FROM NARCISSISM TO SCHIZOPHRENIA
FROM NARCISSISM TO SCHIZOPHRENIA: THE SUBJECT AND METHOD
IN JEAN-LUC MARION, EMMANUEL LEVINAS AND EDMUND HUSSERL

By
RASHMIKA PANDYA, B.A., M.A.

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Descriptive Note

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AUTHOR: Rashmika Pandya, B.A. (University of Regina), M.A. (McMaster University)

SUPERVISOR: Professor Brigitte Sassen

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Abstract

This work explores three phenomenological views of subjectivity in light of methodological transitions within phenomenology since its inception. Jean-Luc Marion offers a critique of Husserl's transcendental ego in *Cartesian Questions*. This critique characterizes Husserl's transcendental ego as a 'schizophrenic ego'. This criticism is aimed at phenomenology's intentionality thesis as well as the method of reduction(s). Marion is influenced by Emmanuel Levinas' ethics and takes issue with a 'theoretical bias' within Husserl's thought, a bias that characterizes subjectivity in the same terms as objectivity. I frame Marion's and Levinas' views of subjectivity in terms of two seemingly opposed 'origins' of subjectivity: Marion's notion of subjectivity embraces a notion of an originally auto-affected subject, while Levinas' position privileges an originally hetero-affected subject. I argue that both these views of subjectivity remain within dualist perspectives. Both thinkers try to overturn a hierarchy of reason over sensation/emotion/feeling by calling for a radically passive institution of subjectivity through either a givenness prior to subjectivity (Marion) or the face to face encounter with an Other (Levinas). However, both positions end up instituting a new hierarchy, one where reason is subjugated to feeling. Rather than dismantling dualism both thinkers end up defending a revised hierarchical thinking. I argue that Husserl's transcendental ego is indeed a 'schizophrenic ego' (i.e., a split ego) in Marion's sense but that this is not a problem for classical phenomenology but an alternative to either an auto-affected subject or a hetero-affected subject. Husserl's works on internal time-consciousness and passive and active synthesis illustrate a necessary correlation between passivity/activity, matter/form, reason/emotion, ego/world and self/other which moves beyond the hierarchical thinking associated with traditional dualist thought. Husserl's notions of correlation and synthesis actually suggest a subject that is always intentionally related to the world and others and is also intentionally self-related. The implicit aim of this work is to suggest an alternative to an ethics of irreducibility endorsed by both Marion and Levinas. Husserlian phenomenology offers the possibility of an ethics of reciprocity, which paradoxically does not undermine the irreducibility of the subject, others or the world.
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Introduction

In the first edition of his *Logical Investigations*, Husserl, echoing Hume in *A Treatise of Human Nature*, suggests that he is unable to locate the ego (i.e., the ego as center of all relations). "[T]he phenomenological ego or unity of consciousness is already constituted, without need of an additional, peculiar ego-principle which supports all contents and unites them all again. Here as elsewhere it is not clear what such a principle would effect" (*LI II* 364/*LI II* 86). As Dermot Moran points out:

Husserl had originally held a Kantian position that the ‘I think’ which can accompany all experiences plays a purely formal role. But by the time of the Second Edition, he maintained that the reduction had to leave behind a residuum which was the pure ego itself (*Introduction* 170).

Husserl’s position in the First Edition of the *Investigations* and arguably this is a position he maintains till *Ideas I*, is that the empirical ego is an object like other objects in the world. An ego underlying this empirical ego that would unite Hume’s “bundle of perceptions” is, at best, fictive. Yet, his later work appears to privilege just such a view of the ego or subjectivity with the transcendental turn and the introduction of the transcendental ego. Husserl’s phenomenology moves from the position of the *Logical Investigations* which purported to return to our lived experience and describe it, to the “principle of all principles” of *Ideas I* and finally to the “absolute egology” of the *Cartesian Meditations*. For many of Husserl’s students this was a return to a Cartesian view of subjectivity and, as such, it betrayed the promise of phenomenology. I suggest that there is an alternative view of subjectivity that results from Husserl’s Cartesian turn. The problem of intersubjectivity centers on how we understand subjectivity whether we accept a Cartesian notion of an autonomous subject that is (at least for itself) ‘transparent’ or whether we endorse a notion of a decentered subject in all its various formations. Depending on how we understand subjectivity, we can characterize intersubjectivity by

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1 This was a view that Husserl revised in the second edition of the *Investigations*. “The opposition to the doctrine of the pure ego, already expressed in this paragraph, is one that the author no longer approves of...” (*LI II* 364 n.3/*LI II* 352 n.5).

2 “Enough now of absurd theories. No conceivable theory can make us err with respect to the Principle of Principles: that every originary presentive intuition is a legitimizing source of cognition, that everything originally (so to speak in its personal actuality) offered to us in intuition is to be accepted simply as what it is presented as being, but also only within the limits in which it is presented there” (*ID I* 43-44/ *ID I* 44). While I cannot elaborate on it here, it should be noted that the principle of principles is also the source of criticism of classical phenomenology’s intuitionism. Certainly Derrida’s critique of Husserl as falling into a metaphysics of presence originates with the kind of evidence that Husserl claims for intuitions.
either reciprocity or irreducibility. Arguably, this creates a ‘false’ dichotomy and there may well be other ways in which to characterize the intersubjective relation. However, the positions I focus on in this work operate within the dichotomy of reciprocity/irreducibility. I argue that while there may be various ways to mediate such a dichotomy one or the other term is usually privileged in intersubjective theories, especially in those theories that I oppose to classical phenomenology. Husserl’s notion of intersubjectivity mediates between the two extremes and so offers an analysis that need not sacrifice either the reciprocity of self and other or the irreducibility of individuals. Taken to an extreme neither reciprocity nor irreducibility is acceptable. Reciprocity taken to an extreme reduces the other to the same (i.e. to a homogenous universality.) While irreducibility suggests that other people are essentially unknowable or, at least indeterminable (i.e. a difference without any similarity), this is to undermine the intersubjective basis of any epistemology or ethics.

This work aims to engage two interpretations of classical phenomenology both of which are motivated by ethical concerns. Jean-Luc Marion and Emmanuel Levinas are both critical of an objective bias within Husserl’s phenomenology and their respective positions develop in reaction to this purported bias. I specifically focus on the notion of subjectivity that each thinker endorses and on the revision of classical phenomenology their formulations of subjectivity entail. Marion and Levinas both attempt to uncover a purely passive ground of subjectivity. The subject, who in Husserl’s thought is characterized as constitutive and constituted, actually reflects a privileging of the knowing subject over an essentially passive and affected subject. In one sense Marion and Levinas develop their own views of subjectivity in light of problems with Husserl’s intentionality thesis, specifically in Husserl’s account of the noetic ‘structures’ of intentionality. According to Marion and Levinas, Husserl maintained an untenable duality between consciousness as passively receptive and consciousness as sense-bestowing and this led him to support a hierarchical view which privileged the constitutive aspects of consciousness. The underlying criticism is that Husserl reduces all transcendences to the immanence of the transcendental ego. The ego subsumes otherness within itself in its drive for unity and identity—in such an analysis the other is an alter ego, a mere reflection of the ego. Marion and Levinas, while maintaining the dualism entailed in the notion of noesis, merely reverse the hierarchical ordering they attribute to Husserl. On their accounts subjectivity (in distinct ways for each thinker) is primarily passive, for Marion this leads to a notion of an auto-affected subject and for Levinas to a notion of a hetero-affected subject. Marion’s account of auto-affection, even when he introduces hetero-affection into it, ends up dissolving the differences between subject and world and subject and other. This is one way to describe what I refer to above as an extreme form of reciprocity. Levinas, on the other hand, posits a view of a conflicted subject haunted by a ‘trace’ of transcendence which is incomprehensible. The irreducibility of the subject and the other suggests that this is a radical difference though one mediated by an unquenchable desire. Levinas merely reverses the hierarchical privileging of the subject over the other, which he associates with violence. Irreducibility taken to an extreme creates an unbridgeable gap between the subject and the other—all dialogue is silenced in such a view. In opposition to these views I suggest that we cannot read Husserl’s notion
of constitution as a production (though there is a sense in which subjectivity is not merely a passive recipient within experience) and that the intentionality thesis with the notion of correlation preserves the transcendence of the world and other—though as a transcendence within immanence. While ethics implicitly drives Marion’s and Levinas’ criticisms of classical phenomenology these criticisms also take issues with key aspects of phenomenological method, intentionality and reduction. I argue that Marion and Levinas while seemingly endorsing opposed notions of subjectivity actually share similarities, particularly in their criticisms and revisions of phenomenological method. For both thinkers the intentional relation actually suggests a non-intentional ground of subjectivity, one characterized by the notion of exposure while the reduction if pushed far enough reveals this ground. I argue that what the transcendental reduction reveals is the impossibility of a complete reduction and the inherently intentional structure of consciousness.

Chapter One analyzes Marion’s claim the subject of Husserl’s Cartes ian Meditations is a “split subject”, a decentered subject or, as Marion suggests in his commentary on this passage, Husserl’s transcendental ego is a ‘schizophrenic ego’ (QC 157/CQ 99). Husserl in the “Second Meditation” refers to this “ichspaltung”/spliting of the Ego, as the distinction between the Ego immersed in the world (“interested in the world”), and the Ego after the phenomenological reduction that is now a “disinterested onlooker”. There are three Egoic levels in this text, the Ego immersed in life, the phenomenological onlooker and the transcendental Ego, which is itself accessible through a “new reflection” (CM 73-74/CM 35). By “schizophrenia” Marion is referring to the redoubled intentionality he takes classical phenomenology to advocate.

3 In the Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty makes a similar criticism to Marion’s against reflection theories of consciousness. Though the main interlocutor is Descartes, Merleau-Ponty is arguably also thinking of Husserl’s absolute consciousness. Merleau-Ponty argues that the kind of “absolute coincidence” of the reflective consciousness and the reflected consciousness that is presupposed in a Cartesian subject is misguided. There is in a fact a lack of coinciding necessarily entailed in reflection—a slippage that nonetheless does not undermine the equality of the “I think” and the “I am.” If Husserl’s intentionality thesis is redeemable and open neither to infinite regress nor the auto-affection thesis that Marion suggests as an alternative it may be that this “lack of coincidence” is also apparent in Husserl’s notion of the absolute ego (Phenomenology 383).

4 Marion cites no sources for this notion of “schizophrenia” and his use of the term seems more colloquial than based on any psychoanalytical definition. I follow Marion in my colloquial use of schizophrenia, narcissism and masochism in Chapters One to Three. No doubt there are interesting connections one could make between Marion’s use of ‘schizophrenia’ and the work of French continentalists such as Jacques Lacan and Felix Guattari and Gilles Deleuze, not to mention some interesting connections between Husserl and Freud, specifically in relation to the notion of the unconscious and repression. However, the scope of this work precludes pursuing those
Essentially the argument is that consciousness only has itself as it has other 'objects' and according to Marion this is to undermine the foundational status consciousness should have within phenomenological method. While Marion suggests this schizophrenia of the ego is a problem for classical phenomenology, I argue that Husserl anticipates a current debate on the decentering of subjectivity. The view of subjectivity that Husserl endorses, specifically after *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness*, is a view of a complex, even divided subject. Implicit in Husserl’s “split ego” is a perspective of the self-relation of a subject which is always articulated for itself through a gap or self-distantiation: a subject that is given to itself only through what Marion refers to as the ecstatic displacement of intentionality. Consciousness is intentional through and through—even in its self-relation. The subject that lives in and through her experience may well be distinguishable from the subject that reflects upon this experience but this is not to say that either is separable other than through abstraction. I argue that Marion's self-affected cogito which he opposes to Husserl’s transcendental ego is such an abstraction and one that only becomes visible through the ecstatic distanciation of intentionality that Marion rejects in Husserl’s phenomenology. In fact, the innovation of the intentionality thesis is that it illustrates the reversibility that characterizes all conscious experience.⁵

While Marion’s position shifts from the self-affection of the *Cartesian Questions* to a hetero-affection in *Reduction and Givenness* and *Being Given*, both works are concerned with disclosing a more primary level of experience. Marion rejects the intellectualism that Levinas claims clings to Husserl’s phenomenology. Marion seeks to replace the primacy of the ego-cogito with an affective cogito, the notion of consciousness as a ‘thinking thing’ is replaced by an affected feeling being. While *Cartesian Questions* suggests the self-relation of a pre-intentional consciousness, *Reduction and Givenness* and *Being Given* argue that Husserl does not push the phenomenological reduction far enough. Below intentionality and reduction is a primary givenness—an anonymous call, a receptive layer of consciousness. If Husserl privileged the constituting role of consciousness, Marion will privilege the essential constitution of consciousness, a constitution that precedes even Heideggerian Being. The Other is, as Levinas argues, beyond Being—it is the Other that calls on consciousness to respond. Marion’s project, which shares affinities with Levinas’s later works, suggests an ethical primacy that supercedes and underlies consciousness. However, Marion’s position also results in a “phenomenology of the unapparent,” a phenomenology that goes to the heart of an invisibility underlying all appearance, an invisibility that goes beyond phenomena to the phenomenality underlying it—what Marion refers to as givenness.⁶ This is to say possibilities.

⁵ This is a term Merleau-Ponty will use in *The Visible and the Invisible* to characterize our self-relation and our relations with others and the world.

⁶ As Dominique Janicaud points out the first use of a “phenomenology of the unapparent” is by Heidegger in the Zürtingen seminars. See: Martin Heidegger,
that consciousness and givenness broadened to an extreme lead us out of dualist perspectives—subject and object are imploded from within revealing givenness and what Marion calls the interloqué. Whether Marion’s position remains phenomenological in such claims or is decidedly unphenomenological is explored in Chapters One and Two. It is not merely a matter of Marion’s not remaining true to the methodological exigencies of phenomenology, as Dominque Janicaud suggests, but that there is an inherent contradiction between claims such as the preceding ones and Marion’s reduction to the call and the respondsee/interlocutor (Theological Turn/Wide Open). As Janicaud so clearly suggests in relation to the possibilities of a future phenomenology, there are limitations to any method. Though these limitations need not be guided by rigid rules or principles since all methods are susceptible to the exigencies of time. Classical phenomenology is as open to revision as any other ‘field’ of research but not all revisions are equally justifiable (Theological Turn 92-99).

In Marion’s formulation givenness gives a foundation for all knowledge. In essence, Marion argues that before we are self-conscious subjects we are intersubjectively instituted by the call as subjects. While I admire Marion’s commitment to ethics and the attempt to continue phenomenology beyond Husserl and Heidegger, I argue that Marion remains tied to a dualistic framework. Rather than moving beyond dualism, Marion inverts the terms of traditional dualistic thought (i.e. mind/body, subject/object, self/other and in relation to the intentionality thesis, experience/reflection.) It may seem strange to claim that there is a dualism of experience/reflection but if Marion claims that he has found the originary source of all experience in the non-reflective affective sphere, this also entails a criticism of a reflective bias on Husserl’s part. However, is it so easy to separate out reflective consciousness from affective consciousness? Are these two distinct moments of consciousness and does one have a more originary basis than the other? If we claim that there is an intersubjective grounding to subjectivity then this type of dualism seems flawed since we are instituted (even into affectivity) through a history of reflection since our ‘world’ is already to some extent affected/reflected before we arrive on the scene. Chapters Four and Five will develop this notion of sedimentation with an analysis of inner time-consciousness (Chapter Four) and passive and active synthesis (Chapter Five).

Against Marion, I argue that classical phenomenology moves philosophy out of dualism and into a synergetic mode of thought. If the philosophical tradition necessarily leads to dualism, we can hope to get beyond such oppositions not by inverting the terms of dualism, but perhaps by suggesting that a dyadic (i.e. paired) relation better describes our relations to others, the world and, most importantly, ourselves. Opposition is replaced by relation in a dyadic framework, I suggest that this moves beyond the aporias associated with the extremes of reciprocity or irreducibility. If our self-relation is also dyadic then the absoluteness of the ego should not lead to the kind of reductionism of all otherness that criticisms of Husserlian phenomenology focus upon (specifically the

*Gesamtausgabe, Seminar* v.15, ed. Curd Ochwadt (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klosterman, 1986), 327-400.
positions of Levinas and Marion.) While the dyadic relation may be oppositional, it is not necessarily oppositional. If the relationship of the Same to the Other is always reductionist, as Levinas claims in *Totality and Infinity*, then it is likely that the reversal of the relation will lead to opposition and reductionism as well. The position that Marion supports in *Reduction and Givenness* and *Being Given*, mirrors the Levinasian reversal of the Same and the Other. I argue that by embracing the notion of a split subject, a subject only given to itself as other, we can move beyond a dualistic or oppositional relation of self and other. My disagreement with Marion and Levinas is not that the ground of subjectivity is intersubjective but that this does not entail a mere reversal of the priority of self and other. The claim that we are all intersubjectively instituted does not undermine the paradoxical claim that as individuals we are also always constituting beings. The questions of origin and method are then at the heart of the disagreement between a classical phenomenological position and those phenomenologists that take up the project of phenomenology post-Heidegger.

Marion reflects a particular kind of critique of Husserl’s method, one that suggests that the main tenets of classical phenomenology, intentionality and reduction, need to be reformulated in a way that avoids the aporias associated with Husserl’s transcendental turn. Chapter One focuses on Marion’s critique of intentionality and relates his notion of self-affection in Descartes thought to Michel Henry’s notion of auto-affection, specifically as formulated in “The Critique of the Subject” and *The Genealogy of Psychoanalysis*. In “Does the Cogito Affect Itself?” Marion takes up Henry’s notion of auto-affection and develops it in relation to Descartes’ *Meditations* and *The Passions of the Soul*. While I only offer a brief overview of Henry’s position I think it essential to at least clarify what he understands by auto-affection since this notion informs Marion’s texts. In concluding Chapter One, I suggest that the schizophrenia that Marion claims arises from Husserl’s transcendental ego is not a problem that needs to be overcome but an aspect of our conscious life that needs to be developed.

Chapter Two develops Marion’s critique of the reduction and what I suggest is a fundamental misunderstanding of the notion of origin and givenness (i.e. Gegebenheit.) Below the intentional relation, which for Marion is the basis of representation, there lies an anonymous call or claim. This call is broadened beyond being in *Being Given*. The pure reduction that he proposes as a final addition to the limited reductions of Husserl and Heidegger arrives at a saturated phenomenon. According to Marion, this saturated

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7 I focus on these works rather than the earlier *The Essence of Manifestation* since both deal directly with Henry’s notion of subjectivity and this is in one sense his concept of ‘life’. These works also elaborate on the thesis Marion follows in *Cartesian Questions*, which claims that within Cartesian texts there is a path not followed that gives a primary or foundational grounding for phenomenology. Another reason for not working through Henry’s entire corpus is that the scope of this work precludes such an endeavour. Henry’s work is complex and while I take exception to some key concepts of his phenomenology there is no doubt a sense in which his radicalization of subjectivity offers phenomenological descriptions of a pre-reflective layer of consciousness that are insightful.
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phenomenon exceeds what in *Being Given* he calls Husserl’s flat phenomena (ED 296-309/BG 199-220). I argue that Marion reduces Being, the Other, the Ego (transcendental and mundane) and the world to such an extent that there is little that differentiates one region of being from another; we are left with an oppressive unity that is barely capable of articulation and certainly not knowable. Marion suggests that below all knowledge there is a true ground, a phenomenality. In one sense the reduction returns the meditating philosopher to the intimacy of self-affection that Marion, following Henry, suggests as a new, more originary grounding for phenomenology. The thinking/knowing self is separated from the feeling/emotive/sensuous self to such an extent that the subject as Marion progressively describes her has disappeared into an incomprehensible givenness which resists all comprehension. In *Being Given* Marion expands the notion of givenness, which based on a reading of Derrida’s *Given Time* and *The Gift of Death*, he equates with the gift. I discuss Derrida’s criticism of this view in Chapter Two. I do not argue that Marion’s whole project is flawed but that he privileges one region, one level of experience (i.e. sensuous/feeling, emotive) over all the others that characterize human experience. And this is to ‘reduce’ human experience, human *being*. It is to return to the worst kind of metaphysics and all the violence it initiated.

Chapter Three explores Levinas’ solution to the problem of the subject within phenomenology. While Levinas may be right to criticize what he refers to as a theoretical bias in classical phenomenology, I argue the solution to this problem cannot entail a mere reversal of the dualities of the theoretical bias. The problem as I understand it is not the desire to articulate an experience beyond the objective but in the hierarchy of this kind of experience over all objective experience and knowledge. If we agree that there are indeed problems with some of Husserl’s formulations of phenomenology and further, if we suggest that these problems arise because Husserl remains tied to traditional dualistic models, then surely the solution cannot be to maintain the dualities but to invert the hierarchies they suggest? I argue that violence lies at the heart of Levinasian subjectivity—the subject in such a view is a subject at war with herself. As with Marion, there is a strange dichotomy between the feeling self and the self that thinks. Levinas creates a hierarchy within subjectivity. A notion of authenticity underlies this hierarchical view of the subject—the authentic self (i.e. ethical subject) is the self purified of all need (this need is characterized by the subject of enjoyment in *Totality and Infinity*). The desire that motivates this subject is informed by a refined sensibility—a purified reason—a reason that always places us before (beneath?) the infinite. Levinas, like Marion, privileges a phenomenology of the unapparent. My objection is not with the kinds of experiences Marion and Levinas explore but the claim that these are ‘origins’ of subjectivity. The real issue centers on how ‘origin’ and foundation are not differentiated, sensibility in both Marion and Levinas is the treated as a primary foundation—one with overtones of a causal notion of primacy. In the final analysis Levinas’ hetero-affected subject fairs better than the auto-affected subject of Marion, Levinas accounts for a transcendence at the heart of the immanence of subjectivity but this is a subject characterized by inner conflict and violence. Both Marion and Levinas attempt to overturn a privileging of reason over affection, immanence over transcendence, subject
over other/object within traditional philosophy but perhaps the problem lies with the assumed purity/irreducibility of these regions.

Chapter Four offers my interpretation of Husserl’s spilt Ego. I briefly discuss the static and genetic methods of phenomenology and tie these to a refinement of reduction(s) and intentionality in classical phenomenology. The problematic relation within intentionality between noesis and noema is at the heart of Marion’s and Levinas’ criticisms of classical phenomenology but also the inspiration for their own mature positions, particularly the separation within the noetic moment of hyle and morphe (i.e. content and apprehension). Husserl maintains the hyle/morphe distinction even in the lectures on passive and active synthesis and I argue there are sound methodological reasons for doing so. Premised on their individual interpretations of this distinction, Levinas and Marion both defend a view of a non-intentional basis of subjectivity. I argue that given Husserl’s analysis of inner time-consciousness this is untenable. I focus primarily on The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness to fill in the sense in which there is, as Marion claims, a ‘schizophrenia’ at the heart of subjectivity. This doubling of consciousness is related to the structure of inner time-consciousness which I suggest reflects its inherently intentional structure. I suggest that the double intentionality thesis Husserl’s introduces in the lectures on time-consciousness expands the notion intentionality beyond an intentionality of act. The schizophrenic ego offers an alternative to the one-sided theories of either auto-affection or hetero-affection which result from the inverted dualism that both Marion and Levinas retain. This ego mediates between the either/or of auto-affection and hetero-affection. We are, in Husserlian terms, constituted beings and constituting beings (i.e. affected and active.) The origin that phenomenology seeks in its various investigations cannot be an origin that acts as the foundation of a system of philosophy. The origin is rather an uncovering of the synthesis of the stream or flux of experience and in this sense it is an infinite task. It is an infinite task not merely because the ideal of a rigorous science underlies it but because the meditating philosopher is always motivated by particular interrogations/questions at any one time. And, more importantly, against some of Husserl’s characterizations, it is because there is always a gap that prevents the philosopher from coming into contact with her initial experience in all its immanence and originality. The meditating philosopher is always involved in a retrospective endeavour.

In Chapter Five I turn to transitions in the notions of intentionality and reduction(s) in Husserl’s thought. I tie these transitions to the role of alterity within classical phenomenology, an alterity that is recovered at the heart of subjectivity with the deepening of the reduction in the transcendental turn. I also address Husserl’s notion of evidence, while the focus is on the kind of evidence he claims for the transcendental ego, I also present an analysis of the notion of evidence as it pertains to the objectivities of the world. While Marion and Levinas are both motivated by ethical concerns in their respective critiques of classical phenomenology the former reduces all transcendence to a radical immanence while the later makes the inscription of a radical alterity at the heart of a just as radical immanence problematic. The issue of transcendence is tied the issues of temporality and individuality in Husserl’s thought. While Husserl persists in suggesting there are non-intentional experiences, particularly in our emotive affective lives I argue
that if we take the temporal unfolding of lived experience seriously then even in these
regions of experience there is an intentionality at work. Husserl’s notion of subjectivity
offers a perspective of a complex subject that is intricately bound to the transcendence of
the world and others because it is always from the first implicated with others and is in its
self relation a self transcending—paradoxically constituting and constituted. I also
suggest that Marion and Levinas both in their respective ways transgress the limitations
of phenomenological method, both push the reduction and intentionality beyond their
limits and this is motivated by the desire to establish a metaphysical (i.e., causal)
foundation for phenomenology. The method of phenomenology suggests that origins are
only retrospectively retrieved and that they act as the ‘grounding’ of phenomenology in a
unique way (Lampert, Synthesis; Byer, Transcendence). If this reading is legitimate then
the sense in which transcendental subjectivity grounds phenomenology is unique. The
absoluteness of transcendental subjectivity does not suggest what Levinas refers to as the
“Same” and which he equates with a tendency to privilege identity and unity and reduce
all otherness. In concluding I address what I refer to as Levinas and Marion’s attempts to
describe the non-normative or abnormal. While it is certainly true that classical
phenomenology focuses on the normative I do not think it precludes an analysis of the
abnormal or non-normative. Though Levinas and Marion may be right that it privileges
the normative/rational over the non-normative.
Chapter One: The Schizophrenic Doubling of the Ego: Husserl's Egology

Introduction

The question of the self relation of subjectivity is paramount within phenomenology. This Chapter deals with a relatively early work of Jean-Luc Marion, dealing with the notion of auto-affection. Marion, influenced by Michel Henry’s material phenomenology, returns to Descartes’ texts in order to show that within these texts a latent alternative to reflection theories of consciousness is apparent. Entailed in this reading of Descartes is a criticism of classical phenomenology, specifically the claim that consciousness is intentional. In order to secure a more originary grounding of phenomenological method, one that is not subject to the charges leveled against reflection theories of consciousness, Marion suggests auto-affection. The self-relation of consciousness cannot be modeled on the perceptual model—unlike the relation it has to objects, a relation secured through the ecstatic distanciation of intentionality, consciousness should come into contact with itself in an immanence and immediacy without ecstatic distance. Implicit in this view is a critique of an objective bias within classical phenomenology. Marion is also an attempting to account for experiences that fall outside a purely objective intentional analysis, experiences that exceed presence. Marion following insights from Husserl’s analysis of the intentional correlation attempts to develop a possibility that Husserl considered but never fully elaborated—a non-intentional dimension of existence characterized by its affectivity. I argue that the kind of grounding Marion seeks for phenomenology is problematic and that Marion’s attempts to discover a non-intentional basis for subjectivity are unsuccessful. This is not to say that the kind of experiences Marion describes are impossible but that these can still be analyzed through an intentional analysis though this would not be through an objective intentional analysis. Part One of this Chapter contextualizes the basis of Marion’s auto-affection thesis. In Cartesian Questions (“Does the cogito Affect Itself”) Marion is influenced by Michel Henry’s notion of auto-affection. I offer a brief analysis of Henry’s critique of the subject and his own notion of auto-affection. I then turn to Husserl’s Ideas I where he describes experiences that are characterized as non-intentional. While Marion does not refer to the numerous texts where Husserl discusses non-intentional experiences, it is likely that he is influenced by these undeveloped themes in Husserl’s texts. In Part Two I turn to Marion’s analysis of Descartes’ Meditations and The Passions of the Soul and flesh out the notion of auto-affection that is developed there. Part three offers a brief defense of Husserl’s intentional thesis, a defense that I return to in Chapters Four and Five. I argue that the implications of the notion of auto-affection on Marion’s mature works is critical and it plays a key role in his revision of phenomenological method which I discuss in Chapter Two.

Part One: Preliminary Remarks

Marion questions the meaning of the ‘cogito’ and in particular, ‘cogitare’, thinking, in Descartes Meditations on First Philosophy and The Passions of the Soul.
There are two primary sources for Marion’s interpretation of Cartesian texts: the first is a critique of Husserlian phenomenology that originates in Heidegger’s works and the second is the influence of Michel Henry’s material phenomenology, which aims to uncover or disclose the immanent (Henry, “Critique”). If Henry’s material phenomenology is inspired by these two strands of thought it is also a development and critique of unresolved aporias in Husserl’s position. The role of the distinction of hyletic data and apprehension within the noetic moment of intentionality in Husserl’s *Logical Investigations* and *Ideas I* also plays a pivotal role in Henry’s phenomenology. While I do not offer an in-depth discussion of Henry’s position I do offer a brief discussion of the influence Henry has on a specific strand of phenomenology that following Levinas will attempt a reversal of the priority of theory over practice (i.e. theory over ethics). Henry develops the nuances and difficulties in Husserl’s intuitionism, which is related to the noetic/noematic analysis in *Ideas I*. (While Husserl does not refer to noema in the *Logical Investigations* he does describe what he later refers to as the noematic moment in *Ideas I*). Henry and Marion attempt to uncover a purely passive sphere of experience, one that precedes the animating intention. This primordial ground of experience can be characterized by the notion of exposure (while this is Levinasian term Henry or Marion both implicitly suggest a similar sense of the subject as exposed). However, it should be noted that Husserl in a footnote in the later part of *Ideas I* already has reservations about the distinction within the noetic moment between morphe/hyletic data.

It is not until p. 199 that it is said in passing that ‘noesis’ signifies the same thing as “concrete-complete intuitive mental process,” with “emphasis on its noetic components.” Thus the hyletic moments belong to the noesis in so far as they bear the functions of intentionality, undergo sense-bestowal, help constitute a concrete noematic sense (*ID I* 181, Appendix 51 /*IDI* 213, n2).

Husserl may well point out two aspects of the noetic moment but this perhaps should not be taken to imply an actual separation between hyle and morphe. While I

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8 In § 17 of the “Fifth Logical Investigation” Husserl states: “We must distinguish between the intentional content taken as object of the act, between the object as it is intended and the object (period) which is intended” (*LI II* 414/*LI II* 113). Dermot Moran offers a concise historical overview of the development of the concept of noema in Husserl’s thought (Introduction 155-160).

9 Robert Sokolowski offers a in depth account of the shift in Husserl’s thought on the component aspects of noesis in his *The Formation of Husserl's Concept of Constitution*. Sokolowski argues that it is only in the transition to a genetic account that the aporia of the relation of intentions (animations) and sensations is capable of resolution (97-115).
cannot offer an in-depth analysis of material phenomenology here, Henry’s brand of phenomenology can be seen as following insights similar to those of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology with his privileging of Husserl’s “Ich Kann” (though with some important differences specifically in the role and function of the body), as well as Heidegger’s return to the question of Being and his critique of the history of philosophy as a history of the “metaphysics of presence.”¹⁰ For Henry the ‘material’ of phenomenology is affection, pure appearance/pure appearing or the phenomenality of any actual or possible phenomena. Henry’s analysis also follows insights taken from Descartes’ notion of material falsity. Sensations cannot be false in the same sense a judgment can—my feeling is not itself mistaken though the circumstances may affect how I feel (i.e. a fever can be accompanied by shivering and feeling cold even though the core body temperature is high.) There is a certain truth to this view—we would not want to treat a feeling as we do a judgment and certainly we do not expect of feelings the kind of evidence we do with judgments or perceptions. Unlike the perception where we can be mistaken and realize it in time (i.e. the fox I thought I saw was a cat) the feeling, regardless of later ‘facts’ does not seem to be susceptible to the same kind of adjustment. This is a key element of Marion’s own position on the primacy of auto-affection—regardless of issues of epistemology our emotive affective lives are given with a ‘certainty’ of a different order than either adequation or inadequacy.

Henry returns to Descartes and Kant in order to show that both philosophers remain blind to their most inspired idea—this is the self-affection of the ego. He associates self-affection with “life” or absolute subjectivity—a non-intentional ground of all experience (Henry, “Critique” 162; Henry, Genealogy 6-7). The problem with representational thought with its “destruction of the subject” is described in “The Critique of the Subject.”

The historical self-destruction of the philosophy of the subject ....implies this decisive consequence: that the essence of the subject, that is to say, of Being itself, cannot consist in representation, because representation does not rest upon itself and cannot ground itself in itself, because to be does not mean to be represented if we are dealing with a being that actually exists in all its concreteness, that truly is. What then does “being” mean? Is there an essence of

¹⁰ While “metaphysics of presence” is Jacque Derrida’s phrase, I would argue that it has affinities with Heidegger’s critique of western philosophy. Simon Critchley holds a similar view in The Ethics of Deconstruction. Quoting an unpublished text of Derrida’s, Critchley illustrates the relation between Derrida and Heidegger: “Heidegger...says that the thinking of Being was lost...when , at the birth of philosophy, Being was determined by metaphysics as presence, as the proximity of the being (étant) before the glance (eidos, phenomenon, etc.) and consequently as object. This determination of Being as pre-sence (pre-sence) and then of presence as the proximity of the being to itself, as self-consciousness (from Descartes to Hegel) would outline the closure of the history of metaphysics (PC 14)” (qtd. in Critchley Ethics 80).
the subject that does not succumb to its own presuppositions, that is not given over in its very principle to nothingness? Or, to put it another way, this time from an epistemological point of view: Is there a philosophy of the subject capable of thinking a subject other than [through] representation, one whose being therefore would not destroy itself? (Henry, “Critique” 160)

In Cartesian Questions, Marion claims to find in Descartes a “non-ecstatic, nonrepresentative, and nonintentional determination of cogitatio,” a pure immanency from which all experience arises (QC 171/CQ 107). The nonintentional cogito is a better foundation for philosophy in Marion’s estimation. The cogito cannot be an object of consciousness but is in its self-affection a coinciding of that which thinks and its thought. Marion makes a distinction between a reflection that necessarily ‘objectifies’ (i.e. makes itself an object) and a thought that thinks itself not as an ‘object’ but through various modalities of itself (i.e. value/esteem) (QC 180-181/CQ 113). This position may be influenced by a distinction Husserl makes between various sorts of ‘objects’ and modalities of ‘objects’ that cannot be “objectivated simply” (ID I 66, ID I 76). While some types of ‘objects’ can be “seized upon” (“Erfassung”), there is a difference when “the act is not simply consciousness of a thing, whenever there is founded on such a consciousness a further consciousness in which ‘a position is taken’ with respect to the thing” (ID I 66-67, ID I 76-77). Husserl makes a distinction earlier in the same section between “seizing upon an object”/“having the mind’s eye on” and “heeding” (“Beachtung”). He is clear that we do not “objectivate” in the same way in ‘seizing’ upon an object (i.e. directing our attention to a ‘thing’) and when we ‘heed’ something or have an attitude towards something such as loving, valuing or hoping (ID I 66-67, ID I 76-77).

In a subsequent section he claims that when we have a feeling it is there absolutely, without adumbrations or profiles. In other words there is a distinction not only between different types of objects (i.e. to attend to a feeling as an object or to attend to things) but also in the modes of givenness of these possible ‘objects’. The suggestion seems to be that feelings, such as love or pain never have ‘sides’ or profiles but are given absolutely or immediately (ID I 81-82/ ID I 95-96). Arguably a feeling would also have to be distinguished from other types of “intensive mental processes” (which may also be ‘objects’ of a very different kind.) Marion’s position can then be seen as a development of this type of absoluteness with the qualification that Marion seeks a type of foundation for this givenness that Husserl claims can never be “seized upon completely” since it is

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11 It is in dealing with Descartes’ The Passions of the Soul that Marion elaborates on this argument. The distinction between an object of consciousness and a modality of consciousness is pivotal to Marion’s interpretation of Descartes.

12 Interestingly, Marion does not refer to Ideas in this essay but only to the Cartesian Meditations. An unsympathetic reading could view this as more than an “oversight” since Marion’s argument against Husserl would no doubt be undermined or at least significantly weakened if this earlier text were cited.
only possible to disclose this givenness retrospectively. At best, the meditating philosopher “swims along with it” [the initial intui
tive mental process] (ID I 82/ID I 97). There is a difference between living in the experience and retrospectively describing such an experience.

Marion claims that Husserl’s transcendental ego is only possible on the basis of intentionality. For Marion intentionality is a form of representation and as such is a derivative operation, one based on a prior experiencing or affection. The intentionality thesis, which claims that all consciousness is ‘consciousness of’, in actuality claims that all thought is a re-presentation of immediate perception (perceptions being mental states, objects in the world, other people and, more radically for Marion’s thesis, one’s self.) Marion claims ‘‘I think’ always signifies that thought is ecstatic, standing out from the I by a displacement originating with it, in the direction of that which it posits as an object” (QC 155/CQ 97). It is only on the basis of intentionality that objectivity of any kind is possible for Husserl. In relation to the cogito, this implies that the cogito only understands and knows itself as an object of consciousness, the cogito is only aware of itself through a representation. The cogito can say sum only by making itself a cogitatum. (QC 156/CQ 98). On the basis of this interpretation of intentionality Marion asks:

Is consciousness related to itself by the same intentional relation that it bears to its other cogitata? Is intentionality capable of applying its ecstasy to thought itself, on the same grounds whereby it does so to every other object? Conversely, does consciousness bear no more intimate relationship with itself than the intentional ecstasy according to the displacement of objectivity that representation traverses? Can the ego be defined only as the impartial spectator of itself [unbeteiligter Zuschauer] (QC 157/CQ 99)?

While these questions are valid if one takes intentionality to be synonymous with representation, which one can only do on the basis of a larger critique of Husserl’s phenomenological method, it is an invalid criticism if it turns out that representation, as a form of objectification, is only one side of intentionality. Marion associates representation with reflection (i.e. a second order experience.) But Husserl’s intentionality thesis suggests that “objectivity” is also (perhaps even originarily) given in our everyday experience which suggests that perhaps passivity is always infected by conscious activity. Marion presupposes that to represent is to intend an object in Husserl’s sense, which is partially correct and on the basis of this presumption equates representation with intentionality as a whole. 13

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13 Dan Zahavi points out that to view intentionality as representationalism is to seriously misunderstand the Husserlian project. One could say that intentionality seeks to show how objects manifest themselves (i.e. how they show themselves) and while the noesis/noema correlation does make a distinction between the object that is intended and as it is intended in various perceptions, recollections, judgments etc., this is not to suggest that the noema are mental representations. “[T]he noema is [not] an intermediary ideal
The Husserlian transcendental ego is the objectified ego that the phenomenologist as transcendental spectator represents to herself. This ego cannot act as the foundation of a world of other represented objects and so puts into doubt the very possibility of any knowledge. The solution to this aporia according to Marion would have to posit that the cogito coincides with or affects itself. The cogito in question would not be a representation that the philosopher posits as an object of consciousness but, as the basis of all representations, would have to have an ontic priority over all objectivities it posits. The meditating philosopher through the Cartesian method of doubt would have to come into contact with herself in pure immanence.

[Because if] doubt disqualifies the relation between every idea (every representation) and its ideatum (what is represented), and if the existence of the ego or even its performance of thinking constitutes an ideatum, then how are we to certify that the representation of that ideatum and it alone constitutes an exception to the disqualification of even the most present of things that are evident? In short, if the cogito, ergo sum heightens representation, then it too, like all representations, must be vanquished by the blow of doubt. For why should it be certain that I think, that I am, if I also represent these things to myself? (QC 161/CQ 101)

identity which is instrumental in our intending the objects themselves...[but rather.] the noema is the perceived object as perceived, the recollected episode as recollected, the judged state of affairs as judged, and so on. [T]he object and the noema turn out to be the same differently considered” (Husserl’s Phenomenology 57-59). I do not think that Marion is making the stronger claim that Husserl repeats the aporias of representationalism but there is definitely the underlying conviction that Husserl privileges a theoretical model of objectivity and that this prevents him from adequately describing a pre-intentional layer of consciousness. In Ideas I as well as The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness, Husserl seems to suggest that there is indeed something like a non-intentional layer of consciousness (or perhaps, more radically, he questions whether there is not a type of intentionality that is non-objective) but he never fully explicates this originary level. Husserl claims that the Ego is “not constituted” and is “undescribable in and for itself: it is pure Ego and nothing more” (ID I 110, 160-161/ID I 133, 191) Accordingly, Marion's project should not be viewed merely as if it were (in the form of a critique) a patricide but as the attempt to think Husserl through, to complete what Husserl leaves unfinished. See also Appendix IX of Internal Time Consciousness, where Husserl is clear that “Consciousness is necessarily consciousness in each of its phases. Just as the retentional phase was conscious of the preceding one without making it an object, so also are we conscious of the primal datum—namely, in the specific form of the ‘now’—without its being objective” (PIZ 119/PIT 162) It will have to be explored whether Husserl is suggesting a non-intentional consciousness in these texts or whether there is another ‘side’ of intentionality that Marion does not acknowledge.

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Henry claims that Descartes’ question in the *Meditations* is the question of the *being* of the cogito “its pure essence” (“Critique” 160). If the essence of subjectivity is representation, as Marion’s interpretation of intentionality suggests, then the cogito can be no more certain of itself than it is of other objects of representation. However, Henry claims that the genius of Descartes lies in the fact that the essence of subjectivity is “the anti-essence of representation” (“Critique” 161). Marion argues that it is only in its “auto-affection” that Descartes’ cogito shows itself as the condition of all representation. Henry suggests that what auto-affection points to is an unrepresentative ground of all representation.

*The history of our representations refers back to a force that allows them precisely to actualize themselves or that forbids them to do so. It is only this force itself that is irreducible to any representation.* This force collapses in on itself in an immediation that is so radical, and in this immediation is submerged into itself in such a way that there is no room in it for Difference, no distanciation thanks to which it would be possible to perceive itself, to represent itself— to be conscious in the mode of representation (“Critique” 165).

What this “force” would seem to indicate for Henry is the unity of experience—the power or “will” that underlies all of “life” (*Genealogy* 164-240). It would seem that if representation gives us difference (i.e. through an abstraction from the immanence of original experience) then the unreflective/unrepresentable ground of difference must be a unity of this difference. Henry wants to uncover a ground of experience that is immediate, that precedes any reflective thought about experience. “Cogito designates that which appears to itself immediately in everything that appears, or rather in pure appearing (what Descartes calls thought)” (“Critique” 166). Against any kind of objectivism (naive or absolute) Henry suggests a ‘radical’ subjectivity. For Henry, self-affection is raw experience, the primordial ground of all experience, if by primordial we understand a pre-reflective experience.¹⁴ Henry uses an example from Descartes’ *Passions of the Soul* (Article 26) to illustrate this nonrepresentational cogito. Descartes imagines that he is dreaming and that all he experiences is false, Henry suggests that:

if in this dream he [Descartes] experiences sadness, anguish, any sort of feeling, this feeling is absolutely, even if it is still a

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¹⁴ Sokolowski in his analysis of Husserl’s pre-predicative consciousness traces the genesis of constitution from a “state of pure sensation”; this is the level of experience/consciousness that Henry and Marion are trying to disclose. Certainly Henry seems to want to uncover the primordial realm of experience as one characterized through its affectivity, its *feeling* (*Formation* 207-212).
dream, *even though the representation is false*. This feeling, therefore, occurs not through representation but independent of it. Which means: without being set forth, without being represented and—if representation is false—on condition of not being so... What is this submission of and to the self-feeling? How does feeling submit to its own Being in such a way as to be definitively and indisputably possible? *In and through its affectivity* (Henry, “Critique” 161; Descartes, *Passions* 33).

Following Henry, Marion sees auto-affection adding to the Cartesian cogito the certainty that a “redoubled intentionality” would put into doubt.\(^{15}\) By “redoubled intentionality”, Marion is indicating that for Husserl even consciousness of oneself is to some extent ‘intentional’. If Descartes claims certainty for his metaphysical first principle, it is because “consciousness does not at first think of itself by representation, because in general it does not think by representation, intentionality, or ecstasy, but by receptivity, in absolute immanence; therefore, it thinks at first in immanence to itself” (QC 167/CQ 105). Intentionality, representation and any kind of knowing or comprehending is viewed as reductive in both Marion and Henry. The solution to this kind of reductionism is to privilege the opposite side of the duality reason/emotion. What stands as the foundation for all rational thought is not rationality itself but its other-feeling. The phenomenality of phenomena is to be found in the affective sphere *not the cognitive sphere*. Human being is ‘split’ into two but the question then becomes how do we ever become things that ‘think’ (i.e cognize/represent)? Underlying both positions

\(^{15}\) Husserl describes the double intentionality thesis in §39 of *The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness*, as well as in Appendix VIII (themes which are continued in Appendix IX.) There does seem to be a problem of infinite regress in these accounts, since it is not clear how the meditating ego can ‘catch’ itself in action without multiplying reflection endlessly. Yet, the double intentionality thesis suggests that what is unique about human beings as conscious beings is that we are capable of this ‘turning’ towards ourselves (PIZ 80-83, 116-119/PIT 105-110, 157-163). John Brough offers an intriguing account of the double intentionality thesis. Brough argues that though there is indeed a splitting of the ego in Husserl’s later works these are “two dimensions which are indeed inseparable, but in some sense still distinct.” Brough’s analysis suggests that the notion of “absolute consciousness” can only be understood through this understanding of a multi-dimensional consciousness. Brough also interestingly talks about a “marginal self-awareness” which relates to Marion’s critique since it suggests a kind pre-reflective self-awareness accompanies all my perceptions (internal and external) (“Emergence” 83-100). Husserl claims something similar in Appendixes VIII and IX of *Internal Time Consciousness*. How this impacts the infinite regress problem will be dealt with in Chapter Four. See also Dan Zahavi’s treatment of implicit self-awareness in *Self-Awareness and Alterity: A Phenomenological Investigation* and “Inner Time Consciousness and Pre-reflective Self-Awareness”.

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there is an implicit notion of authenticity/inauthenticity, though each formulates this in unique ways. We are truly ourselves (i.e. noble) when we do not think, it is only when we let ourselves fall from an initial grace that we become creatures that represent. An interesting position for two philosophers who dedicate their lives to an enterprise that, even when it critiques reason, has recourse to reasoning in order to make its case. Ironically it is not only ‘reasoning’ that is undermined in these accounts since phenomenality in Marion, Henry and Levinas has little to do with embracing our embodied existence or living in what Levinas’ calls the subjectivity of enjoyment. Instead Henry suggests that the “original body” is just like Descartes notion of soul—it is a phenomenal body that is “no different than will” (Genealogy 174-177). This “original body” is unlike the “[objective body that] has eyes, ears, and hands...the Archi-Body [i.e. the original body] does not” (Genealogy 325). In an odd move the phenomena as essentially affective are torn from any relation to corporality–flesh. Instead they are described as quasi-mystical powers, instincts or drives and are equated with Life. It is because all intentionality is dismissed as secondary to an originary givenness that Henry, just were he appears to undo traditional dualist thought, institutes a dualism of life and its ‘other’–body, thing/world, others and all understanding/comprehension. If the milder claim were made that there is a need to phenomenologically describe (dare I say to make an “object” of...) our affective, instinctual lives, there would be no problem with Henry’s claim. What is disturbing is the foundational status accorded to the immanence of experience (i.e. auto-affection) and the separation of our affective lives from our cognitive lives. We may want the artist or poet to reveal the emotive or purely sensual aspects of life without necessarily expecting analyses of this revelation. From the philosopher, especially of the phenomenological variety, we expect reasoned and well defended descriptions and explanations. The overturning of metaphysics cannot be achieved by merely transgressing the sphere of philosophy through Art.

In Part Two, I offer an overview of Marion’s reading of Descartes. The notion of auto-affection that Marion reads in Descartes’ texts is key to Marion’s vision of a non-intentional phenomenology, a phenomenology that in later works he will subject to a purified reduction. In Part Three I offer a preliminary defense of Husserl’s intentionality thesis, a defense that will be broadened in Chapters Four and Five.

Part Two: Auto-Affection

Section One: Meditations

Marion asks if a “nonecstatic, nonrepresentative, and nonintentional determination of cogitatio is to be found among Descartes’ texts” (QC 171/CQ 107). Citing a case from the Meditations, he suggests that there are examples that this may be a possible interpretation of the “cogito, ergo sum” (QC 168-172/CQ 105-107). Marion begins his reflections with Descartes’ “Second Meditation.” Descartes, after coming to the conclusion that at the very least he is “[a] thing that thinks” qualifies this by distinguishing thought from sensible perceptions (Meditations 106). Just before the famous example of wax, Descartes imagines he is dreaming and so all that is known by
his sense-organs may be false/not ‘real’.

Descartes states: “it seems to me that I see light, hear a noise and feel heat” and concludes that what is called perceiving is “nothing other than thinking” (Meditations 107). Even if I were only to dream that “I see,” “I hear” or “I feel,” what I cannot doubt is that these perceptions, though without any real object, still give me assurance of my existence. Marion concludes that the “it seems to me” here actually suggests that despite the fact that there may be no representational object to which my perception corresponds, Descartes is claiming that the affection of the soul (i.e., the thought of light, noise or heat) is without transcendent ‘cause’ and so given in “absolute immanence” (QC 169/CQ 106). What Descartes is describing in phenomenological fashion is the auto-affection of consciousness. However, the claim that the auto-affection of the soul requires no “transcendent cause” is an odd claim to make given that Descartes’ claims that there is indeed a transcendent cause of the soul, the seat to all thought—God (Meditations, 132-141).

Now it seems to me that what Descartes is actually doing in the texts Marion focuses on is reducing all feeling or perception to a representation of the immediate experience through the thought of that experience. In a footnote Marion notes that commentators agree that there is a complete lack of separation between thought and perception in this case, the thought is the perception (QC 170-171 n.16/CQ 106 n.16). Yet, Descartes in the rest of the “Second Meditation” distances himself from this immediacy by making a distinction between perception and thought which ‘judges’. Marion’s claim is valid, in the sense that in this particular example, for a moment, Descartes comes close to an “absolute immanence” of experience. In his ‘reduction’ (the method of doubt) Descartes acknowledges that while he can doubt the validity of his perceptions, he cannot doubt that he has perceptions and is initially aware of himself only through these perceptions. “For it may well be that what I see is not in effect wax; it may also be that I do not even have eyes with which to see anything; but it cannot be that, when I see or (which I no longer distinguish) think I see, I, who think, am nothing” (Meditations 111). However, this one moment cannot be viewed in isolation from the rest of the “Second Meditation” or the conclusions of the whole of the Meditations. The fact that Descartes turns to the wax example immediately following his recognition that to perceive is to think is telling of what Descartes takes to be essential in order to claim clear and distinct evidence.

In order for Descartes to make a distinction between all the qualities I normally associate with a piece of wax and the only quality that he will allow to count as clear and distinct evidence—extension, he must go beyond what is given to him in the actual experiences he has. It is just this kind of abstracting from our experience that phenomenology, whether classical phenomenology or existential phenomenology, finds so objectionable in Cartesian thought. If to represent an experience is to reduce

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16 Marion is suggesting that on his reading Descartes’ cogito is a more originary or ‘foundational’ basis for phenomenology than Husserl’s transcendental ego or Heidegger’s Dasein and this is point he continues to defend in his later work.
experience to a conception of the understanding and one that is based on a subtraction/abstraction from that experience, then Descartes after a momentary lapse slips right back to representing the cogito. In fact, Descartes’ admission that “perceiving....is nothing other than thinking” is qualified through the wax example since some perceiving, the kind we share with animals, is not what gives me clear and distinct evidence of myself (Meditations 107, 111). Descartes sets up a hierarchy of Being where reason is privileged above the senses and the imagination, this is a hierarchy where what is true is what is distilled of anything sensuous or imaginative. The ‘real’ being of Beings is not in their manifestations but in our conceptions (idealizations). In the Meditations it is judgement which guarantees clarity and distinctness and not perception. Descartes states:

If I chance to look out a window onto men passing in the street, I do not fail to see men, just as I say that I see wax; and yet, what do I see from this window, other than hats and cloaks, which can cover ghosts or dummies who move only by means of springs? But I judge them to be really men and thus I understand, by the sole power of judgement which resides in my mind, what I believed I saw with my eyes (Meditations 110, emphasis mine).

It is only the perceiving that is cleansed of all sensuous perception and reduced to an “intuition of the mind” that can give me the kind of evidence Descartes is seeking for the cogito (Meditations 110). If Marion wants to argue that the cogito acts as a foundational principle for representation, then it will only be on the basis of a perceiving of a specific sort that he will be able to do so.

Marion’s first example has illustrated that Descartes is willing to admit that the cogito auto-affects itself in some situations. What Marion does not point out is that it is when perceiving is disassociated from the imagination and the senses, when perceiving is a kind of judging that Descartes thinks something clear and distinct has been revealed about the “thing that thinks” Meditations, 110-111, 106). It is only on the basis of clarity and distinctness that the cogito will be able to act as the condition for all representation. This clarity and distinctness requires that no ‘real’ (and from the context of the “Second Meditation we can take ‘real’ to mean ‘material’) object intervenes between the thought and the perceived. But does representation/intentionality claim that an object must be material? Marion will have to illustrate why it is that an auto-affection of the soul implies that there is no intervening object since it seems that even if I ‘see’ nothing ‘real’ and so only think that I ‘see’, my seeing is still an ‘object’ of my thought. Marion would like to claim that in auto-affection there is no object but only a self relation of the soul to itself but the very nature of thinking implies that I think something. The intentionality thesis only claims that all thought is thought about something and this something, whatever it may be, is the object of thought, this includes thought about myself. I now turn to The Passions of the Soul to see if Marion’s thesis is better defended there.

Section Two: Generosity and Esteem
Marion argues that in *The Passions of the Soul* the two functions of soul, volition and perception, have as their cause the soul and not an object outside of the soul (QC 175-176/CQ 110; Descartes, *Passions* 28-32). Volition and perception are one “thing”, which amounts to saying that the act of willing is the same as the perception of this willing. However, Descartes suggests that even when the soul causes (will) its own affection with itself as its “terminus” there is still an ‘object’ involved, though this is an immaterial object.

Again, our volitions are of two sorts. For the first are actions of the soul which have their terminus in the soul itself, as when we will to love God or in general apply our thought to some object that is not material (*Passions* 28, emphasis mine).

It would seem that even Descartes acknowledged that there are different senses of ‘object’ and that even acts of mind such as willing can be referred to in terms of an object. Marion does not grant this since he argues that auto-affection requires a coinciding of thinking and thought that is without any ecstatic distance.

There are two types of volition and corresponding to these are two types of perception. There are volitions of the body that are related to objects of representation and volitions of the soul, which Marion suggests are more attitudes of the soul or “objective[s]” of the soul—without any ‘real’ objects (e.g., the love of God). Corresponding to the two types of volitions are two types of perceptions, perceptions related to the body and perceptions of our volitions, in the second case the volition and the perception are the same thing (QC 175-178/CQ 110-111). Marion suggests that when Descartes claims in Article 17 of *The Passions* that “it is often not our soul that makes [the passions] what they are” and that the soul “receives [the passions] from things that are represented by them” the inclusion of ‘often’ indicates that sometimes the soul receives its passions from itself (Descartes, *Passions* 28; QC 172/CQ 107-108). This passage is crucial for Marion’s auto-affection thesis since it suggests both the passivity of the soul and its affection (spontaneity) simultaneously. The soul is passive insofar as it is affected but there is no cause outside of itself when it is so affected. Auto-affection is then a self-affection. But Marion also requires that there be no redoubled intentionality in the soul’s self relation, the soul cannot be an object for itself, so it is also crucial that sometimes, when the soul affects itself, it not do so as an object for itself. Not to have an object of the soul in self-affection suggests that the self relation of the

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17 “For its certain that we could not will anything unless we perceived by the same means that we willed it....Nevertheless....the perception and this volition are really only a single thing...” (Descartes, *Passions* 29).

18 This is related to the Cartesian view that the soul is indivisible and admits of no parts, the soul that affects itself does so not because one part of the soul affects another (Descartes, *Passions* 44-45). It is odd that Marion does not mention the indivisibility of the soul at all as it would seem to strengthen his argument for auto-affection.
soul “amounts only to a difference of modalities, not one of content, essence, or object” (QC 177/CQ 110). When the soul affects itself it is only various modalities of itself that it affects and since the soul has no diversity of its parts we cannot think of it as being an object for itself. In one sense we should think of auto-affection as an interiority without any recourse to exteriority—subjectivity before the distancing necessary for any objectivity. While Marion does not explicitly ever claim that Descartes’ cogito, ergo sum can only auto-affect itself if it is undifferentiated, an indivisible whole, this does seem to be the case. But the kind of experience that auto-affection attempts to elucidate is perhaps not describable in terms of wholes and parts but rather in terms of an interiority without recourse to externality.19 Once the possibility of the soul’s self-affection has been established, Marion goes on to suggest that Descartes admits in certain cases of volition, “a perception without a real object other than the soul itself, a perception without ecstatic representation (QC 178/CQ 111).” The move from immaterial/unreal to material/real objects is not at all clear in Marion’s analysis, though it will have importance for his interpretation of the passion of self-esteem. Marion asks:

Can the two features that we have just isolated in certain passions—auto-affection and nonecstatic perception—be re-united in any single passion? And could we, in the case of this passion, sketch a formulation of the cogito, ergo sum without representational ecstasy, by auto-affection (QC 178/CQ 111)?

In order to isolate this nonecstatic passion, Marion outlines the order of the passions of which wonder is the first passion or, the principle passion. Marion now makes his thesis clear by suggesting that the ethical primacy of wonder, which infects generosity, may be related to a repetition and fulfilment of the metaphysical primacy of the cogito, ergo sum. Marion states: “[G]enerosity...preserves within its own definition the global architecture of the cogito, ergo sum, wherein thought related to itself, becomes a principle, and hence

19 For Michel Henry auto-affection is raw experience, the primordial ground of all experience, if by primordial we understand a pre-reflective experience. Henry uses an example from Article 26 of The Passions of the Soul to describe what this kind of nonrepresentative experience would be like. Descartes imagines he is dreaming and that all he experiences is false “[b]ut if in this dream he experiences sadness, anguish, any sort of feeling, this feeling is absolutely, even though it is still a dream, even though the representation is false. This feeling, therefore, occurs not through representation but independent of it. Which means: without being set forth, without being represented and—if representation is false—on condition of not being so....What is this submission that is no longer submission to some other reality, to an exteriority, that is the submission of and to the self—feeling? How does feeling submit to its own Being in such a way as to be definitively and indisputably possible? In and through its affectivity” (Henry, “Critique” 161; Descartes, Passions 33).
an existence” (QC 178/CQ 112). There are two species of wonder, esteem and scorn (QC 178/CQ 111; Descartes, Passions 52-53 and 103). It is through the esteem we can have of ourselves in the passion of generosity that Descartes (according to Marion) unites an ethical primacy to the metaphysical primacy of the Meditations and the Discourse on Method (QC 178-179/CQ 112; Descartes, Passions 52, 102-103). Descartes states: “it is our own merit that we esteem or scorn” (Descartes, Passions 103; QC /CQ 113). Since generosity is infected by wonder, which has as its ‘object’ the novelty or newness of an ‘object’ (i.e., the difference or uniqueness of the object), “not the object qua real (and really given), but rather the (unreal) modality of its presence,” Marion concludes that this suggests that the object is no longer an object but a “unreal modality of objectivity” (QC 180/CQ 113). It is the modalities of novelty and surprise and not the ‘object’ itself that inspires wonder (Descartes, Passions 103). So far the argument suggests that the soul affects itself and that some passions of the soul do not admit of a ‘real’ object but rather a self relation of the soul to itself (i.e., to aspects of itself or modalities of itself.) Marion concludes: “It is always the soul, alone and unique, that causes and suffers—and is assured of itself in experiencing itself under the mode of esteem” (QC 181/CQ 114).

It is through generosity and free will that one chooses to value oneself through esteem, rather than to scorn oneself.20 Self esteem depends on the use of free will and whether it is used badly or not. In either esteem or scorn it is not the object that is important but the quality of the object or the “use or...disposition” of the will (QC 181/CQ 113; Descartes, Passions 102-104). But whether our will is used well or badly is a matter of judgement, it is when we judge that an action or object is related to us in some way that we can either esteem or scorn it (Descartes, Passions 30-31, n.23). When we esteem ourselves, we value ourselves and Descartes adds we value ourselves each according to our individual worth. Marion suggests that this relation is unique since the kind of cogitatio involved here deals with the value of the thing (or act) over the representational or objectified thing (itself). Now this is a crucial distinction since Marion assumes that to value a thing is not to represent it in thought, which for Descartes would involve a necessary precision (i.e., clear and distinct ideas). Value does not imply the same kind of precision or accuracy as a cogitatio of the ordinary variety (QC 182/CQ 114). While it seems that Marion is trying to introduce a notion of possibility into the Cartesian first principle(s), this is soon replaced by “actuality” and by “true value.” Value in Marion’s account of The Passions is associated with Truth, which has the final word.

20 “[Because] one of the principle parts of Wisdom is to know in what manner and for what cause anyone should esteem or scorn himself, I shall attempt to give my opinion about it here. I observe but a single thing in us which could give just cause to esteem ourselves, namely the use of our free will and the dominion we have over our volitions. For it is only the actions that depend on that free will for which we could rightly be praised or blamed; and in making us masters of ourselves, it renders us like God in a way, provided we do not lose by laziness the rights it gives us” (Descartes, Passions 103). It is interesting to note that Marion refrains from commenting on the last sentence in this Article.
Marion states:

“[T]o examine the true value of all the things that we can desire or fear” or “to examine the true value of all the goods whose acquisition seems to depend in some way on our conduct” still remains a work of the cogitatio—one, moreover, that is not a derived or secondary use, but the “true office of reason.” Reason always officiates by the exercise of cogitatio, but cogitatio does not represent objects objectified ecstatically, with intentionality; it can also take as quasi-objects “value,” or better “true value,” which is doubly unreal, and hence doubly immediate to the ego (QC 183/CQ 115).

If we are to value ourselves, we must use our will in the correct way and in the right proportion to our worth. Marion claims: “Generosity has no other object in the soul except the soul itself, but the soul in turn understood as the pure use of will” (QC 181/CQ 113, emphasis mine). The metaphysical primacy of the cogito is based on its certainty, it is the ground of all knowledge but this is supplemented by the ethical primacy of generosity, which assures that volition will be ruled by reason. What is good is also what is ‘true’. When we esteem ourselves, we use our will in the correct manner and for Descartes this means that we control our passions, the majority of which are ‘caused’ by our bodies and not our souls.

The soul that is most worthy of esteem is the soul that is the most self-sufficient, the most perfect. But the cogito also leads to a sum. Marion asks whether there is a parallel ontic structure in generosity (QC 182-186/CQ 115-116)? Marion argues that since generosity “concerns the manner of the being, the survival of the being, and the perfection of the being of the ego [this is the ego as a ‘quasi-object’ and not as the self-affecting/affected soul]....it thus explicitly sanctions the sum” (QC 186/CQ 116). The soul in its self-affection establishes the manner, survival and perfection of its being. Representation is possible because the ego is only the ambassador of a secondary phenomenological layer of being. The primary layer of being is a realm of absolute immanence inhabited by a self-thinking thought that is self-sufficient and perfect and so can act as the standard for all ethical and epistemological truth. And, like mathematical truths that cannot be doubted since they shine in the light of clarity and distinctness, this is a layer of being that is foundational for all knowledge and all practice. Descartes’ cogito in Marion’s reading acts as a catalyst and ground for any possible objectivity through auto-affection. Representationalism and the objectivity it claimed, which Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenology critiqued, is firmly entrenched in a unity without exteriority. Marion’s critique of intentionality does not do away with intentionality at all but grounds it in the perfection of a thought that thinks itself. The critique of intentionality was not then a criticism of representationalism (and for Marion this is intentionality) but rather the establishment of a ground for representation that supposedly gets below intentionality.

Marion’s reading of Descartes presupposes the legitimacy of a certain kind of representation, this is a representation that a ‘super-being’ imposes on an undifferentiated
world, a world that does not even have existence till the cogito objectifies it through an unknown power. Auto-affection in Marion’s analysis becomes the foundation for a metaphysical system of philosophy, a first principle that assures representation clarity and distinctness. However, Michel Henry argues that auto-affection, which occurs in one or two moments in Descartes’ texts, is only the beginning of a philosophical discussion of subjectivity (Henry, “Critique” 162). As the beginning for a philosophy of the subject, auto-affection can offer a description of a phenomenological layer of experience that is characterized by immediacy, a layer of experience that is not mediated by reflection. However, for auto-affection to act as a foundation for a system of philosophy it would have to give us more than a mere description of the immediacy of experience, it would have to act as an ontological ground from which all Being(s) issues. Marion wishes to give the Cartesian cogito just such a ground. The cogito in this reading is the ‘cause’ of all being(s). The cogito creates a world of representation ex nihilo on the model of its own self-sufficiency and perfection. The subject (i.e., the cogito) can act as the condition for the possibility of all experience only by subsuming all difference within itself. With Hegel, we may want to ask if this is not the night when all cows are black? Can auto-affection explain the unity of experience? I would argue that in Marion’s reading of Descartes, representation becomes impossible, precisely because it (the auto-affection thesis) can offer no account of how cogitare makes possible an ego, a world. Descartes could not have moved from the clarity and distinctness of the cogito to the clarity and distinctness of ideas, if at first he were not a being enmeshed in a world. The cogito can think itself only because it first is in contact with a world. The subject devoid of all objectivity could not even think itself. Like Aristotle’s Unmoved Mover, this would be a thought empty of all content, all meaning.

I argue that Marion takes the notion of auto-affection too far. If auto-affection was to explain a layer of experience in which subject and object are not opposing poles of experience but rather correlated in such a way that all sense of outside and inside are overcome, though only momentarily, then auto-affection is evident, at moments, in both the Meditations and The Passions of the Soul. However, it is clear that Descartes himself was not aware of the significance of these moments. As I have shown in Part Two above, Descartes is motivated by an ideal of clarity and distinctness in his epistemology and an ideal of ‘correctness’ in his ethics. Both of these require the supremacy of reason over perception, the soul over the body. Subject and object are separated by an “impassable caesura” (QC 161/CQ 101).

In the final analysis Marion’s re-interpretation of Cartesian texts institutes a performative (i.e. a thinking redefined as feeling) cogito over the notion of an ego that knows. If Marion’s critique made the milder claim that before we are knowing subjects

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21 “With the first two Meditations it is therefore the Being of the subject, hence Being itself, that is most properly in question. All interpretation that aims to reduce the ontological significance of the Cartesian problematic, to assimilate the being of this subject to a being, indeed to a super-being, is nonsensical” (Henry, “Critique” 160).
we are affected subjects (affected by the world and others), his claim would not be so contentious. However, Marion makes the stronger claim that before we are subjects in the world with others we are self-affected subjects: this suggests a performative subjectivity that has no object, not even itself, but is still in its pure interiority self-related. There can be no ego in such an account, the ‘I’ just is its sensations, its experiencing and nothing more. For Marion the presuppositionaless starting point of phenomenology is the auto-affected cogito, this experience is a coinciding of the cogito with its own thought (i.e. thought reduced to perceiving.) Husserl’s “ich kann” is radicalized and instituted as the condition of the world (i.e. representations). In this view the egoic dimension contaminates the original self presence of consciousness. However, Husserl in retracting his early view that there is nothing that unites Hume’s bundle of perceptions may have been thinking of just this enigma—is there any way to articulate our immediate immersion as intentionality? If there is ‘nothing’ uniting the bundle of perceptions then there is only a series of perceptions—Marion’s auto-affection leads to just this conclusion no-one unites experience, but paradoxically something is ‘subject’ to experience. But, and this is the critical question to positions such as Marion/Henry (and to some extent the later Levinas), who uncovers or discloses this primary or revelatory phenomenality and how? Marion posits an affective subject that has no basis from which to act or reflect, the implicit spontaneity of such a subject in its movement towards a world still does not explain what motivates such a self-affected subject to transcend its own immanence towards a world or others. What is more, this subject, like Hume’s bundle of perceptions just is, the unity that the ego (transcendental or mundane) assured for Husserl is instituted in a “thinking” without thought. No ego comes to haunt this self immersed in itself to the point of obscenity—and this is to say no other, no world comes to shake this self out of its narcissism. While a notion of ethics as first philosophy motivates Marion’s project, it is difficult to see how a subject so divorced from any kind of objectivity is capable of any ethical choice or response. Merleau-Ponty offers a concise critique of Marion’s type of auto-affection. While his criticism is aimed at Descartes and does not explicitly refer to auto-affection, it does reflect what results from a position such as that of Marion.

[I]t is not clear how the mind, reflecting on itself, could in the last analysis find any meaning in the notion of receptivity, or think of itself in any valid way as undergoing modification: for if it is the mind itself which thinks of itself as affected, it does not think of itself thus, since it affirms its activity afresh simultaneously with appearing to restrict it: in so far, on the other hand, as it is the mind which places itself in the world, it is not there, and the self-positing is an illusion. ....If it is perfect, the contact of my thought with itself seals me within myself, and prevents me from ever feeling that anything eludes my grasp; there is no opening, no ‘aspiration’ towards an Other for this self of mine, which constructs the totality of being and its own presence in the world, which is defined in terms of ‘self-possession’, and which never finds anything outside itself but
what it has put there (Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology* 372-373).

It is not just a notion of ethics that is forfeited in Marion’s account. Marion separates knowing and doing so thoroughly that the subject in his account is incapable of any kind of reflection, any sense of knowing. Epistemology too must fall in order to make room for an authentic ground for human-beings. Marion’s subject is an anonymous subject characterized by an essential passivity, what he cannot account for is the activity that is just as much an essential characteristic of our lived experience. Husserl’s schizophrenic Ego is replaced by a narcissistic Ego that separates us from any otherness once and for all. The self-affected subject, like Aristotle’s unmoved mover, has no need or desire of commerce with the world or others, it just ‘is’ in the perfection of its self-affection.22

**Part Three: Husserl and Intentionality**

I cannot offer a thorough defense of Husserl’s intentionality thesis here but only the outline of what a defense of Husserl would require. Against Marion it would have to be shown that Husserl’s reflective presentation of the ego, need not reduce to a representation or objectification of the ego as Marion claims, though in one sense, any reflective retreat must in some sense objectify (in Husserl’s terms) its reflection. Husserl’s methodology illustrates that reflection always alters its object; even in natural reflection (i.e., the natural attitude) the best we can hope for is approximations of others, the world and ourselves (*CM* 72-73/*CM* 34). Marion reads Husserl’s project as one of setting out the limits of objectivity. In one sense, Marion understands Husserl’s notion of objectivity divorced from its correlation to subjectivity and, in this formulation, objectivity is transformed into a representation that distances and distorts. What the phenomenological method distances on Marion’s account, is the ability of the ego cogito to express its existence, its esse. In Marion’s estimation, the ego cannot act as the foundation for all possible knowledge without such an expression. The kind of certainty that Marion seeks for the ego cogito is perhaps motivated by Husserl’s own claims for transcendental subjectivity as the absolute basis or non-presuppositional ground of phenomenology. However, Marion misunderstands just how the Absolute ego of the *Cartesian Meditations* acts as a grounding for phenomenology. Husserl is clear in the “Fourth Meditation” that only a genetic phenomenology reveals the sense in which the ego is Absolute and the turn to genetic themes is the turn to issues of temporality.

In the *Cartesian Meditations*, Husserl describes the phenomenological method through various levels of the reduction, which produce various levels of analysis. Husserl acknowledges his debt to Descartes’ method of doubt but to reduce the phenomenological method to the Cartesian method of doubt would be a mistake. The Cartesian method of

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22 It is interesting that when Marion turns to Descartes’ *Passions of the Soul* there is a notion of “true value” and “self-sufficiency” that underlies the self affection of the cogito. “[G]enerosity not only effects the happiness of the ego, it confers upon it the highest possible perfection of existence, that of depending only on itself; hence, it indeed effects its being, ontically, under the ethical modality of happiness” (*QC* 186/CQ 116).
doubt is only the starting point of phenomenological reduction. As beginning philosophers we must not presuppose anything—not even the guiding idea of philosophy as an “all embracing science” (CM 48-49/CM 7). Even Descartes’ method of doubt with its conclusions must be suspended in our thinking. However, some sort of guiding principle is necessary, so we call for a “general idea of science”, initially, as a possibility that may be given a determinate actualization. We need to adopt an attitude of critical reflection. While we cannot accept any of the sciences or their claims to validity as given, we can through a study of the “characteristic intention of scientific endeavor” familiarize ourselves with what a genuine science may look like, though this is initially, a vague generality (CM 50/CM 9). Along with Descartes, the phenomenologist is led to the “ego cogito” or transcendental subjectivity, which is the absolutely apodictically certain basis of judgments. We neither have a science we accept nor a world but have reduced both to phenomena. Nature, as well as the whole of the life-world (i.e. others and all the social world), are reduced to phenomena. Whatever has sense and validity for me as true is still true, in the sense of being “continually there for me” (CM 58-59/CM 19). Obviously this cannot be a mere repetition of Cartesian doubt since I have not lost the world or myself in the process of the reduction but merely bracketed questions of ontological status. Husserl refers to this philosophical attitude as “an abstention from position-takings” (CM 60/CM 20).

This universal depriving of acceptance, this ‘inhibiting’ or ‘putting out play’ of all positions taken towards the already given Objective world and, in the first place, all existential positions (those concerning being, illusion, possible being, being likely, probable, etc.),—or, as it is also called, this “phenomenological epoche” and “parenthesizing” of the Objective world—therefore does not leave us confronting nothing. On the contrary we gain possession of something by it; and what we (or, to speak more precisely, what I, the one who is meditating) acquire by it is my pure living, with all my subjective processes making this up, and everything meant in them, purely as meant in them: the universe of “phenomena” in the (particular and also wider) phenomenological sense (CM 60/CM 20-21).

Marion’s criticism that there is a “redoubled intentionality” in Husserlian phenomenology, since the object of the philosopher’s meditation, transcendental subjectivity, is itself an intentional object, is partially correct (QC 156-157/CQ 98-99). It is true that even the transcendentally purified objects of consciousness are intentional objects on another level of analysis and that the philosopher’s meditations never get completely under her own reflections. The “I” that reflects only ever has itself retrospectively as an object. However, Husserl would also claim that it is still possible to map out the processes of consciousness, though this is an infinite task that philosophy undertakes. “Static phenomenology” that reveals the structures of consciousness is only one aspect of phenomenology. Without a genetic phenomenology, which reveals the basis of subjectivity within an intersubjective world, and, as Anthony J. Steinbock argues,
a generative phenomenology that uncovers the historicity of multiple ‘lifeworlds’, the phenomenological analysis remains ‘incomplete’ (‘Generativity’ 289-325).

Reflection gives us the inherent structures of any experience since the philosopher’s reflections on experience are a doubling of the actual experience of experiencing. The philosopher’s reflections repeat the primal processes of experience and make possible the mapping out of both the subjective and objective structures of experience and with a genetic account, the historical development of these structures. This is an infinite task since experience, whether of oneself or of the world, always overflows any particular determinations. Whether I am experiencing an object in the world or I am reflecting on my experience of myself, there is always a temporal distancing that takes place that makes any complete description impossible. There are always perspectives on an object in the world that I do not and cannot have. I can no more have all the possible perspectives on an object in the world than I have myself as the center of all objectivities completely, there are always aspects of myself that elude me. However, knowledge is still possible since the unity of experience assumes the aspects of particular experiences that are not ‘given’. Another way to say that experience is always possibly determinable is to say that both presence and absence characterize experience, whether the ‘object’ of the experience is out there in the world or is our own ego. Husserl’s notion of horizon(s) reveals this relationship between absence and presence within experience. In order to ‘see’ a house, I must assume the sides of a house that I do not ‘see’, as well as the background within which the house appears, and this is just what my everyday experience gives me. The goal is not to institute the ‘ego cogito’ as the ontological ‘founder’ of all representation that then has to justify her position as the ontologically primary being through which all other being receives its existence but to illustrate that the horizons of Being already infuse our experience of ourselves and other objectivities. The subjective and the objective are correlated for Husserl and the intentionality thesis is Husserl’s way of saying that Being, whether our own or that of objects in the world, always overflows any particular determinations we can have. Peter Koestenbaum in his Introduction to Husserl’s Paris Lectures offers one of the most lucid descriptions of intentionality.

Intentionality is a discovery about the nature of consciousness. To the question “What is consciousness?” phenomenology answers “intentionality.” Intentionality signifies the fact that consciousness is directional, that it is given in experience as an outward moving vector. The source of the movement, the here-zone, is termed the ego, whereas the focus towards which the movement addressed itself, the

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23 Donn Welton offers an interesting account of the role of absence in Husserl’s theory of perception. Welton suggests that we must look closer at the way the notion of horizons permeates all our perceptions. While horizons allow a 'space' for the presencing of things they also suggest the absence necessarily entailed in perception, even our self-perception/self-awareness (Welton, “Structure” 54-69).
there-zone, is the object. The division of the vector into the ego, movement, and object is purely an abstraction, because another fundamental meaning of intentionality is the essential unity of consciousness. To be is to be an object for a subject and a subject for an object at the same time (Koestenbaum xxvii).

While objectivities, whether of intellectual objects or of objects in the world, are constituted in consciousness as the kinds of objects that appear in such and such ways, this is not to suggest that the subject creates a world ex nihilo. Husserl’s theory of constituting consciousness does not ask the question of a first cause, precisely because Cartesian doubt is only an initial aspect of phenomenological reduction. The notion of ‘origin’ in Husserl’s thought is tied to the genesis of various kinds of ‘objects’ and does not in any way suggest a ‘prime cause.’ In fact, when Husserl does turn to genetic phenomenology, it may be understood as a genealogy of the Nietzschean kind, though this is by no means to suggest that genetic phenomenology is equitable with Nietzschean genealogy. Genetic analysis cannot be understood in terms of any kind of foundationalism and ‘origin’ in Husserl’s sense always involves the idea of historical sedimentation. I will return to this sense of ‘origin’ in my concluding comments.

The reductions are meant to clarify how the world is given to consciousness in the various ways that it is given and how consciousness in turn is given to itself through a world. As Dan Zahavi notes intentionality in relation to a world of ‘objects’ is associated with the self-relation of an embodied subject. This is a relationship which is characterized as a “reciprocity between self-affection and hetero-affection” as is evidenced in the example of touching and being touched, a relationship that Merleau-Ponty so lucidly illustrates through his notion of reversibility in The Visible and the Invisible. Zahavi states:

[If] the self-givenness of the touch is inseparable from the manifestation of the touched, if more, generally, self-affection is always penetrated by the affection of the world (Hua 10/100), it seems untenable to introduce a founding/founded relation between subjectivity and world, since they are inseparable and interdependent. As Husserl himself says, ‘every experience possesses both an egoic and a nongoic dimension’ (ms. C 10 2b). These two sides can be distinguished, but not

24 In my understanding of genetic phenomenology, what it should reveal is how the lifeworld, our situatedness within particular historical, social, cultural milieus— influences our experiences, in this sense it is intrinsically bound to a static phenomenology that reveals the unity of experiences through a constitutive analysis. The connection to Nietzsche’s genealogy is that Husserl through a genetic analysis tries to uncover the sedimentations of meaning that develop within the history of various lifeworlds. See: Anthony Steinbock, “Husserl's Static and Genetic Phenomenology: Translator’s Introduction to Two Essays” Continental Philosophy Review 31:2. (April, 1998.)
Marion’s claim that Husserl can only present the ego through the ecstasy of intentionality is valid, however, this schizophrenia of the ego does not cause the kind of problem for Husserlian phenomenology that Marion suggests. Marion concludes:

[Intentional representative ecstasy rends with an impassable caesura the transcendent from the immanent, and the represented from what it represents; the being that carries out the cogito remains separated from the being that it knows as its cogitatum, whatever it may be (QC 161/CQ 101).

Marion’s own formulations suggest a dualism that cannot rejoin the self-affected soul (consciousness) and the world.

Concluding Comments

If it is true that the ego cogito is only ‘given’ for Husserl through the ecstatic distanciation of intentionality, then in what sense can transcendental subjectivity be the presuppositionless foundation for all other philosophical and scientific studies? Husserl suggests that the transcendental ego is an origin in that it explicates the sense of what it is to be a singular subjectivity, as well as what it means to be a subject as such, a universal subject (Carr, Paradox; Landgrebe, “Transcendental Theory of History” 101-113). The Absolute Ego or the transcendental ego is then the way in which we are paradoxically both empirical subjects in the world, subjects that are always particularized and constituted but also, are also always exceeding our situatedness, our facticity, by being subjects that constitute the world. David Carr refers to this relationship as the paradox of subjectivity (Paradox 89). This paradox suggests that while the empirical ego can be understood in a part/whole relation to the world (i.e. as an object in the world like other objects), the transcendental ego cannot be understood in this way since it is constitutive of all meaning that a world can have. The relationship in the Cartesian Meditations between the de facto ego (the empirical ego) and the eidos ego, an ego as such, both entail what Husserl means by transcendental ego. While the Cartesian Meditations, the focus of Marion’s critique of intentionality in Cartesian Questions, carry on a static constitutional analysis, Husserl is clear in the “Fourth Meditation” that this method must be supplemented by a genetic analysis. A genetic analysis would have to account for how ‘persons’ are constituted within ‘lifeworlds’ and how intersubjectivity contaminates the sense in which we are individuals. However, while a genetic phenomenology certainly deals with what Anthony Steinbock refers to as “depth structures” it also necessarily entails an in-depth analysis of the relation of passivity and activity and the key phenomenological notion of synthesis. For Husserl genetic analysis entails a universal ground of subjectivity within which the ego that lives her life is to be analyzed. For Husserl this universality is revealed through eidetic analysis, an analysis which does not
reduce to a Platonic essentialism. Terms like ‘transcendental ego’ or ‘pure egology’ are then to be understood within the larger context of a methodology that seeks to describe and explicate various regions of conscious life.

The schizophrenia that Marion attempts to ‘heal’ the Cartesian cogito of actually reflects the very nature of consciousness, which is always characterized for itself in various ways, while still retaining a necessary unity. The transcendental ego is then Husserl’s way of pointing to the complexity of subjectivity keeping in mind the non-egoic (i.e. worldly) influences that institute us as constituting subjects. The relationship, which consciousness is, can be characterized by Merleau-Ponty's notion of “Flesh”, which suggests an intertwining of inside and outside, self and other and, as I argue, also reflects our own self-relation (Visible Invisible). Husserlian intentionality is not a return to some sort of representationalism or phenomenalism but a turn to our self-manifestation and the manifestation of all otherness. Any one-sided inquiry into these manifestations will only offer a partial perspective of what it is to be a subject and correlatively what it is to be an object. Marion can claim that intentionality is synonymous with representation and so still requires a more primal grounding, only on the basis of his one-sided inquiry. While Marion may touch upon what Husserl in Experience and Judgement will refer to as a pre-predicative ground of experience. Husserl illustrates that this pre-reflective ‘ground’ of consciousness is only discovered through a retrogressive inquiry, an intentional analysis. This pre-predicative ground of experience or judgments is also announced through an encounter and this poses the question with what or whom? Husserl’s notion of intentionality illustrates that the minimal condition for any experience is the distanciation that Marion rejects. The ‘structure’ of experience is, on this account, dyadic but not dualistic. This ‘Absoluteness’ of the transcendental ego is as Robert Sokolowski suggests a “provisional absolute”, though Sokolowski suggests it is “rooted in a final and true absolute” which is the “livingly flowing present (lebendig stromende Gegenwart).”

[On this account], [t]he present, with its characteristics of retention and protention, is what makes the objects of inner experience possible, the same immanent objects which will in their turn be the conditions for constitution of transcendent objects and senses (Sokolowski, Formation 200).

If there is a nonintentional notion of subjectivity in Husserl’s works, as some commentators, such as Dan Zahavi suggest, this is a notion of consciousness as essentially temporal but to claim that transcendental subjectivity is temporal is not to

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25 I do not think it would be valid to equate Husserl’s notion of essence with that of Plato or early modern philosophy. While I cannot offer an in-depth analysis here, Husserelian essences are better understood as ideal types of the Weberian variety. In relation to the eidos ego, this is not an ego cleansed of all particularity so much as an ego that also lives a life of possibility. The eidos ego suggests that each of us is affiliated with others and that our self-relation is dependent on such affiliations since we share similarities to some extent and in the realm of facticity we are all mutually implicated.
institute a first cause of existence (Husserl's Phenomenology). Husserl’s analysis always begins with what is given and the philosophical project as he understands it is to recover the ‘how’ of the givenness of subjectivity and objectivity. I argue that any analysis of this ‘how’ will always be dyadic, offered in (at a minimum) a ‘pair’ of relations that need not be oppositional as in the case of dualism. If, as I have suggested, this is a relation that pertains not just between subjects and objects but is a characteristic of the ego’s self-relation, then Husserl’s transcendental ego does indeed manifest itself as a schizophrenic ego. Any perspective we can have of ourselves will necessarily be schizoid in Marion’s sense. In fact, the self-affective cogito, which Marion claims acts as the foundation of representation, could only appear through the kind of ecstatic distanciation he rejects in classical phenomenology.
Chapter Two: From Narcissism to Givenness

Introduction

Marion’s auto-affection thesis in *Cartesian Questions* is supplemented by a thesis of hetero-affection in *Reduction and Givenness* and *Being Given*. This Chapter argues that the transition from auto-affection to hetero-affection does not signal a radical change of position on Marion’s part but rather is an attempt to deal with an aporia that the auto-affection thesis entails. Marion recognizes retrospectively that his account of auto-affection creates an unbridgeable gap between self and Other and self and world. Auto-affection in the *Cartesian Questions* implicitly was to have laid the foundation for an ethical relation to the Other but once the subject was self-enclosed in a happiness of her own making, there was no motivation for that subject to abide the call of the Other (i.e. whether this be the call of other persons or the call of the world) (QC 186/CQ 116). However, the explicit aim of the earlier *Cartesian Questions* as well as the later “trilogy” (i.e., *Reduction and Givenness*, *Being Given* and *In Excess*) was to challenge a distinction within traditional philosophical thought between thinking and doing. However, in Marion’s analysis (as well as in Levinas’ notion of the Other) the benefit of going back to Descartes for this distinction lies in the Cartesian notion of Infinity: Infinity as a thought which exceeds the finite mind but nonetheless is thought. Marion and Levinas suggest that this thought comes from the radical exteriority of the world and the Other. Marion’s re-working of phenomenological method is then an attempt to think through *thoughts* that exceed cognition—these are thoughts or rather experiences that exceed understanding. Marion’s notion of “saturated phenomena” explores these thoughts that exceed all understanding. Husserl’s intentionality thesis was the target of Marion’s critique in *Cartesian Questions*. From the first text of the trilogy, *Reduction and Givenness*, the focus becomes the transcendental and “existential” reductions resulting in a further reduction that discloses a givenness prior even to Being. *Being Given* correlates this

26 In fact, Marion resurrects the thesis of auto-affection/self-affection through a notion of “flesh” in *Being Given*. While reminiscent of Merleau-Ponty’s use of the term in *The Visible and the Invisible*, “flesh”, as Marion describes it, is quite distinct from Merleau-Ponty’s unique formulation. See Part One for an analysis of Marion’s use of the term (ÉD 321-323/BG 231-232).

27 This is of course why Marion turns to Descartes’ *The Passions of the Soul*, to add the metaphysical primacy of the ego cogito an ethical primacy.

28 Robyn Horner refers to these works as a trilogy in the Introduction to *In Excess* and I think there is a good reason to see these works as related.

29 Intentionality is still questioned in Marion’s later works as Part One of the present chapter illustrates. However, Marion retrospectively sees the problems with early phenomenology as arising from not pushing the method of reduction far enough. There is
reduced givenness to the gift, even before Being (of any kind) givenness gives itself. (This is a point of contention in commentaries of Marion’s “trilogy” especially by Jacques Derrida and Dominique Janicaud. I discuss these criticisms of the translation of Husserl’s “Gegebenheit” and the relating of the gift and givenness in the Part One of this Chapter.) Marion’s thesis is provocative because he does not endorse the more common argument that the transcendental reduction, perhaps even all reduction, is unnecessary for phenomenology. He makes the more interesting claim that the reduction does not go far enough. Below Husserlian ‘presence’ and Heideggerian ‘Being’ there is an anonymous call, a call that does not bring forth a subject from its autonomous enclosure but calls out an “interloque”, a me that is not yet an I. In *Being Given* this duality of the interloque and a call is broadened to that which gives and the responsee. In *Excess* offers compelling phenomenological descriptions of what Marion refers to as saturated phenomena but still maintains the notion of a subject that arrives on the scene of life late to herself or only insofar as she is first subjected, even to her own flesh.

I argue, along with Anthony Steinbock, that once Husserl has clarified the parameters of a static phenomenology the turn to a genetic method and then to the possibility of a generative method entails a reversal of direction. The transcendental reduction does not need to be pushed farther it needs to be supplemented with a genetic and generative account which requires that “phenomenology takes on a new directionality...[p]henomenology cannot and must not only proceed in one direction, from static to genetic; it can and must also double back on itself” (Home and Beyond 47).

Marion does not follow static phenomenology back to its genesis, despite his

30 This is Marion’s preliminary account of givenness in *Reduction and Givenness*, an account that is analyzed in more detail in *Being Given* and *In Excess*.

31 In *Synthesis and Backward Reference in Husserl’s Logical Investigations*, Jay Lampert illustrates that even within the static procedure that characterizes Husserl’s early work genetic themes already are at play. While his discussions focus on a notion of backward reference in Husserl’s *Logical Investigations* his text suggests a similar, though by no means the same, reversal of directionality built into phenomenological method. What is unique in Lampert’s text is that he does not support a developmental account of Husserl’s method through earlier and later texts but rather locates a unity of method from the earlier *Investigations* right to the later work on temporality and passive and active synthesis. I discuss this further in Chapter Four.
interpretation and appropriation of Heidegger’s ‘existential reduction’ but rather pushes the transcendental reduction beyond its own limits. The aim of Marion’s pure reduction is to problematize Husserl’s theoretical approach while integrating existential themes into the phenomenological analysis. If Husserl’s descriptions of phenomenological analysis privileged inanimate objects or abstract entities like music or mathematics (this certainly seems to be Marion’s view at any rate), Marion will follow Heidegger in dealing with objects of a very different sort: death, birth, love and hate, revelation and fatherhood. However, while I agree fully that the ‘objects’ phenomenology deals with need to include those that Heidegger, Marion and Levinas deal with I do not agree with the revision of phenomenological method that Marion endorses. I argue that his attempt at pushing the reduction to its limits ends up offering accounts that to some extent exceed phenomena altogether. This is because givenness in Marion’s thought exceeds phenomenal ‘appearing’ altogether—not because the types of experiences he describes are ‘impossible’ or even outside of “experience” but because of the status he accords these unapparent phenomena (Janicaud, “Theological Turn” 28-31). \[32\] While Marion is careful to remain within a phenomenological discourse, the broadening of givenness not only leads us beyond experience which Husserl certainly recognized as possible, certainly in relation to the Ur-impression and emotions, but he takes what Husserl refers to as an abstraction and institutes it as the foundation of experience. \[33\] Marion in other words returns to the basic elements that make up our experience of the world, ourselves and others but instead of making the return trip from what are at best the results of a static procedure to the genetic basis of this ‘ground’ he institutes this ground, now as a broadened givenness as a non-foundational foundation of experience—of life. What is missing in Marion’s account is the issue of the temporality of experience. \[34\] However, the relation between static and genetic procedures requires not just a one-way traffic but a return and re-turn again (i.e. the analysis always requires rethinking the results at one stage back through the static and genetic procedures of analysis) and in this sense the origins it discovers cannot be foundational principles in any traditional sense but rather suggests that a circularity (though not vicious) is entailed in all reflection on experience—in all our endeavors to understand ourselves or our world.

\[32\] Dominique Janicaud claims the first use of a “phenomenology of the unapparent” is by Heidegger in the Zäringen seminars. See: Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, Seminar v.15, ed. Curd Ochwadt (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klosterman, 1986), 327-400.

\[33\] See Chapter One and Chapter Four for my discussion of these themes in Husserl’s Ideas I.

\[34\] James Dodd in his review of Being Given makes this point about the lack of discussion of temporality in Reduction and Givenness and Being Given. While Marion turns to later texts of Husserl dealing with temporality in In Excess it is questionable whether he does justice to what this discussion adds to Husserlian phenomenology (Dodd, “Marion” 161-184).
This Chapter explores whether Marion’s radical reflection discloses a more primary level of givenness, as he claims, or whether, despite Marion’s claims to the contrary, his reduction leads to a reduction of subject, Other and world to anonymity. This “anonymity” is related to Marion’s earlier thesis of self-affection and the non-intentional immanence of life it supports. I argue that Marion remains subject to traditional dualistic thought in the transition from auto-affection to hetero-affection. If the auto-affection thesis fails to account for Others and a world, the hetero-affection thesis initially fails to account for the self, the subject. Marion suggests a ‘me’ that proceeds an ‘I’ to account for this pre-subject but this I-less ‘me’ has no substance, no place, and as I argue, is in its anonymity incapable of hearing. A subject so reduced cannot respond, since there is nowhere (no here or there) from which to respond. This ‘me’ may be conscious, capable of reacting to auditory stimulation (arguably the call need not be auditory) but it is certainly not self-conscious, that is capable of interpreting in any way what it hears. If to respond in Marion’s view is anything more than to react (i.e. a matter of instinct) he should be able to account for who it is that hears the call. While Marion is certainly not offering a developmental account of subjectivity (though this may be a possible reading of his analysis of birth and fatherhood in both Being Given and In Excess), his analysis seems to trace the subject back to an origin before any kind of constitution occurs—this is an origin beyond which there is nothing (i.e., there is nothing further than this ground which gives rise to the subject and the Other as others and the world). However, it is not just the subject that is reduced in Marion’s account; the anonymous call that designates the Other in Reduction and Givenness also reduces the Other. This notion of the anonymity of both the one called and the call is tied to Marion’s analysis of the gift and its relation to a givenness purified by a ‘pure’ reduction. The Other as this call is no more singular than is the I-less subject, despite Marion’s claim to the contrary. No one in particular responds to the call that no one or no-thing in particular sends. While Marion’s implicit aim is to disclose the meaning of ethics, much like Levinas’ later works aim to do, it seems that the pure reduction does not lead us to a disclosure that reveals an ethical priority of the Other over the Same (i.e., the interlocuted ‘me’) so much as it equalizes both. (This is obviously a contentious reading of Marion’s texts and one I develop in this Chapter). Ethics aside it is not clear what the pure reduction reveals, which other and who is interlocuted? How is the Given given? If Marion’s point is to describe the primordial experience of any Otherness (since the call may be that of the world or other persons) then perhaps Marion touches upon a level of experience that precedes any distinction of self, Other or world. A generalized given before any particular being comes on the scene. However, once this level is revealed it is difficult to assess what this adds to ethical or epistemological discourses other than to say that before we are individuals (i.e. “I”) we are instituted as such by the world and Others. Such a claim on its own has little to say about the social sphere, let alone about the ethical realm. Perhaps more damaging for Marion is that it is questionable whether this givenness or generality ‘appears’. If it does not appear, if it is beyond phenomena or in excess of phenomena, then how does this givenness remain phenomenological? While
there is legitimacy to the project of describing a level of meaning largely ignored by Husserl—the affective sphere in which our lives are meaningful for us, ascribing a foundational role to this sphere is illegitimate. As is suggesting that this region resists all contamination from the exigencies of the understanding. Dominique Janicaud makes a similar point when he suggests that Marion in his haste to proclaim phenomenology postmetaphysical does not distinguish between *metaphysics generalis* and *metaphysics specialis*. Janicaud defines “*metaphysics generalis* (as condition of the articulation of the senses of being [*sens de l’étant*]) and *metaphysics specialis* (as principled foundation of being [*l’étant]*)” and suggests that while Husserl may well move within the former, Marion’s own position falls under the latter (Janicaud, “Theological Turn” 53-55). The givenness Marion returns to is that of a hypothetical first principle. As Janicaud wryly notes:

> The more phenomenality becomes attenuated, to the point of annihilating itself, the more the absolute inflates and amplifies itself, to the point of apotheosis. We have to do here with a rather dry mystical night; the superabundance of grace has been put through the Heideggerian ringer. *But the qualifying terms, in any case, are neither human nor finite: pure, absolute, unconditioned—such is this call* (“Theological Turn” 63).

In the final analysis Marion’s hetero-affection thesis *appears* to fulfill a gap left by the auto-affection thesis of *Cartesian Questions*. Before auto-affection there is hetero-affection, a hetero-affection that now acts as a stable foundation upon which to erect first, a non-intentional self-affected self and finally, an autonomous subject and representation. Below Husserlian intentionality and transcendental reduction lies a primordial realm of experience cleansed of any problematic residues of singularity. Before we are thinking and knowing self-conscious beings we are sensing and feeling conscious beings. We are constituted by givenness before we are capable of being constituting beings, in fact, our constitutive capabilities are put into question altogether in Marion’s account. The question is what does this givenness that subjects us mean; does it have a ‘sense’? Can Marion’s *donation* have a ‘sense’ (“*Sinnbegung*” in Husserl’s terminology) *without appearing*? Certainly this is Marion’s point that there is a ‘sense’ that escapes conceptualization of any kind in his saturated phenomena, which would not be so contentious a claim if it were not for the foundational role these phenomena play in his work. I argue that Marion’s ‘sense’ of *donation* does not appear so much as it is

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35 While Marion certainly gives priority to “saturated phenomena” (as opposed to what he calls Husserl’s “flat phenomena”) it is not clear that this is givenness. In fact, given his descriptions of givenness it seems that givenness ‘gives’ the saturated phenomena and as such precedes what it gives.

36 This is a point that Janicaud returns to with more detail in *Phenomenology “Wide Open” After the French Debate* (2005).
constructed or perhaps constituted, though this is exactly what Marion argues against since givenness precedes all constitution. I argue that contrary to Marion’s donation Husserl’s ‘Gegebenheit’ must appear (as phenomena) though this is ‘before’ any talk of constitution can take place and this is an appearing that may well have hidden ‘sides’ and undetermined and perhaps essentially undeterminable horizons. However, the ‘fact’ that appearing precedes ‘talk’ of constitution may not suggest a pure givenness before all constitution takes place—the notion of temporality in fact suggests ‘before’ and ‘after’ in relation to phenomena are intertwined in a complex relation that is always already constituted by the time we approach it. This complexity of the ‘before’ and ‘after’ of even the simplest appearance or givenness will be developed in Chapters Four and Five.

The larger issue here is whether this sort of an ontological grounding is necessary or desirable for phenomenology, especially if we trace phenomenology to a critique of both rationalist and empiricist tendencies to abstract from our lived experiences and their tendency towards a ‘bad’ metaphysics (i.e., metaphysics specialis in Janicaud’s definition) (“Theological Turn” 53-55). Western philosophy has tended to treat our various faculties (i.e. reason, sensation and imagination) as if each performed a function of its own without interaction or contamination by the other faculties. This separation of the human being into various faculties influences the kind of ontology differing philosophies will support. Marion understands this to be a privileging of reason over sensation/emotion and imagination, his solution is to reverse the priority of traditional philosophy. Husserlian phenomenology illustrates that this separation of the faculties was already an abstraction and one that led to an impasse between the various philosophical disciplines. If the turn to genetic phenomenology entails a return from the static analysis

37 This is not to equate the distinctions Husserl maintains between givenness (Gegebenheit), appearance, apprehension (Auffasung) and phenomena but to suggest that perhaps Marion’s analysis, which separates Gegebenheit from phenomena to some extent, does not adequately deal with Husserl’s use of these terms. It could be argued that for Husserl the transcendental ego does not “appear” as such and certainly the discussion of inner temporality suggests this, however, in Chapter Four I argue that there is a sense in which the flow of experience does indeed ‘appear’ to itself though this is distinct from the way objects ‘appear’.

38 Marion claims that givenness or the claim is a non-ontological grounding or foundation, however, as the basis of ontology it fullfills the same role as ontology does in traditional philosophy.

39 This is not to say that the phenomenologist cannot abstract from her lived experience and examine the role of each faculty separately (an enterprise Husserl supports and spends much of his life elucidating) but that this is a kind of abstraction. Husserl’s critique of rationalism and empiricism makes a similar point, while abstraction can yield valuable insights into how we experience the world, Others and ourselves, it would be wrong to take an abstracted view and superimpose it on the complexity of lived experience. One should not mix up the methodology of phenomenology, which isolates
of his earlier works which supported the early separation of hyle/morphe or form/content (i.e. sensation as non-intentional) to the implications of his later works with the development of the notions of temporality, passive and active synthesis and the lifeworld, then we cannot read Husserl as reiterating traditional empiricist or rationalist positions that suggest a sharp separation of the faculties. Though this is not to say that the early distinctions are jettisoned in his later works but rather that the function of these distinctions is clarified in the movement or ‘play’ between static and genetic themes. If the “lifeworld” as the sedimented social, cultural and historical “world” contaminates not just our cognitive or active (i.e. judicative) synthesis but also is already implied in any passive synthesis then Marion’s pure reduction cannot uncover a purely pre-objective givenness. The phenomenologist, while neutral, is always historically bound in ways she cannot foresee. And, while we may all begin the journey of life as merely conscious beings, it is our capability to be self-conscious that distinguishes us as a species. In fact, while Husserl certainly privileges epistemological concerns (and this is the basis of criticisms of his ‘theoretical bias) this by no means suggests that he was only concerned with these, I would suggest that Husserl’s works are just as motivated by ethical concerns and this may be why the freedom and self-responsibility of the philosopher plays such an important role in his view of philosophy as a rigorous science. Merely reversing the priority of epistemology over ethics does little to reform what Marion (and Levinas) see as a theoretical bias in the history of philosophy. There are good reasons to be critical of notions of reason and truth that are overly restrictive and apply only to limited areas of life or worse that indiscriminately apply ideas of ‘truth’ that are valid for one region of life to regions within which they should have no authority. So for example assessing emotions in terms of perceptual adequation would be absurd—we expect our perceptions various levels and modes of experience from the concrete experiences as they are originally given. In fact, this may be what the term “Erlebnis” was meant to convey—the complexity of experience that gives rise to the world and to the subject. See Husserl’s Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis.

Husserl seems to endorse a notion of non-objective (in Marion’s sense) or pre-predicative experience in Experience and Judgement and Passive and Active Synthesis but I do not think given the work on temporality that this can be equated with Marion’s notion of givenness.

Hegel makes this point in the Preface to Elements of the Philosophy of Right (9-23).

I am thinking here of Merleau-Ponty’s insightful analysis of the child’s coming to self-consciousness in Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language and “The Child’s Relations with Others” in The Primacy of Perception. Merleau-Ponty does not merely address developmental issues in these works but addresses larger issues about the nature of embodied existence and the movement of consciousness to self-consciousness.
and our ideas to ‘fit’ each other (e.g., the cat I see next to my chair is hopefully not a large rat) but how would we apply this kind of adequation between our feelings and an ‘object’? Though this is not necessarily to say there would be ‘no’ criterion entailed in assessing our emotions. There may be other criterion for the relation between a feeling and the “object” it is directed towards. However, this would certainly not be the same criterion as in perceptual adequation, though this relation can at times be analogous to the criterion of truth in perceptual experience. For example, I thought the object of my love had such and such a character but later realize I was mistaken just as I thought I saw a cat but I really was looking at a rat—mistakes happen with the eyes and the heart. What is more, the immediacy and the kind of certainty Marion proposes for our affective lives, particularly in Cartesian Questions, isolates a fleeting moment of our affective lives and institutes it as the foundation of all experience, all knowledge. It may well be the case that my recognition of the false character of the one I thought I loved is a judgment that does not change the certainty of my initial feelings (their ‘truth’) but it is also the case that in retrospect that initial love rings false to me ‘now’, from this perspective and time—not that I did not really feel love at that moment in time but because the one whom I loved was precisely not the one I loved. There are three key points here: First, it may not be the case that our emotive lives are only given in the kind of immediacy Marion following Husserl suggests. Second, there is a sense in which future experiences may radically alter our perspective of past experiences which would need to be further analyzed since this would put into question Husserl’s notion of the recuperability of the past and this would put his notion of evidence in question (at least as Marion understands this notion of evidence). And third, this suggests that Husserl’s maintaining of the distinction of hyle/morphe has a methodical necessity of sorts—without it Husserl’s epistemology would not be as radical as it is—instead he would merely reiterate traditional notions of truth and falsity, his notion of evidence would not be as interesting as it is. Marion, Levinas and of course Heidegger are right that the kind of truth(s) we can expect in our sciences and in certain areas of philosophy (e.g., logic) are not only inadequate to various other regions of life but create and justify violence when applied to these other regions (e.g., ethics, politics, the arts). However, does this necessarily entail an undermining of reason or does it call for a broadening of reason to encompass various notions of truth? Marion and Levinas do not acknowledge the possibility of this broadening within classical phenomenology. For both thinkers epistemology with its relation to a certain kind of economic reasoning is wholly different, in fact, opposed to, the affective spheres they describe and theorize about. While both call for a new reason this is not associated in any way with the reason they view as predominating Western philosophy (Marion, “Reason” 101-134).

In order to do justice to Marion’s position in *Reduction and Givenness* and the later *Being Given* it would be necessary to analyze the criticisms leveled against the theoretical bias of Husserlian phenomenology and the Heideggerian reduction of existence to Being, however, the aim of this work precludes a detailed analysis. 43 In this

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43 A detailed analysis is all the more difficult given the various positions Marion confronts (all of which he envisages as phenomenological.) Marion’s understanding of
Chapter I focus on presenting the general criticisms of the phenomenological/transcendental reduction and the ‘results’ of Marion’s pure reduction. If Marion’s criticisms of classical phenomenology are justified then his own position should offer a viable alternative for phenomenological method and, in relation to my focus in this work, Marion should provide a ‘new’ view of subjectivity that escapes the aporias inherent in Husserl’s notion of the transcendental ego and his self-purported transcendental idealism. However, I argue that Marion cannot make good on this promise, the pure reduction in fact leads to a ‘subject’ that in her performativity gives rise to a world and others all the while remaining oblivious to her own accomplishments. If I am right then givenness is reduced to this performativity of the subject and the attempt to introduce a radical hetero-affectation at the heart of all experience fails. The self-affection of Cartesian Questions returns in full force. The position of Reduction and Givenness will inform the analysis of givenness with its entailed critique of Husserlian phenomenology. While Marion develops his position in more detail in Being Given and In Excess the analysis of Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenology he offers there follows similar insights to those in the earlier work, despite Marion’s claim to the contrary (ED 16/BG 10). In Part One, I analyze Marion’s own position in Reduction and Givenness and Being Given and then in Parts Two and Three turn to the critique of Husserl that is instrumental in informing Marion’s divergence from both Husserl and Heidegger.

**Part One: Preliminary Considerations**

**Section One: Givenness and Gift**

phenomenology as an incremental methodology that ascends to truth by pushing beyond intentionality through the pure reduction, characterizes the history of phenomenology as a movement towards givenness or the gift. To truly do justice to such a position one would have to give a clear account of Marion’s double-handed reading of the positions he subsumes and, at the same time, overcomes (i.e. Descartes, Husserl, Heidegger, Ricoeur, Michel Henry, Derrida and Levinas.) The limitations of this project preclude the depth of analysis this kind of reading of Marion would require. Though it should be noted that there is problem with the notion that phenomenology is like some revolution overtaking and subsuming all the various characters and events involved in its wake in order to deliver what is at best an onto-theological vision of the given. To view the various positions in the history of phenomenology as if they all lead directly to the conclusions Marion supports, like pieces of a puzzle that until now have not fit together, is a little disingenuous. However, despite my reservations there is much in Marion that is worth a closer reading than the one I offer here. See Janicaud’s scathing indictment of Marion’s metaphysics in both “Phenomenology and the Theological Turn” and Phenomenology Wide Open After the French Debate. Janicaud in both texts suggests a more modest role for phenomenology than the one Marion supports. Phenomenology is not all of philosophy and must be vigilant in remaining within some methodological limits.
The following outlines the unfolding of givenness in *Reduction and Givenness* and *Being Given*. Obviously the relation of givenness to the gift plays in major role in Marion’s analysis and borrows much from Derrida’s analysis in *Given Time: I. Counterfeit Money* (in which Derrida analyzes Marcel Mauss’s *The Essay on the Gift*) and *The Gift of Death*. Before turning to the figures of givenness I offer a brief account of the relation of the gift to givenness. Derrida’s analysis of the gift are compelling and obviously influence Marion’s notion of givenness. However, my focus privileges Marion’s application of the gift to givenness and thus only touches on the nuances of Derrida’s gift insofar as it relates to givenness and phenomenological method.

The discussion between Derrida and Marion reflects a similar discussion between Marion and Dominique Janicaud on the translation of Husserl’s “**G**e**g**ebenheit” as “donation.” As Janicaud notes: “In proper French, this [donation] is a legal transaction by which one person transfers goods to another person” (*Wide Open* 34). Yet this is exactly opposed to Marion’s notion of the relation between the gift and givenness and further this definition is opposed to the unconditionality that characterizes givenness which certainly does not operate in an economic horizon for Marion. Janicaud points out that the translation of “**G**e**g**ebenheit” by Ricoeur, Lowit and Kelkel is usually rendered as “the given” (“le donné” or “la donnée”) or as presence (“la présence”) (*Wide Open* 35). Obviously the translation of givenness as presence would displace the relation of gift and givenness that Marion would like to maintain. Derrida also questions the relation of Gegebenheit and the gift. Derrida: “I am not convinced that between the use of Gegebenheit in phenomenology and the problem we are about to discuss [i.e., the gift] there is a semantic continuity” (“On the Gift” 58). But even if we allow a certain hermeneutical license to Marion’s translation and admit that perhaps Husserl’s “Gegebenheit” is open to an analysis such as his does this justify the further relation between the gift and givenness? Marion and Dominique Janicaud on the translation of Husserl’s “**G**e**g**ebenheit” as “donation.” As Janicaud notes: “In proper French, this [donation] is a legal transaction by which one person transfers goods to another person” (*Wide Open* 34). Yet this is exactly opposed to Marion’s notion of the relation between the gift and givenness and further this definition is opposed to the unconditionality that characterizes givenness which certainly does not operate in an economic horizon for Marion. Janicaud points out that the translation of “**G**e**g**ebenheit” by Ricoeur, Lowit and Kelkel is usually rendered as “the given” (“le donné” or “la donnée”) or as presence (“la présence”) (*Wide Open* 35). Obviously the translation of givenness as presence would displace the relation of gift and givenness that Marion would like to maintain. Derrida also questions the relation of Gegebenheit and the gift. Derrida: “I am not convinced that between the use of Gegebenheit in phenomenology and the problem we are about to discuss [i.e., the gift] there is a semantic continuity” (“On the Gift” 58). But even if we allow a certain hermeneutical license to Marion’s translation and admit that perhaps Husserl’s “Gegebenheit” is open to an analysis such as his does this justify the further relation between the gift and givenness? Janicaud illustrates that this ‘relation’ relies not only on a certain leeway with “Gegebenheit” but a relating of this to Heidegger’s use of “**G**eben,” “**E**reignis” and “es gibt” (Janicaud is clear that Marion’s translations of these terms are highly questionable as well) (*Wide Open* 37). Janicaud suggests that Marion misinterprets Husserl’s texts dealing with givenness and I think there is some validity to this claim. However, Husserl seems to accord a special status to what is given to consciousness in immanence, particularly, in having an attitude towards something (i.e., an ‘object’ or state of affairs) or a feeling (e.g. valuing something or ‘seeing’ beauty). (I have already briefly alluded to just these kinds of ‘experiences’ in *Ideas I* in Chapter One). Husserl’s accounts of these types of immanent experiences remain ambiguous and this may justify readings such as Marion’s. I argue in Chapter Five that despite unresolved issues with the status of these types of experiences/phenomena they should not be interpreted as if they occupied a foundational status (i.e., as the presuppositionless basis of phenomenology) in Husserl’s works and that they do not legitimate the relation Marion would like to maintain between givenness and the gift. James Dodd makes an interesting observation in

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his review of *Being Given*:

[Marion’s] point [with the relation of the gift to givenness] is to show that, once we have accepted givenness at the heart of phenomenality, as the ultimate presupposition of the very unfolding of its enactment (the being given “in person” of what “shows itself” or “appears”), then the core of this enactment will in effect not only resist phenomenalization, but point the adept of reduction to an excess of and within phenomenal givenness (“Marion” 167).

Dodd goes on to tie this excess of givenness to a notion of radical immanence in Marion’s thought—an immanence that “belongs not only to consciousness but to the initiatives of givenness itself” (“Marion” 167). If the self-affection thesis of *Cartesian Questions* claimed an origin of consciousness in its immanence to itself, the hetero-affection thesis leads Marion to broaden this self-immanence to include an origin of givenness as well. Givenness as the core of any phenomenality attests to a radical immanence, one only released by Marion’s pure reduction. But as Dodd points out for Husserl the distinction between originary givenness (“originäre Gegebenheit”) and self-givenness (Selbstgegebenheit) is tied to “the origin of sources of clarity as they arise out of the movement of givenness itself” (“Marion” 168, emphasis mine). There is an important insight here, one I would read as suggesting that first givenness is attained and not given in an isolated moment though originary givenness is lived, it only appears (as an appearance) insofar as we reflect on the lived experience (Erlebnis) (i.e., we turn our reflective regard to the lived experience as an intentional object) (“Marion” 168). Either Marion’s sense of givenness does not appear at all or it only appears if he accepts the intentionality thesis as the means of this return to the origin of givenness. There is also the question of the role the temporal unfolding of givenness occupies in Marion’s position—if givenness as originary givenness only appears insofar as it becomes the ‘object’ of a reflective retreat then this supposes a return to originary givenness is possible though only through reflection. This is a position that Marion will not accept since he claims that (originary) givenness is not repeatable, if repeatability implies recuperability. Yet it seems this is just what the pure reduction does—it returns to an originary common ‘ground’ of subjectivity and objectivity. (I discuss this in my discussion of the figures of givenness in *Being Given* below). The point is that givenness is experienced not as an intuitive fullness and that there are some experiences, which exceed either intuitive fulfillment or “intentional ecstasy.” I do not disagree that their may be experiences that do not fit a strictly objective intentionality but not that there are experiences that exceed all intentionality. Not even a purified reduction can release the kind of core of givenness Marion suggests. This however, does not mean that the experiences Marion classifies as saturated phenomena are impossible but that a different approach than that of an objective intentional analysis would be necessary to do justice to these types of experiences. In one sense the separation of givenness from any kind of apprehension or intention, which seem to be the same kind of process for Marion, lead to
a moment of passivity that is dissociated from any kind of ‘activity’. The subject in such an account is paradoxically characterized as given over to givenness which first constitutes the subject as subject but since it is only through the reduction that this givenness ‘appears’ this seems to suggest a passive subject that somehow gives rise to both subjectivity and the world. The self-giving gift—a purified givenness—institutes subjectivity and objectivity. What is this gift? And if this gift/givenness shares the same modality (perhaps phenomenality) as the passive subject then is there anything that separates these two immanent spheres?

At a conference at Villanova University in 1997 Derrida and Marion had a discussion about the gift; it is telling that what separated the two thinkers views on the gift had less to do with how each understood the gift then with differences in their understanding of phenomenology. According to Derrida “when phenomenologists in the broad sense say Gegebenheit, something is given, they refer simply to the passivity of intuition. Something is there. We have, we meet something” (“On the Gift” 58). For Derrida this is not a gift. Derrida summarizes the debate between himself and Marion on the gift as follows:

Where we disagree, if we do disagree, is that after this stage [their agreement on the impossibility of the gift to be present], Jean-Luc says that I have problematized the gift in the horizon of economy, of ontology and economy, in the circle of exchange, the way Marcel Mauss has done, and we have to free the gift from this horizon of exchange and economy. Here I would disagree. I did exactly the opposite. I tried to precisely displace the problematic of the gift, to take it out of the circle of economy, and exchange, but not to conclude, from the impossibility for the gift to appear as such and to be determined as such, to its absolute impossibility (“On the Gift” 59).

In fact, Derrida suggests that though it is impossible for the gift to “exist and appear as such” if existence is taken as “being present and intuitively identified as such” there none-the-less remains a gift (“On the Gift” 59). What this paradoxical formulation entails is that the gift is an “experience of …impossibility” (“On the Gift” 60). Derrida is clear that this experience of impossibility is the “dream” of a “pure gift”, a dream we continue to dream even though we ‘know’ it is impossible (“On the Gift” 72). If Marion claims that the gift (or givenness) appears and it is not clear that it does appear in his analysis, then Derrida suggests a certain overflowing or excess in the experience of the gift, an excess that does not appear, if to appear necessarily entails phenomenological determination. One could say that this is a way to leave open the question of the gift. The gift for Derrida is the possibility of impossibility. Marion, who despite claims to the contrary in Being Given, seems to largely agree with Derrida on the gift as the possibility of impossibility. The gift is given insofar as it does not refer to any cause yet the relation (equation?) between the gift and givenness and the role that givenness plays in Marion’s work suggests that the gift freed from either a giver or receiver perhaps even of any
‘thing’ given does imply a mysterious causality. Marion associates givenness and the gift and then tries to dissociate these from being of any kind and from ‘objects’ but why should these (i.e., being(s) and objects) be treated as if they entailed a necessary determination (i.e., that being or object within phenomenology suggested a closed realm of meaning)? Even the most mundane objects that Husserl takes up as examples (e.g., cubes) have open horizons. However, Marion also wants to liberate the gift (i.e., givenness) from all horizons. While he will talk of a horizon of the gift that is not the economic horizon of objectivity or Being, he is clear that “the last step for a real phenomenology would be to give up the concept of horizon” (“On the Gift” 63, 66). He claims that the real “difficulty for phenomenology now is to become more fair to some phenomena which cannot be described either as object or being” (“On the Gift” 70). And no doubt in a limited view of that which intentionality aims at in its “consciousness of” certain phenomena could not be described as “objects” of any kind. Certainly we would not want to equate objects such as cubes or pipes with people or artworks but does this mean that our relation to the latter falls outside intentionality or that it requires a pure reduction to disclose these phenomena “that we should not try to constitute...but accept... in any sense of accept—as given and that is all” (“On the Gift” 70-71)? Furthermore should we as phenomenologists uncritically accept as Marion suggests or is there more to the story? Would it be possible to accept the kinds of phenomena Marion classifies as saturated without accepting this saturation (of first or second degrees—the “saturation of saturation” of revelation) or its relation to the gift (ED 327/BG 235)? In other words is it possible to describe such experiences where a certain kind of phenomenon is given without being comprehended in the way ordinary ‘objects’ are? I would suggest we can describe the experiences Marion classifies under saturation without abandoning intentionality or having to have recourse to a pure reduction that essentially amounts to an uncritical and indifferent acceptance of phenomena. More importantly, this indifference as a supreme ‘principle’ of givenness as gift seems to suggest an inherent violence (see my discussion of Boredom in Being Given in Part Three below). The issue with Marion’s analysis is not so much in the notion of the impossible possibility of a gift without either giver or receiver and perhaps without any thing given (though this does not necessarily mean there is no gift, one can give time etc. and there would certainly be a gift) but that Marion in Being Given claims that with the “pure reduction” we arrive at a gifted givenness that attests to this impossible possibility. In fact, if we turn to some of Marion’s examples of saturated phenomena that are ‘gifted’ to us it is highly questionable why these types of experiences could not be described within a Husserlian framework. Two examples Marion provides in “On the Gift” illustrate a fairly bankrupt notion of the gift if we accept the characterization of the gift as essentially unconstituted and ‘given’ as it ‘purely’ is: these are the gift of charity and the gift of time (61-63). Marion assumes that if we remove one, two and possibly all three of the three ‘conditions’ of the gift (i.e., a giver, a receiver and a something given) we arrive at the pure event of givenness/the gift. In the case of giving to charity because we do not ‘know’ to whom we give, we have made a gift (i.e., money) but somehow because the gift goes to an anonymous receiver this gift is achieved outside the economy of the gift. Yet, is this gift outside of economy or is it exactly within an economy and the same horizon of economy that Marion claims.
to free the gift from? I give to a charity (for whatever or perhaps for ‘no’ reason—since ‘reason’ does not enter this exchange without economy), there is a gift, I gave an undisclosed amount of money or perhaps some item or other, now does it matter that I do not know to whom I gave or that the gift is not recognized? This seems a rather odd reasoning—I gave, I gave something, I am not sure it was received (one never knows for sure) but it made me feel good to give or perhaps I was trying get away from one of those “volunteers” who work for charitable organizations and I gave to be set free, or perhaps I gave because I feel immensely guilty for some reason or another and there is always the possibility that I gave not for any of these reasons but because it was important for me to give, even if I did not ‘know’ why or to whom I gave. The kind of indeterminacy or unconditionality that Marion requires of the ‘gift’ is not what the gift of charity seems to indicate—I give and in this giving I remain within a circle of exchange—not ‘knowing’ to whom one gives does not indicate that there is no one to whom the gift arrives. Indeterminacy and unconditionality are not the same. A similar situation occurs when I give time, though Marion is right that in one sense no thing is given in the giving of time. This is not to argue that a pure gift in Marion’s sense (and I think this is close to Derrida’s account of the “dream” of the gift) always necessarily ‘occurs’ as exchange since the dream of the gift attests to the ‘ideal’ of giving that underlies any possible gift—though Derrida may well be right that this is the possibility of impossibility. But would this ‘ideal’ be non-intentional and a saturated phenomena in Marion’s sense? It is interesting to note that Derrida will claim that his disagreement with Marion lies in the “possibility of a phenomenology of the gift” though this is not a point against phenomenology but an attempt to “[think] the possibility of phenomenology, but from a place which is not inside what I try to account for.” As Derrida notes the problem with Marion’s account is his version of phenomenology cannot claim to remain phenomenological without “keeping some axioms of what is called phenomenology—the phenomenon, the phenomenality, the appearance, the meaning, intuition, if not intuition, at least the promise of intuition” (“On the Gift” 60-61). In Being Given Marion argues that Husserl’s “principles of principles” (Ideas I § 24) reduces phenomenality to intuition. The analysis of the gift and the relation of the gift to givenness is meant to loosen the tie between intuitivity and givenness (i.e., phenomenality unanchored from any particular appearing “phenomena”). In essence this ‘loosening’ of intuition is a broadening of intuition to a point of saturation, a strange saturation that does not have a limit point of “fullness” but is rather an excess that keeps giving and makes any intuitive determination impossible. Marion asks “[d]oes fulfilling intuition applied to an objective intentionality define in general all phenomenology or merely a restricted mode of phenomenality” (ED 22/BG 13)? Marion’s answer as formulated in Reduction and Givenness and Being Given is to claim a phenomenality that exceeds intuition but non-}

45 Marion’s translation of Husserl’s principle of principles is as follows: “every originarily giving intuition is a source and right of cognition—that everything that offers itself originarily to us in intuition (in its fleshly actuality, so to speak) must simply be received for what it gives itself, but without passing beyond the limits in which it gives itself” (ED 20-21/BG 12).
the-less is ‘significant’. In the following I explore the various figures of givenness Marion explores in *Reduction and Givenness* and *Being Given*.

**Reduction and Givenness**

**Section Two: Figures of Givenness**

Marion’s position in *Reduction and Givenness* suggests that once the reduction is pushed to its limit what is revealed is an interloqué and a call or “claim”. There are four distinctive characteristics of the “claim” each of which constitute the interloqué: convocation, surprise, identification and facticity (RD 302/RG 202). The interloqué originates in the first passion, according to Descartes’ *The Passions of the Soul*, wonder (RD 290-291, 302/RG 193, 202).

The first characteristic of the claim, convocation, distinguishes the interloqué as the one claimed by the claim but, and this is what is distinctive about Marion’s notion of the interloqué, this is not a “subject” in any sense of the term. This is not yet a subject because the “autistic autarchy of an absolute subjectivity” is overturned/undone by an alterity that precedes it an alterity that precedes both intentionality and Being-in-the-world (RD 300/RG 200-201).

In classical terms, one will say that the derived and secondary category of relation, which in principle should not apply to the first category, substance, not only applies to it but subverts it; the interloqué discovers itself as a subject always already derived starting from a relation, a subject without subjectivity (RD 300/RG 201).

There does not seem to be anything too contentious in this first characteristic of the claim since phenomenology, rooted as it is in our facticity, would have to admit that indeed any characterization of the subject already points to a relational being. The subject, the ego, always finds itself already in relation to a world and to Others. While the phenomenological epoché suspends any ontological claims about our facticity it does not affect or alter that facticity in the suspension. The reductions may change the perspective of the philosopher, presenting various ways of understanding the “how” of the world and the subject that finds herself in situation, but it does not alter the fact of the relationality that is the precondition of any experience (this is of course one way to describe the intentional relation). What is contentious is that Marion claims that the subject due to its relationality is without subjectivity. What exactly does this claim imply? It would seem that while the interloqué finds itself affected, it does not find itself so except retrospectively before the interloqué is, the alterity of the convocation falls unto a “subject” that is not and brings her into being, into relation. But what does convocation mean if not a bringing together (of what or whom?), a gathering (can one gather without
Marion fails to account for the fact that alterity already requires ipseity, that convocation or relation requires not just that which calls but also that someone, even if not fully specified or, yet to be further determined, is called. Marion seeks an origin for subjectivity that I would suggest both Husserl and Heidegger argue can never be discovered/uncovered since phenomenology’s starting point, the situation within which we each (always) are enmeshed, already finds a subject in relation. The reductions can uncover the presuppositions upon which the subject, the world and the Other are based (i.e. relation) but not by undermining any of these terms or privileging one term over another. This would include relation unhinged from anything it relates. Instead, phenomenology questions/interrogates by uncovering the how and why of relation—phenomenology starts out with the intentional relation. Perhaps the second characteristic of the claim will support the first?

46 Of course one can gather oneself together but then this already assumes one has been fractured, shattered or divided, even in this case one does not gather except insofar as one is split or divided. While this one is numerically one it is still divisible/divided, this is not a perspective Marion can except if he still maintains the notion of self-affection. Marion would have to show that the claim is the interloquē if he wants to maintain that what calls requires nothing other than itself to which its call is related. But if this is his point why not return to the discovery of Cartesian Questions: self-affection? If Reduction and Givenness is trying to institute a hetero-affection it cannot do so without adequately accounting for that which is affected, the subject. For Marion the condition of the subject, prior even to self-affection is an ‘originarily unconditional’ givenness.

47 While this definitely applies to Husserl’s phenomenology it could be argued that Heidegger moves beyond Dasein to a more originary givenness and so is more in agreement with Marion than with Husserl. However, without being able to elaborate on it here, I think there is reason to believe that even after the turn in Heideggerian thought, Dasein remains pivotal for any disclosure. After all, who brings Being to language, who poetizes at the end of metaphysics?

48 The phenomenologist can of course study each of these terms from a perspective that privileges either an objective or subjective perspective (though this would remain a one-sided inquiry.)

49 I say the why of relation because if we are always already historically bound then part of our analysis should include the presuppositions built into our basic conceptions. Certainly this is what Husserl already recognizes from as early as the Investigations with the notion of habituality. Though he perhaps does not fully articulate the historical ‘sense’ of this till the Crisis with the notion of the “lifeword”. Heidegger understands this “why” as the question of the meaning of being, since this meaning goes hand in hand with a questioning back into the various ways in which this question has been tackled in various “worlds”.

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The second characteristic of the claim, surprise, prohibits the interloqué from comprehending the convocation that it nevertheless receives. In fact, the interloqué suffers surprise since surprise is the antagonist to every form of ecstasy or intentionality. Surprise takes the interloqué and "detaches it from any subjectivity" (RD 300-301/RG 201). It seems commonsense to claim that if one is surprised one cannot know or comprehend what one is surprised by, at least initially, and Marion suggests that what surprise does not allow the interloqué to comprehend, is the convocation. So, something calls something which does not have itself yet and what calls is not known or comprehended (perhaps it cannot be comprehended). With surprise we are given by a givenness, neither given is known or understandable but somehow one given (the call) institutes a second given (the interloqué). How is this institution initiated? Surprise! It is not clear what the second characteristic adds to the call other than to broaden the call to such an extent that it no longer makes sense to say anything about it at all. After all what would there be to say about something we are told cannot be comprehended in any way? This is just Marion’s point beyond all comprehension there is something felt or intimated. And it is this intimation that first constitutes/institutes a subject. Before an “I” there is an anonymous “me” that is surprised/affected by something it cannot reduce (i.e. comprehend) in any way. Givenness, by surprising the interloqué, that is not yet a subject, institutes a subject into intersubjectivity and a world. That this subject is called by something that she does not know or comprehend but rather feels appears legitimate since any “singularity” is an achievement and not something we are born into. None of us enters existence fully formed and particularized. But why is “surprise” the “antagonist” to every form of ecstasy and intentionality? Even if I do not “know” who I am or what I will be or that into which I am born (i.e. the social, cultural, historical world into which I arrive) it is integral to the kind of being that I am that I am confronted with something from the first moment of conscious life. At a minimum there is an intentional relation that institutes me into “life”. Marion may well uncover the sense in which each of us is “constituted” into subjectivity (singularity) but he has not shown that this is a non-intentional ‘relation’ (RD 300-301/RG 201).

The third characteristic of the claim is identification. Marion claims that I am instituted as an ‘I’ without self-determination or anticipatory resoluteness because “the proper name can be proclaimed only when called by the call of the other”. Once again this claim seems legitimate; certainly my identity is always intimately bound to Others and the world. My sense of who ‘Gogo’ is, always suggests not just the experiences that have made me this sort of person but the influence of the world (with all those that have from beginning affected the kind of person I have become.) But why is this sense of identity unmoored from self-determination and “anticipatory resoluteness” altogether?

Why is it that a claim imposes a choice on me; or better: that a claim poses me as the there where one might recognize oneself? Is Marion suggesting that the claim just is the

50 A preliminary answer to this question may be found in Marion’s discussion of anxiety and boredom in Heidegger and the reliance of his own position on a reformulated notion of boredom. See Part Three below.
world (i.e. Others and things)? If this is the case then why is the claim outside/beyond being-in-the-world? Would it not be more apt to suggest that before the differentiation of self/Others or self/World we identify with but do not differentiate ourselves from Others and the world? Marion cannot admit that from the moment we enter existence we are a being that is intimately bound to Others and the world since the claim would then be no more than the world and Others. The indeterminacy of the claim is essential to Marion’s ‘pure reduction’ but he can only legitimate this Absolute indeterminacy once he has unmoored the claim from the ego cogito (in all its various formulations), Others and the world. It would appear that Marion’s reduction is a reduction of everything, anything and nothing to anonymity. Before or beyond Being there is just an unconditioned undifferentiation (RD 300-301/RG 201).

The fourth characteristic of the “claim” is “facticity” and one would think that this characteristic will clarify how the claim and the interloqué are differentiated. Marion suggests that the “claim” is an “a priori that is essentially after the fact, [which] decides the horizon where any theory of the interloqué will become legitimately thinkable” (RD 301-302/RG 202). Marion’s theory seems to endorse a metaphysics that claims a ‘first cause’ of existence that itself remains outside of all causality. If this reading is legitimate, in what sense does Marion remain phenomenological? What does Marion’s broadening of facticity (and I would argue that this broadening beyond Being is a broadening beyond existence) achieve? In what sense is a facticity separated from existence/lived experience still facticity? Marion claims that: “a) facticity therefore precedes the theory, but it is no longer a matter of my facticity as Dasein, it is a matter of the absolutely other and antecedent facticity of the claim convoking me by surprise.” This facticity is not that of the world and Others and the interloqué is whatever it is “well before having consciousness or knowledge not only of [its] eventual subjectivity, but especially of what leaves [it] interloqué” (RD 301-302/RG 202). The answers to the questions I raise above

51 Merleau-Ponty makes this claim in *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language* where he discusses the coming to self-consciousness of the child. “In effect, the self and others are entities that the child dissociates only belatedly. He starts out in terms of a total identification with others.” However, this does not suggest the kind of non-intentional relation Marion supports. While “[t]he child is completely orientated toward others and toward things; he confuses himself with them.” Merleau-Ponty’s conclusion is that the child may be “noncontemplative” but is still a “motor..subject, an ‘I can’ (Husserl)” (Consciousness 36-37) The confusion of self and others does not reduce to the equation of self and other for Merleau-Ponty but rather points to a distinction he makes in *Phenomenology of Perception* between two modes of intentionality: operative intentionality and intentionality of act (the only kind of intentionality that Marion acknowledges.) Operative intentionality is similar to Sartre’s non-thetic consciousness, for Merleau-Ponty this remains intentionally orientated or motivated (*Phenomenology* xvii-xviii).
can only be negative ones since we cannot say anything positive about either the claim or the interloqué other than that the two are related through a relation that precedes the subject, the Other and the object (i.e. world). We can only say (with any clarity) what the claim and the interloqué are NOT. There is a circularity to Marion’s theory, the interloqué justifies the claim as much as the claim retrospectively but, first in the order of causality, justifies/institutes the interloqué. We cannot say anything about either of these terms other than that one is prior to the other (the claim is prior to any interloqué) and that only through a reduction to anonymity of both terms is this theory justified. As soon as one admits that one can actually say something about both the interloqué and the claim Marion’s reduction is threatened.

What Gives? Reduction and Givenness can only say “something does” and we can attempt to understand it in the figures of the interloqué and the claim. Being Given attempts a more explicit answer to this question: What Gives is a gift that can only be given insofar as the receiver does not know what is received or from where the gift arrives, in fact, the receiver cannot acknowledge the gift without annulling its givenness altogether. This may sound like it does little to explain the preliminary characterizations of givenness in Reduction and Givenness and Marion seems to acknowledge the ineffability of his initial attempt to render givenness beyond comprehension or Being. In fact, all the figures of phenomenality (i.e. all phenomena) exiled from Reduction and Givenness, the ego, the Other, the world and even God, re-enter the scene in Being Given. However, what does not change is that these figures are founded on an anonymous and amorphous givenness. I now turn to Being Given to see if the relation of the gift to givenness clarifies Marion’s position.

In Being Given the first figure of givenness is that of the “event”. There is little that is contentious in Marion’s description of the event as a historicity that is essentially “open”. I do not think any phenomenologist (or any insightful philosopher, even if not phenomenological) would want to reduce a historical event to the accounts written in history books. I do not think that historians working today would suggest that we have a bird’s eye view of any historical event through the various accounts we can gather or contend that history is “objective” in the sense that these accounts tell us all we need know without our perspective coming into play. So Marion’s claim that the event has a “teleology without end” and is “interobjective” (i.e. it is intersubjectively constituted and always open to re-constitution) does little by way of illustrating why the pure reduction is necessary (ED 319/BG 229). Certainly the constant revising of history texts attests to the “endless hermeneutic in time” of any event. And, while historians and philosophers of

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52 Of course what Marion’s reduction would have to suggest is that while the claim is first in the order of causality, the interloqué that is subjected to subjectivity is first in the order of knowledge. The reduction, despite Marion’s resistance takes us back to the order of causality.

53 Marion acknowledges that his reduction to anonymity was problematic and retracts it (ED 16/BG 10n2).
history do try to find narratives that make sense of events retrospectively, the unpredictability of history would not be a radical leap of thought for most of those working within the field. 54

The second figure of givenness is more problematic. The “idol” is exemplified by painting. “The idol is determined as the first indisputable visible because its splendor stops intentionality for the first time; and this first visible fills it, stops it, and even blocks it, to the point of returning toward itself, after the fashion of an invisible obstacle—or mirror” (ED 320/BG 229). In fact, the idol gives me various perspectives of myself—one wonders if the art object has not been subsumed in the viewer so thoroughly that “it” no longer matters at all. If all it can give me is varying perspectives of myself it offers, itself, a rather “poor phenomena.” As a theory of aesthetics Marion’s “idol” is fairly bankrupt. Like Heidegger’s description of “Van Gogh’s shoes”, what the painting (since this is the quintessential “idol” for Marion) gives us, is whatever “we” are capable of seeing—no borders or boundaries limit this mirroring of ourselves, certainly not any boundaries that the work itself might suggest. In fact, unlike the “event” “that [presupposes] an interobjectivity and an at least teleological communication...the idol provokes an ineluctable solipsism”(ED 321/BG 230).

The third figure of givenness is ‘flesh’ which is initially characterized by Husserl’s relation of “the felt and what feels” and which Marion broadens and collapses into the immanence of what affects and is affected—self-affection/auto-affection (ED 321-322/BG 230). Chapter One has sufficiently dealt with the kind of relation Marion is claiming for auto-affection but Marion must revive it here to assure the supremacy of the feeling self (which first ‘feels’ itself in immediacy) over that of a thinking self that reflects on what she feels. There may be a sense in which the initial emotion is “given” to me in the kind of immediacy that Marion claims and perhaps this immediacy does not entail intentionality, at least not an intentionality of act. However, I do not think that this isolated moment of our experience can act as the ground of subjectivity and it certainly does not tell us much about our experience. More importantly, can such an experience “appear” except retrospectively—intentionally? I am either in the midst of the moment (which perhaps is never just a “moment”) or the moment has passed and I have moved on to thinking about what I ‘felt’. Whether this kind of affection is truly unmoored from the intentional relation will have to be explored in Chapter Four, here I can only make a preliminary response. While other positions, such as that of Sartre, may make a case for the unreflective immediacy of emotions like jealousy or grief, what is left undetermined (what never gets described) is the fact that my jealousy and grief may be interpreted only secondarily but that it is only in my attempt to try and understand what I ‘feel’ that I come to terms with either my jealousy or grief or even love for that matter. I would be a strange kind of creature if I did not try to understand the meaning of my jealousy or grief,

54 Marion suggests that the unpredictability of events is what characterizes history. However, history remains random and meaningless without an attempt at interpretation. What would unpredictability add to historical facts if we did not take them up as narratives that suggested something or the other about the human condition?
if I did not try to reflect on what such experiences tell me about myself, Others and the world (though by no means does that mean that we all do try to uncover the significance of our emotions). There is also the larger issue here of the temporal consistency of our affective lives. For example, do we truly ‘love’ or experience any affection in a moment, a ‘now’ devoid of retentions or protentions or are affective lives “given” within a temporal process that would complicate Marion’s (and perhaps Husserl’s) notion of immediacy? It is also questionable whether Marion is right that this is a non-intentional relation, certainly we could distinguish between an operative intentionality and an intentionality of act. Especially if we take the notion of an operative intentionality to be lived experience tied to historical sedimentation, to facticity (and this is in one sense to take the temporality of any particular experience seriously). My jealousy does not mysteriously arise out of the void but is to a certain extent conditioned by my life experiences.\footnote{Even in Sartre’s insightful analysis of an experience of jealousy as one where I am my jealousy and nothing more leaves out the intentionally directed emotion there I am peeking through the keyhole already I am directed at something else intentionally directed. For Sartre and Marion this is a non-thetic consciousness (i.e. feeling, not thinking or knowing) and they may be right that, at least initially, there is an immediacy of experience that is unthematized (\textit{Being and Nothingness} 348-352). My contention with this view is that as self-conscious beings this is usually supplemented by a reflection on why we feel the way we do and that even in the immediacy of the emotion we are intentionally directed. Even in feelings such as grief or anxiety that are less accessible to the understanding there is already an unthematized directionality to the emotions. I grieve for myself or for others even if I can only discover this retrospectively (since it is quite possible to be grieving for something one does not ‘know’). I am anxious without an apparent ‘object’ and yet what my anxiety suggests is that despite the unapparentness of anything that causes my anxiety there is a kind of displacement or homelessness that drives my anxiety, one has to have been at home in the world in the first place to have such a feeling but, more importantly, one does not feel this way outside of all relation.} To say anything about my jealousy or grief, even to myself, I must be able to ask why I feel as I do, operative intentionality is then usually mediated by an intentionality of act.

The fourth figure of givenness is the icon. The icon is another way to designate the Other. Much like Levinas’ account of the face to face, Marion claims that the face of the Other ‘gives’ me nothing to see’ (ED 324/BG 233). Instead the Other “weighs” on me with an invisibility that is explained as a gathering of the three previous figures of givenness (ED 324/BG 232). Like the “event” the icon “opens a teleology” (the other cannot be objectively constituted). ‘Like the idol, it begs to be seen and reseen, though in the mode of ‘unconditioned endurance.’ The other determines me much like the idol ‘mirrored’ the gaze. And finally, the icon affects me so deeply, with such a proximity, that it is akin to auto-affection (ED 325/BG 233). It is not clear what if anything can differentiate the ‘flesh’ and the ‘icon’/the self and the Other once this proximity is instituted. Either “I” mirror the Other (the self is subsumed in the Other) or the Other is
taken up within the self ("I") in such a way that its invisibility also implies an appropriation of all Otherness into an "I". If Marion claims that the icon is like the idol then it is possible that even in its invisibility it only can be 'felt' as a reflection of myself. I am the measure of the Other. Marion’s reduction thoroughly reduces any sense of difference between oneself and an Other. While the unseeability of the Other was to ensure the irreducibility of the icon it ends up suggesting that between ‘us’ there is no distance (a non-intentional relationality.) Or if one is more generous in reading Marion that what the “I” is is a reflection or mirror image of the Other, a mirror image that can only return my own reflection. Either way Marion’s reduction is problematic. Either there is no difference between us or one or the other of us decides the Other once and for all.

There is a fifth figure of givenness that I will not deal with. I will not deal with the figure of revelation because if it is the case that for some faith is a ‘real’ aspect of their lived experience then it seems valid to claim a phenomenology of faith is at least possible and is certainly a viable figure of study. (Marion’s notion of revelation is complex and may not be motivated strictly by religious concerns.) I also have steered clear of arguments claiming Marion’s position is either an onto-theology or that it revisits negative theology throughout my analysis because if, as Marion claims, his position remains phenomenological then it should be able to justify its method on phenomenological grounds. I also am sympathetic to the attempts of Marion, Levinas, and Paul Ricoeur to integrate their religious commitments into their phenomenological views, as long as they remain within the parameters set out within the epoche and reduction(s). Though this must remain within certain boundaries if it is not to fall prey to what Derrida and Janicau rightly criticize as a “theological” or “religious” bias. I leave Michel Henry out of this list because it is not so clear that he even claims to remain phenomenological, especially as he develops his thought in I Am the Truth: Toward a Philosophy of Christianity (2003). Also I do not think that for my purposes it adds much to the discussion of Marion and Husserl. If Marion and Levinas claim a separation between their religious writings and their philosophical writings then perhaps one should take them at their word(s) and analyze their texts through phenomenological requirements. I have attempted to do so in this work. Having covered the main figures of givenness one can ask does Being Given take us out of the anonymity of Reduction and Givenness?

Marion returns to the anonymity of the call at the end of Being Given, an anonymity that is now associated with an immanent decision (that of the one who responds) and finally, to a radical immanence, which claims a “passivity of an absolutely originary receptivity” (ED 426/BG 310). Marion suggests that there is a hermeneutical circle of sorts in the relation of the call and the respondee. The “immanent decision” to hear the call is a choice but one that is always retrospective since we always find ourselves enmeshed in givenness already, the choice then is not to recognize Marion’s notion of givenness, non-objective, non-intentional, immanent. However, this is not really a choice at all since we have always already responded once we can claim to be an “I”—there is no possibility of not already being affected by givenness. It remains to be seen if Marion’s reduction does move beyond the aporias of Husserlian and Heideggerian reduction neither of which are ‘undone’ by givenness. In fact Marion claims that both
reductions are premised on the conclusions of the “pure reduction.” Once we have uncovered a prior anonymous givenness we can comfortably return to objectivity and to existence now grounded in a “final cause.”

**Part Two: Reducing the Reduced**

In a nutshell *Reduction and Givenness* suggests that the further the ‘reduction’ is pushed the more Being is given (i.e., “Autant d’apparence, autant d’être”/“So much appearance, so much Being”) (RD 303/RG 203). Husserl’s transcendental reduction culminates with the givenness of beings to a special sort of being, the transcendental ego. What Husserlian reduction leaves unaccounted for is the way of Being of the being that asks the question of the meaning of Being (RD 119-162/RG 77-107). On the basis of an unquestioned starting point, the transcendental ego acts as the determining factor for all other beings. This is what Marion terms the “ideal of objectivity” (RD 121-130/RG 79-85). Marion’s opposition to Husserl’s transcendental reduction is not just that this kind of ‘reduction’ is reductionist (i.e. the Other is reduced to the Same in Levinasian terms) but that at the brink of revealing something essential about the given (and for Marion this is the phenomenality of a phenomenon though a phenomenon he will qualify by the term ‘saturated’ in Being Given), Husserl stops at the level of objective being. His reduction(s) only disclose a preliminary level of givenness. Husserl may begin philosophizing within Kant’s Copernican revolution but he, like Descartes and Kant, does not question subjectivity as to its Being. Since Marion takes Heidegger’s critique of the Cartesian cogito to apply equally to Husserl’s transcendental ego it would be a good idea to explore what this critique entails.

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56 One cannot help but hear an echo from Heidegger’s *Being and Time* in this rendition of the problem.

57 This is obviously a Heideggerian formulation of the issue. Marion ties his analysis of phenomenology to Heidegger’s critique of Descartes in *Being and Time*; a critique that he equates with a critique of rationalist positions in general, specifically the positions of Kant and Husserl. It is questionable whether this kind of equation is justified, even in Heidegger’s own estimation. Marion consistently ties Husserlian phenomenology to a Cartesian starting point but while the method of reduction may be traceable to Descartes’ method of doubt (and no doubt to Kant’s “Copernican revolution”), the roots of classical phenomenology also lie in Hume’s brand of empiricism and his ‘moderate skepticism’. Husserl’s position mediates between these two philosophical poles.

58 Marion sees this failure as a failure to follow through on the promise of phenomenology in the *Logical Investigations* to ‘return to the things’. Husserl betrays his own method by privileging objectivity over givenness which would have let beings appear not through the transcendental ego’s constituting power but through a manifestation prior to any constitution, even that of Being.
Marion claims that Husserl does not question the meaning of the Being of the transcendental ego and as such leaves the ego indeterminate. He argues in *Cartesian Questions* that this indeterminacy results in a lack of foundation or ground for phenomenology. “[T]he reproach [by Heidegger] addressed to Descartes [and Husserl, according to Marion,] applies to two omissions, that with respect to the world, and that also with respect to the ego, whose two ways of Being are missed equally, if in different ways” (RD 131/RG 85). If the “first principle” of phenomenology, the transcendental ego, is indeterminate, then this puts into question the validity of all that follows from the Absoluteness of the ego. What does the second of these omissions, the omission of the way of Being of the ego, imply? Descartes (according to Marion/Heidegger) does not think the esse of the sum of the cogito sum. Having assured the certitude of the cogito as the “first principle which renders possible the certain knowledge of other beings”, Descartes fails to think the meaning of this first principle (RD 133/RG 87). While the cogito assures Descartes of an “epistemic determinacy” it fails to provide any ontological determinacy (RD 134/RG 87). Descartes’ failure is not just the reduction of the ego to “intra-worldly being” (i.e. the ego is characterized on the basis of objects/objectivity) but that objects are reduced (and this is the first omission above) to “Vorhandenheit” (RD 135-137/RG 88-90). Presence, “as a perfect subsistence”, “obtained through reduction, abstraction, and method...does not precede the being that is usable and ready-to-hand [Zuhandenheit], but follows from it through impoverishment and elimination” (RD 136/RG 89). The main issue here is that Descartes does not take into account the ontological difference. Since Husserl follows a Cartesian methodology this is also his failure. Descartes’ mathematical bias is repeated in Husserlian phenomenology with the privileging of “certitude” (i.e. self-evidence) and “permanent subsistence” (i.e. intuition as presence) (RD 84-90, 135-140/RG 53-56, 89-92). The argument simplified is that Descartes misses the ontological signification of the ego sum, because once he arrives at the certainty of the cogito through his method of doubt, his enquiry rather than questioning this cogito as to its meaning turns to the possibility of gaining the same type of certitude for ‘objects’. Once this certitude is achieved (i.e. objectivity), which for Descartes is achieved through an elimination of all “qualities” of an object but one, extension, the cogito is characterized in similar terms as the now purified ‘object’. If it is only through an eliminative process that what is certain and subsistent about objects can be reached then it will be through a similar eliminative process that consciousness or Dasein will be characterized. The two omissions redouble each other leading to a lack of questioning of the ontological status and signification of both consciousness and ‘thing’ (i.e. “world”). For Marion this omission of the ontological difference (and this is a prioritizing of epistemology over ontology) leads to classical phenomenology’s inability to move towards a deeper characterization of phenomena. Husserl’s objective bias, at best, gives us “flat phenomena” (RD 90/RG 56).59 Phenomena are tied to an ‘objective’

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59 In *Being Given*, the “flat phenomena” is a “poor phenomena” (ED 309-314/BG 221-225). Marion suggests that Husserl gives us “poor phenomena” since intuition in Husserl’s thought is always subject to intentionality (as ‘aim’ objectivity constituted by an “I” as gaze) and that intuition is reduced to evidence (“abstract
signification, the measure of this objectivity is consciousness itself and as Marion with Heidegger illustrates, this is a consciousness that has not explored the meaning of its own existence, its own being. Without such an existential analysis the legitimacy of both objectivity and subjectivity are put into question: Husserl's theoretical bias precludes any valid epistemic conclusions because they lack ontological grounding. In the final analysis Husserl's epistemology fails since it repeats the aporias of 'metaphysics', it too must be overcome by Heideggerian "destruction".

**Part Three: The Ideal of Boredom**

Marion's interpretation of the Heideggerian critique of the Cartesian cogito is instrumental in his justification of a third reduction, the "pure reduction" (the first two reductions being those of Husserl, phenomenological and transcendental/eidetic, which Marion does not seem to differentiate and the existential reduction of Heidegger) (RD 297/RG 198). Marion returns to an objection he raised in *Cartesian Questions*: if Husserl remains within the limits of an objective intentional analysis he cannot question the meaning of the existence of the cogito other than through an 'objective' analysis. In such an analysis the subject is reduced to a being like any other object in the world. Husserl does not deal with the meaning of the existence of the ego. While Heidegger makes inroads into the given with what Marion calls the "existential reduction", Heidegger also is guilty of not pushing the reduction far enough (RD 8, 121, 244-246/RG 2, 79, 164). It is not enough to claim that what is given is Being, instead what is given is epistemological certainty). In contrast to these deficits in Husserl's thought Marion suggests a "saturated phenomena" (givenness) that, at least once, shows itself in Husserl's thought in the temporal flux which is prior to objectivity and so intentionality. While Marion may be right about the second claim, the temporal flux itself cannot be intentional, this does not undermine the phenomenological project as Husserl envisages it. For Husserl working within phenomenological method will always mean working within an intentional relation even if the discoveries of such a method suggest a non-intentional temporality. Any articulation of this temporal flux will already be intentional. Marion presupposes an access to givenness that is decidedly unphenomenological (ED 305-314/BG 219-225).

It is interesting to note in relation to Marion’s notion of a pure or final reduction, Merleau-Ponty’s claim in the Preface to the *Phenomenology of Perception*: “[t]he most important lesson which the reduction teaches us is the impossibility of a complete reduction” (Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, xiv).

In fact, Marion’s critique of Heideggerian Being seems to suggest that it is too subjective—Dasein determines the meaning of Being or at least brings being into language. While he acknowledges that the shift in Heidegger’s thought from Husserl’s ego to the notion of Dasein is a higher level of reduction—one that reaches the given not just through an “ideal of objectivity”, he will critique Heidegger for remaining too
a call that cannot be reduced to “Being” since it is the condition of the possibility for any Being whatsoever (RD 280-282/RG 186-187). 62 Before any kind of being is disclosed there are the interloque (a “me” that is not an “I”) and a call that calls forth this “me”. This should not be confused with an intentional relation since prior to intentionality is the call or the “given” that acts as a foundation of all Being, all relation. For Marion, this prior givenness is what phenomenology is to disclose since “[t]he objective of phenomenology does not coincide with objectivity” (RD 8/RG 2). But if phenomenology’s objective is not objectivity it is not subjectivity either, taking Husserl’s notion of correlation as a dualism that necessarily privileges one term over another Marion seeks a final and primary term that grounds intentionality. Givenness grounds the intentional relation and just where it should seem that dualism is vanquished once and for all: it turns out that givenness grounds dualism as well by privileging a certain notion of subjectivity (i.e. the auto-affection thesis of Cartesian Questions), which in its turn grounds objectivity (i.e. representation). Rather than eliminate the problems he locates within intentionality, Marion institutes a prior origin that now justifies a duality of subject/object, self/Other and experience/reflection. This duality is somehow better because it reverses the priority of ego and Other (this is an expanded Other that encompasses the subject, other persons, objects, the world and perhaps even God). Before subject or object there is the call or givenness. This first cause cannot be known only felt—intimated. Marion’s path to the claim/call follows a circuitous route from profound boredom to anxiety in Heidegger’s thought (RD 252-282/RG 169-189). 63

It is in the moods of boredom and anxiety that Marion finds the inspiration of a phenomenality unhinged from all actuality, the indeterminacy that was a problem for Husserl’s account of the transcendental ego is now the source of a renewal of wonder and enthusiasm (RD 295/RG 197). Profound boredom brings us to the experience of the totality of beings through the indifference it creates towards all particular beings, while anxiety brings us face to face with the Nothing, the indetermination of all beings. However, Marion claims that the ‘dialectic’ of Being and Nothingness through boredom and anxiety still clings to a view of subjectivity he rejects. 64 Claiming to move beyond ‘subjective’(in Marion’s terms he criticizes Heidegger for privileging Dasein before Being). Marion claims that givenness is beyond Being. Obviously, Levinas plays an instrumental role in the formulation of the ‘pure reduction’.

62 Marion distinguishes his notion of the ‘call’ from the “call of conscience” in Heidegger’s Being and Time. According to Marion, the ‘call’ or ‘claim’ does not refer back to consciousness but is the condition of a coming-to consciousness of Dasein.

63 While this is a close and enlightening reading of Heidegger, I cannot elaborate on the specifics here as it would lead away from the issues at hand.

64 Marion reads Heidegger’s Being and Nothing through a particularly Hegelian lens, I suspend judgment on whether this is an appropriate reading. Marion’s aim is that of expressing his own divergence from Heidegger’s position.
Heidegger’s view of authenticity vs. inauthenticity, which the analysis of both boredom and anxiety were to reveal, Marion suggests that boredom rethought offers an escape from all metaphysics by suggesting an alternative to the subject as the being that hears the call of Being.

Boredom leaves beings in place, without denying them, depreciating them, or suffering their absent assault. It leaves beings in place, without affecting them, above all without being affected by them; it peaceably and serenely abandons beings to themselves, as if nothing were the matter. But that very abandonment defines it: considering the mute interpellation of beings, of the other, even of Being, it removes itself from them with an equally mute constancy; no wonder ever sets it into ecstasy; boredom defuses the explosion of any call, whatever it might be; it covers itself, refuses to expose itself, defuses the conflict by deserting the field. Absent to beings, to the other, even to Being, it is not there for anyone, to the point that in a sense the one who yields to boredom no longer is. He no longer is because he hates what is....One obviously should not understand this hate as a passion or an intention...[but] as a radical uninterest...(RD 286-287/RG 191).

According to Marion, Heidegger’s analysis still remained tied to a metaphysical perspective since it suggested that Being calls Dasein. He argues that before Dasein is reflected through Being, Dasein is first called by an Other than Being. In fact, before this call, Dasein does not and cannot have itself as an “I” in any way, since the condition for the being of Being for Dasein, and this is the instituting of Dasein into Being, is the Other, the call.

As I see it there are two options for interpreting Marion’s texts: One, we accept a causal relation between givenness and the pre-subject that is called, even into her own subjectivity or two, we understand the “indifference” of boredom as suggesting a leveling of givenness, of whatever kind—since asking about different kinds of givenness is illegitimate within the performance of the third reduction (i.e., an ‘act’ of cognition/comprehension). The first option puts into question Marion’s claim to move out of a “metaphysics of presence”, while the second option suggests once again that the respondee (i.e. the interlocutor) through the performance of the reduction paradoxically gives rise to the givenness it is gifted or, at the very least, that there is no difference between what gives and what is received and no question about ‘who’ receives.

While Marion’s terms switch from Reduction and Givenness to Being Given, what remains consistent is the degradation of a productive/creative subjectivity and the break with any notion of objectivity that he claims is necessary to escape from a “metaphysics of presence.” If the auto-affection thesis required a self-enclosed self-relation in Cartesian Questions, what I have referred to as a narcissism, then the free floating “auto-manifestation” of givenness, as the first of the two options of the later works I present above, requires a masochistic attitude towards the self/subject. In hating what is or being ‘uninterested’ what one really suppresses or undermines is one’s own perspective on the
world. Marion’s pure reduction requires that one undergo a spiritual redemption through boredom by realizing that what distinguishes the Da of Dasein is not Being but an exposure to another than Being. One no longer is required to assess one’s own attitudes or responsibilities but rather to accept without question the subjugation of oneself by an Other. In order to break out of the limitations of phenomenology in the thought of Husserl and Heidegger, we must seek redemption through self-annihilation and rebirth through a mysterious and ever indeterminate Other or, we must accept our origins in a homogenous givenness through which we mysteriously arise and give rise to the world and others (RD 296-297/RG 197-198). The pure reduction then reduces the self to nothing in order that it can be rediscovered (with wonder?) in the claim to which it really should respond. And if we accept no difference between the claim and the self then this is not really a call to respond to another but to bask in the glory of immanence without transcendence. In the first option of interpreting Marion the indeterminacy that he describes as a problem for the transcendental ego is now replaced by an uncanny determinacy: before the subject ‘is’ the subject is determined as such by something/someone beyond Being as ‘this’ subject. This reborn subject must respond, though it can only respond through a determination given/gifted to it by an Other. The “saturated phenomenon” that this ‘gift’ is and gives determines the subject once and for all. There is no need for decision here and the meaning of ethics is reduced to subjugation and self-emasculating. The price for getting out of a “metaphysics of presence” with its economies/exchanges and instrumental thinking is to give up all thinking, to let the gift determine our thought by first determining what it is each of us should (must?) ‘feel’. Of course, it could be argued, that just where one economy is destructed, one where the ‘measure’ of Being and the Other is the self (the subject), another is instituted, that of the Other over the self, over Being.

However, if the second option of interpretation is chosen then it seems that the indifference that characterizes the origin of subjectivity suggests a leveling of all regions of being. The auto-affection thesis returns but with a grander mandate, there need be no motivation other than a paradoxical disinterested self-motivation for the subject to give rise to herself and the world. It is unlikely that Marion intended such a conclusion and no doubt the ethical imperatives that guide his work suggest an alternative reading from either of the ones I offer.

In fact, perhaps there is an alternative that does justice to Marion’s position. Ian Leask suggests that Marion offers a view of the subject as not a nominative subject but rather a dative subject: “Givenness seems to require a dative subject to whom the phenomenon shows itself inasmuch as it gives itself” (Leask 187; ED 371-372/BG 269). However, as Leask points out (in relation to Marion’s own critique of Husserl’s “principle of principles”) the priority of this subject (i.e., as an origin with givenness) seems to suggest that givenness still requires the ‘measure of the “I” (transcendental or not) (Leask 189). I think a possible solution and, one which Marion does not follow, may have been to give up the notion of an anterior origin (not origin in Husserl’s sense) for either subjectivity or givenness. Without the requirement of this anteriority of origin Marion’s analysis of the institution of subjectivity into “life” (i.e., the role of the subject as dative) and the role of givenness in this constitution may have opened up a new
Conclusion: What Gives?

Givenness is gifted to us and as Marion suggests in Being Given, who or what gives resembles Levinasian infinity (ED 100-168/BG 69-118). To the question “what gives?” Marion answers “that which cannot be presented or re-presented in any way.” It is difficult to see what the reduction to givenness achieves, despite Marion’s claim that the further we push the reduction the more Being we are given—in fact it is so much Being (too much?) that it is beyond Being. The claim is further complicated by the fact that in order to receive givenness we, any of ‘us’, cannot ‘know’ we have received—if the gift that is given is unknowable so is the receiving of the gift. Underlying this ‘theory’ is the view that before we are thinking beings we are feeling beings and that there is between thinking and feeling a chasm that traditional philosophy (in Marion’s account this includes phenomenology) does not account for. For Marion this chasm suggests a hope that we can somehow elevate ourselves away from any determinations of Being to a higher ‘truth’ and that this will lead to a new vision of ethics. But can an ethics ‘work’ once all singularity, all determinations are so reduced? Perhaps, ethics requires feeling and thinking, especially since the radical separation of our faculties into thought and feeling/emotion can only be achieved through an abstraction from our lived experiences. My values, hopes and dreams do not float around in some nether region separated from all cognition but are implicated in all of my projects. In fact, my projects attain their ‘sense’ from the larger perspective of ‘who’ I am, have been and want to or will be in the future. If Marion is right that before we are thinking beings we are feeling beings, it is only in relation to a state that he can retrogressively return to—he (as phenomenologist) returns to a state before he had thoughts at all. However, if I reflect on my childhood or even on an emotional state in the recent past where I felt something but did not reflect on this feeling at the time, I already impose upon it an interpretation. More radically, I recognize in my feelings all sorts of attitudes/habitualities that I may not recognize while I am angry, loving, anxious, etc. but that are nonetheless there. As soon as I say I am angry (or acknowledge that I feel angry) do I not already presuppose a whole ‘world’ within which I have learned to differentiate anger from joy or sadness? The kind of perspective Marion envisages me returning to, one that is conscious without any hint of self-consciousness, is questionable even in the most mundane of situations. There is an odd paradox in Marion’s work(s) that tends to privilege immanence over transcendence only to then reduce all immanence to a givenness that transcends all thought, all articulation.

An ethics premised on a deep passivity cannot account for our concrete experience; our facticity is in this account always secondary to a pre-experiential

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65 Marion’s discussion of the gift while informed through Derrida’s Given Time and The Gift of Death is equally inspired by Levinasian themes.
Such a view returns to metaphysics just where it claims to leave all traditional metaphysical positions behind. An ethics such as Marion’s, closely follows Levinas’ claim that the meaning of ethics is our substitutability for the Other. Despite his relating of giving to the gift, Marion suggests a relationship of subjugation of oneself to an Other rather than one of ‘grace’ and giving (though this is an alternative he acknowledges but does not work out in Being Given) (ED 244-245, 265-266/BG 173-174, 190). The subject is subjugated to something it cannot know or understand in any way and it must respond without thought or consideration, even without ‘care’. Response in such a view is reduced to a reaction. One does not respond from a sense of responsibility but from a passivity that cannot do otherwise than to react. The narcissism that characterized auto-affection is replaced by a masochism in the transition to hetero-affection. Underlying the parallelism of narcissism/masochism is a view of authentic selfhood—the really real self is the one for whom evil is no longer an issue or even a possibility. What is disturbing about this reduction to the really real is that it suggests that human agency is an ‘accidental’ attribute, one that is always already conditioned by a prior givenness. In such a perspective we do not choose to act ethically, though we may choose to act unethically (perhaps even sadistically), instead ethics is ontology (or, at the very least the foundation upon which to erect ontology), the only ontology that Marion recognizes.

I argue that we can read Husserl as making a more radical claim about the nature of reality as we experience it and understand both intentionality and reduction in light of this radicality. The notion that Husserl reduces Absolute Being to transcendental subjectivity, which is at the heart of Marion’s critique of classical phenomenology, is valid but what this ‘reduction’ means is, at best, misunderstood by Marion and, at worst, is dismissed altogether in favor a metaphysical (i.e. substantalist) account of a prior origin of both subjectivity and objectivity. I argue that the traumatic view of subjectivity, a kind of inversion of the Hobbesian view of human relations as a “war of all against all,” underlies ethical positions such as those of Marion and Levinas. In contrast to such views, Husserl offers a much more optimistic view of subjectivity and

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66 It is interesting to note in relation to this pre-experiential ‘reality’ what Levinas will suggest is the banality of malice or ‘evil’, one can only see sadism as ‘banal’ if one starts from a (metaphysical in the worst sense) view of the real Self as beyond evil. If the self is always already subjugated to an Other then this real self can only act with ill intent by denying ‘what’ it ‘is’.

67 While Marion is fairly careful not to push his own ‘reduction’ this far in Reduction and Givenness, the relation of the ‘gift’ to givenness in Being Given suggests that once we push the reduction below both the subjective and objective regions what remains is Givenness. I suggest that Marion’s own interpretation of the Derridian “metaphysics of presence”, as not just a reduction of beings to subjectivity but of subjectivity itself to objectivity, leads him to support a notion of an ultimate ‘substance’ giving rise to Being this is Givenness before any being (i.e. all Being) is given (to someone) there is Givenness as indeterminate (perhaps as pure possibility).
intersubjectivity. While his own works remain incomplete on the question of an explicit ethics, there are good grounds for reading an ethics of reciprocity in Husserl's works, an ethics that does not endorse either narcissism or masochism. I argue that this implicit ethics acts as a motivating force in the working out of Husserlian phenomenological method. There are sound reasons for maintaining the intentionality thesis and the method of reduction(s) both of which have meta-theoretical implications: first, phenomenological method offers insights into what philosophizing/reflecting entails and second, it offers insight into what our ability to reflect on and articulate our experience suggests about what it is to be a human being. Once Marion's theoretical alter-ego Levinas is explored (Chapter Three), I will turn to a Husserlian response to the charges of both philosophers (Chapters Four and Five) focusing on an alternative reading of subjectivity.
Chapter Three: The War Within: Levinas' Subjected Subject

Introduction

Chapters One and Two illustrate the problems that arise when either auto-affection or hetero-affection are taken too far and how these theses are related to a tendency in post-Heideggerian phenomenology to move beyond aporias with key tenants of classical phenomenology, specifically Husserl's notions of intentionality and reduction. This Chapter clarifies the similarities and differences between the phenomenology of Jean-Luc Marion and the phenomenological ethics of Emmanuel Levinas. I suggest that the movement from auto-affection to hetero-affection in Marion's thought mirrors the movement within Levinasian ethics from the subject of enjoyment to the ethical subject. Part One exposes the affinities and differences in the thought of both philosophers and offers an overview of Levinas' position. Part Two parallels Chapter One's account of auto-affection with the aim of uncovering the problems with Levinas' version of a self-affected subject, the subject of enjoyment. Part Three deals with the transition in Levinas thought from a self-affected subject, a separated subject, to a subject in relation with others, the hetero-affected subject. In concluding, I suggest that the both philosophers remain tied to a dualistic framework and while Levinas' project 'works' better than that of Marion, it still retains aporias similar to those that haunt Marion's work. The conclusion of this Chapter also signals a transition to Section Two of this work, which offers an alternative to the either/or of auto-affection/hetero-affection, an alternative latent in Husserl's phenomenology. Husserl's schizophrenic ego offers a way to mediate between this either/or of auto-affection/hetero-affection, passivity/activity, reason/emotion, self/world, self/other and immanence/transcendence. The danger of positions such as that of Marion and Levinas lies in a tendency to posit subjectivity as essentially narcissistic (Marion) or as essentially masochistic (Levinas). In such perspectives, the history of philosophy is a history of sadism. Ethics in such positions is traumatic, an invasion of the subject by the Other. As Derrida notes in "Violence and Metaphysics" violence is inherent within subjectivity itself and infects the social relation. Section Two offers an alternative to the narcissistic and masochistic renditions.

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68 This may seem too strong of a claim but if Marion and Levinas question the 'knowledge' that this history unfolds, it is because they both relate knowledge to power and 'power' to oppressive systems. While there is some validity to this claim, the danger of equating all claims of knowledge with oppression is that it leads to a relativism that silences all discourse. This is point Jacques Derrida makes in "Violence and Metaphysics." Derrida suggests the attempt to 'think' outside all oppositions (i.e. dualities) perhaps leads to a greater violence than the violence inherent within language itself (since these oppositions are inherent within the 'structure' of language). As philosophers we certainly would want to remain vigilant/critical of all truth claims but the critical attitude itself becomes dogmatic when it is taken too far when it is critique without any limitation (Derrida "Violence" 79-153).
of subjectivity, the notion of inner temporality and the implications of this for intentionality, correlation and synthesis suggests a mediation between what I have been referring to as auto-affection and hetero-affection. In concluding this work, I suggest an alternative to an ethics of trauma, an ethics of empathy firmly rooted in a reversibility at the heart of all experience.

Part One: Marion and Levinas

In Chapters One and Two I have argued that Marion’s position leads to an unacceptable reductionism; either the world and Others are sacrificed to a hegemonic auto-affected subject or the subject disappears into an anonymous givenness. Marion’s ‘method’ illustrates the dangers of discounting the role of intentionality in phenomenology and of pushing the reduction too far. Yet, Marion’s own position is not just formulated against Husserl, Marion understands the notion of auto-affection to be an aspect of Husserl’s thought that is not fully articulated, in this sense he is completing the work of Husserl in *Cartesian Questions*.69 The thesis of hetero-affection that is developed in *Reduction and Givenness* and *Being Given* elaborates the recurrent theme of givenness and a latent ontology at work in Husserl’s thought. As Chapters One and Two have shown, Marion is also attempting to rehabilitate a privileging of reason (i.e. theoretical thought) over sensibility (i.e. the realm of our emotive, practical lives) in classical phenomenology. However, by arguing for a non-intentional notion of subjectivity and an amorphous notion of givenness Marion’s position leads to unresolvable aporias. In fact, while it appears that auto-affection and hetero-affection posit two very different theses, I suggest that they are intrinsically connected and, in fact, the latter, hetero-affection, reduces to its apparent opposite, auto-affection. Marion’s claim that “the reduction is not defined; it is *performed* as an act...” and the further claim that givenness too is an act “no doubt the same as that of the reduction” leads Marion to suggest that both reduction and givenness are “the act of reconducting the ego to the given as given” (ED 41-42/BG 27). If reduction and givenness are both the same sort of act, this is because the auto-affection thesis still acts as a foundational level in Marion’s thought: the ego which is assured epistemological and ethical primacy in *Cartesian Questions* because of its self-affectivity would have to be equivalent to reduction and givenness. ‘What’ or ‘who’ reconducts the ego to the given as given? In Marion’s position it would seem this can only be the role of an auto-affected cogito. In its self affection the cogito comes into contact with givenness and since givenness is nothing more than the reduction in operation, the ego in its *performativity* manifests the given—not as an ‘object’ but as a *modality of itself*. While Marion is careful not to present his position in this manner, it does seem to follow that givenness is not something exterior to a subject but the very performance of the subject.

69 John Brough and Dan Zahavi both suggest that there may be a non-intentional notion of the ego in Husserl’s thought, a ‘marginal’ or ‘implicit’ “self-awareness” (Brough, “Emergence”; Zahavi, “Inner Time”). Marion may be developing this notion of a non-intentional ego in the auto-affection thesis.
as it unfolds itself. While Marion is careful to maintain the ontological difference between a self-affected subject and givenness, his ‘destruction’ of the intentionality thesis with its dominating ‘objectivity’, leads to the absurd equation of subjectivity and givenness (an immanence without transcendence). Much of Marion’s thought is influenced by Levinasian ethics and it may be the case that Levinas’ position is more defendable than that of Marion.

The reduction of all transcendence to a sphere of absolute immanence, which is what Marion’s notions of auto-affection and hetero-affection suggest, does not end in a reduction of transcendence to immanence in Levinas’ work. In two works leading up to Levinas’ *Totality and Infinity, Existence and Existents* and *Time and the Other*, the claustrophobic immanence of subjectivity is disrupted by the transcendence of the Other (i.e. the suffocating present within which the subject is locked is broken up by a irrecuperable temporality that comes to the subject from another). While in these early works, particularly, *Time and the Other*, Levinas focuses the relation to the Other in the future, in *Totality and Infinity* and *Otherwise than Being* this relation concentrates on an immemorial past that institutes the ethical subject. Levinas also endorses a view of subjectivity that supports a thesis of auto-affection, in *Totality and Infinity* the subject of enjoyment exemplifies auto-affection. However, for Levinas this is tied to the transcendence of the elemental (Bernet, “Traumatized” 109). Levinas maintains a paradoxical ethical priority of a hetero-affected subject over that of an auto-affected subject. This Chapter explores whether Levinas’ subject fares better than the subject of Marion. Both philosophers privilege sensibility over reason, passivity over spontaneity. As Simon Critchley notes: “The ethical relation takes place at the level of sensibility, not at the level of consciousness...[this is] a sensible subject, not a conscious subject” (Critchley, “Introduction” 21). This is a paradoxical pre-conscious subject that is subject to before it is even a subject for the world or with others. Subjectivity in such accounts moves from an extreme narcissism to a debilitating masochism. If Marion’s subject is unable in it’s self-esteem and happiness to relate to any other (other than by subsuming all otherness as I suggest in Chapter One) then Levinas’ subject is in its self-emasculation unable to ‘find’ itself under the weight (height?) of the Other. Levinas’ subject can only reflect a responsibility that comes from an Other, a responsibility that it can never satisfy. The meaning of ethics can only be ‘opened’ through a process of self-

70 For an interesting discussion of this transition see Richard Cohen’s “Introduction” to the English edition of *Time and the Other* (1-28).

71 Bernet discusses a paradoxical “sovereignty and submission” of the subject of enjoyment which is “auto-affection and transcendence”. The subject that is self enclosed in the enjoyment of life is, even in its self enclosure, tied to the “elements” that it lives from (i.e. water, air, earth, fire). Part One of the Present Chapter will discuss this paradoxical independent dependency.

72 Levinas will relate this impossible responsibility to the death of the subject, or rather the interval in time that gives death a meaning. See Derrida’s *Gift of Death* for a
emasculating: the ethical subject must realize, without comprehending, her subjugation to the Other. The subject of enjoyment that merrily appropriates the world in her digestive rapture has only a vacuous center from which her enjoyment emanates. It is only in renouncing this ‘animal’ happiness that the subject is able to become an ethical subject and realize her humanity fully. Levinas will describe the subject of enjoyment as “[i]nteriority [that] must be at the same time closed and open.” This paradoxical interiority subsumes otherness within itself by making all it encounters its own (i.e. it is enclosed) but it must be open to exteriority in order to have something to consume, digest or possess. Happiness is equated with a satisfaction with what one lives from and this is akin to the “animal condition” which one only escapes due to the shock that the insecurity or “disquietude” inherent in living brings about (this ‘shock or surprise is also related to the ‘trauma’ of the subject in the face of the Other). “The happiness of enjoyment is stronger than every disquietude, but disquietude can trouble it; here lies the gap between the animal and the human.” There is a hierarchy at work between the subject of enjoyment that lives in “animal complacency” and the ethical subject that rises above her animality. Interestingly enough it is not love or joy that distinguishes the ‘animal’ from the human but suffering, guilt and disquietude. The meaning of Ethics will not be found in our community with Others but by discovering what makes us suffer and what makes us suffer is not the insecurity of living (i.e. the elements returning to the nothingness from whence they came) but the accusation and judgement in the face of the Other (TI 159/TI 149, emphasis mine).

If Levinas’ critique of Heidegger is that Dasien is never hungry, then a possible critique of Levinas’ subject of enjoyment may be that she just is her hunger (always satiated by an “enough, enjoyment) and nothing more (TI 142/TI 134). Levinas’ position creates an unbridgeable gap between the subject of enjoyment and the subject of ethics. What unites a subject lost in her appropriation of the world and others to a subject that is responsible for the Other? War. A war within the subject—a cannibalism of the self. What the subject must destroy is her will which amounts to ‘gnawing’ away at her self-identity.

Levinas states: “I am a passivity threatened not only by nothingness in my being, but a will in my will. The will [is] already betrayal and alienation of itself but postponing this betrayal, on the way to death but a death ever future…”, it is the kind of being that lives between birth and death, an interval in time, a “not yet” (this amounts to a suffocating presence). The ego is a site of conflict but it is because I am a being that has time that I can resolve this conflict by suffering. “In suffering reality acts on the in-itself of the will, which turns despairingly into total submission to the will of the Other.” I escape the cruelty of suffering because “God or the enemy” (i.e. the Other) “permits me to will”. I can postpone the betrayal of myself by myself by a self-alienation that turns me away from an egoist will and allows me to ‘use’ the time I have for the Other. This is the only way to redeem the cruelty of life (i.e. the human condition) (TI 262-264/TI 236-238).

similar analysis and one that seems to be in dialogue with Levinas even when he is not explicitly named.
I argue that either the auto-affected subject must fall to the hetero-affected subject or that Levinas must maintain a paradoxical and, more damaging for Levinas, untenable duality inherent within subjectivity. This is an 'untenable' duality since for Levinas the ethical relation must precede (in every sense of the term) the subject of enjoyment—if this is the case then either the subject of ethics as an authentic self is paradoxically infected with its evil other, the inauthentic subject of enjoyment (the animal self, not yet fully human) and/or ethics as Levinas envisages it is an ascent (i.e. a progression) from enjoyment to the face—a movement from the transcendence of 'objects' or elements to the transascendence of the infinite (i.e. the Other) (*TI* 30-31/*TI* 41). The meaning of ethics in such an account would be discovered at the end of a process that resembles the kind of system building and hierarchical structure Levinas associates with totality or totalitarianism.

My understanding of Levinas’ notion of totality/totalitarianism is twofold. Totality is the kind of philosophical thinking that reduces difference to sameness: in *Totality and Infinity* Husserl’s phenomenology with its objectifying intentionality that reduces the life of consciousness to the correlation of a noesis to a noema (i.e. representation) illustrates this tendency of reductionism. Levinas distinguishes ontology/theory as the process of logos where the knower subsumes the alterity of the known being from metaphysics. He contrasts ontology with metaphysics and a revised theory that lets the known being manifest itself without the knower in any way affecting this manifestation. In Part Three, I argue this is impossible and is perhaps more violent than the ontology Levinas’ criticizes. Totalitarianism, which Levinas relates to the political, is associated with the philosophical tendency to reductionism: all politics reduces singularities (i.e. individuals) to a “numerical multiplicity” (i.e. the reduction of a plurality of individuals to the State.) Levinas ties this reductionism to the tendency in philosophy to generalize, categorize and form concepts. Levinas calls for a radical multiplicity, which would honor the singularities constitutive of a plurality, for Levinas this is the essential and, what may be more dangerous, necessary difference that separates ethics and politics. Ethics is enacted in the face to face not in the polis where commerce (i.e. economy) is already at work. 73 If politics and ethics are necessarily different in kind then we have no hope of an ethical polis (*TI* 32-39, 127-132, 242-249/*TI* 42-48, 122-127, 220-226).

In the first case, Levinas must view ethics, at best, as a temporary state, since the subject in its dual roles would exhibit a constant return to inauthenticity, ethics could only be momentarily interjected into the life of subjectivity. War is the condition to which humankind eternally returns. Ethics and war are joined forever (Caygill 3). In the second case, Levinas must endorse a view of the progress of humankind that seems to be directly opposed to his critique of Western philosophy. The ‘traditional’ view of progress, 73 For an analysis of the separation of ethics and politics in Levinas’ works see Howard Caygill’s *Levinas and the Political*. Caygill offers an interesting account of the relation of Levinas’ ethical views to his political views in relation to the political upheavals and atrocities Levinas lived through in his time.
the march of reason through history, is at the heart of Levinas’ critique of totalitarianism. It is not the march of reason that leads to ‘peace’ or opens the ethical relation (i.e. the face to face) but rather a sensibility prior to all reason and beyond all economy. If one definition of reason or ‘comprehension’ is that it is a capacity for measuring and assessing options—one kind of economizing—then sensibility will not be the kind of faculty or attitude that measures or determines. Sensibility, which plays such a major role in Levinas’ understanding of ethics, is exposure without measure or limit, the very vulnerability and height of humankind. The notion of sensibility is key to my understanding of Levinas’ notion of subjectivity.

Sensibility can be understood as exposure but also as the impact, the feeling that exposure opens in the subject. For the subject of enjoyment this is a love of what life lives from: air, water, the fruits of the earth etc. Levinas contrasts objectifying intentionality with the intentionality of enjoyment. The intentionality of enjoyment reverses the relation of constituted/constituting: that which life lives from is not reduced to the Same (i.e. an ‘object’ of cognition understood within the noesis/noema correlation) rather, the elemental transcends the subject of enjoyment and is actually constitutive of this subject. What the subject lives from is enjoyment not from representations of objects—in fact, representation (and so objectifying intentionality) is only possible on the basis of the subjects initial emersion in the elemental (i.e. ‘enjoyment’/‘happiness’). There is a shift between the kind of sensibility Levinas describes in enjoyment and the kind of sensibility one has in the face to face—a sensibility which gives rise to a very different notion of reason (TI 133-137/TI 127-130).

The connection between the subject of enjoyment and the ethical subject cannot be placed in a hierarchy without threatening the notion of sensibility since there would be no ‘measure’ to differentiate the sensibility inherent in enjoyment from the sensibility that manifests itself in the face, both are equally exposed. If there is indeed a measure and so hierarchy of the sensible then it seems that Levinas has to admit an economy at work within ethics. There is a mysterious and unbridgeable chasm between the ‘need’ that characterizes enjoyment for Levinas, a need he associates with economic egoity, and the Desire that longs for the Other. Without some way to meditate and, indeed relate, ‘need’ and ‘Desire’ how can Levinas promote the necessary ethical exigency he wants to

74 I am influenced by John Drabinski’s Sensibility and Singularity: The Problem of Phenomenology in Levinas. However, Drabinski argues that there is coherence in the notion of sensibility as it moves from the sensibility of enjoyment to that of the ethical subject. For Drabinski it is the transcendence of the elements and the other that unite these notions of sensibility—both aim at a transcendence that essentially reverses the order of constitution—the subject is first and foremost constituted by sensibility. However, Drabinski also argues that Levinas remains close to the spirit of Husserlian phenomenology in his analysis of sensibility and this is a point I discuss further in Chapter Four. I argue that both these claims are overstated, especially since Levinas seems to move outside an intentional analysis with the notion of proximity.
maintain? The meaning of ethics Levinas wants to uncover is dissimulated at the very moment that it is revealed. If the sensibility that reveals the Other’s face is immeasurable then it cannot be related to the sensibility of enjoyment in any way. This suggests that the transcendence of the elements (i.e. the world) is radically different from the transcendence of the face and I would agree that we would not want to equate these. The sensibility at ‘work’ in the ethical relation is one cleansed of all contact with the factual/concrete world in which it is revealed. And, in fact, this purified sensibility gives rise to a purified reason; the totalitarianism that Levinas opposes to infinity is at ‘work’ just where it seems it should no longer operate—within ethics.

While Levinas wants to reformulate theory in a way that moves beyond the equation of instrumental reason and theory, I do not think he is successful. Levinas claims that the face is prior to reason and the condition for reason and this is not a point I would contest, if the point is that reason is intersubjective, then I would agree. However, Levinas creates a dichotomy between reason and sensibility that no amount of revision of theory can reunite. If theory is tied to metaphysical desire for Levinas then we have already moved outside of all knowledge or objectivity since metaphysical desire cannot, by definition, be known, at best we ‘feel’ the impact of desire. The dichotomy of reason as oppressive and sensibility as openness assures that no traditional sense of reason or rationality comes to infect the highest form of sensibility, which Levinas suggests is the desire for the Other. If Levinas still retains the notion of theory, this is ‘theory’ divorced from any kind of ‘knowledge’ it is a theory premised on a reason equated with goodness and truth, “doing good” (TI 32-39/TI 42-48, 201-204). Parts Two and Three of this Chapter unravel how sensibility in the subject of enjoyment is tied to the sensibility of Desire.

Levinas and Marion both formulate their own positions in opposition to various aspects of Husserl’s phenomenology, specifically against his self-purported transcendental idealism. But inherent in the criticisms of both philosophers lies an alternative reading of classical phenomenology. If Husserl’s subject is from its origin schizoid, this may be due to the intentional nature of all experience, even our self-experience. This suggests a relation between intentionality and temporality that will have to be developed in Section Two of this work. There is also implicit in Husserl’s later works an alternative version of intentionality than that of an intentionality of act, one that is closer to Levinas’ own formulation of transitive intentionality in Discovering Existence with Husserl or Merleau-Ponty’s notion of operative intentionality in the Phenomenology of Perception. 75 If our self-relation is schizoid and there are different senses of

75 Transitive intentionality “brings out intentions that are not at all objectifying, and reference points that do not function as objects: walking, pushing, throwing, the solid earth, resistance, the far-off, earth and sky. The subject no longer remains locked in the immobility of the idealist subject, but finds itself drawn into situations that cannot be broken down into situations that cannot be broken down into representations it could make for itself of these situations.” While I agree that ‘transitive intentionality’ is different from an intentionality that uncovers the
intentionality at work in Husserl’s thought then this also suggests an alternative reading of the absoluteness of transcendental subjectivity and the troubling reduction to a “sphere of ownness” in the Cartesian Meditations. As Derrida insightfully suggests in Speech and Phenomena:

Even while repressing difference by assigning it to the exteriority of the signifiers, Husserl could not fail to recognize its work at the origin of sense and presence. Taking auto-affection as the exercise of the voice, auto-affection supposed that a pure difference comes to divide self-presence. In this pure difference is rooted the possibility of everything we think we can exclude from auto-affection: space, the outside, the world, the body, etc. As soon as it is admitted that auto-affection is the condition for self-presence, no pure transcendental reduction is possible. But it was necessary to pass through the transcendental reduction in order to grasp this difference in what is closest to it which cannot mean grasping it in its identity, its purity, or its origin, for it has none. We come closest to it in the movement of difference (82, emphasis mine).

While Derrida’s position can be taken as a decisive critique of Husserl, I suggest it can be read as offering an alternative account of subjectivity and presence. Self-presence in Husserl is indeed contaminated by an otherness not of its own making, so difference or alterity is not only an internal difference within the Ego but a difference interjected within the Ego from an exterior. Husserl can maintain both the unity of a subject, which despite or, perhaps because of its split nature, relates to itself through a self-distanciation and a subject intrinsically bound to otherness. The unity of a schizophrenic subject is similar, though not synonymous with, that which allows a subject to live an affective life within a world of otherness, this is an inherent reversibility built into the intentional relation (the best ‘model’ of this is of course the relation of consciousness and body). And, if I am forming of representations, I think that we are only able to articulate transitive intentionality at the level of representation (‘objective intentionality’). There is a difference in writing a thesis on the kind of intentionality inherent in walking, talking or pushing and actually walking, talking or pushing. The immediacy of the activity at one level can indeed become an object of thought at another level. But, an even greater objection may be that when I am walking, talking or pushing there is more than just these activities at work—I walk on the sidewalk, talk to myself or to an Other, I push something a whole world is presupposed even in the immediacy of these acts—a world already premised on the ability to form representations, to name, label, categorize. My ‘world’ is a fairly stable one to the extent that I am the kind of being that acts and thinks, is affected and affective (E 142-143/E 127). Merleau-Ponty’s “operative intentionality” suggests the same kind of difference between objective and operative intentionality (Merleau-Ponty Phenomenology, xvii-xviii).
right, without intentional reversibility there is no experience, whether of ourselves, the world or Others. Husserl can maintain an apparent paradox between the irreducibility of Others and a necessary reciprocity entailed in the intersubjective relation because the self-relation of the subject, even as absolute Ego of the transcendental reduction, is, as Derrida notes, a movement of differance. The nature of our experience attests to the differing and deferral that Derrida designates “differance”. The transcendental ego cannot be equated with a Cartesian subject that coincides with itself in transparency. Levinas’ claim that the Same is a totalitarian subject that consumes all it comes into contact with and the implicit relation of the Same and Husserl’s absolute ego that runs throughout Totality and Infinity, is misguided. Derrida also suggests in the above passage that while a pure transcendental reduction is impossible, it is only through the reduction that subjectivity is manifested for-itself not in its self identity but in the difference that comprises any identity it can have: this is a difference or, better yet, a differance, without which there could be no subject, world or Other. While Levinas never presents his position as operating within a transcendental reduction, the movement from the subject of enjoyment to the ethical subject suggests that a reduction (perhaps not transcendental in Husserl’s sense) is indeed at work in Totality and Infinity. Like Marion, Levinas criticizes both intentionality and reduction in Husserl’s thought. Intentionality is restructured into “exposure” while the reduction is pushed to its limit—the face of the Other—which presents what Levinas calls a “transcendent intention” in Totality and Infinity (TI 14-15/TI 29). I argue that while there are some interesting insights in Levinas’ formulation of intentionality, contrary to his critique of Husserlian intentionality, these are aspects of intentionality that are not overlooked by Husserl. With Derrida, I would argue that there cannot be a pure transcendental reduction and that this is just what Levinas’ position seems to require—a ‘purified’ transcendental reduction that yields a subjected subject one in which suffering is the ‘real’ meaning of ethics. There is also a sense in which Levinas attempts to return to a purely passive sphere of subjectivity,

76 Husserl’s reduction(s) are essentially reflective/retrospective processes and while Levinas suggests his unfolding of ethics is not a reflective procedure the description of the movement from the subject of enjoyment to the ethical subject requires a retrogressive movement—I suggest this is already reflective. While “[s]eparation is not reflected in thought but produced by it...”, the path to a recognition of this produced separation already presupposes a reduction at ‘work’. Levinas’ process which posits a separated being (the subject of enjoyment) as posterior to an anteriority that precedes it (i.e., the infinity of the Other which is also the possibility for an ethical subject), seems to suggest a reflection at work in Totality and Infinity, otherwise how to ‘return’ to this anteriority? (TI 46-47/TI 54)

77 It is interesting to note that if for Marion reduction and givenness are equivalent processes then in Levinas intentionality, though not “objective intentionality”, and reduction are equivalent. The face of the Other is the first exposure, in both the order of time and causality, that makes possible an exposure to all else.
one which precedes and is the condition of an acting and thinking subject. This ‘return’ to the passive subject can only be accomplished if we accept a certain suspension of history and temporality.

Levinas’ subject of enjoyment is like the noble or lord in the first treatise of Nietzsche’s *The Genealogy of Morality*. The subject of enjoyment is shown to be a brute creature whose power, if we can call it power, comes from a dependency on the elemental a dependency that is mediated by labor. The Same, despite her apparent happiness, is always already infected by the seeds of her own destruction; an essential dependency that she cannot out power or out do. Until insecurity comes to haunt her, this is a creature at home with herself. However, Levinas points out that this “being at home” is always at the mercy of the elements that return to the “nothingness” or “void” from whence they came: the security of the home is never secure for long since the enjoyment of life can as easily become hunger and destitution. Hobbes’s hypothetical state of nature is instituted as the condition of humanity: before ethics (though we should not be fooled into viewing this as a priority in time) we live lives that are “nasty, brutish and short” since even our enjoyment is riddled with the possibility of pain. For Levinas the only escape out of this life of insecurity is through the face to face encounter which breaks us out of the hegemony of the Same and places us squarely within the trauma instituted by the infinity of the Other. We exchange the insecurity of our self-enclosure only to be traumatized by an impossible exigency to which we must respond. Levinas can see no ground between the isolated autarchy of an insecure subject and the traumatic advent of the face to face but why the either/or? Is there perhaps an alternative to this Hobbesian view of subjectivity and intersubjectivity? I suggest there is.

Parts Two and Three offer an exegesis of the notion of subjectivity in Levinas’ work, focusing mainly on the transition from the subject of enjoyment to the subject of ethics in *Totality and Infinity*. I also (briefly) explore the transformation of the split subject of *Totality and Infinity* to the subjected subject of *Otherwise than Being*. I argue that there is a similar structure at work in Levinas’ and Marion’s thought: there is a ‘play’ between subjectivity as auto-affected and/or hetero-affected in both philosophers. Levinas’ position, like Marion’s seeks to rehabilitate classical phenomenology. Husserl’s theoretical bias plays a pivotal role in Levinas’ own formulation of ethics as first philosophy. Levinas argues that there is a different kind of intentionality at work in ethics than either the intentionality of act that predominates Husserl’s phenomenology or the operative intentionality of Merleau-Ponty. I argue that Levinas’ ethics, offers, at best, an untenable view of subjectivity and intersubjectivity. However, it is not just that Levinas’ ethics do not ‘work’, especially considering that Levinas is not concerned with a prescriptive ethics but with the question of uncovering the meaning of ethics, but that Levinas, like Marion, argues for a prior ‘origin’ of the subject in a deep passivity.

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78 “One of the principal theses of this work is that the noesis-noema structure is not the primordial structure of intentionality (which is not equivalent to interpreting intentionality as a logical relation or as a causality)” (*TI* 328/TI 294; Critchley, “Introduction” 21).
Derrida notes the accusation of totality/totalitarianism is aimed at “the subject-object correlation” and all that this correlation, at the root of Western thought and so language, entails. Levinas’ thought attempts to take us outside of or, at the very least, to the fringes of the subject/object correlation (Derrida “Violence”, 85). However, if language itself embodies this structure of correlation than the attempt to move outside of this ‘structure’ could end up leading to a greater violence than the violence Levinas attributes to philosophy and politics. In fact, Derrida’s complex reading of Levinas suggests that just where Levinas seems to undo the subject/object correlation (inside/ outside, interior/exterior etc.) he institutes other dualities in their place, the movement, particularly in Totality and Infinity, repeats (and perhaps heightens) the violence of totality (Derrida “Violence”, 79-118). It is interesting in relation to Derrida’s criticisms to note the transition to a language of subjugation in Otherwise Than Being, rather than retreat from the violence Derrida locates in Levinas’ earlier work, Levinas pushes the consequences of a possibly inherent violence within language to its limits. The meaning of ethics in such an account is reduced to guilt, shame and ineffectuality, since the subject, whatever she does or does not do, is doomed to be unethical. This may seem a strange claim to make but if the face to face encounter requires a response from the subject and this response must be that of being held ‘hostage’ by the Other, subjugated by the Other, responsible even for the violence the Other inflicts on me, then this is not something I can ‘choose’ to accept or to deny, especially as Levinas unfolds the ‘relation’ between self and Other. Ethics precedes ontology, the Other as beyond Being is the condition for both the subject of enjoyment and the subject of ethics. I cannot choose to not respond since even my refusal is a response, and my responsibility increases in the measure it is assumed. “The better I accomplish my duty the fewer rights I have; the more I am just the more guilty I am” (AE 177-178/ OB 112) (TI 273-274/TI 244). This movement mirrors Marion’s relation between the gift and givenness. In fact the impossibility of ethics becomes more pronounced in Otherwise Than Being. This impossibility is related to a distinction Levinas makes between “saying” and the “said.” My understanding of the distinction between the saying and the said is that “saying” manifests the Other without my mediation (i.e. interpretation) while the “said”, which all saying falls into, is the passage of the Other’s speech through the prism of my egoist psyche, where I appropriate and, it would seem, distort the Other’s speech. In this view of the meaning of ethics, saying is always reduced to the said and the process of dissimulating the said is rarely, if ever, successful. However, if hearing is always hearing as...then no one is capable of hearing “saying” not even a “saying” within ourselves. Discourse is silenced.79 Violence is instituted as the condition of humanity, “violence...is

79 John Llewelyn offers a defense of the saying and said in his article “Levinas and Language.” Llewelyn argues that this relation in Levinas’ works calls for a vigilance and a saying “again and again”, in other words there is not a silencing of all discourse as I claim but rather a resistance to determining the Other entailed in the difference between the saying and the said. I would agree that this is what Levinas intends but I would also suggest that the relation of ethical language and the irreducibility of the face (i.e., the sensibility of desire) suggest that all communication breaks down and leads to violence—
a primordial fact” (T1 248/TI 224). Ethics in such an account is the fruitless attempt to move outside of violence and paradoxically violence/war is the condition for ethics. If subjectivity is characterized through self-conflict then ethics, which is the intersubjective relationship for Levinas, will reflect the inner turmoil and conflict of the subject. And, if the war that rages within subjectivity is irresolvable, is essentially the human condition, then the meaning of ethics as the promotion of peace will require a subject that accepts the sovereignty of the Other without question and before justice. The only way to assure victory is if one of the opponents either accepts the sovereignty of the other or is destroyed. Peace requires the renunciation of all thought and reflection; it requires an obedience without measure. Despite Levinas’ claims to the contrary, ethics and reason are diametrically opposed. The tyranny of the Other replaces the tyranny of the Same that the infinity opposed to totalitarianism was to have undone.

**Part Two: Enjoyment and Insecurity**

In *Totality and Infinity* Levinas suggests that the subject is first a subject of enjoyment, a subject determined by consumption. The subject in this view is a being who appropriates things in the world making them her own, Levinas calls this subject the Same. The Same designates a tendency in Western philosophy to characterize subjectivity as a being which subsumes all otherness into hegemonic sameness. Levinas ties this to a bankruptcy of ethics and to the equation of ethics and politics where politics is understood as the play of power (T1 5-6/TI 21-22). Politics as the play of power has as its aim the domination of all otherness. Ethics tied to power acts in a subsidiary role as the justifier of totalitarian politics aimed at oppression and subjugation. Peace in such thinking is reduced to the avoidance of war but of course this is only on the assumption that the ‘natural’ state of humankind is war and that peace is nothing more than a deferral of this state (T1 242-250/TI 220-226). Levinas wants to redeem the meaning of peace through a rethinking of ethics as first philosophy. Peace is tied to responsibility and is given priority over totalitarianism (i.e. politics). War is always a possibility but not the condition of peace, in fact, war presupposes peace, discourse and so ethics (T1 160/TI 119).

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I suggest that perhaps the opposite is also possible—it can also bridge the distance between us.

80 Part Three will develop the dual sense of this victory: the subject in her inner conflict must destroy a part of herself in order to be ethical and this mirrors her subjugation to the Other, the only “sovereign” possible in Levinas’ account. There is an implicit theme of self-sacrifice that runs throughout *Totality and Infinity* and *Otherwise than Being*. It is interesting to note that Levinas will associate suicide and sacrifice: “only a being capable of sacrifice is capable of suicide.” “Suicide appears as a possibility to a being already in relation with the Other, already elevated to life for the Other.” The ethical relation does not prevent my despair it is the condition within which despair arises (T1 159-160/TI 149).
150). And peace, discourse and ethics are not symmetrical relations between ‘persons’ but an essentially asymmetrical relation between unequals arranged in a hierarchy.

Levinas’ first step in reforming ‘peace’ is to show that the subject is first and foremost a subject of enjoyment. The subject enjoys what she lives from, the air she breathes, the water she drinks, the food she eats and of course the earth that supports her: life is good (TI 154-156/TI 144-147). This subject lives at home with herself, she is self-satisfied and self-sufficient. However, life also causes insecurity, the very elements that sustain us can withdraw into “nothingness” leaving us destitute and hungry. Levinas explains “labor” as the ability to ‘secure’ enjoyment.

The nothingness of the future, we shall see, turns into an interval of time in which possession and labor are inserted. The passage from instantaneous enjoyment to the fabrication of things refers to habitation, to economy, which presuppose the welcoming of the Other. (TI 156/TI 146)

So while we are subject to nature (i.e. elements), through our labor we can assure ourselves a measure of security. Labor is also the first step toward ‘society’ since it entails possession which gives rise to ‘economy’. And, without possession and economy, the trappings of society, the subject could not move beyond her enjoyment to the height of the Other. In one sense the “dwelling” or the “home” already require possession, already presuppose an economy at work. Levinas is clear that the home that founds possession is not a possession in the same sense as the movable goods it can collect and keep. It is possessed because it is already and is henceforth hospitable to the proprietor.” But of course it still is a possession even if it presents itself through hospitality rather than use like movable goods do. The movement from the home to possession and labor should not be viewed as a causal relation—dwelling is already a movement to a form of life that operates within economy (TI 168-169/TI 157). This exposition of the subject of enjoyment should not be understood as if it unfolded in a linear or historical time (i.e. the subject of enjoyment precedes the subject of ethics), rather the movement is one of coming to self-consciousness. This coming to self-consciousness is an internalized affair. The movement to ethics is then a way for a self-interested subject, an interiorized and separated being, to move towards goodness and altruism. However, Levinas also indicates that from the moment of birth we are already steeped in altruism. Since the home already “refers us to...the inhabitant that inhabits it before every inhabitant, the welcoming one par excellence, welcome in itself—the feminine being” (TI 169, 164-167/TI 157, 154-56). Becoming self-consciousness is also a process of separation, within

81 The psyche of enjoyment “maintains itself all by itself.” Levinas ties this self-sufficiency to an ‘atheism’ and correlates this atheism with need. Atheism is also the enactment of a free will—the being that wills a suspension of belief in what is prior to it and its “cause”, the Other. The transition to the Other (the face) is a transition to Desire which is the basis of Truth and Reason (TI 47/TI 54).
enjoyment we are each enclosed within our own satisfaction.

In the happiness of enjoyment is enacted the individuation, the auto-personification, the substantialization, and the independence of the self, a forgetting of the infinite depths of the past and the instinct that resumes them. Enjoyment is the very production of a being that is born, that breaks the tranquil eternity of its seminal or uterine existence to enclose itself in a person, who in living from the world lives at home with itself (TI 157/TI 147).

The notion of separation is crucial for Levinas, without it the distance he wants to maintain between the Same and the Other would collapse. The Other cannot be irreducible if the self is not enclosed, solitary, separated. There is an ethical exigency that drives the necessity of this separation: ethics is only possible beginning with the “I”. Responsibility is not ‘shared’ or reciprocal for Levinas, it is the affair of an “I”, an “I” that no one can assist or accept responsibility for. This is a responsibility to go beyond “objective law” to seek justice beyond “the straight line of justice”, to be “I” is to abide the “call to infinite responsibility” (TI 274-275 /TI 245). It would seem the passage to the Other requires not just a transcending of oneself (I forgo my satisfaction/need) but also a transcending of any objective or universal notions of truth and justice through a Desire that leads to Truth and Justice paradoxically beyond and of this world. The Other acts to found the Same, retrospectively in the order of time, but first in the order of causality (i.e. birth, maternity and fecundity already attest to the sense in which we are all created). Levinas relates this passage from the Same to the Other to the movement in Descartes’ Meditations from the cogito to God. In the Meditations, the indubitability of the cogito (“Second Meditation”) precedes the causal condition of this indubitability—the idea of infinity and perfection—God (“Third Meditation”) (TI 39-41/TI 49-50).

The basis of this lone responsibility is in the sensibility that lies at the heart of an isolated subject. There is also a reformulation of epistemology at work here—truth and justice are not objectively rendered (however, this does not mean they are subjective.) Reason cleansed of any problematic residues of adequation, apodicty or evidence, discloses a realm of Truth and Justice beyond all discourse on Being (TI 90-92/TI 90-91). Levinas, like Plato before him, is claiming that the real Truth, real Justice is not something we can articulate. However, reason purified of its instrumental excesses can give us an idea of an infinite Truth and Justice. This idea of infinity shows itself, though not visibly in the face and can be heard in discourse with the Other (TI 54-58/TI 60-64). Just as Marion assures an ethical and epistemological primacy for the Cartesian self-affected subject in Cartesian Questions, Levinas assures the paradoxically hetero-

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82 Levinas makes this point throughout Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, beyond being and essence, the meaning of ethics is revealed.

83 Plato, “Seventh Letter”.
affected/self-affectuated ego the same kind of primacy. The notion of a paradoxical hetero-affected and self-affectuated subject is mine. Unlike Marion, Levinas recognizes that even in its most isolated moments subjectivity is already affected by otherness. I argue this paradoxical relation is also apparent in Husserl’s schizoid ego. However, Levinas maintains an unfeasible asymmetry between the transcendence of the elements and the subject of enjoyment and the ethical subject and the transcendence of the Other. Without some sort of reciprocity between these terms the immanence of the affected being is lost as well as the transcendence of the Other—there is nothing that could relate two completely incommensurable, uncomparable terms to each other.

However, Levinas’ position effects a reduction that claims that the foundation of ethics and epistemology is in not in the ego as a content but as an idea that overflows the ego—Infinity. The basis of all objectivity is found not in the kind of certitude that assures eternal ‘knowledge’ (i.e. a reduction to a static world) but in the ethical exigency that founds ‘real knowledge’ as justification before “certitude” (TI 90/TI 90). Before we are the type of creatures that represent and appropriate, we are first and foremost creatures that are called upon to justify themselves, epistemology is only possible on the basis of ethics.

Justice would not be possible without the singularity, the unicity of subjectivity. In this justice subjectivity does not figure as a formal reason, but as individuality; formal reason is incarnate in a being only in the measure that it loses its election and is equivalent to all the others. Formal reason is incarnate only in a being that does not have the strength to suppose that, under the visible that is history, there is the invisible that is judgement (TI 275-276/TI 246).

The idea of infinity is the ‘ground’ of representational thought, as its motivation, if not as its end or goal. The call to justify ourselves requires a separated, lone subject that is as irreducible as the Other that calls it to justice (i.e. none of us can be one of many—an instance of the universal, each of us is singular, an ipseity).

The I is not unique like the Eiffel Tower or the Mona Lisa. The unicity of the I does not merely consist in being found in one sample only, but in existing without having a genus, without being an individuation of a concept. The ipseity of the I consists in remaining outside the distinction between the individual and the general (TI/TI 118).

84 This is of course one way to say that there is a teleology inherent to all epistemological projects and Levinas suggests this teleology is (perhaps indirectly) directed by the idea of Infinity.
Separation is not the process of a being becoming rational but is the condition of a subject immersed in enjoyment. My satisfaction is not something I can share, I am so immersed in my happiness or enjoyment, in the immanence of interiority, that no other can come to break the spell. This makes sense since the joy with which I, for example, devour a mango, the varied sensations, texture, taste, smell, the pleasures that course through me, are not something I can share with another, even the one who sits beside me enraptured with his own satisfaction. What is interesting about Levinas' account is that separation is not attributed to a rational sphere of life but to the affective sphere. My separation is affected the moment I am born, not as I become more and more of a thinking rational creature.

Yet, there is a possible objection to this view, one inspired by my observations of my five month old nephew, Arjun. Arjun is in many ways the epitome of enjoyment, there does not appear to be a lot of thought to his appropriation of the world (though he does have the capacity to 'learn' and arguably this already implies the beginnings of thought). Everything he comes into contact with is something to touch, to chew on, to suck, to pull, the world is at his disposal, even those of us enamored by him and at his beck and call. Yet, I recently observed an interesting transition to a level of appropriation that seems to entail more than Levinas seems to suggest in the relationship of the subject to the elements. Already a discrimination that Levinas' notion of sensibility does not deal with is seeping into little Arjun's enjoyment. He has just recently started eating solids and the look on his face as he is introduced to new foods is far from one of enjoyment, instead you can almost see an attempt to understand this 'new' texture and flavor, his look of confusion and consternation is palpable. He applies the same kind of concentration to new surroundings or new 'toys'. In Levinas' perspective the attempt to understand is distinct from the sensibility of our initial exposure to things or the world. But isn't it possible that there is a more intimate relationship between sensibility and comprehension than Levinas allows? While Levinas captures the elusive immediacy of our contact with the world (and this immediacy is evident in our contact with Others as well), does this reduction to a sphere of sensibility abstract from our lived experience where comprehension is woven into our sensibility in a way that is inseparable (other than through an act of philosophical abstraction)? Before Arjun even has a verbal language with which to express the world, he already seems to comprehend it through sensibility. If 'reason' or the comprehension that Levinas wants to associate with totalitarianism already infuses sensibility then the reduction to the sphere of sensibility offers at best an abstraction of lived experience. It offers insight into a sphere of passivity but without an account of our activity, our taking up of enjoyment, it offers a one-sided account of experience. What is more troubling is that Levinas, like Marion, is seeking an origin of the meaning of experience, of ethics, through this one-sided abstraction.

Still the analysis of 'enjoyment' does suggest a positivity: life is good for the lone subject. But doesn't need come to break up this enjoyment? The subject of enjoyment operates at a base (animal?) level of needs and Levinas is clear that his notion of need is vehemently, un-Platonic (TI 117-118/TI 114). Need is not without measure as it is in Plato's philosophy, at the limit of need is satisfaction—happiness. But is this right? Is satisfaction really the limit of need? While thinking of these questions and the account of separation they entail, a memory from my childhood involving a jar of olives came back...
to me. I must have been nine or ten when I discovered a taste for olives, we never had olives at home but I had the opportunity to try some at a friend’s house. There are five siblings in my family and we did not have much money in the first years in Canada. Perhaps because of this, sharing was the first virtue we were taught, though arguably a virtue of necessity. In fact, when I think back, I rarely remember ‘enjoying’ a chocolate bar or a package of chips or a cola without either all or some of my siblings sharing the experience (and sharing the experience meant sharing the chocolate bar, chips or bottle of cola). My world was a shared world until my fateful obsession with olives came to mar this communal world. Olives were my fall from grace but also what instigated my recognition of the meaning of sharing. One could say that I was immersed in sharing before I was capable of achieving the distance to analyze the meaning of sharing. I secretly scrounged pennies, nickels, quarters, ran errands, looked for pop bottles to return, until the fateful day I had saved enough for a jar of olives (I still remember the price $2.59, a small fortune back then). I guiltily hid in the backyard under a bush and one by one ate the whole jar of olives and, still not satiated or perhaps so ashamed that I decided to bathe in my excess, I drank the juice from the jar as well. I remember looking around furtively, every sound making me jump, my stomach and bowels twisting in agitation: needless to say the experience was far from enjoyable. And, it only got worse, I have never been as sick as I was that day. But if the olive eating experience was already unpleasant, the situation became unbearable when my siblings, the ones I did not want to share with, had to look after me and did so with kindness.

So what does this story of debauchery and selfishness have to do with Levinas’ subject of enjoyment? And, more damaging for my account of Levinas so far, is Levinas not making just this point, it is when the Other puts my enjoyment into question that the meaning of ethics as an infinite responsibility is first uncovered? In response to the more serious objection of my account: that in fact my story illustrates what it is that ethics should reveal according to Levinas—the Other putting me into question—I would agree with Levinas fully, if Levinas did not add that this is an asymmetrical questioning (TI 33/TI 43). I suggest the meaning of ethics is to be found in the mutual questioning that puts all subjects into question. And, not just in a mutual questioning, but also in the self-questioning that is only possible from the perspective of a being that is separate from all others, while also being intrinsically bound to these others. If the Other were truly the infinite One who always escapes my grasp, my comprehension, I could not be responsible in any sense of the term—I could not see in the face of the stranger someone with whom I could talk, someone I could listen to. Instead, as in the fable of the tower of Babel, communication would be impossible, not because we have ears to hear but do not listen but because without any common ground there would be just noise and not discourse. One of course does not have to hear to communicate but then one does need to ‘see’ or, to touch at the very least. What would it mean to see (or hear) the destitution of the face of the Other if this destitution were as Levinas insists ‘uncomprehensible’? This leads to another objection to Levinas’ notion of the infinity and irreducibility of the face: does the Other have a body? It seems to me that if in fact I ‘see’ the destitution or hunger of the other it is because I too am a body, a body that can feel hunger and destitution, despair and sadness. Levinas cannot admit this empathy at the heart of our experience of
Others since this would require more than the passivity of sensibility in which he locates our relation to Others—it would require a reciprocity. The face as Levinas characterizes it is without spatial exteriority as Derrida points out. Derrida states:

[T]o neutralize space within the description of the other—is this not to neutralize the essential finitude of a face (glance-speech) which is a body, and not, as Levinas continually insists, the corporeal metaphor of etherealized thought? Body: that is, also exteriority, locality in the fully spatial, literally spatial, meaning of the word; a zero point, the origin of space, certainly, but an origin which has no meaning before the of, an origin inseparable from genitivity and from the space that it engenders and orients: an inscribed origin. The inscription is the written origin: traced and henceforth inscribed in a system, in a figure which it no longer governs. Without which there no longer would be a body proper to oneself. If the face of the other was not also, irreducibly, spatial exteriority, we would still have to distinguish between soul and body, thought and speech; or better, between a true nonspatial face, and its mask or metaphor, its spatial figure. The entire Metaphysics of the Face would collapse (Derrida, “Violence” 115).

It is because I am myself a body that can be hungry, destitute or sick from eating too many olives that I can recognize these conditions in the face of the Other. However, Levinas may be right that even this kind of ‘recognition’ presupposes an intersubjective realm in which I learn vulnerability (of course this is not the way he would articulate the relation with the Other). I am not suggesting that our relations to Others are premised purely on our self-relation but that we are always contaminated by an Otherness not reducible to ourselves. And, while the Other is irreducible (as am I), we are not incommensurable.

I now turn to two further consequences for the subject of enjoyment implicit in my story by presenting two problems with this happy subject. First, Levinas describes enjoyment as an event that separates us from others but there is no account of the very tangible ways in which our enjoyment is enhanced, even premised on the others with whom we share the elements. The food I eat, the air I breathe, the water I drink are enjoyable all the more if I share these with others but Levinas’ account does not discuss this level of enjoyment at all. Since he will reject all reciprocity he cannot talk about a shared level of sensibility. The welcoming of the stranger, the hospitality of the home

85 Though he does come close to suggesting that while sensibility is a singular affair what sensibility is (i.e. the feelings themselves) are common to us all. It is in a description of erotic love that Levinas suggests a universality of feeling similar to that of Max Scheler. I briefly discuss erotic love at the end of Part Two.
instituted by the “feminine”, all of these experiences are ‘beyond’ the movement of enjoyment—these experiences point not to the things here below but to the height of infinity and this is not related to the carnality of enjoyment. I can give the bread from my mouth to the Other, eat it myself or worse, take bread from the Other’s mouth but without reciprocity I cannot share what I have. Levinas will talk about hospitality but this has little to do with disclosing the intersubjective world in which I learn enjoyment—a world that is from the first a shared world. Levinas’ account of erotic love does come close to a notion of reciprocity but even there we are maintained as separate beings and reciprocity is tied to violence.

There is a sense in which the subject of enjoyment, like Marion’s self-affected cogito, is trapped in a self-immanence without exteriority. While the transcendence of the elements are meant to mediate this self-affection it does not break the subject out her self-enclosure. In fact the elements as the medium in which the subject of enjoyment is steeped are not like objects represented, instead they overflow meaning (Levinas calls this overflowing of meaning “alimentation”) (TI 133-137/TI 127-130). This overflowing of meaning does not seem to suggest a radical alterity of the elements but an overflowing of the very life of subjectivity in its affective appropriation of the world. The notion of ‘separation’ so crucial to Levinas’ ethics is premised not on the radical separation of each of our ‘thoughts’ (i.e., this is not for Levinas the problem of other minds) but rather a radical separation of the sensibility of each of us. What makes us each ‘unique’ is not what we think, but ‘how’ we each experience the world and these are two radically different modes of existence. (Levinas associates ‘thinking’ and representation and then differentiates this from a ‘thinking’ purified of representation—affectivity). However, this is not tied to our unique grasp on the world (our grasp on the world as incarnated) but on a sensibility distanced from the sheer materiality of our existences. We cannot ‘share’ this experience of enjoyment. While I agree that there is no doubt a radical alterity entailed in how we each experience the world, ourselves and others, I wonder if this precludes all similarity as Levinas seems to want to suggest? One wonders if this radical separation is the human condition as Levinas implicitly suggests or if it is not a possibility, though by no means the only one, of the human condition.

Had I shared those olives I would not have been as sick as I was and I am convinced to this day that it was not just the excessive olives and olive juice that made me sick but the guilt and shame of not sharing. My point is not merely to reiterate a Sartrean notion of shame—the gaze of the Other, even the possibility of this gaze is what makes me self-conscious but to suggest that before shame or guilt become modalities of my being, the world is already a world in which reciprocity (i.e. sharing) is operative. Is this not what the notion of intersubjectivity already implies? The world can be hostile, I can be selfish but only because my world is first a communal world. Even at only nine or ten, something more than sensibility was at work within me, I was already a being that

86 This is not to imply that “sharing” plays the same role in my analysis as Levinas notion of the face to face plays (i.e. as ‘origin’ of all relations). I am only suggesting that we are all born into a world of others and that our initial institution into life is (usually) already with Others.
judged and reasoned and on the basis of this was capable of feeling shame and guilt. My enjoyment was already influenced by reasoning, though at a rather primitive level. Levinas’ notion of separation requires that a distance between my sensible enjoyment of life and yours be maintained but, it also is the case that when this distance is breached by reciprocity, my enjoyment is heightened along with yours. And, if reciprocity is not just giving you all I have but sharing what I have, then Levinas cannot accept any form of reciprocity.

Second, Levinas’ account also assumes a correlation of need and satisfaction. Plato’s notion that need has no limits (i.e. it only admits of more or less not of enough or perhaps that enough is itself a concept that is relative) may make more sense. The problem with need is that the level I am satisfied at can always increase—the more I have the more I can want—the need that nourishes can also become the lust and greed for more and more. Plato may be right since too many olives and enjoyment soon turns to its opposite, pain and shame. The subject of enjoyment seems to require some built in limit of satisfaction in Levinas’ position but this seems contrary to common sense. The subject that can be hungry, because the elements have returned to the nothingness from whence they came, can labor to secure her future. The message is life is good. We need not worry that even our labor will not assure security or that our greed will get the best of us, at least not until we reach a higher level of sensibility, the face to face. Further, this account of the subject of enjoyment does not take into account the fact that need perhaps is not the kind of sensibility that can be satisfied. Levinas reserves ‘unattainability’ for Desire which longs for that which it can never own or possess—the Other. I would argue that if there is a desire for an ethical exigency, it seems that it should be at the level of need and not merely in a Desire purified by an unattainable infinite. I suggest that the meaning of ethics will not only be found in a renunciation of all needs, in a sphere of infinite obligation, but in the recognition that my needs are tied to those of Others. Self-interest in Levinas is only violence. But is it not also the case that my affections for others already entails to some extent a notion of self-interest as well? And perhaps there is a sense in which my relations with those closest to me conditions my relation with what Levinas will name the Other. For Levinas the only possibility of a way out of violence is not to remove all interest (yours and mine) (which to some extent he associates with the equalizing of politics) but to subordinate my interests to yours. This hierarchy of the Same and the Other is similar to the call and givenness in Marion’s texts. For Levinas the ‘call’ of the Other is a command beyond discourse, which still operates within power structures (Waldenfels, 70). However, one could ask why the recourse to the notion of a call that seems to escape all language? The answer seems to suggest an inherent distrust that language is tied to power structures and will always reduce the other’s saying into the said. In such a view communication is itself the ground of violence—an odd conclusion.

This seems just as violent as a self-interest blind to the interests of others and it suggests that my happiness is only attained at the expense of others. However, my interests can only be separated from those around me through a process of abstraction and abstraction is only possible in the kind of reasoning or theorizing Levinas wants to reject. Levinas’ position is infected by the very disease he locates throughout the history
of philosophy—instrumental reason.

**Part Three: Desire and The Other**

If need is the force that drives the subject of enjoyment, then Desire as a longing that cannot be fulfilled, is what allows the subject immersed in her own happiness to transcend her security and isolation.\(^{87}\) Desire is always for the Other, for Truth and Justice \((TI 23, 56/TI 34, 62)\). “The Other does not affect us as what must be surmounted, enveloped, dominated, but as other, independent of us: behind every relation we could sustain with him, *an absolute upsurge*” \((TI 89/TI 89)\). This “absolute upsurge” announces the irreducibility of the Other, I encounter a face not within a representational mode of thought where the knower (i.e. cognition) affects or alters the known nor in the kind of intentionality that Levinas describes as the intentionality of enjoyment but in a mode of letting be that allows the face to manifest itself as Other. The face is not reducible to the image of the person in front of me and Levinas is clear that there is a perceptual bias running throughout Western philosophy that misses the way in which an Other is manifested.

In effect, the being who speaks to me and to whom I respond or whom I interrogate does not offer himself to me, does not give himself so that I could assume this manifestation, measure it to my own interiority, and receive it as come from myself. Vision operates in this manner, totally impossible in discourse. For vision is essentially an adequation of exteriority with interiority: in it exteriority is reabsorbed in the contemplative soul and, as an *adequate idea*, revealed to be a priori, the result of a *Sinngebung* \((TI 328/TI 295)\).

The Other does not appear as a phenomenon but as a call or command. It is in the discourse I have with another that the face to face takes place and ‘opens’ me to the height of the Other. This hierarchy of the Same and the Other is similar to the call and givenness in Marion’s texts and as Waldenfels notes in “Levinas and the Face of the Other”, the call is a command that is in some sense beyond communication or discourse, which can still operate within a power structure. Waldenfels:

[Levinas’s] sentences are not normal imperatives, uttered by and addressed to somebody, as if the face were the partner of a dialogue or the opponent in a dispute. The resistance which ‘gleans’ in the face of the other’ \((TI 199)\) is not directed to our seeing, knowing or doing, it does not affect our *vouloir dire* or *savoir faire*, but our *vouloir tuer* \((TI 199)\). It changes our power

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\(^{87}\) As Part Two has illustrated this is paradoxically also the possibility (reality?) of insecurity.
(pouvoir) to kill into a sort of powerlessness (impuissance).
‘The expression the face introduces into the world does not defy the feebleness of my powers, but my ability for power [mon pouvoir de pouvoir]’ (TI 198). This peculiar resistance is not based on what the other says and on the reasons the other gives [my emphasis], it coincides with the very fact that the other addresses me….(70).

In fact, Levinas goes much further, through some questionable uses of the notion of heredity, both biological (i.e. fecundity/maternity/paternity/fraternity) and causal (i.e. God), Levinas claims that the subject is a creature—a created being. And, as such, owes a debt that can never be repaid except through an absolute submission—obedience. While Levinas never refers to this indebtedness of the “creature” as operating within an economy, his description of the relation between the Same and the Other describes a primitive (perhaps primordial?) economy at work. Since the subject of enjoyment ‘owes’ her life, her happiness to an Other, she ‘owes’ an immeasurable debt—a debt that even her death cannot repay. In the interval between birth and death such a subject is responsible for the Other, “[a] subject is a hostage”, even substituting herself for the Other by taking the Other’s burden of responsibility (AE 178-188/OB 112-118). I do not choose this responsibility, I am elected (possibly) by the Good (AE 116, 15/OB 183,

88 “[T]he Other, in his signification prior to my initiative, resembles God. The signification precedes my Sinngebung initiative. For the idea of totality, in which ontological philosophy veritably reunites—or comprehends—the multiple, must be substituted the idea of a separation resistant to synthesis. To affirm origin from nothing by creation is to contest the prior community of all things within eternity, from which philosophical thought, guided by ontology, makes things arise as from a common matrix. The absolute gap of separation which transcendence implies could not be better expressed than by the term creation, in which kinship of beings among themselves is affirmed, but at the same time their radical heterogeneity also, their reciprocal exteriority coming from nothingness. One may speak of creation to characterize entities situated in the transcendence that does not close over into a totality. In the face to face the I has neither the privileged position of the subject nor the position of the thing defined by its place in the system; it is apology, discourse pro domo, but discourse of justification before the Other” (TI 326-327/TI 293)

89 “The inability to decline indicates the anachronism of a debt preceding the loan, of an expenditure overflowing one’s resources, as in effort. It would be an exigency with regard to oneself where what is possible is not measured by a reflection on oneself, as in the for-itself” (AE 178/OB 112).

90 In Totality and Infinity, Levinas claims my death is not my own but for the Other, while in Otherwise than Being he suggests “a sacrifice without reserve” (TI 260/ TI 234) (AE 31-32/OB 15).
While the path from need to Desire is presented as an ascent to Truth and Justice in *Totality and Infinity* (a path opened by the face), in *Otherwise than Being*, the Other is discovered at the heart of subjectivity as proximity. Proximity does not signal a nearness in physical space or an approximation in thought but what Levinas calls “a restlessness, a null site, outside of the place of rest” (AE 131/0B 82). Proximity refers to a socialized time and place so “approach, neighborhood [and] contact” better describe it (AE 129/0B 81). While the separation between the same and the Other was absolute in *Totality and Infinity*, in the transition to proximity the Other is inscribed within the same (as a “trace” of alterity within the subject). This should not be taken as an intentionality of another order (i.e. not objective, transitive or an intentionality of enjoyment), since this is a ‘non-intentional’ relation. “Proximity as a suppression of distance suppresses the distance of consciousness of...” (AE 142/0B 89). The subject is obsessed with the Other and this is not a fusion of the subject and the Other but a command (i.e. a responsibility imposed upon me before I am even self-conscious). The subject is “one-for-the-other” (AE 137/0B 86). Levinas describes this relation as a pre-conscious experience (my term not Levinas’) because he wants to signal a distinction between cognition and a “kinship [fraternity] outside of all biology” (AE 138/0B 87). Even before the economic order (i.e. politics and philosophy) comes to rend the subject into two—to make the subject self-conscious—the Other has already infected me through Desire. If the duality of the subject of enjoyment and the ethical subject created a war within the ego this was because before there was any subject there was a “null site” that already left a trace of something completely foreign, the stranger, the neighbor, the Other (not known but never anonymous). The transition from the position in *Totality and Infinity* to the position of *Otherwise than Being* moves from an auto-personification (i.e. an auto-affection) betrayed through an inherent conflict within the Same to the origin of this warring subject as escape from itself in the face of the Other. My origin first appears as obsession, proximity, responsibility and eventually my substitution for the Other. ‘Before’ this origin there is nothing. Levinas relates this coming from nothingness to his notion of creation.

In creation, what is called to being [a self or subject] answers to a call that could not have reached it since, brought out of nothingness, it obeyed before hearing the order. Thus in the concept of creation *ex nihilo*, if it is not a pure nonsense, there is the concept of a passivity that does not revert into an assumption (AE 180/0B 113).

The meaning of ethics is otherwise than Being and beyond essence. It is only when a strange reduction—a reduction of all reductions is accomplished that this *meaning* is revealed. In fact, Being and essence can only arise if the foundation of both is inscribed (in an immemorial past that cannot be recuperated) *within* the subject, before it ever *is a

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91 “Election” has affinities with the notion of “unsurpassable apology” in *Totality and Infinity* (TI 57/TI 63).
subject, by an Other.

The ego is not just a being endowed with certain qualities called moral which it would bear as a substance bears attributes, or which it would take on as accidents in its becoming. Its exceptional uniqueness in the passivity or the passion of the self is the incessant event of subjection to everything, of substitution. It is a being divesting itself, emptying itself of its being, turning itself inside out, and if it can be put thus, the fact of “otherwise than being” (AE 184-185/OB 117).

This is a transcending of its being. The origin here is described as an “anarchic passivity”, a passivity that precedes the empirical order and so the empirical ego. This passivity “more passive than all passivity” opens humanity, the subject, to “its subjection to everything, its susceptibility, its vulnerability, that is, its sensibility” (AE 30/OB 14). While all this sounds rather mystical, the point is that subjectivity is intersubjectively constituted and that an ethical exigency precedes both being and essence. However, this is not the only point, this subject is not merely how or what she is because of the intersubjective world within which she becomes herself but is never herself because of this world of Others. The Levinasian subject is a fugitive from the infectiousness of all transcendence—elemental and Other, she is the subject of enjoyment and economy or she is a fugitive from herself—a fugitive who resorts to cannibalism. The self-affected subject either coincides with herself ‘absolutely’ or she is a subject that through the imperative of the Other turns on her own identity—she ‘purifies’ herself of all thought, and lets herself be enclosed in the Desire for the Other.

The self as a creature is conceived in a passivity that does not revert into an assumption. The self as a creature is conceived in a passivity more passive still than the passivity of matter, that is prior to the virtual coinciding of a term with itself. The oneself has to be conceived outside of all substantial coinciding of self with self. Contrary to Western thought which unites subjectivity and substantiality, here coinciding is not the norm that already commands all non-coinciding, in the quest it provokes....Far from

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92 The role of the body as that which can be tortured and subjugated acts as a “medium” upon which passivity paradoxically “acts”. Levinas claims that the face is not given perceptually, not given to vision. If it is the vulnerability of the Other that the face exposes then it seems that the body of the Other—perceptually given—should be my access to this vulnerability and vice versa (i.e. I am vulnerable because I am incarnate). While we would not want to suggest that a body presents itself as an “object” like other objects its presentation is necessary for me to even recognize another ‘person’. (AE 30/OB 14)
being recognized in the freedom of consciousness, which loses itself and finds itself again, which, as a freedom, relaxes the order of being so as to reintegrate it in a free responsibility, the responsibility for the other, the responsibility in obsession suggests an absolute passivity of a self that has never been able to diverge from itself, to then enter into its limits, and identify itself by recognizing itself in its past. Its reoccurrence is the contracting of an ego, going to the hither side of identity, gnawing away at this very identity—identity gnawing away at itself—in a remorse (AE 180/OB 113-114, emphasis mine).

As the tautological subject of enjoyment (i.e., the subject that always returns to self-identity) she is an imperialist subject who from time to time is master of the universe, at one with herself, while as the subject purified of interests she transcends her empirical self by denouncing self-identity and realizes her true humanity through substitution. Levinas is clear that the latter is the meaning of ethics, the ethical subject assumes the burden of responsibility not for herself but for all the Others. The self must be vigilant, must resist the temptation to rest within herself—to return to an identity with herself. In fact, unlike the position of Totality and Infinity, which argued for the immanence of the subject of enjoyment, the subject of Desire has no identity of self if we assume this is an adequation/coinciding of self with its self (AE 181/OB 114). It is through masochism parading as remorse and despair that the subject is ethical. The really ethical subject is the one that suffers not just for herself but for all the others. Auto-affection, though for Levinas this is always an imperfect auto-affection infected by transcendence at the heart of itself (i.e. the subject of enjoyment), is superceded by a radical hetero-affection at the heart of subjectivity (i.e., the trace).

But is this right? Levinas also claims that proximity leads to substitution. And, substitution it turns out is the “putting oneself in the place of the other” (AE 186-187/OB 117). In hetero-affection:

I am outside of any place, in myself, on the hither side of the autonomy of auto-affection and identity resting on itself. Impassivity undergoing the weight of the other, thereby called to uniqueness, subjectivity no longer belongs to the order where the alternative of activity and passivity retains its meaning. We have to speak here of expiation as uniting identity and alterity. The ego is not an entity “capable” of expiating for the others: it is this original expiation (AE187/OB 118).

If the passivity of substitution is a sensibility that opens subjectivity to the other, before an ego comes on the scene, and this subjectivity in proximity can actually take on the other’s responsibility then what comes to separate the “I” of responsibility and the Other? If no intentionality comes to distance the “I” and other, to the point where I can take his place, then do we do not return to a murderous auto-affection just where we should have left auto-affection once and for all? Levinas argues that it is not that the other is
subsumed within the subject but that the subject fleeing itself is now open to the other, but this seems to suggest a tyranny of the Other. It is only through a symbolic suicide that I can really be for the other; the thought that I could be both for the other and for myself is unethical in such thinking (i.e., economical). We either endorse an odd paternalism (i.e. I can take your responsibility) or suicide (i.e. only by destroying myself endlessly can I answer the exigency of ethics). The subject in its self-destruction takes on the Other’s role—to Marion’s critique of schizophrenia we would have to add a critique of multiple personality disorder. Levinas goes so far as to say that being Good, though this be violent, redeems the violence of alterity (AE 33/0B 15). The message is that it is more ethical to be a masochist or to endorse sadism (i.e., I must take responsibility even for the one who tortures or maims me, I must accept responsibility for the sadism of an other) then to be for myself. The enemy is self-interest and each of us must purge ourselves of all interest other than the purified interest (i.e. Desire) for the Good. Some kinds of violence are justified: the violence of the Good. Ethics and violence are not opposed. True altruism requires both masochism and sadism.

Conclusion

Throughout Levinas’ two texts (and Marion’s works) we see a reversal of the dualities within traditional philosophy. However, merely reversing the hierarchical order of dualisms can do little to really reform the problems Levinas and Marion locate in what Levinas refers to as politics and philosophy. I think a better solution is found in Husserl’s phenomenology. While I have been critical of the subject in Levinas’ work there is much in his thought that I agree with. Levinas posits a notion of subjectivity that does justice to the complexity of a self, we are rarely at one with ourselves, though this need not be a war as Levinas seems to suggest. Levinas also reveals a view of Truth that does not separate truth from justice and I would agree fully that truth is not just the bland facts that science and philosophy sometimes tend to worship. In fact the ‘spirit’ of Levinas’ ethics is difficult to argue against: the meaning of a radical ethics should be a disinterested obligation that supercedes societal ‘norms’ and ‘values’ and is first and foremost dedicated to the downtrodden and disenfranchised in the world. Ethics should be an ideal that to some extent is the “possibility of impossibility.” Absolutely. But does this require an overhaul of the entire history of thought, in fact of all thought that falls outside of a purified sensibility? Or does it suggest that we perhaps need to rethink concepts like identity and difference, self and other, reason and sensibility? Along with Derrida, I would suggest the attempt to implode traditional dualities (i.e., subject/object, interior/exterior etc.) often leads to unsatisfying consequences and this may be because our language(s) (our thinking and doing) work within a logic premised on, perhaps not dualisms, but certainly correlations (Derrida “Violence” 112).

In Section two, I approach the question of subjectivity through reciprocity and reversibility. Husserl’s schizophrenic ego offers an alternative reading of the role of intentionality and reduction within phenomenology and reforms a dualism of reason and emotion prevalent throughout Western philosophy. Aspects of Levinas thought that I have not adequately addressed and the specifics of his critique of a theoretical bias in
Husserlian texts will be explored in Chapters Four and Five.
Chapter Four: Method and Temporality

Introduction

The criticisms that Marion and Levinas level against Husserl are twofold. On the one hand, there is a privileging of objectivity in classical phenomenology, an objectivity premised on the perceptual model which is then applied to the being of consciousness, to life. Following Descartes this model moves from the evidence of perceptual objects and transposes similar evidence onto consciousness (i.e. the cogito.) In this reading evidence is equated with judgement. What accounts such as Husserl’s do not address is a sphere of experience/meaning that cannot be rendered through an objective account—this is our emotive/affective lives. While Husserl certainly mentions valuing and feeling, implicit in the critique of theoreticism is the view that he does little to describe how this region radically differs from any other and less to describe how this sphere of experience grounds all of experience.\(^9^3\) There is some legitimacy to this criticism, though even in early texts (e.g., *Logical Investigations* and *Ideas I*) Husserl acknowledges the difference between the way objects are constituted and the way our emotive/affective lives are given to us. And, what is more, he suggests that the neutralizing procedure of epoche and reduction allows us not only to “return” at will to the fluidity of lived experiences but also to isolate aspects of our experience that may be given in a much more complex manner in our concrete experience. In concrete existence I do not separate out what I know from how I feel about the objects and subjects around me, they are given all at once as objects with certain characteristics, use, value, beauty etc. or as people I love or feel indifferent about, I know or do not know. The method of phenomenology, through epoche and reduction, teases out intentional threads in order to expose the various levels in which the world, others and even ourselves are given to us. There is then a necessary abstraction entailed in the neutrality of phenomenology. In fact, in the *Logical Investigations* Husserl addresses the notions of “abstraction” and “the concrete” in terms of independent and non-independent contents and in terms of what is further elaborated in the third investigation on parts and wholes. Through phenomenological reflection we “set in relief” an aspect of an object from the concrete whole, in a sense this is to make this aspect an ‘object’ of inquiry. Husserl uses the example of a side of a cube which we can isolate from the cube as a whole, the concrete background.\(^9^4\) Abstraction then does

\(^9^3\) This is my interpretation of the objectivist critique of Husserl.

\(^9^4\) Of course there are always aspects of any concrete ‘whole’ that are not given but assumed. In *Synthesis and Backward References in Husserl’s Logical Investigations*, Jay Lampert offers an in-depth account of the method of *Logical Investigations* with its entailed modifications through backward and forward references of synthesizing consciousness. The suggestion is that the ‘origins’ such a method re-covers or rather uncovers are the results of backward references (forward references play a key role as well).
not entail the negative connotations of “ignoring simultaneously given contents” instead we can through reflection bring to the foreground particular aspects of the concrete “object” (i.e., the “side” of the cube) (LI I 220-223/LI I 309-311). This notion of abstraction is entailed in both static and genetic phenomenology. While a static account is certainly limited in the kinds of givenness it can reveal and, more to the point, in how it reveals these limits (or, put a different way, what it leaves out of its account), it still aims to describe as opposed to construct a dimension of our experience. Whether phenomenological method with its entailed modifications distorts its objects or not is the focus of Part One below. In the previous Chapters I have suggested that Marion’s and Levinas’ positions follow a similar procedure to arrive at a givenness beyond Being (obviously this means something different for each thinker.) However, whether givenness or the Other are merely described or are rather constructed on the basis of a certain understanding of consciousness and subjectivity is another matter. Marion and Levinas in their unique ways may both touch upon dimensions of consciousness not adequately described in Husserl’s works. However, the status they give to the levels or regions of meaning they uncover suggest that these (i.e., givenness and the Other as face and infinity) are more than mere ‘dimensions’ of existence. They ground our existence in a primary, perhaps even causal relation—before we are thinking beings we are feeling beings (Marion) or responsible beings (Levinas.) This is to hierarchically privilege one aspect of what it is to be a subject and then to superimpose this on all the other dimensions of being. And, more importantly, this is to present figures of the subject that may well be worth exploring (i.e., narcissistic, masochistic, traumatized) but perhaps should not be normalized. This may seem a strange claim to make but if Marion and Levinas follow Heidegger in viewing the history of philosophy (the Western world) as a history of oppression and repression then merely reversing the traditional views on reason/emotion/imagination will do little to truly overturn or move beyond such distortions. Ironically, just where both thinkers claim to move beyond dualism they legitimize a ‘new’ duality with its own ‘norms.’ ‘Reason’ and ‘rationality’ are subjugated to psychosis and this may not be an accidental consequence that could be otherwise since with the exile of reason we also have the exorcism of all senses of rational normality.

In the Phenomenology of Perception Merleau-Ponty’s criticisms of historical materialism and psychoanalysis suggest that superimposing one dimension of experience onto all others is reductionist and, more damaging, it can distort the complexity of lived experience (171-172). Marion and Levinas not only distort the cognitive aspects of our existence (by undermining all forms of knowledge and comprehension) but they also distort the very dimensions of existence they do privilege (i.e., sensibility and sociality). Unfortunately, Husserl often uses language that suggests a similar distancing of passive

Ironically, the “intellectualist” critique of Husserl which suggests he privileges the theoretical over the practical affective spheres of Being is merely reversed in these accounts. For Marion and Levinas it is our “affective” lives that determine us—the problem is how to account for the theoretical in such a view, other than as an inauthentic mode of existence?
consciousness and active consciousness; subjectivity as sensible/receptive/affective and understanding as a kind of judging. However, Husserl’s thoughts on the nature of passive and active synthesis, history and internal time-consciousness suggest the separation of the two levels of consciousness (which of course are distinct) may be only be an abstraction. An abstraction that none-the-less is revealing of some significant aspects of the structures of consciousness and the nature of experience.

The second criticism suggests that Husserl fails to acknowledge or account for an inherent ambiguity at the heart of existence. Following from the first criticism of objectivism, the charge of a “metaphysics of presence” as interpreted by Marion and Levinas suggests that classical phenomenology cannot account for those kinds of experience that escape ‘presence.’ In its drive to emulate a scientific model of rigour it fails to account for a level of meaning that (perhaps) cannot be brought to presence at all (i.e., the unapparent.) It is just this kind of experience that both Marion and Levinas seek to bring into the open, which is not to say into presence. Marion’s ‘givenness’ suggests a level of experience that lies below all intentionality. One could say that this givenness announces the birth of the world, others and finally the self, which is rightly to be distinguished from the subject or consciousness in any traditional sense of these terms. On the other hand, Levinasian ethics seeks to displace the privileging of theory over practice in Western thought by instituting a practical foundation at the basis of all experience (this is an unconditioned condition of all experience.) This is of course Levinas’ face to face, which situates the beginning or origin of subjectivity not in our various cognitive achievements but in the practical ideal of the good and the just—in obligation. My contention with Marion and Levinas is just with this notion of origin or foundation and not in the first instance with the need for an analysis of the kinds of experience they expose. If we are instituted into a ready made world with all its dimensions—history, language, culture, science, etc., then it seems we should re-think in what sense we can reveal a purely pre-thetic origin or ground for subjectivity, intersubjectivity and the world. While Husserl certainly discusses pre-thetic modes of experience these are perhaps not the kind of origin that either Marion or Levinas reveal. The quest for origins is achieved, as Husserl in The Crisis so clearly articulates, through an indirect method of a “zig-zag” or “circle” (K 59/C 58). The search for origins is a paradoxical enterprise and one that entails a ‘necessary’ circularity of what Husserl calls an “interplay” (“Wechselspiel”), this is the ‘play’ announced through reduction, intentionality and correlation. Especially given the ‘fact’ that we are always born into a particular style of life, even the disinterested phenomenologist in the midst of reduction cannot overcome the various ways in which our origins are always decided before hand and have no retrievable beginnings in the sense of first or primary.96 In fact, this is just

96 In Crisis and Reflection, James Dodd suggests the following in relation to this notion of reactivation: “[T]here is no identifiable place where the original has been left behind and the non-original taken up. The passively given and the actively given do not cancel each other out, but are two moments within any experience of original self-evidence.” (133, emphasis mine) If Dodd is right then any analysis of origins is already ‘reflective’ in Husserl’s sense and origins are definitely not purely passive spheres. Part
Derrida’s point in his insightful commentary on *Introduction to the Origin of Geometry*. Derrida states:

‘First’ (*erste*) nearly always designates in Husserl either an undetermined primacy, or, most often, a de facto chronological priority in cosmic time, i.e., an original factuality. *Proto-*, *Arch-*, and *Ur-* refer to phenomenological primordiality, i.e., to that of sense, of ground, of the de jure, after the reduction of all factuality (*Origin* 37, note 23).

It is not always clear that Marion and, to a lesser degree, Levinas, keep ‘first’ and ‘original’ distinct and, if they do keep these two terms distinct then perhaps the issue is they over-determine the origins they bring to revelation.

I argue in the following that if Husserl claims a presuppositionless ground for phenomenology it is on the basis of an origin that takes into account the paradoxical and perhaps circular sense of any origins even the most primal. Given his description of internal time-consciousness, this paradox is apparent not merely in the world of ‘things’ but in our relation with others and at the very core of subjectivity itself. The “interplay” between passivity and activity suggests, especially given genetic and generative issues that our search for origins leads to ever more complex levels of research and description.

Underlying the criticisms of Marion and Levinas is the view that Husserl is not able to secure the correlation of subjectivity and intersubjectivity once he has insisted on the ‘absoluteness’ of the transcendental Ego. One of the solutions to Husserl’s dilemma is the one Merleau-Ponty puts forward in the *Phenomenology of Perception* and which Husserl states but perhaps does not adequately defend—the basis of subjectivity is intersubjectivity. As Ricoeur notes in *Husserl: An Analysis of His Phenomenology*, this failure also leads to an antimony between Husserl’s understanding of the history of reason and his conviction of the ‘absoluteness’ of transcendental subjectivity.

On one side, does not a transcendental philosophy (in the broad sense Husserl proposes) found all being, including that of the Other and of history in the ego cogito? On the other hand, does not a rationalistic philosophy of history found all private tasks in one great common project and the ego itself in the historical Idea (Ricoeur, *Husserl* 172)?

In the following Chapters I focus on the implications of Husserl’s method for his notion of subjectivity. Chapter Four offers an analysis of Husserl’s methodology. Part One focuses on the static and genetic methods of phenomenology. Part Two turns to transitions in Husserl’s discussion of the noesis/noema correlation (i.e., intentionality.) I

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One fleshes out the notion of origin in relation to the method (static and genetic.) Also see: Edmund Husserl, *Phenomenological Psychology* (*PP*, 154/PP 118) and *Passive and Active Synthesis* (*PS*, 55/PS, 18).
address these issues of method in light of the criticisms of Levinas and Marion. Part Three turns to an analysis of inner-time consciousness and the implications of this analysis for the noesis/noema correlation, focusing specifically on the noetic moment and the problematic “double intentionality thesis” of inner time-consciousness. My aim is not merely to defend Husserl against the charges of objectivism but to bring out the influence of some of Husserl’s less resolved notions on the mature works of Marion and Levinas.

Chapter Five begins with an exploration of the implications of shifts in Husserl’s methodology in light of his work on inner time-consciousness on his notions of reduction, intentionality and evidence. I show that the ground on which the positions of Marion and Levinas are based is flawed. It is not in structures of experiencing, such as that of temporality and the lived body and, certainly not in any notion of reason, that our common humanity is discovered but in our capacity to feel. While such perspectives certainly offer valuable insight into a region of being all too often left undetermined, our emotive, affective lives as well as the social sphere, they do little to radically overturn the problems with traditional dualist thought. However, Husserl at times seems to support the notion of a purely affective receptive region of being and even claims this is a non-intentional sphere. I argue that despite this there is entailed within Husserl’s methodology a ‘better’ solution to dualism. Husserl’s analysis of inner time-consciousness and passive and active synthesis actually support a very different reading, one that suggests a necessary correlation within all experience, what I have referred to contra a dualist view as a dyadic relation. The dyadic relation, in Husserl’s terms ‘correlation’, suggests a necessary reciprocity between the subject and the world and has implications for the social and ethical spheres where reciprocity does not entail sacrificing an inherent irreducibility of individuals. While Husserl is primarily concerned with questions of epistemology, his works also offer suggestions for both a radical ethics and ontology. It is in his notion of a ‘split subject’ that such possibilities are especially apparent. We need not disparage the ‘schizophrenia’ that Marion claims this suggests but rather embrace it as an alternative to traditional views of subjectivity as well as the more ‘radical’ views such as those of Marion and Levinas. It is not by pushing phenomenology to ever purer regions of being through an intensifying of reduction and intentionality that the most significant and fruitful ‘origins’ are uncovered but by recognizing the limitations beyond which reduction and intentionality should not venture and perhaps cannot venture.

Part One: Method

Marion and Levinas, while critical of key elements of classical phenomenology, particularly as it is described in Logical Investigations (I and II) and Ideas I, paradoxically also develop themes not fully elaborated in those early texts. It is these themes which inspire the mature works of both philosophers. Rather than present a through developmental account of Husserl’s method, I focus on key elements of the method related to the themes of auto-affection and hetero-affection. I briefly distinguish the static method from the genetic method and then turn to an analysis of some of the structures revealed by the static method, particularly focussing on the transition of noesis from earlier descriptions which separated out “hyletic data” and animating intention”
within the noetic moment (i.e., Ideas I.) I argue that Marion and Levinas tend to take the static method as the ‘whole’ of classical phenomenology and do not account for the refinement of the method over time or fully appreciate the implications of temporal themes. Without a sustained account of temporality the relation of sensation and form (hyle and morphe) within the noetic moment of experience may indeed lead to the intellectualist critique. Ironically, Marion’s (and to a lesser extent also Levinas’) position(s) may not make significant inroads into genetic or generative methods either. The kind of origins they reveal are in a sense outside of temporality and history despite their claims to the contrary. Givenness and the face to face encounter occur beyond any history and outside of all time. In one sense this is to push the static method of analysis beyond its ‘proper’ parameters—beyond objectivity. The status they each accord to their respective first principles suggests a certain eternality to givenness and the infinity of the face to face. Before developing this critique (Part Three) I turn to Husserl’s method, focussing on the static method.

While it may seem that a discussion of method in classical phenomenology should begin with epoche and reduction(s), I bracket these key aspects of phenomenology for now. The reason for not beginning with a discussion of reduction(s) or intentionality at this stage of my analysis is that the possibility of reduction(s) is intrinsically related to consciousness as intentional. This is to suggest that reduction as an operation of suspension or neutralization of world positing is first not an unnatural ‘act’ or ‘performance’ of the ego but rather an essential possibility of conscious life and second, it is only possible because consciousness is intentional. In fact, the temporal structure of consciousness already suggests that consciousness is intentionally related to the world and others and, as I argue in the following, perhaps this also suggests that consciousness is intentionally self-related. Marion’s claim that Husserl’s transcendental ego is a schizophrenic ego rather than dismantling the transcendental ego may open new possibilities for understanding subjectivity. Husserl in Experience and Judgement is clear that cognition is not an imposition of form on a pre-given and wholly indeterminate ‘world.’

To say that every grasping of an individual object, and every subsequent activity of cognition, takes place against the background of the world indicates something more than the dependence of this activity on the domain of what is pre-given in passive certainty. A cognitive function bearing on the individual objects of experience is never carried out as if these objects were pregiven at first as from a still undetermined substrate. For us the world is always a world in which cognition in the most diverse ways has already done its work (EU 26/EJ 31).

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97 John Drummond makes this suggestion and relates it to the difference between the natural attitude and the philosophical attitude (“Structure” 70-71).
This suggests two possibilities: if Husserl does maintain a notion of a non-intentional sphere of existence then it is only as an ideal limit beyond which analysis cannot venture (i.e., Husserl refers to this as the “idea” in the Kantian sense and quite often as ‘ideal limits’) \((ID I 166-167, 297-298/ID I 197-198, 341-342)\) or, there is no non-intentional consciousness though there may well be a non-thetic intentionality—a kind of “preknowledge” (“Vorwissen”) \((EU 27/EJ 32)\). \((It \ may \ be \ the \ case \ that \ these \ are \ not \ opposed \ points)\). There are also purely formal reasons for clarifying general terminology before tackling the main point of this work, the various terms Husserl introduces in relation to the static and genetic methods are intrinsically tied to a refinement of the notions of reduction(s) and intentionality. Finally, in relation to the positions of Marion and Levinas this refinement suggests a way to deal with the criticisms of both thinkers without necessarily sacrificing the novelty they each bring to phenomenology. I now turn to static and genetic methods.

The static method of phenomenology which is prevalent in the \textit{Logical Investigations}, \textit{Ideas I} and \textit{II} and arguably is also apparent as late as the \textit{Meditations} aims to uncover basic structural elements of our conscious experience. \(^{98}\) Anthony Steinbock differentiates two levels of analysis within the static method: a constitutive analysis that inquires into the way phenomena are given and an analysis of structures such as intentionality, noesis and noema, formal, material and morphological essences, modes of fulfilment and disappointment and distinctions between founding and founded acts \textit{(Home and Beyond, 38)}. \(^{99}\) In one sense what a static analysis gives us access to is a freeze frame perspective of various aspects of our lived experience \((i.e., \ “still \ life”)\) \textit{(Dodd, Crisis 175-188)}. \(^{100}\) Concrete experience gives us ready made ‘objects’ \((i.e., \ intutive \ ‘wholes’)\) and the static procedure allows us to tease out the details of how such objects are given to us \((i.e., \ modes \ or \ manners \ of \ appearing)\) and what ‘structures’ are necessary for experience to be given to us as it is—how ‘objects’ are constituted \((i.e., \ it \ looks \ at \ issues \ of \ motivation \ or \ attention, \ sensuous \ ‘material’, \ association \ etc.)\). Constitution does not suggest ‘production.’ Consciousness does not ‘create’ the world ex nihilo. Though as Sokolowski notes, “reality... receives its \textit{sense} from subjectivity” \textit{(Formation 34)}. In fact, consciousness as inherently intentional suggests an irreducibility between consciousness and transcendent reality and we cannot and, more importantly, perhaps should not dissolve the paradox of our access to the transcendent given the irreducibility of these regions. What a constitutional analysis can do is similar to an archaeological enterprise; it uncovers what lies beneath the surface of our everyday lives, what lies forgotten in the immediacy of the natural attitude or is merely taken for granted.

\(^{98}\) Obviously the static method is at ‘work’ in many other of Husserl’s texts, mention is only made of the texts I focus on in this section.

\(^{99}\) No doubt the list of “structural” elements could be much more comprehensive.

\(^{100}\) Dodd uses the notion of “still life” in relation to the reflective procedure of reduction(s) but it applies just as well to an analysis of static method.
Like archaeology, a static method uncovers what has already been accomplished—its ‘objects’ can only be given retrospectively. And as with archaeology, which can uncover general knowledge about a civilization or era of time fairly accurately but perhaps not the rich nuances of ‘life’ in any era, this kind of a procedure can give us general knowledge of various levels or regions of consciousness. Static phenomenology is concerned with the structural conditions for any kind of knowledge—actual and possible. As such, it inquires into “essences” or essential ‘types’ and for Husserl this entails “imaginative variation” (i.e., eidetic reduction.) (Of course the genetic method also uncovers certain structures at work in the constitution of the world but the difference is in the way each method explores these structures, if within the static method these structures are put into a ‘freeze-frame’ in the genetic and generative methods there is an attempt to follow out constitution as it unfolds—to follow the process of becoming.) Levinas may be right about a certain theoretical bias in Husserl works, an epistemological motivation, though it is hardly self-evident that this amounts to a serious critique of the project of classical phenomenology. While the phenomenologist can study the temporal structure of ‘objects’ as well, at the level of static constitution the analysis remains formal. Husserl certainly acknowledges in Ideas I that the static analysis there leaves out “the enigma of consciousness of time” which gives us “what is ultimately and truly absolute” (ID I 163/ID I 193-194). However, commentators are divided on whether the distinction between static and genetic method entails a development or refinement of phenomenological method or whether the turn to genetic themes signifies a break with the formal and logical concerns in the earlier Logical Investigations. The suggestion that commentators such as Sokolowski make is that the static method limits Husserl’s ability to explain the distinction between the active sense-bestowing (Bestimmung) moment of intentionality (i.e. noeses) and the passive ‘material element’ of the noetic moment which “imposes restrictions on the activity of intentionality” (i.e. sensations as “raw” material play an unspecified role in the intentional correlation) (Formation 210). In fact, Sokolowski’s own analysis can be used to summarize the basis of the conflict between Husserl, on the one hand, and Marion and Levinas, on the other. Marion and Levinas also argue that what is not sufficiently explained in Husserl’s earlier works is the way sensations are prior to the intensive or ‘interpretative’ moment of intentionality and this justifies an analysis of this realm of pure sensations. Obviously each thinker offers a unique analysis of this purified realm of sensation/sensibility. However if static and genetic methods deal with the same content then there may be a different way to understand the relation between the two, this is a position that Jay Lampert implicitly suggests in Synthesis and Backward Reference. Lampert suggests that the category of

101 Lampert implicitly suggests that even in Logical Investigations there is already an explanation of the temporal unfolding of the elements of intentionality, which is to say, backward and forward references already point to the temporal implications of synthesizing consciousness. However, Lampert’s focus is on a “dialectical reading of Husserl’s category of ‘referring backward’” (Synthesis vii). The notion that the ‘content’ entailed in either a static or genetic analysis remains the same is taken from earlier comments on my work by Dr. Lampert.
‘referring backward’ ("zurückweisen"), which entails a forward referring as well, plays a key role in what he calls “synthesizing consciousness” (Synthesis vii). My own analysis of the inner temporality of consciousness as inherently tied to the intentional structure(s) of conscious experience imports themes from Lampert’s analysis, specifically his notion of consciousness as ‘system.’ Lampert states:

[C]onsciousness is a self-explicating system of interpretative activity, a dynamic whose parts demand and pass over into one another, a process that grounds its synthesizing structures as it proce[eds], by continuously referring forward to ideal end-points and referring backward to ideal origin-points (Synthesis 1).102

Lampert also suggests that Husserl’s notion of origin can be understood as “a product of its own results” (Husserl and Hegel 386). If this is a valid reading of Husserl, and I think it is, then there is a unique sense in which the transcendental ego ‘grounds’ phenomenology. There may also be a unique way in which hyletic data as non-intentional, a point that Husserl persists in maintaining, are indeed originary, though this would suggest that such origins are only brought to light through the kind of reflective process that both Marion and Levinas reject for their origins.

Donn Welton suggests that what distinguishes the static and genetic methods is that the former studies the being of transcendental subjectivity while the latter studies it’s becoming (in Home and Beyond Steinbock seems to agree with this distinction) (Systematicity 255-288). This is an insightful way to characterize the difference between the two methods—the one gives descriptions of what is, which always entails an ‘abstraction’ from lived experience, while the other gives us the process through which what is is, how ‘things’ become (Steinbock, Home and Beyond 17-42). A static account can give us fairly precise information about how our experiences are given to us as coherent and unified but it cannot explain the process by which such objects of experience are given or the genesis of interconnections between one structural region and another. As Welton suggests a static method is characterized by the fact that “it restricts itself to...the relationship between the as- and for-structures, to the relationship between things appearing as something and the one to whom and for whom they appear...it supplies a typology of intentionality.” According to Welton, the static method is limited since when it does turn to the for structures it is interested only in general subjective structures of consciousness necessary for any particular region of experience. One way to differentiate the two methods would be to suggest that one is descriptive while the other is explicative (“Systematicity” 262). In fact this is the way Husserl characterizes the two methods in Passive and Active Synthesis.

102 In Husserl and Hegel on the Logic of Subjectivity Lampert focuses specifically on how this notion of consciousness as a “system” relates to Husserl’s notion of the transcendental ego as the pre-suppositional basis of phenomenology (363-393). I address this issue in Part Three.
We can therefore distinguish explanatory phenomenology as a phenomenology of regulated genesis, and descriptive phenomenology as a phenomenology of possible, essential shapes (no matter how they have come to pass) in pure consciousness and their teleological ordering in the realm of possible reason under the headings object and sense. In my lectures I did not say descriptive, but rather static phenomenology (PS, 340/PS, 629).

Before discussing these opposing views of static and genetic method I turn to a brief analysis of genetic method.

I have used an analogy with archaeology to characterize the static method of phenomenology and perhaps an apt way to describe genetic method would be as a genealogical method. Of course this metaphor also suggests that the archeologist to ‘understand’ what it is she uncovers must already have access to the findings at the level of genetic analysis. If the findings of the static method have any validity it is because they already take into account, though only implicitly, what can only be revealed through a different kind of “method” (i.e., genetic method). As genealogical, this method traces out the lineage of the ‘structures’ of synthesis described in the static method, it uncovers the formation of various structures. The explanation of the process by which the manifestation of all experience (i.e., of ourselves, others, the world) is achieved is in one sense an exploration of the origins of experience, intentional life. The still life procedure of static phenomenology offers analysis that misses the depth of our experiences, the analogy of still life suggests that what is missed in such a surface account is the process of experience as it unfolds as well as the historical dimensions and various horizons implicated in any experience. However, if the static method remains operative in Husserl’s corpus it may be because of a distinction Eugen Fink makes between operative concepts and thematic concepts (“Operative Concepts” 44-58). Fink explains the

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103 In Home and Beyond, Steinbock differentiates genetic and generative methods and suggests that a genetic method still maintains a certain formalism which does not delve into “depth structures” such as social relations or birth and death etc. Sokolowski in The Formation of Husserl’s Theory of Constitution also suggests that Husserl’s initial analysis of inner-time-consciousness retains a certain formalism and Husserl in Passive Synthesis makes the same claim in relation to his earlier work. My understanding of this ‘formalism’ is that it remains tied to the “content of apprehension—apprehension scheme” where the content remains ‘neutral’. John Brough also agrees that until Husserl develops his notion of temporality what is left undetermined is the “content” of experience, I have, in reference to Marion and Levinas, referred to this as the ‘phenomenality’ of phenomena (Marion) and sensibility (Levinas)(Brough, “Emergence” 86-87). If the content of apprehension remains ‘neutral’ then this would support an idealist interpretation of classical phenomenology.
difference between these two ‘concepts’ by using a description of our analysis of things at rest as already entailing a discussion of things in motion—temporality. The point is that thematic concepts operate in a ‘medium’ of operative concepts that are, to some extent, not thematized (Fink, “Operative Concepts” 49-50). This is not merely due to a lack of knowledge or a self-ignorance of a particular philosophical thinking but may be an inherent aspect of thinking—the tension between operative and thematic concepts may explain a fundamental aspect of conscious experience. Fink suggests that Husserl’s philosophy “is a remarkable attempt to ‘fix’ the inner unrest of human thinking through a methodological comprehension” (“Operative Concepts” 50). If we understand the static and genetic methods of phenomenology in this light then perhaps it is not a matter of two different ‘methods’ with two different ‘contents’ but rather the dialectic of static and genetic themes each of which supplements the other. In fact, it is in terms of a dialectical reading of the category of backward and forward references in Logical Investigations that Lampert re-covers temporal themes already at ‘work’ within the static method (Synthesis 1-37). This may suggest that earlier analyses of intentionality already, at an operative level, made use of genetic themes and it may also explain why Husserl as late as the texts on active and passive synthesis retains within the noetic moment of intentionality a distinction within the noetic moment of the passivity and activity of the ego. Rather than collapsing the distinction Husserl maintains a tension between sensation and signification that will have to be further developed.

The genetic method is implicitly related to Husserl’s theory of internal-time consciousness and I return to it in Part Three below. In the discussion of time-consciousness, I suggest that the findings at the static level are instrumental in the revelations of a genetic analysis. Having outlined the general differences between a static and genetic method I turn to some further aspects of the static account which, I argue, are at the basis of the ‘objectivist’ criticisms.

Part Two: Intentionality and Correlation

If Marion and Levinas are critical of classical phenomenology, it is based on a reduction of classical phenomenology to the static method, a method, which on a surface reading appears to offer an abstract cognitive analysis. A genetic method on the other hand deals with the genesis of our experience in a passive level of experience that is characterized by its affectivity. However, even this level of experience seems to be characterized by a kind of preknowledge or sense-giving, though this is not a judicative level of understanding. If understanding is broadened to include what Levinas encompasses under the notion of ‘comprehension’ in both Totality and Infinity and Otherwise than Being then it seems legitimate to include under understanding what are in Husserl’s sense pre-thetic levels of sense-bestowing. More importantly passive synthesis already entails comprehension in Levinas’ sense (i.e., at a minimum any experience entails an experience of ‘something’ however vague or indeterminate.) For Levinas there is an essential passivity at the basis of all experience, however, if we take the notion of motivation seriously then it seems that even in the most primordial of experiences...
‘activity’ is apparent, perhaps not a cognitive activity but none-the-less an active taking up of the passive. I have related this to what Husserl refers to as a “pre-knowledge” ("Vorwissen") in *Experience and Judgement*. If we take into account the sedimentation of meanings over time and the way in which each of us is born into a whole history of such sedimented meanings then it seems questionable whether the kinds of experiences Levinas and Marion want to categorize as ‘purely affective’ are even possible (this is not to say these are impossible experiences but it is to question the ‘purity’ of affective experience.) The non-intentionality that Marion suggests the affective sphere entails actually invokes an “implicit intentionality” at ‘work’ in the passive synthesis of affection according to Husserl. Husserl relates this “implicit intentionality” to the “peculiar affective accomplishment within the living present” (*PS*, 173/ *PS*, 222). I turn to what an “affective accomplishment” suggests in my discussion of inner-time-consciousness below. If we take into account the transition from early texts such as the *Logical Investigations* and *Ideas I* to the later *Cartesian Meditations* in Husserl’s account of sensations and intentions then there may be grounds for understanding intentionality different from the intentionality of act Marion equates with representation.

Before turning to Husserl’s texts I should clarify my disagreement with positions such as those of Marion and Levinas. My point is not to equate ‘apprehension’ and cognition but to suggest that perhaps in privileging the Urimpression or hyletic stratum of experience both Marion and Levinas favour aspects of what Mohanty has called a monistic view of intentionality (“Intentionality” 119). While Mohanty aims this charge at Sartre, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty (though Merleau-Ponty to a lesser degree than either Sartre or Heidegger) on my reading of Marion and Levinas the criticism applies equally to them as well (not withstanding the endorsement of non-intentionality). Mohanty argues that a monistic conception of intentionality claims an originary intentionality that grounds what may be “derivative from that one intentionality” (“Intentionality” 119-120). He argues that there are degrees of intentionality within Husserl’s works and that this has implications for the noesis/noema correlation as well as the notions of constitution and synthesis. Marion while defending a non-intentional ground of subjectivity and world falls into the monistic view, precisely because he privileges only one aspect of the intentional relation, the sensuous hyle, and further reduces this to the basis of all experience. Consciousness in Marion’s analysis is similar to Sartre’s non-egoic consciousness in both *the Transcendence of the Ego* and *Being and Nothingness*. Ironically the immanence Marion privileges in such an account mirrors Sartre’s privileging of transcendence (i.e., consciousness as being-in-the-world). However, Marion’s ‘pure’ reduction also suggests that there is no ecstatic distance entailed in the immanence of consciousness; there is a total coincidence of consciousness and world within immanence and this is suggests a non-intentional ground of consciousness and world—a view that Sartre would not endorse. Levinas, on the other hand, also privileges the hyletic moment as the foundation of all intentionality and for Levinas this suggests a similar non-egoic consciousness one characterized by its subjection to the world and the Other. In both views a non-thetic intentionality is posited as the ground of subjectivity and this leads in different ways to each thinker privileging one aspect of the intentional correlation at the expense of the other.
monistic view both Marion and Levinas are led to support an inherently non-intentional basis of subjectivity. I return to this ‘monistic’ view of intentionality in Marion and Levinas and the notion of varying degrees of intentionality in Husserl’s works in Chapter Five. The following contextualizes the basis of the disagreements on method between Marion, Levinas and Husserl.

In the *Logical Investigations* Husserl makes a key distinction between sensations and animating intentions (i.e. apperception, apprehension, intentional ‘act’), which follow a matter/form schema. In fact, Husserl actually raises the question of whether sensations are intentional or non-intentional and further suggests a distinction between objects and sensations/apperceptions.

Apperception is our surplus, which is found in experience itself, in its descriptive content as opposed to the raw existence of sense: it is the act-character which as it were ensouls sense, and is in essence such as to make us perceive this or that object, see this tree, e.g., hear this ringing, smell this scent of flowers etc. etc. *Sensations* [Empfindungen], and the acts ‘interpreting’ [auffassenden] them or apperceiving them, are alike experienced, but they do not appear as objects: they are not seen, heard or perceived by any sense. *Objects* [Die Gegenstände] on the other hand, appear and are perceived, but they are not experienced [erlebt] (*LU*, II v, § 14 399/*LI*, II v, § 14 105).

One can hear echoes of Marion’s thesis of auto-affection in texts such as this—since what is experienced cannot be an ‘object’ of consciousness (i.e., intentional) and an ‘object’ while ‘perceived’ cannot be experienced. Even in this early text Husserl maintains that experience entails both sensations and interpretative acts. However, texts such as this seem to suggest that apprehension entails an ‘act’ of consciousness upon our prior and immediate (passively received) sensations, which supposedly would be given originally while the apprehension would be belatedly tacked on to this initial immanence. Obviously this way of characterizing experience and appearance creates some problems for the interpretation of early phenomenology, especially as Husserl persists in maintaining this distinction within the noetic moment even in the lectures on passive and active synthesis. Marion’s criticism may still be valid since even in later texts Husserl remains unclear on whether sensations and feelings would be non-intentional. The separation of noesis into hyletic data or stuff and an animating intention maintains a matter/form structure. Husserl also seems to suggest that the sensuous understood apart from the animating intention would fall outside of intentionality.

We find such concrete really immanent Data [i.e., pleasure, pain and tickle sensations] as components in more inclusive concrete mental processes which are intuitive as wholes; and, more particularly, we find those sensuous moments overlaid by a stratum which, as it were, animates [beseelende] which
bestows sense [sinngebende](or essentially involves a bestowing of sense)—a stratum by which precisely the concrete intuitive mental process arises from the sensuous, which has in itself nothing pertaining to intentionality (ID I, 172/ID 1,203).

In this formulation it would appear that the sensuous realm on its own has no ‘content’ or ‘quality’ and it is only after a cognitive act or ‘interpretation’ that the sensuous has ‘sense.’ Marion certainly seems to adopt aspects of this view with his notion of modes of consciousness that are intrinsically non-intentional, though non-intentional does not entail ‘formless stuff’ in Marion’s account. Marion endorses just such a separation of experience (as the phenomenality of phenomena) and appearance (the intentionally fulfilled or fulfillable phenomena). This separation of phenomenality and phenomena is certainly a possibility Husserl acknowledged with the notion of feelings as given absolutely, without adumbrations (Abschattungen) and in immanence (ID I, 81-82/ID I, 95-96). However, while Marion’s own account of the immanence of givenness and subjectivity relies on the same sort of absoluteness he is also critical of the claim that on its own the sensuous realm has no ‘sense’—that it requires an ‘act’ of sense bestowing (i.e., it requires ‘objectification’ before it is ‘meaningful’). Marion equates objectivity with cognitive processes and then applies cognition and objectivity to apprehension. Sokolowski suggests that the separation of noesis into intentional act and hyletic data is flawed because what is left out of Husserl’s analysis of both the noetic and noematic moments in Ideas I is the very quality or content of our experiences (Formation 159).

The point of this criticism seems to be that while Husserl certainly discusses various non-cognitive experiences (e.g., valuing, loving, sensing etc.) there is little in his discussions that explains how these experiences differ radically from ‘thinking’. (I would suggest this is not only about how various types of experiencing differ but also how they are mutually implicated.) The point is that Husserl does little to explore what it means to love or to value etc. rather than that he equates emotion to thought. The formulation of hyletic data and animating intentions also suggests that sensations as meaningless on their own require a ‘cognitive’ activity to become meaningful. This is not to equate the moment of apprehension with cognition in general since properly speaking cognition is a vaster field than the noetic moment of apprehension. Apprehensions are not judgements of reason for example. However, it does seem that we would not want to separate it from cognition completely either. Our perceptual and emotive lives are not dissociated from a whole history of understanding the world.

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104 I return to the relation of this absoluteness of feeling to the versions of subjectivity put forward by Marion, Levinas and Husserl in Chapter Five. I argue there that Husserl may not adequately deal with the temporal unfolding of our emotive lives and that this issue is intrinsically tied to how each philosopher understands subjectivity.

105 This is precisely a point that Merleau-Ponty makes throughout the Phenomenology of Perception. While he is certainly critical of a certain notion of cognition or reason (i.e., what I have been referring to as instrumental reason) he also
theoretical bias in classical phenomenology argues that the notion of hyletic data actually points to an intentionality other than an objectifying intentionality (I 65-85/ I 137-51; E 137-144, 145-162/E 122-129,135-150). Levinas ties the notion of hyletic data to Husserl’s discussion of temporality and the Ur-impression, our primal contact with the world and to Husserl’s analysis of the lived body in Ideas II. It is worth taking a slight detour from Husserl’s method to explore Levinas’ defence of hyletic data as it reflects the direction of his mature philosophical work and the affinity between his position and that of Marion.

In his Philosophical Writings, Abbé de Condillac hypothesizes the case of a statue to which we add one sense at a time, smell being the first. Condillac claims that this results in a being which (for itself) is nothing more than what it smells (in Condillac’s example this is a rose) (175). In Intentionality and Metaphysics Levinas suggests that Condillac’s hypothesis is highly problematic when applied to human beings. Levinas is rightfully critical of such an approach as reducing human beings to sensibility and sensibility to qualitative differences (i.e. smell, taste, perception, texture, sound). In Marion’s notions of auto-affection and hetero-affection this is just what is presupposed: prior to reflection or ‘thought’ we are what we sense, even when this sensing is reduced to an anonymous givenness. While Marion does touch upon an essential intimacy that ties us to the world and others and perhaps even to ourselves, what this position fails to take into account is just what the example of Condillac’s statue does not account for: the world of difference between a statue, an inanimate ‘thing’ and a ‘person’. For the person the smell of the rose is not what one is or even the pre-reflective experience of the world, as if we ever so lose ourselves that we merge with that which we experience (other than in mystical experiences tied to most world religions). What our experience seems to suggest is that the ‘rose’ opens the subject to the world, it exposes the subject to something foreign. Unlike Condillac’s statue, the smell of the rose takes on a value for the person, it smells perhaps ‘sweet’ or stimulates one to pleasure, it reminds one of their youth or even in the immediacy of the moment it carries an unarticulated message about one’s time on earth, the ‘nature’ of nature or some such ‘thought.’ While we can no doubt imagine merging with the smell of the rose and excluding all influence from our other senses, this hardly seems to be how our experience operates as a ‘norm.’ In order to separate the smell of the rose not just from the associations of the other senses, the

suggests perception is an achievement and a response to the world—it is not a mute acceptance of givenness as Marion suggests. A whole history of thought is always already implicated in each and every achievement of this sort, this implies that a certain conceptual understanding/reason always already grounds our perceptual contact with the world.

106 For a similar discussion see: Alphonso Lingis, Hyletic Data 96-101.

107 This reference is taken from a translators note to Intentionality and Metaphysics (E 140, /E 125, note 1).
appearance of the rose, its possible texture, the horizons that surround it but also from past associations, a whole history of experience, requires an operation that one can only achieve through abstraction. Levinas takes Husserl’s relation of experience and meaning as being paramount to any kind of phenomenological description. To describe experience, even pre-reflective experience, is to uncover the meanings inherent to a particular experience. However, like Marion, Levinas objects to an objective or theoretical bias in Husserlian phenomenology. What our experience ‘means’ is not some kind of adequation between our expressions about the world and the sensible/experienced world but the way in which an experience affects us, what our experience ‘feels’ like. In both Levinas and Marion, it is sensibility that is privileged over any thought or thinking which is tied to a totalitarian rationality—an objective intentionality. In fact, Levinas’ defense of ‘hyletic data’ is premised on a privileging of sensibility over comprehension. He reads Husserl as claiming that “[t]he presence of the object is not thought as such; it results from the materiality of sensations, from the nonthought that is lived” (E 150/E 139). He ties this lived sensibility to Husserl’s discussion of temporality and claims the Ur-impression is “an other penetrating the same, life and not ‘thought’” (E 156/E 144). (I return to the relation Levinas draws between sensibility, temporality and intentionality in Part Three below.) Levinas may reject a Condillacian view of sensibility but he still maintains, at one level of analysis, the priority of sensation over thought, sensibility is not reducible to what we think or can comprehend. And living is somehow radically different than ‘thought’, whatever a thought so dissociated from life or a life so dissociated from thought could be. However, there is also another critical difference between Marion and Levinas, if for Marion givenness determines human beings (we are affected and feeling beings before we are thinking beings or thinking is determined by affection—and there is a truth to this that would need to be unfolded) for Levinas’ it is only in the transition to an authentic thought, thought as an acceptance of responsibility, that our lives take on significance or meaning. Though this is a ‘thought’ distanced from what Levinas refers to as comprehension or representation. What makes us ‘human’ is the ability to seek the meaning of our existence in the infinity of the Other and this requires a refined sensibility, one radically different from any traditional notion of reason or rationality which he characterizes as forms of totalitarianism. This is also a sensibility radically different from any traditional notion of sensibility.

There are further consequences of the positions of Marion and Levinas. Marion actually seems to defend a privileging of the noetic (immanent) aspects of the intentional relation which he ‘reduces’ to a non-intentional sphere. In fact, while Marion never clearly articulates this, his notion of givenness (broadened beyond objectivity and Being) has affinities with a hyletic data unmoored from any apprehension. Like Condillac’s statue, givenness as call and interloqué are so reduced that there is nothing that separates them. Levinas does not fall prey to this ‘reductionism’ since he maintains an irreducibility at the ‘origin’ of all life. The difference between the two positions is in their attitude to the transcendence of givenness. If in Being Given Marion equates the performance of his reduction to the performance of givenness, both are the same kind of act, then it seems that the ego in its performance or activity produces givenness (ED 41-42/BG 27). To the question “What Gives?” the reply seems to be that which gives the
given to itself—all transcendent being is subsumed in an immanence without limits.\textsuperscript{108}

Auto-affection is first and last cause of all that \textit{is}. And, this is an auto-affection forgetful of its own accomplishments since the banishment of intentionality suggests an immediacy without any past or future. There is another consequence of this view, for Marion the distinctions between affectivity, receptivity and spontaneity are dissolved since ‘what’ affects or receives is nothing other than itself. If, we accept that Husserl’s original characterizations of phenomenological method are flawed since they embrace the matter/form schema (i.e., sensation/sense-bestowal) and further that this leads to a dualism between transcendent reality and the immanence of consciousness, then Marion’s auto-affection thesis and his ‘pure’ reduction merely repeat the aporias he locates in Husserl’s position. As stated in Chapter One it is not clear how or why such a subject would be motivated to transcend the self-sufficiency of her own sphere of immanence towards the world or others. Levinas, on the other hand, is more careful to preserve the transcendental sphere but his transcendence haunts the self-immanence of subjectivity. The subject of enjoyment is haunted by the possibility of lack, the transcendence of the world she lives from withholding itself. The ethical subject is faced by a transcendence that traumatizes her and is beyond all comprehension. In this view the noematic moment is \textit{subsumed} within the noetic moment causing a destruction of subjectivity from within, transcendence breaks the interiority of immanence and, as it were, ‘shatters’ the subject. This is a kind of implosion within the intentional relation, one where the two moments retain their differentiation but also ‘infect’ each other (i.e., the \textit{trace}). The conclusion seems to be that subjectivity is first and foremost instituted by the trauma/exposure of the Other. The notion of trauma, which Levinas does not give any clear definition of in \textit{Otherwise than Being} is, as far as I understand it, the sensibility of the exposure to the face of the Other which commands me. There is a certain violence associated with this term, since in the language of \textit{Otherwise than Being} this term appears alongside terms such as the \textit{persecution} and the being \textit{held hostage} of the \textit{Same} (i.e., the subject) to the Other. Obviously the aim is to disclose a level of primordial passivity or extreme vulnerability. However, these are not just neutral terms that articulate an elusive relationship but terms inspired by a particular critique of the history of the subject in Western thought. The noematic correlate to noesis is the \textit{objective} side of intentionality in Husserl, it is the \textit{representative} (not as a representation of) of the transcendent \textit{within} consciousness. The noematic moment describes in what \textit{manner} an object is given (i.e., as perceived, as judged, as valued etc.) but also acts as the objective pole to which the noetic or subjective experiencing is correlated. One could understand this correlation as introducing openness within both the noetic and noematic ‘sides’ of the correlation since within the noetic moment closure or determinateness is restricted by the open endedness of the hyletic component of noesis and on the noematic side the determinability of modes of appearing (i.e., perceiving, judging etc.) is restricted by an essential ‘open-endedness’

\textsuperscript{108} This formulation of the question is of course premised on a certain reading of the German “es gibt” as well as a relating of givenness and the gift. See Chapter Two for a discussion of givenness and the gift.
of any possible object—things could always be otherwise than they ‘appear’ and there are multiple modes of possible appearing. The noetic on Levinas’ account is the hyletic moment without need of any ‘apprehending act’ on the part of the subject. I understand this as suggesting that sense for the subject is instituted by the exterior—the transcendent world and the transascendent Other (i.e., exposure.) There is a truth in both these perspectives—the sensible world is not a mute and meaningless sphere that requires an abstract cognitive determination (i.e., a judgement) in order to be meaningful (Marion). However, this is not to say that sensation on its own can explain our contact with the world and Others, it may elicit a response from us but we are not purely passive recipients of this call and this is what the ‘act’ of apprehension was meant to disclose. The transcendent (i.e., the world and Others) does indeed contaminate the immanent though this may be because the transcendent while distinct is also not incommensurable or incomparable with the immanent.109 In fact, Husserl’s re-working of his methodology from Ideas I to the Cartesian Meditations may suggest a discontent with his earlier articulations of the correlation of noesis/noema. Though this re-articulation may not suggest a rejection of the earlier method but rather a clarification of why the distinction was methodologically necessary and an elaboration of the moments within correlation. The resolution, following the notion of correlation as a unity in diversity, suggests that while we can indeed talk about abstract moments within the noetic moment—hyletic data and apprehension, this is a methodological principle that allows the possibility of refining our understanding of how we attribute ‘sense.’

However, to claim this is a purely methodological principle does not mean that ‘hyle’ does not play an important role for Husserl. James Dodd suggests “Husserl maintains the notion of hyle as non-intentional in order to point to a horizon within which intentionality unfolds. This would be a way to leave room for a transcendence that cannot be rendered through a purely intentional account but would be a “radical transcendence that can never be the correlate of an intentional thesis” (Dodd, “Phenomenon”435). Dodd suggests that this is a notion of transcendence that the notion of phenomenon is meant to capture. Phenomena are not only that which can be brought to intuitive fulfillment (or not) but the inscription of a transcendence at the heart of experience that none-the-less is within the experienced. I suggest that one way to understand this is in terms of Fink’s distinction between operative and thematic concepts (“Operative Concepts”). Dodd:

[I]t [i.e., the sensuous] is a reel moment of phenomenon as an experience, appearance as sensuous implies that an integration of this distance, this new sense of horizon, into the presentive sphere of the phenomenon has already been achieved. Thus the pure phenomenon has within its structure not only a pure act of

109 Levinas’ position shares affinities with my reading of Husserl, however as Chapter Three has shown there is a problem in the incommensurability of the transcendent and immanent in his works.
synthesis, but a bridge between the field of appearance (which is eidetically ordered) and a radical transcendence that can never be the mere correlate of an intentional thesis. All intentional theses must be understood within a larger context or horizon wherein something that can never be the correlate of a thesis is grasped.... This horizon within which theses are embedded is, as it were, the other side of the intentional, the presence of the radically transcendent, with respect to any presenting experience, within experience ("Phenomenon" 435).

The thematic concepts that lead to new synthesis are themselves grounded by operative concepts that are not themselves thematized but are none-the-less already at 'work' in any experience. This does not suggest that we could uncover this non-intentional 'ground' but rather points to a radical transcendence that is part of any experience we can have. This is not only the transcendence of other persons or objects in nature but also a self-transcendence on the part of the transcendental ego.

Husserl in Passive Synthesis offers an enlightening example of why we would want to keep the methodological distinction within noesis despite the fact that "original adumbration [of the hyletic data] necessarily goes hand in hand with appresentation" (PS, 18/PS, 55 note 33). If my perception of a man should, on closer inspection, turn into that of a wax figure, it is not on the basis of a radical change of the sense data but is rather that "the same stock of hyletic data is the common support for two overlapping apprehensions" (PS, 33-37/PS, 72-75). In this discussion of the mode of doubt Husserl utilizes the distinction of hyletic data and appresentation to explain how doubt arises—the distinction is applied here as purely a methodological separation and aids the phenomenologist in clarifying modes of consciousness. What is of note in Husserl's example is that my experience, even when doubtful, is given with a 'sense.' The 'data' of sensation is presented with an apprehension, even if this apprehension is mistaken. However, there is also a sense in which this possibility of doubt is part and parcel of the way I have 'things'. Hyle plays a dual role as that which remains a "common support for...overlapping apprehensions" and as that which accounts for a transcendence which to some extent cannot be rendered evident (PS, 33-37/PS, 72-75). The notion of hyle then suggests a limitation to the kind of evidence we can hope to achieve in perception and acts as a limiting factor on apprehensions. The apprehensions we have are not merely an imposition of form on matter but rather a mediation between consciousness and the world. As such the hyletic moment introduces a certain openness to our experience of the world. As Dodd points out this suggests a certain "play between 'inactuality' and 'actuality,' between a presence and a non-presence that is of a different order than the difference between 'fulfilled intention' and 'unfulfilled intention'" (Phenomenon 435).

In Cartesian Meditations the noetic is described as the "multiplicities of consciousness," which is to say that noesis describes the various acts or processes of consciousness which go into intending an object, this intended object is for its part the correlate to noesis—noema (CM, 85/CM, 47). In one sense we could understand the noema as the identity pole of the intentional object—not just the object as identical but as
an object with such and such features and predicates. As Drummond points out, the noema should not be understood as if it occupied an intermediate place between consciousness and the external object (i.e., the noema as re-presentation of the externally real object) since the “reduction” has taken us out of the natural attitude with its positing of an external reality (“Structure” 70-71). Within the neutrality of the reduction we take up a philosophical attitude towards our concrete life, this is a shift in our attention, which allows us to see what our living in the natural attitude hides—every lived experience is dyadic. The manifold of acts of consciousness that constitute any experience and the intentionally ‘objective pole’ towards which they are directed. While Husserl’s analysis of noema are complex and not always clear we can understand the noema as the intended unitary object as it is intended (i.e., the various modes of givenness within which we approach ‘objects’), this is not the object as it is in-itself since with the epoche we are only dealing with the object as it is given to consciousness. What is of note in relation to the larger issues of my project is that this intentional relation which paradoxically subsumes the transcendental within the immanent sphere does not reduce the givenness of this transcendence to immanence. The intentional correlation does not explain the production or creation of objects in consciousness but rather describes the inscription of transcendence at the very heart of immanence. The object, whether physical, animate or inanimate, mental, ‘real’ or ideal, whether given as an object of value or merely as a perceived object is given to me as appearing paradoxically as a manifold within its temporal extension and yet as unified. There is another relevant shift in the theory of constitution with the analysis of time, if in works such as Ideas I Husserl appears to relativize the world and to treat it as a product of absolute consciousness, in the later works the correlation between subject and world suggests a co-dependency between the two regions of being. However, I think it is questionable whether the “annihilation of the world” Husserl discusses in § 49 of Ideas I suggests that consciousness produces objective reality or whether the thought experiment in that section actually illustrates the necessary correlation of consciousness and world—without consciousness a meaningful world is nonsensical and without a world consciousness is empty of content. The formulation in this section could however suggest a privileging of one region of being over another (i.e., dualism) rather than the dyadic framework adopted in the Meditations. Though Husserl is clear in §108 of Ideas I that reflection does not produce noema (which would be to reduce the ‘object’ as phenomenon to its noetic correlates) but that the something which appears elicits a response (ID I, 91-93, 220-221/ID I, 109-112, 256-257). This has implications for how intentionality is to be understood and this transforms the ‘absoluteness’ of consciousness. However, even after his lectures on time-consciousness Husserl persists in treating the immanent sphere as if it were presented without adumbrations or profiles. This seems to suggest immanent experiencing is given in a punctual now, which suggests that consciousness is given to itself in an immediacy without any ‘hidden’ moments. Certainly Husserl’s own claims in The Phenomenology of Internal Consciousness suggest the ‘now’ point is to some extent an

110 This would of course clarify the kind of ‘object’ we are dealing with as well.
“ideal limit” or what Husserl refers to as the “edge-point [Randpunkt] of an interval in time” (PIZ 70 /PIT 95). 111 This has implications for the “double intentionality” thesis of inner-time-consciousness and impacts Husserl’s theory of evidence, particularly the self-evidence of the transcendental ego which will have to be explored in Chapter Five.

**Part Three: Immanence, Transcendence and Temporality**

In *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness*, the tension I suggest between the immanence and transcendence of experience, especially in those experiences ‘given’ without profiles or adumbrations—‘in immediacy,’ are explored through the inner temporality of consciousness. The basic ‘structure’ of temporality in this work consists of three ‘moments’: retention, primal impression and protention. My analysis of time consciousness focuses on the relation of inner time-consciousness to intentionality and on whether it is possible to see auto-affection as a relation that breaks out of the bounds of the double intentionality thesis. Commentators, such as Dan Zahavi, take the basic question in this work to be addressing the problem of “reflection theories of consciousness”—the problem of infinite regress—“how consciousness can catch itself in the act of self-awareness without becoming an ‘object’ for- itself” (“Inner Time” 157-180). 112 Zahavi’s resolution to the dilemma of infinite regress is to suggest an implicit self-awareness (i.e., non-reflective awareness), a kind of ‘awareness’ that shares some affinities with Marion’s notion of auto-affection. The problem of infinite regress can be rendered as follows: If consciousness has itself in a way distinct from its objects (i.e., non-reflectively/non-thematically) then it must come into contact with itself in an immanence/immediacy that is distinct from the intentional relation it has to transcendent objects. Consciousness must have a relation to itself that is distinct from the relation it has to objects if it is to act as a reliable grounding for any other objectivity. If classical phenomenology characterizes consciousness as inherently intentional then this seems to suggest that it only ever has itself retrospectively—the consciousness that acts in the world is distinct from the consciousness that reflects upon its acts and acquisitions. Husserl recognized this problem and from the time of *Ideas I* tries to account for the immanence of self-manifestation and differentiate this self-givenness from various types of object givenness in *Internal Time-Consciousness* (this is a point he already acknowledged in the second edition of the *Investigations*). In fact, his suggestions of possibly non-intentional kinds of experiences, even as early as the *Logical Investigations*, may have been an attempt to delineate a unique kind of givenness of consciousness for/to

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111 Jay Lampert suggests that there are problems with the account of inner temporality particularly with the notion of simultaneity (which is essential for Husserl’s account of consciousness’ self relation) and this has repercussions for my account of the double intentionality thesis (private communication: working title: *Simultaneity and Delay*). Thanks to Dr. Lampert for allowing me to look at this unpublished material as it made me aware of problems with my analysis I had not considered.

112 This is my phrasing of the question and not Zahavi’s.
The apodicity of consciousness proclaimed in *Ideas I* and *Cartesian Meditations* is an attempt to differentiate this sphere of experience from other sorts of experiences and to ground all experience in an absolute. However, even in *Ideas I* Husserl is clear that it is only with a discussion of temporality that a "true" absolute can be proclaimed (*ID I*, 162-164/ID I, 192-195).

Zahavi’s notion of self-affection is mediated by a notion of hetero-affection and in this sense is ‘better’ than Marion’s initial rendition of auto-affection in *Cartesian Questions*. However, Zahavi insists that “self-affection” is presented originally as non-dyadic (“Inner Time” 164,167). I argue that the triadic structure of inner-temporality suggests a self-manifestation of consciousness (self-givenness) that still operates within the dyadic structure of intentionality. There may be a self-affection of consciousness in inner time-consciousness but this is distinct from the non-ecstatic auto-affection that Henry and Marion suggest. This is also the position of John Brough in “The Emergence of An Absolute Consciousness.” Brough suggests that Husserl’s notions of vertical intentionality and horizontal intentionality support the notion of an implicit self-awareness, though this is still an intentional relation (“Emergence” 95-99). There is a different kind of intentionality at work in consciousness’self-relation than an intentionality of act, though I would suggest that even this other structure of intentionality retains a dyadic nature and is distinct from but not separate from an intentionality of act. There is a non-objectivating intentionality that reflects the self-constitutive nature of consciousness and this intentionality reflects the very nature of inner time-consciousness. I develop this non-objectivating intentionality in the following. I begin my analysis by differentiating and relating this notion of intentionality to an intentionality of act.

The static analysis of the intentionality of act gives us two perspectives on the same experience—the experience from the perspective of a manifold of appearances, divided into apprehensions and sensations and the appearance of the one unified object as appearing in this or that manner. While the divisive analysis entailed in a static methodology are certainly based on abstractions this does not undermine the truth/evidence they are capable of uncovering. Consciousness as intentional suggests a possibility of a ‘return’ or ‘turn’ within conscious experience, the ability to reflect, which is possible because of the structure of inner-time. In the following, I begin with an analysis of various ‘turns’ within an intentionality of act (Querintentionalität/transverse intentionality) and then relate this to the structure of inner time-consciousness before developing the double intentionality thesis and the intentionality (Längsintentionalität/longitudinal intentionality) it entails (PIZ 81-82/PIT 107-108). (I return to these two intentionalities below). I suggest that within an intentionality of act there are at least four possibilities within each intentional experience and further that these possibilities are reflective of an essential connection between the nature of inner time-consciousness and intentionality.

First, I can direct myself to the unity of the two perspectives within an intentional moment, as is usually the case in the natural attitude. I am unaware in my everyday activities of either the subjective or objective poles of experience. My experience of my room is not given to me as either a series of subjectively perceptual moments offering
various data and "apprehensions" of these data or of an objective pole of reference which unites my various perceptions together. I open my eyes and here is my room just as it was a moment ago, if I go down the hall there are stairs just as I expected. The "world" in the mundane attitude is given to me as a coherent and harmonious world of my projects. I usually live within an unthematized intentionality (this is an intentionality of act but one that is characterized by a naivety, a naive realism) that connects me not only to the world and others but also with myself. I say unthematized intentionality because even in the natural attitude events can momentarily awaken me to an inherent discordance between the world as I live it and as it may be presented to me. The relation I have with the external world can break down (e.g., my "equipment" is broken or in anxiety my relation to the world is transformed and what was familiar takes on an aura of "strangeness.") Heidegger and Sartre describe these types of experiences extensively in Being and Time and Being and Nothingness.

Second, I can, through a "turn" or shift of attitude, become aware of the dyadic nature of experience and focus on the various sensations and acts that give me a world, and become aware of the fleeting aspect of this experience. Instead of "walking" I can in the process of walking think about the very process/movements this entails and how it feels. In other words I can "turn" from an outward directedness (i.e. a perceptual attitude) to an inner directedness (i.e., to my experiencing.) Third, I can focus on the way in which things, others and myself are 'given' as unified and 'whole,' I can turn my attention to the features of experience that are unifying or that attribute identity and I can focus on the features or manner of this unified givenness (i.e. on the perceived as perceived.) I direct my regard to objects each in their unique objectivity. Fourth, I can look at both 'poles' of this experiencing and 'how' they in their turn form a unity (i.e. how the noetic and noematic moments together give this perception, recollection, etc..) It should be noted that the difference between one and four is the difference between living in experience (i.e., the natural attitude) and reflecting on the experience (i.e., the philosophical attitude), reflection on an experience is of course retrospective.

This fourfold 'possibility' opened by intentionality reflects the very nature of consciousness: consciousness has the capacity not merely to have different perspectives on the things of the world (i.e., physical world) but to metaphorically 'walk around' its own experiencing thus 'seeing' its own experiences from various perspectives and in various 'manners'. (I can slow down the unfolding of a particular experience in order to 'see' how an event or object is synthesized and constituted, I can abstract particular 'parts' of an experience in order to explore these parts etc.). This kind of experiencing is obviously not properly a 'spatial' horizon that requires our body as its 'zero-point,' but is analogous to the spatial horizon. The experience of space requires what Merleau-Ponty in the Phenomenology of Perception calls the "lived body," this is the ground of all positionality within space—the condition of space while paradoxically also 'spatial' itself. In a similar way consciousness is not 'in' time like a 'thing' within space nor can we say it is the condition of temporality as the lived body is of space (though perhaps as already temporal it is the condition of objective time.) We can 'turn' and 're-turn' to our experiences because consciousness is temporal. Our 'intentional' hold on the world is paradoxically condition of and conditioned by our essentially temporal nature. What this
means is explored in the following.

Before continuing, I should stress that I do not claim that an implicit self-awareness is not possible but rather question whether this is an auto-affection in Marion’s sense. Marion privileges what I refer to above as ‘tacit intentionality’ and then makes the further claim that this kind of relation when internalized in esteem or any other self-related emotion or feeling suggests a relation without ecstatic distance. Marion takes one side of intentionality of consciousness and posits it as the origin of consciousness, life. I question whether this distance-less relation is possible. If the nature of inner time-consciousness puts into question the possibility of a now point (primal impression) devoid of a retentional or protentional moment and if this suggests a special kind of intentionality, then even in our most intimate moments we are “consciousness of.” I argue in the rest of this chapter and the next that if the now point is always tied to retentions and protentions then we cannot return to an ‘origin’ in the sense either Marion or Levinas suggest and further that this ‘structure’ of inner time is the ‘ground’ of intentionality. Consciousness is intentional through and through because it is temporal, even our affective lives unfold temporally, despite Husserl’s own suggestions of non-intentional regions of experiencing. (According to Husserl, we are conscious of transcendent and immanent objects and non-objectively of the flow within which constitution takes place, we simultaneously experience both, though of course we can ‘abstract’ from one and thematize the other.) The structure of temporality as Husserl describes it suggests that the primal impression while the pivotal point of all lived experience is never given on its own. Husserl’s analysis seems to suggest that this now point is not just related to a past and future, as if each moment could be neatly separated out from the others, but is rather one process with three distinguishable aspects. In one sense it is the now point that is continually coming to be, receding into the past and pre-delineating the ‘place’ of its replacement. The ‘now point’ understood in this way entails its past and future and our thematizing it allows us to abstract from its various moments which, in actuality, are a unity in flux. In fact, this is one aspect of the double intentionality thesis—paradoxically that which is constitutive is also in its turn self-constituted. The temporal unfolding of ‘things’ in the world constitutes the ‘unity’ of ‘things’ and is at the same time a self-constituting unity. Before turning to the double intentionality thesis I briefly explore the process of the temporal unfolding of an ‘object’.

In § 8 of The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness Husserl explains how an object beginning with what he refers to as the “generative now” (i.e., this is the Urimpression, though it occupies the ‘place’ of the ‘first’ primal impression in a succession) recedes “into the remoteness of consciousness” in an analogous manner to how a physical object recedes into the distance as we move away from it (PIZ 25/PIT 45). In subsequent sections this receding of now points (not just the generative now but each successive ‘now’ that follows it) is characterized as “running-off phenomena” [Ablaufsphänomene] (PIZ 27/PIT 48). Each ‘now’ in its turn “sinks back into the past,” which is to say each now is retained as a retention of the now just passed ((PIZ 25/PIT 46). Retentions or the “primarily remembered” are not “symbolization[s]” but “originary consciousness.” However, unlike an echo which has its own now point(s) the retentions are “consciousness of what has just been” (PIZ 31-32/PIT 52-54). The ‘generative now’
with its “comet’s tail of retentions” forms a continuity that is critical for any notion of identity (PIZ 30/PIT 52). In relation to how something that has just been (i.e., that is past) and something that is can be identical Husserl claims: “Something past and something now can indeed be identically the same but only because it has endured between the past and now” (PIZ 34/PIT 57, emphasis mine). In essence this suggests that temporal objects “spread their content over an interval in time” (PIZ 37/PIT 61). This notion of an interval of time is crucial to Husserl’s analysis of inner time consciousness. Within a temporal interval an object is experienced as “continuous[ly] shading-off” which is to say that while the structure of temporality entails three distinct moments (i.e., primal impression, retention and protention), perception or “originary consciousness” is “an act which is continuously gradated.” This suggests that “a punctual phase can never be for itself” (PIZ 47/PIT 70). If a punctual phase is never for itself this also suggests in one sense that objects are given through successive perceptions, each ‘new’ now passing over into retention and soliciting its replacement through protention. Protention for its part prescribes possible fulfills and it is possible that these could be disappointed (i.e., the cat I see on closer inspection turns out to be a rat). While protentions can include various possibilities (i.e., cats and rats) they do not seem to be completely ‘open’, otherwise there would be no consistency to our experiences—this is one way to say our experience is not purely arbitrary—any ‘now’ moment with its retention(s) suggests certain expectations/anticipations. It is possible that we can be surprised and none of our expectations are met but whatever does occur is taken up into the now and retained in retention—perhaps even as an experience that surprised and was essentially unfulfillable.113 (Husserl does not seem to differentiate protention and expectation in Inner Time-Consciousness). So objects are not ‘given’ in an instantaneous ‘now’ but constituted over time, they are inherently temporal. In fact, it is interesting that in relation to givenness Husserl often uses language that suggests givenness is attained not merely given in immediacy. (I explore whether this only applies to what Husserl refers to as objective intentions/intentional objects in Chapter Five.) However, each new now also originary gives new primal impressions so that each past moment undergoes ‘modification’. What this suggests is that each retention is not experienced as a ‘now’ but specifically as a just having been and also that the modified ‘now’ is still ‘identical’ to the new now. This needs elaboration. Identity is tied to both the ever new now moments that arise exhibiting similar or the ‘same’ content (not temporally the same) as well as what Husserl calls the “temporal position.” “The same sensation now and in another now has a difference, in fact a phenomenological difference which corresponds to the absolute temporal position.” The same sensation is different from one temporal moment to the next and this is a difference in temporal position. It is the apprehension that provides the “as what” of the apprehension, i.e., the sense” (PIZ 66/PIT 90). Unlike the sensation which is ‘new’ (at least in relation to temporal position) in each now the apprehension

113 This notion of essentially unfulfillable protentions may clarify the kind of experiences Marion and Levinas suggest and I return to protention in Chapter Five to flesh out in what sense Husserl’s theory of inner time-consciousness can accommodate such experiences.
intends no new sense, though it too is modified in the movement to retention. The "generative now" as well as the terminating now (the last now in a successive series of gradations) act as "ideal limits" since what we actually have is "a continuum of gradations in the direction of ideal limits" (this section of text is specifically in reference to the temporality of perceptual objects) (PIZ 40/PIT 62). Obviously this would impact what kind of 'evidence' perceptual objects can provide. (The moment of protention would introduce an openness of possibility here, particularly in relation to perceptual evidence which would then be open to revision, to a 'seeing more'). In this sense retention as primary remembrance is an intrinsic aspect of experience. Secondary remembrance or reproduction has a similar structure to that of retention (i.e., primary remembrance) with two exceptions: first, reproduction is a practical possibility of conscious life which entails more elasticity in how we can approach memories, which is to say we can presentify memories "quickly" or "slowly" as partial memories or in a confused or clear manner and in fact we can abstract from memories focussing on this or that aspect of a past event or occurrence (PIZ 47-48/71). Second, reproductions are perhaps more prone to errors than retentions since the greater the temporal distance from the present the more chance of a loss of clarity (PIZ 47-49/PIT 71-72). However, errors in primary remembrance can also occur since our apprehensions can be misguided, the temporal succession within an interval of time has taken place but there may not be an objective 'event' that corresponds to this since individual apprehensions can be misguided (e.g., I saw a cat in the yard but the cat was actually a large rat) (PIZ 49-50/PIT 72-73). It should be noted that in the case of errors in primal remembrance what is originally 'given' (i.e., the primal impressions making up the perception of what I thought was a cat) are not themselves mistaken—it is apprehensions that lead to my error. This possibility of the error of memory has implications for Husserl's notion of the recoverability of "the whole stream of consciousness up to the living present" (PIZ 54/PIT 77). Husserl claims that the stream of consciousness as memory (primary and secondary) "is in continuous flux because conscious life is in constant flux and is not merely fitted member by member into the chain" (PIZ 54/PIT 77). The openness that protention guarantees to 'objects' is substituted by new nows within the sphere of memory since every 'new' now retroactively affects the possibilities of what has gone before. In fact, "everything new reacts to the old...the new points again to the new, which, entering is determined and modifies the reproductive possibilities for the old" (PIZ 54/PIT 77-78). Obviously this has implications not only for the kind of evidence transcendent objects can have but for the manner in which consciousness can be given to itself. If a present phase of consciousness in making itself an object 'modifies' this object (as well as itself) then the self-relation of consciousness will have to necessarily entail a certain 'openness', at least in relation to the present within which a 'reproduction' of a past phase of consciousness takes place. Husserl calls this the double intentionality of recollection. What is recollected is a past phase of intentions, however the present also entails its own intentions. "What is remembered appears as having been present, that is, immediately and intuitively. And it appears in such a way that a present intuitively appears which is at an interval from the present of the actual now" (PIZ 59/PIT 83, emphasis mine). In the present a past object in its own temporal position (i.e., with its
now) is presented as a memory (i.e., "as if now") the present also ‘modifies’ this recollection that was and is not in coincidence with this past, otherwise there would be no difference between a present perception and a memory. There is then a double intentionality here; the intentional phase as past and the present intentional phase as recalling this past phase "as if now" (PIZ 59/PIT 83). (Husserl also makes the further claim that this is not a “re-living of the perception” and this has implications for Marion’s notion of auto-affection which I address at the end of this Chapter.) I argue in the following that the double intentionality of recollection reflects the double intentionality of retention which is key to how consciousness can experience itself as constitutive flux.

Husserl explains the double intentionality thesis as follows:
Consequently, like two aspects of one and the same thing, there are in the unique flux of consciousness two inseparable homogeneous intentionalities which require one another and are interwoven with one another. By means of the one, immanent time is constituted, i.e., an Objective time, an authentic time in which there is duration and alteration of that which endures. In the other is constituted the quasi-temporal disposition of the phases of the flux, which ever and necessarily has the flowing now-point, the phase of actuality, and the series of pre-actual and post-actual (of the not yet actual) phases. This phenomenal, pre-immanent temporality is constituted intentionally as the form of temporally constitutive consciousness and in the latter itself. The flux of the immanent, temporally constitutive consciousness not only is, but is so remarkably and yet so intelligibly constituted that a self-appearance of the flux necessarily subsists in it, and hence the flux itself must necessarily be comprehensible in the flowing. The self-appearance of the flux does not require a second flux, but qua phenomenon it is constituted in itself. The constituting and the constituted coincide, yet naturally they cannot coincide in every respect (PIZ, 83/PIT, 109-110, emphasis mine).

If we unpack this dense passage what we discover is that consciousness in one sense only has itself as a temporal flux retrospectively and through an intentional relation. However, Husserl also suggests that there is a paradoxical overlapping of the intentionally directed consciousness that has itself as an ‘object’ and the flux that is the ‘object’. This paradox may become clearer if we first approach the issue by way of an analogy with the consciousness of an object as at the same time a consciousness of our consciousness of the object (i.e., the simultaneity with which the object and consciousness are ‘given’ together in our experience). In what sense would the consciousness of an ‘object’ in the world be simultaneous with a consciousness of this object consciousness? And in what sense can such a simultaneity not “coincide in every respect” (PIZ, 83 /PIT, 109)?

Husserl in addressing a similar issue uses the example of the experience of a
musical note “C.” I focus on two sources in the text of this notion of a single or identical note, the first is § 31 of *The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness* and the second is an Appendix to § 44 on the distinction between internal and external perception (PIZ 94-96, 124-126/PIT 88-94, 170-174). While the theme of Appendix XI is adequate and inadequate perception, it turns out that the notion of identity or unity is tied to what counts as an adequate perception and what does not. These sections shed light on how perception is in one sense an accomplishment and on how even in the simple perception of a tone (i.e., the note “C”) there is a dyadic relation between inner time-consciousness and the object of consciousness. The unity or identity of the tone is tied to the “temporal flux” within which the tone ‘fills out time’. The temporal flux of the sounding of the note “C” is not in time itself (PIZ, 124-125/PIT 171-172). In order to hear the note “C” as one tone that endures and changes (i.e., changes in intensity or fluctuations) a consciousness that follows (“attends”) the temporal unfolding of the tone is necessary. What is more important here is that the unity attributed to the tone as it unfolds in time is also what individuates this tone “C.” The notion of the unity of the note requires a certain continuity be maintained from one moment to the next, this is not a mere succession of nows since this would only give us a series of unrelated notes or partial notes (i.e., we would still have to explain how the successive nows form a unity) and it is hardly the case that the note is accomplished in one punctual ‘now’, since the very notion of a punctual now dissociated from other moments is put into question if every now has its retention(s) and protention(s). Consciousness lives in the identical tone as it unfolds temporally but is not necessarily self-reflective during this time. However, living in the tone, following it as it individuates itself and is individuated by the temporal flux, is still a conscious process (i.e., one is conscious during the time of the tone) but perhaps not properly self-conscious. Listening to the note is not the same as thinking about myself listening to the note. There are two important points we can gain from this text that can be applied to the previously quoted passage dealing with the relation of consciousness to its self. First, identity or unity is not something ready made but unfolds over time through a process and second, while a reflective regard can bring to light the two sides of intentionality, noesis and noema, consciousness and “object” or consciousness and self-consciousness, within lived experience what we follow is the tone (‘object’) through time. Now the sense of consciousness in the example of the tone may well be an implicit self-awareness as Zahavi claims but to follow the tone is not to merge with it in its unfolding, it is not to become the sounding of the tone as Marion’s notion of auto-affection suggests. In this sense while there is a simultaneity of consciousness and its object this is not a coinciding in every respect (PIZ 83/PIT 110). There is a sense in which the tone must be at the same time as the consciousness that follows it out—thus there is a simultaneity of consciousness and ‘object’. However, to follow the temporal unfolding of the tone would also seem to require a ‘distance’ between consciousness and its ‘objects’. While the tone and my consciousness of the tone are given in the same time there appears in this same-nowness not a coinciding of the tone and consciousness but a distance between consciousness and the tone, even in each new now there is an ecstatic distance between ‘object’ and consciousness. There is an ecstatic distance since in one sense experience, even our self-experience entails what Marion refers to as a
schizophrenic doubling of consciousness, consciousness differentiates itself from ‘what’ it experiences. In our self experience this seems at a minimum to indicate a temporal distance—a temporal gap between the consciousness reflecting upon itself and the consciousness it reflects upon. To say that when I love or am joyful etc. these experiences are given without adumbrations is not to say that I just am my love or joy since this assumes the same notion of a punctual ‘now’ uncontaminated by a past or future. No doubt in an abstract account we could isolate such moments as Sartre does with jealousy in *Being and Nothingness* and certainly such abstractions can be insightful. One may live in the feeling, whatever it may be, and this may not be an intentionality of act as Marion understands it but one would still be directed to the feeling and not merely at one with it. On the other hand, to claim that examples such as this suggest a radical hetero-affection, one in which once again consciousness is purely passive seems equally absurd. To hear a tone as a unified sounding of note “C” requires a unifying of temporal elements that cannot be attributed purely to the note itself, unless we retain a metaphysical notion of the tone in-itself. This is not to suggest that it is a purely subjective accomplishment that owes nothing to the note but rather that it is in the relation between consciousness, which has a certain temporal structure, and the note that is sustained during a temporal duration that unity is ‘attained’. The unity or identity of the note takes time. And, in relation to the double intentionality thesis, as Husserl is right to point out it would be absurd to claim that while following out the temporal unfolding of the tone one would remain unconscious or not conscious at all (PIZ 119/PIT 162). To follow out a tone or melody is not purely a passive receptivity since at a minimum the one listening has to follow out (achieve) a temporal path towards identity or even discordance or disunity. This static analysis of a temporal object as it unfolds in time illustrates a necessary intentional distance between consciousness and its object. But does this necessary distance also apply to the self-relation of consciousness? I now return to § 39 quoted above.

In one sense the notion that below an immanent temporality, an objective time, there is a “pre-phenomenal, pre-immanent temporality” seems to suggest a ground or origin of consciousness in the sense of origin that I have suggested both Marion and Levinas endorse. Yet, Husserl claims that this pre-phenomenal temporality is “constituted intentionally as the form of temporally constitutive consciousness and in the latter itself” (PIZ, 83 /PIT, 109, emphasis mine). So how does this pre-phenomenal temporality constitute itself as a phenomenon (of the flux it is)? If we return to the example of how consciousness constitutes an identical object over time and analogically apply this to the self-relation of consciousness what we have is a unique intentionality that suggests a relation different from that between consciousness and ‘objects’ real or ideal. In its temporal unfolding consciousness constitutes itself as constitutive temporality. However, this is not a self-relation without ecstatic distance since the minimum condition for the revealing of this origin is an intentional distance. Paradoxically, “[t]he self-appearance of the flux does not require a second flux, but qua phenomenon it is constituted in itself” (PIZ, 83 /PIT, 109). The flux does not come into contact with its self in an immediacy or auto-affection but only by making itself into a phenomenon. (In one sense any talk of phenomena suggests that ‘something’ manifests itself, if consciousness ‘appears’ to itself as a phenomenon then it seems to follow that there is a ‘distance’ between that which
appears and the one to whom it appears.) However, this is not to say that in making itself
an object consciousness must multiply fluxes, the first flux becomes the ‘object’ of a
second flux, the second flux the ‘object’ of a third and so on. Nor does consciousness
have itself as it does any other objects—transcendent or immanent. However, there is a
problem with this account, since Husserl suggests that in one sense each moment or
phase of the flux is not identical with a phase of the flux in which that moment or phase
is constituted.

The phases of the flux of consciousness in which phases of the
same flux of consciousness are phenomenally constituted cannot
be identical with these constituted phases, and they are not
(PIZ, /PIT, 110, emphasis mine).

There are three points to note in this text: first, this obviously suggests that consciousness
is indeed intentionally directed to itself and does not come into contact with itself without
an ecstatic distance; second, the notion that what is “phenomenally constituted” is not “a”
retention but phases of retentions suggests that consciousness is a complex ‘object’ that
can only be reflectively regarded as an already pre-constituted unity and this has
implications for the sense in which absolute consciousness is an ‘origin’ or ‘ground’ for
phenomenology; third, consciousness only has itself as a phenomenon through a delay in
time (i.e., a temporal ‘gap’), the appearance of consciousness to itself always entails a
looking back at an pre-accomplished temporality. The first point has been a focal point of
my discussion up to this point but the second and third points need to be fleshed out. If
consciousness does not have itself in a retrieved moment of time, a past now this may be
because it, unlike the example above of a single note “C”, entails a different kind of
identity. The note “C” has a fairly determined temporal duration, it begins and fades
away or ends, consciousness on the other hand does not seem to have such determined
beginning and end points. The third point is related to the second and is crucial to the
kind of absoluteness that Husserl is able to claim for the transcendental ego since this
cannot be an origin of consciousness in the sense of primary or first since it is only
‘given’ reflectively and it would seem not ‘originally’ through a ‘presentation’ as are
perceptual objects and it is only given as an already constituted unity (i.e., unlike the
perceptual object which usually has fairly determined beginning and end points isolating
the ‘now’ point in which consciousness first arises is highly problematic). In fact, in an
appendix to § 39 (Appendix VIII) Husserl suggests that it is through “reminiscence
[Rückerinnerung]” that the unity of the stream of consciousness can be given to itself in
internal consciousness (PIZ 116/PIT 157). This would suggest that consciousness has
itself much like it has the objects it is conscious of and this also brings back issues of
infinite regress. However, Husserl is clear that “rentention is an intentionality, in fact an
intentionality of a special kind” he also is clear that “[r]etention itself is not an act of
looking back which makes an Object of the phase which has just expired” (PIZ 118/PIT
161). I discuss the second and third points in the following as it is bears upon the sense in
which neither auto-affection nor hetero-affection can ‘work’ as ‘origins’ of subjectivity
as Marion and Levinas understand these terms.
If auto-affection in Henry and Marion’s sense requires that there can be no ecstatic distance in consciousness’ turn to itself then we would need a moment within which this self experience unfolds that is uncontaminated by either retentions or protentions or alternatively a phase of the flow would have to coincide member for member with a phase of itself without any ecstatic distance. In one sense there is an insight here since any self-relation of consciousness would not have an object other than itself—the one flow would not multiple itself by making itself an ‘object’ of reflection. However, the problem is that the coincidence of consciousness with itself would have to be complete. Marion’s analysis (and Henry’s) is however more complex than this since he claims that it is in certain moments (i.e., self-esteem, boredom) that such a self-affection is apparent. When we ‘feel’ self-esteem or boredom, any affection that is not directed to an ‘object’ but towards modalities of ourselves, we breach the intentional relation. There is a truth to this claim since there most certainly is a difference in how we have ‘objects’ (immanent and transcendent) and in how we experience ourselves. But is this a non-intentional relation or is it rather an intentional relation of an order different from that which we have to objects? Certainly there does seem to be a radical intimacy entailed in our self-relation. Dan Zahavi seems to support such a view. Consciousness does not have itself as object of any kind and the horizontal intentionality Husserl refers to in *Inner Time- Consciousness* actually supports the notion of a self-affection of consciousness. Zahavi:

Thus, Husserl’s analysis is not meant to imply that consciousness only becomes aware of itself through retention. On the contrary, Husserl explicitly insists that the retentational modification presupposes an impressional (primary, original, and immediate) self-manifestation, not only because consciousness is as such self-given, but also because a retention of an unconscious content is impossible.... Is it possible to specify the nature of this impressional self-manifestation, this absolute experiencing, any further? The terminology used, and the fact that we are confronted with an unthematic, implicit, immediate, and passive occurrence, which is by no means initiated, regulated, or controlled by the ego, suggest that we are dealing with a given state of pure passivity, with a form of self-affection (“Inner Time” 172-173).

In such a reading horizontal intentionality with its self-givenness “does not merely concern the elapsing phases [i.e., this is not merely a retentional grasp of consciousness as just having been], but takes its point of departure in an immediate impressional self-manifestation” (“Inner Time” 173). Zahavi qualifies this by stating that “the primal impression taken in isolation [from retention] is a theoretical limit-case”, but if this is a “self-manifestation that lacks the ordinary dyadic structure of appearance” and one given in a “state of pure passivity” then it does seem to agree with Marion’s notion of auto-affection (“Inner Time” 173). However, it should be noted that Zahavi in the previous citations is defending Husserl from the possible objections that either consciousness bears
the same relation to itself as it does to transcend and immanent objects (this would lead to
charges of infinite regress) or given the analysis of inner time-consciousness Husserl is
forced to suggest an unconscious primal impression. In light of these issues Zahavi
suggests that while “[o]ne has to avoid the idea of an instantaneous non-temporal self-
awareness” pre-reflective self-awareness is “not a gradual, delayed, or mediated process
of self-unfolding; rather consciousness is ‘immediately’ given as an ecstatic unity” (“Inner
Time” 173). I would agree that there is an immediacy entailed in the self-awareness of
consciousness but I do not think this is evidenced within a horizontal intentionality but
within vertical intentionality. This would also suggest that even in this immediate self-
awareness there is a dyadic relation at work. In one sense the ‘origin’ of consciousness is
only disclosed through horizontal intentionality but this is only possible on the basis of a
vertical intentionality that reveals an implicit self-awareness underlying any experience.
What a horizontal intentionality discovers are only the ‘results’ of an operation that has
already receded into the past, though this does not make its discovery any less ‘original’.
One way to describe consciousness within a vertical intentionality and a horizontal
intentionality would be respectively as conscious and self-conscious. If there is an
implicit self-awareness it is in our relation to ‘objects’ whether transcend or immanent,
the ‘turn’ to the self-constituting flow is only retrieved through a self-conscious,
reflective regard. This is not to say that the unity of the stream of consciousness is not
evident within a vertical intentionality (i.e., our experiences could have no coherence or
continuity if each experience were not retentionally united with others and if an implicit
awareness of past phases was not included in these experiences) but that this unity is only
implicitly intimated in vertical intentionality. What a horizontal intentionality brings to
light or makes explicit is this implicit unity of lived experiencing. “Consequently like two
aspects of one and the same thing, there are in the unique flux of consciousness two
inseparable homogeneous intentionalities which require one another and are interwoven
with one another” (PIZ 83/PIT 109). If this is a valid reading of the double intentionality
thesis then there may be a way to account for the kinds of experiences Marion and
Levinas suggest are non-intentional without recourse to a non-intentional analysis. The
‘origin’ of consciousness is not discovered in an instantaneous now but through time.
Consciousness is as Jay Lampert suggests “is a self-explicating system of interpretative
activity, a dynamic whose parts demand and pass over into one another, a process that
grounds its synthesizing structures as it proce[eds], by continuously referring forward to
ideal end-points and referring backward to ideal origin-points (Synthesis 1). These are
‘ideal points’ precisely because of the density of consciousness as inherently temporal.
The ‘origin’ of consciousness is not be found in a generative primal impression (other
than as an ideal limit point) but in the “emergence” of consciousness through time
(Brough, “Emergence”).

For Marion what is at stake in the notion of auto-affection is precisely the
grounding of phenomenology in an origin that is primary or first—beyond auto-affection
there is nothing, though somehow everything follows from this origin. While Marion
separates out two moments within auto-affection in Reduction and Givenness and Being
Given (i.e., a call or givenness and the one called) the pure reduction reveals a ground of
phenomenology in a subject that in its performance of the reduction is given a ‘now’
without past or future, there is not givenness and a subject but a subject immersed in a givenness without any ecstatic distance. This is to reduce all transcendences to an undifferentiated immanence since there is nothing that separates the subject from the given. The subject is like a black hole that subsumes everything in her path. Levinas, on the other hand, claims an origin for subjectivity in its exposure to the Other, a radical hetero-affection. This is an origin that institutes time but is itself outside of temporality—an overly full moment in which the exposure to the Other traumatizes the subject into consciousness—life. While Levinas maintains an essential difference between the subject and the Other (and the subject and the elements) the sense of ‘origin’ requires an isolated temporal moment within which this difference is put into play—it requires not only a pure subject (i.e., a radical immanence) but, if we can use this term here, a pure object—the Other (i.e., a radical transcendence). The question here is whether this purity is possible at all and whether such a radical difference can be maintained? While the notion of trace is meant to mediate transcendence and immanence, a transcendence within immanence, it cannot do so except on a model of conflict. The subject is faced with a radical difference which she internalizes—she becomes a self-conflicted subject at odds with all otherness within herself. And the options are the one Marion suggests, which is to subsume all difference into the immanence of subjectivity or, the one Levinas seems to privilege, faced with radical transcendences the subject seeks to expel immanence within herself. However, in one sense this is not so different than Marion’s option since the subject in doing so becomes more and more like the transcendences that plague her—the distance between herself and the Other is breached. This is a subject that can only reflect what she is not—her openness to the Other is diametrically opposed to any sense of self-identity or unity. However, if the subject’s ‘origin’ already implicates otherness (i.e., world, other, and even self) then the notion of the transcendental ego as absolute must mean something other than either auto-affection or hetero-affection suggest.

In what sense does the transcendental ego act as the ground of phenomenology, as a ‘pre-suppositionless’ origin? The ‘origin’ of subjectivity is itself temporally implicated, this is not to say it is ‘in’ time like its objects but paradoxically the ego is indeed out there in the world and as such it too has its temporal unfolding. In once sense the transcendental ego is only available to the phenomenologist retrospectively through a process of reflection. Husserl claims:

What is caused to appear in the momentary-actual [Momentan Aktuellen] of the flux of consciousness is the past phase of the flux of consciousness in the series of retention moments of this flux (PIZ, 83/PIT, 110).

In other words in the “momentary actual” of the flux of consciousness, I take this to be this moment in which consciousness tries to catch itself in action, there appears its own past phase of retentional moments. Why is this not merely the last single retention of consciousness rather than a phase of past retentions? Certainly if Husserl endorsed a notion of auto-affection it would have been better if the time between this consciousness and its ‘object’ were minimized? Consciousness turns and in that turning it comes into
contact with its self a moment before, nothing else intervenes between the ‘now’ and it’s ‘before.’ But instead Husserl suggests this is a phase of retentions, in other words consciousness does not look back and find itself as a beginning—it finds a condensed past of many retentional phases. If we return to the example of the single note “C” as it unfolds through time and question what each of its moments would have to entail we may have a sense of the complexity of what the turn of consciousness to itself entails. In § 31 Husserl is clear that the example of an isolated single temporal object points to the complexity of any perceptual object at all, the tone is heard not only as a preformed unity but rather as a temporal multiplicity (i.e., each ‘moment’ of the tone is a distinct moment that is paradoxically only distinct insofar as it is also united). The real question in such experiences is how this note is identical despite the multiplicity of its appearances? In relation to consciousness we can ask how consciousness can grasp itself not as an object with its own unity but rather as an ‘object’ (i.e., phenomenon), though an ‘object’ unlike any other, which is always already pre-constituted, united, in an irrecoverable time? The unity of the note “C” requires a simultaneity of consciousness and the note as it temporally unfolds. The note takes time to form a unity and is not constituted in a punctual ‘now’ which is to say that consciousness follows the unfolding of a particular ‘object’ and both ‘occur’ in the same-nowness. This same-nowness however, is complicated when we turn to a properly genetic account and reintroduce all the other factors left out of the initial static account (i.e., other background objects, the horizon within which these objects are experienced etc.). In order to hear the tone in its temporal duration I have to follow this tone, which is to say I am conscious of the tone as it unfolds in time, there is in this sense a same-nowness of consciousness and tone “C”. And yet, if I reintroduce the other simultaneous moments that occur within this experience I have a much more complex notion of simultaneity at work. I am at the same time as I hear the tone ‘aware’ (perhaps only implicitly) of the chair I sit on, the surrounding space within which I find myself and more problematic perhaps the tone as it unfolds awakens a host of other memories that now are ‘simultaneous’ with it. However, the phenomenologist in turning to the ground of such constitutive activity does not come into contact with its peculiar ‘object’ in an absolute coincidence. The only way we could catch ourselves outside any intentional relation is if we could stop time, only in an abstract and one-sided account can we understand consciousness as non-intentional. Only on the basis of a such a one-sided account can an auto-affection like Marion’s be suggested. However, there are themes in Husserl’s discussion of time-consciousness that lend themselves to the kind of analysis both Marion and Levinas offer. Husserl suggests that there are experiences

114 In a work in progress Lampert suggests that the notion of simultaneity is a problem for Husserl’s account of inner time-consciousness since the notion of simultaneity does not adequately address the complexity of experience. Different objects can have different rhythms or tempos (i.e., different starting and stopping points) and still be simultaneous in Husserl’s account—in fact Husserl does not deal with the sense in which varying tempos impact his notion of simultaneity (private communication: “Simultaneity and Delay”). I do not think this affects my position though it is an issue that would complicate the notion of auto-affection.

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which are outside of time or are non-temporal.

A value has no position in time. A temporal object may be beautiful, pleasant, useful, etc. and may be all this in a determinate time. But the beauty, pleasantness, and so on, has no place in nature and time (PIZ 98/PIT 126).

This sense of non-temporal experiences can be seen in Levinas’ notion of immemorial time and certainly reflects the status he gives to the sensibility that puts us face to face with the Other—this cannot be a sensibility that accrues to the other as body (i.e., the other is not an object in nature—not a spatio-temporal ‘thing,’ nor an ‘ideal’ object since it presents us with what cannot be comprehended) and it does not call us now (in this moment of time) but rather its calling stops time for the one called (or the call ‘occurs’ in an “immemorial time.”) Levinas can claim a foundational status for the relation between the Same and the Other because beyond this relation there is nothing and, more to the point, this relation occurs outside of time—it is first and last in a time without duration or continuity. Marion’s notion of auto-affection, which I suggest returns in the guise of pure reduction in Being Given, can occur as the origin of representation (though it is not clear how) because this kind of affection occurs beyond the time of objects—it is the proto-givenness that lays a foundation for all other givennesses—it ‘opens’ the time of ‘objects’ and is the grounding of their ‘sense.’ In Chapter Five, I argue that this beyond time is not only beyond phenomena altogether but is a metaphysical fiction. This is not to undermine the kind of experiences revealed by Marion and Levinas but to offer an alternative way of analyzing these phenomena—an alternative that is intentional. I turn to the various notions of intentionality Husserl presents as well as the possible reasons motivating the ‘transcendental turn’ and the role of transcendence within his work. The relationship between passive and active synthesis informs this analysis. I suggest that while Husserl retained a notion of non-intentional ‘experiences’ the results of his own analysis seem to refute this view. In concluding, I address the question of how we are to understand consciousness—subjectivity, if our self-relation can be understood on neither the Levinasian model of radical hetero-affection nor on Marion’s model of auto-affection and suggest the alternative of reciprocity as a mediation between these extremes.
Chapter Five

Introduction

The problem of intentionality within phenomenology is inherently tied to the method of reduction. If the reduction is understood as entailing a suspension of all transcendences then does this not reduce alterity of any kind to a sphere of immanence? The intentionality thesis seems to lead to just this conclusion, the world and others are ‘constituted’ within consciousness and constitution is a kind of production, the intentional relation subsumes transcendence within the immanent sphere. Is this not to fall into a ‘bad’ idealism? Consciousness finds in the world only what it has actively produced, the results of its own functioning? Or is it possible that the deepening of the reduction(s) actually reveals the unique ‘sense’ in which immanence is always already contaminated by transcendence? The reduction(s) opens up the enigma of our relation to the world and others and illustrates the ways in which consciousness and ‘world’ are radically irreducible regions and at the same time necessarily require each other. (One would want of course to take into account the role of the lived body in meditating this irreducibility.)

I have tied the issue of transcendence in phenomenology to three differing views of subjectivity and suggested that at the centre of the debate are reduction and the intentionality thesis. The arguments in favour of an inherently non-intentional sphere of existence are premised on the notion of ‘experiences’ that fall outside an objective intentional analysis. There is certainly validity to this view since we would perhaps not want to analyze our emotive and affective lives in terms of a purely objective analysis. There is a difference in analyzing the constitution of perceptual objects like cubes or houses and analyzing ‘objects’ of a very different sort, e.g., love, desire, beauty or value. Marion and Levinas, each in their own unique ways, try to account for just these sorts of experiences. However, they also both claim that these experiences are non-intentional (Marion explicitly, Levinas, implicitly). What is at stake in the question of intentionality is precisely the sense in which phenomenology accounts for transcendence. According to both Marion and Levinas, Husserl does not adequately deal with transcendence and this is because the notion of intentionality is restrictive, it reduces the transcendent world and others to the immanent sphere of consciousness and with the transcendental reduction the situation is intensified—no transcendence outside of the immanence of transcendental subjectivity. For Marion this implies that consciousness has itself in the same way it has any other objectivity. And this, along with his criticisms of intentionality, leads to the charge that both subjectivity and objectivity are ‘reduced’ within classical phenomenology. According to Levinas the “Other” is reduced to the “Same” which suggests that the radical transcendence Levinas claims for the Other is subsumed within the immanence of consciousness. Classical phenomenology privileges unity and identity over difference, alterity. In the following (Part One), I explore through an example from the physical world what it is that transcendence amounts to in Husserl’s account. I also suggest that a broadened notion of intentionality does indeed account for transcendence. Against Marion’s notion of a pure reduction, I suggest that Husserl’s transcendental reduction sets out the limitations beyond which reduction cannot venture without
sacrificing the transcendence of the world and others and, more importantly, consciousness’ own self-transcendence. Part Two turns to the relationship between non-intentionality and passivity and argues that despite Husserl’s repeated claims for non-intentional ‘experiences’ the analysis of passive and active synthesis and temporality suggest that a purely passive sphere of experience is at best an ideal limit point. My analysis closely follows Lampert’s discussion of the role of ideal forward and end points within the synthesis of experience (Synthesis 182-195). While Lampert’s analysis of forward and backward references focuses specifically on the Logical Investigations the account may be useful to elucidate the accounts of synthesis in Passive and Active Synthesis as well. I offer some suggestions for how to account for supposedly ‘non-intentional’ experiences within an intentional account. Part Three turns to the implications of my arguments, specifically in relation to the notion of subjectivity in classical phenomenology. I address the sense in which Husserl can claim that the transcendental ego is presuppositionless and in what sense it can act as an ‘origin’ and ‘ground’ within phenomenology. In concluding, I address the underlying ethical motivation in Levinas’ and Marion’s revision of phenomenology, particularly in their respective notions of subjectivity. I argue that there is a privileging of the non-normal/abnormal within their works. While it is true that Husserl privileges the normal, which is tied to a particular notion of the rational, I argue that this does not preclude an analysis of the non-normal or abnormal and that in fact the ‘normal’ is open to revision and so acts as a normative ideal that can be and often is revised. Despite their attempts to think outside of normativity, Levinas and Marion end up instituting a new ‘norm’ that of the non-normal (Marion) and the abnormal (Levinas). In one sense this is to return to the totalitarianism Levinas characterizes through economy and exchange—this new economy merely reverses the priority of the other and the same, the passive and the active, the rational and affective/emotive. Marion’s position unlike Levinas’ does not initially seem to operate within a Levinasian ‘economy’ since it seeks to implode the difference between the same and the other, passivity and activity. Yet if my reading of Marion has some validity, it does seem that the pure reduction returns us to an auto-affection where the ‘measure’ of givenness remains the ‘subject’ though a reduced subject that just is the givenness gifted to her and nothing more.

Part One: At the Limit of Reduction

In Intentionality and Transcendence Damian Byers argues that Husserl’s account of the reduction develops from the Logical Investigations to Experience and Judgement, this is a transition from what he refers to as an ‘epistemological reduction’ to the transcendental reduction. Byers’ argues that the exclusion of all transcendence in the Investigations is a problem not only with the way the reduction is operated in early texts

115 I suggest a similar purity of reduction is at work in Levinas’ analysis of the face to face—the Other as incomprehensible, not embodied shares infinities with Marion’s ‘call’ or ‘givenness’. It is precisely through an ‘original’ sensibility that the Other is revealed.
but also with an under-developed account of intentionality (*Intentionality* xi-xvii). The problem of transcendence as Byer understands it is how to account for the transcendence of alterity within a phenomenological method? Given the aims of the phenomenological epoche and reduction(s) to ‘bracket’ all transcendence and to focus on the immanent sphere of experience (i.e., the really inherent contents and acts) it would seem that consciousness is a closed realm—in this reading constitution is a kind of production by consciousness (*Intentionality* 7-21). However, Byer claims that with the development of Husserl’s method and particularly with the introduction of the transcendental reduction and genetic themes classical phenomenology is able to account for transcendence and so alterity. This development also entails a deepening of the notion of intentionality to include what cannot be rendered through an objective account—what Byer refers to as the “transcendental functionary” and Husserl refers to as the transcendental ego (*Intentionality* 187). However, given the bracketing of transcendence how are we to understand the sense in which the transcendent appears within consciousness? The issue of transcendence is related to the issue of identity (of objects, ideal and real and of the ego, mundane and transcendent) and identity is tied to temporality as Chapter Four has shown. The objectivist critique is premised on the assumption that consciousness reduces all transcendences to constituted identities—to what can be theorized and ‘known’. I turn first to an objective example of transcendence to show in what sense Husserl does and does not reduce the object to determinate contents of consciousness, this entails a discussion of the kind of evidence we can expect from ‘objects’. I use an example of a perceptual object since the objectivist critique is premised on a perceptual bias in classical phenomenology. The inherent inadequacy of perceptual objects is related to a lack of complete intuitive fulfilment (i.e. it would not be possible to have all possible spatial/temporal perspectives on an object). Which is to say the transcendent world as inadequate entails an imperfection—it cannot be brought to a complete intuitive fulfilment, though this does not preclude a certain kind of adequacy. However, the notions of inadequate and adequate evidence both require an ideal of intuitive fulfilment, which will be developed in the following example.

In §17 of the *Cartesian Meditations* Husserl uses the example of the perception of a die to discuss the most “fundamental form of synthesis,” this is the synthesis of identification (*CM 79/CM 41*). While phenomenological reflection uncovers the presupposition of the natural attitude (that the world we perceive is a ‘real’ in-itself existent) the suspension of the thesis of existence reveals that we experience the objects of the world as a manifold of appearances that are somehow presented as unified. This is the ‘result’ of the initial phenomenological epoche. The phenomenologist through a regressive inquiry uncovers how it is that our multiple perceptions are unified into this one object.

The one identical die appears, now in “near appearances”, now in “far appearances”: in the changing modes of the Here and There, over against an always co-intended, though perhaps unheeded absolute Here (in my co-appearing organism) (*CM 78/CM 39-40*).
The one identical die appears as near or far, relative to this “absolute Here.” And it also appears in different modes: “visual, tactile, acoustic” etc. (CM 78/CM 40). The problem of constitution is then the problem of how multiplicity is unified and whether in a phenomenological analysis, which suggests this unification is ‘fixed’ relative to the perceiver, the object is not merely reduced to “an ‘intentional effect’ produced by the synthesis of consciousness”. Husserl claims that the identical object is “descriptively ‘in’” consciousness but “not [as] a really intrinsic component part, but rather a being-in-it ‘ideally’ as something intentional” (CM 80/CM 42). Now it is just this sort of analysis that leads to charges of idealism against classical phenomenology. Any unity or transcendence that the object itself may exhibit would seem to be reduced to a ‘production’ of consciousness: consciousness only finds in the object what it itself has ‘produced’ and, as Gary Madison notes, what counts as really real is the ideal (Madison, “Phenomenology” 259; Kern, “Three Ways”126-149). Byer clearly expresses the problem with such an account.

This is a strong affirmation of transcendental idealism on Husserl’s part, and it seems unavoidable. It appears as if the phenomenologist is left with saying that in knowing, the knower—the intentional functionary—really only knows its own products. To understand the object as the product of a synthesis effected by the transcendental functionary is to see the object-being as secondary, and as having no being other than as product, as a unity of actual and potential subjective processes (Intentionality 100-101).

Marion in his criticism of Husserl’s “principle of principles” in Ideas I suggests a similar charge, though he frames it in terms of a reduction of givenness/phenomenality to intuition (ED 20-23/BG 12-14). Perhaps turning to a distinction in the earlier Ideas I will clarify Husserl’s position. In one sense the above passage from the Meditations privileges the noetic moment of intentionality. What can the noematic moment tell us about the object and is there a sense in which the transcendent object contributes to its own identity, is ‘more’ than a mere ‘intentional production’? (The transcendence here should not be taken to mean an object in-itself but to open up the sense in which a perceptual object is always ‘more’ than any particular determination the phenomenologist comes to through an intentional synthesis.)

In § 131 of Ideas I Husserl claims that there is a noematic “core”—“the pure X in asbstraction from all predicates” (IP 1271/IP I 313). The predicates that adhere to this “pure X” or noematic core express the various modes of givenness that any object can

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116 The original text reads “als intentionale Leistung der Bewußtseinssynthesis” (CM 80). Sokolowski tends to translate ‘Leistung’ as either achievement or performance which seems closer to the original text, ‘production’ at any rate cannot be taken as a creation ex nihilo, though there is a sense of the creative within the kind of achievement intentionality suggests (Formation 232; Fink, “Phenomenological Philosophy”).
entail and does entail at a particular time. In one sense the noematic core is a bare “something” that can be apprehended in various ways (i.e., in terms of its physical properties, as valuable, beautiful or useful, etc.), the noematic core as an abstraction is not to be understood as a substance or ‘essence’ to which predicates are randomly attached through some subjective fiat. While the noematic core does maintain an inherent indeterminacy since in-itself it is only a bare ‘something’, it also has the more positive significance that objects are not merely the sum total of our predications. There is always a ‘more’ entailed in any particular determinations we can make, however, not just any determination will do—predication is not a purely random affair. The notion of the identity of the object which in the discussion of inner time-consciousness was described through endurance as a unifying of flux moments (i.e., the identity of the object was temporally determined through the structure of primal impression—retention—protention) explained in what sense identity is not merely a random affair and in what sense it is a play of differences. However, while the analysis of temporal unity offered insight into how it is that temporal unities are constituted by consciousness it left much out of its account. The example of how a tone is temporally extended and yet unified as ‘this’ tone abstracted from the context within which any particular unity is experienced alongside other ‘simultaneous’ unities, not to mention implicit and explicit backgrounds within which any possible experience unfolds.

Husserl in § 19 of the Meditations introduces the role of actuality and potentiality within perceptual experiences. If the unity that is attributed to an object is not merely a subjective ‘production’ but an achievement that entails limitations that are not purely subjective then perhaps there is a way to account for the transcendent within a phenomenological analysis. Once again this should not be taken in terms of a transcendent ‘reality’ as opposed to the subjective immanence of consciousness since within the reduction this is a transcendence within the immanent sphere itself. The limitations imposed on consciousness are then not limitations by an external ‘reality’ but by consciousness itself—this has implications for what transcendence in Husserl’s account means, which will have to be analyzed. For now I return to Husserl’s notions of actuality and potentiality. Husserl:

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\text{[E]very actuality involves its potentialities, which are not empty possibilities, but rather possibilities/ intentionally predelineated in respect of content—namely, in the actual subjective process itself—and in addition, having the character of possibilities actualizable by the Ego (CM 81-82/CAM 44).}
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This passage suggests that every actual experience also has a horizon of possible

117 At a minimum there would be a temporal difference within any identity since even in the perception of the single note “C” the enduring note is temporally differentiated from the point of the generating now to its running off and being retained in retention (of course protention plays a key role as setting out the possibilities of each now that follows the generating now).
experiences and that these possibilities are not arbitrary but belong to the intentional experience itself—the actual experience entails its own predelineated possibilities. Every intentional process also entails a “process horizon” (CM 82/CM 44). A process horizon suggests not only what is actually given in a perception, i.e., the sides of the die we do see but the sides that are “meant” but not visible. These invisible ‘sides’ are ‘meant’ in the sense of anticipations but they also entail perspectives we could have if “we actively directed the course of our perception otherwise”. If for example we turned our eyes this way or that or walked around an object (CM 82/CM 44). Husserl: “Everywhere in this connexion an ‘I can and do, but I can also do otherwise than I am doing’ plays its part—without detriment to the fact that this ‘freedom’ like every other, is always open to possible hindrances” (CM 82/CM 45). This horizon of possibilities any particular perception could have had is also retained as memory exactly as a perception I could have had if I had but turned my eyes. These are memories that are recuperable in recollections. This is exactly where Marion and Levinas differ with Husserl, the kinds of experiences they describe are not recuperable, not stored in consciousness ready to be revived at any moment. Instead they both suggest experiences that transcend time in the sense that these are experiences that are not open to further determinations in the future precisely because they are not determinable in the present (i.e., at the moment of occurrence). This is because in one sense they do not ‘fit’ the perceptual model at all. In this sense Levinas claims that the face gives me nothing to ‘see’ instead it traumatizes me and Marion insists on a proto-givenness that is anonymous. This is not merely a matter of an indeterminacy which could leave open the possibility of future determinacy but of an essential indeterminacy as the very characteristic of the experience—an unconditionality—an excess. However, as the above passage indicates perception always indicates a ‘more’ and Husserl also suggests that the stability of perception “is always open to possible hindrances” (CM 82/CM 45). Before turning to what is meant by ‘hindrances’ in this passage I briefly turn to Lampert’s analysis of “shadowing off” (Abschattung) while the discussion is focused on the “Sixth Logical Investigation” it is related to the notion of predelineated possibilities in the Meditations.

Husserl refers to ‘shadowing off’ in § 17 of the Meditations but does not fully explain just what this means. As Lampert suggests the term has suggested for some commentators a lack of clarity, a fading away or fuzziness. However Lampert, argues that “if some metaphor of shadows is to work, it will have to show not just how perceptions fade away, but also how they actually lift off (ab-) a part of the next perception and already incorporate it as part of its own content” (Synthesis 155). If this lifting off is interpreted in light of the structure of impression—retention and protention then we can see in what sense a retention is not merely the sinking into the past of a particular now point since the now point is not just now but already entails aspects lifted off the protentional moment that is not yet realized and only a possibility. Lampert distinguishes three features of “shadowing off as projection” as follows:

1) the momentum inherent in singular contents
2) their gradual overlapping, and
3) the objective correlates of projective activity (Synthesis 156).
While Lampert’s analysis does not explicitly refer to the temporal structure of a perception in shadowing off I think it can be applied to the sense in which the object is temporally unified. There is a temporal density to any particular experience so that the perception of one side of the die already implicitly suggests the sides only protentionally predelineated. There is also a sense in which the view of one side of the die is carried on in the next view so that the ‘new’ side in a sense already carries with it perhaps only partial aspects of the side just having been. In this way the various profiles of an object are not merely forgotten in the new nows nor lost in their sinking down into retention. Protention, what Lampert refers to as projection already is implicated in the ‘now’ moment. However, as Lampert recognizes the regularity that this implies is no guarantee that one side will be followed by another or that a projection will achieve the expected results (Synthesis 157). There is a sense in which the partial perspectives of an object like a die already pre-figure what the die with all its ‘sides’ should entail, however, there is no guarantee that the perspective of a side of a die will lead to other sides, expectations can always be disappointed, particularly with perceptual objects. Husserl recognized this and claimed only inadequate evidence for perceptual objects, not only because expectations may be disappointed but because no perspective could possibly give us all possible perspectives spatially and temporally. Husserl refers to this as a “leaving open” which is an inherent aspect of all perception (CM 45/CM 83). However, Husserl also claims that the physical thing gives us “absolute evidence, [as] ideal possibilities of ‘limitlessness in the progression’ of harmonious intuitions and, more particularly, according to typically determined predesignated directions (therefore also parallel limitlessness in continuous sequential concatenations of the corresponding noeses)” (ID I 311/ID I 358). Despite an inherent inadequacy of evidence in the physical realm there are prescribed rules and laws for the intuitions of physical things. On the contingency of the intuition of the physical world (i.e., perceptual objects) Husserl has this to say:

No perception of the physical things is definitively closed; there is always room for more perceptions, for determining more precisely the indeterminatenesses, for fulfilling the unfulfilled. With every progression the determinational content of the physical thing noema, which continually belongs to the same physical thing-X, is enriched. It is an eidetic insight that each perception and multiplicity of perceptions is capable of being amplified; the process is thus an endless one; accordingly no intuitive seizing upon the physical thing-essence can be so complete that a further perception cannot noematically contribute something new to it (ID I 311/ID I 358).

Given this recognition of the contingency of knowledge of the physical realm how is it that Husserl refers to an “absolute evidence” of this realm? The “absolute evidence” Husserl suggests actually refers to the ideal of completion or adequacy that underlies experience. “Experience [Erfahrung] in the ordinary sense is a particular evidence. All evidence, we may say, is experience in a maximally broad, and yet essentially unitary,
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sense" (*CM* 93/*CM* 57). Consciousness as intentional "has an essential tendency toward conversion into givings of its object originaliter—accordingly to synthesis of verification, which belong essentially in the domain of the "I can’’" (*CM* 93/*CM* 58). The synthesis of verification are tied to what it is Husserl thinks the transcendental reduction can reveal. The reduction is to reveal the meaning of transcendences which are not really (*Reell*) inherent contents of consciousness. Husserl:

Our considerations have established that the physical thing is transcendent to the perception of it and consequently to any consciousness whatever related to it; it is transcendent not merely in the sense that the physical thing cannot be found in fact as a really inherent component of consciousness; rather the whole situation is an object of eidetic insight: *With an absolutely unconditional* universality and necessity it is the case that a physical thing cannot be given in any possible perception, in any any possible consciousness, as something really inherently immanent (*ID* 76/*ID* 89).

As Byer notes "[t]herefore the object itself, understood not as the noematic sense (our *present* understanding of the object), but as the X, the ‘bearer’ of that sense, *can never* exhibit the finality of a *closed concept*" (Byer 109). In the transcendental attitude the phenomenologist questions consciousness as to how it has its object and whether this corresponds to how the "presupposed object would have to look as ‘it itself’" (*CM* 93/*CM* 58). By questioning that which is in the process of becoming as merely anticipated (i.e. the object only had in a vague manner) through a process of verification (i.e., the synthesis of verification), verification can lead to either a confirmation that the object is presented as it itself or to a nullification of the object meant—to a “different” object meant (*CM* 93/*CM* 57). The object can turn out to be something quite other than what we expected. The correlate to an evident verification is ‘actuality’. The condition of actuality is that we can return to an object as an “abiding possession” so what is actual is that which can be verified through evidence and this evidence institutes an ‘object’ that I can return to at will, though this return is within a “horizon of potentiality”—a possibility without which their would be no ‘fixed and abiding being, no real and no ideal world” (*CM* 95-96/*CM* 60). The synthesis of verification is tied to synthesis of identification since the evidence that is ‘verified’ in the former is premised on the accomplishments of the latter. Without the underlying presumption of the identity of the ‘object’ particular evidences would not provide any sense of “abiding being” instead there would only be the accidental being “for me” of the particular acts. Since the noematic core is not equated with the noematic sense an object has in any particular experience the being of the ‘object’ can only ever be presumptive and this means that any particular evidence can always be nullified at a later time. However, correlative it is the possibility of returning to the evidence of our experience that allows us to be able to posit a “harmonious world” (*CM* 96-97/*CM* 60-62). If the object were not an identity that we had the possibility of returning to, even if this return entailed an overturning of previous evidences, then there
could not be a stable ‘world’. The ideal of a “perfect experiential evidence” underlies our belief in an actually existing world but what the transcendental reduction reveals is that this belief is itself constituted in consciousness. The phenomenologist aims to uncover how this belief in transcendence is constituted within consciousness. The absolute evidence that Husserl refers to is an ideal that motivates both the synthesis of identification and the synthesis of verification. Husserl: “a world itself is an infinite idea, related to infinite possibilities of harmoniously combinable ideas—an idea that is the correlate of a perfect experiential evidence, a complete synthesis of possible experiences” (CM 97/CM 62). The point here is that without the ideal of a perfect evidence the notion of an ‘actual’ world would not make much sense—since without such an ideal which only amounts to the belief that I can as it were “go and see” if my experience does ‘fit’ what shows itself, there would be no “fixed and abiding being, no real and no ideal world” (CM 95-96/CM 60). However, this is not to say that such an ideal can ever be realized only that without such an ideal the notion of evidence would not amount to much and neither would the unity of our experience. In one sense the belief in a transcendent reality external to us is premised on the notion of being able to return to our past experiences and verify our present experiences in light of this past. The unity of objects that the synthesis of identity claims does not preclude the possibility that some determination could be overturned though this would not necessarily entail a completely different object, especially as the unity of the object is distinguished from any particular determinations. Instead Husserl suggests a complex notion of identity that is open to revision and is never given pre-formed but is constituted through time and never once and for all. It is in this sense that Husserl can talk about hindrances to perception. If I am looking at a side of the die and expect to see another side appear if I turn it slightly only to discover upon turning the die that the side of the die I expected to see is damaged or is a different color than I expected then my expectations are disappointed to some extent. Yet, the unity of the object does not rely on all expectations being fulfilled, entities in the physical world can change, age, get damaged or just have different colored sides without becoming something other than we thought they were. This is because the unity of any particular object is the result of the temporal synthesis of various lived experiences and not determined by any particular lived experience, though some may count more than others (e.g. the sides of the die are more integral to the unity of the die than the color of each side). However, this also implies that the object may not be ‘this’ object—the ‘actual’ die is not what I thought it to be but only a one dimensional side of a die and upon turning it I realize that it is not a real die at all but perhaps a fridge magnet or some such thing. The synthesis of verification can account for both disappointment and a total overturning of identity—particular evidences can always be overturned through further experiences leading to an adjustment of evidence but not to a ‘new’ object and it is possible that further evidence does entail a new object one completely different than the object we initially meant. While this certainly introduces a certain contingency to our knowledge of the physical world it also seems to suggest that any ordering of our lived experiences would lead to a synthesis of identification and so be capable of verification. This view does not show how it is that only certain possibilities are predelineated or what ordering of parts would lead to the object itself. The ordering of parts cannot be explained
merely as the linear unfolding of each experienced content being tacked on to the next content since this would suggest that the ‘ordering’ is purely random. I turn to an account that better explains how it is that parts require one another and how it is that even conflict amongst intentions gives rise to a new synthesis or at the very least a modified synthesis, I follow Jay Lampert’s account of the role of conflict and complexity within synthesis in Husserl’s “Sixth Logical Investigation” (Synthesis 143-154).

While the notion of ‘Abschattung’ explains how it is that each new now incorporates expectations of what is to come, this on its own does not guarantee that expectations will be fulfilled. And, more importantly, it does not explain how we have abiding acquisitions that we can return to again and again—the unity of an object does not explain the unity of the world which is presupposed in the unity of particular objects. A more detailed explanation of what occurs when expectations are frustrated needs to be analyzed. In the Meditations Husserl ties expectations to sedimented habitualities, however, as Lampert states: “an account that only appeals to an always deferred prior experience, i.e. which explains each expectation by referring back to an earlier expectation, is ultimately no account at all” (Synthesis 139). In order to fill out the sense in which lived experiences have a history of their own and how this history implicitly prescribes ‘rules’ for their ordering we need to explore the contexts within which experiences unfold and the relation between what Lampert refers to as backward and forward references. Part of the problem with Husserl’s account of the synthesis of identification may be that it is too open—the object can endlessly be determined in various ways. Yet, Husserl’s theory requires a certain closure to any objectivity we can have—the conditions for verifying any particular object require an endpoint or limit even if this is only presumptive. If as I have argued in Chapter Four we never experience an object, the world or ourselves in an instantaneous now but always through time then there must be ideal beginning and end points that circumscribe any experience of an object as unified. These need be only presumptive beginning and end points.

It is in a discussion of background contexts of experience (i.e., horizons in Husserl’s terminology) that Lampert introduces the positive significance of conflicting interpretations. In relation to the experience of the die, the die has a background horizon that implicitly contains the sides of the die not visible a well the context within which the die is viewed—the background ‘space’ of the die but it also contains a background of similarly experienced objects or sedimentations of past experiences. One of the problems with this notion of context is “how ... the present content of experience, which exhausts all that consciousness is at that moment, include[s] any implicit reference or absent influence that is not an explicit part of its content” (Synthesis 143)? The notion of ‘shadowing off’ has addressed how the sides of the die not visible are predelineated as a part of the context of the perception of the die. However, Lampert goes on to ask: “How is it possible for a subject to go back to, or to withdraw his attention into, a background that has ceased to be, or has never yet been, a part of his explicit stream of consciousness” (Synthesis 143, emphasis mine)? The second problem deals with implicit contexts that are somehow taken into account by the subject. I focus on the aspects of Lampert’s analysis that deal with how we are to explain the sedimentations of lived experience that then inform future experiences. If we are to have abiding acquisitions
then this requires that we be able to access a history of experiences. In order to ‘know’ that the perception of a die requires not just the sides visible but the sides not yet visible would require what Husserl in *Experience and Judgment* calls a “preknowledge” of objects of the type ‘die’ (i.e., it entails certain expectations associated with three dimensional objects that in being sedimented are at hand for further experiences of similar objects). In one sense the first experience of a three dimensional object institutes a certain tendency to view similar objects in the same way but it is also in the conflicts between interpretations and the on-going synthesis these suggest that new acquisitions are available for further experience. Lampert uses the example of a roof that was thought to be red but turns out to be green to explain how it is that frustration leads to further synthesis and opens up possibilities for re-interpreting not just the object at hand but the ‘world’. He draws three positive consequences for unsuccessful synthesis (*Synthesis* 144). First, the overturning of the intention that the roof is red at the very least leads to a positive assessment since it is still ‘this’ object which is not as expected—the failed intention still gives rise to a clearer notion of the object. Second, when the red roof turns out to be a green roof this does not merely entail a failure to fulfil the intention the roof is red but the success of incorporating a new intention which is fulfilled. Lampert:

[F]rustrating intuitions give the subject grounds to distinguish, compare and contrast the expected content with the one present…. That certain intuitions can frustrate a meaning intention indicates that the meaning-intention already contained rules for the exclusion of certain intuitions. It not only included the expectation to find P but also the expectation not to find not-P (*Synthesis* 145).

This is an important point since even a frustrated intuition opens up new possibilities for interpretation, which gives the subject new ‘tools’ with which to interpret the world. We can compare and contrast elements of the failed intuition with elements of the fulfilled intuition (i.e. red and green). These are not explicit within the frustrated intuition but rather are opened up as new possibilities due to the failure of intuition (*Synthesis* 145). This is to suggest that the subject is not equipped with fully developed cognitive abilities but develops these through the course of experience—as much through unfulfilled intuitions as through fulfilling ones. If this can be applied not just to our cognitive lives but also to our emotive and affective lives then it may be the case that the analysis of these spheres exhibits a similar development. Third, successful and unsuccessful anticipations both “demand the pursuit of more comprehensive interpretations” (*Synthesis* 145). Each failure of intuition sets up possible exclusions and inclusions. By exclusions Lampert refers to the possibilities that are excluded on the basis of an actualized possibility, so a “red tiled roof” excludes a green one or an aluminium one etc., the excluded properties narrow the boundary limits of any possible interpretation (*Synthesis* 146). Inclusion entails the same kind of narrowing (and broadening) of possibilities. “Conflict is a spur to re-interpretation” (*Synthesis* 146). What is important in relation to my project in Lampert’s analysis is the recognition that the ‘whole’ or unity
unfolds through time and is a “founded relation among member parts and a recognition of a whole is the re-membering of those parts” (*Synthesis* 149). Experience of the unity of the physical world is not given in an instance or in a ‘single blow’ but over time and every experience, even frustrated ones build on this context of meaning. I now turn to the implications of what it would mean for the ‘whole’ to be founded on its parts. What is at stake in the following is just the sense in which the absolute ego acts a ‘ground’ for phenomenology. If any objectivity is ‘founded’ on its member parts it is only in a unique way that this is the case. It is not the case that a succession of partial intuitions are added one to the next to work up to the object as unified but in one sense without the unfolding of each successive partial intuition there would be no ‘object’ or objectivity and more radically perhaps no subject or subjectivity.

Using the example of the perception of a house Lampert claims that the end point of interpretation must paradoxically contain not just the last side perceived but the sum total of all the sides perceived (*Synthesis* 174-175). If the object is to be intuitively presented as ‘this’ object then the last side of the house has to include all sides but this is not a possible intuition—the last intuition in the chain must paradoxically be an intuition of the last side and yet somehow include the sum total of sides. Lampert:

Having a perception of the last side of an object does not count as having the object evidently present unless the perception of the last side fits into, and finishes, a viewing that continues to be present to consciousness. The last side without its history is not a last fulfilment. But even as the last next-content in a continuous history, the last side is not the ideal limit-point unless it presents the object in a single blow. But for its side the “single blow” is a synthetic achievement. It cannot collapse multiple perspectives into a one-sided viewing, nor can it turn a number concept or a scientific category from something that can be defined in many ways into something that can only be defined in a single way, nor can it take something that is by nature the result of a certain ordering of its parts (e.g. a number, a narrative picture, or a history) and turn it into something that can be seen or understood all at once, or with no order or with any order at all. The all-sided perception without a history is no more a last fulfilment than is the one last side. The end-point must be both a singular content of consciousness, i.e. a new and complete percept added to the series previously experienced and a totality of those previous contents, i.e. a unifying principle underlying, mastering, and retaining those contents from the beginning (*Synthesis* 175-176).

118 In a discussion of motivation in *Passive Synthesis* Husserl claims that there is a sense in which an object can be given in ‘one blow’ though this is tied to background contexts and an implicit intentionality—the object was there all along but not part of an explicit attention. I discuss this in Part Three below.
Lampert argues that the end-point is already implicated from the first starting point of perception. This suggests that perception is not a mere tacking on of moments one to the next but that each new now takes up its predecessor "as an ideal possibility subsumed within a whole" (Synthesis 178). The now point takes the factual history of retentions and "transforms them into possibilities for re-interpretation" and wholeness is constituted precisely because each new act requires a rearranging of the previous moments according to a 'new' objective interpretation (Synthesis 178). As I understand it this a 'new' ordering precisely because it is not merely an addition of retention to retention (i.e., what Lampert refers to as the factual history of retentions) but because each now in carrying over its acquisitions, as retentions, sets forth new possibilities for itself. The 'whole' (i.e., the object) is not a static entity that consciousness determines through a linear time but a dynamic unity that opens up new possibilities for consciousness with each new perception. In this sense the whole is founded on its parts but the parts are also in a sense founded on the whole, in the sense that what is retained is always transformed by a new 'objective' sense. Perception is an achievement since it is not merely a retrieving of a preformed unity that was always there but the achieving of unity 'step by step' and not all at once in a 'single blow'. The 'object' for its part always retains an excess, a 'more' but this does not mean that it can be approached in any random manner—to see a die or a house requires a certain ordering of parts. Even if our initial experiences are given piecemeal, for example our experience of a house could well be given with a certain randomness, rather than each side of the house being presented in order (i.e., each adjoining side following the next) we could imagine a presentation of a house that did not follow this order, however, to see a 'house' is to see a structure with a certain composition. The unity of a house cannot be a random ordering of its parts. Even if our perception is not given in an ordered manner there is a tendency to order disjointed perceptions into some sort of unity and not any ordering would constitute a perception of a 'house' or a die. Though the possibilities of what could be a 'house' are varied—a house need not have four adjoining walls for instance nor need it be considered only in terms of its structural possibilities, though a perceptual account would entail these. Husserl's analysis of the synthesis of identification can account for this variation and his notion of the noema opens up the possibility of various modes of presentation.

If the 'whole' is not a pre-determined unity that the phenomenologist recovers through intentional analysis then does this also suggest something about the kind of transcendence Husserl claims to uncover with the transcendental reduction? Is there an objective bias built into phenomenology that seeks to approach the world only in terms of a rational unfolding? The intentional analysis suggests that the only meaning the object has is a constituted meaning and to be constituted is just to be a subjective accomplishment. The 'more' of any possible 'object' may introduce a notion of contingency into what the subject can accomplish but it does not address the alterity of the object so much as open up new possibilities for the subject's appropriation and objectification. Furthermore, eidetic analysis, following from the initial account of the

119 Levinas, following Heidegger explores the social aspects of what constitutes a house (i.e., house is a 'dwelling').
constitution of the world as a rationally ordered (i.e., harmonious) world, seems to suggest that what is ‘essential’ about the object is that it is one in many, a ‘type’ or genus. According to Marion and Levinas this is exactly why classical phenomenology cannot account for the kinds of experiences they want to explore—classical phenomenology misses what is ‘essential’ about the world, about others, about ourselves. What is essential is exactly what cannot be rendered through an eidetic analysis—the individual, the singular. And this singularity of things and others is not primarily given as a subjective accomplishment but through a radical transcendence that affects the subject and first gives the subject meaning. The intentional relation (i.e., correlation) is not our primary access to this transcendence, instead it is in our affective lives that this transcendence first institutes us as subjects to a world, to others. This essential institution does not preclude our being intentionally related to the world but claims this is possible only on the basis of a prior passivity to a transcendence that will always evade any intentional grasp, any final constitution.

However, while Levinas and Marion are right that Husserl’s notion of transcendence is not a radical transcendence (i.e., unknowable in any form and certainly not constituted), I would suggest that it does indeed account for the alterity of the world and others. For Husserl the world and others as always already ‘there’ for the meditating phenomenologist can only appear as transcendences within immanence. This means that while there is an irreducible alterity to the world and others they are not radically transcendent in Marion and Levinas’ sense. The problem of transcendence is how we can have a world, others and ourselves as relatively stable acquisitions despite and to some extent because of this transcendence. Transcendence on this account is an excess, as it for Marion and Levinas, but not an excess that precludes all knowing only one that excludes an absolute knowing. There is always more to experience in the world, hidden sides or relations etc. and in a different way the other person is always much more than any particular determinations or sum of determinations, as am I. However, before turning to transcendence of the other and the subject, I turn to some implications of the analysis of the transcendence of objects for the intentionality thesis. I return to the perception of the die to show a different intentionality at work than an objective intentionality and then suggest that Husserl accounts for various forms of intentionality. I suggest that the experiences Marion and Levinas want to claim are non-intentional are describable in terms of intentionality.

Part Two: Intentionality Revisited

In the discussion of the perception of the die Husserl claims that co-intended with the perception of the die as appearing as near or far or here or there there is an “absolute Here” (CM 78/CM 39-40). Given the spatial terms this ‘absolute Here’ is obviously not a pure consciousness but embodied. The die appears relative to an absolute position that of my body. Husserl also makes the further claim I have available not only the actual perceptions of the die but also those perceptions I could possibly have and even when the perceptual object has receded into the past those perceptions I could have had are part of what is retained and eventually recollectable. “Everywhere in this connexion an ‘I can
and do, but I can also do otherwise than I am doing’ plays its part—without detriment to the fact that this ‘freedom’ like every other, is always open to possible hindrances” (CM 82/CM 45). The ‘body’ is the ‘zero-point’ for the orientations of objects in space and as such it plays a fundamental role in how I have transcendent objects. In Ideas II Husserl describes this relation in terms of a conditional, an “if-then” or “because-therefore” (ID II 57/ID II 62). My orientation as the “Absolute Here” contains a horizon of possibility—in this sense objects are given not only through the ‘sides’ they offer to direct perception but also through the possibilities of my embodied existence through those experiences I could have if I move my eyes this way or that or walk around the object. In this sense “[p]erception is without exception a unitary accomplishment which arises essentially out of a playing together of two correlatively related functions (ID II 58/ID II 63). The correlated functions referred to are the kinaesthetic sensations and those sensations which constitute on the basis of apprehensions corresponding to features of the ‘thing’ (i.e., through adumbrations). Part One of this Chapter has dealt with some aspects of how the latter function, however, this is an odd manner in which to describe what appears to be the difference between the noetic/noematic distinction. There is a sense in which the apprehension is no longer associated with the hyle but now is tied to the noematic sense leaving the hyle as an originary element of embodied existence. The kinaesthetic sensation, while responsible for motivating the apprehensions of things (i.e., the constituting sensations) are not themselves apprehended in the same way. This would seem to legitimate the kind of non-intentional sensation/affectations that Marion and Levinas support except that Husserl suggests that kinaesthetic sensations do have a different type of apprehension and that kinaesthetic sensations are tied to the apprehension associated with constituting sensations (ID II 57/ID II 62). There is an “order” of kinaesthetic sensations that follows the conditional ‘if-then’ or ‘because-therefore’ structure. In the case of the perception of the die there are predelinated possibilities built into what Husserl calls “systems of kinaesthetic sensations,” if I move my eyes then I should see the other side of the die—there is correlation between the motivating and the motivated—between my body’s orientation and the sensations that should follow, disappointment is always possible. This is to say that perception even its most basic level, that of the kinaesthetic sensations already entails an “optimal” ordering, an apprehending of sorts. However, it could still be argued that the intimacy entailed at this level of lived experience is indeed non-intentional, while it is implicated at a higher level with objective intentionality, taken in itself it suggests that my initial contact with the world, others and myself is not intentional in an objective sense at all. In fact, while Husserl claims that the body is paradoxically a ‘thing’ like other things, he also claims that it is more than a mere ‘thing’ since it is a “field of sensation” (Empfindungsfeld), a “physical-aesthesiological unity” (ID II 155-156/ID II 163). The body as an ‘organ’ of sensing is given to itself in a way unique from that of objects. This may not indicate that it is given to itself without any ecstatic distance, though the self-relation of the body to itself is certainly different from the relation it has to objects. However, in describing the self-relation of the body Husserl suggests that the body is distinct from a physical thing and the relation he is revealing with kinaesthesia are not tied to the object/body but to the “Soul” (ID II 149-150/ID II 157). In turning to how we have our bodies Husserl uses a
tactile example. Husserl:

The sensing [Empfindnis] which spreads over the surface of the hand and extends into it is not a real quality of a thing (speaking always within the frame of intuitions and their givenness) such as, for example, the roughness of the hand, its color, etc. These real properties of a thing are constituted through a sensuous [sinnliches] schema and manifolds of adumbrations. To speak in a similar way of sensings [Empfindnis] would be absurd. If I turn my hand, bring it closer or take it away, then, for one, the unchanged color of the hand is given to me as constantly different. Yet the color itself presents itself, and the color constituted first (that of the sensuous schema) manifests a real optical property of the hand. Roughness, too, presents itself and does so actually in manifolds of touch sensations [Tastempfindungen] which constantly flow into one another and to each of which a spreading-out belongs [Ausbreitung gehört]. The touch-sensings [Tastempfindnisse], however, the sensations which, constantly varying, lie on the surface of the touching finger, are, such as they are lying there spread out over the surface [da flächenverbreitet], nothing given through adumbration and schematization. They have nothing at all to do with the sensuous schema. The touch-sensing is not a state of the material thing, hand, but is precisely the hand itself, which for us is more than a material thing, and the way in which it is mine entails that I, the "subject of the Body," can say that what belongs to the material is its, not mine (ID II 149-150/ID II 157).

If this text is carefully analyzed it appears to support a position similar to that of Marion, Henry and the Levinas of Otherwise than Being. In separating out kinaesthetic sensations from 'sensations' that constitute 'real' properties of things such as their texture and color, Husserl is separating out an essential aspect of our experience—this is the hyletic moment, a hyletic moment no longer characterized as formless. The hyletic moment, now separated from apprehension is not characterized through the "sensuous schema" (i.e., not given in adumbrations) which presents "real" aspects of the hand as a physical thing, instead the hyle are "sensings" [Empfindnisse]. "All sensings pertain to my soul; everything extended to the material thing" (ID II 149-150/ID II 157). There are two related points to note here, first, this text appears to privilege tactile sensation over sight, which for its part is associated with rendering the material visible (i.e., with the "sensuous schema") and second, that touch is privileged because what it gives us is the sheer phenomenality of phenomena—it renders what cannot be given in an objective account. What a hand is is not this physical thing with such and such properties i.e., roughness and color) but the feel of itself as a feeling thing and the feel of all it comes into contact with—it is 'pure' sensing. Husserl goes on to say:
If I convince myself that a perceived thing does not exist, that I am subject to an illusion, then, along with the thing, everything extended [and from the context this could be the body as a physical thing as well] in its extension is stricken out too. But the sensings do not disappear [emphasis mine]. Only what is real vanishes (ID II 150/ID II 158).

This text seems to confirm Marion’s thesis in *Cartesian Questions*, what is “reell” according to this text is not anything related to the sensation associated with apprehensions but the kind of sensings that require no object—not even the body—to be. (This is tied to Husserl’s annihilation of the ‘world’ hypothesis in Ideas I and I will return to this at the end of Part Two.) In fact, this text seems to isolate the hyletic moment from ‘apprehension’ and then to broaden the noematic sense to include this apprehension—the object with its properties is something different than the primal contact with the world—not only different but secondary to this primal contact. This would seem to undermine my project thus far. However, if we return to the context within which Husserl makes these claims there may be an alternative reading available, one which illustrates a certain necessity of correlation and so intentionality within the method of classical phenomenology. The above text is preceded by the account of the doubling of sensation—the sense in which one has one’s own body. I turn to Husserl’s analysis of the doubling of sensation. This ‘doubling’ elaborates the manner in which we have our own bodies and expands on how the body is essential for having a world. It should be stressed that throughout Chapter Three of Ideas II Husserl is describing the constitution of the body and the method this text follows is solipsistic (i.e., the Cartesian ‘way’). (I return to the implications of the Cartesian way for the transcendental reduction at the end of Part Two.)

There is a doubling of sensation in the body since it can be experienced or sensed as ‘things’ are but is at the same time the sensing of itself. This doubling of sensation illustrates the way in which the body is a ‘thing’ in the world but is not a mere ‘thing. Husserl maintains a strict correlation of consciousness and body—neither is to be reduced to the other, though in one sense they are inseparable—instead what is revealed in the account of the relationship between body and consciousness is an intertwining of the two. The body has a double sensation of itself since in touching itself it is both touched and touching—in fact, the doubleness here is due to the fact that if I touch one hand with another I can experience each hand as touched and touching.

Hence the Body [Leib] is originally constituted in a double way: first, it is a physical thing, matter; it has extension, in which are included its real [realen] properties, its color, smoothness, hardness, warmth, and whatever other material qualities of that kind there are. I find on it, I sense “on” it and “in” it: warmth on the back of the hand, coldness in the feet, sensations of touch in the fingertips (ID II 145-146/ID II 153).
This doubleness of sensations plays itself out in a different way in relation to external objects. If I am touching a table I can “at the same time” as I am experiencing the table with its various properties (e.g., solid, cold, smooth etc.) be aware of these sensations in my hand of cold, solidness (perhaps as a kind of resistance of the material) and smoothness (ID II 146/ID II 153). There is certainly a different intimacy in the body’s touching itself but this is not necessarily an auto-affection as the analogous example of touching the table highlights. The ‘at the same time’ Husserl refers to requires a shift of attention. I take this to mean that I while I am implicitly aware of my body (i.e., my hand) as a sensing organ, I am explicitly aware of the table as a thing that feels smooth, solid and cold. However, there is a sense in which there is a reversibility built into this relation—I can through a switch in attention be explicitly aware of my hand as experiencing coldness, solidness and smoothness and only implicitly aware of the table as smooth, solid, cold. In a similar fashion I can be aware of the hand I touch as touched (the feeling of being touched) or I can focus on the touching itself—I can focus on the hand that is touching and what it ‘feels’. The body as a physical thing is my access to the natural world and it is so because it is not merely a physical thing—a thing cannot touch back, cannot ‘feel’ being touched etc., though I would suggest that in one sense the intimacy of embodiment does not preclude intentionality. I can either focus on the feeling of touching or I can focus on being touched and while both occur in the ‘same time’ they do not coincide in every respect—there is a temporal gap in my experience of being touched and touching. The body has a unique intentionality of its own. There are also good reasons for not wanting to reduce the body to consciousness or to a thing like other things. If the ‘body’ as sensing is reduced to consciousness (i.e., it is not a ‘thing’ in any manner, not associated with the physical ‘body’) then it appears that there is no way to mediate our contact with the world of ‘things’ other than through a causal account—intentionality on this account would return us to a rationalist account of consciousness as informing a mute and formless matter—any sense of transcendence of the world would be lost. On the other hand, if we reduce consciousness to the body then a causal physiological account of experience would be validated—if we want to understand our experience of the world we need only offer an account of the functioning of organs, etc. to explain how it is our experience operates. This is to reduce consciousness to one thing amongst others. Transcendence is lost in such an account since any experience may be explained in purely causal terms. Both extremes return us to a mechanical causality.

Husserl’s discussion of abnormalities focuses on experiences in which the body mediates our contact with the physical world which can explain how the body as a thing can be causally effected and this can effect the hold I have on the world but also the sense in which embodiment does not reduce consciousness to one thing amongst others (i.e., there is a sense in which consciousness is always ‘more’ than body as a ‘physical thing’ that can be affected in this or that way—this is one way of saying that there is more to the body than merely ‘thingliness’). It is in a discussion of the abnormal functioning of the body that Husserl fills in the paradoxical correlation of consciousness and body. While this is an early section of Ideas II one where this correlation is not yet fully developed it already presupposes the intertwining of consciousness and body.

Husserl’s discussion of abnormalities focuses on experiences in which the body
does not function normally—abnormalities here signify lived experiences that occur if a part of the body is injured (e.g., a burnt hand will not have the same sensings as a ‘normal’ hand or damage to the eyes will effect vision). These cases are not explored only in order to privilege the ‘normal’ over the ‘abnormal’ but to describe and explain experiences that cannot be rendered through a ‘normal’ account. The point is not only to set up a standard of normality that posits all ‘abnormal’ experiences as lesser accounts of perception but to describe and explain these experiences. However, there is also a sense in which the normal does indeed act as a measure of “optimal” perception—if my hand is burnt my tactile experiences will be altered—they will as it were ‘deviate’ from an optimal perception (ID II 68/ID II 72). However, if one sense is altered the other senses will as it were compensate for the ‘abnormal’ sense. The senses form a ‘field of sensation’ just because of this ability to offer a harmonious experience even if one sense is damaged. The conditional relation is altered but not negated through such anomalies. The point is that while the senses each offer unique ‘data’ they do not operate as discreet functions but rather together offer a synthesis that fills in our experience. To see color is already to ‘see’ texture—these are not presented to us as two separate senses (i.e., as a color sensation and a texture sensation), though in one sense we can and do talk as if texture and color were two different aspects of a thing. When I look at the tree outside the window I ‘see’ along with gradations of color the roughness and texture of the bark even if I have not actually touched the tree to ascertain if it is indeed ‘rough’. If one of my senses does not function properly then the other senses fill ‘in’ what is lacking because of the effected sense—if my sight is damaged my senses of touch and hearing are intensified. The world, even for one born blind is presented as a harmonious ‘world’ and it is on the basis of this ‘normal’ harmony that anomalies or abnormalities are assessed. A burnt hand offers data that can highlight this ‘norm’ of sensing. So the positive effects of anomalies set up new conditions for contrasting and comparing experiences (i.e., if my hand is burnt then my sense of touch will be effected in this way).

The inclusion of abnormalities therefore enlarges the original system of psychophysical conditionalities which, along with the normal constitution, is detectable through a mere change of attitude (ID II 74/ID II 78).

The basis on which we can explain those experiences that are abnormal is the ‘normal’ but this is not to undermine abnormal experiences. In one sense the discussion of abnormalities fulfils the same function as the discussion of discordancies or conflicts in perceptual experience—it is when we are can compare ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ experiences that we better understand how ‘normal’ experiences should ‘look’. However, following the claim that abnormalities and anomalies expand our hold on the world and make us aware of our bodies as causally connected to ‘nature’ Husserl goes on to say that there is only one ‘true’ world and that anomalies contribute nothing to the constitution of things. Husserl:

There is the one normally constituted world as the true
world, as ‘norm’ of truth, and there are multiple semblances, deviations of the modes of givenness, which find their “explanation” in the experience of the psychophysical conditionality. Thereby we see that anomalies cannot contribute anything toward the constitution of things, and neither can psychophysical conditionalities. What they do contribute is only the rule of my subjectivity, which precisely resides in this, that things for subjects are experieneable things and that conditioned rules of the series of sensations are conjoined with the Corporeal-thingly causalities (ID II 74/ID II 78).

While the language is this section of text is unfortunate there is also a sense in which the abnormal expands the parameters of ‘normal’ experience. However, the point is also that without any sense of ‘normal’ (or put another way if the abnormal or anomalous become the ‘norm’) any sense the world has can become altered or even lost altogether. The way we ‘sense’ the world of things can be affected by anomalies. However, Husserl’s point is that while “Objective and subjective circumstances’ color our perception of a ‘thing’, “it is still ‘the same’ thing which under these or under other circumstances presents itself in a more or less ‘favorable’ way” (ID II 75/ID II 80, emphasis mine). There is what Husserl refers to as a transformed causality entailed in his account of embodiment—while my body can be acted upon and can act upon the world, its relation to the world is not only causal in a mechanical way. The body operates through a conditionality which Husserl also characterizes as a co-apprehension or “belonging.”

To the apprehension of Corporeality [Leiblichkeit] as such belongs not only the apprehension of the thing but also a co-apprehension of sensation fields, and indeed these are given as belonging, in the mode of localization, to the appearing corporeal body. “Belonging:” phenomenologically, this term expresses relations of the phenomenal “if-then”: if my hand is touched or struck, then I sense it. We do not have the hand as a physical body and, connected with it, an extra-physical consequence (ID II 155/ID II 163).

It is partially due to this ‘belonging’ that the transformation of a mechanical notion of causality into a relation of motivation is possible. While the body as a physical thing can be causally affected, it is not primarily related to the external world through causality of this type. The body is related to the world through its projects, there is a kind of correspondence between the movement of organs (i.e., eyes, hands, the whole body in walking etc.) and ‘what’ appears. If I move this way I will see the back side of the die, if I move my eyes I can follow the movement from one side of the die to the next—this is obviously not a causal relationship as my movement does not cause the appearance of sides nor can my movement be said to be caused to move as are objects (i.e., eye movements are not a matter of plotting out point by point a spread of the visual field—instead my eyes follow out the contours of the world without my consciously willing the
movement, which is to say that perception is not a different kind of ‘thinking’ or cognition). The body is not related to consciousness though a causal connection—there is a spontaneity and immediacy to the body’s movements that a purely causal account cannot explain. I do not have to ‘think’ (i.e., cause) the movement of my eyes as they follow the progress of one side of the die to the next—instead my body is the medium within which the “I can” is enacted, it is as embodied that the Ego has practical possibilities. “The body is an organ of the will” which it to say the body is “the organ in which it [consciousness] is articulated” (ID II 152/ID II 159). However, if the body is damaged or altered (e.g., if I press my eye or ingest santonin) this conditionality can be affected as well (i.e., if I press my eye I will have ‘double vision’ or if I ingest santonin my sense of color will be altered) (ID II 76/ID II 80).

This account of the body’s double sensation presents a notion of intentionality that is not the intentionality of act—this relation cannot be rendered in purely objective terms but it is perhaps not totally disassociated from such an account either. The account of touch/touching illustrates that built into this strange ‘thing’ body is the ability to as it were turn to its own ‘sensing’ to feel itself in the process of ‘sensing’ as also ‘sensed’ but does this entail an auto-affection or is it a unique function of subjectivity that is brought to light only through the reduction? If reduction as a method of reflection has as its aim the teasing apart of intentional threads that are not its own constructions then the results it arrives at while insightful can only be understood as abstractions. If this is a possible reading of the relation of reduction and intentionality then it may be the case that ‘origins’ are only retrospectively uncovered and, more importantly, the method of reduction is not satisfied with retrieving these ‘origins’ but must then re-construct those elements it has separated out. The point is to understand how these elements are held together, which is one way to ask how a harmonious world is possible—it is to understand the ‘order’ of things. This issue is tied to how it is that consciousness can have itself as absolute—since this question reflects the same kind of return to an origin that is retrospectively attained.

Before turning to what kind of ‘origin’ transcendental subjectivity ‘is’ I turn first to the issues of passivity and activity in Husserl’s thought. If ‘sensing’ is a purely passive affair then my argument is flawed and Marion and Levinas are right to claim that the ground of phenomenology is not to be found in an active ego principle but in proto-givenness beyond being—a pure passivity acts on the subject and first institutes this subject as subjected. However, if it turns out that even in the most primal experiencing (i.e., sensing) there are syntheses at ‘work’ and these syntheses are the precursors to our cognitive capacities then there may be an alternative to positions such as those of Marion

120 Merleau-Ponty offers a nice account of how the relationship between the body and consciousness cannot be a causal one except in pathological situations (i.e., the case of ‘Schneider’)—I do not usually ‘think’ through my body movements, my normal hold on the world entails an immediacy that cannot be accounted for through a causal account. Merleau-Ponty understands this immediacy as a possibility of embodied existence—the world for its part is not a fully actualized realm but a realm of possibilities (Phenomenology 98-153).
and Levinas. The questions I explore in the following are centered around the issues of origin and ground. If phenomenological reduction in its bracketing and suspension of world positing does not alter the world as I have it but rather allows the one meditating to explore how it is that this ‘having’ is possible, what conditions this having entails and how it is that transcendence is as it were ‘given’ then it will be through an account of passivity that this ‘having’ is uncovered. However, if it turns out that passivity is always retrieved through layers of sedimentations, sedimentations that it may not be possible to totally uncover other than as ideal limit points beyond which analysis cannot venture, then this complicates the sense in which a purely passive givenness institutes the subject and a ‘world’. In the following I argue that passivity is not an ‘origin’ in Marion and Levinas’ sense precisely because it entails sedimentations of prior active syntheses, sedimentations that to some extent are only latently within experience—passivity and activity are always already implicated with each other. Even the kinaesthetic sensations entail sedimentations—the body has a memory and a unique way of acquiring ‘knowledge’—habitualities.

In *Experience and Judgment* and *Analysis Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis* Husserl is concerned with how it is that we can have abiding acquisitions of any kind, how knowledge is possible. The problem of knowledge is tied to the possibility of a return to sedimented accomplishments—knowledge is built up through time and it is because each experience builds on the next that we have a harmonious world. The question of passivity is then a question of how we initially attain abiding acquisitions that lead to clearer evidences. If we take passivity to be a pure receptivity then this suggests that the ‘order’ of things is ‘given’ to us and we as conscious subjects merely have to articulate what has been given as it has been given—no interpretative moment need intervene and in fact it is when we let interpretation/apprehension determine what is given that ‘totalitarianism’ in Levinas’ sense is instituted. In this view perception taken broadly is a one-way street, it is when we begin to measure, assess and determine that an economic thinking is set into motion, a thinking motivated by self-interest and exchange. I have suggested that the notion of sensibility is key to understanding both Marion and Levinas and their respective criticisms of classical phenomenology. This notion of sensibility is premised on the possibility of a purely passive affective sphere that institutes us as subjects. However, while Husserl certainly explores passive genesis and even suggests a pre-predicative basis of all experience, he also claims through the notion of intentionality that experience entails a two way traffic. Consciousness is instrumental in founding any meaning the world can have but this does not imply that the world is a mute sphere waiting to be informed. Passivity and activity are not oppositional poles but always mutually implicated. Activity or ‘act’ is not always a cognitive act of judging or understanding but in one sense all of our experiences even discordant ones develop cognition. In *Passive Synthesis* it is in terms of a development of ‘motivation’ that the primordial realm of passive genesis is explored. However, while Husserl develops the sense in which a prejudicative synthesis is at work in passive genesis this should not be taken to imply a non-intentional basis of perception nor does it necessarily entail a ‘sensibility’ unmoored from ‘comprehension’ in Levinas’ sense (i.e., as a sensing without ‘object’ of any kind as in the relation to the Other). Husserl:
Perception does not consist in staring blankly at something lodged in consciousness, inserted there by some strange wonder as if something were first there and then consciousness would somehow embrace it. Rather, for every imaginable ego-subject, every objectlike existence with a specific content of sense is an accomplishment of consciousness. It is an accomplishment that must be new for every novel object. Every basic type of object in principle requires a different intentional structure. An object that is, but is not and in principle could not be an object of consciousness, is pure non-sense (PS 19-20/PS 57).

If this text is indicative not just of a constituted level of perception, one where contents have already been synthesized but also has some bearing on the genesis of such a synthesis as it is in the process of being constituted then there may be a way to understand passive genesis as already entailing various cognitive functions that are perhaps not judicative processes yet but the precursors to a judicative cognition. In fact the synthesis of association already entails a differentiation and unification of contents of consciousness that relies on a history of lived experiences—Husserl’s analysis does not return us to a first experience but by abstraction teases apart the intentional threads that give us objects as unified. The account of the temporal unification of ‘objects’ is expanded to include the sense in which contents are differentiated and united through time.

In his discussion of association Husserl utilizes terms pertaining to ‘motivation’, especially that of the “allure given to consciousness” [bewußteinsmäßigiger Reiz] and also the notion of “prominence” [Abhebung] which is related to coming into “relief” of background or implicit ‘objects’ (the ‘objects’ here are impressional moments as they are differentiated and united through association) (PS 148-149/PS 196). By ‘affections’ Husserl is referring to the passive constitution of objects and this is tied to his analysis of the lived body and kinaesthetic sensations. As Steinbock points out in his introduction to Passive Synthesis the “allure” [Reiz] of affections is not meant to be taken as a causal stimulus but as “an ‘enticement to be’ on the part of the ‘object’, a motivational solicitation or pull to attentiveness,” thus the translation of ‘Reiz’ as ‘allure’ (“Introduction” xliv-xlvi). However, affections can solicit us because we have certain “affective tendencies” (PS 151/PS 199). Affections can remain latent or in the background or they can be foregrounded and come to ‘prominence’. Even latent affections are ‘affective’ or can become so—we can be only marginally aware of some aspect of a thing or of the general background or environment of a thing. These tendencies are related to the ‘system’ of kinaesthetic sensations, though here each sense field is explored in its unique functioning—each sense has its own tendencies or capacities that organize unities through association. There is also a varying vivacity of affections, different levels of affective force (i.e., some contents have a stronger vivacity than others). The account of association mirrors the account of how a perceptual object is given to consciousness through profiles [Abschautungen] and the role of similarities and discordancies in perception. Association is characterized through the notions of
prominence or ‘coming into relief’, overlapping, gradations of contrast, fusion at a
distance and fusion at close proximity, concretion and discretion and bridging terms that
unite apparently different groups that have single terms in common (e.g., a red triangle
with differently colored triangles). Husserl claims that the analysis of inner time-
consciousness left out the way individual contents are united and differentiated and that
the analysis of passive synthesis aims to deal with how it is that a successive series is
united into a particular object and in what sense various contents can be so united or how
various objects can be differentiated (PS 128/PS 173-174).

Association explores discreet data in order to reveal how it is that a primordial
organization of contents is already inherent in consciousness before consciousness
actively orders its experiences through concepts of the understanding. Each sense-field
has a unique way of ordering sensations (PS 138/PS 184). When an object elicits our
‘attention’ or has an affective allure on us it is brought to prominence or set in relief.
Given the account of the temporal unity of objects Husserl turns to how there is also
entailed in such an account the unity of contents within these moments. How is it that
moments are connected or differentiated from each other? There are connections of
homogeneity and connections of heterogeneity (PS 129/PS 175). In cases of uniformity
there is an overlapping of one consciousness with another so that in the temporal
unfolding of the contents there is formed an “identity-consciousness” (PS 130/PS 176). If
we recall the account of temporality then this is an account of different ‘moments’ of
consciousness—in each moment consciousness has its contents and when there is a
uniformity of contents from one moment to the next we have ‘identity consciousness’.
When there is similarity and uniformity there is “fusion in distance,” contents are joined
together to either form a unity from moment to moment or they present a similarity.
There is also fusion with conflict or contrast, discreet data can belong to the same unity,
Husserl uses the example of a red square overlapping a blue one, which visually presents
a similarity despite the difference in color. While there is no higher level cognitive
activity at this level of experience there is an affective tendency to not only see a
similarity of the discreet contents but to see contrasts as well (i.e., the contrast of red and
blue). This allows for a “bridging [of] terms” which refers to an affective tendency to
form ‘groups’ on the basis of single common terms (e.g., different colored triangles are
still ‘seen’ as belonging together despite the difference in color) (PS 131/PS 177). In
relation to contrast Husserl states that there is a “repressing” of one content by another
which “means that one conceals [verdeckt] the other, the concealed element [Verdeckte]
tends towards unconcealment [Aufdeckung], then breaking through conceals [verdeckte]
the previously un conceded element[Aufgedeckte]” (PS 130/PS 176). Disparate contents
can be united within the affective sphere because there is an affective tendency to move
from one content to another (i.e., to move from the similarity of squares to dissimilarity
of blue and red). This is already a precursor to cognitive activity since there is already
entailed in such affections a categorizing of shape, color etc on the basis of similarities
and differences without an egoic cognitive ‘act’. This is one way to say that affection
already ‘orders’ contents—the sense-fields do not just take up what is given but already
unify and differentiate contents. Concretion is the belonging together or growing together
of similar contents, a blending of contents (e.g., groups of red figures or groups of blue

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According to Husserl the temporal account of the unity of contents relied on the successive unfolding of contents but the account did not adequately deal with how it was that succession lead to the identity of contents (i.e., the continuity of contents from one moment to the next). In one sense this is a way to account for the noema’s role in the temporal differentiation. The noema are not merely differentiated through a temporal separation from one moment to the next but by a difference of content, rather than account for this through hyletic differences Husserl posits a difference in the ‘object’ itself (not an object in-itself but in how the ‘object and, here ‘object’ refers to discreet sense-data, give themselves). Husserl introduces the notion of “fusion at-close-proximity” to address this oversight. Husserl:

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\text{[E]very prominent datum is not merely juxtaposed with other data in the living relations of succession. Rather, it has in itself an inner synthetic structure and in particular is in itself a continuity of sequence. This inner continuity is the foundation of a continual fusion with respect to content, fusion at-close-proximity. The duration of a content, of a color in the visual field, of a sound in the acoustic field—whether they are data giving themselves now as unvaried or as variable—does not have the character of an unanalysable quality; rather, as a phenomenological analysis immediately shows, it has the feature of continuing, of stretching [Sich-fortdehnens] from phase to phase; in what has become, it is the finished temporal extension, expansion (PS 140/PS 187).}
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Contents are not merely tacked on to one another in a succession but are ‘blended’ or fused together—each phase of contents stretches itself into the next and this holds not just for similar contents but for contrasting contents as well. For Husserl passive synthesis is not merely a purely receptive affair but a capacity to sense in a certain way—a capacity to ‘order’ contents temporally, things become over time. The account of passive synthesis also entails a notion of sedimented contents, contents can sink into the past (i.e., retention) and lose their vivacity, Husserl refers to this sinking into the past as a becoming “unconscious” but as the discussion of ‘bridging terms’ and repressed contents suggested this sinking into the past does not entail complete loss (though Husserl does suggest this as an ideal limit point and one that may be possible—we could forget or lose all memory of an event, experience etc.).\(^1\) Contents that have sunk into the unconscious can be “awakened” again through “reproductive associations” (PS 166-184/PS 214-234). Essentially this suggests that similar experiential situations can ‘awaken’ a past experience. Husserl refers to an “implicit intentionality” that allows repressed contents in retention to be awakened (PS 173/PS 222). While there is no analysis of this ‘implicit intentionality’ from the context it suggests that contents are implicitly retained within

\(^1\) For an extensive discussion of the similarities and differences between Freud’s notions of the unconscious and repressed contents of consciousness see Rudolph Bernet’s “Unconscious Consciousness in Husserl and Freud” (199-219).
consciousness. There are also expectations within the living present that as it were reach back to what is retained in retentions and form new expectations on that basis. “Something similar recalls something else that is similar, but also allows something similar to be expected in coexistence, as in succession” (PS 185/PS 235). Given the sedimentation of lived experiences and despite the fact that memories can fade and get muddled it does not seem that the passivity of lived experience is completely passive. If lived experiences build upon what has gone before then this is not a purely passive experiencing but already entails a building on past experience, a learning from the past. The account of kinaesthetic sensations also suggests that even at a ‘non-cognitive’ level the basis of cognition has already begun.

While the account of passive synthesis may suggest a capacity to order experiences, a tendency to constitute ‘objects’ it does not address the issue of how things are given as things of use, value, beauty or how our emotive lives color our world in distinct ways. In fact the account of passive synthesis leaves out a crucial aspect of sensing—the very ‘feel’ of things. It is this level of passivity that both Marion and Levinas claim precedes constitution of any kind. In “Intentionality and Sensation” Levinas claims that in his discussion of sensing (Empfindnis) Husserl presents an intentional relation but this is not an intentionality that can be rendered through an ‘apprehension’ associated with a synthesis of the understanding or to a judgment of reason (E/E 140). The ‘apprehension’ that belongs to sensing is of a different sort than the one associated with a purely perspectival ordering of ‘profiles’ (Abschautungen). Levinas goes on to tie hyletic data to the Urimpression and to claim that the now point as distinct from retention and protention, as beyond the matter and form distinction, as the “source of all consciousness and being is original creation (Urzeugung), a passage from nothingness to being...” (E 156/E 144). This now point devoid of retentions and protentions is before the matter/form structure because it is ‘before’ the intention which is always delayed in relation to it. While I would disagree with this account of the ‘now point’ there is an insight here, in one sense the temporal depth of a now moment tied to retentional and protentional moments would suggest that the meaning of things takes time, is developed through time. Levinas takes this to suggest that the now point as the rising of a new sensing is separated from an intention that is always delayed in relation to it—this would suggest that it is only in the sinking down of the now point into retention that ‘sensing’ takes on an intention. The now point is a temporal ‘gap’ (i.e., neither movement nor rest) through which the other ‘penetrates’ the same, the point is that it is this sensing of an other that institutes the subject. There is a truth to this, it is in the relation between consciousness and world that meaning emerges but this is not “wholly passivity” as the account of passive synthesis has shown (E 156/E 144). Already at the most base level intentions are at ‘work’ though these are motivated not only by proto-cognitive interests but by the practical interests of living within the world and moving about in the world. Levinas recognizes this and his discussion of an intentionality of a different order in relation to the kinaesthetic senses is reflective of what he calls “transitive intentionality” in “Intentionality and Metaphysics”. Is there a way in which to understand a similar intentionality at ‘work’ in our affective and emotive lives? I offer a speculative account of why we may not want to claim that sensing is non-intentional.
before moving on to the concluding section of this work (i.e., Part Three).

What occurs when one is attuned to the world not in terms of a cognitive or epistemological interest but say in an aesthetic manner? I am at the park, it is autumn and slightly overcast and everything has that rich golden brown texture, leaves, grass, trees, a breeze blows and carries a scent of decay that is strangely pleasant. I am not thinking about the ‘structure’ of this beauty but breathing it in with every breath, feeling it throughout me, basking in all this richness. The feel of the breeze cool and humid as it touches my face, the ground slightly moist under my shoes, I am “in the moment” in a manner of speaking, my worries about getting this dissertation in and those family commitments that I have neglected, getting a job, all of that sinks into the background for the time being. There is temporal dimension to this moment as well, the beauty is not there in an instant that then is gone but unfolds with the colors, the smell, the feel of the breeze and ground, these do not occur in a series of impressional nows each devoid of retentions and protentions but with time. Now is this a non-intentional relation as Marion claims? Or a purely passive receptivity as Levinas suggests? And is the aesthetic attitude devoid of any cognitive acquisitions? There is a sense in which there may be a difference between ‘living’ in the experience and thinking about the experience but it seems to me that there is a kind of subjective assessing and valuing that is apparent even in this aesthetic moment. To be captivated by the world is to respond to its ‘allure’ to see in the world a beauty that in one sense I have partially put there, since the whole scene could take on an ominous quality were I in a different frame of mind, say sick with worry at not having completed this dissertation yet. The scene may then be bare and devoid of the rich colors of summer, the breeze cold and a reminder of the long winter coming, the smell of the death of things a sad reminder of other deaths. Even in a simple aesthetic moment there is a relation to things that is not purely a receptivity but an active taking up of a position in relation to what is ‘given’. This is why the world can lose its meaning, or I can imagine the annihilation of the world and still be, it is why if I am depressed (i.e., in a non-normal or abnormal state) the world can appear chaotic and void of meaning—these are possibilities that I have in relation to what is ‘there’ which for its part is open to various ways of being taken up. If sensing is taken as a pure receptivity then explaining these practical possibilities of life becomes difficult. This certainly is not a cognitive relation to the world but then the cognitive acquisitions I have attained through a lifetime are not completely suspended in the aesthetic moment, they are so to speak ‘there’ in the background as possibilities I could turn to but also entailed in the aesthetic moment itself, I do not leave what I ‘know’ behind in turning to the aesthetic or in a moment of ethical questioning, though these moments for their part can in turn effect prior cognitive acquisitions (e.g., I can become aware of the limitations of cognition by questioning prior judgments, decisions etc.). And in one sense this ‘beauty’ is something acquired as well, I certainly did not think there was anything very beautiful about autumn when I first came to Canada from Africa, it was cold and miserable and incomprehensible. While Husserl in Inner-Time Consciousness claims that beauty or value are not ‘in’ time as are objects, I suggest there is a sense in which they are only through time. Even an emotion takes time to unfold, despite our way of talking about the immediacy of such experiences (i.e., “to ‘fall’ in love at first sight” or “to suddenly be filled with dread” etc.). If classical
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phenomenology does not adequately deal with these experiences it still sets up a procedure, a method, by which to unravel the genesis of such experiences—the method of reduction is a procedure that allows us to ‘see’ what in the midst of living we do not ‘see’—there is meaning everywhere, even in those experiences that make us feel the meaninglessness of all that is (i.e., anxiety, angst, etc.). If this is a rationalist presupposition that clings to Husserl’s thought it is just as much a motivating factor in the works of Marion and Levinas—why seek the meaning of ethics if one thinks that this meaning can never be revealed and dare I say ‘known’? The “possibility of impossibility” that Derrida seeks as a “dream” attests to just this ‘hope’—the ‘focus’ for Derrida is not in the ‘impossibility’ but on the ‘possibility’ that drives his questioning and I suggest a similar possibility drives the works of Marion, Levinas and Husserl (“On the Gift” 72).

Intentionality in Husserl’s thought is not just an objective intentionality as Mohanty points out (“Intentionality”). There are ‘implicit’ intentionalities, latent intentionalities, transcendent intentionalities and embodied intentionalities but in one sense the basic framework of intentionality remains the same. To be intentionally directed to the world, or to others or even to ourselves is to be open to transcendences, though within the reduction this is always a transcendence found within the immanence of consciousness. Even in its most sceptical form (i.e., ‘the Cartesian Way) the method of reduction returns us to a transcendence that is characterized by an excess of givenness—an excess that can be further questioned and explored because it always has ‘more’ to say—an excess that is found at the heart of consciousness itself.

In Part Three, I turn to the possibilities entailed in my analysis thus far for Husserl’s notion of transcendental subjectivity. I suggest that Levinas’ claim in “Intentionality and Sensation” that in Husserl’s thought “Consciousness is delayed in relation to itself—a way of lingering over a past” is absolutely right and that this suggests some positive consequences for the notion of subjectivity (E 156/E 144). But I also suggest that consciousness is also beyond the past in the future and as such is not only the remembrance of things past but the ‘space’ of possibility for things to come. The schizophrenia that Marion fears clings to Husserl’s transcendental ego actually has a positive consequence; subjectivity as temporally constituted and constituting is at once out there in the world as constituted and at the same time a self-transcending movement of becoming, it is constituting. Subjectivity, like the acquisitions it achieves in the world is also an achievement, though one that can only be glimpsed through a retrospective regard. I turn to the “Fourth and Fifth Meditations” to fill in the dyadic essence of the transcendental subject. In concluding I address the ethical imperatives that drive both Levinas’ and Marion’s works and suggest that Husserl’s phenomenology offers a better approach to the question of ethics, one rooted in a reciprocity between the same and other. Reciprocity is not an equalizing of the same and the other but the bridge between the two that opens the possibility of dialogue, discourse and a mutual understanding—a bridge that can never eradicate the intentional ‘distance’ between the same and the other. (War, like Peace is always a possibility of life, though one is not the condition of the other.) This distance cannot be breached because in one sense subjectivity is related to itself through a similar intentional distance—I am not the same in Levinas’ sense because the ‘same’ is always a movement towards the world, others and in a unique way a self-
transcending movement towards self-understanding.

**Part Three: Schizophrenia and the ‘Spread’ of Consciousness**

Having gone through the ‘development’ of the notion of intentionality in Husserl’s thought it is apparent that the notion of ‘hyle’ comes to play a prominent role in classical phenomenology. If ‘hyle’ is tied to the “Urimpression” from *Inner-Time Consciousness* then there are grounds for an auto-affection of the kind that Marion suggests but paradoxically there are also grounds for a Levinasian hetero-affection.

Primal impressions institute the subject into ‘life’ and these impressions as ‘hyle’, as really (reell) immanent contents of consciousness may well justify a notion of auto-affection. Primal impressions as the founding level of conscious life proceed, in every sense, consciousness as ego and any kind of intentionality. A ‘new’ ground of subjectivity is to be found in the self-affected subject for whom life is not characterized by an “I think” but by a visceral phenomenality which overturns a historical privileging of the cognitive subject over a ‘feeling’ affected subject, a history instituted with Descartes’ cogito. Levinas while apparently supporting an opposite interpretation actually holds a similar view. What is characteristic of consciousness is not its cognitive capacities but its passive institution into life by an other. This other is found not only in a radical exteriority but there at the heart of immanence itself—the subject is from the ‘beginning’ instituted into the texture of life by a transcendence within. ‘Hyle’ are the inscription or ‘trace’ of an other within the immanent sphere, a trace that cannot be subjected to determination or, what is the same thing for Levinas, apprehension or interpretation of any kind. In both philosophers what institutes a subject into life, existence, is not to be found in the ‘relation’ between subject and world/subject and other but in the condition of subjectivity as conditioned by a phenomenality freed from any ‘phenomena’. What is really real (reell) is the texture of life itself and this before an oppressive and inherently violent ‘apprehension’ comes on the scene. The ‘hyle’ unmoored from apprehension is not devoid of meaning but is itself an excess of meaning that cannot be determined or com-prehended. The thinking subject is overturned by a feeling affected subject, a dative subject, subject to before subject of. There are insights in both views and textual support of these views within Husserl’s works as Chapters One and Two have shown. Yet, the implications of such texts are at odds with Husserl’s continuous adherence to a view of consciousness as inherently intentional. Both Marion and Levinas read the “Urimpression” as instituting consciousness into life, into existence (i.e., creation). Husserl himself suggests this view:

The primal impression [Urimpression] is the absolute beginning of this generation—the primal source [Urquell], that from which all others are continuously generated. In itself, however, it is not generated; it does not come into existence as that which is generated but through spontaneous generation. It does not grow up (it has no seed): it is primal creation [Urzeugung] (PIZ 100/PIT 131).
However, Husserl also claims that this way of referring to the ‘Urimpression’ “are…images [Bilder]”, given the analysis of the now moment in the rest of *Inner-Time Consciousness* this is an odd way to characterize what should be the results of the analysis of time consciousness. If this manner of speaking of the Urimpression gives us ‘images’ it may be due to the fact that while there may well be a beginning of time in a primal impression, uncovering this beginning does not yield much in the way of analysis of this layer of temporality. The revealed beginning only has significance in relation to the results of the analysis of temporality. However, if the analysis of time-consciousness are meant to uncover a transcendence of consciousness within consciousness, a transcendence that cannot be reduced any further then the Urimpression occupies the ‘place’ of an ‘origin’ as limit point or an ‘origin’ that arises again and again with each ‘actual now’. Husserl is clear that the spontaneity of consciousness “merely brings about the growth, the development of the primally generated” (PIZ 100/PIT 131). The notion of a primally generated now point is meant to express the sense in which each moment is not merely the carrier of the preceding moments (i.e., retentions) nor a projection of what is to come but a unique ‘now’ that brings in the “‘new’ that which comes into existence foreign to consciousness” (PIZ 100/PIT 131). The point is that consciousness does not ‘create’ these primal impressions but not necessarily that consciousness is purely passive in its ‘reception’ or spontaneity in relation to primal impressions. And of course there are other textual references that suggest that a now point devoid of protentional and retentional moments is “impossible” other than as a theoretical boundary point. “If there were such a boundary-point, there would correspond to it a now which nothing preceded, and this is obviously impossible (PIZ 70/PIT 95, emphasis mine).

What does this suggest in relation to the transcendental ego? While the “new” moment suggests that each moment of perception brings in the ‘foreign’, the novel, into consciousness it would seem that consciousness as itself the condition of temporality should not have its ‘origin’ in something ‘foreign’ to it. The transcendence of ‘things’ is secured by the novelty of each new now as well as an inherent incompleteness of our actual and possible perceptions but how does this impact consciousness as itself constituting? In what sense is the transcendental ego a presuppositionless ground of phenomenology? Before turning to the *Cartesian Meditations* in order to clarify in what sense the transcendental ego or transcendental subjectivity can be such a ‘ground’, I briefly turn to *Passive Synthesis*, where Husserl suggests that objects as ‘wholes’ can be given in a ‘single blow’. If Husserl claims that ‘objects’ can be given in this way (i.e., not through adumbrations but all at once) then it seems that there may be a sense in which consciousness can also be self-given in the same kind of immediacy. However, if it turns out that this ‘immediacy’ or ‘at once-ness’ entails a notion of sedimentations and implicit contexts or backgrounds then this may suggest a different sense in which to interpret the self-givenness of consciousness—a self-givenness that is possible only on the basis of a temporal gap (i.e., consciousness has itself not in a punctual ‘now’ but always retrospectively), what Levinas in “Intentionality and Sensation” calls a ‘delay’. However, this is not to support a notion of auto-affection since the ‘past’ that consciousness re-captures is a ‘spread’ or ‘stretch’ of time that in one sense contains a ‘whole’ history, a ‘whole’ life, though in an other sense the transcendental ego is not any particular
history. By juxtaposing a few key texts from *Passive Synthesis* I will be setting up a possible reading of how transcendental subjectivity functions as an ‘absolute’ within phenomenology and in what sense this absolute is revealed as thoroughly intentional, even in its self-relation. While the texts I refer to have very little to do with transcendental subjectivity (at least explicitly), since they deal with passive synthesis of perceptual objects, as an account of the passive ‘origin’ of the temporal constitution of such objects I think it can offer some insight into how it may be that consciousness is paradoxically constituting and constituted. If the results of the analysis of the transcendental ego as an ‘absolute’ in *Cartesian Meditations* entails not just the constituting ‘ego’ but the constituted ‘ego’ then perhaps ‘absolute’ in this sense does not entail a merely formal notion of an empty ego pole or an undifferentiated quasi-temporal ‘structure’. The ‘absolute’ here would be both singular and unique (i.e., ‘this’ one with her own unique history) and universal (i.e., an ego ‘as such’). But this ‘splitting’ of the ego would not necessarily entail a divided subject, in fact the unity of subjectivity requires both senses of the ego. If the ego is to have an abiding and ‘fixed’ world then this ego must itself have an abiding being but the characterization of subjectivity as an empty ego-pole or as a formal quasi-temporal order does not satisfy this requirement—how is this temporal order itself ordered and unified? The subject, like the objects it constitutes must, for itself, be an abiding being, otherwise how would it be the condition of any other abiding and fixed acquisitions? There is another motivation for using the text I do to set up the discussion of subjectivity in the *Meditations*, both Levinas and Marion argue that there is an objective bias within classical phenomenology. This objective bias reflects a tendency within Western philosophy to either exclude or suppress experiences that cannot be accounted for in objective terms. So Marion focuses on experiences that are out of the ‘norm’, that ‘surprise’ us, while Levinas, taking the ethical relation as a relation that falls outside of all ‘norms’ characterizes the face to face as a relation that cannot be objectified in any way—it ‘traumatizes’. Implicit in the critique of classical phenomenology with its ‘egology’ is the view that it cannot account for such experiences at all. The following suggests that in fact Husserl can account for the novel, strange and shocking (though in a context very different than either Levinas’ or Marion’s) and that this does not lead to a view of an anonymous subjectivity equated with an undifferentiated ‘givenness’ (Marion) nor to a view of a divided and conflicted subject who is at war with herself (Levinas). Levinas and Marion also require a suspension of temporality within the experiences they claim as the founding ground of subjectivity—each in his own way suggests a temporal moment devoid of retentions and protentions. The kinds of experiences they privilege are experiences that cannot be repeated, recuperated or comprehended. Underlying both their positions is the view that determinability is always a reduction of the other to the same, of things to our conceptions. What grounds lived experiences and so subjectivity is not repeatable or

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122 These are both terms Husserl uses, ‘spread’ is used in relation to the kinaesthetic sensations (particularly with touch) in *Ideas II* and suggests the way in which hyle are distributed throughout the body, while the notion of ‘stretch’, particularly in *Passive Synthesis* is used in relation to the way contents are distributed through time.
verifiable in any way, it is the unique, the singular that opens the subject to others, to a
world. This requires a purely passive ground of experience, “presence” in these accounts
is a sheer receptivity. I suggest that this is only possible if we tear a “punctual now” out of
its temporal context. In fact the procedure through which such a “presence” is revealed
can only be an intentional one and this is an intentionality of act—the abstractions that
are yielded are insightful but only on condition of being able to re-construct or return to
the starting point of such a procedure—this is to return to the ground of philosophical
reflection, our everyday experience.

In a discussion of affection as motivation Husserl introduces the notions of the
‘unconscious’ and of ‘awakening’. While I have briefly addressed these in Part Two of
this Chapter there are some important insights that need to be fleshed out in relation to
both these terms. The ‘unconscious’ and ‘awakening’ are discussed in relation to the
forming of unities at a passive level. If this passive forming of unities is not merely due to
an “association of succession” which would amount to a unity without its own internal
coherence, a subjective fiat as it were, then there should either be associative synthesis at
work already at a passive level of experience or what Husserl calls “pre-affective
regularities of the formation of unity” (PS 153-155/PS 200-202). However, before
turning to these ‘regularities’ it should be noted that this text is dealing with unities that
are experienced in “one stroke”, these are unities that do not initially seem to require an
enduring temporal duration to be experienced. The examples Husserl uses are those of a
sudden explosion but more mundanely also of a string of lights that become prominent
without our turning our ‘attention’ towards them in an active regard and finally a musical
melody which may have been playing for awhile unnoticed until an especially
“mellifluous sound [or] phrase” brings the entire melody to prominence all at once (PS
154-157/202-203). Are these cases where the now moment brings in the novel in such a
way that there is no time to synthesis the experience at all—since it is “there” in “one
stroke”? We would certainly want to acknowledge that a completely novel experience
could only be given to us in such a manner—we can imagine the tribe of Aboriginals in
the movie “The God’s Must Be Crazy” having just received a mysterious ‘gift’ from the
gods feeling just this way—the mysterious ‘object’ (i.e., a pop bottle) which has fallen
from the sky has a unity but not one that is comprehensible to the tribe (i.e., it is a definite
something but not anything they can comprehend). No doubt such an ‘event’ would have
a meaning but not one that could be characterized through a purely objective account
since what is given is characterized as essentially indeterminable. Husserl’s examples
however reveal that even surprising events may have certain regularities, while he does
not discuss the first example of an explosion, he does provide an analysis of the second
and third examples.

If upon a evening walk you happen to be drawn suddenly to a string of lights—
not in an interval of time but suddenly before you have the time to attentively (i.e.,
cognitively) turn to the lights then the ‘whole’ string of lights is given in a “single stroke”.
Husserl takes this example as suggesting that “we are conscious of an articulated unity
(however much it, as articulated, has within itself special prominences that are materially
relevant) in an unarticulated affection” (PS 154/PS 202, emphasis mine). It would seem
that Husserl can account for those experiences in which something is given and given as
a unity without an ‘articulated affection’, in other words without ‘awakening’ other affections that would aid in seeing this string of lights as a unity—instead in a single stroke the unity is ‘given’—something appears, in fact it is this string of lights that appears and now is sedimented in such a way that it can ‘awaken’ these affections (presumably articulated now) the next time a string of lights is visible. Husserl calls this the “zero-point of awakening” and in one sense this explains how it is that the novel can be experienced. What is interesting is that once this has happened the next string of lights will have an articulated affection—they will motivate a certain tendency to see in a certain way. Not that I cannot be surprised or awed at the next explosion I experience or the next string of lights that I see but that these are now part of a “past horizon” that I may not be fully aware of but are there for potential retrieval (PS 155-156/PS 203-204). These experiences may only be available in an “unconscious” manner. This sinking down of lived experiences into the “unconscious” is not meant to indicate a lack of consciousness but rather a kind of background or horizon of the past, which Husserl characterizes as ‘forgetfulness’, that can with the right affective force be re-awakened. A new experience could awaken the initial experience or aspects of the initial experience then providing a context for the present experience. The analysis here does not discuss the role of the sense-fields in such experiences—affection and “hyletic fusion” are initially, at least, distinguished. However, Husserl does return to the role of the sense-fields and the necessary hyletic fusion that such affections entail. I return to this after discussing the second example of a melody.

The second example is of being occupied with something and not paying attention to it until some aspect of the ‘object’ becomes especially prominent. Husserl uses the example of a melody that plays in the background of attention till something in the melody makes us aware of it. What is interesting is that the melody in becoming prominent draws our attention (i.e., not an active regard in this case, though it could be that as well), the melody is not given just in the segment we happen to hear as prominent but all at once with those segments we were not paying any heed to a moment before. Now this example ‘fits’ into the temporal structure of rentention-primal impression-protention a bit better than the previous one since the affections here radiate back to the still present retentional phases and as it were reactivate these in a single stroke—I turn attentively to the melody as a whole through an awakening of what was just latently present in an “affective past-horizon” and now have the ‘whole’ melody in a ‘single stroke’ (PS 155-156/PS 203-204). The melody is given all at once and not merely as that ‘part’ that I, in an awakened state, as opposed to an ‘unconscious’ state, am aware of—the melody presents itself as a unity. Unlike the previous example of the string of lights, it is not the ‘whole’ ‘object’ that comes to prominence in a single stroke but despite this it is not just the segment or part of the melody that is given but the whole which I was not particularly attuned to till the segment became prominent. The retentions in this case do not pre-determine hearing this melody as a ‘whole’, since they are only latently affective except in relation to this segment which awakens the latent retentions—the past phases of the melody are retrieved but only through the prominence of the present impressional moment.

In both these examples Husserl accounts for novelty and this a novelty that is
apparently found not in the retentional and protentional moments but in the primal impression. It would seem that the primal impression is an ‘origin’ because it is a “primal creation [Urzeugung]” (PIZ 100/PIT 131). However, Husserl’s analysis does not stop at this origin’ he goes on to tie these experiences to the retentional and protentional moments and to illustrate in what sense primal impressions are always tied to retentions and protentions. There is also another key feature of lived experience that these examples are meant to highlight: “in the final analysis, we do arrive at original singularities, that is, at objects that must be given beforehand as a whole in all circumstances and for essential reasons in order for their parts to be given” (PS 156/PS 204). In the case of the string of lights, the string is given as a ‘whole’ and as it were in a moment, but this is not a punctual ‘now’ dissociated from all retention or protention—the prominent event continues, otherwise it would not maintain an affective force—the event either progresses or fades (e.g., with an explosion we can image the receding of the initial ‘shock’, i.e., the sound fades away, the aftermath visually, tactically etc. progresses on). As Husserl suggests later in the text, even if we were to only focus on a sensible datum, such as a speck of color and not on a “concrete perceptual object” it would be perceived “for a stretch [eine Strecke] as temporally extended” (PS 169/PS 218). Even if no retentional moment initially accompanies this generative ‘now’ it, at the very least, sets in motion a protentional moment and as soon as it does so a moment has passed—a retention has already captured the moment of surprise. The string of lights can also set this kind of novelty in relief only due to a background within which this novelty was not expected. An explosion ‘shocks’ us because the preceeding events did not entail the protentional possibility of such a ‘shock’. With the melody the temporal unfolding is slightly different, the melody was already there though only latently till a part of the melody sets in motion a retrieval of its entire historical unfolding and this is not dissociated from protentions only now becoming prominent. Affections have “backward” and “forward” working effects (PS 156/PS 204).

While these examples set-in-relief the rudimentary forms of unification within affection, they already elude to the role of consciousness in responding, even at a precognitive level to affections. Part Two has discussed the role of hyletic data in relation to kinaesthetic sensations and the ‘fusing’ of hyletic data—sense-fields ‘work’ together and in this sense hyletic data are fused. However, while the discussion of the two examples above focused on the role of affections in lived experiences, it presented ‘affections’ as if they were primary and only later followed by the fusion of hyle. Methodologically this was necessary to isolate the role of what the philosophic tradition referred to as sense-data, data that are ‘external’ to consciousness. If in other works there was a distinction between hyle and apprehension then in Passive Synthesis the correlation separates out two moments within the hyletic moment, affection (as representative of external ‘forces’) and hyle as the conscious, though not cognitive taking up of affections. The analysis, as an intentional analysis, accounts for the inscription of the noematic moment within the noetic moment without however collapsing this distinction. The transcendence of the ‘object’ is maintained without sacrificing the role of consciousness as temporally constituting and specifically as nexus of kinaesthetic synthesis within the formation of unity, the founding of sense. In order to illustrate the dyadic nature of this
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relation husserl explores the possibilities of either affection and association bringing about the unity of 'things or the hyletic sphere as responsible for any unity we can possibly have. husserl:

this would mean that just as the original process of streaming within immanence cannot at all be a special accomplishment of an affection, but rather is an original continuous fusion that necessarily takes place, and yet has the conditions of its structural possibility in order for the necessary continuity to be precisely fulfilled continuity; this must likewise be the case with respect to the streaming hyle. that is, hyletic fusion must be carried out in the fixed necessity of temporal constitution, a hyletic fusion arising from original continuity as successive fusion, and again without any accomplishment from affection. furthermore, there must likewise be able to be unities of coexistence; and the most original unity is the unity arising from coexistent continuity: every sense-field for itself is such a unity, constituted without any affection (ps 160/ps 208).

however, following this claim which apparently does not differentiate the hyletic stratum from the moment of apprehension, husserl paradoxically claims:

affectional unities must be constituted in order for a world of objects to be constituted in subjectivity at all. but for this to be possible, affectional hyletic unities must become and must intertwine with one another homogeneously in essential necessity, initially in the hyletic sphere, that is again, in the living present (ps 162/ps 210).

if there is a different 'apprehension' at work within the kinaesthetic sphere it is an apprehension that operates through associations. associations are at work between affection and hyle, through the differentiation of contents and temporal differences. this is a key point and one that returns us to the role of the unconscious and awakening in the constitution of 'objects' but more importantly in the self-constitution of subjectivity. if constitution of 'objects' is temporally bound, since even in the case of 'novel' experiences there are associations at 'work' even if only in the difference between a novel content and just-having-been contents not associated with the novel content then the issue of how past contents are available for consciousness becomes important for a phenomenological analysis. in both the examples above the perceptions could be described only by presupposing a prior acquaintance with other 'objects' but even if the experience were totally 'novel' it would still be experienced within a background context that would give it some sort of determinacy, even if only to say 'this is something, i know not what'. while in the living present, which includes retentional trains, the unity of 'objects' (even if only as discreet sense-data) can be explained it is not clear how these experiences once they fade into the past, into forgetfulness, can still be recalled with any kind of clarity. however, if the 'presence' of unitary objects (i.e, the possibility of a
harmonious world) is tied not just to isolated temporal moments (i.e., a particular ‘present’ with its retentions and protentions) but to the possibility of recovering past associations, and the account of passive synthesis as requiring reproductive associations (i.e., awakenings) requires just this recuperability, then the presence of any lived experience is in one sense founded on recollections.

The extent to which we had to contrast perception as non-presentification [Nicht- Vergegenwärtigung ] with presentifying memory is the extent to which we must now also insist that, by its very nature, perception can only be a concrete process of making present by also necessarily being presentification [Vergegenwärtigung] [i.e., memory is integral to any perception]” (PS 313/PS 600).

Levinas and Marion in different ways focus on the possibility of this recuperability, each in different ways putting this recuperability into question. The kind of abstraction that yields both hyletic data and affections/associations at work can only be attained through a regressive account—through an intentionality of act, the same type of intentionality that reveals the constitution of objects through both syntheses of identification and syntheses of verification. The results of the analysis of passive synthesis return us not to a hyletic data unmoored from all apprehension nor to a temporal moment distinct from retentions and protentions but to the unity of experience that is the presupposition of either of these possibilities. And this unity of things is dependant on a correlated unity of consciousness, perhaps not as a prior unity but as a coexistently constituted unity.

**Conclusion**

In the “Fourth Cartesian Meditation” Husserl takes up the issue of the unity of consciousness and discusses the role of sedimentation in the self-constitution of the Ego. The Ego is not an “empty pole of identity” (CM 100/CM 66). Instead as the substrate of habitualities, the Ego has an “abiding style with a unity of identity…a personal character” (CM 100/CM 66). With every act the Ego determines herself, with every new acquisition she is given to herself with “experiential evidence” (CM 102/CM 68). If we relate this back to the way in which the Ego has ‘objects’ and take into account the role of temporality in the constitution of objects as abiding acquisitions we can see that the intentional relation to the world does not only constitute ‘objects’ (ideal and real) but is with each new acquisition also a constitution of the Ego as ‘this’ Ego with these particular experiences, this ‘history’. Husserl, following Leibniz, names the Ego of “actual and potential conscious life”, “the monad”. Phenomenology can be expressed as the self-explication of this monad since within the reduction this also entails “all constitutional problems without exception” (CM 102-103/CM 68). Just as embodied consciousness had a motivational nexus of if and then, the Transcendental Ego also has a similar type of conditionality (CM 109/CM 75). As Ego of actual and possible experiences the Ego can abstract from actual experiences and attain eidectic insight into a universal sphere (e.g., varying any particular perception one can arrive at universal
insights pertaining to ‘objects’ of a particular type). The point here is that just as
kinaesthetic sensations entail a realm of possibility (i.e., if I turn my head, then I will see
this etc.) our cognitive capacities entail similar possibilities. It is because we can
‘imagine’ alternative realities that we learn more about our own world. We are not
trapped in a world of actuality, a purely factual world, but always have alternative
approaches to problems or different ways of envisaging the world. The Ego can also
reflexively take the same attitude to her own intentional life. While the particular
‘history’ of the meditating phenomenologist would of course influence what ‘type’ this
would reveal (i.e., rational in a particular way), through eidetic variation this procedure
can be broadened to include Egos of various types (CM 103-107/CM 69-73). The if-then
structure of kinaesthetic systems are transformed within the eidetic reduction to an “as
if” structure which reveals universal types (CM 104/CM 70). Husserl calls these “laws
of composibility” to indicate that not every variation can offer actually possible ‘types’—
this is reiterating what was established earlier in the Meditations—not every possibility is
actually possible. I can articulate ‘round square’ but this is not an actualizable possibility.
The notion that not all possibilities are composible stems from the kind of evidence the
transcendental ego can provide. The inadequate evidence of perceptual experience has
already been discussed (in Parts One and Two of the present Chapter) but Husserl claims
that the transcendental ego has an apodictic evidence that is indubitable though not
wholly adequate—it is possible that particular evidences could be found to be inadequate
(CM 55/CM 15). However, with apodictic evidence we have an evidence that gives us the
“inconceivability of their [i.e., the objects in question] non-being” (CM 56/CM 16). If
this evidence is open to inadequacy how is it possible to claim this ‘inconceivability’?
While the transcendental reduction begins by excluding all transcendences except that of
the Ego, the reduction is, as it turns out not an exclusion of these regions at all, since the
world and others are not excluded but reduced to transcendences in immanence. While
the reduction provides apodictic evidence of these reduced realms only the ego is given
with “‘strict adequacy’” and this is the core of the living present (lebendige
Selbstgegenwart) (CM 62/CM 22).123 Everything else that falls within this apodicity
including the open horizon of the “I am” is open to revision (CM 62/CM 23). In other
words there are open horizons surrounding not just the world and others (i.e., the
intersubjective realm) but also the realm of the “I am”. The relativity of the world is
echoed in the relativity of the Ego. However, this would be an odd conclusion to reach
for a philosophy that claims to ground itself in an ‘absolute’ and this is not the final word
on what such a procedure can procure (i.e., the transcendental reduction). As the
preceding analysis have shown while there is a certain contingency to all our knowledge
there is also the possibility of verifying or negating any particular evidences. While

123 This is a key aspect of those theories that support some form of the self-
affection thesis, consciousness is given to itself in a primal impression, an originary
‘now’ and with an intimacy that is not reflective of the intentional relation it has to
‘objects’. These theories also focus on hyletic data as really (reell) immanent contents of
consciousness (Marion, Cartesian Questions, Levinas, “Intentionality and Sensation”,

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Husserl maintains a certain distrust of the evidences we cannot verify in person (‘in the flesh’) and particularly evidences attained through memory or recollection it is apparent that the procedure of reduction comes to rely on these ‘sedimented’ traces of past experiences more and more. If we return to Passive Synthesis we see that with the notion of associative reproductions the role of memory, particularly in relation to how the ego has itself, is tied to the recuperability of the past.

[The life of consciousness] is not only a lived-experiencing [Erleben] continually streaming along; at the same time, as it streams along it is also immediately the consciousness of this streaming. This consciousness is self-perceiving, although it is a thematically executed awareness on the part of the ego only in exceptional circumstances. Belonging to the latter is a reflection that is possible at any time. This perceiving that presents all lived-experiencing [Erleben] to consciousness is the so-called inner consciousness or inner perceiving (PS 320/PS 607, emphasis mine).

The ‘thematically executed awareness’ here relies upon the capacity to reflect on a past life not just the ‘lived-experiencing” held in a still ‘present’ retentional grasp but the life that has flowed away and is only recuperable as a presentification of presentification (PS 324-326/PS 612-614). I argue that it is only through memory that consciousness has itself explicitly as a ‘transcendental ego’. However, does this preclude an implicit self-awareness that accompanies all my experiencing? If we take Husserl’s perceptual examples as a clue this is not the case, in fact, consciousness even when it is out in the street or busy with a project (i.e., not explicitly conscious of itself) already has a history of sedimentations that make any experience possible in the first place. Even at a passive level of experience there was already a reliance on experiences that had moved into the unconscious and since the ‘unconscious’ signifies a consciousness that is not fully awake or aware and not a non-conscious region (i.e., “it is in no way a nothing”), this was the ‘space’ of ‘concealed’ experiences, ‘traces’ or sedimentations of past experiences (PS 167-168/PS 216). What is more is that the unconscious in Husserl’s thought can be awakened, ‘traces’ can be and are re-activated by present experiences in associative reproductions. However, it is not only as ‘unconscious’ that “rememberings” or memory function within Husserl’s analysis, if apodictic evidence is relegated to a ‘egoic core of the living present’ early in the Meditations, the “Fourth Meditation” as a transition to genetic themes, revisits in what sense memory is essential to the apodicity of the transcendental ego (PS 326-327/PS 614, CM 62, 99-121/CM 22, 65-88). The discussion in the “Fourth Meditation” may not focus on ‘apodicity’ but I suggest that the discussion of the eidos ego none-the-less entails the issue of memory. There could be no imaginative variation without a sedimented history of past experiences from which to draw ‘material’. In fact, in Passive Synthesis Husserl is clear that it is through memory that “a spiritual life...a life of knowing, valuing, willing, and doing” is possible (PS 326/PS 614).

124 Husserl does not use either ‘trace’ or ‘sedimentation’ in the referenced text.
Husserl:

Only the intuitive remembering, which awakens the past, creates the past as the intuitively fulfilled shape of the present in the mode of the past and, as it were, experienced once again; and likewise “fore-seeing” the future, the intuitive effective realization of protention, creates the shape of the future that is intuitively given to consciousness as the present in the mode of arriving and, as it were, in pre-enjoying, being experienced in an anticipatory manner (PS 326/PS 614).

Without a sedimented history to which we could return there would be no abiding acquisitions, no objects in the concrete sense but just as important there would be no future possibilities (PS 326-327/PS 614-615). If we could not recognize the ‘same’ object from one time to another there would be no synthesis of identity. The example Husserl uses is turning in a room and re-perceiving the ‘same’ objects that were there before, while in one sense this is a ‘new’ living present there could be no continuity of perception if we could not recognize that these are the ‘same’ objects that were there a moment ago or even a year ago (PS 327 n. 1/PS 615 n.94). The eidetic sphere is a universal sphere, as such it is essential to cognition and without synthesis of identification and synthesis of verification, cognition, “the field of what is specifically logos” would not be possible (PS 327/PS 615). If the analysis of passive synthesis already entailed a proto-cognition at ‘work’ as I have suggested then this is not merely through a subjective imposition or determination but an appearance or manifestation of the ‘logic’ of the things themselves. The transcendental reduction reveals the sense in which the world, things, objects, give themselves before any higher cognitive processes even enter the scene. In relation to consciousness, conscious life, Husserl states:

Consciousness is an incessant process of constituting objectivities in an incessant progressus of graduating levels. It is a never ending history. And history is a graduating process of constituting higher and higher formations of sense through which prevails an immanent teleology. And belonging to all sense is a truth and a norm of truth. History in the usual sense of its relation to human culture is only a highest level, and even this we see has its in-itself prefigured (PS 218-219/PS 270).

Consciousness has its own history and this history is not dissociated from the ‘objects’, the ‘world’ it constitutes. In one sense the objectivity that Marion and Levinas find so objectionable in classical phenomenology is the very possibility of a ‘world’ in Husserl’s thought and not withstanding the ‘annihilation of the world’ in Ideas I this possibility is the possibility of conscious life. The constitution of the world of ‘things’ is at the same time the self-constitution of consciousness—life. The ‘norms of truth’ that Husserl refers to here would be ideals but any philosophical enterprise entails ideals. Husserl’s ‘ideal’ as a ‘norm’ does not undermine the ‘foreign’ or strange but in one sense it does suggest that
these are already premised on operative ‘norms’. For Levinas the ideal of a reason purified of ‘economic’ thinking lies in infinity as an ideal, the meaning of ethics in his account reflects this ideal of being-for-the other outside of all reciprocity or exchange, outside of all ‘norms’ but these ‘norms’ are operative just where they should not be—Levinas can only set up a non-normative, ab-normal in Husserl’s sense, ideal on the basis of what he already presupposes as a ‘norm’—the economic order. For Marion a similar notion is at work, especially in the relation of givenness and the gift, a givenness that gives the impossible—once again against the background of a ‘norm’ of truth as adequation, Marion institutes the condition of this truth in a refined sensibility. If the critique of the “metaphysics of presence” as taken up by Marion and Levinas is premised on the present as the space of possibility for bringing empty intuitions to fulfilment (i.e., for verifying claims of validity, for adequating our experience with what is ‘there’) then the analysis of memory entails a move beyond the present or put another way, the present too has a history. Marion and Levinas implicitly both take the notion of apodicity and separate it from its relation to adequacy—what is given in both accounts is indubitab (i.e., unquestionable and somehow incomprehensible. For Husserl apodicity does entail an indubitability of lived experience but because most of the experiences we have are open to re-appraisal, verification, apodicity entails inadequacy. Husserl can account for those experiences that the philosophical tradition relegated to falsity in an unique way—hallucinations, angst, anxiety, depression or boredom as radically altering the world, are not ‘false’ in the sense of not being ‘real’ (reell) immanent lived experiences but they are contrasted with ‘normal’ experiences which usually present the ‘world’ in a coherent, harmonious manner. The ‘norm’ here is an intersubjective ‘norm’. However, if I am right then this contrast is the very possibility on which both Levinas and Marion rely to formulate their own positions. I turn now to the ‘absoluteness’ of the transcendental ego and offer a speculative account of how this ‘absoluteness’ should be understood in light of Husserl’s analysis of time consciousness, passive and active synthesis, ‘evidence’ and his recognition of the importance of memory.

Husserl throughout the Cartesian Meditations suggests that phenomenology is a personal endeavour—one way to articulate this is that the phenomenologist even in the transcendental attitude carries a ‘history’ with her. If the ego of the mundane or natural attitude is bracketed in the reduction it is only in a unique way—the de facto ego, the ego of ‘this’ life with these particular experiences is not ‘lost’ in this bracketing and this may be because without accounting for the singularity of consciousness, even within the reduction, Husserl cannot account for the “substrate of habitualities” (i.e., sedimentations) that is characteristic of any ego (CM 102-104/CM 67-68). And if this ‘substrate’ is not accounted for the ‘concrete’ ego cannot be re-covered or in one sense discovered and without the concrete ego as ego of this life and these particular experiences there is no possibility of an eidos ego. As I have already suggested without a history of sedimented acquisitions there would be no possibility of imaginative variation and this for Husserl means no possibility of delimiting a universal realm of meaning. I cannot vary the perception of a table unless I have actually experienced a few tables, unless I have recourse to actual experiences I have had I cannot think ‘abstractly’. (This does not imply that I cannot imagine something I have never actually experienced, which
would perhaps limit the creativity of subjectivity, but that even in such cases there would be some experiential requirements—at the very least a contrast with all my actual experiences). The very possibility of philosophy requires this possibility of abstraction. The de facto ego then is the condition of possibility for the eidos ego but in one sense the de facto ego already takes up the attitude of the eidos ego in its approach to the ‘world’. Already at a passive level associations are at ‘work’ with ‘operative’ universals, without this possibility our experiences would have no consistency. The very ability to ‘see’ similarities and contrasts already makes use of concepts that are not yet thematic. Cognition does not come into consciousness at some late stage in development but is from the beginning there as a conscious possibility, one intertwined with our sensibility—to ‘see’ or to ‘touch’ already entails this capacity to distinguish (i.e., to distinguish colors, shades, shapes, textures etc.). The transcendental ego is absolute not merely as the condition of temporality or as a self-affecting ego that acts as a foundation for representation, for a ‘system’ of phenomenology but as the de facto and eidos ego. Transcendental subjectivity is out there in the world and the possibility of ‘this’ world in various ways: as a self that is only implicitly self-aware I am lost in my projects, lost in Husserl’s texts or in more mundane activities but I am, at the same time, capable of stepping out of my world, stopping and looking back at this history of experience, this life (i.e., I can through a reflective regard become explicitly conscious—self-conscious). This possibility of ‘stepping back’ can also be the recognition of oneself as one of many, it can be the move into an eidetic attitude, though as stated this attitude is in one sense always operative even if not thematic. In this sense the phenomenological elucidation of this ‘absolute’ consists of “all constitutional problems without exception” (CM 102-103/CM 68). The absolute is the ground of phenomenology but not as an ‘origin’ beyond which there is ‘nothing’ but in the sense of the sphere within which ‘problems’ of constitution, of synthesis, of various forms of intentionality are to be tackled. Consciousness does not come into immediate contact with itself in a primal impressional moment but in one sense it is aware of itself only through each and every new moment—our contact with the things of the world is the condition for any awareness we have.

The transcendental ego emerged by virtue of my ‘parenthesizing’ of the entire Objective world and all other (including all ideal) Objectivities. In consequence of this parenthesizing, I have become aware of myself as the transcendental ego, who constitutes in his constitutive life everything that is ever Objective for me—the ego of all constitutions, who exists in his actual and potential life processes and Ego-habitualities and who constitutes in them not only everything Objective but also himself as identical ego (CM 130/CM, 99).

There is no non-intentional immediacy underlying our lived experience, even when we affect ourselves we do so in time, with time. There is no perfect coincidence of self with self since we are either out there in the world or are reflexively, through a temporal gap, in the past with ourselves. To be an ‘object’ in the various senses Husserl uses this term is to be a transcendence within immanence and in one sense not even
consciousness has itself other than as an ‘object’, though an object’ of a special kind. Consciousness is intentional through and through. While a thorough account of consciousness in classical phenomenology would require research into the intersubjective realm, this would require a study of its own, one premised on Husserl’s notion of consciousness.

I have explored three figures of subjectivity in this work and characterized them, following Marion’s analysis of Husserl’s transcendental ego, as narcissistic, masochistic and schizophrenic. I have also suggested that the issue with Marion’s and Levinas’ positions is not with regard to the type of experiences that they bring to phenomenological description but with the kind of primacy they claim for these experiences. However, I also suggest that classical phenomenology can deal with these types of experiences and that Husserl’s analysis of ab-normal experiences already entails the groundwork for the kind of analysis both Marion and Levinas pursue. Anthony Steinbock offers detailed analysis of just such experiences and in fact ties them to Husserl’s notion of intersubjectivity, particularly in Husserl’s notions of the ‘alien’ and ‘alienworlds’ (“Generativity”, Home and Beyond). Sensibility is not a radically different human capacity or function than cognition though in the texts I have focused on Husserl does not adequately deal with how it is that our emotive lives are given to us in a unique way from our perceptual lives or how our perceptual lives are ‘colored’ by our emotive lives. The ‘problem’ of subjectivity is based on how we understand the intersubjective relation. For Levinas, subjectivity must be suppressed because the possibility of ethics requires a relation with an Other that is irreducible, incomprehensible and surprisingly not embodied—it is not the Other as embodied that I face. While the notion of proximity is meant to mediate the distance between the self and other, it does so by requiring the subject to turn upon herself and expel the immanence of consciousness in favour of a transcendence within this immanence. Marion, on the other hand, characterizes subjectivity and givenness in the same terms—the subject in his account is so immersed in givenness that nothing comes to separate her from this givenness. On this account, the other seems submerged within the subject to such an extent that the subject reflects the other—the other ‘is’ only a reflection of what the subject sees in herself (as is givenness on this account). However, I think there is a positive reading of both positions, certainly the experiences they describe are worth analysis—the subject can act outside the ‘norm’, can experience phenomena that truly surprise, the abnormal can and does change our world. However, when these kinds of experiences are reified as experiences that truly express our humanity—subjectivity, then there is a danger of normalizing what even Marion and Levinas do not want to normalize. Both want to maintain the ‘singularity’, the uniqueness of the experiences they reveal and rightly so—it should probably not be common place to look at an other and see vulnerability, pain, hunger. Or to face an artwork as one faces a ham sandwich as opposed to facing works of art with respect and openness. Husserl’s account of subjectivity suggests a better alternative because it recognizes the peculiarity of our experiences but also because Husserl does not endorse the radical notion of irreducibility that Levinas does nor the notion of an anonymous subject equated with givenness as does Marion. What it means for consciousness to be intentional is that consciousness is always faced with others—the world and other egos
and in a unique way consciousness is also self-related through an intentional distance. However, for Husserl intentionality does not entail a ‘radical’ irreducibility but rather what in Passive Synthesis in relation to reproductive associations, he refers to as an “affective communication” (PS 175/PS 224). The world of things has something to say because I as an embodied being am capable of hearing what it says, seeing and feeling what it conveys. I can see the fear and terror on the face of another because as an embodied consciousness I too can feel these emotions, I too can be wounded and hungry or have my heart broken and while, as the “Fifth Cartesian Meditation” makes clear, I can never really know how the other feels or what the other’s experience ‘is exactly like’ I as a similar being, with similar emotive, affective and cognitive capacities can approach the other and be capable of hearing what the world is like for them. In fact, the notion of objectivity and with it the synthesis of identity and the synthesis of verification already presuppose an intersubjectivity, a ‘higher’ order level of analysis that is already operative even in the Cartesian method of the Meditations. The ‘objective’ ‘world’ is not merely a construct of the meditating philosopher but already entails social, historical and cultural sedimentations and this presupposes a world of others. An analysis of subjectivity then is only the beginning of an enquiry into the intersubjective realm but how one understands subjectivity, consciousness is instrumental in how the intersubjective realm is characterized. To view the intersubjective realm as an economic order within which individuals are repressed and ‘equalized’ is only possible beginning with a certain notion of subjectivity, what I have referred to as a ‘masochistic’ notion of subjectivity. However, to take the seemingly opposite approach does not yield a vastly different analysis of the intersubjective realm as my analysis of the narcissistic subject has suggested. Husserl offers an account that can mediate between these extremes. Irreducibility and reciprocity are not opposing terms unless one starts out within a dualistic framework of reference. Correlation in Husserl’s thought should not be read as a dualism but a dyadic relation that entails both irreducibility and reciprocity.
Bibliography of Primary Texts and List of Abbreviations

Works by Edmund Husserl

PS


PS


CM


CM


EU


EJ


ID I


ID I


ID II


ID II


ID III  

ID III  

K  

C  

LI I  

LI II  

LI I/LI II  

PP  

PP  

PIZ  

PIT  
Works by Emmanuel Levinas

E  

E  

EE  

EE  

AE  

OB  

I  

I  

TO  

TO  

TI  

TI  

Works by Jean Luc Marion

ED  

BG  
PhD Thesis-Rashmi Pandya-McMaster University-Philosophy


Bibliography of Secondary Sources


