PSYCHOBIOGRAPHY

AND

BERTRAND RUSSELL'S

CREATIVE QUEST
THE CAPTURING OF MULTITUDES OF THINGS
AT PRESENT FUGITIVE:

PSYCHOBIOGRAPHY
AND
BERTRAND RUSSELL'S CREATIVE QUEST

BY

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Abstract

As an alternative to current trends in literary criticism, this thesis argues that the rigorous methods of obtaining knowledge as well as the concepts and insights developed in systematic psychology and psychoanalysis can and should be applied to both creative writers and their texts. Though the relationship between writer and text is a complicated one, a synthesis of well documented evidence from psychology can illuminate confusing aspects of the personality infused in the work and can thus move the critic closer to scientific literary truth, without dehumanizing literature.

The introduction outlines some of the reasons why psychological findings and insights should be useful and why there has not been widespread application of them in the humanities. Biography in particular, as an art form, can benefit from being psychologically informed. Conversely, the discipline of psychology has much to learn from the in-depth study of extraordinary individual lives. The first chapter provides a more detailed inquiry into the methodological problems associated with psychobiography and suggests some applications of scientific method to
biography. The example of Virginia Woolf, whose life and works are particularly intricately connected, will be foremost amongst those used to demonstrate the specific problem of hypothesis testing. Some of the proposed strategies will be executed in the second chapter through a case study of the early life of Bertrand Russell, who provides a good example of some of the difficulties likely to be encountered, as well as the advantages of a psychological approach, especially since his life spans the entire development of modern psychology. The hypothesis about the origins of Russell’s creative impulse will be subsequently tested in the light of his creative works in the period from 1904 to 1914.
Preface

Having been, for the past four years, in the unusual position of straddling the two disciplines of English literature and psychology, which at least according to academic programming, apparently have little bearing on one another, I felt the need to address their similarities in some concrete form; hence this thesis. Though the one undergoes a "ceaseless mental fight" to become more scientific than a social science and the other has become as firmly entrenched a "humanity" as any other academic subject, my experience has been that the one is not complete without the other. Psychobiography, which I have mapped in broad outline, provides only one potential meeting ground. Applications of formal psychology to strictly textual criticism seem limitless. If I have in some way contributed to their meeting by using the figure of Bertrand Russell, whose interests extended over many disciplines, then I consider my object fulfilled.

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PREFACE</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION: PSYCHOLOGY AND THE CRITICISM OF LITERATURE:</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AN INEVITABLE AFFINITY?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER ONE: EXPERIMENTS IN LIVING:</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A CASE FOR PSYCHOBIOGRAPHY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER TWO: BERTRAND RUSSELL'S CREATIVE QUEST FOR EMOTIONAL</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRUTH</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSION</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOTES</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WORKS CITED</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Introduction

PSYCHOLOGY AND THE CRITICISM OF LITERATURE:
AN INEVITABLE AFFINITY?

Although critics of "psychologizing" abound in literature studies, psychology, as a discipline, has much to offer the literary critic and biographer. From the very inception of psychoanalysis, which has had undeniable impact on formal psychology, its practitioners were well aware, not only of the debt they owed to the intuitions of creative writers, but of the potential applications of psychological discoveries to literature and its creators. Sigmund Freud, the founder of psychoanalysis, wrote in 1907 that,

the creative writer cannot evade the psychiatrist nor the psychiatrist the creative writer ... He has from time immemorial been the precursor of science, and so too of scientific psychology.

Some years later, Ernest Jones, Freud's biographer, elaborated on a similar theme, noting disturbing trends in criticism:

A work of art is too often regarded as a finished thing-in-itself, something almost independent of the creator's personality, as if little could be learned about the one or the other by connecting the two studies. Informed criticism, however, shows that a correlated study of the two sheds light in both directions, on the inner nature of the composition and on the creative impulse of its author. The two can be separated only at the expense of diminished appreciation, whereas to increase our knowledge of either automatically deepens our understanding of the other.
In a 1916 summary of the earliest psychoanalytic studies of men of genius, Lucile Dooley acknowledges the origins of the field of applied psychoanalysis and confidently predicts a flourishing future for it:

The first indication of the possibilities for psychoanalysis in art, literature, and biography, in fact, was found in Freud’s "Interpretation of Dreams", which remains as the embryo out of which the whole structure of non-pathological applications of psychoanalysis has grown ... It has proved a most inviting field, and one in which there still remains much unbroken ground.

While undoubtedly some ground has been traversed in this area since 1916, it is rather disconcerting to note a foremost critic and proponent of a psychological approach to literature, Leon Edel, claim, in 1982,

that literary study (that is, biography and criticism) can no longer afford to close its eyes and look away from psychological truths in literary works: they are a part of the truths sought in literary criticism and in biography.

Has literary criticism more often than not been 'asleep' with regards to developments in psychology and the social sciences in the past seventy years? If so, what is it that psychology can contribute? Perhaps more importantly, why has there not been widespread application of formal psychology to literature, and what are the limitations to this approach? These are the issues I hope to address in a general way in this introduction, before moving on in the first chapter to the more specific methodological problems of a particular branch of literary criticism, literary psychobiography.
Leon Edel claims that literature and psychology have been made to seem antagonistic, though they are not necessarily so. In fact, both are often concerned with the exploration and explication of human behavior, though the means of doing so differ. In literature, through an act of the imagination, an individual highly sensitive to his environment articulates the human condition for the reader, who is often able to identify with various aspects of the presentation. Samuel Johnson, himself a great intuitive psychologist, describes the process at the beginning of his argument for the usefulness of biography (1750). He states that,

All Joy or Sorrow for the Happiness or Calamities of others is produced by an Act of the Imagination, that realizes the Event however fictitious, or approximates it however remote, by placing us, for a Time, in the condition of him whose Fortune we contemplate; so that we feel while the Deception lasts, whatever emotions would be excited by the same Good or Evil happening to ourselves.  

Modern psychology attempts to probe the human condition either by examining subhuman organisms with the aim of making predictions about humans, studying individual humans in great depth in order to attempt to make claims about and provide diagnoses for other, similar humans, or by comparing groups of humans. Whereas the goal of psychology has tended to be the discovery of principles or laws applicable to most humans, or at the very least specified groups, literature tends to concentrate on specific individuals at a certain place and time in the history of
the race or in the imagination of the writer, yet the highest art achieves a universal quality.

The similarities between the two branches of knowledge about humans become clearer when we realize that, for years, literary critics have applied their own intuitive psychology to their work. Samuel Johnson is a case in point. One can hardly conceive of a critic more able to empathize with his subject matter than Johnson did in the best of his *Lives of the English Poets*, such as the Life of Savage. Repeatedly, with brilliant psychological strokes, he moves from a particular idiosyncracy of his subject to the general to portray the universal folly of mankind. To illustrate, in that life, Johnson reports that Savage lost the patronage of Sir Richard Steele because Steele discovered that Savage had ridiculed him in public. Johnson then proceeds to set Savage’s imprudence into a larger human context:

A little knowledge of the world is sufficient to discover that such weakness is very common, and that there are few who do not sometimes, in the wantonness of thoughtless mirth or the heat of transient resentment, speak of their friends and benefactors with levity and contempt, though in their cooler moments they want neither sense of their kindness nor reverence for their virtue.

Furthermore, when the modern critic studies the problems of Hamlet’s motivation or attempts to interpret symbols in a work, is he not implicitly using psychology? However, instead of relying solely on his critical acumen or psychological intuition (both of which may be biased) why
should the critic not incorporate information from the vast body of knowledge which now comprises the science of psychology? Indeed, how can the critic who deals with twentieth century authors as informed about the developments of psychology as D. H. Lawrence, W. H. Auden, William Faulkner, John Fowles, Margaret Atwood or Robertson Davies (to name but a few) afford not to make himself aware of the very concepts which he will inevitably be commenting on through his discussion of these authors' texts?

Psychology, that is, psychological insights and concepts as opposed to methods of therapy, can validate intuitions and can strengthen critical arguments. Some concepts, such as depression, have been well documented and are supported by research of diverse types (Arieti, 1980). Such concepts, which describe and explain behavior, enable the literary critic to organize otherwise disparate data in literature, without becoming reductionistic.

As Edel notes, reducing works of art to psychological labels, or making unjustifiable extrapolations, must be avoided, and can be avoided, if one keeps in mind the variability and complexity of human nature. Since nothing can be absolutely proven in psychology, all claims made about behavior in fiction or reality must necessarily be tentative. This does not make such claims any less valuable. Edel convincingly argues, Why should a psychological speculation, based on carefully gathered data and an observation of repeated patterns in a work, not be as valid as pages of endless and inconclusive
speculation about the first night of Twelfth Night, or what Shakespeare actually wrote before Falstaff was made to babble of green fields? In addition, the literary critic willing to forage into the largely unfamiliar territory of the psychologist must be flexible while, at the same time, discriminating in order to gather the best evidence pertaining to the area—in short be able to provide a synthesis which best covers all aspects of the literary problem he is trying to solve. William Runyan, a clinical psychologist, and a strong proponent of the approach, would add that, in a broader context, one must integrate both the positive and negative aspects of the psychological with the interpersonal, social and historical in order to achieve a balanced portrait either of a character, group of characters or a creative writer.

In its drive to become a legitimate science, psychology has developed rigorous and sophisticated methods of collecting, observing and evaluating phenomena, which could well be translated and adopted by the literary critic. To illustrate, knowledge of the scientific method forces the critic to realize the necessity of formulating various alternate hypotheses about a text or an author or their relationship, instead of approaching the problem with one preconceived notion of, for example, how a particular text fits into a historical perspective and thus what it must contain. After all, rational thought, unaided, has its limits. Similarly, awareness and acceptance of the concept of experimenter bias enables the critic to become more
conscious of, and sensitive to, his own theoretical limitations and biases.

Perhaps most importantly, psychology can provide the broad structures needed to address the central issue of the relationship between the writer and his works. For example, the role of genetic factors, as well as early deprivation, loss and trauma as the frequent precursors of depression, and the hysterical and obsessional defenses which can transform it from an illness into an energizer for the creative process, have been convincingly argued (Brink, 1977, 1982) and are well supported in the research literature (Storr, 1972, Ellenberger, 1970, Bowlby 1969, 1973, 1980).

If literary criticism and psychology often have common aims, and if psychology holds a potentially rich source of knowledge for the literary critic, why then has it not been tapped to any major degree? There are several related reasons. One of the most important, as well as obvious, stems from the failure of communication between the two disciplines with the resulting lack of knowledge about psychological discoveries on the part of literary critics. Since the James brothers went their separate ways - Henry to become a novelist and William to develop the principles of psychology - the two disciplines have never been as close. Each has developed its own specialized literature and an accompanying sophisticated technical language. Terms such as self-fulfilling prophecy, condensation, analysis of
variance and object split mean little to the literary critic. Attacks on the jargon filled language of the social scientist by the literary critic are often well-founded but may occasionally mask lack of understanding. Edel approaches the truth when he says,

The answer to the misguided use of psychoanalysis is not to close our ears but to ask ourselves: How are we to deal with this difficult material while remaining true to our discipline - and avoid making complete fools of ourselves?¹²

Literary critics entering this fascinating field must be willing to invest the time and energy not only to master the material but to translate clinical diagnoses into terms appropriate to their discipline. Perhaps increased emphasis on interdisciplinary studies in academic settings will make it easier for potential critics to obtain a thorough grounding in psychology. Until that time it appears as though, in many cases, ignorance has bred contempt. The prevailing attitude of the academic English department seems to be that psychology is a 'pseudo-science' and thus not worthy of serious critical attention (or, for that matter, of research grants). Academics tend to deny the emotional in their studies and thus their resistances are high to some of the psychological material, which inevitably will have deep implications for the critic personally. Freud's uncompromising advice to the psychoanalyst is equally applicable and difficult to follow for the literary critic embarking on such studies:

Only those who have had the experience of examining and feeling their own dreams, and
have learned what exists in their own emotional inwardness - within their personal abysses - can objectively attempt to look at what issues from the inwardness of others.¹³

On the other hand, social scientists must accept some of the responsibility for the failure in communication. The mainstream of psychology baulks at any study which cannot be empirically tested and controlled in some measure, considering such material "soft". Thus the literary critic or the psychologist interested in exploring the other's territory frequently finds himself up against opposing and stifling attitudes. In order to probe more deeply how these divergent attitudes evolved, it is necessary to examine more closely the development of the discipline which Freud claimed owed so much in its origins to the intuitions of the creative writer.

Up until this century the relationship between the writer and his works was rarely called into question and an aura of mystery surrounded it. The oldest aesthetic theories of Pindar and Plato held, however, that the creative person was inherently flawed and the view expressed by Burton in the seventeenth century that "All poets are mad" was commonly accepted.¹⁴ One of the first systematic studies of men of genius, by the philosopher-psychologist Havelock Ellis (1904), reinforced this view, emphasizing as it did the role of psychopathology in creativity.¹⁵ Freud and his followers, in turn, initiated a process of demythification in all areas of human behavior, which extended to the realm of the creative imagination. However,
in its birth pains, at the beginning of this century, psychoanalysis was not able to provide a comprehensive theory to govern the complex writer-text relationship. Instead, its members followed historical precedent and stressed the psychopathological to the detriment of the positive aspects of creativity with their belief in the Kairos as a psychopathological decisive moment for the great man. 16 Freud's (1907) warning that,

Every poet who shows abnormal tendencies can be the object of a pathography. But the pathography cannot show anything new. Psychoanalysis on the other hand provides information about the creative process. Psychoanalysis deserves to rank above pathography, 17

was not generally heeded by his followers, including Hitschmann, Graf, and Sadger, the latter of whom especially "wrote pathographies 'purely out of medical interest', rather than to discover something about the process of artistic creation." 18 In addition, their "methodological vice," according to Coltrera, a historian of the movement, was "psychosexual reductionism." 17 Combined with a content which often shocked a public still living under the illusions fostered by Victorian Society and an often mechanistic rhetoric, it is no wonder that the plausibility of some of the early applied theory was called into question. Early enthusiasm about the explanatory power of psychology for this complex relationship gave way to later disillusionment even on the part of its practitioners. Freud himself said that, "before the problems of the creative artist, analysis must, alas, lay down its
Thus, primarily because of psychoanalysis' insistence on the psychopathological element in creativity, it did not facilitate a relationship with contemporary writers and poets. Understandably, many creators were suspicious of a discipline which wished to delve into their inner beings, only to reduce their artistic endeavor to a neurosis, or worse. Although Virginia and Leonard Woolf, amongst other "Bloomsberries", were instrumental in disseminating the ideas of psychoanalysis in Britain through their publishing of Freud's works at the Hogarth Press, Virginia refused throughout her life to seek psychoanalytic help despite the seriousness of her illness and although her brother, Adrian, became a practising psychiatrist. Rilke, too, refused psychoanalysis saying "Leave me my demons." James Joyce denounced the entire psychoanalytic movement and "recoiled when Jung offered to analyze him". Many additional examples could be given.

Literary criticism too, following upon T. S. Eliot's apparent lead in *Tradition and the Individual Talent* (1921), retreated from the relationship and denied the common sense view, in its attempt to dissociate the writer from his work. Eliot's claim that "honest criticism should be directed at the poetry, not the poet" has had undeniable impact on the course of literary criticism. For example, D. H. Lawrence's advice to David Garnett to

Never trust the teller. Trust the tale. The proper function of a critic is to save the
tale from the artist who created it, has been so often held up by critics as justification for their approach that it hardly needs to be reproduced here.

Nevertheless, Freud remained hopeful that psychoanalysis would eventually overcome its limitations in order to more fully explicate the writer-text relationship. In 1930 he wrote,

"Psychoanalysis can supply some information which cannot be arrived at by other means, and can thus demonstrate new connecting threads in the 'weaver's masterpiece' spread between the instinctual endowments, the experiences and the works of an artist."

Following the second world war, the development of ego psychology, which shifted emphasis, according to Bergmann, onto "the interaction between child and parent and later between endowment and psychic need on the one hand and the social and cultural situations, on the other," allowed a less restrictive approach to the problem of artistic creativity. Mack (1971) states that it became possible to study the product of the creative individual, not simply as revealing of childhood drives, experiences, traumata, disappointments and memories, but as complex transformations, efforts of the ego to "renegotiate" the settlements of childhood and to surmount these early struggles through work.

In this era, Kris (1952) attempted to revise Freud's original linking of poetic activity with daydreaming by warning that the imaginative capacity of writers to reach beyond their personal lives in their writing had been seriously underestimated. "The artist has created a world
and not indulged in a daydream," he said.20 The preponderance of psychological studies encroaching on the world of the artist, however, continued to overemphasize the pathological and thus remained reductionistic.27

Only Erik Erikson, both Mack (1971) and Bergmann (1973) agree, departed significantly and successfully from the psychopathological approach in his psychological studies of Luther (1958) and Gandhi (1967). His development of a sequence of psychosocial phases which span the entire life cycle promoted his broader concern not "simply with the conflicts from which his subjects suffered, but with how they surmounted these and adopted them to the historical realities of their days."30 Erikson's unorthodox voice was not strong enough though, and the mainstream of psychology became increasingly concerned with the struggle to achieve scientific legitimacy, which tended to narrow its scope and to deflect it further away from the arts. Daniel Levinson, a personality psychologist, comments on the post-war period that,

The new era was characterized by pedestrian conformity and a decline of imagination in politics, art and science. Personality-social psychology, reflecting the societal change, retreated from the exciting vistas that had emerged in the 1940's and became increasingly preoccupied with method and the measurement of narrowly defined variables. Psychology moved out of society and back into the laboratory.31

To some degree these "exciting vistas" were approached once again in the 1960's with the renewed interest in creativity, ironically induced by the American
fear of not keeping pace with Soviet technological advances. Psychology once again appeared to be closely allied to a practical end. Creativity was treated as a definable, testable "concept" and a literature flourished which aimed at producing methods of "boosting" creativity, particularly in the educational system (Guilford, 1968, Knellar, 1965). Several researchers even began to perceive creativity as a new sort of subject matter or skill that could be trained in an educational setting (Torrance, 1965, as cited in Vernon, 1977). Regardless of the efficacy of such approaches, this attitude towards creativity did much to reverse the trend of viewing the creative process as an "abnormal" function with psychopathological origins.

However, the social scientists involved in this surge of exploration still did not speak to the arts, since their methodology and their goals were quantitative, that is to say, directed exclusively at enhancing creativity in most people under the widest range of situations. Their interest, for the most part, did not extend to the in-depth examination of extraordinarily gifted creative individuals.

In the 1970's psychoanalysis, that psychological system perhaps best suited to explicate the writer-text relationship, continued to discourage interest from the humanities by turning in upon itself. According to A. Roland (1978), the American Psychoanalytic Association has consistently failed to accept candidates of psychoanalysis from other disciplines, although the numbers of these
applicants are increasing.  

Only very recently have serious attempts been made by social scientists to redress the balance between the psychopathological elements and the benefits accruing from "creative illnesses," and to draw upon the resources of the humanities, particularly upon information about creative writers. In "Manic-Depressive Illness and Accomplishment: Creativity, Leadership, and Social Class," Kay Jamison, a psychiatrist, prefaces her discussion of a hypothesized relationship between depression and accomplishment with the claim that, "a psychopathological approach to mood disorders has resulted in a psychiatric literature generally slighting the positive aspects of affective illness, especially manic-depressive illness and its variants." For theoretical, clinical and social-ethical reasons, she argues, the positive features of mood disorders need to be studied. Furthermore, the best sources are to be found in literature, and especially biography and autobiography since quantitative sources of data are rare and, at any rate, cannot replace the in-depth treatment of the topic which these confessional and artistic productions can provide.

Similarly, William Runyan in *Life Histories and Psychobiography*, using biographies of both writers and political leaders, shows the benefits of making individual life histories the focus of systematic, rigorous psychological research. He maintains that,

The in-depth understanding of particular individuals is also a legitimate objective of
intellectual inquiry and one of the fundamental levels of analysis. The study of life histories has much to contribute to the social sciences, both in its own right and in complement to other forms of research.

It now remains for the humanities to take up the challenge and to respond to the issues raised by these more inclusive and balanced approaches of psychiatrists and psychologists.

Runyan is also important for his illumination of a fundamental reason why psychology has not concentrated on the individual level of analysis, an argument which provides yet another reason why psychological findings have not been as relevant to critics of English literature as they should have been. In psychology the nomothetic view has prevailed, which states that the primary goal of the discipline should be

the development of generalizations of ever increasing scope, so that greater and greater varieties of phenomena may be explained by them, larger and larger numbers of questions answered by them, and broader and broader reaching predictions and decisions based upon them.

These generalizations are then applied to explain and predict particular behaviors. Thus, social scientists have been skeptical of the reverse approach, that is, the study of single cases, since the lack of control makes it difficult to generalize from these types of studies. Campbell and Stanley (1965), whose research design text has been widely followed, disparage the method, stating that what they term "one shot" case studies,

have such a total absence of control as to be of almost no scientific value... such studies
often involve tedious collection of specific
detail, careful observation, testing, and the
like, and in such instances involve the error
of misplaced precision... It seems
well-nigh unethical at the present time to
allow, as a thesis or dissertation in
education, case studies of this nature...

And yet these sorts of studies are the ones literary critics
are most likely to embark on in the examination of a writer
and his texts.

But, as Runyan points out, there is an alternate
approach to obtaining knowledge about human psychology.
Kluckhohn and Murray claim that, "Every man is in certain
respects (a) like all other men (b) like some other men (c)
like no other man." Whereas the mainstream of
psychology has concentrated on the discovery of what is true
of all human beings, at a universal level of generalization,
there are actually two other semi-independent levels of
legitimate inquiry, the level which asks what is true of
groups of human beings and one which attempts to divine what
is true of individual human beings. The latter category
especially, which aims at making generalizations about
specific individuals, has been quite neglected. This
situation needs to be changed because the application of
universal level generalizations to specific individuals has
been shown to be limited. The nomothetic approach often
cannot interpret fully the flux of an individual human life
or the idiosyncracies of especially talented individuals.
As Runyan claims,"... broad generalizations can be applied
only with great caution to particular individuals, as the
relationship between variables in a group study may be very different from the relationship of these variables within a single individual."

A good example of the limitations of the nomothetic perspective occurs in the research on creativity, mentioned earlier. Jamison claims that those in the best position to link the two worlds of mood disorders and creative achievement, i.e. students of creativity, have not done so. What they have concerned themselves with instead, by adopting the nomothetic view, is the development of quantitative and, as far as possible, objective measures of the rather amorphous concept of creativity. However, the most widely used tests, Guilford's Alternate Uses test and Plot titles test, Wallach and Kogan's Patterns test, Torrance's tests and Mednick's Remote Associates test (1962) have several drawbacks derived from their approach. In order to be applicable and comprehensible to the average "subject", most have had to resort to very superficial questions. For example, why should anyone, especially a highly creative person, be motivated to think creatively about the uses of a brick, as one is asked to do in Guilford's Alternate Uses test? Second, the broad assumption upon which most are based – that all manifestations of creativity require the same kind of verbal fluency and unconventionality – may be wrong. There may be a difference, for instance, between scientific and literary creativity. In addition, the reliability and validity of
such "objective" tests have been called into question. Vernon (1977) demonstrated that the conditions of testing, including the ambiguity of task instructions and the frame of mind of the tester, have an effect on subsequent performance on creativity tests.37 As well, contradictory evidence has been produced about whether these standardized creativity tests are actually measuring something different from especially verbal intelligence. The Mednick Remote Associates Test (R.A.T.), for example, which considers creativity from an associative or behavioristic basis, has often been highly correlated with standard measures of intelligence like the W.A.I.S., which suggests that it may be measuring an aspect of intelligence and not creativity. Even between tests of creativity, the correlations have not been high, indicating that each test may be measuring dissimilar types of abilities. Whether the unusual associations required by most of these tests tap the same kind of originality traditionally associated with creativity, as shown by the creative artist or scientist, is debatable at best.

It is interesting to note that one quantitative test which does overcome some of the difficulties of the other creativity tests, the Barron-Welsh Art Scale (Welsh and Barron, 1963), was derived by assessing, through interviews, individuals considered to be creative by their peers.48 Significantly, the test, which has a much higher reported predictive validity than either the Mednick or Guilford
tests, is based on a generalization at the individual level, which says that a creative person is "likely to possess, in addition to superior intelligence and cognitive skills, a distinctive motivational structure and personality." This test, as objective as the others, does, however, suffer from superficiality and has occasionally failed to differentiate those selected as creative by other means from non-creative groups.

These problems with the measurement of creativity by nomothetic, objective means have prompted researchers like Vernon (1977) to return to the common sense view and to state that the best test of any aspect of creativity should be as nearly as possible a sample from individuals of the kind of behavior or thinking that creativity is supposed to involve. Though he would likely deny it, he thus admits the limitations of the nomothetic approach and implicitly advocates research at the individual level, though supplemented by other types of research. It seems to me that the English critic, armed with formal psychological knowledge, is thus in a good position to fill this void in understanding, having at his disposal the cumulative insights and discoveries of an entire tradition of highly creative individuals.

One further important reason for the failure of the widespread application of psychological findings to literature, implied in the discussion thus far, needs to be clarified. Systematic psychology is barely one hundred
and, as is inevitable in any energetic quest for knowledge, there has been a clash of scientific viewpoints and theories; this is, in fact, a necessary but not sufficient condition for the advancement of science. Almost from the divergence of psychology from philosophy, various psychological schools emerged, each one vying with the others to propagate its views. There can be no doubt that one of the competitors, Freudian psychoanalysis, revolutionized psychology. It also was, in some ways, the best suited to explain creators' motivations, and was certainly more often applied to that end than any other contemporary psychology. Bergmann (1973) mentions, for instance, that, aside from the eight psychobiographical monographs published under Freud's editorship between 1918 and 1925, there were dozens of other "Freudian" studies, at varying levels of sophistication, published in the 1920's. However, it was this method of inquiry, psychoanalysis, that aroused hostility amongst psychologists, psychiatrists and philosophers from its inception, for at least two reasons. Aside from its content, the roots of psychoanalysis are quite different from those of formal psychology. Freud, trained in medicine, was heavily influenced by Darwinian thought and was indoctrinated by the then new dynamic physiology of Ernst Brucke. Freud's biologically based, dynamic "psychology" usurped and surpassed earlier mainly descriptive and static models of the mind, derived from philosophy by psychologists like Gustav Fechner. J.A.C. Brown claims that, "academic psychology had been content to
observe and describe behavior; Freud saw the need to explain it. Also, his methods of approaching psychological problems, using the technique of free association and through the case study, were not considered sufficiently empirical, which effectively estranged psychoanalysis from academic psychology. These criticisms of its "softness" continue to plague psychoanalysis to the present day. Karl Popper argues that Freud's theories were "simply non-testable, irrefutable. There was no conceivable human behavior which could contradict them." Despite these perceived differences, Freud himself saw his system fitting into the larger framework of psychology. He claimed that, Psychoanalysis falls under the head of psychology; not of medical psychology in the old sense, nor of the psychology of morbid processes, but simply of psychology. It is certainly not the whole of psychology, but its substructure, and perhaps even its entire foundation. In order to make sense of this statement it is necessary to view Freud as a moulder of thought, a perpetrator of a "substructure" of ideas, rather than a discoverer of facts or of a method of psychotherapy. Even Popper acknowledges that Freud's ideas and explanations of behavior "may well play their part one day in a psychological science which is testable." In fact, a movement has begun to test various aspects of Freud's theory using rigorous scientific methods. Undeniably, Freud's controversial ideas contributed to schism in psychology, but Freud also, according to Brown, "almost irrespective of theoretical details...changed the whole tenor of human thought so that
even those who most violently denounce his views attack them in Freudian clichés and with arguments which would have been incomprehensible had he never existed.

By the end of the second decade of this century opposing systems, including structuralism, founded by Wilhelm Wundt, Gestalt psychology, and John B. Watson's behaviorism, were all firmly established. Although all of these schools, including the doctrinaire Freudian school, have subsequently been found to be too narrow to encompass more recent findings about human behavior, the schizmatic nature of the discipline has persisted up until the present time. The Encyclopedia of Psychology (1973), for example, lists twenty-six schools influential in the development of psychology, almost as many as there are "notable figures" in its brief history. Within psychoanalysis alone, several schisms developed almost immediately, headed by Alfred Adler and Carl Jung. Since Freud's death departures from the classical view have increased to include the English school (i.e. Melanie Klein), and its variants (British object relations - i.e. Fairbairn, Winnicott) the American neo-Freudians (i.e. Karen Horney) and ego psychoanalysts (Kohut), and a more interdisciplinary French school (i.e. Lacan).

What this amounts to is that the perceived fragmentary quality of the discipline and the conflicting evidence available for any given problem have not inspired confidence outside of the discipline itself. The plethora of
explanations instead tends to confuse and discourage the uninitiated layman. In addition, continual developments have rendered many relatively recent findings unstable. A. Brink, for instance, notes that the development of John Bowlby's recent controls system approach to the ties between a mother and her child means that,

object relations theory is in rapid transition, posing a problem to those like myself who are trying to apply the findings in other areas of study. Awkward choices must be made, even after narrowing to object relations the kinds of psychology most likely to yield insights about artistic creativity.\(^2\)

Fortunately there has always been a small number of social scientists willing and able to integrate the best of various theories from both within their discipline and outside it. One early such "hybrid clinician-humanist-scientist" was Henry Murray, who dedicated his *Explorations in Personality* (1938) to Sigmund Freud, A.N. Whitehead, Carl Jung and a biologist-psychologist Laurence J. Henderson. In the book he reflected the diverse qualities of these men, stating as his aim that,

Our work is the natural child of the deep, significant, metaphorical, provocative and questionable speculations of psychoanalysis and the precise, systematic, statistical, trivial and artificial methods of academic psychology. Our hope is that we have inherited more of the virtues than the vices of our parents.\(^3\)

Murray also drew heavily on the other social sciences, especially sociology, and on the humanities, as is reflected in his life-long interest in the biography of Herman
Melville.

More recently an intellectual climate appears to be developing which realizes the need for a synthesis of seemingly disparate ideas in order to provide a sufficient condition for scientific advancement. Surprisingly, some of the impetus for such an amalgamation has come from the 'hard-nosed' discipline of sociobiology, which provides an organizing structure involving a synthesis of personality theories. J. P. Rushton claims that previous to the attempt at integration, situationalists, those who concentrate on what happens just prior to behavior, tended to be skeptical of social learning theorists, who in turn discounted trait theory, the idea that there are personality traits which are consistent across time and situations. The latter theory has minimized or ignored the contributions of behavior genetics, sociobiology, and evolutionary theory. Unfortunately, as Royce (1982) observed, most personality theorists "seem devoted to an exclusive orientation" and are, therefore, unwilling or unable to synthesize.

Nevertheless, much of the controversy over the best explanation of personality differences arises, as J. P. Rushton (1984) has shown, out of a proximal-distal orientation. If explanations of personality move from distal to proximal levels, that is, from evolutionary biology to situational factors, there is much less friction. From this perspective the major theories can be seen as additive and most aspects of behavior explained.
Figure 1: Adaptation of Rushton's distal-proximal orientation of levels of explanation in psychology.

Sociobiology also provides some evidence about the proportion of behavior, or, in statistical terms, the proportion of variance which can be explained by any given theory. Based upon as varied techniques as both classical and "raised apart" twin studies, and adoption studies on diverse traits such as intelligence, altruism and criminality, the empirical evidence suggests that the genes or heritability explain up to fifty percent of the variance in individual differences on personality traits. The remaining proportion of variance appears to be due to environmental differences, an interaction between genetics and environmental effects, and error. Whereas this proportioning of explanation for behavior seems very neat, based as it is upon controlled experimental conditions, when one tries to apply it in the humanities at the level of...
individual psychology it becomes somewhat more complicated, if not absurd. For example, it is extremely difficult to deal with the genetic predispositions of a deceased writer since the critic normally cannot obtain the necessary information. Environmental explanations are somewhat easier to postulate from reading biographies, letters and diaries, and interviewing contemporaries, but at best remain speculative. Inevitably Rushton's approach has its limitations. As an experimental psychologist who has adopted, in Runyan's scheme, the nomothetic view, he tends to ignore the rich contributions of depth psychology and in particular, of psychoanalysis, to the understanding of human behavior. However, he does address the problem of division and competing explanations, albeit in a crude statistical manner, which has alternately fostered and plagued psychology from its birth. Finally, his contribution of a broad structure within which to evaluate explanations of behavior can be applied at Runyan's level of individual generalization, as will be seen, and his spirit of synthesis could well be adopted by the literary critic attempting to provide the best explanations for an individual's motivations to be creative.

Thus, poor communication between literary criticism and psychology, stemming from deeply entrenched attitudes, the emphasis in psychology on the psychopathological in the exploration of creativity, the over-emphasis of the nomothetic view, and the lack of comprehensive theory and
synthesis in psychology have hindered the development of an affinity between literature and psychology, considered so natural at the time of the latter discipline's origin. There are signs, however, in all these areas that the traditional problems are being surmounted as psychology achieves a new maturity, although realistically there will always be elements in both literary criticism and in psychology which will have no direct bearing on one another, just as there will always be literary critics and social scientists suspicious of encroachments on their territory by those untrained in their specialized field.

Having established the potential of psychological insights and findings for literary criticism in general, and especially for the delicate relationship between the writer and his texts, the next chapter examines some specific methodological benefits which psychology can offer and also the problems which have occurred for the practitioners who have applied psychology to literature and lives in the field of psychobiography.

Bertrand Russell has been chosen as the primary "case study" in subsequent chapters, for a number of reasons. Few men of our century have achieved so much in such diverse fields as Russell (1872 - 1970). His career development spans more decades than most men's entire lives and his personality development is correspondingly as complex. Not only has he emerged as one of the most influential thinkers and writers of the twentieth century,
but he also became a public figure, as much in the public eye as many political leaders. As a philosopher he was involved, throughout his life, in a passionate search for knowledge and truth and yet, in his private life, as recorded in his autobiography, he is frequently unaware or obtuse about aspects of his personality. Thus his public and private lives do not always correspond, which poses interesting problems for the critic attempting to achieve psychological accuracy about his life and works. On more practical levels, since he lived within the last century he was himself aware of developments in psychology; these developments are most appropriately applied to figures of this century. Also, there exists a tremendous amount of evidence and supporting documentation with which to make reliable assessments, which is not the case for most writers from earlier centuries. And yet, since Russell is deceased, it is possible to be somewhat objective about the events he was involved in and the issues he supported, without denying his spirit of passionate inquiry, or empathy with the subject, often so important to success in psychobiography.
Were biography generally accepted as an important branch of psychology, the high standards inherent in that science would impose their own discipline and sanctions. White-washing would be considered as nefarious as malignity; inaccuracy of representation more culpable even than inaccuracy of fact... and this ideal of scientific honesty would free biography from the entanglements by which it is at present obstructed and obscured.

CHAPTER ONE

EXPERIMENTS IN LIVING:

A CASE FOR PSYCHOBIOGRAPHY

Biography attempts to capture the flux of a life and to interpret these vicissitudes in order to reach a greater understanding of an individual in his society. The biographer and theorist Leon Edel argues that "... inevitably the biographical process is a refining, a civilizing — a humanizing — process."¹ In our age, these aims should link biography with the discipline of psychology, which provides explanatory power about the individual psyche. Unfortunately, biography, which has always occupied a rather precarious position in literary history, has often suffered because of inadequate understanding of its principles and inept or insensitive practitioners. Even its most avid supporters have been moved to criticize. Samuel Johnson, who enunciated some fundamental principles of biography in Number Sixty of his Rambler Series, well realized that,

...Biography has often been allotted to Writers who seem very little acquainted with the Nature of their task, or very negligent about the Performance. They rarely afford any other Account than might be collected from publick Papers, but imagine themselves writing a Life when they exhibit a chronological Series of Actions or Preferments; and so little regard the Manners or Behavior of their Heroes, that more knowledge may be gained of a Man's real Character, by a short Conversation with one of his Servants, than from a formal and studied Narrative, begun with his Pedigree,
and ended with his Funeral. ²

Instead, he stressed that the truth must reign supreme; he held to that principle throughout his life-writing career. For instance, in defense of his life of Lyttleton, he stated that the biographer must not conceal or invent but that it was the duty of a biographer to state all the failings of a respectable character. ³

Looking back over the Victorian age, in which biography proliferated, Virginia Woolf, another perceptive biographer, remarked the "high death rate" of biographies. She also reiterated Johnson's complaint when she discussed the problem of

why it is so difficult to give any account of the person to whom things happen. The person is evidently immensely complicated ... In spite of all this, people write what they call 'lives' of other people; that is, they collect a number of events and leave the person to whom it happened unknown. ⁴

More modern critics have made less favourable appraisals of the questionable art of biography. W. H. Auden argued that biography was "always superfluous" and "usually in bad taste", ⁵ and Nabokov called biographers "psycho-plagiarists", implying that they prey and thrive on the work of others. In 1983, the well-known critic, Hugh Kenner, himself the author of a critical biography of T.S. Eliot, went so far to claim that,

Biography is a minor branch of fiction, fairly old-fashioned fiction, too. It's hard to think of a biographer's strategem that hasn't its antecedents in Walter Scott or Dickens. No matter whether you've invented your central character or gleaned his dossier
from "sources" you can footnote, what you do next is nothing but tell his story in the way of the Victorian masters. So Joseph Blotner's Faulkner, Mark Schorer's Sinclair Lewis, Richard Ellman's Joyce are all for better or worse fictional creations. Each biographer had no choice save to flesh out his man from his idea of his man: from what he was capable of imagining. "Creation of character," it used to be called.?

Can it be then that biography depends solely on the strength of the biographer's imagination? Is it necessary to tell the story of a life in the way of the Victorian masters? Should biography's highest form be as a "minor branch of fiction"? Are some of the criticisms justified which claim that biography has often resulted in "formal and studied Narratives," which concentrate on the externals and leave the person unknown? After all, it is an undeniable fact that relatively few biographies have survived the test of time in comparison with original literary works. And was Samuel Johnson, a melancholic throughout his life, being overly optimistic when he insisted that the truth of a life could (and should) be revealed? Finally, if biography has not achieved the success and status of other forms of literature, then why? A brief survey of some of the highlights and weaknesses in development of the form provides answers to some of these questions. The distinctions between biography and fiction should become clear along the way.

Virginia Woolf attributed part of the reason for the weakness of the biographical method to its relatively short
history of development. Harold Nicholson says that the story of English biography is one of "arrested development;" there is some truth in both of these assertions. The actual term "biography" only entered English in 1683 on the pen of Dryden. According to Nicholson, before 1791 its legitimacy was hardly recognized and there were few bright spots. In the sixteenth century isolated advances were made by William Roper in his Life of Sir Thomas More and George Cavendish in his Life of Wolsey. Both of these pioneers made fewer didactic comments than had previous biographers about the institutions which their subjects represented, and both shifted emphasis from external actions onto the inner character of their subjects. Both, however, were limited by their commemorative tone. In the "age of the character sketch," the seventeenth century, only Izaak Walton's delightful "Lives" of Donne, Herbert and others significantly contributed to the genre. Nicholson claims that Walton was the first deliberate biographer who was absolutely sincere. Unfortunately, his works suffered because he had "no sense of actuality" and failed to imbue his subjects with distinctive characteristics; "they are all flat and uniform," says Nicholson. With the exception of these extraordinary cases, realism, and curiosity about the individual and his inner state did not flourish in the writing of lives until the eighteenth century. Even then pioneering novelists, notably Daniel Defoe, engendered confusion between the two infant forms by mingling fact and
fiction. Since novels were thought to be the fodder of servant girls, these early novelists often cloaked their productions in the respectability which the writing of 'life histories' and history in general afforded them. Unfortunately for biography this more often than not meant altering the very principles of the form. Laurence Sterne, for example, author of the highly successful fictitious Life of Tristram Shandy, Gentleman, not only broke recently established conventions of the novel but played havoc with Johnson's precepts for good biography set down some ten years prior to the release of the novel. He took Johnson's remark that "the business of a biographer [is] to lead the Thoughts into domestic Privacies, and display the minute details of daily life" to an hilarious extreme, of which the most outrageous example occurs at the outset of the novel. The reader's thoughts are abruptly led into "domestic privacies" through the conversation in bed between Mr. and Mrs. Shandy, at which time Mr. Shandy's animal spirits are disrupted.

Johnson himself, in his Lives of the Poets (1779-81), did not adhere as closely to fact as he could have with more thorough research, and his occasional lapses annoyed some of his learned contemporaries. His now famous statement about Congreve's Incognita (1691) "I would rather praise it than read it" raised some scholarly eyebrows. Nevertheless, Johnson, in his essays on biography and more importantly in his fifty-two lives,
advanced the interest in, and methodology of, biography
tremendously. His practical argument for the dual purpose
of biography compels by its enthusiasm as well as its logic:

Those parallel Circumstances, and kindred
Images to which we readily conform our Minds,
are above all other Writings, to be found in
Narratives of the Lives of particular
Persons; and therefore no Species of Writing
seems more worthy of Cultivation than
Biography, since none can be more delightful,
or more useful, none can more certainly
enchain the Heart by irresistible Interest,
or more widely diffuse Instruction to every
Diversity of Condition. 19

Some of Johnson's success can be attributed to his
own battles with melancholy and his sensitive personality in
general, which enabled him to empathize with, and make
shrewd guesses about, his subjects. He falls short, not so
much because of his own shortsightedness, but because he
lacked the psychological tools to probe the complex relation
between the life and the artistic products of his
poet-subjects. In his Life of Pope, for example, he does
not explore the effect Pope's suffering and physical
deformities had on his writing. He thus often falls back on
description instead of delving into motivation, though he is
usually perfectly candid about his lack of information. In
his Life of Savage he admits that he cannot understand
the psychology which would make Savage's wealthy mother
neglect and abuse her child:

It is not indeed easy to discover what
motives could be formed to overbalance that
natural affection of a parent, or what
interest could be promoted by neglect or
cruelty. The dread of shame or poverty, by
which some wretches have been incited to
murder or abandon their children, cannot be
supposed to have affected a woman who had proclaimed her crimes and solicited reproach, and on whom the clemency of the legislature had undeservedly bestowed a fortune, which would have been very little diminished by the expenses which the care of her child could have brought upon her.16

Another peak in the form was reached soon after Johnson's endeavors with Boswell's Life of Johnson. Several critics of biography agree that it represents the first great modern biography.17 Certainly Boswell had at least one distinct advantage over Johnson in his Lives; he not only knew Johnson well, but during the third of Johnson's life in which Boswell associated with Johnson, he often took a deliberate hand in creating, or at least shaping, his subject's life. It was Boswell who engineered Johnson's trip to the Hebrides, which provided a nice variation in scene for the eventual author of the "Life". In addition, Boswell took extensive notes of Johnson's conversations and was able to cross-examine his subject's wide circle of friends. As Edel points out, we must keep in mind when assessing Boswell's achievement "that Boswell was aided in his invention of actuality because Dr. Johnson was actual to him."18 To write the lives of the dead is quite another matter; thus Boswell should not be taken as the sole model for biography.

But Boswell was also limited by his method. His proximity to Johnson and his hero-worship of him occasionally clouded his perceptions. Edel argues that, clever as he was, Boswell was not always able to catch the
tone of irony in Johnson's conversation. Furthermore, perhaps because of his friendship, there were areas of Johnson's personality and past which Boswell could not probe. W. J. Bate, a biographer of Johnson, claims that Boswell did not care to dwell on Johnson's belief that at times he had come close to insanity. Bate claims that,

Boswell preferred — as would most others in his own situation — to consider Johnson's fears of insanity as a fanciful delusion resulting from a perfectionistic notion of sanity. 20

Aside from these distortions, we also know that Boswell had a great deal of difficulty in writing Johnson's life, since he constantly felt the moral and censuring presence of Johnson while at work. 21 Finally, Boswell's pride at being associated with, and at having a hand in shaping the actions of such a great man, often caused him to place himself at the centre of his biography of Johnson so that the distinction between autobiography and biography became obscured.

The unrealistic spirit of the nineteenth century seems to have been antipathetic to truth in biography. The few candid biographers like Sir Edward Cook, in his Life of Florence Nightingale, and Froude, in his sincere study of Carlyle, worked against the grain. 22 Virginia Woolf has vividly summarized the efforts of the century:

... the majority of Victorian biographies are like the wax figures now preserved in Westminster Abbey, that were carried in funeral processions through the street — effigies that have only a smooth superficial likeness to the body in the coffin. 23
The early Freudian school did much to dispel this sort of myth-making in biography, although the opposite criticisms levelled at the Freudians of psycho-sexual reductionism, and the overemphasis of symbolic interpretations of childhood memories, were often justified. Freud's major practical contribution to biography, his 1910 study of Leonardo da Vinci, was long held up as the ideal psychoanalytic biography until factual flaws were discovered in it, which revealed some of the limitations of the approach. Partially because of the dearth of evidence about da Vinci's early life, Freud based an important interpretation on the symbolic meaning of the vulture in a screen memory of Leonardo's. Unfortunately, in his sources, the original Italian word 'nibbio' had been mistranslated and actually referred to the bird 'kite', not vulture, which altered the meaning of the passage.

The Victorian panegyrics also, however, provoked a reaction by a younger generation of biographers, headed by Lytton Strachey. Up until his publishing of Eminent Victorians, highly analytical Freudian biographies had had little impact on more traditional biography. Strachey, whose brother James had been analyzed by Freud, and who was himself aware of the new psychological discoveries, changed that and should thus be known as the father of modern psychologically informed biography. His talent was for distilling the essences of his Victorian subjects, including their foibles and hidden motives, from masses of
documents available. One side of him — his best side — clamoured for the truth; Harold Nicholson said of him that Strachey believed in intellectual honesty with an almost revivalist dislike of the second-hand, the complacent, or the conventional; a derisive contempt for emotional opinions... a respect, ultimately, for man's unconquerable mind.26

His darker side, however, allowed his animosity towards Victorian rigidity and prudery to discolour his portraits; his biting irony occasionally resulted in caricature.27

Most unfortunately for biography, his imitators often captured his worst side. Mack (1971) says that, ...

... Strachey's delight in exposing the virtuous and reducing the mighty stimulated a whole "debunking" school of crude imitators for whom Freudian concepts of sexuality and psychopathology, misunderstood and misapplied, furnished splendid ammunition with which to attack the subject under the pretense of providing greater understanding.28

Although these imitations flourished in the 1920's and 1930's, perhaps the most notorious example of a work whose goal appears to be disparagement is Bullitt's and Freud's biography of Woodrow Wilson.27 The extent of Freud's participation in the project is unknown, but it is almost certain that he penned the introduction, in which he confesses that,

the figure of the American president ... was from the beginning unsympathetic to me, and this aversion increased in the course of years the more I learned about him and the more severely we suffered from the consequences of his intrusion into our destiny.30
Though Freud went on to claim that some objectivity had been reached, the entire disparaging tone of the work contradicts the statement.  

Lytton Strachey developed his talents in two later works: *Queen Victoria* and *Elizabeth and Essex*. In the former, Virginia Woolf claims that Strachey succeeded admirably because he had ample documentation and he kept within the limitations of the biographical form. Though she blames the failure of *Elizabeth and Essex* on the limitations of the art of biography, she does criticize Strachey for his flouting of those limitations. Since little could be discovered about either Elizabeth or her era, Strachey invented, but the few historical facts available clashed with his invention: "fact and fiction refused to mix", she says, and his novelistic experiment in biography foundered.  

At the other extreme, Harold Nicholson, a contemporary of Strachey's, and a biographer and theoretician, predicted the death of biography as an art form. It would be subsumed as a purely scientific endeavour:  

I would suggest that the scientific interest in biography is hostile to, and will in the end prove destructive of the literary interest. The former will insist not only on the facts, but on all the facts; the latter demands a partial or artificial representation of facts. The scientific interest, as it develops, will become insatiable; no synthetic power, no genius for representation, will be able to keep pace...
During this period of fervent interest in biography Virginia Woolf provided a third perspective on the state of the art, which clarifies the distinction between biography and fiction. Hers was a unique position, since she not only created novels of almost poetic intensity, but she wrote two fictionalized biographies, *Flush* and *Orlando*, as well as a traditional biography, of her friend the art critic Roger Fry. She called her fanciful writing in *Orlando* "scrambled and splashed" and "yet gay and quick reading I think: a writer's holiday"\(^34\), whereas the writing of Fry's life she described as a "terrible and appalling grind" and asked "How can one cut loose from facts, when there they are, contradicting my theories."\(^35\) *Orlando* allowed her imagination free reign; her life of Fry forced her to harness her fancy to fact. Those experiences shaped her succinct comment on biography in the *Art of Biography*. She said,

At any rate, here is a distinction between biography and fiction - a proof that they differ in the very stuff of which they are made. One is made with the help of friends, of facts; the other is created without any restrictions save those that the artist, for reasons that seem good to him, chooses to obey. That is a distinction; and there is good reason to think that in the past biographers have found it not only a distinction but a very cruel distinction.\(^36\)

Clearly then, in the eyes of an artist who worked in both genres, biography is not a minor branch of fiction. If anything, biography tends to fail when it enters the world of fiction in content rather than simply in form. Kenner
seems to have misrepresented biography by choosing as his examples those written in a Victorian manner. As Edel points out, the only resemblance biography has to fiction is that it uses existing forms of narration. How then can it be classified? Strachey viewed it as an art; Nicholson saw it becoming a specialized science. Woolf may have arrived closest to the truth when she claimed that it was a craft "lived at a lower degree of tension" than either novel writing or poetry. Doubtless though, Johnson's argument that biography is both a most useful as well as entertaining form continues to apply.

At the time of writing, biography, which has become increasingly prominent and controversial, seems to have reached a crossroads. On the one hand the debunking school thrives. Many popular biographies concern themselves less with the truth than with satiating their reader's desire to discover the so-called 'sordid' side of the lives of political leaders and of current 'stars' of the entertainment industry. On the other hand, the cheapening and abuses of the form have spawned a significant literature concerned with methodology, which suggests that biography is about to come of age. Although social scientists have become interested in biography as a method, Harold Nicholson's forebodings that biography could become highly technical have proved groundless. Instead there is a growing awareness that the wedding of biography with psychology is a necessity and that the union holds great potential for illuminating the human predicament. In the
political sphere a debate rages about how much access the
public should have to the private lives of potential
political candidates, as an aid in the political
decision-making process. Ernest Jones' prediction that the
need to understand the motivations to seek power would
become a most pressing problem for psychology and biography,
has been borne out. He claimed that,

The necessity for power and force in some
measure and, on the other hand, the almost
invariable abuse of such power provide
problems the solution of which would benefit
the world enormously. There is a
psychological approach available, the
investigation of the particular type of
person who seeks power. The motivation here
will probably turn out to be more complex
than might appear and to be connected with
mysterious inner needs which impel toward
that particular expression. Such
considerations have also an obvious bearing
on the overridingly important matter of
international relations if these are ever to
be lifted above their present childish level
of fear, suspicion and enmity. 41

Mack (1971) claims that the approach referred to by Jones
would logically be psychoanalytically informed. I would
extend the approach by using the broader term of
psychologically informed biography. My purpose in the
remaining pages will be to explore that psychological
process in general, first by examining the issue of the
definition of psychologically informed biography and then by
surveying the limitations of the form, drawn from the
historical examples discussed and suggested in the
methodological literature. Some of these limitations can be
overcome if psychological procedures and decision-making
processes derived from scientific method, as well as the
best of psychological findings, are applied to the biographical process. In some cases I will only be making explicit procedures which are often implicit in good biographies, but my hope is that this will serve to strengthen the argument for applying psychology to biography.

Perhaps because of the abuses of biography, or because of its greater relevance in our culture, there have been increasing attempts to secure psychologically informed biography a place in literary studies by providing an acceptable definition of it. Leon Edel formulated the terms literary psychology and literary biography, by which he means criticism and biography informed by the observations of the social sciences and especially "the explorations of the individual psyche opened up by Freud",¹² in order to distinguish these endeavors from psychoanalytic therapy and psychobiography (respectively). Literary biography is a branch of history which concerns itself with shaping the lives of literary figures (as opposed to politicians or military leaders). It is not a form of psychotherapy because the biographical subject cannot be considered to be a patient and theories of motivation cannot be checked in the course of analysis. Only some of the methods and insights of psychoanalysis, like the methods of interpretation of manifestations of the unconscious, can be applied to biography. Throughout his discussions he stresses the importance of form and the necessity of
translating psychological terms into language appropriate to literary criticism. Documents must be arranged and distilled into a homogeneous, synthetic whole, which is accomplished by the use of fictional devices like "flashbacks, retrospective chapters, summary chapters, jumps from childhood to maturity, glimpses of the future, forays into the past...." For these reasons the term psychobiography, which he calls cumbersome, is not appropriate. According to Edel, "psychobiography" describes technique rather than form. However, because of his overemphasis on the aesthetic aspects of form, Edel's narrative, though often highly entertaining, tends to obfuscate the distinction between fact and interpretation. Although he makes bold claims about his subjects, he frequently does not provide sufficient documentation, which is frustrating since it forces the reader to trust that Edel has interpreted correctly and not unjustly extrapolated.

William Runyan's definition of psychobiography, which he views as an appropriate term, is more inclusive, and thus preferable. In his estimate, psychobiography is a branch of psychohistory. It can be defined as "the application of psychological concepts, data, and methods from any branch of psychology to biography." The most applicable branches are psychoanalysis, developmental, social and personality psychology, and possibly psychobiology. He also distinguishes between the case study, which represents the broad social scientific
technique, and psychobiography, a particular form of that
technique. Psychobiography out of necessity incorporates
narrative as a method and shaping form; narrative can be
used in biography in at least two ways: the
historical-scientific perspective emphasizes description and
interpretation of the course of events, whereas literary
aesthetic biography attempts to simulate in words aspects of
a man's life. In this light, Edel's portraits tend
toward the latter category.

Also, although Runyan does not make this explicit, I
see no reason why biography cannot borrow some of the terms
of the social sciences, as long as they are properly applied
and adequately explained for the lay reader. Consider that
literary criticism has throughout its history incorporated
various languages from fields as diverse as philosophy and
computer science, not to mention the coinage of its own
terminologies.

Defining the term psychobiography is a much easier
task than establishing it as a legitimate and worthwhile
field of inquiry for the traditional biographer and literary
critic. Detractors of the larger field of psychohistory,
which includes psychobiography, have been vocal and are
occasionally justified in their claims. S. Freidlander
argues, for instance, that because psychobiographers have
typically not been trained in the methods of history, early
efforts especially were no more than "dilettantish studies,
superficial at best." Stannard's (1980) attacks are
even more harsh. He claims that,

from the earliest endeavours to write psychohistory to those of the present, individual writings of would-be historians have consistently been characterized by a cavalier attitude toward fact, a contorted attitude toward logic, an irresponsible attitude toward theory validation, and a myopic attitude toward cultural difference and anachronism.48

Certainly there have been more methodologies than excellent biographies. It is not hard to fathom why since good biographies require biographers who are able to handle several roles simultaneously. They must be masters of the subject’s field of endeavor, be thoroughly familiar with the subject’s canon, display critical and literary skills, and be able to employ rigorous procedures to ensure accuracy.

W. Runyan speculates that,

In order to produce a competent biography the amount of knowledge and expertise about the subject’s professional world may approach the amount of knowledge needed about psychology or the techniques of biography.49

Furthermore, psychoanalytic biographers have claimed that virtually nothing can be learned about psychoanalysis from textbooks and that the best route is to undergo analysis before attempting to apply its insights.50

Does this mean then that the psychobiographical enterprise is an overwhelming task? I think not. Undoubtedly it requires dedication and breadth of knowledge but once basic procedural principles are mastered then advice is usually available on the finer points of interpretation, with collaboration possible between specialists in a subject’s field of interest and
professional psychologists or psychiatrists.  

Writers on methodology have tended to stress the limitations of psychobiography and, although most have identified at least six major problem areas, solutions have not been as readily forthcoming. Several theorists have perceived the relation of the biographer to his subject as being at the heart of the biographical enterprise. Essentially a Boswellian problem, this issue has tainted otherwise fine biographies ever since (i.e. Lytton Strachey's *Eminent Victorians*). The psychoanalytic terms transference and countertransference have often been invoked to explain this potential downfall. Countertransference, the more appropriate one, refers to the analysts' transferring his accustomed way of viewing others, along with the unconscious strivings which he originally developed during his own childhood, to the patient, with the result that he sees the patient in a distorted way.

Though there is no patient in the biographical process, the relationship between biographer and subject is analogous; distortions can take at least two forms: idealization and disparagement. Freud first described the former in his *Leonardo* study. Biographers become "fixated on their heroes in a quite special way";

In many cases they have chosen their hero as the subject of their studies because - for reasons of their own emotional life - they have felt a special affection for him from the very first. They then devote their energies to a task of idealization, aimed at enrolling the great man among the class of their infantile models - at reviving in him,
perhaps, the child's idea of his father. To gratify this wish they obliterate the individual features of their subject's physiognomy; they smooth over the traces of his life's struggles with internal and external resistances, and they tolerate in him no vestige of human weakness or imperfection.  

Whether or not one would go as far as Freud concerning the origins of the idealization, his comment about the result, that these biographers "thereby sacrifice truth to an illusion" seems quite accurate. Certainly Freud's insight holds true in the case of Boswell. It is generally agreed that the young Scotsman searched for and found a father figure in Johnson; on occasion he became too closely identified with his biographical subject.

The other type of relationship, which results in disparagement, need not be as obvious as in the Freud-Bullitt biography of Woodrow Wilson or even conscious on the part of the biographer. Anderson (1981) shows that the Georges' otherwise fine biography of Woodrow Wilson suffers because of subtle denigration. The Georges' rely too heavily on their pathologically based thesis that "political leadership was a sphere of competence Wilson carved out for himself...in order to derive therefrom compensation for the damaged self-esteem branded into his spirit as a child," they Downplay Wilson's early political accomplishments, his strong leadership during World War One, and exaggerate his later failures.

Such unconscious shifting of emphasis may at first seem almost impossible to safeguard against, but several
methodologists have suggested possible ways to help avoid both forms of distortion. Most importantly, prospective psychobiographers must thoroughly scrutinize their motivations for choosing a particular subject. In a statement equally applicable to psychobiography, the historian E. H. Carr (1961, as cited in Mack, 1971) claims that every historian has the responsibility for examining himself,

the motive — perhaps hidden motives — which have guided his choice of theme or period and his selection and interpretation of the facts, the national and social background which has determined his angle of vision, the conception of the future which shapes his conception of the past. 

Several theorists have iterated similar claims (Mack, 1971; Edel, 1982; Anderson, 1981) which amount to the argument that the biographer must possess a high degree of self-knowledge. Edel, for example, has made a tentative foray into the motivation of biographers, though he stops short of publicly probing the personal motivation which kept him at work for nineteen years on his multi-volume biography of Henry James. He speculates that,

There must, I take it, be a strong and persistent attraction of some kind to keep the biographer at his work: a boundless curiosity, not unmixed I suppose with a sort of "voyeurism", a drive to power, common I suppose to most professions; a need for certain forms of omniscience. And there is sometimes that other element — we have all encountered it — the impulse toward accumulation and ingestion of data.

Some biographers have even perceived that the unique relationship between a biographer and his subject can become
an asset. Mack (1971) states that it may enable a biographer to have insights that other biographers would not necessarily have. Anderson (1981), who notes Erikson's success at acknowledging and coping with his biases, states that the reactions of the biographer to the subject "can offer an indication of how people who interacted with the subject during his lifetime may have felt about him." At any rate, it is important to keep in mind Carr's (1961) point "that objectivity does not mean absence of bias, but rather recognition in oneself of where one's prejudices lie."

In addition, the biographer must develop a rapport with, or empathy for, his subject. As both Edel and David Holbrook, in his study of Dylan Thomas, have recognized, his role should be that of the participant-observer, and in that role, "He must be sympathetic yet aloof, involved yet uninvolved." The point at which a healthy empathy becomes a distorting identification is, however, debatable. Since these qualities of self-knowledge, awareness and empathy remain elusive, or at least are in practice difficult to monitor, they are not in themselves sufficient safeguards against distortion; the limitations in the otherwise very good biographies by Boswell, Strachey and the Georges make this clear. As will be seen, additional more rigorous methods can be developed to help ensure consciousness of biases.

Another recurring criticism of psychobiography is
that it often makes claims based upon three types of inadequate evidence: insufficient evidence, evidence of the wrong kind (exterior or superficial as opposed to dream reports or free associations) and not enough evidence from a crucial period (i.e. childhood or during adult traumas). Runyan states that, although this criticism needs to be taken more seriously than it has been so far, there is no need for total rejection of the psychobiographical method because of it. Instead, certain common sense restrictions must be placed on the field. Comprehensive studies should not be undertaken of subjects for whom there is insufficient documentation to make interpretations. It should be acknowledged that some questions simply cannot be answered about some subjects. Finally, some developmental theories are best avoided if they cannot be substantiated through evidence.

Many of the criticisms regarding evidence stem from comparisons made between psychobiographical processes and psychoanalytic therapeutic processes. One common one, according to Runyan, asserts that one cannot place the subject of a biography on the couch and thus cannot posit and reformulate hypotheses based on the defenses and feedback of the patient. However, there are at least five advantages which the psychobiographer has over the psychoanalyst because of these very differences in method. The psychobiographer, assuming he studies a deceased person, is able to perceive the subject's life as a whole whereas
the psychoanalyst is restricted to memories from the past and the insights of the present of a patient who has not yet completed his life cycle. Runyan claims that reactions to major life crises especially may be revelatory of personality. Also, unlike the psychoanalyst, the psychobiographer typically can draw on a multitude of outside sources, ranging from documents like letters, diaries and autobiographies to interviews of relatives, friends and colleagues. Although these documents, as Barzun claims, form a rather random and possibly haphazard record of a subject, viewed together they can often corroborate one another. Mack (1971) states that each type of written document presents problems about the soundness of its evidence but the interview has its own special problems and limitations. The interviewer must determine the accuracy of the information he receives, which may be coloured not only by the emotional relationship of the interviewee to the biographical subject, and the inevitable lapses of memory, but by the relationship which develops between the interviewer and interviewee. As a result of these well documented problems (Gorden 1969), historians, claims Mack, have tended to regard written documents as more accurate sources of information than interview material. Nevertheless, if the biographer recognizes and makes explicit the fact that psychological truths are not equivalent to facts, then interview material can be used to supplement and provide a deeper understanding of a subject's influence. Anderson mentions, for instance, that
Erikson was only able to ascertain the full impact of Gandhi upon his followers, which became a central theme of his *Gandhi’s Truth*, by interviewing many followers of the Mahatma.\(^a\)

The advantage most relevant to the literary critic turned psychobiographer concerns the wealth of creative material generated by a literary subject. Again it must be stressed that one should proceed with caution in making links between creative works and artistic personalities. Mack (1971) argues that those writings produced under extreme pain (like T. E. Lawrence’s *Pillars of Wisdom*) often provide the most valuable psychological data since the inner conflicts of the writer may gain ascendancy over his aesthetic sense.\(^b\)

Anderson (1981) originally stated a fourth evidential advantage of the psychobiographer over the psychotherapist.\(^c\) Substitutes may be available for free associations and dreams. Examples include artistic analysis, as in the case of Theodore Roosevelt’s adolescent drawings of himself and his family transformed into animals, or examination of free association-like books or dream books, such as Beethoven’s conversation books.\(^d\)

Finally, psychotherapists typically do not have the benefit of the critical examination of their hypotheses and interpretations as do psychobiographers, whose work becomes public. Thus it is untenable to make the blanket statement that information and evidence are not as available for the
psychobiographer as for the psychotherapist.

Part of the problem of inadequate evidence arises because of the misuse of available evidence, which can occur because of inflated expectations about what psychobiography can or should do, reductionistic interpretations, and methods of reconstruction. Anderson (1981) quite rightly points out that psychobiography cannot solve all the problems of biography, although there is a tendency to rely too heavily on the psychological, whether informal or formal. Biographers must still research thoroughly and evaluate all possibilities of form, as well as make difficult decisions about selection of content. Ideally, psychological interpretations do not preclude political or historical explanations but will dovetail with them. Another limitation which has not always been adhered to is that psychological explanations are necessarily speculative. They should thus be clearly identified as such and their plausibility evaluated by the reader. Perhaps the biggest psychobiographical pitfall resulting from inflated expectations is the assumption that psychological theory, formulated in the twentieth century, is equally valid for earlier centuries and in different cultures. Stannard put forth the harshest charge that psychobiography is "ahistorical" since it does not take account of fundamental differences between various historical periods in thought and emotion and even in the ways of perceiving both inner and external events. Runyan acknowledges that this
criticism has been justifiable, although the problem is not insurmountable. He says,

As a first step, the psychobiographer must learn enough about the subject's social and historical context to have an adequate frame of reference for interpreting the meaning of specific actions, statements, artistic practices, and so on.\textsuperscript{77}

Once the biographer develops the empathy and insight necessary to perceive life from his subject's cultural viewpoint then he must select those aspects of psychological theory which are so well-founded that they continue to appear to be valid, and may indeed have universal application.\textsuperscript{78} Whatever other criticisms may be launched against Erikson's work, it seems to me that his study of Luther achieves that broader awareness of cultural context necessary for the limited scope of his study. Although Erikson continually forges links between Luther's sixteenth century world and modern society, and specifically between Luther's crisis of identity and the similar crises evident in contemporary young people, in order to demonstrate the universal applicability of his psychosocial theory of human development, he refrains from straining the comparison. Instead he points out both the external and internal idiosyncracies of the age, and of Luther within that age. As an example of the former, he mentions that Luther's act of nailing ninety-five theses to the door of the Wittenburg Church was not such an earth-shattering departure from the norm as it might seem, since "it was a custom generally used whenever one wished to invite the public disputation of a
That he has reached an understanding of the psyche of the age becomes clear when he comments that Luther's preoccupation with the devil is not extraordinary since demons had a heightened reality for the common people, which they have lost in our rational, 'scientific age.'

Erikson has also been foremost in delineating the reductionist problem. Two of the larger reductionistic problems have been mentioned earlier - focusing on psychological factors in motivation to the exclusion of historical and cultural ones, and overemphasizing the psychopathological, which belittles achievements of the subject. Aside from these there are several more subtle traps specific to the psychobiographical method. Erikson formulated the term "originology" to describe that habit of thinking which reduces every human situation to an analogy with an earlier one, and most of all to that earliest, simplest, and most infantile precursor which is assumed to be its "origin".

This process, which involves making direct links between childhood and adulthood, does not allow for later formative processes and influences or for the renegotiations which occur on the path to adulthood, and thus distorts. Two other reductionist methods are really oversimplifications, frequently made for stylistic purposes. The "critical period fallacy", according to Runyan, attempts to build a study of a man's life around a certain 'key' period of development, and 'eventism', the discovery in some important episode in a man's life of not only the prototype of his behavior but the turning point in his life from which all
subsequent events and work are described.\textsuperscript{2}

Reconstruction, the final problem area under consideration, refers to the use of psychological generalizations to piece together events of the past for which documentary evidence is not available, especially those occurring in childhood. Reconstruction is almost always necessary since psychobiography, like other methods of obtaining knowledge, relies on an inductive process of inferring meanings and intentions from mental representations of things in words not present to the senses. The problem arises over the degree of reconstruction. The worst excesses occur when, in Runyan’s words, "an earlier event is retrodicted and then is later assumed to have been firmly established."\textsuperscript{3} In practise often only the grosser features of childhood relationships can be hypothesized from adult characteristics and repetitive actions. Runyan arrives at the cautious conclusion that, "if retrodiction is to be practised at all, it is essential that reconstruction be labelled as such and kept distinct from events for which there is documentary evidence."\textsuperscript{4}

Some of the solutions which have been offered to the five problems mentioned, including the biographer’s relation to the subject, inadequate evidence, inflated expectations, reductionism and reconstruction, appear to involve only common sense, which is a strength but also a weakness. In practise these problem areas are more complex,
carry further reaching implications, and are more difficult to surmount. If, as I have argued, intuitive or common sense psychological explanations can be strengthened by drawing on psychological concepts, it should prove beneficial to biographical method to institute more rigorous methods of analysis, using the fundamental principles of psychology as they are derived from scientific method. I should stress before attempting such an alignment that I do not offer the scientific method as a panacea (social scientists should be the first to acknowledge that scientific inquiry frequently proves more erratic in practise than as explained in text books) but as a supporting structure of procedures and checks, which force a psychobiographer to become more aware of potential pitfalls and of ways of overcoming them than if left to his own devices. Following an examination of the important components of the scientific method and their potential applications, I will show how some of these decision-making procedures can be implemented in the study of Russell, even before the actual writing of the 'life' occurs.

At the most fundamental level of discussion it should be realized that scientific method offers one way of generating a body of knowledge. According to Fred Kerlinger, whose Foundations of Behavioral Research is a standard text, the method differs from the common sense approach in several ways. The most important for our purposes are that the scientist systematically and
empirically tests his theories and hypotheses, he tries to implement control, and he consciously pursues relations.\(^6\)

Christensen (1980) points out that the objectives of the approach are fourfold: description, explanation, prediction, and control. The first three of these at least appear to coincide with the aims of biography. Of the four, the key aspect is controlled inquiry since controls enable researchers to identify the causes of their observations.\(^6\) Control in its scientific sense conveys three meanings:

First, control refers to a check or verification in terms of a comparison. Second, control refers to a restraint, keeping conditions constant or eliminating the influences of extraneous conditions from the experiment. Third, control refers to a guidance or directing in the sense of producing an exact change or a specific behavior.\(^7\)

The first meaning most applies to biographical method, although control in this sense has traditionally been achieved by providing a comparison group or set, which is similar to the experimental group except that it does not receive the experimental effect. One of the most challenging tasks before us will be to demonstrate that a degree of control can be achieved through comparisons made within a single case.

One of the basic components of the scientific method, and one of its aims, is theory, in other words, is to find general explanations of natural events.\(^8\) Another less well developed aim, at least of the social sciences, as Runyan (1982) has shown, is to explain phenomena at an
individual level. Regardless of the level, theories, according to Kerlinger, "present[] a systematic view of phenomena by specifying relations among variables with the purpose of explaining and predicting the phenomena." Although theorists have raised the issue of the inadequacy of psychological theory in general for explaining and predicting behavior, the scope of the present paper does not permit that sort of consideration. However, suggestions have been made about the type of theory best suited to psychobiographical endeavors, and they deserve mention. Whereas Friedlander insists on the use of a single type of theory and proposes that the psychoanalytic is the most historical, I would suggest that there is no need to choose one theory exclusively. Anderson's (1981) view is more flexible since he only limits the possible theories to those which are psychodynamic. Although these are probably most easily adaptable for psychobiographical purposes, there is no reason why other theoretical viewpoints cannot supplement them. For instance, consider that criminal biographies have attracted the curiosity of the public since the eighteenth century, when they were particularly popular. If such a study were undertaken in the present, Eysenck's causal theory of extroversion-introversion and neuroticism-emotionalism, based on the inherited reactivity of the autonomic nervous system, would be crucial for shedding light on the subject since it has been used to demonstrate the existence of a criminal personality and has had some success in predicting
criminality. As a practical example of what can be done, Anthony Storr's study of Winston Churchill testifies to the efficacy of a multiple viewpoint approach. He supplements his psychodynamic perspective by considering Churchill's genetic endowment and by applying W. H. Sheldon's theory of somatypes. Thus, eclecticism, as I have stressed throughout, almost always proves more valuable than the adoption of a single theoretical viewpoint. Rather, choice of theories should be based upon the available evidence of the subject's particular conflicts, preoccupations and needs.

The type of study most congenial for psychobiographical purposes also needs to be determined. Psychobiographical inquiries are typically not true experiments since variables are not manipulated by the experimenter. Instead the psychobiographer gathers his data, finds an "experiment in living" placed before him, and must try and make sense of it. Therefore, the most appropriate type of research will be correlational. Unlike experiments, which seek to determine causal relationships, correlations do not involve manipulation or as much control and thus cannot specify that some phenomenon X was the cause (to the exclusion of other causes) of the observed effect Y. However, correlational research may imply causation since, according to Christensen, one gains "the ability to predict one variable from another variable." In other words, correlations attempt to construct the strongest
account of an event from a number of possibilities. The most perceptive theorists and psychobiographers have recognized that correlations are often the best that can be achieved given the tools of psychobiography. Coltrera says that,

I feel that psychobiography and psychohistory fail as applied psychoanalytic method whenever they concern themselves less with the vicissitudes of meaning - the proper work of interpretation - and more with generalizing statements about root origins.™

This is because "generalizing statements about root origins" are most effectively generated under experimental conditions not typically available to the psychobiographer. Erik Erikson's procedure in Luther is to discuss various themes in Luther's life and work, like those found in his first lectures, "side by side with psychoanalytic insights".™ Each variable contributes to the understanding of the other. In Dylan Thomas, The Code of the Night, Holbrook advocates a similar correlational approach: he states,

What I shall boldly do, at any rate, is to place my interpretations side by side with fragments of the history of my subject and with conjectures about his life experience derived from the internal evidence of the poetry, leaving the reader to judge whether the one illumines the other or not. The conjectures will be about his experience of psychic parturition.™

The empirical part of the scientific method requires that beliefs or, in Holbrook's term, "conjectures" are put to the test. Hypotheses are really the working instruments of theories since good ones (i.e. those which are potentially verifiable) carry, according to Kerlinger, "clear
implications for testing the stated relations."\textsuperscript{100} The problem of generating and testing hypotheses is also at the core of the psychobiographical enterprise. The single most persistent criticism, put forth by theorists like Popper (1962) and Gergen (1977), that any theory can be validated by the "appropriate selection of 'facts'", remains to haunt the psychobiographer.\textsuperscript{101} Are there any facts about lives lived or only factual hypotheses? The situation is not hopeless, argues Runyan, and the criticisms have been overstated:

\begin{quote}
It may be possible to interpret any life with any theory, but often only at the cost of distortion or selective presentation of the evidence.\textsuperscript{102}
\end{quote}

Any method can be poorly used and psychobiography is certainly no exception. How then can hypotheses be effectively generated and to what extent verified? The first important step is to view narrative as a method involving choices, both in the situation of analyzing sources (like an autobiography) for the purpose of drawing out hypotheses, and when critically analyzing or writing a biography. In the former context, perspective largely determines the starting point. Since the literary critic is primarily concerned with texts, the logical place for him to begin shaping a literary biography is by searching the works for themes, preoccupations and recurrent character types. Based on a writer's canon, he then makes tentative hypotheses about the life. The psychologist turned psychobiographer might initiate his study by finding out all
he can about the life of his subject from letters, diaries, biographies, interviews and so on, and then checking his formulations against the creative works. Both researchers would then immerse themselves in the historical period of the subject and modify their hypotheses accordingly.

As Leon Edel points out, writers invariably leave behind "psychologic signs" in their works. They have made choices of inclusion-exclusion, whether consciously or unconsciously, and for various artistic or personal reasons. Learning to read those signs is one of the main skills that the craft requires. A comparative example from Woolf's autobiographical Moments of Being and Russell's Autobiography shows the types of strategies involved. The process is certainly aided if the confessional material is intimate and sensitive, as is Moments of Being. Woolf's emphasis throughout on the role of her mother in her life, the repeated references to the tragedy of her death when Virginia was thirteen, and the upheaval it caused, provide ample evidence to start investigating and evaluating the importance of this relationship over Woolf's life span and on her creative works. Eventually in the course of the narrative Woolf does straightforwardly announce an obsession with the ghost of her mother, though this statement without the other evidence of a concern would not likely have been sufficient to warrant a full scale investigation. She says that,

"Until I was in the forties -- I could settle the date by seeing when I wrote To the Lighthouse... the presence of my mother"
obsessed me. I could hear her voice, see her, imagine what she would do or say as I went about my day's doings. She was one of the invisible presences who after all play so important a part in every life.104

In order to evaluate whether Woolf's relationship was in any way extraordinary one would look for a theory which deals with familial relationships and specifically the relation between a mother and her children and the effect of early loss. In this case one might come up with some form of object-relations theory. For someone like Churchill, who Storr says "showed...little interest in the complexities of his own psychology,"105 or in our case Russell, the search is more difficult. Over the three volumes of his Autobiography Russell increasingly distances himself from the material by providing more narrative coverage of external events and less about his inner being. Nevertheless, as Brink demonstrates, some clues about preoccupations can be generated even by considering the ordering of the narrative. For instance, Russell introduces his arrival at Pembroke Lodge where he was raised by his grandmother and then his parent's death before he comes to his birth, which Brink posits may correspond to an affective ranking of the importance of these traumatic events in his life.106 At any rate, these events would likely provide important focal points for determining Russell's representational model of the world.

Whereas this sort of analysis might seem natural to the literary critic, from a social scientific perspective it is novel since, as the psychologist Runyan notes, narrative
is not normally considered a method in the sense that measurement, quantitative analysis and experimentation are used as methods. Runyan examines the logical and empirical features of narrative from the perspective used when critically analyzing a biography; I will draw upon both his illustrations from biographies of Woodrow Wilson, Woolf and Samuel Johnson, and his discussion to summarize these features. Runyan began his inquiry with the assumption that biographies consist of the description and explanation of a life course, a commonly held notion. However, he found that even the best biographies contain few explicit explanations. If explanations are given at all there is usually only a single one proposed for an event, accompanied by consistent evidence. Possible alternate explanations are neither mentioned nor is inconsistent evidence tendered. For example, it is known that Woodrow Wilson was a slow learner and did not become familiar with the alphabet until age nine. In their biography the Georges propose the sole hypothesis that,

One wonders whether Tommy's capacity to learn was not reduced by his father's perfectionist demand... Perhaps, too, failing -- refusing -- to learn was the one way in which the boy dared to express his resentment against his father.

A second common organizing principle involves making a descriptive generalization followed by instances of the behavior, which corroborate it. A slightly different tactic is to construct an idiographic generalization which holds only for the individual and is more analytic. The Georges'
claim that Wilson was unwilling to compromise is an example, "derived from the perception of a pattern of similar events throughout Wilson's career."

A more complicated feature of narrative is that it often works on several levels of abstraction at once. Runyan cites Quentin Bell's analysis of the Stephens' social position in its historical context, in his biography of Virginia Woolf. Bell weaves summary statements like, the Stephens belonged to "the lower division of the upper middle class," with detailed particulars about their household and more general statements about the meaning of their position at that period in English history.

Imaginative portrayals of events, which the biographer creates from his immersion in the historical period or from his own experience and knowledge of the world, constitute another feature of biography. Bell's account of the young Stephens' moth gathering expeditions, though likely not historically accurate, vividly conveys more of what the attraction and meaning of such an experience must have been than a straight, "truthful" account would have.

Life history narrative also frequently contains statements linking past events to the audience's experience and those which evaluate a subject's historical significance. Much of the relevance of Erikson's Young Man Luther depends upon his comparison of Luther's identity crisis to similar crises Erikson observed in
twentieth century youth in his clinical practice. In another example, W. J. Bate begins evaluating his biographical subject Samuel Johnson's impact with the claim that, "Samuel Johnson has fascinated more people than any other writer except Shakespeare." Biographers also expose the relation between the intentions and actions of their subject. Finally, narrative is used to set the achievements of a subject into context. According to Bate, as a lexicographer Samuel Johnson accomplished in nine years with the help of a few assistants what other institutions which have compiled dictionaries have taken twenty, fifty-five and seventy years to complete.

Runyan concludes that these features of narrative make it a far superior method for arriving at an understanding of an individual in his social and historical context than more traditional social scientific methods of analysis. Thus, viewing narrative as a method is essential for both of the processes involved in hypothesis testing: the one which involves formulating hypotheses from sources, an expanding process analogous to divergent (or creative) thinking and the one concerning the critical analysis of hypotheses either when examining a biography or when constructing a life history narrative. These two latter functions are contracting processes which are analogous to convergent thinking. It is the latter, critical process which needs to be developed in more detail.

All biographers take measurements - they "size up"
their subjects either implicitly or explicitly, in an organized or haphazard fashion, as we have seen; they use the features of the narrative method in order to do so. Scientific method offers several ways of evaluating these features and thus of checking the measurements taken. One way of deciding on the acceptability of a measurement is to ascertain its validity, or the extent to which something measures what it is supposed to measure. In order for a measurement to be valid it must also be reliable, that is, providing that the amount of something being measured remains constant, if a measurement is repeated on a subsequent occasion from the original the results will be able to be replicated. Both checks supplement one another and in fact are necessary since a measuring device can consistently measure something incorrectly, that is it can be reliable and not valid. According to Kerlinger (1965), the issues of reliability and validity are the two major problems facing the researcher because, "If one does not know the reliability and validity of one's data little faith can be put in the results obtained and the conclusions drawn from the results." In the sphere of life history writing the discussion of these checks inevitably raises the issue of the consistency of personality, as we shall see, though the importance of establishing a degree of consistency depends upon the biographer's theoretical perspective.

Of the several forms of validity which researchers
typically attempt to establish, face validity is the most commonly applied. It involves being able to make the statement that on the face of things (i.e. from what I have been able to gather from careful examination of my methods and data) I appear to be measuring what I set out to measure - in the psychobiographer’s case certain aspects of the personality of X, possibly in his social or historical context. Kerlinger claims that on an objective test face validity can be increased by careful wording and consideration of the representativeness of questions for the purpose in mind. In psychobiography, that might translate into checking that every sentence, paragraph and chapter is on target or broaches complementary aspects of the biographical problem. A similar form, content validity, asks the question, "To what extent did I cover the content area of the subject under study in a representative manner?" If I set out to describe and offer explanations of the subject’s social, political, spiritual and psychological interests, his early years or final years, did I cover these areas adequately? - in what proportions? Can my emphasis be justified? The obvious weakness of both face and content validity are that they are basically judgemental. However, the achievement of both also depends on the number and quality of the original hypotheses. Initially it is necessary to ask whether the hypotheses cover all questionable aspects of a person’s life, or at least those which are relevant. It helps too if "relevancy" or the "universe of content" is clearly defined
at the outset. Finally, if in addition to specifications of what is being judged there are explicit directions for making judgements (such as may be supplied by a psychological theory) then validity will be enhanced.

Concurrent validity, a stronger form than either face or content, is also more difficult to employ, especially in the psychobiographical enterprise. It involves the examination of the extent to which the measurement obtained compares with an exterior, known valid measurement of the same variable. An extremely battered form would consist of writing about an aspect of a subject's life from primary sources, independently of the standard biography of that person. Assuming that the "standard" biography is generally perceived as accurate and is acceptable to experts in the field, then the extent to which one's independent observations and conclusions coincided with the standard biography would provide a degree of concurrent validity. The problem here is that it is difficult to assess the accuracy of even highly acclaimed current biographies like W. J. Bate's Samuel Johnson, since any inadequacies may not be revealed immediately. Also, one's biographical perspective might differ from the standard biography.

Predictive validity, a fourth test for accuracy, has more practical applications for psychobiography. Kerlinger makes the point that, "in science, prediction does not necessarily mean forecast."\(^{11}\) In this broader than usual sense it is possible to predict something in the past since "pre" only implies "prior to completed knowledge." To
obtain a degree of predictive validity then, it is necessary to check the measuring instrument against some outcome which it predicts. Again, in battered form, several possibilities exist. It may be possible to compare a subject's reminiscences late in life about a specific earlier period with his statements about events and feelings as recorded at that earlier period in his life in journals and diaries. The extent to which the reminiscences "predict" the statements from the earlier period provides a degree of validity. For instance, volume one of Russell's autobiography, begun in 1931, placed side by side with his Journal of 1902-1905, not published until recently, might yield a certain amount of validity. Similarly, the biographer could compare published contemporary sources about an event or period in a person's life with unpublished ones (like letters). Validity would depend on the sources' similarity (over and above differences in purpose of the writing and level of intimacy, etc.) In Russell's case, the attitudes and ideas expressed in his 1914 essay "Mysticism and Logic" could be used to predict the content of his correspondence just prior to the publishing of the essay. A third possibility would be to read only the first half of a standard, chronological biography and then to make predictions about the subject's preoccupations and the themes of the latter portion of his life. In the methodological literature Anderson mentions a strategy of Zonis', which is really a method of arriving at predictive validity, although he does not identify it as such:
The careful investigator can use his empathically derived understandings as hypotheses which can be applied to subsequent events in the life of the subject. As those hypotheses are refined in terms of the way in which the subject apparently responded to those subsequent events, the investigator can assume with greater and greater confidence that he has succeeded in uncovering the meanings which the subject must be bringing to his historical circumstances in order to have responded to them in the ways in which he did respond.

Anderson also outlines a "cleaner" form of predictive validity, which can only rarely be obtained. If hypotheses have been formed, or even whole biographies written and a new primary source (like papers) is uncovered, then hypotheses can be checked and revised as necessary.

The form which has the greatest implications for psychobiography is, however, construct validity since it is in many ways the strongest form and because it is most directly concerned with "inquiry involving the testing of hypothesized relations." Normally, the personality variables which a biographer implements to help "explain" the motivations of his subject are linked with some form of theory. For example, Erikson's term identity crisis, which he uses in his Luther study, is one of the stages in his psychosocial developmental theory. As part of an encompassing theory these variables are expected to change in certain ways under certain conditions. To illustrate, the variable "learning" is expected to increase with reinforced practise and to decrease with disuse. To the extent that a purported measurement of a personality
variable reflects the changes predicted by the theory, it can be assumed to be a valid measure of the variable in question.\textsuperscript{122} Rushton, Brainerd and Pressley (1983) address the problem of establishing construct validity.\textsuperscript{123} They claim that very stable relationships in developmental research have been obscured by weak measurements and that the failure to use aggregate measures of psychological variables has impeded psychology. Their argument says basically that a researcher would never consider testing a person using just a single item or question from a test, so why should he place any confidence in using only one behavioral measure to test and predict a whole range of behaviors? This idea has been formed into the principle of aggregation, which states that sampling a number of behavioral measures provides a more accurate and reliable estimate of psychological reality than using only two measures. Accuracy is increased by numbers of measurements because each measurement by itself contains some random error. These errors cancel out when several estimates are combined and true estimates accumulate averaging over situations.\textsuperscript{124} For example, it has been found that judges ratings of any event from a beauty contest to the effectiveness of teaching become more accurate the more judges used and observations made, and as a result, have a higher predictive validity of behavior.\textsuperscript{125}

The principle of aggregation has bearing on the psychobiographical enterprise both at a theoretical level,
since it addresses the personality consistency issue, and as a technique which strengthens the concept of an idiographic (individual case) generalization. Most psychobiographers either assume, or want to confidently make the statement, that their subject has a personality which is relatively consistent over time and across situations. Ordinarily they will speak of his traits or characteristics. However much this attitude contributes to the organization of the chaos of a life, there has traditionally in psychology not been much evidence to show that the idea of traits has great explanatory power. The personality consistency controversy, otherwise known as the "specificity versus generality" debate, has centred on the massive Hartshorne-May studies (1928-30, as cited in Rushton et al, 1983). These consisted of thirty-three different behavioral tests, including five measures of "service" or altruism, as well as teacher and classmate ratings of children's reputations. By emphasizing the low correlations of around .20 to .30 found between any two of the behavioral measures, Hartshorne and May argued that there was little evidence to support the notion that there are unified character traits of, in their case, deceit or honesty. Walter Mischel (1968) and others supported their situation specific viewpoint by pointing out that .20 to .30 is the average correlation between behavioral instances of a "trait". Whereas Mischel's idea that people often adapt to situations or demonstrate "discriminative facility" is important, it does not preclude the existence of consistent behavior or traits. Using
the principle of aggregation and examining the
predictability achieved from a number of measures", Rushton
(et al, 1983) have obtained correlations of .50 to .60
between multiple behavioral instances of a trait. If
the Hartshorne-May data is reexamined using the principle of
aggregation, it is found that the five altruistic measures
combined correlated .61 with teacher and classmate
measures of a student's reputation and that student's
ratings of their peers correlated even higher (+.80) with
teacher's perceptions of their student's altruism. What these results show in a statistical way is that
individuals' single behaviors can be explained to a
substantial degree by their consistent personality traits.
The existence of traits does not counter genetic theory
since genetics may explain a partial origin of traits.
These results should encourage the psychobiographer to look
for consistent behaviors over the course of a life. It
should also be realized that, though the statistical
apportioning of variance in behavior is not practical in
biography, we now have a principle on which to decide the
strength of evidence. Traits or characteristics of an
individual should only be argued for on the basis of many
behavioral instances and not just one, or even a few
examples. Edel, for example, says of his study of Henry
James that the pattern of the work yielded a pattern in the
life. Patterns are essential for psychobiography. In
this sense the principle of aggregation addresses the
problem of reliability since it involves consistency. In
order for a variable to be reliable it must be consistent, that is it must provide the same reading on two different occasions, providing other factors remain the same.

"Alternate forms" is one way of establishing the reliability of a subject's statements. If interviews are involved, a weak type of alternate forms can be implemented by asking questions and then rewording them in a later interview. If the answers agree then a degree of reliability can be assumed. Or if a person (say Russell) addresses an issue (like pacifism) in a lecture and later speaks of the same in another form (say in a book or pamphlet) then the extent to which the statements agree provides some reliability.

To ascertain the investigator's reliability interobserver reliability is often used. It requires that at least two researchers independently look at and interpret data; on the strength of their agreement reliability is established. Edel (1982) describes an experiment in which this sort of technique was used, although the researchers did not work totally independently. A psychiatrist, G. Moraitis, was invited to examine the transference reactions of an historian studying Nietzsche, and in fact both arrived at perceptions of their biographical subjects from their different fields. Eventually they combined their observations, which provided deeper insights than either could have realized on his own.

The split-half approach involves randomly dividing a
data set in half and then interpreting one half. The extent to which interpretations formed about the second half agree with those made reading the first half would provide a degree of reliability. For example, the technique could be applied to the vast correspondence of over 3,500 letters written between Russell and Lady Ottoline Morrell from 1911 to 1938 in order to determine their dependability as documents. Thus, if a psychobiographer takes the pains necessary to consciously and formally establish a degree of subject reliability, then it is not difficult to realize that he is in a much better position to make idiographic generalizations, which hold for a single case only.

Having shown that the elements of scientific method, particularly the checks or measurements offered by tests of reliability and validity, have potential application in psychobiography, I now propose to provide some more concrete examples of how alternate examples can be checked, borrowing from Runyan's excellent discussion and then implementing some of the techniques in a preliminary discussion of the cases of Woolf and Russell.

Alternate explanations occur on two levels: the macrocosmic, in which differing explanations are offered of an entire life in its social-historical context, and the microcosmic, where differing explanations may be proposed of a single event within a life. At the macrocosmic level differing explanations occur, as Runyan explains, for two fundamental reasons: either there is too much information
available (as in the case of Abraham Lincoln, as well as many more modern figures) so that one perspective cannot possibly encompass the volume of data, or there is too little information available (as in the lives of Shakespeare and Jesus) in which case the temptation is to fabricate. The life of Jesus is a particularly good example of the latter because of the great interest in the sparse details of his life - it is estimated that over 60,000 biographies have been written within the last two centuries - and because of the heated controversy surrounding those "facts". Although the traditional approach is to view him as a saint, the son of God and a performer of miracles, this has been challenged by diverse accounts. Portraits of him range from S. Reiman's view that he was a political Messiah whose task was to establish a new political state to Hirsch's opinion that Jesus was psychopathological and represents a classic case of paranoia. Runyan examines some of the conditions and processes which have led to such a multitude and diversity of accounts of Jesus' life, which can be generalized. Alternative accounts have been shaped by different sources (different opinions about the priority of the Gospels), different conceptual frameworks (a rationalistic or supernatural approach to the miracles), different principles of selection (selecting data to portray a picture of psychopathology), and different purposes (writing a life of Jesus for religious, anticlerical, or historical purposes). Instead of responding to the diversity of accounts by admitting that biography is "hopelessly arbitrary" or by claiming that these biographies require more thorough
research, in which case they would converge, Runyan advocates a position of epistemological relativism. According to this perspective, individual inquirers are "central coordinates in their own subjective frames of reference." Though there is an irreducible "core of diversity" in accounts, rigorous inquiry is employed within one's frame of reference. In practice, good biographers implicitly state their frames of reference. For instance, Quentin Bell, who Runyan criticizes for his scanty psychological treatment of Virginia Woolf's early life, admits that he is no psychologist and does not know enough about mental illness to make links between Woolf's adolescent traumas and later manifestations of her illness. The adoption of epistemological relativism also does not run counter to the implementation of some of the checks provided by scientific method; rather, these positions complement one another.

Not too surprisingly, accounts at a microcosmic level, of a single event, can vary almost as much as entire life accounts. Runyan provides the outstanding example of Van Gogh's act of cutting off his ear on December 23rd, 1888 and presenting it to a prostitute named Rachel. I will comment on it in order to shed additional light on the process of critically evaluating hypotheses at this level. Based on Lubin's (1972) analysis, Runyan presents thirteen psychodynamic explanations of the event, ranging from symbolic explanations to those based on a single incident in
Van Gogh's past to those grounded in a number of past and future events in Van Gogh's life. An example of a religious symbolic explanation is that Van Gogh cut off his ear because he identified with Jesus' disciple Peter, who cut off the ear of a servant at the Garden of Gethsemane. Van Gogh had attempted to paint the scene earlier in the year and may have role played it the night of the incident. A psychologically based symbolic explanation would be that the act was one of symbolic self-castration, carried out because of a homosexual conflict "aroused by the presence of Gaugin", who left Van Gogh immediately following the incident. One based on a past incident considers that the masochist Van Gogh may have been influenced by stories in the newspapers "about Jack the Ripper, who mutilated the bodies of prostitutes, sometimes cutting off their ears." An account based on multiple events suggests that Van Gogh was upset by the perceived loss of his brother Theo, who had become engaged. Two later breakdowns occurred when Vincent learned of Theo's marriage and the birth of his beloved brother's first child. Again, different approaches can be taken to the variance in explanations. According to Runyan, one route is to perceive the explanations as complimentary, but this is not sufficiently critical. Another is to claim that several explanations are concerned with different aspects of the problem. However, there remains a sufficient number of explanations which concentrate on one item -- for instance, why Van Gogh chose his ear to cut off. A more critical attitude would claim
that one, or possibly some, of the explanations are more credible than others. A final position entertained by Runyan is to consider the symbolic interpretations somewhat arbitrary, easily formulated and multiplied. Bergmann’s view coincides. He says that, "the reliability of any interpretation based on symbols alone should be questioned for symbols are overdetermined and their meaning is less constant and less universal than Freud assumed." How then should we deal with these differing explanations and the varying responses which Runyan enumerates? According to the principle of aggregation, for instance, the strongest explanation would be based on a pattern of behaviors, since the truest account of Van Gogh would eventually emerge over several instances. Only the multiple events interpretation, which identifies three similar events concerning Van Gogh’s brother, in which Van Gogh’s reaction was similar, demonstrates any degree of consistency. It should therefore be considered the strongest interpretation of the ear cutting event, though possibly not the only satisfying one. Runyan’s view is in accordance. Runyan also provides a rule of thumb sketch of other considerations necessary to evaluate hypotheses:

Explanations and interpretations can be evaluated in light of criteria such as (1) their logical soundness, (2) their comprehensiveness in accounting for a number of puzzling aspects of the events in question, (3) their survival of tests of attempted falsification, such as tests of derived predictions or retrodictions, (4) their consistency with the full range of
available evidence, (5) their support from above, or their consistency with more general knowledge about human functioning or about the person in question, and (6) their credibility relative to other explanatory hypotheses.  

In the light of the psychological framework established, some comments can now be made about how one might hypothetically approach the life of Virginia Woolf, and about the kinds of decisions which need to be made before embarking on an actual preliminary sketch of Russell.

Initially, if one adopts Rushton’s distal-proximal orientation, it is necessary to acknowledge that some proportion of behavior (of up to about fifty per cent depending on one’s theoretical stance) will have a genetic origin. This does not necessarily mean that hypotheses about genetic endowment are impossible to make but they will likely be more tentative than environmentally based ones. In a typically perceptive passage of Moments of Being, Woolf herself toys with the idea that there may be a genetic or instinctual component which predisposed her to react in a certain way to her half-brother Gerald’s fondling of her when she was a child. She says,

This seems to show that a feeling about certain parts of the body; how they must not be touched; how it is wrong to allow them to be touched; must be instinctive. It proves that Virginia Stephen was not born on the 25th January, 1882, but was born many thousands of years ago; and had from the very first to encounter instincts already acquired by thousands of ancestresses in the past.

For Woolf genetic hypotheses could be proposed based on
known family genealogies and incidents of mental illness. Another significant component of behavior is shaped by the environment, and the evidence has been presented which suggests that traits have a degree of explanatory power. In addition, some behaviors appear to be situation specific, following Mischel's (1968) observations. On the basis of my reading of Woolf's works and several biographies and sketches, including Quentin Bell's standard one and Spater's and Parson's *A Marriage of True Minds* (1977), many complimentary hypotheses could be generated at different stages along the distal-proximal spectrum. Psychological concepts could be used as starting points. For instance, Woolf's behaviors might be illuminated by the concepts of toxic psychosis (a term used in medical psychiatry), basic anxiety (derived from Horney's post-Freudian theory), need for achievement (based on personality trait-theory) and object loss and repair (from Brink's object relational based theory). Following the principle of aggregation all of these would have to be substantiated by many instances of behavior throughout the life course in order to be considered valid. For instance, toxic psychosis would likely have to be discounted since evidence about medical treatments of Woolf is not available. These hypotheses would be considered in the light of Woolf's social position in the upper middle class in Britain during the first decades of this century. In her case the historical events of the two world wars had dramatic impact on her outlook.
As far as Russell is concerned, a similar program could be implemented. From a genetic perspective his case is particularly promising since the genealogy of his prominent ancestry is well documented. Among his close relations, the mental predispositions of his parents, his Uncle Rollo, Aunt Agatha and his Grandmother need to be established. Based on his popular writings, his autobiography, letters, the biographies by Clark (1975) and Wood, (1957) and papers by Brink (1976, 1979, 1982) and the Simons (1974), hypotheses could be generated about Russell’s apparently inherited predisposition to depression (a genetic factor), his obsessional characteristic and his need (similar to Woolf’s) to compensate for object-loss (both psychodynamic terms), his strong need for achievement and power, and his tendency towards dogmatism (all personality traits). These perspectives would be supplemented by consideration of both his social position at the summit of British society in the late nineteenth and better part of the twentieth centuries, his reactions against the ideology of that class, and finally by his intense reactions to major historical events like the Boer War, the two World Wars and the dropping of the atomic bombs in 1945.

Realistically, however, my sphere of knowledge and the limitations of space necessitate placing several limits on my sketch of Russell. Since I am functioning as a literary critic armed with psychological tools of investigation, my frame of reference will be limited to a
consideration of Russell's personality as it is reflected both in his literary ability and his productions. I am not an historian of the period, a philosopher, mathematician or social reformer so these aspects of Russell's life will not receive a proportionate consideration.

There are other parameters which should be delineated in psychobiographical studies, and specifically in the case of Russell. Time span should be indicated. Will the entire life course be interpreted or only a slice? In the present study Russell's early years up to 1914 will be concentrated on, with especial focus on the years 1911-1914. Which activities of the subject will be examined? This sketch will emphasize Russell's relationship with Lady Ottoline Morrell, although the groundwork will be laid by interpreting his prior relations with his Granny and his first wife Alys. Perhaps most importantly the aim needs to be established. My purpose is to outline Russell's relations with these three important women in his life to see if they illuminate Russell's motivations to be creative and help explain his eventual limitations in both the confessional and fictional form. It is thus a correlational approach. I have not set out to disparage Russell (I admire both his capacity for struggle and his accomplishments) or to discredit his early literary achievements, since they were so important to his later development, but to explain why they are not considered works of art and why Russell did not pursue this field further. Finally a narrative form must
be chosen which effectively fuses the chaos of the life into a coherent whole both logical and readable. The aim of my inquiry has dictated a non-chronological approach. Although these sorts of parameters should be expressed in some form in every psychobiography, they do not constitute a method of absolving all criticism but merely define the parameters within which criticism is appropriate. As we shall see, attempting a gestalt of even a particular fragment of a life is a most demanding task. Perhaps after all Lytton Strachey was not so far off the truth when he stated that biography is "the most delicate and humane of all the branches of the art of writing."
...everything has turned out as you predicted 10 years ago. You are a great psychologist.

T. S. Eliot to Bertrand Russell, April 21, 1925
CHAPTER TWO

BERTRAND RUSSELL’S CREATIVE QUEST
FOR EMOTIONAL TRUTH

Bertrand Russell, to use Mr. Ramsay’s terms in Virginia Woolf’s To The Lighthouse, is one of those men who reached at least the letter P in intellectual achievement in a world where most men only reach D or E. As a social critic and reformer Russell’s impact on the current moral milieu has yet to be assessed (if it ever can be). In the Prologue to his Autobiography, he outlines the three governing passions of his life: "the longing for love, the search for knowledge, and unbearable pity for the suffering of mankind". Of these, the search for knowledge predominated and provided impetus for him throughout his long and variegated career. That search is inextricably caught up with his search for emotional truth beyond logic. The frequency of Russell's statements to Lady Ottoline Morrell such as, "It is my business in life to do my best to discover the truth...and to explain what I have come to think, and why..."1 provide them with a degree of reliability.

Nowhere do the implications of the quest surface with more clarity than in Russell’s most important relationship with Lady Ottoline Morrell, at its most intense in 1911 and 1912. Although the love affair lasted only until about 1916, after which it levelled out into a
friendship, it in some sense transformed Russell so that much of his later writing can be seen either as a repudiation or a justification of the events of these momentous years. In March 1911, at a very early stage in the affair, Russell informs Lady Ottoline that,

I will always tell you everything. I feel, as much when it is painful as when it isn’t. We must always build on truth—there is nothing real or good without truth.²

Gradually they do until their quest for truth about their relationship and about the universe becomes a central preoccupation.

Thus, it is rather disturbing to discover such a wide variance in the accounts of the affair as are found between excerpts from Lady Ottoline’s Journals of the period in her memoirs, Russell’s autobiography, begun in 1931, Ronald Clark’s biography of Russell, and Russell’s and Lady Ottoline’s vast correspondence of over 3,500 letters written between 1911 and 1938, the year Ottoline died. Russell’s brief seven or eight page treatment of the burgeoning affair in his Autobiography is particularly unrepresentative and unsatisfying. In attempting to recreate the relationship so many inconsistencies emerge that one soon feels as though, to borrow Andrew Brink’s image, one has entered into a hall of shattered mirrors, each fragment of which reflects one facet of the truth. In both Russell’s activity during the relationship and his later reporting of it, the only thing which appears to be consistent is his inconsistency.
However, perhaps this is not being fair to Russell since, as Runyan has shown, the meaning of a term such as truth partially depends on one's framework of reference. In the case of their relationship, does the truth represent the immediate impressions of the correspondents, as encapsulated in the letters, or the wisdom of hindsight? Instead of focusing on single instances of behavior, I have attempted to find patterns in the discrepancies in interpretations of the truth of the affair and preceding events to reveal various aspects of Russell's personality, including his obsessionality, an outgrowth of his Jocasta mothering, his need for power and his dogmatism. These characteristics in turn can be placed side by side with the literary products of Russell's and Ottoline's relationship in order to illuminate the limitations of these works.

Before proceeding further, it might be useful to note that Russell himself was the first to admit the hopeless complexity of his nature, both in his autobiography, and in numerous letters such as that which he wrote to Ottoline April 10th, 1911: he states, "My best is worthy of you, but I am complex, full of diverse motives, and changes of mood - reasonable and unselfish for long times, and then quite suddenly the reverse."  According to Rushton, who provides evidence to suggest that large amounts of behavior have genetic origins, there are some aspects of that complexity which will be difficult to unravel, since information has been lost about Russell's
early life. In any case, we do not yet have precise enough tools to measure the interaction between genetic endowment and early environment for anyone, let alone such an extraordinary individual as Russell. The situation is certainly not hopeless, although Russell's complexity is revealed even in such a seemingly fundamental aspect of his personality as his attitude towards the truth. Running parallel to his continuing desire and quest for the truth is an ambivalence about it, which has its roots deep in his past. As early as the "Greek Exercises", begun when Russell was 15, Russell questions the benefits of truth seeking. On June 3rd he writes,

...I used never for a moment to doubt that truth was a good thing to get hold of. But now I have the very greatest doubt and uncertainty. For the search for truth has led me to these results I have put in this book, whereas, had I been content to accept the teachings of my youth, I should have remained comfortable. The search for truth has shattered most of my old beliefs, and has made me commit what are probably sins where otherwise I should have kept clear of them. I do not think it has in any way made me happier; of course it has given me a deeper character, a contempt for trifles or mockery, but at the same time it has taken away cheerfulness, and made it much harder to make bosom friends, and worst of all, it has debarked me from free intercourse with my people, and thus made them strangers to some of my deepest thoughts, which, if by any mischance I do let them out, immediately become the subject for mockery which is inexpressibly bitter to me, though not unkindly meant. Thus, in my individual case, I should say, the effects of a search for truth have been more bad than good...Hence I have great doubts of the unmixed advantage of truth."

Truth as an abstract concept is not the only object
sought after towards which Russell manifests ambivalence. Conflicting emotions about his family (in which Russell’s grandmother was the dominant figure) are implied in the entry as well. It appears as though already Russell has learned to mask, or distance himself from, personal conflicts by placing them in the guise of conflicts on an abstract level. That process becomes a reliable pattern as it is repeated all along Russell’s passage to self-knowledge.

Not only does Russell’s ambivalence about truth have its roots deep in his past. In order to aggregate instances of Russell’s behavior in relationships and thus understand the complexities of Russell’s relation to Ottoline, it is necessary to delve at least as far back as to Russell’s conversion of 1901. Prior to that conversion Russell had had revelations of self-knowledge of which the passage cited from the "Greek Exercises" is but one example. The difference with the 1901 conversion, as its title implies, was that it effected a more permanent change in Russell’s character and, most importantly, it was projected from the self outwards onto external objects. In its essence it involved Russell accessing lost knowledge about himself and then applying that knowledge. Although Russell’s 1894 marriage to Alys Pearall Smith had been reasonably happy, a dangerous cleavage in Russell between reason and emotion had been developing unnoticed. During the conversion he realized that,
Ever since my marriage, my emotional life had been calm and superficial. I had forgotten all the deeper issues, and had been content with flippant cleverness.

As far as his consuming passion for mathematics was concerned, the period between 1894 and 1900 had been productive but, in retrospect, he claimed that,

I did a great deal of work, and succeeded in it beyond my hope; but it was entirely technical and dry. Somehow or other the awakening was bound to come. As I look back on the happiness of those years, I feel it to have been not of the best kind. It was associated with hardness and conceit and limitation.

How exactly did Russell’s awakening occur? Andrew Brink, who terms the conversion the first stage in a "creative illness", points out that it was "no doubt the dramatic manifestation of tensions that had been long incubated..." As one would expect, from H. Ellenburger’s outline of the stages of a creative illness, Russell’s conversion was preceded by a period of intense intellectual effort from October to December 1900, which was to result in Russell’s The Principles of Mathematics. February of 1901 saw Russell and Alys staying in Cambridge with his colleague and future collaborator A.N. Whitehead and his wife Evelyn. Having been "profoundly moved" by Gilbert Murray’s reading of the Hippolytus, Russell and Alys returned to the Whiteheads and,

When we came home we found Mrs. Whitehead undergoing an unusually severe bout of pain. She seemed cut off from everyone and everything by walls of agony, and the sense of the solitude of each human soul
overwhelmed me...Suddenly the ground seemed to give way beneath me, and I found myself in quite another region. Within five minutes I went through some such reflections as the following: the loneliness of the human soul is unendurable; nothing can penetrate it except the highest intensity of the sort of love that religious teachers have preached; whatever does not spring from this motive is harmful, or at best useless; it follows that love is wrong, that a public school education is abominable, that the use of force is to be deprecated, and that in human relations one should penetrate to the core of loneliness in each person and speak to that...At the end of these five minutes, I had become a completely different person."

Russell had found a way to contact his depression and to convert its pain and sadness into something more positive and stable. Russell himself wrote that he felt some triumph at the time "through the fact that I could dominate pain, and make it, as I thought, a gateway to wisdom...." The first object of Russell's empathic reaction was the Whitehead's three year old son, who Russell led away from the painful scene, and who Russell must have identified with owing to Russell's early experiences of pain and loss. Before this time Russell had not noticed the boy but, according to Russell, "From that day to his death in the war in 1918, we were close friends." However, the charge of "eventism" might be laid if we uncritically accepted Russell's statement that in five minutes he had become a completely different person. Personalities do not change overnight - let alone in five minutes. Even so, Russell later acknowledged that the conversion was partly delusion and its effects impermanent. He states,

For a time a sort of mystic illumination
possessed me. I felt that I knew the inmost thoughts of everybody that I met in the street, and though this was, no doubt, a delusion, I did in actual fact find myself in far closer touch than previously with all my friends, and many of my acquaintances... The mystic insight which I then imagined myself to possess has largely faded, and the habit of analysis has reasserted itself.¹³

His continued failure to reconcile the reason seeking and emotional aspects of his life is implied in a letter to a confidante, Lucy Donnelly, following the conversion:

Abstract work, if one wishes to do it well, must be allowed to destroy one's humanity; one raises a monument which is at the same time a tomb, in which, voluntarily, one slowly inters oneself.¹⁴

In a brief attempt to circumvent the problems he was now encountering in abstract work, he wrote the passionate, "The Free Man's Worship" which, as Ronald Clark points out, Russell later claimed was "the total result of so much suffering"¹⁵. Russell then retreated from his emotions and immersed himself in the depths of mathematical logic.¹⁶

Also, his new-found empathy did not extend to his wife Alys. In his autobiography Russell describes, with characteristic flippancy, the scene which resulted in his estrangement from Alys.

I went out bicycling one afternoon, and suddenly, as I was riding along a country road I realized that I no longer loved Alys. I had had no idea until this moment that my love for her was even lessening.¹⁷

Though the conflicts must have been brewing for some time, the upshot was a personal storm which drove both Russell and Alys close to suicide at various times and which
left Russell emotionally isolated. In the period from 1902
to 1910 Russell was also in a sense driven to seek oblivion
from personal strife through the technical work required to
produce *Principia Mathematica*, a major achievement in
mathematics. In his autobiography Russell comments that,

> The strain of unhappiness combined with severe intellectual work, in the years from 1902 till 1910, was very great. At the time I often wondered whether I should come out the other end of the tunnel in which I seemed to be.

During these years several of the more puzzling aspects of Russell's personality are illuminated. They have direct bearing on his relationship with Lady Ottoline, which became, for Russell, the light at the end of the tunnel.

Discrepancies in Russell's accounts of his relationship with Alys are immediately striking. In the *Autobiography* Russell makes the claim about Alys that:

> I had no wish to be unkind, but I believed in those days (what experience has taught me to think possibly open to doubt) that in intimate relations one should speak the truth. I did not see in any case how I could for any length of time successfully pretend to love her when I did not. I had no longer any instinctive impulse toward sex relations with her, and this alone would have been an insuperable barrier to the concealment of my feelings.

However, in a journal entry of March 9, 1905 he writes a much more revealing passage about what must have been going on: he confesses that,

> ...I have grown aware of new possibilities of wrong-doing. The habit of not speaking to Alys about anything that really interests me, and the instinct of concealing my feelings from her make it hard not to be untruthful
with her and not to keep silence about things that I ought to tell her about. I do not always resist this temptation successfully; and what is worse, it is making me generally secretive.  

This passage has striking similarities to the one I cited earlier from Russell's "Greek Exercises". In both he feels sinful or at least guilty about the withholding of his innermost thoughts from those close to him. Alys, it appears, has merely replaced his family and specifically his grandmother as both the instigator and the victim of his secretiveness and manipulations. Thus, accumulating evidence, suggesting a pattern of behavior, makes it likely that the information in the less intimate Autobiography is the less reliable in this case.

Anthony Storr has shown that the need to control information both about oneself and about the environment is the dominant characteristic of the obsessional.  

Brink adds that Russell learned obsessional ego defenses in order to withstand, originally, the manipulations of his grandmother so that, by this time,

As an intellectual Russell needed mind control over ideas; he had to think through to first principles, every idea that interested him. He also needed to control people in his ambit, sometimes subordinating them to his mental activities, but keeping them available to meet his romantic and affiliative needs.

Several other characteristics of the obsessional are to be found fully developed in the Russell of this period, all of which derive from original Jocasta mothering, or grandmothering, in Russell's case. Matthew Besdine writes
that the Jocasta mother makes the child her love object as a result of her own emotional starvation. Symbiosis with the child is maintained long after the child needs its independence so that the child begins to feel the love of the mother as a bondage. The resultant character structure, according to Besdine, is

marked by an unresolved Oedipus problem, the fear of love, strong ambivalence in human relations, strong paranoid trends, a tenuous ability to conform or accept authority, an underlying sense of guilt and masochism, a strong homosexual component, latent or overt, and high ambitions. They are unusually oral and demanding, easily disappointed and regress readily to panic, with states of emptiness, withdrawal and depression. The Jocasta reared child differs from the emotionally deprived child in several important respects, among them his intelligence, his inactivity and his leadership qualities.

There are many implications here, which need to be examined separately for Russell's case. His wild fluctuations in his feelings toward Alys are best captured in his Journal of 1902-05 but surprisingly enough the ambivalence surfaces in the Autobiography as well, which provides some degree of alternate forms reliability. He acknowledges that,

During my bicycle ride a host of such things occurred to me, and I became aware that she [Alys] was not the saint I had always supposed her to be. But in the revulsion I went too far, and forgot the great virtues that she did in fact possess.

In his relations with males Russell also demonstrated a characteristic ambivalence throughout his life. Although a tendency to homosexuality is not immediately apparent, especially since Russell was adamant
about the fact that there were no homosexuals in the
Apostles at Cambridge until a later generation than his,
there are indications of a latent homosexuality. I hesitate,
to use this term because of its deprecating connotations and
because 'latent' implies that the impulse was not manifest in
behavior, which weakens its explanatory power.
Nevertheless, for lack of a better term, it must suffice,
with qualifications. Instances of at least an ambivalance
begin to appear in Russell's relationship with Edward
Fitzgerald, a boy Russell befriended while attending the
Crammer's school in 1889. He recounts that, "Having been
lonely so long, I devoted a somewhat absurd amount of
affection to Fitzgerald." Russell goes on to say,
however, that following a European tour,

I came to hate him with a violence which, in
retrospect, I can hardly understand. On one
occasion, in an access of fury, I got my
hands on his throat and started to strangle
him. I intended to kill him, but when he
began to grow livid, I relented.27

Periods of intense attraction to and overvaluation of male
friends, followed by sudden swings to the opposite extreme," mark later relationships as well, including that with his
student Wittgenstein, himself a homosexual.

As far as the Jocasta mothered characteristic of
being ambitious is concerned, there can be no doubt that
Russell's Principia Mathematica became an enormous and
almost overwhelming undertaking. Along with Whitehead,
Russell virtually created a new branch of Mathematics - a
method of deducing mathematics from symbolic logic.
Complimentary to the ambition needed for such a task is the obsessionals's "meticulous concern with exactness" and especially his need for "absolute precision in the meaning of words and sentences." Unfortunately, as Storr claims, for the writer, "this is a double-edged characteristic". It turned against Russell during the summer of 1903 and 1904 when, in his own words, he reached a "complete intellectual deadlock". His description of the period in his autobiography demonstrates his descent into the obsessionals's ritualistic behavior.

Every morning I would sit down before a blank sheet of paper. Throughout the day, with a brief interval for lunch, I would stare at the blank sheet. Often when evening came it was still empty...It was clear to me that I could not get on without solving the contradiction, and I was determined that no difficulty should turn me aside from the completion of Principia Mathematica, but it seemed that the whole of the rest of my life might be consumed in looking at that blank sheet of paper.

Locked into a withered and eventually destructive relationship with Alys and worried about the negative effects on his intellectual future, Russell fell prey to severe depression. However, as Storr notes, the obsessionals activity which results in a ritual such as Russell created "may actually serve a valuable purpose by putting a person in touch with his own inner life." Russell's stand as Women's Suffragette Candidate in the British election of 1907 is the first evidence of a tenuous attempt by Russell to make contact with his inner life and to use his depression in a positive way by creating a bridge between
his self-absorption and the external world. He wrote to William James about his experience that, "Ten days of standing for Parliament gave me more relations with concrete realities than a life time of thought."\(^{32}\)

Though it was necessary for Russell to ascend once again into the realm of abstract thought, in order to write out *Principia Mathematica* after he had solved the logical contradictions, which had plagued him for so long, the stage was set for a second phase of creative illness. This time the incubation period of eight years was much longer, but in the final stage of completing the manuscript of *Principia* Russell once again found himself in a "state of strange and unusual excitement"\(^{33}\) comparable to that experienced in 1901. Upon completion, as he notes in his autobiography, "...I felt somewhat at a loose end. The feeling was delightful, but bewildering, like coming out of prison."\(^{34}\)

Although casually introduced in his autobiography, Russell's chance meeting of Lady Ottoline, during her husband Philip's election campaign of 1910, had about as sudden an impact on Russell as his conversion of 1901. According to Russell, Ottoline "fed something in me that had been starved"\(^{35}\), and in virtually one evening together they had decided to become lovers. For once, the autobiography "predicts" the content of the letters in the Russell archive. Since they reveal a similar picture, a
degree of alternate forms reliability and some validity can be claimed for the information about the abruptness and impact of their relationship. From a brief, almost cursory note from Russell on March 18, 1911, asking if he might stay at the Morrell’s in London, Russell launches into a most passionate letter just three days later, which begins, "My dearest - my heart is so full that I hardly know where to begin."\textsuperscript{35} Begin he did, however, and with a fervour difficult to imagine. Certainly a more complete transformation took place than in 1901, although a similar pattern of events unfolded. As Maria Forte claims, whereas Mrs. Whitehead’s illness and her close friendship with Russell acted as a catalyst and an inspiration for his attempt at emotional writing, Lady Ottoline went much further by becoming a communicant and an influential guide along Russell’s path to self knowledge.

Ronald Clark makes the rather bold claim that, in 1911, "Lady Ottoline was one of the most striking women in Britain."\textsuperscript{36} Perhaps more importantly, as Andrew Brink notes, Ottoline had a similar aristocratic upbringing to Russell’s, including a pattern of loss -- in her case of her father when she was four.\textsuperscript{36} Whereas Russell, in his early years, learned to retreat from conflicting emotions into a world of abstract thought and certainty, Lady Ottoline reacted to love and disruption by taking refuge in a deep belief in a spiritual life, which was never shaken. In one sense the relationship revolves around Russell’s attempt to
come to an understanding of, and to reconcile himself to, 
Lady Ottoline's very different perspective on the value of a 
spiritual life, including a belief in immortality. By the 
end of the first week of their correspondence Russell is 
already aware of their vast differences in religious 
belief -- he writes that.

\[I\text{ cannot understand the wish for a future life - it is the chief consolation that in the grave there is rest.}\]

Their spiritual, emotional, erotic and aesthetic quest also enabled Russell to develop his aesthetic sensibility. Lady Ottoline herself, in her memoirs, acknowledges this facet of her role of "helping to bring back to life his [Russell's] imaginative and poetic side, which he had almost atrophied during the long years of intense self-suppression." \[41\]

Andrew Brink refers to the dynamics of the relationship in terms of a shift on Russell's part from a "worship of reason" to a "worship of beauty", which Russell later retreated from.\[42\] The position became too extreme largely because of Russell's obsessional characteristics, already documented and well established by the time he met Ottoline. Not only do the sheer quantity of the letters and their repetitiveness (which Russell later lamented) attest to Russell's continuing obsessionality, but within even the earliest letters there is evidence of probably unconscious attempts on Russell's part to control and manipulate Ottoline's feelings. During the first week he implores Ottoline to keep up the intensity of their love:
But you must, you shall, be worthy of the love that is best in you and me; you shall not kill the new-born infant. A great love is a great responsibility; do not degrade us both by not living up to the best.43

And in his next letter his tone becomes, briefly, more threatening:

...if you continue to sleep with Philip and I don’t break with you, I shall hate him, probably more and more as time goes on, till it becomes madness.44

In mid-July 1911, a similar tone emanates in several letters, since Russell has failed to persuade Ottoline to leave Philip and Julian: on one occasion he states,

If you give love to anyone else, tho’ I could acquiesce and remain a devoted friend, and not, in any way alter my opinion of you, I should not continue to give love. Altogether you would have a first class tragedy on your hands.45

During the same period he carried his manipulations of Alys to an extreme. Following Alys’ insistence that she would bring Ottoline’s name into their divorce case, Russell carefully thwarted her plans by quietly informing her that he would "commit suicide in order to circumvent her."46

Even in deepest love with Ottoline, Russell was not free from a contrary destructive force: he muses that, "It is love makes me hurt you and when I love most I feel most need to hurt you — I don’t know why."47 One answer is that Russell’s obsessional defense against an internalized Granny had generalized to a fear of his lover’s over-control.48

On the other hand, Russell idealized their love and placed them both on a heroic level. In one particularly
insightful letter Russell claims that he has the "feeling of the doomed Titan wearily upholding a world which is ready to slip from his shoulders into chaos." Further on he transforms Ottoline into "the goddess who raises the storm and then gives healing and comfort to the shipwrecked sailors." Repeatedly he refers to Ottoline’s "divine power of loving" and in more than one instance he makes such a claim as,

You have become to me something holy; my touch will be gentle because I reverence you. Our love shall always be sacred...

The latter quotes aggregated imply an element of mothering in the affair, which indeed gradually replaced their love relationship. And yet there are just as many cases of Russell denying Ottoline’s claims that he idealizes her. He doth protest on one occasion, "I don’t idealize you — there is no need."

By viewing Russell’s tendencies to control and to distort reality through idealization of his loved one and subsequent denial of it, as being manifestations of Russell’s need for power, additional light is shed on his motivation and the consequences of the relationship with Ottoline. These insights do not conflict with Storr’s more distal psychodynamic obsessional theory. Based on a large body of empirical evidence, David Winter, in *The Power Motive*, shows that a need for power is related to both a concern with not being controlled by others and to the distortion of information. In addition, he claims that
"Men high in need for power are resistant to illusions fostered and cherished by others but they are subject to the illusions they create about themselves." R.

Gathorne-Hardy’s comment that Russell and Ottoline "were lovers but she was never ‘in love’ with him" begins to make sense. Also, Ottoline’s much less ecstatic and thus probably more objective judgement of Russell in her Journal, including her note of her lack of physical attraction to Russell and his lack of gentleness and sympathy, even at the emotional height of their affair, further demonstrates how Russell paradoxically deluded himself about his relationship with Ottoline while he gained self-knowledge from the affair.

Need for power, according to Winter, is the sum total of a person’s hope of power, and his fear of power since both involve a concern with power. Not only does such a person "construe the world in terms of power and use the concept of "power" in categorizing human interactions...but [these people] also want to feel themselves as the most powerful." Though Winter’s formulation of the origin of the power motive is somewhat speculative, he has demonstrated that younger sons with an older sibling or siblings score higher in fear of power than other siblings. According to Winter, they have experienced high imposed inhibitions,

the greatest power of others, the least personal power, and hence the greatest powerlessness. For them, in short, the area
of power is most likely to be associated with
evasive consequences because there are so
many more people likely to punish them (and
especially to punish them for trying to have
power.)

In later life those high in Fear of Power tend to "opt for
autonomy and avoid structure from others". In
relationships they "try to avoid rejection rather than
strive for affiliation". Not only is Russell the
youngest sibling but he also found himself in an environment
with at least three powerful adults imposing inhibitions on
him. In fact, the entire Russell lineage seems to have been
concerned with power, having been in ruling positions for
centuries and having finally produced a Prime Minister.

Though it does not seem likely that a personality trait
like need for power could be genetically transferred, Clark,
in the biography, speaks of "the inherited desire for power"
in the family.

Throughout his life Russell demonstrated an
ambivalence toward power. In a Journal entry of 1905 he
fears that, "I am in danger of getting a love of power...the
power of the father confessor." Russell's references to
his 'hunger' to be with Ottoline, which through repetition
become a dominant theme in his correspondence, make one
wonder if he would have devoured Lady Ottoline if he could
have. Finally, his preoccupation with power during the time
of the relationship with Ottoline is strikingly revealed in
a letter to his friend Lucy Donnelly. He says, "Power over
people's minds is the main personal desire of my life; and
this sort of power is not acquired by saying popular things." Fortunately, his insecurity about power resulted in a reaction formation against using overt power, at least in a social context, as seen in his early involvement in pacifist causes.

Winter describes the Don Juan legend as an archetype of the power motive and this too is certainly applicable to Russell. Although Winter does not use Besdine's term of Jocasta mother, like Besdine, he describes Don Juanism as "arising from an ambivalent fear of a powerful and binding mother, and symbolized by the sexual degradation of women". Thus, Besdine's more distal psychodynamic theory is not precluded by the more proximal trait theory of Winter's, but rather they supplement one another. As Winter points out, the Don Juan with a lust for power does more than seduce women - he tricks and abandons them as well. While 'tricks' is perhaps too harsh a word to apply to Russell, his profession of passionate love for Helen Dudley and his subsequent reversal of feeling in 1914 provides one of many possible examples of his inconsistency. It certainly caused more than a little resentment in Lady Ottoline. After acting as mother confessor to the devastated Helen, Ottoline records in her journal that,

I feel very keenly the disappointment in Bertie myself. He used all these extravagant terms of devotion to me such a short time ago, and now they are all gone, and he professed to her all the things he professed to me.
However, before Russell had in some sense left behind Lady Ottoline for Constance Malleson he had produced several literary 'children' in collaboration with Ottoline. By the time of their relationship Russell, according to Brink, "in practise believed in the omnipotence of verbalized thought, in the power of words to encompass and to control all experiences." Russell's intense need for power and his obsessional tendencies both help explain what prompted these works and why they were eventually aborted.

*Prisons,* which both Ottoline and Russell referred to as their child, was the outcome of Russell's second conversion, otherwise known as the summer crisis. It apparently occurred in late July 1911 and developed, as Maria Forte notes, in response to Lady Ottoline's refusal to become imprisoned by Russell, and to his mystical feeling that "something passed" from her to him during the crisis. He later wrote to Ottoline of the experience that,

> I had not supposed it possible to learn wisdom in the midst of happiness...You make me dare to think and feel what it really is my best nature to think and feel...it is like emerging into sunlight from a cavern. I feel such new power...as tho' shackles had fallen from my mind.

Though Russell definitely did feel liberated by Lady Ottoline's sharing of her love and religious feelings with him, *Prisons* is not really about mental prisons at all --- he probably wrote more about prisons at the time he was incarcerated in 1918 for his pacifist writings. Instead, in
its essence, "Prisons" is Russell's attempt to reconcile opposites and to achieve a wholeness or union. On one level Russell tries to align his faith in reason with Ottoline's faith in a spiritual world. He intellectualizes his ambivalence towards her faith -- that is, his ability to accept religious feeling but not her belief in God and the dogmas of religion. Russell concentrates on this compromise in the Prisons I section. He allows that it is important to preserve religion, but only if traditionally accompanying beliefs about the universe are discarded. Demands of the Self, which divide the world into good and bad, must be subordinated in order to achieve a union with the universe. That ultimate union, he claims, is the essence of religion."

On a deeper, psychological level, Russell is desperately striving to repair a split ego. Throughout most of the other sections of "Prisons" Russell describes various polarities and a highly intellectualized method of overcoming them, so that the reliability of this claim is firmly established. In the 'Contemplation' and 'Action and Contemplation' sections Russell claims that of the "two attitudes possible towards objects: action and contemplation, the latter is by far superior since it is impartial whereas the active depends on oppositions between good and bad or useful and useless". In "Freedom and Bondage" he phrases the conflict in terms of unsatisfied desires, which result in bondage, versus satisfied desires,
or better still, no desire, which results in freedom. The Good of the Intellect fragment sets up an opposition between self and not-self, the instinctive intellect and the rational intellect. Rational contemplation overcomes the conflict since it "finds its satisfaction in every enlargement of the not-Self, in everything that magnifies the object contemplated and thereby the subject contemplating."71 The instinctive intellect merely desires to assimilate and subordinate the known world to the Self. Similar oppositions are created in the 'Good of the Emotions', the 'Good of the Will' and the 'Wisdom' sections.

Psychologically, the work can also be viewed as the obsessional's repeated attempts, through ordering and precisely describing his conflicts, of expelling, in Russell's case, the internalized demon granny, the source of his ambivalent feelings. In addition, Russell's prevalent use of words such as 'hostile camps', 'warfare', 'damnation', 'subdue', 'self-assertion' and 'power' affirms the validity of the claim that he construes the world in terms of power. Throughout "Prisons" Russell struggles with his unacceptable, overwhelming desires for total power or omnipotence. In the "Action and Contemplation" part Russell is really speaking of an imaginative way to overcome impingement by powerful others. He claims that "the active side aims at Power, the contemplative at Wisdom".72 Contemplation of an object is the better route since it "is not limited like Power, and does not demand that the object
shall be made small. It enlarges the soul to the greatness of the object." One wonders how much of this thought was originally formed by a Russell who found that he could not obtain power over an overcontrolling granny, or indeed any of his surrogate parents through his actions, but that he could achieve omnipotence in his world of thought.

Russell's ambivalence toward power may also explain his inability to bow down before Ottoline's God. Years later when he was no longer trying to reconcile himself with Ottoline's point of view he wrote,

> The whole idea of throwing away your life blindly, in an imagined service to Christ, is a form of glorifying masochism and of self-abasement before power.74

Although it is difficult to criticize "Prisons" since only fragments remain of a manuscript which reached at least 129 pages by March, 1912, there do exist criticisms indicative of its flaws by two readers of the manuscript -- Lady Ottoline and Mrs. Whitehead. Whereas Lady Ottoline described it in general as "most beautiful", she admitted that, in style, it was "too much like a lecture"75. Mrs. Whitehead was probably a more objective reader since by then she was emotionally distanced from Russell. According to Russell, she said it was "dull", "that the emotions spoken of are not spoken of so as to be felt, and that the intellectual and emotional parts don't belong together."76

Early in 1912 Russell himself admitted his failure
to bring together his feelings and his intellect in the work. Nevertheless, upon completion in September 1911 he had written to Ottoline that he felt "Prisons" had "strengthened the bond between them". If nothing else, he realized that he had tapped some vital inner source by writing it, which he was determined not to relinquish. Though "Prisons" was abandoned, the first chapter, "The Nature and Value of Religion" became the basis for "The Essence of Religion", published in October, 1912. In that essay Russell takes a slightly more extreme view by claiming that religion can and should be preserved without reliance on such "unreasonable" beliefs as dogma, a belief in God or immortality. Three religious values -- worship, acquiescence, and love -- can still function to provide one with a vision of the infinite. Here the poles become the finite and the infinite. Only the infinite world encompasses both reason and vision or emotionality. Again Russell's attempted integration with Ottoline's beliefs failed, this time because it necessitated a distinction between impartial worship and worship of God. Lady Ottoline could not be reconciled to a worship "given to anything that exists in spite of its goodness or badness" because it did not adequately replace in her mind a worship or love of God.

By February 1912 Russell had come to believe that form and not the idea imprisoned both "Prisons" and "the Essence of Religion". He wrote to Ottoline, "Prisons was
wrong, I think, simply because it was expository. One must have a more artistic form." Shortly thereafter, in a characteristic burst of enthusiasm, Russell launched into "The Perplexities of John Forstice", an autobiographical novella.

Russell's expanding imagination now enabled him to transform the conflict into one between science and vision. Though the work is autobiographical, Russell detaches himself from the conflict by splitting his ego into various characters who each express a facet of his thought, especially about his strivings for identity. The story maps the social and emotional awakening of a shy physicist, described as "a single-minded enthusiast, innocent as a child in worldly matters", who reluctantly attends a garden party. There he meets, listens to, and subsequently rejects the world visions of the Empire builder Hatfield Lane, Shifsky, a socialist, and Brieststein, a pessimist financier who suffers from ennui. Through their conversations Forstice is led to consider, for the first time, his own degree of happiness. Subsequently he reacts to the previously bottled emotions of his wife, who he discovers is dying of cancer. His identification of her pain causes some new wisdom to struggle into birth and he embarks on a physical voyage with "a sense of undiscovered mystery." He winds up in Italy with a group "united only in the belief that clear candid thought is the greatest of human activities." Each member in turn propounds an
aspect of Russell’s own thought. Forano the mathematician derives pleasure from exactness and certainty -- in short the perfectness of mathematics -- as Russell had done. Nasispo the philosopher finds a similar complete world in abstract "contemplation not fettered by desire"\textsuperscript{94}, an attitude Russell had adopted around the time of the writing of "Prisons". The poet Pardicretti asserts that man is active as well as contemplative, creative as well as receptive, and that he redeems himself by supremacy of thought as well as passion. Chenskoff, the Russian novelist, outlines his view, very similar to Russell’s, that pain can be reconciled to beauty through the creative act. Alegno, "a spokesman for ordinary mortals", dismisses the earlier theories because of their inaccessibility to the common people and proposes in their place "merely courage and the habit of not reflecting on our own misfortunes."\textsuperscript{95}

Perhaps Russell could never fully understand Alegno’s supposedly ‘simple’ solutions; certainly Alegno perplexes Forstice. Forstice’s search thus continues in the third section of the story, in the encounter with Catherine Belasys, a character created almost entirely by Ottoline from her own experiences with her spiritual mentor, Mother Julian. Forstice becomes a messenger of spiritual love, from his dying Uncle’s Tristram to Catharine, Tristram’s former lover turned nun. Possibly realizing that Forstice will not be able to understand, Catharine expounds some of the themes of "Prisons", such as her belief in universal
love. Forstic returns to the world of harsh reality but he sees it from a new perspective, "with those eyes of vision which had been filling his soul with new light."  

Of particular interest is the theory of creativity dramatized in the novella, especially since Russell’s desire to write creatively peaked during the writing of Forstic. To Ottoline, Russell claimed that "my whole impulse in mental things is towards imaginative writing."  

Chenskoff’s speech on creativity probably reflects what Russell himself had discovered through the exercise:

Chenskoff muses that,

I doubt if there can be really great achievement except through pain; it is pain that gives clear sure beauty, the sense of having been wrought in the fire. It is pain that gives the quality of yearning; without that a man may be an appreciator but not a creator.

Further on the writing becomes more autobiographical:

And looking back over my own life I saw the same dread of the infinite pain, driving me hither and thither in restless passion, making my life a fever except in a few rare moments of courage which had partially redeemed it. Suddenly, as with a new insight, I saw that all the noise and fury was mere cowardice, mere shouting in the night to keep the ghosts away. There was, I saw, another way to deal with this pain, to turn and fight it, to face it and subdue it and make it minister to wisdom; to take it into the soul and endure while it stabbed and stabbed again; and so to rise above it, and learn through it the vision of heaven, the mysterious unity of all life in the search for liberation.

Although Russell found a way to contact his pain and to use it to advantage to repair, in the end he once again
found himself unable to reconcile reason with emotion. As a literary work the novella foundered for a number of reasons.

Its most distinguished critic, Joseph Conrad, who became a "soul mate" of Russell's, advised that the middle section should be expanded into a book "with conversations of the various characters singly." Significantly, he liked the character of the nun. The other characters, it seems to me, are not well enough developed and are too transparent. They are voices or thoughts divested of their bodies and thus lacking in human idiosyncracies. There is too much of Russell the intellect penetrating the prose, always needing to tell his own story, and not enough sublimation and artistic control. In "Forstice" Russell uses the more flexible narrative form but is not flexible enough himself to achieve with it. It is as if he cannot creatively play with his characters but instead has to set down their governing rules or parameters before he begins. Images wither on his vine because he has for too long been involved in using symbolic logic to extract the life juice -- the essence out of prose. In short he is the obsessional who cannot quite release himself or, to use Milton Rokeach's complementary concept, he is the highly dogmatic person who has developed a mental set or a rigidity in thought which limits his openness to change and new input.

Russell himself partially recognized this disability as early as in his "Self Appreciation" of 1897, in which he writes,
My faults are a tendency to nagging, and to overestimating my own importance, so that what thwarts my pursuit seem wicked, though essential to other people's happiness. Also dogmatism. I used to try and improve my character and I used to succeed. Now I only care for efficiency.\textsuperscript{22}

During the writing of "Forstice" Russell became fully aware of the debilitating effect of his "analytic intellect." He fumes that imagination "is constantly checked and thwarted by reason."\textsuperscript{23} Significantly, in the novella Forstice, though a changed man, returns to the study and teaching of physics. Russell too, though changed for the better by his brief foray into the world of fiction, retreated to the more rigid formal essay form in "Mysticism and Logic" of 1914. Once again he returns to the dichotomy between reason and emotion and this time cites historical and philosophical precedents showing the need for both science and mysticism.

Though the accumulated instances of changed behaviors leave no question that Russell was transformed through his relationship with Lady Ottoline Morrell, and that he benefited psychically from his experiences at writing creatively in the years 1911 to 1914, the fact remains that both Russell's autobiography and the literary products of his relationship with Ottoline are to some extent flawed. The autobiography consists of a series of episodes and pithy statements but lacks a core. Russell makes little attempt to explain his motivation, which makes the work unsatisfactory as confessionalism. Occasionally it even descends into untruthfulness. The literary products remain
fragments, or at most strive to reconcile essentially irreconcilable concepts. Only the letters, with all their repetitions and fluctuations, probe deeply enough to reach the essence of Russell the man, if such a multifaceted personality can be said to have an essence.
Conclusion

Some answers to the original questions posed in this thesis should now be apparent. English literature criticism can no longer afford to sustain its divorce from psychology, especially if it desires to realign itself to the needs of its readers. Both psychological insights, based on sound psychological theory, and rigorous methods of inquiry, derived from scientific method, can be profitably applied to the biographical-critical enterprise. The accompanying risks, of generating confusion by the admixture of two fields of inquiry, and of covering the ground of common sense using psychological terms, are worth it. Even the best historical examples of biography – sometimes brilliant, often erratic – have their limitations. Awareness of the biographical problems of the biographer’s relation to his subject, inadequate evidence, inflated expectations, reductionism, and reconstruction, strengthen and in some cases surpass common sense. In addition, safeguards against unconscious error are provided by elements of scientific method. These include realizing that the approach will likely be correlational, ensuring initially that hypotheses are numerous and carefully formulated to suit the problem at hand, viewing narrative as a method, and implementing the checks on validity and reliability of the information.

Not only does the much maligned form of biography provide a vehicle to demonstrate the limitations of intuitive psychology in English criticism, but it also
illustrates the limitations of the nomothetic approach in psychology. Psychobiography as a form provides a means of overcoming both limitations. Far from being a hopelessly complicated task, the exercise in illuminating a segment of Russell's life has shown that psychobiographical links can tentatively be made between personality and written words. They should be made since, as Brink convincingly argues for poetry (which can be applied to other forms),

A poem standing alone is surely an interesting object, but a poem placed in the life context of its maker's conflict and hope takes on quite another aspect. Formal criticism -- style in relation to theme -- is modified by considerations of personal motive and meaning. The poet's poetry becomes a single intelligible statement that readers can more directly relate to the life they themselves experience and seek to understand.  

Lives of artists need not be reduced through psychobiography, to neuroses, if their struggle and achievement figures prominently and if it is realized that such complex personalities do not yield a single truth. Instead, fragments of "truths" composed complement one another.

Although I have not attempted to be comprehensive, I have tried to provide, from the perspective of the literary critic, a rough map of the psychobiographical issues, which needs to be filled in. Though several avenues of approach to Russell's life have been suggested, his need for power in particular should be tested in the light of his later "social cause" activities, such as his involvement with the
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. It may prove the most important facet of his life because of the further reaching implications of this need in other extraordinary individuals.

The obsessional drive for power and often accompanying manifestations of aggression should be more thoroughly scrutinized in leadership because of the potential dire consequences to society. Speeches and written documents of potential leaders need to be analyzed and psychobiographies constructed as aids in predicting stability of personality and efficacy of leadership. The public should have access to the relevant information to facilitate the political leadership decision-making process.

Whereas these tasks may not fall directly on the literary critic, armed with psychological tools he can more effectively bring to the attention of the public possibly disturbing attitudes towards power which have filtered down through the ideology of society into its literature. These possibilities bring to mind the role of the literary critic. Should he, for instance, become involved in carrying out empirical "psychological" research in order to make generalizations about the needs of students and the requirements of the reading public? An antecedent could be found in I. A. Richards' Practical Criticism (1929). Richards carried out an "experiment" on his students in order to test his hypothesis that literary value judgements were highly subjective. It involved asking his students to
evaluate poems, without providing their titles or authors. I see no reason why these sorts of projects could not be entertained, possibly in collaboration with social scientists, since they do have bearing on the critical enterprise, though they will never be the main object of inquiry for the literary critic.

Critics also need to take a more serious look at autobiography and memoirs as texts, not only to clearly distinguish their features from those of biography and psychobiography, but to develop methods for criticizing them, by considering their narrative as a method of disclosing certain information and withholding other types. Samuel Johnson considered autobiography "more valuable" than biography since the biographer has "many temptations to falsehood" including "the zeal of gratitude, the ardour of patriotism, fondness for an opinion, or fidelity to a party," along with a host of less noble ones. The autobiographer, on the other hand, has no motive to distort, except "self-love, by which we have so often been betrayed that all are on the watch against its artifices." Others, like Harold Nicholson, have held that there has not been an autobiographer yet who has attained the detachment necessary for an objective rendering of "truth." What exactly is the position of autobiography in relation to biography and criticism?

Whatever the potential applications of psychological findings and methods to psychobiography and criticism, it
cannot be stressed enough that these psychological frameworks must be applied with care and discrimination in order to avoid "Procrustean bed" criticism; instead, "applied psychology" must fit the art and artist which it serves.
Notes

Introduction

1. In *Writing Lives: Principia Biographica* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1984) Leon Edel notes that the so-called "New Critics" especially have done criticism a disservice because of their insistence on the divorce between biography and criticism. They thus deny that the psychology and motivations of a writer have a bearing on both the form and content of the text. For example, Edel cites I.A. Richard's response of "No biography! No biography! Stick to the text" to Edel's reading of Henry James' anxieties between the lines of "The Turn of the Screw." (p. 137). More recent attacks have centred on the use of systematic psychology in history and historical biography. See, for instance, D.E. Stannard, *Shrinking History: On Freud and the Failure of Psychohistory* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980).


4. Lucile Dooley, "Psychoanalytic Studies of Genius",...

5. Edel, Stuff of Sleep ix, x.


10. Edel, Stuff of Sleep xv.


12. Edel, Stuff of Sleep 218.

13. Sigmund Freud, as paraphrased by Edel, Stuff of Sleep 43.


17. Coltrera 15.


28. E. Kris, as cited in Bergmann 840.

29. Coltrera 15.


33. Jamison 2.

34. Runyan 13.

35. Runyan 6.


42. Welsh, 57.


44. Vernon 66.


48. Popper 37.

52. Andrew Brink, Creativity As Repair; Bipolarity and Its Closure (Hamilton: Cromlech Press, 1982) 11.

53. Henry Murray, as cited in Levinson 45.


55. Rushton 3.

Chapter One


17. See Nicholson, 107 Also, Edel, Lives 55.

18. Edel, Lives 56.


22. Cook's biography is the only one for which Lytton Strachey has any praise. See L. Strachey, Eminent Victorians (London: Chatto and Windus, 1966) 8.


25. In Writing Lives Edel calls Strachey simply the "father of modern biography" after already having bestowed that title on Boswell. 55, 82.

27. Woolf, Biography 122.


32. Woolf, Biography 123.


35. Edel, Lives 206.

36. Woolf, Biography 122.

37. Edel, Lives 185.

38. Edel, Lives 185.

39. Woolf, Biography 125.
40. This phenomenon has been observed in biographies of current literary figures. For example, Anthony Burgess concludes a recent review of *Mailer: His Life and Times* by Peter Manso, which he considers undigested, "a bound file of minutes on Mailer", by stating that, "It was an unworthy thing to unleash so much mere gossip on that sensibility [Mailer's]." Anthony Burgess, "The Prisoner of Fame", *The Atlantic* 6 (June, 1985): 100-104.

41. Mack, "Historical Biography" 177.


46. Runyan 75.


49. Runyan 232.

50. Edel.

51. One successful example is described by the psychiatrist G. Moraitis, as cited in Edel, Lives 154. See also pages 82-83 of the present paper.

52. These include: Mack, "Historical Biography"; Runyan; Edel, Lives.


56. See Bate; Edel, Lives.

57. Anderson, "Methodology" 463.

58. Anderson, "Methodology" 463.


63. Mack, "Historical Biography" 155.


65. Runyan 203.

66. Runyan 204.

67. Runyan 204.

68. Runyan 204.


70. Mack, "Historical Biography" 154.

71. Mack, "Historical Biography" 154.

72. Anderson, "Methodology" 471.

73. Mack, "Historical Biography" 154.

74. Anderson, "Methodology" 472.

75. Bergmann, as cited in Runyan 205.
76. Stannard, as cited in Runyan 205.

77. Runyan 216.

78. According to Runyan, if Kluckhohn's and Murray's dictum that people are in some respects like all others, like some others, and like no other, holds true then certain aspects of theory will be universal.


81. Erikson 18.

82. Runyan 209.

83. Runyan 207.

84. Runyan 20.


86. Larry B. Christensen, Experimental Methodology (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1980) 5; Kerlinger 11.

87. Christensen 16.

89. Kerlinger 11.
90. Anderson, "Methodology" 467.
91. Friedlander 11.
92. Anderson 467.
93. One of the best known is Henry Fielding's fictionalized Jonathan Wild, which is based on the life of an actual criminal of that name.
96. Christensen 31.
98. Erikson 206.
100. Kerlinger 15-16.
103. Leon Edel, Stuff of Sleep and Dreams (New York:

104. Woolf, Moments 80.

105. Storr 229.

106. Private communication from Dr. Andrew Brink.

107. Runyan 75.

108. Runyan 63.

109. Runyan 64.


111. Runyan 55-56.

112. Bate, as cited in Runyan 67.

113. Runyan 77.

114. Kerlinger 429.

115. Kerlinger 447.


117. Kerlinger 447.

118. Kerlinger 447.


120. Anderson, "Methodology" 474.
121. Kerlinger 449.


124. Rushton 19.

125. Rushton 20-21.

126. Rushton 22.

127. Rushton 22.

128. Rushton 22.

129. Rushton 21.


132. Runyan 25.


135. Runyan 64-65.

136. Bell 44.

137. Runyan 38.

138. Runyan 41.

139. Runyan 45.

140. Runyan 39.

141. Runyan 46.

142. Runyan 43.

143. Bergmann 835.

144. Runyan 46.

145. Runyan 47.


Chapter Two


10. A. Brink, "Conversion of 1901", 89.


28. Storr, Creation, 93.

29. Storr 93.


31. Storr, Creation, 97.

32. Russell, in Clark 123.

33. Clark 118.


38. R. Clark, Life of Russell, 123.


Robert Gathorne-Hardy (London: Faber and Faber, 1974) 270.


47. Russell to Lady O. Morrell, R.A. 299.


54. Winter 182.

55. Lady Ottoline Morrell, Ottoline at Garsington, 264.

56. Morrell 273.
57. Winter 18.

58. Winter 159.

59. Winter 160.

60. Winter 161.

61. Clark 22.


63. Russell, in Clark 272.

64. Winter 200.

65. Lady Ottoline Morrell, Ottoline at Garsington, 288.

66. A. Brink, "Death Depression and Creativity", 100.


68. Forte 48.


74. Russell, in Forte 100.
75. Lady O. Morrell to Russell, R.A. 710.081523, October 19, 1911.


77. Russell to Lady O. Morrell, R.A. 184, Sept. 1911.


82. Russell, "Perplexities" 135.


84. Russell, "Perplexities" 137.


86. Russell, "Perplexities" 150.


89. Russell, "Perplexities" 142.


91. Milton Rokeach, Open and Closed Mind (New York:


93. Russell, in Forte 114.

**Conclusion**


4. Johnson, "Idler" 45.

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