of unspecified agent – with visit (each injection)
G539A	Active immunization – Injection of unspecified agent – sole reason (first injection)
G590A	Active Immunization – Injection of influenza agent – With visit
G591A	Active Immunization – Injection of influenza agent – Sole reason
K004A	Family psychotherapy – 2 or more family members in attendance at the same time
K005A	Primary mental health care - Individual care – Per half hour
K006A	Hypnotherapy – Individual care – Per half hour
K007A	Psychotherapy – Individual care – Per half hour
K008A	Diagnostic interview and/or counseling with child and/or parent for psychological problem or learning disabilities – Per half hour
K013A	Counselling – Individual care – Per half hour
K015A	Counselling – Counselling of relatives – on behalf of catastrophically or terminally ill patient – 1 or more persons
K017A	Annual health or annual physical examination – Child after second birthday

**Appendix B (continued)**

<b>Fee Schedule Code</b>	<b>Description</b>
Z101A	Skin and subcutaneous tissue – Incision – Abscess or haematoma – Local anaesthetic - Subcutaneous - One
Z176A	Skin and subcutaneous tissue – Suture of lacerations – up to 5 cm

Note: The basket initially included 57 codes: all codes listed above except E070A and E071A. During the study period the following changes were made: as of November 1, 2004: A111A and A114A were delisted so the basket included 55 codes; as of October 1, 2005 E075A was delisted and replaced with E070A and E071A so the basket was defined by 56 codes; as of July 1, 2006: E070A and E071A were no longer billable so the number of codes defining the basket is now 54 codes. To summarize, all codes were effective during the entire period except: A111A and A114A (effective April 1 1998 to October 31 2004); E075A (effective April 1 2000 to September 30 2005); and E070A and E071A (effective October 1 2005 to June 30 2006). Effective July 1, 2006, E070A and E071A were no longer billable as the geriatric premiums were automatically calculated for patients aged 70 and over.

## **Appendix C: Ontario Primary Care Reform Models**

Primary Care Reform began in Ontario in the 1970s and has provided physicians a series of practice models and organizations alternative to traditional solo fee-for-service practices. Among the many objectives of reforming primary health care are to control costs, increase access to primary health care services (especially in underserved areas), promote interdisciplinary care, increase health promotion and increase quality of care.

Sault Ste. Marie's Group Health Centre (GHC) is Ontario's largest alternatively funded health care organization serving over 60,000 Sault Ste. Marie and Algoma district residents and providing a broad range of services among which primary care, laboratory services, diagnostic imaging, counseling, nutrition services, audiology, vision care and surgery. The centre opened in September 1963 as a consumer-sponsored organization brought to life through the efforts of union groups such as the United Steelworkers of America and the Canadian Union of Public Employees.

Community Health Centres (CHCs) were first introduced in the 1970s in Toronto and Ottawa; by 2007 there were 54 CHCs across the province, 43 are located in urban areas of the province and 11 are located in rural areas. A major expansion of the program was announced in 2005 with the objective of increasing the number of CHCs by opening 21 new CHCs and 28 new satellite centres by 2009. The program aims to improve access to primary care services in underserved, low income and isolated areas of the province. CHCs are an interdisciplinary model of health care where physicians work with nurses, nurse practitioners, social workers and health educators; CHCs operate under a global annual budget and health care providers are salaried.

Health Service Organizations (HSOs) were introduced in 1973 and made available to primary care physicians with the option of practicing in a group or solo. HSOs first operated on a global budget and in 1978 an HSO model funded prevalently with capitation payments was introduced. The HSO program was frozen in 1991, by October 2006 the HSO program included 161 FPs working in 48 groups.

In 1994, MOHLTC, the OMA, Queen's University, the Kingston teaching hospitals and the Clinical Teacher's Association of Queen's University established the Southeastern Ontario Medical Association (SEAMO) through an alternative funding agreement that, amongst other payment arrangements, replaced the traditional fee-for-service payments for services rendered by physicians.

To attract physicians to rural and northern areas of Ontario and alleviate access to primary care barriers in these areas, Community Sponsored Contracts (CSCs) and Northern Group Funding Plans (NGFPs) were introduced in 1996 and 1998, respectively. FPs participating in these plans received a base remuneration (salary) plus incentives.

In 1999, MOHLTC introduced Primary Care Networks (PCNs). Similarly to HSOs, PCNs were paid a capitation rate to provide covered services to its patient population plus a large number of incentive payments for targeted services as well as fee-for-service for services to non-rostered and for non core services. However, the capitation rates between these two primary care models were different as well as many of the incentives available to the FPs. By October 2006 the PCN program included 170 FPs working in 12 groups.

Beginning in 2002, MOHLTC introduced a series of new primary care models that are still in existence and primary care reform began to gain ground. In 2002, Family Health Networks (FHNs) were introduced and offered a blended capitation model to groups of 3 or more FPs. In July 2003 Family Health Groups (FHGs) were made available to Ontario FPs: this is a reformed fee-for-service model for groups of 3 or more FPs. In 2004, MOHLTC began amalgamating previously existing models and creating a harmonized system. Up until then, some models such as SEAMO, GHC and HSOs tracked the services they provided to patients using encounter data/encounter forms that were incompatible with the OHIP claims data. In 2004, CSCs and NGFPs were amalgamated in a new model: the Rural and Northern Physician Group Agreement (RNPAGAs). As of January 2007, there were 61 physicians working in 14 RNPAGAs group 1 (former NGFPs) and 34 physicians affiliated in 25 different RNPAGAs group 2 (former CSCs).

With the 2004-2008 Physician Services Agreement ratified in May 2005, SEAMO, GHC and HSOs were “harmonized” with other primary care reform models and became eligible for many incentives already available to other primary care models and around this time began to submit claims data to MOHLTC rather than encounter forms. FPs in models funded by methods other than fee-for-service (e.g, FHNs, RNPAGAs, HSOs, PCNs, GHC), now had to submit “shadow billings” to MOHLTCA<sup>1</sup> rather than track their service provision data using encounter forms.

In April 2005 MOHLTC introduced an interdisciplinary health care model: the Family Health Team (FHT). FHTs are composed of a core group of health service providers (e.g., physicians, nurses, nurse practitioners) and interdisciplinary collaborators (e.g., in mental health, nutrition, social work, health education) to promote services required by the community (e.g., chronic disease management, nutrition, counseling, palliative care). Each FHT is designed and customized based on the care team and the needs of the patient population and the community. FHTs are funded based on any one or a combination of

---

<sup>A1</sup> More information on shadow billing is provided later in this appendix. Some PCR models, such as PCNs and FHNs, submitted shadow billings from the introduction of the model in 1999 and 2002, respectively; other models such as HSOs, only began to shadow bill in 2005 with the harmonization process.

multiple other PCR models (e.g., some FPs can be in a FHN or FHO and be in a blended capitation model; others may be in a FHG and receive fee-for-service payments and incentives).

In October 2005, MOHLTC introduced a new model offering an option to FPs who wished to remain in a solo fee-for-service practice: the Comprehensive Care Model (CCM) is a solo fee-for-service model offering fee-for-service payment as in the traditional model with the addition of incentives (e.g., bonuses, comprehensive care capitation payments) for the provision of comprehensive or preventive care to rostered patients. In November 2006, MOHLTC announced the amalgamation of HSOs and PCNs into a new blended capitation model: the Family Health Organization (FHO) offering similar incentives and practice features to FHNs.

As a result of this harmonization process, the grand majority of FPs<sup>A2</sup> in the province submit claims or shadow billing claims. The OHIP Physician Claims Database is an accounting-based database and is a financial record of monies paid by the Ministry to physicians. The key variables are: 1) the alphanumeric fee schedule code representing the individual service being claimed, the OHIP Schedule of Benefits lists all billable fee codes along with their associated dollar amount; 2) the fee paid to the physician for having provided such service; and 3) the fee approved i.e., the dollar amount that corresponds to the amount listed in the Schedule of Benefits and recognized by MOHLTC as corresponding to the service provided. For services paid on a fee-for-service basis (i.e., all services provided by FPs in traditional FFS, in FHGs or in CCMs), the fee paid is usually 100% of the fee approved and of the dollar amount listed in the Schedule of Benefits for the claimed code. Claims associated with capitated services (i.e., “core” services provided to enrolled patients by FPs in FHNs or FHOs) are called “shadow billing claims” because, although the fee approved still corresponds to the dollar amount of services provided, the fee paid is \$0 because the physician receives a capitation payment for that service. In order to incentivize physicians in FHNs and FHOs to diligently submit their shadow billings, MOHLTC pays a premium of 10% of the fee-for-service value of the codes claimed. For the five physician group types included in this analysis, the OHIP Claims Database can therefore be considered a comprehensive repository of all services provided by primary care physicians.

For the purposes of this study analyzing the effect of selected financial incentives on primary care physician service provision behaviour, we included, along with traditional FFS, the following PCR models: FHNs, FHGs, CCMs and FHOs. We excluded any FP who was in an HSO because claims data were not available for this PCR model until 2005 at the earliest. Also, although PCNs have been shadow billing since their inception in 1999, FPs in PCNs did not receive a shadow billing premium for several years and thus we question the completeness of the claims data for this group. Similarly, due to data quality or data availability

---

<sup>A2</sup> Physicians working in Community Health Centres do not submit shadow billing claims.



reasons, we excluded the following groups from our analysis: SEAMO, RNPAGs, GHC, ICHA (Inner City Health Associates), St. Joseph's Family Practice Unit and Weeneebayko Health Ahtvskaywin (WHA).

FHNs, FHGs, CCMs and FHOs all offer enrolment to their patients (optional for FHGs, required for FHNs, CCMs and FHOs), provide comprehensive care, impose requirements on FPs to provide a minimum of after-hours care and receive several additional small lump sum payments and bonuses. With the exception of CCMs tailored to family physicians who prefer to remain in a solo practice, FHNs, FHGs and FHOs are groups comprised of at least 3 FPs and must offer Telephone Health Advisory Service (a 24-7 toll-free number) to their patients. With the exception of FHNs for the five cumulative preventive care bonuses, payment of the financial incentives under analysis is made to the individual physician and the target population is based on the FP's patient population, not the group's. As mentioned above, FHNs and FHOs are compensated with a blended system of capitation for "core" services provided to rostered patients and fee-for-service for both non-rostered patients and for "non core" services excluded from the basket of capitated services. FHGs are by far the most popular model with 4,351 physicians being affiliated with the model as of March 31 2008, FHNs are the second most popular model with 1,085 physicians as of March 31 2008. These PCR models saw a major uptake around 2005 with the grand majority of FPs that joined a FHG having left traditional FFS and the grand majority of FPs joining a FHN having left a FHG. While fee-for-service is the primary remuneration method for FHGs and consists of about two thirds of FHGs' income, capitation is the primary remuneration method for FHNs for which about two thirds of income derive from non-fee-for-service payments (Ontario College of Family Physicians, 2005). During the study period, more than half of Ontario's primary care physicians converted to a primary care reform model.

## Appendix D: Data Sources

Four core data sources were linked and used for this research project. All personal identifiers such as patient health card number and physician billing number were encrypted using the same encryption code so all files could be merged.

1. The *Registered Persons Database* provided basic information on the age, sex, OHIP eligibility and location of residence of each OHIP beneficiary.
2. The data that were extracted from the *OHIP Claims History Database* for this project contained information on all physician services provided to OHIP beneficiaries from April 1, 1996 to March 31, 2008. Each record in the claims data files represents a claim submitted by a physician to MOHLTC for payment and a physician visit may be associated with multiple claims (for example: a patient has a complete physical examination and a tetanus shot during that visit). Each claim includes the patient identifier, the date of service, the physician who provided the service, the fee schedule code associated with the service and the approved dollar amount of the service being claimed by the physician.
3. The *Corporate Provider Database* supplied basic information on each physician (age, sex, licensing year and location of the practice) and on all groups the physician was affiliated with during the study period (start date, end date, group number and affiliation type).
4. The *Client Agency Program Enrolment (CAPE)* file provided information on the patient roster for each PCR physician. Each record in this file contained the patient identifier, the rostering physician, the start date and end date of enrollment.

These core data sources were supplemented with several other data from other Ministry databases and from Cancer Care Ontario such as:

- Data extracted from Cancer Care Ontario's Ontario Breast Cancer Screening Program containing the encrypted patient identifier and the date the patient received a preventive mammogram;
- MOHLTC's Fee Schedule Master File containing the history of all billable fee schedule codes and their associated dollar values;
- A list of all HSO groups so to exclude them from the study due to data limitations as discussed in Appendix C above;
- A multitude of business rules, metrics, lists and physician service agreements.

## Appendix E: Assigning Patients to Primary Care Physicians' Practices

The Hutchison methodology (Hutchison, Hurley, Birch, Lomas, & Stratford-Devai, 1997) was implemented for all FPs in the province, not just those in the analysis sample. This ensured that an individual was assigned to an FP as called for by the algorithm, regardless of whether the FP was included in the analysis (if we focused only on the analysis sample, we would have falsely assigned some patients to sample physicians when the individual's real family physician was not included in the sample). A FP's practice population is defined as:

- All persons for whom the physician billed OHIP for at least one visit (see below for how a visit was defined) during the previous fiscal year; and
- All additional patients for whom the physician billed OHIP for at least one visit in each of the two preceding fiscal years.
- Patients who met these criteria for more than one physician were assigned to the physician who billed for the largest number of visits in the most recent year.
- When an equal number of visits were made to more than one physician in the most recent year, assignment is made to the made to the physician who billed for the most recent visit.

A service is defined as a FP visit if:

- The attending physician is a FP and the fee code is one of the following 74 visit codes from the Ontario Schedule of Benefits

Fee Schedule Code	Description
A001A	Minor assessment
A003A	General assessment
A004A	General re-assessment
A005A	Consultation
A006A	Repeat consultation
A007A	Intermediate assessment or well baby care
A008A	Mini assessment
A110A	Periodic oculo-visual assessment, aged 19 years and below
A112A	Periodic oculo-visual assessment, aged 65 years and above
A115A	A major eye examination
A888A	Emergency department equivalent – Partial assessment
A901A	House call assessment – First patient seen
A902A	House call assessment – Pronouncement of death in the home
A903A	Pre-dental/operative general assessment (maximum of 2 per 12-month period)
A905A	Limited consultation
A933A	On-call admission assessment
A945A	Special palliative care consultation
E070A	Geriatric Geriatric Age Premium: Gen. Practice - Geriatric Gen. Assess. Premium - 75 or
E071A	Older
E075A	Geriatric general assessment premium – patient aged 75 or older (maximum 1 per 12 month period)
E077A	Identification of patient for a Major Eye Examination

Fee Schedule Code	Description
G212A	Diagnostic and Therapeutic Procedure – Hyposensitisation, including assessment and supervision – When sole reason for visit
G271A	Diagnostic and Therapeutic Procedure – Cardiovascular – Anticoagulant supervision – long-term, telephone advice
G365A	Diagnostic and Therapeutic Procedure – Papanicolaou Smear – periodic
G372A	Diagnostic and Therapeutic Procedure – Intramuscular, subcutaneous or intradermal – With visit (each injection)
G373A	Diagnostic and Therapeutic Procedure – Intramuscular, subcutaneous or intradermal – Sole reason (first injection)
G538A	Active immunization – Injection of unspecified agent – with visit (each injection)
G539A	Active immunization – Injection of unspecified agent – sole reason (first injection)
G590A	Active Immunization – Injection of influenza agent – With visit
G591A	Active Immunization – Injection of influenza agent – Sole reason
K004A	Family psychotherapy – 2 or more family members in attendance at the same time
K005A	Primary mental health care - Individual care – Per half hour
K006A	Hypnotherapy – Individual care – Per half hour
K007A	Psychotherapy – Individual care – Per half hour
K010A	Psychotherapy – Additional units per member (maximum 6 units per patient per day)
K011A	Hypnotherapy – Group – for induction and training for hypnosis (maximum 8 people), per member, per half hour
K012A	Psychotherapy, Group – Per member of a group of 4, first 12 units per day
K013A	Counselling – Individual care – Per half hour
K017A	Annual health or annual physical examination – Child after second birthday
K019A	Psychotherapy, Group – Per member of a group of 2, first 12 units per day
K020A	Psychotherapy, Group – Per member of a group of 3, first 12 units per day
K022A	HIV Primary Care – Individual care per half hour
K023A	Palliative care support – Individual care per half hour
K024A	Psychotherapy, Group – Per member of a group of 5, first 12 units per day
K025A	Psychotherapy, Group – Per member of a group of 6 to 12, first 12 units per day
K026A	Family Practice & Practice in General - Certification of medical eligibility for Ontario Hepatitis C Assistance Program
K027A	Family Practice & Practice in General – Certification of medical eligibility for Ontario Hepatitis C Assistance Program (OHCAP)
K028A	Family Practice & Practice in General – Sexually transmitted disease management
K030A	Family Practice & Practice in General – Diabetic management assessment
K031A	Health Protection and Promotion Act – Physician Report – Completion of Physician Report in accordance with Section 22.1 of the Health Protection and Promotion Act.
K033A	Counselling – Individual care – Additional units per patient per provider per 12-month period
K040A	Group counselling – 2 or more persons
K041A	Group counseling – 2 or more persons – Additional units
K070A	Home care application – Application
K071A	Home care supervision – Acute Home Care Supervision (maximum 1 every 2 weeks for the first 12 weeks following admission to home care program).
K072A	Home care supervision – Chronic Home Care Supervision (maximum 1 per month commencing in the 13th week following admission to the home care program).
K623A	Certification of mental illness – Form 1 – Application for psychiatric assessment in accordance with the <i>Mental Health Act</i> – includes necessary history, examination, notification of the patient, family and relevant authorities and completion of form.
P004A	Obstetrics, prenatal care – Minor prenatal assessment
W001A	Non-emergency long-term care in-patient services – Subsequent visits – Chronic care or convalescent hospital – additional subsequent visits (maximum 4 per patient per month)
W002A	Non-emergency long-term care in-patient services – Subsequent visits – Chronic care or convalescent hospital – first 4 subsequent visits per patient per month

THE RESPONSE OF ONTARIO PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS TO PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES

<b>Fee Schedule Code</b>	<b>Description</b>
W003A	Non-emergency long-term care in-patient services – Subsequent visits – Nursing home or home for the aged – first 2 subsequent visits per patient per month
W004A	Emergency or Out-Patient Department (OPD) & Non-Emergency Long-Term Care In-Patient Services – General re-assessment of patient in nursing home
W008A	Non-emergency long-term care in-patient services – Subsequent visits – Nursing home or home for the aged – additional subsequent visits (maximum 2 per patient per month)
W102A	Emergency or Out-Patient Department (OPD) & Non-Emergency Long-Term Care In-Patient Services – Admission assessment – Type 1
W104A	Emergency or Out-Patient Department (OPD) & Non-Emergency Long-Term Care In-Patient Services – Admission assessment – Type 2
W105A	Emergency or Out-Patient Department (OPD) & Non-Emergency Long-Term Care In-Patient Services – Consultation
W106A	Emergency or Out-Patient Department (OPD) & Non-Emergency Long-Term Care In-Patient Services – Repeat Consultation
W109A	Emergency or Out-Patient Department (OPD) & Non-Emergency Long-Term Care In-Patient Services – Admission assessment – Annual physical examination
W121A	Non-emergency long-term care in-patient services – Subsequent visits – Nursing home or home for the aged – Additional visits due to intercurrent illness
W107A	Emergency or Out-Patient Department (OPD) & Non-Emergency Long-Term Care In-Patient Services, Admission assessment – Type 3
W777A	Emergency or Out-Patient Department (OPD) & Non-Emergency Long-Term Care In-Patient Services – Intermediate assessment - Pronouncement of death
W872A	Non-emergency long-term care in-patient services – Subsequent visits – Nursing home or home for the aged – Palliative care
W882A	Non-emergency long-term care in-patient services – Subsequent visits – Chronic care or convalescent hospital – Palliative care
W903A	Emergency or Out-Patient Department (OPD) & Non-Emergency Long-Term Care In-Patient Services – Pre-dental/pre-operative general assessment (maximum of 2 per 12-month period)

## Appendix F: Construction of Dependent Variables

Service	Eligible Fee Schedule Codes <sup>a</sup>	Notes
<b>Cumulative Preventive Care Bonuses<sup>b</sup></b>		
Seniors' influenza immunizations	G590A, G591A and tracking code <sup>c</sup> Q130A	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Patients must be rostered with the FP on March 31 but it does not matter who provided the service</li> <li>Since the introduction of the Universal Influenza Immunization Program in 2000, MOHLTC estimates that approximately 70% of seasonal flu shots are provided in physicians' offices and thus are included in the claims data while 30% are provided in community clinics (MOHLTC, 2010). A survey conducted after the 2000-2001 flu season revealed that 65% of people interviewed received their flu shot in their physician's office. (Kwong &amp; Manuel, 2007)</li> </ul>
Toddler immunizations	G538A, G539A and Q132A (tracking)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Patients must be rostered with the FP on March 31 but it does not matter who provided the service</li> <li>Due to the fact that we obtained OHIP claims data for this project for the period April 1, 1996 to March 31 2008, we were not able to measure the proportion of children who received the required number of immunizations on March 31 1999. The study period for this bonus is therefore one year shorter, beginning with fiscal year 1999-2000 rather than 1998-1999.</li> </ul>
Pap smears	G365A, L643A, L713A, L733A, E430A, Q011A (tracking) and exclusion code <sup>d</sup> Q140A	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Patients must be rostered with the FP on March 31 but it does not matter who provided the service</li> <li>No data are available on Pap smears conducted in hospitals.</li> </ul>
Mammograms	X185B, X185C, X185A, Q131A (tracking) and Q141A (exclusion)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Patients must be rostered with the FP on March 31 but it does not matter who provided the service</li> </ul>
Colorectal cancer screenings	G004A, L181A, Q133A (tracking) and Q142A (exclusion)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Patients must be rostered with the FP on March 31 but it does not matter who provided the service</li> </ul>

<sup>a</sup> Although some of the fee codes are no longer billable as they have been de-listed from the Schedule of Benefits, we list all codes that were used to construct the dependent variables at any point during our study period (April 1 1998 to March 31 2008).

<sup>b</sup> CCMs and FHGs are eligible for the 5 bonuses only if they enrolled a minimum of 450 patients as of March 31, 2006 and 650 patients every March 31 thereafter.

<sup>c</sup> Patients may have received the eligible service from a health care provider that does not bill OHIP. For example, seniors may receive their influenza immunization in flu clinics held in shopping malls, community centres, employer's workplace. Tracking codes allow for a FP to flag to MOHLTC that the patient has received the service.

<sup>d</sup> Exclusion codes are used by FPs to flag a patient who, although eligible for the service according to their age and sex, does not require the service and should not be counted in the calculation of the bonus. For example, a female who has had a total hysterectomy does not require a Pap smear. If this female patient is aged between 35 and 69 years, her rostering FP should assign code Q141A to flag that she does not require the service.

**Appendix F (continued): Construction of Dependent Variables**

<b>Service</b>	<b>Eligible Fee Schedule Codes<sup>e</sup></b>	<b>Notes</b>
<b>Annual Special Payments<sup>f</sup></b>		
Obstetrical deliveries	P006, P009, P011, P018, P020, P038 and P041	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Eligible services must be provided by the FP</li> </ul>
Hospital services	A933, C002, C003, C004, C005, C006, C007, C008, C009, C010, C121, C777, C905, C933 and H001	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Eligible services must be provided by the FP</li> </ul>
Palliative care	K023	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Eligible services must be provided by the FP</li> <li>Since K023 was introduced July 1, 1998, the first year that we included in our analysis of this payment is the 1999-2000 fiscal year rather than 1998-99.</li> </ul>
Office procedures	A list of 117 codes <sup>g</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Eligible services must be provided by the FP and patients must be rostered with that FP on the service date</li> </ul>
Prenatal care	P003 and P004	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Eligible services must be provided by the FP and patients must be rostered with that FP on the service date</li> </ul>
Home visits	A901 and A902	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Eligible services must be provided by the FP and patients must be rostered with that FP on the service date</li> </ul>

<sup>e</sup> Although some of the fee codes are no longer billable as they have been de-listed from the Schedule of Benefits, we list all codes that were used to construct the dependent variables at any point during our study period (April 1 1998 to March 31 2008).

<sup>f</sup> Once the FP reaches the target level at any point during the fiscal year, FPs receive the payment. Some eligibility restrictions apply for specific PCR groups and specifically the number of special payments they can receive in one year (e.g., physicians cannot earn both the prenatal and obstetrics payment; physicians in a group with a group number that begins with “BE” or “BC” are restricted in the number of special payments they can earn in a year).

<sup>g</sup> The codes are: D001, D004, D007, D012, E504, E558, E576, E577, E705, E740, E741, E747, F004, F005, F006, F008, F009, F012, F013, F016, F017, F018, F102, G361, G370, G371, G378, G420, R018, R019, R020, R031, R032, R033, R040, R041, R048, R049, R050, R094, Z096, Z101, Z103, Z104, Z106, Z110, Z113, Z114, Z116, Z117, Z118, Z122, Z123, Z124, Z125, Z126, Z127, Z128, Z129, Z130, Z131, Z139, Z141, Z154, Z156, Z157, Z158, Z159, Z160, Z161, Z162, Z163, Z164, Z166, Z167, Z168, Z169, Z170, Z171, Z173, Z174, Z175, Z177, Z179, Z190, Z191, Z192, Z200, Z201, Z202, Z203, Z204, Z211, Z213, Z314, Z315, Z316, Z515, Z527, Z528, Z535, Z536, Z547, Z555, Z567, Z580, Z714, Z733, Z736, Z770, Z845, Z847, Z848, Z854, Z874, Z904 and Z915.

**Appendix G: Specification of the Independent Variables**

<b>Variable Name</b>	<b>Variable Description</b>
treatment	Treatment dummy indicating whether the FP was eligible for the financial incentive on that date
post	Pre- & post- dummy indicating whether it is post-intervention period
treated	Treated & untreated dummy indicating whether the this physician was entitled to collect bonus/special payment during out study period
ffsd fhgd fhnd ccmd fhod	PCR dummies indicating the physician was affiliated with the model on that date ffsd: 1 if FFS, 0 otherwise fhgd: 1 if FHG, 0 otherwise fhnd: 1 if FHN, 0 otherwise ccmd: 1 if CCM, 0 otherwise fhod: 1 if FHO, 0 otherwise
doc_age	Age of physician in years on March 31 2002
doc_ageg1 doc_ageg2 doc_ageg3 doc_ageg4	Physician age-- four categories doc_age1: physician age < 45; doc_age2: 45 ≤ physician age < 50; doc_age3: 50 ≤ physician age < 60; doc_age4: 60 ≤ physician age
doc_male	Physician sex: 1 if male; 0 if female
cmaca	Practice location <sub>s</sub> : metropolitan area influence measured by Metropolitan Influence Zone (five categories: 0 if CMA, 4 levels otherwise: strong, medium, weak, no influence)
riotype	Practice location <sub>s</sub> : urban/rural level measured by RIO score (Rurality Index of Ontario) riotype =0 if RIO score > 45; riotype =1 if RIO score ≤ 45
yrslcyr	Years since licensing year as of March 31 2008
lnsbill	Log of billings: log of total value (fee approved) of claims submitted in 1998-99
workdays	Days of working: total number of days billed in this fiscal year
sum_visit	Number of visits: total # of patient visits in this year
sum_visitg1 sum_visitg2 sum_visitg3 sum_visitg4	Total # of patient visits in this year: four categories sum_visitg1: < 5,000; sum_visitg2: 5,000 ≤ x < 7,500; sum_visitg3: 7,500 ≤ x < 10,000; sum_visitg4: ≥ 10,000
visitpd	Number of patient visits per working day: the number of visits divided by number of days worked in this year
sum_pt	Practice size: number of assigned patients seen per year
sum_ptg1 sum_ptg2 sum_ptg3 sum_ptg4	Practice size: number of assigned patients seen per year, four categories sum_ptg1: < 1,000; sum_ptg2: 1,000 ≤ x < 1,500; sum_ptg3: 1,500 ≤ x < 2,000; sum_ptg4: ≥ 2,000
meanage	Average practice age: average age of eligible patient population on each snapshot date
fmpercent	Proportion of females in the practice: proportion of female patients as of eligible patient population on each snapshot date
clpercent	Proportion of children patients: Proportion of the eligible patients that are under 2 years of age
elpercent	Proportion of elderly patients: Proportion of the eligible patients that are over 65 years of age



<b>Variable Name</b>	<b>Variable Description</b>
year	Year fixed effects: 10 dummy variables for each snapshot year from March 31 1999 to March 2008
cdname	Geographical fixed effects: 49 dummy variables defined by Census Division codes

## Appendix H: Full Set of Regression Results

Below we present the full set of estimated coefficients for each of the regressions results summarized in Tables 10, 11 and 12. Tables H1- H15 list the full results for regression results presented in Table 10; Tables H16- H33 list the full results for regression results presented in Table 11; Tables H34- H78 list the full results for regression results presented in Table 12. The definition of all independent variables can be found in Appendix G. In the tables of full results, the columns of figures represent the following quantities:

coef:	estimate of the marginal effect of this variable
se:	standard error of the estimate
tstat:	t-statistic for the estimated coefficient
pval:	p- value for the estimated coefficient
ci_low, ci_high:	95% confidence interval for the estimated coefficient

Note: the fixed-effects models cannot include variables that do not change over time (e.g., physician sex), so these variables are dropped from such models.

**Tables of Full Results for Regression Results Presented in Table 10**

Table H1: Preventive Care Bonuses, Estimated Marginal Effects, Difference-in-differences Estimator with Physician-specific Fixed Effects, Senior Flu Shot, Full Sample

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment3	0.0278***	(0.00695)	3.997	6.45e-05	0.0142	0.0414
post	0.322***	(0.00890)	36.16	0	0.304	0.339
fhgd	0.0107**	(0.00484)	2.219	0.0265	0.00125	0.0202
fhnd	-0.00293	(0.0152)	-0.193	0.847	-0.0327	0.0268
ccmd	0.0345***	(0.00894)	3.861	0.000114	0.0170	0.0520
fhod	-0.00382	(0.0167)	-0.228	0.819	-0.0366	0.0290
doc_ageg2	0.000445	(0.00571)	0.0780	0.938	-0.0107	0.0116
doc_ageg3	-0.00289	(0.00832)	-0.347	0.729	-0.0192	0.0134
doc_ageg4	-0.000845	(0.0110)	-0.0769	0.939	-0.0224	0.0207
workdays	0.000493***	(7.40e-05)	6.663	0	0.000348	0.000638
sum_visitg2	0.00415	(0.00758)	0.547	0.585	-0.0107	0.0190
sum_visitg3	0.00796	(0.00996)	0.799	0.424	-0.0116	0.0275
sum_visitg4	-0.0113	(0.0126)	-0.895	0.371	-0.0359	0.0134
visitpd	0.00102**	(0.000448)	2.269	0.0233	0.000139	0.00190
sum_ptg2	0.00922	(0.00766)	1.203	0.229	-0.00580	0.0242
sum_ptg3	0.0110	(0.00977)	1.125	0.260	-0.00815	0.0301
sum_ptg4	0.0293**	(0.0117)	2.514	0.0119	0.00646	0.0522
meanage	-0.00202	(0.00166)	-1.220	0.223	-0.00527	0.00123
fmpersent	0.294***	(0.0746)	3.948	7.91e-05	0.148	0.440
clpersent	-0.756***	(0.236)	-3.203	0.00136	-1.218	-0.293
elpersent	0.661***	(0.123)	5.373	7.86e-08	0.420	0.902
_lcdname_3502	-0.138	(0.107)	-1.287	0.198	-0.349	0.0722
_lcdname_3506	0.0572	(0.0977)	0.586	0.558	-0.134	0.249
_lcdname_3507	0.0216	(0.0721)	0.300	0.764	-0.120	0.163
_lcdname_3510	0.208*	(0.125)	1.660	0.0970	-0.0376	0.453
_lcdname_3511	0.337**	(0.142)	2.368	0.0179	0.0581	0.616
_lcdname_3512	0.0226	(0.127)	0.179	0.858	-0.226	0.271
_lcdname_3514	0.119	(0.136)	0.879	0.380	-0.147	0.385
_lcdname_3515	0.124	(0.119)	1.037	0.300	-0.110	0.358
_lcdname_3516	0.178*	(0.106)	1.675	0.0939	-0.0302	0.386
_lcdname_3518	-0.0639	(0.105)	-0.606	0.545	-0.271	0.143
_lcdname_3519	-0.0397	(0.101)	-0.394	0.693	-0.237	0.158
_lcdname_3520	-0.0224	(0.101)	-0.222	0.824	-0.219	0.175
_lcdname_3521	-0.0400	(0.100)	-0.399	0.690	-0.237	0.157
_lcdname_3523	-0.355***	(0.111)	-3.205	0.00135	-0.572	-0.138
_lcdname_3524	-0.166	(0.105)	-1.588	0.112	-0.371	0.0389
_lcdname_3526	-0.0579	(0.112)	-0.518	0.604	-0.277	0.161
_lcdname_3530	-0.124	(0.113)	-1.100	0.271	-0.344	0.0968
_lcdname_3532	-0.715***	(0.149)	-4.804	1.57e-06	-1.006	-0.423
_lcdname_3534	0.174	(0.124)	1.399	0.162	-0.0696	0.417
_lcdname_3537	-0.175*	(0.103)	-1.698	0.0896	-0.378	0.0271
_lcdname_3538	0.404***	(0.124)	3.272	0.00107	0.162	0.647
_lcdname_3539	0.126	(0.109)	1.162	0.245	-0.0868	0.339
_lcdname_3540	0.188	(0.152)	1.238	0.216	-0.110	0.486
_lcdname_3541	0.102	(0.132)	0.773	0.439	-0.156	0.360
_lcdname_3542	-0.209*	(0.110)	-1.898	0.0577	-0.425	0.00679
_lcdname_3543	0.0607	(0.104)	0.583	0.560	-0.143	0.265
_lcdname_3544	0.106	(0.252)	0.420	0.675	-0.388	0.599
_lcdname_3547	0.322**	(0.146)	2.207	0.0273	0.0361	0.608
_lcdname_3548	-0.371***	(0.106)	-3.512	0.000447	-0.578	-0.164

_lcdname_3551	-0.105	(0.106)	-0.995	0.320	-0.313	0.102
_lcdname_3552	-0.218**	(0.105)	-2.076	0.0379	-0.424	-0.0122
_lcdname_3553	-0.238	(0.147)	-1.620	0.105	-0.527	0.0500
_lcdname_3560	0.221	(0.148)	1.497	0.134	-0.0685	0.511
_lyear_2000	0.0667***	(0.00715)	9.330	0	0.0527	0.0808
_lyear_2001	0.269***	(0.00654)	41.08	0	0.256	0.282
_lyear_2002	0.352***	(0.00597)	58.91	0	0.340	0.364
_lyear_2003	0.337***	(0.00608)	55.39	0	0.325	0.349
_lyear_2004	0.394***	(0.00643)	61.26	0	0.381	0.407
_lyear_2005	0.386***	(0.00695)	55.52	0	0.372	0.400
_lyear_2006	0.373***	(0.00774)	48.12	0	0.357	0.388
_lyear_2008	-0.0164***	(0.00403)	-4.063	4.87e-05	-0.0243	-0.00848
_lcmaca_2	-0.0832	(0.0563)	-1.477	0.140	-0.194	0.0272
_lcmaca_3	-0.0474	(0.0649)	-0.730	0.465	-0.175	0.0798
_lcmaca_4	-0.0154	(0.103)	-0.150	0.881	-0.217	0.187
_lcmaca_5	-0.0462	(0.111)	-0.416	0.678	-0.264	0.171
_lriotype_1	0.0911**	(0.0396)	2.299	0.0215	0.0134	0.169
Constant	-0.164	(0.126)	-1.303	0.193	-0.411	0.0828
Observations	19,866					
R-squared	0.469					
Number of id	2,029					

---

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

THE RESPONSE OF ONTARIO PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS TO PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES

Table H2: Preventive Care Bonuses, Estimated Marginal Effects, Difference-in-differences Estimator with Physician-specific Fixed Effects, Senior Flu Shot, FPs who joined PCR before introduction of bonuses

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment3	0.0275***	(0.00701)	3.927	8.65e-05	0.0138	0.0413
post	0.321***	(0.00904)	35.46	0	0.303	0.338
fhgd	0.0105**	(0.00500)	2.093	0.0364	0.000664	0.0203
fhnd	-0.00253	(0.0155)	-0.163	0.870	-0.0329	0.0279
ccmd	0.0396***	(0.00922)	4.295	1.76e-05	0.0215	0.0577
fhod	-0.00501	(0.0170)	-0.294	0.769	-0.0383	0.0283
doc_ageg2	-0.000764	(0.00582)	-0.131	0.896	-0.0122	0.0106
doc_ageg3	-0.00296	(0.00849)	-0.349	0.727	-0.0196	0.0137
doc_ageg4	-0.00277	(0.0112)	-0.247	0.805	-0.0247	0.0192
workdays	0.000465***	(7.53e-05)	6.169	7.04e-10	0.000317	0.000612
sum_visitg2	0.00611	(0.00769)	0.794	0.427	-0.00897	0.0212
sum_visitg3	0.00765	(0.0101)	0.756	0.450	-0.0122	0.0275
sum_visitg4	-0.00949	(0.0128)	-0.743	0.457	-0.0345	0.0155
visitpd	0.000777*	(0.000458)	1.698	0.0894	-0.000120	0.00167
sum_ptg2	0.00841	(0.00781)	1.077	0.281	-0.00689	0.0237
sum_ptg3	0.0114	(0.00998)	1.144	0.253	-0.00815	0.0310
sum_ptg4	0.0311***	(0.0120)	2.602	0.00929	0.00767	0.0545
meanage	-0.00219	(0.00171)	-1.285	0.199	-0.00554	0.00115
fmpercent	0.258***	(0.0763)	3.382	0.000722	0.108	0.407
clpercent	-0.799***	(0.241)	-3.314	0.000921	-1.272	-0.327
elpercent	0.697***	(0.126)	5.540	3.07e-08	0.451	0.944
_lcdname_3502	-0.137	(0.108)	-1.277	0.202	-0.348	0.0735
_lcdname_3506	0.0545	(0.0986)	0.553	0.581	-0.139	0.248
_lcdname_3507	0.0274	(0.0731)	0.374	0.708	-0.116	0.171
_lcdname_3510	0.207	(0.128)	1.622	0.105	-0.0431	0.457
_lcdname_3511	0.335**	(0.144)	2.322	0.0202	0.0522	0.618
_lcdname_3512	0.0186	(0.129)	0.144	0.885	-0.234	0.271
_lcdname_3514	0.113	(0.137)	0.830	0.406	-0.154	0.381
_lcdname_3515	0.120	(0.122)	0.983	0.325	-0.119	0.359
_lcdname_3516	0.154	(0.128)	1.201	0.230	-0.0975	0.406
_lcdname_3518	-0.0622	(0.110)	-0.567	0.571	-0.277	0.153
_lcdname_3519	-0.0494	(0.103)	-0.477	0.633	-0.252	0.153
_lcdname_3520	-0.0429	(0.103)	-0.418	0.676	-0.244	0.159
_lcdname_3521	-0.0305	(0.102)	-0.299	0.765	-0.230	0.169
_lcdname_3523	-0.349***	(0.112)	-3.111	0.00187	-0.568	-0.129
_lcdname_3524	-0.168	(0.106)	-1.584	0.113	-0.377	0.0400
_lcdname_3526	-0.0520	(0.113)	-0.458	0.647	-0.274	0.170
_lcdname_3530	-0.139	(0.115)	-1.207	0.227	-0.364	0.0865
_lcdname_3532	-0.722***	(0.150)	-4.813	1.50e-06	-1.017	-0.428
_lcdname_3534	0.177	(0.126)	1.402	0.161	-0.0704	0.424
_lcdname_3537	-0.181*	(0.105)	-1.725	0.0845	-0.386	0.0246
_lcdname_3538	0.402***	(0.124)	3.233	0.00123	0.158	0.645
_lcdname_3539	0.130	(0.111)	1.175	0.240	-0.0870	0.348
_lcdname_3540	0.182	(0.153)	1.190	0.234	-0.118	0.483
_lcdname_3541	0.0911	(0.132)	0.690	0.490	-0.168	0.350
_lcdname_3542	-0.206*	(0.111)	-1.861	0.0627	-0.424	0.0109
_lcdname_3543	0.0683	(0.107)	0.635	0.525	-0.142	0.279
_lcdname_3544	0.123	(0.253)	0.484	0.628	-0.374	0.620
_lcdname_3547	0.332**	(0.147)	2.265	0.0235	0.0447	0.620
_lcdname_3548	-0.390***	(0.107)	-3.660	0.000252	-0.599	-0.181
_lcdname_3551	-0.115	(0.106)	-1.080	0.280	-0.323	0.0934
_lcdname_3552	-0.224**	(0.106)	-2.123	0.0337	-0.431	-0.0172

_lcdname_3553	-0.254*	(0.149)	-1.705	0.0881	-0.545	0.0379
_lcdname_3560	0.222	(0.150)	1.486	0.137	-0.0709	0.516
_lyear_2000	0.0670***	(0.00733)	9.139	0	0.0526	0.0814
_lyear_2001	0.270***	(0.00668)	40.48	0	0.257	0.283
_lyear_2002	0.351***	(0.00611)	57.46	0	0.339	0.363
_lyear_2003	0.336***	(0.00623)	53.90	0	0.323	0.348
_lyear_2004	0.394***	(0.00659)	59.72	0	0.381	0.407
_lyear_2005	0.386***	(0.00715)	53.99	0	0.372	0.400
_lyear_2006	0.372***	(0.00801)	46.41	0	0.356	0.387
_lyear_2008	-0.0175***	(0.00409)	-4.284	1.85e-05	-0.0255	-0.00950
_lcmaca_2	-0.0807	(0.0581)	-1.389	0.165	-0.195	0.0332
_lcmaca_3	-0.0559	(0.0673)	-0.831	0.406	-0.188	0.0759
_lcmaca_4	-0.00750	(0.105)	-0.0716	0.943	-0.213	0.198
_lcmaca_5	-0.0541	(0.113)	-0.479	0.632	-0.276	0.167
_lriotype_1	0.0967**	(0.0408)	2.367	0.0180	0.0166	0.177
Constant	-0.125	(0.128)	-0.973	0.331	-0.376	0.126
Observations	19,073					
R-squared	0.468					
Number of id	1,948					

---

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

THE RESPONSE OF ONTARIO PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS TO PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES

Table H3: Preventive Care Bonuses, Estimated Marginal Effects, Difference-in-differences Estimator with Physician-specific Fixed Effects, Senior Flu Shot, FPs in PCR models funded primarily by FFS

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment3	0.0244***	(0.00706)	3.457	0.000548	0.0106	0.0383
post	0.319***	(0.00905)	35.19	0	0.301	0.336
fhgd	0.0154***	(0.00510)	3.022	0.00251	0.00542	0.0254
ccmd	0.0363***	(0.00909)	3.998	6.43e-05	0.0185	0.0541
doc_ageg2	-0.00138	(0.00591)	-0.234	0.815	-0.0130	0.0102
doc_ageg3	-0.00414	(0.00860)	-0.481	0.631	-0.0210	0.0127
doc_ageg4	-0.00157	(0.0113)	-0.139	0.890	-0.0238	0.0207
workdays	0.000485***	(7.70e-05)	6.302	3.01e-10	0.000334	0.000636
sum_visitg2	0.00184	(0.00797)	0.230	0.818	-0.0138	0.0175
sum_visitg3	0.00333	(0.0104)	0.320	0.749	-0.0171	0.0238
sum_visitg4	-0.0154	(0.0131)	-1.173	0.241	-0.0410	0.0103
visitpd	0.000961**	(0.000458)	2.098	0.0359	6.34e-05	0.00186
sum_ptg2	0.0110	(0.00795)	1.389	0.165	-0.00454	0.0266
sum_ptg3	0.0169*	(0.0101)	1.668	0.0953	-0.00295	0.0367
sum_ptg4	0.0356***	(0.0120)	2.959	0.00309	0.0120	0.0592
meanage	-0.00146	(0.00169)	-0.863	0.388	-0.00477	0.00186
fmpercent	0.254***	(0.0792)	3.206	0.00135	0.0987	0.409
clpercent	-0.711***	(0.244)	-2.909	0.00363	-1.190	-0.232
elpercent	0.641***	(0.125)	5.108	3.29e-07	0.395	0.887
_lcdname_3502	-0.158	(0.123)	-1.289	0.197	-0.399	0.0825
_lcdname_3506	0.0448	(0.118)	0.380	0.704	-0.186	0.276
_lcdname_3510	0.204	(0.136)	1.501	0.133	-0.0626	0.471
_lcdname_3511	0.205	(0.154)	1.338	0.181	-0.0955	0.506
_lcdname_3512	0.0286	(0.129)	0.222	0.824	-0.223	0.280
_lcdname_3514	0.439***	(0.103)	4.281	1.87e-05	0.238	0.640
_lcdname_3515	0.0671	(0.135)	0.496	0.620	-0.198	0.332
_lcdname_3516	0.164	(0.106)	1.544	0.123	-0.0442	0.372
_lcdname_3518	-0.0685	(0.118)	-0.580	0.562	-0.300	0.163
_lcdname_3519	-0.0531	(0.114)	-0.466	0.641	-0.276	0.170
_lcdname_3520	-0.0354	(0.113)	-0.312	0.755	-0.257	0.187
_lcdname_3521	-0.0515	(0.113)	-0.454	0.650	-0.274	0.171
_lcdname_3523	-0.365***	(0.125)	-2.929	0.00341	-0.610	-0.121
_lcdname_3524	-0.177	(0.117)	-1.513	0.130	-0.406	0.0523
_lcdname_3526	-0.0541	(0.123)	-0.439	0.661	-0.296	0.188
_lcdname_3530	-0.136	(0.124)	-1.091	0.275	-0.379	0.108
_lcdname_3534	0.198	(0.137)	1.451	0.147	-0.0696	0.466
_lcdname_3537	-0.181*	(0.106)	-1.707	0.0879	-0.388	0.0268
_lcdname_3538	0.410***	(0.124)	3.315	0.000920	0.168	0.653
_lcdname_3539	0.149	(0.123)	1.215	0.224	-0.0915	0.390
_lcdname_3540	0.349**	(0.143)	2.440	0.0147	0.0686	0.629
_lcdname_3541	0.0236	(0.130)	0.181	0.856	-0.232	0.279
_lcdname_3543	0.0393	(0.123)	0.319	0.750	-0.202	0.281
_lcdname_3547	0.273*	(0.147)	1.854	0.0637	-0.0155	0.561
_lcdname_3548	-0.292***	(0.107)	-2.731	0.00633	-0.502	-0.0825
_lcdname_3552	-0.285**	(0.129)	-2.206	0.0274	-0.539	-0.0318
_lcdname_3553	-0.251	(0.157)	-1.600	0.110	-0.558	0.0563
_lcdname_3560	0.143	(0.0986)	1.452	0.147	-0.0501	0.336
_lyear_2000	0.0640***	(0.00736)	8.694	0	0.0496	0.0785
_lyear_2001	0.262***	(0.00677)	38.72	0	0.249	0.275
_lyear_2002	0.351***	(0.00616)	57.02	0	0.339	0.363
_lyear_2003	0.334***	(0.00626)	53.36	0	0.322	0.346
_lyear_2004	0.392***	(0.00661)	59.25	0	0.379	0.405

_lyear_2005	0.383***	(0.00713)	53.76	0	0.369	0.397
_lyear_2006	0.369***	(0.00797)	46.33	0	0.354	0.385
_lyear_2008	-0.0176***	(0.00412)	-4.282	1.86e-05	-0.0257	-0.00956
_lcmaca_2	-0.0943	(0.0833)	-1.132	0.258	-0.258	0.0690
_lcmaca_3	-0.0361	(0.0675)	-0.536	0.592	-0.168	0.0961
_lcmaca_4	-0.154	(0.110)	-1.404	0.160	-0.369	0.0611
_lcmaca_5	-0.0273	(0.114)	-0.239	0.811	-0.252	0.197
_lriotype_1	0.0444	(0.0451)	0.984	0.325	-0.0440	0.133
Constant	-0.111	(0.143)	-0.778	0.437	-0.391	0.169
Observations	18,550					
R-squared	0.471					
Number of id	1,893					

---

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1



THE RESPONSE OF ONTARIO PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS TO PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES

Table H4: Preventive Care Bonuses, Estimated Marginal Effects, Difference-in-differences Estimator with Physician-specific Fixed Effects, Toddler Immunization, Full Sample

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment4	0.0107	(0.0111)	0.968	0.333	-0.0110	0.0324
post	0.325***	(0.0114)	28.39	0	0.302	0.347
fhgd	-0.00218	(0.00750)	-0.291	0.771	-0.0169	0.0125
fhnd	0.00422	(0.0171)	0.248	0.805	-0.0292	0.0377
ccmd	-0.00188	(0.0128)	-0.147	0.883	-0.0269	0.0232
fhod	0.0138	(0.0227)	0.611	0.541	-0.0306	0.0583
doc_ageg2	-0.00183	(0.00656)	-0.278	0.781	-0.0147	0.0110
doc_ageg3	-0.00340	(0.00961)	-0.353	0.724	-0.0222	0.0154
doc_ageg4	-0.0263*	(0.0139)	-1.897	0.0578	-0.0534	0.000872
workdays	0.000418***	(0.000103)	4.045	5.26e-05	0.000216	0.000621
sum_visitg2	-0.00434	(0.0113)	-0.383	0.702	-0.0266	0.0179
sum_visitg3	-0.0152	(0.0142)	-1.072	0.284	-0.0430	0.0126
sum_visitg4	-0.0179	(0.0169)	-1.058	0.290	-0.0509	0.0152
visitpd	0.000841	(0.000541)	1.555	0.120	-0.000219	0.00190
sum_ptg2	0.0145	(0.0112)	1.300	0.194	-0.00739	0.0365
sum_ptg3	0.00620	(0.0131)	0.473	0.636	-0.0195	0.0319
sum_ptg4	0.0132	(0.0150)	0.878	0.380	-0.0162	0.0425
meanage	6.84e-05	(0.00225)	0.0304	0.976	-0.00435	0.00449
fmpercent	-0.0631	(0.108)	-0.586	0.558	-0.274	0.148
clpercent	-0.387	(0.278)	-1.390	0.164	-0.933	0.159
elpercent	-0.160	(0.192)	-0.835	0.404	-0.537	0.216
_lcdname_3502	-0.204	(0.172)	-1.187	0.235	-0.542	0.133
_lcdname_3506	-0.260*	(0.150)	-1.735	0.0827	-0.554	0.0337
_lcdname_3507	0.106	(0.0791)	1.345	0.179	-0.0486	0.261
_lcdname_3510	-0.408**	(0.197)	-2.072	0.0383	-0.794	-0.0219
_lcdname_3511	-0.648***	(0.205)	-3.164	0.00156	-1.050	-0.247
_lcdname_3512	-0.513***	(0.165)	-3.114	0.00185	-0.836	-0.190
_lcdname_3514	-0.733**	(0.307)	-2.390	0.0168	-1.335	-0.132
_lcdname_3515	-0.259	(0.176)	-1.474	0.141	-0.603	0.0854
_lcdname_3516	-0.111	(0.176)	-0.628	0.530	-0.456	0.235
_lcdname_3518	-0.400**	(0.166)	-2.412	0.0159	-0.725	-0.0749
_lcdname_3519	-0.378**	(0.158)	-2.401	0.0164	-0.687	-0.0694
_lcdname_3520	-0.372**	(0.157)	-2.367	0.0179	-0.681	-0.0641
_lcdname_3521	-0.349**	(0.158)	-2.203	0.0276	-0.659	-0.0385
_lcdname_3523	-0.146	(0.150)	-0.973	0.331	-0.440	0.148
_lcdname_3524	-0.292*	(0.163)	-1.789	0.0736	-0.612	0.0279
_lcdname_3526	-0.554***	(0.168)	-3.300	0.000971	-0.883	-0.225
_lcdname_3530	-0.405**	(0.164)	-2.473	0.0134	-0.726	-0.0840
_lcdname_3532	-0.656***	(0.218)	-3.006	0.00265	-1.084	-0.228
_lcdname_3534	-0.541***	(0.177)	-3.051	0.00228	-0.889	-0.194
_lcdname_3537	-0.554***	(0.171)	-3.240	0.00120	-0.889	-0.219
_lcdname_3538	-0.0138	(0.164)	-0.0842	0.933	-0.335	0.308
_lcdname_3539	-0.301*	(0.161)	-1.867	0.0619	-0.616	0.0150
_lcdname_3540	0.0902	(0.181)	0.499	0.618	-0.264	0.445
_lcdname_3541	0.124	(0.134)	0.920	0.358	-0.140	0.387
_lcdname_3542	-0.652***	(0.205)	-3.185	0.00145	-1.054	-0.251
_lcdname_3543	-0.495***	(0.155)	-3.199	0.00138	-0.798	-0.192
_lcdname_3547	-0.290*	(0.161)	-1.798	0.0721	-0.606	0.0261
_lcdname_3548	-0.724***	(0.209)	-3.464	0.000533	-1.134	-0.314
_lcdname_3551	-0.713***	(0.155)	-4.596	4.35e-06	-1.018	-0.409
_lcdname_3552	-0.874***	(0.188)	-4.655	3.27e-06	-1.242	-0.506
_lcdname_3553	-0.680***	(0.185)	-3.675	0.000239	-1.042	-0.317

_lcdname_3560	-0.580***	(0.104)	-5.560	2.75e-08	-0.784	-0.375
_lyear_2001	0.0274***	(0.00583)	4.697	2.66e-06	0.0160	0.0388
_lyear_2002	0.0325***	(0.00595)	5.464	4.73e-08	0.0208	0.0441
_lyear_2003	0.0577***	(0.00626)	9.226	0	0.0455	0.0700
_lyear_2004	0.0988***	(0.00707)	13.97	0	0.0849	0.113
_lyear_2005	0.143***	(0.00798)	17.91	0	0.127	0.158
_lyear_2006	0.211***	(0.00987)	21.38	0	0.192	0.230
_lyear_2008	0.0420***	(0.00590)	7.111	0	0.0304	0.0535
_lcmaca_2	-0.0677	(0.0723)	-0.936	0.349	-0.209	0.0741
_lcmaca_3	0.0522	(0.0723)	0.723	0.470	-0.0894	0.194
_lcmaca_4	-0.106	(0.0916)	-1.156	0.248	-0.285	0.0736
_lcmaca_5	-0.397***	(0.119)	-3.348	0.000815	-0.630	-0.165
_lriotype_1	0.0162	(0.0509)	0.318	0.750	-0.0836	0.116
Constant	0.772***	(0.182)	4.244	2.21e-05	0.415	1.128
Observations	16,826					
R-squared	0.356					
Number of id	1,999					

---

Robust standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

THE RESPONSE OF ONTARIO PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS TO PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES

Table H5: Preventive Care Bonuses, Estimated Marginal Effects, Difference-in-differences Estimator with Physician-specific Fixed Effects, Toddler Immunization, FPs who joined PCR before introduction of bonuses

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment4	0.00965	(0.0112)	0.863	0.388	-0.0123	0.0316
post	0.326***	(0.0116)	28.05	0	0.303	0.349
fhgd	0.000251	(0.00782)	0.0321	0.974	-0.0151	0.0156
fhnd	0.00328	(0.0174)	0.189	0.850	-0.0307	0.0373
ccmd	0.00184	(0.0135)	0.136	0.891	-0.0246	0.0282
fhod	0.0152	(0.0234)	0.650	0.516	-0.0307	0.0611
doc_ageg2	-0.000762	(0.00668)	-0.114	0.909	-0.0139	0.0123
doc_ageg3	-0.00297	(0.00980)	-0.303	0.762	-0.0222	0.0162
doc_ageg4	-0.0275*	(0.0142)	-1.945	0.0518	-0.0553	0.000216
workdays	0.000445***	(0.000105)	4.223	2.43e-05	0.000239	0.000652
sum_visitg2	-0.00476	(0.0115)	-0.414	0.679	-0.0273	0.0178
sum_visitg3	-0.0147	(0.0144)	-1.015	0.310	-0.0430	0.0137
sum_visitg4	-0.0187	(0.0172)	-1.082	0.279	-0.0525	0.0152
visitpd	0.000903	(0.000553)	1.633	0.103	-0.000181	0.00199
sum_ptg2	0.0140	(0.0114)	1.231	0.218	-0.00830	0.0364
sum_ptg3	0.00528	(0.0134)	0.395	0.693	-0.0209	0.0315
sum_ptg4	0.0119	(0.0153)	0.780	0.436	-0.0181	0.0419
meanage	-0.000401	(0.00231)	-0.174	0.862	-0.00493	0.00412
fmpercent	-0.0639	(0.111)	-0.575	0.565	-0.282	0.154
clpercent	-0.402	(0.284)	-1.417	0.156	-0.959	0.154
elpercent	-0.126	(0.196)	-0.642	0.521	-0.511	0.259
_lcdname_3502	-0.207	(0.173)	-1.201	0.230	-0.546	0.131
_lcdname_3506	-0.264*	(0.151)	-1.743	0.0814	-0.561	0.0329
_lcdname_3507	0.106	(0.0791)	1.338	0.181	-0.0493	0.261
_lcdname_3510	-0.441**	(0.200)	-2.202	0.0277	-0.834	-0.0485
_lcdname_3511	-0.684***	(0.208)	-3.283	0.00103	-1.092	-0.275
_lcdname_3512	-0.522***	(0.164)	-3.190	0.00143	-0.842	-0.201
_lcdname_3514	-0.739**	(0.307)	-2.408	0.0161	-1.341	-0.137
_lcdname_3515	-0.267	(0.178)	-1.497	0.134	-0.616	0.0825
_lcdname_3516	-0.140	(0.178)	-0.785	0.432	-0.488	0.209
_lcdname_3518	-0.436***	(0.169)	-2.576	0.01000	-0.768	-0.104
_lcdname_3519	-0.386**	(0.161)	-2.400	0.0164	-0.702	-0.0708
_lcdname_3520	-0.365**	(0.160)	-2.276	0.0228	-0.678	-0.0507
_lcdname_3521	-0.359**	(0.161)	-2.236	0.0254	-0.675	-0.0443
_lcdname_3523	-0.154	(0.152)	-1.015	0.310	-0.452	0.144
_lcdname_3524	-0.305*	(0.166)	-1.841	0.0657	-0.629	0.0198
_lcdname_3526	-0.562***	(0.170)	-3.305	0.000953	-0.895	-0.229
_lcdname_3530	-0.403**	(0.166)	-2.422	0.0154	-0.729	-0.0769
_lcdname_3532	-0.654***	(0.220)	-2.976	0.00293	-1.084	-0.223
_lcdname_3534	-0.549***	(0.179)	-3.057	0.00224	-0.900	-0.197
_lcdname_3537	-0.550***	(0.172)	-3.202	0.00137	-0.887	-0.213
_lcdname_3538	-0.0185	(0.164)	-0.112	0.911	-0.341	0.304
_lcdname_3539	-0.308*	(0.163)	-1.889	0.0589	-0.628	0.0116
_lcdname_3540	0.0881	(0.181)	0.487	0.627	-0.267	0.443
_lcdname_3541	0.134	(0.135)	0.991	0.322	-0.131	0.398
_lcdname_3542	-0.654***	(0.205)	-3.192	0.00141	-1.056	-0.252
_lcdname_3543	-0.494***	(0.157)	-3.148	0.00165	-0.802	-0.186
_lcdname_3547	-0.296*	(0.162)	-1.830	0.0673	-0.613	0.0210
_lcdname_3548	-0.710***	(0.210)	-3.386	0.000712	-1.120	-0.299
_lcdname_3551	-0.705***	(0.155)	-4.543	5.60e-06	-1.010	-0.401
_lcdname_3552	-0.866***	(0.188)	-4.614	3.98e-06	-1.235	-0.498
_lcdname_3553	-0.676***	(0.187)	-3.608	0.000309	-1.043	-0.309

_lcdname_3560	-0.577***	(0.104)	-5.528	3.29e-08	-0.781	-0.372
_year_2001	0.0282***	(0.00596)	4.725	2.33e-06	0.0165	0.0398
_year_2002	0.0317***	(0.00609)	5.201	2.01e-07	0.0197	0.0436
_year_2003	0.0582***	(0.00641)	9.075	0	0.0456	0.0707
_year_2004	0.0985***	(0.00728)	13.53	0	0.0842	0.113
_year_2005	0.143***	(0.00827)	17.33	0	0.127	0.159
_year_2006	0.208***	(0.0104)	20.09	0	0.188	0.229
_year_2008	0.0422***	(0.00600)	7.032	0	0.0304	0.0539
_lcmaca_2	-0.0738	(0.0754)	-0.978	0.328	-0.222	0.0740
_lcmaca_3	0.0509	(0.0763)	0.667	0.505	-0.0986	0.200
_lcmaca_4	-0.113	(0.0935)	-1.206	0.228	-0.296	0.0705
_lcmaca_5	-0.402***	(0.120)	-3.350	0.000810	-0.637	-0.167
_lriotype_1	0.0142	(0.0511)	0.277	0.782	-0.0859	0.114
Constant	0.783***	(0.184)	4.253	2.12e-05	0.422	1.144
Observations	16,162					
R-squared	0.356					
Number of id	1,919					

---

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

THE RESPONSE OF ONTARIO PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS TO PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES

Table H6: Preventive Care Bonuses, Estimated Marginal Effects, Difference-in-differences Estimator with Physician-specific Fixed Effects, Toddler Immunization, FPs in PCR models funded primarily by FFS

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment4	0.0103	(0.0113)	0.912	0.362	-0.0118	0.0323
post	0.366***	(0.0124)	29.41	0	0.341	0.390
fmgd	-0.00209	(0.00790)	-0.265	0.791	-0.0176	0.0134
ccmd	-0.00271	(0.0131)	-0.208	0.836	-0.0283	0.0229
doc_ageg2	-0.00202	(0.00690)	-0.293	0.769	-0.0155	0.0115
doc_ageg3	-0.00122	(0.0100)	-0.122	0.903	-0.0208	0.0184
doc_ageg4	-0.0265*	(0.0144)	-1.837	0.0662	-0.0547	0.00177
workdays	0.000450***	(0.000106)	4.231	2.34e-05	0.000242	0.000659
sum_visitg2	-0.00792	(0.0119)	-0.667	0.505	-0.0312	0.0154
sum_visitg3	-0.0210	(0.0149)	-1.413	0.158	-0.0502	0.00815
sum_visitg4	-0.0264	(0.0176)	-1.502	0.133	-0.0609	0.00806
visitpd	0.000997*	(0.000551)	1.808	0.0706	-8.36e-05	0.00208
sum_ptg2	0.0152	(0.0116)	1.306	0.191	-0.00761	0.0380
sum_ptg3	0.00954	(0.0137)	0.697	0.486	-0.0173	0.0364
sum_ptg4	0.0153	(0.0156)	0.983	0.326	-0.0153	0.0459
meanage	0.00123	(0.00232)	0.531	0.595	-0.00331	0.00577
fmpercent	-0.0840	(0.112)	-0.748	0.454	-0.304	0.136
clpercent	-0.331	(0.289)	-1.148	0.251	-0.897	0.234
elpercent	-0.244	(0.198)	-1.235	0.217	-0.632	0.143
_lcdname_3502	-0.193	(0.204)	-0.942	0.346	-0.593	0.208
_lcdname_3506	-0.249	(0.184)	-1.349	0.177	-0.610	0.113
_lcdname_3510	-0.399*	(0.217)	-1.838	0.0661	-0.825	0.0265
_lcdname_3512	-0.514***	(0.166)	-3.103	0.00192	-0.839	-0.189
_lcdname_3515	-0.251	(0.206)	-1.221	0.222	-0.655	0.152
_lcdname_3516	-0.106	(0.178)	-0.598	0.550	-0.455	0.242
_lcdname_3518	-0.393**	(0.189)	-2.075	0.0380	-0.765	-0.0218
_lcdname_3519	-0.381**	(0.183)	-2.086	0.0370	-0.740	-0.0229
_lcdname_3520	-0.367**	(0.182)	-2.018	0.0436	-0.723	-0.0105
_lcdname_3521	-0.343*	(0.182)	-1.878	0.0604	-0.700	0.0150
_lcdname_3523	-0.138	(0.178)	-0.777	0.437	-0.488	0.211
_lcdname_3524	-0.286	(0.187)	-1.530	0.126	-0.652	0.0804
_lcdname_3526	-0.533***	(0.192)	-2.782	0.00541	-0.909	-0.158
_lcdname_3530	-0.401**	(0.188)	-2.139	0.0324	-0.769	-0.0336
_lcdname_3534	-0.505**	(0.202)	-2.498	0.0125	-0.901	-0.109
_lcdname_3537	-0.547***	(0.181)	-3.027	0.00248	-0.901	-0.193
_lcdname_3538	-0.0159	(0.165)	-0.0963	0.923	-0.340	0.308
_lcdname_3539	-0.264	(0.188)	-1.402	0.161	-0.632	0.105
_lcdname_3541	0.128	(0.137)	0.937	0.349	-0.140	0.396
_lcdname_3543	-0.483**	(0.194)	-2.487	0.0129	-0.864	-0.102
_lcdname_3547	-0.289*	(0.164)	-1.766	0.0774	-0.610	0.0318
_lcdname_3552	-0.0322	(0.227)	-0.142	0.887	-0.477	0.413
_lcdname_3553	-0.681***	(0.206)	-3.303	0.000960	-1.086	-0.277
_lcdname_3560	-0.585***	(0.107)	-5.488	4.14e-08	-0.794	-0.376
_lyear_2001	0.0292***	(0.00606)	4.810	1.53e-06	0.0173	0.0410
_lyear_2002	0.0318***	(0.00621)	5.116	3.16e-07	0.0196	0.0440
_lyear_2003	0.0565***	(0.00652)	8.661	0	0.0437	0.0693
_lyear_2004	0.0964***	(0.00731)	13.19	0	0.0821	0.111
_lyear_2005	0.141***	(0.00824)	17.09	0	0.125	0.157
_lyear_2006	0.210***	(0.0102)	20.46	0	0.190	0.230
_lyear_2007	-0.0424***	(0.00607)	-6.983	0	-0.0543	-0.0305
_lcmaca_2	-0.0601	(0.123)	-0.488	0.625	-0.301	0.181
_lcmaca_3	0.0550	(0.0737)	0.745	0.456	-0.0896	0.200

_lcmaca_4	0.0188	(0.209)	0.0898	0.928	-0.391	0.428
_lcmaca_5	-0.390***	(0.146)	-2.665	0.00770	-0.676	-0.103
_lriotype_1	0.0221	(0.0576)	0.383	0.702	-0.0909	0.135
Constant	0.705***	(0.212)	3.322	0.000896	0.289	1.120
Observations	15,669					
R-squared	0.352					
Number of id	1,863					

---

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

THE RESPONSE OF ONTARIO PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS TO PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES

Table H7: Preventive Care Bonuses, Estimated Marginal Effects, Difference-in-differences Estimator with Physician-specific Fixed Effects, Pap Smear, Full Sample

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment1	0.0406***	(0.00436)	9.305	0	0.0321	0.0492
post	-0.0183***	(0.00485)	-3.764	0.000168	-0.0278	-0.00875
fhgd	0.0255***	(0.00304)	8.384	0	0.0196	0.0315
fhnd	0.0392***	(0.0116)	3.380	0.000727	0.0165	0.0619
ccmd	0.0253***	(0.00537)	4.720	2.37e-06	0.0148	0.0359
fhod	0.0828***	(0.0188)	4.409	1.04e-05	0.0460	0.120
doc_ageg2	0.00864***	(0.00264)	3.278	0.00105	0.00347	0.0138
doc_ageg3	0.00621*	(0.00359)	1.731	0.0836	-0.000824	0.0132
doc_ageg4	-0.00220	(0.00495)	-0.445	0.656	-0.0119	0.00749
workdays	0.000141***	(3.97e-05)	3.539	0.000402	6.27e-05	0.000218
sum_visitg2	0.00358	(0.00342)	1.045	0.296	-0.00313	0.0103
sum_visitg3	0.00239	(0.00483)	0.495	0.621	-0.00708	0.0119
sum_visitg4	0.00358	(0.00605)	0.592	0.554	-0.00828	0.0154
visitpd	5.77e-05	(0.000224)	0.258	0.797	-0.000381	0.000497
sum_ptg2	0.00131	(0.00313)	0.418	0.676	-0.00483	0.00745
sum_ptg3	0.00270	(0.00427)	0.633	0.527	-0.00567	0.0111
sum_ptg4	0.00125	(0.00530)	0.236	0.813	-0.00914	0.0116
meanage	0.00756***	(0.000931)	8.120	0	0.00573	0.00938
fmpercent	0.323***	(0.0418)	7.741	0	0.242	0.405
clpercent	0.148	(0.120)	1.236	0.217	-0.0868	0.383
elpercent	-0.494***	(0.0651)	-7.582	0	-0.622	-0.366
_lcdname_3502	-0.00692	(0.0443)	-0.156	0.876	-0.0938	0.0800
_lcdname_3506	0.0204	(0.0370)	0.551	0.581	-0.0521	0.0930
_lcdname_3507	-0.170***	(0.0454)	-3.745	0.000181	-0.259	-0.0811
_lcdname_3510	-0.127**	(0.0571)	-2.226	0.0260	-0.239	-0.0152
_lcdname_3511	-0.0842	(0.0612)	-1.377	0.169	-0.204	0.0357
_lcdname_3512	-0.0949**	(0.0436)	-2.175	0.0296	-0.180	-0.00939
_lcdname_3514	-0.0997*	(0.0573)	-1.738	0.0822	-0.212	0.0127
_lcdname_3515	-0.115**	(0.0473)	-2.438	0.0148	-0.208	-0.0226
_lcdname_3516	-0.112***	(0.0412)	-2.724	0.00646	-0.193	-0.0315
_lcdname_3518	-0.0154	(0.0399)	-0.385	0.700	-0.0937	0.0629
_lcdname_3519	-0.00347	(0.0383)	-0.0905	0.928	-0.0785	0.0716
_lcdname_3520	-0.00167	(0.0378)	-0.0442	0.965	-0.0757	0.0724
_lcdname_3521	-0.0238	(0.0378)	-0.630	0.529	-0.0979	0.0503
_lcdname_3523	0.0262	(0.0365)	0.717	0.473	-0.0454	0.0977
_lcdname_3524	-0.00140	(0.0398)	-0.0351	0.972	-0.0795	0.0767
_lcdname_3526	-0.137***	(0.0473)	-2.889	0.00387	-0.229	-0.0439
_lcdname_3530	-0.0587	(0.0403)	-1.459	0.145	-0.138	0.0202
_lcdname_3532	-0.0114	(0.0612)	-0.186	0.852	-0.131	0.109
_lcdname_3534	-0.246***	(0.0551)	-4.462	8.16e-06	-0.354	-0.138
_lcdname_3537	0.0512	(0.0360)	1.423	0.155	-0.0194	0.122
_lcdname_3538	-0.260**	(0.109)	-2.389	0.0169	-0.474	-0.0467
_lcdname_3539	-0.0742	(0.0468)	-1.586	0.113	-0.166	0.0175
_lcdname_3540	-0.150*	(0.0867)	-1.733	0.0831	-0.320	0.0197
_lcdname_3541	-0.0624*	(0.0371)	-1.682	0.0926	-0.135	0.0103
_lcdname_3542	-0.0599	(0.0387)	-1.549	0.121	-0.136	0.0159
_lcdname_3543	-0.0852**	(0.0376)	-2.270	0.0232	-0.159	-0.0116
_lcdname_3547	-0.121***	(0.0447)	-2.702	0.00690	-0.209	-0.0332
_lcdname_3548	-0.0486	(0.0661)	-0.735	0.462	-0.178	0.0810
_lcdname_3549	-0.0286	(0.0831)	-0.344	0.731	-0.192	0.134
_lcdname_3551	-0.0927**	(0.0420)	-2.208	0.0273	-0.175	-0.0104
_lcdname_3552	-0.144***	(0.0471)	-3.053	0.00227	-0.236	-0.0514

_lcdname_3553	0.0837*	(0.0444)	1.884	0.0595	-0.00337	0.171
_lcdname_3560	-0.0902***	(0.0291)	-3.106	0.00190	-0.147	-0.0333
_lyear_2000	0.00104	(0.00213)	0.489	0.625	-0.00314	0.00523
_lyear_2001	0.000634	(0.00214)	0.297	0.766	-0.00355	0.00482
_lyear_2002	-0.00405*	(0.00234)	-1.730	0.0837	-0.00864	0.000539
_lyear_2003	-0.0121***	(0.00242)	-5.016	5.32e-07	-0.0169	-0.00739
_lyear_2004	-0.0116***	(0.00270)	-4.282	1.87e-05	-0.0169	-0.00627
_lyear_2005	-0.00521*	(0.00311)	-1.677	0.0936	-0.0113	0.000881
_lyear_2006	0.00345	(0.00388)	0.888	0.374	-0.00416	0.0111
_lyear_2007	-0.00538**	(0.00266)	-2.025	0.0429	-0.0106	-0.000172
_lcmaca_2	-0.00745	(0.0182)	-0.409	0.683	-0.0431	0.0282
_lcmaca_3	0.0136	(0.0266)	0.512	0.609	-0.0386	0.0658
_lcmaca_4	-0.106**	(0.0421)	-2.525	0.0116	-0.189	-0.0238
_lcmaca_5	0.0759**	(0.0329)	2.310	0.0209	0.0115	0.140
_lriotype_1	-0.0512***	(0.0189)	-2.709	0.00675	-0.0882	-0.0141
Constant	0.221***	(0.0599)	3.689	0.000226	0.104	0.338
Observations	19,926					
R-squared	0.115					
Number of id	2,029					

---

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1



THE RESPONSE OF ONTARIO PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS TO PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES

Table H8: Preventive Care Bonuses, Estimated Marginal Effects, Difference-in-differences Estimator with Physician-specific Fixed Effects, Pap Smear, FPs who joined PCR before introduction of bonuses

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment1	0.0414***	(0.00436)	9.490	0	0.0328	0.0499
post	-0.0163***	(0.00480)	-3.398	0.000679	-0.0257	-0.00691
fugd	0.0260***	(0.00309)	8.428	0	0.0200	0.0321
fhnd	0.0404***	(0.0118)	3.426	0.000614	0.0173	0.0635
ccmd	0.0246***	(0.00535)	4.590	4.47e-06	0.0141	0.0351
fhod	0.0868***	(0.0192)	4.515	6.39e-06	0.0491	0.124
doc_ageg2	0.00741***	(0.00266)	2.782	0.00542	0.00219	0.0126
doc_ageg3	0.00512	(0.00364)	1.407	0.160	-0.00201	0.0122
doc_ageg4	-0.00504	(0.00500)	-1.008	0.314	-0.0149	0.00477
workdays	0.000115***	(3.90e-05)	2.953	0.00315	3.88e-05	0.000192
sum_visitg2	0.00450	(0.00341)	1.320	0.187	-0.00218	0.0112
sum_visitg3	0.00498	(0.00486)	1.025	0.305	-0.00454	0.0145
sum_visitg4	0.00702	(0.00608)	1.155	0.248	-0.00489	0.0189
visitpd	1.74e-06	(0.000221)	0.00787	0.994	-0.000431	0.000435
sum_ptg2	0.000706	(0.00306)	0.231	0.817	-0.00529	0.00670
sum_ptg3	0.00312	(0.00424)	0.734	0.463	-0.00520	0.0114
sum_ptg4	0.00256	(0.00531)	0.482	0.630	-0.00784	0.0130
meanage	0.00659***	(0.000831)	7.929	0	0.00496	0.00822
fmpersent	0.322***	(0.0426)	7.564	0	0.239	0.406
clpersent	0.191*	(0.108)	1.771	0.0766	-0.0204	0.403
elpersent	-0.444***	(0.0631)	-7.032	0	-0.568	-0.320
_lcdname_3502	-0.00657	(0.0446)	-0.147	0.883	-0.0941	0.0809
_lcdname_3506	0.0289	(0.0371)	0.778	0.436	-0.0438	0.102
_lcdname_3507	-0.170***	(0.0437)	-3.890	0.000101	-0.256	-0.0843
_lcdname_3510	-0.106*	(0.0563)	-1.875	0.0608	-0.216	0.00479
_lcdname_3511	-0.0629	(0.0606)	-1.037	0.300	-0.182	0.0560
_lcdname_3512	-0.0886**	(0.0441)	-2.009	0.0446	-0.175	-0.00214
_lcdname_3514	-0.101*	(0.0566)	-1.786	0.0741	-0.212	0.00984
_lcdname_3515	-0.107**	(0.0476)	-2.256	0.0241	-0.201	-0.0141
_lcdname_3516	-0.115***	(0.0420)	-2.734	0.00627	-0.197	-0.0325
_lcdname_3518	0.00925	(0.0400)	0.231	0.817	-0.0693	0.0877
_lcdname_3519	0.00590	(0.0389)	0.152	0.880	-0.0704	0.0822
_lcdname_3520	0.0116	(0.0384)	0.303	0.762	-0.0636	0.0869
_lcdname_3521	-0.0205	(0.0383)	-0.535	0.593	-0.0956	0.0546
_lcdname_3523	0.0316	(0.0369)	0.855	0.393	-0.0408	0.104
_lcdname_3524	0.00992	(0.0402)	0.247	0.805	-0.0688	0.0886
_lcdname_3526	-0.130***	(0.0472)	-2.764	0.00572	-0.223	-0.0379
_lcdname_3530	-0.0438	(0.0410)	-1.067	0.286	-0.124	0.0367
_lcdname_3532	-0.00686	(0.0611)	-0.112	0.911	-0.127	0.113
_lcdname_3534	-0.234***	(0.0551)	-4.243	2.22e-05	-0.342	-0.126
_lcdname_3537	0.0555	(0.0353)	1.570	0.116	-0.0138	0.125
_lcdname_3538	-0.258**	(0.109)	-2.361	0.0182	-0.473	-0.0438
_lcdname_3539	-0.0656	(0.0469)	-1.398	0.162	-0.158	0.0264
_lcdname_3540	-0.150*	(0.0865)	-1.737	0.0825	-0.320	0.0193
_lcdname_3541	-0.0563	(0.0371)	-1.520	0.129	-0.129	0.0163
_lcdname_3542	-0.0672*	(0.0387)	-1.735	0.0827	-0.143	0.00870
_lcdname_3543	-0.114***	(0.0382)	-2.990	0.00279	-0.189	-0.0393
_lcdname_3547	-0.124***	(0.0450)	-2.764	0.00572	-0.212	-0.0361
_lcdname_3548	-0.0383	(0.0662)	-0.579	0.563	-0.168	0.0915
_lcdname_3549	-0.0273	(0.0827)	-0.330	0.741	-0.190	0.135
_lcdname_3551	-0.0875**	(0.0420)	-2.082	0.0374	-0.170	-0.00512
_lcdname_3552	-0.133***	(0.0475)	-2.799	0.00513	-0.226	-0.0399

_lcdname_3553	0.103**	(0.0453)	2.272	0.0231	0.0141	0.192
_lcdname_3560	-0.0888***	(0.0288)	-3.082	0.00206	-0.145	-0.0323
_lyear_2000	0.000932	(0.00214)	0.435	0.664	-0.00327	0.00513
_lyear_2001	0.000761	(0.00215)	0.355	0.723	-0.00345	0.00497
_lyear_2002	-0.00382	(0.00234)	-1.633	0.103	-0.00841	0.000766
_lyear_2003	-0.0114***	(0.00238)	-4.776	1.80e-06	-0.0161	-0.00671
_lyear_2004	-0.0105***	(0.00266)	-3.944	8.04e-05	-0.0157	-0.00528
_lyear_2005	-0.00403	(0.00307)	-1.312	0.189	-0.0100	0.00199
_lyear_2006	0.00502	(0.00391)	1.286	0.198	-0.00263	0.0127
_lyear_2007	-0.00547**	(0.00264)	-2.073	0.0382	-0.0107	-0.000297
_lcmaca_2	0.00335	(0.0185)	0.181	0.856	-0.0329	0.0396
_lcmaca_3	0.0273	(0.0265)	1.031	0.303	-0.0246	0.0791
_lcmaca_4	-0.0913**	(0.0419)	-2.180	0.0292	-0.173	-0.00922
_lcmaca_5	0.0835**	(0.0327)	2.553	0.0107	0.0194	0.148
_lriotype_1	-0.0523***	(0.0191)	-2.744	0.00607	-0.0897	-0.0150
Constant	0.250***	(0.0558)	4.489	7.21e-06	0.141	0.360
Observations	19,130					
R-squared	0.117					
Number of id	1,948					

---

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

THE RESPONSE OF ONTARIO PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS TO PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES

Table H9: Preventive Care Bonuses, Estimated Marginal Effects, Difference-in-differences Estimator with Physician-specific Fixed Effects, Pap Smear, FPs in PCR models funded primarily by FFS

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment1	0.0403***	(0.00443)	9.100	0	0.0317	0.0490
post	-0.0208***	(0.00490)	-4.253	2.12e-05	-0.0304	-0.0112
fhgd	0.0252***	(0.00319)	7.909	0	0.0190	0.0315
ccmd	0.0261***	(0.00547)	4.771	1.85e-06	0.0154	0.0369
doc_ageg2	0.00844***	(0.00270)	3.133	0.00174	0.00316	0.0137
doc_ageg3	0.00902**	(0.00365)	2.470	0.0135	0.00186	0.0162
doc_ageg4	-0.000351	(0.00501)	-0.0702	0.944	-0.0102	0.00946
workdays	0.000121***	(4.12e-05)	2.935	0.00334	4.01e-05	0.000201
sum_visitg2	0.00226	(0.00363)	0.622	0.534	-0.00486	0.00938
sum_visitg3	-0.00392	(0.00496)	-0.790	0.430	-0.0136	0.00580
sum_visitg4	-0.00413	(0.00620)	-0.666	0.506	-0.0163	0.00803
visitpd	2.89e-05	(0.000227)	0.127	0.899	-0.000416	0.000474
sum_ptg2	0.00399	(0.00325)	1.230	0.219	-0.00237	0.0104
sum_ptg3	0.00502	(0.00440)	1.141	0.254	-0.00360	0.0136
sum_ptg4	0.00427	(0.00542)	0.787	0.431	-0.00636	0.0149
meanage	0.00742***	(0.000946)	7.845	0	0.00557	0.00928
fmpercent	0.319***	(0.0450)	7.097	0	0.231	0.407
clpercent	0.189	(0.126)	1.505	0.132	-0.0572	0.436
elpercent	-0.463***	(0.0665)	-6.962	0	-0.593	-0.333
_lcdname_3502	0.0247	(0.0483)	0.512	0.609	-0.0700	0.119
_lcdname_3506	0.0516	(0.0430)	1.200	0.230	-0.0327	0.136
_lcdname_3510	-0.104*	(0.0608)	-1.705	0.0882	-0.223	0.0155
_lcdname_3511	-0.101	(0.0624)	-1.624	0.104	-0.224	0.0210
_lcdname_3512	-0.0954**	(0.0432)	-2.206	0.0274	-0.180	-0.0106
_lcdname_3514	-0.165***	(0.0429)	-3.854	0.000117	-0.249	-0.0812
_lcdname_3515	-0.0759	(0.0525)	-1.447	0.148	-0.179	0.0269
_lcdname_3516	-0.112***	(0.0430)	-2.599	0.00936	-0.196	-0.0275
_lcdname_3518	0.00952	(0.0429)	0.222	0.824	-0.0746	0.0936
_lcdname_3519	0.0192	(0.0413)	0.465	0.642	-0.0617	0.100
_lcdname_3520	0.0195	(0.0407)	0.479	0.632	-0.0602	0.0992
_lcdname_3521	0.000736	(0.0407)	0.0181	0.986	-0.0791	0.0806
_lcdname_3523	0.0508	(0.0407)	1.248	0.212	-0.0290	0.130
_lcdname_3524	0.0210	(0.0425)	0.494	0.621	-0.0624	0.104
_lcdname_3526	-0.0976**	(0.0471)	-2.071	0.0383	-0.190	-0.00524
_lcdname_3530	-0.0358	(0.0430)	-0.831	0.406	-0.120	0.0486
_lcdname_3534	-0.192***	(0.0552)	-3.476	0.000511	-0.300	-0.0836
_lcdname_3537	0.0675*	(0.0369)	1.832	0.0670	-0.00473	0.140
_lcdname_3538	-0.266**	(0.109)	-2.437	0.0148	-0.481	-0.0522
_lcdname_3539	-0.0206	(0.0469)	-0.439	0.661	-0.112	0.0713
_lcdname_3540	-0.187**	(0.0837)	-2.237	0.0253	-0.352	-0.0232
_lcdname_3541	-0.0588	(0.0371)	-1.587	0.113	-0.131	0.0138
_lcdname_3543	-0.0485	(0.0441)	-1.102	0.271	-0.135	0.0378
_lcdname_3547	-0.115**	(0.0455)	-2.527	0.0115	-0.204	-0.0258
_lcdname_3548	0.00814	(0.0518)	0.157	0.875	-0.0934	0.110
_lcdname_3549	0.0442	(0.0642)	0.689	0.491	-0.0816	0.170
_lcdname_3553	0.106**	(0.0467)	2.271	0.0231	0.0145	0.197
_lcdname_3560	-0.0909***	(0.0291)	-3.123	0.00180	-0.148	-0.0338
_lyear_2000	0.000951	(0.00218)	0.436	0.663	-0.00333	0.00523
_lyear_2001	0.000116	(0.00217)	0.0533	0.957	-0.00414	0.00437
_lyear_2002	-0.00477**	(0.00238)	-2.007	0.0448	-0.00944	-0.000111
_lyear_2003	-0.0133***	(0.00246)	-5.385	7.35e-08	-0.0181	-0.00844
_lyear_2004	-0.0135***	(0.00276)	-4.902	9.58e-07	-0.0189	-0.00811

_lyear_2005	-0.00783**	(0.00313)	-2.501	0.0124	-0.0140	-0.00169
_lyear_2006	0.00145	(0.00396)	0.365	0.715	-0.00632	0.00922
_lyear_2007	-0.00546**	(0.00265)	-2.058	0.0396	-0.0107	-0.000260
_lcmaca_2	0.0207	(0.0267)	0.773	0.440	-0.0317	0.0731
_lcmaca_3	0.0149	(0.0274)	0.542	0.588	-0.0389	0.0687
_lcmaca_4	-0.0178	(0.0424)	-0.421	0.674	-0.101	0.0653
_lcmaca_5	0.110***	(0.0375)	2.933	0.00336	0.0365	0.184
_lriotype_1	-0.0318	(0.0214)	-1.486	0.137	-0.0737	0.0102
Constant	0.183***	(0.0659)	2.783	0.00539	0.0542	0.312
Observations	18,607					
R-squared	0.111					
Number of id	1,893					

---

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

THE RESPONSE OF ONTARIO PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS TO PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES

Table H10: Preventive Care Bonuses, Estimated Marginal Effects, Difference-in-differences Estimator with Physician-specific Fixed Effects, Mammogram, Full Sample

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment2	0.0176***	(0.00459)	3.832	0.000128	0.00859	0.0266
post	-0.00420	(0.00538)	-0.781	0.435	-0.0147	0.00634
fhgd	0.0348***	(0.00289)	12.05	0	0.0291	0.0404
fhnd	0.00557	(0.00899)	0.620	0.535	-0.0121	0.0232
ccmd	0.0442***	(0.00495)	8.928	0	0.0345	0.0539
fhod	0.0135	(0.0101)	1.338	0.181	-0.00626	0.0332
doc_ageg2	-0.00150	(0.00238)	-0.631	0.528	-0.00617	0.00317
doc_ageg3	0.000557	(0.00342)	0.163	0.871	-0.00615	0.00726
doc_ageg4	-0.00271	(0.00475)	-0.570	0.569	-0.0120	0.00661
workdays	0.000187***	(3.53e-05)	5.286	1.27e-07	0.000118	0.000256
sum_visitg2	0.00492	(0.00327)	1.504	0.133	-0.00149	0.0113
sum_visitg3	0.00204	(0.00442)	0.461	0.644	-0.00662	0.0107
sum_visitg4	-0.00170	(0.00553)	-0.308	0.758	-0.0125	0.00914
visitpd	-0.000555***	(0.000209)	-2.652	0.00801	-0.000965	-0.000145
sum_ptg2	0.00514	(0.00342)	1.503	0.133	-0.00156	0.0118
sum_ptg3	0.00741*	(0.00443)	1.671	0.0948	-0.00128	0.0161
sum_ptg4	0.0154***	(0.00537)	2.866	0.00417	0.00486	0.0259
meanage	0.0115***	(0.000832)	13.78	0	0.00984	0.0131
fmpercent	0.331***	(0.0500)	6.614	0	0.233	0.429
clpercent	0.435***	(0.116)	3.760	0.000171	0.208	0.662
elpercent	-0.325***	(0.0621)	-5.229	1.73e-07	-0.446	-0.203
_lcdname_3502	0.000138	(0.0675)	0.00204	0.998	-0.132	0.132
_lcdname_3506	-0.0280	(0.0396)	-0.706	0.480	-0.106	0.0497
_lcdname_3507	-0.0218	(0.0324)	-0.675	0.500	-0.0852	0.0416
_lcdname_3510	-0.00708	(0.0471)	-0.150	0.881	-0.0994	0.0852
_lcdname_3511	0.0258	(0.0654)	0.394	0.694	-0.102	0.154
_lcdname_3512	-0.0420	(0.0474)	-0.886	0.375	-0.135	0.0509
_lcdname_3514	-0.0995*	(0.0567)	-1.756	0.0791	-0.211	0.0116
_lcdname_3515	-0.131**	(0.0597)	-2.187	0.0287	-0.248	-0.0136
_lcdname_3516	-0.0602	(0.0394)	-1.525	0.127	-0.137	0.0171
_lcdname_3518	-0.0391	(0.0473)	-0.827	0.408	-0.132	0.0536
_lcdname_3519	-0.0389	(0.0436)	-0.892	0.373	-0.124	0.0466
_lcdname_3520	-0.0508	(0.0432)	-1.176	0.240	-0.135	0.0338
_lcdname_3521	-0.0479	(0.0435)	-1.101	0.271	-0.133	0.0374
_lcdname_3523	-0.117***	(0.0447)	-2.625	0.00868	-0.205	-0.0297
_lcdname_3524	-0.0903*	(0.0475)	-1.901	0.0573	-0.183	0.00280
_lcdname_3526	-0.137***	(0.0510)	-2.694	0.00706	-0.237	-0.0374
_lcdname_3530	-0.158***	(0.0567)	-2.796	0.00519	-0.270	-0.0474
_lcdname_3532	-0.0646	(0.0621)	-1.041	0.298	-0.186	0.0570
_lcdname_3534	-0.126***	(0.0468)	-2.684	0.00728	-0.217	-0.0339
_lcdname_3537	0.0365	(0.0480)	0.761	0.447	-0.0575	0.131
_lcdname_3538	-0.0419	(0.0491)	-0.853	0.393	-0.138	0.0543
_lcdname_3539	-0.0813*	(0.0451)	-1.802	0.0716	-0.170	0.00714
_lcdname_3540	0.146	(0.0953)	1.536	0.125	-0.0405	0.333
_lcdname_3541	-0.224***	(0.0441)	-5.085	3.72e-07	-0.311	-0.138
_lcdname_3542	-0.0684*	(0.0388)	-1.764	0.0778	-0.144	0.00760
_lcdname_3543	-0.0734*	(0.0399)	-1.838	0.0661	-0.152	0.00487
_lcdname_3544	-0.272***	(0.0889)	-3.065	0.00218	-0.447	-0.0982
_lcdname_3547	0.0131	(0.0695)	0.189	0.850	-0.123	0.149
_lcdname_3548	0.0528	(0.0361)	1.462	0.144	-0.0180	0.124
_lcdname_3551	0.0901**	(0.0376)	2.396	0.0166	0.0164	0.164
_lcdname_3552	-0.0411	(0.0370)	-1.111	0.266	-0.114	0.0314

_lcdname_3553	0.0390	(0.0610)	0.640	0.522	-0.0805	0.159
_lcdname_3560	-0.0903	(0.0627)	-1.441	0.150	-0.213	0.0325
_lyear_2000	0.00811***	(0.00219)	3.696	0.000219	0.00381	0.0124
_lyear_2001	0.0120***	(0.00214)	5.610	2.05e-08	0.00782	0.0162
_lyear_2002	0.0145***	(0.00216)	6.699	0	0.0103	0.0187
_lyear_2003	0.0133***	(0.00229)	5.815	6.17e-09	0.00884	0.0178
_lyear_2004	-0.00409	(0.00269)	-1.522	0.128	-0.00937	0.00118
_lyear_2005	-0.0102***	(0.00312)	-3.265	0.00110	-0.0163	-0.00407
_lyear_2006	-0.00702*	(0.00390)	-1.803	0.0714	-0.0147	0.000612
_lyear_2007	-0.0103***	(0.00259)	-3.978	6.96e-05	-0.0154	-0.00522
_lcmaca_2	0.0134	(0.0261)	0.514	0.607	-0.0378	0.0647
_lcmaca_3	0.0434	(0.0343)	1.263	0.207	-0.0239	0.111
_lcmaca_4	-0.0556	(0.0451)	-1.232	0.218	-0.144	0.0329
_lcmaca_5	0.183***	(0.0425)	4.304	1.69e-05	0.0996	0.266
_lriotype_1	0.0272*	(0.0142)	1.918	0.0551	-0.000596	0.0551
Constant	0.0211	(0.0582)	0.362	0.717	-0.0930	0.135
Observations	19,888					
R-squared	0.158					
Number of id	2,029					

---

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

THE RESPONSE OF ONTARIO PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS TO PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES

Table H11: Preventive Care Bonuses, Estimated Marginal Effects, Difference-in-differences Estimator with Physician-specific Fixed Effects, Mammogram, FPs who joined PCR before introduction of bonuses

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment2	0.0171***	(0.00463)	3.686	0.000228	0.00800	0.0262
post	-0.0144***	(0.00517)	-2.779	0.00546	-0.0245	-0.00424
fhgd	0.0344***	(0.00298)	11.53	0	0.0285	0.0402
fhnd	0.00731	(0.00921)	0.794	0.427	-0.0107	0.0254
ccmd	0.0439***	(0.00516)	8.492	0	0.0337	0.0540
fhod	0.0146	(0.0103)	1.421	0.155	-0.00556	0.0348
doc_ageg2	-0.00103	(0.00242)	-0.424	0.671	-0.00578	0.00372
doc_ageg3	0.00151	(0.00347)	0.434	0.664	-0.00530	0.00832
doc_ageg4	-0.00202	(0.00484)	-0.417	0.677	-0.0115	0.00748
workdays	0.000165***	(3.58e-05)	4.598	4.30e-06	9.45e-05	0.000235
sum_visitg2	0.00548	(0.00333)	1.643	0.100	-0.00106	0.0120
sum_visitg3	0.00205	(0.00450)	0.455	0.649	-0.00677	0.0109
sum_visitg4	-0.00299	(0.00564)	-0.531	0.596	-0.0140	0.00806
visitpd	-0.000586***	(0.000213)	-2.744	0.00607	-0.00100	-0.000167
sum_ptg2	0.00442	(0.00348)	1.272	0.204	-0.00239	0.0112
sum_ptg3	0.00682	(0.00452)	1.508	0.131	-0.00204	0.0157
sum_ptg4	0.0159***	(0.00547)	2.906	0.00367	0.00517	0.0266
meanage	0.0107***	(0.000833)	12.86	0	0.00908	0.0124
fmpercent	0.336***	(0.0516)	6.527	6.90e-11	0.235	0.438
clpercent	0.411***	(0.117)	3.522	0.000429	0.182	0.640
elpercent	-0.288***	(0.0631)	-4.558	5.21e-06	-0.411	-0.164
_lcdname_3502	0.00607	(0.0668)	0.0910	0.928	-0.125	0.137
_lcdname_3506	-0.0239	(0.0398)	-0.601	0.548	-0.102	0.0541
_lcdname_3507	-0.0167	(0.0311)	-0.537	0.591	-0.0777	0.0443
_lcdname_3510	0.0151	(0.0476)	0.318	0.751	-0.0782	0.108
_lcdname_3511	0.0473	(0.0656)	0.722	0.471	-0.0812	0.176
_lcdname_3512	-0.0387	(0.0495)	-0.781	0.435	-0.136	0.0583
_lcdname_3514	-0.101*	(0.0541)	-1.875	0.0609	-0.207	0.00463
_lcdname_3515	-0.143**	(0.0604)	-2.363	0.0181	-0.261	-0.0244
_lcdname_3516	-0.0344	(0.0408)	-0.842	0.400	-0.114	0.0456
_lcdname_3518	-0.00861	(0.0467)	-0.184	0.854	-0.100	0.0829
_lcdname_3519	-0.0507	(0.0445)	-1.140	0.254	-0.138	0.0365
_lcdname_3520	-0.0623	(0.0440)	-1.415	0.157	-0.148	0.0240
_lcdname_3521	-0.0455	(0.0440)	-1.034	0.301	-0.132	0.0408
_lcdname_3523	-0.117***	(0.0451)	-2.591	0.00957	-0.205	-0.0285
_lcdname_3524	-0.0861*	(0.0476)	-1.809	0.0705	-0.179	0.00720
_lcdname_3526	-0.135***	(0.0511)	-2.634	0.00845	-0.235	-0.0345
_lcdname_3530	-0.166***	(0.0578)	-2.875	0.00404	-0.279	-0.0529
_lcdname_3532	-0.0671	(0.0616)	-1.089	0.276	-0.188	0.0537
_lcdname_3534	-0.123***	(0.0475)	-2.594	0.00948	-0.216	-0.0301
_lcdname_3537	0.0319	(0.0474)	0.672	0.502	-0.0611	0.125
_lcdname_3538	-0.0425	(0.0487)	-0.874	0.382	-0.138	0.0529
_lcdname_3539	-0.0796*	(0.0458)	-1.738	0.0822	-0.169	0.0102
_lcdname_3540	0.137	(0.0941)	1.458	0.145	-0.0473	0.322
_lcdname_3541	-0.225***	(0.0437)	-5.149	2.65e-07	-0.310	-0.139
_lcdname_3542	-0.0707*	(0.0388)	-1.820	0.0687	-0.147	0.00543
_lcdname_3543	-0.0763*	(0.0395)	-1.934	0.0531	-0.154	0.00103
_lcdname_3544	-0.246***	(0.0879)	-2.802	0.00508	-0.419	-0.0740
_lcdname_3547	0.0140	(0.0696)	0.202	0.840	-0.122	0.150
_lcdname_3548	0.0426	(0.0357)	1.196	0.232	-0.0272	0.113
_lcdname_3551	0.0907**	(0.0370)	2.455	0.0141	0.0183	0.163
_lcdname_3552	-0.0358	(0.0363)	-0.987	0.323	-0.107	0.0353

_lcdname_3553	0.0333	(0.0620)	0.538	0.591	-0.0881	0.155
_lcdname_3560	-0.0794	(0.0620)	-1.281	0.200	-0.201	0.0421
_lyear_2000	0.00832***	(0.00222)	3.748	0.000179	0.00397	0.0127
_lyear_2001	0.0123***	(0.00217)	5.656	1.58e-08	0.00802	0.0165
_lyear_2002	0.0144***	(0.00220)	6.570	5.19e-11	0.0101	0.0187
_lyear_2003	0.0132***	(0.00233)	5.681	1.36e-08	0.00867	0.0178
_lyear_2004	-0.00395	(0.00274)	-1.441	0.150	-0.00933	0.00142
_lyear_2005	-0.00952***	(0.00319)	-2.987	0.00282	-0.0158	-0.00327
_lyear_2006	-0.00633	(0.00405)	-1.563	0.118	-0.0143	0.00161
_lyear_2008	0.0107***	(0.00264)	4.044	5.27e-05	0.00550	0.0158
_lcmaca_2	0.0183	(0.0265)	0.691	0.490	-0.0337	0.0703
_lcmaca_3	0.0419	(0.0355)	1.182	0.237	-0.0276	0.111
_lcmaca_4	-0.0414	(0.0432)	-0.958	0.338	-0.126	0.0432
_lcmaca_5	0.173***	(0.0431)	4.022	5.80e-05	0.0889	0.258
_lriotype_1	0.0286**	(0.0145)	1.969	0.0489	0.000132	0.0570
Constant	0.0515	(0.0588)	0.876	0.381	-0.0637	0.167
Observations	19,093					
R-squared	0.152					
Number of id	1,948					

---

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1



THE RESPONSE OF ONTARIO PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS TO PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES

Table H12: Preventive Care Bonuses, Estimated Marginal Effects, Difference-in-differences Estimator with Physician-specific Fixed Effects, Mammogram, FPs in PCR models funded primarily by FFS

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment2	0.0177***	(0.00469)	3.785	0.000154	0.00856	0.0269
post	-0.0140***	(0.00521)	-2.678	0.00741	-0.0242	-0.00374
fhgd	0.0350***	(0.00311)	11.27	0	0.0289	0.0411
ccmd	0.0444***	(0.00507)	8.758	0	0.0345	0.0544
doc_ageg2	-0.00185	(0.00251)	-0.738	0.461	-0.00678	0.00307
doc_ageg3	-5.27e-05	(0.00358)	-0.0147	0.988	-0.00708	0.00697
doc_ageg4	-0.00295	(0.00497)	-0.594	0.553	-0.0127	0.00679
workdays	0.000185***	(3.68e-05)	5.016	5.32e-07	0.000113	0.000257
sum_visitg2	0.00430	(0.00348)	1.235	0.217	-0.00252	0.0111
sum_visitg3	0.00251	(0.00466)	0.539	0.590	-0.00662	0.0116
sum_visitg4	-0.00148	(0.00580)	-0.255	0.799	-0.0129	0.00990
visitpd	-0.000627***	(0.000214)	-2.931	0.00339	-0.00105	-0.000208
sum_ptg2	0.00733**	(0.00359)	2.041	0.0413	0.000290	0.0144
sum_ptg3	0.0102**	(0.00465)	2.199	0.0279	0.00111	0.0193
sum_ptg4	0.0181***	(0.00560)	3.229	0.00124	0.00711	0.0291
meanage	0.0115***	(0.000853)	13.49	0	0.00983	0.0132
fmpercent	0.320***	(0.0545)	5.868	4.49e-09	0.213	0.427
clpercent	0.460***	(0.123)	3.730	0.000192	0.218	0.701
elpercent	-0.321***	(0.0633)	-5.078	3.85e-07	-0.446	-0.197
_lcdname_3502	-0.0147	(0.0728)	-0.202	0.840	-0.157	0.128
_lcdname_3506	-0.0494	(0.0518)	-0.954	0.340	-0.151	0.0521
_lcdname_3510	-0.0262	(0.0549)	-0.477	0.633	-0.134	0.0814
_lcdname_3511	-0.0919	(0.0565)	-1.628	0.104	-0.203	0.0188
_lcdname_3512	-0.0394	(0.0471)	-0.836	0.403	-0.132	0.0529
_lcdname_3514	-0.164***	(0.0593)	-2.761	0.00577	-0.280	-0.0475
_lcdname_3515	-0.150**	(0.0663)	-2.262	0.0237	-0.280	-0.0200
_lcdname_3516	-0.0609	(0.0393)	-1.547	0.122	-0.138	0.0162
_lcdname_3518	-0.0597	(0.0541)	-1.103	0.270	-0.166	0.0464
_lcdname_3519	-0.0536	(0.0511)	-1.049	0.294	-0.154	0.0465
_lcdname_3520	-0.0677	(0.0504)	-1.342	0.180	-0.167	0.0312
_lcdname_3521	-0.0634	(0.0503)	-1.259	0.208	-0.162	0.0353
_lcdname_3523	-0.135**	(0.0527)	-2.557	0.0106	-0.238	-0.0314
_lcdname_3524	-0.107**	(0.0539)	-1.985	0.0472	-0.213	-0.00134
_lcdname_3526	-0.148***	(0.0570)	-2.599	0.00937	-0.260	-0.0364
_lcdname_3530	-0.175***	(0.0625)	-2.806	0.00503	-0.298	-0.0529
_lcdname_3534	-0.130**	(0.0545)	-2.385	0.0171	-0.237	-0.0232
_lcdname_3537	0.0260	(0.0478)	0.545	0.586	-0.0676	0.120
_lcdname_3538	-0.0359	(0.0492)	-0.730	0.465	-0.132	0.0605
_lcdname_3539	-0.0868	(0.0530)	-1.637	0.102	-0.191	0.0171
_lcdname_3540	0.178*	(0.0986)	1.808	0.0705	-0.0150	0.372
_lcdname_3541	-0.0909*	(0.0480)	-1.893	0.0583	-0.185	0.00320
_lcdname_3543	-0.0899*	(0.0516)	-1.744	0.0811	-0.191	0.0111
_lcdname_3547	0.0126	(0.0694)	0.181	0.856	-0.123	0.149
_lcdname_3548	-0.0766**	(0.0389)	-1.968	0.0491	-0.153	-0.000310
_lcdname_3552	-0.198***	(0.0620)	-3.194	0.00141	-0.320	-0.0765
_lcdname_3553	0.0230	(0.0664)	0.347	0.729	-0.107	0.153
_lcdname_3560	0.0472	(0.0354)	1.335	0.182	-0.0221	0.117
_lyear_2000	0.00813***	(0.00231)	3.523	0.000427	0.00361	0.0127
_lyear_2001	0.0120***	(0.00225)	5.350	8.93e-08	0.00763	0.0165
_lyear_2002	0.0151***	(0.00226)	6.657	0	0.0106	0.0195
_lyear_2003	0.0138***	(0.00239)	5.782	7.52e-09	0.00915	0.0185
_lyear_2004	-0.00438	(0.00280)	-1.568	0.117	-0.00986	0.00109

_lyear_2005	-0.00924***	(0.00324)	-2.852	0.00435	-0.0156	-0.00289
_lyear_2006	-0.00532	(0.00408)	-1.305	0.192	-0.0133	0.00267
_lyear_2008	0.0104***	(0.00263)	3.953	7.76e-05	0.00525	0.0156
_lcmaca_2	-0.00654	(0.0404)	-0.162	0.871	-0.0858	0.0727
_lcmaca_3	0.0335	(0.0357)	0.938	0.348	-0.0365	0.104
_lcmaca_4	-0.0938	(0.0603)	-1.557	0.119	-0.212	0.0243
_lcmaca_5	0.0281	(0.0432)	0.651	0.515	-0.0565	0.113
_lriotype_1	0.0217	(0.0170)	1.274	0.203	-0.0117	0.0551
Constant	0.0418	(0.0669)	0.624	0.532	-0.0894	0.173
Observations	18,569					
R-squared	0.163					
Number of id	1,893					

---

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

THE RESPONSE OF ONTARIO PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS TO PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES

Table H13: Preventive Care Bonuses, Estimated Marginal Effects, Difference-in-differences Estimator with Physician-specific Fixed Effects, Colorectal Cancer Screening, Full Sample

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment5	0.0850***	(0.00537)	15.83	0	0.0745	0.0955
post	0.123***	(0.00612)	20.05	0	0.111	0.135
fhgd	0.0333***	(0.00420)	7.933	0	0.0251	0.0416
fhnd	0.0676***	(0.00836)	8.083	0	0.0512	0.0839
ccmd	0.0439***	(0.00993)	4.427	9.61e-06	0.0245	0.0634
fhod	0.0736***	(0.0172)	4.269	1.97e-05	0.0398	0.107
doc_ageg2	0.00257	(0.00380)	0.677	0.499	-0.00488	0.0100
doc_ageg3	0.00278	(0.00559)	0.497	0.619	-0.00817	0.0137
doc_ageg4	-0.00516	(0.00768)	-0.672	0.501	-0.0202	0.00989
workdays	0.000159***	(4.82e-05)	3.296	0.000984	6.44e-05	0.000254
sum_visitg2	-0.00522	(0.00536)	-0.974	0.330	-0.0157	0.00528
sum_visitg3	1.40e-05	(0.00699)	0.00200	0.998	-0.0137	0.0137
sum_visitg4	0.00206	(0.00875)	0.235	0.814	-0.0151	0.0192
visitpd	7.85e-05	(0.000301)	0.260	0.795	-0.000512	0.000669
sum_ptg2	0.0183***	(0.00495)	3.702	0.000214	0.00862	0.0280
sum_ptg3	0.0128**	(0.00615)	2.088	0.0368	0.000785	0.0249
sum_ptg4	0.0130*	(0.00754)	1.729	0.0838	-0.00174	0.0278
meanage	0.00614***	(0.00109)	5.649	1.63e-08	0.00401	0.00827
fmpercent	-0.0672	(0.0459)	-1.465	0.143	-0.157	0.0227
clpercent	-0.410**	(0.170)	-2.412	0.0159	-0.743	-0.0768
elpercent	-0.201***	(0.0731)	-2.744	0.00608	-0.344	-0.0573
_lcdname_3502	-0.0226	(0.0616)	-0.367	0.714	-0.143	0.0982
_lcdname_3506	0.00817	(0.0365)	0.224	0.823	-0.0635	0.0798
_lcdname_3507	-0.118***	(0.0297)	-3.961	7.50e-05	-0.176	-0.0594
_lcdname_3510	0.0247	(0.0791)	0.312	0.755	-0.130	0.180
_lcdname_3511	-0.109	(0.0835)	-1.307	0.191	-0.273	0.0545
_lcdname_3512	0.115***	(0.0387)	2.964	0.00304	0.0389	0.191
_lcdname_3514	0.0715	(0.0641)	1.114	0.265	-0.0543	0.197
_lcdname_3515	0.0167	(0.0445)	0.375	0.708	-0.0706	0.104
_lcdname_3516	-0.179***	(0.0442)	-4.056	5.02e-05	-0.266	-0.0927
_lcdname_3518	0.0386	(0.0479)	0.806	0.420	-0.0553	0.133
_lcdname_3519	0.0726**	(0.0358)	2.026	0.0427	0.00237	0.143
_lcdname_3520	0.0820**	(0.0356)	2.305	0.0212	0.0123	0.152
_lcdname_3521	0.0419	(0.0347)	1.208	0.227	-0.0261	0.110
_lcdname_3522	0.201***	(0.0466)	4.310	1.64e-05	0.109	0.292
_lcdname_3523	-0.0409	(0.0323)	-1.265	0.206	-0.104	0.0225
_lcdname_3524	0.00565	(0.0467)	0.121	0.904	-0.0858	0.0971
_lcdname_3526	0.0481	(0.0439)	1.095	0.274	-0.0380	0.134
_lcdname_3529	0.0138	(0.123)	0.112	0.911	-0.227	0.255
_lcdname_3530	0.101**	(0.0397)	2.535	0.0113	0.0228	0.179
_lcdname_3532	-0.147**	(0.0648)	-2.273	0.0231	-0.274	-0.0203
_lcdname_3534	0.00119	(0.0451)	0.0263	0.979	-0.0873	0.0896
_lcdname_3537	0.0966***	(0.0322)	3.003	0.00268	0.0335	0.160
_lcdname_3538	-0.248***	(0.0658)	-3.770	0.000164	-0.377	-0.119
_lcdname_3539	-0.0262	(0.0427)	-0.614	0.539	-0.110	0.0574
_lcdname_3540	0.00242	(0.0600)	0.0404	0.968	-0.115	0.120
_lcdname_3541	0.0835	(0.126)	0.660	0.509	-0.164	0.331
_lcdname_3542	-0.0236	(0.0463)	-0.510	0.610	-0.114	0.0671
_lcdname_3543	0.118***	(0.0333)	3.550	0.000387	0.0530	0.184
_lcdname_3544	-0.491**	(0.232)	-2.113	0.0346	-0.947	-0.0356
_lcdname_3547	0.101***	(0.0343)	2.960	0.00308	0.0343	0.169
_lcdname_3548	-0.117	(0.0808)	-1.454	0.146	-0.276	0.0409

_lcdname_3549	-0.323**	(0.149)	-2.173	0.0298	-0.615	-0.0316
_lcdname_3551	-0.0476	(0.0996)	-0.478	0.633	-0.243	0.148
_lcdname_3552	-0.146	(0.0888)	-1.638	0.101	-0.320	0.0286
_lcdname_3553	0.169***	(0.0461)	3.675	0.000238	0.0791	0.260
_lcdname_3560	-0.181	(0.121)	-1.492	0.136	-0.418	0.0567
_lyear_2000	0.00941***	(0.00334)	2.813	0.00492	0.00285	0.0160
_lyear_2001	0.0274***	(0.00325)	8.426	0	0.0210	0.0338
_lyear_2002	0.0445***	(0.00327)	13.58	0	0.0381	0.0509
_lyear_2003	0.0603***	(0.00343)	17.59	0	0.0536	0.0670
_lyear_2004	0.0712***	(0.00379)	18.79	0	0.0637	0.0786
_lyear_2005	0.0829***	(0.00432)	19.18	0	0.0744	0.0914
_lyear_2006	-0.0932***	(0.00449)	-20.74	0	-0.102	-0.0844
_lyear_2007	-0.0498***	(0.00466)	-10.68	0	-0.0590	-0.0407
_lcmaca_2	-0.0765***	(0.0277)	-2.755	0.00587	-0.131	-0.0221
_lcmaca_3	-0.0714	(0.0467)	-1.529	0.126	-0.163	0.0201
_lcmaca_4	-0.0815	(0.0497)	-1.638	0.101	-0.179	0.0160
_lcmaca_5	0.180	(0.111)	1.628	0.104	-0.0367	0.397
_lriotype_1	-0.0297*	(0.0164)	-1.809	0.0705	-0.0618	0.00248
Constant	-0.147**	(0.0595)	-2.475	0.0133	-0.264	-0.0306
Observations	19,918					
R-squared	0.373					
Number of id	2,027					

---

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

THE RESPONSE OF ONTARIO PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS TO PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES

Table H14: Preventive Care Bonuses, Estimated Marginal Effects, Difference-in-differences Estimator with Physician-specific Fixed Effects, Colorectal Cancer Screening, FPs who joined PCR before introduction of bonuses

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment5	0.0790***	(0.00565)	13.98	0	0.0679	0.0901
post	0.104***	(0.00691)	15.06	0	0.0906	0.118
fhgd	0.0422***	(0.00470)	8.963	0	0.0329	0.0514
fhnd	0.0787***	(0.00920)	8.555	0	0.0606	0.0967
ccmd	-0.118***	(0.0239)	-4.942	7.84e-07	-0.165	-0.0712
fhod	0.0985***	(0.0196)	5.031	4.96e-07	0.0601	0.137
doc_ageg2	0.00566	(0.00457)	1.237	0.216	-0.00331	0.0146
doc_ageg3	0.0104	(0.00667)	1.554	0.120	-0.00271	0.0234
doc_ageg4	0.00729	(0.00910)	0.801	0.423	-0.0105	0.0251
workdays	0.000156***	(5.59e-05)	2.794	0.00522	4.66e-05	0.000266
sum_visitg2	-0.00347	(0.00618)	-0.562	0.574	-0.0156	0.00864
sum_visitg3	0.00474	(0.00803)	0.590	0.555	-0.0110	0.0205
sum_visitg4	0.00689	(0.0102)	0.674	0.500	-0.0131	0.0269
visitpd	0.000156	(0.000358)	0.434	0.664	-0.000547	0.000858
sum_ptg2	0.0184***	(0.00569)	3.229	0.00125	0.00722	0.0295
sum_ptg3	0.0127*	(0.00717)	1.770	0.0767	-0.00136	0.0267
sum_ptg4	0.0147*	(0.00882)	1.670	0.0949	-0.00256	0.0320
meanage	0.00469***	(0.00125)	3.759	0.000171	0.00224	0.00713
fmpercent	-0.181***	(0.0525)	-3.448	0.000567	-0.284	-0.0781
clpercent	-0.490**	(0.207)	-2.363	0.0181	-0.897	-0.0836
elpercent	-0.00423	(0.0801)	-0.0528	0.958	-0.161	0.153
_lcdname_3502	-0.0820	(0.0777)	-1.055	0.291	-0.234	0.0703
_lcdname_3506	0.0660**	(0.0290)	2.276	0.0229	0.00917	0.123
_lcdname_3507	-0.0808**	(0.0338)	-2.388	0.0169	-0.147	-0.0145
_lcdname_3510	0.0805	(0.0765)	1.052	0.293	-0.0695	0.230
_lcdname_3511	-0.0481	(0.0816)	-0.589	0.556	-0.208	0.112
_lcdname_3512	0.125**	(0.0511)	2.445	0.0145	0.0248	0.225
_lcdname_3514	0.0260	(0.0660)	0.394	0.694	-0.103	0.155
_lcdname_3515	0.128***	(0.0424)	3.031	0.00244	0.0454	0.211
_lcdname_3516	-0.182***	(0.0510)	-3.567	0.000362	-0.282	-0.0820
_lcdname_3518	0.0872*	(0.0517)	1.688	0.0915	-0.0141	0.188
_lcdname_3519	0.144***	(0.0367)	3.937	8.29e-05	0.0725	0.216
_lcdname_3520	0.168***	(0.0363)	4.619	3.90e-06	0.0964	0.239
_lcdname_3521	0.101***	(0.0358)	2.807	0.00501	0.0303	0.171
_lcdname_3522	0.270***	(0.0454)	5.954	2.69e-09	0.181	0.359
_lcdname_3523	-0.0221	(0.0274)	-0.807	0.420	-0.0758	0.0316
_lcdname_3524	0.0893*	(0.0532)	1.680	0.0931	-0.0149	0.194
_lcdname_3526	0.109**	(0.0444)	2.448	0.0144	0.0217	0.196
_lcdname_3529	0.0845	(0.126)	0.673	0.501	-0.162	0.331
_lcdname_3530	0.185***	(0.0403)	4.597	4.33e-06	0.106	0.264
_lcdname_3532	-0.0902	(0.0631)	-1.429	0.153	-0.214	0.0335
_lcdname_3537	0.160***	(0.0314)	5.100	3.45e-07	0.0987	0.222
_lcdname_3538	-0.198***	(0.0709)	-2.797	0.00516	-0.337	-0.0593
_lcdname_3539	0.0344	(0.0432)	0.797	0.425	-0.0502	0.119
_lcdname_3540	-0.0341	(0.0630)	-0.542	0.588	-0.158	0.0893
_lcdname_3542	-0.00863	(0.0465)	-0.186	0.853	-0.0997	0.0824
_lcdname_3543	0.0728**	(0.0359)	2.030	0.0424	0.00249	0.143
_lcdname_3547	0.161***	(0.0366)	4.406	1.06e-05	0.0894	0.233
_lcdname_3549	-0.109**	(0.0550)	-1.981	0.0476	-0.217	-0.00116
_lcdname_3553	0.260***	(0.0465)	5.583	2.41e-08	0.168	0.351
_lcdname_3560	0.0833***	(0.0282)	2.957	0.00312	0.0281	0.139

_lyear_2000	0.00966**	(0.00399)	2.418	0.0156	0.00183	0.0175
_lyear_2001	0.0262***	(0.00391)	6.702	0	0.0185	0.0338
_lyear_2002	0.0411***	(0.00391)	10.50	0	0.0334	0.0487
_lyear_2003	0.0562***	(0.00407)	13.82	0	0.0482	0.0642
_lyear_2004	0.0619***	(0.00453)	13.67	0	0.0531	0.0708
_lyear_2005	0.0689***	(0.00537)	12.83	0	0.0584	0.0794
_lyear_2006	-0.0742***	(0.00508)	-14.61	0	-0.0842	-0.0643
_lyear_2007	-0.0364***	(0.00531)	-6.847	0	-0.0468	-0.0260
_lcmaca_2	-0.0360*	(0.0205)	-1.753	0.0796	-0.0762	0.00425
_lcmaca_3	0.0313	(0.0250)	1.252	0.211	-0.0177	0.0803
_lcmaca_4	0.00296	(0.0455)	0.0650	0.948	-0.0862	0.0921
_lcmaca_5	-0.0104	(0.0324)	-0.320	0.749	-0.0739	0.0531
_lriotype_1	0.00169	(0.0155)	0.109	0.913	-0.0286	0.0320
Constant	-0.165***	(0.0610)	-2.705	0.00683	-0.285	-0.0454
Observations	13,158					
R-squared	0.364					
Number of id	1,341					

---

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

THE RESPONSE OF ONTARIO PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS TO PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES

Table H15: Preventive Care Bonuses, Estimated Marginal Effects, Difference-in-differences Estimator with Physician-specific Fixed Effects, Colorectal Cancer Screening, FPs in PCR models funded primarily by FFS

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment5	0.0846***	(0.00588)	14.39	0	0.0730	0.0961
post	0.122***	(0.00633)	19.26	0	0.109	0.134
fhgd	0.0318***	(0.00481)	6.615	0	0.0224	0.0412
ccmd	0.0454***	(0.0103)	4.403	1.07e-05	0.0252	0.0657
doc_ageg2	0.00171	(0.00410)	0.418	0.676	-0.00632	0.00974
doc_ageg3	-0.00221	(0.00596)	-0.371	0.711	-0.0139	0.00947
doc_ageg4	-0.00737	(0.00814)	-0.906	0.365	-0.0233	0.00859
workdays	0.000135***	(5.06e-05)	2.666	0.00768	3.58e-05	0.000234
sum_visitg2	-0.00484	(0.00570)	-0.850	0.395	-0.0160	0.00633
sum_visitg3	-0.00233	(0.00743)	-0.313	0.754	-0.0169	0.0122
sum_visitg4	-0.00227	(0.00924)	-0.246	0.806	-0.0204	0.0158
visitpd	0.000131	(0.000311)	0.422	0.673	-0.000478	0.000741
sum_ptg2	0.0174***	(0.00527)	3.291	0.00100	0.00702	0.0277
sum_ptg3	0.0149**	(0.00656)	2.269	0.0233	0.00203	0.0278
sum_ptg4	0.0172**	(0.00803)	2.146	0.0319	0.00149	0.0330
meanage	0.00604***	(0.00112)	5.368	8.06e-08	0.00383	0.00824
fmpercent	-0.0579	(0.0498)	-1.161	0.246	-0.156	0.0398
clpercent	-0.447**	(0.182)	-2.452	0.0142	-0.804	-0.0896
elpercent	-0.180**	(0.0755)	-2.383	0.0172	-0.328	-0.0319
_lcdname_3502	0.0184	(0.0653)	0.281	0.779	-0.110	0.146
_lcdname_3506	0.0438	(0.0481)	0.911	0.362	-0.0505	0.138
_lcdname_3510	0.0592	(0.0838)	0.706	0.480	-0.105	0.224
_lcdname_3511	-0.0640	(0.0870)	-0.736	0.462	-0.235	0.107
_lcdname_3512	0.119***	(0.0397)	2.991	0.00279	0.0409	0.197
_lcdname_3514	0.00899	(0.0698)	0.129	0.897	-0.128	0.146
_lcdname_3515	0.0406	(0.0503)	0.807	0.420	-0.0580	0.139
_lcdname_3516	-0.182***	(0.0450)	-4.056	5.02e-05	-0.270	-0.0942
_lcdname_3518	0.0786	(0.0526)	1.494	0.135	-0.0245	0.182
_lcdname_3519	0.114***	(0.0420)	2.713	0.00667	0.0316	0.196
_lcdname_3520	0.124***	(0.0415)	2.976	0.00293	0.0422	0.205
_lcdname_3521	0.0814**	(0.0409)	1.991	0.0465	0.00128	0.162
_lcdname_3523	-0.00306	(0.0407)	-0.0751	0.940	-0.0828	0.0767
_lcdname_3524	0.0450	(0.0508)	0.887	0.375	-0.0545	0.145
_lcdname_3526	0.116**	(0.0481)	2.405	0.0162	0.0214	0.210
_lcdname_3530	0.143***	(0.0452)	3.157	0.00159	0.0541	0.231
_lcdname_3534	0.0929*	(0.0479)	1.939	0.0525	-0.000993	0.187
_lcdname_3537	0.119***	(0.0354)	3.374	0.000743	0.0501	0.189
_lcdname_3538	-0.247***	(0.0669)	-3.698	0.000218	-0.379	-0.116
_lcdname_3539	0.0658	(0.0456)	1.443	0.149	-0.0236	0.155
_lcdname_3540	0.0752	(0.0655)	1.147	0.252	-0.0533	0.204
_lcdname_3541	0.327***	(0.0765)	4.274	1.93e-05	0.177	0.477
_lcdname_3543	0.171***	(0.0473)	3.611	0.000306	0.0782	0.264
_lcdname_3547	0.0850**	(0.0356)	2.388	0.0170	0.0152	0.155
_lcdname_3548	-0.0372	(0.0462)	-0.804	0.421	-0.128	0.0534
_lcdname_3552	-0.0374	(0.0836)	-0.447	0.655	-0.201	0.126
_lcdname_3553	0.212***	(0.0507)	4.180	2.93e-05	0.112	0.311
_lcdname_3560	0.0496*	(0.0283)	1.754	0.0795	-0.00584	0.105
_lyear_2000	0.00990***	(0.00356)	2.782	0.00541	0.00293	0.0169
_lyear_2001	0.0279***	(0.00346)	8.071	0	0.0211	0.0347
_lyear_2002	0.0448***	(0.00347)	12.91	0	0.0380	0.0516
_lyear_2003	0.0598***	(0.00362)	16.53	0	0.0527	0.0669
_lyear_2004	0.0705***	(0.00397)	17.78	0	0.0628	0.0783

_lyear_2005	0.0803***	(0.00451)	17.80	0	0.0715	0.0892
_lyear_2006	-0.0928***	(0.00464)	-19.99	0	-0.102	-0.0837
_lyear_2007	-0.0499***	(0.00485)	-10.29	0	-0.0595	-0.0404
_lcmaca_2	-0.0402	(0.0393)	-1.025	0.305	-0.117	0.0367
_lcmaca_3	-0.0804	(0.0493)	-1.629	0.103	-0.177	0.0163
_lcmaca_4	-0.0626	(0.0639)	-0.980	0.327	-0.188	0.0627
_lcmaca_5	-0.0424	(0.0421)	-1.007	0.314	-0.125	0.0401
_lriotype_1	-0.0472***	(0.0176)	-2.682	0.00734	-0.0817	-0.0127
Constant	-0.168***	(0.0651)	-2.588	0.00966	-0.296	-0.0409
Observations	17,778					
R-squared	0.355					
Number of id	1,808					

---

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1



**Tables of Full Results for Regression Results Presented in Table 11**

Table H16: Special Payments, Estimated Marginal Effects, Difference-in-differences Estimator (no physician-specific fixed effects), Obstetrical Services, FPs Eligible for Special Payments in 2005

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment6	-0.000411	(0.00531)	-0.0774	0.938	-0.0108	0.0100
treated	0.0237	(0.0177)	1.341	0.180	-0.0109	0.0583
post1	-0.00826**	(0.00334)	-2.475	0.0133	-0.0148	-0.00172
fmgd	0.00532*	(0.00322)	1.656	0.0978	-0.000978	0.0116
ccmd	0.0117	(0.0107)	1.096	0.273	-0.00922	0.0326
fhod	-0.00351	(0.00908)	-0.386	0.699	-0.0213	0.0143
doc_ageg2	0.000444	(0.00273)	0.163	0.871	-0.00490	0.00579
doc_ageg3	-0.00441	(0.00344)	-1.282	0.200	-0.0112	0.00234
doc_ageg4	-0.00998***	(0.00348)	-2.867	0.00415	-0.0168	-0.00316
doc_male	0.0105***	(0.00350)	3.009	0.00262	0.00367	0.0174
yrslicyr	0.000774***	(0.000228)	3.389	0.000701	0.000326	0.00122
workdays	0.000173***	(5.04e-05)	3.431	0.000602	7.42e-05	0.000272
sum_visitg2	-0.00497	(0.00465)	-1.070	0.285	-0.0141	0.00414
sum_visitg3	-0.00954*	(0.00513)	-1.860	0.0628	-0.0196	0.000510
sum_visitg4	-0.0145**	(0.00603)	-2.399	0.0164	-0.0263	-0.00265
visitpd	-0.000910***	(0.000282)	-3.225	0.00126	-0.00146	-0.000357
sum_ptg2	0.00578	(0.00685)	0.844	0.399	-0.00764	0.0192
sum_ptg3	0.0195*	(0.0112)	1.734	0.0828	-0.00253	0.0415
sum_ptg4	0.0379**	(0.0193)	1.964	0.0495	7.85e-05	0.0757
meanage	0.000973	(0.000652)	1.493	0.135	-0.000305	0.00225
fmpercent	0.0340*	(0.0191)	1.785	0.0743	-0.00335	0.0714
clpercent	1.010***	(0.164)	6.161	7.22e-10	0.689	1.331
elpercent	-0.0746	(0.0499)	-1.496	0.135	-0.172	0.0231
lnsbill	0.0346***	(0.00758)	4.567	4.94e-06	0.0198	0.0495
_lyear_2000	-0.000446	(0.000650)	-0.687	0.492	-0.00172	0.000827
_lyear_2001	-0.00173*	(0.000941)	-1.835	0.0665	-0.00357	0.000117
_lyear_2002	-0.00321***	(0.00114)	-2.809	0.00497	-0.00544	-0.000969
_lyear_2003	-0.00318**	(0.00139)	-2.288	0.0221	-0.00590	-0.000455
_lyear_2004	-0.00436**	(0.00172)	-2.536	0.0112	-0.00773	-0.000991
_lyear_2005	-0.00412**	(0.00205)	-2.009	0.0445	-0.00815	-0.000101
_lyear_2006	0.00232	(0.00170)	1.367	0.172	-0.00101	0.00566
_lyear_2007	0.000109	(0.000991)	0.110	0.912	-0.00183	0.00205
_lcmaca_2	0.0117	(0.00754)	1.557	0.119	-0.00304	0.0265
_lcmaca_3	0.00423	(0.00841)	0.503	0.615	-0.0123	0.0207
_lcmaca_4	0.0102	(0.0235)	0.432	0.665	-0.0359	0.0563
_lcmaca_5	0.0641	(0.110)	0.585	0.559	-0.151	0.279
_lriotype_1	0.00787**	(0.00355)	2.216	0.0267	0.000908	0.0148
Observations	19,934					

Robust standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table H17: Special Payments, Estimated Marginal Effects, Difference-in-differences Estimator (no physician-specific fixed effects), Obstetrical Services, FPs Eligible for Special Payments in 2006

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment6	-0.00417	(0.00400)	-1.042	0.297	-0.0120	0.00367
treated	-0.00239	(0.00453)	-0.528	0.598	-0.0113	0.00649
post2	-0.00747***	(0.00282)	-2.646	0.00814	-0.0130	-0.00194
fmgd	0.00470	(0.00315)	1.493	0.136	-0.00147	0.0109
ccmd	0.00970	(0.00977)	0.993	0.321	-0.00945	0.0288
doc_ageg2	0.000761	(0.00277)	0.275	0.784	-0.00466	0.00619
doc_ageg3	-0.00323	(0.00348)	-0.929	0.353	-0.0101	0.00359
doc_ageg4	-0.00915***	(0.00349)	-2.624	0.00868	-0.0160	-0.00232
doc_male	0.0108***	(0.00343)	3.157	0.00160	0.00410	0.0176
yrslcyr	0.000732***	(0.000222)	3.297	0.000977	0.000297	0.00117
workdays	0.000177***	(4.73e-05)	3.747	0.000179	8.44e-05	0.000270
sum_visitg2	-0.00653	(0.00413)	-1.580	0.114	-0.0146	0.00157
sum_visitg3	-0.0107**	(0.00468)	-2.279	0.0226	-0.0198	-0.00149
sum_visitg4	-0.0142**	(0.00560)	-2.531	0.0114	-0.0252	-0.00320
visitpd	-0.000859***	(0.000268)	-3.210	0.00133	-0.00138	-0.000334
sum_ptg2	0.00750	(0.00711)	1.054	0.292	-0.00644	0.0214
sum_ptg3	0.0198*	(0.0113)	1.752	0.0797	-0.00235	0.0420
sum_ptg4	0.0354*	(0.0184)	1.923	0.0545	-0.000683	0.0715
meanage	0.000993	(0.000623)	1.595	0.111	-0.000228	0.00221
fmpercent	0.0402**	(0.0183)	2.189	0.0286	0.00420	0.0761
clpercent	0.988***	(0.159)	6.213	5.20e-10	0.676	1.300
elpercent	-0.0709	(0.0467)	-1.519	0.129	-0.162	0.0206
lnbsbill	0.0327***	(0.00731)	4.477	7.57e-06	0.0184	0.0471
_lyear_2000	-0.00101					
_lyear_2001	-0.00216**	(0.000926)	-2.329	0.0199	-0.00397	-0.000342
_lyear_2002	-0.00360***	(0.00111)	-3.235	0.00122	-0.00578	-0.00142
_lyear_2003	-0.00366***	(0.00134)	-2.730	0.00633	-0.00628	-0.00103
_lyear_2004	-0.00461***	(0.00167)	-2.764	0.00570	-0.00788	-0.00134
_lyear_2005	-0.00430**	(0.00200)	-2.150	0.0316	-0.00822	-0.000380
_lyear_2006	-0.00577***	(0.00221)	-2.610	0.00906	-0.0101	-0.00144
_lyear_2007	0.000353	(0.000982)	0.359	0.719	-0.00157	0.00228
_lcmaca_2	0.0115	(0.00734)	1.572	0.116	-0.00285	0.0259
_lcmaca_3	0.00700	(0.0124)	0.564	0.573	-0.0173	0.0313
_lcmaca_4	0.00658	(0.0177)	0.371	0.710	-0.0281	0.0413
_lcmaca_5	0.622***	(0.231)	2.692	0.00710	0.169	1.075
_lriotype_1	0.0105***	(0.00210)	4.991	6.00e-07	0.00638	0.0146
Observations	20,187					

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1

THE RESPONSE OF ONTARIO PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS TO PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES

Table H18: Special Payments, Estimated Marginal Effects, Difference-in-differences Estimator (no physician-specific fixed effects), Obstetrical Services, FPs Eligible for Special Payments in 2007

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment6	0.0134	(0.0240)	0.559	0.576	-0.0337	0.0605
treated	-0.00376	(0.00452)	-0.833	0.405	-0.0126	0.00509
post3	-0.00733***	(0.00238)	-3.079	0.00208	-0.0120	-0.00266
fhgd	0.00518	(0.00330)	1.567	0.117	-0.00130	0.0117
ccmd	0.0125	(0.0106)	1.172	0.241	-0.00838	0.0333
doc_ageg2	0.00175	(0.00309)	0.568	0.570	-0.00430	0.00781
doc_ageg3	-0.00153	(0.00374)	-0.410	0.682	-0.00886	0.00579
doc_ageg4	-0.00854**	(0.00373)	-2.291	0.0219	-0.0158	-0.00123
doc_male	0.00993***	(0.00367)	2.706	0.00681	0.00274	0.0171
yrslcyr	0.000723***	(0.000229)	3.156	0.00160	0.000274	0.00117
workdays	0.000203***	(5.05e-05)	4.025	5.71e-05	0.000104	0.000302
sum_visitg2	-0.0105***	(0.00407)	-2.585	0.00974	-0.0185	-0.00255
sum_visitg3	-0.0142***	(0.00470)	-3.032	0.00243	-0.0234	-0.00503
sum_visitg4	-0.0183***	(0.00598)	-3.064	0.00218	-0.0300	-0.00660
visitpd	-0.000846***	(0.000269)	-3.143	0.00167	-0.00137	-0.000318
sum_ptg2	0.00906	(0.00741)	1.222	0.222	-0.00547	0.0236
sum_ptg3	0.0227*	(0.0122)	1.851	0.0641	-0.00133	0.0467
sum_ptg4	0.0387**	(0.0197)	1.961	0.0499	1.38e-05	0.0773
meanage	0.00111*	(0.000643)	1.730	0.0836	-0.000148	0.00237
fmpercent	0.0340*	(0.0194)	1.755	0.0792	-0.00397	0.0720
clpercent	1.026***	(0.168)	6.118	9.50e-10	0.697	1.355
elpercent	-0.0800*	(0.0482)	-1.661	0.0968	-0.174	0.0144
lnbsbill	0.0333***	(0.00734)	4.536	5.73e-06	0.0189	0.0477
_lyear_2000	-0.000650	(0.000658)	-0.987	0.324	-0.00194	0.000641
_lyear_2001	-0.00216**	(0.000945)	-2.292	0.0219	-0.00402	-0.000314
_lyear_2002	-0.00352***	(0.00113)	-3.114	0.00185	-0.00574	-0.00131
_lyear_2003	-0.00371***	(0.00136)	-2.732	0.00630	-0.00638	-0.00105
_lyear_2004	-0.00468***	(0.00168)	-2.785	0.00536	-0.00798	-0.00139
_lyear_2005	-0.00472**	(0.00199)	-2.371	0.0178	-0.00862	-0.000817
_lyear_2006	-0.00646***	(0.00219)	-2.952	0.00315	-0.0107	-0.00217
_lyear_2007	-0.00737***	(0.00227)	-3.244	0.00118	-0.0118	-0.00292
_lcmaca_2	0.00963	(0.00681)	1.414	0.157	-0.00372	0.0230
_lcmaca_3	-0.00372	(0.00398)	-0.936	0.349	-0.0115	0.00407
_lcmaca_4	0.00718	(0.0196)	0.365	0.715	-0.0313	0.0457
_lcmaca_5	0.0762	(0.130)	0.586	0.558	-0.179	0.331
_lriotype_1	0.00701*	(0.00360)	1.945	0.0518	-5.45e-05	0.0141
Observations	20,196					

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table H19: Special Payments, Estimated Marginal Effects, Difference-in-differences Estimator (no physician-specific fixed effects), Hospital Services, FPs Eligible for Special Payments in 2005

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment7	-0.0130	(0.0347)	-0.375	0.707	-0.0810	0.0550
treated	0.246**	(0.107)	2.288	0.0221	0.0353	0.457
post1	-0.142***	(0.0107)	-13.36	0	-0.163	-0.122
fhgd	0.0753***	(0.0170)	4.427	9.54e-06	0.0419	0.109
ccmd	-0.00551	(0.0256)	-0.216	0.829	-0.0556	0.0446
fhod	0.0624	(0.0723)	0.863	0.388	-0.0793	0.204
doc_ageg2	0.0135	(0.0121)	1.116	0.264	-0.0102	0.0372
doc_ageg3	-0.0178	(0.0138)	-1.295	0.195	-0.0448	0.00915
doc_ageg4	-0.0683***	(0.0137)	-5.001	5.69e-07	-0.0951	-0.0415
doc_male	0.0261	(0.0205)	1.274	0.203	-0.0141	0.0663
yrslicyr	0.00391***	(0.000875)	4.471	7.78e-06	0.00220	0.00562
workdays	0.00261***	(0.000209)	12.46	0	0.00220	0.00302
sum_visitg2	0.0333	(0.0238)	1.402	0.161	-0.0133	0.0799
sum_visitg3	0.0198	(0.0285)	0.693	0.489	-0.0361	0.0757
sum_visitg4	-0.00932	(0.0303)	-0.308	0.758	-0.0687	0.0500
visitpd	-0.00207**	(0.000953)	-2.171	0.0299	-0.00394	-0.000201
sum_ptg2	0.0199	(0.0203)	0.977	0.328	-0.0200	0.0597
sum_ptg3	0.0419*	(0.0248)	1.691	0.0908	-0.00665	0.0905
sum_ptg4	0.0686**	(0.0327)	2.096	0.0361	0.00445	0.133
meanage	0.00722***	(0.00260)	2.771	0.00559	0.00211	0.0123
fmpercent	-0.0872	(0.101)	-0.862	0.389	-0.285	0.111
clpercent	5.974***	(0.600)	9.964	0	4.799	7.149
elpercent	0.284	(0.182)	1.560	0.119	-0.0728	0.641
lnsbill	0.0575**	(0.0230)	2.503	0.0123	0.0125	0.103
_lcdname_3506	-0.112***	(0.0125)	-8.922	0	-0.136	-0.0872
_lcdname_3509	-0.0785***	(0.0176)	-4.454	8.43e-06	-0.113	-0.0440
_lcdname_3510	-0.0960***	(0.00699)	-13.73	0	-0.110	-0.0823
_lcdname_3511	-0.0925***	(0.00692)	-13.37	0	-0.106	-0.0790
_lcdname_3512	-0.0901***	(0.00754)	-11.96	0	-0.105	-0.0754
_lcdname_3513	-0.0262	(0.0635)	-0.413	0.680	-0.151	0.0982
_lcdname_3514	-0.0747***	(0.0177)	-4.217	2.48e-05	-0.109	-0.0400
_lcdname_3515	-0.0878***	(0.00921)	-9.533	0	-0.106	-0.0697
_lcdname_3516	-0.0896***	(0.00839)	-10.68	0	-0.106	-0.0731
_lcdname_3518	-0.0860***	(0.0166)	-5.169	2.36e-07	-0.119	-0.0534
_lcdname_3519	-0.109***	(0.0120)	-9.115	0	-0.133	-0.0857
_lcdname_3520	-0.333***	(0.0786)	-4.236	2.28e-05	-0.487	-0.179
_lcdname_3521	-0.103***	(0.0214)	-4.809	1.51e-06	-0.145	-0.0610
_lcdname_3522	0.0466	(0.144)	0.324	0.746	-0.235	0.329
_lcdname_3523	-0.0283	(0.0581)	-0.486	0.627	-0.142	0.0856
_lcdname_3524	-0.00339	(0.0721)	-0.0469	0.963	-0.145	0.138
_lcdname_3525	-0.0880***	(0.0105)	-8.361	0	-0.109	-0.0674
_lcdname_3526	-0.0539	(0.0356)	-1.517	0.129	-0.124	0.0158
_lcdname_3528	-0.0787***	(0.0158)	-4.970	6.69e-07	-0.110	-0.0476
_lcdname_3529	-0.0553*	(0.0335)	-1.650	0.0990	-0.121	0.0104
_lcdname_3530	-0.0857***	(0.0121)	-7.061	0	-0.110	-0.0619
_lcdname_3532	-0.0413	(0.0535)	-0.772	0.440	-0.146	0.0636
_lcdname_3534	-0.0765***	(0.0169)	-4.535	5.76e-06	-0.110	-0.0434
_lcdname_3536	0.157	(0.228)	0.687	0.492	-0.290	0.603
_lcdname_3537	-0.0890***	(0.0131)	-6.773	0	-0.115	-0.0632
_lcdname_3538	-0.0819***	(0.0128)	-6.416	1.40e-10	-0.107	-0.0569
_lcdname_3539	-0.0947***	(0.0117)	-8.096	0	-0.118	-0.0717
_lcdname_3540	-0.0910***	(0.00749)	-12.15	0	-0.106	-0.0764

THE RESPONSE OF ONTARIO PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS TO PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES

_lcdname_3542	0.884***	(0.0239)	36.96	0	0.837	0.931
_lcdname_3543	-0.0763***	(0.0173)	-4.402	1.07e-05	-0.110	-0.0423
_lcdname_3544	-0.0910***	(0.00741)	-12.29	0	-0.106	-0.0765
_lcdname_3547	-0.0893***	(0.00833)	-10.72	0	-0.106	-0.0730
_lcdname_3548	-0.0854***	(0.00958)	-8.908	0	-0.104	-0.0666
_lcdname_3549	-0.0898***	(0.00777)	-11.55	0	-0.105	-0.0745
_lcdname_3553	-0.0707***	(0.0222)	-3.192	0.00141	-0.114	-0.0273
_lcdname_3556	-0.0920***	(0.00673)	-13.67	0	-0.105	-0.0788
_lcdname_3557	-0.0817***	(0.0134)	-6.099	1.07e-09	-0.108	-0.0554
_lcdname_3558	-0.0727***	(0.0212)	-3.424	0.000618	-0.114	-0.0311
_lyear_2000	-0.0159***	(0.00374)	-4.244	2.20e-05	-0.0232	-0.00853
_lyear_2001	-0.0220***	(0.00438)	-5.025	5.04e-07	-0.0306	-0.0134
_lyear_2002	-0.0387***	(0.00463)	-8.351	0	-0.0477	-0.0296
_lyear_2003	-0.0496***	(0.00468)	-10.61	0	-0.0588	-0.0405
_lyear_2004	-0.0784***	(0.00538)	-14.58	0	-0.0889	-0.0678
_lyear_2005	-0.0876***	(0.00578)	-15.16	0	-0.0989	-0.0763
_lyear_2007	0.00633	(0.00554)	1.143	0.253	-0.00452	0.0172
_lyear_2008	0.00759	(0.00708)	1.073	0.283	-0.00628	0.0215
_lcmaca_2	0.264**	(0.108)	2.448	0.0144	0.0526	0.475
_lcmaca_3	-0.0492***	(0.0182)	-2.699	0.00695	-0.0850	-0.0135
_lcmaca_4	0.498**	(0.212)	2.353	0.0186	0.0832	0.913
_lcmaca_5	0.433	(0.266)	1.626	0.104	-0.0889	0.955
_lriotype_1	0.0264	(0.0289)	0.914	0.361	-0.0302	0.0831
Observations	19,777					

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table H20: Special Payments, Estimated Marginal Effects, Difference-in-differences Estimator (no physician-specific fixed effects), Hospital Services, FPs Eligible for Special Payments in 2006

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment7	-0.00493	(0.0738)	-0.0669	0.947	-0.150	0.140
treated	0.139***	(0.0489)	2.841	0.00450	0.0431	0.235
post2	-0.124***	(0.00916)	-13.50	0	-0.142	-0.106
fhgd	0.0848***	(0.0180)	4.715	2.42e-06	0.0496	0.120
fhnd	-0.0159	(0.0722)	-0.220	0.826	-0.158	0.126
ccmd	0.0162	(0.0297)	0.546	0.585	-0.0420	0.0744
doc_ageg2	0.0106	(0.0121)	0.871	0.384	-0.0132	0.0343
doc_ageg3	-0.0188	(0.0142)	-1.328	0.184	-0.0466	0.00895
doc_ageg4	-0.0698***	(0.0142)	-4.923	8.53e-07	-0.0976	-0.0420
doc_male	0.0359*	(0.0203)	1.766	0.0775	-0.00395	0.0757
yrslcyr	0.00386***	(0.000894)	4.325	1.53e-05	0.00211	0.00562
workdays	0.00268***	(0.000218)	12.28	0	0.00225	0.00310
sum_visitg2	0.0163	(0.0206)	0.792	0.428	-0.0240	0.0566
sum_visitg3	0.00663	(0.0260)	0.255	0.799	-0.0444	0.0576
sum_visitg4	-0.0179	(0.0288)	-0.621	0.534	-0.0744	0.0386
visitpd	-0.00208**	(0.00100)	-2.081	0.0374	-0.00404	-0.000121
sum_ptg2	0.0293	(0.0212)	1.379	0.168	-0.0123	0.0709
sum_ptg3	0.0499*	(0.0259)	1.927	0.0539	-0.000844	0.101
sum_ptg4	0.0783**	(0.0343)	2.282	0.0225	0.0111	0.146
meanage	0.00711***	(0.00267)	2.660	0.00780	0.00187	0.0123
fmpercent	-0.0502	(0.105)	-0.480	0.631	-0.255	0.155
clpercent	6.143***	(0.610)	10.07	0	4.947	7.338
elpercent	0.301	(0.189)	1.593	0.111	-0.0693	0.671
lnbsbill	0.0489**	(0.0247)	1.976	0.0482	0.000397	0.0974
_lcdname_3506	-0.121***	(0.0119)	-10.16	0	-0.145	-0.0979
_lcdname_3509	-0.0692**	(0.0346)	-2.000	0.0455	-0.137	-0.00139
_lcdname_3510	-0.101***	(0.00719)	-14.10	0	-0.115	-0.0873
_lcdname_3511	-0.0967***	(0.00739)	-13.09	0	-0.111	-0.0822
_lcdname_3512	-0.0941***	(0.00795)	-11.83	0	-0.110	-0.0785
_lcdname_3514	-0.0803***	(0.0157)	-5.104	3.32e-07	-0.111	-0.0495
_lcdname_3515	-0.0957***	(0.0104)	-9.235	0	-0.116	-0.0754
_lcdname_3516	-0.0935***	(0.00921)	-10.15	0	-0.112	-0.0754
_lcdname_3518	-0.0959***	(0.0137)	-7.004	0	-0.123	-0.0691
_lcdname_3519	-0.117***	(0.0113)	-10.42	0	-0.139	-0.0953
_lcdname_3520	-0.368***	(0.0742)	-4.964	6.90e-07	-0.514	-0.223
_lcdname_3521	-0.116***	(0.0190)	-6.089	1.14e-09	-0.153	-0.0784
_lcdname_3522	-0.0622	(0.0421)	-1.476	0.140	-0.145	0.0204
_lcdname_3523	-0.0415	(0.0473)	-0.877	0.380	-0.134	0.0512
_lcdname_3524	-0.0211	(0.0591)	-0.357	0.721	-0.137	0.0948
_lcdname_3525	-0.0952***	(0.00917)	-10.38	0	-0.113	-0.0773
_lcdname_3526	-0.0686**	(0.0267)	-2.571	0.0101	-0.121	-0.0163
_lcdname_3528	-0.0804***	(0.0171)	-4.705	2.54e-06	-0.114	-0.0469
_lcdname_3529	-0.0685***	(0.0254)	-2.698	0.00697	-0.118	-0.0187
_lcdname_3530	-0.0942***	(0.0104)	-9.063	0	-0.115	-0.0738
_lcdname_3532	-0.0202	(0.0741)	-0.272	0.786	-0.165	0.125
_lcdname_3534	-0.0851***	(0.0134)	-6.333	2.41e-10	-0.111	-0.0587
_lcdname_3536	0.185	(0.237)	0.780	0.435	-0.280	0.650
_lcdname_3537	-0.0971***	(0.0114)	-8.514	0	-0.119	-0.0748
_lcdname_3538	-0.0814***	(0.0162)	-5.021	5.13e-07	-0.113	-0.0496
_lcdname_3539	-0.104***	(0.0103)	-10.16	0	-0.124	-0.0842
_lcdname_3540	-0.0930***	(0.0102)	-9.124	0	-0.113	-0.0730
_lcdname_3542	-0.0199	(0.0979)	-0.203	0.839	-0.212	0.172

THE RESPONSE OF ONTARIO PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS TO PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES

_lcdname_3543	-0.0759***	(0.0209)	-3.623	0.000291	-0.117	-0.0348
_lcdname_3544	-0.0897***	(0.0145)	-6.205	5.47e-10	-0.118	-0.0614
_lcdname_3547	-0.0925***	(0.00985)	-9.391	0	-0.112	-0.0732
_lcdname_3548	-0.0864***	(0.0120)	-7.203	0	-0.110	-0.0629
_lcdname_3549	-0.0842***	(0.0159)	-5.303	1.14e-07	-0.115	-0.0530
_lcdname_3552	-0.0867***	(0.0155)	-5.579	2.42e-08	-0.117	-0.0563
_lcdname_3553	-0.0821***	(0.0164)	-5.021	5.15e-07	-0.114	-0.0501
_lcdname_3556	-0.0966***	(0.00700)	-13.80	0	-0.110	-0.0828
_lcdname_3557	-0.0839***	(0.0153)	-5.478	4.29e-08	-0.114	-0.0539
_lcdname_3558	-0.0796***	(0.0186)	-4.286	1.82e-05	-0.116	-0.0432
_lcdname_3560	-0.0738***	(0.0216)	-3.412	0.000644	-0.116	-0.0314
_lyear_2000	-0.0165***	(0.00387)	-4.270	1.95e-05	-0.0241	-0.00894
_lyear_2001	-0.0229***	(0.00454)	-5.044	4.56e-07	-0.0318	-0.0140
_lyear_2002	-0.0424***	(0.00475)	-8.931	0	-0.0518	-0.0331
_lyear_2003	-0.0541***	(0.00484)	-11.18	0	-0.0636	-0.0446
_lyear_2004	-0.0823***	(0.00559)	-14.70	0	-0.0932	-0.0713
_lyear_2005	-0.0918***	(0.00600)	-15.29	0	-0.104	-0.0801
_lyear_2006	-0.105***	(0.00676)	-15.60	0	-0.119	-0.0922
_lyear_2007	-0.000833	(0.00544)	-0.153	0.878	-0.0115	0.00983
_lcmaca_2	0.172*	(0.0894)	1.921	0.0547	-0.00347	0.347
_lcmaca_3	-0.0572***	(0.0162)	-3.530	0.000416	-0.0890	-0.0255
_lcmaca_4	0.251	(0.262)	0.958	0.338	-0.262	0.763
_lcmaca_5	0.271	(0.228)	1.188	0.235	-0.176	0.717
_lriotype_1	0.0233	(0.0313)	0.743	0.457	-0.0381	0.0846
Observations	20,052					

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table H21: Special Payments, Estimated Marginal Effects, Difference-in-differences Estimator (no physician-specific fixed effects), Hospital Services, FPs Eligible for Special Payments in 2007

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment7	-0.0186	(0.0373)	-0.498	0.618	-0.0916	0.0545
treated	0.0706*	(0.0367)	1.926	0.0541	-0.00125	0.142
post3	-0.102***	(0.00693)	-14.69	0	-0.115	-0.0883
fhgd	0.0765***	(0.0176)	4.342	1.41e-05	0.0420	0.111
fhnd	0.414**	(0.204)	2.024	0.0430	0.0131	0.814
ccmd	-0.00394	(0.0272)	-0.145	0.885	-0.0573	0.0494
doc_ageg2	0.00856	(0.0122)	0.703	0.482	-0.0153	0.0324
doc_ageg3	-0.0242*	(0.0142)	-1.709	0.0875	-0.0520	0.00355
doc_ageg4	-0.0751***	(0.0140)	-5.354	8.63e-08	-0.103	-0.0476
doc_male	0.0169	(0.0222)	0.760	0.447	-0.0266	0.0604
yrslicyr	0.00424***	(0.000910)	4.659	3.18e-06	0.00246	0.00602
workdays	0.00281***	(0.000215)	13.07	0	0.00239	0.00323
sum_visitg2	0.000636	(0.0188)	0.0338	0.973	-0.0362	0.0375
sum_visitg3	-0.00606	(0.0242)	-0.250	0.803	-0.0536	0.0414
sum_visitg4	-0.0378	(0.0265)	-1.427	0.154	-0.0896	0.0141
visitpd	-0.00164	(0.00100)	-1.630	0.103	-0.00361	0.000332
sum_ptg2	0.0200	(0.0203)	0.984	0.325	-0.0198	0.0599
sum_ptg3	0.0382	(0.0246)	1.553	0.121	-0.0100	0.0865
sum_ptg4	0.0598*	(0.0321)	1.860	0.0629	-0.00321	0.123
meanage	0.00822***	(0.00275)	2.990	0.00279	0.00283	0.0136
fmpersent	-0.0894	(0.105)	-0.849	0.396	-0.296	0.117
clpersent	6.195***	(0.612)	10.12	0	4.995	7.395
elpersent	0.260	(0.191)	1.360	0.174	-0.114	0.634
lnsbill	0.0615**	(0.0246)	2.503	0.0123	0.0133	0.110
_lcdname_3506	-0.116***	(0.0134)	-8.666	0	-0.142	-0.0896
_lcdname_3507	-0.0458	(0.126)	-0.365	0.715	-0.292	0.200
_lcdname_3509	-0.0644	(0.0402)	-1.604	0.109	-0.143	0.0143
_lcdname_3510	-0.101***	(0.00710)	-14.23	0	-0.115	-0.0870
_lcdname_3511	-0.0961***	(0.00795)	-12.09	0	-0.112	-0.0806
_lcdname_3512	-0.0989***	(0.00743)	-13.30	0	-0.113	-0.0843
_lcdname_3514	-0.0816***	(0.0163)	-5.015	5.31e-07	-0.114	-0.0497
_lcdname_3515	0.0261	(0.0956)	0.273	0.785	-0.161	0.214
_lcdname_3516	-0.0951***	(0.00843)	-11.28	0	-0.112	-0.0786
_lcdname_3518	-0.0846***	(0.0208)	-4.061	4.88e-05	-0.125	-0.0437
_lcdname_3519	-0.112***	(0.0127)	-8.834	0	-0.137	-0.0871
_lcdname_3520	-0.320***	(0.0763)	-4.192	2.77e-05	-0.469	-0.170
_lcdname_3521	-0.101***	(0.0250)	-4.039	5.36e-05	-0.150	-0.0519
_lcdname_3522	0.00694	(0.129)	0.0537	0.957	-0.246	0.260
_lcdname_3523	-0.0138	(0.0717)	-0.193	0.847	-0.154	0.127
_lcdname_3524	0.0309	(0.0972)	0.318	0.751	-0.160	0.221
_lcdname_3525	-0.0903***	(0.0128)	-7.084	0	-0.115	-0.0653
_lcdname_3526	-0.0433	(0.0468)	-0.926	0.355	-0.135	0.0484
_lcdname_3528	-0.0842***	(0.0155)	-5.440	5.34e-08	-0.114	-0.0538
_lcdname_3529	-0.0458	(0.0447)	-1.023	0.306	-0.133	0.0419
_lcdname_3530	-0.0851***	(0.0165)	-5.152	2.57e-07	-0.117	-0.0527
_lcdname_3532	0.00320	(0.0923)	0.0347	0.972	-0.178	0.184
_lcdname_3534	-0.0816***	(0.0172)	-4.736	2.18e-06	-0.115	-0.0479
_lcdname_3536	0.135	(0.213)	0.634	0.526	-0.283	0.554
_lcdname_3537	-0.0913***	(0.0157)	-5.812	6.18e-09	-0.122	-0.0605
_lcdname_3538	-0.0828***	(0.0159)	-5.210	1.88e-07	-0.114	-0.0517
_lcdname_3539	-0.0971***	(0.0136)	-7.140	0	-0.124	-0.0705
_lcdname_3540	-0.0927***	(0.0113)	-8.210	0	-0.115	-0.0706



THE RESPONSE OF ONTARIO PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS TO PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES

_lcdname_3542	0.870***	(0.0290)	30.02	0	0.813	0.927
_lcdname_3543	-0.0737***	(0.0234)	-3.150	0.00163	-0.120	-0.0278
_lcdname_3544	-0.0982***	(0.00687)	-14.28	0	-0.112	-0.0847
_lcdname_3547	-0.0941***	(0.00942)	-9.995	0	-0.113	-0.0757
_lcdname_3548	-0.0903***	(0.00998)	-9.049	0	-0.110	-0.0708
_lcdname_3549	-0.0870***	(0.0134)	-6.509	7.56e-11	-0.113	-0.0608
_lcdname_3553	-0.0612*	(0.0336)	-1.822	0.0684	-0.127	0.00463
_lcdname_3556	-0.0974***	(0.00694)	-14.04	0	-0.111	-0.0838
_lcdname_3557	-0.0865***	(0.0138)	-6.272	3.56e-10	-0.114	-0.0595
_lcdname_3558	-0.0691**	(0.0289)	-2.393	0.0167	-0.126	-0.0125
_lyear_2000	-0.0176***	(0.00385)	-4.571	4.86e-06	-0.0251	-0.0101
_lyear_2001	-0.0246***	(0.00452)	-5.435	5.48e-08	-0.0334	-0.0157
_lyear_2002	-0.0412***	(0.00481)	-8.576	0	-0.0507	-0.0318
_lyear_2003	-0.0545***	(0.00485)	-11.25	0	-0.0640	-0.0450
_lyear_2004	-0.0836***	(0.00555)	-15.05	0	-0.0945	-0.0727
_lyear_2005	-0.0921***	(0.00594)	-15.50	0	-0.104	-0.0804
_lyear_2006	-0.104***	(0.00661)	-15.69	0	-0.117	-0.0908
_lyear_2007	-0.103***	(0.00676)	-15.20	0	-0.116	-0.0895
_lcmaca_2	0.337***	(0.118)	2.868	0.00413	0.107	0.567
_lcmaca_3	-0.0463**	(0.0200)	-2.315	0.0206	-0.0855	-0.00709
_lcmaca_4	0.335	(0.232)	1.445	0.148	-0.119	0.789
_lcmaca_5	0.475*	(0.274)	1.733	0.0831	-0.0622	1.012
_lriotype_1	0.00771	(0.0401)	0.192	0.847	-0.0708	0.0862

Observations 20,138

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table H22: Special Payments, Estimated Marginal Effects, Difference-in-differences Estimator (no physician-specific fixed effects), Office Procedures, FPs Eligible for Special Payments in 2005

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment9	0.00584	(0.0640)	0.0912	0.927	-0.120	0.131
treated	0.164*	(0.0903)	1.819	0.0689	-0.0127	0.341
post1	0.0356	(0.0223)	1.597	0.110	-0.00809	0.0792
fhgd	-0.0633***	(0.0181)	-3.496	0.000472	-0.0988	-0.0278
ccmd	-0.104***	(0.0318)	-3.275	0.00106	-0.167	-0.0419
fhod	0.0530	(0.117)	0.454	0.650	-0.176	0.282
doc_ageg2	-0.0652***	(0.0191)	-3.405	0.000662	-0.103	-0.0277
doc_ageg3	-0.139***	(0.0268)	-5.175	2.28e-07	-0.191	-0.0862
doc_ageg4	-0.201***	(0.0313)	-6.412	1.43e-10	-0.262	-0.139
doc_male	0.138***	(0.0330)	4.177	2.96e-05	0.0732	0.203
yrslicyr	0.00459***	(0.00170)	2.698	0.00697	0.00126	0.00793
workdays	0.000720**	(0.000284)	2.535	0.0112	0.000163	0.00128
sum_visitg2	0.0884**	(0.0391)	2.259	0.0239	0.0117	0.165
sum_visitg3	0.107**	(0.0476)	2.249	0.0245	0.0138	0.201
sum_visitg4	0.0489	(0.0556)	0.881	0.379	-0.0600	0.158
visitpd	0.000805	(0.00151)	0.534	0.593	-0.00215	0.00376
sum_ptg2	0.105***	(0.0390)	2.687	0.00721	0.0283	0.181
sum_ptg3	0.201***	(0.0454)	4.416	1.00e-05	0.112	0.290
sum_ptg4	0.235***	(0.0520)	4.512	6.42e-06	0.133	0.336
meanage	0.00287	(0.00471)	0.608	0.543	-0.00637	0.0121
fmpercent	-0.237	(0.151)	-1.570	0.117	-0.533	0.0589
clpercent	0.309	(0.975)	0.316	0.752	-1.603	2.220
elpercent	0.224	(0.311)	0.719	0.472	-0.386	0.834
lnsbill	0.194***	(0.0429)	4.531	5.87e-06	0.110	0.278
_lcdname_3502	0.354**	(0.162)	2.186	0.0288	0.0366	0.672
_lcdname_3506	0.277*	(0.156)	1.780	0.0751	-0.0280	0.582
_lcdname_3507	-0.0678	(0.163)	-0.416	0.677	-0.387	0.252
_lcdname_3509	-0.166*	(0.0878)	-1.893	0.0584	-0.338	0.00590
_lcdname_3510	0.103	(0.191)	0.538	0.591	-0.272	0.477
_lcdname_3511	-0.0559	(0.174)	-0.320	0.749	-0.398	0.286
_lcdname_3512	0.172	(0.181)	0.946	0.344	-0.184	0.527
_lcdname_3514	-0.00990	(0.160)	-0.0617	0.951	-0.324	0.304
_lcdname_3515	0.192	(0.222)	0.862	0.388	-0.244	0.628
_lcdname_3516	0.489***	(0.183)	2.672	0.00755	0.130	0.848
_lcdname_3518	0.127	(0.162)	0.786	0.432	-0.190	0.444
_lcdname_3519	0.165	(0.161)	1.025	0.305	-0.150	0.480
_lcdname_3520	-0.00906	(0.140)	-0.0645	0.949	-0.284	0.266
_lcdname_3521	0.156	(0.158)	0.987	0.324	-0.154	0.466
_lcdname_3522	0.196	(0.204)	0.960	0.337	-0.204	0.597
_lcdname_3523	0.358**	(0.160)	2.233	0.0256	0.0437	0.673
_lcdname_3524	0.334**	(0.152)	2.193	0.0283	0.0355	0.632
_lcdname_3525	-0.0262	(0.160)	-0.164	0.870	-0.340	0.287
_lcdname_3526	0.131	(0.168)	0.784	0.433	-0.197	0.460
_lcdname_3528	0.389***	(0.128)	3.043	0.00234	0.138	0.639
_lcdname_3529	0.286*	(0.165)	1.731	0.0835	-0.0378	0.610
_lcdname_3530	-0.0571	(0.140)	-0.408	0.683	-0.331	0.217
_lcdname_3532	-0.0213	(0.127)	-0.169	0.866	-0.269	0.227
_lcdname_3534	0.315*	(0.162)	1.942	0.0521	-0.00289	0.634
_lcdname_3536	0.239	(0.186)	1.287	0.198	-0.125	0.603
_lcdname_3537	-0.0242	(0.138)	-0.175	0.861	-0.295	0.247
_lcdname_3538	0.150	(0.152)	0.983	0.325	-0.149	0.448
_lcdname_3539	0.293*	(0.156)	1.880	0.0600	-0.0124	0.598

THE RESPONSE OF ONTARIO PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS TO PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES

_lcdname_3540	0.212	(0.279)	0.759	0.448	-0.335	0.759
_lcdname_3541	-0.0836	(0.177)	-0.472	0.637	-0.431	0.264
_lcdname_3542	0.242	(0.334)	0.726	0.468	-0.412	0.896
_lcdname_3543	0.295*	(0.178)	1.659	0.0972	-0.0536	0.645
_lcdname_3544	-0.153	(0.253)	-0.608	0.543	-0.649	0.342
_lcdname_3547	-0.0595	(0.164)	-0.363	0.716	-0.381	0.261
_lcdname_3548	0.00905	(0.151)	0.0598	0.952	-0.288	0.306
_lcdname_3549	0.0668	(0.378)	0.177	0.860	-0.675	0.808
_lcdname_3553	0.0687	(0.171)	0.401	0.688	-0.267	0.404
_lcdname_3556	0.570***	(0.0987)	5.776	7.66e-09	0.377	0.763
_lcdname_3557	-0.0255	(0.202)	-0.126	0.900	-0.422	0.371
_lcdname_3558	0.197	(0.188)	1.045	0.296	-0.172	0.566
_lyear_2000	-0.00270	(0.00822)	-0.329	0.742	-0.0188	0.0134
_lyear_2001	-0.00438	(0.00929)	-0.471	0.637	-0.0226	0.0138
_lyear_2002	0.000613	(0.0108)	0.0566	0.955	-0.0206	0.0218
_lyear_2003	-0.00171	(0.0122)	-0.139	0.889	-0.0257	0.0223
_lyear_2004	-0.0276*	(0.0148)	-1.872	0.0612	-0.0566	0.00129
_lyear_2005	-0.0353**	(0.0172)	-2.051	0.0402	-0.0690	-0.00157
_lyear_2007	0.0158*	(0.00860)	1.842	0.0654	-0.00101	0.0327
_lyear_2008	0.00392	(0.0106)	0.368	0.713	-0.0170	0.0248
_lcmaca_2	0.0612	(0.113)	0.540	0.589	-0.161	0.284
_lcmaca_3	0.0499	(0.0936)	0.533	0.594	-0.134	0.233
_lcmaca_4	0.319**	(0.146)	2.189	0.0286	0.0335	0.606
_lcmaca_5	0.342	(0.358)	0.956	0.339	-0.359	1.044
_lriotype_1	-0.0615	(0.0823)	-0.747	0.455	-0.223	0.0998
Observations	19,897					

Robust standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table H23: Special Payments, Estimated Marginal Effects, Difference-in-differences Estimator (no physician-specific fixed effects), Office Procedures, FPs Eligible for Special Payments in 2006

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment9	0.0754	(0.127)	0.595	0.552	-0.173	0.324
treated	0.334***	(0.0678)	4.937	7.94e-07	0.202	0.467
post2	0.0432	(0.0265)	1.630	0.103	-0.00874	0.0951
fhgd	-0.0686***	(0.0182)	-3.761	0.000169	-0.104	-0.0329
fhnd	-0.104	(0.0996)	-1.045	0.296	-0.299	0.0912
ccmd	-0.106***	(0.0324)	-3.284	0.00102	-0.170	-0.0429
doc_ageg2	-0.0731***	(0.0193)	-3.798	0.000146	-0.111	-0.0354
doc_ageg3	-0.147***	(0.0269)	-5.461	4.75e-08	-0.199	-0.0941
doc_ageg4	-0.207***	(0.0314)	-6.576	0	-0.268	-0.145
doc_male	0.121***	(0.0339)	3.572	0.000355	0.0546	0.187
yrslcyr	0.00476***	(0.00170)	2.801	0.00510	0.00143	0.00809
workdays	0.000670**	(0.000292)	2.295	0.0217	9.78e-05	0.00124
sum_visitg2	0.0965**	(0.0395)	2.444	0.0145	0.0191	0.174
sum_visitg3	0.112**	(0.0482)	2.322	0.0202	0.0175	0.207
sum_visitg4	0.0551	(0.0566)	0.974	0.330	-0.0558	0.166
visitpd	0.000867	(0.00153)	0.567	0.570	-0.00213	0.00386
sum_ptg2	0.107***	(0.0390)	2.749	0.00598	0.0308	0.184
sum_ptg3	0.202***	(0.0452)	4.472	7.75e-06	0.114	0.291
sum_ptg4	0.236***	(0.0517)	4.555	5.25e-06	0.134	0.337
meanage	0.00283	(0.00473)	0.599	0.549	-0.00643	0.0121
fmpersent	-0.269*	(0.152)	-1.771	0.0766	-0.566	0.0287
clpersent	0.364	(0.972)	0.374	0.708	-1.542	2.269
elpersent	0.243	(0.312)	0.778	0.436	-0.369	0.854
lnsbill	0.199***	(0.0428)	4.654	3.26e-06	0.115	0.283
_lcdname_3502	0.298*	(0.172)	1.738	0.0823	-0.0382	0.635
_lcdname_3506	0.232	(0.159)	1.460	0.144	-0.0796	0.544
_lcdname_3507	-0.0833	(0.156)	-0.533	0.594	-0.390	0.223
_lcdname_3509	-0.123	(0.109)	-1.122	0.262	-0.337	0.0917
_lcdname_3510	0.0622	(0.190)	0.328	0.743	-0.310	0.435
_lcdname_3511	-0.0512	(0.170)	-0.302	0.763	-0.384	0.281
_lcdname_3512	0.151	(0.181)	0.835	0.404	-0.204	0.507
_lcdname_3514	-0.0100	(0.151)	-0.0664	0.947	-0.306	0.286
_lcdname_3515	0.220	(0.312)	0.704	0.481	-0.392	0.832
_lcdname_3516	0.476**	(0.187)	2.538	0.0111	0.108	0.843
_lcdname_3518	0.0865	(0.159)	0.542	0.588	-0.226	0.399
_lcdname_3519	0.117	(0.160)	0.729	0.466	-0.197	0.430
_lcdname_3520	-0.0460	(0.140)	-0.328	0.743	-0.321	0.229
_lcdname_3521	0.118	(0.157)	0.748	0.454	-0.191	0.426
_lcdname_3522	-0.0674	(0.255)	-0.265	0.791	-0.567	0.432
_lcdname_3523	0.332**	(0.161)	2.061	0.0393	0.0162	0.648
_lcdname_3524	0.282*	(0.160)	1.771	0.0766	-0.0302	0.595
_lcdname_3525	-0.0625	(0.152)	-0.411	0.681	-0.361	0.236
_lcdname_3526	0.0938	(0.165)	0.568	0.570	-0.230	0.418
_lcdname_3528	0.368***	(0.129)	2.848	0.00441	0.115	0.621
_lcdname_3529	0.247	(0.168)	1.473	0.141	-0.0817	0.576
_lcdname_3530	-0.0192	(0.152)	-0.126	0.899	-0.317	0.279
_lcdname_3532	-0.0274	(0.124)	-0.221	0.825	-0.270	0.216
_lcdname_3534	0.278*	(0.167)	1.667	0.0956	-0.0489	0.605
_lcdname_3536	0.217	(0.184)	1.179	0.238	-0.144	0.579
_lcdname_3537	-0.0583	(0.133)	-0.440	0.660	-0.318	0.201
_lcdname_3538	0.146	(0.146)	0.996	0.319	-0.141	0.432
_lcdname_3539	0.243	(0.160)	1.520	0.129	-0.0704	0.556

THE RESPONSE OF ONTARIO PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS TO PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES

_lcdname_3540	0.282	(0.264)	1.069	0.285	-0.235	0.798
_lcdname_3541	-0.0559	(0.157)	-0.356	0.722	-0.363	0.252
_lcdname_3542	0.421**	(0.166)	2.540	0.0111	0.0963	0.747
_lcdname_3543	0.184	(0.168)	1.092	0.275	-0.146	0.514
_lcdname_3544	-0.0547	(0.310)	-0.176	0.860	-0.662	0.553
_lcdname_3547	-0.0646	(0.154)	-0.419	0.675	-0.366	0.237
_lcdname_3548	-0.0119	(0.145)	-0.0820	0.935	-0.296	0.272
_lcdname_3549	0.486***	(0.157)	3.101	0.00193	0.179	0.793
_lcdname_3552	-0.218	(0.182)	-1.194	0.233	-0.576	0.140
_lcdname_3553	0.0237	(0.166)	0.143	0.886	-0.301	0.348
_lcdname_3556	0.558***	(0.101)	5.508	3.64e-08	0.359	0.757
_lcdname_3557	-0.0423	(0.198)	-0.213	0.831	-0.431	0.346
_lcdname_3558	0.146	(0.187)	0.781	0.435	-0.220	0.512
_lcdname_3560	0.0320	(0.284)	0.113	0.910	-0.524	0.588
_lyear_2000	-0.00280	(0.00827)	-0.339	0.735	-0.0190	0.0134
_lyear_2001	-0.00278	(0.00936)	-0.297	0.766	-0.0211	0.0156
_lyear_2002	0.00185	(0.0109)	0.169	0.866	-0.0196	0.0233
_lyear_2003	-0.000841	(0.0123)	-0.0685	0.945	-0.0249	0.0232
_lyear_2004	-0.0290**	(0.0148)	-1.960	0.0499	-0.0581	-7.08e-06
_lyear_2005	-0.0351**	(0.0172)	-2.034	0.0420	-0.0689	-0.00127
_lyear_2006	0.0409*	(0.0228)	1.795	0.0726	-0.00375	0.0857
_lyear_2007	0.0128	(0.00833)	1.533	0.125	-0.00355	0.0291
_lcmaca_2	0.0421	(0.105)	0.402	0.688	-0.164	0.248
_lcmaca_3	0.0500	(0.0952)	0.525	0.600	-0.137	0.237
_lcmaca_4	0.215	(0.194)	1.110	0.267	-0.165	0.594
_lcmaca_5	0.360	(0.312)	1.154	0.249	-0.252	0.973
_lriotype_1	-0.0584	(0.0837)	-0.697	0.486	-0.222	0.106
Observations	20,175					

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table H24: Special Payments, Estimated Marginal Effects, Difference-in-differences Estimator (no physician-specific fixed effects), Office Procedures, FPs Eligible for Special Payments in 2007

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment9	-0.141***	(0.0531)	-2.657	0.00787	-0.245	-0.0370
treated	0.111*	(0.0597)	1.859	0.0631	-0.00604	0.228
fhgd	-0.0609***	(0.0181)	-3.368	0.000759	-0.0963	-0.0255
ccmd	-0.1000***	(0.0318)	-3.145	0.00166	-0.162	-0.0377
fhod	0.197	(0.126)	1.560	0.119	-0.0504	0.444
doc_ageg2	-0.0680***	(0.0190)	-3.573	0.000353	-0.105	-0.0307
doc_ageg3	-0.136***	(0.0266)	-5.103	3.35e-07	-0.188	-0.0836
doc_ageg4	-0.193***	(0.0314)	-6.139	8.32e-10	-0.255	-0.131
doc_male	0.123***	(0.0331)	3.705	0.000211	0.0578	0.188
yrslicyr	0.00458***	(0.00168)	2.734	0.00625	0.00130	0.00786
workdays	0.000693**	(0.000282)	2.459	0.0139	0.000141	0.00125
sum_visitg2	0.102***	(0.0390)	2.617	0.00888	0.0256	0.179
sum_visitg3	0.115**	(0.0477)	2.409	0.0160	0.0214	0.208
sum_visitg4	0.0635	(0.0557)	1.139	0.255	-0.0458	0.173
visitpd	0.000856	(0.00151)	0.566	0.571	-0.00211	0.00382
sum_ptg2	0.103***	(0.0386)	2.655	0.00793	0.0268	0.178
sum_ptg3	0.196***	(0.0449)	4.364	1.28e-05	0.108	0.284
sum_ptg4	0.229***	(0.0515)	4.442	8.90e-06	0.128	0.330
meanage	0.00322	(0.00465)	0.693	0.488	-0.00590	0.0123
fmpercent	-0.264*	(0.149)	-1.776	0.0757	-0.556	0.0273
clpercent	0.312	(0.957)	0.326	0.744	-1.563	2.188
elpercent	0.168	(0.308)	0.545	0.586	-0.436	0.771
lnbsbill	0.197***	(0.0424)	4.644	3.42e-06	0.114	0.280
_lcdname_3502	0.324*	(0.170)	1.908	0.0564	-0.00889	0.657
_lcdname_3506	0.263*	(0.154)	1.712	0.0868	-0.0380	0.564
_lcdname_3507	-0.0393	(0.147)	-0.266	0.790	-0.328	0.250
_lcdname_3509	-0.281***	(0.0584)	-4.821	1.43e-06	-0.396	-0.167
_lcdname_3510	0.0866	(0.196)	0.443	0.658	-0.297	0.470
_lcdname_3511	-0.0907	(0.156)	-0.583	0.560	-0.396	0.214
_lcdname_3512	0.0857	(0.158)	0.541	0.589	-0.225	0.396
_lcdname_3514	0.000212	(0.162)	0.00131	0.999	-0.317	0.317
_lcdname_3515	0.523***	(0.127)	4.103	4.08e-05	0.273	0.772
_lcdname_3516	0.492***	(0.177)	2.778	0.00547	0.145	0.839
_lcdname_3518	0.113	(0.157)	0.721	0.471	-0.194	0.420
_lcdname_3519	0.150	(0.157)	0.953	0.340	-0.158	0.459
_lcdname_3520	-0.0223	(0.136)	-0.164	0.870	-0.290	0.245
_lcdname_3521	0.137	(0.154)	0.892	0.372	-0.164	0.439
_lcdname_3522	0.127	(0.269)	0.472	0.637	-0.400	0.654
_lcdname_3523	0.425***	(0.139)	3.049	0.00229	0.152	0.698
_lcdname_3524	0.294*	(0.156)	1.884	0.0595	-0.0118	0.600
_lcdname_3525	-0.0377	(0.154)	-0.245	0.806	-0.339	0.264
_lcdname_3526	0.122	(0.164)	0.744	0.457	-0.199	0.443
_lcdname_3528	0.387***	(0.129)	2.996	0.00273	0.134	0.640
_lcdname_3529	0.274*	(0.164)	1.674	0.0941	-0.0469	0.596
_lcdname_3530	0.00627	(0.153)	0.0409	0.967	-0.294	0.306
_lcdname_3532	0.0537	(0.143)	0.377	0.706	-0.226	0.333
_lcdname_3534	0.313*	(0.160)	1.959	0.0501	-0.000161	0.626
_lcdname_3536	0.237	(0.183)	1.297	0.195	-0.121	0.595
_lcdname_3537	-0.0397	(0.131)	-0.302	0.762	-0.297	0.218
_lcdname_3538	0.149	(0.150)	0.990	0.322	-0.145	0.442
_lcdname_3539	0.271*	(0.155)	1.750	0.0802	-0.0326	0.575
_lcdname_3540	0.184	(0.286)	0.642	0.521	-0.377	0.745

THE RESPONSE OF ONTARIO PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS TO PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES

_lcdname_3541	-0.0680	(0.180)	-0.377	0.706	-0.422	0.286
_lcdname_3542	0.251	(0.357)	0.705	0.481	-0.448	0.951
_lcdname_3543	0.321*	(0.164)	1.956	0.0505	-0.000722	0.643
_lcdname_3544	0.0424	(0.305)	0.139	0.889	-0.555	0.640
_lcdname_3547	-0.0411	(0.162)	-0.253	0.800	-0.359	0.277
_lcdname_3548	-0.0294	(0.147)	-0.199	0.842	-0.318	0.259
_lcdname_3549	0.448**	(0.184)	2.441	0.0146	0.0884	0.809
_lcdname_3553	0.0283	(0.161)	0.175	0.861	-0.288	0.344
_lcdname_3556	0.566***	(0.103)	5.503	3.74e-08	0.365	0.768
_lcdname_3557	-0.0305	(0.200)	-0.153	0.878	-0.422	0.361
_lcdname_3558	0.188	(0.185)	1.016	0.310	-0.175	0.552
_lyear_2000	-0.00287	(0.00809)	-0.355	0.723	-0.0187	0.0130
_lyear_2001	-0.00212	(0.00923)	-0.230	0.818	-0.0202	0.0160
_lyear_2002	0.000971	(0.0107)	0.0912	0.927	-0.0199	0.0218
_lyear_2003	0.000423	(0.0121)	0.0350	0.972	-0.0233	0.0241
_lyear_2004	-0.0290**	(0.0146)	-1.991	0.0465	-0.0575	-0.000454
_lyear_2005	-0.0362**	(0.0170)	-2.132	0.0330	-0.0695	-0.00292
_lyear_2006	0.0353	(0.0224)	1.573	0.116	-0.00868	0.0793
_lyear_2007	0.0488**	(0.0244)	2.001	0.0453	0.00101	0.0965
_lyear_2008	0.0370	(0.0263)	1.408	0.159	-0.0145	0.0886
_lcmaca_2	0.0594	(0.104)	0.573	0.567	-0.144	0.263
_lcmaca_3	0.0495	(0.0911)	0.543	0.587	-0.129	0.228
_lcmaca_4	0.362***	(0.131)	2.756	0.00586	0.105	0.619
_lcmaca_5	0.329	(0.279)	1.182	0.237	-0.217	0.875
_lriotype_1	-0.00720	(0.0748)	-0.0962	0.923	-0.154	0.139

Observations 20,209

Robust standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table H25: Special Payments, Estimated Marginal Effects, Difference-in-differences Estimator (no physician-specific fixed effects), Prenatal Care, FPs Eligible for Special Payments in 2005

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment10	0.314***	(0.107)	2.922	0.00348	0.103	0.524
treated	0.243**	(0.112)	2.170	0.0300	0.0235	0.462
post1	0.00307	(0.0327)	0.0936	0.925	-0.0611	0.0672
fhgd	-0.0153	(0.0241)	-0.635	0.525	-0.0624	0.0319
ccmd	-0.0234	(0.0487)	-0.481	0.631	-0.119	0.0720
fhod	-0.264	(0.162)	-1.627	0.104	-0.582	0.0542
doc_ageg2	0.0214	(0.0255)	0.840	0.401	-0.0286	0.0714
doc_ageg3	-0.0158	(0.0362)	-0.436	0.663	-0.0867	0.0551
doc_ageg4	-0.0642	(0.0556)	-1.156	0.248	-0.173	0.0447
doc_male	-0.0315	(0.0486)	-0.647	0.518	-0.127	0.0638
yrslicyr	0.00185	(0.00223)	0.829	0.407	-0.00252	0.00621
workdays	0.00147***	(0.000360)	4.090	4.31e-05	0.000766	0.00218
sum_visitg2	0.0434	(0.0414)	1.051	0.293	-0.0376	0.124
sum_visitg3	0.0228	(0.0577)	0.395	0.692	-0.0903	0.136
sum_visitg4	-0.0406	(0.0721)	-0.563	0.574	-0.182	0.101
visitpd	-0.00124	(0.00218)	-0.566	0.571	-0.00551	0.00304
sum_ptg2	0.164***	(0.0363)	4.525	6.05e-06	0.0930	0.235
sum_ptg3	0.281***	(0.0425)	6.614	0	0.198	0.364
sum_ptg4	0.305***	(0.0478)	6.387	1.69e-10	0.212	0.399
meanage	0.0299***	(0.00495)	6.040	1.54e-09	0.0202	0.0396
fmpersent	0.881***	(0.175)	5.042	4.61e-07	0.539	1.224
clpersent	20.59***	(1.555)	13.24	0	17.54	23.63
elpersent	-1.785***	(0.341)	-5.230	1.70e-07	-2.453	-1.116
lnsbill	0.00206	(0.0479)	0.0431	0.966	-0.0918	0.0959
_lcdname_3502	0.455***	(0.0564)	8.059	0	0.344	0.565
_lcdname_3506	0.533***	(0.0491)	10.87	0	0.437	0.630
_lcdname_3507	0.316	(0.205)	1.538	0.124	-0.0866	0.718
_lcdname_3510	0.521***	(0.0131)	39.73	0	0.496	0.547
_lcdname_3511	0.459***	(0.0772)	5.953	2.63e-09	0.308	0.611
_lcdname_3512	0.502***	(0.0205)	24.50	0	0.462	0.542
_lcdname_3513	0.427***	(0.0848)	5.037	4.72e-07	0.261	0.593
_lcdname_3514	0.491***	(0.0279)	17.60	0	0.436	0.546
_lcdname_3515	0.511***	(0.0167)	30.56	0	0.478	0.543
_lcdname_3516	0.514***	(0.0121)	42.34	0	0.490	0.538
_lcdname_3518	0.529***	(0.0336)	15.75	0	0.464	0.595
_lcdname_3519	0.506***	(0.0595)	8.495	0	0.389	0.622
_lcdname_3520	0.538***	(0.145)	3.698	0.000217	0.253	0.823
_lcdname_3521	0.589***	(0.0479)	12.31	0	0.495	0.683
_lcdname_3522	0.484***	(0.0406)	11.93	0	0.405	0.564
_lcdname_3523	0.512***	(0.0150)	34.13	0	0.483	0.542
_lcdname_3524	0.539***	(0.0208)	25.97	0	0.499	0.580
_lcdname_3525	0.503***	(0.0266)	18.94	0	0.451	0.555
_lcdname_3526	0.418***	(0.0924)	4.523	6.11e-06	0.237	0.599
_lcdname_3528	0.520***	(0.0127)	40.90	0	0.495	0.545
_lcdname_3529	0.522***	(0.0154)	33.91	0	0.492	0.552
_lcdname_3530	0.490***	(0.0390)	12.58	0	0.414	0.566
_lcdname_3532	0.458***	(0.0540)	8.477	0	0.352	0.564
_lcdname_3534	0.517***	(0.0149)	34.81	0	0.488	0.546
_lcdname_3536	0.517***	(0.0126)	40.91	0	0.493	0.542
_lcdname_3537	0.491***	(0.0478)	10.27	0	0.397	0.585
_lcdname_3538	0.477***	(0.0388)	12.31	0	0.401	0.553
_lcdname_3539	0.552***	(0.0204)	27.12	0	0.512	0.592



THE RESPONSE OF ONTARIO PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS TO PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES

_lcdname_3540	0.508***	(0.0153)	33.27	0	0.478	0.538
_lcdname_3541	0.234	(0.196)	1.195	0.232	-0.150	0.617
_lcdname_3542	0.510***	(0.0128)	39.77	0	0.485	0.535
_lcdname_3543	0.504***	(0.0223)	22.56	0	0.460	0.547
_lcdname_3544	-0.255	(0.223)	-1.145	0.252	-0.692	0.182
_lcdname_3547	0.393***	(0.105)	3.757	0.000172	0.188	0.598
_lcdname_3548	0.479***	(0.0357)	13.42	0	0.409	0.549
_lcdname_3549	-0.00837	(0.333)	-0.0252	0.980	-0.660	0.644
_lcdname_3553	0.462***	(0.0562)	8.222	0	0.352	0.572
_lcdname_3556	0.489***	(0.0255)	19.18	0	0.439	0.539
_lcdname_3558	0.487***	(0.0344)	14.13	0	0.419	0.554
_lyear_2000	0.00812	(0.0102)	0.799	0.424	-0.0118	0.0281
_lyear_2001	0.0233**	(0.0118)	1.980	0.0477	0.000232	0.0464
_lyear_2002	0.0371***	(0.0136)	2.719	0.00655	0.0103	0.0638
_lyear_2003	0.0349**	(0.0155)	2.246	0.0247	0.00445	0.0654
_lyear_2004	-0.0551***	(0.0187)	-2.941	0.00328	-0.0917	-0.0184
_lyear_2005	-0.0672***	(0.0219)	-3.075	0.00210	-0.110	-0.0244
_lyear_2006	-0.0206	(0.0132)	-1.564	0.118	-0.0464	0.00521
_lyear_2007	-0.00518	(0.0101)	-0.513	0.608	-0.0250	0.0146
_lcmaca_2	0.170*	(0.0961)	1.770	0.0767	-0.0182	0.359
_lcmaca_3	-0.135	(0.0952)	-1.422	0.155	-0.322	0.0512
_lcmaca_4	0.468***	(0.0410)	11.42	0	0.388	0.548
_lcmaca_5	0.487***	(0.0270)	18.00	0	0.434	0.540
_lriotype_1	0.0595	(0.0975)	0.611	0.541	-0.132	0.251
Observations	19,857					

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table H26: Special Payments, Estimated Marginal Effects, Difference-in-differences Estimator (no physician-specific fixed effects), Prenatal Care, FPs Eligible for Special Payments in 2006

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment10	0.106	(0.0705)	1.506	0.132	-0.0319	0.244
treated	0.173***	(0.0660)	2.615	0.00891	0.0432	0.302
post2	0.00841	(0.0329)	0.256	0.798	-0.0561	0.0729
fhgd	-0.0175	(0.0240)	-0.732	0.464	-0.0645	0.0294
ccmd	-0.0203	(0.0485)	-0.418	0.676	-0.115	0.0748
fhod	0.123	(0.181)	0.684	0.494	-0.230	0.477
doc_agem2	0.0275	(0.0254)	1.081	0.280	-0.0223	0.0773
doc_agem3	-0.0113	(0.0362)	-0.312	0.755	-0.0822	0.0596
doc_agem4	-0.0721	(0.0556)	-1.296	0.195	-0.181	0.0369
doc_male	-0.0280	(0.0483)	-0.581	0.561	-0.123	0.0665
yrsllycr	0.00202	(0.00223)	0.908	0.364	-0.00234	0.00639
workdays	0.00139***	(0.000358)	3.897	9.74e-05	0.000693	0.00210
sum_visitg2	0.0378	(0.0406)	0.931	0.352	-0.0417	0.117
sum_visitg3	0.0214	(0.0567)	0.378	0.705	-0.0896	0.133
sum_visitg4	-0.0426	(0.0711)	-0.599	0.549	-0.182	0.0967
visitpd	-0.00149	(0.00217)	-0.685	0.494	-0.00574	0.00277
sum_ptg2	0.163***	(0.0355)	4.599	4.25e-06	0.0937	0.233
sum_ptg3	0.279***	(0.0418)	6.677	0	0.197	0.361
sum_ptg4	0.302***	(0.0471)	6.422	1.35e-10	0.210	0.395
meanage	0.0291***	(0.00497)	5.862	4.57e-09	0.0194	0.0389
fmpercent	0.910***	(0.174)	5.233	1.66e-07	0.569	1.250
clpercent	20.84***	(1.553)	13.42	0	17.80	23.89
elpercent	-1.746***	(0.343)	-5.094	3.50e-07	-2.418	-1.074
lnsbill	0.0163	(0.0475)	0.343	0.732	-0.0768	0.109
_lcdname_3502	0.397***	(0.107)	3.714	0.000204	0.188	0.607
_lcdname_3506	0.469***	(0.0726)	6.463	1.03e-10	0.327	0.612
_lcdname_3507	0.218	(0.262)	0.833	0.405	-0.295	0.731
_lcdname_3510	0.509***	(0.0156)	32.63	0	0.479	0.540
_lcdname_3511	0.473***	(0.0430)	11.01	0	0.389	0.558
_lcdname_3512	0.493***	(0.0214)	23.10	0	0.452	0.535
_lcdname_3514	0.471***	(0.0357)	13.19	0	0.401	0.541
_lcdname_3515	0.412***	(0.117)	3.525	0.000424	0.183	0.641
_lcdname_3516	0.509***	(0.0124)	41.21	0	0.485	0.534
_lcdname_3518	0.485***	(0.0513)	9.443	0	0.384	0.585
_lcdname_3519	0.430***	(0.0881)	4.883	1.05e-06	0.258	0.603
_lcdname_3520	0.373**	(0.163)	2.284	0.0223	0.0530	0.694
_lcdname_3521	0.529***	(0.0641)	8.260	0	0.404	0.655
_lcdname_3522	0.436***	(0.0862)	5.062	4.14e-07	0.267	0.605
_lcdname_3523	0.498***	(0.0208)	23.97	0	0.457	0.539
_lcdname_3524	0.513***	(0.0281)	18.24	0	0.458	0.568
_lcdname_3525	0.468***	(0.0454)	10.31	0	0.379	0.557
_lcdname_3526	0.299**	(0.142)	2.108	0.0350	0.0210	0.578
_lcdname_3528	0.515***	(0.0128)	40.30	0	0.490	0.540
_lcdname_3529	0.506***	(0.0206)	24.59	0	0.466	0.547
_lcdname_3530	0.452***	(0.0584)	7.740	0	0.338	0.567
_lcdname_3532	0.436***	(0.0563)	7.742	0	0.326	0.546
_lcdname_3534	0.502***	(0.0198)	25.32	0	0.463	0.541
_lcdname_3536	0.512***	(0.0127)	40.21	0	0.487	0.537
_lcdname_3537	0.428***	(0.0753)	5.688	1.28e-08	0.281	0.576
_lcdname_3538	0.468***	(0.0372)	12.58	0	0.395	0.540
_lcdname_3539	0.529***	(0.0266)	19.89	0	0.477	0.581
_lcdname_3540	0.508***	(0.0127)	39.85	0	0.483	0.533

THE RESPONSE OF ONTARIO PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS TO PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES

_lcdname_3541	0.286*	(0.148)	1.932	0.0533	-0.00412	0.576
_lcdname_3542	0.489***	(0.0238)	20.53	0	0.443	0.536
_lcdname_3543	0.480***	(0.0389)	12.33	0	0.404	0.556
_lcdname_3544	-0.169	(0.248)	-0.680	0.496	-0.655	0.318
_lcdname_3547	0.386***	(0.101)	3.811	0.000138	0.187	0.585
_lcdname_3548	0.471***	(0.0353)	13.35	0	0.402	0.540
_lcdname_3549	0.250*	(0.146)	1.712	0.0868	-0.0362	0.536
_lcdname_3552	0.00909	(0.438)	0.0207	0.983	-0.850	0.868
_lcdname_3553	0.382***	(0.102)	3.753	0.000175	0.182	0.581
_lcdname_3556	0.481***	(0.0264)	18.20	0	0.429	0.533
_lcdname_3558	0.445***	(0.0600)	7.422	0	0.328	0.563
_lyear_2000	0.00720	(0.0102)	0.709	0.479	-0.0127	0.0271
_lyear_2001	0.0285**	(0.0118)	2.408	0.0161	0.00529	0.0516
_lyear_2002	0.0393***	(0.0137)	2.861	0.00422	0.0124	0.0662
_lyear_2003	0.0388**	(0.0157)	2.465	0.0137	0.00795	0.0696
_lyear_2004	-0.0491***	(0.0188)	-2.606	0.00917	-0.0860	-0.0122
_lyear_2005	-0.0672***	(0.0220)	-3.051	0.00228	-0.110	-0.0240
_lyear_2006	-0.0128	(0.0280)	-0.456	0.648	-0.0677	0.0421
_lyear_2007	-0.00402	(0.0100)	-0.400	0.689	-0.0237	0.0157
_lcmaca_2	0.0150	(0.112)	0.134	0.894	-0.204	0.234
_lcmaca_3	-0.166*	(0.0913)	-1.816	0.0693	-0.345	0.0131
_lcmaca_4	0.320***	(0.122)	2.632	0.00848	0.0817	0.558
_lcmaca_5	0.388***	(0.0968)	4.006	6.18e-05	0.198	0.577
_lriotype_1	-0.0256	(0.0979)	-0.261	0.794	-0.218	0.166
Observations	20,109					

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table H27: Special Payments, Estimated Marginal Effects, Difference-in-differences Estimator (no physician-specific fixed effects), Prenatal Care, FPs Eligible for Special Payments in 2007

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment10	0.184	(0.127)	1.452	0.146	-0.0645	0.433
treated	0.172***	(0.0589)	2.913	0.00358	0.0561	0.287
post3	0.0103	(0.0326)	0.317	0.751	-0.0535	0.0742
fhgd	-0.0188	(0.0238)	-0.790	0.429	-0.0656	0.0279
ccmd	-0.0326	(0.0486)	-0.671	0.502	-0.128	0.0626
fhod	-0.0692	(0.194)	-0.357	0.721	-0.449	0.311
doc_agem2	0.0258	(0.0255)	1.012	0.312	-0.0242	0.0758
doc_agem3	-0.0109	(0.0359)	-0.302	0.763	-0.0813	0.0596
doc_agem4	-0.0661	(0.0554)	-1.194	0.232	-0.175	0.0424
doc_male	-0.0313	(0.0472)	-0.663	0.507	-0.124	0.0612
yrslcyr	0.00218	(0.00220)	0.992	0.321	-0.00213	0.00649
workdays	0.00144***	(0.000357)	4.037	5.42e-05	0.000741	0.00214
sum_visitg2	0.0494	(0.0396)	1.247	0.212	-0.0282	0.127
sum_visitg3	0.0208	(0.0561)	0.371	0.711	-0.0891	0.131
sum_visitg4	-0.0386	(0.0705)	-0.547	0.585	-0.177	0.0997
visitpd	-0.00108	(0.00218)	-0.496	0.620	-0.00535	0.00319
sum_ptg2	0.174***	(0.0350)	4.978	6.44e-07	0.106	0.243
sum_ptg3	0.285***	(0.0411)	6.928	0	0.204	0.366
sum_ptg4	0.312***	(0.0464)	6.721	0	0.221	0.403
meanage	0.0296***	(0.00491)	6.023	1.71e-09	0.0199	0.0392
fmpercent	0.877***	(0.169)	5.183	2.19e-07	0.545	1.209
clpercent	20.50***	(1.540)	13.31	0	17.48	23.52
elpercent	-1.798***	(0.338)	-5.314	1.07e-07	-2.461	-1.135
lnsbill	-0.00916	(0.0478)	-0.192	0.848	-0.103	0.0845
_lcdname_3502	0.436***	(0.0764)	5.713	1.11e-08	0.287	0.586
_lcdname_3506	0.514***	(0.0578)	8.890	0	0.401	0.627
_lcdname_3507	0.344**	(0.151)	2.272	0.0231	0.0472	0.641
_lcdname_3509	-0.0661	(0.271)	-0.244	0.807	-0.596	0.464
_lcdname_3510	0.512***	(0.0134)	38.12	0	0.486	0.539
_lcdname_3511	0.453***	(0.0759)	5.963	2.48e-09	0.304	0.601
_lcdname_3512	0.500***	(0.0215)	23.24	0	0.458	0.542
_lcdname_3514	0.488***	(0.0264)	18.47	0	0.436	0.540
_lcdname_3515	0.493***	(0.0233)	21.14	0	0.447	0.538
_lcdname_3516	0.509***	(0.0119)	42.83	0	0.486	0.533
_lcdname_3518	0.514***	(0.0396)	12.97	0	0.436	0.591
_lcdname_3519	0.484***	(0.0688)	7.039	0	0.349	0.619
_lcdname_3520	0.491***	(0.160)	3.062	0.00220	0.177	0.805
_lcdname_3521	0.570***	(0.0553)	10.31	0	0.461	0.678
_lcdname_3522	0.445***	(0.0877)	5.077	3.83e-07	0.273	0.617
_lcdname_3523	0.503***	(0.0181)	27.78	0	0.468	0.539
_lcdname_3524	0.526***	(0.0230)	22.88	0	0.481	0.571
_lcdname_3525	0.491***	(0.0319)	15.40	0	0.428	0.553
_lcdname_3526	0.387***	(0.111)	3.500	0.000465	0.170	0.604
_lcdname_3528	0.515***	(0.0125)	41.31	0	0.491	0.539
_lcdname_3529	0.514***	(0.0165)	31.20	0	0.482	0.546
_lcdname_3530	0.483***	(0.0421)	11.48	0	0.401	0.566
_lcdname_3532	0.469***	(0.0405)	11.58	0	0.390	0.549
_lcdname_3534	0.513***	(0.0155)	33.13	0	0.483	0.543
_lcdname_3536	0.513***	(0.0124)	41.49	0	0.489	0.537
_lcdname_3537	0.474***	(0.0593)	7.990	0	0.357	0.590
_lcdname_3538	0.482***	(0.0330)	14.62	0	0.417	0.547
_lcdname_3539	0.544***	(0.0226)	24.05	0	0.499	0.588

THE RESPONSE OF ONTARIO PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS TO PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES

_lcdname_3540	0.503***	(0.0149)	33.70	0	0.474	0.532
_lcdname_3541	0.212	(0.197)	1.079	0.280	-0.173	0.598
_lcdname_3542	0.505***	(0.0129)	39.27	0	0.480	0.530
_lcdname_3543	0.497***	(0.0235)	21.19	0	0.451	0.543
_lcdname_3547	0.385***	(0.107)	3.609	0.000307	0.176	0.594
_lcdname_3548	0.479***	(0.0327)	14.63	0	0.415	0.543
_lcdname_3549	0.169	(0.208)	0.812	0.417	-0.239	0.578
_lcdname_3553	0.435***	(0.0741)	5.869	4.39e-09	0.290	0.580
_lcdname_3556	0.487***	(0.0237)	20.52	0	0.441	0.534
_lcdname_3558	0.473***	(0.0420)	11.25	0	0.390	0.555
_lyear_2000	0.00748	(0.0101)	0.738	0.461	-0.0124	0.0274
_lyear_2001	0.0277**	(0.0117)	2.365	0.0180	0.00474	0.0506
_lyear_2002	0.0401***	(0.0136)	2.955	0.00313	0.0135	0.0667
_lyear_2003	0.0396**	(0.0155)	2.556	0.0106	0.00922	0.0699
_lyear_2004	-0.0549***	(0.0186)	-2.944	0.00324	-0.0914	-0.0183
_lyear_2005	-0.0666***	(0.0219)	-3.037	0.00239	-0.110	-0.0236
_lyear_2006	-0.00803	(0.0277)	-0.290	0.772	-0.0623	0.0462
_lyear_2007	0.00788	(0.0301)	0.262	0.793	-0.0511	0.0668
_lcmaca_2	0.0799	(0.122)	0.654	0.513	-0.160	0.320
_lcmaca_3	-0.168*	(0.0946)	-1.776	0.0757	-0.353	0.0174
_lcmaca_4	0.446***	(0.0470)	9.489	0	0.354	0.538
_lcmaca_5	0.481***	(0.0260)	18.51	0	0.430	0.532
_lriotype_1	0.0386	(0.0935)	0.412	0.680	-0.145	0.222
Observations	20,151					

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table H28: Special Payments, Estimated Marginal Effects, Difference-in-differences Estimator (no physician-specific fixed effects), Home Visits, FPs Eligible for Special Payments in 2005

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment11	0.00734	(0.00726)	1.012	0.312	-0.00688	0.0216
treated	-0.0117***	(0.00364)	-3.226	0.00125	-0.0189	-0.00461
post1	-0.00754**	(0.00312)	-2.412	0.0159	-0.0137	-0.00141
fhgd	-0.00725**	(0.00287)	-2.528	0.0115	-0.0129	-0.00163
ccmd	-0.00693	(0.00422)	-1.643	0.100	-0.0152	0.00134
doc_ageg2	-0.00320	(0.00312)	-1.025	0.305	-0.00931	0.00292
doc_ageg3	0.000393	(0.00408)	0.0963	0.923	-0.00761	0.00840
doc_ageg4	-0.00488	(0.00462)	-1.057	0.291	-0.0139	0.00417
doc_male	0.0164***	(0.00440)	3.726	0.000194	0.00777	0.0250
yrslicyr	8.52e-05	(0.000202)	0.422	0.673	-0.000311	0.000481
workdays	0.000168***	(5.48e-05)	3.063	0.00219	6.04e-05	0.000275
sum_visitg2	-0.00559	(0.00407)	-1.373	0.170	-0.0136	0.00239
sum_visitg3	-0.00342	(0.00549)	-0.623	0.533	-0.0142	0.00734
sum_visitg4	0.00978	(0.00957)	1.023	0.306	-0.00897	0.0285
visitpd	-0.000763***	(0.000279)	-2.737	0.00621	-0.00131	-0.000217
sum_ptg2	-0.000273	(0.00423)	-0.0646	0.949	-0.00856	0.00801
sum_ptg3	-0.00581	(0.00429)	-1.354	0.176	-0.0142	0.00260
sum_ptg4	-0.0148***	(0.00450)	-3.281	0.00104	-0.0236	-0.00595
meanage	0.000499	(0.000717)	0.696	0.487	-0.000907	0.00191
fmpercent	-0.0221	(0.0202)	-1.094	0.274	-0.0617	0.0175
clpercent	0.0669	(0.167)	0.401	0.689	-0.260	0.394
elpercent	0.0755*	(0.0442)	1.710	0.0872	-0.0110	0.162
lnbsbill	0.0373***	(0.00796)	4.682	2.83e-06	0.0217	0.0529
_lcdname_3502	0.490	(0.347)	1.410	0.158	-0.191	1.171
_lcdname_3506	0.0326	(0.0600)	0.544	0.586	-0.0849	0.150
_lcdname_3510	0.132	(0.185)	0.715	0.475	-0.230	0.495
_lcdname_3513	0.181	(0.232)	0.781	0.435	-0.273	0.635
_lcdname_3514	0.176	(0.203)	0.870	0.384	-0.221	0.574
_lcdname_3515	0.120	(0.193)	0.618	0.536	-0.260	0.499
_lcdname_3516	0.249	(0.336)	0.743	0.457	-0.408	0.907
_lcdname_3518	-0.00318	(0.0191)	-0.166	0.868	-0.0406	0.0343
_lcdname_3519	0.0453	(0.0744)	0.609	0.542	-0.100	0.191
_lcdname_3520	0.0147	(0.0272)	0.542	0.588	-0.0385	0.0679
_lcdname_3521	-0.00653	(0.0159)	-0.412	0.681	-0.0376	0.0245
_lcdname_3522	0.501	(0.356)	1.409	0.159	-0.196	1.198
_lcdname_3523	0.00223	(0.0290)	0.0766	0.939	-0.0547	0.0591
_lcdname_3524	0.000663	(0.0240)	0.0277	0.978	-0.0463	0.0476
_lcdname_3525	0.0474	(0.0943)	0.503	0.615	-0.137	0.232
_lcdname_3526	-0.00135	(0.0213)	-0.0634	0.949	-0.0430	0.0403
_lcdname_3528	0.0374	(0.0819)	0.456	0.648	-0.123	0.198
_lcdname_3529	0.0245	(0.0551)	0.444	0.657	-0.0835	0.132
_lcdname_3530	0.0288	(0.0670)	0.430	0.667	-0.103	0.160
_lcdname_3531	0.629*	(0.326)	1.930	0.0536	-0.00969	1.267
_lcdname_3534	0.0276	(0.0627)	0.440	0.660	-0.0953	0.150
_lcdname_3536	0.571	(0.426)	1.339	0.181	-0.265	1.407
_lcdname_3537	0.0187	(0.0476)	0.392	0.695	-0.0746	0.112
_lcdname_3538	0.119	(0.180)	0.662	0.508	-0.233	0.471
_lcdname_3539	0.0675	(0.102)	0.661	0.508	-0.132	0.267
_lcdname_3540	0.546	(0.421)	1.298	0.194	-0.279	1.371
_lcdname_3541	0.187	(0.273)	0.684	0.494	-0.348	0.721
_lcdname_3544	0.303	(0.435)	0.696	0.486	-0.550	1.156
_lcdname_3547	0.0655	(0.121)	0.540	0.590	-0.173	0.304

THE RESPONSE OF ONTARIO PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS TO PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES

_lyear_2000	-0.00106	(0.00106)	-1.004	0.315	-0.00313	0.00101
_lyear_2001	-0.00159	(0.00141)	-1.131	0.258	-0.00434	0.00117
_lyear_2002	-0.00407**	(0.00160)	-2.547	0.0109	-0.00720	-0.000938
_lyear_2003	-0.00483***	(0.00159)	-3.035	0.00240	-0.00795	-0.00171
_lyear_2004	-0.00599***	(0.00189)	-3.164	0.00156	-0.00970	-0.00228
_lyear_2005	-0.00693***	(0.00223)	-3.114	0.00184	-0.0113	-0.00257
_lyear_2007	-0.000109	(0.00121)	-0.0900	0.928	-0.00248	0.00226
_lyear_2008	0.00207	(0.00205)	1.009	0.313	-0.00195	0.00609
_lcmaca_2	-0.0173***	(0.00286)	-6.053	1.43e-09	-0.0229	-0.0117
_lcmaca_3	0.00564	(0.0131)	0.429	0.668	-0.0201	0.0314
_lcmaca_4	-0.0150***	(0.00261)	-5.764	8.21e-09	-0.0201	-0.00992
_lcmaca_5	-0.0118**	(0.00600)	-1.962	0.0498	-0.0235	-1.20e-05
_lriotype_1	0.00303	(0.0122)	0.249	0.803	-0.0208	0.0269

Observations 18,814

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table H29: Special Payments, Estimated Marginal Effects, Difference-in-differences Estimator (no physician-specific fixed effects), Home Visits, FPs Eligible for Special Payments in 2006

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment11	0.00331	(0.0124)	0.267	0.789	-0.0209	0.0276
treated	-0.00300	(0.00714)	-0.421	0.674	-0.0170	0.0110
post2	-0.00681**	(0.00296)	-2.297	0.0216	-0.0126	-0.001000
fhgd	-0.00653**	(0.00278)	-2.349	0.0188	-0.0120	-0.00108
ccmd	-0.00579	(0.00416)	-1.391	0.164	-0.0140	0.00237
doc_ageg2	-0.00359	(0.00295)	-1.218	0.223	-0.00937	0.00219
doc_ageg3	-0.000310	(0.00382)	-0.0810	0.935	-0.00780	0.00718
doc_ageg4	-0.00576	(0.00421)	-1.367	0.171	-0.0140	0.00249
doc_male	0.0156***	(0.00420)	3.726	0.000195	0.00741	0.0239
yrslicyr	0.000142	(0.000191)	0.742	0.458	-0.000233	0.000517
workdays	0.000155***	(5.32e-05)	2.914	0.00356	5.08e-05	0.000259
sum_visitg2	-0.00433	(0.00415)	-1.045	0.296	-0.0125	0.00379
sum_visitg3	0.000340	(0.00597)	0.0569	0.955	-0.0114	0.0120
sum_visitg4	0.0151	(0.0111)	1.367	0.171	-0.00655	0.0368
visitpd	-0.000729***	(0.000268)	-2.716	0.00660	-0.00125	-0.000203
sum_ptg2	-0.00128	(0.00398)	-0.322	0.747	-0.00909	0.00652
sum_ptg3	-0.00674*	(0.00408)	-1.653	0.0983	-0.0147	0.00125
sum_ptg4	-0.0153***	(0.00434)	-3.526	0.000423	-0.0238	-0.00679
meanage	0.000568	(0.000700)	0.812	0.417	-0.000804	0.00194
fmpercent	-0.0208	(0.0200)	-1.038	0.299	-0.0600	0.0184
clpercent	0.0671	(0.165)	0.407	0.684	-0.256	0.390
elpercent	0.0669	(0.0428)	1.563	0.118	-0.0170	0.151
lnbsbill	0.0345***	(0.00776)	4.449	8.65e-06	0.0193	0.0497
_lcdname_3502	0.624**	(0.310)	2.015	0.0439	0.0171	1.231
_lcdname_3506	0.0397	(0.0657)	0.605	0.545	-0.0890	0.168
_lcdname_3510	0.143	(0.196)	0.729	0.466	-0.241	0.527
_lcdname_3514	0.151	(0.182)	0.831	0.406	-0.205	0.508
_lcdname_3515	0.0348	(0.0751)	0.463	0.643	-0.112	0.182
_lcdname_3516	0.216	(0.286)	0.754	0.451	-0.345	0.776
_lcdname_3518	-0.00104	(0.0204)	-0.0513	0.959	-0.0410	0.0389
_lcdname_3519	0.0534	(0.0811)	0.659	0.510	-0.106	0.212
_lcdname_3520	0.0172	(0.0272)	0.635	0.526	-0.0360	0.0705
_lcdname_3521	-0.00469	(0.0163)	-0.289	0.773	-0.0365	0.0272
_lcdname_3522	0.329	(0.310)	1.061	0.289	-0.279	0.936
_lcdname_3523	0.00318	(0.0283)	0.112	0.910	-0.0523	0.0586
_lcdname_3524	0.00340	(0.0261)	0.130	0.896	-0.0477	0.0545
_lcdname_3525	0.0558	(0.103)	0.543	0.587	-0.146	0.257
_lcdname_3526	0.00115	(0.0230)	0.0500	0.960	-0.0440	0.0463
_lcdname_3528	0.0169	(0.0528)	0.321	0.748	-0.0865	0.120
_lcdname_3529	0.0316	(0.0626)	0.505	0.614	-0.0911	0.154
_lcdname_3530	0.0213	(0.0567)	0.376	0.707	-0.0898	0.132
_lcdname_3531	0.544*	(0.299)	1.817	0.0692	-0.0427	1.131
_lcdname_3534	0.0349	(0.0712)	0.491	0.624	-0.105	0.174
_lcdname_3536	0.527	(0.413)	1.277	0.201	-0.282	1.336
_lcdname_3537	0.0233	(0.0509)	0.456	0.648	-0.0766	0.123
_lcdname_3538	0.0993	(0.140)	0.708	0.479	-0.176	0.374
_lcdname_3539	0.0775	(0.109)	0.709	0.478	-0.137	0.292
_lcdname_3540	0.502	(0.380)	1.322	0.186	-0.243	1.247
_lcdname_3541	0.171	(0.241)	0.711	0.477	-0.300	0.642
_lcdname_3542	0.568	(0.381)	1.493	0.136	-0.178	1.315
_lcdname_3543	0.0112	(0.0387)	0.289	0.773	-0.0647	0.0871
_lcdname_3544	0.655*	(0.373)	1.757	0.0789	-0.0755	1.385



THE RESPONSE OF ONTARIO PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS TO PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES

_lcdname_3547	0.0582	(0.103)	0.565	0.572	-0.144	0.260
_lyear_2000	-0.00115	(0.00101)	-1.144	0.253	-0.00313	0.000824
_lyear_2001	-0.000911	(0.00139)	-0.656	0.512	-0.00363	0.00181
_lyear_2002	-0.00344**	(0.00155)	-2.225	0.0261	-0.00648	-0.000411
_lyear_2003	-0.00424***	(0.00155)	-2.741	0.00613	-0.00727	-0.00121
_lyear_2004	-0.00530***	(0.00184)	-2.886	0.00391	-0.00890	-0.00170
_lyear_2005	-0.00668***	(0.00215)	-3.110	0.00187	-0.0109	-0.00247
_lyear_2006	-0.00605**	(0.00251)	-2.407	0.0161	-0.0110	-0.00112
_lyear_2008	0.00247	(0.00173)	1.423	0.155	-0.000931	0.00586
_lcmaca_2	-0.0163***	(0.00272)	-6.003	1.94e-09	-0.0217	-0.0110
_lcmaca_3	0.000941	(0.00997)	0.0944	0.925	-0.0186	0.0205
_lcmaca_4	-0.0139***	(0.00246)	-5.650	1.60e-08	-0.0187	-0.00909
_lcmaca_5	-0.00930	(0.00754)	-1.234	0.217	-0.0241	0.00547
_lriotype_1	0.00457	(0.0103)	0.442	0.659	-0.0157	0.0248
Observations	19,251					

Robust standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table H30: Special Payments, Estimated Marginal Effects, Difference-in-differences Estimator (no physician-specific fixed effects), Home Visits, FPs Eligible for Special Payments in 2007

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment11	0.0844	(0.0784)	1.076	0.282	-0.0693	0.238
treated	-0.00772*	(0.00401)	-1.925	0.0542	-0.0156	0.000139
post3	-0.00511*	(0.00293)	-1.745	0.0810	-0.0108	0.000630
fhgd	-0.00662**	(0.00274)	-2.414	0.0158	-0.0120	-0.00125
ccmd	-0.00645*	(0.00391)	-1.650	0.0989	-0.0141	0.00121
fhod	-0.0115**	(0.00557)	-2.059	0.0395	-0.0224	-0.000549
doc_ageg2	-0.00417	(0.00281)	-1.482	0.138	-0.00969	0.00135
doc_ageg3	-0.000884	(0.00363)	-0.243	0.808	-0.00800	0.00624
doc_ageg4	-0.00532	(0.00413)	-1.287	0.198	-0.0134	0.00278
doc_male	0.0146***	(0.00411)	3.558	0.000374	0.00656	0.0227
yrslicyr	0.000122	(0.000187)	0.652	0.515	-0.000244	0.000487
workdays	0.000150***	(5.17e-05)	2.905	0.00368	4.88e-05	0.000252
sum_visitg2	-0.00397	(0.00410)	-0.969	0.333	-0.0120	0.00406
sum_visitg3	-0.000773	(0.00561)	-0.138	0.890	-0.0118	0.0102
sum_visitg4	0.0126	(0.00986)	1.276	0.202	-0.00674	0.0319
visitpd	-0.000772***	(0.000263)	-2.934	0.00334	-0.00129	-0.000256
sum_ptg2	-0.00106	(0.00396)	-0.267	0.790	-0.00881	0.00670
sum_ptg3	-0.00510	(0.00411)	-1.242	0.214	-0.0132	0.00295
sum_ptg4	-0.0136***	(0.00434)	-3.146	0.00165	-0.0222	-0.00515
meanage	0.000441	(0.000688)	0.641	0.522	-0.000908	0.00179
fmpercent	-0.0217	(0.0193)	-1.123	0.262	-0.0596	0.0162
clpercent	0.0587	(0.159)	0.370	0.712	-0.252	0.370
elpercent	0.0707*	(0.0421)	1.680	0.0929	-0.0118	0.153
lnbsbill	0.0352***	(0.00769)	4.572	4.82e-06	0.0201	0.0503
_lcdname_3502	0.605*	(0.319)	1.900	0.0574	-0.0191	1.230
_lcdname_3506	0.0428	(0.0734)	0.583	0.560	-0.101	0.187
_lcdname_3507	0.147	(0.237)	0.620	0.535	-0.318	0.612
_lcdname_3510	0.152	(0.217)	0.699	0.485	-0.274	0.577
_lcdname_3512	0.0771	(0.125)	0.616	0.538	-0.168	0.322
_lcdname_3514	0.185	(0.207)	0.892	0.372	-0.221	0.591
_lcdname_3515	0.0732	(0.180)	0.406	0.685	-0.280	0.427
_lcdname_3516	0.224	(0.296)	0.757	0.449	-0.356	0.804
_lcdname_3518	-0.00163	(0.0199)	-0.0820	0.935	-0.0407	0.0374
_lcdname_3519	0.0569	(0.0905)	0.628	0.530	-0.121	0.234
_lcdname_3520	0.0189	(0.0299)	0.632	0.528	-0.0398	0.0776
_lcdname_3521	-0.00381	(0.0178)	-0.214	0.831	-0.0387	0.0311
_lcdname_3522	0.373	(0.330)	1.128	0.260	-0.275	1.020
_lcdname_3523	0.00724	(0.0360)	0.201	0.841	-0.0634	0.0779
_lcdname_3524	0.00482	(0.0294)	0.164	0.870	-0.0528	0.0624
_lcdname_3525	0.0600	(0.114)	0.528	0.598	-0.163	0.283
_lcdname_3526	0.00246	(0.0260)	0.0948	0.924	-0.0484	0.0534
_lcdname_3528	0.0379	(0.0788)	0.481	0.631	-0.117	0.192
_lcdname_3529	0.0319	(0.0659)	0.484	0.628	-0.0973	0.161
_lcdname_3530	0.0265	(0.0664)	0.400	0.689	-0.104	0.157
_lcdname_3531	0.590*	(0.314)	1.878	0.0604	-0.0257	1.205
_lcdname_3532	0.00502	(0.0324)	0.155	0.877	-0.0584	0.0685
_lcdname_3534	0.0301	(0.0664)	0.454	0.650	-0.0999	0.160
_lcdname_3536	0.524	(0.421)	1.245	0.213	-0.301	1.350
_lcdname_3537	0.0233	(0.0533)	0.437	0.662	-0.0811	0.128
_lcdname_3538	0.203	(0.232)	0.876	0.381	-0.251	0.658
_lcdname_3539	0.0765	(0.115)	0.667	0.505	-0.148	0.301
_lcdname_3540	0.459	(0.416)	1.103	0.270	-0.357	1.274

THE RESPONSE OF ONTARIO PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS TO PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES

_lcdname_3541	0.182	(0.219)	0.828	0.408	-0.248	0.612
_lcdname_3543	-0.000821	(0.0280)	-0.0294	0.977	-0.0556	0.0540
_lcdname_3544	0.822***	(0.232)	3.546	0.000391	0.367	1.276
_lcdname_3547	0.0789	(0.137)	0.577	0.564	-0.189	0.347
_lyear_2000	-0.00149	(0.00100)	-1.485	0.137	-0.00346	0.000477
_lyear_2001	-0.00114	(0.00135)	-0.846	0.397	-0.00380	0.00151
_lyear_2002	-0.00375**	(0.00152)	-2.466	0.0137	-0.00673	-0.000770
_lyear_2003	-0.00441***	(0.00152)	-2.900	0.00373	-0.00739	-0.00143
_lyear_2004	-0.00555***	(0.00181)	-3.075	0.00211	-0.00909	-0.00201
_lyear_2005	-0.00678***	(0.00210)	-3.221	0.00128	-0.0109	-0.00265
_lyear_2006	-0.00631***	(0.00244)	-2.582	0.00983	-0.0111	-0.00152
_lyear_2007	-0.00646**	(0.00261)	-2.473	0.0134	-0.0116	-0.00134
_lcmaca_2	-0.0167***	(0.00298)	-5.604	2.09e-08	-0.0225	-0.0109
_lcmaca_3	0.00694	(0.0132)	0.525	0.600	-0.0190	0.0329
_lcmaca_4	-0.0135***	(0.00272)	-4.941	7.76e-07	-0.0188	-0.00812
_lcmaca_5	-0.0133***	(0.00298)	-4.477	7.56e-06	-0.0192	-0.00751
_lriotype_1	0.000728	(0.0104)	0.0699	0.944	-0.0197	0.0211

Observations 19,557

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table H31: Special Payments, Estimated Marginal Effects, Difference-in-differences Estimator (no physician-specific fixed effects), Palliative Care, FPs Eligible for Special Payments in 2003

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment8	0.00926	(0.0117)	0.789	0.430	-0.0137	0.0322
treated	0.0131**	(0.00613)	2.135	0.0327	0.00107	0.0251
post1	-0.000839	(0.00424)	-0.198	0.843	-0.00915	0.00747
fhgd	-0.00258**	(0.00122)	-2.109	0.0349	-0.00498	-0.000182
ccmd	0.00266	(0.00385)	0.691	0.490	-0.00488	0.0102
fhod	0.00114	(0.00210)	0.543	0.587	-0.00297	0.00525
doc_ageg2	-0.00209*	(0.00123)	-1.709	0.0875	-0.00450	0.000308
doc_ageg3	-0.00328**	(0.00158)	-2.083	0.0373	-0.00637	-0.000194
doc_ageg4	-0.00436*	(0.00226)	-1.928	0.0539	-0.00880	7.30e-05
doc_male	-0.000965	(0.00361)	-0.267	0.789	-0.00804	0.00611
yrslcyr	-2.90e-05	(9.93e-05)	-0.292	0.770	-0.000224	0.000166
workdays	5.78e-05**	(2.52e-05)	2.293	0.0218	8.40e-06	0.000107
sum_visitg2	0.000710	(0.00209)	0.340	0.734	-0.00339	0.00481
sum_visitg3	0.000684	(0.00289)	0.237	0.813	-0.00498	0.00635
sum_visitg4	-0.00139	(0.00264)	-0.528	0.597	-0.00656	0.00377
visitpd	7.72e-05	(9.54e-05)	0.809	0.419	-0.000110	0.000264
sum_ptg2	0.00142	(0.00222)	0.640	0.522	-0.00293	0.00578
sum_ptg3	-0.000937	(0.00225)	-0.416	0.678	-0.00536	0.00348
sum_ptg4	-0.00164	(0.00220)	-0.743	0.458	-0.00595	0.00268
meanage	-0.000160	(0.000322)	-0.497	0.619	-0.000791	0.000471
fmpercent	-0.00829	(0.00994)	-0.834	0.404	-0.0278	0.0112
clpercent	-0.0855	(0.0731)	-1.169	0.242	-0.229	0.0578
elpercent	0.0206	(0.0193)	1.066	0.286	-0.0173	0.0584
lnsbill	0.00462	(0.00296)	1.561	0.118	-0.00118	0.0104
_lyear_2000	-0.00383***	(0.00125)	-3.051	0.00228	-0.00629	-0.00137
_lyear_2001	-0.00365***	(0.00115)	-3.164	0.00156	-0.00592	-0.00139
_lyear_2002	-0.00308**	(0.00134)	-2.297	0.0216	-0.00571	-0.000451
_lyear_2005	0.00283	(0.00174)	1.631	0.103	-0.000571	0.00624
_lyear_2006	0.00525*	(0.00291)	1.802	0.0715	-0.000460	0.0110
_lyear_2007	0.00581*	(0.00329)	1.765	0.0776	-0.000643	0.0123
_lyear_2008	0.0306**	(0.0124)	2.463	0.0138	0.00626	0.0550
_lcmaca_2	-0.000648	(0.00145)	-0.446	0.655	-0.00350	0.00220
_lcmaca_3	-0.000491	(0.00207)	-0.238	0.812	-0.00454	0.00356
_lcmaca_4	0.00206	(0.00422)	0.488	0.625	-0.00621	0.0103
_lcmaca_5	-0.00229	(0.00230)	-0.994	0.320	-0.00681	0.00223
_lriotype_1	-0.00739	(0.00596)	-1.242	0.214	-0.0191	0.00428
Observations	9,681					

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1

THE RESPONSE OF ONTARIO PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS TO PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES

Table H32: Special Payments, Estimated Marginal Effects, Difference-in-differences Estimator (no physician-specific fixed effects), Palliative Care, FPs Eligible for Special Payments in 2004

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment8	0.00379	(0.00542)	0.699	0.485	-0.00683	0.0144
treated	0.00635**	(0.00265)	2.393	0.0167	0.00115	0.0116
post2	0.0177**	(0.00794)	2.224	0.0261	0.00210	0.0332
fhgd	-0.000834	(0.000961)	-0.867	0.386	-0.00272	0.00105
ccmd	0.000242	(0.00172)	0.141	0.888	-0.00314	0.00362
fhod	6.74e-05	(0.00184)	0.0367	0.971	-0.00353	0.00366
doc_ageg2	0.000170	(0.000867)	0.196	0.844	-0.00153	0.00187
doc_ageg3	-0.00140	(0.000943)	-1.480	0.139	-0.00324	0.000452
doc_ageg4	-0.00254*	(0.00138)	-1.848	0.0646	-0.00524	0.000155
doc_male	0.000696	(0.00122)	0.571	0.568	-0.00169	0.00308
yrslicyr	9.59e-05	(7.24e-05)	1.325	0.185	-4.59e-05	0.000238
workdays	6.60e-06	(9.75e-06)	0.677	0.498	-1.25e-05	2.57e-05
sum_visitg2	0.000405	(0.00148)	0.274	0.784	-0.00249	0.00330
sum_visitg3	-0.000161	(0.00168)	-0.0956	0.924	-0.00346	0.00314
sum_visitg4	0.00114	(0.00283)	0.403	0.687	-0.00441	0.00669
visitpd	2.95e-05	(5.38e-05)	0.550	0.583	-7.58e-05	0.000135
sum_ptg2	0.00168	(0.00163)	1.032	0.302	-0.00151	0.00488
sum_ptg3	0.00336	(0.00298)	1.127	0.260	-0.00248	0.00920
sum_ptg4	0.00233	(0.00319)	0.729	0.466	-0.00393	0.00859
meanage	0.000140	(0.000161)	0.872	0.383	-0.000175	0.000456
fmpersent	0.00372	(0.00506)	0.736	0.462	-0.00619	0.0136
clpersent	0.0291	(0.0381)	0.763	0.445	-0.0456	0.104
elpersent	-0.00189	(0.00852)	-0.221	0.825	-0.0186	0.0148
lnsbill	0.00150	(0.00168)	0.891	0.373	-0.00179	0.00479
_lyear_2001	0.00232	(0.00185)	1.254	0.210	-0.00131	0.00595
_lyear_2002	0.00455	(0.00341)	1.335	0.182	-0.00213	0.0112
_lyear_2003	0.00254	(0.00255)	0.997	0.319	-0.00245	0.00753
_lyear_2004	0.00271	(0.00346)	0.782	0.434	-0.00408	0.00949
_lyear_2005	-0.00255**	(0.00119)	-2.139	0.0324	-0.00489	-0.000214
_lyear_2006	-0.00224**	(0.000996)	-2.254	0.0242	-0.00420	-0.000293
_lyear_2007	-0.00174**	(0.000776)	-2.248	0.0246	-0.00326	-0.000223
_lcmaca_2	0.00369*	(0.00217)	1.696	0.0898	-0.000573	0.00794
_lcmaca_3	0.00331	(0.00955)	0.346	0.729	-0.0154	0.0220
_lcmaca_4	0.0539	(0.0501)	1.075	0.283	-0.0444	0.152
_lcmaca_5	0.00613	(0.0126)	0.485	0.628	-0.0186	0.0309
_lriotype_1	-0.00162	(0.00452)	-0.357	0.721	-0.0105	0.00725
Observations	8,495					

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table H33: Special Payments, Estimated Marginal Effects, Difference-in-differences Estimator (no physician-specific fixed effects), Palliative Care, FPs Eligible for Special Payments in 2005

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment8	0.0316	(0.0305)	1.036	0.300	-0.0282	0.0914
treated	0.00269	(0.00204)	1.319	0.187	-0.00131	0.00669
post3	0.00503	(0.00399)	1.260	0.208	-0.00280	0.0129
fhgd	-0.00217**	(0.000964)	-2.252	0.0243	-0.00406	-0.000282
ccmd	0.00284	(0.00349)	0.812	0.417	-0.00401	0.00968
fhod	-0.00170*	(0.000946)	-1.798	0.0722	-0.00356	0.000154
doc_ageg2	-0.000798	(0.000723)	-1.103	0.270	-0.00221	0.000619
doc_ageg3	-0.000994					
doc_ageg4	-0.00196	(0.00124)	-1.586	0.113	-0.00439	0.000462
doc_male	0.00111	(0.00110)	1.006	0.314	-0.00105	0.00328
yrsllyr	-4.18e-05	(7.21e-05)	-0.580	0.562	-0.000183	9.94e-05
workdays	-7.17e-06	(9.04e-06)	-0.794	0.427	-2.49e-05	1.05e-05
sum_visitg2	-0.000839	(0.00115)	-0.730	0.465	-0.00309	0.00141
sum_visitg3	-0.000650	(0.00155)	-0.418	0.676	-0.00370	0.00240
sum_visitg4	-2.85e-05	(0.00201)	-0.0142	0.989	-0.00396	0.00391
visitpd	8.78e-06	(4.35e-05)	0.202	0.840	-7.65e-05	9.41e-05
sum_ptg2	2.34e-05	(0.00141)	0.0166	0.987	-0.00273	0.00278
sum_ptg3	0.00122	(0.00219)	0.556	0.578	-0.00308	0.00552
sum_ptg4	-0.000152	(0.00186)	-0.0817	0.935	-0.00380	0.00349
meanage	0.000239	(0.000190)	1.260	0.208	-0.000133	0.000611
fmpercent	0.00433	(0.00400)	1.082	0.279	-0.00351	0.0122
clpercent	0.0256	(0.0358)	0.715	0.475	-0.0445	0.0957
elpercent	0.000852	(0.00943)	0.0904	0.928	-0.0176	0.0193
lnsbill	0.00300	(0.00186)	1.611	0.107	-0.000649	0.00665
_lyear_2000	0.000414	(0.00183)	0.226	0.821	-0.00318	0.00401
_lyear_2001	-0.000565	(0.00123)	-0.459	0.646	-0.00298	0.00185
_lyear_2002	0.000171	(0.00165)	0.103	0.918	-0.00307	0.00341
_lyear_2003	-0.000703	(0.00128)	-0.551	0.581	-0.00320	0.00180
_lyear_2004	-0.000723	(0.000733)	-0.987	0.324	-0.00216	0.000713
_lyear_2006	-0.00158**	(0.000618)	-2.556	0.0106	-0.00279	-0.000368
_lyear_2007	-0.000758**	(0.000368)	-2.063	0.0391	-0.00148	-3.80e-05
_lcmaca_2	0.00746	(0.00852)	0.876	0.381	-0.00924	0.0242
_lcmaca_3	0.000975	(0.00291)	0.335	0.737	-0.00472	0.00667
_lcmaca_4	0.00840	(0.00806)	1.042	0.298	-0.00740	0.0242
_lcmaca_5	0.00335	(0.00558)	0.600	0.548	-0.00758	0.0143
_lriotype_1	-0.000980	(0.00232)	-0.423	0.672	-0.00552	0.00356
Observations	9,928					

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1

**Tables of Full Results for Regression Results Presented in Table 12**

Table H34: Estimated Marginal Effects: Preventive Care Bonuses by Age, Difference-in-differences Estimator with Physician-specific Fixed Effects, Senior Flu Shot, < 40

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment3	0.0236	(0.0220)	1.075	0.283	-0.0195	0.0667
post	0.710***	(0.225)	3.152	0.00164	0.268	1.151
fhgd	0.00696	(0.0141)	0.492	0.622	-0.0207	0.0347
fhnd	-0.0178	(0.0400)	-0.446	0.656	-0.0963	0.0606
ccmd	0.0845***	(0.0301)	2.802	0.00513	0.0254	0.144
fhod	0.000320	(0.0312)	0.0103	0.992	-0.0608	0.0614
doc_age	-0.0495**	(0.0248)	-2.001	0.0455	-0.0981	-0.000992
workdays	0.000544***	(0.000182)	2.981	0.00291	0.000186	0.000901
sum_visitg2	-0.0336*	(0.0184)	-1.826	0.0680	-0.0697	0.00249
sum_visitg3	-0.0251	(0.0259)	-0.967	0.334	-0.0759	0.0258
sum_visitg4	-0.0589*	(0.0330)	-1.784	0.0746	-0.124	0.00585
visitpd	0.00314***	(0.00108)	2.901	0.00376	0.00102	0.00527
sum_ptg2	0.0222	(0.0177)	1.252	0.211	-0.0125	0.0569
sum_ptg3	0.0326	(0.0235)	1.389	0.165	-0.0134	0.0786
sum_ptg4	0.0331	(0.0272)	1.215	0.224	-0.0203	0.0865
meanage	0.0130***	(0.00406)	3.205	0.00137	0.00505	0.0210
fmpercent	0.451***	(0.147)	3.069	0.00218	0.163	0.739
clpercent	0.381	(0.531)	0.718	0.473	-0.660	1.423
elpercent	-0.0244	(0.403)	-0.0604	0.952	-0.815	0.766
_lcdname_3506	0.134	(0.0961)	1.392	0.164	-0.0547	0.322
_lcdname_3511	0.227***	(0.0603)	3.765	0.000171	0.109	0.345
_lcdname_3518	0.136	(0.0862)	1.574	0.116	-0.0333	0.305
_lcdname_3519	0.126*	(0.0659)	1.917	0.0554	-0.00293	0.255
_lcdname_3520	0.145**	(0.0571)	2.537	0.0112	0.0329	0.257
_lcdname_3521	0.000165	(0.0779)	0.00212	0.998	-0.153	0.153
_lcdname_3523	-0.149	(0.101)	-1.468	0.142	-0.347	0.0500
_lcdname_3524	-0.103	(0.0928)	-1.111	0.266	-0.285	0.0788
_lcdname_3532	-0.699***	(0.139)	-5.027	5.43e-07	-0.972	-0.426
_lcdname_3537	-0.223**	(0.0937)	-2.386	0.0171	-0.407	-0.0398
_lcdname_3538	0.141	(0.111)	1.274	0.203	-0.0761	0.358
_lcdname_3539	-0.0563	(0.0565)	-0.995	0.320	-0.167	0.0546
_lcdname_3543	0.193*	(0.115)	1.682	0.0927	-0.0320	0.418
_lcdname_3560	-0.0104	(0.151)	-0.0688	0.945	-0.306	0.285
_lyear_2000	0.121***	(0.0316)	3.831	0.000132	0.0590	0.183
_lyear_2001	0.337***	(0.0527)	6.398	1.95e-10	0.234	0.441
_lyear_2002	0.468***	(0.0769)	6.084	1.40e-09	0.317	0.618
_lyear_2003	0.489***	(0.101)	4.831	1.46e-06	0.291	0.688
_lyear_2004	0.590***	(0.126)	4.690	2.92e-06	0.343	0.837
_lyear_2005	0.622***	(0.150)	4.140	3.61e-05	0.327	0.917
_lyear_2006	0.671***	(0.175)	3.830	0.000132	0.328	1.015
_lyear_2007	-0.0307	(0.0273)	-1.124	0.261	-0.0842	0.0228
_lcmaca_2	0.182***	(0.0380)	4.798	1.72e-06	0.108	0.257
_lcmaca_3	-0.166	(0.109)	-1.528	0.127	-0.379	0.0470
_lcmaca_5	0.0930	(0.0881)	1.056	0.291	-0.0797	0.266
_lriotype_1	-0.0286	(0.0400)	-0.715	0.475	-0.107	0.0499
Constant	0.901	(0.831)	1.084	0.278	-0.729	2.530
Observations	2,320					
R-squared	0.483					
Number of id	237					

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table H35: Estimated Marginal Effects: Preventive Care Bonuses by Age, Difference-in-differences Estimator with Physician-specific Fixed Effects, Senior Flu Shot, 40-55

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment3	0.0493***	(0.0104)	4.742	2.15e-06	0.0289	0.0696
fhgd	0.00327	(0.00676)	0.483	0.629	-0.00998	0.0165
fhnd	-0.0119	(0.0222)	-0.535	0.593	-0.0554	0.0317
ccmd	0.0309**	(0.0131)	2.366	0.0180	0.00530	0.0565
fhod	0.00115	(0.0220)	0.0524	0.958	-0.0419	0.0442
doc_age	0.00664	(0.00748)	0.888	0.374	-0.00802	0.0213
workdays	0.000387***	(0.000109)	3.561	0.000372	0.000174	0.000600
sum_visitg2	0.00994	(0.0117)	0.853	0.394	-0.0129	0.0328
sum_visitg3	-0.000433	(0.0146)	-0.0296	0.976	-0.0291	0.0282
sum_visitg4	-0.0286	(0.0180)	-1.589	0.112	-0.0638	0.00668
visitpd	0.00110*	(0.000623)	1.763	0.0780	-0.000123	0.00232
sum_ptg2	0.0160	(0.0122)	1.308	0.191	-0.00797	0.0399
sum_ptg3	0.0141	(0.0151)	0.933	0.351	-0.0155	0.0436
sum_ptg4	0.0424**	(0.0176)	2.408	0.0160	0.00788	0.0768
meanage	-0.0105***	(0.00286)	-3.672	0.000242	-0.0161	-0.00490
fmpercent	0.328***	(0.112)	2.923	0.00348	0.108	0.549
clpercent	-1.307***	(0.326)	-4.011	6.09e-05	-1.946	-0.668
elpercent	1.343***	(0.210)	6.395	1.69e-10	0.931	1.754
_lcdname_3506	-0.251	(0.178)	-1.404	0.160	-0.600	0.0992
_lcdname_3507	-0.0232	(0.123)	-0.190	0.850	-0.263	0.217
_lcdname_3510	-0.242	(0.204)	-1.189	0.235	-0.641	0.157
_lcdname_3512	-0.190	(0.222)	-0.856	0.392	-0.624	0.245
_lcdname_3514	-0.263*	(0.157)	-1.679	0.0932	-0.570	0.0441
_lcdname_3516	-0.155	(0.197)	-0.785	0.432	-0.541	0.231
_lcdname_3518	-0.436**	(0.189)	-2.301	0.0214	-0.807	-0.0646
_lcdname_3519	-0.346*	(0.179)	-1.937	0.0527	-0.696	0.00406
_lcdname_3520	-0.285	(0.180)	-1.586	0.113	-0.637	0.0672
_lcdname_3521	-0.309*	(0.179)	-1.731	0.0835	-0.659	0.0409
_lcdname_3523	-0.432**	(0.187)	-2.303	0.0213	-0.799	-0.0642
_lcdname_3524	-0.461**	(0.184)	-2.507	0.0122	-0.821	-0.101
_lcdname_3526	-0.399**	(0.183)	-2.183	0.0290	-0.757	-0.0407
_lcdname_3530	-0.339*	(0.182)	-1.860	0.0629	-0.696	0.0182
_lcdname_3537	-0.325*	(0.189)	-1.726	0.0844	-0.695	0.0442
_lcdname_3539	-0.183	(0.160)	-1.147	0.251	-0.496	0.130
_lcdname_3543	-0.325	(0.216)	-1.503	0.133	-0.748	0.0987
_lyear_2000	0.0653***	(0.0125)	5.217	1.86e-07	0.0408	0.0899
_lyear_2001	0.273***	(0.0176)	15.47	0	0.238	0.307
_lyear_2002	0.341***	(0.0240)	14.24	0	0.294	0.388
_lyear_2003	0.319***	(0.0311)	10.24	0	0.258	0.380
_lyear_2004	0.373***	(0.0386)	9.687	0	0.298	0.449
_lyear_2005	0.359***	(0.0461)	7.783	0	0.269	0.449
_lyear_2006	0.344***	(0.0538)	6.390	1.74e-10	0.238	0.449
_lyear_2007	0.269***	(0.0612)	4.394	1.12e-05	0.149	0.389
_lyear_2008	0.247***	(0.0685)	3.610	0.000308	0.113	0.381
_lcmaca_2	-0.162**	(0.0658)	-2.458	0.0140	-0.291	-0.0328
_lcmaca_3	-0.0515	(0.115)	-0.449	0.653	-0.276	0.173
_lcmaca_4	-0.0448	(0.143)	-0.313	0.755	-0.326	0.236
_lriotype_1	-0.0474	(0.0439)	-1.078	0.281	-0.133	0.0388
Constant	0.199	(0.391)	0.509	0.611	-0.568	0.967
Observations	10,508					
R-squared	0.474					
Number of id	1,073					

Robust standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1



THE RESPONSE OF ONTARIO PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS TO PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES

Table H36: Estimated Marginal Effects: Preventive Care Bonuses by Age, Difference-in-differences Estimator with Physician-specific Fixed Effects, Senior Flu Shot, > 55

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment3	-0.00111	(0.0104)	-0.107	0.915	-0.0215	0.0193
fhgd	0.0247***	(0.00807)	3.059	0.00223	0.00887	0.0405
fhnd	0.0224	(0.0223)	1.002	0.316	-0.0214	0.0661
ccmd	0.0244*	(0.0130)	1.869	0.0617	-0.00119	0.0499
fhod	-0.0310	(0.0309)	-1.001	0.317	-0.0916	0.0296
doc_age	0.0231	(0.0248)	0.931	0.352	-0.0255	0.0716
workdays	0.000540***	(0.000121)	4.456	8.50e-06	0.000302	0.000777
sum_visitg2	0.0160	(0.0119)	1.345	0.179	-0.00733	0.0394
sum_visitg3	0.0367**	(0.0162)	2.270	0.0232	0.00501	0.0685
sum_visitg4	0.0386*	(0.0212)	1.826	0.0678	-0.00283	0.0801
visitpd	-0.000300	(0.000832)	-0.361	0.718	-0.00193	0.00133
sum_ptg2	-0.00196	(0.0118)	-0.166	0.868	-0.0251	0.0211
sum_ptg3	0.000529	(0.0156)	0.0340	0.973	-0.0300	0.0311
sum_ptg4	0.00727	(0.0197)	0.369	0.712	-0.0314	0.0459
meanage	0.000362	(0.00250)	0.145	0.885	-0.00454	0.00526
fmpercent	0.260**	(0.125)	2.080	0.0375	0.0150	0.505
clpercent	-0.572	(0.465)	-1.228	0.219	-1.484	0.341
elpercent	0.386**	(0.171)	2.258	0.0240	0.0510	0.722
_lcdname_3502	-0.115	(0.202)	-0.569	0.569	-0.510	0.280
_lcdname_3506	0.572***	(0.120)	4.784	1.75e-06	0.338	0.806
_lcdname_3510	0.876***	(0.135)	6.492	9.14e-11	0.611	1.140
_lcdname_3511	0.861***	(0.152)	5.670	1.50e-08	0.563	1.158
_lcdname_3512	-0.181	(0.185)	-0.980	0.327	-0.544	0.181
_lcdname_3515	0.460***	(0.168)	2.734	0.00628	0.130	0.790
_lcdname_3518	-0.0199	(0.177)	-0.112	0.911	-0.367	0.328
_lcdname_3519	0.115	(0.170)	0.678	0.498	-0.218	0.448
_lcdname_3520	0.0601	(0.166)	0.361	0.718	-0.266	0.386
_lcdname_3521	0.326	(0.204)	1.598	0.110	-0.0738	0.726
_lcdname_3524	0.0592	(0.178)	0.332	0.740	-0.291	0.409
_lcdname_3526	0.358*	(0.209)	1.711	0.0872	-0.0522	0.768
_lcdname_3530	-0.0991	(0.177)	-0.560	0.575	-0.446	0.248
_lcdname_3542	-0.196	(0.195)	-1.006	0.315	-0.577	0.186
_lcdname_3543	0.0555	(0.216)	0.258	0.797	-0.367	0.478
_lcdname_3547	0.539***	(0.205)	2.633	0.00848	0.138	0.941
_lcdname_3548	-0.313***	(0.102)	-3.065	0.00219	-0.512	-0.113
_lcdname_3551	-0.486***	(0.187)	-2.595	0.00947	-0.852	-0.119
_lcdname_3552	-0.614***	(0.191)	-3.206	0.00135	-0.989	-0.238
_lcdname_3553	-0.224	(0.186)	-1.207	0.227	-0.589	0.140
_lyear_2000	0.0342	(0.0274)	1.246	0.213	-0.0196	0.0880
_lyear_2001	0.207***	(0.0506)	4.079	4.59e-05	0.107	0.306
_lyear_2002	0.280***	(0.0749)	3.737	0.000188	0.133	0.427
_lyear_2003	0.247**	(0.0997)	2.481	0.0131	0.0519	0.443
_lyear_2004	0.279**	(0.124)	2.241	0.0250	0.0349	0.522
_lyear_2005	0.251*	(0.149)	1.687	0.0917	-0.0408	0.543
_lyear_2006	0.206	(0.174)	1.184	0.236	-0.135	0.547
_lyear_2007	0.149	(0.199)	0.751	0.453	-0.240	0.539
_lyear_2008	0.109	(0.223)	0.487	0.626	-0.329	0.547
_lcmaca_2	0.263**	(0.114)	2.306	0.0212	0.0394	0.487
_lcmaca_3	0.455***	(0.176)	2.588	0.00967	0.110	0.800
_lcmaca_4	0.0269	(0.108)	0.248	0.804	-0.186	0.239
_lcmaca_5	0.527***	(0.105)	5.044	4.68e-07	0.322	0.732
_lriotype_1	0.269***	(0.0551)	4.878	1.10e-06	0.161	0.377
Constant	-1.871	(1.420)	-1.317	0.188	-4.655	0.914

Observations	7,038
R-squared	0.475
Number of id	719

---

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

THE RESPONSE OF ONTARIO PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS TO PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES

Table H37: Estimated Marginal Effects: Preventive Care Bonuses by Age, Difference-in-differences Estimator with Physician-specific Fixed Effects, Toddler Immunization, < 40

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment4	0.0274	(0.0255)	1.073	0.283	-0.0227	0.0774
fhgd	-0.0126	(0.0191)	-0.658	0.510	-0.0501	0.0249
fhnd	0.0144	(0.0519)	0.278	0.781	-0.0874	0.116
ccmd	-0.0507*	(0.0305)	-1.664	0.0963	-0.110	0.00906
fhod	0.0863	(0.0596)	1.449	0.148	-0.0305	0.203
doc_age	-0.00506	(0.0237)	-0.214	0.831	-0.0515	0.0414
workdays	0.000383	(0.000244)	1.570	0.117	-9.56e-05	0.000862
sum_visitg2	-0.0269	(0.0253)	-1.065	0.287	-0.0765	0.0227
sum_visitg3	-0.0477	(0.0326)	-1.465	0.143	-0.112	0.0162
sum_visitg4	-0.0188	(0.0398)	-0.471	0.637	-0.0968	0.0593
visitpd	0.00113	(0.00116)	0.977	0.329	-0.00114	0.00341
sum_ptg2	0.0482**	(0.0214)	2.251	0.0245	0.00621	0.0902
sum_ptg3	0.0266	(0.0274)	0.969	0.333	-0.0272	0.0804
sum_ptg4	0.0413	(0.0312)	1.322	0.186	-0.0200	0.103
meanage	-0.00417	(0.00463)	-0.900	0.368	-0.0133	0.00492
fmpersent	0.0273	(0.177)	0.154	0.877	-0.320	0.374
clpersent	0.0464	(0.623)	0.0745	0.941	-1.175	1.268
elpersent	0.506	(0.465)	1.088	0.277	-0.406	1.418
_lcdname_3502	0.0853	(0.114)	0.748	0.454	-0.138	0.309
_lcdname_3510	0.127*	(0.0694)	1.823	0.0685	-0.00961	0.263
_lcdname_3518	0.346*	(0.178)	1.948	0.0516	-0.00236	0.694
_lcdname_3519	0.421**	(0.170)	2.479	0.0133	0.0879	0.754
_lcdname_3520	0.364**	(0.168)	2.169	0.0302	0.0349	0.692
_lcdname_3521	0.381**	(0.173)	2.207	0.0274	0.0425	0.720
_lcdname_3523	0.297	(0.245)	1.212	0.226	-0.183	0.777
_lcdname_3524	0.467***	(0.179)	2.617	0.00895	0.117	0.817
_lcdname_3530	0.227	(0.180)	1.263	0.207	-0.126	0.579
_lcdname_3534	-0.165**	(0.0727)	-2.268	0.0234	-0.308	-0.0223
_lcdname_3537	0.0891	(0.124)	0.717	0.474	-0.155	0.333
_lcdname_3538	0.415***	(0.139)	2.979	0.00293	0.142	0.688
_lcdname_3543	0.323*	(0.183)	1.772	0.0766	-0.0346	0.681
_lyear_2000	-0.478**	(0.192)	-2.490	0.0129	-0.854	-0.102
_lyear_2001	-0.449***	(0.168)	-2.672	0.00762	-0.779	-0.119
_lyear_2002	-0.428***	(0.145)	-2.955	0.00317	-0.712	-0.144
_lyear_2003	-0.389***	(0.121)	-3.208	0.00136	-0.627	-0.151
_lyear_2004	-0.335***	(0.0977)	-3.428	0.000622	-0.526	-0.143
_lyear_2005	-0.257***	(0.0751)	-3.425	0.000630	-0.405	-0.110
_lyear_2006	-0.171***	(0.0533)	-3.214	0.00133	-0.276	-0.0667
_lyear_2007	-0.0598**	(0.0266)	-2.250	0.0246	-0.112	-0.00768
_lcmaca_2	0.290	(0.189)	1.538	0.124	-0.0800	0.661
_lcmaca_3	-0.0222	(0.0752)	-0.296	0.767	-0.170	0.125
_lcmaca_5	0.462**	(0.182)	2.531	0.0115	0.104	0.820
Constant	0.761	(1.008)	0.755	0.450	-1.216	2.737
Observations	2,044					
R-squared	0.556					
Number of id	234					

Robust standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table H38: Estimated Marginal Effects: Preventive Care Bonuses by Age, Difference-in-differences Estimator with Physician-specific Fixed Effects, Toddler Immunization, 40-55

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment4	-0.00999	(0.0148)	-0.677	0.498	-0.0389	0.0189
fhgd	0.0107	(0.00978)	1.096	0.273	-0.00846	0.0299
fhnd	-0.00973	(0.0201)	-0.483	0.629	-0.0492	0.0297
ccmd	0.00337	(0.0166)	0.203	0.839	-0.0291	0.0358
fhod	-0.0134	(0.0244)	-0.548	0.584	-0.0611	0.0344
doc_age	-0.0112	(0.00778)	-1.437	0.151	-0.0264	0.00408
workdays	0.000139	(0.000134)	1.039	0.299	-0.000123	0.000401
sum_visitg2	0.0169	(0.0155)	1.092	0.275	-0.0134	0.0472
sum_visitg3	0.00130	(0.0189)	0.0686	0.945	-0.0358	0.0384
sum_visitg4	-0.00561	(0.0220)	-0.255	0.799	-0.0488	0.0375
visitpd	-5.11e-05	(0.000698)	-0.0731	0.942	-0.00142	0.00132
sum_ptg2	0.00329	(0.0154)	0.214	0.831	-0.0269	0.0335
sum_ptg3	0.00290	(0.0174)	0.167	0.868	-0.0312	0.0370
sum_ptg4	0.00124	(0.0196)	0.0629	0.950	-0.0373	0.0397
meanage	0.000746	(0.00320)	0.233	0.816	-0.00553	0.00702
fmpercent	-0.146	(0.140)	-1.044	0.297	-0.420	0.128
clpercent	-0.570	(0.360)	-1.584	0.113	-1.275	0.135
elpercent	-0.0449	(0.268)	-0.167	0.867	-0.570	0.480
_lcdname_3506	-0.299*	(0.161)	-1.850	0.0643	-0.615	0.0177
_lcdname_3507	0.0490	(0.0839)	0.584	0.559	-0.115	0.214
_lcdname_3510	-0.517**	(0.262)	-1.974	0.0485	-1.031	-0.00352
_lcdname_3512	-0.502***	(0.159)	-3.166	0.00155	-0.813	-0.191
_lcdname_3514	-1.100***	(0.306)	-3.589	0.000333	-1.700	-0.499
_lcdname_3516	-0.211	(0.239)	-0.882	0.378	-0.680	0.258
_lcdname_3518	-0.504**	(0.242)	-2.077	0.0378	-0.979	-0.0284
_lcdname_3519	-0.381**	(0.157)	-2.422	0.0154	-0.690	-0.0727
_lcdname_3520	-0.382**	(0.157)	-2.427	0.0153	-0.691	-0.0734
_lcdname_3521	-0.364**	(0.157)	-2.315	0.0206	-0.671	-0.0558
_lcdname_3523	-0.246	(0.235)	-1.048	0.295	-0.708	0.215
_lcdname_3524	-0.339**	(0.171)	-1.983	0.0474	-0.674	-0.00393
_lcdname_3526	-0.753***	(0.147)	-5.118	3.16e-07	-1.042	-0.465
_lcdname_3530	-0.278	(0.175)	-1.585	0.113	-0.622	0.0658
_lcdname_3537	-0.470**	(0.200)	-2.348	0.0189	-0.862	-0.0775
_lcdname_3539	-0.372***	(0.143)	-2.611	0.00905	-0.652	-0.0928
_lcdname_3543	-0.268*	(0.158)	-1.698	0.0895	-0.577	0.0413
_lyear_2001	0.0412***	(0.0108)	3.803	0.000144	0.0199	0.0624
_lyear_2002	0.0547***	(0.0174)	3.145	0.00167	0.0206	0.0888
_lyear_2003	0.0920***	(0.0245)	3.753	0.000176	0.0440	0.140
_lyear_2004	0.146***	(0.0324)	4.524	6.15e-06	0.0829	0.210
_lyear_2005	0.193***	(0.0405)	4.776	1.82e-06	0.114	0.273
_lyear_2006	0.273***	(0.0488)	5.587	2.39e-08	0.177	0.369
_lyear_2007	0.399***	(0.0567)	7.043	0	0.288	0.510
_lyear_2008	0.446***	(0.0644)	6.931	0	0.320	0.573
_lcmaca_2	-0.119	(0.0893)	-1.337	0.181	-0.295	0.0557
_lcmaca_3	0.371***	(0.120)	3.104	0.00192	0.137	0.606
_lcmaca_4	-0.248**	(0.103)	-2.407	0.0161	-0.450	-0.0461
_lriotype_1	-0.0696	(0.0515)	-1.351	0.177	-0.171	0.0314
Constant	1.467***	(0.407)	3.607	0.000311	0.670	2.264
Observations	9,095					
R-squared	0.392					
Number of id	1,065					

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1

THE RESPONSE OF ONTARIO PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS TO PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES

Table H39: Estimated Marginal Effects: Preventive Care Bonuses by Age, Difference-in-differences Estimator with Physician-specific Fixed Effects, Toddler Immunization, > 55

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment4	0.0375*	(0.0199)	1.884	0.0596	-0.00151	0.0764
fhgd	-0.0336**	(0.0144)	-2.329	0.0199	-0.0618	-0.00531
fhnd	0.0107	(0.0346)	0.309	0.757	-0.0571	0.0784
ccmd	0.000825	(0.0241)	0.0342	0.973	-0.0465	0.0481
fhod	0.0757*	(0.0454)	1.665	0.0959	-0.0134	0.165
doc_age	0.00287	(0.0360)	0.0798	0.936	-0.0676	0.0734
workdays	0.000561***	(0.000190)	2.947	0.00322	0.000188	0.000934
sum_visitg2	-0.0149	(0.0211)	-0.707	0.479	-0.0562	0.0264
sum_visitg3	-0.0155	(0.0270)	-0.573	0.567	-0.0684	0.0374
sum_visitg4	-0.0216	(0.0329)	-0.657	0.511	-0.0861	0.0429
visitpd	0.00127	(0.00114)	1.115	0.265	-0.000961	0.00349
sum_ptg2	0.0106	(0.0215)	0.494	0.622	-0.0315	0.0528
sum_ptg3	-0.0105	(0.0261)	-0.404	0.686	-0.0616	0.0405
sum_ptg4	0.00509	(0.0306)	0.166	0.868	-0.0548	0.0650
meanage	-0.00523	(0.00413)	-1.267	0.205	-0.0133	0.00286
fmpercent	0.0423	(0.235)	0.180	0.857	-0.418	0.502
clpercent	-0.313	(0.619)	-0.505	0.613	-1.526	0.901
elpercent	0.0233	(0.317)	0.0735	0.941	-0.598	0.645
_lcdname_3502	-0.173	(0.236)	-0.734	0.463	-0.636	0.289
_lcdname_3506	0.358***	(0.136)	2.638	0.00837	0.0920	0.625
_lcdname_3512	-0.686***	(0.227)	-3.028	0.00248	-1.130	-0.242
_lcdname_3515	0.198	(0.201)	0.983	0.326	-0.196	0.591
_lcdname_3518	0.154	(0.217)	0.710	0.477	-0.271	0.580
_lcdname_3519	0.00962	(0.214)	0.0450	0.964	-0.410	0.429
_lcdname_3520	0.147	(0.205)	0.717	0.473	-0.255	0.549
_lcdname_3521	0.301	(0.249)	1.208	0.227	-0.188	0.790
_lcdname_3524	0.316	(0.221)	1.430	0.153	-0.117	0.748
_lcdname_3526	0.202	(0.263)	0.768	0.443	-0.314	0.717
_lcdname_3530	0.122	(0.204)	0.596	0.551	-0.278	0.522
_lcdname_3542	-0.782***	(0.248)	-3.152	0.00163	-1.269	-0.296
_lcdname_3543	-0.650***	(0.220)	-2.957	0.00312	-1.080	-0.219
_lcdname_3547	-0.365*	(0.199)	-1.839	0.0659	-0.754	0.0241
_lcdname_3551	-0.158	(0.208)	-0.759	0.448	-0.565	0.250
_lcdname_3552	-0.335	(0.206)	-1.624	0.105	-0.740	0.0695
_lcdname_3553	-0.155	(0.205)	-0.755	0.450	-0.556	0.247
_lyear_2000	-0.327	(0.289)	-1.129	0.259	-0.894	0.240
_lyear_2001	-0.306	(0.253)	-1.206	0.228	-0.803	0.191
_lyear_2002	-0.305	(0.218)	-1.402	0.161	-0.732	0.122
_lyear_2003	-0.290	(0.181)	-1.597	0.110	-0.645	0.0659
_lyear_2004	-0.258*	(0.146)	-1.770	0.0768	-0.543	0.0278
_lyear_2005	-0.215*	(0.110)	-1.957	0.0504	-0.430	0.000389
_lyear_2006	-0.151**	(0.0748)	-2.014	0.0441	-0.297	-0.00398
_lyear_2007	-0.0381	(0.0383)	-0.994	0.320	-0.113	0.0370
_lcmaca_2	0.741***	(0.135)	5.478	4.52e-08	0.476	1.006
_lcmaca_3	0.702***	(0.210)	3.339	0.000847	0.290	1.115
_lcmaca_4	0.374***	(0.105)	3.547	0.000393	0.167	0.580
_lcmaca_5	-0.344**	(0.144)	-2.385	0.0171	-0.626	-0.0612
_lriotype_1	0.0794	(0.0932)	0.852	0.394	-0.103	0.262
Constant	0.398	(2.365)	0.168	0.866	-4.238	5.034
Observations	5,687					
R-squared	0.264					
Number of id	700					

Robust standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table H40: Estimated Marginal Effects: Preventive Care Bonuses by Age, Difference-in-differences Estimator with Physician-specific Fixed Effects, Pap Smear, &lt; 40

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment1	0.0596***	(0.0136)	4.383	1.23e-05	0.0330	0.0863
post	0.157***	(0.0556)	2.820	0.00485	0.0478	0.266
fhgd	0.0303***	(0.00921)	3.291	0.00101	0.0123	0.0484
fhnd	0.0250	(0.0253)	0.985	0.325	-0.0247	0.0746
ccmd	0.0693***	(0.0129)	5.372	8.66e-08	0.0440	0.0946
fhod	0.0261	(0.0319)	0.817	0.414	-0.0365	0.0886
doc_age	-0.0210***	(0.00587)	-3.578	0.000354	-0.0325	-0.00950
workdays	0.000242***	(7.57e-05)	3.192	0.00143	9.31e-05	0.000390
sum_visitg2	0.00440	(0.00747)	0.590	0.556	-0.0102	0.0190
sum_visitg3	0.00873	(0.0113)	0.773	0.440	-0.0134	0.0309
sum_visitg4	0.0105	(0.0140)	0.754	0.451	-0.0169	0.0379
visitpd	-0.000957**	(0.000463)	-2.066	0.0390	-0.00187	-4.86e-05
sum_ptg2	0.00379	(0.00653)	0.580	0.562	-0.00902	0.0166
sum_ptg3	0.00908	(0.00963)	0.943	0.346	-0.00981	0.0280
sum_ptg4	0.00869	(0.0124)	0.702	0.483	-0.0156	0.0330
meanage	0.00769***	(0.00188)	4.094	4.40e-05	0.00401	0.0114
fmpercent	0.349***	(0.0618)	5.647	1.86e-08	0.228	0.470
clpercent	0.597***	(0.211)	2.834	0.00464	0.184	1.009
elpercent	-0.394**	(0.184)	-2.142	0.0323	-0.754	-0.0333
_lcdname_3506	0.0286	(0.0529)	0.540	0.589	-0.0752	0.132
_lcdname_3511	0.0343	(0.0232)	1.480	0.139	-0.0112	0.0797
_lcdname_3518	0.0608	(0.0550)	1.106	0.269	-0.0470	0.169
_lcdname_3519	0.112**	(0.0524)	2.140	0.0324	0.00939	0.215
_lcdname_3520	0.0520	(0.0515)	1.009	0.313	-0.0490	0.153
_lcdname_3521	0.0107	(0.0546)	0.195	0.845	-0.0965	0.118
_lcdname_3523	0.0906	(0.0558)	1.624	0.104	-0.0188	0.200
_lcdname_3524	-0.00239	(0.0553)	-0.0432	0.966	-0.111	0.106
_lcdname_3530	-0.0234	(0.0530)	-0.442	0.658	-0.127	0.0804
_lcdname_3534	-0.166***	(0.0334)	-4.988	6.61e-07	-0.232	-0.101
_lcdname_3537	0.0645	(0.0472)	1.366	0.172	-0.0281	0.157
_lcdname_3538	-0.296***	(0.112)	-2.641	0.00832	-0.515	-0.0761
_lcdname_3543	0.114*	(0.0632)	1.805	0.0712	-0.00984	0.238
_lcdname_3560	-0.105**	(0.0442)	-2.379	0.0174	-0.192	-0.0185
_lyear_2000	0.0208**	(0.00839)	2.474	0.0134	0.00430	0.0372
_lyear_2001	0.0433***	(0.0133)	3.245	0.00119	0.0171	0.0694
_lyear_2002	0.0615***	(0.0188)	3.265	0.00111	0.0246	0.0984
_lyear_2003	0.0759***	(0.0246)	3.084	0.00207	0.0276	0.124
_lyear_2004	0.0920***	(0.0304)	3.022	0.00254	0.0323	0.152
_lyear_2005	0.109***	(0.0367)	2.983	0.00289	0.0375	0.181
_lyear_2006	0.135***	(0.0430)	3.135	0.00174	0.0504	0.219
_lyear_2007	-0.0399***	(0.0100)	-3.993	6.76e-05	-0.0596	-0.0203
_lcmaca_2	0.0395	(0.0359)	1.099	0.272	-0.0309	0.110
_lcmaca_3	0.0528	(0.0345)	1.528	0.127	-0.0150	0.120
_lcmaca_5	0.130***	(0.0419)	3.109	0.00190	0.0481	0.212
_lriotype_1	0.0216	(0.0365)	0.592	0.554	-0.0499	0.0931
Constant	0.770***	(0.207)	3.728	0.000198	0.365	1.175
Observations	2,334					
R-squared	0.202					
Number of id	237					

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1

THE RESPONSE OF ONTARIO PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS TO PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES

Table H41: Estimated Marginal Effects: Preventive Care Bonuses by Age, Difference-in-differences Estimator with Physician-specific Fixed Effects, Pap Smear, 40-55

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment1	0.0533***	(0.00626)	8.521	0	0.0411	0.0656
post	-0.0495***	(0.0159)	-3.123	0.00180	-0.0806	-0.0184
fhgd	0.0229***	(0.00408)	5.610	2.09e-08	0.0149	0.0309
fhnd	0.0419***	(0.0144)	2.910	0.00362	0.0137	0.0701
ccmd	0.0304***	(0.00813)	3.736	0.000188	0.0144	0.0463
fhod	0.0769***	(0.0238)	3.234	0.00123	0.0303	0.123
doc_age	0.00419***	(0.00155)	2.703	0.00687	0.00115	0.00724
workdays	0.000123**	(5.61e-05)	2.185	0.0289	1.26e-05	0.000233
sum_visitg2	0.00648	(0.00529)	1.226	0.220	-0.00388	0.0168
sum_visitg3	-0.000725	(0.00714)	-0.101	0.919	-0.0147	0.0133
sum_visitg4	0.00313	(0.00871)	0.359	0.720	-0.0139	0.0202
visitpd	0.000235	(0.000306)	0.767	0.443	-0.000365	0.000834
sum_ptg2	0.00928**	(0.00453)	2.049	0.0404	0.000404	0.0182
sum_ptg3	0.00984	(0.00609)	1.617	0.106	-0.00209	0.0218
sum_ptg4	0.00575	(0.00741)	0.777	0.437	-0.00876	0.0203
meanage	0.00291**	(0.00136)	2.144	0.0320	0.000250	0.00557
fmpercent	0.333***	(0.0603)	5.513	3.63e-08	0.214	0.451
clpercent	-0.00114	(0.148)	-0.00773	0.994	-0.291	0.288
elpercent	-0.175*	(0.0907)	-1.929	0.0538	-0.353	0.00285
_lcdname_3506	0.145**	(0.0716)	2.020	0.0434	0.00429	0.285
_lcdname_3507	-0.0995***	(0.0347)	-2.865	0.00417	-0.168	-0.0314
_lcdname_3510	-0.0205	(0.0877)	-0.234	0.815	-0.192	0.151
_lcdname_3512	-0.0523	(0.0697)	-0.749	0.454	-0.189	0.0845
_lcdname_3514	-0.0966	(0.0591)	-1.635	0.102	-0.212	0.0192
_lcdname_3516	-0.0616	(0.0621)	-0.992	0.321	-0.183	0.0601
_lcdname_3518	0.105	(0.0672)	1.555	0.120	-0.0273	0.236
_lcdname_3519	0.0866	(0.0663)	1.307	0.191	-0.0433	0.216
_lcdname_3520	0.104	(0.0659)	1.585	0.113	-0.0247	0.234
_lcdname_3521	0.0968	(0.0653)	1.483	0.138	-0.0312	0.225
_lcdname_3523	0.160**	(0.0779)	2.057	0.0397	0.00753	0.313
_lcdname_3524	0.137**	(0.0685)	2.002	0.0453	0.00289	0.272
_lcdname_3526	-0.127**	(0.0593)	-2.138	0.0325	-0.243	-0.0106
_lcdname_3530	0.0153	(0.0694)	0.221	0.825	-0.121	0.151
_lcdname_3537	0.131*	(0.0693)	1.885	0.0595	-0.00522	0.267
_lcdname_3539	0.00577	(0.0515)	0.112	0.911	-0.0952	0.107
_lcdname_3543	0.0976	(0.0650)	1.502	0.133	-0.0298	0.225
_lyear_2000	-0.00172	(0.00331)	-0.519	0.603	-0.00820	0.00476
_lyear_2001	-0.00696	(0.00426)	-1.636	0.102	-0.0153	0.00138
_lyear_2002	-0.0142**	(0.00565)	-2.523	0.0117	-0.0253	-0.00318
_lyear_2003	-0.0257***	(0.00701)	-3.662	0.000252	-0.0394	-0.0119
_lyear_2004	-0.0260***	(0.00851)	-3.054	0.00227	-0.0427	-0.00931
_lyear_2005	-0.0190*	(0.0103)	-1.842	0.0654	-0.0392	0.00121
_lyear_2006	-0.0149	(0.0123)	-1.217	0.224	-0.0390	0.00912
_lyear_2007	-0.00616	(0.00391)	-1.576	0.115	-0.0138	0.00150
_lcmaca_2	0.0430*	(0.0228)	1.884	0.0596	-0.00175	0.0878
_lcmaca_3	0.0910**	(0.0439)	2.076	0.0379	0.00508	0.177
_lcmaca_4	0.0478	(0.0484)	0.989	0.323	-0.0470	0.143
_lriotype_1	-0.00182	(0.0139)	-0.131	0.896	-0.0290	0.0254
Constant	0.0368	(0.114)	0.323	0.746	-0.186	0.260
Observations	10,541					
R-squared	0.136					
Number of id	1,073					

Robust standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table H42: Estimated Marginal Effects: Preventive Care Bonuses by Age, Difference-in-differences Estimator with Physician-specific Fixed Effects, Pap Smear, &gt; 55

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment1	0.0197***	(0.00709)	2.783	0.00541	0.00583	0.0336
post	0.374***	(0.108)	3.447	0.000571	0.161	0.586
fhgd	0.0264***	(0.00541)	4.877	1.10e-06	0.0158	0.0370
fhnd	0.0414*	(0.0237)	1.745	0.0811	-0.00512	0.0880
ccmd	0.0105	(0.00792)	1.322	0.186	-0.00506	0.0260
fhod	0.122***	(0.0454)	2.696	0.00704	0.0334	0.211
doc_age	-0.0441***	(0.0120)	-3.673	0.000241	-0.0676	-0.0206
workdays	0.000119*	(6.59e-05)	1.813	0.0699	-9.70e-06	0.000248
sum_visitg2	0.00240	(0.00551)	0.435	0.664	-0.00840	0.0132
sum_visitg3	0.00654	(0.00806)	0.812	0.417	-0.00926	0.0223
sum_visitg4	0.00255	(0.0103)	0.246	0.805	-0.0177	0.0228
visitpd	0.000214	(0.000410)	0.523	0.601	-0.000588	0.00102
sum_ptg2	-0.00910*	(0.00547)	-1.663	0.0963	-0.0198	0.00162
sum_ptg3	-0.00798	(0.00748)	-1.068	0.286	-0.0226	0.00667
sum_ptg4	-0.00636	(0.00951)	-0.668	0.504	-0.0250	0.0123
meanage	0.0115***	(0.00152)	7.568	0	0.00851	0.0145
fmpercent	0.328***	(0.0781)	4.192	2.81e-05	0.174	0.481
clpercent	-0.0366	(0.299)	-0.122	0.903	-0.622	0.549
elpercent	-0.748***	(0.0989)	-7.565	0	-0.942	-0.554
_lcdname_3502	0.165**	(0.0652)	2.532	0.0114	0.0373	0.293
_lcdname_3506	-0.155***	(0.0426)	-3.640	0.000275	-0.238	-0.0715
_lcdname_3510	-0.286***	(0.0718)	-3.977	7.05e-05	-0.426	-0.145
_lcdname_3511	-0.283***	(0.0717)	-3.950	7.90e-05	-0.424	-0.143
_lcdname_3512	0.138*	(0.0831)	1.663	0.0963	-0.0247	0.301
_lcdname_3515	-0.120**	(0.0566)	-2.121	0.0340	-0.231	-0.00909
_lcdname_3518	0.0233	(0.0640)	0.363	0.716	-0.102	0.149
_lcdname_3519	0.0834	(0.0625)	1.334	0.182	-0.0391	0.206
_lcdname_3520	0.0959	(0.0605)	1.585	0.113	-0.0227	0.214
_lcdname_3521	0.0176	(0.0633)	0.277	0.781	-0.107	0.142
_lcdname_3524	0.121*	(0.0697)	1.743	0.0815	-0.0152	0.258
_lcdname_3526	-0.0157	(0.0658)	-0.239	0.811	-0.145	0.113
_lcdname_3530	0.0465	(0.0614)	0.757	0.449	-0.0739	0.167
_lcdname_3542	0.159**	(0.0697)	2.278	0.0227	0.0222	0.296
_lcdname_3543	0.108	(0.0695)	1.549	0.122	-0.0286	0.244
_lcdname_3547	0.0225	(0.0632)	0.357	0.721	-0.101	0.146
_lcdname_3548	-0.00230	(0.0391)	-0.0588	0.953	-0.0790	0.0744
_lcdname_3551	0.137**	(0.0636)	2.158	0.0310	0.0126	0.262
_lcdname_3552	0.0851	(0.0635)	1.341	0.180	-0.0393	0.210
_lcdname_3553	0.174***	(0.0627)	2.771	0.00561	0.0508	0.297
_lyear_2000	0.0445***	(0.0125)	3.556	0.000379	0.0200	0.0690
_lyear_2001	0.0888***	(0.0243)	3.657	0.000258	0.0412	0.136
_lyear_2002	0.126***	(0.0362)	3.497	0.000473	0.0556	0.197
_lyear_2003	0.162***	(0.0482)	3.354	0.000800	0.0672	0.256
_lyear_2004	0.205***	(0.0602)	3.408	0.000659	0.0871	0.323
_lyear_2005	0.253***	(0.0722)	3.501	0.000468	0.111	0.394
_lyear_2006	0.308***	(0.0843)	3.649	0.000266	0.142	0.473
_lyear_2007	-0.0384***	(0.0127)	-3.029	0.00246	-0.0633	-0.0135
_lmaca_2	-0.190***	(0.0375)	-5.050	4.54e-07	-0.263	-0.116
_lmaca_3	-0.340***	(0.0612)	-5.559	2.82e-08	-0.460	-0.220
_lmaca_4	-0.280***	(0.0296)	-9.464	0	-0.338	-0.222
_lmaca_5	-0.162***	(0.0446)	-3.639	0.000275	-0.250	-0.0750
_lriotype_1	-0.142***	(0.0320)	-4.429	9.62e-06	-0.204	-0.0789
Constant	2.628***	(0.685)	3.836	0.000126	1.285	3.971



THE RESPONSE OF ONTARIO PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS TO PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES

Observations	7,051
R-squared	0.093
Number of id	719

---

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table H43: Estimated Marginal Effects: Preventive Care Bonuses by Age, Difference-in-differences Estimator with Physician-specific Fixed Effects, Mammogram, &lt; 40

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment2	0.0447***	(0.0155)	2.878	0.00404	0.0142	0.0752
post	0.00475	(0.0662)	0.0717	0.943	-0.125	0.135
fhgd	0.0290**	(0.0114)	2.543	0.0111	0.00663	0.0513
fhnd	-0.00984	(0.0186)	-0.528	0.598	-0.0464	0.0267
ccmd	0.0755***	(0.0198)	3.816	0.000139	0.0367	0.114
fhod	-0.0238	(0.0248)	-0.962	0.336	-0.0724	0.0247
doc_age	-0.00508	(0.00703)	-0.723	0.470	-0.0189	0.00871
workdays	0.000340***	(8.58e-05)	3.965	7.59e-05	0.000172	0.000508
sum_visitg2	0.0130	(0.00958)	1.352	0.176	-0.00583	0.0317
sum_visitg3	0.0191	(0.0131)	1.463	0.143	-0.00651	0.0448
sum_visitg4	0.0158	(0.0166)	0.952	0.341	-0.0168	0.0485
visitpd	-0.000767	(0.000528)	-1.454	0.146	-0.00180	0.000267
sum_ptg2	0.0135	(0.00884)	1.532	0.126	-0.00379	0.0309
sum_ptg3	0.0191*	(0.0108)	1.760	0.0785	-0.00218	0.0404
sum_ptg4	0.0344***	(0.0133)	2.582	0.00990	0.00826	0.0605
meanage	0.0169***	(0.00216)	7.832	0	0.0127	0.0211
fmpercent	0.401***	(0.0767)	5.230	1.86e-07	0.251	0.552
clpercent	0.828***	(0.262)	3.156	0.00162	0.313	1.342
elpercent	-0.589***	(0.195)	-3.026	0.00251	-0.970	-0.207
_lcdname_3502	0.0932	(0.0900)	1.035	0.301	-0.0834	0.270
_lcdname_3510	-0.0789**	(0.0308)	-2.557	0.0106	-0.139	-0.0184
_lcdname_3518	0.0190	(0.0784)	0.243	0.808	-0.135	0.173
_lcdname_3519	0.0185	(0.0753)	0.245	0.806	-0.129	0.166
_lcdname_3520	-0.0840	(0.0724)	-1.159	0.246	-0.226	0.0581
_lcdname_3521	-0.0784	(0.0822)	-0.954	0.340	-0.240	0.0828
_lcdname_3523	-0.0807	(0.0661)	-1.221	0.222	-0.210	0.0489
_lcdname_3524	-0.116	(0.0797)	-1.457	0.145	-0.273	0.0402
_lcdname_3530	-0.258***	(0.0789)	-3.273	0.00108	-0.413	-0.104
_lcdname_3534	-0.0660***	(0.0162)	-4.083	4.62e-05	-0.0976	-0.0343
_lcdname_3537	0.0964**	(0.0450)	2.142	0.0323	0.00816	0.185
_lcdname_3538	-0.0488	(0.0623)	-0.783	0.434	-0.171	0.0735
_lcdname_3543	-0.0416	(0.0902)	-0.461	0.645	-0.218	0.135
_lcdname_3544	0.00248	(0.0515)	0.0482	0.962	-0.0985	0.103
_lyear_2000	0.00962	(0.00991)	0.971	0.332	-0.00981	0.0291
_lyear_2001	0.0186	(0.0157)	1.184	0.237	-0.0122	0.0495
_lyear_2002	0.0187	(0.0224)	0.834	0.404	-0.0252	0.0626
_lyear_2003	0.0202	(0.0295)	0.684	0.494	-0.0376	0.0780
_lyear_2004	0.0102	(0.0365)	0.281	0.779	-0.0614	0.0819
_lyear_2005	0.00402	(0.0436)	0.0922	0.927	-0.0815	0.0895
_lyear_2006	0.0202	(0.0512)	0.394	0.694	-0.0803	0.121
_lyear_2007	-0.0143	(0.0107)	-1.334	0.182	-0.0352	0.00670
_lcmaca_2	-0.0184	(0.0443)	-0.415	0.678	-0.105	0.0686
_lcmaca_3	-0.0638**	(0.0319)	-2.001	0.0455	-0.126	-0.00127
_lcmaca_5	-0.0210	(0.0494)	-0.425	0.671	-0.118	0.0759
_lriotype_1	0.0837*	(0.0449)	1.867	0.0621	-0.00424	0.172
Constant	-0.0969	(0.247)	-0.392	0.695	-0.581	0.388
Observations	2,322					
R-squared	0.255					
Number of id	237					

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1

THE RESPONSE OF ONTARIO PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS TO PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES

Table H44: Estimated Marginal Effects: Preventive Care Bonuses by Age, Difference-in-differences Estimator with Physician-specific Fixed Effects, Mammogram, 40-55

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment2	0.0165**	(0.00698)	2.362	0.0182	0.00280	0.0302
fhgd	0.0361***	(0.00381)	9.459	0	0.0286	0.0436
fhnd	0.0193**	(0.00981)	1.965	0.0494	5.16e-05	0.0385
ccmd	0.0378***	(0.00649)	5.822	6.01e-09	0.0251	0.0505
fhod	0.0176	(0.0124)	1.418	0.156	-0.00672	0.0419
doc_age	-0.00327	(0.00212)	-1.544	0.123	-0.00742	0.000881
workdays	0.000191***	(4.66e-05)	4.102	4.13e-05	9.98e-05	0.000282
sum_visitg2	0.00188	(0.00422)	0.446	0.655	-0.00639	0.0102
sum_visitg3	-0.00258	(0.00573)	-0.451	0.652	-0.0138	0.00865
sum_visitg4	-0.00792	(0.00709)	-1.117	0.264	-0.0218	0.00598
visitpd	-0.000276	(0.000277)	-0.997	0.319	-0.000819	0.000267
sum_ptg2	0.00991**	(0.00465)	2.128	0.0333	0.000782	0.0190
sum_ptg3	0.0104*	(0.00602)	1.726	0.0844	-0.00141	0.0222
sum_ptg4	0.0184**	(0.00734)	2.510	0.0121	0.00403	0.0328
meanage	0.00911***	(0.00117)	7.800	0	0.00682	0.0114
fmpercent	0.450***	(0.0670)	6.722	0	0.319	0.582
clpercent	0.337**	(0.133)	2.531	0.0114	0.0760	0.598
elpercent	-0.229***	(0.0801)	-2.860	0.00425	-0.386	-0.0720
_lcdname_3506	0.0812	(0.0846)	0.960	0.337	-0.0847	0.247
_lcdname_3507	-0.0372	(0.0424)	-0.878	0.380	-0.120	0.0458
_lcdname_3510	0.202**	(0.0877)	2.297	0.0216	0.0296	0.374
_lcdname_3512	0.0503	(0.0669)	0.752	0.452	-0.0808	0.181
_lcdname_3514	0.0110	(0.0524)	0.209	0.834	-0.0917	0.114
_lcdname_3516	0.0776	(0.0686)	1.132	0.258	-0.0568	0.212
_lcdname_3518	0.169**	(0.0836)	2.028	0.0426	0.00565	0.333
_lcdname_3519	0.134*	(0.0758)	1.771	0.0766	-0.0143	0.283
_lcdname_3520	0.161**	(0.0763)	2.113	0.0346	0.0117	0.311
_lcdname_3521	0.143*	(0.0764)	1.875	0.0608	-0.00650	0.293
_lcdname_3523	0.0439	(0.0834)	0.527	0.598	-0.120	0.207
_lcdname_3524	0.0925	(0.0822)	1.126	0.260	-0.0686	0.254
_lcdname_3526	0.0260	(0.0829)	0.314	0.754	-0.136	0.188
_lcdname_3530	0.150*	(0.0820)	1.831	0.0671	-0.0106	0.311
_lcdname_3537	-0.0355	(0.0766)	-0.463	0.644	-0.186	0.115
_lcdname_3539	0.0832	(0.0693)	1.201	0.230	-0.0526	0.219
_lcdname_3543	0.0663	(0.0830)	0.799	0.424	-0.0964	0.229
_lyear_2000	0.0122***	(0.00358)	3.406	0.000662	0.00517	0.0192
_lyear_2001	0.0185***	(0.00504)	3.663	0.000251	0.00858	0.0283
_lyear_2002	0.0250***	(0.00691)	3.610	0.000308	0.0114	0.0385
_lyear_2003	0.0291***	(0.00893)	3.258	0.00113	0.0116	0.0466
_lyear_2004	0.0134	(0.0111)	1.211	0.226	-0.00831	0.0352
_lyear_2005	0.0146	(0.0134)	1.090	0.276	-0.0117	0.0408
_lyear_2006	0.0185	(0.0158)	1.168	0.243	-0.0125	0.0495
_lyear_2007	0.0149	(0.0190)	0.782	0.434	-0.0224	0.0522
_lyear_2008	0.0316	(0.0210)	1.509	0.131	-0.00947	0.0728
_lcmaca_2	0.0853**	(0.0351)	2.432	0.0150	0.0165	0.154
_lcmaca_3	0.134*	(0.0713)	1.887	0.0592	-0.00523	0.274
_lcmaca_4	0.000285	(0.0666)	0.00428	0.997	-0.130	0.131
_lriotype_1	0.0324	(0.0231)	1.400	0.161	-0.0129	0.0777
Constant	0.0185	(0.137)	0.135	0.893	-0.250	0.287
Observations	10,532					
R-squared	0.155					
Number of id	1,073					

Robust standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table H45: Estimated Marginal Effects: Preventive Care Bonuses by Age, Difference-in-differences Estimator with Physician-specific Fixed Effects, Mammogram, &gt; 55

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment2	0.0135**	(0.00682)	1.983	0.0474	0.000156	0.0269
post	0.482***	(0.154)	3.135	0.00173	0.180	0.783
fhgd	0.0307***	(0.00480)	6.391	1.77e-10	0.0213	0.0401
fhnd	-0.0151	(0.0205)	-0.734	0.463	-0.0553	0.0252
ccmd	0.0408***	(0.00765)	5.337	9.76e-08	0.0258	0.0558
fhod	0.0249	(0.0246)	1.013	0.311	-0.0233	0.0730
doc_age	-0.0534***	(0.0170)	-3.137	0.00171	-0.0868	-0.0200
workdays	0.000167***	(6.36e-05)	2.618	0.00887	4.18e-05	0.000291
sum_visitg2	0.0105*	(0.00570)	1.840	0.0658	-0.000683	0.0217
sum_visitg3	0.00602	(0.00774)	0.777	0.437	-0.00916	0.0212
sum_visitg4	0.00386	(0.00989)	0.390	0.697	-0.0155	0.0232
visitpd	-0.000707*	(0.000386)	-1.832	0.0670	-0.00146	4.95e-05
sum_ptg2	-0.00217	(0.00588)	-0.369	0.712	-0.0137	0.00935
sum_ptg3	0.00127	(0.00790)	0.160	0.873	-0.0142	0.0168
sum_ptg4	0.00481	(0.00948)	0.508	0.612	-0.0138	0.0234
meanage	0.0106***	(0.00134)	7.891	0	0.00796	0.0132
fmpercent	0.254**	(0.0996)	2.550	0.0108	0.0587	0.449
clpercent	0.0975	(0.277)	0.352	0.725	-0.445	0.640
elpercent	-0.287***	(0.0896)	-3.198	0.00139	-0.462	-0.111
_lcdname_3502	-0.126*	(0.0659)	-1.912	0.0560	-0.255	0.00321
_lcdname_3506	0.00711	(0.0449)	0.158	0.874	-0.0809	0.0951
_lcdname_3510	0.0119	(0.0499)	0.240	0.811	-0.0858	0.110
_lcdname_3511	-0.0613	(0.0509)	-1.206	0.228	-0.161	0.0384
_lcdname_3512	-0.262***	(0.0935)	-2.800	0.00513	-0.445	-0.0785
_lcdname_3515	-0.217***	(0.0717)	-3.032	0.00244	-0.358	-0.0768
_lcdname_3518	-0.237***	(0.0720)	-3.293	0.000998	-0.378	-0.0959
_lcdname_3519	-0.149**	(0.0630)	-2.364	0.0181	-0.273	-0.0255
_lcdname_3520	-0.143**	(0.0597)	-2.391	0.0168	-0.260	-0.0257
_lcdname_3521	-0.132**	(0.0621)	-2.122	0.0339	-0.253	-0.0100
_lcdname_3524	-0.0340	(0.0655)	-0.518	0.604	-0.162	0.0944
_lcdname_3526	-0.210***	(0.0697)	-3.009	0.00263	-0.346	-0.0731
_lcdname_3530	-0.294***	(0.0686)	-4.286	1.84e-05	-0.429	-0.160
_lcdname_3542	-0.211***	(0.0642)	-3.287	0.00102	-0.337	-0.0852
_lcdname_3543	-0.203***	(0.0664)	-3.052	0.00228	-0.333	-0.0725
_lcdname_3547	-0.0934	(0.0877)	-1.064	0.287	-0.265	0.0787
_lcdname_3548	-0.146***	(0.0350)	-4.167	3.13e-05	-0.215	-0.0773
_lcdname_3551	0.0619	(0.0693)	0.893	0.372	-0.0740	0.198
_lcdname_3552	-0.0440	(0.0691)	-0.636	0.524	-0.179	0.0914
_lcdname_3553	-0.0934	(0.0700)	-1.333	0.183	-0.231	0.0439
_lyear_2000	0.0620***	(0.0175)	3.538	0.000407	0.0276	0.0963
_lyear_2001	0.120***	(0.0343)	3.502	0.000464	0.0529	0.187
_lyear_2002	0.178***	(0.0513)	3.466	0.000531	0.0773	0.278
_lyear_2003	0.229***	(0.0684)	3.342	0.000838	0.0945	0.363
_lyear_2004	0.267***	(0.0854)	3.131	0.00175	0.1000	0.435
_lyear_2005	0.311***	(0.102)	3.036	0.00241	0.110	0.512
_lyear_2006	0.370***	(0.120)	3.094	0.00199	0.136	0.604
_lyear_2007	-0.0596***	(0.0175)	-3.414	0.000644	-0.0939	-0.0254
_lmaca_2	0.0829**	(0.0412)	2.012	0.0443	0.00213	0.164
_lmaca_3	0.178***	(0.0599)	2.970	0.00299	0.0604	0.295
_lmaca_4	0.276***	(0.0446)	6.186	6.54e-10	0.189	0.363
_lmaca_5	0.0771*	(0.0396)	1.944	0.0519	-0.000635	0.155
_lriotype_1	0.0526***	(0.0166)	3.165	0.00156	0.0200	0.0852
Constant	3.136***	(0.972)	3.226	0.00126	1.230	5.041

THE RESPONSE OF ONTARIO PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS TO PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES

Observations	7,034
R-squared	0.157
Number of id	719

---

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table H46: Estimated Marginal Effects: Preventive Care Bonuses by Age, Difference-in-differences Estimator with Physician-specific Fixed Effects, Colorectal Cancer Screening, &lt; 40

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment5	0.147***	(0.0191)	7.703	0	0.110	0.185
fhgd	0.00911	(0.0150)	0.606	0.544	-0.0204	0.0386
fhnd	0.0413	(0.0293)	1.407	0.160	-0.0163	0.0988
ccmd	0.0236	(0.0328)	0.721	0.471	-0.0406	0.0879
fhod	0.0475	(0.0506)	0.939	0.348	-0.0517	0.147
doc_age	-0.0196*	(0.0102)	-1.933	0.0533	-0.0396	0.000283
workdays	7.83e-05	(0.000126)	0.620	0.535	-0.000169	0.000326
sum_visitg2	2.46e-05	(0.0147)	0.00167	0.999	-0.0288	0.0289
sum_visitg3	0.00394	(0.0208)	0.189	0.850	-0.0369	0.0448
sum_visitg4	0.0222	(0.0259)	0.857	0.391	-0.0286	0.0730
visitpd	-1.62e-05	(0.000756)	-0.0214	0.983	-0.00150	0.00147
sum_ptg2	0.0152	(0.0136)	1.116	0.265	-0.0115	0.0418
sum_ptg3	0.00880	(0.0178)	0.495	0.621	-0.0261	0.0437
sum_ptg4	-0.00329	(0.0215)	-0.153	0.879	-0.0455	0.0389
meanage	0.00523*	(0.00279)	1.876	0.0608	-0.000237	0.0107
fmpercent	-0.0738	(0.123)	-0.602	0.547	-0.314	0.167
clpercent	-0.0315	(0.359)	-0.0878	0.930	-0.735	0.672
elpercent	-0.299	(0.278)	-1.077	0.282	-0.844	0.246
_lcdname_3502	0.0220	(0.115)	0.191	0.849	-0.204	0.248
_lcdname_3510	0.0963**	(0.0473)	2.038	0.0417	0.00361	0.189
_lcdname_3518	0.0326	(0.0566)	0.576	0.564	-0.0784	0.144
_lcdname_3519	0.0625	(0.0471)	1.328	0.184	-0.0298	0.155
_lcdname_3520	0.0259	(0.0359)	0.720	0.471	-0.0446	0.0963
_lcdname_3521	0.0556	(0.0501)	1.108	0.268	-0.0428	0.154
_lcdname_3523	0.0970	(0.0612)	1.584	0.113	-0.0231	0.217
_lcdname_3524	0.197***	(0.0672)	2.937	0.00335	0.0655	0.329
_lcdname_3532	-0.245***	(0.0728)	-3.365	0.000781	-0.388	-0.102
_lcdname_3534	0.0758***	(0.0252)	3.004	0.00270	0.0263	0.125
_lcdname_3537	0.0246	(0.0450)	0.545	0.586	-0.0638	0.113
_lcdname_3538	-0.259***	(0.0926)	-2.791	0.00531	-0.440	-0.0769
_lyear_2000	0.0300**	(0.0143)	2.097	0.0361	0.00195	0.0581
_lyear_2001	0.0757***	(0.0230)	3.297	0.000994	0.0307	0.121
_lyear_2002	0.117***	(0.0323)	3.628	0.000293	0.0539	0.181
_lyear_2003	0.165***	(0.0425)	3.881	0.000107	0.0817	0.249
_lyear_2004	0.209***	(0.0526)	3.970	7.44e-05	0.106	0.312
_lyear_2005	0.250***	(0.0626)	3.994	6.73e-05	0.127	0.373
_lyear_2006	0.184**	(0.0733)	2.513	0.0121	0.0404	0.328
_lyear_2007	0.268***	(0.0835)	3.208	0.00136	0.104	0.432
_lyear_2008	0.336***	(0.0937)	3.584	0.000346	0.152	0.519
_lcmaca_2	0.152***	(0.0517)	2.937	0.00336	0.0504	0.253
_lcmaca_3	-0.205**	(0.0885)	-2.317	0.0206	-0.379	-0.0315
_lcmaca_5	0.0526	(0.0520)	1.011	0.312	-0.0494	0.155
_lriotype_1	-0.240***	(0.0519)	-4.625	4.00e-06	-0.342	-0.138
Constant	0.799**	(0.350)	2.281	0.0226	0.112	1.486
Observations	2,197					
R-squared	0.481					
Number of id	224					

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1

THE RESPONSE OF ONTARIO PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS TO PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES

Table H47: Estimated Marginal Effects: Preventive Care Bonuses by Age, Difference-in-differences Estimator with Physician-specific Fixed Effects, Colorectal Cancer Screening, 40-55

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment5	0.0810***	(0.00803)	10.09	0	0.0653	0.0968
fhgd	0.0323***	(0.00557)	5.800	6.83e-09	0.0214	0.0432
fhnd	0.0803***	(0.0110)	7.289	0	0.0587	0.102
ccmd	0.0584***	(0.0140)	4.171	3.06e-05	0.0309	0.0858
fhod	0.0826***	(0.0208)	3.967	7.32e-05	0.0418	0.123
doc_age	0.000779	(0.00358)	0.218	0.828	-0.00624	0.00780
workdays	2.62e-05	(8.02e-05)	0.327	0.743	-0.000131	0.000183
sum_visitg2	-0.00814	(0.00872)	-0.934	0.351	-0.0252	0.00896
sum_visitg3	-0.00386	(0.0107)	-0.361	0.718	-0.0249	0.0171
sum_visitg4	-0.00536	(0.0130)	-0.414	0.679	-0.0308	0.0200
visitpd	-0.000549	(0.000443)	-1.239	0.215	-0.00142	0.000320
sum_ptg2	0.0228***	(0.00811)	2.804	0.00506	0.00685	0.0387
sum_ptg3	0.00787	(0.00944)	0.834	0.404	-0.0106	0.0264
sum_ptg4	0.00176	(0.0111)	0.159	0.874	-0.0200	0.0235
meanage	0.000609	(0.00190)	0.320	0.749	-0.00312	0.00434
fmpercent	-0.129*	(0.0735)	-1.754	0.0794	-0.273	0.0151
clpercent	-0.472*	(0.247)	-1.910	0.0562	-0.956	0.0125
elpercent	0.230	(0.144)	1.594	0.111	-0.0528	0.512
_lcdname_3506	0.295***	(0.0516)	5.707	1.18e-08	0.193	0.396
_lcdname_3507	-0.121***	(0.0337)	-3.576	0.000350	-0.187	-0.0545
_lcdname_3510	0.257***	(0.0974)	2.641	0.00827	0.0663	0.448
_lcdname_3512	0.368***	(0.0568)	6.485	9.33e-11	0.257	0.479
_lcdname_3514	0.232***	(0.0551)	4.208	2.60e-05	0.124	0.340
_lcdname_3518	0.304***	(0.0335)	9.073	0	0.238	0.370
_lcdname_3519	0.346***	(0.0425)	8.135	0	0.262	0.429
_lcdname_3520	0.371***	(0.0407)	9.126	0	0.292	0.451
_lcdname_3521	0.303***	(0.0475)	6.374	1.93e-10	0.210	0.396
_lcdname_3522	0.482***	(0.0527)	9.143	0	0.378	0.585
_lcdname_3523	0.221***	(0.0505)	4.374	1.24e-05	0.122	0.320
_lcdname_3524	0.126*	(0.0670)	1.875	0.0608	-0.00570	0.257
_lcdname_3526	0.380***	(0.0832)	4.562	5.12e-06	0.217	0.543
_lcdname_3529	0.376***	(0.128)	2.950	0.00318	0.126	0.627
_lcdname_3530	0.375***	(0.0469)	7.999	0	0.283	0.467
_lcdname_3537	0.353***	(0.0550)	6.431	1.33e-10	0.246	0.461
_lcdname_3539	0.285***	(0.0614)	4.647	3.42e-06	0.165	0.406
_lcdname_3540	0.350***	(0.0656)	5.329	1.01e-07	0.221	0.478
_lcdname_3542	0.329***	(0.0668)	4.925	8.56e-07	0.198	0.460
_lcdname_3543	0.337***	(0.0539)	6.253	4.18e-10	0.232	0.443
_lyear_2000	0.0126**	(0.00589)	2.144	0.0320	0.00109	0.0242
_lyear_2001	0.0314***	(0.00838)	3.752	0.000177	0.0150	0.0479
_lyear_2002	0.0509***	(0.0115)	4.410	1.05e-05	0.0283	0.0735
_lyear_2003	0.0689***	(0.0150)	4.606	4.15e-06	0.0396	0.0982
_lyear_2004	0.0810***	(0.0186)	4.344	1.41e-05	0.0444	0.118
_lyear_2005	0.0963***	(0.0224)	4.298	1.74e-05	0.0524	0.140
_lyear_2006	0.0411	(0.0266)	1.548	0.122	-0.0109	0.0932
_lyear_2007	0.0856***	(0.0301)	2.848	0.00441	0.0267	0.144
_lyear_2008	0.139***	(0.0337)	4.113	3.95e-05	0.0726	0.205
_lcmaca_2	-0.00749	(0.0246)	-0.304	0.761	-0.0557	0.0408
_lcmaca_3	0.0193	(0.0287)	0.672	0.501	-0.0370	0.0757
_lcmaca_4	-0.0191	(0.0465)	-0.410	0.682	-0.110	0.0721
_lriotype_1	-0.0131	(0.0226)	-0.580	0.562	-0.0575	0.0312
Constant	-0.184	(0.175)	-1.054	0.292	-0.527	0.158

Observations	10,744
R-squared	0.394
Number of id	1,092

---

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1



THE RESPONSE OF ONTARIO PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS TO PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES

Table H48: Estimated Marginal Effects: Preventive Care Bonuses by Age, Difference-in-differences Estimator with Physician-specific Fixed Effects, Colorectal Cancer Screening, > 55

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment5	0.0670***	(0.00837)	8.010	0	0.0506	0.0835
post	0.277**	(0.126)	2.196	0.0281	0.0297	0.523
fhgd	0.0391***	(0.00705)	5.544	3.08e-08	0.0252	0.0529
fhnd	0.0542***	(0.0142)	3.803	0.000144	0.0263	0.0821
ccmd	0.0406***	(0.0153)	2.661	0.00781	0.0107	0.0706
fhod	0.0330	(0.0374)	0.882	0.378	-0.0404	0.106
doc_age	-0.0203	(0.0139)	-1.460	0.144	-0.0476	0.00697
workdays	0.000117*	(6.69e-05)	1.750	0.0801	-1.40e-05	0.000248
sum_visitg2	-8.35e-05	(0.00714)	-0.0117	0.991	-0.0141	0.0139
sum_visitg3	0.00543	(0.00998)	0.544	0.586	-0.0141	0.0250
sum_visitg4	0.0104	(0.0130)	0.798	0.425	-0.0151	0.0359
visitpd	-0.000167	(0.000485)	-0.345	0.730	-0.00112	0.000784
sum_ptg2	0.00754	(0.00660)	1.144	0.253	-0.00539	0.0205
sum_ptg3	0.00937	(0.00899)	1.042	0.297	-0.00825	0.0270
sum_ptg4	0.0178	(0.0123)	1.448	0.148	-0.00629	0.0419
meanage	0.00591***	(0.00149)	3.952	7.83e-05	0.00298	0.00884
fmpercent	-0.0181	(0.0691)	-0.262	0.793	-0.153	0.117
clpercent	-0.382	(0.294)	-1.302	0.193	-0.958	0.193
elpercent	-0.188**	(0.0906)	-2.080	0.0375	-0.366	-0.0109
_lcdname_3502	-0.247**	(0.0991)	-2.491	0.0128	-0.441	-0.0526
_lcdname_3506	0.0439*	(0.0266)	1.651	0.0989	-0.00824	0.0960
_lcdname_3510	0.110***	(0.0217)	5.054	4.45e-07	0.0671	0.152
_lcdname_3512	-0.0214	(0.109)	-0.197	0.844	-0.234	0.192
_lcdname_3515	-0.154	(0.105)	-1.476	0.140	-0.359	0.0506
_lcdname_3518	-0.0776	(0.108)	-0.719	0.472	-0.289	0.134
_lcdname_3519	-0.133	(0.104)	-1.276	0.202	-0.337	0.0713
_lcdname_3520	-0.105	(0.102)	-1.031	0.302	-0.304	0.0943
_lcdname_3521	-0.206**	(0.105)	-1.975	0.0484	-0.411	-0.00149
_lcdname_3524	-0.136	(0.105)	-1.296	0.195	-0.341	0.0695
_lcdname_3526	-0.203*	(0.106)	-1.909	0.0563	-0.411	0.00545
_lcdname_3530	-0.0570	(0.105)	-0.542	0.588	-0.263	0.149
_lcdname_3537	0.149***	(0.0552)	2.706	0.00683	0.0411	0.257
_lcdname_3542	-0.313***	(0.115)	-2.730	0.00636	-0.538	-0.0882
_lcdname_3543	-0.171	(0.106)	-1.607	0.108	-0.379	0.0376
_lcdname_3547	-0.163	(0.104)	-1.569	0.117	-0.367	0.0408
_lcdname_3548	0.164**	(0.0762)	2.153	0.0313	0.0147	0.314
_lcdname_3549	0.0941	(0.0585)	1.608	0.108	-0.0206	0.209
_lcdname_3551	-0.0822	(0.101)	-0.815	0.415	-0.280	0.115
_lcdname_3552	-0.166	(0.103)	-1.605	0.109	-0.369	0.0367
_lcdname_3553	-0.00672	(0.107)	-0.0629	0.950	-0.216	0.203
_lyear_2000	0.0264*	(0.0149)	1.770	0.0768	-0.00284	0.0556
_lyear_2001	0.0606**	(0.0284)	2.138	0.0326	0.00503	0.116
_lyear_2002	0.0935**	(0.0422)	2.219	0.0266	0.0109	0.176
_lyear_2003	0.124**	(0.0561)	2.207	0.0273	0.0139	0.234
_lyear_2004	0.151**	(0.0700)	2.153	0.0313	0.0135	0.288
_lyear_2005	0.176**	(0.0840)	2.092	0.0365	0.0111	0.340
_lyear_2006	-0.118***	(0.0287)	-4.116	3.90e-05	-0.174	-0.0619
_lyear_2007	-0.0647***	(0.0156)	-4.142	3.49e-05	-0.0953	-0.0341
_lcmaca_2	-0.0490	(0.0348)	-1.406	0.160	-0.117	0.0193
_lcmaca_3	0.217**	(0.0996)	2.175	0.0297	0.0213	0.412
_lcmaca_4	-0.0835***	(0.0321)	-2.601	0.00931	-0.146	-0.0206
_lcmaca_5	0.0715	(0.0466)	1.533	0.125	-0.0199	0.163
_lriotype_1	-0.00787	(0.0183)	-0.431	0.667	-0.0437	0.0280

Constant	1.076	(0.803)	1.340	0.180	-0.498	2.650
Observations	6,977					
R-squared	0.304					
Number of id	711					

---

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

THE RESPONSE OF ONTARIO PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS TO PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES

Table H49: Estimated Marginal Effects: Preventive Care Bonuses by Practice Size, Difference-in-differences Estimator with Physician-specific Fixed Effects, Senior Flu Shot, < 1K

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment3	0.0248	(0.0162)	1.537	0.124	-0.00685	0.0565
post	0.337***	(0.0195)	17.24	0	0.298	0.375
fhgd	0.0397***	(0.0132)	3.009	0.00265	0.0138	0.0656
fhnd	0.0886**	(0.0416)	2.131	0.0332	0.00706	0.170
ccmd	0.0378*	(0.0229)	1.651	0.0988	-0.00708	0.0826
fhod	0.0725	(0.0645)	1.123	0.261	-0.0540	0.199
doc_ageg2	-0.0145	(0.0137)	-1.056	0.291	-0.0414	0.0124
doc_ageg3	-0.0599***	(0.0230)	-2.607	0.00919	-0.105	-0.0148
doc_ageg4	-0.0688**	(0.0303)	-2.268	0.0234	-0.128	-0.00931
workdays	0.000732***	(0.000145)	5.035	5.08e-07	0.000447	0.00102
sum_visitg2	-0.0257*	(0.0143)	-1.802	0.0717	-0.0537	0.00227
sum_visitg3	0.00598	(0.0375)	0.159	0.873	-0.0676	0.0796
sum_visitg4	-0.0218	(0.0683)	-0.319	0.750	-0.156	0.112
visitpd	0.00270*	(0.00151)	1.791	0.0734	-0.000256	0.00566
sum_ptg2	-0.0233*	(0.0125)	-1.866	0.0622	-0.0478	0.00119
sum_ptg4	-0.210**	(0.0824)	-2.555	0.0107	-0.372	-0.0490
meanage	-0.00282	(0.00352)	-0.802	0.423	-0.00972	0.00408
fmpercent	0.193	(0.131)	1.478	0.140	-0.0631	0.449
clpercent	-1.064**	(0.487)	-2.182	0.0292	-2.019	-0.108
elpercent	0.743***	(0.220)	3.377	0.000742	0.312	1.175
_lcdname_3506	0.223***	(0.0801)	2.787	0.00536	0.0661	0.380
_lcdname_3510	0.562***	(0.104)	5.428	6.17e-08	0.359	0.765
_lcdname_3511	0.827***	(0.123)	6.722	0	0.586	1.069
_lcdname_3518	0.0589	(0.0614)	0.959	0.338	-0.0616	0.179
_lcdname_3519	0.162**	(0.0634)	2.556	0.0106	0.0377	0.286
_lcdname_3520	0.161***	(0.0573)	2.813	0.00495	0.0489	0.274
_lcdname_3521	0.114***	(0.0422)	2.706	0.00685	0.0314	0.197
_lcdname_3526	0.0408	(0.133)	0.306	0.759	-0.220	0.302
_lcdname_3534	0.343***	(0.114)	2.997	0.00275	0.119	0.567
_lcdname_3539	0.267***	(0.0981)	2.722	0.00653	0.0747	0.459
_lcdname_3552	-0.166**	(0.0729)	-2.274	0.0230	-0.309	-0.0228
_lcdname_3560	0.251**	(0.122)	2.053	0.0402	0.0113	0.492
_lyear_2000	0.0812***	(0.0178)	4.566	5.18e-06	0.0463	0.116
_lyear_2001	0.290***	(0.0162)	17.93	0	0.258	0.322
_lyear_2002	0.348***	(0.0149)	23.30	0	0.319	0.377
_lyear_2003	0.348***	(0.0147)	23.64	0	0.319	0.377
_lyear_2004	0.393***	(0.0153)	25.67	0	0.363	0.422
_lyear_2005	0.384***	(0.0161)	23.80	0	0.352	0.415
_lyear_2006	0.372***	(0.0178)	20.87	0	0.337	0.407
_lyear_2008	-0.0230**	(0.0110)	-2.098	0.0360	-0.0445	-0.00150
_lcmaca_2	0.0460	(0.130)	0.352	0.725	-0.210	0.302
_lcmaca_3	-0.0327	(0.102)	-0.319	0.750	-0.234	0.168
_lcmaca_5	0.256**	(0.102)	2.503	0.0124	0.0554	0.456
_lriotype_1	0.291***	(0.0609)	4.779	1.85e-06	0.172	0.410
Constant	-0.513***	(0.155)	-3.306	0.000959	-0.817	-0.209
Observations	3,270					
R-squared	0.442					
Number of id	336					

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table H50: Estimated Marginal Effects: Preventive Care Bonuses by Practice Size, Difference-in-differences Estimator with Physician-specific Fixed Effects, Senior Flu Shot, 1K-1.5K

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment3	0.0166	(0.0123)	1.344	0.179	-0.00760	0.0407
post	0.353***	(0.0158)	22.40	0	0.322	0.384
fhgd	-0.00593	(0.00890)	-0.667	0.505	-0.0234	0.0115
fhnd	-0.0247	(0.0266)	-0.927	0.354	-0.0769	0.0275
ccmd	0.0301*	(0.0163)	1.844	0.0652	-0.00189	0.0621
fhod	-0.0188	(0.0282)	-0.667	0.505	-0.0740	0.0364
doc_agem2	-0.00167	(0.0114)	-0.146	0.884	-0.0240	0.0206
doc_agem3	0.00604	(0.0158)	0.382	0.703	-0.0250	0.0371
doc_agem4	0.00127	(0.0205)	0.0619	0.951	-0.0390	0.0416
workdays	0.000698***	(0.000140)	4.985	6.40e-07	0.000424	0.000973
sum_visitg2	0.00319	(0.0107)	0.298	0.766	-0.0178	0.0242
sum_visitg3	0.0119	(0.0154)	0.768	0.442	-0.0184	0.0421
sum_visitg4	-0.0247	(0.0266)	-0.926	0.354	-0.0769	0.0276
visitpd	0.000838	(0.00100)	0.834	0.404	-0.00113	0.00281
sum_ptg2	0.00737	(0.0110)	0.669	0.504	-0.0142	0.0290
sum_ptg3	0.0167	(0.0141)	1.189	0.234	-0.0108	0.0443
sum_ptg4	0.00200	(0.0385)	0.0520	0.959	-0.0735	0.0775
meanage	-0.00574*	(0.00293)	-1.957	0.0504	-0.0115	1.09e-05
fmpercent	0.565***	(0.136)	4.161	3.22e-05	0.299	0.832
clpercent	-0.163	(0.460)	-0.354	0.724	-1.064	0.739
elpercent	0.882***	(0.217)	4.073	4.70e-05	0.458	1.307
_lcdname_3502	-0.393*	(0.219)	-1.792	0.0733	-0.823	0.0371
_lcdname_3506	-0.140	(0.158)	-0.886	0.376	-0.449	0.169
_lcdname_3507	-0.0334	(0.0840)	-0.398	0.690	-0.198	0.131
_lcdname_3510	-0.0103	(0.0749)	-0.137	0.891	-0.157	0.137
_lcdname_3512	0.0447	(0.136)	0.329	0.742	-0.222	0.311
_lcdname_3514	0.346***	(0.119)	2.912	0.00361	0.113	0.579
_lcdname_3518	-0.195*	(0.107)	-1.826	0.0679	-0.404	0.0144
_lcdname_3519	-0.168	(0.142)	-1.183	0.237	-0.447	0.111
_lcdname_3520	-0.154	(0.141)	-1.094	0.274	-0.429	0.122
_lcdname_3521	-0.233*	(0.140)	-1.667	0.0957	-0.506	0.0410
_lcdname_3523	-0.404***	(0.152)	-2.656	0.00792	-0.702	-0.106
_lcdname_3524	-0.321**	(0.127)	-2.526	0.0116	-0.570	-0.0719
_lcdname_3530	-0.376**	(0.178)	-2.113	0.0347	-0.725	-0.0271
_lcdname_3537	0.512***	(0.106)	4.811	1.54e-06	0.303	0.720
_lcdname_3539	-0.0945	(0.173)	-0.546	0.585	-0.434	0.245
_lcdname_3540	0.231	(0.210)	1.098	0.272	-0.181	0.642
_lcdname_3542	-0.264	(0.162)	-1.634	0.102	-0.581	0.0527
_lcdname_3543	-0.163	(0.166)	-0.983	0.325	-0.489	0.162
_lcdname_3547	0.143	(0.197)	0.727	0.467	-0.243	0.530
_lyear_2000	0.0817***	(0.0134)	6.079	1.30e-09	0.0553	0.108
_lyear_2001	0.282***	(0.0123)	22.93	0	0.258	0.307
_lyear_2002	0.363***	(0.0113)	32.09	0	0.341	0.385
_lyear_2003	0.348***	(0.0115)	30.36	0	0.325	0.370
_lyear_2004	0.413***	(0.0119)	34.76	0	0.389	0.436
_lyear_2005	0.403***	(0.0128)	31.39	0	0.378	0.428
_lyear_2006	0.392***	(0.0142)	27.71	0	0.364	0.420
_lyear_2008	-0.00657	(0.00742)	-0.885	0.376	-0.0211	0.00798
_lcmaca_2	-0.179***	(0.0453)	-3.956	7.72e-05	-0.268	-0.0905
_lcmaca_3	0.123	(0.147)	0.841	0.401	-0.164	0.411
_lcmaca_4	-0.184**	(0.0819)	-2.248	0.0246	-0.345	-0.0235
_lcmaca_5	0.167*	(0.0875)	1.908	0.0564	-0.00458	0.338
_lriotype_1	0.0391	(0.0663)	0.590	0.555	-0.0909	0.169

THE RESPONSE OF ONTARIO PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS TO PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES

Constant	-0.0908	(0.175)	-0.518	0.604	-0.434	0.253
Observations	5,935					
R-squared	0.458					
Number of id	606					

---

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.

Table H51: Estimated Marginal Effects: Preventive Care Bonuses by Practice Size, Difference-in-differences Estimator with Physician-specific Fixed Effects, Senior Flu Shot, &gt; 1.5K

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment3	0.0312***	(0.00992)	3.141	0.00169	0.0117	0.0506
post	0.311***	(0.0133)	23.36	0	0.285	0.337
fhgd	0.00776	(0.00648)	1.198	0.231	-0.00494	0.0205
fhnd	-0.0192	(0.0203)	-0.947	0.343	-0.0589	0.0205
ccmd	0.0343***	(0.0121)	2.822	0.00479	0.0105	0.0581
fhod	-0.0181	(0.0193)	-0.938	0.348	-0.0559	0.0197
doc_ageg2	0.00686	(0.00755)	0.909	0.363	-0.00793	0.0217
doc_ageg3	0.00649	(0.0110)	0.590	0.555	-0.0151	0.0280
doc_ageg4	0.0158	(0.0145)	1.091	0.275	-0.0126	0.0443
workdays	0.000141	(0.000109)	1.285	0.199	-7.40e-05	0.000355
sum_visitg2	0.0134	(0.0224)	0.598	0.550	-0.0305	0.0572
sum_visitg3	0.0145	(0.0238)	0.609	0.542	-0.0322	0.0613
sum_visitg4	0.00496	(0.0255)	0.195	0.846	-0.0450	0.0549
visitpd	0.000148	(0.000532)	0.277	0.781	-0.000896	0.00119
sum_ptg2	0.108***	(0.0338)	3.186	0.00145	0.0414	0.174
sum_ptg3	0.106***	(0.0348)	3.054	0.00226	0.0381	0.174
sum_ptg4	0.127***	(0.0353)	3.610	0.000308	0.0582	0.196
meanage	-0.000179	(0.00256)	-0.0698	0.944	-0.00520	0.00484
fmpercent	0.106	(0.124)	0.860	0.390	-0.136	0.348
clpercent	-0.988***	(0.339)	-2.918	0.00353	-1.652	-0.324
elpercent	0.391*	(0.218)	1.798	0.0722	-0.0353	0.818
_lcdname_3506	0.0501	(0.0883)	0.568	0.570	-0.123	0.223
_lcdname_3512	0.534***	(0.202)	2.646	0.00816	0.139	0.930
_lcdname_3514	0.983***	(0.280)	3.508	0.000453	0.434	1.532
_lcdname_3515	0.497***	(0.146)	3.397	0.000685	0.210	0.784
_lcdname_3516	0.754***	(0.149)	5.068	4.09e-07	0.463	1.046
_lcdname_3518	0.344**	(0.137)	2.513	0.0120	0.0756	0.611
_lcdname_3519	0.309**	(0.129)	2.397	0.0165	0.0564	0.562
_lcdname_3520	0.344***	(0.128)	2.702	0.00691	0.0945	0.594
_lcdname_3521	0.417***	(0.131)	3.179	0.00148	0.160	0.674
_lcdname_3523	-0.742***	(0.117)	-6.344	2.34e-10	-0.972	-0.513
_lcdname_3524	0.238	(0.149)	1.595	0.111	-0.0544	0.529
_lcdname_3526	0.471***	(0.139)	3.393	0.000694	0.199	0.743
_lcdname_3530	0.309**	(0.133)	2.323	0.0202	0.0482	0.569
_lcdname_3537	0.0780	(0.106)	0.737	0.461	-0.129	0.285
_lcdname_3538	0.974***	(0.177)	5.502	3.86e-08	0.627	1.321
_lcdname_3539	0.342**	(0.143)	2.387	0.0170	0.0611	0.623
_lcdname_3540	0.658***	(0.193)	3.401	0.000675	0.279	1.037
_lcdname_3541	0.781***	(0.208)	3.745	0.000182	0.372	1.189
_lcdname_3543	0.689***	(0.151)	4.553	5.36e-06	0.392	0.985
_lcdname_3552	0.550***	(0.176)	3.119	0.00182	0.204	0.895
_lcdname_3553	0.194	(0.165)	1.176	0.240	-0.129	0.517
_lyear_2000	0.0535***	(0.00961)	5.561	2.75e-08	0.0346	0.0723
_lyear_2001	0.256***	(0.00884)	28.93	0	0.238	0.273
_lyear_2002	0.348***	(0.00813)	42.80	0	0.332	0.364
_lyear_2003	0.328***	(0.00844)	38.86	0	0.311	0.344
_lyear_2004	0.387***	(0.00912)	42.42	0	0.369	0.405
_lyear_2005	0.383***	(0.00996)	38.39	0	0.363	0.402
_lyear_2006	0.370***	(0.0111)	33.25	0	0.348	0.392
_lyear_2008	-0.0186***	(0.00523)	-3.552	0.000384	-0.0288	-0.00833
_lcmaca_2	-0.247***	(0.0640)	-3.861	0.000114	-0.372	-0.122
_lcmaca_3	-0.707***	(0.182)	-3.888	0.000102	-1.063	-0.350
_lcmaca_4	-0.286***	(0.0980)	-2.919	0.00352	-0.478	-0.0939

THE RESPONSE OF ONTARIO PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS TO PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES

_lcmaca_5	-0.322**	(0.150)	-2.147	0.0319	-0.616	-0.0280
_lriotype_1	0.111**	(0.0463)	2.407	0.0161	0.0207	0.202
Constant	-0.403**	(0.167)	-2.418	0.0156	-0.729	-0.0762
Observations	10,661					
R-squared	0.494					
Number of id	1,087					

---

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table H52: Estimated Marginal Effects: Preventive Care Bonuses by Practice Size, Difference-in-differences Estimator with Physician-specific Fixed Effects, Toddler Immunization, &lt; 1K

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment4	0.0138	(0.0343)	0.401	0.688	-0.0535	0.0810
post	0.178***	(0.0331)	5.360	9.26e-08	0.113	0.242
fhgd	-0.0298	(0.0286)	-1.042	0.298	-0.0858	0.0263
fhnd	0.0167	(0.0607)	0.275	0.783	-0.102	0.136
ccmd	-0.00540	(0.0426)	-0.127	0.899	-0.0889	0.0781
fhod	-0.0845	(0.0888)	-0.952	0.341	-0.259	0.0896
doc_ageg2	-0.000240	(0.0217)	-0.0111	0.991	-0.0427	0.0423
doc_ageg3	-0.0368	(0.0382)	-0.962	0.336	-0.112	0.0382
doc_ageg4	-0.0505	(0.0554)	-0.912	0.362	-0.159	0.0582
workdays	0.000987***	(0.000272)	3.625	0.000296	0.000453	0.00152
sum_visitg2	-0.0295	(0.0241)	-1.226	0.220	-0.0768	0.0177
sum_visitg3	0.0440	(0.0683)	0.644	0.520	-0.0899	0.178
sum_visitg4	0.232**	(0.109)	2.118	0.0343	0.0172	0.446
visitpd	0.00103	(0.00249)	0.413	0.680	-0.00385	0.00590
sum_ptg2	0.00836	(0.0198)	0.423	0.672	-0.0304	0.0472
meanage	0.00700	(0.00657)	1.066	0.287	-0.00588	0.0199
fmpercent	-0.0163	(0.248)	-0.0655	0.948	-0.504	0.471
clpercent	-0.755	(0.715)	-1.056	0.291	-2.158	0.647
elpercent	-0.738	(0.496)	-1.489	0.137	-1.710	0.234
_lcdname_3506	0.0154	(0.109)	0.142	0.887	-0.198	0.229
_lcdname_3510	0.203*	(0.107)	1.901	0.0574	-0.00642	0.413
_lcdname_3518	-0.121	(0.145)	-0.832	0.406	-0.405	0.164
_lcdname_3519	-0.0284	(0.150)	-0.189	0.850	-0.322	0.266
_lcdname_3520	-0.102	(0.147)	-0.694	0.488	-0.391	0.187
_lcdname_3521	-0.139	(0.130)	-1.066	0.287	-0.395	0.117
_lcdname_3526	-0.509***	(0.174)	-2.926	0.00347	-0.850	-0.168
_lcdname_3534	-0.392**	(0.180)	-2.172	0.0300	-0.745	-0.0380
_lcdname_3537	0.0410	(0.128)	0.320	0.749	-0.210	0.292
_lcdname_3539	-0.151	(0.161)	-0.938	0.348	-0.465	0.164
_lcdname_3552	-0.259**	(0.116)	-2.246	0.0248	-0.486	-0.0329
_lyear_2000	-0.259***	(0.0327)	-7.937	0	-0.323	-0.195
_lyear_2001	-0.227***	(0.0315)	-7.202	0	-0.289	-0.165
_lyear_2002	-0.216***	(0.0312)	-6.934	0	-0.277	-0.155
_lyear_2003	-0.202***	(0.0298)	-6.769	0	-0.260	-0.143
_lyear_2004	-0.131***	(0.0285)	-4.593	4.63e-06	-0.186	-0.0749
_lyear_2005	-0.0789***	(0.0259)	-3.044	0.00237	-0.130	-0.0281
_lyear_2007	-0.0503**	(0.0215)	-2.340	0.0194	-0.0925	-0.00815
_lcmaca_3	0.195*	(0.113)	1.716	0.0864	-0.0278	0.417
_lcmaca_5	-0.443***	(0.0786)	-5.632	2.02e-08	-0.597	-0.288
_lriotype_1	-0.0251	(0.0379)	-0.662	0.508	-0.0995	0.0493
Constant	0.435	(0.294)	1.480	0.139	-0.142	1.011
Observations	2,402					
R-squared	0.278					
Number of id	313					

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1



THE RESPONSE OF ONTARIO PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS TO PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES

Table H53: Estimated Marginal Effects: Preventive Care Bonuses by Practice Size, Difference-in-differences Estimator with Physician-specific Fixed Effects, Toddler Immunization, 1K-1.5K

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment4	0.00371	(0.0208)	0.178	0.859	-0.0371	0.0446
post	0.150***	(0.0204)	7.345	0	0.110	0.190
fhgd	0.00367	(0.0147)	0.250	0.803	-0.0251	0.0325
fhnd	0.0349	(0.0332)	1.051	0.293	-0.0302	0.100
ccmd	0.0323	(0.0231)	1.395	0.163	-0.0131	0.0776
fhod	0.0505	(0.0438)	1.153	0.249	-0.0354	0.136
doc_ageg2	0.000545	(0.0126)	0.0434	0.965	-0.0241	0.0252
doc_ageg3	0.00954	(0.0183)	0.522	0.601	-0.0263	0.0453
doc_ageg4	0.000863	(0.0268)	0.0322	0.974	-0.0516	0.0533
workdays	0.000631***	(0.000202)	3.131	0.00175	0.000236	0.00103
sum_visitg2	0.0129	(0.0154)	0.836	0.403	-0.0173	0.0430
sum_visitg3	0.00221	(0.0217)	0.102	0.919	-0.0403	0.0447
sum_visitg4	0.00394	(0.0355)	0.111	0.912	-0.0657	0.0736
visitpd	-0.000820	(0.00140)	-0.584	0.559	-0.00357	0.00193
sum_ptg2	3.18e-05	(0.0160)	0.00198	0.998	-0.0314	0.0314
sum_ptg3	-0.000861	(0.0195)	-0.0441	0.965	-0.0391	0.0374
sum_ptg4	0.0693	(0.0430)	1.614	0.107	-0.0149	0.154
meanage	0.00427	(0.00428)	0.998	0.318	-0.00412	0.0127
fmpercent	0.177	(0.179)	0.989	0.323	-0.174	0.528
clpercent	0.0151	(0.519)	0.0291	0.977	-1.002	1.033
elpercent	-0.540	(0.330)	-1.637	0.102	-1.187	0.107
_lcdname_3506	-0.0200	(0.162)	-0.123	0.902	-0.338	0.298
_lcdname_3507	0.0890	(0.109)	0.816	0.415	-0.125	0.303
_lcdname_3510	-0.291	(0.269)	-1.083	0.279	-0.818	0.236
_lcdname_3512	-0.287	(0.253)	-1.135	0.256	-0.782	0.208
_lcdname_3518	-0.270	(0.248)	-1.088	0.277	-0.755	0.216
_lcdname_3519	-0.217	(0.210)	-1.032	0.302	-0.628	0.195
_lcdname_3520	-0.164	(0.201)	-0.815	0.415	-0.558	0.230
_lcdname_3521	-0.104	(0.200)	-0.520	0.603	-0.496	0.288
_lcdname_3523	0.0626	(0.266)	0.235	0.814	-0.460	0.585
_lcdname_3524	-0.0752	(0.207)	-0.364	0.716	-0.480	0.330
_lcdname_3530	-0.238	(0.222)	-1.071	0.284	-0.672	0.197
_lcdname_3532	-0.126	(0.145)	-0.865	0.387	-0.410	0.159
_lcdname_3539	-0.185	(0.145)	-1.273	0.203	-0.470	0.0999
_lcdname_3542	-0.406*	(0.245)	-1.655	0.0980	-0.886	0.0749
_lcdname_3543	-0.306	(0.223)	-1.369	0.171	-0.744	0.132
_lcdname_3547	-0.103	(0.250)	-0.414	0.679	-0.593	0.386
_lyear_2000	-0.210***	(0.0186)	-11.29	0	-0.246	-0.173
_lyear_2001	-0.181***	(0.0179)	-10.13	0	-0.216	-0.146
_lyear_2002	-0.176***	(0.0169)	-10.37	0	-0.209	-0.143
_lyear_2003	-0.148***	(0.0166)	-8.914	0	-0.180	-0.115
_lyear_2004	-0.108***	(0.0158)	-6.822	0	-0.139	-0.0770
_lyear_2005	-0.0639***	(0.0138)	-4.619	3.97e-06	-0.0910	-0.0368
_lyear_2007	-0.0392***	(0.0114)	-3.438	0.000592	-0.0616	-0.0169
_lcmaca_2	-0.0678	(0.0496)	-1.367	0.172	-0.165	0.0294
_lcmaca_3	0.00736	(0.0979)	0.0753	0.940	-0.184	0.199
_lcmaca_4	-0.104	(0.102)	-1.010	0.312	-0.304	0.0973
_lriotype_1	0.0189	(0.0866)	0.218	0.827	-0.151	0.189
Constant	0.495	(0.307)	1.612	0.107	-0.107	1.097
Observations	5,042					
R-squared	0.322					
Number of id	601					

Robust standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table H54: Estimated Marginal Effects: Preventive Care Bonuses by Practice Size, Difference-in-differences Estimator with Physician-specific Fixed Effects, Toddler Immunization, &gt; 1.5K

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment4	0.0214	(0.0137)	1.569	0.117	-0.00534	0.0482
post	0.104***	(0.0133)	7.851	0	0.0783	0.130
fhgd	0.00266	(0.00869)	0.306	0.760	-0.0144	0.0197
fhnd	-0.0133	(0.0197)	-0.674	0.500	-0.0519	0.0253
ccmd	-0.0188	(0.0161)	-1.169	0.242	-0.0503	0.0127
fhod	0.0215	(0.0233)	0.923	0.356	-0.0242	0.0672
doc_ageg2	-0.00625	(0.00780)	-0.801	0.423	-0.0215	0.00904
doc_ageg3	-0.00277	(0.0112)	-0.248	0.804	-0.0247	0.0191
doc_ageg4	-0.0348**	(0.0157)	-2.214	0.0269	-0.0656	-0.00398
workdays	-1.19e-05	(0.000117)	-0.102	0.919	-0.000241	0.000217
sum_visitg2	-0.00793	(0.0305)	-0.260	0.795	-0.0678	0.0520
sum_visitg3	-0.0154	(0.0327)	-0.469	0.639	-0.0795	0.0488
sum_visitg4	-0.0182	(0.0345)	-0.528	0.597	-0.0857	0.0493
visitpd	0.00113**	(0.000560)	2.010	0.0444	2.80e-05	0.00222
sum_ptg2	0.000924	(0.0432)	0.0214	0.983	-0.0838	0.0856
sum_ptg3	-0.0111	(0.0428)	-0.260	0.795	-0.0951	0.0729
sum_ptg4	-0.00219	(0.0433)	-0.0506	0.960	-0.0870	0.0826
meanage	-0.00539*	(0.00282)	-1.912	0.0559	-0.0109	0.000135
fmpercent	-0.228	(0.157)	-1.450	0.147	-0.536	0.0802
clpercent	-0.533	(0.346)	-1.542	0.123	-1.211	0.145
elpercent	0.305	(0.252)	1.209	0.227	-0.190	0.799
_lcdname_3506	-0.539***	(0.0975)	-5.524	3.41e-08	-0.730	-0.348
_lcdname_3512	-0.588***	(0.218)	-2.694	0.00707	-1.015	-0.160
_lcdname_3514	-0.514	(0.481)	-1.069	0.285	-1.457	0.429
_lcdname_3515	-0.451**	(0.204)	-2.213	0.0269	-0.850	-0.0515
_lcdname_3516	-0.0936	(0.222)	-0.421	0.673	-0.529	0.342
_lcdname_3518	-0.484**	(0.191)	-2.538	0.0112	-0.857	-0.110
_lcdname_3519	-0.511***	(0.186)	-2.751	0.00596	-0.875	-0.147
_lcdname_3520	-0.508***	(0.184)	-2.762	0.00576	-0.868	-0.147
_lcdname_3521	-0.440**	(0.187)	-2.352	0.0187	-0.807	-0.0733
_lcdname_3523	-0.206	(0.181)	-1.137	0.256	-0.561	0.149
_lcdname_3524	-0.478**	(0.206)	-2.323	0.0202	-0.881	-0.0746
_lcdname_3526	-0.561***	(0.199)	-2.823	0.00476	-0.950	-0.171
_lcdname_3530	-0.508***	(0.190)	-2.675	0.00750	-0.881	-0.136
_lcdname_3537	-0.693***	(0.151)	-4.593	4.42e-06	-0.988	-0.397
_lcdname_3538	-0.0806	(0.232)	-0.348	0.728	-0.535	0.374
_lcdname_3539	-0.628***	(0.199)	-3.158	0.00160	-1.018	-0.238
_lcdname_3541	-0.501**	(0.223)	-2.249	0.0246	-0.937	-0.0642
_lcdname_3543	-0.423**	(0.202)	-2.093	0.0364	-0.820	-0.0268
_lcdname_3548	-0.144	(0.427)	-0.336	0.737	-0.981	0.694
_lcdname_3553	-0.755***	(0.210)	-3.597	0.000323	-1.166	-0.343
_lyear_2000	-0.200***	(0.0116)	-17.24	0	-0.223	-0.177
_lyear_2001	-0.174***	(0.0110)	-15.76	0	-0.195	-0.152
_lyear_2002	-0.170***	(0.0104)	-16.36	0	-0.191	-0.150
_lyear_2003	-0.143***	(0.00985)	-14.56	0	-0.163	-0.124
_lyear_2004	-0.111***	(0.00972)	-11.37	0	-0.130	-0.0915
_lyear_2005	-0.0687***	(0.00823)	-8.347	0	-0.0849	-0.0526
_lyear_2008	0.0393***	(0.00678)	5.788	7.40e-09	0.0260	0.0525
_lcmaca_2	-0.188*	(0.0965)	-1.949	0.0513	-0.377	0.00108
_lcmaca_3	-0.408	(0.254)	-1.604	0.109	-0.907	0.0905
_lcmaca_4	-0.269	(0.226)	-1.187	0.235	-0.713	0.175
_lcmaca_5	0.0267	(0.106)	0.253	0.800	-0.180	0.234
_lriotype_1	-0.0323	(0.0625)	-0.517	0.605	-0.155	0.0902

THE RESPONSE OF ONTARIO PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS TO PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES

Constant	1.494***	(0.209)	7.137	0	1.084	1.904
Observations	9,382					
R-squared	0.435					
Number of id	1,085					

---

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table H55: Estimated Marginal Effects: Preventive Care Bonuses by Practice Size, Difference-in-differences Estimator with Physician-specific Fixed Effects, Pap Smear, &lt; 1K

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment1	0.0395***	(0.0105)	3.769	0.000167	0.0190	0.0601
post	-0.0219**	(0.00941)	-2.328	0.0200	-0.0403	-0.00346
fhgd	0.0302***	(0.00794)	3.807	0.000143	0.0147	0.0458
fhnd	0.0503**	(0.0204)	2.462	0.0139	0.0102	0.0903
ccmd	0.0469***	(0.0136)	3.446	0.000576	0.0202	0.0737
fhod	0.0189	(0.0276)	0.685	0.493	-0.0352	0.0731
doc_ageg2	-0.00762	(0.00623)	-1.222	0.222	-0.0198	0.00460
doc_ageg3	-0.0125	(0.0104)	-1.198	0.231	-0.0329	0.00796
doc_ageg4	-0.0167	(0.0138)	-1.210	0.226	-0.0438	0.0104
workdays	0.000447***	(8.70e-05)	5.129	3.10e-07	0.000276	0.000617
sum_visitg2	-0.0119*	(0.00669)	-1.779	0.0754	-0.0250	0.00122
sum_visitg3	-0.0251	(0.0177)	-1.424	0.155	-0.0598	0.00948
sum_visitg4	-0.0449	(0.0276)	-1.628	0.104	-0.0990	0.00918
visitpd	0.00117	(0.000930)	1.259	0.208	-0.000652	0.00299
sum_ptg2	0.00121	(0.00579)	0.209	0.834	-0.0101	0.0126
sum_ptg4	0.307***	(0.0356)	8.635	0	0.237	0.377
meanage	0.00493*	(0.00272)	1.814	0.0698	-0.000399	0.0103
fmpercent	0.263***	(0.0829)	3.177	0.00150	0.101	0.426
clpercent	0.0134	(0.315)	0.0426	0.966	-0.604	0.631
elpercent	-0.278*	(0.158)	-1.763	0.0780	-0.587	0.0312
_lcdname_3506	0.0495	(0.0416)	1.188	0.235	-0.0322	0.131
_lcdname_3510	-0.0892	(0.0719)	-1.240	0.215	-0.230	0.0518
_lcdname_3511	-0.0645	(0.0824)	-0.783	0.434	-0.226	0.0971
_lcdname_3518	-0.0172	(0.0268)	-0.641	0.521	-0.0697	0.0354
_lcdname_3519	0.0765**	(0.0319)	2.398	0.0165	0.0140	0.139
_lcdname_3520	0.0822***	(0.0290)	2.830	0.00469	0.0252	0.139
_lcdname_3521	-0.00640	(0.0227)	-0.282	0.778	-0.0509	0.0381
_lcdname_3526	-0.201***	(0.0597)	-3.373	0.000752	-0.318	-0.0843
_lcdname_3534	-0.281***	(0.0582)	-4.839	1.37e-06	-0.395	-0.167
_lcdname_3537	0.271***	(0.0654)	4.146	3.47e-05	0.143	0.400
_lcdname_3539	-0.0911**	(0.0452)	-2.016	0.0439	-0.180	-0.00250
_lcdname_3552	-0.0660**	(0.0315)	-2.095	0.0363	-0.128	-0.00423
_lcdname_3553	0.269***	(0.0596)	4.512	6.68e-06	0.152	0.385
_lyear_2000	0.00510	(0.00576)	0.885	0.376	-0.00619	0.0164
_lyear_2001	0.00777	(0.00533)	1.457	0.145	-0.00269	0.0182
_lyear_2002	0.00224	(0.00595)	0.377	0.706	-0.00942	0.0139
_lyear_2003	-0.00370	(0.00594)	-0.622	0.534	-0.0153	0.00795
_lyear_2004	0.000957	(0.00627)	0.153	0.879	-0.0113	0.0132
_lyear_2005	-0.00270	(0.00729)	-0.371	0.711	-0.0170	0.0116
_lyear_2006	-0.00516	(0.00879)	-0.587	0.558	-0.0224	0.0121
_lyear_2008	0.000839	(0.00712)	0.118	0.906	-0.0131	0.0148
_lcmaca_2	0.0740	(0.0500)	1.481	0.139	-0.0240	0.172
_lcmaca_3	0.0788**	(0.0359)	2.197	0.0281	0.00849	0.149
_lriotype_1	-0.228***	(0.0577)	-3.951	7.97e-05	-0.341	-0.115
Constant	0.379***	(0.120)	3.164	0.00157	0.144	0.614
Observations	3,301					
R-squared	0.112					
Number of id	336					

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1

THE RESPONSE OF ONTARIO PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS TO PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES

Table H56: Estimated Marginal Effects: Preventive Care Bonuses by Practice Size, Difference-in-differences Estimator with Physician-specific Fixed Effects, Pap Smear, 1K-1.5K

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment1	0.0375***	(0.00719)	5.218	1.87e-07	0.0234	0.0516
post	-0.0131	(0.00798)	-1.637	0.102	-0.0287	0.00258
fhgd	0.0171***	(0.00565)	3.035	0.00241	0.00607	0.0282
fhnd	0.0185	(0.0223)	0.830	0.406	-0.0252	0.0623
ccmd	0.00233	(0.00973)	0.239	0.811	-0.0167	0.0214
fhod	0.0550	(0.0340)	1.618	0.106	-0.0116	0.122
doc_ageg2	0.0260***	(0.00537)	4.841	1.33e-06	0.0155	0.0365
doc_ageg3	0.0214***	(0.00673)	3.188	0.00144	0.00825	0.0346
doc_ageg4	0.0167*	(0.00873)	1.915	0.0555	-0.000393	0.0338
workdays	0.000179**	(6.95e-05)	2.572	0.0102	4.25e-05	0.000315
sum_visitg2	0.00372	(0.00456)	0.817	0.414	-0.00521	0.0127
sum_visitg3	-0.00340	(0.00704)	-0.484	0.629	-0.0172	0.0104
sum_visitg4	-0.00786	(0.0104)	-0.752	0.452	-0.0283	0.0126
visitpd	0.000430	(0.000460)	0.936	0.350	-0.000471	0.00133
sum_ptg2	0.00384	(0.00426)	0.902	0.367	-0.00451	0.0122
sum_ptg3	0.00563	(0.00620)	0.909	0.364	-0.00652	0.0178
sum_ptg4	-0.0363**	(0.0165)	-2.196	0.0281	-0.0686	-0.00389
meanage	0.00895***	(0.00130)	6.867	0	0.00639	0.0115
fmpercent	0.454***	(0.0658)	6.907	0	0.325	0.583
clpercent	0.295*	(0.172)	1.722	0.0852	-0.0410	0.632
elpercent	-0.537***	(0.0849)	-6.322	2.80e-10	-0.703	-0.370
_lcdname_3502	0.167*	(0.0877)	1.907	0.0566	-0.00468	0.339
_lcdname_3506	0.0684	(0.0560)	1.220	0.223	-0.0415	0.178
_lcdname_3507	-0.137***	(0.0444)	-3.082	0.00206	-0.224	-0.0498
_lcdname_3510	0.0275	(0.0959)	0.287	0.774	-0.161	0.216
_lcdname_3511	0.0331	(0.0981)	0.338	0.736	-0.159	0.225
_lcdname_3512	0.0468	(0.0843)	0.555	0.579	-0.118	0.212
_lcdname_3514	-0.0678	(0.0746)	-0.908	0.364	-0.214	0.0785
_lcdname_3518	0.153*	(0.0787)	1.950	0.0512	-0.000831	0.308
_lcdname_3519	0.0234	(0.0730)	0.320	0.749	-0.120	0.166
_lcdname_3520	0.0102	(0.0718)	0.142	0.887	-0.131	0.151
_lcdname_3521	0.00863	(0.0709)	0.122	0.903	-0.130	0.148
_lcdname_3523	0.0152	(0.0815)	0.186	0.852	-0.145	0.175
_lcdname_3524	0.0603	(0.0746)	0.809	0.418	-0.0859	0.207
_lcdname_3530	-0.0253	(0.0769)	-0.328	0.743	-0.176	0.126
_lcdname_3537	0.0423	(0.0498)	0.850	0.395	-0.0553	0.140
_lcdname_3539	-0.0416	(0.0440)	-0.944	0.345	-0.128	0.0448
_lcdname_3542	-0.0320	(0.0710)	-0.450	0.653	-0.171	0.107
_lcdname_3543	-0.00587	(0.0792)	-0.0741	0.941	-0.161	0.149
_lcdname_3547	-0.152*	(0.0859)	-1.768	0.0771	-0.320	0.0165
_lcdname_3548	-0.103*	(0.0570)	-1.813	0.0699	-0.215	0.00841
_lyear_2000	-0.00103	(0.00409)	-0.253	0.800	-0.00904	0.00698
_lyear_2001	-0.00189	(0.00411)	-0.460	0.646	-0.00995	0.00617
_lyear_2002	-0.00476	(0.00432)	-1.102	0.271	-0.0132	0.00371
_lyear_2003	-0.0128***	(0.00431)	-2.978	0.00291	-0.0213	-0.00439
_lyear_2004	-0.0159***	(0.00480)	-3.312	0.000934	-0.0253	-0.00649
_lyear_2005	-0.00488	(0.00546)	-0.894	0.371	-0.0156	0.00582
_lyear_2006	0.00661	(0.00682)	0.968	0.333	-0.00677	0.0200
_lyear_2007	-0.00743	(0.00475)	-1.563	0.118	-0.0168	0.00189
_lcmaca_2	0.00964	(0.0250)	0.385	0.700	-0.0394	0.0587
_lcmaca_3	-0.165**	(0.0833)	-1.986	0.0471	-0.329	-0.00211
_lcmaca_4	-0.0102	(0.0428)	-0.237	0.812	-0.0941	0.0738
_lriotype_1	-0.0758**	(0.0337)	-2.252	0.0244	-0.142	-0.00981

Constant	0.0736	(0.111)	0.662	0.508	-0.144	0.292
Observations	5,944					
R-squared	0.121					
Number of id	606					

---

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

THE RESPONSE OF ONTARIO PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS TO PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES

Table H57: Estimated Marginal Effects: Preventive Care Bonuses by Practice Size, Difference-in-differences Estimator with Physician-specific Fixed Effects, Pap Smear, > 1.5K

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment1	0.0371***	(0.00570)	6.509	7.94e-11	0.0260	0.0483
post	-0.0112*	(0.00647)	-1.725	0.0845	-0.0239	0.00152
fhgd	0.0247***	(0.00405)	6.097	1.12e-09	0.0168	0.0327
fhnd	0.0428**	(0.0167)	2.558	0.0105	0.0100	0.0757
ccmd	0.0308***	(0.00711)	4.338	1.45e-05	0.0169	0.0448
fhod	0.111***	(0.0265)	4.191	2.80e-05	0.0591	0.163
doc_ageg2	0.00551	(0.00347)	1.590	0.112	-0.00128	0.0123
doc_ageg3	0.00284	(0.00470)	0.604	0.546	-0.00638	0.0121
doc_ageg4	-0.0108	(0.00670)	-1.613	0.107	-0.0239	0.00233
workdays	-0.000121**	(5.23e-05)	-2.308	0.0210	-0.000223	-1.82e-05
sum_visitg2	0.00607	(0.0104)	0.586	0.558	-0.0142	0.0264
sum_visitg3	0.0179	(0.0111)	1.617	0.106	-0.00380	0.0396
sum_visitg4	0.0258**	(0.0118)	2.185	0.0289	0.00266	0.0490
visitpd	-0.000699***	(0.000245)	-2.855	0.00431	-0.00118	-0.000219
sum_ptg2	0.00632	(0.0142)	0.445	0.656	-0.0215	0.0342
sum_ptg3	0.0123	(0.0145)	0.851	0.395	-0.0160	0.0407
sum_ptg4	0.0120	(0.0147)	0.818	0.413	-0.0168	0.0409
meanage	0.00836***	(0.00105)	7.932	0	0.00629	0.0104
fmpercent	0.229***	(0.0533)	4.300	1.72e-05	0.125	0.334
clpercent	0.0933	(0.169)	0.553	0.580	-0.237	0.424
elpercent	-0.686***	(0.0972)	-7.062	0	-0.877	-0.496
_lcdname_3506	-0.00393	(0.0490)	-0.0801	0.936	-0.100	0.0922
_lcdname_3512	-0.0205	(0.0716)	-0.287	0.774	-0.161	0.120
_lcdname_3514	0.0635	(0.117)	0.541	0.588	-0.166	0.294
_lcdname_3515	-0.0385	(0.0570)	-0.676	0.499	-0.150	0.0732
_lcdname_3516	-0.00277	(0.0671)	-0.0413	0.967	-0.134	0.129
_lcdname_3518	0.0425	(0.0526)	0.808	0.419	-0.0606	0.146
_lcdname_3519	0.0411	(0.0528)	0.778	0.436	-0.0624	0.145
_lcdname_3520	0.0510	(0.0516)	0.988	0.323	-0.0502	0.152
_lcdname_3521	0.0556	(0.0531)	1.048	0.295	-0.0484	0.160
_lcdname_3523	-0.0327	(0.0521)	-0.627	0.530	-0.135	0.0694
_lcdname_3524	0.0630	(0.0636)	0.991	0.322	-0.0616	0.188
_lcdname_3526	0.0203	(0.0551)	0.368	0.713	-0.0877	0.128
_lcdname_3530	-0.0173	(0.0543)	-0.318	0.750	-0.124	0.0891
_lcdname_3537	0.0908**	(0.0459)	1.977	0.0480	0.000790	0.181
_lcdname_3538	-0.169	(0.127)	-1.328	0.184	-0.418	0.0805
_lcdname_3539	-0.190***	(0.0574)	-3.305	0.000954	-0.302	-0.0772
_lcdname_3540	-0.317***	(0.0853)	-3.712	0.000207	-0.484	-0.149
_lcdname_3543	0.0342	(0.0609)	0.562	0.574	-0.0851	0.154
_lcdname_3552	0.0471	(0.0776)	0.607	0.544	-0.105	0.199
_lcdname_3553	0.123**	(0.0571)	2.155	0.0312	0.0111	0.235
_lcdname_3560	-0.00904	(0.0727)	-0.124	0.901	-0.152	0.134
_lyear_2000	0.000491	(0.00267)	0.184	0.854	-0.00475	0.00573
_lyear_2001	-0.000910	(0.00274)	-0.332	0.740	-0.00628	0.00446
_lyear_2002	-0.00710**	(0.00299)	-2.371	0.0177	-0.0130	-0.00123
_lyear_2003	-0.0154***	(0.00308)	-4.993	6.06e-07	-0.0214	-0.00935
_lyear_2004	-0.0131***	(0.00349)	-3.758	0.000173	-0.0200	-0.00628
_lyear_2005	-0.00471	(0.00406)	-1.160	0.246	-0.0127	0.00325
_lyear_2006	0.00849	(0.00531)	1.598	0.110	-0.00192	0.0189
_lyear_2007	-0.00653*	(0.00347)	-1.884	0.0596	-0.0133	0.000266
_lcmaca_2	-0.0350	(0.0324)	-1.082	0.279	-0.0985	0.0284
_lcmaca_3	-0.140*	(0.0775)	-1.805	0.0712	-0.292	0.0121
_lcmaca_4	-0.116**	(0.0571)	-2.022	0.0432	-0.228	-0.00354

_lcmaca_5	0.119**	(0.0562)	2.113	0.0346	0.00857	0.229
_lriotype_1	-0.0171	(0.0122)	-1.403	0.161	-0.0410	0.00678
Constant	0.245***	(0.0679)	3.611	0.000306	0.112	0.378
Observations	10,681					
R-squared	0.141					
Number of id	1,087					

---

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1



THE RESPONSE OF ONTARIO PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS TO PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES

Table H58: Estimated Marginal Effects: Preventive Care Bonuses by Practice Size, Difference-in-differences Estimator with Physician-specific Fixed Effects, Mammogram, < 1K

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment2	0.0173	(0.0112)	1.536	0.125	-0.00477	0.0393
post	0.00527	(0.0116)	0.454	0.650	-0.0175	0.0280
fhgd	0.0254***	(0.00826)	3.068	0.00217	0.00915	0.0416
fhnd	-0.0298	(0.0196)	-1.519	0.129	-0.0683	0.00866
ccmd	0.0517***	(0.0143)	3.627	0.000291	0.0238	0.0797
fhod	0.00753	(0.0195)	0.387	0.699	-0.0306	0.0457
doc_ageg2	0.00665	(0.00686)	0.970	0.332	-0.00679	0.0201
doc_ageg3	-0.00168	(0.00941)	-0.178	0.859	-0.0201	0.0168
doc_ageg4	-0.00837	(0.0137)	-0.610	0.542	-0.0353	0.0185
workdays	0.000371***	(8.28e-05)	4.484	7.62e-06	0.000209	0.000534
sum_visitg2	-0.00908	(0.00622)	-1.461	0.144	-0.0213	0.00311
sum_visitg3	-0.0309*	(0.0182)	-1.698	0.0896	-0.0667	0.00479
sum_visitg4	-0.0509**	(0.0238)	-2.135	0.0328	-0.0977	-0.00416
visitpd	0.000596	(0.000738)	0.807	0.420	-0.000852	0.00204
sum_ptg2	-0.0121**	(0.00567)	-2.142	0.0322	-0.0232	-0.00103
sum_ptg4	0.195***	(0.0538)	3.629	0.000289	0.0897	0.301
meanage	0.00387**	(0.00192)	2.013	0.0442	9.97e-05	0.00763
fmpercent	0.309***	(0.108)	2.862	0.00423	0.0973	0.520
clpercent	0.00316	(0.273)	0.0116	0.991	-0.532	0.538
elpercent	0.0402	(0.127)	0.317	0.751	-0.208	0.288
_lcdname_3502	0.0130	(0.0777)	0.167	0.868	-0.139	0.165
_lcdname_3506	-0.0482	(0.0380)	-1.270	0.204	-0.123	0.0262
_lcdname_3510	-0.0553*	(0.0299)	-1.848	0.0647	-0.114	0.00337
_lcdname_3518	-0.0751	(0.0852)	-0.881	0.378	-0.242	0.0920
_lcdname_3519	0.104**	(0.0504)	2.063	0.0392	0.00514	0.203
_lcdname_3520	0.0938**	(0.0456)	2.054	0.0400	0.00427	0.183
_lcdname_3521	0.0444	(0.0290)	1.531	0.126	-0.0125	0.101
_lcdname_3524	-0.122**	(0.0545)	-2.240	0.0251	-0.229	-0.0152
_lcdname_3526	0.0178	(0.0522)	0.341	0.733	-0.0846	0.120
_lcdname_3539	0.0497***	(0.0145)	3.427	0.000618	0.0213	0.0782
_lcdname_3552	-0.0841***	(0.0228)	-3.683	0.000235	-0.129	-0.0393
_lcdname_3553	-0.190***	(0.0481)	-3.953	7.91e-05	-0.285	-0.0959
_lcdname_3560	0.0646	(0.0572)	1.129	0.259	-0.0476	0.177
_lyear_2000	0.00880	(0.00598)	1.470	0.142	-0.00293	0.0205
_lyear_2001	0.0129**	(0.00589)	2.191	0.0285	0.00136	0.0245
_lyear_2002	0.0143**	(0.00566)	2.522	0.0117	0.00318	0.0254
_lyear_2003	0.0192***	(0.00589)	3.253	0.00116	0.00761	0.0307
_lyear_2004	0.00533	(0.00672)	0.792	0.428	-0.00786	0.0185
_lyear_2005	-0.00540	(0.00738)	-0.731	0.465	-0.0199	0.00907
_lyear_2006	0.00915	(0.00904)	1.012	0.312	-0.00858	0.0269
_lyear_2008	0.00597	(0.00754)	0.792	0.428	-0.00881	0.0207
_lcmaca_2	0.0110	(0.0605)	0.182	0.856	-0.108	0.130
_lcmaca_3	0.0500	(0.0552)	0.906	0.365	-0.0582	0.158
_lriotype_1	0.0215	(0.0444)	0.485	0.628	-0.0655	0.109
Constant	0.156	(0.110)	1.423	0.155	-0.0590	0.371
Observations	3,284					
R-squared	0.112					
Number of id	336					

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table H59: Estimated Marginal Effects: Preventive Care Bonuses by Practice Size, Difference-in-differences Estimator with Physician-specific Fixed Effects, Mammogram, 1K-1.5K

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment2	-0.00300	(0.00756)	-0.397	0.691	-0.0178	0.0118
post	-0.0137	(0.00882)	-1.558	0.119	-0.0310	0.00355
fhgd	0.0439***	(0.00478)	9.192	0	0.0346	0.0533
fhnd	0.00549	(0.0222)	0.247	0.805	-0.0381	0.0491
ccmd	0.0381***	(0.00767)	4.965	7.07e-07	0.0231	0.0531
fhod	0.00732	(0.0208)	0.351	0.725	-0.0335	0.0482
doc_aged2	-0.000467	(0.00443)	-0.105	0.916	-0.00915	0.00821
doc_aged3	0.00620	(0.00636)	0.975	0.330	-0.00627	0.0187
doc_aged4	0.0158*	(0.00850)	1.863	0.0625	-0.000826	0.0325
workdays	0.000262***	(6.62e-05)	3.961	7.55e-05	0.000132	0.000392
sum_visitg2	0.00326	(0.00433)	0.754	0.451	-0.00522	0.0117
sum_visitg3	0.000596	(0.00651)	0.0914	0.927	-0.0122	0.0134
sum_visitg4	-0.00406	(0.0114)	-0.356	0.722	-0.0264	0.0183
visitpd	1.40e-05	(0.000477)	0.0294	0.977	-0.000920	0.000948
sum_ptg2	0.0112**	(0.00469)	2.387	0.0170	0.00200	0.0204
sum_ptg3	0.0151**	(0.00629)	2.405	0.0162	0.00280	0.0275
sum_ptg4	0.00125	(0.0171)	0.0733	0.942	-0.0322	0.0347
meanage	0.0160***	(0.00140)	11.43	0	0.0132	0.0187
fmpercent	0.553***	(0.0711)	7.788	0	0.414	0.693
clpercent	0.656***	(0.216)	3.043	0.00236	0.233	1.079
elpercent	-0.507***	(0.0909)	-5.573	2.64e-08	-0.685	-0.328
_lcdname_3502	-0.468***	(0.0997)	-4.697	2.70e-06	-0.664	-0.273
_lcdname_3506	-0.324***	(0.0800)	-4.054	5.11e-05	-0.481	-0.167
_lcdname_3507	0.00494	(0.0368)	0.134	0.893	-0.0671	0.0770
_lcdname_3510	0.0427***	(0.0133)	3.216	0.00131	0.0167	0.0687
_lcdname_3512	-0.0646	(0.0755)	-0.857	0.392	-0.213	0.0833
_lcdname_3514	-0.217***	(0.0445)	-4.883	1.07e-06	-0.304	-0.130
_lcdname_3518	0.0217	(0.0311)	0.695	0.487	-0.0394	0.0827
_lcdname_3519	-0.190***	(0.0544)	-3.487	0.000493	-0.296	-0.0831
_lcdname_3520	-0.199***	(0.0528)	-3.762	0.000170	-0.302	-0.0952
_lcdname_3521	-0.205***	(0.0480)	-4.266	2.03e-05	-0.299	-0.111
_lcdname_3523	-0.317***	(0.0577)	-5.493	4.13e-08	-0.430	-0.204
_lcdname_3524	-0.208***	(0.0363)	-5.720	1.12e-08	-0.279	-0.137
_lcdname_3530	-0.369***	(0.0861)	-4.284	1.87e-05	-0.538	-0.200
_lcdname_3537	0.0740*	(0.0397)	1.865	0.0623	-0.00380	0.152
_lcdname_3539	-0.454***	(0.0909)	-4.996	6.06e-07	-0.632	-0.276
_lcdname_3540	-0.621***	(0.103)	-6.049	1.56e-09	-0.822	-0.420
_lcdname_3542	-0.279***	(0.0574)	-4.859	1.21e-06	-0.392	-0.166
_lcdname_3543	-0.196***	(0.0653)	-3.004	0.00268	-0.324	-0.0681
_lcdname_3547	-0.255***	(0.0813)	-3.129	0.00176	-0.414	-0.0950
_lcdname_3548	-0.240***	(0.0371)	-6.461	1.13e-10	-0.312	-0.167
_lyear_2000	0.00733*	(0.00403)	1.818	0.0691	-0.000575	0.0152
_lyear_2001	0.00931**	(0.00390)	2.386	0.0171	0.00166	0.0170
_lyear_2002	0.0103**	(0.00405)	2.541	0.0111	0.00235	0.0182
_lyear_2003	0.00500	(0.00421)	1.188	0.235	-0.00325	0.0133
_lyear_2004	-0.00981**	(0.00470)	-2.086	0.0370	-0.0190	-0.000590
_lyear_2005	-0.0199***	(0.00538)	-3.702	0.000216	-0.0305	-0.00938
_lyear_2006	-0.0256***	(0.00651)	-3.932	8.53e-05	-0.0384	-0.0128
_lyear_2007	-0.00906*	(0.00479)	-1.893	0.0584	-0.0184	0.000323
_lcmaca_2	0.0808***	(0.0239)	3.387	0.000711	0.0340	0.128
_lcmaca_3	0.0640	(0.0548)	1.169	0.242	-0.0433	0.171
_lcmaca_4	0.0365	(0.0337)	1.083	0.279	-0.0295	0.102
_lriotype_1	0.0292	(0.0231)	1.267	0.205	-0.0160	0.0745

THE RESPONSE OF ONTARIO PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS TO PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES

Constant	-0.159**	(0.0725)	-2.190	0.0285	-0.301	-0.0167
Observations	5,937					
R-squared	0.197					
Number of id	606					

---

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table H60: Estimated Marginal Effects: Preventive Care Bonuses by Practice Size, Difference-in-differences Estimator with Physician-specific Fixed Effects, Mammogram, &gt; 1.5K

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment2	0.0281***	(0.00622)	4.521	6.23e-06	0.0159	0.0403
post	-0.00194	(0.00760)	-0.255	0.799	-0.0168	0.0130
fhgd	0.0296***	(0.00399)	7.420	0	0.0218	0.0374
fhnd	0.0150*	(0.00901)	1.664	0.0961	-0.00267	0.0327
ccmd	0.0458***	(0.00694)	6.610	0	0.0323	0.0594
fhod	0.0192	(0.0126)	1.528	0.127	-0.00542	0.0438
doc_ageg2	-0.00356	(0.00304)	-1.171	0.242	-0.00953	0.00240
doc_ageg3	-0.00302	(0.00443)	-0.683	0.495	-0.0117	0.00566
doc_ageg4	-0.0138**	(0.00624)	-2.207	0.0273	-0.0260	-0.00154
workdays	-1.39e-05	(4.41e-05)	-0.314	0.753	-0.000100	7.26e-05
sum_visitg2	0.00629	(0.0103)	0.609	0.543	-0.0140	0.0266
sum_visitg3	0.00834	(0.0111)	0.753	0.451	-0.0134	0.0301
sum_visitg4	0.0107	(0.0117)	0.911	0.363	-0.0123	0.0336
visitpd	-0.00121***	(0.000242)	-5.005	5.68e-07	-0.00168	-0.000736
sum_ptg2	0.0280	(0.0178)	1.575	0.115	-0.00684	0.0629
sum_ptg3	0.0334*	(0.0181)	1.849	0.0645	-0.00201	0.0688
sum_ptg4	0.0416**	(0.0183)	2.278	0.0228	0.00580	0.0774
meanage	0.0115***	(0.00112)	10.20	0	0.00925	0.0137
fmpercent	0.199***	(0.0614)	3.240	0.00120	0.0785	0.319
clpercent	0.480***	(0.149)	3.213	0.00132	0.187	0.773
elpercent	-0.345***	(0.0816)	-4.226	2.40e-05	-0.505	-0.185
_lcdname_3506	0.0271	(0.0502)	0.540	0.589	-0.0712	0.125
_lcdname_3512	-0.333***	(0.0834)	-3.996	6.49e-05	-0.497	-0.170
_lcdname_3514	-0.605***	(0.150)	-4.031	5.60e-05	-0.899	-0.311
_lcdname_3515	-0.299***	(0.0827)	-3.615	0.000302	-0.461	-0.137
_lcdname_3516	-0.328***	(0.0798)	-4.116	3.89e-05	-0.485	-0.172
_lcdname_3518	-0.237***	(0.0719)	-3.293	0.000993	-0.378	-0.0958
_lcdname_3519	-0.229***	(0.0704)	-3.258	0.00113	-0.367	-0.0913
_lcdname_3520	-0.256***	(0.0682)	-3.756	0.000174	-0.390	-0.122
_lcdname_3521	-0.234***	(0.0704)	-3.315	0.000919	-0.372	-0.0955
_lcdname_3523	-0.0241	(0.0605)	-0.398	0.691	-0.143	0.0944
_lcdname_3524	-0.146*	(0.0772)	-1.898	0.0578	-0.298	0.00484
_lcdname_3526	-0.310***	(0.0774)	-4.007	6.19e-05	-0.462	-0.158
_lcdname_3530	-0.320***	(0.0776)	-4.129	3.67e-05	-0.472	-0.168
_lcdname_3537	-0.0499	(0.0412)	-1.213	0.225	-0.131	0.0308
_lcdname_3538	-0.171*	(0.0906)	-1.890	0.0588	-0.349	0.00636
_lcdname_3539	-0.340***	(0.0728)	-4.677	2.96e-06	-0.483	-0.198
_lcdname_3540	-0.139	(0.0992)	-1.406	0.160	-0.334	0.0550
_lcdname_3543	-0.348***	(0.0753)	-4.629	3.73e-06	-0.496	-0.201
_lcdname_3544	0.296***	(0.0891)	3.324	0.000891	0.121	0.471
_lcdname_3548	0.271***	(0.0860)	3.146	0.00166	0.102	0.439
_lcdname_3553	-0.119	(0.0805)	-1.482	0.138	-0.277	0.0384
_lyear_2000	0.00765***	(0.00284)	2.697	0.00700	0.00209	0.0132
_lyear_2001	0.0121***	(0.00278)	4.331	1.50e-05	0.00660	0.0175
_lyear_2002	0.0147***	(0.00285)	5.164	2.47e-07	0.00914	0.0203
_lyear_2003	0.0140***	(0.00309)	4.545	5.55e-06	0.00798	0.0201
_lyear_2004	-0.00502	(0.00370)	-1.357	0.175	-0.0123	0.00223
_lyear_2005	-0.00698	(0.00439)	-1.590	0.112	-0.0156	0.00162
_lyear_2006	-1.49e-05	(0.00551)	-0.00271	0.998	-0.0108	0.0108
_lyear_2007	-0.0127***	(0.00321)	-3.952	7.81e-05	-0.0190	-0.00639
_lcmaca_2	0.0956**	(0.0388)	2.463	0.0138	0.0195	0.172
_lcmaca_3	0.352***	(0.0948)	3.715	0.000204	0.166	0.538
_lcmaca_4	0.0783	(0.0557)	1.405	0.160	-0.0309	0.188

THE RESPONSE OF ONTARIO PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS TO PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES

_lcmaca_5	-0.218***	(0.0732)	-2.982	0.00287	-0.362	-0.0748
_lriotype_1	0.0477***	(0.0163)	2.922	0.00349	0.0157	0.0797
Constant	0.254***	(0.0824)	3.084	0.00205	0.0926	0.416
Observations	10,667					
R-squared	0.191					
Number of id	1,087					

---

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table H61: Estimated Marginal Effects: Preventive Care Bonuses by Practice Size, Difference-in-differences Estimator with Physician-specific Fixed Effects, Colorectal Cancer Screening, &lt; 1K

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment5	0.0682***	(0.0149)	4.569	5.11e-06	0.0389	0.0975
post	0.124***	(0.0126)	9.797	0	0.0991	0.149
fhgd	0.0583***	(0.0134)	4.346	1.44e-05	0.0320	0.0845
fhnd	0.152***	(0.0271)	5.621	2.08e-08	0.0990	0.205
ccmd	0.137***	(0.0331)	4.137	3.62e-05	0.0720	0.202
fhod	0.130***	(0.0370)	3.520	0.000439	0.0576	0.203
doc_agem2	0.0174*	(0.0102)	1.696	0.0901	-0.00272	0.0374
doc_agem3	0.0401**	(0.0165)	2.425	0.0154	0.00768	0.0726
doc_agem4	0.0211	(0.0206)	1.022	0.307	-0.0194	0.0615
workdays	0.000270***	(9.21e-05)	2.933	0.00338	8.96e-05	0.000451
sum_visitg2	-0.0149	(0.00989)	-1.511	0.131	-0.0343	0.00445
sum_visitg3	0.0108	(0.0216)	0.502	0.616	-0.0315	0.0532
sum_visitg4	0.0371	(0.0394)	0.942	0.346	-0.0401	0.114
visitpd	0.000229	(0.000995)	0.231	0.818	-0.00172	0.00218
sum_ptg2	0.0103	(0.00935)	1.100	0.271	-0.00805	0.0286
sum_ptg3	-0.112***	(0.0333)	-3.346	0.000832	-0.177	-0.0462
sum_ptg4	-0.185**	(0.0934)	-1.980	0.0478	-0.368	-0.00183
meanage	0.000361	(0.00202)	0.179	0.858	-0.00360	0.00432
fmpercent	-0.00670	(0.0777)	-0.0863	0.931	-0.159	0.146
clpercent	0.772*	(0.396)	1.951	0.0511	-0.00381	1.548
elpercent	0.124	(0.127)	0.972	0.331	-0.126	0.373
_lcdname_3502	0.00959	(0.0907)	0.106	0.916	-0.168	0.187
_lcdname_3506	0.0654	(0.0612)	1.069	0.285	-0.0546	0.185
_lcdname_3510	0.129**	(0.0575)	2.242	0.0250	0.0162	0.242
_lcdname_3518	-0.130	(0.127)	-1.018	0.309	-0.380	0.120
_lcdname_3519	-0.0545	(0.101)	-0.540	0.589	-0.252	0.143
_lcdname_3520	0.0239	(0.0992)	0.241	0.809	-0.171	0.218
_lcdname_3521	0.00341	(0.0895)	0.0381	0.970	-0.172	0.179
_lcdname_3524	-0.201*	(0.111)	-1.807	0.0708	-0.420	0.0171
_lcdname_3526	0.153	(0.105)	1.460	0.144	-0.0525	0.359
_lcdname_3529	0.0848	(0.125)	0.678	0.498	-0.161	0.330
_lcdname_3534	0.0861	(0.0868)	0.991	0.322	-0.0842	0.256
_lcdname_3539	0.0601	(0.0857)	0.701	0.483	-0.108	0.228
_lcdname_3542	0.226*	(0.120)	1.889	0.0590	-0.00856	0.461
_lcdname_3552	-0.136***	(0.0513)	-2.647	0.00816	-0.236	-0.0352
_lcdname_3560	-0.0540	(0.0363)	-1.488	0.137	-0.125	0.0171
_lyear_2000	0.0130	(0.00872)	1.486	0.137	-0.00414	0.0301
_lyear_2001	0.0369***	(0.00848)	4.356	1.37e-05	0.0203	0.0536
_lyear_2002	0.0551***	(0.00819)	6.721	0	0.0390	0.0711
_lyear_2003	0.0733***	(0.00821)	8.924	0	0.0572	0.0894
_lyear_2004	0.0815***	(0.00863)	9.435	0	0.0645	0.0984
_lyear_2005	0.0886***	(0.00956)	9.265	0	0.0698	0.107
_lyear_2006	-0.0739***	(0.0111)	-6.662	0	-0.0956	-0.0521
_lyear_2007	-0.0398***	(0.0114)	-3.500	0.000472	-0.0621	-0.0175
_lcmaca_2	-0.123	(0.0805)	-1.525	0.127	-0.281	0.0350
_lcmaca_3	-0.134*	(0.0707)	-1.891	0.0588	-0.272	0.00496
_lcmaca_4	0.0325	(0.0640)	0.508	0.611	-0.0930	0.158
_lcmaca_5	0.130**	(0.0503)	2.576	0.0101	0.0309	0.228
_lriotype_1	0.116**	(0.0465)	2.488	0.0129	0.0245	0.207
Constant	-0.163	(0.123)	-1.323	0.186	-0.404	0.0785
Observations	3,243					
R-squared	0.369					
Number of id	330					

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1

THE RESPONSE OF ONTARIO PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS TO PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES

Table H62: Estimated Marginal Effects: Preventive Care Bonuses by Practice Size, Difference-in-differences Estimator with Physician-specific Fixed Effects, Colorectal Cancer Screening, 1K-1.5K

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment5	0.0788***	(0.0101)	7.822	0	0.0590	0.0985
post	0.112***	(0.0121)	9.310	0	0.0888	0.136
fhgd	0.0470***	(0.00791)	5.943	2.98e-09	0.0315	0.0625
fhnd	0.0520***	(0.0144)	3.610	0.000309	0.0238	0.0803
ccmd	0.0295*	(0.0151)	1.955	0.0507	-8.84e-05	0.0592
fhod	0.0412	(0.0298)	1.381	0.167	-0.0173	0.0997
doc_ageg2	0.00779	(0.00696)	1.120	0.263	-0.00584	0.0214
doc_ageg3	0.00800	(0.0101)	0.791	0.429	-0.0118	0.0278
doc_ageg4	0.0137	(0.0137)	0.996	0.319	-0.0133	0.0406
workdays	0.000269***	(9.06e-05)	2.972	0.00297	9.17e-05	0.000447
sum_visitg2	-0.00616	(0.00742)	-0.831	0.406	-0.0207	0.00838
sum_visitg3	-0.00426	(0.0108)	-0.395	0.692	-0.0254	0.0169
sum_visitg4	-0.00779	(0.0176)	-0.442	0.659	-0.0423	0.0268
visitpd	0.000227	(0.000682)	0.333	0.739	-0.00111	0.00156
sum_ptg2	0.0205***	(0.00670)	3.062	0.00221	0.00738	0.0336
sum_ptg3	0.00963	(0.00900)	1.070	0.285	-0.00801	0.0273
sum_ptg4	-0.0209	(0.0246)	-0.849	0.396	-0.0691	0.0274
meanage	0.00717***	(0.00221)	3.251	0.00116	0.00285	0.0115
fmpercent	-0.0128	(0.0841)	-0.152	0.879	-0.178	0.152
clpercent	-0.585**	(0.269)	-2.174	0.0297	-1.112	-0.0575
elpercent	-0.195	(0.148)	-1.316	0.188	-0.484	0.0953
_lcdname_3502	0.855***	(0.138)	6.189	6.49e-10	0.584	1.126
_lcdname_3506	0.675***	(0.125)	5.404	6.78e-08	0.430	0.921
_lcdname_3507	-0.132***	(0.0329)	-4.010	6.15e-05	-0.197	-0.0675
_lcdname_3510	0.118***	(0.0256)	4.634	3.67e-06	0.0684	0.169
_lcdname_3512	0.195*	(0.104)	1.881	0.0601	-0.00828	0.399
_lcdname_3514	0.107	(0.105)	1.019	0.308	-0.0987	0.312
_lcdname_3518	0.157	(0.0968)	1.622	0.105	-0.0327	0.347
_lcdname_3519	0.782***	(0.123)	6.379	1.93e-10	0.542	1.022
_lcdname_3520	0.748***	(0.122)	6.143	8.68e-10	0.509	0.987
_lcdname_3521	0.688***	(0.118)	5.836	5.65e-09	0.457	0.919
_lcdname_3523	0.598***	(0.121)	4.953	7.53e-07	0.361	0.834
_lcdname_3524	0.544***	(0.110)	4.931	8.44e-07	0.328	0.760
_lcdname_3530	0.793***	(0.127)	6.225	5.17e-10	0.543	1.043
_lcdname_3537	0.237***	(0.0559)	4.243	2.24e-05	0.128	0.347
_lcdname_3539	0.677***	(0.130)	5.213	1.93e-07	0.422	0.932
_lcdname_3540	0.759***	(0.144)	5.290	1.27e-07	0.478	1.040
_lcdname_3542	0.688***	(0.129)	5.351	9.10e-08	0.436	0.940
_lcdname_3543	0.829***	(0.123)	6.713	0	0.587	1.071
_lcdname_3547	0.671***	(0.125)	5.382	7.70e-08	0.426	0.915
_lcdname_3549	-0.00535	(0.0523)	-0.102	0.919	-0.108	0.0972
_lyear_2000	0.00601	(0.00581)	1.033	0.302	-0.00539	0.0174
_lyear_2001	0.0200***	(0.00571)	3.507	0.000456	0.00883	0.0312
_lyear_2002	0.0350***	(0.00585)	5.985	2.30e-09	0.0235	0.0465
_lyear_2003	0.0494***	(0.00619)	7.987	0	0.0373	0.0615
_lyear_2004	0.0614***	(0.00693)	8.857	0	0.0478	0.0750
_lyear_2005	0.0698***	(0.00800)	8.726	0	0.0541	0.0855
_lyear_2006	-0.0935***	(0.00821)	-11.38	0	-0.110	-0.0774
_lyear_2007	-0.0516***	(0.00853)	-6.043	1.61e-09	-0.0683	-0.0348
_lcmaca_2	-0.0487**	(0.0233)	-2.093	0.0364	-0.0943	-0.00309
_lcmaca_3	-0.0599	(0.0372)	-1.612	0.107	-0.133	0.0130
_lcmaca_4	-0.0979***	(0.0363)	-2.700	0.00696	-0.169	-0.0268
_lriotype_1	-0.0604**	(0.0252)	-2.399	0.0165	-0.110	-0.0110

Constant	-0.761***	(0.129)	-5.885	4.22e-09	-1.014	-0.507
Observations	6,059					
R-squared	0.377					
Number of id	617					

---

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1



THE RESPONSE OF ONTARIO PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS TO PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES

Table H63: Estimated Marginal Effects: Preventive Care Bonuses by Practice Size, Difference-in-differences Estimator with Physician-specific Fixed Effects, Colorectal Cancer Screening, > 1.5K

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment5	0.0896***	(0.00731)	12.26	0	0.0752	0.104
post	0.127***	(0.00873)	14.55	0	0.110	0.144
fhgd	0.0206***	(0.00536)	3.842	0.000123	0.0101	0.0311
fhnd	0.0567***	(0.0108)	5.230	1.73e-07	0.0354	0.0780
ccmd	0.0321**	(0.0137)	2.351	0.0187	0.00535	0.0589
fhod	0.0894***	(0.0244)	3.663	0.000251	0.0416	0.137
doc_ageg2	-0.00454	(0.00502)	-0.904	0.366	-0.0144	0.00530
doc_ageg3	-0.00995	(0.00733)	-1.357	0.175	-0.0243	0.00442
doc_ageg4	-0.0234**	(0.0104)	-2.241	0.0251	-0.0438	-0.00292
workdays	-6.64e-05	(7.33e-05)	-0.905	0.365	-0.000210	7.73e-05
sum_visitg2	0.0206	(0.0157)	1.316	0.188	-0.0101	0.0513
sum_visitg3	0.0313*	(0.0168)	1.859	0.0631	-0.00171	0.0643
sum_visitg4	0.0383**	(0.0182)	2.105	0.0353	0.00264	0.0739
visitpd	-0.000307	(0.000368)	-0.836	0.403	-0.00103	0.000413
sum_ptg2	0.00591	(0.0151)	0.393	0.695	-0.0236	0.0354
sum_ptg3	0.0114	(0.0155)	0.734	0.463	-0.0190	0.0419
sum_ptg4	0.0152	(0.0161)	0.940	0.347	-0.0165	0.0468
meanage	0.00906***	(0.00156)	5.812	6.39e-09	0.00600	0.0121
fmpercent	-0.177**	(0.0885)	-2.003	0.0452	-0.351	-0.00383
clpercent	-0.776***	(0.242)	-3.211	0.00133	-1.249	-0.302
elpercent	-0.492***	(0.126)	-3.916	9.07e-05	-0.738	-0.246
_lcdname_3506	0.134***	(0.0377)	3.565	0.000366	0.0605	0.208
_lcdname_3512	0.0505	(0.0577)	0.876	0.381	-0.0625	0.164
_lcdname_3515	0.0861	(0.0532)	1.617	0.106	-0.0183	0.191
_lcdname_3516	-0.114**	(0.0565)	-2.018	0.0436	-0.225	-0.00328
_lcdname_3518	0.200***	(0.0535)	3.726	0.000195	0.0946	0.304
_lcdname_3519	0.122***	(0.0464)	2.638	0.00835	0.0315	0.213
_lcdname_3520	0.144***	(0.0435)	3.300	0.000972	0.0583	0.229
_lcdname_3521	0.0674	(0.0508)	1.326	0.185	-0.0322	0.167
_lcdname_3522	0.291***	(0.0473)	6.149	8.12e-10	0.198	0.384
_lcdname_3523	0.0307	(0.0367)	0.837	0.403	-0.0412	0.103
_lcdname_3524	0.141***	(0.0513)	2.751	0.00595	0.0406	0.242
_lcdname_3526	0.0649	(0.0556)	1.169	0.243	-0.0440	0.174
_lcdname_3530	0.154***	(0.0476)	3.228	0.00125	0.0604	0.247
_lcdname_3537	0.163***	(0.0392)	4.170	3.07e-05	0.0866	0.240
_lcdname_3538	-0.228***	(0.0762)	-2.993	0.00277	-0.377	-0.0787
_lcdname_3539	-0.0503	(0.0546)	-0.921	0.357	-0.157	0.0567
_lcdname_3540	-0.196***	(0.0735)	-2.665	0.00772	-0.340	-0.0517
_lcdname_3542	-0.294***	(0.0590)	-4.990	6.14e-07	-0.410	-0.179
_lcdname_3543	0.0295	(0.0517)	0.570	0.569	-0.0718	0.131
_lcdname_3544	-0.379***	(0.0902)	-4.204	2.65e-05	-0.556	-0.202
_lcdname_3552	-0.0130	(0.0912)	-0.143	0.886	-0.192	0.166
_lcdname_3553	0.210***	(0.0524)	4.008	6.18e-05	0.107	0.313
_lyear_2000	0.00837*	(0.00457)	1.830	0.0672	-0.000593	0.0173
_lyear_2001	0.0256***	(0.00446)	5.724	1.07e-08	0.0168	0.0343
_lyear_2002	0.0430***	(0.00456)	9.418	0	0.0340	0.0519
_lyear_2003	0.0588***	(0.00485)	12.14	0	0.0493	0.0683
_lyear_2004	0.0699***	(0.00539)	12.98	0	0.0593	0.0805
_lyear_2005	0.0848***	(0.00621)	13.67	0	0.0727	0.0970
_lyear_2006	-0.0979***	(0.00609)	-16.07	0	-0.110	-0.0859
_lyear_2007	-0.0514***	(0.00635)	-8.098	0	-0.0638	-0.0390
_lcmaca_2	0.0326	(0.0270)	1.207	0.228	-0.0203	0.0855
_lcmaca_3	0.0743	(0.0731)	1.017	0.309	-0.0689	0.218

_lcmaca_4	0.0823*	(0.0469)	1.753	0.0796	-0.00972	0.174
_lcmaca_5	0.354***	(0.0843)	4.200	2.69e-05	0.189	0.519
_lriotype_1	-0.0117	(0.0188)	-0.625	0.532	-0.0486	0.0251
Constant	-0.184**	(0.0851)	-2.162	0.0306	-0.351	-0.0172

Observations	10,616
R-squared	0.391
Number of id	1,080

---

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

THE RESPONSE OF ONTARIO PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS TO PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES

Table H64: Estimated Marginal Effects: Preventive Care Bonuses by Baseline Compliance, Difference-in-differences Estimator with Physician-specific Fixed Effects, Senior Flu Shot, Lowest Quartile

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment3	0.0356***	(0.0137)	2.589	0.00966	0.00864	0.0625
post	0.345***	(0.109)	3.163	0.00157	0.131	0.560
fhgd	0.0588***	(0.0112)	5.231	1.76e-07	0.0368	0.0808
fhnd	0.117**	(0.0481)	2.435	0.0149	0.0228	0.211
ccmd	0.0485**	(0.0232)	2.086	0.0370	0.00291	0.0940
fhod	0.00754	(0.0438)	0.172	0.863	-0.0784	0.0935
doc_age	-0.0132	(0.0120)	-1.102	0.270	-0.0366	0.0103
workdays	0.000391***	(0.000114)	3.419	0.000634	0.000167	0.000616
sum_visitg2	-0.00212	(0.0121)	-0.176	0.861	-0.0258	0.0216
sum_visitg3	0.0209	(0.0170)	1.232	0.218	-0.0123	0.0541
sum_visitg4	-0.00168	(0.0213)	-0.0787	0.937	-0.0435	0.0402
visitpd	-0.00168**	(0.000675)	-2.482	0.0131	-0.00300	-0.000352
sum_ptg2	0.0301***	(0.0114)	2.635	0.00845	0.00771	0.0525
sum_ptg3	0.0472***	(0.0157)	3.001	0.00271	0.0164	0.0781
sum_ptg4	0.109***	(0.0190)	5.750	9.55e-09	0.0720	0.147
meanage	-0.00294	(0.00251)	-1.172	0.241	-0.00786	0.00198
fmpercent	0.375***	(0.104)	3.591	0.000333	0.170	0.580
clpercent	0.0146	(0.412)	0.0353	0.972	-0.794	0.823
elpercent	0.565***	(0.180)	3.137	0.00172	0.212	0.918
_lcdname_3502	0.0717	(0.140)	0.512	0.609	-0.203	0.346
_lcdname_3506	0.267**	(0.117)	2.276	0.0229	0.0370	0.497
_lcdname_3507	-0.193**	(0.0921)	-2.095	0.0363	-0.373	-0.0123
_lcdname_3512	0.214	(0.152)	1.401	0.161	-0.0852	0.512
_lcdname_3515	0.312**	(0.155)	2.014	0.0441	0.00823	0.616
_lcdname_3518	0.0321	(0.126)	0.255	0.799	-0.215	0.279
_lcdname_3519	0.204*	(0.124)	1.648	0.0993	-0.0386	0.447
_lcdname_3520	0.192	(0.121)	1.596	0.111	-0.0439	0.429
_lcdname_3521	0.147	(0.124)	1.184	0.236	-0.0966	0.391
_lcdname_3523	-0.585***	(0.154)	-3.808	0.000142	-0.887	-0.284
_lcdname_3524	0.0421	(0.131)	0.321	0.748	-0.215	0.299
_lcdname_3526	0.192	(0.133)	1.439	0.150	-0.0695	0.453
_lcdname_3530	0.196	(0.131)	1.497	0.134	-0.0607	0.453
_lcdname_3537	0.0834	(0.0903)	0.923	0.356	-0.0937	0.261
_lcdname_3538	0.615***	(0.151)	4.072	4.75e-05	0.319	0.911
_lcdname_3539	0.261*	(0.148)	1.763	0.0780	-0.0292	0.550
_lcdname_3541	0.121	(0.134)	0.907	0.365	-0.141	0.383
_lcdname_3543	0.264**	(0.124)	2.122	0.0339	0.0202	0.508
_lcdname_3560	0.206*	(0.106)	1.932	0.0534	-0.00303	0.414
_lyear_2000	0.0507***	(0.0157)	3.225	0.00127	0.0199	0.0815
_lyear_2001	0.222***	(0.0260)	8.552	0	0.171	0.273
_lyear_2002	0.294***	(0.0372)	7.912	0	0.221	0.367
_lyear_2003	0.246***	(0.0491)	5.002	5.91e-07	0.149	0.342
_lyear_2004	0.364***	(0.0611)	5.950	2.88e-09	0.244	0.484
_lyear_2005	0.373***	(0.0731)	5.100	3.54e-07	0.230	0.516
_lyear_2006	0.377***	(0.0853)	4.417	1.02e-05	0.209	0.544
_lyear_2007	0.00253	(0.0150)	0.168	0.866	-0.0269	0.0320
_lcmaca_2	-0.0996	(0.105)	-0.947	0.344	-0.306	0.107
_lcmaca_3	0.0202	(0.0977)	0.207	0.836	-0.171	0.212
_lcmaca_4	-0.149	(0.129)	-1.160	0.246	-0.401	0.103
_lcmaca_5	0.108	(0.117)	0.925	0.355	-0.121	0.337
_lriotype_1	0.000263	(0.0740)	0.00356	0.997	-0.145	0.145
Constant	0.341	(0.603)	0.565	0.572	-0.841	1.522

Observations	4,887
R-squared	0.418
Number of id	503

---

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

THE RESPONSE OF ONTARIO PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS TO PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES

Table H65: Estimated Marginal Effects: Preventive Care Bonuses by Baseline Compliance, Difference-in-differences Estimator with Physician-specific Fixed Effects, Senior Flu Shot, Middle Two Quartiles

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment3	0.0267**	(0.0104)	2.560	0.0105	0.00626	0.0472
post	0.254***	(0.0719)	3.529	0.000419	0.113	0.395
fhgd	0.00416	(0.00649)	0.640	0.522	-0.00857	0.0169
fhnd	-0.00898	(0.0201)	-0.446	0.656	-0.0485	0.0305
ccmd	0.0370***	(0.0123)	3.007	0.00264	0.0129	0.0611
fhod	-0.00781	(0.0273)	-0.286	0.775	-0.0612	0.0456
doc_age	0.00686	(0.00789)	0.870	0.384	-0.00861	0.0223
workdays	0.000549***	(0.000106)	5.203	2.00e-07	0.000342	0.000756
sum_visitg2	-0.00691	(0.0114)	-0.607	0.544	-0.0292	0.0154
sum_visitg3	-0.0168	(0.0144)	-1.167	0.243	-0.0451	0.0114
sum_visitg4	-0.0443**	(0.0180)	-2.460	0.0139	-0.0796	-0.00901
visitpd	0.00209***	(0.000649)	3.219	0.00129	0.000817	0.00336
sum_ptg2	0.00479	(0.0114)	0.420	0.675	-0.0176	0.0272
sum_ptg3	0.00517	(0.0139)	0.372	0.710	-0.0220	0.0324
sum_ptg4	0.0109	(0.0163)	0.667	0.505	-0.0211	0.0429
meanage	-0.00371	(0.00234)	-1.582	0.114	-0.00830	0.000885
fmpercent	0.218**	(0.108)	2.011	0.0444	0.00548	0.430
clpercent	-0.373	(0.323)	-1.155	0.248	-1.005	0.260
elpercent	0.748***	(0.174)	4.288	1.82e-05	0.406	1.089
_lcdname_3506	0.565***	(0.199)	2.839	0.00453	0.175	0.954
_lcdname_3510	-0.119**	(0.0605)	-1.969	0.0490	-0.238	-0.000533
_lcdname_3512	0.455**	(0.222)	2.046	0.0408	0.0190	0.890
_lcdname_3514	0.636***	(0.233)	2.735	0.00624	0.180	1.092
_lcdname_3516	0.755***	(0.181)	4.182	2.91e-05	0.401	1.109
_lcdname_3518	0.495***	(0.183)	2.697	0.00700	0.135	0.855
_lcdname_3519	0.390**	(0.182)	2.143	0.0321	0.0333	0.748
_lcdname_3520	0.399**	(0.181)	2.209	0.0272	0.0449	0.754
_lcdname_3521	0.511***	(0.185)	2.763	0.00575	0.148	0.873
_lcdname_3523	0.377**	(0.191)	1.974	0.0484	0.00257	0.751
_lcdname_3524	0.380**	(0.185)	2.058	0.0397	0.0180	0.743
_lcdname_3526	0.321	(0.233)	1.375	0.169	-0.137	0.778
_lcdname_3530	0.274*	(0.147)	1.863	0.0625	-0.0143	0.561
_lcdname_3534	0.586***	(0.223)	2.623	0.00872	0.148	1.024
_lcdname_3537	0.544***	(0.110)	4.958	7.25e-07	0.329	0.759
_lcdname_3539	0.547**	(0.214)	2.551	0.0107	0.127	0.967
_lcdname_3540	0.760***	(0.248)	3.060	0.00222	0.273	1.247
_lcdname_3542	0.453**	(0.178)	2.547	0.0109	0.104	0.802
_lcdname_3543	0.484**	(0.201)	2.409	0.0160	0.0903	0.879
_lcdname_3547	0.942***	(0.212)	4.436	9.29e-06	0.526	1.358
_lcdname_3552	-0.0882	(0.0897)	-0.983	0.326	-0.264	0.0877
_lcdname_3553	0.182	(0.111)	1.643	0.100	-0.0351	0.398
_lyear_2000	0.0637***	(0.0126)	5.043	4.67e-07	0.0390	0.0885
_lyear_2001	0.262***	(0.0183)	14.27	0	0.226	0.298
_lyear_2002	0.351***	(0.0250)	14.06	0	0.302	0.401
_lyear_2003	0.339***	(0.0325)	10.43	0	0.275	0.403
_lyear_2004	0.382***	(0.0404)	9.473	0	0.303	0.461
_lyear_2005	0.368***	(0.0483)	7.631	0	0.274	0.463
_lyear_2006	0.344***	(0.0563)	6.108	1.05e-09	0.234	0.454
_lyear_2007	0.0264***	(0.00940)	2.812	0.00494	0.00800	0.0448
_lcmaca_2	-0.154**	(0.0700)	-2.196	0.0281	-0.291	-0.0165
_lcmaca_3	-0.115	(0.117)	-0.983	0.326	-0.344	0.114
_lcmaca_4	-0.0476	(0.155)	-0.308	0.758	-0.351	0.255
_lcmaca_5	0.230**	(0.106)	2.176	0.0296	0.0228	0.437

_Iriotype_1	0.0774	(0.0515)	1.502	0.133	-0.0236	0.178
Constant	-0.807*	(0.415)	-1.947	0.0516	-1.620	0.00555
Observations	9,908					
R-squared	0.512					
Number of id	1,009					

---

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

THE RESPONSE OF ONTARIO PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS TO PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES

Table H66: Estimated Marginal Effects: Preventive Care Bonuses by Baseline Compliance, Difference-in-differences Estimator with Physician-specific Fixed Effects, Senior Flu Shot, Highest Quartile

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment3	0.0204	(0.0152)	1.347	0.178	-0.00932	0.0502
post	-0.586*	(0.313)	-1.872	0.0613	-1.199	0.0277
fhgd	-0.0215**	(0.00972)	-2.212	0.0270	-0.0405	-0.00245
fhnd	-0.0383	(0.0239)	-1.602	0.109	-0.0852	0.00857
ccmd	0.00937	(0.0152)	0.614	0.539	-0.0205	0.0393
fhod	-0.0238	(0.0257)	-0.929	0.353	-0.0741	0.0265
doc_age	0.108***	(0.0347)	3.114	0.00186	0.0400	0.176
workdays	0.000324	(0.000206)	1.569	0.117	-8.08e-05	0.000729
sum_visitg2	0.0423**	(0.0172)	2.458	0.0140	0.00856	0.0760
sum_visitg3	0.0477**	(0.0225)	2.119	0.0342	0.00356	0.0918
sum_visitg4	0.0315	(0.0283)	1.113	0.266	-0.0240	0.0871
visitpd	0.00240**	(0.00112)	2.133	0.0329	0.000194	0.00460
sum_ptg2	-0.0132	(0.0188)	-0.700	0.484	-0.0501	0.0237
sum_ptg3	-0.0244	(0.0245)	-0.998	0.318	-0.0724	0.0235
sum_ptg4	-0.0420	(0.0294)	-1.429	0.153	-0.0996	0.0156
meanage	-0.00413	(0.00467)	-0.884	0.377	-0.0133	0.00503
fmpercent	0.425*	(0.247)	1.721	0.0853	-0.0591	0.910
clpercent	-2.138***	(0.612)	-3.495	0.000479	-3.337	-0.939
elpercent	0.769**	(0.302)	2.545	0.0110	0.177	1.361
_lcdname_3502	-0.652***	(0.155)	-4.209	2.61e-05	-0.956	-0.348
_lcdname_3506	-0.383***	(0.140)	-2.727	0.00641	-0.658	-0.108
_lcdname_3510	-0.0837	(0.125)	-0.669	0.504	-0.329	0.162
_lcdname_3518	-0.283***	(0.0919)	-3.082	0.00207	-0.463	-0.103
_lcdname_3520	0.0508	(0.0560)	0.907	0.365	-0.0591	0.161
_lcdname_3521	0.501***	(0.165)	3.032	0.00245	0.177	0.826
_lyear_2000	-0.0183	(0.0389)	-0.469	0.639	-0.0945	0.0580
_lyear_2001	0.110	(0.0708)	1.548	0.122	-0.0292	0.248
_lyear_2002	0.0838	(0.105)	0.802	0.423	-0.121	0.289
_lyear_2003	-0.0109	(0.139)	-0.0783	0.938	-0.283	0.262
_lyear_2004	-0.0905	(0.174)	-0.521	0.602	-0.431	0.250
_lyear_2005	-0.207	(0.208)	-0.996	0.319	-0.616	0.201
_lyear_2006	-0.317	(0.243)	-1.304	0.192	-0.794	0.160
_lyear_2007	0.118***	(0.0355)	3.316	0.000920	0.0481	0.187
_lcmaca_2	0.269**	(0.130)	2.069	0.0386	0.0141	0.523
_lcmaca_3	0.164	(0.104)	1.573	0.116	-0.0404	0.368
_lcmaca_4	0.0544	(0.102)	0.532	0.595	-0.146	0.255
_lriotype_1	0.310***	(0.0872)	3.549	0.000391	0.139	0.481
Constant	-5.447***	(1.663)	-3.275	0.00106	-8.707	-2.186
Observations	5,071					
R-squared	0.493					
Number of id	517					

Robust standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table H67: Estimated Marginal Effects: Preventive Care Bonuses by Baseline Compliance, Difference-in-differences Estimator with Physician-specific Fixed Effects, Toddler Immunization, Lowest Quartile

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment4	0.0265	(0.0245)	1.081	0.280	-0.0215	0.0745
fhgd	0.0175	(0.0181)	0.971	0.332	-0.0179	0.0529
fhnd	-0.000129	(0.0504)	-0.00257	0.998	-0.0989	0.0987
ccmd	-0.00177	(0.0299)	-0.0593	0.953	-0.0603	0.0568
fhod	0.0753	(0.137)	0.551	0.582	-0.193	0.344
doc_age	-0.0202	(0.0169)	-1.198	0.231	-0.0533	0.0129
workdays	0.000771***	(0.000206)	3.747	0.000182	0.000367	0.00117
sum_visitg2	0.00210	(0.0240)	0.0876	0.930	-0.0449	0.0491
sum_visitg3	-0.00368	(0.0306)	-0.120	0.904	-0.0637	0.0563
sum_visitg4	0.00690	(0.0365)	0.189	0.850	-0.0647	0.0785
visitpd	0.00302***	(0.00102)	2.958	0.00312	0.00102	0.00502
sum_ptg2	0.0201	(0.0218)	0.921	0.357	-0.0227	0.0630
sum_ptg3	-0.00508	(0.0264)	-0.193	0.847	-0.0568	0.0466
sum_ptg4	0.00919	(0.0312)	0.294	0.769	-0.0521	0.0705
meanage	-0.00436	(0.00506)	-0.861	0.390	-0.0143	0.00557
fmpercent	0.00623	(0.239)	0.0260	0.979	-0.463	0.475
clpercent	-1.238*	(0.712)	-1.738	0.0823	-2.634	0.158
elpercent	-0.444	(0.411)	-1.082	0.279	-1.250	0.361
_lcdname_3502	-0.0559	(0.298)	-0.187	0.851	-0.641	0.529
_lcdname_3506	-0.136	(0.291)	-0.465	0.642	-0.707	0.436
_lcdname_3507	0.0845	(0.0956)	0.884	0.377	-0.103	0.272
_lcdname_3512	-0.628***	(0.235)	-2.677	0.00746	-1.088	-0.168
_lcdname_3515	-0.329	(0.241)	-1.362	0.173	-0.802	0.144
_lcdname_3518	-0.510*	(0.266)	-1.918	0.0552	-1.031	0.0112
_lcdname_3519	-0.415*	(0.240)	-1.729	0.0839	-0.886	0.0556
_lcdname_3520	-0.397*	(0.240)	-1.652	0.0987	-0.869	0.0743
_lcdname_3521	-0.383	(0.237)	-1.617	0.106	-0.848	0.0816
_lcdname_3523	-0.125	(0.180)	-0.697	0.486	-0.478	0.227
_lcdname_3524	-0.265	(0.236)	-1.123	0.262	-0.728	0.198
_lcdname_3530	-0.412	(0.257)	-1.606	0.108	-0.916	0.0910
_lcdname_3537	0.0805	(0.141)	0.570	0.568	-0.196	0.357
_lcdname_3538	-0.0652	(0.223)	-0.292	0.770	-0.503	0.372
_lcdname_3539	0.201***	(0.0741)	2.716	0.00665	0.0559	0.346
_lcdname_3542	-0.719**	(0.339)	-2.122	0.0339	-1.383	-0.0548
_lcdname_3543	-0.331	(0.243)	-1.359	0.174	-0.808	0.146
_lcdname_3553	-0.692***	(0.264)	-2.618	0.00890	-1.211	-0.174
_lcdname_3560	-0.255**	(0.115)	-2.214	0.0269	-0.482	-0.0292
_lyear_2000	-0.544***	(0.139)	-3.903	9.67e-05	-0.817	-0.271
_lyear_2001	-0.503***	(0.122)	-4.113	3.99e-05	-0.743	-0.263
_lyear_2002	-0.495***	(0.105)	-4.704	2.66e-06	-0.701	-0.288
_lyear_2003	-0.583***	(0.0884)	-6.594	0	-0.756	-0.409
_lyear_2004	-0.402***	(0.0722)	-5.565	2.84e-08	-0.543	-0.260
_lyear_2005	-0.318***	(0.0556)	-5.712	1.21e-08	-0.427	-0.209
_lyear_2006	-0.226***	(0.0415)	-5.444	5.58e-08	-0.307	-0.145
_lyear_2007	-0.0668***	(0.0229)	-2.910	0.00363	-0.112	-0.0218
_lcmaca_2	-0.0483	(0.104)	-0.466	0.641	-0.252	0.155
_lcmaca_3	-0.111	(0.0820)	-1.355	0.176	-0.272	0.0497
_lcmaca_4	-0.0825	(0.0919)	-0.898	0.369	-0.263	0.0976
_lcmaca_5	-0.0888	(0.0996)	-0.892	0.373	-0.284	0.106
_lriotype_1	0.0136	(0.0620)	0.219	0.827	-0.108	0.135
Constant	2.099**	(1.015)	2.068	0.0387	0.109	4.089
Observations	3,810					



THE RESPONSE OF ONTARIO PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS TO PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES

R-squared                    0.403  
Number of id                455

---

Robust standard errors in parentheses  
\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table H68: Estimated Marginal Effects: Preventive Care Bonuses by Baseline Compliance, Difference-in-differences Estimator with Physician-specific Fixed Effects, Toddler Immunization, Middle Two Quartiles

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment4	0.0120	(0.0137)	0.876	0.381	-0.0149	0.0389
fhgd	-0.00523	(0.00959)	-0.545	0.586	-0.0240	0.0136
fhnd	-0.0193	(0.0217)	-0.890	0.374	-0.0618	0.0232
ccmd	0.00138	(0.0175)	0.0789	0.937	-0.0329	0.0356
fhod	0.0367	(0.0228)	1.606	0.108	-0.00809	0.0815
doc_age	0.00750	(0.0190)	0.394	0.694	-0.0298	0.0448
workdays	7.25e-05	(0.000134)	0.542	0.588	-0.000190	0.000335
sum_visitg2	0.00952	(0.0160)	0.596	0.551	-0.0218	0.0409
sum_visitg3	0.00784	(0.0192)	0.408	0.683	-0.0298	0.0455
sum_visitg4	0.00900	(0.0224)	0.403	0.687	-0.0348	0.0528
visitpd	7.28e-05	(0.000703)	0.103	0.918	-0.00131	0.00145
sum_ptg2	0.0158	(0.0149)	1.061	0.289	-0.0134	0.0449
sum_ptg3	0.00499	(0.0172)	0.291	0.771	-0.0287	0.0387
sum_ptg4	0.0195	(0.0196)	0.994	0.320	-0.0190	0.0580
meanage	-0.00241	(0.00276)	-0.872	0.383	-0.00782	0.00300
fmpercent	-0.144	(0.138)	-1.046	0.296	-0.414	0.126
clpercent	-0.822**	(0.345)	-2.383	0.0172	-1.498	-0.146
elpercent	0.153	(0.241)	0.634	0.526	-0.320	0.625
_lcdname_3506	-0.345***	(0.122)	-2.827	0.00471	-0.584	-0.106
_lcdname_3510	-0.524***	(0.203)	-2.581	0.00986	-0.922	-0.126
_lcdname_3511	-0.751***	(0.209)	-3.589	0.000334	-1.162	-0.341
_lcdname_3516	-0.307**	(0.150)	-2.048	0.0406	-0.601	-0.0132
_lcdname_3518	-0.519***	(0.174)	-2.990	0.00280	-0.860	-0.179
_lcdname_3519	-0.478***	(0.153)	-3.133	0.00173	-0.778	-0.179
_lcdname_3520	-0.491***	(0.154)	-3.201	0.00138	-0.792	-0.190
_lcdname_3521	-0.436***	(0.157)	-2.771	0.00560	-0.745	-0.128
_lcdname_3524	-0.413**	(0.162)	-2.542	0.0111	-0.731	-0.0943
_lcdname_3526	-0.571***	(0.173)	-3.291	0.00100	-0.911	-0.231
_lcdname_3530	-0.549***	(0.160)	-3.441	0.000582	-0.863	-0.236
_lcdname_3537	-0.713***	(0.188)	-3.788	0.000153	-1.083	-0.344
_lcdname_3539	-0.416**	(0.177)	-2.349	0.0188	-0.764	-0.0689
_lcdname_3542	-0.797***	(0.167)	-4.777	1.81e-06	-1.124	-0.470
_lcdname_3543	-0.633***	(0.128)	-4.959	7.23e-07	-0.883	-0.383
_lcdname_3547	-0.380***	(0.144)	-2.650	0.00806	-0.662	-0.0991
_lcdname_3552	-0.135	(0.118)	-1.149	0.251	-0.366	0.0955
_lcdname_3553	0.0913	(0.178)	0.514	0.608	-0.257	0.440
_lyear_2001	0.0195	(0.0203)	0.961	0.337	-0.0203	0.0594
_lyear_2002	0.0116	(0.0386)	0.299	0.765	-0.0642	0.0873
_lyear_2003	0.0259	(0.0574)	0.452	0.651	-0.0865	0.138
_lyear_2004	0.0714	(0.0765)	0.934	0.351	-0.0785	0.221
_lyear_2005	0.104	(0.0954)	1.089	0.276	-0.0831	0.291
_lyear_2006	0.170	(0.115)	1.477	0.140	-0.0555	0.395
_lyear_2007	0.279**	(0.134)	2.081	0.0374	0.0162	0.541
_lyear_2008	0.312**	(0.153)	2.037	0.0417	0.0118	0.611
_lcmaca_2	-0.00957	(0.121)	-0.0792	0.937	-0.246	0.227
_lcmaca_3	0.258**	(0.119)	2.165	0.0304	0.0244	0.491
_lcmaca_4	-0.282	(0.198)	-1.423	0.155	-0.671	0.107
_lcmaca_5	-0.376*	(0.210)	-1.787	0.0739	-0.788	0.0364
_lriotype_1	0.0364	(0.0881)	0.413	0.680	-0.136	0.209
Constant	0.662	(0.921)	0.719	0.472	-1.143	2.466
Observations	8,795					
R-squared	0.435					
Number of id	1,023					

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

THE RESPONSE OF ONTARIO PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS TO PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES

Table H69: Estimated Marginal Effects: Preventive Care Bonuses by Baseline Compliance, Difference-in-differences Estimator with Physician-specific Fixed Effects, Toddler Immunization, Highest Quartile

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment4	0.0149	(0.0237)	0.628	0.530	-0.0316	0.0614
fugd	0.00145	(0.0156)	0.0925	0.926	-0.0292	0.0321
fhnd	0.0710**	(0.0294)	2.414	0.0158	0.0133	0.129
ccmd	0.0108	(0.0222)	0.485	0.628	-0.0328	0.0544
fhod	0.0180	(0.0269)	0.667	0.505	-0.0348	0.0708
doc_age	-0.00748*	(0.00448)	-1.671	0.0948	-0.0163	0.00130
workdays	0.000392*	(0.000217)	1.805	0.0712	-3.38e-05	0.000817
sum_visitg2	-0.0197	(0.0192)	-1.028	0.304	-0.0574	0.0179
sum_visitg3	-0.0317	(0.0255)	-1.242	0.214	-0.0817	0.0183
sum_visitg4	-0.0497	(0.0321)	-1.548	0.122	-0.113	0.0132
visitpd	-0.00145	(0.00121)	-1.193	0.233	-0.00383	0.000931
sum_ptg2	0.00551	(0.0230)	0.239	0.811	-0.0396	0.0506
sum_ptg3	0.0185	(0.0272)	0.678	0.498	-0.0349	0.0718
sum_ptg4	0.0236	(0.0303)	0.780	0.435	-0.0358	0.0830
meanage	0.0112**	(0.00499)	2.242	0.0250	0.00141	0.0210
fmpercent	-0.119	(0.220)	-0.539	0.590	-0.551	0.313
clpercent	0.413	(0.540)	0.764	0.445	-0.646	1.471
elpercent	-0.667*	(0.405)	-1.647	0.0997	-1.462	0.127
_lcdname_3506	0.0920	(0.123)	0.748	0.454	-0.149	0.333
_lcdname_3514	-0.368	(0.272)	-1.355	0.175	-0.901	0.164
_lcdname_3518	0.0558	(0.0704)	0.792	0.428	-0.0823	0.194
_lcdname_3519	-0.0797	(0.0724)	-1.101	0.271	-0.222	0.0622
_lcdname_3520	-0.0464	(0.0599)	-0.776	0.438	-0.164	0.0710
_lcdname_3521	-0.0693**	(0.0312)	-2.225	0.0261	-0.130	-0.00823
_lcdname_3526	-0.408***	(0.107)	-3.817	0.000138	-0.618	-0.199
_lcdname_3537	0.0514	(0.190)	0.271	0.786	-0.320	0.423
_lcdname_3539	-0.113	(0.0965)	-1.174	0.241	-0.302	0.0759
_lcdname_3540	0.0708	(0.161)	0.439	0.661	-0.245	0.387
_lyear_2000	-0.339***	(0.0438)	-7.729	0	-0.424	-0.253
_lyear_2001	-0.296***	(0.0402)	-7.368	0	-0.375	-0.217
_lyear_2002	-0.263***	(0.0365)	-7.203	0	-0.335	-0.192
_lyear_2003	-0.101***	(0.0326)	-3.102	0.00194	-0.165	-0.0372
_lyear_2004	-0.197***	(0.0297)	-6.630	0	-0.256	-0.139
_lyear_2005	-0.160***	(0.0265)	-6.045	1.64e-09	-0.212	-0.108
_lyear_2006	-0.106***	(0.0251)	-4.219	2.52e-05	-0.155	-0.0566
_lyear_2007	-0.0382***	(0.0108)	-3.537	0.000409	-0.0594	-0.0170
_lcmaca_2	-0.128***	(0.0398)	-3.215	0.00132	-0.206	-0.0500
_lriotype_1	0.0383	(0.131)	0.292	0.770	-0.218	0.295
Constant	0.996***	(0.337)	2.958	0.00312	0.336	1.656
Observations	4,221					
R-squared	0.297					
Number of id	521					

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table H70: Estimated Marginal Effects: Preventive Care Bonuses by Baseline Compliance, Difference-in-differences Estimator with Physician-specific Fixed Effects, Pap Smear, Lowest Quartile

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment1	0.0240**	(0.0102)	2.349	0.0189	0.00398	0.0441
post	0.0452	(0.0693)	0.653	0.514	-0.0906	0.181
fhgd	0.0680***	(0.00833)	8.160	0	0.0516	0.0843
fhnd	0.165***	(0.0415)	3.964	7.48e-05	0.0832	0.246
ccmd	0.0361**	(0.0149)	2.419	0.0156	0.00684	0.0653
fhod	0.275***	(0.0678)	4.060	4.99e-05	0.142	0.408
doc_age	-0.00706	(0.00759)	-0.930	0.352	-0.0220	0.00783
workdays	-0.000188**	(8.51e-05)	-2.204	0.0276	-0.000354	-2.07e-05
sum_visitg2	0.00201	(0.00949)	0.212	0.832	-0.0166	0.0206
sum_visitg3	0.0173	(0.0129)	1.342	0.180	-0.00798	0.0426
sum_visitg4	0.0306**	(0.0153)	1.991	0.0465	0.000475	0.0606
visitpd	-0.00136***	(0.000432)	-3.156	0.00161	-0.00221	-0.000517
sum_ptg2	-0.00532	(0.00770)	-0.690	0.490	-0.0204	0.00978
sum_ptg3	-0.000461	(0.0106)	-0.0435	0.965	-0.0213	0.0204
sum_ptg4	0.00561	(0.0125)	0.449	0.654	-0.0189	0.0301
meanage	0.00757***	(0.00185)	4.086	4.46e-05	0.00394	0.0112
fmpercent	0.313***	(0.102)	3.075	0.00212	0.113	0.512
clpercent	-1.234***	(0.383)	-3.224	0.00127	-1.984	-0.483
elpercent	-0.737***	(0.113)	-6.522	7.70e-11	-0.959	-0.515
_lcdname_3502	0.0145	(0.0771)	0.188	0.851	-0.137	0.166
_lcdname_3506	0.164***	(0.0369)	4.435	9.44e-06	0.0913	0.236
_lcdname_3507	-0.307***	(0.0593)	-5.167	2.48e-07	-0.423	-0.190
_lcdname_3510	0.0472**	(0.0209)	2.253	0.0243	0.00613	0.0882
_lcdname_3512	-0.112**	(0.0502)	-2.234	0.0255	-0.211	-0.0138
_lcdname_3515	-0.133***	(0.0491)	-2.701	0.00695	-0.229	-0.0363
_lcdname_3518	0.000725	(0.0348)	0.0208	0.983	-0.0674	0.0689
_lcdname_3519	0.0445	(0.0369)	1.208	0.227	-0.0277	0.117
_lcdname_3520	0.000830	(0.0326)	0.0255	0.980	-0.0631	0.0648
_lcdname_3521	-0.0608**	(0.0304)	-1.998	0.0458	-0.120	-0.00113
_lcdname_3526	-0.110***	(0.0341)	-3.241	0.00120	-0.177	-0.0436
_lcdname_3530	-0.0510	(0.0362)	-1.410	0.159	-0.122	0.0199
_lcdname_3537	0.186***	(0.0432)	4.302	1.73e-05	0.101	0.270
_lcdname_3540	-0.145*	(0.0812)	-1.786	0.0742	-0.304	0.0142
_lcdname_3547	-0.250***	(0.0500)	-5.009	5.67e-07	-0.348	-0.152
_lcdname_3549	-0.0392	(0.0519)	-0.756	0.449	-0.141	0.0624
_lcdname_3553	0.0985**	(0.0453)	2.177	0.0296	0.00978	0.187
_lcdname_3560	-0.0840**	(0.0348)	-2.415	0.0158	-0.152	-0.0158
_lyear_2000	0.00281	(0.00919)	0.306	0.759	-0.0152	0.0208
_lyear_2001	0.00473	(0.0161)	0.294	0.769	-0.0268	0.0363
_lyear_2002	-0.00228	(0.0234)	-0.0975	0.922	-0.0481	0.0436
_lyear_2003	-0.00823	(0.0310)	-0.266	0.790	-0.0690	0.0525
_lyear_2004	0.0177	(0.0384)	0.462	0.644	-0.0576	0.0931
_lyear_2005	0.0379	(0.0461)	0.821	0.412	-0.0526	0.128
_lyear_2006	0.0506	(0.0540)	0.938	0.348	-0.0552	0.156
_lyear_2007	-0.00716	(0.0103)	-0.696	0.486	-0.0273	0.0130
_lcmaca_2	0.0923***	(0.0147)	6.289	3.50e-10	0.0635	0.121
_lcmaca_3	0.111*	(0.0635)	1.749	0.0804	-0.0134	0.235
_lcmaca_4	0.00313	(0.0322)	0.0972	0.923	-0.0601	0.0663
_lcmaca_5	0.164***	(0.0364)	4.496	7.10e-06	0.0923	0.235
_lriotype_1	-0.110***	(0.0286)	-3.865	0.000113	-0.166	-0.0544
Constant	0.621	(0.393)	1.581	0.114	-0.149	1.392

Observations 4,949

THE RESPONSE OF ONTARIO PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS TO PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES

R-squared	0.181
Number of id	505

---

Robust standard errors in parentheses  
\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table H71: Estimated Marginal Effects: Preventive Care Bonuses by Baseline Compliance, Difference-in-differences Estimator with Physician-specific Fixed Effects, Pap Smear, Middle Two Quartiles

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment1	0.0502***	(0.00585)	8.587	0	0.0388	0.0617
fhgd	0.0189***	(0.00400)	4.710	2.51e-06	0.0110	0.0267
fhnd	0.0142	(0.0136)	1.046	0.295	-0.0124	0.0409
ccmd	0.00979	(0.00631)	1.552	0.121	-0.00257	0.0221
fhod	0.0640***	(0.0231)	2.774	0.00554	0.0188	0.109
doc_age	0.000940	(0.00160)	0.586	0.558	-0.00221	0.00409
workdays	0.000224***	(4.60e-05)	4.869	1.14e-06	0.000134	0.000314
sum_visit2	0.00375	(0.00490)	0.765	0.444	-0.00586	0.0134
sum_visit3	0.00358	(0.00615)	0.582	0.561	-0.00848	0.0156
sum_visit4	0.00460	(0.00745)	0.618	0.536	-0.00999	0.0192
visitpd	0.000285	(0.000256)	1.116	0.265	-0.000216	0.000787
sum_ptg2	0.00760	(0.00464)	1.640	0.101	-0.00149	0.0167
sum_ptg3	0.0104*	(0.00574)	1.815	0.0696	-0.000836	0.0217
sum_ptg4	0.00802	(0.00690)	1.164	0.245	-0.00549	0.0215
meanage	0.00916***	(0.000920)	9.954	0	0.00736	0.0110
fmpercent	0.201***	(0.0462)	4.362	1.30e-05	0.111	0.292
clpercent	0.525***	(0.142)	3.708	0.000211	0.247	0.802
elpercent	-0.508***	(0.0682)	-7.445	0	-0.641	-0.374
_lcdname_3502	-0.119*	(0.0655)	-1.812	0.0701	-0.247	0.00972
_lcdname_3506	-0.0415	(0.0686)	-0.605	0.545	-0.176	0.0930
_lcdname_3510	-0.163*	(0.0895)	-1.823	0.0684	-0.338	0.0123
_lcdname_3512	-0.0971	(0.0634)	-1.531	0.126	-0.221	0.0272
_lcdname_3516	-0.127**	(0.0645)	-1.964	0.0495	-0.253	-0.000258
_lcdname_3518	-0.0219	(0.0629)	-0.347	0.728	-0.145	0.101
_lcdname_3519	-0.0118	(0.0617)	-0.192	0.848	-0.133	0.109
_lcdname_3520	-0.00212	(0.0612)	-0.0347	0.972	-0.122	0.118
_lcdname_3521	-0.00895	(0.0607)	-0.147	0.883	-0.128	0.110
_lcdname_3523	0.0540	(0.0445)	1.213	0.225	-0.0333	0.141
_lcdname_3524	0.0584	(0.0649)	0.900	0.368	-0.0688	0.186
_lcdname_3534	-0.284***	(0.0738)	-3.850	0.000119	-0.429	-0.140
_lcdname_3537	0.0242	(0.0630)	0.385	0.700	-0.0992	0.148
_lcdname_3538	-0.216*	(0.119)	-1.812	0.0700	-0.450	0.0177
_lcdname_3539	-0.103	(0.0668)	-1.538	0.124	-0.234	0.0282
_lcdname_3542	-0.0464	(0.0578)	-0.803	0.422	-0.160	0.0669
_lcdname_3543	-0.131**	(0.0605)	-2.164	0.0305	-0.249	-0.0124
_lcdname_3548	-0.0710	(0.0940)	-0.756	0.450	-0.255	0.113
_lcdname_3551	-0.0796	(0.0637)	-1.250	0.211	-0.204	0.0452
_lcdname_3552	-0.142**	(0.0679)	-2.088	0.0368	-0.275	-0.00868
_lyear_2000	0.000484	(0.00312)	0.155	0.877	-0.00564	0.00661
_lyear_2001	0.000440	(0.00412)	0.107	0.915	-0.00763	0.00851
_lyear_2002	-0.00341	(0.00549)	-0.622	0.534	-0.0142	0.00735
_lyear_2003	-0.0137**	(0.00693)	-1.975	0.0483	-0.0273	-0.000103
_lyear_2004	-0.0203**	(0.00857)	-2.374	0.0176	-0.0371	-0.00355
_lyear_2005	-0.0172*	(0.0103)	-1.679	0.0932	-0.0374	0.00289
_lyear_2006	-0.00828	(0.0123)	-0.673	0.501	-0.0324	0.0158
_lyear_2007	-0.0436***	(0.0142)	-3.066	0.00217	-0.0714	-0.0157
_lyear_2008	-0.0363**	(0.0158)	-2.297	0.0216	-0.0672	-0.00532
_lcmaca_2	0.0119	(0.0231)	0.514	0.607	-0.0334	0.0572
_lcmaca_3	0.0129	(0.0310)	0.416	0.677	-0.0479	0.0737
_lcmaca_4	-0.0787	(0.0570)	-1.380	0.168	-0.191	0.0331
_lcmaca_5	0.0241	(0.0686)	0.352	0.725	-0.110	0.159
_lriotype_1	-0.0247	(0.0224)	-1.103	0.270	-0.0686	0.0192
Constant	0.115	(0.103)	1.115	0.265	-0.0874	0.318

THE RESPONSE OF ONTARIO PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS TO PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES

Observations	9,944
R-squared	0.126
Number of id	1,013

---

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table H72: Estimated Marginal Effects: Preventive Care Bonuses by Baseline Compliance, Difference-in-differences Estimator with Physician-specific Fixed Effects, Pap Smear, Highest Quartile

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment1	0.0377***	(0.00957)	3.938	8.35e-05	0.0189	0.0565
fhgd	0.0126**	(0.00499)	2.520	0.0118	0.00279	0.0223
fhnd	0.0158	(0.0101)	1.558	0.119	-0.00407	0.0356
ccmd	0.0419***	(0.00849)	4.935	8.29e-07	0.0253	0.0585
fhod	0.0288**	(0.0115)	2.513	0.0120	0.00633	0.0513
doc_age	-0.000282	(0.00166)	-0.170	0.865	-0.00353	0.00297
workdays	0.000368***	(7.99e-05)	4.602	4.30e-06	0.000211	0.000524
sum_visitg2	0.00223	(0.00478)	0.466	0.641	-0.00715	0.0116
sum_visitg3	-0.0121	(0.00798)	-1.520	0.129	-0.0278	0.00351
sum_visitg4	-0.0256**	(0.0113)	-2.266	0.0235	-0.0477	-0.00344
visitpd	0.00140**	(0.000599)	2.338	0.0194	0.000226	0.00257
sum_ptg2	0.00297	(0.00536)	0.553	0.580	-0.00754	0.0135
sum_ptg3	0.00162	(0.00726)	0.223	0.823	-0.0126	0.0159
sum_ptg4	-0.00399	(0.00934)	-0.427	0.669	-0.0223	0.0143
meanage	0.00268	(0.00328)	0.816	0.415	-0.00375	0.00910
fmpersent	0.402***	(0.0679)	5.923	3.39e-09	0.269	0.536
clpersent	-0.0254	(0.190)	-0.133	0.894	-0.398	0.348
elpersent	-0.0974	(0.146)	-0.666	0.505	-0.384	0.189
_lcdname_3502	0.154	(0.0981)	1.566	0.117	-0.0387	0.346
_lcdname_3506	0.159*	(0.0857)	1.852	0.0640	-0.00926	0.327
_lcdname_3510	-0.0173	(0.0203)	-0.854	0.393	-0.0571	0.0224
_lcdname_3514	0.0835	(0.0901)	0.928	0.354	-0.0930	0.260
_lcdname_3518	0.126**	(0.0584)	2.165	0.0304	0.0120	0.241
_lcdname_3519	0.144**	(0.0646)	2.226	0.0261	0.0172	0.270
_lcdname_3520	0.135**	(0.0627)	2.157	0.0310	0.0123	0.258
_lcdname_3521	0.0987	(0.0626)	1.577	0.115	-0.0240	0.221
_lcdname_3524	0.0731	(0.0628)	1.165	0.244	-0.0499	0.196
_lcdname_3526	-0.132	(0.0802)	-1.642	0.101	-0.289	0.0255
_lcdname_3530	0.113*	(0.0626)	1.800	0.0719	-0.0100	0.235
_lcdname_3532	-0.0515	(0.0476)	-1.082	0.279	-0.145	0.0418
_lcdname_3539	-0.0280	(0.0697)	-0.401	0.688	-0.165	0.109
_lcdname_3543	0.153**	(0.0692)	2.213	0.0270	0.0175	0.289
_lyear_2000	0.00588*	(0.00340)	1.730	0.0836	-0.000782	0.0125
_lyear_2001	0.0110***	(0.00348)	3.171	0.00153	0.00421	0.0179
_lyear_2002	0.0138***	(0.00393)	3.504	0.000463	0.00606	0.0215
_lyear_2003	0.0127***	(0.00447)	2.839	0.00455	0.00392	0.0214
_lyear_2004	0.00744	(0.00541)	1.375	0.169	-0.00317	0.0181
_lyear_2005	0.0117*	(0.00645)	1.815	0.0696	-0.000938	0.0243
_lyear_2006	0.0190**	(0.00800)	2.375	0.0176	0.00332	0.0347
_lyear_2007	-0.00505	(0.00362)	-1.395	0.163	-0.0121	0.00205
_lcmaca_4	-0.129**	(0.0659)	-1.964	0.0496	-0.259	-0.000237
Constant	0.218**	(0.0943)	2.309	0.0210	0.0329	0.403
Observations	5,033					
R-squared	0.142					
Number of id	511					

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1



THE RESPONSE OF ONTARIO PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS TO PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES

Table H73: Estimated Marginal Effects: Preventive Care Bonuses by Baseline Compliance, Difference-in-differences Estimator with Physician-specific Fixed Effects, Mammogram, Lowest Quartile

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment2	0.0341***	(0.00919)	3.709	0.000210	0.0161	0.0521
fhgd	0.0387***	(0.00672)	5.755	9.26e-09	0.0255	0.0518
fhnd	0.0369	(0.0266)	1.386	0.166	-0.0153	0.0890
ccmd	0.0555***	(0.0101)	5.521	3.57e-08	0.0358	0.0753
fhod	0.0618	(0.0471)	1.313	0.189	-0.0305	0.154
doc_age	-0.0267***	(0.0101)	-2.646	0.00816	-0.0466	-0.00693
workdays	0.000201**	(8.05e-05)	2.494	0.0127	4.29e-05	0.000359
sum_visitg2	-0.0120	(0.00842)	-1.420	0.156	-0.0285	0.00455
sum_visitg3	-0.0125	(0.0107)	-1.166	0.243	-0.0336	0.00853
sum_visitg4	-0.0157	(0.0129)	-1.215	0.224	-0.0409	0.00961
visitpd	-0.00143***	(0.000388)	-3.689	0.000228	-0.00219	-0.000671
sum_ptg2	0.0104	(0.00778)	1.334	0.182	-0.00487	0.0256
sum_ptg3	0.0194**	(0.00966)	2.009	0.0446	0.000465	0.0383
sum_ptg4	0.0380***	(0.0112)	3.387	0.000714	0.0160	0.0600
meanage	0.0121***	(0.00166)	7.287	0	0.00883	0.0153
fmpercent	0.291***	(0.105)	2.780	0.00547	0.0857	0.496
clpercent	-0.661**	(0.301)	-2.194	0.0283	-1.251	-0.0703
elpercent	-0.570***	(0.134)	-4.264	2.05e-05	-0.832	-0.308
_lcdname_3502	0.0451	(0.0556)	0.813	0.416	-0.0638	0.154
_lcdname_3506	0.0311	(0.0402)	0.774	0.439	-0.0476	0.110
_lcdname_3507	-0.107**	(0.0439)	-2.444	0.0146	-0.193	-0.0212
_lcdname_3511	-0.109***	(0.0158)	-6.884	0	-0.140	-0.0779
_lcdname_3515	-0.192**	(0.0790)	-2.430	0.0151	-0.347	-0.0371
_lcdname_3518	-0.0134	(0.0488)	-0.275	0.783	-0.109	0.0823
_lcdname_3519	-0.0732	(0.0709)	-1.032	0.302	-0.212	0.0658
_lcdname_3520	-0.0735	(0.0684)	-1.075	0.283	-0.208	0.0606
_lcdname_3521	-0.0779	(0.0673)	-1.158	0.247	-0.210	0.0540
_lcdname_3523	-0.156**	(0.0754)	-2.062	0.0393	-0.303	-0.00765
_lcdname_3524	-0.0702	(0.0826)	-0.850	0.395	-0.232	0.0917
_lcdname_3526	-0.171**	(0.0743)	-2.307	0.0211	-0.317	-0.0258
_lcdname_3530	-0.216***	(0.0805)	-2.678	0.00744	-0.373	-0.0577
_lcdname_3547	-0.0572	(0.0895)	-0.639	0.523	-0.233	0.118
_lcdname_3551	0.103	(0.0894)	1.153	0.249	-0.0723	0.278
_lcdname_3552	-0.0443	(0.0903)	-0.490	0.624	-0.221	0.133
_lcdname_3553	-0.0151	(0.0848)	-0.178	0.858	-0.181	0.151
_lcdname_3560	-0.0225	(0.0302)	-0.744	0.457	-0.0817	0.0368
_lyear_2000	0.0344***	(0.0112)	3.085	0.00205	0.0125	0.0563
_lyear_2001	0.0685***	(0.0207)	3.307	0.000950	0.0279	0.109
_lyear_2002	0.0938***	(0.0306)	3.060	0.00223	0.0337	0.154
_lyear_2003	0.114***	(0.0408)	2.803	0.00509	0.0343	0.194
_lyear_2004	0.133***	(0.0509)	2.607	0.00917	0.0329	0.232
_lyear_2005	0.165***	(0.0609)	2.717	0.00662	0.0460	0.285
_lyear_2006	0.204***	(0.0711)	2.865	0.00419	0.0643	0.343
_lyear_2007	0.219***	(0.0814)	2.689	0.00720	0.0593	0.379
_lyear_2008	0.262***	(0.0915)	2.858	0.00428	0.0822	0.441
_lcmaca_2	0.0656***	(0.0188)	3.482	0.000502	0.0287	0.103
_lcmaca_5	0.0422*	(0.0244)	1.729	0.0839	-0.00564	0.0899
_lriotype_1	-0.000243	(0.0177)	-0.0137	0.989	-0.0350	0.0345
Constant	1.281**	(0.507)	2.527	0.0116	0.287	2.275
Observations	5,031					
R-squared	0.252					
Number of id	515					

Robust standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table H74: Estimated Marginal Effects: Preventive Care Bonuses by Baseline Compliance, Difference-in-differences Estimator with Physician-specific Fixed Effects, Mammogram, Middle Two Quartiles

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment2	0.0176***	(0.00621)	2.829	0.00467	0.00539	0.0297
post	0.0348*	(0.0197)	1.765	0.0775	-0.00384	0.0733
fhgd	0.0399***	(0.00412)	9.684	0	0.0318	0.0480
fhnd	0.0201**	(0.00920)	2.187	0.0288	0.00209	0.0382
ccmd	0.0495***	(0.00708)	6.986	0	0.0356	0.0633
fhod	0.0372**	(0.0153)	2.428	0.0152	0.00717	0.0672
doc_age	-0.00528***	(0.00203)	-2.606	0.00918	-0.00925	-0.00131
workdays	0.000193***	(4.43e-05)	4.362	1.30e-05	0.000106	0.000280
sum_visitg2	0.0153***	(0.00463)	3.305	0.000952	0.00623	0.0244
sum_visitg3	0.0124**	(0.00616)	2.021	0.0433	0.000375	0.0245
sum_visitg4	0.0109	(0.00757)	1.438	0.151	-0.00396	0.0257
visitpd	-0.000342	(0.000289)	-1.182	0.237	-0.000909	0.000225
sum_ptg2	0.00716	(0.00479)	1.493	0.136	-0.00224	0.0166
sum_ptg3	0.0133**	(0.00624)	2.126	0.0336	0.00103	0.0255
sum_ptg4	0.0183**	(0.00746)	2.448	0.0144	0.00364	0.0329
meanage	0.0116***	(0.00108)	10.73	0	0.00950	0.0137
fmpercent	0.198***	(0.0570)	3.474	0.000516	0.0863	0.310
clpercent	0.811***	(0.166)	4.874	1.11e-06	0.485	1.137
elpercent	-0.233***	(0.0738)	-3.155	0.00161	-0.377	-0.0882
_lcdname_3502	-0.0184	(0.0746)	-0.246	0.805	-0.165	0.128
_lcdname_3506	0.133*	(0.0685)	1.942	0.0521	-0.00122	0.267
_lcdname_3510	0.133*	(0.0713)	1.861	0.0628	-0.00710	0.273
_lcdname_3511	0.226***	(0.0791)	2.860	0.00424	0.0712	0.381
_lcdname_3512	0.130**	(0.0619)	2.102	0.0356	0.00875	0.251
_lcdname_3516	0.114*	(0.0661)	1.724	0.0847	-0.0156	0.243
_lcdname_3518	0.156**	(0.0694)	2.245	0.0248	0.0198	0.292
_lcdname_3519	0.194***	(0.0639)	3.044	0.00234	0.0692	0.320
_lcdname_3520	0.182***	(0.0630)	2.887	0.00390	0.0584	0.305
_lcdname_3521	0.165***	(0.0619)	2.666	0.00769	0.0437	0.286
_lcdname_3523	-0.0321	(0.0527)	-0.609	0.542	-0.135	0.0712
_lcdname_3524	0.0569	(0.0664)	0.857	0.391	-0.0732	0.187
_lcdname_3526	0.0600	(0.0678)	0.885	0.376	-0.0730	0.193
_lcdname_3532	-0.0467	(0.0780)	-0.599	0.549	-0.200	0.106
_lcdname_3537	0.0634	(0.0666)	0.953	0.341	-0.0671	0.194
_lcdname_3538	0.0569	(0.0649)	0.877	0.381	-0.0703	0.184
_lcdname_3539	0.133***	(0.0508)	2.624	0.00870	0.0337	0.233
_lcdname_3542	0.0894	(0.0564)	1.585	0.113	-0.0212	0.200
_lcdname_3543	0.107*	(0.0600)	1.779	0.0752	-0.0109	0.224
_lcdname_3548	0.0506	(0.0621)	0.815	0.415	-0.0711	0.172
_lcdname_3549	0.0493	(0.102)	0.484	0.628	-0.150	0.249
_lyear_2000	0.0154***	(0.00372)	4.132	3.64e-05	0.00807	0.0226
_lyear_2001	0.0227***	(0.00505)	4.485	7.40e-06	0.0128	0.0326
_lyear_2002	0.0310***	(0.00677)	4.587	4.55e-06	0.0178	0.0443
_lyear_2003	0.0341***	(0.00868)	3.928	8.61e-05	0.0171	0.0511
_lyear_2004	0.0177	(0.0108)	1.644	0.100	-0.00340	0.0388
_lyear_2005	0.0140	(0.0129)	1.086	0.277	-0.0113	0.0394
_lyear_2006	0.0190	(0.0153)	1.243	0.214	-0.0110	0.0489
_lyear_2007	-0.0168***	(0.00386)	-4.343	1.42e-05	-0.0243	-0.00920
_lcmaca_2	0.0676***	(0.0257)	2.632	0.00850	0.0173	0.118
_lcmaca_3	0.0757	(0.0573)	1.322	0.186	-0.0365	0.188
_lcmaca_4	0.0245	(0.0481)	0.509	0.611	-0.0698	0.119
_lcmaca_5	0.173**	(0.0719)	2.409	0.0160	0.0322	0.314
_lriotype_1	0.0228	(0.0161)	1.417	0.157	-0.00875	0.0544

THE RESPONSE OF ONTARIO PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS TO PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES

Constant	0.130	(0.128)	1.012	0.311	-0.121	0.381
Observations	9,873					
R-squared	0.158					
Number of id	1,007					

---

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table H75: Estimated Marginal Effects: Preventive Care Bonuses by Baseline Compliance, Difference-in-differences Estimator with Physician-specific Fixed Effects, Mammogram, Highest Quartile

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment2	0.0136	(0.0103)	1.316	0.188	-0.00665	0.0338
post	-0.315***	(0.0687)	-4.585	4.66e-06	-0.450	-0.180
fhgd	0.0271***	(0.00506)	5.342	9.67e-08	0.0171	0.0370
fhnd	4.94e-05	(0.0183)	0.00270	0.998	-0.0358	0.0359
ccmd	0.0197**	(0.00803)	2.458	0.0140	0.00399	0.0355
fhod	0.0125	(0.0105)	1.189	0.234	-0.00812	0.0332
doc_age	0.0328***	(0.00747)	4.389	1.17e-05	0.0181	0.0474
workdays	0.000179**	(7.40e-05)	2.415	0.0158	3.37e-05	0.000324
sum_visitg2	0.00372	(0.00461)	0.808	0.419	-0.00531	0.0128
sum_visitg3	0.000802	(0.00664)	0.121	0.904	-0.0122	0.0138
sum_visitg4	-0.00682	(0.00915)	-0.746	0.456	-0.0248	0.0111
visitpd	0.000155	(0.000458)	0.339	0.735	-0.000743	0.00105
sum_ptg2	0.0126**	(0.00583)	2.170	0.0301	0.00122	0.0241
sum_ptg3	0.0119	(0.00758)	1.571	0.116	-0.00296	0.0268
sum_ptg4	0.0156	(0.0102)	1.525	0.127	-0.00445	0.0356
meanage	0.00622***	(0.00176)	3.531	0.000418	0.00277	0.00968
fmpercent	0.500***	(0.102)	4.909	9.50e-07	0.300	0.700
clpercent	0.0945	(0.151)	0.625	0.532	-0.202	0.391
elpercent	0.0305	(0.104)	0.293	0.770	-0.174	0.235
_lcdname_3502	0.125	(0.112)	1.122	0.262	-0.0936	0.344
_lcdname_3510	0.0394	(0.0443)	0.888	0.374	-0.0475	0.126
_lcdname_3514	0.0406	(0.0566)	0.717	0.473	-0.0703	0.152
_lcdname_3518	0.0317	(0.0359)	0.881	0.379	-0.0388	0.102
_lcdname_3519	-0.00726	(0.0478)	-0.152	0.879	-0.101	0.0864
_lcdname_3520	-0.0154	(0.0416)	-0.371	0.710	-0.0969	0.0660
_lcdname_3521	-0.124***	(0.0480)	-2.580	0.00990	-0.218	-0.0298
_lcdname_3524	-0.0880**	(0.0422)	-2.084	0.0372	-0.171	-0.00522
_lcdname_3530	-0.0250	(0.0402)	-0.622	0.534	-0.104	0.0539
_lcdname_3534	-0.108*	(0.0594)	-1.809	0.0705	-0.224	0.00899
_lcdname_3537	0.188***	(0.0694)	2.707	0.00681	0.0518	0.324
_lcdname_3539	-0.0335	(0.0583)	-0.574	0.566	-0.148	0.0809
_lcdname_3540	0.393***	(0.123)	3.200	0.00138	0.152	0.634
_lcdname_3543	-0.0580	(0.0720)	-0.806	0.420	-0.199	0.0831
_lyear_2000	-0.0277***	(0.00832)	-3.328	0.000882	-0.0440	-0.0114
_lyear_2001	-0.0539***	(0.0153)	-3.530	0.000419	-0.0838	-0.0240
_lyear_2002	-0.0802***	(0.0226)	-3.546	0.000395	-0.125	-0.0359
_lyear_2003	-0.106***	(0.0300)	-3.549	0.000391	-0.165	-0.0477
_lyear_2004	-0.158***	(0.0375)	-4.208	2.63e-05	-0.231	-0.0842
_lyear_2005	-0.204***	(0.0450)	-4.523	6.25e-06	-0.292	-0.115
_lyear_2006	-0.235***	(0.0528)	-4.450	8.82e-06	-0.339	-0.132
_lyear_2007	0.0335***	(0.00878)	3.815	0.000138	0.0163	0.0507
_lcmaca_2	-0.0248	(0.0304)	-0.813	0.416	-0.0844	0.0349
_lcmaca_3	-0.0159	(0.0175)	-0.910	0.363	-0.0502	0.0184
_lcmaca_4	-0.149*	(0.0768)	-1.941	0.0524	-0.300	0.00153
_lriotype_1	0.0966*	(0.0558)	1.734	0.0831	-0.0126	0.206
Constant	-1.389***	(0.352)	-3.942	8.20e-05	-2.079	-0.698
Observations	4,984					
R-squared	0.167					
Number of id	507					

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1

THE RESPONSE OF ONTARIO PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS TO PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES

Table H76: Estimated Marginal Effects: Preventive Care Bonuses by Baseline Compliance, Difference-in-differences Estimator with Physician-specific Fixed Effects, Colorectal Cancer Screening, Lowest Quartile

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment5	0.0910***	(0.00731)	12.46	0	0.0767	0.105
post	0.118**	(0.0484)	2.442	0.0146	0.0233	0.213
fhgd	0.0135***	(0.00502)	2.683	0.00733	0.00363	0.0233
fhnd	0.0479***	(0.0159)	3.018	0.00256	0.0168	0.0791
ccmd	0.0528***	(0.0173)	3.054	0.00227	0.0189	0.0867
fhod	0.101***	(0.0357)	2.826	0.00473	0.0309	0.171
doc_age	-0.00372	(0.00522)	-0.712	0.477	-0.0140	0.00652
workdays	0.000187**	(7.69e-05)	2.435	0.0149	3.65e-05	0.000338
sum_visitg2	-0.0171*	(0.00989)	-1.725	0.0846	-0.0365	0.00233
sum_visitg3	-0.00812	(0.0122)	-0.665	0.506	-0.0321	0.0158
sum_visitg4	-0.00688	(0.0149)	-0.460	0.645	-0.0362	0.0224
visitpd	-0.000643	(0.000546)	-1.177	0.239	-0.00171	0.000428
sum_ptg2	0.0296***	(0.00863)	3.430	0.000608	0.0127	0.0465
sum_ptg3	0.0368***	(0.0101)	3.652	0.000263	0.0171	0.0566
sum_ptg4	0.0534***	(0.0128)	4.186	2.89e-05	0.0284	0.0784
meanage	0.00520***	(0.00169)	3.081	0.00208	0.00189	0.00851
fmpercent	-0.257**	(0.101)	-2.554	0.0107	-0.455	-0.0597
clpercent	-0.841***	(0.278)	-3.020	0.00254	-1.386	-0.295
elpercent	-0.355***	(0.114)	-3.122	0.00181	-0.578	-0.132
_lcdname_3506	0.0109	(0.0267)	0.408	0.683	-0.0415	0.0633
_lcdname_3510	0.120***	(0.0183)	6.560	6.01e-11	0.0841	0.156
_lcdname_3512	-0.0254	(0.0844)	-0.300	0.764	-0.191	0.140
_lcdname_3514	-0.174***	(0.0421)	-4.129	3.72e-05	-0.257	-0.0914
_lcdname_3519	-0.0261	(0.0656)	-0.397	0.691	-0.155	0.103
_lcdname_3520	-0.0178	(0.0677)	-0.262	0.793	-0.151	0.115
_lcdname_3521	-0.0869	(0.0681)	-1.276	0.202	-0.220	0.0466
_lcdname_3522	0.0998**	(0.0401)	2.488	0.0129	0.0211	0.178
_lcdname_3523	-0.164**	(0.0728)	-2.258	0.0240	-0.307	-0.0217
_lcdname_3524	-0.0863	(0.0695)	-1.241	0.215	-0.223	0.0501
_lcdname_3530	-0.0109	(0.0239)	-0.455	0.649	-0.0577	0.0360
_lcdname_3539	0.0817	(0.0506)	1.614	0.107	-0.0175	0.181
_lcdname_3543	-0.0134	(0.0668)	-0.200	0.841	-0.144	0.118
_lcdname_3552	-0.0638	(0.0629)	-1.015	0.310	-0.187	0.0594
_lyear_2000	0.00277	(0.00624)	0.445	0.657	-0.00945	0.0150
_lyear_2001	0.00769	(0.0110)	0.698	0.485	-0.0139	0.0293
_lyear_2002	0.00999	(0.0161)	0.621	0.534	-0.0215	0.0415
_lyear_2003	0.0107	(0.0214)	0.499	0.617	-0.0313	0.0527
_lyear_2004	0.0198	(0.0266)	0.743	0.457	-0.0324	0.0720
_lyear_2005	0.0380	(0.0320)	1.189	0.235	-0.0247	0.101
_lyear_2006	-0.126***	(0.0138)	-9.182	0	-0.153	-0.0995
_lyear_2007	-0.0685***	(0.0109)	-6.301	3.25e-10	-0.0898	-0.0472
_lcmaca_2	0.00185	(0.0215)	0.0863	0.931	-0.0403	0.0440
_lcmaca_3	0.0192	(0.0357)	0.538	0.591	-0.0508	0.0893
_lcmaca_4	0.00329	(0.0350)	0.0940	0.925	-0.0653	0.0718
_lriotype_1	-0.0487**	(0.0223)	-2.183	0.0291	-0.0924	-0.00496
Constant	0.213	(0.274)	0.776	0.438	-0.325	0.750
Observations	4,918					
R-squared	0.410					
Number of id	502					

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table H77: Estimated Marginal Effects: Preventive Care Bonuses by Baseline Compliance, Difference-in-differences Estimator with Physician-specific Fixed Effects, Colorectal Cancer Screening, Middle Two Quartiles

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment5	0.102***	(0.00728)	13.95	0	0.0873	0.116
fhgd	0.0341***	(0.00571)	5.977	2.35e-09	0.0229	0.0453
fhnd	0.0494***	(0.0113)	4.350	1.38e-05	0.0271	0.0716
ccmd	0.0329**	(0.0142)	2.316	0.0206	0.00506	0.0608
fhod	0.0352	(0.0216)	1.631	0.103	-0.00711	0.0775
doc_age	-0.00390	(0.00243)	-1.605	0.109	-0.00866	0.000863
workdays	3.42e-05	(5.85e-05)	0.584	0.559	-8.05e-05	0.000149
sum_visitg2	0.00453	(0.00647)	0.700	0.484	-0.00815	0.0172
sum_visitg3	0.00469	(0.00871)	0.539	0.590	-0.0124	0.0218
sum_visitg4	0.00159	(0.0109)	0.146	0.884	-0.0198	0.0230
visitpd	-0.000445	(0.000357)	-1.247	0.213	-0.00114	0.000254
sum_ptg2	0.0144**	(0.00576)	2.497	0.0125	0.00309	0.0257
sum_ptg3	0.0198***	(0.00752)	2.632	0.00850	0.00505	0.0345
sum_ptg4	0.0215**	(0.00939)	2.293	0.0219	0.00312	0.0399
meanage	0.00155	(0.00123)	1.254	0.210	-0.000871	0.00397
fmpercent	-0.0151	(0.0491)	-0.307	0.758	-0.111	0.0812
clpercent	-0.137	(0.215)	-0.637	0.524	-0.559	0.285
elpercent	-0.0415	(0.0915)	-0.454	0.650	-0.221	0.138
_lcdname_3502	0.00618	(0.0724)	0.0853	0.932	-0.136	0.148
_lcdname_3506	0.0916**	(0.0412)	2.224	0.0262	0.0109	0.172
_lcdname_3507	-0.124***	(0.0269)	-4.609	4.11e-06	-0.177	-0.0713
_lcdname_3510	0.151***	(0.0426)	3.549	0.000389	0.0677	0.235
_lcdname_3512	0.315***	(0.0579)	5.446	5.30e-08	0.202	0.429
_lcdname_3515	0.0789	(0.0537)	1.469	0.142	-0.0263	0.184
_lcdname_3516	0.0117	(0.0552)	0.212	0.832	-0.0965	0.120
_lcdname_3518	0.222***	(0.0585)	3.796	0.000148	0.107	0.337
_lcdname_3519	0.144***	(0.0444)	3.233	0.00123	0.0566	0.231
_lcdname_3520	0.144***	(0.0424)	3.396	0.000688	0.0609	0.227
_lcdname_3521	0.115***	(0.0425)	2.694	0.00707	0.0312	0.198
_lcdname_3523	-0.0664*	(0.0367)	-1.810	0.0703	-0.138	0.00551
_lcdname_3524	0.175***	(0.0475)	3.688	0.000227	0.0821	0.268
_lcdname_3526	0.151***	(0.0504)	2.988	0.00282	0.0518	0.249
_lcdname_3530	0.170***	(0.0480)	3.539	0.000404	0.0757	0.264
_lcdname_3534	0.190***	(0.0496)	3.829	0.000130	0.0927	0.287
_lcdname_3537	0.156***	(0.0403)	3.879	0.000106	0.0772	0.235
_lcdname_3539	0.121***	(0.0463)	2.610	0.00906	0.0301	0.212
_lcdname_3540	0.242***	(0.0454)	5.335	9.79e-08	0.153	0.331
_lcdname_3542	0.111**	(0.0565)	1.964	0.0496	0.000195	0.222
_lcdname_3543	0.150***	(0.0426)	3.520	0.000434	0.0665	0.234
_lcdname_3547	0.163***	(0.0419)	3.890	0.000101	0.0809	0.245
_lcdname_3548	0.0402	(0.0767)	0.525	0.600	-0.110	0.190
_lcdname_3549	-0.0140	(0.0434)	-0.323	0.746	-0.0991	0.0711
_lcdname_3551	-0.0498	(0.0413)	-1.206	0.228	-0.131	0.0311
_lcdname_3552	-0.148**	(0.0619)	-2.398	0.0165	-0.270	-0.0271
_lcdname_3560	0.0890***	(0.0313)	2.840	0.00452	0.0276	0.150
_lyear_2000	0.00754*	(0.00423)	1.780	0.0751	-0.000762	0.0158
_lyear_2001	0.0189***	(0.00601)	3.142	0.00168	0.00710	0.0307
_lyear_2002	0.0278***	(0.00811)	3.429	0.000608	0.0119	0.0437
_lyear_2003	0.0410***	(0.0103)	3.980	6.94e-05	0.0208	0.0612
_lyear_2004	0.0632***	(0.0127)	4.975	6.63e-07	0.0383	0.0881
_lyear_2005	0.0892***	(0.0154)	5.794	7.10e-09	0.0590	0.119
_lyear_2006	0.0445**	(0.0181)	2.455	0.0141	0.00898	0.0801
_lyear_2007	0.103***	(0.0205)	5.008	5.61e-07	0.0625	0.143

THE RESPONSE OF ONTARIO PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS TO PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES

_lyear_2008	0.167***	(0.0230)	7.234	0	0.121	0.212
_lcmaca_2	-0.0384	(0.0297)	-1.292	0.196	-0.0966	0.0198
_lcmaca_3	0.0519	(0.0432)	1.201	0.230	-0.0329	0.137
_lcmaca_4	-0.0512	(0.0354)	-1.446	0.148	-0.121	0.0182
_lcmaca_5	0.0186	(0.0393)	0.472	0.637	-0.0585	0.0957
_lriotype_1	-0.0226	(0.0189)	-1.193	0.233	-0.0597	0.0145
Constant	0.0756	(0.129)	0.584	0.559	-0.178	0.329
Observations	9,938					
R-squared	0.451					
Number of id	1,012					

---

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table H78: Estimated Marginal Effects: Preventive Care Bonuses by Baseline Compliance, Difference-in-differences Estimator with Physician-specific Fixed Effects, Colorectal Cancer Screening, Highest Quartile

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment5	0.0711***	(0.0145)	4.897	1.01e-06	0.0426	0.0995
post	-0.145*	(0.0822)	-1.763	0.0779	-0.306	0.0162
fhgd	0.0371***	(0.00959)	3.869	0.000111	0.0183	0.0559
fhnd	0.0895***	(0.0166)	5.374	8.10e-08	0.0568	0.122
ccmd	0.0383**	(0.0193)	1.986	0.0471	0.000492	0.0761
fhod	0.0940***	(0.0362)	2.601	0.00934	0.0231	0.165
doc_age	0.0325***	(0.00886)	3.663	0.000252	0.0151	0.0498
workdays	0.000309**	(0.000120)	2.568	0.0103	7.32e-05	0.000546
sum_visit2	-0.00785	(0.0133)	-0.591	0.555	-0.0339	0.0182
sum_visit3	-0.00844	(0.0167)	-0.506	0.613	-0.0412	0.0243
sum_visit4	-0.0102	(0.0204)	-0.498	0.618	-0.0501	0.0298
visitpd	0.00150**	(0.000751)	1.992	0.0465	2.33e-05	0.00297
sum_ptg2	0.0159	(0.0138)	1.149	0.251	-0.0112	0.0430
sum_ptg3	-0.0237	(0.0166)	-1.426	0.154	-0.0563	0.00889
sum_ptg4	-0.0389**	(0.0192)	-2.020	0.0434	-0.0766	-0.00115
meanage	0.00881***	(0.00308)	2.863	0.00421	0.00278	0.0148
fmpercent	0.198	(0.128)	1.543	0.123	-0.0535	0.449
clpercent	-1.247***	(0.380)	-3.277	0.00106	-1.993	-0.501
elpercent	-0.0281	(0.195)	-0.144	0.886	-0.411	0.355
_lcdname_3506	0.0630	(0.0763)	0.826	0.409	-0.0865	0.213
_lcdname_3510	0.167	(0.153)	1.090	0.276	-0.134	0.468
_lcdname_3514	0.664***	(0.147)	4.527	6.15e-06	0.376	0.952
_lcdname_3518	0.241*	(0.132)	1.821	0.0686	-0.0184	0.500
_lcdname_3519	0.367***	(0.122)	3.009	0.00263	0.128	0.606
_lcdname_3520	0.387***	(0.123)	3.146	0.00167	0.146	0.628
_lcdname_3521	0.374***	(0.120)	3.111	0.00188	0.138	0.609
_lcdname_3522	0.603***	(0.129)	4.657	3.30e-06	0.349	0.857
_lcdname_3524	0.191	(0.130)	1.462	0.144	-0.0650	0.446
_lcdname_3529	0.211	(0.166)	1.273	0.203	-0.114	0.535
_lcdname_3530	0.209	(0.130)	1.614	0.107	-0.0449	0.463
_lcdname_3537	0.292***	(0.0650)	4.495	7.14e-06	0.165	0.420
_lcdname_3539	0.183	(0.112)	1.628	0.104	-0.0373	0.402
_lcdname_3541	0.585***	(0.127)	4.598	4.38e-06	0.336	0.834
_lcdname_3542	0.131	(0.0849)	1.540	0.124	-0.0357	0.297
_lyear_2000	-0.00104	(0.0128)	-0.0812	0.935	-0.0262	0.0241
_lyear_2001	0.0200	(0.0199)	1.009	0.313	-0.0189	0.0590
_lyear_2002	0.0479*	(0.0281)	1.702	0.0888	-0.00726	0.103
_lyear_2003	0.0649*	(0.0368)	1.761	0.0783	-0.00734	0.137
_lyear_2004	0.0385	(0.0457)	0.842	0.400	-0.0511	0.128
_lyear_2005	-0.000845	(0.0545)	-0.0155	0.988	-0.108	0.106
_lyear_2006	0.0350*	(0.0194)	1.808	0.0706	-0.00294	0.0730
_lyear_2007	0.0155	(0.0120)	1.292	0.196	-0.00803	0.0391
_lcmaca_2	-0.103	(0.140)	-0.733	0.463	-0.378	0.172
_lcmaca_3	-0.394***	(0.0649)	-6.069	1.39e-09	-0.521	-0.267
_lriotype_1	0.0172	(0.148)	0.117	0.907	-0.272	0.307
Constant	-2.038***	(0.423)	-4.814	1.53e-06	-2.868	-1.208
Observations	5,062					
R-squared	0.430					
Number of id	513					

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1



**Tables of Full Results for Regression Results on Basket of FHN Capitated Core Services**

Table H79: Basket of 57 Core Services Covered by the FHN Capitation Rate, Estimated Marginal Effects, Difference-in-differences Estimator with Physician-specific Fixed Effects, Base Case: Treatment Group Consisting of FPs in a FHN and Control Group Consisting of FPs in FFS

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment13	0.000345	(0.00465)	0.0741	0.941	-0.00877	0.00946
treated	-0.0123***	(0.00272)	-4.523	6.15e-06	-0.0176	-0.00696
post	0.000324	(0.00321)	0.101	0.920	-0.00597	0.00662
fhnd	0.0988***	(0.00596)	16.57	0	0.0871	0.110
doc_ageg2	0.00225	(0.00161)	1.394	0.163	-0.000912	0.00541
doc_ageg3	0.00802***	(0.00173)	4.634	3.61e-06	0.00463	0.0114
doc_ageg4	0.0190***	(0.00252)	7.531	0	0.0140	0.0239
doc_male	-0.00336	(0.00210)	-1.602	0.109	-0.00747	0.000751
yrslicyr	-0.000895***	(9.09e-05)	-9.846	0	-0.00107	-0.000717
workdays	-0.000335***	(1.82e-05)	-18.41	0	-0.000370	-0.000299
sum_visitg2	0.00429*	(0.00235)	1.822	0.0684	-0.000324	0.00890
sum_visitg3	-0.00294	(0.00312)	-0.942	0.346	-0.00907	0.00318
sum_visitg4	0.00144	(0.00408)	0.352	0.725	-0.00657	0.00944
visitpd	0.000607***	(0.000112)	5.408	6.48e-08	0.000387	0.000827
sum_ptg2	0.0138***	(0.00206)	6.708	0	0.00978	0.0179
sum_ptg3	0.0212***	(0.00248)	8.545	0	0.0163	0.0261
sum_ptg4	0.0286***	(0.00295)	9.711	0	0.0228	0.0344
meanage	0.00622***	(0.000235)	26.44	0	0.00576	0.00668
fmpercent	0.0498***	(0.00774)	6.426	1.35e-10	0.0346	0.0649
clpercent	0.419***	(0.0504)	8.315	0	0.321	0.518
elpercent	-0.347***	(0.0156)	-22.19	0	-0.377	-0.316
lnsbill	-0.0173***	(0.00235)	-7.349	0	-0.0219	-0.0127
_lcdname_3502	0.00454	(0.0119)	0.380	0.704	-0.0189	0.0280
_lcdname_3506	0.0119	(0.00831)	1.433	0.152	-0.00438	0.0282
_lcdname_3507	-0.0222**	(0.0111)	-1.996	0.0460	-0.0439	-0.000396
_lcdname_3509	0.0349**	(0.0145)	2.406	0.0162	0.00645	0.0632
_lcdname_3510	0.0427***	(0.00997)	4.286	1.83e-05	0.0232	0.0622
_lcdname_3511	0.0220*	(0.0121)	1.810	0.0703	-0.00182	0.0458
_lcdname_3512	0.0449***	(0.00907)	4.943	7.78e-07	0.0271	0.0626
_lcdname_3513	-0.00802	(0.0226)	-0.354	0.723	-0.0524	0.0363
_lcdname_3514	0.000788	(0.0101)	0.0779	0.938	-0.0190	0.0206
_lcdname_3515	0.0274***	(0.00960)	2.856	0.00429	0.00860	0.0462
_lcdname_3516	-0.0686***	(0.0129)	-5.320	1.05e-07	-0.0938	-0.0433
_lcdname_3518	0.0134	(0.00853)	1.575	0.115	-0.00328	0.0301
_lcdname_3519	0.0309***	(0.00833)	3.709	0.000209	0.0146	0.0472
_lcdname_3520	0.0470***	(0.00814)	5.770	8.07e-09	0.0310	0.0629
_lcdname_3521	0.0376***	(0.00826)	4.553	5.34e-06	0.0214	0.0538
_lcdname_3522	-0.0300***	(0.0110)	-2.734	0.00626	-0.0515	-0.00850
_lcdname_3523	-0.0317***	(0.00953)	-3.327	0.000881	-0.0504	-0.0130
_lcdname_3524	-4.65e-05	(0.00870)	-0.00534	0.996	-0.0171	0.0170
_lcdname_3525	0.0452***	(0.00920)	4.915	8.99e-07	0.0272	0.0633
_lcdname_3526	0.0151*	(0.00867)	1.740	0.0820	-0.00191	0.0321
_lcdname_3528	-0.0121	(0.00950)	-1.272	0.203	-0.0307	0.00653
_lcdname_3529	0.0213**	(0.00915)	2.327	0.0200	0.00336	0.0392
_lcdname_3530	0.0241***	(0.00858)	2.806	0.00502	0.00726	0.0409
_lcdname_3531	-0.0199*	(0.0117)	-1.693	0.0905	-0.0429	0.00314
_lcdname_3532	-0.0100	(0.0103)	-0.975	0.330	-0.0302	0.0101
_lcdname_3534	0.0129	(0.00970)	1.327	0.185	-0.00614	0.0319
_lcdname_3536	-0.0128	(0.0101)	-1.276	0.202	-0.0325	0.00688
_lcdname_3537	0.0301***	(0.00826)	3.644	0.000270	0.0139	0.0463

_lcdname_3538	0.0391***	(0.00875)	4.469	7.92e-06	0.0220	0.0563
_lcdname_3539	0.0271***	(0.00841)	3.223	0.00127	0.0106	0.0436
_lcdname_3540	-0.0153	(0.0128)	-1.193	0.233	-0.0404	0.00983
_lcdname_3541	-0.0480**	(0.0214)	-2.243	0.0249	-0.0899	-0.00605
_lcdname_3542	0.00669	(0.0115)	0.583	0.560	-0.0158	0.0292
_lcdname_3543	0.0129	(0.00858)	1.499	0.134	-0.00396	0.0297
_lcdname_3544	0.0380**	(0.0167)	2.270	0.0232	0.00518	0.0708
_lcdname_3547	0.0255**	(0.0118)	2.160	0.0308	0.00236	0.0486
_lcdname_3548	0.0169*	(0.0101)	1.663	0.0963	-0.00301	0.0367
_lcdname_3549	0.0244	(0.0187)	1.303	0.193	-0.0123	0.0610
_lcdname_3551	-0.0860	(0.0646)	-1.331	0.183	-0.213	0.0406
_lcdname_3552	0.0495	(0.0380)	1.303	0.193	-0.0249	0.124
_lcdname_3553	0.0111	(0.00936)	1.188	0.235	-0.00722	0.0295
_lcdname_3556	0.0411**	(0.0162)	2.538	0.0112	0.00935	0.0728
_lcdname_3557	0.0485***	(0.0130)	3.742	0.000183	0.0231	0.0740
_lcdname_3558	0.0194*	(0.0105)	1.853	0.0639	-0.00112	0.0399
_lcdname_3560	0.0403**	(0.0201)	2.004	0.0451	0.000882	0.0797
_lyear_2000	0.00781***	(0.00190)	4.104	4.08e-05	0.00408	0.0115
_lyear_2001	0.00726***	(0.00191)	3.793	0.000149	0.00351	0.0110
_lyear_2002	0.00606***	(0.00193)	3.139	0.00170	0.00227	0.00984
_lyear_2003	0.00699**	(0.00315)	2.219	0.0265	0.000816	0.0132
_lyear_2004	0.00170	(0.00320)	0.530	0.596	-0.00458	0.00798
_lyear_2005	-0.000394	(0.00328)	-0.120	0.904	-0.00682	0.00603
_lyear_2006	-0.00121	(0.00373)	-0.323	0.747	-0.00852	0.00611
_lyear_2008	-0.00107	(0.00384)	-0.279	0.781	-0.00861	0.00647
_lcmaca_2	-0.0111**	(0.00473)	-2.346	0.0190	-0.0204	-0.00183
_lcmaca_3	-0.00752	(0.00463)	-1.625	0.104	-0.0166	0.00155
_lcmaca_4	-0.0155**	(0.00689)	-2.251	0.0244	-0.0290	-0.00200
_lcmaca_5	-0.0607***	(0.0133)	-4.546	5.51e-06	-0.0868	-0.0345
_lriotype_1	-0.00527	(0.00409)	-1.289	0.197	-0.0133	0.00275
Constant	0.929***	(0.0286)	32.53	0	0.873	0.985
Observations	15,466					
R-squared	0.247					

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1

THE RESPONSE OF ONTARIO PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS TO PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES

Table H80: Basket of 57 Core Services Covered by the FHN Capitation Rate, Estimated Marginal Effects, Difference-in-differences Estimator with Physician-specific Fixed Effects, Sensitivity Analysis I: Treatment Group Consisting of FPs in a FHN and Control Group Consisting of FPs in FFS, FHG or CCM, Services Provided to All Patients for FPs in Control Group

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment13	0.00344	(0.00356)	0.966	0.334	-0.00354	0.0104
treated	-0.0141***	(0.00260)	-5.429	5.74e-08	-0.0192	-0.00901
post	0.00701***	(0.00192)	3.644	0.000269	0.00324	0.0108
fhgd	-0.0285***	(0.00146)	-19.49	0	-0.0314	-0.0257
fhnd	0.103***	(0.00504)	20.44	0	0.0932	0.113
ccmd	-0.0123***	(0.00329)	-3.733	0.000190	-0.0187	-0.00584
doc_ageg2	0.00399***	(0.00138)	2.892	0.00383	0.00128	0.00669
doc_ageg3	0.00654***	(0.00146)	4.470	7.85e-06	0.00367	0.00941
doc_ageg4	0.0191***	(0.00212)	8.986	0	0.0149	0.0233
doc_male	-0.00358**	(0.00178)	-2.009	0.0445	-0.00707	-8.71e-05
yrslcyr	-0.000825***	(7.81e-05)	-10.56	0	-0.000978	-0.000672
workdays	-0.000408***	(1.51e-05)	-26.97	0	-0.000438	-0.000378
sum_visitg2	0.00247	(0.00194)	1.269	0.205	-0.00134	0.00628
sum_visitg3	-0.00128	(0.00257)	-0.499	0.618	-0.00631	0.00375
sum_visitg4	0.00385	(0.00338)	1.140	0.254	-0.00277	0.0105
visitpd	0.000481***	(9.23e-05)	5.206	1.95e-07	0.000300	0.000662
sum_ptg2	0.0125***	(0.00174)	7.191	0	0.00910	0.0159
sum_ptg3	0.0183***	(0.00208)	8.789	0	0.0142	0.0224
sum_ptg4	0.0225***	(0.00245)	9.206	0	0.0177	0.0273
meanage	0.00590***	(0.000206)	28.57	0	0.00549	0.00630
fmpercent	0.0308***	(0.00665)	4.628	3.72e-06	0.0177	0.0438
clpercent	0.339***	(0.0452)	7.507	0	0.251	0.428
elpercent	-0.330***	(0.0136)	-24.29	0	-0.356	-0.303
lnsbill	-0.0134***	(0.00193)	-6.951	0	-0.0172	-0.00962
_lcdname_3502	-0.00476	(0.00980)	-0.486	0.627	-0.0240	0.0145
_lcdname_3506	0.00694	(0.00669)	1.038	0.299	-0.00617	0.0200
_lcdname_3507	-0.0180*	(0.00975)	-1.851	0.0642	-0.0372	0.00106
_lcdname_3509	0.0348***	(0.0123)	2.822	0.00478	0.0106	0.0590
_lcdname_3510	0.0368***	(0.00794)	4.643	3.45e-06	0.0213	0.0524
_lcdname_3511	0.00875	(0.00996)	0.879	0.379	-0.0108	0.0283
_lcdname_3512	0.0390***	(0.00718)	5.434	5.56e-08	0.0249	0.0531
_lcdname_3513	-0.0176	(0.0217)	-0.809	0.418	-0.0601	0.0250
_lcdname_3514	-0.00676	(0.00792)	-0.854	0.393	-0.0223	0.00877
_lcdname_3515	0.0271***	(0.00801)	3.389	0.000702	0.0114	0.0428
_lcdname_3516	-0.0840***	(0.0107)	-7.868	0	-0.105	-0.0631
_lcdname_3518	0.0120*	(0.00681)	1.756	0.0791	-0.00139	0.0253
_lcdname_3519	0.0243***	(0.00671)	3.617	0.000299	0.0111	0.0374
_lcdname_3520	0.0373***	(0.00654)	5.700	1.22e-08	0.0245	0.0501
_lcdname_3521	0.0310***	(0.00664)	4.666	3.09e-06	0.0180	0.0440
_lcdname_3522	-0.0297***	(0.00930)	-3.193	0.00141	-0.0479	-0.0115
_lcdname_3523	-0.0227***	(0.00780)	-2.904	0.00368	-0.0380	-0.00737
_lcdname_3524	-0.00138	(0.00694)	-0.199	0.842	-0.0150	0.0122
_lcdname_3525	0.0387***	(0.00753)	5.138	2.80e-07	0.0239	0.0534
_lcdname_3526	0.0115*	(0.00700)	1.650	0.0991	-0.00217	0.0253
_lcdname_3528	-0.0191**	(0.00748)	-2.550	0.0108	-0.0337	-0.00442
_lcdname_3529	0.0145*	(0.00741)	1.957	0.0503	-2.07e-05	0.0290
_lcdname_3530	0.0220***	(0.00700)	3.142	0.00168	0.00827	0.0357
_lcdname_3531	-0.0166	(0.0103)	-1.620	0.105	-0.0368	0.00349
_lcdname_3532	-0.0213***	(0.00789)	-2.704	0.00685	-0.0368	-0.00587
_lcdname_3534	0.0170**	(0.00758)	2.247	0.0246	0.00218	0.0319
_lcdname_3536	-0.0327***	(0.00802)	-4.083	4.47e-05	-0.0484	-0.0170

_lcdname_3537	0.0238***	(0.00666)	3.576	0.000350	0.0108	0.0369
_lcdname_3538	0.0313***	(0.00690)	4.538	5.72e-06	0.0178	0.0448
_lcdname_3539	0.0194***	(0.00678)	2.866	0.00416	0.00614	0.0327
_lcdname_3540	-0.0196*	(0.0111)	-1.770	0.0767	-0.0414	0.00211
_lcdname_3541	-0.0342**	(0.0170)	-2.017	0.0437	-0.0675	-0.000972
_lcdname_3542	0.00636	(0.00935)	0.680	0.496	-0.0120	0.0247
_lcdname_3543	0.0126*	(0.00687)	1.834	0.0667	-0.000867	0.0261
_lcdname_3544	0.0354**	(0.0144)	2.463	0.0138	0.00723	0.0636
_lcdname_3547	0.0274***	(0.0101)	2.719	0.00655	0.00765	0.0472
_lcdname_3548	0.0118	(0.00811)	1.453	0.146	-0.00411	0.0277
_lcdname_3549	0.0281	(0.0172)	1.635	0.102	-0.00558	0.0618
_lcdname_3551	-0.101	(0.0629)	-1.610	0.108	-0.224	0.0220
_lcdname_3552	0.0572*	(0.0324)	1.765	0.0776	-0.00632	0.121
_lcdname_3553	-0.00717	(0.00747)	-0.961	0.337	-0.0218	0.00747
_lcdname_3556	0.0452***	(0.0123)	3.666	0.000247	0.0210	0.0694
_lcdname_3557	0.0352***	(0.0106)	3.330	0.000869	0.0145	0.0559
_lcdname_3558	0.0185**	(0.00824)	2.245	0.0248	0.00235	0.0346
_lcdname_3560	0.0341**	(0.0173)	1.967	0.0492	0.000127	0.0680
_lyear_2000	0.00777***	(0.00187)	4.161	3.18e-05	0.00411	0.0114
_lyear_2001	0.00735***	(0.00187)	3.922	8.80e-05	0.00368	0.0110
_lyear_2002	0.00599***	(0.00189)	3.174	0.00151	0.00229	0.00968
_lyear_2004	-0.00341*	(0.00191)	-1.788	0.0738	-0.00716	0.000328
_lyear_2005	-0.00469**	(0.00199)	-2.361	0.0182	-0.00858	-0.000796
_lyear_2006	-0.00940***	(0.00219)	-4.297	1.74e-05	-0.0137	-0.00511
_lyear_2007	-0.0151***	(0.00224)	-6.738	0	-0.0195	-0.0107
_lyear_2008	-0.0228***	(0.00230)	-9.928	0	-0.0273	-0.0183
_lcmaca_2	-0.0127***	(0.00394)	-3.210	0.00133	-0.0204	-0.00493
_lcmaca_3	-0.00926**	(0.00395)	-2.341	0.0192	-0.0170	-0.00151
_lcmaca_4	-0.0228***	(0.00572)	-3.977	6.99e-05	-0.0340	-0.0115
_lcmaca_5	-0.0690***	(0.0116)	-5.973	2.37e-09	-0.0917	-0.0464
_lriotype_1	-0.00480	(0.00348)	-1.382	0.167	-0.0116	0.00201
Constant	0.935***	(0.0237)	39.45	0	0.889	0.981
Observations	21,480					
R-squared	0.263					

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1

THE RESPONSE OF ONTARIO PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS TO PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES

Table H81: Basket of 57 Core Services Covered by the FHN Capitation Rate, Estimated Marginal Effects, Difference-in-differences Estimator with Physician-specific Fixed Effects, Sensitivity Analysis II: Treatment Group Consisting of FPs in a FHN and Control Group Consisting of FPs in FFS, FHG or CCM, Services Provided to Rostered Patients Only for FPs in FHG or CCM

VARIABLES	(1) coef	(2) se	(3) tstat	(4) pval	(5) ci_low	(6) ci_high
treatment13	-0.00208	(0.00471)	-0.443	0.658	-0.0113	0.00715
treated	-0.0124***	(0.00279)	-4.444	8.88e-06	-0.0179	-0.00693
post	-0.00216	(0.00342)	-0.632	0.528	-0.00887	0.00454
fhgd	-0.748***	(0.00794)	-94.15	0	-0.764	-0.732
fhnd	0.102***	(0.00607)	16.82	0	0.0903	0.114
ccmd	-0.861***	(0.0374)	-23.01	0	-0.935	-0.788
doc_ageg2	0.00201	(0.00166)	1.215	0.224	-0.00123	0.00526
doc_ageg3	0.00814***	(0.00178)	4.584	4.60e-06	0.00466	0.0116
doc_ageg4	0.0188***	(0.00259)	7.280	0	0.0138	0.0239
doc_male	-0.00393*	(0.00215)	-1.823	0.0683	-0.00815	0.000295
yrslicyr	-0.000876***	(9.33e-05)	-9.383	0	-0.00106	-0.000693
workdays	-0.000336***	(1.87e-05)	-17.99	0	-0.000372	-0.000299
sum_visitg2	0.00441*	(0.00242)	1.821	0.0687	-0.000338	0.00915
sum_visitg3	-0.00267	(0.00321)	-0.832	0.405	-0.00897	0.00362
sum_visitg4	0.00265	(0.00420)	0.631	0.528	-0.00558	0.0109
visitpd	0.000545***	(0.000115)	4.725	2.32e-06	0.000319	0.000771
sum_ptg2	0.0132***	(0.00212)	6.234	4.66e-10	0.00905	0.0173
sum_ptg3	0.0210***	(0.00255)	8.253	0	0.0160	0.0260
sum_ptg4	0.0280***	(0.00303)	9.267	0	0.0221	0.0340
meanage	0.00627***	(0.000242)	25.97	0	0.00580	0.00674
fmpercent	0.0509***	(0.00796)	6.396	1.64e-10	0.0353	0.0665
clpercent	0.410***	(0.0518)	7.905	0	0.308	0.511
elpercent	-0.353***	(0.0160)	-21.98	0	-0.384	-0.321
lnbsbill	-0.0166***	(0.00241)	-6.866	0	-0.0213	-0.0118
_lcdname_3502	0.00981	(0.0122)	0.805	0.421	-0.0141	0.0337
_lcdname_3506	0.0166**	(0.00836)	1.981	0.0476	0.000176	0.0330
_lcdname_3507	-0.0174	(0.0113)	-1.547	0.122	-0.0395	0.00465
_lcdname_3509	0.0413***	(0.0148)	2.795	0.00520	0.0123	0.0703
_lcdname_3510	0.0478***	(0.0101)	4.741	2.14e-06	0.0281	0.0676
_lcdname_3511	0.0325***	(0.0123)	2.653	0.00798	0.00849	0.0565
_lcdname_3512	0.0498***	(0.00918)	5.425	5.89e-08	0.0318	0.0678
_lcdname_3513	-0.00205	(0.0232)	-0.0884	0.930	-0.0475	0.0434
_lcdname_3514	-0.000317	(0.0101)	-0.0314	0.975	-0.0201	0.0195
_lcdname_3515	0.0331***	(0.00969)	3.418	0.000633	0.0141	0.0521
_lcdname_3516	-0.0638***	(0.0131)	-4.852	1.23e-06	-0.0895	-0.0380
_lcdname_3518	0.0189**	(0.00856)	2.211	0.0271	0.00215	0.0357
_lcdname_3519	0.0356***	(0.00838)	4.252	2.13e-05	0.0192	0.0521
_lcdname_3520	0.0521***	(0.00818)	6.370	1.94e-10	0.0361	0.0681
_lcdname_3521	0.0425***	(0.00830)	5.114	3.19e-07	0.0262	0.0587
_lcdname_3522	-0.0249**	(0.0111)	-2.238	0.0252	-0.0468	-0.00310
_lcdname_3523	-0.0263***	(0.00963)	-2.734	0.00626	-0.0452	-0.00746
_lcdname_3524	0.00388	(0.00875)	0.443	0.658	-0.0133	0.0210
_lcdname_3525	0.0505***	(0.00929)	5.436	5.52e-08	0.0323	0.0687
_lcdname_3526	0.0191**	(0.00873)	2.184	0.0290	0.00195	0.0362
_lcdname_3528	-0.00746	(0.00963)	-0.774	0.439	-0.0263	0.0114
_lcdname_3529	0.0261***	(0.00924)	2.824	0.00474	0.00799	0.0442
_lcdname_3530	0.0294***	(0.00864)	3.406	0.000662	0.0125	0.0464
_lcdname_3531	-0.0129	(0.0119)	-1.082	0.279	-0.0362	0.0105
_lcdname_3532	0.0255**	(0.0102)	2.511	0.0120	0.00560	0.0454
_lcdname_3534	0.0176*	(0.00982)	1.794	0.0728	-0.00163	0.0369
_lcdname_3536	-0.0217**	(0.00981)	-2.208	0.0272	-0.0409	-0.00243

_lcdname_3537	0.0343***	(0.00830)	4.135	3.56e-05	0.0180	0.0506
_lcdname_3538	0.0471***	(0.00875)	5.385	7.34e-08	0.0300	0.0643
_lcdname_3539	0.0319***	(0.00846)	3.776	0.000160	0.0154	0.0485
_lcdname_3540	-0.00407	(0.0129)	-0.315	0.752	-0.0293	0.0212
_lcdname_3541	-0.0404*	(0.0219)	-1.850	0.0643	-0.0833	0.00241
_lcdname_3542	0.00105	(0.0113)	0.0928	0.926	-0.0211	0.0232
_lcdname_3543	0.0173**	(0.00864)	2.003	0.0452	0.000372	0.0342
_lcdname_3544	0.0441***	(0.0171)	2.586	0.00973	0.0107	0.0776
_lcdname_3547	0.0317***	(0.0119)	2.654	0.00797	0.00827	0.0550
_lcdname_3548	0.0220**	(0.0103)	2.141	0.0323	0.00186	0.0421
_lcdname_3549	0.0340*	(0.0190)	1.789	0.0737	-0.00326	0.0713
_lcdname_3551	-0.0789	(0.0664)	-1.189	0.234	-0.209	0.0512
_lcdname_3552	0.0539	(0.0390)	1.382	0.167	-0.0226	0.130
_lcdname_3553	0.0154	(0.00944)	1.631	0.103	-0.00311	0.0339
_lcdname_3556	0.0451***	(0.0166)	2.727	0.00640	0.0127	0.0776
_lcdname_3557	0.0439***	(0.0130)	3.391	0.000697	0.0185	0.0693
_lcdname_3558	0.0217**	(0.0106)	2.052	0.0402	0.000970	0.0423
_lcdname_3560	0.0440**	(0.0206)	2.138	0.0325	0.00367	0.0844
_lyear_2000	0.00779***	(0.00196)	3.983	6.84e-05	0.00396	0.0116
_lyear_2001	0.00731***	(0.00197)	3.715	0.000204	0.00345	0.0112
_lyear_2002	0.00609***	(0.00198)	3.068	0.00216	0.00220	0.00998
_lyear_2003	0.00969***	(0.00335)	2.897	0.00377	0.00314	0.0162
_lyear_2004	0.00438	(0.00339)	1.291	0.197	-0.00227	0.0110
_lyear_2005	0.00359	(0.00345)	1.041	0.298	-0.00317	0.0103
_lyear_2006	-0.00126	(0.00386)	-0.328	0.743	-0.00883	0.00630
_lyear_2007	0.00274	(0.00389)	0.705	0.481	-0.00488	0.0104
_lcmaca_2	-0.0108**	(0.00483)	-2.240	0.0251	-0.0203	-0.00135
_lcmaca_3	-0.00766	(0.00471)	-1.624	0.104	-0.0169	0.00159
_lcmaca_4	-0.0223***	(0.00701)	-3.179	0.00148	-0.0360	-0.00855
_lcmaca_5	-0.0631***	(0.0137)	-4.603	4.20e-06	-0.0900	-0.0362
_lriotype_1	-0.00692*	(0.00416)	-1.662	0.0965	-0.0151	0.00124
Constant	0.918***	(0.0293)	31.35	0	0.861	0.976
Observations	15,543					
R-squared	0.518					

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1

### References to Appendices

- Hutchison, B., Hurley, J., Birch, S., Lomas, J., & Stratford-Devai, F. Defining the Practice Population in Fee-for-Service Practice. *Health Services Research* 1997;32(1):55-70.
- Kwong, J. C., & Manuel, D. G. Using OHIP physician billing claims to ascertain individual influenza vaccination status *Vaccine* 2007;25:1270-1274.
- Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, Public Health Protection and Prevention Branch. Special Data Request; 2010.
- Ontario College of Family Physicians. *Family Physicians and Public Policy: The Light at the End of the Tunnel*. Toronto OCFP; 2005.