Case Study of a Certification Campaign: Attempt at Unionization Among Brock University Faculty in 1983-84
CASE STUDY OF A CERTIFICATION CAMPAIGN: ATTEMPT AT UNIONIZATION AMONG BROCK UNIVERSITY FACULTY IN 1983-84

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ABSTRACT

This research is a case study of a certification drive that took place at Brock University. The study views the "certification campaign" as the critical factor in the rejection of unionization among Brock University faculty in the 1983-84 academic year.

Two factors led the researcher to examine the role of the certification campaign in the rejection of unionization at Brock University: First, the same reasons that led faculty elsewhere to unionize were also the reasons underlying the attempt at unionization among Brock University faculty. These were the unsatisfactory grievance procedures, anti-administration sentiments and unsatisfactory salary settlements; Second, Brock University exhibited the same characteristics of those institutions where faculty often adopted collective bargaining. That is, Brock University was one of the young, recently established, growing universities.

Seventeen faculty members were interviewed to assess two aspects of the certification campaign: a) how the arguments in favour of certification were received; b) how the campaign leadership was perceived. Axelrod (1982) maintains that all successful unionization campaigns appealed to their constituency both in terms of the arguments that they presented and also through their
leadership. The interview data indicate that the arguments presented by the campaign leaders in favour of certification were not supported by faculty members, including those faculty in favour of unionization. The campaign leadership, on the other hand, did not have a favourable standing among those faculty who opposed collective bargaining in 1983-84. The campaigners were described as less mature in terms of their age and service in the university; they were perceived as political ideologues and mainly concerned with the power structures within the university.
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I owe special thanks to two professors at Brock University who loaned me their files on the certification drive. Without this information it would have been impossible to write this thesis. Also, many thanks to those professors who contributed to the writing of this thesis by agreeing to be interviewed. These interviews were a delightful experience, and it reinforced my belief that academics are, indeed, a very special breed of people. Like many students, until I undertook the writing of this thesis, I was unaware that as well as the stress imposed upon them by the very nature of their occupation, my professors also
had to work under less than ideal conditions. This saddened and also angered me, because to me they are the dedicated representatives of a uniquely human quality, that is, the desire to know, to understand and to better the world in which we live.

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INTRODUCTION

Beginning in the 1970s with cutbacks in funding, universities began to experience chronic underfunding. They were, in turn, forced to down-size their operations. This created unfavourable working conditions for academics. First the academic job market deteriorated; in order to cut their expenses, universities began to cease filling vacated tenure-track positions; as well they started to rely increasingly upon part-time academics and also created provisions that made the laying off of tenured faculty possible. Second, faculty salaries deteriorated and quite often university administrations rejected out of hand faculty salary briefs. Thirdly faculty participation in university governance deteriorated since university administrations frequently undermined academic bodies, i.e Senate, Faculty Council etc. The majority of university faculty responded to these conditions by unionization.

By the mid-1980s the faculty in more than 60% of Canadian universities adopted collective bargaining. Research on faculty unionization indicates that faculty in unionized institutions often chose collective bargaining as a response to the arbitrariness of their administrations, as a solution to unsatisfactory grievance procedures and unsatisfactory salary settlements. Also, unionization
occurred more often in young and growing universities that were more likely to experience the impact of the transition from expansion to contraction. Brock University was one of these young universities in 1983-84 when the attempt at unionization took place.

Chapter one examines the development of the conditions that prompted faculty interest in unionization in Canada. It also looks at how these developments transformed the conditions under which academics carry out their work.

Chapter two is a discussion of the extent of faculty unionization, the conditions under which faculty interest in unionization translated into actual unionization, reasons for faculty opposition to unionization, research findings on faculty attitudes toward unionization and the characteristics of the institutions where unionization took place. Also discussed in this chapter are the conditions surrounding the attempt at unionization at Brock University.

Chapter three contains a discussion of the research method used in this study. This chapter also includes a discussion of the interview questions.

Chapter four is the analysis of the certification campaign. It first lays out the conditions for a successful certification campaign, and then examines: a) the campaigners' arguments in favour of certification and how
they were received by the faculty I interviewed, and b) the way in which the campaign leadership was perceived, especially by faculty who opposed unionization at Brock University.

The conclusion section of this thesis is a discussion of the main findings of this research along with possible directions for future research on faculty unionization.
CHAPTER ONE

The Underfunding of Universities as the Major Underlying Cause for Faculty Unionization

The underfunding of universities, which began during the early 1970s as a result of a transition in Canada's economic policy, created the conditions for faculty interest in unionization. This transition represented a shift in emphasis from Keynesian economic policy, which had encouraged the infusion of state funds into the country's economy, and in turn had aided in the growth of universities, to a neo-conservative economic policy that favoured the curtailment of social spending and forced universities to down-size their operations. This transition created different conditions under which academics carried on their work. This chapter examines the changes in the following areas, which created favourable conditions for faculty interest in unionization: a) Faculty salaries; b) The academic job market; c) University administration and academic work.
Government Underfunding

The underfunding of Canadian universities began during the early 1970s, a period that corresponded to a crisis in the country's economy (Axelrod, 1982; Buchbinder and Newson, 1988). The crisis began in the late 1960s and reached full intensity in 1974 (Weltmeyer, 1987:94-5).

The Canadian state, like others after the Great Depression of the 1930s, relied on Keynesian economics to stimulate the country's economy and to fight unemployment (ibid.). This involved the "massive infusion of state funds" into the economy, and it worked during the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s (ibid). During this period universities were also perceived as a strategy for economic growth, and the number of universities in Ontario, for example, tripled (Buchbinder & Newson, 1988:12). Public pressures "formerly undreamed of have come to bear on universities already in existence" and have compelled "the founding of new ones" (Pergy in Whalley, 1964:39). The 1960s were the expansion period of universities. As well, Buchbinder and Newson (1988:12) argue that "with some justification, during this period, a broadly based public consensus was forged not on the objectives but on the benefits of higher education to society as a whole." Axelrod, on the other hand, maintains that the "Conservative government's policy of expansion was
based principally on the desire to provide more highly qualified labour for corporate expansion" (ibid.).

Government spending in the 1960s and early 1970s based on Keynesian Economics resulted in an "enormous deficit", followed by tax levies and inflation (Weltmeyer, 1987:95). Unemployment increased and progressed throughout the system (ibid.). Governments curtailed "social spending in favour of catering to corporate needs" (Buchbinder & Newson, 1988:14). Thus, Keynesian economics were replaced by neo-conservative supply-side policies (ibid.).

Universities, according to Axelrod, were hit the worst of all publicly-funded institutions from government cuts on spending (Axelrod, 1982:180). In Ontario, for example, between 1970/71 and 1979/80, grants per university student fell by 13.1 percent; between 1972/73 and 1979/80 the universities' share of "total provincial expenditures declined between 12 and 15 percent" (ibid.). The support that the Ontario government provided its universities during this period was much lower than the other provinces. According to Axelrod, between 1974/75 and 1980/81, Ontario moved from being seventh among provinces to being tenth in terms of grants per full-time student; on the other hand, during the same time, argues Axelrod, the other provinces increased their operating grants at a rate of about 65 percent greater than Ontario (Axelrod, 1982:182).
The 1970s were the beginning of what is referred to as the contraction period of universities; that is, "an organizational capacity to cut programmes, reduce staff and curtail services" was required from the universities (Buchbinder & Newson, 1988:14-5). The underfunding of universities, thus the necessity for their contraction, has created the following conditions for university faculty: a) depressed salaries and a reduction in faculty complements; b) a poor academic job market, threat of lay-offs, attack on tenure; c) the ascendancy of university administration and changes in academic work. Each will be discussed in turn.

a) Faculty Salaries

The emphasis on university expansion during the 1960s created a favourable condition for the improvement of faculty salaries. Prior to this, between 1939 and 1956, according to Professor V.C Fowke's study presented to the Special Universities Conference in Ottawa (November 1956), teachers failed to share in the gains of the rest of the community (cited in Woodside, 1958:132). The raises they received during this time, according to Fowke's study, "barely compensated for the rise in the consumer price index"(ibid.).

Another study made by the National Research Council (1956) indicated that Ph.D scientists whose income was four
to five times that of a factory worker in 1930, "averaged only 1.93 times as much in 1955" (cited in Woodside, 1958:135). The same study also shows that Canadian professional workers, "taken together", improved their real earnings only 38 percent between 1911-51, while the improvement for wage earners was 250 percent (ibid). In 1958 Woodside pointed out that pipe-fitters in the Canadian steel industry were better paid than assistant professors; moreover, "... the industry is offering new Ph.D.'s twice as much as they can receive by joining a university staff, and attractive working conditions and fringe benefits as well " (Woodside, 1958:130).

The situation for university faculty, as Woodside's observation suggests, was bound to change. Universities suddenly found themselves not only in competition with private industry, but also with each other for qualified staff. Canadian universities also had to compete with American universities to keep their best professors. According to Woodside, there were no fewer than 25 American bids for senior members at the University of Toronto in the academic year of 1955-56: "... one of the University's best classicists was hired away at double the salary he received in Toronto" (Woodside, 1958:134). An entire staff in Education at the University of Manitoba was hired away by
the University of British Columbia, to which President Saunderson of the University of Manitoba "limited his comment to a comparison of the salary scale at Manitoba with that of other Canadian universities" (ibid.).

Universities' response to this competition was to improve the salaries of their staff. For example, on the advice of the Gordon Commission, the University of Toronto, in 1957, announced that it was making a raise of 50 percent in starting salary of full-time professors and only "slightly less for lower ranks to be accomplished in three annual steps" (Woodside, 1958:132). The improvement of faculty salaries corresponded to the expansion period of universities, to a favourable economic climate, and to a favourable job market; however, this improvement would not last.

Beginning in the late 1960s and early 1970s, universities and their staff came under attack. Public attitudes toward universities were becoming hostile. In 1969, the once Principal of Queens University wrote: "...the public eye has fixed on the universities as never before, and it has been a severely critical eye, looking for weaknesses and deficiencies..." and he continued: "Members of the public ask, why are universities being given so much public money, raising my taxes and crowding the government services I favour ...?" (Corry 1969:17). Public hostility
toward universities also extended to the professors, according to Bissel (1971:25): "Now the professors are under fire for downgrading their teaching duties, the tradition of academic tenure is called into question, expansion of university libraries is attacked, and research, especially fundamental research, is stigmatized as a wasteful luxury that impinges on the main job of teaching."

The improvements made to faculty salaries during the 1960s began to erode during the 1970s and throughout the 1980s. A 1982 Canadian Association of University Teachers (CAUT) brief submitted to the Parliamentary Task Force on Federal Provincial Fiscal Arrangements reported that "faculty salaries dropped 15% in real purchasing power during the 1970s, which was between 5 and 10 percent greater than the Canadian average of this period" (in Brock University Faculty Association [BUFA] Newsletter September, 1983). The loss in purchasing power in terms of floor salaries, from 1971-72 to 1983-84, for all Ontario universities and for the major ranks, according to McAdie, was 22.5 percent for the rank of associate professor; and 21.2 percent for the rank of assistant professor (McAdie in Higher Education Group, 1985:301). McAdie argues that the governments' implicit control over faculty salary levels has been great (in Higher Education Group, 1988:142). In 1975 the federal government introduced the "Anti-Inflation Act"
eliminating salary increases from 1976 to 1978 (ibid.). Moreover, in 1982 the provincial government introduced "Wage Controls" (Bill 179) that limited salary increases for 1983-84 (ibid.).

Not every member of the public sector was affected by the government's conservative monetary policy. While Ontario faculty salaries were controlled by the Inflation Restraint Act, the earnings of physicians were not subject to the same control. The following is an excerpt from the minutes of "The Standing Committee on Social Development, Bill 42, Minister of Colleges and Universities Amendment Act, September 7, 1983 (afternoon sitting)." The dialogue is between the Minister of Colleges and Universities, Hon. B.M. Stephenson, and Dr. W. Jones, President of the Ontario Confederation of University Faculty Associations:

Dr. Jones: (OCUFA, President): Let me put it like this. My salary is currently controlled by the Inflation Restraint Act. The salaries of physicians are not controlled.

Hon. Miss Stephenson (Minister of Colleges and University Affairs): I am aware of that...

Dr. Jones: (OCUFA, President): That seems to represent a decision on the part of the government of Ontario to deal differently with members of the public sector.

The life-time earnings of an academic by 1982, according to D.C. Savage of CAUT, was similar to many other callings such as school teachers and carpenters (CAUT,
Special Edition, 1982). The fact that faculty salaries had suffered seriously has generally been admitted, according to McAdie (in *Higher Education Group*, 1985:302). However, university administrators, while not denying it, maintained that to restore faculty salaries would have affected the rest of the budget and this they could not allow (ibid.). Certainly, the poor academic job market did not give much bargaining power to faculty regarding their salaries.

b) Poor Academic Job Market, threat of lay offs, attack on tenure

The early 1960s presented a favourable academic job market. This was due to the expansion of universities accompanied by generous government funding, increased student enrollment and competition between universities for academics. Beginning with the 1970s, with government's changing economic policy that favoured cutbacks on social spending, the academic job market began to deteriorate. Under budgetary cutbacks and decreased funding universities found themselves forced to: a) increasingly rely upon part-time academic work and; b) eliminate programmes and full time academic positions, including making provisions for the possible lay-off of faculty with tenure.

The number of Ph.D graduates not finding academic posts was already noticeable beginning in the 1970s (Axelrod, 1982:150). A study conducted by the Graduate
Students Union at the University of Toronto found that less than half of its 158 Ph.D's looking for teaching positions found one at a university (ibid.). By the 1980s the situation had worsened. In 1982, D.C. Savage of CAUT warned that it was becoming more and more difficult to recruit new blood into the academic community: "...there are so few jobs and when there are jobs the starting salaries are so low that it is difficult to recruit the best" (CAUT special edition, March, 1982 pp. 24-31). According to an address delivered by D.Farr and E.S Spence in 1982 to the Canadian Society for the Study of Higher Education, there was a "substantial number of highly qualified individuals who under different job market conditions would have obtained full-time university employment." However, these individuals were "scrambling to simulate full-time employment from part time assignments, often in more than one faculty and sometimes more than one institution" (1982, May 30, pp.5-6).

By the late 1980s, as observed by Buchbinder and Newson (1988), this situation appeared to have changed very little. Ph.D graduates who managed to obtain teaching positions still found themselves in a vulnerable position: they had neither financial nor job security; they were hired to carry on teaching duties; their contracts began and ended with the courses they taught; their salaries were a fraction
of those with full time appointments; they were not paid benefits, with the exception of vacation pay, even if they had worked at the institution for long periods at a time (Buchbinder & Newson, 1988:25).

Government cutbacks of university funding received warm support from corporate leaders. One corporate executive from the food industry rationalized this support by saying, "We have a growing feeling that the universities have been extravagant in both over-building and keeping excess staff" (Axelrod, 1982:182). Corporate leaders, according to Axelrod, appear to believe that the financial squeeze on Canadian universities was no particular evil if "it forced them to streamline their operations, eliminate redundant faculty, and drop programs that produced surplus graduates, then so much the better. With fewer dollars, universities might well produce more value for each scholar" (ibid.). This indeed became the trend of the 1980s.

In 1981, "The Report of the Committee on the Future Role of Universities in Ontario" urged universities to make provisions for reducing faculty and staff. It read:

Continued fiscal restraint will require reductions in faculty and staff, including those with tenure. Governing bodies must ensure that appropriate compensation and redundancy policies are in place, and that the costs entailed are provided for (cited in OUFACTS, April 5, 1982).

At Queen's University, for example, mention of a redundancy policy came as early as 1972, in the report of
the "Task Force on the Implications of Constant Student Enrollment During the Period of 1975-80." The report recommended that "...a tenure policy review be made that should pay particular attention to redundancy and economic necessity" (ibid.). Redundancy may be caused "by a decrease in student enrollment in a program, or by the withdrawal of certain courses or programs in order to initiate new ones" (ibid.). Economic necessity, on the other hand, is defined as "a choice between existing programs and decisions to create new programs" (ibid.).

University cutbacks in faculty and staff, by way of redundancy and economic necessity policies, create two dilemmas that challenge university tradition. The first one is the threat this poses to disciplines that are considered the core of university education such as humanities; the second one presents a threat to academic freedom which is guaranteed through the tenure system. The criteria to be used in order to determine which program should be eliminated could best be illustrated through the example of the plan developed by the Office of Institutional Management at the University of Houston (the Houston Plan) that Dr. Jones presented during the Meeting of "The Standing Committee on Social Development, Bill 42, Minister of Colleges and Universities Amendment Act", September 7, 1983:

What the Houston Plan does essentially is look at the total offerings of an institution and say:
"which ones contribute to the mission statement"---I use their phrase -- "of the university? Let us rate them on an approximation to this mission statement. Let us rate"--as you can imagine, the department of petroleum engineering--[sic] "Let us rate this pretty high and let us rate"--now I have to be very careful which one I pick-- "Sanskrit studies as some distance from the mission. [sic] "Let us now look at the dimension of how much each part contributes to the fiscal balance of this institution." In other words, "Let us do a bit of profit centre thinking," rather like the chartered banks do.

And the implications of this, according to Dr Jones, are:

As soon as you begin to try any of these exercises, almost a logical problem creeps in. What have you got other than the numbers? The numbers you have are related to some kind of determination of fiscal goals for the institution; so you immediately get a steering effect of ratings. It is very difficult, for instance, for a university administration to say "We have got to have a philosophy department," when there is a whole stack of numbers that say, "If you treat philosophy in isolation and say what is its contribution to fiscal balance you cannot show it" [sic] (ibid.).

In 1982 David Dodge, Assistant Deputy Minister of Employment and Immigration Canada, responsible for the Labour Market Report in the 1980s, presented a paper called "Employment Training, Government Perspective" at the Canadian Society for the Study of Higher Education. This report suggests that the criteria to be used for eliminating programmes are current market needs. Dodge argued that "...given that labour market needs are moving increasingly toward high technology areas of engineering, science, communications, management, accounting and computer
programming, public post-secondary education expenditure must follow suit, with a consequent shrinkage in other areas" (cited in BUFA 1982 October). Here the "shrinkage" of expenditure in "other areas" clearly means the marginalization of Humanities and the Social Sciences. According to the Task Force Report on the Advancement of Social Science Research in Canada in the 1980s, Federal Government expenditure on Social Sciences and Humanities research was already "less than one tenth of their expenditure on research in the natural sciences" (in BUFA June 1983). The possible cost of such a move was predicted by the Rt. Hon. Vincent Massey. When laying the cornerstone of a new Arts building at the University of Ottawa, he came out "firmly against placing the arts and technical faculties in separate compartments":

We cannot leave the development of atomic forces to technocrats who ignore the principles which underlie human relations. Such men would be as dangerous as statesmen who were ignorant of the existence of atomic energy. The world needs philosophic scientists and scientific philosophers. Conflict between science and the humanities is surely a meaningless strife. If true to itself science must confer many of the blessings which the humanities themselves transmit to those who follow them (Cited in Woodside 1956:45; from University of Ottawa Calendar, 1956-57).

The policies of economic necessity and redundancy, perhaps indirectly, make tenure uncertain and the result is that academic freedom too becomes uncertain. As one faculty
member (from Queen's University) put it: "One could not be certain that one's dismissal came for the reasons alleged; few administrators attack freedom directly and the argument of redundancy could provide an excellent oblique angle from which to launch such an assault" (OUFACTS, April 5, 1982). Two examples from recent years would perhaps suffice to illustrate the fragility of academic freedom. One case involved, in the 1970s, the awarding of a research fellowship by the academic panel of the Canada Council to a university lecturer, "who had been active in student protests and had been alleged to have Marxist views" (Hurtubise & Rowat, 1970:76). It appears that the fear of criticism by members of Parliament caused his award, which otherwise was a routine one, "to be reviewed by the whole council" (ibid.). However, later a number of MP's "did criticize the award, thus implying that a scholar's political views should be considered in awarding research grants" (ibid.).

A second example is the case of David Mandel, an academic in McGill University's Political Science Department in 1979-80. He was recommended by the Political Science Department Appointments Committee to a tenure-track position; he was the only Canadian among preferred candidates. However, he did not get the tenure-track position, nor was he offered an explanation. An
investigation of his case revealed that Mandel was perceived by some of his colleagues in the department as a "left wing socialist with strong Trotskyist leanings"; or engaged in "marxist scholarship in portraying the Russian Revolution in ways let's say a pluralist wouldn't," or again, "he was a person critical of Israeli policy" (Fenickel & Mandel, 1987:88). Regarding the denial of a tenure-track position to Mandel, Samuel Freedman's comment illustrates how fragile academic freedom is, even under the tenure system:

There are often ideological or scientific differences within a department... There could be pressure from within the department, there can be pressure from deans, or even, I regret to say it, university administrations. That's a conceivable matter. There can be pressure from the business community or sources of private funding of the university (in Fenickel & Mandel, 1987:93).

Tenure and consequently academic freedom could be placed within two competing views of the university. In one view, the university's aim must be "the search for knowledge...not merely actual discovery, not merely even the attempt to discover, but the creation and cultivation of the spirit of discovery" (Truscot, 1951: 69). Consistent with this, the university is "the conscience of society in the sense of establishing some means whereby truth is arrived at and value judgments made"(Katz, 1956:179). According to this vision, the university is the centre of "international contacts free from the urgency and prejudices of political manoeuvre" (Gilmour, 1954:20). Such a university needs a
condition of autonomy, meaning not only to determine its own role in the society that it serves, but also "to dispose of the resources at its command as it sees fit" (Corry, 1969:41). The professors and students, in this type of a university, would pursue their line of inquiry "without any political or social pressure" (Hurtubise & Rowat, 1970:67). More importantly, in such an institution academics are professionals and together form a "community of scholars."

The other vision of the university is as an institution whose function is to meet the immediate needs of a society, defined by market forces and the state. In this context, tenure represents job security against the vagaries of market forces, or changing needs. And academics are simply employees of the individual universities.

The reasons for making an effort to approximate the former vision of the university, through the protection of tenure, need to be stressed. Within the context of the university defined as the "conscience of society," tenure is, according to Katz, critical for four reasons: 1) It restricts the major principle of economic relations in the market place, i.e. free wage labour; 2) It lessens the translation of faculty into commodities whose value is solely determined by their current market price; 3) it protects academic freedom; and 4) it permits self-criticism, that is, criticism of societal institutions (Katz, 1986:20).
Canadian universities, at least until the late seventies, appeared to have found a happy medium between these two visions of university -- i.e. where the quest for knowledge and social criticism is balanced with the meeting of society's immediate needs. This is evidenced both by public-supported universities founded with a particular philosophy underlying their curriculum, and by the relative autonomy enjoyed by the universities until at least the mid sixties. Even as early as 1860, Daniel Wilson, a University of Toronto professor of history and English literature, addressed this question before a select Committee of the Ontario Legislature:

...the one aim of the Senate, and of the College Council, has been to devise a system of study whereby the youth of this Province may acquire those higher branches of education best calculated to fit them for becoming intelligent and useful members of community. In Canada, at least, education must be practical. It may be all very well for certain Oxford men, and their undiscriminating admirers, to maintain that the highest aim of a perfect college training consists in the mastery of classical learning, but the scholarship of Oxford, if forced without restriction or choice upon the youth of Canada, would in most cases prove of comparatively little practical avail... The English Universities, under their old rigid system, turned out a class of educated men, with whom too frequently the people found little sympathy; but the Scottish University system, by the very laxness which left the student's choice of studies so much to himself as practically to amount to a comprehensive system of options, has made an educated people; and the latter I conceive is what Canada desires (cited in Harris, 1967:67).
Numerous authors writing on the development of post-secondary education in Canada maintain that Canadian universities enjoyed relative autonomy until at least the late 60s. Institutional autonomy is defined as "the relative ability of the university's governing body to run the university without any outside controls" (Hurtubise & Rowat, 1970:67). R.S. Harris, for example, argues that "The most remarkable characteristic of the Ontario system of higher education is that it has been largely fashioned by the universities themselves" (1967:xii). The former principal of Queen's University, J.A. Corry, also maintains that in Canada teachers and scholars "insisted for the most part successfully ...that they should be free to determine the content of their teaching and research in the fields assigned to them" (1969:41). All government policies vis-a-vis universities appear to have been developed during the expansion period of universities (Sheffield, 1978:126). This period also corresponds to open-ended funding of universities by the government. Until the 1950s, for example, there was no formal office dealing with universities in Ontario (Sheffield, 1978:106-7). It appears that the government's interest in the affairs of universities, according to Sheffield, had been strengthened "particularly by the creation, in 1964, of the Department of University Affairs" (ibid). Formerly government-university
relations were mediated through the Department of Education (ibid.).

The change in government policy vis-a-vis universities corresponds to a shift to neo-conservative economic policies. Thus, the Dodge Report is not only indicative of the change in the nature of government involvement in post-secondary education, but is also indicative of a shift away from the 'happy medium.' That is, "university" no longer denotes a "Community of Scholars" but rather, as P. Smith points out, it denotes a "Physical Plant" (in Whalley, 1964:51). This is because, Smith maintains, the values and assumptions of the business world have reached into universities; this explains the notion that the physical university (i.e. the grounds and buildings) constitutes a 'plant', since the university could then be considered akin to the "physical establishment of an industrial concern"(ibid). There is of course no harm in the mere name, writes Smith:

...but nothing could be more stultifying to the enquiring mind than the logical consequence of this notion; for if a university is a 'plant', then the teachers are 'hands', and the students are presumably 'the goods in process', or something of the kind (ibid.).

Indeed, the whole notion of "more scholar per dollar", maintained by the politicians and corporate leaders lends support to Smith's argument. The notion that the university is merely a 'physical plant' also finds
expression in practices where one can dispose of the 'redundant hands' when the need arises, or can take steps to get the 'hands' as cheap as possible.

c) The Ascendancy of the University Administration and Changes in Academic Work

The expansion of higher education in the 1960s resulted in the growth of university administration. The contraction of universities on the other hand corresponds to the ascendancy of university administration and the following changes in academic work: a) diversification of the work force; b) separation of functions; c) attack on tenure (Buchbinder & Newson, 1988:25).

The expansion of universities during the 1960s meant increasing bureaucracy. As a result, according to the Dahl-Berdahl Report on university government (1966), "...poor communication among presidents, boards, and university senates surfaced"; this in turn "produced tension, and mistrust in the planning and decision making" (Axelrod, 1982:205). The expansion of universities required academic leaders, presidents and deans, in order to manage large budgets, increased staff and students (Buchbinder & Newson, 1988:16). Despite the increase in the size of the administration, Buchbinder and Newson maintain that it retained its academic character and collegial governance structure (ibid.).
The major change in university governance, thus the change in its academic character, came about when universities found themselves obliged to down-size (ibid.). This was a major change mainly because, according to Buchbinder and Newson, "universities are organizationally equipped for expansion not contraction" (ibid.). Hence, contraction required more management "in order to adjust to budgetary cutbacks" (ibid.). Consequently, administrators, argue the authors, acquired a place "of their own" in the university governing structure (ibid.). Formerly, when universities consisted of small departments, an academic also carried on administrative duties beside his/her research and teaching. This meant a form of participation in the university governance. The expansion of universities, thus the increased need for more management, resulted in the separation of administrative functions from academic functions. Many administrators, according to the authors, are no longer academics and consider themselves professional managers "belonging to associations specializing in university administration" (Buchbinder & Newson, 1988:16-17).

The consequence of the ascendancy of "managers", those whose job is administration only, argue Buchbinder and Newson, is that even academics with full-time or partial administrative duties are directed by management, whereas
this was formerly done by academic bodies, i.e. senates, faculty councils, and college committees (Buchbinder & Newson, 1988:17). The tasks of deans and principals also appear to have changed. They no longer "determine the academic direction of university since they occupy a position below management" (ibid.). In this case the deans and principals are seen as part of management by the average faculty (ibid.).

Buchbinder & Newson (1988:42) attribute the expansion and differentiation of university administration to changes in government policies that "limited both the authority of administration and the autonomy of the institution, particularly in funding and program development." They argue that government policies provided "a justification" for "the expansion and centralization of administrations" (ibid.). Thus administrators have directed their powers "internally, towards controlling academics" (ibid.). This observation has been affirmed by the delegates who attended the CAUT Council Meeting in Ottawa during 1982. Delegates testified to the intensification of the transformation of the faculty "into highly trained workers" by university administrators:

Consultation with faculty, collegiality in the sense of shared responsibility, seems to be replaced by the arbitrary power and the concomitant denigration of the professoriate to the status of clerks who simply do as they are told (M.Husain in BUFA October, 1982).
The same report also notes the increasing number of cases of administrative disregard for "due process and rights of faculty to 'fairness' and 'justice'."

The ascendancy of the administration and the consequent decrease in the participation of academics in the governing structure of their institution, I will argue, cannot be explained solely either by the expansion of universities, as Axelrod (1982) does, or by the contraction of universities after an expansion period, as Buchbinder and Newson (1988) maintain. The assumption behind both these arguments is that, prior to the expansion period, academics fully participated in the governance of their institution. Even if we accept this assumption, it would be difficult to explain why what was formerly "administration" turned into "management," and as well, what was formerly "academic" turned into "skilled worker." For this transition to occur, the institution must already have the necessary basis in its governing structure to transform itself into a business organization.

In Germany, for example, university professors are civil servants, and the finances of every German university are controlled by a "senior official of the government called a Kurator who lives in the university offices" (Hurtubise & Rowat, 1970:68). While they do have academic committees, senates, and rectors, "...financial power is
firmly in the hands of the government whose representative has to be consulted and satisfied throughout the year" (ibid.). Yet, according to Hurtubise and Rowat, every German university and its staff preserve "a degree of academic freedom and individual autonomy which is more absolute" than for universities in England (ibid.). Moreover, every professor "...reigns supreme in his own department and cannot be coerced by anybody. He is appointed for life and he can study and lecture about any subjects in which he is interested whether it is of the slightest importance to his students or not" (ibid.). The German professor in this case may be a civil servant, but he is still a professional, not a "skilled worker."

The seed of the transformation of university administration into "management" -- the adoption by the universities of a business model of organization -- should be sought in the peculiarities of the North American university governance system when it was first founded, and the place that the academics occupied within it.

In North American university governing structures, the highest body of authority is the Board of Governors. The Board of Governors was originally composed strictly of non-academic individuals who were either businessmen or professionals, with or without any academic background.
Gilmour, in 1954, points out how this is a peculiarity of the universities on this continent:

That we have, as in the United States but to an extent unknown elsewhere in the Commonwealth, what is called lay control, is an important consideration. Lay control, in this sense, means that universities are not governed by academic persons, whether fellows or professors, or by university courts in which academic persons have a strong voice, but by boards of non-academic persons...the only person involved in management being the president, principal, or rector (Gilmour. 1954:23).

The role of academics under the ultimate authority of the Board of Governors is to exercise influence only. Appointments, promotions, and the allocation of funds are "legally and officially made at the pleasure of the Board of Governors" (Reid in Whalley, 1964:9). In most cases, according to Whalley, even the academic decisions are "specifically within the competence of the board" (ibid, 156). For example, Reid points out that a Canadian professor of economics "may be asked to advise the government about the nation's financial policy" but "he must not have a voice in determining the financial policy of his own university," or a professor of political science "may be asked by the United Nations to help the new African states establish democratic machinery, but he must never be permitted to apply his knowledge to the constitutional problems of his own institution" (Reid in Whalley, 1964:9).

A visitor from the University of Edinburgh in 1957 was also
surprised at the university governance structure in Canada: "Having found in the Canadian University so much to admire, so much indeed to envy -- I was all the more disturbed to find that the elements of academic participation in the supreme government of universities was practically non-existent" (cited by Reid in Whalley, 1964:24).

In British universities the idea of placing the ultimate authority in the hands of an outside authority, argues Reid, was never accepted (in Whalley, 1964:8). What is accepted as normal is that: "...the academic staff have de facto control of the following functions: 1) the admission and examination of students; 2) the curricula for the courses to study; 3) the appointment and tenure of academic staff; and 4) the allocation of income among the different categories of expenditures... (ibid.).

This difference in the governance structure of North American universities, according to Rowat is: in North America the assumption has always been that "...a university is much the same as a business enterprise and should therefore be organized and run like a business" (in Whalley, 1964:73). To demonstrate how universities are organized according to a business model, Morton points to the office of the president (in Whalley, 1964:93). He argues that this office is not in the ancient European tradition, and was created by the Board of Governors who "felt the need of a
man to be their chief executive". Thus, drawing upon their experience in corporations, the board "created the office of president and made it superficially acceptable to university tradition by combining it with the traditional office of Vice-Chancellor" (ibid.). Morton further maintains that since universities are becoming big business, the assumption is that "they must follow the precedents known to the governors of Canadian universities" i.e. business principles (ibid.).

The adoption of the business model for university governance is interpreted by M. Cohen as being based upon the North American mythology of efficiency (in Whalley, 1964:105). That is, "a mythology that idealizes the businessman as the ideal of the self-reliant citizen and concludes that academics could not efficiently administer their own affairs" (ibid.).

There had been successful attempts on the part of American academics, in the 1960s, to partake in the governance of their institution. However, during the same period in Canada seven different institutions had "...formally requested the right to elect representatives of the governing body," without immediate success (Reid in Whalley, 1964:22). And even in the case of success, the governance structure of Canadian universities would remain essentially the same. The Board of Governors, whose members
are appointed by the provincial government, still represents the ultimate authority.

I have argued that the increase of "management" in university governance, and the decreasing role of academics in the running of their institutions, cannot be explained solely by the increase in the size of the administration (Axelrod, 1982), or by an expansion period followed by a contraction period of universities that led to the "centralization of the administration" (Buchbinder & Newson, 1988). The peculiarities of university government in North America, which from the beginning has been based upon a business model, should also be taken into account. An institution whose governing structure is similar to that of a business, during a period of crisis, would respond to this crisis as would a business. Perhaps the events that led faculty to unionize at Carleton University would suffice to illustrate this point. The president of Carleton University, in 1975, announced that "he and the Board of Governors would reserve the ultimate right to determine how lay-offs would occur irrespective of the recommendations of the 'Senate Document of the Release of Teaching Staff in Time of Financial Stringency'" (Axelrod, 1982:209). Yet, the Senate is the highest academic body within the university, and also where faculty participation in university government takes place.
The ascendancy of university administration and government cutbacks on funding also had the effect of creating three major changes in academic work (Buchbinder & Newson, 1988). These changes are: a) diversification of the work force; b) separation of functions; c) the attack on tenure (ibid.).

The diversification of the work-force meant the creation of separate categories of academics each having "distinct terms and conditions of employment" (Buchbinder & Newson, 1988:25). These categories are: "tenure-track academics" who perform teaching, research, and service, who have tenure and a salary in accordance with the position that they occupy; "limited contract academics" who perform teaching, research, and service but do not have tenure; "part-time academics" who are hired for teaching duties only, their contracts beginning and ending at the end of each course they were hired to teach (ibid.).

The practice of hiring part-time academics, according to Buchbinder and Newson (1988), serves to reduce the costs of an institution. Part-time academics not only are paid a fraction of the salaries commanded by full-time academics, they are not eligible for benefits except for vacation pay (25-26). Other alternatives used by the universities for reducing costs are: not to replace vacated tenure-track positions that involve long term commitments;
to rely more on limited-contract academics; and to make provisions for the lay-off of tenured faculty (ibid.).

The separation of functions, i.e. teaching, research, and service, argue Buchbinder and Newson, is not a new phenomenon. It originated in the nineteenth-century development of the research university in Germany (Buchbinder & Newson, 1988:27). While the origin of such separation of functions may have its precedent in nineteenth-century Germany, as the authors point out, the creation of separate categories of academics, the elimination of tenure-track positions and the increasing reliance on part-time and limited-contract academics is related to the business model of management of the universities. What is sought is "efficiency"; that is, more value per dollar spent. P. Smith (in Whalley, 1964:51-2) argues that this is an extension of the managerial revolution, "that phenomenon of twentieth century capitalism", into the universities. According to the author, in one Canadian college an attempt was made to assess "a professor's output by means of a scale based on the number of hours of lecturing" that he did "per week and the number of students lectured to" (ibid.). A board member, who also happened to be an educational administrator at a very high level, maintained in the presence of the
author that "professors in subjects such as humanities ought to be expected to teach for eleven months a year" (ibid.).

**An Overview**

During the 1960s universities received generous government funding and public support that encouraged their expansion. The number of universities and students rapidly increased. For academics this meant a favourable job market, considerable improvement in their salaries, and a change in their work environment. With the increase in the number of students, staff and faculty, the administrative needs of the university also grew. And while formerly academics handled administrative functions along with their teaching and research duties, the rapid expansion of the university brought forth a class of 'managers' whose sole occupation was administration. The effect of this was that academic bodies which formerly ran the institution, i.e. senates and faculty councils, were now subordinated to a largely non-academic administration.

In the 1970s, the rise of conservative monetary economic policy caused severe cuts in university funding. The academic job market and faculty salaries began to deteriorate. Universities, while having formerly adopted only the management practices of the business model, now adopted as well the cost-cutting practices of that model.
They started to rely increasingly upon part time academics, to whom they paid a fraction of the salary, and gave none of the benefits of a full time academic. They also ceased filling vacated tenure-track positions. As well, the notion of tenure itself came under attack. It now became possible for the appointment of a tenured faculty to be terminated if the university found it a financial necessity.

Faculty increasingly responded to these conditions, as will be discussed in the following chapter, by unionizing.
CHAPTER TWO

Why Do Faculty Unionize: the Conditions Surrounding the Certification Attempt at Brock University

Over sixty percent of Canadian universities are unionized. Research findings on faculty unionization indicate that the two major motivating factors for faculty adoption of collective bargaining are the perception of the university administrators as being arbitrary and unfair, and faculty dissatisfaction with salary settlements. However, even in institutions where union certification was successful, it was achieved only by a slight margin. Various sources indicate that Canadian faculty offered strong resistance toward unionization.

This chapter will examine: the extent of the unionization; the circumstances under which faculty adopted collective bargaining; reasons for faculty opposition toward unionization; research findings on faculty attitudes toward unionization and the characteristics of the unionized institutions; and lastly, the conditions that surrounded the attempt at unionization among Brock University faculty, and how Brock University compares with unionized universities.
The Extent of Faculty Unionization

In 1970, L'Association des Ingenieurs Professeurs en Sciences Appliques de Sherbrooke in Quebec, was the first institution in higher education in Canada to adopt collective bargaining. Five years later, by 1975, 60% of all Quebec professors were certified (Axelrod, 1982:204). By 1984 in Canada 36 out of 53 universities (67.9%) had adopted collective bargaining and five other universities (5%) opted for "special plan" arrangements (Shell & Loeb, 1986:539). As of 1988, however, universities without collective bargaining rights in Ontario were; the University of Western Ontario, Queen's, McMaster, Wilfrid Laurier and Brock University (Guttman in Higher Education Group, 1988:120-139).

The adoption of collective bargaining by university faculty, or "faculty unionism," refers "to the replacement of the collegial governance system with one based on the process of collective bargaining for determining wages, promotions, and conditions of employment" (Shell & Loeb, 1986:537-38). In the collegial governance system, faculty negotiate on an individual basis with the administration regarding employment terms, whereas under certification this is done collectively. The parties engaged in this negotiation process are the faculty representatives and the university administration representatives (ibid.). Where an
impasse occurs there are two solutions: one is binding arbitration, the other is a strike by the collective members (ibid.). Collective agreements reached under certification are legally binding and thus, in Ontario for example, enforceable under the Ontario Labour Relations Act. Under "special plan," the faculty still negotiates with the administration collectively. In case of an impasse they have recourse to third party arbitration; however, they cannot strike and they are not under the protection of the Labour Relations Act.

The Labour Relations Act is the statute governing labour relations in Ontario. One of the prime objectives of this act is to promote orderly legal status collective bargaining by regulating some of the following major areas:

1. The definition and formation of a trade union
2. The certification of an union
3. Negotiations towards a contract (collective agreement) between employer and employee
4. Resolution of impasses in negotiations
5. Resolution of grievances during the life of a collective agreement (CAUT Publication).

The adoption of collective bargaining among faculty first started in the United States. However, in both the United States and Canada, the same reasons appear to have led faculty to unionize:
Collective bargaining seems to have appeared in Canadian universities for the same reasons as in the United States, namely the poor academic job market, the erosion of rights and perquisites lacking legal protections, budgetary cutbacks, the increase in size and remoteness of the university administrations and the growth of unionism in the public sector (Buchbinder & Newson in Higher Education Group 1985:223).

Axelrod (1982) identifies two dimensions, global and local, for the unionization of faculty in Canadian Universities. The global dimensions are: the underfunding of universities, poor academic job market, and the growth of unionization in the public sector. Underfunding and the poor academic job market, as discussed in the previous chapter, have an obvious impact upon faculty salaries, and employment conditions.

The growth of unionization in the public sector and the gains associated with it, according to Axelrod, have been one of the factors for faculty interest in unionization. The 1960s were characterized by an increase of unionization among white-collar employees in Canada (Axelrod, 1982:205). Throughout the country, teachers in elementary and secondary schools and also community colleges took advantage of federal and provincial legislation that permitted their organizations to be certified (ibid.). According to Axelrod, as "teachers' salaries and working conditions improved, many university professors looked on with envy and a little anger at the apparent erosion of
their own status" (ibid.). Moreover, the example of doctors, lawyers and engineers who adopted collective bargaining, with whom the professors readily identified themselves, made professors "realize their own vulnerability" (ibid.).

The local dimension for the causes of unionization, according to Axelrod, are the changes in university governance and a growing, younger, more vocal faculty. The bureaucratization of the university, writes Axelrod, led to poor communication among the constituent bodies of academic governance. This in turn created a sense of powerlessness among faculty leading to the increasing adoption of collective bargaining (Axelrod, 1982:206-8).

Buchbinder and Newson (in Higher Education Group, 1985:222) view faculty unionization as an expression of an "intense political struggle currently underway on local university campuses." This struggle is viewed as a result of external political and economic processes, and is reflected within the universities "in contentious relations between various constituent bodies" (faculty versus administration) (ibid.). The struggle is over the definition and control of academic work (ibid.). The academic work process (the organization of the work and how it is carried out) as will be recalled from chapter one, is affected by three major changes caused by the underfunding
of universities and the ascendancy of university administrators. These were the diversification of the work force, the structural separation of teaching, research and service, and attempts to eliminate tenure.

Resistance to Unionization Among Faculty

While over 60 percent of universities are unionized in Canada, researchers of faculty unionization agree upon the fact that Canadian faculty members offered strong resistance to the adoption of collective bargaining in their institutions (Schramm, 1976:46; Ponak & Thompson, 1984:449).

Where collective bargaining was voted on, the vote often occurred "in an atmosphere of relative controversy often with union certification following a slim positive margin" (Shell & Loeb, 1986:538). Faculty that oppose unionization, in general, find an industrial relations model to be inappropriate for an institution like a university. F.R. Scott, for example, maintains that a university is an institution sui generis: "to which there is no exact parallel in our society. It will, however, have some form of government embodied in its legal structure. It cannot be outside the law, though intellectually it is a law unto itself" (in Whalley, 1964:28). Perhaps for this very reason, the attempt to unionize at a given university takes place in an atmosphere of contention. The most frequent
reasons for opposing unionization among faculty appear to be: a) fear of the loss of "collegiality"; b) having to go on strike; c) increased bureaucracy, and legalism as a consequence of unionization; and d) other more specific fears associated with unionization.

Arguments for or against certification, and the controversy arising therefrom, appear to be rooted within the peculiarities of the university as an institution. One such peculiarity, according to Penner (1978-79:73), is that of "collegiality"; collegiality as "a certain employer-employee sharing of responsibilities" coupled "with the more fundamental employer-employee relationship." This presents a problem, according to Penner, since certification under North American Labour Relations law assumes "a sharply delineated interest dichotomy between employers and the employees such that, basically every person in an institution must be one or the other" (ibid.). The difficulty that this creates, notes Penner, is evident in some of the certification applications (ibid.). While a number of administrations sought to exclude chairpersons from the bargaining unit, in others academic team leaders and deans were included in the bargaining unit.

The notion of collegiality as one of the factors that creates opposition to unionization among faculty, is related, according to C.J. Schramm (1976:43), to the
professional self-image that "one is participating in the management of the institution." Those who favour certification argue that collegiality has been eroded, while others who oppose certification maintain, or in Penner's words, "seriously believe that the university still exists as a modern day extension of the medieval community of scholars...some academics supposed that they fully shared in the governance of the university" (Penner, 1978-79:73).

The possibility of a strike as a consequence of unionization is another major anxiety among university faculty. According to D.C. Savage (1978) of CAUT:

In the last resort, certified faculty associations have the right to strike to secure their goals. There has been much debate in the university as to whether this right should be exercised. Some have considered strikes unprofessional or unseemly. Others have suggested that since the university is devoted to reason it would be wrong to employ force rather than reason. (in Penner 1978-79:77)

The faculty fear of strike associated with unionization is a real one. A study comparing faculty attitudes in Canadian universities towards unionization found that faculty members in non-unionized universities perceived a causal relationship between unionization and the necessity of going on strike. The faculty in unionized universities, on the other hand, saw less of a link between unionization and having to go on strike (Schell & Loeb, 1986). However, the same study also found that most faculty
members indicated a strong preference for binding arbitration (ibid.).

Another powerful factor in faculty resistance toward unionization is the fear that it leads to increased bureaucracy, legalism and formality. However, faculty favouring unionization argue that "the university is already bureaucratized and the fundamental legal relationship of the non-administrative academic to the institution was that of an employee to an employer" (Penner, 1978-79:73).

Other fears associated with collective bargaining are: 1) the replacement of "merit" by "seniority"; 2) the possible difficulty of dismissing incompetent faculty; and 3) universities may be bankrupted with excessive salary demands. Whether or not this is the case in unionized universities is not known.

The fear that the adoption of collective bargaining in an institution may lead to "inflexibility" is supported. According to D.O Wells, "there is little doubt that universities have less flexibility in adjusting to fiscal restraint than they had before faculty unionization" (1982:2). This is because, D.C.Savage of CAUT maintains, "...a strong financial exigency clause in a collective agreement makes the situation immeasurably more complex for a government bent upon arbitrary and precipitous cuts in a university's funding." Hence, he points out, the collective
agreement of a certified institution is under the protection of the Labour Relations Act, thus legally enforceable: "a government intent on making large scale cuts, for example, in order to force lay-offs of faculty would have faced the legal and political consequences" of ignoring the Labour Relations Act (October 14, 1983 correspondence with BUFA president).

**Research Findings on Faculty Unionization**

Studies dealing with the causes of faculty unionization indicate that universities where faculty chose certification did so as a response to the managerial structure of their institution because such a structure produced a sense of powerlessness among faculty. Mark Thompson (1976), a commentator on faculty unionization in Canadian universities, maintains that:

No doubt the bitter dismissals at Simon Fraser, United College in Manitoba (now the University of Winnipeg) and at Sir George Williams University in Montreal served to emphasize how uncertain the legal foundation of tenure was. Moreover, it became apparent that tenure was the only form of job security the academics had. But, drawing in part on the experience at the University of Manitoba, I would suggest that the rapid growth of Canadian universities in number and enrollment led almost inevitably to the growth of an employer bureaucracy which, becoming increasingly alienated from the professoriat, developed hard-nosed administrative responses to faculty concerns. In the process such bureaucratic responses shattered the illusions of many academics about collegiality as the guiding ethos of university life (cited in Penner, 1978-79:72).
A survey carried out after a favourable vote for collective bargaining rights at Cincinnati University, for example, indicated that what motivated the faculty was anti-administration sentiment and low salaries (Herman & Skinner, 1976:44-48). The main complaint regarding the administration was "secrecy and concentration of power among senior administration officials; unilateral measures by the administration; top heavy; failure to communicate with faculty" (ibid.).

Ponak and Thompson's (1984) study among Canadian faculty show similar findings. According to their research, the main advantages of collective bargaining perceived by faculty were "in the protection that collective bargaining can provide against arbitrary administrative action and its ability to extract higher salaries" (Ponak and Thompson, 1984:460). Again, Allen & Keavany's study (1981: 583) suggests that faculty who perceived their employment conditions as largely beyond their control were more interested in collective bargaining than those who perceived themselves to be in control. They maintain that union support is a backlash against the administration for failing to establish "the faculty desired link between performance and reward" (1981:587). Thus, they argue: "...rather than being subject to personnel decisions made unilaterally by
the administration, the faculty may be willing to substitute a union-negotiated procedure" (ibid.).

Based upon various research findings, such as those mentioned, it is possible to argue that faculty unionization is initially a response to managerial structure of an institution. If management is going to be able to chill interest in unionization among university faculty, maintain Allen and Keavany, "...pay, promotions and other personnel decisions should be based on merit...further, the procedures for establishing the relationship between merit and outcomes such as pay must be perceived as fair." (1981:587)

Research on faculty attitudes toward unionization indicate that in all types of institutions non-tenured faculty supported collective bargaining more than tenured faculty, and younger faculty more than older faculty. Among the disciplines, major support for collective bargaining came from the faculties of social sciences. Opposition to collective bargaining was registered from faculties of Law and Engineering (Carr & Vaneyk, 1973; Nixon II, 1975; Ponak & Thompson, 1984). The lower level of support for unionization among older and tenured faculty could be that they have a secure position and a better financial settlement than the younger and non-tenured faculty. The opposition to collective bargaining by the faculties of Law and Engineering, according to Penner, is that traditionally
they have enjoyed higher status and commanded larger salaries than faculty in other disciplines (1978-79:73). For example, one of the fears among some faculty in professional schools regarding unionization was that "their hitherto most favoured status would be lost in the sea of collectivism:"

Faculties of law and dentistry, for example, had often enjoyed much larger than average salary increases, especially between 1970 and 1974, due to "market differentials". The fact that such teachers could command much larger incomes in private practice led to demands that their salaries be bonused either as an incentive for them to become university teachers in the first place or to remain faculty rather than return to the more lucrative private sector (Penner 1978-79:73).

One of the chief obstacles to faculty co-operation in regard to the adoption of collective bargaining, argues Axelrod, was "the historical disparity in salary between law professors (among others) and arts and science teachers" (1982:211). However, the support for unionization among the law faculty at York University was secured "by YUFA's [York University Faculty Association] promise to preserve the income disparity in subsequent contracts" (ibid.).

Research dealing with the patterns of unionization among institutions suggests that unionized universities were among the youngest, least-established and most financially pressed institutions (Axelrod, 1982:207). According to Garbarino, unionization often took place where single
campuses were converted into multicampus institutions, including the mixing of two-year colleges with four-year colleges (1975:61-7). Kemerer & Baldridge (1975:52-7) on the other hand found that unionization appears to be higher in low-prestige rather than high-prestige institutions. However, all these researchers admit that their findings cannot explain why some specific institution adopts or rejects unionization. Thus, as Garbarino suggests, "...the decision for or against bargaining is made within an institutional framework, and most institutions contain a complex mixture of the various groups holding divergent views" (1975:78).

The Conditions Surrounding the Attempt to Unionize at Brock University in 1983-84

In 1981, the Brock University Faculty Association (BUFA), representing 78 percent of the 219 faculty members, adopted in principle the idea to invite CAUT and OCUFA officials to discuss certification during their December meeting (BUFA, December 22, 1981). BUFA had studied the certification issue since 1976 (BUFA, October 3, 1983). In February 1982 Patrick Wesley, executive director of OCUFA, Tina Head, professional officer for CAUT, and Al Staffer, trustee of the CAUT defense fund, visited Brock University and spoke to faculty members on the issue of the possible certification of faculty at Brock University (BUFA, February
1, 1982). In the spring of 1983, a secret straw ballot indicated that faculty was divided 50/50 on the certification issue. In April of 1983 the Certification Investigation Committee (CIC) was formed by the BUFA executive. Its mandate was "to formulate a proposal for a first collective agreement at Brock, to be used as the basis for negotiation with the Board, in the event Brock faculty decide to form a union" (BUFA, August 15, 1983; from CIC to faculty members).

Parallel to the CIC, a group of BUFA members who opposed certification formed the Committee to Maintain Brock's Collegiality (CMBC). This committee consisted of former presidents of BUFA.

During a BUFA general meeting in March 1983, a decision was made to proceed with sign-up in October 1983. The CIC held two meetings prior to the sign-up procedures of October 1983. In one meeting Professor Bates from Lakehead spoke about the benefits and drawbacks of certification. The other meeting featured a debate between two professors from York University: David Logan (Biology) on the "anti" side, and Howard Buchbinder (Social Sciences) on the "pro" side.

In the General Meeting of October 1983 the BUFA executive was instructed to cancel the vote on certification. Thus, the vote instead of being on
certification was to be on whether to proceed to "a vote" for certification or not. This move was proposed by the CMBC. The move, referred to as the Kushner/McDonald motion, which was put to a vote was:

Be it resolved that BUFA not conduct a sign-up campaign but instead undertake a constructive role rather than an adversarial one. In this regard the BUFA executive should be directed to report back to the membership with respect to a) the present inadequacies of Brock's grievance procedure b) recommendations to improve such deficiencies (BUFA, October 23, 1983).

The Kushner/McDonald motion, not to proceed with the vote on certification, was carried 66-62 with 2 abstentions and three late votes, thus deciding the fate of certification at Brock.

The general conditions, that is the chronic underfunding and possible cut backs on programs and staff that afflicted other universities, as discussed in Chapter One, also afflicted Brock University in the 1983-84 period when the attempt at unionization took place.

A letter sent to the Board of Trustees by the then Brock University President Alan Earp regarding the attempt to unionize among faculty is informative in terms of the general conditions surrounding the attempt to certify:

"It should be appreciated that morale in the profession generally has been lowered by protracted underfunding, the decline in salaries vis-a-vis those of other professions, and an increasing sense of vulnerability and susceptibility to the vagaries of government
decisions. Faculty, in short, tend to feel insecure" (October 28, 1983).

President Earp also informed the Board about the internal issues that led a large number of faculty to consider unionization:

1. Insecure contractual arrangements, which, unlike those in a collective agreement, could be changed unilaterally by the Board.

2. Inadequate grievance procedures.

3. A largely meaningless form of salary negotiation. (ibid.).

1. Insecure Contractual Arrangements:

A communique called "The Case for Unionization at Brock University in 1982-83" to faculty members states that no faculty member at Brock University at the time had a written contract with the university; they received a letter of appointment, non-standard, containing no reference to the Brock University Faculty Handbook. According to the communique, Brock faculty employment terms of the time were implicit rather than explicit (March 10, 1983). This meant that if, for instance, a professor should find himself or herself fired, it could fall upon the courts to determine what these implicit terms are in reference to The University Act, the Handbook, and traditional practices (ibid.). The argument presented is that:

The Brock University Act does not define tenure. The Handbook mentions references in several places, but defines it in a contradictory manner: I. 1.7.2. VI. A. 1. and I. 1.7.2. VII. B. 1: A tenured faculty member can be dismissed only "for
just cause."  I. 1.7.2. VI. A. 2: Tenure is a privilege.  I. 1.7.2. VIII. A: A tenured faculty member can be dismissed for budgetary reasons, which appear to include academic reasons (ibid.).  

Thus, the argument is that "the traditional practice gives no clear-cut precedent." Moreover, the handbook is "explicitly said to be subject to periodic change and revision, so that none of its current provisions can be taken as firm conditions of employment." The implications of this are that "no individual professor has a legal basis on which to protect his/her job through court action" (ibid). Even if, maintain the authors of the communique, a court should find that there has been a wrongful dismissal, it has no authority to order the reinstatement of the wronged professor; it can only order the award of damages to this professor.  

The president of the university, however, in his letter to the members of the Faculty Board, sought to clarify the contractual status as well as the terms and conditions of employment of faculty members as set out in the Faculty Handbook:

Both the terms and conditions of employment and the contractual status of faculty members are as enforceable as any provisions of a collective agreement. They can be enforced in the courts or through the special adjudicative procedures set out in the handbook which are similar to the special arbitration procedures set out in collective agreements....

Changes may be made to the faculty handbook by the Board but if such changes destroy the nature of the employment made by the Board, i.e., the granted tenure, or materially alter the terms and
conditions of employment, a faculty member may treat that action as constructive dismissal and seek his remedy through the court system or through the procedures set out in the faculty handbook as the case may be. (Alan Earp, President, October 19, 1983)

While President Earp argued in his letter that the terms and conditions of employment as well as the contractual status of faculty members, as set out in the faculty handbook, were as enforceable as any provisions of a collective agreement, Howard Snow of CAUT was not of this opinion. C.F. Laywine, treasurer of BUFA (1981), asked Snow's opinion on the status of the Brock Faculty Handbook. Snow, upon examining the handbook, maintained that because the appointments are made by letter, which is not at all standard, these letters generally indicate only the duration, nature, and salary of the appointment without incorporating the faculty handbook nor even including copies of the policy statements on appointment, promotion and tenure, nor any on patents and copyrights; as such, the Brock faculty handbook is not specifically incorporated into the contract of employment. He argues that the employment contract of faculty members at Brock will inevitably have some terms beyond those expressed in the letter of appointment. Those terms "will be implied which are necessary for the proper functioning of the employment relationship." Legally, all such implied terms would refer back to the terms stated in the faculty handbook. However,
he argues, since the faculty handbook "expressly states that policies are subject to change from time to time and that faculty continue to be bound by the changing policies of the Board of Trustees," legally the implied terms of the letter are themselves subject to change.

Brock University faculty concern with the legal status of their employment terms came at a time when the Report of the Committee on the Future Role of Universities (1981) recommended a major restructuring of universities:

Major restructuring of the system should be as follows: one fully comprehensive university; four full-service universities; four or five special purpose institutions; an unspecified number of "liberal arts" institutions offering undergraduate programs only; closure of the rest (cited by Hayns in BUFA 1981 October).

Also, Richard Bellaire of the CAUT, on the CBC "Metro Morning Show," suggested that Brock University could be one of the universities to be closed (ibid.).

The 1983-84 academic year was also the year when British Columbia Premier William Bennett introduced the Public Sector Restraint Act (Bill 3). This intensified the insecurity felt by many academics about their employment. The Bill's intent was to abolish tenure. It gave the Board of Governors and the Cabinet of British Columbia the right to fire any faculty "without cause" (UBC Faculty Association Appendix, July 25,1983). The Bill was temporarily withheld when it provoked strong reaction on the part of academic
organizations in Canada, including the Brock University Faculty Association, as well other academic organizations in the United States, Britain, Australia, and New Zealand (BUFA August 1983).

2. Inadequate Grievance Procedures:

In 1983, Brock University President Alan Earp, in a private letter to a faculty member, acknowledged that, formal grievances at Brock "were relatively new phenomena." According to President Earp, grievance procedures at Brock University were not formalized until 1978 when the Senate recommended to the Board the procedures set out in the faculty handbook. In the same letter President Earp qualifies the year 1982 as "the year of grievances" for Brock University (September 14, 1983).

There were two grievances that were most upsetting (based on my interviews) to faculty members at Brock University in 1980-81. According to the "Special Report of the BUFA membership on the CAUT Grievance" (October 18, 1983) the nature of these two grievances is as follows:

One of the grievances was about a dean who three times urged two faculty members to resign from Brock University (with financial settlements) "on the grounds that enrollments were low in their courses". The investigating committee found that "there was an element of intimidation" in the manner the dean approached the faculty members. The dean also
asked the Committee on Academic Planning "to consider terminating the programme the faculty members were teaching." On December 2, 1981, the faculty members filed a grievance with BUFA, charging the dean with intimidation and harassment. The BUFA investigating committee, on May 17, 1982, concluded that "the dean's use of threats had constituted completely unacceptable behaviour." The BUFA executive and the administration agreed that the dean should write letters of apology to the faculty members in question "acceptable in content to the BUFA executive." The dean's draft was unacceptable to The BUFA executive, and the subsequent negotiations with the President of the University and the Acting President having failed, the grievance was sent to CAUT.

The other grievance again appeared to be related to the behaviour of the same dean as in the previous case. In September 1980 this particular dean, according to the same report, warned a faculty member on the subject of his "alleged misconduct toward female students." The following year, the Dean received an informal complaint from another faculty member "on which basis he showed a list of names to a student and asked her to speculate about the faculty's possible involvement with each of them." The offended student, according to the report, filed a complaint with BUSU (Brock University Student Union). Most offensive to
the faculty members appear to be the following action taken by the dean in question in dealing with this particular case: he convened a meeting of the faculty member's entire department for November 26, 1981, "in a room that was equipped with a tape recorder and microphones." As a response the faculty member's colleagues in his department, "lodged a grievance with BUFA... on the major complaint of "trial without charge." The BUFA investigating committee found that "there has been a strong element of intimidation in the Dean's behaviour." In this case too, the dean in question refused to send a letter of apology to the grievor acceptable in content to the BUFA executive. The case was sent to the CAUT Academic and Tenure Committee.

A position statement by a faculty member to his colleagues on December 2, 1983, also testifies to the inadequate grievance procedure of that period at Brock University:

For the past few years, I have personally spent close to 80 hours in meetings devoted to grievances (even though I was not on a grievance investigating committee). Each of the cases was initiated by a faculty member and was a protest against some action by administrators (including one chairperson). Each could have been prevented by clearer regulations. Each could have been resolved much more quickly by some type of tribunal. Currently we have achieved a true state of grievance helplessness (Lordahl, December 2, 1983).

The same faculty member, in his letter addressed to Brock University faculty, informs that the need for binding
arbitration of grievances is brought about "by the administration's very low priority in observing fair and proper procedures in its actions" (ibid.). This faculty member maintained that he has observed "shoddy and unequal evaluation procedures being used in everything from tenure and promotion decisions to teaching evaluation and merit determinations" (ibid.).

3. Meaningless Salary Negotiations:

Underfunding of universities, according to Dr. Harrison, BUFA president during 1983-84, can leave young universities such as Brock in a vulnerable situation (BUFA September 1983). Harrison reports that, in 1982-83, Brock University received $712 less per student than McMaster; $816 less per student than the University of Toronto; and these discrepancies, she maintains, when combined with Brock's enrollment of 7800, indicate that the loss of income resulting from the then "current formula," is almost five million dollars, which was some 20% of Brock's operating budget (ibid.).

The faculty salaries in young universities operating on low grants, coupled with the restraint on wage increases, according to McAdie (in Higher Education Group, 1985;1988), fare worse than faculty salaries in universities that receive larger grants. Indeed, for the period of 1985-86, in terms of average salary paid for associate professors in
Ontario, Brock University ranked last out of sixteen universities listed by McAdie (1988:150).

The Brock University faculty salary demand during the 1982-83 period (the period when the attempt for certification took place), was rejected by the administration out of hand. A report of the BUFA salary committee for this period indicated that "it is the custom to have a general meeting at which the salary settlement is discussed by members of the Faculty Association." Yet, in 1982-83 such a meeting did not take place. Instead, the final offer was imposed, according to the report, by the administration and the faculty was informed of this by the president of the university.

Another report, "Final Report of the Chairman of the 1982/83 BUFA Salary Committee" in October 1982 indicates that the BUFA salary committee was quite dissatisfied with the membership of the University Staff Relations Committee. Hence, the attitude of the latter, meaning the way in which it responded to the BUFA Salary Committee, added insult to injury. According to the report, faculty were told that:

a) University faculty have always been underpaid;

b) Brock Faculty can't get jobs anywhere else anyway;

c) Big increases in faculty salaries would interfere with the fund-raising campaign;
d) BUFA's attempt to recover some of its lost buying power was equivalent to bargaining in bad faith;

e) The Brock faculty should compare itself to faculty in other small universities

This response to the Brock University faculty demand on salaries came at a time when Brock University obtained "the greatest percentage increase in grants from the government," which was according to the report, 16.1% compared to the average increase of 12% (ibid.).

As will be recalled, in universities where faculty chose to unionize, the two leading causes for their choice was the perceived arbitrariness of the administrators in dealing with faculty, and the unsatisfactory salary settlements. These conditions, also acknowledged by the president of the university, were present at Brock University during the certification drive of 1983-84.

Brock University also exhibited the characteristics of those institutions where unionization occurred more often, thus making it a likely candidate for the adoption of collective bargaining among its faculty. It is often faculty in the young, least-established, and growing universities that adopted collective bargaining (Axelrod, 1982: 207-8). In Ontario, according to Axelrod, (as of 1982), four of the seven unionized institutions-- Carleton, York, Lakehead and Trent-- were young universities (ibid.). What made them likely candidates for unionization, according
to Axelrod, is that in comparison to established universities they lacked the resources to make the transition from unrestrained expansion to that of contraction (ibid.). They received much less funding per student because they did not have a substantial graduate student population (ibid.). In 1971 the embargo imposed by the provincial government on new graduate programs, maintains Axelrod, further restricted their potential income (ibid.).

Since the factors that led faculty in other universities to unionize were present at Brock University, the certification campaign itself might provide an understanding as to why at Brock University faculty rejected unionization. Axelrod (1982:211) claims that all successful certification campaigns had the following characteristics:

a) issues were addressed in pragmatic versus ideological terms:

No organizer could hope to sign up a majority of professors by employing traditional working class rhetoric. Terms like "solidarity", and "exploitation" were completely eschewed. The possibility of strikes was consistently downplayed (ibid.).

b) Unions were not presented as ends in themselves but as means to achieving some specific tasks. Nor were unions the proponents of economic egalitarianism (ibid.).
c) The ability of union proponents to gain support depended to a very large degree on how 'responsible', conservative and academically credible they were themselves (ibid.).

The following chapters will deal with the Brock University Certification Campaign of 1983-84, based upon the general framework provided by Axelrod above: a) the nature of the arguments in favour of unionization presented by the campaigners, and how these arguments were received by the faculty; and b) how the campaign leaders were perceived by their colleagues.

An Overview

The majority of Canadian universities have certified associations. Both in Canada and the United States the same reasons appear to have led faculty to unionize. These are: a) the poor academic job market; b) the erosion of rights and perquisites, such as tenure, lacking legal protection; c) budgetary cutbacks; d) the size and remoteness of the university administration; and e) unionization in the public sector.

In Canada, faculty strongly resisted unionization. The main reasons for this are: a) professional self-image; b) the feeling of participation in the governance of the university; c) fear of strikes; d) fear of increased
bureaucracy; e) fear of the possibility of the replacement of meritocracy by other rules.

Faculty who adopted unionization in their institution often cited the arbitrariness of the administration. The fact that unionization might extract higher salaries was also among the leading motivating factors. Various sources also note that unionization often took place in younger, least established, and growing universities. For example, four of the seven unionized institutions in Ontario exhibited these characteristics.

Brock University was one of these young and growing universities in 1983-84. There was also a substantial interest in unionization among faculty during this time. Yet, faculty in the end decided not to unionize.
CHAPTER THREE

Methodology

Methodology is the theory and analysis of the research design adopted by the researcher. Sociologists use various methods, and sometimes a combination of methods, to gather and analyse data. Often the choice of a particular research method is determined by the research question.

This chapter is a discussion of the research method used in this study. It includes how interviewees were selected, the type of interviewing technique used during this study, and a discussion of the interview questions.

Research design involves the selection of a strategy for collecting data or evidence. Methodology, on the other hand, is the theory and analysis of how research should proceed (Harding, 1987:2). Social scientists often make a choice between quantitative and qualitative research methods. Quantitative research methods originate from the natural sciences, and employ quantitative measurement, experimental design and statistical analysis to understand social phenomena. Qualitative research methods, for the same purpose, rely on a tradition derived from anthropological field studies (Patton, 1980:19). The techniques used to gather data in this case are in-depth, open-ended interviewing, and personal observation (ibid.).
However, there are also a number of social scientists who use multiple methods in the analysis of the same empirical events. This approach is called *triangulation* (Denzin, 1989:13). The argument in favour of this approach is that "each method leads to different features of empirical reality" (ibid.). In light of this, then, the choice of one particular method, as is the case in this research, is not necessarily inappropriate since it could not pretend to be an exhaustive study, but merely an aid in the understanding of one particular aspect of an event.

Qualitative methods have their origin in a variety of philosophical, epistemological and methodological traditions (Patton, 1980:44). However, the unifying theme through these traditions is the notion of *verstehen* (ibid.). The *verstehen* tradition stresses "understanding that focuses on the meaning of human behavior, the context of social interaction, on emphatic understanding based on subjective experience, and the connections between subjective states and behavior" (ibid.). The tradition of *verstehen* or understanding emphasizes the human capacity to know and understand others "through sympathetic introspection and reflection from detailed description and observation" (ibid.).

During this research some interviewees, whose discipline was in the natural sciences, asked why I was not
using a quantitative method, or why I was not collecting quantifiable data. Perhaps presenting a concrete example of the advantages of qualitative methods for certain research questions would help illustrate the appropriateness of the research technique choice I made. During the early 1970s, the school system of Kalamazoo, Michigan adopted a new accountability system for teachers (Patton, 1980:23). The Kalamazoo Education Association (K.E.A) reacted to this new system by saying that it demoralized the teachers (ibid.). School officials, however, dismissed it by arguing that teachers did not want to be accountable (ibid.). In 1976, the K.E.A sponsored a survey among teachers comprising a standardized questionnaire. The result of the survey indicated that the majority of teachers were negative about the accountability system (ibid.). The school officials again dismissed the survey results by saying "they had never expected teachers to like the system, teachers didn't really want to be accountable, and the teachers' unions had told the teachers to respond negatively anyway" (ibid.). However, later, having read the teachers' own personal comments and experiences with the new system in their own words, the nature of discussion between the school officials and teachers changed (ibid.). School board members could not so easily dismiss "the anguish, fear, and depth of concern revealed in the teachers' own reflection" (ibid.).
Thus, the discussion about the new system, due to new depth in understanding, shifted from out-of-hand dismissal of the teachers' views, to that of "what do you think we should do?" (ibid.). Qualitative data collected as open-ended narrative without attempting to fit people's experiences into "predetermined, standardized categories such as the response choices that comprise typical questionnaires or tests," allows the researcher to find out what "people's lives, experiences, and interactions mean to them in their own terms" (Patton, 1980:22; Berg, 1989).

In this research, qualitative methods have been selected as the appropriate technique. The aim of the research was to understand, in reference to the campaign at Brock University in 1983-84, whether or not the certification campaign itself played any role in the rejection of unionization, either in terms of the arguments that were presented or how the leadership was perceived.

A case study is the analysis of a single case or multiple cases for the purpose of description or generation of theory (Denzin, 1989:185). Case studies, according to Patton (1980:24), may generate particularly useful information. This is so according to Simon (1978:206), because the case study method depends on common sense and imagination. The investigator, maintains Simon, makes up procedures as she/he goes along because she/he purposely
"refuses to work within any set of categories or classifications"; if she/he did so there would be no benefits in doing a case study (ibid.). However, this method also has its drawbacks. For example, it does not allow the generalization of the research findings to other similar cases; it makes comparability difficult since different studies may involve different approaches (White, 1990:134).

The data sources for this research are interviews with faculty, Brock University Faculty Association newsletters, and archival material - that is, minutes of meetings, and personal correspondences between the president of the university and the Board of Governors, between the Board of Governors and the faculty association, and between the President and the faculty association.

**Sampling Strategy, Interview Technique, Interview Questions**

There are two general categories of sampling: random and purposive. The choice between the two involves whether one's goal is to generalize the research finding to other similar cases, or to learn something and come to an understanding about a selected case or cases without needing to generalize to all such cases (Patton, 1980:100). Random sampling increases the likelihood that the data collected is "representative of the entire population of interest"
(ibid.). Purposive sampling, on the other hand, is based upon the researcher's decision as to "what cases they could learn the most from" (ibid.). Purposive sampling also offers the possibility of looking for critical cases. The critical cases are those "that can make a point quite dramatically or are, for some reason, particularly important in the scheme of things" (Patton, 1980:103). The identification of critical cases, according to Patton, depends on the recognition of the dimensions that make for a critical case (ibid.).

In this research, the purposeful sampling method has been used. The faculty interviewed fit one of the following categories: a) Pro-Union Campaign Organizers; b) Anti-Union Campaign Organizers; c) Faculty who were in favour of unionization but did not take active part in the campaign; d) Faculty who were against certification and did not take active part in the campaign. There is a concentration of the number of interviews in this latter category. The reason for this concentration is to understand whether or not the certification campaign played any role in their position toward unionization.

A total of seventeen interviews with faculty were completed. The distribution of interviews according to category is as follows: Four interviews in the category of the pro-union campaign organizers; two interviews in the
category of the anti-union campaign organizers; three interviews in the category of those faculty in favour of unionization who did not take an active role in the pro-union campaign; and eight interviews in the category of those faculty against unionization who did not take an active role in the anti-union campaign.

The names of both pro- and anti-union campaign organizers were obtained from Brock University Faculty Association newsletters. Their names were listed under the committee with which they were associated: either the Certification Investigation Committee (C.I.C), which campaigned in favour of unionization, or the Committee to Preserve Brock's Collegiality (C.P.B.C), which opposed unionization. The names of the remaining faculty were picked from the 1980-81 Brock University Academic Calendar.

The purpose of interviewing, according to Patton (1980:196), is to allow us to enter into the other person's perspective. The assumption is that "that perspective is meaningful, knowable, and able to be made explicit" (ibid.). There are three approaches to interviewing: 1) the informal conversational interview; 2) the general interview guide; and 3) the standardized open-ended interview (Patton, 1980:196-7; Berg, 1989). The first one is used more often in field research where the researcher is also a participant observer; the second comprises a general outline that the
researcher prepares before each interview (ibid.); the third, the standardized open-ended interview, necessitates a careful preparation of questions that are to be asked of all interviewees and in the same order. With this third type of interviewing, maintains Patton, flexibility in probing is more or less limited; however its advantage is that it reduces the bias that might arise from the use of different interview questions (ibid.). This reduces the possibility of more in-depth probing with some subjects, less with others.

In this research, it is the standardized open-ended interview method that has been used. The wording of questions was based upon the arguments presented by the campaign organizers, and mainly borrowed from the campaign literature. The reason for this, as will be recalled, is that Axelrod (1982) claims that how the issues were addressed in favour of certification along with how the leaders of the campaign were perceived by their colleagues played a decisive role in the adoption of collective bargaining.

Also at the beginning of each interview the faculty were presented with the most representative of the original campaign literature belonging to the CIC and the CPBC. This was necessary, since the campaign took place nine years ago,
and also the questions were about the opinion of the interviewee on the campaign arguments.

A Discussion of Interview Questions

The interviewees were asked to comment on the following arguments presented by the CIC in favour of certification:

a) There is danger for universities deriving from governmental policies, shifting student demands and market trends.

b) There is an attack on tenure: attempts to weaken, to circumvent or abolish tenure selectively, i.e., only for faculty in subjects and programs not deemed "useful".

c) As a result of government policies (selective abolition of tenure) there is a weakening of the cohesion and solidarity of the university community.

d) Brock University is threatened more acutely than large and long-established universities.

e) Faculty at Brock University had no individual security or protection. Faculty had no written contract with Brock University, meaning individual faculty had no legally enforceable contract that contained "tenure" as an explicit employment term.

f) Faculty had no collective security or protection. The Senate could not protect academics in a real show-down with the Board, because the University Act gave Senate only an advisory role in the procedures of appointing, promoting, tenuring and terminating academic appointments.

g) Brock University Faculty Association can do a little more, but not much, unless faculty unionize.
The responses to these question served in evaluating the campaign arguments and often generated comments upon the campaign leadership.

The C.P.B.C campaign statements against unionization, rather than responding to the arguments of the C.I.C as to "why faculty should unionize," took the form of cost benefit analyses. The C.I.C responded to it by emphasizing the benefits of faculty unionization and downplaying the possible costs. However, there were two issues addressed by the C.P.B.C (October 11, 1983) to which C.I.C did not respond. What would be the effect of unionization on:

a) Brock's external financing;
b) Internal equity with respect to changes in workload procedures and salaries.

Indeed the C.P.B.C informed their colleagues that they requested a report from BUFA on the above-mentioned issues in October 1983, yet five months later they were still waiting for a reply. Interviewees were asked to comment on these issues addressed by the C.P.B.C.
CHAPTER FOUR

The Certification Campaign at Brock University

Modern universities differ considerably from the traditional universities of the past. They fulfil multiple functions, and have varied personnel. Also academics within it, unlike other institutions, have a distinct relation to their employer, the university. Academics have a dual citizenship: they are employees of a particular institution, and with their colleagues they participate in the running of their work-place. More importantly, they belong to a particular discipline whose members are dispersed throughout other institutions and by whom their status as a scholar is determined. Certification campaigns, both in terms of the arguments they present in favour of unionization, and also through their leadership, have to appeal to this heterogeneous constituency whose members have a divided loyalty between the institution that employs them and their discipline.

This chapter examines the certification campaign that took place in 1983-84 at Brock University in terms of how the campaign arguments in favour of certification were received, and how its leadership was perceived by faculty who opposed certification.
Certification Campaign at Brock University

A certification campaign in a university, if it is to be successful, has to take into consideration: first, the nature of the modern university as distinct from the university of a century ago when addressing the problems for which they present unionization as a solution; second, the campaign leadership has to appeal to the distinctive nature of academics, that is, as professionals, as employees, and most importantly as individuals whose career is based upon individual achievement and recognition of this achievement by the members of their discipline nationally and internationally.

Modern universities fulfil multiple functions. Besides teaching and research which are the traditional functions of a university, they also offer direct service to the community through consultation and applied research. Modern universities, thus, house both academic departments as well as professional schools; some departments may be committed to the traditional disinterested pursuit of truth, while others are vocational schools in "disguise" (Coser, 1965:275). Hence, the functions of a modern university are varied, as is its personnel (ibid.).

In the modern university, according to Ladd and Lipset (1975:55), the professoriate has come to be deeply divided: "...it has become extraordinarily disparate in its range of fields, substantive interests and outside
associations, career lines and expectations." No longer does a university refer to a "cluster of liberal arts faculty all performing more or less the same task"; it refers, rather, to a multiplicity of clusters (ibid.). These are units of associations with which the academics identify themselves and where they spend a substantial amount of their professional lives (ibid.). An academic is more likely to know the members of his/her own field throughout other universities than the academics in other fields in his/her own institution. As well, academics belonging to different fields within a given institution enjoy, to a considerable degree, different status and privileges. For example, faculties of law and dentistry, according to Penner (1987-79: 73), traditionally had a more favoured status in their institution and also enjoyed a salary much higher than the average in comparison to academics in other fields. The nature of the modern university with its diverse functions and personnel has implications for certification campaigns. The campaign has to identify those problems that have relevance for the majority of academics in their institution. Also, research on unionized institutions suggests that unionization was adopted as a solution to problems specific to the institution.
The second aspect of certification campaigns involves their leadership, and whether or not it would appeal to the distinct nature of academics. Collectively as professionals, academics have a dual relation to their employer, the university. They are employees who participate, to a certain degree, in the governance of their institution. As well, they occupy an individual position vis-a-vis their employer as scholars based upon their individual achievements within their respective fields.

Academics are professionals in possession of generalized and systematic knowledge. Their occupation necessitates a high degree of independence, internal self-control and evaluation (Ladd & Lipset, 1975:244). More importantly, their occupation, as is the case for other professional occupations, involves a reward structure that is "a set of symbols of work achievement which are ends in themselves" (ibid.). Their independence as professionals depends upon the degree to which they are part of the decision-making process in their institution. Traditionally, it is through their elected members to the senate that they achieve and maintain this participation. The rewards, such as obtaining tenure, are based upon the evaluation of their work by their peers. The necessary conditions for the preservation of their status as professionals, and the presence of a reward structure based
on meritocracy and peer evaluation, are part of the academic tradition. Certification campaigns, if they are to be successful through their arguments and also through the credibility of their leadership, will assure their constituency that these traditions will not be altered as a result of unionization.

Academics, as one of the faculty members interviewed for this research put it, are 'Primadonnas'. They exhibit the same kind of individualism associated with "artists and free-floating intellectuals" (Reisman cited in Ladd & Lipset, 1975:292). Hence, their career achievements are, to a large extent, based upon solitary work. Thus, while they might be receptive to collective action such as unionization as a solution to societal problems, they are not readily receptive to unionization in their own work place. They fear that unionization might reduce emphasis on research, and possibly lead to the erosion of meritocracy. For example, Ladd and Lipset (1975:292) found that the more scholarly faculty, who were much more liberal than other academics on societal issues, thus ideologically more inclined to the norms of unionism, tended to oppose any change in their own institution.

The critical nature of the campaign leadership comes into play here. If the leadership is perceived as ideologically committed to collectivism, it is not likely to
draw much support for the reasons mentioned above. Also, as Ladd and Lipset (1973) suggest:

the shift from faculty representation by committeemen of the academic senate to the officers union, from one 'oligarchy' to another, does not end the phenomenon of a kind of self-coopting minority rule in faculty government, but it probably means a major change in the type of individuals 'representing' the professoriate (ibid, 284).

The fear, then, that academic traditions might be altered with the new representatives becomes a legitimate concern among some academics.

The unionization attempt at Brock University in 1983-84 took place in an atmosphere of general insecurity felt by most universities. The possible closure of small programmes, thus the potential lay-off of tenured faculty, the proposed restructuring of universities that included the closure of some universities, possibly including Brock University, led a large number of Brock faculty to question the type of contractual arrangements they had with the university. This questioning was also intensified, if not provoked, by the attempt of the Dean of Humanities, using methods unacceptable to the faculty, who tried to force two tenured professors to leave the university because enrolment was low in their programme. However, the unsatisfactory salary negotiations and grievance procedures were among the most frequently cited reasons by faculty interviewed for the attempt at unionization.
The faculty were evenly divided on the issue of whether or not certification was the answer to their problem. Two committees were formed: the Certification Investigation Committee (C.I.C), established by the faculty association, which campaigning in favour of certification; and the Committee to Preserve Brock's Collegiality (C.P.B.C) whose membership was mainly composed of former presidents of the faculty association, who campaigned against the certification.

This chapter will examine the certification campaign, in terms of the arguments presented in favour of certification, how these arguments were received, and how the campaign leadership was perceived by faculty members who decided to oppose certification.

The C.I.C. Arguments in Favour of Certification

The main argument in favour of unionization presented by the C.I.C. at Brock University was the perceived presence of a danger for universities in general and Brock in particular of governmental policies (both federal and provincial), shifting student demands, and market trends. The danger to universities, according to the campaign literature, took three forms:

a) The prolonged financial squeeze is worsening.

b) Both levels of government have published policy proposals to remould all or some universities, reducing some to the level of community colleges, reducing others to job-
training institutes responsive to governmental and business directives.

c) The financing of new high technology, science, and business programs will be at the expense of other academic subjects, principally in the humanities, but to some extent in the social sciences (BUFA, March 10, 1983 Campaign Literature).

The danger for faculty, according to the campaigners, derived directly from the danger to universities. This included the attack on tenure, but only for the faculty in subjects and programs not "deemed useful" (ibid.):

a) The financial squeeze depresses faculty salaries on the one hand, and on the other hand makes it seem attractive to reduce faculty complements, which implies attempts to weaken, circumvent, or abolish tenure.

b) Governmental pressure and shifting student demands make it seem attractive to reduce faculty complements selectively, i.e., only in subjects and programs not deemed "useful."

c) This selective threat has the effect of weakening the cohesion and solidarity of the university community by holding out the promise that some may survive at the expense of others. It is this promise that poses the single greatest threat to the survival of genuine universities and academic work. For it prevents us from acting together in our own defense, and indeed co-opts us into acting against our own universities and colleagues. Of course, there are legitimate differences between different sectors of the university, but more basic is the common need to protect the university as a whole against outside pressures (BUFA, March 10, 1983:1-2 Campaign Literature).
Thus, according to this view, unionization is a means to defend the university. It will help to preserve university autonomy and guarantee academic freedom; it will make layoffs costly and difficult; it will bring in equality that is the heart of collegiality (BUFA Publications, March 10, October 3, October 5, 1983).

Campaigners (the C.I.C) also argued that the internal situation alone at Brock University would not warrant certification; but what warrants certification at Brock or at any other university in Ontario "is the need for legally binding protections and procedures in order to preserve the autonomy of the university and guarantee academic freedom" (BUFA, October 5, 1983). Since, at Brock University, faculty do not have a written contract with the university, individual professors have no legally enforceable contract "which contains tenure as an explicit employment term" (BUFA, March 10, 1983). Moreover, the Senate cannot protect academics, because its role is only advisory and can be overruled by the Board:

[The Brock University] University Act explicitly gives Senate only an advisory role in the crucial area of procedures for appointing, promoting, tenuring, and terminating academic appointments. E.g., if the Board were to declare financial exigency, and if the Senate after study of the books were to find that no financial exigency exists, the Board could overrule this advice of the Senate, and fire any professors it wished. Even if Senate agreed, any faculty input on who was to be fired, would be only a recommendation, which the Board need not heed. The Board in fact
would be free to fire whomever it wished. And none of the fired professors would have any right of first refusal or reinstatement if the university were to start hiring again the very next day (BUFA, March 10, 1983:4 Campaign Literature).

Also, if a professor, according to the C.I.C, grieves against the administration for wrongful dismissal, it is the administration that decides what to do about the grievance. The faculty association can call in the C.A.U.T (Canadian Association of University Teachers) which can threaten the administration with public censure and provide legal and financial assistance for court action. However, the C.I.C argued that if the administration is willing to shrug off censure, then neither the faculty association nor CAUT, or even the court could reinstate the professor (BUFA, March 10, 1983:4-5). On the other hand, because unionized institutions are under the protection of the Labour Relations Act, this would provide tenured faculty with legal protection (ibid.).

a) Do Government policies and market trends threaten the university?: Interviewee Response

The arguments presented by the C.I.C were based upon the assumption that the particular view of the university that their arguments entail is shared by their colleagues in general. That is: a) a university is an autonomous institution whose function is teaching and research; b) government policies and market trends are posing a danger to
universities by altering their functions to that of job-training institutions, thus interfering with their autonomy; c) the closure of small programmes, especially in the Humanities and Social Sciences, is an attack on tenure and thus academic freedom. Unionization would give a lever to academics in protecting the university and their jobs by making tenure legally enforceable.

This view of the university as an autonomous institution which is, or is to be, free from the interference of the government and market forces, not only does not coincide with the realities of the contemporary university, but also is not necessarily shared by all academics. While the "genuine university" implied in the arguments of the C.I.C is committed to the creation of knowledge, art, literature and to an emphasis on innovation and avant-garde-ism that implies a tendency to reject the status quo (Ladd & Lipset, 1975:13), the real university accepts the status quo, and the functions ascribed to it through government policies and market forces. It is part of the social apparatus designed to transmit "the existing culture, including the beliefs that help to legitimate the authority system of the society." This is also supported by Birnbaum, among other scholars:

The university has abandoned or de-emphasized its task of mediating high-culture, in favor of the preparation of educated manpower for the administrative and productive apparatus of a
technically complex society. Further, that manpower is indispensable to the effective governance of the society: it monopolizes the knowledge, whether abstract or applied, employed in the coordination and the direction of the whole. The university as the primary location for an elite of knowers, is therefore integrated in the system of power (Birnbaum, 1971:416).

Universities are financially dependent upon the state, upon private donations (in Canada only to some extent), and the market. As Piven points out, "Ideals notwithstanding, those on whom the universities depend for funds have something to do with how the university pursues its mission..." (cited in Kaplan & Schrecker 1983:19).

Control over the mission of the universities does not always take a direct form. Often this is achieved through the offering of material rewards that strongly encourage the collaboration of intellectuals with the mission defined by those outside the university. Research grants, stipends and consultantships, according to Borrows, play a significant role in the career of individual academics by providing them with the opportunities for publication, promotion and tenure (Borrows, 1990:252).

The C.I.C argument in favour of unionization that promotes a particular vision of a university is not endorsed by those faculty interviewed. The C.I.C argued that the government policies and market trends threatened the university's autonomy and academic freedom. The majority of the faculty interviewed, however, felt that because the
university is a publicly funded institution, it is the responsibility of the university to respond to these outside forces. Also, regarding government policies toward universities, Alan Earp, then president of Brock University, in his letter to the faculty association suggested that not only was government intervention into the affairs of the university not a threat, but that it was to be expected, since universities are government-supported institutions (Letter to BUFA, May 23, 1983). The following responses by two faculty members who took part in the certification campaign suggests that C.I.C's argument in this regard was not necessarily shared by its own members. When asked whether the university was threatened by governmental policies and market trends, their responses were similarly negative:

That wasn't a major issue issue for me...I think universities are publicly funded institutions and we have to respond to market demand, public demand. We really do have responsibility to our tax-payers and to our students (Social Science Faculty, C.I.C member).

That's an economic reality of which we are all going to have to live with...we [the discipline] are always involved in real life issues, not just ivory tower issues, so we never felt threatened. That particular reason for certification was not one that impressed me very much (Social Science Faculty, C.I.C member).

Associated with governmental policies and market trends, and central to the C.I.C's argument for certification, was the link between the closure of small
programmes, especially in the humanities and social sciences, and the attack on tenure. However, the interview data suggest that this was not a major motivating factor for those who favoured certification, nor did the faculty who opposed unionization feel that this was a major issue. Regardless of discipline and the position taken toward unionization, faculty exhibit the following responses to the C.I.C argument that "there is an attempt to abolish tenure selectively only for programs in Humanities and Social Sciences,":

1) There is no immediate attack on tenure:

Some interviewees, regardless of their position toward unionization, did not feel that tenure was under attack. Others, argued that tenure is very secure. For some interviewees who were pro-union, the question of tenure was not a motivating factor in favouring unionization:

I don't remember this as being a particular concern (Humanities Faculty, against unionization);

That was not one of my favourite arguments for certification (Social Science Faculty, C.I.C member);

I don't think that this was a major motivator for the unionization attempt (Social Science Faculty, C.I.C member).
2) The attack on tenure is on issue separate from the closure of small programs:

Another variation in the interviewee response to the C.I.C argument that 'the phasing out of small programmes constitutes an attack on tenure,' is that the issue of tenure is viewed separately from the possible closure of small programmes. Thus, the C.I.C argument in this case did not find support:

There is a separate issue of tenured professors in small programs, or small departments. I think that's somewhat a different issue. It doesn't strike me as an... outrageous attack upon academic freedom or upon universities. If in some cases, let's say small departments which are dwindling, any department in any university is considered for closure, this sometimes happens... In fact let's say... if you are dealing with some specialized field in microbiology and it's simply not a program that's drawing students, and is attracting less and less interest among scientists, then the university might have to cut this program down. What you do, with the tenured faculty in that program, I am not sure. But it seems to me that this is a separate issue (Humanities Faculty, against unionization).

3) The attack on tenure is a valid concern, but certification can do little:

When the attack on tenure was seen as a reality, some faculty felt that unionization could not protect tenure:

It is clearly a valid concern, [but] I don't see how certification would have much effect on that (Science Faculty, against unionization).
4) Tenure should be abolished. Another response to the C.I.C argument that 'tenure is under attack,' not only was dismissed but rather tenure was perceived as no longer serving its original purpose, thus should be eliminated:

My long term position has been that tenure is no longer serving its original purpose. Its original purpose was to protect disadvantaged faculty [who] by virtue of disadvantage, by virtue of their age, or their lack of permanent standing...feel threatened, [and] as a consequence are unable to speak their minds. The original purpose of tenure was to give such younger people some permanence, some feeling of stability so they would feel free to speak out. That was the original purpose of tenure. My view is that university academics are able to do that at any time, from the moment they walk through the door, to the moment they retire. Tenure artificially protects people who maybe shouldn't be here any more...tenure is now used, not for its original purpose but to protect people's jobs. (Senior Administrator, against unionization).

In summary, the phasing out of small programmes, especially in the Humanities and Social Sciences as a result of government policies and market trends, does not appear to have been a major concern among the faculty interviewed, including some who participated in the certification campaign. Also, the C.I.C's argument that linked the closure of small programmes to an attack on tenure did not have much support.
b) Brock University Faculty does not have a written contract that contains tenure as an employment term: Interviewee Responses

The absence of a written contract with the university that contains tenure as an employment term, as will be recalled, was presented by the C.I.C within the context of the phasing out of small programmes in Humanities and Social Sciences, as a result of government policies and market trends. The C.I.C also argued that Senate could not protect academics, hence its role is only advisory, and could be overruled by the Board. Thus, it was argued, unionization would provide legal protection for tenured faculty.

The interview data suggest that for the majority of faculty interviewed, the absence of a written contract that contained tenure as an employment term was not perceived as a possible threat to tenure. This view was also held by some members of the C.I.C interviewed. Thus, faculty who received from the president a letter stating that they were appointed without term understood that they had tenure: "...we all had letters stating that you were appointed without term...we trusted it" (Humanities Faculty, against unionization); "I have been in three or four universities, I never had a contract. I had a letter saying that I had been appointed without term. That is tenure"(Social Science Faculty, C.I.C member).
Those faculty who did not see the necessity for a legally enforceable contract that defines tenure as an explicit employment term, including those in favour of certification, also argued that they never encountered a case where a tenured faculty member was discharged without just cause. Furthermore, if the administration had ever tried to engage in such a practice, the faculty interviewed maintained that an appeal to CAUT would redress the matter. They argued such an action by the administration would have created widespread protest among the academics. Thus, it was very unlikely to happen.

However, some of the faculty in favour of certification, saw the necessity for a legally enforceable contract containing tenure as an explicit employment term. However, they did not feel the need for a legal contract as protection against government policies or the market trends that forced universities to close small programmes. Rather, the need for this type of contract was linked to the administration which was "arbitrary" and "heavy-handed" at the time. The attempt by one particular dean, using methods unacceptable to faculty, to force two tenured faculty to leave the university was an especially motivating factor among some faculty to consider collective bargaining:

My view is that probably collective bargaining drives arise out of problems or perceived problems with the administrations. There were a couple of catalysts at Brock at the time. Initially, I
certainly would have been opposed to the whole idea [unionization]. ... What really influenced me was the attempt by the administration to intimidate two tenured professors. That I found ... clear evidence that we just had to get the rules down on paper and insist that everybody abide by [them] (Humanities Faculty, C.I.C member).

In summary, what emerges from the interviews is that the absence of a written contract with the university that contains tenure as an explicit employment term is perceived as a threat only in relation to whether or not the administration is trustworthy. Faculty who perceived the need for a contract reported the arbitrary nature of the administration at the time and the need to have the rules in written form. Thus, the connection made by the C.I.C; between the phasing out of small programmes because of government policies and market trends, and the absence of a written contract with the university that makes tenure insecure, is not supported by the interviewees.

c) Senate Cannot Protect Academics: Interviewee Responses

The Senate, according to the C.I.C, cannot protect academics because of its advisory role vis-a-vis the Board, including matters of hiring, promoting and terminating academic appointments. The Board, for example, can terminate an academic appointment by declaring "financial exigency." However, if the Senate, upon examining the books, finds that this is not the case, it can do little
about it. The final decision is the Board's. What is implied here is that the "financial exigency" clause could be used arbitrarily by the Board to terminate the appointment of any academic it pleases. Previous discussions on tenure suggest that this threat was felt only in association with the behaviour of a particular dean. The Senate's advisory role in this case was not questioned.

The interviewees' responses to this argument varied. However, one aspect common to all is that the powerlessness of the Senate vis-a-vis the Board is not so much in its advisory role, but in the type of individuals who represent the faculty. For faculty favouring unionization, certification would mean a shift from a representation of faculty by a small clique in the Senate to a representation of faculty interests through the faculty association:

There was probably a body of faculty who felt left out of the decision-making processes in the university. The same crowd of people got elected to the Senate every year. I think it seemed to this group of faculty that a clique was running the place. The faculty association was not relevant as a power base...Of course the unionization would have turned the Faculty Association into a more vital part of the university than it had been up to that point (Social Science Faculty, pro-union).

A number of interviewees who were not in favour of certification argued that unionization would not guarantee a fair representation of faculty interests. A union would, as
in the Senate, end up in the hands of a small clique. The difference is a choice between representation by the Senators or union executives:

...as with many labor organizations that would sooner or later be power structure,...the union executives would be the real power. Of course officially it is the power of workers, but actually the shots would be called by people who have the time to spend drafting rules that we all live by. Some of us thought better to cast our lot with the somewhat nebulous idea of 'collegiality'...even if somewhat a 'dubious ideal'..." (Humanities Faculty).

The Senate's advisory role was not questioned in the sense argued by the C.I.C.: that is, the possible termination of academic appointments by the Board arbitrarily, and Senate's powerlessness in that regard. Moreover, some interviewees argued that protecting individual academics is not the role of the Senate. What was at issue however, is that Senate's advisory role did not give power to faculty. Thus, unionization could accomplish just that, by giving faculty "a power which might come out of united faculty action and to make clear publicly that the university faculty is not being supported adequately" (Social Science Faculty, C.I.C member).

The Perception of the Campaign Leadership

The interviewees who opposed unionization at Brock University were convinced that the campaign organizers, who were also active members of the faculty association, were
already committed to the idea of unionization because of their particular political philosophy. The C.I.C members were perceived as mainly concerned and dissatisfied with the power structure of the university:

Active unionization fits with their political views. They thought the system needed a redistribution of power. They certainly had a different political philosophy (Science Faculty, against unionization).

The majority of the C.I.C members were from the Humanities and Social Sciences. Interviewees who were from the science faculties commented that some of the ideas of faculty in the aforementioned disciplines were not likely to appeal to those in the Sciences. Also, these faculty members maintained that at Brock University, the Science Faculty was more mature in terms of the age of the professors and also that they had more time in service to the university. That is, the C.I.C members were younger, had less service in the university, and were also more politically inclined toward the idea of unionization.

The view of the campaigners as not part of the old established faculty, and the perception that unionization was an outcome of their political orientation, also found expression in the words of the following interviewee who referred to the C.I.C members as a "fringe group":

I think the people who were spearheading the union drive were...that was their conviction from the start. And that maybe the timing was right to see
about doing something like that. I had definite concerns, you get a fringe group running such an organization [faculty association]...(Science Faculty, against unionization).

The C.I.C leaders were active in the faculty association. Some interviewees expressed distrust of faculty who spent a lot of time and energy in the association. This was perceived as less commitment to teaching and research, and unionization meant having to live with the rules devised by this type of faculty. However, the same concern was also expressed by faculty who were in favour of unionization:

The faculty association tends to be taken over by faculty who make a profession of being faculty association leaders. They become sort of union bureaucrats. And that's a real danger. I was supporting unionization with the assumption that those of us who were committed academics, are going to have to remain involved and become increasingly involved with the faculty association (Social Science Faculty, pro-union).

What emerges from the interviews is that the fields to which C.I.C members belong, that is Humanities and Social Sciences, their active involvement in the faculty association, the perception that they were younger and had less service in the university, and also their perceived political orientation, all appear to have been sources of concern and distrust among faculty who opposed unionization. However, the possible lack of credibility of the C.I.C members was also acknowledged from within their own ranks:
"...there is no way that they were going to accept or trust people like [X] and [Y]...there was a distrust there" (Social Science Faculty, C.I.C member).

The membership of the C.P.B.C that opposed unionization was perceived by faculty in general as a respectable constituency in the university:

The people on the collegiality committee were sort of old-established...They represented the faculty who have been active on Senate. They represented the faculty from the Science division, and the Science division has always been very prestigious at Brock. They represented the faculty who have been at Brock for a long time. This was a very prestigious group (Social Science Faculty, pro-union).

It is important to note here that the perception of the C.I.C leaders as "having an ideological commitment to unionization" may well have to do more with the kind of arguments in favour of unionization that they presented rather than their age or discipline. The committee that campaigned against unionization also included faculty members from the Social Sciences and they did not appear any older than the C.I.C members I interviewed.

In every campaign communique, the C.I.C leaders consistently pointed to the "government" as the real "threat" to universities, and unionization as the solution to defend the university. Moreover, even the possibility of having to go on strike once unionization becomes a reality is presented as a weapon to ward off the danger posed to universities. One communique reads: "...strike weapon is
alien to faculty traditions, but if the universities were left in peace to do their work none of this would be necessary" (BUFA, March 10, 1983). As will be recalled from the discussion on faculty opposition to unionization in Ch.2, one of the real fears associated with unionization among academics is 'the fear of having to go on strike.' Indeed, Axelrod (1982:211) insists that successful campaigns consistently down-played the possibility of strikes.

Research on faculty unionization, on the other hand, indicates that more often than not faculty opted for unionization only to address traditional union issues. These are working conditions and salaries. C.I.C arguments fell outside the scope of these traditional union concerns. Also, the campaign arguments could very well qualify as ideological, thus lending support to the perception among some interviewees that C.I.C leaders had a political commitment to unionization. As the interview data indicate, there was no consensus among faculty as to whether the government is "the threat," or the "benevolent giver" which can make legitimate demands on the universities. Both stand are ideological because they reflect the position taken vis-a-vis the status quo. However, Axelrod (1982:211) maintains that successful campaigns addressed issues in pragmatic versus ideological terms. The reason for this is, as Ladd and Lipset (1975:55) have pointed out, "A large number of
professors have backed almost every variety of opinion and political action that secured support among the general public—with the important exceptions of explicitly racist and extreme rightist positions." A particular view of government-university relations as a campaign argument is not likely to meet with consensus.

An Overview

The Brock University faculty in 1983-84 appeared to have been generally receptive to the idea of unionization. However, they were almost evenly divided as to whether unionization was a viable solution to their problems. Two committees were formed: the Certification Investigation Committee (C.I.C) which campaigned in favour of unionization; and The Committee to Preserve Brock's Collegiality (C.P.B.C) which opposed certification. At a general meeting, upon the request of the C.P.B.C, faculty members were called upon to vote "...that BUFA not conduct a sign-up campaign." The motion passed by a slim margin.

Two major problems have been found in regard to the C.I.C campaign in favour of unionization that might have played a role in the rejection of unionization: a) their arguments were not supported by the faculty interviewed, including some C.I.C members themselves; b) their
leadership did not have a favourable standing among faculty who opposed unionization.

The arguments presented by the C.I.C in favour of certification were based upon a particular view of a university. That is, "a genuine university" is committed to research and teaching only, and is, or should be, free of government interference and market trends. Governmental policies and market trends, by forcing the closure of programs in the disciplines of Humanities and Social Sciences, were posing a threat to universities: a) by turning universities into job-training institutions or community colleges; b) by threatening tenure, thus academic freedom. Also, the C.I.C. maintained that while the internal situation at Brock University did not warrant unionization, faculty nevertheless should still unionize in order to protect the university from outside pressures.

The interviewees, including some C.I.C members, viewed governmental policies as a reflection of an economic reality with which the universities must live. The university's response to market trends, on the other hand, was seen as a natural response, if not the responsibility of a publicly-funded institution. Unionization could not do much in this area. Also, the connection made by the C.I.C between the phasing out of small programmes in the Humanities and Social Sciences and an attack on tenure, did
not find support among the interviewees, including those who favoured unionization. Tenure was viewed as a separate issue.

Interviewees who favoured unionization saw it as a solution to the problems specific to the institution. The major motivating factor for favouring unionization was the arbitrariness of the administration, unsatisfactory grievance procedures, and salary settlements.

Faculty who opposed unionization viewed the campaign leadership as ideologically committed to unionization, and mainly concerned with the power structure within the university. The committee that opposed the certification campaign, on the other hand, was described by a C.I.C member as "a prestigious group" at Brock university. They had longer service, belonged to disciplines that had high prestige within the university, and also served on the Senate.

The C.I.C's argument in favour of unionization was presented in ideological terms. Here, ideology is viewed as "a constrained set of political positions prescribing the 'appropriate' response to matters of government and public policy matters" (Ladd & Lipset, 1975:38). Hence unionization was presented as the 'appropriate response' to governmental policies and market trends. An ideological stance in favour of unionization in an academic setting necessarily
disregards the nature of the modern university, that is, its differing personnel and their varying political orientations. Consequently, unionization as a means to defend a view of the university that excludes professional schools, vocational disciplines, and applied research is not likely to find support. Since the university already encompasses these disciplines, the faculty in these fields are also legitimate members of the contemporary university.

An ideological stance in favour of unionization on the part of the campaigners also intensified the fears associated with it among some faculty, such as collectivism and egalitarianism that might have led to the erosion of meritocracy and the rewards associated with it, such as tenure. This fear was and is legitimate, because academics, like artists, often engage in solitary work. Their careers depend upon the recognition of individual achievements by fellow members of their discipline.
CONCLUSION

The adoption of collective bargaining by university faculty in Canada began in the early 1970s. According to the commentators on faculty unionization this was a response of university faculty to changes that began to take place in their work environment. These changes commenced in the 1960s when universities received generous government funding that encouraged their expansion. On the one hand the expansion of universities created a favourable job market and satisfactory salary levels for academics; on the other, this expansion also resulted in increased bureaucracy which in turn created tension between academics and university administration. This tension intensified when universities began to operate under fiscal restraint in the 1970s, forcing them to find ways to cut their expenses. Thus, increasingly universities began not to fill vacated tenure track positions, to rely increasingly on part-time academics for teaching and to make provisions to lay off tenured faculty in small programs. Faculty salaries also started to fall behind in comparison to the earnings of other professionals.
Faculty in unionized universities often cited the lack of satisfactory grievance procedures, arbitrary administration and unsatisfactory salary settlements in their institution as the main reasons for having adopted collective bargaining. As well, it was often the faculty in newly established and growing universities that adopted unionization. According to Axelrod (1982:207-8), these young Canadian universities were not as well equipped as the long established universities to make the transition from expansion to contraction. Long established institutions not only experienced growth gradually, but they also received much larger funding because of the size of their graduate student population. This was not the case with young universities. According to Axelrod, not only did they experience growth at a much faster pace, they also felt the effects of the fiscal restraint more immediately, since the funding that these institutions received was comparably lower than established institutions (ibid.). These conditions, maintains Axelrod, led many of the academics working in these universities to adopt collective bargaining. Indeed, four out of the seven unionized universities in Ontario exhibited these characteristics (ibid.).

The case of Brock University in this respect is an interesting one. In 1983-84, it was a likely candidate for
unionization. Not only was it one of the youngest and a rapidly growing university; there was also substantial support for unionization. Faculty at first were evenly divided as to whether or not unionization was a solution to their problem. Those who favoured collective bargaining were motivated by the same factors that led their colleagues in other universities to unionize. They were dissatisfied with the grievance procedures, and according to these faculty, the administration was heavy-handed and arbitrary. As well, faculty, regardless of their position toward unionization at Brock University, were dissatisfied with their salary settlements, often imposed upon them without any negotiations. Moreover, Brock University faculty also felt that their salaries compared poorly with those faculty in other universities in Ontario.

In the case of Brock University the presence of the factors that led other institutions to unionize appear not to have led to the adoption of collective bargaining by faculty members. The presence of these factors, in the case of Brock University, underlies only the attempt at unionization, but did not predict its success.

The critical element in the rejection of unionization at Brock University appears to be the certification campaign itself. In successful campaigns, effort and energy are spent by a group of faculty who
identify problems specific to their institution and with whom a heterogeneous constituency can identify themselves. Also, these leaders articulate credible and convincing arguments for unionization as the only viable solution. Axelrod (1982:211) claims that every successful campaign addressed these problems in pragmatic versus ideological terms, and unions were presented as a means to achieve some specific tasks. As well, Axelrod maintains that the leaders of the campaign itself were the critical elements of a successful campaign:

While the initiators of union drives may well have been politically to the left of the colleagues they set out to organize, every successful campaign addressed issues in pragmatic as opposed to ideological terms...the ability of union proponents to sign up sufficient support depended to a very large degree on how 'responsible', conservative, and academically credible were the organizers themselves. Right-left splits did exist on the executives of most faculty associations, but unity was preserved and support increased by the tendency of the latter to allow the image and program of the proposed union to be shaped by the former (ibid.).

For example, according to Axelrod, at York University, the first chair of the unionized faculty association admitted "to having been willingly 'used' by the 'left wing' of the union for the purpose of signing up more conservative faculty elements" in the campaign (ibid.). At the University of Ottawa, the whole collective bargaining drive was initiated by the medical and science faculties,
considered to be the most conservative departments in most institutions (ibid.). According to Axelrod, that these 'respectable' elements of the university "were among the earliest union supporters prevented the administration from dismissing the campaign as the work of young, left-wing, malcontented professors" (1982:212).

One of the main features of the certification campaign at Brock University, which departs from those successful campaigns, is the nature of the problems identified by the campaigners for which unionization was presented as a solution. These problems were not specific to the institution; rather they were broad in scope. Also of importance, the identification of these issues as "problems" required an ideological stance. The campaigners argued that market forces and the state were transforming the universities into job-training institutions, particularly by forcing the closure of programs in the humanities and social sciences. Thus, the adoption of collective bargaining was a means to defend the university against these outside forces. Interview data, on the other hand, suggest that there was no consensus among faculty members as to whether or not these were pivotal issues. Some even argued that it is the responsibility of the university, as a publicly funded institution, to respond to these outside pressures. The campaign arguments in favour
of unionization, in this case, had an appeal only for those
faculty members critical of the status quo. Consequently,
the faculty for whom the campaign arguments did not have any
appeal, defined the campaign leaders as ideologically
committed to unionization by whose rules they would be
forced to live with if collective bargaining were adopted.

This research was a case study of one particular
certification campaign. However, a systematic study to
compare certification campaigns at universities where they
were rejected, as well as in universities where they were
adopted, could provide further insight. Such research would
increase our understanding of why some institutions unionize
while others choose not to, and also clarify the reasons
behind success or failure.

After two decades of faculty unionization, there
appear to be many questions that need answers. As a
response to the growing number of certified faculty
associations, did administrations in non-unionized
universities become more responsive to the concerns of
faculty? Again, did the experiences of faculty in unionized
universities encourage their colleagues in non-unionized
universities to view the adoption of collective bargaining
as not a preferable solution? Was unionization in general a
response to the changes that took place in the academic work
place, or to the way in which these changes were implemented
in individual institutions? For example, one major change was the provisions made to lay off tenured faculty in small programs, especially in humanities. Was unionization among faculty a response to the lay off of tenured faculty in these traditional academic disciplines, or rather was it a response to the criteria used by the university administration in the selection of individual faculty members whose appointments were to be terminated?

Continued research on faculty unionization would contribute to our understanding of the modern university as the work-place of academics, and could be used as a good predictor of the direction that universities are heading toward. The conclusion reached by Axelrod (1982:213) in this respect is quite significant:

The trend to collective bargaining among academics reflected what the university had become: a mammoth corporate entity in a recessionary state. The metaphor, of course, could be pushed too far. But possibly, they fell just one step short. Forced to justify themselves on the basis of productive, 'required,' and 'relevant' scholarly output (in terms of both trained manpower and research), yet compelled to do so with limited resources, they developed characteristics common to public and private corporations.
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