G.E. MOORE: COMMON SENSE,

SCIENCE, AND ETHICS
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ABSTRACT

I begin by examining Moore's notion of common sense because it is my contention that his work is not neatly separated; rather, his ethical and non-ethical philosophy have common sense as an underlying theme. For Moore, common sense was not reducible to indubitable, cracker-barrel wisdom; it is popularized science, what would be a matter of common sense if we were to take the trouble to learn.

Moore's allegiance to science is the cord that connects his ethical and non-ethical work. In Principia Ethica, he attempts to introduce the spirit of scientific investigation into ethics. The 'naturalistic fallacy', to which special attention is given, is shown to be a guide to avoiding the error of essentialism, that is, of presuming that there is a unique good-making property or quality, common to all good things. Essentialism is rejected because it leads away from the open investigation characteristic of science, toward dogmatism. From this perspective, several popular criticisms of Moore's ethics are shown to be misguided.

In the last chapter, an interpretation of Moore's non-naturalism based on my understanding of the naturalistic fallacy is given, that is quite different from the one most commonly accepted.
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INTRODUCTION

The most common first impression of G.E. Moore's work is that, no matter what else it may be, it is not philosophy. His common sense arguments are most often taken to be not conclusive, philosophically naive, and easily refuted. To treat Moore in this manner, I will argue, is to do him a great injustice, as well as doing a disservice to philosophy.

In this thesis, then, my overall intension is to show that several important criticisms of Moore's ethics are inappropriate or misguided. They miss their mark mainly because they fail to adequately account for Moore's common sense approach, an approach that is attributed to his later non-ethical works. An adequate understanding of common sense in Moore is necessary to understand his ethics.

When considered in the light of later developments, Principia Ethica, which is normally taken as the first modern meta-ethical tract, is seen to be a common sense explication of ethics which starts from a common sense understanding of the word "good", not, as would be the case in meta-ethics, with the logic of moral language. I will show that his emphasis on what "good" stands for, and his rejection of essentialistic definition in ethics, is meant to prescribe a particular type of investigation in ethics that does not presuppose its results from the start.

In order to show that common sense principles are involved in Principia, I will be concerned in the first chapter with giving an adequate account of these principles. I will develop a more expansive view of common sense by dealing with "What is Philosophy" and "Proof for
an External World", not just with "The Defense of Common Sense". Especially in the former two works, he presents a view of the type of proof that is possible with respect to the fundamental problems of philosophy which has been largely overlooked or misunderstood. It is my contention that it is because too much emphasis is put on "The Defense of Common Sense", and not enough emphasis on the other works, that philosophers have been led to believe that common sense is parochial and espouses credulity, and is thus not involved in the esoteric considerations of Principia.

After identifying the main principles of common sense, I will turn in the second chapter to an investigation of Moore's notion of a possible science of ethics as it appears in Principia. I will show that the notion of a science of ethics can only be properly understood in the light of Moore's later views with regard to common sense. Although his understanding of science may be naive by the standards of the modern philosophy of science, it will be shown that his approach is consistent with certain aspects of common sense explicitly formulated only later in his career. The second chapter is organized around showing that Ryle's view, that Moore's refutation of naturalism is meant to exclude the sciences from ethics, is quite mistaken. Quite to the contrary, the 'naturalistic fallacy', and to a lesser extent, the 'open question technique', is meant to introduce what Moore and I understand to be the basic approach of the sciences, that of an open, non-dogmatic attempt to understand phenomena. In ethics, this is to be understood as a rejection of a priori definitions that commit the ethical philosopher to a particular type of investigation and presupposes the results he will achieve.
More specifically, in the second chapter, Frankena's well-known criticism of the naturalistic fallacy will be reviewed in a new light. A very important principle of Moore's common sense approach is that a re-evaluation of the meanings attached to crucial philosophical terms such as, "argument", "premiss", "proof", "fallacy", "definition", is necessary for progress in philosophy. Frankena's view that the naturalistic fallacy is not a fallacy in a logical sense will then be shown to be inappropriate, precisely because it was never meant to be understood as an inferential fallacy at all.

In the third and concluding chapter, I will deal with certain aspects involved in the science of ethics, and the common sense approach, which were only indicated in the second chapter, but which need further explication in order to get a complete picture of Moore's ethical philosophy. I have two main concerns here. First, I will clear up the confusion that surrounds Moore's non-naturalism. Second, I will investigate Moore's use of intuition in order to show that it is in keeping with the non-dogmatic, non-essentialist position I attribute to *Principia Ethica*. 
CHAPTER I

A: The Form of the Argument.

My approach and overall goal is summed up in a remark made by G.E. Moore in an essay on Kant's philosophy. His reason for concentrating on Kant is that "reference to the views of the philosopher with whom you are most in agreement, is often the clearest way of explaining your own view to an esoteric audience: but partly; also, because I think he has been much misunderstood." Sadly, what Moore believed to be Kant's fate has become his also.

Some of the blame for this state of affairs does rest with Moore himself. Although they spring from the best intentions, the linguistic constructions Moore used to arrive at a precise statement of his position tend more to contribute to confusion rather than doing away with it. Some of Moore's accounts are extraordinarily confusing. But instead of criticizing his style, or rejecting his account, I try, wherever possible, to put Moore's insightful analysis in a form more in keeping with contemporary usage.

Beside the linguistic confusion, Moore is most misunderstood with regard to the proper place and role of his common sense philosophy. Most often it is thought that Moore developed his interest in common sense only later in his career; and that earlier he had been interested in traditional philosophy. Parts of Principia Ethica and Ethics do, in fact, form the groundwork of meta-ethics, the study of the language and logic of moral discourse, but that was not his primary concern. My
contention is that we cannot properly understand Moore, or these important contributions, if we assume that his philosophy is neatly segmented.

I intend to show that although common sense is explicitly defended only later in his career, it forms the basis of his earlier ethical philosophy. In order to show this, it is necessary to explicate common sense as formulated later in his career; and after isolating the principal moves, go on to show that this type of reasoning is evident in *Principia Ethica*.

Perhaps it would have been better had Moore used another term, for most often philosophers understand common sense as cracker-barrel philosophy. Common sense is thought to be parochial and credulous, and therefore, not a fitting pursuit for those interested in wisdom. Moore's version does share some characteristics in common with this popular version, but it also differs in certain relevant aspects.

By common sense Moore meant a type of inquiry that is neither parochial nor credulous; rather, he meant a type of investigation that charts a course between dogmatism and scepticism. On the one hand, common sense rejects dogmatism, that is, any position that claims (or implies) that it has *a priori* knowledge of the essential nature of phenomena; and on the other hand, it rejects unreasonable scepticism—which is mainly a reaction to dogmatism—that claims that we can have no knowledge of phenomena. Common sense, according to Moore, espouses a type of investigation that incorporates the spirit of scientific inquiry; that is, an open non-dogmatic search for knowledge of the world which is grounded in actual experience. This means, in effect, that a conclusive resolution of many of the major philosophical problems so far as they are perplexities about the world, is not possible. But this does not
mean that no knowledge is possible; rather, it means that the nature of common sense claims about the world are, like scientific claims, legitimately made only within a range of tolerance of error. They are, in this sense, likelihoods; they are probably true. All we can rightly expect is some reasonable degree of certainty, not absolute certainty. Consequently, as Moore construed it, the job of philosophy was not to deduce the nature of the world from a priori definitions; it was to come up with reasonable a posteriori descriptions of the world.

Kant made the following remark about common sense that is worth quoting here, because it sets the tone of my inquiry. He said that "common sense must be shown in action by well-considered and reasonable thoughts and words, not by appealing to it as an oracle when no rational justification for one's position can be advanced." I will show that Moore's common sense philosophy does not have oracle-like status; that it is a type of open non-dogmatic investigation that incorporates the motivating spirit of science; and that by implication, the distinction between common sense and scientific reasoning is one of degree, not of kind.
Malcolm's Critique of Common Sense Beliefs.

Moore begins his "Defense of Common Sense" with a list of common sense beliefs which he holds to be so fundamental, so trivially true as to be not worth mentioning, if it were not for the fact that some philosophers have said things that appear to be contrary to them. 3

About Moore's list of common sense beliefs, Norman Malcolm says:

that not only does the famous 'Defense of Common Sense'
have no clear relationship to common sense but, furthermore, if we go through Moore's list of so called 'Common Sense views' it is far from clear, with regard to some at least either what assertions he was making or that he was making any at all. 4

Malcolm goes on to claim that there is a substantial difference between a "common sense view" and a "common sense belief", from which he believes the former are derived. Moore's common sense views, as presented in the "Defense of Common Sense", are highly philosophical, and not, in his opinion, common beliefs at all. In order to test the validity of Malcolm's claim, let us consider Moore's list of common sense views in detail.

"There exists at present", says Moore, "a living human body, which is my body". On the same page, he goes on to say that there are other bodies much like his which have

like it, (a) at some time been born, (b) continued to exist from some time after birth, (c) been, at every moment of its life after birth, either in contact with or not very far from the surface of the earth; and that many of these bodies have already died and ceased to exist. 5
Furthermore, these bodies have had experiences, and dreams, and so on. And finally, Moore wants to say that there have been, and are, many other humans who hold these things to be true without qualification.

Malcolm's assertion is that some of these truisms, which he does not clearly identify, are not common sense views, because they are not commonly held. In one sense, I agree with Malcolm: as they are expressed they are not commonly held. It is possible, however, to put Moore's assertions in a less precise manner, which though not philosophically useful, still shows that his main assertions are commonly held. When they are put into common usage, Moore's truisms are: (1) I have a body and there are many other bodies like mine that have existed and exist, (2) there are many people with bodies who hold (1) to be true. Very few people, I assert, would disagree with Moore's truisms when stated this way, except perhaps, some philosophers. These truisms are the fundamental, permanent things that we do believe we know.

To deny these fundamental elements of the structure of our knowledge is to be led into absurdity. If, for instance, we hold that other human beings exist, it is absurd to assert that no one knows of the existence of others, something Moore believes some philosophers have claimed; for to assert that no one knows, is to admit that there are others who do not know. Thus, to claim that no one knows of the existence of others is self-contradictory because such a proposition "logically entails the proposition that many human beings, beside the philosopher himself, have had human bodies, which lived upon the earth."6

At least with regard to those truisms I translated, there can be no question that they are commonly held; but why, one may ask, did Moore
resort to such complex language to express these views? It is well
known that certain philosophical problems, though strictly not linguis-
tic, do still play on the ambiguities of language. In order to show
that a particular philosopher's view does depart from common sense, we
must clearly state that view; for it is fully possible that a view is
only superficially contrary to common sense. But the first step in this
process must be stating the meaning of the common sense views as clearly
and adequately as possible. But to state adequately the meaning of
common sense views meant, for Moore, to give a correct analysis of those
propositions. Although Moore held that it was unlikely that anyone
could give a correct analysis of all the implications of any common sense
view, he still held that it was possible to give a correct, unambiguous
analysis in specific, narrow, well-defined circumstances. 7 This entails
departing from common usage; it means listing one's views in a step by
step manner, in a degree of precision which is not normal usage, and
which is quite numbing on first sight.

Moore's technique, for instance, involves stating very clearly,
and at length, in what way he holds the views of common sense to be true.
Moore takes pains to say that for a proposition to be true, he means that
it is entirely true; that if a proposition is partially false, it is for
him not true at all. 8 This is not something we would do in normal con-
versation. But such a qualification is philosophically necessary in
order to show precisely which views agree, and especially, which views
really disagree with the one we are asserting.

Malcolm's mistake, I think, can be reduced to a misidentification
of common sense beliefs with commonly held beliefs that are, and according
to Malcolm, should be expressed in ordinary usage. I will show in the next section why we should not identify Moore's common sense beliefs with vulgar beliefs, that though common sense beliefs do encompass what I call the fundamental building blocks of knowledge, they are not restricted to these. But for the moment, I want to concentrate on the language of expression of common sense views. To say that common sense views are often expressed in ordinary usage, is not to say that we must, or should, remain on that level of language; nor does it mean that we should explicate those views in ordinary language. A certain degree of precision, as I have noted above, and C.D. Broad pointed out earlier, may be required that cannot be got through ordinary language. Everyone, for instance, believes in what is ordinarily called material things, but the physicist explains them in terms of atoms, protons, and so on. These terms and the theoretical structures from which they arise are not a part of ordinary language and experience. (Of course, as more people become scientifically informed, many of these terms will enter ordinary language, though probably, they will lose some precision). Similarly, everyone believes he is conscious, but the philosopher explicates consciousness by intentional analyses which contain structures not used in every day speech.

Common usage should not be understood as an explicatory device; rather, as J.N. Findley points out, common sense uses ordinary language to "trap" the notions with which it will deal. "The role of ordinary language", says Findley, "is to ensure that we have a genuine notion before us for analysis, that we are not merely playing with words and saying nothing at all". Just as science begins with the objects of
ordinary experience, and from there advances beyond ordinary experience by positing theoretical entities and hypothetical non-sensuous super-structures, in order to give a full account of the phenomena; so too, Moore's common sense philosophy "secures the existence of its subject matter by using ordinary words that we know have an application." 11

In order to better say what Moore was doing in "A Defense of Common Sense", I will put him in a roughly Cartesian framework that is familiar to most philosophers. Moore was interested in isolating and analyzing those fundamental elements of knowledge, those propositions that could not reasonably be doubted, from which we construct our structure of knowledge. Moore differs from Descartes in that he was not interested in an apodictic starting point, that which, it is claimed, cannot be doubted at all; rather, he was interested in propositions that it would be very unreasonable to doubt. It is not impossible to doubt his truisms, only very unreasonable to do so.

This last point can only be got by implication, because Moore does not state it as I do. Clearly, Moore believed that some philosophers have doubted, or said what amounts to expressing a doubt or a denial of his truisms. It should also be noted that nowhere does Moore say that his views cannot be doubted; in fact, the type of investigation he engages in implies the opposite. The fact that he is concerned with showing that philosophers cannot consistently hold views contrary to common sense, 12 demonstrates that Moore believed his truisms, however illogical it may be, could be denied or doubted.

Moore's overall point, then, is not that the truisms of common sense cannot be doubted, not that they are the indubitable starting
point, but that his truisms express the fundamental elements of human knowledge. To build a structure of knowledge, we must begin with fundamental elements, those things that cannot reasonably be doubted. What could be more reasonable than the following: I was born, I exist and so do others; I and others are in some spatial relationship to ourselves and to the objects of the world?

The above, I think, adequately refutes Malcolm's objection to common sense views. I have shown their nature and their use, but to stop here would be to give an incomplete and mostly incorrect picture of Moore's common sense philosophy. From what has so far been said, it may be thought that common sense consists only of bedrock propositions that are largely not open to revision, and that one need only learn these to do philosophy. If this were the case, common sense would not be a method of inquiry but a dogma. And furthermore, the link between common sense and science would be at most a trivial one. That is, so far as scientists are men of common sense, they would not think to doubt Moore's truisms; but it hardly seems, on first sight, that these truisms form any relevant part of scientific investigations. In order to see the connection, it is necessary to look at common sense from the wider perspective afforded by his essay, "What is Philosophy".
In this section, I have three main goals. First, my overall goal is to show what Moore held to be the job of philosophy, what it is about, in other words. Second, I will give a more adequate account of common sense views, showing how they are arrived at, and how they are linked to science. Third, I will investigate a method of decision with regard to the problems of philosophy, which Moore indicates, but does not clearly state in "What is Philosophy".

In "What is Philosophy", the introductory lecture to the series called Some Main Problems of Philosophy, Moore asserts that philosophy is distinguished by the sorts of questions "that philosophers are constantly engaged in discussing and trying to answer." Arriving at adequate answers to these questions forms the main problems of philosophy. Moore's first point, then, is that the philosopher's job is to give answers, to try, at least, to solve problems.

According to Moore, the first and generally most important problem with which philosophers deal, is that of trying to give a general description of the whole Universe, mentioning all the most important kinds of things which we know to be in it, considering how far it is likely that there are in it important kinds of things which we do not absolutely know to be in it, and also considering the most important ways in which these various kinds of things are related to one another. Although by academic standards, the above is stated strangely, what it says follows a conventional pattern.

It is usual to give metaphysics as the first division of philoso-
But Moore departs from accepted practice in the next step he takes. Rather than giving a general account of the major movements in philosophy, such as: the ancient, medieval, modern; and in the course of doing this, indicating the position of common sense philosophy, he immediately launches into a lengthy account of the views of common sense. His account of particular philosophies and philosophers has only a small role in the lecture. The explication of common sense views takes up roughly two thirds of the lecture.

Why is this the case? It is not merely an expression of his particular bias, but a statement of the nature of philosophy as he construes it. Philosophy is, for Moore, not mainly contemplative; it is, as I have said, problem-oriented. Philosophy, says Moore, is the "science which tries to say: Such and such kinds of things are the only kinds of things that there are in the Universe, or which we know to be in it." From this perspective, the understanding of philosophies is not a problem in the same sense as giving a general description of the universe is a problem. The obscurities of philosophies are only relevant when, and if, it is discerned that they have anything to say about what Moore identifies as the first problem of philosophy. However, philosophers do have a lot to say about the nature of the universe, and so do scientists; both offer descriptions, or what can be understood in descriptive terms. The problem is that these descriptions are often in opposition to one another. More precisely, the opposition is between some, but not all, philosophical views of the universe and the scientific view. (At least one philosophical view, that of Moore, is not in opposition to the scientific view.) How are we to choose, to discriminate between these accounts? And choose we
must, if philosophy is for us oriented toward problem solving, if it is an activity and not a passivity.

We have, says Moore, a collection of views about the universe, that although not constituting a general description of the whole universe, "are so universally held that they may...be called the views of common sense." Moore goes on to say that it is interesting and worthwhile noting which views either add, detract, or contradict the views of common sense. But in order to do this, it is first necessary to clearly state what are the views of common sense; what is included, what is excluded, and what is not a concern of common sense. After doing this, we will have a principle of discernment. We will be able to discriminate between alternate views. The last assertion, that the views of common sense are to be used as a measure or check of alternative philosophical accounts, I will not defend at this point. Moore did not, in fact, say that this was his intention; but after giving an account of common sense views, it will be easy to show that this must have been his intention.

Briefly, common sense holds that there are two general sorts of things in the universe: an enormous number of material objects, and a lesser number of acts of consciousness. Material objects are spatially related; that is, they are in space, and either touching or at some determinable distance and direction from other objects. We hold, also, that material objects continue to exist when they are not perceived. A list of these objects would include: stars, planets, tables, plants, animal bodies, and human bodies. Acts of consciousness are a lesser number. They only attach to human bodies and some animal bodies; but for the multitude of material objects, no acts of consciousness attach to them.
This is a very general account. We have, also, more specific views or beliefs about the character of material objects and acts of consciousness. We hold views in respect to the dimensions and distances between objects, that, for instance, the sun is much larger than the earth, that the distance between these objects and other heavenly bodies is so large as to be measured in millions of miles. Moreover, we believe that the earth is very old, that it has existed for millions of years; and that there was a time when no living things existed; and that, quite probably, there will be a time some distance in the future when this will again be the case. With regard to acts of consciousness, we hold that they definitely attach to most humans, and at least some animals, and perhaps, to some beings not yet discovered on other planets (at least we do not absolutely rule out the possibility).

The above was not always representative of commonly held beliefs; "as you know", says Moore,

there was a time when it was by no means common sense to believe some of those things: there was a time when nobody believed some of them...But I think I am right in saying we now believe that these primitive views about the material Universe were certainly wrong: we have discovered that they were wrong: and this discovery is part of our progress in knowledge.

To say this is clearly to link common sense views with scientific knowledge. How else could we know, for instance, that the sun was larger than the earth, and the rest of the more specific views of common sense, than through scientific knowledge? We certainly do not know them by way of direct, simple observation, the method that is characteristic of the popular version of common sense. From this perspective, the sun, moon and stars appear smaller than the earth, and not at great distances from
one another. Yet Moore says we know these views to be false, and we know that our present views are true. They can be legitimately knowledge claims only if they are derived from and justified by the natural sciences. The list Moore gives is the following: astronomy, physics, chemistry, physiology, geography, history, biology. All of these Moore holds to be specifically descriptive; that is, they describe narrowly defined, specific aspects of the universe. But it is philosophy that puts them together to give a general description of the whole universe. To give this general description, it must draw on what Moore calls the "special" sciences named above. These special sciences, says Moore, we believe "have been very successful in giving us a great deal of real knowledge... that all of them have succeeded in acquiring a great deal of real knowledge... that all of them have succeeded in acquiring a great deal of real knowledge... that all of them have succeeded in acquiring a great deal of real knowledge... that all of them have succeeded in acquiring a great deal of real knowledge... that all of them have succeeded in acquiring a great deal of real knowledge...

It is worth noting here that we could arrive at some of the general views of common sense without appeal to science. It is possible to determine that objects are of a determinate size, and that they are spatially related by simple observation. But we need astronomy to tell us that the distance between stars is enormous. And so it goes with many of the other more specific common sense beliefs.

Not all, and not even most of the views Moore lists can be derived from simple observation. By far, most of Moore's common sense beliefs are properly understood as scientific knowledge claims, that are stated in a language less precise than that of science, but which is more understandable to non-scientists than the language of science. If my claim is true, we should find more areas in which common sense and science coincide.
First, let us isolate certain aspects of science, that although not covering the whole range of inquiry, are indicative of the spirit of science. Science is most generally understood as an open inquiry into the nature of the world. It is concerned not with a private world, accessible only by specialized and exclusive means, but with the common world we all experience. Although the intricacies of science sometimes require specialized knowledge to be fully understood, this knowledge can be got by those willing and able to put the effort. More generally, we hold that the descriptions of the world that science gives are accessible, at least in principle, to all of us. There is no priesthood, whose exclusive right it is to interpret holy script; rather, the findings of science are open to scrutiny, to confirmation or rejection, by other scientists and interested laymen. Examples are given, unambiguous descriptions are offered, and especially, conclusions are offered for verification, or more properly, falsification. Scientific knowledge claims are assertions made from within a tolerance of error; that is, they are claimed to be the most reasonable things to believe, given the evidence to date.

The majority of Moore's common sense views as expressed in "What is Philosophy" have the above character. Moore begins by saying he will proceed by examples, he will give examples to avoid ambiguity, and to get across as clearly as possible, precisely what he means. His examples are descriptive; they involve, for the most part, word-pictures of things with which he assumes his audience is familiar. For example, in order to say clearly what he means by saying material objects are always "distant from all the rest in some direction", he makes reference to a sphere. He
says that a sphere is like a perfectly round ball. "Now from the centre of a sphere a straight line can be drawn to each of the points upon its surface. Each of these straight lines, we should say, led in a different direction from the centre: this is what we mean by a direction." In this example, he involves his audience by making reference to things—i.e. balls, spheres, straight lines—which he assumes to be common to his audience. They are so common, Moore thinks, as to be just common sense.

At this point, I would like to digress slightly in order to correct an error Moore made. He says that the beliefs he is expounding are so universally held as to be called common sense, and by this he means the most commonly known views of science. But surely this is not the case; these views are not universally held. Ignorance, superstition, and dogmatism are not remnants existing only in remote outposts, they are sad facts of the modern world as well. It is a forgivable mistake, but by common sense views, Moore cannot mean that they are actually universally held; rather, "he means [or should mean] that which could be a matter of common knowledge if one took the trouble to find out." He can, however, assume (as I do) that his particular audience has taken the trouble to find out these things, or subsequently will take the trouble.

The best example of Moore's involving his audience, and presenting his views for public scrutiny, is to be found where he shifts from saying that these are the views or beliefs of common sense to saying that they are knowledge claims. Moore begins by saying he will give an account of common sense views. He says these views amount to beliefs about what is in the universe. But common sense views or beliefs are not mere opinions that are held uncritically; they are knowledge claims that are derived
from scientific knowledge. We know now that our present common sense views are true, and previous ones are false, because our present views are justified by science. We believe—that is, all of us who have taken the trouble—that science has the most reliable knowledge about the world.

Until mid-way through "What is Philosophy", Moore is content to say that "we believe" such and such to be the case with regard to material objects and acts of consciousness. But then he switches to saying that "we know" that these views are true. And it is worth noting that he uses "we know" at least seven times in the space of a few sentences. This is not an accident, nor is it a mannerism. It is a conscious, concerted appeal to his audience, that amounts to saying: "You know these things, you can check these assertions." Just as the scientist presents his findings in a detailed experimental form that calls for independent checking; so too, Moore presents his views in a form that calls for public checking. His views, of course, are not put experimentally; but they can, nonetheless, be checked against scientific claims and revised in the light of new findings. To say, for instance, that there are an enormous number of material objects, and that the distance between some of them (stars) is great, is not as precise as stating the number of known galaxies and giving the distance between them in light years; but the former claims are not in opposition to the latter; they are just popularized. The common sense views can be checked against their scientific counterparts.

Moore's common sense views, then, consist in two sorts. The first, but smaller in number, are propositions that Moore believes all
reasonable men, including scientists share. These are, however, not specifically scientific. The second, and larger in number, are popularized scientific claims that are shared by those who are acquainted with science. The first type of common sense views form the foundation of our knowledge about the world, and although it is possible to doubt them, it is unreasonable to do so. While the second type of common sense views are open to doubt, in the sense that they can be revised or rejected in light of new evidence, they are still the most certain specific knowledge we have about the universe. Together, these views of common sense give us the basic outline of the universe. This outline stands ready for us philosophers to use to check our general descriptions of the whole universe.

Why did Moore not clearly say that this was his intention in explicating the views of common sense? My belief is that he thought it was too obvious to state, especially in a lecture. In a lecture, it is possible to get many things across which are not ever put down explicitly in the written lecture. But dealing only with the written record, we still cannot ignore the fact that roughly two thirds of his lecture is concerned with the precise statement of common sense views. Neither can we ignore his emphasis on identifying philosophical accounts that either go beyond or contradict the views of common sense. And finally, we cannot ignore his insistence on solving the main problems of philosophy, that the philosopher's job is to give answers, to find solutions. It would be incredible if Moore meant for us only to precisely state the views of common sense, and to list those views that added to or contradicted common sense. It is just too obvious for Moore to bother stating
it in so many words.

Further support can also be found within the lecture. Moore notes that common sense views do not, as he has stated them, constitute a general description of the whole universe; but they could become such, if one were to close them by asserting either (1) that material objects and acts of consciousness are the only sorts of things in the universe, (2) or that these are the only sorts of things that we could know to exist in the universe. But to do so would be rash, and symptomatic of dogmatism not of open discussion. For, in the first place, we would have to reject much of modern science which speaks of entities which do not clearly fit into either category, e.g., sub-atomic particles, genes, etc. And, in the second place, we would reject out of hand all philosophical accounts that include more than the things common sense knows to be in the universe. Many scientific theories and some philosophical accounts would have to be false. We should note, however, that Moore never does close the discussion; the views of common sense are a check-list, not a dogma.

What Moore has said is that if we are going to build a structure of knowledge, we must begin with a firm foundation. He believes, and I believe, that the firmest knowledge we have is that of common sense. Both the basic common sense views; i.e., that I have a body, that material objects are spatially related; and the more scientific views are to be used as a check in the following manner. Any philosophical proposition that contradicts any one of our basic common sense beliefs can be rejected since it attack the foundation of our knowledge. Any proposition of philosophy that seems to be contrary to any one of our common sense views
should be held in abeyance until it is shown that it is not, in fact, contrary. Only in this way can we avoid continually tearing down the structures of knowledge. Only in this way can we progress toward being able to supply answers and solutions.

The underlying principle here will be admitted to be both commonsensical and reasonable. In order to arrive at the sort of accurate general description we require, we must hold some things to be fundamental. These Moore calls the views of common sense. If we do not hold these views, or some other set of views as fundamental, no progress will be possible. That is to say, as the history of philosophy so plainly teaches us, it is possible to produce an endless number of theories, elaborate stage-plays, all of which are consistent with themselves. But when taken as a whole, they contradict one another. Which ones will we choose, which will we reject or accept? Without common sense as a foil, our choice can be based only on personal caprice.

But why not take some other set of views as our check? No other set of views can claim to have such widespread acceptance. Clearly, no philosophical proposition can claim to be so beyond reasonable doubt as: "I have a body and a mind, and there is a world outside of, and independent of me"? Similarly, no philosophy carries the authority that science does with respect to the actual constitution of the universe. It is worth repeating that we do not close the discussion by making the views of common sense out to be a general description, just another philosophy, in other words. This is because our goal is to solve problems through discussion and inquiry, not to solve them through dogmatic assertions; and because, if we did so, common sense would become just one of many theories
D: Common Sense and Problem Solving.

Here I want to show how Moore uses common sense to solve a problem of philosophy. My intention is not to prove that his solution is correct; rather, my goal is to illustrate Moore's way of approaching what he thought to be a problem. In the course of doing this, his modification of traditional philosophical argumentation will be investigated in order to fully develop the common sense approach to philosophy.

The first problem of philosophy is to give a general description of the whole universe; but what if some philosophy denied or doubted the existence of some part of the universe, such that the external world, the world of material objects independent of mind, was not, in that sense, external, or did not really exist? The second disjunct would certainly be a problem; for it amounts to a doubt with regard to one of the important sorts of things common sense holds to be in the universe. Moore thought that idealism of a sort says that there are no material objects in the sense mentioned in section C, or that what we call material objects are merely ideas in minds. In "A Proof of an External World", Moore puts philosophy to work on the problem of coming up with a satisfactory proof that will dispel these doubts.

Idealism can be held in one of two ways. One could simply say that, contrary to common sense, material objects do not exist independently of mind. Few, if any, idealists have ever put their views in this manner. Rather, they have said that the common sense view that there is an independent world is a matter of faith; no one, they say,
can satisfactorily prove the existence of this world. Indeed, idealism seems reasonably held, since in principle it admits of revision, or rejection, should such a proof be forthcoming. If it were possible to give a satisfactory proof, and also show that it is not satisfactory to idealists because their doubt is expressed in such a way as to disallow any possible proof, we will have won a real victory. For we will have shown that idealism is not reasonably based, and can be rejected because it is contrary to common sense.

Supposing that there was a real doubt as to the existence of the external world; what would be the argument form by which we could dispel this doubt? Moore says that "from the proposition that there were things of that kind it would follow that there are things to be met with in space." Or, put another way, "if you have proved that two plants exist...you will ipso facto have proved that there are things to be met with in space." In other words, we need only prove things of this sort to exist. It is not necessary to prove that the inference itself is valid; that from the fact that at least two external things exist, it follows that an external world exists. This can be further illustrated in the following way. Idealism states, in effect, that there is no external world in Moore's sense; therefore, there cannot be material objects in his sense either. But if there are material objects, it follows that there is also an external world in Moore's sense. The problem, then, is to prove the premise(s) from which the conclusion follows. The point to remember is that Moore gives the argument form, and assumes its validity, prior to giving his proof.

Moore starts with a quote from Kant's Critique of Pure Reason.
to the effect that the existence of "things outside us" cannot be satisfactorily proved, such that we must accept them on faith. What is important for us to note is that Moore takes idealism to begin with scepticism, and it is with this sceptical starting point, as we shall see, with which Moore is most concerned.

Moore admits that Kant may have given such a satisfactory proof, then asks if there are other proofs. Moore's intention, in part at least, is to determine what would be the form of a satisfactory proof such as to dispel doubt. In order to do this, it is necessary to get quite clear on what is actually in question. Before engaging in this task, I want to make one point which I will return to later. Moore assumes, at the outset, that there really is a problem, that there really is a doubt, and that it is up to him to remove it. Not until quite late in the essay does he suggest that it may only be a pseudo-problem.29

"Things outside of us", Moore thinks is too vague for his purpose; instead, he opts for "things that are to be met with in space." These are not things that are merely presented in space, such as: after-images, double images, hallucinations, bodily pains, etc. All of these are dependent on particular minds. You may see a spatially located after-image, or you may have a pain in your foot; but I do not see your image nor feel your pain. The sorts of things Moore wants to prove the existence of are the sorts of things that "might have been perceived by others as well as by the man in question."30 To make a long story shorter, we can say that "things that are to be met with in space" are the sorts of things we could physically meet, the sorts of things we could
bump into. A list of these things would include: tables, chairs, animals, human bodies or their parts. In other words, Moore wants to prove the existence of what was called material objects in section C.

Even if we prove the existence of material objects, will we have proved that there is a world external to our minds? Is it not possible to say that "material objects" are ideas in our minds of external things. Consequently, we will not have proved that there is an external world in the relevant sense. After investigating the many ways in which we could mean that the sorts of things mentioned above (i.e., tables, chairs, etc.) could be in our minds, Moore makes a distinction between the sorts of things that can be said to be mind-dependent, and those that are not. Things like ideas, after-images, bodily pains, etc., are such that if at any time I say that any one of them exists, then I imply that some mind is having an experience. But a material object is different in that my statement of its existence is "logically independent of my perception of it...from the proposition, with regard to a particular time, that it existed at that time, it never follows that I perceived it at that time". This logical demonstration seems conclusive to me, but there are reasons with which I will deal later, why an idealist who bases his position on scepticism would reject it.

For the sake of argument, let us admit the following: by "things to be met with in space", we mean what Moore calls material objects, and if we could prove things of this sort, it would follow that there is an external world in just the sense Moore means. What, then, is Moore's proof? His proof is deceptively simple. With the appropriate gesture, he says: here is one hand, and here is another hand. He has proved, he
thinks, that it is true that there are at least two things to be met with in space. Therefore, it follows that there is an external world. The proof of the existence of material objects is not, it should be noted, a logical inference; but rather, it is an ostensive demonstration. That is, the validity of the inference is not in question: if there are at least two material objects, then there is an external world. Here is a hand and here is another, is meant to demonstrate that it is true that there are at least two material objects. In other words, he has proved the premise from which the conclusion follows. The argument itself is not in question, or at least, Moore assumes that it is not.

This certainly does not seem, on first sight, to be satisfactory to those schooled in traditional philosophy; it does not seem to dispel the doubts we have with regard to the external world. Norman Malcolm makes the following comment about Moore's proof which is worth quoting, since it sums up the prevalent attitude of philosophers.

To call a philosophical doubt a doubt is as misleading as to call a rhetorical question a question. We should not say that a man was feeling a philosophical doubt as to whether he was having a hallucination if he was, in the ordinary sense of the words, in doubt as to whether he was having a hallucination.

Later on Malcolm adds the following:

What we mean by proving that something that we see is a hand is not a philosophical activity.

If a philosophical doubt is not a doubt in the ordinary sense of the word, in what sense is it a doubt, or is it a doubt at all? Malcolm's point, I think, is that a philosophical doubt is not the same as, for instance, a doubt as to the veracity of a perception of what is called a material object. Rather, what is in question is the ultimate nature of
material objects. They are not really in space, as common sense would have it, they are really ideas in minds of things in space. That there is no doubt as to the perceived nature of material things, I will concede; but I will also add that, for the idealist, there is no doubt as to their ultimate nature either. They are ideas in minds, and that is all there is to it.

What is expressed as a doubt as to the nature of the world, and which Moore takes as a doubt, is not, in fact, a doubt. No ostensive demonstration, no appeal to facts, can ever prove that things are to be met with in space; because the assertions of idealism are not really about those things. We cannot, to borrow a little, refute idealism by kicking a stone.

It is commonly known, I think, that no matter how strongly one holds to idealism, this makes no difference in day to day affairs. Idealists treat fire and lightening with fear and respect. In fact, idealism says nothing about how we ought to conduct ourselves with regard to the world; that is, nothing we do not already know. Instead, idealism asserts something about the ultimate nature of the world, to the effect that it is quite different from the way we normally think that it is. But what is not ordinarily observed is that the idealists' assertions are just as much a matter of faith as is the commonsensical view Moore expounds. The idealist with which Moore deals begins his case with our supposed inability to prove the world is the way we think it is. He says that the existence of an external world is a matter of faith, and as such, is open to doubt. But, of course, the same is true in reverse. That all the world is ultimately mind-dependent equally cannot be proved;
no ostensive demonstration could ever prove this. Thus, idealism is a matter of faith.

In other words, the idealist uses an apparent doubt, to express an assertion about which he has no doubt. He then rules out ostensive demonstration, but apparently leaves room for a logical argument. But, in fact, the philosophical-logical argument is ruled out from the start as well.

The philosophical-logical argument will always be inconclusive because of the way this supposed doubt is put. When an idealist says that we cannot prove that there is an external world, the sense in which he means "proof" is that of absolutely conclusive proof. The proof must dispel all possible doubt, not just all reasonable doubt. Logical argument though admitted in principle, is ruled out in fact, because it is always possible for an idealist to doubt how any argument could ever prove the ultimate nature of the world was other than he knows it to be. Thus, after hearing Moore's argument that mind-dependent and mind-independent things are logically distinct, he could admit this, but add that it is still necessary to prove that they are in fact distinct. They are logically distinct, but this is only a reflection of a linguistic distinction. But this linguistic distinction is not a real distinction. That vulgar folk and their language express a distinction, does not mean that the distinction does, in fact, exist. The logical argument must always fail because it is based on concepts derived from vulgar language. But vulgar language does not necessarily reflect reality. In this move, logic is excluded in fact. The bottom line is that the idealist does not want a proof "but something like a general statement as
It is wrong to call a philosophical doubt of the kind Moore is concerned with a doubt, not because it is a special sort of doubt, but because it is not a doubt at all. The sort of doubt Moore deals with is not really a doubt; it is simply a means of making an assertion. The bottom line is that it is always possible to set up a problem, or so-called problem, in such a way as to admit of no possible solution. No problem really exists, no question is really asked; instead, idealism of this sort is based on assertions that come in the guise of problems or doubts. It is merely a philosophical account which is contrary to common sense, and in opposition to the problem-solving nature of philosophy; since no solution is in principle possible, because both ostensive and logical demonstration are ruled out.

What Moore does in "A Proof..." is very much a philosophical activity, according to his notion of what philosophy is about. That is, it is philosophical, if philosophy is an activity directed toward solving problems and identifying pseudo-problems. Idealism appears to be a problem. After thoroughly investigating the problem, we find that, according to its form, it admits of no possible solution. If there really was a doubt as to the existence of material objects, ostensive demonstration, "here is a hand", or logical demonstration, material objects and ideas are distinct concepts, would be satisfactory to dispel this doubt.

Idealism seemed to Moore to be a problem; it seemed to involve a doubt with regard to the world. Reasonably enough, but perhaps naively, Moore assumes that there really is a doubt, and it is his job to dispel
that doubt. After careful investigation, it became evident, as it has for Malcolm, that it "is not quite easy to say what it is that they [idealists] want proved—what it is that is such that unless they got a proof of it, they would not say that they had a proof of the existence of external things." In other words, Moore has solved at least one problem; he has shown that something that appears to be a problem is, in fact, a pseudo-problem. Idealism that starts from doubt is really nothing more than an assertion as to the ultimate nature of the world put in a problematic way that can be rejected on common sense grounds.
E: Summary.

Here I want to briefly summarize the main points made in the previous sections in order to indicate the sorts of things that I will show to be evident in Moore's earlier ethical works. In his later works, I have argued, Moore held the job of philosophy to be a problem-oriented activity of trying to give reasonable descriptions of the whole universe. While not of such vast proportions, in *Principia Ethica* the job is oriented around the problem of giving a reasonable description of the main things of which ethics is concerned.

Although it is difficult to give a precise statement of what a reasonable description would be, it is possible to illustrate this distinction by reference to what is not reasonable. Any account that dogmatically asserts the outcome of an inquiry prior to actually undertaking the investigation would be unreasonable. Rather than claiming that such is quite probably the case, and appealing to an audience to confirm or reject the claim based on the reasons given, the dogmatist merely tells the audience to believe the truth.

One caution must be included here. I do not impute morally bad motives to those who have held to dogmatic claims. The philosophers who hold to dogmatic positions do so out of error. The main point of Moore's 'naturalistic fallacy' is to uncover that error.

In the later writings, Moore links common sense views to scientific claims. The spirit in which these claims are made is that of non-dogmatic or open discussion, inquiry, and investigation. It is the at-
tempt to introduce this motivating spirit of science into ethics which is the single most important aspect of *Principia Ethica*; and it is the most generally neglected aspect of this work.

In order that philosophy could solve problems and make progress, it was necessary for Moore to change the traditional philosophical approach. In his earlier work, Moore modifies both the nature and use of philosophical definition. This is done both to keep the discussion open, to avoid dogmatism; and to make progress in solving problems.

There are many more points of interest, but these three should be kept in uppermost in our minds. First, there is the attempt to introduce the spirit of science which involves a rejection of dogmatism. And second, there is the genuine attempt to solve problems, which involves the third aspect; that of a modification of philosophical approach. In the next two chapters, I will show that these moves are evident in *Principia Ethica*, and that to understand the work it is necessary to get clear on their implications.
CHAPTER II

A: Objectives.

My overall goal in this chapter is to show in what way *Principia Ethica* espouses a common sense approach to ethics. It was demonstrated in the last chapter that common sense according to Moore has more to do with science than with cracker-barrel wisdom. Moore's stated goal, that of *Principia* being a prolegomenon to a science of ethics which will uncover "what are the fundamental principles of ethical reasoning",¹ and his rejection of naturalistic ethics, do not constitute a rejection of science; quite the contrary, he actually argues for the introduction of scientific reasoning into ethics.

This approach is best illustrated by the 'naturalistic fallacy' which involves a rejection of the traditional form of philosophical definition in terms of essential characteristics. An essentialistic definition would be of the form: All A's are x, nothing that is not x can be an A, because x is a necessary characteristic of all A's. I will show why this type of definition must be rejected from any account that claims to be in any sense scientific.

What I have called Moore's rejection of dogmatism can be more precisely called an attempt to establish non-essentialism as the operative approach to ethics. While a great deal of work is required to establish my position, I would like to simply state why essentialism is to be rejected from scientific accounts. If science were to accept essentialistic definitions, progress would be stifled and it would become dogmatic.
If, for example, 19th century biologists took whiteness to be an essential characteristic of swans, then it would follow that the newly discovered black creatures which were so very much like swans, could not possibly be swans. Indeed, it would not even be necessary to look at the creatures, for they would know ahead of time that they were not swans.

If science says that $x$ is a characteristic of A's, it means that all A's so far observed have had the characteristic $x$; it does not mean that $x$ is an essential characteristic such that if something was very much like an A but was not $x$, then it would necessarily not be an A. I will argue presently that the most important point of the naturalistic fallacy is to prevent the dogmatism mentioned above from creeping into the proposed science of ethics.

From this perspective, it will be shown that Frankena's well-known criticism of the naturalistic fallacy is inappropriate because it fails to take account of Moore's rejection of essentialism. For different reasons, Prior and Hancock's criticisms of Moore's rejection of naturalism are misguided. Rather than their positions being in opposition to Moore's, they tend to support it.
B: Moore’s Rejection of Naturalistic Essentialism.

It is commonly accepted that in large part *Principia Ethica* constitutes a concerted effort to refute naturalism. Naturalism, simply put, is any attempt to define "good" in terms of natural properties. There are, of course, some problems as to what a natural property is, and I will deal with them later on; but for the moment, we can note that to say that "good" means the propensity in an object or state of affairs to produce pleasure, or that "good" means a property like 'better suited for survival', would be to express two forms of naturalism. Hedonism is a type of objectivism, for it holds that it is a property of the object to produce pleasure, and not any attitude that someone holds toward an object that makes it good. The same is, of course, true for the notion of 'better suited for survival' which can be determined by straight-forward scientific investigation.

Naturalistic ethics which includes Hedonism and Evolutionism says that the sorts of things "good" ascribes to objects are amenable to scientific investigation; that is, by observation or experimentation we could determine what is goodness. But according to Moore, the major implication of his account of ethical value is that "good" refers not to any natural property; instead, it refers to a simple non-natural quality of objects or states of affairs. One thing that can be stated without argument is that no matter what else a non-natural quality may be, it is not amenable to this type of investigation. If a non-natural quality is apprehended at
all, it is by intuition.

My point, then, is that the accepted interpretation of what is called Moore's refutation of naturalism is thought to include a rejection of the type of objectivities of which the natural sciences deal. But this standard interpretation is incorrect. Moore's refutation of naturalism includes two interrelated moves: the rejection of naturalistic essentialism, and an attempt to put natural properties in their proper place in the investigation.

Gilbert Ryle makes the following remark about Moore's early view of naturalistic ethics that is worth considering in detail here; first, because it substantiates what I have just said about the standard interpretation of Moore's ethics; and second, because it sets the theme of this chapter.

In *Principia Ethica* 'naturalistic' is a comminatory title just because natural is still a relatively derogatory, tense-connoting adjective. What Ethics is essentially about is proudly outside the orbit of the mere natural sciences, including psychology and sociology. However, by 1903 the status of the temporal is beginning to rise a little—if only because Ethics would have nothing to prescribe unless people existed for periods of time.

Although a lot is said in the above, there are just two implications on which I would like to concentrate at the moment. Ryle says, in effect, that Moore had been, and was still largely an idealist when he wrote *Principia*. If this is true, it follows that Moore was not a common sense philosopher, since his common sense approach involves a rejection of idealism. Secondly, Ryle's remark means that Moore's rejection of naturalism is meant to exclude, out of hand, the subject matter of the sciences. By implication, this means that it was not Moore's intention to
introduce the scientific spirit into ethics. Quite the contrary, such an approach is characteristic of dogmatism, not open investigation.

I would first like to point out that although Ryle's article is mainly concerned with the relation between "The Nature of Judgement" and Principia Ethica, he draws support for his claim from Moore's earliest publication, "In What Sense, If Any, Do Past and Future Time Exist". It is not at all clear that, in this discussion, Moore was arguing for idealism, though there may be some under-currents that are suggestive of this. By stretching the point, one could say that Moore may have inadvertently argued for the general unreality of time by according the highest degree of reality to present time which has less content than past time and none of the potential of future time. But if we deal with Moore's words on a more literal common sense level, and within the strictures of a discussion, the most we can say is that he held time to be difficult for philosophers to analyze adequately because philosophers and their thoughts about time occur entirely within a temporal framework.

With regard to "The Nature of Judgement", which was published at almost the same time as Principia, Ryle assumes that Moore was an idealist and then goes on to assert that idealism has some important part to play in Principia. But Ryle has no substantial support in Moore's early work, and a thorough analysis will show that there is no support of this claim to be found in Principia.

The main thrust, then, of Ryle's comment quoted above, is that Moore, even in 1903, with the publication of Principia, was still labouring under the influence of an idealism in which, according to Ryle, he held that space and time and the things contained therein were unreal in
some sense. From this it follows that the only things worthy of ethics, or any branch of philosophy, are not the illusory things of the senses with which the natural sciences deal, but rather, unchanging realities. Ryle's use of "proudly outside the orbit of the mere natural sciences" suggests to me that he means that Moore rejected, for no good reason, the subject matter of the natural sciences, that is, natural properties, in favour of non-natural qualities. I, however, hold that it was out of respect for the natural sciences (the same respect out of which he said later in his career that science had gained real knowledge of the universe), and the motivating spirit of science, combined with a fervent wish that ethics could become like a science in the relevant respects, that Moore was lead to reject naturalistic ethics. For as I will show presently, naturalistic ethics violate the spirit of scientific reasoning.

There is no suggestion in Principia that pleasurableness or suitability for survival could not be a mark of some, or even all, good things. Quite the opposite, "It may be true", says Moore, "that all things which are good are also something else." However, this we can determine only by investigating those things that are actually ethically good. But in order to do this, we must get clear on what "good" means.

Moore thinks we should answer the more general question as to the meaning of "good" prior to our investigation of good things for the following reason. When speaking of the relationship between the science of ethics and casuistry, he says that the former supplies the theoretical grounding of the latter. Casuistry, the practice of judging the moral value of conduct, "has been unable to distinguish, in cases which
treats, those elements upon which their value depends." It is thus drawn into the error of thinking "two cases to be alike in respect of value, when in reality they are alike only in some other respect." It has made this mistake because it has concentrated only on good conduct, rather than the more general question as to what is "good". If ethics is to be a science, its methodology should be such as to avoid this error, otherwise if we examine good conduct alone of all good things, then we shall be in danger of mistaking for this property, some property which is not shared by those other things: and thus have made a mistake about Ethics even in this limited sense; for we shall not know what good conduct really is.

Casuistry is too narrow in its approach to value. Yet casuistry "is the goal of ethical investigation." It is thus up to the science of ethics to say what "good" means, how it is to be defined, in other words.

Before beginning the next section, which will be concerned with how Moore defines "good", I want to draw attention to some of the implications of the above. The problem with casuistry, and by implication, ethics that concentrate mainly on morally relevant conduct, is that their approach to value is too narrow. The problem with beginning our investigation with good conduct, or good things, is a methodological one. Moore's point is that we must first get clear on what we mean by "good" so that we can avoid mistakenly identifying some property of, say, good conduct with the property or quality that makes things ethically good.

We can get a hint of how dogmatism may creep into ethics in the following example. Suppose we note that all our examples of good conduct are also conducive to survival. We are then prone to believe that 'conducive to survival' is a mark of all good things, even those actions we
have not yet investigated. And we might even become dogmatic about it. We may say that being conducive to survival is a necessary characteristic of not just good conduct, but of all good things. If we keep the discussion open by asking what "good" means, at least we can keep this error from entering our investigation right at the start.
C: The Rejection of Naturalism in Overview.

The goal of this section is to give a general overview of the reasoning involved in Moore's rejection of naturalistic ethics. This involves considering the substitution technique, the open question technique, and the naturalistic fallacy. It is necessary to lay out this general overview because the criticisms of which I deal are based on this model. While it is not entirely false, this standard interpretation gives a distorted picture of Moore's program because it fails to put enough emphasis on certain specific moves with which I will deal in sections D and E. Nonetheless, this standard interpretation is useful in that it shows quite clearly upon what Frankena's, Prior's, and Hancock's inappropriate criticisms are based.

After stating that what "good" and "bad" refer to are the only simple objects of thought with which ethics deals, Moore says that the definition of "good" is "the most essential point in the definition of Ethics; and moreover a mistake with regard to it entails a far larger number of erroneous ethical judgements than any other."¹² If we do not get clear on what "good" means, then we are likely to make mistakes with regard to judgements as to the goodness or badness of sorts of things or states of affairs. Since the science of ethics is to supply us with reasons for thinking this or that is good, it must first get clear on what "good" means. In light of this, Moore asks the following questions: "What then, is good? How is good to be defined?"¹³

There is one thing worth pointing out about Moore's approach so
far. It may seem trivial at first, but these two questions are just alternate versions of the one question. Moore begins immediately with his account of the definition of "good", and seems to neglect the first question. But, after pointing out that he is not interested in verbal definitions, he says his concern is "solely with the object or idea... that the word "good" is generally used to stand for." This involves the first question. By definition, Moore means what the word "good" stands for, its reference, goodness. Thus, the two questions mentioned above are but one question as to what is the nature of goodness. To further substantiate this, it is worth considering the notation he uses. Moore says that 'good' is the only simple object of thought common to ethics, and that its definition is most important; but the questions he actually asks are: "What, then, is good? How is good to be defined?" He does not use inverted commas in the questions that he uses to say in what sense he means to define "good". A reasonable interpretation of this is that his primary concern is not with analyzing the word "good", and not that he mixed up meaning and naming; but that what he wants to know by how "good" is to be defined is what is the thing named and what is its nature.

How, then, is "good" to be defined? It cannot, says Moore, properly be defined at all; it is indefinable. And to attempt to define "good" is to commit the 'naturalistic fallacy'. In order to make sense of this unusual answer, we must consider in more detail the type of definition Moore means. What we are asking for in a philosophical definition is not a dictionary definition, a definition in terms of words. Neither do we want a stipulative one, in which, for instance, "good" is said
to mean "pleasurable". For as Moore points out, how could we ever argue with anyone as to the meaning of a term if a term could mean, or be defined in any way the speaker chooses?

To roughly paraphrase Moore's argument on this point, suppose someone were to say a circle was a straight line: How could we answer except to say that this is not the case? Yet, if he adamantly maintained that this was the way he defined a circle, we would either end the discussion, or point out that a meaningful definition cannot be arbitrary, but must reflect the nature of the object defined. The point with regard to ethics is that "if good is defined as something else, it is then impossible either to prove that any other definition is wrong or even to deny such a definition." 16

What we want in a philosophical definition, Moore says, is a thorough analysis of the thing named with reference to its parts. For example, the definition of "horse" would consist in saying what are the parts of a horse, mentioning hooves and hide, and internal organs, and how these parts are related to one another. To the objection that this is not a definition but a description, I can only agree and point out that I am not at this point concerned with arguments as to the correctness of his terminology, but with establishing that this is what Moore meant by a philosophically relevant definition.

Moore contends that "good" is indefinable in the above sense of definition.

My point is that 'good' is a simple notion, just as 'yellow' is a simple notion; that, just as you cannot, by any manner or means, explain to anyone who does not already know it, what yellow is, so you cannot explain what good is.
"Good" is indefinable because of something about goodness, that to which the word refers. It is not that the word "good" is indefinable, but that the simple object of thought to which the word refers is indefinable, because it consists in no parts. When we use the adjective "good" to apply to anything, we mean that the thing in question has some simple quality to it. We can only indicate what this quality is insofar as we can point (or name) the sorts of things that possess this quality. Goodness is just "something you think of or perceive, and to anyone who cannot think or perceive it, you can never, by any definition, make its nature known."\(^{18}\)

Moore does not mean that those things and states of affairs that are good, what he calls "the good", are indefinable. Those things can be defined in terms of their parts. His main object, Moore says, is "to help towards discovering that definition."\(^{19}\) And indeed, the point of the last chapter of Principia is that of giving such a descriptive definition. The goal of Principia as a whole is to arrive at that definition. Here, however, we are not concerned with that goal, but with the grounding principles by which we are able to properly give such a definition.

We can verify the claim that goodness is indefinable in the above sense by the process that I call the substitution technique. If we consider what the word "horse" stands for, we will find that it is possible to substitute a descriptive definition in terms of parts and relations for the object or idea that is before our minds. We know that the word "horse" refers to a complex thing because we can substitute a description of a complex entity, of the general form: "an animal having hooves and bodily organs of a particular type and arrangement", for the idea or object called before our minds by the word "horse". But, says Moore, "there is nothing
whatsoever which we could so substitute for good; and this is what I mean when I say good is indefinable."²⁰

What if someone were to say that he did not have before his mind a simple object of thought which is "an ultimate term of reference to which whatever is capable of definition must be defined"²¹; but instead he has in mind a property that is both natural and definable? Moore uses what has become known as the 'open question technique' to counter this objection.

First, Moore points out that "propositions about the good are all of them synthetic and never analytic."²² Analytic and synthetic are to be understood along standard Kantian lines. To uncover new knowledge, we must predicate of a subject something other than what is contained within the conception of the subject; otherwise the predication is analytic, and thus, only clarificatory, or it is tautological, and thereby true, but trite.

Although it would be rash to say analytic predication is not significant, it is the case that we want to do more in an investigation of phenomena, than to clarify concepts; our goal is synthetic predications about phenomena. For example, we do not just want to say bodies are extended, this being necessarily true by definition. Rather, we want to say bodies have weight, which if it is true, we know to be true by investigation. It is not an open question whether any particular body is in fact extended because we know by definition, prior to and independent of any investigation, that it must be so. If ethics is scientific in the sense that it is concerned with making statements about phenomena, and not merely with analyzing concepts, then it will always be an open ques-
It may be claimed that ethics is only about clarifying concepts. Indeed, it may be that this is the nature of metaethics, although there is room for doubt even here. All I need say, however, is that for Moore, ethics was the discipline that supplied reasons for thinking this or that really was good or bad. Furthermore, Moore felt that when a naturalist said that "Pleasure is good", he was doing more than just trying to clarify concepts, he was trying to say something that was true about objects or states of affairs. If this is the case, and "Pleasure is good" is meant to be a synthetic proposition, then it will be meaningful to ask: "Is this pleasure good?" But if "good" means "pleasure", then to ask if this pleasure is good is to ask if pleasure is pleasurable. But this is not an open question. We know by definition, prior to and independently of investigation, that pleasure is pleasurable. The same applies to any other natural property that is identified with "good". The discussion becomes closed or dogmatic; it is not an open question whether anything said to be good, under these circumstances, is actually good.

By the method of substitution we know that "good" stands for a simple object of thought. The open question technique shows that to identify goodness with any natural property is to close the discussion in that the nature of the phenomena is claimed to be known prior to and independently of investigation. If "good" does not mean any natural quality, Moore concludes it must stand for a non-natural quality. Moore believes that we will agree with him, if only we will pay attention to what is actually before our minds when we think of what "good" stands for.

I will say more about non-naturalism in Chapter III. For the
moment, I ask the reader to hold in abeyance the obvious objection that Moore seems to be committing the same type of error as his 'open question' is meant to avoid.

Now, just as it is generally wrong to say anything whatever is anything other than what it is; it is wrong to say that a simple non-natural quality is a natural property. If we say goodness is pleasurableness because "good" means "pleasure" by definition, then we commit the 'naturalistic fallacy'. Moore puts it this way.

And if anybody tried to define pleasure for us as being any other natural object; if anybody were to say, for instance, that pleasure means the sensation red, and were to proceed to deduce from that that pleasure is a colour...Well, that would be the same fallacy which I have called the naturalistic fallacy. 24

How does the naturalistic fallacy refute naturalistic ethics? According to this interpretation, which I will show in Section D approximates the standard one, the efficacy must come from Moore's apparent ontological claim. Only if we agree that "good" does really stand for a non-natural quality does it have any general use in ethical investigation. If this ontological claim cannot be substantiated, Moore's fallacy dissolves into a statement of a simple rule of thought that tells us to remember that "Everything is what it is, and not another thing." 25

This is the basis of the approach W.F. Frankena takes in his article "The Naturalistic Fallacy". After discussing in what sense, if any, it is a fallacy, he concludes that the naturalistic fallacy, since it is not a fallacy in the usual sense of asserting a conclusion that does not follow from a set of premises, that it must be a definist fallacy that can only properly be used as a final evaluative tool in ethical discussion.
Only after we have shown that a proposed definition of "good" does amount to saying that goodness is something other than what it is, are we entitled to reject an ethical theory. Frankena says that

it is a mistake to confuse or identify two properties. If the properties really are two, then they simply are not identical. But do those who define ethical notions in non-ethical terms make this mistake? 26

The point is that we must demonstrate that a particular naturalistic ethics does say that goodness is other than what it is by first demonstrating that "good" does not refer to some natural property. Frankena holds that the naturalistic fallacy only says that it is wrong to say of anything, particularly goodness, that it is anything other than what it is. Moore's fallacy is the mistake of misidentifying two separate properties. If this were the case, Moore's fallacy would be of little philosophical or logical interest.

Arthur N. Prior's criticism of Moore's rejection of naturalistic ethics has the same basis. He says that Moore's argument only works against one type of naturalistic ethics; it does not work against a committed, determined naturalist. With regard to the open question technique, Prior says that the naturalist may counter Moore by

admitting that the assertion that, say, pleasure and nothing but pleasure is good, is for him a mere truism and that if Ethics be the attempt to determine what is in fact good, then the statement that what is pleasant is good is not, strictly speaking, an ethical statement, but only a way of indicating just what study is to go under the name of Ethics—the study of what is actually pleasant, without any pretense of maintaining that pleasure has any 'goodness' beyond its pleasantness.

Prior counsels, then, that we be "bold enough and tough enough"28 to stick by our views. We should not be concerned that many others have thought
that ethics had to do with more than determining what is pleasurable. We simply hold that ethics is the study of pleasure, and that is all there is to it.

Roger Hancock takes a similar position. He admits that it would be self-contradictory to affirm that all pleasures are not good if we first maintain that "good" means "pleasure"; for we would be saying, in effect, that all pleasures are not pleasurable. But, according to Hancock all the naturalist need do to extricate himself from this predicament is simply to admit that "in point of fact it is self-contradictory to say that something is pleasant and yet not good."29 In other words, we merely say that goodness and pleasurableness are the same thing, and therefore, all pleasures are good.

All of the above criticisms are based on the same principle, that of the ease by which Moore's apparent ontological claim can be rejected. It is thought that without this claim as to the actual nature of goodness, it would be easy for the naturalist to say, for instance, that "good" and "pleasurable", though not synonymous terms, refer to the same property. The naturalistic fallacy does not prove that goodness cannot be defined in terms of non-ethical properties. What is first necessary is to prove that goodness is not a natural property. They all take the word "natural" in the term "naturalistic fallacy" to be indicative of the error of misidentifying natural properties with a non-natural quality. But this, I will argue in the next section, is the root of their error. In order to understand Moore's fallacy we must begin by determining in what sense it is a "naturalistic" fallacy.
In this section I have three main goals: that of showing in what sense Moore's fallacy is natural; that of showing that even if it is not a fallacy in the strictest logical sense, it is a serious error to make; and finally, that of showing why the criticisms mentioned in Section C are inappropriate. The sense in which it is naturalistic, is the key to a correct understanding of Moore's fallacy.

In most philosophers' minds, the naturalistic fallacy is associated with, or even identified with the "is/ought" or "fact/value" problem first mentioned by Hume. The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, which presents the most commonly accepted interpretation of philosophical matters, says that "[naturalistic] loosely associated with the problem of whether ethical properties are natural properties is the question of whether it is possible to deduce an 'ought' from an 'is'". Whereas Hume's problem concerns deducing an "ought" from an "is", it seems that Moore's fallacy has to do with the converse problem of deducing an "is", or fact, from an "ought", or value. The reason why it is thought that the naturalistic fallacy is a version of Hume's problem is, I think, because of the emphasis Moore places on the error of defining "good" in terms of natural properties. Indeed, the standard interpretation is that what G.E. Moore called the naturalistic fallacy is the identifying of goodness with any natural characteristic, such as pleasantness or being the object of desire. This is part of the naturalistic fallacy; but it is not the whole of it. And to concentrate on this part is to get a distorted picture; since, as I will demon-
strate presently, it is a serious methodological error to define "good" at all.

In Principia two versions of the naturalistic fallacy are given. One is that of defining "good" in terms of natural properties, but the other is that of defining "good" in terms of some metaphysical reality. "It should be observed", says Moore, "that the fallacy, by reference to which I define 'Metaphysical Ethics', is the same in kind; and I give it but one name, the naturalistic fallacy." If Moore's fallacy had essentially to do with identifying non-natural properties with natural ones, and if it is admitted that a metaphysical reality is not natural, then it would be negligent on Moore's part to use the same name for both. But he uses the same name because of the sense in which his fallacy is a natural one.

Although the naturalistic fallacy is not even the converse of Hume's "is/ought" problem; the sense in which it is natural can be illustrated by reference to a well-known aspect of Hume's philosophy, his account of how we come by our idea of causal efficacy. It should be kept in mind, however, that the point is not to argue for the truth of Hume's position, but only to draw out one implication of his account.

All careful observation of causal relations ever discloses is that one object, the cause, is constantly conjoined with another object, the effect. We can discover no causal efficacy between the two; yet after several observations "in which the same objects are always conjoined together, we immediately conceive a connection betwixt them." But this connection "is nothing but an internal impression of mind, or a determination to carry our thoughts from one object to another." Hume says that the
"mind has a great propensity"\(^{36}\) to do this. In the *Enquiry* this propensity is identified with "custom" or "habit"\(^{37}\); by which he means that we have a strong propensity of mind to habitually posit a causal efficacy which is not given in experience.

It would not be to stray too far, to say that by "propensity", "determination", or "habit" of mind, Hume meant a natural inclination to which we are all prone. But, as Hume's analysis itself proves, this natural inclination does not determine us to a particular account of causality; that is, through careful observation we can overcome our natural tendency, and come to realize that no such necessary connection does, in fact, exist. This is, in essence, the sense in which Moore means that his fallacy is natural, or naturalistic. And this, as will become clear presently, is why it is correct to say that defining "good" in terms of a metaphysical reality is a version of the naturalistic fallacy.

It is natural that after investigating several instances of good things, and noting that they have some one thing in common, to assume that "these properties, in fact, are simply not 'other' but absolutely and entirely the same with goodness."\(^{38}\) "The inference is very natural"\(^{39}\), says Moore. Indeed it is. Our natural inclination is to think that to be good means that something must possess this one property. If it does not possess this property, it cannot be good. And it does not matter whether we define this property in terms of pleasurableness, or conducive to survival, or a holy will; in each case, we are led into the same errors.

It is a short step from saying that goodness and pleasurableness are one and the same, to saying that "good" and "pleasurable" mean the same thing. Yet those who do this "fail to perceive that their conclusion
'what possesses this property is good' is a significant proposition"; it is not meant to be analytic or tautological, "and yet, if it does not mean one or other of these two things, the inference contradicts its own premise." It would not be an open question whether this particular pleasure, even if it were a sadistic one, is good; since by definition it must be good.

Not only that, but more seriously, when we begin with a definition of good, our ethical investigations become closed and dogmatic; and this is regardless of our intentions to engage in an honest investigation.

For we shall start with the conviction that good must mean so and so, and shall therefore be inclined either to misunderstand our opponent's arguments or to cut them short with the reply, 'this is not an open question; the very meaning of the word decides it; no one can think otherwise except through confusion.'

We are fundamentally confused, then, to think that courage and self-sacrifice are good. Since they are arguably not pleasurable, they cannot possibly be good. My contention, then, is that the naturalistic fallacy is properly understood as an attempt to keep essentialistic definitions from being posited at the beginning of any honest inquiry into the nature of ethical phenomena. For this approach either leads us away from the phenomena into the analysis of words only, or we are led into dogmatism.

Of course, there is no error involved in the analysis of words only; and indeed, there is nothing wrong with this pursuit at all, provided we realize that this is what we are doing. But I and Moore feel that ethics has more to do than simply to analyze words; we, along with many other ethical investigators, are interested in what "good" stands for, together with determining what things are good. If we are concerned with
an honest investigation, we will want to avoid the logical errors that follow from our natural (but avoidable) inclination to raise a characteristic of some good things to the status of the essential condition of all good things.

At this point, it is possible to show that Moore's fallacy, though not an inferential error, is still a serious error deserving of the title fallacy. The naturalistic fallacy is a methodological fallacy, that of assuming at the beginning of an argument, perhaps in the first premise, that which the argument is supposed to demonstrate. Thus, we begin ostensively or in effect, defining "good" as "pleasurable", or "conducive to survival", or in "accordance to God's will", or as "a holy will", and so on. In each case, we are committed from the start to a particular conclusion and method of inquiry. Only that which is pleasurable is good, and our job is now just to investigate types of pleasure, and perhaps, to defend the truth against its opponents. Only that which is conducive to the survival of the individual or the species is good, and our job is to carefully determine which of the actions open to us are likely to attain this goal. Only that which is in accordance to God's will is good, and our job is to study the Scripture well. And finally, only that which incorporates the principle of a holy will can be good, and our job is to distinguish those sorts of actions from others. This list could be extended indefinitely, but that would serve no useful purpose. However, one more rather trivial example will, I think, help to show just how wrong it is to begin our investigations with a definition of the type Moore means.

Suppose someone were to begin an ethical investigation by defining "good" in terms of redness; that is, "good" and "red" mean the
same because goodness and redness are identical. As silly as this may be, the conclusion clearly follows: only that which is red can possibly be good. Let us now investigate all things that are red. But you say, "not all, and perhaps none of the things I think are good, are red. Well, you must be mistaken. Let us have no more talk of non-red things being good. The very definition of the word determines the matter."

For Moore, it is fundamentally wrong, it is a fallacy to define "good" at all. This is something that Frankena, Prior, Hancock, and all the standard interpretations I can find, fail to see or fail to place enough emphasis on. With the exception of Frankena, they all take "naturalistic" to be referring to the error of defining "good" in terms of natural properties; whereas I take "naturalistic" to be referring to our natural inclination to take a characteristic that a selection of good things have in common to be the thing that makes them good. From there, we proceed to define "good" in terms of this property, such that nothing that does not possess this characteristic can be good. And I repeat, it does not matter whether we define "good" in terms of natural or non-natural characteristics; it is the same methodological error that is involved. We exclude a whole world of things that could be good prior to any investigation. In other words, we become methodologically dogmatic.

Before substantiating my interpretation of the naturalistic fallacy, I want to clear up a possible objection, to the effect that it is not a fallacy in a strictly logical sense. Perhaps Moore is using "fallacy" in an extended sense, in a way that does not quite match that of modern formal logic. But this is inconsequential; for only if we can give good reasons for limiting the scope of "fallacy" to purely inferen-
tial errors, can we say that the naturalistic fallacy is not a fallacy. There seems to me to be no reasonable grounds for such a drastic limitation. We might note in this connection that there are many words that have a specific use in logic, but that also have a use, which I think is primary, in common usage. Some examples would be "argument", "statement", "proposition", "premise". These are the terms that Moore extended, to fit the circumstances, later in his career.

Although my contention that their primary use is that of common language may not be widely shared by philosophers, I think that it cannot be denied that they have other uses than the strictly logical, and it would be absurd to argue that this is not the case. Now, let us consider how Moore moves away from the usual philosophical sense of "definition" to a common-usage sense.

First, I want to point out that Moore was aware that he had moved away from the orthodox philosophical sense of definition. He says that it "[w]ould have served my purpose just as well, if I had used the word 'photograph' instead of definition, and had said that good[read goodness] was unable to be photographed." But this does not detract from his account; rather, it should be an even more convincing reason to believe that Moore had a commonsensical sense of the word in mind.

Of the three basic types of definition mentioned by Moore—i.e., lexicographical, analytic and/or stipulative, and definition as analysis of the referent of a word—we need say very little here about the first form. It is sufficient to say about both forms of lexicographical definition, which defines in terms of usage, that definitions of this type are philosophically uninteresting because in both variants we are told really
only what is the accepted usage of a word, not that the usage is correct. Of the remaining two types, 'the open question technique' shows that the analytic/stipulative furnishes us with no new knowledge of the referent. And we know that an analysis of the referent of "good" is not possible because we have before our minds a non-complex quality, goodness. Finally, if we define "good" in terms of some quality or property of some good things, we commit the naturalistic fallacy and are lead into dogmatism.

Missing from this account is the traditional philosophical definition in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. It is missing precisely because this is what Moore was most concerned with avoiding in his science of ethics; for so far as it is scientific, ethics must be concerned with solving problems as to the nature of phenomena, that is, with describing what the word actually stands for. It was axiomatic starting points, or put another way, propositions that were true by definition prior to and independently of investigation, that Moore most wanted to avoid. The following comment, which no one has paid much attention to, illustrates that this is his intention. He says, "if I am right", that propositions about good are synthetic and not analytic, "then nobody can foist upon us such an axiom as that 'Pleasure is the only good' or that 'The good is the desired' on the pretense that this is 'the very meaning of the word'." (My emphasis). It may, in fact, be the case that 'Pleasure is the sole good' or that 'The good is the desired'; but such conclusions must be established by investigation. The reason, then, why we should not begin with any definition of "good", is because our goal is to gain real knowledge of phenomena, not simply to show what are the consequences of accepting arbitrary definitions.
In support of this, it is worth pointing out that it does not matter if "good" really does stand for "a natural object, that would not alter the nature of the fallacy nor diminish its importance one whit." This is because it is up to us to demonstrate that goodness is a natural object (or a non-natural object) through investigation of phenomena, not by beginning our investigation with a definition that says this. It is a serious methodical error to begin an investigation with a definition because as soon as we do that, we are no longer engaged in open inquiry, but are dogmatically asserting our views. In the following, Moore tells us that his aim is to introduce openness of endeavour that is characteristic of the spirit of science.

If we start with the conviction that a definition of good...can be found, we start with the conviction that good can mean nothing else than some one property of things; and that our only business will then be to discover what is that property. But if we recognize that, so far as the meaning of good goes, anything whatever may be good, we start with a far more open mind.

Any definition of "good" is fallacious in an open investigation because it prejudices the results of the investigation from the start. The reason why philosophers are lead to believe that goodness can be equated with a particular property of things is, Moore tells us, because most things that are good are complex things that possess many properties. The inference is natural enough: one assumes that a particular property of certain things that are good is the good-making property. The next step is to define "good" in terms of this property. But as soon as we do this, all pretenses of scientific rigour and objectivity must be abandoned. For we now know a priori that, for instance, all pleasurable things are good,
and nothing that is not pleasurable is good. Yet we firmly believe that
certain pleasures are not good, and some things are not pleasurable but
are yet still good. To deny this would be to deny common experience.

Even if the conclusion is that Moore failed in his attempt to
ground ethics in the open spirit of scientific investigation, free from
essentialistic definition and dogmatism, few philosophers could help but
sympathize with his motivation. Some will be encouraged to take up his
quest. None, who understand Moore's program, will accuse him of reject-
ing science; when, in fact, his work shows that he has embraced the very
spirit of scientific endeavor.

Of course, our work is not over when we have exposed the fallacy
of beginning with a definition, it is just beginning. That is why
Frankena's criticism, that the naturalistic fallacy cannot be used as a
general leveling club against all forms of naturalistic ethics, is so
inappropriate. Moore never intended that it be used in this fashion, and
he never used it in that manner. The naturalistic fallacy is meant to
illustrate the proper way to begin an investigation. The fact that a
writer commits the naturalistic fallacy does not make his conclusion
false. What Moore is "maintaining is that the reasons which he actually
gives for his ethical propositions are fallacious ones so far as they
consist in a definition..." 48

"If p then q, given q, therefore p", is definitely fallacious;
but that does not mean that p is necessarily false. It is well accepted
that an invalid argument form could still have a true conclusion. It is
still up to us to demonstrate by some means that a naturalistic conclusion
(or a metaphysical one, for that matter) is false. In the next chapter,
I will be concerned with how Moore uses intuition to refute one conclusion, that the sole good is pleasure, which he believed to be linked with committing the naturalistic fallacy. For the moment, however, I want to conclude my discussion of Moore's critics.

The major error that all his critics commit is of thinking that the naturalistic fallacy is that of defining one thing in terms of another, primarily a non-natural quality in terms of natural properties. This leads Ryle to suggest that Moore rejects science. This has been shown to be incorrect. Frankena maintains that Moore has to prove that "good" does not stand for a natural property. What he overlooks is that it is a methodological error to begin an open investigation by positing an essentialist definition in terms of anything at all. The naturalistic fallacy does not, nor was it intended to refute all naturalistic conclusions; it was meant to show us how to start an open search for knowledge of phenomena by avoiding a serious error.

"The direct object of Ethics is knowledge and not practice", says Moore, "and anyone who uses the naturalistic fallacy has certainly not fulfilled his first object, however correct his practical principles may be."49

We can now deal with Prior and Hancock's criticisms under one head, for they both say the same thing in effect; that all one need do to avoid Moore's reasoning is to be "bold enough and tough enough" to stick by our views. They say respectively that ethics is "the study of what is actually pleasant", and that in fact "it is self-contradictory to say that something is pleasant and yet not good."50 For Prior, it follows that, since food and sex are characteristically pleasurable, then the gourmet
and the libertine are ethical experts. For Hancock it follows that sadistically inflicting pain on others, so far as it results in pleasure for at least one individual, is ethically good. To the objections that there are particularly ethical pleasures, and that sadism involves harm to others and is thus morally wrong, I can only point out that these qualifications are not made by the above authors. Indeed such qualifications amount to saying, some pleasures are ethically good; which is an assertion few philosophers would dispute. But that is not the point at issue here. Prior and Hancock's point is that all one need do is stick to one's position to avoid Moore's reasoning. My first point, then, is that no reasonably thoughtful and open-minded person could stick to the positions mentioned by Prior and Hancock; they would add qualifications to avoid the distasteful consequences that follow from "boldly", or dogmatically, holding those positions unqualified.

The above, however, does not refute the general position for which Prior and Hancock have inadvertently argued. Refutation of the position for which they argue is not possible. Refutation is an intellectual activity that calls for a certain commitment to reasonable discourse which is not a part of dogmatism. Indeed, it is always possible to dogmatically stick to a position no matter what reasons are presented against it. Suppose we are confronted with someone who firmly holds that, for instance, a triangle is a circle, because that is the way he defines a circle. How could we refute him? After giving our reasons for holding our view, we could do no more than say: "A triangle consists of straight lines and I will prove to you that I am right: for (this is the only argument) a straight line is not a circle." But if our opponent is persistent, we
will come to a point where we admit that no more can be said: "This is the way it is", we would say, "you either see it or you do not." In this case, to say: "I don't understand you", is only to say something about one's own mental state, and nothing about the question at issue. On the other hand, to say one's opponent makes no sense is to appeal to an audience; that is, we assert that if our opponent's view were presented to the "sober judgement of reflective persons" they would reject it. In this appeal to an audience, which is a feature both of Moore's later work and of Principia, which I will deal with in Chapter III, Moore shows his basic allegiance to open investigation characteristic of science.

I speak of Moore's rejection of essentialism throughout because there really is no way to refute dogmatism. All science can do is present its position as clearly and precisely as possible, and trust to the good graces of the learned public. All Moore can do is present his position, and trust his audience will accept an open-minded position, and reject dogmatism. No one can make those who will not see, see; and no one can make those who will not understand, understand. It seems to me significant that in face of Moore's argument, Prior and Hancock suggest what amounts to dogmatism. What they construe as a rational mode of discourse is just the opposite. What they have succeeded in doing is to point out a sad fact of the human condition: it is always possible to be "bold enough and tough enough" to hold a view, no matter how flawed it is. What they suggest as a means to avoid Moore's reasoning—a suggestion I believe they would not have made, had they understood his program—is, in fact, a rejection of all reasoning.
E: Some Neglected Issues.

As well as setting the stage for the final chapter of this thesis, I want also to deal with some important but largely neglected side-issues. Up to this point, Moore's particular sense of definition has been contrasted to other types, but criticism of it have been put off. I will deal with these criticisms by showing that Moore's account corresponds to a common sense understanding of definition, and to a type prevalent in the natural sciences. Also, I will deal with Moore's consequentialism by showing that this position follows from adopting the spirit of scientific inquiry.

Moore's example of a philosophically useful definition of the word "horse" is one that tells us "that a certain object, which all of us know, is composed in a certain manner: that it has four legs, a head, a heart, a liver, etc., all of them arranged in a definite relation to one another." About what I call Moore's descriptive definition, Gilbert Ryle says that it involves the error of mixing up the definition of "horse" with the real thing called horse in English and Caballus in Latin. The error is that of thinking that 'hooves' or 'having hooves', as well as an assortment of internal organs, was part of the definition of the word "horse". It is an error only because Ryle does not accept the descriptive sense of definition. For him, a philosophical definition clarifies concepts, and concepts have little or nothing to do with the constitution of the objective referent. To put Ryle's criticism more precisely, we can say that it is wrong to give, in answer to a question as to the meaning of a word, a des-
cription of tis referent, because to do so, is to confuse a word's meaning with its referent. But did Moore commit such a crude error as to confuse a word's meaning and referent? Surely, it seems that he did not; for he says quite unequivocally that his business is solely with the object of idea...that the word is generally used to stand for. What I want to discover is the nature of the object or idea. 55

With regard to the first goal of the science of ethics, Moore says that "what we want to know is simply what is good." And by that, he meant "the object or idea...the word is generally used to stand for." Moore held that the word "good" when used in the phrase, "a good x", stood for something; and that it was the job of ethics to say what it stood for, as well as giving a description of those things that are good. There is no grounds in Principia for charging Moore with confusing meaning and reference; the most he can be charged with is using "definition" and "meaning" in a way not in keeping with generally accepted philosophical usage. By what does "good" mean, how is it to be defined; he had to mean--due to the fact that the referent goodness was indescribable or indefinable--what is the nature of the things so designated by the word.

However, Moore's use of "definition" and "meaning" does correspond to common sense and to scientific usage. Commonsensically, a definition can be either in terms of words, or a clarification of concepts, or it can be a description of the referent. By far, the last type is the most sought after in ordinary circumstances, because it is the only kind that gives us any practical knowledge. For example, if we see a sign that says: "Beware of the x's", we would normally ask what x means. And by
this, what we want is a description of x, such that we could recognize an x when we see it, in order to be able to obey the sign. Because Moore holds that the ideal of the science of ethics must be practical knowledge, he must opt for a descriptive definition that explains the actual nature of the object the word stands for. To do good, we need a descriptive definition in terms of parts and relations of good things so far experienced, in order that we may recognize good things not yet experienced.

In the natural sciences, on the other hand, conceptual definitions and definition in terms of other words are rare, and when they occur, it is only systematically clarificatory, in the sense in which we learn how to use a word within a discipline. But this is always secondary to determination of the constitution of the referent; and indeed, is parasitical on the former since, within a science, we cannot know the proper use of a word unless we know what it is supposed to stand for. Of course, science does not stop at simply indicating the referent; it is constantly engaged in describing the exact constitution of the referent. Science is concerned with saying that the thing named consists of such and such parts arranged in a particular fashion. As new knowledge is gained, the definition or description is expanded. In this manner, science becomes more exact and can thereby give a fuller account of the thing under consideration.

In like manner, Moore's analysis of the referent is meant to give us a more exact description of what a word refers to. Although "good", or goodness, cannot be defined in this manner because Moore says that it is a simple non-natural quality; those things that are good can thus be
defined. The descriptive definition of those things that are good is what Moore took to be one of the main jobs of the science of ethics. "I do not mean to say that the good, that which is good, is thus indefinable", says Moore, "...for my main object is to help towards discovering that definition." Only in Chapter IV of Principia does Moore attempt to give such a descriptive definition of two states of consciousness that he holds to be unquestionably good: friendship and the appreciation of beautiful objects.

This approach, however, points up a serious problem. If we consider the above 'objects' in "absolute isolation", separate from anything they are usually associated with, we will find that, unlike pleasure or happiness considered in this way, friendship and the appreciation of beautiful objects are "the most valuable things we can know or image." That they are the most valuable things we know, I am not concerned with debating; but what I am interested in is the way they are considered as isolated ideas in the mind.

M. Lazerowitz agrees that for Moore,

analysis is in some respects like dissection. Like the anatomical dissection of horse, an analysis of the concept horse which is more than clarificatory takes us beyond the definition that a horse is a "solid-hoofed perissodactyl quadruped" and informs us of the existence and function of observed parts.

Lazerowitz goes on to say that this may lead people to think that "things need not be investigated in themselves and that the examination of conceptual surrogates will yield knowledge of things." He must have assumed that Moore advocated the analysis of conceptual surrogates, because he says that Moore's analyses "can be nothing more than clarificatory";
that, in fact, all appearances of saying something about the nature of phenomena are mistaken. As Lazerowitz puts it in another work, Moore's analyses amount to nothing more than an attempt to clarify and stabilize the language used in philosophy; and more generally, that philosophy as such amounts to little more than "academic moves within terminological categories."62

That this view corresponds in any relevant sense to what Moore was doing in Principia is thoroughly mistaken; and I think Lazerowitz would not have attributed it to Moore, had he understood his program. For it is precisely this type of a priori analysis which the naturalistic fallacy is meant to warn us against. If we begin with a definition in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, then we are committed to "academic moves within terminological categories". Or put another way, even if the definition is grounded in some experience of certain things, so far as it is extended to include all possible experience of things of this type, it is at best clarificatory, or in the case of ethics, mainly dogmatic.

I would not dispute the common sense principle that no before-the-fact analysis can ever yield new knowledge of phenomena; at most, such analyses are clarificatory. All new knowledge of phenomena is gained through actual investigation, which is based on experience of them. If we only investigate linguistic or logical construction, then all our analyses can possibly yield is knowledge of language or logic. The question of course, is whether Moore was concerned with analysis in this sense: did Moore analyze just the concept divorced from the real world? Or was it that he held that the concept was derived directly from experience,
rather like an impression or idea; and that analyzing this would give us knowledge of things, since the idea is derived directly from experience?

First, it is worth noting that Moore did not use the term "concept". His concern, he says, is with the "object or idea" that is actually before our minds. Next consider the example he actually uses. When Moore says that the only type of definition of "horse" that he will accept for his purposes is one that describes the entity named, he does not say that this description can be got by analyzing the concept of a horse (whatever that would be). It is reasonable to assume that one must examine horses, or read reliable accounts of examinations of horses, to be able to say what horses are really like. A word cannot call an idea before our minds unless we have had experience, either directly or indirectly, of the thing named by the word.

Similarly, to give an adequate description of friendship or the appreciation of beautiful objects, we must have had experience of these states of consciousness. Nowhere in Principia does Moore suggest that his analysis can be done independently of experience; in fact, he says quite the opposite. In his final chapter on 'the ideal', that to which our actions should be directed, Moore distinguishes three senses of 'the ideal': the Summum Bonum, the 'Human Good', and "good in itself in a high degree". The Summum Bonum is said to be beyond our capacities, but the 'Human Good', which is identified with utopias, may be that for which we ought to strive. Yet, in order to know what ought to be included or excluded from a utopia, we must determine "among all the wholes known to us, which seem to be better than all the rest." (my emphasis) Thus, our investigation, according to Moore, must be concerned first with those
good things of which we have had experience, not with a priori "terminological categories".

The reason for Lazerowitz's confusion is, I think, Moore's isolation method. It is really a very simple common sense means to arrive at an adequate description. If we want to give an adequate anatomical description of a horse, we must abstract all unimportant details, such as time and place etc., related to our experience of a horse. Similarly, with regard to friendship, we think only of this state of consciousness, by isolating it in thought from all other states. In both cases, the idea under exclusive analysis is derived directly from experience; and the accuracy of the description is dependent on memory, and not on a knowledge of terminological or conceptual categories.

Turning now to Moore's consequentialism, I want briefly to show how this position is in keeping with the program so far laid out. Mainly, the program concerns the attempt to introduce the spirit of scientific inquiry, and this involves a rejection of essentialism and dogmatism. What could be more dogmatic than stating without reservations that the end never justifies the means; that no matter what the circumstances, no action can ever be justified by its intended goal? Such statements, due to their universal quality, cannot be justified by any experience; they are held in a closed dogmatic manner. And it is worth noting, that at least in Principia, Moore is not concerned with deontological positions, which may or may not be held dogmatically; rather, his concern is with those moral pontifications that most commonly come from the pulpit.

The science of ethics has as a goal, practical knowledge; that is, "practical Ethics" is meant to furnish us with rational means by which
we can distinguish right from wrong action. How can we judge as to the rightness or wrongness of possible actions if we hold that the end never justifies the means? If we consider the actions independently of their ends, we will likely depend on the counsel of church, state, or conscience. But to rely on conscience, which is largely only the internalized voice of father, church or state, describes not a decision process, but is to yield to dictatorship. This arbitrary approach is supplanted by "the method of empirical investigation...Every judgement of practical ethics is reduced to the form: This is the cause of that good thing." Dogmatic dictatorship is usurped by scientific democracy.

In Principia Ethica, Moore opts for consequentialism because it seems to be the only approach that is scientific. To correctly say that this is the cause, or will cause, that good thing, we must actually investigate causes and effects. Such claims cannot be made independently of experience; and like scientific claims, they are made from within a tolerance of error. "An ethical law", says Moore, "has the nature not of a scientific law but of a scientific prediction: and the latter is always merely probable, although the probability may be very great."

The main lines of Moore's position have now been laid out, but there are at least two loose ends which are in need of special attention in the next chapter. I have argued that Moore's main point in Principia Ethica was to introduce the spirit of scientific investigation into the field of ethics. The naturalistic fallacy shows that if we start from an essentialistic definition, we end up either in the analysis of words only, or in dogmatism. But, according to the fallacy, it is wrong to define "good" at all, not just wrong to define it in terms of natural properties.
This, however, points up a problem that I have so far avoided. When Moore says that "good" stands for a simple non-natural quality, does he mean that there is something to which the word applies, such that if some $x$ does not possess this quality it cannot possibly be good? According to the standard interpretation of Moore, I think a positive answer would be given. But if this is what Moore means, if he granted some sort of positive ontological status to a simple non-natural quality, then he would have committed the naturalistic fallacy. For he would be saying that all good things are distinguished by possessing this one unique quality, and that to know what things are good, we need only identify those things possessing this quality. I will argue in the next chapter that the answer to the above question should be negative, and that Moore did not commit the naturalistic fallacy.

With regard to dogmatism, as I have said, it consists mainly in holding to a view, in such a way as to allow no questioning. It is dictatorial, and as such, ought to be rejected by philosopher and scientist alike. On the other hand, the practice of intuiting conclusions by a faculty of soul, is deservedly held in disrepute by most philosophers, due mainly to its arbitrary, personal nature. According to the common conception, if the dogmatist and the intuitionist are not the same, they are at least close kin. It is common knowledge that Moore was an intuitionist of a sort. Unless it is made clear in what sense he was an intuitionist, particularly the way in which intuition is employed in his investigation, Moore could be charged with dogmatism. I will argue that unlike other forms of intuition, Moore's is neither arbitrary, personal, nor dogmatic; rather, in Moore's account, intuition is used in accordance with the highest principles of free and open discussion.
A: Non-Naturalism.

A point upon which Moore is badly misinterpreted, but which assures his place in the history of philosophy, is his claim that goodness is a simple, non-natural quality that is indefinable. Simplicity, it has been observed, is a comparative term; all natural things are more or less complex. Absolute simplicity being ruled out, it has been argued wrongly that, even if goodness is comparatively simple, that does not mean it is indefinable, even by Moore's sense of definition. It is also commonly assumed that by calling goodness a non-natural quality, Moore has accorded it some queer existential status. This assumed ontological claim is the basis of the misunderstanding of the naturalistic fallacy; such that it is thought to be the mistake of defining non-natural something in terms of natural properties. I have shown, however, that this methodological error is not dependent upon any ontological claim; and that, if Moore made such a claim, he too would be guilty of the naturalistic fallacy. By giving a plausible account of his use of "non-natural", and by rejecting his notion of simplicity, I will show that he did not commit the fallacy. My point is that Moore's notion of the simplicity of goodness is a mistake, but not a fatal one. After saying what might account for this mistake, I will show that goodness is still indefinable by Moore's terms.

My contention is that Moore's use of "non-natural" is ontologically negative, that is, it only says that goodness is not either a natural property or any metaphysical property (or entity). Metaphysical
entities (or somethings) are like goodness in that both are non-natural; they do not exist in time, and are not the objects of perception. But, for Moore, the mistake "metaphysical ethics" makes is to assume "that, whatever does not exist in Nature, must exist in some supersensible reality, whether timeless or not". Metaphysical somethings are thus held to exist somewhere; but goodness, according to Moore's account does not exist at all! Moore's claim that goodness is but does not exist either has been ignored or misinterpreted. Before saying what Moore meant by this, I want to deal with one interpretation of the nature of goodness, and show why it fails.

Based on his interpretation of Moore's "The Nature of Judgement", James H. Olthuis suggests that goodness can be nothing more or less than a concept.

"Goodness" is indefinable because it is a concept, and concepts are simple independents, the ultimate building blocks of the universe—behind which you cannot go and against which an appeal to facts is ridiculous. Moore does say that all "that exists is thus composed of concepts necessarily related to one another in specific manners, and likewise the concept of existence." But he goes on to say that "the concept can consistently be described neither as an existent, nor as a part of an existent, since it is presupposed in the conception of an existent." However, this does not tell us anything more that we already knew about goodness; for Moore tells us in Principia that

It is immediately obvious that when we see a thing to be good, its goodness is not a property which we can take up in our hands, or separate from it even by the most delicate of scientific instruments, and transfer to something else. It is not, in fact, like most of
the predicates which we ascribe to things, a part of
the thing we ascribe it.

A complete description of things that are good, would not involve a refer-
ence to goodness; which is to say that goodness does not exist at all.
The clearest way to put this is to say that if we abstract all the parts
of good things, we would not be left with goodness, rather, we would have
nothing left.

Even if Olthius were right, and goodness is a concept, he would
not have solved our problem; he would have only moved it back one step.
We know that concepts are also non-natural. We are no closer to under-
standing what a non-natural quality is. At most, Olthius has inadvertant-
ly discovered that goodness, and the notion of concepts, are in the same
class for Moore; they are but they do not exist. But of course, Moore
tells us in Principia that goodness is not the sole member of the class
of non-natural, non-existents; and that, "the most prominent members of
this class", he says, "are perhaps numbers." By beginning with the sense
in which numbers, and mathematical entities in general, are non-natural,
it will be possible to show that Moore's non-naturalism is a notion that
has been well-known to philosophers since antiquity.

"It is quite certain", says Moore, "that two natural objects may,
exist; but it is equally certain that two itself does not exist and never
can." He goes on to say that

Two and two are four. But that does not mean that either
two or four exists. Yet it certainly means something.
Two is somehow, although it does not exist...No truth
does, in fact, exist; but this is peculiarly obvious with
regard to truths like 'Two and two are four', in which
the objects, about which they are truths, do not exist
either.
It has been accepted for ages by non-platonist mathematicians, that although mathematics has practical application to natural objects existing in space and time, mathematics does not make any ontological claims. Due to the fact that it is impossible to draw a dimensionless line, no constructed triangle could be a perfect one, could have one hundred and eighty degrees. All our constructions are thus only approximations. The same goes for all mathematical entities. To say that a triangle does not exist is not to say that the notion is meaningless. "It certainly means something." It is somehow.

On this, Moore shows that he is not quite clear on the point he wants to make. He seems to say that numbers both do not exist, yet also do exist in some way. That is, the present tense forms of the verb 'to be' are taken as indicators of existence. The fact that Moore emphasizes 'is' indicates to me that he had some special sense in mind. I think that what he wanted to do was draw a distinction between at least two kinds of non-existents, that is, between fictions of the mind, and non-existents that have a very important role to play in our thought. Thus, unicorns do not exist at all; numbers do not exist, but they are somehow, they certainly mean something.

This, then, is what Moore meant by goodness is but does not exist. Just as mathematical entities do not exist, but propositions about them mean something; so too, goodness does not exist, but it does mean something to say that certain things are good.

It means that the natural things that we characteristically say are good, are comprised of parts, and that it is possible to give a comprehensive description of those parts and the relations between them.
Ethics now becomes the investigation and description of "the things or qualities which are good, which can exist in time—can have duration, and begin and cease to exist—can be objects of perception." It is not our job to describe the indescribable, or define the indefinable. A triangle is indefinable in Moore's sense of definition, not because it has no parts, but because it does not exist, and thus, cannot be an object of perception. That the elements or terms of mathematics must be grasped by intuition is so well accepted as to require no argument at all.

To criticize Moore on the grounds that simplicity is a comparative term is correct; but it does not go far enough because it overlooks the sense in which goodness is non-natural. And thus, it does not refute Moore's claim that goodness is indescribable or indefinable. All natural things are more or less complex and can be described in terms of their parts. Further, several non-natural things can be described in terms of parts, e.g., a triangle consists in three straight lines that enclose a space. Consequently, being non-natural does not in itself make something indefinable.

Moore is indeed confused here. He has part of the solution, but not all of it. By concentrating on the sense in which non-natural things do not exist, the puzzle can be completed. Moore was using mathematical entities as an example to illustrate what he meant. They are ideal entities that do not exist. But goodness is not an ideal entity; rather, it does not exist because it is no particular entity at all. The mistake of the naturalistic fallacy is mainly that of making some property of some good things out to be the good-making property, or goodness. But what is also involved here is the mistake of assuming that there is one, unique
good-making property, that goodness as such exists. Thus, goodness cannot be defined, or 'photographed', to use Moore's earlier term, not because we have a notion of simplicity before our minds, but because we have no particular thing before our minds at all. A photograph of any good thing would not be a photograph of goodness as well; because there is really no goodness, no unique good-making property. My contention, then, is that what Moore took for a simple notion, was just the lack of any particular notion at all. It is possible, I will presently show, to drop entirely Moore's mistaken notion of simplicity and still retain the force of his analysis.

Like mathematical entities, goodness does not exist, but it differs from mathematical entities in that its objects do exist. It does not exist because it is no particular thing at all, not because it is ideal. Thus, it is indefinable in Moore's sense. However, those things that are good are amenable to investigation. And it is our job to describe them as they are, based on our experience of them, not to deduce their nature by beginning with a priori definitions of the type: "good" means "pleasurable", or "good" means "better suited for survival", and so on. This is what Moore attempts to do in his analysis of the appreciation of beauty, and friendship. He does not assume from the start that these 'objects' are pleasurable or evolutionarily advantageous—if he did, he would be committing the naturalistic fallacy. If these properties are characteristic of good things, it is up to us to show that by investigation.

To say that goodness is non-natural is an ontologically negative claim; it is totally mistaken to assert that Moore extended any existential status to the non-natural qualities. There is no basis in Principia
for such a claim. Moore did not commit the naturalistic fallacy. He uses non-natural as a means of not being pinned down to any essentialistic definition of "good". He will not allow "good" to be defined in natural terms; but neither will he allow it to be defined in non-natural metaphysical terms. To say that something is good is not to say that it has some unusual, non-natural quality that makes it good. Rather, if we want to know what it is that makes us say a thing is good, we ought to look at it, and describe its characteristics. By comparison of our descriptions of those things that are good, we may arrive at a list of characteristics that could serve to help identify other good things. But this should never be a closed list; for to close it, by saying it is a complete exhaustive list of the characteristics of all good things, is to commit the naturalistic fallacy. That is to say, that we would merely have substituted a long list of essential characteristics for just one essential characteristic, such as, pleasurableness.

Before turning to Moore's use of intuition, I want to make an observation based on the above interpretation of non-naturalism. It is commonly assumed that Moore was an objectivist, that he held that there was some quality independent of subjective attitude that was possessed by all good things. To assume that there is some unique characteristic of all good things that makes them good is to commit the naturalistic fallacy; and it does not matter whether we hold that it is an 'objective' quality or a 'subjective' (attitudinal) quality. So far as Principia Ethica is concerned, to say that certain states of consciousness are good, is not to say that they are possessed of some queer non-natural quality called goodness. Therefore, in Principia, Moore was not an objectivist; of course,
he was not a subjectivist either.

Objectivism of a sort is a part of Moore's later work, *Ethics*. Although Moore says he is concerned, in *Principia*, with the meaning of "good", his account really concerns establishing a method of analyzing those things that are good, and not with determining what we mean when we use "good" to designate any particular thing. Furthermore, with regard to "right", even though he says that it is identical with "useful", he also says that practical ethics, which is concerned with judgements as to the rightness or wrongness of action, involves "the method of empirical investigation." It involves inferences based on experience as to the consequences of actions. The rest of the chapter is concerned with determining the principles and limitations of the causal reasoning involved; it does not concern meta-ethical analyses of words. The reason why *Principia* is thought to be concerned with objectivism is because it is thought that by saying goodness is non-natural, Moore was predicating some strange but objective property to good things. This, I have shown to not be the case.
B: Moore's Intuitionism.

To show in what sense intuition can be dogmatic, I will draw out the implications of a contemporary criticism of the use of intuition in ethical investigations. In *Modern Moral Philosophy*, W.D. Hudson says that an appeal to intuition does not fulfill the crucial third condition of all valid knowledge claims. Such claims, he says, are distinguished by the following criteria. Any sentence of the form: "I know that x" is a knowledge claim if and only if, i) x is true, ii) I believe that x, iii) I am able to give an appropriate account of how I know that x. 12 A knowledge claim must include an account in terms of "a framework of covering laws... tying it in with what we know about the way the world, as a whole, works." 13 To say: "I know, and you all know, that such is the case", this being a rough paraphrase of the way Moore sets up his intuitive claims, is, for Hudson, at most an expression of true belief. "What more than 'I believe that x' does 'I know by intuition that x' tell us?...it tells us nothing more", says Hudson. To claim to know that x by intuition, whatever x may stand for, must be rejected from an account of ethical value terms, concludes Hudson, otherwise our account cannot make a reasonable claim to knowledge.

Hudson is labouring under what I call the popular understanding of intuition. One merely claims to know some truth (any truth); and by implication, anyone who does not acknowledge this truth is held to be seriously deficient in this most essential of faculties. The point here is that an
intuition is thought to be a personal, arbitrary view that is not open to
public scrutiny. The role of the audience to which the intuitionist
addresses himself is passive; its job is merely to hear the truth, not to
assent to evidence for a reasonable view. In this sense, intuition is
contrary to the spirit of science, and is dogmatic.

This popular understanding of intuition is not entirely wrong, for
most intuitionists do follow this pattern. But by dealing with some exam­
ples of Moore's intuitionism, and his explanation of intuition as such, I
will show that his use is not dogmatic, and is in keeping with the open
principles of science and common sense as laid out in this thesis.

Let us begin with one implication of Hudson's account; which is
that intuition is an alternative to reasons or reasoning. In the preface
of Principia, after identifying the activity of ethics with determining
what ought to exist and what we ought to do in order that it may exist,
Moore takes pains to say that he is not an intuitionist in the usual sense.
"The intuitionist proper", says Moore, "is distinguished by maintaining
that propositions of my second class...[what we ought to do]...are incapa­
bale of proof or disproof...I...maintain that propositions of this kind are
not intuitions."¹⁵ A proposition of Moore's first class would be,"Friend­
ship is good"; an example of his second class would be,"Strict honesty is
the best means to preserve a friendship."

"Friendship is good" is a simple statement of what we see to be
the case; it is not the conclusion of any inference. But, on the other
hand, "Strict honesty is the best means to preserve a friendship", is not
an intuition; it is the conclusion of an inference based on experience.
Propositions of Moore's second class concerning what we ought to do "must
consist...of causal truths." Because Moore was a consequentialist, he held that to say we ought to do x, is to say x is the cause of an effect which is better that the effects of all other possible acts. That A is good, is an intuition, but that x is the cause of A is not an intuition. In order to say that x will cause A, an inference based on prior experience is required.

For Moore, then, intuition has nothing to do with that which is amenable to causal or empirical investigation; it only has to do with simple, direct apprehensions. Put another way, intuition does not have to do with reasoning but with determining a reasonable starting position from which to begin our reasoning.

In general, Hudson's criticism does not apply to Moore, because his intuitions have to do with only one's starting point; they are not the type of knowledge claims to which Hudson's criticisms are directed. In fact, Moore's position is similar to Hudson's; that is, what can be explained in terms of 'covering laws' ought not to be given over to intuition. As a starting point, however, an intuition must be judged on its reasonability, not rejected out of hand because it is an intuition. Indeed, all starting points, whether in science or in philosophy, are intuitions which "are incapable of proof". Science, for instance, assumes that all events have a cause. Although particular cases confirm this assumption, this universal proposition, owing to its nature, cannot possibly be proved by any experience.

What exactly is meant by a simple, direct apprehension, is now a crucial question. Moore says, "just as you cannot explain to any one who does not already know it, what yellow is, so you cannot explain what good
is." Those things that are intuited, he goes on to say in the next para-
graph, are just "something which you think or perceive, and to anyone who
cannot think or perceive them, you can never, by any definition, make
their nature known."\(^{18}\) We must avoid putting too much stress on Moore's
perceptual analogy. It is doubtful that we physically see goodness. To
say: "We see that it is good", is to speak metaphorically. Also, we
should note that the experience of yellow is not itself an intuition.
But yellowness and goodness are alike in that they are both the sorts of
things that we are immediately or directly aware of; they are not infer-
red.

We may be better able to understand Moore's intuitions if we con-
sider his claim that they are self-evident, but not necessarily true.
"The expression 'self-evident' means...the proposition...is evident or
true, by itself alone...it is not an inference."\(^{19}\) It is not true because
it appears to be true; "it has absolutely no reason" for its truth. The
analogy is based on logic, and thus, it would be worth considering the
following "logical" formulation of the principle.

Let us assume for the sake of argument that someone maintains that
A is not A. How would we answer him? After making sure it is not a con-
fusion over words, we could appeal to the consequences of not accepting
the principle of identity and the benefits of accepting it. But these
would be reasons for accepting the principle, not reasons for saying it is
true. In the end, we would be reduced to saying: "This is the way it is,
you just see it or you don't. We cannot help but to think this way; it is
plainly self-evident." We cannot prove that the principle of identity is
true simply by naming it a law of logic, as Moore points out below.
For indeed, who can prove that proof is itself a warrant of truth? We are all agreed that the laws of logic are true and therefore we accept a result which is proved by their means; but such a proof is satisfactory to us only because we are all so fully agreed that it is a warrant of truth. And yet we cannot, by the nature of the case, prove that we are right in being so agreed.

Simply put, inference and deduction require the assumption of certain principles or laws, which are the basis of the inference or deduction; but these are not themselves open to proof; for they are the basis of such proof. No deduction, in other words, can prove the validity of deduction as such. This does not mean that the laws of logic are false; it means that their truth is a matter of intuition. There is no reason we can give why A must be A; though there are reasons why we ought to accept the truth of the proposition. Although the objects are different, in both logic and ethics, intuition is applied only to the starting position. "We must not... look on Intuition, as if it were an alternative to reasoning." At most it gives us a place to begin our investigations; it does not (or should not) supply us with conclusions.

Moore's point, then, is that to reason, it is necessary to accept some things as true for no reason at all. The inference, which is the basis of reasoning, is itself not inferred.

For all true inference must be inference from a true proposition; and that the conclusion follows from the premiss must again be a true proposition: so that here also it would appear that the nature of a true proposition is the ultimate datum.

Some things must be intuitions. Hudson's claim that it does not matter what we claim to know through intuition, that being intuited is sufficient to warrant rejection, is unreasonable; since this would involve rejecting logic and science. For these employ intuition. They assume something
which cannot be proved—that the laws of logic are true, that all events have a cause. These assumptions can properly be called intuitions.

A technique of isolation, James H. Olthuis notes, is bound up with Moore's general methodology in that in "all situations Moore's method is... distinguish clearly, isolate the thing in question, bring it before the mind; and the rest is up to inspection." But there is an aspect of the method to which Olthuis does not pay enough attention that shows Moore's use of intuition is not dogmatic.

The fact that a writer commits the naturalistic fallacy does not necessarily prove that his conclusion is false; at most it shows that the reason he gave for the conclusion is faulty. It still remains to show that the proposition, e.g., that the sole good is pleasure, is false. Moore says that the method he "employed in order to shew that pleasure was not the sole good, was that of considering what value would attach to it, if it existed in absolute isolation, stripped of all its usual accompaniments." If we are tempted to think that pleasure really is the sole good, we should think of a life that contains only pleasure. In this thought experiment, we must assume that we have no knowledge, either of anything else, or of the pleasure; we only have the pleasure.

We must be willing to sell in exchange for the mere happiness every vestige of knowledge... both of happiness itself and of every other thing... Can anyone still declare it obvious that this is reasonable? That pleasure alone is good as an end?

But even if we add an element of consciousness, the result is much the same, says Moore.

Could we accept, as a very good thing, that mere consciousness of pleasure, and absolutely nothing else, should exist, even in the greatest quantities? I think
we can have no doubt about answering: No. Far less can we accept this as the sole good.

It seems to me that Moore is right about the majority judgement in this case. The question, however, is why we agree, and upon what evidence we make our judgement. What reasons do we have for agreeing? What if someone were to say that pleasure did appear to him to be the sole good; how could we prove that he is wrong and we are right?

The answer is that we could not prove that he is wrong, any more than we could prove that A is not A, is false. With regard to our first assumptions, whether in logic, science, or ethics, we are dealing with the intuitive level. Our first assumptions are held to be self-evident, that is, their truth (or falsehood) rests on nothing prior and can only be grasped immediately by intuition. We can, of course, give reasons why we assumed x, and we can try to say why we believe the contrary assumption to be unreasonable. These reasons, we hope, will be generally convincing. But in the end, we cannot prove the contrary view to be false. Moore sums up this point in the following:

I could do nothing to prove that it was untrue; I could only point out as clearly as possible what it means, and how it contradicts other propositions which appear to be equally true. My only object in all this was, necessarily, to convince. But even if I did convince, that does not prove that we are right. It justifies us in holding that we are so; but nevertheless we may be wrong.

To show that our objector's position is not to be taken seriously, we can only appeal to the reasonability of our position as against the unreasonability of his. But to whom do we make appeal; who do we try to convince? Our appeal is made to an audience or jury of reasonable men. "In favour of this conclusion", that the sole good is not pleasure, Moore says, "I
can appeal with confidence to the 'sober judgement of reflective persons'". 28

Now Moore does say that all one has to do is to "attentively consider with himself what is actually before his mind." 29 From this, and similar statements, one might think that after isolating what is at issue, it is merely a matter of personal inspection. One asks only: "Does this seem to me to be true?" If so, the problem is resolved. But surely, there is more to it than this; for otherwise our account would be nothing more than mere opinion, and open at every turn to refutation by a contrary opinion.

If we read Moore carefully, we see a constant appeal to the judgements of others. With regard to goodness, he says, "Everybody is constantly aware of this notion." 30 Later, with regard to Hedonism, he says, "I shall try to produce agreement that the fundamental principle" 31 is unreasonable. (My emphasis). With regard to what things are good, he says that they are "By far the most valuable things, which we know or can imagine." 32 There are more examples, but this is sufficient for my purpose, which is to show that Moore did not hold that a personal intuition by itself was enough to establish a philosophical assumption or starting position. The use of "everybody", "we", "us", "reflective persons", and so on, is not merely a mannerism, but points to an underlying principle of common sense and science which has already been dealt with in respect to Moore's later non-ethical writings. 33 The proper employment of intuition involves an appeal to an audience and its active participation in the accumulation of knowledge. Our job is to gain an audience's assent as to the reasonability of our assumptions, not to present absolute truths that
are, due to the nature of absolute truth, not open to question. The audience's job is thus to assent to the reasonability of our starting position, that, in effect, our intuition has a common basis, that it is not a purely personal, arbitrary view.

It is this point that Olthuis does not consider adequately. He does, of course, say that we should not be overly concerned with the apparent arbitrariness of intuition, because what is claimed "correspond(s) to what everyman believes and experiences. No right-minded, clear-thinking person will ever think of questioning the intuitions, not because they are intuited, but because we simply cannot help holding them—they are common sense." Olthuis is right on this, and later on I will supply a list of Moore's intuitions which substantiates his point; however, he has stopped short of clearly indicating the intersubjective nature of the appeal to intuition. It is not that I hold certain assumptions to be reasonable and others unreasonable that makes them worth or not worth holding; it is that the "sober judgement of reflective persons" corresponds to my view that makes it better, as a starting position, than another view which does not enjoy similar acceptance. Without the audience, there would be no way to distinguish between starting positions; for, as such, they are intuitions and are not open to proof.

When we have presented our assumptions, upon what does our jury base its judgement? It surely is not based on reasons taken as premises from which a conclusion is deduced, though reasons are not discounted. If the judgement were entirely based on reasons in this sense, there would be no need to consider an audience. If we were dealing, that is, with strict logical validity, since few ever disagree with logic, we could safely as-
sume general acceptance. But with regard to our first ethical assumptions, the case is different.

Ethics, and philosophy in general, have always been in a peculiarly unsatisfactory state. There has been no agreement about them...Philosophical questions are so difficult, the problems they raise are so complex, that no one can fairly expect...to win any more than limited assent. 35

Reasons are held only to be more or less supportive of our assumptions; our assumptions are reasonable or they are not. Whether or not they are reasonable is a matter for the inspection of our audience.

We are no longer concerned with whether Moore’s assumptions are intuitions, but with whether they are reasonable: would they get limited assent? First, I must emphasize that Moore did not intuit some strange non-natural qualities. This point has been dealt with in section A of this chapter. A list of his major intuitions in order of importance follows below.

(i) That the laws of logic are true, though, by the nature of the case we cannot prove that they are so.

(ii) That if we are to have real knowledge of phenomena, we must investigate the phenomena, not a priori definitions.

(iii) That pleasure is not the sole good.

(iv) That friendship and the appreciation of beauty are good; are some of the greatest goods we know.

(v) Anything whatever could be good.

Who amongst us could honestly disagree with these assumptions? They are all assumptions and not conclusions; if they are true, they are true by virtue of themselves alone. This can be illustrated by reference to the fourth intuition. An investigation of friendship(s), whether abstract or
concrete, can only tell us what are the aspects of particular friendships, but not why friendship as such is good; because, as was shown in section A of this chapter, to say that goodness is a non-natural quality, is not to say that there is a unique good-making quality. 36

Moore's use of intuition is applied only to the starting position, not to conclusions. Starting positions can be established by no other means. He does not intuit strange non-natural qualities. Neither is his use personal and arbitrary; the assent of an audience as to the reasonableness of the assumptions is required. Therefore, Moore's use of intuition is not dogmatic, but is in keeping with the open principles of science and common sense. We have no reasonable grounds to reject Moore's account because he uses intuition in this most limited way; any more than we should reject Hudson's account for the same reason. For he assumes that it is possible to establish a position by argumentation, and thus, assumes the laws of logic to be true. But that the laws of logic are true is an intuition; it cannot be proved in terms of covering laws. Hudson's account is rejected because his conclusion is unreasonable, not because it involves intuition. The point is simply that intuition is essential, and has a proper place in all branches of knowledge, most especially, in philosophy. And Moore's account amounts to an attempt to say what is the proper place of intuition.
C: Summary.

My concern here is with giving a summary and overview of the thesis as a whole. Since my contention was that a more accurate understanding of his ethics can be got by considering Moore's later non-ethical work, it was necessary in the first chapter to consider Moore's common sense philosophy. Common sense does not espouse credulous parochialism; rather, Moore had in mind an approach to philosophy which is grounded in a lay understanding of science. This involves avoiding the route of definism which ends by saying "p must be the case". Instead, we look and see, that is, investigate; and our propositions about the phenomena under consideration are made from within a tolerance of error.

The beliefs of common sense are divided into fundamental ones that cannot reasonably be doubted, and popularized scientific knowledge; that is, knowledge that could only be got through scientific investigation. In large part, Moore's common sense philosophy amounts to an attempt to introduce the spirit of the scientific venture into philosophy. But this is not something exclusive to Moore's later period, but can be found in embryonic form in Principia Ethica.

The most important aspect of the spirit of science is its open, non-dogmatic approach to knowledge. Dogmatism in general, which I defined as a closed attitude wherein one rejects all contrary views prior to investigation, is an attitude that ought to be avoided. This is because definition in its traditional form closes off the investigation. Goodness is what it is defined as, and that is all there is to it.
In the second chapter, I tried to show how one can consistently interpret *Principia*, and especially the naturalistic fallacy, as a concerted effort to avoid the pitfalls of dogmatism in ethics. Essentialism, the assumption that there is one (or more) essential characteristic(s) of all good things, is the form dogmatism takes in ethics. The naturalistic fallacy is thus the methodological error of assuming a conclusion prior to, and independently of investigation. It is also characteristic of an error about meaning, the essentialist error; that for any word there is some one thing for which it stands, which is common to all uses of the word. Hence, Moore must hold that definition in its traditional form is always inappropriate, at the end of a study as well as at the beginning. In opposition to the *a priori* deductive approach, Moore adopts a more open-ended approach to the meaning of words like "good". Later in his career, Moore was interested in specifying some general truths about the universe ("a general description of the whole universe") in order to combat scepticism, but earlier too he was interested in stating general moral truths in the interest of advancing philosophical knowledge.

In the third chapter, I was concerned with tying up loose ends. Firstly, I showed that Moore's use of intuition was not dogmatic, but in keeping with the spirit of science. Secondly, my interpretation of Moore's non-naturalism based on a mathematical analogy goes some of the way toward clearing up the ambiguities that surround this notion. Moore's non-naturalism does, however, require more investigation. It is not exactly clear what Moore meant by 'non-natural' qualities. Possibly they are only an awkward way of stating the error of essentialism. In any case, the
standard reading, which takes non-natural qualities to have ontological status, cannot any longer be asserted as an obvious fact.
NOTES

Chapter I


2. Kant, Prolegomena, p7.


6. Ibid., p43.

7. Ibid., p37.

8. Ibid., p35.


11. Ibid., p72.


14. Ibid.

15. Ibid., p2.

16. Ibid.

17. Moore actually says that we believe that "by far the greater number of material objects in the Universe are unconscious", p8. This is surely a loose and inaccurate use of language. Planets, chairs, and books are non-conscious; that is, they are not now, and are not likely ever to be conscious. We reserve the term "unconscious" for knocked-out boxers and accident victims, etc., that is, for entities that have been and are likely to again be conscious.
18. Ibid., p3.
20. Ibid., p5.
23. Ibid., p2, 16, 17, ... etc.
24. Ibid., p15.
27. Ibid.
29. Ibid., p147.
30. Ibid., p131.
31. Ibid., p143.
32. Ibid., p144.
34. Ibid., p213.
36. Ibid.

Chapter II


2. To avoid any confusion later on, it is worth noting here that the propensity of an object to characteristically produce pleasure is not dependent on any particular subject's attitude toward the object, though, of course, whether or not it does in fact produce pleasure in any particular subject is dependent on that subject's constitution. Nevertheless, objects are, in the above sense, pleasurable or they are not, regardless of whether any particular subject does derive pleasure from them.
3. Later on I will deal with the problems involved with the sense in which the naturalistic fallacy is naturalistic. The main point of the fallacy is to show the error involved in beginning ethical investigations with any essentialistic definition. The most common type of essentialistic definition is in terms of natural properties, what I call here naturalistic essentialism. But this is not the only kind of essentialistic definition. One could also define "good" in terms of metaphysical essentials, what could be called metaphysical essentialism. I will show in section D that both types of essentialistic definitions are correctly called "naturalistic".


5. Moore, "In What Sense, If Any, Does Past and Future Time Exist",

6. Ibid., p238,240. This approach is very close in spirit to Moore's refutation of Bradley's claim that time is unreal, in "Conception of Reality" (1917). Here Moore's main point is that if "time is unreal" means that time is an illusion, then something happening before or after something else is also an illusion. Thus, contrary to our apparent experience, temporal sequences do not occur. Even though the treatment is more detailed here than in his earliest paper, the same point, the inability to even begin to get clear on the meaning of a statement that is made within a temporal framework but which calls into question the very framework from which the question arises, is evident.

8. Ibid., p5.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid., p2.
11. Ibid., p5.
12. Ibid.
14. Ibid.

15. I have opted for a slightly different notation system than Moore. Most often he uses a set of single inverted commas when he is referring to the word 'good', and he uses no inverted commas when speaking of what the word stands for (i.e., good). I use double inverted commas for the word "good", and use goodness to designate the referent of the word.
16. Ibid., p11.
17. Ibid., p7.
22. Ibid., p7.
23. Ibid., p12.
24. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
28. Ibid., pl2.
29. R. Hancock, "The Refutation of Naturalism in Moore and Hare", Studies in the Philosophy of G.E. Moore, p47.
32. Ibid., p178.
34. Hume, Treatise, p163.
35. Ibid., p165.
36. Ibid., p167.
37. Hume, Enquiry, p43.
39. Ibid., p38.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid., p21.

42. This is one of the major points of G. Ryle's, "Formal and Informal Logic", Dilemmas, p123, 127-129.

43. Moore, Elements of Ethics, Russell Archives, This unpublished series of lectures, I take to be a draft of Principia Ethica. Except for some matters of style and a few interesting comments, it follows very closely the later work.

44. P.E., p8, section 8.

45. Ibid., p7.

46. Ibid., p14.

47. Ibid., p20.

48. Ibid., p19.

49. Ibid., p20.

50. Section C, p50-51

51. P.E., p11.

52. Ibid., p94.

53. Ibid., p8.


56. Ibid., p12.

57. Ibid., p8-9.

58. Ibid., p188.


60. Ibid., p239.

61. Ibid., p240.


63. P.E., p184.
Chapter III

1. In his argument against objective moral values, J.L. Mackie makes the following comment which is in line with the standard interpretation of Moore's non-naturalism.

   If there were objective values, then they would be intuitions or qualities or relations of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe. Correspondingly, if we were aware of them, it would have to be by some special faculty of moral perception or intuition ... These points were recognized by Moore when he spoke of non-natural qualities ..., J.L. Mackie, Ethics, p38.

While my account does not diminish the force of Mackie's argument because objectivists have assumed that Moore did attach existential status to the non-natural, it will show that Moore was not guilty of positing queer entities, and that, Mackie was mistaken to attribute such a view to Moore.

2. P.E., p111, also p113, section 67, 1st paragraph.
5. Ibid., p181.
7. Ibid., p111.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid., p112.
11. Ibid., p146.
13. Ibid., p103.
15. P.E., "preface", p x.
17. Ibid., p x.
18. Ibid., p7.
19. Ibid., p143.
20. Ibid., p76.
21. Ibid., p144.
25. Ibid., p89.
26. Ibid., p94.
27. Ibid., p145.
28. Ibid., p94.
29. Ibid., p16.
30. Ibid., p17.
31. Ibid., p76.
32. Ibid., p188.
33. Chapter I, Section D.
34. Olthuis, Facts..., p45.
35. P.E. p76
36. Chapter III, Section A, p78, 79
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