THE MODERN UNIVERSITY AND DEVELOPMENT OF A SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION
GROWTH OF THE MODERN UNIVERSITY AND THE DEVELOPMENT
OF
A SOCIOLOGY OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES

By

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A Thesis
Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy

McMaster University
June, 1975
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (1975) McMaster University
Hamilton, Ontario

TITLE: Growth of the Modern University and the Development of a Sociology of Higher Education in the United States

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NUMBER OF PAGES: xi, 291.
This dissertation examines the interrelationship between higher education and the capitalist socio-economic system in the United States. The central argument is that both the growth of colleges and universities, and the development of a sociology of higher education, have been dependent upon, and serve to support, the historical transformation of the socio-economic system from laissez-faire to corporate capitalism. A socio-economic elite which has dominated the development of scientific knowledge and the growth of colleges and universities since colonial times, has profitably invested its riches in reshaping higher education to serve the dictates of the new capitalism in its corporate form. An examination of college and university financing, educational philosophy, and the social science practiced by professors shows that these changed to accommodate changes in the socio-economic system. The cumulative emphasis has been, and continues to be, on the production, sale, and consumption of a practical (marketable) knowledge which furthers elite domination of the educational industry.

The sociology of higher education, as it has developed over the past twenty years, provides an example of theory which furthers this elite domination. A review of three eminent theorists, Burton R. Clark, David Riesman, and Christopher Jencks, shows how their attempt to make colleges and universities
autonomous from the surrounding socio-economic system makes higher education increasingly dependent upon, subservient to, that system. Clark's "active" education creates an Academic Revolution based upon the specialized expertise of academic disciplines which Riesman labels "the racecourses of the mind". The sociological racecourse helps provide Jencks with an individualistic explanation which makes income and occupational inequalities attributable to "accidents" of personality and luck. The argument presented herein suggests these inequalities are legitimated and sustained by the commitment of the education-as-autonomous theorists to a pluralistic ideology which ties the growth of higher education with the prevailing socio-economic arrangements of corporate capitalism. Briefly, the education-as-autonomous thesis developed by Clark, Riesman, and Jencks provides a notion of pluralism (widely dispersed power) that encourages and helps to ensure the non-pluralistic domination of higher education by a corporate elite capable of transforming wealth into power.

A summary review of the foundations of American sociology underscores the interconnections between this pluralism and German sociologist Max Weber's conception of scientific "objectivity". It is Weber's science, characterizing the sociologist as an objective analyst receptive to all data, rather than the science of Lester Ward and the Americans, which continues to be a major influence on the majority of sociologists educated in the United States. While Weber and Ward both de-
veloped a pluralistic science providing ideological support for American capitalism, Weber did so in a manner that seemed more value-neutral. Weber was simply more inclined than Ward to make his values supporting the socio-economic structure of capitalism more covert. This supposed value-neutrality of Weber's sociology appeals to social scientists, legitimating and sustaining the professional practice which maintains their privileged position within the current socio-economic order. Weber attempts to make scientists as objectively autonomous from the larger socio-economic system as the Clark-Riesman-Jencks thesis tries to make the universities. Accordingly, the pluralism of Weber's "constellations of interest" includes superman/wonderwoman sociologists capable of transcending the ordinary by pacifying passion in a professional manner.

An examination of this sociological professionalism in two settings, the professional association and the university, indicates the importance of Weber's notion of scholarly objectivity as the central norm governing professional practice. Adherence to the objectivity norm is of primary importance in giving rise to the view among many sociologists that sociology as "understanding" cannot be a practice. This conception of sociology has helped promote itself to become "the official view" of social reality—a view that encourages university professors to serve and protect elite interests, interests they recognize as becoming increasingly their own. Professional commitment and responsibility have come to mean participation
in the development of Weber's "objective" science which continues to maintain the Clark-Riesman-Jencks myth that universities and professional associations are autonomous, objectively value-neutral and, therefore, apolitical. To act in a professionally responsible manner, then, involves a professional commitment which has come to mean service to, maintenance of, the socio-economic arrangements of today's corporate capitalism.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to take this opportunity to express my appreciation to the members of my committee for their assistance. Dusky Lee Smith, my dissertation advisor, has been a friendly and strong supporter of my work, even during those times when there was little more than potential to support. Beyond his unwavering commitment to my research efforts, a commitment that at times forced him into uncomfortable situations, Dusky's own research and writing have continued to provide inspiration for me during the course of this work. Whatever merit this dissertation may have is largely attributable to him.

Dick Brymer has offered thoughtful advice and criticism as my work has progressed. He always managed to find time for me in a very busy schedule. His comments and suggestions have been most helpful in changing, and improving, parts of the Introduction and Chapter One.

Ian Weeks has contributed more time and energy than a student should rightfully expect from the "outside" committee member. He has been on the "inside" with respect to this work throughout its preparation. Over the past two years, in the course of several stimulating and fruitful conversations, his talent in offering wise counsel has been made clear. His challenges to my thinking have been responsible for clarifying
and developing several of the key ideas in this dissertation.

Judith Anderson did an excellent job of typing this manuscript. It is difficult to find the words to express my gratitude for her willingness to deal with the many trifling irritations she was forced to endure. However, she should know that the cheerful application of her skills has been greatly appreciated.

Finally, I would like to thank all those people who have in various ways supported me during the "ups" and "downs" of research and writing. Over the years there have been many friends who, at different times and in different ways, have contributed to the completion of this dissertation. They need not be named, they know who they are. One person, however, should be mentioned by name. Rona Grace Achilles, because she lived with me during the time that much of this manuscript was written, was probably forced to hear more of it than she at times desired. Her comments were always supportive and encouraging, often stimulating me to a renewed interest in my work.
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INTRODUCTION

Social theorists have long been concerned with the interrelationship between individual consciousness and collective social arrangements, the affinity between ideas and socio-historical trends. The specific interrelationship to be discussed and analyzed in this study is the affinity between the development of sociology and the historical transformation of the socio-economic system in the United States from laissez-faire to corporate capitalism. An examination of this relationship will be undertaken in order to collect data concerning this study's general thesis—namely, that the growth of higher education in the United States has been and is dependent upon, and subservient to, changes in the socio-economic system.

The structural arrangements of this socio-economic system can be interpreted as having passed through three stages: mercantilism (1740-1828), laissez-faire (1819-1896), and corporate capitalism (1882-?).¹ Sociology, according to Roscoe and Gisela Hinkle, can be viewed as having passed through four phases: its first appearance (1848-1880), its foundations (1875-1918), the attempt to make it scientific (1915-1935), and the reciprocity of theory, research, and application (1930-?).² The foundations of sociology, then, were established during the transformation from laissez-faire to corporate capitalism, roughly from 1865 to 1914.
This transformation of the economy not only brought about a change in the way goods and services were profitably produced and distributed, but also in the way individuals thought about themselves in relation to the socio-economic system. The following were all central assumptions of laissez-faire capitalism that came to be questioned: that the individual acting to further self-interest would automatically be in harmony with the best interests of the larger society; that supply and demand would achieve an automatic balance which would be favorable to all by regulating the production and consumption of goods; that the state following this "natural law" of non-interference could best protect free trade by acting as an unbiased referee of economic activity—enforcing property rights and contract laws while guarding against external aggression from other nation states.

As the state moved from its role as referee to that of regulator of economic activity, free enterprise became much less free. It created and enforced laws (the pure food and drug acts is but one example) to which adherence was required. It supplied protective subsidies to those who could not compete on their own (for example, the homesteader and/or farmer, the railroads and later the airlines) as well as protective tariffs to successful competitors like Andrew Carnegie, Andrew Mellon, J. Pierpont Morgan and John D. Rockefeller. During the lengthy and nearly continual depression from 1873 to 1898, it repeatedly intervened to
extend the limits of the domestic marketplace, aiding considerably the fortunes of several industrialists, including the above-mentioned, and strengthening the American economy in general. Thus, while Americans at home were experiencing the second post Civil War depression of 1874-1879, the depression of 1884-1886, the panic of 1894-1896, the silver campaign depression of 1896-1897, and the panics of 1904 and 1907, troops were sent abroad to occupy the Phillipines (1899-1901) and Panama (1903-1914), and went to war with Spain (1898) to gain, among other things, foreign cooperation in providing new frontiers for United States economic expansion.

It was during this period of general social uneasiness occasioned by domestic depression and foreign opposition to United States aggression that American sociology had its beginnings as a science. Many of the phenomena accompanying the economic chaos and opposition to American aggression were defined as threats to the well-being of national interests. Dusky Lee Smith, among others (notably, William A. Williams, Charles Page, and the Hinkles)\(^5\), has suggested that these threats to the stability of the socio-economic order can be viewed as providing impetus for social reform. His work provides evidence showing that the early American sociologists—William Graham Sumner, Franklin H. Giddings, Albion W. Small, and Lester F. Ward—developed theories which were, in part, answers to the social problems of a socio-economic system in troubled transition. In brief,
Smith argues that the foundations of sociology should be seen as part of a general reform movement, the founders' sociologies also being ideologies supportive of the emergent socio-economic arrangements of corporate capitalism.

Smith's emphasis on the affinity between thought and institutional framework follows a tradition firmly established in the work of, among others, Thorstein Veblen, Karl Mannheim, and C. Wright Mills. The present study attempts to continue this tradition by analyzing the interrelationship between sociology and prevailing socio-economic arrangements in order to focus on those agencies and individuals supposedly most concerned with intellectual activity—the colleges/universities and the professors.

It would appear that the founding fathers of American sociology and the members of the Metaphysical Club—a group of "learned professionals" which included Charles Peirce, William James, and Oliver W. Holmes, Jr.—developed an ideology that came to be used to support and legitimate the growth of higher education as functional to the development of American capitalism. Their agreement that knowledge is, can be made to be, and should be useful to industrial entrepreneurs came at a time (c. 1865-1914) of rapid expansion in both the number of higher learning institutions and in the scope of a university curriculum which was to provide a basis for the development of a practical and scientific sociology.

The new science of sociology, in the process of proving
its usefulness to the capitalists, supplied a rationale fundamental to the twentieth century growth of higher education. Its continued development in educational settings promised answers to America's most pressing social problems—answers provided by a service-oriented corps of trained scientists ever willing to make themselves available for rewarding careers not only in the university, but also in business and industry. The current professionalism of today's social science practitioners appears to reflect this capitalistic orientation of American colleges and universities. Thus, the first and most general thesis of this study is stated as follows: If American colleges and universities have been and are dependent upon, subservient to, the development of American capitalism, then both the early development of American sociology and current professional activity among its practitioners should reflect the transformation of the socio-economic system from laissez-faire to corporate capitalism.8

A second thesis, fitting within the framework of the first, results from an examination of the scientific study of higher education by sociologists. While there is considerable evidence to indicate that a relatively few powerful capitalists continue to create, shape, and sustain American colleges and universities in order to strengthen their control of the socio-economic system, there is also a large body of sociological theory that either explicitly states, or at least implies, that the educational institution is autonomous—
an "independent variable".

Such eminent educational theorists as Burton R. Clark, David Riesman, and most recently, Christopher Jencks, emphasize this independent and autonomous role, rather than the subservient role, of education in relation to the socio-economic system. Their work appears as evidence that corporate capitalism is fashioning higher education. Their proposals for corporate reform both reflect and reinforce the major institutional arrangements of the American economy. These three sociologists argue that those involved in higher education come from diverse social origins, from all socio-economic groupings, to actively participate not only in creating and controlling school experiences, but also in criticizing and changing the surrounding socio-economic system. Their argument accepts and underscores the assumptions central to the pluralistic ideology which sustains the institutional arrangements of this system—namely, that the sources for arriving at economic/political decisions are many and varied, including businesspersons, educators, laborers, farmers, consumers and voters. It is also assumed that these various groups, depending in large measure upon their specific interest, are highly influential in one or perhaps a few spheres but weak in many other areas. A further assumption proposes that only rarely does a group possess the resources to dominate a given issue; rather, a group usually makes its presence felt by rejecting undesirable alternatives, by possessing a "veto power". This pluralistic ideology also
assumes that no group is cohesive enough to stay together on a significant majority of issues.\(^9\)

Accordingly, the second thesis of this study is stated as follows: If those making the education-as-autonomous argument are providing ideology which serves to reinforce the corporate capitalists' domination of higher education, then their educational theories should consistently reaffirm the ideology of the American socio-economic system's growth and development—in a word, pluralism.

This thesis, combined with the first, offers an explanation as to why the education-as-autonomous argument retains sociological credibility even though most data on higher education seem to make its validity highly questionable. The "autonomous" argument attempts to separate colleges and universities from the socio-economic context within which they have been created and maintained. In the education-as-autonomous view, institutions of higher learning and professors become, given particular subgroupings, one more large interest group. Like businesspersons, laborers, and farmers, educators use the veto power of specific interests to make easier their adjustment to prevailing socio-economic arrangements. This emphasis on pluralism is an important factor contributing to the popularity of the education-as-autonomous argument among sociologists. A review of the origins and early theoretical foundations of sociology in the United States indicates that such an emphasis constitutes a central part of the American sociological tradition. In brief, there is a strong affinity between an emphasis on pluralism and the development in the
United States of a scientific and humanistic sociology serving capitalism.

"The Father of American Sociology", Lester F. Ward, and his contemporaries, argued that a refined science of sociology could become the theoretical base for a social policy designed to solve America's social problems. In advocating a Sociocracy—a government based upon the application of sociological principles—Ward placed his trust in the beneficence of a science conducive to the efficient management of the socio-economic system based upon corporate capitalism.

Similarly, Max Weber, Ward's European contemporary, produced a scientific sociology that gives support to, and has been used to maintain, American capitalism. The greater popularity of Weber in comparison to Ward among American sociologists can be partially attributed to the apparent objectiveness of Weber's sociology. Ward was less inclined to hide the capitalistic value bias of his Sociocracy, while Weber was able to develop a sociology supportive of capitalism that appeared to be more value neutral. This apparent neutrality provided scientific respectability to a sociology harmonious with, and subservient to, American capitalism by characterizing the sociologist as being receptive to all the data, no matter how conflicting, in the interest of objective analysis.

The pluralism implied by the apparent neutrality of Weberian analysis also served as the ideological basis for
laissez-faire capitalism; each individual was to allow self-interest to govern action.\textsuperscript{10} As American capitalism became more corporate, the units of power became larger. It was no longer the individual, but the state and the largest corporations which more frequently came to bear the major responsibility for uniting diverse interests in order to further the collective well-being. Thus, the transformation from laissez-faire to corporate capitalism reduced the proportional number of individuals powerful enough to shape the socio-economic system to serve their personal interests. This transformation, then, solidified and strengthened the socio-economic position of a wealthy and small group of capitalists.

Sociologists, along with other social scientists (for example, John Kenneth Galbraith in economics and Robert Dahl in political science), often produce scientific arguments providing ideological support and protection for the privileged position of this socio-economic elite. In so doing, they also protect and advance their own position within the socio-economic system.\textsuperscript{11} Consequently, the argument that higher education is an independent and "active agent" primarily responsive to the population at large (pluralism) promotes change directed at reforming higher education from within. Attention, for example, becomes focused upon faculty/student matters of a professional nature—including tenure and graduation requirements, grading, and student participation.
in "governing". This emphasis makes less likely the adequate consideration of contending theories emphasizing higher education's subservience to, and dependence upon, a small group of wealthy and powerful capitalists. Serious treatment of these theories would imply not only a differing conception of the way in which various institutional elements in the social order are related, but also a differing conception of social change. In short, the education-as-subservient argument, in contrast to the education-as-autonomous view, implies educational change directed at the fundamental institutional arrangements by which the wealthy few have profited.

The wealthy few have given a small percentage of their corporate profits and inherited funds to scientist-educators. Social scientists in exchange for their ideological support have been provided with large research grants as well as employment opportunities in elite business and industrial firms, and with the government (the Departments of Defense and HEW, and the CIA are only a few of the government agencies commonly employing social scientists). Also, there exists the more general promise of white collar prestige—professional insurance against being confused with the working class. Modern sociological theory can be viewed as indicative of the sociologists' appreciation of elite largesse. Thus, sociological interpretations of specific institutions, the education-as-autonomous argument is exemplary, have been developed within a more general framework emphasizing the end of ideology in North America. Some of America's most prominent
sociologists who have received shares of elite profits—for example Daniel Bell, Lewis S. Feuer, and Seymour M. Lipset—have focused on the dearth of ideology in the United States and pronounced its death.\footnote{12} This end-of-ideology thesis as well as the education-as-autonomous argument can be viewed as a logical outcome of Weber's emphasis upon the supposed value neutrality of science as method where the objectivity and rational fairness of prevailing socio-economic arrangements is underscored while their domination by the wealthy few is expanded and strengthened. In short, the end-of-ideology theories as well as the education-as-autonomous theories provide data supporting the central argument of the present study—namely, that sociologists have invented sociological theories which support and reinforce the socio-economic elite's control of an educational institution which is far from being autonomous from the prevailing socio-economic system.

Method

Viewed most simply, "method" is nothing more nor less than the procedure used in attempting to understand or explain something. When it is overemphasized, method becomes the Methodology of "abstracted empiricism"; when not emphasized enough, method becomes ruled by the Concepts of "grand theory".\footnote{13} Thus, the central problem in the design of any scientific study is to develop procedure that avoids the tendency "to scatter one's attention and to cultivate method for its own sake".\footnote{14}
as well as the tendency to create "an elaborate and arid formalism in which the splitting of Concepts and their endless rearrangement becomes the central endeavor." Success in dealing with this central problem depends upon understanding how to ask and how to answer relevant questions.

The criteria that determine relevancy in any study is neither arbitrary nor relativistic. As C. Wright Mills has pointed out, classic sociologists have left us a tradition that demands intellectual problems be relevant to the public issues of the times and the private troubles of individual men and women: "More than that—they have helped to define more clearly the issues and the troubles and the intimate relations between the two." The present study attempts to follow in this tradition.

Accordingly, to ask and answer questions concerning the possible relationships between the development of a practical scientific knowledge and the historical transformation of the American socio-economic system leaves one with an analysis that is incomplete. Such relationships attain a measure of significance only when they are in turn related to the everyday concerns of students and professors, as well as those of non-university people whose lives are also directly and indirectly involved. The present study, then, seeks to show how the professional practice of professors is both affected by and affects the surrounding socio-economic environment by answering questions such as the following: Has scientific knowledge been used to profitable advantage
by practical entrepreneurs, and if so, in what ways? Have the scientific theories of social scientists been used to smooth the transition from laissez-faire to corporate capitalism, and if so, how and by whom? Is there a relationship between this transformation of the socio-economic system and the growth of higher education, and if so, what is it?

These questions should clearly indicate that the present study is not undertaken with the notion of exercising control over the properties of the subject matter being examined; such control is impossible, not only because much of the data being worked with have not been developed as data per se, but also due to the complexity resulting from the introduction of several properties to be analyzed. In brief, the opportunity to control one property has been sacrificed in anticipation that attention to a large number of properties will be rewarded by description and analysis of some of the relationships among them. 18

Since these relationships are examined in a case study of one socio-economic context, the United States, the opportunity to compare is provided by the time factor. Thus, the period between the Civil War and World War One permits analysis over a considerable time span of the interrelationship between the growth of American higher education and corporate capitalism. Further, a review of recent sociological theory concerning university education and the professorial practice it encourages, permits a comparison that contrasts the early development with the later solidification of both corporate
capitalism and higher education.

This review—an examination of recent sociological assessments of higher education in the work of Clark, Riesman, and Jencks—clearly emphasizes the close connection between science and ideology. It has been suggested that the term ideology is used to signify both the consciousness of an epoch and the "false consciousness" of individuals who are not aware of their true role. The major concern of this study is not to show that the education-as-autonomous theorists possess false consciousness; rather, it is to indicate the limitations on human interaction, the domination over social behavior, imposed by the affinity between thought forms and social structure.

The structure of the American socio-economic system has been conceptualized by social scientists in basically two ways—as being shaped by either one dominant elite group or by a variety of less dominant groups. Several basic questions relating the work of the education-as-autonomous theorists to these two views are relevant to the two major theses of the present study: Do these theorists develop sociologies that address themselves primarily to elitist or to pluralist conceptions of the structure of power in the United States? In what ways do they incorporate the key properties of either conception—as assumptions, as axiomatic truths, or as natural processes? How do the incorporated properties relate to each theorist's notions of both social order and social change? In what ways might these notions
and their related properties influence each theorist's statements concerning the educational institution and its reform? What interrelationships might there be between these statements and contemporary disturbances in prevailing socio-economic arrangements?

The answers to questions such as these go beyond simple recognition of the fact that the relationship between science and ideology is close. One is always potentially the other. It is as Noam Chomsky has written: "When we consider the responsibility of intellectuals, our basic concern must be their role in the creation and analysis of ideology." It is this basic concern that at once guides and provides the unifying theme for the chapters which follow. Starting with the socio-economic system, the changing structure of capitalism, the present study examines the interrelationships between the socio-historical growth of science in American colleges and universities (Chapter One) and, the education-as-autonomous argument of prominent American sociologists (Chapter Two), the influence of Max Weber on the development of an "objective" science of sociology in the United States (Chapter Three), and the professionalism of today's social science experts (Chapter Four).

During the course of this examination, considerations of method have and will be made with reference to yet another point made by Mills—namely, that one of the main features characteristic of the crisis he saw in social science "is the retreat into the supposed neutrality of sheer fact."
Accordingly, the method of the present study acknowledges an interrelationship between peoples' ideas and their social arrangements. This interconnection includes the realization that many kinds of social questions of concern to social scientists cannot be answered by a retreat to sheer fact. Not to recognize the fact that most social facts come to social investigators already-interpreted is to deduce a schizophrenia peculiar to social scientists which would exempt them from the influence of this interconnection. The method of the present study, then, accepts the reality that these scientists live in a socio-historical, institutional framework with others, rather than in another world of abstractions. In sum, such a method reaffirms the fact that science and social policy are interrelated and together have much to do with shaping and controlling individual lives. It also rejects the abstract arguments which claim they are or can be separated.

Organizational Structure of the Dissertation

The first task, in accordance with the most general thesis of this study, is to present and evaluate historical data concerning the growth of higher education in relation to the transformation of the socio-economic system in the United States from laissez-faire to corporate capitalism. Thus, Chapter One is addressed to the thesis that the growth of higher education in the United States has been and is dependent upon, subservient to, changes in the socio-economic
An examination of the education-as-autonomous theories of Burton R. Clark, David Riesman, and Christopher Jencks comprises Chapter Two. This examination addresses the second thesis of this study—namely, the relationship between the education-as-autonomous argument and the prevailing ideology of the American socio-economic system (pluralism) which permits a corporate elite to continue its domination of American higher education. Placing this review of the educational theories of three, currently-prominent sociologists immediately after Chapter One might at first appear to constitute a break in the historical continuity of the present argument. On the contrary, the placement of this review directly after the opening chapter provides another way to check the validity of, and in fact it does demonstrate the present-day continuity of, the dependency thesis appearing in the initial chapter. Further, this review is placed immediately after Chapter One's historical account of the growth of American higher education in order to make clear the contrast between the education-as-autonomous argument presented in this second chapter and the dependency thesis developed in the first.

Chapter Three attempts to explain this contrast between, as well as the continuity of, the material presented in the first two chapters by focusing on the development of American sociology as a science and the scientific norm of objectivity. The pluralism that makes higher education
autonomous for Clark, Riesman, and Jencks is also central to the supposedly value-neutral science popularized in the United States by the German sociologist Max Weber. Weber's sociology, like the scientific theories of Lester Ward and other early Americans, makes sociologists an interest group. However, the value preferences of Weber and his followers in supporting the supposed pluralism of existing socio-economic arrangements are much less obvious than the partisanship of those sociologists who advocated Ward's Sociocracy. Consequently, Weber's apparent neutrality provides scientific respectability to a sociology harmonious with, and subservient to, the historical development of American capitalism. Weber's partisanship, no less than Ward's, strengthens the dominant position of a privileged and wealthy elite engaged in fashioning and refashioning this capitalism.

Chapter Four, then, is a discussion of how this elite interested in maintaining the corporate socio-economic arrangements of today's capitalism is served by Weber's legacy to present-day, social science professionalism. An examination of professional associations, the education-as-autonomous thesis, and the university setting attempts to highlight the relationships between professionalism and the normative definitions of objective science, current sociological theory, and bureaucracy. Just as Weber made his conceptualization of bureaucratic requirements synonymous with the dictates of German capitalism, present-day American sociologists adapt their professionalism to the bureaucratic routine of the
universities that employ them by applying their scientific understanding to the maintenance of the current socio-economic system. In short, to act in a professionally responsible manner involves a professional commitment which has come to mean service to, maintenance of, the socio-economic arrangements of today's corporate capitalism.
FOOTNOTES

1. See William A. Williams, The Contours of American History (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966). Williams' three-stage thesis explaining changes in the structural arrangements of the American socio-economic system has been heavily relied upon in the present analysis. In fact, the present study might even be considered as a particular, more specific test of the validity of this more general thesis as stated by Williams.

2. While the dates noted here are slightly different from those the Hinkles established, the last three stages use their designations. See Roscoe C. Hinkle, Jr. & Gisela J. Hinkle, The Development of Modern Sociology (New York: Random House, 1954), p. vi.

3. For a more detailed account of this depression see Williams, Contours, especially pp. 313-342.


5. See Smith, Socio-Economic Influences; Williams, Contours; Charles Page, Class and American Sociology (New York: The Dial Press, 1940); and Hinkle & Hinkle, Development.


7. Since almost all, if not all, knowledge could fit the category of being "useful", it should be noted that the word useful is used throughout this dissertation in a very particular way. The term useful is employed in the present study to emphasize the way in which scientific knowledge came to be a profitably marketable commodity exploited by an elite group of industrial entrepreneurs.
8. This thesis is stated with the awareness that to show a dependency relationship between the growth of higher education and changes in a particular socio-economic system (capitalism) raises, but does not answer, a further question. Would this dependency relationship of higher education have developed in the United States even had there been a different socio-economic system—a socio-economic structure other than capitalism? To answer this question would seem to require a quite different analysis based on a comparative study of the development of higher education in relation to the various socio-economic conditions produced by different socio-economic systems.


10. The bible of laissez-faire capitalism, The Wealth of Nations, was written in 1776 by Adam Smith who believed that the disparate self-interests of various individuals were brought together by "the invisible hand". This hidden hand was supposed to lead "the private interests and passions of men" in the direction "which is most agreeable to the interest of the whole society."


15. Ibid., p. 23. Mills also noted a third tendency in which attempts to formulate a theory of history "too readily become distorted into a trans-historical strait-jacket into which the materials of human history are forced and out of which issue prophetic views (usually gloomy ones) of the future." (See pp. 22 & 23)


18. Both these approaches—a focus on handling either one or several properties—as well as many approaches between these two, are well established in the work of sociologists. For further discussion on this point see, for example, Matilda White Riley, *Sociological Research* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1963), pp. 3-29.


CHAPTER I

THE GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICA'S COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES: HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE SERVICE OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM

Colleges and universities in the United States are dependent for survival upon the prevailing socio-economic system. They originated and are sustained by the market economy that surrounds them. American higher education has become increasingly tied to the fortunes of a governmental-military-industrial partnership that produces, sells, consumes, and repackages the knowledge commodity. This merger with, and dependency upon, big business and the Federal government can best be understood by examining the interrelationship between the growth of scientific knowledge and the historical transformation of American capitalism. This interrelationship—examined in the development of, and changes in, the sources of financial support for colleges and universities, the educational philosophy of administrators and professors, and theoretical analyses of American society prominent among early social scientists—clearly indicates the dependence of higher education upon prevailing socio-economic arrangements dominated by a wealthy elite. Financing, educational philosophy, and the social science practiced by professors have all changed to accommodate the transformation of the American socio-economic system from mercantilism to laissez-faire to corporate capitalism. In brief, the wealthy few have found it profitable to invest their riches in dominating the
production, consumption, and sale of knowledge as they re-
fashion prevailing socio-economic arrangements to further
their interests.

Elite domination of higher education has resulted
in an emphasis upon the usefulness of particular kinds of
knowledge. The idea that knowledge should be useful in
sustaining a market economy had its origins in colonial America
during the mercantilist stage of capitalist development.
Wealthy trustees, drawn from the elite and residing off-campus,
began to encourage a pragmatism commensurate with, and
supportive of, their privileged position within the larger
socio-economic system. Later, post-revolutionary proposals
concerning the creation of a national university and the first
state university,² as well as the increasing professional-
ization of college instructors, served to further emphasize
the marketable utility of higher education. Useful knowledge
became defined as being synonymous with the happiness which
could be gained by protecting the general welfare. The
general welfare was in turn defined so as not to endanger
the freedom of the non-resident trustees (the elite) to govern,
maintain, and develop their higher learning corporations.

During the important fifty year period between the
end of the Civil War and the beginning of World War I, the
capitalist elite developed these corporations as training
grounds for the scientist-technicians needed to operate its
industries. As the scientific undertakings of the first
generation of American sociologists and the Metaphysical Club
illustrate, scientist-educators developed and taught a useful science. Their scientific knowledge reflected, and served to support, emerging socio-economic arrangements—the transformation from a laissez-faire to a corporate form of capitalism.

Professorial practice has supported this transformation to a corporate capitalism; university scientists have joined their capitalist benefactors in attempting to reform the socio-economic system by wedding science to the developing technology. Thus, the elite who employed the professors found many of them eager to accept positions as both part-time consultants for, and full-time employees of, its manufacturing and industrial concerns. The ascendency of a professorial role model complementing and fostering this pragmatic mix of science and technology has been greatly encouraged since the turn of the century. As the most successful corporate capitalists turned their philanthropic interests from the direct support of particular colleges and universities to the establishment of research foundations, professors found it was not only practical, but also profitable, to join the "ivory tower" with the "world of affairs"—to produce and apply useful knowledge. There is ample historical precedent for this practice and today's service-oriented higher education, oriented to serving prevailing socio-economic arrangements, should be viewed as the extension of its historical development.
Knowledge Should Be Useful: Higher Education and Mercantilism

The socio-economic arrangements that characterized the American social system following the War of Independence were, according to William A. Williams, basically a reflection of British mercantilism. As it developed in England, mercantilism was a system of political economy designed to maintain a corporate morality during the transition from an agrarian to a commercial and industrial society. During this transition the church was replaced by the state as regulator and protector of the general welfare; puritan religiosity became liberal paternalism. This state paternalism, like the "hidden hand" of the later laissez-faire capitalism, offered aid to the down-trodden and oppressed without changing the socio-economic structure in a manner that might have altered relationships between the oppressed and their oppressors. In brief, the general welfare was maintained not by improving the socio-economic position of the many, but by following an expansionist economic policy that benefited only a select few.

In England, these few constituted a landed nobility which preserved the general welfare by promoting revenue and tariff policies that encouraged the development of new markets and helped to control a rising merchant class. In the United States, mercantilism was promoted by and served, rather than controlled, the commercial interests of New England merchants. They, like the English nobility, favored a policy that would allow their country to prosper by taking wealth and therefore,
happiness, from other countries. Such expansionist ideology was tempered in the American case by the probability of unfavorable consequences resulting from economic competition with the older, more established nations; thus, the colonial government instituted a tariff policy that insured home merchants against the potential dangers of "free trade" with stronger, foreign competitors.  

Encouraged by the government to make only limited and safe foreign investments, the northern merchants as well as the southern plantation owners began using their profits to promote and develop institutions, e.g., education, at home. These prosperous merchants and agriculturists laid the foundation for a future, profitable relationship between higher education and their other economic enterprises by helping to formulate and extend two important principles upon which the first colleges were established. First, these schools were to be administered by groups of trustees, who neither resided, nor made their livelihood, on campus. Second, an important factor in determining college curriculum was the potential market utility of particular knowledge. The first principle was to have a significant bearing on the second, greatly influencing the development of American colleges and universities; as a lesser proportion of trustees came to be chosen from, and to represent, the church, they began to fashion a pragmatic curriculum that would strengthen their manufacturing and industrial concerns in the competition for future markets.
The principle that colleges should be non-resident corporations was first underscored at America's oldest college, Harvard (founded in 1640). The question of the trustees' right to govern became a matter for public discussion in 1723, when tutor Nicholas Sever, on behalf of himself and colleague William Welsteed, argued that the Charter of 1650 bestowed upon them as new teachers the right and duty to become Fellows in the Corporation governing the affairs of the college. 10 While the tutors' interpretation of the Charter was in all probability correct, 11 Harvard President John Leverett, with support from the state governor, rejected their attempt to initiate a tradition of self-government. He argued that the resident tutors should never constitute a majority of the Corporation's governing board because it is "contrary to the light of nature that any should have an overruling voice in making those laws by which themselves must be governed in their office work, and for which they receive salaries." 12 Thus, Leverett reaffirmed a policy that had been practiced at Harvard since the school's inception—namely, government by non-residents with occupational and financial interests outside the college. 13

That these outside interests of non-residents were to be given great weight in governing American colleges and universities was not a principle peculiar to Harvard. Thus, the Charter of William & Mary College of Virginia (founded in 1693) tied the college to the community by instructing
the campus General-Assembly, consisting of the college's members, to nominate and elect Trustees from the wider society to govern the academic community. Further, just as an act of the General Court of Massachusetts which turned the incomes of the Charlestown Ferry over to the Harvard treasury enabled that college to pay many of its own expenses, William & Mary's charter attempted to make that institution financially self-sufficient by applying the revenues from Virginia's number one crop/industry, tobacco, to college construction.

The Charters of Connecticut's Yale (1745) and New Jersey's Princeton (1746 and 1748) also broadened and encouraged the principle of non-resident control. At Yale, Harvard's "tax breaks" were extended to cover a greater range of financial activities in support of the college, while Princeton empowered its Trustees to choose their own successors as well as to nominate and appoint all "inferior" officers and ministers. Similarly, the Charter of Rhode Island College or Brown University (1764) gave those who were not officers of instruction tenure for life, while at the same time limiting the proportion of college fellows among the trustees to one third of the total number.

This firm adherence to the practice of having college affairs supervised by outsiders—at first, mostly clergymen, and later, predominantly manufacturers and industrialists—began to produce a pragmatism that both protected the interests, and revealed the elitism, of the supervising trustees. Thus,
the following elitist rationale was used by the Harvard Overseers in a 1762 petition to the governor opposing the construction of a new college in western Massachusetts:

For although more of our youth might by this means [the founding of a western college] receive what is usually called a liberal education, and which might pass for a very good one with many, yet we apprehend this would be rather a disadvantage than the contrary, as it would prevent a sufficient, though smaller number of our youth, being sent to Cambridge, where they would unquestionably be much more thoroughly instructed and far better qualified for doing service to their country. 20

Similarly, President John Witherspoon, in advertisements of 1772 aimed at persuading wealthy Englishmen in the West Indies to send their sons and their money to Princeton, argued a utilitarian morality appealing to an economic elite.

He wrote, in part, as follows:

The children of persons in the higher ranks of life . . . have of all others the greatest need of an early, prudent and well conducted education. The wealth to which they are born becomes often a dangerous temptation, and the station in which they enter upon life, requires such duties, as those of the finest talents can scarcely be supposed capable of, unless they have been improved and cultivated with the utmost care. Experience shews the use of a liberal Education in both these views. It is generally a preservative from vices of a certain class. . . . It is also of acknowledged necessity to those who do not wish to live for themselves alone, but would apply their talents to the service of the public and the good of mankind. Education is therefore of equal importance in order either to enjoy life with dignity and elegance, or imploy it to the benefit of society, in offices of power or trust. 21

Witherspoon and the Harvard Overseers argue for a liberal, humanistic higher education. Their statements clearly
indicate that the first institutions of higher learning were established for the benefit of youth from a particular socio-economic background—namely, the children of an aristocratic elite. They justify such elitism by arguing that an education designed to train a talented few for service to their country will result in benefits for all. It was this beneficence of their elitism which helped diversify a college curriculum designed to train clergymen and community leaders, and anticipated the necessity of tempering privilege to fit the democratic-humanistic sentiments growing out of the Revolution.

One of the revolutionary period's leading statesmen, Thomas Jefferson, first annunciated the emerging view that school curriculum should be made available to the children of the vast majority of citizens, rather than being exclusively reserved for, and tailored to, a ruling and cultured class. His statement, Bill for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge, presented to the Virginia Legislature in 1799, is exemplary of that balance of elitism and populism which was to justify future state financing of higher education—not on religious grounds, but for political-economic reasons:

"...experience hath shewn, that even under the best forms of government, those entrusted with power have, in time, and by slow operations, perverted it into tyranny; and it is believed that the most effectual means of preventing this would be, to illuminate, as far as practicable, the minds of the people at large... And whereas it is generally true that the people will be happiest whose laws are best, and are best administered, and that laws will be wisely formed, and honestly administered, in proportion as those who form and administer them are wise and honest; whence it becomes..."
expedient for promoting the publick happiness that those persons, whom nature hath endowed with genius and virtue, should be reached by liberal education... but the indigence of the greater number disabling them from so educating, at their own expense, those of their children whom nature hath fitly formed and disposed to become useful instruments of the public, it is better that such should be sought for and educated at the common expense of all, than that the happiness of all should be confined to the weak or wicked. 22
(my emphasis)

The core of Jefferson's argument is composed of abstractions--natural endowment, usefulness, happiness--and it is individuals of privileged position within the socio-economic system who possess the resources to make such abstractions concrete. Thus, Jefferson's plan was not implemented in a single county in the state because it required initiation by justices representing the wealthy class, who thought that its adoption would, in Jefferson's words, "throw on wealth the education of the poor". 23 His plan was, however, to be revived some twenty years later by a group of Boston businessmen who saw the possible economic advantage to themselves that might result from greater attention to public education. Accordingly, the widely-imitated Boston Public High School was opened in 1821 to instruct those non-college-bound boys interested in business and the machinery of industry. 24

The popular support favoring a practical education to be taught in public high schools had developed, in part, from the arguments of those who proposed to establish a federal university. One such proponent was Philadelphian...
Benjamin Rush, a distinguished chemist and medical practitioner. In a 1798 essay he argued that the scientific practice of religion, government, and commerce should be taught in a republican university in order that "man" might become more perfect, as well as happy. His conception of such instruction in perfection and happiness reflects the liberal and paternalistic humanitarianism that characterized American mercantilism. Thus, Rush urges that the study of commerce be treated as an important part of university curriculum because it offers:

... the best security against the influence of hereditary monopolies of land, and, therefore, the surest protection against aristocracy. I consider its effects as next to those of religion in humanizing mankind, and lastly, I view it as the means of uniting the different nations of the world together by the ties of mutual wants and obligations. 25

The humanitarian impulse that Rush hoped would create a higher learning capable of uniting nation states by making them economically interdependent, was also called upon to help students from disparate ethnic backgrounds adjust to their new environment. Rush celebrates the homogenizing effect of education in the following way:

I conceive the education of our youth in this country to be peculiarly necessary in Pennsylvania, while our citizens are composed of the natives of so many different kingdoms of Europe. Our schools of learning, by producing one general, and uniform system of education, will render the mass of the people more homogeneous, and thereby fit them more easily for uniform and peaceable government. 26

These statements by Rush, as well as those of the Harvard Overseers, Witherspoon, and Jefferson, emphasize the
humanitarian serviceability of education in schools. During the mercantilist period of capitalist development (1740-1828), support for this idea of formal instruction in serviceable knowledge began to grow. The knowledge producing institutions of higher learning, as well as the newly-established high schools, were beginning to offer a more practical curriculum. From the first the knowledge imparted through formal schooling had been reserved for the children of the wealthy elite--those whose future lives of dignified enjoyment and/or service to the nation would reflect the usefulness of their education. Later, as the opening of the Boston Public High School suggests, vocational and technical knowledge was made available to youth from divergent socio-economic backgrounds so that they might capably assist the elite in regulating and protecting the general welfare. While the availability of this pragmatic knowledge in colleges and universities did not become widespread until well into the period of laissez-faire capitalism (1819-1896), the developmental beginnings and supervision of a more practical curriculum can be traced to a small number of wealthy mercantilists. In short, development of and instruction in a pragmatic higher learning would help to protect the markets, and thereby, the fortunes, of this elite by encouraging Americans of lower socio-economic circumstances--mostly immigrants--to adjust their lives so as to fit into and serve the prevailing socio-economic system.
Knowledge Defined by the Hidden Hand: The Dartmouth College Case and the Transition to Laissez-Faire Capitalism

By the end of the first quarter of the nineteenth century the wealthy few who had prospered under a protective mercantilism were in a favorable position to increase their wealth under a laissez-faire policy that encouraged competition through free trade. They began to view a mercantilism of restraint as detrimental to a search for new markets that would return greater profits by permitting them to expand their industrial and agricultural operations. The general welfare came to be increasingly defined by the interests of this elite, as they continued to dominate and use institutions of higher learning to protect their privileged position. Two important events of the year 1819, the collapse of the Central Bank and the decision in the Dartmouth College v. Woodward case, exemplify the transition of the American economy from mercantilism to laissez-faire capitalism and the manner in which this change in prevailing socio-economic arrangements affected the development of colleges and universities.

The Central Bank was established by the Federal Government in 1816. President Madison viewed the bank as part of a monetary policy designed to cope with the problems of rapid economic growth stimulated by the War of 1812. He was especially concerned with, and sought to remedy, the inequities resulting from the unregulated laissez-faire banking of the war period. However, from the first, government
representatives to the board of directors were overpowered by speculating businessmen with whom they were to share administrative duties. The businessmen undermined the bank as an agency of reform by establishing a policy of loose credit in exchange for a high rate of interest that assured them generous profits. As it soon became clear that this policy was in large part responsible for a faltering economy—the panic and depression of 1819 was the eventual result—the government in Washington succeeded in reorganizing Central Bank operations. Credit was tightened by restricting new loans and calling in old ones. In this way, the government succeeded in restoring the economy; the restoration, however, created an enmity among local and regional banks caught short of capital by the change in credit policy. Thus, the irony of the Central Bank was that its creation reflected a mercantilism designed to safeguard the corporate (public) welfare, while its existence and eventual collapse helped cause a movement away from this protective mercantilism towards a competitive, laissez-faire capitalism. In brief, the corporate or general welfare came to be redefined in terms of the "hidden hand" of individualistic and private enterprise.

The decision of the United States Supreme Court in the Dartmouth College case placed institutions of higher learning within the emerging philosophy. The general welfare was best assured by allowing the hidden hand to regulate
private entrepreneurship in the higher education business. The case arose due to a lack of clarity as to the locus of control at Dartmouth College. Should control reside with the president of the college or was it to be located in the absentee board of trustees? In 1815, anticipating that Dartmouth President John Wheelock (son of Dartmouth's founder, Eleazar Wheelock) was about to make a public issue out of this question, the New Hampshire legislature, which had originally chartered Dartmouth, voted to investigate the affairs of the college. The school's trustees were enraged by this legislative action and quickly removed Wheelock from his positions as president, professor, and trustee. The Republican party sided with Wheelock and on the basis of the "college issue" won the election of 1816.

As the controversy continued it became clear that neither Wheelock nor the trustees was very concerned about the issue of state control. However, the matter of state control over Dartmouth continued to be of great concern to the recently-elected governor and several legislators whose stand on this issue had gained them their new positions. After the predominantly Republican legislature passed a revised charter that changed the name of the college as well as providing for more effective state control over the new Dartmouth University, the Dartmouth trustees attempted to preserve the authority of their control by arguing their position in court. In an 1817 decision the state court of
New Hampshire ruled that Dartmouth was a public institution subject to legislative control under the revised charter as issued by the state legislature. Thus, the trustees' continued operation of the college was declared illegal and they appealed to the higher court for a decision as to whether Dartmouth was to be considered a public or a private corporation.28

In Washington, alumnus Daniel Webster made two major points in presenting the trustees' argument. First, he reasoned that the original college charter of 1769 was a contract that would become void, in violation of the federal constitution, if the New Hampshire legislative actions were allowed to stand. Second, he emphasized that failure to reverse the state court decision would result in the college, as well as other private corporations with a similar public service orientation, being continually confronted with imminent destruction. They would be "subject to the rise and fall of popular parties, and the fluctuations of political opinions."29

The Court, in an opinion delivered by Chief Justice John Marshall on February 2, 1819, supported Webster and the trustees by protecting Dartmouth and other private colleges against direct political interference:

The corporation in question is not a civil, although it is a lay corporation. It is an eleemosynary corporation. It is a private charity, originally founded and endowed by an individual, with a charter obtained for it at his request, for the better administration of his charity. . . . Eleemosynary corporations are for the management of private property, according to the will of the donors. 30
The Court's ruling assumed that the successful entrepreneur, one who had demonstrated competitive fitness in accumulating great wealth, would in pursuing personal interests also act in the best interests of the general public. The ruling maintained that the truth of this principle, so fundamental to laissez-faire capitalism, was least in doubt when philanthropic interest was directed towards the development and growth of a college, an institution defined by the Court as a charity existing for the public's benefit. The Dartmouth decision, consequently, served to promote the educational entrepreneurship of a wealthy elite, thereby leading to an increase in the number of colleges and universities competing for its patronage.

Between 1780 and the beginning of the Civil War nearly 1,000 colleges, the vast majority of them "private" institutions, were started. By 1862 the resulting struggle for survival had reduced this number to 182, and college presidents continued their practice, begun in the 1830's, of touring the country in search of funds. The prevailing opinion among these professional educators reflected and gave strong support to the emergent laissez-faire capitalism of this period. Those institutions meriting survival would be chosen by the wealthy to survive, or as one college president put it: "If a college attracts to itself patronage and endowment, it has a right to live; if it does not, it will die. The law of natural selection applies to the colleges as well as to the animal and vegetable world. . . ."
These "naturally" selected colleges were to become increasingly dependent upon their benefactors' success in competing for the expanded commercial and industrial markets promoted by laissez-faire capitalism. Their continued existence could be assured by persuading potential donors of higher education's obvious worth in influencing the unseen machinations of the hidden hand. In short, the happiness of all concerned—the general welfare—rested upon the development of a pragmatic curriculum, a practical science. This science, of course, was one which the wealthy few might profitably apply to the technical problems connected with the operation of their manufacturing and industrial concerns. Supported by the Dartmouth decision, these few strengthened their privileged position by encouraging the refinement of this useful science. During the mid-1800s they continued to aid the development of particular private colleges by selectively offering their wealth to institutions emphasizing a practical curriculum; further, they began to actively develop public (state) universities as training centers for the scientific-technical manpower which they would employ in their commercial and industrial enterprises. Higher education, then, was to become a big business at the reflexive center of a process, the infancy of which in the early 1800s gave little indication of the huge proportions maturity would bring—the wedding of science and technology.
Scientific Knowledge Is Useful to Practical Entrepreneurs: Growth of the Educational-Industrial Partnership

The joining of science and technology often seems "natural" when viewed from present surroundings; however, studies concerning the practice of science in industry have resulted in the issuance of a cautionary, historical forward to this point of view. Historian Kendall Birr summarizes: "For most of human history, science and technology were separate enterprises with differing objectives and conducted by different individuals and even different classes of people."32 In the United States, the colonists' emphasis upon the utility of knowledge in bettering their material conditions led to an early and continuous intermixing of these separate enterprises.

The labors of Benjamin Franklin, one of the most highly respected men in colonial America, exemplified a working relationship between the theoretical and the technical aspired to by many. Not only did his wave theory of light lead to a most practical device, the lightning rod, but he also applied his scientific talents to designing bifocals and developing an improved stove.33 Yet, Franklin's effective combination of science and technology was not always to be found in a single individual. A mutual dependence between scientists and technicians began to grow as they more frequently exchanged beneficial knowledge.

Thus, the theoretical knowledge concerning electric currents, magnetism and general mechanical motion implied and
encouraged the development of electromagnets, motors and generators. Similarly, all the theoretical ingredients for the telegraph were available to scientists prior to its invention. The development of a practical device, however, was achieved by two non-scientists—William Cooke, an English anatomist, and Samuel F.B. Morse, an American painter. In the case of the telephone, inventor Alexander Graham Bell did have scientific training—but in speech and not in electricity.34

The microphone in Bell's device was significantly improved by Thomas A. Edison, a brilliant engineer with a limited scientific background. In this instance, as in the production of his electric lamp, Edison experimented by "trial and error", rather than by the rigorous application of scientific theory. He was, however, quite willing to employ the assistance of those trained in science (for example, his mathematician F.R. Upton) to enhance his "technician's approach".35 In brief, the "pure" knowledge of scientific theory often waited upon, but—as the cooperation between Upton and Edison indicates—was increasingly to inform, the "applied" knowledge of technical practice.

No one was earlier aware of this fact than wealthy landholder Stephen Van Rensselaer, who, in 1824, founded America's first technical college based upon the educational philosophy that practice served both to instruct and complete theory. The purpose of his polytechnic institute in Troy, New York, was to train teachers who would, when employed in
district schools, instruct "the sons and daughters of farmers and mechanics... in the application of experimental chemistry, philosophy, and natural history, to agriculture, the domestic economy, the arts, and manufacturers." Accordingly, scientific instruction of these future teachers was to begin with the practical application of the subject matter only under special conditions. For example, scientific principles were introduced only after an excursion to a factory, mill, garden, construction site, etcetera.

Van Rensselaer's vision of a practical higher education was to find favor with many among the wealthy elite. For example, meat-packers Philip D. Armour and his son, J. Ogden, viewed the millions of dollars they used to build the Armour Institute of Technology as an investment helpful in protecting their industrial concern. This educational entrepreneurship could result in favorable publicity that might counter increasing public knowledge of, and outrage over, the degrading working conditions in the Chicago stockyards, the slum-like living conditions in the "stockyard district", and the Armours' harsh treatment of cattlemen, small competitors and customers.

Further, a technical institute could produce knowledge valuable in making industrial improvements at the Armours' plant; accordingly, Armour was the first company to establish a research department in order to explore the potential profits to be made from scientific meat packing.

Like the Armours, Benjamin N. and James B. ("Buck") Duke--whose fortunes were built from tobacco, railroads, cotton
manufacturing, and power development--transformed little Trinity College into a large university in order to protect their business concerns. That their interest in higher education went beyond pure philanthropy was made clear when a critic charged that the purpose of the Duke Endowment was to preserve the family tobacco and electric power companies and "Buck" arrogantly agreed. Similarly, New York camera manufacturer George Eastman, not only "bought" local goodwill where he maintained his major plant by building Rochester College into an internationally known university, but also in distant areas. Upon discovering that some of his company's most valuable technicians had received their training at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (M.I.T.), Eastman invested $20 million in that institute.

For Eastman, the Dukes, the Armours, Van Rensselaer and other wealthy capitalists, investing in institutions of higher learning was good business. Their determination to bind scientific training to current technological practice fostered an increasing willingness among scientists to transfer, for financial considerations, of course, their knowledge to those of a more practical persuasion.

As early as 1836, Yale chemist James C. Booth opened a laboratory in Philadelphia, the center of the U.S. chemical industry; he soon became busily engaged as a consultant to several industries, while continuing to instruct students. In 1848, an agricultural chemist at Yale, John P. Norton, was analyzing crude and vulcanized rubber for an aspiring
industrialist named Charles Goodyear; the results of these analyses were profitably used by Goodyear in building his empire. (Despite the so-called "managerial revolution", the Goodyear family still dominates the company.) In 1855, a third Yale chemistry professor, Benjamin Silliman, Jr., prepared a report on samples of Pennsylvania crude oil for entrepreneurs interested in drilling there; his report stimulated interest in oil speculation as a potentially profitable investment and was used by Edward Drake as a guide in drilling his first well at Titusville in 1859.40

A later and even more telling instance of the rapid development of this scientific-industrial partnership took place in Germany, and concerned the business of making dyes. While it was an English chemist, William H. Perkin, working with the German von Hofmann, who was primarily responsible for discovering the dye process, certainly the fact that the Germans came to dominate the dye manufacturing business rested in large part on their willingness to finance research efforts aimed at a practical synthesis of indigo. This synthesis was first made by Adolf von Baeyer in 1880, but was satisfactorily refined only after seventeen years of research costing nearly $5 million by the German Badische Anilin-und Soda-Fabrik Gesellschaft.41

While the above figure is dwarfed in the presence of today's vast expenditures on "research and development" by big business-government-military, nevertheless it is an example and an extension of Franklin's fusion of science and
technology. Contacts between scientists and technicians were no longer to be simply more frequent, but routine. That the university was to serve as both the central gathering place and training grounds for scientists and technicians was made clear with the U.S. Government's passage of the Morrill Federal Land-Grant Act in 1862. In this legislation, sponsored by Vermont Congressman Justin Smith Morrill, the government in Washington agreed to give land to those states constructing agricultural and mechanical colleges. The result was a tremendous growth in the number of state-supported schools, a growth that not only increasingly secularized a curriculum moving away from the clerical perspective in both management and content, but that also increased the dependency of higher learning institutions on the prosperity of business and industry.

This increased dependency was nowhere more evident than at those educational institutions where obvious attempts were made to resist the pragmatic influence of an industrial elite. Thus, it is most significant that among the first scientists anxious to demonstrate the practicality of their work to the wealthy capitalists were the three professors from Yale—Booth, Norton, and Silliman; significant because it was the Yale faculty as a group that produced the classic document, The Report of 1828, arguing against a collegiate education relevant only to the practicalities of the present moment. The Yale faculty favored the laying of foundations for a "superior education": "The two great points to be gained
in intellectual culture, are the discipline and the furniture of the mind; expanding its powers and storing it with knowledge." Accordingly, mathematics was to be studied because it developed powers of reasoning, classics because they developed standards of taste, and so on.

In supporting a classical curriculum, the Yale faculty also managed to underscore the pragmatic value of such an education. They argued that adherence to their required course of fundamental subjects—rather than to a student selected course drawn from a more recent and supposedly, more practical, curriculum—would prove to be the most useful education for future merchants, manufacturers, and agriculturists.

Can merchants, manufacturers, and agriculturists derive no benefit from high intellectual culture? They are the very classes which, from their situation and business, have the best opportunities for reducing the principles of science to their practical applications. The large estates which the tide of prosperity in our country is so rapidly accumulating, will fall mostly into their hands. Is it not desirable that they should be men of superior education, of large and liberal views, of those solid and elegant attainments, which will raise them to a higher distinction, than the mere possession of property; which will not allow them to hoard their treasures, or waste them in senseless extravagance; which will enable them to adorn society by their learning, to move in the more intelligent circles with dignity, and to make such an application of their wealth, as will be most honorable to themselves, and most beneficial to their country? 45

In brief, the classical curriculum taught by Yale professors—the Booths, Nortons, and Sillimans—was designed
to humanize their students, the future wealthy capitalists, so that they would be capable of applying their wealth honorably and beneficially. One of the best investments for these capitalists was to support the scientific practice of professor-scientists, thereby promoting an educational-industrial partnership that was to eventually replace the classical with a more modern and practical curriculum, a curriculum that emphasized the usefulness of science to the developing industrial technology of the philanthropic elite.

Harvard College, to take an example of early educational investment on the part of the elite, benefited from a professorship endowed in 1816 by wealthy physicist Benjamin Thompson (Count Rumford), a two-hundred acre farm and other properties bequeathed in 1835 by prosperous agriculturist Benjamin Bussey, and a new school of applied science which was heavily financed in its first years (1847-1855) by successful textile manufacturer Abbott Lawrence. Thompson required the holder of his $1,000 a year professorship to teach "the utility of the physical and mathematical sciences for the improvement of the useful arts, and for the extension of the industry, prosperity, happiness, and well being of society."47 Bussey's farm was also to be a source of pragmatic learning in accordance with his stipulation that it be used to establish "a course of instruction in practical agriculture... and in such other branches of natural science as may tend to promote a knowledge of practical
agriculture." Similarly, the more than $100,000 Lawrence contributed to building the scientific school that carried his name was to be a remedy for an America "somewhat neglectful in the cultivation and encouragement of the scientific portion of our national economy". Lawrence, like Thompson and Bussey before him, was interested in providing practical training in the "application of science to the useful arts" for those who were to pursue future careers as engineers, miners, machinists, and mechanics.

This interest of the wealthy in fashioning higher education, and more particularly, science, to the utilitarian demands of occupation and career met with vigorous opposition from Dartmouth President, Nathan Lord. In an 1828 statement marking the beginning of his presidency, Lord indicated his disapproval of education for careers. Unlike Princeton and Union, colleges that had been admitting special scientific students since the turn of the century, his college was not to be "designed for individuals who were to engage in mercantile, mechanical or agricultural operations." The next two decades during which Lord sought to raise funds on behalf of the college seemed to educate him concerning the reluctance of successful capitalists to support, what was for them, his non-utilitarian, classical curriculum. Thus, by 1851 Lord was willing to accept Boston businessman Abiel Chandler's offer to donate $50,000 for the instruction of "the practical or useful arts of life composed chiefly in the branches of mechanics and civil engineering, the invention
and manufacture of machinery. . . together with bookkeeping and such other branches of knowledge as may best qualify young persons for the duties and employments of active life. . . ." In 1867, Lord welcomed engineer Sylvanus Thayer's gift of $40,000, and also accepted another Thayer offer of $30,000 to build a graduate school of civil engineering.

In accepting the Chandler and the second Thayer donation, as well as federal land-grant money for agricultural education, Lord's practice had directly contradicted his 1828 philosophy of higher learning. By the close of his administration he was writing of the increasing necessity of a higher education in the "practical and useful arts of life", revealing a pragmatism that had been both an influence upon, and was a reflection of, the transformation of the Dartmouth curriculum over which he presided. Lord's change of mind in favor of career-oriented higher education clearly indicates that the criteria for college survival was largely determined by a wealthy elite. That Lord should have provided leadership for the institution whose favorable hearing before the Supreme Court protected the college from the whim of popular and/or powerful opinion seems most fitting; for it was this court decision that also encouraged the elite educational entrepreneurship responsible for Lord's and Dartmouth's increasing dependence upon the popular and the powerful.

Lord was not alone in adopting--as a necessity of survival--a pragmatism attractive to a small group of wealthy
and powerful manufacturers and industrialists. Henry Philip Tappan, for example, was unsuccessful in his attempt to reform Michigan higher education so that it might conform to his somewhat classical view of scholarship. He summarized this view when he accepted the presidency of the University of Michigan in 1852.

We shall have no more acute distinctions drawn between scholastic and practical education; for, it will be seen that all true education is practical, and that practice without education is little worth; and then there will be dignity, grace, and a resistless charm about scholarship and the scholar. 53

This emphasis upon the unity of scholarship and practice could have been interpreted so as to reinforce both prevailing socio-economic arrangements, the privileged position of the elite, and populism in the Jacksonian tradition. 54 However, such an interpretation was made most unlikely by Tappan's hope that his philosophy in practice might serve to make education a "counter influence against the excessive commercial spirit and against the chicanery and selfishness of demagougeism" that he felt characterized American society. 55

Tappan was dismissed eleven years later, in 1863. He had received little support from either the regents, faculty, or the general public. Ten years prior to his 1852 speech the University of Michigan Regents had issued a statement which, unlike Tappan's, was much closer to the emerging philosophy and practice characteristic of higher education's future development. The Regents argued that the non-sectarian
growth of universities was dependent upon the "character and principle" of those men, like themselves, held responsible for their administration.\textsuperscript{56} In brief, practical entrepreneurs responsible for developing business and industrial corporations were, in the same manner, to develop university corporations that would serve society. It was the university president, representing an educational viewpoint contradicting the practical regents, who was removed. The president did not serve the regents.

The practical view was given strong support by two of the most prominent educators in mid-nineteenth century America--the presidents of Harvard and Brown, Edward Everett and Francis Wayland. Everett, in his inaugural address of 1846, spoke for many of his less-famous colleagues when he stressed the necessity for "a school of theoretical and practical science, for the purpose especially of teaching its application to the arts of life, and of furnishing a supply of skillful engineers and of persons well qualified to explore and bring to light the inexhaustible natural treasures of the country, and to guide its vast industrial energies in their rapid development."\textsuperscript{57} Later (1849), after accepting Abbott Lawrence's initial donations to be used in building such a school, Everett urged the Massachusetts' legislature to finance a less exclusive and more useful higher education because it was in the public interest "to prepare for future usefulness in church and state the mass of average intellect."\textsuperscript{58}
Wayland echoed Everett and foreshadowed future developments at Tappan's Michigan and elsewhere. In an 1850 statement he argued that "if every man who is willing to pay for them has an equal right to the benefits of education, every man has a special right to that kind of education which will be of the greatest value to him in the prosecution of useful industry."59

Wayland's view that a costly and utilitarian higher education could lend support to the unseen hand's "natural" allocation of duty and privilege was an extension of his economic philosophy. Presented in his 1837 textbook—the most popular economics text in America over the next half century—the Wayland economic philosophy was clearly a primer of and for the laissez-faire capitalism of the period. For Wayland, competition was "a beneficent, permanent law of nature", and self-interest, "the mainspring of human exertion."60

The practice of college and university faculty illustrated, and eventually reflected, the transformation of the economic system that Wayland's principles attempted to explain. The professors supported administrative and trustee efforts to develop a more useful higher education by building upon the Booth-Norton-Silliman tradition of applying scientific knowledge to the problems of industry. They not only rushed to the service of industry as consultants and later, fulltime employees, but they also developed instructional programs to train the future labor force of the industrialist trustees.
Furthermore, it was these same university-based scientists who were in large measure responsible for developing the ideology of corporate capitalism in a manner that encouraged an organized merger of science and technology on a grand scale. This scale was to become so vast that the science-technology union can no longer be viewed as characteristic of one man (Franklin) or a few individuals, or the university as an institution; rather, it should be seen as a reflection of the American market economy as a whole.

The Production and Application of Useful Knowledge: Social Scientists Support the Transition from Laissez-Faire to Corporate Capitalism

The institutional arrangements which came to characterize the American socio-economic system in transformation during the late 1800s gave to the corporation a status similar to that accorded the individual under laissez-faire capitalism. Again, as was the case in the earlier transformation of the economy from mercantilism to laissez-faire capitalism, federal Supreme Court decisions were very significant. In the Charles River Bridge case (1837) the Court ruled against monopolies and in favor of unrestricted competition in the interest of "progress". In another decision made that year the Court opened banking to competition among all citizens. While both rulings gave support to laissez-faire capitalism by reinforcing the idea that the economic well-being of all would be enhanced through "free" competition, these decisions also gave legal introduction and sanction to the new capitalism by confirming the group or
corporation as a legitimate unit of competition. Chief Justice Roger B. Taney, in an opinion of 1839, offered a rationale which justified his rulings favoring a corporate form of economic competition. The corporation, he explained, "is, indeed, a mere artificial being, invisible and intangible; yet it is a person, for certain purposes in contemplation of law, and has been recognized as such by the decisions of this Court." In the words of New York's liberal reformer, William Leggett: "We are for leaving free trade; and the right to combine is an indispensable attribute of its freedom."

As the corporate model came to dominate the American socio-economic system, institutions of higher learning received sustaining financial contributions by producing knowledge useful for an elite concerned with maintaining the new socio-economic arrangements by which they were profiting. Thus, Philadelphia metal manufacturer Joseph Wharton, in an 1881 letter to the University of Pennsylvania trustees, expressed his concern that the current "college education did little toward fitting for the actual duties of life any but those who propose to become lawyers, doctors, or clergymen..." and offered his financial aid in the founding of a "School of Finance and Economy" provided particular views were taught. Wharton's desire to see special emphasis placed upon teaching the necessity of a protective tariff reflected his support for the corporate ideology of the new capitalism designed to protect his interests in zinc, nickel, and iron. While most wealthy capitalists were less obvious regarding the purposes
of their educational philanthropy than was Wharton, they were no less concerned than he with shaping institutions of higher learning so that their curriculum would support the new capitalism in its corporate form. It was upon this capitalism with a corporate base that the partnership between higher education and industry was to continue developing.

There were at least two groups of scientists whose views served to support and encourage corporate ideology during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. One was a gathering of "learned professionals" calling themselves the Metaphysical Club, and the other was the first generation of American sociologists. The members of these two groups shared and strongly supported the notion that knowledge is, can be made to be, and should be useful.

The Metaphysical Club was comprised of seven (sometimes nine) Harvard graduates, who were either lawyers or philosopher-scientists. In contrast with most of the early sociologists, the Club members, while they met in a university setting, did not experience typical academic careers. In fact, with the exception of William James, the others—Charles S. Peirce, Joseph Warner, Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., Esq. Nicholas St. John Green, Chauncey Wright, John Chipman Gray, and less-regular attenders, John Fiske and Francis E. Abbot—were never dependent upon institutions of higher learning for their livelihood. C. Wright Mills has suggested that this lack of attachment to the university as employer, their university student experience and the fact that their fathers'
occupations could all be classified as "free-professional", are common social circumstances which in all probability helped to bring about their initial acquaintanceship and influenced their continued intellectual dialogue and development.66

They began meeting in Old Cambridge in the early 1870s to discuss philosophers such as Jeremy Bentham and J. S. Mill in relation to the then-popular writings of Herbert Spencer and Charles Darwin. While the members' differing vocations and philosophical viewpoints made for heated debates, it is clear that their discursive issues were chosen and argued within a general framework that was shared by all. According to Mills, their focus stemmed from three themes that were thought to be worth pursuing. First, the members to a man accepted science as a legitimate approach to making sense out of experience and interests. Thus, an interest in science was the foundation for most discussion—even discourse in the area of religion. Second, law was a theme of major interest, not only as the day-to-day vocation of several members, but in all probability as a central topic in the discussions as well. Third, they were interested in logic, not only the logic of law, but the logic of science as method—as "definitional technique".67

In short, knowledge was to be acquired in a logical manner (scientific method) and practically applied (e.g., law). There is little doubt that these meetings of the Metaphysical Club profoundly influenced each individual member—probably
the most striking example of this influence was Justice Holmes' emphasis on law as experience rather than logic— and laid the ground-work for non-club member John Dewey's popularization of his pragmatic doctrine of "instrumentalism". It was in these meetings that Darwin's belief in the rule of nature's laws over human beings was challenged with a belief in the efficacy of ideas used as manipulative instruments in controlling the social environment. Thus, the value of knowledge should be judged relative to the conduct or action it called forth.

If the discussions of the Club members, and later the theories of Dewey and his followers, served to promote value judgments as to the usefulness of knowledge, the work of the early American sociologists involved efforts to make their disciplined knowledge more useful. As Dusky Lee Smith has made clear, it was a usefulness that helped to justify and maintain the socio-economic arrangements of the prevailing system. According to Smith, American sociology's founding fathers—Lester Frank Ward, Franklin Henry Giddings, Albion Woodbury Small, Edward Alsworth Ross, and Ulysses Grant Weatherly—developed sociologies that provided ideological support for America's chaotic transition from laissez-faire to corporate capitalism. Thus, it was not simply coincidence that the first publications and university courses under the heading "sociology" appeared in the 1870s—a decade that saw the fourth in a series of economic depressions continuing
past the turn of the century, great discontent on the part of the laboring class, Rockefeller's and Carnegie's control of the petroleum and steel markets, and the rise of socialism. For in Smith's words, "The chaos of the 70's and the development of American sociology are not unrelated phenomena; rather, sociology developed within the reform movements created to salvage the capitalist system." 71

While the social Darwinism of one early sociologist, William Graham Sumner, obviously supported the basic premises of a laissez-faire capitalism, Smith argues that Sumner's contemporaries were no less enthusiastic in promoting an altered capitalism, in its corporate form, as being the socio-economic system capable of solving America's social problems. For Ward et. al., the Good Society was one in which the "nature" of "man" would be managed and controlled so as to fit the purposes of the group. In this way, by manipulating individual needs so as to make them synonymous with those of society, the transition from laissez-faire to corporate capitalism might be made in an atmosphere of peaceful adjustment. In brief, conflict, say between laborers and their employers, was to be organized into happiness by "depicting the industrial techniques of capitalism as the basis of the good life." 72

Of course, for those who for various reasons were unwilling to live this good life, submission could be encouraged through legislation--Club member Holmes, and the first sociologists as well, recognized the pragmatic power of the law to make the "dominant opinion" of the powerful effective. 73
But education, grounded in humanistic science, offered a more subtle means of eliminating the social problems threatening conformity to the requirements of the new capitalism. Thus, the early sociologists were interested in science as a method of inquiry which served both to argue for the respectability, the objectivity and value-neutrality, of their findings, and to allow them greater control over their subject matter—people. Just as the physical scientists had brought the logic of science to bear in controlling the natural environment, these social scientists hoped to employ the same method in the realm of the social. In developing a social science that could be used to manage people the first sociologists had to reconcile the humanistic tradition of their culture with the profit-making rationality of their capitalist employers. As Smith points out, this reconciliation made social science and the capitalism it served "liberal."

The liberal struggle with the humanistic tradition involves a number of potential contradictions. For example, liberals seek to reconcile the expectation of private gain with the anticipation of a day to day life in which the individual personality is of priceless value; the search for profits with the search for a public sensitivity in which the self-development of the personality is supreme; and the pursuit of personal financial wealth with the quest for a form of public policy in which each individual has an equal voice. 74

The fact that such equality did not exist was no doubt bothersome to the first sociologists. Smith argues that their sociologies are an ideological blend of science and
humanism that constitutes an attempt to solve the apparent contradiction between the objective, value-free, neutral approach of science and the subjective, value-laden, partisan character of the humanistic tradition. His comments on Ward, "the Father of American Sociology", characterize the engagement of nearly all the early sociologists with the task of scientifically organizing people through the creation and implementation of social policy:

At the base of Ward's scientific sociology was the conquest of human desires--social forces--in order to improve and better society. . . . Ward argued that if government were in the hands of social scientists [i.e., Sociocracy] it might be elevated to the rank of an applied science, and if sociological laws were followed it would be discovered that 'man is as easily managed by intelligence as . . . nature was shown to be.' 75

For Ward, applying his principles of scientific sociology would constitute a social policy capable of solving "social problems". The significant and disturbing differences between rich and poor could be resolved by rectifying the inequality of education which caused them. Likewise, that small minority of persons who either disagreed with the marketeering ideology of the prevailing socio-economic system (communists, anarchists, etc.) or misused their privileged positions of wealth within that system (certain speculators, inheritors, etc.) could be reeducated. The success of such educational efforts rested upon refinement of the science of sociology--the theoretical base of the Sociocracy. In short, the scientific organization of happiness, "the aim
of human life", was heavily dependent upon education.  

Ward's thesis was taken up by John Dewey, whose instrumentalism—anticipated by, and incorporating much of, the dialogue among Metaphysical Club members—called for the application of scientific technique in solving social problems. Dewey considered all knowledge to be hypothetical. Its value, like that of the mind itself, had to do with serviceability, with the "control of the environment in relation to the ends of the life process."  

Dewey's definition of knowledge, then, was inextricably tied to, and always verified by, experience—or as in science, experiment. Philosophy was of little value unless it could be understood in terms of, and led to, action—for when individuals act they make purposeful choices that affect their lives, interfering with conditions as they are. Thus, the struggle for existence and the resultant natural selection of the Darwinists, were always affected by human consciousness.  

For Dewey, as for Ward, this consciousness could be raised to the point where humans could control and manipulate the environment in the best interests of the collectivity. As the following passage from Sidney Fine's discussion of pragmatism makes clear, Dewey, again like Ward, placed a great deal of faith in education as the key to social reform:  

Although Dewey did not hesitate to lend his support to social reforms effected by legislation, it was to education that he looked as 'the fundamental method of social progress and reform.' "I believe," he stated in 1897,
'that education is a regulation of the process of coming to share in the social consciousness; and that the adjustment of individual activity on the basis of this social consciousness is the only sure method of social reconstruction.' Through education, Dewey believed, society could orient itself in the direction in which it desired to move. 80

This direction in the United States of 1900 involved the stormy transformation of the socio-economic order from laissez-faire to corporate capitalism. Such a transformation, as argued earlier, involves changes in social consciousness—or in other words, the way in which individuals think about themselves relative to others is closely tied to the character of the prevailing socio-economic arrangements. For both Dewey and Ward, education was instrumental in teaching people to cope with change. In short, Americans could be "educated" to regulate their individual actions so as to "share in the social consciousness"—adjusting their behavior to make it more compatible with the demands of the socio-economic system as defined by the prevailing power groups.

Probably no group of individuals was more successful in adjusting to the demands of the new corporate capitalism than the second generation of American sociologists. Building upon the work of Ward and the other founding fathers and undoubtedly influenced by the continued development of Dewey's theory, this generation was most interested in producing a useful sociology. 81 Their concern with usefulness led to an interest in social engineering which first became apparent as a response to, but at the same time fitted with, businessman
Frederick Taylor's emphasis on the scientific management of industry.

Taylor, in a 1911 publication, developed a theory of worker motivation that stressed the importance of a close relationship between material rewards and work efforts as the central factor motivating each individual to peak performance. The best method of payment, then, was piece-work wages, and Taylor's students, the time and motion engineers, attempted to find those physical motions that were the least fatiguing for workers but that also allowed them to produce to their fullest capability in the least amount of time. From Taylor's rationalistic and monetary viewpoint these were the optimum conditions for both the worker and the manager.82

The sociological response to this rather static and abstract emphasis on formal structure and rational considerations became known as the Human Relations approach. Its adherents emphasized that which the scientific management theoreticians had paid little attention to, "the informal side of bureaucracy".83 The efforts of Elton Mayo and his colleagues to reduce the high employee turnover rate in the mule-spinning department of a textile mill near Philadelphia and the Roethlisberger-Dickson investigation of management-worker relations at a Western Electric Company plant in Hawthorne, Illinois, are the most well-known studies in this tradition.84 The latter study's demonstration that non-economic
considerations (rewards) were central in motivating the workers and keeping them happy set the stage for a series of controlled experiments to determine the effects of changed conditions regarding communication, participation, and leadership patterns in small work groups. 85

While the Human Relations approach developed as a response to, and supposedly, a critique of, Scientific Management, it was not a contradictory alternative. Rather, it was a sophisticated complement to Scientific Management. 86

The proponents of each were interested in keeping workers happy by rewarding them for orderly maintenance of, and improvement in, productivity. Happy workers were productive. Happy workers were also the key to the minimization of labor-management conflict—a necessary ingredient for the development and growth of corporate capitalism. The second generation of American sociologists was without doubt genuinely interested in establishing harmonious and peaceful relations between individuals in disparate socio-economic positions; likewise, there should be absolutely no doubt about the crucial role this attempt to eliminate conflict played in serving the interests of that powerful economic elite concerned with maintaining the continuity of prevailing socio-economic arrangements. 87

To summarize, the members of the Metaphysical Club and the early American sociologists, as well as the generation of scientist-educators who followed, were busy building an
ideology that placed themselves, their disciplines, and their academies in the service of the surrounding socio-economic system. An elite group of highly sophisticated and powerful corporate capitalists was receptive to this ideology for two reasons. First, it suggested that the answers to society's problems should be sought through the development of the social sciences—an idea which was becoming increasingly reasonable to capitalists becoming wealthy from the practical application of science to technical problems. Second, and most importantly, this ideology assumed a service-oriented corps of trained scientists ever willing to make themselves available to business and industry. These scientists were to be trained in the colleges and universities dominated by these same wealthy and influential capitalists who would later employ them. Thus, the knowledge that American educators gained through their practice of science in no way threatened their elite employers; rather, it served to support and solidify this elite's privileged and controlling position within the socio-economic system—a position strengthened by the educational entrepreneurship of the twentieth century.

Useful Knowledge and the Consultant/Grantsman Role Model in Higher Education: Corporate Capitalism Encourages Applied Research 88

The educational philanthropy of the few who had amassed great fortunes between the end of the Civil War and the turn of the century became a mirror image of the socio-economic arrangements by which they had profited. Adjusting
their own financial interests to the demands of the new historical situation the business and industrial elite re-shaped higher education to fit the corporate mould. The wealthy members of this elite continued to make large, personal contributions to particular schools—for example, Baltimore merchant John Hopkins gave $3½ million to establish a university in his name; Pennsylvania steelman Andrew Carnegie gave $7 million to found a Pittsburgh technical institute bearing his name; California railroader Leland Stanford willed $24 million to build a university in his son's name; and New York oil magnate John D. Rockefeller founded and continued to support the University of Chicago with a sum of $34 million.89 In addition, the wealthy also began bestowing corporate gifts to higher education through the establishment of private foundations. Among the earliest of these foundations providing financial assistance to colleges and universities was Rockefeller's Institute for Medical Research of 1901, his General Education Board of 1902, with assets of $46 million and the Rockefeller Foundation of 1913, with assets of $154 million; the Carnegie Institution first established in 1902 led to the Carnegie Foundation of 1906, with $31 million and the Carnegie Corporation of 1911, with $151 million; and Mrs. Steven V. Harkness' Commonwealth Fund of 1918, with $43 million.90 These and the other foundations that came to characterize educational entrepreneurship in the twentieth century were significantly different from institutions preceding them—not only in the
magnitude of their total wealth, but most importantly, in
the substantial sums of money designated to support scientific
research.91

The first scientific institutions—the American
Academy of Arts and Sciences founded in 1796, the Smithsonian
Institute in 1846,92 the American Association for the
Advancement of Science (AAAS) in 1848, and the National
Academy of Sciences in 1863—provided little or no financial
support to scientific investigators. The AAAS, America's
largest scientific association, offered no research funds
whatsoever from its founding until New York philanthropist
Mrs. Elizabeth Thompson made her initial donation of $1,000
for research in 1873.93 By 1895, the rather paltry $94,000
aggregate principal of the National Academy’s research
endowment made it easily the most important single source
of scientific research grants in the United States.94 At
the turn of the century, despite a gross national product
that had more than doubled and the $153 million endowed to
higher education during the previous twenty-five years,
endowments specifically reserved for scientific research
amounted to less than $3 million.95 Carnegie alone, in
setting aside $10 million to charter the Carnegie Institution
of Washington D.C., promised to increase this amount sub-
stantially.

The Carnegie Institute (CI) can be considered the
prototype for the twentieth-century research foundation as
it was the first institution permitting scientific researchers to co-ordinate university and government science. The CI's primary emphasis was on research, reflecting its founder's wish to remedy America's "National Poverty in Science" by giving her the funds necessary to achieve a commanding position "in the domain of discovery". Accordingly, the first of six objectives in the institute's draft plan read, in part, "to increase the efficiencies of universities and other institutions... by seeking to utilize and add to their existing facilities and to aid their teachers in experimental work". A short time later, Carnegie himself—in his January 28, 1902 deed of trust—put the university clause far down the list of institute objectives and declared that the first objective was "to promote original research". Giving the trustees full authority to redirect the trust should its original design become outmoded, the CI would remain, in Carnegie's words, "an active force working by proper modes for useful ends".

Carnegie's research with a useful end soon came to characterize professorial practice shaped in the corporate image. University scientists, attracted by the efficiency of collective action, began to emulate the organizational practices of men like Carnegie and Rockefeller. An early example can be found in the work of Harvard's noted astronomy professor, Edward Pickering, who thought he could do for science what Carnegie, Rockefeller, and others had done for industry. He felt that "the same skill in organization,
combination of existing appliances, and methodical study of detail, which in recent years has revolutionized many commercial industries, should produce as great an advance in the physical sciences."  

Although Pickering's plan for endowing astronomy eventually failed, his career of scientific entrepreneurship in a corporate form foreshadowed the future of American higher education.

Metaphysical Club member, Charles Peirce, also gave strong support to the new, corporate science. In the same year (1889) that Pickering received significant financial backing for his astronomy projects from philanthropist Catherine Wolfe Bruce, Peirce defined a university for the new Century Dictionary as "an association of men for the purpose of study . . . that the theoretical problems which present themselves to the development of civilization may be resolved." When his editors expressed confusion, noting that they understood a university to be an educational institution, Peirce replied that they were "grievously mistaken, that a university had not and never had anything to do with instruction and that until we got over this idea we should not have any university in this country." Later, the first president of the Carnegie Institute, Robert S. Woodward, would develop this research emphasis at the institute so it would become, in his own words, "a university in which there are no students".

The research emphasis of the CI and other wealthy foundations encouraged professors to follow the Peirce
definition. Turning away from instructional activity they became more deeply involved with their research role as consultant/grantsman. Foundation financial support has made the research institute over which Woodward presided and the modern university nearly indistinguishable. Increasingly involved with the research apparatus that originated during the last quarter of the nineteenth century--learned journals, learned societies, university presses, and sabbatical leaves--the professors have used most of their knowledge and expertise, not to instruct students, but to help the wealthy shape higher education to fit the new, corporate socio-economic arrangements. Thus, Clark Kerr, former president of the University of California and a celebrant of today's corporate higher learning, accurately summarizes current professorial practice when he confesses that he has often thought of the university as "a series of individual faculty entrepreneurs held together by a common grievance over parking."  

Professorial concern over parking attests, among other things, to the prevalence of the consultant/grantsman role model. The rise of this model to its present predominant position as a guide for professorial practice is compatible with both early and more recent theoretical developments in American sociology. Darting back and forth from university to government to business obligations, many of today's most successful professors live Lester Ward's commitment to a social science that helps repair and thereby, sustain, corporate socio-economic arrangements. The practice of these
professors has more recently been supported by, and in turn supports, sociological theory concerning the growth of higher education in the United States. In short, as is argued in the following chapter, this sociology of higher education is itself shaped by and encourages the maintenance of today's corporate capitalism.

Conclusion

Colleges and universities in the United States have been, and continue to be, dependent for their survival upon prevailing socio-economic arrangements. The inter-relationship between knowledge and wealth has often been acknowledged and supported by those close to higher education. These acknowledgments have made clear the way in which higher education has been shaped to fit the historical transformation and maintenance of American capitalism. Thus, Francis Lieber, a pre-Civil War economist at South Carolina College, characterized the era in which he taught by noting that individual property was the "nourisher of mankind, incentive of industry, and cement of human society." Later, the Secretary of the Carnegie Institute, Charles D. Walcott, recorded a changing conception of Lieber's view--fitting old ideas concerning the individual ownership of property to the new corporate emphasis of an economic system in transformation. In a 1903 letter explaining to his employer the necessity for research to become more organized, Walcott spoke of the two basic approaches to practicing science--individualism ("the old view that one man can develop and carry
forward any line of research") and collectivism ("the modern idea of cooperation and community of effort"). In Walcott's opinion, "we might as well try to make a great research institution of the CI by pure individualism, as to expect success in great industrial enterprises by the individualism of 1850 to 1870." 107

The collectivism that Walcott argued for has replaced the "community of scholars" with a community of entrepreneur-educators interested in cooperating with big business and government to profitably market their scientific knowledge. While the universities cooperate to play the stocks with increasing proficiency, 108 becoming more dependent on the profits of large companies and consequently, more reluctant to criticize their activities, "the professors are less interested in teaching students than in yanking the levers of their new combines so that these machines will grow bigger and go faster." 109

In sum, the modern university has in large part been reduced to serving as "banker-broker for the professors' outside interests". 110 In the words of Clark Kerr, "the research entrepreneur becomes a euphoric schizophrenic." 111 This schizophrenia is not new to sociologists; instead, it is a central part of the origin and development of their science. In brief, it is this schizophrenia that helps explain the discrepancy between the sociohistorical development of colleges and universities as dependent upon, subservient to, the socio-economic system and the pluralistic contention
of the most prominent sociologists of education--discussed in the following chapter--that higher education is autonomous, a variable independent of the socio-economic system.
1. In writing of the dependency of colleges and universities upon the market economy within which they exist, it should be noted, of course, that all institutions are in some measure dependent for their survival upon arrangements characteristic of the prevailing socio-economic system. The intent of this opening sentence and the remainder of the chapter which follows is to describe and analyze this dependency relationship with specific regard to the development of American higher education.

2. There is some disagreement over which institution of higher learning should be known as the first state university in the United States. While the University of Georgia is the oldest state institution by reason of its charter date, 1785, the state did not appropriate funds directly for its support until 1881. For additional information on the "profitless dispute" over which was the first state university see John S. Brubacher and Willis Rudy, Higher Education in Transition (New York, 1950), pp. 141-142, 423.

3. Probably the best description and example, of this service orientation is Clark Kerr, The Uses of the University (New York: Harper and Row, 1964). The classic philosophical document in this regard is, of course, The Republic of Plato.


5. Ibid., p. 41.

6. For an excellent discussion, as well as definitions, of what is meant here by the terms "oppressed" and "oppressors" see Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, trans. Myra Bergman Ramos (New York: Herder and Herder, 1971), especially pp. 28-29.

7. See Williams, Contours, pp. 35 and 41.

8. Ibid., pp. 139, 161 and 164.

9. These same principles, the origins of which are to be found during this mercantilist period of capitalist development in the United States, continue to be the basis for the growth of today's corporate higher education.
9. continued.
For an informative analysis of the socio-economic back-
grounds and activities of the corporate elite engaged
in shaping this education to fit its practical concerns
see Ferdinand Lundberg, America's 60 Families (New York:
The Vanguard Press, Inc., 1937). A cursory glance at
current 60-family involvement in college/university
affairs is all that is needed for an updated reaffirmation
of Lundberg's thesis concerning the domination of American
higher education by a corporate elite. A focus on the
role of but one family alone, say the Rockefellers, in
"Education for Profit and Tax Exemption" (the title of
Lundberg's Chapter Ten) would provide a vast amount of
data. The Rockefellers continue to have a commanding
voice in the affairs of the top four universities on
Lundberg's 1933-34 list of the twenty universities and
technical colleges with the largest endowments (Lundberg,
pp. 375-377)--Harvard, Yale, Columbia, and the University
of Chicago. At Harvard and Yale, Rockefeller oil money
continues to provide the financial base which, when com-
bined with smaller contributions made by heirs to the
J.P. Morgan fortune, underwrites the major role played
by the Morgan interests in managing both universities.
The Rockefeller interests at the time of the Columbia
University uprising in 1968 were being looked after by
several "friendly" trustees, see The Guardian (New York:
The dependence of the University of Chicago, founded by
the elder J.D. Rockefeller, on the continuing financial
support of the Rockefellers is probably the most well-known
example of the family's investment in higher education.
The current Board of Trustees at Chicago reads like an
excerpt from an invitation list to a gathering of Rockefeller
family and business associates. The Rockefeller name
itself continues to be represented by Life Trustee, banker
David Rockefeller, who received his Ph.D. from Chicago,
and his nephew, Trustee John D. Rockefeller, IV.

Richard Hofstadter and Wilson Smith (Chicago: University
p. 11. Also, see "Tutor Sever's Argument on the
Constitution of Harvard College, 1723", pp. 21-27,
especially pp. 21 and 22.

11. The reader can judge by reading the entire Charter, Ibid.,
pp. 10-12.

12. Ibid., "Leverett's Answer to Sever, 1723", pp. 27-32,
especially pp. 31 and 32.
13. Individualized and specific information concerning the first Harvard Overseers is difficult to obtain. However, general statements concerning the composition of the 1650 Board of Overseers and the other boards governing Harvard in the early days make clear the fact that the Overseers were "non-residents with occupational and financial interests outside the college." Thus, Samuel Eliot Morison describes the Board of Overseers responsible for the corporate charter of 1650 as:

- a cumbersome body for the ordinary needs of college business, difficult to assemble from the different parts of the Bay Colony;
- and only one member of it, the President of the College, had any close contact with college affairs. Moreover, the President and Tutors had no security. They were merely employees of an official board, in the unfortunate position of having responsibility without power. Any and every act of their government and discipline was liable to be overruled by the Overseers. The contrast between their situation and that of English college fellows, who enjoyed almost sovereign powers within their college precincts, was humiliating.


The year before, the Corporation had taken a new departure by electing a distinguished layman, James Bowdoin, to its fellowship; and the practice then began of filling the Corporation with 'solid men of Boston'—lawyers, jurists, physicians, financiers, and an occasional statesman, bishop, or man of letters. (Tercentennial History, p. 21).


16. Ibid., p. 38.


18. Ibid., "Charters of the College of New Jersey (Princeton), 1746, 1748", pp. 82-91, especially pp. 88 and 90.

20. Ibid., "Harvard Opposes a New College in the West, 1762", p. 132.


23. Ibid., p. 118. Of course, in Jefferson's time, as in our own, the fact remains that the wealthy, because they can afford to finance a lengthy period of schooling for their children, receive a much better return on their education dollar than do the non-wealthy.

24. See S.E. Frost, Jr., Historical and Philosophical Foundations of Western Education (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Books, 1966), p. 401. Of course, the real flowering of a differentiated and practical curriculum in the junior high and high schools was not to come until the early 1900's. Two recent books underscore the importance of understanding the role played by elementary, junior high, and high schools in the development and growth of American colleges and universities. Joel H. Spring, Education and the Rise of the Corporate State (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972), notes that two principles, socialization and differentiation, have demanded the loyalty of everyone at all levels of formal schooling. In becoming socialized each individual would cooperatively acquiesce to being "tracked" according to "ability". The differentiation which resulted from, and was part of, this socialization process would help reproduce a hierarchical division of labor that would keep members of the various socio-economic classes in place generation after generation. See Spring, especially Chapters Five and Six; also, Chapters Two and Three. David N. Smith, Who Rules The Universities? (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974), also discusses these two principles with regard to the rise of high schools and teacher training in the expansion of higher education. In discussing "The Robber Barons" (Chapter Four) Smith echoes Spring when he says, "in the particular context of developing monopoly capitalism in which public education first blossomed, it was understood by the barons that the twin desires for skilled labor and a passive working class
were complementary. They dovetailed in the shaping of secondary education which took place in this era." (Smith, p. 84).


27. See Williams, Contours, pp. 200-201.

28. For a more detailed exposition, which has been heavily drawn upon in the present brief account of this case, see Frederick Rudolph, The American College and University (Toronto: Random House of Canada, 1962), pp. 207-212.


33. Ibid., pp. 39 and 40.

34. Ibid., pp. 46 and 47.

35. Ibid., pp. 47, 51 and 52.
36. Curti and Nash, *Philanthropy*, p. 65. Van Rensselaer continues his letter describing the new school in this way: "I am inclined to believe that competent instructors may be produced in the school at Troy, who will be highly useful to the community in the diffusion of a very useful kind of knowledge, with its application to the business of living." Quoted from Curti and Nash, p. 65. The authors note that Ethel M. McAllister, *Amos Eaton: Scientist and Educator* (Philadelphia, 1941), pp. 317-368, presents convincing evidence that Eaton drafted the letter for Van Rensselaer.

37. Ibid., p. 84. For a harrowing account of the violence that Armour and other meat packers loosed upon their employees see Upton Sinclair, *The Jungle* (New York: New American Library, 1906).

38. Ibid., p. 126.

39. Ibid., pp. 78-79. "MIT is now the nation's sixty-seventh largest military prime contractor, only four places behind Eastman Kodak on the list of war profiteers." Quoted from David N. Smith, *Who Rules?*, p. 92.


42. The Morrill Act required that the "peoples colleges" hold as their principal object an honored place for the "useful sciences". The legislation promised each state that agreed to the terms of the Act 30,000 acres of federal land for each of its senators and representatives or "federal land scrip" to be used for buying equivalent acreage in another state. The sale of this acreage was to provide a capital fund invested by the state in order to pay 5 percent annually in support of the college. Each participating state had 5 years within which to provide "at least not less than one college" or the grant would cease. The second Morrill Act of 1890 greatly strengthened the original legislation by providing annual appropriations for land-grant colleges and stimulating state legislatures to do likewise. This Act was amended in 1905 and 1907 and further supplemented by the Smith-Lever Act of 1914 and the Smith-Hughes Act of 1917. Together these acts provided funds to land-grant colleges offering vocational education and teacher training in home economics, agriculture, and trades. In addition to
the Morrill Act and its many amendments, another piece of legislation contributing to the state university movement was the Hatch Act of 1887. This act allowed for federal funds to be allocated for the creation of agricultural experimental stations to support pioneering experiments of natural scientists. Finally, it should be noted that two other major acts relating to agriculture, besides the Morrill Act, were passed by Congress in 1862. One act established the U.S. Department of Agriculture while the other, the Homestead Act, offered millions of acres of land to settlers at little initial cost other than a small filing fee. For further information about the Morrill and Hatch Acts and similar legislation see excerpts from "The Morrill Act, 1862", in Hofstadter and Smith, American Higher Education, Vol. II, pp. 568-569; "The Development of the Land-Grant Colleges and Universities and Their Influence on the Economic and Social Life of the People", West Virginia University Bulletin (Morgantown: West Virginia University Office of Publications, 1963), especially, Helen G. Canoyer, "The Changing Role of Home Economics", pp. 97-114; and Rudolph, The American College and University, pp. 247, 249-253, and 261.

There should be no doubt about the important part the Morrill Act played in this growth of an increasingly secularized and practical higher education; by 1961 there were 69 American colleges being supported by the Morrill Act and related legislation. However, the importance of the Act is often incorrectly interpreted due to a less than full appreciation of the socio-economic arrangements within which the legislation took shape. Rudolph, for example, correctly points out that "the institution that did probably the most to change the outlook of the American people toward college-going was the land-grant college, creation of the Morrill Federal Land Grant Act of 1862." (Rudolph, p. 247) In other words, the Act did, as Congressman Morrill had intended it should, "promote the liberal and practical education of the industrial classes in the several pursuits and professions of life." But this statement needs a good deal of elaboration—it needs to be placed within its socio-economic context. As the major argument of the present chapter suggests, the Morrill Act should be properly viewed as simply a public and legal acknowledgement by the government of the successful efforts of an industrial elite to develop an increasingly practical higher education. Thus, Rudolph himself later in his book points out: "In the end, what sold agricultural education to the American farmer and overcame the hostility of the Grange was evidence that scientific
agriculture paid in larger crops, higher income, and a better chance to enjoy higher living standards—in other words, an opportunity to make frequent use of the Montgomery Ward or Sears Roebuck catalogue." (p.261)

The "elective system" that the Morrill Act and related legislation encouraged has been well-analyzed by Richard Hofstadter in the following summary statement: "The elective system seemed like an academic transcription of liberal capitalist thinking for it added to the total efficiency of society by conforming to the principle of division of intellectual labor." Cited in David N. Smith, Who Rules?, p. 77. Smith has taken this quote from Hofstadter and C. DeWitt Hardy, The Development and Scope of Higher Education in the United States part I (New York: Columbia University Press, 1952), p. 50.

The Yale Report was written as the reply of the Yale Corporation and faculty to Connecticut critics of the classical college curriculum—these critics specifically opposed retaining the "dead" languages. Interestingly, The Report in shortened form as well as an endorsement by a committee of the Yale Corporation were published in the January, 1829 edition of the famous magazine founded and operated by Professor Silliman, The American Journal of Science and Arts.


Ibid., pp. 287-288. For an excellent analysis of the way in which formal schooling helps the wealthy to adorn society, move in the more intelligent circles, and apply their wealth so as to honor themselves and benefit their country, see E. Digby Baltzell, Philadelphian Gentlemen (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958), Chapter XII entitled "Education and Status Ascription". Baltzell's summary of the founding and expansion of the University of Pennsylvania by Trustees who were "Proper Philadelphians" (pp. 320-326) is greatly expanded upon in Edward Potts Cheyney, History of the University of Pennsylvania 1740-1940 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1940).

For more information on the development of a scientific curriculum at Princeton and Union see Rudolph, pp. 113-114.
51. Ibid., p. 69.

52. Ibid., p. 70, for the quoted phrase and more information about Lord.


54. A growing number of lyceums (3,000 in 1835) and libraries dealt to a large extent with science and its applications—the "commoner", the non-scientist, was becoming greatly interested in the relationship between science and technology. For an interesting comment on the popularity among laypersons of the knowledge as useful doctrine as reflected in their creation of societies "for the diffusion of useful knowledge", see Charles Weiner, *Science and Higher Education*, *Science and Society in the United States*, eds. Van Tassel and Hall, p. 167. For a more complete discussion of the popularization of scientific and technical knowledge during this period see Merle Curti, *The Growth of American Thought* (New York, 1964), pp. 335-357. Also, see Rudolph, Chapter 10, "Jacksonian Democracy and the Colleges".


61. See Williams, *Contours*, especially pp. 246-263.

62. Ibid., p. 260.
63. Ibid., p. 250. For a brief, but informative early history of this definition of freedom as it evolved in the courts so as to encourage corporate philanthropy, see Howard S. Miller, The Legal Foundations of American Philanthropy 1776-1844 (Madison: The State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1961).

64. See Curti and Nash, Philanthropy, pp. 74-75. For a more detailed discussion of the rise of business education in the colleges and universities and the roles played by both Wharton and John D. Rockefeller, see David N. Smith, Who Rules?, pp. 81-83. For more information on the entire Wharton family, see Baltzell, Philadelphia Gentlemen.

65. The phrase "learned professionals" is taken from C. Wright Mills, Sociology and Pragmatism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969). This book contains a thorough discussion of the pragmatic outlook shared by these men who called themselves the Metaphysical Club, see pp. 84-116.

66. Ibid., pp. 114-115. Mills provides excellent and very complete analyses of the pragmatism of Metaphysical Club members Charles Peirce and William James in Parts II and III.

67. Ibid., pp. 115-116.


70. Ibid., p. 402.

71. Ibid., p. 402. Some of the most well-known among these reform movements that Smith refers to include the I.W.W., the Socialists, the syndicalists, and the American anarchists.

72. Ibid., p. 416.


76. Ibid., pp. 146-150 and 154-155. For the primary source see Lester F. Ward, Applied Sociology: A Treatise on the Conscious Improvement of Society By Society (Boston: Ginn and Company, 1906). For a brief discussion of how the sociology of Albion Small was influenced by, and became a part of, the Ward perspective see J. Dorfman, Veblen, pp. 92-93.


78. Ibid., p. 284, for a similar discussion. For Dewey's work upon which this interpretation is based see My Pedagogic Creed (New York, 1897), p. 14; "The Significance of the Problem of Knowledge", in The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy and Other Essays in Contemporary Thought (New York, 1910), pp. 271-304.


80. Fine, Laissez Faire, p. 288. For the quotes from Dewey in their original context see My Pedagogic Creed, p. 16. For more information on Dewey and a brief, but excellent, discussion of the way in which adjustment of individual activity to the social consciousness was accomplished in Dewey's laboratory school at the University of Chicago, see Spring, Education and Corporate State, especially pp. 50-54.

81. For example, see Robert E. L. Faris, Chicago Sociology 1920-1932 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970) for a discussion of the way in which the second generation of sociologists at the University of Chicago developed a useful sociology built largely upon the work of founding father Albion W. Small.

83. What is meant by this phrase is well-documented by Peter M. Blau, *Bureaucracy in Modern Society* (New York: Random House, 1956) Chapter Three; its origination can be traced to Charles H. Page, "Bureaucracy's Other Face", *Social Forces*, 1946, pp. 88-94.


87. Again see Baritz, *Servants of Power*. A sociology that helped establish harmonious and peaceful relations between individuals in disparate socio-economic positions was commensurate with the corporate liberalism of the representatives of the capitalist elite. Gerard Swope, to take only one example from among many, rose to his positions as President and Chairman of the Board at General Electric Company by arguing for the existence of unions as the means to better management-labor relations. Centralized unions and happy workers promised to reduce the industrial strife so harmful to the development and growth of corporate capitalism. Swope's work in providing a more stable domestic environment for the maturation of corporate capitalism permitted his son, Gerard Jr. (legal counsel), to turn his attention to the regulation of General Electric's international trade. For an informative paragraph on the relationship between General Electric and American institutions of higher learning see David N. Smith, *Who Rules?*, p. 123; for details on a specific computer consortium Dartmouth has with General Electric see James Ridgeway, *The Closed Corporation: American Universities in Crisis* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1966), pp. 50-52.

88. The term consultant/grantsman is left in the singular to emphasize the generic sense, referring to female as well as male professors, in which it is used.

manufacturers and industrialists, see Chapter Ten in its entirety, "Academic Freedom and Big Business". Of particular interest to this author is the dismissal of economist-sociologist E. A. Ross, who held views that contradicted those of his employer, Jane Stanford, widow of railroad millionaire Leland Stanford. Ross was dismissed because in a public speech he reprimanded business for some of its excesses. The criticism by Ross, in which he urged municipal ownership of the railroads and a ban on Oriental immigration, does not invalidate Dusky Lee Smith's contention that the sociology formulated by Ross and the other early American sociologists provided ideology for the growth of corporate capitalism (see note 69). Rather, what this criticism and the resulting dismissal underscore is the domination of wealthy corporate capitalists over higher education. In short, a professor teaching at a university founded by a railroad robber baron whose fortune was built on free ("coolie") labor was not going to be permitted to urge municipal ownership of utilities and a ban on Oriental immigration. For more details concerning the Ross case see pp. 421, 432, and 436-445.

Ibid., pp. 413-414. The General Education Board, to which Rockefeller's "gifts" ultimately totaled over $129 million, offers an excellent illustration of the way in which powerful and wealthy capitalists control and shape higher education in the United States. Conducting a study of colleges in the United States, the Board concluded that there were too many of them. However, any problems engendered by this surplus of institutions could be worked out by the "natural law" of competition among these schools to attract survival money. The Board proceeded to "influence" this natural law, using the millions of dollars it controlled to grant salvation to those colleges that had developed policies and programs acceptable to the Board. See Curti and Nash, Philanthropy, p. 216. For a rather complete and current guide to U.S. foundations--both the "granting" and "operating" types (p. 39)--and a discussion of differences among them, see Harold Orleans, The Nonprofit Research Institute (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1972).

It should be noted, however, that this research money made available through philanthropic "gifts" amounts to a very small proportion of the total wealth of the rich. Thus, that the organized philanthropy of a few individuals among the wealthy resulted in a sizeable increase in the face value of educational "gifts" is truth which should be accompanied by a less well-known fact. The fact is that as capitalism in its corporate
91. continued.
form became solidified during the post-Civil War rise
of the industrialists and bankers, the trend of philan-
thropic and charitable "giving" in relation to all income
and other expenditures continued to be downward. See
Lundberg, 60 Families, pp. 320-323; also see pp. 325-327
for a list of the twenty largest foundations and the
income distribution of the twenty most active foundations
in 1934. Lundberg also provides an excellent discussion
that explains why "giving", "gifts", and like terms should
be placed within quotation marks (see pp. 328-335).
Further, in his discussion of common misinterpretations
which exaggerate the amounts as well as the apparent
motivation of Rockefeller Institute benefactions (pp.346-
355), Lundberg makes a noteworthy point concerning the
size of families and the establishment of foundations.
The presence of several children in a family of wealth
often acts as a "tax break" substitute to the establishment
of philanthropic foundations. Thus, the philanthropic
Rockefeller Sr. had only one son. The son who had six sons
of his own might be expected to have had less need to be
philanthropic because he could spread his tax liability
among several persons. Lundberg found that in 1934 and
1936 the son did not transfer any of his taxable surplus
to the several foundations under his control (see p. 355).

92. For an excellent analysis of the origins of the Smith-
sonian, including a discussion of the controversy over
whether the Institute should develop a research or a
library emphasis, see Howard S. Miller, Dollars for
Research: Science and Its Patrons in Nineteenth-Century
America (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1970),
pp. 9-23.

93. Ibid., pp. 127-129, for further information on Thompson's
philanthropy.

94. Ibid., p. 127.

95. Ibid., p. 132. It should be noted that this sum was
much more modest than might appear, for nearly half of
it was given to one science alone--astronomy. For current
data on endowments to higher education and financial
support for research and development in the United States,
see David N. Smith, Who Rules?, Chapter 7 entitled
It is common knowledge that since 1950 governmental
spending on research and development has grown at an
extremely rapid rate (pp. 165-166). However, it is worth
emphasizing, as is indicated in the table on expenditures
for American higher education from 1920-1963 (p. 164),
how remarkably well "donations" from private sources have
95. continued. 
kept pace with the tremendous increase in public expenditures. This fact indicates the inadvisability of placing too much stress on a separation between "private" and "public". For the two merge as the result of the daily activities of a wealthy, dominant elite and as Smith points out, "the capitalist class would greatly prefer to let the state continue financing basic research rather than shoulder the burden itself." (pp. 168-169)

96. Miller, Dollars for Research, p. 167. In speaking of the CI as prototype for twentieth-century research foundations, Carnegie's predecessor, George Peabody, should not be forgotten. His contributions to science, resulting in the establishment of the famous museum that bears his name, are evidence of his practicing the Gospel of Wealth long before Carnegie coined the phrase and elaborated the doctrine (see Miller, pp. 138-140).

97. Ibid., p. 172.

98. Ibid., p. 173.


100. For an excellent analysis of the dominance Carnegie and Rockefeller exercised over the development and growth of American higher education see David N. Smith, Who Rules?, Chapter 5, pp. 94-111. Smith describes this domination in the following manner:
    In the first three decades of this century, the essence of what Carnegie and Rockefeller achieved can be described as the standardization of American universities and colleges. Confronted by a situation in which hundreds of institutions fought with each other for survival, Carnegie and Rockefeller decided to work for the systematic transformation of American higher education from an unstructured and disorganized welter of universities loosely serving the robber barons to a tightly knit system of higher education systematically serving corporate capitalism. Their method was simple and effective. From the hundreds of colleges competing for funds, they chose to invest in only a handful, imposing stringent conditions as they did so. The result of this policy was that colleges and universities favored by the foundations thrived, while other, less fortunate institutions either withered on the vine or struggled along in obscurity . . . . Thus, during the crucial formative years at the beginning of this century, the biggest of the big robber barons were allowed to define and
100. continued. control American higher education (pp. 94-95).
Also, see Lundberg, *60 Families*, Chapter 10, for details concerning the Rockefeller-Morgan alliance which continues to dominate several leading universities in the United States.


102. *Ibid.*, p. 162. It should be noted that Peirce failed to deal with the possibility that some women might have desired to be included as part of his association for the purpose of study.


104. Thus, the Mellon Institute, a part of the University of Pittsburgh from 1913 to 1927, in 1967 merged with the Carnegie Institute of Technology to form the Carnegie-Mellon University. Over a decade earlier, in 1954, the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research had become Rockefeller University. See Orlans, *Nonprofit Research Institute*, p. 30 and pp. 152-154. For an informative bibliography and data that provide the basis for a composite picture of the socio-economic backgrounds and educational attitudes of the trustees who currently sit on the governing boards of American colleges and universities, see Rodney T. Hartnett, "Trustee Power in America", *Power and Authority: Transformation of Campus Governance*, eds. Harold L. Hodgkinson and L. Richard Meeth (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Inc., 1971), pp. 25-38. In considering who the trustees are Hartnett writes:

Trustees, as a group, are quite wealthy. More than half have annual incomes exceeding $30,000, and at private universities 49 percent have an annual income of $75,000 or more. Many are business executives. At private universities, for example, nearly half are executives of manufacturing, merchandising, or investment firms. The overwhelming majority are male, white, Protestant, and in their fifties and sixties. Politically, they tend to regard themselves as moderate Republicans. In 1968 approximately two-thirds of them said their political and social views were similar to those of Richard Nixon and Nelson Rockefeller. Although there is some evidence of changes in the composition of many governing boards since 1968--particularly in the direction of including more women, blacks, and people under forty--the preceding statements would still hold up as quite accurate, general descriptions of American college and university trustees in 1970. (p. 28)
105. Kerr, Uses of the University, p. 20.


108. The way in which this cooperation sustains the dependency of colleges and universities upon the continued well-being of the socio-economic system is clearly evident in the report of a nonprofit corporation known as the Common Fund. The Fund, managing the endowments of 216 colleges and preparatory schools, ended its first year (1971-72) with a profit yield on members' investments of 12.8 per cent. This figure exceeded by two full percentage points the stock market's average for 1971-72 of 10.8 per cent. The $2.3 million grant that permitted the Common Fund to begin its operations came from the Ford Foundation, whose president, McGeorge Bundy, first suggested that smaller colleges and universities might get better performance from their endowments by permitting stock market experts to manage their pooled resources. Once again, the importance of the research foundation, the representative of the corporate economy to higher education, in determining which colleges and universities will survive and/or thrive is underscored. A brief summary of the 1971-72 Common Fund Report is in The New York Times, Sunday, October 1, 1972, p. 28.


110. Ibid., p. 193. For a similar statement concerning the role of "think tank" employees as "agents", rather than creators, of new knowledge and discovery, see Paul Dickson, Think Tanks (New York: Atheneum, 1971), p. 28.

111. Kerr, Uses of the University, p. 59.
CHAPTER II


The education-as-autonomous argument is based upon the assumption that the school has become the central institution of the American social system. Recently, this assumption has been much discussed as the major theme of Ivan Illich's book, *Deschooling Society*. For Illich, schooling is a "hidden curriculum" that confuses "teaching with learning, grade advancement with education, a diploma with competence, and fluency with the ability to say something new."¹ Consequently, Americans must "deschool" because students are "schooled" to mistake service for value, thereby legitimating and recreating the privilege and power of the schooled within existent institutional arrangements. Illich writes:

> In a basic sense, schools have ceased to be dependent on the ideology professed by any government or market organization .... In other words, schools are fundamentally alike in all countries, be they fascist, democratic or socialist, big or small, rich or poor .... In view of this identity, it is illusory to claim that schools are, in any profound sense, dependent variables. This means that to hope for fundamental change in the school system as an effect of conventionally conceived social or economic change is also an illusion. Moreover, this illusion grants the school--the reproductive organ of a consumer society--almost unquestioned immunity. ²

While Illich bemoans this almost unquestioned immunity of the schools, for him it is this same immunity that renders
the schools, as independent variables, capable of fundamentally altering the present socio-economic system. He makes this view of social change most explicit:

Schools have alienated man from his learning . . . . He does not trust his own judgment, and even if he resents the judgment of the educator, he is condemned to accept it and to believe that he cannot change reality. The converging crisis of ritual schooling and of acquisitive knowledge raises the deeper issue of the tolerability of life in an alienated society. If we formulate principles for alternative institutional arrangements and an alternative emphasis in the conception of learning, we will also be suggesting principles for a radically alternative political and economic organization. 3

This argument that assumes changes in the educational, rather than the economic, institution to be fundamental in changing the larger social system is supported by, among others, Burton R. Clark, David Riesman, and Christopher Jencks--three of the most prominent sociologists currently observing the growth of higher education in the United States. Yale's Professor Clark, having been chosen eleven years ago to write the education chapter in what has become the standard source book for sociologists, The Handbook of Modern Sociology, and two years ago to chair the education session at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, could be considered the foremost expert on higher education among professional sociologists. For Clark, American colleges and universities are more than just autonomous with respect to the larger socio-economic system; rather, like Illich, he argues that higher education has become an "active force"
shaping this system.\footnote{4}

For the past twenty years, Professor Riesman, currently dividing his working-day between Harvard University and the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, has made an argument similar to, and supportive of, Clark’s "active" view of higher education. He contends that the modern university maintains a relatively independent existence apart from the other institutions that comprise the American social system. Moreover, like Clark, Riesman argues that the growth and development of the scientific disciplines, the "racecourses of the mind", has produced an academic revolution that is in large part responsible for shaping the current socio-economic order.

Riesman’s former collaborator, Professor Jencks, currently apportioning his work time between Harvard and the Center for Educational Policy Research, has recently added a somewhat unique variation to their education-as-autonomous argument. According to Jencks, accidents rather than schools are central to the maintenance of the current social system. Jencks continues to conceive of the school as autonomous— independent of existent socio-economic arrangements—likening the school to the nuclear family while presenting evidence that questions the effect of schooling with regard to income and occupational inequalities among individuals.

In short, it is the argument of this chapter that these inequalities are preserved by the work of the three sociologists reviewed here; Clark, Riesman, and Jencks, like
Illich, by reasoning higher education to be largely independent of the surrounding socio-economic system seem to have obligated themselves to play a supportive role in legitimating and sustaining that system. This obligation is, at least in part, a result and a reflection of their commitment to a pluralistic view of the structure of power in the United States; summarily stated, a view that assumes a rather wide dispersion of power among a rather large number of people representing a variety of groups and issues. Focusing on the dispersion and variety of power their analyses share a characteristic common to most pluralists--failure to see the "big picture". Thus, each author makes higher education autonomous, separating colleges and universities from the socio-economic context within which they are created and maintained; the result is the legitimation, and thereby recreation, of the current socio-economic system.

The Pluralism of Burton R. Clark: Colleges and Universities as "Active Agents" and Cultural Innovation

Burton Clark begins his discussion of education in the "expert society" by noting the increased public concern over education's role in an age marked by the second scientific revolution; civic clubs, professional associations, academic disciplines, and a variety of other interested groups all seem to be out to "save education"--to make it relevant to a world transformed by atomic energy and computers. Clark argues that this concern is not misplaced for "technology with a vengeance" will continue to alter the role of education in today's society. "The effect of technological advance is
to increase the pre-eminence and power of the expert, and with this, to increase the commitment of education to technical and professional preparation.\textsuperscript{7}

This task of preparing future experts is, according to Clark, consistent with the traditional function of the educational institution as it continues to become "society's main vehicle of cultural indoctrination". For Clark, it is clear that "society expects education to do its bidding, transmitting a heritage and preparing the next generation in approved ways."\textsuperscript{8} However, he notes that fulfillment of these expectations is complicated by the pluralism of American society; "the volume of knowledge is large, groups differ over what should be taught, and the general values of society contain many contradictions."\textsuperscript{9} Thus, responsibility for determining educational policy rests with an ever-increasing variety of groups having different interests and ideas about questions regarding "what to teach, who shall be educated, the direction of change".\textsuperscript{10} In brief, Clark argues that both professors and students are becoming increasingly important educational interest groups formulating and answering these and similar questions as "education in a technological society becomes itself an active force, one of the important institutions in innovation and in changing what men think."\textsuperscript{11}

What men and women—-to include that half of the population forgotten in the Clark analysis—think is not, however, a matter that is completely relative to and dependent
upon changing opinions of the various interest groups. For although Clark argues that the quality of excellence of the cultural material transmitted by formal schooling cannot be judged by absolute standards, he also contends that "there are major pockets of social agreement." Thus, Clark believes "an observer can roughly assess quality in education on the basis of its appropriateness for the requirements of adulthood." Accordingly, on the next page Clark informs his readers: "In this book I attempt to edge toward a 'clinical' judgment of quality, on the basis of how adequately education prepares the young for adult life." 

By assuming this relationship between quality in education and preparation for adult life, Clark also assumes the legitimacy of, and helps to recreate, the current socio-economic system within which adult life in the United States is lived. These assumptions are a logical extension of Clark's view that there is a second scientific revolution--different in kind from the first, the industrial revolution--responsible for producing a society of trained experts. As the title of his book indicates (Educating the Expert Society), Clark assumes the expert society and a quality education that is independent of, but trains potential experts to fill vacancies within, the larger socio-economic system. In short, students receive an education that encourages them to emulate Clark, who neglects questions concerning the developing character of American society in favor of inquiries that focus analysis on problems of training experts to serve
This emphasis upon training experts in numerous specialities is in keeping with Clark's pluralistic view of American society—a view that is strengthened by his conception of professors and students as interest groups important in restructuring society. Thus, according to Clark, education should no longer be seen as merely a "passive instrument" doing society's bidding, but rather, as an "active force" shaping the social system. He claims that three facts characterizing the operation and effects of present-day schooling support this argument that the educational institution is now a "prime contributor to change in society": Education 1) produces new culture, 2) liberalizes attitudes, and 3) differentiates culture.

Clark argues his first point, education produces new culture, by stressing "the increasingly large role of the university as an inventor of knowledge and technique." He supports this statement by citing statistics that emphasize the development of the university as a research center; these statistics are in turn used to assert that colleges and universities serve as 'centers of innovation and change, of investigation of the application of knowledge to current needs, and of re-examination and criticism of society.'

Clark might have had cause to re-examine this assertion concerning the role of university research in bringing together, in fostering a connection between, innovation and
criticism, had he attempted to specify whose "current needs" are served by "the application of knowledge". Such an examination might have tempered his active view of professors: "Oriented to critical thought and set apart from many pressures of the market place, academic men can and do become free intellectuals, critical and innovating." In brief, Clark's failure to examine professorial practice---"the topic of teaching as a profession is barely broached, being touched upon only here and there in an offhand fashion"---conveniently permits him to posit a new interest group, the "free intellectuals"; convenient, because in this way, Clark is able to add increased variety to his pluralistic model of American society.

The tolerance required to sustain this pluralism seems to be developed in large part, according to Clark, in the classroom. In presenting evidence to support this second point in his active argument, schooling liberalizes attitudes, Clark emphasizes the fact that "a growing body of evidence indicates that education leads toward tolerant and humanitarian attitudes." For Clark, then, the proof that validates his "education as an active agent" argument is found not only in the research orientation of universities staffed by free intellectuals, but also in the development of tolerant attitudes among students. However, in his determination to emphasize a positive relationship between education and tolerant attitudes, Clark seems either to be ignorant of, or to simply ignore, other explanations which
might question his tolerance conclusion.

For example, in citing studies that find a positive relationship between amount of formal schooling and more liberal student attitudes toward ethnic and racial groups, Clark fails to inform his readers of a most significant fact; namely, that much of the social science literature on stereotyping shows stereotypic images are reassessed, and often lose their coherence, with increased contact between the typer and the typed. Consequently, the liberal, and supposedly more tolerant, attitudes found among certain college graduates—attitudes that Clark attributes to their time spent in the classroom—may simply reflect the separation and isolation of their lives from those of most Blacks, Indians, and other minorities.

Similarly, Clark's emphasis upon scientific studies that show a positive relationship between education and liberal attitudes toward a democratic political system may reflect a tolerance that need never be practiced by the tolerant. Thus, it might be rather easy to be "democratic" when a college education has certified one to be part of the management group of administrative technocrats, than when one is part of the managed group of laborers. Further, it might not be terribly difficult to sustain a favorable belief in a multiparty political system (regarded by many observers as the most important measure of democratic attitudes) when reality continues to become increasingly uni-dimensional—when the choice is between "tweedle-dee" and "tweedle-dum".
both owing allegiance to that small number of powerful individuals who, in governing America, have pre-selected the group from which the candidates themselves are chosen. In such an environment, most college-graduate liberals can be fairly confident that the defeat of a personal preference at the polls will not lead to changes in the prevailing socio-economic order which might threaten their privileged positions; for the most successful and very powerful capitalists are not likely to radically alter current corporate arrangements that create and confirm the value configuration of a culture profitable to them.

This culture, according to Clark, becomes increasingly differentiated—the third point in his active argument—as tolerant (more liberal) students continue to be trained by free (critical and innovating) intellectuals. For Clark the major reason why education differentiates culture is the fact that after a certain number of years common schooling gives way to individual preparation for an occupation. Fast becoming characteristic of modern technological society—that is, the United States—is the replacement of higher education's "integrative function" which emphasized a core curriculum with training in diverse disciplines for specialized occupations. What results is, according to Clark, "the widening cultural split between men of science and men of the humanities".26

Such a split is to be expected because: "The specialization trend, which is irreversible, means that
individuals are allocated to a widening spectrum of adult subcultures that are hooked to occupational subworlds." This specialization, and the pluralism that it implies, is in Clark's view accentuated by the academy itself, through "the process of fields giving rise to subfields" and "variation in the character" of the more than 2,000 colleges in the United States. For Clark, the many types of colleges--the Protestant, the Catholic, the liberal-arts, the state, and so on--"represent a cultural diversity in themselves; they educate and train differently, and their 'products' are not of a piece." Once again, Clark's emphasis on pluralism--supposedly evident in higher education's diversity--seems to infer causal connections that are, at best, highly questionable. For example, the fact that colleges and universities are increasingly involved in attempting to train students for work in a wide variety of fields, should not necessarily lead to the conclusion that these students are less and less like one another. On the contrary, it could be that students--largely because of the way (how) they are taught, not what they are taught--and their schools are growing more and more alike.

This interpretation, however, no matter how closely it corresponds with current experience among those involved in higher education, could never be subscribed to by Clark. For to accept this view is to question the pluralism of American society, severely diminishing the supposed power
of various student and faculty interest groups by emphasizing their inability to implement the educational changes they desire. Similarly, if it could not be argued that education was in large part responsible for producing liberal student attitudes, the validity of a pluralistic model of the power structure in the United States would again be a matter for scepticism. Likewise, the research orientation of colleges and universities must produce free, rather than 'bought and sold', intellectuals if the pluralistic doctrine is to remain unquestioned.

Moreover, the pluralism that makes education active can also, according to Clark, solve the problems of the educational institution. For example, if students are becoming more and more alike and this is perceived as a problem, pluralism will provide a solution. Thus, what Clark refers to as "mass processing" in higher education—the lengthy registration line, the large lecture hall, and the anonymous graduation—can be countered if colleges and universities can create: "Excitement, identification, a sense of belonging to a different organization—these are means by which some high schools and colleges reach and shape their students." These are the means by which Clark sees membership for the mass transformed into "an exciting rather than a routine matter."

For Clark, then, pluralism as a problem producer is also its own problem-solving antidote. The pluralism that will make higher education "more dispersed and disparate" in the future—"a crazy quilt patched with materials of varied hue and size"—will also provide educational leaders trained to "counter drift with design by building organizations and fashion—
ing programs that steer change in desired directions." Clark argues that it is the special interest in education—as opposed to economics, politics, religion—which empowers this leadership group to give direction, to make higher education exciting rather than routine.

The pluralism that separates education from economics, from politics, from religion and so on, is commensurate with Clark's view that higher education is an "active agent". This view in turn reaffirms the basic assumption of pluralism, that there is a rather wide dispersion of power within current socio-economic arrangements, by making higher education autonomous. Pluralism joins individuals involved in higher learning to various educational interest groups, each group possessing—dependent upon the congruity between interests and the issue in question—a relative measure of influence and autonomy. In Clark's words, "Autonomous agencies can be critical and innovative; dependent ones usually cannot." Thus, the pluralism that supports and is supported by his active argument—colleges and universities are "centers of innovation and change"—permits Clark to make higher education autonomous by definition.

In sum, not only does Clark's pluralism make institutions of higher learning autonomous, innovative; it is also a blueprint for managing the innovations. Change is directed, the future anticipated, by a pluralistic view of the power structure that has become a mechanism of self-service. It is a mechanism that is scientifically applied by trained experts.
to predict and correct those problems which might prevent the supposed pluralistic base of the present social system from being brought into the future. Free intellectuals and their tolerant students not only connect today and tomorrow by solving the problems of transition from one to the other, but in so doing they shape the future in the image of the present. In this way, the routine can be made more exciting— that is, more pluralistic—and if leaders feel it is necessary, the exciting more routine. Thus, change becomes the current order as pluralism, like Clark's sociology that reaffirms it, supports the existent socio-economic arrangements of today's corporate capitalism.

The Pluralism of David Riesman: Academic Disciplines as "Racecourses of the Mind" and Academic Revolution

David Riesman, like Clark, has long been concerned with higher education's role in directing cultural change; as early as 1956, he made known his concern that the leading American universities were "directionless . . . as far as major innovations are concerned." Riesman, like Clark, charts a direction for universities by using his pluralistic view of the American social system to make higher education active and autonomous. In brief, Riesman argues that the universities themselves, by virtue of the fact that they house what he calls "the intellectual veto groups", will be increasingly responsible for determining the direction of higher learning in the United States.
Implicit in all I have said is the notion that what my collaborators and I speak of in *The Lonely Crowd* as the 'veto groups,' the political and social blocs and groupings that frustrate political action in the United States, operate also in the intellectual realm, in terms of departments and fields. Each prevents the others from growing too big, from encompassing too much. While it takes tremendous energy and courage and vision to inaugurate a new field . . . the nationalistic investments of less courageous and less dogmatic men can serve to maintain an old field and even to give its development a certain autonomy. 37

Thus, "the push and pull" of disciplines as veto groups (pluralism) helps provide autonomous, yet balanced, direction to the directionless universities. Allowing for both the development of old fields and the inauguration of new ones, the academic disciplines serve as both mediators and "evocators"; 38 they both constrain and add variety, balancing and blending academic parochialism with creativity. The Riesman emphasis is, however, on constraint and not creativity; the disciplines become, in his words, "the racecourses of the mind." 39 Rather than encouraging professors and students to create new courses, the Riesman emphasis views the disciplines as keeping them on course by "stabilizing the market for ideas, policing it to some extent and thus controlling the worst charlatanry, and making large-scale reorganizations of large-scale universities about as difficult as comparable re-organizations in the political realm." 40

Over the past two decades, Riesman with the help of, among others, Christopher Jencks, has reiterated this thesis that the veto power possessed by professors trained on one
of a variety of racecourses permits them to direct and shape higher education. The power of professors, then, as in the Clark analysis, is due to the fact that they are specialized experts; while the very existence and proliferation of these numerous specialities seems to be the fact upon which Riesman reaffirms his commitment to pluralism. Thus, fifteen years after his initial discussion of the racecourses, Riesman restates his view that: "Looked at in comparative and historical perspective, American higher education is astonishingly pluralistic."\(^{41}\)

According to Jencks and Riesman, this academic pluralism is fast becoming transformed by the professors into power. The power of academic pluralism prohibits the wishes of such interest groups as clinical psychologists and psychiatrists, corporate administrators, engineers, state legislators, students, and even educators themselves,\(^{42}\) from falling outside the boundaries demarcated by the professors' racecourses. Consequently, Jencks and Riesman argue that this variety of groups—each group holding quite different ideas about education—has "ended up pursuing increasingly convergent goals by ever more similar means."\(^{43}\) The major reason for this convergence is "the colleges' universal preference for undergraduate faculty trained in the standard disciplines at the leading national graduate schools."\(^{44}\) In brief, it is the growth and development of academic power in shaping higher education—"the academic profession increasingly determines the character of undergraduate education in
America"\textsuperscript{45} that Jencks and Riesman refer to as The Academic Revolution.

This revolution, while controlling the power of several interest groups outside the university, seems to be largely confined to the campus; in brief, it seems to have brought about few, if any, changes in the prevailing socio-economic arrangements of corporate capitalism. The conclusion that there is or ever could be revolution arising from, and confined almost solely to, the universities may be yet another artifact of a commitment to pluralism that encourages the authors to disregard the interrelationships between education and other societal institutions. Thus, while Jencks and Riesman introduce their analysis by claiming that the problem to which they have addressed themselves is "the relationship between higher education and American society",\textsuperscript{46} this relationship is quickly submerged by their concern with the supposed growing influence of the academic disciplines on the development of higher education. In backing Riesman's racecourse thesis, the authors seem to have forgotten who owns the tracks; more than likely, they never knew. For the pluralism of academic veto groups, like Clark's education-as-active argument, makes it unlikely that Jencks and Riesman would look beyond the academy and its racecourses to the power structure of the larger socio-economic system; instead, as with Clark, they see higher education as autonomous.

In fact, according to Jencks and Riesman, the university is more than autonomous, it is fast becoming the most funda-
The American graduate school has become the envy of the world, a mecca for foreign students and a model for foreign institutions. It has also become one of the central institutions of American culture. The university has, indeed, become the new Maecenas, and its decisions to give or withhold patronage shape much of American life. What the graduate schools define as "research" will get done; what they exclude is likely to languish.

This view of an autonomous higher education rapidly emerging as the central institution of today's America is maintained by analysis that invests the university with enough power both to separate from--the campus is seen as a world apart--and also to control changes in, the other institutions comprising the larger socio-economic system. Thus, on the one hand the authors are able to argue that the "character of American life" is in large part determined "within such diverse and sporadically conflicting enterprises as the Chase Manhattan Bank and the Treasury Department, the Pentagon and Boeing Aircraft, the Federal Courts and the National Council of Churches, CBS and The New York Times, the State Department and the Chamber of Commerce, the Chrysler Corporation and the Ford Foundation, Standard Oil and Sun Oil." While at the same time, they use the next 530 pages to argue that an academy made powerful by the growth and development of academic disciplines has, in large part, replaced this "mixed bag" of established institutions in determining the character of life in America. In brief, Jencks and Riesman redirect the supposed diversity and conflict from
these several institutions to a very powerful single insti-
tution, education: "The graduate departments and the ideology
for which they stand have thus far managed to win over or
override all the major interest groups which might have forced
them to deviate from their chosen path." 

This path, like the authors' analysis that separates
education from the larger socio-economic system, leads to
other analytical divisions that are both confusing and
questionable. Most often these divisions bifurcate reality
in a way that further isolates education from other insti-
tutions of the social system. For example, pure is contrasted
with applied work and research made separate from teaching
as Jencks and Riesman differentiate the intellectual from
the academic, and the academic from the practical. This
intellectual-academic-practical distinction corresponds with
the plurality of student groups--each group holding different
value configurations--that Clark labels the non-conformist,
the academic and the vocational subcultures. The attachment
of students to this variety of subcultures (interest groups)
not only helps prepare them to join Clark's "occupational
subworlds", but it also helps to widen the "generation gap"
that separates the young from the old.

Professors too play an important role in dividing the
generations by becoming more professional--to use the Jencks-
Riesman terminology, they become more "colleague-oriented"
as opposed to "client-oriented". As the following passage
makes clear, this collegial orientation of professors
fosters, and fits nicely within, the authors' view of higher education as autonomous:

Unlike a doctor or lawyer, an able scholar does not have to persuade non-professional customers to respect his expertise; his "customers" are other scholars. Of course he needs non-professional financial support, but he gets this in ways that give the non-professionals only minimal power to direct or even evaluate his work... Research grants come mostly from large bureaucratic organizations. While such a bureaucracy may adopt the overall priorities of laymen rather than professionals, it usually hires academicians to work out the details of its relationships with the academic profession. This means that decisions about how research will be done, who will get to do it, and even (on a de facto basis) what the research will really be about, are made by members of the guild. 53

Jencks and Riesman elaborate this argument as they continue developing their fantasy of education as an autonomous institution in a discussion of graduate school reform entitled, "Pure' versus 'Applied' Work":

We begin with departmentalism and specialization. The basic problem here is how to determine the research agenda of individuals and groups. At present there are two conflicting tendencies. The academic profession is eager to ensure that everyone will draw up his agenda to please his colleagues... In this context the test of good research becomes how much influence it has on other scholars. The government and the major foundations, on the other hand, have a different set of priorities. They are primarily interested in non-academic problems, and they finance research in the hope that it will illuminate these problems... This divergence about the proper subjects of research does not, however, usually extend to methodology. On the contrary, government agencies and foundations subsidize academic research primarily because they are impressed by the methodological competence of university professors. They may
want to redirect this competence into new areas, but they make relatively little effort to influence the technique. That, indeed, is why the marriage between government research agencies and the academic profession has proved fairly satisfactory; many academicians are not particular about the areas in which they work so long as they are free to choose the methods, and the government frequently has no preconceptions about the method so long as it controls the areas . . . .

In all this and more, there is no discussion of alternative explanations of this marriage. For example, it is possible that the Jencks-Riesman wedding may be of the "shotgun" variety, initiated by the Department of Defense; or it may be that the "two conflicting tendencies" is yet another one of the authors' creative abstractions that bifurcate reality. For as the role of government in the historical development of science within American colleges and universities suggests (see Chapter One), there has been, from the beginning, little conflict. Further, whatever conflict did exist has been resolved not by an autonomous and powerful education institution, but instead by a higher education that has maintained the favor—that is, the financial support—of the government and the major foundations. Thus, the point is, the Jencks-Riesman analysis notwithstanding, that in the great majority of cases if the researcher can please the government and/or foundation sponsor, then his/her colleagues will also be pleased.

Just as Jencks and Riesman attempt to disconnect the interests of the academy and government, they also use their intellectual-academic-practical distinctions to try keeping
education separate from industry, the university from business.

The only interest groups that have shown a continuing capacity to compete with the academic profession in the training of high school graduates are enormous bureaucratic and corporate enterprises: the Armed Services and the major corporations ... (The Department of Defense is said to spend more on education beyond high school than all the state legislatures in the country combined, and General Electric spends more than any but the largest universities).

Nonetheless, we see little prospect that these in-house training programs will emerge as genuine alternatives to those conducted by academicians ... 58 (my emphasis)

Once again, the pluralism of Jencks and Riesman that encourages the division and subdivision of reality causes them to overlook possible interpretations that counter their analysis. In this instance, their separation of education and industry ignores the possibility that relationships between higher education and the larger socio-economic system may make American colleges and universities "in-house training programs" for "enormous bureaucratic and corporate enterprises" like the Armed Services and General Electric.

Such an oversight is to be expected on the part of sociologists so deeply committed to pluralism as are Jencks and Riesman. For them, the argument that education is autonomous is more than the idea that the academic profession shapes the educational institution with the acquiescence, if not always the approval, of a variety of groups representing a kaleidoscope of interests; it is also the embodiment of America's humanistic heritage. Thus, Jencks and Riesman
logically extend their autonomous argument to suggest that improving the racecourses of the mind is perhaps synonymous with advancing the human condition:

Other professional schools justify themselves (and their budgets) in terms of external problems and needs. The graduate academic departments are for the most part autotelic. They resent even being asked if they produce significant benefits to society beyond the edification of their own members, and mark down the questioner as an anti-intellectual. To suggest that the advancement of a particular academic discipline is not synonymous with the advancement of the human condition is regarded as myopic. Perhaps, considering the affluence of American taxpayers and the relatively ample supply of talented, well-educated college graduates, it really is. 59

This implied relationship between affluence and higher education is, however, bothersome to Jencks and Riesman. They argue--in a chapter entitled, "Social Stratification and Mass Higher Education"--that there has been "a good deal of social mobility in America" because the United States falls closer to an "equality" rather than a "hereditary" model. 60 The role played by education in this model remains somewhat unclear to the authors as they puzzle over the relationship between educational attainment in school and occupational status.

In brief, type of work and amount of formal schooling, for most Americans, do not seem to match--to be positively correlated--as might be expected if the United States is an "equality" society. Yet, as Jencks and Riesman quite elaborately explain, this fact does not invalidate the
mobility-through-educational attainment argument. For while it is the children of the upper-middle class who, as a group, continue to find employment that enables them to maintain their class position; it is also they who, when compared to children of other socio-economic classes, remain in school the longest.\textsuperscript{61}

For those readers who remain unconvinced that this apparently close relationship between amount of schooling and type of employment for many in the upper-middle class could be transferred to the children of lower classes, making them more equal, Jencks and Riesman point to what they see as a kind of fairness in the way most colleges selectively admit and continually reevaluate students. Thus, while the authors acknowledge the fact that colleges tend to "pre-select the upper-middle class", they are quick to remind their readers that when reevaluation (grading) is added to this admission process it is not only the youngsters from lower-strata families who are eliminated, but also a substantial fraction of upper-middle children. Of course, the reasons for elimination are different for both groups; most lower-class individuals "have 'the wrong attitudes' for academic success", while many in the upper classes "drop out" because "they lack academic competence and dislike feeling like failures year after year."\textsuperscript{62}

Since Jencks and Riesman do not carry further their discussion of these upper-middle class youth who withdraw from school, one is left to speculate. Keeping to the logic
of their argument concerning the maintenance of upper-middle class status over generations, one might reasonably presume that some who drop out are able to use their class background in helping them to, when convenient, drop back in. In these cases, a phone call from father to a friend who is dean of a law school, a membership in the right country club, and/or similar "achievements" may replace school evaluations in separating future lawyers from laborers. In this way, the equal society is perpetuated—members of the various socio-economic classes are kept in their respective places generation after generation. In fact, this matter of keeping, and knowing, one's place is an important consideration for Jencks and Riesman. Their concern over this matter is nowhere better illustrated than in the content and interpretation of the following creative anecdote:

Suppose, for example, that Yale must choose between two applicants. One is an obviously gifted boy from the wrong side of the tracks in Bridgeport. The other is a competent but unremarkable youngster whose father went to Yale and now practices medicine in New York. All right-thinking people assume that Yale should choose the first boy over the second. We agree. Nonetheless, this decision almost certainly causes more individual misery than the alternative. If a Bridgeport boy is refused a place at Yale and goes to the University of Connecticut (where he still has a fair chance of discovering a new world) or even to the University of Bridgeport (where this is conceivable if less likely), he will be disappointed but seldom shattered. The University of Connecticut is a smaller step up than Yale, but it may in fact more nearly fit his temperament if not his talents. The New Yorker who fails to make Yale and winds up at the University of Connecticut, on the
other hand, will very likely feel himself branded a failure. Connecticut may suit his talent, but probably not his temperament. The verdict will seem doubly harsh for being just. The rejected Bridgeport boy can blame his fate on snobbery and feel it is not his fault but "the system". The New Yorker has no such defense.

Nonetheless, there is a point of diminishing returns beyond which the advantages of meritocracy and mobility to society as a whole may no longer offset their disadvantages to individuals who fail to meet the test. . . . If, to revert to our earlier example, there are talented boys who do not want to go to Yale and mediocre ones who do, is any useful purpose really served by recruiting the former and excluding the latter? . . .

What all this suggests is that further efforts to increase mobility may be not only fruitless but undesirable. What America most needs is not more mobility but more equality. . . .64

In sum, the sociology of Riesman and colleague Jencks, like that of Clark, amounts to ideological maintenance of an equality that preserves and perpetuates existing socio-economic arrangements. Riesman's pluralism creates "intellectual veto groups" who, by running the "racecourses of the mind", have directed a revolution that has left higher education autonomous. While Jencks and Riesman attempt to argue that this academic revolution is largely confined to the campus, they confess that the autonomy of colleges and universities gives to higher education the power to in large part replace "established institutions" in determining the character of American life. They argue that the pluralism which altered the academy is currently modifying a socio-economic system that continues to make Americans both more affluent and talented. Thus, equality is considered within
the interest-group context of a pluralism that, like Riesman's sociology, continues to keep "the system as a whole expanding", and individuals in place—knowing their interests and groups—within the corporate context of today's capitalism.

The Pluralism of Christopher Jencks: The Schools as Nuclear Families and Accidental Inequality

Recently, Christopher Jencks, with the assistance of several collaborators, has attempted a rather rigorous and scientific re-examination of this notion of equality. Jencks draws two distinctions that are for him crucial to any discussion of the way in which schooling might affect policies of social reform, and that consequently, have been the center of much criticism concerning Inequality: The first is between equality of opportunity and equality of condition; the second is between equality as related to groups and equality as related to individuals. These distinctions underlie the following statement written by Jencks in response to critical comments concerning his book, and summarizing the direction, major findings, and conclusions of his work:

In any event, the purpose of Inequality was not to argue the case for socialism, which is complex and problematic. Neither, as the book makes clear, was its purpose to argue against school reform. Rather, the aim of the book was to show that one specific, widely-held theory about the relationship between school reform and social reform was wrong. According to that theory, the degree of inequality in income is determined by the degree of inequality in skills. These, in turn, depend on family background, genes
and schooling. The evidence presented in *Inequality* seems to me to show that variations in family background, IQ genotype, exposure to schooling, and quality of schooling cannot account for most of the variation in individual or family incomes. This means we must reject the conservative notion that income inequality is largely due to the fact that men are born with unequal abilities and raised in unequal home environments. We must also reject the liberal notion that equalizing educational opportunity will equalize people's incomes. The evidence in *Inequality* cannot carry us much further, even though its rhetoric sometimes tries. 66

The reason that neither the evidence, nor the rhetoric, of *Inequality* is unable to carry us much further than a rejection of "the liberal notion that equalizing educational opportunity will equalize people's incomes" can be found in the seeming inability of Jencks to clarify what his evidence means in relation to whom. Critic Lester C. Thurow puts the matter this way: "*Inequality* might be summarized as 'nothing affects anything.' Or, more accurately, as fifty to seventy percent of what goes on does not seem to be explained by anything else that goes on."67 His summary is echoed by Stephan Michelson, one of the book's collaborators, who states the problem with these words: "... what most bothers me about the concept of equality in *Inequality* is that I cannot pin it down. I don't know whose inequality is being cared about, and what relationship this has to the way society operates."68

Perhaps this is so because the Jencks explanation of adult inequality (variance) in occupational status and
income replaces such commonly-accepted predictive factors as IQ scores, school examination scores, and years of formal schooling with the "noncognitive" traits of personality and luck; the obvious difficulty in scientifically predicting and controlling the effects of such capricious factors as personality and luck might in large measure explain the difficulty Jencks has in relating his evidence on inequality to people. Or, perhaps the Jencks inability to make clear the relationship between inequality and "the way society operates" should be seen as an outcome of his commitment to pluralism. For to be unable to specify which people are being talked about, to clarify "whose inequality is being cared about", is characteristic of analyses based upon a pluralistic view of the structure of power. In the words of Jencks' colleague, Riesman, "there is no longer a 'we' who run things and a 'they' who don't, or a 'we' who don't run things and a 'they' who do, but rather that all 'we's' are 'they's' and all 'they's' are 'we's.'" 69

Evidently Jencks agrees with this most arguable assumption concerning the undirectedness of life in today's America, for he forecloses the possibility of finding both direction and directors with analysis that has "ignored extreme cases." 70 The result is, in Michelson's words, "the deliberate choice of methodology which is weighted by the number of individuals within a category." 71 Thus, even though there is factual evidence that most of the wealthiest Americans inherited their wealth, if Jencks included non-labor
income in his correlations they would be, according to Michelson, "scarcely affected". He would still find almost no relationship between family origin and current income. In brief, the Jencks statistical approach is conveniently unable to analyze actual differences in family income for identifiably different individuals; conveniently, because just a few families control the great majority of wealth in the United States and they, as it happens, are among the extreme cases Jencks has chosen to ignore. Michelson writes:

Jencks thus chooses hypotheses and methods which neither ask whom tests of "merit" serve, nor how they do so. It is clear that testing does "maintain the privileges of the economic elite" operating through meritocratic selection for schools. But testing serves a different purpose for the ruling class, the few owners of the means of production. They inherit their status directly. They, however, want to preserve the characteristics of a society which allows this direct inheritance for a very few under a rhetoric of merit equality. . . . Jencks has estimated the net result of these contradictions. The "optimal" amount of status transmission in a competitive market society with a small property-owning ruling class would be described by a father-son status correlation greater than zero (because high-status parents must see a better than random chance of passing on status) and less than one (because low-status parents must see some chance of their children surpassing them). Although estimating the actual correlation is not a trivial task, neither is it a politically telling one. 72

While this criticism is basically both well-reasoned and accurate, to suggest that the Jencks analysis is not politically telling is most inaccurate. For what it tells about, and in the end legitimates, are the institutional
interconnections of the existent socio-economic system. This legitimation is accomplished, as in the Clark and Riesman analyses, by separating one institution from another. Jencks, like other pluralists, has difficulty seeing the "big picture".

Thus, just as Jencks must separate the extreme from the middle levels of the socio-economic structure in order to find a nonrelationship between people and their own inequality, he must also separate school from factory in order to disconnect the personal from the political. Jencks argues that schools "serve primarily as selection and certification agencies, whose job is to measure and label people, and only secondarily as socialization agencies, whose job is to change people. This implies that schools serve primarily to legitimize inequality, not to create it." 1173 In other words, since personality and luck, rather than education, explain most of the variation in adult occupations and incomes, the expectation that changing the schools will reduce inequality (equalize economic differences) is "fantasy"; a more realistic strategy is, according to Jencks, "to make the system less competitive by reducing the benefits that derive from success and the costs paid for failure." 74 Jencks thinks that this could be accomplished if the school was to become more like what he says it is, a family rather than a factory. 75

Such a vision of future schools supports the privileged
position of the few wealthy families the Jencks analysis ignores. It is a plan for educational reform that attempts to make the school more equivalent to the American family, the nuclear family, thereby attempting to make the school more autonomous; conceptualizing the school as family, Jencks argues that the school, unlike the factory, is relatively separate and independent of its socio-economic surroundings. What Jencks fails to see is that to maintain even the idea of independence, the school, like the nuclear family, has become a "service station" molded to the contours of capitalism in its corporate form. Thus, children taught in schools modeled upon today's nuclear family are no less "products" ready for service in the corporate order than is the case when schools are patterned after today's factory. In brief, the Jencks proposal for educational reform succeeds in moving schools away from functioning as he says they do, legitimating inequality by measuring and labelling, towards recreating inequality by passing on ideology that serves to help reproduce the current socio-economic system.

To return for a moment to the example of father's phone call that compensates for unsatisfactory academic performance and permits his son to attend law school. In the Jencks analysis, the effect of this call can be subsumed, written off, under either personality and/or luck. Likewise, a son may not have to develop his ability "to persuade a customer" or "to look a man in the eye without seeming to
"stare" if his father can do it for him. Similarly, "chance acquaintances who steer you to one line of work rather than another, the range of jobs that happen to be available in a particular community when you are job hunting, the amount of overtime work in your particular plant," may not matter much if your father owns the plant. In short, the mobility that leads to economic success, like the change that brings about educational reform, can be interpreted in the Jencks view as an individual, or a family, enterprise—enterprise that does not disturb the institutional relationships of corporate capitalism.

Such enterprise is commensurate with the Jencks argument that differences among individuals are more relevant than group differences—attention to which, Jencks contends, was responsible for the failure of the 1960's "War on Poverty" as the focal point for social reform. If he is correct, the problem for public policy makers, as Thurow has pointed out, is to some extent analogous to the basic problem of quantum mechanics. "While it is impossible to predict the path of individual particles or atoms it is possible to predict the effect of groups of particles. If true . . . public policies can be designed to help groups of individuals but they cannot be designed to help particular individuals." Thus, for Jencks the fact that a father's phone call—like the recommended choice of the one Bridgeport applicant to Yale over the other—permits the upper class to pass on privileged position to a new generation can simply be trans-
lated as the unofficial (not public) policy of an enlightened social order; for the emphasis of the Jencks argument is that it is more important to eliminate inequality within groups rather than differences between groups in order to eliminate dissatisfactions. For those individuals of middle and lower class origins, who usually find official public policy even less amenable to personal needs than do the upper class, and who are without the unofficial phone call of a well-positioned influential father, they too can use the schools to keep abreast of the other members of their group. In these cases education can be seen, using the Jencks perspective, as a risky, but possibly profitable, investment—profitable not to the middle and lower classes as groups, but to particular individuals only.

The Jencks pluralism, then, emphasizes the individualistic competition of all 'we's' and 'they's' for a greater share of scarce resources (larger individual incomes), without analyzing the social system within which this competition takes place. His pluralism assumes this problem of disconnectedness between the personal and the political; it also posits the answer to the problem—namely, maintenance of the existing social system. For Jencks, the educational institution, as well as all others, is legitimated within the corporate socio-economic arrangements that currently prevail. He writes:

...The general implication of our work may therefore be that reformers should concentrate more attention on the internal
workings of institutions and less on the relationship between institutions. Perhaps what America needs is more radical innovation in what might be called micro-politics and less concern with what might be called macro-politics. 82

This reform strategy that discourages attempts to work out the relationships between institutions nicely complements Jencks' inability, in large part an attribute of his pluralistic bias, to analyze the socio-economic system as a whole. This inability, in turn, leaves him unable to suggest viable alternatives by implementing his own reform strategy of applying his scientific evidence to the workings of any single institution. Thus, the school, like the nuclear family, in becoming more autonomous via the Jencks argument—that is, separated from its socio-economic surroundings—permits students to make the personal political only within the confines of the existent social system. Accordingly, Jencks tells us that despite finding such commonly-used measures as school examination scores and academic credentials are poor predictors of occupational performance, 83 "staying in school has a modest effect on many of the noncognitive traits [for instance, ambition and persistence] that employers value."84

This message to stay in school begins to look like an advertisement for the current socio-economic order when it is remembered Jencks argues that these noncognitive traits
of the personality, along with luck, are largely responsible for the wide variation in individual incomes. If income is randomly distributed because it is pulled out of a personality/luck magic hat unresponsive to the machinations of science, then one logical outcome of the Jencks argument might be to help shift social policy from saying that we do not know how to control incomes to the position that incomes are uncontrollable. In this way, the powerful and privileged position of one extreme group that Jencks ignores, the very wealthy (the group that Michelson calls "the ruling class"), could be solidified within the current socio-economic system; the positions of the less-privileged middle and lower classes could also be solidified, and their members encouraged to try harder. This extra effort could then be translated to mean more schooling. Indeed, Jencks, in his reassessment of *Inequality*, seems to argue that the way in which school attendance affects adult occupation and income is not quite so unimportant as his evidence may have first suggested:

If those who earn low incomes are almost all being punished for failings they cannot prevent, like having poor parents, black skins, or low IQ scores, it seems clear to me that their incomes ought to be supplemented by those who have been more fortunate. But if those with low incomes are mostly being punished for failings they can remedy, such as not wanting to work, the case for redistribution is more problematic. This is also true if most of the poor are being punished for making the "wrong" choice at some time in the past, such as dropping out of school. Society has a stake in discouraging certain
kinds of anti-social behavior, and if dropping out of school reduces an individual's capacity to contribute to the general welfare, it may make sense to punish this decision by paying drop-outs less. 86 (my emphasis)

Thurow might have been wrong; rather than "nothing affects anything", often Jencks seems to be saying that "some things affect everything". Translated, this means that while the learning of ambition and persistence taught in school may not help one to a more plush job at a higher income, this training will help each individual to adjust to and accept their position within prevailing socio-economic arrangements. In the words of Jencks:

...There is no evidence that building a school playground will affect the students' chances of learning to read, getting into college, or earning $50,000 a year when they are 50. Building a playground may, however, have a considerable effect on the students' chances of having a good time during recess when they are 8... 87

This strategy of school reform that attempts to guarantee a "good time" for all, should also continue to help guarantee a supply of happy workers "educated" to undertake the variety of jobs this society demands be done. It is a strategy that should once again give comfort to that group most often responsible for creating these demands, but ignored by Jencks, the very rich. After all, the members of this group have long believed that school should be little more than a "good time" extension of the family—that the most important things were usually learned not in classrooms, but by interacting with the members of one's own class
in the drawing rooms and board rooms of family corporations. In sum, for Jencks inequality is something more than just the individual accidents his analysis suggests; to borrow and change a well-known phrase, "all is not undirected drift." Rather, school in the United States offers an education that is an important factor in shaping the adult "successes" who maintain present socio-economic arrangements. The Jencks infatuation with the family model of the school turns their education into a reflection of his pluralism. Education becomes training in ambition and persistence liberally mixed with instruction in tolerance; the result is subservient employees who, in accepting (tolerating) their own position in relation to others, are happy to do their part to help maintain and recreate the demands of a socio-economic system that has brought great wealth to their employers. The Jencks analysis is, then, a pluralistic view strongly reminiscent of colleague Riesman's notion of the "other-directed man"; the increasingly common American character type who would, assuming instruction in family-like schools, continue to place his ability to be "at home everywhere and nowhere" in the service of societal demands. In American society, the others to whom the other-directed man, as well as Jencks and his sociological pluralism, are directed, and serve, is a small group of very powerful and wealthy corporate capitalists.
Conclusion

The pluralism that makes higher education autonomous—permitting Clark, Riesman, and Jencks in turn, to view academe as being a creative agent, an institution in revolution, and like a family—is again very much in evidence in Riesman's latest work, Academic Values and Mass Education. In summarizing this study of the early years of two new schools, Oakland University and Monteith College, Riesman reiterates his thesis that "American higher education is astonishingly pluralistic." Pluralistic means, as it did before, that the educational institution is separated from its socio-economic surroundings. This separation once again results in a reaffirmation of both the education-as-autonomous argument and the current socio-economic system.

Accordingly, for Riesman, colleges and universities are characterized by fluidity and change; they become Clark's creative agents. They hire professors who, being relatively uncontrolled by clients in setting work pace and standards (the academic revolution), agree with Riesman in viewing teaching as a search for the "right strategy". These schools and their professors are part of what Riesman calls a "non-system"; the same non-system, perhaps, that inspires Jencks to suggest a non-relationship between the American people, their social system, and their own inequality.

In brief, the pluralism that encourages Riesman to conceptualize teaching as a search for the right strategy
also encourages Jencks to interpret his findings of inequality as individual accidents and Clark to argue for a creative education without any innovations that might threaten the existent socio-economic system. That the arguments of these three social scientists—the major figures involved in developing a sociology of higher education over the past twenty years—complement one another so well should not be surprising. For what they share is pluralism—a pluralism that permits each author to make higher education autonomous by isolating the educational institution from the larger social system. The same pluralism that makes today's research entrepreneur, referred to by Kerr as "schizophrenic", euphoric. A pluralism that is not new to sociological analysis; rather, as the following chapter attempts to explain, it has long been one of the most fundamental assumptions of the origin and development of American sociology as a science.
FOOTNOTES


2. Ibid., p. 74.

3. Ivan Illich, "After Deschooling, What?" Social Policy, September/October 1971, p. 9. It is obvious that whatever meaning Illich ascribes to "alienation", his conceptualization is not grounded in the workings of the American socio-economic system. Alienated Americans will not disappear because there emerges an alternative emphasis in the conception of learning which will alter political and economic organization; rather, to put this matter the right way around, alterations in political and economic organization alter the conception of learning by changing the objective condition of individual relationships to the means of production. Because Illich has the dependency relationship between the educational and the socio-economic institutions reversed his proposals for changing learning outlined in Chapter Six, "Learning Webs", do not, when taken together, constitute an alternative to the present schooling system; instead, they reinforce and perpetuate the prevailing socio-economic arrangements that permit a small group of corporate capitalists to continue controlling the educational institution. For an elaboration of this criticism of Illich, see Herb Gintis, "Towards a Political Economy of Education: A Radical Critique of Ivan Illich's Deschooling Society", This Magazine Is About Schools, Spring 1972, pp. 117-145.

In his latest book, Tools For Conviviality (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), Illich remains confused about the interrelationship between education in schools and the socio-economic arrangements of the larger social system. His misconceptions concerning who rules, who dominates "learning" and other major processes and institutions which make up the larger socio-economic order can be interpreted as evidence of this confusion. See, for example, pp. x, xii (where he first suggests that "managers", rather than owners, dominate and shape the prevailing socio-economic order), pp. 12, 16-17, 23, and 27. Less confusing and more accurate are Illich's generally competent discussions of the effects of over-professionalization (see, for example, pp. 3, 7, 46-47 on the "knowledge-capitalism of professional imperialism", and pp. 61-73--the section of Chapter 3 entitled "Over-programming"); the changing Christian-capitalist conception of the way in which power relates to the use of time (p. 33); the reproduction of the present "class society" in the schools and elsewhere (p. 35).
4. This argument is found in *Educating The Expert Society*. The general theoretical orientation presented in this book has, as might be expected, influenced the presentation of research findings in three others—*The Open Door College: A Case Study*, *Adult Education in Transition*, and *The Distinctive College*. However, since in these three studies Clark examines specific aspects of American higher education in a way that adds little to the more encompassing perspective presented in *Expert Society*, they have not been reviewed here.

5. For an excellent discussion of this phrase, the big picture, in relation to social theory, see C. Wright Mills, *The Sociological Imagination* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), especially Chapter One and most particularly, pp. 17-24.


7. Ibid., p. 3.

8. Ibid., p. 4.

9. Ibid., p. 4.

10. Ibid., p. 5.

11. Ibid., p. 4.

12. Ibid., p. 7.

13. Ibid., p. 8.

14. Ibid., Introduction, "Education in the Technological Age," especially pp. 1-3. The changing relationship between humans and the machines they have produced is, and should continue to be, of concern to all North Americans. However, to posit a second scientific revolution requiring an education that ensures the training of experts, wholeheartedly embraces the technological age—encouraging control of human beings by a machine-like logic that tends to perpetuate itself. In short, humans are encouraged to continue eliminating themselves from the process of living by becoming more efficient—that is, "being" in Clark's world, automated by the second scientific revolution, becomes increasingly automatic. Being becomes a job for the machine and/or the machine-like human. For similar thoughts on this matter, see Jacques Ellul, *The Technological Society* (New York: Random House, 1964).
15. Ibid., pp. 25 and 26. For the "classic" discussion of education as a "passive instrument" that Clark has in mind here, see Emile Durkheim, Education and Sociology, translated by Sherwood D. Fox (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1956), pp. 65 and 66.

16. Ibid., p. 27.


19. Ibid., p. 9.

20. Ibid., p. 30.

21. Ibid., pp. 35 and 107-112. In citing these studies to support his view that education leads to more liberal (tolerant) attitudes regarding both racial and political matters, Clark fails to cite what was, at the time, probably the most well-known review and interpretation of research on this relationship between education and attitudes—a review that strongly disputes Clark's view. See Philip E. Jacob, Changing Values in College: An Exploratory Study of the Impact of College Teaching (New York: Harper and Row, 1957).

22. One of the earliest and probably most widely-known studies that suggests this conclusion is the "streetcar scene" demonstration of rumor reported in G. W. Allport and Leo Postman, The Psychology of Rumor (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1947), p. 71.

23. Clark, pp. 30-35.

24. This is not to suggest that the managers are not themselves managed. See C. Wright Mills with Hans H. Gerth, "A Marx For The Managers", in Power, Politics & People, edited by Irving Louis Horowitz (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), especially pp. 62, 64 and 67. Also, it should be noted that a small percentage of today's college graduates are opposed to becoming managers, actively choosing to become laborers instead.


27. Ibid., p. 39.

28. Ibid., p. 39.

29. Ibid., p. 39.


32. Ibid., p. 283.

33. Ibid., p. 287.

34. Ibid., p. 288.

35. Ibid., p. 40.


37. Ibid., p. 107.

38. Clark Kerr in his book, *The Uses of the University* (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), cites Riesman as having originally suggested this term "evocator". While the term is used here to refer to the academic disciplines, Kerr uses it in evaluating the role of today's university president; see pp. 29-41. A very brief discussion of this role by Riesman can be found in *Constraint and Variety*, pp. 30-32.

39. Ibid., For the phrase and a brief discussion of what Riesman has in mind when he uses it, see pp. 109, 110. For a more complete elaboration of the racecourse idea, see all of Chapter Two, "The Intellectual Veto Groups", pp. 66-119.
40. Ibid., pp. 109, 110.


43. Ibid., p. 480.

44. Ibid., p. 480.

45. Ibid., p. 510. For a more lengthy statement of this "revolution", see pp. 25, 26.

46. Ibid., p. XV.

47. Ibid., pp. 513, 514.

48. Ibid., p. 10.

49. Ibid., p. 540. This quotation could be interpreted as being very accurate; however, this could be so not because graduate department ideology is, as the authors suggest, different from the surrounding socio-economic system, but rather, because it is a duplication of that system. American higher education is not autonomous, but dependent.

50. Ibid., pp. 243, 252. These distinctions help Jencks and Riesman, like Clark, make their argument more pluralistic by reaffirming a supposed cultural split between scientists and humanists.

51. For Clark's discussion of these subcultures among college students, see Chapter 6, Expert Society. The notion of a generation gap, like subcultural divisions, is a favorite theme among sociologists. While this is not the place to list the many who have "capitalized" upon the theoretical manufacture and maintenance of such a gap, the reader is referred to one of the most well-known, Lewis S. Feuer, The Conflict of Generations, for a bibliography.


53. Ibid., p. 238.

54. Ibid., p. 516.

55. Ibid., see pp. 517-523.
56. Again, the reader is referred to James Ridgeway, *The Closed Corporation*.

57. In considering the academic division of labor (the proliferation of subject matter specialties and specialists) in relation to this statement, one might want to question its relative validity when applied to diverse segments of the university faculty. To do so might make clear important qualifications bearing on the general point being made here. What would also likely be made clear is the poverty and irrelevance of much criticism of universities among "liberal" social scientists who claim that they and their colleagues in the humanities are less "bought" by research sponsors than those working in the natural (physical) sciences, schools of business, etcetera.


63. These examples should help illustrate the unacceptability of the achievement-ascription distinction that many sociologists continue to make. For excellent discussions of how the educational institution continues to keep members of the various socio-economic classes in place generation after generation, see Samuel Bowles, "Unequal Education and the Reproduction of the Hierarchical Division of Labor"; Florence Howe and Paul Lauter, "How the School System is Rigged for Failure", *The Capitalist System*, written and edited by Richard C. Edwards, Michael Reich, Thomas E. Weisskopf (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1972), pp. 218-235.

64. *Academic Revolution*, pp. 149, 150.


71. Michelson, "Further Responsibility", p. 102. The discussion in the remainder of this paragraph corresponds very closely with Michelson's comments, see pp. 102, 103.

72. Ibid., p. 103.

73. Jencks, Inequality, p. 135.

74. Ibid., p. 7.

75. Ibid., pp. 255-257. For an excellent discussion of various models of higher education, see Robert Paul Wolff, The Ideal of the University (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), Parts One, Three, and Conclusion.

76. For a superb analysis of the extent to which nuclear family units have become, if not factory-like, the major maintenance institution of corporate capitalism, and of the traditional role of women in providing this service, see Dorothy E. Smith, "Women, the Family and Corporate Capitalism", Women in Canada, ed. Marylee Stephenson (Toronto: New Press, 1973), pp. 5-35. Also, see Saul D. Feldman, "Impediment or Stimulant? Marital Status and Graduate Education", American Journal of Sociology, January 1973, pp. 982-994.

77. Jencks, Inequality, p. 227.

78. Ibid., p. 227.


81. Jencks, Inequality, p. 250.

82. Ibid., p. 250.

83. Ibid., see pp. 52, 53, and the remainder of Chapter Three. Also, p. 134.

84. Ibid., p. 134. For his comments on the noncognitive traits of ambition and persistence in relation to schooling, see p. 132.
85. Thurow, p. 110.
86. Jencks, "Inequality in Retrospect", p. 156.
90. For an idea of the way in which the liberalism taught in the schools affects students, see Edgar Z. Friedenberg, *Coming of Age in America: Growth and Acquiescence* (New York: Random House, 1963), especially Chapter Three. Also, the work of John Kenneth Galbraith is exemplary of the way in which many liberals conceive of the relationship between higher education and the current socio-economic order. See his *The New Industrial State* (New York: The New American Library, 1967), particularly pp. 271-385.
91. For this description of the other-directed character type as being "at home everywhere and nowhere", see Riesman, *The Lonely Crowd*, p. 26.
CHAPTER III

THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN SOCIOLOGY AS A SCIENCE AND THE SCIENTIFIC NORM OF OBJECTIVITY: THE INFLUENCE OF MAX WEBER

Pluralism is one of the most fundamental assumptions of American sociology. A central theme of pluralistic doctrine is the notion that conflicting opinions are not only to be tolerated, but even welcomed by decision-makers. This toleration has been the ideological foundation of American socio-economic arrangements during the socio-historical transformation from laissez-faire to corporate capitalism. \(^1\)

It has also been, from the inception, an important part of the ideological foundation of American sociology. This foundation, however, as is argued in this chapter, has been built more on rejection of, rather than agreement with, the science developed by the first American sociologists—William Graham Sumner, Franklin H. Giddings, Albion W. Small, \(^2\) and Lester F. Ward. In brief, the popularity of many arguments from today's most prominent American sociologists (for example, the education-as-autonomous thesis of Clark, Riesman, and Jencks) is a debt for the most part owed to a sociology originating in Germany—in particular, the work of Max Weber.

The political-economic structure of Weber's Germany was similar to Ward's America. The supposedly less democratic rule of an "Imperial Chancellor", like the supposedly more democratic legislation of a congress elected by the people,
were both attempts to protect the self-interests of a few individuals by legitimizing the business concerns of corporate groups. Both Ward, along with his contemporaries in the United States, and Weber developed sociologies that in tolerating, encouraged the apparent pluralism of a democratic capitalism; sociologies conducive to the maintenance, and efficient management, of prevailing socio-economic arrangements. Ward, however, was less inclined than Weber to hide the value bias of his sociology.

Ward's sociology made him and the future generations of sociologists who were to govern by applying sociological principles (Sociocracy) an interest group, the members of which shared a value configuration supporting the pluralism of the existent socio-economic system. In short, Ward's sociologists were to become value partisans with an ever-increasing interest in the benefits they might receive in exchange for their help in maintaining the emergent corporate arrangements of American capitalism. Weber, on the other hand, while also developing a sociology providing ideological support for capitalism, did so in a manner that appeared to be more value-neutral. This apparent neutrality provided scientific respectability to a sociology harmonious with, and subservient to, American capitalism. It characterized the sociologist as being receptive to all the data, no matter how conflicting, in the interest of objective analysis. Such an orientation, as the following discussion implies, is commensurate with a tolerance for conflicting opinions usually
thought to be characteristic of the supposed pluralism of American democracy.

The First American Sociologists: The Social Reform Emphasis

Dusky Lee Smith, in examining the value-partisanship of Ward and his contemporaries, argues that the foundations of American sociology should be analyzed as part of a general movement for social reform which characterized the post Civil War period. This period, the last third of the nineteenth century, marked the transition from laissez-faire to corporate capitalism, a transition far from being orderly. Attempting to stabilize an economic system in the turmoil of one slump after another, wealthy corporate employers time and again mobilized the power of governmental authority in support of violent struggles against their increasingly dissatisfied employees as well as the angry unemployed who could not find work. Smith emphasizes the similarity of the founding fathers' sociologies in supporting these attempts by employers to bring order to and solidify the corporate economy. These sociologies, Smith contends, are also ideologies helpful in maintaining the emergent socio-economic arrangements of the new capitalism. 4

Sumner (born in 1840) and Ward (1841) reached a youthful maturity in time to experience the panic of 1857, the secession depression of 1861-1862, and the first post-war depression of 1865-1866; Small (1854) and Giddings (1855) went to elementary school during this period of economic disturb-
ances. By the time Giddings entered Union College in 1874, a second post-war depression was underway—a downward turn in the economy that marked the beginning of twenty-five years of economic uneasiness. 5

As Americans struggled through the five year depression begun in 1874, the panic of 1894-1896, and the silver campaign depression of 1896-1897, some began to examine the socio-economic system with the hope of finding solutions to these increasingly frequent economic crises. One result was a socialistic philosophy that provided the ideological base upon which many laborers began to organize their dissatisfaction. 6 Thus, the labor riots of 1877 were put down by the gun as Federal troops patrolled the streets of such cities as Chicago and Baltimore. The poverty-stricken Irish immigrants who were urging other laborers to openly express their anger over working conditions, the Molly Maguires, were lynched. 7 Eventually, there occurred equally violent, but more organized, union strikes at the Carnegie Steel Company (1890) and against George Pullman’s railway (1894). The latter strike was led by Eugene Debs, a socialist who in less than a year’s time had found 150,000 other railroaders to support his newly-created American Railway Union. The union’s strike against Pullman—a response not only to working conditions on his railroad, but also to his management of the company town in which many of the strikers lived—stopped all operations between Chicago and San Francisco. President Cleveland, against the wishes of the
Illinois Governor, sent over 10,000 Federal troops to Chicago under the guise of ensuring that the mail was delivered—bringing order to what many considered the anarchism of the unionized strikers.\textsuperscript{8}

While Debs and other socialists—notably, Big Bill Haywood organizing miners—were working to unionize labor, employers were also organizing to prevent their workers from receiving an increasing share of the new corporate wealth. Thus, by 1888 the owners had succeeded in developing a legal weapon, the injunction, with which to fight strike activities; they, like their unionizing employees, were becoming more sophisticated—supplementing the repression won by bullets with that obtained by barristers.\textsuperscript{9}

The injunction was not the only way in which wealthy capitalists used the courts to protect their interests. For example, when the Sherman Anti-trust Act of 1890 threatened their monopolies of petroleum and steel, John D. Rockefeller, Andrew Carnegie, J.P. Morgan, and others, were successful in having holding companies given legal approval. The result was a tremendous consolidation of wealth as these men merged capital by incorporating smaller business concerns as subsidiaries of a parent company.

By the time some 340,000 men participated in the May Day strikes of 1886, and a bomb exploded in Haymarket Square three days later, the owners were using their merger profits not only to buy the protection of militia and magistrates, but also to finance the scientific wisdom of the first
missionaries of sociology. Thus, Sumner's sociology received direct financial support from his life-long friend and wealthy corporate lawyer, William Whitney—a graduate with Sumner from Yale who used his Harvard law degree to practice in New York City where, in addition to holding directorships in several other corporations, he was a trustee of Consolidated Gas Company and the Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York. Giddings' financial security did not come from the direct support of a wealthy benefactor, but was the result of unusually rapid career advancement—from the recommendation of Woodrow Wilson that led to his first teaching job at Bryn Mawr in 1888 to his acceptance in 1894, at the age of 39, of the first full-professorship of sociology in the United States. Small, for the better part of his long academic career, was well-paid for his service to Rockefeller's University of Chicago—where the first department of sociology in the world was established—as professor and Dean of the Graduate School of Arts and Literature during the lengthy presidency of their mutual friend and close business associate of J.D. Rockefeller, William Rainey Harper.10

The connections between Ward, a career civil servant, and the wealthy corporate owners might seem to be less direct. As Smith points out, however, it was Ward who, shortly after the Haymarket Riot, attempted to prevent an "open revolt" of the people by warning the corporate rich not to abuse their wealth, urging them instead to actively institute and direct
needed social reforms. It was also Ward who two years later, in 1888, lent his scientific support to a policy of President Harrison and Secretary of State Blaine, a policy which raised government tariffs protecting home industries to an all time high, making the dominant position of the corporate rich even more secure. Ward, like the other founding fathers, practiced a science based upon a belief in social evolution which suggests that the prevailing social system would and should constitute an important part of any progress obtained by social change. Therefore, their scientific suggestions as to what ought to be, e.g., higher tariffs, are usually made so as to affirm the validity of the capitalism which "is" in determining the capitalism that will be. In brief, the sociologies developed by Ward and his contemporaries focus on the necessity of maintaining prevailing socio-economic arrangements.

Sumner argued for a sociology that would "enable us to make the best of our situation"; a sociology that helps the person to intelligently "conquer" freedom in order to "conform to the conditions in which he finds himself". Giddings argued for a sociology that would emphasize the development of a "consciousness of kind"; this process--by which individuals are socialized to become conscious of, and to associate with, those of like-mind--permits societal institutions to develop "through a process of historical evolution" that implies a "certain stability". Small, too, recognized the need for stability as he advocated a sociology
of "right industrial relations" that "attempts to derive safe conclusions"; a sociology that, in transforming conflict into cooperation, promotes the "good"—"the on-going of the social process".15

Potential obstructors of this process such as socialists, anarchists, and other "cynics", were criticized by Sumner, Giddings and Small alike. Thus, Sumner spoke out against socialist and anarchist "cranks"; Giddings denounced "cynics" who interfered with the normal course of evolution by contributing to the "proletarian madness" which threatened the stability of a developing like-mindedness (consciousness of kind); while Small questioned the sanity of unscientific "social agitators" who suggest "programs which may be justly characterized as proposals to suspend economic law by substitution of benevolent sentiment".16

However, as Smith points out, to note that the first American sociologists were unsympathetic to the programs of particular reformers is not to say that they opposed reform. Even Sumner, who felt that sociology would never "be able to reconcile itself with those philosophies which are trying to find out how we arrange things so as to satisfy an ideal of society",17 saw hope in the reform possibilities of a fully-developed sociology able:

... to criticize and judge even the most established ways of our time, and to put courage and labor into resistance to the current mores where we judge them wrong. It would be a mighty achievement of the science of society if it could lead up to
an art of societal administration which should be intelligent, effective, and scientific. 18

Sumner argued that this scientific administration would lead to reform only if it permitted the guiding principles for holding private property, which goes together with and sustains liberty, to be determined by a "few great capitalists"—the initiators of reform. 19 Similarly, Giddings praised the American commercial spirit that made for an increasing concentration of wealth in the organization of combinations and trusts, 20 and he hoped that this social progress of historical ("normal") evolution could be facilitated by the rational knowledge a scientific sociology could and would provide. A "superior few" already possessed this knowledge by virtue of their "rational-ethical consciousness" that provided the foundation for a criticism of social values leading to gradual reform. "Scornful cynics" and "mad proletarians" should be educated ("vital instruction") so as to attain a consciousness resembling that of the superior few who, "habitually subordinate feeling to reason, and who, therefore, cannot become a part of the combustible material of the mob spirit". 21

Small, like Giddings and Sumner, felt that the syndicates and trusts which produced capitalist monopolies were "the pioneers of a better era"—an era where the subordination of feeling to reason would mean that individual ends would give way to the domination of social ends. 22
This new era of corporate capitalism was to be both described and directed by the sociologist as referee. While Small thought that "facts alone can be a reliable source of opinions", he argued that the facts did need to be refereed. He urged, consequently, the establishment of an institute of social science so that sociologists could use the "pre-vision" that their science provided to give "intelligent direction" to the progress of the on-going social process.

For Small, then, it was the application of sociological knowledge that could bring "sanity" to social agitation; the "dispassionate examination" of the sociologist referee could act as a brake upon social change--bringing not only fairness (the sociologist could become "the ally of any class which is temporarily at a disadvantage against any other class"), but also tranquility "in adapting our institutions to existing conditions". According to Small, corporations such as Proctor and Gamble and the National Cash Register Company were, in their adaptation, providing "good examples of social sanity". In short, the sanity brought to business practices by these corporations corresponds with the value emphasis that guided interpretation of facts in Small's sociological enterprise: "The aim of sociology is not a theory and practice of sociology, but an effective policy of rational sociability which shall include the largest number of men in the fellowship of reciprocally helpful cooperation." (my emphasis)

Small's effective policy of rational sociability
(social sanity) referred by the sociologist is Giddings' wish for a scientific sociology promoting rational-ethical consciousness and Sumner's call for the scientific administration (read control) of society. This scientific emphasis of the first American sociologists—their blending of social values with scientific facts in order to promote gradual change—was given an even more explicit reform focus by Ward, the first president of the American Sociological Society.

Variously referred to as the "Father of American Sociology", the "Master Builder of Sociology", and the "American Aristotle", Ward argued that happiness might best be acquired through government by sociological principles—Sociocracy. For Ward, intellect, the human addition to nature's governing principle of "might makes right", is "the mightest of all agencies". Intelligence informed by science, then, could control "social forces".

The major social force, according to Ward, grows out of the universal desire to acquire and protect wealth; and since "possession of property, to use Ward's example, and enjoyment are, in the nature of things, bound up together", then the wealthy (Giddings' superior few) would lead the way to social reform. Thus, Ward viewed the current socio-economic system as constituting something of a servo-mechanism in which protection was built into prevailing arrangements—only reform, and not revolution, could and should lead to reasonable and rational change. His sociology emphasized the importance of the intellect in sustaining, rather than
replacing "time-honored institutions". He writes that "after the frenzy is over . . . reaction usually sets in, resulting in a return, temporary at least, to conditions as near as possible to those that existed before the revolution." 32 In short, Ward favored controlling the emotional frenzy of revolution with an applied sociology which corresponded to natural processes—a sociology which, through "artificial means" of accelerating these processes, would keep the social order in close harmony with nature.

The human species as a part of nature has, in Ward's view, evolved from a genetic to a telic existence—a change that involves becoming conscious of feeling. While individuals are becoming socialized to control their newly-found emotions for the benefit of the group, similarly, the socio-economic system—undergoing a transformation from its more natural (laissez-faire) state towards a new form—is becoming less individualistic and more corporate in outlook as social forces are controlled by intelligent planning. 33

Intelligent planning would, according to Ward, remove the ignorance of the lower classes that permits the wealthy to take advantage of them. The ignorant are not, however, found only among the masses of uneducated poor people; for there is also "an army of social reconstructionists" that fails to understand, and consequently, cannot apply, the laws of science to social change. "It is this divorce of science from reform . . . that threatens society." 34

Ward proposed to unite science with reform, thereby
countering the "conflicting and bewildering panaceas" of extremist reformers by providing "the essential prerequisite to successful reform measures"—namely, "a widespread acquaintance with the principles of sociology". 35 "If government could be in the hands of social scientists . . . it might be elevated to the rank of an applied science, or the simple application of the scientific principles of social phenomena." 36 The "true reformer", unlike the extremist, both understands and applies the principles of Ward's sociology.

It is a sociology that—like Small's safe conclusions, Giddings' certain stability, and Sumner's conquest of freedom—emphasizes the infeasibility of making radical changes which might threaten the evolving socio-economic system; thus, education or the transmission of knowledge, which Ward equated with power, "must be exclusively intrusted" to the institution that it protects—the state. 37 Ward's sociology, like that of the other early American sociologists, but very unlike that of his most famous European contemporary—Max Weber—joined the supposedly value-neutral facts of social science to the value-partisan politics of social policy. Ward's government by sociological principles (Sociocracy) is Giddings' rational-ethical consciousness expanded and applied—an answer to the Sumner-Small plea for the scientific administration of society through an institute of social science; and it stands in stark contrast to the distinction that Weber made between science and politics.
Max Weber's Germany under the Rule of Bismarck: The Socio-Economic Reforms of a Charismatic Leader

Weber's sociology, like the sociologies of the early Americans, should be viewed within the context of the changing socio-economic arrangements of his time. The task of bringing stability to the German economy during the last third of the nineteenth century became in large part the responsibility of one man—Germany's most charismatic leader prior to Hitler, Otto von Bismarck. Accordingly, it is to be expected that Weber's sociology could have been heavily influenced by—in fact, the argument developed in this chapter is that it faithfully reproduces the essential characteristics of—the Bismarck regime.

Bismarck created governmental policy without bothering to consult the great majority of the governed; he simply made decisions for them. The German tradition had long supported leadership of this type. In his summary of the Germans' "war of liberation" against Napoleon in 1813, A.J.P. Taylor refers to this legacy of executive rule:

"Thus Germany passively endured the war of liberation, just as previously it had endured conquest by the French and before that the balance of the system of Westphalia. The Allies defeated the French, but they could not undo the effects of French rule; and they had to devise a new system for Germany which would serve the interests of Europe, as previously the Napoleonic system had served the interests of France. The people of Germany were not consulted. They could not be consulted. As a political force they did not exist."

Fifty years later Bismarck was engaged in developing an increasingly self-serving power with which he could make
sure that most Germans still "did not exist" as a political force—a power that was soon to make him, as Imperial Chancellor, the chief administrator of his "new system for Germany." During Bismarck's rule Weber, born in 1864, was maturing as a liberal intellectual. Weber's parents—his father, who came from a financially secure family of textile manufacturers in western Germany, was a successful lawyer and National-liberal parliamentarian; his mother, "a woman of culture and piety whose humanitarian and religious interests were not shared by her husband"—were actively involved in attempting to increase the political influence of a declining liberalism. Their house served, for the first twenty-nine years of Weber's life, as a meeting place for the coalition of prominent politicians and professors from the University of Berlin responsible for developing liberal opinion—that opinion which was so easily dominated by the autocratic rule of Bismarck.

This domination was made possible by what appeared to be the development of a policy of national unity—a policy in which Bismarck skillfully administrated a tariff system that restored the financial security of Prussia's aristocratic landowners, the Junkers. Bismarck's bureaucratic administration in support of a capitalism made synonymous with allegiance to the Fatherland is the same combination of factors that, as this analysis will show, constitutes the central focus of Weber's sociology.

The Junkers were, to use Taylor's phrase, "a unique
landed class" of East Prussia. In contrast with the landowners of western Europe, they were not a leisured class. As owners of colonial lands they worked their estates themselves, without tenants. In Taylor's words:

... The Junker estates were never feudal; they were capitalist undertakings, which closely resembled the great capitalist farms of the American prairie—also the result of a colonial expropriation of the American Indians. The Junkers were hardworking estate managers, thinking of their estates solely in terms of profits and efficiency, neither more nor less than agrarian capitalists. 44

In brief, the Prussian Junkers were "too poor to afford the aristocratic luxury of unbalanced accounts; and they brought to the affairs of state the same competence as was demanded on their own estates."45 Thus, it is not surprising that the Prussian tariff of 1818, which gave at least moderate protection to the Junkers, marked the beginning of the first tariff system in all of Europe. To return to Taylor's description of the Junkers, "it was their application at the office desk which kept them afloat" as Europe's most durable, hereditary governing class. 46

The Junker emphasis on administrative efficiency was the distinguishing characteristic of the professional and intellectual middle classes into which Weber was born. It was these classes that still dominated the relatively small towns of Germany in 1848, the year the German masses revolted against the military monarchies in Vienna and Berlin. These uprisings, described by Taylor as "glorified unemployed riots"—
a response to Germany's first general economic crisis during the winter of 1847-48—led to a centralizing of power and the calling of a National Assembly at Frankfort. The work of this assembly revealed and strengthened the administrative tie that permitted the liberal, middle-class professionals to unite with the more conservative, upper-class Junkers to dominate the German masses. Taylor writes of this union—a bond to which Weber was later to lend scientific legitimation in his writings on social science methodology and bureaucracy—from the liberal perspective:

... The Frankfort liberals were not actuated, as is sometimes supposed, by class interest. They were not capitalists or property owners; they were lawyers and professors. Disorder and revolution offended their principles and threatened their high ideal of creating a united Germany by consent. Nothing good, they believed, could come of the intrusion of the masses into politics; and they regarded the repressive activities of the armed forces as essential to the security of the liberal cause. 47

As a commissioned officer, Weber also considered the armed forces essential to this cause. His reliance on persuasion by force was made clear in a speech delivered to the 1907 congress of the Verein fur Sozialpolitik. Speaking of the future of the Social Democratic Party Weber issues this warning:

... If the party seeks political power and yet fails to control the one effective means of power, military power, in order to overthrow the State, its dominance in the community and in public corporations and associations would only show its political impotence more distinctly, and the more it thought to rule simply as a political party and not objectively, the sooner it would be discredited. 48
Weber's year of military training in 1883-84 had turned his initial condemnation into objective admiration of the requirements of military discipline. Converted by his training experience to believe that the body works more precisely when all thinking is eliminated, Weber apparently found considerable appeal in this partitioned view of men; taking leave from his university studies, he returned to Strassburg for summer exercises in 1885 and again in '87, and participated in more military maneuvers a year later.

Some twenty-five years later he was anxious to march at the head of his company in a world war about which he said: "In spite of all," it was "a great and wonderful war." While his health would not permit his participation as a leader of a company, he did serve from August 1914 to the fall of 1915 as a disciplinary and economic officer in charge of operating nine hospitals in the Heidelberg area. With the peace of 1918, Weber called upon "the designated war criminals" among Germany's political leaders to offer their heads to the enemy as compensation for the mistakes they had made in conducting the war. His hope was that this offering would restore prestige to the German officer corps he so dearly loved—a love clearly shown in this answer to a favorite student's question concerning his post-war political plans: "I have no political plans except to concentrate all my intellectual strength on the one problem, how to get once more for Germany a great general staff."
Weber's emphasis on the importance of developing this general staff supported the cause of the liberals, which was also that of the Junkers—namely, the protection of the capitalistic socio-economic arrangements by which they were profiting. Thus, the Frankfort Assembly's answer to the riots of the unemployed in the cities, and the more widespread general uprisings which followed, was a government without power to change existent socio-economic conditions. Taylor writes:

... In fact the Central Power had all the qualities of a government except power. The Minister of Foreign Affairs was not recognized by any foreign state except revolutionary Hungary—which was recognized by nobody else; the Minister of War had no soldiers; the Minister of the Interior had no means of ensuring that the orders which he issued to the governments of the German states would be obeyed. The salaries of the ministers and of Archduke John were paid out of the funds collected in 1840 for federal defence, which had remained on deposit with the Rothschilds. No national taxes were levied....

When Bismarck became the central power he, like the Frankfort liberals of 1848, created a hollow government—a government that amounted to nothing more than an illusion of power widely-dispersed. It was based on Bismarck's 1866 proposal to establish a German parliament elected by direct universal vote. The Junkers, at that time "the weakest and most reactionary social force in Germany", were forced to accept this proposal in order that they might appear to be aligned with policy that was both powerful and progressive; thus, they were placed in a ruling position by Bismarck and
made accountable to him. So too were both the professionals and merchants of the middle classes and the working class who endorsed the proposal and accepted Junker rule; the former were promised continued prosperity through the reinforcement of ties that strengthened their bond with the Junkers, while the latter was convinced that the vote would bring social security. In Taylor's words: "The only loss was Freedom, and that is not an item which appears in a balance sheet or in a list of trade union benefits." 54

Freedom to the liberals of the middle classes became transformed, under Junker rule, into a wish for "liberal administration". 55 Thus, the administrative talent of the Prussian General Staff that "won" the war of 1870, 56 became, under Bismarck's direction, ever more efficient at achieving liberal demands without relinquishing power. As with the parliamentary proposal of 1866, Bismarck initiated reforms designed to maintain the reality of his autocratic rule by retaining the image or appearance of pluralism. This was accomplished, as the following description of Taylor's makes clear, by encouraging development of the corporate capitalism upon which the liberal-Junker alliance was based.

The Bismarckian order of 1871 had a simple pattern: Junker Prussia and middle-class Germany, the coalition which sprang from the victories of 1866 . . . . Between 1867 and 1879 the German liberals achieved every liberal demand except power: and in Germany the demand for power had never bulked large in the liberal programme. Never have liberal reforms been crowded into so short a period . . . . Germany was given at a stroke uniform legal procedure, uniform coinage, uniformity
of administration; all restrictions on freedom of enterprise and freedom of movement were removed, limited companies and trade combinations allowed. It is not surprising that in face of such a revolution the liberals did not challenge Bismarck's possession of power: he was carrying out their programme far more rapidly than they could ever execute it themselves. 57

Endorsing limited incorporation and trade combinations, Bismarck tied his own position of power and the security of the liberals' middle-class status position ever more closely to the development of capitalism in its new corporate form. Thus, the end of the free trade era—heralded by the 1873 financial panic which marked the beginning of severe depression in Germany and the rest of Europe, and in the United States as well—was met by Bismarck's policy favoring development of the Kartells that fixed prices and regulated production during the 1880's. While the liberals received governmental support for industrial consolidation, the new capitalism required Bismarck—somewhat against his will, because it was a step towards the Greater Germany he was resisting 58—to further stabilize emerging socio-economic arrangements by implementing a policy that would protect the Junker position. The moderate tariff of 1879, and the much higher tariffs of the 1880's, lessened the possibility that the newly-built railways of Russia and the American continent could provide enough cheap grain to destroy German agriculture. In brief, it was a policy that not only made secure the Junker position, but it also created allegiance to Bismarck on the part of small farmers in East Prussia; they, much more than
the Junker managers of large estates, needed protection.\textsuperscript{59}

This protection, the method by which Bismarck retained and strengthened his control over the liberals, Junkers, and small farmers, was soon extended to the working class—the wage laborers. In exchange for their liberty—their freedom to oppose Bismarck—between 1883 and 1889 he established for German workers a compulsory insurance program against sickness, accident, and old age. This program of social security was yet another indication of Bismarck's administrative genius; not only did he manage to organize worker security at no expense to the state—it was subsidized for the state by employers and the workers themselves—but he also used the good will engendered by the program to collaborate with his rivals and eventual successors, the Social Democrats.\textsuperscript{60}

The new chancellor of 1890, General Leo von Caprivi, carried on the Bismarck tradition by giving emphasis to efficient organization and administration. While Caprivi's integrity was incorruptible, he was also politically inexperienced. His government, often ignoring the fact that power remained centralized in relatively few hands, was barely able to avert several potential economic crises—the Army Law renewal of 1893 is probably the most well-known example—by administering at least temporary unity among the various socio-economic classes. Caprivi's successors, Prince Chlodwig Hohenlohe and then Prince Bernhard von Bülow, placed even more emphasis upon, and were considerably less discreet about, creating economic unity. Bülow's Germany of 1900 was searching
for "World Policy" that would provide an outlet for the overproduction of a rapidly maturing industrial capitalism; and the chief accomplishment of Bülow's administration was that his Minister of Finance, Johannes von Miquel—a frequent guest in Weber's parents' house—quite simply was able to buy, with the high tariff of 1902, the support of the Prussian Junkers for the Reich. 61

Bülow's successor in 1909, Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, was, even more markedly than Bismarck and his other predecessors, an administrator. The descendant of a Frankfort family that had for generations supplied the state with bureaucrats, Bethmann became a civil servant who exemplified the "objective" bureaucrat-statesman that Weber's sociology idealized. Thus, while Bethmann has been described by Taylor as "cultured, sympathetic, honest, he ran over with good intentions", 62 it was his administration that most truly fulfilled Bismarck's "blood and iron" promise of 1862 by leading Germany into World War One and military rule. Taylor writes:

... All he lacked was any sense of power; and so it came about that this 'great gentleman' became, through his very irresponsibility, responsible for the Agadir crisis, for the military violence at Saverne, for the violation of Belgian neutrality, for the deportation of conquered peoples, and for the campaign of unrestricted submarine warfare—crimes a good deal beyond Bismarck's record, all extremely distasteful to Bethmann, but all shouldered by his inexhaustible civil servant's conscience. It was useless, one might say dishonest, for him to have a high character: his sin was to belong to a class which had failed in its historic task and had become the
blind instrument of Power which it could not itself master. Bismarck had said in 1867: 'Let us put Germany into the saddle. She will ride'; but in reality he had been the rider and Germany the horse. Now Bethmann threw the reins on the horse's back. 63

In sum, the Bethmann conscience that helped shape Max Weber's Germany is precisely what Weber advocates and encourages as he develops his sociology. The violence that resulted from Bethmann's attempt to be value neutral is herein viewed as nothing more nor less than Weber's attempt to transfer the supposed objectivity of his science to bureaucracy. The result was a scientific equation that attempted to link the social organization of bureaucracy with the socio-economic arrangements of a nationalistic corporate capitalism—to make capitalism as value-neutral as Weber believed bureaucracy was. Such objectivity was, among other things, to form the core of the kind of education Weber thought necessary to reconstruct war-torn Germany. In a 1918 letter addressed to a Frankfort colleague he writes: "'Objectivity' (Sachlichkeit) as sole means to achieve pureness and the feeling of shame against the disgusting exhibitionism of those who are morally broken down—only this will provide us with a firm attitude. . . ."64 For Weber, this objective attitude was fostered by the supposedly value-neutral social organization of bureaucracy and he celebrated, patterning his science after, the increasing efficiency with which modern government from Bismarck to Bethmann was able to exclude "love, hatred, and every
purely personal... feeling from the execution of official tasks." 

Max Weber's Science: Schizophrenic Objectivity and "Superman Sociology"

In his essay on "Objectivity" in Social Science and Social Policy" Weber argues that "it can never be the task of an empirical science to provide binding norms and ideals from which directives for immediate practical activity can be derived." "Existential knowledge" is to be distinguished from "normative knowledge"--what "is" must be separated from what "should be". For Weber, scientific analysis cannot directly evaluate the appropriateness of a given goal or end, but only the appropriateness of the means for achieving that end.

In order to maintain this view that social science ("the analysis of facts") cannot directly address questions of social policy ("statement of ideals") Weber introduces a scientific rationality that permits the sociologist to, at least partially, detach science from its cultural context. Thus, Weber's sociologist is allowed to consider, and be influenced by, cultural surroundings only in the initial stages of research and only on the condition that motives and values remain "scientifically oriented".

... in social sciences the stimulus to the posing of scientific problems is in actuality always given by practical "questions." Hence the very recognition of the existence of a scientific problem coincides, personally, with the possession of scientifically oriented motives and values. ...
As research progresses, this cultural influence that initially helps determine the scientific problem can be, in Weber's view, carefully controlled by the social scientist. Capable of distinguishing between "scientifically oriented" values and "normative standards", Weber's sociologist uses scientific wisdom to separate empirical from normative self—the objective-scientist self leaves questions concerning social policy to be answered by sentimental-citizen self:

... it should be constantly made clear to the readers (and—again we say it—above all to one's self!) exactly at which point the scientific investigator becomes silent and the evaluating and acting person begins to speak. In other words, it should be made explicit just where the arguments are addressed to the analytical understanding and where to the sentiments. ... 70

In this manner Weber reasons a scientific schizophrenia that permits the sociologist to develop a value-relevant understanding of social reality without making value judgments. 71 The result is a sociology that is shaped by Weber's efforts to be value neutral—to separate his scientific from his political (citizen) self. This separation can be viewed as an important heuristic device aiding Weber in exploring and explaining the rationality of his scientific methodology. This separation can also be viewed as being largely responsible for prohibiting Weber from sufficiently exploring and explaining the logic of the way in which value judgments influence the practice of social scientists. In failing to attend to this matter of value rationality Weber is unable to adequately
understand either the content of, or be clear about when he is moving between, the two selves and their respective worlds which he creates. Ironically, then, it is precisely the movement between these two worlds, a separation Weber made with the intention of eliminating bias, which accounts for the persistent value bias that characterizes his sociology—namely, his scientific support of capitalism.72

Thus, the scientific schizophrenia that allows Weber to distinguish between and separate means from end, fact from value, objective knowledge from emotional action as he moves between his scientist and citizen worlds also facilitates a separation of the economic from the political. This dichotomy permits Weber in defining power—"the possibility of imposing one's will upon the behavior of other persons"73—to make a further distinction between voluntary agreement and authoritative imposition.74 It is this split which in turn forms the basis for Weber's distinction between interest groups, the primary focus of his economic sociology, and types of authority, the major concern of his political sociology.75 The result of this bifurcation of reality is that Weber obscures the interrelationships between the agreements of interest groups and the imposition of authorities; as Jean Cohen has argued, domination becomes the "authoritarian power of command" as Weber locates power not in the economic relations of class, but in the political relations of bureaucracy.76
For Weber, the primary characteristic of bureaucratic social organization is the rationalized specialization of tasks, the development of a hierarchy of authority. As Anthony Giddens points out, this characteristic is also the most important, the most essential, feature of Weber's capitalism. Weber argues—to follow the Giddens thesis—that the labor of administrative officials is, like the labor of the workers whom they administer (control), "expropriated" from the means of production by the bureaucratic form of social organization. This separation of administrative staff from the material means of administrative organization allows Weber to equate managers with workers; similarly, it also serves to equate bureaucracy with, and to legitimate, the existent division of labor produced by modern capitalism.\[77\]

Much of Weber's work, in addition to his writing on bureaucracy, is concerned with the development of capitalism in Germany. His doctoral dissertation of 1889 examined the various legal principles by which medieval trading companies were allowed to combine in order to minimize the risk of private enterprise. Subsequently, he studied the Junker estates of East Prussia and worker-motivation in his grandfather's linen factory in Westphalia. His several speeches to the congresses of the Verein fur Sozialpolitik in 1905, 1907, 1909 and 1911, touched upon such topics as cartels and the State, economic communal enterprises, the growth of bureaucracy, and the problems of productivity and psychology of the working classes. In none of this work does Weber ever
seem to fundamentally question the sanctity of capitalism. However, he is careful to promote a particular kind of capitalism.

Accordingly, in his 1909 speech Weber decries the addiction to order produced by "the unquestioning idolization of bureaucracy". He argues that this "predilection for bureaucracy" is "a purely moral sentiment". Therefore, he urges that this "belief in the unshakability of the undoubtedly high moral standard of German officialdom" be replaced with a more objective system. Although this system would be based upon "the expansion of private capital, coupled with a purely business officialdom which is more easily exposed to corruption", it would help Germany increase her 'power value', "the ultimate value", among the nations of the world. Ten years later, amidst the post-war clamor for socio-economic arrangements that were more socialistic, Weber again offers an "objective" defense of an "objective" capitalism:

We have truly no reason to love the lords of heavy industry. Indeed, it is one of the main tasks of democracy to break their destructive political influence. However, economically their leadership is not only indispensable, but becomes more so than ever now, when our whole economy and all its industrial enterprises will have to be organized anew. The Communist Manifesto quite correctly emphasized the economically (not the politically) revolutionary character of the work of the bourgeois-capitalist entrepreneur. No trade union, least of all a state-socialist official, can carry out these functions for us. We must simply make use of them, in their right place:
hold out to them their necessary premium--profits--without, however, allowing this to go to their heads. Only in this way--today!--is the advance of socialism possible. 80

Once again, Weber's scientific schizophrenia permits him to posit a fragmented world--a world in which the development of a science that is objective links Weber's sociology to a capitalism built upon the objectivity of bureaucracy. The value neutrality that supposedly results, in fact, creates the value bias of his impotent sociology. It is a sociology that can be nothing else but a legitimation of prevailing socio-economic arrangements--the arrangements of a German capitalism that Weber himself referred to as "the fate of our time". 81 Thus, in perceptively criticizing those who mistake state-controlled cartellization (monopolization) of profit and wage interests for the ideal of a "democratic" or "socialist" future, Weber proceeds to characterize a viable alternative moving in the direction of this ideal, the organization of consumer interests, as a "pipe dream". 82 For Weber, then, the development of a workable socialism must wait upon the capitalism of a refined state bureaucracy.

In Weber's sociology, capitalism becomes equated with, interchangeable with, bureaucracy. Through a process of substitution the central problem of the German socio-economic order becomes bureaucracy, rather than capitalism; the problem is no longer economic, the fact that one class profits by the labor of another, but political--that is to say,
bureaucratic. People do not dominate (control) one another; instead, hierarchical offices (bureaucratic roles) dominate each other. People "alienate" each other not because of the way in which interaction is affected by their relationship to the means of production, but because of their "objective" relationship to bureaucratic hierarchies. Thus, Weber focuses considerable attention on what he referred to as "the leadership problem".

Weber was early aware that it was the political leaders elected by the people, and not the people or masses themselves, who safeguard capitalism, and the economic leaders "necessary premium--profits--", against "the dictatorship of the official". The Bismarck regime had left Germany with a strongly centralized bureaucracy unable, in Weber's view, to provide the independent political leadership to carry out the "tasks of the nation". Thus, in his 1894 inaugural lecture (Antrittsrede) as professor of economics at the University of Freiburg, he speaks of the necessity for developing the political leadership of the economically prosperous bourgeoisie--leadership which would, without becoming despotic, "place the political power-interests of the nation above all other considerations":

The threatening thing in our situation ... is that the bourgeois classes, as the bearers of the power-interests of the nation, seem to wilt away, while there are no signs that the workers are beginning to show the maturity to replace them. The danger does not ... lie with the masses. It is not a question of the economic position of the ruled, but rather the
political qualification of the ruling and ascending classes which is the ultimate issue in the social-political problem. 86

Scientist Weber provides citizen Weber with a solution to this problem, the leader with charisma. This extraordinary individual, like Weber's "superman sociologist", is able to put his fragmented world back together again, protecting both the wilting bourgeoisie and the immature workers from the political dangers of bureaucracy/capitalism. That these dangers, in Weber's view, have little or nothing to do with class differences, the economic relationship between the rulers and the ruled, logically anticipates his particular kind of "voluntarism". In brief, it is a freedom of action that becomes rationally reserved for the super individual, the charismatic leader, whose personal magnetism "preaches, creates, or demands new obligations" of bureaucracy/capitalism. 87

For Weber, charismatic domination is, at least initially, the very opposite of bureaucratic domination. "Pure" charisma is antithetical to all ordered economy. "It is the very force that disregards economy ... where its 'pure' type is at work, it is the very opposite of the institutionally permanent." 88 However, it is precisely this instability of charismatic authority which permits it to be fitted into the reality of socio-economic relations:

... Genuine charisma rests upon the legitimation of personal heroism or personal revelation. Yet precisely this quality of charisma as an extraordinary, supernatural,
divine power transforms it, after its routinization, into a suitable source for the legitimate acquisition of sovereign power by the successors of the charismatic hero. Routinized charisma thus continues to work in favor of all those whose power and possession is guaranteed by that sovereign power, and who thus depend upon the continued existence of such power. 89

Charisma, then, becomes routinized to answer the "need of social strata, privileged through existing political, social, and economic orders, to have their social and economic positions 'legitimized.'"90 In the final analysis, even Weber's super individual, the charismatic leader, must eventually cooperate in tailoring (routinizing) "irrational" and "revolutionary" passions to fit the bureaucracy (the capitalism) of prevailing socio-economic arrangements. Weber writes: "The routinization of charisma, in quite essential respects, is identical with adjustment to the conditions of the economy, that is, to the continuously effective routines of workaday life. In this, the economy leads and is not led."91

Weber's antidote for this deadening effect of bureaucracy/capitalism is, as Cohen points out, individualistic opposition--an opposition which is to be based upon acceptance of the prevailing normative definitions of the existent socio-economic system. Even Weber's chosen agent of change, the charismatic political leader, has no other alternative but to work from within bureaucracy/capitalism, cooperating with the privileged social strata in cooling charisma. The passions which initiate change are to be carefully monitored
For Weber, the point is not to alter the bureaucracy/capitalism that allows some individuals to dominate at the expense of others; rather, as Cohen argues, "the point is to salvage the soul against the impersonal, calculating formality of domination."93

The salvation urged by Weber's sociology helps ensure the continuation of bureaucratic/capitalistic domination. Both Weber's "mild-mannered daily reporter", the superman sociologist, and his charismatic leader can, like Clark Kent, "leap tall buildings at a single bound"--providing the appearance of transcending reality, while actually preserving it. Weber's faith in the charisma of a super agent of change--the logical extension of, and counterpart to, his super scientist--is transformed into a faith in prevailing socio-economic arrangements. Thus, while his charismatic leader and sociologist alike are able to momentarily transcend their cultural surroundings--the former at the outset, prior to the routinization of charisma, and the latter nearer the completion of value-relevant, but not value-biased, scientific work--they resign themselves to cultural influences at that point in their work most crucial to the maintenance of the established socio-economic system. In brief, the charismatic leader's personal magnetism creates a passion that, in falling short of revolution, becomes locked into (routinized by) the prevailing socio-economic system. Similarly, the superman
sociologist's objectivity creates a science in which his problem-producing reality becomes locked into the "phone booth" of Weber's imagination--a science that leaves him incapable of emerging to observe how his sociology is changed by, but unable to change, existent socio-economic arrangements. 94

Weber's phone booth is the ideal type. It is this methodological technique that permits the transformation of citizen Weber's empirical reality into the "mental constructs" of scientist Weber. He describes the ideal type as a research procedure in both negative and positive terms.

It is not ideal in the sense of advocating something which ought to be. Neither is it average in either the sense of a mediation or a summary of all traits common to a given phenomenon. It is not a proposition about reality which can be empirically verified as reality's "true" essence. Thus, the ideal type is neither a hypothesis, nor can it be construed as an end in itself.

Rather, the ideal type is a technique, a means for constructing and testing hypotheses in order to facilitate comparisons of various aspects of the empirical world. According to Weber:

... An ideal type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical construct (Gedankenbild). In its conceptual purity, this mental construct (Gedankenbild) cannot be found empirically anywhere in reality. It is a utopia. . . . 95
However, while the ideal type is never actually found in reality, it must be "objectively possible". Logical soundness, then, is the basis upon which such a type is to be accepted as a reliable tool for use in research designed to check its validity.

Emphasis on logic to construct abstractions which neither are fully realized in, nor are accurately representative of, the material world is often characteristic of another type, the stereotype. Both the ideal type and the stereotype involve exaggerating certain key features, while ignoring certain other features, of a phenomenon for the purpose of organizing observations into categories. It is usually argued by Weber's many current disciples that such a comparison is unfair, not legitimate. The ideal type, they contend, is a "scientific" tool used to guard against the tendency to stereotype—to type emotionally, using both preconceived beliefs and varied empirical data gathered from biased sources to emphasize negative characteristics. Such reasoning is, however, extremely weak protest, as it fails to dismiss the fact that both types can be formulated so as to meet Weber's primary criteria of abstractness and logical soundness leading to objective possibility. The result of typing in both instances is often a "picture in the mind—a preconceived (i.e., not based on experience), standardized, group-shared idea" which has been oversimplified. The phenomenon examined is logically cleansed of its contradictions—made into "a pure abstraction of the understanding". The
world becomes a matter of competing interpretations—definitions of the situation—with the appellation "scientific" used to distinguish among various typologies, withholding credibility from some and lending it to others.

In sum, in constructing his sociology, Weber carefully overlooks the primary fact concerning this competition: namely, that both the ideal type of the scientist and the stereotype of the citizen are, like all other abstractions, given a fixed form in the reality of everyday living by the powerful—usually at the expense of the less powerful. Weber's inability to see that it is the powerful's desire to replace symbols (definitions of the situation) no longer effective in dominating the less powerful which constitutes the new knowledge necessitating the construction of fresh ideal types, is scientific blindness attributable to the "objectivity" of his sociology. This objectivity, residing in the sociologist's scientific and not citizen self, is supposed to produce a science that is value neutral; instead, it encourages development of a body of knowledge that is subjective and biased—a sociology that permits Weber to live in both his worlds without adequately understanding either one. It is a sociology that, like the ideal type which provides its basic insights, confuses appearances with the actualities of the social world it attempts to describe and analyze. Thus, bureaucracy appears to be equatable with capitalism, manager with worker, people with offices, power with politics,
political leadership with change. Such confusion is characteristic of a science most concerned with preserving rather than changing the reality of prevailing socio-economic arrangements; a science that enlists the superhuman qualities of charismatic leaders and scientific sociologists to create a sociology which supports that which is, as opposed to that which might be.

Conclusion

The sociology of Max Weber, above all else, is a science oriented towards preserving the rapidly maturing German capitalism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This justification of existing socio-economic arrangements was accomplished "objectively", giving the appearance that Weber's science differed sharply from the more obvious value partisanship that characterized the first American sociologists' scientific legitimation of their socio-economic system. Thus, Ward's attempt to shape and regulate the prevailing value configuration of this system by applying scientific principles has been much less appealing to future generations of American sociologists than Weber's attempt to separate values from facts, the political economy from science. In short, the "executive privilege" that has welded nationalistic passions to the developing economic system from Bismarck to Bethmann to Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford, can be more readily extended to bureaucratic sociologists if scientific work is thought to exist in a
realm of reason set apart from a sphere of sentiment.

Weber's sociologists, then, may be viewed in much the same way as the Clark-Riesman-Jencks argument characterizes the institutions of higher learning which employ them--as an autonomous interest group set apart from other groups in a society supposedly made more pluralistic ("democratic") by their presence. Weber's "constellations of interest" give way to charismatic leaders and superhuman sociologists who transcend the ordinary by pacifying passion in a professional manner. Thus, the curious paradox of Weber's science: While he mourns the decline and replacement of the cultivated and well-rounded individual by the technician, his sociology encourages a role of growing dominance for the specialized expert--a "professional". In short, Weber's despair over the increasingly narrow range of choices open to individuals as capitalism matured, was overcome by an analysis--bureaucracy becomes the inevitable result of, and interchangeable with, capitalism--which gave considerable impetus to this trend. For Weber, the socio-economic arrangements of German capitalism in 1900 were not only "the fate" of his time, but also the facts. "The Truth is the Truth", spoke Weber from his deathbed in Munich--his last attempt to support the objective sociology which could alone give credence to these final words.

As the next chapter will show, the legacy left by Weber, his objective sociology, has become for most social scientists the focal point of the professionalism that guides
their scientific practice. The education-as-autonomous thesis illustrates the central importance of the science Weber developed to the social theory being created by today's sociologists. Thus, the Clark-Riesman-Jencks argument takes Weber's objective science as a demarcation point not only to view colleges and universities as autonomous, but also to envision professors as trained professionals able to stand apart from and control the passions that sway the masses. These educated and relatively autonomous professionals know the truth as Weber saw it. They, like the education-as-autonomous theorists, often develop arguments exhibiting the same curious paradox characteristic of Weber's science: The objectivity that is supposed to preserve the pluralism of choice among conflicting values, results instead in a value-partisanship—a partisanship that further strengthens the dominating position of a wealthy and privileged elite engaged in fashioning a capitalism that is increasingly one-dimensional.
FOOTNOTES

1. It should be pointed out that this toleration has never been extended to those particular opinions which suggest practice that might threaten the socio-economic arrangements of the prevailing capitalism. Thus, American history shows that the decision-makers, the wealthy and powerful capitalists, and their representatives have exercised a quick and forceful repression of most opinions of communists, socialists, and anarchists.

2. It should be noted here that Small spent two years (1879-1881) in Germany studying social science at the universities of Berlin and Leipzig.

3. The changes brought about by the socio-historical transformation of the German and the American socio-economic systems from laissez-faire to corporate capitalism were clearly evident in both countries at about the same time. The concentration of industrial wealth in the holdings of a relatively few corporate capitalists proceeded somewhat more rapidly in the United States than in Germany. Even so, the concentration of available German capital in banks, to take an important indicator of corporate development, was occurring at the same time (the last quarter of the nineteenth century), if not a little earlier, in Germany than it was in the United States. By 1900 both countries were characterized by comparatively well-developed corporate economies. For more details concerning the growth of corporate socio-economic arrangements in Germany, see Golo Mann, The History of Germany Since 1789 (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), especially pp. 200-203.


5. This uneasiness has been termed a "depression" by William A. Williams, The Contours of American History (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966), especially pp. 313-342. For an excellent study of three Americans who were among the dominant figures of this twenty-five year period, see Robert Green McCloskey, American Conservatism in the Age of Enterprise (New York: Harper and Row, 1951).

6. The word "socialistic" is used advisedly; for it should be understood that during this "age of reform" the socialists constituted just one of many social reform groups and movements. See D.L. Smith, Socio-Economic Influences, p. 206.

8. It should be noted that the number of workers actively involved in the strike against the Pullman Co. was considerably less than the 150,000 membership figure. For a detailed description of this and other noteworthy strikes initiated around this time, see Louis Adamic, *Dynamite* (New York: The Viking Press, 1934).

9. For a fuller description of the effect of the injunction and other legal weapons see D.L. Smith, *Socio-Economic Influences*—especially his comments concerning the relationship between the Pratt Amendment and the growth of imperial capitalism on p. 115.

10. This and other valuable information concerning financial support for the work of the first American sociologists can be found in Smith, *Socio-Economic Influences*. The following quotation, found on p. 93, gives a clear picture of the wealth and influence of Sumner's financial benefactor, Whitney:

Whitney owned extensive land-holdings. For example, in addition to his New York City residence, he owned a Venetian palace which was situated on 5,000 acres in the Wheatly Hills near Jamaica, Long Island; a Sheepshead Bay House with a private tract covering 300 acres; a mansion at Berkshire Hill, Massachusetts with 700 acres of land; an Adirondack game preserve of 16,000 acres; a lodge at Blue Mountain Lake with a golf course; a Blue Grass farm of 3,000 acres in Kentucky; and an estate at Aiken, South Carolina consisting of 2,000 acres. In his leisure time he frequented the following clubs in which he held membership: Metropolitan, Union, Knickerbocker, Manhattan, Democratic, Yale Alumni, University, Century, Racquet, Jockey, New York Yacht, and the Suburban Riding and Driving Club.


13. See Smith, *Socio-Economic Influences*, pp. 36, 40, 41. The original source material can be found in William
13. continued.


16. Ibid., pp. 158-159 and 265-266. Giddings' discussion of "proletarian madness" can be found in *Democracy*, especially pp. 240-245; while the Small quote is taken from *Introduction*, p. 75.

17. Ibid., p. 35. The quotation is from *Essays*, p. 178.


19. Ibid., pp. 76-80. For Sumner's view of the relationship between property and liberty see *Earth Hunger*, p. 176.


27. Ibid., p. 269. This quotation is taken from Introduction, p. 82.


30. Ibid., p. 310. See Dynamic Sociology, p. 590.

31. Ibid., p. 327. This quotation can be found in Dynamic Sociology, p. 494.


33. Ibid., pp. 314, 315 and 319-321.

34. Ibid., pp. 339-342. The quotation can be found on p. 342 of Smith's work and in Ward's Cosmos, Vol. IV, p. 312.


36. Ibid., p. 368. This quotation can be found in Dynamic Sociology, Vol. II, p. 249.

38. The adjective charismatic is used to indicate the fact that the strength of Bismarck's personality had important effects on the German masses. Its use is not meant to suggest, however, that Bismarck derived the power with which he ruled by personal magnetism alone. On the contrary, the governmental administration Bismarck created is a near-perfect example of social organization designed to routinize charisma by legitimating power within the confines of bureaucratic routine.

39. It should be noted here that Weber at times spoke against Bismarck, see Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968), Volume Three, pp. 1385-1392; Hans H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 31-33; and Reinhard Bendix, *Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait* (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, 1960), pp. 443-444. However, the fact that Weber sometimes denounced Bismarck for his intolerance of independent-minded political leaders and his reliance upon advisors who were nothing more than docile and obedient servants of governmental bureaucracy, does not alter and should not overshadow the equally important, if not more important, fact that Weber's sociology was a powerful reinforcement for--essentially an imitation of--Bismarck's bureaucratic administration. For a brief note to the effect that Weber exempted Bismarck from his "wholesale indictment" of monarchical and bureaucratic absolutism, see Bendix, note 60 on p. 451.


42. In order to better understand what kind of emphasis should be placed upon the word "appeared", see Taylor, *Course of German History*, p. 126. The policy referred to here made clear what Bismarck himself said to one of the liberals in 1848: "I am a Junker and mean to benefit by it." (Taylor, p. 95).

43. This combination of factors constituting the central focus of Weber's sociology was not new among German intellectuals. Weber's notion of an "objective" science dates back at least to Kant and Hegel, as well as being clearly evident in the beliefs and actions of Johann Fichte. Professor Fichte of the University of Berlin was an outspoken advocate of German nationalism--believing that the superiority of the German people made it imperative that the Germans not only govern themselves, but also the French and all the
43. continued.
other peoples of Europe as well. Fichte's nationalism
was strongly supported by his conceptions of the nature
of science and of the university setting within which it
was taught. Nearly 100 years before Weber wrote about
separating reason from emotion, Fichte, evidently fearing
that the outbreak of war in 1813 might bring emotional
bias into his classroom, dramatically cancelled his
lectures and retired to his study "until the liberation
of the fatherland". See Taylor, *Course of German History*,
pp. 44 and 45.

44. Ibid., pp. 28, 29.

45. Ibid., pp. 60, 61.

46. Ibid., p. 61.

47. Ibid., p. 77. Taylor's disclaimer of class as a motivating
factor does not alter the fact that these liberals, as
professionals, were a part of the emerging middle classes.

48. Quoted from J.P. Mayer, *Max Weber and German Politics*
is Mayer's emphasis, objectively is my own.
Earlier Weber had supported the naval program of Secretary
of State for the Imperial Navy, admiral von Tirpitz. As
Mann points out, Weber "surrendered as much to the cult of
power as the imperial admiral" and most other Germans by
urging the development of sea power as an essential part
of world politics designed to protect the German economy.
Weber writes:

Only complete political dishonesty and naive
optimism can fail to recognise that, after a
period of peaceful competition, the inevitable
urge of all nations with bourgeois societies to
expand their trade must now once more lead to
a situation in which power alone will have a
decisive influence on the extent to which in-
dividual nations will share in the economic
control of the world, and thus determine the
economic prospects of their peoples and of their
workers in particular.
Quoted from Mann, *History of Germany*, p. 262.


50. Ibid., p. 22.

51. Quoted from Mayer, *German Politics*, p. 107. For more
on Weber's exchanges with, his questioning of, "designated
war criminals"--and in particular, his exchange with
Ludendorff--see Gerth and Mills, *From Max Weber*, pp. 41-42.
52. Taylor, *Course of German History*, p. 76.
55. For more on this, and Taylor's distinction between "liberal administration" and "liberal government", see *Course of German History*, p. 110.
56. *Ibid.*, p. 114, for more information on this war. The word "won" has been placed in quotation marks to indicate this author's doubt as to whether anybody can ever really "win" in a war.
58. This was the paradoxical irony of the Bismarck administration: That in order to protect his own power, Bismarck was continually forced to support a policy of unification which moved the nation ever closer to the Greater Germany he did not desire. See note 42 of this chapter.
59. For a brief discussion concerning the creation of this allegiance among the small farmers see Taylor, *Course of German History*, p. 29.
60. *Ibid.*, see pp. 130, 131 for more details on this social security program.
61. *Ibid.*, see p. 149. Bülow's "World Policy" had been developing for some years under his predecessors. Caprivi, especially, was very active in foreign affairs—see Mann, *History of Germany*, pp. 255-256. For more details on the way in which Bülow directed Germany's international relations see Mann, pp. 265-270, especially pp. 266 and 268.
64. Quoted from Mayer, *German Politics*, p. 103.
65. Quoted from Bendix, *Intellectual Portrait*, p. 483. Evidently, Weber had no small measure of success in training many of his closest friends and relatives to exclude such sentiment. Thus, writing his wife-to-be, Marianne, Weber cautions: "We must not tolerate within us vague and mystical attitudes. If feelings run high, you must tame them, to steer your life soberly." (Mayer, p. 37) Later, Marianne, in a biography of her husband, would write in the third person (speaking of herself as "she" and of her husband and herself as "they"); in short,
65. continued.
"the indestructible barriers against yielding to passions"
(even such "passion" as writing in the first person when
speaking about oneself), which Marianne notes that Weber's
mother had developed in him, are also readily observable
in Marianne herself. See pp. 119 and 120 of a most recent
and superb, socio-psychological analysis of Weber by Martin
Green, The von Richthofen Sisters: The Triumphant and the

66. Max Weber, "Objectivity" in Social Science and Social
Policy", The Methodology of the Social Sciences, trans­
lated and edited by Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch
(New York: The Free Press, 1949), p. 52. It should be
noted at the outset of this analysis that this author is
aware of the breadth, and realizes the many lasting con­
tributions, of Weber's work. Accordingly, only a small
portion of his work has been scrutinized, focusing in
particular on Weber's conceptions of objectivity and
bureaucracy, in order to show the way in which his writings
on scientific method and social organization have made a
lasting impact upon present-day sociology. Further, the
criticism of Weber's notion of "objectivity" presented
herein is not meant to undermine or destroy the idea that
science as logical method can be of value in comparing
several arguments, one to another, in order to attempt a
determination of the validity of each. The judgment implied
in this determination is recognition of the reality that
some arguments make a stronger case than others. The
stronger arguments constitute better interpretations of
the material world because, to borrow a phrase from C.W.
Mills, they are closer to "the run of fact". This fact
is interpreted by human beings who, rather than possessing
as individuals two independent selves, are whole persons
whose beings are shaped by a value configuration that re­
sults from the intersection of historical influences, the
milieu of present social structure, and individual biography.
It is within this framework that some arguments and analyses
can be considered to be more "objective" than others. For
elaboration of this conception of objectivity, the relation­
ship between fact and value, see Mills, The Sociological
Imagination (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961),

68. Ibid., pp. 52-54.
69. Ibid., p. 61.
70. Ibid., p. 60.
71. Ibid., pp. 55 and 56.

72. This is not to argue that Weber was not acting in "good faith" by emphasizing this separation; he was well aware of the abuse of power and privilege that results when prejudice predominates fact as the major determinant of policy decisions. It is to argue that in moving between his separate worlds Weber developed a science, the logic of which could do little other than to offer support for prevailing socio-economic arrangements. It is to argue against the view that the development of a sociology by Weber which supported and/or paralleled capitalist interests is in the main attributable to accident. A more correct statement would be to attribute Weber's sociological support of capitalism to omission—scientific blindness attributable to the "objectivity" of his sociology.


75. Ibid., see pp. 158-328 for the economic and pp. 324-423 for his political sociology. The Bendix attempt (see Intellectual Portrait, p. 289) to apologize for Weber's inability to adequately relate his analytical abstractions to the material world cannot make Weber's fragmented conception of reality whole.


78. For further and later (1917) evidence of Weber's consistency in protecting capitalistic socio-economic arrangements see Economy and Society, eds. Roth and Wittich, pp. 1423-1424. The list of the topics of Weber's several speeches to the Verein fur Sozialpolitik can be found in Mayer, German Politics, p. 67.
79. See Mayer, German Politics, pp. 125-131. See Green, The von Richthofen Sisters, for an excellent study showing the ways in which this split between the moral sentiment of ethics and the objectivity of science affected Weber's most intimate relationships. When it comes to drawing out the connections between Weber's science and his daily round of activities, the Green analysis is superior to any this author has read.

80. Quoted from Giddens, Politics and Sociology, pp. 24-25. Also, see Mayer, German Politics, p. 96.


82. See Economy and Society, eds. Roth and Wittich, p. 1454.

83. See Cohen, "Rationalized Domination". This interpretation is also at least implied in Giddens, p. 36.

84. The phrase "dictatorship of the official" is taken from Weber's Law in Economy and Society, p. 508. For a short, but excellent, review of Weber's thinking on the relationship between bureaucracy and democracy, see Giddens, pp. 17-19. Also, see Mayer, German Politics, p. 44 and pp. 94-96.

85. See Giddens, Politics and Sociology, p. 35. Also, see Weber, Economy and Society, eds. Roth and Wittich, p. 1454. Weber's emphasis upon leadership has been accurately summarized by Green, The von Richthofen Sisters, as follows: "It was Weber as much as anyone who made imperialism a respectable political cause in Germany." (p. 155) Also, see pp. 149, 150, and 153.

86. Ibid., pp. 17-18.

87. Ibid., p. 38 for the quoted portion.


89. Ibid., p. 262.

90. Ibid., p. 262.

91. Ibid., p. 54. Weber thought that "of all those powers that lessen the importance of individual action, the most irresistible is rational discipline." (See Green, p. 41, who quotes this from Weber's "The Meaning of Discipline") For Weber, it is clear that even the charismatic leader
Continued,

must, at some point, submit to the dictates of rationality. Thus, Weber was able to create and practice a science that could routinize the charisma of a Bismarck, supporting him and his successors by separating doctrine from the person who advocates it. He was able to do this in his own life even when the person involved, Otto Gross, was openly loved by Weber's lover, Else von Richthofen, and lived a style of life disapproved of by Weber. (See Green, especially pp. 56 and 129).

This passage is quoted from Gerth and Mills, From Max Weber, p. 115.

See Cohen, "Rationalized Domination", p. 82.

For those readers who are unfamiliar with Superman comics, radio and television programs, public phone booths, as well as washrooms, were locations often used by Clark Kent for his transformation from "mild-mannered daily reporter" into Superman. Further, it should be noted that superhuman activities are not limited to the male sex alone; for, as this author has recently been advised, there exists a "Wonder Woman" who also performs super feats. For those interested in more information, or in ordering Wonder Woman T-shirts, comics, etc., see the "Classified" section of Ms. magazine.

Weber, "'Objectivity', in Methodology, p. 90.

Ibid., p. 80.

Ibid., especially pp. 90 and 91.

The quoted material is only part of a more complete definition which seems to support Weber's notion of the ideal type, see Thomas Ford Hoult, Dictionary of Modern Sociology (Totowa, New Jersey: Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1974), p. 319. Also, see p. 309 for the definition of sociotype, a type defined as being counter to, or the opposite of, the stereotype.


On this point see Gerth and Mills, From Max Weber, p. 73; also, Chapter VIII on "Bureaucracy", pp. 196-244.
CHAPTER IV

SOCIOLOGICAL PROFESSIONALISM OR "SERVICE IS OUR BUSINESS": MAX WEBER'S LEGACY

Sociologists interested in the study of occupations usually cite the following factors as being characteristic of the professional occupational environment: 1) expertise 2) autonomy 3) commitment 4) responsibility.¹ To quote from occupational sociologist Lee Taylor's characterization: "Professionalism is an environment created by and for idea people. It is an environment of occupational persons who are devoted to creativity and service norms."² (my emphasis) This devotion has made the majority of today's sociologists very sensitive about the image they have created in utilizing their technical mastery of specialized knowledge. Most would prefer to define their service not in "Boy Scout", social work or social reform terms, but instead, would subscribe to Peter Berger's definition of sociology as distinguished from social work: "Social work, whatever its theoretical rationalization, is a certain practice in society. Sociology is not a practice, but an attempt to understand."³

This view of sociology as non-partisan understanding, coupled with Berger's refusal to see this understanding as a practice, amounts to a reformulation of Weber's "objective" sociology. It is the same view that permitted Weber to understand and mourn the growth of bureaucratic meritocracy through educational certification, but did not instruct him
as to how he might implement his desire "to keep a portion of mankind free from this parcelling-out of the soul, from this supreme mastery of the bureaucratic way of life."^4

Rather, Weber's sociology, with its emphasis on an objective understanding of social reality, has helped to create the organizational context within which professionalism has been made compatible with the exigencies of bureaucracy. Just as Weber made his conceptualization of bureaucratic requirements synonymous with the dictates of German capitalism, present-day American sociologists, in adapting their professionalism to the bureaucratic routine of the universities that employ them, apply their scientific understanding to the maintenance of the current socio-economic system.

In short, as the following discussion of professorial practice will elaborate, to act in a professionally responsible manner involves a professional commitment which has come to mean service to, maintenance of, the socio-economic arrangements of today's corporate capitalism.

Professionalism and the Normative Definitions of Objective Science: The Professional Association

Perhaps the clearest statement of the professional norms that govern the daily behavior of modern social scientists can be found in their response to disruptive disturbances which moved from the campus to their own professional meetings. A review of reassessments offered by some who attended the 1968 annual meetings of the American Sociological Association (ASA), the American Historical Association (AHA), the American
Political Science Association (APSA), and to take one example from the humanities, the Modern Language Association of America (MLA), shows that all these professional associations share and reaffirm certain basic tenets of a professionalism that binds scholars in the various academic disciplines to one another.

The first and most basic tenet is that of scholarly objectivity. Richard Ohmann's report on the 83rd annual meeting of the MLA makes it clear that Weber's emphasis on objectivity is an obsession not solely confined to the natural and social scientists. Scholars in the humanities also strive to attain objectivity; for to be objective means to become professionally pure—to cleanse one's scholarly activity, separating it from, and lifting it above, the mundane coarseness of political scuffling. It was just such scuffling at the MLA meeting which resulted in the arrest of Ohmann's friend, Louis Kampf, head of the Literature Section, Department of Humanities, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Kampf and other supporters of an activist group known as the New University Conference or the "radical caucus", were putting up posters in the lobby of the New York Americana, a convention hotel. The hotel guards objected and attempted to tear down one of the posters bearing a quotation from Blake, "the tigers of wrath are wiser than the horses of instruction." Kampf and supporters in turn objected by placing themselves in front of the posters while the guards
tried to shove them aside. A hotel guard called the police and Kampf and two graduate students were arrested.

Ohmann admits that, given the temper of the times, he was not bothered by any feature (such as intensity, viciousness, length) of this incident which was extraordinary. Rather, he remembers and recounts it because he found himself peculiarly disquieted by his friend's arrest: "I should have been enraged; instead I felt guilty."³ Ohmann's attitude, like that of the Americana management and the police who patrolled outside the hotel, resulted from his expectations as to what constitutes professional behavior; in brief, Kampf by failing to keep his professional activity differentiated from his political activity, his scholarly separate from his citizen self, violated these expectations.

While the maintenance of a scientific objectivity that supposedly keeps politics from contaminating scholarship helps legitimate the prevailing socio-economic system, professional organizations and their members are often more actively involved in courting the favor of the system's elite. Thus, in his examination of the activities of the American Sociological Association, "The Professional Organization of Sociology: A View from Below", Martin Nicolaus points out that as early as 1960-61 the ASA received eighty percent of its budget from the corporation and government contracts it "services".⁶ To quote Nicolaus in some detail:

"Maintenance and lubrication of this liaison with the economic, military, and civil
sovereignty is the main but not the only significant business of the Association. Its array of committees undertakes, among other things, the business of disseminating the results of this connection outward around the world and downward into the colleges and high schools. The committee on publications, for example, besides keeping rein over the ASA's half-dozen official quarterlies and monthlies, produces a series of monographs and readers in which the official view of the social scene is retailed overseas and at home. The committee on "International Cooperation" maintains liaison with Soviet and East European sociologists, including "rescue" services a la Congress for Cultural Freedom; and pursues a program "to encourage the growth of sociology and support the isolated sociologists in the developing countries of Africa, Asia, and the Middle East." (Latin America is apparently considered already in the bag.) A committee on "International Order" dispenses wishful platitudes on the order of "... if the conditions may be changed so there will be no more Vietnams." The committee on "Social Studies Curriculum in American Secondary Schools" promotes under the social science label variations on the theme of "I Pledge Allegiance" into junior colleges and high schools; a parallel body assists in the indoctrination of teachers for these courses. Since the great majority of sociology BA's are hired by the official bureaucracies, the cycle of sovereignty-sociology-sovereignty is neatly closed at both ends. 7

That individuals reap handsome rewards for their reaffirmation of, and therefore, renewal of, this servility cycle can be seen in the career patterns of the successful. 8 Those who become successful servants must, however, learn to be discreet. For with the public disclosure of the operational details of a few scientific projects--the Michigan State-CIA sponsored Vietnam Project and Project Camelot are two good examples--professional social scientists have come to realize
that they serve by researching non-professionals who either do not understand, or actively seek to undermine, the rules of the professional game.

Perhaps it is the fear of just such sabotage that motivates sociologists to sell an "official view of the social scene" to the non-professional public, while at the same time encouraging them to exercise control over professional colleagues by instituting within the ASA formal political mechanisms that are best described as elitist. According to Nicolaus, these mechanisms permit the continuation of a caste system in which the upper caste ("composed of full-time responsible Ph.D.'d professional sociologists employed by universities, business, or government") elects the president, vice-president, and a twelve-member Council whose power is literally "beyond appeal". However, such elitist practice begins to look like a democratic paradise when ASA organizational procedures are compared with the internal processes of the American Political Science Association.

In a review of these processes, Alan Wolfe argues that American political scientists, in structuring their own professional association, have been unable to practice the pluralism they preach. He points to the unrepresentative character of the association's business meetings, nominating committee, and elections as evidence of the undemocratic and unpluralistic (elitist) character of the APSA. Wolfe contends that this character is much less surprising, in fact,
easily understood, if one is familiar with the political science upon which it is based. The "New Conservative" political science is anti-participatory, optimistic (S.M. Lipset's famous statement that "the fundamental political problems of the industrial revolution have been solved" is exemplary), and conservative. This new conservatism does more than simply argue against the futility and/or potential harm resulting from the implementation of reform proposals, nor does it simply indulge in a celebration of existing institutions; rather, in a much more subtle manner it acknowledges the need for certain reforms while attempting to ensure that the purpose of reform is to conserve whatever is being reformed.

Reform, however, has never played a major role in the activities of professional associations; for these organizations have rarely made their concerns relevant enough to the crucial problems of the present-day to produce anything other than a reinforcing impact upon the structure of our daily lives. In this regard, the 1917 debate among American historians over whether or not to hold their annual meeting because the United States had become involved in World War I is instructive; for it reflected not so much their concern with war problems, but rather their desire to serve the nation by maintaining a tension between their professionalism and social involvement. This tension, a strong and seemingly permanent feature of all the associations of professional scholars,
continues to be maintained within the American Historical Association today. It surfaces, according to one observer, in the form of a Newsletter that provides gossip suggesting experimentation and innovation, while the association continues to maintain a strongly traditional editorial policy—so traditional that the association's journal, The Review, has published no more than one article in the few years prior to 1968 "that explicitly related historical understanding to the concerns of the present". Thus, it is little wonder that AHA members have never been overly concerned about the degree to which the association practice of submitting its Annual Reports for congressional approval has limited radical content; for it is highly unlikely that the AHA—nor any of the other professional associations—would take a position relevant to any present-day concern, much less a position so unorthodox as to rouse congressional interest.

Social change, then, is not a top priority of professional associations; rather, their focus is on social control. Often, the associations, as a group, leave the task of determining their position on controversial issues to the American Council on Education (ACE)—a board of well-known, professional educators who in effect form a government lobby for the education industry. For example, it was ACE that helped the professional associations suppress the "student unrest" of the 1960's.

First, the Council issued a statement deploring campus
disruptions that interfered with "the process of orderly discussion and negotiation to secure significant change". Then, in continuing their attempt to quiet Congressional critics, Council members argued that education was, like other mass media industries such as the movies or television, capable of policing itself. It is an argument most difficult to refute. In fact, between 1965 and 1968 the ACE Research Office surveyed the social, vocational, and educational attitudes of about 300,000 entering first year students at some 400 colleges and universities. Later, these students were resurveyed to better understand the influence of higher education on the development of these attitudes. The questionnaire which asked, among other things, about political attitudes, ideas on drugs, participation in demonstrations, and hobbies, could be used by college administrators to compare their own students' characteristics with those from a similar institution; it could also be used as ACE Research Director, Alexander W. Astin, suggested, to insure relative calm on campus by studying the backgrounds and interests of activists in order to exclude students with "protest-prone" profiles.

During the 1967-68 school year, when Astin was a fellow at Stanford's Center for Advanced Study in Behavioral Sciences, Center activities were disturbed by serious student disruptions. Astin and colleagues responded by forming a seminar which eventually issued a statement calling for an in-depth study of student protests. Published in the July 5th (1968) issue
of Science magazine, the statement read, in part, as follows:

It is clear from the increasing number and intensity of demonstrations on campuses in the United States and abroad that we do not understand how best to deal with these crises when they occur and certainly do not have the knowledge to prevent them from occurring in the first place. . . . It is important to point out that, in using words like deal with and prevent in discussing these protests, there is the implicit assumption that violent or destructive behavior, of itself, is undesirable and self-defeating. We believe this to be true. 17

Once suggested, a study of student protest—valuable to the Stanford fellows, not only for reasons of both morality and international security, but also because the study of student protest "is important in its own right as an area for behavioral research"18—was soon financed by a grant from the National Institute of Mental Health. 19 The main component of the research undertaken was a series of 45 in-depth interviews of students and faculty on 22 protest-plagued campuses, the actual interviewing being subcontracted to a section of the Bureau of Social Science Research (BSSR) headed by Astin's wife, Helen. Within a year's time Astin was obliged to explain the purposes of this research in answer to questions raised by newspaper reporters. His explanation brings into sharp focus the three major components of the professional ethic: A denial of present-time relevance and a desire to serve which are accompanied by a disclaimer against favoritism and/or elitism—in brief, an emphasis on objectivity and autonomy.
Accordingly, Astin's first point was that the research being conducted by the BSSR was not meant to exclude potential college students on political grounds. In other words, because research findings might be used by college admissions officers not just to exclude, but possibly, "to admit more protest-prone students, or employed by student activists as a basis for advocating changes in admissions policies on other grounds", Astin argued that the current study was unrelated to the previously-issued Stanford manifesto on the problem of student protest. Thus, after explaining how this research might be of service to a variety of concerned parties, Astin proclaimed it to be "objective". He denied that the study was designed with the view that campus disturbances constituted "a 'problem' in need of a 'solution'. We claim no special expertise in making such value judgments. What we do claim to be expert in is the objective empirical study of higher education." Finally, Astin cited the elaborate security precautions taken to protect respondents from unwarranted invasions of their privacy by authorities, and then attempted to deemphasize the importance of any relationship between the Council's desire to suppress campus protests and the research-in-question with the assurance that "the aims, methods, and findings of the Office of Research were wholly independent of the politics of the ACE." 

In short, ACE Research Director Astin's defense of the "protest" research is a near-perfect example of the way
in which the Council functions as protector of the various professional associations. It is a statement that encourages professional educators to continue practicing their science in an objective and self-serving manner; in so doing, given their servile relationship to the socio-economic elite, these educators serve the dictates of the prevailing socio-economic system. They, like Astin, discourage change and encourage 'system maintenance' by viewing present socio-economic arrangements as the logical outcome of the past and the only acceptable foundation for building the future.

Professionalism and Current Sociological Theory: The Education-As-Autonomous Thesis Reconsidered

Helping Director Astin police the education industry was a committee appointed to advise ACE researchers in their work on the protest study. Among the committee's distinguished members were two eminent sociologists, Amitai Etzioni and David Riesman. They and their colleagues on the advisory committee issued a statement which read, in part, "the study is not a comprehensive investigation of the causes of campus unrest, since it necessarily neglects the role of social, political, economic, and historic factors." As Lauter and Alexander point out, one is tempted to ask what this research does include if these items are not taken into consideration. In search of an answer as to why the study "necessarily neglects" these factors, one might begin by looking to the scholarly work of Riesman, the advisory committee's leading
specialist on American colleges and universities. A brief reexamination of his contributions, as well as those of Jencks and Clark, to the literature on higher education suggests not just the analytical poverty of their education-as-autonomous thesis, but also, its ideological suitability to the ACE goal of protecting and fostering academic professionalism.

To summarize, Riesman argues that the intellectual veto power of professional educators gives them control in shaping a higher education that is autonomous--so autonomous, that the university, under the direction of the increasingly powerful professors, is fast becoming the dominant institution of the American social system. According to Riesman, professional fitness for service in this leadership position comes about as a result of training in one of the academic disciplines, those veto groups he labels "the racecourses of the mind". Tracking on one of these racecourses, in the view of both Riesman and co-author Jencks, schools future educators to objectively separate their professional from their personal lives. Thus, the newly socialized professors come to learn that not only are the universities within which they run the racecourses autonomous, but as professional scientists, they too can act autonomously (professionally). Stated another way, they learn to make few genuine attempts at gaining respect for their expertise from those outside of, and lower in the status hierarchy than, 'the profession'; instead, they learn to professionally ignore the wishes and
needs of "clients" in order to gain the approval of colleagues. Such ignorance is not usually, as Riesman and Jencks seem to suggest, synonymous with "the advancement of the human condition"—that is, if this phrase is to be made relevant to the great majority of people. Rather, like the objectivity that prohibits a less fragmented and more complete social analysis, it helps to make the education-as-autonomous thesis and a narrow scientific professionalism mutually reinforcing. Such reinforcement, in turn, helps the elite maintain current socio-economic arrangements by making sure that everyone, professional and non-professional alike, knows and remains in their place. In short, the human condition furthered by the colleague orientation of the Riesman-Jencks view of academic professionalism protects Yale and its graduates against an influx of too many clients-turned-colleagues from "the wrong side of the tracks"; or to remain within the Riesman metaphor, his view of the racecourses he has been so instrumental in designing does not allow for much 'off-track betting'.

Similarly, the Jencks examination of Inequality suggests the futility of betting on those whose breeding is questionable—those without the benefits of being born into families where adults have been schooled in one or more of the academic racecourses. For Jencks, however, a bet on the Yale admission chances of the physician's son from New York City would be almost as risky as one on the Bridgeport boy
from the other side of the tracks; for in his opinion, decisions as to who is permitted to run the racecourses, like the benefits that might possibly obtain from successfully completing the race, have become personalized accidents.

These accidents and their relationship to extreme differences in individual incomes become, in the Jencks view, sociologically unrelatable; as personal fortuities and adversities, they come to resemble the distinctiveness that he sees separating the factory from both the autonomous school and the independent nuclear family. As with the school and the family, individual accidents help eliminate dissatisfaction that results from the important inequalities within groups, as opposed to the less significant differences between groups. Therefore, Jencks argues, enlightened public policy would not attempt to monitor or control these accidents; instead, the Jencks analysis permits them to be molded to, and to serve, the contours of the current capitalism in its corporate form.

Clark too is concerned with, and develops an argument that fosters, this service orientation of higher education. For Clark, education is becoming "active"; the passive and traditional service function that has made schools "society's main vehicle of cultural indoctrination" is now being supplemented by education which is innovative—an "active force". Thus, Clark's colleges and universities, because they play an increasingly large part in creating the "expert society"
they serve, are becoming increasingly autonomous.

This autonomy is necessary if higher education is to remain an "active agent". According to Clark, both professors and students are becoming increasingly important interest groups, and like Riesman and Jencks, he sees development of the academic disciplines as being vital to the restructuring of society. Moreover, Clark argues that the research orientation of professional educators, when combined with the tolerant attitudes they teach their students, is not only able to create "new culture" but is also capable of sustaining the culture it creates. Clark contends, then, that pluralism, the supposedly increased differentiation caused by the proliferation of academic disciplines, can provide both creative and maintenance functions—but only if professional educators are allowed to develop their academic specialities with a minimum of outside interference. Briefly stated, the same pluralism that strengthens professionalism in order to solve problems within the educational institution, can also solve the problems of the larger socio-economic order, as objective (that is, professional) educational leaders "steer change in desired directions".

Thus, in the writings of Riesman, Jencks, and Clark, the same theme, with variations, continually reappears: The expertise of professional scientist-educators makes them capable of an objective, an unbiased and value-neutral, understanding of the socio-economic system. The implication
is that since they stand apart from this system they are creating and serving, professional social scientists should be able, if given sufficient autonomy, to apply their supposedly non-partisan expertise to social problems—solving them in ways that will benefit the great majority of non-experts. By promoting this professional ideology, professionals with specialized expertise are able to create an ever-widening gulf between these non-experts and themselves. The result for scientist-educators is that objectivity and autonomy become ever more closely tied together; the problem-solving properties of an "unbiased" science are used by professional educators who, working in colleges and universities that supposedly stand apart from the value-relevance and bias of the present socio-economic order, plan the new society. This planning, as this review of the education-as-autonomous thesis and the previous discussion of professional associations indicate, places primary emphasis upon social control as opposed to social change. As the following discussion will show, the Jencks vision that schools should be reformed to guarantee a "good time" for all is brought ever closer to reality by scientist-educators adept at using the university bureaucracy to foster and enhance their professional image. In so doing, they guarantee a good time for themselves at the expense of the less-privileged by helping to protect and solidify the power and privilege of the few wealthy capitalists who employ them.
Professionalism and Bureaucracy: The University Setting

The same norms of objectivity that govern the conduct of scientists at professional meetings and that help to create, and are in turn recreated by, sociological theory (e.g., the education-as-autonomous thesis) also structure interaction on the university campus. Scientist-educators have become very skilled at manipulating the professional norm of objectivity and the educational thesis of autonomy, making them mutually supportive in an attempt to dominate students. The professional responsibility involved in exercising this domination is being transformed into irresponsibility, as the professors shape their expertise to help a small group of corporate capitalists strengthen their dominant position within the present socio-economic system. The way in which professors learn to manipulate, and thereby maintain, potential conflict between the ties of community as opposed to the requirements of bureaucracy and the obligations of teaching versus those of research offer excellent illustrations of how professional irresponsibility is developed.

The autonomy claimed for colleges and universities by Riesman, Jencks, and Clark is extended to individual professors through a professional ideology that emphasizes reciprocal responsibility to, and therefore, the authority of, colleagues. However, the legitimation of professional activity is not solely limited to the horizontal authority of collegial relations, but also rests in part with the
vertical authority of bureaucratic social organization. Research attempting to differentiate between the rational and legal components of Weber's theory of bureaucratic authority has demonstrated that most research subjects were adept at switching their rationalization for obedience from a professional ("knowledge without office") to a bureaucratic ("office without knowledge") base of legitimacy. The group of scientist-educators who conduct this kind of research understands, better than most, the advantages to be gained from switching between a professional and a bureaucratic base of authority.

Thus, when participation in departmental affairs—attendance at faculty meetings, development of curriculum, evaluation of professorial classroom performance, hiring of new faculty—is the student issue, the faculty can solidify their position within the academic hierarchy by calling on the canons of professionalism to provide them a rationale for questioning the students' competence as participating members. When class attendance, formal examinations and grading are of concern to students, the faculty can shift responsibility from themselves to the rules and regulations of the academic bureaucracy without threatening their professional status. If the professors are adept at playing this game of switching reference groups, they can, in both instances, force students to direct their animosities to realities (in the first instance, "the profession", and in
the second case, the academic bureaucracy—"the organization") amorphous enough that the students' power to change academic structures is largely confined to their rhetoric.

It should not be surprising, then, that one of the most well-established social science findings is the research fact that professional workers are often less than eager participants in bureaucratic organizations;²⁷ for it is this lack of enthusiasm that recreates itself by allowing professionals to play off the idea of horizontal communication among colleagues against the vertical (top-down) communication of bureaucracy. Within the academic profession it should be granted that there is some potential conflict between the "community of scholars", as both idea and organization, and the reality of academic bureaucracy; however, the word potential should be underscored, as college and university faculty members in their daily activities attempt to ensure that the dialectic between destruction and preservation of this "dual" structure works to their benefit.

Similarly, the degree to which research and teaching obligations become opposed to one another, resulting in conflict situations for scientist-educators, is in large part determined by these educators. The professors themselves, then, more than any other group, give credence to the following description by Caplow and McGee of the relationship between university teaching and research: "For most members of the profession the real strain in the academic role arises
from the fact that they are, in essence, paid to do one job [teaching], whereas the worth of their services is evaluated on the basis of how well they do another [research].

In brief, most professors quickly learn how to make professional ideology fit their individual capabilities and interests, using one activity, either research or teaching, to minimize the evaluative importance of the other.

Thus, if the talented and motivated researcher should find that attention to a lengthening list of publications leaves too little time and energy to do an adequate job of teaching, there are usually other less capable and/or motivated researchers in the department who will compensate for this inadequacy. This latter group is usually more than willing to attempt to remedy such teaching deficiencies; for since professional norms will not allow them to acknowledge their inadequacy as researchers by dropping all pretense of research activity, their only serious claims for recognition and promotion lie with successful participation in other activities such as teaching, departmental and university administration, volunteer service to the university as "community", and public service. Accordingly, rather than administering one's own research grant, the unsuccessful researcher may, for example, turn his/her energies to administering departmental monies and routinizing teaching--hiring new faculty and organizing class schedules, departmental meetings, and agendas. Not called upon to help the government
plan counter-insurgency (Project Camelot) and direct warfare (MSU-CIA Vietnam Project) in foreign lands, or to help IBM develop "learning" programs for inner-city school children at home, he/she offers services to the local school board and is asked to look into the problem of an increasing rate of juvenile delinquency on the city's "North Side".

What these examples illustrate is the complementarity of the professional and the academic hierarchies. The professor who is both an outstanding researcher and teacher is much more rare than the opposite, but one can still attain the recognition and promotion that lead to a position of authority by gaining control over the communication channels in one of these hierarchies. Individual professorial circumstance is, however, of little consequence to the student, who is usually the loser in all cases. The case of the professor who is both an inadequate researcher and teacher needs no further explanation, while the opposite instance usually finds the professor far too harried by publication and lecture commitments to have much time for students. At any rate, as is the case with the good researcher and poor teacher, success in publishing is rewarded by a reduction in classroom hours. Finally, the individual whose research output and/or quality is inadequate, for whatever reason, but who excels in the lecture hall, is usually the one for whom the well-known phrase "publish or perish" becomes a reality. In short, competency in, and fondness for, research and/or teaching is
of little matter, as professors learn to play one off against
the other in order to insulate themselves from the campus
group they have grown to dislike more than any other—the
students. 31

The supposed dichotomy between teaching and research
becomes, then, like the supposed differentiation between
academic community and bureaucracy, somewhat illusory.
Further, and most importantly, success in lessening whatever
conflict potential these dichotomous tendencies contain be-
comes an artifact of maintaining the present socio-economic
system; in other words, success in this regard rests upon
professorial ability to develop increasingly closer ties
between the daily operation of schools and the other major
institutions of the prevailing socio-economic order. Thus,
as consultant/grantsman professors become more objective
and autonomous, more skilled at fusing technical and mana-
gerial roles, they make themselves and the educational
organizations they represent increasingly dependent upon
preserving, fundamentally unchanged, the institutional
arrangements of the current socio-economic system. In brief,
professorial emphasis is on social control rather than social
change.

This emphasis has been excellently documented in a
recent research report on the Russell Sage Foundation. Jay
Schulman, Carol Brown, and Roger Kahn focused on this founda-
tion in order to study "some of the ways in which sociology,
sociologists, and collectivities of sociologists and social scientists foster elite domination in the United States by pursuing professional interests and projecting professional ideologies which reflect a mobile upper-middle class situation. The authors find upper-middle class professors, as a group, are linked to a few powerful individuals, a power elite, because they share a belief that individual achievement is recognized and rewarded, that social control is more requisite for the general welfare than is social change, and that beneficial social change can only be brought about through the action of "authorities." Schulman, Brown, and Kahn find that the Russell Sage Foundation, because it has "little direct contact with policy-makers or government offices", fosters these beliefs; the authority of "authorities" receives a good deal of legitimating support from foundations which, like the professors whose research they sponsor, are usually permitted to "appear before the public as the disinterested scholar." This attitude of scholarly objectivity and autonomy is most clearly evident in the authors' review of the persons and organizations to whom Russell Sage sends complementary copies of their foundation-sponsored books and the more lengthy routine-announcements list. Their review lends credibility to the hypothesis that in the foundation view knowledge is power—"it need merely be produced and published to have a beneficial effect." Not only is the foundation successful in insulating itself from authorities near the top of the
socio-economic structure—"Russell Sage's communication links are predominantly with elements of the knowledge industry rather than with policy-makers"—but, the same communication network also protects the foundation from those recipients of the authorities' decisions at the bottom.

Thus, the Russell Sage Foundation promotes a science of social control, a "managerial sociology", that encourages a particular kind of social change—change based on an "institutional flexibility" that continues to provide "helping" jobs for the upper-middle class. The professional helpers, like the professional educators who have certified them, are insulated from both the upper and lower extremes of the social class structure. Their attempts to initiate change which might solve particular social problems produce, like the research efforts of foundation-sponsored scientists, nothing more than the aggrandizement of their own position within the socio-economic structure. In short, the Schulman-Brown-Kahn description of sociological researchers is also most applicable to the professional helpers whom their research helps to legitimate and support: "Frequently, it appears that members of the knowledge industry are simultaneously the generators, producers, the packagers, distributors and consumers of their own product. The only thing they are not is their own funding source, a situation that they and the Russell Sage Foundation appear intent on remediying."

What is implied in this brief discussion of the way
in which the education of professional helpers schools them in the ideology of professional educators has been well summarized by David K. Cohen and Marvin Lazerson: "Going to school was [and is] better preparation for becoming a good worker than work itself!"\textsuperscript{40} In their examination of the historical development of "Education and the Corporate Order", Cohen and Lazerson argue that the purpose of education is "to socialize children into a stratified class society".\textsuperscript{41} Professional educators, then, as the present analysis indicates, are involved in continually recreating this society--imparting an ideology that in absolving themselves, also absolves wealthy corporate capitalists from responsibility for injustices resulting from the arrangements of the socio-economic system they dominate. Education becomes useful to the capitalist elite as "a means for deferring direct (redistributive) social change by displacing it onto individual achievement"; the idea that knowledge could become power redistributing the wealth of the larger socio-economic system as a unit gives way to the theme that technological training is the key to personal, an individualized, success.\textsuperscript{42}

For some time it has become increasingly clear that the strongest proponents of this theme are those large and wealthy corporations whose continued prosperity is very much dependent upon maintenance of the current socio-economic system. Thus, the sober, "business-is-business" objectivity of the boardroom has come to dominate the knowledge industry as IBM, RCA, Time-Life, ATT, ITT, Singer, and Xerox attempt to make
teachers and students as value-neutral and autonomous as the teaching machines their sales representatives sell. The monopoly over knowledge that can be brought about by these machines and accompanying "learning packages" fits the familiar and profitable mold of present-day corporate efficiency. This monopoly is not, however, without rewards for obedient and unquestioning educators and their students. Both groups experience, according to the sales promotion, a considerable reduction in anxiety—the learning packages and the machine absolving the teachers of responsibility and guilt for the inadequacies of their students, while conditioning both students and teachers to passively accept the obscuring of social and political alternatives that helps neutralize imagination.43

This neutralization process is currently taking on much wider dimensions as corporate executives use the latest technique to take some of the risk out of their domination of that industry, the knowledge industry, which the current technology first helped them to control. No longer will this corporate elite have to play the odds that Weber's message on objectivity and value neutrality will reach undergraduate university students, instructing them in the professional ideology that helps sustain the present socio-economic system. Instead, the elite can simply make sure that this message is passed on through the unifying and unilateral medium of the computerized teaching machine.

Accordingly, the objectivity and value neutrality of
increased military spending is a lesson currently being programmed by IBM into American first graders. In growing older, they are not likely to question "Our Working World" of capitalism in which the machine is able to show them how large defense expenditures can maintain a distinction between producer ("someone who makes something useful or does useful work") and consumer ("someone who consumes things"), and at the same time tie New York City to Calcutta and Singapore. Rather, social and political alternatives to such capitalistic imperialism, and the imagination that can create them, will continue to be consumed as school. Graduate school, the final step in this schooling process, becomes a high-stake game in which professionals (both the certified and those in the process of being certified) figure out new ways to make a Ph.D. pay. Some prominent sociologists write "how to" manuals on this subject, while their colleagues turn to pacifying themselves, and other workers not as well-placed within the socio-economic system as professors, by proclaiming "the end of ideology".

The ideology of this and similar proclamations has been, in part, responsible for training professors determined to bestow their supposed objectivity and autonomy upon other professional educators; teaching machines and learning packages can bring the university without students to first grade teachers and their pupils. The end of ideology can, just as it does for Columbia and Harvard, easily obscure the connections between
Public School Nineteen and other institutions of the prevailing socio-economic order. The end of ideology can unify opposites--murder becomes transformed into pacification, war peace, slavery freedom--just as surely for the first graders and their teacher, as for the professor and graduate assistant; and while the professor's six-year-old is figuring out the relevance of "spit wads" in adjusting to the teaching machine game, the professor attempts to make the lecture an ever more perfect video-tape recording of him/herself, and the graduate assistant becomes increasingly proficient at offering standardized responses to anticipated questions concerning lecture material. The objectivity and autonomy produced by this kind of education reinforces itself. Professionalism makes for more professionalism, as so-called "efficient teaching" frees the professor and teaching assistant to package more learning programs for the first grader.

The new learning programs are comprised of the established research findings that are supposed to provide impetus for new sociological theory. This theory is presented by professors and graduate students, as an exercise in professional responsibility, to colleagues at professional meetings, graduate students in seminars, and undergraduates in lecture halls. Socio-political alternatives to the prevailing socio-economic system are not merely reduced, but virtually eliminated, as professors continue to unite professional sociology, scotch and soda, and the stock market;
graduate students learn how to mix Marx, marijuana, and job market anxiety; while undergraduates bring together Berger, beer, and business careers. Academic professionalism, like the corporate capitalism which creates and sustains it, has room for the cocktail hour, the counter culture, and the collegian who can "chug-a-lug". As is the case with the teaching machines upon which corporate technology has made educators increasingly dependent, academic professionalism has become a medium that is a large part of the message it transmits; thus, Cutty Sark, cannabis, and Carling become at once more important than, as well as part of, sociological analysis of the social system. In brief, sociological professionalism strengthens a cycle of servility that is of vital significance in maintaining the socio-economic arrangements of the current corporate capitalism.

Conclusion

This review of professional practice among professors indicates the great dependence of the educational institution upon the prevailing market economy within which it exists. Professorial practice defines the factors Lee Taylor cites as being characteristic of the professional occupational environment--expertise, autonomy, commitment, and responsibility--in ways that strongly support the hegemony of a capitalist elite. Max Weber's notion of scholarly objectivity is the central norm governing this practice. It is the norm by which university professors continue to serve and protect elite interests that
become their own, each succeeding generation of professional social scientists recreating anew the Nicolaus servility cycle of sovereignty-sociology-sovereignty. It is the norm that makes Riesman, Jencks, and Clark blind to both the dependency, past and present, of higher education upon the surrounding socio-economic system, and the socio-political character of academic professional associations. It is the norm that not only permits, but encourages, Taylor to include in the summary of his professionalization chapter the following words: "The power of professionalization is nonpolitical and the authority of professionals is limited to their technical subject area." 47

This statement by Taylor, like the work of the education-as-autonomous theorists and a great many of their colleagues, clearly reiterates Weber's position as regards method in scientific analysis. Their attempt, like Weber's, to "de-politicize" the university with a professional ideology that fragments reality by maintaining a schizophrenic distinction between scientific fact and ethical value, merely succeeds in "amoralizing" their chosen academic discipline. 48 The result, to apply phrases that Weber himself used to distinguish between two types of professional politicians, is professors who subscribe to a professional ideology which permits them to live "off", rather than "for", science. 49 As Alvin Gouldner has argued, the attraction of Weber's value-free doctrine is partly attributable to the fact that "it is somehow useful to those who believe it;" 50 that it permits them to "think of sociology as a way of getting ahead in the world by providing them with
neutral techniques that may be sold on the open market to any buyer. 11

The buyers are an increasingly small group of wealthy capitalists who would like their corporate conglomerates to control the knowledge industry in Calcutta and Singapore as well as New York. They educate and employ professional scientists in their schools and research foundations—scientists whose continued employment often depends upon learning how to discipline their science with the canons of a professionalism that can encompass cannons of another kind. For at times the dictates of global capitalism force multi-national corporations to literally bomb people into compliance with corporate needs. It is on these occasions that the corporate owners must find the sociology that Nicolaus describes as "the official view of the social scene" especially comforting.

For their part, social scientists are made comfortable—being handsomely rewarded by the elite for their attempts to shift responsibility for "social problems" from these powerful few and the specific socio-economic arrangements of a capitalism they control to the failings of specific problem individuals and a not-so-specific entity known as "society". In short, the same morality that is concerned with security and order when Astin and his colleagues view campus demonstrations and conflict as problematic, can be profitably retailed abroad to "developing" nations by enterprising social scientists. Thus, Daniel Bell and others develop an end-of-ideology thesis that
gives prominence to social scientist experts in charge of re-pairing the welfare state framework--technicians who, to borrow a phrase from Noam Chomsky, use their science to support "a technology of social tinkering" on an international scale. 53

This social tinkering is encouraged by a scientific professionalism which, as is argued in this chapter, becomes valuable to the university educator because it quite simply "places the scientist in a moral vacuum". 54 Believing he/she is accountable only to science itself, to the standards of "objectivity", the scientist begins to view him/herself as free from responsible involvement in the social effects of scientific research. The commitment of Taylor's autonomous expert becomes increasingly non-responsible, and eventually, irresponsible, with respect to the way in which scientific findings are used to affect the social environment. Chomsky reemphasizes the major theme of this chapter when he argues that the development of this attitude of non-responsibility permits most scientists to believe that there is "no further need for ideologies that look to radical change. The scholar-expert replaces the 'free-floating intellectual' who 'felt that the wrong values were being honored, and rejected the society', and who has now lost his political role (now, that is, that the right values are being honored)." 55

The development of this kind of professionalism fits well with Weber's science--a sociology that actually discourages professional social scientists from achieving what Weber regarded
as "the ultimate aim of our science" and a most serious duty, collaboration in the political education of the German nation. 56 It is this education that continues to allow others to share Weber's belief in the irrelevance of paying much attention to who controls the modern concentration of 'the means of production', as well as his wisdom in viewing forms of State as only techniques. 57 Thus, for Weber, as for Riesman, Jencks, Clark, Taylor, Berger and thousands of other professional sociologists, analysis of the social world is a value-neutral understanding which can be gained under any political-economic regime whatsoever. It is precisely this self-serving abdication of social responsibility, this unaccountability, which makes the following Nicolaus quote an appropriate conclusion to this review of academic professionalism: "In the last analysis, the only moves toward liberation within sociology are those which contribute to the liberation from sociology. The point is not to reinterpret oppression but to end it." 58
FOOTNOTES


2. Taylor, p. 130.


4. Quoted from J.P. Mayer, Max Weber and German Politics (London: Faber & Faber, 1943), p. 128. For comments addressed to Weber's view of a science of sociology that would be "objective", and a summary of the position taken in this dissertation concerning the objectivity of sociology as a science, see p. 186, note 66.

5. Richard Ohmann, "An Informal and Perhaps Unreliable Account of the Modern Language Association of America", The Antioch Review, Fall 1969, p. 330. It should be noted here that the arrest of Kampf and the graduate students produced a much larger reaction than just the mere feeling of guilt on the part of Ohmann; for the MLA was quickly joined by the Federal Government, represented by the FBI, in exacting retribution from Kampf and his allies. See Ohmann, pp. 330, 335, 336, and 338. Also, the Ohmann article shows just how "political" were many of the MLA decisions. For example, the association went on record twice against "the immoral, illegal, and imperial war" the U.S. was waging in Vietnam (p. 333); and, the MLA moved—for a variety of reasons, including the role of Mayor Daley and the Chicago police in the 1968 Democratic National Convention—its 1969 annual meeting from Chicago to Denver. (pp. 342, 343)


7. Ibid., pp. 382-383.


16. Ibid., see pp. 292-293.

17. Ibid., quoted on p. 293.

18. Ibid., p. 293. This quote was also taken from the Stanford seminar's statement published in Science.

19. The overall concerns of the funding institution provide yet another indication that protest is "out of order", "unhealthy"—perhaps even, a sign of "mental illness".

20. See Lauter and Alexander, "Educational Faith", p. 296. One certainly has to wonder what the chances are that the study's findings might be used in the way Astin suggests. For example, how likely is it that administrators would admit more "protest-prone" students who are likely to bring about unrest when their own job security is directly related to their ability to maintain campus quiet and order?

21. Ibid., see p. 296.

22. Ibid., p. 296.

23. While this is not the place to undertake an analysis of Etzioni's work, suffice it to say that his organizational theory, like the educational theory of Riesman, focuses on maintaining the prevailing socio-economic system. In celebrating a sociology that emphasizes social control and
23. continued.
its relationship to social order, Etzioni purposefully chooses compliance as the major variable in his comparative analysis of complex organizations. This choice permits him to equate coercion, economic assets, and normative values as major sources of control. This equation, in turn, permits Etzioni to dismiss arguments based on a power elite perspective with a pluralistic theory of organizations that not only turns protest into acceptance, but most importantly, freedom into domination. See Amitai Etzioni, A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations (Glencoe: Free Press, 1961). Riesman, besides serving in this advisory capacity, is also otherwise involved in helping to maintain current socio-economic arrangements. One of his more recent activities was to serve on the "editorial advisory board" of a new magazine entitled Change. Riesman's advice and manuscript suggestions have helped make the kind of magazine Robert S. Fogarty ("A Nice Piece of Change", The Antioch Review, Fall 1969, pp. 305-319) describes in the following manner: "Change magazine is not published by a group of innovators but by a PR firm; Change magazine is dominated by "communications" and "higher education" leaders whose interests are essentially functional; Change has a half-million dollar budget and can purchase opinions at ten cents a word; Change is a fact not a process."(p.319)


27. This fact has been documented by, among others, Goode, "Community"; and Everett C. Hughes, Men and Their Work (Glencoe: Free Press, 1958), pp. 131-138. (It should be noted here that, although Hughes may not have been aware of it, women also work.) Also, Alvin W. Gouldner has, in examining organizational tension resulting from the coexistent needs for expertise and loyalty, identified polar types of professionals—"locals" and "cosmopolitans". See "Cosmopolitans and Locals: Toward an Analysis of Latent Social Roles", Administrative Science Quarterly, December 1957 and March 1958, pp. 281-306 and pp. 444-480.

29. It should be strongly emphasized that access to, and control over, communication channels in one of these hierarchies makes it much easier to gain access to communication outlets in the other. See, for example, Diana Crane, "The Gatekeepers of Science: Some Factors Affecting the Selection of Articles for Scientific Journals," *The American Sociologist*, November 1967, pp. 195-201.

30. The faculty with lowest status have the heaviest teaching loads; and the more one teaches, the less likely it is that one can find time to do the writing necessary for a rise in status. This circle is made even more vicious due to the fact that it is often difficult to determine what constitutes "adequate" research and teaching. It is not unusual for adequacy to be equated with success in publishing; but as the Crane article (see previous footnote) points out, decisions as to whose work gets published are often made by an academic elite. Thus, publication, as with many other things, depends at least as much on "who you know" as "what you know". Similarly, a crowded classroom, like a lengthy list of publications, does not always mean that the lecturer is an adequate teacher.

31. A familiar professorial "line" involves distaste, even hate, for administrators; professors claim that they want to join students in fighting the university administration. However, a 1968 study conducted by Edward Gross suggests that this is nothing more than liberal rhetoric. Thus, when Gross asked administrators and faculty members in U.S. nondenominational universities to rank organizational goals, he found that most of the goals placed at the bottom (three of the last four) referred to students. In short, if professors, as a group, do not dislike students, few are interested in paying much attention to them. See Edward Gross, "Universities as Organizations: A Research Approach", *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 33, August 1968, especially p. 530.


33. Ibid., see p. 2. It should be noted here that the authors contrast these three beliefs with three ways in which Russell Sage professional practices do not mesh with interests of the power elite. They argue that by promoting pluralism, increasing organizational structure
at the middle levels of society, and communicating the impression of an increase in social problems which are endemic to the system, the Russell Sage Foundation works against power elite interests. On the contrary, this writer suggests, without developing the argument at this time, that an excellent case could be made showing how these outcomes of Russell Sage professional practice not only mesh with, but strengthen, the interests and position of the power elite.

34. Ibid., p. 22.
35. Ibid., see p. 27.
36. Ibid., p. 31 for the quotation. Also, see pp. 27-30.
37. Ibid., see p. 30 and pp. 31-32.
38. Ibid., see p. 3.
39. Ibid., p. 33.
41. Ibid., p. 72.
42. Ibid., p. 71 for the quotation. Also, see pp. 52 and 72.
43. For a similar argument and more data on the way in which a few large corporations control the knowledge industry, see Michael Seltzer and Howard Karger, "Good Morning Class . . . . My Name is Bzzz Uzz, Crackle", Ramparts, March 1974, pp. 10-14.
44. Ibid., p. 12. "Our Working World" is a learning package which moves the corporate perspective from "Families at Work" in the first grade to "Our Working World Cities at Work" (New York, Calcutta, and Singapore) in the third.
45. See, for example, Pierre Van den Berghe, Academic Gamesmanship: How to make a Ph.D. pay (Toronto: Abelard-Schuman, 1970).
47. Lee Taylor, Occupational Sociology, p. 131.


52. Riesman and Jencks are especially good at shifting responsibility so as to emphasize the failings of particular individuals, while Clark is very adept at making vague and ill-defined references to "society" as the locus of social problems.


55. Chomsky, *American Power*, p. 345. The following indicates what Chomsky has in mind when he refers to the responsibility of intellectuals: "Intellectuals are in a position to expose the lies of governments, to analyze actions according to their causes and motives and often hidden intentions. In the Western world, at least, they have the power that comes from political liberty, from access to information and freedom of expression . . . . The responsibilities of intellectuals, then, are much deeper than . . . the 'responsibility of peoples', given the unique privileges that intellectuals enjoy." (*American Power*, p. 324)


57. *Ibid.*, see pp. 88 and 76.

review and conclusions

This study has attempted to answer several questions (see INTRODUCTION, pp. 12-13 and 14-15) suggested by its two major theses. The answers, taken together, provide evidence in support of both theses. The more general of the two, the interrelationship between higher education and the socio-economic system, was stated as follows: If American colleges and universities have been and are dependent upon, subservient to, the development of American capitalism, then both the early development of American sociology and current professional activity among its practitioners should reflect the transformation of the socio-economic system from laissez-faire to corporate capitalism. Data concerning this hypothesized dependency of higher education upon the market economy has been presented and analyzed in each chapter of this study.

The Growth of Scientific Knowledge and the Dependency Thesis: Higher Education in the Service of Capitalism

Chapter One, an examination of the growth of scientific knowledge and the development of America's colleges and universities supports the view that a socio-economic elite has dominated the growth of higher education in the United States from colonial times to the present. The colonial government's revenue and tariff policies helped to increase profits for a developing upper class by protecting home merchants and agriculturists against the potential dangers of "free trade" with
stronger, foreign competitors. Encouraged by the government to make only limited and safe foreign investments, both the northern merchants and the southern plantation owners began to use their wealth to develop domestic institutions, including those related to education. Gradually, business and industrial financiers came to replace the clergy as the major occupational group from which college and university trustees were chosen.

The new trustees were like the old in that they neither resided, nor made their livelihood, on campus. One significant difference between the two groups was that the financiers made sure that the dictates of piety were suited to or supplanted by the dictates of profit in shaping both school curriculum and the evolving social conscience. This social conscience—the democratic-humanistic sentiments growing out of the revolutionary period—contained the suggestion that the privileges enjoyed by a few wealthy individuals might be disproportionate with their contribution to the welfare of the great majority. Consequently, the socio-economic elite in their new capacity as university trustees used their dominant power over higher education to institute instruction in a curriculum made increasingly practical. The new trustees made vocational and technical education available to youth from divergent socio-economic backgrounds so that the young might be educated to find happiness in applying their useful knowledge to assist the trustees (the elite) in regulating and protecting the general welfare.
By the mid 1800's the socio-economic elite had succeeded in shaping and sustaining a laissez-faire policy that was to enhance the general welfare by replacing the protection of mercantilism with the competition of free trade. Adam Smith's "invisible hand", as opposed to a conscious policy of mercantilist restraint, would serve to safeguard the general welfare by distinguishing the few most fit competitors from the many. The Supreme Court's decision in the *Dartmouth College v. Woodward* case (1819) both anticipated and fostered the increasingly popular view that these few (the elite) were capable of making their pursuance of personal interests compatible with the best interests of the general public. Thus, a small number of wealthy capitalists, by bestowing their riches upon particular institutions of higher learning, decided which few schools among the many were to survive. The price of survival for the "naturally selected" colleges was to make them increasingly dependent upon their benefactors' success in competing for the expanded commercial and industrial markets promoted by laissez-faire capitalism. The continued existence of these schools could be assured by persuading potential donors of higher education's obvious worth in influencing the unseen machinations of the hidden hand. The general welfare, then, the happiness of all, rested upon the continued development of a pragmatic curriculum.

This development was given tremendous impetus, as well as the state's official seal of approval, when the U.S. Government
passed the Morrill Federal Land-Grant Act in 1862. The Morrill Act granted thousands of acres of land to those states agreeing to set up industrial and mechanical colleges. In time every state would have its land-grant college, and in seventeen states support for a more practical curriculum resulted in the establishment of two such schools.

The center of this curriculum was a practical science that was to become increasingly united with the technology of nineteenth-century industrialism. The wealthy few soon discovered that they might profitably apply a useful science to the technical problems connected with the operation of their manufacturing and industrial concerns. Thus, successful capitalists like Charles Goodyear and later, the Armours, the Dukes, and George Eastman, hired professors to make their knowledge useful in suggesting the possible uses of rubber, and in finding scientific solutions to the problems of producing various consumer goods from hot dogs to cigarettes and cameras. While the professors acted as consultants, college administrators sought financial aid for their schools from wealthy manufacturers and industrialists. Two of the most successful fund-raisers among nineteenth-century college presidents, Harvard's Everett and Brown's Wayland, were outspoken advocates of the view that classical curriculums should be made pragmatic—that is, profitably modern. They were eventually joined by Dartmouth's Lord and Michigan's Tappan, staunch supporters of the classical tradition, whose views
gradually changed to match their first-hand instruction in the economic reality of the growing educational-industrial partnership.

This partnership, developing rapidly during the last quarter of the nineteenth century, was part of a trend characterizing the transformation of the American socio-economic system as a whole from laissez-faire to corporate capitalism. The new economy gave to the corporation a status similar to that accorded the individual under laissez-faire capitalism. As the corporate model came to dominate the socio-economic system, wealthy industrialists began to take a greater interest in the growth and development of higher education. Many institutions of higher learning began to receive sustaining financial contributions for producing useful knowledge for the elite, an elite interested in maintaining and increasing huge profits made possible by the financial and industrial combinations consistent with the new socio-economic arrangements.

There were at least two groups of social scientists producing useful knowledge for the corporate elite during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Both the Metaphysical Club and the first generation of American sociologists developed scientific theories which served to support and encourage corporate ideology. The Club members were "learned professionals" (either lawyers or philosopher-scientists) who began meeting in Old Cambridge in the early 1870's to discuss the ideas of philosophers such as Bentham, Mill, Spencer, and Darwin.
These discussions were given a focus by the members' unanimous acceptance of science as a legitimate approach to making sense out of their experiences and interests. They were interested in science as method—as the "definitional technique" used by humans to control and manipulate the environment. Thus, the Cambridge Metaphysicians preceded pragmatist John Dewey and his followers in arguing that the value of knowledge should be judged relative to the conduct or action it calls forth.

While the discussions of the Club members served to promote value judgments as to the usefulness of knowledge, the work of the first American sociologists involved efforts to make their disciplined knowledge more useful. The founding fathers of sociology in the United States—William Graham Sumner, Franklin Henry Giddings, Albion Woodbury Small, Lester Frank Ward—developed sociologies providing ideological support for America's chaotic transition from laissez-faire to corporate capitalism. Ward and his contemporaries, like the Metaphysical Club members, thought that the Good Society was one in which the actions of individuals should and could be directed and controlled to fit the purposes of the group. This emphasis upon the group as having primacy over the individual was the central assumption of the new capitalism. In short, it was this emphasis which brought the early sociologists together with the industrial elite in viewing those persons unable and/or unwilling to discipline their individual needs to the purposes of the new order as "social problems".
Social problems could, of course, be "solved" by calling upon the pragmatic power of the law to make the dominant opinion of the powerful effective. Ward and his sociological colleagues, however, preferred education as a more subtle and humanistic means of eliminating social problems threatening conformity to the requirements of the new capitalism. Ward argued that a government by scientific principles (Sociocracy) would result in the scientific organization of happiness. Social problems would be eliminated if Americans could be taught to regulate and adjust their individual actions so as to "share in the social consciousness". In Ward's view, then, the general welfare was directly linked to education; specifically, the general welfare rested upon success in refining the theoretical base of the Sociocracy, the science of sociology.

The science of sociology, as it matured in the United States, helped to ensure that the developing social consciousness was corporate. Refining their science to make it harmonious with adjustment to the demands of the new capitalism, the second generation of American sociologists extended the work of Ward and the other founding fathers. Their concern with producing a sociology useful to the socio-economic elite led to an interest in social engineering—an interest that was at first a response to, but at the same time consistent with, businessman Frederick Taylor's emphasis on the scientific management of industry. Taylor's engineering approach to employee-employer relations was an attempt to vary material
rewards in order to motivate each worker to peak performance. The sociologists of the Taylor era served the interests of the powerful few who hired them to make social science knowledge useful for the management of their business and industrial concerns.

In brief, the educational entrepreneurship of the early twentieth century, in which elite financial support was dispensed according to the type and quantity of knowledge produced, continued to organize the merger of science and technology on a vast scale. Interested in the technical application of scientific knowledge to the problems of production, a wealthy few offered large financial incentives to scientist-educators who could demonstrate the capitalist utility of their science. In reshaping higher education to fit the corporate mold, these wealthy few used newly established foundations, private foundations under their domination, to supplement their personal contributions to particular schools with corporate gifts bestowed upon enterprising professor-researchers. Busy submitting research grant proposals to elite foundations, modern (twentieth century) entrepreneurial professors have for the most part ignored students. Today's aspiring consultants spend most of their time darting back and forth from university to government to business enterprises. In their travels they serve and strengthen the interests of a few wealthy and powerful corporate capitalists who are concerned with maintaining the continuity of prevailing socio-economic arrangements.
Chapter Two reviews the theoretical analyses constructed by three of the most well-known of these servants—Burton R. Clark, David Riesman, and Christopher Jencks. Together they have developed a sociology of higher education that attempts to deny the historical relationship of dependency which ties the growth of American colleges and universities to the maintenance of prevailing socio-economic arrangements. This attempt to prove higher education autonomous, however, only serves to affirm the positive relationship between education and the socio-economic arrangements of corporate capitalism.

Thus, their theories concerning higher education, when added to the historical data of Chapter One, make even more creditable the thesis suggesting that the growth of American colleges and universities has been and continues to be dependent upon, subservient to, the development of American capitalism. Furthermore, the present examination of the Clark-Riesman-Jencks argument, the education-as-autonomous argument, provides data that strongly supports the second thesis of this study: If those making the education-as-autonomous argument are providing ideology which serves to reinforce the corporate capitalists' control of higher education, then their educational theories should consistently reaffirm the ideology of the American socio-economic system's growth and development—in a word, pluralism.

Contrary to the data presented in Chapter One, Clark,
Riesman, and Jencks not only find higher education to be relatively independent of the socio-economic structure of American capitalism, but the "active agent" bringing about socio-historical changes within this structure. In making this argument these authors rely quite heavily upon a pluralistic view of the U.S. power structure. This view assumes a rather wide dispersion of power among a rather large number of people representing a variety of groups and issues. Focusing on the dispersion and variety of power, the analyses of Clark, Riesman, and Jencks share a characteristic common to most pluralists—failure to see what C. Wright Mills has called the "big picture". Thus, each author makes higher education autonomous, separating colleges and universities from the socio-economic context within which they are created and sustained. Their writings result in the legitimation, and thereby, perpetuation of the prevailing socio-economic system.

"Active Agents" and Cultural Innovation

Burton R. Clark argues that the educational institution, "society's main vehicle of cultural indoctrination", not only continues to be involved with the task of preparing society's future experts, but education in a technological society is itself becoming "an active force". Professors and students, along with many other educational interest groups, are becoming increasingly active in formulating and answering questions regarding "what to teach, who shall be educated, the direction of change". While these questions are difficult to answer,
"there are major pockets of social agreement" based upon Clark's assumption that quality in education can be roughly assessed on how well it prepares students for "the requirements of adulthood". Thus, Clark's pluralism not only emphasizes the training of experts in numerous specialties designed to preserve and perpetuate the current socio-economic system within which adult life in the United States is lived, but it also helps him to conceptualize professors and students as interest groups important in restructuring this system.

Clark contends that higher education, in particular, should no longer be seen as merely a "passive instrument" doing society's bidding, but rather, as an "active force" shaping the social system. The educational institution is now a "prime contributor to change in society" because colleges and universities 1) produce new culture, 2) liberalize attitudes, and 3) differentiate culture. Clark emphasizes the active role of professors in promoting "the increasingly large role of the university as an inventor of knowledge and technique". Clark's failure to examine and specify whose "current needs" are served by the application of this new knowledge and technique, makes it easier for him to add variety to his pluralistic model of American society by viewing professors as a new interest group, the "free intellectuals".

Free intellectuals help sustain this pluralism by teaching tolerance in the classroom. In arguing that schooling liberalizes attitudes, Clark fails to account for evidence
which suggests that finding a positive relationship between education and liberal attitudes may simply reflect a tolerance that need never be practiced by the tolerant. This evidence emphasizes the fact that the daily lives of most college graduates are far removed from those of most racial and other minorities. These minorities, and not most of the graduates, are consistently (routinely) affected in an adverse manner by the workings of a supposedly democratic political system. The culture upon which this system is based becomes, according to Clark, increasingly differentiated as tolerant (more liberal) students continue to be trained by free (critical and innovating) intellectuals.

For Clark, the specialized nature of this training means that "individuals are allocated to a widening spectrum of adult subcultures that are hooked to occupational subworlds." He maintains that growth in the number of academic specializations, "the process of fields giving rise to subfields", as well as "variation in the character" of the more than 2,000 colleges in the United States are indicative of the way in which education differentiates culture. In developing this thesis Clark fails to consider the many variations of a counter argument which suggests that students, primarily because of the way (how) they are taught, and their schools are becoming more and more alike. This alike interpretation, however, no matter how closely it corresponds with recent experience among those involved in higher education, would never be subscribed to by
Clark. For to accept this view is to question the pluralism of American society, severely diminishing the supposed power of various student and faculty interest groups by emphasizing their inability to implement the educational changes they desire. Similarly, if it could not be argued that education was in large part responsible for producing liberal student attitudes, the validity of a pluralistic model of the power structure in the United States would again be a matter for scepticism. Likewise the research orientation of colleges and universities must produce free, rather than 'bought and sold', intellectuals if the pluralistic doctrine is to remain unquestioned.

Moreover, the pluralism that makes education active can also, according to Clark, solve the problems of the educational institution. Educational problems produced by a commitment to Clark's pluralism are also to be mastered by this pluralism that is its own problem-solving antidote. Thus, the pluralism that will make higher education "more dispersed and disparate" in the future--"a crazy quilt patched with materials of varied hue and size"--will also provide educational leaders trained to "counter drift with design by building organizations and fashioning programs that steer change in desired directions". The desired directions of steered change become the current order as pluralism, like Clark's sociology that reaffirms it, supports the existent socio-economic arrangements of today's corporate capitalism.
"Racecourses of the Mind" and Academic Revolution

David Riesman, like Clark, has long been concerned with higher education's role in directing cultural change. In 1956, Riesman found that the leading American universities were "directionless . . . as far as major innovations are concerned."

Riesman, like Clark, charts a direction for universities by using his pluralistic view of the American social system to make higher education active and autonomous. Riesman argues that the universities themselves, because they house what he calls "the intellectual veto groups", will be increasingly responsible for determining the direction of learning in the United States. The fact that membership in each of these groups is based upon familiarity with a particular academic discipline helps to provide, in Riesman's view, both autonomous and balanced direction to the directionless universities.

Apropos the title of his 1956 book Constraint and Variety in American Education, development and growth of the academic disciplines both constrains and adds variety, balancing and blending academic parochialism with creativity. The Riesman emphasis is, however, on constraint and for him, the disciplines become "the racecourses of the mind". Rather than encouraging professors and students to create new courses, the Riesman emphasis views the disciplines as keeping them on course by "stabilizing the market for ideas, policing it to some extent and thus controlling the worst charlatanry, and making large-scale reorganizations of large-scale universities about as
Over the past twenty years, Riesman, with the help of several collaborators, has reiterated this pluralistic thesis that the veto power possessed by professors trained on one of a variety of racecourses permits them to direct and shape higher education. According to Rissman and co-author Christopher Jencks, professorial power is becoming so strong that the wishes of other educational interest groups are kept from falling outside the boundaries demarcated by the professors' racecourses. It is this growth and development of academic power in shaping higher education that Jencks and Rissman refer to as The Academic Revolution.

The conclusion that there is or ever could be revolution arising from, and confined almost solely to, the universities may be viewed as another artifact of a commitment to pluralism that encourages the authors to at times disregard, and often confuse, the interrelationships between education and other societal institutions. Their initial intention of addressing themselves to the problem of "the relationship between higher education and American society" soon turns into concern with the supposed growing influence of the academic disciplines on the development of higher education. In backing Riesman's racecourse thesis, the authors seem to have forgotten who owns the tracks. It is even more likely that they never knew. For the pluralism of academic veto groups, like Clark's education-as-active argument, makes it unlikely that Jencks and Riesman
would look beyond the academy and its racecourses to the power structure of the larger socio-economic system. Instead, as with Clark, they see higher education as autonomous.

This view of an autonomous higher education rapidly emerging as the central institution of today's America is maintained by analysis that invests the university with enough power both to separate from—the campus is seen as a world apart—and also to control changes in, the other institutions comprising the larger socio-economic system. This separation leads to other analytical divisions that are both confusing and questionable. Most often these divisions bifurcate reality in a way that further isolates education from other institutions of the social system. For example, "pure" is contrasted with "applied" work and research made separate from teaching as Jencks and Riesman differentiate the intellectual from the academic, and the academic from the practical. This intellectual-academic-practical distinction not only helps prepare students from a variety of subcultures to join Clark's "occupational subworlds", but it is also helpful in attempting to disconnect the interests of the academy from those of the government and to keep education separate from industry. This dividing and subdividing of reality often seems to encourage Jencks and Riesman to overlook possible interpretations which might contradict their analysis. Thus, the authors characterize the vast expenditures on post-secondary education made by "enormous bureaucratic and corporate enterprises" like the Armed Services
and General Electric as "in-house training programs" which are to some degree in competition with, but do not provide genuine alternatives to, the training conducted by academicians. Separating higher education from government and industry Jencks and Riesman ignore the possibility that relationships between higher education and the larger socio-economic system may make American colleges and universities "in-house training programs" for "enormous bureaucratic and corporate enterprises" like the Armed Services and General Electric.

Such an oversight is to be expected on the part of sociologists so deeply committed to pluralism as are Jencks and Riesman. For them, the argument that education is autonomous is more than the idea that the academic profession shapes the educational institution with the acquiescence, if not always the approval, of a variety of groups representing a kaleidoscope of interests. For them, an autonomous higher education is also the embodiment of America's humanistic heritage.

When they logically extend their autonomous argument and suggest that improving the racecourses of the mind is perhaps synonymous with advancing the human condition, Jencks and Riesman argue that "mass higher education" has helped to provide enough social mobility to validate their assertion that the United States falls closer to an "equality" as opposed to a "hereditary" model of society. In making this "equality" argument the authors acknowledge the fact that statistical data on employed Americans concerning possible causal connections
between amount of formal schooling and type of work obtained is at best confusing. Jencks and Riesman are not confused, however, about the importance of knowing, and keeping, one's place within the prevailing socio-economic class structure. They, like Clark, develop a sociology which is very concerned with the ideological maintenance of an equality that preserves and perpetuates existing socio-economic arrangements. In short, equality is considered within the interest-group context of a pluralism that, like Riesman's sociology, continues to keep "the system as a whole expanding", and individuals in place--knowing their interests and groups--within the corporate context of today's capitalism.

Nuclear Families and Accidental Inequality

Jencks, with the assistance of several collaborators, has recently attempted a rigorous and scientific reexamination of this notion of equality. The aim of his book, Inequality, was to show that "one specific, widely-held theory about the relationship between school reform and social reform was wrong." The Jencks rejection of this theory--"the liberal notion that equalizing educational opportunity will equalize people's incomes"--is not as convincing as it might be because Jencks fails to adequately specify whose inequality he is analyzing. In brief, Jencks is unable to clarify what his evidence on the relationships between schooling and occupational status and income means in relation to whom.

Perhaps Jencks' difficulty in relating his evidence to
people arises from his substitution of the "noncognitive" and capricious predictive factors of personality and luck for more commonly-accepted measures of "success" (IQ scores, school examination scores, years of formal schooling). Or, as the present analysis suggests, perhaps Jencks' inability to make clear the relationship between inequality and people should be seen as an outcome of his commitment to pluralism. For to be unable to specify which people are being talked about, to clarify whose inequality is being cared about, is characteristic of analyses based upon a pluralistic view of the structure of power. In the words of Jencks' colleague, Riesman, "there is no longer a 'we' who run things and a 'they' who don't, or a 'we' who don't run things and a 'they' who do, but rather that all 'we's' are 'they's' and all 'they's' are 'we's'."

This statement emphasizing the undirectedness of life in modern America is reemphasized by Jencks' contention that adult inequality in occupations and incomes is largely attributable to differences in personality and luck. The present argument suggests that Jencks finds inequality to be largely accidental (undirected) by foreclosing the possibility of finding both direction and directors with analysis that has "ignored extreme cases". Among these extreme cases Jencks has selectively ignored, are those few families who control the great majority of wealth in the United States. Choosing hypotheses and methods which leave him unable to analyze actual
differences in family income for identifiably different individuals, the Jencks statistical approach legitimizes the institutional interconnections of a corporate capitalism dominated by the few wealthy families his analysis ignores. This legitimation is accomplished, as in the Clark and Riesman analyses, by separating one institution from another. Jencks, like other pluralists, has difficulty seeing the "big picture".

Thus, just as Jencks must separate the extreme from the middle levels of the socio-economic structure in order to find a nonrelationship between people and their own inequality, he must also separate school from factory in order to disconnect the personal from the political. For Jencks, schools "serve primarily as selection and certification agencies", rather than socialization agencies. Since most of the variation in adult occupations and incomes can be explained by personality and luck rather than education, the expectation that changing the schools will reduce inequality by equalizing economic differences is "fantasy". A more realistic strategy is, according to Jencks, "to make the system less competitive by reducing the benefits that derive from success and the costs paid for failure". Jencks thinks this could be accomplished if the school was to become more like what he says it is, a family rather than a factory.

The Jencks plan for educational reform attempts to give the school more autonomy by making it more closely equivalent to the American family. Conceptualizing the school as
nuclear family, Jencks argues that the school, unlike the factory, is relatively separate and independent of its socio-economic surroundings. In making this argument Jencks fails to adequately consider counter interpretations based upon the thesis that the nuclear family, like both the school and factory, has become a 'service station' molded to the contours of capitalism in its corporate form. Thus, children taught in schools modelled upon today's nuclear family are no less 'products' ready for service in the corporate order than is the case when schools are patterned after today's factory. In brief, the Jencks proposal for educational reform succeeds in moving schools away from functioning as he says they do, legitimating inequality by measuring and labelling, towards recreating inequality by passing on ideology that serves to help reproduce the current socio-economic system.

The emphasis of the Jencks argument, then, is that it is more important to eliminate inequality within groups rather than differences between groups in order to eliminate dissatisfactions. Accidents of personality and luck which help the elite upper class pass on privileged family position to a new generation can simply be translated as the unofficial (not public) policy of an enlightened social order. Thus, as with the nuclear family, the school, made increasingly autonomous (separate) from other societal institutions via the Jencks argument, encourages students to make the personal political only within the confines of the existent social system. In
this way, the powerful and privileged position of the extreme group that Jencks ignores, the very wealthy, is solidified within the arrangements of the current socio-economic system. Similarly, the positions of the less-privileged middle and lower classes can also be solidified, and their members encouraged to try harder. This extra effort can then be translated to mean more schooling.

Schooling, as reformed by the pluralistic analysis of Jencks, becomes education that will train students to adjust to and accept their position within prevailing socio-economic arrangements. Jencks emphasizes the fact that financing a school playground (as well as making other educational expenditures) may not help students learn to read or gain a more plush job at a higher income, but it may "have a considerable effect on the students' chances of having a good time during recess when they are 8". The Jencks strategy of school reform that attempts to guarantee a "good time" for all is education which stresses training in ambition and persistence liberally mixed, a la Clark, with instructions on tolerance. The result of this strategy should guarantee a supply of subservient and happy workers "educated" to undertake the variety of jobs necessary to maintain and recreate the demands of the current corporate capitalism. It is a strategy that should give comfort and bring increased wealth to those very rich capitalists who, ignored by Jencks, are most often responsible for creating these demands. The members of this elite have long believed
that school should be little more than a "good time" extension of the family—that the most important things are usually learned not in classrooms, but by interacting with the members of one's own class in the drawing rooms and board rooms of family corporations.

The Jencks infatuation with the family model of the school turns education into a reflection of his pluralism. One logical outcome of the Jencks argument might be to help shift social policy from the view that Americans do not know how to control incomes to the position that incomes are uncontrollable. Thus, the Jencks pluralism, like that of Clark and Riesman, emphasizes the individualistic competition of all 'we's' and 'they's' for a greater share of scarce resources (e.g., larger individual incomes), without an adequate analysis and little questioning of the social system within which this competition takes place. In assuming a problem of disconnectedness between the personal and the political, Jencks' pluralistic view of the American power structure, again like the views of Clark and Riesman, becomes a mechanism of self-service which posits a pluralistic answer. The answer focuses upon the legitimation and maintenance of the existing socio-economic system by an increasingly autonomous educational institution which does not disturb the dominant position of the present elite. Chapter Two, then, presents the education-as-autonomous argument of Clark, Riesman, and Jencks as being both in contrast with, and demonstrating the historical continuity of, Chapter
One's description and analysis of the dependency of higher education in relation to prevailing socio-economic arrangements.

Pluralism and the Development of an "Objective" Sociology in the United States: The Influence of Max Weber

Chapter Three attempts to place the pluralism of the education-as-autonomous theorists within the developmental tradition of American sociology as an objective science. A central theme of pluralistic doctrine is the notion that conflicting opinions are not only to be tolerated, but even welcomed by decision-makers. This toleration has been the ideological foundation of American socio-economic arrangements during the socio-historical transformation from laissez-faire to corporate capitalism. It has also been, from the inception, an important part of the ideological foundation of American sociology. Chapter Three presents the argument that the development of this foundation has been built more on a rejection of, rather than agreement with, the science introduced by the first American sociologists--Sumner, Giddings, Small and Ward. In brief, the popularity of many arguments from today's most prominent American sociologists (for example, the education-as-autonomous thesis of Clark, Riesman, and Jencks) is a debt for the most part owed to a sociology originating in Germany--in particular, the work of Max Weber.

The political-economic structures of Weber's Germany and Ward's America were somewhat similar. In both places the transition from laissez-faire to corporate capitalism contributed
to, and was accomplished during, a period (c. 1865-1900) of severe economic disturbances. Depressed economies in both countries led frustrated German and American workers, many of whom could not find employment, to an angry search for solutions to increasingly frequent economic crises. Thus, the supposedly less democratic rule of an "Imperial Chancellor", like the supposedly more democratic legislation of a congress elected by the people, became attempts to protect the self-interests of a few individuals by legitimizing the business concerns of corporate groups. Both Ward, along with his contemporaries in the United States, and Weber developed sociologies of tolerance that encouraged the apparent pluralism of a democratic capitalism; sociologies conducive to the maintenance, and efficient management, of prevailing socio-economic arrangements. Ward, however, was less inclined than Weber to hide the value bias of his sociology.

Ward's sociology proposed to unite science with reform. According to Ward, the evolution of the social system was as "natural" as the socialization process by which individuals learn to control newly-found emotions for the benefit of the group. Just as individuals could evolve (be socialized) so as to fit into groups, the evolutionary social forces making socio-economic arrangements less individualistic and more corporate could be controlled by intelligent planning. For Ward, intelligent planning meant Sociocracy—government relying upon the application of "a widespread acquaintance with the
principles of sociology".

Ward's explicit emphasis upon the importance of government by sociological principles in bringing about social reform was echoed by his contemporaries. Thus, Small's "effective policy of rational sociability" ("social sanity") referred by the sociologist is Giddings' wish for a scientific sociology promoting "rational-ethical consciousness" and Sumner's call for the "scientific administration" of society. This administration would control unscientific "social agitators" (socialists, anarchists, and other "cynics") who contributed to the "proletarian madness". The result would be gradual reform which would not disturb the natural evolution of a socio-economic system dominated by Sumner's "few great capitalists" who are the initiators of reform, Giddings' "superior few" who possess rational-ethical consciousness, Small's monopoly capitalists who are "the pioneers of a better era", and Ward's wealthy who exemplify the fact that "possession of property, and enjoyment are, in the nature of things, bound up together."

The first American sociologists, then, those who were to govern by applying sociological principles, attempted to blend their scientific facts with prevailing social values in order to promote gradual change. They became an interest group, value partisans with an ever-increasing interest in the benefits they might receive for increasing the profits of a wealthy few by promoting a pluralistic ideology important in sustaining the emergent corporate arrangements of American capitalism.
Weber, like the first American sociologists, also developed a sociology providing pluralistic ideological support for corporate capitalism. However, his support is based upon a science which appears to be more value-neutral than the sociologies of the early Americans. Weber attempts to neutralize his sociology by maintaining a distinction between the socio-economic policy of politics and the objective requirements of science. Weber's science characterizes the sociologist as being receptive to all the data, no matter how conflicting, in the interest of objective analysis. This apparent neutrality is commensurate with a tolerance for conflicting opinions usually thought to be characteristic of the supposed pluralism of American democracy. This apparent neutrality also provides scientific respectability to a sociology harmonious with, and subservient to, the socio-economic arrangements of a corporate capitalism that emerged in Germany during the rule of Chancellor Otto von Bismarck.

Bismarck's bureaucratic administration in support of a capitalism made synonymous with allegiance to the Fatherland is the same combination of factors that characterizes and constitutes the central focus of Weber's sociology. Bismarck initiated socio-economic reforms endorsing limited incorporation and trade combinations favorable to the development of capitalism in its new corporate form. These reforms joined the interests of the more liberal professional and middle classes into which Weber was born and the more conservative upper-class Junkers with the interests of German workers.
Bismarck designed his reform policy so as to retain the image or appearance of a democratic and objective (bureaucratic) pluralism, while maintaining the reality of his autocratic rule. Later, one of Bismarck's successors, Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, exercised this "objective" conscience which characterized German leadership to make Bismarck's "blood and iron" promise of 1862 the reality of World War I and military rule.

Bethmann, like his predecessors, was searching for "World Policy" that would provide an outlet for the overproduction of a rapidly maturing industrial capitalism. His career as a civil servant exemplifies the "objective", bureaucratic-statesman that Weber's sociology idealizes. The violence and destruction which resulted from Bethmann's attempt to conscientiously maintain efficient socio-economic organization that was value-neutral is herein viewed as nothing more nor less than Weber's endeavor to transfer the supposed objectivity of his science to bureaucracy. In brief, Weber's sociology becomes an attempt to link the social organization of bureaucracy with the socio-economic arrangements of a nationalistic corporate capitalism, an attempt to make capitalism as value-neutral as Weber believed bureaucracy to be. For Weber, then, capitalism becomes equated with, interchangeable with, bureaucracy.

This equation is made possible by Weber's scientific view of the relationship between what "is" ("existential knowledge") and what "should be" ("normative knowledge"). This
division of knowledge in turn forms the basis for Weber's distinction between social science ("the analysis of facts") and social policy ("statement of ideals"). Weber proceeds from this distinction to create a schizophrenic sociology that enables his sociologists to act in superman/wonderwoman fashion. In their attempts to transcend the biased reality of ordinary individuals, Weber's sociologists are capable of keeping separate, yet moving between, their two worlds of scientific and political (citizen) selves. Ironically, it is precisely the movement between these two worlds, a separation Weber made with the intention of eliminating bias, which accounts for the persistent capitalistic value bias that characterizes his sociology.

The scientific schizophrenia that allows Weber to distinguish between and separate objective knowledge from emotional action as he moves between his scientist and citizen worlds also facilitates further divisions of reality. Among these divisions is a separation of the economic from the political. This dichotomy permits Weber in defining power to make a further distinction between voluntary agreement and authoritative imposition. It is this split which in turn forms the basis for Weber's distinction between interest groups, the primary focus of his economic sociology, and types of authority, the major concern of his political sociology. The result of this bifurcation of reality is that Weber develops a pluralistic analysis which obscures the interrelationships between the
agreements of interest groups and the imposition of authorities. In short, Weber locates power not in the economic relations of class, but in the political relations of bureaucracy.

Thus, addressing himself to German reconstruction following World War I, Weber contends that one of the main tasks of democracy is to break the "destructive political influence" of the "lords of heavy industry", while at the same time he argues that "economically, their leadership is not only indispensable, but becomes more so than ever now, when our whole economy and all its industrial enterprises will have to be organized anew." Using this separation of political from economic matters, Weber continues his "pluralistic" and "objective" defense of a "pluralistic" and "objective" capitalism by arguing that the development of a workable socialism must wait upon the capitalism of a refined state bureaucracy. This bureaucracy would hold out to the industrial lords "their necessary premium--profits--without, however, allowing this to go to their heads."

Weber's bureaucracy/capitalism which controls the heads of heavy industry lords also routinizes (adjusts) the charisma of controlling political leaders to fit prevailing socio-economic conditions. Weber's pluralistic sociology contains "constellations of interest" which include charismatic leaders who are, like superhuman sociologists, capable of pacifying passion in a professional manner. The schizophrenia which permits Weber to so decisively separate emotional action from objective knowledge obscures the actualities of the social world it
attempts to describe and analyze with confusing appearances--
bureaucracy appears to be equatable with capitalism, manager
with worker, people with offices, power with politics, political
leadership with change. In short, it is this schizophrenia
that allows Weber's sociology, when compared to the sociologies
of Ward and the other early Americans, to appear to be a less
value-partisan and more "objective" justification of prevailing
socio-economic arrangements.

For modern social scientists this apparently "objective"
sociology capable of separating values from facts, the political
economy from science, has been most appealing. It becomes even
more appealing when combined with Weber's bureaucracy-equals-
capitalism analysis which gives considerable impetus to a trend
he bemoaned--namely, the increasingly narrow range of choices
open to most individuals as capitalism matures. Such analysis
makes it easier for modern sociologists to take a "factual"
view of the dominant socio-economic arrangements of their day
that is in harmony with Weber's description of German capitalism
in 1900 as "the fate of his time". In developing this view,
they may be able to gain a measure of security for themselves
by reproducing the curious paradox which makes it appear that
Weber's sociology mourns the decline and replacement of the
cultivated and well-rounded individual by the technician, while
it actually encourages a role of growing dominance for the
specialized expert--a "professional".
Chapter Four attempts to provide an overview of today's sociological professionalism that is Max Weber's legacy. The education-as-autonomous thesis—considered as an example of current sociological theory—is related to an examination of current professional practice in two settings, the professional association and the university. This examination clearly indicates the importance of Weber's conception of scholarly objectivity as the central norm governing professional practice. Adherence to the objectivity norm is of primary importance in giving rise to the view among many sociologists that sociology as "an attempt to understand" cannot be a practice. This conception of sociology has helped promote itself to become what Martin Nicolaus calls "the official view of the social scene"—a view that encourages university professors to serve and protect elite interests, interests they recognize as becoming increasingly their own. Professional commitment and responsibility have come to mean participation in the development of Weber's "objective" science and this participation continues to maintain the Clark-Riesman-Jencks myth that universities and professional associations are objective, value-neutral and, therefore, apolitical.

The responses of modern social scientists to the 1960's disruptive disturbances on campus and in their own professional associations offer a clear picture of the normative definitions
which comprise the professional ethic governing the practice of "objective" science among today's professors. The first and most basic tenet of this professionalism is an emphasis upon scholarly objectivity uncontaminated by political action. The arrest of Louis Kampf at the annual meeting of the Modern Language Association in 1968 is a clear indication that one violates professional expectations when unable to keep professional activity differentiated from political activity, scholarly self separate from citizen self. This premier norm, "objectivity", calls forth two closely-related normative beliefs, autonomy and pluralism, which make the professional ethic complete.

Thus, the case for analytic objectivity can be made more easily if one's research can be shown to be autonomous from prevailing socio-economic arrangements. The great majority of individual scientists, like the American Sociological Association and similar organizations, receive a large proportion of their budgets from the corporation and government contracts they service. The content of a few of their arguments—for example, the Clark-Riesman-Jencks education-as-autonomous thesis—permits a statement of supposed autonomy. However, in most cases argument content does not focus directly on the issue of research autonomy and consequently, cannot offer the hope of dismissing questions concerning the interrelationships between research findings and the sources of research financing. In these cases, an attempt is often made to make "objectivity" credible by issuing statements which disclaim the servility
of the research project in contributing to the support and maintenance of prevailing socio-economic arrangements.

These disclaimers usually contain, almost as a matter of routine, an appeal to pluralism, the third element of the professional ethic. Favoritism and/or elitism is denied and the supposed "objectivity" and "autonomy" of research findings reaffirmed by declaring them to be, if not irrelevant to the concerns of the moment, of possible value to a variety of concerned parties (interest groups). Thus, a former Research Director of the American Council on Education (ACE)—a board of well-known educators to whom the professional associations often leave the task of determining their position on controversial issues—believes in a benign pluralism that will guide the usage of ACE survey information valuable in constructing "protest-prone" student profiles. This information might be used by college admissions officers not only to exclude certain activist students, but possibly, "to admit more protest-prone students, or employed by student activists as a basis for advocating changes in admissions policies on other grounds". In short, it is this kind of pluralistic argument which reinforces professional emphasis upon a supposedly "objective" understanding that is not thought to be partisan practice.

This view of sociology as non-partisan understanding which is not a practice is a reformulation of Weber's "objective" sociology. It is the same view that supports the Clark-Riesman—
Jencks' advocacy of more autonomy for professional social scientists whose expertise enables them to separate themselves from the prevailing socio-economic system in order to offer an "objective" and value-neutral understanding. This understanding constitutes the problem-solving properties of an "unbiased" science. Professional scientist-educators, working in colleges and universities which supposedly stand apart from the value-relevance and bias of the present socio-economic order, use this science to plan the new order by revising the old. Thus, professionals with specialized expertise create an ever-widening gulf between themselves and non-experts, promoting a professional ideology which suggests that autonomy tied ever more closely with objectivity equals the "progress" of a meritocratic system. The education-as-autonomous theorists argue that the "meritocratic competition" encouraged by this progress can, to return to a Jencks-Riesman phrase, "keep the system as a whole expanding". In short, the Clark-Riesman-Jencks analysis of higher education as autonomous, like the objectivity of Weber's scientific understanding of social reality, helps create the organizational context within which professionalism is made compatible with the exigencies of a university bureaucracy dependent upon the maintenance of prevailing socio-economic arrangements.

University scientist-educators have become very skilled at manipulating the professional norm of objectivity and the educational thesis of autonomy, making them mutually supportive.
Such manipulation can be viewed as an attempt on the part of many professors, an attempt supportive of the interests of their employer-trustees, to maintain dominance over students. It is the argument of this fourth chapter that the supposed professional responsibility involved in attempting to exercise this dominance is being transformed into, and should more properly be viewed as, professional irresponsibility.

Professional irresponsibility is well-illustrated by the way in which most professors learn to manipulate potential conflict between the ties of academic community as opposed to the requirements of bureaucracy and the obligations of teaching versus those of research. Summarized, the point is that this manipulation succeeds both in maintaining potential conflict between the supposed bureaucracy-community and teaching-research dichotomies, while at the same time bringing about a limited merger which makes the divisions created by these apparent dichotomies somewhat illusory. Success in dominating students, then, becomes dependent upon professorial switching between, in order to maintain the illusion of potential conflict between, the requirements of bureaucratic and professional reference groups. Thus, as the consultant/grantsman professors become more objective and autonomous, more skilled at fusing technical and managerial roles, they tie their own interests ever more closely to those of their wealthy employer-trustees. In brief, the daily activities of most professors make the survival and growth of colleges and universities increasingly dependent
upon preserving, fundamentally unchanged, the institutional arrangements of the current socio-economic system.

To summarize, today's sociological professionalism supports "a technology of social tinkering" that helps legitimate the development of corporations on an international scale. It is a professionalism encouraging social scientists to shift responsibility for "social problems" from particular socio-economic arrangements dominated by their employers, a few wealthy and powerful corporate capitalists, to the failings of particular individuals and a not-so-specific social organization known as "society". A professionalism that fosters a science in which problems are not attributed to the basic structure of elite domination, but rather to an inadequate working of the system. It is this professionalism that helps give rise to the general framework of the end-of-ideology social theory within which more specific arguments (e.g., the education-as-autonomous thesis) are developed. A professionalism that fosters a science of social domination in which the professionals' own scientific theories increase their non-responsibility for the social effects of their research. A professionalism that makes the "objective" and "autonomous" expert ever more irresponsible and impotent, as the knowledge industry becomes more dependent upon, and centralized in, a few giant corporations. To act in a professionally responsible manner, then, involves a professional commitment which has come to mean service to, maintenance of, the socio-economic arrangements of today's corporate capitalism.
Lester Ward's commitment to the idea that the social scientist should use science to help repair and thus, sustain, these prevailing socio-economic arrangements is echoed today by Marvin B. Sussman and his followers. They advocate an "action" sociology. Sussman stresses the usefulness of sociology as a "policy science" and urges sociologists to apply their disciplined knowledge in their new role as professional consultants. He argues that this role has been enhanced by "the closing of the gap between the discovery of knowledge and its application outside of academia. . . . When the social order breaks down, action is required immediately; it cannot wait for the findings of research."¹ Thus, sociologist consultants, like the army medic and the social worker, answer the call of those who dominate the socio-economic order by using whatever expertise they possess to patch up the ailing social structure.

This liberal reformism is critically dismissed by spokesmen for a more "radical" sociology. Steven E. Deutsch, one of the leading figures among the radical writers, begins his criticism by noting that action sociology, like all American sociology, has not been free of theoretical biases arising from "an ideology of liberal conservatism".² In disposing of action sociology as not being radical enough, Deutsch contends that action analyses have not challenged the existing structure of power: "The action sociology of recent years has been an engaged sociology, but it has clearly not been revolutionary."³
With the hope of building a revolutionary science by returning sociology to its proper role—research, Deutsch offers the following comments:

The initial perspective might be a radical structural position in contradistinction to the traditional liberal reformist position... A structural account of American society will not only identify low income persons, but will make poverty amidst affluence understandable; it will not only identify the magnitude of the military establishment, but it will permit a logical interpretation of the linkages between the economic and political apparatus. The poor in America are seen, then, not only as a sociologically interesting specimen, but as the product of a particular kind of social structure. In fact, a structural analysis of poverty really tells the sociologist more about the affluent and the total society than it does about those who are poor. 4

One could agree with much of what Deutsch says and still want to ask why the radical sociologist must study the rich indirectly by studying the poor directly? Maybe it is a good methodological tactic, superior to a structural analysis focusing on wealth? Or maybe radical sociology, at least Deutsch’s brand, is simply "old wine in a new bottle"? "If sociology has potentially much to contribute and has accumulated a considerable debt due to its failure to provide thus far", as Deutsch reasons, one might consider how much credit would be gained, and with which creditors, through the use of his radical perspective... For Deutsch seems to reaffirm Sussman’s contention that the scientist consultant has "an unprecedented responsibility... to influence change in social institutions and policies."6 This responsibility encourages the sociologist
consultant to act as a "tool" (Sussman's terminology) for those privileged and powerful interests concerned with maintaining existent socio-economic arrangements. In brief, Deutsch's radicalism, like the action sociology of Sussman, appears to reinforce, rather than attempting to disclose and/or redistribute, the power of the elite; it offers little hope that scientists might obtain a measure of autonomy by freeing their professional practice from the domination of the wealthy, corporate capitalists.

Action, radical, and other varieties of the new sociologist, with the support of their academic institutions, are often rather willing to accept this domination. For if these professors become successful in their new role of creating and implementing social policy—selling corporate capitalism—the economic and prestige pay-offs are big. In short, the aspiring instructor need not become the RAND Corporation's expert on Vietnam or the new Secretary of State in order to profit by helping to protect American capitalism at home and abroad; instead, the professor need only become proficient in playing "the university game".

Success in playing this game not only contributes to, but also depends upon, the future growth of a science triangle involving big business-government-education. According to James Ridgeway, who supplies documentation of how big business and the defense department dominate higher education, the money flows out of industry and/or government to the university where
someone "hatches a utilitarian idea" which can be sold to a company that either makes a product or designs a test. "The object of the university game, then, is to control any two legs of the triangle, for by doing so, the university professor can establish the beginnings of power." 8

The research money largely responsible for determining professorial power is often awarded through a project institute. Sometimes professors are employed by a university affiliated with a nonprofit, applied research institute; 9 in other cases faculty members must use their consultant/grantsman expertise to found and/or direct project institutes that become devoted to pursuing their personal research interests. In each instance this professorial entrepreneurship usually proves to be financially beneficial to both the institute and the professor's university. For example, two institutes located in Washington D.C., the Human Resources Research Office (HumRRO) and the Center for Research in Social Systems (CRESS), have attracted large sums of money to the universities with which they are affiliated by proving their invaluability to the defense department's study and practice of psychological warfare.

CRESS used to be known as the Special Operations Research Office (SORO) until the bad publicity from its abortive "Project Camelot" made a name change advisable. 10 CRESS operates a head office in Washington, turning over some 250,000 of a $3 million annual budget (1968) to American University in return for that institution's services in managing
the affairs of its world-wide offices. The relationship between CRESS and American is a warm one and CRESS staff, while not jointly appointed to the university faculty, receive such faculty benefits as health care, membership in the eating club and free tuition. HumRRO employees, some of whom hold joint appointments as faculty members, have also been cordially received by their host university, George Washington. As in the CRESS-American alliance, the university is payed a like portion of a similar yearly budget as a fee for managing HumRRO's activities. These activities have included research and teaching in armor, infantry, air defense, aviation, and recruit training with special emphasis on the learning of native language and customs. Dr. Lloyd Elliott, George Washington president, has spoken his hope that the intelligence yielded and required by this instruction—carried on in seven operating offices around the country—will provide more joint projects involving HumRRO staff and university faculty and graduate students.11

Not all universities are favored by the defense department with the kind of financial encouragement that has helped make President Elliott such an eager recipient; often, professors find it necessary to make the research climate at their school more hospitable by founding their own project institutes. For example, sociologists Paul Lazarsfeld and Robert K. Merton became pioneers in the project business by establishing and operating the Bureau of Applied Social Research
For the last quarter of a century the Bureau has fulfilled the promise of higher education in service to the nation first envisioned by Witherspoon, Jefferson, and Rush nearly two hundred years ago. While much of its scientific work has been financed by the federal government, several of its most profitable "spin-offs" have involved the so-called "private sector." Bureau employees in their role as scientist-consultants act as liaisons, providing scientist-administrators such as Lazarsfeld and Merton with valuable contacts that help link them and their university to the government and/or private industry (the university game). The work of Columbia professor, William N. McPhee, on behalf of the Bureau offers an excellent illustration.

McPhee was sent by the Bureau as a consultant to Simulmatics Corporation. His sound advice concerning education games, designed by a group of professors at John Hopkins headed by well-known sociologist James Coleman, led to his appointment as a vice-president and director of Simulmatics. By helping Coleman--also a vice-president and director--and his colleagues market their product through Simulmatics, McPhee not only put Columbia in further touch with important social scientists from another well-financed university, but he also put the Bureau within reach of a portion of the government funds channelled through Simulmatics. Most of this money, over $700,000 in defense contracts in 1967, comes from the Pentagon's Advanced Research Projects Agency. It has been used mainly to
pursue the special interest in political propaganda—an interest quickly converted into active involvement in the Vietnam War—of the major shareholder of Simulmatics stock, MIT political science professor, Sola Pool. According to Ridgeway, "Simulmatics looks like nothing more than a dummy corporation through which Pool runs his outside Defense work"; flying graduate students and professors from major universities to its villa in Saigon to interview Vietcong defectors and prisoners, and to sample the wartime opinions of other groups among the South Vietnamese, Pool's corporation spent most of its government research grants attempting to help the Pentagon develop a Vietnam pacification program.\textsuperscript{15}

The way in which the federal government financed Pool, Coleman and their associates, and thereby gained the cooperation and intimate involvement of McPhee and the Bureau for Applied Research with Simulmatics, vividly emphasizes the fact that the research activity of the most financially successful and well-known university scientists is big business. In the words of Carnegie, who viewed consolidated scientific enterprise as having the same advantages over isolated research as the department store had over the shopkeeper, "the bigger system grows bigger men and it is by the big men that the standard of the race is raised... Dealing with petty affairs tends to make small men; dealing with larger affairs broadens and strengthens character."\textsuperscript{16}

While McPhee and the Columbia University Bureau help
Pool and Coleman deal with large affairs bearing relevance to battlefields far from home, sociologists such as Noel Day and Daniel P. Moynihan broaden and strengthen their characters by applying their scientific knowledge to large problems on the domestic front. While the talents of McPhee and Coleman were being Pooled in an attempt to educate/pacify the Vietnamese, Day and Moynihan were attempting to do the same with blacks in Roxbury, a Boston slum.

Day was part of a "core group" of people employed by the Organization for Social and Technical Innovation (OSTI), headquartered in Cambridge, Massachusetts. OSTI, started by Donald Schon with the financial backing of his former employer—the oldest "profit-making" research institute in the U.S.—A.D. Little & Company, agreed to act as advisor to a Roxbury community development corporation organized by Day known as Circle Associates. With the aid of OSTI and A.D. Little, Day hoped that Circle Associates could build a venture capital fund of about $500,000 that would permit blacks to buy back Roxbury from white companies located either in or near their community. This collection and centralization of capital would, in Day's view, successfully change Roxbury's economic base; community people would be put to work through Circle initiative in starting small loan companies, supermarkets and various manufacturing concerns, and in securing contracts offering maintenance, vending and catering services to existing factories. Once the economic base was altered, once the Roxbury blacks
were educated/pacified to reflect Day's idea of community, then the organization that Day and OSTI-Little had created and set in motion would be turned over to the people of Roxbury. In brief, Day and his associates would, in their scientific wisdom, attempt to do for Roxbury blacks what they could not do for themselves—adjust to, fit into, prevailing socio-economic arrangements.¹⁸

Moynihan's work, like that of Day, also protected these arrangements in Roxbury. Less willing than Day to reorganize Roxbury blacks, Moynihan was content simply to study them. In 1968, Moynihan who, between appointments to government offices in the Johnson and Nixon administrations, was directing the Joint Center for Urban Studies, found his budget greatly enlarged by Ford Foundation grants. At a press conference announcing two $3 million awards for urban studies made to Harvard and MIT, he clearly delineated the limits of Center responsibility to the people whom the Ford money would enable the Center to study. Supported by Harvard and MIT presidents, Nathan M. Pusey and Howard Johnson, Moynihan suggested that the new funds be used to accumulate more knowledge about urban problems so that these problems could eventually be solved. A black man in the audience questioned the necessity for further study, noting that the problems were really rather simple; they involved providing an opportunity for adequately-paid employment that would enable a family to eat and have a decent place to live, and a chance for children to get a fair education. A
reporter then asked why Harvard and MIT, rather than using the grant money to establish chairs in urban studies, could not turn it over, say, to the people of Roxbury who would reorganize their community to solve their own problems. The answer:

'Because the Ford Foundation gave it to us, I guess,' Moynihan said, 'because we can use it, and we're here. And our activities—the function of universities is to study and teach. It was given for that purpose and I think we're happy to receive it for that purpose.' He added, 'We should not like to suggest that we are anything but immensely grateful to the Ford Foundation, but, sir, quite, really, you know, would you say, you can rephrase your question and ask why do you spend money on cancer research when you could give money to people who had cancer? I mean, we are saying—and I think you would miss the intellectual climate of these two universities at this point—we are saying that we don't think the answers to these questions are adequately known, and we don't think that until they are adequately known, you are going to be able to do much about them, and that happens to be the business of the universities, that and training people to work in these things; that's our thing, and with this grant we're going to do more of it.'

In sum, the thing that the Moynihans, Days, and thousands of other consultant/grantsman professors are doing is supporting and protecting the socio-economic arrangements by which they continue to profit. Elite largesse dispensed through private foundations and governmental departments has enabled university professors to afford the luxury of dismissing, often completely ignoring, large groups of people in less privileged circumstances. Thus, the most successful professor-entrepreneurs frequently use elite wealth to dismiss—and on occasion, to neutralize—not only the most sizeable group within the
academic community, the undergraduate students, but also, as in the Moynihan case, entire communities of people who exist outside of the university. In so doing, these professors offer their wealthy benefactors an excellent return on their research dollars.
FOOTNOTES


3. Ibid., p. 89.

4. Ibid., p. 90.

5. Ibid., p. 91.

6. Sussman, "Sociologist as Tool", p. 3. The responsibility that Sussman speaks of has been shouldered, in part, by two Boston sociologists, Henry Etzkowitz and Gerald M. Schaflander. Like action sociologist Sussman and radical sociologist Deutsch, they present a new sociology. As "Institution-Formation" sociologists, Etzkowitz and Schaflander feel that they "must propose and/or develop new and unique institutional solutions to the situations people are in because there is no guarantee that poor people alone know how to solve their own problems--or that red or black voices necessarily speak with truth or clarity on the nature of their own appalling condition." (p. 403) For further information on these sociologists' perspective see their entire article, "A Manifesto for Sociologists: Institution Formation--A New Sociology," Social Problems, Spring 1968, 399-408; and note 18 below.

7. The individuals being referred to here are, of course, Daniel Ellsberg and Henry Kissinger. For authoritative data on their career mobility patterns--patterns that illustrate the interconnections between the education industry and the prevailing socio-economic system--see Peter Schrag, "The Ellsberg Affair," Saturday Review, November 13, 1971, pp. 34-39; and David Landau, "The Rise of Henry Kissinger," Ramparts, December 1971, pp. 36-44. For a detailed account of the growth of the RAND Corporation, originally financed during World War II by government research contracts and Ford Foundation money as a "think tank" for the U.S. Air Force, see Paul Dickson, Think Tanks (New York: Atheneum, 1971). Dickson notes that in addition to the Air Force and other military agencies, RAND's clients include the Ford Foundation, the
7. continued.
National Institutes of Health, several private hospitals,
the Carnegie Corporation, and the city of New York.

8. James Ridgeway, The Closed Corporation: American Universities in Crisis (New York: Ballantine Books, 1968), p. 11. As Paul Dickson has correctly pointed out, relationships among the components of Ridgeway's triangle will be altered some in the future as big business and industry continues to increase the percentage it contributes to R&D expenditures in the United States. See Think Tanks, p. 11. For documentation of the role of the several universities (California Institute of Technology, Harvard, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and the University of California) that work with an increasingly smaller number of large corporations to dominate the energy industry, see Ridgeway's latest book, The Struggle to Monopolize the World's Energy Resources (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., 1973), especially the section on "Financial Institution Control of Energy Companies," pp. 412, 413, 420, 421, and 431.

9. The Stanford Research Institute and the Syracuse University Research Corporation are prominent examples. The term "nonprofit" is used advisedly, realizing the many ways—both indirect and direct, nonmonetary and monetary—these institutes profit. A good example of this profit can be seen in the tax breaks given to these nonprofit research organizations.

10. "Project Camelot," ostensibly concerned with anti-Americanism in Chile, became essentially a counter-insurgency project attempting to forecast revolution and insurgency in underdeveloped areas of the world. Project members, sponsored by the U.S. Army in what was originally to be a three to four year, $4-6 million contract let to SORO, were to find and try to eliminate the causes of revolution and insurgency so that the developed nations (e.g., the U.S.) could more easily continue their control of the less developed countries. For a discussion of the role of social scientists involved in this 1964-65 Project—a role that makes transparent the relationship between higher education and the prevailing socio-economic system—see Irving Louis Horowitz, Professing Sociology (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1968), especially pp. 288, 300-301. For more detail and other interpretations of Project Camelot see The Rise and Fall of Project Camelot, ed. Irving Louis Horowitz (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1967).


12. Lazarsfeld and Merton are not without the company of their sociologist colleagues in the institute business. Thus, the Center for Policy Studies was started by Columbia
12. continued.
University sociologist Amitai Etzioni; the Cambridge Institute was started by Harvard professors Christopher Jencks and Gar Alperovitz; and the National Opinion Research Center has been directed, successively, by a number of University of Chicago sociologists.

13. The word so-called precedes the phrase "private sector" because any remaining opposition from individuals and/or institutions that would permit one to make a distinction between private and public has long since been repressed and negated. For an excellent presentation of this point of view see Herbert Marcuse, _One-Dimensional Man_ (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964).


15. See Ridgeway, _Closed Corporation_, pp. 54-57, p. 56 for the quote. This author, while a graduate student at the University of Hawaii, was offered the opportunity to apply for an interviewing job in Vietnam that was similar to those described by Ridgeway. Employment of this kind was readily available to a large percentage of the social scientists in Honolulu at this time, 1965-1967.


17. A.O. Little, Inc. was founded in Boston in 1886. The term "profit-making" is used simply to emphasize the fact that this company was designed to make money, to survive economically, by selling its professional research services to industry. Donald Schon--after resigning from his government position as director of the Institute for Applied Technology at the Bureau of Standards--not only talked A.O. Little into working with OSTI on joint projects such as the one with Day's Circle Associates, but he also persuaded his former employer to loan him $150,000 to help OSTI get started. For more on Schon, see Ridgeway, pp. 68-70.

18. For a similar interpretation upon which this author draws, see Ridgeway, _Closed Corporation_, pp. 70-72. The reorganization process proposed by Day and the anticipated outcome of his project could be described as a sort of
18. continued.
"Love It or Leave It" approach. Such an approach has been
well-articulated by "Institution-Formation" sociologists,
Etzkowitz and Schaflander (see note 6): "Therefore, it
seemed very clear that it was up to us--because we have
the knowledge and training--to propose new solutions. We
could say, as did the CIO organizers, 'This is the idea
that we think is right. This is the program; we're going
to come in as whites on a fifty-fifty basis. If you don't
like it, OK!! If you do like it, come on and join us.'"
(p. 404)

19. Ibid., p. 171. Ridgeway continues, "Shortly after announce-
ment of the Ford grants, a neighborhood group in Roxbury
met, and showing simple good sense, voted to stay clear
of any professor connected with the Joint Center." Research
partnerships, like the Harvard-MIT management of the Joint
Center, have become standard operating procedure for today's
research institutions. This pattern of corporate planning,
in which the individual scientist representing a single
organization has been replaced by a research team supported
by an association of organizations, has long been favored
by the National Science Foundation. For more on this, with
a special focus on universities, see Harold Orlans,
Contracting For Atoms (Washington: The Brookings Institution,

Moynihan has recently returned to Harvard after two
years as U.S. Ambassador to India. In the March 1975 issue
of Commentary Moynihan says that Americans should cease
"to apologize for an imperfect democracy" and go on the
offensive as "the new society's loyal opposition", urging
the developing countries of the Third World to find
democracy's equal. Among his observations--drawn, one
might assume, from his recent experience abroad--is the
statement that the multi-national corporation is "arguably
the most creative institution of the 20th century". He
urges that this interpretation, along with other favorable
reviews of the achievements of American corporate capitalism,
be "forcefully" broadcast to the World. In brief, Moynihan
is interested in encouraging the Third World countries not
only to find the equal of America's imperfect democracy,
but also to emulate the American corporate capitalism which
develops and sustains "creative" multinational corporations.
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________. "Sanity in Social Agitation", American Journal of Sociology, 4: 335-351.


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