THE NATURE AND ORIGINS
OF THE SELF - AS - OBJECT

BY: MARLA POLLOCK, B.A, M.A.

A Thesis
Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies
In Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements
For the Degree
Master of Arts

McMaster University
November, 1993
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

To my guides: Drs. C. Miall, P. Archibald, and G. Knight.
With thanks for the assistance of Dr. R. Hornosty.
The intent of this study is to consider changes in the naturalization of the self-as-object in both behavioral and mental spheres, or the "self-as-instrument" and "self-conscious-self", respectively. The concern here is on the naturalness versus historicalness accorded these two aspects of the self-as-object. A focused examination of the treatment of the self-as-object in three theoretical schools, the Chicago School, Mass Society Theory, and Post-Modern school, assists in drawing the conclusion that the more the self-as-object is separated in these two spheres, the more the self-as-instrument, and in particular and self-as-egoistic-instrument, is naturalized. Further attendant with this separation is a self-conscious-self that becomes an increasingly historical and problematic construct.
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The intent of this study is to consider changes in the naturalization of the self-as-object in both behavioral and mental spheres, or the "self-as-instrument" and "self-conscious-self", respectively. The concern here is on the naturalness versus historicalness accorded these two aspects of the self-as-object. A focused examination of the treatment of the self-as-object in three theoretical schools, the Chicago School, Mass Society Theory, and Post-Modern school, assists in drawing the conclusion that the more the self-as-object is separated in these two spheres, the more the self-as-instrument, and in particular and self-as-egoistic-instrument, is naturalized. Further attendant with this separation is a self-conscious-self that becomes an increasingly historical and problematic construct.
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION
I. FORMULATION OF THE PROBLEM.

The naturalness of cultural and self objectification is a long-standing focus of sociological interest, debate and discussion. I will be examining conceptions of the naturalness versus historicalness/relativity of "self-as-object", as an aspect of the increasing objectification of western society which Chicago School, Mass society, and Post-Modern theorists agree to be an important feature of modernity.

In the realm of thought, I will address the consciousness of persons' "selves" as objects of definition, attention, scrutiny, elaboration, interest and/or problematization. I refer to this as the "self-conscious" aspect of "self-as-object" or, the "self-conscious-self". In the realm of action, I will consider the usage of "self" as an instrument or means through which to realize conscious goals and purposes. This is the "instrumental" aspect of "self-as-object," or the "instrumental-self".

I have chosen the Chicago, Mass Society and Post-Modern theoretical schools, because they offer three distinct perspectives to the problem of the naturalness versus historicalness of self-as-object. Such other schools as the Existential and Neo-Freudian (Douglas and Johnson, 1977, Kemper, 1978; Fromm, 1965; Marcuse, 1964; Fontana, 1984; Lasch, 1984) have been excluded because they are more eclectic and have
borrowed more heavily from philosophy and psychology, respectively; and have not addressed to the same degree the origins of the self-as-object.

There are large differences of opinion about the naturalness versus historicalness of the self-as-object, both within and between Chicago, Mass Society and Post Modern schools.

Simmel, who strongly influenced Chicago School theory, accorded a degree of naturalness corresponding to his concept of cultural objectification, that is; as emergent in certain historical conditions, but as part of a large-scale and inevitably progressive historical force. In some Chicago school theory it is more strongly naturalized in the direction of, for example, an organically functional adaptation and/or idealized capacity distinctive to human beings (Mead, 1964; Park, 1952). Further away from Simmel, and more towards the historical end of the continuum, are theorists in the Mass Society school. More compatible with Marx’s than Simmel’s view of objectification, they treat "self-as-object" as a by-product of macroscopic social structural changes that are nevertheless reversible and/or modifiable (Mills, 1963; Riesman, 1961). The Mass Society theorists Sennett (1977) and the Post-Modern theorist Foucault (1986), approach the self-conscious-self still more historically, as a specific kind of response to macrostructural changes from among a range of possible responses; while self-as-
object is treated in other Post-modern theory in terms of historically specific institutional changes (Rose, 1990). Finally, the originating mechanisms of "self-as-object" of conscious thought and behavior are viewed at times, and inconsistently, within Chicago School theory, as unreal social and/or cognitive artifacts (Cooley, 1903; Goffman, 1959,1986).

There is, then, a dramatic range of views as to the naturalness versus historicalness of the self-as-object. I will be considering where on this continuum the originating processes of the self-as-object can be best located; as common human capacity and/or practice. My focus will be on a "self-as-object" manifest in both conscious thought and behavior.

For the purposes of this thesis, I will limit my consideration of historical processes of objectification of self to those manifested and impacting upon microscopic level individual and face-to-face contacts. This focus on basic, direct, and elementary units of analyses offers the advantage of enabling comparisons between the three theoretical schools, all of which address the origins of "self-as-instrumental-object" at the level of face-to-face interaction, as well as the emergence of the "self-conscious self" in microscopic contexts.

Within each of the three theoretical schools I have chosen, I
am considering the works of a few selected theorists, based primarily upon whether they address the nature and/or mechanisms of origin of both self-as-object-of-consciousness, and self-as-instrument. From the Chicago School, these theorists include Cooley, Park, and Goffman; from the Mass Society school, Riesman, Mills, and Sennett; and from the Post-Modern school, Foucault and Rose. Although he does not address himself to self-as-instrument, I have included Mead in my discussion of the Chicago School, because his views on the "self-conscious-self" are of particular importance to other Chicago School theorists.

Theorists from the three schools are also not in agreement as to whether the "instrumental" aspect of objectified self logically or historically precedes the "self-conscious" aspect. Thus the mechanisms of "self-as-instrument" are conceptualized at times as either more or less naturally based that those of the "self-conscious self". Goffman of the Chicago school (1959, 1986) and Foucault (1986) of the Post-Modern School stand out in particular, in the extent to which they view the "instrumental" "self-as-object" as more "natural" than the "self-conscious self."

Thus I will also be critically considering the interrelationship of the mental and behavioral components of "self-as-object", insofar as this relates to their relative naturalness or historicalness.
Discussion of "self-as-object" relationships will additionally require a consideration of their internally and externally directed, as well as egoistic and altruistic forms; since these differing forms have theoretically differing properties of "naturalness versus historicalness", as well as implications for the naturalness of other forms of "self-as-object."

For example, there is an increased tendency within modernity and within each of the theoretical schools, to essentialize a self-as-instrument of egoistic rather than of altruistic purposes. This "self-as-instrument", when combined with a "self-conscious-self" that is regarded as unreal, or as the product of unnatural withdrawal from the social sphere; is productive of a heightened and unnatural separation of self-as-object in the two spheres. This occurs in the writings of Goffman and Foucault, who assume or explicitly address the self-as-egoistic-instrument as a "natural given"; and regard the self-conscious-self as fallacious or as emerging from unnatural mechanisms or processes of societal retreat.

As well, I will be addressing an increased tendency over time for self-as-instrument to be regarded as occupied and directed toward inner "self" goals, and as consciously manipulating and acting upon itself in reaching these goals. This kind of "internal" or "internally directed" instrumental orientation is
also associated with a naturalized egoistic instrumental self in the external or extrinsic realm. This will be demonstrated in the writings of Park and the Post-Modernists.

Overall, individual theorists and theoretical schools are critically examined with regard to their accounts of the natural and historical origins of the "self-as-object."

2. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

A. Historical Overview.

An understanding of the differing internal and external, egoistic and altruistic, and behavioral and mental aspects of self-as-object within modernity will require, initially, a general historical review of its changing conceptualizations over time; and of how these changes represent a broadening of self-as-object in some respects; and an unnatural narrowing in others.

Greek Antiquity and the Renaissance, in particular, are periods in which the concept of "self-as-object" is described with some consistency as undergoing conceptual changes. The kinds of conceptual changes described at these times and in nineteenth
century "classical" sociological theory, are elaborated upon and serve as background to, "self-as-object" in twentieth century theoretical schools; and will therefore be outlined below. (See especially Hegel, 1900; Heller, 1978; Greenblatt, 1980; Kovel, 1980).

In the latter half of this review I contrast streams of thought regarding the naturalness versus historicalness of cultural objectification and/or self-as-object, and its specific originating processes. One stream emanates from Hegel, the Young Hegelians and Marx; the other from Simmel. These differing approaches are strongly visible in subsequent sociological treatment of the mechanisms and nature of "self-as-object" in the twentieth century theoretical schools.

The validity of these later developments, as well as presentation and analysis of the originating mechanisms of self-as-object conceived during Antiquity and the Renaissance, will be taken up in subsequent chapters of this thesis. Mass Society and Post-Modern theory in particular address mechanisms of origin of "self-as-object" in Antiquity and/or in later historical periods prior to nineteenth and twentieth century modernity.

Park of the Chicago school is the modern theorist who in the explicitly relates objectified instrumental behavioral to the
"self-conscious-self". A description of the manner in which he does so will end this introductory chapter and serve as a bridge to the second, "Chicago School", chapter.

B. Antiquity.

In Eastern thought, discussion of occurred earlier than in western antiquity. It can be seen in the earlier hymns of the Hindu Rig Vela between 2000 and 1000 b.c. (Eliot, 1921:51).

A continuing characteristic of eastern thought is the monotheistic union or "bliss of absorption" of the self in the natural world. In Hinduism, for example, "self" is a supreme and natural form of existence within which all forms of existence are part, or identical to. Relative to this, the "Ego" and individual personalities are explicitly devalued as phenomena to be denounced, diminished, controlled, mutilated mortified, or and/or transcended (Ibid:6-13,43-49).

In western Greek antiquity up to the time of Homer in the eighth century B.C., human mentality was also and similarly "embedded in a total force field with which nature, the person and society were in continuous exchange with," and emergent from (Kovel, 1980:307). During these times, issues of the relative
naturalness of self-as-object make little sense. The use of self-as-instrument in the behavioral sphere also makes little sense in such a society, with its "customary morality"; that is, one which does not entail an individual seating or basis, and therefore individual being "conscious... of what he is doing" (Hegel, 1900:353,354).

However, during the decline of Athenian culture within Greek antiquity, a concept of self-as-object-of-consciousness emerges, to be gradually isolated from the body and its appetites and desires, as well as from its initial social and natural embeddedness. Kovel (1980) describes the eighth to fourth century B.C. as "transitional" to the idea of "psyche" as a "free-standing" "entity" and "living self" to be analyzed and possessed; and constitutive of the birth of an "individuality born of separateness; although at that time such a "psyche" remains conceptualized as harmoniously integrated with the body or "soma", as its mental correlate (Kovel, 1980:305-306).

Hegel (1900:318-321,242-358) similarly traces such critical change in human mentality, wherein an individual nature, and "personality" is developed elaborated, and displayed, to the Fifth Century B.C. in the teaching of Socrates. The latter also viewed the individual constitution as conditioned by "the moral", as distinct from a customary, basis for action.

A self-as-instrument of individual, egoistic, and pragmatic
purposes also arises in the Fifth Century B.C. teachings of the Sophists. They took up how individual persons' "process(es) of reflection" and what they think and know can be "variously handled" as an "object" of the mind. Implicit in their teachings as to how to go about doing this, is the conscious manipulation of mental processes in order to change other persons' opinions and/or beliefs. They taught that human "rhetoric" and "disputation" allowed persons to "prove everything, to discover a justifiable side in every position," "make the worse appear the better cause", and to "twist arguments" through presentation and exaltation of "appearances" and "opinion", over essence (Russell, 1959:27,46-47,35; Hegel, 1900:352).

However, they did not consciously connect these acts of manipulation to a free standing inner "psyche", or "self", and therefore were not sufficiently detached from their selves to be consciously using it as instrument of other purposes (Kovel, 1980).

The treatment of "psyche" or "self" as inner attribute awaited the Platonic period from 427-348 B.C., and its emerging dualisms of thought such as are apparent in the concept of a psyche differentiated from "soma" "as a discrete entity". This "self", enthroned and superordinated over human "passions..appetite or desire", allows for "a much more radical
drawing of "distance between individuals...and society.." ; as opposed to a prior "articulat(ion) of psyche with the society from which it arises" (Kovel, 1980:306-307,317; Russell, 1959:14).

Kovel notes in the behavioral realm the appearance at this time in Platos "Republic" of deceptive practices such as the "noble lie" employed by rulers, as a means of, for example, maintaining "a socio-economic order". An example cited by Kovel is the promulgation of the falsehood that the "different classes of people are so because of essential metallic differences in their nature.." This constitutes "the first known western instance of propaganda and..deliberate mystification.." Hegel also notes the beginnings of a "principle of corruption" beginning in 431 B.C. at the time of the Peloponnesian war, four years prior to Plato's birth. He describes such corruption as a subjectivity born of self-retreat, and "obtaining emancipation for itself; with an attendant "self-conscious" and abstract "personality" being exercised with indifference to the "concrete characteristics" of individuals (Hegel, 1900: 348,351,363; Kovel, 310-311).

Thus the psyche or "self" as independent "object," entity, and "passive existent", emerges, as not only capable of isolation as object for study, but of behavioral manipulation in the service of goals. However, Kovel (1980:306,307,314) states that the
enthronement of psyche from the sphere of the social is not yet generally exercised at this time; tending rather to be integrated with social purpose and having "the quality of activity" as well as of "moral responsibility."

It should also be noted that there is not exact agreement as to when such a self-conscious-self or personality emerges, or whether it does so as the product of individual freedom or retreat. Heller, (1978) for example, stresses that the Roman world was more generally productive of the "abstract" and universal Personality" or "ego", and discusses it as rooted at this time in increased human freedom rather than withdrawal; while Foucault (1986) of the Post Modern school, later to be discussed, stresses the first and second century A.D. in the Greco-Roman world, as linked to a self-conscious-self that is to him, a product of individual retreat.

The works of ancient theorists do show seeds of the essentialization of a self-as-egoistic-instrument, and of a conscious use of self-as-instrument, subsequent to Plato and during Aristotle's life span of 384-322 B.C. Aristotle (1941:1325-1329,1337) leans towards further acceptance of the "noble lie"; although only for statedly altruistic and social purposes. He proposes that the sophists teachings' as to the "art" of "practice" through "modes of persuasion", only constitutes "unscrupulous practices " if not applied for noble,
right or "moral purpose"; such as getting others to see the truth.

While Aristotle himself problematized "the whole business of oratory" as being concerned with appearances over essence, he went further in the sense that he advocated the conscious use of self-as-instrument through "principles of utility" directed toward noble goals. He states that "when we know what action or character is required, then,... in... suggestion or action, we have to change and reverse our form of words" (Aristotle, 1941:1343-1359, 1435).

He also asserts that "all of us" as orators and speechmakers "have to argue that things are bigger or smaller than they seem.." Among his principles and lines of argument for doing so in the act of convincing others, are the use of "indignant language", representing the accidental as essential", "working on the emotions of the judges themselves," and pitting persons against each other. As well, in the "Revolution" section of Book V of his "Politics"; the stated purpose of which is to describe "the means through which the safeguarding" of political governments and constitutions from acts of revolution "may best be put into effect" for socially noble purpose; Aristotle (1944:371-417, 401, 435, 459, 467-471; 1941:1358, 1430, 1435, 1408-1409) in fact describes the means through which statesman, including tyrants, can use manipulative
practices in order to maintain rule. Concerning appearances, the statesman is believed to be required to pose and pretend to "be speaking on behalf of the people" "in all ....actions" and to "cleverly play the part of royalty," "guardian and steward.." , as opposed to bearing one self in the manner of a "contemptible personality"..; in order to avoid inciting "outrage" from the populous.

This essentialization of a conscious use of personality as instrument to accomplish goals, constitutes a more routine and sustained application of "means to ends" than that visible in Plato.

C. The Renaissance.

Heller (1978:200-201,231-241,403,376) states that objectifying trends were given significant impetus in sixteenth century Renaissance humanist thought and its "cult of the particular abilities of the individual; and its approach to humanity and one's own organism, as well as the natural world, as an object of study." There was an increased propensity for "self-consciousness" to "take an objective form" at this time; initially in positive terms of an expansive and free experience of self in the exercising of personal strivings and will. Thus persons were coming to know themselves and "tak(ing) delight" in
themselves and their objectified personalities; as they engage in self examination, analysis of their particularity, and insight into their "own personality, psyche, and behavior. Further, the goal of a "self-realization and self-enjoyment of the personality" emerges as internally directed instrumental action. However, accompanying this heightened self-conscious-self and internally-directed instrumental-self, is an intrinsic shaping or manipulation of one's own human identity (Greenblatt, 1980:2-3; Heller, Ibid.,)

There also appears at this time a self-consciousness of one's self-crafted being; and of its behavioral correlate in role-playing. This heightened and distanced awareness of one's self and role is experienced by some as oppressive, unreal, imprisoning, and "alien"; and as involving an effacement, undermining and replacement of self and spontaneous human action. (Greenblatt, 1980:9-16,33,57; Heller, 1978:200,241,376).

To Renaissance persons such as Thomas Moore, the self-conscious-self becomes problematized as "withdraw(al) from public life."; rather than of expansion in "an ideal of society", as in antiquity (Heller, 1978:4-24,207,187,201,197,247; Greenblatt, 1978:46).

Heller and Greenblatt, as social commentators and Renaissance observers, wrote about the manipulative fashioning of one's self
at this time, its manifestation in behavioral "role playing", and views of it as a good and natural basis of human desire; critically. The "achievement of a...distinctive personality", role, and "characteristic address to the world..." in the Renaissance, is believed to extend to "attempts to fashion other selves," in terms of "machiavellian calculation" as well as of "humanist" reform (Heller, 1978:122,422,376; Greenblatt, 1980:1-3,15).

Like Aristotle's "Revolution", Machiavelli's "The Prince" (1950) appears in the form of advice to rulers. However, as a Renaissance product, "The Prince" goes much further in the direction of an essentialization of "self-as-egoistic-instrument." Thus unlike Aristotle's characterization of a world of generally virtuous men and instrumental behaviour embedded in "overall social activity"; Machiavelli (1950:64-66,35) depicts a world consisting "only of the vulgar, and of men who are "bad," and "would not observe their faith with you..", it is deemed necessary, in this evil world, to rely on one's "semi-animal" or "semi-human...nature".

Within this context, the planning of action in light of objective knowledge of consequences is deemed necessary on a more systematic basis than it was in Greek Antiquity, with such knowledge constituting "customary science" and "political technique" Ethically, as well, the Prince is mandated to "not..
shrink from any kind of evil in the interest of a good result;" as well as to be willing to use "evil", "cunning" and "manipulation" in "the totality of means towards the practical implementation of political knowledge" (Machiavelli, 1950:35,64,65; Heller, 1978:320-353,401).

Machiavelli's (1950:64-66) essentialization of "semi-human"/"semi-animal" behavior is another example of the extent of his separation of "self-as-instrument" from a moral, social and distinctively human consciousness. He further essentializes Aristotle's "manipulation of appearances," in the exercise of self-as-instrument, as mandated by the nature of men. "For men in general judge..by the eyes.." and ears; by what "goes out of (one’s) mouth" and "what you appear to be..".

Machiavelli (1950:3,35-41,63-65,18-23) also essentializes and naturalizes Aristotle's use of "personality" as appearance and disguise, asserting that one must be a "great feigner and dissembler.."; and that "those that have been best able to imitate the fox" and to "disguise (their) character" through appearances "have succeeded best." Thus his "prince" must not only manage his appearance, as is the case with Aristotle's "statesman", but modify his own qualities, to ensure that "all who see and hear him" judge him as being virtuous. Likewise, Machiavelli's prince explicitly aims to shape his subjects' qualities, rather than merely, as in Greek Antiquity, their
opinions. He specifically advocates the use of friendship "favour", dependency and sense of obligation, to "shape persons into... form".

However, Greenblatt contends that overall instrumental "fashioning" of self and others during the Renaissance, unlike that in "The Prince", was still mediated by external "submission to an absolute power or authority situated at least partially outside the self" such as, for example "God," a sacred book," or "an institution such as church" or "court..." (Ibid.,:9).

To summarize the substantial elaborations of "self-as-object" during the Renaissance; there is not only a continuation of a self-as-object separated from its initial social and moral embeddedness; as process underway in Greek antiquity; but a heightened self-conscious-self and self-conscious awareness of an instrumental-self. The "egoistic-instrumental-self", also emergent in Antiquity, is during Renaissance times not only increasingly essentialized, but disengaged from the "self-conscious-self", and assumes problematic and internally directed forms.

The Renaissance problematic; self-consciously instrumental, egoistic, and internally directed self-as-object; sets the stage for later nineteenth and early twentieth century argument as to its mechanisms and degree of historicalness. Nineteenth century
argument as to the historicalness of "self-as-object" may also be thought of as emergent from theoretical interest at this time in the naturalness of increased objectification at the cultural level.

I will now turn to this nineteenth century and early twentieth century treatment of cultural and self objectification by Hegel, Marx, and the Young Hegelians on the one hand; and Simmel, on the other. As we shall see later, their contrasting treatments of self-as-object are also strongly visible in the three twentieth century schools that am considering.

D. Objectification in Modernity; Hegel, the Young Hegelians, and Marx.

(i) Cultural and Self Objectification - Overview.

During the nineteenth to early twentieth century, views of modern cultural and self objectification as both hostile, alien and historical; and idealized, natural and essential, are apparent. It is generally Simmel's idealistic and essentialist leanings, together with those of the early Chicago school who are influenced by him; which offer a contrast to the Young Hegelian and Marxist more problematic and historical characterization of self-as-object. These two contrasting orientations toward self-as-object may also be characterized in
terms of elaborations of, and/or reaction to, differing aspects of Hegel's treatment of modern objectifying tendencies.

Common to both streams of thought, and to Hegel, is an expressed concern regarding the integration rather than isolation of the person in modern objectified culture; and concern for a self-as-instrument integrated with a distinctively human self-consciousness.

There is another kind of sense in which these divergent theoretical strains are complimentary; insofar as Simmel contributes more to later theory concerning the self-conscious-self, while Marxist views are more visible in later conceptions of the nature of self-as-instrument; as will be discussed in this thesis.

In the discussion below both streams of thought and their relation to Hegel's positions will be considered; first, as regarding the self-conscious-self and then the instrumental self.

(ii) The Self-Conscious Self in Hegel, the Young Hegelians, Marx, and Simmel.

Hegel (1949:232-266,502-516,650,374-377; 1900:363) "whose philosophy had become supreme in Germany during the 1820's", addresses both natural and unnatural and problematic aspects of
self-consciousness, although his abstract and metaphorical
"self-consciousness" is, in the main, presented in evolutionary
and hence natural terms. For example, Hegel refers to its
elevation of "individual content" to a universal "spiritual
objectivity"; which progresses through the "vehicle.." of an
idealized culture." This idealized self-consciousness, as an
expression and affirmation of a universal and moral will; is
also conceived as concretely realized, rather than derivative
of, individual "personality" and "empirical consciousness."
(McClellan, 1969:1).

Essential to the natural progress and evolutionary advancement
of such self-consciousness, according to Hegel, is an active and
dialectical "double process" of encounter with the "others'
reality" or "externality", which is eventually "turned back
directly into itself". The natural course of this dialectical
process is stated as having its beginning in a "detached",
alienated and estranged self. It is this self that must be
dialectically cancelled and transcended in order to rise "to the
level of objective truth.." and freedom and emancipation "from
..the limited and the external"; as well as from "constraint"

Such process is also described in terms of a coming outside of
self and of self realizing and becoming aware of itself, with a
resulting emergence in "detailed distinctiveness" of an
"independent self-consciousness" which yet contains the "other", "outside itself". (Hegel, 1949; 229-233)

The idealization and essentialization of an independent self not containing the other, becomes more apparent in Simmel and that stream of Chicago School theory influenced by him; as will be discussed below. The naturalization of a more independent self-conscious self also has implications, to be discussed in this thesis, for the naturalization of an egoistically based instrumental self. However, within Hegel's (1900:374-375,377; 1949:253) theory itself, there is little hint of an idealized naturalization of an independent or egoist self in the modern sense. Hegel's self-consciousness is rather described as advancing from an initial state of independent and alien self-conscious "particularity", with its dependence on disposition and sentiment; to "a principle of right... external" to human subjectivity and equated with a moral comprehensiveness of being."

To him, when this does not occur, self-consciousness assumes the form of a permanently alienated and unnatural "self feeling" derivative of retreat from the external into self. In this regard, Hegel (1949:251-264,503,514-515,229,233; 1900:363,375) describes a "self-feeling" or "unhappy consciousness", "remote" and "brooding over itself"; with a "sense of the bare empty unit of the person;" as a condition in which one's true
life, personality, and subjective embodiment seems to be outside and "remote from its self"; and yet are felt to be one's own self. Under such conditions, historically emergent in the heightened awareness of one's self and role-playing in the Renaissance; the external becomes "an object... alien..." and constraining. (Greenblatt, 1980:12-17,27-72).

To summarize, Hegel's abstract "self-consciousness", advancing in evolutionary terms at the cultural level, may be realized at the individual level in a permanently unnatural and alienated state, as well as in dialectically liberating, expansive and self-conscious terms.

In the Young Hegelian group active in the 1830's after Hegel's death, and until 1844; increasing objectification at the level of state and self are at times addressed, as in Hegel, in abstract and evolutionary terms. (McLellan, 1969:22-23,40-66).

Of the Young Hegelian group, Bauer in fact approaches an abstractly conceived "self-consciousness" in even more spiritual, transcendent, and arguably reified terms than Hegel; describing it as in its infinitude "embrace(ing) everything, the source of everything" , and the "the sole power of the universe..". For Bauer, it also clearly retains its natural and evolutionary character; being connected to "the progress of man's spirit". Similarly, Hess views the "self-conscious ego as

At the same time, however, there is a tendency within the Young Hegelian group, particularly in Cieskowski, Ruge, and Feuerbach, as well as in Marx, to view cultural objectification and/or modern self-consciousness in more problematic and more historical terms. For example, along with Marx, Feuerbach views Hegel’s "alienated self-consciousness" in terms of a historically and culturally rather than individually derived "loss of..self" and outside, reified placement of oneself. Such loss of self is also treated as contrary to essential and distinctively human needs (Marx and Engels, 1959:60; McLellan, 1969:51-64,149-155).

In terms of specific historical mechanisms, Bauer and Feuerbach discuss religion as a forum in which "self-consciousness makes itself into an object, and an imaginary separate and reified thing "out of control," and "deprived of its value.." . Modern religious consciousness is also referred to by Bauer as "the work of a divided mind and the objectification of this very division.." (McLellan, 1969:61,64,89,41,149).

This approach to modern religious consciousness as alienated in its objectification, is extended by some in the Young Hegelian group to a more generally objectified modern consciousness
and/or self-consciousness. Hess, for example, links a generally problematic modern self-consciousness to economic and social conditions, including private property; and, beginning in 1840, Engels and Marx associate the development of capitalism with modern alienated objectification (McLellan, 1969:42,45,152,155).

Marx specifically implicates the money economy and its connection with private property, the separation of labour, and exchange and competition, as conditions conducive to modern cultural objectification and objectified human social relations. For it is in such conditions that forced labour arises and one's action becomes devoid of spontaneity and no longer an expression of one's "essential being". The worker under conditions of forced labour is also described as no longer able to exercise his distinctively human capability of working-up and creating an objective world; inhabiting instead a world which belongs not to him but to the object. Having "put his life" into this object, the worker no longer "feels himself "to be freely active in any but his animal functions.." (Marx and Engels, 1959:56-63; McLellan, 1960:133)

Marx (1959:56-63) also characterizes the modern world as one in which things are increasingly valued, and men devalued into market commodities; their natural "species being" being transformed into a mere means of maintaining an individual physical existence. Furthermore, "everything which appears in
the worker" as an activity of alienation and estrangement appears in the non-worker as a state of "alienation, of estrangement" (Tucker, 1959:67).

A Marxist analysis would further suggest that the alien and objectified self becomes even more accentuated in modern, increasingly differentiated cultures, with their more sophisticated technology and increased surplus. This is because it is these cultures that are more likely "to have private ownership of land...commodity exchange and...coercive forms of labour..." As well, increased technology and surplus are more likely to be accompanied by a restriction of political and legal decision-making to a small minority of the community. This places limits on the positive free and expansive consciousness of self referred to in Hegel and in Heller's (1978) characterization of Greek and early Renaissance persons (Archibald, 1989:181).

Thus, in contrast to Hegel's general idealization and naturalization of cultural objectification; a Marxist analysis suggests a generally diminished, alien and problematic experience of self in modern culture; an "unhappy self-consciousness" generally and pervasively blocking persons. Marx specifically advocates conditions of 'free labour' to address negative modern conditions inclusive of objectification. It is then that persons can be affirmed in their objective world; with
their productions objectifications of their own essential individuality rather alien and oppressive to them. Furthermore, although he believes that it is important for workers to retain "some aspirations" for "objective individuality" and of themselves "as agents of history", as an incentive and prerequisite for initiating "fully historic change; he also believes that such individuality should not be understood separately from human communal life, it being just their particularities that make 'individual(s)', real 'individual' communal beings. (Archibald, 1989:53; McLellan, 1969:108-113,60,67, Marx cited in McLellan:110).

Marx's problematic and historical placement of modern objectification constitutes a type of approach to be differentiated from Simmel's liberal approach below.

(iii) The Self-Conscious-Self in Simmel.

As opposed to the movement of thought within the Young Hegelian group and in Marx, Simmel's response to the cultural objectification which accompanied the epochal social.."transformations(s)" of the nineteenth century, is relatively positive; embracing values of rationalism, "philosophic liberalism" and "individualism" (Nisbet 1966:8; Lawrence 1976:412; Gouldner, 1970)
His "objectification" emphasizes the Hegelian conception of objectified self and culture as differentiated, morally transcendent over "subjective particularities" and prejudices, and free from community constraints. Also reminiscent of Hegel's approach, Simmel characterizes the increasingly objectified modern world in somewhat abstract, evolutionary, and progressive terms; as advancing the "sum total of...knowledge.." through processes of higher unification, "concentration..of..truth" and "spiritual achievement" of the human community. He also joins Hegel in "enthrone(ing)" objectification in an ideal realm above society and the individual; referring to cultural objectification, for example, as the "great process of objectification of our most recent culture" (1976:197-213,117,197,181; 1950:170,255-256,319,351; 1969a:707,236).

Simmel specifically characterizes objectification as an "intellectual approach to people and things", and an approach of "pure logic". Practically, the objectified modern world is believed to be more efficient and specialized; a world "that can be acquired without strife or suppression." To Simmel, the modern specialized division of labour and its focus on objective functions of individuals, the money economy, and the modern metropolis in which they emerge; are linked to a cultural objectification characterized in terms of evolving human and historical capacity (Simmel, 1976:158-181,213,117,120,132).
In terms of essentialism, and reminiscent of the spiritual and progressive qualities imparted to Hegel's "self-consciousness", Simmel refers to cultural objectification as a growth and evolution of "the social macrocosm"; and a law-like historical force involving objects "follow(ing) more and more obediently their own inner logic..", according to their "own energies and norms." He also refers to cultural objectification as governed by an "impulse" inherent in nature, "to save energy" (1976:117-118,120,132,197,158,249,217; 1950:421).

To Simmel, increased cultural objectification implies parallel increases in the individual realm. His evolved romantic, liberal, and free objectified "self" is rooted in a correspondingly historically evolving social structure, and the idealized properties which he applies to cultural objectification are similarly applied to the inner lives of persons. In this vein, Simmel refers to objective differentiation as making it possible for persons to develop a "personality", or "the nucleus of an ego" as a "complex and dynamic" entity distinct from its surrounding world (1976:213,163; 1950:351,381,78-83).

He relates the increased "self-feeling(s) of modern individuals to a Hegel-like idealized expansion of being "at least partly" "connected" to the increased freedom within modernity to feel
and experience, as well as develop, "selves" as "objects" of "contemplation". Freedom to partake of other sources of experience and knowledge, or to "feed on objective sources which need not be personally present", is also implicated as critical in the development of the "ego" and of one's "awareness" of it. Simmel (1950:263,351,319; 1976:117,158-181) naturalizes the The objectified human personality not only in terms of human freedom, but of "spiritual development"; from undifferentiated "child-like and primitive" conditions of chaos, unity, emotionalism and impulsivity; to a capacity for "objective contemplation" distinguishing humans from the lower animals.

Earlier Chicago School theorists (Mead, 1964; Park, 1952,1969), strongly influenced by Simmel, tend at times to idealize and naturalize objectification and "self-as-object" even further, with their tendency to associate them with higher and distinctively human ideal capacities. However, like Hegel, the Young Hegelians, and Marx, Simmel himself did address more problematic and unnatural aspects of objectification in modern individuals. For example, consistent with a view of the changes of modernity as alienated, Simmel discusses the "superindividual", impersonal, and abstractly "detached" existence that modern culture assumes with reference to the "individual personality". He also points out a related limitation in the modern metropolis: the large amount of direct and reciprocal interaction between individuals and society, and
consequent exclusion of individuals who, at the same time, become more and more "dependent on...objects". Simmel also echoes Marx in his expression of concern for the devaluation of persons relative to objects in the modern objectified world; with Simmel referring, as well, to an "atrophy of individual culture through the hypertrophy of objective culture". (Simmel, 1950:169,415-423; 1976:206,216; 1969b:592; Tucker, 1959:57).

It should be noted, however, that Simmel (1976:206; 1950:415,422-423) generally framed the above problems as ones of too much, or an "overgrowth", of "objective culture"; rather than as qualitative changes. When Simmel does describe a qualitative reaction of individual withdrawal and retreat into self in the modern metropolis, he views it as functionally adaptive, and hence "natural". Thus persons in the modern metropolis who "nourish" and "elaborate" their "individuality; summoning "the utmost in uniqueness and particularization in defense of "personal colorations and incomparabilities" "displac(ed)"; are viewed as doing so in order to "preserve" a "personal core" which has become limited in the degree to which it can be socially expressed; as well as to establish a "fixed point" of reference difficult to find "in anything external" to oneself. Individual "reserve" and retreat are also characterized as positive and functionally adaptive reactions to the "continuous external contacts with innumerable people" in the modern metropolis; as well to the inevitable "distrust"
occasioned by its many "touch-and-go" contacts.

However, this retreat and defensive exaggeration of self, though regarded as problematic and historically specific in its linkage to the modern metropolis, are not viewed as having a fundamental transforming effect on persons' psyches, and Simmel does not assign to it the role of an originating mechanism of "self-as-object". Rather, he saw problems of cultural "overgrowth" as problems of degree, and of secondary by-products of a "fundamentally" sound and progressive social process (1950:229,421-422).

This may be explained in relation to his general placement of the modern objectified self in an idealized and non-conflictual merging of person and objective culture. Unlike the Marxist "dialectic", this merging is productive of a "self-as-object" less amenable to antagonistic, alien and historical; as opposed to natural colorations. In this vein, Simmel specifically emphasizes the "interweaving" between the inner life of persons, and the outer and concrete culture, as dual inner and outer components of a "unified" whole; if objectification is to advance to the benefit of persons and culture. His "objectification of mind" is also premised on such dual, harmonious and reciprocal interaction (1976:163,213,218; 1950:318,258).
Paradoxically, however, Simmel's (1976:170,117,42,166; 1950:351,263) self-as-object also has a less qualified attribute of "independence" than does Hegel's, the Young Hegelians, or Marx. His "objectified personality" or "ego" is thus not only freer of group and societal constraints, but more autonomous and independent of the social sphere. He states that the result of persons' reciprocal interactions with a more objectified culture, is a more independent individual who is socially "determining" as much as "determined."

I am contending that it is such an independent "self-conscious-self", ripped from its active, social and moral embeddedness, that is conducive to being problematized, or approached as historically relative, in later social theory. Such self-consciousness then becomes a secondary and "unreal" social artifact, a by-product of retreat from a hostile and alienating world, and/or a consciously engineered construction by historical occupants of power. On the other hand, a Simmel-like faith in an independent and autonomous individual self, and focus on "the self" as "an experiential core of being"; is characteristic of liberal modernity, and visible in particular in naturalized views of self-as-object in Early Chicago School theory. (Parker, 1989:83; Simmel, 1950:81,82; Nisbet, 1966:10; (Cooley, 1902; Goffman, 1959, 1986; Sennett, 1977; Foucault, 1986; Rose, 1990).
(iv) The Instrumental-Self.

Problematic behavioral manifestations of "self-as-object-of-consciousness" and/or cultural objectification, are described by Hegel, Marx, and Simmel, as discussed above.

However, it is left to Park of the Chicago school to explicitly relate self-as-object in the behavioral and conceptual realms. The manner in which he does so, in relation to both an altruistically and egoistically conceived instrumental self, will conclude this chapter.

As early Chicago School theory, Park's inconsistent naturalization of both the "egoistic" and "altruistic" self-as-instrument, marks a turning point within this modern school, beyond which "self-as-altruistic-instrument" is no longer regarded as descriptive of reality or potential reality; and a naturalized "self-as-egoistical-instrument" is no longer seen as warranting or as capable of historical correction. The movement from Hegel's and Marx's belief and emphasis on the realizability of a more social and altruistic self-as-instrument; towards an increasingly naturalized "self-as-egoistic instrument" in Simmel and Park, will also be outlined below.

Hegel (1949:239-264,407,519-520,650-651; 1900:363-409,321) had
referred to a self-consciousness based upon retreat and withdrawal rather than dialectical expansion into a moral "comprehensiveness of being;" as an unnatural violation of the essential Good and "ethical order", and therefore as having implications in the behavioral realm. Thus, when self-consciousness is incapable of expanding toward a "principle of right" external to the individual, it also has "a merely vain and futile 'mind of its own'; taking its material from "passion, caprice..desire, lust, fancy" and "self-interest." It becomes realized, then, as "individual personality..confined within its narrow self and its petty activity." As well, such "self-feeling" is associated with a pursuit of "object(s)..'with soulless and heartless severity" as "mere dominion"; as well as with "frauds, cunning", and flattery. Ironically, in his description of a related very unnatural keeping up of forms, appearances, and "theatrical display", in "the public sphere"; Hegel makes use of a theatrical metaphor later drawn upon by Simmel and Chicago School theorists in their naturalization of "humans-as-theatrical-performers".

To Marx, the contamination of one's activity and private and social relations by objectified commodity exchange relations has implications for their estranged and/or confrontational character as, for example, "mainly means toward narrow ends.." These "human relations lose..distinguishing characterisits and are..reduced towared those of other animal(s)". (Archibald,
Moving to the latter half of the nineteenth century, Simmel, while expressing concern about problematic behavioral and social relations related to the amount of objectification and impersonality of modern life; does not view these changes as having fundamental import or as opposed to distinctively human needs. (Simmel, 1950:415,422,318; 1969b,592; 1976:216,176-187,206).

Similar to Hegel, he links objective behavioral activity towards others, to the capacity in certain individuals to act out of purposes of "selfish individualism" and "egoism" that are without regard for persons and their subjectivities. He also links absolutely objective orientations to an emphasis on deceit and, as first noted by Aristotle, the keeping up of forms and appearances; and discusses related conscious deception and lies asethically objectionable. However, Simmel approaches these and other behavioral applications of self-as-object, like those of the self-conscious-self; as problems of degree, and as applying only in restricted circumstances of absolute objective orientation, and/or as misguided applications of the objective "intellectual approach." Thus these behavioral orientations are again treated as more the unnatural exception than the natural state, and not as representing fundamental or historically problematic changes in the orientation of human behavior.
Furthermore, although Simmel (1950:411,412,293; 1976:175) treats them at times as qualitative and problematic aspects of modern objectified culture, he does so with great inconsistency. Thus at times, and in a manner consistent with Marx, teleological or instrumental modes of being in modern objectified culture are discussed as reducing to "mere means an extraordinary number of things..", and making life into "one vast teleological system.." Simmel is also reminiscent of Marx in his elaboration of the importance of money to modern cultural objectification; stating that modern money is conducive to calculative and instrumental rather than emotional orientations in modern behaviour.

However, at other times he essentializes this kind of egoistic instrumental use of self, as is the case with retreat into the "self-conscious-self", in terms of functional adaptation. For example, he discusses teleologically oriented actions and other objectified and calculative "techniques" (s) "directed by the will" in order to attain goals, as natural and functional adaptations to a modern metropolitan life favouring "the exclusion of ..irrational (and) instinctive..traits and impulses.." He also associates conscious "deception" and "lies" with a distinctly human capacity to "modify... behavior in view of the fact that it is recognized" Furthermore, conscious
deception and lies are treated as "a selecting factor to breed intelligence or create leisure for the few... who need the leisure for producing higher cultural goods or for giving a leader to the group..."; and as contributing functionally to "the formation of certain concrete relations", and "the welfare of the many..." (1950:310-316).

The "psychological winning...over" and "exploitation" of persons are similarly naturalized, in certain cases, as an evolutionary advance over the "mechanical appropriation" of persons; and in other cases, as a "functional necessity" of metropolitan life, and as natural and "fruitful" human desire. Teleological and instrumental direction and recomposition of uttered thoughts are also naturalized as occurring largely on an instinctive and automatic basis, and most often without awareness. Thus persons are stated to be biologically predisposed to show their psychic processes "stylized by selection and arrangement". In places, the above orientations are also treated as traits distinctive of man the animal and his "inherent a priori demand for perfection". For human beings are believed to be "tool-making" and "goal-pursuing animal(s)" at the same time that they are "the objective animal." (1976:157,143; 1950:312).

It is not surprising, then, that Simmel (1950:310-311) sometimes regarded behavioral orientations towards form, appearance, and
teleology, problematized by Hegel and Marx, respectively; as natural. In this regard, Simmel states that the "other individual" is often "basically no more...than a piece of nature which poses for our cognition." Such naturalization of self-as-egoistic-instrument is compatible with Simmel's liberal view of the "self-conscious self", in terms of autonomy, independence, and reduced articulation and dependence on the surrounding social world, as discussed above.

Park, who imported Simmel's ideas to American Chicago School Sociology (Ritzer, 1983:47); addresses the above calculative, teleological and instrumental objectified behaviors, with the behavioral capacity "peculiar to human nature" to act with "self-consciousness"; thus explicitly treating objectified behavior as an expression of a "self-conscious-self" (Park and Burgess, 1969:190).

As with Simmel's "instrumental self", Park's evaluation of such self-conscious behavior, referred to as "conduct", is inconsistent. At times self-conscious "conduct" as an instrumental application of self as means to a desired goal or end is related to an egoistic and problematic "artifice in..behavior"; while at other times it is discussed in terms of distinctively human natural qualities. (Park and Burgess, 1969:70,190; 1950:249-250,359-360).
Park’s negative and egoistic version of "conduct," in its pursuit of personal goals and concern with social convention and appearances, as well as its planned and "means-end" orientation towards such appearances, is seen as a more fundamental problem of modernity than Simmel’s "objectification." For example, Park employs a theatrical metaphor drawn upon previously by Hegel, in that he describes such "conduct" in terms of "impersonat(ion)"; "front"; "role" or "mask"; "played by an "actor", in the service of individual "striving(s)"; and points out that the word "personality" is "derived from the Latin 'persona', and means a "mask used by actors." (Park and Burgess, 1969:70,191-192; 1950:249-250,359-360).

Park’s (1969:190-192) positive and natural version of self-conscious "conduct" on the other hand, is one of idealization and linkage to capacities "peculiar to human nature", such as the capacity to judge and morally evaluate actions; as well as to be ethically directed by societal customs, laws and beliefs. This version of "conduct" is more reminiscent of the ancient Greek notion of an altruistic and social "instrumental-self."

Subsequent to Park, Chicago School theory in the person of Goffman not only naturalizes "self-as-egoistic-object", but also treats it as developmentally and/or and logically prior to the "self-conscious" self; a view not uncommon to twentieth century "self-as-object theory, as will be illustrated in this thesis."
Twentieth century self-as-object theory also tends increasingly to address itself to self-as-object in either behavioral or conceptual realms; or within the instrumental self, either in internal or extrinsically-directed realms.

Thus, while Chicago School theory more strongly addresses the self-conscious-self; Mass Society Theory focuses on an externally directed "self-as-instrument"; through terms such as "mask", "instrument", "manipulation", "manipulation of self" and of "people," "self-management, and "self-control"; (Mills, 1956:182-184,188; Riesman,1961: 128,129,149,151) Post-Modern theory strongly focuses on the "self-conscious-self", and upon internally-oriented instrumental manipulations. (Foucault, 1986; Rose, 1990)

In the following "Chicago School" chapter, I will begin detailed discussion and analysis of the nature and mechanisms of origin of an increasingly essentialized self-as-egoistic-instrument, problematized self-conscious-self, and separation of self-as-object in the two spheres.
CHAPTER TWO

THE CHICAGO SCHOOL
In the United States, sociology "took hold as an academic discipline largely under the aegis of the University of Chicago." "Chicago School" theory reached its "fruition" and peak influence in the 1920's, but continued to dominate American sociology into the 1930's, and developed further in the 1940's and 1950's. However, the Chicago School theorists whose works I am considering in relation to the self-as-object, span the twentieth century, and reflect a diversity of approaches, orientations and influences. I will open this chapter by "locating" changing Chicago School orientations to self-as-object within the varying social contexts and theoretical influences surrounding Chicago School theory over the course of the century (Gouldner, 1970:20-22; Ritzer, 1983:46-50).

For practical purposes, I will mark off temporal and conceptual "boundaries" relating to the Chicago School "self-as-object", through designations of "early", "mid", and "late" Chicago School Theory.

The "early" Chicago school will be represented by Mead and Cooley. Mead, a philosopher, is considered a significant theoretical influence on Chicago School thought. Cooley, though spending his career at the University of Michigan, is also associated with the Chicago School. (Ritzer, 1983:47)
Park will be regarded as a "mid" Chicago school theorist. Although his formative years in the 1880's and 90's were roughly the same as those of Cooley and Mead, he lived into the 1940's, and his theory presents a bridge between the socially embedded and idealized self-as-object of Mead and Cooley; and the more socially detached and egoistic character of the self-as-object in Goffman's "later" work (Ritzer, 1983:48).

Goffman, who did his graduate work at the University of Chicago, is "often thought of as the last major thinker associated with the original Chicago School." Between the 1950's and into the 1970's he developed a "dramaturgical" approach to interpersonal social life. His "dramaturgical" self-as-object, in both behavioral and conceptual realms, is most extensively and clearly illustrated in "The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life." Discussion will centre on this work and will be supplemented by Goffman's more structural orientation to everyday "self presentation" and self experience in his 1986 book; "Frame Analysis." (Ritzer, 1983:63-64,192).

After discussing Chicago school colorations of the "self-as-object" in relation to social and theoretical influences, I will specifically examine early Chicago School "liberal faith", and continuing liberal influences in Chicago School theory. The liberal influence, in its glorification of human individuality,
and/or independence, and autonomy; will be related to a more problematically than naturally conceived self-conscious-self and an increasingly naturalized self-as-egoistic-instrument, over the course of Chicago School theory. However, much of the discussion of the naturalized self-as-egoistic-instrument will occur in the last section of this chapter on "Chicago School Pragmatism." It is the pragmatic influence that has the most directly discernable and readily traceable relationship to the alterations in Chicago School approaches to the self-as-object over the course of the century.

Early Chicago School theory tends to concentrate more on the "self-conscious-self" aspect of the self-as-object, while Goffman’s later theory focuses more on the self-as-instrument, and Park’s works include ample discussion of both. My analysis of the Chicago School self-as-object in this chapter will reflect these differences in focus.

1. FROM IDEAL TO ALIEN: THE SOCIAL AND THEORETICAL CONTEXT.

Of the European social theorists, it was Simmel’s social psychological and microscopic level interests that were most compatible with the American social psychological focus on small-scale interaction and symbolic interactionism. Simmel had an immediate and profound impact on early and mid Chicago School
thought. (Parker, 1990:13; Ritzer, 1983:28,30,50,64,47.)

Chicago school thinkers take Simmel’s (1969c:322-327) naturalization of objectification "one step further". For although Simmel idealizes and naturalizes modern cultural objectification in evolutionary terms, he also addresses at times a tension between positive and negative aspects of objectification in social relations. He refers to an "element of coolness", as well as a loss of "specific, centripetal character" and "sentiment of uniqueness", in modern relations. This is particularly evident in his discussion of the modern "stranger"; as remote, distanced, alienated, and estranged; along with "the stranger’s" more desirable properties.

Early Chicago school theory emphasizes the ideal aspects of the modern objectified culture and/or self in terms of "evolutionary...social progress" and transcendence over nature’s previously unaided limits; as Simmel did. However, they do so with little of Simmel’s tensions or ambivalence. Cooley’s problematic types of "self-feeling" are individual problems, and the posings and posturings he describes are regarded as unintentional and not injurious. Mead’s "I", though asserting itself as a correcting factor to its sometimes over-mechanized, "routine" or "stereotyped" social sphere; is viewed as a contributory and altruistic rather than as an oppositional force and is not believed to be normally required. (Ritzer, 1983:41;

Although Simmel (1976:157,164-165,215; 1969c:323) does at times describe objectified orientations in human behavior as "individual-level" problems; he locates his evolutionary cultural objectification process in relation to such other macroscopic factors as "role" made possible when persons "can live by trade" as "middlemen", or are more mobile and less restricted to "a circle of customers." General conditions of urban living, a money economy, and a division of labour as discussed in the previous chapters, are also considered; and are picked up upon in Park's "mid" Chicago School theory. However, in both Simmel and Park, such historical references are general, little described, and hardly elaborated upon. In the other Chicago School theorists, they are even more scarcely and/or abstractly applied.

Bearing upon this tendency to steer away from macroscopic-level and historical factors is a conceptualized self/societal relationship as harmonious, natural, reciprocal, and conducive to the betterment of both individual and society. Such betterment includes the development of a freer and more independent individual which, as Hegel puts it; still contains the "other", "outside itself". Mead and Cooley join Simmel
(1976:201,247) in placing onus within this idealized process on the self-conscious-self, for "keeping up" with advances at the level of the cultural.

For example, Cooley, who states that self and "self-feeling" develop through reciprocal interaction between society and the individual as "aspects of the same thing..." and as "a case of a whole and one of its differentiated parts..."; also describes modern persons as responsible for transforming their "I", or, self-conscious-self, in such way that it becomes a "not easily distinguishable" "phase" of the natural self\societal "process" (Cooley,1902:90-93,319,149,151; 1962:324).

For his part, Mead (1964:209,216-245,17) conceives of a self-conscious-self as arising within an idealized and distinctively human process of taking and indicating to self the "organized social attitudes of the..social group" or, the "generalized other". In doing so, one is described as calling out in one self "a set of definite responses which belong to the others of the group." Here again, one's distinctively human self-consciousness is directly derivative of the idealized attitudes of the "social other".

Early Chicago school idealization and naturalization of the self-conscious-self in relation to an idealized social sphere, with its implication of "resistance to the social order" as
"unnatural;" renders cultural or historical treatment of it of limited relevance and pertinence. (Parker, 1990:17; Gouldner, 1970:20).

Park extends Simmel's idealized cultural objectification to the distinctively human capability "to gain "control over (one's) own nature, and "to observe" and "take a disinterested view of things"; through a self-conscious-self. However, Park's (1969:84,188,375,954-957; 1950:26-27,31,52-62,27,107-108,359-360,375,379) ambivalent and mixed attitudes toward the self-conscious-self frequently exceed Simmel's expressed ambivalence toward the objectified modern world. In relation to early Chicago School views, Park's self-conscious-self comes to be seen in terms other than as a harmonious product of reciprocal interaction within the social sphere.

Certainly, some of Park's (1952:52-53) "mid" Chicago School writings, as well as Goffman's work in the 1950's to 70's; need be understood in the context of a declining Chicago school influence in contemporary North American Sociology, and a diminishing propensity, generally, to adapt Simmel's ideal and natural orientations toward modern objectification. Thus Park generally shows less inclination to regard the changes of modernity in terms of natural progress and evolution. At times he describes modern individuals in very unnatural terms; stating that they are problematically situated in a world that they are
not "by nature" equipped to handle and in an "associated existence" to which they are unable to "wholly reconcile (them) selves". As was the case in the Renaissance, perceptions of a harsher and more alien culture accompany descriptions of a more conflictual, distanced, and alienated experience of the individual and self (Coser, 1977:379-380; Ritzer, 1983:22,42,46-50; Gouldner, 1970:20-22; Nisbet, 1966:19; Park, 1969:312,375,326,954-957; 1950:375,250,360; 1952:26-31).

Of the European theorists, Marx's and Weber's conceptualizations of modern persons distanced and detached from self and social sphere, assume increased pertinence in Park's (1969:954-963,312,626; 1952:26-31,52-62,107-108) and Goffman's (1959:56) writings. Weber's and Marx's descriptions of a modern social world depersonalized, distanced from persons, and/or rationalized, and bureaucratized, are echoed in Park's and Goffman's work. Park comes to describe a self-as-object that emerges as a defensive product of withdrawal from the social sphere; a process similar to Hegel's description of the "alien" "self-felling". He also introduces an unequivocal "self-as-instrument" of one's conscious goals. The varying manipulations of self and other carried out by such self-as-instrument, are sometimes treated as very unnatural and sometimes naturalized. At times, Park also offers highly naturalized versions of the self-conscious-self.
By the time of Goffman's (1959:254,56) "late" Chicago School theory, the self-conscious-self is consistently viewed as illusory, and the self-as-instrument of egoistic ends is consistently naturalized. Since the latter is naturalized as a part of human nature, it also does not lend itself to historical treatment or elaboration.

The above discussion of the social and theoretical context surrounding Chicago School colorations of the self-as-object has also given us a general overview of the general direction of change in conceptualizations of the self-as-object over the course of Chicago School theory; that is, towards an increasingly unnatural and problematic self-conscious-self and an increasingly naturalized self-as-egoistic-instrument and self-as-instrument.

The general orientation of change from ideal to more detached and alien views of the self-as-object will now be more specifically related to the changing "liberal vision" of early, mid, and late Chicago School theory.

2. LIBERALISM

Simmel's idealized and naturalized "growing independence" and "autonomous self-sufficiency" of the individual" in "liberal
orders"; is echoed in Mead’s, Cooley’s and Park’s salutary attitude towards free enterprise, capitalism, the market economy, and the modern competitive division of labour. Park echoes Simmel in glorifying the modern division of labour as enabling persons to develop their own vocation and peculiar and special individual talents (Simmel, 1950:294,351; 1976:219-220; Park, 1969:712; Cooley, 1962:53-56; Mead, 1936:170-175).

Park (1969:314,712,757-758; 1952:262,175; 1950:360), who at times expresses views strongly influenced by Simmel, specifically describes the urban "larger, freer world of men and affairs" as both the "natural environment of the free man" and as offering "room and freedom for the expansion, differentiation, and development of... individual aptitudes." The urban environment is stated to provide opportunity to find, "somewhere among (its) varied manifestations", "the sort of environment... that brings (one’s) innate qualities to full and free expression"; as well as facilitating self-expansion.

The change from more direct, intimate and face-to-face "primary" relations to modern metropolitan indirect, secondary and less personal relations, is also referred to as a development of individual freedom and lessening of restriction by "the family and the local community". Park sees such development as providing a larger content for the individual’s "self-conception" (Park, 1952:32,47-48; 1969:311-312; 1950:358).
At times, Park (1952:175) joins Simmel in viewing this metropolitan life as heightening one's experience of the individual self and sense of uniqueness from the larger social sphere. Moreover, "it is the individual's possession and consciousness of a unique experience, and his disposition to think and act in terms of it, that constitutes him finally a person."

An idealization of human autonomy and accompanying naturalization of the self-conscious-self is even more apparent in Mead's (1964:230-236; 1936:405-407) and Cooley's (1902:211,216; 1962:48) work. For example, Mead's independent and autonomous "I" is glorified in its capacity for creative, indeterminate, and noncalculative "responsive "movement(s) into the future". Mead states that this "I" or "ego" develops from awareness of one's past responses to the "socialized me". Even Cooley, whose self-conscious "I" and "ego" cannot be conceived separately from the other and "you", glorifies and naturalizes a concern for "what the individual actually is, as only he himself can know and appropriate." For "insofar as a man amounts to anything, stands for anything, (and) is truly an individual, he has an ego about which his passions cluster."

Such an "Early Chicago School" celebratory view of individual autonomy continues to be found in contemporary times. For

However, within the Chicago School, it is again Park's (1952:156,252,176,203; 1950:361) "mid" Chicago theory which begins to question faith in human self, agency, and the individual production of meaning, including that of the "self-as-object". He expresses disenchantment and ambivalence with the liberal vision of a free society, stating that in it the individual is actually "more free on the political than the moral" level. Park is likewise sometimes disillusioned with notions of the free and independent thinker within that society; describing the self/societal relationship in terms of constraint and artificiality rather than independence. For example, he describes a society which is limited in its expectations and acceptance of persons' "independence of action". In this society, persons are described as withdrawing at times to "preserve...their independence of thought...when...unable to maintain their independence of action."

Park also refers to the difficult task of maintaining one's independence, and of the frequent tendency to abandon it; succumbing to self-conceptions derived by conventionally shaped societal roles. This will be elaborated upon below.
As well, defensive withdrawal "against the psychic assaults" of the other may be accomplished by making one's "manners a cloak" and one's "face a mask, behind which (one) is able to preserve a certain amount of inner freedom." This kind of self-as-object, naturalized in terms of its functionality and essentiality, is seen to have problematic consequences. For example, Park (1952:175-176,203; 1950:361,422-423) states that social communication and interaction between such "masked" individuals becomes difficult, and that this difficulty facilitates "racial" reserve and "prejudice."

Park (1952:203,175-176; 1950:361) also refers to a self-conscious-self that arises in response to one's "collision with the existing social order", a collision which he naturalized as an inevitable product of "personal association" and of the individual's developing maturity and increasing independence. Such self-consciousness results in an "inevitable personal reserve" and "private life" which "the individual himself conceives...as something...inaccessible to other minds." This reserve, in turn, heightens the person's consciousness of our "individual differences of experience, together with a sense of their ultimate incommunicability." It is additionally associated with our "racial" reserves, and with the appearance of "brooding, subjective, inscrutable egos."

Thus Park sees the self-as-object as a defensive response to a
difficult social environment which threatens one's freedom and independence; a response that is adaptive but that becomes problematic to individuals, their interpersonal relationships, and to society at large. Also, he shows movement towards the essentialization and naturalization of this problematically identified self-as-object.

By the time of "late" Chicago School theory Goffman's (1959:56,67,68,251-252,209; 1986:130,575) "bureaucratization of the spirit" appears to have informed the experience of the individual and self to the point that any notion of a "real" self is abandoned; with the conscious experience of self regarded as illusory and as having no natural basis. However, the free and independent American Chicago School liberal survives in Goffman's work at the situational level, in the actions of his self-as-egoistic-instrument; constantly at work manipulating appearances in order to get others to define situations to his/her advantage. Such self-as-instrument, essentialized to meet the demands of a harsh social world, seemingly exercises its freedom and independence to the point of being completely torn from any social rooting or connectedness. Hegel, Feuerbach, Marx, Simmel and the early Chicago School theorists would characterize such a self-conscious-self as "unnatural."

In summary, in Park's work the earlier Chicago school self-
conscious-self, idealized and naturalized, partly in its freedom, independence, and expansiveness; begins to give way to a notion of an unnatural self-conscious-self formed from societal collision or threats to one's independence. In turn, this problematic, unnatural self-conscious-self comes to be essentialized; and the concrete actions of the self-as-egoistic-instrument to be identified with "the natural".

Thus with the rise and relative fall of the possibility of a free and independent society and self within that society, there emerges a self-as-object either increasingly problematized by the theorist, or essentialized in its alien and socially detached characteristics. At the same time, a more cynically based self-as-instrument and self-as-egoistic-instrument comes to predominate Chicago school "self-as-object" theory.

Now we will turn to the relationship between turn-of-the-century American pragmatic thought and Chicago School theories of self-as-object. American pragmatism may be understood as having a strong and direct theoretical impact on conceptions of the mechanisms and naturalness of the self-as-object.
3. CHICAGO SCHOOL PRAGMATISM

(A) Background

Early Chicago School approaches to the self-as-object were heavily influenced by the turn-of-the-century American "pragmaticist" and pragmatic philosophies of C.S. Pierce and William James, respectively; as well as the "instrumentalism" of John Dewey. These approaches, hereafter collectively referred to as "pragmatic", may be understood as a reaction against European formalism. The pragmatic philosophy of Pierce, James, and Dewey is generally characterized as finding the bearing or meaning of any particular statement in its consequences, "objective result(s)" or, possibilities for future action or experience (Russell, 1959:276-278; Coser, 1977:290,333-352,456).

James and Dewey are particularly prominently cited in Chicago School theory in the works of Mead (1964:16-17,228,67-77; 1936:344) and Cooley (1902:90-91,136-138,143). These two American pragmatists also make contributions to Park's 1921 Sociological Textbook, "An Introduction to the Science of Sociology", and are cited by Park and Goffman (See, for example, James cited in Park, 1921:80, Dewey in Park, 1952:173,200, and James in Goffman, 1956:48-49).

In the realm of behavior, pragmatic philosophy appears
especially compatible with the Chicago school self-as-instrument, in its emphasis on objective consequences and results as defining meaning. In fact, the roots of a naturalized, pragmatically-oriented self-as-instrument are visible from the time of early Chicago school theory.

Although classical American pragmatic philosophers believed that truth and meaning resided in the consequences or objective results of action, they approached the meaning of instrumental activity as lying in long-term consequences as well as immediate results.


However, neither of these classical pragmatist's come close to naturalizing behavior towards others that is consciously or knowingly instrumental or egoistically motivated. It is left to Goffman and at times, Park, within Chicago School theory, to naturalize such behavior. James, for his part, maintains that a
high level of consistency in behavior towards others is called for if one is to lead a happy and harmonious life. He characterizes the "heterogeneous personality" as pathological, and views conduct as generally guided by the "natural good", and the "spiritual" and moral life.

Dewey explicitly (1969a:186) denounces the knowing instrumental use of self "so as to get desired results, without reference to the emotional and intellectual disposition and consent of those used." Both Dewey and James hold that impulses consciously controlled in intelligent behavior should be controlled in distinctively human and altruistic ways (Dewey, 1969b, 76-79; James, 1969:122-126).

Thus although the "classical" pragmatists do not naturalize a self-as-egoistic instrument oriented to the attainment of specific goals through the manipulation of others in interpersonal situations; Chicago school theorists increasingly come to apply pragmatic emphasis on teleologically oriented behavior and practical and functional results, towards a naturalized self-as-egoistic-instrument; and a relatively denaturalized self-conscious-self whose workings are not empirically or concretely observable.

The Chicago school tendency to naturalize the self-as-object in terms of adaptation, pragmatism, and functionality; including
functionality essential to human evolution; may also be understood as drawing from Darwin. The Darwinian view of intelligence as "a problem-solving activity," and "naturalistic conception of..mind" in terms of "instrumental process"; had impact upon the developing Chicago School "brand of pragmatism" (Mead, 1964:4-18; Park 1952:145-146; Cooley, 1902:66,190-191; Coser, 1977:318,348-349).

Regarding the self-conscious-self, Goffman joins Cooley (1902:138) in acknowledging James's influence upon his ethereal conception of the self-conscious-self. Such influence can be related to a strand of James's thinking which he calls the doctrine of 'radical empiricism'. This doctrine generally assumes truth and meaning are to be found not in one's self or self-consciousness, since it is only our experience of self and self-consciousness that we can really know. The ramifications of this approach are particularly clear and well developed in Cooley's self-conscious-self (Russell, 1959:278).

Hegel's German Idealism, with its transcendental and romantic qualities, is also incorporated into the distinctively "Chicago School" pragmatic view of the self-conscious-self. Both James's ethereal approach, and Hegel's idealistic, romantic, and transcendental orientation, bear relation to the eventual denaturalization of the self-conscious-self.
The ethereal and ideal/transcendental qualities in the Chicago school pragmatic self-conscious-self are not unrelated; the "ethereal self-conscious-self" refers to an ideal and transcendental realm outside of self, and therefore amenable to assuming qualities of detachment and alienation from self.

(B) Early Chicago School Pragmatism

The first section below deals with Hegel's German Idealist influence, and the second with James' contribution, to the self-conscious-self emergent in early Chicago School theory. These two sections will explore in further detail the roots of doubts concerning the naturalness of the self-conscious-self in early Chicago School theory, and will demonstrate the ease with which such self-conscious-self becomes denaturalized in later Chicago School theory.

Consistent with a pragmatic approach, Early Chicago School theorists will be shown to naturalize the self-conscious-self in relation to its functionality, rather than its "weak" intrinsic properties. The third section below will specifically describe the largely functional and pragmatic mechanisms and bases of naturalization of Mead's and Cooley's self-conscious-self.

It is particularly in the context of a more alien and harsh
experience of self and social world expressed by Park, and pervasive in Goffman's theory; that the early Chicago School ethereal and transcendental self-conscious-self is taken to its extreme expression and logical conclusion.

(i) An Ideal/Transcendent Self-Conscious-Self.

German idealistic or romantic philosophy emphasizes the creative capabilities of an "I" not only free and independent but "transcendental"; taking on reified properties and powers of its own. This is illustrated in Hegel's characterization of self-consciousness "find(ing) its own action and existence" "in objects" (Hegel, 1949:267; Coser, 1971:348).

In early Chicago School theory, Cooley's (1902:152) looking glass self-conscious-self, in its derivation from subjective reactions to one's imagined or inferred "appearance" in the eyes of the other, also looks for and "finds its... existence", "in objects" (Hegel).

Mead's (1964:3-18,77,92-101,210,220,228-230,349) debt to German idealistic philosophy is discernable in his discussions of subjective states as functionally initiating phases of acts to be completed by the responding organism, and of subjects
"Involv(ing) the object in order that we may have consciousness." He further refers to self-consciousness as creating the conditions whereby persons are able to create meaning or to "think at all".

Mead (1964:77;3-18,100) is also importantly influenced by Hegel's "romantic(aly)" transcendental approach to the interplay between subject and object that is also evident in Simmel's writings. As well as his "self-consciousness", Mead's "self" and "meaning" arise in a "dynamic" process that passes from the subject to the object "phase" of the subject-object relationship. Subject and objects are further described as not "static" and as not existing in themselves. Consciousness becomes an act "not distinct from the world about us", and the self-conscious-self becomes not only ethereal; but located outside the individual.

Explicitly borrowing from both the German Idealists Hegel and Darwin, Mead (1964:121,13-18) describes the processes of such subject/object interplay in terms of a single "life-process" that assumes different forms. He also describes the self-conscious-self as arising from an abstract process whereby one assumes the perspective of an ever larger and more organized moral universe of "generalized others" outside the self.

In his transcendental approach to self and the self-conscious-
self, Cooley expresses (1962:319,324; 1902:90-93,149,151) indebtedness to James and others for the "idea that..persons (are) composed largely of common elements." In this vein, Cooley regards social "institutions(s) as "representing .a development far transcending any ..personal consciousness". Personal ideas are believed to have "no existence apart from a mental whole..", and in regards to the self-conscious-self, individual's are described as not capable of feeling or sensing a unique or particular "I", or, self-consciousness,.. without a "correlative sense of you, or he. or they."

(ii) An Ethereal Self-Conscious-Self

Cooley's ethereal self-conscious-self, or "I", also echoes James's "radically empiricist" "unreal" self-consciousness. Particularly strongly influenced by James, Cooley cites James's notion of our conscious "self" designations as "..things which produce..excitement of a certain peculiar sort". Cooley also describes the "I" as "known to our experience primarily as a feeling.." not clearly or definitely "marked off in experience from other kinds of feeling" (Cooley, 1902:138-143; Russell, 1959:278).

Cooley (1902:,89-95,138-167,210) goes on to characterize the "I," or "self-feeling", as an "imaginative self"; and as
"crude" and "vague"; being "made up of..innumerable sentiments, as well as a good deal of primitive emotion." "Self-feeling" becomes, to him, "a certain part of our thought with which we connect a distinctive emotion or sentiment." Like the emotions, attitudes, purposes, desires, claims, ideas, and other mental contents correlated with it, this self-conscious-self becomes a secondary imaginative product without rooting in any natural, "sensual," or material fact. Thus ideas and feelings of a material or individually existent self are regarded by Cooley as "illus(ory)".

Cooley (1902:89-95,151-167,217) nevertheless associates a "self-idea" of the looking-glass "sort", with one’s "somewhat definite imagination of how one’s self..appears in a particular mind", or, with the conscious reaction component of a "Looking-Glass" self. Cooley's looking-glass self consists in total of our imagination of the others' judgement of our appearance, and our reaction to such "reflected" self with "some sort of self-feeling, such as pride or mortification." Both self and self-conscious-self derivative of this process are naturalized as distinctive to human beings. For "as social beings we live with our eyes upon our reflection".

The looking-glass type of self-feeling, as an extension of a self not separable or "distinct, in our mind, from other persons"; is subject to whatever social interactional
influences one happens to be exposed to at any given time; Thus self-feeling becomes "a social sentiment, or type of sentiments, defined and developed by intercourse." However, to Cooley, (1902:90-93,149; 1962:23-67) such self-feeling and "intercourse" are not arbitrary and are altruistically based; arising as they do in relation to those others of our intimate "primary groups" with whom we most strongly identify, and who reflect the ideals of the larger social community.

Thus, however problematic a construct the self-conscious-self may appear to be, to Cooley, his (1902:153,217) "imaginative self" remains an ideal and distinctively human mental construction and social propensity.

Mead (1964:71-77) also cites James's doubts "as to whether consciousness as such exists"; and concludes that the consciousness of self as a structurally "static" entity is illusory. For if one tries "to find out what takes place in the experience of the individual..you get a surer clue if you take the man's action" than if you take certain static contents and say these are the consciousness of the man..

So the Chicago School self-conscious-self, naturalized on a reified and transcendental bases, and painted in an ethereal light, constitutes a weak construct amenable to denaturalization; particularly by later Chicago school theorists
who hold less idealized and transcendental notions of the relationship between the self and society.

In early Chicago School theory, the self-conscious-self was naturalized and idealized not along lines of inherent substance or basis in material fact, but in terms of functionality.

4. PRAGMATISM AND THE "EARLY" CHICAGO SELF-CONSCIOUS-SELF

Cooley's (1902:228,192,197,130-157,224) ethereal "I", "self-feeling", or "self-consciousness" is stated, in explicit agreement with James, as "enabl(ing) person(s) to "function..acceptably"; and to be used or discarded as needed. Cooley remarks that "if the "I" is interesting and agreeable we adopt it for the time being.." However, more frequently, Cooley's self-conscious-self, in both its positive and negative forms, is essentialized. For one thing, it is described as fulfilling distinctly human needs; and naturalized as an evolutionary instinct "very profoundly rooted" in "heredity", or, "the history of the human race and..indispensable to any plan of life at all similar to ours".

More specificality, self-conscious "self-feeling" is "doubtless connected in evolution with its important function in
stimulating and "unifying the special activities of individuals." It is also viewed as essential to human functioning in its provision of a consciousness of the peculiar or differentiated aspect of one's life" and of "the antithesis between the mind and the rest of the world." Further, according to Cooley if 'I' did not denote an idea much the same in all minds..it could not be used..universally as a means of communication. "

Cooley’s (1902:197,228,153) "I" or "self-feeling" is also associated with purposeful activity and thought, and the exercise of power and causality. For "it is only as we have self-consciousness that we can be aware of those special tendencies which we assert in production, or can learn to express them, or even have the desire to do so." Thus, to Cooley, "each man must have his "I"; it is more necessary to him than bread..".

However, Cooley’s (1902:224,164-167,197) proposed originating processes of "self-feeling" "of the looking-glass sort" is generally oriented away from the finer aspects of human evolution in it’s association with feelings of appropriation, concern with appearances, and ability to produce concrete and immediate behavioral effects in others. This "self-feeling" is described as developing through the child’s learnt appropriation as his/her own; a significant other’s (i.e. "parent or nurse"’
actions which the child believes to have influenced. Having "tasted the joy of being of cause, of exerting social power", children are stated to wish more of it. Thus they begin to perform and "pose" in ways that elicit specific effects such as "attracting attention". The child then begins "to apprehend personality, and to foresee its operation". According to this description, children would appear to acquire self-feeling from their egoistic manipulations of their sel(ves)-as-instruments, although this self-as-instrument may also be viewed developmentally, as an exercize of human capacity essential to feelings of self-competency and self-mastery, as well as to human reasoning capabilies.

Cooley (1902:160-167,139-140,149) also refers to "immature" self-feeling in a negative light, in terms of "affectation" and undue preoccupation with what other people think. He also problematizes it as oriented toward the aggressive and appropriative. However, its placement as part of normal child development, to an extent, naturalizes it. As well, Cooley at times describes self-feeling as never losing its "gusto of appropriation" and characterizes it as "a militant social tendency," always existing, and "working to hold and enlarge its place in the general current of tendencies." These naturalization of an appropriative "I" have added implications for the naturalization, of a self-as-egoistic-instrument"; to be picked upon in later Chicago School Theory.
Cooley's (Ibid., 160-167, 136-140) somewhat inconsistent discussions of self-feeling as artifactual to such things as "that towards which we (adults) have the 'my' attitude" and "that which is designated in common speech by the pronouns of the first person singular." would seem to reflect its ethereal and problematic nature to him. He also refers to the "I" as "learned in the same way that the meanings of hope, regret...and...other works of emotion and sentiment are learned: "that is, by having the feeling, imputing it to others in connection with some kind of expression, and hearing the word along with it."

Mead (1964: 3-18, 89-95, 77, 349-350), who characterizes distinctions between human consciousness and "the world about us" as "functional distinctions, regards the meaning of subjective states generally to be dependent upon their completion in the "response of the organism to whom they are directed." The mechanisms of self-consciousness, too, are placed in functional stimulus-response relations. Mead specifically emphasizes the distinctively human cognitive mechanisms underlying the stimulus-response relations formative of the self-conscious-self. To him, it is the human ability to assume the perspective of the other that is at the genesis of self-consciousness.
For according to Mead (1964:101-103), it is the assumption and organization of the perspectives of the other that allows one to reflexively address oneself; and, through the medium of language as significant symbol, become an object to oneself. Such a process, productive of the most elementary form of self-consciousness, is believed to mature with childrens' increasing capacities to address themselves not just from the role of "consecutive" others in their "play"; but from the organized attitudes of "generalized other"(s) towards the child. This is believed to occur in the taking of the organized roles of all players into account in following rules of "games." It is a process believed to develop yet further when the individual can assume "the generalized attitude of a member of a group...that widens until it takes in all rational individuals."

Reminiscent of Cooley, Mead (Ibid.,99) also describes infants as beginning to bring self into the field of experience in stimulating themselves "to play the parts which one's conduct and attitudes calls out in those about one". This reference to a self-as-object that arises in order to play parts which please others, also significantly places the self-conscious-self as emerging secondarily to instrumental and egoistic behavior.

Mead's (1964:13-18) originating conditions for consciously bringing "self" "into the field of experience", and the other purposes the self-consciousness serves, are to be viewed in
relation to a natural and evolutionary "life-process".

Mead's (1964:209,228,349) self-conscious-self performs such vital functions as providing for the core and primary structure of a self. Specifically, "in indicating oneself as carrying out an act", "content" is supplied "for the attachment of...memory image" to a self now identified with such acts, and thereby "isolated and rendered "definite". Thus the self-conscious-self is viewed as providing for the unified experience of an illusory, but functional, self "structure".

Such self-consciousness is also capable of controlling the "further expression" of such self. Mead (1964:96,238-241) contrasts such internal manipulation of self with "impulsive" "uncontrolled", and automatic activity. Paradoxically, in the form of Mead's "I", it is also associated with creativity, assertion to the demands of the "conventionalized" and determined social "me", and spontaneous "self expression". What is clear from these characterizations of the controlling of one's "expression", is Mead's position that once the self-conscious-self has developed, it can serve to guide and control conduct.

Mead (1964:95-97) approaches self-consciousness as not only at the root of the human self but of the human mind. For "the essential condition for the appearance of..mind is that the
individual...be acting with reference to himself, so that his action would include himself as an object." This occurs not in spontaneous or "immediate experience" but "in conduct within which readjustment must take place before the act is completed". It is then that there is "a place for such an involution as that of making one's self an object"; with one's action including "a reaction toward the individual himself".

Thus the processes of self-consciousness are framed not only as meeting higher human needs for a self and a mind, but as arising from the need to meet concrete and immediate needs. For Mead states that "the immediate function of the appearance of the self in experience is that of analyzing the complex response in the face of conflict, so that (there)...may appear.. a reconstructed act." Such reconstruction takes place through persons pointing out to themselves "the results of past experience"; utilizing such experience to again indicate the appropriate and selective stimuli that will enable them to readjust their actions, and continue their activity and their "process of advance to a distant goal" (1964:95-98).

And so goals and objectives are advanced, and manipulations of self and environment performed, through an evolutionary and naturalized self-conscious-self interconnected with instrumental action. As well, in a world where "individual and environment mutually determine each other", a perception and experience of a
unified environment is stated to result from self-conscious reflexive activity insofar as it involves the "organization of the environment and its objects in terms of the conditions of the solution of the problem." (Mead, 1964:101).

The self-as-object is also described as functioning to isolate meanings, abstract ideas, and symbolically communicate the content and character of the object. In such communication the self-conscious-self also "furthers the reorganization of (self) responses." (Mead, 1964:98-100).

Mead's (1964:238-241) and Cooley's "self-conscious-selves" are presented in overall idealistic and natural terms. Mead's "I", derivative of the self-conscious-self, is placed in a somewhat reactive position in relation to the socialized "me". However, it is not believed to be activated or called for under "normal conditions.", in which "the way in which an individual acts is determined by his taking the attitude of the others in the group". When the "I" is elicited, it calls upon the straying other to "fall into.. place in the whole social process".

Some reservations concerning the potential unnaturalness of "self-feeling" are expressed in Cooley's (1902:228-229,169,198,205,212,224) discussion of "disordered" or otherwise problematic "self-feeling(s)". However, these are largely considered exceptional "individual level" problems, and are not
related to any macroscopic level conditions, including that of cultural objectification. Cooley thus takes less account of historical or cultural effects on the modern psyche than does Simmel.

Any indication of the relevance of social or historical macroscopic level factors is vague and general. For example Cooley (1902:227,153,138,161) refers to "society" as having "a marked effect" upon childrens' developing self-feelings in certain particular cases. He also refers to a "peculiarity of self-feeling when "men find themselves out of joint with their social environment..", and states that "the object of self-feeling" "is affected by the general course of history..the particular development of nations, classes, and professions, and other conditions of this sort."

However, he places such speculations as to the role of historical factors in tight bounds, believing that although one should study the "I" and "go behind it" and "its history and conditions", one must "not..question its authority." This position is consistent with the early Chicago school position, traceable to Hegel and Simmel, that it is the individual who is responsible for keeping up with a culturally transcendental, idealized, and natural societal course; and for adopting its presumed most natural and superordinate perspective (Mead, 1964:234-235; Cooley, 1962:313-325; 1902:138).
To Mead and Cooley, the self-conscious-self is assumed to be largely exercised in reciprocal interactions within a social sphere that is generally free and unconstraining. Mead assumes the general capability and propensity for all in society to take the perspective of all others, and places unquestioned value in accommodating the perspectives toward oneself, of as large a group of "generalized others" as is possible. The "others" whose reflected judgments are an important component of the "self-feeling" of Cooley's social looking-glass are not considered as having egoistic or antagonistic propensities impacting on such reflections. In failing to consider that some persons' perspectives and reflections are more likely to be treated as legitimate than others; Cooley and Mead fail to acknowledge the roles of power and wealth; or, for the most part, social or historical influences upon self and "self-feeling"; or that persons may not generally want to adopt the perspectives of the "generalized other" (Gouldner, 1970).

The Early Chicago School treatment of the self-conscious-self as the product of introspection, social consensus, and perfect communication, constitutes what Parker, in contrast, (1990:1-4, 9, 69, 83, 90-118) would designate a liberal "rhetorical appeal to 'the natural.'"

There is apparent in Park's "mid" Chicago School theory, a
movement away from both Cooley's idealized and naturalized "I", (1902:149,91-93) and Mead's self-conscious-self; with Park believing that taking the perspective of others may at times be incompatible with natural human needs. Park emphasizes that others' conceptions of self may limit one's "self-conception". Further, such limitations may be related to specific social/historical conditions.

What must also be considered, though, is that the isolated self-as-object essentialized by Goffman, and, inconsistently by Park; would be viewed by Mead (1964:226-241) and Cooley (1962:313--325), as well as to Hegel and Fuerbach, as distinctly unnatural to human essential being.

The Early Chicago School functional approach to self-consciousness in terms of active process rather than static or formal attributes also echoes Hegel's views as to the active and engaged character of a distinctively human self-conscious-self. Mead and Cooley's self-conscious-self specifically retains connection with the concrete social sphere and individual behavior within that sphere; with Mead approaching self-consciousness as a condition for intelligent conduct and intelligent control of self and environment; and Cooley addressing the behavioral manifestations of immature, disordered, noble, and other types of "self-feeling".
Mead and Cooley also make contributions to "self-as-object" theory in delineating mechanisms of self-consciousness which draw upon innate human capabilities. Mead emphasizes reflexive and symbolic mechanisms of self-consciousness, and Cooley points out the relevance of human imaginative and social inferencing capabilities. Additionally, as we shall see below, Park and Mills adopt modified versions of Cooley’s "looking-glass-self" in their conceptualizations of a self-conscious-self arrived at through more conflictual and socially distanced processes.

Mead’s perspective taking also stresses distance from self, in the form of taking the perspective of the other, as an integral component of the self-conscious-self. Although such distancing is approached solely in ideal and natural colorations by Mead, Park again elaborates upon its potential to effect an isolating and unnatural experience of self.

In summary, early Chicago School theory may be thought of as specifying uniquely human cognitive and social mechanisms formative of the self-conscious-self in ideal social conditions. Unfortunately, in mid to late Chicago School theory, as the notion of a self-conscious-self having its basis in idealized and transcendent qualities of the social sphere waned; perceptions of it as potentially socially embedded and the product of distinctly human processes, also waned.
5. PRAGMATISM AND PARK'S "MID" CHICAGO SCHOOL SELF-CONSCIOUS-SELF.

Consistent with mixed attitudes towards the changes of modernity, Park's Mid Chicago theory treats the self-conscious-self ambivalently; and with varying degrees of naturalness.

At times he offers Cooley-like descriptions of "self-consciousness" or the "self-regarding sentiments" in terms of a uniquely human capacity to initiate and create life "aims...ideals, ambitions", and to rationally direct activities in accordance with "goals that exists in...imagination...". Also elaborating upon Mead, he refers to self-conscious "self-analysis" not only as "the counterpart of the inhibition of immediate and impulsive self-expression" but of such self-expression "in social relations" (1950:358-360; Park and Burgess, 1969:273; 1950:375,250,360,18-19).

Park furthermore associates the distinctively human self-conscious-self with activity that "makes the behaviour of individuals" as "human beings" "differ from that of the lower animals, "and lends their behavior a consistency that "may be described as 'conduct.'" He at times also expresses agreement

Moreover, he sometimes goes along with Simmel’s treatment of the shy and reserved retreat into self in the modern metropolis as non-problematic. Park (1952:203) makes reference to the self-consciousness derivative of this withdrawal as an individual-level phenomenon or as an atypical exception rather than the rule. For instance, he cites the appearance of this self-conscious-self under circumstances of persons’ failures and "unpardonable thing(s)"; and states that it renders persons "a problem to (one’s) self as well as to society". Such reserved self-consciousness is also contrasted to a self-consciousness arising from persons’ positive self distinctions.

However, as previously discussed, Park at other times describes a problematic self-consciousness born of retreat from the modern urban environment, and describes a very unnatural self-conscious-self whose origins are socially rooted. For while he expresses Cooley’s hope that modern urban social organization can provide a forum for the reciprocally responsive relationship between self and society inherent to Cooley’s looking-glass-self process; he refers to urban life and its money economy and impersonality as negatively impacting on interpersonal relations, as well as on the values and social controls
exercised through Cooley's "primary groups" (Park, 1969:70; 1952:26-27,31,175-177).

Thus Park describes persons within the metropolis, not as engaged in continuous reciprocal interaction with the other, but as "shy" and distanced from one another. These persons, rather than being beneficiaries of a harmonious and non-conflictual "self-reflection"; are limited "by the conception which every other individual.....has of himself, and of every other individual." One's self-conceptions thus come to be described by Park as social products "determined by the conceptions that other persons have" of oneself. (Park, 1952:175-177; 1950:18). Park does not believe their self-conceptions to be entirely determined. For when persons encounter others not always "capable of taking us, ..at our own valuation.." or "estimate of ourselves"; they can "strive(s)" and "struggle" in order to gain the "recognition" of the other"and "live up to" their own self-conceptions, as well as "the conception which we should like other persons to have of us". Even so, there are limitations on the person's success in doing so. For Park describes their struggles and strivings as "depressing..(and) often.. heartbreaking.. and..eventually abandoned in favour of conformity to "excepted models" and "conventional patterns." (1952:203,175-177,26-27,31; 1950:18).

These conventional patterns assume the form of roles; with one's
"self-conception" at least partly determined by such roles or "parts" acquired through the reflections of a depersonalized, rationalized, and distanced "looking-glass". These "reflections" are removed from persons' essential being to the extent that even when they are able to exercise choice as to the role they are to play, they may find themselves "not fitted to the role." (1952:203,175,26-27,31; 1950:18,375,358).

Park (1950:18-19; 1952:176) also points out that "in seeking to live up to the role which...society has imposed upon us, we find ourselves in a constant conflict with ourselves.."; unable to act "simply and naturally as a child", and to respond to each natural "impulse as it arises". Instead, we are forced to conform to "accepted models", in "our manners..speech gestures" and general behavior. We thus come to express ourselves through conventional "masks."

Persons' self-conceptions are referred to as varying broadly with their "social milieu" and "vocation", as well as with the "recognition and status which society accords them", and the role that the person "seeks to play in the..social group..". Park (1955:285-286; 1952:147; 1950:375) does not get more specific about the mechanisms through which variations in the above impact upon self-conception. He approaches such changes as general phenomena of a depersonalized modern urban culture. He may view the determined self-regarding sentiments of the modern
metropolis as natural in the sense of inevitable. He cynically points to "fate" as determining one’s role and self-conception within a given society.

Park at times (1969:353) naturalizes a masked and role-oriented self-conscious-self in other ways. For example, like Simmel, he refers to the "disappearance of the individual..behind their role" as an essential vehicle, or price to be paid for the "uninterrupted self-maintenance" and "security" of the "group".

At other times, Park (1952:203) demonstrates a reluctance to problematize the role-like self-conscious-self; stating, for example, that it does not appear "in the ordinary course of events", when persons are able to accept "the role to which society assigns (them)" and thus likely to remain naive", "unconcerned about (them) selve(s) and unconscious of (their) conduct."

He also occasionally naturalizes and idealizes the Early Chicago School "looking-glass" self process through which one’s self-conscious-self is infinitely malleable and manipulable, and defined by the reactions of those about one. For example, he states that the individual "whose conceptions of self is not at all determined by the conceptions that other persons have" is "probably insane", and further contends that the fear that others will not form or reflect back to us, the "good
impression" of ourselves that we would like them to have, is natural to all who are not "hermits" (1952:176).

All in all, however, Park's focus on the unnatural distancing elements of a role-like self-conscious-self, and of the mechanisms through which such self-conscious-self emerges within the modern metropolis, constitutes an additional contribution towards the understanding of how persons' self-conceptions may be affected by depersonalizing social circumstances like those of the modern metropolis.

5. PRAGMATISM AND GOFFMAN'S "LATE" CHICAGO SCHOOL SELF-CONSCIOUS-SELF

In Goffman's (1986:575) more concrete and empirical late Chicago School pragmatism, the self and self-as-object, as intrinsic human qualities, are radically denaturalized. To Goffman, the human self is merely a "palpable thing of flesh and bone" amounting to "a set of functions" (Gouldner, 1970).

Goffman (1959:209,251-252,67-68; 1986:575) draws heavily upon early Chicago, and particularly Cooley's, problematization of the self-conscious-self as sensory fact, and "product of
imagination". However, he does so without Cooley's naturalization of it as a distinctively human function. To Goffman, "self-as-character" is an "image", whose point of reality is its appearance in theatrical roles, masks, and other behavioral presentations.

Thus persons is generally believed to have as an object of contemplation only their role-like presentations and appearances; although, as part of their function, their "performed characters" make a convincing impression that they as interactants bring a personage along with them, and a sense to the audience "of what sort of person (they are) behind the role." Goffman refers to such engineered impressions of personhood as "this human effect"; an illustration of how far his self-as-object has become alienated from human nature (1986:298-299, 1959:252).

He views the successful engineering of the impression or appearance of "self-as-character" as essential to the profitability of one's performance. The successful rendering of the impression that one's performed interactions "arise" from early Chicago-like interactions of a "steady moral light" and "socialized character," is also essentialized in relation to social obligations or roles (1959:251-254; 1986:298-299).

Goffman (1986:574, 5-13, 130) states that the personal sense of
self-consciousness, far from being freely arrived at, arises from one’s culture, which "itself prescribe(s) what sort of entity we must believe ourselves to be" in the interests of an optimal "show".

6. PRAGMATISM, SELF-AS-INSTRUMENT, AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SELF-CONSCIOUS-SELF IN EARLY AND MID CHICAGO SCHOOL THEORY

(A) Background and Overview.

In Mead’s (1964:238-241) theory, though manipulation of one’s environment is glorified, a naturalized self-as-instrument is only implied in a referral to a capability of self-conscious mind to "control its further expressions." Mead’s "I" only comes into consciousness after it has been expressed, and ambiguously described as having both elements of unpredictability and impulsivity; and capabilities for controlled response, does not constitute a self-as-instrument. Mead’s contributions to a naturalized self-as-instrument are more indirect.

In Park’s "mid" Chicago School theory, the self-as-instrument begins to be naturalized; usually along the lines of functional or pragmatic adaptation. By the time of Goffman’s "late" chicago
theory an impersonal and egoistic self-as-instrument is naturalized along several different dimensions; for example, inevitability, functionality, essentiality to immediate everyday wants and needs, and compatibility with human biological drives.

Along with the increasing naturalization of a pragmatic self-as-instrument and denaturalization of the self-conscious-self in mid to late Chicago school theory, comes a separation of "self-as-object" in the two spheres. It is only in early and parts of mid Chicago school theory that there is an assumption of a "self-conscious" "self-as-instrument", and a self-as-instrument that is guided and connected to a distinctively human and socially embedded self-conscious-self (Mead, 1964: 239-240, 177-178, 240, 226; Cooley, 1902: 173-228, 319-320; 1962: 52-53).

Park of the "mid" Chicago school at times treats as problematic a modern self-as-instrument whose egoistic pursuits are very much connected to a rational and calculating self-conscious-self which lacks social embeddedness.

It is in Goffman's work that the separation of self-as-object in the two realms is naturalized. Goffman's self-as-instrument is generally not connected to a substantive "self-feeling", or to social or other referents transcending self-interest.

This separation of self-as-object in the two spheres is common
in contemporary social theory; and discernable in Mass Society and Post Modern theory, as we shall see in subsequent chapters of this thesis.

(B) Roots of A Pragmatic Self-as-Instrument in Early Chicago Theory

As previously discussed, Mead's functional and "behavioristic" approach to mind and self-consciousness, places them in their origins as emerging secondarily and as a consequence of the need to find a solution to a concrete and immediate problem, and to so be able to continue one's activity. These views are conducive to an idealization and relative naturalization of teleologically oriented action focused on immediate results; despite Mead's emphasis on a self-conscious-self that guides human actions once it is formed (1964:95-96,124-125).

As well, compared to Simmel, Mead (1964:312,177-179,125,92-93) goes "one step further" in his idealization of teleologically oriented behavior, in regarding an act or stimulus as having no intrinsic meaning, but only acquiring meaning and reality in relation to its results, and to its manipulated results. For "the later stages of the act...determine how we are going to approach the object, and the steps in our early manipulation of it." As well, "contacts in immediate experience are in themselves never ultimates" but "always look beyond themselves
to further conduct".

Such glorification and naturalization of instrumental activity becomes generally problematic within Chicago school theory as the self-as-instrument becomes conceptually disengaged from a socially embedded self-conscious-self. It is then that an "egoistic-self-as-instrument" is prone to being naturalized.

Similarly, (1902:164-167,228,168) in his discussion of the "self-feeling" of "the looking glass sort", Cooley places its mechanisms of origin in secondary relationship to instrumental activity. However, a partly egoistic and manipulative self-as-instrument is naturalized as developing in children as they begin to use parental reactions to modify their behavior in a way that "works" in securing approval, sympathy, tenderness, and positive self "reflection". Cooley refers to such activities in terms of self-"imposture", and "pos"(ing). They define the child as "young performer," learning "to be different things to different people."

Cooley (1902:165-167,319-320; 1969:708; 1962:28) more specifically naturalizes his "performing" and egoistically manipulative self, in terms of distinctively human attributes and adaptive behavior. For example, he states that children "live..in ..(their effect(s) upon other people", and describes human tendencies and "impulses" to "set store by our
appearances, "adapt....appearance to the impression we wish to make.", "seek honour and dread ridicule, (and) defer to public opinion.." For according to Cooley, we are all "something of an imposter...pos(ing) more or less.." upon a "stage".

Such naturalization of deceptive instrumental behavior may be approached as an early sign of a naturalized separation and independent assertion of self-as-instrument, relative to a distinctively human self-consciousness (Cooley, 1902:164-168).

Cooley (1902:164-168,192-198) further essentializes egoistic and teleologically oriented behavior in his assertions that "Every productive mind must have intense self-feeling, and that;" The "I" "should be functional, and so long as a man is functioning acceptably there can be no objection to his using it."

However, although his statements appear compatible with a naturalized self-as-egoistic-instrument; and his naturalization of egoistically manipulative behavior constitutes a step in the direction of an elaborated and naturalized self-as-egoistic-instrument; Cooley does not naturalize the conscious use of self or others in the service of egoistic goals. The only suggestion of such naturalized consciously egoist manipulation of self, is in his descriptions of children learning to "apprehend personality and foresee it"s operations", and this may equally likely naturalize a self-as-instrument of self-mastery and self-
competency, rather one that is solely egoistic (1902:164-168,192-198).

As does Simmel, Cooley (1902:319-321; 1962:28) stresses that behavioral "adaptation (that) taking the form of deliberate and injurious deceit" or "intentional imposture," is to be contrasted with unconscious posings to make us "seem a little better than we are", or "show the world a better or idealized aspect of ourselves". These posings are naturalized in terms of biological "impulse", as well as in their functionality in helping persons to "improve" or "train" themselves.

Furthermore, Cooley does not approach even these unconscious objectified behavioral orientations or impostures as entirely non-problematic. He refers to them as having widespread negative effects upon human "credulity".

Intentional imposture is condemned in stronger language as a "sham" and "a sort of parasite upon human idealism"; thriving only "by the impulse to believe". These kinds of behavioral "finesse and posing," "affectation," and "put-on thing" are viewed by Cooley (1902:172-175,205,216-217,228,319-321; 1969:208; 1962:23-55) as atypical and unnatural; to be found, for example, in the "silly, weak, (and) contemptible", immature adolescents, and "persons of great ambitions." Such behavior is further referred to as to not "genuinely representative of the
deeper needs and tendencies of human nature).

For persons are seen as responsible for guiding their conscious "self-feeling" towards the larger social sphere. Cooley (1902:172-228 93-198,24,320; 1969:708; 1962:23-55) states that persons should align their "self-feeling" with "noble purpose" and "ideas and aims of general and permanent worth". He addresses "disorders of self-feeling", describes "egoism" as a "disagreeable" "excess" of "self-feeling", and states that discipline and control of one's self-feeling is essential if one is to "escape the pains to which it makes (the person) liable." Indeed, Cooley cynically and fatalistically relates theatrical behavioral orientations to more macroscopic and historical changes; for example, in his reference to modern competition as distributing "the parts among the players in such a way that "the play goes on."

Cooley (1902:193-197,94,224) is consistent with Mead in his belief that even though teleologically oriented behavior temporally precedes the self-conscious "I"; this "I" or "self-feeling" once formed in human development, guides one's behavior. "For it is only as we have self-consciousness that we can be aware of those special tendencies which we assert in production, or can learn how to express them".
At times, Park (1952:32,47-48; 1969:311-312; 1950:358) characterizes the change from the more direct, intimate and face-to-face "primary" relations, to modern metropolitan indirect, less personal and "secondary relations"; not only as providing larger content to the individual's "self conception"; but behavior that is more and more a product of "the formulation of a rational and abstract principle."

Occasionally, Park's (1969:70) use of the term "persona" relates to this capability for rational "..organization of (personal) traits", which determine the "role" of the individual and the part which he plays among his group of fellows" in the modern metropolitan world.

Consistent with Cooley and Mead, Park (1969:190-191; 1952:55,103-105; 1950:19,358-360,285-286) also regards human instrumental activity, including internally directed "self-control;" as connected to "self-consciousness" or the "self-regarding" sentiments. It is such activity that he designates as distinctively human "conduct".

Such distinctively human "conduct" and it's control of self
through rational and abstract principles; would constitute the unequivocal appearance of a self-as-instrument within Chicago School theory. Park describes it at times as a self-as-altruistic-instrument, and "conduct" as having ethical connotations associated with uniquely human "aims, ideals, and ambitions; and at the root of the human capability to exercise judgement "good and evil" (1969:190-191; 1952:55; 1950:19, 285-286, 358-359).

This "conduct" is also naturalized in Early Chicago "consensual" terms; that is, it is glorified in its responsiveness to conventional "understanding(s) by the actor of what his actions look like or appear to be to others." Such responsiveness is related to a distinctively human sensitivity and capability for taking into account "the comment that other men are making, or are likely to make, upon one's actions", as well as human desire for "honour, reputation, and self-respect" (Park, 1969:190-191; 1952:55).

Park (1950:285-286) also discusses biological human maturation as playing a role in such "conduct" insofar as it is absent in animals and "very little children..who are naive and innocent of convention and of the complications it introduces into..behavior.." and "unaware of the character of the comment which one's behavior is likely to arouse in others." Thus to an extent, "conduct" is naturalized in relation to human
development.

However, Park (1952:103-105; 1950:285-286) also discusses the responsiveness of human "conduct" to others' comments in terms of societal determination. To him, "man the political" as well as "sophisticated" and "conventional" "animal"; is amenable to being "socially controlled".

He further notes that one's consciousness of "the comment that other men are...likely to make upon (one's) actions" can pave the way for man the "calculating" and "casuistic" animal. For persons able to "conduct" themselves consistently and "in accordance with rational principles" may apply those principles towards egoistic ends. Park's (1969:956-957,311-312; 1952:31,27.108,)"self-as-instrument," therefore, like his "self-conscious-self", is approached at times as a problematically distanced, depersonalized and socially determined psychic transformation of a modern metropolis whose "money economy" extends to social relations "defined in terms of interest and...cash".

Park (1969:311-313; 1952:108,44-47; 1950:250-251) within metropolitan life, singles out the weakened and diminished presence of Cooley's "primary groups" and their "intimate relationships" in modern urban life as most prominently producing this problematic self-as-instrument. The predominance
of secondary relations in the "great city" is seen as productive of relations that are "divorced from participation in the common life", disruptive of reciprocal interaction and lacking in social controls. These relations are also characterized as impersonal, "casual", "transitory", and lacking in social values or "moral order".

In place of the social and moral controls of the primary groups within the metropolis, Park (1952:108,42-4; 1969:311-313) describes a superficial form of social control through public opinion and advertising, which is in turn productive of a world of "conventional" signs and "fashion". In this world the "art of life" involves "skating on thin surfaces and a scrupulous study of style and manners". It is in this conventional world where Park's detached and distanced self-conscious-self comes to express itself exclusively in societal roles. In the context of a society of diminished social values and a moral and social order defined by the others' conceptions of self and of all others, such roles are likely to become consciously deceptive and goal-oriented "fronts".

Park (1950:249-250,358-360) also makes use of the term "conduct" to describe these self-consciously deceptive uses of self-as-instrument in the modern urban environment. No longer reflecting larger societal values, this conduct is characterized as superfluous, fortuitous, distanced, impersonal, and false. It
is also associated with persons as "actors" wearing "conventional" "masks". Having "one eye always on the gallery", they put on "a front" and acquire "manners and a style and dress..." in line with "the part (they are) expected to play" and "the type" they are "seeking to impersonate" or to be.

Thus according to Park these masks become a hollow form or medium through which persons strive for their "prospective" egoistic goals. It is in such manner that "our very faces" become "living masks, which reflect, to be sure the changing emotions of our inner lives, but which more and more tend to conform to the type we are seeking to impersonate". Such egoistically oriented self-manipulations also involve "artifice" in the manipulation of others ((1950:358-360,249-250; 1952:176; 1955:18).

Although Park (1955:18; 1950:361; 1952:47,176) problematizes his masked, egoistic, and role-like self-as-instrument in relation to modern urban life; because he does not refer to the conditions of its change, or address it as amenable to change, he contributes to its naturalization. At times, Park even explicitly naturalizes a "mask" and "role-like" self-as-egoistic-instrument in terms of functionality, adaptability, inevitability, essentiality, ease of adoption, universality, and even, as distinctively human trait. For example, within Park's world of "psychic assaults," experienced from the very presence
of the other in the environment, it is only in states of exultation and..ecstasy" that persons let themselves "go completely, and yield (themselves) wholly to the occasion and to the influences of the persons about (them)". Park also notes that persons assume quite spontaneously all the manners and attitudes proper to "the roles they are striving to live up to.." as they "act" and "dress" their "part(s)".

As well, a mask-like orientation to the social world is universalized in Park’s (1950:249-250,360-361; 1955:18-19) contention that "every nationality" has its characteristic 'face' and "conventional mask." Park further universalizes masks as inherent to human nature in his statement that "it is probably no mere historical accident..that the word ‘person’, in its first meaning, is a mask"; and the term "personality", "derived from the Latin persona, a mask used by an actor". Park even goes so far as to state that insofar as this mask represents "the conception we have formed of ourselves-the role we are striving to live up to-this mask is our truer self.."; and becomes "second nature", as well as a mark of our maturity and achievement of "character".

Park (1950:360) does not regard manipulations of the other as consistently problematic, either. For human beings, "as distinguished from the lowlier creatures", bring always an element of "artifice" as well as "convention" to their rational,
planned and consistent "conduct". As well, "relatively few of man's actions are wholly natural and naive". Park is here essentializing a kind of "conduct" which he at times regards as very problematic.

Whereas Park is at least inconsistent in his valuation of the differing ways in which human rational and goal-oriented conduct can be applied; in Goffman's (1959:251,253) "late" Chicago school theory, an elaborated mask and role-like orientation to the social world, and a constant egoistically based instrumental maneuvering of self to "manipulate..impression(s)" of one's audience; is not considered at all problematic.

(D) Self-as-Instrument in Goffman's "late" Chicago School Theory

Goffman (1959:48-49,217; 1986:2-13,573) cites James' assertions that each world has its own special and separate style of existence, and James's descriptions of persons "show(ing) a different side of (themselves) to..different groups" of persons. Elaborating on what he believes to be the implications of this, Goffman describes "everyday activity" as most meaningly approached according to which of the innumerable rule-produced plane of beings, or "frames of reference" one happens to occupy at any given "moment" of social life. These frames are treated as having a determining influence on persons, and as justifying
the conscious use of a self-of-many-faces, varying "in accordance" with the "principles of organization governing the "events" of a "frame" (Goffman, 1959:48).

Goffman (1986:573; 1959:217) does not envision persons within such frames (1986:573; 1959:217), as merely showing "a different side" of a true underlying self; but as exercising a part of a self-as-instrument that is infinitely malleable; and whose movement "from place to place" in an easy, "poised" and unconfused way is essential. For "self...is not an entity half-concealed behind events," but a "set of functions" or "changeable formula for managing oneself during" events.

This (1986:1-13,130; 1959:56,244-255) situationally conceived self-as-instrument is not generally linked to social or historical phenomena. Although he associates a certain "bureaucratization of the spirit" necessary to one's "perfectly homogeneous performance(s) at every appointed time", Goffman does not usually treat macroscopic-level variables relating to such performances as specifyable. Rather, he believes that managed behavior and performances of "everyday activity" are most meaningfully approached at the level of the "constitutive rules" of one's "frame of reference". These constitutive rules are regarded as arising diffusely from person' "differing interests" and self-interests.
Goffman's (1959:19-20,251-253,209) self-as-instrument, radically disengaged from the self-conscious-self and its social embeddedness, becomes essentialized in its egoistic form. Park's and Cooley's (1902:320) descriptions of "actors" hiding their actions behind masks, and striving to "adapt... appearance to the impression we wish to make", are elaborated upon by Goffman as activities constitutive and definitive of self. To Goffman, the mask is the reality and reality the mask; the role is the person, the person the role.

Goffman's (1959:19,209,251-255) "dramaturgical" sociology treats Cooley's and Park's theatrical metaphors as appropriate descriptors of everyday human activity. He cites Park's reference to masks as becoming "second nature" to persons, and views persons as "performer(s) with natural "capacit(ies) to learn...a part."

His pragmatic self-as-instrument not only arises from the need to meet immediate "self" goals, as Mead describes, but remains concentrated upon such goals in everyday activity; and rooted to constantly manipulating self and others in service of them (1959:19-20,251,253,209; 1986:573).

Goffman (1959:3,209,249-255; 1986:8) focuses upon the "real techniques" and "successful staging(s)" employed by this individual "qua performer". The behavioral "operations" of his
self-as-egoistic-instrument "give others as much of their due as is consistent with enlightened self-interest." For "regardless of the particular objective which the individual has in mind and his motive for having this objective, it will be in his interests to control the conduct of others, especially their responsive treatment of him." Such efforts are deemed essential. An egoistic self-as-instrument is necessary "in any "business,"...at some point or other in the...dramatic...round of...activity.."

According to Goffman, (1959:4,250-254,209; 1986:569) it is specifically through persons' self-expressions, images, "claims about self" and creation of impressions, that everyday activity is transformed into gestures addressed to (an) audience; with "postures...struck and appearance" "tailored." Through the use of such stylized manoeuvering, others are led to "act voluntarily in accordance with one's own plan" and maintain one's preferred "definition of the situation.." Goffman's actors thus "manipulate the impression the observer uses as a substitute for reality..".

Thus Goffman states that (1959:229,237,254) the key factor "whenever persons enter another's immediate physical presence" is "the maintenance of a single definition of the situation.." social life. This involves "shared staging problems" and "concern for the way things appear" as "dramaturgic elements of
the human situation." Indeed, "most...techniques of impression management" are so naturalized that they "have a counterpart in the...tendency of the audience and outsiders to act in a protective way in order to help the performers save their own show."

The self-controlled "management" of one's face, voice, emotions, and feelings is furthermore essentialized as knowledge necessary for young children to know "in ordinary family life...", so that they can function as members of the cooperatively acting family "team"; and be taken to "public and semipublic ceremonies..." (1959:216-218)

Even within the family domain, children are believed to have something of a natural leaning towards managed behavior. As illustration, and reminiscent of Cooley's discussion of learning "what works" in eliciting positive parental responses, Goffman (1986:566) discusses the propensity of children who have hurt themselves to wait until they get to their parents before bursting into tears and eliciting the sympathy that is their aim.

As in Park, and as far back as Aristotle, Goffman's (1959:216-217,227,235) egoistic-self-as-instrument is naturalized as a functional, defensive response to a harsh social world. The treacherousness of this social world is assumed to demand the
concentration, "self-control" and "poise" befitting a "disciplined performer...with the only thing behind one's "mask", "a naked unsocialized look...of concentration..." upon one's ...difficult, treacherous task."

As a "fundamental dialectic" of "all social interaction", such "treacherousness" not only naturalizes the use of mass and roles defensively, for self-management; but for active "exploitation of...others on the basis of...information...glean(ed) about them" (Goffman, 1959:250.)

Goffman (1959:216; 1986:569-570,7-13) believes that it is essential that his self-as-"performer" be disassociated from his own "presentation", and distanced enough "from his own show" to effect the disciplined "self-control" and suppression of "emotional response" and "spontaneous feeling" necessary for a successful performance." Thus his self-as-egoistic-instrument becomes a mechanism of stylized and strategic posings unrelated to intrinsic being; and directed towards a distanced social sphere. One must wonder about the ultimate naturalness and functionality, of persons so detached and isolated from their own activity and being.

(7) GoFFMAN'S NATURALIZED SELF-AS-INSTRUMENT - EXPLORING THE ROOTS
Goffman's active impression-management processes and emphases on actions directed towards the 'self we would like to be', together with his descriptions of how "ordinary men" in their mundane activities create and sustain meanings and understandings... that constitute their own social order and "reality"; appear, at least at the microscopic level, to indicate an active and creative, "natural" self-as-instrument. For the self-as-instrument like "any part of the self", would seem "in its nature, ..(to be) suggestive of exertion rather than rest" (Cooley, 1902:216; Parker, 1990:27; Gouldner, 1970:391).

Even his ((1959:245,253; 1986:2,10-13,566) vague and general referral to "living interaction..itself..somewhat coerced by those sustaining it.." and actions "bolted down in social establishments", or "classes of establishments" would seem to leave some room for individuals to "personally negotiate aspects of all the arrangements under which (they) live." However, individual actors are also limited in their creative capacities of action through their functions as team members whose predetermined lines are relative to the "scene" they happen to occupy. Thus, although Goffman's "individual as performer" is described somewhat fluidly in terms of "capacity to learn", this capacity is "exercised in the task of training for a part".
The egoistic manipulations of Goffman's "actors" may also be regarded, paradoxically, as recognizing the determining "importance of power" in persons' everyday experiences of reality and of themselves. However, Goffman does not concern himself with socio-historical factors that might affect the operations of such power as it relates, for example, to the capacity to project a self successfully or to define social reality. He seems to take such operations of power as a natural given, though he acknowledges that the content of his dramaturgical rules are not "culture-free" (Parker, 1989:27,90; Gouldner, 1970:379-381,391; Goffman, 1986:13; 1959:244-245).

In "Frame Analysis, Goffman (1986:5,13-14) goes on to state that he "personally holds society to be first in every way" and the individual's experiences and involvements within it to be "second". He characterizes his subject matter as dealing "only with matters that are second"; implying that the absence of the "first" in his descriptions does not mean that he is not cognizant of their contribution. Goffman states that he restricts his subject matter in this way because the job of changing his actors' "false consciousness" and tackling the role of factors such as class upon the nature of personal experiencing and acting; is a formidable task that is hardly feasible. His contribution is rather to be made by describing "the meaningfulness of (their ) everyday activity" through "a
closed, finite set of rules" that yield "a powerful means of analyzing social life."

However, his general movement beyond descriptions of egoistic manipulative action to its naturalization is perhaps most clearly illustrated in his statement that "the great exemplar in the matter of exploitative fabrication is nature herself, and the great devices are the ones this questionable lady has led organisms to employ for protection and for predation, these devices involving camouflage, mimicry, and intimidation" with "the pointed source in social life" being the "con game" (1986:13,103-104; 1959:227).

Additionally, Goffman's (1959:251) description of persons as "merchants of morality" whose concerns are "not with the moral issue of realizing ... standards, but with the "amoral" engineering of a convincing impression that they are being realized; fails to separate "the moral answer with the empirical. This necessarily implies that "what is, should be" (Gouldner, 1970:26).

Gouldner (1970:29-33,47,379-380) states that a social theorists' assumptions, "beliefs, and...cognition (are) "embedded in (the) theory's postulations." As social psychology, Goffman's assumptions, including his naturalization of the narrowly grounded conduct of his self-as-egoistic-instrument, may be
viewed in a larger context, as a cultural product. This is because "each variant of social psychology not only describes social phenomena but also, as part of a culture, creates and reproduces the phenomena it studies". (Parker, 1989:17-27; 1990:90,94-98). This is a double edged sword, though, since the same perspective-taking may be applied in viewing the prevalence of efforts of social scientists like Gouldner to focus and be concerned with the appearance/reality separation in present day society; and on chastising other theorists who are not so concerned. For Gouldner's beliefs too, may be treated as cultural products.

This aside, as a cultural product Goffman's self-as-egoistic-instrument may be thought of as "representative of the new age in which modern morality has been edged out by Machiavellian social 'actors' and persons "envisioned as "tricky, harassed little devils.."" (Gouldner, 1970:380; Parker, 1989:137).

His naturalized theatrical orientation to human behavior and "unnatural" treatment of the self-conscious self, may also reflect a world of more than a diminished liberal faith in an underlying self and self-consciousness. It may reflect a general loss of faith in notions of truth and meaning. To Goffman, there is nothing behind the empirically evident appearances, impressions, and performances of the world "as stage" (Parker, 1990:90-91,94; Lasch, 1984:153,155; Gouldner,
Also, to recall Heller's discussion, in a culture where persons' expressions are perceived as performance and appearance; doubt concerning the authenticity of the other's expressions would logically follow; and would increase the tendency to respond to others with calculative orientations.

As cultural product, the historical rootings of Goffman's version of the self-as-object may be explored. Such analysis would encompass such background assumptions not only of disenchantment with notions of truth, meaning, and self; but a loss of faith and trust in the other and of general ideals; in favour of the performances, exploitative and manipulative behavior, and managed impressions of the egoistic self-as-instrument (Gouldner, 1970).

Analysis of these assumptions may bear fruit in relation to the work of the other Chicago School theorists; since they are assumptions and naturalizations increasingly apparent over the time span of Chicago School theory as theorists grow more and more disillusioned or ambivalent towards the turn-of-the-century liberal vision of self and society. Goffman's positions may then reflect a culmination of culturally derived views of reality as residing in concrete theatrical-like performances having no underlying point of reality; including that of a distinctively
human self-consciousness. Such problematization of the self-conscious-self, combined with a more natural vision of the self-as-instrument; are also to be found in the more contemporary Mass Society and Post-Modern theoretical schools, as will be addressed in subsequent chapters of this thesis.

Heller (1978:205,152,354,304-317,115-120) and Gouldner (1970:380,387) offer historical and cultural analysis of such increasingly naturalized self-as-egoistic-instrument, problematized self-conscious-self, and their accompanying background assumptions. Heller traces a generally problematic morality, disengagement of conduct from notions of 'truth', and perception of the world as 'great theatre'; to the emergence of capitalism and bourgeois society in the Renaissance. Gouldner also points to Rousseau’s feelings of conflict between morality and emergent values of utility during Renaissance times.

Heller (1978:204,85,154,120-121,199) regards desire for gain and self-interest, and emphasis on individual competition and self-preservation as "the starting-point of human conduct"; as "ethical motive actuating bourgeois production" and capitalist competition. She asserts that capitalism facilitates a more individual form of brutality in which individuals come to be only able to realize themselves egotistically, and "against others."
She also regards self-conscious role behavior in relation to the "ever more conformist world of developed bourgeois society"; noting, as Park did, that such behavior provides a forum in which men can disguise their intentions" and "manipulate others" , in pursuit of egoistic goals (1978:207-208,219,230).

According to Heller, (1978:312,207-208,280-282,307-328,291,218-219,248-251,380,405) it is in the "developed bourgeois society" (of) the seventeenth century that a "pre-Renaissance" single, unequivocal, universally valid scale of values" is replaced by the principle of utility; a principle to which all "existence...and ethical factors..become reduced." This Renaissance interest in the category of utility and "pragmatism" in "the extraordinary importance" it "attaches to the practice and transmittability of technique.., is associated with a "moral universe" of individual gain, and "breeding ground for evil."

Gouldner (1970:387-388) notes that by the time of modernity and its increasingly rationalized and bureaucratized world, "Weber held that the relationship between utility and morality was "not solvable..."

Gouldner (1970:381-382) believes that large-scale bureaucracies contribute to the culture of Goffman's dramaturgical world insofar as these bureaucracies seem to have a "momentum of
their own" and are "little amenable to the influence of individuals." Individuals "whose sense of worth and potency are impaired", and who feel themselves as "having little impact on the organization as a whole, focus on the management of impressions."

Furthermore, he envisions "the new bourgeois" or "new middle class" "world of impression management" as a product of a "tertiary economy", or "transition from an older economy centered on production to a new one centering on mass marketing and promotion; including the "marketing of the self". In the modern 'market' norms of classical utility do not apply because there is an absence of belief that the outcome of effort is dependent on a person's 'real' accomplishments and usefulness. Persons in this economy, living "in constant fear of exposure."

Thus "Goffman’s sociology corresponds to the new exigencies of a middle class whose faith in both utility and morality has been undermined"; a class who resolve Weber's dilemma of classical utility versus morality by being concerned with neither. Their focus of concern is rather exclusively on the manipulation of appearances. (Gouldner, 1970:382,388-390)
To summarize, Heller’s analysis would suggest that Chicago School pragmatism and its’ naturalization of an egoistic-self-as-instrument may be understood in historical relation to the dawn of capitalism in the Renaissance; while, within modernity Gouldner (1970:386) believes that Goffman’s "dramaturgical model also represents "an accommodation congenial to those who are willing to accept contemporary existent master institutions."

8. CONCLUSION

The naturalization of the self-conscious-self in Hegel and Simmel, as well as the early Chicago theorists, is of a self-conscious-self realized through mechanisms of expansiveness, social embeddedness, and reciprocal connection to the social sphere.

Park’s theory suggests that the self-as-object may be realized through mechanisms beneficial or detrimental to one’s natural and essential being. The self-as-object may arise through an unnatural and problematic withdrawal from a complicated and impersonal modern existence; from experiences of collision with one’s society, or from experiences of self-expansiveness, freedom, and greater differentiation of experience to be found in an ideal and not excessively objectified or depersonalized
Within the Chicago School, it is not until Goffman's "late" Chicago School theory that a radically "unnatural" self-conscious-self is severed from connection to the self-as-instrument. Goffman's elaboration and description of an egoistic-self-as-instrument disassociated from the self-conscious-self represents his contribution to an understanding of the self-as-object.

Such dissociation between self-as-object in the two realms will be seen to be frequently presumed in contemporary Post-Modern theory.

At best, Chicago School theory is cryptic in its consideration of historical and cultural mechanisms relating to originating mechanisms of the self-as-object. Mass Society theorists offer a multiplicity of historical mechanisms relating to the emergence of the self-conscious-self. It is to their theories that we will now turn.
CHAPTER THREE

M A S S S O C I E T Y T H E O R Y
I BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION.

As we have seen, Chicago School claims regarding the origin and mechanisms of the self-as-object have tended towards the extremes of our natural vs. historical continuum; with substantial elements of naturalization of the biologic, universal, and adaptive sort in the theory of Mead, Cooley, and Park; but with elements of total unreality or lack of reference basis in reality, in Goffman's and parts of Cooley's work.

In contrast, Mass society school theorists occupy a more "mid range" position on the continuum; tending to view the self-as-object and mass society as more historically based and problematic. Usually, the naturalization of this self-as-object centres around its inevitability and contingency upon broadly based socio-historical ("mass") factors.

The following "Background" section provides first social and then theoretical context to the phenomenon of objectification and its alleged essentiality in twentieth century "mass society". Next, evidence supporting mass society theorists' assumptions of a fundamentally cooperative self and self and society will be contrasted with assumptions strongly visible in twentieth century social political theory concerning "the nature
of the masses". Finally, I will address recurring "themes" of interest in de Tocqueville's and Marx's work that assume prominence in later mass society theory. This will "lead into" later parts of this chapter detailing Mill's, Sennett's, and Reisman's discussions of the origin and processes of the self-as-object.

(A) The Social Context

Mass Society theory partly reflects developing concerns about post World War II America. Disenchantment with classical liberal freedoms and a supposedly friendly universe of equal and open opportunity found strong expression in mass society theory. Reisman, Mills and Sennett are among those who criticize a mass society as made up of "homogeneous" and/or "isolated" individuals who (can) be manipulated by a few well-organized elites..." or by systems of cultural beliefs (Mills, 1953:464-467; Archibald 1978:24).

The more historical coloration of the self-as-object in mass society theory may also be placed into perspective of the many general and rapid social structural transformations during this period; including the rise of Simmel's and Park's urban "metropolis", industrialization, central bureaucratic administration, and monopoly capitalism. Mass society theorists
offer differing conceptualizations of how these and other factors work upon the self-conscious-self, and of their interaction and relative importance. Psychologically, these conditions are compatible with increased impersonalism, alienation, and individual detachment from self and self-conscious-self.

(B) The Theoretical Context.

In European social theory, even Simmel (1976: 204,210), a relatively conservative thinker, viewed the more objectified division of labour, large-scale industry, and capitalist economy in modernity, as potentially problematic; for example, of enhancing the likelihood that workers would become "objective artifacts". However, mass society theorists draw more upon, variously, Marx's, Durkheim's and Weber's views and take into account far reaching socio-historical factors which prevent persons from realizing their natural human potential. They also consider optimum levels of societal integration and individual autonomy, the possibility that contemporary social difficulties are resolvable through the application or inquiry of the social sciences, but also that some broad-reaching historical problems might be avoidable. According to many of them, society transforms humans' essential being into a mere utilitarian use

Many of the concerns of these theorists, are Durkheim's: the means and conditions through which optimum levels of individual/societal integration are and can be realized (Riesman, 1961; Sennett, 1977; Mills, 1953); including common belief systems (Sennett, 1977; Riesman, 1961), dependence on "mechanical" socio-economic factors such as the division of labour (Mills, 1954,1963,1951); societal guidance, regulation or normatively based interventions (Sennett, 1973); or direct constraints over power-holders or specific social conditions (see, for example Mills, 1953,1963; Sennett, 1973; Reisman:1961).

Nevertheless, like Weber and Marx, mass society theorists tend to see the contemporary society as increasingly unnatural to human needs; echoing Weber in their vision of this problem as one of grand historical proportion, and less solvable than was the case in Chicago School theory. Also like Marx, they seek to identify social and historical conditions under which cultural objectification would no longer be alien and unnatural, and when "uniformed" references to a "mere undifferentiated" or "compact" messy mass" and "limitations of the masses" could no longer accurately describe the modern social world. Thus the alienated

However, all the theorists in this chapter are less certain than Marx that this will occur, since they presume a social world which more and more effectively separates persons from their human essence.

As well, they all differ from the mainstream of twentieth century democratic theory. Such theory regards the limitations and weaknesses of modern democratic or "mass" society as inherent to human nature, and as indicating the need for a limited sphere of participatory action; a controlled and limited form of democracy. On the other hand, most mass society theory views the problems of the contemporary individual and self as defense against, or reflections or results of, historical conditions including objectification (Pateman, 1970; de Tocqueville, 1956:144,430-431; Mills, 1953:464-470; 1951, ix-xx; Reisman, 1954:30-31).

Additionally, more contemporary theorists look upon the characteristics of mass individuals - incompetent, detached, homogeneous, isolated, antagonistic, violent, authoritarian, passive, means-end oriented and objectified or "mass-minded" as historically rooted and modifiable. (e.g. see Archibald 1978:79-
81, 139, 148-155; Pateman, 1970). For example, Pateman attributes the alienation and atomization of "mass" individuals to modern "representative" as opposed to truly "participatory" democracy. Pateman notes how the former fails to give the populace the knowledge and experience necessary for effective participation and contribution to the political process. Thus Pateman sees mass qualities as product rather than cause, of a problematic mass society.

Furthermore, Pateman (1970) points out that empirical evidence indicates that whenever democratic participation is enhanced, and persons are allowed increased participation, control, and co-operative decision-making at all societal levels; results are consistently positive, both in terms of increased feelings of confidence, autonomy and political efficacy, and, in the workplace, of heightened group productivity and efficacy.

Indeed, even de Tocqueville (1956:117, 200-206, 195-197, 299, 214-215, 155; 1966:26); the nineteenth century European theorist who became the first describer of the American mass society, emphasized, like Durkheim, that some restraints need be placed on the liberties and independence of society and of American society in order to avoid "natural...disorder", and circumvent "whatever natural repugnance may restrain men from acting in concert"; stressed the importance of mass participation, experience and training "as to the art of political association"
at all societal levels. It is then that "fellows" combine who would otherwise "live...apart".

He believes that "by dint of working for the good of one's fellow-citizens, the habit and the taste for serving them is at length acquired". The transfer to civil life of "notions" acquired in this way allows for greater "public tranquility" and "prosperity" (de Tocqueville, 1956: 137, 205-209).

Both Marx and de Tocqueville identified in the nineteenth century characteristics that are pertinent to the self-as-object in later mass society theory. These themes are addressed by later mass society theorists, and are noted below, first in Marx's work and then in de Tocqueville's:

(i) Marx
According to Marx (1975:297-304; 1956:304), mass production, modern division of labour, concentration of industry, automation and technological advances, as well as capitalist modes of production; reduce human beings to the "status" of a "commodity". As capitalism develops, "commodity fetishism" dehumanizes workers, transforming them into nonhuman commodities. Their essence is experienced as external, and their material objects only produced and sold. In capitalists, dehumanizing fetishism assumes the form of money becoming the main objective in their lives, more important than "human considerations" (Archibald,
Such fetishism furthers the alienating power of money over people. According to Marx, money as value confounds and confuses all "natural and human qualities" (Marx and Engels, 1975:304,306,323-326).

Related to this is a pettiness, egoism, calculated subservience, selfishness, greed, alienation, and finally, withdrawal from a world characterized by such qualities. (Marx and Engels, 1975:304-306,323-326).

The dependency of the worker within capitalist modes of production, as discussed above, is a common theme in mass society theory. It is a dependency which contributes to a lesser ability to act according to one's purposes and create and be the source of one's life. (Marx and Engels, 1975:304,306,323-326; Archibald, 1978:36-38).

Another theme in Marx's work that appears prominently in mass society theory, particularly in Sennett's work, is the fragmentation and division of persons within a society of private sphere abstracted from the public. This makes for an atomistic society wherein persons are separated from their natural and communal state.
This is a violation of their essential being because it is only in their social significance that persons acquire importance as human beings. As Marx puts it, persons' individual and "species-life" are not in their essence "different, however much...the existence of the individual is a more particular or general mode of the life of the species." The enhanced individualism emergent from such separation in contemporary times helps to turn individual existence to a final goal, and all action means towards such goal. (Marx and Engels, 1975:297,299,332,75-81; Archibald, 1978:39-40; 1989:21-22,31).

Finally, and most importantly for the self-as-object, Marx's theme of alienation is at least implicit in the work of all three theorists. Compared to Mills' and Reisman', in Sennett's work the detached and alienated, self-conscious mask is viewed as more desirable and natural, in the sense of consistency with human needs, than is spontaneous activity, at least under certain circumstances in the public realm. He maintains that then a detached, non- spontaneous and alienated mode of being is natural, in the sense of being both functional and compatible with human needs for self-expression.

It is Mills who agrees more closely with Marx's position in his consistent linkage of the heightened contemporary self-conscious-self with impersonality and detachment.
(ii) de Tocqueville.

De Tocqueville (1956: 117,200-206,195-197,299,214-220,155), a Frenchman and one of the first observers and theorists of the new American "society of equals" or, of equal opportunity, addresses subject matter that assumes pertinence in later mass society theory.

Mass society theorists also tend to share de Tocqueville’s (1956:117-120,315,136,308,71; 1966;332,260-261) focus upon the individual human psyche and the conditions of its suppression, subordination, and/or weakening in society. In mass society theory, it is specifically the independence and freedom of the "individual" in the "mob" that evokes concern (Pateman, 1970:4-5).

De Tocqueville contrasts the new American democratic society with European rule under monarchies and aristocracies and is an overall enthousiast of the former.

His praise of American society extends to its influences "counterveiling" a despotic, tyrannical, and/or subordinating rule over individuals. In this regard, he underlines the importance of American extensive political participation in local groups, decentralized administration, "local freedom" of the populace to administrate minor affairs, freedom of the
press, strong religious beliefs, and a "legal profession" with accompanying "courts of justice", "jury", and political rights". These he believes protect the populace from potential oppressive rule, including the weakening of the individual and psyche by the emergent "aristocracy of business" in America (1956:308; 1966:232-239, 322-324, 20-24, 111-112; Archibald, 1978:22-23).

He cautions that should "counterveiling" factors be absent, there would be a potential for American society to exact a new and stronger toll over the individual and particularly the individual psyche. His descriptions of the ensuing consequences constitute "themes" that are visible and elaborated upon in present day "mass society" theory.

For example, de Tocqueville (1956:200, 71, 136, 117-120, 315; 1966:260-261, 332) writes of the possibility for the individual to disappear in the "throng of the masses"; standing so near that they may all at any time be fused in one general mass. In this mass one "is close to one's fellows" but "feels and touches them not."

Also under such circumstances, the centralized, representational government of American is capable of impacting upon individuals more than in the case of a monarchy. For "no monarch is so absolute as to combine all the powers of society in his own hands...as a majority is able to do". The "strict uniformity" of
legislation and regulation from this representative power may then create a "multitude of beings" in "universal uniformity"; "shaped in each other's likeness" (1956:117,200,315; 1966:332).

de Tocqueville (1956:117,302-304,360) similarly colores the increased dependency of the person under these conditions, seeing individuals more vulnerabale to the increased efficiency of a democratic rule which may assume wider functions in private as well as public life.

Such efficient governmental power is characterized as a Weber-like rule that is "absolute, minute, regular, gentle, provident and mild"; a less physical form of power unlikely to be identified and met with resistance, and hence more effectively subordinating the individual; particularly when supplemented by the servitude of the public opinion in the mass majority (1956:117,302-305,112-121,360; 1966:302-323).

de Tocqueville's (1956:217-220) discussions of an increased dependency of persons together with an emergent "manufacturing class" or "aristocracy of business"; having the objective, unlike the ancien regime aristocracy, "not to govern the populace but to use it," bear similarily to Marx's concerns. Given very unfavourable circumstances, de Tocqueville describes this new class as having the potential to transform virtuous actions to actions of utility. Within the mass society school
Mills in particular expounds upon this new form of contemporary power.

De Tocqueville (1966:158-161) also describes the division of labour associated with this manufacturing class as capable of being problematically impersonal; with the master asking nothing of the workman but labour; and the workman expecting nothing but wages. Workmen may then become dependent upon a class of masters, rather than on any particular master, as is the case in an aristocracy. This could make for an individual weakened and prone to narrow-mindedness, passivity, uniformity of action, and loss of self.

Besides the threat to individuality and independence, other psychological concerns addressed by de Tocqueville (1966:216,226,223) and the mass society theorists include heightened feelings of pride, vanity, and jealous cravings; explained as "attempts to set oneself above and apart from the multitude by creating numerous artificial and arbitrary distinctions and finding in the slightest privilege a matter of great importance."

Moreover, the (1956:256,192-193,315; 1966,44-45,226,22) petty longings and greed of the populace encourages individuals to fall back upon themselves and isolate and severe their ties to their fellows. Jealousy, vanity, pettiness, and extreme pleasure
in the possession and displaying of material things are also addressed as dangers, particularly given the pure accessibility of "a thousand material things" to a populace rendered weak and greedy. Later, Mills and Reisman discuss this pettiness, greed and material pride in historical perspective (de Tocqueville, 1956:256,192-193,315; 1966:44-45,226,223).

Sennett, among mass society theorists in particular, addresses the significance of "many small and almost invisible threads" of power in a populace of "innumerable multitude", where traditional class barriers and distinctions do not apply (Mills, 1951; Sennett, 1977; de Tocqueville, 1966:223,226,216,256,44,45).

Mills’s (1951) and Sennett’s (1977) writings echo de Tocqueville’s (1956:222-224;1966:219) discussion about the personalization of "etiquette" or "roles of good breeding" in big city public life. As the former uniform, regular, depersonalized and clearly demarcated behavioral codes become more complex and less demarcated; they also may become a "light and loosely woven veil through which the real feelings and private opinions of each individual are easily discernable." When this occurs, more importance tends to be attached to individuals and their behavioral intentions; with a correspondingly lower sense of security and privacy in public life.
Finally, de Tocqueville (1956:117,302-304,360) addresses the possibility of individuals in this society, reminiscent of Marx, being restrained, weak, stupefied, subordinated, impotent, and of broken spirit; with a mediocrity of desire "replacing ambition to the point where they are robbed of "all the uses of (their) sel(ves)".

The objectification and lack naturalness accorded to the modern "mass" within mass society theory, helps explain the alleged unnaturalness of the modern self-as-object. The following discussion of Mills, Reisman, and Sennett, will show that the more "massification" is viewed as inherent to democracy, the more a problematic self and self-as-object are also seen as inevitable and natural. As will be illustrated, the democratic "mass" society and self-as-object comes to assume a more Weber-like and tragical form relative to that of de Tocqueville's.

The discussion below will also consider specific historical factors which these mass society theorists claim affect the self-as-object.

Mill's characterizations of the self-as-object is the most "middle-of-the-road" and as such, will be the first presented. His self-as-object generally is interwoven with circumscribed historical events. He incorporates elements of a Mead-like, highly naturalized self-conscious-self; distinctively human in
its capacities and needs, but with provisions for conflict and social determination both at the historically specific, and broadly based historical level; although at times even his "self-conscious-self" lacks reality basis. His views, for the sake of clarity, will be presented first.

Reisman's "self-as-object", though more contemporaneous with Mills than Sennett, is the most extreme and esoteric. He usually sees the self-as-object as mass determined, but also as having essential, Freudian-like features; some of which he sees as bound to express themselves. When they do, they triumph over unnatural societal restraints. These extreme views will be presented last.

Sennett also perceives a "personality self-consciousness" which allows for greater ease, spontaneity and therefore naturalness, in some public circumstances. However, at other times he links the self-conscious-self and the self-as-instrument. However, on other occasions he links such distanced self-consciousness as well as self-as-instrument, to specific and problematic historical beliefs and class-related factors. His account will be presented after Mills, to ease comparability and serve as conceptual bridge between the views of Mills and Reisman.
II MILLS

A. The Nature of Masses, Objectification and the Self-As-Object.

Mills (1963:397-401; 1951:232-234) views the "mass" citizenry of declining freedom, political will and effective action from a socio-historical perspective.

According to him, persons are "historical creation(s)" shaped by the social institutions of their times. Unlike de Tocqueville, Mills (1953:11,30; 1963:397-401) did not believe that these individual/societal problems are wholly resolvable through public education within the boundaries of present society. Consistent with Pateman's (1970) view of the contemporary populace as no longer capable of fulfilling democratic or even liberal human ideals, he advocated more fundamental change, particularly in modern bureaucratic and communicative systems. He did not believe that the mass need drift blindly. Rather, they are capable of taking matters into their own hands; for example, by organizing and agitating against private commercial sources of decision meeting that fail to consider the human landscape.

Mills (1953:90-111,10-23,166-169,298,83-85,176) sees contemporary cultural objectification as largely unnatural and
alien. He describes objectified relations in the modern detailed division of labour as role governed. Roles are regular, patterned, and mutually oriented behavioral expectations which emanate from a variety of societal institutions. According to Mills, these roles are learned and internalized, and combined with a persons' psychic structure to make up his or her human character or persona. Correspondingly, Mill's self-image allows for friction and unfriendly determining influences. It's mechanisms are similar to Cooley's "looking-glass self."

However, Mills (1973:14,90-93) also differs from Cooley. For example, he emphasizes the extent to which one's "preferred self-image" may be rejected by the other.

Mills's (1953:90-93,xvi,108-109) "looking glass self" also more easily allows for the expression of elements of autonomy. For example, autonomy is exercised in one's selection of what kind of person one would like to be, and which significant others' image of one self one reacts to. While some autonomy of self-image is considered to be necessary for an adequate self, it is also set within the limits of one's social and institutional placement, class and status.

Further problematizing the self-conscious-self, Mills (1953:93,20,94,109-111,11) wavers on its validity; at times characterizing the experience of self as a Cooley-like illusion
and a linguistic artifact of "I" references, as well as a completely functional entity. With regard to its functionality, Mills states that our own experiences and impulses; when not experienced as emerging form our self; become alien, depersonalized, pathologic and compulsive. At other times, though, Mills refers to a "true" versus "distorted" "actual self"; suggesting the validity of the experience of self.

Furthermore, Mills modified the early Chicago School self-as-object toward a more role-governed "self-image". It becomes particularly problematic in situations of political and authoritative instability and other anxiety-ridden situations, where consistent role-governed behavior patterns and common expectations and appraisals of others are lacking. Under these situations there is "status-panic" and a frantic attempt to get others to confirm one’s self-image. When this occurs in the context of a "societal" rather than "communal" social integration of solely private interests, persons are prone to use others as means to their own ends. "Psychic manipulation" and "machiavellian attitudes" then emerge, in the form of hypocrisy, posing and stylized presentations of the self-as-instrument (1953:190,95,98-102).

The appearance of this self-as-egoistic-instrument is highly qualified, even in cases of non "communal" integration. For example, Mills (1953:98-102) states that situations of change
and political and individual uncertainty, instability, disintegration, and conflict may also be favorable to the formation of a Mead-like conscience or generalized other that exercises behavioral self-control. Moreover, such a generalized other is a natural consequence of maturation and movement through diverse and often conflicting roles and norms. It is also more prone to develop in a contemporary big city life that offers a very large scope and range of actions, decisions, and individual accountability for decisions. Also, this conscience may be equally likely to emerge in situations of strong group control and a stereotyping of roles, as in circumstances of instability and change. In the former, its appearance and control over the self-as-egoistic-instrument has widespread applicability.

However, Mills (1963:439-452; 1953:190,95-102,114-129) also contends that a Mead-like distanced and heightened self-awareness emanating from frustrated, interrupted or questionable activity, may be trigger the stratagems of a self-as-egoistic-instrument, rather than of a "generalized other" exercising control over such stratagems. The strategems may involve the use of situationally specific and culturally determined "Vocabularies of Motive"(s); or, statements of motive which are socially accepted and justifiable in different situations, particularly when activity is questioned and/or in situations of alternative, unexpected or frustrated conduct. In such
situations, a heightened and distanced self-consciousness obtained through taking the perspective of the other, is directed to purposes of role manipulation and/or a lining up of conduct in order to persuade others to accept the furtherance of one's own conduct. Conversely, such lining up must be in accordance with vocabularies of motives themselves constrained within ranges of action that are socially acceptable. Thus vocabularies of motive may play a role in controlling the boundaries of manipulation of a self-as-egoistic-instrument.

Vocabularies of conduct are not natural products of maturation, but learned and internalized in the course of development. They are "imputed by others before being avowed by (one)self." They are also described as socially relative and variable with societal roles and institutions (1963:445).

Mills (1953:115,118; 1963:444-447) notes that in much of twentieth century urban America, the content of vocabularies of motive has shifted from the individualistic ethos of laissez-faire to one of public service and efficiency. He believes that the current vocabulary of motives bring together ingredients of profit and commercial vocabularies. Could not such vocabularies also include ingredients of objectified and goal-related behavior now normative in lines of conduct?

We will now turn to specific historical events relevant to
Mill's self-as-object.

(B) Monopoly Capitalism and the Self-As-Object.

As a mass society theorist, Mills (1953:186-188; 1951:21-22,262,233; 1963:269-271) views the allegedly thwarted independence of the individual in mass society as a historical product. He expands upon de Tocqueville's view that the authority structure in modern society has the potential to become more problematic than earlier ones, due to it being less perceptible; and that an "aristocracy of business" could come to dominate such authority structure. He sees mass society authority structures as broad, interconnected, multifaceted, and located in heavily bureaucratized modern institutions. For Mills, these authority structures are in "monopoly capitalism"; which developed in the twentieth century and has had a far reaching impact on the human psyche and self-as-object.

Twentieth century monopoly capitalism itself is connected with twentieth century accumulated wealth and enormous increases in the scale of property, division of labour, machine usage, factory organization, mass production, and bureaucratization of the workplace. According to Mills, under monopoly capitalism there is a displacement of older, and often family-based or patriarchal, capitalistic enterprises. In a shift viewed by

Within this occupational shift, the "new" middle class and tamed white-collar "mass" are proletarianised, with limited independence; moving in prearranged ways, subject to rules of ascension, and hedged in by bureaucratic regulation. They become one of many specialized units in an elaborate marketing organization, part of the centralized control and standardization of the modern bureaucratized workplace. Such control extends to the presentation of their selves. (1956:161-189, 34 263-265, 223, 225; 1967:267-273).

Using sales as an example, Mills (1956:171-189, 225-226, 233) notes centralized control in department stores by 1900. The new white-collar salespersons lose their personally-known markets. Instead, they are required to use self-manipulation to handle and service people, paper, and money; transiently and impersonally. Furthermore, the ability to use one's personality as an instrument becomes a commodity in demand in the new "personality market". The new white color mass transfers control
of their personal traits to them for a price, turning themselves into an instrument by which goods are distributed, and requiring them to engage in conscious manipulation of their customers or clientele. Their ability to so becomes a key factor in their occupational success, mobility, or failure.

Thus, persons within modern authority structures are prodded within this modern authority structure to turn themselves into instruments by which to use others for personal ends, without moral sanctifying of the means; they become further alienated in their relation to these others (1956; 225-226,233,172-189).

Under such conditions individuals' expressiveness and spontaneity are replaced by masks which are the expressions of companies' aspirations. This new middle class personality market goes well beyond the alienating conditions of wage-work. in that a "sales personality" becomes "a pervasive model for masses of people." People in all areas of life relate to each other according to the "salesman ethic"; using self manipulation to manipulate the other, and, as a consequence, they become more estranged from the other (1956:226-227,182-187; 1967:272).

The great centralization of power in bureaucratized institutions has thwarted persons' independence and desire for security, as well as increased their competitiveness and manipulation. This is illustrated in Mills's (1967:268-271; 1956:91-100)
descriptions of the contemporary 'fixer'. Located just beneath the captain of industry or the new, top executives of the large-scale bureaucratic enterprise, the fixer's position and social mobility are analogous to those of small entrepreneur of the past, but they take on new forms. Thus similar to the new middle class as with their "sales personality", the fixer sells himself as one who fixes things; primarily personnel problems between and among businesses, government, and the public. Unlike his former small counterpart, entrepreneur, he is dependent upon the powerful others who run the increasingly centralized and bureaucratized institutions of monopoly capitalism. He exists in anxious competition for their good will, favour and impressions of being needed. He often creates such impressions by manipulating their anxieties.

Summary.

Mills draws liberally from Early Chicago school theory; in considering the processes of the self-conscious-self, referring to the looking-glass-self, Mead-like derivations of self-consciousness through the assumption of the perspective of the outside other, and the "generalized other". He then makes his own contribution to an understanding of the interaction of the self-conscious-self and the self-as-instrument. For one thing, he points out that a heightened self-conscious-self may be associated both with a self-as-instrument or self-as-egoistic
instrument; as well as towards a heightened "generalize other" or conscience. For another, employing mechanisms of role and role internalization, partly from a Freudian and partly from a culturalist perspective; he generally underlines the contribution of both human essential and cultural elements of the self-as-object. Relative to other mass society theorists, more thought is given to the interrelationship of self-conscious-self and self-as-instrument, largely through the concept of "role" (1953:208,109,166-169,84,176,110,11,30).

Mills also extends the Chicago School mechanisms of the self-as-object to include conflict; being far more critical of modern society than they were. His "vocabularies of motive" and historical treatment of monopolistic capitalism add to our understanding of the self-as-object.

However, as did Goffman, Mills facilitates the theoretical separation of the self-as-instrument from the self-conscious-self, and the separation of instrumental activity guided by human consciousness, when he assigns to the self-as-instrument higher reality status that the self-conscious-self; the latter of which is referred to at times as having no reality basis.

As well, the manner in which the self-conscious-self and self-as-instrument interact with each other, and their relative impact upon individuals' actions, psyches and selves-as-objects,
is unclear. In his references to a biological psychic structure which, together with roles, accounts for one's personhood, he offers no account of the extent or nature of their involvement with other "self" processes, including the self-as-object.

Finally, Mills' idealization and romanticization of earlier and freer periods of personal initiative in the early stages of capitalism, as compared to the constraints of twentieth century "mass" monopoly capitalism; does not sufficiently take into account the many problematic features of, for example, eighteenth century and earlier emergent capitalism and its effects on persons, their psyches', and selves-as-objects.

III SENNERTT

A. Objectification and Personality Self-Consciousness

Sennett believes that the threat to the independence of the person in mass society comes from an overburdening of personal and psychological life, as observed by de Tocqueville.

Sennett also harkens back to de Tocqueville (1977:151,337,328) in his references to the "psychological tyranny of the populace". Such tyranny is also described, as Mills contends, through mechanisms minute and regular, rather than forceful and
overt. Sennett focuses most in the belief systems related to this tyranny. He regards beliefs as "a fundamental "social and power condition".

Sennett (1977:337,183,115-129,20-21,150-151,1,62; 1973:328) is particularly interested in the apparent increase in valuation of individual personality and intimacy in human relations, changes associated with increased secularity, immediacy and immediate life, and in the perceived nature of persons. They are also conducive to the objectification of peculiarities of character, and to the crystallization of the self as object.

These beliefs are traced to Enlightenment rationalism and positivism, which began by emphasizing an observational rather than interactive stance toward objects and objects in the human social world. Such stance becomes generally apparent in mid seventeenth century urban life, and is pervasive by the nineteenth century (1977:263,128,22,150-151,62,126; 1973:328).

Sennett specifically centres on everyday changes in convictions and attitudes in the large urban centres of London and Paris between the eighteenth and nineteenth century. By the nineteenth century, codes of knowledge and perceptions of persons and personhood made more and more of differences in the immediate impression persons made on each other, and public actions formerly masked in ritual and etiquette became

Objectification in the form of personality self-consciousness is opposed to the enlightenment derivation of "order from a sense of nature", and of "natural character as a common thread running through mankind". The secular emphasis on the individual rather than the transcendent and on immediacy and immediate impression, also make for a self-conscious-self that is more burdened and vulnerable. (1977:115,151,217,264-265)

Sennett does not believe that objectification in general need be put to such unnatural use. He points to eighteenth century social life in London and Paris, and its impersonal "public geography" of behavioral codes, ritualized play acting, costumes, and ornamentations, as objectifications of body and voice that facilitate, and are adaptive to, public expression
The objectification of body and voice in a "public geography" occurred as a material response to the geographic mobility and demographic upheaval, displacement, and uprooting of masses of traditional peasants and villagers to larger and more dense cities in the eighteenth century. These restless strangers arose side by side with the expansion of capitalism and the mercantile and commercial classes. The result is a problematic gathering and intermingling of many people not known to each other and not readily classifiable by former routine labelling by way of origin, family background or occupation (1977:128-129,20,38-40,63).

In the midst of this material disorder, rootlessness, restlessness and complexity of social relations, an impersonal public geography of emotional order and stability was forged with rules and modes of address and relations deemed necessary and appropriate to day-to-day public interactions amongst these people of unknown qualities. (1977:60-62,38-41).

For example, every-day intermingling in public drew upon an objectification of the body in dress, costume, ornamentation, or mask; that became functional and precise indicators of social standing or occupation; allowing for a "reading" of persons in unstable and difficult conditions (1977:38-
Objectified codes of appearance and behavior also provided for orderly public expression at a distance from one's personal circumstances, without fear of objectifying one's impulses and emotions, or giving unwanted signs of self or motive (1977:330, 22, 264, 62, 126-128, 37, 336).

This is because the immediate encounter was taken as the limit of knowable reality, rather than being analyzed in individualistic terms. Theatrical presentation of body and voice need be accepted only at "surface or "face" value"; with a disbelief or willing suspension of belief in body and voice as symbols of underlying personality peculiarities or traits (1977:259-264, 30-41, 315, 326).

In fact, it is insofar as objectifications of body and voice inhibit or suspend a "personality self-consciousness" controlled by self-consciousness, that easy and regular public movement occur, and social bonds are forged between strangers (1977:64-65, 35-42, 190-191, 152, 73).

Generally, Sennett (1977:190-191, 264, 314, 152, 35) naturalizes the suspension of personality self-consciousness as essential to the expression of the human creative powers of man-the actor, and of human growth generally, which only develops from encounters
with a wider unknown. The actor is given provision to escape from the self-conscious-self into the realm of theatrical play. In doing so, however, he also enters the realm of alienation from self, and alienation from self becomes so naturalized.

Thus Sennett (1977:40-42,34-36,314,330-331) portrays the self-consciousness that is formative of personality self-consciousness, in a completely unnatural and problematic light. However, the illustration that he offers of the benefits of a willing suspension of disbelief in the self-as-object is drawn from a historically specific situation not only of restlessness, confusion and rootlessness, but of transition to a capitalist economy and to city life. Might there not be historical circumstances in which persons could objectify their essence and be intrinsically involved in public activity? Mills and Reisman, as well as Marx, believe that such objectification is realizable. Moreover, Sennett's own "Hidden Injuries of Class" also expresses belief that cultural beliefs and class-related factors that inhibit workers' spontaneous self-expression, are historical and problematic.

Sennett also naturalizes his nineteenth century actors and their social theatrics and societal stages, as common and long-standing occurrences dating back to ancient Greece, in which persons are envisioned as actors and society a stage. He maintains that the inhibition of personality self-consciousness
arises from the natural, because essential, need to deal with the problem of an audience in a sea of strangers; a problem frequently solved through common and formal codes of experiences, appearances and expressions amenable to a meaningful public domain (1977:314, 40-42, 35).

However, even if this is true, is it tenable in this post-Freudian world to suspend one’s belief in persons as motivated beings with purposes and energies, both conscious and unconscious? Can we routinely suspend belief regarding the person underneath the appearance and expression? Can we stop ourselves from analyzing persons’ individual traits and motives?

In terms of the developmental and evolutionary naturalism of play-acting, Sennett also points to the development towards self-distanced objectification in childrens’ play, later to be expanded upon in games, as described by Piaget. In play and games the child learns to postpone immediate gratification to achieve a sense of control, manipulability and mastery over what he expresses. The rules of childhood games are viewed as first attempts to objectify action and put it at a distance. (1977:314-323)

Sennett does demonstrate that the impersonal and distanced social mask need not be a social evil, as often regarded, or involve manipulation or lack of commitment and investment of
feeling, as evident in Goffman's work. Rather, behavior at a distance from one's personal circumstances can be very emotional, feeling, and spontaneous, since personality is kept clearly separate from one's identity in society (1977:35-37,73,314-315,326).

He illustrates the naturalness of a suspended or limited self-conscious-self and personality self-consciousness in a given historical situation, and shows that a theatrical mode of behavior free of the self-as-unstemmed or self-as-egoistic-instrument, is possible and at times highly functional.

By the nineteenth century and the entrenchment of a belief structure in which the individual is enshrined as a social idea, the idea of man-the-actor and his playful behavior codes of action run up against a movement towards a stable flourishing of a bourgeois class, industrial capitalism, and conceptual distinctions between public and private; with expressiveness excluded in the public domain. This shift in focus to the private becomes apparent by the 1840's and 50's. Sennett laments the disappearance of persons as actors from the '1840's to the 1890's; as players became denied the art of acting (1977:36-41,126-129).

Like Mills, Sennett idealizes and romanticizes earlier and more transitional stages of capitalism in the eighteenth century.
B. Class and Self-As-Object.

Sennett implicates the social, industrial, economic and belief structures in contemporary society as responsible for a fragmentation and splitting of self into private and public spheres that is even more pronounced in the lower and middle-lower classes. For them, the social "me" is kept more private and distinct from the personal "I", such that individuals increasingly feel that only in the private world 'out there' can their human feeling, expressiveness, and the real 'me' safely emerge. (1973:233,207-217).

Sennett describes a heightened tendency towards manipulation in these classes. This, he believes, is in response to, and in compensation for, to the manipulation practised daily upon lower and lower-middle class persons at all societal levels and institutions. There arises, then, a longing among persons to reverse the power situation; so that through their work, they can manipulate others, "mold" what people are thinking, and request the obedience routinely demanded of them. Their actual ability to exercise such manipulative control, however, is out-of-reach; not only for material reasons, but because of culturally-instilled self-doubt as to whether they are 'special' and intelligent enough to exercise the control that exists exclusively in "the professions" (1973:222-237,207,124-
Even at the level of the family, manipulation appears as a product of persons denied their basic human need for dignity. They then seek compensation and personal life meaning in the form of "sacrifice" for their children; a "sacrifice" which requires the children, "by rights of expectations and wishes", to enter a higher social class and "develop themselves" in a way their parents could not. This unspoken social contract between parent and child is regarded by the children as a way parents have of manipulating rather than really loving them (1973:124-134).

As a further illustration in the interpersonal arena, there is in courting a continual, compensatory continual desire and need to earn a respect from the other that is lacking in the outside world. This has the affect of turning actions "into a means" of eligibility. This damages love, since love cannot in truth be something earned or deserved (1973:207).

4. REISMAN-

(A) Groupism and the Other-Directed Self-Conscious-Self

Reisman expresses "classical" mass society concerns regarding less visible and more subtle social structural problems for the individual and his/her psyche and autonomy (1954:34-35).
He identifies an American "groupism", an "other-directed" character structure, as the menace replacing an earlier, ruthless individualism; stating on occasion that unless present trends are reversed, the hegemony of this contemporary "other-directed" self lies not far away (1954:38; 1961:20,26-27,251,257).

The "other-directed" character is viewed as a cultural and societal product of contemporary mass society. Reisman (1961:20,90,26-27; 1954:99,34-35,266,341) asserts that society at large requires a large amount of conformity through character structure, in order that persons desire as inner compulsion, what is culturally necessary, and what is culturally necessary is personally and compulsively desired. Individuals acquire and maintain their character structure through unconscious modeling of parents; and through public opinion, norms, school, movies, radio, and other institutions which define goals for modern children. Children internalize these cultural goals from parental and cultural "superegos".

Other-directed characters are particularly attentive to what others think of them and how competent they are in their manipulations of others, and in being manipulated. Their historically specific, but nonetheless "characterological, drive" leads them to manipulate the persons they can, or
It would appear, then, that character structure is culturally determined, yet also relatively intractable to change (1954: 36-37,103-104).

Reisman (1961:180-182,65,127,130,233) points out that the contemporary "characterological drive" which is conducive to using one's self-as-instrument, and is visible in political life in the form of the "inside dopster"; has, as is the case with Mill's lower-middle class "sales ethic", increasingly spread to the population at large. Many people aspire to this kind of character and pride themselves in their ability to suppress their "emotional fire" in order to be so. Such suppression is carried out to the point of decreased capacity to feel; and of becoming the mask donned; a reference compatible with the common mass society theme of the individual lost in the throng. However, in "Individualism Reconsidered" (1954:341-350,36-37;103-104), published four years after "The Lonely Crowd" (1961), he draws upon Freudian essentialist terminology and concepts in expressing his belief in the inevitable triumph over all societal modes of characterological conformity, through the processes of the "id". Reisman states that the rebellious id struggles constantly in an inner war to overcome authority. This "id" has the last word, and the capacity to liberate itself from superego authority structures; because these internal
authority structures can't suppress all of the id's claims for liberty. Reisman extrapolates this model to the societal level and its bureaucratic authority structures of compulsion and conformity. At this level as well, he sees individuals constantly rebelling against authority. Authoritative structures thus rest on a precarious foundation.

Moreover, even in "The Lonely Crowd" (1961; 100, 259-260), he develops and glorifies an "autonomous" character type that is non-conforming, capable of reinterpretation of their culture, and of "conscious self-direction" as opposed to being guided "by voices other than their own."

The victories of the id and autonomy notwithstanding, Reisman (1961:7, 26-27) emphasizes the role of population shifts and trends, discernable in Greek Athenian culture and in western society since the middle ages. These shifts and trends have a strong bearing upon social and characterological conditions, including the self-as-object.

B. Origins of the Other-Directed Self-Conscious-Self.

Reisman (1961:100) discusses two revolutions in population growth and accompanying characterological modes of conformity, within western society. They represent revolutions from
traditional modes of conformity. Their implications for the nature of self-as-object are outlined below:

In the first revolution, beginning with the Renaissance and including the industrial and political revolutions of the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth century, more advanced technology, spurs the division of labour and permits sufficient leisure for individuals to imagine being someone else and to take the roles of the other. There is then a Mead-like potential for increased awareness of self. This awareness allows persons to restructure and exert command over their social relations, and to use manipulation rather than force in doing so. When this occurs, social relations are stripped forever of their old "animal-like simplicity", and the potential for use of self-as-instrument arises (Reisman, 1961:246-247).

During this revolution, character changes from one based on traditional to inner-directed modes of conformity. This is compatible with the cultural demand at this time for new possibilities for an expanding population (1961:6-8,149-150,8,101-110; 1954:112).

The inner-directed mode of conformity requires persons to procure under their own motive power, instrumental manipulation of specific means to general ends. This is conducive to experiences of self-mastery, and mastery of fate and nature. A
positive consciousness of self is also heightened in these conditions of relative independence and autonomy. (1961:6-8,100,259-260,149-150; 1954:100-112)

The second revolution from traditional modes of conformity entails a characterological change particularly evident in the middle classes of American big cities. (1961:149-150; 1954:112) This revolution is associated with the closing of European immigration, in beginning about 1890, to the cities of the advanced industrial countries. This ushers in a period when productive needs and frontiers to be conquered are largely taken care of, and population expansion is no longer required. There is an "incipient population decline" wherein deaths exceed the number of births. Associated with this there is a decline in the proportion of the populace engaged in production and extraction, and increased activity in service trades in the tertiary economic realm. There is also a growth of business, government, and the professions within heavily bureaucratized structures that are more dependent upon public opinion than industry for their success (1954:100-104; 1961:6-8,112,149-150).

There is also a focus on the remaining refractory components of the industrial process: the persons who run the machines. Attention is increasingly paid to their psyches and their "human relations," and decreasingly to technical problems. (1961:45)
The worker comes to depend more on the expectations of others, and less on what he/she does than on what they think he/she does. If one is to achieve success and social mobility under these conditions one must be attuned to the expectations of the other, and competent in manipulating others and being manipulated. The self-as-egoistic-instrument emergent from these conditions is characterized as requiring a smooth and unruffled manipulation of self, rather than emotional involvement in one’s experiences (1961: 149-151, 6-15-20, 48; 1954: 40-45, 13, 8, 19, 99-104).

The other-directed use of self-as-object becomes increasingly apparent over the course of the twentieth century in edifying literate to youth, magazines, journals, and educational content expounding upon the use of self and others in the interpersonal realm, even for such intangible goals as wealth, popularity, happiness, and affection. Thus the other-directed self-as-object has increasing awareness of acting upon itself as well as on others (1961: 149-151, 6-7; 1954: 112, 8, 19, 99, 100-104).

Reisman (1961: 48-49) also reiterates the theme of the importance and problem of social uncertainty in mass society theory generally, associating such uncertainty with a heightened self-as-instrumental-object in the case of the other-directed character type. For example, with the loss of old certainties
and parental assuredness regarding child-reading in the age of other-directedness, parents look for direction as to how to handle their children, as well as workmates and others, in the mass media. Through these sources, they are then influenced by "personnel" methods of manipulation. The other-directed child responds in kind; leading to mutually manipulative relations between parent and child.

Reisman's contribution to self-as-object theory lies in calling to attention differing kinds and mechanisms of self-consciousness, with differing degrees of naturalness. For example, he separates a positive self-consciousness emanating from the autonomous and, to a lesser degree, inner-directed character type, and its associated feelings of mastery; from the heightening of self-consciousness that is a product of the "other-directed" pervasive use of self-as-instrument in the other-directed.

The importance he places upon demographic influences for the self-conscious-self is notable. Additionally, he points out the interrelationships among population increments and other "mass" factors impacting upon the self-as-object such as technological development, division of labour, corporatism, capitalism, bureaucratization and objectification; and their attendant "groupism" and lack of individual initiative.
Reisman's vision of the liberating powers of the id and its objectified bureaucratic authority structures does not carry much validity, considering that even in Freud's (1957, 1918) own theorizing the id is not allowed much expression, let alone liberation; instead, civilization itself requires that it remain suppressed or displaced.

**IV SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION**

Self-as-Object theory was expanded upon in the mass society school to include elements of conflict as well as the influence of a variety of socio-historical factors such as secularism, demography, large scale industrialization, capitalism, and social upheaval.

Through Mill's internalization, roles, vocabulary of motives, and language offer general mechanisms through which the self-as-object is formed and interrelates with the self-as-instrument, to him a strain of doubt remains as to whether the self-conscious-self has any real referent.

He points out that we do not know the extent or nature of involvement, if any, of the socially derived self-conscious-self with more biologically based aspects of the human psyche, or the manner in which such psyche interacts with socially determining influences.
As noted, all theorists tend to idealize earlier periods of history when conditions favoured less self-consciousness, in Sennett's case; or a more positively derived self-consciousness. Mills associates the latter with family or small-scale capitalism as opposed to present-day monopoly capitalism, and Reisman similarly but indirectly blames contemporary corporatism, large-scale bureaucratic industry, and mass consumption as problematically impacting on the modern day individual and self-as-object. Sennett romanticizes early eighteenth century public life in Paris and London, as well as "pre-Renaissance" beliefs emphasizing the virtue of individualism and valuation of "the unique"; and the "personal".

Thus while Mills and Riesman's contemporary and problematic self-as-object is historically tied to the decreased mark of the individual in society, and of his/her initiate, creativity, and individualism; Sennett sees the contemporary problematic "personality self-consciousness" as the product of beliefs which place too much emphasis on individualism, uniqueness, and personalism.

Since Sennett's celebration of impersonality, and of a Goffman-like "man-the-actor", is very narrowly and situationaly based in human history, there does not seem to be a lot of support for
his idealized detached, distanced and alienated "person-as-performer".

As well, Reisman's romanticized self-as-object, linked to the repression and reemergence of the id over superego structures, as noted, is not viable.

It is interesting to note, as in Goffman's Chicago School theory, the naturalization of "man-the-actor" in Sennett, and the extreme denaturalization of the self-conscious-self at times in Mills. Such denaturalization grows more pronounced in post-modern theory; facilitating the separation of the self-as-instrument from the self-conscious-self.
CHAPTER FOUR

THE POST-MODERN SCHOOL
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

Post-Modern writings lean towards a Weber-like concern for the changing nature of power and authority structures and their culturally determining effect on the individual and his/her psyche.

According to Weber, (1958, 1969) power and authority are changing in the direction of increased rationalization. Weber specifically focuses on the roots of contemporary rationalism in protestantism, secularism, and bureaucratization.

Also like Weber, Post-Modern theorists emphasize (1958,1969) the complexity and inevitability of modern problematic social processes such as rationalization and objectification. They explore the roots and layers of large-scale socio-historical phenomena seemingly moving of their own momentum, exerting themselves and shaping persons as they proceed and progress through various historical eras.

Thus on our continuum of naturalness Post-modern theorists tend to treat objectification and self-as-object in terms of historical inevitability, unavoidability and/or determinism. Within the Post-Modern school, Foucault veers towards positions of inevitability and determinism more consistently than Rose,
who sees a modern form of self-consciousness that is historically determined but addressable.

I will take up Rose’s (1985, 1989, 1990) and Foucault’s (1986) Post-Modern writings concerning the self-as-object. I have chosen Foucault and Rose because it is they who most clearly and extensively address the emergence and experience of one’s self as a conscious object of attention, scrutiny, reflection, problematization, and awareness.

I will broadly outline the post-modern approach, and then present an amalgamated historical sketch of events of importance to the self-as-object which is in agreement, or at least compatible with, the views of both theorists. This will help give us an overview of a "post-modern" self-conscious-self. Rose and Foucault agree substantially on historical events and changes in the content of the self and/or self-as-object in history; although they emphasize very different historical periods in their accounts. We will then consider these two theorists’ differences in approach, assumptions, and finally, historical accounts, beginning with Foucault, who roots the self-conscious-self in an earlier time frame than Rose.

Foucault (1983:208, 237-239) joins Martin, Gutman, and Hutton (1988:3-5, 146) in describing his large body of work prior to the 1980’s as having generally dealt with the technologies of
power and domination, and their actions, reformations, and objectifications of the subjectivities/ selves of the mass populace. Such power forms were largely contained in scientific inquiry, language, and societal exclusion of "deviant" "others".

However, and most useful for the purposes of this thesis, Foucault showed a "late" interest, beginning in 1981, and before his death in 1984, in how a human being directly and consciously acts upon, transforms, and so constitutes him or her self. (Martin, Gutman and Hutton, 1988:3; Foucault, 1983:237-239,208).

The "later" Foucault became interested in the "disillusionment with the modern world and subsequent turning within"; seeing this to be "similar to the situation of the Roman Empire." Thus "breaking with his starting point of the classical age" of sixteenth and seventeenth century Europe; "the pivotal period in his previous analyses until his "'History of Sexuality'" (volume III), Foucault located the roots of the modern concept of the self in first and second century Greco-Roman philosophy, and in fourth and fifth century Christian spirituality (Foucault, 1988:17,39-49; Martin, Gutman and Hutton, 1988:4,5,146).

Rose's work compliments Foucault's in the sense of explicitly focusing on the development of the self-as-object in Foucault's "classical age". Rose and Foucault also agree with the
pertinence of the "human sciences" to the present-day self-as-object, though it is Rose who elaborates upon this theme in greater detail (Foucault, 1988:49; Rose, 1990, 1985).

The views of Parker, (1989, 1990) as both post-modern theorist and observer, will be included at times. This will be particularly helpful in giving context and clarity to the kinds of differences in approach that Rose and Foucault adopt within post-modern theory.

2. A POST-MODERN APPROACH TO THE SELF-CONSCIOUS-SELF

In contrast to the mass society school, post-modernists lean towards detailing the local, particular, complex and interwoven power operations that structure differing modern social forms (Parker, 1990).

Post-Modern "genealogies" have as their subject the workings or historical ontologies of the constitution of truth, self, power, and their interrelations, in structuring social forms. This includes "techniques" and "technologies" used in shaping persons (Parker, 1990:3-4; Foucault, 1983:231-232,237; Rose, 1990a).

Among other things, post-modernism may be viewed as a reaction
to traditional western experimental and positivistic social psychology, and their claims to scientific truth. In post-modern theory, "truths," including that of the concepts of the self-as-object, are generally socially constructed. It is the ideology behind claims to truth, the social control and "technology" they legitimate, and the changes in subjectivities that they induce; that are the focus of analysis. Generally, Post-modernists do not view societal conditions and beliefs of any sort as any more natural than alternative societal arrangements (Parker, 1990).

In this vein, Rose asserts the goal of Post-Modern genealogy as "not to reveal falsity but to describe the constitution of truths", and of the "how" rather than the "why", of a self variously constituted and shaped through webs of power (Parker, 1989:9,17,23-27,44-45; Rose, 1990a:4,217).

Post-modern theory also self-consciously breaks from the theoretical concentration within "modernity", in the last century and a half in the western world, upon cultural domination over the individual. Rather, the post-modern approach is one that asserts that it is the collective consciousness of all; their everyday activities and ordinary beliefs and internal states, that are affected and dominated by social power formations and the wide-ranging political-cultural sphere (Parker, 1989:2-4,46-60,23-24; Rose, 1990a:208,124-
Consistent with Ariel's (1962) historical findings regarding the socio-historical content of such everyday concepts as "the child", "family", "deviant," "normal", and "citizen"; "the unitary self" is also viewed as a social construction; a heterogeneous and shifting result of the social expectations, duties, and norms applied to it. Our belief systems concerning self are a fabrication of various historical-cultural centres of power. Rose considers "the self.. a vital element in the networks of power that traverse modern society." (Rose, 1985: 224-225,148,163-164; 1990a:124-129,208-218; Parker, 1989:116; 1990b:116,213).

The constructive powers of social discourse, defined as systems of statements, make language a very important mechanism of the construction of "truths" such as the self-conscious-self or "self-image" (Rose, 1990a:240; 1990b:105-107,117) Parker, 1989:225,9-27,47-52; 1990:15).

Rose (1990a:216-218,131,238-240; 1990b:106-107; Parker, 1989: 17,24-26) holds that beliefs about self are fabricated from centres of power that have addressed us as objects of expert knowledge, expectations, and norms. These beliefs are objects of increasingly rational scientific and psychological discourse. Rose also describes the shifting content of the sources and
powers which determine the self as progressively "governmentalized"; that is to say, elaborated, rationalized, and centralized.

Roses's contemporary rationalized power centres, in the form or "under the auspices" of government and government institutions, increasingly investigate and act upon persons through the discipline, discourse, and expressive power of modern social psychology. The results of social psychological institutionalized investigations are communicated to governments in support of powerful, oppressive social practices (Rose, 1990b:108-109; Parker, 1989:23-24,46-6).

Other social representations contributing to our conceptualizations of the self include those of scientific thought, protestantism, romanticism, and exclusive possession, among others (Rose, 1990b:106-107).

Finally, the post-modern approach needs to be understood as in some part a reaction to modern structuralism. Like post-structuralism, structuralism concerns itself with collective existences and underlying realities that organize particular observations, despite individual intentions. Structuralism offers itself as a science that derives its explanations from signs, most notably in language, from which one can find an underlying reality (Parker, 1989:51-56).
Post-modernists react against the structuralist venture to find objective truths that post-modernists believe not to exist. They contend that since structuralists' texts represent meanings transformed from other texts, the true recovery of meanings and structures is impossible.

However, according to Parker (1989:49-56), Foucault's post-modern deconstructions of texts try to reinforce the 'scientific' character of structuralism; the idea being that "our conversations and interactions are structured by texts, as well as by the power relations contained within the surrounding discourses."

Thus Post-structuralist meanings, like those of structuralism, throw into question the possibility of arriving at definitive and true meanings, and, as discussed above, offer a critique of 'truth' as such. Foucault states that our very theories are objectifications, historically motivated conceptualizations. Parker also characterizes post-structuralism as leading us to believe that there is a "social knowledge of meaning which, of its nature, escapes and determines the individual subject" (Parker, 1989:53-57,105-107,116,121-148; Foucault, 1983:209,231-232).

Parker does submit that post-structuralism, including that of
Foucault’s, helps demystify the truth in the dominant culture and as such is politically useful, despite Foucault’s efforts at political neutrality (Parker, 1989:48-56).

3. A POST MODERN HISTORY OF THE SELF-CONSCIOUS-SELF

Substantively, there is a noticeable amount of overlap in Foucault’s and Rose’s discussion of events in human history of significance to the self-as-object. These include the rising authority of the church, the elaboration of governmental powers and ‘science of police’, and the advent of the "psy" sciences and therapies. As we shall see, the nature of the experience of self is also seen by both theorists to differ in content and form with historical changes in power centres. However, Foucault places overwhelming emphasis on mechanisms of the self-as-object in antiquity; while Rose concentrates on modern psychotherapeutics.

We will now outline an amalgamated historical sketch of the sources of self-as-object that draws upon Foucault’s and Rose’s commonalities, or at least areas of compatibility of approach to the self-conscious-self, and to historical events accorded significance by them. This sketch will show a self-conscious-self that is not only intensified over the course of time, but whose content changes fundamentally in relation to differing
historical institutions. We will then proceed to an account of these two theorists' differences in emphases, approach, and proposed mechanisms and processes of the self-conscious-self.

We will start with the changes in the "technique" of self that accompanied the transition from pagan to christian culture in the early Christianity of the first centuries a.d. At that time there emerged a belief in an intensified and negatively oriented self-conscious-self that expressed itself in acts of renunciation and practices of seeking of obedience through "self" disclosure. The renunciation, rupture, or refusal of self is undertaken as discipline, so as to eliminate thoughts which do not lead to God (Foucault, 1982:230,244; 1988:39-49; Rose, 1990a:218-220).

However, historically, renunciation of self is not regarded as the most prominent change in the self-conscious-self. Rather, Foucault and Rose emphasize historical changes in the positive content of the self-conscious-self.

For Foucault approaches these changes in the self-conscious-self in terms of persons' varying responses to situations of withdrawal from a complex socio-political realm. He states that persons have choices and are capable of original responses to such situations.
As an illustration, let us jump back one step to the Greco-Roman or Hellenistic era, and its distinctive conception and "cultivation" of a self whose content is far from being a necessary consequence of social withdrawal or an "expression in the sphere of ideology". This self-conscious-self constitutes a new "stylistics" of attending and caring for oneself, and an "art of existence" which "philosophy, particularly that of Socrates, claimed to be." The "care of the self" that emerges at this time involves a practice of making one's life and self into an object for aesthetic values, or "create(ing) ourselves as a work of art." Under these conditions, the experience of a self is one of relative enjoyment, without desire and disturbance; an experience that is positive and creative rather than defensively cultivated. In our contemporary society, Foucault (1986:67-68,45-49; 1988:26-27; 1982:237,245) claims that we have hardly any remnant of this kind of self-as-object.

Rose (1990a:220-222) describes other changes in the self-conscious-self over the course of the "classical period" of the sixteenth to eighteenth century. He relates the collective shaping, domination, rationalization and imposition of techniques and technologies bearing upon persons' subjectivities' and selves during this period to an eventual intensification and alteration of the self-conscious-self. Rose (1990a:220-222) describes the sixteenth and seventeenth century coercive intrusion of government into the private details of
life; such as the dress of servants and nurses, the control of beggars, and the supervision of midwives; as escalated in the seventeen and eighteenth century, with its idea of the 'reason of the state'; and techniques and knowledge applied to the control of the populace and of persons within it, collectively called the 'science of police'. All of this, according to Rose, required increased self-discipline and self-scrutiny.

Rose (1990a:208-209,217-239; 1990b:104-105,116; 1985:222-226) believes that social science and the application of psychotherapeutics are compatible with the interest and concern beginning in sixteenth and seventeenth century European government for the details of the personal life of the populace. These "psy" sciences provide for a more contemporaneously based self-conscious-self that is a continuance and evolution from earlier, more directly coercive applications of political rationality and technology.

From the eighteenth century, the practice of psychotherapeutics increasingly served as a sophisticated distribution mechanism for governmental shaping of persons' subjectivities. Foucault and Rose see these mechanisms as filling the space vacated by the formal dismantling of the 'science of police' in the nineteenth century, when the latter were conceived as constituting too great an intrusion into personal affairs (Foucault, 1982:214-216; Rose, 1990a:217-227,237-238; 1985:222-
By the mid nineteenth century, psychology "adopted an empiricist methodology" and set itself as an "objective science of reaction and behavior" and as a more indirect form of social control than the former directly coercive measures of government (Rose, 1990a:217-227).

By the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, it is evident that governmental scientific policing, rather than disappearing, has assumed a more sophisticated and psychologically informed shaping of the details of personal life. For example, government extension of education to the populace includes hygienic programmes for persons "managing themselves and their relationships with others" (Rose, 1990a:27,32; Parker 1989:3,47).

Over the last two hundred years, such psychotherapeutic "technologies of self" entail the construction of a self-conscious-self whose content is "obsessive". The positive content of such self-conscious-self arises in the face not only of individuals' retreat and withdrawal from enhanced state powers, but from the very mechanisms of social control informed by the psychotherapeutic, psychological and psychiatric sciences, that persons look up to from their points of retreat (Foucault, 1982:215-217; Rose, 1990b:104-105).
This obsessive and psychotherapeutic self-conscious-self is also viewed by Rose (1990a:220-222) and Foucault (1988:48-49; 1982:214-215,240-241), in a sense, as a continuance of self practices and rules that had been contained within the religious framework emergent at the dawn of Christianity. For the consciousness of self is described as a historical force never disappearing but "reaffirmed" in the altered framework of the Renaissance and escalating, subsiding, and continuing through to the seventeenth century. From the eighteenth century on, the self-conscious-self is "reinserted" in the context of the "so-called human sciences."

Thus the self-conscious self is not regarded by either Rose or Foucault (1988:27) as a modern trait born of the reformation or romanticism, but rather, particularly in Foucault, one of the most ancient western traditions; constantly undergoing permutations and modifications, and surfacing from latency into periods of great activity centuries later. Within its changes in expression and content, there is seen to be manifest a core of self-consciousness that is continuous and underlying. This is a self-conscious-self naturalized in the sense that it has a historical motive power and momentum of its own. When it reemerges it does so with an intensity and distinct content that in turn is historically determined, in varying degrees.
This treatment of the self-conscious-self may be construed as having a reified quality reminiscent of Hegel's account of the movement of self-consciousness through history (Parker, 1989).

Also, this account "glosses over" as a by-product of an allegedly more fundamental, hidden force, the substantial changes in individuality, self, and experience of self that occur in the Renaissance and Reformation.

Furthermore, relative to the self-conscious-self, neither Foucault nor Rose pay much attention to the self-as-instrument. For post-modernism, the self-as-object of antiquity and early Christianity becomes an instrument only in the context of exercises consciously carried out for purposes of constituting oneself, whether for aesthetic development and the attainment of knowledge, or for self renunciation. Foucault (1983) also describes other conscious "exercise(s) of the self upon the self" as occurring in some modern-day cults. This ignoring of the externally and interpersonally directed self-as-instrument may be explained in part by the fact that its activities have become naturalized to the point that they are taken for granted; internalized, or operating below the level of consciousness, for theorists as well. Even when consciously acknowledged, the activities of such a self-as-instrument may not seem to require explanation.
Elias (1978, 1982) describes a similar phenomenon with regard to the historical development of manners and self-control in the west. According to Elias, behavior previously under external control and now internalized need not be the object of discourse. It is merely assumed. Similarly, the external self-as-instrument may be perceived as requiring little explanation and interest, as compared to a self-conscious-self that has gradually and more consistently come to be seen as a problematic and socially relative construction in need of historical address.

Others may protest that Foucault's accounts generally address an "individual nature" or "essence" of man, or "discrete personality" which does not exist; that there is no difference between the "essence" of humans and that of all other living beings. The venture into the essence of persons, including their self-consciousness, may then be written off and dispensed with as "abstract objectivity" (See, for example, Horkheimer, 1978:97).

However, even if this were case, it is of interest to investigate changes in beliefs concerning self-consciousness for their cultural and behavioral implications.

It should also be noted that there is a whole stream of Freudian and neo-Freudian literature (See, for example, Freud, 1918 and
Fromm, 1976) that address various intrinsic and internal needs of the individual as discrete entity. As well, this literature assumes and addresses itself to discrete internal structures within the individual, such as the "ego", whose functioning is important to essential and distinctively human needs and desires.

4. THE SELF-AS-OBJECT: POST-MODERN DIFFERENCES IN APPROACH

Another criticism of Foucault in general is that he pays insufficient attention to persons' ability to act creatively, and on their own initiative, as opposed to being determined or molded by society (See for example, Baudrillard, 1983,1987).

Indeed, although Foucault's (1988:10,14-19) writings on the self-as-object speak of choice in persons' responses to adverse and otherwise determining events, these choices seem to be collective and impersonal in nature.

Nevertheless, Foucault (1988:10; 1982:250) claims that in showing how material causes and factors interact upon people, and how people react to them, he is contributing to their freedom, and that his role as an 'intellectual' is to make changes in persons' minds; and to show them that they much freer than they feel; if they would only "question, criticize and destroy themes built up in history." Foucault also contends
that concrete change is possible because it is human beings themselves who have constituted their selves and identity and therefore human beings to whom we must look to modify their fate.

Rose (1990a:57-61; 1990b:116,106) explicitly tries to discover deeper and more accurate meanings in texts. He looks for hidden, repressed or internally contradictory meanings so as to expose and dismantle ideological and false constructs, including those bearing upon the self. It is then that such meanings cannot be used as ideological weapons. Rose encourages resistance to powers and forces exposed in texts that are normally determining of persons. Thus his post-modernism is less skeptical and cynical about concepts such as truth and freedom (Parker, 1989:3-4,53-55).

Thus while Foucault describes his genealogy in neutral and apolitical tones, as concerned with how the self consciously constitutes itself as subject, and the shifting forms of political power on persons; Rose (1990a:213-217) refers to "genealogies of a social formation" which delineate the ways in which "our authorities, in pursuing social objectives, have found it necessary and desirable to educate us in the techniques for governing ourselves" (Foucault: 1988:4; Parker, 1989:44-45,56).
A. Processes of a Self-Conscious-Self in Foucault.

Foucault (1982:243, 1986:45-49) notes a preoccupation with self in the texts of ordinary people in the Greco-Roman or Hellenistic culture, starting from about the third century b.c. and continuing until the second or third century a.d. The theme of taking care and cultivating one's self reached its highest development in the first and second centuries a.d. (i.e. a.d. 1 to 199). This is evidenced in Greek philosophy and discourse, and in the philosopher Epictus's vision of man as the "being destined to care for himself through a reasoning faculty given him by nature." These centuries are designated by Foucault as a "golden age" in the cultivation of the self (1986:45-49; 1982:243).

Even though Foucault (1988:9,27; 1986:1) idealizes some aspects of this "golden age" of self-conscious-self, as we saw above, he is not always positive in his descriptions of it. According to him, it is at this time, even as early as antiquity, that individual withdrawal from the social sphere precipitates the "first permutation" in the intensity, quality, cultivation, and "concern with self". The "self" experience becomes more
introspective, detailed, and broad, as illustrated in the daily ritual of self-analysis in one's "thirty minute examination of conscience" at the end of every day. This self-conscious-self is to be understood in response to individual withdrawal from two cultural and institutional changes at this time.

Foucault specifically fingers changes in marital practice and a new importance of marriage and the couple, and in a redistribution in roles and rules in the "political game." The growing complexities of married and political life give rise to a new problematization of the self. This withdrawal is not envisioned primarily as a negative one, but as an adaptive response to new complexities; a new way of conceiving oneself (Foucault, 1986:1). I now discuss both institutional changes in more detail.

(i) *Marriage in antiquity*

Foucault (1986:72-77) describes marital practice in the Hellenistic and Roman civilizations as changing from a private transaction and matter for the family to decide, to an intrusion of family matters by public institutions. In the second and first centuries b.c. hellenistic marriage becomes a civic institution; although the extent of marital institutionalization is unknown because documents are limited to a few geographical areas.
Such an institutionalized and more objectified conjugal bond is part of an effort to preserve it. It brings with it duties and obligations much more closely defined than in the past. Conjugal relationships come to have their own force, difficulties, benefits, pleasures, and art or "aesthetics of shared pleasures" (1986:148-183,228-237).

For the husband, marriage evolves from a simple authoritative and status-determined master/servant relationship, to a contractual relationship of relative reciprocity; in which the wife’s increased status dictates "reasonable government" and "moderate conduct" on the part of the husband. There is also an "objectification" of sexual relations within the "conjugal relationship". For example, intercourse becomes condemned unless within marriage and "with a view to marriage’s particular objectives", such as the production of "progeny". The exercise of increased marital fidelity is based on assumptions of mutual consent, respect, friendship, romance, and complete and "purified union". To the husband, the definition of the way he is able "to form himself as an ethical subject" within the marital realm is now complex and problematic (Foucault, 1986:75-79,148,165-183).
(ii) The Political Game in Antiquity

Not only changes in marriage, but also in politics made life more complex, objectified, and problematic; paving the way for a new kind of self-mastery and life-strategy. These changes were evident from about the third century B.C., and continued until the second or third century A.D. (Foucault, 1982:243, 235).

Foucault (1986) argues that the retreat into self that occurred with the decline of the Greek city states and the organization of the hellenistic monarchies cannot be attributed solely to this decline. Other problematic changes occurred in the public realm at this time which required and entailed changes in the practices of the self.

Specifically, persons became enmeshed within administratively complex, vast, and discontinuous networks of power. Political power became relativized and "founded on rational principles", although the exercise of power occurred in relatively "fluid" rather than rigidly hierarchical, "intermediary networks". Within these networks, the individual stood between a "higher power whose orders must be conveyed", and individuals and groups "whose obedience must be obtained." "The individual is always the ruler and the ruled, and, even when the ruler, acts as a delegated power whose office depends on the pleasures of the prince." In this more complex interplay of relations of command
and subordination, within a web of power that is "unstable" and "anxiety producing", one has to be "careful not to give offence", particularly to the powers above. To be secure, the ability to artfully govern oneself becomes a crucial political attribute. It becomes necessary for persons to exercise self-restraint, and "control behavioral outbursts", emotions, and angry and violent displays. In order to assert oneself and one’s superiority over others within such unstable power networks, the detached and goal-oriented aspects of such actions would seem to amount to using the self as an instrument (Foucault, 1986:90-91).

Also, within this complex and unstable socio-political sphere, where their own positions becoming problematic, persons become disinclined to identify with these positions, and experience further difficulties in conceiving themselves as acting subjects. In response to such instability and its ensuing personal crises, there comes a "resigned self-mastery of adequate relationship of self purely in relation to oneself". "Attending to the self came to offer that which can be securely formed by one’s own actions" (Foucault, 1986: 93-95; 1988:39-49).

This attending to self and self-mastery become ethically defined not in relation to the "governance of others," but "the ability to limit one’s ambitions and withdraw from them when they
prevent one from attending to oneself". This ethics of self-mastery, disengagement from duties, and limitation of ambitions, status and rank in the Hellenistic period, was one not just of individualistic withdrawal or valorization of private life, but a positive response to a "crises of subjectification", in the form of an elaborated tending to one self. The importance given to the problem of 'oneself' and the ensuing cultivation of the self, becomes "the seeking in devotion to self that which could enable one to give purpose to one's existence" (Foucault, 1986:93-95).

Thus the destabilizing forces in the first and second century a.d. are met with a more cultivated self-conscious-self; one more introspective, detailed, intensified, and concerned with self and self-analysis. This effect is heightened and facilitated by the advent of the act and medium of writing at this time (Foucault, 1986:28; 1982:246).

(iii) Christianity and Onwards

To return to Foucault's (1986:235) historical account, he describes a reified connection and continuity between Greco-Roman imperatives involving an existence dominated by self-preoccupation, and the imperatives of Christianity eight centuries later.
In the neoplatonic age of the third or fourth century; Socrates's and Plato's theme of "taking care of oneself" comes increasingly to take on meanings of austerity, constant examination, and detailed and rigorous knowledge of oneself (Foucault 1988:23-30,36-40; 1986:45).

It will be recalled by the time of the Christian valorization of self eight centuries after the initial "golden age" of self-cultivation, that one's relationship with oneself became still more intense. This preoccupation with one's self occurred via the transformation, correction, and purification of the self; with efforts to control thoughts, will, and other elements of self opposed to God's will; as well as in attempts to find salvation (Foucault, 1988:20-43; 1986:45).

It will be recalled, these austere "renunciation" practices of the self-conscious-self escalate and continue through to the seventeenth century when they become "reinserted" into the practices of the so-called human sciences (Foucault, 1986:235-249; 1988:39-49; 1982:241).
B. Processes of Roses's Self-Conscious-Self.

To study the processes of the psychotherapeutic self-conscious self whose historical roots and origins we have discussed above, let us now return to Rose.

The modern individual with his or her enhanced subjectivity and ultra self-conscious-self internalises a psychotherapeutic discourse that make "new sectors of reality thinkable, practicable and utilizable." The gradual acceptance of the increasingly rational discourses and vocabularies of the psychotherapies, and a feeling of being 'at home' in them, makes for the "ideological success of a regime of 'truth'", and paves the way for the emergence of a scientifically and psychologically obsessed self-conscious-self (1990a:115,131,137,208-220,237-249; 1990b:103-115; 1985:226).

The discourse of the psychotherapy; its "language of self-interpretation" and "criteria of self-evaluation"; make for a "psycho-pedagogy of social competence in which a profoundly psychological existence is rendered into thought". The therapist "educates the client" in systematic self-inspection, monitoring, and analysis, including procedures for self-awareness, and "algorithms" that "make the self visible as it engages in transactions with others" (Rose, 1990a:213-224,235-
This "educational" and "skills" model of human problems makes "the therapist's job more often...the teaching of new skills" than the removal of not very well defined 'illnesses'. This makes "virtually all of us candidates for therapeutic intervention" Life becomes a "skilled performance" (Rose, 1990a:237-239).

Rose's contemporary self-conscious-self is thus derivative of expert technique; a fabricated object of expert knowledge. Gradually, scientific, rational, and social psychological discourses and practices make the self "the target of a reflexive objectifying gaze, committed...to its own technical perfection." Self now manages itself in acts of "self-government upon which rational governance relies." (1990a:238-239,217; 1990b:107,115-116; 1985:222-225).

This kind of self-conscious-self is also described as a reified "offspring, however distant, of "medieval systems of the administration of the soul that...Weber and others consider to have been fundamental to western modernity" (1990a:217-239).

Rose (1990a:224-228) also writes of the vocabulary of psychotherapy as compatible with a culture of consumption and
autonomous selfhood. Such vocabulary is productive of the individual who is 'free to choose' from among the meaningless and/or artificial choices available.

6. CONCLUSION

Foucault's and Rose's unique contribution lies in their emphasis on how the content and quality of the self-conscious-self have differed in disparate historical periods, even though the self-conscious-self has been one of retreat and withdrawal in early as well as late periods of history. Indeed, they stress that to regard such withdrawal as a general mechanism of the self-conscious-self is of limited value; since persons in differing historical periods have very differing responses to this withdrawal, and it is these different responses that must be the centerpiece of accounts of changes in the self-conscious-self.

Foucault and Rose compliment each other in their work insofar as Rose centres on processes of the self-conscious-self in the "here-and-now" and Foucault emphasizes those operative in antiquity. Nevertheless, their conceptualization of the self-conscious-self is one of a singular force moving through history and undergoing different permutations and strengths of
expression as it does so. What we gather from their accounts is a self-conscious-self emergent in antiquity, modified in form and content at the dawn of Christianity through to the middle ages, reasserting itself during the Renaissance and Reformation periods, and moving on to take its place to serve governmental technique through the "psy" sciences (Rose, 1990a 220-221). This kind of naturalization is suspect; as is their failure to characterize the role of the Renaissance in the formation of the self-conscious-self in any but these reified terms.

The strongest difference between Foucault and Rose is Rose’s consistent position that oppressive forms of self-consciousness can and should be combatted.
CHAPTER FIVE
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The question of the naturalness of the self-as-object is a complex one, which requires highly specific meanings for "natural" and "historical". For example, it appears that the biological capacity which humans have to treat themselves as an object, expresses itself in many different ways; some of which may be "natural" in the sense of being functionally adaptive or inevitable.

The self-as-object may be thought of as historically emergent, or even determined, whether in the short or long term or both. It emerges ontogenically when one realizes that one can act upon one’s surroundings and creativity to determine one’s self and world. It is also a capacity which builds upon previous cultural advances which give persons both the time to contemplate, experiment and ‘play’ with themselves, and different means with which to express themselves. Antiquity and the Renaissance were two such periods of advance.

As well, cultural development must provide enough of a division of labour that each individual is not necessarily always doing the same things as the collective and can relatively easily imagine him/her self in the role of the other.
Cultural development or advance need not be "natural" or conducive to a "natural" self-conscious-self. Instead, such development may be productive of a self-conscious self of retreat from a complex and rapidly changing social sphere in which social interaction and personal adaptation become problematic. The partial withdrawal from the social sphere which often occurs under such conditions may be seen during the decline of Greek culture in Antiquity, and in the nineteenth century, with its swift monetariation, capitalization, urbanization, centralization and rationalization of authority structures, and division of labour. Particularly, the capitalist money market and modern division of labour, with their distancing and alienating elements, are productive of a self-as-object that is unnatural, in the sense of being incompatible with human needs for spontaneity, creativity, and self-expression.

On the other hand, as the Post-modernists have shown us, the differing human responses to withdrawal from a problematic or complex culture also have bearing upon the nature of the self-conscious-self. This is illustrated by the contrast between the early Christian self-conscious-self of reenunciation, and the Greco-Hellenistic self-conscious-self; the latter of which calls for a constant mode of caring for oneself and searching for
truths spiritually and within oneself. Thus a self-conscious-self realized in withdrawal from a problematic or complex culture is not necessarily problematic, constraining, and determining of persons' subjectivities. Rather, it may be productive of a furthering of human reflection and reasoning, and in this way be natural in its adaptability with distinctively human needs and capacities.

Finally, the intensity and content of the experience of self-as-object is influenced by specific historical and biological occurrences as "big city life" (Mills, 1963) and adolescence, respectively (Cooley, 1902:160-167,139-140,149).

As for the self-as-instrument, assessments of its nature and naturalness must also consider its basis of origin. The self-as-instrument may be rooted in role-like expectations and/or self-interest. While this kind of usage of self-as-instrument is generally heightened when the self-conscious-self is heightened, it also appears to be decreasingly problematized and increasingly naturalized over the course of history. This process is accelerated in the twentieth century theoretical schools examined here. Thus while there is an underlying naturalizing strain of "man-the actor" in all three schools, Cooley and Park of the Chicago School only occasionally problematize the self-as-egoistic-or "role-related" instrument;
whereas Mass Society theorists come to regard the egoistic self-as-instrument as pervasive, and by the time of Post-Modern theory it is so taken for granted that it barely warrants mention.

In contrast, within these theoretical schools, the self-conscious-self tends to be considered more of a problematic and historically constructed entity over the course of the twentieth century. Here one need only note the difference between Mead's and Goffman's approaches to the self.

Thus whereas in early symbolic interactionism the self-as-instrument is interactive but still subordinate to the self-conscious-self, by Goffman the former had become quite detached from the latter.

Early Chicago School theory illustrates that self-instrumental behavior need not be solely role and egoistically oriented; that it can be consciously directed beyond social roles and institutions and beyond egoistic applications. As well, the self-as-instrument makes its ontogenic appearance in children's developing feelings of self-mastery, and may be related to feelings of self-mastery and accomplishment throughout the life course.
However, when there is a separation of consciously instrumental behavior from self-conscious awareness and reflection of what we are doing, and how we may best modify or redirect our own actions or, when the self-as-instrument becomes detached from the human self-conscious-self, the cost to the individual and to society is great. The individual becomes alienated from his or her self and social world; an alienation that may further artificialize or nullify one's conscious experience of the self, as well as being compatible with a distanced and manipulative "use" of self and other.

As well, insofar as persons come increasingly to draw upon the self-as-egoistic instrument, and relate to others solely and consciously in an instrumental mode, their environment becomes harsher and more threatening, and the further use of the self-as-egoistic-instrument becomes essentialized.

It is Park and Mills who most extensively and clearly address the interaction of one's conscious self-conceptions with one's conscious instrumental activity. Of them, Mills, with his processes of internalization, and discussion and linkage of roles, self, institutions and mass capitalism, offers the more consistent and coherent account of their genesis in childhood and usage in adulthood. However, he remains vague on the contribution and extent of involvement of one's "psychic
element" with ones developing role and self. It is also likely that there are other processes of self-as-instrument beyond those which can be explained by role or socially justifiable excuse supplied by the available "vocabulary of motive"; as I discussed above.
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