

CHILDREN OF BLOOD, CHILDREN OF SHAME

CHILDREN OF BLOOD, CHILDREN OF SHAME:
CREATION AND PROCREATION IN LONGANA, EAST ACBA,
NEW HEBRIDES

By

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ABSTRACT

This is a study of the relationships between the systems of consanguineal and affinal classification, the types of genealogical and affinal connections to which the terms refer, and the modes of conduct that are normatively grounded in relations of genealogical connection as they are conceived by the people of Longana district, Aoba. The Longana have a Crow system of kin classification in conjunction with exogamous matrimoieties.

Important to the analysis of Longana kinship is their theory of procreation, which consists essentially of three parts. First, the Longana believe that parents contribute equally to the substance of their offspring. The Longana themselves posit relations of genealogical connection. Second, the theory of gestation states that a woman's children congenitally acquire her kin class status with respect to her cross-sex sibling. Third, the Longana have a story that accounts for the origins of men and women, sexual knowledge and procreation.

The mode of consanguineal classification cannot be discovered by analyzing the terms together with the kin types to which they refer separately from the system of spouse and affinal classification, and separately from

the modes of conduct that are normatively ascribed to relations of consanguinity and affinity. The principal reason for this is that certain consanguineal relationships, namely the children of grandchildren and the offspring of cross-sex siblings, refer to more than consanguinity, or substance, alone.

These consanguineal relationships refer also to relations of affinity; to ideas concerning gestation and its significance in the context of the cross-sex sibling bond; to ideas concerning the creation of men and women, and hence to the origin and nature of procreation itself. These conceptions are expressed in the story of human reproduction in which the first woman was a sibling with a male sexual identity with respect to her husband and his brothers. The story is a sequence of events between the first siblings, their spouses and affines, wherein the principles for classifying consanguineals and affines are contained. Also, the story is the means by which particular modes of conduct come to be connoted by the connections between ego and his or her cross-sex sibling, cross-sex sibling's spouse, and cross-sex sibling's offspring -- what is called the cross-sex sibling complex. The cross-sex sibling complex, together with the terminology and modes of conduct appropriate to it, are manifestations, symbols, of the theory of procreation.

An understanding of the significance of the cross-sex sibling complex is essential for discovering the principles of the Crow terminology, and has relevance for understanding Longana descent, politics, economics, and ritual. In particular, the theory of procreation informs the cross-sex sibling complex in such a way that certain offspring of cross-sex siblings have, congenitally, two sexual identities with respect to their parents' cross-sex siblings, and the resulting multiple kin class statuses held by these kin types refer to the relationships between the first woman and her brothers and her children expressed in the story of human reproduction.

Thus, the Longana concept of genealogical connection contradicts the prevalent, if implicit, assumption that kin types have associated with them either a male or a female sexual identity, and contradicts the assumption that a genealogical grid constitutes a conveniently simple, semantically neutral, framework for analyzing kinship systems. Finally, the dissertation suggests that a pro-genealogy approach to kinship, and a cultural or symbolic approach to kinship, are not necessarily opposed strategies for investigating the relationships between systems of kin classification and the modes of conduct that may be associated with such systems.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The focus of this dissertation is on the nature of genealogical connection as it is conceived by the people of Longana district, east Aoba, New Hebrides. [My thesis is that some relations of genealogical connection are symbolic for the Longana, and it is by means of this symbolism that consanguineal and affinal terms come to be associated with particular modes of conduct.] My dissertation is relevant, therefore, for what has been called (Fortes 1969:52) the central question in kinship studies: how are the relations of genealogical connection transformed into social relations, relations of kinship?

The relationship between kin terms and forms of social action that are normatively grounded in relations of genealogical connection has been variously conceived. What follows is an outline of four of the theoretical positions regarding the relationship between kin classification, genealogical connection, and modes of conduct ascribed to relations of genealogical connection, that are most relevant for my dissertation. The theories will be discussed in more detail below and in subsequent chapters as the theoretical issues become relevant in my analysis of the

Longana data.

Most anthropologists (see e.g., Fortes 1969, 1978; Schneider 1972) take what has been called (Strathern 1973: 31; Fortes 1978:21) a pro-genealogy view of kinship. As Fortes has stated the position:

. . . all classes and categories of genealogically describable connections are ultimately traceable by the actors to actual, postulated, or figurative parentage and the reproductive cohabitation which is its prerequisite, whether or not infused with mystical notions. This is the basic model. These are the empirical "givens" (Fortes 1969:251-252);

thus:

. . . the central position in kinship systems . . . [is] . . . the constellation of the relations of mother and child and the child's begetter . . . (Fortes 1978:21).

Relations of genealogical connection originate in the act of sexual intercourse; they are based upon parentage and thus are naturally given. These genealogical relationships, originating in the biological family (Lounsbury 1964b [1969]:252-253 fn) or in the simple recognition of genitor-offspring and genetrix-offspring relationships (Scheffler 1973:755, 756), result in a web of relatedness, for if each person is related through the facts of

procreation to his or her genitor and genetrix, each person is similarly related to his or her siblings, children, parents' siblings, and so on. Each person is, therefore, the center of his or her own genealogical web, an egocentric genealogical grid.

Are the chains of genealogical connection, resulting from the facts of parentage, relations of kinship? Here is where anthropologists differ most significantly in their attempts to determine what kinship is all about.

According to those who follow in the theoretical tradition of Radcliffe-Brown, the chains of consanguinity originating in the facts of parentage are the neutral or latent biological framework around which all societies build their kinship systems. The genealogical links themselves are not relations of kinship:

There is the purely physical relation between a child and a woman who gives birth to it or the man who begets it. The same relation exists between a colt and its dam and sire. But the colt does not have a father or a mother. For there is the social (and legal) relation between parents and children which is something other than the physical relation (Radcliffe-Brown 1950:25).

Reduced to its rudimentary postulates, kinship begins from the recognition of mere offspring as children, of their begetters and bearers as parents, and of mating as marriage or its equivalent (Fortes 1969:252).

Relations of genealogical connection become relations of kinship when the former become attached to, or innucleated by (Fortes 1969:54), values, affect, and modes for conduct. How does this innucleation come about?

It is the function of a kinship terminology to distribute or assign status relationships, rights and duties, and affect, all of which come from domains external to the purely biological facts of parentage, to the relations of genealogical connection. Thus the function of kin terms is to create social relationships out of purely genealogical, physical, relationships. Kin terms, therefore, have a dual semantic function: they refer to relations of genealogical connection, and they refer to status relationships between relatives. It follows, then, that kin terminologies cannot be analyzed separately from the norms to which they refer, or separately from the relations of genealogical connection which are the foundation of all kinship systems.

The word kinship thus refers to more than the biological facts of parentage in which genealogical connections are grounded. Relations of kinship are links of genealogical connection recognized for social purposes. Kinship, therefore, includes: relations of consanguinity and therefore a system of consanguineal classification; marital relationships and therefore a system of spouse and affinal classification; and the rights and duties associated with the consanguineal and affinal terminologies.

Scheffler and Lounsbury agree with the principle that relations of genealogical connection originate in the facts of intercourse, or procreation, but argue that the relations of genealogical connection per se, not the values, attitudes and norms ascribed to the fundamental relations of genealogical connection, constitute the domain of kinship. That is to say, the genealogical grid, the egocentric genealogical network, is kinship. There are two reasons for this position.

First, the fact that kin terms may have a dual semantic function in that they refer to relations of genealogical connection and may refer also to status relationships ought not to lead us to conclude that it is the function of kin terms to allocate statuses to relations of genealogical connection. It has been noted by many anthropologists (Scheffler and Lounsbury 1971:150-158; Scheffler 1973:768-769; Needham 1974:54-55) that the fact that a society has a certain type of kin classification -- for example, Crow -- tells us little or nothing about the rights and duties, the status relationships, that may be associated with the terminology. Second, it appears from fine-grained studies of kin classification that, within a society, classification of two or more kinsmen by the same term does not necessarily imply that all those classed by the same term have the same rights and duties toward ego (Keessing 1969, 1972:21; Scheffler 1973:768).

Simply put, then, a kin terminology in any one society may or may not function to label roles or to distribute roles over a genealogical grid. Whether or not kin terms have this function in any one society is a matter for empirical investigation and analysis. Only if the system of kin classification and any system of status relationships that may be associated with the former are analyzed separately can it be determined to what degree the principles of kin classification have any correspondence with the distribution of rights and duties between kin. Therefore, kin terms must be analyzed separately from any status relationships or connotations that those terms may have (Scheffler 1973:769).

There is an additional refinement in Scheffler's and Lounsbury's theory. The elementary relations of kinship are the genatrix-offspring and genitor-offspring relationships. Therefore, spouse and affinal relationships are not primitive or essential features of relations of genealogical connection per se (Scheffler 1972a:117, 119). Thus consanguineal terms are to be analyzed separately from the system of spouse and affinal classification.

Kinship, then, is the genealogical network based upon strict consanguinity per se. Kinship is the genealogical grid to which the terms refer, and the principles -- contained in the system of kin classification-- for establishing, and discriminating between, genealogically

defined categories (Scheffler 1972b:311).

Scheffler and Lounsbury claim that their theory is an ethnosemantic one. The grid used by the analyst refers to the folk-cultural theory of procreation that is held within the culture itself. That is to say, once the investigator establishes that the people concerned recognize that sexual intercourse is necessary for the engendering of offspring, then he or she may justifiably claim that informants postulate genitor-offspring and genetrix-offspring relations of genealogical connection and may justifiably construct a genealogical grid, or a kin type notation representing that grid, in order to analyze the system of kin classification. The genealogical grid constitutes a semantic field of consanguinity postulated within the culture concerned (Lounsbury 1969 [1964a]:193; Scheffler and Lounsbury 1971:69-70). Thus the anthropologist's model that accounts for the distribution of kin terms over a genealogical grid replicates the rules of kin classification that are used by the actors themselves (Scheffler and Lounsbury 1971:136-144).

The underpinnings of Scheffler's and Lounsbury's theory of kinship semantics can be stated as follows. Kin terms refer to relations of genealogical connection. The logical structure of the kin classification can be discovered only by analyzing the consanguineal terms and their genealogical referents separately from any social

relations that may be ascribed to the terms. How the terms come to be associated with social relationships is moot.

→ The correspondence between the mode of kin classification and any system of social relationships that may be associated with the system of kin classification is an important, but logically separate, empirical and theoretical problem.

Needham and Schneider, who oppose the pro-genealogy theories of kinship, also begin with a common core of assumptions and assertions. Kinship is quasi-genealogical; the egocentric genealogical grid, the foundation of the pro-genealogy approach to kinship, is an ethnocentric delusion, a product of the anthropologist reading his own folk-cultural theory of procreation into his data. There is no such thing as kinship.

According to Needham (1974:40):

. . . kinship has to do with the allocation of
→ rights and their transmission from one
generation to the next.

The analyst can express the allocation of rights and duties and their inheritance in genealogical terms, but there never has been an adequate explanation for this fact. Kinship has nothing to do with egocentric relations of genealogical connection, or with theories of procreation.

So-called kinship terms refer not to egocentric

relations of genealogical connection but to status relationships, social categories, that are not allocated on genealogical grounds. The patterning of a kin terminology in any society is thus a reflection of the social institutions or social categories that are present in that society -- marriageability, membership in corporate groups, generational status relative to ego, and so on. It follows that the mode of classification cannot be discovered from an analysis of the terms alone, and that kinship terminologies in themselves have no predictive value with respect to the forms of social action or social institutions that will be found in a society.

If kinship terms have nothing to do with egocentric relations of genealogical connection, and have nothing to do with theories of procreation; and if kinship terms refer to the allocation and inheritance of rights, and if these are not allocated by genealogical criteria; then:

To put it very bluntly . . . there is no such thing as kinship; and it follows that there can be no such thing as kinship theory (Needham 1974:42).

Several anthropologists (e.g. Fortes 1969:83; Scheffler 1972b:315; Schneider 1972:55) have noted a

contradiction in Needham's theory: Needham employs an egocentric genealogical grid in his analyses. For example, in a discussion of a "lineal relationship terminology" Needham (1974:55) states that the terminology asserts

. . . jural statuses into descent lines,
such that, e.g., F = FB, FBS = MZS,
S = BS

Needham's use of a kin type notation here either assumes the existence of egocentric relations of genealogical connection in the society that he is analyzing, or at least it involves the assumption that an egocentric genealogical grid is a suitable instrument for analyzing the terminology; yet Needham insists that kinship, defined as an egocentric genealogical network, doesn't exist, and that anthropologists who use a genealogical grid in their analyses mislead themselves into believing that the actors conceive the relations in question in genealogical terms (Needham 1974:41,42). Schneider, I think, sums up best this contradiction in Needham's work:

. . . one can read almost any of Needham's papers and find that the core or the key to categorical definition and content of the category is in more or less large part defined genealogically. . . . Again, genealogy rests on those old and reliable

standbys of human existence, sexual relations, conception, and parturition . . . (Schneider 1972:55).

Thus Needham compromises his claim that there is no such thing as kinship. However, he has drawn attention to an important fact: too frequently, anthropologists present no evidence that their informants postulate egocentric relations of genealogical connection; it appears that anthropologists presume the ethnographic appropriateness of using a genealogical grid to describe kinship systems (Needham 1974:73; see also Schneider 1972: 32-63; Southwold 1971:36, 40).

Schneider argues that this presumption is the result of a consistent failure by social anthropologists to appreciate the meaning that concepts of consanguinity have for the people who posit them. Largely as a result of his work on American kinship (Schneider 1968a, 1972), Schneider has concluded that concepts of consanguinity, although they may have reference to a folk-cultural theory of biology, primarily have symbolic significance for the people who posit them -- they stand for something other than an egocentric genealogical web. In the case of American kinship, the elements of consanguinity stand for a norm of "diffuse, enduring solidarity":

The last few pages of my book, American

Kinship [1968a], make the point that the biological elements have symbolic significance. . . . The symbols are 'biological' in the sense that the culturally given definition of the symbol system is that it is derived from the facts of biology as a process of nature itself. But it is fundamental to our understanding that we appreciate that these biological elements are symbols and that their symbolic referents are not biology as a natural process at all (Schneider 1972:45).

. . . the symbols and meanings of the beliefs and premises about human reproduction, of bio-genetic relationship and so on in American culture, mean or stand for diffuse, enduring solidarity. Their function is one of coping and adapting . . . with problems of meaning and with the maintenance of solidarity and of particular patterns of solidarity. They provide a meaningful social order and social life in this sense. It is in this sense that the cultural aspects of 'kinship' constitute a system of symbols and meanings . . . (Schneider 1972:47).

Schneider's conclusion that American kinship cannot be conceived primarily in terms of the facts of parentage and consequently cannot be conceived as, and analyzed by the use of, a genealogical grid, has important theoretical implications.

First, anthropologists have, since the work of Morgan (1871), conceived our own kinship system as a genealogical grid and, implicitly or explicitly, we have used that grid in analyzing other kinship systems and in comparing them with our own. Thus, the field of kinship studies has been marred by two serious flaws: a faulty

conception of what our own kinship system is all about, and an ethnocentric assumption that people in other cultures conceive of their kinship systems in the same manner that we wrongly assumed was appropriate for our own (Schneider 1972:47-49).

Second, if the above is true, kinship is

. . . a non-subject. It exists in the minds of anthropologists but not in the cultures they study (Schneider 1972:51).

Thus Schneider recommends that we abandon the pro-genealogy view of kinship, and concentrate on the study of the cultural significance that people attach to relations of genealogical connection. What has been called kinship is really part of a cultural system -- a system of symbols and meanings. To study a cultural system is to observe social action and abstract from our observations the norms for social interaction that are contained in those actions. Next, from the norms we abstract the symbols and meanings, ". . . the basic premises that a culture posits for life" (Schneider 1972:38) that are contained in the norms. The symbols and meanings, once abstracted, can be analyzed as a system, on its own terms, separately from any implications that biology, ecology or social organization

may have for the system of symbols and meanings (Schneider 1972:37-39).

In Schneider's approach, so-called kin terms do not refer primarily to relations of genealogical connection as these are conceived by Fortes, Scheffler and Lounsbury. A system of kin classification refers to a system of norms within which are embedded the symbols and meanings, ". . . the basic premises which a culture posits for life" (Schneider 1972:38; see also Schneider 1976:198-199, 201). It follows then, that the mode of kin classification cannot be discovered from the terms alone (Schneider 1972:37).

It may be that Schneider's interpretation of American kinship, the foundation of his critique of the pro-genealogy approach to kinship, is mistaken (see Scheffler 1976). Be that as it may, I show in Chapter Eight that my analysis of the Longana data offers some support for Schneider's critique of the anthropological assumptions underlying the use of a genealogical grid as an instrument of analysis, and for his argument that relations of genealogical connection may have a significance other than simple consanguinity for the people who posit them.

Longana Kinship

As I will demonstrate, the Longana kinship system is not in full accord with any of these theories, although it shows a partial fit with all of them. In brief, the Longana postulate relations of genealogical connection and have a terminology that refers to those genealogical relationships, i.e., a kinship terminology; but the Longana mode of kin classification cannot be discovered by examining the consanguineal terminology separately from the system of spouse and affinal classification, or separately from the modes of conduct that are grounded in the following types of consanguineal and affinal relationships: cross-sex sibling; cross-sex sibling's offspring; cross-sex sibling's spouse; and spouse's cross-sex sibling. I shall refer to these types of consanguineal and affinal relationships as the cross-sex sibling complex.

The Longana systems for classifying consanguines, spouses and affines, together with the modes of conduct ascribed to the cross-sex sibling complex, are concrete manifestations of, and thus are symbolic (Geertz 1973:91) of, the Longana theory of procreation or theory of human reproduction. I follow Scheffler (1973:749) in defining a theory of procreation as ". . . a folk-cultural theory designed to account for the fact that women give

birth to children".

The Longana theory of procreation consists of three parts. First, there is a belief that offspring inherit the substance of their parents. The Longana themselves postulate egocentric networks of genealogical connection.

Second, the Longana have a theory of gestation such that the offspring of a woman share in her sexual identity and her kin class status as a sibling with respect to her cross-sex sibling. Thus a man's sister's son is that man's (1) sibling, by virtue of sister's son's^v gestation in his mother's womb, (2) sibling of opposite sex for the same reason, and (3) sibling of same sex by virtue of his male gender.

Third, the Longana have a narrative, which I call the Longana story of human reproduction, that accounts for the origins and nature of: men and women and procreation; the consanguineal and affinal terminologies; and the principles of conduct appropriate between same-sex and cross-sex siblings, the protagonists of the drama. Especially important for my analysis is the story of the creation of the first woman from a male sibling. Human reproduction was made possible only when a woman, who had a covert male sexual identity, established a procreative relationship with her brother.+

The Longana story of human reproduction, in conjunction with their theory of gestation, infuses the cross-sex sibling complex with meaning in such a way that the spouse and certain offspring of ego's cross-sex sibling are ego's siblings of same and of opposite sex. I will show in Chapter Five that the resultant composite kin class statuses of these consanguineals and affines are reminiscent of those belonging to the protagonists of the Longana story of human reproduction. The Longana story of human reproduction in turn contains the principles for classifying the spouses and offspring of cross-sex siblings and provides the principles for the modes of conduct associated with these types of consanguineal and affinal relationships. In particular, I will show that the classification and modes of conduct appropriate to the kin type: offspring of cross-sex sibling, are congenital implications of the kin type itself.

My analysis of the Longana data incorporates elements of the pro-genealogy approach to kinship with an interpretation of genealogical connection as a symbolic system in order to account for the correspondences between the system of consanguineal and affinal classification and modes of conduct grounded in relations of genealogical connection. In doing so, I demonstrate that a synthesis of the genealogical and symbolic theories

of kinship is possible.

I first realized that the Longana kinship system did not seem to fit within any known theoretical framework when I discovered and investigated a problem that emerged in the field. The next section outlines that problem and discusses the methods that I used in my research.

Problem and Methods

Although the northern New Hebrides is known as an area in which many societies possess exogamous matrimoieties in conjunction with Crow kinship terminologies (Codrington 1891; Rivers 1914; Allen 1964), little is known of the nature and working of these systems. A series of articles in the 1960's concerning the social organization of the Banks Islands in the northern New Hebrides, underlined the inadequacy of our knowledge of such systems and the importance of an intensive study of these systems for the ethnographic record (Needham 1960, 1964; Keesing 1964; Allen 1964).

Longana district, east Aoba, was chosen as a field site for two reasons. First, I knew that east Aoba has a Crow kinship terminology in conjunction with exogamous matrimoieties (Allen 1964, 1969).

Second, my supervisor, Dr. William L. Rodman, and

Margaret Rodman, had done field research in Longana from 1969 through 1971. I had studied William Rodman's dissertation (1973) on Longana politics, and Margaret Rodman was preparing an M. A. thesis (1976) on the Longana spheres of exchange. Through conversations with the Rodmans, from a study of their written materials, and because they had kindly made their field notes accessible to me, I had a considerable knowledge of Longana social and political organization.

Thus, Longana seemed an ideal location for an extended study of kinship in a northern New Hebridean society. The Rodmans generously agreed to share their field site with me, and to write letters to Longana in order to ease my entry into the field. I departed for Longana in March, 1976.

Early in my fieldwork, an unexpected problem arose that occupied my attention for the next twelve months. At first, there seemed to be no patterning to the way in which the Longana classified the children of grandchildren, and the Longana seemed unable to explain to me how they classified these relatives.

More specifically, my early research yielded at least two terms of reference for the children of grandchildren. For example, my male informants variously classified the kin type: son's son's son,

as: "grandchild", "son", "father", "brother", and "sister's child".

The Longana seemed unable to explain to me the cause of this variation in the classification of the children of grandchildren. Most frequently they suggested that a classification of these relatives by a phrase that glosses as "child of grandchild" -- a literal translation of the kin type -- would be sufficient for my purposes.

One informant, to whom I vented my frustration, suggested that the variation that I had recorded for the classification of the children of grandchildren was the result of intramoiety marriage by ego and/or his descendants. This informant told me also that, even if he and all his descendants practised moiety exogamy, there would still be alternate terms for the children of grandchildren, because his classification of these descendants often depended upon how he classified the spouse of his grandchild -- and that was a complicated matter that would take a long time for me to understand.

He was correct: it was arduous and time consuming for the Longana to teach me, and for me to learn, their complex system of spouse and affinal classification so that I could solve the problem of how the Longana classify the children of grandchildren. In order to master the system of classification I drew up a kinship schedule that begins with the four grandparents,

and their siblings, of an hypothetical ego, and, using the assumption that everyone in the schedule took a spouse from the matrimoiety opposite to his or her own, I asked the Longana to classify five generations of descendants of this grandparental generation. Such a kinship schedule contains over 180 kin types, and each informant and I worked through it, including the terms for the spouse of each kin type. From this information I was able to develop an ideal model of the Longana system of spouse and affinal classification, and hence to determine which great-grandchildren could be classed by more than one term of reference, and the circumstances under which a particular grandchild would be classed by a particular term.

I was able also to vary my use of the hypothetical kinship schedule or to use segments of it to explore particular problems. For example, I was able to test the validity of my predictive model by assuming that someone on the schedule married within his or her own moiety, work out the classification that I thought would be appropriate for his or her descendants, and match my predictions with the responses of my informants.

When my predictions were wrong, I told my informants what my predictions were, and they would correct my mistakes. However, if I was confident that my model was correct, I required the Longana to justify

their responses.

The Longana didn't mind having their knowledge challenged, and they enjoyed challenging my expertise as well. Half way through my research, several informants decided that they would periodically test my knowledge of the principles behind their system of spouse and affinal classification. This was a boon, for I discovered more than once that even though I had developed a model that could predict who gets called what, my reasoning behind those predictions was wrong, and I would have to develop another predictive model.

In order to ground my growing knowledge of the principles of Longana consanguineal and affinal classification in Longana usage, I collected genealogies by the method described by Barnes. Barnes' method essentially consists of obtaining a genealogical narrative from each informant, systematically

. . . recording the names of members of the cognatic stocks descended from the informant and from each of his ancestors, along with the spouses of members. The narrative should therefore include all the informant's known cognates and their spouses (Barnes 1967:111).

As I collected the genealogies, I also obtained terms of reference and address for each relative and his or

her spouse. Each narrative was diagrammed as soon as it was recorded, and the charts so produced were compared in order to detect and investigate inconsistencies in the data.

For each person on the genealogy I required: moiety affiliation, moiety subdivision membership; place of birth, previous residences, reason for change of residence, place of death; religious affiliation, changes in religious affiliation (Anglican, Church of Christ or Seventh Day Adventist); adoptive parents and adopted children.

I developed formal interviews from the data that I had gathered by collecting genealogies and by using hypothetical kinship schedules. I collected over 100 formal interviews, most of them taped, on the subject of Longana kinship and marriage. Some of these interviews run between thirty-five and forty single-spaced, typed, pages. In addition, my use of participant observation, a technique that in Longana often leads to spontaneous unstructured interviews on a broad range of topics, yielded a large and invaluable body of information on Longana custom.

Through my researches into the problem of the classification of the children of grandchildren, I gained an intimate knowledge of the Longana system of spouse and affinal classification. This knowledge

resulted in my discovering and solving two other ethnographic puzzles.

First, the spouse of a cross-sex sibling and the cross-sex sibling of a spouse classify one another as cross-sex siblings. Second, the mode of conduct that is appropriate between a man and his sister's husband and children is similar to the social relationship between ego and his sister. Research into these phenomena, together with my attempts to develop a predictive model for the classification of the children of grandchildren, resulted in my eventual discovery of the significance that the story of the creation of the first woman has for the cross-sex sibling complex.

Chapter Summary

In the next chapter I present an overview of those social, economic and political aspects of Longana society that are relevant for my analysis of Longana kinship. In Chapter Three I show that the Longana posit egocentric relations of genealogical connection. I examine the consanguineal terminology, establish that it is of Crow type, and introduce the problem of the classification of the children of grandchildren. The system of spouse and affinal classification is the focus of Chapter Four.

In that chapter, I develop models for the

system of spouse and affinal classification, and demonstrate that knowledge of the affinal classification is essential for understanding how ego classifies his or her descendants. In particular, I conclude that the Longana data exists in contradiction to Scheffler's (1972a:117) generalization that spouse and affinal relationships are not essential to systems of consanguineal classification.

That conclusion is reinforced in Chapter Five, wherein I analyze the Longana story of human reproduction and their theory of gestation and show that (1) the affinal terminology is important for understanding how the Longana classify the offspring of cross-sex siblings and (2) the modes of conduct that are normatively associated with the cross-sex sibling complex are crucial for discovering the mode of classifying the spouses and offspring of cross-sex siblings. I show that, by means of the Longana theory of gestation, the offspring of cross-sex siblings congenitally acquire certain kin class statuses and sexual identities that account for their classification. Gestation also makes this type of consanguine symbolic of the Longana story of human reproduction, thereby accounting for the modes of conduct associated with the mother's brother - sister's son and father's sister - brother's child social relationships.

I conclude that Scheffler's and Lounsbury's ethnosemantic theory is wrong, with respect to the Longana data, in the following particulars: the mode of kin classification cannot be discovered by examining the consanguineal terminology alone, and, second, because some types of genealogical connection have a cultural significance other than simple consanguinity, a genealogical grid, or a kin type notation based upon it, cannot be used as a neutral, objective instrument for analyzing the Longana system of kin classification. Finally, I present the implications of my findings for Lounsbury's analysis of Crow kinship terminologies (1964b [1969]).

I continue my examination of the system of social relationships, the modes of conduct, that the Longana ascribe to relations of genealogical connection in Chapter Six. I show that all those classed by the same term do not have the same social identities and rights and duties with respect to ego, thereby confirming a point that Scheffler (1973:768) has consistently stressed: the fact that two or more kinsmen may be classed by the same term need not imply that those kinsmen have identical statuses with respect to ego. Coclassification does not imply similarity of status, but it does have to do with defining a class of potential successors to statuses held by the genealogically closest representative of the kin class, as Scheffler and Lounsbury

(1971:154) have hypothesized. Finally, I offer evidence to suggest that the Longana do not, contrary to the theories of Scheffler (1973:754) and Fortes (1978:21), conceive of genetrix-offspring and genitor-offspring relations as inalienable.

In Chapter Seven, I show that the Longana social organization is loosely structured with respect to the norms associated with kinship; discuss the Longana concept of descent; and examine the degree to which the Longana theory of procreation informs their politics, exchange, and social interaction.

In Chapter Eight I discuss the theoretical significance of my analysis of Longana kinship. In particular, I present my reasons for concluding that my analysis of the Longana data suggests that a pro-genealogy approach to kinship and an approach that stresses the symbolic nature of culturally conceived relations of genealogical connection are not necessarily opposed strategies for discovering the mode of kin classification, analyzing the modes of conduct grounded in relations of genealogical connection, and establishing any correspondences between classification and social action.





FIGURE 1

MAP OF THE NEW HEBRIDES



and between $167^{\circ}40'$ and 168° longitude. Aoba is about twenty-two miles long, and ten miles across at its widest portion.

Aoba's shape, which resembles that of a capsized canoe, is largely determined by a dormant volcano, Manaro, that forms the bulk of Aoba's land mass. Manaro rises to approximately 4,940 feet near the center of the island. Lava flows from Manaro bisect the island's width. Secondary volcanic activity (Bonnemaison 1972a:90) has created a spine along the longer northeast-southwest axis of Aoba, effectively bisecting the island lengthwise. Thus, geological and morphological features divide the island, roughly, into four quadrants.

By convention, the northeast, southeast and southwest quadrants of the island are known as matrilineal east Aoba (Allen 1964, 1969:20, 21; Bonnemaison 1972a:105). Briefly, the population of east Aoba is divided into two exogamous matrimoieties, named Takaro and Merambuto. Each matrimoiety consists of a number of named, exogamous, dispersed matriclans. There is a preference for agnatic inheritance of land, although uterine kin may legitimately claim rights to land. The system of kin classification is Crow (see Allen 1964:316, 1969:19-21, 80-84; Bonnemaison 1972a:105-108).

There is cultural variation within matrilineal east Aoba. The inhabitants of the island distinguish

at least five east Aoban groups (Bonnemaison 1972a:99, 1974:185). Each group resides within a geographically defined, named, district. The people who live within a district share a distinctive dialect, a sense of cultural uniqueness and political unity, and show a preference for endogamy (Bonnemaison 1972a:99, 1974:185-186). Longana, which is located in the southeast quadrant of the island, is one such district.

The social structure of the westernmost quadrant of Aoba, known as the district of Dui Dui, has been studied extensively (Allen 1968, 1969). Although the people of Aoba share a common language and express their common identity as Aobans to outsiders (Allen 1969:19; Bonnemaison 1972a:92), there are important cultural differences between the people of Dui Dui and the inhabitants of the rest of the island. By contrast with matrilineal east Aoba, the Dui Dui do not possess a Crow kinship terminology or exogamous matrimoieties and matriclans. The two populations, traditionally hostile toward one another, continue to express their mutual distrust and rarely intermarry (Allen 1969:21, 25; Bonnemaison 1972a:92).

Before my research in Longana in 1976 and 1977, no one had conducted a sustained investigation of kinship in any of the districts of east Aoba. Surveys of east Aoban kinship and social organization, based on five or

six weeks of fieldwork, describe data that were gathered principally in the northeast quadrant of the island (Allen 1964, 1969:19-21, 80-84; Bonnemaïson 1970:2, 4, 1972a:105). Given that there is cultural variation within east Aoba, the degree to which these brief surveys of social organization applied to Longana was uncertain.

Thus there was an ethnographic need for a study of kinship in Longana district. Longana was an attractive field site for additional reasons. First, because I had studied the field notes from William and Margaret Rodman's research in Longana from 1969 to 1971, I had considerable knowledge of Longana before I began my research. Second, there are practical advantages to doing field research in the district. Longana has an airstrip and there are six flights a week into the district. I could have supplies flown in, and I could leave quickly in an emergency. Furthermore, at Lolowai, at the northeastern tip of Longana, the Anglican church maintains a small hospital; the government has a post office and radio-telephone; and there is a good harbour and storage building so that I could collect supplies arriving by ship conveniently.

There now exists a fairly diverse range of published and unpublished literature concerning Longana. This literature may be divided into two general categories. First, there are those works that are based upon very

short periods of research in the district. In this category there are articles that incorporate data from Longana in surveys of: east Aoban political structure (Bonnemaison 1972a, 1972b); Aoban cultivation (Bonnemaison 1970, 1974, 1978); and Aoban kinship (Allen 1964, 1969; Bonnemaison 1972a). In addition, there are brief descriptions of some aspects of the Longana economy (Bonnemaison 1972c; Gould 1978).

In the second category are works that are based upon a minimum of twelve months of anthropological research in Longana. There are detailed descriptions and analyses of continuity and change in Longana politics and law (W. Rodman 1973, 1977; M. Rodman 1978; W. Rodman and M. Rodman 1978); analyses of Longana wedding ceremonies and exchanges (M. Rodman 1976, 1980); and a paper on contemporary sorcery (M. Rodman and W. Rodman n. d.). There are two papers about Longana kinship. One of these (M. Rodman and Lovell n. d.) concentrates on the importance of informant error for the discovery and analysis of Longana principles of kin classification. The other (Poewe and Lovell 1980) uses selected data from my research for a brief comparison and contrast of Longana and Luapula (Zambia) kin classification, marriage, and descent.

This dissertation is the first systematic description and analysis of Longana kinship. Thus, in addition to its theoretical import, this work is an

original contribution to the ethnography of Longana in particular, and of east Aoba in general. Finally, my dissertation will help to fill a gap in the ethnographic record that was first perceived by Keesing (1964:300): little is known of the nature and working of societies that possess exogamous moieties in conjunction with Crow kinship terminologies.

Longana

The district of Longana is located in the southeast quadrant of Aoba. Longana is roughly triangular in shape, and has an area of approximately sixteen square miles. The apex of the triangle, bounded by the Anglican church headquarters at Lolowai, is at the northeastern tip of the district. The base of the triangle is a precipitous ravine, Wai Sala. It is approximately seven miles from Wai Sala ravine, at the southern border of Longana, to Lolowai. The coast forms the long southeastern border of Longana. The inland boundary of the district is the volcanic spine that bisects the island's length.

As one travels from the northeastern tip of Longana along the coast to Wai Sala ravine, the most outstanding geographical feature is the rapid constriction of the flat, fertile plain that runs the length of the district. In the northeastern region of the

district, one may penetrate inland from the coast for one or two miles before encountering the volcanic spine that marks the western boundary of the district; but as one approaches Wai Sala, flat plain rapidly gives way to the rugged slopes of Manaro.

The climate is tropical. Annual temperature fluctuates between a low of about seventy degrees to a high of about eighty-five degrees Fahrenheit. From May until October, the days are likely to be clear, dry and cool. The district receives the southeast tradewinds during this period. From November to April, there is a marked increase in humidity, and a muggy stillness envelopes the district. This is the time of sudden storms and cyclones, but the district is protected from their full impact by being on the sheltered side of the island.

The residents of the district refer to themselves as "we Longana people". They most frequently refer to the inhabitants of the southwest and northeast quadrants of Aoba, respectively, as the Malavung and the Lobaha. The Longana regard themselves as a group, distinct from the Malavung and the Lobaha, on the grounds of dialect and minor differences in ceremony. In the past, hostility characterized the relations between the Longana and their neighbours (M. Rodman 1978:144-145).

Each hamlet in Longana is affiliated with one of




FIGURE 2
MAP OF AOBA

three religious denominations: Anglican, Seventh Day Adventists, and Church of Christ. The forty Anglican hamlets occupy the coastal plain and the foothills of the district up to an elevation of about 600 feet above sea level. At this elevation, in the heart of the southwestern section of the district, live the Seventh Day Adventists, in three hamlets. Above them, high in the southwestern hills of Longana, live the majority of the Church of Christ adherents, in sixteen hamlets.

The Seventh Day Adventists, totalling fifty men, women, and children, are uninterested in Longana traditions and confine themselves largely to their own hamlets. The Anglican and Church of Christ adherents interact at traditional weddings, funerals and occasionally at pig killing ceremonies, but they are uneasy each in the other's presence.

First, Anglicans justifiably credit themselves with the preservation of Longana tradition, whereas the early founders of the Church of Christ were vigorously anti-custom. The early years of Church of Christ proselytization in Longana, beginning in 1907, created tension which has not been forgotten (W. Rodman 1977:527). Second, the Anglican - Church of Christ religious split among the population is also affected by the politics of independence. The New Hebrides has been a British and French Condominium since 1906. In 1977, the New Hebrides

seemed to be on the verge of independence. The Longana adherents of the Church of Christ are followers of Nagriamel, a political movement with millenarian roots. Nagriamel is allied with the anti-independence movement in New Hebridean politics. The Anglicans support the New Hebrides National Party, a pro-independence movement. Consequently, the politics of independence have been grafted onto the pre-existing religious divisions of Longana.

I conducted most of my research in the Anglican sector of Longana. In 1970 there were 450 Anglican residents in the district (W. Rodman 1973:97). I counted 555 Anglican adherents in 1977. This is an 18.7% increase in the Anglican population in six years, or a growth rate of 3.1% per annum. This rate of population growth is not surprising, given that the estimated population growth rate for the New Hebrides is 2.5% per annum (W. Rodman, personal communication).

The population of Longana district in 1970 was 860 persons (W. Rodman 1973:80). Using the figure of 2.5% per annum as the minimum population growth rate for Longana, and using my figure of 3.1% per annum as the maximum growth rate, I estimate that the population of Longana district in 1977 was between 989 and 1,020 persons.

Table 1 shows the Longana preference for district endogamy (W. Rodman 1973:90). There were ninety-seven extant marriages within the Anglican population in 1977. Of ninety-one married Longana males, seventy-six (83.5%) took spouses from within the district, and eighty-eight (96.7%) took spouses from matrilineal east Aoba. Of eighty-two married Longana women, seventy-six (92.7%) took spouses from Longana and seventy-seven (93.9%) took spouses from matrilineal east Aoba.

The Longana also have a preference for marrying within their own religious denomination (W. Rodman 1973:92). My census of the Anglican population of Longana shows that, out of ninety-seven marriages, eight involved one partner from a different religious denomination.

The Anglican population is divided into six church parishes. Members of a parish consider themselves a group, on the basis of common residence, politics and religious activities. Membership in the parish is determined by worship at the parish church and residence in a hamlet near the church. The parish is the largest local group within which mutual assistance can be expected (see W. Rodman 1973:95-106).

Within the parish, hamlets may have informal alliances from which work groups may be drawn and from which support may crystallize in intra-parish politics.

TABLE 1
ORIGINS OF SPOUSES (ANGLICAN POPULATION)

<u>Origin of Spouses</u>	<u>Longana Men (91)</u>	<u>Longana Women (82)</u>
Other island	2 (2.2%)	5 (6.1%)
Lobaha	6 (6.6%)	1 (1.2%)
Malavung	6 (6.6%)	-
Dui Dui	1 (1.1%)	-
Longana	76 (83.5%)	76 (92.7%)

Hamlets may also have lasting alliances with hamlets in other parishes based upon marriage and politics.

Hamlets are named settlements consisting of one or more dwellings. In 1977, the smallest hamlet consisted of one person; the largest had forty-eight residents. The Longana state a preference for patrivirilocal residence, and a rule that a man is entitled to claim the land owned by his father. Each married man has his own household. Thus, one would expect the development of large hamlets consisting of agnatically related males, together with their wives and unmarried children. However, hamlet composition seldom conforms to this expectation for four major reasons.

First, a man's matrikin have the right to claim a portion of his land, and may, because of strife, live in his hamlet. Second, Longana believe in the ability of sorcerers to inflict illness on entire settlements (see also M. Rodman and W. Rodman n.d.). Thus, when an outbreak of serious illness occurs in a hamlet, residents may decide to escape the sorcery by abandoning their settlement to live with their patrilateral or matrilateral kin in other hamlets.

Third, the population of a settlement may decline naturally. With land to spare, an ambitious man may attempt to coax others, perhaps of his own matriclan, to migrate and take up residence in his hamlet.

Fourth, the Longana prefer to live in dispersed hamlets, and value their privacy highly. Even in larger hamlets, the houses of brothers will be partially hidden behind some bush, a hill, or palms. Disputes between siblings, sons and fathers, are common. Often the result of such disputes is the splitting off of one or two families to live in another hamlet or to cut a new hamlet in the bush.

There are also recent historical events, and customs that are no longer practised, that have influenced the location and composition of contemporary Longana hamlets. First, prior to pacification in the 1920's and 1930's, raids, revenge, and warfare were endemic to Longana. Men and their families could seek refuge and protection from a war leader, but often the price was loss of land (see M. Rodman 1978:148-149). Thus, there are people who are not living in the natal hamlets of their fathers or paternal grandfathers.

Second, in the past, men could refuse to release their dead brother's land to his sons and drive them from their natal hamlet. The dispossessed sons could try to take refuge with grandparents, mother's brothers, or a political leader (ratahigi).

Third, between 1935 and 1945, the Longana began to develop coconut plantations on the fertile flat land of the district (W. Rodman 1973:68-69; M. Rodman 1978).

This has resulted in migrations from hill villages and the establishment of relatively new hamlets.

- Consequently, hamlet composition is and always has been affected by factors other than agnatic rights to land and a preference for patrivirilocal residence. However, Longana men are reluctant to reside in the natal hamlets of their wives. A man is the head of his household. If a man lives in his wife's hamlet, he may not be able to control his wife's activities or beat her in order to enforce his will, for she can always appeal to her parents and siblings for help.

Each household has several gardens and is expected to provision itself (M. Rodman 1976:27). The Longana grow taro, yams, Chinese cabbage, kumara, bananas, papaya and manioc as their major crops. They also grow tomatoes, English cabbage, pineapple and green beans. Breadfruit, mangoes and nuts are prized foods.

Garden produce belongs to the household that grows it. Nevertheless, hamlet co-residents cooperate in gardening activities. Brothers will help one another in clearing a new swidden, and brothers' wives will work together in the gardens of their husbands. Margaret Rodman describes Longana production as "cooperative individualism:

The process of production . . . is characterized by cooperative individualism. The units that consume garden produce usually are the units that claim land rights to that particular garden. Land tenure determines consumption of agricultural products. Rights of consumption imply rights of disposal, and it is on this basis that food products may be shared informally. Cooperative labour, among, for example, brothers' wives yields not a communally-owned product, but several separate bundles of products that correspond to the number of plots worked by the women (M. Rodman 1976:27).

Although all of the residents of a Longana hamlet may not have been born there, and may not be close kin, the Longana have a saying that all co-residents are "born within one fence". That is to say, all members of a hamlet ought to behave toward one another, and present themselves to outsiders, as if they were close kin.

Each hamlet has its political leader. In small hamlets, the acknowledged leader may be an elder brother, or perhaps the man of highest rank in the graded society, the hungwe, which will be described below.

An ambitious man or a leader will erect a clubhouse (gamali) where men from his own and other hamlets may gather to discuss local issues, socialize, and drink kava, a mild intoxicant made from the roots of Piper methysticum. Males past the age of puberty used to sleep and eat in the clubhouse, or men's house, and

women were forbidden entry. Today, women may enter the men's house, and people seldom sleep there.

The Longana are divided into matrimoieties, named Merambuto and Takaro. There is an explicit rule that one's spouse ought to come from the other moiety. However, some Longana did, and do, marry in violation of the rule of moiety exogamy. The Longana, apparently unlike the people of Lobaha (Bonnemaison 1972a:105), do not regard intra-moiety marriage with horror or consider it to be incestuous.

The Longana were polygynous. The men who married within their matrimoiety were likely to be either poor men with few resources who would have to take any woman that was available, or ambitious men of many resources and growing renown. An ambitious man, or an established political leader (ratahigi), would take wives from his own moiety for protection.

Members of the moiety opposite to one's own are not trusted, a fact that contributes to some marital tension in Longana. In particular, a leader feared that his wives not of his moiety might try to poison him, especially if some of these women were close relatives of a rival leader. Consequently, an ambitious man would take at least one wife from his own moiety to prepare food for him. If he was a man of renown, he would designate a same-moiety spouse as his matagoro -- a special wife whose

exclusive duty it was to attend the leader.

Longana say that leaders did not have intercourse with a matagoro. However, matagoro did conceive. A pregnant matagoro was secluded during pregnancy, and it was claimed that her infant had been discovered in the bush. The infant was assigned to the moiety of its mother, and a new descent category, or matriclan (duvi), was created for it.

Thus intra-moiety marriages were not considered incestuous, nor were marriages within a descent category absolutely forbidden. The genealogy of a leader who claims several men of renown in his ancestry shows that, out of seventy-nine marriages on his chart, sixty are between members of opposite moiety, nineteen are intra-moiety marriages, and there are two marriages in which the husband and wife are of the same matriclan. By comparison, the genealogy of a man who claims one illustrious forbear shows that, out of fifty-nine marriages, three are between members of the same moiety, and one is between members of the same descent category.

A man who had wives of same and of opposite moiety could produce offspring of both moieties. Such children call one another "siblings". The Longana place special value on the sibling of opposite moiety relationship, known as bababulu.

The Longana say that bababulu siblings are

closer than siblings born of the same mother. One's bababulu siblings can be counted upon for support when even true siblings may fail. A bababulu sibling, although he is not of one's moiety and descent category, is entitled to the same rights as a sibling who is born from the same mother as oneself.

The Longana no longer practise polygyny, yet bababulu relationships flourish for two main reasons. First, a man may have as many as three or four wives over the course of a lifetime, and one of these women may be of his own moiety. Any children that the latter has by this man, and any children that she has had from a previous union, will be bababulu siblings to the children of his previous, or later, wives.

Second, one's classificatory father may marry a woman of his own moiety. His children are one's bababulu, although this relationship must be cultivated by treating one's classificatory bababulu as if he or she is the offspring of one's genitor.

I have characterized the Longana matrilineal descent category (duvi) as a non-corporate clan. Extensive justification for this is given in further sections of this dissertation. For the present, I note only that the Longana matriclan is not, and was not, a collective person with respect to property, or in an ideological, ceremonial, or political sense.

Apart from a rule that one ought not to marry within one's own clan, -- and this rule can be circumvented -- descent categories do not regulate marriage. Although one's spouse should be of the opposite moiety, one is free to select a spouse from any descent category.

In the past, the Longana practised infant or child betrothal (W. Rodman and M. Rodman 1978) and the right to bestow a child in marriage rested with the child's father. The Longana say that a man would try to follow the rule of moiety exogamy when looking for a spouse for his son, but the overriding criterion was the reputation of the girl's parents as industrious people who would raise their daughter to be a reliable wife and mother (W. Rodman and M. Rodman 1978).

Because a man's sister's children may claim some of his land upon his death, sometimes at the expense of his own children, a man may try to meet his obligations to his matrilineal descendants and to protect his sons' claims to his parcels of land by arranging a marriage between one of his sons and a woman of his own descent category. That is to say, a man may try to arrange for one of his sons to marry a woman whom his son classes as a father's sister (e.g. son's father's sister's daughter). In so doing, a man hopes to (1) ensure amicable relations between his own matrilineal descendants and his sons,

(2) ensure that his sons will not meet strong opposition from his matrikin when his sons lay claim to his plots of land, and (3) ensure that some of his grandchildren will be his own matrilineal descendants, and thus will be in a strong position to receive some of his land.

Apart from the practise just described, and the rule of moiety exogamy, the matriclan affiliations of the potential spouses of one's children are unimportant when one is arranging their marriages. Furthermore, a marriage does not imply any obligation for future marriages between the clans of the couple. The Longana say that it is advantageous to have one's siblings and offspring take spouses from as many descent categories as possible, thereby increasing the support that one can receive from ties of affinity to many sibling sets of different clans.

The structure and function of the graded society (hungwe) in Longana politics has been studied extensively (see especially W. Rodman 1973, 1977). The hungwe has been defined as: ". . . a secular hierarchy of ranks achieved by the slaughter of progressively more valuable tusked boars" (W. Rodman 1973:1).

Attainment of the second highest rank (mabu) in the graded society makes a man eligible to become a political leader (ratahigi). A leader must also be articulate, modest, sensitive to the wishes of others, and have a reputation for generosity. A high ranking man

without these qualities is unable to attract followers.

A leader's sphere of influence is limited (W. Rodman 1977:527). Essentially, a ratahigi can count on his kin, his co-residents, and the residents of hamlets close to his own for support. Other hamlets within his own parish may or may not support him depending upon their interests, and depending upon the amount of effort that the leader has invested in forging inter-hamlet alliances. Beyond his own hamlet cluster and parish, a ratahigi's influence can diminish greatly.

Relations of kinship have little to do with the making of a ratahigi (see also Bonnemaïson 1972a:95). A father is expected to raise his sons through the minor childhood ranks of the graded society out of affection, and out of a desire to teach them the intricacies of the hungwe (W. Rodman 1973:157-165). A man's brothers will aid him with pigs in the lower adulthood ranks. But, commencing at the middle ranks of the hungwe, boars of the appropriate tusk development become more difficult to obtain, and one's network of kin will not be able to provide the core of support necessary to obtain the requisite number of boars. As a man climbs the rungs of the hungwe, he becomes more dependent upon his skills in investing boars in the rank-takings of others, and upon political alliances that he is able to form with highly ranked men. At the higher ranks of the hungwe,

genealogical information is unreliable for trying to understand why donors present boars to an aspirant. ↘

In the past, political leaders could legitimately use physical coercion to enforce their will (W. Rodman 1973:529). This is no longer possible. However, a ratahigi retains his traditional role as a mediator of disputes in the district.

Although the colonial government appoints men who are not qualified by high rank in the hungwe to mediate disputes and to report serious offences, such men, known as assessors, do not usurp the traditional rights of a ratahigi to preserve the peace, nor do they become serious political rivals of traditional leaders. The traditional leaders have allied with the assessors, thereby gaining access to the coercive sanctions of the colonial government (W. Rodman 1973:278-286, 1977). ↗

Thus, traditional leaders have successfully adapted to the injection of a foreign legal system into their traditional polity, and the graded society remains a vital institution in modern Longana. The survival of the hungwe is due also to the fact that the development of coconut plantations in Longana did not threaten the pig husbandry upon which the graded society depends (Allen 1969:12, 145; W. Rodman 1973:59-61).

Pigs are units of wealth controlled by men. Mats, woven exclusively by women, are units of wealth

controlled by women. The pig and mat spheres of exchange are bridged primarily in the ritual slaughter of pigs by women. This ceremony is known as dure (see M. Rodman 1976, 1980).

A woman kills untusked pigs when she is a child and on the eve of her wedding. She may also take rank in the graded society by killing a tusked boar either by itself or together with untusked pigs. However, some women never take rank in the graded society, and it is rare that a woman exceeds the highest of the minor, or childhood, ranks of the hungwe (M. Rodman 1976:12-14, 34; W. Rodman 1977:528).

Fundamentally, dure ceremonies have to do with the establishment of marital relationships and with exchanges between siblings of opposite sex. A man, by contributing pigs to his daughters' dure ceremonies, is able to repay his sisters with pork for the mats that they contributed to his wedding exchange. Because the dure ceremony is intimately associated with the cross-sex sibling relationship, I will examine it in more detail in later sections of this dissertation.

→ Mats, vital to wedding exchanges, cannot be exchanged for money, nor can money serve as a substitute for mats in ceremonial prestations (M. Rodman 1976:51). Thus, in Longana, the two foundations of ceremonial exchange, mats and pigs, have not been threatened by the

development of coconut plantations and the subsequent involvement of the population with a cash economy. —

In the chapters that follow, I am concerned in the main with Longana tradition. However, I do not want to leave the impression that Longana is a backwater of conservatism.

The Longana have planted extensive areas of the coastal plain in coconuts. These plantations are all indigenously owned. There are no businesses owned by Europeans in the district. The Longana market the dried coconut meat, copra, through local cooperatives, use the services of a local entrepreneur, or deal directly with copra boats that call along the coast.

Cash from copra sales, or from labour on local plantations, may be spent on: four-wheel drive trucks, motorcycles, portable radios and tape decks, digital watches and European clothing; tinned fish, meat, vegetables, and bags of rice; kerosene for stoves, lanterns and generators; teakettles, pots, pans, and luggage; beer, wine, soft drinks, gum; building materials such as tin for roofing and concrete for European style houses; tuition for children attending local schools, or attending schools elsewhere in the New Hebrides, Fiji, or Papua New Guinea.

The Longana welcome change, yet temper their enthusiasm for adapting to the white man's ways with

concern for the future of their valued cultural heritage. They admire Europeans and their technology, yet they are critical of the white man's legacy in the islands and alert to the future possibilities for neo-colonialism. Longana desire economic development, but not at the expense of their Aoban identity. To date, these people have succeeded in maintaining their vital traditions while adapting to the white man's religion, government, and economy.

CHAPTER THREE

THE CONSANGUINEAL TERMINOLOGY

Introduction

In this chapter and the next I analyze the Longana system of kin classification employing concepts derived from the Longana theory of procreation. For analytical purposes, and clarity, the emphasis in this chapter is on the classification of consanguineals. In order to avoid confusion with the Longana concept of dai or "blood", my use of the term consanguineal, unless otherwise specified, will conform to the following definition (Keesing 1975: 148): a consanguineal is any ". . . relative by birth . . . as distinguished from in-laws ('affines') and step-relatives". According to this definition, my mother's brother is a consanguineal relative who may be described as mother's mother's son. But in Longana, ego's mother's brother is not a "blood" relative. The term dai ("blood") in Longana is applied only to ego's own offspring and sometimes to, but not beyond, ego's own grandchildren. Since one of the major conclusions of this dissertation is that a knowledge of the classification of spouses and affines is essential for understanding the distribution of consanguineal terms, this chapter and the

next, which analyzes the classification of spouses and affines, constitute a unit.

In the next section of this chapter, I argue that the terminology is a kin terminology. That is to say, the terms are ". . . premised on genealogical reference" (Scheffler and Lounsbury 1971:13). In the third section, I establish that the kin terminology is of Crow-type, and begin an analysis of the distribution of the terms. The classification of siblings and half-siblings is given more extensive treatment in the fourth section. In particular, I show that the Longana principle of descent is not associated with a notion that all members of a descent category share a common substance. In the fifth section I broach the problem of the classification of grandchildren and their offspring, and indicate the necessity for a knowledge of the classification of spouses in order to account for the alternative classifications for the children of grandchildren.

The kintype notation employed throughout this dissertation is common in the anthropological literature (Scheffler and Lounsbury 1971:78). The symbols are:
 F = father; S = son; C = child; B = brother; M = mother;
 D = daughter; Z = sister; GC = grandchild; GP = grandparent;
 H = husband; W = wife. Thus, for example, FBSD = father's brother's son's daughter. Glosses of Longana terms and phrases are enclosed in quotation marks.

Genealogical Connection and Terminology

Some anthropologists (e.g. Needham 1974:20) do not accept a definition of kinship by genealogical criteria, and others (Southwold 1971:36) are skeptical, in the light of what they consider inadequate evidence, that kin terms refer to genealogical connection. These anthropologists, like others before them (Lowie 1920; Hocart 1937) argue that there is an inherent circularity in classifying words as kinship terms: the anthropologist claims some words are kin terms because he is told by his informants, or observes, that ego may refer to his father or mother by a certain term, and therefore the anthropologist assumes or infers that the term of reference means "father" or "mother".

The anthropologist who makes this assumption betrays his ethnocentrism, for he does not consider the possibility that people of other cultures may categorize close relatives differently than do we (Southwold 1971:39; see also Bohannan 1966; Hocart 1937; Lowie 1920). In classificatory systems, the term which the anthropologist glosses as "father" also may be applied to persons who are not ego's father, e.g. father's brother, father's sister's son. The anthropologist either ignores the fact that two or more kin types are classed by the same term, or attempts to account for it by " . . . use of the ingenious evasion

of 'extension': the term which really means 'father' is extended to apply to all those other men" (Southwold 1971: 39).

But, the argument continues, if this were the case, an extended use of the term, that is, the application of the term to those who are not ego's father, should be marked ". . . by some qualification of phrase or tone to indicate an extended signification" (Southwold 1971:39). Since there is no logical reason why genealogically close and distant relatives within a category should be distinguished (Needham 1974:73) and there appears to be no ethnographic justification for the claim that they often are (Needham 1974:73; Southwold 1971: 40), one must assume that the theory of extensions is false. The terms refer rather to undifferentiated social categories which have nothing to do with genealogical status or cultural notions of procreation (Needham 1974: 40). These social categories are defined with reference to statuses which, it is claimed, are not genealogically ordered, such as marriageability (Needham 1962), generational status relative to ego (Bohannan 1966; Leach 1958), membership in corporate groups (Southwold 1971:52). The fact that the anthropologist can define these social categories genealogically is simply a convenient fact resulting from the ethnographer's ethnocentric method of description (Needham 1962:37, 1974:41).

Those who take the position just described correctly argue (Southwold 1971:40) that the appropriate evidence ought to be presented in order to justify the claim that a particular terminology is a system of kin classification and not a system of social classification. I argue that the terminology to be analyzed in this chapter is a system of kin classification, and I do so on the following evidence: customary observances of expectant and new parents which demonstrate an enduring connection between parents and offspring; the idea that parents equally contribute a unique substance (dai) to their offspring; and the fact that Longana do reckon degrees of genealogical distance within categories given in the terminology.

The Longana believe that sexual intercourse is necessary for conception. When a woman is pregnant, the woman and the physical father of the child follow customary observances which ensure the well-being of their foetus and the health of the newborn infant. A pregnant woman drinks coconut milk to prevent a sickly child. She should not eat crabs, for the crab may clutch the foetus and interfere with delivery; similarly, she should not eat eels, for they might wrap around the foetus and strangle it or hold it in the womb. An expectant father should not put his head under water when bathing in the ocean, for the father has to hold his breath in order to

do so, and the foetus' breath would be halted and it would suffocate in the womb. The child is born in a small hut and the mother and her child do not come out of the hut for ten days. During this time, only the father, his own children and grandchildren may come to see the child.

After a child is born, its father should not swim in deep water, for infants cannot swim and if the father drowns, the infant will die. When the father of a newborn infant leaves his child to go to his gardens, or to visit, he should drag a vine behind him. The vine, Longana say, is like an umbilical cord which attaches the infant to its father and prevents the small child from getting lost. Dragging the vine ensures that when the father returns, his child will be at home.

These customary observances of the mother and father of the child demonstrate an intimate connection between parents and offspring which is also evident in the principle of dai, or "blood". Only the physical father and mother of a child contribute to a child's blood as a result of sexual intercourse, and only the physical parents of a child may refer to that child as daingu , "my blood". Ego may refer to his or her own offspring as daingu, ("my blood"), in order to distinguish his or her own offspring (netui) from other children he or she classes as netui (e.g. netui tuengu: "child of my brother", male ego). Reciprocally, the real children

of ego may refer to his or her own parents only as tamai sibongu ("my real tamai") and ratahi sibongu ("my real ratahi"). Tamai, for the present, may be glossed as "male parent", and ratahi as "female parent".

Others in the class tamai may be referred to by qualifying phrases which distinguish these kin types from real tamai e.g., tamangu, hatie tamai sibongu ("my tamai, but not my true tamai"); tue tamai ("same -sex sibling of my tamai"(FB)); alai tamangu ("sister's child of my tamai"). Similarly, one may distinguish between one's own ratahi (M), tubui (GP), vagabui (GC); retue (siblings), and others classed by the same term. Consequently it is reasonable to claim that the Longana distinguish between genealogically close and more distant members within a category.

The distinction which the Longana draw between close and more distant relatives is based upon the concept of dai (blood), which is rooted in the Longana theory of procreation. Ego's physical parents are the only tamai and ratahi who contribute to ego's blood, or substance, and half of ego's blood or substance comes from each parent. Although tue tamai (FB) and tue ratahi (MZ) share a portion of ego's substance if they are full-siblings of ego's tamai and ratahi, ego's substance is the unique product, shared only with his own full-siblings, of the sexual union of those to whom he refers as tamai sibongu

and ratahi sibongu. Thus, it is not ethnocentric to assert that the latter terms refer to the unique genealogical relationship established by procreation and the inheritance of dai, and that the terms ratahi sibongu and tamai sibongu may be glossed as "my own, or true, mother" and "my own, or true, father". It follows then that others to whom ego refers as tamai (e.g., FB) and ratahi (e.g., MZ) are not the primary referents of the terms in their narrowest senses.

In sum, the terminology refers to classes of kin (tamai, ratahi, etc.) within which degrees of genealogical distance are distinguished, and the common use of relative product definitions to mark these distinctions within kin classes (e.g., tamai sibongu (F); tue tamai (FB, FMZS); alai tamai (FZS, FZDS, FMZDS)), indicates that each of the constituent kin categories (e.g., alai tamai) within each class, and thus the kin class itself, are defined with reference to the genealogically closest member (primary referent) of the class. The terminology is anchored in Longana notions of procreation and genealogical connection, and is therefore a system of kin classification. Further evidence for this conclusion can be found throughout this chapter.

The Terms

The Longana terms of reference, including terms for spouses and affines, are given in Table 2 below. The consanguineal terms for male and female ego are diagrammed in Figures 3 and 4. The terminology embraces the entire population.

On inspection, this terminology readily falls into that type which anthropologists designate as "Crow" (Scheffler and Lounsbury 1971:14-15): F = FB = FZS = FZDS etc.; FZ = FZD = FZDD = FZDDD etc.; a man's BC and MBC are classified with his own C; and a woman's MBC are classified with her BC.

The Longana believe that father and mother contribute equally to their child's blood (dai). Full-siblings are thus of identical blood, or substance. The term daingu ("my blood") is often used to distinguish ego's own children (netui) from others he or she may classify as netui ("child"): a man may refer to his own children as daingu, and to his BC as netumaru ("my brother's and my child"). BC and ZC are not of the same dai as ego.

Ego's own siblings are members of their mother's moiety subdivision or descent category (duvi). For a male ego, duvi includes the matrilineal descendants of his Z, and all matrilineal descendants of his MMM and her same-sex

TABLE 2

TERMS OF REFERENCE

Key: ♂ : terms used by male ego.
 ♀ : terms used by female ego.
 If ♂ and ♀ signs are absent, the terms are used by either sex. Uninflected stems are used throughout.

tamai F, FB, FZS, FZDS, FZDDS, FZDDDS, etc.; FMZS, FMZDS, etc.; FFBS, FFBDS, etc.; FFZSS, FMB, MH, MZH; ♂ : SSS, BSSS, MBSSS; SWBS; ♀ : DSS, ZDSS, BSSS, MBSSS, H of any netui.

ratahi M, MZ, MMZD, MMMZDD, MFBD, MFZSD, MFZDSD, FW, FBW.

ratahi* FMZ, FMZD, FMZDD, etc.; FZ, FZD, FZDD, FZDDD, etc.; FFBDD, FFBDD, etc.; FFZSD; ♂ : SSD, BSSD, MBSSD, SWBD, FZHBW; ♀ : DSD, BSSD, ZDSD, MBSSD. Ratahi* is used throughout this dissertation to avoid confusion with ratahi (M).

bui M only (diminutive of tubui).

tokaure MB, MMB, MMMB, MMZS, MMMZDS, MFBS, MFZSS, MFZDSS.

tue ♂ : B, FMBS, FFBSS, FBS, MZS, FZSS, FZDSS, MBDSS, MBSDS, DSD, DSS, SDS, ZDDDS, FFZD, ZHF, WZH; ♀ : Z, MZD, FZSD, FZDSD, MBDS, SSD, BDS.

tokagi Any tue older than ego.

tehi Any tue younger than ego.

hangu ♂ : Z, MMZDD, FMBD, FFZD, MZD, FBD, FZSD, FZDSD, MBDS, MBSDD, ZDDDD, SDD, DHZ, SWZ; ♀ : B, FBS, MBDS, BDS, SSS, W of any hangu.

alai ♂ : ZC, ZDC, ZDDC, ZDDDC, FBDC, FBDDC, FZSDC, MZDC, MZDDC, MBDC, DSC, SDDC, ZHBC, DHZC, SWD.

netui ♂ : C, BC, BSSC, FBSC, MBC, MBDDC, MBSSC, MZSC, MZDSC, MMZSC, MMBC, MMMZSC, MMMZDSC, MMBC, FZSSC, FBDC, ZSC, ZDSC, ZDDSC, ZDDDC, DDC, SSC, SDSC, WM, ZHC, DHC, SWBC, WZC; ♀ : C, SSC, DDC, BSDC, BDS, MBSDC, MBDC, FZSDC, FBDC, ZC, ZSSC, MZDC; netui gagumaresu: BC, DSC, SDC, BSSC, BDDC, MBC, MBSSC, MZSC, MMZSC, MMBC, MMMZDSC, MMMZSC, MMMBC, MBDDC, FBSC, FZSSC.

TABLE 2 -- CONTINUED

vagabui ♂ : DC, BDC, MZSDC, MBDC, FBSDC, ZSDC, W of ego, tue, alai, or vagabui gogona; ZHZ, WZ; vagabui gogona: SC, BSC, MZSSC, MBSC, FBSSC, W of all netui; ♀ : SC, SDC, ZSC, ZSDC, BDC, BDDC, MBDC, MBDDC, MZSDC, FBSDC, FBDSC; vagabui gogona: DC, SSC, ZDC, ZSSC, BSC, BDSC, FBDDC, MBDC.

Also, anyone two or more generations junior to male or female ego.

tubui FM, FMB, FMZ, MF, MFB, MFZ, MFZC, MFZDC, MFZDDC; tubui gogona: MM, MMZ, MMM, MMMZD, FF, FFB, FFZ, FFZC, FFZDC.

Also, anyone two or more generations senior to ego.

halai ♂ : H of all hangue and alai; ZHB.

huri H of all real or classificatory FZ (ratahi*), FZHB (if married to a ratahi*).

bweli ♂ : H of all netui and vagabui; WF, WFB, ZHF, DHB, DHZC; ♀ : W of all netui, vagabui, vagabui gogona and netui gagumaresu; H of all vagabui and netui gagumaresu.

bababulu Half-siblings who share a common father and whose mothers are of opposite moiety to one another.





FIGURE 3

KIN CLASSIFICATION: MALE EGO.



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FIGURE 4

KIN CLASSIFICATION: FEMALE EGO

siblings. The matriline descended from Z is given a special term (alai) which is marked for three generations: alai (ZC), alailimbogi (ZDC), alailimbolimbogi (ZDDC); ZDDDC are siblings (tue and hangue) and ZDDDDC begin the alai cycle again. The reciprocal of alai is tokaure (MB) and this term is applied upward three generations by male and female ego to MB, MMB, and MMMB. A female ego has no alai: the children of her B (hangue) are netui gagumaresu ("children to eat"); and her junior duvi mates are her C (netui), DC (vagabui gogona) etc. Alai (ZC, male ego), tue (same-sex siblings), hangue (opposite-sex siblings) and tokaure (MB) are all classed by Longana as siblings, retue. The class of siblings is discussed in more detail in the third section of this chapter.

Grandparents (tubui) and grandchildren (vagabui) of same moiety as ego are distinguished from those of opposite moiety by adding the term gogona ("sacred") to those of same moiety: vagabui gogona. Also, grandparents and grandchildren may be distinguished by sex: tubui mera ("male grandparent"); tubui vavine ("female grandparent").

Ego's FZ is referred to as ratahingu bulengu toa ("my mother, my fowl") the root of which is ratahi (M). The addition of the phrase bulengu toa distinguishes this woman as being of the opposite moiety to ego. If the

context is clear, the phrase bulengu toa may be dropped and ratahi alone may be used. Ultimately, the Longana explain the qualifying phrase bulengu toa by reference to the customs associated with this woman. These customs will be described in Chapter Five. Since the uninflected stem for FZ is ratahi, I shall write FZ as ratahi* in order to avoid confusion with ratahi (M).

Father's alai (FZC) are father's siblings; consequently ego refers to the matrilineal descendants of FZ as ratahi* and tamai (F). This line of ratahi* and tamai, ego's father's duvi (descent category), continues in unbroken succession from FZ and FMZ. Ego's MFZ is a tubui, (grandparent), and her matrilineal descendants are tubui because ego's MFZ's uterine descendants are ego's MF's siblings (alai). Similarly, ego's FFZ is a tubui gogona ("sacred" grandparent), and so are her matrilineal descendants.

Tubui is a term that has four meanings. First, tubui can mean "mother" in the sense of genetrix. The diminutive bui is applied as a term of reference to ego's own mother to distinguish her from others classified as ratahi. Second, tubui may be used to refer to an old woman, or anyone who is two or more generations senior to ego. Third, a man with children may refer to his F as tubui remaresu ("their, my children's, grandfather").

There is an element of respect involved: tubui remaresu is interchangeable with tamargai remaresu, tamargai being applied to one who is elder and wise.

Fourth, tubui may also be applied strictly as a term of genealogical relationship. One's genealogically defined grandparents are: MM, MMZ, MF, MFB, MFZ and her uterine descendants; FM, FMZ, FF, FFB, FFZ and her uterine descendants. Although the classification of MM and MMZ as tubui is genealogical, in that the reciprocal for DDC and ZDC is vagabui, the Longana also frequently refer to MMB and MMMB (tokaure) as tubui. This is a generational use of the term, since MMB never refers to his ZDC as vagabui; ZDC is alai.

Consequently, the Longana point out that the term tubui can refer to real grandparents (tubui sibongu), or it can "cover up" other genealogically based terms such as ratahi* (FZ), ratahi (M), tamai (F), tokaure (MB), that may be applied to relatives two or more generations senior to ego. This will become more clear in Chapter Four, as it depends upon the problem of how the Longana classify children of vagabui (GC).

It is evident from Figures 3 and 4, and from Table 2, that not all of those classified as ratahi (M), tue (same-sex sibling), hangue (opposite-sex sibling), alai (ZC) or tubui gogona are going to be of ego's

descent category (duvi), although they will be of ego's moiety if moiety exogamy is practised. Similarly, not all those classed as ratahi* (FZ), tamai (F) and tubui (GP) are going to be of ego's father's descent category, although they should be of opposite moiety. All those of opposite moiety to ego (havara, "their side") are referred to as retamanda ("our fathers") by a male and a female ego; male ego may also use renetunde ("our children"). All those of same moiety (havangu, "my side") are referred to as retuanda ("our siblings").

Obviously the term retue ("siblings") has a wide range of meanings, from ego's own siblings (retue sibongu) up to and including all those persons of same moiety as ego. The classification of siblings is sufficiently important to merit separate treatment. I begin with the most restricted sense of the term retue and move toward its broadest meaning.

The Classification of Siblings

A woman's dai will refer to one another as retue sibongu ("true" or "real" siblings) because, as the Longana say, they are "born from one mother". At this level, mother (ratahi) is excluded from the category retue, and so is her brother (tokaure); this man is not descended from ego's mother. ZC are not retue sibongu because ZC are not of the same substance (dai) as ego and his Z; ZC

and their MB are the offspring of different procreative pairs. Nevertheless, ego and his ZC are descended from one mother, ego's mother, even if they are not, strictly speaking, retue sibongu. Consequently, a male ego can refer to his alai (ZC) as retue, because they are all descended from ego's mother, and ZC can reciprocate. At times, one may hear a Longana refer to, or address, his tokaure (MB) as tokagi (elder brother). The Longana regard this as serious talk, for in effect it ignores the fact that ego and his MB are not retue sibongu. Thus Longana males terminologically equate a woman's brother and her offspring as siblings of one another. This is a ← characteristic feature of Crow kinship terminologies (Scheffler 1972a:126; Keesing 1975:115).

The children of MZ are not of the same dai as ego; they are not born from one mother. However, MZC are members of ego's mother's descent category (duvi). From MB's point of view, his M (ego's MBM) is the lineal ancestress of ego's M and ego's MZ; they and their offspring are retue to MB, and therefore ego and MZC are retue to one another. Even so, if pressed for clarification when referring to his MZC as retue, a male ego will add: "not my real siblings" (hatie retue sibongu), and will note that MZC are siblings by virtue of their descent from MZ (tue ratahingu). Offspring of other ratahi of ego's duvi are simply classed as "siblings of my mother's descent category" (retue,

duvi ratahingu). Offspring of ratahi not of ego's descent category (duvi) are classed simply as retue, with the phrase "not of my mother's descent category" (hatie duvi ratahingu) added if clarification is needed. The patterning is similar for a female ego, but those classed as "child" are not retue at this level of meaning. In addition, a female ego has no alai: the children of an opposite-sex sibling are "children" (netui gagumaresu).

Ultimately, of course, all members of ego's descent category (duvi) are descendants of the same woman, or mother. Hence, all members of the same descent category are classificatory siblings. At its widest meaning, the term retue includes all members of the same moiety. It is here that grandchildren (vagabui) and grandparents (tubui) become incorporated as retue. At this level, retuanda ("our siblings") is synonymous with havangu ("my side; my moiety"). Since all persons of same moiety as male ego are retuanda ("our siblings"), all those of opposite moiety are retamanda ("our fathers"), or renetunde ("our children"). However, the Longana never equate mothers (ratahi) or children (netui) with siblings (retue) for the purposes of reckoning their offspring.

The distinction of being "born of one mother" can be expanded to include all members of ego's duvi (descent category) and moiety. All of the uterine descendants of a common ancestress are siblings. This is

of course a concept of descent. But the importance of being born from one mother is coupled with the Longana concept of blood (dai) or substance, half of which comes from each parent. This means that the substance of a woman rapidly diminishes in each generation of her descendants. Thus, in Longana, descent is not conceived as a sharing of identical substance by all uterine descendants of an ancestress. I shall return to this point in Chapters Six and Seven.

Half-siblings are classed as retue. Half-siblings born of the same father are usually distinguished from full-siblings with a qualifying phrase such as: ratahine, hatie ratahingu ("his mother is not my mother"). Ego and his half-siblings will not be "true" siblings (retue sibongu) to one another. What ego and his half-siblings share is the same substance (dai) from their common father only.

Should ego's father take another wife of opposite moiety to ego's mother, this second wife is still a ratahi (M) to ego, and her children, although of opposite moiety, are still retue to ego. These opposite-moiety half-siblings are given a special term, bababulu, which can be glossed as "to stick" or "to tie up". Although ego's opposite-moiety siblings (retue)

share with ego only the dai of their father in common, as do half-siblings of same moiety, the bababulu relationship is of special significance. Classificatory bababulu are the offspring of any woman of opposite moiety to ego who is married to any man whom ego classifies as tamai (F).

The Longana also distinguish those retue ("siblings") who are born from different fathers. Father's own brother's wife (ratahi) may be of same moiety as ego's mother, but of different descent category (duvi). If ego's F and FB are retue sibongu to one another, ego's FBC will share the same amount of dai or substance that ego inherits from his F, and FBC will be siblings (retue) by virtue of their descent from father's same-sex full-sibling. For example, an informant may state that a sibling is "not a true sibling" (hatie tue sibongu), and then specify that his sibling is a "child of my father's brother" (netui tue tamangu). Likewise, the children of all men of father's descent category (duvi) are siblings. But the Longana distinguish these latter retue from siblings who are children of "true" fathers and siblings who are children of FB (tue tamai); they are more distant retue ("siblings"), children of someone who is simply "of my father's descent category" (duvi tamangu). Since not all tamai are of ego's father's descent category, ego has siblings (retue) who are not children of his father's descent category, and they can

also be distinguished. Although the Longana can and do distinguish siblings as being "born from different fathers", they are more likely, in this matrilineal system, to initially use the "born from a different mother" distinction for those retue ("siblings") just discussed.

I began this discussion of siblings with the statement: "A woman's dai will refer to one another as retue sibongu ('true' or 'real'siblings) . . .". This is the way in which my informants defined true siblings for me. Yet they also recognize that siblings born from the same mother may have different fathers. Such half-siblings will not be of identical substance because only half of their substance, from their mother, is held in common. Nevertheless, informants insisted that in this case birth from the same womb is more important than difference in substance: half-siblings who share the same mother are retue sibongu ("true siblings)". This may be rhetoric; it needs further investigation. For the present, I cannot freely gloss retue sibongu as "full-sibling".

In more typical circumstances, retue sibongu also share the same father and thus are usually full-siblings as well. Henceforth I shall restrict myself to the ideal situation: whenever I use retue sibongu it shall be understood that I imply also that such siblings are, in anthropological parlance, full-siblings.

The Longana distinguish true siblings, half-siblings and more distant classificatory siblings on the basis of genealogical connection and genealogical distance from the primary referents of the terms for physical parents. This section provides further evidence for the argument I made at the beginning of this chapter: the terminology is a system of kin classification.

The Classification of Grandchildren and the Children of Grandchildren

The classification of grandchildren (vagabui) and the children of grandchildren is a major ethnographic problem of this dissertation. This issue cannot be settled until the next chapter. Here I will provide some preliminary information on the classification of grandchildren, and detail the indeterminacy in the classification of the children of grandchildren.

Ego's CC contain one-quarter of his or her dai ("blood"). When questioned as to whether vagabui (GC) are dai, informants may answer in the affirmative but quickly point out that grandchildren (vagabui) are not really dai due to the dilution of blood; or informants may categorically deny that grandchildren may be called daingu ("my blood") while at the same time pointing out that grandchildren are very close to being dai. As a genealogical relationship, vagabui is a fuzzy category

standing on the border of the Longana concept of consanguinity. And vagabui gogona (grandchildren of same moiety), while not quite dai, not necessarily of ego's duvi (descent category) if ego is male, nor of the same blood as are ego and his or her full-siblings, are nevertheless included in the category retue (siblings). Vagabui gogona are frequently referred to by the Longana as tehi (younger sibling) when determining the classification of their offspring.

The patterning of kin terms for the children of grandchildren for both men and women is shown in Figure 5. It is assumed that ego and all his descendants take spouses from the opposite moiety. Knowing that grandchildren of same moiety (vagabui gogona) are classificatory siblings (retue) helps to explain some of the terms for their offspring. For male ego, the fact that SS is a classificatory sibling accounts for the classification of SSC as netui (C). But this leaves the alternate classification of SSC as tamai (F) or ratahi* (FZ) unexplained. SD is a retue (classificatory sibling) and her offspring are classificatory retue. But there is a problem here: if SD = retue = hangué (Z), why aren't her children classed as alai (ZC)? Furthermore, DSC are tue (B and Z) or alai (ZC). It doesn't seem likely that under some circumstances DS = F, in order to account for his offspring being tue (siblings), and

under other circumstances DS = Z, in order to account for his offspring being classed as alai (ZC). Since DSC are the same moiety as DSW, it would seem more reasonable that DSC are classed following the classification of DSW.

There are similar problems with the classification of children of grandchildren for a female ego. In particular, the alternates for a woman's SSC suggest that these descendants are being classed according to the classification of SSW.

The suggestion that the selection of spouses by grandchildren can influence in some manner the ← classification of ego's CCC receives reinforcement when one considers that the selection of spouse by male ego can affect the classification of his offspring. Figure 5 has been made on the assumption that moiety exogamy is practised throughout. But should a man marry a woman of his own moiety, and his descendants follow the rule of moiety exogamy, his DC will be grandchildren of the same moiety as ego (vagabui gogona), SC will be vagabui, and the patterning of terms in the next generation will be the reverse of that shown in Figure 5 (see Figure 6). That is to say, the classification of the descendants of ego cannot be predicted, beyond one generation, from a knowledge of the consanguineal terminology alone. The influence of the classification of spouses and affines on the consanguineal terminology is the subject of the next




FIGURE 5

THE CLASSIFICATION OF CHILDREN OF GRANDCHILDREN

chapter.

Summary and Conclusions

I reserve a full discussion of the Longana system of kin classification until the end of the next chapter. However, the following statements may be made at this point. First, the terminology described herein is a system of kin classification. I am not saying that the terminology refers solely to relations of genealogical connection as they are posited by the Longana. Instead, the terms refer to genealogical relationships, and hence they can be called kinship terms. —

Second, the kin terminology, in its general features, conforms to a type which anthropologists call Crow. The terminology equates a woman's children and her brother as siblings. This feature has been called the "nucleus" or the basic distinguishing feature of the Crow-type terminologies (Keesing 1975:115). The nucleus of the Longana Crow terminology is given closer scrutiny in Chapter Five. In addition, I have indicated that the principle by which a ZS is equated as sibling with his MB is a result of a descent principle, commonly expressed in terms of being "born from one mother", or born from the same womb. This descent principle is cross-cut by the Longana doctrine of blood (dai) in a manner such that all members of the same descent category

(duvi) are not of identical substance, or blood.

Finally, I have indicated that the classification of the descendants of ego cannot be predicted from a knowledge of the consanguineal terminology alone; a knowledge of how the spouses of ego and his or her descendants are classified is also necessary. It is to that subject which I now turn.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE CLASSIFICATION OF SPOUSES AND AFFINES

Introduction

In this chapter I solve the problem of indeterminacy in the classification of third generation descendants. In doing so, I shall show that the Longana system of classifying spouses and affines is essential for an understanding of the consanguineal terminology.

In the second section of this chapter I will briefly deal with the classification of the spouses of ego's consanguineals who are not ego's descendants or the descendants of anyone classified as ego's same-sex sibling (e.g., B, MB, ZS, male ego; Z, female ego). Then I will examine the system by which male and female Longana classify their spouses and the spouses of their descendants, and demonstrate that this system accounts for the alternate classification of the children of grandchildren.

In the third section I show that the system for classifying spouses of descendants for men is separate from, though related to, that for women. In the fourth section I mention some other aspects of the referential terminology which make the system difficult to isolate and analyze. In the final section I summarize the

findings of this and the previous chapter, and discuss the theoretical implications of the data examined so far.

The Classification of Spouses

The spouses of ego's F and spouses of all those classed as F (tamai) are ratahi (M). The spouses of ego's M and all those classed as M are tamai (F). The spouses of ratahi* and all those classed as ratahi* (FZ) are huri ("to follow"). The spouses of all tubui (grandparents) are tubui.

A male ego classifies his spouses and the spouses of all those classed or equated with same-sex siblings (B, MB, ZS, ZDS, etc.), as vagabui (grandchild). ZH, ZDH, ZDDH, etc., are classed as halai. The term is self-reciprocal; WB = halai.

A female ego classes her spouse and the spouses of all those she classes as same-sex siblings (Z) as tubui. The spouses of all those classed as opposite-sex siblings (hangue) are equated with opposite-sex siblings, hangue (BW). BSW, and BDH are classed as netui (child).

The Longana use two modes for classifying spouses of one's descendants. I shall call these two modes the general mode and the specific mode. Informants often use these two modes interchangeably. Both modes make use of the uninflected stems for consanguineals listed in Table 2 of Chapter Three.

The more general mode of classifying one's spouse and the spouses of one's descendants frequently uses the stems of kin terms embedded in a phrase to mean e.g., "the father of . . ." or "the mother of . . .", or "the child of . . .". For example, a man may use the phrase: tamai netui vagabui ("father of child of grandchild") to refer to his granddaughter's husband in the general mode of affinal classification.

The specific mode of classifying spouses and affines uses the inflected forms alone, as they are used for referring to consanguineals. For example: tamangu ("my father"), refers to consanguineals (F, FB, etc.) and also refers to an affine (DH, female ego) in the specific mode of affinal classification.

The general mode of classifying spouses masks the more specific, more complex method of classifying spouses and affines. For example, a DSW may be tubui lo valei vagabui ("woman [mother] of grandchild's house"; general mode, male ego), but she is also, in the specific mode, a hangue (Z), or a ratahi (M), or an alai (ZD). But these alternate classifications are not simply DSW's pre-marital classification. In the specific mode, a male reclassifies his spouse as vagabui (GC) at marriage, regardless of her pre-marital classification, and, reciprocally, a female reclassifies her husband as tubui.

This custom ultimately accounts for the fact that there are two or more terms for the spouses of some of ego's descendants and two or more terms for some of ego's third generation descendants.

I will examine only the specific mode of spouse and affinal classification, since it is the key to the problem of the classification of ego's third generation descendants. The more general mode which ego uses to classify his or her spouse and the spouses of descendants may be found in Appendix A.

(a) Male Ego

All of the males who marry ego's opposite-moiety descendants are equated with siblings (retue). Given this, and the fact that all males reclassify their spouses as vagabui, a model may be constructed which should predict the terms of reference that ego will apply to the spouses of his children and grandchildren.

The model will be partially successful when tested against the data, but by showing where and why the model errs, I can use the model as a didactic device to give an orderly account of the intricate and often subtle system for the classification of the spouses of ego's descendants, and to solve the problem of the classification of children of grandchildren. I invented the model when I conducted

my research in order to sharpen my inquiries. The corrections that I make to the model result from an analysis of my informants' responses to it. The model is presented in Table 3. The logic that I used to construct the model may be found in Appendix B.

The model is only partially successful at predicting the reclassification of ego's SSW, and it is wrong totally for predicting how DSW will be classified (see Figures 7 and 8). We might expect, since SS is vagabui gogona, and thus is structurally equivalent to a younger sibling (tehi) for the purposes of reckoning kin, that SSW would be reclassified the same as ego's W or his BW. She usually is, provided that SSW is not a "close" ratahi* (FZ). Should ego, his brothers, or his son marry a FZ, ego will reclassify her as a vagabui or vagabui gogona. But SS is not of the same blood as ego, nor is he, strictly speaking, ego's dai. Thus should SS marry certain women of ego's father's moiety subdivision (duvi), ego will be obliged to continue to refer to SSW as ratahi*, and her children, ego's SSC, will be ratahi* (FZ) and tamai (F). But there is an exception to this rule, and it concerns what is meant by a "close" ratahi*.


First, a "close" ratahi* must be of ego's father's moiety subdivision for the rule to apply. Second, she must be classed as hangue (Z), or alai (ZD, ZDD, or ZDDD) by ego's father for the rule to apply. Should ego's SS

TABLE 3A MODEL FOR THE CLASSIFICATION OF SPOUSES
OF DESCENDANTS; MALE EGOW = vagabuiDH = tueWB = vagabuiSSW = vagabuiZH = tubuiSDH = netuiWF = tueDSW = vagabui gogonaWM = netuiDDH = tueSW = vagabui gogona

W: 1. Any kin class → 2. VAGABUI

SW: 1. Any kin class → 2. VAGABUI GOGONA

SSW: 1. NETUI
 TUBUI
 VAGABUI } → 2. VAGABUI
 RATAHI* → 2. RATAHI*



1. = pre-marital classification of spouse.
 2. = post-marital classification of spouse.

FIGURE 7

A MAN'S CLASSIFICATION OF THE SPOUSES OF HIS DESCENDANTS, TRACED THROUGH HIS SON

DSW: 1.

VAGABUI GOGONA
 RATAHI
 TUBUI GOGONA
 HANGUE (Z) } → 2. RATAHI
 ALAI (ZD) → 2. HANGUE (Z)
 ALAI (ZDD, ZDDD) → 2. ALAI (ZD, ZDD)
 HANGUE (ZDDDD) → 2. ALAI

1. = pre-marital classification of spouse.
 2. = post-marital classification of spouse.

(IF DSW = 2. RATAHI)
 (IF DSW = 2. HANGUE)
 (IF DSW = 2. ALAI [ZDD])
 (IF DSW = 2. ALAI)




FIGURE 8

A MAN'S CLASSIFICATION OF THE SPOUSES OF HIS DESCENDANTS, TRACED THROUGH HIS DAUGHTER

marry a woman of ego's F's duvi whom ego's father classifies as, e.g., ZDDDD (hangué), but whom ego nevertheless classifies as FZ (ratahi*), the rule does not apply, and FZDDDD, or any uterine descendant of this woman, will be reclassified as vagabui by ego should she marry ego's SS, and ego's SSC will be classified as netumaru, "children of mine and my brother's".

The model predicted that DSW will be reclassified as vagabui gogona. But Longana never refer to her as such. There are good reasons for this. First, ego reclassifies SW as vagabui gogona, and we might expect that this classification would be reserved for ego's SW, or for the wife of anyone classed as S (netui) by ego. Second, DS is a vagabui and therefore is not strictly speaking dai to ego, whereas ego's S is. From my data, this woman (DSW) is never referred to as vagabui gogona; indeed, there is a rule for reclassifying DSW which effectively eliminates the possibility that she will be classified the same as SW.

The rule for the reclassification of DSW operates in such a manner that, with the exception of DSW being a ratahi (M) before her marriage, DSW is given the classification of her female relative who is one step closer, lineally, to ego, and the classification of DSC follows from the postmarital classification of DSW (see

Table 4). Note that, although all those classed as ratahi (M) are siblings in the widest meaning of the term, ratahi are never equated with siblings for the purposes of reckoning their offspring. Siblings, however, may be reclassified as ratahi (M).

It is with respect to the classification of DSW that what I have called the specific mode of classifying spouses comes to a fieldworker's attention. When I asked for the classification for DSW, Longana males gave first the more general term: tubui lo valei (plus name), and then quickly pointed out her more specific classification, or they proceeded directly to the specific classification of DSW.

The more general mode is most frequently used for the male spouses of descendants. In the specific mode, all of the males who marry ego's opposite-moiety descendants are equated with siblings, retue. That DDH is tue (B) is reflected in the term of reference for his children: DDC is referred to as netumaru: "my brother's and my child". Thus DDC is classified not with reference to DD (unless she happens to be, through intra-moiety marriage, a vagabui gogona), but in reference to DDH who is same moiety to ego. Just as ego's BC are netumaru, so are ego's DDHC netumaru.

The model predicted that SDH would be reclassified as netui at marriage. My data confirm this,

TABLE 4

THE RECLASSIFICATION OF DSW (MALE EGO)

<u>Pre-marital Classification</u>	<u>Post-marital Classification</u>	<u>Offspring (DSC)</u>
<u>vagabui gogona</u> (GD)	<u>ratahi</u>	<u>tue, hangue</u>
<u>ratahi</u> (M)	<u>ratahi</u>	<u>tue, hangue</u>
<u>tubui gogona</u> (GM)	<u>ratahi</u>	<u>tue, hangue</u>
<u>hangue</u> (Z)	<u>ratahi</u>	<u>tue, hangue</u>
<u>hangue</u> (ZDDDD)	<u>alai</u>	<u>alai</u>
<u>alai</u> (ZD)	<u>hangue</u>	<u>alai</u>
<u>alai</u> (ZDD)	<u>alai</u>	<u>alai</u>
<u>alai</u> (ZDDD)	<u>alai</u>	<u>tue, hangue*</u>

* The offspring of a ZDDD (alailimbolimbogi) are always tue (B) and hangue (Z). Thus, should the pre-marital classification of ego's DSW be the same as that of one of his uterine descendants, ego's classification of his DSW's children conforms to the principles for classifying the children of his uterine descendants: the offspring of hangue are alai, and the offspring of alai are, with one exception, alai.

but the classification of SDH has no influence on the classification of SDC: SD is vagabui gogona, a grandchild of same moiety as ego, and she is therefore equivalent to a sibling (tue) for classifying her offspring. Thus SDC are tue and hangue.

This raises an interesting question: if SD is a classificatory sibling (hangue), why aren't SDC alai (ZC)? I have noted that the offspring of ZDDD (alailimbolimbogi) are also tue and hangue. Although ZDDD is a tue, and therefore equivalent to a Z (hangue), ZDDD is three times removed from ego, and Longana say that this genealogical distance makes ZDDD a very "weak" sister. That her offspring are tue (B) and hangue (Z), and not alai (ZC) is indicative, Longana say, of the dilution of the "blood" of ego's Z by three generations of in-marrying males. One might suspect, therefore, that SD (vagabui gogona) is structurally the same as a ZDDD for the purposes of classifying her offspring, since the offspring of ZDDD and SD are classified as tue (B) and hangue (Z). But ZDDD and SD are not equivalent as classificatory siblings.

Alai are the uterine descendants of ego's Z; they are not the result of ego's procreative relationship, as are ego's grandchildren. This applies even if ego's SW is ego's alai (ZD, ZDD, etc.), for the Longana say that ego's "line" or duvi is "broken" if his child procreates

with ego's Z or her children. Offspring of this marriage will be grandchildren of same moiety (vagabui gogona), not alai (ZC). Whereas all of the uterine descendants of ego's Z are siblings born from one mother, ego's grandchildren of same moiety are siblings (retue) only in the widest sense of the term.

Thus informants will state that SD, as a classificatory sibling of opposite sex (hangué), is not as "strong" a sister as ZDDD. Some informants say that, strictly speaking, SDD should not be classified as hangué (sibling of opposite sex); rather, she is, like her mother, simply a tue in the broadest sense of the term and to signify this, SDD should be classified as tue like her brother, not as hangué (Z). I found no disagreement with this opinion, but, most informants insisted that the classification of SDD as hangué is appropriate, even though it is not precise.

The Longana argue that grandchildren of same moiety are not "strong" siblings by reasoning from the notion of descent (being born from one mother). Analytically there are two crucial reasons why these descendants of ego occupy an equivocal status, at least for the purposes of classifying their offspring.

First, all grandchildren contain but a small proportion, one-quarter, of ego's "blood". But because

they can be called daingu, my "blood", they are somewhat like ego's children (netui), and the status of SC as siblings is correspondingly weakened. Second, one-half of the substance of grandchildren comes from ego's children's spouses. So grandchildren are like affines as well. Indeed, the Longana say that grandchildren of same moiety can be thought of as tokaure (MB), tehi (younger B), ratahi (M), alai (ZC), or hangue (Z), depending upon the pre-marital classification of SW, although informants add that these more specific terms of reference should not be used.

As lineal descendants of ego, vagabui gogona are almost like dai, almost affines. By virtue of this mix their status as siblings is weakened and this is reflected in the classification of their offspring. The Longana say that a female vagabui gogona (grandchild of same moiety) always produces "weak" siblings (retue) because of her status as a female, but the children of a male vagabui gogona (SSC) are not always classed as children (netui): the status of SS as sibling, for purposes of classifying his offspring, is overridden when a SS marries a ratahi* (FZ) and SSC will be classed as FZ and F.

(b) Female Ego

The model for the classification of spouses of the descendants of a female ego is presented in Table 5. This model was designed in the field and checked with informants. The logic that I used to construct the model may be found in Appendix C.

I have sufficient data to support, with one exception, the predictions made for the classification of spouses of children and grandchildren by a female ego. The exception is the classification of BW as vagabui. Since a male ego reclassifies his W as vagabui one would expect a woman to reclassify BW as grandchild (vagabui) as well, but this is not the case. The spouses of all those classified as hangue (B, MB) by a female ego are referred to as hangue (B) or gahoraingu ("mine to send"). Although both men and women refer to MB as tokaure, MB is an opposite-sex sibling (hangue) for a female ego. The wife of a MB and the descendants of MB are classified exactly the same as for a hangue (opposite-sex sibling). The children of all hangue are netui (C), but of opposite moiety: netui gagumaresu ("child to eat").

One might expect, therefore, since DS is a grandchild of same moiety as ego (vagabui gogona) and DSC can be netui gagumaresu (BC), that DS is like an opposite-sex sibling, and his spouse also will be

TABLE 5

A MODEL FOR THE CLASSIFICATION OF SPOUSES OF
DESCENDANTS: FEMALE EGO

H = tubui

DH = tamai

HZ = tubui

SW = vagabui

BW = vagabui

SSW = vagabui gogona

HM = tubui

SDH = netui

HF = tubui gogona

DSW = vagabui

DDH = tubui

classed as hangue, as is BW. The former is true, but the latter does not occur.

The status of grandchildren is ambiguous, and the situation is similar to that for a male ego. Vagabui (grandchildren) are almost dai, almost affines. Consequently the status of grandchildren of same moiety as siblings is weakened as it is for male ego. Although vagabui gogona, for a female ego, are born of the same mother as she, this does not appear to enhance the status of grandchildren of same moiety as siblings. I conclude that, because of the equivocal status of DS (vagabui gogona) as retue, he is not of the same status as those classed as opposite-sex siblings (hangue), and this accounts for the fact that DSW is not classified as BW. But it does not account for the classification of BW as an opposite-sex sibling (hangue). This matter must be left until Chapter Five, where I shall show that the classification of BW as B is partly a consequence of the brother - sister social relationship.

The reclassification of SW as vagabui (grandchild of opposite moiety) is the result of HM being reclassified as tubui (grandparent of opposite moiety). The spouses of all male uterine descendants of a female ego may be reclassified as vagabui, and there is no contradiction with the classification of SW = DSW as there is for male ego. As a consequence, there is no shunting of the spouses of grandchildren by a female ego in order to

overcome the contradiction of classifying the spouses of two non-equivalent kinsmen by the same term. Since there is no contradiction within the model, what is the cause of the alternate terms for the children of grandchildren?

Informants adjust the model to social reality (see Table 6). For example, an informant, when I asked her to classify the hypothetical spouse of SD replied: "He should be a netui (C), but if he is a hangue (B) I can't change it". Grandchildren are at the borderline of dai, and here the classification of ego's grandchild's spouse may override the model. If this should occur, ego may have to classify her great-grandchildren following the pre-marital classification of her grandchild's spouse.

Grandchildren's spouses who are classified as grandparents of same moiety (tubui gogona) and grandchildren of same moiety (vagabui gogona) before marriage are equated with siblings (tue or hangue) for the purposes of classifying their offspring. Thus, grandchildren's spouses who are of same moiety as ego are children (netui), mothers (ratahi), or siblings (tue, hangue). Following these rules, the classification of the children of grandchildren for a female ego is given in Table 6.

Ego classifies the offspring of SC according to the pre-marital classification of SC's spouse, or by equating as siblings the spouses of SC whom ego classifies

TABLE 6

THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE CHILDREN OF
GRANDCHILDREN: FEMALE EGO

<u>Relative</u>	<u>Pre-marital Class. of Spouse</u>	<u>Offspring</u>
SS	<u>vagabui gogona</u> (= <u>tue</u>)	<u>netui</u>
	<u>tubui gogona</u> (= <u>tue</u>)	
	<u>tue</u>	
SD	<u>ratahi</u>	<u>hangué, tue</u>
	<u>netui</u>	<u>vagabui gogona</u>
	<u>netui</u>	<u>vagabui</u>
DS	<u>hangué</u>	<u>netui gagumaresu</u>
	<u>vagabui gogona</u> (= <u>hangué</u>)	
	<u>tubui gogona</u> (= <u>hangué</u>)	
DD	<u>vagabui</u>	<u>netui gagumaresu</u>
	<u>tubui</u>	
DD	<u>ratahi*</u>	<u>ratahi*, tamai</u>
	<u>tamai</u>	<u>netui</u>
	<u>vagabui</u>	
	<u>tubui</u>	

as grandchildren or grandparents, of same moiety, before their marriage to SC. DSC are normally netui gagumaresu (= BC) unless DSW is a ratahi* (FZ) to ego. This situation is similar to that for the classification of the offspring of SS for a male ego, and needs no further comment. The classification of DDC is determined solely by the status of DD as the equivalent of a sibling (tue) and thus there are no alternate terms for DDC.

Consequences of the Reclassification of Spouses

Men and women have different systems for classifying the spouses of their descendants and the children of grandchildren. Although the two systems are related to one another in that men reclassify their spouses as grandchildren (vagabui) at marriage, and women reciprocate by reclassifying their husbands as tubui (grandparent), the net result is two separate and independent systems for the classification of the spouses of one's descendants. A woman does not find it necessary to shunt the spouses of her grandchildren in order to avoid classifying the spouses of two or more non-equivalent kinsmen by the same term.

Consequently, with the exception of DDC, a woman classifies her CCC differently than does her spouse (Table 7). Moreover, ego and his spouse classify CCC independently of one another. That is, with the

TABLE 7

THE CLASSIFICATION OF GRANDCHILDREN'S SPOUSES
AND CHILDREN OF GRANDCHILDREN

<u>MALE EGO</u>				<u>FEMALE EGO</u>			
<u>GC's Spouse</u>	<u>Class. of GC's Spouse</u>	<u>GC's C</u>	<u>Class. of GC's C</u>	<u>GC's Spouse</u>	<u>Class. of GC's Spouse</u>	<u>GC's C</u>	<u>Class. of GC's C</u>
SSW	<u>vagabui</u> <u>ratahi*</u>	SSC	<u>netui</u> <u>tamai,</u> <u>ratahi*</u>	SSW	<u>tue</u> <u>ratahi</u> <u>netui</u>	SSC	<u>netui</u> <u>tue, hangue</u> <u>vagabui gogona</u>
SDH	<u>netui</u>	SDC	<u>tue,</u> <u>hangue</u>	SDH	<u>hangue</u> <u>netui</u>	SDC	<u>netui gagumaresu</u> <u>vagabui</u>
DSW	<u>hangue</u> <u>alai</u> <u>ratahi</u>	DSC	<u>alai</u> <u>alai</u> <u>tue,</u> <u>hangue</u>	DSW	<u>vagabui</u> <u>tubui</u> <u>ratahi*</u>	DSC	<u>netui gagumaresu</u> <u>netui gagumaresu</u> <u>tamai, ratahi*</u>
DDH	<u>tue</u>	DDC	<u>netui</u>	DDH	<u>tamai</u> <u>vagabui</u> <u>tubui</u> <u>netui</u> <u>(gagumaresu)</u>	DDC	<u>netui</u> <u>netui</u> <u>netui</u> <u>netui</u>

exception noted, one cannot predict, from a knowledge of how ego classifies a child of a grandchild, what ego's spouse's classification of that descendant will be. For example, regardless of a male ego's classification of SSS, ego's wife may classify her SSS as B, C, or GC of same moiety. How ego's wife classifies SSS is determined solely by how she classifies SSW. Similarly, with the exception of the pair MMM and MMF, one cannot predict, from the knowledge of how ego classifies one of his consanguineals three generations his senior e.g., FFF, how ego will classify that consanguineal's spouse (FFM).

For a female ego, the children of an opposite-sex sibling (hangue) are netui gagumaresu ("children to eat"). This means that a woman has netui (C) of same moiety as she, her own children, and netui of opposite moiety, her brother's children. But a woman does not classify her brother's descendants as she does her own. The interesting result of this is that a woman classes the descendants of her BS as she does the descendants of her D, and she classifies the descendants of her BD as she classifies the descendants of her S (Figure 9). Why she does this cannot be explained solely on my analysis of the terminology so far. I shall return to this problem in Chapter Five.

Because opposite-sex siblings classify each

other's descendants differently (Figure 10), the logic of the system sometimes generates alternate terms for a woman's third generation descendants, but her cross-sex sibling will classify these descendants by one term only. Consequently, within each of the four descent categories (duvi) related to ego through ego's parents (the duvi of ego's M, MF, F, FF), all generationally senior males are classed by one term, but all generationally senior women are not. Furthermore, sometimes ego will not class these women as siblings of their brothers (Figures 11 to 14).

It appears that ego may be equating generationally senior women of his own descent category as siblings -- of one another in alternating generations, since M = MMM (Figure 11), and a female ego equates generationally junior women of her descent category as siblings to one another in alternating generations, since GD = sibling, D = DDD (Figure 9). In Chapter Five, I demonstrate that actually a female ego is covertly equating her offspring with herself, and hence as her siblings. Because the demonstration of this requires evidence from the affinal and consanguineal terminologies, normative statements from informants, and because it is crucial to the MB - ZS social relationship, I postpone further discussion of the subject until Chapter Five.




FIGURE 9

A WOMAN'S CLASSIFICATION OF HER DESCENDANTS
AND HER BROTHER'S DESCENDANTS





FIGURE 10

THE CLASSIFICATION OF A CROSS-SEX SIBLING'S DESCENDANTS




FIGURE 11
EGO'S MOTHER'S DUVI




FIGURE 12
EGO'S FATHER'S DUVI




FIGURE 13

EGO'S MOTHER'S FATHER'S DUVI




FIGURE 14

EGO'S FATHER'S FATHER'S DUVI

Also, it appears that a male ego may be equating alternate generations of his patrilineal kin, but these equations may be masked four generations below and above ego's generation by the effects of the system of spouse classification for a man's descendants.

I will fully examine the classification of opposite-sex siblings' spouses in the next chapter, but I think that two observations concerning that custom are appropriate here.

First, ego classes FZH as huri ("to follow"), and a male ego's F classes his ZH as halai, a term which is self-reciprocal: $ZH = WB = \text{halai}$. Ego's F classes all of the children of his halai (ZH) as alai (ZC). Since halai is self-reciprocal, one might expect that ego's FZH (huri), who refers to ego's F as halai, classes ego as alai (ZC). But there is no uniform reciprocal of huri. If WB is married to one's Z, then WBC is alai, but if WB marries a woman who is not one's Z, then WBC may be classed as tue (B) and hangue (Z) or ratahi (M) and tokaure (MB), for example.

Similarly, there seems to be no uniform reciprocal for MBW. My data on this point show that HZC are classified as BC, GP, GC. I suspect that part of the cause of this collection of terms for HZC is that a woman may classify HZC according to the classification of HZH. If HZH is a hangue (opposite-sex sibling) to his

WBW, then she will class HZC as BC. The term tubui for HZC was given by males, and is the reciprocal of a male classifying MBW as W: vagabui (GC) by her HZS. I have no data indicating that HZC are classed as hangue (Z) by their MBW. I suspect that the classifications of MBW as hangue (opposite-sex sibling) by a female ego, and vagabui (GC = W) by a male ego are formalities, and do not require uniform reciprocals. That seems to be the case too for the classification of FZH (huri) and WBC.

Second, ego's FZ and M classify one another as opposite-sex siblings (hangue) and thus opposite-sex siblings become ego's opposite-moiety mothers (ratahi*, FZ; ratahi, M). But why do these women classify one another as opposite-sex siblings? Are WB and ZH (halai) also classifying one another as opposite-sex siblings? The system of spouse and affinal classification, itself the solution to the conundrum of the classification of grandchildren, offers its own riddles. I shall answer them in the next chapter.

Other Aspects of the Referential Terminology

There are other aspects of the referential terminology which make it an extremely dynamic system. Variations in the terminology may be determined by context. An anthropologist who points to a man's elder

brother and asks: "Who is that man?" may receive the reply: "My elder brother" (tokangu). Or, the answer may also be: "The father of our (the two of us) children" (tamai netumaru). The difference in the responses is connected to two factors: the status of B as a married man with children, and the status of elder brother as a man to be respected.

How this system works is best illustrated by starting with two unmarried brothers. The younger will refer to the elder as tokangu. Should elder brother marry, he is referred to as tamai ("the father of . . ."). For example, should younger brother approach elder brother's wife to ask the whereabouts of elder brother, the term of reference will be: tamai netumu ("the father of your child"), if elder brother has no children; as tamai Tari if elder brother has a child named Tari. To refer to elder brother as tokangu in this context is a sign of disrespect for him. This is clearly an example of the use of a term of reference being conditioned primarily by the quality of the relationship between two kinsmen. But the case of terms of reference for ego's sister is not so simple.

As soon as male ego's hangue (Z) becomes married, she is no longer referred to as hangue. As a married woman with no children, Z becomes netui halangu ("child of my sister's husband"); after she has borne children,

Z is referred to as renetui halangu ("the children of my sister's husband"). Such terms are not dependent upon the behaviour of a man's Z to ego, but upon her status as a married sister with or without children. In addition, the term of reference for a sister also depends upon the moiety affiliation of the questioner. Should a Takaro man enquire of a Merambuto man concerning the latter's sister, "Who is this woman?", the latter will reply with: "Your child" (netumu). As one informant explained it: "You tell him netumu. She is the same as their child, but she is my sister. This man knows this. As soon as I say netumu to him, he thinks: 'Oh, this woman is this man's sister'".

In order to analyze the Longana system of kin classification, I have had to ignore such changes in the terms of reference. The traditional line diagrams displaying the Longana terminology in these pages thus contain a fiction at the most elementary level: strictly speaking, the children of a man's Z (hangué) are not alai; alai are the children of ego's married Z, and ego must not refer to her as hangué after she is married.

Furthermore, I have prepared Figure 3, in Chapter Three, which displays the consanguineal terminology for male ego, by transposing the system for classifying the children of grandchildren to the matrilateral segment of the line diagram. Similarly, Figure 4, Chapter Three,

which shows the consanguineal terminology for a female ego, has been prepared by transposing the system for classifying the children of grandchildren of an opposite-sex sibling to the matrilateral segment of the diagram. The Longana agree that the descendants of a MB are classed according to the same principles as one's own descendants, if one is male, or according to the same principles as one's opposite-sex sibling's descendants, if one is female. But the distribution of kin terms on these diagrams is contingent upon the assumption that no kin types displayed on the diagrams intermarry, either within their own moiety or following the rule of moiety exogamy. For example, a man's son may properly marry ego's MBSD or MBSDD, and should that occur, MBSDD, for example, would be assigned affinal status by ego because she is a more distant kinsman by genealogical reckoning than is ego's son. The line diagrams which display the consanguineal terminologies for male and female ego, Figures 3 and 4, Chapter Three, are really fictional, for they are models which never appear in toto in genealogies due to such correct marriages and intramoiety marriages. But to try to account for the Longana system of kin classification without ignoring changes in the terms of reference and without the assumptions just described would be like trying to describe the dynamics of a rising wisp of smoke.

Summary and Conclusions

The problem of the classification of children of grandchildren is not a trivial one for the Longana: because this is a Crow system of kin classification, and since there is no genealogical limit to the application of the terminology, a Longana is likely to have such relatives his own age with whom he may interact.

To simply ask a Longana how he or she would classify the children of grandchildren is to ask the impossible. The most frequent response is vagabui ("grandchild"). Such a response is correct, but it is simply the generational use of the term: vagabui may be applied to all of ego's descendants who are three or more generations junior to ego. Or, one might get the reply: netui vagabui ("child of grandchild") which is merely a literal translation of the kin type.

Before an anthropologist, or a Longana, can predict the classification of these descendants of a hypothetical ego, there are four crucial things he or she must know. First, one must know if ego and all his descendants follow the rule of matrimoiety exogamy. Second, the moiety affiliation of the spouse of vagabui ("grandchild") is required. Third, one may be required to know the pre-marital classification of the spouse of the grandchild. Fourth, one must know the rules,

where they apply, for the reclassification of spouses. Additional information may also be required: for the spouses of some grandchildren, e.g. SSW, male ego, the descent category (duvi) of the spouse, and whether she is genealogically close to ego, are important factors.

The Longana classification of the children of grandchildren is not a trivial problem for anthropologists either. This system of kin classification exists in contradiction to Scheffler's generalization (1972a:117) that spouse and affinal relationships are not essential for the study of systems of consanguineal classification:

. . . systems of affinal or in-law classification are structurally dependent on systems of . . . consanguineal classification, and the criteria and rules a system employs in the classification of kin types may or may not be employed in the classification of affinal relationships. Therefore, systems of . . . [consanguineal] classification may be compared without reference to their associated systems of affinal classification (Scheffler 1972a: 119).

My examination of the Longana data shows that the system of affinal classification is not structurally dependent upon the system of consanguineal classification. Indeed, I have shown that an understanding of the rules for classifying spouses and affines is essential for an understanding of how consanguineals are classified.

Furthermore, I showed also that a study of the classification of affines can contribute to our understanding of the status of certain consanguineals in the terminological system. Grandchildren of same moiety are almost one's affines, almost one's children, because they contain one-quarter of one's blood. Hence their status as sibling for the purposes of reckoning their offspring is critically ambiguous. And without knowing the rules for the classification of affines, the Longana classification of the children of grandchildren would be incomprehensible. The Longana terminology is based upon a system of consanguinity and affinity, and it is difficult to see how the Longana consanguineal terminology, which is Crow, can be compared with others of the type without taking into account the system of classifying spouses and affines.

My conclusion that the Longana system of consanguineal classification refers to relationships of consanguinity and affinity is as yet based solely upon the classification of the children of grandchildren. In the next chapter, I will demonstrate that affinal relationships are of fundamental importance for the understanding of Longana kinship.

CHAPTER FIVE

CHILDREN OF BLOOD, CHILDREN OF SHAME: CONSANGUINEAL AND AFFINAL CLASSIFICATION, SEXUAL IDENTITY, AND SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS

Introduction

In the last two chapters, I examined the Longana system of consanguineal and affinal classification without bringing into the analysis data from observed or normative behaviour. In this chapter I begin to shift the focus from the study of the terminology alone to an examination of the social relationships which the Longana associate with the terms. I do so by considering three problems that cannot be solved from a study of the terminology alone. First, why do the Longana reclassify their spouses as they do? Second, do men classify the spouses of their opposite-sex siblings as opposite-sex siblings, as do women? And if so, how can this be possible? Third, why is it that a woman classifies the descendants of her BS as the descendants of her D, and the descendants of her BD as the descendants of her S? I will show that an answer to the first question is essential to the solution of the second and third problems, and has relevance to the MB - ZS relationship as well.

The next section of this chapter provides the reason why the Longana reclassify their spouses as they do by introducing a part of the Longana theory of procreation that has not as yet been discussed. The Longana have a narrative that accounts for the creation of men and women, the origin of the consanguineal and affinal terminologies, and the beginning of procreation. This narrative, to which I refer as the Longana story, or theory, of human reproduction, identifies the first woman as a sibling who had male and female sexual identities and lays down the rules for appropriate behaviour between cross-sex siblings.

These last two facets of the Longana story of human reproduction are crucial for solving the riddle of the classification of the spouses of cross-sex siblings, which is discussed in the third section. In that section I relate the classification of spouses and siblings' spouses to the story and, in particular, I show that the spouse of one's cross-sex sibling is a sibling of same and of opposite sex, as was the first affine.

The fact that certain Longana can have a dual sexual identity with respect to certain others, a phenomenon associated with their story of human reproduction, is relevant to the MB - ZS relationship, and it is also relevant to a woman's classification of

and her social relationship to her BC. These topics are discussed in the fourth section.

In the fifth and final section I draw together the results of this chapter and discuss their methodological and theoretical implications. In particular, I argue that, in the Longana case, one cannot discover the mode of consanguineal and affinal classification from an examination of the terminology alone.

The Longana Story of Human Reproduction

The Longana believe that women become pregnant as a result of sexual intercourse and that both parents contribute equally to the substance of the child. But the Longana "theory" of human reproduction is more extensive than this: these basic propositions are related to a more inclusive theory, expressed as a narrative, that explains how it is that men and women came to be different from one another and the circumstances under which children came to be born. Because of the importance of the Longana account for this and later sections of the dissertation I give the story in some detail.

The first section of the story is an edited version of the same tale told to me on different occasions by various informants. I recount it as if it were given by one informant:

When Tagavui made Aoba, he created ten brothers. These men were not fully human, as you and I. There were no women at this time.

The eldest of the ten brothers was the leader of the group. He feared that, when he and his siblings were dead, there would be no more people. "How", he wondered, "can we make future generations of people?"

One day, the nine younger siblings were playing with an orange. The leader asked them to stop, but his brothers ignored him. Angered by his brothers' disrespect, the eldest picked up a stone and threw it at his brothers. The stone struck one of the men and mutilated his genitals. The wounded man became transformed into a woman, but of course they didn't know what she was, for no one had seen a woman before.

The woman was shocked and embarrassed by her sudden injury and transformation. Unable to comprehend what had happened to her, she fled, weeping, trying to hide herself from her brothers. Several times her brothers called for her to join them but she refused. They offered her food, but she would not take it. They built a house for her so she could sleep by herself.

Later, the eldest sent one of the other brothers to fetch the woman. She said to him: "Oh, hanguengu ('my cross-sex sibling') I cannot join you". The eldest sent each of the others to his sister, but she wouldn't come, calling them in turn: tokarengu ('my mother's brother'); netungu ('my child'), vagabuingu ('my grandchild') -- all these words for relatives originated in this manner, except for ratahingu bulengu toa ('my father's sister'). That came later, after there were lots of people.

Finally, the eldest decided to go to the first woman. He took some food and offered it to his sister. She said: "Oh, tubui ('grandfather'), enter and give me my food".

The others told the eldest that he and the first woman should live together. So the eldest cohabited with the first woman. In this way procreation became possible, and the two produced many offspring, our ancestors.

At this point there are many versions telling of the offspring of the first man and woman to live together. But all are essentially the same: the first woman cohabited only with the one whom she called tubui. Her offspring were thus a set of siblings, confronted with the same problem as before: how could they ensure future generations? Thus brother procreated with sister and parent procreated with child. Later they decided that this was not good, so they prepared a taro pudding, placed it on a leaf, and cut the pudding down the center. All those on one side of the pudding ate together, as did all those on the other side. After they ate, coconuts were divided into two piles. Those who ate together drank together. In this manner the population was divided into two halves, one named Takaro, the other half named Merambuto. Since they had decided that men should not procreate with their own siblings and offspring, it was decided that men should take their wives from the other moiety. Because women bear the children, children would be of their mother's moiety.

The story tells of the creation of the first woman from a set of male siblings; the separation of females from males and avoidance between brother and sister; the establishment of the kin terminology; the cohabitation of the first female with her tubui, which coincided with an acceptance of food from this male only;

and the birth of children from the union of this pair. With the establishment of an incest tabu and exogamous matrimoieties, the beings became fully human and the form and principles of Longana society were established.

But what should be noted first is the fact that the origin of the kinship terminology and the first procreative relationship are inextricably conjoined. The Longana story of human reproduction suggests that the kinship terminology is based upon a system of consanguinity and affinity. And, as did the first procreative pair, present day Longana men and women become tubui and vagabui to one another at the time they initiate a procreative relationship. The Longana say that all men should marry grandchildren (vagabui), as did the first man to establish a procreative relationship with a woman. Because of the system of spouse reclassification, all men do.

The story of reproduction has relevance beyond the contemporary reclassification of spouses in Longana. There are visible manifestations of this story in the social relationships between members of the opposite sex. Because the social relationships between siblings are important for what follows, I will briefly discuss them here and show how they are rooted in the Longana story of reproduction.

Between siblings there is a norm of solidarity and generalized reciprocity. Within the sibling set two important distinctions are made: relative age and sex. As with the first sibling set, the eldest male sibling has a position of authority with respect to his junior siblings. He may discipline and punish a recalcitrant junior sibling.

Opposite-sex siblings, upon reaching maturity, must avoid one another, as did the first woman with respect to her cross-sex siblings. Men fear menstrual blood: pollution by it can cause men to lose their breath and die. Unmarried sisters should live separately from their brothers. Men, in the past, lived in the men's house (gamali) upon reaching puberty, and their unmarried sisters resided with their mothers. Today, in many hamlets, one often finds bachelors living together in a small house; their unmarried sisters are living with their parents. An adult should not enter the house of an opposite-sex sibling.

Adult cross-sex siblings were, in the past, very tabu to one another, and were subject to elaborate avoidance customs designed to avoid sexual contact, some of which may still be observed today. The Longana characterize these avoidances, in pidgin, as "shame" (sem). In Aoban, the appropriate word is mai-mai, the meaning of which recalls the first cross-sex sibling

relationship. Mai-mai has meanings ranging from shyness and embarrassment, to respect and deference. I shall use the term avoidance when referring to the meanings associated with mai-mai.

I wish to temper my description of the avoidance patterns characteristic of the cross-sex sibling social relationship with the observation that, due to missionization, coeducation, and the influence of European folk-ways in general, these avoidance practises are disappearing among the younger generation. However, the sudden appearance of a sister on a path, or inside a house, can still cause a young man considerable discomfort.

Should a man accidentally meet his sister on a path, she should detour into the bush and turn her back to her brother, for she should not come close to her brother, nor touch him, nor look upon his face. A woman may not eat food which her brother has killed, prepared, or carried from his gardens, although she may go to her brother's gardens and take produce for her own use.

It is forbidden for a man to use his sister's name, and he must not look for his sister if he wants to talk to her; a man should ask a mother, a father, or a wife to send a message to his sister that her brother wishes to speak to her. When a sister approaches

her brother to speak to him, she does not use a term of address; she stands at a distance, hangs her head in deference, and her brother talks to her quietly and soberly. If a woman must go to another village, her brother may accompany her, but she walks a good ten to fifteen paces behind her brother. A woman, whatever her age, is always subordinate to her adult male siblings.

The embarrassment, the shame, the deference, the avoidance of physical contact with an opposite-sex sibling and avoidance of contact with food which has been prepared or carried by an opposite-sex sibling -- all of these characterize the initial shock accompanying the act which created the first sister. That act, an accident, was the result of the anger of the oldest sibling at being disobeyed by his youngest brother. It was overcome only by the establishment of a procreative union between the first sister and her eldest brother.

The first sister was also the first woman, and women and men should, like the first woman and men, avoid one another. At feasts, at church and afterwards, men and women form separate groups. They do not walk down the road together. Young women travel together, and the men do the same. If a man and his wife walk together, she walks behind at a respectful distance. Men eat with men, women with women and children. Women were not allowed in the men's house.

This separation of the sexes in general is disappearing today. Young men and women mingle at school and at western-style dances. However, hovering at the edges of the dance are concerned parents, few of whom extol the virtues of this white man's custom. It is said by the elders and the middle-aged that familiarity between the sexes will inevitably lead to sexual relations. These in turn will spoil arrangements made for the marriage of offspring at their birth or shortly thereafter. In addition, informants point out that it was customary, and many feel it still should be, for unmarried youth to be kept ignorant of sexual intercourse until their wedding night. Sexual intercourse, outside of marriage, was forbidden (tabu).

The Longana story of human procreation has relevance for Longana today. All men reclassify their wives as yagabui (grandchild) just as did the first husband. He too was a grandparent (tubui) to the first wife, who was also his sibling. The Longana story of procreation is the base (gaidumo) from which the system of consanguineal and affinal classification comes. Similarly, the avoidance between cross-sex siblings today is rooted in the reactions of the first cross-sex siblings to one another.

The avoidance between cross-sex siblings is important for what follows. But so is another,

perhaps more crucial, point: the first opposite-sex sibling was created accidentally from a man. Tagavui, the creator, did not make a separate, purely female being for the purposes of procreation. As a transformed male, the first woman had both male and female principles, she had two sexual identities. Because of her male sexual identity, she was a same-sex sibling to her brothers, and they to her. Because of her female sexual identity, she was an opposite-sex sibling to her brothers, and for the same reason, they were opposite-sex siblings to her. Although the men had only one sexual identity, they could be both same and opposite-sex siblings to the first woman, because she had both sexual identities.

Thus the first procreative pair were siblings, and each was of same and of opposite sex to the other. I shall show that a knowledge of this, and of the avoidance relationship between opposite-sex siblings, are critical factors in approaching the remaining subjects of this chapter.

The Classification of Spouses and Siblings' Spouses

(a) Male Ego

Because a man reclassifies his wife, and her sisters, as grandchild (vagabui) at marriage, one would expect that WB would be so classified. But such is not

the case. A man and his WB refer to one another as halai. The Longana say that, when applied to ZH, halai means "my sister together with the man with whom she cohabits".

Since both ZH and WB refer to one another by the same term, what is the relationship between them? Frequently the Longana emphasize that halai are like brothers. A ZH or a WB can be counted upon to provide aid and protection without payment. But halai are also like opposite-sex siblings to one another. This first came to my attention when I observed two men walking down a path, one ten to fifteen paces behind the first. The second man, walking behind the first where one would expect a woman to be, was married to the first man's sister.

In Longana, a man equates his cross-sex sibling's spouse with a sibling of opposite sex. Thus, a man's ZH is a male "sister", a sibling with two sexual identities. In public, halai behave like cross-sex siblings: they speak soberly to one another, they must not touch one another, and they may not enter one another's house. In private, the pattern of avoidance may be lifted somewhat; halai may act toward one another in a manner appropriate to same-sex siblings.

When a man establishes a procreative relationship he becomes transformed, as it were, into a woman and a sibling with respect to his WB. A man's ZH is thus his

female cross-sex sibling and, because ZH is a man, the latter is also a male same-sex sibling. Conversely, a man's WB becomes transformed into his male cross-sex sibling and, because he is a man, WB is also a male same-sex sibling.

In short, halai, (WB, ZH) is a term that is self-reciprocal. The distinguishing feature of the relationship between halai is that one of the pair, ZH, is a female cross-sex sibling with respect to his WB, and the latter is a male cross-sex sibling with respect to his ZH.

(b) Female Ego

A woman classifies her H and his brothers as tubui ("grandparent"). However, a woman's HZ is not classified as tubui. A woman classifies her HZ as hangue, and HZ reciprocates: BW is hangue ("cross-sex sibling"). Behaviourally, a woman's HZ assumes the role of a male cross-sex sibling with respect to her. HZ may refer to ego as gahorai ("to send") or mai ("to come") as may ego's husband.

When a woman establishes a procreative relationship, her HZ becomes transformed into a sibling and a male. A woman's HZ is thus a male cross-sex sibling and, because she is a woman, HZ is also a female same-sex sibling. Conversely, a woman's BW becomes a

female cross-sex sibling and, because BW is a woman, BW is also a female same-sex sibling. That is to say, a woman's BW is a woman who is her cross-sex sibling and her same-sex sibling.

As an affinal term, hangué (BW, HZ) is self-reciprocal. The distinguishing feature concerning the relationship between these affines is that one of the pair, HZ, is a male cross-sex sibling with respect to the other, her BW, while the latter is a female cross-sex sibling with respect to her HZ.

(c) The Story of Human Reproduction and the Classification of Spouses and Siblings' Spouses

When ego marries, his or her cross-sex sibling becomes transformed into a male cross-sex sibling with respect to ego's spouse, and ego becomes transformed into a female cross-sex sibling with respect to his or her spouse's cross-sex sibling. It is possible to formulate this rule because of observations and inquiries concerning the appropriate behaviour between ego and his or her cross-sex sibling's spouse.

But why should this rule exist? Why, for example, does one's spouse's cross-sex sibling become one's male cross-sex sibling? Informants say that their story of human reproduction contains the essentials from which an understanding of their customs concerning kinship

may be derived. That story provides the key to a fuller understanding of the Longana classification of spouses and siblings' spouses.

The first woman established a procreative relationship with one of her siblings after she created the consanguineal terminology and the terminology for the classification of spouses. With respect to the latter, the first woman classed her sexual partner as tubui and became, therefore, vagabui to him, at the time their procreative relationship was established. Thus, the classification of spouses today refers to the initial procreative relationship between siblings who were of same and of opposite sex to one another.

The terminology for affines who are married to one's siblings also can be derived from the Longana story of reproduction. The original sibling's spouse was a same-sex sibling's wife, a woman who had also a covert male identity and who was a sibling to her spouse and her spouse's siblings. The first sibling's spouse relationship, like the first spouse relationship, was with a sibling of same and of opposite sex.

Today's custom of referring to one's same-sex sibling's spouse by the same term as does that sibling refers to the original affinal relationship: sibling's spouse. When the first woman classed her sexual partner as tubui, she became vagabui to her husband. Although

she had previously classed her husband's brothers with consanguineal terms, they were still fundamentally same-sex siblings to one another. There is a sense, then, in which a term that the first woman applies to one of her brothers applies to them all. Her sexual partner, and thus his brothers -- her spouse's siblings -- became her tubui, and she, the first sibling's spouse, became their vagabui. Hence, today, for a male ego, BW is vagabui and, for a female ego, ZH is tubui.

Phrased in another way, a person of opposite sex to oneself who establishes a procreative relationship with one's sibling is terminologically equated with one of the first sibling pair, i.e., as vagabui or tubui, who entered into the first procreative relationship. This alternate phrasing focuses upon the sex of the spouse of ego's sibling rather than on the relative sex of ego's sibling.

Shifting our focus to the sex of sibling's spouse relative to ego aids in the understanding of the relationship between ego and the spouse of ego's cross-sex sibling. In Longana, one's sibling's spouse who is of one's sex becomes equated with one's sibling of opposite sex, female. This derives from a second aspect of the relationship of sibling's spouse found in the story of human reproduction.

The first affinal relationship was between the

first woman and the siblings of her spouse, all of whom were male. From the point of view of one of these males, whom I shall call EGO, this woman, who represents the first sibling's spouse, was (1) originally of EGO's sex, and was (2) transformed into a person of opposite sex, a female, and was (3) a sibling. Therefore, the first sibling's spouse was a sibling of same and of opposite sex. Conversely, from the point of view of the first woman, EGO, who represents the first spouse's sibling, was (1) originally of same sex and (2) became, as a result of her transformation, of opposite sex, male, and was (3) a sibling. Thus the first spouse's sibling was a sibling of same and of opposite sex.

We can, from this aspect of the story of human reproduction, derive the rule for the classification of the spouse of one's cross-sex sibling and the cross-sex sibling of one's spouse. That rule, stated in full, is: any person who is of the same sex as oneself and who establishes a procreative relationship with one's sibling is transformed into one's sibling of opposite sex, female; and, conversely, the sibling of any person with whom one establishes a procreative relationship, and who is of the same sex as oneself, becomes transformed into one's sibling of opposite sex, male.

Thus, for a man, a sibling's spouse who is a male becomes a female opposite-sex sibling, and is ✎

therefore a sibling with two sexual identities to his ZH (halai) ; conversely a spouse's sibling who is a male becomes a male opposite sex sibling and thus is a sibling with two sexual identities to his WB (halai). For a woman, the same rule applies: a sibling's spouse who is a female becomes a female opposite-sex sibling (BW = hangué); and, conversely, a spouse's sibling who is a female becomes an opposite-sex sibling, male (HZ = hangué).

When examined in conjunction with the story of human reproduction, the rules for classifying the spouses of cross-sex siblings and the cross-sex siblings of spouses appear to recapitulate the creation of the first cross-sex sibling and recreate the first affinal relationships. ↵
 There is also a recapitulation of the story of human reproduction in the reclassification of spouses.

Before the first woman classified her sexual partner as tubui, and he classified her as vagabui, the first woman avoided the man who was to become her husband, thereby initiating the pattern of avoidance between cross-sex siblings. After classifying this man as tubui, she and her partner lived together, they discovered sexual intercourse, and procreation began.

To a degree, the custom of child betrothal recreates these events. When children are betrothed, they reclassify one another as tubui or vagabui. Henceforward, until the time they are actually married,

they are to avoid one another in a manner appropriate to cross-sex siblings. Only on their wedding night is sexual knowledge revealed to the couple. Thus, the custom of reclassifying one's betrothed as tubui or vagabui is, as in the story of human reproduction, associated with a period of avoidance that precedes procreation.

Do spouses have two sexual identities with respect to one another as did the participants in the first procreative union? The fact that ego refers to his spouse as vagabui brings to mind the original procreative union. Second, the classification of the spouse of a cross-sex sibling as one's sibling of same and of opposite sex implies that spouses will have two sexual identities with respect to one another. For example, if I am a sibling of same and of opposite sex to my WB, then I am also a sibling of same and of opposite sex to all of his siblings, one of whom is my wife. Third, the initial period of avoidance between a betrothed couple suggests that they are, like the first couple, siblings of same and of opposite sex until their actual marriage.

But here the similarities of the contemporary spouse relationship to the original procreative union end. In a more important sense, spouses cannot have two sexual identities with respect to one another.

In the story of reproduction, the phenomenon of dual sexual identity occurs in conjunction with the cross-sex sibling bond and identical substance. Because of the imposition of the incest tabu, a later development in the story, cross-sex siblings of same substance must not have sexual intercourse with each other. Cross-sex siblings may not be spouses. Hence, when a couple consummates their marriage, all behaviour between them that is reminiscent of the original cross-sex sibling relationship ends. All that remains of the original procreative relationship is the classification of one's spouse as tubui or vagabui. By extension, the same applies to ego and the spouse of his or her same-sex sibling.

Analytically, the spouse relationship is and is not associated with dual sexual identity because the classification of spouses refers to two periods of time. It refers to a pre-human period in which the first woman was created and the first procreative union was established and, because the same classification of spouses is used today, it refers also to the invention of the incest tabu and the consequent transition to ~~h~~ humanity. Human spouses do not have two sexual identities with respect to one another because today there can be no cross-sex sibling bond between them. In a sense, the classification of spouses recapitulates human creation.

Each marriage in Longana recapitulates the story of human procreation to some degree by means of the classification of spouses and the classification of the spouses of siblings. In particular, the status of the spouse of a cross-sex sibling as a sibling of same and of opposite sex is of great importance for understanding the relationship between ego and the offspring of his or her cross-sex sibling. This is the subject of the next section.

The Classification of the Offspring of Cross-sex Siblings

(a) Male Ego

I begin with a feature of the terminology noted in Chapter Three: ego appears to be equating generationally senior women of alternate generations in his or her descent category as siblings of one another. From an examination of this feature, I show that the children of a woman are covertly equated with that woman's siblings. Furthermore, because of gestation, a man's ZC acquire their mother's sexual identity with respect to their MB. A man's ZC are his cross-sex siblings. Thus a man has two sexual identities with respect to his MB.

I have extended Figure 11, Chapter Four, upward one generation and downward four generations for male ego and for female ego (Figure 15). The spouse of each

kin type is included. Figure 15 is a model of the classification of the spouses of male and female uterine kin of ascending and descending generations. This Figure shows the classifications of consanguineals' spouses that an ego should make according to the logic of the models for the classification of ego's descendants' spouses developed in Chapter Four. In particular, I have assumed that a woman should classify her BW as vagabui, and a man should classify his ZH as tubui. Figure 16 gives the classifications that ego actually makes.

In Figure 15, one can see that both men and women should class the spouses of their uterine relatives according to the same pattern. In addition, male and female egos are equating women of alternate generations as siblings, since the spouses of women in alternate generations are classed by the same term. As I showed earlier, alternate generations of matrilineal kinsmen do classify one another as siblings (tubui gogona /GP/; vagabui gogona /GC/), so although this is familiar, the model suggests that a male ego should be consistently equating women of alternate generations as siblings, as does his sister, but he appears not to do so. Indeed, a man classes the spouses of all women in his matriline of his generation and below by a single term: halai (ZH) (Figure 16), thereby masking or "covering up" as the Longana say, the terms which the model predicts as

appropriate. In addition, he classes women (and men) who are his sister's uterine descendants by a single term for three generations (Figure 16). Furthermore, a woman does not classify the spouses of those men of her matriline who are of her generation and above as the model predicts (Figure 16).

In Figure 15, a male ego equates MH with ZDH. Thus he covertly equates his M and ZD who equate one another as siblings. But is a male ego making the equation: $ZD = M?$, or the reverse: $M = ZD$ (= sibling)? If $ZD = M = \text{ratahi}$, then ZD would equate her MB as a child (netui). Thus, ZD would be making the following equations: $MB = C$ and therefore $M = C$. This is clearly impossible. A mother refers to her own offspring as daingu ("my blood"), and daingu, because it can be used only for descendants, means that a child cannot refer to his parents or parents' siblings as "my blood". That is to say, daingu, which is synonymous with "own" child (netui), cannot be applied to a genetrix. A mother cannot be a child to her own child, and one cannot equate the sibling of one's genetrix with one's offspring.

It appears then that a male ego is making the covert equation: $M = ZD = \text{sibling}$, and thus $MB = \text{ego's sibling}$. If this is so, one can understand how the cross-sex sibling of one's mother becomes equated with a sibling, and how the spouses of one's M and ZD become

equated in Figure 15. However, it seems that ego cannot equate his M as his sibling. That equation is submerged in blood: a woman never applies daingu to her sibling. A contradiction presents itself: somehow, a man and his M become as siblings to one another, yet the bond of dai makes this an impossibility. This problem is more conveniently handled by examining it from the perspective of a female ego.

In the model for a female ego (Figure 15), a woman makes the equation: $MH = DH$. Thus it seems reasonable to say that a woman is equating her M and D as siblings of one another. But what is the equation that ego is making? If ego is covertly equating her M and D as siblings of one another, and if ego, her M and her D are related to one another through successive bonds of dai, then what is the relationship of a M and D to ego? Because of the blood relationship that unites the three women, ego cannot equate her M with her D as child (netui), and she cannot equate her D with her M as ratahi.

Ego and her B covertly equate ego's D with ego and hence as ego's sibling, and they equate ego with her M and hence ego is her mother's sibling. In this manner, a woman's $DD = D = \text{ego} = \text{sibling}$. But how can this occur, given the Longana doctrine of blood? Initially it appears that the doctrine of blood (dai) would prevent the possibility that a child can be identified with its

mother, and hence as its mother's sibling. Because a woman refers to her children as daingu and never refers to her sibling as daingu, one's mother cannot be equated with one's sibling. This portion of the logic of dai is overridden only at the broadest sense of the term of retue (siblings) in which all members of the same moiety are classificatory siblings of one another. By the same logic, a woman cannot equate her C as her sibling. This conclusion is not really overridden, but it can be contradicted: since ego does not refer to her M as daingu, and ego never refers to a sibling as daingu, a child and its sibling can be equated with their mother.

The contradiction is circumvented by the fact that a woman contributes not only dai to her offspring; she also carries those children within her womb. As the Longana so frequently put it: children are carried by and come out of their mother. As a result of gestation, children are identified with their mother, but not completely. Because of the logic of the concept of dai, a woman's children are not of identical substance as their mother and her siblings; they are like her siblings, but they are not retue sibongu ("true" siblings) to their own mother and her full-siblings.

In short, the bond of dai ties a woman's children to her, and the fact that these children are born from their mother's womb partially identifies these children

with their mother. A woman's children can be covertly equated with their mother, and hence, as a kind of sibling of their mother. A woman can be mother and sibling to her own children. But the reverse will not work: because a mother does not emerge from a child's womb, and because a child cannot refer to its mother as daingu, a mother cannot be identified with her child and hence as her child's sibling. This may seem like a fine distinction but the Longana employ it all the time. They are insistent that one's mother is not one's sibling, but the offspring of a woman can be her siblings. This fact appears also in the rules for classifying the spouses of consanguineals. Those affines whom a male ego classifies as hangue (Z) may be equated with a ratahi (M), but those whom ego classes as ratahi (M) are never equated as hangue (Z).

The fact of gestation, then, partially identifies a woman's children with her. Her children, because they are not of identical substance with their mother, and because she refers to them as daingu, cannot be completely identified with their mother, nor are they of identical substance with her siblings. The doctrine of dai in fact denies that a woman's offspring can be her siblings. The fact of gestation circumvents the contradiction.

A consequence of the identification of a woman's child with its mother is the Longana doctrine that all of the uterine descendants of a woman are born of one mother, and so are siblings in the widest meaning of the term. Thus a woman's son's spouse (Figure 15) may be equated with her DSW in two ways. First, a woman's son is covertly equated with a sibling (Figure 16), and DS (vagabui gogona) is equated with a sibling. Second, the classification of a woman's SW as her DSW follows from the system of affinal classification for a female ego: if SW reclassifies ego's S as tubui (GP), then ego will also be a tubui to her SW; thus SW = DSW = vagabui (GC).

If a woman's child is equated with its mother, then why, in Figures 15 and 16, does not a woman classify her DH as her own H? The answer to this question is in the system of spouse classification as well as in the doctrine of blood. A woman's DH reclassifies ego's D as vagabui (GC), and hence DH is a tamai (F) to ego. The system of spouse and affinal classification meshes with the doctrine of blood in that no overt equivalence of a woman and her daughter becomes established.

That a woman and her mother are equated as siblings of one another thus remains covert. But not so for a man and his mother. That a woman (Figure 15) equates SW with BW is an important clue that in Longana, a woman's children are identified with their mother and




FIGURE 15

MODEL FOR THE CLASSIFICATION OF SPOUSES IN EGO'S MATRILINE




FIGURE 16

THE CLASSIFICATION OF SPOUSES IN EGO'S MATRILINE

hence are equated as her siblings.

If Longana, because of gestation, partially identify a woman's children with their mother, then a man equates his ZC as his siblings. But if a man identifies his ZC with his Z, then ZS is a cross-sex sibling to his mother's brother.

He is. Male alai (ZS) share some of the avoidance customs of their mothers in interaction with MB, although the avoidance is not as pronounced as it is between a real brother and sister. A sister's son may not look directly into the face of his MB, and, when requesting something of his MB, an alai must hang his head in deference. Like their mother, ZC must not enter the house of their MB, nor may MB enter the house of his ZC. A ZD, because of her sex, is a kind of Z to her MB, and her husband is classified and treated as is male ego's ZH (halai).

A ZS, despite his status as a female by virtue of his birth from his M, is still a male, and thus like a same-sex sibling to his MB. Ego therefore classes the spouse of his ZS as ego classes his W. ZS has the right to claim the widow of his MB as his W, and, as ego's junior same-sex sibling, is entitled to lay claim to, and compensation for, the land belonging to his deceased MB.

The Longana will agree, when asked, that a man's

ZS, despite his overt maleness, is an opposite-sex sibling to his MB. The following statement illustrates this and also provides evidence that the Longana equate a woman's children with their mother because of gestation. The informant was asked why he avoids his MB. The reply:

It's like this. His sister carried me. So even though I am a man I'm his sister! Why is the avoidance between us so strong? It's because his sister carried me. That's why he avoids me and I avoid him, because I came out of his sister. †

Because a man's ZS has a dual sexual identity with respect to his MB, MB is not, strictly speaking, a B. I noted in Chapter Three that the Longana say that when a man refers to or addresses his MB as tokagi ("elder same-sex sibling"), rather than tokaure (MB), it was regarded as serious talk, for use of the term for elder same-sex sibling for a MB overrode the fact that ego and his MB were not of identical blood. Use of the term tokagi for MB does that, and more. It ignores the fact that MB and ZS are also opposite-sex siblings to one another. Some Longana say that tokagi should never be used for MB, unless one wishes to express respect for his accomplishments in the graded society (hungwe) or his status as a wise elder. The term tokaure (MB) and its reciprocal alai (ZS) express the fact that these two men

are not simply siblings of the same sex to one another. A ZS has dual sexual identity.

Because of gestation, a man's ZC congenitally acquire their mother's kin class status as a sibling, and her sexual identity, with respect to their MB. Hence, a man's ZC are his cross-sex siblings, and a ZS has two sexual identities with respect to his MB. Consanguineals, as well as affines, may have two sexual identities in the context of the cross-sex sibling tie.

(b) Female Ego

I turn now to a woman's classification of her brother's children. I noted in Chapter Three that a woman classifies the descendants of her BS as she does the descendants of her D, and she classifies the descendants of her BD as she does the descendants of her S. I can now offer an explanation for this.

The key to understanding why a woman classifies the offspring of her BC as she does is to focus not on the consanguineal relationships that a woman has with her B and his offspring, but to focus on the affinal relationship that a woman has with her BW. Focusing on the consanguineal terminology alone merely informs us of the curious fact that somehow, a woman seems to equate her BS with her D, and her BD with her S. But, the knowledge that a woman is a male cross-sex sibling to her

BW, and a female cross-sex sibling to her HZ, features which derive from the affinal classification and ultimately from the Longana story of reproduction, are major factors in explaining why a woman classifies the descendants of her B as she does. Also required is the knowledge that a woman's children are covertly equated with their genetrix, and thus are her siblings.

Now, since a woman acquires, as a result of the classification of affines, a male sexual identity as a cross-sex sibling with respect to her BW, and conversely she becomes a female cross-sex sibling to her HZ, then the relationship between a woman and her BW is analagous to the relationship between a man and his Z. Furthermore, both women are siblings of same and of opposite sex with respect to one another.

Most important, a woman's BW is a woman who is her sibling of same and of opposite sex. Thus, because of gestation, a woman's BWC will acquire their mother's sexual identity, which is dual, and her status as a sibling, with respect to their FZ. Reciprocally, a FZ will have the same dual sexual identity as a sibling with respect to her BWC as she does with respect to her BW.

A FZ thus has two kin class statuses, M and sibling, in combination with two sexual identities with respect to her BC. Reciprocally, a woman's BC are her C

and her siblings, and they have two sexual identities with respect to her as well.

Because a woman and her BW are siblings by virtue of the affinal classification, and because they are both women, a woman is a kind of MZ or M to her BWC. Hence the classification of ratahi* for FZ. Consequently, as a kind of mother, a FZ classifies her BWC as she does her own: netui. Also, because a woman has two sexual identities with respect to her BWC, and they toward her, a woman's BS is a "female" son and hence can be equated with ego's daughter for the purposes of reckoning BS's offspring; and ego's BWD is a "male" daughter and can be equated with ego's son for the purposes of reckoning her BD's offspring.

A FZ is also a kind of sibling with respect to her BC. This, I think, is a crucial relationship, for it means that a FZ has a dual sexual identity as a sibling to her BC, who have two sexual identities, as siblings, toward her. Important social consequences flow from this relationship.

Only a woman can impart sexual knowledge to a child. A man or a woman may not discuss sexual matters with their own children (daingu) or anyone of the same descent category or moiety. This prevents anyone who is a child's F, FB, M, MB, MZ, MM, B, Z, ZC, etc., from instructing him or her concerning sexual intercourse.

That leaves FZ, but there is more to it than this simple process of elimination.

The relationship between a woman and her brother's children is unique in Longana. A FZ is not only a consanguineal to whom one is congenitally a sibling of same and of opposite sex, she is also the only consanguineal who is a woman with a male sexual identity. She is, with respect to her brother's children, like the first woman: a female sibling with a male sexual identity. And it was by means of the creation of this first woman or first cross-sex sibling that the first procreative union was established and sexual knowledge came to be known.

And so it comes to pass in this society that a woman with a male sexual identity, like the first woman, imparts sexual knowledge to younger generations. When a young man and woman are married, it is their fathers' sisters who, after the exchanges of valuables between kin of the bride and of the groom are completed, accompany their brothers' children to the house of the groom, and, on the wedding night, instruct the pair concerning sexual intercourse and ensure, forcibly if need be, the consummation of the marriage. Parenthetically, I speak in the ethnographic present here; the Longana say that this custom has not been practised for about twenty years.

That a woman's brother's children are siblings of same and of opposite sex is also important, for if it were otherwise, the strong separation of the sexes would prevent this ceremony from occurring if, for example, a BS had only a male sexual identity with respect to his FZ. FZ's status as a woman would prohibit the physical contact and explicit sexual references required in the sexual instruction of her BS.

A FZ is always associated with sex and marriage. A FZ is the only person to whom a young man or woman may go to divulge his or her sexual liaisons or exploits. — Illegitimate sexual partnerships can cause great trouble for an unmarried man or woman in Longana, and because the penalty for being caught in such exploits is usually a valuable tusked boar to the outraged father of the girl, a young man may "feel thunder" at the hand of his father. A FZ, by being forewarned of the problem by her BS can be expected to try to soften the anger of the culprit's father.

At weddings, the dual sexual identity of the fathers' sisters of the bride and groom, and hence the ceremonial role they are to play late in the evening, are publicly celebrated. Now, and at no other time, may women, usually so restrained in the presence of men, publicly sing songs and make jokes with explicit sexual references, and taunt men. →

The father's sisters of the bride sing obscene songs, over the loud protests of the local clergy, as they oil and dress the bride before taking her to the groom's village where the father's sisters of the groom, carrying sticks, circle the father's sisters of the bride and suddenly try to raise the skirts of the father's sisters of the bride in an attempt to expose their genitals. Later in the wedding ceremony, the father's sisters of the bride and groom will shinny up short palms at the edge of the village clearing to retrieve dead snakes which have been hidden there. Men, who are genuinely afraid of snakes and lizards, visibly become tense. They continue with the business of preparing and drinking kava, all the while keeping a close watch on the fathers' sisters of the bride and groom.

The women slide down the palms, holding aloft the snakes. Lizards appear in the hands of others. Charging across the clearing, shouting with glee, the women whip the snakes round and round over their heads. Now, all semblance of male dignity dissolves in panic. Men scramble to get out of the way, some trying to hide behind other men. Others peek from behind shrubs. Snakes arc gracefully and swiftly into the seething mob of men. Lizards, thrown like four-legged darts, find their marks. And men, leaving their dominance behind with the kava, stampede, screaming, for the bush. A straggler or an

obtuse male ethnographer who insists on ignoring the fun in order to take notes, is liable to find a live lizard jammed down the back of his trousers. Shortly, the men will cautiously return from the bush, restore their kava bowls, and amidst much laughter about how ridiculous the others looked as they ran for the bush, agree that they all had lots of fun. The women quietly gather with the women, the men with the men, and the reserve between the sexes is re-established.

The term for FZ itself, ratahi bulengu toa, sums up the ritual importance of this woman concerning marriage. Bulengu toa translates as "my chicken". During a wedding ceremony, the father's sisters of the groom scrape a coconut, and the father's sisters of the bride dance, arms outstretched like hens, toward the coconut meat. As the father's sisters of the bride, or the hens, reach the coconut meat, the father's sisters of the groom, or the roosters, capture the father's sisters of the bride. As one informant put it: *

Before you are married, your wife and her father's sisters are like wild fowl. You call this woman, your wife, but she will not come to you. So your father's sisters feed this woman's father's sisters. They and your woman are no longer wild fowl. Your father's sisters tame your woman's father's sisters, and now your woman will come to you. She is tame now, she is your fowl.

A woman, as does her M, classifies her MBW as hangue. Thus, a FZD has the same kin class statuses and sexual identities with respect to her MBC as does her mother. There are conditions with respect to this rule that will be discussed in Chapter 6.

Because of gestation, it appears that one's FZS should be a sibling with two sexual identities, as is a FZD. However, this is not the case. Ego classes his FZS as his F's same-sex sibling (tamai), and one's F is not one's sibling of same and of opposite sex. Furthermore, a man and his MB are more like same-sex siblings for the purposes of status succession and spouse classification. Ego classifies his MBW as he does his own wife (vagabui), and has the right to claim his MB's widow as his W.

Because dual sexual identity occurs in conjunction with a cross-sex sibling tie; and because a man's spouse (vagabui) cannot be also his cross-sex sibling; and because MBW = BW = W; then a man cannot be a sibling with two sexual identities with respect to his MBW and MBC. Consequently, ego and his or her FZS (tamai) are not siblings of same and of opposite sex with respect to one another.

(c) The Cross-sex Sibling Bond, Procreation, and Dual Sexual Identity

My description and analysis of the cross-sex sibling complex -- that is, ego and his or her cross-sex sibling, cross-sex sibling's spouse, and cross-sex sibling's offspring -- has so far neglected the possibility that cross-sex siblings have two sexual identities with respect to one another. It is that possibility that will be examined in this part.

In contemporary Longana, as in the story of human reproduction, dual sexual identity, the cross-sex sibling bond, and procreation are conjoined. But, in the story, dual sexual identity occurs in conjunction with the cross-sex sibling bond before the first procreative union was established. That is to say, in the beginning, the phenomenon of dual sexual identity occurred in the presence of the cross-sex sibling tie alone.

Do contemporary cross-sex siblings have two sexual identities with respect to one another? I shall argue that they do not. In doing so, I consider data concerning the B - Z social relationship and re-examine the story of human reproduction.

Let us suppose that contemporary cross-sex siblings do have two sexual identities with respect to

one another. This implies that a woman passes on, because of gestation, her two sexual identities to all of her offspring. Therefore, brothers should have two sexual identities with respect to one another. However, the B - B social relationship does not have the avoidance pattern associated with it that characterizes the B - Z social relationship, the MB - ZS social relationship, or the WB - HZ social relationship. This indicates that siblings from the same womb do not have two sexual identities with respect to one another.

Furthermore, if we suppose that contemporary cross-sex siblings of identical substance do have two sexual identities with respect to one another, then they would be in the initial relationship expressed in the story of procreation. In that story, the sibling tie in conjunction with two sexual identities made sexual knowledge and a procreative union possible. Dual sexual identity in combination with a sibling tie still implies sexual knowledge and a potential procreative union between a woman and a man, as in the FZ - BS social relationship.

Therefore, if contemporary cross-sex siblings had two sexual identities with respect to one another, one would expect that they would be able to procreate with one another, or that sometime during their lives, they would be able to significantly relax the strict avoidance pattern that characterizes their relationship.

But the avoidance between B and Z is never relaxed. They may not procreate.

Similarly, a woman and her MB are cross-sex siblings, but there is no dual sexual identity and hence no potential sexual familiarity or procreative union between them. That the MB - ZD social relationship is so unlike the FZ - BS social relationship indicates that ZD does not have two sexual identities with respect to her MB, and that a woman does not have two sexual identities with respect to her B that she can pass on to her offspring. Gestation has only the effect of making a woman's daughter a female sibling with respect to her MB. By contrast, a woman's son, because of gestation, has two sexual identities as a sibling with respect to his MB. -

Why do B and Z no longer have two sexual identities with respect to one another? A re-examination of the story of human reproduction that takes into account the Longana concept of shared substance (dai) suggests that the adoption of the incest tabu and exogamous matrimoieties by the mythical ancestors of the Longana implies the loss of dual sexual identity between cross-sex siblings born from the same womb.

The first genitor and genetrix were cross-sex siblings of identical substance who had two sexual identities with respect to one another. Thus the first

progeny and their parents were of identical substance with respect to one another. Because the first progeny were full-siblings of their genetrix, they were siblings of same and of opposite sex with respect to her and with respect to one another. In short, the first sibling set resulting from the act of procreation could inherit their genetrix's dual sexual identity because they and their genetrix were of identical substance.

At this stage in the Longana story of reproduction, cross-sex siblings from the same womb had two sexual identities with respect to one another and could procreate with one another. However, the later adoption of exogamous matrimoieties together with the incest tabu prevented siblings from the same womb and ideally from the same moiety from marrying. This ultimately prevented the possibility of a woman's children from inheriting her dual sexual identity because her children could no longer be of identical substance as she, and therefore children could not be fully equated with their mother.

Because of the incest tabu and moiety exogamy, one's dai can no longer be the offspring of one's own cross-sex sibling. Today, children of blood are not children of shame. Hence, one's offspring are not one's siblings of same and of opposite sex, and cross-sex siblings from the same womb do not have two sexual identities with respect to one another.

Fundamentally, the story of human procreation concerns the significance of womb in the process of procreation. In the story, procreation is conjoined with the cross-sex sibling bond and dual sexual identity. Although cross-sex siblings from the same womb no longer have two sexual identities with respect to one another and may not marry, the significance of procreation and gestation remains, especially with regard to a cross-sex sibling's procreative union. In this sense, procreation in conjunction with the cross-sex sibling bond is still associated with siblings of same and of opposite sex, as in the relationships that ego has with respect to his or her cross-sex sibling's spouse and cross-sex sibling's offspring.

Summary and Conclusions

In this chapter, I have demonstrated that an understanding of the logic of the affinal terminology has proved to be crucial for an understanding of the logic of the consanguineal terminology in two further respects: the classification of the descendants of a woman's cross-sex sibling, and, more indirectly, in the classification of MB and ZS. These findings strengthen my argument, in Chapter Four, that the terminology is based on a system of consanguinity and affinity, and that therefore the terminology for spouses and affines cannot

be ignored for the purposes of analyzing the consanguineal terminology or for the purposes of comparing the Longana terminology with other Crow-type systems of consanguineal classification.

Second, but no less important than the above, is the fact that I have relied heavily on the affinal and consanguineal terminologies of women in this chapter, especially in the classification for a woman's B's descendants and in the analysis of the classification of MB - ZS by a male ego. As some anthropologists (Poewe 1978:364; Scheffler and Lounsbury 1971:67) have noted, studies of kin terminologies have been seriously flawed because they are based upon how the terms are used by a male ego only. The Longana system of consanguineal and affinal classification is more easily understood by examining the mode of classifications for both men and women. Indeed, that is what the mode of classification is all about: man, woman, and procreation. ←

Third, I have shown that observed behaviour and the norms upon which observed behaviour is based are important for the analysis of the Longana terminology. Knowing that the spouses of cross-sex siblings are equated terminologically with cross-sex siblings is important, but that is not enough. It is important to know, since the terms for the spouses of cross-sex siblings

are self-reciprocal, who is which kind of cross-sex sibling. Without that information, the logic of a woman's classification of the descendants of her BC would remain a mystery.

Also, one would not suspect, from the terminology alone, that a ZS is identified as ego's cross-sex sibling, or, more accurately, that ego's ZS has both male and female sexual identities with respect to his mother's brother. Even if one could deduce this from the terminology alone, one would still not understand how it is possible for a man to take on a woman's status, and vice versa in the case of a FZ.

Some anthropologists (Scheffler and Lounsbury 1971:39; Scheffler 1972a:115) argue that the behavioural entailments associated with a kin term are dependent upon, or are secondary to, the genealogical relationship between ego and an alter. That is to say, the application of a kin term to an alter only implies the behavioural entailments associated with the term. Logically, then, one can split the behavioural entailments from the application of the term itself:

. . . entitlement to the social status connoted by a kinship term is a normative implication of designation by the term, not grounds for designation by it

Thus, the structure of a system of status connotations, where statuses are ascribed between particular categories of

kin as such, must be dependent on the structure of the system of category designation but not vice versa. It follows that a system of kin categories must be analyzed and compared independently of any system of status connotations that may be associated with its terms (Scheffler 1972a: 115, my emphasis).

I agree with the first part of Scheffler's argument, but not the last. For example, a ZS is an alai regardless of his behaviour toward his MB. The social statuses associated with the term are contingent upon being classed by the term. Being classed by the term depends not upon the social relationship associated with it, but upon the appropriate genealogical connection. But to argue, as Scheffler does, that therefore a system of kin classification must be analyzed independently of the system of social statuses associated with it is to fall into a logical trap. The social statuses associated with, or expressed by the terms may be an important clue to the mode of kin classification, as is the case in Longana. Here I must express agreement with Schneider (1972:49): the mode of kin classification may not be discoverable from the kin terms alone. ←

Fourth, I have shown how the Longana story of reproduction is fundamental to the kin terminology. In a sense, the Longana story of reproduction is relived each generation with the establishment of each procreative

relationship and the birth of each child. It knots together sexual identities, the social statuses associated with them, and the system of consanguineal and affinal classification by investing certain consanguineal and affinal links with meaning for the Longana. And that meaning, meaning from the Longana point of view, is especially important for kinship theory; for what has come to be known as the "Crow skewing rule" (Lounsbury 1964b [1969]) violates the Longana logic for classifying a man's MB and his ZS.

In a paper that many regard as a classic in kinship theory, Lounsbury 1964b [1969] :212-255) grouped Crow type systems of kin classification into four varieties according to the four types of skewing rules which they seemed to employ. A skewing rule:

. . . expresses the formal equivalence, in specified contexts, between two kin types of different generations. Among its effects are the skewing of the relation between terminological generation and natural generation (Lounsbury 1964b [1969] :218).

Not one of the four skewing rules formulated by Lounsbury corresponds to the logic by which the Longana class matrilineal kin. Since some of the formalists (Scheffler and Lounsbury 1971:136-150) have claimed that their analyses have cognitive validity for the

people who employ the terms, and since they have admonished others (Scheffler 1972a: 116-117) for not paying sufficient attention to the "ethno-" in ethnosemantics, the question of whether the Longana employ a logic similar to that embodied in a Crow skewing rule is important.

Lounsbury's Crow Type II skewing rule (1964b [1969]) is the only one that results in a distribution of consanguineal terms similar to that of the Longana, excepting the alternate classifications for the children of grandchildren in the Longana system. It is that skewing rule which I shall examine:

SKEWING RULE (Crow Type II): $MB \rightarrow B$.
 COROLLARY: $Ss [ZS] \rightarrow B$; and $Sd [ZD] \rightarrow S[Z]$.
 (Lounsbury 1964b [1969]:231).

According to Lounsbury (1964b [1969]:231) the skewing rule should read: let the kin type mother's brother be equivalent to the kin type brother. A Longana who did this for the purposes of kin classification would be violating the theory of blood relationship. To equate a MB with a B is to equate a woman, MBZ or M, with her children. Except at the broadest meaning of the term sibling (retue), in which everyone of same moiety is a sibling, this is impossible in Longana, although the reverse is not. The reader may object that, since a MB

and his ZS do not call one another daingu, the skewing rule really does no harm in equating a MB and his ZS as brothers. But one of the reasons that the Longana insist that a MB is not a B is based on the fact that MB and B are not of identical substance. The other reason is that a MB is not a same-sex sibling. This brings me to the corollary.

The corollary would read (Lounsbury 1964b [1969]: 231): let a man's sister's child be equivalent to that man's sibling (brother or sister respectively). The corollary fails because the Longana do not always parcel out one sexual identity per person. A sister's son, despite his obvious gender, is also a cross-sex sibling to his mother's brother because a woman's children emerge from her womb. ✓

The fundamental flaw in the Crow skewing rule and its corollary, in the Longana case, is that it focuses upon isolated kin types, and the wrong ones at that. The males whom the skewing rule erroneously equates as same-sex siblings of one another, MB and ZS, are really secondary to the central importance of the woman who, because of her womb, creates the relationship between MB and ZS. Because of her womb, a woman's son has two sexual identities with respect to that woman's cross-sex sibling. The dual sexual identity of a man's ZS is built into the genealogical connections which link a man to his ZS. A ZS has the sexual

identity of his mother regardless of his behaviour toward his MB in the same way that a Z is a cross-sex sibling whether or not she behaves like one. The Longana data warn us that anthropologists can no longer afford to build into their notions of genealogical connection the assumption that associated with each link in the genealogical chain is one, and only one, sexual identity. Employing a kin type notation (e.g., ZS) for the purposes of analysis is useful, and perhaps mandatory (Scheffler and Lounsbury 1971), but is potentially misleading. —

Focusing upon isolated kin types is also potentially misleading. The dual sexual identity of a man's ZS is as much a product of the procreative relationship which a man's Z has with her husband as it is of the fact that she has a womb. Indeed, ZH himself has a dual sexual identity with respect to his WB. The dual sexual identity of ZH, and ZHS, points to or stands for the importance of the procreative act in Longana, the fact that the terminology refers not just to kin types but also to procreation or marriage and its associated theory.

The skewing of the terminology is a by-product of the more fundamental Longana principle that a woman's children congenitally acquire the kin class status and sexual identity of their mother with respect to her brother, not the result of an equation of MB and ZS as

same-sex siblings. Because a man's ZS has also a male sexual identity with respect to his MB, the Crow skewing rule can give the impression that it is effective in the Longana case, but only at the expense of ignoring the Longana theory of procreation, including the Longana concept of blood (dai). To do so would necessitate abandoning the claim (Scheffler and Lounsbury 1971:37-38) that formal analyses of kinship terminologies rest upon the concepts of genealogical connection as they are posited in those cultures that employ the terminologies. In the Longana case, the skewing rule (Type II) represents no more than a mechanism that will stamp out the appropriate terms onto a genealogical grid as we may conceive it; a refusal to believe in ghosts that invest certain types of genealogical connection with shades of meaning.

CHAPTER SIX

BONDS OF BLOOD: GENEALOGICAL CONNECTION AND SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS

Introduction

In Chapter Five, I examined the relationship between kin terminology, genealogical connection, and social relationships associated with the cross-sex sibling complex. In this chapter, I continue my examination of the social relationships that the Longana ascribe to relations of genealogical connection by focusing on the network created by links of substance (dai).

I will show that the rights and duties that the Longana associate with a kin term are held fully only by the person classed by the term who is genealogically closest to ego and that the rights and duties of others classed by the same term attenuate with increasing genealogical distance from the former. This finding is not unusual (see Radcliffe-Brown 1952; Keesing 1969:213; Scheffler and Lounsbury 1971:153-154). However, the rights and duties of alter may be affected by other identities which he or she may have such as relative age, marital status and coresidence. Thus, the fact that two or more kin types are classified by the same term

does not imply that all those so classified have similar social identities and rights and duties with respect to ego.

Second, I show that even the rights and duties associated with the bond of dai itself may be disclaimed. Hence Longana kin terms, do not, strictly speaking, label roles; or, put another way, the kinship terminology, and genealogical connection, only imply or connote rights and duties (Scheffler 1972:115).

Third, I argue that the Longana do not postulate the bond of dai as being inalienable. Therefore the Longana concept of genealogical connection exists in contradiction to Scheffler's generalization (1973:756) that genitor-offspring and genetrix-offspring relationships are universally conceived as inalienable and are irreducible elements in every culture.

Finally, I point out an interesting phenomenon concerning the nature of genealogical connection itself which has been implicit in Chapter Five. The Longana ideology associated with the bond of dai and more distant genealogical connections is ambiguous. That is to say, the bond of dai and/or the fact that certain kinsmen have two sexual identities may be used to forge solidary relationships with the siblings and other kin of

one's parents and oneself, or they may be used to deny one's obligations to close and distant relatives. Both options are embraced by the Longana concept of custom, the subject of Chapter Seven.

Siblings: tue (B), hangue (Z)

The bonds of blood (dai) that are established between a man and his offspring and a woman and her offspring are extremely important. Under typical circumstances, full-siblings (retue sibongu) will share the same mother and father. Full-siblings will be of the same moiety and descent category (duvi) as their mother. Between siblings there is a norm of solidarity which is at its strongest between full-siblings. A full-sibling can demand, and expect to receive without repaying, access to another full-sibling's land, food, and labour.

Within the sibling set two important distinctions are made: relative age and sex. The eldest male is in a position of authority over his brothers and sisters. The eldest male's status with respect to his younger siblings is similar to that of a father. A father confides in his first born son, instructs him in ritual matters, and advises his eldest son on the disposal of his parcels of land when he dies. An elder brother should instruct, care for, and discipline his younger siblings when they are children; when younger siblings reach maturity they

may argue with the first-born, but should always show deference to his position and respect for his authority. An elder brother acts on behalf of his younger siblings at public events: he gives away the daughter of a younger brother at her marriage, and at a man's death, it is his eldest son who compensates his father's siblings for the use of the dead man's land. The elder brother is in charge of the estates of his father upon the latter's death, and he holds the land in trust until such time as a younger brother is capable of assuming his share.

Under normal circumstances, then, the first-born male is the leader of his sibling set. However, there are traditional tales of the unpredictability of life in which a younger male sibling achieves dominance over the eldest because of circumstances or superior ability. A man who, for example, achieves higher status in the graded society than his elder brother is entitled to refer to the latter as "younger sibling" (tehi) and act as the elder brother at public functions.

Brothers live together on their father's land. Each adult brother is head of his own separate household in which live his wife and offspring. A man has his own plots of land which his household cultivates, and as household head, each brother is expected to provide for the members of his household. Although informants

frequently stress the ideal of sibling solidarity and the norm of generalized reciprocity between brothers, they also point out that each man ultimately is responsible for his own well-being and that of his family. A lazy or irresponsible brother may find that his siblings refuse to come to his aid.

Upon the death of a man, his plots of land revert to his siblings. A man also has the right to claim as his wife his brother's widow, whom he classes as his own wife, or to accept the brideprice should she remarry outside the sibling set. Full-siblings will refer to one another as retue sibongu ("born from one mother"), and one would expect that the norms of sibling solidarity and opposite-sex sibling avoidance would be strongest in this case, for such siblings share identical substance by virtue of the fact that they have the same mother and father, and are of the same moiety and duvi (descent category) affiliation. However, in the past polygyny was practiced, and half-siblings of same moiety also share the same bond of dai with their genitor as do full-siblings. Furthermore, such half-siblings are coresidents. Informants insist that although half-siblings same moiety can be distinguished from retue sibongu, they are of the same status as full-siblings. Half-siblings of opposite moiety have a special status, and are termed

bababulu. Such half-siblings share the same dai from their genitor, and, in addition, are of the same moiety as one's genitor.

The term bababulu is self-reciprocal, and informants sometimes express the relationship with a half-sibling who is the same moiety as one's father in terms of deep respect mixed with a little fear, for to insult such a person, or not to treat such a person as a full-sibling will anger one's father and he (or his siblings) may come to favour his dai of the same moiety at the expense of his other children. Informants say this is possible because such children are both dai and classificatory siblings of their father. However, the bababulu relationship is too advantageous for all parties bound up within it to destroy for it "ties up", as informants say, a set of siblings who are of one moiety and duvi affiliation with all half-siblings of opposite moiety who are descendants of the same father. The bababulu relationship is stronger even than the relationship between full-siblings, for it entitles half-siblings of opposite moiety to assume the identity of one's full-sibling.

The Longana often state that all those classed as tue (E) or hangue (Z) who are of one's own duvi (descent category) are to be treated as one's own siblings,

but this is an ideal. One's relationship with first cousins within one's own descent category (MZC) most closely approximates that among one's own siblings, and such cousins may not marry. Beyond the range of first cousins, the rights and duties owed to hangue (Z) and tue (B) of one's own descent category attenuate, but it is impossible to specify a point at which a clearly defined break occurs. Women of one's descent category may be married, although it may be difficult to do so. A further discussion of this, with case material, is presented in Chapter Seven. Genealogically distant classificatory siblings of same descent category who are coresidents, or spatially close, will likely behave toward one another as close siblings, but apart from the influence of spatial propinquity, the only obligations that siblings of same descent category beyond the range of first cousins have to one another are to provide food, shelter and protection. In times of warfare genealogically distant siblings of same descent category would never knowingly attack one another. ←

The obligations toward siblings of one's own moiety who are not of one's descent category and not dai of one's father are even fewer. The genealogically closest example of such siblings would be FBC, and here Longana disagree over their status. Because FBC are first cousins, some Longana argue that one is morally

obligated to treat them as if they were one's own siblings. Others argue that such siblings are one's coresidents and therefore must be treated as one's own siblings, especially if one does not have real siblings, for one needs the contribution of brothers and sisters, especially in acquiring wives. Between siblings who share only the social identity of same moiety, and who are not coresident, there is a blanket obligation to offer mutual protection, food and shelter, and a prohibition against marriage. But these obligations are very weak. Intramoiety marriages are and were common, and in time of warfare classificatory siblings who shared only common moiety affiliation and who were not coresidents could knowingly kill one another.

Matrilateral Relationships: ratahi (M), tokaure (ME), alai (ZC)

A child typically has many ratahi: his own mother and her sisters, his father's co-wives, and the wife of anyone classed as tamai. It is very difficult to draw distinctions based upon genealogical connection alone as far as social identities and statuses are concerned, except to say that the relationship with one's own mother is strongest, and where the relationship is not reinforced by coresidence and/or same descent

category affiliation, it is weakest.

A genetrix refers to her offspring as dai, and only this woman can be referred to as bui.

A genetrix has the responsibility of caring for her children, protecting them from harm, and providing ← for them. Informants often speak of their mothers with more affection than they do of their fathers, stressing that, when a child is an infant, the mother is always there to protect it from harm but the father is often away working in his gardens, visiting, and, in the past, fighting. Upon reaching adulthood, a child maintains a warm, friendly relationship with his mother. She is to be respected. Her requests to aid her ageing brother and mother's brother ought to be obeyed, but an adult male will not avoid his mother. However, when one is a child, it is tabu (forbidden) for a mother to talk of sexual matters with her offspring.

There is one important duty which only a mother, or in her absence, a MZ must perform. Because of gestation, the bond of dai between a mother and her offspring carries with it duvi (descent category) membership, and each duvi has associated with it one or more socially undesirable traits which belong to it and it alone, and it is thought that these traits are heritable. This is not to say that all members

of the same descent category must display the same personality characteristics, but that in each generation some members will display them. For example one descent category is said to have a propensity for intra-duvi marriages ("marrying sisters"); and if a man of that duvi marries a woman who is also of that duvi, such behaviour will be seen as regrettable, but ultimately understandable. Other duvi are noted for theft, or for being exceptionally strong-willed, etc. Consequently, there is an element of embarrassment in duvi membership, and most informants are reluctant to publicly disclose such membership, and to divulge duvi membership to an anthropologist. An enemy can be publicly humiliated if one remarks that he is a rubbish man because he displays the traits of his descent category (duvi). Thus a mother will take great pains to educate her children in their potentially inherited faults so that they may be overcome.

A MB tokaure should care for and provide economic assistance for his ZC as he would for his own sister and brother. Longana frequently emphasize that a MB, as an elder sibling, should be solicitous for the welfare of his alai (ZC): he knows when his Z and her children are in need, and he can be trusted, without being asked, to come to one's aid with money,

produce, and valuables for ceremonial events such as marriages and rank-takings in the graded society (hungwe).

Because ZC are partially identified with Z, a man's sister's sons are both same-sex and opposite-sex siblings to him. As opposite-sex siblings, male alai (ZS) are in a subordinate position which increases the authority of MB. Male alai share some of the avoidance customs of their mothers in interaction with MB, although the avoidance behaviour is not as pronounced as it is between a real brother and sister.

Longana frequently state that the mother's brother is the "boss" over his "line" (duvi) of sister and all her descendants, and trace an orderly line of succession of authority from MNMB to MMB to MB. Furthermore, one frequently hears Longana make reference to what at first appears to be a segmentation of authority within the duvi. For example, it is often said that one's MB is the authority over his segment of the duvi, and one's MMZS (tokaure) has authority over his segment of the duvi. But this is not lineage segmentation: it is a recognition of the difference between close and distant tokaure within the same duvi (descent category). Alai (ZC) do not show the same respect and avoidance toward more classificatory tokaure (MB),

even within the same duvi, and, should one's own MB die, authority passes to his oldest surviving sibling rather than to an older surviving tokaure who is genealogically distant. Furthermore, there are a number of factors which prevent the MB from fully exercising his authority, and decrease his rights and duties, toward his sister's children.

First, a MB is a sibling to his ZS because both MB and ZS are born from the same mother -- MEM. But ego's MB is not a "true" sibling because his MB and he are not of identical substance. Ego and his MB are the offspring of different procreative pairs. The Longana doctrine of blood serves to isolate each generation of siblings within the matriline from succeeding generations, thereby preventing by dilution, as it were, the development of a stronger concept of descent based upon notions of inherited identical substance.

Second, because of the bond of dai between a woman and her children, and the association of her children with her womb, a man's ZS shares in the sexual identity of his mother. The resulting avoidance pattern between MB and his ZS adds an element of restraint to the MB-ZS relationship that is not characteristic of the B - B social relationship.

Third, the bond of blood (dai) between a father and his children binds those children to him. A father has stronger rights over his children than does the MB of the children. The bond of dai between a man and his offspring outweighs the fact that MB and ZS are born of one mother. A father has the right to bestow his child in marriage regardless of the wishes of the child's MB, for example. Of course, one's child's MB is one's halai (WB), and one's WB's opinion ought to be consulted or respectfully heard concerning the marriage of his alai (ZC), but a WB's superior status over his ZH does not extend to his ZH in matters relating to the latter's offspring. Should ZH die, the rights over his children pass to the deceased's brother, or to the eldest male child if he is an adult.

Fourth, the rights and duties bound up in the MB-ZS relationship attenuate sharply with birth order and genealogical distance. The MB-ZC relationship is strongest between a man and the first-born son of his own sister. A man may, for example, enter the house of his sister's second or third-born son, but never the house of the first-born. ZDC (alailimbogi) and ZDDC (alailimbolimbogi) are also alai, but the strength of the MB relationship is very weak with these

more distant and younger alai. Longana attribute the weak nature of the relationship between a man and his ZDC and ZDDC as being due to both genealogical distance or dilution of blood and to relative age. Although ZDJ, for example, ought to honour their MMB's requests for labour and produce, the relationship between a ZDS and an aged tokaure (MME) is not as fettered by the respect and avoidance characteristic of the ME-ZS social relationship.

Thus, the concept of blood (dai) together with the identification of a child with its mother, the latter itself the foundation of the Longana concept of descent, drive a conceptual and normative wedge between a man and his sister's male uterine descendants as male siblings, whereas the concept of descent together with the dogma of sibling solidarity make a close social relationship possible between them. The resultant is a highly ambiguous social relationship.

There is potential conflict between an elder male of a sibling set and their mother's brother. Because the eldest male of a sibling set is their full-sibling, and a MB is not, an adult elder brother may not consult with MB concerning important matters such as the disposal of land. Conversely, it is a recognized principle in Longana that a MB may be disinterested

in the future well-being of his born or unborn ZC, and the pressures of existence in the real world or personal characteristics may lead a MB to leave his ZC with little, or no, inheritance.

The Longana frequently state that a MB is "boss" over one's sibling set. This is more a statement of a normative ideal, for some informants, under further questioning, will admit that which others freely volunteer: to say that a MB is "boss" over his Z's uterine descendants is to engage in loose talk. MB has most authority over the first-born male of his ZC, and, through him, to the rest of the sibling set. Furthermore, the authority of MB is not really that of an elder brother, as previously discussed. But treating MB as if he were an elder brother, calling him tokagi (elder same-sex sibling) and thus giving him the respect and deference due to an elder brother is to honour an elder uterine kinsman who holds authority over one's M and hence, ideally, over her children. To thus honour a man is to help ensure a smooth relationship between oneself, one's M. and her opposite-sex sibling, and to help ensure that a MB will live up to his obligations as a sibling toward his ZC: a mother's brother should donate pigs to his ZC's rank takings, should contribute to his ZC's wedding, and should help his ZC defray the funeral

expenses when their father dies. And MB should try to ensure that a portion of his estate goes to his ZC when he dies.

The fulfillment of the obligations associated with the MB-ZS relationship depends upon the quality of that relationship. This is even more so when a more classificatory relationship exists (such as with a MMZDS), and the relationship is at its weakest between tokaure (MB) and alai (ZS) who are merely of the same moiety.

Alai (ZC, ZDC, ZDDC) may succeed to some of the identities of a MB. Under normal circumstances, a man's next eldest same-sex full-sibling (retue sibcngu) succeeds to his spouse and parcels of land, and, should the deceased's children be young, his brother succeeds also to the obligation to care for his deceased's children and the rights to discipline them and arrange for their marriages. Should a man die leaving no male siblings (retue simbongu), then his ZS (alai) or ZDS (alailimbogi), or in the absence of either of the latter, a ZDDS, alailimbolimbogi succeeds to his identities with respect to his land and his offspring, but only if these descendants of the deceased's sister (hangue) are adult. Should a man who has no same-sex full siblings and no real Z (and therefore no real

alai) die, the rights to his land and children pass to his half-siblings by the same father. Only in the event that a man has no real alai (ZC) and no half-siblings by the same father can his more classificatory alai of same duvi (e.g. the deceased's MZDS) legitimately lay claim to his land, and even then, the Longana say that their claim is very weak.

The problem of succession to land is complicated by the principle of dai. A man's same-sex full-siblings gain control of his parcels of land when he dies, but the bond of dai between a father and his sons normally ensures that his offspring, upon payment of compensation to the siblings (tue tarai) of their dead father, succeed to most of their father's parcels of land. Under ideal circumstances, the payments to a tue tamai (FB) ensure that most of a man's land passes to his offspring, and some of the land is held by the deceased's siblings. I will return to this subject in the next section.

Patrilateral Relationships

A man refers to his own children as daingu ("my blood"). A man has full authority and responsibility for his child's education and well-being. The Longana are indulgent with young children, and discipline may

be administered in public with an embarrassed apology to anyone present that the child is a "strong head," or strong-willed; a trait that is both admired and disapproved by the Longana. Fathers, and mothers, claim to show no special desire for or favouritism toward children of either sex.

As a child matures, it learns that an indulgent father can become a stern disciplinarian. One's father may mete out physical punishment to his children, and a child must show his father (and mother) considerable respect. The Longana say that a child, regardless of his age, must never strike his or her father if he threatens or administers physical punishment. A father is responsible for teaching his child ritual knowledge, but, because a child is of opposite moiety to his father, a child cannot expect his father to reveal all he knows. A child must seek to fill out the gaps in his knowledge from someone of same moiety as he. A ME or a grandparent of same moiety as a child is a good candidate as a teacher.

A man, by virtue of his identity as a male, is the household head, provider for his family, and guardian of his offspring. In particular, a man ought to provide land for his children. Upon a man's death, his sons, by virtue of the bond of dai which linked

him to his offspring, are entitled to their father's parcels of land. Before his death, a father tells the history of his parcels of land, and the legitimacy of his claims upon them, to his eldest son.

Although a man's siblings may offer their BC advice and scold them, the Longana say that only a real father may physically discipline his children, and ultimately it is he who decides whom his children shall marry. Upon a man's death, his own same-sex sibling succeeds to his duties and rights over his children, but fulfillment of these rights and duties by a tue tamai (FB) toward his BC are contingent upon the quality of the former relationship between the dead man and his siblings, and the quality of the relationship between FB and ego. Under ideal circumstances, a FB will come to regard his BC as his own, and will hold his BC land in trust for them until they are mature enough to claim it, or see that it is released to them if they are adult when their father dies.

The Longana say that, because of the principle of sibling succession to land, and because of the rights to that land which those to whom a sibling refers as daingu have, some of a man's parcels of land stay with his siblings and/or alai (ZC), and some goes to his children if the latter pay compensation to their

dead father's siblings at the funeral of their father. Should the children not pay compensation to their father's siblings for the land, all of it remains with their father's siblings.

This of course is the ideal, but in the past, things were not so simple. A man's children could be, and were, denied rights to their father's land by their tue tamai (FE) and alai tamai (FZS). If land was scarce, or if father's siblings set the compensation payments too high, or if they simply did not want to divide and share the land with their brother's offspring, they could drive their dead brother's children from the land. It is clear then that although a tue tamai (FE) and alai tamai (ZS) could succeed to their elder brother's identities as landholder and provider for his children, the two identities were held to be separate, and a tue tamai (FE) could refuse to live up to his obligations as a provider of land for, and guardian of, his dead brother's offspring. One's EC are not one's dai.

Consequently, many Longana state that land tended to stay within the duvi, rather than pass from father to son. But this statement must be treated with caution: the rule that a man's dai had rights to his land upon the payment of compensation to their

father's siblings was, and is, customary. Furthermore, such statements are usually used to contrast today's practises with the ideal. Longana state that today, with the advent of valuable land devoted to copra cash-cropping, white man's inheritance patterns are becoming more common. That is, the bond of dai is now over-stressed, and that with payment of compensation to a father's siblings, all the land is going to the children of the deceased. The practise finds favour with younger generations, and is of considerable anguish to the older generation who feel that the customary ideal of ensuring that some of one's land be held for one's alai is a more equitable arrangement.

The Longana are prone to saying that the relationship between a man and his alai tamai (FZS) is identical to that between a man and his father. This is a normative statement, for upon a little probing, the Longana will freely discuss the reasons why an alai tamai (FZS) is not like a father: a FZS does not refer to his MEC as daingu; a FZS is not of identical substance with one's father or father's brother; a FZS is like an opposite-sex sibling to one's F. For these reasons, a F may not have a close relationship with his ZS, and this will have its effect on the relationship which a FZS will have with his

MBS. Nevertheless, since a FZS is entitled to succeed to one's father's statuses and may be able to successfully exert a claim to one's father's parcels of land upon his death, the Longana state that, for these reasons, a prudent man will honour and respect a FZS as he would honour and respect his own tamai. This is cross-cut by relative age: if alai tamai (FZS) is an adult, he may give you advice and scold you; if he is a married adult he is in an even better position to give advice, and help you; but a younger youth (e.g., FZDS, FZDDS) or small child is not capable of fulfilling the functions of a father and is not entitled to scold his adult MBS, nor will his advice be sought.

Under ideal circumstances, then, the relationship between a person and his alai tamai (FZS) will be a strong one, characterized by the respect which a child shows for its father and the authority mixed with indulgence which a man has for his children. Similarly, informants state that anyone who is classified as alai tamai (FZS) or tue tamai (FB), of the same duvi (descent category) as one's own father can be counted upon to offer aid and protection wherever one happens to go, provided that such men are aware of your descent category affiliation. But classificatory tamai and alai tamai and tue tamai who are not of one's father's

descent category are not so obligated, unless a close relationship has been established with them, and they can refuse to aid, and could even knowingly kill, a classificatory netui (C) whose father was not of their descent category.

The tamai-netui (F-C) relationship is strongest when it is cemented by the bond of dai, but even here, a person may deny the statuses associated with dai. Although the bond of dai, once known, cannot be denied, the rights and duties ideally associated with it may be. I have recorded two cases in which a man's adult sons were constantly an embarrassment to him. In both cases, the father threatened to disown his offspring in an attempt to make them more tractable. Such a threat is extremely serious, for a man's surest claim to land is based squarely upon the bond of dai which he has with his father. The threats to disinherit were not carried out, for they had the desired effect: the adult sons were sufficiently shaken by the threats to listen to reason and cease their publicly disruptive behaviour. Nevertheless, informants assured me that a man could disown his sons.✓

And children may disclaim their parents. A man who does not live up to his obligations as provider, guardian and mother's husband may find himself rejected

by his offspring. About fifteen years ago, a man deserted his two young sons when his wife was extremely ill. She was taken, with her sons, to her father's hamlet where she recovered. Her children remained with her in her natal hamlet. These young men acknowledge that their genitor is their tamai sibongu (real father), but show him no respect, rebuff his attempts to re-establish his relationship as their father, and refuse all his requests for assistance with his gardens and copra. In short, these young men acknowledge the identity of dai that they have as offspring of this man, but deny all rights and duties that ideally are associated with it.

Father's opposite-sex sibling is one's ratahi*. In the last chapter I examined the dual sexual identity of a FZ and its importance in the roles which she plays at a child's wedding.

In addition to giving her BC sexual instruction and her role in capturing and taming the FZs of the bride, a FZ dispenses, with the authority of one's F, advice on proper marital behaviour. The following is taken from a lecture given by a FZ to a young woman just prior to the latter's wedding:

When you marry you will go to live in your husband's village. When your husband is angry with you he may beat you. You must not run away. If your husband hits you outside, then you go inside your house and stay there. If he hits you inside your house, then you go outside and cut the grass or sweep. You must not run away from your husband and come back to your father. When your husband tells you to do something, you must do it!

A FZ has considerable authority, and she must be respected, especially before one is married. She plays a principal part in one's wedding, and she does so, if necessary, on the authority of her B, one's father. There is some fear of the authority associated with a FZ. She may also physically punish her BC, as does a child's F and M.

But there is indulgence too. A Longana is as fond of his FZ as he is respectful of her authority. In many respects, a FZ is like a M to her BC. A BC may go to live with his FZ for periods of time, and she treats her BC as she would her children, and they reciprocate: they help her with household chores such as cooking, cutting and carrying firewood. And a FZ is one's loyal and trustworthy confidante; one can tell her things which not even one's mother or siblings should hear.

In the last chapter I indicated that the status of FZ is like that of a same- and opposite-sex sibling, like a mother, and like a "male" mother. Consequently it is impossible to obtain from an informant a clear statement as to exactly what a FZ is. The following statement is an example of how a FZ may be described by Longana. It is one of the clearest I could obtain:

She is like a mother (ratahi) but she is not like your mother. She is your father's sister, of his duvi (descent category). She is not really like a mother. You respect her advice, and you honour her just as you would your father. She can beat you too. She is a ratahi, but not the same as your mother, she is not the same as a kind of mother . . . she is a mother, but it is different . . . she calls you "child" (netui), and she tries to make you happy . . . you cannot call the sister of your father "father" (tamai), because she is a woman. So you call her mother.

The Longana ultimately resort to explaining what a FZ is by outlining her duties in the wedding ceremony. Hence they point out that the phrase bulengu toa ("my chicken"), and her role as instructress of sexual knowledge distinguishes FZ from M. But the phrase bulengu toa refers also to another custom associated with FZ, and one just as important, for it is

through this woman that the system of consanguinity and affinity is connected to the focus of Longana culture, the graded society (hungwe).

The reciprocal of ratahi bulengu toa ("mother of my fowl") is netui gagumaresu ("child to eat"). The latter term refers to an important custom wherein a woman is given gifts of food by her brother's children. ✓ The rules of opposite sex avoidance forbid a man from offering food to his opposite-sex sibling. Yet a man's sister provides him with large quantities of mats which he needs to obtain a bride (see M. Rodman 1976). These mats are not given as gifts. A brother must repay his sister for the mats she donates at his wedding with gifts of pork. A man may not offer his sister pork which he has killed, but a man's child may offer his or her FZ pork which the child has killed, and so a man's children repay his Z for the mats which she contributed to her brother's wedding; hence the term for a woman's BC: "mine to eat."

The customary gifts of food from a BC to its FZ begins when a child is an infant. When the umbilical cord of a boy or girl dries and falls off, the mother of the child places a stick in the infant's hand, and, holding her infant's hand, plunges the stick into the head of a live, trussed chicken. The infant's mother

and father present the fowl to the father's sister of the infant. This ceremony is performed once again when the child begins to teethe. The dead chicken is presented to the father's sister, and the father of the child declares to his sister: "our child (yours and mine) has taken the first step in the hungwe". The fowl is not pork, but it is a promise of pork to come.

When a man takes rank in the graded society, he often donates a boar for his son to kill. A father thus honours his son and helps him to achieve the minor ranks in the hungwe. Flesh of the boar which the child kills is presented to the child's FZ. Hence a man may honour his son, help him through the minor ranks of the hungwe, take rank in the hungwe, and, at the same time, indirectly repay his Z for the mats that she donated at his wedding (W. Rodman 1973:166-167). The obligation of a man to give pork to his Z is lifelong.

As a man's sons mature and progress through the minor ranks of the graded society, he may donate pigs for a classificatory son to kill so that his Z will continue to receive pork. For example, I attended a ceremony in which an old man took the highest rank in the graded society. At the end of the ceremony, the old man gave a pig for his ZDSS (netui) to kill. In this manner, the man's aged sister was rewarded

with pork for the mats which she contributed to her brother's wedding forty years before.

A woman kills untusked pigs, in a ceremony known as dure, once as a child and again on the eve of her wedding (see M. Rodman 1976). The father of the young woman sees to it that pork from his daughter's dure ceremony is received by his sister:

In the ceremony of dure, little girls are the instruments through which exchanges between adult brothers and sisters are effected. The norm of sister avoidance prevents a man from preparing food for his sisters; but he may feed his female siblings with gifts of pigs that his own child has killed. Men control the flow of pigs in Aoban society, while women produce and affect the distribution of pandanus mats. A man can repay the mats needed for bridewealth exchanges only by providing his sisters with pork, and to do so he must use a young girl as an intermediary (M. Rodman 1976:16).

The Longana say that all of the female uterine descendants of a FZ have the statuses of a ratahi bulengu toa. However, this rule is cross-cut by a woman's marital status, age, descent category membership and residence. A FZD, for example, who is not married may not be used as a confidante, nor may she give sexual instruction to her MBC, for she has not, as the Longana say, "known men". The respect and authority due a

FZ is not given by an adult man to a young child who is classed as ratahi*. Ratahi* of one's father's duvi (descent category) who reside at a distance may play little part in one's life, although informants insist that such women may do so if they wish. Ratahi* not of one's father's descent category usually have little effect on one's life, unless they happen to live in one's hamlet. Such women may take on the status of real FZ under certain conditions described below, but they are not obligated to do so, and one is not obligated to take on the roles of a BC toward them.

One's own father's own sister occupies the full set of identities of a FZ. While she is alive, her daughters and daughters' daughters etc. play a secondary part in the rights and duties of a FZ. These latter may participate as ratahi* at one's wedding, for example, but always one's genealogically closest and eldest ratahi* plays the principal part, and the others are subordinate to her lead. When a man's FZ dies, the next genealogically closest, and eldest woman whom one classes as ratahi*, e.g. FZD, succeeds to her status.

Life, of course, is not always so orderly. Under certain atypical circumstances any woman whom a man classes as ratahi* may assume the rights and

duties of a ratahi* toward him. For example, I witnessed a wedding ceremony for a man whose father had no surviving sisters. These women died without producing female offspring. The roles of ratahi* at the man's wedding were filled by local women not all of whom were of the groom's father's descent category. None of these women appeared on the groom's father's genealogy. The woman who played the part of the groom's principal, or genealogically closest FZ was a classificatory ZDDD (alalimbolimbogi) of the father of the groom.

I noted earlier in this section that informants find it difficult to describe precisely what a FZ is. The same is true for her husband, to whom ego refers as huri ("to follow"). A ratahi* marries and follows her husband to his hamlet. Her brother's son may follow FZH and stay with his FZH (huringu "mine to follow"). In the eyes of FZH, this child who helps his wife and treats her as a mother is "like" a son, and the Longana say that their FZH is like a father to them. A FZ is a ratahi* of opposite moiety. A FZH is like a tamai (F) of the same moiety. A FZH however does not discipline his WBC. As a consequence, a WBC can joke with his FZH, laugh at him, and tickle him under the chin in public. The joking relationship

is not unrestrained, however, because a huri (FZH) is of the same moiety as his WBC, and is therefore also like an elder sibling. In fact, a huri may be an elder sibling, or a MB. The closest that the Longana are able to come to describing the status of huri is as a close friend, one who is indulgent and generous.

Grandparents and Grandchildren

The relationship between a man and his grandchildren is one of familiarity and ribald jesting, although a grandparent can and does discipline his or her grandchildren. The joking relationship between a man and his grandchildren is modified by gender and moiety affiliation.

Between males of alternate generations and opposite moiety, the joking relationship is strongest. The usual custom is for a grandson to feign serious conversation with his grandfather, or else to sneak up on him from behind. The unsuspecting elder is then thrown to the ground, dust kicked in his face, and an attempt to tear off a piece of the old man's clothing is often made. Both men howl obscenities at one another. The attack is quickly over, and the young man disappears, laughing, down the bush trail. But not all young men

are successful at surprising their grandfathers. A young man may find that he has a heavy price to pay for his incompetence, for if the old man succeeds in defending himself long enough to clutch the young man's genitals, he is entitled to inflict considerable pain to his satisfaction. And the grandson, protest as loudly as he might, must suffer the penalty for an unsuccessful ambush until his grandfather decides to release him.

I have observed youngsters so attack elders of high and low rank. Most men engage in the jesting relationship with grandchildren whatever their rank in the graded society, but there are a few men who will not allow the dignity of their status to be publicly assaulted. If a grandfather is very old, or frail, a mock attack will ensue. There are some men who are the same age as their genealogically closest surviving grandparents who continue to engage fully in the joking relationship regardless of their relative ranks in the graded society: I have seen two men of superior rank (mabu) in the graded society, both over the age of fifty, sit facing one another in a crowded men's house, grabbing one another's ankles, pulling each other's shirts, lips and ears, swearing and laughing at one

another.

Between grandparents and grandchildren of same moiety the extent of the joking relationship is weakened because one is like an elder sibling of the other. In particular, a grandchild of same moiety of his grandparent must not swear at his grandparent. Usually the behaviour between them is restricted to a mock battle of strength such as arm wrestling or subdued jostling marked by uneasy laughter.

The joking relationship with a grandparent of opposite sex is usually more subdued. A woman's grandfather of the opposite moiety is entitled to tease his granddaughter with obscenities, and some do. However, reserve between the sexes hampers the full development of a joking relationship with a granddaughter for many men, and a young woman may tend to avoid a grandfather who teases her publicly with his sexual joking.

A father may hide some of his ritual knowledge from his own son, but not from his own grandchildren. In particular, a man's son's child may receive special instruction, since the grandparent and his grandchildren will be of the same moiety. Grandparents will contribute to the economic well being of their grandchildren by donating pigs and mats at weddings and at the funeral

ceremonies for a grandchild's father, for example.

Vagabui ("Grandchild") and Tubui ("Grandparent") as
Terms for Consanguineals and Spouses

The term for "grandchild" (vagabui) is used for consanguineals and spouses by a male ego. Furthermore, Longana males say that consanguineal granddaughters are approved and ideal spouses (see also Allen 1964: 317-319). One's own granddaughter is not marriageable because she possesses one-quarter of one's substance, but a BDD is an approved potential spouse. Similarly, women say that it is good to marry a "grandparent" (tubui).

Because grandchildren and grandparents of same moiety as ego (vagabui gogona, tubui gogona) are like ego's siblings, ego ought not to marry them, for one's spouse (vagabui, tubui) should not be also one's sibling. However, one's consanguineal grandchild or grandparent who is not like one's sibling -- vagabui and tubui of opposite moiety to oneself -- can be also one's spouse.

For a man, consanguineal vagabui who are not of his moiety are not like his siblings and there is an absence of restraint between a man and these

grandchildren. Sexual familiarity, though limited to an exchange of obscenities, is a characteristic feature of the relationship between a man and his grandchildren of opposite moiety.

Thus a man's granddaughter of opposite moiety is, apart from his FZ, the only woman to whom he may speak of sexual matters. This customary lack of male - female restraint, say the Longana, implies a potential procreative relationship between a man and his granddaughters of opposite moiety. However, because a grandchild is not a man's sibling of same and of opposite sex, a granddaughter of opposite moiety does not have the same kin class statuses and rights and duties with respect to a man as does his FZ. Nevertheless, the status of a vagabui of opposite moiety as an ideal spouse ties vagabui as a consanguineal category to the story of human procreation.

In Chapter Five, I argued that the consanguineal, spouse and affinal terminologies are inextricably conjoined. The status of a consanguineal grandchild returns us to the same point. In the context of the story of human reproduction, there is a certain congruence of vagabui as a consanguineal term with vagabui as a term for a man's spouse.

In the story of reproduction, the first genitor's consanguineal vagabui was his junior sibling who was also destined to become his wife. However, the later adoption of the incest tabu and exogamous matrimoieties meant that siblings ought not to be also wives (vagabui). I have argued in Chapter Five that the custom of classifying one's spouse as vagabui refers to both of these conditions in the story.

Consanguineal vagabui are yet a man's junior siblings (vagabui gogona, e.g., BSD) and potential spouses (vagabui, e.g., BDD). However, the former ought not to be also one's wives (vagabui) while the latter, because they are not one's siblings, are ideal potential spouses (vagabui). Thus, there is a sense in which vagabui as a term for consanguineals recapitulates the story of human reproduction in a manner similar to that of vagabui as a term for spouses.

Adoption, Illegitimacy, and Flood

I noted earlier that even the rights and duties associated with the bonds of dai may be disclaimed in Longana. But can the bonds of dai themselves be disclaimed? Some anthropologists (Scheffler 1973:754) argue that genitor-offspring and genetrix-offspring

relations are ". . . universally conceived as inalienable (Scheffler 1973:755; see also Fortes 1978:21).

Not so in Longana. The Longana have a form of adoption (halo) in which an infant may be raised as the dai of another couple. Should the child learn of its real parents, it may make claims, e.g., to land, on the basis of its bonds of dai to its real parents, and these claims must be recognized as legitimate. However, in these cases, the adopted child does not lose his or her legitimate rights as the son or daughter of his adoptive parents. To the Longana, adoptive links of dai, so to speak, are no weaker than real ones.

Informants lament the fact that there are malicious people who have, for whatever reason, informed another that he or she is the child of another man and woman. But informants universally claimed that there are cases of successfully hidden adoption in the district, and these adopted persons have been brought up to believe that they are the offspring of their adoptive parents. Successful cases of hidden adoption are by definition impossible to find. Indeed, it is often extremely difficult to find out about cases of adoption in which the adopted person, and others, are aware that he is not the dai of those who refer to him as daingu.

But the issue here is not whether an anthropologist is able to find successful cases of hidden adoption, or what happens when one's true parentage is revealed. The question is: do the Longana consider the bonds of dai -- genitor-offspring and genatrix-offspring relations -- as being inalienable? In Longana, the bond of dai is in principle alienable through the process of adoption.

Furthermore, in cases of illegitimacy, the Longana did not try to establish the genitor of the child, and with good reason. To accuse a man of "pulling a woman", a phrase which means anything from forcible rape to elopement, was to invite a fight which could result in the death of the accused or the outraged father of the woman. Such deaths initiated rounds of vengeance into which larger numbers of people were drawn, and often the end result was warfare. Consequently, when a father found that his unwed daughter was pregnant, he made no attempt to find the genitor. The father would try to find someone to marry his daughter and so become the child's father. In addition, a woman could have aborted herself with the aid of her sisters and mothers in the menstruation hut, thus keeping the fact of her pregnancy secret.

But failing this, or a man willing to marry the woman, the Longana had an ingenious device for ensuring that an illegitimate child remained with its mother and, hopefully, would provide a suitable explanation to the public for the appearance of an infant.

In the Longana story of procreation, many of the descent categories (duvi) originated when infants were discovered in the bush, or miraculously appeared from the feathers of birds, in a bird's nest, in a litter of pigs, etc. When an unmarried woman became pregnant, she would be secluded until she delivered. During the night, her infant would be taken into the bush and placed, for example near a bird's nest. At dawn, the women would walk through the bush, retrieve the child, and noisily announce that they had, as had the founding ancestors, found a child which must have been born by the bird whose nest was nearby. The child was given the moiety affiliation of its mother, assigned to a new descent category named after the bird that had presumably given birth to it; and placed with its mother. If the infant was a girl, she would be the founder of a new descent category.

The Longana say that, in the past, people believed this deception. Whether people believed it

or not is not the point. The genitor of the child was not sought. The illegitimate bond of dai between a man and his child was totally discounted and therefore so were the rights and duties associated with that bond of dai.

In Longana, genitor-offspring and genitrix-offspring relations were not and are not considered inalienable. The evidence from adoption practises and from customs concerning cases of illegitimacy, exists in contradiction to Scheffler's generalization that genitor-offspring and genitrix-offspring relations are:

. . . universally conceived as inalienable, as 'in the nature of things' It is a source of considerable concern to most of the world's peoples that it is possible to create relations of genealogical connection out of wedlock While it is important to note that a man's entitlement to some or most of his rights and duties as genitor of his offspring may be denied him if he did not have the right to engender them in the first place, he remains their genitor whether he had that right or not, and this fact is never totally discounted for social purposes (Scheffler 1973:755).

Summary and Conclusions

All those classed by the same term do not have the same social identities and rights and duties with respect to ego. Characteristically, the genealogically closest representative of the kin category, e.g., (tamai) has a cluster of social identities (Keesing 1969:221), e.g., guardian, disciplinarian, household head, etc., that more genealogically distant members of the class do not have in full. Potentially, these other members of the kin category may assume the full set of identities associated with the term upon the death of the genealogically closest member who is classed by the term. In other words, the statuses associated with a kin term attenuate with genealogical distance from the primary referent of the term. Thus, a FB (tue tamai) may succeed to his brother's status with respect to ego, but while one's father is alive he and only he occupies the full set of identities associated with the term tamai (F) with respect to those whom he classifies as daingu. Ideally, there is an orderly succession to the status of F, and the rules are genealogically phrased. For example, in the event of father's death, one's eldest FB should succeed to his status, and only if one has no FB may a FZS succeed

to the identities associated with one's father. The Longana system of kin classification thus supports, at least in the Longana ideal model, a hypothesis suggested by Scheffler and Lounsbury:

. . . we may treat it as a hypothesis that rules of kin-class or terminological extension may reflect rules of status succession. Extensions of a kinship term, then, would define a class of potential legal successors - and successors to successors - to statuses held by one's nearer kinsman (Scheffler and Lounsbury 1971:154).

The Longana data also confirm a point which Scheffler (1973:768) has consistently stressed: the fact that two or more kinsmen may be classed by the same term need not necessarily imply that those kinsmen have identical status with respect to ego. One reason why this is true in Longana is that rights and duties associated with the term attenuate with genealogical distance. But there are additional reasons why coclassification does not imply similarity of status in Longana.

First, one's relative age may affect one's status. For example, no one expects an adult to confide in, or take advice from a tamai (e.g., FZDS) who is a young child. Second, marital status may be

important. A man's FZD may not assume her identities as confidante and sexual instructress if she is unmarried. Third, a genealogically close kinsman may not exercise his or her identities with respect to ego if he or she lives at a distance. Conversely, a genealogically distant kinsman may be treated as a close kinsman if he or she resides in ego's hamlet. This factor of coresidence is important. The Longana claim that all those who live in the same village or "within the same fence", as they put it, are as close relatives to one another, and should demonstrate the solidarity ideally typical of close kinsmen, at least with respect to outsiders.

Fourth, coclassification does not necessarily imply similarity of status because of the nature of genealogical connection itself. The fact that certain kinsmen may have two sexual identities adds considerable ambiguity to the status system. A MB and his ZS may choose to accent the same-sex sibling aspect of their relationship, and thus a man's ZS may be treated as if he were a tue (B). This is the normative ideal in Longana, but because a man's ZS is like an opposite-sex sibling, and not of identical substance as are his own siblings, there is ample opportunity for a man to neglect his duties as an elder brother to his ZS,

and vice versa. Thus, although there is a normative rule that a man and his sister's offspring are like elder and junior siblings to one another, there is no guarantee that the genealogical connections between them will be sufficient to ensure that they will assume and maintain the normatively appropriate statuses with respect to one another.

Furthermore, although the bond of dai between ego and his or her own offspring normatively associates those offspring closely with ego's siblings, especially if those siblings are of identical substance to ego, there is no guarantee that ego's siblings will assume the normatively appropriate statuses with respect to ego's children. A FB may refuse to assume the responsibility for ensuring that his dead brother's children will receive some of the land which they can claim from their father's sibling-set because of the bond of dai which links them to their dead father. Only a man's own children are his daingu, and a man can always refuse to play tamai (F) to his dead brother's child. Such behaviour was not normative, but it wasn't unusual either.

The Longana notion of blood relationship has two aspects. On the one hand, it can serve as a link to a field of genealogical connections beyond one's

parents and thus to a large number of persons who will, normatively at least, be able and willing to assume, partially or wholly, the same rights and duties with respect to ego as those kin types who are genealogically closest to ego. Thus the bonds of dai may be seen as a means of social integration.

On the other hand, the notion of blood relationship can and does have the opposite effect, for it systematically and sharply carves out parent-child relationships as units and disembeds them from the rest of the social network. Nowhere is this more clearly seen than in the separation of the uterine descendants of a common ancestress, "siblings born of one mother", into isolates of siblings of identical substance. In Longana, the nuclear family overrides descent.

Beyond the immediate genealogical relationships created by dai the rights and duties associated with the kin terminology are only loosely connected to genealogical connection. Even the social identities associated with the bond of dai itself are not inherent to it. Thus a man may be one's genitor, but genitors need not assume the identities appropriate to a father with respect to his daingu and vice versa.

Many anthropologists (e.g., Firth 1968:23, 27; Fortes 1969:52-57; Needham 1974:40, 55, 73; Schneider

1968b:13, 1976:201; Southwold 1971:40) have argued or assumed that a primary function of a system of kin classification is to refer to a system of roles or rights and duties. As Scheffler has noted:

. . . . The argument is not simply functional but causal: terminological equations and distinctions of kin types are held to follow . . . from equivalence or nonequivalence of social status, or both terminological and jural status are held to be dependent "on the group structure of the society" . . . or on other abstract "structural principles"

While it may be true in some cases that coclassification implies similarity of status and, conversely, that classification under different kinship terms implies dissimilarity of status, this is far from being a nonexceptionable arrangement (Scheffler 1975:768).

The Longana data support those anthropologists (Keesing 1969, 1972:21; Scheffler and Lounsbury 1971:5; Scheffler 1972a:115, 1973:768) who argue that, strictly speaking, kin terms do not label roles; kin terms only connote or imply rights and duties:

. . . occupying a focal kin type vis-a-vis ego connotes a cluster of roles. Alter's classification by the kin term does not depend on his assuming this cluster of social identities (or their being appropriate to him) and enacting the composite role (Keesing 1969:221).

However, the data tell us more than that.

Since the Longana do not conceive of the bonds of dai as inalienable, their concept of parentage and therefore of genealogical connection exists in contradiction to Scheffler's generalization (1973:756) that genitor-offspring and genetrix-offspring relationships are irreducible elements of all kinship systems.

CHAPTER SEVEN

KINSHIP AND CUSTOM

Introduction

In the last chapter, I identified a fundamental ambiguity inherent in the Longana concept of genealogical connection. On the one hand, the Longana may use the bond of dai to forge an ideology of solidarity, or kinship amity (Fortes 1969:232) beyond their immediate parents, siblings and children. However, because the bond of dai can also serve to isolate one's own siblings, offspring and parents from one's other more classificatory kin, e.g., FB, BC, MB, etc., the axiom of kinship amity can be denied. ✓

The Longana refer to the norms surrounding genealogical connection that emphasize solidarity as the "straight" or the "true" way. But deviations from these standards for behaviour between kin are not unusual.

In the initial stages of fieldwork, the ethnographer who asks for the customs associated with different kin classifications is introduced into a world in which all those classed as F (tamai) are

kindly, indulgent, and as concerned for the welfare of their brother's children as they are for the welfare of their own; in which all those classed as siblings behave toward one another as siblings; a world in which all mother's brothers treat one as a true sibling; a world in which all men marry women of opposite moiety, etc. Such a view of Longana kinship and society is a parody of Longana social life. Standards for imitation (gaidumo) exist, and the Longana say they are rules, but the Longana also say that there are rules and there are the actions of men.

As I have indicated in Chapter Six, the rules or norms and the circumventions of them are rooted in the fact that the norms or standards for imitation themselves are only loosely connected with genealogical connection. The latter itself is an inherently ambiguous concept. The concepts upon which the rules are based are subject to negotiation, bargaining and interpretation.

But why should the norms and concepts upon which they are based be open for reassessment? In the next section I describe values unrelated to the kinship system. These values are principles for the pursuit of safe and successful living in Longana, and that pursuit is not always in accord with the ideal standards for behaviour associated with genealogical connection.

In such circumstances norms are not a reliable guide to social action in Longana.

In the third section, I put the material discussed in the second to use in examining some case examples that illustrate that the normative model of kinship relationships is often not a reliable guide in predicting or accounting for social action in Longana. The Longana manage to surprise not only the ethnographer who tries to utilize the normative model for kinship behaviour in order to figure out what his informants are up to, they manage to surprise one another as well. By these criteria (Keesing 1972:24) Longana society may appropriately be characterized as loosely-structured.

This brings up the problem of the analysis of statuses and roles in the study of kinship. In the fourth section of this chapter, I supplement the material presented so far with a detailed example of the public debate that occurred when two close kin of the same descent category announced their intention to marry. An analysis of that debate demonstrates that, in the Longana case at least, it is not fruitful to assume that the norms associated with kin class statuses form an underlying code for behaviour which may be studied as a grammatical system (Goodenough 1965;

Keesing 1969, 1970, 1972) in order to account for Longana behaviour. Rather, the norms should be studied as they are used in social transactions (Scheffler 1966:293). It is the bargaining, manipulative approach to life which characterizes Longana society, not an adherence to rules, or the existence of rules for the breaking of rules (Harris 1974).

In the fifth section, I discuss the Longana descent categories (duvi). I argue that there are no descent groups in Longana, but the descent categories play a significant part in Longana social life nevertheless. By means of these descent categories, and by manipulating the norms associated with siblings, a Longana can artfully create a web of obligations with classificatory kin of other descent categories of same and of opposite moiety.

In the sixth, and final section, I draw together elements from this and the preceding chapter in order to discuss the theoretical relevance of the relationship between kin terminology and social action in Longana.

Values for Living

The Longana subscribe to a number of values that are not related to the kinship system. These values are told to children in the form of custom stories and proverbs.

There is a rule that one ought not to force people into doing something that they do not wish to do. Resentment will always redound upon the forceful person, and, since one needs the cooperation of others, it is foolish to erode one's support. Repeatedly I heard the Longana justify others' actions which were contrary to the rules of kinship with the statement: "It is not good, but you cannot force men".

In a story which is used to instruct children, a man wants the leaky roof of his house repaired. His son wants to play in the surf with his friends, but the old man insists that his son help with thatching the roof. The son complies, but sadly. After the job is done, the old man, who is a magician, tells his son to get out his surf board and stand near the entrance to the village. Soon large waves come down the path, and the child spends a pleasant afternoon riding the sea.

The moral of the story is that authority may

be used, and ought to be respected, but one must not give the appearance of forcing another to conform to one's wishes. The child had to submit to the authority of his father, but at the same time the father respected the personal autonomy of his child.

And personal autonomy is highly respected in Longana. This results in the saying that one ought to mind one's own business. A man may refuse to become involved even in his brother's affairs, even when his brother is placed in jeopardy. This was forcefully driven home to me when, as a result of a gift that I made to a good friend, I learned that I had placed his health, perhaps his life itself, in danger. I vainly searched for the man. Persuaded by Longana ideology that the relationships between siblings are solidary, and assuming that between full-siblings solidarity would be axiomatic, I reported to the man's elder full-sibling the dangers that his brother faced. I was startled to receive a stone-faced reply of unconcern:

You will have to take that up with my brother. The matter is strictly between you and him. You find him. I have other things to do.

Other informants confirmed the principle that a man's

dealings with other men are really his own business. Later, my friend reprimanded me for involving others in his affairs.

Personal autonomy is valued, and so is a kind of rugged individualism. The Longana admire a person who, through his own efforts, succeeds in accomplishing much, particularly in the hungwe. One needs a strong will to succeed in life, especially in the graded society. Without determination a person will be of no account.

But there are limits to the admiration of a strong will. A person who gives the appearance of being excessively headstrong is bound to build up significant and long-lasting resentment. A strong-willed person who is successful can be assured of reserved admiration. One who fails may find it difficult to recover or build his reputation. The Longana will attempt to temper a headstrong child with discipline, while at the same time showing pride that the child demonstrates great determination.

The value placed upon personal autonomy, individualism and a strong will is combined with an ethos of reserve, or circumspection. The Longana have a series of proverbs that are used in everyday life, especially for the instruction of children, that

emphasize the same message: be prudent.

One such proverb is: "Give open-handedly with your right hand, but keep the left clenched". When one gives, one gives generously. But to give generously according to all the obligations associated with the kinship system, for example, will rapidly drain one's resources.

Ideally, a request from a kinsman cannot be denied. By holding some of his valuables in reserve, by "clenching his left hand", a man can always claim that he has nothing left to give. All Longana espouse the norm of generalized reciprocity between kin. They also know that to live up to the blanket obligations toward distant classificatory kin, or kin whom they do not trust or respect, can deplete one's resources for financing political ambitions or the marriage of one's children.

There are several ways in which one may protect one's valuables from the demands of others. For example, pigs, always in demand, especially if they have tusks, may be placed under the name of one's child who is too young to require such quantities of valuable animals. It is understood between father and son that the pigs be released only to the father. When another Longana requests a pig of the father, he may deny that

he has any; the numerous pigs rooting around his estate belong to his child. No one is fooled by this subterfuge. Yet the child cannot be forced to give up those pigs to anyone who requests them, at least not without his father's permission.

These customary values that are not associated with the Longana kinship system cross-cut the rights and duties ascribed to genealogical connection and enable a person to deny his kin-associated rights and duties, or at least to maneuver around them. Knowing the Longana standards with respect to approved interaction between kin may not be a reliable guide to Longana social action.

Action

In this section I will employ case materials to argue that the Longana social system is loosely structured. That is to say, Longana social action may be related to, but is not always predicated upon, the norms or rights and duties ideally associated with relations of genealogical connection.

Some anthropologists (Keesing 1972) object to, or are wary of, the use of the term loosely structured to characterize the social organization of a people.

A society might qualify as "loosely structured" if people went around surprising one another. When they go around surprising the ethnographer but not one another, the ethnographer must be looking for the wrong kind of structure in the wrong way (Keesing 1972:24).

The Longana have consistently managed to surprise three ethnographers who have studied them since 1970: myself, and Margaret and William Rodman (personal communication). In addition, the Longana routinely surprise one another.

I had been on the island for a number of months when I heard that a wedding was to take place in about three weeks' time. I had collected the genealogies of the fathers of the bride and the groom, and during the next few weeks I studied them carefully. On the eve of the wedding, I arranged for the father of the groom to come to my house. My plan was to comb through his genealogy with him, and try to estimate which of his kin were going to contribute how much to the bridewealth.

My informant, whom I shall call Joseph, agreed with me that the people on his genealogical chart should contribute to the payment which is made by the father of the groom to the bride's kin. But he couldn't tell

me whether in fact many of these kin were coming, and how much they were going to bring. Joseph emphasized that people will contribute only if they are willing and able, and that is up to each man to decide. One cannot force men to live up to their obligations, and it was conceivable that Joseph's prestation could fall short of the required amount. Joseph could not be certain of how much his kin would be contributing until they actually appeared in his hamlet and the donations were counted.

What then, was the required amount? Joseph didn't know that either. Although the fathers of the bride should consult with the fathers of the groom in advance so that the father of the groom can present more mats and pigs to the bride's kin than he receives from them on the day of the exchange, things can easily go awry.

First, the father of the bride may refuse to discuss the bridewealth before the wedding (M. Rodman 1976:60) if he is unhappy with the marriage. This may result in the unexpected presentation of a large number of mats to the kin of the groom, and they may not be able to return an appropriate "profit" to the kin of the bride. Second, even if the father of the bride has negotiated the bridewealth exchanges,

there is no guarantee that he will live up to the agreement. It is not unknown for a bride to appear in the village of the groom with more valuables than the groom's kin can repay. The father of the groom can be "downed" in this manner. That is, his reputation can be damaged, although the wedding will not be halted.

There are thus two elements which can lead to the potentially unpleasant surprise of the kin of the groom. First, one's kinsmen may be unable and/or unwilling to contribute the requisite goods on the day of the wedding. Second, one can always be fooled by the father of the bride.

Consequently, in order to control the ambiguity inherent in the bridewealth exchanges, a representative of the kin of the groom, usually a FB or B, appears in the village of the bride when her portion of the wedding exchange is being amassed. The representative of the groom's kin does a quick count of the pigs and mats, returns quickly to the hamlet of the groom and reports to the groom's father. The father of the groom and his brothers can then finally ascertain if they have the requisite amount.

In the morning we'll go down to the bride's village and we'll see. One of us will go down. He'll watch them getting ready to bring the woman here. He'll count how many mats, how many pigs. Then he'll come back and tell us how many mats and pigs we'll need, and then we'll talk and see if we have enough, because there must be a little more given to those belonging to the bride than they give to us. It isn't acceptable for us to return to them their own mats and pigs.

If the kin of the groom are short of the amount that they have observed being amassed by the kin of the bride, they have no longer than the rest of the day and that evening to try and obtain more valuables. The bride usually is brought to the groom's village on the day after she has killed pigs (dure) and her mats have been accumulated. Sometimes, however, she may be brought that afternoon.

Ambiguity, and hence uncertainty is institutionalized in bridewealth exchanges. Uncertainty also is a fact of life in the investment and ritual slaughter of boars in the graded society (hungwe) (M. Rodman 1976:58-59; W. Rodman 1973), but since that institution is not closely connected with the kinship system, I mention the uncertainty with respect to it only in passing. Rather, I wish to discuss two cases in some detail as further examples of the fact that knowledge of the statuses ascribed to

kinship is not enough to account for social action in Longana.

Case I

Michael is a high ranking man in the Aoban graded society (hungwe). He lives with his brothers in the village of Luwoa. Three miles down the road lives the principal leader (ratahigi) of Longana, Job. Job's success in the graded society is largely due to the fact that Michael's father, now dead, a man of high rank and great influence in Longana, adopted Job as his brother and aided Job's meteoric rise in the hungwe.

Job is thus a "father" of Michael, and Job's children, who live in the hamlet of Tiko with Job, are Michael's "siblings". Job has helped Michael substantially in the graded society, and Michael, loyal to his sponsor, is known as the executive, or the "hand" of Job. So close is the relationship between Michael and Job that some informants say that Michael is closer to Job's sons than he is to his own siblings who live with Michael in Luwoa.

Michael is recognized as a man of integrity. This, coupled with his rank in the graded society, qualifies him for the title of ratahigi (leader), at

least of his own village of Luwoa.

Although the villages of Luwoa and Tiko are three miles apart, they worship at the same church and have close political and social ties because of the adoptive and political relationships between Michael's father, Michael, and Job. The people of Luwoa and Tiko identify themselves, and are identified, as being members of one community, under one ratahigi, Job, and his assistant, Michael.

During my stay in Longana, a series of disputes erupted between Michael's real siblings at Luwoa and his siblings by adoption at Tiko. The disputes centered around Job. Job had been building an exceptionally large men's house commensurate with his rank, at Tiko. He had called upon Michael and his siblings at Luwoa for labour, and they had worked hard. It is customary in Longana to reward those who labour on projects of this sort with food, kava, and payments of mats. For a long time, Job had provided copious amounts of food and kava but his payments of valuable mats to Michael's siblings had never been made.

Michael's siblings then refused to labour on Job's men's house until the outstanding debts had been paid. Work halted on the men's house, for Michael's siblings were Job's principal source of labour. Job

and his children were angry, but no payments seemed forthcoming.

One of Michael's children worked at the Cooperative store in Tiko where Job had run up a long-standing debt of a few hundred dollars and, despite repeated requests by the Coop, Job had not paid off his account. The Coop was in financial difficulty and needed their money. Out of exasperation, and perhaps a little malice, Michael's son posted Job's account on the Coop bulletin board.

A man's business is a private matter, and a ratahigi's dignity, and reputation, is jealously guarded. Job justifiably was angered. He demanded that valuable tusked boars be paid to him by Michael, his siblings and children in compensation for the defamation of character that Job had suffered because of the gossip concerning his intentions to pay his debts to the Coop and to Michael's siblings.

Michael paid, but he could not cover the fines of his children and his brothers. At this point, one of Job's children who rightly has a reputation of being rapacious, attempted, on behalf of his father, to raise the compensation payments. Michael understandably balked, and his siblings from Tiko and his siblings from Luwoa became involved in a fractious dispute

that sometimes erupted in violence over a period of a month. Job, publicly embarrassed over this turn of events, tried in vain to restrain his offspring. Michael, for his part, tried to restrain his siblings, also to no avail.

Although Michael and Job made their peace, Michael was now in an intolerable position. His own siblings at Luwoa called upon him as ratahigi and as a full-sibling to defend their interests against Job's children. Job's children demanded that Michael, as the "hand" of Job, as the ratahigi of Luwoa and as their sibling, enforce their demands upon Michael's own siblings and children.

Speculation concerning Michael's position in the dispute was the topic of much conversation for a period of two weeks. Whom would Michael support? Some informants said that Michael would support his own siblings. They had been abused by Job and his children. Michael was first born; he must support his full-siblings. Others claimed that Michael could not forget his status as a ratahigi and the fact that he owed Job gratitude and loyalty for Job's support and sponsorship. Still others argued that Michael's close association with Job and his children over the years was de facto proof that Michael was unconcerned about his real siblings, and that he would support his "father"

and mentor, Job, and his "siblings", Job's children.

The dispute erupted again in Michael's village. Job's children and Michael's younger siblings fought. Then they proceeded to Michael's house in order to confront him and, they hoped, definitively ascertain Michael's position.

Whom did Michael support? No one. To the consternation of his squabbling siblings and fellow Longana, Michael, hearing the noise of the fight as it approached his home, had quietly gathered together his dogs and, literally and figuratively leaving his social identities and rights and duties behind, had gone off to the bush to hunt wild pig. Then he visited his FBC in another village about five miles distant, for a week.

This decision cost Michael heavily. His reputation as a ratahigi and as a kinsman was severely damaged. Up until the time I left Aoba, Michael had not been able to restore his position with his siblings or his reputation as a promising man of influence in Longana politics. But what is important in this case is that the Longana who were not parties to the dispute were unable to predict what Michael would do. Indeed,

they disagreed among themselves about what Michael should do. And Michael's siblings and Job's children were startled by what Michael did.

Michael's case is dramatic, but the surprise he caused is not all that unusual in Longana. One more example must suffice to demonstrate my point. It is a neat contrast to Michael's case. Whereas Michael shed his identities to the consternation of his kin, Isaac used his kinship status to mystify the entire district.

Case II

Before my arrival on Aoba, the people of the district of Longana had decided to build a Cultural Centre near the village of Lovonda. Considerable land was required for the project, and it was decided at a district meeting that the land would be donated to the Centre.

Some of the land that Andrew and his brothers cultivated was to be made into a playing field for the Centre. Andrew's brothers were in favour of donating the land, but Andrew, aided and abetted by his son, Isaac, contested the gift. Andrew's land was valuable. It was planted with coconut trees, and copra is the principal access that Aobans have to cash. Isaac,

for his part, was concerned for his patrimony. Andrew calls Isaac daingu ("my blood"): that land should someday belong to Isaac.

Isaac was also employed by the Centre, for Isaac had a good education and was familiar with the "fashion" of white men. A young Australian was hired to oversee the construction and development of the Centre.

At the time of my arrival, Andrew had asked \$1600 Australian for compensation. His brothers, and the political leaders of the district were angered. The price went up to \$3200. Another meeting was held.

Isaac did all the talking. Andrew is a retiring man, but Isaac is well-known as a "strong-head". He argued his case with some arrogance, but well. Andrew's brothers and the leading politicians decided that Andrew's land ought to be donated to the Centre but some compensation should be made to Andrew for the loss of his coconut trees. Andrew received five dollars per tree for his losses, a total of \$490.

Here Andrew drops out of the picture, and Isaac takes centre stage. Isaac was unhappy with the land settlement and made his complaints public. The Australian was angry because he thought that Isaac, as an employee of the Centre ought not to have asked

such an exorbitant sum for the land. Isaac's incessant complaining further alienated him from the Australian and from Isaac's fellow Longana who thought that Isaac ought to abide by the decision that the district leaders, his father's brothers, and the public had made.

Isaac's relationship with the Australian deteriorated to the point that the Australian had Isaac fired. Isaac's protests received little sympathy: his headstrong actions against a community decision, and his constant grumbling and scrapping with the Australian had eroded support for his present case.

Two days after Isaac was fired, Longana awoke to find the playing field planted in coconuts and bananas, and the road running round the field blocked by logs. Isaac admitted to planting the field and blocking the road.

The Longana were outraged. The land issue was settled, and Andrew had accepted compensation. How could Isaac have the audacity to raise the land issue again? Besides, as one ratahigi informed me, everyone could understand Isaac's concern for a part of his patrimony, but Andrew was still alive, and had the right to dispose of his land. Furthermore, a son doesn't take his father's land without the agreement of his father's brothers, and without compensating them

for that land. Hence, Isaac's making a garden out of the playing field was also contrary to the rules for succeeding to one's father's parcels of land.

Over the next two months, small meetings of important men were held to decide what to do about Isaac. The Longana hoped the matter would go away, or else that someone would be able to persuade Isaac to tear out the trees and remove the roadblock. Isaac adamantly refused to do so.

Finally, exasperated, the two most important ratahigi and other principal leaders met, and decided that an unpleasant general meeting would be held at the Centre. Isaac would be taught a lesson. His fine for defying the law of the ratahigi would be stiff. This headstrong young man had to be brought under control.

A general meeting was called. People flowed into the large hall at the Centre from all over the district. The crowd became so large that people jostled one another for a place near windows and doors; others had to sit on the grass and hope that those near the windows would keep up a running commentary on the progression of the case.

The meeting opened. The ranking men made

preliminary statements concerning the purpose of the meeting -- Isaac's claim, by the planting of trees, to the Centre's land. Isaac rose to speak. A change had come over him. His arrogance was gone. His voice was respectfully muted. The crowd hushed, listened to Isaac's opening statement, and then rapidly began to buzz and groan with disbelief.

Isaac did not want the land, he wanted his job! He confessed that the planting of the field had been a ruse to air his complaints concerning his firing. Now that everyone was here, said Isaac, they might as well listen. They did, and they decided that Isaac had been mistreated, although he was not without blame. Isaac was reinstated.

The Longana had assumed that Isaac, by planting the playing field, was renewing his claim to Andrew's land by right of his bond of dai to Andrew. That was an action that a headstrong young man would be expected to perform. But Isaac admitted only to planting the crops. He never did say why he had done so. Isaac had used his kinship status as Andrew's son, and the rights associated with that status, to mystify his fellow Longana. Isaac's action reinforced his reputation as a "strong-head". But now people were filled with amusement and admiration for Isaac's brilliant coup.

This man, admitted the principal ratahigi of Longana, had potential.

In sum, there are times when the Longana are unable to use the norms associated with genealogical connection to predict or influence another's actions. Furthermore, as the case of Isaac shows, even those actions that seem most intelligible as manifestations of the rights and duties associated with genealogical connection may be illusory.

I have emphasized the unpredictable element in Longana society in order to argue that Longana society is loosely structured with reference to the rights and duties associated with genealogical connection. But are the norms associated with kinship therefore unimportant in understanding Longana social action? In the next two sections I will show that, even though Longana social action may be unpredictable at times, the norms associated with kinship and marriage are vitally important for an understanding of Longana society.

Using the Rules

Isaac's case is a good example. He used the norms associated with dai to mystify his audience.

But if those norms were not important, his audience could never have been misled.

Isaac was using kinship to talk about something else. But the message he was conveying by doing so was not his real purpose. Longana thought that Isaac was talking about land, when in fact he was talking about his job. Anthropologists have often commented on the use of kinship as idiom (Leach 1961:11, Scheffler 1965:112) and this certainly occurs in Longana as Isaac's case illustrates. However, an apocryphal story has it that Freud once remarked that sometimes a cigar is just a cigar; in Longana, sometimes disputes about kinship are just disputes about kinship.

Case III

When Barnabas announced his intention to marry Rachel, the first reaction of many Longana was to forbid the marriage. Rachel is Barnabas' MMMZDD. Barnabas refers to Rachel as ratahi (M), and both Barnabas and Rachel are of the same moiety and descent category: duvi na ure ("duvi, or 'part' of the lobster"). Furthermore, Barnabas and Rachel have lived all their lives in the hamlet of Undu and so they were well

aware that they are of the same descent category.

Barnabas' father was dead, but his father's full-sibling (FB) Matthew had dutifully assumed the responsibilities of guardian, provider of land, disciplinarian, etc., of Barnabas' father. Matthew was determined that Barnabas and Rachel would not marry.

Matthew is an old man and is perhaps the most respected political leader (ratahigi) in the district. He is also renowned as the ultimate authority on Longana custom. As a ratahigi, Matthew forbid the marriage. As a man of custom he argued that such marriages were not "straight". As the father of Barnabas, Matthew threatened that, should Barnabas defy his ruling, then Matthew would see to it that Barnabas would not receive any of his dead father's land.

There were those who agreed with Matthew. There were those who did not. The two factions met at Matthew's homestead in Undu to debate the issue, for Barnabas and Rachel had announced that, whatever the consequences, they were determined to marry.

Matthew was persuaded to relent by the very people that an ethnographer would expect to oppose

the marriage most strongly: the close kin of Barnabas and Rachel, especially those who are members of the couple's descent category (duvi na ure). The arguments that the members of duvi na ure used to persuade Matthew to change his mind are instructive.

First, it was argued that since Matthew, Rachel and Barnabas all lived in Undu, and Matthew had often acknowledged the affection and esteem that he and his BS Barnabas had for one another, Matthew could be assured that Barnabas and his wife would care for him in his old age. It was emphasized that often children are lax in their duties to aged parents, especially if their parents are not their real parents. Barnabas had consistently treated Matthew with the affection and respect due to his own genitor, and there was every reason to suppose this would continue in the future if Barnabas was allowed to marry Rachel. But if Barnabas was forced to run away with Rachel to live in another hamlet, as he surely would, Matthew would likely be permanently estranged from Barnabas.

Second, intramoiety marriages were nothing new. Matthew was aware, it was argued, that marrying a woman of same moiety was customarily desirable, especially for a ratahigi. Furthermore, many custom stories refer to the marriage of actual brother and

sister. One is the Longana story of procreation. Another is the story of the first ritual slaughter of boars, in which a man needs a wife in one part of the ceremony. He has none, and so he marries his sister. But the most important custom story concerns the history of duvi na ure itself.

There are certain people in Longana who are members of a descent category known as duvi biti (biti: "little"), but they are, the Longana say, really duvi na ure. Those of duvi na ure who have married their descent category "sisters", or who are matrilineal descendants of such marriages, are said to be following a tradition of intra-duvi marriage established long ago by a man named Biti.

Biti, it is said, was of marriageable age, but found it difficult to find a wife. So Biti charmed a coconut with love magic, place it on a path which he thought the women from other hamlets would use, and waited in the bush.

Much to Biti's consternation, his younger sister appeared on the path, and charmed by the coconut, insisted upon marrying Biti. Biti, his parents and siblings all objected, but there was nothing they could do. The magic was too strong. Biti and his sister were

married.

Consequently, it is not unexpected that every generation or so two people of duvi na ure become married. The Longana say that it is one of the character flaws of those of duvi na ure to want to marry their "sisters", and when they do, they are assigned the duvi affiliation of duvi biti. Duvi na ure is the only duvi given this derogatory appellation: when people of other duvi intermarry there is no reclassification of them. The appellation of duvi biti is, then, regarded as an insult to all those of duvi na ure, whether they have married within their own duvi or not.

Some people say that we are duvi biti because a man of duvi na ure took his sister. So now they say that we marry our sisters. That's why they say that Barnabas and Rachel are duvi biti. This is rubbish talk! We're not ashamed of it, because Biti wasn't the first man or the last to do it!

Although those of duvi na ure regard the characterization of their duvi as having a propensity to marry sisters as slander, the story of Biti could be used to the advantage of Rachel and Barnabas, and it was. After all, Barnabas and Rachel couldn't really help themselves. They were the victims of a

heritable trait for which their duvi is famous.

Matthew had to admit that intramoiety and intra-duvi marriages were part of Longana tradition, even though they weren't "straight" practises. Then his opponents strengthened their case by arguing that because Rachel was the same duvi as Barnabas, and what is more, his ratahi (M), Barnabas could leave his wife at home assured that she would look after her husband's interests, would treat his brothers with respect, and would not cheat on her husband.

Finally, a strong argument for the marriage of Rachel and Barnabas was made on the basis of their personal characteristics, or "fashion". Although one's spouse should come from the moiety opposite to one's own, the Longana emphasize that the personal qualities of the potential spouse may determine choice. It was argued that Barnabas and Rachel are fine examples of a proper upbringing according to Longana custom. They are kind to everyone, industrious, and respectful to their elders. There was nothing in the history of their families or in their present behaviour that would indicate that these two young people would have a bad marriage.

Matthew, consistent with his reputation as

reasonable man and leader (ratahigi), yielded to the arguments of those in favour of the marriage. Matthew insists yet that the marriage was wrong. However, the relationship between Barnabas and Matthew has not been harmed by the marriage or the debate over it.

Case III demonstrates that the rules associated with kinship and marriage are open for discussion. The Longana say that the norms associated with kinship and marriage are important, but tradition also includes precedents, such as the story of Biti and the custom for leaders (ratahigi) to take at least one wife of same moiety for protection, that run counter to the rules of kinship and marriage. Such contradictions to the normative order provide loopholes that allow the rules to be re-negotiated according to concrete situations.

Loopholes, once established, can be exploited using other norms that are associated with kinship and marriage. Once Matthew had to admit that intramoiety and intra-duvi marriages were part of the Longana tradition, his opponents could argue the advantages of having a wife who is also a ratahi (M) of one's duvi and who would therefore be more concerned for one's welfare and more faithful than a woman of opposite moiety; the advantage of marrying someone of good

character, and the advantage, for Matthew, of not alienating the future respect and affection of a dutiful son.

Some anthropologists (Goodenough 1965, Keesing 1970) have treated the norms associated with kinship as part of a conceptual code that underlies and informs behaviour. They assume that the social identities and the rights and duties associated with genealogical connection are conceptually systematized by the actors and therefore the norms may be analyzed formally as if they constitute a grammar (Goodenough 1965:6, Keesing 1970:423) in order to explain and predict social interaction.

So conceived, cultures are epistemologically in the same realm as language . . . , as inferred ideational codes lying behind the realm of observable events (Keesing 1974:77).

It is true that there is a normative "code" associated with genealogical connection, but it does not carry us very far in understanding Longana social interaction. First, the Longana concept of genealogical connection itself and the dual sexual identities associated with some types of genealogical connection

(e.g., a man's ZS), give ample opportunity for the code to be denied or circumvented.

Second, the code is contradicted by traditional practises and myths that can be used in evaluating the code itself. Third, there are values not associated with the notion of genealogical connection that provide a rationale for circumventing the code. These values, and the circumvention of the norms associated with genealogical connection are as much a part of Longana culture as the code itself.

In the Longana case, it is not a fruitful procedure to abstract the norms associated with genealogical connection and treat them as an ideational system under the assumption that the purpose of these norms is to provide a set of standards by which social action is organized. Depending upon particular circumstances, the norms associated with kinship may be used in this way, but often they are not.

Descent Categories and the Expansion of Kin Networks

In preceding sections of this chapter I have described how a person may circumvent the norms associated with genealogical connection in the pursuit of private goals. To a certain extent I have thus neglected the other side of Longana kinship: the kinship norms imply

solidarity between relatives. If the norms can be circumvented, how can ego try to ensure that others will in fact live up to their obligations toward him?

As I have indicated in Chapter Six, ego may stress, through his behaviour toward alter, the solidary aspects of the bonds of dai in an attempt to ensure that his immediate classificatory kin (e.g., FB, FZC, MB, etc.) live up to the rights and duties associated with their kin classifications. This is effective, but it limits one's support to a small circle of relatives. In order to be successful, a man needs a considerable number of people upon whom he can rely, especially if his sibling set is small. This section examines the role that Longana descent categories (duvi) have to play in the Longana kinship system.

I have consistently referred to the Longana duvi as a descent category. In doing so, I have been following those anthropologists (Keesing 1975:9-10; Scheffler 1966) who maintain that a distinction between social category and social group is necessary in the analysis of social systems. A social category, such as "the descendants of ancestor X" is a conceptual classification, whereas a social group:

. . . consists of actual warm-blooded human beings who recurrently interact in an interconnected set of roles . . . what defines a group is its internal organization, the articulation of its members in a set of interconnected roles (Keesing 1975:10).

The distinction between category and group is essential (Scheffler 1966; Holy 1976:107-131), for it is not always true that the existence of descent categories among a people results in the existence of descent groups among them (Scheffler 1966:544). ✓
Longana is such a case.

The Longana have a concept of descent. As I have noted in Chapters Three and Five, all the uterine descendants of a common ancestress can be thought of as being born from that ancestress. This is achieved by identifying the offspring of a woman with herself, or more accurately, her womb. All the uterine descendants of a woman are siblings by telescoping, as it were, her uterine descendants upward through successive wombs. Thus the category duvi is defined with reference to an ancestress.

However, the Longana cannot trace actual links to the founding ancestress of their descent category. Indeed, knowledge of one's progenitors

for more than three generations is vague." No one knows how many generations have passed since his or her duvi was formed. Duvi, then, are matriclans. But these matriclans are not descent groups, nor are - unilineal descent groups formed from the matriclans.

The essence of descent group ideology is that the members of the descent category can together act as a single legal individual (Keesing 1975:17; Scheffler 1966 : 543; Fortes 1969:304) vis-a-vis outsiders. Descent categories can be transformed into descent groups, the paradigm of the corporation (Fortes 1969:304), because the descent ideology itself declares that those belonging to the descent category see themselves in an important sense as one person (Fortes 1969:304; Keesing 1975:17-18).

Some anthropologists (Fortes 1969:176 fn, 184, 304; La Fontaine 1973:47) seem to assume, probably on the basis of African materials, (Poewe and Lovell 1980), that a concept of descent that is expressed as "being born of one mother" or of "one womb" implies that all members of that descent category see themselves as being of the same substance as their ancestors, therefore, as one person. The Longana data exist in contradiction to this assumption.

Certainly, the primitive elements of the notion of unity within the Longana matriclan are present, due no doubt to the upward telescoping of uterine kin and hence their identification as siblings: one ought not to marry within one's matriclan, one ought not to kill a member of one's matriclan, for example. But, as I have shown in Chapters Three, Five, and Six, the Longana doctrine of blood (dai) ensures that a sibling set cannot see themselves as their progenitors or as having identical substance with future generations.

The Longana descent construct lacks the basic condition, as specified by Fortes (1969:304), for the development of lineages: as Longana see it, there is no past, present and future continuity of substance associated with the cross-sex sibling bond. Each individual sibling set within the descent category has its own unique substance.

Internally, or viewed from within, the Longana descent category is not conceived as one person. Also, externally, or viewed from without, Longana descent categories are not jural persons. That is to say Longana descent categories do not have legal or political unity and autonomy.

No Longana knows how many descent categories there are. Informants' estimates range from ten to

fifteen duvi for each moiety. From my records, I have fifteen for the Tagaro moiety and thirteen for the Merambutu moiety. Although informants give estimates, no single informant can name all the duvi of his moiety.

Longana duvi were not all formed at the same time or in the same manner, a fact that helps to explain their number. Some descent categories originated soon after the first pre-humans imposed a moiety system upon themselves. Other ancestresses appeared later from various sources such as holes in the ground, or from the feathers of birds. Others originated with the daughters of matagoro, or as illegitimate children. A leader's same-moiety wife, matagoro, was not to have intercourse with her husband. When a matagoro became pregnant, her offspring were treated in the same manner as illegitimate children as described in Chapter Six. Still other Longana descent categories are the matrilineal descendants of extremely powerful ratahigi. If a man achieved outstanding renown, his matrilineal descendants were called by his name, and thereby a new descent category was formed.

Although Longana know the places of origin of duvi, the places of origin are not sacred, and there are not sacred rituals or ancestor worship associated with the places of origin. The members of a duvi do not congregate at any time, for any reason, at the place of the descent category's origin.

There is no tendency for the membership of a duvi to reside near the place of origin of the descent category. Patrivirilocal residence ensures that duvi membership is scattered throughout the district. Local groups are not distinguished by commonality of descent, nor do local groups conceive of their relationships vis-a-vis other local groups in an idiom of descent.

Duvi are not autonomous within the political sphere. Leadership is the prerogative of ratahigi, men who have achieved renown as ranking men in the graded society (hungwe) and, in the past, as warriors. Such men gathered around them factions of supporters of any duvi affiliation. Political alliances and enmities between local groups were the result of the politics of ratahigis supported by their local factions and inter-hamlet alliances. The fact that a man was a ratahigi held no implications for the future rank

and influence of his ZS. There were no perpetual offices associated with the duvi.

There was no doctrine of collective responsibility with respect to blood vengeance. Acts of vengeance were directed specifically at one's enemy or his immediate kin, preferably a brother or a son. If one could not kill an enemy or his immediate kin, another person, of any duvi affiliation, from one's enemy's hamlet was regarded as acceptable but not exactly equivalent. An enemy's duvi-mate from another locality was not an acceptable substitute for one's enemy. To kill such a man or his immediate kin merely initiated a separate round of blood debts with another local group or alliance. It was not unknown for a powerful ratahigi to persuade a man to kill another of the latter's duvi, albeit from another locality.

Apart from a rule that one ought not to marry within one's duvi, Longana descent categories did not and do not regulate marriage. There were no marital alliances between descent categories qua descent categories. Furthermore, the right to bestow a child in marriage rested with the father of the child, not the child's uterine kin. In addition, sexual relations within one's duvi were not regarded as incestuous.

Intercourse with full-siblings would result in swift death for the couple. Intercourse with a ZD resulted in public ridicule which, it was hoped, would drive the man to suicide.

Furthermore, the Longana duvi is not a collective person with regard to the death of its members or with respect to land. These two remaining topics can conveniently be discussed at the same time.

When a person dies, it is the responsibility of his immediate uterine kin (siblings, MB and ZC) together with his offspring and their uterine kin, to bury him. Together, the uterine kin of the deceased and uterine kin of the deceased's children orchestrate the funeral and the mortuary feasts.

The deceased's father's closest uterine kin dig the grave. For this service they are paid mats and a pig by the sibling set and children of the deceased. The immediate uterine kin of the dead man - his siblings, sister's children, and mother's brother, then consult with the deceased's offspring and their immediate matrikin in order to decide the expenses associated with a burial that will be considered appropriate for a man of the deceased's rank and status in the community.

The uterine kin of the deceased must contribute a quantity of valuable mats in which the corpse will be wrapped for burial. The offspring of the dead man and their MB and ZC will contribute an equal quantity of mats. For a high ranking man, as many as ten navahangavulu, the most valuable mats in Longana (see M. Rodman 1976) may be required, together with large quantities of mats of lower denomination.

After the man is buried, he must be feasted every ten days for one hundred days. It is mainly the duty of the offspring of the deceased and their uterine kin to supply and prepare the puddings[✓], pork[✓], and kava[✓] for these mortuary feasts[✗], although the uterine kin of the deceased also contribute. The mortuary feasts are open to anyone who wishes to attend, and large gatherings are common.

In addition to the expenses outlined above, the children of the deceased are responsible for settling any outstanding debts that their father had incurred, and, in order to obtain title to their dead father's land, the children of the deceased must present their dead father's siblings with valuable tusked boars. ✗

Funeral expenses can be a heavy burden for the uterine kin of the deceased and his children. The

penalty for inability to meet funeral expenses is loss of land.

If the uterine kin of the deceased are unable or unwilling to contribute enough garden produce, pork, mats, labour, and kava to their kinsman's funeral and mortuary feasts, any man of any descent category may do so and in consequence may claim an appropriate portion of the deceased's land. In this way, the land of the deceased becomes transferred to a man, or a sibling set, of another duvi. ✓

Genealogically distant members of the deceased's duvi are under no obligation to financially support the deceased's immediate matrikin. Indeed, genealogically distant duvi-mates of the deceased, by contributing heavily to a man's funeral when his uterine kin cannot, may legitimately claim the dead man's land for their sibling sets at the expense of the uterine kin of the deceased. When a Longana uses the word duvi with reference to the rights and duties concerning weddings, funerals, land or vengeance, he is referring primarily to a set of siblings and their uterine kin of proximate generations (MB, ZC), and secondarily to any members of the descent category who feel obligated, on an individual basis, toward the former.

The land belonging to a sibling set may be alienated in other ways. In the past, before the cash-cropping of coconuts was introduced, a mother's brother could sell land for a few mats or a small pig to anyone he chose without having to obtain the consent of his entire descent category, although if he was responsible, he would have conferred with his siblings on the matter. A man may give some land to his brother's son, regardless of his duvi, when the latter takes rank in the graded society. But land was most frequently lost at funerals:

We take ground, especially when a man dies. If you contribute to the labour and expenses of his funeral, you can take some of his land. If his duvi do not work at his funeral, they lose the right to his land. Now you're head of the land. If you are concerned about some of your duvi, you can give them some of it. That's up to you. If you don't want to, you don't have to.

In addition, some of the land of a man passes to his sons, provided the latter make compensation with payments of pigs to the surviving members of their father's sibling set. ← If the deceased's offspring and their uterine kin are unable to compensate the

deceased's brothers with pigs, men of any duvi may do so with the consent of the dead man's siblings, and so claim the land that would normally go to the offspring of the deceased. The latter cannot count on the financial support of genealogically distant members of their descent category in order to secure land for their sibling set. ✓

Fortes has argued that property is not the foundation of matrilineal descent groups, but is ". . . the vehicle of the unity and solidarity of the sibling group and its projection in the intergenerational continuity of the uterine stirp" (1969:186). Property is not so conceived in Longana, as the customs for stripping away the property of a sibling group and its future uterine descendants at funerals attest. Furthermore, my analysis of Longana funeral customs reveals that the membership of a descent category is not identified as, and do not identify themselves as, a collective unit in life and death.

The Longana descent category is not, and was not, a collective unity in an ideological, legal, ceremonial, political, or economic sense. Longana descent categories did not convene, qua descent categories, for any purpose. There are no matrilineages in Longana,

and my investigations concerning the past status of duvi indicate that Longana society was not structured around matrilineal descent groups. The Longana duvi, then, is a dispersed, non-corporate, matriclan. ←

What, then, is the social significance of Longana descent categories? The Longana use the descent categories to create and substantially expand a range ← of people upon whom they can rely as siblings.

The principal targets in this process are women of specified descent categories, and the institution that serves as the mechanism is dure, a ". . . ritual event in which a female kills pigs" (M. Rodman 1976:12). I noted in Chapter Six that dure is one means by which a man may repay his sister with pork for the valuable mats that she contributed to her brother's bridewealth payments. By providing pigs for his daughter (netui) to kill, and by seeing that the pork is given to his sister, a man can present his sister with gifts of pork while maintaining the rules of opposite-sex sibling avoidance associated with food.

As a woman sees it, a brother is one who feeds her with pork using his child as an intermediary in exchange for the mats which she contributes to her brother's wedding and for the services, such as sexual

education, that she provides for her brother's child. A man, however, has many persons whom he classes as netui ("child"); e.g., MBC, BC, ZSC, etc.

When a man's classificatory daughter performs dure, he may give a pig to the girl's father for the girl to kill. The donor tells the father of the girl that the carcass of the pig is to go to a woman who is the donor's genealogically distant classificatory sister. When the pork is presented to the latter, the donor's name is revealed to her.

The gift of pork from a man to a genealogically distant classificatory sister at once signals that the donor regards the recipient as he does his own sister, and creates an economic imbalance between the donor and recipient, for the gift of pork is a prepayment, as it were, in anticipation of services rendered. Furthermore, the recipient will share the gift of pork with her own and genealogically close classificatory sisters and daughters and thus, by extension, other women are indebted, as sisters, to the donor as well.

When the donor requires mats for his wedding, or the marriage of his brothers or sons, or the funeral of his father, the recipient of the pork, together with her sisters and daughters, will contribute. The Longana

← how
 12
 11 11 11 11

✓

say that the recipient's brothers will come to view the donor as a full-sibling also.

There are three reasons why the dure ceremony is the chief mechanism by which genealogically distant classificatory sibling sets are brought into a close social relationship. First, dure is the only ceremony involving pigs in which the donor determines to whom the carcasses will go (M. Rodman 1976:65).

Second, a man's gifts of pork to a woman are not free gifts; they are payments for, or in anticipation of, her donations of valuable mats which a man requires at various times in his life. Thus, the gifts of pork to a woman initiate an economic imbalance between the donor and the recipient that can be balanced only in the future. In the interim, the woman will come to think of the donor as she does her own brother. And her children and brothers will do so as well. ✓

Third, dure ceremonies allow a man not only to signal his intent to regard another sibling set as his own, but to demonstrate his intentions economically by sacrificing his pigs to initiate the relationship of cross-sex sibling economic dependency with a woman of that sibling set. A man may attempt to treat a classificatory brother as a close sibling, and he may

be successful in doing so. But by giving pork to that classificatory brother's sister, a man establishes the seriousness of his intent. ✓

Through the institution of dure a man may literally invest his pigs in the norms associated with kinship in order to create a web of sibling sets who will regard him as a close sibling. In this manner, the fact of genealogical distance and the concomitant possibility of indifference toward ego are overcome.

This method of "buying sisters", as the Longana put it, is only effective with those genealogically distant classificatory sisters who are of the same descent categories as one's siblings, half-siblings, and the offspring of one's father's brothers. The assumption is that since these women are genealogically one's closest sisters, other women of the same descent categories will be more easily induced to look upon one as a close sibling.

Especially desirable are those distant classificatory sisters whose descent category memberships are the same as one's opposite moiety siblings (bababulu) who are offspring of one's father and father's brother. The bababulu relationship ties up', as the Longana say, one's own sibling set with a sibling set of opposite

moiety. By means of the institutions of dure, duvi, and the bababulu relationship, a man can lash together a large number of sibling sets from both moieties upon whom he can rely.

The descent categories that ego can use to build constellations of sibling sets who will feel obligated to him as siblings are genealogically specified: the descent categories of his father's children and his father's brother's children. The end result is to transform sibling sets of genealogically specified descent categories into a network of close kin. In this manner are ego-oriented genealogical relationships, or kinship relationships, and ancestor-oriented, or ✓ descent relationships, intertwined in Longana.

Summary and Conclusions

In Chapter Six, I showed that the classification of two or more kintypes by the same term does not imply that they will have similar statuses with respect to ego. The social identities associated with the kin terminology attenuate with genealogical distance, and are cross-cut by other factors such as relative age, marital status, and co-residence. More fundamentally, the rights and duties associated with kinship are not

inherent to the Longana notion of genealogical connection.

In this chapter, I have expanded my investigation of the norms associated with the terminology, and genealogical connection, in order to consider the role the norms have to play in Longana social action. I have concluded that Longana social organization is loosely structured with respect to the norms associated with kinship. There are two principal reasons for this conclusion.

First, the Longana value personal autonomy, individualism, and a strong will; and hold that circumspection is a necessary precept if one is to live successfully. These maxims are unrelated to the norms associated with kinship, and provide a rationale for ignoring, denying, and manipulating the rights and duties implied by genealogical connection. ✓

Second, the Longana do not conceive of their customs as a tightly integrated, internally consistent set of rules that are to be applied independently of any particular situation. The norms associated with kinship are seen as the "straight" way, as standards for interpersonal behaviour, but there are also other customs, and precedents having the force of custom, that contradict the normative order. Such contradictions

to the norms implied by genealogical connection provide loopholes that allow the rules of kinship and marriage to be negotiated according to concrete situations.

Although the rights and duties implied by genealogical connection may be denied, ignored, debated, manipulated and used as rhetoric in the pursuit of individual goals, they are also important in solidifying relationships between relatives, especially with those who are not of one's parents' sibling set or their offspring. Even within this relatively small circle of relatives, it is prudent to take seriously one's rights and duties toward specified alters. Where genealogical links are not cemented by substance (dai), it is wise to treat even close classificatory kin (e.g., FB, MB), as if they are one's parents or siblings.

The norms appropriate between siblings of identical substance may be used to significantly expand the number of sibling sets who will, it is said, regard ego as his own siblings. The principal mechanisms for this are: certain genealogically specified descent categories -- one's own, and the descent categories of the offspring of one's father and father's brothers; and the institution of dure. Because of the bababulu relationship, sibling sets of both moieties may be

drawn into one's network of socially close kin.

I think it is fair to characterize the Longana social system as an anastomosis of ego-centered webs of dyadic social relationships founded upon, and maintained and expanded by, the norms appropriate to the bonds of dai and identical substance; yet ever-changing as individuals negotiate, debate, and manipulate the norms of kinship in the pursuit of their private goals. The nodes in this system were the powerful ratahigis and those who aspired to that position: high ranking men in the graded society (hungwe) and fierce warriors who collected about them factions of supporters and dependents. The power of the ratahigis is gone, but the loose structure of the Longana social system remains.

Longana society is not structured around matrilineal descent groups. Furthermore, the Longana kinship system is another illustration that similar types of Crow terminologies need not be associated with similar kinds of descent categories and descent groups. For example, the Luapula (Zambia), Longana and Kofyar (Nigeria) have similar Crow-type systems of consanguineal classification. The Luapula have corporate matrilineages, the Longana have matrilineal descent categories but no corporate descent groups, and

the Kofyar have no matrilineal descent categories but have corporate patrilineal descent groups (Foewe and Lovell 1980; Netting 1968). The existence of such cases undermines attempts to account for the existence of Crow systems of kin classification on the grounds that such systems are associated with matrilineal descent groups (see also Lounsbury 1964b [1969]:215; Scheffler and Lounsbury 1971:155-156).

Finally, I have noted the importance of the dure ceremony for the expansion of kinship networks. But dure has more significance than the means by which ego may expand his network of sibling sets who will feel obligated to him as genealogically close siblings.

The dure ceremony is an integral part of the establishment of procreative relationships. Only women perform dure and every woman performs dure on the eve of her wedding. Figs, units of wealth controlled by men, are killed by the bride. Pork from the ceremony goes to the bride's father's sisters as food; payment on behalf of the bride's father for the mats, units of wealth controlled by women, that the bride's father's sisters provided so that their cross-sex sibling could himself establish a procreative union.

In the story of procreation, the first procreative union is associated with the first woman accepting an offer of food from one of her cross-sex siblings. By means of dure, the establishment of procreative relationships is associated yet with men giving food to their cross-sex siblings.

However, because of the cross-sex sibling avoidance pattern, a man may not give pork directly to his sister. In the dure ceremony, a man uses his daughter as an intermediary between himself and his sister. This arrangement can also be related to the story of procreation.

A bride kills a pig that has been given to her by her father (tamai) who, like her mother (ratani), refers to the bride as netungu ("my child"). The flesh of the pig will go from the bride's father to the latter's sister to whom the bride refers as ratahingu* ("my mother"), and who refers to the bride as netungu ("my child"). It is as if the bride is also the offspring of cross-sex siblings; as if her father's sister is as the first woman was, both father's sister and mother to her brother's child.

The dure ceremony emphasizes the same elements that are stressed in the story of the first procreative

union: the cross-sex sibling bond; cross-sex sibling avoidance; the importance of woman in the process of procreation; and gifts of food by a man to his cross-sex sibling in association with his own procreative relationship. Thus, an examination of the dure ceremony returns us to the cross-sex sibling complex and the Longana theory of procreation.

CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSION

Introduction

The Longana theory of procreation provides the context, the imaginative universe (Geertz 1973:13) without which Longana kinship would not be intelligible. The Longana theory of procreation consists roughly of three parts: the story of human reproduction or creation; gestation; and substance (dai). The focus of the first is the cross-sex sibling bond. The focus of the last is the parent-offspring relationship. The second, the theory of gestation, gives the concept of substance significance in the presence of the cross-sex sibling bond.

The Longana story of human reproduction, together with their doctrine concerning gestation, are essential for understanding the mode of kin classification and how modes of conduct come to be associated with certain types of consanguineal and affinal connections. In the next section, I summarize the importance of these two elements of the Longana theory of procreation for

understanding the Longana Crow-type kinship system.

I discuss the relevance of my examination of the Longana data for kinship theory in the third and concluding section.

The Theory of Procreation and the Cross-sex Sibling Complex

Rules for the classification of spouses, spouses of siblings of same sex, and spouses of siblings of opposite sex can be derived from the story of human reproduction. The rules for the classification of the spouses of cross-sex siblings recreate the original relationships of sibling's spouse and spouse's sibling. The rules for these affinal terms and the associated kin class statuses stem from the story of human reproduction.

The transformation of the spouse of a cross-sex sibling into a sibling of opposite sex, female, is essential for an understanding of the Longana Crow kinship system. The system for classifying the spouses of siblings of opposite sex and the theory of gestation are linked, indirectly in the case of a male ego, directly in the case of a female ego, to the composite kin class statuses of the offspring of one's cross-sex siblings and of the cross-sex siblings of one's parents.

Because of the Longana theory of gestation, the multiple kin class statuses that a child has with respect to his MB and FZ are congenitally acquired. One can account for the fact that a man's sister's children are his cross-sex siblings by concentrating solely upon the congenital relationship between a man, his sister, and her children. However, because of the mode of affinal classification, a man's ZH is, like the first sibling's spouse, a man who has been transformed into a sibling of opposite sex, female. From this perspective, a man's ZC are his siblings of opposite sex by virtue of their congenital relationship (dai) with their father. It is as if a man's sister's children have gestated in the womb of their father, who has become an opposite sex sibling, female, to his wife's brother.

The result of the Longana mode of affinal classification, together with their ideas concerning gestation, is that a man's ZH and ZC are his siblings of opposite sex female, and that a ZH and a ZS are also a man's siblings of same sex. The affinal terminology does not directly generate the composite kin class status of a man's ZS as it does for a man's ZH.

For a female ego, the system for classifying affines, which stems from the Longana story of reproduction, bestows multiple kin class statuses upon a woman and her brother's wife. The Longana theory of gestation results in the inheritance of the composite kin class status of a woman's EW by the latter's children.

Thus a woman is to her brother's child as the first Aoban woman was with respect to her sibling with whom she initiated a procreative relationship: a woman who is a sibling with a male sexual identity. Also, because of the affinal terminology and gestation, a woman is to her brother's child as the first Aoban woman was with respect to her own offspring: a mother and sibling of same and of opposite sex. Thus, a FZ is associated, as was the first woman, with sexual knowledge, the initiation of procreative relationships, and the sharing of food between cross-sex siblings. This complex and important relationship that a woman has with respect to her cross-sex sibling's offspring is reflected in the classification of FZ as ratahingu bulengu toa and a woman's classification of her BC as netungu gagumaresu.

The phrase bulengu toa ("my fowl") refers to a father's sister as a female sibling with a male sexual identity in two ways. First, bulengu toa compresses the various rights and duties of a father's sister with respect to marriage and sexual instruction into a single referent: the little drama that occurs at weddings wherein the "fowl" (FZ) of the groom "tames the fowl" (the FZs) of the bride so that a new reproductive union may be established. Second, the first food that a woman receives from her brother comes from her brother's child, who is her sibling of same and of opposite sex. This food is a fowl (toa) that the child has killed as his or her first step in the graded society.

Furthermore, a man may offer his sister pork only by using his child as an intermediary. Thus a woman associates her brother's child with food, and refers to this child as "mine to eat" (gagumaresu).

The classification of a father's sister as ratahingu bulengu toa ("my mother, my fowl") compactly refers to that woman's multiple kin class statuses as a kind of mother and as a sibling of same and of opposite sex, and refers also to the rights and duties that are normatively associated with this combination of kin class statuses. Ultimately, then, the classification

of FZ refers to the first genetrix. Reciprocally, a woman's classification of her brother's child as netungu gagumaresu ("my child, mine to eat") refers to that child's statuses as a kind of son or daughter and sibling of same and of opposite sex.

The mode of affinal classification, together with the Longana concepts concerning gestation, provide the principles by which a woman classifies the children of her cross-sex sibling, and hence provide the principles for the Crow terminology for a female ego. The same principles account also for the unusual classification of the descendants of a woman's brother's children.

The story of reproduction and the theory of gestation provide the principles by which the children of ego's cross-sex siblings acquire their kin class statuses, and hence provide the principles for the Crow terminology. Also, the affective and ritual relations associated with the multiple kin class statuses inherent to the FZ - BC and MB - ZC genealogical relationships stem from the story of the creation of the first woman and her subsequent relationships with her siblings.

The avoidance complex that is associated with the MB - ZC social relationship is characteristic

of the B - Z social relationship. The pattern of avoidance between siblings of opposite sex is expressed in the Longana story of human reproduction. In the case of the FZ - BC social relationship, the details of the rights and duties of FZ toward her BC, especially concerning the marriage ceremony, food, and dure ritual, are not specified in the story of human reproduction. Nevertheless, the principles underlying these rights and duties are more or less explicit in the Longana story of human reproduction, for they are clearly associated with the multiple kin class statuses that were possessed by the first woman with respect to her siblings and offspring and are possessed by a father's sister with respect to her brother's children.

Finally, my analysis of the Longana system of kin classification is significant for the interpretation of Crow terminologies. Some anthropologists argue that the essential feature, or "nucleus" (Keesing 1975:115) of Crow-type systems of kin classification is the equation of a MB with B (Keesing 1975:115; Lounsbury 1964b [1969]; Scheffler 1972a; Scheffler and Lounsbury 1971:156). In Longana, however, MB and ZS are not only siblings, they are

siblings of same and of opposite sex; and so are a woman and her cross-sex sibling's children.

Ego and his or her cross-sex sibling's offspring are equated as siblings because of the significance that the Longana attach to gestation in the presence of the cross-sex sibling bond. Thus my analysis of the Longana terminology supports Poewe's argument that ". . . womb . . . is the epitomizing symbol of a Crow-type matricentricity", and, once this is recognized, the major features of Crow systems of classification may be more readily understood (Poewe and Lovell 1980:77; see also Poewe 1980).

Furthermore, in the Longana case, the "nucleus" of the Crow terminology is not simply the relationship between a man and his ZS. The "nucleus" of the Longana terminology consists of the relationships between ego and his or her: cross-sex sibling; cross-sex sibling's spouse; and cross-sex sibling's children. Without all of these consanguineal and affinal types -- what I have called the cross-sex sibling complex -- together with the theory of procreation, the Longana system of Crow classification cannot be understood.

Conclusions

I

The Longana mode of classifying consanguineals cannot be discovered solely from the consanguineal terminology. There are two principal reasons for this conclusion. First, in Chapters Three and Four, I demonstrated that, in order to account for the way the Longana classify the children of grandchildren, knowledge of the classification of spouses and of those affines who are married to ego's children and grandchildren is required. Second, in Chapter Five I demonstrated that, in order to account for the classification of the children of cross-sex siblings, knowledge of the system for classifying those affines who are spouses of cross-sex siblings is required.

More accurately, to understand how a woman classifies the offspring of her cross-sex siblings, knowledge of the affinal classification is required. Knowledge of the affinal classification is not required to understand how a man classifies his opposite-sex sibling's children. However, because terminologies are used by both male and female egos, a female ego's classification is just as essential as a male ego's

for understanding the general problem of how the children of cross-sex siblings are classified.

Therefore, the affinal terminology is just as essential for understanding the classification of the children of cross-sex siblings as it is for understanding the classification of the children of grandchildren. Thus my analysis of the Longana data does not support Scheffler's generalizations (1972a: 117, 119) that spouse and affinal terminologies are structurally dependent upon systems for classifying consanguineals, and therefore consanguineal terms may be analyzed separately from affinal terms.

II

The terms for consanguines do not by themselves provide any clues concerning the fact that composite kin class statuses, important for understanding the mode of consanguineal classification, may be associated with certain types of consanguineal connection; but observations of actual behaviour between consanguineals and interviews concerning the appropriate modes of conduct between consanguineals of specified types, do. Hence observed behaviour and data concerning modes of conduct appropriate between certain consanguineals provide crucial clues to the Longana mode of

consanguineal classification.

Thus I disagree with Scheffler's (1972a:117, 1978:3) methodological dictum that systems of consanguineal classification must be analyzed separately from any social statuses and affective relationships that may be associated with the terms. The Longana case demonstrates what some anthropologists (Fortes 1969: 53, 58; Schneider 1972:37) have long maintained - the mode of consanguineal classification may not be discoverable unless modes of conduct associated with the terms are taken into account as part of the analysis of the terminology.

However, I am not claiming that the function of consanguineal terms in Longana is to label roles or to distribute right and duty statuses among persons. The Longana data support Scheffler's insistence that consanguineal terms only imply modes of conduct (Scheffler 1972:115, 1973:768, 1978:3; see also Keesing 1969:221, 1972:21). As I have demonstrated in Chapters Six and Seven, the sole knowledge that two persons may be classed by the same term does not mean that they will share the same statuses with respect to ego, or behave toward ego in a similar fashion.

The rights and duties associated with the consanguineal terms or with the types of genealogical connection to which they refer can be denied and they can be manipulated because they are always subject to other publicly shared values concerned with the pursuit of individual goals. Also, the social relationships ascribed between consanguineals may be, as in the case of MB and ZS, inherently ambiguous. Other factors, such as relative age, residence, marital status and genealogical distance can also attenuate or negate the social statuses that may be implied by a consanguineal term. Finally, the bonds of substance, dai, are alienable.

In Longana, jural and affective statuses are normative implications of the consanguineal terminology. However, those implications are essential for discovering the mode of consanguineal classification.

III

The Longana mode of spouse and affinal classification cannot be discovered from the spouse and affinal terms alone. Without the Longana story of human procreation, we know only that spouses are classified as grandchildren and grandparents, but we do not know why; we know that the spouses of cross-sex

siblings and spouses' cross-sex siblings are classed as cross-sex siblings, but we do not know why the Longana do this, nor do we understand its significance.

Furthermore, ego's classification of his or her cross-sex sibling's spouse, and the reciprocal classification, seems bizarre without the knowledge that one of these affines takes on a female sexual identity, as a sibling, with respect to the other. This information can be deduced from the Longana story of human reproduction, which provides the rationale for it, but it is more readily learned from observing the interaction pattern between ego and his or her cross-sex sibling's spouse, or from inquiring about the appropriate mode of conduct between ego and his or her cross-sex sibling's spouse. In short, a full understanding of the mode of spouse and affinal classification requires information from observations and/or knowledge of the norms associated with the terms, together with an interpretation of the Longana story of human reproduction.

IV

It follows from my conclusions in Sections I, II, and III, that the consanguineal and affinal

terminologies form an integrated whole; neither is structurally secondary to the other. The consanguineal and affinal terminologies, considered as a unit, cannot be analyzed in strict isolation from the modes of conduct that are normatively ascribed between certain consanguineals and affines. That is to say, one cannot discover the mode of consanguineal and affinal classification from the consanguineal and affinal terms alone.

V

Scheffler and Lounsbury (1971:76-77) assume that for every kin type there is one truly proper term of reference only. The Longana evidence suggests that this assumption is not justified.

In Chapter Four, I showed that the application of consanguineal terms to certain kin types can be contingent upon social statuses which have nothing to do with genealogical connection per se. The alternate terms for the children of grandchildren depend upon such statuses as, for example, the moiety and clan filiation of the spouses of ego's child and grandchild. The classification of a man's sister varies with her marital status and whether she is alive or dead.

If there are two or more kin terms that can

be applied properly to a certain type of genealogical connection, and if the selection of which term to apply to that type of genealogical connection depends upon considerations that are extraneous to that genealogical connection per se, then knowledge of the kin type to which the set of terms refers may be a necessary requirement for discovering the mode of kin classification but, contrary to Scheffler and Lounsbury's theory (Scheffler and Lounsbury 1971:76-77; Scheffler 1972b:320, 1976:87, 1978:3), it is not a sufficient requirement.

The inadequacy of employing an analysis of the kin types to which the terms refer as the sole method for discovering the mode of kin classification first came to my attention with respect to the problem of indeterminacy in the classification of the children of grandchildren. There are other reasons for questioning the value of employing a genealogical grid as the major technique for understanding Longana kin classification, and kinship. These reasons are discussed below.

VI

The fact that composite kin statuses are associated with certain types of genealogical connection

raises issues concerning the anthropological conception of genealogical connection, and further calls into question the use of a genealogical grid as a tool in the analysis of kinship systems. As Scheffler and Lounsbury (1971:37-38) note:

The critical term here is "genealogical". The problem of defining it, and thereby "kinship", in a way that is cross-culturally useful has given anthropologists considerable difficulty let us simply state that by "genealogical connection" we designate culturally posited forms of interpersonal connectedness that are held to be direct consequences of processes of engendering and bearing children and that have the property of indissolubility. To phrase this another way, genealogical connection is employed here as a general cover term for a wide variety of culturally postulated forms of congenital relatedness between persons.

. . . The terms of this stipulative theoretical definition of genealogical connection only require that, in local theories, sexual intercourse is considered necessary to the processes of engendering and bearing children.

Schneider (1972:32-37) has pointed out that there is nothing unusual about this definition of kinship. It or definitions similar to it, have been in common use since the time of Morgan (1871) and W. H. R. Rivers (1924), and it is still considered appropriate by many anthropologists (e.g., Fortes

1969:53-56, 1978:13, 21; Scheffler 1978:4-5).

With the qualification that in Longana relations of genealogical connection are alienable, the definition of genealogical connection used by Scheffler and Lounsbury is ethnographically appropriate in the Longana case. As I demonstrated in Chapter Three, the Longana recognize that sexual intercourse is necessary for engendering and bearing children. They posit genitors and gentrices, as their doctrine of substance or blood (dai) illustrates.

Given that parent-child bonds of genealogical connection are posited by the Longana, then each individual is related to his or her siblings, children, the siblings of his or her parents, etc., by the same parent-child ties. What results, then, is an egocentric network, or grid, composed of chains of relatedness -- what is more commonly called a genealogical grid.

The chains of genealogical connection may be expressed diagrammatically, or as kin types (e.g., F, M, FZ, MB, etc.). Both devices have been used in this dissertation. That a kin type notation is appropriate in the Longana case is indicated also by the terminology: Longana can and frequently do use relative product definitions as alternate classifications of relatives: e.g., father's sister (FZ) is ratahingu bulengu toa or

hangue tamangu ("my father's sibling of opposite sex").

The construction of a genealogical grid and the use of a kin type notation in the analysis of Longana kinship is thus ethnographically appropriate, for they represent an ethnosemantic field constructed on the basis of substance (dai) postulated within Longana culture. Therefore, as Scheffler and Lounsbury (1971: 69) point out, use of a kin type notation is mandatory if the anthropologist desires to examine the words that refer to relationships of genealogical connection.

Paradoxically, the fact that the analytical use of a kin type notation is ethnographically appropriate in the Longana case is potentially a conceptual trap. Kin type notations such as 'ZS' or 'FZ', or the triangles and circles that anthropologists use to diagram kin types, disguise the fact that certain kin types may have more than one kin class status and more than one sexual identity.

The matter of sexual identity is especially important; the use of a kin type notation assumes, explicitly or implicitly, that each person has one and only one sexual identity -- is either male or female -- and that this is a cultural universal, a matter of biology

(see, e.g., Warner 1937 [1968]:63,66; Lounsbury 1964a [1969]:195, 1964b [1969]:219; Goodenough 1967 [1968]:329; Scheffler and Lounsbury 1971:50, 78-79).

In short, the use of a kin type notation may impose our notions of biology upon another culture's belief system, and seriously undermine our analysis of their kinship system. Wallace (1965 [1969]:401) noted the logical possibility of this:

. . . . But most semantic analysts, whether or not they wish to claim psychological reality for their analyses, probably make use of some plausible assumptions about the meaningfulness of these kin-types to some sort of "human nature" Thus when the analyst finds that some kin-term sets sort out neatly into "male" and "female" distributions, he does not hesitate not only to use this discovery as a convenient aid to the construction of his own predictive model of usage, but also to attribute his distinction to the native speakers (explicitly or implicitly). To avoid doing so, indeed, would demand a more rigorous hocus-pocus-manship than even the post positivistic anthropologists probably possess But this raises the more general problem of justifying the use of any universal set of conceptual denotata as a meta-language into which all kinship terminologies can be translated.

In Longana, certain offspring of cross-sex siblings have, congenitally, two sexual identities --

they are male and female. My analysis of the Longana data supports Wallace's misgivings concerning the use of kin type notations. The dimension of sex is not a cross-cultural universal; it is a matter of ethnobiology, and as Schneider (1968a, 1972:45) has insisted, no good can come from uncritically projecting our cultural notions about biology into the analysis of kinship.

Wallace (1965 [1969]:401) mentions another problem with respect to the use of a kin type notation. Kin types are frequently treated as if they are objects, as kinds of things, mere referents for kin terms, and thus the question as to whether the genealogical relationships expressed by the kin type notation have meaning in and of themselves does not seem to arise (see also Fortes 1969:54; Hammel 1965 [1971]:323; Scheffler and Lounsbury 1971:3-5, 50; Keesing 1972:18-19). Conveniently, the anthropologist can create a genealogical grid that is ethnographically appropriate, and use it as a neutral, inherently meaningless analytical instrument for the examination of a terminology which refers to it.

But a problem presents itself: if genealogical connections expressed by the kin type notation are semantically neutral, or latent (Fortes 1969:54), how do social relationships, or modes of conduct, come to be associated with them? For many anthropologists (Scheffler and Lounsbury 1971:155-158; Scheffler 1972:317; Fortes 1969:54; Needham 1974:41), the manner in which modes of conduct become associated with relations of genealogical connection is rather mysterious or accidental. Somehow, the latent relations of genealogical connection become innucleated (Fortes 1969:54), as it were, by values, rights and duties. That is, they become transformed into social relations.

The Longana concept of dai is significant with respect to this problem. As I have emphasized in Chapter Six, the concept of substance or dai is Janus-faced. From one perspective, it is expansive, stressing what might be called an axiom of amity (Fortes 1969:232) or standing for ". . . diffuse, enduring solidarity" (Schneider 1972:47). But there is a dilatory aspect to the doctrine of substance as well, a natural tendency for it to emphasize difference and separateness, not unity.

This inherent contradiction in the concept of dai means that a Longana is not born into a ready made network of kinship solidarity. A Longana has to construct a network of relatives who will treat him according to an ideal set of standards. Kinship amity exists only as potential, not as an actuality.

The Janus-faced nature of dai allows the Longana to use norms or rules from other domains -- the political, the economic, and the publicly shared maxims concerning personal self interest and well being -- to deny, or take advantage of, the modes of conduct associated with genealogical connection. As the Longana stress, whether the norms associated with substance have any value for social action or not depends upon the interests and actions of men in particular circumstances. Regarding norms as codes for conduct cannot account for social action; what is actually done need not have been (Geertz 1973:18).

In Longana, the concept of substance is not tied to the norms associated with it. It might reasonably be said that the concept of dai stands for, or symbolizes, the importance of the procreative relationship in the Longana theory of procreation and thus substance weakly points to the concepts regarding womb and the nature

of men and women; but unlike the modes of conduct associated with the cross-sex sibling complex, there is nothing intrinsic to the relationship between the bonds of dai and the norms associated with them.

One may say that the norms associated with the links of substance stand for solidarity or amity, but the concept of substance itself cannot be said to stand for these things. Social action in conformity to the norms associated with links of substance cannot be said to be manifestations of the concept of substance itself, or of the concepts contained within the Longana theory of procreation.

The Longana case indicates that a methodology (see Schneider 1972:37-39) that searches for the meaning, or the symbolism, of kinship by assuming that such meaning can best and most easily be found through a simple process of abstracting a normative code from social action and the symbolic system from the normative code may or may not be fruitful: some modes of conduct may be manifestations of concepts expressed in the theory of procreation, others may not. Furthermore, we are not entitled to assume, as some are prone to do (Fortes 1969:232; Schneider 1972:47) that the premises and beliefs about procreation promote social integration.

In short, the concept of substance by itself provides no evidence concerning the manner in which modes of conduct come to be associated with it. In this respect, the Longana evidence concerning dai is that it is latent, or neutral, and all that we can say about the problem is that, somehow, rights and duties and affect have become attached to, or have innucleated, genealogical connections based on substance alone.

Nevertheless, some types of genealogical connection are not merely neutral objects for the Longana. The Longana case illustrates that a kin type notation specifies not only position on a genealogical grid, but a genealogical relationship, a type of genealogical connection that may express concepts of a theory of procreation that are not contained in the concept of substance, or in the simple proposition that sexual intercourse is necessary for the engendering of children. The cross-sex sibling bond, together with the genealogical relationship: child of cross-sex sibling and the affinal relationship: spouse of cross-sex sibling, form a complex of consanguineal and affinal relationships that is informed by the Longana story of human reproduction and - by means of the resultant composite

kin class statuses - refers to Longana concepts regarding the nature of men and women, and gestation, concepts to which the notion of dai, or substance, does not directly refer.

I have referred to this complex of consanguineal and affinal relationships centered upon the cross-sex sibling bond as the cross-sex sibling complex. It is by means of this cross-sex sibling complex that the genealogical grid, the web of kinship, constructed solely upon the notion of substance, becomes suspended in a web of meaning for the Longana. The genealogical grid is not a neutral instrument of analysis in the Longana case. Ultimately, it, like the consanguineal and affinal terminologies, refers to the story of human procreation.

There is, then, nothing mysterious or accidental concerning the fact that certain modes of conduct are appropriate between persons who occupy the positions denoted by the consanguineal and affinal types associated with the cross-sex sibling complex. The cross-sex sibling bond itself, together with the composite kin class statuses associated with the children of cross-sex siblings and the spouses of cross-sex siblings, stem from and refer to the original consanguineal and affinal

relationships and the modes of conduct related in the Longana story of human reproduction.

In a sense, the persons who are cross-sex siblings, offspring of cross-sex siblings, and spouses of cross-sex siblings, re-enact with their alters the drama of the Longana story of human reproduction. The modes of conduct and the ritual associated with the cross-sex sibling complex are symbols - they are concrete manifestations of the explicit and implicit concepts (Geertz 1966:5) contained in the Longana story of human reproduction.

Schneider has argued that kinship, in the sense of a genealogical grid that can be used as a neutral analytical apparatus, does not exist:

. . . 'kinship' is what Morgan's, Goodenough's, Lounsbury's, Levi-Strauss', Leach's and Needham's (among others) analytical schemes are all about, but they have no referent in any known culture . . . (Schneider 1972:50).

Schneider is correct with respect to the Longana data: kinship, in the form of the analytical apparatus that has been used in anthropology since the time of Morgan and Rivers, conceived as a web of interpersonal

superior ontological status than the analytical category "theory of procreation".

Second, Schneider's refusal to grant cultural status to native beliefs concerning any aspect of their universe is contradictory, given the definition of culture that he uses. A ". . . body of definitions, premises, statements, postulates, presumptions, and perceptions . . ." (Schneider 1976:205) about the nature of procreation and parturition is surely a cultural statement.

The Longana theory of procreation is a symbolic information source, a ". . . model for 'reality'. . ." (Geertz 1966:7). According to Schneider, a cultural system, a system of symbols and meanings, provides ". . . a meaningful social order and social life. . ." (1972:47). That is precisely what the Longana theory of procreation does.

The consanguineal and affinal terminologies, taken separately or as a unit; the Longana notions concerning substance, the nature of men and women, sexual intercourse, conception, gestation; and the modes of conduct associated with the cross-sex sibling complex, are elements of a symbolic system, each not fully intelligible without the other, which singly and collectively derive from, and thus stand for, the Longana theory of procreation. in particular the Longana

story of human reproduction. That story itself is a symbol (Geertz 1966:8): a theory that systematically incorporates separable ideas and attitudes into a narrative - a doctrine in narrative form. Kinship, as a system of symbols and meanings, exists in Longana.

As a doctrine, a symbolic system, the Longana theory of procreation pervades the mode of kin and affinal classification. Through the meaning with which it endows the cross-sex sibling bond, the theory of procreation attaches modes of conduct to the cross-sex sibling complex, and, through the latter, informs ritual associated with marriage, the exchange of pigs and mats, and the ritual slaughter of pigs in the dure ceremony and the graded society. In the social system, the meaning of womb, combined with the doctrine of dai, substance, results in a weak concept of descent that is not conducive to the formation of descent groups. Finally, the significance of the cross-sex sibling complex can be found in such spheres of social action as the expansion of one's kinship network by means of the dure ceremony.

As Schneider (1972:51) has noted, the concepts of procreation, conception, etc., can be found in the economic and political domains as well as in the social. But the Longana theory of procreation does

not provide the key, or master set of symbols, that organizes these domains.

The Longana theory of procreation is especially important for the understanding of social norms and social action, as we may expect, but it cannot account ↗ for all modes of conduct, even between kin, and all social action in Longana cannot be intelligibly described as a concrete manifestation of concepts contained within the Longana theory of procreation. For example, the Longana theory of procreation informs the spheres of economics and politics only insofar as these domains have to do with the exchange of food between cross-sex siblings. The political and economic domains are not — subsets of, are not intelligible as, manifestations of the Longana theory of procreation.

Schneider (1972:59), remarking on the omnivalence of symbols, claims that we cannot properly distinguish kinship, religion, or politics, for example, as cultural systems. However, the symbolic import of the Longana theory of procreation is limited. Contrary to Schneider, it does make sense to refer to Longana kinship as a cultural system, distinguishable from, although not unrelated to, the spheres of economic exchange, or politics, for example, as cultural systems.

VIII

My analysis of the Longana data supports Scheffler's generalization that:

. . . the foundation of any kinship system consists in a folk-cultural theory designed to account for the fact that women give birth to children; i.e., a theory of human reproduction (Scheffler 1973:749).

Thus I am in fundamental agreement with what has come to be known as the pro-genealogy view of kinship (Strathern 1973:31; Fortes 1978:22). But I have a proviso.

I share with Schneider (1972:36-37) a skepticism toward theories (e.g., Scheffler and Lounsbury 1971:38, 50; Scheffler 1973:756; Fortes 1978:21) that hold the primitive elements of any kinship system to be parent - child relations of genealogical connection, even when, as in the Longana case, these are postulated by the people concerned. The primitive elements of any kinship system have to be empirically determined in each case (Schneider 1972:37).

However logical it may seem to some anthropologists (Scheffler and Lounsbury 1971:50; Scheffler 1973:751) that genitor - offspring and genetrix - offspring relationships must precede sibling ties, that is not the way the Longana see it. In their theory of procreation, parent - child relationships are derivative. The primary, original, or primitive relation of genealogical connection was the sibling bond, followed in order by spouse and affinal relationships and, finally, parent - child relationships.

Furthermore, the fact that parent - child relationships may be a component of a theory of procreation, or even a universal component of such theories (Scheffler 1973:756; Fortes 1978:21) is no indication that these particular forms of relatedness have the most significance for the people who posit them. A genealogical grid that is constructed solely with reference to the fact that parent - child relationships are posited within a culture may not be sufficient to account for the cultural content, the semantics, of all relations of genealogical connection that are posited within that culture.

IX

In summary, my analysis of the Longana data has shown that the principles of kin classification cannot be discovered by isolating the consanguineal terms together with the chains of genealogical connection, and analyzing them separately from the terminology for spouses and affines, or separately from the modes of conduct that are normatively ascribed to relations of consanguinity and affinity. The principal reason for this is that certain consanguineal relationships, namely the offspring of cross-sex siblings, and the children of grandchildren, have a significance for the Longana other than that of consanguinity.

These consanguineal relationships refer also to relations of affinity, to ideas concerning gestation, to the significance of the cross-sex sibling bond, to Longana ideas concerning the creation of men and women, and hence to the origin of procreation itself. These conceptions are expressed as a story, a sequence of events between the first siblings, their spouses and affines, wherein the principles for the classification of consanguines and affines, and the principles for conduct between same-sex siblings, cross-sex siblings, sibling's spouse and spouse's sibling, are contained.

Thus, in Longana, the consanguineal and affinal terminologies, and certain types of consanguineal and affinal relationships, together with the modes of conduct appropriate to them, are manifestations, symbols, of the story of human reproduction.

In short, the system of consanguineal and affinal classification, and modes of conduct associated with some of the terms, are two parts of a system of symbols and meanings. Neither part is comprehensible without the other, and the relationship between the two cannot be understood fully without knowledge of the significance of the common feature that links them -- the relations of genealogical connection as they are conceived by the Longana.

My work offers support for those, such as Scheffler, Lounsbury, and Fortes, who argue that genealogy is of central importance in the analysis of kinship systems; at the same time, it offers support to those, such as Schneider, who stress the symbolic import of culturally conceived relations of genealogical connection. My analysis of the Longana data suggests that a pro-genealogy approach to kinship and a cultural, or symbolic approach to kinship, are not necessarily

opposed strategies for investigating the relationship between principles of kin classification and modes of conduct grounded in relations of genealogical connection.

APPENDIX A

THE GENERAL MODE OF CLASSIFYING SPOUSES

The spouses of ego and his or her descendants may be classified in the following manner:

Male Ego

- W gahorai ("to send"). Used mainly before children are born.
 tubui lo valengu ("the mother in my house"). Used after children are born.
- DH bweii. Used only for males who marry those whom ego classifies as netui.
- DDH tamai netui vagabui ("father of child of grandchild").
- DSW tubui lo valei vagabui ("mother in the house of grandchild").
- SW gahorai netui ("child's to send"). Used mainly before SW bears children.
 tubui lo valei netui ("mother in child's house").
- SSW gahorai vagabui ("grandchild's to send").
 tubui lo valei (plus name of SS e.g., Tari). Note the difference between this usage and the one for DSW. Ego must use the name of the relative here because SS is a vagabui gogona.
- SDH tamai netui vagabui ("father of child of grandchild").

Female Ego

- H tamai netui ("father of child").
- DH tamai netui netui ("father of child's child").

APPENDIX A -- CONTINUED

DDH tamai netui vagabui ("father of child of grandchild").
 DSW gahorai vagabui ("grandchild's to send").
 SW bweli
 SSW gahorai vagabui ("grandchild's to send").
 SDH tamai netui vagabui ("father of child of grandchild").

The use of bweli by females is less consistent than it is by males. Males apply the term only to those men of same moiety who have married a daughter. Females apply the term to women who have married: a son; a brother's son; a grandchild of same moiety; a grandchild of opposite moiety; and to men who have married: a grandchild of opposite moiety and a brother's daughter.

With the exception of the term bweli, then, the same distinctions are drawn by both male and female egos: childless female affines are distinguished from those who have given birth; male affines are "fathers". Although I have not recorded that the phrase tubui lo valei vagabui is used by women for DSW after she has had children, I have no reason to doubt that it exists; men as well will often use the term gahorai to refer to their wives or son's wives long after they have had children.

APPENDIX B

A MODEL FOR THE CLASSIFICATION
OF SPOUSES AND AFFINES, MALE EGO

<u>Model</u>	<u>Logic</u>
W = <u>vagabui</u>	
WB = <u>vagabui</u>	W is <u>vagabui</u> .
ZH = <u>tubui</u>	Z classes ZH as <u>tubui</u> .
WF = <u>tue</u>	WF is same moiety as ego.
WM = <u>netui</u>	WM is a generation senior to W.
SW = <u>vagabui gogona</u>	S reclassifies his W as <u>vagabui</u> ; thus (by generational criterion) ego is a <u>tubui gogona</u> to her.
DH = <u>tue</u>	DH is of same moiety as ego.
SSW = <u>vagabui</u>	SS is a <u>vagabui gogona</u> (= <u>tehi</u> , "younger brother") and thus he is equivalent to ego for the purposes of reckoning his offspring. SSW, therefore, will be classed as ego's wife.
DSH = <u>netui</u>	Ego's S refers to DH as <u>tue</u> . Therefore, SDH is a <u>netui</u> to ego, since a sibling of ego's child is ego's child.
DSW = <u>vagabui gogona</u>	Ego's DS is a <u>tubui</u> to ego's DSW; ego's D is a <u>tubui</u> to DSW. Hence ego's DSW is a <u>vagabui</u> <u>gogona</u> to ego.
DDH = <u>tue</u>	Since DH is a <u>tue</u> to DDH, ego is a <u>tue</u> to DDH.

APPENDIX C

A MODEL FOR THE CLASSIFICATION OF
SPOUSES AND AFFINES, FEMALE EGO

<u>Model</u>	<u>Logic</u>
H = <u>tubui</u>	
HZ = <u>tubui</u>	H is a <u>tubui</u> .
BW = <u>vagabui</u>	B refers to his W as <u>vagabui</u> .
HM = <u>tubui</u>	H is classified as <u>tubui</u> . By generational criterion, HM is a <u>tubui</u> .
HF = <u>tubui gogona</u>	As above, adjusted for moiety membership. A spouse of a <u>tubui</u> is a <u>tubui gogona</u> .
DH = <u>tamai</u>	WM is <u>netui</u> .
SW = <u>vagabui</u>	HM is a <u>tubui</u> .
SSW = <u>vagabui gogona</u>	Ego's SSW refers to ego's S as <u>tubui gogona</u> (HF). Since the mother of a <u>tubui gogona</u> is, by generational criterion, a <u>tubui gogona</u> , ego's SSW is <u>vagabui gogona</u> .
SDH = <u>netui</u>	Ego's S refers to his DH as <u>tue</u> , and a <u>tue</u> of ego's S is a <u>netui</u> to ego.
DSW = <u>vagabui</u>	Ego's DSW refers to ego's D as <u>tubui</u> (HM). Thus ego is also <u>tubui</u> to her DSW, and DSW is a <u>vagabui</u> to ego.
DDH = <u>tubui</u>	A WM is <u>netui</u> . Therefore DDH and ego class DD as <u>netui</u> . Therefore DDH = H = <u>tubui</u> .

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