THE PROBLEM OF THE JUSTIFICATION OF VALUE JUDGMENTS
THE PROBLEM OF THE JUSTIFICATION
OF
VALUE JUDGMENTS
WITH REFERENCE TO THE VIEW OF TAYLOR, IN
NORMATIVE DISCOURSE

by

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this essay is to analyse the problem of the rational justification of value judgments. To a large extent, I have used Taylor's account of the technique of justification (verification, validation, vindication, and rational choice of a way of life), as this is presented in his book, Normative Discourse. To a lesser extent, I have also used Baier's account of the technique of validation, as it is presented in his book, The Moral Point of View.

I have attempted to show that it is possible to justify value judgments, despite the logical dichotomy between factual statements and evaluative statements. 'Justification' is taken as proof of correctness: that is, a statement is said to be justified if it is proven to be correct. On Taylor's technique, justification is possible, although only incompletely so. It is possible to prove that a value judgment is the correct one to make from within the perspective provided by a given way of life. Justification cannot be complete since the adoption of the perspective cannot be justified. On Baier's technique of validation, complete justification can be achieved: once it has been shown that an evaluatum meets the criteria in terms of which it was judged, and that these criteria are relevant (valid) for judging that object since the object must meet
these criteria in order effectively to realize its purpose, nothing more needs to be shown. Although Baier's account allows for complete justification while Taylor's allows for only incomplete justification, Baier's account cannot be used to replace that of Taylor. They are appropriate in different contexts. While Baier's account of validation is appropriate for judgments of use-value, Taylor's account is appropriate for value judgments other than those of use-value. Accordingly, justification is possible using either technique, although complete justification may be possible only in the context of judgments of use-value.
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1: Introduction

The purpose of this essay is to analyze the problem of the justification of value judgments. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a preliminary discussion on the nature of the problem.

To evaluate is to attempt to reach a decision regarding the value of an object. Objects of evaluation ('evaluata'), include persons, states of affairs, inanimate objects, and actions. The term 'evaluation' shall be used to refer to the act or process of reaching a value decision, while the term 'value judgment' shall be used to refer to the outcome of this process (the 'ascription' of value to an object). Value judgments are expressed in evaluative statements. Generally, the predicates of evaluative statements contain the terms 'good', 'bad', 'right', 'wrong', 'valuable', 'valueless', 'worthy', 'unworthy', or 'worthless'. Examples of such statements are: 'Smith is a good (bad) person', 'X is a good (bad) car', 'murder is wrong', 'putting bubblegum on theatre seats is wrong', 'Jones is a worthy candidate for the position', 'silver and gold are valuable commodities', and so forth.

To claim that all evaluative statements contain
the above terms is to oversimplify matters. Statements such as 'John is a fine fellow', 'this is terrible beer', 'that is an interesting idea', 'he is a crook', can be called indirect or implicit evaluative statements. These statements can arise as the results of the process of evaluation. They are said to be indirect evaluative statements since they express value judgments but do not contain terms such as 'good' or 'bad'. As the statement 'John is a bad person' expresses a condemnation of John, so does the statement 'John is a terrible bore', although the condemnation of the latter is probably of a different sort than that expressed by the former.

Accordingly, evaluative statements and factual statements can be distinguished on the basis of the terms used. This is not to say that statements which do not contain the terms listed above on page one are non-evaluative or factual statements. Evaluative statements contain either direct evaluative terms such as 'good', or indirect evaluative terms such as 'terrible'. Factual statements contain neither direct nor indirect evaluative terms.

In the following discussion, I shall talk in terms of ascriptions of 'good' or 'bad', 'right' or 'wrong'. This shall be done for the sake of simplicity. Whatever can be said regarding the ascription of these
terms can be said regarding the ascription of the indirect evaluative terms.

Justification is taken, herein, as rational support. To demand justification is to demand proof. Once a belief, for example, has been shown to be correct, it has been justified. It is generally held that factual statements can be justified in one of two manners. Firstly, one may attempt to show that what a belief claims to be the case really is the case. Correspondence between statements and facts is the criterion of correctness here. Secondly, one may attempt to show that the statement is the conclusion of a valid deduction in which the premises are known to be true. Deducibility from true statements is the criterion of correctness here: in any valid deduction, the truth of the premises guarantees the truth of the conclusion. By using any of the valid argument forms, it is impossible to have true premises and a false conclusion.

If justification is conceived in this manner, it seems to become problematic with regard to value judgments. On the one hand, we have the problem of establishing what evaluative statements are supposed to correspond to. On the other hand, we have the problem of the logical dichotomy between factual statements and
evaluative statements: namely, that no evaluative statement can be deduced from factual statements.

Evaluative statements can assume propositional form: in ascribing value, we are predicating value of the evaluatum. The statements 'X is a blue car' and 'X is a good car' are grammatically identical. The question which arises is whether this similarity is complete: is the latter capable of being justified by the method which is appropriate for the former? As long as we can prove that X really is a blue car, the former statement can be justified. If X is a red car or a blue bus, the former statement is refuted. The same does not seem to hold for the statement 'X is a good car'. While we might refute this statement by proving that X is not really a car at all, the problem arises as to how we are to prove that X, a car, really is good. While we may follow Moore, for example, in claiming that 'good' denotes a property of some sort, we are hard-pressed to show just what this 'property' is, or how it differs from the property denoted by 'bad'.

We seem to be in possession of what Wittgenstein may have had in mind when he warned us that "misunderstandings concerning the use of words (are) caused ... by certain analogies between the forms of expression in
different regions of language." The similarity between statements such as 'X is a red book' and 'X is a good book' may incline us to carry this similarity too far - to the point, that is, where 'good' is viewed as denoting a property of some sort, as does 'red'. To predicate 'red' of X is to say something informative about X - but if 'good' does not denote a property (or a relation), to predicate it of objects is not to say anything informative about them. While evaluative statements can have the same form as factual propositions, they do not seem to have the informative content of factual propositions.

Even if it is true that terms such as 'good' denote a special sort of property, this is not helpful. Since we are hard-pressed to show how the property denoted by 'good' differs from that which is denoted by 'bad', we cannot justify evaluative statements by this version of the correspondence method: for, we could not prove that any ascription of 'good' or 'bad' is correct.

If we attempt to deduce our evaluative statements from true premises, we run into the problem of the logical dichotomy between factual statements and evaluative statements. In this deduction, some of the premises must be known to be true by comparison between what they claim to be the case and what really is the case (the correspondence method). If this is not possible,
the truth of the premises which are deduced from them is not established, unless by the correspondence method. If it is true, as it seems to be, that only factual statements can be justified by the correspondence method, then the premises must be factual.

Accordingly, the attempt to deduce our evaluative statement from factual statements which are known to be true seems to be attractive. However, no such deduction can be legitimate. Generally, any term that is in the conclusion of a valid argument is also in at least one of the premises. In all attempts to deduce evaluative statements from factual statements, there is an evaluative term in the conclusion which is not in the premises. The sole exception to this general rule is the valid argument form of addition. However, this form gets us nowhere. The truth of the factual premise (p) does not guarantee the truth of the evaluative component in the conclusion (g). The disjunctive is false only if both disjuncts are false: if 'p' is true, 'pvg' is true regardless of the truth-value of g.

Accordingly, evaluative statements appear to be unjustifiable. At least, neither of the two methods of justification which were mentioned earlier seem to be appropriate for the justification of evaluative statements. The problem of the justification of value judgments
is thereby a major topic, and perhaps the major topic, of value theory. If philosophers are interested, in the words of Paul W. Taylor, in "WHAT IT MEANS TO BE RATIONAL whether we are pursuing science, mathematics, or history, or are evaluating,"⁴ then this problem is of central importance for any philosophical investigation of the process of evaluation. The foregoing discussion seems to preclude the possibility that reason can have any role in the activity of evaluation. Even if it is possible to have correct and incorrect value judgments, it does not seem to be possible to prove that any such judgments are correct or incorrect.

I have chosen to make special reference to the account by Taylor of the procedure of justification as he presents it in his book, Normative Discourse. As I shall point out below (footnote four), Normative Discourse has been derived, in part, from other sources. It is not merely an incorporation of these other sources, however. In the words of one reviewer, "to a great extent the book consists of a tidying up and elaboration of points made by previous authors."³ Thus, Normative Discourse is a representative of a specific type of approach at its strongest or best— at least at its most explicit, which is a result of Taylor's 'tidying up and elaboration'. There is much that is unique in Taylor's
account - especially with regard to the final step of the procedure.

Taylor's work is important for the present purpose for an additional reason, which is more important than the one given in the previous paragraph. Taylor's approach to the problem of the justification of value judgments is a sustained attempt to maintain the dichotomy between factual statements and evaluative statements as well as the view that evaluations are rational. Indeed, in the one place where we might expect a deductive relation between evaluative and factual statements, Taylor denies that the values are really values. While most everyone would class the terms 'ought' and 'should' as normative or evaluative terms, Taylor claims that such statements fall outside the evaluative or normative region "when the sole justification of the act proposed is pure utility." (ND, p217) The sentence 'you ought to do action A in order to achieve end E' is a statement of pure utility, provided that the value of E is not in question. The above sentence is equivalent to 'A is useful for the purpose of obtaining E', which is a factual sentence that is justified by reference to the regularity with which the implementation of A results in E. In all other contexts, though, the key normative terms ('good', 'bad', 'right', 'wrong', 'ought', and 'should'), as Taylor calls them,
are indeed normative. Taylor holds that they can be neither translated into non-normative terms nor deduced from non-normative statements.

Although Taylor holds that there is a logical dichotomy between factual statements and evaluative statements, he attempts to argue that evaluation is rational; that is, that value judgments are justifiable. Taylor presents a detailed analysis of the logical progression of the process of justification. Taylor summarizes his view of the steps of the process of justification as follows:

I distinguish four general phases in the over-all process of justifying value judgments: verification, validation, vindication, and rational choice. We verify value judgments by appeal either to standards or to rules which we have adopted. We validate standards or rules (i.e. we justify our adopting certain standards or rules) by appeal to higher standards or rules. The adoption of standards or rules which themselves cannot be validated by appeal to any higher standards or rules results from our decision to accept a whole value system. We vindicate our accepting a whole value system by appeal to the way of life to which we are committed. Our commitment to a way of life can be justified in terms of a rational choice among different ways of life.

(ND, p77)

The process of justification begins, then, with the invocation of a standard or rule and ends with a choice among different ways of life. The progression is a
logical one: sooner or later the process of the justification of a value judgment comes to the point where the whole way of life within which the judgment was made comes into question.\(^4\)

A number of problems are encountered en route from the justification of a specific value judgment to the justification of the choice of a way of life. In most cases, the issues which are encountered are shifted to increasingly higher levels. The two main problems which arise are the problems of the rationality of the procedure and of the relativity of the judgments. We begin with a relativity of standards and rules in terms of which an evaluatum can be judged, and we end up with a relativity of ways of life in which the standards and rules are 'at home'. Moreover, while it may seem rational to judge the evaluatum by a specific standard or rule, the question arises as to the rationality of using that rule or standard to the exclusion of an incompatible standard or rule - and so forth, into each new level.

I shall discuss the beginning stage of the problem of rationality or reason in the second chapter: namely, the view that the nature of the evaluatum (its properties or relations) is irrelevant to its own evaluation. This seems to be a consequence of the logical dichotomy between factual statements and evaluative
statements. Taylor's account of the procedure of evaluating by standards and rules shall be presented as a means to avoid this alleged consequence of the dichotomy. I shall point out that Taylor's approach invites the further problem of relativity, and shifts the problem of rationality to the next higher level. This provides a spring-board for the discussion of the steps of the process of justification, which I shall present in chapter three. Although some critical remarks shall be made in the third chapter, I shall be primarily concerned with an exposition of verification, validation, and vindication. Since the problems of relativity and rationality are shifted to the final step of rational choice, the major criticisms of Taylor's position shall be left to the fourth chapter, wherein the step of rational choice shall be discussed. In the fifth chapter, I shall briefly present an account of the choice of a way of life that may be offered as an alternative to Taylor's account of rational choice. In the sixth and final chapter, I shall summarize the main points raised previously, and conclude regarding the possibility of justifying value judgments without deducing evaluative statements from factual statements.
II: The Problem of Relevance and Evaluation

By Standards and Rules

In the introduction, it was argued that although we must deduce evaluative statements from factual statements if we are to guarantee the truth of the evaluative conclusion, this deduction cannot be valid. This being so, the nature of the evaluatum seems to become irrelevant to its own evaluation. The purpose of this chapter is to point out how this seems to be the case, and how this problem can be overcome.

1. The Problem of Relevance

The problem of the relevance of the nature of the evaluatum is part of the problem of justification. If the properties or relations of evaluatum E are irrelevant to the evaluation of E, it is impossible to justify an ascription of value to E by an appeal to E's nature. While it may seem reasonable to scrutinize carefully the evaluatum before judging its value, this seems to be a waste of time. If evaluative statements cannot be deduced from factual statements, then despite the correctness of the premises, neither 'E is good' nor 'E is bad' necessarily follows from the premises (wherein 'E' is the evaluatum). If we grant the premises, we are not committed to grant the conclusion; there is no inconsistency in granting the premises and denying either 'E is good'
or 'E is bad'.

If evaluative statements cannot be deduced from factual statements, then, factual considerations seem to be irrelevant to evaluative considerations. A criterion that must be met in order for a reason to be relevant to the view for which it purports to be a reason is that the statement of the reason, in conjunction with other premises, entails the statement of the view in question. Otherwise, the 'reason' counts neither for nor against the view in question. No matter how well informed one may be regarding the properties and relations of evaluatum E, since one knows nothing which pertains to the value of E, one is still in a quandry regarding the value of E. Because nothing that one comes to know about E seems to be relevant to the decision which one is trying to reach, apparently one might just as well ignore E when ascribing value to it.

Accordingly, reason seems to be precluded from evaluations. At least part of what it means to be rational is to hold a view on account of reasons which are relevant to the view held. If this is so, to hold a view on account of irrelevant 'reasons' would not be rational. Therefore, to maintain that E is good on account of certain properties or relations of E would not be rational.
2. Evaluations by Standards and Rules

As I mentioned previously, Taylor's view of the process of evaluation can be seen to meet the problem of relevance, although Taylor does not raise this problem himself.

Taylor considers evaluation as a process of determining the value of an object by using standards or rules. Although there are some differences between evaluating by standards and evaluating by rules, the logic of each is basically the same. One difference which is worth noting at this point is that since standards and rules are applicable to different evaluativa, standards are met or not met as a matter of degree, while rules are either fully met or not met at all. Standards are used to judge the goodness or badness of evaluativa such as agents, states of affairs, and objects such as cars and books, and so forth. Rules are used to judge the rightness or wrongness of actions, and thoughts. An action is not more or less right; it is either right or wrong. On the other hand, one car may be better than another car.

According to Taylor, "evaluation is either a process of grading something or a process of ranking something in comparison with other things."(ND, p4) Gradings and rankings contain five elements, of which
only three are important for our purpose. Firstly, there is a norm or a set of norms "according to which the evaluatum is graded or ranked." (ND, p4) Secondly, the evaluatum possesses "A SET OF GOOD-MAKING OR BAD-MAKING CHARACTERISTICS."(ND, p4) Finally, there is a "POINT OF VIEW within the framework of which the grading or ranking is carried out."(ND, p4) The standards which are used to evaluate the object or objects specify the norm or norms that stipulate which properties or relations render the object good and which render the object bad; that is, whether certain characteristics of the evaluatum are good-making or bad-making.

The standards are from different points of view. For example, a standard which specifies pornography as a bad-making characteristic of works of art is most likely a moral standard. It specifies a characteristic that renders a work of art a morally bad work of art - regardless of the work's good and bad-making characteristics from the aesthetic point of view. From the aesthetic perspective, a pornographic novel may be a good work of art: it meets a given norm or set of norms that stipulate its characteristics as good-making from the aesthetic point of view. Points of view are not necessarily mutually exclusive. For example, it is possible to have an aesthetic standard which states that regardless
of any other aesthetic virtues that a given novel may have, if it has a bad-making characteristic from the moral perspective, it is a bad novel. The novel would be aesthetically-bad because of an immoral characteristic.

The logic of evaluating by standards should be reasonably clear by now. The first step is the "ADOPTION OF A STANDARD OR SET OF STANDARDS for evaluating (ranking or grading) the evaluatum."(ND, p9) The standards specify the norms by which the evaluatum shall be judged. Next, it is necessary to give an "OPERATIONAL CLARIFICATION OF THE STANDARDS."(ND, p9) This consists of a clarification of the norms of the adopted standards. For example, one may order the norms in terms of their importance for judging the evaluatum under consideration. An operational clarification of a standard of good people may result in the judgment that justice is more important than honesty, such that a person who is dishonest yet just is deemed to be better than one who is honest yet unjust.

Once this is accomplished, one is in a position to investigate the evaluata in order to grade or to rank them. Once the standard is adopted, the natures of the evaluata take on a 'value significance'. When they are seen in the light of a given standard which specifies that their characteristics are good-making, they
can be seen to be good. From a specification of the standard in conjunction with a statement that the eval-
uatum meets the norms of the standard, we can deduce the value of the evaluatum. For example, from 'anyone who is just is a good person' and 'Smith is just', we can validly deduce 'Smith is a good person'. This deduction is the final step in the process of evaluation.

Similar remarks can be made regarding the logic of evaluating by rules. According to Taylor, two things must be determined in order to judge whether action A is right or wrong: "(1) whether (it)... falls under (is covered by) a rule and (2) if it does fall under the rule whether doing the act is in accordance with or violates the rule." ([ND, p38]) Since doing action A involves breaking a promise, A falls under and violates the rule 'keeping promises is right'. From the statements 'to break a promise is to violate this rule', 'whatever violates this rule is wrong' and 'action A involves a breaking of a promise', one can deduce the statement 'A is wrong'. Rules specify the norms or norm that define which characteristics count as right-making characteristics and which count as wrong-making characteristics.

Although this approach does not attempt to deduce evaluative statements from factual statements, the nature of the evaluatum is not irrelevant to its own evaluation.
By specifying the norms that determine which properties or relations are good-making and which are bad-making, or which are right-making and which are wrong-making, standards and rules guarantee the relevance of the evaluatum. In order to meet the standards or to be covered by the rules, an evaluatum must possess certain characteristics. If an evaluatum does not have at least one of the characteristics which a given standard specifies as good-making, it cannot be classed as good according to that standard.

In chapter one, I mentioned that evaluative statements cannot be deduced from factual statements, since there must be an evaluative term in the premises. To invoke a standard or rule is to add an evaluative term to one of the premises. This premise clarifies the relation between the facts expressed in the factual premise and the values expressed in the conclusions. The legitimacy of the inference from the factual premise to the evaluative conclusion is thereby guaranteed. The evaluative conclusion can be validly deduced from the statement of the standard or rule in conjunction with the factual statement that the evaluatum possesses the characteristics mentioned in the other premise. For example, the statement 'X is a bad poem' can be validly deduced from the major premise 'unnecessarily verbose
poems are bad poems' and the minor premise 'X is an unnecessarily verbose poem'.

The addition of the major premise renders the deduction valid, but this is not enough. The argument must be sound. A sound argument is a valid argument which has premises that are known to be true. If an argument is proven to be sound, no further justification of the conclusion is required, for as I remarked earlier, the truth of the premises in any valid argument guarantees the truth of the conclusion. The process of justification can be seen to be directed towards this issue. While verification is the attempt to justify the minor premise, validation, vindication and rational choice constitute the attempt to justify the major premise. That is, in verification we attempt to show that the evaluatum really does possess the characteristics which are specified in the major premise. In the steps of validation, vindication and rational choice, we attempt to show that the standard expressed in the major premise is the correct one with which to judge the evaluatum. If it is possible to justify the standard or rule, the premise which we added in order to make the factual statement relevant to the evaluative conclusion can be accepted as correct. Since the answer to this issue hinges on the success or failure of the steps of the
process of justification, I shall forego discussion of this issue for the present.

Two problems of more immediate concern that arise at this point are: (1) the evaluatum may possess both good-making and bad-making characteristics, and (2) the evaluatum may be good according to one standard yet bad according to another standard, or right according to one rule yet wrong according to another rule. While there need not be conflicting standards or rules in the former case, in the latter case there is a conflict between different standards or different rules.

The difficulty in the first problem is that of assessing an "evaluatum (which has) ... characteristics of both kinds." (ND, p10) For example, standard S stipulates that anything with property p is good yet anything that stands in relation r to any other object is bad. Evaluatum E possesses p and stands in relation r to another object. In order to assess such evaluata, we have to give an operational clarification of our standard. To give an operational clarification of a standard is to give a procedure for determining the degree to which an evaluatum meets a standard: it is to give a basis for the conclusion that a given object is bad because its bad-making characteristics - taking into account their number, importance, and degree to which an object
possesses them - outweigh its good-making characteristics. If the evaluatum meets the norms of badness to the same degree that it meets the norms of goodness, we have to establish "the relative precedence of those standards." (ND, p12) Greater weight is given to the norms of one of the standards, such that the fact that the evaluatum meets those norms is said to warrant the conclusion that the evaluatum is on the whole good, or on the whole bad. If for some reason it is not possible to establish precedence, the reasonable judgment would be to judge the object as neutral - that is, to judge it as "ON THE WHOLE ... neither good nor bad, but more or less indifferent." (ND, p10)

Where we have conflicting judgments owing to two different standards or rules, the problem increases. Here, "a characteristic which is good-making according to one standard may be bad-making according to another." (ND, p10) Any change in the evaluatum's nature may serve merely to complicate the matter: the object may change, but the new characteristics are good-making according to one standard yet bad-making according to another standard. The question which arises, therefore, is 'which standard or rule is the correct one to use?' If one standard is incorrect, we have reason to grant the judgment which accords with the former standard to the exclusion of the
one which accords with the latter standard.

It is this problem which provides the backbone of the ensuing discussion. It seems reasonable to use standards and rules to evaluate objects, for doing so gives a basis for judging whether the objects are good or bad, right or wrong. However, the problem of the role of reason in determinations of value becomes shifted to a new level; viz., the problem comes to be centered around the choice between conflicting standards and conflicting rules. If we have reason to use one standard and not its opponent, or one rule and not its opponent, we are justified in judging the matter in accordance with the one and not the opponent. We have reason to make up our minds whether the evaluatum is good and not bad or bad and not good, right and not wrong or wrong and not right. Until this is done, it seems that we are left with two valid arguments which reach opposite conclusions, and no way to tell which argument is sound. Taylor's approach, therefore, invites the problem of relativity, which serves to shift the problem of reason to the next level. As I shall show in the next chapter, both problems are shifted to higher levels with each step in the process of justifying value judgments.
III: The Process of Justification: Verification to Vindication

If we follow Taylor's approach in justifying value judgments, we shall find that while it ultimately fails to overcome the problem of relativism, it partially overcomes the problem of rationality or reason. The purpose of this chapter is to give a critical exposition of Taylor's account of the process of justification, from verification to vindication. Rational choice shall be dealt with separately, in chapter four, for the problems of relativity and reason are shifted to the level of rational choice in such a manner that their solution hinges upon the success of rational choice.

This chapter shall not deal exclusively with Taylor's account. Baier's account of validation is given in addition to Taylor's account of validation. The interesting aspect of Baier's account is that it halts the process of justification at validation. On Baier's account, unlike that of Taylor, there is no need to continue from validation to vindication and rational choice.

1. Verification

According to Taylor, the process of verification "IS IDENTICAL WITH THE PROCESS OF EVALUATION." (ND, p77)
In both cases, the person checks the evaluatum in order to determine whether it meets the given standard or is covered by the given rule. Verification differs from evaluation in the perspective of the person who is performing either one. The evaluator investigates the evaluatum in order to judge its value. The verifier investigates the evaluatum in order to determine whether the evaluation was correctly made — that is, whether the evaluatum is really covered by the rule, or really does meet the standard to the degree claimed by the evaluator.

Verification of an evaluation is not the same as verification of a factual proposition, although the notions of truth and falsity, or correct and incorrect, are present in both. To verify a factual proposition is to show that what it claims to be the case, really is the case. To verify an evaluation is to show that the judgment really did accord with the standard or rule. A verified value judgment can be said to be correct only in the sense that it is correct to maintain that the evaluatum is good or bad given the standard that was used to judge the evaluatum.

2. Validation

Justification cannot stop with verification. It is necessary to justify the standard or rule that was
used to evaluate the object in the first place. It is possible to verify two incompatible value judgments that were made from two incompatible standards and rules. For example, a book is good according to one standard yet bad according to another. Both judgments have been verified. Consequently, it is as correct to say that the book is good given one standard as it is to say that the book is bad given the other standard. If we are to decide that it is good and not bad, or bad and not good, we have to justify using one of the standards to the exclusion of the other.

Even if we do not have two incompatible judgments that result from competing standards or competing rules, we still have to justify the standard or rule in terms of which the evaluatum was judged. We have to justify the 'given-ness' of the standard or rule. The means by which this is attempted is validation.

Baier and Taylor give different accounts of the technique of validation although they attempt to answer essentially the same question. Baier emphasizes the role of 'criteria' in his account of verification. He uses 'criterion' in much the same manner as Taylor uses 'norm'. According to Baier, a value judgment is verified when it is shown to meet the criteria stipulated by the standard concerned. The question that Baier raises, then,
is: "are these the right criteria?"¹ Baier interprets 'right' as 'appropriate' ('relevant' or 'proper').

Taylor phrases the question regarding the demand for validation as: "are those standards or rules appropriate ones for judging an evaluatum of that sort?"(ND, p80) The main difference between the manner in which Baier and Taylor pose the question seems to be that while Baier is concerned with the appropriateness of criteria, Taylor is concerned with the appropriateness of standards and rules. The difference is insignificant, if there is any difference at all. Insofar as standards and rules express the criteria or norms in terms of which evaluata are judged, to inquire into the appropriateness of the standard is to inquire into the appropriateness of the criteria or norms.

Baier's proposed manner of determining the appropriateness of the criteria relies upon knowledge of the purpose of the evaluatum. He writes:

Roughly speaking, the proper criteria for evaluating cars, fountain pens, milers (runners) and so on are determined by the purpose of the thing, activity, or enterprise in question. Knowing the purpose of the car enables us to see that speed, comfort, safety and the like are proper criteria. (MFV, p30)

Knowing the purpose of the evaluatum is not sufficient by itself, for determining the appropriate criteria.
According to Baier, the appropriate criteria for evaluating cars can be determined "from the purpose of cars only if taken together with a great many other more general human aims." (MPV, p81) To use Baier's example, "safety is a criterion not simply because cars have the purpose of serving as means of transportation, but because we want to live unhurt as long as possible." (MPV, p81)

Baier does not assert that the technique of validation contains no 'subjective' elements: he admits that some criteria are subjective. Criteria are said to be subjective in the sense that their appropriateness varies in relation to the unique needs and purposes of different evaluators. Baier writes, for example, that "the real difficulty (lies) ... in drawing the line between (criteria which are) capable of objective validation and the others." (MPV, p82) It is important to note that subjective criteria are not necessarily arbitrary, although Baier seems to lump together the terms 'personal', 'subjective' and 'arbitrary'. Because the motoring needs of a commercial driver differ from those who drive primarily within the city, a variation in appropriate criteria results. For the former person, criteria such as speed are appropriate while criteria such as a small wheel base (to facilitate easy parking) are inappropriate. Because the latter person will have little opportunity
to travel above thirty miles per hour, speed is an inappropriate criterion while a small wheel base is an appropriate criterion for that person. Because the unique needs of individual evaluators determine the criteria which a car must meet in order to be good (useful), there is not necessarily anything arbitrary about subjective criteria.

On the other hand, with regard to the criterion of safety, Baier holds that "there is nothing arbitrary, subjective or personal about it." (MPV, p81) The basic human desire to live unhurt as long as possible renders safety an appropriate criterion for evaluating cars, regardless of the unique needs, desires and purposes of individual evaluators.

This claim can be challenged from two sources. Firstly, we can question whether there is such a desire. If there is a basic human desire to live unhurt as long as possible, then we would probably be more cautious regarding our safety in automobiles. However, ever since the introduction of safety belts, car drivers and passengers have generally ignored them. This seems to indicate a lack of concern with living unhurt as long as possible. It may be objected that our basic human desire to live unhurt as long as possible is not actualized in the wearing of seat belts because we are not being reasonable - were we reasonable, we would realize the danger
to our lives and health that riding in cars presents. Although we assume that accidents happen only to other people, the odds are fairly high that we could become involved in an accident, too.

This leads us to the second objection to Baier's claim that there is nothing subjective, arbitrary or personal about criteria which are related to basic human desires. It is possible to find cases where it seems to be reasonable not to meet criteria that are said to meet basic human desires. For example, a racing car driver with terminal cancer finds that he has only a few months left to live. He can either spend the remainder of his life in a drugged semi-conscious state, or he can end his life himself. Since this person is used to an adventurous life, the former alternative would not be very attractive. Since suicide is a means to avoid the humiliating dependency brought on by a prolonged hospital stay, it seems to be a reasonable course of action. A car crash is not only a means to suicide, but it is also an appropriate means for a racing car driver. If this is reasonable, it is reasonable for him not to judge a car to be good on the basis of its superior safety features. Such a car could only frustrate his goal: that is, it is useless for his purpose.

Even if examples such as the above are legitimate,
Baier's point is not destroyed very much. The eccentric nature of the above example suggests that cases contrary to Baier's point are the exception and not the rule. If this is true, then on the whole, were people reasonable they would agree that safety is an appropriate criterion for judging the goodness of cars, regardless of any other criteria whose appropriateness varies in relation to the personal needs and desires of given evaluators. Baier may be correct in stating that "anyone who claims that safety, reliability, comfort and the like are not appropriate criteria of excellence in cars simply does not know what he is talking about, or is a little crazy, to say the least." (MPV, p81)

In Baier's account of validation, therefore, the appropriateness of the criteria can be established with reference to the primary purpose of the evaluatum, general human desires and the unique purposes of specific evaluators. The primary purpose of the evaluatum determines the total range of criteria. The range of criteria is narrowed with reference to the unique purposes of specific evaluators - especially as these purposes are determined by the needs and desires of given evaluators.

In Taylor's account of validation, there are three steps and three methods. The three steps are as
follows. Taylor writes:

1. We must show... that the standard or rule is RELEVANT. That is, its scope or range of application must include the class of comparison of the given value judgment. ... 2. We must show that (nothing) permits us to make an EXCEPTION to the general application of the standard or rule determined in step 1. ... (Consequently) the evaluatum itself, not merely a class of things to which it belongs, is shown to be correctly judged by the standard or rule. 3. We must show either (a) that no other valid standard or rule conflicts with the one being applied, or (b) that if there is a conflict, the one being applied takes precedence over all those in conflict with it.

(ND, p84-85)

The first and second methods are used to accomplish the first step while the third method is used to accomplish the second and third steps. Taylor summarizes the three methods of validation as follows. Here, 'S' designates the standard being validated while 'R' designates the rule being validated. Taylor writes:

METHOD I: Appeal to higher standards or rules which are more general than S or R and from which S or R can be deduced.

METHOD II: Appeal to standards for judging the consequences of fulfilling or of not fulfilling S or R.

METHOD III: Appeal to standards or rules for deciding whether it is better to make an exception to S or R than to follow S or R, and for deciding the relative precedence of any standards or rules which are in conflict with S or R.

(ND, p86)
We may note that there are really only two steps to Taylor's technique of validation. Because the second and third steps are carried out by the third method, it is evident that these two steps are actually the same. More importantly, we can show that the evaluatum itself, not merely the class of which it is a member, is correctly judged by S or R on the ground either that no other standard or rule which covers the class conflicts with S or R, or that S or R takes precedence over a conflicting standard or rule. The point of validation, which is to show that the standard or rule is justified in general because no exception is warranted to the standard or rule, can be accomplished in two steps by three methods.

With regard to Method I, the point seems to be that if the evaluatum's class is included within the scope of a more general standard or rule, the class must be included within the scope of S or R as well. This assumes that the more general standard or rule is appropriate for judging the class of which the evaluatum is a member. If the more general standard is appropriate, S or R must also be appropriate - for, S or R can be deduced from the more general standard or rule (in conjunction with the appropriate material premises). On this method, we reach what may be termed the second stage of justification. In the first stage, our concern was
to justify S or R. Now, we must justify the more general standard or rule. This involves verifying the judgment that the more general standard or rule includes the evaluatum's class within its scope, as well as validating the new standard. Its appropriateness is assumed; this assumption must be justified.

The second stage is reached on Method II as well. Method II involves invoking a standard in order to evaluate the effects of acting in accordance with R or of meeting S. We have to validate this new standard: if we use Method I, the second stage is reached once again.

If the first step is completed, the most that has been shown is that standard or rule is appropriate for judging the evaluatum's class. A new standard is invoked once more in order to determine whether an exception is warranted. The judgment is evaluative: we are attempting to judge whether anything to do with the evaluatum's characteristics or with the circumstances make it better to make an exception. Insofar as a new standard is invoked, the second stage of justification is reached.

If two competing standards or rules have been validated by the first step, since both cover the evaluatum's class, precedence must be established. In order to mediate the conflict, appeal is made to a more general
standard or rule, which maintains that it is better to
give precedence to one of the standards or rules. For
example, it is found that an action is judged to be
right because it is covered by a rule which is deducible
from the principle of justice. However, the same action
is judged to be wrong because it is covered by a rule
which is deducible from the principle of honesty. Both
judgments are verified, and validated by the first step.
If the moral value system of which the principles of
justice and honesty are members contains the principle
of brotherly love as its ultimate principle, the prin-
ciple of brotherly love can be invoked to establish
precedence. If it is found that, in the circumstances,
 doing the action meets the principle of brotherly love
to a greater extent than does not doing the action, pre-
cedence can be given to the principle of justice, there-
by justifying the rule which is deducible from this prin-
ciple. The action is deemed to be ultimately right despite
its dishonesty. The second stage of validation is reached,
for the new standard has to be justified.

On all three methods, therefore, we must invoke
more and more standards. Once we are at the second stage
of justification, we are ready to reach the third. More
standards are invoked at each level or stage. As
the second gave way to the third, the third gives way
to the fourth, and the fourth to the fifth. As Taylor recognizes, we seem to be heading into an infinite regress. The problem that arises, therefore, is that justification seems ultimately unattainable. Taylor writes:

> Now either this process goes on to infinity or it stops somewhere. In the former case, since the ultimate grounds on which a value judgment is based can never be reached, no value judgment can ever really be shown to be justified. In the latter case, the point at which the validation stops must be arbitrarily chosen, since it cannot itself be validated.

(ND, p104)

Each stage depends on the next higher one for its justification: $S$ or $R$ is valid GIVEN that the next higher one is valid, and this one is valid GIVEN that the next higher one is valid, and so on. The one at which this regress is stopped cannot be validated since there are no higher ones to invoke; or, if some are invoked, the whole process is merely begun anew.

We may attempt to avoid this regress by using Baier's technique of validation to the exclusion of that of Taylor. Since Baier's technique does not attempt to invoke more and more general standards, no infinite regress can occur. Once it has been shown that the evaluatum must possess certain characteristics in order to serve its purpose as well as the purposes of individual evaluators, the relevance of the criteria has been
established. However, Baier's method is limited to those contexts when only mere use-value or pure utility is at issue. Use-value must be distinguished from instrumental value. Something is said to have instrumental value when it will likely result in an end that has intrinsic value. Something is said to have use-value or pure utility when it will likely result in a given end, regardless of the value of that end. In order to justify an ascription of instrumental value to a means, it is necessary to justify an ascription of intrinsic value to its result. If the end has not been proven to have intrinsic value, the means has not been proven to have instrumental value. In order to prove an ascription of use-value, all that has to be shown is that the given end will likely result from an implementation of the evaluatum. In Baier's presentation of validation by purpose, the value of the end (which the evaluatum has the purpose of realizing) is not in question. Therefore, Baier's technique of validation is limited to the context of use-value.

It is interesting to note that Taylor's technique of validation is for value judgments other than those of use-value. Taylor does not even consider use-value or 'pure utility' to be evaluative. Taylor writes, for example, that "'ought' sentences are neither prescriptive nor evaluative when the sole justification of the act
proposed is pure utility." (ND, p217) Judgments of use-value, that is, are neither evaluative nor prescriptive. Taylor's point regarding 'ought' can be extended to include good or bad, and right or wrong. While Baier's account is appropriate to judgments of use-value, Taylor's account is appropriate in other value contexts.

It seems, then, that we are thrust upon Taylor's account for evaluations other than those of use-value. However, even if we use Taylor's method, there need not be an infinite regress. As Taylor states, "if we are not to go into infinity we must arrive at standards or rules that are ultimate." (ND, p106) The ultimate standard or rule cannot be validated. The question that arises, therefore, is since this one is not justified, is the evaluation rendered unjustifiable? Since each stage in the process of justification relies upon the next stage for its justification, it seems as though the answer to this question is affirmative.

Once an ultimate standard or rule has been reached, a value system has been exposed. The flaw in the above argument is that it overlooks the extent of justification that has been achieved. Provided that the evaluation was made in terms of a standard or rule that has been validated in terms of the system of which it is a part, it is justified to some extent. It has
been found that the standard or rule covers the evaluatum itself, and that no conflict is present, or that if conflict is present, the standard or rule at issue takes precedence. Once this has been established, the judgment is correct GIVEN the perspective from which it has been judged. In this instance, the perspective is determined by the value system from which the judgment was made. From the standpoint of that system, that is, the judgment was the correct one to make.

The extent of justification that is achieved is minimal, however. We may distinguish between internal and external justification. The judgment has received internal justification provided that the standard has been validated in terms of the system of which it is a part, and provided that the judgment has been verified. It has received external justification if the above has been shown as well as the following: the value system must have been shown to be the correct one to use. Two conflicting judgments that have been given internal justification in terms of their respective systems are equally justified. If it has been shown that it is incorrect to use one of the systems yet correct to use the other one, one of the judgments has been 'ultimately' justified.
3. Vindication

The demand for external justification is the demand for vindication. Taylor uses the term vindication "as a synonym for 'pragmatic justification'." (ND, p130) At issue, here, is the justification of the act of selecting a given value system as the one in terms of which one evaluates. Taylor writes: "when I speak of vindicating a value system I speak in an abbreviated form. What we vindicate is not a value system itself but a person's act of adopting it and a person's state of being committed to it." (ND, p129-130) The value system is not shown to be a "true" value system (however that would be interpreted). The attempt is to give the person reason to adopt it to the exclusion of any other. It is for this reason that vindication is pragmatic.

Vindication is carried out in two ways. Taylor writes: "we can show that it (the value system) is a necessary, effective, or sufficient means to bringing about or furthering an end, and we can show that it contributes to the value of a whole of which it is a part." (ND, p130) In the first method, instrumental value, not use-value, is at issue. The value system is graded, according to Taylor, "according to a standard of instrumental value." (ND, p130) In the second method, contributive value is at issue. Something is said to have
contributive value if and only if the value of the whole of which it is a part is reduced by its absence and increased with its presence. If the value of the whole is reduced in the presence and increased in the absence of the evaluatum, then it has contributive disvalue.

The question which arises, therefore, is, what is the end or whole to which reference is made? The answer, according to Taylor, is "'a way of life'."(ND, p131) The end or ends at issue are the ideals of the way of life while the whole is the way of life as a whole. Taylor defines a way of life as "A SET OF VALUE SYSTEMS EACH OF WHICH BELONGS TO A DIFFERENT POINT OF VIEW AND ALL OF WHICH ARE ARRANGED IN AN ORDER OF RELATIVE PRECEDENCE."

A way of life is made up of a moral system, a political system, an aesthetic system, an economic system, and so forth. Each of these are from a different point of view: the moral point of view, the political point of view, and so on. The way of life may be determined by the value system that takes precedence. A moral way of life gives precedence to the moral system in such a manner that in the activity of making a decision, moral considerations take precedence over any other considerations.

It is in this manner that we reach the final stage of the process of justification; namely, rational
choice of a way of life. If there is a variety of ways of life and no way to justify selecting one over any other, then more than one alternative value system can be vindicated. All that has to be done is to show that the value system is instrumentally and contributively valuable in terms of a given way of life. An alternative value system is shown to be instrumentally and contributively valuable in terms of another way of life. The act of adopting the former value system is as vindicated to anyone living the former way of life as is the act of adopting the latter value system to anyone living the latter way of life. If it is possible to justify the choice of one of these ways of life over the other, then only that value system which is an essential part of it or which is instrumental in realizing its ideals is vindicated. The next chapter deals with this issue.

4. The Problem of Reason

Thus far, the problem of reason has been partially overcome. We can distinguish between reason within specific systems of value and reason outside specific systems of value. Reason does have a role within the activities of verification and validation. In verifying a value judgment, one attempts to prove that the judgment was made correctly. In the invocation of general standards, one deduces the lower standards from the general
ones, in conjunction with certain material premises. One deduces the value of the evaluatum from the statement of the standard or rule in conjunction with the material premise that the evaluatum possesses the characteristics specified in the major premise. In short, validation makes use of an important tool of reason (deduction), while verification makes use of other tools of reason appropriate to the empirical investigation of objects. If the evaluatum has been verified and validated, the evaluator has reason to judge it as he judged it.

This may be a small step, however. The problem of reason recurs on the level of external justification. Ultimately, the problem becomes centered around the issue of the choice of a way of life. Nonetheless, the problem has been solved, if only in part.

5. The Problem of Relativism

While the foregoing serves to solve the problem of reason in part, the problem of relativism is not solved at all. Once Taylor's technique of validation comes to a halt, the problem of relativism is shifted to the 'system' level. Here, the correctness of the judgment is relative to the system in terms of which it was made. GIVEN one value system, it is correct to judge that a certain action is right, yet GIVEN another value system, it is correct to judge that the same action is wrong.
This assumes, of course, that both value judgments have been verified and that the rules have been validated in terms of the systems of which they are a part. If it is found that we are justified in making an exception to one of the rules, the conflict is resolved.

From the 'system' level, the problem is shifted to the 'way of life' level. This difficulty was mentioned at the end of the discussion on vindication. The value judgment becomes relative to the way of life of which the value system is a part. The value judgment is the correct one to make from the perspective provided by the way of life. It is 'as correct' as the opposite judgment which is made in terms of the opposite way of life - unless it can be shown that we are justified in adopting one of the ways of life to the exclusion of the other.

Accordingly, not only is the process of justification shifted to a new level, but so are the subsidiary problems of relativism and reason.
IV: The Process of Justification: Rational Choice

As I mentioned previously, rational choice of a way of life is the final step in the process of justification. If it is not possible to justify the choice to adopt a way of life then it is not possible to provide a full or complete justification for any given value judgment. Moreover, it is at this level that we must find the solution to the problem of relativism as well as the final solution to the problem of reason. I shall argue that Taylor's account of rational choice fails to meet any of the above problems: the problem of reason is not given a final solution, the problem of relativism is not solved, and evaluations are not given full justification.

Following a brief exposition of the conditions of rational choice which Taylor outlines, I shall discuss the role of rational choice in the process of justification, the problem of reason, and the problem of relativism.

1. Taylor's Account of Rational Choice of a Way of Life

According to Taylor, a choice is rational if it meets "conditions of freedom, conditions of enlightenment, and conditions of impartiality." (ND, p164)

Although the ideal rational choice is "totally free,
totally enlightened, and totally impartial,"(ND, p174), in Taylor's view, the rationality of any actual choice is a matter of degree - for, as Taylor states, "no actual choice can ever be completely free, completely enlightened, or completely impartial."(ND, p165). I shall argue that even if all of the conditions are met to the highest possible extent, the choice cannot be rational.

In order for a choice to be free, four conditions must be met. First, the choice must not have been "DECISIVELY DETERMINED BY UNCONSCIOUS MOTIVES."(ND, p165) While they may influence the choice, if they override all other factors, the choice is not free. Second, the choice is not free if it is "DETERMINED BY INTERNAL CONSTRAINT."(ND, p165) An example of an internal constraint would be an extreme desire for one of the alternatives. Similarly, the choice is not free if it is "DETERMINED BY EXTERNAL CONSTRAINT."(ND, p165) No one or nothing can determine the choice by holding a real or metaphorical gun to the head of the chooser, if the choice is free. Finally, the choice must be "DECISIVELY DETERMINED BY THE PERSON'S OWN PREFERENCE."(ND, p166) He must choose the kind of life that he himself wants to live - not the kind of life that anyone else would select for him. A free choice is not an uncaused choice.
On the above conditions, freedom is seen as self-determination.

For all its freedom, the choice may not be rational. Freedom is a condition of rationality, but it does not guarantee that the choice is rational. If the above conditions are not met, the person is not in a position to use his reason in making the choice. Even if the above conditions are fully met, the person's preference could be anything but rational: he could have no reasons to prefer what he does prefer, or, good reasons to prefer the opposite of what he prefers. The conditions of enlightenment and impartiality are offered in order to ensure a rational preference, thereby a rational choice.

According to Taylor, a preference is enlightened to the extent that it meets three conditions. He writes:

(a) **THE NATURE OF EACH WAY OF LIFE IS FULLY KNOWN.**
(b) **THE PROBABLE EFFECTS OF LIVING EACH WAY OF LIFE ARE FULLY KNOWN.**
(c) **THE MEANS NECESSARY TO BRING ABOUT EACH WAY OF LIFE (i.e., what is required to enable a person to live each way of life) ARE FULLY KNOWN.**

(ND, p166)

Each condition includes three types of knowledge, which Taylor calls intellectual knowledge, imaginative knowledge, and practical knowledge. To have intellectual knowledge of a way of life is to possess "all the
empirical knowledge necessary for a complete and accurate DESCRIPTION of the way of life itself (to satisfy condition a), of the probable effects of living according to it (to satisfy condition b), and of the necessary means for bringing it about (to satisfy condition c)." (ND, p166) To have imaginative knowledge of a way of life is to be able to "ENVISAGE what it is like to live each way of life." (ND, p167) To have practical knowledge of ways of life is to have "knowledge by acquaintance." (ND, p169) In Taylor's view, practical knowledge of a way of life is gained by actually living that way of life. (see ND, p169) Presumably, the person lives that way of life for a while in order to obtain first-hand experience of how one acts in certain situations, what effects occur with some amount of regularity and what they are really like, and finally, how one sets about living that way of life.

In order for a choice to be impartial, three conditions must be met. It must be disinterested, detached ("objective"), and unbiased. A disinterested preference is one that is not "determined by bribes, by exercise of favoritism, by desire to protect one's privileges (or those of one's family, friends, or class), or by any emotional prejudices." (ND, p170) To use Taylor's example, an anti-Semite could not be disinterested
in a choice between two ways of life, one of which includes or is defined by Judaism.

In order for a choice to be detached or objective, it must be "among ways of life other than that in which the person was brought up, and other than that to which he is committed at the time of the choice."\(^{(ND,p170)}\)

If a person is committed to one of the alternatives, his preference is already decided. As Taylor states, "such a person is not in a position to make a choice at all, to say nothing of a rational choice."\(^{(ND, p170)}\)

However, it seems that the person's own way of life will inevitably be among the alternatives: in order to adopt a way of life other than his own, he will have to give up his own way of life. In other words, he cannot help but choose between his own way of life and at least one other way of life. If his own way of life is among the alternatives, then, it seems that he has no choice at all, let alone a rational choice.

The person must free himself from his commitment to the way of life he was living prior to the choice. \(^{(UNMSI)}\)

Taylor may be aware of the fact that a chooser's own way of life will be among the alternatives, for although he does not state this possibility in an explicit manner, the conditions of unbiasedness can be seen as the means to freeing oneself from the commitment to one's own way
of life.

A choice is biased if the person has been "IN-DOCTRINATED INTO OR CONDITIONED BLINDLY to accept the way of life in which he was brought up." (ND, p172) The same would hold if the person was conditioned blindly or indoctrinated into living a way of life in which he was not raised. In order to preclude indoctrination, the person must have had a liberal education, a non-authoritarian upbringing and a varied experience of life. That is, he must be in a position to realize that there are alternatives to his present way of life and that these alternatives cannot be ruled out solely on the basis of their dissimilarity to his present way of life.

2. Rational Choice and the Process of Justification

The first difficulty which arises is that the process of justification seems to have been extended in time to the extent that it has become overly cumbersome. If the person is asked to go through the process of rational choice in order to prove the correctness of the value judgment with which he began, then it would be quite some time before the value judgment is justified. This is so especially because of the means of gaining practical knowledge of the alternatives - as I mentioned earlier, the person must actually live that way of life
for a period of time, and he must be educated in such a way that he can learn from his experience by keeping some measure of detachment from each way of life that he 'tries on'. (see ND, p169)

From the standpoint of justification, it is not necessary for each person to go through the procedure of rational choice. One could point out that the way of life within which one made one's judgment has been chosen by people whose choices met the conditions of freedom, impartiality and enlightenment. To the extent that rational people prefer way of life A over way of life B, as Taylor states, "TO THAT EXTENT IT IS REASONABLE FOR ANYONE TO ACCEPT A AS PREFERABLE TO B."(ND, p174) In the final analysis, the judgment which accords with A is justified while the one which accords with B is not justified.

Although the process of justification does not become overly cumbersome for the above reason, it will not do to point out that the way of life in which one's judgment was made has been chosen by free, enlightened and impartial people. Someone with an opposing judgment may be able to do the same. According to Taylor, even if the conditions of freedom, impartiality and enlightenment are fully met, it is still possible that different people will choose different ways of life. He writes:
It is always possible that variations in temperament among people will result in variations in their preference for ways of life. Thus even choices made under ideal conditions of rationality will be subject to the disagreements among romanticists and classicists, doers and thinkers, rationalists and mystics (and so on).

... This possibility must be admitted, but it does not destroy the concept of a rational choice as such.

(ND, p175)

Rational people, say, are known to choose either way of life A or way of life B. Someone who has correctly made his judgment within way of life A has no defense against someone else who has correctly made his judgment within way of life B. If this 'temperament possibility' is actualized even in circumstances wherein ideal conditions of rationality hold, then rational choice becomes useless to the person who is attempting to show that his value judgment is justified because it is correctly made in terms of a rationally chosen way of life.

It should be emphasized that the 'temperament possibility' is just that - as a possibility, it may never be actualized. To admit to the possibility is not to claim that different ways of life will probably be chosen by people who are fully free, fully impartial, and fully enlightened. However, at the end of the fourth section of this chapter, I shall point out that fully free, fully enlightened and fully impartial people will
probably choose different ways of life after all - although this is a consequence of a different point. Accordingly, I shall return to this issue at the end of section four.

3. Rational Choice and the Problem of Relativism

According to one reviewer of *Normative Discourse*, Taylor's admission that a number of people could choose different ways of life even though all made fully free, fully enlightened and fully impartial choices ruins his defense of absolutism against relativism. While I agree with Cooper's point that Taylor's defense of absolutism does not work, I do not agree with Cooper's reason for drawing this conclusion. Because my reason for drawing this conclusion relies upon the argument which I shall present in section four of this chapter, I shall wait until that time to complete my discussion on the relation between rational choice and the problem of relativism. Accordingly, the purpose of this section is to strengthen Taylor's defense of absolutism by showing how it can meet Cooper's objection.

Cooper's objection relies upon the erroneous view that disagreement constitutes the problem of relativism. Relativism claims not merely that the value of an object varies in relation to the value system in which it was
judged; also, it denies that there is any way to justify the view that only one system is the correct one to use. Even if there is no disagreement in fact, relativism can still be a problem. For example, even if all people agree that object O is good, it could be that their judgment is neither correct nor incorrect IN THE LAST ANALYSIS. They could be assuming the same value system, such that their judgment is the correct one to make from the standpoint of that value system. It is logically possible that the judgment that O is bad could be the correct one to make from the standpoint of an alternative value system, even though no one, in fact, uses that value system. In the last analysis, we cannot say that the judgment that O is good is justified while the judgment that O is bad is not justified.

By the same token, if a number of people judge the value of an evaluatum differently, it may be the case that only one judgment is the correct one to make. Thus, even if different ways of life are chosen, it is possible that only one way of life is the correct one to choose. Also, even if all people choose the same way of life, if it cannot be shown that this way of life is the correct one to choose, the problem of relativism is still present. Thus, if a number of people choose different ways of life, wherein all have made choices that were
fully free, fully enlightened and fully impartial, the issue of absolutism versus relativism is left undecided.

Taylor does not, and he need not, try to refute relativism on the level of value judgments that are mere matters of taste, such as 'butterscotch ice cream is better than vanilla ice cream'. The problem is most troublesome on the level of value judgments that are not matters of taste, such as judgments of moral value, aesthetic value, and so on. Because Taylor defines a way of life as an hierarchically-arranged system of value systems which include moral value systems, political value systems and so on, it is evident that Taylor is concerned with value judgments that are not mere matters of taste. I shall argue in the next section that Taylor's presentation of rational choice will not suffice to overcome the problem of relativism.

4. Rational Choice and the Problem of Reason

I shall argue that the choice of a way of life cannot be rational. This is not to be understood as a claim that the choice is irrational. Rather, I shall argue that the choice is non-rational. In a rational choice, a person follows the so-called 'dictates' of reason. The person knows that it is correct to choose A over B, and acts on this knowledge by choosing A over
B. If the dictates of reason are not followed, the choice is irrational. The person knows that it is correct to choose A over B, yet chooses B over A. If there is no way to know whether the choice of A over B is correct or whether the choice of B over A is correct, any choice of one over the other is non-rational. The dictates of reason are neither followed nor broken. The rationality of the choice is not determined by the correctness of what is really chosen: rather, it is determined by the agent's following the dictates of reason, which in this case is the act of choosing the way of life which one knows to be the correct one to choose. By saying that the choice of a way of life is non-rational, therefore, we are proposing that there cannot be any dictates of reason in this choice.

Even if we suppose that individuals can choose in a manner that is totally free, totally enlightened, and totally impartial, it does not follow that the choice is rational. Freedom, impartiality and enlightenment are conditions of rationality, but they are not sufficient to render the choice of a way of life rational. At least, on our concept of rationality, any choice that is biased, prejudiced, determined by internal or external constraint, uninformed or misinformed, cannot be rational. The bias, prejudice, misinformation or
constraint can be the factor or factors which cause the person to go against the dictates of reason. Even given that the conditions of rationality which Taylor outlines are conditions of rationality, even choices which exhibit these conditions to their fullest extent are non-rational. This is because the choice of a way of life involves an evaluation of the alternatives. On Taylor's thesis, there cannot be any standards or rules outside ways of life. For this reason, Taylor denies that the choice of a way of life involves an evaluation. I shall argue, however, that this does not constitute grounds on which to deny that the choice of a way of life is evaluative: rather, it indicates why the choice must be non-rational, even if the conditions of freedom, enlightenment and impartiality are fully met.

It is interesting to note that Taylor claims that we can deduce the statement 'A ought to be preferred to B' from the statement "A is rationally preferred to B". (ND, p182) This 'ought' indicates that we are dealing with an evaluation. According to Taylor, 'ought' is prescriptive only when it is used in a second-person before the event recommendation such as 'you ought to surrender your bus seat to that elderly lady.' Otherwise, the term 'ought' is evaluative, except when it is used in the sense of pure utility.² The statement that A ought to
be preferred to B is not a second-person before the event recommendation. Therefore, it is not prescriptive. Since there is no mention of an end, the value of which is not in question, 'A ought to be preferred to B' is not meant in the sense of pure utility. Therefore, it is not an instance of pure utility. Therefore, it must be evaluative.

Taylor may respond to this argument by stating that 'ought' statements are evaluative ONLY when they are dealing with particulars, but a way of life is not a particular. At least, the spirit of Taylor's account of evaluation by standards and rules suggests that Taylor views evaluations as concerned only with particulars. Moreover, this view is suggested by the second step in the process of evaluation, wherein one attempts to show that the standard or rule covers the particular evaluatum under inspection, not merely the class of which it is a member. If it is true that all evaluata are particulars, and if it is true that ways of life are not particulars, it must be true that ways of life cannot be evaluata. Hence, the statement 'A ought to be preferred to B' cannot be evaluative.

However, this can be replied to in two ways. Even if it is granted that only particulars can be evaluata, this does not constitute a reason to deny that ways
of life can be evaluated. Ways of life are particulars. When we are choosing between ways of life A and B, we have before us two instances of the same type. Granted, they have a complex structure, and granted, we are not able to pick a way of life up in our hands (as we can do with a particular chair), but neither of these factors constitutes a reason to deny that ways of life are particulars.

Even if it is granted that ways of life are not particulars, we still have no reason to deny that they can be evaluated. Statements such as 'war is hell' indicate that evaluations are not restricted to particulars. In the above statement, no particular war is being evaluated - rather, the statement expresses a value judgment on either wars in general or all wars inclusive.

Moreover, we can note that way of life A is said to be PREFERABLE to B (see ND, p174). The term 'preferable' can mean one of two things: (1) CAPABLE of being preferred or (2) WORTHY of being preferred. If we are dealing with an evaluative ought, then 'preferable' is being used in the latter sense; because A is worthy of being preferred to B, we ought to prefer A to B. Also, A is said to be RATIONALLY preferable to B - from a rational standpoint, A is worthy of our preference.

We are dealing, then, with an evaluation of ways
of life A and B for the purpose of deciding which one is the better one to choose. The conditions of enlightenment seem to be geared to this purpose. In the second chapter, it was mentioned that a reasonable evaluation was at least as informed as possible regarding the evaluata. In the case before us, the alternative ways of life are the evaluata and the step of enlightenment is the part in the process of evaluation wherein the evaluator attempts to learn about the characteristics of the evaluata.

In chapter two, it was argued that the information gathered is irrelevant to the evaluation unless the transition between factual premises and the evaluative conclusion could be made via a standard or rule that stipulates whether the characteristics are good-making or bad-making, right-making or wrong-making. To utilize the information gained in the process of enlightenment, there must be a standard or rule that can be invoked. However, if all standards and rules are contained within ways of life, to invoke a standard or rule at this point is to presuppose a way of life. Thus, there can no longer be a real choice to speak of, let alone a rational choice.

As mentioned in the introduction to this section, Taylor denies that the choice of a way of life involves
an evaluation, but the reason why Taylor denies this, is the reason why the choice is non-rational. Taylor writes:

I do not call this process (of rational choice) DELIBERATION, however. Deliberation is evaluation, and all evaluation is made according to standards and rules. We are concerned here with a preference, not an evaluation. There are no standards or rules to appeal to, since we are dealing with a choice among whole ways of life and all standards and rules are included in these. If we were to appeal to a standard or rule we would be presupposing a way of life in making the choice, and therefore our choice would not be a choice among ways of life.

(ND, p166)

If the choice is a genuine one, no standards or rules can be operative in making the choice. What must be seen, then, is whether it is true that this renders the choice of a way of life non-evaluative.

Essentially, Taylor's argument is that the choice of a way of life cannot be evaluative, since all evaluations make reference to standards or rules, but the choice cannot make reference to standards or rules (on pain of circularity). This argument is valid, but not sound. The premise 'all evaluations make reference to standards or rules' is not necessarily true. As mentioned in chapter one, to judge the value of an evaluatum is to ascribe value to it, or, to reach a decision on the object's value. Standards or rules need not be appealed to, although a value judgment that does not
use a standard or rule may not be capable of being justified, at least not by verification, validation and so forth. Standards and rules are characteristic of REASONABLE or justifiable value judgments, not of value judgments as such. If it is possible to talk of a justified value judgment as one that is correctly made in terms of a valid standard or rule, then it is possible to talk of an unjustified value judgment as one that is made with reference to an invalid standard or rule, or no standard or rule at all. Although it is unreasonable to judge an object without referring to a standard or rule, one's judgment does not stop being a judgment. Insofar as it is possible to decide that object 0 is good without using a standard or rule, it cannot be necessarily true that all evaluations are made with reference to standards or rules.

If the choice is genuine, it must be non-rational. Despite the person's freedom, enlightenment and impartiality, he cannot validly deduce that one way of life is preferable to any other way of life from factual statements regarding the natures of the alternative ways of life. The relevance of the facts that he has gathered to the conclusion he wishes to reach cannot be established: hence, he is not in a position to follow or to break the dictates of reason.
From these considerations, it follows that the step of rational choice cannot be of any use to a person who is attempting to justify a value judgment. Different ways of life can be chosen by people who make fully free, fully enlightened and fully impartial choices, since it is impossible to prove that the choice of one way of life is the correct choice to make. Once a person has followed Taylor's procedure of rational choice, he is bound to choose one way or the other - unless he lives the rest of his life vacillating between the alternatives. Once he has come to the point of choice, he is not living any particular way of life, for in order to satisfy the condition of detachment or objectivity, he has given up the way of life to which he was committed prior to being in the position of choice. In an important respect, he is in a vacuum. Since there is no guarantee that one choice is correct while another is incorrect, each person will probably end up choosing different ways of life - perhaps in accordance with their temperaments. That is, it may be for the above reason that the 'temperament possibility' will be actualized. Thus, it will not do to point out that the way of life within which one made one's choice is a way of life chosen by people whose choices were fully free, fully enlightened and fully impartial, for this cannot be an
effective means to showing that one's value judgment is justified in the last analysis.

Moreover, because the choice of a way of life is non-rational, the problem of relativism is not overcome. Even if a person successfully follows Taylor's procedure and becomes fully free, fully enlightened and fully impartial, there is no basis on which he can be justified in choosing one way of life over another. As I mentioned earlier, the relativist thesis claims not only that the value of an object varies in relation to the perspective from which it is judged, but also that it is impossible to show that one of the perspectives is the correct one to adopt. Because ways of life contain value systems, ways of life provide the ultimate framework or perspective from which evaluata are judged. To say that it is not possible to justify adopting one way of life over another, is to say that it cannot be shown that one of the perspectives is the correct one to adopt.

Accordingly, it is not possible to prove that one of two competing value judgments is 'ultimately' correct, although they may be correct in the limited sense of being the correct ones to make within the frameworks of their respective ways of life. Both judgments are verified. The standards or rules are found to be valid. The value systems of which the standards and rules are
parts are vindicated in terms of the given ways of life.

5. Summary

Taylor's approach to the problem of justification has limited success. Even if it is possible to meet all of the conditions of rationality which Taylor outlines, the choice of a way of life is non-rational. Justification can be achieved, but only in the internal sense which I discussed earlier. A judgment which is the correct one to make within the framework of a given way of life is justified to some extent, but it is as justified as is a conflicting judgment which is the correct one to make within the framework of another way of life. Similarly, reason is operative within the framework of given ways of life, but not outside these frameworks. We begin with the problem of relativism on the level of two conflicting standards or rules, but because we are left with this problem on the level of conflicting ways of life, the earlier problem is not solved.

Therefore, justification of a value judgment is not complete, the problem of rationality or reason is not given a final solution, and the problem of relativism is given no solution at all.
V: Trans-Way of Life Standards and the Choice of a Way of Life

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss an account of the justification of the choice of a way of life that may be offered as an alternative to the account of Taylor. It may be argued that one of the major problems in Taylor's account is that it cannot allow for trans-way of life standards. Since a trans-way of life standard does not belong to a given way of life and no other, it can be said to be outside any given way of life. As we have seen, Taylor claims that all standards are included within ways of life. If this is so, no standards can be used to validate the transition from statements that pertain to the characteristics of the alternative ways of life to the evaluative conclusion that one ought to be preferred. The transition is not 'validated' since without a premise expressing a trans-way of life standard, the evaluative conclusion cannot be validly deduced from the factual premises.

I shall argue that although a premise which expresses such a standard would serve to validate the transition under consideration without resulting in circularity, such a standard is not really all that helpful after all.
Circularity does not result from an invocation of this standard: as it is outside any given way of life, to invoke it is not to presuppose a way of life. However, such a standard expresses norms or criteria which cannot be justified, at least not by Taylor's method of justification. To attempt to justify them by Taylor's method involves showing that they belong to a value system which has instrumental and contributive value towards way of life. The most of which they may be capable is validation - but the act of adopting the value system could not be vindicated.

It may be argued, then, that such trans-way of life norms make the choice of a way of life 'REASONABLE', even if not fully rational. The choice would be reasonable insofar as the deduction of the statement that a way of life ought to be preferred from the factual statements pertaining to each alternative way of life would be valid. Since the norms contained in the standard cannot be fully justified, the choice would not be fully rational. The norms which would be offered, here, would be those of rationality. It would not be possible to offer moral, political, or aesthetic norms, for these are contained within ways of life. According to Taylor, the conditions of rationality which he specifies are conditions which "ANYONE in ANY way of life would accept
as defining a way of life."(ND, p176) If this is true then the norms or conditions of rationality are outside any given way of life.

As I mentioned, if this method was followed, justification could not be complete. However, the problem of relativism would be partially solved. While those who do not accept these norms as binding would have no reason to follow them in their choice of a way of life, those who do accept them (i.e., those who are rational) would have reason to use them in making their choice. Those who do not accept them cannot be said to be 'wrong' in doing so, for the system that these norms compose cannot be vindicated.

The conditions which Taylor outlines will not do for the purpose of validating the transition from factual statements about each way of life to the evaluative conclusion that one of the alternatives is preferable. What is required are norms which stipulate the good-making and bad-making characteristics of ways of life. The conditions of freedom, enlightenment and impartiality are not such substantive requirements. They say nothing which pertains to the sort of conditions which ways of life must possess in order to count as 'good' or 'bad' from the rational standpoint. Taylor specifies a procedure which has the purpose of bringing
the person to a rational frame of mind. Once one is in this frame of mind - once one is totally free, totally enlightened and totally impartial - one does not have a means to weigh the characteristics of one way of life against those of another way of life. This can be done only by using specifications that certain characteristics are good-making while others are bad-making.

One norm of rationality that may be offered is that of internal consistency. If it is rational to be consistent, it must be rational to adopt a way of life that will allow one to be consistent. It is only by doing this that one can realize one's goal of being rational. However, this does not get us very far. On the one hand, it is possible that many different ways of life are equally self-consistent. On the other hand, those which are not self-consistent can be made to be so. We could clarify the standards and rules in order to remove internal conflicts which arise from ambiguities. We could determine precedence in terms of the supreme principle of the system which is at the top of the hierarchical arrangement in order to remove conflicts between valid standards and rules from different systems. In so far as it is possible to make ways of life live up to the norm of self-consistency, self-consistency cannot be invoked in order to give reason for choosing one way
of life over another.

The above assumes that the norms of rationality are not contained within any way of life. If it makes sense to talk of a rational way of life, this assumption is false. A rational way of life would be one that strives for such things as self-consistency, proof of the truth of all beliefs, and so forth. To invoke the norms of rationality, therefore, would be to presuppose a way of life. Our problem simply recurs: now we would have to justify the evaluation that the rational way of life is the best way of life.

Therefore, even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that there can be trans-way of life norms, these are of little, if any, use for making the choice of a way of life rational. The possibility of making ways of life self-consistent does not overcome the problem of relativism: it would not be possible to claim that way of life A ought to be preferred over way of life B because A is self-consistent while B is not, since B could be made to be equally self-consistent. However, if it makes sense to talk of a rational way of life, the norms of rationality would not be trans-way of life. As it is circular to claim that A ought, morally, to be preferred to B because A is a moral way of life while B is an amoral or immoral way of life, it
is circular to say that A ought, rationally, to be preferred to B because A is a rational way of life while B is not.
VI: Summary and Conclusion

I have attempted to investigate the possibility of justifying value judgments without attempting to deduce evaluative statements from factual statements. As I have indicated, it is possible to do this. However, it is evident that the extent to which justification is possible depends upon whether the evaluatum is purposive or non-purposive.

In chapter one, I stated that to justify is to prove correct. It is not enough for a statement to just happen to be correct - it must be shown to be correct. I mentioned two methods by which justification can be achieved. One can show that what a statement claims to be the case really is the case. I termed this the correspondence criterion. Secondly, one can show that the statement is the conclusion of a valid deduction in which the premises are known to be true. I termed this the deducibility criterion. In this method, the truth of the premises guarantees, or proves, the truth of the conclusion.

The foregoing discussion kept the second condition foremost in mind, although I did not entirely ignore the possibilities of the first method. In chapter one, I dealt with the view that terms such as 'good' denote
'non-natural' properties which are possessed by objects. If this were so, one could justify the statement 'Jones is a good person' by showing that Jones is a person who possesses the property designated by the term 'good'. Since we are hard-pressed to show just how this property differs from the property denoted by 'bad', we cannot justify evaluative statements by using this version of the correspondence method. Even if it is true that Jones possesses the property denoted by 'good', this cannot be proven.

Accordingly, the second method of justification seems to be the most promising. Were it possible to deduce evaluative statements from factual statements, there would be no problem of justification. However, there must be an evaluative term in at least one of the premises in order for the transition from the facts expressed in the premises to the values expressed in the conclusion to be valid. As I pointed out in chapter two, the type of approach taken by Taylor attempts to remedy this situation by placing an evaluative term in one of the premises. The major premise of the resultant argument expresses the fact that the evaluatum meets the standard or is covered by the rule.

For example, from the statement 'all benevolent people are good people' in conjunction with the statement
'Smith is a benevolent person', the statement 'Smith is a good person' can be validly deduced.

From the standpoint of justification, it is not enough to use arguments which are only valid: the arguments must be sound. A sound argument is a valid argument in which the premises are known to be true. As Taylor presents it, the process of justification can be seen to be an attempt to provide a method whereby an evaluative argument can be proven to be sound. The step of verification is directed toward the question regarding the truth of the minor premise. The remaining steps in the technique of justification are directed towards the question regarding the truth or correctness of the major premise. The attempt of validation is to show that the major premise is the correct one to use for judging the evaluatum itself, GIVEN the value system to which the standard expressed by the major premise belongs. Vindication and rational choice constitute the attempt to show that the value system is the correct one from which to judge, while an alternative value system is not the correct one from which to judge.

As I have shown in chapter four, it is at the point of rational choice that the process of justification breaks down. Even if it is possible to choose a way of life by using a trans-way of life standard of
rationality, it is still not possible to justify the choice of one way of life over another.

Thus, two conflicting arguments can be said to be 'equally sound'. That is, the standard or rule expressed by the major premise of one argument is validated in terms of a value system that has instrumental and contributive value to way of life A, and the facts expressed in the minor premise are known to be true. From the standpoint of way of life A, it is correct to judge the evaluatum by the standard or rule expressed by the major premise. For those living way of life A, that standard is the correct one to use in that situation. For those living A, the major premise is correct in the sense that it is the correct one to use for the attempt to deduce the value of the evaluatum. However, there is another argument regarding the same evaluatum in which a different standard expressed by the major premise is validated in terms of a value system which has instrumental and contributive value to way of life B, and the facts expressed in the minor premise are correct. From the standpoint of way of life B, the major premise is the correct one from which to argue, since it expresses the standard or rule which is correct to use in that situation.

In other words, if we follow Taylor's procedure
of justification, it is possible to justify value judgments, although on this procedure there is no attempt
to deduce evaluative statements from factual statements. Although justification can be achieved by this method,
it would have to be shown that one perspective is the correct one to adopt. In this case, this involves
showing that it is correct to choose a given way of life, for ways of life provide the ultimate perspectives from
which evaluations and value judgments (of non-purposive evaluata) can take place.

This is not to say that all value judgments are capable of only incomplete or partial justification. As we saw when Baier's technique of validation was discussed, it is possible to provide a complete justification for a value judgment. The evaluata for which Baier's technique is appropriate are purposive objects such as cars, fountain pens and so forth. Because certain criteria must be met by an object in order for it to serve its purpose and the purposes of individual evaluators, these criteria are appropriate ('valid') for judging that object. Once this is shown, no further justification is necessary. The judgment with which we are concerned is one of use-value or utility. The statement that a car is good (useful) because it possesses certain properties or relations is justified by proving that the
car must possess those in order to be useful. The value of the end which the object has the purpose of realizing is not in question.

It may be argued, here, that if we can reduce all value judgments to judgments of use-value, then we have a means to provide complete or full justification for all value judgments. However, this cannot be done. Since we make value judgments which are not judgments of use-value, to reduce all value judgments to judgments of use-value is to distort our value experience. Since value judgments which are not use-value judgments are more important than judgments of use-value, it is important to determine how and to what extent such judgments can be justified.

Therefore, even though it is not possible to deduce evaluative statements from factual statements, it is possible to justify value judgments. At least in the case of purposive evaluata, it is possible to achieve full or complete justification for a value judgment.
Notes

Chapter I


2 Paul W. Taylor, *Normative Discourse* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1961), p.viii. Normative Discourse shall be referred to as ND and the appropriate page number or numbers in parentheses immediately following the close of quotation marks, when the reference is direct. If the reference is indirect, the same method shall be used, except for the addition of 'see' prior to 'ND'.


4 Taylor receives the technique of verification from, primarily, Kurt Baier in *The Moral Point of View* (Ithaca, 1958). Although Taylor claims to adopt the term 'validation' from Baier's work, Taylor's technique of validation owes more to validation as it is conceived by Feigl, from whom Taylor receives the concept of vindication. (see Herbert Feigl, "Validation and Vindication", in Sellars & Hospers, eds., *Readings In Ethical Theory*, N. Y., 1952, pp667-680) We shall have occasion, indeed, to contrast Taylor's technique of validation with that of Baier below in chapter three. The last stage in the process of justification, rational choice, comes from R. M. Hare, in *The Language of Morals*, (Oxford, 1952).

Chapter III

1 Kurt Baier, *The Moral Point of View* (Ithaca, 1958), p75. Subsequent references to this work are denoted as MPV as well as the appropriate page number.
Chapter IV


Chapter V

1 For example, in a moral way of life, the moral value system is at the top of the hierarchy of value systems. Its supreme principle becomes the predominant ideal of that way of life. If this principle is that of brotherly love, then the person who lives this way of life attempts to realize this ideal in all interactions with other people. If he is presented with an action which is right according to a valid rule of his political system yet wrong according to a valid rule of his moral system, then he will decide that the action is wrong 'in the last analysis'. Its discordance with the supreme standard of the moral value system overrides its accordance with the supreme principle of the political system. In this fashion, precedence can be established in terms of the supreme principle of the top value system.
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