THE PRINCIPLES OF PHILOSOPHY
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ABSTRACT

Taking the title of this page literally, I wish to say the following: In this thesis I attempt to re-solve some of the metaphilosophical problems concerning the logic of philosophy (i.e. its definition, structural principles, historiography, etc.) in view of the general theory that all of philosophy is but the expression of a single idea—that of the relationship between Reason and Experience. Towards this end, and from within a Kantian framework, I undertake to examine the history of philosophy in order to demonstrate how these basic metaphilosophical problems are generated and how it is that they cannot be solved. The one original claim being made in all of this, then, is simply that philosophy only ever has one thing to say and that this thing cannot be said. If I am right about this, then I have made no contribution to human knowledge, except in the Socratic sense that we now know something which cannot be known. I draw no moral from this except to note in passing that philosophy was first defined as the love of wisdom.
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THE PRINCIPLES OF PHILOSOPHY

Prologue: The Plan of This Work

If the word 'metaphysics' is taken in one of its dictionary senses as meaning the system of principles underlying a particular study or subject, then philosophy itself may be profitably regarded as having its own metaphysics—the principles of philosophy.

Thesis: All of philosophy is but the expression of a single idea—that of the relationship between Reason and Experience. It is therefore the purpose of this paper to explicate a theory of philosophy which is completely consistent with this thesis and thereby to take the first step towards deriving the totality of philosophy from a single principle. Since it is my primary intention now merely to introduce this idea, I want only to here establish the prima facie plausibility for subsequent work in theory of philosophy along these same lines.

Basically, the idea consists of two separate claims: first, that all the problems of philosophy can

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be derived from the problem of the relationship between Reason and Experience; and second, that this problem is insoluble. Hence this thesis represents a contribution, not to human knowledge, but to human ignorance. In order to prove that these claims are true, three distinct demonstrations are required: first, that all the problems of philosophy can be shown to be reducible to the Reason-Experience problem; second, that each attempt to solve this problem can be shown to be unsuccessful; and third, that the first two (metaphilosophical) claims are not open to the same objection as is philosophy generally. The first claim is what constitutes the central topic for this present thesis, namely, that the Reason-Experience relation determines the definitional and structural characteristics of all philosophies. Thus at least one philosophical problem (the most fundamental one of all), the problem of philosophy itself, may be shown to be reducible to the Reason-Experience problem. The second claim also forms part of the subject matter for this thesis, namely, that the two most commonly attempted solutions to the Reason-Experience problem, which assume their prior similarity, are ultimately unsuccessful. Thus, for example, Rationalism maintains that the sensible is intelligible and therefore results in empirically vacuous metaphysics. On the other hand, Empiricism maintains that the intelligible is sensible and therefore
results in a failure to explain general concepts. The third claim essentially involves the problematic relationship between philosophy and metaphilosophy. For how can one make truth-claims about the whole of philosophy when those very same claims are also at the same time a part of philosophy? In other words, is the claim that 'the problem of philosophy is insoluble' itself a solution to the problem of philosophy? Now this issue has not been satisfactorily resolved with respect to the philosophical theory of philosophy which is being advanced here. I do not know how this issue can be resolved, or even if it can be solved at all. Thus I thought it best to adopt a Kantian point of view (because Kant seeks to mediate between the two most common positions) which attempts to solve the Reason-Experience relation based on the prior assumption of a categorial difference between the two. This means, of course, that the problem of schematism in the first Critique also arises in regards to this thesis. Thus, just as Kant cannot ultimately explain the relationship between Reason and Experience, I cannot ultimately explain the correspondence between the a priori, formal principles of philosophy and the contingent, empirical history of philosophy. So any comments made regarding Kant's so-called solution to the Reason-Experience problem are to be read keeping this crucial qualification firmly in mind. After all, I am only making
use of Kant temporarily, until I have created a place
(if any such place exists) where I can stand on my own.

The plan of this thesis may be given as follows:
In the first part, the problem of the history of philos-
ophy is examined in order to lead the reader into a
proper understanding of the central concerns of meta-
philosophy as a philosophical discipline in its own
right. In the second part, there is a discussion con-
cerning the way in which the problem, as stated in the
first part, is to be solved and how the philosophia
perennis is to be extracted from the history of philos-
ophy. In the third part, the solution to the problem
of the history of philosophy is presented and elaborated.
Moreover, a few of the major implications of the main
thesis of this paper are drawn out and explicated. One
such implication being, for example, that philosophical
disagreement does not really exist and hence that any
argument concerning the principles of philosophy is,
strictly speaking, vacuous. The point will be made that
differences of opinion over such principles are merely
apparent and are only ever the result of how philoso-
phical ideas are expressed as opposed to what philoso-
phical ideas are expressed. In the fourth and final
part, some indications are given of the various ways in
which the solution of the third part may be applied in
a practical manner to the history of philosophy. Given the contemporary climate of opinion which prevails in Anglo-Saxon philosophy, it seems fitting that special attention be paid to the philosophies of Wittgenstein. The point will be made that neither of Wittgenstein's philosophies is a radical departure from the traditional lines which Western philosophy has taken and that therefore the distinction between critical and speculative philosophy is untenable.
PART ONE: THE PROBLEM

The history of philosophy—it is in the form of this expression that the central issue of metaphilosophy appears. For although these words are constantly being used, pedagogically and otherwise, in the scholarly conversations of philosophers, they have remained problematic throughout the entire 2,500 years to which they have been applied. For the philosophical problem which they create may be stated as in the following question, "Is the phrase, 'the history of philosophy' a contradiction in terms?" And if it is true that the proper treatment of a problem is the best first step towards discovering an adequate solution to it, then the extent of the discussion below will be amply justified.

That the problem of the history of philosophy is a valid problem and ought not to be dismissed is evident from two things: the first is that philosophy, more than any other intellectual discipline, makes important use of its own past. For example, Plato is still read by contemporary philosophers for philosophical reasons. The second is that although Plato is still being read by
philosophers, not all of what he had to say, or even the way in which he said it, is still taken to be of philos-
ophical interest. As a matter of fact, many aspects of Plato's writings are now considered to be largely irre-
levant. Thus, on the one hand, there seems to be a part of the history of philosophy which remains of permanent philosophical interest—this is the philosophical part of the history of philosophy. On the other hand, how-
ever, there equally seems to be a part of the history of philosophy which changes sufficiently to render it of little consequence to present concerns—this is the historical part of the history of philosophy. Thus the facts of the matter, when they give rise to conflicting theories of philosophy, tend to lend support to the view that the history of philosophy constitutes a valid topic for metaphilosophical research.

Specific analysis reveals that the problem which the history of philosophy presents actually contains within itself three separate, though related, issues. The first issue enquires into whether philosophy can have a history at all. The second issue enquires into what is to qualify as being included in the history of philosophy. And the third issue enquires into how the history of philosophy is to be properly ordered. These three issues therefore constitute the core subject area of metaphilosophy, at least insofar as the history of
philosophy is being treated as a philosophical difficulty, and may be further broken down in the following manner.

The first issue is directly concerned with the apparent contradiction between philosophy and its history, at least in terms of the two contrasting conceptions of truth which are involved in each. The emphasis on the permanent, philosophical aspect of the history of philosophy implies a notion of truth which depends upon the securing of total agreement as to an eternally fixed and philosophically correct doctrine (e.g. Descartes). However, if the emphasis is placed on the changing, historical aspect of the history of philosophy, then a notion of truth is implied which depends upon dialectical disagreement as the only correct way towards achieving final truth in philosophy (e.g. Hegel). And since philosophy is supposedly seeking to discover the truth, a metaphilosophical contradiction arises between these two opposing views. Granting that philosophical disagreement manifests itself temporally as the history of philosophy and that such a history apparently exists, the permanent, philosophical viewpoint concludes that, as philosophy has not yet attained the truth, what now passes for the history of philosophy is merely a record of philoso-
phical error. Thus philosophy does not exist and the historical viewpoint is therefore criticised for being unable to discriminate between what counts as philosophy and what does not count as philosophy. By the same token, the changing, historical viewpoint concludes that if there is nothing in the history of philosophy which qualifies as philosophy, then the systematic viewpoint may be criticised for being incapable of producing an example of philosophy which could be of any historical importance whatsoever. In Kantian terminology, these two points may be translated to read that history is blind and philosophy is empty. Either way (i.e. the denial of philosophy's history or the identification of philosophy with its history), the difficulty of identifying philosophy remains and the problem, then, is to reconcile the historicity of philosophy with the notion of truth in philosophy and thereby to arrive at a satisfactory account of philosophical truth. (Of course it may be argued that philosophy does not seek to attain the truth at all. And if this is the case, then it can only be replied that this argument is being directed towards an entirely different kind of discipline than the one which forms the topic of this essay. For the metaphilosophical solution towards which
this essay is meant to contribute, only makes sense if there exists a metaphilosophical problem concerning the history of philosophy and the nature of philosophical truth.)

The second issue arises because the nature of philosophy is problematic in a way in which other intellectual disciplines are not. For philosophy is an anomaly insofar as disagreement over its definition virtually guarantees that the disputants will be engaged in disciplines of an entirely different order (e.g. Logical Positivism and Phenomenology). This difficulty is further compounded by the wide variety of definitions which have been given of philosophy throughout its history. Thus before it can be determined what exactly is to be included or excluded in the history of philosophy, it will first be necessary to arrive at a working definition of philosophy which can then be used as a standard for that determination. If this requirement is left unfulfilled, then there will be no way of determining what is to be the history of philosophy. For to include only what is said by philosophers is already to beg the question in an important way. And to include instead everything that has ever been said in connection with philosophy is simply to admit the failure to arrive at any standard for discrimination. Whatever the solution to this
problem may be, one thing remains clear from the first issue—the solution must not only be able to consistently separate the philosophical from the non-philosophical, it must also be able to avoid carrying such a programme to the extreme. (As the nature and formulation of a question necessarily determine the kinds of answers which are possible to it, the key to the solution of the problem of the history of philosophy demands to be formed in part from the historical point of view because this metaphilosophical problem has only actually arisen from the perspective which history alone is capable of providing.) In other words, the solution must be capable of accounting for at least a large part of what is commonly accepted to be the history of philosophy. Thus the solution must be able to offer a philosophical explanation for most of the traditionally important facts which are to be encountered throughout the historical literature (i.e. histories, encyclopedias, and dictionaries of philosophy, as well as philosophy textbooks, etc.). Facts which raise such questions as, for instance: why certain identifiable philosophers are generally regarded as being the most important; why a few categories of philosophy (e.g. Rationalism and Empiricism), or groupings of philosophers (e.g. Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz and Locke, Berkeley, Hume), constantly reappear in histories
of philosophy and philosophy curriculums; why the Kantian philosophy is credited with the synthesis of Rationalism and Empiricism; why the Forms are considered of central importance in Plato's dialogues even though they are only occasionally encountered there; why Kierkegaard's individual is always set against Hegel's system; and why the so-called problems and historical approaches predominate in the organizing of philosophical instruction and philosophy textbooks, etc.

The third issue is most easily formulated on the basis of its pedagogical implications. Traditionally of course the history of philosophy has been organized in either one of two ways: the first method is to order the opinions of the philosophers around a certain set of immutable problems which are taken to constitute the sole subject matter of technical philosophy. This is commonly referred to as the systematic or problems approach to the history of philosophy. (This tendency may be found in Wittgenstein for example and its paradigm in the typical journal article.) The second method is to order the arguments of the philosophers along roughly chronological lines so as to emphasize their progressive development. This is commonly referred to as the historical or
developmental approach to the history of philosophy. (This tendency may be found in Aristotle for example and its paradigm in philosophical scholarship generally.) Of course the deficiencies of each approach are well-known, for whereas the systematic method is unable to account for the changing, historical conditions of philosophy, the historical method is likewise unable to account for the permanent, internal relations of philosophy. The first therefore results in the perception of philosophical problems as being irrelevant to practical human affairs, while the second results in the perception of philosophical argument as endless philosophism. Obviously the problem which these two positions present when taken together demands a solution which, while it succeeds in synthesizing only those elements which are responsible for making each an attractive position in the first place, eliminates those elements which make it impossible for the above difficulties to be overcome.

From the preceding discussions, two considerations would seem to follow: One, that the first and third issues are really just two different aspects of what is at root the same basic problem. That is to say that the fact that the history of philosophy can be organized systematically and historically suggests that philosophy has both its purely philosophical parts
and its purely historical parts. And because the philosophical part is equated with the more permanent aspects of the history of philosophy, it may be identified with the actual attainment of philosophical truth. (This claim will be modified later on.) Similarly, because the historical part is equated with the more changeable aspects of the history of philosophy, it may be identified with progressive development of philosophical truth. (This claim will also be modified later on.) Hence the third issue is directly transformed into the first issue and thus a solution to one entails a solution to the other. The question which arises at this point is how to proceed in the solution of either problem. The answer to this is to be found in a fuller explication of the second issue, something which will therefore be undertaken in the next part of this paper.
least on an exploratory level. The following comments are being presented, then, only in order to lead the reader into that mode of understanding which is conducive to the attainment of the intuitive perception of the solution to the problem of the history of philosophy—an intuition which the writer of this paper already possesses and is now attempting to communicate here. It is therefore left entirely to the reader to determine whether or not this part has been of any use in reaching a proper understanding of the material which follows it.

It is always best to start at the beginning. In the case of philosophy this means enquiring into the problem of the nature of philosophy itself via an investigation of the second issue in Part Two and as stated in the question, 'What is philosophy?'* The problem of philosophy is the most basic presupposition of all philosophy. (The word 'philosophy' refers to any discipline which assumes a general theory as to the nature of the problems, methods, and solutions of philosophy. Thus, for example, Linguistic

*The 'problem of philosophy' is a matter of defining philosophy and it only arises out of the more general 'problem of the history of philosophy' which is a matter of separating out the a priori elements of philosophy.
Analysis and Phenomenology would be philosophies.) This problem is the central problem of philosophy insofar as a solution to it provides the key to the solution of all other philosophical problems (i.e. if it is known what the special subject matter of philosophy is, and the method which is proper to its treatment, then the appropriate results may be more easily reached). Thus a solution to any philosophical problem presupposes in turn a solution to the problem of philosophy. (Since philosophical problems must have philosophical solutions in order to have solutions at all, any such solution must presuppose a workable definition of philosophy.) In other words, an answer to the question, 'What is philosophy?' is logically prior to the solution of any other philosophical problem (with the special exception of the metaphysical one which will be discussed later).

Thus the problem of philosophy is also logically the first philosophical problem, which is the reason why it is being dealt with here.

If the central issue to which this part of the paper must address itself is contained in the question, 'What is philosophy?' then the answer must first differentiate philosophy from the other intellectual disciplines. So what is the distinguishing characteristic of philosophy? There is one peculiarity
PART TWO: THE METHOD

It will become evident in Part Three that, as this essay concerns itself only with metaphysics, all philosophical argument in support of the necessary, a priori principles of philosophy is, strictly speaking, inconsistent with the main thesis of this paper. Thus this section is really of the same pseudo-philosophical form of presentation as that which has been hitherto accepted as constituting the very sum and substance of the history of philosophy itself. (The actual tendency will be towards Rationalist arguments as this section was largely borrowed from an earlier draft of this paper which attempted to express the same thesis only in a Rationalist manner.) However, where conviction cannot be attained, there nevertheless remains the possibility of persuasion. And so, even though the solution to the problem of the history of philosophy is already built into the problem itself (because insofar as it is philosophical it is subject to the exact same metaphilosophical determination as is all the rest of philosophy), rhetorical arguments may yet prove to be heuristically useful, at

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in the logic of philosophy which sets it apart from the other disciplines, and so this enquiry notes that philosophy is the only intellectual discipline in which the theoretical metastudy of that discipline also forms an integral part of that discipline's subject matter precisely because it is of the same kind. Thus, for example, the question, 'What is philosophy?' is itself philosophical and so it requires a philosophical answer. Metaphilosophy is, therefore, the philosophy of philosophy, whereas, for example, metascience is also a part of philosophy, as opposed to being a part of physics. This means that any philosophical investigation must also include itself as a topic for philosophical investigation. Thus one of the aims of this essay is to overcome that last great methodological dualism which exists between, and is represented by, philosophy on the one hand, and the rest of the world on the other. For now, not even philosophy itself is to be immune from philosophical criticism. (The reason why this dualism has persisted for so long will become evident in Part Three and illustrated historically in Part Four.) This point constitutes the first heuristic guide which will be used in searching for the definition of philosophy, and hence metaphilosophy, which the solution to the problem of philosophy requires.
This purely logical point can only be explained on the supposition that philosophy seeks a totality of which it is also a part. This explanation is supported by the systematic and historical definitions of philosophy and which follow respectively: The formal definition of philosophy simply equates it with the sum total of its disciplines. Thus philosophy is metaphysics, ontology, epistemology, logic, ethics, applied ethics, aesthetics, semantics, social philosophy, political philosophy, economic philosophy, philosophy of religion, philosophy of psychology, philosophy of science, philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of history, philosophy of education, legal philosophy, and so forth. In short, philosophy is interested in the sum total of human experience. Philosophy, then, relates to the whole universe of knowledge of the world. The material definition of philosophy simply equates philosophy with the material content of its entire history. Thus philosophy is Plato's Republic and Symposium; Aristotle's Metaphysics and Ethics; Augustine's Confessions; Aquinas's Summa Theologiae; Hobbes's Leviathan; Descartes' Meditations on First Philosophy; Spinoza's Ethics; Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding; Leibniz's New Essays Concerning Human Understanding; Berkeley's Principles of Human Knowledge; Hume's Treatise of Human Nature; Kant's Critique of Pure
Reason and Critique of Practical Reason; Schopenhauer's
The World as Will and Representation; Hegel's
Phenomenology of Mind; Marx's Communist Manifesto;
Kierkegaard's Concluding Unscientific Postscript;
Nietzsche's Thus Spake Zarathustra; Wittgenstein's
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and Philosophical
Investigations; Husserl's Cartesian Meditations and
Ideas; Heidegger's Being and Time; and so forth.

In short, philosophy is done by human beings
while living in the world and is recorded in written
documents. Philosophy, then, is also a part of the
world.

Before this present discussion begins to merge
with the more general material concerning the prelimi-
nary definition of philosophy, this seems an appropriate
place to show exactly how this peculiarity determines
the absolute importance for all philosophers of the type
of metaphilosophical enquiry which this paper is at-
tempting to undertake. The first important point con-
cerns the very possibility of this enterprise. For if
philosophy is about the whole world while at the same
time it is also a part of it, then there must neces-
sarily be the possibility of a pure philosophy of phi-
losophy, or what is the same thing, metaphilosophy
(i.e. a philosophical theory of philosophy which does
not utilize psychological, sociological, economic, or
political explanations, etc.—these are of course other
ways of studying philosophy, however, they are of no concern to the strictly philosophical interests of this essay). Thus, if the basic metaphilosophical question is, 'What is philosophy?', then it must be possible to provide an answer which is purely philosophical.

The second important point is likewise entailed by the fact that philosophy is about the whole world and yet is also at the same time a part of it. For it follows from this that a philosophical answer to the question, 'What is philosophy?' presupposes in turn a proper metaphilosophical position. Thus the first question that must be answered is, 'What is metaperspective?'. What is required next, therefore, is a working definition of metaphilosophy. Unless this type of examination is undertaken prior to any attempt at a detailed definition of philosophy, mistakes will be neither avoidable nor detectable. The difficulty is that metaphilosophy in its pure form is a discipline which is entirely new to philosophy. Thus, besides being a metastudy of philosophy, what else is known of it? Philosophy itself, however, has been around for quite a while and, because metaphilosophy is after all still philosophy, the definition of metaphilosophy will perforce be built upon the general definition of philosophy which has yet to be formulated.
The third important point is also entailed by the fact that philosophy is about the whole world and yet is also at the same time a part of it. For whatever a philosophy claims is true of the whole world must also be true of that philosophy in virtue of its being a part of that world. Thus philosophy is self-defeating insofar as it must falsify itself every time it claims to be asserting the truth about the nature of philosophy (e.g. the early Wittgenstein). Given this general reductio ad absurdum for all of philosophy, then, philosophy cannot claim to have attained the metaphilosophical truth without resulting in an inherent contradiction. In practice every philosophy therefore presupposes a transcendence in the form of a freedom from its own truth—a dualism between itself as a philosophy and the rest of the world. Predictably enough, philosophers have, in a variety of ways, either attempted to deny the undeniable, or ignore that which cannot be ignored. This dualism between philosophy and the world may therefore be evident primarily in the split between a philosophy and the metaphilosophical viewpoint which it implies either explicitly or implicitly. Examples of the phenomenon will be given in Part Four. All of this does not serve to prove that every philosophy is necessarily false, however, it only proves that any philosophy which attempts to
found a metaphilosophical theory on itself results in a fundamental inconsistency. Metaphilosophy is logically prior to philosophy. In other words, if philosophy, as was previously claimed, is about the whole world, then, because metaphilosophy is also philosophy, metaphilosophy must be about the whole of philosophy (i.e. in practical terms, its entire history). This means that a metaphilosophical theory which is based upon a philosophy (i.e. a metaphilosophical theory which is constructed from the bottom up) will be unable to give an explanation of all the facts precisely because it depends upon assuming the truth of one philosophy and hence it rejects the rest. Thus, pure metaphilosophy does not proceed from any single philosophy for it would then embody in itself the very thing which it is attempting to explain and would therefore render itself incapable of resolving the problem of philosophy. (Pure metaphilosophy is therefore also capable of explaining all other metaphilosophical theories which owe their origins to particular philosophies.) The task, then, is to come up with a definition of philosophy which is not dependent upon the correctness of any specific philosophy (for then the resulting definition of metaphilosophy would not be pure) but rather is somehow derived from all. (i.e. to construct a metaphilosophical theory from the top
down). Therefore, if there must be metaphilosophy, and if there cannot be a proper one when it is based on a particular philosophy, then, as would be appropriate to this level of discussion, a proper metaphilosophical theory must be sufficiently general and abstract so as to avoid its own falsification. So far the formal and material definitions of philosophy, which issue forth from the systematic and historical metaphilosophical theories respectively, serve to qualify in the search for such a metaphilosophy because neither one presupposes the truth of any particular philosophy. The formal definition does not presuppose the truth of any single philosophy because it does not presuppose any philosophical content at all. The material definition does not presuppose the truth of only one philosophy because it presupposes the entire content of philosophy.

It now seems wise to provide a critique of the first definition of metaphilosophy which is offered explicitly in the literature. A critique based on the points made in the preceding discussion should prove enlightening, especially in light of the fact that the original definition of metaphilosophy was based upon the later philosophy of Wittgenstein. The philosopher first claiming to be doing metaphilosophy proper was Morris Lazerowitz:
Metaphilosophy is the investigation of the nature of philosophy, with the central aim of arriving at a satisfactory explanation of uncontested philosophical claims and arguments. For some philosophers, I have discovered, the word has come to be the name of the special view I have advanced and elaborated over the years: the view that represents a philosophical theory as a gerrymandered piece of language, which, because it is presented in the ontological idiom, is capable of creating the intellectual illusion that a theory of things is being stated and also of giving expression to a cluster of unconscious ideas. Putting aside the special view with which the word 'metaphilosophy' has become associated, the need to improve our understanding of philosophy, what it is and how it works, can no longer be in question for philosophers who are serious about their subject.¹

On the basis of what has already been said, it is apparent that Lazerowitz has made three serious mistakes in his discussion of metaphilosophy. The first is that his own metaphilosophical theory has been premised upon the essential correctness of Wittgenstein's philosophical position and therefore, as a result of this, it embodies the very same problem which it is attempting to solve. This is the prime metaphilosophical error and vitiates the entire theory. The second is that he appeals to a type of explanation which is not purely philosophical, namely,

¹Morris Lazerowitz, "A Note on 'Metaphilosophy,'" Metaphilosophy, Volume I, Number 1, January, 1970.
Freudian psychology. This is perhaps understandable in light of the close conceptual connection which exists between Wittgenstein and Freud--both thinkers were concerned with meaning and symbolism, although in separate spheres. Freud was very much interested in philosophy, especially as a deviant psychological phenomenon, and Wittgenstein was of course generally involved in the philosophy of psychology and with Freud in particular. Thus Lazerowitz has found an interesting way of intellectually compensating for Wittgenstein's charge that philosophy is nonsense--Freud is brought in to show how philosophy is meaningful on at least one important level. In other words, the arguments used by philosophers are really rationalizations which only appear as arguments because of their retrospective falsification by conscious thought processes. Nevertheless, this kind of approach is inexcusable for a strictly proper metaphilosophy. The third mistake, and the cause of the first two, is that Lazerowitz has offered a definition of philosophical activity prior to any critical examination of the metaphilosopical position which is presupposed by such a definition. Thus there is no general attempt on an abstract level to determine what exactly constitutes metaphilosophy proper, that is to say, its distinctly
appropriate problems, methods, and solutions.

The next step is to attempt to arrive at a
definition of philosophy which, while it avoids the
aforementioned negative conditions for improper meta-
philosophical theory, will contribute the key to
determining the way in which the problem of the history of philosophy is actually to be solved. Accordingly, an examination of the question, 'What is philosophy?' is now required in order to indicate the proper course towards which a search for answers ought to be directed.

The attempt to discover what is ultimately basic in the systematic formulation, treatment, and solution of philosophical problems is the first step, logically speaking, which any new mode of philosophizing must take, whether explicitly or implicitly. If metaphysics is taken in its literal sense to mean 'first philosophy,' then this quest may be defined as the enquiry into metaphysics, or the final presuppositions, or first principles, which underlie what types of questions are asked, the way they are asked, the way they are answered, and the answers themselves. If all that is required as a solution to the problem of philosophy is a definition of philosophy, then why is it a problem at all? After all, any actual philosophy is an answer to the question, 'What is philosophy?'
The mere existence of philosophy, however, is not a solution to this problem because it is in fact the problem itself. For there are many different philosophies and therefore many different definitions of philosophy. Aristotle's definition of philosophy, for example, is only a definition of Aristotle's philosophy. The reason why the nature of philosophy is problematic, then, is due to the fact that there is disagreement among philosophers as to the correct answer to the question, 'What is philosophy?'

This being the case, then, an answer to the question, 'What is philosophy?', in order to be an answer to the question at all, must not dismiss the question by claiming that only one philosophy is true. Thus in metaphilosophy at least, and as was pointed out previously, error is exclusion. For how can one philosophy be known to be the truth? And what is the nature of philosophical truth if nothing in philosophy is ever settled once and for all? However, unless a definition of philosophy can be given which is not dependent upon the truth of any one philosophy, it could be claimed that philosophers know neither what philosophy is, nor even if a work is philosophical at all, except in the limited and unsatisfactory sense of their own philosophy.

If there are only philosophies and no
philosophy, then the question, "What is philosophy?" is rendered meaningless. Thus the answer, if there is to be one at all, must contain the essential elements which are common to all philosophies. Accordingly, the resulting definition will be abstract and general because it transcends that which distinguishes individual philosophies from one another.

Thus a philosopher criticizing this work for being overly general and too abstract would be in the same position as a lay person criticizing philosophy for being overly general and too abstract—both have simply misunderstood the nature of the respective investigations. Also, proper criticism of this work cannot proceed from the perspective of a particular philosophical position because such criticism would in effect be denying the legitimacy of this enquiry by dismissing the very question to which it is intended to be an answer.

The history of philosophy consists of changing problems, methods, and solutions. What remains constant is the claim by philosophers that, despite their widespread differences, they are all doing philosophy. The question which arises is, 'How can all these philosophers be doing philosophy and yet at the same time still retain their different philosophies and theoretical conceptions of what they are doing when they philosophize?'
Since the answer must consist of the essential elements which are common to all philosophies, the definition of philosophy cannot be composed of any historical subject matter, methodology, or body of generally accepted conclusions. Thus by process of elimination, historical change must itself be taken, at least initially, as that core of continuity.

Philosophy may therefore be defined as that study which seeks to define itself and metaphilosophy may be defined as that metastudy which attempts to determine the exact method whereby philosophy defines itself. (These definitions have the virtue of not resting upon the correctness of any single philosophy.) As a result of this definition, the main concern of this investigation will be with those philosophies which have redefined philosophy. And in view of the fact that philosophy has achieved many different answers to one question (i.e. What is philosophy?), methodological issues will figure predominantly: How does philosophy proceed in obtaining different answers to the same question? Whatever this method, or principle of change may be--the Logos which is at work within philosophy--it must primarily explain why there can be fundamental and absolute differences of opinion over the definition of philosophy even when all the participants in the discussion are agreed that they are
engaged in doing philosophy. For the nature of philos-
ophy would not be problematic unless disagreement existed
over the definition of philosophy.

Thus, if philosophizing is to continue without
appearing sophistical, philosophic disagreement must be
given a philosophical foundation. In other words, if a
general theory of philosophy is required in order to ex-
plain why philosophers have not been able to give defini-
tive answers to their own questions, then a solution to
this problem, which of necessity must be philosophically
both interesting and significant, will only be possible
if it originates from within a metaphilosophical dia-
lectic. (If the central problem of philosophy only
arises because philosophy is about the whole world of
which it is also a part, then how can the two terms of
the relation be completely distinguished and separated?
And from what standpoint? The solution must be the
result of a dialectic. Thus metaphilosophy is an abduc-
tive theory—it is partly determined by the facts (i.e.
by historical content) and in turn partly determines
the facts (i.e. by formal principles). It is in this
sense, then, that philosophy is a self-educating dis-
cipline for it utilizes exploratory problem-solving
techniques at least in the initial heuristic stages.)
The one fact of paramount importance for metaphilosophy,
then, at least initially, and the sole point upon which
all philosophers will probably agree, is the existence of disagreement in philosophy as to the very nature of philosophy itself. Thus one of the purposes of this present thesis is to secure agreement among philosophers by demonstrating that the problem of philosophy can be resolved once the logic of its history is made plain.

Given the definition of philosophy as that study which seeks to define itself, and granting what the metaphilosophical question assumes (i.e. philosophy is properly described, historically speaking, as being a changing series of answers to a basically constant set of metaphilosophical questions), the next question becomes, 'How does philosophy proceed in answering its questions so as to obtain different answers to the same questions?' This is a methodological issue. The difficulty is that, although agreed methods, when applied to a common subject matter, should lead to agreed conclusions, this is not the case in philosophy where there are many different philosophies. Thus, if there exists a metaphilosophy over and above the particular historical manifestations of philosophy, then it must consist of a metaphilosophical method which, although it is used by all philosophers to determine their philosophies, nevertheless guarantees that there will be many legitimate outcomes. It is only in this way, then, that philosophy can be talked about as an integrated
subject while yet retaining its varied instances, all of which are equally entitled to be called valid.

This being the case, and if every disagreement presupposes a prior and more fundamental agreement, then philosophy can be characterized historically as a series of changing answers to a constant set of metaphilosophical questions (i.e. 'What is philosophy?', 'How is philosophy possible?'). This is once again the reason why the problem of philosophy is a problem at all. Thus, in the interests of consistency and completeness, a critical examination of this description itself is required if only for the reason that it provides a sufficient condition for metaphilosophical investigation.

If the foregoing description is valid, then it rests upon the assumption that there is no true philosophy, at least not in the sense that there is only one correct solution to the problem of philosophy. Metaphilosophy must therefore assume the opposite extreme, namely, that there is no false philosophy. This means assigning logically equivalent truth-values to all existing philosophies. It is only in this way that metaphilosophy may be required to give a philosophical foundation to disagreement in philosophy. Otherwise the history of philosophy becomes nothing more than a record of philosophical error. In other words, the key to answering the question, 'What is philosophy?' is the
heuristic claim that the problem of philosophy has been solved many times (i.e. the claim that Rationalism, Existentialism, Platonism, Linguistic Analysis, Phenomenology, etc., are all equally valid).

Thus this thesis as metaphilosophy must assume what all philosophical writing assumes, namely, that philosophy is possible however it may be defined. In other words, metaphilosophy must, in seeking to learn what philosophy is, take it for granted that it already knows in some sense what philosophy is. Otherwise the Socratic paradox of learning arises. So the search for a definition of philosophy is neither a case of not knowing at all nor a case of knowing it all. Rather it is a case of coming to know, explicitly and in a general and abstract way, what is already known implicitly and in a particular and concrete way.

It has been shown, then, that one of the conditions for answering the metaphilosophical question, 'What is philosophy?' is the assumption that the history of philosophy be initially accepted as constituting real philosophy. Thus the only other issue which must be addressed, because it is logically prior to the question, 'What is philosophy?,' is the question, 'How is philosophy possible?' In answering the latter question the method of presupposition is required.

There is but one method whereby philosophy can
examine itself critically and that is the transcendental method of presupposition. This means that the metaphilosophical enterprise is essentially a logical investigation into the foundational assumptions upon which all of philosophy is grounded. Thus metaphilosophy, being pure philosophy, deals only with the logical matter of what is presupposed in a philosophical or metaphilosophical work. The method of presupposition is the only way in which philosophy can make of itself the problem to be solved, because it is the sole method which is critically reflexive (i.e. it is even capable of examining itself, thereby eliminating the need for any infinite hierarchy of meta-studies.) Thus metaphilosophy must be presuppositionless if it is to avoid making the question, 'What is metaphilosophy?' into a question which can only be answered at a further level of meta-enquiry and so on. Thus the method of presupposition is the only method that can be used to render metaphilosophy presuppositionless. The question, 'What is philosophy?,' is therefore transformed, via the method of presupposition, into the question, 'How is philosophy possible?' (In explicating the necessary conditions for the possibility of philosophy, the meaning of the word 'philosophy' should thereby become clearer.) The answer to this question, then, consists in somehow making rational disagreement a necessary
condition for the possibility of any philosophizing at all. This being so, the history of philosophy serves merely to assist in making explicit what is already implicit in the notion of philosophy itself (i.e. chronology is important only insofar as it delineates the logical structure which is inherent in that history). Combining these two complementary methodological elements, then, the metaphilosophical question may be restated in the form, 'Is there a logic to the history of philosophy?'

The upshot of the discussion thus far may be given as follows: One, there must be some identifiable feature which is essential and therefore common to all philosophy as philosophy. Two, this feature must be one which determines a philosophy insofar as its metaphilosophical theory is concerned. And since a definition of philosophy is simply the concise statement of a metaphilosophical theory of philosophy, definitions which serve as answers to the question, 'What is philosophy?' will furnish a convenient base from which to approach the difficulty of formulating a general and abstract theory of philosophy in Part Three. Thus this feature may be identified in, and isolated from, the definitions of philosophy which have been given during its history. Three, the method of accomplishing this task will be the method of pre-
supposition which logically leads to the uncovering and exposure of First Philosophy, or the metaphysical principles of philosophy. In other words, this method will be used to discover, in the definitions of philosophy, those necessary conditions which allow for the very possibility of such definitions being given at all. And four, the entire history of philosophy will provide all the information required for such a task to be performed.

On a practical level, then, a handy historical guide may prove useful in actually carrying out the above plan. For if both as a matter of historical fact, and as a necessary condition for the possibility of this thesis, every philosophical and metaphilosophical truth is debatable, then the claim might here be made that the two basic metaphilosophical approaches to the theory of philosophy are mirrored in the history of philosophy. Thus it would be reasonable to expect that philosophers have by and large tended towards identifying their subject in either one of two ways: the systematic philosophers have equated philosophy with mathematics and the historical philosophers have equated philosophy with science. Plato and Leibniz provide excellent examples of the former tendency, while Aristotle and Hume provide excellent examples of the latter tendency. (Husserl is the obvious exception to the latter case, although his
attachment to mathematics may be explained away in light of the inconsistent elements of Rationalism which were only later purged by others such as Merleau-Ponty, for example. Besides no adequate theory of logic was ever forthcoming from Husserl.) The point, however, is that philosophical disagreement and argument are interminable. And so although appeals to fact are frequently made, philosophical truths cannot just be about straightforwardly factual issues, for empirical truths can be settled through experience. Also, although appeals to logic are frequently made, philosophical truths cannot just be about straightforwardly analytic issues, for analytic truths can be settled through meaning. There remains but one alternative with regard to establishing the logical status of philosophical truths, namely, the Kantian classification of a priori synthetic. Hence the suggestion may be made that this analogy lends support to the idea that the Kantian philosophy supplies the key to understanding the synthetic solution to the problem of the history of philosophy.

Combining the two preceding heuristic elements (i.e. the general method for determining the logic of the history of philosophy and the specific Kantian solution to the problem of synthesizing the dichotomous philosophical trends of Rationalism and Empiricism), one might reasonably predict the discovery of
two basic categories of philosophical meta-theory which, as in the case of the systematic and historical definitions of philosophy, present a problem which can only be solved through a synthesis of the two opposing positions. What this naturally suggests is a supplementary heuristic method which may be used to expedite the historical one, namely, the method of comparative morphology—a method which compares apparently diverse philosophies on the basis of their structural similarities.
PART THREE: THE SOLUTION

Any elementary history of philosophy is sufficient for establishing the metaphysical principles of philosophy. However, if the volume of secondary material is any indication of the importance of the primary sources on which they are written, then these principles may be located in a quantitative manner alone. Thus on the basis of statistical amounts, a list of the greatest historical figures in philosophy may be assembled as follows: Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, Marx, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, Husserl, and Heidegger. Philosophy therefore has a history which is constituted in shape by those classic figures whose written works have, according to common consent, endured the test of time. Since some criterion of classification is required for selecting representative texts (otherwise the selection merely prejudges the main issue which is at stake here), the substantial agreement among philosophers as to the great figures in the history of philosophy will serve as the particularly appropriate method of discrimination. Statistically speaking, it is obvious from the mere
quantity of material in any philosophy library that the list of great philosophers would at least have to be drawn from the above group. The reasons for the suitability of post-judgment in this case are intimately related to, and warranted by, the historical nature of both the problem of the history of philosophy and the method whereby it is to be resolved. Therefore, although it is the history of philosophy itself which renders the nature of philosophy problematic, it is nonetheless precisely the fact that philosophy does have a history, and upon which perhaps all philosophers may be brought to agree despite their philosophical differences, that supplies the foundation upon which this present undertaking may proceed.

The greatest philosophical thinkers are precisely those who are the most original. And it is originality in the extreme which has been equated with the radical re-definition of philosophy. For, unlike other intellectual disciplines, different definitions or theories of philosophy do result in very real differences in the practice of philosophizing. This is the reason why philosophy's greatest figures are responsible either for first discovering a metaphysical principle or for giving such a principle its purest expression. The former creates a thematic movement or school in philosophy while the latter serves to
perpetuate such a unit into a fully consistent tradition.

Platonism answers the question 'What is philosophy?' by defining philosophy as the study of ultimate reality, or the most general causes and principles of things when those causes and principles are taken to be the Forms. Thus the only answer to the question as to how philosophy is possible is contained in the presupposition that universals are ultimately the only real existents (particulars are only real insofar as they copy the Forms). At the same time, Aristotelianism answers the question, 'What is philosophy?' by defining philosophy as the study of ultimate reality, or the most general causes and principles of things when those causes and principles are of the particulars. Thus the only answer to the question as to how philosophy is possible is contained in the presupposition that particulars are ultimately the only real existents (universals are only real in a secondary sense because they are dependent upon particulars for their existence).

Rationalism (as in Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz) answers the question, 'What is philosophy?' by defining philosophy as the attempt to derive knowledge, in general and a priori, from indubitable and self-evident primary axioms via deductive procedures. Thus the only answer to the question as to how philosophy is possible is contained in the presupposition
that certain knowledge is conceptual only. At the same time, Empiricism (as in Locke, Berkeley, and Hume) answers the question, 'What is philosophy?' by defining philosophy as the attempt to construct knowledge, a posteriori and in general, from indubitable and self-evident basic elements via inductive procedures. Thus the only answer to the question as to how philosophy is possible is contained in the presupposition that certain knowledge derives only from immediately experienced sensations. Thus Kantianism, in a synthesis of Rationalism and Empiricism, answers the question, 'What is philosophy?' by defining philosophy as the attempt to identify and isolate the necessary conceptual elements which structure our sensible experience a priori. Thus the only answer to the question as to how philosophy is possible is contained in the presupposition that knowledge results only from the combination of both conceptual and perceptual components.

Essentialism (as in Hegel and Marx) answers the question 'What is philosophy?' by defining philosophy as being only a part of the total socio-historical experience of human beings and therefore as being determined along with it within some rationally discernible scheme or system. Thus the only answer to the question as to how philosophy is possible is contained in the
presupposition that only collective experience is ultimately significant insofar as it can be systemized. At the same time, Existentialism (as in Kierkegaard and Nietzsche) answers the question, 'What is philosophy?' by defining philosophy as essentially personal and therefore consisting in the analysis of one's own subjective experiences while living in the world. Thus the only answer to the question as to how philosophy is possible is contained in the presupposition that only individual experience is ultimately significant insofar as it is unique.

Symbolism (as in the two philosophies of Wittgenstein) answers the question, 'What is philosophy?' by defining philosophy as the analysis of language with the aim of dissolving philosophical problems into nonsense because of their misuse of language. Thus the only answer to the question as to how philosophy is possible is contained in the presupposition that a symbolic scheme is the only sort of thing in which meaning may reside. At the same time, Phenomenalism (as indicated in the two phenomenologies of Husserl) answers the question, 'What is philosophy?' by defining philosophy as the pure manifestation of the phenomenal world insofar as it manifests meaning. Thus the only answer to
the question as to how philosophy is possible is contained in the presupposition that the world of phenomena is the only sort of thing in which meaning may reside.

The structural similarities in the above exposition should be intuitively obvious and this recognition forms the basis for the method of comparative morphology. The point is simply that the categories of universal, concept, system, and symbol are expressing essentially the same root idea, namely, that of Reason or the Ideal. Whereas the categories of particular, sensation, individual, and phenomena are likewise expressing essentially the same idea at bottom, namely, that of Experience or the Real. The fact that they each receive apparently different expressions is to be accounted for on the basis of historical change alone. Four historical periods may therefore be distinguished in the history of philosophy which correspond to the ontological, epistemological, experiential, and semantical modes of philosophizing which were just indicated above. In each of these historical contexts, a solution to the problem of the relationship between Reason and Experience, or the Ideal and the Real, yields a philosophical theory which is stated in the form of a logically first, metaphysical principle. This is what makes a philosophy
possible and is, therefore, what logically determines a solution to the problem of philosophy (i.e. a definition or theory of philosophy) at the philosophical level. And because metaphilosophy is also philosophy, such a procedure must likewise suffice to provide a solution to the problem of the history of philosophy at the metaphilosophical level.

It is important to note that within each of the aforementioned historical contexts, there exist two opposing philosophies which are separated on the basis of their conflicting metaphysical principles: Platonism and Aristotelianism; Rationalism and Empiricism; Essentialism and Existentialism; and Symbolism and Phenomenalism (or, being non-symmetrical, Phenomenology) respectively. The crucial point in this respect is that the Kantian-type synthesis of Rationalism and Empiricism, for example, only makes sense on the supposition that neither of the two philosophies synthesized really succeeded in solving the problem of relating Reason and Experience. This becomes of extreme significance in later discussion.

Anyway, one of the functions of metaphilosophy is the systematization of the history of philosophy. A general overview of the logical structure of the history of philosophy, based on the chronological order of the recurrences of the metaphysical principles when imbedded
in their historical contexts, may be arranged as follows:

The philosophy of the first period presupposes the logical priority of the philosophical discipline of ontology. Within the ontological context there exists a philosophy of the Ideal, Platonism, and a philosophy of the Real, Aristotelianism. The two solutions to the Ideal-Real problem equal the principles of these two philosophies, namely, being is universal and being is particular.

The philosophy of the second part presupposes the logical priority of the philosophical discipline of epistemology. Within the epistemological context there exists a philosophy of the Ideal, Rationalism, and a philosophy of the Real, Empiricism. The two solutions to the Ideal-Real problem equal the principles of these two philosophies, namely, knowledge is conceptual and knowledge is sensational.

The solution to the Ideal-Real problem as it appears in philosophy itself equals the principle of the philosophy which solves the problem of reconciling Rationalism and Empiricism, namely, knowledge is conceptual and sensational. Thus the philosophy of Kantianism.

The philosophy of the third period presupposes the logical priority of the philosophical discipline of experientics (i.e. the discipline which studies human
experience generally). Within the experiential context there exists a philosophy of the Ideal, Essentialism, and a philosophy of the Real, Existentialism. The two solutions to the Ideal-Real problem equal the principles of these two philosophies, namely, experience is systematic and experience is individual.

The philosophy of the fourth period presupposes the logical priority of the philosophical discipline of semantics. Within the semantical context there exists a philosophy of the Ideal, Symbolism, and a philosophy of the Real, Phenomenalism. The two solutions to the Ideal-Real problem equal the principles of these two philosophies, namely, meaning is linguistic and meaning is phenomenal.

Thus there is a logic to the history of philosophy.

Now metaphilosophy is in a position to answer Wittgenstein's radical scepticism concerning traditional philosophy. For Wittgenstein's critical attack on so-called speculative philosophy is indefensible on the grounds that there is no real difference between the two precisely because Wittgenstein's philosophical criticism presupposes the exact same form of metaphysical principle which also makes possible the rest of
philosophy.

Now it may be objected that the statement of these principles exists at such a high level of generality and abstractness that at best they are misleading in their over-simplification, and at worst they are worthless in their meaninglessness. It may be replied that different levels of philosophical discussion require appropriately higher or lower levels of generality and abstractness. And that, at this stage at least, the metaphilosophical statement of the principles of philosophy must be given very generally and abstractly, as any more precise a statement presupposes a particular philosophical interpretation within that principle. Thus metaphilosophy, in order to be accurate, must by nature be imprecise—it cannot at this stage formulate the principles of philosophy in such a way as to assume a specific interpretation of them, for that would mean committing a version of the prime metaphilosophical error of exclusion. However, this is not to say that such a procedure cannot be done. It only means that such a procedure should not be done in a place which is inappropriate to it. Thus if one is no longer interested in delimiting the most general historical periods in philosophy, or the most abstract metaphysical principles of philosophy, then one might be interested in exploring a more specific
period of philosophy at a more concrete level of metaphysical expression. Thus, for example, the following characterization might be appropriate:

Within the Essentialist principle of experiential metaphysics there is the idealism of Hegel, which is theistic and centres upon the philosophy of history, and the realism of Marx, which is atheistic and centres more upon socio-economic philosophy;

Within the Existentialist principle of experiential metaphysics there is the idealism of Kierkegaard, which is theistic and centres upon the philosophy of religion, and the realism of Nietzsche, which is atheistic and centres more upon the philosophy of psychology;

Within the Symbolist principle of semantical metaphysics there is the idealism of the early Wittgenstein, which is the analysis of logic and centres upon the philosophy of logic, and the realism of the later Wittgenstein, which is the analysis of language and which centres more upon the philosophy of language.

And within the Phenomenalist principle of semantical metaphysics there is the idealism of the early Husserl, which is formal phenomenology of eternal essences, and the realism of the later Husserl, which is informal phenomenology of the
the lived world of experience.

Of course such treatments can be made successively more specified and concretized depending upon the exact questions to which the investigation happens to be seeking answers.

Now that the core subject matter of metaphilosophy (i.e., the metaphysical principles of philosophy) has been identified and isolated, a discussion of that subject matter must now be undertaken in order to develop a theory of philosophy which is consistent with the main thesis of this paper.

If the categories are arranged in the order of their opposition, then the following list emerges: universal-particular, concept-sensation, system-individual, and symbol-phenomenon. And although the opposition may be expressed in different ways (as is obviously evident from the simple fact that the list has a length), the two principles which are being expressed by these two-termed relations nevertheless remain the same throughout these changes. The two principles which are being referred to here may be expressed metaphilosophically and in relation to one another under four separate though related classifi-
cations: the first is purely logical and is expressed in terms of the intelligible and the sensible. For universals, concepts, systems, and symbols all supply conditions required for intelligibility in relation to their counterpart particulars, sensations, individuals, and phenomena which supply the conditions required for sensibility. The second is purely temporal and is expressed in terms of permanence and change. For in relation to changing particulars, sensations, individuals, and phenomena, the permanent characteristics of experience are to be located in its universal, conceptual, systemic, and symbolic aspects. The third is metaphorically spatial and is expressed in terms of unity and plurality. Thus, just as a universal serves to unify plural particulars, so too does a concept unify a plurality of sensations, a system unify a plurality of individuals, and lastly, a symbol (e.g. a word) unify a plurality of phenomena. Finally, the fourth is expressed in the purely numerical terms of the One and the Many (as is evident from the preceding expression) and it is from this terminology that two new labels are derived which will be henceforth used to refer to these two principles despite their different expressions. Thus Monosophy means the love of the One, the intelligible, the permanent, and the unitary. And Polysophy means the love of the Many, the sensible, the changing,
and the diverse.

Perhaps another way of expressing this same point would be in terms which, although they are used in a more consistent manner, are still acceptable to traditional metaphysicians. Thus the whole problem of philosophy has been to determine the relationship between Reason and Experience. And the solutions which have been offered to this problem have been of basically three types: Idealism claims that Reason or thought somehow determines Experience or reality; Realism claims that Experience or reality somehow determines Reason or thought; and Kantianism claims that both have their dual roles to play and that the whole secret of proper philosophical method lay in the logical task of unfolding the exact contribution of each.

Of course the most immediately striking observation which is to be made in respect of these principles is that almost all philosophies are founded exclusively upon the emphasis of only one aspect of these two-sided relations. And it is precisely for this reason alone that all such philosophies are to be labelled as protophilosophy, for their metaphysical positions entail certain fundamental deficiencies which prevent them from constituting philosophy proper. So a discussion of
these protophilosophies and the implications which follow from the acceptance of their flawed principles cannot fail to be of assistance in understanding why only Kantianism may be called philosophy proper and how its synthetic solution may in turn be applied to the metaphilosophical problem of the history of philosophy. This is because the principles of proto-philosophy are derivative and degenerative from the principles of philosophy proper, as will now be demonstrated.

It must be noted that, just as the metaphilosophical problem of the history of philosophy is only a problem if there exist two terms requiring a relation to be established between them (i.e. systematic and historical), so too is the central philosophical problem of the relationship between the Monosophic and Polysophic principles in human experience only a problem if there exist two terms requiring a relation (e.g. intelligible and sensible). Thus a protophilosophical solution to the problem is really simply a denial of the problem itself, at least insofar as it implies dualisms between what has being and what does not have being, between what can be known and what cannot be known, between what is significant experience and what is not, and between what has meaning and what does not have meaning. Historically the
tendency is rather to conflate the two terms from the point of view of only one of them, in order to make a pseudo-solution possible. In effect this means that any given protophilosophy only incorporates one of the two principles which are necessary to philosophy proper (and likewise the opposite protophilosophy only incorporates the remaining principle). It is in this way that the principles of protophilosophy may be derived from those of philosophy proper. However, this also implies that the principles of protophilosophy are degenerative from those of philosophy proper, for protophilosophical principles, because they attempt to explain the Monosophic in terms of the Polysophic (or vice versa), must create irresolvable contradictions along the line of demarcation between the intelligible and sensible. This, then, is the first implication of accepting any given protophilosophical principle. Connected with this is the inability of any given protophilosophy to argue in a positive way for its own principle. This is because such metaphysical principles are both logically prior to any possible philosophical argument and immune from any such argument anyway as they are necessary principles. Typically what happens is that a protophilosophy will offer a negative argument for its principle by way of criticism of its opposite. Thus, for example, the rationalist will criticize sense
perception on the grounds that it cannot distinguish between illusory and veridical perceptions. Likewise, the empiricist will criticize reason for being unable to offer truths about the world that are empirically verifiable. Further discussion of this point will be left to Part Four. Among the many other implications of accepting any given protosophical principle are a few which are especially important and therefore they will also be singled out for closer inspection in Part Four of this essay. However, as they are only required in order to fill out certain aspects of one's understanding of why the synthetic solution is a solution, they will not be mentioned until they are treated in Part Four.

Keeping the preceding considerations in mind, it is now time to deal directly with the notion of synthesis. The nature of the Monosophic-Polysophic problem dictates that the real solution to it must consist in transforming the two terms into the kind of logical relationship which does not render any one of the terms subordinate to the other in respect of their importance in the final relation. Each must remain equally essential, otherwise the perennial protosophical problem of accounting for one side of the relation in terms of the other must arise, and this, as has been shown, results in insoluble contra-
dictions. This consideration explains why the Kantian-type solution serves as the only successful one, for it is only the categories of form and content which are capable of isolating the two elements of Monosophy and Polysophy in such a way as to attain the purest expression of the principles which they embody and yet, at the same time, to retain their strict dependence upon one another. In familiar terminology, the categories of form and content are distinguishable, not separable. This ensures that there are no grounds for the possibility of constructing a philosophy merely in terms of one to the exclusion of the other. Thus the question of any further synthesis simply does not arise in the case of philosophy proper, for the categories of form and content admit of no mediation as they stand in the sort of peculiar polar opposition to one another which is necessary to the very nature of their relationship. It remains only to be shown, then, how the principle which is at work behind the Kantian synthesis may be similarly applied at the level of metaphilosophical discussion. If the history of philosophy, or philosophy in its systematic and historical aspects, is taken to be the core problem in metaphilosophy, then the solution to this expression of the Monosophic-Polysophic problem assumes the following shape: the permanent, intelligible, and unitary side of philosophy is to be represented by a
formal principle and the changing, sensible, and plural side of philosophy is to be represented by historical content. The metaphysical principles of philosophy are therefore analogous to Kant's synthetic a priori propositions to the extent that they both fulfil similar functions (i.e. the determination of the logical structure of philosophy and experience respectively).

The crucial distinction between the history of metaphysics and the history of ideas must be constantly borne in mind if one is to avoid confusing empirical historical analysis with the logical task of metaphilosophy proper. For although the principles of philosophy must be expressed in concrete historical terms in order that they be made relevant to the time in which they happen to appear in the writing of a philosopher, it is not now the proper place to conduct an investigation into these historical connections. Thus the correct function of metaphilosophy is to isolate and examine the principles of philosophy and their implications in a purely a priori manner. Consequently, the fact that those principles are only expressed historically is, from this point of view, purely accidental, for there are no real philosophical differences of opinion in philosophy, there are only historical differences. In short, then, real philosophical disagreement does not exist. When this point is coupled with the distinction
between philosophy proper and protophilosophy the reasons for the main thesis of this paper are evident.

Knowledge of the history of philosophy shows examples of types of philosophy which conform to the Monosophic-Polysophic principle. However, because these types ultimately derive from the nature of philosophy itself, the principle which they embody could have been discovered without any knowledge of the history of philosophy at all. And if this line of thinking is followed through to its logical conclusion, then this entire metaphilosophical project could be reconstructed a priori, at least in its pure form. Thus historical knowledge of philosophy is methodologically heuristic and so the apparent concern with philosophers and their writings is only intended to be used as an aid in order to facilitate classification of philosophical ideas. Obviously this means that metaphilosophy is as much a correction of the history of philosophy as it is a description of it (i.e. it creates a new method of argument whereby the history of philosophy may be rendered radically consistent).

It is not being claimed that these principles will necessarily appear anywhere within the actual history of philosophy. The point is simply that insofar as philosophy actually does appear in history and as philosophy, then it must instantiate those principles.
Thus there is a metaphilosophical mandate for the broad revision of philosophical error when it involves these principles—something which will become more important in Part Four.

One of the most significant implications of the thesis that all philosophy is the expression of a single idea bears directly upon what has hitherto been accepted as constituting the most important arguments of philosophy. For pure metaphysics does not have a history and, although metaphysics has a history, its formal principles are necessary and therefore a priori. It is only the expression of metaphysics which is a posteriori and contingent in the historical sense. Thus any appearance that philosophical argument is relevant in their connection is illusory. Furthermore, it is misleading, for such argument has always tended to obscure the necessary status of those principles.

A further important implication is that, in their metaphilosophical context, the Kantian categories of form and content entail the logical dualism between philosophy and the world. For if it is the world which supplies the historical content necessary to render metaphysical principles relevant to human concerns and issues, then that world can never been discussed in a philosophically significant way except when interpreted through those metaphysical principles. An important implication of
this general point is that philosophy never treats of the world as it really is, but only as it appears philosophically. Thus, for example, science cannot be described philosophically as it actually works, but rather only as it appears to work in light of any given philosophy of science. In this sense, the philosopher in the capacity of being a philosopher is necessarily concerned with an ideal world, and this is something which must be distinguished from the real world in which the philosopher as a human being actually lives. Thus in this way common sense is immune from philosophical criticism. It therefore follows that, although the real genesis of metaphysical principles may be grounded in the very nature of human being itself, any ultimate explanation of the Monosophic-Polysophic categories will not be of any philosophical interest. It seems fairly obvious then that these two categories, when translated into the idiom of philosophers as human beings, approximately correspond to the distinction between Reason and Experience. Of course this is not to give a philosophical explanation of the matter. It is nonetheless useful in understanding why philosophy exists. In this connection the distinction between philosophy and the world seems to furnish an explanation for why protophilosopshies are predominant in the history of philosophy. It can only be because, as human beings,
philosophers have found it easier or preferable to develop philosophies as extensions of their personalities. Once again, however, this does not constitute a philosophical explanation. And insofar as philosophy is concerned with acquiring such an explanation it will not be forthcoming for the simple reason that there is nothing philosophical which requires an explanation here. After all, protophilosophy is not yet philosophy, strictly speaking. If this is still unsatisfactory for metaphilosophy, then it may at best be said that philosophy is what results from the synthesis of two opposing protophilosophies when they have had their respective mistakes removed. It is only in this sense then, that the elements of philosophy are perhaps contained within the principles of protophilosophy.

The most notable exception (because the most widespread) to the metaphilosophical organization of the history of philosophy appears to be that of Existential Phenomenology. First, it must be pointed out that both Existentialism and Phenomenology originally began as fully independent philosophies in their own right. It must be noted that both Existentialism and Phenomenology are subsumed under the category of Polysophy (there are no examples of a merger between two philosophies of different metaphysics which are also on the opposite sides of the Monosophic-Polysophic distinction). Thus
there may be less a conflict than a tension operating between the two philosophies. For example, it is possible that Phenomenology is the more basic of the two terms in this equation and therefore that it is legitimately applied, as a theory of the nature of philosophical method, to an Existential subject matter. In a time when science has become the predominate ideal of knowledge, it is natural for philosophers to attempt to say something that is important and yet nevertheless different from science. Thus it might have initially appeared to philosophers that the 'scientific' methodologies of Logical Analysis and Formal Phenomenology were in fact empty of any real philosophical content. If this is the case, then it seems that the informal phenomenologists sensed this deficiency first and so adopted the more human concerns of Existentialism (e.g. Heidegger). Rather recently, it appears as though Linguistic Analysis has likewise resorted to borrowing ideas from a previous historical stage, namely, that of the experiential-historical approach in Essentialism (the fact that this is the opposite of Existentialism is no mere coincidence) to changing conceptual schemes (e.g. Rorty). The connection between Linguistic Analysis and Empiricism is therefore only historical and not logical. However, it is also possible that the metaphysically constructive stages of both Symbolism and
Phenomenalism have yet to surface in their historical development. If this is the case, then these partnership must eventually break down as untenable conflicts in compromise.

One explanation for why a synthesis of the systematic and historical aspects of philosophy has not been forthcoming is a tendency on the part of the advocates on both sides to conflate two different issues. What is being rejected from the historical approach is not the idea of change as such, but the related notion of progressive development. Similarly, what is being rejected from the systematic approach is not the idea of permanence as such, but the related notion of immutability. Although these pairings may be distinguished, they are hardly ever to be found actively separated in the literature. And this is what causes most of the resulting confusion, for without separating the two terms from one another within these two sets of elements, their synthesis is impossible. In other words, permanence and change are not necessarily mutually exclusive, whereas immutability and progressive development are contradictories. Once this stumbling block has been overcome, synthesis, although difficult, nevertheless now becomes possible. The connection here with form and
content should be readily apparent for the formal principles of philosophy are what remain the same even though they are subject to changing historical contents.

The objection may be raised at this point as to the historical status of metaphilosophical truth itself, for if the principles of philosophy can only be expressed historically, and if as philosophy metaphilosophy is itself subject to the same principles, then how is it that metaphilosophy can lay claim to any sort of final truth concerning these principles? The answer to this question is not to claim inconsistently that metaphilosophy is ahistorical, but rather to carry the premise of the objection to the very extreme by identifying metaphilosophy with the entire history of philosophy itself. So that as philosophy changes historically, metaphilosophy simply expands in order to accommodate the additional information. Hence metaphilosophical truth is only final in the sense that at any given time there is simply nothing more to be said beyond what has already been said. In connection with its status as truth, this becomes clearer upon pointing out that, as previously demonstrated, neither proto-philosophy nor philosophy is capable of producing a
metaphilosophy which can be true as it cannot reach the level of generality and abstraction which renders it consistent with itself. In other words, the historical content of such metaphysical principles are themselves only a part of history and as such are subject to contradiction between meta-theory and historical content. On the other hand, the historical content of metaphilosophy is the entire history of philosophy itself. Thus there is no resulting contradiction between meta-theory and historical content since that content never changes in the qualitative sense, only in the quantitative sense.

The objection may now rightly be raised as to the exact reasons why this classification should be preferred to any other. Let us take as a paradigm example of such an alternative classification the popular metaphysical categories of Idealism and Realism. There are three reasons why those categories are unacceptable as a metaphilosophical classification of philosophies, which is after all what is being sought here: The first reason is that the categories of Idealism and Realism cannot account for the legitimate existence of all philosophies. Thus, to take one obvious example, Logical Positivism rejects the very possibility of metaphysics as a philosophical discipline. Hence, although Logical Positivism is a philosophy, it must not advance any claims as to whether Idealism or Realism is the correct category for
a proper metaphysical theory of reality. Thus, the philosophy of logical positivism can hardly be classified in terms of those same categories. And, as has been demonstrated, error is omission in metaphilosophy.

The second reason is that Idealism and Realism are classifications which remain within the framework of only one discipline among many within philosophy itself. The metaphilosophical classification of this paper, however, is cross-disciplinary insofar as it is grounded in the historical content which results in the changing priorities given to the disciplines as first philosophy. In other words, Idealism and Realism are classifications of the positions which philosophers happen to maintain in respect of a certain discipline, whereas metaphilosophy seeks to classify the different philosophies as philosophies. This means that the two classifications are really answers to two entirely different questions. One way of understanding this difference is in terms of logical priority, for insofar as Idealism and Realism are metaphysical positions towards which philosophical arguments are directed, then they necessarily presuppose the very things which are at issue for the metaphilosophical classification (i.e. the nature of philosophical argument, etc.). In short, metaphilosophy is not concerned with problems in philosophy, but rather with problems about philosophy.

The third reason is that the classification is
not a philosophical classification for the metaphilosophical position which would be presupposed by such a metaphysical classification is not itself subject to a metaphysical classification of the same kind. In other words, in the case of Idealism and Realism, there is no necessary connection between such a classification of philosophies and the metaphilosophical viewpoint which would be inherent in that classification. Any yet, as has been demonstrated, there must be such a connection because metaphilosophy is philosophy. Thus Idealism and Realism are not philosophical classifications, although they may be metaphysical classifications, or historical, or of some other sort.

In short, then, the categories of Idealism and Realism are incapable of furnishing metaphilosophy with what it requires, namely, a philosophical classification of all philosophies.

The conclusion which has been reached in Part Three regarding the nature of the relationship between the history of philosophy and philosophical truth is therefore that, although the truth is already known in a formal sense, it nevertheless remains necessary to express that truth in historical terms. For form without content is empty and content without form is blind. Thus philosophy is an 'eternal recurrence.'
PART FOUR: THE PRINCIPLES

The purpose of the following section is to illustrate, by way of historical example, some of the formal features of philosophy. A useful technique which results from the theory of philosophy which is being proposed in this essay is the application of the method of collative morphology to the history of philosophy. This method is simply a way of critically comparing the various principles of philosophy and is based, not on analogy, but on the recognition of their identical formal features regardless of how they may happen to differ as historical expressions of the same idea. Such a procedure as this should prove helpful in understanding such things as, for instance, how the central features of a philosophy are actually determined, how a particular philosophy may be criticized, and how certain philosophers and their ideas fit into the scheme of philosophy considered as an historical whole.

Hence, it is hoped that the following will give a more concrete, if not more detailed, picture of how
the history of philosophy appears in light of the proposed theory of philosophy. For the time being, attention is exclusively devoted to the principles of protophilosophy which are implied by the metaphysical principle of philosophy. The four principles to be considered are: 1) The Ideal-Real principle; 2) The Appearance-Reality principle; 3) The principle of the given; and 4) The philosophy-metaphilosophy relation. Except in the case of Wittgenstein, most of the discussion, given the obvious limitations of time and space, will only serve to suggest a programme of study which is to be based on the theory of philosophy here. Therefore, the references to historical fact which follow are only meant to show how such a programme is warranted on the basis of the theory. The case of Wittgenstein is given extended treatment only in order to show how the metaphilosophical analysis may be applied to the other historical examples which have been cited. The actual examination of this synthetic solution to the problem of philosophy, especially in reference to its ethical-ideological implications, will be left to another work.

If it is objected that the following material is already well known, then the metaphilosophical theory is only designed to explain why this should be
so. However, if the material is new, then the metaphilosophical analysis which follows must be true given the fact that the principles with which it deals are necessary to all philosophy. Hence, except for their particular historical expression, these principles can be known a priori.

Given the metaphilosophical fact that all proto-philosophies attempt to resolve the Ideal-Real problem exclusively from one side of the equation, one can reasonably predict that all such philosophies will attempt to account for the other side by assimilating it to the original and thereby denying the essential difference between the two. However, according to the metaphysical principles, such an attempt must end in failure for only a synthesis which initially accepts the separation between the two is capable of offering a real solution to the problem of the relation between the Ideal and the Real. Turning now to the actual historical examples, this expectation is abundantly confirmed. A well-know example is, of course, Hume, who states categorically that all ideas are faint copies of impressions. In effect, then, Hume is denying the logical distinction between the Ideal and the Real by offering us an account of the relation which is supposed to be a causal genesis, but which is in actual fact simply a stipulative definition.
The so-called empirical arguments given by Hume in support of this thesis and the subsequent rhetorical questioning, "show me the impression," which follows only serve as evidence of the illusory nature of the philosophical arguments which surround this metaphysical principle in Hume. Also, it now becomes apparent that the notion of an idea as in a faint copy of an impression and the notion of an idea as in the relations between ideas are two different notions. For otherwise, how could Hume have consciously maintained, inconsistently with his empirical principle, the validity of analytic truths. This dogma of Empiricism was only later to be purged by Quine with his rejection of the analytic-synthetic distinction and so the perfecting of Empiricism as an ideal philosophical position continues to be worked out even today. In general, then, we can say that the empiricists thought of conceptions as confused forms of perceptions. Thus, according to metaphilosophical principles, the rationalists ought to have thought of perceptions as confused forms of conceptions. And this explains why Kant rejects the common tenet of both Rationalism and Empiricism, namely, that there is no real separation in the distinction between conception and perception. Coupled with this attempt to deny the separation of the Ideal and the Real must be
the ultimate failure of each philosophy to solve the problems which are directly related to the side of the equation which is opposite to the side originally selected as a starting point. Once again metaphilosophy points out what is already well-known, namely, that Hume (as well as Locke and Berkeley) was unable to explain satisfactorily either the formation or acquisition of general concepts. However, all this is to add nothing to the current literature. What is important is to apply what is already known in this case to other cases and on the basis of a proper critical comparison of their formal features.

Thus, for example, one can either state a priori or explain retrospectively, depending on one's acquaintance with the primary and secondary sources, that there will be an intermingling of the intellectual and sensuous elements in both Aristotle and Hegel. Thus we know, metaphilosophically speaking, why Aristotle's distinction between the intelligible and the sensible is drawn ontologically as being between primary and secondary substance. For it is only in this way that the one is already dependent upon the other (i.e. essences are only real substances in a secondary sense and are ontologically dependent upon the existence of concrete individuals). Thus we also know that Aristotle's doctrines of secondary substance in general and hylomorphism
in particular must be untenable. For the same reason, Aristotle's aesthetic theory must also fall, depending as it does on the idea of art as bringing out the universal which is hidden in the individual. In other words, the essence is given priority in Aristotle's aesthetic theory and this is inconsistent with the status which is assigned to it in the original ontological theory. This same criticism can be extended across all the philosophical disciplines with which Aristotle deals and which are infected by the same metaphysical principle. Likewise, Hegel's system must not allow for taking into account the place of individuals and their characteristic features. Again, then, Plato attempts to break down the distinction between the world of forms and the world of particulars by maintaining that the latter are in some sense a reflected copy of the former. Of course Plato's replies in regard to the relationship which exists between the forms and the world of sensible particulars are reduced to the poetic metaphors of participation and imitation. Furthermore, Plato is unsuccessful in attempting to bridge the gap between the intellectual and the sensual pleasures, which is but another implication of the more general failure. The same thing may be indicated in the later evolution of Husserl's philosophical interpretation of Empiricism. Because the tendency of Phenomenology was
later properly redirected toward Polysophy, Husserl, as
the founder of Phenomenology, must make the difference
between concepts and sensations merely a matter of degree
and not of kind. Thus Husserl holds that not only can we
intuit that which is individual or particular, but also
that which is general—hence the method of intuiting
essences and the breakdown of the distinction between
the conceptual and the sensual at least methodologically
speaking. A similar breakdown occurs, logically speaking,
through the eidetic reduction whereby the sensible parti-
cular is transformed into the general essence. Likewise
similar considerations apply to the existentialist defini-
tion of what constitutes an individual’s essence.

The notion of the given figures prominently in
both Monosophy and Polysophy for the simple reason that,
since the two protosophical principles are absolute
presuppositions, there must be a basic set of given mate-
rial upon which those principles may act. In the case of
Monosophies the given must be intelligible, relatively
permanent, shared, and logically prior to the sensible
world. Thus the given may take on the typical forms of
something which one is either born with—the doctrines
of recollection (Plato) or innate ideas (Descartes)—
or born into—the doctrines of class membership (Marx)
or linguistic practice (Wittgenstein). On the Polysophic
side of the issue, the phenomenological method of
bracketing based on the distinction between the given and its interpretation (i.e. naive realist assumptions, scientific theories, philosophical presuppositions, etc.) is merely another form of the basic empiricist demand for isolating the given element in sensible experience. This is, of course, despite Husserl's initial and inconsistent tendencies towards Rationalism. It follows from this that neither protophilosophy can argue for the essential correctness of the given simply because it is what is supposed to be given and so can hardly be supported by the very philosophical argument which it is supposed to support in turn. Thus the rationalists instead point out the existence of perceptual illusion and the empiricists point out the fact that innate ideas are not shared in common by all.

The acceptance or rejection of the traditional metaphysical distinction between appearance and reality is a defining characteristic of all Monosophies and Polysophies respectively. For in both cases the stance taken allows for the very possibility of philosophical method. Polysophies, because they begin from the point of view of the sensible, changing world of diverse experience, must confine themselves to the world of appearance only. In sharp opposition are, of course, the Monosophies which, because they must search elsewhere for direct confirmation of the intelligible, permanent,
and unified nature of the world, posit the existence of an underlying reality which is inaccessible to sense experience.

Obviously Plato was a traditional metaphysician when he asserted the reality of an intelligible world of forms over and above the world of sensible particulars. In familiar contrast, the Polysopher Aristotle rejected the distinction between appearance and reality in nature by placing intelligible form in the sensible particular itself.

Similarly, although the empiricists reject the distinction between appearance and reality, the rationalists draw the distinction between appearance and reality in an epistemological way. For they assert that all propositions of knowledge, even though they may appear to be synthetic or contingent, are really analytic or necessary. Thus the rationalist has paved the way for the possibility of applying his own philosophical method of analysis. It is now easy to understand why the rationalist criticism of Empiricism is that it is blind, while the empiricist criticism of Rationalism is that it is empty. For Rationalism must deny experience and Empiricism must deny reason.

A typical rationalist metaphysics is the Marxian analysis of reality which extends even to philosophy itself. For within an historical context which has been
interpreted materialistically, Marx claims that all philosophy is ideology which is merely in turn a manifestation in the world of appearances of the basic underlying reality of economic determinism in politics. Faced with the obvious metaphilosophical question which arises at this point, Marx has no recourse but to claim for his work the status of science. This is, of course, one way of dealing with the metaphilosophy-philosophy issue. Nevertheless it remains true that Marx is doing philosophy precisely because his work does rest upon a metaphysical principle, namely, that history forms an intelligible system.

That philosophy cannot generate a metaphilosophy which is also true is amply evidenced by the historical illustrations of various philosophies attempting to erect methodological dualisms between themselves and the rest of the world. However, this is a futile attempt to overcome the contradictions which must be created when any philosophy attempts to produce a theory of philosophy which must be logically prior to that philosophy in the first place. Thus, for example, Marx is being most philosophical when claiming that all philosophy is only the ideological product of various socio-economic conditions and hence is only true for that time period. Marxism is of course the most ideological of all philosophical doctrines and so Marx claims that his philosophy is actually
science and not really philosophy at all.

Hegel's philosophy should have been authored by the Absolute Spirit itself as that philosophy was the ultimate perfection of absolute self-cognition.

Kierkegaard absurdly attempts to establish and communicate the claim that truth is subjective and that therefore every philosophy is essentially personal and thus only an individual's. Similarly, Nietzsche's claim that everything which could constitute a philosophy is only a particular perspective is itself another such perspective.

Plato's problem is accounting for one's ability as an individual to acquire knowledge of the forms. It appears as though Plato's only recourse is through mystical experience, hence the doctrine of recollection which claims that the mind, in a previous existence unhampered by the intelligible-sensible dichotomy, must have been able to achieve communion with the forms. Thus Plato claims that it is only through the use of dialectic that one can come to know the forms and yet Plato never uses the dialectic to discover the theory of forms. Thus the dialectic, as an actual give and take debate, disappears almost entirely from Plato's dialogues just before the theory of forms is presented for the first time as a positive philosophical thesis in the Republic. And anyway, how could Plato know this
to be true unless he had in fact reached the highest form, the Good (which is denied by Socrates).

Finally, Kant was forced to have recourse to the mysterious practical in order to explain how the transcendental philosophy was itself ultimately possible. Thus the contradictory conflation of the noumenal-phenomenal distinction with that of the intellectual-sensuous distinction in the Kantian philosophy between the two Critiques.

Wittgenstein was a rarity among philosophers in that he was both able to clearly perceive, and willingly admit to, the metaphysical necessities (i.e. the a priori principles of philosophy) of at least his earlier position. This was perhaps due to his extreme independence from the history of philosophy and therefore from the illusory arguments which obscure metaphysical discussion. Subsequently, however, his place in the history of philosophy has been severely misinterpreted. The problem is that the historical connection between Wittgenstein and the British empiricists has always been mistaken as also entailing a logical connection and it is the latter which is simply not the case. For Wittgenstein was, in his early philosophy, a thorough-going rationalist and he remained so in his later philosophy as well. The reason for this error has been the failure to distinguish between being empirical (which
Wittgenstein with his later emphasis on the detailed study of the actual workings of natural language, certainly was) or rational, and being an Empiricist (which Wittgenstein with his exclusive emphasis on symbolic meaning certainly was not) or Rationalist. Thus Marx was empirical, but he was a Rationalist, for although the method of this philosopher may appear empirical the principle from which it is derived as decidedly Rationalist. So calling a philosopher an Empiricist because he insists on examining words is like calling a philosopher a Rationalist because he insists on thinking. In many ways Wittgenstein's philosophies provide a model illustration of the metaphilosophical type of analysis which is being proposed here. It is for this reason, then, that Wittgenstein's case will be treated in relative depth and detail and that the discussion concerning all of his metaphysical principles will be fully integrated to give an overall metaphilosophical picture of his philosophy. (The same type of analysis could be carried out for all the others given sufficient time and space.)

First, Wittgenstein rightly maintains in consistency with the main problem of all protophilosophies, that the relationship which exists between language and the world of phenomena cannot be said, only shown. In other words, that such a solution is not to be found anywhere
within philosophy itself (i.e. there is no philosophical solution, although perhaps there may be a poetic, or literary one, etc.) Of course he then goes on to identify this with the realm of the mystical. The consequences of this doctrine are especially important for Logical Positivism if this philosophy is viewed as being derived from the *Tractatus*. As the relationship between language and the world cannot be explained, Wittgenstein must naturally have problems with the correspondence part of his theory of truth. Thus Wittgenstein claims that it may indeed be impossible to actually find his simple objects anywhere in the world and this is because the picture theory of meaning is expounded in a rationalist manner (i.e. the rationalist ideal that truths about the world can be discovered merely by way of an examination of thought or, in this case, the logic and language of thought. Since language must have a sense it must therefore be of a certain logical form or structure and therefore the world must be similarly structured in order to be capable of being represented in language). As Wittgenstein says, among the things that cannot be stated are the existence of the simple objects that serve to make up the substance of the world. His claim is merely that these are at least entities which satisfy the logically necessary conditions for a relationship between language and the world and therefore, if only for that reason alone, they must exist.
In typical rationalist fashion they are, in other words, merely a demand of theory. Clearly, however, the metaphilosophical perspective allows one to simply dismiss this claim as impossible because it conflicts with the necessary metaphysical principle of all protophilosophies, namely, that nothing can in fact bridge the gap which they themselves have created between the Ideal and the Real. Wittgenstein's ploy is the same as all other protophilosophers in this respect, for he blurs the distinction between language and the world by claiming that they must be structurally symmetrical. All of this leads, of course, to Wittgenstein's own version of the traditional appearance-reality metaphysics, for the simples, which supposedly correspond directly to the world are in fact the underlying reality of what appears as the complex propositions with which language users actually deal. And yet these simples do not constitute an empirical theory of meaning for they are immutable things which cannot be described by propositions (for they compose all propositions) and are nowhere given in actual experience. Thus the distinction between appearance and reality once again paves the way in a rationalist system for the possibility of philosophical method. In Wittgenstein's case it is the possibility for logical analysis. It also means that all complex propositions are analytically necessary because they are all composed of simple propositions. So
what Wittgenstein is left with is only a strict coherence theory of truth as all propositions are truth functional (i.e. given complex facts all atomic facts could be known through philosophical analysis and thus all true propositions could then be generated by way of logic, although Wittgenstein does not proceed to commit the further error of claiming that the same method can be used to determine which propositions are actually true). The implications for Logical Positivism should now be quite obvious, for the really telling criticism of that school is not that the principle of verification is inconsistent with itself by way of self-inclusion, but that the principle itself is internally inconsistent. In other words, and according to metaphysical necessity, the principle should not contain any reference at all to the empirical side of the problem of verification as this is inconsistent with a strict Monosophy (just as was Humean Empiricism inconsistent in accepting the existence of analytic propositions. Thus Logical Positivism could have been saved from following a blind alley if the empiricist element had been exorcised a priori via metaphilosophy). Thus all apparently empirical propositions are really ultimately analytical and it is part of the business of philosophy to display this. Of course, Logical Positivism does go so far as to say that, because philosophy is concerned with conducting conceptual enquiries, the proposi-
tions of philosophy are necessary in a linguistic sense and hence are analytic. However, this is not going far enough, for the positivists (e.g. Carnap) went on to attempt the construction of logically perfect languages of simple elements for describing empirical phenomena. And such a project, as has been shown, is a priori doomed to failure on the basis of a proper metaphilosophical understanding of the Wittgensteinian assumptions concerning the philosophical nature of language.

At this stage Wittgenstein is also very much aware of the problematic philosophy-metaphilosophy relation for he says that we can have thoughts about what cannot be stated only when we conceive of the world as a limited whole of which we are then not a part. This is what Wittgenstein labels as a mystical experience. It also means that Wittgenstein was the first philosopher to recognize the metaphilosophical necessity of denying the meaningfulness of his own philosophy, for if it is true, then it must be false by way of self-inclusion. Of course, Wittgenstein's solution to this problem is really only an evasion of the issue. The well-known ladder analogy breaks down for the simple reason that his philosophy is strictly speaking nonsensical because the language in which it is expressed does not succeed in fulfilling the function which all language is supposed to if it is to be sensical. Thus the ladder would also
be, by analogy, non-functional and so one could never use it to climb up to the position where one could see the world correctly and then discard the ladder.

Second, Wittgenstein remains a rationalist in the Investigations. A central tenet of Rationalism is, of course, the kind of Essentialism of which one variety infects the entire structure of the Tractatus. Wittgenstein, believing himself to be later moving towards a kind of linguistic Empiricism, with its concomitant rejection of Essentialism, attempts to maintain a theory of language which partly revolves around the twin notions of language game and family resemblance. According to the metaphysical theory his later attack on Essentialism was simply mistaken and it is evident from his own work that there is an essential characteristic which all language games have in common, and that characteristic is contained in his definition of language as a rule-governed form of behaviour. Of course, this definition is what his entire philosophy ultimately rests upon. This is an error which Marx does not commit for, even though he makes a very similar move against Hegelianism, Marx fully perceived the necessity of Essentialism to his rationalist philosophy.

Third, the traditional metaphysical distinction between appearance and reality again crops up in Wittgenstein's later philosophy in order to make room for the possibility of the philosophic enterprise as such. Thus
the distinction between the surface grammar of language (which is one of the major sources of philosophic error because it leads philosophers into the mistaken belief that such appearances constitute the real meaning of language) and the depth grammar of language. According to Wittgenstein, of course, a philosophic analysis of the underlying reality of our language can show us what the real meaning is supposed to be and hence dispel our linguistic confusions.

Fourth, another version of the rationalist coherence theory of truth also appears in the Investigations. Wittgenstein again admits, this time implicitly, that there is no connection, at least philosophically speaking, between language and phenomena. This becomes evident in Wittgenstein's deliberate destruction of his earlier naming theory of meaning, for in severing this pseudo-connection between word and object, he is in effect committing himself to the metaphilosophical viewpoint that such a connection is always impossible on the protophilosophical level. And this explains why Wittgenstein says that, if pressed for an ultimate justification of one's linguistic practice, one can only reply that this is simply what one does. In this sense we are in fact dealing with a species of Idealism where one's world is in some sense a product of one's language. The ultimate result of this is of course communal solipsism. Thus the coherence theory of truth
reveals itself here as forms of life which only make sense to one who is actually confined within that form. Practically speaking, then, all proper linguistic utterances are once again analytic in the sense that they can only ultimately be understood once one understands the rules of the game—rules that cannot be empirically verified in terms of actual correspondence to worldly elements. Thus the notion of the given also appears in that Wittgenstein cannot argue for the essential correctness of language. Instead his only recourse is to simply state that ordinary language is in perfect order and that it therefore makes perfect sense.
EPILOGUE: THE PLAN OF FUTURE WORK

The point of this paper has been to give some indication of how a metaphilosophical theory might be built upon the notion that all of philosophy is the expression of a single idea—that of the relationship between Reason and Experience, or the Ideal and the Real. In the present work this thesis has been developed from an historical point of view. The next step is to demonstrate the necessity of these general metaphysical principles a priori and in abstraction from their specific and concrete historical manifestations. What also remains to be done in future work is to further elaborate this thesis from an interdisciplinary perspective (i.e. the disciplines which constitute the subject of philosophy), and especially to identify and isolate those metaphysical principles which have determined the logic of ethico-ideological systems in the history of philosophy. Beyond this, there remains only the task of executing the requisite scholarship. In this way, there should emerge a more convincing case for the view that philosophy is only ever attempting to express one idea—albeit in multifarious ways.
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