AN AGENT-SEMANTICAL THEORY OF REFERENCE
AN AGENT-SEMANTICAL THEORY OF REFERENCE

By

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This work provides a theory of singular reference based on the idea that the function of a referring expression is to get an audience to think of some particular item. Although this obvious fact has not escaped anyone's notice, many believe that the considerations associated with this communicatory function do not belong to "semantics" but to "pragmatics". Others regard such considerations as relating to "perlocutionary", as opposed to "illocutionary", effects. By contrast the framework presented, which can be described as "Gricean", puts forward the theory of communication as the primary arena of semantics. I take the view (derived from Wittgenstein) that representation is to be explained in terms of agency.

Starting from a simple condition for paradigm acts of reference, the theory is developed by considering three areas of contemporary concern: names, definite descriptions and intentional contexts. While the "cluster" theory is upheld as an insight into the problem of determining the conventional bearer of a name, it is conceded that names function semantically in a manner postulated by Mill. Donnellan's distinction between referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions is redrawn; unlike recent
accounts of this distinction, the account proposed represents the distinction as a sharp one. The account of intentional contexts introduces an approach which exploits the Gricean model for analyzing a speaker's strategy. This approach differs significantly from other published accounts of intentional contexts.
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My convention for non-nested quotation marks is as follows. Single quotes are used for purest mention; double quotes, for other uses. The test for "purest mention" is whether the quoted expression can be preceded by syntactical descriptions such as 'the letter', 'the name', 'the description' and so on. Hence I would write:

John referred to Margaret by 'Peggy'.
John referred to Margaret as "Peggy".

The convention for nested quotation is to use a different style from the containing quotations unless this would be confusing. Thus I might write:

Margaret said "John referred to me as 'Peggy'.'

The uses of double quotation marks include marking off utterances, introducing propositions and concepts, and for signalling "shudders".

The conventions of the respective authors have been followed in passages of quotation. These contexts are indented and single spaced.

Notes appear at the end of each chapter.
CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

1.1 The Topic

The topic of the present work is singular reference in English and the aim is to provide an adequate framework for the description of the various phenomena which it includes. Furthermore, I aim to show that this framework provides a solution to one classic semantical puzzle, the analysis of intentional contexts. The types of referring expression studied are names and definite descriptions.

A theory of reference which is to apply to a language actually used to talk about things has to come to grips with a variety of untidy facts. Members of a speech community will differ in their beliefs and hence may give conflicting accounts of their use of the same names or descriptions; even so we maintain standards of correctness. On the other hand, we allow that there is a sense in which a speaker may successfully refer to something although he used an incorrect name or description. We say that he is successful because we know to what he refers. Furthermore, a description or a name may apply to a number of different items and yet unique reference can be made by its use. We may also observe that although a speaker may correctly refer
to something by name without being acquainted with the named item, it may be true that he cannot identify it uniquely either by name or by description.

These various observations of how we actually use language have been enlisted to call into question, or challenge, the classical philosophical accounts of reference which were largely developed in the context of formal languages. This might seem irrelevant criticism, or at least unfair, and hence might be resisted by a staunch formalist. However, there are a number of other well-known difficulties concerning reference which have always been perceived to fall within the limits of semantic concern. These include the difficulties associated with the analysis of intentional and alethic sentences, and sentences about fictional items.

However, it is far from true that the classic formalists ignored the kind of linguistic observations noted above. Frege, for one instance, considered the first observation mentioned; he addressed the fact that different speakers may attach different "senses" to the same words. But it is much harder in the context of the various contemporary approaches to distinguish purely semantical issues from epistemic problems. The semantic problems of the last paragraph, no less than the linguistic observations noted prior, have an epistemic side. It should not now seem outlandish to suggest that the kinds of insight and
consideration derived from studying the "epistemic" problems derived from linguistic observation, may throw light on, or indeed suggest, solutions to "semantical" problems.

1.2 The Method

Although the method is due to Grice, the roots of agent-semantics, as I interpret it, lie in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. In my view it is Wittgenstein's later writings on representation, rather than the behaviouristic theories with which agent-semantics is sometimes (with some justification) associated, which provide the proper philosophical impetus to the approach. It contrasts most strongly with what have been called "model-theoretic" accounts of representation, such as that given in Wittgenstein's own earlier work. The central point is that meaning and agency are crucially connected; meaning is not a structural property but a function which items can be used to fulfill. To be sure, without structural complexity signs could not meet the sophisticated needs of human societies; but fundamentally signs are tools. These are ideas which will be explicated as we progress.

There are exegetical reasons for associating agent-semantics with behaviourism, but these are not compelling. In his original article Grice presents criticisms of behaviouristic theories (those of Morris and
Stevenson) before presenting his own theory; this order of presentation might be cited as justification for viewing the theory as a refined behaviouristic one. Furthermore, it would be fair to view Bennett's recent presentation of an agent-semantical theory as behaviouristic. However, as I shall explain more fully later, there is no obligation on those who would defend agent-semantics to reduce the mentalistic concepts on which the analysis depends to instances of behaviour or to "dispositional properties". The aim of the theory is to emphasize those aspects of language in its social setting which have to do with agency; the reduction of mental concepts is quite a separate aim and not one with which I have particular sympathy.

I alluded above to the "model-theoretic" approach to semantics as the approach which contrasts most strongly with that adopted here. I adopt this catch-all term to cover the logical atomism of Wittgenstein and Russell, "logical semantics" in the tradition of Carnap and Tarski, Davidsonian semantics, possible world-semantics and recent variants. The feature of these opposing approaches which justifies placing them together is the doctrine that representation can be explained in terms of structure: language and thought represent by virtue of the structure of the representation. In Wittgenstein's "picture theory" this account took the form that representation is a structural
isomorphism between sign and signified complex under some rule of projection. More recent model-theoretic approaches put emphasis on the syntactic structure of the language as a whole. Ultimately the notion of atomic elements of the language being correlated with constituents of the world can be discarded but the theory may, nevertheless, prove to be a model-theoretic one. It will count as model-theoretic so long as it presents the internal structure of the language as the key to a sign’s being a representation.

The model-theoretic approach strongly contrasts with agent-semantics, which holds that representation is ultimately connected with agency, the activity of the subject. This approach was developed by Wittgenstein in his later writings and, although his method is not followed here, the fundamental view of representation is due to him.

Of course, not all approaches to semantics fit handily into one of these categories. Hintikka, from whom I borrow the term 'model-theoretic', offers 'game-theoretical semantics', which he suggests is not model-theoretic and owes a debt to Wittgenstein. But it is not easy to say whether he adopts the view that representation is to be explained in terms of agency.2

The Gricean method is to embrace the notion of agency and use it to articulate conditions necessary for a speaker, an utterance, or a sentence to mean something.
This requires an extensive use of the verb 'intend', an expression which many philosophers treat gingerly. Such caution is justified if one takes a model-theoretic approach, or in a context where reduction of intentional concepts is sought. But the theory being presented here does not provide such a context. It would be a criticism of the theory if it distorted the ordinary notion of an intention in order to meet explanatory demands laid upon it. But I do not think this charge can be sustained.

Grice's work aims at the definition of meaning, particularly that of whole utterances. The present work differs in that I aim to articulate conditions under which reference occurs. Its direct theoretical predecessors are developed by Strawson and Searle. Strawson's theory will be discussed in connection with referring by description. In *Speech Acts* Searle incorporates Gricean conditions in a theory of referring. I do not discuss this version of the theory, since it would embroil me in a tortuous history of the early debate on Grice's conditions and in an unproductive discussion of speech-act theory. However, Searle's theory of proper names, which stands independently, is defended and some of his more recent work on reference is discussed. Another work in this tradition, specifically about reference, is Meiland's *Talking About Particulars*.

The agent-semantic method leads to a distinctive
view of proper names and definite descriptions and offers an intuitive solution to the problem of "referential opacity". Gricean conditions have sometimes been brought into discussions of these matters, but without an appreciation of the general philosophical framework to which they properly belong. These conditions should not be added to fundamentally model-theoretic accounts without acknowledgement that the whole nature of the theory has been changed.

2.3 The Procedure

The theory to be defended is an application of Grice's analysis of meaning to the particular case of referring. The basic version of the theory has been distilled to one condition which will be presented in the next chapter. The theory will then be elaborated by applying it to problems which have challenged other theories of reference. The basic version is, in short, a sufficient condition for an act of referring which involves the speaker's intention to draw his audience's attention to something, the grammatical function of the expression, and the relationship between the expression and the item, e.g. the expression names the item. In chapter two this condition is presented and objections are considered.

In chapter three I focus on the notion of naming
viewed both as the conventional relation and as an activity, i.e. the act of referring by using a name. The balance struck by the theory between the speaker's intentions and the conventional aspects of names provides a framework for discussion of issues arising from Kripke's criticism of Searle's "cluster theory". The cluster theory, viewed as a theory about how one might determine which object is conventionally named by an expression, is defended. But Kripke's point that the cluster does not make a "semantical" contribution is accepted.

In chapter four I defend the contention, explicit in chapter two, that one may refer by using a definite description. Donnellan's distinction between referential and attributive uses is redrawn within the agent-semantical framework and the complex question of whether the theory conflicts with Russell's theory of descriptions is explored. Comparisons are also made with recent speech-act approaches.

Chapter five turns to the analysis of intentional contexts and represents the principal theoretical gain of the approach. The flexibility of the theory concerning the relationship between expression and item allows it to be applied to the grammatical subject of the subordinate clause of an intentional context, even though the standard test for a term's having a referential role, "substitutability", fails in such contexts. The agent-semantical approach
enables us to mark a distinction between co-designation and co-reference and modifies our interpretation of this test. The workings of this distinction, however, cannot be explained until the theory itself has been presented.

In the concluding chapter, I summarize the important results and suggest directions for future research.

Notes
2. J.Hintikka, "Language Games". I should note that the term 'model-theoretic' is also used, elsewhere, in a narrower sense. "Model-theoretic semantics" is sometimes opposed to "absolute truth-theoretic semantics"; the latter predates the application of mathematical model theory to semantics.
2.1 Reference As Use

As has often been observed, the word 'use' has two important senses. First it may have the sense of a particular utilization of something: the use, in this sense, is a transitory feature imposed on the thing. Hence one may talk of the "use" of a name or description on a particular occasion. Corresponding to this we apply 'naming' and 'describing' to kinds of activity; in this case to name something or to describe something are particular utilizations of the expressions involved. This sense of naming appears in the example: "When reporting the crime John named the culprit."

Secondly, the word 'use' may be used to mean the function of something: a function is, as it were, a standing property of the thing. Companably, 'naming' and 'describing' may represent standing properties or better relations; in this connection one talks of the "meaning in the language", or the "reference in the language", of the name or description. Thus corresponding to the second sense of 'use' is the conventional meaning or reference of the
term. This sense of naming appears in the example: "'Raskolnikov' named the culprit."

While any particular act of referring to something may involve the convention to use 'e' to refer to x, it is not at all typical that there be a convention to refer to x on some given occasion. The distinction between meaning-as-convention and meaning-as-activity (both might be deduced from the Wittgensteinian slogan "meaning is use") is important. Model-theoretic approaches refuse to acknowledge the relevance of meaning-as-activity to semantics but rather consign the notion to the separate area of concern, "pragmatics". In what follows I show how, from the agent-semantical point of view, meaning-as-activity is seen to have relevance. I shall henceforth use 'refer' corresponding to naming and describing in the sense of particular actions; I shall use 'designate' for the conventional referential relations (naming and describing).

Among theorists interested in language as a social phenomenon, some have described meaning-as-activity in terms of meaning-as-convention (I think of the Austin/Searle tradition of "speech-act theory", where the emphasis is on rules and conventional procedures); others have gone the other way, describing meaning-as-convention in terms of meaning-as-activity (I think of the Gricean tradition where the emphasis is on the speaker's aims). Both traditions
might be said to follow Wittgenstein and be "agent-semantic approaches"; but the Gricean approach, it seems to me, places a much more convincing view of the speaker in the foreground. Furthermore, the agent-semantic approach naturally extends to account for non-conventional and non-linguistic features of the communicatory situation.\footnote{1}

The speech-act approach describes the speaker as earnestly endeavouring to follow the rules governing the situation in which he finds himself; the Gricean speaker, on the other hand, is primarily intent on getting his message across by whatever means seems appropriate. The conventions are there to be exploited. The difference may be merely a matter of emphasis, but the emphasis the speech act theorist places on rules is sometimes taken to show that the approach is public and above board relative to the reliance on intentions associated with the agent-semantic approach. But this virtue is illusory. It requires the speech act theorist to suppose that there are context-free rules of a language which can be applied without any special consideration of the speaker's beliefs. I do not think the latter idea is defensible and hence I do not believe the speech act approach in fact does (or should) avoid dependence upon the speaker's beliefs. In fact Searle explicitly argues against such a view in "Literal Meaning".

The Gricean theory explains meaning-as-convention in
terms of meaning-as-activity (or "non-natural meaning" as Grice originally calls it). The idea of a speaker (or, more generally, an agent) meaning something is defined in terms of his intending certain effects on some audience. The idea of meaning-as-activity is thus introduced without broaching the topic of convention. Meaning-as-convention is attributed to conventional means for producing effects in audiences. Thus, it is hoped, meaning-as-convention can be analysed in terms of the independent notion of meaning-as-activity. In the present work I am not so much concerned with the generalized notion of meaning as with the specific notion of referring. One can isolate the communicatory role of referring. Our task in the next section will be to explore the additional structure which characterizes acts that fulfill this role and which are acts of reference.

But what is the communicatory role of referring? Strawson describes the aim of referring as that of "forestalling" the question, "What (who, which one) are you talking about?". Searle expresses a similar idea in saying that the referring expression "serves to pick out or identify some object" where by 'identify' he means "there should no longer be any doubt or ambiguity about what exactly is being talked about." As we shall see, there are cases where this condition may be considered too strong.
However, a formulation which Donnellan uses is particularly suited for Gricean purposes: in referring we "intend our audience to realize whom we have in mind."2

2.2 The Condition REF

In this section a basic condition for paradigm acts of reference is developed. The first step is to illustrate cases which I take to be paradigm. Consider the following examples of a person, S, intending an audience, A, to have an object in mind:

1. S activates an electrode in A's brain intending A to think of something (or other). A thinks of Hiroshima as a consequence.
2. S wishes to remind A that his car is blocking the driveway and jingles some keys.
3. S wishes to remind A that his car is blocking the driveway and says: "Most status symbols relate to money", which is an allusion to a past conversation about A's car.
4. S says: "'Socrates' has eight letters."
5. S says: "Everyone in this room has a degree."
6. S says: "Someone not a million miles away is thinking of running for office."
7. S says: "The wealthiest businessman in Hamilton is thinking of running for office."
8. S says: "Ralph B. Ortcutt is thinking of running for
office."

Probably no one would argue that (1)-(3) are cases of reference. The rest have variously been argued to be, or argued not to be, cases of reference in some sense. The cases I shall consider are represented by (7) and (8). These represent two kinds of paradigm case: reference by description and reference by name. I consider them separately in the subsequent two chapters.

Before proceeding with the main task here, which is to find a sufficient condition for both kinds of paradigm case, I should say a word about why I do not automatically count case (4) as one of referring. The reader may feel with some justice that the expression "Socrates" in (4) refers to the expression 'Socrates'. The justification is that it is conventional to interpret quotation as transforming an expression into the name of a type of expression. If that is one's view, then case (4) differs not at all from case (8) and would thus not be worth considering separately. However, it is not altogether clear that this is a satisfactory view of quotation. One alternative interpretation is that the convention to put quotes around the expression indicate that the expression-type is being exemplified rather than being referred to. I exclude case (4), so interpreted, from my paradigm examples.

To return to the analysis of what I take to be
paradigm cases, in each of the above eight cases S intends A to have an object in mind, but S does not in every case intend A to realize that he (S) has that object in mind. Thus in case (1), and possibly in cases (2) and (3) depending on the details of the situation, S can fail to meet the formula that he intend A to realize which object S has in mind. For example, S may wish to convey the impression that his jingling keys is inadvertent and nothing could be further from his mind than A's inconveniently parked car. It is partly this condition that A recognize that S has some object, x, in mind that makes a situation one of communication. Another part is that A recognize that S intends him (A) to have x in mind. The latter would seem possible only if S is doing something to achieve this end. But stronger still, if the situation is to be one of communication S must intend A to realize that S intends A to have x in mind by getting A to see that he (S) wants him (A) to have x in mind. Let us call this kind of communication situation "object-introduction" and stipulate that an attempt to introduce an object to an audience meets the following condition:

OBJ S utters 'f' with the open intention that A have x in mind by recognition that K('f',x).

There are two things to explain here: the "open intention" and the relation K.
(1) Open intentions:

In connection with the attempt to define "S-meaning" (roughly: speaker's meaning or what a speaker means by uttering something as opposed to what the sentence he utters means), Schiffer has argued that it is not possible to draw up a list of intentions that are jointly sufficient since there may be, for any given set of intentions, one further intention to deceive A about S's primary intention. However, Schiffer overcomes this by introducing a concept he calls "mutual knowledge." 4

A typical case of mutual knowledge would be where two persons are facing each other across a table, each knows that there is a table between them, and each knows that the other knows there is a table between them. More complex embedding of knowledge of each other's knowledge is possible, but the practical point is that there is no doubt of the fact before them nor of each other's acquaintance with it. Communication, like other cooperative activity, usually depends on there being such mutual knowledge. For example, if S wants to tell A something he will normally create a situation such that they mutually know that S has produced a particular sequence of sounds (or whatever A detects). This is not always the case, for example when writing an anonymous letter or talking through a translator, but these are exceptional cases and not the paradigm cases
which we want to capture.

I now define an open intention, modelling the definition on Schiffer's formulations of his definitions of S-meaning:

S openly intends A to have x in mind in situation

\[ E = \text{df} \quad S \text{ intends to create a situation } E \text{ such that } \]

S and A mutually know that E is good evidence for believing that S intends A to have x in mind.

Thus what 'open' in OBJ does is exclude cases where S has artful, hidden intentions which would transform the situation from being one of attempted communication into one of attempted manipulation of A by S. For the most part, the pertinent feature of the situation E which S creates is the utterance ('f' in OBJ). The contribution of context and so on is important but may be ignored in the simple cases to be considered here.

(2) The Relation K:

K is a stand-in relation between the sign produced and the object S has in mind. In any given case 'K' stands for the relation S intends A to recognize as holding between the sign and object. In a simple case where S refers by name (e.g. the obvious situation suggested by case (8)) the relation K will be that the word names the object (e.g. 'Ralph B. Ortcutt' names the man). A complex case would be one where S alludes to the object (e.g. case (3) above).
Here the relation $K$ is the complex chain of associations upon which $S$ relies to get $A$ to connect the sentence with the object. Thus we see that the relation $K$ may be an entirely context-dependent, nonconventional relation or it may be the conventional relation of naming. The relation $K$ may be called $S$'s identification strategy.

So far I have introduced a condition for what I have called "object introduction". Reference, regarded as an activity of speakers, may be counted as one kind of attempt to introduce an object. What distinguishes referring from other efforts to introduce objects is that the sign involved is a referring expression, or to put it another way, $S$'s identification strategy is a referential strategy. We should therefore consider the conditions which are to be met by a sign if it is to count as a referring expression. It will emerge later that this distinction between reference as an activity and the referential strategy used is crucial to the further development of the theory.

Referring is paradigmatically one element of a total performance which constitutes a complete speech act. A speech act is a signal based (in some way) upon the practices of some speech community; it is a signal which $S$ believes is a viable way of getting $A$ to believe or do something. An incomplete speech act is not necessarily one where the speaker fails to produce a whole sentence (NP +
VP), but one where he fails to produce as much as he believes is requisite for an audience to make a reasonable interpretation. Communication may take place even though a speaker does not produce a complete sentence; that is, the production of a partial English sentence may be a complete speech act.

Such brief utterances as: "Scalpel!", "Sit!" or "Home!", may be speech acts; but one would not take them to represent specimens of complete English sentences. If a language merely consisted of such non-complex signals, there would not be any referring expressions in the language. Wittgenstein considers such a "language game" in the Investigations where the builder utters: "Slab!", and his mate fetches a slab. Clearly we do not have here a paradigm referring expression which can be isolated from the rest of the signal as one might isolate 'the slab' in the English utterance: "Bring me the slab!" The expression 'the slab' can be identified as a distinct component in an English sentence because of the way it recurs in combination with other words.

However, we cannot merely say that in order for paradigmatic reference to take place the syntax of the sentence used has to be of a certain complexity, or that this possibility exists in the language. The speaker also has to understand this complexity. He has to have the
competence to grasp some of the possibilities the syntax affords. Wittgenstein makes this point in the discussion mentioned.

We say that we use the command in contrast with other sentences because our language contains the possibilities of those other sentences. Someone who did not understand our language, a foreigner, who had fairly often heard someone giving the order "Bring me a slab!", might believe that this whole series of sounds was one word corresponding perhaps to the word for "building stone" in his language.

Let us change the example slightly to the order: "Bring me the slab!", which contains the referring expression 'the slab' when uttered by a native speaker. We can only argue that there is a referring expression in such a case by relying on our own competence to make such discriminations. The speaker believes that he is using a generic term to convey an instruction. For this reason we would not take this as a paradigm example of reference.

We have a condition for object introduction in general, and several features of paradigm acts of reference in particular have been noted. Two speech acts may be equivalent with respect to their having the same intended response, yet differ in not involving the same component acts of reference. Furthermore, simply referring to something does not convey anything unless a message is implicit, e.g. "The scalpel!" for: "Give me the scalpel, please!" Lastly, if we attribute to a speaker the intention
to refer to an object, we thereby attribute to him a certain
linguistic competence. Thus referring expressions
paradigmatically occur in the mouths of speakers who are
competent in a syntactically complex language.

Confining our attention to the central case of
stating, we stipulate sufficient conditions for the
performance of a speech act aiming at a belief response in
an audience:

PROP(1) S meant that p by uttering 's' if S uttered 's'
with the open intention that A believe that p partly
by recognition that C('s',p).

Two points:
(i) A's recognition that the signal or sentence 's' is
related to p is only intended to be partly responsible for
his belief, since this connection does not give him a reason
for believing that p. In the case of statements, A's reason
will be that S intended him to believe it and A has no
reason for mistrust.
(ii) In the simplest case, the relation C will be that 's'
means p, but this is not the only possibility. Speaker's
meaning and sentence meaning notoriously can diverge. You
may say you must tidy your office when what you mean
(actually intend me to believe) is that you do not want to
listen to me read my paper on multiply-nested intentional
contexts.
We are here interested in reference and this concerns what the speaker is using his sentence, and in particular his referring expression, to mean rather than what he means by using the sentence. Thus we are not concerned with S's primary intentions if these diverge from those intentions relating to the intended interpretation of his sentence. We may focus on the latter, the "utterance meaning", by further analysing the signal produced.

We have already observed that reference paradigmatically takes place as part of the production of a complex signal. Suppose S utters 'Fe' thereby performing a speech act, where 'e' is a referring expression and 'F' the rest of the signal. In the simplest case, 'F' will be a one-place predicate or "classifying" expression. We can now combine OBJ and PROP(1) as follows:

S meant that p by uttering 'Fe' if S uttered 'Fe' with the open intention that A believe that p and have x in mind partly by recognition that K('e',x) and C('Fe',p).

Clearly this is not in the simplest form possible since if S utters 'Jones is guilty' intending A to believe Jones is guilty, it is not incidental to A's acceptance that Jones is guilty that he has Jones in mind. Thus the clause 'and have x in mind' may be dropped. But we need to bring out the role of K and the grammatical connection between 'e' and
'F'. This may be achieved as follows:

PROP(2) S meant that Gx by uttering 'Fe' if S uttered 'Fe' with the open intention that A believe that Gx partly by recognition that K('e',x) and M('F',G).

I have replaced 'p' by the complex propositional sign 'Gx', and the sign 'M' has been introduced for what may be described as the conventional meaning relation between a predicate expression and what it is used to mean. Thus 'M('F',G)' is read: "'F' means G". 'G' in the latter formulation introduces the common element in the propositions expressed by 'Fa', 'Fb', 'Fc' and so on - it is what is believed about a, b, c and so on. Restricting the predicate expression to its conventional meaning excludes certain cases from meeting PROP(2) which nevertheless involve reference. However, such cases can be allowed for once the paradigm is established. Establishing that paradigm is the aim here. An illustration of PROP(2) being met by a simple case is the following:

S meant that Jones is guilty by uttering 'Jones is guilty' since S uttered 'Jones is guilty' with the open intention that A believe Jones is guilty, partly by recognition that 'Jones' names Jones and 'is guilty' means is guilty.

This case is simple because S is using the name of the object to refer to it and, better still, he has the right
name. More complex cases will be considered in due course.

From the foregoing we may deduce sufficient conditions for referring; these give conditions which paradigm acts of reference meet when they occur within speech acts directed at belief-responses.

REF S refers to x by 'e' if S utters 'Fe' and has the open intention that A believe Gx partly by recognition that R('e',x) and M('F',G).

Here the relation R is S's referential strategy, the way A is intended to get from 'e' to x. The clearest case of such a strategy is the conventional name relation. This will be discussed in the following chapter. Another such strategy is description, as I shall argue in chapter four. More complex, non-conventional strategies will be considered in chapter five.

The distinction between reference-as-activity and the referential strategy is built into the condition REF. Thus when the referential strategy is conventional the condition embodies the distinction between reference-as-activity and reference-as-convention. (The speaker might intend to use a conventional strategy but have a false idea of what the conventional referent of the designator is. Such a case would have to be excluded from what was just called a "conventional strategy".)
2.3 Objections to the Basic Theory

One way of clarifying a theory is by considering objections that might be brought against it. This both provides a backdrop of contrasting views and an opportunity to explain the theory in more detail. In this section I consider a number of general objections to the theory so far presented.

In Reference and Generality Peter Geach denies that reference-as-activity is of interest:

Personal reference - i.e. reference corresponding to the verb 'refer' as predicated of persons rather than expressions - is of negligible importance for logic.

His argument concerns the following case:

Suppose Smith says, as it happens truly, "Some man has been on top of Mount Everest." If we now ask Smith "Which man?" we may mean "Which man has been on top of Mount Everest?" or "Which man were you referring to?" Either question is in order; and if what Smith says is true the first must have an answer, whether or not Smith knows the answer. But though it is in order to ask whom Smith was referring to, this question need not have an answer; Smith may have learned only that some man has been on top of Mount Everest without learning who has, and then he will not have had any definite man in mind.

Thus Geach considers it in order to ask which man Smith was referring to even where he uses the indefinite expression 'some man'; the implication is that where Smith does have some particular man in mind he refers to that man by 'some man'. Thus Geach writes:
Suppose that when Smith made his statement he had in mind Sir Vivian Fuchs, whom he falsely believes to have been on top of Mount Everest; then Smith may be said to have been referring to Sir Vivian Fuchs, but what he actually said was true; but if it conveyed a reference to Sir Vivian Fuchs, it would have to taken as a predication about him, and then it would be false.

Here Geach makes use of a distinction between what the words convey and what the speaker intends, between what 'some man' conveys and what the speaker had in mind, namely, Sir Vivian Fuchs. According to the agent-semantical account, the speaker refers to the object his words are intended to convey. Thus in the above case, it is incorrect to say the speaker referred to Sir Vivian Fuchs by 'some man' as he did not intend his audience to have Sir Vivian Fuchs in mind as a consequence of his use of 'some man'; to expect an audience to achieve this, without special context, would be sanguine in the extreme. Thus this would not be counted as a case of referring.

Again contrary to our account of reference, Geach makes use of a distinction between what the words convey and what the audience gathers in the following:

Smith says indignantly to his wife, "The fat old humbug we saw yesterday has just been made a full professor!". His wife may know whom he refers to, and will consider herself misinformed if and only if that person has not been made a full professor. But the actual expression 'the fat old humbug we saw yesterday' will refer to somebody only if Mr. and Mrs. Smith did meet someone rightly describable as a fat old humbug.
on the day before Smith's indignant remark; if this is not so, then Smith's actual words will not have conveyed true information, even if what Mrs. Smith gathered from them was true.

Under normal conditions, where Mr. Smith believes his epithet is accurate and that his wife will know who he means by recognizing the truth of this description, Mr. Smith's referential strategy reflects his presupposition that the man is a fat old humbug. He does not, however, assert that latter judgement. If, as it turns out, the judgement is unjust then his statement may be faulted for a false presupposition but not for asserting a falsehood. The latter is how I would characterize the point that Geach expresses as that "Smith's actual words will not have conveyed true information."

Thus, in short, I contend that Geach finds the personal sense of 'refer', or reference as an activity, irrelevant because he saddles reference in that sense with false applications. The idea that, if a speaker has a particular person in mind, the speaker must be referring to that person when using an indefinite expression, is not a tenet that need be upheld. Nor need we agree with Geach that if the description 'the fat old humbug we saw yesterday' is used to refer within an assertion, then the words will convey a falsehood if the description fails of the object of reference. On the other hand, the relevance
of introducing the personal use of 'refer' comes out in the analysis of demonstratives, anaphorae and intentional contexts (including performative utterances), as well as in the philosophical investigation of the connection between language and the world.

In Linguistic Representation Jay Rosenberg presents an analogy (model-theoretic) theory of thought explicitly inspired by Wittgenstein's Tractatus. He writes:

[The analogy theory] reveals the ultimate sterility of agent-semantics and its intentionalist underpinnings. For if thought is a representational system analogous to public language, then it cannot be appealed to to explain how representational systems succeed in representing a world. Whatever the merits of agent-semantics as a component in an account of public linguistic performances, the analysis of representation must be conducted at a level undercutting the distinction between the overt and the covert, between public language and thought. This, as I read it, is one of the main lessons of the Philosophical Investigations and it is paradoxical on that account that the Investigations has also provided the main incentive for intentionalistically grounded theories of agent-semantics.

Thus, while it is doubtless in some sense true to say that bits of language don't represent but, rather, it is people who use bits of language to represent, at a more fundamental level it is true that a person can use something overt to represent only by deploying - by backing it with - something covert which represents in the same sense.

Rosenberg believes, therefore, that thought is a "covert" system, analogous to public language, which represents in the same sense as language. (An alternative to this view, the only one which Rosenberg can see, is the introduction of
modes of being; this approach he rejects.) Rosenberg views agent-semantics as "explaining" one system in terms of the other and, since both systems represent in the same way, he concludes that this does not advance our understanding of representation.

Let us look at the point that language is a system. Language is a "system" in so far as grammatical rules can be given which speech approximately follows in practice. It is also a "system" in that it is a method by which human beings communicate. Now consider in what ways thought might be called a "system". If 'thought' is being taken in a generic sense to include thinking, remembering, expecting, fearing, wanting and so on, then they are only related systematically in so far as they involve belief. Beliefs can be marshalled into systems in that certain beliefs are co-tenable and others are not; and some beliefs may be held more firmly than others. But this system, while intimately connected with a subject's grasp of his language, does not itself constitute a system of representation. Thus Rosenberg's claim that there are two systems of representation is not clearly correct.

A more telling point, perhaps, is the fact that representation (in any obvious sense) is not necessarily involved in thinking at all. We might grant that, in some sense, the sentence 'it is raining' represents it is
raining, but if I think that it is raining, it is not at all clear that anything need represent it is raining. In some cases I might "represent" rain to myself by picturing drops of water falling or by saying to myself: "It is raining," but these procedures are not essential. Consider the following scenario: I hear a pattering sound. Subsequently someone comes in and remarks what a nice day it is. I reply: "I thought it was raining." This reply does not necessarily report that any "representation" occurred.

Since Rosenberg appeals to Wittgenstein, we may quote the following to reinforce the point of the last paragraph:

When I think in language, there aren't 'meanings' going through my mind in addition to the verbal expressigns: the language itself is the vehicle of thought.

Thus if one thinks in language one is not using another "system of representation", though in either mechanical or phenomenal terms some different process is occurring than when one is speaking.

Underlying Rosenberg's objection is the idea that agent-semantics is "explaining" one thing in terms of something else which is just as complicated. The notion of explanation is one that is often taken narrowly to mean "reduction to simpler terms." A concept is "explained" in terms of concepts which are considered more basic. Thus
apparently simple predicates are replaced by more complex predicates constructed from predicates that are considered as, in some way, more basic. However, if we take having an explanation in a wider sense to mean having an improved understanding, then reduction is not the only possible paradigm. Seeing the connections between concepts is understanding. Hence drawing those connections is also explanation. Agent-semantics may be seen as displaying some of the connections between thought and language rather than reducing linguistic representation to psychological terms; the effort is not in any way to eliminate semantic concepts by preference for psychological ones.

In "Intentionalism in the Theory of Meaning" John Biro presents general arguments against Gricean theories of meaning and semantical theories which allow intentions to play an essential role. He calls these (following Bennett) "meaning-nominalist theories". He argues against two versions of meaning-nominalism, each having a different view of the nature of intentions. The arguments are successful but I suggest that, in neither account, do the assumptions made about intentions stand up. Hence the arguments do not stand against the position here defended.

The first version of the theory is one which maintains that intentions are essentially non-observable. Thus the meaning-nominalist maintains that a sufficient
account of utterance meaning must incorporate reference to the speaker's intentions concerning the meaning of the sentence he uses. Biro suggests that this meaning-nominalist is committed to the following tenets:

a) Intention-ascriptions cannot always be replaced by a description of context (linguistic and/or non-linguistic).

b) An intention is sufficient to make an utterance of 's' mean "p", despite the fact that 's' conventionally means "q".

Biro suggests that if the meaning-nominalist were not committed to (a) then there would be no point in introducing intentions; and if he did not maintain (b) then the theory would not be capable of reducing utterance meaning to speaker's meaning. Biro goes on to point out the epistemological difficulty in this position: it follows that there may be no way at all of discovering what a speaker means since intentions are logically private and the evidence available may be misleading.

However, tenets (a) and (b) are not acceptable. It is quite contrary to the Wittgensteinian view, which is at the basis of our approach, to suppose that intentions are private. Rather than maintaining (a) we would hold that an intention-ascription is a mentalistic explanation of S's activity which interprets his action in that context. A non-mentalistic description of the context is not equivalent
but it does represent the sum of the immediate evidence we have for a description in terms of intentions.

Tenet (b) suggests the view which is associated with the name 'Humpty Dumpty': one can use any expression in any context to "mean" what one likes. This tenet is absurd because it neglects the logic of intentions. It would indeed be an unusual situation where a speaker could, like Humpty Dumpty, say "There's glory for you" and rationally expect his audience to understand that he meant that there's a nice knock-down argument for you. With sufficient ingenuity such a context could be constructed. But, clearly, in a "normal" situation it would be completely irrational to interpret a speaker's utterance this way hence a rational speaker would not formulate such a strategy. A speaker does not "have an intention" at will, as he might be free to imagine some fanciful object; an intention corresponds to purposive activity which is, typically, rational. Thus, although an utterance of 's' may mean "p", while 's' conventionally means "q", simply citing the intention to mean "p" is not a complete explanation. The dynamics of the strategy whereby A is intended to understand 's' to mean "p" must be exhibited. In sum, the first position outlined by Biro, neglects the constraints of context and is redolent of the untenable view that intentions are privately generated causes of actions.

The second position which Biro criticizes takes a
different view of intentions. On this view "the act's being a certain kind" is taken as "evidence for the presence of the relevant intention". Thus the ascription of intention is a hypothesis to explain phenomena which may be described independently of that explanation. Biro argues as follows:

If it is granted that utterings are a kind of acting, and thus that knowing what utterance has occurred is at least part of knowing what act has been performed, it follows that the identity of utterances is no more dependent on their utterer's actual intentions than is the identity of acts in general on those of the agent. But with utterances, their 'identity' in this sense (i.e., what utterance they are) is their meaning. Thus if we can know what a speaker's utterance means, without knowing what intentions he actually has, then it cannot be the intentions he actually has which constitute - in any part - the meaning of his utterance.

So the criticism is that the evidence for the ascription of intention includes the evidence for what the utterance means and hence the intention is irrelevant to the determination of the utterance meaning.

The position criticized again incorporates a faulty view of intentions. It surely cannot be a correct view that the identity of an act is independent of the agent's intentions. Clearly the identity of any movements or sounds made is independent, but if we describe this activity as an "act", that is, in terms which exhibit a purpose, meaning or rationale, then this is tantamount to ascribing intentions: it implies that the agent had certain intentions. To
illustrate this claim, let us suppose that we feed random electrical pulses to a voice synthesizer and, quite by chance, the device emits the sentence 'I am hungry'. There is no disputing that the sentence has a conventional meaning; merely to point this out is not tantamount to ascribing intentions. We are concerned with utterance meaning, as Biro makes clear. If we describe the device as having asserted that it is hungry (produced an utterance with that meaning), then we are committed to the view that the device meant something. If the device meant something then, according to the intentionalist, it had certain intentions.

Of course, we would be wrong to describe the voice synthesizer in these terms. The point is that the relationship between the evidence and the ascription of intention is not, as Biro's criticism supposes, comparable to that between smoke and fire ("non-natural meaning"). To interpret the evidence in terms such as "asserts" or "means" is to apply intentional concepts and is a short step from the ascription of intention. 10

Biro's criticisms are directed towards the epistemological problem of deciphering a speaker's utterance given the intentionalist view that this involves determining the speaker's intentions. He correctly points out that a description of the total speech situation must be adequate
for the decipherment of the utterance. I have suggested that the evidential connection between the observed phenomena and the ascription of intention is not what Biro supposes in either of his versions of meaning-nominalism. Nevertheless, Biro is correct in rejecting the positions he describes and consequently in rejecting the "reductive analysis of utterance-meaning" in terms of intentions. The type of analysis advocated here could not be described as "reductive". Intentions are introduced to bring out the connections between agency and meaning. What Biro misses is that an adequate description of the speech situation is already an interpretation. Furthermore, an adequate description must often include reference to the speaker's beliefs and attitudes and hence is sometimes explicitly mentalistic. In my view the intentionalist should be concerned to point out the connections between semantics and mentalistic concepts and not to reduce one to the other.

In "Reference and Identifying Descriptions" Steven Boer criticizes Donnellan's use of the notion of having an item in mind.

One cannot "have X in mind" or "intend to refer to X" (let alone succeed in doing so) if one cannot in any way accurately identify X to oneself. Both Searle and Strawson are careful to point out that it is a conceptual truth about "intending" that a necessary condition of one's intending to single out a particular is one's being able to describe that particular identifyingly. Intentional magic - the directly
opposed view according to which the speaker's intentions somehow give him privileged access to things even when he cannot recognize them or say anything uniquely true of them - lurks behind several of Donnellan's remarks.

Boer is concerned, in part, to defend the view that to have an item in mind one must be able to identify it uniquely by a "backing of descriptions". This, in various formulations, is known as "the principle of identifying descriptions". I reject this principle. Thus the theory I propose may similarly be accused of relying on "intentional magic".

Donnellan presents the following case designed to challenge the view that it is a requirement that the user of a name be able to identify what the name refers to:

Suppose a child is gotten up from sleep at a party and introduced to someone as 'Tom', who then says a few words to the child. Later the child says to his parents, "Tom is a nice man". The only thing he can say about 'Tom' is that Tom was at a party. Moreover, he is unable to recognize anyone as 'Tom' on subsequent occasions. . . The case could be built up, I think, so that nothing the child possesses in the way of descriptions, dispositions to recognize, serves to pick out in the standard way anybody uniquely . . . Does this mean that there is no person to whom he was referring?

Donnellan answers that it does not mean this. I would agree. Boer describes this view as appealing to "intentional magic" and suggests that, since the child does not know who Tom is, the child cannot genuinely be referring.

Two types of examples may be presented which suggest that the principle of identifying descriptions must be given
up or drastically modified. One is the phenomenon of "deferential name use" which we shall discuss again in the next chapter. The idea is that one speaker may rely on the fact that others know (i.e. can identify uniquely) the referent, rather than being able to present an identifying description of his own. Of course, such a speaker could say "I mean the person others mean by 'Joey Smallwood'", but such an answer is "question-begging" - as Donnellan calls it - in that it does not provide a description which gives an interesting answer to how the referent is thought of. The point of the backing of descriptions is to explain just this.

The second type of example is, perhaps, a stronger counterexample to the principle of identifying descriptions. Tyler Burge illustrates how a subject may not have a conceptual grasp of a particular item about which he nevertheless has beliefs.

On seeing a man coming from a distance in a swirling fog, we may plausibly be said to believe of him that he is wearing a red cap. But we do not see him well enough to describe or image him in such a way as to individuate him fully. Of course, we could individuate him ostensively with the help of descriptions that we can apply. But there is no reason to believe that we can always describe or conceptualize the entities or spatiotemporal positions that we rely on in our demonstration ... The perceived object (say, a book) may not be inspected in sufficient detail to distinguish it from all other objects except by reference to spatiotemporal position. And this, as before,
will often not be individuatable by the perceiver except by context-dependent, nonconceptual methods.

Burge's examples illustrate that one may have beliefs about, and therefore refer to, something which one cannot uniquely describe. Thus I think we may take it that Boer, in his denial of the view that the child refers, does not have the backing of a universal principle to the effect that speakers who genuinely refer can identify their referents by description.

But what are we to make of this apparent capacity of ours to "intend" an object without being able to identify it? Are we relying on "intentional magic"? In the case of the sleepy child, Donnellan suggests that the parents may well be able to form a reasonable conjecture about whom the child meant by 'Tom'. Let us say that they decide that it is Tom Brown. The question is, then, how is it possible for the child to think of Tom Brown when he cannot describe the man? However, this question is misleading. Intentional states have the feature of being directed towards objects: if the child thinks then he is thinking of an object. The manner in which the child represents the object, whether or not this is "conceptual", is not at issue; we know, in any case, that he cannot produce a uniquely identifying description of Tom Brown. The important point is that it is not the child who identifies the object of his state as Tom Brown, but the
parents. Thus if anything needs explaining about the relationship between the object of the child’s belief and Tom Brown, it is only the reason why the parents identify the two. The child is not in a position to dispute the hypothesis if Tom Brown satisfies such descriptions as he has available. Within his own world picture the item he means by 'Tom' is unique even if he cannot articulate a description which would uniquely identify from his parent's perspective. Hence, since the parents are unlikely to appeal to intentional magic in giving their reasons for the identification of Tom Brown with the child's referent, we have no need to appeal to intentional magic.

Traditional theories of reference take the view that referential success requires that (1) the referent exists, and (2) the name or description correctly designates the referent. Some theorists who have taken an interest in epistemological issues surrounding the use of language add the extra requirement that we have just been considering: (3) the speaker can uniquely identify the referent. These principles have been adopted by most agent-semantic theorists. In adopting them, I believe, the agent-semanticist loses sight of the basis of an intentionalist theory. Three interesting features of intentional states are: (a) the object of the state may not exist, (b) the subject of the state may have mistaken
beliefs about the item which is identified as the object of
his state, and (c) the subject will lack knowledge of some
of the characteristics of the item which is identified with
the object of his state. Clearly, if one takes seriously the
view that reference is primarily an intentional activity,
one should recognize the impact of features (a)-(c) on
tenets (1)-(3). It was feature (c) which facilitated our
reply to Boer in the last paragraph. The other features will
also be detected at work as we proceed.

The concept of reference embodied in REF is likely
to meet resistance because of its intentional nature. It
might, for instance, be accused of defining "intending to
refer", or something of the sort, and not "referring" since
it does not incorporate tenets (1) and (2). The unusualness
of this concept of referring (relative to other theories
rather than relative to non-theoretical ways of talking
about reference) may be more apparent when I point out that
it follows from REF that if the speaker believes that there
is an item x, and believes he will be understood to be
talking about x if he uses designator 'e', he will \textit{refer} to
x by 'e' whether or not x exists or 'e' designates x. From
the usual standpoint this appears to subvert the whole idea
of successful reference. It looks as if reference is
\textit{guaranteed} and \textit{failure} impossible.

There are, in fact, a variety of ways one may fail
to meet the conditions for referring. One way would be not to have a coherent referential strategy: for example, if S uttered: "Horace is dead," and claimed he intended to refer to Napoleon by the name 'Horace', we could not give credence to this if S could not give any rationale for adopting this strategy. This case differs from that of a "slip of the tongue" where S would withdraw his use of 'Horace' were he to notice the slip. Another failure to meet the conditions for reference would be where no speech act is performed; for example, S utters 'Horace' not in answer to a question, or prefatory to any comment or in order to confuse, remind or impress his audience; S simply utters the phonemes with no intention at all. Since it is incorrect to attribute any intention to $S$ he fails to refer.\textsuperscript{15}

The above kinds of failure should not be confused with the following. At a different level, one may fail to refer to Napoleon when giving a lecture on European History. One might have intended to refer to Napoleon when preparing the lecture but forget to mention him when delivering it. The example reflects the fact that referring is an action. This kind of oversight raises no philosophical problems for referring that are not raised by any other act of omission; it does not bear on the conditions for referring.

There is also a sense in which $S$'s reference is not guaranteed, which is that $S$ may fail to succeed in his
communicatory aims. S may fail to introduce the object, that is he may fail to get A to have x in mind. However, the failure of a referential strategy may be as much the "fault" of the audience as the speaker. S might legitimately expect a fact to be known by A whereas, as it turns out, A does not know this fact. Clearly, S will not create a situation in which the fact is mutual knowledge simply by using the description. Hence his referential strategy will fail.

An objection may be raised in relation to the guarantee of reference; this may be called the "Heraclitean Problem." The objection might run as follows: "The object of reference is fixed by an act of referring, it is the intended object of reference; but that means its identity conditions are given by that act, which means in turn that you cannot refer to the same object twice since another act will be involved." This objection relies on a mistaken logical view of the relation between act and object. One may, in fact, hit the same ball twice; the difficulty in the case of referring is to see how the identity conditions of the object are given.

Referring is an act of identifying an object to an audience, not one of giving the identity conditions. In traditional terminology one might say the object "transcends" the act of identification. The object has a
character appropriate to objects of the category the speaker has in mind. For example, if the speaker is referring to an actual physical thing, as he believes, then the object has the characteristics of reidentifiability and externality. If the intended object of reference is a fictional character, say, then again the object is independent of the act though, of course, fictional items have different identity conditions from the sort associated with actual physical things. Thus the identity conditions of the object are not given by referring to it. The speaker presupposes that the item has identity conditions of a certain type.

The prima facie difficulty with allowing an object of reference to have the identity conditions which the speaker presupposes it has is that it may turn out that we are unable to identify the object with any known referent. The speaker may believe he is referring to an actual thing but, in fact, nothing corresponds to his description. In such a case we are committed to saying that the item to which he refers is independent of his act and has the type of identity conditions which he presupposes. But this is a correct view. If S refers to the hurdy-gurdy in the attic, yet there is no such thing in the attic and no hurdy-gurdy to which S might have been referring, we nevertheless treat the hurdy-gurdy as an independent object in arriving at the conclusion that it does not exist. Clearly we would not look
in the attic for S's private mental objects. We do not discover the absence of a private object in the attic but the absence of the hurdy-gurdy to which S referred. Thus our conclusion should not be that the hurdy-gurdy is a private object after all, but that the hurdy-gurdy is non-existent. In other words our dilemma is not: Does the hurdy-gurdy exist or is it a private object? Our question is: Does the hurdy-gurdy exist or does it not? Posing the question this way shows that we take S's reference seriously, that is, we take S to be referring to an item having identity conditions of the kind associated with physical objects.

The point that the object of reference is independent is connected to a point about the identity of referential acts themselves. There is a trivial sense in which one cannot perform the same action twice; an action once performed is an episode that occurred at a particular time and any subsequent action is a different episode. But there is a more important sense in which one does perform the same action twice; if I rap on the table with my knuckle, I can repeat this action, I can rap it again. The point applies to making statements and to referring. One may make the same statement twice in that one may utter the same sentence (or another with the same meaning) to the same effect (the identity of the audience would normally be taken to be immaterial in this connection). Likewise one refers
to the same object twice in intending some audience to have the **same** object in mind on both occasions. Thus the repeatability of an act of reference actually depends upon the logical independence of the object from the act. This is another way of saying that reference depends upon the possibility that the audience may have the object in mind; the object may be the object of an act other than the speaker's own act of referring (namely the audience's act of grasping what the speaker refers to) and hence is independent of that act.

A worry some feel about the Gricean use of mental concepts is that one is ascribing intentions that no one could articulate without familiarity with the Gricean model nor, even then, without a pencil and paper handy in the more complex cases. This uneasiness is due to another mistake about mental attributions. There is a difference between claiming that someone could readily articulate something and claiming that he merely believes, feels or intends something. An intention, feeling or belief may be expressed in action though the subject be unable to articulate the state verbally. There are no doubt very complicated presuppositions made in most human interactions both with inanimate things and other human beings. It may be a difficult matter to articulate these presuppositions precisely, yet to attribute the having of them, and hence
the belief in them, to an agent is unobjectionable. The insight one gains from studying any discipline or art concerned with human beings may be the articulation of familiar yet difficult ideas; one recognizes their truth as giving coherent expression to something that does not strike one as a novel perception. The literature of agent-semantics abounds with intricately analysed, bizarre examples which tend to distract one from the central, familiar point: communication involves doing something with the intention of getting someone else to believe or do something, and language is a sophisticated tool for achieving this. This is not to say that language is only used in this way but that, like thought, it is importantly connected to human action.

The aforementioned intricate analysis of bizarre examples has been motivated by an effort to formulate necessary and sufficient conditions for meaning. In the present work this area is largely bypassed by two moves. The first is the adoption of Schiffer's use of the idea of mutual knowledge (a similar idea appears in Lewis's Convention) to forestall questions as to the sufficiency of the conditions by production of counterexamples involving lurking intentions to deceive. The second is the waiving of the requirement that the conditions be necessary. Bennett adopts this policy in Linguistic Behaviour, describing this
as "the dominating strategic fact" about his book. He writes:

Conditions for meaning would be 'weak enough to be instructive' if they were necessary for meaning, but I have declined to aim so high. I shall try to establish sufficient conditions which are weak enough to cover a large, central, basic class of instances of meaning. By 'central' I mean important in our everyday uses of language. By 'basic' I mean adequate as a basis for explaining all other kinds of meaning. In the same spirit I claim that REF gives conditions for paradigm acts of reference.

2.4 Intention and Convention

In this section, without attempting to give an analysis of either intention or convention, I attempt to ease the reader past certain fundamental worries which he may feel in connection with the proposed theory of reference. One of these worries concerns the reliance of the theory on a prior theory of convention which may seem to make the theory vacuous. This problem is adequately dealt with by Schiffer in connection with the parallel problem concerning his theory of meaning. A second worry is the question of the priority of intention and convention: surely one can only have the intention to express a certain message, given that there exist the requisite conventions by which to express it; hence are not conventions prior in some
way? I shall address this question below.

To recap, a case of object introduction is one of reference if the identification strategy (the way the audience is expected to infer what S intends him to have in mind) is a referential strategy. However, I have not given a general condition for a strategy to count as a referential one but illustrated two kinds of paradigm case, referring by name and referring by description.

The conditions PROP(1) and PROP(2) given above follow Schiffer's development of the Gricean theory of meaning. It was noted that in PROP(1) speaker's meaning (meaning-as-activity) was defined in general (for statements), whereas in PROP(2) the narrower concept of utterance meaning relied upon the notion of conventional meaning. Schiffer points out that the general definition shows the ultimate reliance of the notion of meaning upon intention. The narrower definition presupposes an account of convention based upon the wider notion of meaning together with certain social concepts. Thus the appeal to convention in the narrower definition does not make the analysis of meaning vacuous.

A similar relationship holds between the conditions OBJ and REF. OBJ has an open field for its identification strategy whereas REF relies on a prior account of the relation R. The two examples of R, naming and describing,
which I have elected to discuss are conventional and hence the theory of reference relies like Schiffer's theory of meaning on a prior account of convention in terms of basic psychological and social concepts.

The view of convention which Schiffer adopts and to which I shall also appeal, is developed in its modern guise by Lewis in *Convention* and has since undergone refinements. However, it would be an exaggeration to suggest that a full account of the grammatical regularities which represent the conventions of English have been given by Lewis (or any other author). What one may claim on Lewis's behalf is a clarification of the logical status of grammatical rules by the provision of a suggestive model of simpler cases.

Lewis develops his account in terms of mathematical games-theory but, as he points out himself, it can be expressed independently. The main idea is that in certain kinds of situation it is beneficial to each member of a community that there be certain patterns or ways of doing things. Clearly one need is the need to communicate since any cooperative activity (and some ways of being uncooperative) rely on communication. If one takes the very simple type of case where there is a recognizable, recurrent need to convey a specific message, one can see that a state in which there is a mutually known pattern of expressing
that message is preferable to there not being such a state. One can imagine that it might be beneficial to each member of the community in terms of hunting efficiency to have one signal which meant "start shooting now!". How that one signal came to be successfully used in the first place is not important; what is important is that it is the conventional pattern because there is a history of successful precedent.

The difficulty is that "communication" is not the sort of specific goal which your average tribesman is after. There are only a limited number of specific messages that are expressed in recurrent situations. Linguistic conventions are far more developed than this since they permit the speaker to convey novel messages. The benefit to the individual member of there being linguistic conventions is compared to the traditional idea of a Social Contract, where although there are disadvantages to bowing to the system (such as receiving tax-bills) there is an overall improvement in well-being and security as compared to the State of Nature. Comparably a situation in which there are general conventions for expressing truths (and making tax-demands) is preferable to one where there is no conventional communication. Again the history of the development of linguistic conventions is not important here. The important point is that we now see the logical status of
linguistic conventions to be that of mutually understood projections based upon past communicatory success. There is no rigid lexicon external to this activity.

Turning to intentions, following Wittgenstein, we want to reject any suggestion (such as is encouraged by some model-theoretic approaches) that mental concept words such as 'intention' or 'belief' name private events. Rather we want to encourage the view that intentions and beliefs are expressed in behaviour or speech. This does not imply appealing to private entities to explain the public phenomena. Although the narrow identification between bodily movement and a belief or intention (naive behaviourism) should be rejected, we would only demur from the identification of a bodily movement with the expression of belief or intention because the description of the movement as movement lacks the element of interpretation introduced by describing the movement as expression. To describe the movement as an expression of belief is to read into it a social context in which the mentalistic framework of explanation has a purchase. It might be said that there is not sufficient complexity in the movements of amoebas to justify description of their movements in mentalistic terms; but the mistake of saying that an amoeba "believes" there is food to the north is not that of falsely attributing to it a consciousness it lacks, but one of exaggerating the
expressive power of its movements. Picturing to oneself and indulging in "inner" monologue are special forms of behaviour which do not have obvious external manifestations. To attribute these abilities to a subject normally involves more complex and sophisticated criteria than the attribution of more fundamental mental concepts such as belief, intention, hope or fear. The latter do not necessarily take expression in "inner" consciousness and are not unnaturally adapted to the description of animal behaviour. The point is that the concept of "intention" belongs to the framework of explanation of behaviour and it is not necessary to raise difficult questions about the nature of consciousness to get a first understanding of it. What one has to look at is the behaviour of the community and it is upon this that one bases one's interpretation of the behaviour of the individual.

We may now consider the question of the priority of convention and intention. We may acknowledge two points. First, it is possible to attribute to an agent the intention to express a message without attributing to him the intention to use any convention. Some spontaneous signals or gestures are based on naturalistic resemblances rather than established conventions and indeed there may be a component of meaning in ordinary speech acts which depends
on tone of voice, gesture or body-posture and which is arguably non-conventional. Secondly, some messages are of such a sophisticated nature that one cannot imagine that an agent could intend to convey it without his already having absorbed the conventional rules of a language. One cannot imagine someone devoid of mathematical training intending to express the fact that $e$ to the minus $i$ times pi is equal to minus one. However, when one is talking about logical priorities the historical order in which messages become expressible is irrelevant. What matters is how one structures the theory. Order of logical priority is relative to some theory. The agent-semantic view is that intentional and conventional concepts are essentially related; we are not compelled to maintain that the theory must be structured in a particular way. If it is possible to start by taking the notion of a conventional rule as primitive and structure a general theory of meaning then we have a context in which it is true that convention is logically prior to intention. However, the notion of an intention seems to be the more general one and is the more natural choice as a primitive concept of the theory. We say, therefore, that the notion of intention is logically prior to that of convention in the context of the proposed theory.

To conclude this section let me run over the general
shape of the theory. The Gricean approach to meaning explains meaning-as-convention in terms of meaning-as-activity. This is achieved by specifying what it is to mean something when no convention is relied upon. The status of conventions is then explained, following Lewis, as patterns of communicative behaviour extrapolated from the past success of certain strategies. A speaker will conform to such patterns in the expectation that others within the community will make similar projections and hence grasp his meaning. This general account can be narrowed down to the theory of reference. The basic task of object-introduction can be done without a referring expression, for example by ostension. Referring is a sophisticated way to attempt to introduce an object; it involves the use of a referring expression and hence relies on the background of a syntactically complex language and the relation of designation and derivative relations.

The picture of language which emerges from the agent-semantical viewpoint is that of a conventional practice. When a community can be identified each member of which may expect to employ a common system of signs for the purpose of getting another to believe things or perform tasks, one may say that community has a language. Thus it is the primary fact about language that it is used to communicate and its distinguishing feature is that it is
conventional. However, all this has to be set in the context that human beings (or any beings which are described as talking to each other in the same terms as human beings) are creative agents each having a unique perspective. The result of the latter situation is that a language is continually under review and re-assessment and does not "run on rails"; the rules or conventions are themselves matters to be interpreted and exploited in novel ways. We shall see in later chapters that this picture of language facilitates a reassessment of familiar problems in the theory of reference and thus represents a distinctive contribution to that discussion.

Summary

A number of semantic terms appear in two general kinds of sense. The expression 'refers to', for example, may have the sense of "is the conventional reference of", or, of "performs the action of referring." In the present work 'refer' is used in the latter sense. The term 'designate' is used for the conventional semantic relations of naming and describing.

The agent-semantic approach adopted in the present work is one which takes activity senses of semantic terms to be prior to the conventional senses. The insistence on the relevance of the use of language follows Wittgenstein's
original lead. The key idea is that language represents because it is used to communicate.

The communicatory function of referring is to draw an audience's attention to some item. "Object introduction" is (by local definition) an attempt to get an audience to have some item in mind by communicatory means. Object introduction fulfills the following condition:

**OBJ** S utters 'f' with open intention that A have x in mind by recognition that K('f',x).

This condition excludes non-communicatory means by requiring that the speaker intend the audience to recognize his full intentions in producing the signal.

An agent-semantic theory of reference may be presented which builds upon the fundamental idea of object-introduction.

**REF** S refers to x by 'e' if S utters 'Fe' and has the open intention that A believe Gx partly by recognition that R('e',x) and M('F',G).

The distinction between referring as an activity of the speaker and the referential strategy, R, is displayed by this condition. The speaker's referential strategy may be that of designation - the conventional relations of naming and describing - or it may be idiosyncratic and dependent upon the particular context for its effectiveness. The logical status of conventional relations is described by
Lewis in Convention.

The agent-semantic approach displays the interconnections between linguistic meaning and psychological concepts; it does not "reduce" one to the other. Referring as an activity only takes place if the speaker uses a referring expression. If the speaker refers, there is an object he has in mind. The "guarantee" of referent does not trivialize the notion of reference, nor is the object dependent for its identity upon the identity of the act. REF only gives sufficient conditions for referring but those acts which meet this condition include paradigm examples.

Notes

1. Charles Altieri gives the following insightful assessment of the difference between Austin and Grice:

Grice distinguishes himself from Austin in two basic, interrelated ways. Because he insists on utterances as acts, Grice locates his version of performative force in maxims rather than rules, so he concentrates on nonconventional rather than conventional models of implicature. The concept of nonconventional implicature, in turn, has as its context Grice's insistence on human meanings as nonnatural, and hence as based on intentional properties that entail hermeneutic analysis. Where Austin vacillates, Grice is firm: speakers' meanings are not decoded but interpreted, and interpretation requires correlating in probabilistic terms a particular synthesis of agents' purposes with features of a situation or context.
Act and Quality: A Theory of Literary Meaning and Humanistic Understanding, pp. 81-2. Searle's own perception of his past work is that he put too much emphasis on communicatory intentions (Intentionality pp. 165-6).


3. Searle advocates such an account in both Speech Acts (pp. 73-6) and Intentionality (pp. 183-5) where he describes the standard view as "preposterous". Nevertheless, the standard view seems to hold up for cases of purest mention in direct contexts.


6. P.T. Geach, Reference and Generality. This and subsequent quotations from Geach in this section are from pp. 7-8.


10. Wittgensteinians describe this type of relationship between evidence and the application of the concept "criterial". To discuss this here would take us away from the main topic. See J.V. Canfield, Wittgenstein: Language
14. Searle has argued, in his recent book Intentionality, that Burge's examples do not refute what he calls the "descriptivist position". The descriptivist position holds that the "intentional content", which may not be verbalized, always distinguishes between items thought about. This is a radical modification of the principle of identifying descriptions which hitherto has been regarded as involving descriptions only. But, even if we agree with this modified principle, I don't believe it would put Boer at ease over the question of "intentional magic".
15. Compare N.L. Wilson, "Grice on Meaning: The Ultimate Counter-Example".
17. D. Lewis, "Languages and Language."
CHAPTER THREE

Referring by Name

3.1 Introduction

One of the two kinds of referential strategy illustrated in the last chapter was that of naming. It should be completely uncontroversial to say that ordinary proper names are used to refer. But there is a theory of historical importance that names are disguised descriptions and this is associated with the view that descriptions are not referring expressions. However, the view that names are disguised descriptions is implausible and sympathies have shifted away from any obvious version of it. Thus one need feel no compunction in asserting that ordinary names represent one kind of referential strategy.

In recent years the topic of proper names has enjoyed a revival of interest stimulated by Saul Kripke's lectures, "Naming and Necessity". It is now widely accepted that proper names have no connotation but refer immediately without any semantic contribution from associated descriptions. However, this view, with which I agree, opens up a number of problems which the opposite view is designed to answer. For example, how is it that a name attaches to its bearer, and how is a speaker in a position to rely on
this attachment?

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the contributions of Searle and Kripke, and to answer these "epistemic" questions in line with the agent-semantical theory presented. The condition REF implies that in a case of successful reference the audience, A, recognizes that a relation holds between the referring expression 'e' and the object 'x'. It does not specially require that A recognize or associate a set of descriptions as true of x. To be sure, successful communication requires that A recognize what S intends him to believe about x, but what S intends him to believe about x need have no connection at all with the properties conventionally associated with x. This provides one reason for saying that the "cluster of descriptions" performs no immediate role. The cluster comes in when we consider the "epistemic" questions relating to determining which item is the bearer, that is, when we analyze what the relationship between 'e' and x presupposes. The immediate role of names is simply to refer.

3.2 The Causal Theory

In his lectures "Naming and Necessity", Kripke tentatively offers the causal theory as a theory about the conventional name relation. He writes:

My use of 'refer' is such as to satisfy the schema, 'the referent of 'x' is x', where 'x' is
replaceable by any name or description. 1

However, he also says:

Call the referent of a name or description in my sense the 'semantic referent'; for a name, this is the thing named, for a description, the thing uniquely satisfying the description. Then the speaker may refer to something other than the semantic referent if he has appropriate false beliefs.

This is puzzling at first sight since it is not at all obvious what beliefs one would have to have to refer to something other than the "semantic referent" given Kripke's sense of reference. Given that I think the man in the distance is Mr. Smith and I say: "Mr. Smith is raking leaves", it would seem that I've referred to Mr. Smith according to Kripke's schema whether or not my belief about the man in the distance is true or false. In fact, as is explicit in a later article, "Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference", which I discuss in the next chapter, Kripke holds that there are two kinds of reference. In the lectures Kripke claims to be concerned only with "semantic reference", that is, I take it, with the conventional name relation. However, many of his examples concern the decipherment of a speaker's reference.

Kripke holds that names are "rigid designators". He introduces the notion of a rigid designator as follows:

What is the difference between asking whether it's necessary that 9 is greater than 7 or whether it's necessary that the number of
planets is greater than 7? Why does one show anything more about the essence than the other? The answer to this might be intuitively 'Well, look, the number of planets might have been different from what it in fact is. It doesn't make any sense to say nine might have been different from what it in fact is.' Let's use some terms quasi-technically. Let's call something a rigid designator if in any possible world it designates the same object, a non-rigid or accidental designator if that is not the case. Of course, we don't require that the object exist in all possible worlds.

One can see, roughly, that it "does not make sense" to say nine might have been different, but Kripke maintains that all names are rigid designators. Clearly it makes sense to say Nixon might have been different (one might wish he had been), thus one might wonder why Kripke holds that 'Nixon' is a rigid designator. In fact what Kripke maintains is that it does not make sense to say Nixon might not have been Nixon and this gives him an intuitive test for rigidity. Kripke builds his account of possible worlds around this point. He treats names as "rigid". The object we call Nixon may be stipulated to be in some other possible world, perhaps not having the name 'Nixon' in that world, nor having any other "accidental property" Nixon has in this. But 'Nixon' is used by us to name Nixon in any world in which we imagine him.

Kripke's problem, therefore, is to explain how ordinary names attach "rigidly" to their bearers without describing them. Kripke compares his view with Mill's view
that names "denote" but do not "connote". He writes:

the basic problem for any view such as Mill's is
how we can determine what the referent of a
name, as used by a given speaker, is.

This is not the problem about the conventional name relation
but about speaker's reference; however, we can overlook this
if we assume that the speaker is correct in his usage.

Kripke's tentative solution to the problem is the causal
theory.

When the name is 'passed from link to link', the
receiver of the name must, I think, intend when
he learns it to use it with the same reference
as the man from whom he heard it . . . Notice
that the preceding outline hardly eliminates the
notion of reference; on the contrary, it takes
the notion of intending to use the same
reference as given.

In the addenda to the lectures Kripke replies to a
counter-example given by Gareth Evans in "The Causal Theory
of Names":

Today the usage of the name ['Madagascar'] as a
name for an island has become so widespread that
it surely overrides any historical connection
with the native name ['Madagascar' to name part
of the African Continent].

. . . a present intention to refer to a given
entity (or to refer fictionally) overrides the
original intention to preserve reference in the
historical chain of transmission.

The predominantly social character of the use
of names dictates ordinarily that a speaker
intend to use a name the same way as it was
transmitted to him; but in the 'Madagascar' case
this social character dictates that the present
intention to refer to an island overrides the
distant link to native usage.

The emphasis on the social character of names and upon
speaker's intentions is one of which I approve, but I do not see that there remains any essential role for a causal link between the object and the speaker, or between the bearer and the general use of the name, to perform. If at each stage in the link a speaker must intend to use the name the same way as the previous speaker then the strength of the chain depends on the continuity and consistency of the speakers' mutual interpretations, not on the putative rigidity-determining relation "causality". But what we have here is Lewis's account of convention that each speaker attempts to conform to the pattern of past successful references.2

The failure of the causal theory to account for the "rigidity" of the conventional name relation need not be regretted since, in one sense, this relation is not rigid. As I shall explain fully below (section 3.4), the question of what a name conventionally names may not be a clear-cut one; it may emerge that there is no obviously correct determination in the light of the facts. Kripke notes that it does not make sense to say: "Nixon might not have been Nixon", whereas it does makes sense to say: "The first man on the moon might not have been the first man on the moon." This may show a difference between most names and descriptions but it does not show that 'Nixon' is unambiguously attached to some one object. One attempts to
construe the statement "Nixon might not have been Nixon" as an assertion of non-self-identity - which is absurd - since 'Nixon' is naturally read as a referring expression in each occurrence. However, one can understand the statement "The first man on the moon might not have been the first man on the moon" as implying that the description 'the first man on the moon' might not have been true of the man of which it is true. The second occurrence of 'the first man on the moon' in the statement is not a referring one. Hence the difference has to do with the fact that (most) names do not have the variety of uses which descriptions have; the difference has no bearing on the alleged rigidity of names.

We need not conclude that the causal theory has nothing to offer on the problem of "determining" what item is the conventional bearer of the name. This problem must be distinguished from that of accounting for any alleged fixity of names; one may determine (i.e. make a judgement) which is the bearer without it being true that the bearer is determinate (i.e. unambiguously attached to the name).

3.3 The Cluster Theory

The view which Kripke opposes is known as the "cluster theory". This is presented by Searle:

What I have said is a sort of compromise between Mill and Frege. Mill was right in thinking that proper names do not entail any particular description, that they do not have definitions,
but Frege was correct in assuming that any
singular term must have a mode of presentation
and hence, in a way, a sense. His mistake was
in taking the identifying description which we
we can substitute for the name as a definition.3

Kripke regards Searle's view as belonging to the Fregean
side. What Searle does is to replace Frege's fixed set of
descriptions providing the sense (defining the "meaning") of
the name by a cluster of descriptions, which may vary to a
degree between speakers, providing the background
identification of the object. Searle is clear that names
function differently from descriptions.

But the uniqueness and immense pragmatic
convenience of proper names in our language lies
precisely in the fact that they enable us to
refer publicly to objects without being forced
to raise issues and come to an agreement as to
which descriptive characteristics exactly
constitute the identity of the object. They
function not as descriptions, but as pegs on
which to hang descriptions. Thus the looseness
of the criteria for proper names is a necessary
condition for isolating the referring function
from the describing function of language.

Therefore Searle maintains that there are descriptive
criteria for the application of proper names but that to
apply a name to an object is not to assert that any
particular description fits.

As Kripke sees the issue between himself and Searle,
it is not over whether names have senses (= "meanings").
They both agree that they do not. The issue between them is
whether names have senses (= referent fixing background
descriptions); Searle says they do whereas Kripke denies this. Indeed Searle makes a proposal that seems to justify this reading: "it is a necessary fact that Aristotle has the logical sum, inclusive disjunction, of properties commonly attributed to him . . ." A remark to which Kripke responds:

It just is not, in any intuitive sense of necessity, a necessary truth that Aristotle had the properties commonly attributed to him.

But it is not clear that Searle intends to make this strong claim. Searle makes his proposal in a discussion of the conditions for a name being a name of something in a language. Thus what he is saying concerns the presuppositions for talking about Nixon at all. In Kripkean terms, Searle's thesis need be no stronger than the following position: It is true in all possible worlds that if 'N' is a name in some community, then there is a disjunctive set of criteria for the proper application of the name by a member of the community.

It would seem, therefore, that the main point of difference between Searle and Kripke is that Searle maintains that there must be descriptive criteria for the application of a name whereas Kripke maintains there need not be. Kripke uses a number of examples to discredit the utility of the cluster theory in determining the correct object. These are apparently successful when one takes
these examples as concerning the decipherment of a speaker's reference, but when one takes the examples to concern the conventional name relation the results are far less clear. Some of the examples (for instance, those about Feynman and Einstein) can only be taken to be about the decipherment of a speaker's reference.

Consider the case Kripke gives where the most important description that a speaker attaches to a name of someone turns out to be true of another person. Here the cluster view would seem to recommend the conclusion that the speaker had been referring to this second person. The case is as follows. Suppose it were true that Gödel had not proved the incompleteness of arithmetic but someone called "Schmidt". Gödel in fact stole the manuscript and disposed of Schmidt. A speaker whose only belief about a person he refers to as "Gödel" is that he proved the incompleteness of arithmetic would not, even so, be described as having been referring to Schmidt. It seems correct to say that, like the rest of us, he refers to the unscrupulous Gödel.

This result might be diagnosed by saying: "Gödel was called 'Gödel' and Schmidt, 'Schmidt', and it does not matter what the speaker believed about Gödel." Thus it seems the resolution of one's intuitions about the case would be made at the level of the institution of naming people, either in terms of who was generally known as
"Gödel" or who correctly held Gödel's birth-certificate. Clearly it is not made at the level of the individual speaker's beliefs, given that the speaker intends to conform to general usage.

But the example is one of an imaginary popular delusion. Thus the falsity of the speaker's belief is not so easily dismissed since this is no idiosyncrasy on his part. It may be that the achievement in question is all most people who have heard of Gödel know about him. However, consider the problem of disambiguation in this connection. There are many people named "Gödel", so how is one to tell which Gödel is being referred to on a given occasion? It might be answered that it is the Gödel to whom the proof of incompleteness is attributed and this description, though it be based on a false belief, plays a role in disambiguating the reference. However, though most people who have heard of Gödel might have no more to say than this, this will not be true of everyone, or so it is supposed by those who use the name. There will be a complex network of beliefs about Gödel some of which will only be held by a few or one. The latter cluster of descriptions, which a biographer might gather, is that which would properly be used to determine the conventional bearer of the name.

To get a Kripkean example at the level of proper
bearers of names one has to describe a total change of accepted beliefs - in the Gödel example there were sufficient remnant facts about Gödel to determine the object even after the myth about his proof had been exploded. Consider Kripke's example of Jonah:

. . . Biblical scholars generally hold that Jonah did exist, the account not only of his being swallowed by a big fish but even going to Ninevah to preach or anything else that is said in the Biblical story is assumed to be substantially false. But nevertheless there are reasons for thinking this was a real prophet.

Here, Kripke would presumably claim that we have a case in which the descriptions commonly attributed to a person, Jonah, are false of anyone, yet the name can still be traced as the name of a person. But (arguably) the proper referent is not that which the Biblical description gives but that given by the evidence of the scholars. Preference is given to the latter cluster (in scholarly discussions at least). But if the scholars identify their man with the Biblical Jonah there must have been something right in the Biblical account. Had a Jonah turned up in the Bible as a lame beggar in the New Testament, the scholars would not have made the same identification. Thus, ironically, were a total change of beliefs to take place there would be no reason to say that the previous cluster was incorrect since one would have no grounds for saying that the previous references were to the newly characterized bearer!
I have given reason to doubt the importance of the causal theory as applied to the conventional name relation. Evans's Madagascar case forces Kripke to acknowledge the importance of current usage and it is hard to see how one could determine which causal chain to follow up without some input from the associated cluster. Tracing an individual speaker's confusion is a different matter; knowing the chain of events leading to his acquisition of a belief may assist the decipherment of a speaker's reference. However, Kripke's examples do not show that there need not be descriptive criteria for the application of a name.

3.4 An Agent-semantical Approach

The condition REF may be given particular application to the case of referring by name:

REF(name) S refers to x by name if S utters 'Fn' and has the open intention that A believe Gx partly by recognition that 'F' means G and 'n' names x.

This condition allows us to distinguish clearly the different questions with which we have been concerned.

One point I stressed in the last chapter was that S's act of referring to x is distinct from the strategy he uses. We may go on to note that the activity of referring and the relation of naming are independent in the sense that
S's belief that 'n' names x may be false, yet S still correctly be said to be referring to x. (Since 'refer' in our sense is identified with intending to achieve a certain effect, it is not a "success word" as it is on standard approaches. S may be said to refer to something even if the strategy he employs has little chance of success. By contrast 'cut', for example, is a success word. I may intend to cut a piece of string but if I am getting nowhere with my rubber knife, I would not be said to be cutting the string.)

We can distinguish three questions:

a) What does 'n' conventionally name?
b) What is S referring to by 'n'?
c) What does S believe 'n' conventionally names?

Question (a) is a general question about the proper name 'n' as it is correctly used in a speech community. Oddly perhaps, since naming is a semantic relation, the question raises "epistemic" issues concerning how we know or find out what a name conventionally names. Question (b) concerns S's particular use of the name. In order to answer it we have to find out whether S intends to use the name conventionally. If he does we turn to question (c) since, in this case, the answer to questions (b) and (c) will be identical. (A proviso might be added to cover a case where S intends to refer to the conventional bearer whoever he may be.) However, question (b) need not have the same answer as
question (c) since S may not be using the name conventionally. For example, S may refer (mockingly) to someone as "Einstein" or "Romeo". More interesting cases of non-conventional uses of names will be considered later, but in this chapter we are concerned with the strategy of referring by the conventional name. The two main issues, therefore, are (1) the problem of determining the conventional bearer, and (2) the problem of deciphering the speaker's reference.

We should consider names in the light of their social utility. Proper names facilitate discussion of their bearers when those are absent and cannot be pointed at. Persons, places, works of art, ships, certain privileged animals and favourite possessions are given names. The selection of these among individual things reflects the practical needs of human speech communities. Some names are attached to things by ceremonial or official procedures. Other names are attached to things by informal procedures; for instance, they may develop through the abbreviation of descriptions, from the contraction of official names, or as a result of jokes about an official name or its bearer. A name is properly used to refer to its bearer, for the most part, but questions may be raised concerning how one is to identify this bearer. It must also be remembered that a given name may have several bearers.
The account adopted here is that a name is a conventional referential strategy: it is conventional if members of the speech community can expect (some) others to be able to identify which object is being introduced by its use. Individual acts of reference by name, where the speaker intends to employ the conventional name, accord with correct usage within the community only if the object he intends to introduce is the conventional bearer. But this account does not tell us how to determine which is the conventional bearer.

Broadly speaking there are two ways one might determine what a name names. The first is to identify the object characterized by conventional wisdom as the proper bearer of the name. The other is to trace the origin of the name; by this criterion, the bearer is the object the name was introduced to name. The latter "causal" or "historical" method is not always possible, nor always correct when it is possible (as we have seen). In the case of the conventional, description method, there may be controversy as to what is the truth. But in any case, there seems no obvious pressure to suppose that there must be exact principles for the identification of the bearer of the name. Names might be introduced or become conventional due to some confusion rather than a specific act of dubbing. There is no reason to suppose that there is one clear, right resolution
of that confusion which will make sense of subsequent references. This will be more obvious after we have considered the second question of how we go about deciphering a speaker's particular reference.

A particular act of reference by name involves the speaker intending an audience to have an object in mind partly by recognition that the name names the object. S's supposition that A can recognize which object is designated indicates, in straightforward cases, that S believes the name conventionally designates the object. The problem associated with S's referring by name is that of "deciphering" his reference: How does an audience determine what S is referring to by name?

Rather than describe the point of view of any actual audience, I shall assume the role of an infallible audience in order to answer this question. That is, I shall assume that my beliefs are all correct and that any deviations from my own perspective are errors. Perhaps some of us take this attitude in any case, but it is as well to be explicit about it in a theoretical discussion. Let us call this "the Olympian Assumption." Practically speaking, we do assume, in certain areas of discourse, that there is some clinically tested set of facts; the Olympian Assumption, in this case, simply amounts to the claim to be privy to those facts. Hence, deciphering S's reference from this perspective
amounts to assessing his performance relative to the actual world as it is correctly described. I call this making the Olympian Assumption to draw attention to the epistemological presumption we make in arrogating such knowledge.

The question we ask in respect to S's reference is not: "Is there an object of reference?", since if we have attributed to S the intention to refer, we are already committed to the view that there is an object of reference. The question rather is: "Which object did S refer to?". Clearly this question is not answered by careful scrutiny of the utterance of the expression itself. One must, of course, determine what expression S used but the next consideration is what S says about the object. The whole must be considered in the light of the context including what we know of S's beliefs.

Consider the case of what may be called "direct" reference by name, that is, where S refers to x by the name which he believes is conventionally associated with x. In fact, it will be the first stage of decipherment to decide that this is S's strategy. In chapter five I shall consider "indirect" reference, that is, where S uses a name which he believes another, the audience say, to associate with the object. But supposing we decide S is using the direct strategy, if what S apparently says about the conventional bearer does not match what we know about it, nor does it
match what we suppose S knows about it, the question will arise as to whether S is not referring to some other object.

Consider a case where S utters the sentence 'Darkin took a famous voyage to South America in the Beagle'. Clearly the most likely hypothesis is that S has got the name wrong, he should have said "Darwin". We might test our hypothesis by asking S: "Do you mean the author of The Origin of Species?" If he answers affirmatively the hypothesis would be confirmed, practically speaking. But suppose he answered: "No, I don't mean Malthus, I mean the author of Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity collected from the Appearances of Nature." Now S is very muddled. He thinks the author of The Origin is called "Malthus" and the author of Evidences went on the voyage in the Beagle and was called "Darkin". There are various choices one might make to get the best fit between S's beliefs and the truth. One might say S believes Paley (the real author of Evidences) was called "Darkin" and went on the famous voyage, or one might say S believes that Darwin wrote Evidences and was called "Darkin". However, when things are so confused one's tendency is to reeducate S without inquiring precisely how the confusion is best described.

Between the two extremes of simply getting the name wrong and being hopelessly confused lies the situation most
of us are in about many of the things that every schoolboy should know. We have the principal fact down but are vague, ignorant or wrong about much else. Given that a person has that principal fact and the name to go with it, it would take a considerable amount of peripheral confusion to abandon the hypothesis that he meant that person or thing. The peripheral beliefs take on more weight if the principal fact does not correctly go with the name, that is, where what the speaker takes to be the key characteristic of what he is talking about does not truly concern the bearer of the name he has got hold of. The relevant considerations for deciding with what the speaker's referent should be identified would seem to include:

(i) The weight attached by the speaker to the correctness of the name and to any other beliefs he has about the object, and

(ii) How and in what circumstances the speaker came by his beliefs and his subsequent confusion if this can be traced.

Considerations (i) coupled with the principle of maximising the truth of the speaker's most weighted beliefs (which may not be a clear-cut decision procedure), or coupled with the principle of maximising the consistency of the speaker's most weighted beliefs, may lead to opposite results from considerations (ii). The important point here is that in any case it is a judgement we must make as to what is best
said of the case, it is not a question that has one right answer. The reason for supposing that one could formulate procedural principles for the identification of the referent in difficult cases would be that we have consistent intuitions over these matters (unless the principles are to be arbitrary). But this may not be true.

Returning, then, to the first problem, that of determining the conventional bearer. I pointed out that there may be no definitive answer to the question of what a name conventionally names. This should be clearer now we have considered the problem of deciphering a speaker's reference. A name is conventional only if deferential name use is supported, that is, only if it is generally believed that past references using a given expression have been successful. But the only ongoing test of success when the referent is distant in time or place, is the compatibility of people's beliefs about the item. The question of identity is only raised when there are competing descriptions, that is, incompatible beliefs. Determining which item is the conventional bearer is a matter of evaluating evidence and making a judgement.

The Olympian Assumption allowed us to evaluate a particular speaker's recalcitrant usage. But in a difficult case, such as that of Jonah, it is hard to justify making such an assumption. The experts may be able to justify the
contention that there was an historical prophet to whom the (Babylonian) legend was transposed to make a (Hebrew) moral point, but the question of whether the popular reference to Jonah is "really" reference to this prophet is not settled by this. Just as one might dissociate the historical Richard III from the treacherous character in Shakespeare's play, the option of arguing that 'Jonah' conventionally names a Biblical character who was swallowed by a fish is open to those who read the Bible as (historical) fiction. Other options involve taking the Bible as history and either saying that it contains (literal) falsehoods, or that the scholars must be wrong. Thus we are thrown into a highly controversial area where the idea that there is a formula for determining the right answer is clearly misplaced.

3.5 The Immediacy of Reference by Name

My discussion has principally been concerned with what might be called "epistemic" rather than with "semantic" issues. When Kripke argues for the "rigidity" of names he has in view the behaviour of names (by contrast with some descriptions) in modal contexts. It is intuitively correct that we can imagine Nixon, say, with a significant change of properties and yet still refer to this imagined object as "Nixon". We have concentrated on the epistemic implications of the point that 'Nixon' may turn up in a context where the
conventional cluster by which he might be identified no longer identifies him. But we may also note that the fact that the name works in this context implies that the cluster of descriptions is not contributing to the truth-conditions of the assertion.

What Kripke's discussion emphasizes is that names function in some ways like demonstratives, that is, they "immediately" refer to the bearer. (The term 'direct' is often used for this view of names, following Kaplan, but I reserve that term for another technical sense.) Kaplan describes this as the view that names "should not be considered part of the content of what is said but should rather be thought of as contextual factors which help us to interpret the actual physical utterance as having a certain content." Kaplan reminds us that most proper names are not held by a unique bearer but that they must be disambiguated by context.5

Although I have given support to the cluster theory, this is not to say I regard reference of names as mediated by descriptions. The point is that, although Searle rejected Frege's view that names have senses, the false impression remained that Searle supposed that the background descriptions played a semantical role, that is, that he supposed they contributed to the truth-conditions of the assertion. What does seem to be true is that the background
descriptions, once established, allow us to discover to what the name refers. This association between the use of a name and the conventional wisdom concerning the item named should not be confused with the contribution which the name makes to the truth-conditions of the assertion. Mill was correct that the name simply serves to refer to the item.

3.6 Beliefs about the Bearer

Let us resume our discussion of epistemic issues surrounding the use of names. That there is no current need for the speaker to know the bearer of a name— in the sense that he be able to identify it uniquely by a non-question-begging description— is shown by the fact that he may be relying on the fact that if others use the name it must name something. Putnam originally describes this as the "division of linguistic labour" but the term "deferential name-users" has become popular. We met this concept above in connection with the Gödel hoax example and it underlies Kripke's causal theory. Most people have only limited ideas about some items which they nevertheless readily name. As the Gödel example shows, the truth of these ideas is not the crucial factor in deciphering a speaker's reference. Neither the truth of the assertion he makes about Gödel (i.e. what he says about the person he calls "Gödel") nor the communicatory efficacy (i.e. who he is understood to
be talking about) is altered by the truth of the cluster of descriptions currently available to the speaker. Thus the speaker's intention to refer to the conventional referent may override any beliefs he has about that item.

On the other hand, it is possible that a speaker intend to refer to an item, \( x \), and believe that the item is conventionally named "\( e \)", but be mistaken about that name-relation. In this case he refers to \( x \) by a faulty strategy. Given our notion of reference we say, to take the example where \( S \) has the false belief that 'George Burns' names Harry Truman, that he referred to Harry Truman as "George Burns". To decipher his reference another way would be "uncharitable". In this case, his belief as to who the conventional referent is has an impact on the interpretation of his strategy which would otherwise be construed as straightforwardly conventional. Thus, unlike the case considered in the last paragraph, the speaker's beliefs override the intention to refer to the conventional bearer. This type of contrast will appear again when we consider descriptions.

Finally, let us consider the following case which raises some fundamental questions. I could not describe this quarter in my hand so that you could pick it out from others in another situation. This does not seem to prevent me from dubbing it "Moosehead" and referring to it by name.
If I were to drop it into my pocket, which contains several quarters, I may no longer be able to distinguish it myself. Even so I could continue to refer to Moosehead although the only description of uniqueness I can supply is that it is the one I held in my hand on a particular occasion. Thus it seems I have introduced a name for something which no one can describe in a non-question-begging way.

But the example just described is not immediately convincing. It may be felt that simply calling the coin "Moosehead" falls short of genuinely naming it. Perhaps, after all, we should be able to provide a context-free description to underwrite the name-relation? We might consider providing a description of the causal, or "historical", chain connecting my usage of the name 'Moosehead' with the occasion of dubbing. This might seem to "fix" the relationship between the name and the coin by a description free from indexicals. But, in point of fact, I can provide no such description and nor can anyone else. The epistemic reality of most situations, perhaps, is the same. We may accept as a physical, or metaphysical, truth that there are "causal chains" or some sort of continuity between events but we cannot assume that these are monitored and available to rescue us from epistemological difficulties. The difficulty is that there is no such solid information.

But perhaps our doubts about the genuineness of the
naming of the coin stem from the modest circumstance of dubbing? Suppose we augment the scene with a small crowd of interested observers, a notary and, possibly, a clergyman. Does this alleviate our anxiety over whether the coin is authentically named "Moosehead"? I would answer not. The problem is not so much the quality of the naming ceremony as the fundamental anonymity of the object named. If a shepherd has twelve sheep and uses twelve names to call them by we would not allow that he has named each sheep unless he can tell the sheep apart and use the names with some consistency. Thus, we might conclude, a genuine addition to our stock of names is only achieved if there is a recognizable, distinctive feature of the item named. But this conclusion may be too strong. It probably could be argued from the existence of the institution of naming that some items must have such uniquely distinguishable features, but it is not so clear that every name must be associated with such a feature.

The shared belief that a name is uniquely associated with an item is sufficient for communication. We all tend to accept that if a name has currency then it is uniquely associated with some one item. It may be that we are wrong on some occasions. Suppose, for example, it gets around Ottawa that Cyril Wormtongue is about to make a revealing statement. However, there is controversy over who
this spokesman is. Some say that he is a member of the Prime Minister's staff, others that he is a high-ranking official in the Finance Department, and yet others that he is something to do with the Security Forces. We speculate about what Cyril Wormtongue is going to say, depending on our theory as to who he is, but by the end of the day it has been established that there is no such person. We would claim, surely, that we have been communicating even though what we said turns out to be unverifiable. We talked about Cyril Wormtongue even though it turned out that he did not exist and we did not know anything about him.

Returning to the Moosehead example, we have established that the name 'Moosehead' does not meet the desideratum that the item be associated with a non-question-begging, uniquely identifying description. But this is no more than a desideratum. I don't think we should say that I cannot think about Moosehead or refer to it. Thus it seems we can be content with relatively weak identifying descriptions (such as 'The quarter that I named "Moosehead"') which would not enable me or anyone else to pick the coin out. This conclusion follows through on our discussion of Boer and Burge in section 2.3.
Summary

Kripke's observation that names function in descriptions of possible worlds leads him to maintain that names are rigid designators. He tentatively proposes that names are rigidly linked by a causal process to the items they were introduced to name. However, Evans's Madagascar case forces Kripke to recognize the importance of current usage. The fact that beliefs of later users may override the history of the name shows that the causal chain does not "rigidly" fix the bearer. Kripke's criticism of the cluster theory is not conclusive, though his examples force a more careful scrutiny of how one deciphers the particular use of a name to refer. His discussion also draws attention to the fact that the associated cluster performs no immediate semantic role and to the "deferential" aspect of naming.

Searle's version of the cluster theory denies that names have senses and is not in clear conflict with the idea that the cluster has no immediate semantic role. Rather the cluster may be viewed as the required linguistic environment for deferential name use. The speaker may not have immediately available any specific descriptions but he will believe that, at some time, they might be supplied. If there were no associated descriptions there would be no use for the name.

Determination of the conventional bearer of a name
may be a complex problem involving common beliefs about the item, expert opinion and the history of the name. It is a question of making a judgement rather than of revealing the underlying truth since, for example, the name may have come to have its present usage as the result of a confusion and hence have no clear connection with its original usage.

The decipherment of a speaker's reference involves, first, the determination of whether he is intending to use the name conventionally. If he is, one must next determine what he believes the name conventionally names. If he is not, the determination of the reference will involve different kinds of consideration some of which will receive attention in a later chapter. However, even if he is using a conventional strategy it can still be a complex problem to determine to what he is referring. Even if we assume there is a clear-cut correct answer as to which is the conventional bearer, the speaker may have idiosyncratic beliefs which conflict with the received views. In this case it may be uncharitable to insist that he is referring to the conventional bearer.

Notes
1. S. Kripke, "Naming and Necessity". This quotation and the others from Kripke in this chapter are from the same source.
2. This point, I think, is one of the main thrusts of Searle's criticism of the causal theory in his recent discussion of proper names in *Intentionality*, p. 244 ff.


4. An interesting argument for the necessity of taking into account the speaker's beliefs or the theorems of a language in determining the object of reference is presented by N.L. Wilson in "Substances without Substrata". Wilson there introduces his "principle of charity" - the idea of deciphering a speaker's reference in order to maximise the number of his utterances which can be counted as truths. However, as we will see, the goal of maximising the number of truths may compete with the goal of maximising consistency (from an external point of view). Furthermore, a decipherment by this principle may conflict with the speaker's intentions and hence not be "charitable" in the sense of true to what was meant. Nevertheless, one must agree with the holistic thrust of the argument.

5. D. Kaplan, "Dthat".

4.1 Introduction

In the last chapter I was able to take for granted that names are used to refer, and part of my concern there was with the question how the name "attached" to its bearer. When we turn to the second kind of referential strategy selected for study, definite descriptions, the problem is different. The connection between the description and the item is obviously intended to be that it describes the item. The apparent sufficiency of this connection may lead one to deny that referring is any part of the function of a description, and maintain that its role is simply to describe. In this chapter I defend the view that definite descriptions, in the kinds of examples generally discussed, do perform the role of referring expressions.

The application of the proposed theory to definite descriptions is straightforward. Taking 'the d' as representative of any definite description the condition may be given as follows:
REF(dd) S refers to x by a definite description if S utters 'F(the d)' and has the open intention that A believe Gx partly by recognition that 'F' means G and 'the d' uniquely describes x in that context.

The phrase 'in that context' is included in this condition (and not in REF(name)) not because definite descriptions are inherently more dependent on context than names (they are not), but simply to offset the adverb 'uniquely' which would otherwise be too strong. Names or descriptions cannot be guaranteed to be absolutely unique and hence depend on context to some degree. A definite description such as 'the even prime number', like the name 'pi', requires only the context of standard mathematical English usage but not many descriptions or names are quite so generally applied. Definite descriptions such as 'the cat', 'my house' or 'the only one to win a prize', depend on immediate context for their uniqueness of reference. This is equally true of most names. Names such as 'John' or 'Mary' also depend on immediate context for their successful use.

This chapter will be concerned to explore the application of the proposed condition to examples of the use of definite descriptions which have vexed (though not defeated) a number of authors in recent years. The theories of description which are traditionally opposed are Russell's
and Strawson's. However, Donnellan presents a distinction which, he claims, allows one to say that both Russell and Strawson are partly right. This claim has been broadly rejected but Donnellan's examples have continued to be of interest to those concerned with the use of definite descriptions in English. In this chapter I consider the discussions of Searle, Kripke and Bach. The theory proposed here owes a debt to both Strawson and Donnellan. While concessions to Russell's approach are possible, my view is that Russell's theory belongs to an opposing tradition which cannot finally be reconciled with an agent-semantic approach. It is not likely that justice is done to Russell's theory by considering it in the context of the problems and concerns of agent-semantics.

4.2 Russell and Strawson

The view that sentences containing definite descriptions should not be treated as subject-predicate sentences is due to Russell. Russell's classic theory of descriptions basically eliminates definite descriptions as referring expressions. Instead of allowing that a sentence such as 'the man in the dock is guilty' has the form: "Ge", where 'e' is a referring expression, Russell's analysis has it that the sentence has the form: "(∃x)(Mx.Dx.(y)(My.Dy →y=x).Gx)", in which no referring expressions appear. (I
have not analysed 'in the dock' for simplicity.) Thus, contrary to surface appearances, 'the man in the dock is guilty' is not a simple subject-predicate sentence but expresses a complex proposition.

Russell's analysis may be broken down in English into three parts:
1) There is at least one man in the dock,
2) There is at most one man in the dock,
3) Whoever is a man in the dock is guilty.
Thus, for Russell, conditions (1) and (2) form part of an analysis of what is asserted (or logically implied) by any use of the sentence in question. The third condition shows as an indefinite statement containing two predications but no referring expression.

This theory is in stark contrast with the one proposed here. According to the agent-semantic view, in the simplest case, if $S$ asserts 'The man in the dock is guilty' then he refers to some $x$ such that 'the man in the dock' describes $x$. Here $S$ refers, and by extension 'the man in the dock' refers, to $x$ and the referential strategy is that 'the man in the dock' describes $x$. Thus the expression 'the man in the dock' is a distinct semantic unit (a referring expression) and the sentence is taken as basically having the form: "$Fa". This contrasts with Russell's analysis where the sentence is treated as expressing a
Likewise, Strawson's theory does not eliminate referring expressions but on the contrary stresses that the speaker refers by using the phrase 'the man in the dock'. Strawson, however, holds that conditions (1) and (2) (above) are invariable presuppositions of any use of the sentence in question. Thus his deviation from Russell has often been seen in the shadow of the issue of whether, if either (1) or (2) is false, the assertion as a whole is false (following Russell) or neither true nor false (following Strawson). However, it would seem that the first issue is whether the sentence is correctly regarded as singular or general.

It is sometimes taken (e.g. by Donnellan in the article to be considered below) that Russell is trying to account for how utterances involving sentences with definite descriptions as grammatical subjects represent the particular state of affairs they are about. There is justification for this reading of Russell:

Thus if 'C' is a denoting phrase, it may happen that there is one entity x (there cannot be more than one) for which the proposition 'x is identical with C' is true, this proposition being interpreted as above. We may then say that the entity x is the denotation of the phrase 'C'. Thus Scott is the denotation of 'the author of Waverley'.

However, earlier Russell says:

This is the principle of the theory of denoting I wish to advocate: that denoting
phrases never have any meaning by themselves, but that every proposition in whose verbal expression they occur has a meaning.\footnote{I}

Denoting phrases include 'all men', 'some man', 'any man' as well as definite descriptions. Thus Russell says that such phrases do not have "meanings". But he goes on to allow that a definite description "denotes" the unique existent which fits the description if there is such a thing.

There are a variety of ways of regarding Russell's "analysis" (Kripke gives at least three and Donnellan another).\footnote{2} Let us, for the sake of discussion, distinguish what we may call the "formal theory", which is the full analysis in which no denoting phrases appear, from the "informal theory" (to give it a matching title). The informal theory concerns English denoting phrases and is the theory with which Donnellan contrasts his own. The main tenet of the informal theory is that definite descriptions "denote" if what is uniquely described exists. This theory, it may be noticed, threatens to undermine the dichotomy between referential and description accounts of how definite descriptions function; a term which "denotes" both describes the item and corresponds to it.

Perhaps the best way of regarding the "formal" theory (in that it avoids questionable theories or ontological assumptions) is to take it as a proposal for a formal language having certain syntactical devices. In this
case, whatever it is, the analysis (whether it is an analysis of a proposition or a sentence) is distinct from the English sentence. As I noted in chapter two, two utterances may be equivalent with respect to their intended audience responses (i.e., they express the same proposition) even though not the same with respect to containing the same references. From these two points we may infer that Donnellan's and my own remarks about the use of (English) definite descriptions are not in conflict with Russell's formal analysis. The characterization of the English utterance as singular does not contradict the possibility that Russell's analysis, although general, is materially equivalent to it. Thus, barring questions of truth valuation when things go wrong, which I shall discuss below, one need not regard Strawson's theory (or my own) as logically inconsistent with the formal theory.

The informal theory differs from the formal one in that it concerns the use of English definite descriptions and thus we cannot avoid comparisons with the approach taken here. Following the authors with whom we shall be concerned, it will be versions of the informal theory which represent the contrasting view referred to as Russell's in the rest of the chapter. While sympathetic to doubts which the reader may have as to whether these theories are really Russell's, since direct comparisons with the formal theory
are not feasible (if the point of the last paragraph is accepted), it is expeditious to refer to them as "Russell's theory".

4.3 Donnellan's Distinction

In "Reference and Definite Descriptions" Donnellan made observations about the ordinary use of definite descriptions which continue to be a focus of attention. Donnellan distinguishes between two uses of definite descriptions in English. The "referential use", which he represents as corresponding roughly to the Strawsonian analysis, and the "attributive use", which corresponds roughly to the Russellian. In this section I present Donnellan's distinction in the context of Russell's and Strawson's theories.

Donnellan distinguishes two uses of definite descriptions as follows:

Referential:

[The speaker] uses the description to enable his audience to pick out who or what he is talking about and states something about that person or thing.

Attributive:

[The speaker] who uses [the] description . . . states something about whoever or whatever is the so-and-so.

Donnellan illustrates his distinction with the following examples (among others):
Referential

... Jones has been charged with Smith's murder and has been placed on trial. Imagine there is a discussion of Jones' odd behavior at his trial. We might sum up our impression of his behavior by saying "Smith's murderer is insane."

Attributive:

... we come upon poor Smith foully murdered. From the brutal manner of the killing and the fact that Smith was the most lovable person in the world, we might exclaim, "Smith's murderer is insane."

In the attributive case if no one satisfies the description then "there is no person of whom it could be correctly said that we attribute insanity to him." Furthermore, Donnellan points out, in this case one fails to say something true (he does not definitely commit himself as to whether one says something false, or neither true nor false). In the referential case even if no one fits the description then it may still be possible to identify the man referred to, i.e. Jones in the example. In this case there is a sense in which the speaker has said something true if Jones is insane. Donnellan points out that if we know Jones did not murder Smith we shall not be content to express our agreement with the speaker as: "It is true that Jones is insane." This is because it is now we who seem to be endorsing the epithet 'Smith's murderer' by using it to refer to Jones.
Donnellan notes that it does not depend upon the beliefs of the speaker whether he is using the definite description referentially or attributively. The speaker may believe that Jones is the murderer but, nevertheless, remark that Smith's murderer is (must be) insane as the conclusion drawn from the view that "anyone who murdered poor Smith in that particularly horrible way must be insane." This contrasts with the referential case where the conclusion is based upon observation of Jones. Thus it is not the beliefs of the speaker which are important. Donnellan points out that since uses are being distinguished it is the intentions of the speaker which are crucial.

What Donnellan wants to deny is that Russell's account of denoting properly accounts for referential examples. On Russell's view the use of the definite description 'the F' as a grammatical subject implies that there exists one and only one F, and the assertion concerns that item. Donnellan maintains that this does not characterize the referential use in two kinds of case: (i) misreference: S may say: "Smith's murderer is insane", and refer to Jones, whom S falsely believes is Smith's murderer; furthermore, S will have said something true if Jones is insane. (ii) Indirect reference: S may say: "Smith's murderer is insane", and refer to Jones despite the fact S truly believes that Jones is innocent; here S uses the
description 'Smith's murderer' since he realizes that others believe that Jones is guilty. (The terms 'misreference' and 'indirect reference' are not Donnellan's. I discuss this distinction in the next chapter.) Donnellan allows that in normal cases the referential use of 'Smith's murderer' presupposes or implies that the man referred to is uniquely guilty of Smith's murder.

A Russellian will reply that it is simply false that one can make a true statement using the sentence 'Smith's murderer is insane' if the person who is Smith's murderer is not insane. If Jones is not guilty then his sanity has nothing to do with the truth or falsity of the sentence. Similar points apply to the second kind of case, so that Donnellan has not provided an example where the Russellian entailment does not obtain. The Russellian will also point out that sentences have entailments or they do not, and this does not vary unless the sentence is ambiguous. 5

Donnellan wants to deny that Strawson properly accounts for attributive cases. Strawson holds that the speaker's report is neither true nor false in the following case. Having noted the condition of the body, S concludes: "Smith's murderer is insane", but in fact there is no murderer, Smith's death having been an accident. Strawson bases this claim, which Donnellan does not dispute, on the fact that the speaker failed to refer, i.e. he did not refer
to anything. But Donnellan holds that this fact does not explain the result that the remark is not true since, in the case where there is a murderer, the speaker has not referred but said something true or false by using a definite description attributively. Hence not referring does not give the reason for Strawson's result.

This criticism is invalid. Strawson's sense of failing to refer is that the object of reference does not exist. Thus if one takes the example of an attributive use and applies Strawson's analysis, Strawson's reason that the neither-true-nor-false result obtains is that the speaker tries to refer but, as it were, misses, since there is no murderer. However, Donnellan's sense of "failing to refer" in the above context is that the speaker did not refer at all since he was doing something else, namely using a definite description attributively. But Donnellan cannot fairly assume that using a definite description attributively excludes the possibility of "referring" in Strawson's sense. Hence Strawson's explanation of the neither-true-nor-false result by "failure of reference" may still hold. Furthermore, Donnellan's account of the fact that the report is not true would resemble the latter, and one might go on to point out that despite first appearances, Strawson's account of reference resembles Donnellan's attributive use as much as the referential use.
There is an example about which Donnellan, Russell and Strawson arrive at different conclusions, the case of misreference where S refers to Jones as "Smith's murderer" even though he is innocent. Donnellan maintains that the speaker refers to Jones and says something true if Jones is insane. Russell maintains that the description denotes Smith's murderer and the sentence is true if Smith's murderer is insane, otherwise he says something false. Strawson (possibly) would get the result that the remark is neither true nor false since the speaker makes the false presupposition that the man in the dock is Smith's murderer. Strawson mainly talks about existential presuppositions; thus there is an element of extrapolation in supposing that any false presupposition would give rise to the neither true nor false evaluation. Another interpretation would be to place Strawson with Russell in this case.

The issue between Donnellan and Russell might be reduced to this: In the case where the speaker "refers" to Jones as "Smith's murderer" and where Jones is innocent, does the speaker (a) refer to Jones in Donnellan's sense of 'refer', or (b) denote the murderer of Smith in Russell's sense of 'denote'? These do not offer conflicting alternatives unless there are conflicting presuppositions or entailments. But the assumption that Jones is Smith's murderer does not conflict with the entailment that there is
exactly one murderer of Smith. It is possible that there might be conflict in a case of indirect reference, but I think such cases should be set aside from the basic account of direct reference. Thus we can conclude that there is no direct conflict between Russell's and Donnellan's account with respect to the item denoted or referred to. However, there is clearly a conflict concerning the truth valuation. A reasonable way of describing this conflict from the agent-semantical point of view will be given in the next section.

The issue between Donnellan and Strawson over which item is referent might be sidestepped in the same way by maintaining that they have different senses of 'refer'. However, I believe Donnellan is true to intentionalist sense of referring in maintaining that the referent is the man in the dock.

The clearest issue over the controversial case concerns what valuation should be placed on utterances when the referring expression "fails" in a referential case. I believe that Donnellan is correct in maintaining that the speaker nevertheless states something true. In the next section I try to do justice to Donnellan's observations by providing an account of his distinction in line with the agent-semantical theory.
4.4 An Agent-Semantical Approach

The analysis of Donnellan's observations which I propose treats both the cases which Donnellan counts as referential uses and those he counts as attributive uses as being cases of reference. To keep things clear I shall call the former "indicative" and the latter "attributive".

The indicative case is the "normal" case. S refers to x, using a strategy selected as likely to allow A to infer which item, x, S means. In the straightforward case the strategy is a description which S believes fits x and he expects A to recognize this fact. If it turns out that S is wrong about the description of the object he will nevertheless claim to have been talking about x. He will select a different strategy to say which x he meant.

The distinctive characteristic of the attributive case is that if the description fails, the speaker has not asserted anything about any object. "Failure of description" here means that no item of the intended type (actual, fictional, etc.) uniquely fulfills the description in the situation. At the time of utterance, of course, the speaker will have considered his remark to be "about" something; what is meant by saying "the speaker has not asserted anything about any object" is that he withdraws the remark if it turns out that it fails to fit an item appropriately. Thus in Donnellan's case S utters: "Smith's
murderer is insane," and whether or not S would accuse a particular person of being Smith's murderer, if it turns out that there is no murderer, S will deny having made a remark about anyone.

An outstanding feature of attributive cases is that the speaker has, in some way, a general reason underlying the conviction he expresses. In the case illustrated S's reason for believing that Smith's murderer is insane is that anyone who would murder Smith must be insane. Kripke implies in one place that it is the difference between having a particular and a general reason that separates indicative from attributive cases. But, as Kripke notices, one's reasons may be mixed and so this understanding of the phenomenon would suggest that there would be in-between cases. However, this is not an adequate account of Donnellan's observations. There is a sharp difference between the decipherment of the speaker's reference as a reference to a particular object whether or not it fits the description, and as a reference to whatever object does satisfy the description. If A deciphers S's reference as a reference to x in the latter style he is committed to the view that the description fits x. In the former style of decipherment he is only committed to the view that S believes that the description fits.

We may, therefore, distinguish two modes of
decipherment: the attributive mode of decipherment takes that object which satisfies the description notwithstanding any ancillary beliefs the speaker has concerning which object it is; the indicative mode of decipherment takes the particular object which the speaker believes satisfies the description in the context. However, the question arises as to why one mode of decipherment should be selected rather than the other; clearly there must be some difference between the cases which accounts for why one mode is correct and the other not. The difference is as follows: In the indicative case the description used is merely one of several possible strategies; another strategy (another description, a name) might have done as well. In the attributive case the description used is essential; and this comes out in the point that if the description fails the speaker will not claim to have commented about any particular thing. Thus the distinction between modes of decipherment translates into a distinction between the speaker having an essential referential strategy and his having options.

One indication of which alternative constitutes the appropriate decipherment is the nature of the reasons S has for his contention. If S has general reasons then the attributive mode of decipherment may be preferred to the indicative mode. If S has mixed reasons the question which
mode of decipherment is appropriate may be moot, but the two modes are nevertheless distinct. If both modes of decipherment are plausible alternatives and yet they yield different verdicts, then misdescription or misidentification must be involved on the indicative reading. If the utterance turns out false on the attributive reading but true on the indicative, the latter will nevertheless imply that S has a false belief. To determine what is best said one must look at the rest of S's beliefs.

In the indicative case the speaker intends the audience to grasp his reference by understanding the strategy he (S) uses. Although S has other options at his disposal, the particular strategy is chosen as one which is available to A. S does not intend A to grasp the content of the other possible strategies he might have used, however, he does intend A to understand that there are such options. This is clear when we look at the situation from A's point of view. In the indicative mode of decipherment we allow that S has some item in mind whether or not it satisfies the particular description he has chosen to use. Thus we suppose that S must have some other description he might have used. Hence we have some latitude in deciphering S's reference.

In the attributive case the speaker, likewise, intends the audience to grasp his reference by understanding the strategy he (S) uses. Thus, from a narrow perspective,
the intentions and strategy appear the same as in the indicative case. However, $S$ does not have the further intention that $A$ understand that $S$ has other options at his disposal. Thus referring indicatively and referring attributively differ in an analogous way to sailing with, and sailing without, a life-jacket; from a narrow perspective one is doing the same thing, but the result in the event of failure is different in each case. The difference is not easily characterized as a difference in the "content" of the intention in the different cases. An action performed in one situation can mean something entirely different performed in another; to describe this difference one has to describe the situation as it is perceived by the agent.

One element of Donnellan's presentation of his distinction is that he suggests that in the referential case the speaker "has a particular person in mind", whereas in the attributive case this need not be so. I have followed Donnellan in characterising reference as involving the speaker intending the audience to have an object in mind. But contrary to Donnellan, I have suggested that attributive cases are cases of reference. I maintain that in such cases the speaker intends the audience to have a particular object in mind. I should therefore justify this contrary description of attributive cases.
In the case where the detective, on seeing Smith's mutilated body, remarks: "Smith's murderer must be insane," he does not intend us to believe that he has a particular suspect in mind. However, if we say that the detective "intends us to have an item in mind" as a result of his utterance, we might be taken to be implying that he does have a particular suspect. Hence the vernacular use of the phrase "have something in mind" may not support my contention that the detective intends his audience to have a particular object in mind. Strawson and Searle talk of "identifying the object for the audience" and this might seem a more natural description of the case were it not for the fact that the detective would not be said to "know the identity" of the culprit either. The difficulty is that "having an object in mind" or "knowing the identity" are often taken to be states of closer acquaintance with the object than merely being able to describe. However, in saying that the speaker intends the audience to "have an object in mind" I require no special intimacy on behalf of the speaker nor that he should expect such of his audience. (A teacher might refer to Vasco Da Gama without expecting his class to have instant special acquaintance with this personage.) It is enough that the speaker believes some one object is named or described (in the context) and intends his audience to suppose that this is so. In sum, "having in
mind" is not to be taken to mean "being acquainted with" but only as having the belief that some particular item is represented by the expression used.

The point that we use the weaker vernacular sense of 'having in mind' may be connected with the discussion of the previous chapter concerning deferential name use. We observed that speakers often rely on the fact that a name is in current use rather than on having a "backing of descriptions" which they can produce in order to identify the referent. In the present context such speakers would nevertheless be said to "have in mind" what they refer to, and to intend their audiences to "have in mind" the item as a consequence of their use of the name. Strawson's phrase 'identify the object for an audience' for the function of referring expressions is, on the usual interpretation, too strong a requirement in that this takes it to be necessary that the speaker and, if the speaker is successful, the audience, be able to uniquely describe or point to the item. Thus the weak sense of "having in mind", characterized by the mere implication that the subject believes that there is some one item named or described, is the one favoured in the present context.

We may now reconsider the controversial case over which Russell, Strawson and Donnellan arrive at different results. This is an indicative case (a case of direct
reference by an optional description) where the description is false of the intended object. The example is where S wants to say of the man in the dock that he is insane and utters: "Smith's murderer is insane," but in fact (contrary to S's belief) the man is innocent. Let us suppose Smith was murdered and the murderer is sane but the man in the dock is insane. Russell maintains that the proposition is false because it is false that the one and only murderer of Smith is insane. Strawson, possibly, would maintain that the utterance is neither true nor false since the speaker makes the false presupposition that the man in the dock is Smith's murderer. Donnellan maintains that the remark is true since he takes the speaker to be referring to the man in the dock.

I favour Donnellan's result since (by hypothesis) the correct decipherment of the speaker's reference is that he refers to the man in the dock. However, we may also note that a second decipherment is possible. We could decipher S's reference by 'Smith's murderer' as an attributive use. We would then follow Russell's result in maintaining that the utterance is false. However, this decipherment is not, in the case hypothesized, the correct one. But we do have here a reasonable way of regarding Russell's theory from the agent-semantic viewpoint. It is a theory which invariably takes the use of definite descriptions to be attributive and hence only gets the correct truth valuation when the use is
genuinely attributive or when the description is correct. Thus the conflict between Donnellan and this theory over the truth-valuation must be put down to the fact that the Russellian overlooks cases of indicative misreference (but not all indicative reference as Donnellan suggests).

A second point about the choice of decipherment may be made in connection with another version of the man-in-the-dock example. We may suppose that the man in the dock is sane and the murderer insane. Russell now has the result that the proposition (utterance) is true, Donnellan and I that it is false. The correct decipherment is (again by hypothesis) the one that Donnellan and I take. Thus decipherment may not be a matter of being charitable in the sense of maximizing the truth or consistency of the speaker's beliefs. The speaker will accept that he said something false of the man in the dock when it turns out that that man is sane. Furthermore, he will not claim to have said something true of the murderer even though, as it turns out, "his words" were true: he was not talking about anyone other than the man in the dock. Thus the correct decipherment in an actual case may be inferred from the conditions under which the speaker withdraws his claim.
4.5 Searle's Account

In this section I contrast Searle's account of the phenomena which Donnellan describes, with the account just presented. This exercise provides the opportunity to amplify certain features of my account and illustrates differences between a speech-act approach and a purely Gricean approach. However, both approaches share the same general agent-semantical outlook. In the subsequent section I examine Kripke's attempt to combine agent-semantics with a fundamentally model-theoretic approach.

Searle's approach involves an analogy with the distinction between primary and secondary illocutionary acts. This distinction is most easily grasped from examples and Searle provides many in an earlier article. One such example is the utterance: "You are standing on my foot." The primary illocutionary act is a request that the audience get off the speaker's foot. The secondary illocutionary act is the statement that the audience is standing on the speaker's foot. As Searle puts it "the primary illocution is not literally expressed" but, one might add, it represents the primary reason for the uttering of the sentence.

Searle draws a new distinction between primary and secondary "aspects". He maintains that whenever a speaker refers he uses a linguistic expression which represents the
object under some aspect. Thus if one uses the expression 'Smith's murderer', the object is represented under the aspect of being Smith's murderer; if one uses the name 'Jones', the object is represented under the aspect of being Jones, or of being called by the name 'Jones'.

Searle explains the notion of a primary aspect in connection with indicative cases. If $S$ refers to "Smith's murderer" meaning that man over there, then Smith's murderer is the secondary aspect and that man over there is the primary aspect. The primary aspect, but not the secondary aspect, figures in the truth conditions of the statement. Hence Donnellan's result that the utterance is true only if that man over there is insane is sustained. Furthermore, Searle points out, if nothing "satisfies" the aspect of being that man over there then the statement cannot be true.

Searle's analogy is that Donnellan's referential cases involve "two distinct reference acts": the explicit representation of the object under a secondary aspect and an underlying representation of the object under the primary aspect.

... that there are two distinct reference acts being performed in these cases, a primary and a secondary, is shown by the fact that my hearer upon hearing me say in the so-called referential case "Smith's murderer is insane" can respond to my utterance by saying, "You are right in saying that man we are both looking at is insane, but you are wrong in thinking he is Smith's murderer."
Thus by analogy with the two "illocutionary acts" performed when remarking that you are standing on my foot, I perform two "referential acts" in remarking that "Smith's murderer is insane" when I mean that man we are both looking at.

Searle's account of the attributive case is straightforward. The attributive case differs from the indicative in that the speaker represents the object by its primary aspect. Thus the speaker will not have said anything true. Searle characterizes these cases as those where sentence and speaker meaning coincide.

Before turning to criticism it is worth observing that Searle's theory of how descriptions function can be seen as an extended and modified version of his theory of proper names (indeed this new version of his theory is applied to names and descriptions without discrimination). He has extended the theory to cover descriptions and modified it in two ways: First he talks in terms of "aspects" rather than just linguistic items. Secondly, he postulates certain core descriptions ("primary aspects") which the speaker favours most. However, the use of the analogy with primary and secondary illocutionary acts to account for Donnellan's indicative cases is novel.

Clearly there are several points of similarity between Searle's theory and that presented in the previous
section. Most importantly, both accounts allow that both
attributive and indicative cases are referential uses of
descriptions. Searle's description of the choice of
primary aspects in an indicative case ("one that the
speaker supposes will enable the hearer to pick out the . .
. object") resembles my account above (if one takes a weak
sense of "pick out"!) And Searle's "primary aspects"
correspond to (but clearly are not identical to) "essential
descriptions." Nevertheless, there are a number of features
of Searle's account which I would dispute.

I find difficulty with the notion of the double
referential act which Searle alleges takes place in
indicative cases. It would seem sensible to suppose that a
referential act requires the use of a referring expression.
Since only one referring expression (and corresponding
"aspect") is involved in indicative cases I cannot find room
for a second referential act (to the same object). The
analogy with the (clear) distinction between primary and
secondary illocutionary acts is of no help since it would
seem that reference is involved only in the "secondary" act.
(I pointed out in chapter two that we must consider S's
actual utterance in connection with reference, not his
primary intentions.) The primary illocutionary act does not
involve a distinct referential act but is something which is
done by means of or in performing the secondary act. The
terminology "primary" and "secondary" illocutionary act is misleading in that it suggests that two utterances (and their component "propositional acts") are involved. They are not, in fact, similar acts at all.

I used the term 'essential' to cover the description used in attributive cases and 'optional' for indicative cases. This was meant to suggest what is in fact the case, that in the attributive case the speaker wants to talk about what satisfies that description and not about anything else. Thus if S wants to talk about Smith's murderer he uses the description 'Smith's murderer' and not some other description true of the man he believes murderered Smith (if he does have a suspect). Searle's use of 'primary' and 'secondary' is different. Searle employs the notion of primary aspect in indicative cases to describe what might otherwise be described in terms of "core descriptions", that is, the speaker's most weighted beliefs about the object he refers to. But in connection with attributive cases Searle uses the notion of a primary aspect to describe what I have described in terms of the essential description. Searle says that the description used in an attributive case represents the object under a primary aspect either because it is "the only aspect in possession of the speaker" or "in those cases when the speaker is in possession of several aspects . . . only one of them figures crucially." This
represents quite a different use of the notion of a primary aspect from that corresponding to the notion of "core description".

Searle seriously considers an objection, first raised in the debate between Donnellan and McKay. This is the "near miss" attributive case. The idea is that even in attributive cases although we use the description 'Smith's murderer' we might be content to be taken to refer to the person responsible for Smith's mutilated condition even if Smith had not died of the attack (he was dead already or died from some independent cause). Thus Searle writes:

Even in the "attributive" cases, we are likely to have a collection of aspects under which reference could be made and should any one of them fail us we can fall back on the others, just as we do in the "referential" cases; for what we really had in mind was, e.g., "the person responsible for what we observed". There is therefore no sharp dividing line between referring under a primary or a secondary aspect.

Remember that according to Searle:

The only difference is that in the so-called referential cases the reference is made under a secondary aspect, and in the so-called attributive cases it is made under the primary aspect.

Thus, according to Searle, the difference between indicative and attributive reference is not sharp because even in attributive cases we may have "fall-back" descriptions. Furthermore, Searle notes that unrealistic to suppose "the
aspects under which we refer to objects come in neat little packages which we could label primary or secondary aspect"; "our beliefs come in whole messy networks". Thus again the difference between indicative and attributive references is blurred.

This result is quite opposed to what I have argued above since I believe that there is a sharp contrast between indicative and attributive reference (although it may be difficult to decide whether to analyse any particular case one way or the other). The fact that our beliefs come in "messy networks" has no bearing on whether the description used is essential. Searle's running together two notions (core descriptions and essential descriptions) under the rubric "primary aspect" makes it seem as if it had a bearing.

The attributive "near-miss" objection should be dismissed. The claim is that if the speaker does not have to totally withdraw his remark but emend it when confronted with the facts, he was in fact referring to something under an incorrect description (but only a slightly incorrect one). (Donnellan seems to think that because it can only be slightly incorrect this marks a sufficient difference between indicative and attributive cases. Searle correctly dismisses this notion.) However, the fact that a speaker may gracefully wriggle out of his mistake does not mean that
he was right all along. It just means he was not far wrong in his beliefs. In the case illustrated, the speaker did not have a wrong belief about Smith's attacker (that he was a murderer), but he had a wrong belief that there was a murderer of Smith. What the facts reveal is that the man he referred to does not exist. However, another person resembles the murderer he imagined he was referring to, since that person inflicted the damage and is insane. This allows the speaker to shift to a description such as 'Smith's mutilator' and attribute insanity to this person.

A final point of disagreement between Searle's and my own account brings out another feature of the latter. When Searle considers the problematic indicative case where S utters "Smith's murderer is insane", referring to the innocent man in the dock, he argues that if we are to say that the utterance is true we must be able to specify the content of the utterance which we are claiming is true, and this specification involves the primary aspect. Hence if we say the utterance is true we must say that the content of the utterance is (for example) that the man in the dock is insane.

I sympathise with Donnellan's contention that there is a sense in which the utterance is true in such a case, but I find Searle's handling of this unattractive. As Searle notes, it is not always easy to say which the core
description is. Thus it seems to introduce irrelevant difficulties to demand that we must specify which description is to be taken as primary in order to endorse the utterance. An alternative is to maintain that the description used does not figure in what is said to be true. In other words, we need not regard the referring expression as contributing to the content of what is said to be true (the proposition) although clearly it contributes to the "meaning" of the utterance in a larger sense.

The suggestion here is that descriptions, like proper names, should be treated as referring immediately. The referential strategy is part of the "meaning", that is, part of how the audience is intended to understand what is being said, but the truth condition turns on whether the predicate is true or false of what the referring expression picks out. This clear distinction of roles is suggested by the agent-semantic theory but it may be added that in ordinary circumstances straightforward endorsement of the utterance might give the false impression that one agreed with the truth of the description used to refer. This is why one might respond, as in Searle's example above, "You are right in saying that man we are both looking at is insane, but you are wrong in thinking he is Smith's murderer." But unlike Searle I do not take this to show that two distinct acts of reference are being performed.
This suggestion concerning descriptions is open to an objection, but not a crucial one. Consider:

1) John won the race.

2) The winner of the race won the race.

It is standardly held that (1), if true, is contingently true whereas (2) is "necessarily true". According to our account the truth-conditions are the same. I'm not convinced (2) should be regarded as a necessary truth unless it be taken as elliptical for another statement. We can give an account of why it is typically such a trivial statement: if A understands the conventional strategy of referring to x as "the winner of the race" then the assertion that x won the race is uninformative. However, if the strategy were not conventional, that is, if there were some context-dependent reason to refer to x as "the winner of the race" unconnected with the fact that x won the race, then the assertion would not be trivial. Hence we can resist claims that (2) is necessarily true since, in an odd situation, we might truly say that the winner of the race did not win the race.

4.6 Kripke's Reconciliation

In this section I argue that Kripke's combination of agent-semantic and model-theoretic theories is not viable. In "Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference", Kripke offers a version of a reconciliatory position which holds
that Russell and Donnellan are accounting for different things and hence that there is no genuine conflict. Kripke's "semantic reference" is not exactly Russell's "denotation", nor is his "speaker's reference" Donnellan's "referential use", but the postulation of simultaneous, non-competing linguistic functions is essentially there.

Kripke pounces on the following remark in Donnellan's paper:

The grammatical structure of the sentence seems to me to be the same whether the description is used referentially or attributively: that is, it is not syntactically ambiguous. Nor does it seem at all attractive to suppose an ambiguity in the meaning of the words: it does not appear to be semantically ambiguous. (Perhaps we could say that the sentence is pragmatically ambiguous: the distinction between roles that the description plays is a function of the speaker's intentions.) These, of course, are intuitions; I do not have an argument for these conclusions. Nevertheless, the burden of proof is surely on the other side.

Kripke points out that if the distinction is not semantic it is not a criticism of Russell. Kripke opts to read Donnellan as arguing for a "semantic" distinction and undertakes to offer a "pragmatic" distinction that accounts for the phenomenon without requiring the abandonment of a unitary Russellian account of descriptions. I shall not review this pragmatic distinction (since I do not think it works) and shall concentrate instead on the proposal that there are two kinds of reference.
Kripke provides the following "tentative" characterization of speaker's reference:

... the speaker's referent of a designator [is] that object which the speaker wishes to talk about, on a given occasion, and believes fulfills the conditions for being the semantic referent of the designator ... The speaker's referent is the thing the speaker referred to by the designator, though it may not be the referent of the designator, in his idiolect.

Since Kripke puts in the condition that the speaker believes that the object fulfills the conditions for being the semantic referent, he excludes "indirect reference". I have suggested that this is appropriate although Donnellan's counter-examples (to Russell) include such cases.

The characterization of semantic reference runs as follows:

If a speaker has a designator in his idiolect, certain conventions of his idiolect (given various facts about the world) determine the referent in the idiolect: that I call the semantic referent of the designator. (If the designator is ambiguous, or contains indexicals, demonstratives, or the like, we must speak of the semantic referent on a given occasion. The referent will be determined by the conventions of the language plus the speaker's intentions and various contextual features.)

Thus a designator like 'Smith's murderer' will have a semantic referent in a speaker's idiolect which will be determined on an occasion by his intentions as to which Smith he is talking about, what he means by 'murderer', and so on. This notion is not Russellian denotation which is
hardly defined in terms of idiolects and intentions (Russell favoured treating indexicals separately)\(^\text{10}\). Nevertheless, Kripke uses Russellian formulas to represent semantic reference; hence we can count this as a version of the informal theory.

Kripke suggests that his distinction between semantic reference and speaker's reference is a special case of the Gricean distinction between speaker's meaning and sentence meaning and he gives various possible accounts of how Russell's theory might be an account of the meaning of an English sentence (e.g. the English sentence has a "deep structure" like its Russellian paraphrase). Thus the notion of "semantic reference", at least with respect to descriptions, comes in at a different level than that of speaker's reference.

By allowing that the notion of speaker's reference applies to utterances which at the "deep" level do not contain referring expressions, Kripke divorces the idea of reference from the form of the sentence at that level. In fact, contrary to his initial characterization of speaker's reference quoted above, he comes out in favour of applying the notion to sentences which even at a surface level do not contain referring expressions, thus bringing the notion into line with Geach's idea of "personal reference" which I criticized earlier.
When a speaker asserts an existential quantification, $\exists x (Fx \& Gx)$, it may be clear which thing he has in mind as satisfying "Fx", and he may wish to convey to his hearers that that thing satisfies "Gx".

While Kripke notes that his treatment is like Geach's, he gives a more plausible example. The example is that of an "arch" use such as: "Not everyone in this room is abstaining from champagne, and any such non-abstainer . . ." However, I do not think that even this counterexample need be accepted. In such a case the speaker has someone in mind but the "arch" effect is achieved by carefully not referring to the person. The case would count as an attempt at object-introduction as I have defined that notion, but one must have a referring expression if one is to refer (as I reconstruct that notion).

I noted Donnellan's remark that Russell's notion of denotation applies to both attributive-use cases and referential-use cases. Clearly Kripke takes his notion of semantic reference to apply to both uses of definite descriptions. This is not to say that there is always a semantic referent; if $S$ uses the designator 'the man raking leaves' the semantic referent is the unique man raking leaves if any. Kripke makes a policy of writing another man into the scenario who satisfies the description if the speaker's referent does not, in order "to avoid any unnecessary and irrelevant entanglements." Naturally if one
wrote two extras into the scenario there would be no semantic referent since neither would be the unique raker. If no person satisfied the description according to the rules there again would be no semantic referent.

It is my contention that those cases which Kripke regards as cases of divergence between speaker's and semantic reference should properly be regarded as cases where there are alternative decipherments of the speaker's reference. As it appears from the agent-semantic view-point, Kripke is confusing designation with reference, that is, conventional semantic relations with referring; semantic reference is a hybrid notion which cannot be uniformly applied without arbitrariness.

Towards the defense of this contention I begin with a distinction between misdescribing and misidentifying which I derive from the following suggestion of Kripke:

There is one significant difference between the case of proper names and that of definite descriptions. If someone uses "Jones" to refer to Smith, he has misidentified Smith as Jones, taken Smith for someone else. To some extent I did think that Jones was raking leaves... On the other hand, if I think that someone is "her husband" and so refer to him, I need not at all have confused two people. I merely think that one person possesses a property - that of being married to her - that in fact he lacks. The real husband is irrelevant.

We may say S misidentifies the object if he confuses it for another, whereas S misdescribes the object if he mistakes
the object as having a property it does not have. Obviously one may not misdescribe by name but one may misidentify, as well as misdescribe, by description. The situation which Kripke presumably envisages is Linsky's example: the speaker does not know a person's husband and is making an inference based on present circumstances in describing the man as "her husband". But consider another situation: the speaker does know her husband and has mistaken her present escort for the husband whom he resembles (perhaps he's a relative); this case would be one of misidentification. In a case of misidentification there are two objects which the speaker has confused; the description he uses fits an object other than that which stimulates the comment.

Consider the case where S misidentifies Smith as Jones and consequently refers to Smith as "Jones". Kripke suggests that there is "some extent" to which S does think that Jones is raking leaves. But the speaker does think, without any doubt, that Jones is raking leaves. One might also say that S thinks Smith is raking leaves. Jones and Smith are two alternative decipherments of S's reference. Kripke, however, regards Jones as the semantic referent and Smith as the speaker's referent. One can see that he calls Jones the semantic referent because 'Jones' names Jones, but Kripke provides no rationale for taking Smith to be the speaker's referent. Kripke misses the point that one may,
in some cases, decipher the speaker's reference as being to Jones.

Consider the case where S misdescribes Smith as "the man raking leaves" (Smith is in fact playing golf). Unlike the case of misidentification it is unclear what if anything is the semantic referent. According to his policy Kripke writes another man into the scenario. By strict Russellian principles there should only be one raker of leaves in existence. Kripke might introduce the speaker's intentions to complement the description so that exactly one item corresponds. But if S utters: "The man raking leaves is methodical", referring to the golf-player, it is not at all clear where a raker of leaves must be situated in order to count as Kripke's semantic referent. If there is a methodical leaf-raker the other side of the park, would Kripke count S's utterance as true? Perhaps he would say the sentence-in-the-context is true but the utterance is only true if the golf-player is methodical. If so, the truth or falsity of the sentence-in-the-context (one could not just take the English sentence 'the man raking leaves is methodical' and call it true or false without taking it in some context) turns arbitrarily on how one determines whether or not a raker was to count as the semantic referent (ten yards away? twenty yards away?). Thus "semantic referent" does not show itself as an intuitive concept in
many misdescription cases.

The following cases help clarify my position:

1) S wants to tell A that Jones, who is known to them both, has gone insane. In the distance S sees Smith, whom he takes to be Jones, and says: "The man raking leaves is insane."

2) S sees Smith, whom he takes to be Jones, raking leaves and, noting that it is a gusty day, he says: "Jones is insane."

In case (1), on being confronted with correct information, S will say he was talking of Jones being insane and not of the man raking leaves. In case (2), the confrontation will lead S to say he was talking of the man raking leaves being insane, not Jones. However, in both cases at the time of utterance the speaker's view was that Jones was the man raking leaves. The decipherment of his own past references leads to different results because of the content of the message he intended to convey.

In case (1) the speaker misidentifies the raker and as a result refers by misdescription to the man he mistakes the raker for. In case (2) the speaker misidentifies the raker and as a result refers by misnomer to the raker. In case (1) one may uncharitably say he said something false of the man raking leaves, and likewise in case (2) one may say he said something unfair (false perhaps) of Jones. However,
the charitable reading is that mentioned as the speaker's decipherment of his own past reference. Kripke describes Donnellan as "hedging" over such cases when giving a verdict as to whether the statement is true or false. But before one evaluates a statement one has to be clear what the referring expressions should be taken to refer to and it is not prevarication to require that this be established.

In sum, Kripke's distinction between the semantic and speaker's referent can be applied in some cases from the perspective of an audience or the speaker at a later time. But the distinction should be replaced by one between competing decipherments of speaker's reference. The main Russellian contribution to the notion of "semantic reference" seems to be the point that the semantic referent actually satisfies the description (though Kripke adds extra parameters involving the speaker's idiolect). But this point merits little more acclaim than that the "semantic referent" of a name bears the name. A case of reference involving misidentification may plausibly be deciphered in two ways; thus a judgement is called for. Cases of reference involving misdescription but not misidentification tend to require arbitrary interpretation if a second referent (a "semantic referent") is to be located. It will be accident, or careful script-writing, if a suitable referent is located.
4.7 The Conflict With Russell's Theory

The current consensus in the literature seems to be that Donnellan's observations do not conflict with Russell's theory. However, I find no consensus as to how Russell's theory is to be applied to English descriptions. Russell originally set out to represent the logic of "denoting phrases", such as 'some man', 'all men' and 'the man', in a notation with names, predicates, logical particles and the familiar quantifiers. How Russell's remarks are understood to apply to definite descriptions in English varies from author to author. It is often held that the Russellian theory says something about the "meaning" of definite descriptions and not about their "use". Thus the straight contradiction between a Russellian evaluation of the controversial referential case, and Donnellan's evaluation, is put down to a "pragmatic" feature of the utterance. This is reminiscent of Russell's own condemnation of Strawson: that he confuses the problem of descriptions with that of indexicals. (Accounts of the meaning of indexicals are generally counted as "pragmatics".)

Obviously the agent-semanticist can borrow neither the contrast between meaning and use, nor any simple distinction between semantics and pragmatics. Although we can distinguish speaker's meaning from the conventional
sentence meaning, we cannot isolate any context-free meaning since the sentence meaning is only a projection based upon actual usage which is never context-free. The question, from the agent-semantic point of view, is whether a Russellian account gives the conventional, context-dependent meaning of a sentence containing a definite description.

A positive answer to this is given by Kent Bach who offers a slightly revised version of Searle's account of the referential/attributive distinction. Bach is prepared to express his view in the following terms:

I know of no objection to [Russell's theory] that cannot be met by distinguishing the semantics of sentences from the pragmatics of using them. In particular, the [referential/attributive] distinction poses no problem...

Unlike Searle, who takes Russell's theory to apply to a suitably reconstructed sentence rather than the one the speaker uses, Bach takes Russell's theory to apply to "the contents of locutionary acts", that is, to the sentence used. In fact he is also prepared to maintain that in referential cases the speaker makes a "direct" (Russellian) statement and also and "indirect" statement. (The use of 'direct' and 'indirect' is the same as Searle's: one directly states "You are standing on my foot" and thereby indirectly requests you to move.) Thus in the controversial case the speaker makes a false direct statement ("Smith's
murderer is insane"), and a true indirect one ("The man on trial is insane").

The advantage of Bach's approach, from the point of view of preserving the purity of Russell's theory, is that one does not need to delve into the context or the intentions of the speaker in order to apply the theory. The disadvantage is that Bach is forced to maintain that, unless the speaker believes that the description applies uniquely, he is using it elliptically. For example, if S says "The car is in the ditch", what he literally says by Russellian principles is that the one and only car is in the one and only ditch. According to Bach, by literally saying this the speaker is elliptically stating something whose content would uniquely describe the relevant car and ditch. Bach suggests that most definite descriptions are not, in fact, believed to be uniquely satisfied. He also points out that whether a description is uniquely satisfied is a matter of contingent fact not semantics.

What, therefore, are the grounds for believing that Russell's theory gives the conventional meaning of an utterance containing a definite description? The appropriate type of evidence would be linguistic. We might rephrase the question: Does the successful use of definite descriptions rely on our projecting the Russellian interpretation of them? Bach does not offer evidence for this. If anything,
his idea that descriptions are usually not believed to be uniquely satisfied seems to point away from this view. The actual motive for defending the Russellian view is, I believe, rather different. The effort to preserve the universal applicability of Russell's theory is a continuation of the traditional alignment of semantics with Russellian logic. It is clearly desirable that semantics be aligned with some logic or other, since this gives us formal grounds for believing our ordinary reasoning is consistent; but the particular logical system developed by Russell may not be appropriate for the purpose. The requirement that a definite description uniquely describes an existent item may indeed be an unnecessary burden.

However, if pressed, we can reconcile a "Russellian" theory to Donnellan's observations by drawing a "pragmatic" distinction. I suggested above that Russell's theory corresponds to an attributive decipherment of the use of a description. Although it may fairly be described as the "wrong" decipherment in referential cases involving misreference, it is nevertheless a legitimate interpretation (in the sense that it takes the speaker at his word). We saw earlier that Kripke suggests that if a designator is "ambiguous or contains indexicals, demonstratives, or the like" the semantic "referent will be determined by the conventions of the language plus the speaker's intentions
and various contextual features." We have also seen that Bach suggests that if the description is "semantically incomplete" the corresponding direct statement is elliptical. It is clear that Russell's theory, on its own, does not (always) provide a clear method for deciphering the reference. To decipher S's use of 'the car' ('the one and only car') in the attributive mode we have to take account of the context (both the linguistic context and the context of situation). Thus, even though we can accommodate Russell, the Russellian conditions defer to, or must be supplemented by, the conditions provided by context.

But there is a real conflict between a genuinely Russellian approach and an agent-semantical one which lies deeper than the problems we have discussed. The approaches represent two opposed views of what an account of reference would look like. A genuinely Russellian approach should be model-theoretic; the semantic structure of the linguistic context should be held to account for how the utterance is about what it is about. The agent-semantical approach places the burden of the account of representation on the intentions of the speaker in producing the signal. His beliefs as to the conventional meaning of the sentence, the audience's beliefs, or other factors stemming from the particular context, play a crucial role in the explanation of the meaning of what he says.
An objection may be raised to the model-theoretic view. One can take the given structure and imagine it in a situation having an additional complicating feature which renders the structure ambiguous. The only way to stop at the particular is to isolate an aspect of the speech situation that, were it duplicated in the more complex situation, would resist this bifurcation. The only such aspect is the speaker's communicatory intention; this resists bifurcation since its identity is tied to the identity of the object. It is here that the recognition of the connection between reference and the speaker's intentions is most urgent. This is the root of the agent-semantic approach.

However, it might be countered that the model-theoretic approach can include the speaker's intentions as part of the semantic structure of the situation. It may be claimed, furthermore, that it is the structure of the intention (its "content") which explains how it determines what is represented. But this is to treat intentions as being the same type of item as sentences. They are not the same. As outlined at the end of chapter two, the concept of an intention belongs to the framework of mentalistic explanation. Unlike sentences, intentions are not used to represent: rather they are appealed to in order to explain representation. This point, if not an adequate
reply as it stands, indicates the grounds upon which the model-theoretician's annexation of intentions would be resisted.

Summary

Definite descriptions are frequently used as referring expressions. The opposing view shows its weakness when it comes to handling cases of misdescription. Donnellan points out that it is intuitively correct to allow that the speaker says something true even though he misdescribes the item.

Donnellan's view that definite descriptions are also used in a non-referential way to apply to whatever fits the description was countered by the point that the requirement that the speaker be acquainted with the item he refers to is unreasonable and there is no other reason to deny that attributive cases are cases of reference.

Donnellan's distinction was redrawn in terms of two kinds of referring. In one case one refers using an "optional description" (another strategy might have been chosen to express the point). In the other type of case one's description is "essential"; if nothing fits that description in an appropriate way, one withdraws the remark.

Searle presents a distinction between types of reference which is also aimed at accounting for Donnellan's
observations. This was found to be unsatisfactory in various ways. But the discussion of this theory led us to recognize that the theory proposed requires us to maintain that the definite description does not contribute to the sense (or the truth conditions) of the proposition asserted, but refers immediately. The content of the description contributes to the meaning of the utterance only by its function as a referential strategy.

Kripke's attempt to combine Gricean and Russellian elements was rejected mainly on the grounds that the "Russellian" contribution was uninteresting in the easy cases, and unworkable in the difficult ones. A distinction emerged from the discussion between misidentifying and misdescribing. One misidentifies one item for another, but misdescription involves only one item. This distinction connects with the idea of alternative decipherments. Only in cases of misidentification is the attributive decipherment charitable.

If allowances are made for contextual features, Russell's theory, taken as an interpretation of the conventional meaning of the sentence, can be reconciled to the agent-semantic theory presented. However, a genuinely Russellian account belongs to an opposing tradition that presents structural features as an account of representation. This underlying view cannot be reconciled to
the principles advocated here.

Footnotes
2. S. Kripke, "Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference"; K.S. Donnellan, "Reference and Definite Descriptions".
3. S. Haack, Philosophy of Logics, p. 70, suggests that merely distinguishing between the (pragmatic) notion of reference and the (semantic) notion of denotation sufficiently handles Donnellan's observations. However, some account must be given of the different possible truth-evaluations in the controversial case.
4. This and the other quotations from Donnellan in this chapter, op cit.
5. It will be noticed that this reply is not really "Russellian" in that it is expressed in terms of using sentences and Russell, at least some of the time, talks in terms of propositions. However, the "Russellian" here is less flexible than the "Russellian" accounts of Kripke or Bach to be considered below.
7. J.R. Searle, "Indirect Speech Acts".
8. J.R. Searle, "Referential and Attributive". The rest of
the quotations from Searle in this section are from this article.

9. S. Kripke, op cit; the rest of the quotations from Kripke in this section are from the same source.

10. B. Russell, "Mr. Strawson on Referring".

11. P.F. Strawson, in "On Referring", briefly mentions "indefinite references" (Logico-Linguistic Papers p. 24-5). Curiously, given the way he characterizes the function of referring, he both describes them as "referring" uses and says that some (e.g. "arch" uses) disclaim the intention to forestall the question "What (who, which one) are you talking about?". The idea that some such uses are referring uses has been developed by C. Chastain in "Reference and Context". I take Chastain's suggestion (which has some plausibility) to be that some indefinite expressions are referring expressions; Kripke's suggestion is that one refers in some sense even though there is no referring expression.

12. This point is made by Searle et alii in the introduction to Speech Act Theory and Pragmatics.

13. K. Bach, "Referential/Attributive".

14. Bach puts this more technically in terms of the "R-intended completion" of the description. The notion of "R-intention" is developed in his book (with Harnish). The idea of a "semantically complete description" is that of one
which is *de facto* uniquely satisfied. Bach sometimes seems aware that S may not have any such description available, but he also claims in one place that one cannot think of an individual under an incomplete description (p.244).
CHAPTER FIVE

Referring and Intentional Contexts

5.1 Introduction

The account of referring presented above treats the referential relation as "immediate". This has the implication that the truth-conditions of the utterance do not include the truth of the description or of any descriptions associated with the name. Analysis of the referential strategy will bring to light the non-immediate aspects of the reference. Reference by name often involves the assumption that the audience has an idea of the identity of the referent, but this is by no means universal. Reference by description usually involves the assumption that the description used is true of the item referred to, but this is not a necessary condition. It is not generally true that the audience need "grasp the sense" or, in our terms, recognize the truth of any descriptions in order to understand the reference.

This treatment of reference raises the question of the analysis of intentional contexts. We have gone against a Russellian treatment of descriptions which offer one type of
solution to problems concerning intentional contexts. Furthermore, Frege's classic solution involves his distinction between the sense and reference of an expression and we have rejected senses. Since these solutions are not available to us we must find another. It will be helpful to review the main problem from Frege's point of view at this juncture.

Frege holds that all expressions (simple and complex) used to make true or false assertions have both senses and referents. The referent of 'my pen' in the assertion: "My pen is red", is my pen; the referent of 'red' in the assertion: "Red is a colour", is the universal. Frege also maintains that predicate expressions have referents, these are "concepts" which he describes as "incomplete objects". The predicate '... is red', which appears in the first example, has a different referent from the name 'red', which appears in the second example. An expression designates its referent.

Frege maintains that expressions express senses. He describes the sense of an expression as the "mode of presentation" of its referent; another characterization of sense is that if one knows the sense of an expression one knows how to identify the referent. It may be said that the sense is the important ingredient of the meaning of an expression from a logical point of view.
Frege applies his distinction to sentences as wholes. He takes the "thought" to be the sense of a sentence. A thought is expressed by a sentence. The thought that the mid-point of \( ab \) is the centre of the circle is different from the thought that the mid-point of \( cd \) is the centre of the circle, even though these points are identical. Frege takes the "truth-value" (the True or the False) to be the referent of a sentence. One reason Frege gives for this is that interest in the referents of the component expressions goes hand in hand with determinations of truth-value. The other reason is that nothing else remains unchanged by substitution of coreferential expressions. In general, Frege maintains, the referent of a complex expression is a function of the referents of the component expressions.

However, this dictum runs into trouble over certain examples. Consider:

1) John believes that the mid-point of \( ab \) is the centre of the circle.
2) John believes that the mid-point of \( cd \) is the centre of the circle.

Now if the expressions 'the mid-point of \( ab \)' and 'the mid-point of \( cd \)' are coreferential the truth-values of (1) and (2) should be invariably the same following Frege's dictum. However, Frege accepts that this need not be true.
He proposes that in contexts such as (1) and (2) the expressions in the subordinate clause have their ordinary senses as referents; the whole subordinate clause refers to the thought and not to a truth-value. This feature is called "indirect reference" and such contexts "indirect contexts".

This type of solution is not available to us for various reasons. Perhaps the principal one is that we do not acknowledge that there are "senses" which function as Frege requires them to do. The meaning of the referring phrase, if it can be said to have one, does not contribute to the truth or falsity of the assertion. Thus even in the case most favourable to Fregean analysis, that of referring by description, there is no "sense" available to act as referent in indirect contexts. If names and descriptions refer in such contexts (and I shall maintain that they do), we cannot find any special entities presupposed by our semantics to supply objects of reference.

I have described the activity of referring as an attempt to introduce an object to an audience by means of a referential strategy. One may say that an expression 'e' refers to x in a sense derivative from S's referring to x by 'e'. However, this immediate relation is distinct from those relations such as names or describes which are examples of referential strategies. In the next section I explain a
distinction between types of strategy which was mentioned in the last chapter. A second distinction is drawn in the subsequent section which enables us to isolate a special type of strategy which may be used in psychological attributions (although not in these alone). This discovery is put to work in resolving Frege's puzzle about psychological contexts in a new way.

5.2 Direct and Indirect Reference

Since human beings are fallible there will be individual members of the speech community who are wrong about the correct name for an object. A speaker who has such a mistaken belief will refer to an object by the wrong name. Likewise a false belief may result in the speaker using a description that does not fit. Such cases are cases of simple misreference. Consideration of such cases contributes to the acceptance of the view that definite descriptions are referring expressions since this assumption allows one to give alternative interpretations of what the speaker meant. In chapter four we found that this gives the most natural understanding of various cases of misreference by description. However, there are other possible kinds of case.

Donnellan gives the following example which he takes to be one of referring by description:
Suppose the throne is occupied by a man I firmly believe to be not the king, but a usurper. Imagine also that his followers as firmly believe that he is the king. Suppose I wish to see this man. I might say to his minions, "Is the king in his countinghouse?" I succeed in referring to the man I wish to refer to without myself believing that he fits the description.

Donnellan gives the example to show that referring by description does not depend upon the speaker's beliefs, although he adds the qualification that such a case "may be parasitic on a more normal use." Prior to the quoted passage he characterizes descriptions as being in their referential use "merely one tool for doing a certain job, another description or a name, would do as well." This is correct taken as articulation of the idea of an optional strategy as explained in the last chapter. But the tenor of Donnellan's remarks underplays the role of the content of the description and hence the thinking behind the referential strategy. It is important to the analysis of the referential strategy that the speaker believes that the minions believe that the description fits.

However there are two possible cases which Donnellan might be presenting here. Donnellan does not not specify whether or not the speaker intends it to be mutual knowledge between himself and his audience (the minions) that he is using a description which he does not believe fits the object, though one that his audience does believe fits.
a) The natural construal of the story, the one that Donnellan probably had in mind, is that it is one of deliberate misreference. The speaker intends to create a semblance of the standard situation where S and A mutually know that S intended A to have the man in mind by recognition that 'the king' designates the man. The situation can only be a semblance since S and A do not mutually believe this. (An analogy may help here: if I own an imitation Picasso I may intend my guests to believe they recognize a Picasso; I do not intend them to recognize a Picasso since I do not believe that I have a Picasso for them to recognize.) Donnellan's case can be counted as a kind of reference on this construal, though not an ordinary case; similarly one may count a case of lying as one of stating but not an ordinary kind since, while S intends A to believe p partly on the ground that S believes p, it is not true that S believes p.

b) The less obvious construal of Donnellan's story is appropriate where S intends to create a situation in which it is mutual knowledge between S and the minions that S intends them to have the man in mind by recognition that 'the king' designates the man for the minions. The case on this construal is one of object-introduction (it meets OBJ) but we have a new kind of identification strategy. Rather than just designation we have designation-for-another,
designation for the minions in this case. It is simplest and, as we shall see, fruitful to allow that designation-for-another is a referential strategy rather than some new species of object introduction. Such strategies may be called "indirect referential strategies".

The two construals of Donnellan's story represent a distinction which I mark by the terms 'deliberate misreference' and 'indirect reference'. Deliberate misreferences are those where S intends, or is indifferent towards, the false impression that he believes the designator he uses fits. "Deliberate misreference" meets the condition that S openly intends A to believe he(S) recognizes that 'e' designates x; direct reference meets this too but also meets the stronger condition that S openly intends A to recognize that 'e' designates x. These conditions may be compared with our sufficient condition for paradigm reference:

\[ \text{REF } S \text{ refers to } x \text{ by 'e' if } S \text{ utters 'Fe' and has the open intention that A believe } Gx \text{ partly by recognition that } R('e',x) \text{ and } M('F',G). \]

In the case of direct reference the relation R is simply that of designation. Misreference, however, does not fulfill this condition and hence, if we want to count it as a type of reference, we would have to make special provision. It is worth noting that deliberate misreference is not
distinguishable from ordinary reference from the audience's point of view if the speaker is successful.

Indirect reference, on the other hand, involves the intention that it be recognized that $S$ is using a designator based upon the beliefs of another ($S$ may or may not believe it fits). It is normally contextual clues that mark the difference between the cases from the audience's perspective, though it is possible for the speaker to use parenthetical phrases to indicate that he is referring indirectly; for instance as in: "The king (as you call him) is in his countinghouse." Indirect reference meets REF above. In this example the relation $R$ is designation-for-the-minions.

Although direct reference involves the intention that it be recognized that 'e' designates the object, there are certain cases where $S$ does not actually expect the audience to accept that the designator applies. He may recognize that $A$ has an entrenched contrary position. To expect the direct strategy to work in such cases, $S$ must suppose that $A$ acknowledges $S$'s position without agreeing with it, that is, $A$ will recognize that 'e' designates $x$ for $S$. This case may be counted as direct reference, just as telling someone something that one knows they will never believe is nevertheless counted as ordinary stating. An example of such direct reference would be where $S$ addresses
the loyal minions: "The usurper (as I call him) is in the countinghouse." Here S uses a designator which he believes fits (i.e. 'the usurper' designates the man for S) yet S recognizes the eccentricity of his own use in A's eyes. This case may be counted as one of direct reference since it meets the condition that S openly intend that A recognize that S believes that the designator fits the object.

Indirect reference need not be based on the audience's preferred designation. S may use a designator which neither S nor A believe fits. S in this case openly intends that A recognize that 'e' designates x for T, where T is a third party. For example, S and A may mutually recollect that Jones has the paranoid belief that Smith does imitations of him; S says to A: "The Jones-mimick is raking leaves." Here S uses a designator which Jones believes fits, though not one that either S or his audience endorses. However, determination of T's identity need not be so straightforward in other cases. T might, for example, be the popular consensus rather than an actual person. Donnellan alters his king/usurper example to give, in effect, such an example; the previous quotation continues:

It is not even necessary, moreover, to suppose that his followers believe him to be the king. If they are cynical about the whole thing, know that he is not the king, I may still succeed in referring to the man I wish to refer to. Similarly, neither I nor the people I speak to may suppose that anyone is the king
and, finally, each party may know that the other does not so suppose and yet the reference may go through.

The final possibility here is one of indirect reference since it is mutually known that S intends A to recognize that 'the king' designates the man for T and T might here be the general populace.

The main difference between deliberate misreference and indirect reference is that the latter is a form of open communication; there is no deceit involved. More complicated deceitful strategies which mimic direct, indirect or even misreference may be constructed but it is not to the point to discuss these here. I have discussed deliberate misreference only to distinguish it from indirect reference. The distinctions I have drawn may be summarized as follows:

Direct reference (or ordinary reference) involves the open intention that A recognize that 'e' designates x (for S). Inadvertant misreference will also meet this condition. Deliberate misreference: a case of apparent reference where S does not believe that 'e' designates x and hence does not in fact have the open intention that A recognize that 'e' designates x, though he does openly intend that A believe that he recognizes that 'e' designates x.
Indirect reference: a case of reference where $S$ openly intends that $A$ recognize that 'e' designates $x$ for $T$, where $T$ is not $S$. This condition does not preclude the possibility that $S$ believes that 'e' designates $x$.

5.3 Direct and Subjective Intentional Reports

Frege held that the referent of 'the king' in a context such as 'John believes that the king is miserly' is its ordinary sense. As I noted above, Frege called this phenomenon "indirect reference" and such contexts "indirect contexts". I have introduced the term 'indirect reference' for a different notion altogether. However, there is the connection that my notion of indirect reference has special application to "indirect contexts". While Frege characterized the sense as the "mode of presentation" of the object, a characterization which might equally describe the idea of a referential strategy, Frege's view that the ordinary sense of an expression is the referent in indirect contexts is not matched by any suggestion (on my part) that the speaker refers to his referential strategy in such contexts. What I suggest is that the speaker may refer to the object indirectly using a designator which the subject of the reported mental act might apply.

Indirect reference, as I have defined it, may occur in any context, not just in indirect contexts. For
instance, it occurs in: "Smith's murderer is insane", where the speaker is referring to Jones whom he believes innocent, the strategy being for the benefit of an audience who thinks that Jones is guilty and yet knows that S believes him innocent. However, the phenomenon has considerably more interest when it occurs in indirect contexts.

We may apply the distinction to a relational context such as: "John is waiting for the mailman." If S makes a dyadic report of the form: "PFe", where 'P' refers to a person, 'F' is a psychological verb and 'e' refers to the object, S might (1) use a direct referential strategy such that 'e' designates x (for S) where x is the object of P's mental act or state; or (2) use an indirect referential strategy such that 'e' designates x for P.

We may call the first alternative making a direct report and the second making a subjective report.

Conditions for these may be given as follows:

**DIR** S makes a direct report of T's psychological state if S utters 'PFe', where 'F' is a psychological verb, and S has the open intention that A believe TGx partly by recognition that R('P',T,S) and M('F',G,S) and R('e',x,S).

**SUBJ** S makes a subjective report of T's psychological state if S utters 'PFe', where 'F' is a psychological verb, and S has the open intention that A believe TGx
given corresponding treatments in terms of agency. "To imply such and such" is taken to be equivalent to intending an audience to infer such and such. "To presuppose such and such" is taken to be equivalent to intending an audience to recognize such and such. The latter are clearly similar concepts.

From DIR we see that S presupposes that 'e' designates x (for S) in making a direct report of T's state. On the other hand, we see from SUBJ that S presupposes that 'e' designates x for T in making a subjective report. Thus some of S's presuppositions in making a report are systematically related to the strategy he uses. As we shall see later he may have other presuppositions in the particular situation, but in the case of those presuppositions which are integral to the strategy it is convenient to say that the report implies the truth of what is presupposed. Thus we might say, for example, that the subjective report PFe implies R('e',x,T) for some item x.

5.4 Dyadic Intentional Reports

The application of the distinction between direct and subjective reports may be contrasted with Quine's use of his notion of "referential opacity". In Word and Object Quine defines "purely referential position" as that which belongs to a singular term which is replaceable by any other
singular term that designates the same object without altering the truth-value of the sentence. He then defines "referential transparency" as that which belongs to a "mode of containment" that does not modify the referential positions of the singular terms in the contained clause. For example if the mode of containment 'It is true that . . . ' is prefixed to 'Tully was a Roman' then the resulting construction still has 'Tully' as purely referential; thus this mode of containment is transparent. Modes of containment which are not transparent are "opaque"; these include quotation, modal and intentional contexts.

"Opacity", therefore, is a logical feature which is exhibited by reports of intentional activities. An example which Quine discusses is:

1) The commissioner is looking for the chairman of the hospital board.
Quine suggests that if we understand (1) "in such a way to be prepared to affirm it and yet to deny"
2) The commissioner is looking for the dean, "even though, by recent appointment and unknown to the commissioner"
3) The dean = the chairman of the hospital board, "then we are treating the position to the right of 'looking for' as not purely referential." Quine suggests that we may understand (1) in a different way and be prepared to affirm
(2); here the position to the right of 'looking for' is referential. Thus Quine suggests that (1) is sometimes afflicted with opacity and sometimes not, hence that (1) is in some sense ambiguous. An adaption of Quine's proposal is the following. Report 01 (below) takes 'the commissioner is looking for . . . .' as an opaque mode of containment. Sentence T1, on the other hand, takes it to be a transparent mode of containment.

01) The commissioner is endeavouring-to-cause himself <to find the chairman of the hospital board>.

T1) The commissioner is endeavouring-to-cause himself and the chairman of the hospital board <to be related as finder and found>.

No expression within the pointed brackets has referential position; hence one cannot "substitute" 'the dean' for 'the chairman of the hospital board' in 01. In the transparent version, T1, 'The chairman of the hospital board' is outside the pointed brackets and has referential position; one may therefore substitute 'the dean'.

The weakness of Quine's style of analysis is that, unlike either the Fregean or agent-semantic approaches, the expressions within the pointed brackets are given no logical role. In neither T1 nor 01 is it clear what role the clauses in pointed brackets are playing. However, a more clear-cut fault with the proposal is the following.
Quine provides in (1) a shelter for the term 'the commissioner of the board' which (somehow) disallows inferences which would be natural if this expression had referential position. This means that we cannot infer from (1) that the commissioner is looking for someone. But there is no reading of (1) for which this should be accepted - the commissioner is looking for someone no matter whether he is ignorant of certain descriptions of the person he is seeking (which is surely inevitable), and no matter if the person he seeks does not in fact exist (he might have been sent on a wild goose chase). Quite how the sentence 'the commissioner is looking for someone' should be construed is not a question I shall consider, but no matter how it is understood it should follow from (1) on any reading. Yet Quine explicitly blocks this inference.

Quine seems to blame the possibility of the two readings of (1) on the verb 'look for' - he talks of opaque and transparent uses of this verb; but it hardly seems that one is reporting the commissioner doing something different in the two kinds of cases. The English syntax seems the same on each reading, though, naturally, someone might propose an underlying difference. I would contend, however, that the difference concerns the object expression; in one case one is referring to the object of search as the subject believes it designated, and in the other, as (in the
speaker's view) it is designated. The distinction proposed, between direct and subjective reports, is able to capture this point.

I introduce the convention of putting braces around terms of subjective reference; these braces simply signal the fact that the speaker is using the expression on the understanding that this is how the subject of the relation believes the object designated. They are not part of the syntax of the sentence. All that is indicated is that the report (the sentence in this particular use) meets SUBJ. The role of the braces might be compared to the use of parenthetical remarks such as 'as he thinks' in: "P is aiming at the king (as he thinks)", though the implication that he is wrong is not an essential part of the subjective report. Now S might make the direct report:

D1) The commissioner is looking for the chairman of the hospital board,

or the subjective report:

S1) The commissioner is looking for {the chairman of the hospital board}.

Both occurrences of 'the chairman of the hospital board' are referential. Our problem is, therefore, how to explain the phenomena which Quine labels "opacity".

The problem really turns on the question of "substitution": can one substitute one expression for
another *salva veritate* given that they both designate the same object? I shall first consider what exactly is meant by asking whether one can "substitute" a codesignator.

Clearly if one is talking of sentences rather than spoken utterances then one can substitute one term for another in a literal sense to get a new sentence. But if one is talking about utterances the question of substitution is whether the speaker might have used one expression rather than another - it is a counter-factual question. For example, suppose we have a message written in pencil, not just a sample of written English but a statement; it reads: "The commissioner is looking for the chairman of the hospital board." Now let us ask whether we can rub out 'the chairman of the hospital board' and write in 'the dean' given we know that the chairman is the dean, and have the same message. (This is a stronger question than a question about substitution *salva veritate*.) The general answer to this question is "no" since we cannot interfere with the original and be logically guaranteed that what is meant remains the same (I am waiving any notion that the identity of the message requires the identical sentence). In fact, the question raised is whether what we mean by the altered sentence is what the author (S) meant by the original, and one cannot get logical guarantees either way.

There are several questions we might ask about
"substitution" of one expression for another in S's message. We might ask whether in fact the man S refers to is the dean. Again, we might ask whether S believes the man he refers to is the dean. Yet again we might ask whether the commissioner has the belief that the chairman of the hospital board is the dean. The question about substitution salva veritate is perhaps best taken to be the first of these alternatives: "Is the man S refers to the dean?", since a positive answer would indicate that the revised message is coextensive with the original. But this question is independent of the issue about which Quine is concerned, which involves the commissioner's knowledge and our willingness to affirm that the commissioner is looking for the dean. In the context of an agent-semantical theory, which is concerned with utterances, we must specify more clearly which question we are asking in raising a question of substitution.

Being more careful, then, we may ask whether we might make the direct report "The commissioner is looking for the dean", on the basis of (a) our knowledge that the chairman of the hospital board is the dean, (b) accepting that 'the chairman of the hospital board' designates the chairman of the hospital board for S, and (c) our accepting the truth of S's statement that the commissioner is looking for the chairman of the hospital board (D1). The answer to
this question is clearly "yes". However, unless we know that S believes that the chairman of the hospital board is the dean we cannot say whether S might have made the direct report:

4) The commissioner is looking for the dean.

It should be noted that S might make this direct report given that he believes that the chairman of the hospital board is the dean; the truth of this belief is beside the point.

On the other hand, the question whether we might make the subjective report that the commissioner is looking for "the dean" depends on whether or not the commissioner believes that the person he is looking for is the dean, and in Quine's story he does not. Clearly, the question whether S might have made the subjective report:

5) The commissioner is looking for {the dean},
depends upon what S believes the commissioner believes about the chairman's deanship.

It turns out then that, except when we are talking directly from our own perspective, questions of substitution are questions about what somebody else believes. What Quine regards as opacity because certain inferences fail, is regarded, from the agent-semantical standpoint, as a reflection of the variety of referential strategies that may be employed. The contexts are not to be construed as
opaque" because the contained expressions do have
"referential position". One may substitute 'the dean' for
'the chairman of the hospital board' given a strategy under
which the second term can be construed as coreferential with
the first.

It is straightforward to state the condition under
which two expressions are coreferential; it may be less easy
to determine whether the condition is met in actual cases:
Let two acts of reference, involving 'e1' and 'e2'
respectively, satisfy REF in the particular forms
REF1 and REF2. Now 'e1' is coreferential with 'e2'
if and only if x1 is identical to x2, where x1 and
x2 are the items referred to in REF1 and REF2.
This condition exploits the fact that REF contains only
direct references.

Two expressions are codesignative if they designate
the same item. They are codesignative-for-S if S believes
they designate the same item. It can be seen that if S
refers to x as "e1" and again as "e2" it does not follow
that 'e1' and 'e2' are codesignative-for-S; he may be using
an indirect referential strategy in either case.

Far from being equivalent, codesignation and
coreference are independent. One way in which this emerges
is that two expressions may be codesignative-for-S but not
codesignative-for-T and since S may select an indirect
strategy no principle of substitutivity expressed in terms of designation can be maintained. One cannot move straight from the fact that S used two expressions codesignative-for-S to the conclusion that S referred to the same thing; nor from the fact that S referred to the same thing to the conclusion that the expressions he used were codesignative-for-S. Thus, rather than the usual view of substitutivity which incorporates the false assumption that codesignative expressions are interchangeable, we must maintain that only coreferential expressions are interchangeable. Determining whether two expressions are coreferential opens up the whole issue of deciphering a speaker's reference. Thus there is no simple substitution rule.

5.5 Subjective Reports of Belief

Following the agent-semantic approach we regard S's meaning that p by uttering 'u' as closely related to intending A to believe that p. This fits in with the philosophical usage of the term 'proposition' to cover what S expresses (his belief that p), what 'u' means ('u' means that p), and what A is intended to believe (that p). Thus we can say that if we report T's belief in the form: "T believes that p", then we assert that a relationship holds between subject T, and proposition p. And concerning the
clause 'that p' we can say it "introduces" a proposition. Furthermore, since proposition introduction is accomplished by means of sentences, it seems sensible to suppose that it sometimes involves reference. On this supposition we can apply our theory of reference to belief contexts.

SUBJ(belief) S makes a subjective report of T's belief if S utters 'P believes Fe' and S has the open intention that A believe that T believes Gx partly by recognition that R('P',T,S), M('believes', believes, S), M('F',G,T) and R('e',x,T).

This condition is clearly a special case of SUBJ above. Belief is selected here for study since it is a central case and is the case most often discussed in connection with the problem of "opacity".

It might be thought adequate to extend our earlier notation to represent subjective reports as follows:

T1) Peter believes {Schubert} wrote symphonies.

Here the braces indicate again that S refers to the item which Peter believes is named "Schubert". However, this is not adequate.

Let us suppose that the majority of Peter's beliefs about Schubert are correct. Thus we are generally content to decipher his references using the name 'Schubert' as conventionally correct. However, oddly enough, Peter does not know that Schubert wrote "The Trout". He identifies "The
"Trout" correctly by name when he hears it, but one of the things he believes about the composer is that he was not a symphonist. The other things he believes about the composer - for instance, that he died tragically young - are equally true of Schubert. We would have, following the suggestion above:

T2) Peter believes \{the composer of "the Trout"\} did not write symphonies.

But to whom do we refer here by the expression 'the composer of "the Trout"'? Since Peter correctly identifies "the Trout" the only plausible candidate, given Peter's beliefs, is that it is Schubert. But then Peter believes Schubert wrote symphonies, hence we don't seem to have expressed what the subjective report is supposed to capture.

In fact we must represent subjective reports of beliefs in the form:

S1) Peter believes \{Schubert wrote symphonies\}.
S2) Peter believes \{the composer of "the Trout" did not write symphonies\}.

Here the braces surround the entire contained context signifying that the whole clause expresses Peter's belief in terms which he would accept.

The logic of belief reports depends upon the presuppositions which the speaker has in using the strategy he selects. If we have S1 above and
S3) Peter believes {Schubert wrote the Octet in F major},
then making necessary assumptions about Peter's rationality
we may conclude:
S4) Peter believes {the composer of the Octet in F major
wrote symphonies},
since in both cases S presupposes that Peter would express
beliefs in the form given.

However, we could not get from the direct report
D1) Peter believes Schubert wrote symphonies,
and S3 to S4 without, at least, the additional premise that
Peter believes that the man he calls "Schubert" wrote
symphonies. (This is what is expressed by T1 above.) The
problems raised by "substitution" are thus forestalled since
there are restrictions on what would be a permissable
referential strategy in the given context.

Both for technical completeness and later
application T1 and T2 should be investigated further. These
reports have the form: "P believes F{e}". They tell us what
a subject actually believes about the item he calls "e" but
do not allow us to infer that P would express any belief of
his as "Fe". A more interesting type of this partially
subjective form of report has the form: "P believes f={e}",
where both 'e' and 'f' are referring expressions. For
example,
T3) Peter believes the composer of "The Trout" is
In effect this type of report tells us what expressions in the subject's idiolect designate. The example translates between Peter's and the speaker's idiolect.

It might be objected that subjective reports also translate between the speaker's and the subject's idiolect since the subjective report presupposes that P believes 'e' designates x. But this is not a genuine translation since there is no specific designator 'x' which S intends A to have in mind. The 'x' in conditions REF, SUBJ and so on is simply a dummy referring expression. The partially subjective form (T3) genuinely translates since it explicitly equates a designator used directly with one used subjectively.

5.6 A Problem of Consistency

As we saw in chapter three the decipherment of others' references may be problematic when their beliefs diverge from one's own. This phenomenon is reflected in the logic of reports of actions and intentional states. In this section I examine the problem from an agent-semantic viewpoint. The dyadic case is considered before the more frequently discussed belief contexts.

(a) A Dyadic Case

Suppose Hassim believes in a system of astrology of
peculiar antiquity which leads him to hate Phosphorus with its chilling influence, whereas he loves Hesperus for its benevolent control over human destinies. Hassim is a person for whom the statement: "Hesperus is identical to Phosphorus", would be informative. Given that S accepts that Hassim refers to Hesperus as "Hesperus" and Phosphorus as "Phosphorus", he may assert both:

1) Hassim loves {Hesperus},
2) Hassim hates {Phosphorus},

and refer in both cases to the same planet since he believes that Hesperus is identical to Phosphorus. S might also make the direct reports:

3) Hassim loves Phosphorus,
4) Hassim hates Hesperus,

but he does not here presuppose that 'Phosphorus' designates for Hassim the object of Hassim's love, nor mutatis mutandis for 'Hesperus'. However, S could also make the direct report:

5) Hassim loves Hesperus.

From (4) and (5) S is committed to the following:

6) Hassim both loves and hates Hesperus.

This expresses S's view that Hassim is related to one and the same thing with opposing affections. Now it would be reasonable to infer from (5) that Hassim does not hate Hesperus; from this and (4) we could derive:
7) Hassim both hates and does not hate Hesperus. While S may say that this is a matter of Hassim being inconsistent since he is mistaken about the identity of Hesperus relative to Phosphorus, it might be argued that it is S who is inconsistent since he is committed to (7) whereas Hassim is consistent since he is not committed to (7).

The resolution of this problem is as follows. Consider the question in the following terms:

8) This trunk is too heavy,

9) This trunk is not too heavy,

where 'this trunk' refers to the identical object, do these assertions contradict one another? Clearly they do if 'too heavy' is to be taken in the same way in each case. But if we give a particular context they may be understood as consistent. The trunk may be too heavy for me to lift but not too heavy for the cart, hence if the context allows it (8) can be taken in a different way to (9). It will be pointed out that 'too heavy' is a relative term and this explains this resolution of the paradox, but the dependency upon context to make up for terseness of expression also characterizes other kinds of descriptive expressions. A shade of colour may look red against a yellow background but orange (not red) against a purple one. In an appropriate context we could therefore infer that "This shade is red and
not red" means something consistent although it is disconcertingly paradoxical.

Applying this point to the problem at hand, if (7) is to be understood as consistent the context must supply the appropriate relativization and we happen to know what this is here - Hassim hates Hesperus in its guise as "Phosphorus" but does not hate it in its guise as "Hesperus". (Note that the last sentence must be construed as a direct report.) In a similar way, a remark such as: "John hates but does not hate Mary," might suggest relativization in time (sometimes he hates her, sometimes he does not), or in the object (he hates some of her characteristics but not all). This sort of contextual bedding is always "there" but its contribution is usually confined to enriching the meaning of what is actually asserted. In the cases just considered the context plays a logical role which is not reflected in the syntax of the utterance.

The more usual approach to this problem is to build contextual bedding into the syntax in order to maintain surface consistency. This procedure is necessary if one's aim is to build a formal system in which features of ordinary language are made perspicuous; the agent-semantical approach differs in that it does not regard the actual surface structure as "elliptical" for some more explicit
version but offers an analysis of how the utterance as a whole, including its contextual features, comes to have the meaning it does.

The suggestion that Hassim is consistent since he is not committed to (7) must be dismissed from S's standpoint, and since we are on S's side (we believe that Hesperus is identical to Phosphorus), we too must dismiss this claim. Although Hassim would deny that he both hates and does not hate Hesperus, this is also an expression of his inconsistency since he has already admitted that he hates Phosphorus and does not hate Hesperus. What may be said is that Hassim is "internally consistent"; that is, there is no contradiction in his world picture since he does not recognize that 'Hesperus' designates the same item as 'Phosphorus'. But this is not consistency from our point of view. Since, after all, we regard our point of view as the correct one, we must say that Hassim is not truly consistent.

(b) A Belief-that Case

Let us consider Quine's famous spy case. Ralph believes a man, whom he has seen several times wearing a brown hat, is a spy. Also there is a man whom Ralph once saw at the beach and whom he knows to be the respectable Bernard J. Ortcutt. However, the man whom Ralph saw in a brown hat is none other than Ortcutt. Now we have both:
a) Ralph believes that the man in a brown hat is a spy.
b) Ralph does not believe that the man seen at the beach is a spy.

Clearly substituting 'Bernard J. Ortcutt' for 'the man in a brown hat' in (a), and for 'the man seen at the beach' in (b), would jointly yield inconsistent attributions of belief to Ralph. Yet we want to say both (a) and (b) are true and not regard ourselves as inconsistent. Quine's contention, then, is that belief contexts are referentially opaque and hence that the that-clauses are logically sealed. Thus he maintains that the definite descriptions in (a) and (b) are not referring expressions.

From the perspective of the proposed theory Quine's discovery of opacity in belief contexts stems from running together two questions of substitution. If one asks about possible substitutions for 'the man in the brown hat' in the report: "Ralph believes the man in a brown hat is a spy," one might be asking (i) Whether we ourselves might refer to the topic of Ralph's belief as "Ortcutt," or (ii) Whether Ralph might refer to the topic of his belief as "Ortcutt". Adopting the Olympian Assumption and assuming we are dealing with direct reference, question (i) may be re-expressed: "Does 'the man in the brown hat' designate Ortcutt?" But Quine supposes that if Ralph does not know the man in the brown hat is Ortcutt, it is incorrect to report Ralph's
belief as: "Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy." Rather he logically isolates direct reference which goes beyond the subject's own representation of his topic and simply forbids such substitutions. Thus Quine, while apparently asking question (i), is covertly asking question (ii) since he has legislated that only this one applies. Hence the view that opacity afflicts the context is reinforced.

Now we may make a direct report:

1) Ralph believes that the man in the brown hat is a spy, and hence also the direct report:

2) Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy, since Ortcutt is the man in the brown hat. But though the subjective report:

3) Ralph believes that \{the man in the brown hat is a spy\}, is true since Ralph would refer to someone as "the man in the brown hat" and describe him as a spy, the following subjective report is false.

*4) Ralph believes \{Ortcutt is a spy\}, since 'Ortcutt' is not a name of the spy for Ralph. Likewise the subjective report:

*5) Ralph believes that \{the man in the brown hat is not a spy\}, is false. Ralph would not accept the report "The man in the brown hat is not a spy" as an expression of his belief.

In Quine's spy story we have both (2) and:
6) Ralph believes that Ortcutt is not a spy. 
Hence we may infer: 
7) Ralph believes both that Ortcutt is a spy and that Ortcutt is not a spy. 
Nevertheless Quine wants to say that Ralph is not inconsistent since he has not made the identification of the man in the brown hat, whom he believes to be a spy, with Ortcutt. I suggest that this is not consistency in the ordinary sense; it is a much weaker kind. 

To attribute to Ralph belief in inconsistent propositions is not the same thing as accusing him of "inner inconsistency" as we may call it. To accuse Ralph of inner inconsistency we would need: 
8) Ralph believes that \{Ortcutt is a spy\} and that \{Ortcutt is not a spy\}. 
But this conclusion we cannot derive. We may assert: 
9) Ralph believes that \{Ortcutt is not a spy\}. 
But (4) is not true, hence we cannot derive (8) by conjunction. Thus we cannot accuse Ralph of inner inconsistency, which is as we want it. 

However, one must not be too generous to Ralph in reporting his position. If Ralph asserts: 
10) Ortcutt is not a spy but the man in the brown hat is a spy, 
we should regard him as (externally) inconsistent. Ralph is
using direct referential strategies in (10). We take the correct decipherment of his references to be that he is referring to Ortcutt in both cases even in the light of the fact that this means he is externally inconsistent. In Ralph's idiolect, we suppose, 'Ortcutt' and 'the man in the brown hat' designate two objects not one, but this assumption that he is internally consistent does not force us to try to decipher his references so as to make him out to be externally consistent. Thus in (7) we correctly attribute to Ralph inconsistency in the external sense, and in doing this we remain faithful to our picture of things.

However, there is another side to the disparity between Ralph's and our own world picture. We may plausibly assert, or infer it from (9) and Ralph's internal consistency, that:

11) Ralph does not believe {Ortcutt is a spy},
from this we may infer:

12) Ralph does not believe that Ortcutt is a spy, since 'Ortcutt' is a name of Ortcutt for Ralph. But (12) together with (2) reveals that:

13) Ralph does and does not believe that Ortcutt is a spy. This, as Kaplan rightly points out, seems inconsistent. 4 Were we to follow Kaplan here we would find a sense in which (13) is true. Kaplan takes 'believe' in (13) to be equivalent to his 'Bel' and would expand using an internal
negation, roughly:

14) There is at least one representation of Ortcutt under which Ralph believes him a spy and at least one under which Ralph does not believe him a spy.

Thus, in Kaplan's terms, Ralph has two "vivid names" of Ortcutt, one which contains the name 'Ortcutt' and the description 'the man in the brown hat', and another which contains the description but not the name. Ralph can believe and not believe that Ortcutt is a spy. However, while one may agree that these points characterize the situation, it is far from being plausible that (14) expresses what (13) expresses. (I should perhaps avoid implying that this is precisely what Kaplan was aiming to do in providing his style of analysis.)

Some light is shed on our predicament over (13) by considering the argument for (11). This argument might be expressed:

9) Ralph believes {Ortcutt is not a spy},

15) If Ralph believes {Ortcutt is not a spy} he does not believe {Ortcutt is a spy},

hence

11) Ralph does not believe {Ortcutt is a spy}.

Premise (15) expresses the assumption that Ralph is internally consistent. This assumption might be expressed as the rule:
IC If P believes \{\textit{not-s}\} then he does not believe \{s\}. This may be regarded as the internal version of the following external rule of consistency:

EC If P believes that not-s, he does not believe that s. This might be regarded syntactically as a rule for the "exportation of negation". If we adopt this rule, any report that Ralph has inconsistent beliefs may be turned into an inconsistent attribution of belief. For instance:

6) Ralph believes both that Ortcutt is a spy and that Ortcutt is not a spy,
may by EC be converted to:

13) Ralph does and does not believe that Ortcutt is a spy.
In fact, what EC expresses is the "requirement" that P be externally consistent.

Given that human fallibility must be taken into account by any interesting analysis of belief, one would reject EC from a formal calculus of belief unless special restrictions were specified. However, our ordinary policy concerning the beliefs of others might be characterized as the adoption of EC. But if we find ourselves falling into contradiction EC is abandoned in favour of IC and we assume that the subject has false beliefs concerning the identity of the topic. Hence, following the style of solution already indicated earlier, the surface contradiction of (13) is put to rights by relativization to Ralph's incorrect beliefs.
We understand that Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy when that man appears in a brown hat, but that he does not believe Ortcutt is a spy when that man appears as a respectable citizen.

5.7 A Speech-Act Approach

In the last chapter I contrasted my purely Gricean account of the referential/attributive distinction with a speech-act approach. However, until recently, speech-act approaches to the problems of intentional contexts were hard to find. In 1976 A.C. Genova was able to write in an article called "Speech Acts and Non-Extensionality":

_long overdue, I think, is the direct application of certain aspects of recent speech act theory to the general problem of non-extensional linguistic contexts._

I have discovered no precedents to Genova's publication though recently Searle has presented an account. As his title suggests Genova is working in the Austin/Searle tradition and the principal technical difference between his treatment and mine stems from this. Rather than regarding the referential strategy within indirect reports as one case of indirect reference, Genova talks of "rules for reference in non-extensional contexts", hence taking such contexts as permitting a special kind of reference not elsewhere possible.

In such contexts, it is a constitutive rule of the speech act of reference that we have the
option of using the referring expression in one of two ways - just so long as we (the speakers) are willing to accept the logical consequences of either option, e.g. whether or not inference based on substitutivity or existential generalization is to apply to certain constituents of our utterance.

It is clear from this that Genova still regards "opacity" as a problem of blocking inferences; he just gives a different account than Quine of why the inference is blocked (in so far as either gives a genuine account). The approach I have suggested, by contrast, insists only that the presupposition to the proposed referential strategy is established (e.g. that the commissioner believes that the chairman of the hospital board is the dean) before the inference is drawn in those terms.

Perhaps as a consequence of his legalistic way of looking at the phenomena (in terms of "constitutive rules"), Genova is less than clear about the two ways of referring to the object. Rather than explaining the two ways as I have done as a matter of communicatory strategy (direct or indirect) he almost seems to explain them in terms of two modes of being of the object which may be concomitant; one may refer to the object "as a purportedly existing object" or "as also being an intentional object." This may be unfair but the point remains that Genova is not clear about this. As I suggest in the final chapter of the present work, the philosophical significance of the proposed theory
lies in its power to demystify the idea of an intentional object.

Genova applies his account to alethic contexts in a way that seems to me implausible. The fact that problems of intentional and alethic contexts have hitherto been treated under the same head does not mean that these are genuinely similar problems, or that a solution to one should reveal a method for solving the other. However, Genova's article is a pioneering work of great interest. We are certainly in agreement that an analysis of reports of intentional activity which takes into account "the speaker-hearer relation as this obtains in a particular context" brings to light important considerations which the traditional style of non-contextual logical analysis misses.

5.8 A Distinct Issue

An illustration of the flexibility of the theory presented is provided by consideration of another, much discussed example.

1) Jones believes that the richest debutante in Dubuque will marry him.

It is suggested that there is an ambiguity here since (1) might be read as informing us that there is some particular young lady who is the richest debutante in Dubuque and Jones believes she will marry him; or (1) might be read as
informing us that Jones believes it will be true that the richest debutante in Dubuque marries him. One underlying issue here is the nature of Jones's acquaintance with the topic of his belief. For example, Kaplan holds that 'believe' is multiply ambiguous depending upon the degree of "rapport" the subject has with the topic of his belief (i.e. what his belief is about). If Jones is en rapport with the richest debutante in Dubuque then (1) may be read relationally:

R1) Jones Bel ([x will marry Jones], the richest debutante in Dubuque).

But if Jones is not en rapport with her then (1) will be read notionally:

N1) Jones B [the richest debutante in Dubuque will marry Jones].

Kaplan might supply a variety of predicates to replace 'Bel' depending upon how vividly Jones represents the young lady in question.

Against this I would urge that how Jones represents the young lady does not affect what the sentence means. The agent-semantical counter-suggestion for this case is that the differences one reads into the reports concern the presuppositions which the speaker might be imagined to have in different situations concerning the nature of the subject's acquaintance with the topic. The different
possible presuppositions about the nature of Jones's acquaintance have no very definite relationship with the use of a direct or a subjective referential strategy.

In addition to the presuppositions a speaker necessarily makes in using either a direct or a subjective strategy, he may, in a particular context, intend A to infer something about Jones's acquaintance with the lady. In making the direct report he may or may not intend A to infer that Jones regards himself as acquainted with a person whom he believes he will marry. If the speaker implies there is no such report involving a name or some circumstantial description then he reports a case of the sort Kaplan would represent by N1. Kaplan's weaker "relational" predicates correspond to S's presupposition that Jones's acquaintance with the topic is remote; he may have only heard the name used or have a vague description such as 'the girl who lives near cousin Betty'. However, it would be unusual for a situation to be such that a speaker could expect the audience to infer the exact nature of Jones's acquaintance, yet Kaplan's weaker "relational" belief predicates suggest that in one of its senses (1) conveys this information; again this seems to put underlying meaning into the analysis of what is asserted.

The usual purpose of making a subjective report is to refer to the object by a designator which the subject
believes fits but which the speaker does not. Thus a usual case of making a subjective report is one where Jones is acquainted with some lady whom he falsely believes is the richest debutante in Dubuque. It would only make sense to suppose Jones falsely applies the designator to someone whom he is not acquainted with if he has an idiosyncratic idea of what counts as "the richest debutante in Dubuque". If (less usually) the subjective report is made where the speaker does not disagree with Jones's judgement, then the point of a subjective report would likely be to emphasize that Jones does realize that the description 'the richest debutante in Dubuque' applies to the lady he believes will marry him. It seems likely, in this case, that the speaker does believe Jones is acquainted with the lady, but one could construct a case where the acquaintance is only distant.

So far I have portrayed the perceived ambiguity in the Jones/Debutante example as one of different presuppositions about Jones's acquaintance with the lady in different cases. The problem we discussed in the Ralph/Ortcutt case involved Ralph being inconsistently related to Ortcutt. The latter difficulty can be generated in a Jones/Debutante case. Suppose Jones is acquainted with Mary-Lou but believes incorrectly that she is not the richest debutante in Dubuque; however, Jones also has the general ambition to marry the richest debutante in Dubuque.
We may find ourselves, in this case, both affirming and denying Dl. This, as I explained above, is due to our deciphering Jones's references (to "Mary-Lou" and to "the richest debutante in Dubuque") as references to one thing despite his idiosyncratic belief that there are two involved; if we express ourselves explicitly then there is no contradiction.

The case just described brings us to another problem which has connections with Donnellan's observations described in chapter four. If Jones can have a general reason for the belief that the richest debutante in Dubuque will marry him it is apparent that Jones's belief as to who satisfies the description may be set apart. Thus contrary to how I have described the interpretation of (1) so far, an ambiguity may be perceived which has nothing to do with any presuppositions about Jones's acquaintance with anyone but has entirely to do with a certain general ambition or obligation on Jones's part. Jones may believe that whoever satisfies the description 'the richest debutante in Dubuque' will marry him (just as his father before him married the richest debutante in Dubuque when he was twenty-five).

My account so far could allow a case where S makes a subjective report presupposing "zero" acquaintance on Jones's part with the designated topic. But there is a difference in the new type of example since, rather than
presupposing zero acquaintance, it is presupposed that acquaintance is irrelevant. However, this difference will be nugatory in the zero acquaintance case. The difference comes out when the acquaintance is significantly greater than zero since then the possibility of divergence between decipherments of Jones's references to his topic has some grounding. The attribution of belief which is indifferent to acquaintance may be associated with attributive reference in that the corresponding direct context (i.e. any utterance Jones makes expressing his belief) will be regarded as containing such a strategy, Jones having general grounds for his assertion. Correlatively, the attribution of belief which presupposes some acquaintance with the topic may be associated with indicative reference in that the corresponding direct context will be regarded as containing such a strategy, Jones having a particular person in mind.

**Summary**

In this chapter two important distinctions emerged. We distinguished between direct and indirect reference, and between direct and subjective reports of intentional activity. Direct reference occurs when the speaker has the open intention that A recognize that 'e' designates x (for S); thus naming and describing are direct referential strategies. Indirect reference occurs when the speaker has
the open intention that A recognize that 'e' designates x for T (where T is not S, but the condition does not rule out that 'e' designates x for S); thus naming-for-T and describing-for-T are indirect referential strategies. Indirect reference is to be distinguished from deliberate misreference where S does not openly intend that A recognize that 'e' designates x since S does not believe that 'e' does so.

The second distinction is a special application of the former distinction. If S uses a direct referential strategy to refer to the object of another's activity he makes a direct report. If S uses an indirect strategy involving designation for the subject (or agent) then the report is a subjective report. This distinction may be used to explain the nature of difficulties that have hitherto been treated by "blocking" certain inferences based upon the principle of substitutivity. Names and descriptions are not necessarily coreferential even if they are codesignative-for-S, since S's referential strategy may be indirect. Furthermore, terms may be coreferential but not codesignative-for-S. It follows that "substitutions" cannot be made without consideration of whether the strategy is direct or indirect and, if indirect, without consideration of what is codesignative-for-T.

Applying these distinctions to belief attributions
can be understood as reporting that a relation holds between a person and a proposition. The proposition is "introduced" by a that-clause. The that-clause is not a referring expression; however, it is a sentence. An attribution of singular belief: "P believes that Fe," contains a referring expression 'e' by which the speaker refers to the topic of belief. The belief attribution is direct if the that-clause introduces a proposition in accordance with S's ideas of correct expression. It is subjective if S believes that 'Fe' expresses P's belief in terms which P would accept and intends his audience to recognize this fact as the key strategy of his assertion.

A distinction can be drawn between consistency with the truth and "inner consistency" or the internal consistency of a subject's world picture. When reporting the beliefs of another it is possible to fall into inconsistency by compromising too far in order to interpret those beliefs charitably. This inconsistency is superficial and can be eliminated by a more careful description of those beliefs explicitly relativizing references as subjective.

It is possible to draw a distinction between attributive and indicative subjective reference within belief contexts. This can be used to handle one ambiguity associated with the example: "Jones believes that the richest debutante in Dubuque will marry him." Other
ambiguities perceived in this example are a function of the various presuppositions which might be held concerning the degree of acquaintance between Jones and that lady.

Notes
1. The current popularity of the view that names refer immediately (do not have senses) has stimulated interest in alternative solutions. Dissatisfied with model-theoretic approaches, some have pointed out the need for a psychological framework within which to treat these problems. There is a feeling that perhaps these problems are not narrowly semantical ones at all. It is, therefore, in tune with this theme that the agent-semantic treatment can be presented. See, for example, B. Hall-Partee, "Semantics - Mathematics or Psychology?", J.P. Reddam, "Van Fraassen on Propositional Attitudes", S. Schiffer, "The Basis of Reference."
2. G. Frege, "On Sense and Reference". I have adopted 'referent' for Frege's term 'Bedeutung' which Black translates as 'reference' and Dummett as 'meaning'. For Frege the Bedeutung of a name is its bearer.
3. K.S. Donnellan, "Reference and Definite Descriptions".
4. D. Kaplan, "Quantifying In".
5. A.C. Genova, "Speech acts and Non-extensionality".
6. Searle makes some remarks on the issue in "Referential
and Attributive" (in the section entitled "De re and de dicto", and more recently and more extensively in Intentionality (especially chapter 7). The main thrust of Searle's account is that the speaker may not be committed to the content of an embedded proposition. He suggests that the crucial factor in determining the speaker's commitment is the containing context.

While I agree with the general idea that the embedded proposition is presented, without being asserted, in belief-ascriptions, the account I have given suggests that the meaning of the containing main clause is not the determining factor in the discriminations between different cases. Others have pointed out (and indeed Quine acknowledges) that in English the sentences 'About Ortcutt, Ralph believes he is a spy' and 'Ralph believes Ortcutt is a spy' do not mark a rigid distinction. Both sentences may be used in either of the senses we have considered. Thus, unfortunately, we have to appeal to the wider context to explain the differences.

Searle does not give an account of what it is to present a proposition without asserting it, except to say that the speaker repeats the propositional content without the illocutionary force of asserting it. My concern, and part of Genova's, is with the detail of referring to the topic of belief.
7. D. Kaplan, *op. cit.* The square brackets in examples substitute for Kaplan's "Frege quotes". Roughly, they indicate that the expressions within refer to senses.

8. B. Loar, in "Reference and Propositional Attitudes", has also criticized Kaplan for building too much concerning the belief relation into an account of the logical form of belief sentences. Loar himself builds into his account of the logical form what the account presented here places at the level of presuppositions. On his account, in rough terms, the referring expressions in the contained context may play the dual role of referring and forming part of a conjunctive predicate.

Loar's article is of particular interest here since he cites good intuitive reasons for regarding singular terms in the contained context as referential (pp. 48-9). Furthermore, he distinguishes the three main types of belief ascription here discussed. Consider his example:

(e) Ralph believes that the president of the Boardroom Sweeper's Association is a spy.

There are at least three ways in which this sentence might be taken; they may be indicated roughly as follows.

(e₁) Ralph believes that whoever is president of the B.S.A. is a spy.

(e₂) Ralph believes of the president of the B.S.A., under that description, that he is a spy.

(e₃) Ralph believes of that person (the one I here refer to as the president of the B.S.A.) that he is a spy.

(p. 55 n.)
We would deal with these as follows: \( e_1 \) is an attributive, subjective report (explained in the text below), \( e_2 \) is a subjective report, and \( e_3 \) is a direct report.
CHAPTER SIX

Conclusion

6.1 In Retrospect

In Chapter One I declared my aim to be to provide a framework for the description of the phenomenon of singular reference in English and to show that it suggests a solution to certain well-known puzzles concerning intentional contexts. This aim was fulfilled, in brief, as follows.

I presented the basic agent-semantic theory of reference along the lines of Schiffer's refined, Gricean theory of meaning.

\[ \text{REF} \]

S refers to x by 'e' if S utters 'Fe' and has the open intention that A believe Gx partly by recognition that R('e',x) and M('F',G).

This condition introduced the relation, R, which is S's referential strategy. The two general types of strategy I considered were naming and describing.

Following Lewis, I take semantic relations to be conventional if a member of a speech community can legitimately expect (some) others to recognize them by reason of their successful use in past communications. Lewis's model fits the observation that names are used even though individual speakers are unable to identify their
bearers uniquely. There is a reliance on the fact that a name is in use. The phenomenon of deferential name use is one of the things that militate against the view that the "sense" of a name plays an immediate communicatory role. Another is the fact that names function in counter-factual contexts where the associated cluster is not held to be true of the bearer.

Just as we distinguish referring as an activity from the referential strategy used, we distinguish the individual speaker's particular use of a name to refer from the name's having a conventional bearer. The decipherment of the particular use of a name need not be to the conventional bearer. Even if a speaker intends to use the name conventionally he may be mistaken as to which the bearer is. (Of course, he need not have a belief as to which item it is, other than the "question-begging" belief that it is the item of that name.) Hence it may not be charitable to decipher his reference to the conventional bearer. Questions of decipherment call for a judgement and there may be no completely satisfactory solution. As we saw in connection with the analysis of belief contexts, it is possible to be led into contradiction by attempting to interpret another's reference charitably.

Since current usage is a major factor in the determination of the conventional bearer of a name, the
vagaries of determining what individual speakers mean ultimately affect the question. We generally assume that there are those who "know" which the bearer is, but there are cases where different criteria of correctness may compete. Our standards of correctness may even vary. For example, in a popular context 'Jonah' refers to someone who was swallowed by a fish, whereas in a scholarly context this might be denied.

If we turn to the other general type of referential strategy considered, the fact that definite descriptions are used to refer is revealed by one type of case when the description used fails to fit anything. The speaker may insist that he had in mind a particular item to which he was referring. He will withdraw the expression when it is pointed out to him that it does not describe the item to which he wishes to refer. He does not withdraw his assertion. This type of case does not fit an analysis that takes the meaning of the description to be part of what is asserted since, in this case, the assertion would have to be withdrawn.

The opposite effect may be observed, however. In another type of case the speaker may withdraw his assertion. If the speaker wanted to refer to the item that fits a certain description and not any other, he should withdraw the remark altogether when confronted with the fact that
there is no such item. This type of case nevertheless satisfies the conditions for reference.

The difference between the types of case just outlined was described in terms of the referential strategy being "optional" or "essential". One might test whether the strategy is essential or one of a number of options by determining whether the speaker would withdraw his assertion, or merely the description he used, if it turns out that the description does not fit. The possibility of doubt as to which strategy a speaker is using may give rise to alternative decipherments of his reference. This does not mean that the two kinds of situation are not distinct kinds. If there is a problem we may be in doubt as to whether he has misidentified his referent (confused it with another), in which case the designation is an essential strategy, or merely misdescribed it (mistaken it for having a property it does not have), in which case the designation is an optional strategy.

Once a convention is established it becomes possible for speakers to exploit it in novel ways. Thus the two general kinds of conventional strategy may be exploited in unconventional ways. One general type of exploitation arises from human fallibility, or as it might be seen, the ability of human beings to judge in ways conflicting with each other. If T, a third person, believes 'e' designates x and S
knows that A knows T's belief, S may refer to x by 'e'. This is an indirect referential strategy: R('e', x, T).

The indirect strategy is used in subjective reports. S may report P's psychological state but refer to the object of the state (or to the topic of a belief or some other propositional attitude) by means of a designation which P believes applies. The usual presupposition that R('e', x, S) is absent; hence inferences which rely on this presupposition cannot legitimately be drawn. Thus:

\[ \text{PFe} \rightarrow \text{Pff} \quad \text{given 'e' designates f (for S)} \]

But:

\[ \text{PF}\{e\} \rightarrow \text{Pff} \quad \text{unless 'e' designates f for P, and this is not presupposed in the general case.} \]

Thus noun phrases in intentional contexts can be taken to refer. Hence such contexts are not "opaque". But the surface syntax is no clue to the inferences which may be drawn. To understand these we have to take into account other features of the speech situation.

An additional complexity arises in the case of subjective reports of propositional attitudes since the proposition as a whole must be expressed in S's idiolect to qualify as a subjective report. (Subjective reports, like puns, are hard to translate.) Thus the fact that P believes \{Fe\}, together with the fact that 'e' designates x for P and
'f' designates the same x for P, does not imply that P believes \{Ff\} since it is possible that P does not believe \(e = f\). This kind of discrepancy between the population of the world as P sees it (it contains two items which P calls "e" and "f") and the population of the world as we see it (e and f are the same item), may give rise to contradiction if we charitably suppose P refers to the item to which we refer by using the expressions 'e' and 'f'. To avoid this we should insist that in the last resort charity belongs at home. P is inconsistent if he maintains both "Fe" and "not Ff". We can accept that relative to his own world view P is consistent; but this relativization has to be made explicit if surface consistency is to be maintained.

The idea that a speaker may have an essential descriptive strategy for referring to the item he has in mind can be transposed to belief contexts: one may report a subject's belief by an essential description. Thus we can have an attributive, subjective strategy. If, to take a fresh example, P believes he will be awarded the largest contract no matter which one it is, then the attributive, subjective strategy is 'the largest contract'. If, however, P believes he will be awarded the contract to build the convention centre and, incidentally, believes this to be the largest contract, then any strategy by which P might refer to the convention centre would be appropriate in a
subjective report. In either case the sentence used could be 'P believes the largest contract will be his.' If P wins the contract to build the convention centre, but this was not the largest contract, then in the first case it is clear P had a false belief. However, in the second case it is legitimate to opt for a different strategy to refer to the topic of P's belief; hence we can re-express P's belief in terms which make it clear that he had a true belief (although he also had a false one).

6.2 In Prospect

In this section I indicate several possible lines of further inquiry. This serves as a statement of the potential philosophical relevance of the work presented.

I have contrasted the agent-semantical view of reference with model-theoretic approaches, noting that these tie reference to ontology. Some recent formal approaches have broken away from this tie, but the standard interpretation of the quantifier 'some' is existential ('there exists an x such that x . . .'). If, instead, semantics is tied to the theory of communication, then the notion of "objects of reference" is connected to that of "objects of thought": S intends A to have x in mind. Consequently there is no prima facie objection to reference to non-existent items. One may think of a non-existent (e.g.
The legitimacy of reference to non-existent items opens up the possibility of treating intentional states as dyadic relations in a straightforward way. The difficulties of the opposite approach can be seen from the following:

It has long been known that no relational analysis is possible of sentences containing intensional objects. A relation can hold only between two things which exist; in any true sentence a relational expression, if it occurs, must stand between two proper names with bearers or between two non-vacuous descriptions. It cannot be true that John is taller than the present King of France; it may be true that he admires Ossian. True, one may have a relation to something which no longer exists, and two things need not exist contemporaneously to stand in a relation to each other. It may well be that I am fatter than my great-grandfather, though he died before I was born. But a verb such as "admire" may stand before a name that never had a bearer at all. The Greeks worshipped Zeus, though Zeus never was.

However, if there are no longer logical pressures forcing us to say strange things like 'Zeus' never had a bearer, or that one can have relations to something that used to exist (but no longer does) but not to something that never existed, we can explore the relational analysis of intentional contexts.

The analysis, proposed in chapter five, of reference in certain intentional contexts is a start in this direction. We may contrast the agent-semantical analysis of belief-that contexts and Kaplan's analysis from an
ontological point of view. Kaplan's analysis presupposes "intermediate entities" ("senses") whereas, according to our proposal, the topic of belief is referred to unmediated. If the topic of belief does not exist, Kaplan's theory rests with the view that the subject's belief has sense but no reference; the belief means something but is not about anything. On our view, the topic of the belief is what the subject believes it to be. Naturally, if that item does not exist, it cannot be identified with any existent thing. That, however, is not a reason to claim that the item cannot be thought about or referred to.3

From preliminary study of the case of reports of the form: "P sees e," it is fruitful to introduce another species of referential strategy to accommodate a special type of presupposition which may be made in some situations. The following cases, where the object seen is referred to by a definite description, exemplify different kinds of reports of seeing.

1) Lady Macbeth sees the bloody knife.
   (She is actually looking at the knife.)

2) Lady Macbeth sees the bloody knife.
   (She is hallucinating.)

3) Percy sees the bird in the nest.
   (He is looking into a squint-test apparatus; the bird and the nest are on separate cards.)4
4) Ralph B. Ortcutt sees the message he has been waiting for.

(He is looking at a configuration of pebbles on the beach.)

In case (1), we intend A to infer that the knife is actually present; whereas in case (2) we do not. In case (3), setting aside the fact that the bird and nest are pictured (not real), we do not intend A to infer that the bird actually is in the nest. In case (4), depending upon the details of the situation, we may or may not intend A to infer that the pebbles really are a message. Thus different presuppositions are made in different cases.

It is case (3) whose analysis forces us to recognize a new type of referential strategy. If we interpret example (3) as a direct report, we would have the condition that S believes that 'the bird in the nest' describes what Percy is looking at. But this is not the case; S knows that the bird and nest are on separate cards. However, if we interpret example (3) as a subjective report, we would have the condition that S intends A to infer that Percy believes that 'the bird in the nest' actually describes what he is looking at. This is not the case either; Percy need not be deceived that the bird and nest are actually pictured together. Thus we need to interpret this case as involving a new type of strategy. The new form of strategy is one where S refers to
x by a designator believed (either by himself or another person) to fit the object by virtue of how it appears. This is opposed to referring to it according to how it is believed to be. Until now we have considered only the latter kind of strategy.

The utility of this understanding of the referential strategy is that it allows us to comprehend the logic of reports where the speaker refers to what is seen as it appears and yet does not legitimize inferences based on the assumption that the characterization is factually correct. This applies to cases of illusion such as case (3), or the following case. S reports: "P sees the tall person on the right", where in fact the person on the right is medium height (the same height as the person on the left), but they are standing in an oddly shaped room which makes the one on the right appear tall. The designator 'the tall person on the right' might be used without the implication that either S or P believes that it is true of the actual situation; merely that the designator applies in virtue of how the situation appears to P. 5

Cases (1) and (2) above do not require this special type of strategy for their interpretation. Typically, "by definition" one might almost say, things appear to people as they are in fact. Thus, if the speaker wants to imply that the knife does not appear to Lady Macbeth as a knife, then
he would have to say so or allow the context to carry that implication. Case (2) does not require the new strategy because the knife appears to her how it is. If the knife she hallucinates can be identified with the actual knife (a case of "vivid" recollection), then what differentiates this case from veridical seeing is the absence of normal causal conditions for seeing actual things. If the knife is just a figment of her imagination (it is quite different from any actual knife), then how it appears to her defines how it is. Thus we do not need to invoke a distinction between appearances and reality.

This brief account indicates how complicated the presuppositions of a report of seeing may be. Before drawing inferences from S's report we must establish whether S is referring according to how it appears (to S or to P depending on whether the strategy is direct or indirect) or according to how it is believed to be (by S or by P, again depending on whether the strategy is direct or indirect). Furthermore, we must consider whether the causal conditions for seeing are assumed to be normal or otherwise.

This approach potentially simplifies the logic of perceptual reports, which are standardly described by introducing distinctions of sense in the uses of perceptual verbs. For example, reports containing 'see' in one sense are taken to support inferences based upon the truth of the
characterization of the object, whereas reports containing 'see' in a second sense do not. The two main difficulties with this approach are that (1) verb complements of 'see' in the second sense are given no clear logical role, and (2) it is impossible to establish any semantic connection between the two senses, whereas there is no intuitive ambiguity in English. The agent-semantic approach sketched suffers from neither of these drawbacks.

In this work I have undertaken to present a theory of reference based upon the work of Grice and Strawson among others and to discuss within this framework some of the controversial issues which arise in the theory of reference. In this section I have indicated how the theory may have relevance for wider epistemological problems. Of course, there is still room for further examination of the foundations of the whole approach and for defending, what will remain for some, an eccentric use of 'refer'. If my discussion of the controversial issues has been at all successful we can conclude that such further research would be worth undertaking.

Notes
1. E.g. A. Orenstein, Existence and the Particular Quantifier, T. Parsons Nonexistent Objects, and R. Routley Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond.

3. For discussion of the identity of non-existent items see the works cited in note (1).

4. This example is borrowed from G.E.M. Anscombe "The Intentionality of Sensation".

5. The situation may appear different to different people:

   It has been reported that wives may not see their husbands as distorted by the [Ames Distorted Room] - they see their husbands as normal, and the room its true queer shape.

   R.L. Gregory *Eye and Brain*, p. 177.

6. See R. Chisholm *Perceiving: a Philosophical Study*, and D. Odegaard "Anscombe, Sensation and Intentional Objects". Also compare the discussion of Quine's example 'The commissioner is looking for the chairman of the hospital board' in section 5.2.
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Abbreviations:-

J.P. Journal of Philosophy
P.R. Philosophical Review
P.S. Philosophical Studies
B.B. Basil Blackwell
D.R. D. Reidel Publishing Company
R.K.P. Routledge, and Kegan Paul Ltd.
U.P. University Press, or University of - - - Press


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