

THE EVERYBODY A SOLDIER MOVEMENT  
DURING THE GREAT LEAP FORWARD, 1958-1964

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## Abstract

This thesis analyzes the development, interrelations, and the roles of the "Everybody-A-Soldier" Movement (EASM) in China between 1958 and 1964, which is a major cornerstone of the militarization of Chinese society, which, in turn, is seen as a unique strategy of Chinese Communist development.

The basic assumption of this thesis is that a strong political organization, to strengthen the capacity of a political system in order to promote political stability, political integration, and socio-economic development, is of primary importance. Most developing countries badly need but often lack political stability, integration, and satisfactory economic development in the process of modernization, which is a prevailing political theme in developing countries. According to this thesis, the EASM system, among other things, is likely to solve these problems.

It is contended that the EASM system did not happen just because Mao Tse-tung wished it. It was brought about by the contemporary internal and external political developments in China and by special historical circumstances that promoted the emergence of the system.

Any socio-political system necessarily affects, and is affected by, the environment in which it exists. The thesis thus analyzes the institutional factors of the EASM in order to explore its interrelationships with other systems.

In analysing the roles of the militia, this thesis finds that the EASM in China has helped the Communist Party of China to consolidate its political support and thus its political control in the countryside. It has halted political insurrections in the countryside, which used to be the hothouse of political insurrections.

The EASM, by enrolling the majority of the Chinese labour force in the militia organization, has helped the Communist Party of China to mobilize and organize coordinated actions of large numbers of people in pursuing economic development and other social reforms which are of primary importance to a capital-short country such as China.

The possible role of the EASM in future wars is discussed along with the military functions of the militia. According to the thesis, the militia has played a successful role in war and will continue to be useful in the future.

My analysis has to a considerable degree confirmed my propositions. I also perceived in the conclusion of my study that the militia organization would change toward a more limited role and insignificant status as the Communist Party of China becomes more routinized and institutionalized, and Chinese modernization makes significant progress.

## Preface

The Everybody A Soldier Movement was called for by Mao Tse-tung in 1958. Since then it has been an important political system for pursuing socio-political reforms in China. The author has closely observed the development of this movement for several years. The primary interest of this study is to find out the function of the militia system in contemporary Chinese political development and its interrelations with other social systems. Owing to unsolvable difficulties, the author was not able to do any field study in order to carry out precise empirical research.

To meet the necessary requirements of this study the author has consulted many libraries and used all materials available in North America. The conclusions presented in this study are, generally speaking, based on the empirical evidence, selective as it has been. Speculations are avoided, but not completely.

Several persons who have contributed to this study should be mentioned here. Prof. Klaus Pringsheim, who has spent many days and nights in reading and commenting on my manuscript, should be first appreciated here. His encouragement and concern were of primary importance to the completion of this study. Dr. Peter Potichnyj and Dr. Yun Hua Jan are both members of my supervisory committee and have contributed to this study with their invaluable advice and comments. Dr. Gordon Means and my fellow graduate student Steve Allen have

read some chapters of my manuscript and given their invaluable comments.

With the enthusiastic support of Dr. Adam Bromke, the Chairman of the Department, I was able to get a moderate grant from the Faculty of Graduate Studies to carry out one month of research at Columbia University in New York, in which I used the special Chinese collection in the East Asia Library.

During my stay at Columbia University, I was fortunate to have the opportunity to discuss my subject with Sinologists such as Dr. S. Levine, Dr. Andrew Nathan and Dr. Richard Sorich. Their deep interest in my subject and constructive suggestions and invaluable advice have greatly encouraged me to face the arduous work. All of these persons should be sincerely thanked here.

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## The Everybody A Soldier Movement

During the Great Leap Forward, 1958-1964

### I. Introduction

#### 1. Thesis

This study is designed to inquire into the effect of the Everybody-A-Soldier Movement (hereafter referred to as EASM) on the political development of China.

The EASM was called for by Chairman Mao Tse-tung in 1958 following his personal inspection of the people's commune system and the mass militia movement in South China. In explaining the significance of the EASM, Mao told his country that "the militia division is a military organization, a labour organization, an educational organization, and a physical organization."<sup>1</sup> The purpose of "the establishment of militia divisions on a large scale is not purely a question of mobilization of manpower, collective action, and fulfillment of production tasks, it is a question of having the masses (to) militarize and collectivize their life."<sup>2</sup>

According to Franz Schurmann, "if the ideal of communism was the pure ideology of communization, its practical

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1 "Important Statement by Chairman Mao Following Provincial Inspection Tour," New China News Agency (hereafter referred to as NCNA), English, Peking, 30 Sept. 1958; Survey of China Mainland Press (hereafter referred to as SCMP), No. 1871, p. 1.

2 Teng K'e-ming (滕克明), "Report to Kiangsi's Militia Work Conference," Kiangsi Jih-pao, 13 Dec. 1959; SCMP, No. 2196, p. 37.

ideology was militarization. The methodology of the revolution was the militarization of the peasantry."<sup>3</sup> Other scholars such as Tang Tsou and Benjamin Schwartz also pointed out the unique characteristics of Chinese modernization as collective effort and militarization.<sup>4</sup>

From both the words of Mao and the western scholars, one will realize that as far as the Chinese revolution and modernization are concerned, the mass militia may play a significant role with the strategy of militarization of Chinese society.

The contemporary political development in China as well as most developing countries is primarily aimed at national modernization which is basically an effort of industrialization and other socio-political reforms in order to catch up with the advanced western countries. However, the effort of modernization in many countries has often been interrupted by the high rate of political insurrections in the countryside; by the low capacity of the government to organize and mobilize human and natural resources for economic development;

3 Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California, 1968), p. 480.

4 Tang Tsou, "The Values of Chinese Revolution," in China's Developmental Experience, ed. Michael Oksenberg (New York: Praeger, 1973), p. 38, and Benjamin Schwartz, "Modernization and the Maoist Vision: Some Reflections on Chinese Communist Goals," China Quarterly, 21 (Jan.-Mar. 1965), pp. 11-15.

by low consensus and identity between the élite and masses, and the city dwellers and the villagers; and by the passive and conservative attitude of the peasants. These factors, which are identified by scholars as the causes of political instability, of disintegration, and of the lack of legitimacy of the government, have often caused military intervention in the national politics of many developing countries.<sup>5</sup>

Students of the social sciences have pointed out the role of the military in the struggle for national power, but relatively few paid enough attention to the utility of military organization in promoting national socio-economic development.

The seizure of political power by military leaders in the developing countries is a negative factor of political development rather than a positive one. Only when the military is used to help national modernization in socio-economic aspects, can it be a positive factor.

The military model of organization which will be further discussed in the next chapter could increase the capacity of the government to mobilize as well as to control the society for national development, if it is applied to other aspects of a society. The process of applying a military model of organization to other aspects of a society is defined as militarization in this study. The EASM system is an example of the implementation of the military model of

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5 See Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University, 1967), pp. 192-263.

organization to the nonmilitary sectors of China. As a major cornerstone of militarization of Chinese society, is the EASM able to assist China to overcome the above-mentioned problems, and help to promote Chinese socio-economical development?

In other words, if the EASM is designed by Mao as an organization with multiple purposes for promoting Chinese modernization, what is its effect on contemporary Chinese political development? If there is any significant effect, how did it function? What mechanism did the EASM use to achieve its purposes. Furthermore, while the militia system has long existed in China, the EASM did not occur earlier but in 1958. Is there any particular reason for this fact?

Although the idea of the EASM is not totally new either in China or the western countries,<sup>6</sup> yet there is no other government in history or in the contemporary world that has implemented it on as large a scale as the Communist Party of China (hereafter referred to as CPC) did in 1958. Furthermore, even if there were any similar system implemented in any country, no one had extended the primary role of the militia beyond military affairs as China has been doing. Therefore, the EASM of China is not only unique in its large size but also unique in its role in the effort of modernization. However, the EASM has up to now never been properly

6 In Chinese history the traditional Yü Ping Yü Nung (寓兵於農) policy was implemented in Ch'in State (秦國, prior to the unification) as early as in 348 B.C. and was later re-adopted by some other dynasties in China. See Table 1 in Chapter III of this thesis. As to the western world, the idea was included in Plato's Republic, Karl Marx and V.I. Lenin's works such as The Civil War of France, The State and Revolution and many other works. The thesis will discuss this in later chapters.



explored by students of Chinese politics in the western world. This study is therefore designed to close this academic gap.

## 2. Propositions

Most socio-political systems are developed through a long historical process. No system can be imported from outside and imposed on a society by anybody without adapting to the contemporary necessities of the society. The EASM system which was initiated by Mao in 1958 is likely to have its historical root in China and it is designed to cope with the contemporary domestic and external political development of China (proposition 1).

Organization is often defined as structures of differentiated roles,<sup>7</sup> which require the ordered exercise of power. In these structures, some men command and others obey.<sup>8</sup> As a system has its roots in its particular society, it cannot be free from the effect of the particular environmental factors. Organized along the lines of a militia organization which had its model of organization in the Chinese People's Liberation Army (hereafter referred to as PLA) and controlled by the CPC as an instrument in the process of the Chinese revolution, therefore, the organization of the EASM is likely to be

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7 Marion J. Levy, Jr., The Structure of Society (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University, 1952), pp. 19-20.

8 Schurmann, Ideology and Organization, op. cit., p. 3.

affected by the principles of organization both of the PLA and the CPC (proposition 2).

The majority of the population in most developing countries still live in the countryside. Although the city dwellers play a very active role in a country's political life, the political stability of the country relies on the stable support of the villagers.<sup>9</sup>

According to Huntington, the role of the dominant groups in the countryside is a critical factor determining the stability or fragility of the government. If the countryside supports the political system, the system itself is secure against revolution and the government has some hope of making itself secure against rebellion.<sup>10</sup> In other words, whoever can control the countryside, he will be able to achieve political stability.

By enrolling the majority of the population in the mass militia, the CPC has to a large extent controlled the countryside of China. The EASM is likely to promote the political stability of China and to halt revolution and insurrection in the countryside (proposition 3).

A considerable degree of consensus and identity between élite and masses is often said to be necessary for socio-political integration in any society.<sup>11</sup> According to Leonard

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9 See Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, op. cit., pp. 291-292.

10 Ibid.

11 Claude Ake, A Theory of Political Integration (Illinois: Dorsey Press, 1967), pp. 100-116.

Binder, political integration can be promoted by creating a cultural-ideological consensus between the élite and masses.<sup>12</sup> Similarly, Ake believes that political leaders must be calculated to dramatize their concern for, and identity with the masses.<sup>13</sup> With the majority of the peasants enrolled in the militia organization, the EASM drastically helped the CPC to carry out intensive political education and mass line work among the masses; both of them are assumed to be able to promote consensus and identity between the political leaders and the masses. Therefore, the EASM is likely to serve as a vehicle to promote political integration in China (proposition 4).

Students of modernization have noted that a modern society can only be built among modern people. According to Alex Inkeles, "The idea of development requires the very transformation of the nature of man."<sup>14</sup> Daniel Lerner's "mobile personality"<sup>15</sup> and Inkeles' "modern man" both are created by increasing communication and education. Since the CPC sees the militia organization as an educational organization and extensively uses it as a vehicle to carry out

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12 Leonard Binder, "National Integration and Political Development," American Political Science Review 58 (Sept. 1964), p. 630.

13 Claude Ake, "Research Note, Political Integration and Political Stability: A Hypothesis," World Politics 19:3 (Spring 1967), p. 489.

14 Alex Inkeles, "The Modernization of Man," in Modernization: The Dynamics of Growth, ed. Myron Weiner (New York: Basic Books, 1966), p. 138.

15 See Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East (New York: The Free Press, 1965), pp. 49-50.

political education and military training among the peasants, the EASM is likely to help to transform the passive, conservative Chinese peasants into a modern man (proposition 5).

A modern political system is often required to promote socio-economic reforms. To achieve these goals, the political system needs proper authority or capacity to mobilize and organize different social forces in order to carry out coordinated actions. An advanced system is seen as possessing higher capacity rather than a less developed one.<sup>16</sup> According to Weiner, a society with a high capacity appears to be organizationally competent to create industrial organizations. The incompetence of organizational skills in developing countries not only makes them unable to mobilize their resources, but also makes them fail to use modern technological inventions.<sup>17</sup> With the militia system as an organizational framework, the EASM has put the majority of Chinese manpower under a hierarchical and semimilitary organization, which is closely controlled by the CPC. The capacity of the Chinese political system, therefore, is strengthened in carrying out coordinated socio-economic actions by large numbers of people, which is critically important for economic development in a capital-short country. Therefore, the EASM is likely to

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16 See Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Brown, 1966), p. 29.

17 Myron Weiner, "Political Integration and Political Development," in The Developing Nations, ed. Frank Tachau (New York: Dodd and Mead, 1972), p. 63.

strengthen the capacity of the government and promote economic development (proposition 6).

### 3. Approach and Method

While the thesis is primarily designed to examine the effect of the EASM on contemporary Chinese political development, it is equally concerned with the structure, history, ideology, and other aspects of the system.

In addition, due to the limitation of data, the study does not expect to take any consistent empirical approach. Propositions given above only serve as a minimal guide-line to the study rather than as precise hypotheses for testing. Based on these reasons, the thesis will adopt an eclectic functionalism by which function is only treated as one among many relevant considerations that together comprise a comprehensive political analysis.<sup>18</sup>

To understand the possible reasons of implementation of the EASM in 1958, the study will examine the Chinese traditional militia system prior to 1958 and the contemporary internal and external political developments that affected the emergence of the EASM.

To fully understand the effect of the EASM on the changes in Chinese society, institutional factors of the militia such as size, membership, structures, functionaries, and deployment will be analysed. The process of recruitment,

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18 William Flanigan and Edwin Fogelman, "Functional Analysis," in Contemporary Political Analysis, ed. James C. Charlesworth (New York: The Free Press, 1967), p. 73.

the class background of militia members, and the militia's relationship with other organizations such as the PLA, the Party, the local government, and the communes will be fully explored.

To examine the functions of the EASM in the contemporary political development of China, the thesis will roughly divide the functions of the militia into two categories: the stationary functions and the dynamic ones. The former emphasizes the routine functions performed by the militia in peacetime such as increasing production, maintaining law and order, and serving as a military reserve. The latter emphasizes the dynamic characteristics of functions which either are exercised by the militia on a very special occasion or need high coordination with other organizations such as promoting political socialization, serving as a shock force for particular social construction or preventing natural disasters, and waging people's warfare.

While the development of the EASM at national level will be reviewed, a particular emphasis will be placed on the militia activities in Kwangtung Province during the 1958 to 1964 period. The militia activities of other provinces or other periods will be used to compare with those of Kwangtung. The reasons for this decision are these: First of all, the function and dysfunction of the militia system is more easily seen when the society is in a state of uncertainty and high mobility rather than in a normal situation. When the Great Leap Forward (hereafter referred to as GLF) was running high in China, and later when China suffered from

serious disasters, economic crisis, and war threats, China actually experienced her worst years since the Communist regime assumed power in 1949. This situation might provide us a unique opportunity to observe the activities of the militia.

Secondly, Kwangtung Province was one of the two provinces<sup>19</sup> most susceptible to war threats in the early 1960s; and thus the militia activities in Kwangtung might have been more active there than those in many other provinces.

Thirdly, the continual communication between Kwangtung and Hong Kong after 1949 made information on the militia activities in Kwangtung more readily available.

The analysis will concentrate on the militia activities in the countryside rather than the city, because the political highlight in the GLF was focused on the countryside.

#### 4. Materials

Since it was impossible to carry out field study in China, the research work for this thesis primarily relies on the library collections available in North America. Although the available materials are not enough to carry out a detailed empirical research, they are adequate to meet the minimal requirement of observing the development of the whole system and its functions, which are the major considerations of this study.

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25 Fukien Province, which is opposite of the Kuomintang occupied off-shore islands, is another province. Kwangtung borders on Hong Kong, this made it a more likely subject to political sabotage initiated from outside.

The major analyses of this study are primarily based on the materials published in China with the exception of the traditional militia system prior to 1911 which relies on historical books published outside China. All of the materials used in this thesis are classified into the following categories (When the name of a person, journal, or place in China is related in this study, we shall use the Wade-Giles system and give the Chinese characters when it is first used).

A. Documents: The key documents which are available for this thesis include: Militia Regulations, the Militia Hand Book, the Conscription Law, the Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, the Constitution of the People's Republic of China (Hereafter referred to as PRC), the Constitution of the CPC, the Electoral Law of the PRC, Decisions on Mutual Aid and Cooperation in Agricultural Production adopted by the Central Committee of the CPC, the Resolution on the Establishment of People's Communes in the Rural Areas, and the Tentative Regulations of the Weihsing (Sputnik) People's Commune.

B. Major Policy Statements, Speeches and Works of Chinese Leaders: Materials of this category include at least four subcategories: (1) Mao Tse-tung's works — Mao's major statements and writings on the militia, guerrilla war, communes, agricultural cooperatives and other relevant subjects are all available in his 4-volumes of Selected Works (1926-1949), a volume of Selected Readings (1928-1963)(毛澤東著作選讀



in Chinese only), and a newly published volume: Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed: Letters and Speeches (1956-1972). (2) Important works and speeches about the EASM by other political and military leaders published in Chinese magazines and newspapers — These materials are mostly translated into English and edited into the Survey of Chinese Mainland Press (Hereafter referred to as SCMP), Extracts from China Mainland Magazines (Hereafter referred to as ECMM), and Current Background (Hereafter referred to as CB). (3) Secret military papers — The Bulletin of Activities of the PLA (工作通訊). These materials covered the year 1961 only. However, important meeting minutes and reports about the contemporary militia situation and policy are all contained in it. These materials are translated into English and edited into a huge volume — The Politics of the Chinese Red Army. (4) Important editorials of Hungchi (紅旗 Red Flag) and Jen-min Jih-pao (人民日報 People's Daily, hereafter referred to as JMJP).

C. Militia Activities Printed in Chinese Newspapers and Magazines: These materials are primarily printed in Hungchi, Peking Review, JMJP, Ta-kung Pao (大公报 Hereafter referred to as TKP), Kuang-ming Jih-pao (光明日報 Hereafter referred to as KMJP), dispatches of NCNA, and above all, Nan-fang Jih-pao (南方日報 Hereafter referred to as NFJP), etc. Most of these materials have been translated into English and edited into the SCMP, ECMM, and CB.

D. Secondary Publications Outside China: Materials

belonging to this category are divided into two subcategories — publications in Chinese and in English. Publications about the militia in English are not very numerous. There is not a single book dealing with this subject in particular. Works in Chinese primarily from Taiwan are rich in information. To avoid bias, we seldom use them without concurrently comparing them with other resources. The most important works of this category usually include in Issues and Studies (問題與研究 Hereafter referred to as I & S), Ti-ch'ing Yen-chiu (敵情研究 Hereafter referred to as TCYC), Fei-ch'ing Yüeh-pao (匪情月報 Hereafter referred to as FCYP), Chung-kung Yen-chiu (中共研究 Hereafter referred to as CKYC), Fei-ch'ing Nien-pao (匪情年報 Hereafter referred to as FCNP), Fei-ch'ing Yen-chiu Ts'ung-k'an (匪情研究叢刊 Hereafter referred to as FCYCTK), Ti-ch'ing Yen-chiu Lun-wên Chi (敵情研究論文集 Hereafter referred to as TCYCLWC), the Central Daily News (中央日報) and a few other journals. Some of these publications are secret papers, others are circulated publicly.

Besides, the writer has personally interviewed six Chinese who lived in China during the period from 1958 to 1964 and who have emigrated to the U.S.A. and Canada now. All of these people have very good educational backgrounds without strong political bias. Their personal data are as follows:

- A. A doctor in his early 40s. He was an Overseas Chinese in Peking Medical School and served as a doctor in Peking

for twenty years. He was permitted to emigrate to Hong Kong in 1972. He is now in the U.S.A.

- B. A middle rank cadre in his middle 40s. He served as an English translator for the government information office for a long time and worked at the commune level several times as well. He married a returned Overseas Chinese, so he was permitted to emigrate to Hong Kong. Now he is in New York. Many of his comments on the Chinese political campaigns and political leaders gave me the impression that he was not biased.
- C. A youth in his early 30s. He finished his high school in China. Now he is studying in Canada. He legally left China for Hong Kong in 1965. He is a little bit pro-communist.
- D. A doctor in his late 30s. He returned to China from Hong Kong to receive his medical education there in the middle 1950s. He got married there and came out of China before 1966. He gave fairly high credit to the Communist regime.
- E. A woman doctor in her late 30s. She was born and educated in central China. She married an Overseas Chinese and was permitted to emigrate to Hong Kong in 1974 after serving for 15 years as a doctor in China. She is now in Hamilton, Canada. Her long personal career in China gave her a strong identity with China.
- F. A doctor in his middle 40s. He was educated there, and

later served in Kwangtung for a long time. He was permitted to emigrate to Hong Kong with his family. He was a little bit resentful of the Communists for suppressing his Christianity, but he still gave relatively high credit to the Communist regime.

Although their information is to some extent useful, it will not be cited in this study except as it is used to compare with other conflicting comments. To minimize the possible biases and prejudices from using selective data and biased reports, the following criteria for choosing materials will be strictly observed:

- (1) When different materials are concurrently available, the study will rely on those which are in a category prior to others (in the order listed above: A, B, C, D, etc.);
- (2) If both of those materials are available with significant discrepancies, the paper would present the conflicting views with a personal comment;
- (3) When there are either only official documents and newspaper reports from China or only materials published outside China available, we could use either only with very careful judgement.

## 5. Organization

The thesis will be divided into four parts. In the first part, the thesis will commit itself to discussing the

general concept of militarization and the Chinese strategy of modernization in order to provide an analytical framework.

In the second part, a brief description of the socio-political background prior to the implementation of the EASM and an intensive analysis of the relationships between the militia movement and the Three Red Flag campaigns will be presented.

In the third part, the thesis will discuss the militia organization in terms of institutional factors. By doing so, we can expect to explore the institutional interaction of the militia with other social systems.

The fourth part will concentrate on the functions of the militia, which will be in turn divided into stationary and dynamic functions. The effect of the EASM on Chinese development will to some extent be confirmed in the Conclusion of the thesis. The prospects of the EASM in the future will be evaluated too.

## II. Militarization and the Chinese Approach to Modernization

Students of China have studied Chinese politics using various approaches which were summed up by Michael Oksenberg in seven Categories, that is: historical, modernization, bureaucracy, totalitarian model, comparative, revolutionary regime, and methodological approach.<sup>1</sup>

Among these approaches, some are more often used than others. The totalitarian and developing country models (modernization), for example, are seen by James Townsend as the most popular approaches used in studying Chinese politics recently.<sup>2</sup> However, instead of using either of these approaches, he adopted a radical totalitarian model to analyze Chinese politics. According to his explanation, the political élites in China seek an extreme mobilization and penetration of society to bring about rapid industrialization and modernization. It is this intense ideological commitment to change that distinguishes radical from conservative totalitarian systems.<sup>3</sup>

From a different point of view, Benjamin Schwartz summed up the major approaches to studying Chinese politics as modernization, nationalism, and totalitarian based on the goals of the Chinese political leaders.<sup>4</sup> To Schwartz, all

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1 Michael Oksenberg, A Bibliography of Secondary English Language Literature on Contemporary Chinese Politics (New York: Columbia University, 1969), p. 1.

2 James R. Townsend, Politics in China (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974), pp. 14-22.

3 Ibid., pp. 22-25.

4 Benjamin Schwartz, "Modernization and the Maoist Vision:

of these goals have motivated the strategies of Chinese political development. "It is thus entirely meaningful to stress that the speedy achievement of nationalist goals has been one of the unchanging central goals of the leadership which has shaped the priorities and strategy of the modernization process itself."<sup>5</sup>

As far as the goal of modernization is concerned, the Maoist vision of good society and the sanctified image of the methods by which the vision is to be achieved are often involved. It is a popular opinion that the Maoist vision of good society is closely related to the ideology of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism. In achieving this vision, the Soviet model and Maoism have strongly influenced the Chinese strategy of modernization. Scholars, including Schurmann and Schwartz, never failed to point out the influence of the Soviet model of economic development on China between 1949 and 1957. However, they took the Maoist strategy in Chinese development since 1957 seriously.<sup>6</sup>

Based on Chinese politics prior to the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (Hereafter referred to as GPCR), Schwartz believes that the emphasis on the individual's total self-abnegation and total immersion in the collectivity

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Some Reflections on Chinese Communist Goals," China Quarterly 21 (Jan. - Mar. 1965), pp. 3-19.

5 Ibid., p. 8.

6 See Schurmann, Ideology and Organization, op. cit., pp. 239-308; Schwartz, "Modernization and the Maoist Vision," op. cit., pp. 15-16.

as ultimate goods, the frequent reference to the model of military life, the power of spiritual transformation; and the "man rather than weapons or tools as the decisive force in history" are the particular characteristics of Maoist projection of the future.<sup>7</sup>

Similarly to Schwartz, Prof. Tang Tsou evaluated the Chinese goals and strategy of development as that : "the immediate goals of this mobilized society are national survival, a proper place in the international community, social equality, and economic development. In endeavoring to achieve these goals, the Chinese have shown a measure of creativity in their collective effort . . ."<sup>8</sup>

While scholars emphasize the collective effort and mass mobilization as the particular characteristics of the Chinese model of development, militarization of the peasants within the people's commune is often singled out as the essential element of the Chinese model.<sup>9</sup> According to Dennis M. Ray, the labour strategy of the commune experiment was an extension of the politico-military strategy employed by the Chinese communists

7 Schwartz, "Modernization and the Maoist Vision," op. cit., 11-15.

8 Tang Tsou, "The Values of Chinese Revolution," op. cit., p. 38.

9 See Jo Yung-hwan, "Agricultural Collectivization as the Developmental Model for Communist China," Occasional Paper No. 1 (Center for Asian Studies, Arizona State University, 1967). Also see Dennis M. Ray, "The Future of the Maoist Model of Development," Asian Forum 2:11 (1970), pp. 123-35.



in the years before 1949.<sup>10</sup> A similar but better known point of view about the particular characteristic of the commune is stated by Schurmann:

If the ideal of communism was the pure ideology of communization, its practical ideology was militarization. The methodology of the revolution was the militarization of the peasant.<sup>11</sup>

We shall briefly analyse the concept of militarization, its relations with modernization and the EASM system in the remaining pages of this chapter.

### 1. The Concept of Militarization

The concept of militarization is often interlocked with the concept of militarism. Laurence I. Radway describes, for example, a fully militarized society as one which confers a privileged position on warriors. The armed forces exercise great power as the partners or agents of other social groups or, in the extreme case, unilaterally determine the nature of basic institutions, the choice of regimes, the rights and duties of citizens, and the share of national resources allocated to military functions.<sup>12</sup>

Raoul Girardet sees the expansion of French military control over Algeria against the terrorists during the revolutionary war in the 1950s as a militarization.<sup>13</sup>

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10 Ray, "The Future of the Maoist Model of Development," Asian Forum 2:11 (1970), p. 126.

11 Schurmann, Ideology and Organization, op. cit., p. 480.

12 Laurence I. Radway, "Militarism," vol. 10 of International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences (New York: MacMillan & The Free Press, 1968), p. 300.

13 Raoul Girardet, "Civil and Military Power in the Fourth

Actually, both Radway and Girardet's discussions relate more to militarism than militarization.

### Militarism

The prevalence of military regimes in many developing countries is often referred to as the rule of militarism. Militarism is defined by John J. Johnson as "the domination of the military man over the civilian, the undue emphasis upon military demands, or any transcendence, by the armed forces, of true military purposes."<sup>14</sup>

Stanislav Andrzejewski defines militarism as militocracy in which the military preponderates over the civil personnel. To him, militarism also means "militancy or aggressive foreign policy involving the readiness to resort to war"<sup>15</sup> and/or the emphasis of propagating military ideals and military virtues. However, militocracy can occur without an ideology.<sup>16</sup>

Morris Janowitz divided militarism as "designed militarism, reactive militarism, and unanticipated militarism." By designed militarism, he means the domination of the military in domestic politics and in foreign policy, that is political

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Republic (France)," Changing Patterns of Military Politics, ed. Samuel Huntington (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), p. 135.

- 14 John J. Johnson, "The Latin-American Military as a Politically Competing Group in Transitional Society," The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, ed. John J. Johnson (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 91.
- 15 Stanislaw Andrzejewski, Military Organization and Society (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968), pp. 184-185.
- 16 Ibid., p. 186.

intervention as well as external expansion of the military.<sup>17</sup> By reactive militarism, he means that the political behavior of the military is in part generated by the weakness of civilian institutions and the direct pressure of civilian groups which seek to co-opt and enlarge the role of the military establishment.<sup>18</sup>

Unanticipated militarism develops from a "lack of effective traditions and practices for controlling the military establishment, as well as from a failure of civilian political leaders to act relevantly and consistently."<sup>19</sup> It is to a large degree similar to reactive militarism, because both are due to the impotence of civilian leaderships and are to respond to the developments in the civilian society.

While political roles of the military are predominant in almost all definitions of militarism, the practitioners of militarism are usually divided into two kinds, in accordance with their political orientations: conservative and radical. The former are identified as traditional military oligarchy; the latter as military reformers. The conservative militarists usually do not have a strong political doctrine and are closely tied to the ruling class. They are enthusiastic about maintaining order and laws rather than pursuing reforms. There is no profound change in either the nature of the

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18 Ibid., p. 16.

19 Ibid.

privileges or in their span when the new military oligarchy replaces the incumbents. The radical militarists usually identify themselves with the lower middle class and rural people. They eagerly aim at social reforms. Their efforts not only focus on the change of the whole nature of privileges and vertical mobility on a large scale, but vigorously pursue a thorough economic development such as industrialization, nationalization of the means of production, etc.<sup>20</sup> However, both conservative and radical militarists emphasize law and order and tolerate no opposition. According to Huntington, most traditional military oligarchies (praetorianist) tend to turn to radical reformers and in turn to mass praetorianism.<sup>21</sup>

#### Militarization

Militarization is to a considerable degree different from militarism. According to Andrzejewski, militarization can occur without the predominance of the military. When a

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20 Andrzejewski, Military Organization and Society, op. cit., pp. 195-196.

21 According to Huntington, when a traditional military oligarchy changes into a radical one, it usually plays a progressive role. It pushes for reform and helps the middle class get into power. However, when the society continually develops toward a mass participation stage, the military becomes conservative. It blocks the rise of lower class and mass participation. It exercises veto coups and serves as a guardian of the old order. So the change from a radical military praetorianism to a mass one is a change from progressive to conservative. See Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, op. cit., pp. 208-224.

society brings about a recasting of various aspects of social life in accordance with the pattern of military organization, it is a militarization of the society.<sup>22</sup>

Despite the traditional antimilitary attitude, the Chinese, according to Pye, tend to favor military-type organizations. The spirit of military organization finds its way into all manner of government and political organizations. "In China the model has generally been the army, and the cultural idea of the well-organized group stresses the essentially military qualities of discipline, order, vigor, loyalty, and obedience."<sup>23</sup> Pye names this tendency in traditional China as militarization. His understanding of Chinese history may not be completely correct, but his concept of militarization seems to be a very comprehensive one.

Emphasizing the contemporary need of agricultural development, the Hungchi magazine identifies militarization as: "to militarize the agricultural organization, to turn the action of the peasants into struggle, and to collectivize their lives."<sup>24</sup> Similar to Andrzejewski and Pye, the Hungchi's definition also emphasized the application of a military pattern of organization and military spirit to the nonmilitary

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22 Andrzejewski, Military Organization and Society, op. cit., p. 185.

23 Lucian Pye, The Spirit of Chinese Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT, 1968), p. 194.

24 "Great Upsurge in Farming People's Communes," Hungchi 7 (Sept. 1, 1958), p. 14.

sectors of the society, above all, the agricultural organizations and the peasants. Its goal was to change the traditional agricultural organization and method in order to meet the need of agricultural development. To quote the article:

What is meant by the militarization of organization of course does not mean that they are really going to organize military companies, and even less does it mean that they want to give themselves officers' ranks. The rapid development of agriculture simply demands that they greatly emphasize their own organizational character, demands that in their work they act faster, in a more disciplined and efficient way, that they can better be shifted around within a broad framework, like workers in a factory or the soldiers in a military unit. Thus they have recognized that their organization requires militarization.<sup>25</sup>

When the EASM was later called for by Mao in the high tide of communization, militarization was no longer limited to the agricultural organization and the peasants; it was expanded to the whole society with the establishment of militia divisions of a large size. The goal was not only aimed at improving the production organization, it equally emphasized the military implications of the militarization of the peasants in the national defense and social security.

From all of these discussions, one is likely to realize that militarization is primarily aimed at adopting the military pattern of organization and the spirit of soldiers to organize the nonmilitary masses in order to promote the efficiency of their action.

Based on this realization, for our particular

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<sup>25</sup> Ibid., pp. 14-15.

purpose, we tend to propose a definition of militarization as that militarization of a society is to apply the military model of organization to other aspects of the society in order to effectively mobilize and organize the natural as well as human resources for new objectives without necessarily having military domination.

## 2. Characteristics of Military Organization

As we have defined that militarization is the application of the military model of organization to the nonmilitary aspects of a society, it is necessary for us to understand the unique characteristics of military organization. Military organization exhibits most characteristics attributed to the bureaucratic type of organization which Max Weber regarded as the most efficient way of carrying out certain types of enterprise under specific conditions. The structure of military organizations is designed to meet emergent needs, therefore, it has developed a complex chain of command and precise division of labour in order to enable itself to coordinate and control the activities of large forces of men.<sup>26</sup>

The characteristics of military organization can be briefly described as follows:

Hierarchical Command: Command is defined as the

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<sup>26</sup> William Anderson, "Social Structure and the Role of the Military in Natural Disaster," Sociology and Social Research 53 (1969), p. 243.

possession or exercise of controlling authority. Hierarchical command means the control or controlling authority is organized in a graded order. The military missions usually involve a coordinative action of a great number of people. So it needs good organization as well as strong leadership. As Andrzejewski says, "success in war, more than in any other human activity, depends on co-ordination of individual actions, and the larger a group the more necessary is the coordination, and the larger the hierarchy required."<sup>27</sup> The sense of urgency and the reality of immediate combat always make the military an authoritarian organization, but the need of coordination and initiative of the soldier, often urge the military to the other side. This is called by Janowitz as "the dilemma of command."<sup>28</sup> The military organization is often rigidly stratified into two closed hierarchies — the officers and the rank and file. This phenomenon severely impedes the coordination of the military. The officers are more likely to be authoritarian in peace time, at least when the urgent need of coordination is over. It seems that by insisting on mass line and other policies, the PLA has to a large extent broken this traditional "dilemma of command," (mass line will be discussed later) and improved the relationships between the officers and privates.

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27 Andrzejewski, Military Organization and Society, op. cit., p. 29.

28 Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1960), p. 46.



Regimentation and Discipline: Regimentation means a controlled or strictly organized body; discipline means acting in accordance with rules and regulations. A collective body only can expect to operate smoothly when its individual members act according to a commonly comprehensive rule or order. If everybody acts on his own will, the collective action will be impeded. The military is a combat unit. Its combat goal requires its members to act strictly based on the orders and rules of the army. A regimented and disciplinary organization usually promotes subordination and cohesion. According to Andrzejewski, the size of the army or the participation rate of the military directly affects the degree of subordination. The larger the military size, the higher the subordination will be. Subordination, among other things, implies cohesion, because strict subordination means tight organization and, therefore, cohesion.<sup>29</sup>

The recent development of technology has lessened the roles of authoritarian discipline in the military. It is gradually replaced by manipulation, persuasion, and group consensus in order to encourage the initiative and innovation of the individuals, because the technology of warfare is so complex that the coordination of a complex group of specialists cannot be guaranteed simply by authoritarian discipline. The old concept of discipline is "domination" and negative

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29 Andrzejewski, The Military Organization and Society, op. cit., pp. 120-121.

sanctions against the violators," but the new one is "positive incentive" and "persuasion."<sup>30</sup>

No matter what changes the concept of discipline may undergo the military is still a more regimented and disciplinary organization than any other component of a society. The disciplinary mind and regulated behavior of its members help to promote the efficiency of the military.

Team Work: Modern warfare is a large-scale military campaign. The complex weapons and the large number of soldiers particularly need coordinative actions of the masses rather than the individual bravery as the middle-age European knight did. The need of team spirit is the primary reason why military organization emphasizes regimentation and discipline; this is also why the military discipline has changed to insure a "team concept of morale."<sup>31</sup>

The military organization is an extreme example of collective and self-contained society. The need of cooperation not only develops its high team spirit, but to some extent even develops kinship relationships between the officers and the privates.<sup>32</sup> The officers are asked to take care of their men and provide them with fatherly advice. Consequently, the feeling of group solidarity and the capacity for collective

30 Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, op. cit., p. 38.

31 Ibid., p. 39.

32 H. Brotz and Everett Wilson, "Characteristics of Military Society," American Journal of Sociology 51 (1946), p. 374.

action have been a strong characteristic of military organization.

Ideological Fervor Both the organization and its goal make the military an ideal society for ideological indoctrination. The organizational goal of the military is combat against enemies in order to protect the society. This is likely to promote nationalism and patriotism of the military, and thus it tends to provide a sense of citizenship among the soldiers.<sup>33</sup> In addition, the military training also facilitates the officers in conducting political indoctrination among their soldiers. The military attitude of the soldiers makes them more likely to accept what their superiors say.<sup>34</sup> While the military recruitment in developing countries primarily comes from the peasants, the various kinds of military training programs are likely to promote the political dimensions of the soldiers. As Pye said "while the army must mold those who enter it into the image of a good soldier, the good soldier is also to some extent a modernized man in the developing countries."<sup>35</sup>

#### Political indoctrination of the military in the

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- 33 Lucian Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization," in The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, ed. John J. Johnson (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University, 1962), p. 83.
- 34 Edward Shils, "The Military in the Political Development of the New States," in The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, op. cit., p. 29.
- 35 Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization," op. cit., p. 80

communist countries is heavier than in many non-communist countries, because the military in communist countries is controlled by the communist parties which often put ideological work ahead of other types of work. The military in communist countries may even be used as a political work team. Politics taking command, for example, clearly reflects the importance of political indoctrination in the PLA.

Efficiency: The military is a "crisis organization."<sup>36</sup>

It is designed to meet the needs of immediate combat in any unexpected "crisis". Although efficiency is the goal of all organizations, it is more important to the military than to others, because it directly affects the security of the society. The successful waging of a war depends primarily on the efficiency of the military rather than its number. To meet the immediate need of combat, the military organization always aims at a high rationality. It must be able to mobilize its resources in the crisis and win the war. It either wins the war or perishes, there is little room for any other choice.

While training and equipment are important to keep a high efficiency of the military, the internal cohesion and strong fighting will are essential to any army. An army with superior technologies and weapons but weak fighting spirit may lose its war to the iron-willed enemy with inferior weapons.<sup>37</sup>

36. Janowitz, The Military in the Development of New Nations, op. cit., p. 42.

37. The Vietnam war has fully confirmed this point of view. According to a report of the Globe and Mail (Canada) On April 30, 1975, the CIA submitted a report about the Vietnam war with a similar point of view to the White House in 1963 but was ignored.

The internal cohesion and strong fighting spirit cannot be derived totally from material incentives. Patriotism, the feeling of belonging, organization and discipline, and political consciousness all are relevant factors.

Beside these common characteristics of military organization, the Chinese PLA has developed some unique traditions which not only distinguishes the PLA from many traditional military organizations but also influences the substance of the militarization of the Chinese society.

Party Control and Political Command: Based on Mao's theory that political power grows out of the barrel of a gun, and that the Party commands the gun and the gun must never be allowed to command the Party, the PLA is always required to accept the control of the CPC.<sup>38</sup> There is little room for it to develop militarism in China. It is often seen as an armed group for carrying out political tasks of a class nature. So it not only fights but also shoulders such important tasks as agitating among the masses, organizing them, arming them, and helping the Party to set up political power.<sup>39</sup> This particular system not merely makes the PLA a political army but also makes the Chinese militarization highly political. The EASM, for example, is also seen as a

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38 Mao Tse-tung, "Problems of War and Strategy," Selected Works, Vol. 1 (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1967), p. 224.

39 Mao Tse-tung, "On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party (Dec. 1929)," Selected Works, Vol. 1, op. cit., pp. 105-106.

tool of the proletarian class in order to consolidate its power in China.

Military Democracy: To cope with the disadvantageous economic condition, the PLA had developed a military democratic system in the long revolutionary war,<sup>40</sup> which consists of the well-known mass line, Shia-fang (下放) policy, and the criticism and self-criticism system etc. While the high ranking officers are often sent down to the company to serve as a private in order to close the gap between the officers and the ordinary soldiers, the criticism and self-criticism is also used as a mechanism by the CPC to combat the tendency of bureaucratization in the PLA.<sup>41</sup>

Based on the principle of mass line, big and small meetings of various kinds are often used by the PLA to promote mutual understanding between the officers and the soldiers. By so doing, the Party leaders have been able to persuade and encourage the soldiers to obey orders and commands. These meetings were even practiced at the front up to the company levels,<sup>42</sup> when the army is in operation. The democratic tradition of the PLA is also implemented in the militia organization.

Given the uniquely Chinese system of political command and military democracy, it is likely to make the military

40 Mao Tse-tung, "The Struggle in the Ching Kang Mountains (Nov. 25, 1928)," Selected Works, Vol. 1, op. cit., p. 83.

41 Mao Tse-tung, "The Democratic Movement in the Army," Selected Works, Vol. 4 (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1969), p. 191.

42 Ibid.

organization a less regimentation and more education-oriented organization, as applied to the nonmilitary aspects of the society.

### 3. Militarization and Modernization

#### Concept of Modernization

A common phenomenon of political development in most developing countries since the second world war has been the effort for national modernization.

The term modernization as used in the various disciplines of social science encompasses different elements. Economists see modernization primarily in terms of man's application of advanced technology to the control of natural resources in order to bring about a marked increase in the growth of output per head of population. Industrialization therefore is the major aim of modernization. While sociologists and anthropologists are primarily concerned about the process of differentiation that characterizes modern society, they concurrently pay attention to the disruptive effects of the modernization process.

Political scientists do not exclude economic development or industrialization from the concept of modernization but put more attention on the political aspect of modernization and the effects of its process on the political system. They focus particularly on the problems of nation and government-building as modernization occurs.<sup>43</sup>

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43 Myron Weiner, ed. Modernization, the Dynamics of Growth (New York: Basic Books, 1966), p. 3.

Scholars like Claude Ake emphasize the importance of political integration and concentrate on increasing political authority and political consensus;<sup>44</sup> others like Huntington pay special attention to political stability and thus emphasize the institutionalization and bureaucratization of the political system.<sup>45</sup> While scholars like Daniel Lerner, and E. Rogers emphasize individual change and thus pay particular attentions to the effect of communication on modernization;<sup>46</sup> others like G. Almond and Claude Welch concentrate on increasing the capacity of the political system in order to meet the increasing demands placed upon it.<sup>47</sup>

Generally speaking, most scholars of political modernization in the western world believe that a modern political system should be (1) an increased centralization of power in the state, coupled with the weakening of traditional sources of authority; (2) the differentiation and specialization of political institutions; and (3) increased popular participation in politics, and greater identification of

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44 See Ake, A Theory of Political Integration, op. cit., pp. 17-35.

45 See Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, op. cit., pp. 1-92.

46 See Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Societies, op. cit.; also see E. Rogers, Modernization among Peasants: The Impact of Communication (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1969).

47 See Almond, Comparative Politics, op. cit.



individuals with the system as a whole.<sup>48</sup> These scholars are, more or less, influenced by the traditional western democratic system and thus often favor a system of mass participation with parliamentary democracy. However, to many developing countries, the most important task of the country is to strengthen the authority and capacity of the government in order to be able to mobilize as well as to organize the resources of the society to carry out socio-economic modernization. So we agree with Welch that the goal of political modernization is to develop an institutional framework that is sufficiently flexible and powerful to meet the demands placed upon it. With a modernized system, the government must become fully capable of performing a wide variety of duties. Its capacities must increase, so that change can be accommodated within political channels.<sup>49</sup> In other words, the primary goal of political modernization in developing countries, at least for the particular purpose of this study, is to strengthen the authority and capacity of the political organization so that the government can effectively mobilize and organize the resources of the society in order to carry out economic as well as other socio-political reforms.

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48 Claude E. Welch, "The Comparative Study of Political Modernization," in his Political Modernization: A Reader in Comparative Political Change (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1967), pp. 16-16.

49 Ibid., p. 7.

Militarization and the Increase of the Capacity of  
Government

Traditional liberal-democratic philosophy often holds to the belief that the government that does the least is the government that rules the best. Under this philosophy, the early modernizing tasks of European countries were not achieved with any governmentally sponsored plan; they were developed through several centuries by the societies themselves. However, under the jet-propelled theory of modernization, the leaders of developing countries believe that for achieving modernization the country must invest every available resource without wastage or delay and must act with efficiency and discipline under a precisely planned program and a strong leadership. The growing need for government services which emerges in the course of social mobilization usually implies persistent political pressures for a greater government involvement in the national economy. As Allan Spitz writes:

Modernization in the 20th century differs from modernization in earlier periods in one fundamental way — politics is expected to lead the way to modernity. In the western world, a more libertarian or individualistic view appears to have been accepted by society in moving along the road to modernization, in contrast to the acceptance of more government intervention in the political modernization process in the non-western countries. The primacy of government in the modernizing process is more or less taken for granted throughout the underdeveloped world today.<sup>50</sup>

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50 Allan Spitz, "An Examination of the Political Modernization Processes in Japan and India," Indian Journal of Political Science 30:4 (Oct. - Dec. 1969), p. 320.

While national modernization needs a strong government-  
 al leadership, the lack of authority of the governments in  
 many developing countries often causes their modernizing efforts  
 to be interrupted. According to Edward Shils, most developing  
 countries, above all the new states, are characterized by  
 "gap" — gaps between the educated and the uneducated, between  
 the townsmen and the villagers, between the national and the  
 local, and between the ruler and the ruled. As long as the  
 gap endures, "it will provide a temptation to a nationalistic,  
 populist counter-elite. When the civilian elite has diffi-  
 culty in finding its way, a military élite with clear and  
 simple convictions will feel called upon to offer itself as  
 the proper agent of its closure."<sup>51</sup>

Although students of political science have affirmed  
 that military regimes tend to be a prevailing phenomenon in  
 many developing countries, very few give them high credit.  
 The failure of military regimes to promote political stabil-  
 ity as well as socio-economic development is explained by  
 Janowitz as a lack of leadership skills. The military  
 leaders are not familiar with bargaining skills and political  
 communications that are required for sustained political  
 leadership.<sup>52</sup> Their military mind does not help them to be  
 conciliatory either.<sup>53</sup>

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51 Shils, "The Military in the Political Development of the  
 New States," op. cit., p. 29.

52 Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of  
 New Nations, op. cit., p. 40.

53 In his Military Professionalization and Political Power,

How can the military play a more positive role in the process of modernization in developing countries? According to Lucian Pye, in large measure, the story of the underdeveloped countries is one of countless efforts to create organizations by which resources can be effectively mobilized for achieving new objectives. This is the problem of establishing organizations. A military establishment comes as close as any human organization can to the ideal type for an industrialized and secularized enterprise.<sup>54</sup> With its specialized training, advanced techniques, most modernized equipment, and above all its organizational pattern, the military can make those who enter it, into the image of the good soldier. To the developing society, "the good soldier is also to some degree a modern man."<sup>55</sup> Accordingly, the military in developing countries can promote the modernization of their societies by means of training their people to be good soldiers; the military model of organization is also a valuable model for developing countries to organize their societies. The adoption of a military model of organization and military qualities such as discipline, order, vigor, loyalty and obedience to organize a society is likely to increase the capacity of a political system.

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Bengt Abrahamsson argued with the concept of the military mind, but he did not totally deny it.

54 Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization," op. cit., pp. 73-74.

55 Ibid., p. 80.

Militarization and the Mobilization of Manpower

Militarization of the Chinese society is basically an application of the mass line to economic organization. As a Marxist, Mao Tse-tung believes that contradiction is a universal phenomenon existing in everything and every society at all times.<sup>56</sup> He divides contradictions into antagonistic and nonantagonistic ones. The former is a contradiction between opposites; the latter a contradiction among the people. Contradictions between the bureaucrats and masses, the leaders and led, and the city and country are considered by Mao as nonantagonistic contradictions.<sup>57</sup> The mass-élite gap which is similar to Mao's bureaucrat-mass or leader-led contradictions has often been attacked in China by the mass line which is often simplified as "coming from the masses and going back to the masses."<sup>58</sup> According to Mao, the mass line is a process of decision-making and of policy implementation. The Party should take "the ideas of the masses and concentrate them (policy making), then go into the masses and propagate and explain these ideas until the masses embrace them as their own, hold fast to them and translate them into action (policy implementation)."<sup>59</sup>

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56 Mao Tse-tung, "On Contradition," Selected Works, Vol. 3 (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1967), p. 316.

57 Mao Tse-tung, "Concerning Correctly Dealing with Contradictions among People," Selected Readings of Mao Tse-tung (A class edition) (Peking: People's Press, 1965), pp. 327-328.

58 Mao Tse-tung, "Some Questions Concerning Method of Leadership," Selected Works, Vol. 3, op. cit., p. 119.

59 Ibid.

The success of the mass-line primarily depends on the "close contact with the masses and relies on them."<sup>60</sup> In achieving this goal, the Party usually adopts two facets of strategy: Criticism and the Hsia-fang system. By using criticism, the Party tries to halt the tendency of bureaucratization by mass criticism.<sup>61</sup> The criticism, according to Mao, is primarily aimed at unity. So it is also known as a strategy of curing the disease in order to save the patient.<sup>62</sup>

By using Hsia-fang and other relevant policies, the Party keeps a close contact with the masses. "Hsia-fang", according to Teng Hsia-p'ing, means "sending the leading cadres to lower bodies and letting them learn from the masses by living and working among them."<sup>63</sup> Although "Hsia-fang" has also been used to solve other socio-political problems such as relieving urban unemployment, punishing political foes etc.,<sup>64</sup> it is primarily used to "guard against the danger of

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60 Teng Hsiao-p'ing, "Report on the Revision of the Constitution of the Communist Party of China (Sept. 1956)," in Essential Works of Chinese Communism, ed. Winberg Chai (New York: Bontam Book, 1969), p. 319.

61 This method was developed during the rectification campaign in 1942 in Yen-an. Mao explained it in detail in 1957 in "Concerning Correctly Dealing with Contradictions among people." It is used for dealing with the contradictions among the people. See Selected Readings of Mao Tse-tung, op. cit., p. 333.

62 Ibid.

63 Teng Hsiao-p'ing, "Report on the Revision of the Constitution of the Communist Party of China," op. cit., p. 319.

64 Doak Barnett, Cadres, Bureaucracy and Political Power in Communist China (New York: Columbia University, 1967), p. 60.

the leading bodies turning bureaucratic"<sup>65</sup> and to "correct the isolation of the cadres from peasant and workers, from reality, and from physical labour" etc.<sup>66</sup> Therefore, according to James Townsend, Hsia-fang is to some extent an education or political socialization; it is a populist-oriented policy.<sup>67</sup>

When the mass line is used to mobilize the masses, it is closely linked with organizational work. A political organization, according to Schurmann, must reach out to the most distant and poorest of the masses.<sup>68</sup> The cadres in China are often asked to spend most of their time among the masses in order to understand their feelings and to help them to organize their production and improve their livelihood. By doing so, they can expect to integrate themselves with the masses in all things and thus "to get the masses organized."<sup>69</sup> According to Mao, "the only road to liberation for the people and the only road from poverty to prosperity" is to get the masses organized; getting them organized into a great army of labourers." With the militarized labour, Mao hopes to build a new China, that is a modern country. When we "have learned to organize the labour of the masses" as Mao said "and bring the creative power and initiative of the masses into play, we

65 Teng Hsiao-p'ing, "Report on the Revision of the Constitution of the Communist Party of China," op. cit., p. 322.

66 Li Ming-hua (黎明華), "An Analysis of the Chinese Communist Enslavement of Cadres and Students," (共匪奴役幹部學生之分析) FCYP 11:9 (Nov. 1968), p. 32.

67 Townsend, Political in China, op. cit., p. 213.

68 Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China, op. cit., p. I (prologue).

69 Mao Tse-tung, "Getting Organized," Selected Works, Vol. 3, op. cit., p. 158.

shall certainly be able to . . . build up a new China."<sup>70</sup>

Although the concept of "great army of labour" submitted by Mao in 1943 in Yen-an (延安) was still vague, it seemed to be the basic idea of militarization of the Chinese peasantry which has been implemented nationwide since 1954 through the mutual-aid team system, the agricultural cooperatives, the people's commune system and eventually the EASM step by step.<sup>71</sup> As soon as the broad peasant masses are militarized, that is getting organized, by collective effort they are said to be able to industrialize and urbanize themselves in order to gradually reduce the differences between city and country.<sup>72</sup> Furthermore, the militarized villagers will be permitted to embrace the small towns in the jurisdiction of their communes and thus the commune will be committed to various industries concurrently. This is said to eliminate the difference between industry and agriculture, and thus the gap between city and country.<sup>73</sup>

#### Militarization and National Security

Although the purposes of militarization are multiple,

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70 Ibid., p. 157.

71 Mao had referred to the cooperative systems in this paper. Ibid., p. 157. All of these systems will be discussed in the next chapter.

72 Article 2, Tentative Regulations (Draft) of the Weihsing (Sputnik) People's Commune, in The Chinese Communist Regime: Document and Commentary, ed. Theodore H. E. Chen (New York: Praeger, 1967), p. 240.

73 JMJP, 4 Sept. 1958.



one of the primary considerations of militarization is often closely related to the contemporary national security. From the Chinese historical facts (see Section One , Chapter 3 of this study), one is likely to realize that the expansions of the mass militia system in traditional China generally coincided with the internal and external military necessities. When military threat was reduced, the militia system gradually lost its significance and faded. This finding is also applicable to the militia organization of the CPC in the long civil war. The militia activity had almost disappeared from Chinese newspapers in the middle 1950s.

When many developing countries are often bothered by political insurrections and guerrilla bands in the countryside, the militarization of the peasants is likely to increase the capacity of the government to maintain law and order. Mao Tse-tung always believed that the mobilization and organization of the masses is a major weapon to defeat the enemies.<sup>74</sup> According to Mao, when the masses are mobilized, organized, and armed, they can make widespread raid on the enemy, prevent the leakage of news to the enemy, and thus keep the enemy in the dark, while they concurrently provide a screen for the PLA.<sup>75</sup>

The total militarization of the peasantry, which is primarily implemented by arming the masses into a militia

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74 Mao Tse-tung, "On Protracted War (May 1938)," Selected Works, Vol. 2 (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1967), p. 166.

75 Ibid., p. 166.

organization is likely to form a human sea in the war. While it can permit our own army to swim in it freely, it will drown the enemy whenever it gets in to it.<sup>76</sup> As Mao declared that China, in addition to mighty regular armed forces, requires a tremendous number of militia divisions. Thus, when imperialists invade China, they would find difficulty in moving a single step.<sup>77</sup>

As far as the internal political insurrection and guerrilla war are concerned, the militarization of the society is likely to help the government to control the countryside and deprive the political dissenters of getting support from the masses. A successful guerrilla war, to a large degree, depends on the sympathetic support of the masses.<sup>78</sup> The masses are like water while the political insurgents and guerrilla bands are like fishes. As long as there is water, there is no difficulty for the fish to survive.<sup>79</sup> However, when the majority of the population is organized into the militia organization, it will undoubtedly strengthen the hand

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76 Ibid., p. 54.

77 See "Important Statement by Chairman Mao Following Provincial Inspection Tour," op. cit., p. 2.

78 See Samuel Huntington, "Guerrilla Warfare in Theory and Policy," in Modern Guerrilla Warfare: Fighting Communist Guerrilla Movements, 1941-1961, ed. Franklin Marx Osanka (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), p. xix.

79 See Mao Tse-tung, General Problems of Guerrilla Warfare in the Sino-Japanese War 抗日游擊戰的一般問題 (Yenan: Chieh-fang She, 1938), pp. 55. Cited from Stuart Schram, The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung (New York: Praeger, 1969), pp. 287-288.

of the government to deal with political insurrection. If the government can rally the support of the masses by means of the EASM, it will be able to drain away the water and leave the fish to die.

#### 4. EASM and Militarization

While the concept of militarization of the Chinese peasant was officially submitted by the CPC in 1958 when the commune system was implemented,<sup>80</sup> it was actually developed in the Chinese revolution for several decades in the form of people's war against the Kuomintang and the Japanese.

From the long experience of the Chinese revolution, Mao realized that "the richest source of power to wage war lies in the masses of the people"<sup>81</sup> and that "a revolutionary war is a war of the masses. Only by mobilizing and relying on the masses can a war be carried out."<sup>82</sup>

According to Chen Po-chün (陳伯鈞), a communist writer on Mao Tse-tung's military thought, the people's war is "essentially and in all respects, a concrete form of the mass line. The mass line, as applied to a revolutionary war, called for organization of mass movements on a large scale

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80 "Great Upsurge in Forming People's Communes," op. cit., p. 15.

81 Mao Tse-tung, "On Protracted War," Selected Works, Vol. 1, op. cit., p. 186.

82 Mao Tse-tung, "Be Concerned with the Well-Being of the Masses, Pay Attention to Methods of Work," Selected Works, Vol. 1, op. cit., p. 147.

and full exploitation of the forces of the popular masses in fighting to defeat the enemies.<sup>83</sup>

A similar point of view was held by Lin Piao (林彪). "The basic line of our Party" was to boldly arouse the masses of the people and expand the people's forces so that under the leadership of the Party, they could defeat the aggressors and build a new China."<sup>84</sup>

The application of the mass line to revolutionary war is to mobilize the masses and arm them in the form of militia organizations, so they can help the Party to fight against the enemies.

While the Central Committee of the CPC decided to use the people's commune system as a vehicle to have the people to organize themselves along military lines, work with militancy, and lead a collective life, it did not identify the communes with the militia. On the contrary, it put the militia (military affairs) under the control of the commune.<sup>85</sup> It became even clearer in the Hungchi editorial of Sept. 1, 1958 that "getting the people organized along military lines" simply means to organize the agricultural labourers along military lines in

83 Chen Po-chün, "Study the Thought of Comrade Mao Tse-tung," JMJP, 14-15 Nov. 1960; SCMP, No. 2385, pp. 1-2.

84 Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of the People's War!" in Peking and People's War, ed. Samuel B. Griffith (London: Paul Mall, 1966), pp. 59-60.

85 Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPC on the Establishment of People's Communes in the Rural Areas, August 29, 1958. See Communist China, 1955-1959: Policy Documents with Analysis (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 1965), p. 454.

order to act more quickly and with greater discipline and efficiency, so that like the factory workers and army men, the peasants can be deployed with great freedom and on a large scale. Although the militarized agricultural organization is likely to be transformed against the human enemies it is primarily organized to battle against the natural enemies. The militia organization is only a subsystem of the commune and a facet of the total activities of the commune.<sup>86</sup>

However, as scholars realized, the EASM which was to arm the whole peasantry was the last stage before communization. They saw it as a part of the whole process of militarization. It was the "military aspect of militarization", which had something to do with the international situation in 1958.<sup>87</sup> In fact, the EASM not only has its military implications, but also non-military ones. According to Chairman Mao, the militia is a military organization, a labour organization, an educational organization, and an athletic organization. With the life of the masses militarized and collectivized, militia divisions will also be able to promote the mobilization of manpower, collective action, and fulfilment of production.<sup>88</sup>

In more elaborate words, General Fu Chiu-t'ao wrote:

By implementing everybody-a-soldier movement, we shall be able to educate the people with the good tradition of the PLA and promote the organization of the people,

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86 "Great Upsurge in Forming People's Communes," op. cit., p. 459.

87 Schurmann, Ideology and Organization, op. cit., p. 478.

88 Teng K'e-ming, "Report to Kiangsi's Militia Work Conference," op. cit., p. 37.

their discipline and capacity to fight; we can strengthen their will in order to fear no hardship and dangers and dare to make the high mountains bow to them and rivers concede to them. By implementing everybody-a-soldier movement through militarization of the organization, combativization of the action, collectivization of the life, we shall be able to reform the old customs remaining in the masses and the concept of private ownership step by step, and cultivate a kind of collective thought and attitude of communists in order to promote the speed of economic development and the high tide of cultural and technical revolution with the great communist cooperation.<sup>89</sup>

From these quotations, we can realize that under the commune, militarization of the peasantry was actually carried out in two ways: the work organizations and the militia. The militarization of work organizations had started long before the implementation of the commune. The organization of mutual-aid teams, the agricultural producer's cooperatives, and the communes in different degrees all have promoted the militarization of the peasantry.<sup>90</sup>

In the sense of militarization of the peasantry, the EASM is different from both the work teams of the commune and the previous militia organization. Generally speaking, as a productive unit, the work teams include all of the households within the area indiscriminately. They are loosely organized labour units. Their functions are fixed and less dynamic.

The militia organization prior to the EASM was basically

89 Fu Chiu-t'ao, "Everybody A Soldier," Hungchi 10 (1958), p. 22.

90 Franz Schurmann believes that the militarization of work organizations was abandoned after 1959. In fact, the reduction of size of the commune and the change of its basic accounting unit from the commune to work teams did not change the organizational pattern and its characteristics.

limited to a few people. It was an élite organization in the villages. Its functions were rarely beyond political and military affairs. However, under the EASM, the militia organization includes the majority of the able-bodied population in a relatively close military organization. Its highly energetic elements and hierarchical organizational pattern make it more mobile and thus fit more dynamic work. The members of militia organizations are more militarized than those of work teams. Furthermore, the functions of the militia since 1958 have drastically expanded. It is not only a military and political organization, it is also a labour, athletic, and educational organization. These new functions indicate that the EASM in China was an important vehicle for promoting socialist construction which, to a large extent, equals the concept of modernization prevailing in the western countries.

### III. The Historical Background of the EASM

The militia is an armed force of the masses of the people under the firm and strong leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and not divorced from production. It is an armed producer, an organization which combines labour with military force and which is at once civilian and military in character.

— Liu Yun-cheng<sup>1</sup>

Everybody-a-Soldier is organized in the form of militia within the commune.

— Fu Chiu-t'ao<sup>2</sup>

Most modern socio-political systems have been developed through a long historical process. No system can be imported from outside and imposed on a society by anybody without adapting to the necessities of the society.

The EASM in China was not Mao's personal innovation, it was at least partly developed from Chinese historical practice and was used by different dynasties of China to meet the temporary necessities of internal and external socio-political developments. To understand the particular social background of this movement, it is necessary for this study to explore the possible effect of the traditional Chinese Yü Ping Yü Nung system (寓兵於農, quartering soldiers among farmers. Hereafter referred to as YPYN), the contemporary international environment, and domestic socio-political developments on the policy of the EASM, which was

1 Liu Yun-cheng (刘云铮), "The Militia in People's Revolutionary Wars of China," JMJP, Peking, 28 June 1962; SCMP, No. 2780, p. 1.

2 Fu Chiu-t'ao, "Everybody a Soldier," op. cit., p. 22.



submitted by Mao Tse-tung in 1958.

### 1. The Historical Derivation of the EASM

From a historical point of view, the concept of the EASM is not totally new. Since early history, the Chinese governments of different dynasties have developed a system of YPYN. In some dynasties, this system was less than that of everybody-a-soldier, in others it was almost the same. In addition, the self-defence corps in modern China before the implementation of the EASM was actually its forerunner. The militia organization, which was developed by the communists in the wars against the Japanese as well as the Kuomintang (hereafter referred to as KMT), has inevitably had a tremendous effect on this movement.

#### The Traditional System of YPYN

The concept of YPYN was developed from various traditional military reserve systems in different dynasties of traditional China. It would be untrue to think that this concept could be exclusively explained by any particular system implemented in any single dynasty; and thus it would be also unfair to attribute this system to any particular man exclusively. Although the concept has long been a dominant doctrine to Chinese historians in discussing the relevant subjects, it would be less honest to say that the system of YPYN prevailed throughout Chinese history. On the contrary, it was in the broadest sense that the YPYN system was only implemented in a short period by several dynasties (see Table 1).

Table 1: The Various Systems of Yu Ping Yü Nüing in China

Dynasty	System *	The Period of the Dynasty **	The Period of Implementation of the System ***
Ch'in 秦 (prior to unification)	Shih Wu Chih (什伍制): 1. Organized the peasants into semi-military units. 2. Local officials train peasants to learn war skills and to obey the laws in the agricultural off seasons. 3. Functions: promoting production, law and order, and preparing for war.	348 B.C. (Shang Yang 商鞅 was the chief minister of Duke Hsiao 孝公 — 221 B.C. (the unification of China))	348 B.C. - 221 B.C.
Former Han 前漢	Ping-nüing Ho-i (兵農合一): 1. Peasants above 23 and under 56 were regulated by law as military reserves. 2. Production corps were set up in the border areas. 3. Soldier and farmers were identified.	202 B.C.-9 A.D. (the Former Han was replaced by Hsin 新).	B.C. 207-100 after Emperor Wu 武帝, the system was gradually faded.
Northern dynasties: Northern Wei, East Wei, West Wei, Northern Chi, Northern Chou 北魏, 東魏, 西魏, 北齊, 北周	Fu Ping Chih (府兵制): 1. Peasants above 20 and below 60 were enrolled as military reserves. 2. The country was divided into 100 Fu, each Fu had a responsible officer to supervise training programs as well as mobilization matters. 3. Training was carried out in the agricultural off-season. 4. The reservists were entitled to tax-exemption.	Northern Wei 386-535, East Wei 534-550, West Wei 535-556, Northern Chi 550-577, Northern Chou 557-581	A.D. 386-581 since Hsiao-wen-ti's 孝文帝 land reform, conscription system was implemented.
-- Continued --			

Sui Dynasty 隋	Similar to the Northern dynasties.	A.D. 590-618.	A.D. 590-618.
T'ang Dynasty 唐 朝	Fu Ping Chih (府兵制): 1. Similar to Sui's Fu-ping. 2. The reserve: selected from peasants above 20 and below 60. 3. Chen-ch'ung Tu-wei (折衝都衛) was the responsible officers at the Fu headquarters to mobilize as well as to train the peasants. 4. The reserve could be called for special service in peace time, no longer than one month.	A.D. 618-906.	A.D. 618-700 until the Empress Wu 武后.
Sung Dynasty 宋 朝	Pao Chia Chih (保甲制): 1. The peasantry households were organized into semi-military units. 2. 10 households were organized into one Pao; 10 Pao into one large Pao; 10 large Pao into one Do-pao. 3. One adult male of each household should enroll as militia in the Pao. 4. Local officials were responsible for training the peasants in the off-season in a proper place close to the peasant's home.	960-1279	1068-1085 (only under Wang An-shih's premiership).
Yuan Dynasty 元 朝	1. The male Mongols (over 15 and under 70) were all enrolled as soldiers. 2. The Han people over 20 were required to enroll in the reserve according to their wealth, either each household one man or two to three households one man.	1260-1368	1260-1368
Taiping 太平天國 (Ching)	Everybody-A-Soldier System: 1. Every household was organized into a military organization.	1850-1864	1850-1864

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| <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>2. 15200 households were organized into an army corp.</li><li>3. Unit leaders were military officers with formal military rank.</li></ol> |  |  |
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- Sources: \*
- \* The materials are edited from Teng Cheng-chih's The Two Thousand Years of Chinese History (Hong Kong: Taipeng Press, 1964).
- \*\* The period of the dynasty is adopted from Dun J. Li, The Ageless Chinese (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971), pp. 561-569.
- \*\*\* Adopted from Teng's book and checked with Dun J. Li's book.

YPYN has long been a popular term used by Chinese historians as well as other scholars. They used it without bothering to define it. Consequently the very concept of YPYN becomes ambiguous. Scholars such as Teng Ch'eng-chih (鄧誠之), for example, see that the Wei-sou Ping (衛所兵) of the Ming Dynasty was in conformity with the doctrine of YPYN,<sup>3</sup> but to Dun J. Li, Wang An-shih's (王安石) Pao Chia (保甲) system was also a system of YPYN.<sup>4</sup>

The Wei-sou Ping, according to Teng, was characterized by a system in which the country set up military headquarters (Wei-sou) and located armies at strategic points in provinces and counties. The sources of recruitment were primarily volunteers, surrendered enemies, and criminals.<sup>5</sup> This system has nothing in common with the Han and T'ang systems which Teng takes as a model of YPYN. The Han system featured everybody as a soldier and mixed soldiers with farmers, while the T'ang system was characterized by selective conscription, an élite militia under the Fu Ping Chih, and sitting military bases (Fu) in provinces or districts.<sup>6</sup>

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3 Teng. Ch'eng-chih, The Two Thousand Years of Chinese History, 中華兩千年史 Vol. 3 (Hong Kong: Taiping Press, 1964), p. 370.

4 Dun J. Li, The Ageless Chinese: A History (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971), p. 210.

5 Teng Cheng-chih, The Two Thousand Years of Chinese History, Vol. 3, op. cit., p. 370.

6 Chien Mu (錢穆), The Outline of Chinese History 國史大綱 (Shanghai: National Edition and Translation House, 1948), p. 298.

Wang An-shih's Pao Chia system, under which the peasant families were organized into semi-military groups featured a mass militia system. At least one male adult from each family had to enroll in the militia and take military training in the off-season.

YPYN literally means "quartering soldiers among farmers." In traditional China it was regarded as a desirable military reserve system for an agricultural society. A successful implementation of YPYN system primarily depends on at least three prerequisites: first, a good population registration system is necessary to guarantee the implementation of conscription law in war time. The Ch'in State was the first in Chinese history to organize all of its people in accordance with a semi-military system (Shih Wu Chih).<sup>7</sup> The Sung Dynasty, under Wang An-shih's premiership, organized its peasants in a similar system (Pao Chia Chih).<sup>8</sup> Both are successful examples of YPYN. Secondly, there must be an efficient mobilization system — a proper communication system between the central and local governments, a well organized mobilization agency. The T'ang Dynasty's Fu Ping Chih, for example, set up military headquarters in provinces and counties, the Cheh-ch'ung Tu-wei (折衝都衛: title of military officer) was the responsible officer at the local

7 Teng Ch'eng-chih, Two Thousand Years of Chinese History, Vol. 1, op. cit., p. 25.

8 Dun J. Li, The Ageless Chinese, op. cit., p. 209.

level to mobilize soldiers in case he received the proper order from the central government or other authorized office.<sup>9</sup> Thirdly, there must be a proper training system at the local level in order to provide the necessary training program in peace time; otherwise the newly recruited soldiers will be unable to carry out their combat duties. Generally, the local governments were responsible for training the peasants to use weapons and learning military regulations.<sup>10</sup> The T'ang system required the Cheñ-ch'ung Tu-wei at the Fu level to train the peasants.<sup>11</sup> The training programs were usually carried out in the agricultural off-season.

The YPYN system permits a country to maintain a relatively small army in peace time without hurting her national security; it relieves the country from the burden of heavy military expenditures in normal times; it reduces the possibility of military domination in domestic politics, because a successful implementation of YPYN policy will actually relieve most military leaders from their commanding positions in peace time.<sup>12</sup>

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9 Teng Chéng-chih, Two Thousand Years of Chinese History, Vol. 3, op. cit., p. 105.

10 Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 25, and Vol. 4, p. 133.

11 Ibid., Vol. 3, p. 105.

12 In the early period of T'ang, Sung, and Ming dynasties, the governments deliberately implemented a system to separate the high military leaders from the army in peace time in order to avoid the emergence of warlords. It is called "Ping Wu Ch'ang Chiang (兵无常将 the soldiers do not have a permanent general). See Chien Mu, The Outline of Chinese History, op. cit., p. 2.

From the Table 1 above, it seems true that whenever the regime could successfully implement a kind of YPYN system, the country was relatively powerful and prosperous. When this system collapsed the authority of the dynasty usually tended to decline sooner or later. The Ch'in State in the Warring State (戰國) period, for example, conquered six other states, because it, according to Chinese historians, implemented the Shih Wu Chih — mass militia system. The Former Han was much stronger than the Later Han; while the Former Han adopted a militia system, the Later did not. The Northern dynasties eventually unified China with their Fu Ping Chih. Sui and T'ang both followed and improved the systems of the dynasties preceding them, thus creating unprecedentedly powerful and prosperous dynasties in Chinese history. Since the Fu Ping Chih declined after the Empress Wu, the T'ang's authority was weakened as well.<sup>13</sup> Forty years after Wang An-shih and his reform programs were removed, the capital city of the Sung Dynasty fell and the government was forced to move to the south of the Yangtze River until its total overthrow.<sup>14</sup>

The fact that starting from a border area, the Taiping could wipe out the Ch'ing (清) army south of the Yangtze

13 Teng Ch'eng-chih, The Two Thousand Years of Chinese History, Vol. 3, op. cit., p. 105.

14 Wang An-shih was removed from power in 1085, Kaifeng (開封), the capital city of the Northern Sung, fell in 1126, between this period, Wang was reappointed to the premiership for a short period, but again he was not able to implement his reforms.



within a few years, was partly due to the Taiping's everybody a soldier system. From the Maoist perspective, the Taiping were really a group of armed-peasant forces. Although the Taiping rebellion eventually failed, its impact on the Manchu regime was tremendous.

The EASM may not be the same thing of the militia system of the Ch'in, Sung and the Taiping's. However, it would be untrue to say that Mao's concept of EASM is totally irrelevant to the traditional Chinese YPYN system. Mao Tse-tung has a good deal of knowledge of Chinese history.<sup>15</sup> It is unthinkable that he was unaware of this traditional YPYN system. If so, he was probably influenced by these systems during the various dynasties.

The Communist Experience with the Militia Movement  
Before 1949

When the imperial officials usually stayed in the walled cities in traditional China, the countryside was often left unguarded. For personal reasons, the gentry and landlords in the countryside often organized the peasant into self-defense corps in order to protect the former's possessions. However, due to the lack of financial and political assistance from the higher levels government, these organizations often remained, to a large degree, at the local level in the villages and were small in numbers. They neither

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<sup>15</sup> In Mao Tse-tung's speeches and works, one is likely to find Mao's political concept is more often than not inherited from Chinese history.

contained the majority of the peasants nor developed into an integrated system throughout the country. Whether they were organized or not was primarily determined by the contemporary local situation. If the gentry in the villages wanted to organize the villagers with their financial support, the self-defense corps might be able to operate; otherwise, even if the situation called for it, it would still be impossible to have a militia. The extreme disorder in the early Republican period caused by the prolonged warlord period after the 1911 revolution led to the reemergence of various local self-defense corps in the countryside. However, instead of remaining a small local militia organized by the village gentry, an integrated effort to arm the majority of the peasants in the countryside was initiated by the Chinese communists in the 1920s. Since then, the traditional local self-defense corps changed its nature. It was no longer a spontaneous local organization to guard the rich; it became an integrated armed force, controlled by the communist insurgents against the local gentry, landlords, and the KMT army in the border areas.

The Chinese communists started to mobilize the peasants by organizing the peasant associations. After this, the Party

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16 General Kung Chu (龔楚) first organized a peasant army in 1926 in Pei-kiang area (北江區) in Kwangtung Province. He recruited his soldiers from the young members of the peasant association. See Kung Chu, "The Memoir of Participating in the CPC's Military Struggle," 參加中共武裝鬥爭紀實 Ming-pao Monthly 65 (June 1971), p. 98.

further organized them into a peasant army (Nung Chün 農軍).<sup>16</sup>

One year after the CPC was established, Mr. P'êng Pai (彭湃), a pioneer of peasant movement, initially organized the peasant association in Hai-lu-feng County (海陸豐縣) of Kwangtung in 1922. Two years later, Mao Tse-tung with the help of KMT left wing leaders such as Wang Ching-wei (汪精衛) and Liao Chung-kai (廖仲凱), established a Peasant Movement Institute (農民運動講習所) at Canton (廣州).<sup>17</sup> As the director of the institute, Mao personally presided over the cadres' training work of the peasant movement, and thus began his consistent effort to rely on the peasant as the major force of revolution in China. This was explained as the sinification (or sinicization) of Marxism, because according to Marxism, only the proletariat or the industrial workers are revolutionary. The peasants are conservative; they cannot be a leading factor in the revolution.<sup>18</sup>

The armed peasant movement in Kwangtung was by no means an EASM as it was later to become. According to General Kung


17 In 1924, under the United Front, the Communist Party members were permitted by Dr. Sun Yat-sen (孫逸仙) to join the KMT as individuals. Many Communist leaders such as Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai (周恩來) were appointed to important positions in the KMT apparatus and military organization.

18 The term "sinicization" is submitted by Stuart R. Schram based on Mao's On the New Stage (it is translated as "The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War," in the Selected Works, Vol. 2, pp. 195-211.) See Schram's The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung (New York: Praeger, 1969), p. 171.

19 Kung Chu, "Memoir of Military Struggle in the CPC," Ming-pao Monthly 65 (June 1971), p. 98.

Chu, an organizer of the Kwangtung peasant army in 1926, the peasant army was organized along administrative areas. Each village was organized into a squad or a platoon; each administrative village (Hsiang 鄉) a platoon or company; each district (Ch'ü 區) a company or battalion. A squad had 8 to 12 soldiers. Battalion was the largest unit of the peasant army under the peasant association of the county.<sup>19</sup> (See Table 2.)

Table 2: The Organization of the Peasant Army in Kwangtung in 1926



The soldiers of the peasant army were recruited on a voluntary basis from the members of the peasant association, which was an exclusive organization of the poor peasants. Therefore, the peasant army in this period was actually a small élite group, which served as the backbone of the communist peasant movement in the rural areas. It was used to support the political struggle in the countryside and to maintain law and order there.

However, when the military struggle between the CPC and the KMT stepped up in 1927 the peasant armies were often required to fight shoulder to shoulder with the Red Army. Since then, the armed peasant was gradually used by the Party as a reserve force of its regular Red Army.

After the failure of Nanchang (南昌) uprising on Aug. 1, 1927, Mao Tse-tung led his remnant Red Army to the Ching-kangshan (井崗山) area in Hunan, where he established the first communist base in the Kiangsi-Hunan border area and was later joined by Chu Teh (朱德) and other leaders. As the KMT army stepped up its encirclement and suppression operation against them, Mao organized and, above all, armed the whole population of the border areas into Red Guards (except the landlords and the rich peasants) to assist the Red Army to defend the area, and thus he developed his famous people's warfare. By applying this strategy he defeated the KMT attacks four times.

Although the Peasant Associations from which the Red Guard was organized was still an important instrument of the communist peasant movement in the border areas in this period, it seemed to have expanded to include the majority of the border population; and thus, the red guard included almost all of the able-bodied population there. The armed peasants in the Kiangsi-Hunan border were divided into Red Guard (赤衛隊),<sup>20</sup> the Young Pioneers (少先隊), and the Model Teams (模範隊) etc. (See Table 3.)

<sup>20</sup> This term is different from the term Hung Wei-ping (紅衛兵) used during the GPCR, 1966-69,

Table 3: The Classification of Armed Peasant Forces Based on Age in Kiangsi - Hunan Border Area in 1934

Classification	Age
Red Guard	18 - 40
Young Pioneer	18 - 23
Model Team	19 - 40
Laundry Team	Under 18 and over 40
Recreation Team	Under 18 and over 40


Sources: The Organizational Law of the Red Guard (赤衛軍組織法) made by Headquarter of the Kwangtung-Kiangsi Military region in The Collection of the Red Bandits Reactionary Documents (赤匪反動文件類編), Vol. 6, p. 1757. Also, Tsao Pao-i, (曹伯一) The Establishment and Collapse of the Kiangsi Soviet Regime, 1931-1934 江西蘇維埃之建立及其崩潰 (Taipei, Taiwan: The East Asia Institute, National Chengchi University, 1973), pp. 318-324.

In the earlier period, the Red Guard was still an elite group selected from the members of the peasants' associations and trade unions in the age group of 19 to 30.<sup>21</sup> However, later its membership was extended to include all citizens of the border area between 18 and 40 years old except the gentry, landlords, and the capitalists. The children under 18 and the seniors were organized into recreation (慰勞隊) and laundry teams (洗衣隊). (See Table3) The Red Guards were organized

<sup>21</sup> Kung Chu, "Memoir of Military Struggle in the CPC," Ming-pao Monthly 70 (Nov. 1971), p. 100.

as squads, platoons, companies, battalions, and regiments. The largest unit was a division. (See Table 4.) There was a headquarter in each county to command it.<sup>22</sup>

Table 4: The Organization of the People's Armed Forces in the Kiangsi-Hunan Border Area in 1934



- Sources: 1. Kung Chu, "Memoir of Military Struggle in the CPC," Ming-pao Monthly 70 (Nov. 1971), p. 100.  
 2. Tsao Pao-i, The Kiangsi-Soviet Regime, op. cit., pp. 318-324.  
 3. The Organizational Law of the Red Guard, 1932.

<sup>22</sup> See the Sources under Table 3.

Besides maintaining law and order at the local level, the Red Guard was often sent to support the Red Army in war when the situation needed. Sometimes it was even used to wage guerrilla war independently.

The Young Pioneers were an armed mass organization composed of men and women 18 to 23 years old.<sup>23</sup> It was limited to youth who were workers, poor or middle peasants with workers as its backbone. The organization of Young Pioneers paralleled the Communist Youth League at the local level and accepted the latter's leadership; while there were squads, platoons, companies, and battalions, every county, province and the central government had headquarters to lead these organizations at their respective levels.<sup>24</sup>

The Young Pioneers were the military reserve of the Red Army in the border area. They were more reliable than the Red Guard to support the local political struggle; they were often mobilized as a unit to join the army.

The members of model teams were selected from the Red Guard and Young Pioneers. They were the most energetic elements in the border area with the most reliable political background. So they were actually an elite group of local armed forces.

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23 According to Kung Chu the members of the Young Pioneers were from 14 to 18. This study uses the above-cited Organizational Law of the Red Guard and Tsao Pao-i's information.

24 Tsao Pao-i, The Kiangsi-Soviet Regime, op. cit., pp. 318-324.



They were better equipped and trained than any other local forces and, thus, were ready to join the war at any moment.

The model team was more often than not seen as a regular Red Army in the border area. They were usually organized as independent regiments (獨立團) or garrison battalions (警衛營) at the county level; special teams (特務隊) or guerrilla teams (游擊小組) at the district level. These may be ordered directly by the commander of the regular Red Army to carry out military missions.<sup>25</sup>

Generally speaking, all of the Red Guards, Young Pioneers, and Model Teams were armed mass organizations. Their major functions were more political than military. They assisted the CPC in consolidating control of the countryside, to keep the KMT army in the dark and to deprive it of an opportunity to move in the countryside, while they provided a human sea for the Red Army to swim in. However, when the war was stepped up, all of these armed peasant organizations were used as military reserves. Their military training and political indoctrination made it much easier for them to adapt to the military life and thus they could throw themselves into war as soon as possible.

These armed peasant forces helped the CPC to stand up for almost six years under the repeated encirclement and

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25 "Special Correspondence from the Central Soviet Region in Kiangsi," The First National Soviet Congress, in Power Relations within the Chinese Communist Movement 1930-1934, Vol. 2, ed. Tso-liang Hsiao (Seattle: University of Washington, 1967), pp. 427-428.

suppression operations of the KMT army.<sup>26</sup> This experience was later broadly applied to all of the communist border areas during the Sino-Japanese war and the civil war which followed.

The communist militia movement in North China during the Sino-Japanese war was a little different from before. Instead of the KMT, the Japanese imperialists became the number one enemy, and nationalism and patriotism rather than class struggle<sup>27</sup> were the major themes of propaganda. The border bases were extended from northwest to east China and covered a population of one hundred million people. However, most of these bases were vulnerable to Japanese attack and were contested by the KMT. This situation forced the CPC to adopt a more flexible method to organize the militia. The Party must persuade the peasants to cooperate with it and accept its leadership, otherwise the peasants might go over to the KMT or Japanese side.

Under the economic blockade and sabotage of the KMT and Japanese, the CPC was forced to design a strategy of integrating labour with military service (劳武结合).<sup>28</sup> The

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26 From Mao Tse-tung's establishment of the Chingkangshan base in late 1927 to the end of 1934 was more than seven years. However, the Kiangsi-Hunan border area began to operate in the middle of 1928 when General Chu Teh joined Mao.

27 Under the second united front after 1937, the CPC declared it would abandon Marxist policy temporarily and obey the united leadership of General Chiang Kai-shek (蒋介石) against the Japanese.

28 "Introducing the Experience of the Collective Labour Organization in the Kan-ning Border Area," CFJP, Yen-an, 21 Dec. 1943.

Party popularized the traditional peasant mutual-aid systems of northwest Shensi Province in most of its border area enclaves as a major agricultural production organization.<sup>29</sup>

The membership of the mutual-aid teams were almost automatically organized into self-defense corps. Out of these self-defense corps, the most energetic elements were further enrolled into a militia organization and/or guerrilla group. The mutual-aid teams and most members of the self-defense corps concentrated primarily on agricultural work or other production while the militia and guerrilla group were fighting against the intrusion of the enemy in order to protect the village and its crops. The land of the militia members, meanwhile, was tilled by the mutual-aid teams in order to ensure their economic life.<sup>30</sup>

Besides, the economic hardships of the border areas made it necessary for the CPC to adopt a policy of refining the armed forces and simplifying government organization (精兵簡政) in order to reduce the government expenditure.<sup>31</sup> Although the Red Army was numerically reduced, or at least its expansion

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29 These were organized by the landlords in the border areas. After the CPC extensively implemented mutual-aid organization in its controlled areas, the Party extended the mutual-aid team system to the whole country after 1949 as a transitional system of agricultural collectivization.

30 "Chang Chu-yuan (張初元), the Hero of "Militia and Labour," CFJP, Yen-an, 2 Feb. 1934.

31 The "Refining the Armed Forces and Simplifying the Government Organization" policy was consistently carried out by the CPC in the Yen-an period from 1941 to 1944. See Tsao Pao-i, The CPC's Political Experience in the Yen-an Period 中共延安時期之政治經驗 (Taipei: National Chengchi University, 1973), pp. 171-254.

slowed down temporarily, the CPC did not weaken its military power. The Party greatly expanded its militia organization in order to maintain its military expansion without increasing military expense at all. The party declared in this period that it developed more than 2 million militia, while it only had less than one million in the Red Army<sup>32</sup>

This experience inevitably affected the military policy of China after 1949, above all, since the people's commune system was implemented in 1958. While the Chinese were often under a real or imagined military threat around their border, they were able to keep their standing army at the 2 and half million level.

When the self-defense corps were widely popularized among the whole peasantry in the border area, the militia seemed to remain an elite organization throughout this period. It was similar to the model teams or the Young Pioneers in the Kiangsi-Hunan period, while the self-defense corps was similar to the Red Guard organization.

The armed peasant movement in the Kiangsi-Hunan period was primarily limited to a relatively small area directly controlled by the Soviet regime; the Red Guard was based on unified organizational regulations. However, the militia system during the Sino-Japanese war period was organized throughout the numerous isolated border areas and the Japanese occupied areas. The different local situations made the

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32 "The Militia Behind the Enemy," (活躍於敵後戰場的民兵)  
CFJP, Yenan, 8 July 1944.

militia movement develop in different ways in order to adapt to the particular local conditions.<sup>33</sup> There was no national organization to regulate the militia organization until 1950, when the militia organization was put under the control of the Ministry of National Defense. Since then the Min-ping (民兵) has become the only mass military organization in the country.

In the civil war period after 1945, the CPC expanded its militia organization wherever it arrived. The militia was fully used to consolidate the newly occupied areas and support class struggle in the countryside.<sup>34</sup> Later when the war reached its last stage, several millions of militia were often mobilized to support a major operation. They were either responsible for transporting materials, or wounded soldiers, or directly involved in fighting shoulder to shoulder with the PLA.<sup>35</sup> However the drastic changes of the war and the lack of

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33 In Shantung Province (山东省) there were Young Pioneers of the Resistance-War, basic self-defense corps, and the ordinary self-defense corp. All of them were called militia; but in the Shansi border area, militia was selected from members of the mutual-aid teams or the ordinary self-defense corps. See Tsao Pao-i, CPC's Experience in Yen-an, op. cit., pp. 151-154. Also see Lo Jui-ch'ing, "Set Up Large Numbers of Militia Divisions, Build the Motherland, and Safeguard the Motherland," Hungchi 10 (1960); SCMP, No. 2262, p. 2; also, Liu Yun-cheng, "The Militia in the People's Revolutionary Wars of China," op. cit., p. 4.

34 William Hinton, Fanshen: A Documentary of Revolution in a Chinese Village (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967), described how the militia was used by the peasant associations to consolidate their control of the village. See pp. 103-177.

35 Liu Yun-cheng, "The Militia in the People's Revolutionary Wars of China," op. cit., p. 6.

source materials make it difficult to judge the whole system of the militia during the Sino-Japanese war and the civil war period except as mentioned above.

In the land reform period, the militia was still very active, but since the middle 1950's, it gradually became inactive. The relatively peaceful political situation caused the fading of the militia. The newspapers rarely reported its activities.

A more important reason for the inactivity of the militia in the middle 1950's was the modernization of the PLA. The intra-party debate about the usefulness of the militia was revealed after P'eng Teh-huai's (彭德懷) purge. It was said that the Korean war faction headed by P'eng in the PLA was predominantly concerned with the modernization of the PLA, so they said that the militia would be useless in a modern war.<sup>36</sup>

## 2. The Contemporary Political Development and the EASM

During the land reform period, the local peasant associations led by the poor and lower-middle peasants waged a fierce class struggle against the landlords in the countryside with the militia organization as their political muscle.

36 P'eng Teh-huai, the then Minister of National Defense was removed from his position in middle 1959 for his criticism of Mao Tse-tung and the commune system. After his dismissal, the debate about the usefulness of the militia organization was publicized too. See David Charles, "The Dismissal of Marshal P'eng Teh-huai," China under Mao, ed. Roderick Macfarquhar (Mass.: MIT, 1966)

However, since the country began socialist reconstruction after the Korean war, the role of the militia became less important. When the Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference<sup>37</sup> (hereafter referred to as CPPCC) assigned the PLA an active role in the socialist construction it only required the militia to safeguard local order and to lay the foundation for national mobilization. It did not mention any thing else that the militia could contribute directly to socialist reconstruction.

This description undoubtedly indicated the attitude of the political leaders about the possible roles of the militia in peacetime and probably dominated the activities of the militia in the postwar years until 1958, when Chairman Mao once again called for the establishment of a militia division. The reasons behind this change closely related to the internal as well as external political developments in 1958.

#### Domestic Political Development

Since the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the CPC had among other things carried out at least

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37 Article 24 of the Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (adopted on Sept. 29, 1949): The armed forces of the People's Republic of China shall, during peacetime, systematically take part in agricultural and industrial production in order to assist in national construction work, provided such work does not interfere with their military duties.

In Article 23 of the same Common Program, however, it described the militia system as: the People's Republic of China shall put into effect the militia system to safeguard local order and to lay the foundation for national mobilization.

three big domestic policies which changed the traditional Chinese socio-political structure drastically during its first decade in power: the land reform from 1949 to 1952; the cooperativization of agriculture from 1953 to 1957; and the communization of the countryside in 1958.<sup>38</sup>

The land reform movement redistributed about 700 million Mou of land<sup>39</sup> (one Mou 畝 = 1/6 acre) to the peasant. Consequently, the land reform not only changed the socio-economic structure of the village, but also lessened the size of farms. According to Chao Kuo-chun, the average size of farms was only 7 Mou in northern Manchuria and less than 2 Mou in south China in 1952 (see Table 5). The small farm

Table 5: Farm Size after Land Reform in 1952<sup>40</sup>

	Northern Manchuria	Southern Manchuria	Honan	Hunan & Hupei	East China
Size of Farm	7	3	2-3	1-2.5	1.5-2

system is not economic and impedes agricultural mechanization.

Mao Tse-tung foresaw the necessity of expanding farm size as

38 See The Contemporary Situation of the People's Commune of the Communist Bandits 英匪人民公社視况 (Taiwan: Military Administration Committee in War Area, the National Defense Council, 1965), pp. 1-3.

39 Ibid., p. 1.

40 Chao Kuo-chun, Agrarian Policies of Mainland China: A Documentary Study (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 1957), p. 37.



well as accumulating funds for financing mechanization in the early 1950's.<sup>41</sup> Furthermore, for ideological reasons, the political leaders saw the dangers of the spontaneous tendency of restoring capitalism in the countryside. Mao wanted to curtail this tendency by means of agricultural cooperativization.<sup>42</sup> He even went so far as to say that "it is impossible for a country to avoid agricultural cooperativization while she is pursuing industrialization by means of socialism."<sup>43</sup> Probably it was due to this belief that the Common Program passed by the CPPCC stipulated that "the people's government should guide the peasants step by step in the organization of various forms of mutual-aid in labour and cooperation in production according to the willingness and mutual benefit."<sup>44</sup>

Based on this policy, the Central Committee of the CPC made a decision on mutual-aid and cooperation in agricultural production in 1951, which was published in March 1953 after being amended by the same committee based on the conclusions of local discussions.

According to this resolution, the Party decided to achieve socialist transformation of agriculture by means of

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41 Mao Tse-tung, "On Agricultural Cooperativization (July 31, 1955)," Selected Readings of Mao Tse-tung, op. cit., pp. 308-309.

42 Ibid., p. 313.

43 Ibid., p. 307.

44 Article 34, The Common Program, op. cit.

mutual-aid teams (hereafter referred to as MAT) and agricultural producer's cooperatives (hereafter referred to as APC).<sup>45</sup> The first five-year economic plan promulgated in 1953 stipulated that before the end of 1957, one-third of the peasant households should have joined the cooperatives.

From 1953 to 1954, the government encouraged the peasants to organize the MAT. Under this system, the peasants of the same team either worked together or exchanged their labour, draught animals, and farm tools during the agricultural season or year-round. However, the ownership of land still belonged to the individual members of the team. It did not really change the small farm system at all. "Its primary goals were to educate the peasant to engage in collective production, to promote the notion and custom of collective labour, by practice."<sup>46</sup> By the end of 1954, it was said that 58 per cent of the peasant households had joined the MAT.

Since 1954, the primary task of the Party was to persuade the peasants to further consolidate their MAT. Lower-level agricultural producer's cooperatives (hereafter referred to as LAPC) were organized. The Party encouraged the peasants to pool their lands. While the peasants were share-holders and agricultural workers in the cooperatives, the collective

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45 The decision is in The Chinese Communist Regime, ed. Theodore H.E. Chen, op. cit., pp. 218-221.

46 Li Ming-hua, The Land Struggle of the Chinese Communist 中共的土地鬥爭 (Taipei, Taiwan: The Institute of International Relations, 1970), p. 271.

was entitled to use the land in a unified way and to distribute the product according to the contribution of land and labour of the individual members after various deductions such as taxes, public and welfare funds, production costs, etc.

In addition, the cooperatives may possess collective property and run sideline production too. This was called semi-socialist agricultural organization. By early 1956, more than 80 per cent of the peasant households had already joined the LAPC and thus overfulfilled the schedule described in the first five-year economic plan.<sup>47</sup>

When Chairman Mao called for a push for cooperativization in July 1955,<sup>48</sup> the movement was suddenly accelerated. While the regime was still pushing for establishing the LAPC in some areas, it was also campaigning to establish Higher-level Agricultural Producer's Cooperative (hereafter referred to as HAPC) in those areas where the LAPC had been set up. More than 91 per cent of the peasant households either joined the LAPCs or the HAPCs in 1956. In mid-1957, the households in the LAPC and HAPC reached 97 per cent (see Table 6).

The obvious differences between the LAPC and the HAPC lay in the ownership of land and other important means of

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47 Ibid., p. 272.

48 See Mao Tse-tung, "On Agricultural Cooperativization," op. cit., p. 295.

Table 6: The Progress of Agricultural Collectivization<sup>49</sup>

Year	LAPC		HAPC		Totals		%
	APC Households		APC Households		APC Households		
(in thousands)							
1952	3.6	57.2	0.0	1.8	3.6	59.0	0.1
1953	15.0	272.8	0.0	2.1	15.1	274.9	0.2
1954	114.0	2,285.0	0.2	12.0	114.0	2,297.0	2.0
1955	633.0	16,881.0	0.5	40.0	634.0	16,921.0	14.2
1956	682.0	34,839.0	312.0	76,874.0	994.0	111,713.0	91.9
1957(June)	84.0	4,497.0	668.0	113,414.0	752.0	117,911.0	97.0

production. While the members of the LAPC turned over their privately owned land, irrigation works (e.g. ponds and wells), large groves, timber-producing forests, and major means of production (e.g. draught animals and large farm tools) to the cooperatives, they got rent or other income from the latter. However, when the HAPCs were implemented, all of the land was collectivized without paying any dividends, as previously done, to the owners, except some compensation for the productive means.<sup>50</sup>

Although the peasants were still permitted to retain private plots and keep small farm tools in the HAPC, it was

49 Source: Chūgoku nenkan (Tokyo, 1958), p. 229, figures rounded off.

50 Wang Tong-eng, "Structural Change and Development in Chinese Agriculture," Ph.D. dissertation of Iowa State University of Science and Technology, 1966, pp. 79-80. Also Li Ming-hua, The Land Struggle of the CPC, op. cit., pp. 273-274.

said that, after the cooperativization, socialist revolution in Chinese agriculture was completed. This transformation was not only a change of the ownership of land and the size of farms but also of the organization of labour and thus of the total structure of rural society.

Like all other individual agricultural systems, the traditional Chinese agricultural system was a family business. The production unit was organized among family members. Beyond the family boundary, the farmers subjected themselves to nobody in their use of land. Individualism always prevailed in the Chinese countryside. However, since the beginning of cooperativization, while the size of the cooperatives expanded from one stage to another (see Table 7),

Table 7: The Size of the APC

	MAT	LAPC	HAPC
Household	Less than 10-20*	26*	110-185**

Sources: \* See Mao Tse-tung, "On Agricultural Cooperativization," op. cit., p. 298.

\*\* Li Ming-hua, The Land Struggle of the CPC, op. cit., p. 273. In fact, the size of the HAPC was varied. Some cooperatives may have more than 1,000 households. See Wu Chih-pu, "From Agricultural Producer's Cooperative to People's Commune," ECMM, No. 147 (Nov. 3, 1958), p. 3.

the production was no longer a family business.<sup>51</sup> The individual labour now was replaced by collective labour. In order to organize, discipline, and regulate the action and behavior of the collective labour force to effectively increase agricultural output<sup>52</sup> it was necessary to put the peasants into semi-military organizations — production brigades and work teams.<sup>53</sup> Through elections, former local cadres and army veterans were selected to head the labour organization of the peasants. This change brought the first stage of militarization to Chinese society. This phenomenon inevitably facilitated the implementation of the EASM.

After the successful completion of the first 5-year economic plan, Chinese political leaders suddenly changed their gradualistic approach to developing the Chinese economy. Mao Tse-tung announced in January 1958 that in industry China would overtake Britain in fifteen years.<sup>54</sup> He set

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51 "T'ao Chu Answers Hong Kong and Macao Reporters on Matters Relating to People's Communes," WHP, 13 Jan. 1959; SCMP, No. 1939, p. 5.

52 Ibid., p. 6. Also see "Structure of People's Communes Outlined," CB, No. 517 (Sept. 5, 1958), p. 23.

53 According to Articles 30 to 38, the Model Regulations for HAPC adopted in 1956, all members were to be assigned to one of the three types of organizations: (1) production brigades working on the fields, (2) production teams working in supplemental enterprises, and (3) production brigades working in the supplemental enterprises. The difference between the brigade and team is one of size. The former is composed of 20 to 40 households; the latter 7 to 8.

54 Mao Tse-tung, "Speech at the Supreme State Conference (Jan. 28, 1958)," in Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed: Talks and Letters, 1956-1971, ed. Stuart Schram (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin, 1974), p. 91.

forth the essential ideas of the Three Red Banners — the General Line, the GLF, and the People's Commune System — as the basic guides for the country in the coming years.

At the second session of the Eighth National Congress of the CPC in May 1958, Liu Shao-chi (刘少奇), the former Chairman of the People's Republic of China, summarized the new Party "general line" as "to build socialism by exerting our utmost efforts, and pressing ahead consistently to achieve greater, faster, better and more economical results."<sup>55</sup> To realize the goals set by the general line, the Party started to drive for a GLF in the spring of 1958 on every front in socialist construction.<sup>56</sup> The GLF, which was an unprecedented mass movement for increasing production in 1958, could be analyzed in two areas: industry and agriculture. The mass iron-smelting campaign was the highlight of the industrial aspect of the GLF; the communization of the countryside was the agricultural one. However, the people's commune system was established as an institution to carry out both the industrial and agricultural goals of the GLF.

The communization which caused a serious economic setback in 1960 to 1962 has long been discussed by political leaders as well as academic workers. To the Chinese leaders, "the people's communes are the logical result of the march of events" and "the emancipation of thought of the people in

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55 The Collection of Personal Materials on the Problems of Liu Shao-chi 刘少奇问题资料彙集 (Taipei: The Central Committee of the KMT, 1972), p. 299.

56 Ibid.

the GLF."57 It is the result of the urgent demand on the part of social productive forces following their rapid development, for the adjustment of the original production.58

"The nation-wide GLF on the basis of industrial and agricultural production has," according to Wu Chih-pu (吳芝圃), the 1st Secretary of CPC in Honan, "exposed that the scale of the original agricultural producer's cooperative can not fully cope with the needs of development of social productive forces."59 "Small in size, limited in manpower, weak in material and financial resources, with a comparatively low level of collectivization, and mainly engaged in agricultural and sideline production, the APC could not meet the needs for the promotion of various construction enterprises calling for greater scope and higher speed." So there came "the active demand for the building of people's communes."60

The "urgent need" for large-scale construction was often explained as the need for mobilizing big manpower in order to build water conservation systems crossing the border of cooperatives, and thus the merging of small cooperatives and

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57 See "Resolution on the Establishment of People's Communes," op. cit., pp. 454-456.

58 Wu Chin-pu, "From Agricultural Producer's Cooperative to People's Commune," op. cit., p. 2.

59 Ibid.

60. Ibid., p. 3.



tight organization of the labour force were often seen to be necessary.<sup>61</sup>

Western scholars, among other things, often believed that the GLP was primarily an attempt to overcome the problem of lagging agricultural productivity. According to Chalmers Johnson, the lack of investment in agriculture in the first 5-year economic plan caused the stagnation of agricultural output and thus made it impossible to meet the demand for food in the city and for raw materials by industry. However, instead of investing more money in agriculture, the solution of the government was to rely on the mobilized and organized will of the masses.<sup>62</sup> A similar point of view was expressed by Edgar Snow. To Snow, the poor harvest of 1956 had forced a thorough search for means of stimulating rural production without reducing capital investment in industry.<sup>63</sup>

The method used by the Chinese government was to mobilize the underemployed labourers in the countryside to improve agricultural productivity. The vehicle for achieving this goal is the "Commune."<sup>64</sup>

This explanation was confirmed by at least one of my

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- 61 See "Resolution on the Establishment of the People's Communes," op. cit., pp. 454-456. Also Hungchi 7 (Aug. 1958), pp. 14-15.
- 62 Chalmers Johnson, "Building a Communist Nation in China," in The Communist Revolution in Asia, ed. Robert A. Scalapino (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1969), p. 61.
- 63 Edgar Snow, Red China Today (New York: A Vintage Book, 1971), p. 412.
- 64 Ibid., p. 414.

interviewees who was in China from 1958 to 1962.

Close to the official stand, Schurmann believes that the continual merging of the APC and the Need for militarizing the organization of work were the basic reasons for the establishment of the commune system.<sup>65</sup> According to Chou Tsu-yu, a NCNA correspondent, some APCs in Szechuan had expanded to cover the whole Hsiang area before 1958. Thus, they combined themselves with the Hsiang governments into a single entity and ran small industries, too. These cooperatives became the forerunners of the People's Communes.<sup>66</sup>

As analysed before, militarization of agricultural organization seems to be a natural trend as far as collectivization is concerned. The need for new organizational skills to deal with peasant labor, released as a result of eliminating small farm systems, helped to introduce military patterns of organization into agriculture. This need was accelerated when the APCs were expanded to cover several thousand or ten thousand households of peasants; otherwise, the party could not expect to use this labour force effectively.

In answering questions about militarization of the agricultural organization in Canton, Tao Ch'u emphasized the difficulties caused by the expansion of the APC without

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65 Schurmann, Ideology and Organization, op. cit., p. 475.

66 Chou Tsu-yü, "What Are the Advantages of Combining the Hsiang and Cooperative into a Single Entity?" SCMP, No. 1872, pp. 24-26.

organization and discipline as the primary reason of militarization.<sup>67</sup>

The Chinese militarization of agricultural organizations, according to T'ao Ch'u, was an emulation of western industrial organizations. As written by Marx in The Manifesto of the Communist Party, T'so Ch'u attributed the innovation of a "industrial workers army" to the bourgeoisie. The link between the military and western factory organizations and the militarization of Chinese agriculture was more clearly indicated by Hungchi:

The rapid development of agriculture simply demands that they greatly emphasize their own organizational character, demands that in their work they act faster, in a more disciplined and efficient way, that they can better be shifted around within a broad framework, like the workers in a factory or the soldiers in a military unit. Thus they have recognized that their organization requires militarization.<sup>68</sup>

After the peasants were completely integrated in the hierarchical organizations such as the commune, production brigades, work teams etc.<sup>69</sup> and were directly controlled by the new

67 "T'ao Chu Answers Hong Kong and Macao Reporters on Matters Relating to People's Communes," op. cit., p. 6.

68 "Great Upsurge in Forming People's Commune," op. cit., pp. 14-15.

69 The structures of the communes were not identical in different areas. Although the 6th general plenum of the Central Committee of the CPC in Dec. 1958 decided the structure of the people's commune should be unified into three levels such as commune; production brigade, and production team . . . , the organizations and their names showed great discrepancies in the early stages. There were the following forms:

entity of the commune, the Chinese villages were more like military camps, and the peasants more like soldiers than they had been in the cooperatives.

If militarization, as Schurmann believes, is really the practical ideology of communization, and the arming of the peasantry was the last stage before communization,<sup>70</sup> the EASM should be a logical result of the militarization of the agricultural organization and, in turn the prerequisite of the establishment of the people's commune. In fact, a widespread movement to turn the whole country into soldiers was, according to General Fu Ch'iu-t'ao, the director of the Department of Mobilization, was concurrently implemented while the APC was merging into communes.<sup>71</sup> However, this fact can be more properly explained as that "the collectivization of the agriculture created a favorite condition for making everybody-a-soldier"<sup>72</sup> rather than vice-versa, because

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|--------------------------------------|---|---------------|--|
| 1. Commune                           | _____   | _____         | production team                                      |
| 2. Commune                           | _____   | brigade _____ | team   |
| 3. Commune                           | _____   | brigade _____ | team _____ group                                     |
| 4. Commune                           | { district office<br>district area }<br>basic commune | _____         | brigade _____ team                                   |
| 5. Commune                           |   | _____         | regiment _____ battalion _____ company _____ platoon |
| 6. Commune (regimental headquarters) |   | _____         | battalion _____ company _____ platoon                |

<sup>70</sup> Schurmann, Ideology & Organization, op. cit., pp. 480-481.

<sup>71</sup> Fu Ch'iu-t'ao, "The People's Militia — A Favorite System of Our People," Che-hsueh Yen-chiu (哲學研究) No. 1 (Jan. 10, 1960), ECMM, No. 159, p. 28.

<sup>72</sup> Liu Yun-chen, "Great Significance of Making Everybody a Soldier," JMJP, 18 Nov. 1964; SCMP, No. 3350, p. 4.

there is no inevitable reason to turn the whole country into soldiers after the militarization of the organization of labor, unless some more important reasons convinced the leaders to do so. A possible clue might be found in the contemporary external situation and Mao's perception of the roles of the militia in these events.

#### The Impact of External Developments on the EASM

Since Khrushchev started his de-Stalinization campaign in 1956, the Sino-Soviet relations have gradually deteriorated. When visiting Moscow in November 1957, Mao Tse-tung was ridiculed by Khrushchev about his statement that "The East Wind Is Prevailing Over the West Wind."<sup>73</sup> Mao's demand for military aid, including atomic support, was turned down. Meanwhile, China was required to repay the debt-amortization installments owed to the Soviet Union.<sup>74</sup> This made Mao resent the Soviet leaders and he decided to act independently.<sup>75</sup> Soon after his return to Peking, Mao set out on nationwide trips in December 1957 until May 1958. His three-red-banner idea which was developed on this trip may have had special significance for national security. So when the party was mobilizing the peasantry to join the communes, it concurrently recruited the

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73 Cited in Joseph Peterson, The Great Leap — China (Delhi: B.I. Publications, 1966), p. 327.

74 Snow, Red China Today, op. cit., p. 412.

75 Peterson, The Great Leap — China, op. cit., p. 237.

peasants into mass militia organizations which were often referred to as the EASM.<sup>76</sup>

When Mao talked to the NCNA reporters following his inspection tour to the Yangtze river area in September 1958, he made it clear that the mass militia to which he had paid special attention during his tour, was a major weapon designed to cope with possible external invasion. When he praised the militia and called for establishing militia divisions around the country. He said that "the imperialists were pushing China around in such a way that China must deal with them seriously. China, in addition to mighty regular armed forces, requires a tremendous number of militia divisions. Thus when imperialists invaded China, they would find difficulty in moving a single step."<sup>77</sup>

Mao's denunciation of the imperialists "pushing China around" was probably based on the following international events: On July 15, the U.S.A. landed her armed forces in Lebanon in order to stop possible political chaos. The Chinese held mass political rallies in big cities to protest the American aggression. Two weeks later, a Sino-Soviet summit conference was called in Peking in order to discuss a possible

<sup>76</sup> On Sept. 13, 2 weeks before Mao's call for establishing militia divisions, the Peking JMJP carried an article of "Everyone A Soldier: Combining Labour with Arms." It revealed that militia organization was expanding in many provinces, and the term "everybody a soldier" was already used. CB, No. 530, p. 5.

<sup>77</sup> "Important Statement by Mao Following Inspection Tour," op. cit., p. 2.

response. Khrushchev visited Peking from July 31 to August 2. At the end of the meeting, a strongly worded communiqué was issued to warn the Americans but perhaps nothing relating to concrete actions was decided. The JMJP editorial without naming names, denounced the Soviet leaders on August 8 as "naive", "soft hearted"; and advocating a policy of not provoking the enemy in order to relax the international tension."<sup>78</sup>

Following the Chinese "militant and belligerent"<sup>79</sup> reaction toward the U.S. Intervention in Lebanon; the American State Department issued a memorandum on August 11 that the U.S. would insist on her policy of non-recognition of Communist China.<sup>80</sup> Either wanting to make a strong gesture against the American intervention in Lebanon in spite of the Soviet's cautious attitude or being annoyed at the U.S. Memorandum, Peking ordered the bombarding of Quemoy & Matsu Islands on August 23, which suddenly created the danger of a Sino-American Confrontation in the Taiwan Straits. Six days later (August 29), China declared all-out mobilization and, then, the EASM was formally justified.<sup>81</sup>

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- 78 "Only through Resolute Struggle May Peace Be Defended," JMJP, 8 Aug. 1958; SCMP, No. 1832 (Aug. 14, 1958), p. 2.
- 79 Schurmann used this words to commend Mao's policies since "The East Wind Prevailing over the West" speech. See Ideology and Organization, *op. cit.*, p. 480.
- 80 "JMJP Editorial on U.S. China Memorandum," JMJP, Peking, 16 Aug. 1958; SCMP, No. 1836, p. 1.
- 81 Chen Cho (陳卓), "Survey of the Development of Militia of the Communist Bandit," 共匪民共發展概況 FCYC 1:1 (1960), pp. 1-2.

Although some scholars, Schurmann for example, were reluctant to judge whether the foreign policy derived from internal policy, or vice versa,<sup>82</sup> others, like Snow, tended to conclude that the external factors undoubtedly played a role in the domestic politics.<sup>83</sup> Writers in Taiwan are closer to Snow's conclusion that the EASM was at least partly a Chinese response to international events.<sup>84</sup>

Since the Korean War, the Chinese PLA had consistently pursued a policy of modernization in cooperation with the Soviet Union. However, after the Soviet Union refused to aid China with atomic bombs and other modern weapons unless China surrendered her armed forces to the command of the Soviets in 1957,<sup>85</sup> the Chinese leaders were forced to adopt a self-reliant and self-sufficient policy. To achieve these policies, a "walking on two legs" strategy<sup>86</sup> was fully developed in order to lessen China's vulnerability to external

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82 Schurmann, Ideology & Organization, op. cit., p. 481.

83 Snow, Red China Today, op. cit., p. 412.

84 Hsiang Da-kuen (向大猷) The People's Commune of the Communist Bandit (Taipei: The Institute of Chinese Mainland Study, 1966), pp. 10-11.

85 John Gittings, The Role of the Chinese Army (London: Oxford University, 1967), p. 238. Also Chen-ya Tien, "The Function of the Militia System in Chinese Nation-building after the Civil War of 1949," Master's Thesis at Dalhousie University, 1971, p. 150.

86 The "Walking on two Legs" strategy was applied to various aspects of Socio-economic development in China. As it applies to the military, it means that the country should use all of the means at its disposal, old and new, traditional as well as modern, or nuclear and conventional weapons, to defend itself.



attack due to her military weakness caused by the Sino-Soviet rift. Therefore, reviving mass militia organization, among other things, was likely considered to be a proper way to fulfill this purpose. In the opinion of Chinese leaders, the imperialists cannot defeat China by a long range nuclear attack alone without a conventional invasion with ground forces. However, if a land invasion is launched against China after an initial strike, the enemy would be heavily defeated by a Maoist people's war — a protracted war supported by the aroused masses of the people and fought by the large regular forces, local forces, and a massive militia developed under the concept of EASM.<sup>87</sup>

Based on these analyses, it is safe for us to propose that the EASM was not called for by Mao only because it was the logical development of the domestic political line, above all the militarization of the agricultural organization in 1958; nor was it only because the contemporary external situation caused this movement accidentally. It was an accumulation of factors such as the historical experience of Chinese militia movement, the militarization of the organization of work, and the contemporary international situation, all of which jointly convinced the Chinese leaders to call for an EASM in the late 1958.

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87 CFCP, 1 Aug. 1965. Also Chen Po-chün, "Study the Thought of Comrade Mao Tse-tung on People's War," op. cit., p. 1.

### 3. The Development of the EASM

Although the EASM had substantially spread in the countryside before September 1958, the campaign was officially stepped up only after Mao's inspection and call for establishing militia divisions at the end of September. A week after Mao told the NCNA reporters that militia divisions should be set up widely, General Fu Ch'iu-t'ao, published his famous long article: "Everybody-A-Soldier." He developed the basic concept of the movement in detail. To him, the EASM is an important component of Mao's people's warfare and people's commune system. Its basic principle is to combine "labour with military affairs;" in other word, it is to organize agriculture, industry, commerce, culture, and the military together with the militia organization.<sup>88</sup> Under his description, the armed peasants will be used to fight against at least two enemies — nature and the imperialists.

When there is no invasion from an external enemy, the whole country will march coherently under the communist spirit to combat against the natural enemy in order to industrialize agriculture, to urbanize the rural area, to promote socialist construction, and to transform (the Chinese society) to communist society. In case the external enemy dare to attack us, we shall be able to eliminate all of them absolutely, completely, and clearly.<sup>89</sup>

According to Fu, the EASM is Mao's application of the general truth of Marxism-Leninism to China's particular

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88 Fu Ch'iu-t'ao, "Everybody A Soldier," op. cit., p. 22.

89 Ibid., p. 23.

situation.

In the Paris commune, Marx revealed his concept of "arming the whole people" in order "to organize all male citizens into a national army in order to replace the standing army"<sup>90</sup> to defend the country.

In contrast with the "national army" of the Paris commune, the Chinese EASM has at least three differences: The Chinese EASM includes both men and women rather than men only. As far as the relationship between the militia and the standing army is concerned, there was no rivalry between them at least when the EASM was initiated in 1958 (the possible conflict developed thereafter will be discussed later). The militia is set up by the Party to serve as an aide and reserve of the PLA in case of war. It is also often required to learn from the PLA. Therefore, their relationship is mutually supplementary rather than competitive.<sup>91</sup>

In addition, the citizens of the Paris commune were only supposed to serve in the national army for a "very short period;"<sup>92</sup> but under the Chinese militia system, all able-bodied men and women of a particular age group are supposed, at least theoretically, to serve as militia all the time except those who are classified as politically unreliable.<sup>93</sup>

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90 Karl Marx, The Civil War in France 法蘭西內戰 (Peking: People's Press, 1971), p. 144 (in Chinese).

91 Fu Ch'iu-t'ao, "Everybody A Soldier," op. cit., p. 22.

92 Marx, The Civil War in France, op. cit., p. 56.

93 Under the EASM the able-bodied men between 16 and 45,

Although Lenin embraced the idea of "armed workers" in his State and Revolution, it is too vague to judge whether this is a system of Everybody-A-Soldier. However, the concept revealed in "the Armed Forces and the Revolution" indicates that "arming the whole nation" was to turn all of the soldiers into citizens; all of the citizens who can hold weapons into soldiers.<sup>94</sup> It seems closer to the Chinese mass militia. However, the "armed people" in Lenin's "The Armed Forces and the Revolution" as Marx's "national army" in the Paris commune did not mention whether the females should be included in the armed forces or not.

While General Fu was talking about the philosophy of the militia, the PLA General Staff Department lost no time to take action in order to put the concept into practice. October 7, the Department began to call a national militia work conference in order to study the concrete problems of the movement.<sup>95</sup> The delegates held many on-the-spot meetings and discussions in Peking. The conference suggested that the militia divisions should be organized in cities, factories, government organs,

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women between 16 and 35 were all organized into militia, except those who are landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionary, undesirable elements and rightists. See Article 6, "Regulations Governing the Militia Work," published by Ministry of National Defense of the People's Republic of China on July 13, 1961. (Hereafter referred to as Militia Regulations.)

94 V. I. Lenin, "The Armed Forces and the Revolution," Collected Works, Vol. 10 (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1962), p. 56.

95 "National Conference Discusses Militia Work," NCNA, Peking, English, 19 Oct. 1958; SCMP, No. 1881, p. 8.

schools as well as communes. The possible role of the PLA in helping to arm the whole nation was also discussed.<sup>96</sup>

Following the national militia conference, the actual militia movement turned to the local level. The campaign reached its high tide right after the close of the conference. Up to the end of November 1958, it was said that more than 170 million men and women — about 34 per cent of the total population — were enrolled for the militia (see Table 8).<sup>97</sup>

Table 8: The Militia Organization in Provinces and Municipalities in 1958

Area	Population (10 thous.)	Militia (10 thous.)	Organization (one)	Percentage
Peking	276	220	56 D.* 64 I.R.* 11 I.B.* 32 I.Co.*	80%
Shanghai	620	300	Most are in Brigade (Ta-tui)	50%
Fukien	1,310	500	498 R.* 56 I.B.	38%
Kiangsi	1,799	730	240 D.	40%
Kwangtung	3,470	1,500	150 D. 4 Steel Army Corps	41%
Kwangsi	1,956	880	224 D. 2,400 R.	44%
Yunan	1,740	100	All are R.	60%
Keichow	-	(65)	-	-
Chechiang	2,286	550	R.	24%

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Kiangsu	4,120	840	180 D. 2,400 R.	20%
Szechuen	6,230	3,000	R.	50%
Anhui	3,000	300	B.*	10%
Hopei	3,850	700	R.	20%
Hupei	-	( 107 )	-	-
Honan	4,420	2,000	D. & R.	45%
Tibet	-	( 5 )	-	-
Shansi	1,430	460	D.	33%
Shantung	4,880	3,500	R. & B.	71%
Shensi	1,588	700	more than 10 D. more than 700 R.	45%
Kansu	-	(57)	-	-
Liaoning	1,850	400	D.	21%
Kilin	1,120	100	D.	10%
Sikang	-	(16)	-	-
Hunan	3,320	400	D. & R.	12%
Sinkiang	-	(27)	-	-
Inner Mongolia	870	267	an army group and several R. & B.	33%
Heilung- kiang	1,800	600	B. & Co.	30%
<b>Total</b>	<b>51,935</b>	<b>18,067</b>		<b>34%</b>

\* D = Division; R = Regiment; B = Battalion;

Co. = Company; I.R. = Independent Regiment;

I.B. = Independent Battalion; I.Co. = Independent Co.

Sources: 1. Chen Cho, "Survey of the Development of Militia  
of the Communist Bandits," op. cit., p. 65.

2. Adjusted by myself with materials from other  
sources.

3. The militia numbers in brackets are not included in the total number and average percentage, because there is no available population number of the corresponding provinces.

Although the early flood in June 1959 had caused a varied degree of natural calamities in Kwangtung and other southern provinces, and the central Party leaders had seriously split about the GLF and commune system,<sup>98</sup> the EASM seemed to be unaffected, temporarily at least. Before the end of March 1960, most provinces had held militia representative conferences and elected delegates to the national militia representative conference being called in Peking. This was the first time since the campaign started in 1958 that the militia delegates at the provincial level gathered to discuss the whole situation of the system. Training programs, consolidation problems, and the roles of the militia in socialist construction, etc. were discussed. Kwangtung, for example, held its first militia representative conference from April 2 to 5, 1960. The conference unanimously approved a resolution to put

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96 Ibid. Also CB, No. 530, pp. 1-2.

97 Presumably this meant that their names were entered on a list.

98 The Lushan Conference was held from July 17 to the end of the month. Mao Tse-tung was criticized by P'eng Teh-huai and allies about the GLF and commune, after the conference, P'eng was dismissed, but the split of the Party leaders did not end. See Stuart Schram, ed., Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed, op. cit., pp. 131-146.

forward four proposals to the militiamen of the entire province. It called for the militiamen to promote their political consciousness and military skill, to keep vigilance in order to defend the motherland, and above all, to implement the party's general line and speed up socialist construction.<sup>99</sup>

The national militia representative conference which was held from April 18 to 27 made a ten-point proposal at the closing session, which primarily concentrated on four aspects: the militia (1) should actively take part in socialist construction, production, and "social health" campaign; (2) should learn culture and scientific knowledge and actively take part in the technical innovation and technical revolution campaigns; (3) should learn the PLA tradition, work style, study military techniques, and thus aid the PLA to reinforce the national defense; and (4) should maintain social order and protect production.<sup>100</sup> This proposal provided a general picture of the status and functions of the militia which will be analysed in the later chapters.

#### The Set-Back of the Movement

The split of the central leadership in the Lushan Conference in late July signaled the damages of the GLF to the economy; however, the problems of the militia movement

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99 "1st Representative Conference of Militia of Kwangtung Closed," NFJP, 7 April 1960; SCMP, No. 2280, pp. 6-10.

100 "Delegates to the National Militia Conference Make Proposal to All Militiamen in China," NCNA, Peking, 27 April 1960; SCMP, No. 2252, pp. 18-20.



were only felt a year later when the natural calamities deeply plunged the countryside into economic disorder. The militia movement throughout 1960 was still running high, but since early 1961, it was rarely mentioned in the newspapers.<sup>101</sup> In fact the mass militia campaign may have been impracticable from the very beginning in some regions but had escaped the attention of the political leaders through various conferences and on-the spot discussions.<sup>102</sup> According to an investigation report from Honan and Shantung provinces submitted to the central authority in late 1960 the impracticability, impurity, the misuse of militia, and the corruption of the militia cadres had caused serious problems.<sup>103</sup>

The hurriedly organized mass militia during 1958 to 1960 were in some areas only an organization on paper. Names were put on the list without the knowledge of the person. Some militia units even fell under the control of the class enemy or bad elements and thus they were often used to rob, to beat, to

101 According to the data available in the SCMP, there was no report relating to the militia activity in 1961 except a few in Kwangtung Province. Even the activities reported from Kwangtung were at a low level and small-scale. See SCMP, No. 2481, pp. 6-7; No. 2801, pp. 17-18; No. 2802, pp. 13-16.

102 "Speech of Yang Ch'eng-wu at the Telephone Conference on Jan. 12," Bulletin of Activities, No. 5, in The Politics of the Chinese Red Army (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institute, 1966), p. 138.

103 Chen Tsai-tao, "Investigation Report on Militia Activities in Honan," Bulletin of Activities, No. 21, in The Politics of the Chinese Red Army, op. cit., p. 566.

rape, and even to slaughter people in the countryside. A great number of weapons held by the militia were not only misused, but also lost or sold to the class enemies. It was said that these phenomena were not limited to the above-mentioned two provinces, but occurred in other provinces too. This was realized as extremely dangerous in the countryside, above all, when the country was plunged into serious disorder caused by natural calamities.<sup>104</sup>

To handle this situation, the PLA sent 57,000 officers to the countryside to investigate the real situation and reorganize the collapsed militia organization. Based on the reports of the work teams, the Ministry of National Defense issued a militia regulation in July 1961. Since then the Party and the army began their fence-mending work. They purified the basic cadres of the militia and took the weapons away from the militia. The commanding authority of the local leaders was restricted, the military regions were granted more power to control the deployment as well as training programs of the militia.<sup>105</sup>

The priority of the reorganization campaign was aimed at the militarily and politically vulnerable areas such as suburban area of big cities, border areas, islands, and areas along

104 "Speech of Yang Cheng-wu," op. cit., pp. 138-140.

105 "We Must Do Good Substantial Work in Building Up the Militia," Bulletin of Activities, No. 5 & 21, in The Politics of the Chinese Red Army, op. cit., pp. 142 & 564.

railways and important highways. The economically backward areas had priority over advanced areas. Eventually the campaign for reorganizing the militia spread to the whole country. The backbone units were restored before the ordinary militia.<sup>106</sup>

The reorganization and restoration were basically completed in 1962. So when the KMT started to take advantage of the economic difficulties of 1959-61 to open guerrilla war on the mainland, the militia organization was able to play an important role in preventing any successful invasions.<sup>107</sup>

The total number of militia was restored to the 1958 level or a little higher in 1963.<sup>108</sup>

#### Learning from the PLA

The militia was often controlled and influenced by the People's Liberation Army since the very beginning of the communist movement. The early history of the militia system in Kiangsi-Hunan border area and the Yen-an period as discussed above has indicated the reasons and processes of the development of this close relationship. However, as far as the

106 Ibid., pp. 559-565. Also Ting Kuang-hua (丁匡華), "The Current Situation of the Collapse of the Militia Organization of the Communist Bandits," 共匪民衆組織崩潰之現況 TCYC 91 (Sept. 3, 1962), pp. 6-8.

107 From 1961 to 1963 the KMT continually parachuted and landed guerrillas, but most of them were captured as soon as they arrived. The study will discuss them in detail in the later chapters.

108 The Study of the Militia System of the Communist Bandits (Taipei: The Central Committee of the KMT, 1966), p. 2.

leader-follower relationship between them is concerned, there was no time during the Chinese revolution that the Party was so strongly committed to the policy of learning from the PLA as in the early 1960's. For this purpose, the PLA created a lot of model soldiers as well as units. Lei Feng, a "5-good soldier"<sup>109</sup> for example, was created as a symbol of new socialist man to educate the masses. He was described as having a strong class-consciousness and putting the party and collective interests before self. He always devoted himself to the people and believed that man is happiest when he contributes everything of himself to the cause of liberating mankind.<sup>110</sup>

The learning from the PLA had its broad implications. Merle Goldman believed that "learning from the PLA" was a campaign to shift the socialist education movement from a negative criticism of the cadres and peasants to a positive construction of a new socialist society. In other words, this is a change of ideology.<sup>111</sup>

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109 The 5-good soldier was a movement in the PLA developed in 1960 similar to the 5-good youth movement started a little earlier in the society. The standard of 5-good soldier: 1) good at political ideology; 2) good at military techniques; 3) good at the "three-eight" style of work; 4) good at fulfilling tasks; 5) good at physical training. See "Call for High Tide in 'Five-Good' Campaign in the Armed Forces," CKCNP, 18 Nov. 1960; SCMP, No. 2433, pp. 5-6.

110 "Lei Feng, a Great Soldier," NCNA, Shanyang, 25 Feb. 1963; SCMP, No. 2943, p. 7.

111 Merle Goldman, "The Chinese Communist Party's 'Cultural Revolution' of 1926-64," in Ideology and Politics in Contemporary China, ed. Chalmers Johnson (Seattle: University of Washington, 1973), pp. 248-249.

Since the middle 1950's, the PLA under the leadership of P'eng Teh-huai was often criticized for its deviation from the mass line and thus isolated itself from the masses. After Lin Piao replaced P'eng as the Minister of National Defense in 1959 and as a supporter of Mao, he committed himself to bringing the army back to Mao's revolutionary military line.<sup>112</sup> He emphasized China's particular revolutionary tradition and Mao's military doctrines. Lin's systematic implementation of the "5-good soldier" campaign, the "4-good company"<sup>113</sup> campaign, the "3-8 style"<sup>114</sup> and the "4-first",<sup>115</sup> not only greatly publicized Mao's military doctrine and rationalized

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- 112 Gittings, "China's Militia," The China Quarterly 18 (April - June 1964), p. 107. Also, Shih Cheng-chi (史誠之), "Past of the PLA and the Future of the CPC," (論解放軍的過去與中共的未來) Part II, Ming-pao Monthly 5:2 (Feb. 1970), p. 26.
- 113 4-good company: for a high score in regard to : 1) political ideological work, 2) "3-8 work style," 3) military training, and 4) livelihood management. See "The PLA Cites Large Numbers of '4 good Companies' — The Whole Army Devotes Vigorous Efforts to Basic-Level Construction and Chalks Up Marked Results over the Past Year —," JMJP, 29 January 1962; SCMP, No. 2682, p. 8.
- 114 3-8 style: 1) three phrases — keeping to a firm and correct political orientation, working hard and living plainly, and being flexible in strategy and tactics; 2) 8 characters — unity, vigor, seriousness, and optimism (eight Chinese words but 4 in English). See "Propagate the Three-eight Work Style throughout the Country," JMJP editorial, 23 Feb. 1964; SCMP, No. 3178, pp. 2-5.
- 115 4-first: human factors, political work, ideological work, and living ideas, in the first position in considering everything. "Learning from the PLA," JMJP, 1 Feb. 1964; SCMP, No. 3164, pp. 3-4.

it into a more consistent system, but also closed the gap between the army and the masses created by the effort of modernization after the Korean war by means of learning from the PLA movement and thus, corrected the deviation of the PLA, too.<sup>116</sup>

The learning from the PLA, according to Shih Cheng-ch'i, helped Mao to consolidate his support in the army as well as with the masses. This was a preparation for his struggle for power in the GPCR.<sup>117</sup> During the GPCR, for example, a typical slogan used by the masses, above all, by the Red Guards, was copied from those of the "learning from Lei Feng" campaign: "to read the work written by Chairman Mao, listen to Chairman Mao's words, do things according to Chairman Mao's directives."<sup>118</sup>

In addition, the learning from the PLA was also aimed at publicizing Mao's military doctrines to the society in order to promote socialist construction. According to the JMJP editorial, "in a flexible manner, the revolutionary spirit of a proletariat and combat character of the PLA can be fully developed in launching socialist revolution and undertaking of socialist construction."<sup>119</sup>

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116 Gittings, "China's Militia," op. cit., p. 107. Also see Schurmann, Ideology and Organization, op. cit., p. 570.

117 Shin Cheng-chih, "The Past of the PLA and the Future of the CPC," Part III, Ming-pao Monthly 5:3 (March 1970), pp. 75 & 77.

118 "Lei Feng, a Great Soldier," op. cit., p. 7.

119 "The Whole Country Must Learn from the PLA," JMJP,

Since the initial stage of the EASM in 1958, General Fu Ch'iu-t'ao has asked the militia to learn the spirit of the PLA but not its formalism.<sup>120</sup> A "5-good militia" movement was initiated by the first militia representative conference of Kwangtung Province.<sup>121</sup> Military technique and "3-8 work style" were emphasized in the militia training programs.<sup>122</sup> At the second representative conference held in 1962, "5-good militiamen" as well as "4-first" both were the major themes that the conference called for the militia of the whole province to practice.<sup>123</sup> Similar campaigns were carried out in the same period by the militia units in other provinces. Lowenchao People's Commune in Shansi Province, for example, awarded the 5-good militia title to 288 militiamen on May Day, to 374 on July 1st, and to 464 on the National Day, in 1959.<sup>124</sup> Militia divisions in Shanghai elected "5-good" militiamen and "4-good"

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1 Feb. 1964; SCMP, No. 3164, p. 2.

120 Fu Ch'iu-t'ao, "Everybody A Soldier," op. cit., p. 22.

121 "First Representative Conference of Militia of Kwangtung Closed," op. cit., p. 10.

122 Yang Hui-tu, "The Method of Training More Militiamen Rapidly, Satisfactorily, and Economically," NFJP, 30 Sept. 1960; SCMP, No. 2412, p. 1.

123 "Second Kwangtung Provincial Militia Representative Meeting Opens," NFJP, 11 June 1963; SCMP, No. 3030, p. 4.

124 "Lowenchao People's Commune in Shansi Province Gains Good Experience in Unfolding of '5-good' Movement among Militiamen," Shansi Jih Pao (山西日报), 25 Nov. 1959; SCMP, No. 2173, pp. 9-11.

militia units in 1962.<sup>125</sup> While these campaigns strengthened the militia organization and made it a faithful follower, an aide, a powerful reserve and a junior partner of the PLA, the latter has actually emerged as a dominant force in domestic politics and was ready to serve as a major supporter of Mao's fatal blow in the GPCR against the revisionists — Liu Shao-chi and his followers. When Mao won the struggle in 1968, the PLA became the big winner and exercised the authority of the central government.<sup>126</sup> This phenomenon temporarily changed the Chinese political system into a "militocracy" and caused direct conflict between the PLA and other groups in the post-cultural revolution years.

During the cultural revolution, the militia in the countryside were predominantly occupied with production rather than revolution which concerned the workers in the cities.<sup>127</sup> However, occasional reports about the conflict

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- 125 "'5-good' Militiamen and '4-good' Militia Units Commended at Meeting of the Militia Division of the Foreign Trade Bureau," Shanghai, CFJP, 9 June 1962, supplement to SCMP, No. 102, p. 20.
- 126 After 1968, under the "three-in-one" and "supporting the left" policies, the PLA chaired almost all the provincial and municipal revolutionary committees. Many PLA leaders were appointed ministers of Departments of the State Council, replacing civilians.
- 127 The State Council and the Central Committee of the CPC repeatedly issued directives to the communes that they should promote production and not go to the city or other communes to link the workers and peasants as the Red Guards did. See Directive of the CPC Central Committee Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in the Countryside, Dec. 15, 1966.



between the militia and the rebels<sup>128</sup> (the Red Guard primarily) have reminded the latter to mend their fences with the militia.

Since the Lin Piao incident in 1971, the CPC has once again strengthened its control over the militia. According to reports, the militia divisions in the big cities such as Peking and Shanghai, are controlled by Chi'ang Ching (江青), Mao's wife, and her followers, and are deployed to patrol the cities with modern equipment.<sup>129</sup> This report speculated that Mao and the cultural revolutionary group wanted to check the PLA by militia.<sup>130</sup> If this is true, it will be a very important development that the militia has changed its follower and learner status, and is raised to play a role of balancer in the Chinese political development between the PLA and the revolutionary groups. Although this change and its possible development are still not clear and also beyond the limit of this study, their implications for future Chinese political development may be considerable.

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128 According to a report of the Central Daily News, 8 Aug. 1974, the militia in Hupei attacked the Red Guards and killed several hundred of them.

129 Central Daily News, 6 Oct. 1974. It said that the militia in the big cities were equipped with tanks.

130 According to a report in the Central Daily News, 11 Oct. 1974, the militia is helping Mao Tse-tung to achieve the policy of the Party commanding the gun, because using the militia to patrol the city, gives Mao the excuse to ask the PLA to return to their barracks, and thus ends their civilian responsibility.

#### IV. Institutional Data on the Militia

The militia is an important instrument of consolidating the people's democratic dictatorship and resisting the aggression of imperialists. It is the armed force of the masses of the people. So it is the handle of a knife, which should always be put into the hand of the Party and the people and never into the hand of the class enemy.

— Political Teaching Materials of the Militia of the Communist Bandits: How to Be a Good Militiaman.

Organization is often defined in sociological theory as "structures of differentiated roles,"<sup>1</sup> which require the ordered exercise of power. In these structures, some men command and others obey.<sup>2</sup>

Militia organization is also a structure in which there are functionaries and ordinary members. The former command, while the latter obey. The CPC is very sensitive to the activity of the militia. It not only strictly controlled the recruitment of militia cadres at all levels, but also controlled the admission to militia membership. As a political organization, the recruitment and participation of militia to a large extent applied the general principles of Chinese political participation.

According to James Townsend, the CPC's concept of political participation is closely relevant to the dictatorship of the proletariat; the supremacy of the collective

1 Marion J. Levy, Jr., The Structure of Society, op. cit., pp. 19-20.

2 Schurmann, Ideology and Organization, op. cit., p. 3.

interest; party leadership; the mass line; activism and political consciousness; and socialist democracy.<sup>3</sup>

Under the dictatorship of proletariat, not only the membership of militia is exclusively limited to the working class and its allies, but the organization itself is also seen as a tool of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The Party which is a self-appointed vanguard of the working-class automatically assumes the leadership to control the militia. With politics taking command, activism and political consciousness are seen as important qualifications of militia recruitment. Mass line and socialist democracy are not only used as the methods of militia recruitment, but also used as the major guidance of internal activities of militia. This chapter will examine the recruitment of membership, the structures, and the recruitment of the militia cadres. By so doing, it is possible for us to grasp the whole process of Chinese militarization and the roles of the CPC in the militia. Besides, the deployment of militia organization will also be analysed in the last section in order to realize the power relations of the militia in Chinese local politics, because the CPC not only controls the militia from within, but also controls it from without.

### 1. Membership

Although the militia membership was theoretically

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<sup>3</sup> James R. Townsend, Political Participation in Communist China (Berkeley: University of California, 1969), p. 65.

extended to everybody in 1958, it was actually limited to a particular group of people. There are age, physical, and above all political limitations. When the EASM was implemented in 1958, there was no uniform regulation to govern the organization of the militia. Local cadres carried out their work either based on contemporary directives issued by different organizations, or based on their discretion. Therefore, the organization of militia in the first few years was more or less flexible.

#### Age and Sex

According to age, physical condition, and class background, the militia is basically divided into two kinds: the youngest men and women with healthy bodies and the best class background are organized into backbone militia units; the remaining militiamen are organized into ordinary militia. Without a unitary regulation, the limitation of age and sex of militia in different provinces was very different. The age span, for example, in some provinces was longer than others; some provinces excluded females from backbone units but others included them (see Table 9). Kiangsi Province, for example, included all persons from 16 to 50 years old in militia organizations. The male citizens from 16 to 30 were included in backbone units.<sup>4</sup> The failure to mention the females seems to

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4 Teng K'e-ming, "Report to Kiangsi's Militia Work Conference," op. cit., p. 41.

Table 9 : The Age and Sex Limitation of Militia in Kiangsi, Kiangsu, Fukien and Kwangtung in 1959

Province	Militia	Sex	Age
Kiangsi <sup>a</sup>	Backbone	Male	16-30
	Ordinary	Male	31-50
		Female	16-50
Kiangsu <sup>b</sup>	Backbone	Male	16-30
		Female	
	Ordinary	Male	31-50
		Female	
Fukien <sup>c</sup>	Field Army (Backbone)	Male	16-30
		Female	
	Local Army (Ordinary)	Male	31-55
		Female	
	Supporting Army	Teenagers	under 15
		Male	over 56
Female	over 51		
Kwangtung <sup>d</sup>	Basic-level- cadre division	Male	16-60 <sup>+</sup>
		Female	16-40 <sup>+</sup>

a Teng K'e-ming's "Report to Kiangsi's Militia Work Conference," op. cit., p. 41.

b Ch'un-chung 群众 5 (Oct. 1, 1958); ECMM, No. 150, p. 7.

c Hungchi 10 (1958), p. 26.

d WHP, 30 Sept. 1958.

imply that women in Kiangsi Province were only qualified to be ordinary militia in 1958. The stipulation in Kiangsu Province was similar to that of Kiangsi except for permitting females to join the backbone militia as the males did.<sup>5</sup>

5 Liu Hsien-sheng (刘先胜), "Let the Whole People Be armed to Defend the Homeland," Ch'un-chung 5 (Oct. 1, 1958); ECMM, No. 150, p. 7.

The age-span of militia in Fukien Province was broader than in the above-mentioned provinces. The young men and women in Ching-ming Commune (荆門公社), Ming-hou County (閩侯縣), for example, from 16 to 30 years old were both organized into a field army regiment. Males of 31 to 55 years old and females of 16 to 50 years old, without having to join the field army regiment, were included in the local army.<sup>6</sup> The terms "field army" and "local army" were actually the equivalent of "backbone militia" and "ordinary militia" used by other provinces. In addition, the teenagers below 15 and elders above 50 (women) or 55 (men) were organized into supporting army<sup>7</sup> (后勤部隊), which did not exist in other provinces mentioned above.

With limited materials, it is difficult to judge the age span of militia in Kwangtung Province. According to a report in WHP in 1958, the militia divisions in Canton City included "professors over 60 years old, workers with snowwhite hairs and women in their thirties and forties."<sup>8</sup> Although this may not represent the general age-span of militia membership in Kwangtung, it still shed some light on the problems of age and sex of Militia there. First of all, the age-span of

6 The Party Committee of the CPC of Ming-hou County, Fukien Province, "Workers, Peasants, Merchants, Students, and Soldiers Being Unified into One," (工農商學兵結合一律) Hungchi 10 (1958), p. 26.

7 Ibid.

8 "Six Militia Divisions Formally Established in Canton," WHP, 30 Sept. 1958; ECMM, No. 530, p. 17.

Kwangtung militia might be broader than the province mentioned above; secondly, women in these basic-level-cadre militia divisions were only in their forties, which was 10 years younger than other provinces. However, it is unclear whether these old professors, workers and women in the basic-level-cadre militia divisions belonged to the ordinary units or the backbone units.

Differing from the western scholars, writers in Taiwan never omitted these problems from their discussions, because both age and sex not only relate to the actual number of militia but also the fighting power of it. However, most of the Taiwan writers did not distinguish between men and women or rural and city militia. Many of them simplified the age span as "16 to 50" for both male and female, city and rural militia.<sup>9</sup>

The only exception was the article written by Chen Cho. He distinguished the age-span of the militia between male and female, city and commune militia (see Table 10):

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9 See Bao Bau-chao, Kuo Tung-yang (鮑步超、郭東陽), "The Fighting Power of the Militia of the Communist Bandits," (英匪民衆作戰能力之研究) TCYCLWC 2 (1963), p. 126; also, Ting Kuang-hua, "The Current Situation of the Collapse of the Militia Organization of the Communist Bandits," op. cit., p. 1.

Table 10: The Age and Sex Composition of the Militia in City and County in 1960

Name	Area	Age	Sex
Backbone Militia	Country	16-30	Male
		16-30	Female
	City	16-25	Male
		16-25	Female
Ordinary Militia	Country	31-50	Male
		16-50	Female
	City	26-50	Male
		26-36	Female

Source: Chen Cho, "Survey of the Development of Militia of Communist Bandits," op. cit., p. 64.

Without specifying his sources, Chen said that the backbone militia in cities were composed of young men and women of 16 to 25 rather than 16 to 30 as it was in the country. The ordinary militia in cities was composed of women of 26 to 36 and men of 26 to 50. The age span of ordinary militia women was 14 years younger than the men in cities. The age span of ordinary militia women in the country was the same as the men there. It was 14 years longer than women militia in cities. There is no explanation in Chen and others' works about this discrepancy.

Since the adoption of the Militia Regulations in 1961, the above mentioned discrepancies about age and sex of the



militia between provinces and between city and country were totally eliminated. Now any male citizen between 16 and 45, healthy and not disabled, shall be recruited to join the militia organization except landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries, undesirable elements and rightists.<sup>10</sup> "All male citizens between 16 and 30, or female citizens between 16 and 25, with a clean political background and strong body, may be grouped into backbone militia; those remaining into ordinary militia."<sup>11</sup>

After the adoption of this regulation, the age-span of militia was shortened. The age of male militia is 5 years younger than before; the female's 15 years. In addition, the female members of backbone militia is also 5 years younger than before (See Table 11)

Table 11: The Comparison of the Age and Sex Limitation of Militia Before and After 1961\*

Name	Before 1961		After 1961		Comparison
	Limitation	Span	Limitation	Span	
Backbone Militia	M. 16-30	15	16-30	15	Same
	F. 16-30**	15	16-25	10	-5
Ordinary Militia	M. 31-50	20	31-45	15	-5
	F. 31-50**	20	26-35	10	-10

Sources:

\* This table is partly adopted from Hung Chi-tao's "The Study of the Regulations Governing the Militia Work of the Communist Bandits," (对共匪「民兵工作条例」之研究) FCYP 8:6 (July 31, 1966), p. 66.

\*\* I adopted the age-span of the militia in the country from Table 10.

This change has probably lowered the militia number considerably. Nevertheless, from a military point of view, the fighting power of militia may have been strengthened, because the new regulation eliminated most child-bearing women from backbone militia.<sup>12</sup> This stipulation not merely made the backbone militia more mobile and stronger than before, but also provided better protection to individual families. This policy was to a large extent in accordance with the policy of retreat immediately after the failure of the GLF in 1960.

Generally speaking, most people will tend to decline physically after they pass the 40s. Therefore, when the new regulation relieves men over 45 and women over 35 from militia obligation, it is likely to maintain a higher fighting power of the militia with a smaller number.

According to Seymour M. Lipset, the elder people tend to be stable and are likely to retain the ideas of their youth.<sup>13</sup> Although the new regulation relieved the middle-aged men and women from militia duty, the Party will risk little danger of losing the loyalty of these people. They are likely to retain their perspective and loyalty to the Party continually

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12 For the sake of birth control, China has for a long time implemented a policy of later marriage. Women are encouraged to start their marriage after they are 25 years old, while men after 30. So this description is in accordance with the marriage policy.

13 Seymour M. Lipset, Political Man (New York: A Doubleday Anchor Book, 1960), p. 283.

when they leave the militia after serving a long term.<sup>14</sup> Therefore, the result of a shorter term of militia service does not necessarily weaken the political control over the masses by the Party.

#### The Class Background of the Militia

The militia organization had been a major instrument of political struggle used by the CCP in civil wars and the Sino-Japanese war, so the Party often paid special attention to controlling it and maintaining its class purity. When the EASM was initiated in 1958, class background and political purity were still emphasized at least theoretically.<sup>15</sup> However, this was more or less ignored due to the rapid expansion of quantity. This phenomenon was already mentioned by General Teng K'e-ming, the Commander of Kiangsi military region in 1959.<sup>16</sup> A year later, the political purity of militia became a major subject between Chinese military leaders in a series of conferences. According to General Yang Ching-wu, the landlords, rich peasants, counterrevolutionaries and bad elements infiltrated the militia organization and made their way into administrative levels of the militia organization.<sup>17</sup> They

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14 Ibid.

15 See Liu Hsien-sheng, "Let the Whole People Be Armed to Defend the Homeland," op. cit., p. 8.

16 Teng K'e-ming, "Report to Kiangsi's Militia Work Conference," op. cit., p. 42.

17 "Speech of Yang Ch'eng-wu," op. cit., p. 139.

commanded the militia to arrest innocent people as ruffians and smugglers, to rob, beat up and push around the people, to rape women, and practice seriously unlawful acts.<sup>18</sup> Some militia organizations almost became the tool of oppression used by the class enemy. They were in some places, therefore, seen as mad dogs, gangsters, bandit kings, and tiger bands by the masses.<sup>19</sup> This fact made the Chinese leaders, above all the military leaders, once again emphasize the class problem of the militia.<sup>20</sup>

According to James Chieh Hsiung, Liu Shao-chi and his followers believed that "class struggle disappears in a socialist society; since China has crossed the socialist threshold, class struggle has ceased to exist."<sup>21</sup> Furthermore, they even believed that based on the reality of Chinese life the opposites inseparably and permanently united. This is known as a theory of "two merging into one" (ho-erh Wei-yi).<sup>22</sup>

However, to Mao Tse-tung, contradictions between "ourselves and the enemy" still exist in socialist society. The

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18 "Report by Comrade Fu Ch'iu-t'ao on the Inspection of Work of the Honan Militia," Bulletin of Activities 4, in The Politics of the Chinese Red Army, op. cit., p. 119.

19 Ibid.

20 "Speech of Yang Ch'ing-wu," op. cit., pp. 138-139. The same request was submitted by other participants of the meetings.

21 James Chieh Hsiung, Ideology and Practice: The Evolution of Chinese Communism (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), p. 210.

22 Ibid.

masses with proletarian dictatorship should continually keep vigilance against the sabotage of the class enemy.<sup>23</sup> This ideological difference between Chinese leaders was exaggerated due to the acceleration of the Sino-Soviet rift since the early 1960s. While the Soviet leaders declared that the state of dictatorship of the proletariat in the Soviet Union has been transformed into "the state of the entire people" and "the party of the working class into the party of the entire people."<sup>24</sup> Mao repeatedly reminded his party and country that classes will continue to exist for a long time, and a struggle of class against class will continue, too. The restoration of the reactionary classes is possible if the party and the masses do not keep their vigilance.<sup>25</sup>

The concept of the class struggle being reflected in the militia's work is the total exclusion of the 5 kinds of bad elements from joining militia organization in order to guarantee the purity of militia. The militia regulations affirmed again the status and role of the militia as "an important tool of the Chinese people for . . . implementing the people's

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23 Mao Tse-tung, "Concerning Correctly Dealing with contradictions among People," op. cit., p. 328.

24 Wolfgang Leonhard, Three Faces of Marxism: The Political Concepts of Soviet Ideology, Maoism and Humanist Marxism, trans. Ewald Osers (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1974), p. 174.

25 "Speech at the Tenth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee, September 24, 1962," Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed, op. cit., p. 189.

democratic dictatorship internally."<sup>26</sup> Thus, "landlords, rich peasants, counterrevolutionaries, undesirable elements and rightists shall be barred from the militia organization."<sup>27</sup> However, the children of these bad elements are permitted to join the militia.<sup>28</sup>

According to the same regulation, for purifying the militia organization, a "regularization" should be carried out every year in coordination with rectification campaigns or other movements to dismiss old and recruit new members.<sup>29</sup>

After the reorganization of the militia in 1961, the Party made every effort to keep in control of it. The Party reminded the militia members that militia organization is an important instrument for consolidating the people's democratic dictatorship. It is the handle of a knife, which should always be put into the hand of the Party and the people and never into the hand of the class enemy.<sup>30</sup> Accordingly, the first of the ten demands imposed on militia by the "militia regulation" is to "submit themselves to the Party leadership."<sup>31</sup> Political

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26 Militia Regulations, Article 1.

27 Ibid., Article 6. Without clear definition, the term undesirable elements and rightist are likely to be used abusively against any dissenters.

28 Jan Myrdal, Report from a Chinese Village (New York: Pelican Book, 1967), p. 318.

29 Militia Regulations, Article 11.

30 Political Teaching Materials of the Militia of the Communist Bandits: How to Be a Good Militiaman, (共匪民兵政治教材「怎樣當個好民兵」) Xeroxed by the Information Bureau of the Department of National Defense, Republic of China in 1966, p. 34.

31 Militia Regulations, Article 4.

indoctrination<sup>32</sup> and military control exercised by military regions<sup>33</sup> are greatly strengthened.

Estimate of the Number of Militia

Since 1958, the expansion of militia has been very great. Based on the incomplete statistics given in the last chapter, the number of militia in late 1958 was 170 million. After the reorganization through 1960 to 1962 the figure was raised to 179.5 millions in early 1963.<sup>34</sup>

According to Chin Ting (金鼎), a writer in Taiwan, the number of militia had probably reached 221.6 millions in 1964. Although the figure was very close to the official figure of 220 million declared by China in 1964,<sup>35</sup> It is not very reliable, because Chin has used extremely selective data. His adoption of 39% as the average rate of enrollment and "16 to 50" as the qualified age to enroll in the militia,<sup>36</sup> for

32 Ibid., Articles 20 & 21.

33 In Chapters 6 & 7 of the Militia Regulations, the deployment of militia and its training are closely supervised by the military district and subdistrict at different levels (a detailed discussion will be given later).

34 The Study of the Militia System of the Communist Bandits, op. cit., p. 2.

35 Chin Ting, "Analysis of the Campaign of 'Three Consolidations' in the Militia Works of the Communist Bandits," (对匪民兵“三落境”阴谋之研析) FCYP, 7:12 (Jan. 31, 1965), p. 1.

36 Chin Ting used the enrolling rate of Honan Province as the average rate. See ibid, p. 114, cited from General Fu Ch'in-t'ao's report. The average rate of enrollment based on the result of Table 8 of last chapter is 34 per cent.

example, were likely to exaggerate the number of militia greatly; and his use of "12 per cent" as the average detained population and "3 per cent" as the average of the 5-kinds of bad elements of the whole population might also affect the correctness of the militia number.<sup>37</sup>

According to Hu Yo-pang, the former Secretary General of the Chinese Communist Youth League, the Chinese Youth between 16 and 30 in 1964 were 120 million.<sup>38</sup> The yearly population increase of this group was roughly 8 million for the entire group including males and females. Provided this figure can be also applied to calculate the yearly population distribution of those 31 to 45 years old ( it is likely lower), the total population of 16 to 45 of men and 16 to 35 of women should be around 200 million.<sup>39</sup>

After discounting the disabled population, the 5-kinds elements, and the detained population, the total militia number will be far below the figure of 200 million. The difference between this figure and that given by the Chinese officials is unlikely to be due to the underestimate of the actual population of 31 to 45 year olds, because the prolonged Sino-Japanese war and the civil war probably have caused a

37 Chin Ting, "The Campaign of 'Three Consolidation' in the Militia Work," op. cit., p. 114.

38 Cited from Chin Ting's article cited above, p. 114.

39 The figure is calculated based on the following formulas:  
 a. 16-30 years old population = 120 million.  
 b. 31-45 years old male =  $15 \times 4 = 60$  million.  
 c. 31-35 years old female =  $5 \times 4 = 20$  million.



great loss of lives in this age group. Another conceivable reason for this difference is that of the inflation of the Chinese statistics.<sup>40</sup> With the obvious inflation of food output in 1958-1959,<sup>41</sup> the exaggeration of the militia figure is not unlikely.

## 2. Organization

An organization is seen as a collection of human beings to achieve common goals.<sup>42</sup> Cooperation and cohesion have often been the primary consideration of any organization. According to Andrzejewski, the rate of recruitment of an army directly affects its degree of subordination, which in turn affects the cohesion and cooperation.<sup>43</sup> Under the slogan of EASM the rate of enrollment of militia was as high as 34% of the total population as mentioned before. If the militia is not properly

40 Harvey Nelsen, "Regional and Paramilitary Ground Forces," The Military and Political Power in China in the 1970s, ed. William W. Whitson (New York: Praeger, 1972), p. 140.

41 In the "Speech at the Tenth Plenum of the Eight Central Committee," September 24, 1962, Mao said, "The most serious fault was that our requisitioning was excessive. When we did not have very much grain, we insisted on saying that we had. See Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed, op. cit., p. 190. Also, see the discrepancy of grain output between the Chinese sources and western estimates in Alva Lewis Eriman's "China: Agricultural Development, 1941-71," People's Republic of China: An Economic Assessment (Washington: Joint Economic Committee of Congress of the U.S.A., 1972), p. 121.

42 James H. Carrington, Command, Control, Compromise: Value and Objectives for the Military Manager (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute, 1973), p. 27.

43 Andrzejewski, Military Organization and Society, op. cit., pp. 120-121.

structured it is impossible for the militia to achieve its organizational goals charged to it by the Chinese political leadership.

As a paramilitary and mass organization, the militia is different from the PLA and the regional forces.<sup>44</sup> It is composed of young and middle-aged men and women who are either commune members or city dwellers of various professions. As a mass military organization, the primary role of the militia members in peace-time is still production. Thus, the organization should maintain close contact with the production units.

#### Coordination with Production Units

As militia members are peasants and workers in various fields, they are not detached from production in peace time. Accordingly, the militia organizations are set up in the communes, factories, mines, organizations, schools and other business units.<sup>45</sup> "When the productive, working or studying organizations of various units undergo changes, militia organizations shall also be readjusted in time."<sup>46</sup> They should even be organized into various kinds of technical militia units based on their different professions.<sup>47</sup>

44 Nelsen named the people's police, public-security forces, and the independent units of the PLA controlled by the military regions at various levels as regional forces. See "Regional and Paramilitary Ground Forces," op.cit., p. 135.

45 Militia Regulations, Article 5.

46 Ibid., Article 7.

47 Ibid.

According to Liu Hsien-sheng, "militia teams of various size should be set up according to the farming areas and specialized production teams." in the commune. They should be set up in the cities by taking the factories, maines, enterprises, schools, and government organs as units.<sup>48</sup> While a big production organization includes several subunits, several militia teams should be formed. "The number of militiamen in a production team should not be rigidly fixed."<sup>49</sup> It is required to adapt to the "objective reality" of the circumstances rather than the "subjective demand" of organizational uniformity.<sup>50</sup>

Backbone Units Separated from Ordinary Ones at Basic Levels

While the militia organization has enrolled almost all able-bodied men and women of a large age-group, the physical condition of the members and their socio-political consciousness are likely different from each other. Although it is politically convenient for the Party to have all people organized along military patterns, in order to achieve mobilization and political control, it is difficult and not even necessary to make all of them soldiers in accordance with combat requirements. Furthermore, mixing men and women in the same unit may cause some technical difficulties of management. Therefore, militia

48 Liu Hsien-sheng; "Let the Whole People Be Armed," op. cit., pp. 7-8.

49 Ibid.

50 Teng K'e-ming, "Report to Kiangsi's Militia Work Conference," op. cit., p. 40.

organizations separated the younger from the elders, and men from women at the basic level. According to the regulations, "militiamen are basically classified into backbone militia and ordinary militia. All male citizens between 16 and 30, or female citizens between 16 and 25, with a clean political background and strong body, may be grouped into backbone militia; those remaining into ordinary militia."<sup>51</sup> In other words, the most energetic and youngest population with the best political background are seen as backbone militia and organized separately at the basic level. Members of backbone militia and women militia are organized into separate squads; in cases where separate squads are impractical, teams may be set up under squads.<sup>52</sup> However, at higher levels, these separate units are combined. The commander of a militia unit should concurrently serve as the leader of backbone militia under his command. A platoon commander, for example, should concurrently serve as the leader of the backbone militia squad under his control. The same rule applies to the company and battalion commanders. There is no backbone militia battalion or regiment. The backbone militia company is directly controlled by the commander of the regiment or division.<sup>53</sup>

Backbone militia units are physically stronger and

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51 Militia Regulations, Article 6.

52 Ibid., Article 7.

53 Ibid.

politically more reliable than ordinary units. So they are taken seriously by the military hierarchy in China.<sup>54</sup> They are better trained and equipped than the ordinary units.

### Mass Line and Democratic Management

People's war is basically characterized as a mass movement and a concrete form of the mass line.<sup>55</sup> Militia organization is a product of application of the mass line to people's war and is based on voluntariness and political self-consciousness.<sup>56</sup> As a voluntary mass military organization, it is not required to organize totally along the PLA pattern.<sup>57</sup> Mass line and democracy are particularly emphasized in militia work in order to suit the living habits of the masses.<sup>58</sup> Although they are practiced by the PLA,<sup>59</sup> mass line and democratic management are more emphasized by the militia. They are implemented in

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54 Lin Piao and Chen Tsai-tao (陳再道), the then commanding officer in Wu-han military region both emphasized the military role of the backbone militia and thus asked the PLA to tightly control it. See The Bulletin of Activities 21, op. cit., pp. 560 & 568.

55 Chen Po-chün, "Study the Thought of Comrade Mao Tse-tung on People's War," op. cit., pp. 1-2.

56 Militia Regulations, Articles 5 & 6. Also see The Militia Hand Book cited in TCYCLWC 3, p. 1333.

57 This point of view was first expressed by Fu Ch'iu-t'ao in his famous article of "The People's Militia: A Favorite System of Our People," op. cit., p. 32.

58 Ibid.

59 Mao Tse-tung, "The Democratic Movement in the Army," op. cit., p. 191.

the following two ways: selection of cadres and other decision-making.

In selecting cadres, militia members are permitted to elect their own leaders at different levels personally or through their representatives based on the nomination of the Party Committee.<sup>60</sup> According to Mao Tse-tung, the PLA soldiers were given the right "to nominate those whom they trust from their own ranks for lower-level cadre posts, subject to appointment by the higher level."<sup>61</sup> However, this right was only applied on a very limited scale. There must be an acute shortage of cadres; the vacancy must be a lower-level one; and the superior officers are not able to appoint one of their own choice. Soldiers were only given the right to nominate rather than to elect their cadres.<sup>62</sup> Even so, Mao still made it clear that "it is not to be the rule, however, but is to be done only when necessary."<sup>63</sup> Thus, one can say that the election of cadres by the militia is substantially different from the system of the PLA. However, the implementation of democratic administration and mass line in matters other than selecting cadres in the militia are little different from the PLA.

Under the military democratic movement, the PLA not only permitted soldiers to expose the errors and misdeeds of bad

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60 Militia Regulations, Article 13.

61 Mao Tse-tung, "The Democratic Movement in the Army," op. cit., pp. 191-192.

62 Ibid.

63 Ibid., p. 192.

elements among the cadres by means of implementing criticism and self-criticism sessions, but also practiced democracy in training and fighting. Soldiers might be called upon to teach the officers; various meetings were called to openly discuss the possible ways of achieving military missions from the basic level up to the company.<sup>64</sup>

Militia members are given a similar right as the PLA soldiers. They can express their opinions through public discussions. The cadres are urged to consult the masses and to listen to their opinions with open minds in carrying out any mission. No utter harshness, forcible orders and suppression of democracy are permitted. Beating, scolding and bodily corporal punishment are strictly forbidden; democratic administration and mass criticism and self-criticism are all applied to the internal activities.<sup>65</sup>

The militia organization was often seen by western scholars as a further totalitarian control over the Chinese people by the Communist Party. The regimentation and other sacrifices forced on the people were unprecedented.<sup>66</sup> Provided these comments are true, the implementation of mass line and democracy in the militia organization should be able to relieve the feeling of regimentation and sacrifices to some extent.

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64 Mao Tse-tung, "The Democratic Movement in the Army," op. cit., p. 191.

65 Article 14, Militia Regulations.

66 Ralph L. Powell, "Everybody A Soldier," Foreign Affairs, 39(Oct. 1960); p. 101.

### The Structure of the Militia

A social system changes when its component elements, goals, and the contemporary environment surrounding it change. The militia organization under the EASM almost contains all able-bodied populations of China from 16 to 45 years old. The rate of participation is much larger than before. Although its organizational goal is similar to the previous organizations, the environmental factors in 1958 were obviously different from the previous ones. The militia organization before 1949 was largely limited to the border and rural areas with peasants as its primary components. Since 1949, above all after 1958, it has extended its organization to cities, where the population is primarily composed of workers, engineers and other technicians with higher modern education. Before 1949, the PLA relied primarily on capturing weapons from the enemy to equip itself. There were very few modern weapons available to the militia. Their major weapons were spears, knives, bows, and traditional hunting guns.<sup>67</sup> Accordingly, the militia organization before 1958, above all before 1949, was primarily concentrated in small infantry units in the villages. Militia divisions were only found in Kiangsi-Hunan border area, where the central Soviet government of the CPC was located from 1931 to 1934, but it was still primarily infantry. However, following

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<sup>67</sup> Tsao Pao-i, The Kiangsi Soviet Regime, op. cit., pp. 319-322.



Mao's call for establishing militia divisions in 1958, militia divisions were generally set up in almost all communes. Some areas set up independent regiments, army corps, etc. (See Table 8 in Chapter III) After the reorganization of 1961, militia organization became uniform. The division is the largest unit in counties as well as cities.<sup>68</sup> (See Table 12) While city militia is organized in factories, mines, governmental organizations, schools, and business units, its structure is similar to that in the communes. Due to the different sizes of various organizations in cities, a city militia division often covers several organizations of similar nature. Thus, in the city of Canton in 1953, there were divisions of government cadres at provincial and municipal levels, divisions of workers of the municipal factories, and divisions of students in Canton City.<sup>69</sup>

To fit the pattern of production units, i.e., the commune or business units, different militia organizations are set up to adapt to the number of militiamen. In case the number of militiamen is not large enough to organize a division, a regiment or battalion will be set up. The number of subunits of various militia units and the number of militiamen for various units are generally not fixed.<sup>70</sup> However, a militia organization

68 Article 7, Militia Regulations.

69 "Six Militia Divisions in Canton," op. cit., p. 17.

70 Militia Regulations, Article 7.



which specifies numbers of men is not unusual. The Canton militia division, for instance, was organized according to a four-four system. Each division included 4 regiments; each regiment 4 battalions. The same is true of company, platoon, and squad.<sup>71</sup> Some writers in Taiwan tend to believe that the largest militia unit in the communes is a regiment rather than a division.<sup>72</sup> This may be true in the less populated communes. In the populous communes, militia divisions still seem to be the regular units as the militia regulations stipulate.<sup>73</sup>

Although infantry was still the major organization of militia in the rural communes, city militia has adapted to the particular nature of the business to develop other units with their advanced modern technique and special equipment. Kwangtung Province, for example, organized communication battalions with post and telephone workers.<sup>74</sup> The bus drivers were organized into automobile militia units. The peasant militia divisions in communes were not fully equipped with advanced weapons, but rifles, machine guns, and grenades were available to them in a limited numbers, above all in the coastal provinces where a war threat exists. (See Table 13)

<sup>71</sup> "Six Militia Divisions in Canton," op. cit., p. 17.

<sup>72</sup> See Chen Cho, "Survey of the Development of Militia of the Communist Bandits," op. cit., p. 63. Also, The Study of Militia System of the Communist Bandits, op. cit., p. 5.

<sup>73</sup> See Militia Regulations, Articles 9, 10 & 13.

<sup>74</sup> "Signal Communication Militia Battalion in Shaokuan Municipality, Kwangtung, Undergoes Hard and Severe Training," T'i-yu Pao (体育报), 16 Nov. 1964; SCMP, No. 3366, p. 2.

Table 13: The Weapons of the Militia Companies in Hsiamen (廈門) and T'ungan (同安) Counties, Fukien Province in 1963

Weapon	Militia Unit	
	1st Com., 1st B., 2nd R., Hsiamen Militia Division	Backbone Com., Nanpu Militia R., Tungan County
75 mm Gun	1	-
Machine Gun	4	2
Rifle	52	15
Submachine Gun	-	8
Carbine	-	8
Pistol	1	6
Grenade	-	314

Source: Combined and amended Bao Bu-chao and Kuo Tung-yang's Table 2 and 3 about the weapons of the militia companies in Hsiamen and Tungan Counties in "The Fighting Power of Militia of the Communist Bandits," op. cit., pp. 137-138.

Besides light infantry weapons, some militia units, in Kwangtung Province, for example, were even equipped with mortars and anti-aircraft guns.<sup>75</sup>

The change of equipment of the militia has complicated its organization. It would be a waste and a very dangerous thing for the government to put several million valuable weapons in the hands of the militia<sup>76</sup> without a proper way to control it and train it. This duty is usually charged to the militia cadres, local Party leaders and military regions at various levels.

75 "Militiamen on Nan-ao Island Brimming over with Vim and Vigor in Military Training — While the Enemy Is Horning his Knife We Must Make Our All the Sharper," NFJP, 28 April 1965; SCMP, No. 3460, pp. 5-6.

76 Mao Tse-tung once made an off hand remark in 1967 that

### 3. Functionaries

When discussing the implications of the large number of militia, writers in Taiwan never failed to point out the great dangers that the communists must risk. Chen Cho, for example, believes that militia organization is likely to add to the dissatisfaction of the people and prompt military collapse of the communist regime.<sup>77</sup> The militia members will turn their guns against the communists in case the Nationalist army brings a war to the mainland.<sup>78</sup> A similar point of view is found in many other works, implying that the militia could be a fatal affliction for the Communists, if an anticommunist movement on the mainland were to arise. As soon as the Nationalists begin to set their feet on the mainland, the militia will revolt from the inside in order to totally eliminate the Communists.<sup>79</sup>

Although the validity of these optimistic views is doubtful the political leaders in China have been highly vigilant in controlling the militia. They know that the militia organization is a knife. The handle of the knife should always be in the hands of the people and party. While there were minor incidents in the militia organization in the three bad years as mentioned before, generally speaking, the party never lost its control

the militia has three million guns. See SCMP, No. 4070 (Nov. 30, 1967), p. 10.

77 Chen Cho, "Survey of the Development of Militia of the Communist Bandits," op. cit., p. 66.

78 Ibid.

79 Ting Kuang-hua, "The Current Situation of the Militia Organization," op. cit., p. 9. Similar views are found

over the militia; and thus there was no evidence to show that the Nationalists got any help from the militia when they tried in vain to open a guerrilla corridor in Kwangtung and other coastal provinces from 1962 to 1965<sup>80</sup> (this will be analysed in the coming chapters).

How have the Communists been able to keep the unprecedented large number of militia in order without risking serious dangers? From the words of the Communist leaders, we get the clue that they have paid extreme attention to the control of the functionaries of the militia and have benefited from this policy. In his report to the Military Affairs Commission of the CPC, General Fu writes: "The reason why our party can lead and control a large militia is that it depends mostly upon the militia cadres who function as a backbone, bridge, and head. These cadres are not only the backbone of the establishment for national defense, but also the backbone of the building of production."<sup>81</sup>

When the militia organization was partly shattered in 1961, many leaders were on the alert for the possible infiltration of class enemies into it, and thus warned the masses to grasp militia work. General Liu Hsien-sheng, for example, once

in Wang To-nien's (王多年) "The Military Implications of the People's Commune System of the Communist Bandits," TCYCLWC 4, p. 1636. Also Bao Bou-chao, Kuo Tung-yang, "The Fighting Power of Militia of the Communist Bandits," op. cit., p. 135.

80 The Nationalist regime in Taiwan started to send armed guerrillas to mainland China in 1962. According to reports from China, all of them were wiped out. See "The Communiqué of Chinese Ministry of Public Security," SCMP, No. 2891, p.1.

81 "Report by Fu Ch'iu-t'ao on Honan Militia," op. cit., p. 8.

said: "The people's armed forces provide one of the tools for the proletarian dictatorship. . . . They cannot permit those class dissidents . . . to infiltrate the militia, nor must they allow them to usurp the position of leadership and take over control of the weapons."<sup>82</sup> General Yang Ch'eng-wu, with a similar view, said: "We must keep clean the ranks of the cadres of our units and the primary level cadres in the militia. . . . In dealing with those militia cadres whose political thinking is uncertain and with suspicious characters, we shall use the ballot to vote them out of office."<sup>83</sup>

Based on these insights and the vigilance they entailed, the militia regulations stipulated the process of recruitment of militia cadres and their control. According to the regulations, militia cadres constitute the central force for leading militiamen in carrying out various missions.<sup>84</sup> Therefore, militia cadres at various levels should be put under the unified control of the local party commissar. People's armed forces departments shall constantly keep a clear knowledge of and exercise control over, the number, quality and political-ideological attitudes of the militia cadres.<sup>85</sup>

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82 Liu Hsien-sheng, "Let the Whole People Be Armed to Defend the Homeland," op. cit., p. 8.

83 "Speech of Yang Ch'eng-wu," op. cit., p. 138.

84 Militia Regulations, Article 12.

85 Militia Regulations, Article 16.

### The Concept of Cadres

The term "cadre" used by Communists is not totally similar to the term "functionary", "Office-holder", or "public servant". According to Philip Selznick, the concept of "cadre" was developed by the Bolsheviki from the traditional Russian military system of a permanent staff of leaders who train recruits and around whom new units may be built. "It is in this sense that the Communist membership functions as the cadre of a wider mass movement."<sup>86</sup> Communist cadres, however, are more than just technically trained members of an elite group. To Selznick, Communist "cadres are dedicated men. The idea of the 'professional revolutionary' is not to be taken literally. It does not necessarily refer to full-time functionaries. The key element is personal commitment to the point where serious risks are accepted."<sup>87</sup>

In discussing cadre policy, Mao Tse-tung realizes that cadres are a decisive factor in carrying out the Party policy. Mao gave the criterion of a good cadre in 1938 as that he should carry out the Party line resolutely, keep party discipline, tie closely with the masses, have the ability to find his bearings independently, and be active, hard-working and unselfish.<sup>88</sup>

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86 Philip Selznick, The Organizational Weapon: A Study of Bolshevik Strategy and Tactics (New York: The Free Press, 1960), p. 18.

87 Ibid.

88 Mao Tse-tung, "The Role of CCP in the National War," op. cit., p. 202.



These five criteria for party members have been explained as criteria for successors.<sup>95</sup> According to Mao Tse-tung, they are indissolubly linked to one another. The first is theory, or also orientation. The second is the aim — i.e. whom do you serve? The last three refer to methodologies. The cadres or successors of revolution should unite themselves with the majority. They must implement democratic centralism, must not allow everything to be settled by the word of one man, must carry out self-criticism, and must be modest and prudent.<sup>96</sup>

These criteria for cadres show the strong political considerations of the Party. The concept of "professional revolutionary" and "the dedicated men" seems to have reemerged. Its adherence to the proletarian statesman style and mass line have signaled the democratic posture of the cadre and anti-bureaucratization effort, but it refers less to official positions, government leadership than the Chinese dictionary definition cited above.

Students of Chinese politics in the western world usually tend to use the word "cadre" close to that of the Chinese dictionary. A widely cited definition about cadre was given by Barnett. "Cadres are those who hold any post as a functionary in the bureaucratic hierarchies in China, from top to bottom."<sup>97</sup>

95 "Talks with Mao Yuan-hsin (1964-6)," Mao Tse-tung unrehearsed, op. cit., p. 242.

96 Ibid.

97 Barnett, Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China, op. cit., p. 39.

Close to Mao's concept of cadre; the Chinese dictionary defined "cadre" in its 1951 edition as follows:

The cadre is not an ordinary person, nor is he a so-called worker in a government bureau. He is different from the usual employees in bureaus, as well as fighters in 'military' units. 'Cadre' means one who has a certain degree of political awareness and is responsible for certain political tasks.<sup>89</sup>

This definition more or less expressed the unusual character of the concept of cadre in the early period of the communist movement. It implies the concept of "personal dedication" and "professional revolutionary" without sticking to the official positions of government. However, adapted to the contemporary power status of the CPC, the new edition of the dictionary in 1954 changed its definition about the concept of cadres. It reads:

Cadre: generally speaking, it means a worker in a state institution. Persons who work in state institutions or a department of production, capable of unifying and leading the masses to carry out Party and government policies and directives, to implement duties and programs promptly under the leadership of the Party and higher-level government institutions are cadres.<sup>90</sup>

Although this definition is more precise than before, it is also more bound by the official position which one holds. It is less related to the concept of "professional revolutionaries" and "dedicated men" which is implied in the concept of cadres mentioned by Selznick and Mao Tse-tung.

89 Hsin Mingtz'u Tzutien (Shanghai, 1951), p. 50796, cited from Schurmann's Ideology and Organization, op. cit., p. 106.

90 Ibid.

Since the middle 1960s, the CPC has raised the question of training successors for the revolution. Mr. An Tzu-wen, a senior party leader, published an article in Hungchi in 1964 in which he suggested five criteria for a good cadre.<sup>91</sup> These were later adopted by the ninth Party Congress as the criteria for party members in 1969.<sup>92</sup> Although Peking Review once again elaborated these criteria in 1972,<sup>93</sup> the new Party Constitution adopted by the Tenth Party Congress in 1973 completely maintained the original version that was adopted by the Ninth Party Congress. It reads:

Members of the Communist Party of China must:

1. Study and apply Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung thought in a living way.
2. Work for the interests of the vast majority of the people of China and the world.
3. Be able at uniting with the great majority, including those who have wrongly opposed them but are sincerely correcting their mistakes; however, special vigilance must be maintained against careerists, conspirators, and double-dealers so as to prevent such bad elements from usurping the leadership of the Party and the state at any level and guarantee that the leadership of the Party and the state always remains in the hands of Marxist revolutionaries.
4. Consult with the masses when matters arise.
5. Be bold in making criticism and self-criticism.<sup>94</sup>

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91 An Tzu-wen (安子文), "Training Successors for the Revolution Is the Party's Strategy Task," Hungchi (Sept. 23, 1964), pp. 17-18.

92 See Chapter 2, Article 3, Constitution of the Communist Party of China adopted by the Ninth Party Congress in 1969.

93 "Unity of Revolutionary Cadres: A Guarantee for Victory," Peking Review 27 (July 7, 1972), p. 6.

94 Chapter 2, Article 3, Constitution of the Communist Party of China adopted by the Tenth Party Congress in 1973.

Similar to Barnett, Schurmann defined a cadre as ". . . someone who holds a formal leadership position in an organization. A party secretary is a party cadre; a military officer is a military cadre; an official is a government cadre."<sup>93</sup>

Other scholars often combined both Barnett and Schurmann's definitions into one. James Harrison, for example, defines "cadres" as "those who hold any post as a functionary in the bureaucratic hierarchies or a formal leadership position in an organization."<sup>99</sup>

It seems that Mao's initial idea of cadre policy was borrowed from Stalin.<sup>100</sup> It emphasized the dual nature of red and expert. According to Schurmann, the cadre policies of the CPSU and the CPC had been similar to each other before they assumed power. While the Soviet Union implemented industrialization with a corps of professionally trained managers, the Chinese Communists relied on their politically trained cadres.<sup>101</sup>

However, the difference between these two countries is only in degree rather than in kind. According to James Townsend, the Chinese cadre policy often emphasized the combination of red with expert. When red experts are not enough

<sup>98</sup> Schurmann, Ideology and Organization, op. cit., p. 162.

<sup>99</sup> James Pinckney Harrison, The Long March to Power: A History of the Chinese Communist Party, 1921-72 (New York: Praeger, 1972), p. 460.

<sup>100</sup> Joseph Stalin, Problems of Leninism (Moscow, 1954), pp.657-662.

<sup>101</sup> Schurmann, Ideology and Organization, op. cit., p. 279.

to staff the expanding bureaucracies, "they could be balanced organizationally through the employment of some reds and some experts."<sup>102</sup> In maintaining the balance between red and expert, the scale of cadre policy in China often fluctuated from one side to another. However, under Mao's leadership, politics taking command has more often prevailed than that of economics which was denounced by Mao as a policy advocated by Liu Shao-ch'i before 1966.

Generally speaking, under the supremacy of the party leadership, the CPC's cadre policy toward the militia is more or less close to Townsend's principle of "balance", i.e. employment of some reds and some experts. The local party leaders have, for example, automatically assumed the position of political commissars of the militia, while the demobilized soldiers or others who are knowledgeable in military matters are appointed as commanders.<sup>103</sup>

#### The Sources of Cadres of the Militia

As Mao Tse-tung believes that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun" and "the army is the chief component of the political power of a state," he has always insisted that "the party command the gun; the gun shall never be allowed to command the party."<sup>104</sup> As the militia is a gun, it is a tool

102 Townsend, Politics in China, op. cit., p. 245.

103 See Militia Regulations, Article 13.

104 Mao Tse-tung, "Problems of War and Strategy (Nov. 6, 1938)," Selected Works, Vol. 2, op. cit., pp. 224-225.

of proletarian dictatorship and the party never hesitated to command it. To consolidate the control of the militia, and purify the ranks of militia cadres, the Party has limited the sources of militia cadres to a relatively small circle.

According to the militia regulations, outstanding Party members, Young Communist League members, or ambitious and reliable workers, poor peasants, lower-middle peasants and positive elements (activists) shall be selected to serve as militia cadres.<sup>105</sup>

The five bad elements, i.e. the landlords, rich peasants, counterrevolutionaries, undesirable elements and rightists who are barred from the militia organization are automatically deprived from being selected as militia cadres. According to Fu Ch'iu T'ao, the well-to-do peasants or middle peasants were also barred from being appointed to the position of cadres.<sup>106</sup>

Workers, poor peasants and lower-middle peasants, who are faithful to the party and socialistic endeavors, must be further screened by additional standards: Party membership; Young Communist League membership; positiveness; and ambitious and reliability. While the first two are favorable qualifications, they are not always available in the villages. Accordingly, "positive", "ambitious and reliable" workers, poor and

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<sup>105</sup> Militia Regulations, Article 12.

<sup>106</sup> "Report by Fu Ch'iu-t'ao on Honan Militia," op. cit., p. 119.

lower-middle peasants become qualified to fill the post of militia cadres.

Before the reorganization of the militia in 1961, local political leaders were often concurrently appointed as leaders of the militia. The militia organization in Cheng-men Commune, Ming-hou County of Fukien Province, for example, appointed the director of the commune as commander of the militia; the Secretary of the Party, as the Political Commissar; and the Secretary of the Young Communist League (共產主義青年團, hereafter referred to as YCL) as the Vice-commissar. The leaders of the productive brigades and work teams were respectively appointed as commanders of battalions, companies, platoons, and squads of the militia.<sup>107</sup>

The writers on the militia in Taiwan often use the phrase of "the same people with two organizations" (一套人馬兩套機構) to indicate the phenomenon of overlapping leadership between commune and militia.<sup>108</sup> However, this phenomenon has totally changed since 1961.

A separation of militia organizations from productive units was carried out as early as 1959. General Teng K'e-ming, for example, suggested in a conference on militia work in Kiangsi in 1959 that "a proper separation of these two organizations will facilitate both production and militia

107 The Party Committee of the CPC of Ming-hou County, Fukien, "Workers, Peasants, Merchants, Students, and Soldiers Being Unified into One," op. cit., p. 24.

108 See Chen Cho, "Survey of the Development of Militia of the Communist Bandits," op. cit., p. 63.

work."<sup>109</sup> When the higher military leaders held a telephone conference in early 1961, the opinion further prevailed. General Yang Ch'eng-wu, for example, said at the conference that "in order to strengthen work on the militia, we must apply the rule that the leaders of various production teams cannot concurrently act as cadres of the militia."<sup>110</sup> When the militia regulations were promulgated in July, 1961, the regulations unequivocally prescribed that the leading departments of various militia organizations should be separated from production organizations. They should not replace each other. The leaders of productive units of the commune should not concurrently serve as commanders of militia divisions, regiments, battalions and companies or as platoon leaders.<sup>111</sup>

While the militia regulations excluded commune leaders from concurrently serving as militia cadres, they strengthened the leading roles of local Party and YCL secretaries. They retained the posts of political commissar and political instructor of the militia organization for the secretaries of local Party committees at different levels within the commune and the posts of deputy-commissar, deputy-political instructor or deputy-political director for the secretaries of YCL at the same level.<sup>112</sup>

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109 Teng K'e-ming, "Report to Kiangsi's Militia Work Conference," op. cit., p. 139.

110 "Speech of Yang Ch'eng-wu," op. cit., p. 139

111 Militia Regulations, article 9.

112 Ibid.



According to John Gittings, the decision to separate the militia cadres from the commune's was apparently made in order to check excessive local power.<sup>113</sup> However, the permission for local party leaders to play a leading role in militia organization may have undermined this effort. "The threatened party leaders," according to Nelsen, "at local levels during the GPCR used their influence over the militia to fend off Red Guard attacks and even exaggerated the conflict between the radical Red Guards and the status-oriented workers and peasants."<sup>114</sup> Nevertheless, the party leaders' control over the militia is unlikely to be yielded to any other organization as long as the Party still wants to control it.

If the political commissars who are concurrently led by local party leaders represent "reds" in the militia, the commanders at various levels will be the "experts" who are primarily recruited from the demobilized soldiers and those who have military experience.

When the EASM was implemented in 1958, there were 6.8 million demobilized soldiers of the PLA who were already seen as potential cadres for the militia.<sup>115</sup>

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113 Gittings, The Role of the Chinese Army, op. cit., p. 213.

114 Nelsen, "Regional and Paramilitary Group Forces," op. cit., p. 143.

115 Fu Ch'iu-t'ao, "Everybody A Soldier," op. cit., p. 24. Also see Liu Hsien-sheng, "Let the Whole People Be Armed to Defend the Motherland," op. cit., p. 8.

According to Michel Oksenberg's study, over seven million retired soldiers have played a very important role in the local leaderships, above all at district and multiple-village levels.<sup>116</sup> 37 per cent of militia cadres, armed forces department officials, and local security personnel were staffed with ex-soldiers.<sup>117</sup>

Needless to say, military experience is the determinant factor for the ex-soldiers having played an important role in the militia. However, the following reasons are no less important:

The PLA is consistently seen as a political army. The close party control system in the PLA and its intensive political training programs have fully transformed the PLA members into party workers as well as fighters.<sup>118</sup>

According to Barnett, the PLA members usually have

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116 The study reveals that 11% and 26% of ex-PLA cadres were serving at district and multiple-village levels of government from 1962 to 1965. See "Local Leaders in Rural China, 1962-1965: Individual Attributes, Bureaucratic Positions, and Political Recruitment," in Doak Barnett, ed., Chinese Communist Politics in Action (Seattle: University of Washington, 1972), p. 175.

117 See Ibid., Table 14, p. 186. According to this Table, an equal percentage of ranks were occupied by peasant leaders recruited from the collectivization and post-1955 period.

118 Gittings, The Role of the Chinese Army, op. cit., pp. 99-112, discussing political control system of the PLA. Also see Mao's "On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party Dec. 1929," Selected Works, Vol. 1, p. 105. The CPC required that the PLA is not merely a fighter but also "an armed body for carrying out the political tasks of the revolution."

higher rates of Party or YCL membership than other social groups.<sup>119</sup> This may guarantee a higher political consciousness among the soldiers.

The soldiers had passed a very extensive security investigation before they were recruited into the PLA. This process guaranteed the soldiers to be absolutely reliable elements with a favorable family background, social class, and political attitude.<sup>120</sup> Their favorable background and further political training in the army surely entitled them to be considered loyal elements of the party.

In addition, under the conscription system, of all eligible young men who wish to enter the army, only a very small percentage is accepted.<sup>121</sup> Therefore, the PLA members are usually the most energetic and prominent elements in the society. They usually enjoy a high social prestige.

With all of these special conditions, the ex-soldiers are more or less natural leaders in the society, above all in the countryside. Their military knowledge, political consciousness, and leadership skills learned from the army - all prepared them to be militia cadres. Besides, due to high social prestige and special roles in the militia, the demobilized PLA soldiers are likely to form an elite group at the local

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119 Barnett, Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Local Political Power in Communist China, op. cit., p. 243.

120 Ibid., p. 244.

121 Ibid.

level and serve as a bridge between higher level elites and the masses in the countryside.

### The Procedure of Cadre Recruitment

A formal procedure for recruiting cadres is described in the militia regulations in order to guarantee the implementation of the mass line and democratic administration.

The democratic system in China is known as socialist democracy which is featured as people's dictatorship and discipline rather than democracy.<sup>122</sup>

According to Townsend, "socialist democracy is actually an attempt to incorporate the Party's concept of political participation into the state system."<sup>123</sup> The organizational principle of the CPC has long been identified as democratic centralism, which is often defined as "centralism on the basis of democracy and democracy under centralized guidance."<sup>124</sup> Centralism based on democracy, according to Liu Shao-ch'i, means that the leading bodies of the Party are elected by the membership on a democratic basis and enjoy their confidence. The authority of the leading body of the party given by the

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122 Mao Tse-tung, "Concerning Correctly Dealing with Contradictions among People," op. cit., p. 330. Also see "More on the Historical Experience of the Proletariat," JMJP Editorial, 29 Dec. 1956.

123 Townsend, Political Participation in Communist China, op. cit., p. 77.

124 The Constitution of the CPC adopted by the 8th National Congress on Sept. 26, 1956.

party membership should be able to manage all party affairs, and to command the obedience of its lower organizations and of the party membership. The democracy under centralized guidance means that every party meeting should be convened by the leading body and carried through under proper leadership. A list of nominees should be carefully prepared by the leading body for every election.<sup>125</sup>

Under democratic centralism, "the party not only needs democracy, but needs centralism even more;"<sup>126</sup> "the people enjoy a wide measure of democracy and freedom, but at the same time they have to keep themselves within the bounds of socialist discipline."<sup>127</sup> The real democracy, according to Mao, must be explained in concrete term of class struggle. Under people's democratic dictatorship, for example, the reactionary classes and exploiters are suppressed, while the people enjoy democracy. Democracy is a means rather than an end. Acceptable democratic methods are discussion, criticism, persuasion, and education, which are brought into play to resolve contradictions among the people.<sup>128</sup>

In accordance with the principle of democratic centralism, the process of selecting militia cadres is divided into three

125 "Liu Shao-ch'i on Party Organization," The Chinese Communist Regime, op. cit., p. 163.

126 Mao Tse-tung, "Rectify the Party's Style of Work (Feb. 1, 1942)," Selected Works, Vol. 3, op. cit., p. 44.

127 Mao Tse-tung. "Concerning Correctly Dealing with Contradictions among People," op. cit., p. 332.

128 Ibid., pp. 331-332.

stages: the nomination, election, and the approval of the next higher party organization. Unlike the election of a people's congress, in which all political parties constitute an election committee to prepare a joint candidate list based on the recommendation of groups and individuals,<sup>129</sup> the nomination of candidates for militia cadres is an exclusive right of the Party Committee.<sup>130</sup> By so doing, the Party can expect to put their favorite persons into the list of candidates, meanwhile, it can exclude the undesirable names.

Although there is no regulation regarding the process of nomination, the Party is often urged to apply the mass line and democratic centralism before it presents the list of candidates to the masses for election.<sup>131</sup> It is difficult to determine whether the candidate list provided by the party organization is equal to or larger than the actual numbers of cadres elected. However, it is not unreasonable to presume that the list of candidates might be equal to the numbers of cadres to be elected, because, the same rule is applied to other elections. The candidate lists, for example, provided by the election committee in the election of people's congress at various levels are equal to the actual numbers of deputies to be elected.<sup>132</sup>

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129 Townsend, Political Participation in Communist China, op. cit., p. 128.

130 Militia Regulations, Article 8.

131 "Report by Fu Ch'iu-t'ao on Honan Militia," op. cit., p. 119.

132 Townsend, Political Participation in Communist China, op. cit., p. 128.

The nomination of militia cadres only covers commanders and deputy commanders at various levels. The political commissars, deputy commissars, political instructors and deputy instructors, as discussed above, are not subject to election; they are concurrently occupied by the secretaries of the party organization and the YCL at corresponding levels.<sup>133</sup>

As is the case with other elections at the basic levels in China, militia elections are held at meetings rather than at polling booths.<sup>134</sup> According to the Electoral Law of the PRC, an elector may vote in accordance with the list of candidates or for any other citizen he may choose.<sup>135</sup> This description may only serve as window dressing without any substantial meaning; nevertheless the militia regulations do not have a similar stipulation. There is no empirical evidence to prove or disprove that the militia have ever refused the list of candidates put to them by the party organization, or that they have elected any persons as cadres who were not listed on the candidate list. It is likely that the militia members have always voted for the candidate provided by the Party. The cadres up to battalion level are elected by direct vote at general meetings. Beyond that level, according to Li Hung-fu, a battalion commander in Shensi Province, the commanders of the

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133 Militia Regulations, Article 8.

134 Townsend, Political Participation in Communist China, *op. cit.*, p. 128. Also Article 51, the Electoral Law of PRC, as to the militia election, see Article 8, Militia Regulations, and Myrdal, Report from a Chinese Village, *op. cit.*, p. 309.

135 See Article 51, The Electoral Law of the PRC promulgated on March 1, 1953.

next lower units elect their commanders of next higher units. In other words, the elections beyond battalion are indirectly carried out by militia representatives.<sup>136</sup>

The cadres below battalion are reelected every year, while the cadres of divisions and regiments are elected every two years.<sup>137</sup> There is no limitation for the current cadres to stand for reelection provided the Party organization renominates them.

There is no description regarding the removal of cadres from office. However, empirical evidence showed that militia cadres can be removed from office by mass vote, if the Party so desires. "In dealing with those militia cadres whose political thinking is uncertain and with suspicious characters," said General Yang Ch'eng-wu in 1961, "we shall use the ballot to vote them out of office. The process of voting out a militia cadre at any level must be fully based on the Party's class line. It must be examined and approved by the leadership."<sup>138</sup>

The result of the election has to be approved by the next higher Party organization<sup>139</sup> in order to avoid the possibility of any undesirable person being elected. The same applies to the removal of cadres.

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136 Myrdal, Report from a Chinese Village, op. cit., p. 317.

137 Militia Regulations, Article 8.

138 "Speech of Yang Ch'eng-wu," op. cit., pp. 138-139.

139 Militia Regulations, Article 8.



The militia is a mass organization based on the voluntary principle. Whether the members and cadres are paid regularly or not, there are different discussions. According to Li Hung-fu, all of the militia cadres below the commune are on a part-time basis without any income, even with any days' work for taking part in manoeuvres and the like, but the cadres at the county level are paid a full-time salary.<sup>140</sup> Some writers on the militia in Taiwan often said that militia members and lower level cadres are not paid regularly. They are paid with workpoints by the productive unit, when they are assigned to work during the day-time in order to make up their income loss.<sup>141</sup> Another author said that militia men are not paid at all for their assignments, the platoon commanders are more or less subsidized; from the company level up, the cadres are paid regularly according to the standard of the regular army.<sup>142</sup>

The militia regulations leave the income problem open to the local authorities at different levels. They only stipulate that "if the assignment conflicts with labour work hours, appropriate work-point subsidies or rewards shall be given. The concrete measures of subsidy and rewards shall be carried out in accordance with stipulations of various

140 Myrdal, Report from a Chinese Village, op. cit., p. 317.

141 Bao Bou-chao and Kuo Tung-yang, "The Fighting Power of the Militia of the Communist Bandits," op. cit., p.127.

142 Study of the Militia System of the Communist Bandits, op. cit., p. 10.

provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions."<sup>143</sup>

From these discussions, we may believe that there is no regular payment to the militia members and cadres for their routine services, but that they may be subsidized when they are assigned to perform militia duties in case of conflict with their normal work-hours.

#### 4. Deployment.

##### The Command and Use of the Militia Force

When the high military leaders discussed militia work at a telephone conference in 1961, General Yang Ch'eng-wu disclosed some serious problems about the use of militia forces.

In some locations the limits of use were not clearly defined, nor was the control strict. . . . They (cadres) often use the militia without authorization, beating and cursing the people at will, or they set barriers along certain roads so that they could arrest the masses in transit and confiscate their property, sometimes even robbing them. Especially where counter-revolutionaries or hoodlums had seized the power of leadership in the commune or the team, they used the militia to do evil for the sake of profit, and have therefore created a very bad impression among the people.<sup>144</sup>

There are at least two problems revealed in Yang's speech about the misuse of the militia: the quality of the cadres and the location of authority of using the militia. Strict party control of the nomination of the militia cadres may to some extent curb the problems caused by undesirable cadres.

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<sup>143</sup> Militia Regulations, Article 25.

<sup>144</sup> "Speech of Yang Ch'eng-wu," op. cit., p. 142.

However, the control of individual cadres cannot totally stop the misuse of the militia except when proper allocation of the authority of deploying the militia is clearly defined.

According to Yang, "the militia is an instrument to be used for defending ourselves against the invasion of imperialism and to help us practice the people's democratic dictatorship. Only for dealing with enemies in the class struggle at home and abroad can the militia be used; it is definitely not to be used for settling internal contradictions of the people within the country."<sup>145</sup>

The deployment of militia not merely relates to how to use it, but also who or what organization should have the authority to use it. In other words, where the power of command should be located, and what process should be applied when the necessity of use arises. When the EASM was initiated in 1958, Fu Ch'iu-t'ao and many other responsible military leaders strongly preferred a close connection between militia organization and the communes. With the slogan of "the same people with two organizations," the local party and commune leaders were concurrently appointed as militia leaders. However, the misuse of militia in doing evil not only indicated the inability of the local cadres to provide an effective leadership to lead the militia, but also revealed the dangers of excessive local power.<sup>146</sup>

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145 Ibid.

146 Gittings, The Role of the Chinese Red Army, op. cit., pp. 213-219.

Since ancient times, Chinese political development has often shifted between centralism and localism. As long as national government was strong enough, excessive localism was often suppressed to avoid threats to the central authority. On the other hand, it was less true to say that a strong local authority would like to subject itself to a weakened central government. Therefore, very few emperors in traditional China could allow the existence of a strong local power.

Dr. Sun Yat-sen suggested a balance of power between national, provincial, and county government. It was included in the constitution of the Republic of China in 1948. However, the local governments, above all the governments below county level, were still very weak throughout the Republican period. Under the present regime, the CPC began to decentralize the economic decision-making powers to local governments in 1957. There were two types of decentralization in China: decentralizing the decision-making powers to production units i.e. factories and work teams (in case of agricultural organization) or decentralizing it to provincial governments.<sup>147</sup> According to Schurmann, the Chinese decentralization in 1957 was of the second type. The real benefit of this policy went to the provincial governments. However, the local government at commune level was greatly strengthened due to the agricultural collectivization and

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<sup>147</sup> Schurmann, Ideology and Organization, op. cit., pp. 209-210.

communization in the countryside. The commune not only ran economic affairs by itself but also controlled militia divisions. This phenomenon was referred to by Schurmann as "the local centralizing tendencies."<sup>148</sup> Other scholars simply named it "commune centralism."<sup>149</sup> This centralization of power in the commune was apparently unprecedented in Chinese history and thus raised the concern of the higher government to check its power. According to Gittings, the separation of commune cadres from concurrently occupying the leadership of the militia is in order to check excessive local power.<sup>150</sup> In fact, the policies taken by the CPC to check excessive local power were not merely to separate the leadership of the militia organization from those of the communes, but also to distribute the authority of command among several organizations in order to achieve the principle of check and balance. Under this policy, the local party committee, higher government, and military district are permitted to share the authority of deploying the militia forces.<sup>151</sup>

When the militia organization was partly shattered in 1960, Mao urged the provincial military district to

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148 Ibid., p. 210.

149 See Townsend, Politics in China, op. cit., p. 120. Also see, E. L. Wheelwright and Bruce McFarlane, The Chinese Road to Socialism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971), p. 50.

150 Gittings, The Role of the Chinese Army, op. cit., p. 219.

151 See Militia Regulations, Article 27 & 28.

devote virtually their entire resources to rebuilding the militia structure. They were not only required to send work-teams to restore and purify the militia organization, but also required to handle its military training. No matter how reluctant the PLA leaders had been to build mass militia forces previously, the heavy commitment to the militia work eventually developed a strong authority of the military district over the control and use of the militia.

When Yang Ch'eng-wu spoke to the telephone conference in January 1961, he first suggested the occasions, procedure, and authority of permitting the use of the militia. In each case, the military district must be consulted. When there is any counterrevolutionary movement or spies, the concerned local Party Committee and the departments of people's armed forces can and must immediately mobilize the militia to suppress and extinguish it. Meanwhile, they must report to the provincial military district about the conditions and numbers of militiamen mobilized immediately.<sup>152</sup>

If the local authority wants to deploy militia to guard railroads, bridges, storehouses, etc., a unified proposal submitted by the local Party Committee and military subdistrict must previously be approved by the provincial Party Committee and provincial military district. If a local public security force needs the militia to help it meet a major incident, it must confer with the department

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152 "Speech of Yang Ch'eng-wu," op. cit., p. 142.

of people's armed forces of the corresponding local government and get the permission of the Hsien or city party committee. Meanwhile, it must report to the higher military organization.<sup>153</sup>

When the PLA became further involved in militia work, the military leaders began to assume command directly. Marshal Lo Jui-ching (羅瑞卿), for example, ordered in April 1961 that "the provincial military district must be given the authority to decide what activities should be conducted by the militia."<sup>154</sup>

In explaining Marshal Lo's order, both General Chang Ai-ping (張愛萍) and Kan Ssu-ch'i (甘樹其) pointed out that "the military district must act as the staff of the provincial party committee. They must be depended upon to ask for advice and report to the provincial party committee. In so doing, the judicial and political organs of the provincial military districts and military subdistricts will become really militia headquarters and political department."<sup>155</sup>

The growing authority of the military district and provincial party organizations is totally at the expense of the commune and to some extent, of the local party organization.

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153 Ibid.

154 "We Must Do Good Substantial Work in Building Up the Militia," op. cit., p. 564.

155 Ibid.

### Tripartite Control

The promulgation of the militia regulations finally set up the framework of a power structure of militia organization in middle 1961, which included most suggestions mentioned above. Generally speaking, the new regulations set up a tripartite control system. The department of people's armed forces, the local party committees, and the military district collectively share the authority of militia deployment. The department of people's armed forces is responsible to arrange or meet the required militia activities; the local party committees and military district or subdistrict are authorized to approve the use of the militia. When the local army or public security, for example, needs the help of militia to meet a particular necessity, the concerned department of the people's armed forces of county or city must determine the numbers of militia to be mobilized with the concerned army or public security and report the decision to the local party committee and military subdistrict for approval.<sup>156</sup>

In case of enemy invasion or harrassment, counter-revolutionary armed riots, enemy airdrops, or the infiltration of enemy agents, the local party committee and commanding organizations of militia shall promptly mobilize militia to smash, suppress, search and arrest the enemy resolutely without waiting for approval, but, they must

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156 Militia Regulations, Article 24.



report to superior organizations at the same time.<sup>157</sup>

The local party committee can have the final say about the deployment of militia only when the militia are needed to carry out routine missions such as protection of production within the commune.<sup>158</sup>

The new militia regulations also authorized the military districts and subdistricts at various levels and the department of people's armed forces of county and municipalities to send work teams regularly to go to the grass-roots level in order to carry out investigations and researches, to help them to resolve problems, to sum up experience, and report the objective situations to the party committee in time. They are responsible to recommend solutions and proposals to the party committee and act as their staff.<sup>159</sup>

Since the reorganization and the promulgation of the regulations in 1961, the militia organizations has to a large extent been institutionalized. According to commentaries from Taiwan, this change has greatly improved the capacity of the Party to control the militia on the one hand, and strengthened the militia organizations in order to exercise its functions charged to it by the Party on the other hand.<sup>160</sup>

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157 Ibid.

158 Ibid.

159 Militia Regulations, Article 28.

160 Hung Chi-t'ao, "The Study of Militia Regulations of the Communist Bandits," op. cit., p. 67.

## V. The Function of Militia: (1) Stationary Function

An organization is set up primarily for achieving some goals. It is a means to an end. The businessman, for example, does not organize for the sake of organization, but to produce a product or service and to reward those who contribute to that end. The EASM was designed as a mechanism of militarization of the Chinese peasantry. It was expected to exercise some functions in the process of political development. According to militia regulations the major functions of the militia in normal times are as follows:

During the time of peaceful construction, the militia shall carry out various activities under the premise of submitting themselves to the efforts of production and construction. They shall also make preparations for war. The basic missions of the militia are as follows:

1. To participate positively in socialist reconstruction, and function as leaders in production;
2. To coordinate with regular troops in strengthening the sea, land, border and air defenses, and defense against enemy agents, so as to maintain the social order;
3. To be ready at all times to join the army and go to war, to deal blows to invaders and defend the fatherland.

It is obvious that these militia missions can be roughly divided into three aspects: economic, political, and military. The roles of the militia in production were often mentioned as being both a major force and shock force.<sup>2</sup>

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1 Militia Regulations, Article 3.

2 Political Teaching Materials of the Militia, op. cit.,  
p. 15.

As a major force of production, the militia was often required to hold high the Three Red Banners (The Great Leap Forward, The People's Commune System and The Party General Line), to promote production, to take a leading role in developing and consolidating the collective economy, and to participate actively in agricultural production.<sup>3</sup>

As a shock force, the militia was used to fight national disasters such as flood, drought, and to meet other urgent needs.<sup>4</sup>

As far as political function is concerned, when the militia was seen by the party as an instrument of proletarian dictatorship, it was used to fight against the class enemies and maintain law and order. In ensuring its political loyalty the militia organization was often used as a vehicle of political indoctrination and social mobilization. The ten basic demands which the Party required every militiaman and woman to achieve are not only aimed at creating a good militiaman but also a socialist man by combining the virtues of expert and red.<sup>5</sup>

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3 Ibid., p. 14.

4 "How to Be a Good Militiaman," promulgated by the political department of the Fukien Provincial Military Region in 1963. In The Materials for Militia in the Socialist Education Movement (These data were reproduced by the Taiwan government and a xeroxed copy is available in the special collection of China documents, East Asian Library, at Columbia University. No detailed information about the publisher is available), p. 40.

5 The ten basic requirements are: 1) Submit to the Party's leadership; 2) Abide by the government's laws and regulations; 3) Obey the commands of superiors; 4) Protect the masses' interests; 5) Expose bad men and bad deeds; 6) Be kind to others; 7) Taking political and military lessons; 8) Take part in sports activities; 9) Take good care of weapons and ammunition; and 10) Safe-guard state secrets. See Article 4, The Militia Regulations.

Through continual political indoctrination, the militia was expected to become a major factor in implementing party policies in the process of socialist construction.<sup>6</sup>

As a mass military organization, the militia is required to perform some military functions. Generally speaking, the military role of the militia can be divided into two aspects: 1. the reserve force of the PLA, and 2. guerrilla and anti-guerrilla war-fighters. The militia organization has integrated with the reserve-system and become the only source of military recruitment since 1957. Where people's war is concerned, the militia is expected not only to assist the PLA, but is required to play an independent role in guerrilla and anti-guerrilla wars.<sup>7</sup>

Based on the above analyses, the roles of the militia in economics, politics, and the military tend to possess dual characteristics. The promotion of production, the maintenance of law and order, and serving as a reserve of the army are the major activities of the militia. They are the day-to-day activities and thus are routine functions of the militia. The regular occurrence of these activities and the method of fulfilling these functions both are basically predictable. The change of these activities is relatively low. Therefore, we define these activities as stationary functions of the militia.

6 Political Teaching Materials of the Militia, op. cit.,  
p. 21.

7 Ibid., pp. 9-12.

The activities of shock force in production, political indoctrination and mobilization, and fighting guerrilla or anti-guerrilla wars are not regular day-to-day activities. They merely occur on rather unusual occasions or at crucial moments. By contrast with the stationary roles, the occurrence and method of fulfilling these roles are of low predictability. Their completion is primarily determined by the capacity of the organization to adapt to the temporary situation of particular events. Therefore, these roles are defined here as dynamic functions of the militia. Based on this concept, the functions of the militia are divided into stationary and dynamic ones in this study. (See Table 14)

Table 14: The Typology of the Militia Function

	Political	Economical	Military
Stationary Function	The maintenance of law and order	Major force of production	Reservist
Dynamic Function	Political indoctrination and social mobilization	Shock force	Guerrilla and anti-guerrilla war

#### 1. The Maintenance of Law and Order

No matter what kind of political system a country has, it must exercise some authoritarian power to maintain the existence of the government and protect the peaceful life of the ordinary people. This power of the government is a legitimate function of its existence. One essential condition for carrying out its duties is the availability of

coercive resources. A government backed by strong coercive powers is desirable to guarantee the implementation of its public policies from the possible impedance of hostile social forces. In a developing country, multiple hostilities coming from the old social forces often attempt to undermine the reform-oriented regimes in order to revive their own dominant status. According to Claude Ake, an authoritarian rule in developing countries is necessary for maintaining political integration and political stability:

An attempt to manipulate the economic structure in order to increase integration is certain to arouse the hostility of certain vested interests. So will the attempt to make people relate to national symbols rather than to tribal ones. The quest for integration will make powerful enemies for the new order. To maintain a minimum of political stability, it is crucial that the government be strong enough to deal with the centrifugal forces that the drive for integration will activate.<sup>8</sup>

Since the CPC assumed political power in China in 1949, it has always waged a class war against its enemies in order to consolidate the new regime. In the continuous class struggle, the militia was often seen as an indispensable instrument of the people's democratic dictatorship, and thus is required to fulfill its duties primarily in maintaining social order and law.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Claude Ake, "Research Note, Political Integration and Political Stability," op. cit., p. 489.

<sup>9</sup> Following the description of the Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, in which the militia is required to safeguard local order and to lay the foundation for national mobilization, the conscription law (military service law) also charged the militia with the maintenance of local public security. See Article 58, the Conscription Law.

### The Local Security Force

Although there are many organizations that are responsible for maintaining social order, a police system almost unexceptionally exists in all societies. The police functions in China had long been performed by the public security force of the PLA. In July, 1955, the public security force below administrative district and county levels was reorganized as "people's armed police" and transferred to public security agencies in the respective local governments.<sup>10</sup>

The reorganization of the public security force of the PLA was basically finished in 1958; since then the people's police has belonged to local public security agencies at different levels.<sup>11</sup>

The police force of the present regime like those of the preceding ones is usually quartered in the cities and big towns.<sup>12</sup> It may be dispatched to establish police outposts (Pei-chu So 派出所) in the subdistricts of the cities and towns, but the

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10 The State Council order "On the Reorganization of the Public Security Force at the Administrative District and County Levels into the People's Armed Police," July 30, 1955, cited from "The Police of the Communist Bandits," TCYC 113 (Feb. 25, 1963), p. 4.

11 "The Police of the Communist Bandits," op. cit., p. 5.

12 See "The Directive on the Establishment of Permanent Population System," (關於建立經常戶口登記制度的指示) (Resolution of the 11th Meeting of the State Council, June 6, 1955), and Article 3, "The Regulation of Population Registration of the People's Republic of China, 1958," (中華人民共和國戶口登記條例), cited from "The Police of the Communist Bandits," op. cit., pp. 3 & 8.

countryside and most rural market towns are left to the informal public security agencies among the masses. There is no police at all.<sup>13</sup> However this does not necessarily mean that local public security in the Chinese countryside is endangered. On the contrary, the public security apparatus at the local level was, according to Barnett, extremely powerful and pervasive in its influence and the police controls of a variety of sorts played a very significant role in the over-all political system.<sup>14</sup>

In county X for example, there was only a total of 147 state cadres on the Public Security Bureau's table of organization.<sup>15</sup> All of the policemen were quartered in the seat of the county, a market town, and a sea port except eleven men who were assigned to work in the communes as special agents throughout the county.<sup>16</sup> (See Table 15)

However, during the period of more than a decade since the Communists fully consolidated power in this area, there had never been any occasion for the local security forces to request any help from the army to maintain local law and order. It is obvious that the effectiveness of the public security

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13 Ibid.


14 Barnett, Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China, op. cit., p. 442.

15 County X is used by Doak Barnett in his Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China. It is probably a seacoast county of Kwangtung Province.

16 Ibid., p. 224.



Table 15: The Distribution of Police Forces of County X in Kwangtung.



\* Number of police.

Source: This table is based on the information revealed by refugees from Kwangtung in Hong Kong published in Barnett's Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China, *op. cit.*, pp. 221-226.

system in County X did not by any means rest solely on these uniformed policemen. According to Barnett:

In each commune there was a political and legal department in charge of security, and in every brigade there was either a security committee (Chih An Pao Wei Wei Yuan Hui, or Chih Pao, for short) or, at the minimum, a single security committeeman. And working under or in close collaboration with all these local cadres dealing with security problems, were the local militia units.<sup>17</sup>

The political and legal department was set up universally down to county level in the party committee.<sup>18</sup> Below the county, it was neither a universal system nor a party organization.<sup>19</sup>

The Security Committee was set up based on the Regulations of the Security Committee of 1952 issued by the State Council. Although it was only a mass organization operating in the basic units such as organization, factories, schools, businesses, streets, and villages,<sup>20</sup> it seemed actually to be

17 Ibid., p. 226.

18 "Study of the Public Security System of the Communist Bandits," (土匪公安特務組織之研究) FCYCTK 2:2 (1960), p. 8.

19 Tan-sui (淡水) Commune in Huiyang County (惠陽縣) of Kwangtung and Shaw-chiang (小江) Commune in Lien-chiang County (連江縣) of Fukien both only had a security committee in 1960 rather than political and legal departments. See Hsiang Ta-kuen, The People's Commune of the Communist Bandits, op. cit., pp. 50-51. However in Shu-sui County (徐水縣) of Hopei, all seven communes had political and legal departments rather than security committees. See Evolution of the People's Commune System of the Communist Bandits in the Past Six Years 六年來共匪人民公社暴政的演变 (Taipei: Military Administration Committee in War Area of the National Defense Council, 1965), Table I. In both cases, they were seen as governmental organizations.

20 See "The Police of the Communist Bandits," op. cit., p. 7. Also see Study of the Public Security Organization and

a branch of local government and was supervised by the public security bureau or the special public security agents.<sup>21</sup> The committee (or the committeeman in case there is no committee) is responsible to mobilize the militia and other mass organization to keep vigilant against spies, fire, theft, and other counterrevolutionary activities. According to the revelation of regugees, the leader of militia in Brigade B of Commune C in County X was concurrently the security committeeman in the early 1960's. This arrangement definitely gave the militia an important role in the maintenance of law and order.<sup>22</sup> "The combination of public security personnel and militia alone," according to Barnett, "provide the Party authorities with what appeared to be sufficient backing to maintain effective, unchallenged political control at the local level."<sup>23</sup>

#### The Militia and Local Political Control

While the militia is seen as an instrument of people's democratic dictatorship, the Party consistently attempts to keep the militia members vigilant in order to control the class

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the People's Police of the Communist Bandits 共匪公安組織及人民警  
警之研究 (Taipei: Yang-ming Shan-chrong Press, 1957), p. 137.

21 "Study of the Public Security System of the Communist Bandits," op. cit., p. 10.

22 See Barnett, Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China, op. cit., p. 390.

23 Ibid., pp. 390-394.

enemies and eliminate them.

As everybody knows, landlords, rich peasants, the rightist capitalists, and the remnant counterrevolutionaries are seen as the class enemies of the working people. "They are only allowed to behave themselves and not to be unruly in word or deed. If they speak or act in an unruly way, they will be promptly stopped and punished."<sup>24</sup> The militia is partly responsible to stop and even to punish them in the countryside.

The militia is told that class struggle also exists in the socialist construction period. The overthrown reactionary ruling class and a handful of untransformed people with the tendency of self-developing capitalism still attempt to restore capitalism at the expense of socialism. So, there is always a struggle between the socialist and the capitalist lines. They should stand for the socialist road and protect and consolidate the collective economy.<sup>25</sup>

For consolidating socialist society, the militia was required to closely cooperate with the public security agencies and the PLA to exterminate bandits, suppress counterrevolutionaries to defend the coast and frontier, and to protect production.<sup>26</sup> (See Table 16)

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24 See Political Teaching Materials of the Militia, op. cit., p. 12. Also see Mao's "On people's Democratic Dictatorship," Selected Works, Vol. 4, op. cit., p. 418.

25 Political Teaching Materials of the Militia, op. cit., p. 13.

26 Study of the Militia System of the Communist Bandits, op. cit., p. 5.

Table 16: The Duties of Militia

Militia	Duties
I. Backbone Militia	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Census registration of population in the countryside.</li> <li>2. Posting sentries and patrolling the countryside.</li> <li>3. Collecting taxes.</li> <li>4. Supervising the transportation of grain and other communal properties.</li> <li>5. Uncovering and arresting the anti-communist elements.</li> <li>6. Implementing the three-fix policy.</li> <li>7. Collecting information and passing messages for the PLA.</li> </ol>
II. Ordinary Militia	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Guarding the air and earth in the countryside.</li> <li>2. Guarding villages and checking harbours and strategic points.</li> <li>3. Assisting the army.</li> <li>4. Transporting grain, military materials, and commune properties.</li> <li>5. Guarding against fires, floods, storms, and air-raids.</li> <li>6. Guarding local agencies, banks, warehouses and communes.</li> <li>7. Other temporary duties of local security.</li> </ol>
III. Reserve Militia*	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Fire fighting, transportation, looking after the wounded, road building, and stretcher bearing.</li> <li>2. Running mess, nurseries, sewing, haircutting, and other light outside work.</li> </ol>

\* Reserve Militia was adopted by some areas before 1961. Since Militia Regulations were promulgated in 1961, the militia system has integrated into backbone and ordinary militia. The reserve militia no longer exists.

Source: The materials are cited from The Study of the Militia System of the Communist Bandits, op. cit., p. 5. I made the Table.

It seems that the militia duties described in Table 16 can be divided into four categories: controlling population, protecting local organization and common property, assisting the army, and patrolling the countryside. Population control and countryside sentry and patrol, among other things, seem to be the key methods of the militia in fulfilling its duties of maintaining law and order.

Travel and movements in China must be registered and approved by the public security men. These controls were strengthened by the food rationing system.<sup>27</sup> The militia in the countryside was responsible for checking dubious people and households at any time; it was also responsible to stand sentry at the important points such as bridges, harbours, granaries, and other public entrances in order to check strangers. The movements of the five bad elements and the overseas Chinese in the coastal provinces, for example, were strictly supervised.

Generally speaking, the regular patrol and sentry, and other duties performed by the militia in Kwangtung have to some extent helped the public security agencies to be successful in halting the political insurgency and sabotage committed by the Nationalists from Hong Kong, Macao, or Taiwan.

According to NFJP, the militia in Kwangtung had

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27 There is a detailed description about population registration and travel restrictions and its procedures in Barnett's Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China, op. cit., pp. 309-399.

annihilated altogether 32 groups of armed secret agents that had landed from the sea or air, and killed or arrested more than 300 secret agents before 1964.<sup>28</sup>

### The Militia in Action

As a coastal province and bordering on Hong Kong and Macao, Kwangtung finds it more difficult to prevent its population from fleeing and is vulnerable to sabotage by external political insurgents. The militia in Kwangtung were therefore, particularly required to heighten their vigilance. In Taishan (台山) County, for example, the militia of Toushan (獨山) Commune had captured fleeing counterrevolutionaries in seven cases.<sup>29</sup> Similar cases in other counties were also reported. Some of these cases have been well publicized in order to arouse the political vigilance and class consciousness of the masses. The militia of Chienp'u (前鋪) Brigade of Lungchiang (龍江) Commune, Huilai (惠來) County, for example, noticed the suspicious actions of two ex-landlords on a summer evening in 1962. Their action in proper time was said to have halted a conspiratorial plot.<sup>30</sup> An well-known case about the arrest of a group of anti-Communist elements was uncovered by a woman militia member. When she was looking for herbal medicine along the beach in

28 See "Militiamen in Kwangtung Have Rendered Outstanding Meritorious Service in the Past Fifteen Years," NFJP, 30 Sept. 1964; SCMP, No. 3330, pp. 4-5.

29 NFJP, July 1962; SCMP, No. 2796, p. 7.

30 SCMP, No. 2803, p. 9.

the early morning, she found several persons were pushing a fishing boat at the shore in the dark. She suspected that they must be bad elements and reported to the nearby militia post. Eventually a group of escaping anti-Communist elements were arrested.<sup>31</sup>

The regular posting of sentries and patrolling of villages and their entrances by the militia were said to some extent to have formed a close net in the broad countryside. It was said that whenever the militia receives a signal, they are able to take effective action within few minutes to meet any urgent situation. The militia unit in Hsiawan (夏灣) No. 1 Brigade, Chienshan (前山) Commune, Chuhai (珠海) County was said to have formed a combat style marked by constant alertness. When the unit received an urgent message from the public security department once at midnight, the battalion commander was able to get his men assembled and rushed to their outposts of observation within five minutes.<sup>32</sup>

While these activities of the militia are impressive, the continual flow of refugees from Kwangtung into Hong Kong indicates that security is far from complete. However, the dubious efficiency of the militia in preventing the flight of

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31 "Cantonese Fishermen and Militiamen Cleverly and Boldly Captured Fleeing Gangsters," CKGNP, 4 August 1962; SCMP, No. 2805, p. 3.

32 "Hsiawan Militia Keeps Vigilant Watch and Guards the Frontier," NFJP, 22 June 1962.



their fellow villagers, does not necessarily apply to the successful discovery of political insurgents who worm their way in from outside.

During the post-1959 years when China was suffering from the worst economic problems, the KMT regime in Taiwan lost no time in waging an espionage war against China in order to create a favorable atmosphere for its military action planned to open a guerrilla corridor in Kwangtung. Alerted to this plot, the militia and masses were reminded to keep vigilance over any political sabotage and spy activity. The public security agencies in Kwangtung publicized many uncovered cases, many of them were said to be discovered by militia due to their high vigilance.

A militiaman of Shat'ouchüch, Pao-an County, for example, helped to uncover a group of seven special agents who had sneaked in from Hong Kong, when he discovered a stub of a foreign-made cigarette when he was grazing cattle one day.<sup>33</sup>

The fishermen militia were even able to play an important role in watching suspicious boats on the sea, when they were fishing. A fishing boat of Aotou People's Commune, Huiyang County, while fishing near Bias Bay at midnight, discovered a suspicious little junk moving on the sea. The leaders of the fishermen who happened to be militia leaders ordered the boat to trace the junk and check it. Consequently, five secret

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33 "Militia in Kwangtung Have Rendered Outstanding meritorious Service," op. cit., p. 6.

agents of the KMT on the junk were arrested and brought to the public security bureau. This fishing boat was later given great publicity and was praised as a "police post on the sea" and "second navy."<sup>34</sup>

Due to the exclusion of non-political offenses from newspapers, it is difficult for us to judge how effective the militia activities in Kwangtung were in protecting the village from ordinary theft, violence, etc. Nevertheless, from the reports leaked in the secret military papers (The Bulletin of Activities), it is obvious that the militia had been very active in this field. However, the occasional failure of the militia to distinguish nonantagonistic contradictions among the people from antagonistic ones, and brutal treatment toward the minor violators of a nonpolitical nature have resulted in a diminution of their power in dealing with ordinary social violence.<sup>35</sup>

## 2. Army of Producers

From the very beginning of the EASM, Mao has defined the militia as a "labour organization." Since then, political leaders in China never failed to point out the production or economic functions of the militia in their speeches. Lin Pao,

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34 "Five Secret Agents from Hong Kong Arrested by Fishermen," TKP, 27 Sept. 1962; SCMP, No. 2840, pp. 1-2.

35 See "Report by Fu Ch'iu-t'ao on the Honan Militia," op. cit., pp. 117-119. Also see "Speech of Yang Ch'eng-wu," op. cit., pp. 138-140.

for example, told the National Militia Conference in 1960 that establishing large numbers of people's militia divisions has an important bearing on speeding up socialist economic construction, because the militia members represent an industrial army among the whole people.<sup>36</sup>

With a similar point of view, Mr. Chao Tzu-yang, the Secretary of the Party Committee of the CPC in Kwangtung, told the Kwangtung 1st Militia Conference in 1960 that the primary task of the militia is to do a good job of production. Any militia training must be coordinated with production efforts and must serve production.<sup>37</sup> General Sung Wei-shih, the PLA responsible officer in Kwangtung Province even made it clearer, saying that to carry out production and construction properly is the end, not the means, of militia work."<sup>38</sup> To him, production and construction are the material basis of militia work. Whenever production and construction are not satisfactorily carried out, there is no way to expect a successful construction of militia.<sup>39</sup>

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36 "Full Text of Marshal Lin Piao's Speech at Closing Session of National People's Militia Representative Conference," NCNA, Peking, 27 April 1960; SCMP, No. 2252, p. 18.

37 "First Representative Conference of Militia of Kwangtung Closed," op. cit., p. 8.

38 Sung Wei-shih (宋維斌), "It Is Necessary to Implement Resolutely the Policy of Taking Production as the Key-note in Militia Work," NFJP, 10 Nov. 1960; SCMP, No. 2402, p. 5.

39 Ibid.

Based on these concepts, the Kwangtung Militia Conference asked its militia members to engage in production actively and implement the Party's general line in order to speed up socialist construction.<sup>40</sup> A similar demand was made in the 2nd Kwangtung Militia Conference in 1963.<sup>41</sup>

There are historical reasons as well as temporary necessities for the Chinese to emphasize the production role of the militia. During the long process of revolution, for example, the CPC implemented the principle of combining labour with military activities among both the militia in the border areas and the PLA. When the Party carried out the policy of collectivization of agriculture and militarization of the peasantry in the countryside, the militia naturally inherited this historical experience and became an important instrument for consolidating the collective economy.

The Experiences of the PLA Production and Construction Corps

For a long time during the Sino-Japanese War, the CPC had been totally blocked in the North Shensi border area by

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40 "First Representative Conference of Militia of Kwangtung Closed," op. cit., p. 9.

41 When the country was called upon by the 10th Plenary Session of the 8th Party Central Committee to implement the policy of "agriculture as the foundation and industry as the leading factor," the Militia Conference in Kwangtung called upon its members to hold to this policy. See Lin Li-ming, "Push the Militia Build-up to a Higher Stage of Development. Opening Speech at the Provincial Conference of Representatives of Militiamen," NFJP, 11 June 1963; SCMP, No. 3030, p. 7.

the KMT and the Japanese and suffered serious economic hardships. Under the slogan of "helping oneself" and "self-sufficiency," the Party and army both were required to commit themselves to production. The 359th Brigade of the 120th Division of the 8th Route Army led by General Wang Chen (王震), for example, was dispatched to Nanniwan (南泥湾), 100 Li (里) south of Yen-an to carry out land-reclamation and production. Within two years of hard work, the army reclaimed 25,000 Mou (亩) of land. This not only made them totally self-sufficient in food but they even had a surplus of grain to supply the border area.<sup>42</sup>

The Nanniwan experience has been greatly publicized in China. The Party has for a long time urged the PLA and the masses to learn this fine tradition of the army.<sup>43</sup> When the CPC demobilized part of its army in 1949 after the close of the civil war, more than half a million of the PLA soldiers were organized as production and construction corps and quartered in Sinkiang, Tibet, Manchuria and other border provinces. The corps in Sinkiang, for example, has reclaimed tens of millions of Mou of wasteland. They have also built farms, factories, reservoirs, canals and electric power

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42 Wang Chen, "Self-sufficiency in Production in Nanniwan Today and in the Past," CKCNP 23 Sept. 1960; SCMP, No. 2366, pp. 6-7.

43 In 1960 the PLA in Kwangtung were mobilized to learn the spirit of Nanniwan in order to increase production and practice economy. See "Spirit of Nanniwan: A Fine Tradition of the Army," YGWP, 8 Sept. 1960; SCMP, No. 2357, p. 8.

stations. Shelter-belts of trees have been grown, roads built, and grain, cotton, vegetables, melons, fruits, and tobacco and other industrial crops planted. Modern industries including iron and steel, building and repairing machinery, refining sugar, weaving, paper making, mining, etc. have also been established.<sup>44</sup> All this could not have been achieved had there not been such a corps with a high level of organization and discipline. According to reports, the CPC has valued these experiences highly and thus continually sent educated city youth and other people to expand the corps.<sup>45</sup>

Since 1960, the CPC has further extended these experiences to the army as well as the masses in other parts of the country. During the hard years after 1959, the PLA were often encouraged to produce their food. The PLA unit in Kwangtung, for example, was urged to inherit and promote the spirit of hard struggle of Nanniwan. It was said that a certain unit had reclaimed over 300 Mou of land and reaped 64,000 cabbages in 1960.<sup>46</sup> In accordance with the campaign of learning from the PLA, there is no need to say that the militia was urged to apply the highly praised PLA

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44 Wang Chen, "Self-sufficiency in Production in Nanniwan Today and in the Past," op. cit., p. 8.

45 FCNP (1967), pp. 768 & 777.

46 Wang Chen, "Inherit and Promote the Spirit of Hard Struggle of Nanniwan," YCWP, 8 Sept. 1960; SCMP, No. 2357, p. 7.

virtue of production to their farm work in order to increase production after agriculture was totally collectivized in 1958.

Communization and the Campaign for Great Coordination

According to John G. Gurley, the output per capita may be raised not only by capital deepening but also by improvements in the quality of the labour supply. Although the labour quality can be raised by improvements in health, by job training programs, and by living conditions in general, the growth of output per capita may come about because of improvements in organization and management techniques — better ways of combining the factors of production and more effective ways of inspiring the labour force to great efforts.<sup>47</sup>

While China was unable to invest a large amount of capital to promote agricultural mechanization in the late 1950s, it directed its effort to improve labour organization and management in order to increase agricultural output. The agricultural collectivization and communization in China were aimed at improving work organization and management in order to direct large amounts of labour for coordinative actions as Hungchi editorial writes: "Militarization of organization (communization) . . . requires the peasants to strengthen

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47 John G. Gurley, "Capitalist and Maoist Economic Development," America's Asia: Dissenting Essays on Asian-American Relations (New York: A Vintage Book, 1971), pp. 328-389.

their organization in the process of fast development of agriculture and requires them to act faster, in a more disciplined way, and more efficiently in order to deploy a large number of labourers in a large area as freely as is the case of workers in factories and the soldiers in the army."<sup>48</sup>

With an unusual insight, John K. Galbraith described the Chinese economy as a coordination of great battalions:

But clearly the Chinese rely heavily — more heavily even than the other socialist economies — on organization. The economic system is a great battalion in which some lead, in which many march and in which there is much emphasis on the soldiers' sense of purpose. . . . The capacity to enlist the energy of many for common purposes is everywhere in use.<sup>49</sup>

Although Galbraith believes that the agricultural collectivization perhaps is, if any, still the weakness of the Chinese economy, the militarization of labour organization is highly valued as the major factor in the success of the Chinese economy at large.<sup>50</sup>

The mass militia has been seen by scholars as an important form and the last stage of militarization of the Chinese peasants. It should be able to play a role in the collective effort of agricultural development, because the members of the militia consist of the most energetic elements of the peasants;

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48 Hungchi 7 (1958), p. 15.

49 John Kenneth Galbraith, A China Passage (New York: New American Library, 1973), p. 105.

50 Ibid., p. 100.



they are actually the core of the Chinese labour force on the agricultural front. As General Fu Ch'iu-t'ao said: "When there is no attack from the external enemy, the militia will march with the great coordinative spirit of communists against nature, and march for industrialization and urbanization of the rural areas, promotion of socialist construction, and transformation (of China) into a Communist society."<sup>51</sup> He leaves no doubt that the EASM in the form of militia organization is aimed at establishing a socialist industrial army for agriculture based on democratic centralism.<sup>52</sup> With a similar point of view, General Lo said, when the militia division is established, "it will be very convenient for implementing great coordination" and "large corps campaigns," when it marches against nature.<sup>53</sup>

Even before Chairman Mao called for the establishment of militia divisions in September 1958, some local political leaders in Kwangtung had been using the form of militia divisions to solve their organizational problems due to the mobilization of large numbers of peasants in building irrigation systems and other projects.<sup>54</sup>

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51 Fu Ch'iu-t'ao, "Everybody A Soldier," op. cit., p. 23.

52 "The People's Militia: A Favorite System of Our People," op. cit., p. 31.

53 Lo Jui-ch'ing, "Set Up Large Numbers of Militia Divisions," op. cit., p. 2.

54 Ch'eng Yi, "The Production Army of the People's Commune — The Story of the Birth and Growth of the Tawan Militia Division," NCNA, Peking, 27 April 1960; SCMP, No. 2251, pp. 2-6.

The Tawan Militia Division: A Pioneer Unit in Kwangtung

Tawan is a commune in Kwangtung located on the fringe of the Nanling Mountains. The land was very poor and constantly beset by flood and drought. To change the poor and backward features, the Party Committee in Tawan decided to carry out an irrigation project on Polo River in late 1957. When the decision was announced, it was said that the inhabitants bubbled with enthusiasm. On New Year's Day 1958, some 15,000 able-bodied men beat their gongs and drums and pledged their allegiance to the cause. Red banners fluttered everywhere along the work site and the water conservancy battle was on.

Due to the lack of organization and division of labour, the work was in a state of chaos and inefficiency. Several days later, the Party leader concluded that unless he organized the masses along the structure of an army, he would not be able to make any progress. He was once a militia company commander, so he intended to organize the masses by means of militia organization. After he got this idea accepted by the Party Committee and endorsed by the veteran militia members and demobilized soldiers, he organized the masses into 37 militia companies. After reorganization, the office of the water conservancy committee was changed to the Water Conservancy Command Headquarters. 27 companies were dispatched to open up ditches, 5 were assigned the job of damming up the river and 5 were ordered to rear services of supply. At the same time, 7 branch headquarters were set up to execute the orders from the

command headquarters and to supervise the companies. 57 work sheds and kitchens were erected on the work site and life became collectivized.

It was said that due to this arrangement the water conservancy was able to be completed within 60 days and the cost was cut down by 69 per cent; it was also said that this project was the most difficult and was last to be started among the six major projects in the county but was the first completed, the best built, and cost the least.<sup>55</sup>

This story helps us to realize that while an unorganized large mass may have difficulty taking coordinated action, the militia system helped to organize the mobilized masses and promoted economic development. Meanwhile, the production or economic activity in this particular case was the end of militia organization (as General Sung Wei-shih said) rather than the means.

The Tawan militia division continued to function after the communization in the same year. It was committed to land reclamation, manure collection, silkworm breeding, and other types of industrial production (see Table 17).

#### The Production Roles of the Kwangtung Militia

The Tawan militia division probably was one of the model units in China. It was well publicized by the Chinese

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55 The whole story is paraphrased from Ch'eng Yi's "The Production Army of the People's Commune," op. cit., pp. 1-2.

Table 17: The Leading Roles of the Tawan Militia in Production from 1958 to 1959

Unit	Year	Land Reclamation		Building Water Conservation		Promoting Production	
		Militia Mobilized	Work Completed	Militia Mobilized	Work Completed	Militia Mobilized	Work Completed
Tawan Commune	1958			15,000	Within 60 days finished the work which was formally planned as 120 days.		
Tawan Commune	1959	15 companies	Improved 7,300 <u>mow</u> land				
Kutao Brigade		102 militia	Improved 225 <u>mow</u> land				
Chungpu Brigade	1959					a platoon	Increased production to 93% (silk).
Chipeng Brigade	1959					a battalion	Breeding 3,200 hogs within 3 months.
Hsiao-lien Brigade	1959					a company	Increased output of mine to 15 tons a day.
Tawan Commune	1959					a Battalion	Building an electric station

mass media. Other units might not be as prominent. Therefore, their activities were not exposed as fully as those of the Tawan unit, but some of them still carried on significant economic activities in Kwangtung Province.

Militia members are the hard core of any labour force in the work team, their production activities as individual commune members being very important. Nevertheless, the activities explored in this study are exclusively limited to those of militia units, which are more or less limited to the highly coordinated actions of a large group of people.

Furthermore, the production activities of the militia are more significant in labour-intensive projects than those of capital-intensive ones. The significant economic activities of the Tawan militia, for example, were water conservancy building, land reclamation, mining, and manure collecting. None of them are capital-intensive projects. (See Table 17)

Land Reclamation: Although China is a large country its arable land area is very small. According to Victor Petrov, only 11 per cent of China's total area is under cultivation.<sup>56</sup> However, it is said that another 10 per cent of the total territory could be arable land, suitable for plowing, if it had sufficient rainfall or a water supply for irrigation.<sup>57</sup>

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56 Victor P. Petrov, China: Emerging World Power (Princeton, N.J.: Nostrand, 1967), p. 9.

57 Ibid.

China has been experiencing a shortage of farm land for a long time. The peasants are often described as hungry for land. To increase agricultural output reclamation of new land is often seen as an effective measure. Since 1949, the Chinese government has paid much more attention than any preceding regime to opening new land. The Sinkiang production and construction corps, for example, had reclaimed more than 10 million Mou of irrigated land before 1966.<sup>58</sup> Similar efforts and achievements in other areas were said to be very impressive, too.<sup>59</sup> The sources on the reclamation of new land in Kwangtung by the militia were incomplete. However, based on the few cases available, the militia organization in reclaiming land in Kwangtung was still impressive. (See Table 18) Tawan militia division, for example, improved 7,300 Mou land with its 15 companies in 1959. Shihshih Brigade of Countien Commune reclaimed 652 Mou of land with a militia company; P'aotai Brigade opened 868 Mou of land with a militia battalion. (See Table 18)

Although it is impossible for us to estimate the total acreage of new land opened by the militia in Kwangtung from these limited cases, it is fairly clear that the achievement in the several areas mentioned is quite impressive.

Manure Collecting: In increasing agricultural output

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58 FCNP (1966), p. 776.

59 See Petrov, China: Emerging World Power, op. cit., p. 12. It is said that in Honan 815,000 acres of land were reclaimed from the deserts.

Table 18: The Leading Roles of the Kwangtung Militia in Land Reclamation

Unit	Militia Mobilized	Time	Work Completed	Sources
Kutao B.* Tawan C.* Yingtak County	103 militia	1959	Improved 225 <u>Mou</u> land	<u>SCMP</u> No. 2251 p. 4
Tawan Commune Yingtak County	15 companies	1959	7,300 <u>Mou</u> land	<u>SCMP</u> No. 2251 p. 4
Shihshih B. Coutien C. Chaoyang County	a company	1961	Reclaimed 652 <u>Mou</u> wasteland	<u>SCMP</u> No. 2402 p. 3
P'aotai B. Nanhai C. Chaoyang County	a battalion	1961	Reclaimed 868 <u>Mou</u> land	<u>SCMP</u> No. 2481 p. 6

\* B = Brigade C = Commune

fertilizer is as important as water supply. Chemical fertilizer in China was almost non-existent before 1949. China started to produce and import fertilizers since then, but the supply was (and still is) far from adequate in the 1950s.<sup>60</sup> Therefore, China still has to rely on the extensive use of farm manure.<sup>61</sup> In getting the necessary manure, the CPC at the local level often mobilized the peasants to collect various types of manure. (See Table 19)

The P'aot'ai Brigade, Nanhai Commune, for example,

<sup>60</sup> In 1960, the total production of chemical fertilizer in China was 2.8 million tons. See Petrov, China: Emerging World Power, op. cit., p. 28. The minimal need of fertilizer is said to be no less than 30 million tons.

<sup>61</sup> JMJP, Peking, 21 August 1962.

Table 19: The Leading Role of the Kwangtung Militia in the Campaign of Collecting Manure

Unit	No. of Militia	No. of Day	Kind of Manure	Method of Achieving the Goal	Amount	Source
P'aot'ai B.* Nanhai C.* Tienpai County	300	10	Sea & green fertilizers	Going to an island and the shore to collect it.	120,000 piculs of sea & green manure, and 3,700 piculs of oyster shell ashes.	SCMP No. 2481 p. 7
Ta-ao B. Fengchiang C. Jaop'ing County	33	12	Sea & Miscellaneous manures	Going to sea and mountain to collect.	22,000 piculs	SCMP No. 2481 p. 7
Shihch'iao B. Shihkou C. Kuangssu County	Probably one battalion	-	-	-	110 piculs per <u>mow</u>	SCMP No. 2481 p. 7
Shihch'iao B. Shihkou C. Kuangssu County	a platoon	3	Pond manure	Draining its water and getting the manure.	13,000 piculs	SCMP No. 2481 p. 7
No. 1 Team Yanghsu B. Nan-ao County	23 militia women	-	miscellaneous	Collecting in the fields and along the shore.	20,000 piculs	SCMP No. 2703 p. 5

\* B = Brigade  
C = Commune



collected 120,000 piculs of sea and green manure with 300 militia men in 10 days. Shihch'iao Brigade, Shihkou Commune was able to supply 110 piculs of manure per Mou for their land with one militia battalion. Some of these activities by militia units involved considerable difficulties. They sometimes, for example, must go 10 miles away to the sea to collect sea weed and oyster shells. With their coordinated action of large numbers of people, the militia's achievement was fairly impressive.

Water Conservancy Building: If the Chinese communication has done any important thing in increasing agricultural output, it must be the building of irrigation systems and water conservancy projects. Almost all visitors to China agreed on this fact. Most of these achievements were accomplished primarily by means of large scale coordination of militarized peasants rather than by machines.

The Kwangtung Provincial Government, for example, started 551 big water conservancy projects in 1958. Instead of investing any capital, the government mobilized a large number of peasants to carry out coordinated action with their hands and hoes.<sup>62</sup>

The role of the militia in this campaign was undoubtedly very important. Unfortunately, their activities in this aspect in Kwangtung were not reported in detail except the case of the Tawan militia division, mentioned above. In reporting the

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62 "Kwangtung Masses Build Big Water Conservancy Projects," NCNA, English, 29 Nov. 1958; SCMP, No. 1909, p. 25.

militia achievements on the economic front, the NFJP once mentioned that "they (militia) fought at work sites through day and night, blocking rivers and streams, digging ponds and ditches, sinking wells, conducting water to irrigate the fields, and making positive contributions toward overcoming the drought."<sup>63</sup> It seems that this report was not limited to the Tawan case only but applied elsewhere as well.

The militia activities in other provinces indicated that they may have been more active than the Kwangtung Militia. 8-million Shantung militia, for example, set up 160 water conservancy construction regiments in 1960. They completed 44 large and medium-sized water conservancy projects and more than 240,000 small ones, enlarging irrigated acreage in Shantung by 40 million Mou.<sup>64</sup>

All of these cases have to some extent indicated that the militia organization had provided a proper framework for the Chinese peasants in the 1960s to organize their labour force in order to carry out coordinated action for construction.

### 3. Militia and the Reserve Service

Since the CPC developed its first militia system in the Kiangsi-Hunan area, a three-ladder military recruitment

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63 "Militiamen in Kwangtung Produced Remarkable Results on All Fronts in Past Year," NFJP, 3 Oct. 1963; SCMP, No. 3130, p. 11.

64 Lo Jui-ch'ing, "Set Up Large Numbers of Militia Divisions," op. cit., p. 5.

has often been used to expand the PLA in the revolutionary wars.<sup>65</sup> During the long revolutionary wars, the backbone militia in the border areas enabled the PLA to recruit in a continuous stream large numbers of soldiers who had a high political consciousness and had undergone a certain amount of military training. This system guaranteed the eventual victory of the Communists.<sup>66</sup>

When Chairman Mao called for the establishment of militia divisions, these historical experiences naturally helped the Chinese leaders to emphasize the military roles of the militia.

"To turn the whole nation into soldiers," said General Fu, "it can build up reserve forces with a high degree of political consciousness and military training. It can foster tens of millions of talented reserve officers and fundamentally resolve the contradictions between a small-sized army in peace time and a large-sized army required in war time."<sup>67</sup>

With a similar point of view, General Lo Jui-ch'ing once said that a great reserve force is an important factor

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65 The three-ladder system was the Red Guard, the local Red Army, and the regular Red Army. The expansion of the Regular Army was along this line. See Mao Tse-tung, "A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire," Selected Works, Vol. 1, op. cit., p. 118.

66 Liu Yùn-cheng, "The Militia in the People's Revolutionary Wars of China," op. cit., p. 7. Also see, "Great Significance of Making Everybody A Soldier," JMJP, 18 Nov. 1964; SCMP, No. 3350, pp. 2-3. Also see Chen Po-chun, "Study the Thought of Comrade Mao Tse-tung on People's War," op. cit., p. 8.

67 Fu Ch'iu-t'ao, "The People's Militia;" op. cit., p. 29.

toward winning or losing a war, while intensifying "the construction of our People's Liberation Army, we should develop mass armed forces, organize large numbers of militia divisions, establish a nation-wide defense network, and keep a colossal reserve force."<sup>68</sup>

These opinions of the military leaders were later incorporated into the regulations of the militia. In Article one, the regulation reads: "It (the militia) is an able aids, as well as a powerful reserve force, of the Chinese People's Liberation Army."

When Chinese leaders appraise the military role of the militia primarily based on their historical experience, western scholars tend to question the value of the militia system in the nuclear era. For example, both Ralph Powell and Stuart Schram thought that Mao's military doctrine was outmoded in the nuclear era.<sup>69</sup>

Whether the militia system can provide a useful reserve force in the nuclear age partly depends on the validity of Chinese strategy in a nuclear war, and partly on the relationship between the militia system and the reserve system.

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68 Lo Jui-ch'ing, "Set Up Large Numbers of Militia Division," op. cit., p. 4.

69 Powell, "Everyone A Soldier," op. cit., p. 109. Also, Schram, The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung, op. cit., pp. 129-130.

The Militia Role in a Nuclear War

Since the United States Air Force B-29 dropped two atomic bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan in August 1945, a nuclear era has emerged. It changed the military thought and war preparation of states overnight.

After the close of the Second World War, the concept of total war which primarily meant nuclear war dominated the minds of military strategists of the western world, above all, those of the Americans. "In general war," as Klaus Knorr writes, "the major nuclear powers would employ strategic weapons against one another."<sup>70</sup>

Although the atomic explosion by the Soviet Union in Sept. 1949 ended the United States' monopoly of atomic weapons, the continual development of thermonuclear weapons made the concept of general war an unthinkable excess. Even the fact of the Korean War, which was successfully managed in a limited area without using nuclear weapons, failed to change this concept immediately. From John F. Dulles' "massive retaliation"<sup>71</sup> policy to Robert McNamara's "flexible response" and "controlled

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<sup>70</sup> Klaus Knorr and Thornton Read, Limited Strategic War (New York: Praeger, 1962), p. 4.

<sup>71</sup> Dulles explained his policy as stopping the potential aggressors by nuclear retaliation. There would be no shelter, no border limit and no means of restraint, if the aggressors dared to start any war again. Cited from Richard Fryklund, 100 Million Lives (New York: Mac-Million, 1962), p. 7.

response",<sup>72</sup> the American strategists only accepted the strategy of a non-nuclear limited war in 1961.

When the concept of general war was dominant in the minds of the western strategists, the CPC's military struggle against the KMT primarily remained in "millet plus rifles."<sup>73</sup> So when Mao's statement was made public that "the atom bomb is only a paper tiger; . . . it looks terrible but in fact it is'nt,"<sup>74</sup> he was ridiculed by the strategists in the western world. However, Mao's statement not only emphasized the "paper tiger" but also "the determinant factor of war" — people. Mao did not ignore the destructive power of nuclear weapons. He realized that "the atom bomb is a weapon of mass slaughter." Nevertheless, he insisted that "the outcome of a war is decided by the people, not by one or two new types of weapons."<sup>75</sup>

While Mao's emphasis on the roles of people in war was based on a widely accepted Chinese traditional military philosophy, its temporary value was designed to write off the psychological threat caused by the military gap between the PLA and the KMT and the U.S.A.<sup>76</sup> Indeed, it would be self-defeating

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72 Cited from Albert Legault, Deterrence and the Atlantic Alliance, trans. Archibald Day (Toronto: the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1966), p. 52.

73 Mao Tse-tung, "Talks with the American Correspondent Anna Louise Strong," Selected Work, Vol. 4, op. cit., p. 101.

74 Ibid.

75 Ibid.

76 Hyobom Pak, "China's Militia and Mao Tse-tung's People's War," Orbid 11:1 (April 1967), pp. 290-291.

to exaggerate the destructive power of nuclear weapons when one does not have them yet.

When the Soviet Union sent its first man-made satellite into orbit in 1957, Mao became so optimistic that he even stated: "it was no longer the West Wind that prevailed over the East Wind, But the East Wind that prevailed over the West Wind."<sup>77</sup> The psychological pressure caused by the American nuclear weapon on the Chinese leader seemed suddenly to be removed by the Soviet's new achievement in nuclear weapons.

When Mao talked about the east wind prevailing over the west wind in Moscow, it made sense only on the assumption of close integration of Sino-Soviet military command and maximum joint use of Soviet military technology.<sup>78</sup>

When Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated after Mao's return from Moscow in 1957, the optimistic perspective on the prevailing east wind suddenly disappeared again. Instead, China was dangerously isolated from both the support of her Soviet ally and the western powers.<sup>79</sup> Against this situation, Mao called for the establishment of militia divisions and the implementation of the EASM.

When Lin Piao lectured to the National Militia Conference

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77 Mao Tse-tung, "The East Wind Prevails over the West Wind," SCMP, No. 1656, p. 1; also see Mao's "We Must Not Fear Nuclear War," Peking Review 33 (1963), pp. 6-7.

78 Snow, Red China Today, op. cit., p. 604.

79 Ibid., p. 605.

in 1960, he told the militia delegates that the imperialists were preparing for large-scale guided-missile and nuclear warfare. To deal with such a war, the most important thing for China to do was to mobilize and rely on the people to carry out a people's war.<sup>80</sup> Lin did not mislead his audiences with any illusions. He said "We fully realize men are the decisive factor in war; we also realize the important role modern technology plays in war. We must therefore lose no time in vigorously improving the technical equipment of our forces and in strengthening the modernization of our forces."<sup>81</sup>

It is obvious that Lin wanted to fill the military gap between China and its enemies by people's war rather than to match them in nuclear weapons. In other words, before being able to rely on nuclear power to contend with the imperialists, China must defend her country with whatever she has. As General Yeh Chien-ying (葉劍英) said: "In the light of conditions prevailing in our country, if war breaks out in the next three or five years, we shall still have to rely upon the weapons now in our hands. . . . On the other side, we should make great efforts toward developing super-weapons. This is to walk on two legs."<sup>82</sup>

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80 "Lin Piao's Speech at the Closing Session of National Militia Conference," op. cit., p. 17.

81 Ibid.

82 "Speech of Comrade Yeh Chien-ying at the Training Meeting of the Military Affairs Commission," Bulletin of Activities, No. 10, in The Politics of the Chinese Red Army, op. cit., p. 253.



In facing a possible nuclear attack, the Chinese leaders tend to believe that China cannot be defeated by a long-range nuclear strike without an invasion of the area by ground forces.<sup>83</sup> If the enemy refuses to land ground forces against China on her territory, it is assumed that the Communist regime could survive, despite nuclear strikes, and rule a damaged but still viable country.<sup>84</sup> Alternatively, if a land invasion is launched against China after an initial nuclear strike, the enemy would be heavily defeated by a Maoist People's War — a protracted broken-back war supported by the aroused masses of the people and fought by the large regular forces, local forces, and a massive militia developed under the concept of EASM.<sup>85</sup>

Like Powell<sup>86</sup> and Schram,<sup>87</sup> one may not agree with the Chinese defense doctrine and believe that Chinese strategy in the nuclear era is outmoded, irrational, and invalid. However, one cannot help but agree that the Chinese strategy is realistic. Unless the Chinese leaders were ready to surrender their country to the outside threat, they had to fight with whatever they had.

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83 Ibid.

84 Powell, "Maoist Military Doctrines," Asian Survey 7:4 (April 1968), p. 246.

85 CFCP editorial, 1 August 1965. Also see, Liu Yun-cheng, "The Role of People's Militia," Peking Review (Feb. 5, 1965), p. 20.

86 Powell, "Everyone A Soldier," op. cit., p. 111. Also "Maoist Military Doctrines," op. cit., p. 244.

87 Schram, The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung, op. cit., pp. 129-130.

Based on this realization, the strategical value of the militia in the whole concept of Chinese national defense is likely to be affirmed, at least during those years when China did not yet have nuclear weapons. Later, when China possessed her own nuclear weapons, the proliferation of nuclear weapons has almost neutralized them. This development may have convinced the Chinese leaders that the mass militia system should be maintained, even if not solely for military purposes.

The Integration of the Militia System and the Reserve Service

Since the establishment of the Chinese Red Army in 1927, the Chinese Communists had continually implemented a voluntary military system. The army recruits were brought in by the local party organizations from Red Guard or militia organizations through a process of mobilization. The three-ladder system of recruitment established in the Kiangsi-Hunan area continually functioned until the close of the Korean War.<sup>88</sup>

After the close of the civil war in 1949, the Common Programme required the nation to prepare for the enforcement of an obligatory military service system at the appropriate moment. The militia system was at the same time affirmed as the proper organization to lay the foundation for national mobilization.<sup>89</sup>

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88 Ting Li (丁勵), The Militia System of the Chinese Communists (Hong Kong: Union Press, 1954), p. 69. Also see Gittings, The Role of the Chinese Army, op. cit., pp. 63 & 206.

89 Common Programme, Article 23.

After the Korean War, the CPC began to work for a Conscription Law. It was often said that the implementation of a conscription system will give the country the following advantages: First of all, an obligatory service system was thought to be logical and fair. Short-term conscription would spread the load more evenly, avoid permanent hardship to army dependents and the consequent economic drain on the state. It would also help to keep the army always young and healthy.<sup>90</sup> Secondly, conscription can help the army to recruit the necessary talent in order to carry out military modernization. Meanwhile, the modern equipment and technical training of the army are also helpful in spreading new techniques to the countryside through annual conscription and demobilization. This helps economic development, as well.<sup>91</sup> Thirdly, conscription helps to solve the contradiction between maintaining a small army in peace time and having a large force during war-time. The conscription also helps to cut down military expenditures. This makes it possible to direct money and manpower to socialist construction in peace time.<sup>92</sup>

According to the Conscription Law, recruits discharged from the obligatory service were classified as Class I,

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90 Gittings, The Role of the Chinese Army, op. cit., p. 151.

91 Ibid. Also, "How Will Conscription Be Carried Out This Year," RFJP, 28 Nov. 1959; SCMP, No. 2169, p. 35.

92 Ibid.

Reserve Service. Citizens liable to conscription who are not called up for active service in peace time, citizens liable to conscription who are exempted from active service in peace time, and women aged eighteen to forty who have registered themselves for reserve service shall enter into Class II, Reserve Service.<sup>93</sup> Both Class I and Class II of reserve service are further divided into two grades. Grade I shall include those reserve servicemen thirty years of age and under; Grade II shall include those reserve servicemen forty years of age and under.<sup>94</sup> When the Conscription Law was introduced in 1955, it did not refer to the integration of the reserve system and annual conscription into the militia system. It only specified that the people's militiamen will continue to maintain local security and protect production and construction.<sup>95</sup>

Furthermore, there was no evidence to indicate that annual conscription was exclusively limited to militia members.

A "provincial regulation on handling of recruits discharged from obligatory military service" promulgated by the State Council in middle of 1955 indicated that the demobilized recruits were basically incorporated in the

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93 See Conscription Law, Articles 26 & 27.

94 Ibid., Article 29.

95 Ibid., Article 57.

96 See NCNA, 18 May 1955, in SCMP, No.1780.

militia organization's reserve force.<sup>96</sup> However, an important change of the militia's role took place as late as 1957 when P'eng Teh-huai, the Minister of National Defense, formally declared that the country was preparing to integrate reserves into the militia organization in order to solve the contradiction between maintaining a small army in peace time and having a large one in war.<sup>97</sup> Since promulgation of the Militia Regulations in 1961, this system was explicitly described in Article 6; the annually discharged obligatory conscripts and retired soldiers were required to be incorporated into the militia organization as soon as possible.

Since the integration of the reserve service system into the militia in 1957, the reserve servicemen of Grade I of both Class I and Class II have been incorporated into the backbone militia units. While the Grade II reserve servicemen or servicewomen of both Class I and Class II have been incorporated into the ordinary militia units.<sup>98</sup> (See Table 20.) However, before the implementation of the EASM, there was no evidence to show that the recruits were exclusively from the militia members until 1958, when the militia organization included (theoretically at least) almost all of the able-bodied men and women. The qualifications of the militia,

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97 See Teng Ting-yuan (滕定章), "Study of the Military Function of the People's Commune of the Communist Bandits," (《土匪人民公社在军事上之研究》) TCYCLWC 3, p. 105. Also see FCNP (1957), p. 704.

98 Ibid.

Table 20: The Relationship between the Militia Organization and the Reserve Service System

		Reserve Service	
		Class I	Class II
Militia System	Backbone	Grade I	Grade I
	Ordinary	Grade II	Grade II

above all the backbone militia, were almost identical with those of the eligible military conscripts. Most 5-kind elements, for example, are disqualified from taking part in both militia and military service.<sup>99</sup> The eligible age for conscription is two years higher than that of the backbone militia. While only a selective group of women are qualified for service, all women in the eligible age group are required to take part in the militia. (See Table 21)

Table 21: Comparison of Age and Sex between Militia Members and Reserve Servicemen

		Reserve		Militia		
		Age	Sex	Age	Sex	
Grade I		18-30 (Class II)	M	16-30**	M	Backbone
		Below 30 (Class I)	M	16-25	F	
Grade II		31-40 (Class I)	M	31-45	M	Ordinary
		31-40 (Class II)	M	26-35	F	
		18-40 (Class II)	F	16-30	M*	
				16-25	F*	

<sup>99</sup> See Article 3 of the Conscription Law and Article 6 of the Militia Regulations.

\* Those who are disqualified to join the backbone militia.  
See Article 6, Militia Regulations.

\*\* Demobilized recruits are permitted to stay as backbone militia until 40 years old. See Article 6, Militia Regulations.

Source: Article 6 of Militia Regulations and Articles 26 and 29 of the Conscription Law.

Since 1958 the militia, above all the backbone militia, has become the only source of recruitment. Conscription in Kwangtung in 1959, for example, was limited to the backbone militia men who reached the full age of 18, 19, and 20 years old.<sup>100</sup> Since then a "cyclical military conscription system"<sup>101</sup> has been fully developed. The conscripts are recruited from the militia and would return to the militia after discharge from active service.

#### Military Training of the Militia

A successful reserve system should not only provide an army with the needed manpower but also provide it promptly with skillful soldiers in order to be able to join in fighting immediately after they are recruited. To achieve this goal, the reserve system should be able to carry out a proper training program for its reserve servicemen in peace time. Otherwise it will not be able to meet emergencies or crises. From the available materials it is difficult for us to judge the training

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100 "How Will Conscription Be Carried Out This Year?" op. cit., p. 33.

101 See Gittings, The Role of the Chinese Army, op.cit., p. 208.

program of the Chinese reserve force before 1957. However, since integration of the reserve system with the militia in 1957, the training of both are identical. According to the Militia Regulations, systematic political education and military training shall be carried out for militia members.<sup>102</sup>

Political education in China is always a top priority. It not only relates to the Party's propaganda but also its effort to transform and remould Chinese peasants. We shall deal with it in next chapter.

The militia is a labour organization, the primary role of its members being production. So the militia military training is often required to be coordinated with production. Training should not affect production.<sup>103</sup> General Lo Jui-ching suggested that militia activities should be based on the principle of "stitching a seam that has been undone." Applying this to training, it means that any training program must be carried out in leisure time.<sup>104</sup> Mr. Chao Tsu-yang even told the Kwangtung Militia Conference that production is the material foundation of militia work. Any training must combine with it.<sup>105</sup> Based on these considerations, the Chinese developed their

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102 Militia Regulations, Article 20.

103 Teng K'e-ming, "Report to Kiangsi's Militia Work Conference," op. cit., p. 42.

104 "We Must Do Good Substantial Work in Building Up the Militia," op. cit., p. 562.

105 "First Representative Conference of Militia of Kwangtung," op. cit., p. 8.



unique training method and programs.

The Training of the Cadres: Militia training can be divided into training of cadres and of militia members. Cadres' training is usually planned and carried out in coordination with the Department of People's Armed Forces of counties, cities, and communes. Collective training is usually "carried out in the form of a conference. Such a conference should be held several times a year, and each should last for about one week."<sup>106</sup> The training of cadres below company level is usually conducted by communes; those of companies and battalions by counties.<sup>107</sup> There is no indication about the training of higher cadres. It is conceivable that military regions and higher government may be responsible for the training of these cadres. Militia cadres of Kwangtung Province held collective training class in many counties in 1962. Cadres who accepted their training in counties were sent down to lower levels to pass on their experiences to those at lower levels.<sup>108</sup>

Training programs for cadres usually concentrate on studying strategies both of the Chinese and the enemies, teaching techniques, and research conducting, etc. Cadres' training in Huachou County, Kwangtung, for example, required

106 Teng K'e-ming, "Report to Kiangsi's Militia Work Conference," op. cit., p. 43

107 Ibid. However, occasionally communes also handle training classes which include higher cadres. See P'an Chu-siu, "Party Committee of Haishan Commune, Jaop'ing Hsien, Develops the Role of Militiamen in Production," NFJP, 10 Nov. 1960; SCMP, No. 2402, p. 4.

108 "Fostering and Training of Militia Cadres in Enping (Yunping), Shaokuan (Shiukwan) and Other Localities,"

the trainees to study the general strategy of U.S. imperialism and anti-infiltration and anti-commando tactics in accordance with local geographical features. At the lower levels, cadres were taught the tactics of coping with parachuted agents and of maintaining social order, and work methods.<sup>109</sup> When collective training is held, military leaders of military regions were often invited to give lectures and other instructions.<sup>110</sup>

Training of the Rank and File: Under the EASM, militia organization contains almost all able-bodied men and women. As it is not supposed to interrupt production, military training of the rank and file is much more complicated than that of the cadres. The earliest systematic discussion of militia training at provincial level in 1958 was by General Liu Hsien-sheng and Teng K'e-ming. Their opinions almost became the blueprint of militia training. According to General Liu, the arrangement of time, tasks, methods and demands of militia training must be based on the following principles: Labour should be combined with military affairs, and training should be scattered and not centralized. Work sites should be turned into drill grounds and classrooms, so as to carry out training and production simultaneously. In

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NFJP, 30 Oct. 1962; SCMP, No. 2914, pp. 9-10.

109 Ibid.

110 Kao Feng (高鋒), "Shiuhing Sub-Military District Holds Training Class for Cadres," NFJP, 11 Aug. 1962; SCMP, No. 2817, p. 10.

the first stage, the training was required to be carried out one or two hours a day for about two months. Then, it will be turned into a regular spare-time activity.<sup>111</sup>

General Teng's discussion basically concentrated on the same question as Liu did but put more emphasis on the effective use of opportunities to carry out training. The training, according to Teng, should be carried out on the following occasions:

A. Training should be coordinated with the campaign to eliminate wild beasts. The militia can practise shooting and make use of the terrain.

B. When the militiamen are building highways and water conservancy projects, training should be carried out during spare-time taking the company as the basic unit.

C. Training should also proceed in coordination with the military parades on several major festivals each year such as May Day, August 1, and October 1.<sup>112</sup>

Teng did not specify the time schedule but generally stated that the training plan should be a "long-term" one.<sup>113</sup>

Summing up the various discussions, the militia military training forms can be simplified as follows.

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111 Liu Hsien-sheng, "Let the Whole People Be Armed to Defend the Homeland, op. cit., p. 8.

112 Teng K'e-ming, "Report to Kiangsi's Militia Work Conference," op. cit., pp. 43-44.

113 Ibid., p. 44.

1. Centralized training.
2. Scattered training.
3. Centralized teaching but scattered practice.
4. Scattered in large units but centralized in small ones.
5. Scattered in long-term training but centralized in short term training.
6. Mobile training.
7. Delegating to military regions to give training.
8. Clubs.
9. Using movies, drama, exhibitions and radio.
10. Contests of strength, joint-training, and sport.<sup>114</sup>

The militia spent most of 1958 and 1959 in enrolling new members under the EASM. Systematic training only started in 1960. According to reports from the NFJP, the Kwangtung militia organization raised a high tide of military training in 1960. The trainees reached 1,850,000 which was three times higher than during the preceding year, but it was still only 12.3 per cent of the total enrolled militia in the province (the total enrollment of militia in 1958 was 15 million). Their training was primarily limited to infantrymen. Some of them might have received other kinds of training.<sup>115</sup>

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114 See Study of the Militia System of the Communist Bandits, op. cit., p. 7. The items 8 & 9 are more often used in political education than military ones.

115 "New Situation Appears in Training of Militiamen in Kwangtung," NFJP, 29 March 1960; SCMP, No. 2280, p. 2.

The natural disasters since 1960 almost shattered the militia organization and stopped most activities except struggling against flood and drought. The military training was gradually restored in 1962 after the natural disasters were over and the militia organization was reorganized.

Reports from different parts of the country revealed that military training was carried out on a much larger scale in cities as well as in the countryside. Military encampments and military sports competitions for the militia were held here and there.<sup>116</sup>

The prevalent forms of militia training in Kwangtung Province were varied. They included military camping, sports, shooting practice, military reviews or parades, mutual teaching, and combining training with work, etc. (see Table 22).

Table 22: Forms, Methods, and Subjects of Military Training of the Kwangtung Militia from 1958 to 1964

name	Method	Subject	Units	Source
Military camping	Students of college and middle school, employees, workers of government and factories in cities, or communes camping in the military bases, commune, or on the mountains in the summer.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Concept of national defense.</li> <li>2. Military exercises such as rifle-shooting, emergency mobilization, drilling at night.</li> <li>3. National defense-physical activities.</li> <li>4. Wireless operation.</li> <li>5. Motorcycling, gliding and parachuting.</li> <li>6. Quick marching.</li> <li>7. Searching for, rounding up and capturing enemy secret agents.</li> </ol>	Various counties and municipalities	<u>SCMP</u> , No. 2412, pp. 1-2; No. 3281, pp. 4-5; No. 2803, p. 8; No. 2824, p. 4.

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Military sports	The militia units at the basic level hold military sports activities in their spare time. The higher governments hold military sports regularly.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>8. Grenade throwing, bayonet-fighting.</li> <li>9. Using Terrain.</li> <li>1. Team marksmanship for men and women.</li> <li>2. Grenade throwing.</li> <li>3. Bayonet fighting.</li> <li>4. Basketball and volleyball matches.</li> <li>5. Swimming with arms.</li> <li>6. Water-borne military activities such as shooting on boats, rowing, boarding sampans.</li> <li>7. Judging wind power, the speed of current.</li> </ol>	Canton, P'unyu County, and other counties	SCMP, No. 2935, p. 4; No. 3248, pp. 11-12; No. 3444, p. 24.
Practising shooting	Various units of militia hold shooting practise with different weapons.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Rifle.</li> <li>2. Mortar.</li> <li>3. anti-aircraft gun.</li> </ol>	Nan-ao Island and many counties and administrative districts.	SCMP, No. 3460, pp. 5-6; No. 2851, p. 9.
Military reviews or parades	Prior to the national day, militia strengthened military training in order to participate in review.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Using weapons.</li> <li>2. Military sports.</li> </ol>	Canton, Po-an, Shaokuan, Ch'aochou, Chao-ch'ing, counties etc.	SCMP, No. 2851, p. 9.
Mutual teaching	At the basic level, the militia is encouraged to learn from each other.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Individual military skills such as jumping-up, charging, lying down, and shooting etc.</li> <li>2. Two units mutual assistance.</li> </ol>	Tienpai, Huiyang counties.	SCMP, No. 3248, pp. 11-13.

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Combin- ing with production or labor	Adapting to the parti- cular equip- ment of the production unit, the militia developed various kinds of special techniques.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Communication with wireless and wire operations.</li> <li>2. Automobile driving.</li> <li>3. Waterborne military activities.</li> <li>4. Judging wind power, the speed of current.</li> </ol>	Shaokuan, SCMP, P'unyu and other counties  No. 3366, pp. 2-3.  No. 3248, pp. 11-12.  No. 3444, p. 24.
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The stepping up of military training after 1962 was probably related to the increase of KMT military activities in the coastal provinces during that period. Although the KMT military infiltration failed to open a guerrilla corridor in Kwangtung, the militia organization and its activities were thus strengthened.

#### The Content of Military Training of the Militiamen

The content of military training of the militia rank and file is very different from that of the cadres. The training of the cadres is concentrated on strategy, tactics, leadership and work methods. These subjects are helpful for the completion of their duties as commanders. However, the training of the militiamen is usually concentrated on fighting skills, weapon and tool use and physical training. (see Table 22) These subjects can be practiced individually or in small units. Although most military training in the countryside seems to be still limited to infantrymen and light

weapons, other advanced training such as parachuting, navigation, artillery firing and tank driving were occasionally reported from city militia activities in different areas.<sup>117</sup>

In addition, the militia training subjects have also extended to maintenance of social order, patrolling, post standing, uncovering agents, etc. The following list is likely to cover all subjects of military training of the militia:

- a. Military drill.
- b. Shooting and grenade throwing.
- c. exploding techniques and obstacle removing.
- d. Bridge building and other military construction.
- e. Armed march.
- f. Climbing mountains and using tools.
- g. Techniques of fighting without weapons.
- h. Shock tactics.
- i. Swimming and shooting on boats.
- j. Tunnel tactics and empty house and clear field.
- k. Night combat.
- l. Distinguishing and utilizing terrain.
- m. Patrolling and post standing.
- n. Techniques of uncovering agents.
- o. Techniques of transporting prisoners.
- p. Weapon protection.

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117 "More Than 10,000 University Student Militiamen in Peking Go to Armed Forces Units for Short-term Training," NCNA, Peking, 6 Oct. 1964; SCMP, No. 3326, pp. 4-6.



q. Knowledge of air raid and airplanes.

r. Heavy weapons and their use.<sup>118</sup>

Similar to the cadres' training, the militiamen's military training is also conducted by local party committees in coordination with other units. The instructors of military training of the militia men are primarily demobilized or retired soldiers who are often militia cadres at basic levels.<sup>119</sup> However, there is evidence to show that the PLA units in Kwangtung and the officers of military regions and Department of People's Armed Forces of higher governments were often sent down to the villages to help with the militia training.<sup>120</sup>

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118 See Study of the Militia System of the Communist Bandits, op. cit., pp. 8-9.

119 "Militiamen of Canton Municipality Undergo Arduous Training in Anti-aircraft Shooting and Shooting on Water," Canton, YCWP, 27 April 1965; SCMP, No. 3460. And see, "Militiamen in Huilai Make Use of Their Spare Time in Drill Exercise," NFJP, 15 July 1962; SCMP, No. 2803, p. 8.

120 Ibid. Also see "Party Congress of CCP Kwangtung Provincial Military District Closed," NFJP, 3 Oct. 1961.

## VI. Militia Function: (2) Dynamic Functions

### 1. Militia Training and Political Socialization

Social scientists have realized that peasants in most traditional societies are characterized as passive and conservative. They are given to fatalism and familism. Their limited aspirations and limited perception of good make them less innovative and low in empathy.<sup>1</sup> Scholars such as Daniel Lerner and Everett Rogers have paid special attention to the transformation of peasants in adapting to modern society as the prerequisite of modernization of any society. According to Lerner, people in modern societies are characterized by high empathy or mobile personality. They are distinguished by a high capacity for identification with new aspects of their environment; they are equipped with mechanisms needed to incorporate new demands upon themselves that arise outside of their habitual experience. In other words, people with high empathy can "see themselves in the other fellow's situation."<sup>2</sup>

To achieve a high empathy or mobile personality, the peasants who should be liberated from the traditional society need a new ideology in order to establish a new identity other than their local community and kinships.<sup>3</sup>

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1 Rogers, Modernization among Peasants, op. cit., p. 25. Also Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society, op. cit., p. 50.

2 Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society, op. cit., pp. 49-50.

3 Ibid., pp. 47 & 50.

China is an agricultural society. 80 per cent or more of its population are peasants. Although it has long been one of the most civilized countries in the world, its peasants were no less passive, conservative, and tradition-oriented than those of other traditional societies. The economic backwardness and low rate of literacy have also characterized the Chinese as "poor and blank."<sup>4</sup>

Mao's attitude toward the Chinese peasants is twofold. He dislikes the passive and dependent attitude of traditional dealings with authority of the peasants, thus, he wants to stress activism and positive political participation in order to move away from the traditional style of social authority.<sup>5</sup> However, he is not annoyed with the poverty and ignorance of the peasants, because he believes that these disadvantageous conditions can help the peasants to accept changes and reforms. As he once said: "Those who are poor want to change things, they want to make their own effort, they want revolution. A blank piece of paper has nothing written on it; so one can write on it the newest and most beautiful words. One can paint on it the newest and most beautiful pictures."<sup>6</sup> In other words,

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4 Mao deliberately used this term to mark the Chinese. See "Introducing an Agricultural Cooperative," Selected Readings of Mao Tse-tung, op. cit., p. 381.

5 Richard H. Solomon, "Mao's Effort to Reintegrate the Chinese Policy: Problems of Authority and Conflict in Chinese Social Problems," in Chinese Communist Politics in Actions, ed. Doak Barnett, op. cit., p. 315.

6 Mao Tse-tung, "Introducing an Agricultural Cooperative," op. cit., p. 381.

Mao wants to change the Chinese peasants by taking advantage of their weakness.

Since it assumed power in 1949, the CPC has deliberately replaced the traditional Confucianism with Marxism-Leninism and Mao Tse-tung thought. Under the slogan of politics taking command, the CPC has consistently resocialized the Chinese by the regular educational apparatus as well as any available mechanism.

The Militia Organization as a Vehicle of Political Socialization

With most able-bodied men and women included in it, the militia organization is often seen as a useful mechanism for political indoctrination among the peasants. Chinese leaders want to use the militia organization as a university to educate the people in proletarian politics and the traditional styles of the PLA. By so doing, they expect to have a full effect on the promotion of ideological consciousness of the people, on the promotion of the spirit of arduous struggle and on the development of man's subjective initiative.<sup>7</sup>

Therefore, the Militia Regulations stipulate that systematic political education should be carried out for militiamen.<sup>8</sup>

The political education of the militia aims at two goals: consolidating the regime and constructing socialism.

7 Sung Wei-shih, "Implement the Policy of Taking Production as the Key-note in Militia Work," op. cit., p. 6.

8 See Militia Regulations, Article 20.

As an instrument of people's dictatorship, the militia are often required by the Party to strengthen their ideological construction, so that they can enhance their class consciousness and revolutionary vigilance; this can also guarantee the loyalty of the militia to serve the socialist cause. In the view of the Chinese leaders, without political education, the militia members will lose their direction and thereby fail to play a positive role and use their great strength. The militiamen "must be educated in the images of the revolutionary martyrs. Thus, they will have the political consciousness of passionately loving their mother country, the people, and the socialist cause."<sup>9</sup>

While the immediate goal of political education of the militia is to consolidate the regime against enemies' attack, its more positive and long-term goal seems to transform the tradition-oriented and conservative peasants into modern citizens in order to live in the new society. In other words, militia organization serves as a vehicle used by the Party to remold the Chinese peasants into new socialist men. The 5-good youth, 5-good soldier, and 5-good militia are, more or less, models of new socialist men who are often praised as active and working selflessly for the Party, collective interest and socialism. Chao Tzu-yang (趙紫陽), for example, once told the Kwangtung militia: "Militia organization could more effectively push the people to study in order to raise

<sup>9</sup> Liu Hsien-sheng, "Let the Whole People Be Armed to Defend the Homeland," op. cit., pp. 8-9.

their political understanding, increase their military knowledge, and elevate their cultural levels. . . . All these would be beneficial to the transformation of social customs, and to the changing of the spiritual outlook of the people."<sup>10</sup>

With a similar point of view, Teng K'e-ming emphasizes the effect of militia education on overcoming the passive attitude, strengthening the organization and discipline of the people, eliminating the concept of private ownership, and cultivating the collectivist and communist styles.<sup>11</sup>

Although the cultivation of new socialist man does not completely rely on the political education of the militia; it is conceivable that the militia political education provides a helpful mechanism to promote it. The militiamen, for example, were often encouraged to learn from the PLA and to achieve the standard of 5-good militia.<sup>12</sup> The PLA is politically highly indoctrinated and thus is often seen as a model of good citizenship. When the Party calls for learning from the PLA, it intends "to instill in the millions of militiamen the most genuine, the best, and the most beautiful things of the PLA

10 "First Representative Conference of Militia of Kwangtung Closed," op. cit., p. 8.

11 Teng K'e-ming, "Report to Kiangsi's Militia Work Conference," op. cit., p. 39.

12 5-good militiaman is 1) good political thinking, 2) good labour and production, 3) good performance of duty and training, 4) good 3-8 style, 5) good care of weapons. See "2nd Militia Conference Begins in Canton," YCWP, 17 April 1963. Also see supplement to SCMP, No. 116, p. 28.

and to disseminate the same things among the people of the whole country through the militiamen."<sup>13</sup> According to General Chen Tsai-tao, the implementation of the 5-good militiaman movement actually corrected some bad habits of the militia in Honan.<sup>14</sup> It not only helps the militia to promote their political ideology, but also to improve their production, their performance of duty and training, and their "3-8 work style."<sup>15</sup> If any one can satisfactorily fulfill all or most of these requirements, he is likely to be a good citizen in any society.

#### The Method of Militia Political Education

The political education of the militia is in many aspects different from military training. The military training of the militiamen primarily concentrates on weapons use, terrain recognition, and other fighting skills and tactics. Most of these subjects closely relate to physical activities; so a systematic military training in any sense needs proper space, time, and some equipment. However, political education is primarily a mental activity. It is less affected by space, time, and equipment. It can be carried out in groups or by individuals; it can be conducted by man face to face, or through radio, television, newspapers, magazines, drama, movies and other methods indirectly.

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- 13 Sung Wei-shih, "Implement the Policy of Taking Production as the Key-note in Militia Work," op. cit., p. 6.
- 14 Chen Tsai-tao, "Investigation Report on Militia Activities in Honan," op. cit., p. 572.
- 15 3-8 work style is an important movement in the PLA, see footnote no. 109 of Chapter III of this study.

Political education in China is a course that almost everybody has to take. Accordingly, the militia can share education facilities with other groups. Differing from military training, the need for an independent program of political education is not imperative. General Lo Jui-ching, for example, suggested that no independent program of political education for the militia should be taken; it should be combined with other types of social education such as activities of the Party and (Youth) League, political education, and cultural and recreational activities for the masses.<sup>16</sup>

When The Militia Regulations were promulgated in 1961, they adopted a similar principle. They required that the main method of political education shall be carried out in coordination with the Party and Youth League education and socialist education.<sup>17</sup> Since then this method has become very popular. Some local party committees in Kwangtung, for example, often conducted political education for the militia in close coordination with Party, League, trade union, and women's associations.<sup>18</sup>

Apart from combining programs coordinated with other organizations, however, the militia occasionally also conducts

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16 "We Must Do Good Substantial Work in Building up the Militia," Op. cit., p. 562.

17 Militia Regulations, Article 21.

18 Li Yi-chung, "Make Earnest Efforts to Perform Well the Work of Educating Militiamen in Current Trends," NFJP, 28 Oct. 1961. Also SCMP, No. 2802, p. 15.



collective political education by itself. The regular meeting days of the militia, May Day, August 1 (the Army Day), and Oct. 1 are partly used for political education. Lectures, study classes and contests may be carried out on such occasions.<sup>19</sup>

Besides, social movements are often seen as the best occasion to strengthen the ideology of the militia. China is characterized as a mobilizing society under the CPC regime. Mao and many other political leaders prefer to use mass movements to mobilize political support and thus to arouse the political ideology of the masses. In order to intensify political education of the militia, according to Lo Jui-ching, political rallies must be strengthened, because these meetings can supply the militia with "living political and ideological education."<sup>20</sup>

As a highly organized society, the CPC was able to conduct any mass rally at its chosen time. The Kwangtung militia organization, for example, mobilized about 6 million of its members in 1962 to learn the living stories of the heroic spirit of the militia in annihilating the KMT armed guerrillas in their coastal areas.<sup>21</sup> After reports were given by the

19 See Militia Regulation, Article 23. Also see "We Must Do Good Substantial Work in Building up the Militia," op. cit., p. 562.

20 "We Must Do Good Substantial Work in Building up the Militia," op. cit., p. 562.

21 "Militiamen Throughout Kwangtung Receive Profound Education in Annihilation of U.S. — Chiang Kai-shek Armed Agents," NFJP, 19 March 1963; SCMP, No. 2980, p. 1. Also see "Militiamen of Swatow Raise Vigilance against Enemy Intrusion," NFJP, 5 July 1962; SCMP, No. 2796, p. 6.

heroes, discussions and demonstrations usually followed. When the vigilance of the militia about the class enemy was raised, their ideology was also supposed to be promoted. In addition, the higher party organization and the military district also dispatched propaganda teams to give reports and other propaganda programs for the militia in the countryside, occasionally. Chanchiang Administrative District in Kwangtung Province, for example, sent 7,000 reporters and 3,800 propaganda teams to circulate in its areas and conducted propaganda 11,000 times, for a total audience of 1,300,000 between 1962 to 1963.<sup>22</sup>

The usual methods of political education for the militia are summed up in Table 23.

#### The Content of Militia Political Education

The Militia Regulations describe that the major content of political education of the militia shall include the Party's general line of socialist reconstruction and various policies; domestic and international situations; duties and responsibilities of the militiamen; and the revolutionary traditions and the '3-8 work style.'<sup>23</sup> From this description, one is likely to realize that militia political education is primarily aimed at molding good citizens. By teaching the masses the Party's major policies and the current situations,

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22 NFJP, 19 March 1963; SCMP, No. 2980, p. 1.

23 Militia Regulations, Article 21.

Table 23: Major Methods of Political Education of the Militia in Kwangtung during 1960 to 1964

Form	Method	Sponcers	Sources
Individual programs	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Broadcasts.</li> <li>2. Newspapers.</li> <li>3. Magazines.</li> <li>4. Club, cultural hall, and window shows.</li> <li>5. Drama, movie and other activities.</li> </ol>	Hsinfeng County, Chanchiang Administrative	<u>SCMP</u> No. 2801, p. 17; No. 2980, p. 1.
Collective programs	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Joint study groups coordinated with other organizations.</li> <li>2. Militia regular meetings.</li> <li>3. Other temporary study groups —such as newspaper reading groups.</li> </ol>	Chingyuan, Huiyang and Hxilai counties	No. 2802, pp.15-16; No. 2949, p. 10; No. 2915, pp.8-9; No. 2935, p. 5.
Mass movement	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Political rallies in denouncing the enemies and supporting friendly countries.</li> <li>2. Learning living stories.</li> <li>3. 5-good militia movements.</li> <li>4. Learning from the PLA.</li> </ol>	Huiyang, Swatow, Taishan, Chinkiang.	No. 2877, p. 9; Supplement to <u>SCMP</u> , No. 116, pp.26-27.
Propaganda team	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Military district work teams.</li> <li>2. Higher level government and party propaganda teams.</li> <li>3. Recreational teams.</li> </ol>	Chanchiang Administrative District and many counties throughout the province.	No. 2890, p. 1.

the Party hopes to win over the loyalty of the militia; by telling them of their duties and responsibilities, the Party is in fact teaching what roles the militia should play in the process of socialist reconstruction. When the Party teaches them revolutionary traditions and the 3-8 work style, it is actually teaching the militia how to fulfill their duties in socialist construction. From the higher levels of doctrine to the basic methods of practice, the Militia Regulations seem to have provided a logical outline for a training program.

Based on this stipulation, the Ministry of National Defence published its standard teaching materials for militia political education in 1961. It contained twelve units with ten major subjects, which can be roughly classified into four big topics (see Table 24).

Although the organization of the teaching materials is divided into twelve units, its major contents seem to be primarily concentrated on two aspects: the enemies and the standards of a good militia. The identification of the enemies, the strategies which the Chinese designed to deal with the enemies, and the roles of the militia in dealing with the enemies, all refer to the first aspect.

When the teaching material identifies American imperialism as the number one enemy of China, it tries to convince the militia of Mao's theory that the imperialists as well as their nuclear weapons are both paper tigers. The determinant

Table 24: The Standard Materials of Political Education of the Militia in 1961

Topic	Subjects
1. The Enemies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. American imperialist — the enemy of China and the world.</li> <li>b. Keeping high vigilance and taking the enemy seriously.</li> </ul>
2. The Strategy of National Defense	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. People's warfare.</li> <li>b. Man — the determinant factor of war.</li> </ul>
3. The Roles of the Militia in War	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. The roles of the militia in the long revolutionary war.</li> <li>b. The roles of the militia in the nuclear era — the future war.</li> </ul>
4. The Roles of the Militia in Domestic Politics	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Militia is an instrument of people's democratic dictatorship.</li> <li>b. The three duties of the militia — socio-political, economic, and military functions.</li> <li>c. The ten requirements: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Submit to the Party's leadership;</li> <li>2) Abide by the government's laws and regulations;</li> <li>3) Obey the commands of superiors;</li> <li>4) Protect the masses' interest;</li> <li>5) Expose bad men and bad deeds;</li> <li>6) Be kind to others;</li> <li>7) Take political and military lessons;</li> <li>8) Take part in sports activities;</li> <li>9) Take good care of weapons and ammunition;</li> <li>10) Safeguard state secrets.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

Sources: Political Teaching Materials for the Militia, op. cit., pp. 1-44.

factor of war is not one or two modern weapons but man, the political consciousness of the people.<sup>24</sup> After downgrading the power of the atom bomb, the material teaches the militia that people's warfare should be the effective strategy to defeat any enemy if he dares to invade China in the future. This strategy demonstrates the significance of the militia divisions and the EASM.

From past experience, the teaching material tries to figure out the possible roles of the militia in future wars. They will be asked to serve as reservists, to fight guerrilla wars, and to maintain law and social order.<sup>26</sup>

The change in the international situation has added the Soviet Union, the socialist imperialists, to the list of enemies of China, but it does not drop the American imperialists from the enemy list yet. In addition, the fact that China possessed a moderate number of nuclear weapons since 1964 has not drastically changed the original concept of atom bombs and people's war. Lin Piao's widespread article of "Long Live the Victory of the People's War," for example, was published in 1965 after China exploded its first atom bomb. When the Sino-Soviet border conflict was elevated during the cultural revolution, the Chinese once again committed themselves to strengthening their militia.<sup>27</sup>

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24 Political Teaching Material of the Militia, op. cit., pp. 13-16.

25 Ibid., pp. 9-11.

26 Ibid., pp. 24-25.

27 See "The Militia Activities in Tung-yuan (東莞) of Kwangtung," Shing-tao Jih-pao (星島日報), 12 Dec. 1969. Also see the

The later part of the teaching material totally concentrates on a single topic — the role of the militia in domestic politics. It teaches the militia that class struggle still exists in socialist society. The militia should distinguish enemies from the people and serve the latter as an instrument of people's democratic dictatorship.<sup>28</sup>

The three duties and ten requirements are intensively taught in the material. The ten requirements which cover the entire activities of the militia have actually portrayed a concrete model for a good militiaman. To a limited extent, this is also a model for a new socialist man imagined by the leaders.

In contrast with the militia regulations, the political teaching material published by the Ministry of National Defense has covered almost all subjects mentioned in the regulation, with an emphasis on the military aspect and the role of the militia. It did not mention the 3-8 work style and other military traditions of the PLA.

The Major Subjects of Political Education of the Kwangtung Militia from 1961 to 1964

In contrast with militia regulations and the political training materials of the Ministry, the political education of

militia training activities in other provinces in 1969 in "The Militia Situation in War Preparation of the Communist Bandits," (共匪全面备战中的民兵情况) TLFCCP (Oct. - Dec. 1969), pp. 1-19.

<sup>28</sup> Political Teaching Material of the Militia, op. cit., pp. 26-30.

the Kwangtung militia is aimed at more concrete events rather than abstract doctrines (see Table 25).

Table 25: The Major Contents of Political Education of the Kwangtung Militia from 1961 to 1964

Topics	Subjects
1. Current Situation	a. International situation — Cuba Crisis for instance. b. American aggression. c. Nationalist armed agents attacks and their capture.
2. Class Consciousness	a. Class struggle. b. Comparing the past miserable life with the present happiness. c. Comparing Hong Kong society with the Chinese socialist society.
3. Revolutionary Traditions — Past and Present	a. Learning from the PLA. b. 5-good militia movement. c. Learning the "3-8 work style" and the "four first". d. Learning the living stories of the heroic militia models — Kuo Yung, Chen Yung-mei, and Chang Piao, etc. e. Other revolutionary stories.
4. Economic Affairs	Learning production skills and advanced experience.
5. Political System	a. The CPC. b. The LCY.

Sources: SCMP, No. 2796, pp. 6-9; No. 2801, p. 17;  
 No. 2802, pp. 15-16; No. 2805, pp. 3-4;  
 No. 2840, p. 3; No. 2877, p. 9;  
 No. 2915, pp. 8-9; No. 3030, p. 9;  
 No. 2942, p. 10; No. 2935, p. 5;  
 No. 2949, p. 10; No. 2980, p. 1;  
 No. 3314, pp. 12-13;  
 and Supplement to SCMP, No. 116, pp. 26-27.



The increasing military activity of the KMT in Kwangtung in the early 1960s greatly alarmed the local Party officials there. To cope with this threat, the local Party officials intensified the political education of the militia in order to raise their class consciousness and firm up their fighting spirit. Current event reporting often dominated the militia activities.<sup>29</sup> They called for the senior people to report on their miserable lives and sufferings in the old society in order to indicate how sweet the present life is. Then, the militia were urged to defend their socialist society against the KMT invasion.<sup>30</sup>

To stop the peasants from fleeing to Hong Kong, Party leaders even mobilized persons who had been in Hong Kong and Macao to compare the corrupted Hong Kong society with the Chinese socialist society and tried to persuade the fishermen to refuse to enter to Hong Kong.<sup>31</sup> However, the continual flow of Chinese to Hong Kong and Macao discredits the effect of this campaign.

The campaigns for learning revolutionary traditions and learning from the PLA in Kwangtung from 1961 to 1964 were strong.

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29 Li Yi-chung, "Make Earnest Efforts to Perform Well the Work of Educating Militiamen in Current Trends," op. cit., p. 15. Also see NFJP, 22 Jan. 1963; SCMP, No. 2942.

30 NFJP, 22 Jan. 1963; NFJP, 30 Oct. 1962; NFJP, 13 June 1963.

31 "Party Committee of Lienhuashan Commune Steps up Ideological Education and Military Training," NFJP, 20 Aug. 1964; SCMP, No. 3314, pp. 12-13.

Needless to say, this was partly due to the particular military considerations. The increased military activity of the KMT in 1962 suddenly increased the importance of the military function of the militia. However, the 5-good militia movement, the "3-8 work style" and "four firsts" actually meant more than temporary military needs. They were partly aimed at militarizing the peasants and the whole society as discussed before.

It is worth mentioning that the militia political education in Kwangtung also helped to spread advanced production experience by collectively studying newspapers.<sup>32</sup>

The political education of the militia cadres seems to be little different from that of the rank and file. International situations, Mao Tse-tung's works and class struggle were all mentioned in the schedules of various cadre training classes in Kwangtung in 1963.<sup>33</sup>

#### The Effectiveness of the Political Education of the Militia

Without enough material, it is difficult for us to judge the effectiveness of the political education of the militia. Taking political support as a criterion, some people may discredit the militia political training by pointing to the continual flow of Chinese refugees to Hong Kong; others may argue that the

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32 "A Basic-Level Militia Company in Huilai Hsien Carries out Newspaper — Reading Activity Unremittingly," NFJP, 19 Feb. 1963; SCMP, No. 2935, p. 5.

33 "Fostering and Training of Militia Cadres in Enping [Yunping], Shaokuan [Shiukwan] and other Localities," NFJP, 30 Oct. 1962; SCMP, No. 2915, pp. 9-10.

CPC has successfully rallied the political support of the majority of the 800 million Chinese because there is no visible evidence to show that serious violence has happened in China against the CPC rule. Some people may take the failure of the KMT to invade China in the early 1960s as evidence of the success of the CPC's political indoctrination. Each of these arguments may be justified but none of them can be claimed as exclusively valid. There is no secret that Mao Tse-tung and other political leaders want to remould the traditional passive and conservative attitude of the Chinese peasants. Without measuring the actual changes of their attitude toward authority, it is improper for the study to give any firm conclusion. However, from some visitor's reports, one may be impressed that some degree of change has actually occurred. Prof. Ho Ping-ti, a Chinese American historian, revealed that the spiritual outlook of the Chinese has totally changed. They are active, confident, and positive.<sup>34</sup> A similar view is seen from the report of Prof. Yang Chen-ning, a Chinese American physicist and Nobel winner.<sup>35</sup>

Several Overseas Chinese have identified a drastic

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34 Ho Ping-ti (何炳棣), "From Historical Angle to Look at the Characteristics and Achievement of New China," (從歷史的角度看新中國的特色與成就) Selected Reports from China of Chinese American Scholars (留美中國學者訪華觀感集) (Hong Kong: The Seventy's Press, 1974), pp. 1-34.

35 Yang Chen-ning (楊振寧), "My personal Impression about the People's Republic of China," (我對中華人民共和國的印象) Selected Reports from China of Chinese American Scholars, op. cit., p. 46.

change of attitude of the peasants in the countryside in Kwangtung. At one point, different reports agreed that the younger generation in the countryside has changed its traditional indifferent attitude toward public affairs. The concept of marriage, the authority of elders, and the interest in new events all changed drastically. Nevertheless, they recognized that some traditional attitudes of the old people did not change very much.<sup>36</sup>

In commenting on the achievement of the CPC's mass mobilization, Prof. Chin Yao-k'i (金耀基) once said that by violent and drastic methods, the CPC has made considerable achievements in breaking the local bondage, economic conservatism, and psychological passivity of Chinese society.<sup>37</sup> Chin attributes these drastic changes to mass mobilization of the CPC. To him, the ideology of mass mobilization is to arouse the political consciousness of the masses in order to liberate their potential, or to remove the traditional four big mountains (old thought, old tradition, old habit, and old culture) from the head of the masses in order to recover their creative powers.<sup>38</sup> If Chin's comment is acceptable, the political education of the militia is likely to have made some contribution to it.

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36 Sheng Chi-yao (沈己堯), "Shih Cheng Commune: A Memory of my Home Town," (石正公社—故鄉新憶) Nan-pai Chi Monthly (南北極月刊) 46 (1974), pp. 13-15.

37 Chin Yao-k'i, "Problems about Mobilization of Manpower and Economic Construction," Ming-pao Monthly 9:4 (April 1974), p. 43.

38 Ibid., p. 42.

## 2. The Militia and the Shock Force in Production

### Shock Tactics and Shock Force

Shock tactics means a method of attack by mobile units in which the suddenness, violence, and massed weight of the first impact produce the main effect.<sup>39</sup> Shock force is often referred to as shock troops in the military. It means troops especially selected, trained, and equipped for engaging in assault.<sup>40</sup> From these definitions, one is likely to realize that shock tactics and shock force are usually used in operations in order to win a battle by means of sudden attack with specially selected, trained and equipped troops in a selected area and time to smash the enemy and achieve the goal of a campaign.

As discussed before, Mao Tse-tung and most Chinese leaders have fought their way to power with people's warfare. Their personal military experiences tend to affect all aspects of their behavior. They see almost everything as a war and thus react to it with military strategy and combat action.

According to Chalmers Johnson, the strategy for economic development pursued by the Chinese Communists since 1949 has followed a pattern roughly similar to the strategies of revolution adopted by the Party between 1921 and 1949. The Great Leap Forward was above all the application of this strategy.<sup>41</sup>

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39 See Webster's Dictionary.

40 Ibid.

41 Chalmers Johnson, "Building a Communist Nation in China," op. cit., pp. 60-61.

In other words, the strategy used in 1958 for economic development was Mao's revolutionary strategy or people's warfare. Schram even said that the idea of war against nature is a favourite one of Mao's military thought.<sup>42</sup>

According to Schram, Mao tends to exalt the revolutionary will of human beings until it becomes not merely an important factor in history, but an all-powerful force capable of reshaping the material environment in a completely arbitrary fashion. "This attitude is obviously linked to Mao's guerrilla experience and to his conviction that men, not weapons, are the decisive factor in a revolutionary war."<sup>43</sup>

Mao's people's warfare is basically a guerrilla war. It depends largely on using mobile strategies to concentrate an absolute superior force and to make a shock-attack on a chosen goal in a chosen time in order to achieve surprising effect.<sup>44</sup>

As cited in the last chapter, General Fu Chiu-tao and many other Chinese military leaders often said that the mass militia will march against the enemy in war and against nature in socialist construction. The communization and militarization were intended partly at least to apply this strategy in order to carry out coordinated actions of large corps in production.

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42 Schram, The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung, op. cit., p.90.

43 Ibid., p. 78.

44 Johnson, "Building a Communist Nation in China," op. cit., pp. 54-55.

The application of shock-tactics to economic development is therefore a logical part of people's warfare. In using this strategy, the militia serves as a specially selected, trained, and equipped shock-troop. As General Lo Jui-ch'ing (羅瑞卿) writes: "The militia has become a great labour force of high political consciousness and working efficiency. It is . . . a shock force on all production fronts."<sup>45</sup> A similar point of view was expressed in the Joint Militia Work Conference of Kwangtung, Kwangsi and Hunan provinces. Following the principle of combining labour with military training, the militia was required to play its role fully as a shock troop on the production front.<sup>46</sup>

Although the roles of the militia in production are usually divided into principal-force and shock-team,<sup>47</sup> the terms of shock-team and shock-tactics in many cases were broadly used indiscriminately to cover all production activities. When the NFJP, for example, reported the achievement of the Kwangtung militia, it mentioned that the militia not only achieved excellent results in national defense drilling, but

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45 Lo Jui-ch'ing, "Set Up Large Numbers of Militia Divisions," op. cit., p. 5.

46 "Militia Work Conference Held in Canton by Kwangtung, Kwangsi and Hunan Provinces," NFJP, 3 Oct. 1960; SCMP, No. 2374, p. 1.

47 See Political Teaching Materials of the Militia, op. cit., p. 31. Also see "Militiamen in Kwangtung Have Rendered Outstanding Meritorious Service in the Past Fifteen Years," op. cit., p. 6.

also "acted as shock-forces in production."<sup>48</sup> In another report, the same newspaper wrote that when the militia follows the principle of combining labour with military training, "it can play its role fully as a shock-troop on the production front."<sup>49</sup> Literally, "shock-force in production," and "shock-troop on the production front" both include all production activities of the militia. However, a careful reader should not miss the distinction between the roles of militia as a shock-team and a principal force in production from the following report:

In spring and summer this year, our province was stricken with drought which was the severest of its kind of the past 50 years. . . . Together with the masses of commune members, they fought at work sites through days and nights, blocking rivers and streams, digging ponds and ditches, sinking wells, conducting water to irrigate the fields, and making positive contributions toward overcoming the drought.

In September, a grade-11 typhoon attacked our province. . . . During the attack of the typhoon, close to 20,000 militiamen in Linkao-hsien formed more than 400 shock-teams for emergency rescue work, and fought doggedly against rainstorms and torrents.<sup>50</sup>

Obviously, when the militiamen worked together with other commune members in fighting against drought, they were taking a leading role and worked like a principal force and not as a shock-team.

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48 See NFJP, 29 March 1960.

49 "Militia Work Conference Held in Canton," op. cit., p. 1.

50 "Militiamen in Kwangtung Produced Remarkable Results on All Front in Past Year," op. cit.



In the latter situation, it not only implied that the militia-men were organized for a very special occasion but also implied that only specially selected elements such as backbone-militia or physically stronger members were organized into the shock-force. In fact, there are many evidences to show that shock-teams were actually organized in many places by backbone-militia to complete special work.<sup>51</sup>

Based on the strict definitions given earlier, this study tends to limit the application of shock-forces and shock-tactics to two occasions only. First of all, shock-force and shock-tactics are used to complete some work which is specially urgent and has to be completed within a given time. Secondly they are used for emergency-rescue against natural disasters. Otherwise loss of life and damage to property will be inevitable.

#### Shock Forces for Emergency Production

As discussed in Chapter two, military organization is more efficient than other types of organization to meet emergency demand at a crucial moment, because its bureaucratic internal structures with chains of command enable it to coordinate and control the activities of large numbers of men. As William Anderson writes:

The structure of military organization, is, of course, related to the fact that they often play a particularly important role in a community or society in so far as emergency activities are concerned. Military organizations

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51 See P'an Chu-hsiu, "New Recruits in Kwangtung Proceed to Posts of Defending the Fatherland," NFJP, 5 Jan. 1960.

have complex and basically bureaucratic internal structures with established chains of command and divisions of labour. Such structures enable military organizations to coordinate and control the activities of large forces of men.<sup>52</sup>

The militia organization is a mass military organization. It has to a large degree inherited the characteristics of military organization. This is why the Chinese often organized militia shock-units to meet emergency work. They even used militia shock-units to lead the production contest. When draft-age youth, for example, were expected to enroll in the army in Feb. 1960, the local Party leaders wanted to complete winter production work before they left. They called for the militia units to start a work contest in various counties. Shock production teams were organized by backbone militia and draft-age youths (usually the eligible age is 18, 19, and 20) in all parts of the province to unfold production contests.<sup>53</sup> In Huiyang County, for example, over 800 shock teams were organized by more than 18,000 members of 19 communes.<sup>54</sup> This campaign was highly valued by the CPC. The Party Committee made a tremendous propaganda effort to publicize the achievements completed by these shock teams.<sup>55</sup>

More often, a militia shock-force is organized to

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52 Anderson, "Social Structure and the Role of the Military in Natural Disaster," op. cit., p. 243.

53 P'an Chu-hsiu, "New Recruits in Kwangtung," op. cit., p. 30.

54 Ibid.

55 Ibid.

complete some emergency production and work which will seriously jeopardize other production and work plans if it is delayed (see Table 26). In May 1962, mountain torrents

Table 26: Militia Shock Force Mobilized for Emergency Work in Kwangtung from 1962 to 1964

Unit	Nature of Work	Militia Mobilized	Time Spent	Sources
Canton Railway Militia Division	Emergency work in building bridge	200	4 days	Supplement to <u>SCMP</u> , No. 105, p. 22.
Canton Shipyard	Assembling Hall — emergency work	16	-	<u>SCMP</u> No. 3342, p. 4.
	Emergency work in building a dredger	108	one hour	
	Emergency work — production	1,400		
	Emergency work — repairing a salvage lighter	24	through days & nights	
Hsinghua Battery Factory Canton	Emergency product	-	-	<u>SCMP</u> No. 2280, p. 5.

washed away the road bed of the Peking-Canton Railway in a certain place in Kwangtung Province. When the department concerned decided to build a bridge over the deepest gap caused by the torrents, a shock-force of 200 militiamen was dispatched. The unit rushed to the locality of trouble and battled four days and nights. It was said that the militia fulfilled the

target of emergency repairs 30 hours ahead of schedule.<sup>56</sup>

This enabled the Peking-Canton Railway to move passengers and goods freely.

Canton Shipyard was said to have repeatedly achieved what seemed to be impossible without using shock-tactics. In fulfilling emergency production, sometimes the shipyard mobilized as many as 1,400 militia members to organize shock teams, but on other occasions, only a small team of 16 militia men.<sup>57</sup> Some of this production work needed higher skills, but others not. Old workers were dispatched to help those mobilized to take part in the shock teams without the necessary skills. Consequently, they were said to have all fulfilled their tasks.

#### Shock Forces Against Natural Calamities

As military organization is better than other types of organization to carry out emergency work, it is equally better than others to rescue lives and property from natural disasters. According to Anderson, military organizations often play an important role during natural disasters in a society. While they assume a supportive role in terms of disaster relief activities in some societies, they may become the central

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56 "Canton Railway Militia Division Carries on Diversified Activities," YCWP, 5 Oct. 1962.

57 "Canton Shipyard Reinforces Militia Building," NFJP, 24 Sept. 1964.

organization involved in such activities in other societies.<sup>58</sup>  
 It is said that the roles played by military organizations in natural disasters are closely related to the socio-political systems of that society. In a centralized society, the military usually plays a role of leadership, otherwise a supportive role.<sup>59</sup>

Although China has a centralized societal structure, the roles of the militia force in rescuing people during natural disasters seemed to be similar to the National Guard of the U.S.A. It was usually called upon by the local Party and civilian authorities at different levels. It must obey the control of these authorities rather than take over leadership.<sup>60</sup>

During the early 1960s when China was confronted with rare big floods, the militia were often mobilized to rescue lives and property. The militia units in Kwangtung Province, for example, played a very important role in disaster rescue work. (See Table 27).

In 1964, when heavy rains in many places caused serious disasters, about 100,000 militia men were organized into shock-teams in Ch'ao-an, Yingte, Chaokuan counties of Kwangtung

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58 Anderson, "Social Structure and the Role of the Military in Natural Disasters," op. cit., p. 242.

59 Ibid., p. 251.

60 In the United States of America, only the governor has the authority to call on the National Guard force for rescue during natural disasters and other needs. See Anderson's "Social Structure and the Role of the Military in Natural Disaster," op. cit., p. 244.

Table 27: Militia Shock Force in Disaster Rescue in Kwangtung from 1961 to 1964

Place	Nature of Work	Militia Mobilized	Time Spent	Sources
Ch'ao-an, Yingte, and Chaokuan counties	Fighting floods	100,000	-	<u>SCMP</u> No. 3330, p. 6.
Yingte County	Rescue population and property in flood	20,000	-	No. 3330, p. 6.
Linkao County	Fighting flood	20,000	-	No. 3130, p. 11.
Po-an County	Fighting natural calamities, repairing communications	95	over night	No. 2417, p. 11.
Canton Shipyard	Emergency rescue	-	-	No. 3342, p. 4.
Chenchiao Commune, Ch'aochow County	Fighting flood	-	several days	No. 3330, p. 6.

Province to fight floods by shock-tactics. When the government-seat of Yingte County was surrounded by flood in the middle of June, 1964, about 20,000 militiamen from various neighboring communes, braving winds and rains, rushed to rescue the marooned commune members and large amounts of state property.<sup>61</sup>

Once when flood surrounded certain brigades of Chen-chiao Commune of Ch'aochow County, the dikes in several places were jeopardized. Militia shock forces were organized to repair and reinforce the dikes and keep watching by turns on the dikes, thereby safeguarding the dikes and securing production and lives and the property of the people from loss.<sup>62</sup>

From these examples, it seems correct to say that the militia not only served as a principal force in production but also served as a shock force at the critical moment.

### 3. The Militia and Guerrilla and Anti-guerrilla Warfare

#### Definition of Guerrilla Warfare

Since the Second World War, guerrilla warfare has become a familiar tactic and has often been used by revolutionaries and communist insurgents. According to historians of war, guerrilla warfare has existed as long as the history of human beings. However it was little noted by students until this

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61 See "Militiamen in Kwangtung Have Rendered Outstanding Meritorious Service," op. cit., p. 6.

62 Ibid.

century. Guerrilla warfare is often seen as a weapon of the weaker. It is also identified as revolutionary war, partisan war, small war, and irregular war. Marx believed that guerrilla warfare is a strategy used by a small and weaker nation to overcome its superior enemies.

A nation, fighting for its liberty, ought not to adhere rigidly to the accepted rules of warfare. Mass uprisings, revolutionary methods, guerrilla bands everywhere; such are the only means by which a small nation can hope to maintain itself against an adversary superior in numbers and equipment. By their use a weaker force can overcome its stronger and better organized opponent.<sup>63</sup>

Lenin emphasized the role of guerrilla warfare in civil wars. He identified it as armed struggles waged by small groups and individuals of the revolutionaries against other parts of well organized and better equipped people in the country. He wrote:

Partisan struggle is an unavoidable form of action at a time when the mass movement has matured to the point of insurrection and when the intervals between the big battles of the civil war are becoming shorter.<sup>64</sup>

To Marx it seems that guerrilla warfare can be used by the weaker to overcome the superior and thus makes it possible to win a war eventually. However, from Lenin's point of

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63 Karl Marx, Neue Rheinische Zeitung 161 (April 1, 1849), quoted in F. O. Miksche, Secret Forces, the Technique of Underground Movements (London, 1950), p. 25.

64 V. I. Lenin, "Partisan Warfare," in Modern Guerrilla Warfare: Fighting Communist Guerrilla Movements, 1941-1961, ed. Franklin Mark Osanka (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), p. 74. Also see Orbis (Summer 1962).



view, guerrilla war is only a transitional phenomenon from continual mass uprisings to the big battle of civil war. Lenin left little doubt that guerrilla warfare is not the major method for eventual victory in a war. T. E. Lawrence was a guerrilla absolutist. He believed that "guerrilla, forever elusive, without front or rear, drifting around like a cloud of gas, would always be able to get the better of a regular occupation force tied to cumbersome supply lines."<sup>65</sup> To him, if the guerrillas played their cards correctly and if conditions are suitable, the partisans could win (a war) without support from a big army. He, therefore, tended to underestimate the decisive role played by regular armies.<sup>66</sup>

Mao Tse-tung emphasizes the irregularity and fluidity of guerrilla war.<sup>67</sup> He agrees that guerrilla warfare is a weapon of the weaker, but he is not a guerrilla absolutist. He realizes the limits of guerrilla war.<sup>68</sup>

A) The strategical value of guerrilla warfare exists only in a weak but large country. According to Mao if a country is small there would not be enough space for a guerrilla to carry out its long distance mobile activities. Thus the guerrilla can only render direct support over short

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65 Lewis H. Gunn, Guerrilla in History (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1971), pp. 44-45.

66 Ibid.

67 Mao Tse-tung, "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War," Selected Works, Vol. 1, op. cit., p. 243.

68 Gunn, Guerrilla in History, op. cit., p. 64.

distances to the campaign of the regular army. A strong country is likely to expel the enemy quickly; or the enemy can not occupy extensive areas as the Japanese did in China. Then the guerrilla warfare would simply play a supporting role in campaigns and would involve only tactical but not strategic problems. However, a weak but large country such as China was can not quickly expel the enemy and a large part of the country may be occupied by the enemy. The strategic value of guerrilla war in such cases will be significant.<sup>69</sup>

Both Marx and Mao agree that guerrilla warfare can be used by a weak nation against a superior enemy with better equipment and organization. While Marx only stated that guerrilla warfare could be used by a small country to overcome the strong enemy, Mao limited its value at a tactical level in a small country.

The term "small" and "large" are highly flexible. When Mao limited the strategic value of guerrilla war to a large country, he did not define how large the size of a country should be in order to fight a guerrilla war. Since guerrilla warfare has been successfully waged by both communists and non-communists in many relatively small countries such as Korea, Indochina, and in many African countries, the effect of size of a country on guerrilla war has become less significant than Mao thought. Furthermore, a country as powerful as the Soviet Union also waged guerrilla warfare against

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69 Mao Tse-tung, "Problem of Strategy in Guerrilla War," Selected Works, Vol. 2, op. cit., pp. 79-80.

Germany in the Second World War.<sup>70</sup> Therefore, guerrilla warfare is no longer a weapon of the weaker only. It may be waged by any country whenever it is applicable.

B) The strategic value of guerrilla warfare in civil war differs from that in national war against external invaders. According to Mao, when a guerrilla force is first brought into being in civil war, it is the pioneer of the revolutionary forces. Guerrilla warfare thus is the primary form of a civil war. When the revolutionary war proceeds to strategic offensive, regular warfare emerges. However, it is "regular only in its concentration and planning in command and organization; in other aspects it retained a guerrilla character and, in regular warfare, was on a low level."<sup>71</sup> In other words, guerrilla warfare is primary in both stages of civil war. Regular warfare is only a higher level of guerrilla warfare.<sup>72</sup> However, in national war such as the Sino-Japanese war, although guerrilla warfare is primary in the first period (including the stages of the strategic defensive and strategic stalemate), it is waged by the regular army. In the second period, regular warfare will dominate the war. The regular army after getting the necessary up-to-date equipment will be able to wage regular warfare in any sense. So Mao believes that in national war as a whole, "regular warfare is primary

70 C. Aubrey Dixon and Otto Heilbrunn, Communist Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Praeger, 1962), pp. 19-91.

71 Mao Tse-tung, "Problems of War and Strategy," op.cit., p.227.

72 Ibid.

and guerrilla warfare supplementary."<sup>73</sup>

To Mao, guerrilla warfare in national wars becomes important only after the emergence of strategic stalemate when the invaders have occupied a large part of territory.<sup>74</sup> This is to some extent similar to Huntington's statement that "guerrilla warfare is only emphasized when and where the possibilities of regular warfare have been foreclosed."<sup>75</sup>

C) Guerrilla warfare should be developmental. Although Mao emphasized guerrilla warfare in the long process of the Chinese revolution, he often consciously wanted to get rid of guerrillaism and to achieve regular warfare when the situation permitted it. Unlike Lawrence, Mao believes that "Only regular warfare can decide the final outcome of the war."<sup>76</sup> Taking it as a whole, guerrilla warfare only plays a supplementary role in war. It must coordinate with the regular army in strategy.<sup>77</sup>

The guerrilla units were consistently urged to undergo the necessary steeling and to transform themselves gradually into regular forces in the protracted war, so that their mode of operations would be gradually regularized and guerrilla warfare would develop into mobile warfare.<sup>78</sup> This developmental

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73 Ibid., pp. 229-230.

74 Mao Tse-tung, "On Protracted War," op. cit., pp. 137-138. Also "Problems of War and Strategy," op. cit., p. 229.

75 Huntington, "Guerrilla Warfare in Theory and Policy," op. cit., p. xvi.

76 Mao Tse-tung, "Problems of War and Strategy," op. cit., p. 229.

77 Mao Tse-tung, "Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War," op. cit., p. 91.

78 Ibid., p. 107.

point of view is more clearly revealed in the following quotation:

. . . in the long course of struggle the guerrilla units and guerrilla warfare will not remain as they are, but will develop to a higher stage and evolve gradually into regular units and regular warfare. Through guerrilla warfare, we shall build up our strength and turn ourselves into a decisive element in the crushing of Japanese imperialism.<sup>79</sup>

It seems that Mao's concept of guerrilla war is to some extent close to Lenin's partisan war which is only a form of struggle in the interval of big battles.<sup>80</sup>

Summing up the discussion, a definition of guerrilla warfare can be quoted as follows:

Guerrilla warfare is a form of warfare by which the strategically weaker side assumes the tactical offensive in selected forms, times, and places. . . . To achieve victory in most wars, guerrilla warfare must be accompanied by other forms of warfare. Guerrilla warfare is resorted to (1) after regular (i.e., stronger) forces have been defeated, (2) before they have been created, and (3) where they are unable to operate.<sup>81</sup>

#### Militia and Guerrilla Warfare

The prevalent strategy of guerrilla warfare is often referred to as hit-and-run. It requires the guerrilla force to be able "to concentrate the maximum forces, act secretly and swiftly, attack the enemy by surprise and bring battles to a quick decision."<sup>82</sup> To achieve these goals, the guerrilla

79 Mao Tse-tung, "Problems of War and Strategy," op.cit., p.233.

80 See footnote 64, this chapter.

81 Huntington, "Guerrilla Warfare in Theory and Policy," op.cit., p. xvi.

82 Mao Tse-tung, "Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War," op.cit., p. 84. Also "On Protracted War," op.cit., p. 158.

forces need a favorable environment in order to secure their action. The security of the guerrilla force, according to Huntington, only can be found in rugged terrain and a friendly populace.<sup>83</sup> A similar point of view was held by Lawrence that a successful guerrilla war depend on unassailable base and a friendly population. To him rebellions could be made if only two per cent of the people served in the striking forces but ninety-eight per cent passively sympathetic support would be necessary.<sup>84</sup>

Learning from the long process of Chinese revolution, Mao Tse-tung fully realizes the importance of support of the masses and establishment of the bases. According to Mao, the richest source of power to wage war lies in the masses of the people.<sup>85</sup> He often urged his army and Party to mobilize the masses. "The mobilization of the common people throughout the country" Mao said "will creat a vast sea in which to drown the enemy."<sup>86</sup> Meanwhile, it will create condition that can facilitate the guerrilla action among it. "The popular masses are like water, and the guerrilla like fish. Whenever there is water, a fish will have no difficulty in preserving its existence."<sup>87</sup>

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83 Huntington, "Guerrilla Warfare in Theory and Policy," op. cit., p. xix.

84 Gunn, Guerrilla in History, op. cit., p. 45.

85 Mao Tse-tung, "On Protracted War," op. cit., p. 186.

86 Ibid., p. 154.

87 Mao Tse-tung, "General Problems of Guerrilla Warfare in

To establish bases is no less important than the support of the masses for the success of guerrilla war. According to Mao, it is impossible to sustain guerrilla warfare behind the enemy lines without base areas, because guerrilla forces must rely on the bases in performing their strategic tasks, preserving and expanding themselves, and destroying the enemy.<sup>88</sup>

Where the people in the base area is concerned, Mao makes it clear that they are armed people.<sup>89</sup> According to Mao, the process of transforming an area into a base is to annihilate the enemy, to destroy the puppet regime, to mobilize and organize the masses, and to develop people's local armed forces and political power.<sup>90</sup>

Therefore, the development of local people's armed forces becomes a prerequisite for establishing bases. The local people's armed forces are varied. In the Kiangsi-Hunan Soviet period, there were Red Guard, Model Teams, Youth Pioneers, and Guerrilla Teams or special teams.<sup>91</sup> They were armed with spears and shotguns and their organization was based on townships and villages. They were usually dispatched to suppress counterrevolutionaries, protect local governments, and assist the Red Army in the battle. Sometimes, they also waged guerrilla

the Sino-Japanese War," op. cit., pp. 287-288.

88 Mao Tse-tung, "Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War," op. cit., p. 93.

89 Mao Tse-tung, "Strategy in China's Revolutionary War," op. cit., p. 238.

90 Mao Tse-tung, "Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War," op. cit., pp. 96-97.

91 See Tables 3 & 4, Chapter III.

wars independently.<sup>92</sup> It was largely due to these local armed forces that the weak and small Red Army was able to win many battles in the anti-encirclement campaigns of 1930s.

The people's armed forces in the Sino-Japanese war consisted of self-defense corps, militia or guerrilla group.<sup>93</sup> The militia in the Sino-Japanese war was used extensively to consolidate the base areas and to fight the Japanese in coordination with the PLA. According to Lin Piao, in the base areas behind the enemy lines, everybody joined in the fighting — the troops and the civilian population, men and women, old and young; every single village fought. Various ingenious methods of fighting were devised, including "sparrow warfare, land mine warfare, tunnel warfare, sabotage warfare, and guerrilla warfare on lakes and rivers."<sup>94</sup>

The role of the militia in fighting, therefore, was manifest principally in its support for the regular army and guerrilla units, but they also fought guerrilla warfare independently. Sometimes they fought to defend their own villages, other times they fought in close coordination with one another under a unified command and within a solid organization.<sup>95</sup>

Whether the local people's armed forces can play a similar role in the future as they did before, largely depends on the

92 Mao Tse-tung, "Struggle in the Chingkong Mountains," op. cit., p. 84.

93 See Chapter III, p. 17 down.

94 Ibid., pp. 80-81.

95 Liu Yun-cheng, "The Militia in the People's Revolutionary Wars of China," op. cit., p. 5.



development of the roles of guerrilla warfare in the future. If guerrilla warfare should be applied in future wars as it is now, probably the people's armed forces would still play a very important role in the future.

The Chinese have made it clear that they are still preparing to fight a people's war in the future no matter if it is a nuclear war or not.<sup>96</sup> In other words, the Chinese leaders still see the possibility of guerrilla warfare playing a primary role in future wars. Although the Chinese national defense doctrine in the nuclear era was questioned by some students such as Stuart Schram, Ralph Powell,<sup>97</sup> it was supported by other students. Huntington, for instance, believes that guerrilla war is possible in the later phases of a future total war. Such a war presumably would begin with an air-missile exchange of nuclear explosives. However, he thinks that guerrilla warfare in a total war could only be used by the defeated side to improve its bargaining position; it could never succeed in defeating the victorious power unless outside intervention with new sources of power is available.<sup>98</sup>

With a different point of view, Colonel Slavko N. Bjelajac believes that although nuclear weapons will dominate future

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96 See the discussion in Section 3, Chapter V, p. 36 down.

97 See Ibid., p. 42, footnotes 86 & 87.

98 Huntington, "Guerrilla Warfare in Theory and Policy," op. cit., p. xvii.

conflicts, the communist countries can avoid nuclear terror with unconventional warfare. "Unconventional warfare" according to Bjelajac includes various kinds of violent actions such as guerrilla attacks, civil insurrections, mass riots, sabotage or terrorism. Unless the west moves swiftly and purposefully to meet its opponents on this vast and shifting battleground, neither its massive nuclear stockpiles nor delivery systems may save it from final defeat in the protracted conflict.<sup>99</sup>

Some more recent publications also bear similar points. Lewis Gunn, for instance, believes that "guerrillas may have their part to play in conventional and even in nuclear warfare, for if atomic weapons are ever used on the battlefield, the enemy's rear may conceivably be the safest place for the defenders own forces."<sup>100</sup> Robert Taber, the author of The War of the Flea sees that the conflicts over the world today are basically those of have-nots. Guerrilla war is a popular war in one form or another. It will be increasingly used in the third world against colonialists and imperialists. In such a war, according to Taber, the Americans cannot win.<sup>101</sup>

From all of these arguments, one is likely to agree that no matter if it is a nuclear war or a conventional war,

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99 Slavko N. Bjelajac, "Unconventional Warfare in the Nuclear Era," Modern Guerrilla Warfare, ed. Franklin Mark Osanka, op. cit., p. 440.

100 Gunn, Guerrilla in History, op. cit., p. 88.

101 Robert Taber, The War of the Flea: Guerrilla Warfare, Theory and Practice (London: Paladin, 1972), pp. 151-54.

guerrillas will still play a considerable role in the future. So will the militia.

When the Chinese discuss the possible role of the militia in future wars, they do not expect to repeat their familiar guerrilla strategy exactly as before. On the contrary, in accordance with their special socio-political system, they are planning a new strategy of guerrilla war. Provided war breaks out now, they are likely to turn every people's commune, factory, mine, and school into a strong fortification, which will engage in comprehensive struggles against air raids and air-dropped enemy forces, effectively maintain social order, steadfastly carry on production, safeguard communications, consolidate the rear and coordinate operations with and support the fighting at the front.<sup>102</sup>

The fortified communes not only can free the regular army from local defense in order to permit them to concentrate or dealing with the major enemies, but also can delay the march of the enemy and force him to disperse on a wide front and thus to create opportunities for the regular army.

In case the enemy occupies the areas, a real guerrilla war would begin. By relying on the armed forces of the masses, the country is likely to turn every mountain peak, ditch, stretch of forest and house into a stronghold and attack the enemy from every direction. Thus no matter what methods the

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102 Liu Yun-cheng, "The Role of People's Militia," op. cit., p. 19.

enemy adopts and what weapons he uses, he cannot find an easy way to escape the impact of the guerrillas.<sup>103</sup>

While the effect of the EASM and communes on military affairs has not been tested, the bitter memory of the Vietnam war still remains fresh. Against this background, one is likely to agree that the militia can play a considerable role in the wars of future, above all in a conventional war.

#### Militia and Antiguerrilla Warfare

As guerrilla warfare is increasingly used by political insurgents in many developing countries, the problems of counter-guerrilla warfare have gradually come to the attention of scholars as well as politicians. In dealing with guerrillas, more and more people have realized that guerrilla warfare is a socio-political problem rather than military one. The success or failure of counter-guerrilla warfare is strongly affected by the socio-political programs of the government. As Gunn writes: "Counter-guerrilla warfare, like conventional wars, is politics by other means. Armed action must therefore correspond to its political objectives. Butch and bolt actions are useless unless victories are consolidated by maneuvers designed to

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103 Ibid., p. 20. Also see his other article "Great Significance of Making Everybody a Soldier," JMJP, 18 Nov. 1964. Also see Political Teaching Materials of the Militia," op. cit., pp. 24-25.

clear and hold."<sup>104</sup> The method which can help to consolidate military victories and is often mentioned by students of social science is popular support.<sup>105</sup>

If the government can successfully undercut popular support, the guerrillas would be starved as fish would die without water, because a successful campaign of guerrilla war totally relies on the cooperation of the masses. Without their sympathetic support, guerrilla cannot get their information, food, and other support; they will thus lose their war.

The success of counter guerrilla warfare in Malaya and the Philippines in the 1950s, for example, is often mentioned as an example of successful implementation of socio-political policies by which mass support was shifted from the guerrilla to the government side. Magsaysay, for example, did not defeat the Huks with his army but with agrarian reforms. He diverted the majority of his army to social work — setting up medical stations, building schoolhouses, repairing roads and bridges, and helping the peasants get their rice to market, rather than committing them to fighting. This policy eliminated the Huks from cities and brought the counter guerrilla war to a victorious conclusion.<sup>106</sup>

The British defeated the communist guerrillas in Malaya

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104 Gunn, Guerrilla in History, op. cit., p. 89.

105 See Ibid., p. 87. Also see Bjelajac, "Unconventional Warfare in the Nuclear Era," op. cit., p. 447.

106 Taber, The War of the Flea, op. cit., pp. 120-121.

because they succeeded in isolating guerrillas from the masses with a costly program of resettlement. They removed more than half a million Chinese squatters from the fringe of the jungle to protected villages, where they could be kept under surveillance and at the same time offered advantages that tended to woo them from their political connexion with the insurgents.<sup>107</sup>

Besides these political and economic reforms, the British got the support of the masses by promising Malaya effective independence. So they eventually drove the guerrillas back to the jungle and won the war.

Instead winning the support of the Soviet people, the Germans adopted a mass-killing policy in their war against the guerrillas of the U.S.S.R. in the Second World War. This policy helped to rouse the Soviet partisan movement against the Germans and eventually defeated them.<sup>108</sup> Later, the Germans tried to organize militia in some areas to counter the guerrilla activities. However, their failure to get popular support made it impossible for them to trust the indigenous armed forces. The militia were only permitted to carry rifles without ammunition.<sup>109</sup> Even so, considerable hostilities were caused between the Soviet guerrillas and the German-organized

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107 Ibid., p. 124.

108 Dixon and Heilbrunn, Communist Guerrilla Warfare, op. cit., p. 44.

109 Ibid., pp. 110 & 128.

militia. The Germans repeatedly rewarded the militia with money and intended to expand the militia service.<sup>110</sup> Had the Germans not committed serious mistakes in losing peasant support, the militia could have done better in assisting them to defeat the guerrilla bands.

After assuming power in 1949, the CPC finished its long role of opposition and political insurrection in China. Since then, it was the CPC that has had to deal with political insurrection and guerrilla bands of the KMT remnants. To counter the KMT guerrilla forces, the CPC assigned the militia to wipe out the remnant bandits, to suppress counter-revolutionaries, to defend the coast line and border areas, and to maintain social order, in coordination with the PLA and the public security forces.<sup>111</sup> When the CPC started its largescale campaign against the guerrilla forces, the militia was fully mobilized. According to Ting Li, no counterrevolutionary activity was uncovered, no KMT agents, bandits or secret society members were arrested, without the coordinated action of the militia. Village patrolling and guard-post systems were established in order to effectively control any sabotage and insurgent activities.<sup>112</sup>

When China suffered a serious economic crisis from 1959 to 1961, the KMT government lost no time to carry out

110 Ibid., pp. 120 & 129.

111 Study of the Militia System of the Communist Bandits, op. cit., pp. 5-6. A similar article is contained in the Militia Regulations, see Article 3.

112 Ting Li, The Militia System of the Chinese Communists, op. cit., p. 57.

large-scale guerrilla activities on the mainland. However, the CPC's intensive political indoctrination and organizational control were able to consolidate its popular support among the majority of the population. Consequently most guerrilla forces and spies dispatched from Taiwan and Hong Kong were wiped out (see Table 28). According to the Chinese statements from 1958

Table 28: The Number and Percentage of the Kuomintang Guerrilla Bands Captured in Kwangtung, Fukien and Chekiang Provinces from 1958 to 1964

<u>Landed Province</u>	<u>No. of Groups</u>	<u>No. of Persons</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Kwangtung	14	213	88.3
Fukien	2	17	7
Chekiang	1	11	4.7
Total	17	241	100

to 1964, at least 17 groups of armed guerrillas were wiped out almost immediately after they first set foot on the mainland. The largest guerrilla band was composed of 35 members; the smallest of only 3. All of these guerrillas were dispatched in 1962 and 1963 except 2 groups which were sent in 1958 and 1964 respectively. 14 out of the 17 groups were landed and captured in the coastal areas of Kwangtung Province; one in Chekiang and the others in Fukien. Most of these captures were directly affected by the militia (see Table 29). The communique of the Chinese Ministry of Public Security particularly mentioned the contributions of the militia and masses in these campaigns.<sup>113</sup>

<sup>113</sup> See NCNA, Peking, English, 29 Dec. 1962; SCMP, No.2891, p. 1.



Table 29: The Captured Guerrillas from 1958 to 1964

Guerrilla Unit	Code Name	Person	Date	Landing Area	Captured by	Sources
-	-	3	July 4, 1958	Yampak Chuang Automous Hsien, Kwangtung	Villagers and militia	SCMP, No.1287, p. 42.
5th Detachment of Armed Agents or 2nd Independent Column of the Anti-Communist National Salvation Army (ACNSA)	Haiwei Plan of the Ministry of National Defense, Taiwan (海威計劃)	14	Oct. 1, 1962	Haifeng, Kwangtung		No.2891, p. 2.
1st Detachment of Armed Agents or 3rd Independent Column of ACNSA	Haiwei Plan	12	Oct. 7, 1962	Waiyeung, Kwangtung	Fishermen and militia	No.2891, pp.2-4.
4th Detachment or 4th Independent Column of ACNSA	Haiwei Plan	14	Oct. 8, 1962	Hweilai, Kwangtung	Militia	No.2891, pp.2-4.
3rd and 7th Detachments or 5th and 6th Independent Column of ACNSA	Haiwei Plan	22	Oct. 28, 1962	Tinpak, Kwangtung	Militia	No.2891, pp.2 & 4.
-- Continued --						

Hailung (海龍) Team of Armed Agents or the Vanguard of ACNSA (including the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and a communication detachments)	"Panchao" Plan of the Ministry of National Defense (班超計劃)	33	Nov. 2, 1962	Taishan, Kwangtung		No. 2891, p. 2.
6th Detachment or 7th Independent Column of ACNSA	Haiwei Plan	35	Nov. 29, 1962	Taishan, Kwangtung		No. 2891, p. 2.
23rd Independent Column of ACNSA	-	10	Dec. 6, 1962	Hweilai, Kwangtung	Militia	No. 3330, p. 5.
-	Intelligence Office of Chiang	22	June 21, 1963	Chungshan, Kwangtung		No. 3012, p. 17.
71st Detachment of Anti-Communist Assault Army (ACAA)	Ministry of National Defense	7	June 21, 1963	Changpu, Fukien.		No. 3012, p. 17.
61st Detachment of ACAA	Ministry of National Defense	10	June 22, 1963	Shaoan, Fukien		No. 3012, p. 17.
91st Detachment of ACAA	Ministry of National Defense	10	June 22, 1963	Haifeng, Kwangtung		No. 3012, p. 17.

-- Continued --

31st Detachment of ACAA	Ministry of National Defense	11	June 27, 1963	Pingyang, Chekiang		No. 3012, p. 2
31st Independent Column of ACNSA	Intelligence Office of Taiwan	9	June 28, 1963	Tinpak, Kwangtung		No. 3012, p. 2.
		Group	June 26, 1963	Taipai (on sea), Kwangtung	Fishermen & Militia	No. 3330, p. 5.
-	The U.S.A. Navy Auxiliary Communication Center and the Taiwan National Security Bureau	8	The summer of 1963	Hainan, Kwangtung (air-drop)	Militia	No. 3330, p. 5.
-	Hong Kong (Taiwan)	7	-	Pao-an, Kwangtung	Militia	No. 3330, p. 5.
±	Macao	3	March 28, 1964	Chungshan, Kwangtung	Fishermen & Militia	No. 3330, p. 6.

The Kwangtung Provincial People's Council and Kwangtung Provincial Military District Command issued a joint order commending militiamen and the people for their wiping out the 9 groups of armed guerrillas.<sup>114</sup>

After being captured, a guerrilla commander told his captors: "Terrible! The whole population on the mainland have become soldiers! I feel that I have been caught in a net!"<sup>115</sup>

In commenting on the successful campaign against guerrilla infiltration, the NFJP wrote that "the victory is due to the fact that the broad masses of the people have a high degree of political consciousness and revolutionary vigilance, that they love their mother country deeply and hate the enemy intensely."<sup>116</sup> If one takes these words seriously, one is likely to agree that the CPC's political indoctrination of the militia has paid off in counter guerrilla warfare. They not only successfully drained out the water and left the fish starved but developed a vast sea to drown the guerrilla bands.

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114 NFJP, 31 Dec. 1962; SCMP, No. 2911, p. 7.

115 "U.S.-Chiang Agents Killed, Captured in Kwangtung," NCNA English, Canton, 29 Dec. 1962; SCMP, No. 2891, p. 5.

116 Ibid., p. 8.

## VII. Conclusion

This dissertation has analysed the development, organization, and functions of the EASM. I shall summarize my discussions as follows:

1. The Contemporary Major Socio-political Development and the Implementation of the EASM

As stated in Chapter III, no socio-political system can be imposed on a society without adapting itself to the contemporary political reality of the society. The EASM in 1958, in my view, occurred not because Mao Tse-tung desired it, but because the contemporary domestic and international political situation were ripe for it. The evidence showed in this study indicates that the communization of the Chinese countryside and the militarization of the agricultural working organization have greatly helped the CPC to mobilize, organize, and, above all, militarize the majority of the Chinese peasants in the form of militia organizations. However, the implementation of the people's commune system might not have to bring the establishment of militia divisions of large size had there been no other reasons to require it. In my view, the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations in 1957, the American military intervention in the Lebanon crisis, and the Taiwan Strait Crisis forced China to adopt a drastic new strategy of national defense which was often referred to as self-reliance, walking on two legs, and people's warfare.

The EASM system was chosen by Mao as a part of the new strategy to respond to real as well as imagined threats. A socio-political system has its historical root. It is true to say that Mao called for the EASM in 1958, but it would be less honest to attribute this concept to Mao's personal invention. Different concepts of EASM occurred in China as well as in other countries long before Mao. The Chinese traditional YPYN system which was first adopted by the Ch'in State in 348 B.C. and was intermittently adopted by different dynasties until the Ch'ing Dynasty, may have influenced the Chinese leaders intellectually, even if the two systems are not the same.

## 2. The Prevailing Political Ideology and the Organization of the EASM

The organizational characteristics of a socio-political system often reflect the prevailing social value system of the society in which it exists.

The evidences shown in this study indicate that the organization of the EASM was closely linked to the contemporary Chinese political ideology and organizational principles of the CPC.

### Politics Taking Command

Political supremacy is a predominant principle of the contemporary Chinese political system. According to Chairman Mao political power grows out of the barrel of gun, and

never allows the gun to control the Party. The militia organization is a military force. It must not only obey Party policy but also accept Party leadership. The secretaries of the local Party committee and the YLC, and the retired PLA soldiers are the agents of the Party in charge of leading the militia.

#### Class Line and the Militia

Class struggle is a dominant factor in Chinese contemporary politics. Under the theory of proletarian dictatorship, the militia is seen as an instrument of the proletarian class in order to suppress the class enemy and consolidate its political power. To achieve this goal, the CPC has taken a strong class line in the organization of the militia. The landlords, rich peasants, counterrevolutionaries, undesirable rightist elements (5 kinds of bad elements) are excluded from participating in the militia; the cadres of the militia are exclusively chosen from the political activists of the workers, poor and lower-middle peasants. Class purification is the primary consideration of the militia organization.

#### Mass Line and Democratic Centralism

Mass line is an extremely important principle of Chinese political life. It is, to a considerable degree, a Chinese style of democracy. In applying this doctrine to the militia, the militia members are permitted to elect their leaders (except the political commissarships which are concurrently occupied by the Secretaries of the Party

Committee and the YLC) and criticize them. When mass line and democracy are implemented in the militia (other organizations as well), the principle of "democratic centralism" is strictly followed. Under this principle, the Party committee is empowered to nominate the candidates of militia cadres and to approve the result of the election and the resolutions passed by the militia meetings.

#### Combining the Militia Work with Production

When the EASM contains the majority of the able-bodied men and women of the society, it cannot help but affect production. The militia is often asked to adapt its activities and organizations to the productive activities and organizations.

Whenever the production unit changes, the militia organization follows suit. To achieve this goal, both the militia organization and its training program are required to be flexible. The size and number of the militia unit are not fixed; the form of militia training is flexible. They are required not to interrupt production.

### 3. The Effect of the EASM on Political Development

By analysing the major problems of contemporary political development in developing countries, I have proposed that political stability, political consensus, economic development and the change of peasant attitudes are the primary tasks for developing countries to achieve in the process of modernization. Based on the evidence presented



in previous chapters, the effect of the EASM on political development can be summed up as follows:

### Promoting Political Stability

According to this study in Chapter 5 and 6, the Chinese militia under the EASM have to a large extent promoted political stability. The danger to political stability in developing countries is basically posed by the breach of law and order by internal political insurrection, ordinary offenders, and external military threat. The militia-patrols and guard-posts in the countryside have effectively halted political insurrection and guerrilla activities of the KMT in the early 1960s. Research published in Taiwan not only confirmed the effect of the coordinated defense of the militia and the PLA on the political infiltration and guerrilla activity of the KMT, but also speculated on the possible effect of militia activity on the possibility of future wars against the mainland waged by the KMT.<sup>1</sup> Western scholars such as Powell and Gittings noted that the effect of militia activity on maintaining law and order against political insurrection is considerable, but due to its rudimentary training as a reserve force, its effect on military capabilities is marginal.<sup>2</sup> The strategic value of the militia in nuclear

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- 1 Cheng Ch'ih (澄之), "Looking at the Development of the Combat Power of the Militia through the Recent Militia Work Conference of the Communist Bandits," FCYP 8:9 (Oct. 1965), p. 31.
- 2 Ralph L. Powell, "Communist China's Mass Militia," Part II, Current Scene, Developments in Mainland China 3:8 (Dec. 1, 1964), pp. 5-6. Also Gittings, "China's Militia," op. cit., pp. 115-116.

war is clearly recognized by the military leaders in Taiwan but doubted by western scholars.<sup>3</sup> Based on the analyses in Chapters 5 & 6, this study tends to agree with the conclusions of Taiwan reserchers. In other words, the militia is likely to play a considerable role in future wars.

#### Political Consensus and Identity

Political consensus and identity are the essential factors which affect the political integration of a country. Based on the analysis of the intensive political education of the militia, and the constant commitment of the Party to the militia organization, a fairly high degree of political consensus and identity between the political leaders and the militia seems to have been achieved. The legitimacy of the Party and the regime is supported by the majority of the militia. However, this study notes that the political consensus and identity developed by the militia political education have a strong class bias. Political dissenters are often identified as class enemies and excluded from the militia organization. Similar to Powell, this study tends to agree that to some extent the militia can "serve as a transmission belt for the Party, carry directives downward and information upward to leading cadres"<sup>4</sup> and thus to bridge the gap

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3 Powell and Schram, see footnotes 86 and 87 of Chapter 5. The opinions of Taiwan writers can be represented by the conclusions of General Wang Do-nien. See "The Military Implications of the People's Commune System of the Communist Bandits," op. cit., pp. 1636-1637.

4 Powell, "Communist China's Mass Militia," Part II, op. cit., p. 6.

between the masses and the political leaders.

While political integration can be promoted by consistent political indoctrination conducted by the Party, it is also important to realize that serious chaos among the militia and the masses may occur whenever a serious ideological split occurs among the top leaders. From the evidence mentioned in Chapter 4, one is likely to realize that during the GPCR, when the top Party leadership split into different ideological factions, the militia controlled by the local Party committee tended to deepen the political crisis by independent action. The struggle for control over the militia by different factions in order to consolidate their power status may plunge the country into a bloodshed civil war. The reported clashes between militia and Red Guards during the GPCR at the local level in some provinces are obvious evidence.<sup>5</sup>

#### The Change of Peasant Attitudes

Part of the political education of the militia is directed towards transforming the personality of the Chinese peasant into that of a socialist man. Mao and the CPC have made it clear that the Chinese should be able to do factory work with hammer in hand, to do farming with hoe and plow or

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5 In addition to the evidence shown in Chapter 4, other reports are also available in The Military Struggle, Uprising, and its Development in the Mainland (匪区武鬥斗争及其发展), ed. The Central Committee of the KMT (Taipei: The Central Committee of the KMT, 1969), pp. 144-200.

harrow, to fight the enemy with the gun, and to express themselves in writing with pen.<sup>6</sup> Like the 5-good youth and the 5-good soldier movements, the 5-good militiaman movement is also aimed at molding socialist man. Military training, regular study meetings and current-situation reports have some what helped to bring the passive and shortsighted peasant militiamen to look at things beyond their villages. Although no research was carried out in China to measure the actual change of the peasants by scholars from the western world, visitor's reports have impressed us that the concept of family, marriage, authority as well as political attitudes among the younger generation have changed drastically. However, the intensive political education of the militia is emphasized to raise the political consciousness of the masses and their political loyalty rather than to train an independent citizen.

#### Economic Development

Increasing production can be achieved by means of capital investment, management improvement, and new-technique application. The governments of many developing countries have been handicapped by the shortage of capital as well as organizational skills. China is in the process of modernization. It is as short of capital as any other developing

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<sup>6</sup> Mao Tse-tung, "A Letter to Lin Piao on May 7, 1966," cited from John Burns, "Blueprint from Mao: Cadre Schools Mold the Socialist Man," The Globe and Mail, 20 April 1973.

countries. However, it is the most populous country in the world and thus is seen as the country most likely to use its huge manpower in order to fill the gap of capital shortage. The militia organization has, among other things, provided a proper framework to mobilize and organize a large number of people to carry out coordinated actions in order to promote economic development. Based on the evidence shown in Chapters 5 and 6 of this study, the role of the militia as a unit active in the economic field is two-fold: First of all, the militia organization is a useful mechanism of the society to organize economic activities with a labour intensive strategy. The Kwangtung militia, for example, were mobilized to reclaim or improve waste land, to construct water conservancy and irrigation systems, to collect manure as well as to carry out emergency production. Secondly, the militia is often used as a shock force in crisis moments such as to rescue lives and property from flood and other critical situations. Besides, the militia organization can be useful to help diffuse modern knowledge and techniques among the militia members through military training as well as by political education, to a marginal degree.

#### 4. The perspective of the EASM

Parties are the products of history. Of all the things in this world, there are none which are not the products of history. . . . Every thing which is produced by history will also be destroyed by history. The Communist Party was produced by history, and for that

reason the day will inevitably come when it will be destroyed. The democratic parties have a similar destiny.<sup>7</sup>

Similar to Hegel's theory of historical determinism, Mao's words strongly imply that a political system has its particular historical mission, and would be replaced by other systems after completing its mission. It also indicates that a system comes into being when certain historical conditions exist and tends to decline after the original historical conditions disappear or a new condition emerges. In other words, Mao's theory is basically in accordance with the contemporary belief that a political system is created to perform some particular functions. Its rise, development, and decline are inevitably affected by the change of the objective environment in which it exists.

The EASM system was created in 1958 under particular circumstances and to meet particular necessities of Chinese political development. Its development will inevitably be affected by the development of Chinese politics in the future. Although the future development of the EASM is not particularly discussed in this study, it has been referred to in the process of analysis. Based on the evidence revealed in the previous chapters, I would predict the following possible developments for the militia in the future.

#### The Decline of the EASM

In Chinese history most YPYN systems came into being

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7 Schram, ed., Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed, op. cit., p. 75.

at the beginning of new dynasties (Ch'in's Shih Wu Chih, T'ang's Fu Ping Chih, and the Taiping Army, etc.) or at a particular moment when war was highly likely (Sung's Pao Chia Chih). In the former case no militia systems had existed for a long time. Most of them declined gradually after peace was restored and before a new war threat was felt; in the latter case, the militia disappeared when the war efforts failed. The CPC started to organize Red Guards and militia during the revolutionary war and the Sino-Japanese war. After the victorious conclusion of the civil war in 1949, the militia gradually faded until 1958 when both in the internal and external political development of China there emerged certain conditions which facilitated the establishment of the EASM and mass militia as analysed in Chapter 3 of this study. Since the very beginning of the EASM, the voices of dissenters have never been completely silenced (as in P'êng Te-huai's opposition to the militia system). Some western scholars also questioned the long-term value of the EASM system, and suspected that it could not be maintained for long. Although the study concludes that the militia has performed satisfactorily in several aspects in contemporary China and tends to agree that it is likely to play a significant role in possible future wars, the mass militia will gradually change in accordance with the development of China in the future.

For a revolutionary regime, the extensive mobilization

of the masses for socio-political reform and economic development carried out so far by the CPC is justifiable. However, when China's modernization is completed, and war threats from outside are diminished, the primary excuse for China's maintenance of a mass militia will be the domestic class struggle only, which Mao thinks will continue for a long time in socialist society. Nevertheless, the theory of continual class struggle is not disputable. After Mao's death, if the new leaders adopt a different policy of class struggle, the mass militia might lose most of its major bases. If so its organization would be reduced to a much smaller size. The ordinary militia would gradually disappear. The backbone militia with a much smaller number than it has now, would serve as a military reserve and thus become an élite local armed force.

#### The Reduction of the Role of the Militia

Under the CPC, the militia is used as a Party apparatus to carry on political socialization, economic development, socio-cultural reforms, and political struggle. These not only go far beyond the traditional roles of the militia under the YPYN system, but are also different from the Red Guards or self-defense corps of the CPC in the process of civil wars. When the CPC moves to routinize and institutionalize itself, which would inevitably occur in the long run, the militia organization would gradually become a small chosen group as mentioned above, and would only perform two



functions: it would become the reserve of the army and the police helper to maintain law and order in the countryside. While its military function may change depending on the possible change of the form of future wars, the police function of the militia in the countryside would persist as long as the majority of the population still live in the countryside and no police force is likely to be dispatched to the villages. The other functions such as political functions as well as economic functions would become insignificant and even nonexistent when the Party abandons class struggle as a primary consideration of domestic politics and the production is fully developed and mechanized.

A Balance Force between the Army and the Party?

Impossible!

The militia has long been advised to learn from the PLA and has served the army as an aide, while the army is charged to serve as an organizer and instructor in developing the militia. However, there is evidence to show that the PLA was reluctant to involve itself in organizing a mass militia either because of strategic reasons or because of group interests, as many scholars already noted. After the Cultural Revolution, the overexpanding political involvement of the PLA has forced Mao and his left wing followers in many cities to use the militia to counterbalance the PLA. This new development may raise the political consciousness of the militia, but it is far from true to say that the

militia can serve as a balance-force in the struggle between the Party and the army, because the loose organization, poor equipment, minimal training, and above all the part-time nature of the militia, tend to reduce its ability to compete with the army, should a struggle ever develop between the Party and the PLA.

Glossary

I. Abbreviations of the Titles of Newspapers and Magazines:

- CB Current Background (Hong Kong: The U.S.A. Consulate General)
- CFJP Chieh-fang Jih-pao (解放日报, Yen-an & Shanghai)
- CKCNP Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien Pao (中国青年报, Peking)
- CKYU Chuang-kung Yen-chiu (中共研究, Taipei)
- ECMM Extracts from China Mainland Magazines (Hong Kong: The U.S.A. Consulate General)
- FCNP Fei-ch'ing Nien-pao (匪情年报, Taipei: Fei-ch'ing Yen-chiu She 匪情研究社)
- FCYC Fei-ch'ing Yen-chiu (匪情研究, Taipei)
- FCYCTK Fei-ch'ing Yen-chiu Ts'ung-k'an (匪情研究叢刊, Taipei: The Planning and Studying Committee of Restoring the Mainland, National Assembly 國民大會光復大陸設計研究委員會)
- FCYP Fei-ch'ing Yüeh-pao (匪情月报, Taipei: The Institute of International Relations 國際關係研究所)
- I & S Issues and Studies (問題與研究, Taipei: The Institute of International Relations)
- JMJP Jen-min Jih-pao (人民日报, Peking)
- KMJP Kuang-ming Jih-pao (光明日报)
- NCNA New China News Agency (新華社)
- NFJP Nan-fang Jih-pao (南方日报, Canton)
- TCYC Ti-ch'ing Yen-chiu (敵情研究, Taipei: The Section of Enemy Study of the Executive Yuan 行政院敵情研究室)
- TKP Ta-kung Pao (大公报, Hong Kong)
- TLFCCP Ta-Lu Fei-ch'ing Chi-pao (大陸匪情季报, Taipei: The Central Committee of Kuomintang)

- TYCK            Tung-ya Chi-k'an (東亞季刊, Taipei: The Institute of International Relations)
- TCYCLWC        Ti-ch'ing Yen-chiu Lun-wen Chi (敵情研究論文集, Taipei: The Institute of National Defense 國防研究院)
- WHP            Wen Hui Pao (文匯報, Hong Kong)
- YCWP           Yang-ch'eng Wan-pao (羊城晚報, Canton)

## II. The Names of Major Chinese Leaders in this Thesis

- |                 |     |
|-----------------|-----|
| Chao Tzu-yang   | 趙紫陽 |
| Chen Tsai-tao   | 陳再道 |
| Chi'ang Ching   | 江青  |
| Chou En-lai     | 周恩來 |
| Chu Teh         | 朱德  |
| Fu Ch'iu-t'ao   | 傅秋濤 |
| Hu Yao-pang     | 胡耀邦 |
| Kung Chu        | 龔楚  |
| Liao Chung-kai  | 廖仲凱 |
| Lin Piao        | 林彪  |
| Liu Hsien-sheng | 劉先勝 |
| Liu Shao-ch'i   | 劉少奇 |
| Lo Jui-ch'ing   | 羅瑞卿 |
| Mao Tse-tung    | 毛澤東 |
| P'eng Pai       | 彭湃  |
| P'eng Teh-huai  | 彭德懷 |
| Sung Wei-shih   | 宋維斌 |
| T'ao Chu        | 陶鑄  |
| Teng K'e-ming   | 鄧克明 |

Teng Shiao-p'ing	鄧小平
Wang An-shih	王安石
Wang Chen	王震
Wang Ching-wei	汪精衛
Wu Chih-pu	吳芝圃
Yang Ch'eng-wu	楊成武
Yeh Chien-ying	葉劍英

### III. Miscellanea

APC	Agricultural Producer's Cooperatives (農業生產合作社)
Ch'ü	區
CPC	Communist Party of China (中國共產黨)
CPPCC	The Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (中國人民政治協商會議共同綱領)
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
EASM	Everybody A Soldier Movement
GLF	Great Leap Forward (大躍進)
Fu Ping Chih	府兵制
GPCR	Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (無產階級文化大革命)
HAPC	Higher-level Agricultural Producer's Cooperative (高級農業合作社)
Hsiang	鄉
Hsien	County (縣)
KMT	Kuomintang (國民黨)
LAPC	Lower-level Agriculture Producer's Cooperative (初級農業合作社)

Li	里
MAT	Mutual-aid Team (互助隊)
Mou	畝
Nanniwan	南泥灣
Pao Chia Chih	保甲制
Ping-nung Ho-i	兵農合一
PLA	People's Liberation Army (人民解放軍)
PRC	People's Republic of China (中華人民共和國)
Shih Wu Chih	什伍制
YCL	Young Communist League (共產主義青年團)
YPYN	Yü Ping Yü Nung (寓兵於農)

Appendix I

## Conscription Law of the People's Republic of China\*

(Adopted by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on February 7, 1955)

## Chapter I: General Principles

Article 1. This Law is enacted in accordance with Article 103 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China, which states: "It is the sacred duty of every citizen of the People's Republic of China to defend the homeland. It is the honorable duty of citizens of the People's Republic of China to perform military service as required by law."

Article 2. It is the duty of all male citizens of the People's Republic of China who have reached the age of eighteen to perform military service according to provisions of this Law, irrespective of nationality, race, occupation, social status, religious belief, or education.

Article 3. Counterrevolutionary elements, feudal landlords, and bureaucratic capitalists disfranchised by law for a certain period, and other disfranchised persons are not eligible for military service.

Article 4. The armed forces of the People's Republic of China are composed of various arms of the People's Liberation Army.

Article 5. Military service is divided into active service and reserve service.

Those on active service are called servicemen in active service and those on reserve service are called reserve servicemen.

Article 6. Servicemen in active service and reserve servicemen consist of officers, noncommissioned officers, and privates.

Article 7. The terms of active service for noncommissioned officers and privates are as follows: three years for noncommissioned officers and privates of the Army and Public Security Force; four years for noncommissioned officers and privates of the Air Force, Coast Guard Force, and Seaborne Security Force; and five years for noncommissioned officers and ratings of seaborne forces of the Navy.

The term of active service is counted from March 1 of the year subsequent to the year of call-up.

Article 8. Based on the needs of the army, the State Council has the right to extend the term of active service for noncommissioned officers and privates by a period of up to four months; the Ministry of National Defense has the right to transfer the servicemen in active service from one branch of service to another and to change their term of active service accordingly.

Article 9. Noncommissioned officers having served the term of active service may, according to the needs of the army and their desire, perform active service beyond the term; the period beyond the term of active service shall be at least one year.

Article 10. Noncommissioned officers and privates shall end their term of reserve service when they have reached the age of forty, and shall retire at the expiration of their term of reserve service.

Article 11. The Ministry of National Defense has the right



to register women with special medical, veterinary, and other technical training for reserve service, and may organize them to receive collective training if necessary.

In wartime women having received such training may be called up to serve in the army. Women with proper qualifications may also be given technical training.

Article 12. The State Council and the administrative organs of the state in provinces, autonomous districts, municipalities directly under the Central People's Government, autonomous chou, hsien, autonomous hsien, and municipalities shall set up conscription committees to direct conscription work. The organization and duties of the conscription committee shall be determined by the State Council.

Article 13. Conscription bureaus shall be set up in all provinces, autonomous districts, municipalities subordinate to provincial governments, autonomous chou, hsien, autonomous hsien, and municipalities. Conscription bureaus are military organs in charge of conscription work.

The people's councils of municipal ch'ü, hsiang, and chen shall undertake conscription work in accordance with the decisions of the conscription bureaus of municipalities directly under the Central People's Government, hsien, autonomous heien, and municipalities.

Article 14. Noncommissioned officers and privates who entered their services in the army as volunteers before the promulgation of this Law should, according to orders of the Ministry of National Defense, be demobilized, put on the reserve list, or retired by stages. The state shall issue them different amounts of production subsidies according to the length of their service, and the local administrative organs of the

state shall properly resettle them and help them establish themselves in civilian life.

## Chapter II: 'Call-Up

Article 15. The period from March 1 of every year to the end of February of the next year shall be the year of call-up. Male citizens who have reached the age of eighteen before June 30 of the year of call-up should be called up for active service.

Article 16. All male citizens who have reached the age of eighteen before June 30 of the year of call-up should register for military service and take preliminary physical examinations before July 1, upon the notification of the conscription bureaus of municipalities directly under the Central People's Government, hsien, autonomous hsien, and municipalities. Those registered for military service and having passed preliminary physical examinations are called citizens eligible for conscription. Measures for military service registration shall be drawn up by the State Council.

Article 17. The State Council shall determine the number of persons to be called up for active service each year, measures of call-up, and quotas for provinces, autonomous districts, and municipalities directly under the Central People's Government. The quotas given by provinces and autonomous districts to hsien, autonomous hsien, and municipalities shall be determined by the people's councils of provinces, autonomous districts, and autonomous chou.

Article 18. Regular nationwide call-up should take place from November 1 of each year to the end of February of the following year according to the order of the Ministry of National Defense. Local dates of call-up should be determined

by the conscription bureaus of provinces, autonomous districts, and municipalities directly under the Central People's Government.

Article 19. To facilitate call-up, municipalities directly under the Central People's Government, hsien, autonomous hsien, and municipalities shall be made call-up areas, within which a certain number of call-up stations may be established according to requirements.

Article 20. Following announcement of call-up, every citizen eligible for conscription should report at the date set by the conscription bureau of the call-up area in which he was registered. Citizens eligible for conscription who find it necessary to change their call-up area should complete procedures of transfer prior to August 1 of the call-up year; subsequent to August 1, the call-up area can be changed only if citizens eligible for conscription are transferred to another area on official duties, or if citizens eligible for conscription are removed with their families to another call-up area.

Article 21. At the time of call-up, the conscription committees shall organize state health organs in the localities concerned to give physical examinations on enlistment to citizens eligible for conscription. Examinations shall be conducted according to the standard of physical examination set by the Ministry of National Defense.

Article 22. Conscription may be deferred in the case of citizens eligible for conscription who are found unfit for service on account of illness.

Article 23. Subject to consideration and approval of the conscription committees of municipalities directly under the

Central People's Government, hsien, and autonomous hsien, citizens eligible for conscription who are the sole family support or only sons shall be exempted from active service during peacetime. However, should the above conditions for exemption change, they should be called up for active service for the remaining part of a five-year period counting from the date they are eligible for conscription.

Article 24. Students studying in senior middle schools and schools equivalent to senior middle schools who have reached the age of eighteen shall be called up or deferred in call-up according to order of the State Council.

Students studying in institutes of higher learning shall be deferred in call-up.

Article 25. Citizens liable to conscription who are under arrest, sentenced to prison terms, or placed under surveillance shall not be called up.

### Chapter III: Reserve Service of Noncommissioned Officers and Privates

Article 26. Reserve service of noncommissioned officers and privates shall consist of class I reserve service and class II reserve service.

Article 27. Noncommissioned officers and privates who have fully served the term of active service shall enter into class I reserve service.

Article 28. Citizens liable to conscription who are not called up for active service in peacetime, citizens liable to conscription who are exempted from active service in peacetime, and women aged eighteen to forty who have registered themselves

for reserve service in accordance with Article 11 of this Law shall enter into class II reserve service.

Reserve servicemen not called up during the call-up year and entered into class II reserve service may still be called up for active service for the remaining part of a five-year period counting from the date of their being put on the reserve list.

Article 29. Both class I and class II of reserve service shall be divided into grade I and grade II. Grade I shall include those reserve servicemen thirty years of age and under; grade II shall include those reserve servicemen forty years of age and under.

Article 30. Noncommissioned officers and privates on reserve service should participate in collective training according to the order of the Ministry of National Defense.

Article 31. Grade I reserve servicemen of class I selected for noncommissioned officer duties should participate in collective training according to the order of the Ministry of National Defense, and shall enter into reserve service at the expiration of collective training.

Article 32. Grade I reserve servicemen of class I selected to receive the rank of 2d Lieutenant should participate in collective training according to the order of the Ministry of National Defense. Those who have passed examinations at the expiration of their collective training and awarded the rank of 2d Lieutenant shall enter the reserve service of officers; those who have failed in the examinations shall continue to perform the reserve service of noncommissioned officers.

Chapter IV: Active Service and Reserve Service  
of Officers

Article 33. Officers retired after serving their term of active service, officers retired before fully serving their term of active service, officers given the rank of 2d Lieutenant according to Articles 32 and 54 of this Law, and personnel working in state organs that are not military organizations or in other enterprises who are qualified for officer duties and given the ranks of reserve officers, shall be put on the list of reserve officers.

Reserve service of officers shall be divided into grade I and grade II according to age.

Article 34. The maximum age limits for active service and reserve service of officers are as follows:

1. Officers of the Ground Force, Air Force, and Public Security Force:

2d Lieutenant: Thirty years of age for active service, forty for grade I reserve service, and forty-five for grade II reserve service.

1st Lieutenant: Thirty years of age for active service, forty for grade I reserve service, and forty-five for grade II reserve service.

Senior 1st Lieutenant: Thirty-five years of age for active service, forty-five for grade I reserve service, and fifty for grade II reserve service.

Captain: Thirty-five years of age for active service, forty-five for grade I reserve service, and fifty for grade II reserve service.

Major: Forty years of age for active service, fifty for grade I reserve service, and fifty-five for grade II reserve service.

Lieutenant Colonel: Forty-five years of age for active service, fifty-five for grade I reserve service, and sixty for grade II reserve service.

Colonel: Fifty years of age for active service, fifty-five for grade I reserve service, and sixty for grade II reserve service.

Senior Colonel: Fifty years of age for active service, fifty-five for grade I reserve service, and sixty for grade II reserve service.

Brigadier General: Fifty-five years of age for active service, sixty for grade I reserve service, and sixty-five for grade II reserve service.

Major General: Sixty years of age for active service, sixty for grade I reserve service, and sixty-five for grade II reserve service.

Lieutenant General and above: maximum ages to be determined according to specific conditions.

2. Officers of the Navy and Seaborne Security Force:

Warrant Officer: Thirty-five years of age for active service, forty for grade I reserve service, and forty-five for grade II reserve service.

Junior Lieutenant: Thirty-five years of age for active service, forty for grade I reserve service, and forty-five for grade II reserve service.

Lieutenant: Forty years of age for active service, forty-five for grade I reserve service, and fifty for grade II reserve service.

Senior Lieutenant: Forty years of age for active service, forty-five for grade I reserve service, and fifty for grade II reserve service.

Captain Lieutenant: Forty-five years of age for active service, fifty for grade I reserve service, and fifty-five for grade II reserve service.

Captain 3d rank: Fifty years of age for active service,

fifty-five for grade I reserve service, and sixty for grade II reserve service.

Captain 2d rank: Fifty-five years of age for active service, fifty-five for grade I reserve service, and sixty for grade I<sup>1</sup> reserve service.

Captain 1st rank: Fifty-five years of age for active service, fifty-five for grade I reserve service, and sixty for grade II reserve service.

Rear Admiral: Fifty-five years of age for active service, sixty for grade I reserve service, and sixty-five for grade II reserve service.

Vice Admiral: 60 years of age for active service, sixty for grade I reserve service, and sixty-five for grade II reserve service.

Admiral and above: maximum ages to be determined according to specific conditions.

Article 35. Reserve officers shall retire after fully serving their term of reserve service.

Article 36. Reserve officers should participate in collective training during the period of reserve service according to the order of the Ministry of National Defense.

Article 37. Officers' service regulations shall be separately drawn up.

#### Chapter V: Rights and Duties of Servicemen in Service and Reserve Service

Article 38. Servicemen in active service and reserve service enjoy the civil rights and duties prescribed in the Constitution of the People's Republic of China.

Except for those provided in this Law, the rights and



duties of servicemen in active service arising from their military duties shall be prescribed separately by military regulations.

Article 39. Servicemen on active service and reserve service who perform meritorious service should be given state orders and medals and titles of honor.

Article 40. Living expenses and traveling expenses incurred by reserve servicemen during the period of collective training shall be supplied by the state.

Article 41. Workers and office employees should be granted specific leave and paid the usual salaries by the units to which they belong when they attend to business pertaining to registration and conscription.

Article 42. Reserve servicemen among workers and office employees should retain their original posts and should be paid a certain salary by the units to which they belong during the period of collective training of reserve servicemen. The wage standards shall be fixed by the State Council.

Measures for dealing with questions faced by peasants, handicraftsmen, and other laboring people arising from collective training of reserve servicemen shall be determined by the State Council.

Article 43. Reserve officers shall receive subsidies from collective training organs, according to the standard set by the Ministry of National Defense during the period of collective training.

Article 44. Dependents of servicemen in active service who were killed or die of illness on active duty are entitled to

pensions and preferential treatment by the state. Servicemen in active service who are disabled on active duty shall receive pensions and preferential treatment by the state. Regulations on pension and preferential treatment shall be separately drawn up.

Article 45. Servicemen in active service and their dependents are entitled to preferential treatment by the state under regulations to be separately drawn up.

Article 46. Servicemen in reserve service are under obligation to observe the discipline of the People's Liberation Army during the period of collective training.

#### Chapter VI: Registration and Statistics of Servicemen in Reserve Service

Article 47. Servicemen in reserve service should register for military service at the place designated by the conscription bureaus in the localities where they reside.

Article 48. Servicemen in reserve service who change their place of residence should complete transfer of their conscription records at the same time as completing the transfer of their census records.

Article 49. Registration and statistics of servicemen on reserve service shall be handled by conscription bureaus of municipalities directly under the Central People's Government, hsien, autonomous hsien, and municipalities.

Article 50. Measures governing registration and statistics of servicemen in reserve service shall be drawn up by the Ministry of National Defense.

## Chapter VII: Wartime Call-Up

Article 51. Wartime call-up shall be ordered by the Ministry of National Defense on the basis of a decision by the State Council, following state proclamation of a mobilization order.

Article 52. Upon proclamation of a mobilization order by the state, all personnel of the People's Liberation Army should carry on their duties until they are freed from active service by order of the Ministry of National Defense; and all servicemen in reserve service should prepare to answer the call-up and should punctually report at the designated place after receipt of orders from the conscription bureaus of municipalities directly under the Central People's Government, hsien, autonomous hsien, and municipalities.

## Chapter VIII: Military Training of Students of Senior Middle Schools and Above

Article 53. Students of senior middle schools and schools equivalent to senior middle schools should receive military training prior to call-up in schools. The hours and subjects of training shall be decided by the State Council.

Article 54. Students of institutes of higher learning should receive military training in school and should prepare to acquire the ranks of company grade officers and perform the duties of company grade officers. The hours and subjects of training in institutes of higher learning shall be decided by the State Council.

Article 55. Military training of students of senior middle schools and above shall be conducted by military teachers on the school staff.

## Chapter IX: Addenda

Article 56. Youths under eighteen years of age who wish to enroll in military academies of their own account shall not be subject to restrictions of the draft liability age for active service stipulated in this Law.

Article 57. Following enforcement of this Law, people's militiamen should carry on their tasks of preserving local security and protecting production and construction.

[Note: In January, 1965, the period of compulsory military service was lengthened by one year.]

\*This Law is cited from The Chinese Communist Regime, ed. Theodore H. E. Chen (New York: Praeger, 1967), pp. 311-319.

Appendix II

Regulations Governing the Militia Work\*  
民兵工作条例

(As Published by Ministry of National Defense  
of the Peiping Regime on July 13, 1961)

Chapter I: Nature and Missions of the Militia

Article I. The militia is an important tool of the Chinese people for resisting imperialist aggression externally, and implementing the people's democratic dictatorship internally. It is an able aide, as well as a powerful reserve force, of the Chinese People's Liberation Army.

During the stages of various revolutionary wars and socialist reconstruction, the vast militia of our country, under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and Chairman Mao, played an important role by coordinating with the People's Liberation Army in defeating domestic and foreign enemies and in defending the socialist reconstruction.

Today, the imperialists still insist on their policies of aggression and war, and the American imperialists still occupy Taiwan, our territory, seriously threatening the security of our country. For resisting the imperialist aggression, safeguarding the territorial integrity and sovereignty of our fatherland, and maintaining world peace, we shall, in accordance with Chairman Mao's instructions, not only establish a powerful regular army, but make all-out efforts to set up militia divisions. If the imperialists should dare to stage a war of aggression against our country, we would implement our policy of "all people being soldiers", and our militiamen would answer the draft call to join in services systematically and en masse, constantly reinforcing and expanding the People's Liberation Army, coordinating with and supporting it in battles, and

thoroughly defeating the aggressors.

Article II. The militia is an armed mass organization under the Party's leadership and is closely related with production. It is the foundation for military mobilization of our country. It is a military, educational and sports organization. The massive laboring people, by joining the militia organization and receiving certain political education and military training, may go a step further in heightening their class consciousness and national defense concept, enhance their military knowledges, strengthen their organizational discipline, and improve their physical conditions.

Article III. During the time of peaceful construction, the militiamen shall carry out various activities under the premise of submitting themselves to the efforts of production and construction. They shall also make preparations for war. The basic missions of the militia are as follows:

1. To participate positively in socialist reconstruction, and function as leaders in production;
2. To coordinate with regular troops in strengthening the sea, land, border and air defenses, and defense against enemy agents, so as to maintain the social order;
3. To be ready at all times to join the army and go to war, to deal blows to invaders and defend the fatherland.

Article IV. For achieving the glorious missions given to the militia by the Party and the state, every militiaman shall obey orders of the Party, and Chairman Mao, and thoroughly meet the following ten demands:

1. Submit to the Party's leadership;
2. Abide by the government's laws and regulations;
3. Obey the commands of superiors;

4. Protect the masses' interests;
5. Expose bad men and bad deeds;
6. Be kind to others;
7. Take political and military lessons;
8. Take part in sports activities;
9. Take good care of weapons and ammunition; and
10. Safeguard state secrets.

## Chapter II: Organization of the Militia

Article V. Militia organizations shall be set up in people's communes, factories, mines, organizations, schools, enterprises and business units. In areas of ethnic minorities, militia organizations shall be set up step by step on the basis of actual social reform conditions and the degree of the masses' consciousness.

Article VI. To join the militia and defend the fatherland is a citizen's glorious duty and privilege. Any male citizen between 16 and 45, or female citizen between 16 and 35, healthy and not disabled, shall be recruited to join the militia organization. Landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries, undesirable elements and rightists shall be barred from the militia organization.

Militiamen are classified into backbone militiamen and ordinary militiamen. All male citizens between 16 and 30, or female citizens between 16 and 25, with a clean political background and strong body, may be grouped into backbone militia; the remaining into ordinary militia.

Rehabilitated or retired servicemen constitute the core of backbone militia. The age limit for them to join the militia may be extended to 40. Servicemen retired or rehabilitated from the People's Liberation Army each year shall be

taken into the local militia at once.

Qualified male and female citizens, when recruited to join the militia, shall be given adequate education in mobilization so as to heighten their sense of honor in joining the militia.

Article VII. The militia shall be so organized as to fit in well with production, work and study organizations, making it easier to lead and more suitable for carrying out various activities.

1. The militia organization generally consists of squad, platoon, company, battalion, regiment and division, in that order. Any unit that engages in organizing its militia shall take into consideration the number of militiamen it has. When the number of militiamen is enough to form a regiment or division, a militia regiment or division shall be organized. In units with only small numbers of militiamen, only companies or battalions may be organized. The number of militiamen in various organizations shall be flexible rather than rigidly fixed. There may be regiments under a militia division; also, there may be battalions and companies directly attached to a division. This principle is applicable also to the organization of militia regiments and battalions.

2. Generally, members of backbone militia and ordinary militia, militiamen and militiawomen, shall be organized into separate squads; in cases when separate squads are impractical, they may also be integrated. When necessary, teams may be set up under squads.

3. In the organization of backbone militia, generally a backbone militia platoon shall be set up within a militia company and the company commander shall serve concurrently as the



platoon leader. Within a militia battalion, a backbone militia company shall be set up, and the battalion commander shall serve concurrently as the company commander. A backbone militia company shall be placed under the direct command of a militia regiment or division. There shall be no backbone militia battalion or regiment.

4. Various kinds of technical militiamen shall be organized according to the different professional nature of various units or based on wartime needs.

5. When the productive, working or studying organizations of various units undergo changes, the militia organizations shall also be readjusted in time.

Article VIII. Based upon actual needs, several chosen squads, platoons and companies of the backbone militia shall be armed, and their leadership enhanced; in time of peace, they shall not be concentrated nor divorced from production. In time of emergencies, they may be summoned to carry out assigned missions at any time.

Article IX. Leading departments of various militia organizations shall be separated from production organizations. They shall not replace each other. Generally, the chiefs and brigade and team leaders of the people's communes do not concurrently serve as commanders of militia divisions, regiments, battalions and companies or platoon leaders. A militia commander shall participate in the administrative commission of the same level in the commune as a member. He shall submit to the dual leadership of the administrative commission and the superior militia commanding organization.

This principle is also applicable to factories, mines, government organizations, schools, enterprises and business units.

Article X. A regular meeting system shall be set up in militia organizations in order to make timely arrangements, carry out inspections, sum up work results and promote studies.

1. For backbone militiamen, with squad (platoon, company) as unit, generally one meeting shall be called each month. The duration of the meeting shall not exceed two hours.

2. For ordinary militiamen, with squad (platoon, company) as unit, each year two or three meetings shall be called on appropriate occasions to be coordinated with mass activities.

3. Meetings of militia cadres at various levels may be called in consideration of working need. The number of these meetings called each year shall be decided by the various units themselves on the basis of actual needs.

Article XI. The organization of the militia is a long-range, delicate, and difficult work. To purify and strengthen the militia organization, each year a regularization shall be carried out around the time of the lunar new year (in schools, after the arrival of new students). This regularization can also be effected by coordinating with rectification campaigns, rectification of communes, or other proper occasions. With militia company or platoon as unit, the work of "dismissal" and "recruitment" shall be carried out: after propaganda and education, citizens qualified for militia shall be recruited into the militia ranks, while over-aged militiamen shall be dismissed and over-aged backbone militiamen transferred to the ranks of ordinary militiamen. At the same time, work shall be summed up, cadres reelected and various systems strengthened and streamlined.

## Chapter III: Militia Cadres

Article XII. Militia cadres constitute the central force for leading militiamen in carrying out various missions. They are also the central force for leading the militia in joining the army and carrying out war duties in time of war. Outstanding Party members, Young Communist League members, or upright and reliable workers, poor peasants, lower-middle peasants and positive elements shall be selected to serve as militia cadres.

Article XIII. Leaders (commanders) and deputy leaders (deputy commanders) of militia squads, platoons, companies, battalions, regiments or divisions shall be nominated by Party organizations at various levels. They shall be selected through democratic election in militia meetings or militia representatives' meetings, with the results checked and approved by Party organization one level higher. The leaders (commanders) and deputy leaders (commanders) of squads, platoons, companies, and battalions shall be re-elected every year. Commanders and deputy commanders of militia regiments and divisions shall be re-elected every two years.

The post of political commissar of a militia division or regiment shall be concurrently occupied by the first secretary of the Party commission of the same level. The post of political instructor of a militia battalion or the political director of a militia company shall be concurrently occupied by the secretary of the Party general branch or the Party branch, or the deputy secretary of the Party branch. In special cases, these positions also may be occupied by commissars of the Party general branch or Party branch. The post of deputy political commissar, deputy political instructor, or the deputy political director may be occupied by the secretary of the Young Communist League of the same level.

Article XIV. Militia cadres of various levels shall serve as models for militiamen on all occasions, in living up to the "three disciplines and eight attentions for Party and political cadres" and the "ten demands for militiamen" as stipulated in these regulations. In work, they shall adopt a mass line and a democratic attitude. They shall always consult the masses and listen to the masses' opinions with open hearts; utter harshness, forcible orders and suppression of democracy shall be discarded; beating, scolding and bodily corporal punishment shall be strictly forbidden. When carrying out various missions, democratic discussions shall first be held so that the positiveness of the masses may be developed. In cases when the emergency of military actions leaves no time for discussion, simplified mobilizations shall be held to explain clearly the nature of the mission.

Militia cadres of various levels shall all resolutely implement the principle of democratic administration. They shall advocate the self-education and self-control among the militiamen. They shall teach the militiamen to exchange views, help one another, exchange experiences and learn one another's good points, and point out and remedy one another's defects. These are good for continuous heightening of consciousness and strengthening of consolidation.

Article XV. Militia cadres at various levels shall accept the criticism and supervision of the masses with open hearts. If the masses' opinions are correct, they shall be accepted. If the opinions can not be put into practice immediately, clear explanations shall be made and reasons given. If the views are not correct, explanations and educations shall be made with patience. When the masses make direct reflections or accusations to the superior-levels, the cadres shall not interfere, nor seize the letters, nor take retaliatory actions.

Article XVI. Militia cadres at various levels shall be put under the unified control of the local party commissar. People's armed forces departments shall constantly keep a clear knowledge, and exercise control, of the number, quality and political ideological conditions of militia cadres. They shall strengthen the work of cultivation and education, so as to continuously raise the political standard and working capability of these cadres. When a militia cadre is transferred, he shall be replaced at once. The transferred cadre shall complete the hand-over procedure with his successor.

#### Chapter IV: Militia Weapons

Article XVII. There shall be definite assurance that weapons of the militia are in the hands of upright and reliable workers, poor peasants, lower-middle peasants and positive elements. Militiamen in control of weapons shall be strictly screened by the Party branches, approved by the Party commissars of the people's communes, factories, mines, government organizations, schools, enterprises or business units, and reported to the county or municipality people's armed forces departments. Without instructions by the county or municipality people's armed forces departments, militia weapons of various units shall not be exchanged. Weapons assigned for use by specific personnel shall not be lent to others without approval by the Party branch.

Article XVIII. Militia weapons shall be deployed at chosen spots, in accordance with the social conditions and the needs of peacetime and wartime missions. They shall not be equally distributed nor excessively concentrated.

Article XIX. As for the control of militia weapons, they may be put under concentrated control of specific personnel in rural communes, with production brigade or team as unit; they

may also be kept by individual militiamen using the weapons. In factories, mines, government organizations, schools, enterprises, and business organizations, they shall be put under concentrated control of specific personnel.

In militia divisions, regiments, battalions and companies, there shall be cadres responsible for the control of arms and ammunitions. The situation in which "no one is responsible" shall be avoided. In weapon-control, the general requirements are:

1. Instruction on weapons-preserving shall be constantly conducted for militiamen keeping and using weapons.

2. Increases and decreases of the number of weapons and ammunitions shall be recorded in time.

3. Regular cleaning and regular counting and inspection of armes and ammunitions shall be carried out strictly to prevent missing or damages. In cases of missing or damages, the reason shall be ascertained promptly, and reported to the superior levels, and measures handling the case shall be sought from them.

4. When a cadre responsible for the control of arms and ammunitions is transferred, he shall complete handover procedure with his sucessor, by handing over the arms and ammunitions, rifle by rifle and bullet by bullet.

#### Chapter V: Political Education and Military Training

Article XX. Systematic political education and military training shall be carried out for militiamen. The training and education of militiamen shall be carried out by adopting multifarious measures and by engaging them in the production

work in coordination with the central work of different localities. The contents of education and training shall be in accordance with the principle of "small in quantity yet high in quality." The main recipients of such education and training shall be militia cadres and backbone militiamen.

Article XXI. The strengthening of the militia's education in political ideology, especially the live ideological education reflecting existing circumstances, is a decisive factor in strengthening and improving the militia organization.

The major contents of the education shall include the Party's general line of socialist reconstruction and various policies, domestic and international situations, duties and responsibilities of militiamen; and revolutionary traditions and the "three-eight" working mode. Such educations shall be carried out with the conditions in the locality and ideological conditions of the militiamen taken into consideration. Through these educations, the militiamen's class consciousness and patriotism may be heightened; they may be made to stand firmly for the "Three Red Banners and they may positively take part in the socialist reconstruction, with their national defense concepts and the will to fight strengthened, to continue and exemplify the glorious traditions of our party, Army and militia.

As for the educational method, the main idea shall be the coordination between the Party and Youth League education and the socialist education; when situation permits, classes shall also be conducted to educate militiaman attending as a company or as a platoon. The contents of the lectures shall not be excessively heavy and the duration of a class shall not be too long.

Article XXII. Military trainings of the militia shall be

carried out during the idle season of farm intervals between production sessions, and after-office hours. Attention shall be paid to the combination of the busy and the idle. Contents of military trainings shall be decided in consideration of the duties and equipment of the militiaman of different localities. In rural villages, the main contents of training shall be target practice, grenade-throwing and familiarization with topography and crops; in urban areas, factories, mine, schools, government organizations, enterprises and business units, the main contents shall be technical service trainings and the "three-defense" education. For ordinary militiamen, generally military training are not required; instead, they are to be given some instruction in military common sense. For militia-women, their physical conditions shall always be taken into consideration, and they shall not be demanded to perform the same as militiamen.

Training methods shall emphasize small-size, one-the-spot and separate training. In urban areas, training shall also be carried out through camping activities and by coordinating with national defense sports activities.

Article XXIII. People's communes, factories, mines, government organizations, schools, enterprises and business units, by coordinating with such celebrations as the "May 1", "August 1" and "October 1" days, may hold each year a small-size rally or review of backbone militiaman. Such programs or contests as lectures on current situations, military technique performance, calisthenics and singing may be held. The duration shall not exceed one day.

#### Chapter VI: Militia Assignments

Article XXIV. To cope with class enemies at home and abroad, and to safeguard socialist reconstruction, the militiamen shall



take up certain assignments which are their honorable duties. In time of peaceful reconstruction, the assignments for militiamen shall be kept at a minimum. Any task that can be taken up by regular troops or the people's policemen shall not be assigned to the militiamen; those which must be taken up by militiamen shall also be properly controlled. The militiamen may take up the missions of sentries in coastal, frontier and air defenses, and protection of railroads, bridges and important storehouses. County or municipality people's armed forces departments, upon instructions from higher-levels and on the basis of actual needs, shall help local troops and department concerned in determining the number of militiamen needed and report to the local commissar and the military sub-district for approval. When the public security department of a county or a municipality needs the help of militiamen in handling a criminal case, or when the local troops need the help of militiamen in supporting the frontline or actual fighting, they shall first consult, except in emergency cases, the county or municipality people's armed forces departments and obtain approval from the county or municipality commissar. Within a people's commune, when militiamen are needed to carry out routine missions as protection of production, the commune commissar shall make the final decision.

In case of enemy invasion or harrassment, counter-revolutionary armed riots, enemy airdrops, or sneak-in of enemy agents, the local Party commissar and commanding organizations of militia shall promptly summon militiamen to counter resolutely, suppress, search and arrest the enemies; at the same time, they shall report to their superior levels.

Article XXV. The militiamen, when carrying out assignments, shall adopt as simple and practical ways as possible. Generally, the assignment shall be taken up by militiamen nearest the spot of assignment, on a rotation basis. If the assignment conflicts

with labor work hours, appropriate work-point subsidies or rewards shall be given. The concrete measures of subsidy and rewards shall be carried out in accordance with stipulations of various provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions.

Article XXVI. The armed militiamen shall be used only to deal with counter-revolutionaries and to maintain social order. They shall not be used to handle the internal contradiction of the people. Militiamen shall not be employed for settling quarrels of the masses, nor shall they open fire or use violence. No cadre is allowed to employ militiamen to bind up, detain or search the masses. Any one who violates this shall be punished. Serious offenders shall be prosecuted according to the criminal law.

#### Chapter VII: Strengthening of Leadership

Article XXVII. The militia work shall be carried out in close coordination with production and the central work, under the unified leadership of the local Party Commissar. At various levels shall strengthen their leadership over the militia work, listing it in the meeting agenda and make regular checks of the work of people's armed forces departments, to understand the actual situation and solve problems. Party branches in various units shall always study the militia conditions and strengthen the political ideology work among the militiamen, so as to ensure the purity and firmness of the militia organizations.

Article XXVIII. Military districts and subdistricts at various levels and county and municipality people's armed forces departments shall regularly organize work teams, led by leading cadres, to go to the grassroot level. They shall carry out investigations and researches, help in the work,

sum up experiences, report them to the Party commissar in time, request for instructions and suggest concrete ways and measures of solution, thus serving as good consultants to the commissar. At the same time, they shall volunteer to coordinate well with various departments concerned.

Article XXIX. Party commissars and people's armed forces departments at various levels shall give commendations and rewards to units and individuals who have made outstanding accomplishments in militia work. Units and individuals receiving the commendations and rewards shall be chosen through democratic suffrage.

Article XXX. County and municipality Party commissars and people's armed forces departments may call a militia representatives' meeting every year or every two years, to sum up experiences, commend outstanding militiamen and promote work.

Ministry of National Defense.

July 13, 1961

\* The English translation is cited from Issues and Studies 2:1 (Oct. 1968).

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