CONTROLLING THE AUTONOMOUS
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AN EXPLORATORY CASE STUDY OF THE MECHANISMS
OF CONTROL SURROUNDING THE ACHIEVEMENT
OF STATUS IN ACADEMIA

BY

WILLIAM MICHAEL SLANEY, B.A. (HONS.), B.ED.

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AUTHOR: William Michael Slaney, B.A. (Hons.) (Queen’s University)
B. Ed. (Queen’s University)

SUPERVISOR: Doctor G. Rosenblum

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the relationship between status, mechanisms of control, and individual academic autonomy. It is a qualitative study which relies upon previous research in the field of academia in conjunction with data generated by semi-structured interviews of full time academicians in the social sciences at McMaster University.

It is proposed in this thesis that the accumulation of status has come to play a critical role in the academic market economy which most universities entered as academia expanded during the post World War Two era. It is suggested that the primary element in the realization of status is the publication of research, especially during the recessionary, no growth situation universities have been experiencing since the 1970's. Published research is viewed as a commodity, valued by both academics and those in positions of authority at the university. To ensure its production a number of controls are erected.

Although effective control is often associated with the rigidity of Taylorism, such a prescription for academics is both ideologically unpalatable and unnecessary. The novitiate to the academic labour process is given little direction in terms of guidance, performance expectations, job description or how to allocate personal resources. When the
above are coupled with an ambiguous, institutionally based evaluation format, the result is often the perception that academia is a prime example of occupational autonomy - as promoting independence of both thought and action. But perhaps it can also be a means of controlling academics through indirect external pressure, which also shapes the internal controls of academics. The end product of such a scenario may not be an independence for the academic that autonomy would by definition suggest, but a conformity which is ultimately consistent with accumulation of institutional status.
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This acknowledgement would be remiss if it did not mention the conduct of an ex-committee member during the preliminary stages of the thesis. The essentially destructive criticisms and opinions offered after repeated delays and cancelled appointments displayed a lack of basic courtesy and perhaps a misunderstanding of the function of a committee member. It was behavior unbecoming of an individual in academia.
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"This university has the same name as the one I started my career at in 1953, but you might as well be talking about another university. It still happens to be in Hamilton, however, the approach, the numbers, the constituency, the pressures - everything has dramatically altered."

(Professor, November 25, 1985)

The span of decades which separates the 'dramatically altered' McMaster of 1953 and today can be more accurately measured in terms of centuries. The developments that occurred have taken an essentially mediaeval institution and thrust it into the latter half of the twentieth century. This is not to say the staffs at universities were not active participants in their own transformations, as Axelrod (1982: 203) has commented, the universities and their faculties were 'scarcely dragged kicking and screaming into the modern world'. One plausible reason for the initial receptivity to the accelerated pace of modernization during the 1960's was the general experience, and the optimistic perception, that the changes were almost entirely positive. It was a time of economic prosperity and, politically, a demonstrated demographic 'need' was defined to justify university expansion.

Ironically, when growth slowed and a recessionary climate settled into the larger economy, universities appeared to return to conditions similar to the pre-
expansion period - times characterized by recurring financial difficulties and scarce employment opportunities. However, the similarities ended with these two conditions, for instead of a close knit society of academics residing in an institution which for years had been relatively impervious to outside economic and political pressures, there stood a mammoth corporate entity affected and influenced by recession.

An awareness of this has resulted in a number of nostalgic laments on all manner of topics pertaining to academia. Even though they are for the most part overstated, the mourning 'then versus now' accounts only serve to underscore that all facets of academia were affected by the emerging complexity of the modern university. Although the primary concepts dealt with in this thesis are institutional status, controls and academic autonomy, this thesis will have to deal, at least peripherally, with the varying political and economic climates in order to understand the relationships between the concepts.

I. AIM

Using a case study approach involving full time professors in the social sciences at McMaster University, the main aim of this thesis is to generate a substantive theory regarding the interplay between institutional status, mechanisms of control to ensure it is accumulated, and individual academic autonomy. The hypotheses guiding such
complex conceptual categories as status, control and autonomy, along with their attendant properties, will be elaborated upon as the thesis progresses. However, it is useful to note that one hypothesis emerged in the planning stages of the research which eventually became the hypothesis from which others branched. It tentatively proposed that how academics came to view their occupational autonomy and subsequently to organize their time would, in part, reflect the control mechanisms in place to achieve status. This hypothesis was underpinned by two basic premises, and these premises provided the foundation upon which an in depth analysis could proceed.

II. PREMISES

1. The acquisition, and of primary importance - the accumulation - of status is one of the major preoccupations of an academic institution.

   Despite the ivory tower image of universities as delicate vessels of cultural transmission, those involved in decision making at academic institutions can be as vigorous in the pursuit of their particular interests as their counterparts in private, profit-making corporations (Karabel, 1984: 4). To this end, the policies and methods of organization within a particular setting, be it in the business or academic sector, are oriented towards the maintenance or improvement of some mutually identifiable comparative standing. In academia the relative success or failure of the promotion of organizational interests result
in a form of stratification not unlike that found in the business sector (and elsewhere). In this type of scenario, two or more organizations of the same type are constantly visible to each other, and more significantly, continually comparing the other on certain relevant criteria.

Whereas in the business sector the relevant criteria may be anything from the share of the market to profit margins, academic measurement of performance and the consequent status ranking are not as easily determined. The hierarchical rank or position of one academic institution relative to another is based upon a number of perceived qualities, each of which is conducive to the elevation of an institution's status. The qualities include; teaching and/or program reputation; size of endowment; modernity of physical plant; diversity and number of course offerings; extensiveness of teaching, research and library facilities; number of students, staff and professional schools (including graduate programs); research funding involvement; and staff/university commitments to research. No single feature to the absolute exclusion of others, distinguishes an institution, but presumably institutions will rely upon certain combinations and permutations to achieve a desired level of status.

2. Every organization has a particular amount of work it must (or wants to) accomplish; thus embedded in the organizational structure is a need to control workers in
order to ensure that the work is carried out (Goldman, 1983: 71, Tancred-Sheriff, 1985: 1).

Universities, not unlike other organizations, have persons who determine the goals and objectives of the institution, for which there is a required level of worker productivity to ensure they are realized. In the business sector an organization must produce at a certain level to maintain solvency, but normally there is a desire in capitalist society which extends beyond the point of mere viability into the realization and maximization of profits. The business analogy can be extended to the university where there is an institutional expectation that status will not only be maintained, but also, ideally, extended. In order to maintain and extend academic status inter-institutionally a variety of intra-institutional control mechanisms are employed.

III. FOCUS

To explain adequately the relationship between controls, status, and academic autonomy it will be necessary to note where the task emphasis at the institutional level is placed and why. It is likely that such information will indicate how status is accumulated and suggest what task(s) will be defined as able to enhance institutional status. Once this is delineated, the way is cleared to inquire into and explicate the types of control mechanisms found in academia. The intention after this is accomplished
is to understand how the controls are exerted upon individuals to ensure they allocate an adequate amount of their personal resources to enhancing the status of a particular institution. Although, as already mentioned, there are numerous qualities that build institutional status, an M.A. thesis cannot adequately deal with a broad analysis of all of the contributing factors which enhance it. Nor is there time to discuss the differing control mechanisms that guide the various factors towards the accumulation of status. Thus, the focus of this thesis, while acknowledging the importance of other status enhancing features and the variety of methods involved in realizing status, will attend primarily to the pressures and controls that surround the academic task of research production.

IV. RATIONALE FOR RESEARCH PRODUCTION EMPHASIS

There is a two-fold justification for emphasizing research production.

1. The primary rationale for emphasizing research production is that it appears to be one of the critical areas in academia that must be pursued if institutions have aspirations towards increasing their share of academic status (Trow, 1984: 140).

Due to the relative importance of research in the accumulation of status, the forms of control experienced by academics are easier to detect when research production is scrutinized. Numerous, unrelated studies relevant to academia have made explicit and specific
references to the importance of research in relation to status accumulation (cf. Wilson, 1942: 206, Caplow and McGee, 1975: 26, Long and McGinnis, 1981: 441). However, a common feature of these studies is their reluctance to go beyond stating the contribution research makes towards the accumulation of status. This reluctance neglects the origins of an institutionalized preoccupation with status, and hence, an exploration of the fundamental nature of research in academia is ignored.

Throughout the data gathering stage of this study, an analysis of the nature of research and its affinity to status accumulation was developed. The analysis took as its point of departure certain analytical aspects of Marx's theory of value.

Specifically this thesis reformulates his theorizing on the attributes of a commodity, and his later discussion on universal equivalence within the context of academia. By extrapolating from the theory of value, both published research and status can be conceived of as commodities. In addition to being a commodity, published research can also be seen as constituting the social form of wealth in academia. The expression of that wealth is embodied in the relative levels of status that published research is able to potentially accumulate. Ultimately, the acquisition of status will in turn hierarchically rank institutions.
Without a clear understanding of the commodity nature of published research, its desirability with respect to status accumulation is obfuscated by simplistic impressions that the academic labour process is primarily engaged in the production of use-values. To avoid these impressions is to invite complications — especially since the accumulation of status is a combination of elements, and therefore any attempt to identify such an abstract entity is difficult. By analyzing research production the abstractness of status is considerably reduced.

Research production, for the most part, produces a tangible end product in the form of published materials. The labour involved in research and its subsequent publication allows one to trace, to a greater extent than other academic job tasks, how the work academics do develops from elementary use-values to potential exchange-value. Eventually this leads to the realization of status through the 'surplus value' research publication is able to create. This surplus value of published research, which can be expressed in status, accrues to the institution from which the research emanated because the institution is able to, in Martin Trow's terms, 'borrow' status from their most distinguished research faculty and then, by being prestigious themselves, are able to confer status on their staff as a whole (Trow in Clark, 1984: 149).

Trow's use of the term 'borrow' tends to present the
process as innocuous and mutually beneficial. Although in many cases the borrowing process can be advantageous for both academics and institutions, there is the assumption that academics have 'chosen' to allow or freely participate in the borrowing. Since it is institutionally desirable to achieve as high a level of status as possible, invariably there are consequences for the manner in which the academic labour process is organized. The most obvious manifestation of these consequences is the implementation of control mechanisms which the acquisition and accumulation of status indirectly calls forth. It is at this juncture that the second rationale for emphasizing research production presents itself.

2. Research production highlights the impediments academics are confronted with when attempting to realize their individual occupational autonomy.

   Implicit in the main hypothesis and later in the second premise are limitations upon what has traditionally been viewed as an occupation with few controls. The expansion of universities in the 1960s and very early 1970s and just as importantly, the subsequent recessionary and no growth periods that have prevailed to the present, increased the complexity of universities. Academic writers began noting that in an attempt to compensate for the logistical problems associated with complexity, a bureaucratization process occurred which emphasized more rational and efficient forms
of organization (c.f. Sykes in Martin 1969: 203, Porter et al. 1971: 29-30, Axelrod, 1982: 203-207). Consequently, new pressures, expectations and even demands placed on academics would be expected to impinge upon what was once a broad ranging (if overly idealized in the literature) occupational autonomy.

Before proceeding further it is advisable to have a working definition of autonomy. A dictionary definition of autonomy normally presents it as the condition whereby an individual is controlled by his/her own rules/norms of conduct or performance and not subject to or dependent upon the controls of a higher authority. Obviously occupational autonomy cannot be as all embracing as the above definition suggests if the second premise on worker control (p. 5) is valid. Therefore, in the organizational context in which academia is to be studied, autonomy will be defined as the relative degree of freedom academics have in arranging their labour without perceived threats to occupational security or advancement. This is not to say that autonomy absolves the academic of all responsibility. There is the implicit assumption that accountability is present. Accountable for what, or to whom, is of course the primary problem (Adams, 1973: 1).

Occupational autonomy, as defined above, is based upon the assumption that individual faculty are, by virtue of
their expertise, in the best position to determine and organize their work, accountable only to their peers (Finkelstein, 1984: 73). The precarious nature of this autonomy is easily disrupted if disputes occur over how the work should be organized (i.e., how much time will be devoted to the various tasks) or what should be emphasized when the inevitable attempts at evaluation are undertaken. With respect to concerns surrounding research production, it is hypothesized that occupational autonomy can be threatened if the locus of organization and/or task emphasis no longer resides with the individual and/or peers. This is especially true if decisions are no longer initiated by the individual, but are replaced by institutionalized 'expectations' that academics will participate in consistent, demonstrable, research programs.

The oversimplified, inaccurate version of this latter scenario is the repeatedly quoted phrase 'publish or perish'. This is a phrase so overused that it becomes an embarrassment to state, but would, if it were true, epitomize the negation of individual autonomy. However, the negativism of the phrase does not appear to be substantiated either by general commentators on academia (Trow and Fulton, 1975: 74-75, Wilson, 1977: 141), or by the academics interviewed. A more accurate account of the situation was coined by Trow and Fulton, who noted that while the publish or perish mechanism of control
is often referred to when dramatizing the position of academics, the reality is one of 'publish and flourish' (Trow and Fulton, 1975: 75). Thus controls are not expressed solely in the form of sanctions against the individual who produce little or no research, but as identifiable rewards for those who are active researchers. The complexity of these external controls will be dealt with in Chapter Four. Later in Chapter Five, the discussion will revolve around how internal and external controls surrounding the accumulation of status affects the autonomy of academics.

When discussing occupational autonomy it becomes apparent that the thesis is dealing with a segment of the much broader issue surrounding academic freedom. The ideal of academic freedom generally includes vague and unclear references to the opportunity of unrestricted expression of thought coupled with protection from retribution for stating a particular position. The expressions can take the form of research, teaching and/or the mutual exchange or opinions both within and without academia. However, the point to be addressed is not of such a magnitude as to encompass general infringements upon freedom of expression, but rather the specific infringement of individual autonomy that emanates from the controls that shape and organize the academic labour process. As the second premise (p. 5) would suggest, the demand for status accumulation necessitates directing
academics to pursue activities that fulfill institutional status aspirations.

This is not to say academics do not wish to pursue, of their own volition, an activity such as research - indeed the research emphasis of graduate schools would presumably inculcate positive attitudes towards research production. The formal education process is a recognized socializer (Kaplan, 1983: 3), and this thesis does not wish to minimize the impact of an academic's training and initiation on later career orientations to the job tasks in academia. While acknowledging that such a multi-phasal, interlocking socialization process exists, it is also important to realize that these preliminary controls may be insufficient to guarantee the production of research at some institutionally desirable level. Hence, other controls external to academics are initiated (e.g. peer pressures and performance monitoring evaluations). These controls can still allow for freedom of expression, but not necessarily autonomy of action since research production has the potential to be generated at artificially high levels under conditions where it is emphasized.
V. RESEARCH DESIGN

1. SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS

A detailed description of the respondent selection process is provided in Appendix A. What follows now is a brief descriptive section on the characteristics of the sample.

The unit of analysis was determined by a stratified, random sample of full time academics employed in the social sciences at McMaster University during the 1985-1986 academic year. Stratification for the purposes of selection was based on years of service at McMaster and academic rank.

The number of respondents selected for interviews was fifty-two (30% of the total number of academics in the social sciences [N = 172]). The number of interviews that were actually carried out was forty-four, eight fewer than the original projected number. There were three refusals, one individual was no longer employed at McMaster, and four were unable to be contacted, or if contacted an interview time could not be agreed upon, despite the constant attempts made by the researcher. Years employed at the institution ranged from two to thirty-seven. In terms of organizational position there were sixteen Professors, fourteen Associate Professors and fourteen Assistant Professors.

Access to the sample group posed few problems, the major difficulty that emerged was the elusiveness of
academics. This was due primarily to the limited amount of
time academics spend in their offices, even during posted
office hours.

2. SELECTION OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

An academic institution is a complex structure
composed of widely disparate disciplines with diverse goals
and differential returns to faculty skills. By singling out
the social sciences for special attention there is an attempt
at a compromise (Tuckman, 1976: 71). The social sciences can
be conceived of as touching a middle ground between the
natural sciences, which garner large grants (and are,
therefore, thoroughly at home with the research funding
procedures found in academia), and the humanities. The
latter faculty is often less well endowed financially, but
has an aura of indispensability due to its traditional place
in universities - a tradition which the social sciences lack
(Wolff, 1970: 190). Overall the research production levels
of academics in the social sciences relative to other
faculties tends to place them squarely in the middle between
the natural sciences, law and medicine at the top end, and
the humanities, business and education at the lower end (Trow
and Fulton, 1975: 54-55). In addition, the possibility of
outside remuneration or employment for the social scientist
is not as great as that found in the natural sciences,
however, it is considerably greater than the humanities.
The level of dependency upon academia, as perhaps the only form of employment, is important in this study because it is likely that experience with control mechanisms will result in differing reactions. By choosing the social sciences this thesis attempted to minimize the gross differentials, across a broad range of disciplines, for alternative employment. In doing so, the study could concentrate on a more homogeneous sample group which at the same time had some of the characteristics of other fields of inquiry in the natural sciences and the humanities.

The social sciences play an almost schizophrenic role in academia, attempting to achieve scientific respectability by producing research near the level found in the natural sciences, while at the same time trying to develop the traditional philosophical respectability of the humanities. By isolating the social sciences for analysis, one does not have to account for the large swings in productivity because the production of research is relatively similar across disciplines. The differences between the social sciences and other fields becomes apparent when attention is drawn to the various publication skills needed by academics. In the social sciences, publication usually involves:

1. Large amounts of data collection.
2. A substantial familiarity with the literature and/or.
3. An ability to integrate present research with the conceptual work of others.
4. A long lead time for publication and, as a result the average number of publications is limited to a greater extent than the natural sciences.

This is contrasted with publication in the natural sciences (for example, high energy physics or biology) where:

1. There is a premium placed on innovative research (Gaston, 1973: 4), with a heavy investment in conceptualization and experimental design required.

2. Length is not critical in determining acceptability.

3. It is not critical to be familiar with a large body of research.

4. Successful experiments can result in a number of articles (Tuckman 1976: 67).

Since this study is focusing upon research production, these generalized differences between the humanities, natural and social sciences, and especially the similarities within the social sciences are analytically useful. Mechanisms of control are easier to identify if a similarity of conditions surrounding research production exists. As well, the perceptions academics have of performance criteria, and the time that they are expected to allocate to research, is standardized to a greater extent within the social sciences than across the entire university population.

3. THE INTERVIEW PROCESS

The interviews were semi-structured, the content being highly dependent upon concerns expressed by the
respondents to open-ended questions posed by the researcher. The data gathered from the interviews were, for the most part, subjective appraisals of situations academics experienced or perceived they would experience at some later date.

The interviews were conducted in the offices of the academics. The potential respondent was first contacted personally, given a broad verbal statement of intent, informed of ethical considerations, and made aware of the precautions taken to ensure anonymity. The willingness to set a later interview date was considered a mutual agreement, indicative of an intention on the part of the individual to participate in the research. All the interviews were taped, except when the respondent did not wish to be taped (three respondents were not taped). The length of the interviews ranged from a low of twenty minutes to almost two hours, with a mid-range around forty-five minutes.

The questions were designed to elicit responses from academics on three broad dimensions of control, relating to research production. The first dimension discussed was the influence of status in shaping the importance of tasks found in academia. Of concern at this stage were general remarks by academics about the labour process. Academics were then asked to outline the various tasks, the kinds of training they had to help them in carrying out the tasks,
whether one task appeared to be emphasized over others by academics, and to which task the individual allocated the majority of his/her time.

The second dimension of control that was explored was the evaluation of performance. Analytically this dimension was separated into three forms of pressure, although in reality they are difficult to differentiate. The first pressure is that of initial academic socialization and the continual reinforcement of that socialization by the organization of the academic labour process. Questions pertaining to this pressure revolved around the conceptions academics had when they first arrived at McMaster and how the tasks were initially explicated.

For the lack of a better term, the second pressure can be characterized as a nonformalized evaluation process. It involves an individualistic, highly subjective evaluation of performance based upon comparisons drawn amongst and between colleagues. The hypothesis tested here began with the premise that academics are given little direction at the outset of their careers, and therefore must initially rely not only upon the training emphasis they have received (pressure one), but also on observations of what other academics appear to be stressing. As the academic’s career continues, actions are then guided by comparing the progress of oneself with the relative progress of others in the same
situation, and an awareness that others are making the same comparisons.

The third pressure, external objective evaluation, refers to other academics some of whom may be peers in the labour process, judging the 'worth' of an individual in an organized committee setting. The term 'objective' evaluation is actually a misnomer because the process can be shrouded by the use of subjective data gathering procedures (Winthrop, 1970: 6-12, Lewis, 1973: 283). The interviews attempted to determine if academics are aware of the pressures, whether the pressures influence or motivate their allocation of personal resources, and lastly, their experiences with the different forms of evaluation.

This pressure also included an investigation of the institutionally based rewards or sanctions to elicit compliant participation in an activity that is instrumental in the accumulation of status. An analysis of this third pressure was an attempt by the researcher to determine the effects the mechanisms of control have on occupational autonomy. The respondents were asked to comment on the importance of research production relative to other tasks in academia, in what area the rewards/sanctions apply, and how they manage the various pressures placed upon them.

The third dimension of control related to research production were the internal pressures and motivations
academics develop. The questions asked academics, related to this element of control, sought to generate data on what academics view as the major determinants of their participation in the academic labour process. In some respects, the information gathered is similar to the first and second pressures already mentioned in the second dimension of control, but the emphasis is different. Internal controls are not developed in total isolation, but instead of the analysis concentrating primarily on external elements—whether they be academia as a whole, the employing institution or colleagues—individual motives are stressed. In conjunction with the emphasis on the individual, motivational factors such as personal ambition and goals were explored to give a more rounded picture of the control mechanisms experienced by academics.

4. BOUNDARIES/LIMITATIONS

The desire to make definitive empirical generalizations has to be tempered with an attempt to ensure adequate depth is achieved in the specific area of inquiry. Depth in an inquiry is realized through the imposition of boundaries which concentrate the focus of attention, not only upon the topic addressed, but also the concepts which are utilized, and data base employed. It is acknowledged that the focus on research production of full time academics in the social sciences excludes a large segment of the university
population and will neglect issues of tremendous importance to a number of academics. The most notable exclusions in this study are all the full time staff not in the social sciences and part time academics. The most notable neglect of issues are those surrounding women faculty.

Part time academics are most often hired to teach undergraduate courses, while research production is generally within the domain of full time faculty (Leslie et al., 1982: 21). Thus in this thesis they are regarded as constituting a separate labour market. This labour market has its own control mechanisms which are not directly related to the accumulation of status.

This concept of exclusion on the basis of separate labour markets was extended to those employed in a full time capacity who were without a Ph.D. Including individuals without a Ph.D. in a credential oriented environment was seen as unnecessarily complicating matters. In effect, one would be trying to compare persons in two different strata, where the opportunities for ascending the academic hierarchy would be different as would be the exposure to certain expectations and controls.

Due to the focus of this thesis, concerns expressed by women in academia – who are typically over-represented in the lower sector of the academic hierarchy – are not discussed (Hu – de Hart in Kaplan and Schrecher, 1983: 143). The issue
that this thesis must address is whether full time women in academia, like part timers and non Ph.D. academics, constitute a separate labour market with different mechanisms of control exerted upon them. At the outset of the research a tentative hypothesis guided the questions asked. It maintained that once the discriminating factors are outlined, full time academics, irrespective of gender, need to pursue research production if they have any desire whatsoever to achieve occupational security (i.e. gain tenure), promotions and/or salary increases. It is important to note that women are hindered more than men in their abilities to produce research, but the control mechanisms that are embedded in the academic labour process ensure that women will attempt to participate in the production of research. After the interviews with women academics, this hypothesis remained essentially intact. The control mechanisms differed when the issue of gender was specifically brought up, which suggested that women were not entirely a separate labour market, but there are certain form and content differentials in the control mechanisms. The perceptions women have with regard to the pressures to produce research are similar to their male colleagues, but other factors do impinge over and above those typically associated with research production. There was a sparse amount of data obtained, primarily because of the small number of women in the sample group, therefore the
observations are found not in the body of the thesis but in Appendix B.

So far, the discussion of limitations has concentrated on outlining the boundaries imposed by the researcher. However, one of the greatest limitations of this thesis, beyond the selected boundaries of a case study, is the limited access the researcher had to official documents. Confidential documents pertaining to tenure, promotion and salary decisions would have aided (if they even existed) in concretely defining the importance of research production. Through the study of committee decisions the emphasis could have established the expectations of committees', and more broadly the institutional desires for status. A discovery of the expectations as stated, or inferred, by the minutes of committee meetings, could have allowed for a better understanding of how individual occupational autonomy can be replaced by individual occupational conformity when a labour process is shaped to realize particular expectations.

Instead, the researcher had to rely upon the stated criteria contained in university documents without recourse to primary data on whether the criteria are adhered to or ignored. Some of the primary agents in the events were interviewed, both those who were making the decisions and those who had decisions made regarding them, but these are secondary accounts. The study did not specifically attempt
to interview academics who were involved in tenure and promotion decisions at the departmental and faculty level. However, there was the assumption that those who were full professors or associates for a considerable length of time, would have been involved with such committees at some point in their careers. This assumption would appear to have been borne out; from a total of forty-four respondents, the study involved six persons who were, are, or are going to be chairmen, and nineteen who had sat on one of the two committees (i.e., either at the departmental or faculty level).

The accuracy of the accounts individuals gave must to an extent be considered a limitation, yet their reconstructions of events surrounding various decisions in academia are not without validity. Even if, for the purposes of argument, the subjective perceptions and recall of an academic's career experiences appear to an outside observer to be devoid of an 'objective truth' - the beliefs still have powerful consequences (Coser, 1986: 244). When considering the content of the interviews, the perceptions individuals have of how and/or why their allocation of personal resources is influenced presents a reality unto itself. When these perceptions are organized in a qualitative study they can help form a rudimentary understanding of the academic labour process.
At this juncture it cannot be emphasized strongly enough that this thesis is a qualitative case study. As such, the material presented makes no sweeping statements, rather it records the general sentiments of the respondents. As with any qualitative study there must be an implicit trust in the researcher that the data put forth is to a large degree the prevailing opinions and attitudes of the academics interviewed. No doubt there will be the academic reader who will disagree with some of what is stated by academics interviewed in this study, all that can be asked is that the reader assess whether the disagreement is predicated on a rigorous study of academia or the subjective, experiential incidents to which the reader has been exposed. This is not to denigrate the validity of such experiences; they are as real as any of those related by the respondents, but only to indicate, as Livesey has noted, that it is sometimes a professorial habit to extend one's personal experience to all of higher education and regard individual circumstance as the rule for others (Livesey, 1973: 316).

SUMMARY

To effectively examine the complex dynamics of the three main concepts, this thesis will rely upon the two premises that began this introductory chapter. This stated, it must be made clear that premises are not neutral tools in the hands of the research, they imply certain conditions and
contain their own propositions under the guise of predetermined truth. In recognition of this, the chapters of this thesis sought to cull the inferred hypotheses from the premises as the chapters unfolded. For instance if status, as the focus suggests, is a major preoccupation with the institution it is likely the task(s) emphasized at the institution will be those that enhance institutional status. Chapter Two keeps this in mind and by examining the dual role of the university it sets the stage for the subsequent analysis of status in Chapter Three.

Chapter Three takes the first premise, and the above hypothesis, and asks why a particular task is emphasized. The theoretical points generated in this chapter leads inevitably to a consideration of the second premise and its concern with control. Preoccupation with status and the realization of it through properties produced by academics will, if the second premise holds, develop institutionalized controls to maintain production. The second premise has its own set of assumptions, in particular that workers need to be controlled. This is a contentious issue in academia where occupational autonomy is considered paramount and the individual expertise involved in job tasks is seen as sufficient control in ensuring production. Chapters Four and Five are left the onerous task of developing the hypotheses concerning the relations among the types of control
mechanisms and individual autonomy, and outlining the properties of each concept. Chapter Four begins with the institutionalized external controls, while Chapter Five incorporates the more internal controls and their relationship with autonomy and status.

Before proceeding to Chapter Two, it should be reiterated that this thesis is a qualitative case study of full time academics employed in the social sciences at McMaster University. As stated above, the study is premised upon the importance of status accumulation, and that a variety of control mechanisms are employed to ensure the accumulation is sustained and extended. The latter premise intimates that there are potential restrictions placed upon one facet of academic freedom — the occupational autonomy of academics — as a result of the controls. By focusing on research production, which comes to be perceived as a major contributor to status, there is an attempt to identify the controls to which academics are exposed. During this process the autonomy of the individual also comes under scrutiny.

CHAPTER ONE END NOTES

1 By the term substantive theory it is meant the formulation of concepts and their interrelation into a set of hypotheses for a given substantive area (in this case academia) based on research in the area (Glaser and Strauss, 1970: 288).
I. THE MAIN TASKS OF ACADEMICS

It is generally conceded that research and teaching are the primary tasks of a university.

Explicit support for the claim that teaching and research are the main tasks of a university is well documented in the academic literature (Wilson, 1942: 135, Hughes, 1958: 166, Wolff, 1970: 99, Elder et al., 1976: 221, Riesman, 1981) and implicitly acknowledged as the priority tasks through the many studies of academia which either downplay or ignore other university commitments (Caplow and McGee, 1965, Millett, 1961, Crane 1970, Lewis 1973), and studies that choose to restrict their analysis to teaching and research (Clark, 1984, Tancred-Sheriff, 1985). In addition, the centrality of teaching and research is often referred to in literature by government agencies; interuniversity organizations, and individual universities. The first two generally express their views on functions of universities through vague objectives, as can be seen in the following excerpt from an Ontario Council on University Affairs publication (1978), which maintains universities exist in order to:

"...develop a more educated populace, to educate and train people for the professions, to promote study at the highest intellectual level, to conduct basic and applied research, to provide service to the community..." (p. 8)

Specific to McMaster, and in contrast to the original
CHAPTER TWO
THE DUAL ROLE OF THE UNIVERSITY

PREFACE

The design of the founders and governing bodies has been to provide for qualified students a liberal education in a Christian atmosphere.

(McMaster University Directory, 1952-53:3)

If the above quote sounds like an antiquated mixture of classical Athenian idealism and medieval religious piety, then there is the strong possibility that as time has passed McMaster University has changed its "design". A change in design includes, among other things, a change in emphasis with respect to the work done by academics. This chapter proposes to examine the main tasks of academia, first noting their complexity and secondly, assessing where the institutional emphasis on the task lies - both historically and presently at McMaster. This analysis is seen as a necessary preamble to understanding the relationship between status and the controls developed to ensure its accumulation.

Before proceeding further, it is imperative to point out that this thesis, and in particular this chapter, makes no normative judgements as to which task should be emphasized, nor will it become mired in the controversy surrounding any of the various written complaints over imbalances in the importance granted either endeavor (Livesey, 1975: 45).
design of the university, reference to university functions is clearly outlined in a 1977 statement by the university's Long Range Planning report, A Plan for McMaster:

"Canadian universities provide a multiplicity of services...but among these services two are preeminent. The first is the task of post-secondary education...To this end, the universities are those institutions entrusted with the preservation and dissemination of the higher forms of human knowledge. The second task involves research and scholarship, since it is also the obligation of the universities to promote the extension of human knowledge and the improvement of human understanding through systematic and disciplined study". (p. 2).

Given the above statements, it is relatively safe to state that the primary tasks of a university are teaching and research. Therefore, by association, academics employed by the university will, in varying degrees, involve themselves in these tasks.

II. TEACHING/RESEARCH COMPLEXITY

These two tasks comprise a variety of labour skills that are in themselves far more complex than first appearances would suggest. For instance, teaching is often regarded and defined as merely presenting material in a lecture to a large number of students. Academics were quick to point out that with such a superficial definition of teaching ignores the preparation required in organizing material. Gathering material for a particular subject, apart from just the time required to ferret out the resources,
demands an appreciation that different settings will require different materials. In addition, as the following academic suggests, different settings involve different styles or aptitudes in the presentation of the material:

I've always thought of myself primarily as an undergraduate lecturer. I'm not that good in a seminar situation. I'd love to be able to deal with students in a sort of Socratic fashion, I mean getting them to discover stuff on their own, but I'm not very good at that. I'm a reasonable lecturer."

(Associate Professor, 5 years)

The actual student contact time requires certain adjustments on the part of the professor with respect to the content. Alterations take into consideration the mixture of the classes to be taught, whether it be teaching undergraduates in fields which are, or are not, directly related to the areas which students will later pursue, training students to enter a profession, and teaching/supervising graduate students. All the above require attention to the level at which the material is being presented when the time arrives to assess students. Assessment requires the preparation of exams, relevant essay topics, or whatever other means of evaluation desired by a professor. The assessment process in itself complicates matters when enrollments are considered. Depending on the size of enrollment, there will be tremendous variability on the time an academic must devote to any particular course:

"Speaking from personal experience, I can deal with the amount of time placed on me when marking 40 or 50
essays, but 130 just wipes me out. I also have 400 students in my first year course, now fortunately I've had some excellent T.A.'s, but still the time spent on this course is greater than if I had a small third year seminar course."

(Professor, 14 years)

Finally, there is also a directional element to the teaching component which revolves around initiation of undergraduates in an academic tradition and providing guidance of an academic nature to both undergraduate and graduate students.

The research component is itself an intricate matrix of form and content. In form, research can be an academic's 'voyage of discovery', a training regime for academics to keep themselves in condition, and/or simply an occupational requirement for promotion (Porter et.al., 1971:107). The form of research can also be expressed in different formats, be it only in the mind of the researcher, in lectures, at conferences, or in published form. That there was no clear consensus among the respondents as to what form research should take appeared to be due to a preoccupation with whether an individual's research was making a 'contribution'. Whether that contribution should develop growth in the individual, the discipline, the learning of students, or some combination thereof, was a point of debate:

"What is research? Is this journal [pointing to the desktop] that I take home and read in bed tonight research? Better yet, why isn't it research?
"Who is to judge whether or not the guy [sic] who goes off to the cottage in the south of Cornwall with a stack of books in his area won't be getting more out of his time than the guy who’s feverishly writing papers during his sabbatical? I don't know how to resolve that." (4)

Leaving aside the lack of consensus on what research should constitute or contribute, the content of research can be classified into two broad categories: basic (sometimes referred to in the literature as 'pure') research and applied research. The distinction has potentially different implications in terms of the controls to produce it because the two categories generally cater to different service markets (Tuckman, 1975:36). One can also subdivide the categories of research into a variety of content which includes; work on the frontiers of a discipline; any original or critical thinking in an academic form within an individual's discipline; and, as well, certain problem solving commissions (Chester in Martin, 1969:78).

This descriptive digression was inserted at this point to reinforce the diversity of the two major tasks found in academia. No simplistic definition suffices, especially with regards to research, because not only are the tasks complex in and of themselves, but also they tend to overlap. Analytically, the two tasks can be separated and isolated into their constituent elements. However in reality,
research and teaching are not totally separate. The results of research are normally at some point recombined in the teaching product (Tancred-Sheriff, 1985:16) since both have in their pristine form, the interests of furthering knowledge as a common denominator. Hence, neither of the two tasks can proceed indefinitely without the other (Livesey, 1975:45).

Research creates new knowledge by advancing beyond prior discoveries. Scholarship preserves, refines and modifies the knowledge and teaching disseminates it (Clarke, 1984:107). Research becomes tied into instruction of those at the more advanced levels whose programs have as their objectives the development of abstract learning and problem solving abilities (Porter et al., 1971: 106). This is not to say that the link between research and teaching is unidirectional. A more accurate description would be one of interdependence, whereby students are taught the knowledge of present day researchers in order to become the future researchers who contribute to the knowledge of future students.

The interdependence of the tasks in no way presupposes a harmonious relationship. This is especially true if one task is given greater emphasis than the other. An academic in a position where one task is emphasized is confronted not so much with a problem in the socio-
logical sense of the term, but a dilemma. The simplest form of dilemma occurs when the accomplishment of two ends (e.g., the preparing of lectures and the completion of research) depend on the same scarce means—in this case time. One end is attained at the expense of the other and academics, not unlike others, are cursed with a finite set of resources. The choice of how to distribute personal resources poses the dilemma (Blau, 1973:270). It is highly probable that a substantial institutionalized emphasis on one task is likely to be met with a reduced capacity on the part of the academic to provide services in other areas. But where exactly is the emphasis at the institutional level?

III. AN EVOLVING EMPHASIS

An analysis of task emphasis would have been greatly simplified if McMaster conformed to the literature found in the field of academia. A researcher could merely cite the relevant material over the past half century that has consistently concluded universities tend to give research greater priority. In fact, it was initially assumed that research was the emphasized task at McMaster. This assumption was coupled with the proposition, derived from the opening interviews, that the expansion in the 1960’s was merely an epiphenomenon that momentarily set aside an emphasis on research in order to deal with the growing enrollment of students and a fixation with the enlargement of the physical plant of the university. As the interviews progressed both assumption and proposition were found to be
misleading because, at McMaster, task emphasis has gradually evolved since the Second World War:

"I believe this institution used to be like a liberal arts college in the U.S. In those institutions you find a greater emphasis on the teaching component and, indeed, the citizenship component, and some minimal expectation on research. That yes, you will keep current in your field and if you put out an article that's fine, that's great, but that is not why you have been hired - you are hired to interpret. That's basically how a liberal arts college works and that's, as I said, what I think Mac used to be like. But in the last couple of decades, certainly on this side of the campus - that is the arts and social sciences side - there's been a transition from what was predominantly a teaching function to a research one. The pendulum has gone the other way with almost as heavy a demand on the research side as you have in the physical sciences."

(Professor, 17 years)

It is important to recognize this shift, not solely in the interests of historical accuracy, nor because changes in emphasis are indicative of aspirations of those at the institution to move beyond the original 'design' of McMaster, but because an institutional emphasis can influence which task will affect and possibly control the other. In effect, as the emphasis shifts, so too does the relative position of the task in terms of whether it is dominant or subordinate.

In order to clarify what has just been stated and put it into perspective, it must be remembered that McMaster was a denominational university until 1957, and was, therefore, heavily influenced by its Baptist origins - as can be inferred by the quote which opened this chapter. The stated
emphasis was on education and according to academics employed during the Post-War - pre 1960’s expansion era (1945-1963) they were hired primarily for the task of teaching:

"When I was hired, they wanted someone to get into the classroom and teach courses. During that time I was spending 90% of my time teaching and 10% on research and writing. There was no other way I could do it with the course loads we were given."

(Professor, 37 years)

With teaching emphasized, and academics given course loads that were two, sometimes three times, the present-day average, the ability to do research was seriously curtailed. The above Professor, and others who have been at McMaster for over twenty years, mentioned that carrying a course load of eight to ten courses was not exceptional. This directly contrasts with present-day averages around three to four courses over an academic year. With the teaching task emphasized and essentially controlling the research process, lack of production should not be problematical:

"Well research used to be something one ought to do in one's rare idle moments, but if you didn’t there were no great repercussions..."

(Professor, 32 years)

In addition to teaching being emphasized at the institutional level, it was also likely to be the central task for many academics because the Ph.D., with its emphasis on the acquisition of research skills, was not widely held at McMaster. At the start of the 1950's with a staff
(purposely referred to as the 'Officers of Instruction') of 88, only 38 (43%) held the highest degree (1951-52). A full decade later the percentage of Ph.D's rose to 61% (1961-62). The increase would continue until presently, considering just the social science departments involved in this study, the percentage of academics with a Doctorate is 96% (1985).

The rise in Ph.D's followed an increasing interest at the university in research and both of these coincided with a progressive expansion of McMaster. From the vantage point of the 1980's it is tempting to view university expansion as confined to the 1960's. Undoubtedly, the immensity of the expansion - which saw Ontario university enrollments between 1962-68 increase from 39,000 to 92,000 along with the proportion of the total provincial budget for education rise from 1% to 11% - dwarfed by comparison all previous growth (Axelrod, 1982:141). However, at McMaster there were spurts of growth ever since the Second World War, the results of which prompted 'pre-expansion' statements such as the following:

"The university is engaged in a program of unprecedented expansion evidences of which are the construction here of Canada's first nuclear reactor on a university campus (1957), and the erection of an Engineering building (1958) ... Important developments since World War Two have been the extension of graduate studies and research."

(McMaster Yearbook, 1959-60:13)

Although there was an increasingly pronounced interest
in research, there was still an inability on the part of institutional authority figures to develop the interest into a concerted emphasis. It is important to remember that during this time period and into the 1960's, enrollments doubled every five years and to keep pace academics were hired in numbers never seen before or since (peaking in 1969-70 with 138 newly hired academics). Research aspirations both institutional and individual were limited by the need to cater to high enrollments.

"When instructors were needed to cope with the influx of students I know a lot of my colleagues who were just coming in had to put their research on the back burner. A lot of bright people never got their research careers off the ground because of it."

(Professor, 24 years)

Later as enrollments levelled off and hiring decreased, new academics would be exposed to the institutional-wide transition from a mere stated interest in having academics produce research to a developed emphasis on research production. For the remainder of this chapter the analysis of where the emphasis lies will concern itself with the present situation at McMaster. It will become apparent that what occurs in the present is a direct contrast with the past. The analysis gives the impression of being static, in that it deals with a point in time where research appears to be emphasized, but the emphasis is still evolving and will continue to evolve over time.
IV. PROFESSING EQUALITY

Interestingly, it is an emphasis that is not directly stated in university publications. Instead, research is given greater praise and attention, while at the same time a professed equality between the tasks is expressed. The reader should understand that to only analyze the published goals/objectives of universities when trying to determine where priorities lie is not very fruitful because more often than not it degenerates into a largely empty exercise of determining who proclaims which cliches the most often or vociferously (Clark, 1984: 108). However, the text of university publications, while quite limited in explaining what the job tasks actually entail due to their tendency to remain in the realm of abstract goals, can indirectly provide insight into how the performance of the job tasks is shaped. The studies can also intimate where academics will allocate their personal resources within these job tasks by revealing which endeavour has the balance tipped in its favour.

The previously referred to Long Term Planning Committee report for McMaster University contains the claim that the university shares a commitment to instruction not unlike other Canadian universities. However, in contrast to the original 'design', the report goes further to characterize McMaster as playing a "special role" (the
committee's term). The role is, it is claimed, directly a result of its emphasis on the development of graduate programmes and moreover, its 'enviable position in terms of scholarly performance' (p. 4). In a 1983 - 84 publication concerned with the character and role of McMaster University there is the statement that the 'special role of McMaster University derives principally from the long standing commitment of our faculty members to research.' With self-evident pride in accomplishment, the report proceeds with a breakdown of McMaster's successes in winning larger research awards than the national averages and, specifically describes its high sponsored research to staff ratio - ranking it second in Ontario in absolute dollar terms (behind Toronto) and first when university size is considered. Also mentioned is McMaster's high rate of revenue intake from research funding in proportion to its overall operating revenues that places it second in the province (behind Guelph), but first when research expenditures are expressed as a percentage of operating expenditures (See Appendix C for specific figures). With this stated, it is not inaccurate to make the assertion that through its publications, McMaster views itself, and would like others to view it, as a research center.

Typically, the determination of how important research or teaching is to a university is made difficult because policy makers (whoever they may be) do not wish to be
seen as developing or rewarding the one component at the expense of another. There is considerable time apportioned within publications to maintain that the two functions are of equal importance. McMaster is no exception. In the university’s 1977 report, attention is given to what is termed the ‘erroneous assumption’ that in an overall determination of priorities the importance of teaching is underemphasized. The committee directly refers to claims by unspecified faculty members that insufficient attention is paid to teaching competence or excellence in making tenure and promotion decisions. It states that, "Although such claims are not justified it is essential to recognize that they are widely held." Why the claims of imbalances are widely held is not addressed, only that they are present. That presence, regardless of whether it is erroneous or unjustified, is perceived by the authors of the report as a potential source of conflict which cannot be overlooked.

For all the good intentions and undoubtedly genuine sentiments which go into the affirmation of the importance of the teaching function in order to improve teaching performance, in the end these add up to little more than window-dressing to avoid openly admitting that research has priority over teaching in those institutions that are regarded (or are wishing to be regarded) as research centers. The present situation at McMaster appears to closely reflect
the following blunt statement by Blau:

"A fundamental characteristic of the academic stratification system is that research has higher standing than teaching. This is often lamented and sometimes lauded, but there is little disagreement about it being true".

(Blau, 1973: 275)

The desires expressed in specific statements released by a high level administrator at McMaster, which characterized publicized university intentions of making McMaster University a centre of excellence in teaching, were diplomatically summarized by one associate professor as:

"...very nice sentiments and sentiments no doubt you will hear some cynical rebuttals from other colleagues [sic]. However, I think (administrator) himself believed them. But essentially you're fighting an organization where the primacy isn't on teaching"

(Associate Professor, 13 years)

V. DE FACTO DISPARITY

It is at the level of recognition for the efforts put forth that the theoretical compatibility of the two tasks encounters problems. The major defining feature that distinguishes research from teaching is that it is more readily open to inter-institutional acclaim. Livesey makes reference to this disparity when he states that the successful scholars can bring money to their campuses in the form of grants, which not only enhance the reputation of the individual but also the departments and institutions with which they are affiliated (Livesey, 1975: 53). Teaching or excellence in instruction is more of a localized phenomenon
and therefore, quite apart from claims of inability to measure teaching (which will be discussed later), it is not accorded the same level of recognition (Wilson, 1942: 178). Presented with a scenario of differential recognition, it is pertinent to ask whether the two ideally intellectually compatible tasks enter into competition with each other?

Sure they do (pause). Yeah I must say quite frankly that there were times when I may have trimmed that is if I had a good lecture working and I knew it was a good lecture, and it was a trade off between fine tuning something or doing some research - yeah. I would probably trade off in favour of the research. Now other times I can say that I knocked myself out developing a course and did let the research slide for a summer. Mind you I did that after certain other things had happened, after I felt in terms of the research I was unassailable.

(Associate Professor 14 years)

Contained in the above comment is one particularly noteworthy phrase, the reference to being sure that 'in terms of research' the individual was ‘unassailable’. This individual was recounting when evaluation of performance was critical to retaining employment, and the task that was seen as critical was research. Thus, one consequence of this situation is that teaching can subtly (and not so subtly) take a subordinate position at the margins of job performance. By marginal subordination it is meant that rarely can decisions to prioritize one component over the other be an all or none determination, where one task is totally abandoned while the other is given complete
overriding importance. Instead subordination occurs at the fringes of effort expended upon either task. Personal resource allowances are restricted and extra effort is curtailed or avoided in order to give greater attention to the prioritized component. In remarks made by respondents, the marginality referred to occurs not only figuratively, but also quite literally:

"You see where research encroaches on teaching is on the margin; do I prepare that next assignment, or do I simply rip a couple of questions out of a book, photocopy them and then off you go?"

(Associate Professor, 12 years)

"Because of research demands you pick up last year's lectures, you fiddle with them in the margins and that's about it."

(Associate Professor, 8 years)

The preceding remarks and comments made by academics are not intended to convey the notion that academics committed to research are, ergo, shirking their responsibilities as teachers. Nor should it be construed that teaching no longer affects research or makes it a difficult task to accomplish. Course loads have been reduced. However, enlarged courses coupled with a lack of funding to hire new staff or grant sabbaticals with the same frequency can detract from research output. The above comments merely serve to illustrate the contrast, and indeed reversal, of previous statements by academics referring to past commitments to teaching with the present-day emphasis on
research. In both situations decisions upon how to divide resources and where to place 'priority' involve attempts on the part of individuals to anticipate the criteria upon which they are judged. However, the exact criteria are rarely explicitly stated in academia. Logan Wilson effectively summarized the dilemma academics face when he stated:

"In view of the vague and conflicting criteria by which his [sic] work is judged, he is uncertain in the allocation of his energies. He knows that he is a competitor but often is not clear regarding the terms of the competition".

(Wilson, 1942: 62)

The 'competition' revolves around where to allocate resources in order to reap the benefits inherent in the organization. It would be expected that the distribution of a professor's time and energy between teaching and research will depend in part on the responsibility, motivation and aptitude of the individual, and in part (a large part) on the emphasis the institution s/he is affiliated with puts on teaching and research (Millett, 1961: 64). What is considered the dominant ethos of the university has to be taken into account by the participants. Thus any prospective employee or persons already employed would be foolish not to be cognizant of the institutional pride in the research component, and a little naive not to think the 'university' and its administration considered it an important endeavor for its employees to pursue. One general comment with reference to allocating time resources by an associate
professor of eighteen years particularly stands out:

"Although there are few priorities certainly any new person starting off in a faculty has got to concentrate on their research and get publications because they can't advance unless they do, and preferably a fair list if you want to guarantee your job. This become a very serious issue because if one university has refused you tenure - that's after six years - then your chances of getting a job elsewhere are pretty slim. You're looking at changing careers."

(Associate Professor, 18 years)

It would appear that this undesirable prospect is enough to deter many from spending undue amounts of time on the various tasks related to the teaching component. The newly initiated academics with aspirations of advancement are quick to pick up the sentiments of their colleagues, and arrive at decisions as to where their valuable time should be spent and what component is to be given less time. As one assistant professor who had been at the university for only two years states:

"It's so difficult to find the time (for teaching). There is no way you can give time to teaching, do sufficient research to stay alive, and do all the administrative garbage that's required of us without putting in a seventy hour week. You can't cut back on the administrative stuff, if you cut back on the research you won't get promoted, you won't get raises and you'll never get tenure. So the easiest place to cut in a lot of ways is in the teaching."

(Assistant Professor, 2 years)

VI. TASK PRIORITY IN ACADEMIA

Why it is easier to cut corners with teaching will be dealt with later (Chapter 4) when discussing the controlling
elements of the evaluation process. For now the main consideration is where priority lies and the corresponding decisions of academics to pursue that which they believe to be the guarantor of continued employment. That research is the primary guarantor of job security has been discussed, that it is actually emphasized is not as overtly expressed. But the following responses typify how, lack of explicitness notwithstanding, the ends results are well known:

"I think its pretty much true that research gets a greater emphasis. True in the following sense, for example and I think here is where it is most clear. I've yet to hear at McMaster or elsewhere for that matter, where an outstanding researcher was denied tenure or promotion because of bad teaching - it's very hard to find. There's lots of cases though where an outstanding teacher has been denied tenure or promotion because of a lack of research".

(Assistant Professor 4 years)

"The easy answer would be that the emphasis is on research. Uhm ... but that in fact is not so. The emphasis is really on all three: service, teaching and research, and its a matter of success and failure. Can you succeed by being a good committee person? Answer? No. Can you succeed by being a good teacher? No. Can you succeed by being a good researcher? Yes!... So when it comes, and I guess this is really the key point, when it comes to promotion, you've got to have the research anchor in order to secure promotions."

(Associate Professor, 6 years)

The penalties for not doing research, or the believed limited benefits that teaching provides, may be more apparent than real - at the very least the situation is not as simplistic as the much quoted 'publish or perish' syndrome.
would imply. However, this study indicates that university publications which claim academics are 'unjustified' in their thinking research takes precedence may be equally guilty of distorting reality.

After studying the relationship between productivity, faculty salaries and promotions, Katz (1973) concluded that it was evident research ability, publication record and national reputation were the most important factors influencing salary and promotion decisions. Katz and others (Lewis 1973, Winthrop, 1973, and Knapper, 1977) also observed that university administrators made decisions regarding salaries and promotions, in an intuitive manner that was heavily oriented towards the research component, and seldom was there any clear understanding of the weights they attached to the various criteria. The effects of these decisions were best articulated by Chester:

"Although teaching, research and administrative contributions are all allegedly considered in promotion decisions it is difficult to find academics who believe that this is really the case".

(Chester in Martin, 1969: 82)

A quote that supports Chester's assertion, and is in line with previously quoted academics, is the following reference to administrative decision making:

"I think the stated weights are 40% research, 40% teaching and 20% administrative. Whether those weights are rigidly adhered to I'm not sure. I'm pretty sure that the following holds and that is
good research will offset poor teaching, but the reverse is not true."

(Associate Professor, 12 years)

Thus, the incentives become defined as emerging from the research component of the two functions. In tangible terms one advances in salary, intra-institutional status amongst colleagues (promotion), and inter-institutionally prestige is elevated if the research is frequently published and/or heavily funded by outside agencies. On the teaching side the incentives are summarized quickly in a sentence or two and are devoid of the instrumentalism associated with research (i.e. merit increases, tenure):

"The rewards in teaching are wholly personal."

(Assistant Professor, 5 years)

"Ah, there isn’t any [incentives]. Either you have an interest in it [teaching] or you don’t."

(Assistant Professor, 6 years)

"Tangibly? Well I get fairly good reviews - I can’t think of anything else."

(Assistant Professor, 3 years)

VII. EXCURSUS: THE ADMINISTRATIVE TASK AND ITS ASSOCIATED PROBLEMS

It would be a serious omission to leave this chapter without making at least a passing reference to the administrative tasks academics are expected to perform after gaining employment. Research and teaching are not the only activities a university embraces. Nor does involvement in these two tasks comprise the totality of work done by academics. Committee work and the already quoted mention of
'service to the community', which for the purposes of this thesis will be classified under the general heading of administrative duties, also forms a part of the labour done in academia. Although the task will be mentioned only briefly, its significance should not be minimized.

The significance of academics participating in administrative tasks stems from the subsequent difficulties the participation creates. The difficulties occur at two levels, one is a purely analytical problem, the other involves the practicalities associated with individual academics attempting to organize their labour. In the case of the former, problems arise because it is difficult to determine from whence 'policies' regarding the job tasks emanate. The difficulty is a result of trying to establish exactly who is responsible for the policies that are initiated. With respect to the latter - the individual organization of the tasks - the addition of administrative tasks to the work already done by academics can be an indirect contributor to the tensions between teaching and research. It can potentially siphon off valuable time and energy that would otherwise be spent on the two main tasks.

The point to be stressed is that any analysis of academia contains its own set of problems and a consideration of where the emphasis lies in academia is no exception. Firstly, to merely state that an 'institution' emphasizes either job task is an oversimplification. Policies are not
generated by institutions, but by individuals both inside and outside the physical boundaries that constitute the university. To make the claim that an institution gives priority to one task over the other, reifies the physical plant as a decision-maker unto itself, and thereby ignores the complex interplay within what is generically termed a university's 'community of scholars'.

Secondly, the constant interaction of members of this community, while in their administrative capacity, complicates the analysis of the two primary tasks by obscuring attempts to establish whether the imbalances are a result of a definitive management (or worker) strategy. In academia delineations between employee and employer lack applicability because usually the traditional distinctions are blurred to such an extent that one is never quite sure who the employer or employee is. Unquestionably there are hierarchies within academia, but they are not of the same genre in terms of authority structures as those found in other organizations. Thus it is difficult, if not virtually impossible, to determine which individuals have influenced or directed the institutional policies on the significance of teaching or research, and those who merely work within the generalized mandates that are set out (Wright, 1979: 195).

SUMMARY

In summary the objective of this chapter was to assess where academic priorities lay with respect to the two
main tasks in academia. To initiate such an analysis the content of university publications were examined and remarks by academics solicited. Although publications devoted time to maintaining that a parity exists, the direction and thrust of arguments tended to suggest the contrary by indirectly giving priority to research. In academia this creates difficulties because the job tasks can be (but are not always) divided into distinct components. The job tasks being complex, consume vast amounts of time and energy, but due to the academic structure of recognition the tasks are differentially acknowledged. That this can lead to tension between the two tasks was readily confirmed by academics.

Having addressed where the emphasis lies the next chapter will turn to explaining why research production has become, and will likely remain, a high priority at McMaster. As Chapter Three will observe, there are many reasons that have been put forth as to why imbalances between the two tasks is the norm in academia rather than the exception. However, it will soon become apparent that many of the reasons, while having a grain of truth contained within them, are not addressing a fundamental issue that shapes the academic labour process - the role of research production in the accumulation of status.

CHAPTER TWO END NOTES

2 See Ontario Ministry of Colleges and Universities publications, especially the opening preambles of The Challenge of the 80's (1981) and Ontario Universities: Options and Futures (1984) - respectively known as the Fisher
and Bouey Commissions.


4. The inability to resolve the problem will have implications later when the distinction between research and published research is made (Chapter Three) and the academic evaluation process is examined (Chapter Four).

5. The figures which follow were compiled from the McMaster Yearbook(s) - the academic year referred to is in brackets.

6. The role of market conditions will be dealt with in greater detail in Chapter 4.


10. A good example of the claimed importance of teaching is the time spent in the 1977 report, A Plan For McMaster University (op. cit.), concerning the creation of a Center for Instructional Development (p.16) VI.

11. Some of the unique characteristics of the authority structures in academia are found in Bucher’s (1970: 7) treatment of a medical school’s ’nonbureaucratic hierarchy’ and Noble and Pym’s (1970: 436) ’involved hierarchies’ distinguish some of the unique characteristics of academia.
CHAPTER THREE
THE INTER-INSTITUTIONAL ACHIEVEMENT OF STATUS

PREFACE

The previous chapter has indicated where the emphasis lies at McMaster in relation to the two main tasks in academia. In the literature, and according to academics, it became clear that research held a superior position relative to the other tasks when institutional goals and objectives were considered. Before proceeding to identify the forms of control present within the academic labour process, and how they are exerted to ensure that an adequate amount of an academic's time is allocated to sustaining and developing the activity which is given priority, it is necessary to elaborate on why research is emphasized. There are a number of reasons put forth, both in the literature and by the academics who were interviewed, as to why research is given greater priority and, hence, why individuals and institutions who produce research are accorded higher status in academia. The reasons tend to cluster around three major headings; the altruistic pursuit of knowledge; a functional perspective; and impressions concerning the relative visibility of research. The latter rationale has two sub-categories, the inability to measure teaching and the structure of academic funding.

The above viewpoints will be reviewed and their merits and validity assessed along with their deficiencies. Then a
fourth variant of why research is emphasized will be postulated. This variant uses some of the premises of the visibility category, but may provide a deeper understanding of the issue. To guide the inquiry into the basic elements of this variant, aspects of Marx’s theory of value will be incorporated. By extrapolating from the theory of value and using the attributes of research production in correspondence with the examples Marx uses, the origins of research can be identified, as can the path it takes through the academic marketplace until it emerges as a contributor to institutional status. In the process of this analysis a fundamental distinction will be developed between research and published research, a point that will become important later when discussing the mechanisms of control found in academia. To generate a theory of why research is emphasized three sources were used in this chapter; published university statements; various literature that touched upon the subject; and the comments of academics.

I. RATIONALES FOR RESEARCH EMPHASIS

1. THE ALTRUISTIC PURSUIT OF KNOWLEDGE

“All the grand sources, in short, of human suffering are in a great degree, many of them almost entirely, conquerable by human care and effort...if will and knowledge were not wanting, it might be easily made–yet every mind sufficiently intelligent and generous to bear a part...in the endeavor will draw a noble enjoyment from the contest itself...”

(Mill, 1957: 20)
At first glance, John Stuart Mill would appear to be an unlikely candidate to quote from when opening a discussion on the altruistic pursuit of knowledge in academia. However, the essential concepts of utilitarianism are premised on mankind having an humanitarian nature which can recognize that the 'greatest good for the greatest number' involves unselfish sacrifices from the institutions of society and the individual. In this context the above quote by Mill contains essentially two supports for why research is emphasized for altruistic reasons. One, that research plays a fundamental role in the betterment of mankind. The second is that the individual who takes up the challenge will be intrinsically rewarded and thus the emphasis on research can be seen as a result of a genuine desire, devoid of selfishness, to improve the human condition. Individual motivations will be dealt with later, for now attention is on how universities view the their altruistic role. In the context of a university, Mill's care and effort translates into a commitment to research, that revolves around the acquisition of new knowledge to 'conquer' suffering - irrespective of discipline. When discussing universities, the altruistic pursuit of knowledge leans heavily on the assumption that, in general, universities are the vanguard of the acquisition of knowledge and are instrumental in the progress of society. As Clark Kerr states (1963:v) in updating Mill's sentiments:
"The basic reality, for the university, is the wide-spread recognition that new knowledge is the most important factor in economic and social growth."

Lyricism, metaphors, rhetoric and analogies abound when attempts are made to articulate the assertion that universities are a necessary element in realizing this 'basic reality'. This can be observed in the following statement by a Cornell University president, as quoted by Robert M. Hutchins (1967: 7):

"The university and other institutions of society... have now been joined together by a new kind of blood system, made up of ideas, the trained intelligence, and the manpower, which provide the driving energy for our society. And the university is the great pumping heart that keeps this system fresh, invigorated, and in motion."

An academic not contributing to knowledge in an innovative way, provokes questions concerning his or her 'worth' which are justly entertained if the notion of the altruistic purposes of research is accepted. This notion was explicitly stated in the opening pages of Gaston's study of British High Energy Physicists where he commented that if an individual academic 'cannot contribute to something original, or work with someone on something original he might just as well choose another profession' (1973: 3). The inference is, and this is not restricted to the limited parameters of Gaston's study, that the fundamental task of an academic is to contribute to new knowledge. Hence, the justification
for emphasizing research at universities can be couched in
magnanimous terms of selflessness, and commitment to
continued knowledge acquisition and human development. An
eexample of this can be found in one of McMaster’s
publications:

"We remain convinced...of the central role that a
university such as our own must play in the
immediate and long term development of basic and
applied research in this country."(13)

An Assistant Professor, echoing the sentiments of
other colleagues, concurs with this role:

"I think it’s one of the major functions of a
university - to explore questions and provide
answers for issues that are of interest to society.
It’s a very necessary and important function... I
mean a society without a research wing, I think,
would be a very poor society."

(Assistant Professor, 3 years)

And lastly, at the extreme end, Bercusson et. al.
(1984) state their opinions regarding why research is
emphasized and what should be the result for those who do not
comply with the altruistic pursuit of knowledge:

"The university, by definition, is research-
oriented institution dedicated to the advance of
knowledge... Scholarship and publication are part
and parcel of the responsibilities of every
academic. Those who cannot perform are failing in
their duties and should perish..."

(Bercusson, et al, 1984: 88, 112-3)

University publications tend to put forth a
persuasive case when discussing their altruistic motivations.
Just prior to the statement mentioned above, the McMaster publication - a rebuttal to a government report - bemoans the expenses of research, claiming that incidental and indirect costs over and above research grant intake is a pressing problem. This is a problem which could potentially detract from the universities commitment to research, because for every dollar in research grant received by the university another dollar of expense is incurred by the institution. The expense of research is immense and the university is not loath to make it known that its commitment to research is a heavy financial burden. Briefly stated, some university publications imply that there are no benefits derived from research for the institution, except for the consolation that it is performing its altruistic duty.

Clearly, the continued expansion of knowledge, both basic and applied, is an integral part of growth in a technologically dependent society. Equally clear, is that when examining basic research, universities are society’s primary custodian of this activity (Porter et al., 1971:115). However, the altruistic viewpoint does not deal conclusively with why research is emphasized. To say that an altruistically based conception of research is not conclusive, is not to dismiss the perspective entirely. What is being suggested is that alternative explanations should also be taken into account.
2. THE FUNCTIONAL PERSPECTIVE

This perspective maintains that the imbalances of importance between research and teaching are a result of the greater significance of research for society, and that it requires more training and talent than teaching. The stratification of the two tasks is functional, if the previous statement is correct, because the scarce skills required to produce research 'sells' for higher prices. To get people to occupy these positions, greater prestige and other rewards are provided as incentives for those who qualify. Paraphrasing Davis and Moore (1945: 244), the production of research as a job task, if functionally important, must have an attractive power that will draw the necessary skills in competition with other tasks. The task must therefore command at least greater prestige, and, ideally in a capitalist based society, monetary incentives.

There is also the belief among academics, shared in the literature by Bercusson et. al. (1984: 108), that it is research that distinguishes them from teachers at other levels of education and it is this distinction that merits the greater prestige accorded the academic researcher:

"Teaching is what we share in common with high school teachers. Research is kind of the hallmark of a university professor - that we are producers of knowledge, not just transmitters. That's why there is more prestige attached to research than teaching."

(Professor, 14 years)
The logic that often extends from this line of thought is that research is in some ways a more difficult task to accomplish than teaching. This point of view is expressed quite emphatically by the following Assistant Professor:

"I think it's [research] thought to be a harder job, that the really bright do it. It's like the old phrase, those that can't do-teach. Well the same thing applies when it comes to the industry of knowledge. The brightest people in [discipline] are the ones who turn out more research, and the less bright ones are those that concentrate on teaching it. On average I think that's true, uhm... and there is just more prestige attached to it as a result."

(Assistant Professor, 4 years)

This perspective can be a persuasive one. As intimated in Chapter One there is an interdependency between the two tasks and it is not totally illogical to place research first. After all, it's those research contributions which produce the knowledge that the academic teacher will disseminate. The functional perspective maintains that the reason status rests with the research component is that the task requires more skill on the part of the individual and is more important to society. Therefore, to have people and, by extension, institutions, pursuing research, greater status needs to be accorded to the task. That status should go to the originator of knowledge and not its expositor is not questioned.

The misconception inherent in the logic of this
perspective is best stated by Blau (1973:275), who remarked that although persons with superior abilities often achieve positions that command high status, this does not necessarily mean that these positions require greater abilities or skills. Blau acknowledges that some research can be viewed as requiring greater expertise than certain aspects of teaching. Equally important, he notes that some research does not require outstanding skills, while other elements of teaching may in fact require a great deal of skill. Whatever the case may be, the ensuing argument degenerates into a largely unproductive exercise of justifying importance and as Blau comments:

"How much training and talent are needed for a position is not a meaningful question that can be answered, because the services provided and thus the qualifications needed are not fixed but depend on the status rewards offered to fill the position."

(Blau, 1973: 276)

Consequently, apart from the often stated criticisms of the functional perspective, a major flaw exists with respect to the relation between the status rewards offered a particular task and the stated functional importance of the task itself. The rationale for stratification rests on the axiom that the functional importance of the task, and its relative difficulty, determines the status reward offered the task. At the same time, the entrenched status rewards, which give research its hierarchical superiority, are supposed to
be an attempt to recognize the functional importance and the relative difficulty of the task. Thus, the functional importance, coupled with the difficulty of a task, are the criteria for the stratification of status, while status stratification indicates the functional importance and difficulty of a task. It is self-evident that the argument that has just been outlined is tautological.

However, it should not be forgotten that the causal deficiencies of this perspective do not necessarily affect the outlook academics have when regarding why research is emphasized.

3. VISIBILITY

The visibility of research emerged as the most frequently cited explanation by academics of why it is the emphasized task at the institutional level. The discernible theme of the visibility argument was the constant comparison and contrast of the research task with teaching. When the greater visibility of research relative to teaching is referred to, both in the literature and by academics, discussion centers on the differences between the tasks when it comes time to determine their 'worth'. In the context used here 'worth' is not seen in the functionalist terms of importance, but as the qualities exhibited by a task that renders it observable and measurable. Hypothetically, if institutional status is to be accumulated from the tasks
performed at the university, then it becomes critical for the
tasks to be in a position where the institution can
'advertise' that a certain amount of quality and quantity of
the tasks can be found at the institution. Taken in this
light, teaching appears to fall short. As Caplow and McGee
state in their book, The Academic Marketplace, teaching is
not the emphasized task because it is an unknown property:

"It is possible, of course, that one reason why
teaching ability does not weigh heavily... is that
information about it is difficult to obtain."

(Caplow, McGee, 1965: 139)

Universities profess a desire to cultivate good
teaching, but there is as yet no infallible means of
developing or detecting 'good' teaching. The outcome
noted by Logan Wilson over forty years ago - and applicable
to McMaster University since the expansion era - is that
superior teaching is neither demanded nor rewarded in
the same way as distinction in research (Wilson, 1943:
179). The net result, as the upcoming discussion on intra-
institutional control mechanisms shows, is a two tiered
evaluation process. When those in positions of authority
relate to individuals at the institution, one often sees in
the literature the following explanation for emphasizing
research as the valid measurement of competence in academia:

"University presidents, academic deans and
department heads regard research as important
because the publication of scholarly articles and books is a more objective way of measuring academic success than success as a teacher in a classroom." (Millett, 1961:114)

Caplow and McGee’s rationale, Wilson’s complementing statement and Millett’s explanation of the attempts to determine academic worth based upon some kind of objective criteria that are thought to be unobtainable with respect to the teaching component have reached an almost law-like standing in academia. This includes not only the individual as Millett intimates in the above quote, but as well it extends to the employing institution and the various attempts to establish its ‘worth’ in terms of the reputation it has amongst other institutions. The following two comments by academics, while similar in tone, are both included because the first suggests the primacy of research, while the second reinforces the proposition that teaching has a serious visibility deficiency when it comes to making interinstitutional comparisons:

"It’s the way prestige goes. Just as an individual doesn’t get to be internationally famous very often for being a first-rate teacher, so a department or a university doesn’t get very much prestige for having a lot of good teachers around its campus, but rather for having a lot of people who get known for having their names on articles and books. I think that’s not being extremely cynical, that’s just the way of the world - the way things go."

(Professor, 21 years)

"I happen to think that at the undergraduate level at McMaster this department give[s] a far better training in [discipline] than more prestigious research institutions and I’ll mention the University of Toronto as an example, but you can’t prove this. There’s no demonstration of it, but
what you can demonstrate is the quantity of scholarly production, and to some extent quality as well."

(Professor, 18 years, emphasis added)

Given the above, academics realize that their job tasks may be thought of with reference to two axes; those that bring only local recognition and rewards; and those that result in both local and extra-local prestige for both themselves and for the institution to which they are affiliated (Wilson, 1942: 177). As stated in Chapter Two, teaching and administrative tasks belong primarily in the former category. Conversely, "success" in research production can often win the professor major research grants or contracts from government, foundations, and/or public agencies. Grants and contracts also bring money directly and indirectly to the campuses which employ the academic (Livesey, 1975: 221). Excluding for the moment the status aspects of research production, some scholarly activities have the additional advantage of being self-sustaining, because they can, in some instances, generate their own budgetary support (Elder, 1976: 221).

Traditionally, large amounts of funding for research projects that relieve institutions of financial burdens have been more in evidence in the physical sciences where research can involve heavy expenditures in hardware. However, large expenditures are becoming more prevalent in other areas as,
for example, the value and uses of computers are becoming better understood. Apart from the many examples of grandiose research projects, are the relatively low cost, but numerous, miscellaneous expenses associated with research. Outside research funding can relieve the institution of travel expenses, and even sabbaticals can be redefined as research leaves with the institution not committed to salary payments during the time away. In times of fiscal restraint that has over the last few years reduced the budgets allocated for university operating costs, the above mentioned attributes, in and of themselves, are a compelling rationale for institutions to have their employees produce research. In discussing the emphasis McMaster appears to place on research, one academic was moved to remark:

"I think a few years ago they [administrators] looked around and they saw a certain number of niches developing within the provincial academic landscape and they decided, or at least realized anyway, that an emphasis on research was one way to solidify their position in what was not and is not an especially optimistic, expansionary or supportive climate."

(Associate Professor, 14 years)

The necessity of having to find a 'niche' highlights how McMaster has developed in the last forty years. During the Second World War and previous to it, McMaster had a static population both in terms of faculty and students - all of whom were contained in a physical plant that consisted of
eight buildings (one of which was a greenhouse). The end of the Second World War, with its influx of war veterans, created a brief spurt of growth which would level off but still continue incrementally until it eventually took off in dramatic fashion during the 1960's. The rise in student population towards the end of the forties resulted in an expanded university consisting of seventeen buildings. More important than the expansion was the funding of it. In 1947, for the first time, McMaster received provincial grants (Axelrod, 1982:80). This was the beginning of the end of an era where universities in general, and McMaster specifically, eked out an existence by funding generated within the university. The growth, quite minimal in proportion to the 1960's, upset the delicate budget of the denominational university. The growing interest in research referred to in the previous chapter and the funding required for it, coupled with new programs (most notably graduate studies which was the fastest growing body of students as a percentage of student population) necessitated a reorganization of the university exactly ten years after the first grants. In the words of one university publication, reorganization was necessary to relieve "the Baptist Church of a responsibility that is now too great for it to continue to assume" (McMaster Yearbook, 1956-57:3).

Increasing complexity and expense were offset by
economic prosperity. With the recession the vulnerability of universities became obvious. An expanded McMaster in some ways resembled organizations in the corporate sector, but more significantly, the institutions had entered into a market economy where commodities were needed to compete for scarce resources. It is at this point, that the purely altruistic pursuit of knowledge for knowledge’s sake, or research as the expression of a moral obligation on the part of the academic to her/his institution, met with the economic and political reality of the ‘provincial academic landscape’.

Academics appeared cognizant of research production’s influence on the direct relations between the state and the university, and in determining the more indirect competitive relations between universities. During the interviews, the production of research was seen by academics as critical in determining the nature of the relations. Perceptions of how the funding is allocated to universities, and the criteria associated with the allocation, were central to academic’s opinions on why research has come to mean so much and why the institution was eager to emphasize research production:

"It’s hard to say why the administration has taken such a hard line on it [research productivity] but it has a lot to do with the competition for funding within the Ontario system. It’s political and McMaster is certainly caught in the middle, it must make a case for itself, that it is unique; that it produces more research than other universities or at least it’s in the upper"
rank of universities who do. So there is pressure for the collective bibliography to grind out every year."

(Associate Professor, 13 years)

The pressure the Associate Professor refers to is felt in at least two different ways; there is pressure at the personal level to produce research (the mechanisms of which will be examined in Chapter Four); and, of more immediate concern at this point, there is pressure at the institutional level. The latter pressure virtually demands establishing the solidity of a department's, or more broadly speaking—a university's, worth through an emphasis on research production. Certainly there are a number of ways to establish worth and other universities have pursued them, but according to respondents, the relative visibility of research provides one of the better platforms upon which to secure a favourable position when the funding of academic institutions is at stake. Attitudes towards the relation between research and funding were sometimes expressed in dramatic fashion; research production was seen as providing security against 'invasions', or, as the next comment infers, staving off extinction:

"This may be a very crass outlook on the attributes of research, but research can be seen as ensuring basic survival. For example, we recently had the Bovey Commission roll through the universities; the fear in the community was that it would recommend the slashing of departments to cut out what is generally termed wasteful replication. Now if your department has high productivity levels, in other words research and publications,
the less likely you’ll feel budgeting restraints or outright dissolution."

(Associate Professor, 11 years)

Related to, but separate from the attention surrounding state-university funding, are the inevitable inter-institutional comparisons and concern with where one’s institution is located relative to others in the ‘pecking order’ of the academic hierarchy. Since status stratification occurs among various institutions, academics felt it was natural that universities were anxious to ascend the hierarchy. The visibility of the institution plays a major role in its position. As suggested by the earlier comments, and almost unanimously supported by other academics throughout the course of the interviews, institutional visibility is achieved almost exclusively through research production — specifically the publication of research.

It must be stressed that research publications are not the only property that promotes the visibility of a university. In the first chapter (p 4), brief mention was made of other aspects, including the physical plant (e.g. at McMaster the medical school and nuclear reactor), numbers of faculty and students and particular programs, all of which contribute to visibility in their own way. However, what emerged from the data was the opinion that in a no growth situation, where the aforementioned aspects are static and already widely replicated, the visibility of the research
emanating from a particular institution appears to become the cornerstone of an institution’s accumulation of status when comparisons across institutions are made.

Call it what you want, it may be as simple as trying to keep up with the Jones’s. Publications are a measure, I suppose, of the stature of the institution – the quality of its professional output. That professional output is defined as research, or at least that’s how it is conventionally understood.

(Assistant Professor, 12 years)

With specific reference to staff contributions to institutional visibility, for the truly elite of academia visibility goes beyond mere publications. Initially these academics establish their credentials as a researcher by having their publications appear in the top journals of their discipline. Status increases through invitations to present research at conferences, having their work frequently cited and even emulated by others. The top strata of the elite garner collective honours that are coveted by others as symbols of intellectual expertise (Hagstrom, 1965:8). These academics and the institutions where they work are a distinct minority, but the act of publication is something they still share in common with other academics. The performance of the act produces a certain amount of visibility and status for the academic and the parent institution.

II. RESEARCH-PUBLISHED RESEARCH DISTINCTION

It should be fairly obvious to the reader by now that this chapter, and more broadly – this thesis, is not
discussing research per se, but published research. What exactly is meant by the two terms is difficult to express because as Chapter Two's description of the tasks suggests, there are no pat definitions that could adequately incorporate their complexity. When it became obvious throughout the course of interviews that academics queried what was meant by the term research, a very broad definition was needed. The one utilized during the interviews simply defined research as 'any systematic study and investigation in some field of knowledge'. The very generality of the definition allowed academics to discuss and elaborate on their viewpoints across the range of conceptual categories examined in this thesis. It also developed the distinction between research as defined above and published research, with the latter being the results of research found in printed form and disseminated among academics.

Since published research, and not just research, appears to play a significant role in the accumulation of individual and institutional status, it is hypothesized that a fundamental change has occurred in the properties published research possesses. In order to develop a substantive theory it is necessary to look for help among formal theories in sociology. The one deemed most applicable, and which helps account in a relevant fashion for the distinction between research and published research, is Marx's theory of value.
Using his theorizing purely as an analytical tool, and reformulating it where necessary, the first clues of how published research figures in the accumulation of status begins to unfold.

Fundamental to any understanding of Marx's theory is his discussion on the attributes of a commodity (use-value, exchange value and the labour power they involve) and that a commodity can produce surplus value.

According to Marx every individual has a potential commodity that they alone possess - labour power. Marx notes that by working the individual becomes in actuality 'what before he only was potentially, labour power in action, a labourer' (Marx, 1967: 177). Of express concern for Marx was the product produced from that labour power in action. Presumably, the product of that labour has some utility. If it is entirely useless, then so is the labour contained in it (Marx, 1967: 41). Assuming the labourer is not inclined to producing something totally devoid of utility, then the product is said to have use-value. The use-value of a product of labour is determined both objectively and subjectively. Objectively the product embodies a definable utility for the producer. Subjectively a conscious personal decision is made as to whether the time spent on the product was worthwhile. It is important for the discussion which follows to note that the use-value of a product of labour, in
and of itself, does not define a commodity, for as Marx states:

"A thing can be useful, and the product of human labour without being a commodity. Whoever directly satisfies his wants with the produce of his own labour, creates, indeed, use-values, but not commodities."

(Marx, 1967: 40)

In order for a product of labour to be a commodity it needs the two-fold aspect of use-value and exchange value (Marx, 1967: 60). Exchange value is acquired by a product of labour when it enters into relations with other commodities in the marketplace. These relations, through their interaction, begin to develop a semblance of order. A specific commodity can be identified and a value is placed upon it. Whether or not the producer gets the full 'value' for the commodity depends upon the social economic situation in which it is introduced, but if full value is not received it normally means that a non-producer (i.e. capitalist) has developed a way to skim a surplus off the commodity. The manner in which surplus value can be obtained will soon be discussed, but first the specifics of commodity production will be examined as they relate to academia.

The producer, in this case the academic, spends a portion of his/her time on a particular task. Thus the original commodity an academic possesses, not unlike others, is labour power. Of express concern here is the product
produced from that labour power. The product of that labour is research - which presumably has some usefulness. If there is a definable usefulness, both subjectively and objectively, then the research has use-value. At this point the research is only a potential commodity.

To become a commodity, research must present itself in published form, because it is through publication that research enters the 'market'. Unpublished research has no exchange value. Without publication the research has only a localized impact (if that) and does not enhance the status of the individual or the institution. With this stated a qualifying remark should be added; not all research needs to—or should - be published, as is the implied assertion of Bercusson et al., (1984: 111). Research, as noted in Chapter Two, has different facets and not all research lends itself to publication. This is not to say it is useless, but rather that it lacks the attributes of a commodity. What is suggested here is that research without publication does not have an exchange value, i.e. it cannot be marketed, - a necessary requirement for acquiring exchange-value.

Extending Marx's theorizing to include his consideration of universal equivalence, certain parallels specific to academia can be observed. He notes that the universal equivalent form is the form of value in general and, hence, the particular commodity that becomes identified
as such becomes the money commodity, or serves as money (Marx, 1967:69). Marx indicates that historically the money commodity has realized itself in gold. However, in academia the corresponding universal equivalent can be conceived of as not directly money (or more precisely - gold), but published research.

The universal equivalent is usually something abstract, an entity independent of specific commodities with use-values. Once research is published it gains exchange value, but at the same time it does not 'lose' its use-value. This does not disqualify published research as a universal equivalent. Through publication the use-value, although not diminished, is transcended by exchange-value. Thus an abstraction occurs which is similar to gold when its use-value is overridden by its importance in the market as an equivalent for other commodities. The abstraction occurs when the totality of published research is taken into account. When standing as an equivalent, published research is not premised on the specific quality (the relative use-value) of particular pieces of research. At best it recognizes that contained within the vast quantity of research there will be some quality. At the very worst, if there is an absence of distinguishable quality, the quantity can potentially serve as the abstract 'wealth' and other commodities are equivalent to it. Even if the quality of the
commodity is distinguishable, it is so only because it has been published, disseminated and developed an exchange value. Ultimately, this allows the commodity to stand in the position of a currency able to purchase other commodities, based on the accepted conception that it is the social form of wealth in academia. Thus published research has a social monopoly and can play the part of the universal equivalent, albeit in a fashion extended beyond the typical boundaries of the concept. Presently, research stands, paraphrasing Marx, as the commodity which is habitually exchanged for various other commodities — most notably status (Marx, 1967: 66). In essence, once in the 'market' of academia, published research has a unique ability to pose as the currency with which status is purchased.

Thus when research is published and acquires not only exchange value, but also the social form of wealth as expressed as the money commodity, two purposes are fulfilled. In the first place, publications can serve as a proxy for the skills possessed by an academic. Journal articles or books provide 'proof' of a faculty member's ability to conduct research at a level sufficient to meet prevailing standards in his/her discipline (Tuckman, 1976: 55). Presumably, at this individualistic level there is a qualitative dimension to the assessment of the content of the research. The original use-value of research, the later exchange-value, and
commodity status of published research has a number of advantages for the producer. Apart from the high-minded facets of knowledge acquisition and dissemination, the published research can open potentially new avenues of remuneration and status beyond the confines of the host university, ranging from government task force appointments to speaking invitations and engagements - a point which will be dealt with in greater detail in the two following chapters.

Secondly, and in addition to the personal attributes, published research has a cumulative element, whereby all the academics who do research at a particular institution, and have their research published, contribute to a collective vitae. The result of this is that published research becomes abstracted from the individuals who produced the research, and becomes embodied in the institution itself. It is at this level that the visibility benefits of published research become most apparent, and the institutional emphasis on research production best understood. As already hinted at by academics, and alluded to in the introduction (p. 7), the institution benefits from research production.

The exact expression of how much published research will be able to stand in exchange for the commodity of status is difficult to determine at the institutional level. What can be stated is that the cumulative output of research once
published, even of dubious quality, merit or importance, has produced a certain amount of status which can be appropriated by the institution. Before proceeding further, it should be noted that a particular form of status is being examined in this thesis.

III. OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE STATUS

At the institutional level in academia two forms of status can be discerned, an objective and a subjective form. Objective status is based upon an institution's greater or lesser resources relative to other institutions. It is largely a function of law and state policy because it is of the kind found in formal regulations which define the boundaries between different sectors of higher education (Trow, in Clark 1984: 134). In Ontario, this objective status is clearly observable in the distinction between universities and colleges, and may become more evident between universities if various provincial government reform suggestions were to be carried out. This objective dimension, while important in determining many of the policies and academic decisions both outside and within a university, is not the prime consideration of this chapter.

Of particular importance is the subjective form of status, which is characterized by variations in reputation and prestige, and is largely a matter of differentiation among institutions within the university segment of higher
education (Trow, in Clark 1984: 134). For the moment the formal competition for scarce financial resources is sidelined in order to show that the positions between institutions also has an informal basis. The informal social position that the subjective form of status relies upon inevitably affects how successful institutions are in the competition for funding. In order to determine a university’s position, the level of research production comes to play an important role in the status accumulation of an institution. In this subjective ‘market’, status can be seen as a by-product of the exchange-value of published research. Unlike research – and its exchange-value extension, publications – status itself has no intrinsic value, i.e. it cannot provide from its properties, esoteric as they are, a defineable use-value. However, it does have value simply because others perceive it to be a worthwhile commodity to possess.

Those institutions which manage to accumulate the most status are perceived to be the ‘wealthiest’, or more precisely, located in the upper ranks of the academic hierarchy. Thus, universities as a rule, and specifically McMaster, due to their entering a market economy are committed to research production because the commodity of published research must be exchanged for status in order to be admitted to the upper ranks of the hierarchy. The
ranking in the hierarchy and concern over position can be conceived of as a scaled down version of the dynamism of capitalist society. It resembles in form Marx’s opening comment on capitalism in the first chapter of Capital where, ‘The wealth of those societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails, presents itself as an immense accumulation of commodities...’ (Marx, 1967:35). However, as Marx also noted, the commitment to the production and accumulation of commodities is not the only manifestation of capitalism, nor is it the major defining feature. The latter distinction is reserved for the goal of producing and realizing surplus-value (Marx, 1967: 509). The question to be answered is how does published research develop ‘surplus-value’ in the form of additional status for the institution?

Marx maintains that in a capitalist society it is individuals, while expending their commodity-labour, who produce surplus-value. It is a surplus that does not accrue to the producer, but instead to the capitalist. The surplus-value is generated from a quantitative and qualitative excess of labour, which is accomplished through either; 1. a prolongation of the work day beyond the point at which the labourer would have produced an equivalent for the value of her/his labour power (absolute surplus-value); or, 2. a surplus of labour can be derived through the methods that enable the necessary labour to be accomplished
in less time - thereby allowing for a greater portion of the work day to be devoted exclusively to the production of surplus-value (relative surplus-value) (Marx, 1967: 509-10).

The problem that arises is that this strict application of Marx's categories of surplus-value are of limited utility when discussing the production of research in academia. An attempt could be made to argue that the demands of research and the final published product are the result of a work day increased beyond the definite point of necessary labour, but this would be stretching absolute surplus-value beyond the boundaries normally associated with the concept. In addition, the surplus is not necessarily a result of the amount of time expended on the product of research, but stems from the realization of its publication and the cumulative effect of the published research generated by those employed at the institution. That any 'surplus-value' the product may have resides in the publication also negates a consideration of any refinements in the methods of production. As a result, the exploitation which the production of surplus-value generally suggests, is not clearly delineated. True, academics are paid labourers, and hence, some surplus-value should be identifiable (otherwise how could the institution accumulate status), but it must be remembered that the accumulation of status is not as tangible as the accumulation of money in capitalist production.
When attempting to analyze the surplus of work done by producers in academia the situation does not lend itself to such niceties as an exacting balance sheet that can detail where the surplus occurs and state how they were achieved. Instead, what is left is an awareness that the institution has benefited from its faculty's research output, but a bewilderment as to the process through which the benefits were realized. Simply stated, there exists no equation to guide the transaction, i.e. x amount of published research cannot be exchanged for y status. But precision of calculation is not necessarily required.

Whatever the reception published research receives, the institution is able to realize a surplus because it can share, or to use Trow's terminology referred to in the first chapter (p. 9), borrow, the status that is normally accorded published research in academia. Of course if the research is perceived to be of a high quality by others in academia, all the better for both the researcher and the parent institution. Once the fanfare fades (if indeed any existed in the first place) the institution has gained status by association, the institution's collective vitae has been added to, and the drive for status accumulation can continue through the pressures exerted upon academics to produce research.
SUMMARY

It is at this juncture, that this thesis turns from why research is emphasized to an examination of the specific relationship between status and the mechanisms of control that ensure its accumulation. To understand the basis upon which controls are predicated, it was necessary to explore the relative position of research to status. With this in mind, the first part of this chapter dealt with the differing perspectives found in the literature and articulated by academics on why research is emphasized. After outlining the perspectives, attention was directed to the primacy of status accumulation and how it can be achieved inter-institutionally via research publication. Theoretically, this chapter developed an analysis which relied upon aspects of Marx's theory of value to illuminate how research publications are a central commodity in academia - equal in some respects to money outside of academia. It was proposed that status amongst institutions relies upon the 'currency' of research in published form. Published research can extend the reputation of the individual who produces the end product, but as well a portion of the status accrues to the institution. Seen from this perspective, the pursuit of status is the product of the interaction between the academic and the institution in which she/he is employed. It is the nature of the interaction that now becomes of interest.
CHAPTER THREE END NOTES

12. Marketplace in this context refers exclusively to the relations between the products of labour and their course of production, not academic labour markets in general.


14. Many general criticisms of the functional perspective exist, one of the earliest articles which contains all the pertinent criticisms was written by George A. Huaco, "The Functionalist Theory of Stratification" Inquiry, Vol. 9, 1966, 215-240.

15. War veterans, in the four years that they were distinguished as a separate category at McMaster, reached a high of 28% of the total student body (McMaster Yearbook, 1948-49).


17. Appendix D details the numerous studies which outline the role published research plays in the determination of institutional hierarchies.
CHAPTER FOUR
ENSURING STATUS ACCUMULATION INTRA-INSTITUTIONALLY

PREFACE

The second premise which began this thesis contended that universities, like other organizations, have a particular amount of work to accomplish, and therefore there is a need to control workers to ensure the work is carried out. Based upon what has been stated in the previous two chapters regarding the institutionalized emphasis of one task, a working hypothesis deriving from the premise would propose that if published research is an important part of the work to be accomplished at a university, then there should be controls to maximize the likelihood that it will be produced. With this in mind, this chapter will be focused on the external institutionally based pressures and controls that are directed at - as opposed to directed by - the individual. This is not to say that external and internal controls are mutually exclusive and easily delineated. As will become apparent in this and the succeeding chapter, the external mechanisms of control can coincide and overlap with internally motivated controls surrounding the production of research.

Usually, the 'workplace' would be the best starting point to begin studying the control mechanisms that individuals experience while working. As Goldman, (1983:51) states, by using the workplace as the cornerstone in
examining the work activity of individuals, researchers can emphasize the immediate activities and concerns of workers. The difficulty encountered when using this strategy to study academia is that no single 'shopfloor' can be delineated. Unlike a factory or a formalized bureaucratic organization where the activity of the individual, the subject of the work, and the instruments used (Marx's three elementary factors of the labour process, as stated in Capital, 1967:178) can be observed, academia is a multi-task occupation which is not entirely site specific.

As a result, the spectrum of controls surrounding the labour process needs to be broadened to provide an accurate picture of the mechanisms present in academia. It is instructive to note the controls on the institution which influence how the labour process is organized. The controls found in academia which affect academics are not wholly a result of institutional policy. Policies are tempered by a number of external social forces which are not static. These social forces and their effect on the labour process are integrated within this chapter, and where applicable, are stated at the outset of the control mechanisms being discussed. Closer to institutionally based controls, because a workplace is a fiction, recourse was made to understanding the various dimensions of control that surround the labour process and which are open to observation and articulation by
academics. These dimensions came to be expressed through three definable processes; the selection process; the initiation/definition process; and the evaluation process. Permeating each of the three processes are inconsistencies and ambiguities which, in the final analysis, bolster the mechanisms of control. These apparent contradictions are developed and reiterated throughout this chapter with respect to the process under examination. Sequentially it is fairly obvious that the selection process illustrates the initial mechanism of control to which academics are exposed. Therefore, it is with this process the chapter begins.

I CONTROL AT THE POINT OF SELECTION - THE CHOICE

"Departments can hire only a few faculty, and choices must be made from among those available. Which faculty member a department chooses will depend on the importance it gives to the package of skills offered by each potential faculty member and on the price of these skills in the marketplace."

(Tuckman, 1976: 41)

Tuckman makes two noteworthy points in the above quote. He first makes his reader aware of a fairly obvious, but seldom referred to, mechanism of control that exists at the hiring stage of academics. Sociology refers to it as 'gatekeeping'; an academic institution would claim it is maintaining 'an enviable position in terms of its scholarly performance' (Plan for McMaster, 1977: 4). Equally important is the second inference made by Tuckman, that the selection
process is guided by the 'price' of skills in the marketplace. The implication of this latter point is that the selection of a faculty member is not considered in a total social and economic vacuum, but instead the market situation must be taken into account.

Thus, the degree of selectivity a department, or more broadly speaking, an institution, can exercise when attempting to make appointments is not fixed. It can best be described as a sliding scale of selectivity, and at what point the scale is momentarily resting is largely a result of whether the institution is in a 'buyers' or 'sellers' market.

From the present day vantage point of the mid 1980's there is the tendency to view the 1960's as the comparative standard by which to judge today's conditions in universities. However, the sixties must be put in the proper perspective - a period of growth in Western higher education that has been unparalleled in recent history. Until the so called baby boom generation passed through the universities, coupled with a relatively prosperous Western economy, conditions of scarcity have been the norm rather than the exception in terms of employment opportunities in academia. Logan Wilson, writing in the early forties, commented on the employment situation in academia. The concerns he expressed then are remarkably similar to current conditions:

"There is a growing opinion that on advanced levels, the saturation point of employability in higher
education is already close at hand."
(Wilson, 1942: 30)

Of course Wilson could not foresee that the greater accessibility to a university education after World War Two, coupled with larger government funding, would greatly improve the possibilities of employment in academia. However, it was not until the cohort of post World War Two births passed through the universities during the sixties that academia was transformed into a true 'sellers' market. Except for those few years, it has been primarily a buyer's market with the decision makers of institutions firmly ensconced as the arbiters of what the required 'package of skills' would constitute. In a buyers' market the decision makers can be highly selective when choosing a candidate.

During the period of rapid expansionism, the university was limited by the constraints of a sellers' market, and had to concentrate on meeting the growing staffing requirements. By today's standards, the opportunities for the prospective employee was an academic nirvana, with the institution openly soliciting the individual:

"I got a letter in the mail from the university..uhm..it may have been that they were on the (discipline's) mailing list for needers [sic] of Ph.D's coming up. The letter said McMaster University - I had never heard of it."
(Associate Professor, 16 years)

In this situation, so goes the theory of market
advantage, the upper hand rests with the academic who is selling his/her labour skills package. If the theory holds it would be expected that few demands during the selection process could be made. In addition, there should be a scarcity of enforceable controls determining what the content of the individual's labour would eventually constitute:

"Coming to McMaster in 1967, the demand or even the expectation of research publication was not there. It was not there because all Canadian universities were expanding in the 1960's... Now in that sort of atmosphere the university is in no position really to say to young scholars, 'you produce in a scholarly sense or off you go'."

(Professor, 18 years)

"For about 3 or 4 years it was Carte Blanche time. McMaster had to find staff and so a lot of people were hired and tenured without very much to their credit. People who couldn't get jobs in academia today were getting jobs then because there was a demand for them."

(Professor, 17 years)

Unfortunately for the academic these sellers' market conditions did not extend beyond the early seventies. As expansion dwindled and a recessionary academic climate began to prevail, the sellers' ability to find openings, much less determine the terms of employment were severely curtailed. In this reversion to a similar pre-1960's market condition, the buyer is able to set more stringent requirements and be more selective when choosing a faculty member.

Tailoring the working hypothesis to the present-day selection of individuals, it is not inconsistent that those
institutions in the post expansions era attempting to attain or retain their 'market share' of status would take steps to ensure they hire staff who could produce research. These steps are especially likely when the distinctly advantageous features of published research—relative to the other tasks of academia—are considered. Extending the logic even further, the selection of research oriented academics becomes an important element of control through the fostering and sustaining of the research initiative, for as Blau (1973: 109) states:

"Appointments based on research raise research involvements by governing the selection of persons committed to research and by consequently providing a colleague climate that stimulates research interests."

The above is somewhat reminiscent of the altruism associated with the pursuit of knowledge as outlined in the previous chapter, but it also has an especially persuasive appeal in a capitalist based society. By gearing the criterion of selection to research productivity, the selection process can be rationalized on the basis that the 'profits' of status accumulation can be maximized. In terms of a cost-benefit analysis, it can be construed as being economical and an efficient personnel management program, or in the words of a professor:

"I think there's a recognition that there is an economics of scale in terms of doing research. That is, if you bring a lot of researchers together in one center, they'll produce more research than if they
are scattered all over the place."

(Professor, 14 years)

Helpful, one might even say necessary, in developing this stimulating research environment are the right market conditions that allow an institution to exercise a high degree of selectivity. If a large pool of candidates exists and there are few employment opportunities, the institution has the favourable market conditions to implement selection criteria which are partial to hiring people who will make contributions to research. The advantage of this selection process is that once it is in place it can be self-perpetuating, and thus, institutional controls can recede from view. Professors hired (or tenured and promoted) on the basis of a system which accords a high value to research, and who become responsible for the hiring of others on this basis, are more likely to be in favour of research as a major criterion for selecting a candidate (Williams et. al., 1974: 319).

Those actually involved in the hiring process readily acknowledged that the mandate when recruiting individuals was the ability of the candidate to make scholarly contributions. This process of selection was seen by academics as fraught with difficulties. A host of factors, not the least of which is that there is little in academics' backgrounds that prepares them for the role of a personnel selection manager. Those interviewed that had experience on selection committees
were virtually unanimous in stating that the process had to be approached with a great deal of care and attention.

Most took a long term view of a candidate’s selection. They were cognizant that if in later years tenure was denied, this usually meant an error was committed in the hiring process (Adams, 1973: 88). This point is not lost even on the most junior academic. When considering the gravity of tenure decisions on junior faculty, it is not surprising that a ‘mistake’ in hiring is seen as more than just poor judgement on the part of the selection committee. As the next excerpt indicates, indecisiveness may also play a role—and have much more profound consequences:

"The hiring decision is probably the one they take the most seriously, even more so than tenure. Because if the university turns someone down for tenure that’s almost like admitting they made a bad hiring decision. That’s discouraging to new people who they want to hire because if they turn someone down it means that they may not know what they want."  

(Assistant Professor, 2 years)

It is pertinent to pay closer attention to the latter part of the above statement. Not only does it point to the ramifications (i.e., the discouragement engendered) over the lack of reference points new academics are likely to be faced with when tenure is denied to their peers, but it also asserts that the new people are not just passive entities. This is an important point when considering the selection process because, irrespective of the decisions arrived at by a selection committee, there has already been an earlier
decision by the candidate who decides to put her/his name forward for consideration. This seems like a rather self-evident observation, but the choice of where the respondent applies can have certain expectations attached to it:

"A lot (of academics) came here because the research emphasis was already in place - they wouldn't have came [sic] here had it not been."

(Associate Professor, 9 years)

Thus many of the potential tensions between the selection requirements and an applicant’s expectations may never even surface at the selection stage of an individual. Why they would not surface is probably a function of the initial training process to which most academics are exposed. The training process serves as both an introduction to academia and as a preliminary socializing agent for the control mechanisms that will be experienced once employed.

With respect to training, the Ph.D is a research degree. Its specific intent is to develop skills both methodological and theoretical that will enable individuals to order their thought processes towards a particular discipline.

Hence, the applicant seeks employment where the skills learned, and emphasized, in graduate school will be put to good use. After all, it is not illogical to want to be located at an institution where one can pursue the activity for which one is trained, rather than expend an inordinate amount of time and energy on a task that one has
not been expressly trained to perform. The expectation an applicant brings can be seen in the following two statements by academics (note especially the emphasized sections):

"Why did I choose McMaster over other job offers? McMaster had certain advantages in terms of research and the kinds of support one would get....the department here is a very strong one, and I knew it would be able to provide the stimulation, or at least be in the same ballpark, that I was used to during my graduate career."

(Assistant Professor, 3 years)

"The general impression I had about most schools is that as you go down the line from the higher rated to the lower rated, the emphasis moves from research to teaching because the departments that are not as well known tend to have less money, smaller staffs and bigger classes. Thus more time has to be devoted to the teaching, but say here at McMaster, the teaching load is relatively light and you know you're going to get time to do research - which is presumably one of the reasons you applied in the first place."

(Assistant Professor, 5 years)

These statements were elicited from academics relatively new to McMaster. Their opinions reflect the general sentiment of those hired since the expansion years. Ladd and Lipset (1975c) earlier noted that younger academics were more inclined to identify themselves as scholars or scientists than their more senior colleagues. Unfortunately, they did not elaborate upon this finding other than to state that it suggested that 'a significant shift in role definition may be occurring' (Ladd and Lipset, 1975c: 2).

The problem is how to account for this shift. There appears to be a contradiction between market conditions and the training of academics. If the Ph.D. is a research
degree, should not academics be predisposed towards research—regardless of market conditions? If the training process has not altered appreciably, then academics should have been more or less equally socialized to emphasize research, independent of when they came on stream.

Having no evidence that graduate school has changed its research emphasis, an alternative explanation must be found to answer why younger academics are more likely to view themselves as researchers. A plausible answer lies in the identities academics develop in response to, and when interacting with, the prevailing market conditions. As the last two quotes illustrate, academics were able to evaluate the situations they experienced or perceived they would experience upon coming to McMaster. How they perceived the academic labour process provided an insight into the motives behind the actions taken and played a fundamental role in determining the identities they possess.

From these identities, and the commitments they presuppose, a number of particularly salient identities can be distinguished. By salient identities, or more precisely—identity salience, one is referring to one aspect of how the self is organized. Identities tend to cluster around similar skills, and are in turn loosely patterned in a somewhat flexible hierarchy of prominence (McCall and Simmons, 1966: 77), or what Stryker refers to as a ‘salience hierarchy’.
Discrete identities are ordered into a salience hierarchy, which according to Stryker is characterized by the proposition that: the higher the identity in that hierarchy, the more likely that the identity will be invoked in situations. If there are conflicts, or contradictory expectations occur, the relative location of a particular identity in the salience hierarchy becomes a potentially important predictor of subsequent behavior (Stryker: 1980: 60).

During a period of ballooning student populations, academics had to be hired for teaching. The actual training of academics has not been altered, but their knowledge of what was going to be required of an academic upon hiring has changed. Although there was a lack of formal training in teaching, academics might well develop a greater commitment to teaching based on the likelihood that this was the task which was most needed and expected. Thus, the external events cut across the existing commitments to research that were nurtured in graduate school, to produce the salient identity of the academic as a teacher.

On the other hand, when selectivity is reestablished and hiring is predicated on demonstrable research ability, those about to enter the academic labour force are equally adept at adjusting to the situation. During their training they have been exposed to the reality of greater
Institutional selectivity and are aware that the future conditions of securing employment will revolve around meeting the demand for researchers. The result should be greater commitment to research, which would in turn produce a greater personal identification with the attributes of a researcher. In the end, by choosing to participate, consent is accorded by the academic to the governing 'rules' that determine the process of selection.

The above discussion on differing identities between faculty members should not leave the reader with the impression that no senior academic was drawn to McMaster for research purposes. Academics employed before and during the expansion also cited the opportunity to do research as an attractive feature of McMaster. However, these sentiments were expressed less often and typically after other aspects had been articulated.

Upon overcoming the tacit controls surrounding selection, or more precisely, meeting the criteria of the control mechanism, the academic becomes exposed to a new set of controls that make up the initiation/definition and evaluation processes of academia.

II EXPLICATION OF TASKS - CONTROL DURING THE INITIATION/DEFINITION PROCESS

"Larvatus Prodeo"

Descartes

"The first year or two is like walking through a messy room in the dark."

(Associate Professor, 4 years)
'Masked, I go forward' remarked Descartes when referring to the nature of scientific inquiry. As indicated by an associate professor, the term could also be applied to university professors during the initial years of employment at an institution. According to academics the confusion and anxiety they experienced, or still experience in the case of recently hired faculty, was primarily due to the manner in which the tasks of academia are explicated.

The explication of tasks is one way in which the labour process can be controlled. Usually this form of control is unambiguously stated and relatively simple to identify. Those who fall under the purview of the control are relieved of the possibility of misinterpretation because the tasks are clearly delineated. This form of control exists in academia, but task explication is stated ambiguously and, for the newly recruited academic, the specifics must be learned once participation in the labour process is underway.

Control when manifested through the explication of tasks can be defined in a similar way to the concept of power. A person (or persons), is deemed to have control if s/he is able to make individuals act in accordance with her/his wishes, despite the wishes of these others (Clegg, 1979:102). This type of control tends to be realized through the implementation of formalized rules and regulations which
outline the tasks of the individual. The individual in turn is obliged not only to be aware of the rules, but also to abide by them. In most work settings outside of academia, control in the form of task explication normally emanates from management. Through directives they establish the objectives and design the rules to meet them (Burawoy, 1978: 272). These directives have essentially two purposes, to control the workplace and to control the worker. The control, however, is rarely total, nor is it intended to be. There is the general recognition that a degree of autonomy is desirable, for to aim at total control poses the potential situation that workers will unite against it and thereby defeat the initial reasons for the controls implementation (Brecher, 1979: 13).

In academia, the explication of the tasks, and the corresponding control it implies, is not as overt as those found in other work settings. Hence, this form of control is difficult to precisely identify. Undeniably there are statements pertaining to the tasks, and they could be loosely regarded as originating from ‘management’—administrative persons and committees within the university. As well the statements can be interpreted as the rules and regulations that academics are wise to abide by, but notably absent from such documents as the tenure and promotion guideline are the comprehensive task descriptions associated with other occupa-
tions. The documents outline points of concern, however little attention is directly paid to the amount of time that should be spent on the tasks, nor is the amount or quality of material produced considered in detail.

The academic located within such an organizational context is exposed to one of the great oddities of academia—the ambiguous initiation process that revolves around how the performance of the two job tasks is presented. In a now classic study of academics and institutions, Theodore Caplow and Reece J. McGee (1965) were among the first to refer to this oddity. They found in formal statements made by universities regarding job requirements a great deal of lip service was given to teaching. However, in their analysis they noted a contradiction. It appeared universities in general, and in particular the departments involved, hired individuals to teach, but invariably individuals were evaluated on their research contributions to their particular discipline.

For most academics the introduction to employment at a particular university involves a letter from either the administration or the department head which broadly outlines the obligations of both parties, stating the appropriate number of courses a professor is expected to teach and for which s/he will receive a certain salary (Higgins, 1974: 28 - 36):
"I got a little package of information from, I think, the President's office containing the tenure document, what we get in terms of vacation and that's about all. But nobody gave me any idea as to what proportion of time I should spend on different things." (Professor, 20 years)

"There's a letter that they send, that sort of outlines your obligations and the university's obligations to you. I mean it's the funniest little letter. It says, you know, that you'll be expected to teach an appropriate number of courses as decided by your chairman and for which you'll receive x salary and you get two months free of scheduled commitments in the summer. Plus you'll be expected to teach evenings or summers every two or three years - and that's really it."

(Assistant Professor, 3 years)

The above statements are virtually identical in content, the only difference is that there is a time span of seventeen years separating when the two people received their respective packages. This is a point of importance when one considers that there has been little evolution in how academics are formally introduced to the job tasks at McMaster. Of greater importance is the realization that the academic, at the very outset, is left to determine how much time should be spent on either time consuming component since there are no fixed schedules - only references to the amount of time free from scheduled commitments and the number of weeks vacation. What is clear is that the sole obligatory product for the great majority of academics is course work, the rest of an academic's activity appears to remain at the discretion of the individual (Tancred-Sheriff, 1985: 376).
Therefore at first glance the work performed in academia can be crudely dichotimized into that activity which is compulsory—teaching, and research which can be labelled as an expected activity (Trotter in Knapper, 1977: 153).

The oddity of academia centers upon the different implications of the compulsory or expected activities with respect to an academic's career. Based upon Caplow and McGee's findings the label of 'expected' is really a misnomer. To only state that an activity is expected is to infer that there are rather minor consequences should the activity not be carried out. This can be directly contrasted with the conception that were a compulsory activity unfulfilled, measures to rectify the situation would soon be initiated against the negligent individual. However, in reality this is not an accurate depiction because the expected activity is in actuality a compulsory task (especially for the untenured). Teaching, while stated as compulsory, is more of an obligation that, once performed, must be reinforced with a demonstrable commitment to research. Thus the irony of the situation comes to the forefront, the expected is the priority activity, while the compulsory activity plays a subordinate role.

Two questions arise when the above is considered. If the explication of tasks is ambiguous, then how does the faculty member determine what is expected? (i.e. How does one
manage in the 'dark, messy room' to order the labour process?) Before attempting to answer this rather involved question, it is first prudent to ask why, in the first place, the explication of tasks is lacking explicit rules? A satisfactory answer to the latter question provides a basis for proceeding with the former question. At the same time the answer can outline the constraints surrounding institutionally organized attempts to control faculty.

Controls are not unidirectional. True they are normally directed at the worker, but the significance of rules and regulations lies in the constraints they impose on the initiators as well as the targeted individual or group. This is particularly observable when considering academia and the lack of detail with regard to task explication. The explication of tasks lacks detail for a number of reasons. The labour process involves different tasks. These tasks can be performed at various times and by various people. This variability is compounded by the lack of a specific shopfloor that would allow for tasks to be clearly delineated and organized. A further complication is the multiplicity of control mechanisms and the problems they entail. Overriding these reasons for the lack of greater detail is a more general one - the broader societal ideology of liberalism. The liberalism that permeates academia is usually concerned with generalized conditions surrounding the issue of academic
freedom. These conditions of freedom of initiative and activity are seen from a liberal perspective as a necessary precursor for scholarship and learning to exist (Brown, 1969: 3).

Theoretically, the liberal traditions surrounding academia can be threatening to a society. Especially if the academics employed at universities are not in agreement with the existing tenets of the larger society. However, the strength of the ideology espoused in Western society rests in part upon the claims of liberal freedoms (Wright, 1977: 209). Advancement (however distinguished), so goes the argument by Wright, is dependent upon intellectual production. Therefore, to erode the institutionalized freedoms that are in place at universities is to jeopardize the production process. In the end, to directly encroach on the production process may result in little more than a Pyrrhic victory.

Of express concern here are not these generalized aspects, although the reader should be aware that they do have a spillover effect, for they limit the formal articulation of what can be expected from academics. University administrators cannot make outright demands that staff produce x amount of published research with y amount of quality any more than they can wantonly suppress research they do not find compatible with their own beliefs. However, as academic freedom in the broader sense of the term can be
violated insidiously, so too can the autonomy of the academic be circumvented when productivity decisions are made. In other words, explicitness is not a criterion a control mechanism must exhibit. Subtlety can work just as effectively. A chairman will not necessarily attempt to overtly regulate the activity of a new faculty member, as is clearly stated by one former chairman:

"I would never dream of telling the most junior faculty member it's time you published an article in lets say (a leading journal in the field) if you're going to teach or do research around here." 24

(Professor, year withheld)
(II-2-14-4)

If the above were carried out it could be construed as an infringement upon academic freedom, but the following quote — again from a former chairman — does not differ in the end desired. Only the means to achieve the end are articulated differently:

"When I was the chairman of this department you discussed progress with them (junior faculty) virtually annually....and when their tenure decision is coming up you may point out, 'Look if you keep it up like this things look good'. Or you might say, 'Look its been three years and you haven't published anything yet. Now you do realize that you have only three years to go before you face [the] tenure hurdle deadline. If you want me to bat effectively for you, you better have two or three articles in print."

(Professor, year withheld)
(II-1-4-8)

The above quote is one indicator of how university liberalism is stage managed to conceal the controls that guide the academic novitiate. This initiation process for
the academic begins at the point of securing employment, but the questions surrounding the performance of tasks are prevalent even while the applicant is moving through the selection process:

"I wanted information before I came, because when I came what was important in my mind, and in those of almost everybody considering these situations is - what type of standards do I need [to meet] for advancement. In the first place for tenure, but then beyond that, what type of standards will I be expected to meet in order to progress through the ranks."

(Associate Professor, 8 years)

According to the above cited Associate Professor, the information received during the selection phase was, in retrospect, of limited use. The nebulous nature of the responses and the fact that those involved knew that standards were not static, required the individual to learn the standards while on the job. As a result the initiation process for respondents was characterized as one of personal anxiety in the face of few explicit guidelines. In order to compensate for the lack of explicitness, academics attempted to make crude generalizations about what was expected of them. One source they consulted at the very outset of the initiation process was the scanty literature provided by the institution:

"Sure there were documents one could read concerning, for example, agreements between the university and the faculty association on the requirements for tenure and promotion. Where they articulated things concerning the three basic criteria the [tasks in academia]....But really the only help they were was
the feeling they gave you as to what was important. You kind of assumed, at least I did, that the order in which they appeared was the way they were going to evaluate you."

(Associate Professor, 4 years)

The order in which the tasks appear in the McMaster tenure and promotion document is: research, teaching, and administration. As a definitive statement on the organization of individuals' labour, the guidelines contained in this document can be said to be of marginal value. The document does not control in a 'typical' fashion either the workplace or the worker, yet neither can it be summarily dismissed as having no effect on the outlook individuals develop. As the quote indicates, the lack of explicitness did not restrain the academic from making inferences about the relative importance of the various tasks in academia.

Inevitably, individuals begin to understand their situation through interactions with other academics and the previously crude generalizations begin to gain substance, as can be seen in the next excerpt from one of the latest additions to the faculty:

"My perception of the way things go around here, is that you don’t have to be a wonderful communicator (referring to teaching). I mean that’s not something the university places a high value on. They place a higher value on ability as a researcher."

(Assistant Professor, 3 years)

The significance of using this quote is not to try and reaffirm the statements made previously by academics in Chapter Two concerning where the emphasis lies. In
actuality, the assumption by the assistant professor that teaching is 'not something the university places a high value on' may be somewhat overstated. The salience of this statement is that it illustrates that academics are quick to realize the emphasis and that their advancement depends upon accommodating themselves to it. In Clark's terms (1984:160) they have learned what is worth doing and, ultimately, what the effort and achievement will cost.

The positive attributes of research and indicators of how much time will be spent on this task are derived from a variety of sources, not the least of which are the negative aspects associated with teaching. With some academics the positive attitudes towards research are a result of experiences that occurred before arriving at the employing institution. Just as prior training, and the predispositions it developed, had an effect on the selection process, likewise associations with professors during graduate school produced indications of where an academic's time was to be spent:

"Yes, in a way there are indicators of how much time you should spend on the various tasks. They weren't consciously laid down as indicators, though. There were members of the discipline who were professors of mine, and others that I knew of - practitioners from other universities who were highly respected, and one got the idea of the sorts of things they did....I knew what they did and I figured if I became a professor I would be like them. By that I mean, they did a lot of research, a lot of fieldwork, and they did a lot of studying and writing."

(Associate Professor, 8 years)
The above emulative aspects are incorporated into the later experiences of selection and initiation. Not surprisingly, as academics progress beyond initiation to more solidified positions, the procedures become more refined for defining job task emphasis and the concomitant expectations. As previously indicated, one of the major sources of reference is an academic's colleagues. The use of colleagues as a reference group had two basic elements that tended to be ordered sequentially.

Upon first arriving at the institution colleagues were originally used to determine the allocation of personal resources, whereas later in an academic's career colleagues come to be used primarily as the indicators of performance levels to be achieved. At first glance the two references appear to be identical and, indeed, they do share some of the same characteristics. It took a particularly perceptive Professor who had been at the university for thirteen years to point out the difference. Paraphrasing the academic, the initial reference employed by academics is essentially a form of guided observation. The academic observes role models while in graduate school, and later is influenced by the verbal and non-verbal communication of colleagues. The second use of colleagues as a reference point also has observational features, but more importantly the source of the observation is the direct comparison of
academics. An element of performance judgement is introduced and involves an academic actively comparing him/herself to others. The comparisons need not be restricted to immediate colleagues. For example they can be developed from circumstances surrounding the vacancy an academic fills upon the firing of a previous individual:

"The position I was filling had in fact been vacated by somebody who had not completed his dissertation and he'd been here six years, and been denied tenure twice because the dissertation was not finished. I drew two conclusions from this, one that this department was still not as high pressure as a lot of others in terms of research or they would have gotten this guy out before the end of six years. The second conclusion was that they did expect certain standards and could eventually be tough. So there was [sic] two sorts of messages in that; one, you better not forget about research and writing altogether and; two, you didn't have to produce two books or whatever to secure tenure in this department." 25

(Associate Professor, 11 years)

The comparisons are derived from not only the insight of observations involving personal experience, but also the experiences of those who have preceded the academic and, of course, the experiences of peers. The latter are particularly influential since it is peers that define the expectations that are in place through either their comments, actions, or as the next quote suggests - encounters with performance evaluations:

"You can feel or find out the expectations through observation. It often comes from precedents. In other words, a tenure and promotion faculty committee makes certain decisions this year about people. Now those decisions saying yes to this man [sic] and no to this man send out messages to the faculty."
Basically, that this man has been granted promotion because he did 'a'; and this man was not granted promotion because he didn't do 'b'. Now 'a' and 'b' may be the same thing, but one man did what was expected, the other didn't. That's a very informal and unstructured sort of going about, but this is the academic grapevine."

(Professor, 17 years)

When discussing the various processes that can potentially impinge upon the autonomy of academics it is inevitable that the discussion will eventually involve mechanisms of control related to the evaluation process. The emphasis in this section, which will continue into the next section, has been on how faculty attempt to reduce the uncertainty of what is expected of them. With few direct reference points, faculty were nonetheless able to define their roles as academics. That they were compelled to order these surroundings instead of having the tasks clearly explicited was seen as a result of liberal ideology. Constrained by the liberalism surrounding academia, those in positions of authority within a university are unable to set forth explicit guidelines. That this lack of explicitness does not unduly hamper the accumulation of status can be observed when attention is turned to the controls involved in the process of evaluation.

CONTROL THROUGH EVALUATION

Few subjects pertaining to academia could consistently draw the ire, frustration, and/or chagrin of
academics than discussions surrounding, what was termed in the introductory chapter, the external objective evaluation process. The term was chosen to differentiate it from the subjective evaluations academics make amongst themselves during the initiation and definitional stages. In addition, the establishment of tenure and promotion committees, with their publicized guidelines, projects the appearance of objectivity at the institutional level of evaluation. This thesis is in no position to categorically uphold or refute claims by academics that the evaluation process is one characterized more by ambiguity than objectivity. All that will be, and can be, put forth in this section is that irrespective of any deficiencies suggested by claims of ambiguity - real or imagined - the institutionally based evaluation process can still serve as an effective mechanism of control to ensure the desired institutional emphasis is accomplished.

Displeasure with the ambiguous nature of evaluation usually stemmed from claims by academics that the process was both inadequate and inconsistent. During the interviews, these terms frequently divided with respect to the tasks being evaluated. The label of inadequacy was affixed to evaluations of the teaching component, while inconsistency was charged against evaluations of research. Claims of inadequacy regarding teaching evaluations can be noted
quickly and summarized by academics with experience on tenure and promotion committees. Firstly, there was a negative clustering of opinion that stated student evaluations were a poor measurement of teaching. Secondly, since student evaluations were widely thought of as deficient, academics believed committees made tenure and promotion decisions, despite publicized statements to the contrary, on the basis of research. In summarizing these opinions, committee members would state:

"The evaluations [students] are looked at, then basically shuffled to one side to get on with the serious business [later affirmed to be an academic's research record]."

Professor 20 years

"In my experience [as a committee member] student evaluations cannot really help one get tenure or promotion. If you have a good research record, good teaching evaluations can make your case slightly stronger. If you have a good case without teaching evaluations and you then add teaching evaluations that happen to be poor - they don't really do you any damage. But if your research is not very distinguished and you have poor teaching, then the evaluations make you very vulnerable. Or I'll put it a little more briefly ... uhm, they can do you damage, but they can't do you much good. They can be used against you, but not for you."

(Associate Professor, 11 years)

Without access to either tenure and promotion committee meetings or the written records of such meetings (if any were made or kept) the veracity of such statements cannot be substantiated. However, this is of little consequence because it is the perception on the part of
academics that the above transpires which is of interest. The importance of such perceptions is the potential they have on shaping an academics attitude towards the task. If evaluations are perceived to be based on research as the result of a default in adequate measures of teaching, or because of a belief that research is the task institutional authority figures wish to emphasize, then it is highly probable individuals will take into account the expectations that are in place and order their labour accordingly:

There is a cynicism with regard to teaching that is very prevalent and I think growing. But in a sense the viewpoint that interacting with students is perhaps a waste of valuable time is a very realistic viewpoint. If people are operating in terms of the structure of the university, they know that the time they spend in the classroom and with most students out of class is time taken away from what's considered to be real scholarship."

(Associate Professor, 8 years)

Once the 'order' of the activities is determined, the difficulty for the academic is to calculate the output levels that will satisfy the requirements of evaluators. In the previous section it was noted that some academics initially referred to the tenure and promotion document for guidance when first hired. As the institutionally imposed hurdles of tenure and promotion are approached, the document spells out a variety of considerations, rules, and, importantly for some academics, the appeal procedures in the event of dissatisfaction with committee verdicts. The problem for the individual, according to by academics, is that inconsis
encies exist between what the rules state and what in fact happens.

Paradoxically, inconsistency can actually enhance the effectiveness of control, while presenting a confused picture to the onlooking academic who is being evaluated. This is not to say the inconsistency, and its accompanying shroud of ambiguity, is unproblematical for the evaluator. The combination of the ever-present constraints of liberal ideology and the lack of a single shopfloor serve to obscure any attempt by evaluators to define an accurate job description. Consequently, one of the most frequently used bases for the evaluation of workers' performance is unavailable. It is through the precise description of what a job constitutes that evaluations can be devised to determine whether the worker is accomplishing what the description indicates should be accomplished. The lack of a definitive job description effectively diminishes the likelihood that performance can be evaluated by explicitly stated criteria. Those in positions of authority when confronted with such a situation are alternately constrained and emancipated in such a situation. Constrained in the sense that precise knowledge of the work accomplished is unavailable. Emancipated because the evaluators can emphasize criteria deemed to be important, arbitrarily determine the broad requirements of performance to be achieved, and, just as easily, raise the requirements
necessary to attain a particular level.

The latter aspect was observed to cause the most confusion amongst academics because there are no direct references as to what will ensure a good evaluation. As noted at the end of the initiation section, there are indirect references of what is expected. The problem that emerges for the individual is that these expectations are not fixed; there is variance and fluctuation in the decision making process. The shifting expectations of the formal evaluation process is similar to the implications of changing market conditions on the selection process. Compare for instance the shifts in selection (p. 95) with comments first on tenure and then promotions:

"You see the rules are constantly changing. When I started, completion of the Ph.D. was the main criterion for tenure. Later it became articles from the dissertation. This has now increased to other articles."

(Associate Professor, 16 years)

"I think in terms of research they have become much more demanding. So what you could get promoted with in the earlier seventies, wouldn't get you promoted to a lesser rank nowadays ... uhm ... Maybe that's a little bit of an exaggeration, but definitely you need more articles today than you needed five years ago to get the same promotion."

(Associate Professor, 5 years)

The shift in expectations is problematic for the individual because one is always dealing with outdated comparisons, and on a broader scale of inconsistency - compositional changes in committee members. Thus, even
colleague comparisons are an imprecise method of determining productivity due to shifting demands:

"There is a shift and the shift is inequitable in the lines of expectations. Where the expectations are not clearly communicated far enough in advance, you are always working with last year's expectations - you don't know what next year's expectations are going to be. So if someone goes for promotion with three articles in three years and doesn't get promoted, and someone else gets promoted with five articles, well then you know the break even point is about four or five articles. But assuming that you may just be able to manage another two articles and then you go up for a promotion, and suddenly the expectations have changed. It's now seven or six, or maybe it has gone from one to three - whatever, and this can change very rapidly from year to year."

(Assistant Professor, 8 years)

That the changes in expectations can occur as rapidly as the above academic suggests was verified by other accounts given by academics, some of whom experienced the shifts first-hand:

"The year I came to McMaster was the last of the big hiring drives. I think there were five of us hired that year. Basically the expectations for granting tenure were quite modest by today's standards. All appointments were two year term appointments and we were told in an unofficial way that tenure was granted at the end of the contract, if you had completed your dissertation.... Well when we came up for tenure they wanted to give us another two year contract with tenure after the first year of the contract if we showed promise. Our chairman at the time, who was a pretty imposing personality, went to the committee and basically said that the rules were being changed in the middle of the game and it wasn't fair. We all got tenure, but looking back it's interesting how things were changing even then."

(Associate Professor, 16 years)

This leaves academics in a position with only
imprecise measurements to gauge sufficient output. They are left to their own devices to judge whether they have produced enough, while at the same time are never really certain whether their interpretations of the expectations coincide with evaluation committees. This ambiguity would appear to be an ineffective form of control if any attempt is being made to systematically accumulate the status at the institutional level. That it is not ineffective is due in large measure to two facets of the academic labour process. Firstly, and most obviously, ineffectiveness is minimized because individuals can easily identify where in academia the institutionally based rewards lie. Academics may not definitely know how much research they should produce, or what quality it should exhibit, but they are aware that a high degree of both brings rewards:

"Why I have decided to do research in the first place I’m not sure. I’m certain part of my decision to do research and my enthusiasm for it is because I know I will be rewarded. I mean there is an incentive-response system in place."

(Assistant Professor, 3 years)

When asked why the breakdown of time tended to be oriented towards research, for those academics who stated the majority of their time is spent on the research task, the typical response paralleled the above quote:

"Well two reasons, partly because of my own intrinsic motivation about what I want to do. But it’s also the system of rewards, how it works and what you get reinforced for doing. Since the majority of the reinforcements and rewards are
found in research, then you tend to expend your energy in getting grants and doing studies."
(Associate Professor, 11 years)

It is important to note that academics usually tempered the notion of reward orientation with the qualification that research was something that was internally motivating. This will be given greater attention in Chapter Five, but is mentioned here to avoid impressions that academics take a completely mercenary approach to their occupation. However, by the same token, academics are not as oblivious to the formal rewarding and non-rewarding of the tasks as the folklore surrounding academics normally suggests.

Thus, it seems likely that differential rewards to skills will alter some academics' orientations to the tasks for which they are responsible. Probably, digressing briefly to teaching again, over some broad salary and promotion range, an academic's allocation of time to alternate activities may be unresponsive to changes in the relative returns to teaching. However, beyond the point where the lower return of teaching causes more dissatisfaction than satisfaction, faculty may begin to cultivate alternative skills (Tuckman, 1976: 41). That this can happen is demonstrated by the following academic, who, when asked why research was recently taking up more time, replied:

"I’d say dissatisfaction with my career progress has been the motivating factor for switching to research. I personally enjoy teaching, but I’ve spent too much time on it in terms of my own progress relative to research."
(Assistant Professor, 12 years)
That academics view the acquisition of institutional rewards as directly related to research productivity is quite obvious. The question that remains is what effects does the ambiguity surrounding the quality and quantity of research have on production rates? It is at this point that the second facet of the argument that the evaluation process is not ineffective in achieving its ends becomes apparent. Without definitive criteria to ascertain whether productivity is sufficient, the academic does not have the option found in other work settings to restrict output.

Instead, a high level of output is necessary to garner the rewards that might not be received if productivity is low. With set rewards for certain levels of achievement and added bonuses for surpassing the basic level, output can be gauged, paced and collectively restricted. Without a ceiling, the institution avoids these common managerial problems of motivation. Encouragement through rewards in such a situation promotes self-interest in narrow individualistic ways. The academic, once involved in the labour process, can unintentionally reinforce upwardly spiraling production rates because the lack of clarity that encircles expectations encourages it. As with many controls in academia, appearances can be deceiving, the inadequacy and inconsistency suggested by ambiguity gives way to an underlying effective control:

"I didn't know what I needed in terms of numbers..."
or quality, or some combination of the two. I just worked as hard as I could, harder than I had to as I have subsequently found out, to get things ready for publication before I came up for tenure."

(Professor, 13 years)

The above quote and the one on the preceding page provide a fitting contrast when rank, years of service and commitment to research are observed. Although the two academics came to McMaster only a year apart, the one who claims to have emphasized teaching and is now embarking on a research program has remained an Assistant Professor. In the meantime the other academic has reached the rank of Full Professor. This can by no means be offered as conclusive evidence that research is emphasized, rewarded and that the ambiguity of the control mechanisms can produce such a discrepancy. It is obvious only a rigorous quantitative study that expressly examined the relationship between rank, years of service and publishing record could make such an assertion. All that can be stated at this point is that the above relationship appears to support earlier claims by academics that research is emphasized and controls/rewards are in place to achieve its production.

So far the pressures exerted upon academics has concentrated on the institutionally based controls and rewards. Since many of the decisions arrived at during the formal evaluation process are made by colleagues, it is not a simple matter to distinguish where evaluation ends and
peer pressures begin. The difficulty is primarily a result of the understanding that a university is as community. In a community there is, ideally, a meeting of equals, however, like Orwell's farm there can be stratifications to equality. Trevor Noble and Bridgette Pym (1970) observed that within a community of scholars there existed a receded locus of power. The individuals with influence could be detected by the various committees they sat upon. The composition of membership to important committees seemed to frequently reveal that the same people were involved (Noble and Pym, 1970: 437). To openly expose this nucleus of influence would run the risk of ruining the accepted definition of equality. However, as Noble and Pym mentioned, the opacity of the decision making process obscured the concentration of power and, by extension implied the right of status equals to be respected and consulted. (Noble and Pym, 1970: 433).

Since the political structure of McMaster is not likely to differ from other universities, the same phenomena no doubt occurs. However, of interest here is not the specifics of committee membership. This brief excursus into the political dimension of academia is mentioned to make the reader aware that there are academics who can exert greater pressures than others through their influence at the institutional level. The predispositions of those who are thought to be the academics with influence are generally well known:

"In a sort of unofficial way there is a kind of
hierarchy between teaching and research. In the sense that people who concentrate more of their time on research, or in that direction, tend to be the powerful individuals in the department." (Associate Professor, 4 years)

"The ones who the administration listens to, and are taken seriously, are by and large the ones who publish." (Assistant Professor, 9 years)

Before leaving the political realm altogether, it could be a matter of debate as to how these people became 'powerful'. For instance, are they in positions of authority solely because of the rather apolitical reason that they met publishing expectations, or are there other mitigating circumstances? That there was no comprehensive discussion by respondents on the political maneuvering that can be attempted in trying to get ahead was probably due to the interviews being concerned with occupational conformity as opposed to political conformity. The former is an expression of the form of an individual's labour. The latter is an expression, or lack thereof, of controversial issues and theoretical stances. This is not to say ingratiating oneself or compromising one's principles to further academic careers does not occur; there were a few allusions and passing references to suggest the contrary. However, they were not pursued because the issue was not of direct importance to understanding the institutionalized mechanisms of control and, perhaps more importantly, the researcher could not run the risk of appearing to be more interested in the gathering
of gossip and innuendo of the type associated with shady journalists and their tabloid employers.

Whatever the case may be in terms of how academics became 'powerful individuals', the pressures they exert both inside their departments and within the larger institution can shape the content of appraisals. During the section on selection process it was stated that people with research backgrounds were likely to implement hiring criteria based on the research potential of candidates. Later, they are likely to base formal rewards on research. Informally, peer pressure can be applied in ways that alternate between rewards and sanctions for the (non)production of research. A less than subtle form of informal pressure is the increasing trend among departments to issue a brochure containing the publications of the department's faculty:

"In the department every once and a while we make an inventory of all the publications of the people in the department. You don't get a formal letter saying you Dr. ______ are at the bottom of the pile - you're not pulling your load.... I suppose it's up to you to recognize the message contained in these inventories. If they're doing this list obviously they want publications to cite in it."

(Assistant Professor, 2 years)

Lewis B. Mayhew (1970: x) noted that as academic departments gain strength, which he defined as research potential, they become a force for expansion themselves. Academics realize where the strength lies and the direction
in which expansion is likely to proceed. They have a vested interest in a research department, for one's own career is tied with the reputation of the department and the colleagues that comprise the department:

"When someone publishes something in a good journal there’s an implicit recognition that the person has done a good job. Part of the congratulations goes to the person, but there is also the recognition that its good for the department. It raises the status of the department."

(Professor, 17 years)

"I think people who make up the institution are concerned about the status of the institution. There’s a practical element, the higher the status of an institution, the easier it is for you to attract research money and money to do other things. If you’re at Harvard, it’s very easy to get money, if you’re at a lesser university it’s much more difficult. You need people producing research to generate income."

(Associate Professor, 9 years)

In such a situation, a non-research producing colleague can become a liability. In contrast, due to the above stated benefits of research production, the superior status of researchers makes them more desirable as colleagues (Blau, 1974: 274). The teachers make few contributions to the accumulation of status and therefore, the likelihood of employing them in the first place must be minimized. Once hired, the academic faces the normative pressures of colleagues who are producing.

Those doing the pressuring have already consented to the logic of the reward structure and the control it represents. When this occurs one of the most sophisticated
levels of control has been achieved. Drawing on Richard C.
Edwards, the most sophisticated level of control grows out of
incentives for workers to identify themselves with the
enterprise, to be loyal, committed and thus self-directed or
self-controlled. Such behaviour involves what may be called
the 'internalization' of the enterprises goals and values
(Edwards, 1974: 150). That academics succumb to such a
refined control was openly admitted:

"I think I have imbibed, probably, the standards of
the university to some extent. That yes, we have
to protect ourselves in a competitive situation.
We need to hold our own against others, and the
only way to do that is to use their standards."
(Professor, 18 years)

That the standards were research related was admitted
openly, and in order to achieve the standards colleagues must
publish. Those that produce do not receive many of the more
obvious institutional rewards. In addition, there are the
sanctions imposed upon them by peers during informal
interactions. The informality was mentioned earlier when
academics spoke of how colleagues subtly (and not so subtly)
frowned upon the amount of time spent on teaching. The
informality can actually be extended to the curtailment of
interaction, in effect a form of ostracism takes place:

"The pressure gets communicated in as subtle a way
as not asking your advice as much as anyone else's
advice."
(Assistant Professor, 10 years)

"If you're not doing research you're simply not
taken that seriously."
(Professor, 7 years)
These two responses are similar in content but the perspective from which they were articulated during the interviews was different. The quote from the Assistant Professor was explaining the personal feelings experienced while serving on departmental committees. The succeeding Professor's quote was issued as a negative attitudinal response towards the contributions a non-researcher makes to his/her department from the point of view of someone who wanted to be identified as a researcher. These two particular quotes were used because again they come from people with stated differential commitments to research and there is again a disparity in rank achievement in favour of the researcher.

The above quotes, when taken in quick succession, have a consistent logic. Communication amongst colleagues in a department will naturally revolve around the respective interests of individuals. Although research in most cases is a private endeavour, not to contribute to research is a far more isolating experience. The non-researcher alienates him/herself by not contributing to the task the organization and colleagues put a premium on. Importantly, the isolation is all the more persuasive because peers in academia are not confined to the department or institution. Beyond these physical sites is the discipline at large, and
the lack of research does nothing to improve interactions at this level:

"Most of the interaction with our peers is research oriented. You don't go to conferences with people from other universities to talk about how best to teach courses. If you're not researching and producing, well what you've got [sic] to talk about with your peers becomes pretty limited."

(Associate Professor, 14 years)

If we remain with the institution and an academic's immediate colleagues, the pressure of ostracism may not be so much one of conscious commission, but more an act of omission premised upon the belief that there are few mutual interests. Lack of productivity is interpreted as suggesting the individual is unaware of the latest developments in the subject. Thus, the individual's opinions are perceived to be of limited utility and are not sought.

Amateur psychologizing would state that, since colleagues can be conceived of as the primary reference group, the ostracism probably has at least some minimal effects on the targeted individuals self-esteem and feelings of worth as an academic. However, when indifference and/or neglect through the lack of communication are the pressures, they can to a certain extent be ignored. More troublesome for the individual is that this relatively passive, informal pressure can evolve into a more active articulation of dissatisfaction with the lack of research productivity. It takes a strong constitution to withstand concentrated
pressure, and as the following quote demonstrates, an academic will on occasion attempt to remedy the situation:

"We have had assessment done on the department. In general the reviews are quite good. In the last review we had a statement which for all intents and purposes stated that one member of the department should be cut. This individual hadn't published in, well, it doesn't matter. So a meeting was convened which was not precisely titled 'what to do with professor x', but essentially it turned out that way. Needless to say professor x was not in attendance. I'm not sure if the person was even informed. Anyways this professor felt the pressure and has since presented a paper."

(Rank and year withheld).

(I-7-18-30)

The above is an extreme example of peer pressure, and by all accounts not one that is frequently pursued. Usually if the academic does not comprehend that the neglect is a result of inactive research production and, therefore, does little to remedy the situation, other uses for the person are found. Time consuming administrative tasks and/or high enrollment undergraduate courses are increasingly relegated to the non-researcher.

"There are some people who are reasonable teachers who haven't published and there is a sense, 'well let's at least put their teaching skills to good use'."

(Associate Professor, 18 years)

"Most of us would not be the least bit unhappy if you took away our committee work. So if you're not holding up your end of the research side, the easiest thing to do for everybody else is to dump their committee work on you ... (pause) ... and I, for one, don't see anything wrong with it."

(Associate Professor, 8 years)
From a negative perspective, informal pressure may be exerted through the realization, that should one not produce sufficiently, numerous committee memberships and undesirable courses may await. This bête noire may itself provide a motivating factor to become, or remain, a productive researcher. That an obligation to produce research created by the academic subculture can force some professors into an activity which they may find irksome and/or to which they may not be suited is suggested by the previous quotes on the lack of return for teaching and the pressured professor presenting a paper. However, seen in a more positive light, the intent of the above is to release those who are productive researchers – with the proviso that the extra release time will in fact produce tangible results. Both perspectives can be observed in the following quote:

"The teaching load in this department is light – very light. It's fortunate we have it and the only reason we have it is because there's one person who takes on the first year course virtually single-handedly. All I can say is I'm glad it's ____ and not me, yet the implicit understanding is that because of the light teaching load, we should be doing research."

(Assistant Professor, 3 years)

SUMMARY

The positive perspective referred to above indicates that there is a mixture of choice and pressure involved. So far, the choice has been mediated by a number of external processes that shape the academic labour process. The
attitudes of academics and how they view their occupation has been presented as being intricately bound to the processes they experience. It was noted that a more pervasive form of control is limited by a number of social forces and conventions. However, the lack of explicitness was not particularly problematic, because explicitness was not found to be necessary to achieve the proper orientations that would secure status accumulation. The evaluation process allows, from an organizational standpoint, a means of controlling employees while at the same time appearing to play a non-interventionist role. This chapter has dealt almost exclusively with external pressures exerted on academics. It is up to the next chapter to develop the degree of autonomy academics have with regard to the 'choices' they make, and in the process, develop a discussion on internal controls.

CHAPTER FOUR END NOTES

18. Wilson himself was surprised at how many of the issues, including the scarcity of employment, were similar almost forty years later (Wilson, 1979: 3).

19. See Finkelstein (1984: 90) for an elaboration of this explanation.

20. A more definite answer requires the implementation of a longitudinal study. Such a study would attempt to measure shifting attitudes in relation to changing market conditions and career possibilities.

21. Some academics were quite adamant about their desire to leave the States during the late sixties and early seventies. Canada in general was attractive not only for the occupational opportunities, but there were also economic
incentives (a tax free income) and a less restive socio-
political climate. The expanding McMaster also drew people
who came to do what can appropriately be termed as 'pioneer
work'. These were individuals hired during the middle years
of the 1960's to oversee the development of specific areas of
inquiry, whether it be the beginning of new departments or
the organizing of graduate programs within established
departments. A host of other reasons prevailed as well,
ranging from the superior recreational facilities of McMaster
(compared for example to McGill) to the convenient location
of McMaster to the University of Toronto library (which could
be interpreted as a vague form of research commitment).

22. Or conversely, provoke disaffection, frustration
and indifference which eventually affects the level of
production. The outcome once again, defeats the purpose of
instituting the controls (Storey 1983: 186).

23. Fortunately for Western society, academics as a
whole are not the vanguards of widespread social, economic or
provide the political positions of American academics and
their attitudes on social and political issues. They contend
that while academics display a high degree of liberalism
relative to other occupational groups, they are in no sense
of the term 'radical'. Halsey and Trow (1971) arrived at the
same conclusions when studying British academics, see their
chapter titled, Politics, especially p. 43.

24. The researcher and academics realized that certain
comments, and/or specific references when additional
individual background was provided (i.e., comments of an
academic who also happened to be a (ex) chairman, or awards
and honours bestowed) could identify the person - should
anyone be inclined to cross reference rank with years at the
university. In such cases where this was a possibility, or
where the subject matter was deemed sensitive by the academic
and absolute anonymity was requested, the researcher gave
assurances that only a reference number would be used. The
reference numbers are included with the relevant quotes to
provide the reader with the information that the same
academic is continually being quoted.

25. As an aside, this particular individual went on to
concur with the basic argument put forth in the selection
process section, stating that since arriving, the
expectations have increased due to, among other things, the
greater selectivity afforded institutions in a buyers market.

26. For an example see the McMaster Academic Guide
27. This is not particularly unique to universities, but a phenomenon which occurs in most institutions and work settings.

28. Institutionally based rewards refers to those rewards that are normally associated with institutional progress i.e., tenure, promotion and salary increments.

29. One other institutionally bestowed reward has not been discussed - sabbaticals - they will be dealt with when controls surrounding rank differentials is addressed in Chapter Five.

30. There were only three brief comments that referred to advancing, or being held back, because of political reasons and only one extended account of self-serving political obsequiousness.

31. In fact no study dealing with the academic reward structure attributed the same rewards to teaching. Studies consistently found that faculty who publish are more likely to be rewarded with promotion and salary increases than for any other activity (Katz, 1974: 470, Tuckman, 1976: 87, Finkelstein, 1984). In one of the more comprehensive studies, Trow and Fulton (in Trow, 1975: 76) noted that for almost every age group over 35, those who had high publication rates were several times (a minimum of two and a half times) more likely to be professors than those who were inactive. As well a higher proportion of active researchers are tenured at age 35-39 than inactive men or women twenty years older.

32. McMaster also published an institutionally wide list of faculty publications during the mid seventies. After three academic years it was discontinued. Publications of Faculty and Staff - 1973-74 (74-75, 75-76). Hamilton, Ontario: McMaster University, 1974 (75, 76).

33. Research is at times conducted co-operatively. The pressures in this case are far more obvious and need not be dealt with in great detail. Indicators of where time should be allocated become centered around what the group wants to accomplish. The pressure felt by the individual is to carry an equal portion of the research.
"Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?" (asked Alice)

"That depends a good deal on where you want to go," said the Cat.

A confused Alice was not entirely grateful to the Cheshire Cat for its intractable reply. The deeper, existential nature of the reply was no doubt a part of Alice's chagrin, but more immediately was the simple problem of direction. As final arbiter of both the philosophical and pedestrian questions, the responsibility caused a certain degree of consternation. In academia, the more profound existentialism of the Cat may not be quite so unlimited, but academics can be exposed to a myriad of permutations when attempting to organize their labour.

Of course personal decisions regarding the organization of academic work is in no small way influenced by the high status of research and/or the external controls and rewards designed to ensure its production. However, the presence of externalities presents an imperfect and incomplete picture of the motivations that pressure academics to pursue the research component of the academic labour process. The previous chapter emphasized the more coercive factors
experienced by academics and thus by implication noted how academic autonomy can be constrained. This chapter moves away from what until now could be termed a primarily mechanistic approach to the controls on academics to produce research. But academics are not entirely passive entities constantly reacting to market demands, there are elements of voluntarism present and they play an active part in establishing the parameters of occupational autonomy. Voluntarism is by definition premised on the ability to make choices, and the purpose of this chapter is to delve into the choices academics are able to make regarding the research task. An academic's voluntaristic ability has already been briefly dealt with in the previous chapter where decisions revolving around the selection process were discussed. This chapter expands the initial choices of institutional selectivity to encompass the choices academics make across the labour process as a whole. Of equal importance is to determine the motivations that underline any choices that are made. As the chapter progresses, academic autonomy will be revealed as an occupational distinction that is not merely bestowed, but developed, extended and even hindered by academics through their active participation in research. The intimated contradictions inherent in achieving autonomy will need to be addressed if we are to eventually arrive at some satisfactory conclusions concerning the amount of control individuals in academia exercise when making
decisions regarding their labour.

1. RESEARCH - PUBLISHED RESEARCH DISTINCTION REVISITED

If external controls do not fully account for the production of research then other factors must be involved. One element that should not be overlooked is a predisposition on the part of academics towards research. If this is the case, it could be stated that any of the controls previously mentioned are essentially a further enticement over and above the interests an academic already possesses. Unfortunately, such an all encompassing statement is far too simplistic and overlooks the complex motivations that surround individual emphases on research.

Previous research has exposed a division within the professoriate over where interests lie. Trow (1975: 41-43) found that half of the academics employed at "High Quality" institutions claimed they were research oriented (the other fifty percent stated their interests as leaning towards teaching). In "Medium Quality" institutions, the percentage interested in research dropped to forty percent. Lipset and Ladd (1975: 10), in one of the most comprehensive studies of academia, were surprised to find that a mere four percent of academics stated their interests in research were "very heavy", and only twenty-five percent said their interests were "heavy" in research. In the most recent large scale report on academics in the United States (Boyer, 1986),
researchers noted that sixty-three percent of all faculty and nearly forty percent of those at universities "known for research" indicated their interests lie towards teaching as opposed to research and in addition have little desire to do so. No quantified data exists regarding McMaster, but if there is similarity across institutions, how can the shift in research emphasis of academics in Chapter Four be accounted for?

The use of the term "scholarly research" is significant, for scholarship in all these studies is synonymous with publication and this distinction is an important consideration when an academic's autonomy of action is investigated. When academics in this study were asked whether they preferred the research task to others, their first inclination was to ask how the term research was being used. At first this was puzzling, but it soon became apparent that they discerned, as has this thesis in Chapter Three, a difference between research and published research.

When research was broadly defined as a careful systematic study or investigation in some field of knowledge, academics were inclined to view research as something intrinsically motivating. Their willingness to engage in research stemmed from an inner directed volition which ranged from a simple interest in the subject matter, to the challenge of finding solutions to particular problems. Left out of the equation were any references to external criteria
influencing their decision to delve into an area of inquiry:

"Well you get into the field because.... curiosity prods you every now and then. You may read or hear about something in your field and you get excited. Now how you decide to channel that excitement is a highly personal thing."

(Professor, 24 years)

Of course that channelled excitement can ultimately express itself in publishing. For some, the process of conceptualizing, writing, and revising their research was the best way to realize their full potential as academics. To aim for their research to eventually be published, lent the task a purpose that developed the individual intellectually by demanding a systematic organization of one's thoughts. The end, publication, was important only in that the means to achieve it were in themselves a fulfilling and positive learning process:

"I seem to understand things better when I write them out clearly. To work it through to the point where it's publishable - then find my understanding of the topic takes a leap forward. And I find it does this in a way that reading just doesn't do."

(Professor, 14 years)

For others, publication was seen in the same idealistic terms, but also incorporated a more profound attitude towards the value of publishing research. Interest in a particular field became coupled with a genuine desire to share their findings with others. In such cases, the sharing
process had the additional advantage of improving an academic's research through the feedback they received after an article or book was published. Publishing becomes a form of responsibility and the pressure the individual feels is one of helping to extend the parameters of the discipline— to use a typical phrase—to push back the frontiers of knowledge. Academics who were inclined to view research as a responsibility were often prone to talk about personal standards that motivated them to produce research for publication and/or were concerned about their long term effect in their respective fields:

"I start from a set of criteria. First, I ask is this going to make a significant impact on what other people are doing? Will it be a valuable contribution to their work? Will it be remembered five years hence? If the answer to these questions is yes, then it must be published. One has an obligation to put it out."

(Professor, 17 years)

"I published because I'm responsible to posterity, I guess. Because the status of this subject ten years after I have retired should be a little better than if I had never existed."

(Professor, 19 years)

II. A VIEW WITH ROOM

The above standards and sense of responsibility are admirable, but they were not particularly widespread among respondents. It is not a coincidence that the altruistic reasons for publishing were mostly articulated by Professors.
From their vantage point at the top of the hierarchy, they were able to view what was occurring below them, while at the same time had room to decide the directions in which their careers would proceed. The luxury of reflecting upon the value of one's research to the discipline, along with the less advertised absence of any deadlines to meet, gave Professors the opportunity to be philosophically idealistic about publishing. At times they inadvertently revealed why research was done by their more junior colleagues, but which they as Full Professors did not have to become involved.

"There is no higher rank, which means I am not pressured to publish in order to swell a vitae or to look good in order to get a promotion. Therefore, I can afford the old rule that I have adopted, 'I will not write because I have to say something, I will only write if I have something to say'. Now if I don't think I have something to say, I won't submit it for publication. The journals are just too cluttered with third rate stuff - mainly from people who need to produce something whether it's good or not. I'm sure if half the stuff in journals never saw daylight nobody would be worse off - except of course the author."

(Professor, 13 years)

Allusions to the "clutter of the third rate stuff" can be found in just about any book or article on academia. The general consensus of researchers who investigate the relationship between academics and research find that the emphasis on publication has resulted in needless repetition of research done elsewhere (Porter, 1971:31 Tuckman, 1976:79, Fulton, 1986:239); superficial research endeavours (Caplow
and McGee, 1965:190, Blau, 1973:104); and the production of research that goes unread (Weiss in Martin, 1970:193, Crane, 1970:239). One writer in rhetorical solemnity was moved to ask, "Is humanity the wiser for the agglomeration of new knowledge, or has knowledge merely strengthened the oppressors of the world?" (Fulton, 1986:234). The answer to Fulton's question may be neither; instead a variation of one of Parkinson's Laws provides a clue. Parkinson noted that information increases in accordance with the capacity to provide for it - not in accordance with any specific need for it.

As academic market conditions changed during the 1970's, and a heavier reliance upon publication became the major benchmark of an academic's worth, academics were compelled to adapt. As production climbed so too did the capacity to provide a forum for it. Logan Wilson, writing in 1978, was surprised to learn from Ulrich's International Periodical Dictionary that in the field of Sociology alone there were some 330 publications that academics could choose from when submitting their research.

Academics as a whole were quick to point out the "clutter", not only within journals but also in the general quality of journals currently available. Seldom were they loathe to make disparaging comments regarding the quality of research produced. In fact, the term "garbage" was the most
frequently used descriptive term when reference was made to published material. However, few Full Professors, or those with tenure, were willing to admit that they had sullied themselves by submitting sub-standard research for publication to advance their careers. (In actuality, perhaps few did. Depending upon when senior academics were due for tenure or promotion the pressures to publish were not as evident because of the previously stated options a sellers market provided.) Those academics that were candid about their motivations to produce research while ascending the academic hierarchy tended to rationalize their actions by spreading the blame around or brushed it off with inspired wit:

"I think like a lot of people I did a certain amount of mining of my dissertation and published things that were certainly of no great contribution to anything."

(Associate Professor, 14 years)

"I would in all honesty have to say that to get a list of publications I submitted material that was awful...(pause, grin)...spell that o-f-a-l."

(Associate Professor, 11 years)

This thesis has neither the time nor the inclination for moralizing on the topic of academics publishing research of questionable value at artificially high levels. The motivations to do so are easy to understand and will be elaborated upon further as the chapter progresses. Of
primary importance is to understand that, like Alice in the opening quote, the critical decision an academic must make is in choosing the direction in which one wishes to proceed. As one professor noted in a response worthy of the Chesire Cat:

"It depends, I suppose on how far up the ladder you want to reach. If you want to be at the top, then presumably you're going to spend your time doing research. Invariably there's competition between yourself and others in the department for positions. A competition, I might add, that has become fiercer as universities find themselves with tighter budgets."

(Professor, 32 years)

Overlooked in the literature and by many academics is whether the climb to the top was worth the effort. Quite evidently if job and financial security are a priority, then for most the climb is well worth the hardship. There is, however, a downside to publication for some academics. Those who were sensitive to their own intellectual growth wondered if field specialization had hampered their broader knowledge of the discipline. For these academics, their career devotion to publishing produced results that were not seen as entirely positive:

"For 15 to 20 years I turned out perhaps more than the average academic in terms of verbiage, articles and books, but what I am conscious of is that I had not the time to really read as deeply and as widely in (subject) as I wanted. I look at some of my other colleagues who do not get peer or international recognition because they have published less..."
than I and I'm aware that they have read more and in some senses they are better scholars than I am."

(Professor, 18 years)

The above retrospective view was not widely stated, for the most part senior academics accepted the competition and occupational obstacles as a probationary period where they established their scholarly credentials. As with any rites de passage, there were expressions of self-satisfaction at having risen to the challenge and an enjoyment in reaping the benefits. With respect to the latter, the most cherished reward for having demonstrated their ability was the elimination of more obvious external controls. New pressures emerge, but gone is the pervasive competition between colleagues. As academics climb the hierarchy, those in positions of authority were able to exercise their power to foster competition among individuals by granting or with-holding promotions, postponing or accelerating them, and through the distribution of merit increases. Once at the top, the incentives to produce research are, in the words of those who have obtained the senior most rank, "thrown out". No higher rank is available and the tighter budgets which have increased competition in lower ranks no longer provide monetary incentives for a Full Professor to continue publishing:

"Once you're near the top end of the salary profile, the scale for salary increments is negligible - especially in the last, say, half
decade or so. Money doesn’t play a factor anymore. I mean if anyone told me to publish a few articles this year and I’ll get an extra 200 dollars...well, that’s laughable.”

(Professor, year withheld)
(I-3-5-37)

Monetary factors or job security are no longer coercive elements involved in pressuring Full Professors to publish, but this should not be construed as evidence that the internal controls that pressure academics to continue publishing are purely altruistic. At a quick glance it would be easy to mistakenly assume that what is being suggested here is a type of U-curve with respect to altruism and publishing. The academics, similar to Beckers’ subjects in The Boys in White (Becker, et al., 1961), have a high degree of initial idealism upon entering the occupation which fades with early experience, only to return later as a modified, tempered idealism. Such a proposition would require a broad based longitudinal study of academics, mere interviewing would not be able to control for the influence of market conditions. All that can be stated, based on interviews, is that there is a pragmatic approach associated with publications across all ranks. The major difference being senior academics understand and sometimes share the motivations of junior colleagues, whereas junior academics are realistic about how occupational security and personal autonomy is achieved and they adjust their labour accordingly.
Full Professors acknowledged that one of the most prominent reasons for continuing to publish was personal pride. This pride did not necessarily contain a selflessness or even a responsibility to the discipline. It was a pride that appeared to be activated by a very basic psychological insecurity which invariably took into account the activities of other members in the department. The expression of pride was a fear of being left behind in their respective fields. The salient identity of the academic as researcher is jeopardized if other academics consider the individual to be the departmental albatross, or worse, the butt of every resentful joke made by junior members who feel that their upward mobility is being blocked by an unproductive colleague. Attempts to avoid the literal translation of "Emeritus" finds Full Professors responding defensively about their continued research activity:

"One doesn't like to get known as a dodo, or a guy who shot his bolt and done everything he's ever likely to do and now you can forget him."

(Professor, 21 years)

Personal pride could also become tinged with a troublesome conscience, especially when tenure and promotion decisions are being made. As was first mentioned in Chapter Three and again in Chapter Four, to get tenure today much more is expected in the way of research output than ten or fifteen years ago. However, those who comprise tenure and
promotion committees, normally Full Professors and senior, tenured Associate Professors, are in the position of applying criteria they may not have been able to meet either when they were up for advancement, or perhaps even with their present credentials. Budgetary politics aside, a typical scenario and the potential for engendering guilt was described at length by one Full Professor:

"A concrete case would be one that is going on in this department right now. Someone's getting turned down for tenure, or has been recommended to be turned down, where ten years ago they would have easily gotten it. It's a very trying time because what you have are senior professors who are imposing higher standards on their junior colleagues than what was expected of them. Now if any standards are going to change this has to happen, but it's a hard transition. It is also a hard change to justify to a junior faculty member and can create a great deal of friction. If you're being told NO by some one who was told YES, who has the same record, or worse, it's easy to understand the resentment of the person who's being denied. As a member of the committee I can look around at the other committee members, or the department, and can say, 'there but for the fortune of the time go you - even I for that matter.' You can feel shame or relief, in the end we all have to live with ourselves, and I'm sure some of my colleagues take refuge in the rationalization of improving standards. I have tried to remain active by publishing so I don't feel too much like a hypocrite when enforcing standards I never had to meet or would be unable to meet."

(Professor, 17 years)

III. LOWER RANK CONTRAST

At the opposite end of the spectrum the motivations to publish involving selflessness, personal pride and/or guilt
are, if not outrightly rejected, submerged by the weight of personal ambitions to survive and "succeed" in academia. The untenured are in the midst of a competitive situation, and while the impetus to produce research is not as stark as Coleridge's 'two great giants leagued together - bread and cheese', there is a sense of urgency when discussing publications that is noticeably suppressed among senior faculty. The personal ambition that drives untenured academics is more materialistically based and results oriented. As the following quote suggests, publication is geared to meeting externally set criteria and involves an awareness of the prevailing market conditions and expectations:

"To be blunt, I put a lot more time into research before I got tenure than after I got it...Last year was my first tenured year and I've slacked off the research. Before tenure I was overallocating time to research simply because I wanted to make sure I got tenure here, and if I didn't get tenure here, when I went to the market, the most important selling point would be the research. So that was my insurance policy."

(Associate Professor, 4 years)

It must be underlined that academics, irrespective of rank, are not adverse to participating in research. Their training and inclinations are such that research is an attractive proposition. It is the institutionalized emphasis on publication that engenders resentment and leaves any feelings of self-satisfaction a distant second behind the by-products of the rewards that publication offers. External
demands recede upon tenure and promotion, but for the untenured the pursuit of rewards associated with research is unavoidable. Standards of excellence are a luxury limited to those who no longer have to cater to the expectations of those in positions of authority. In place of excellence, the dominant ethos for the junior faculty member becomes expediency. A poignant contrast between Full Professor and an untenured Assistant is found in a previous quote (p. 144) where the Professor sets out personal criteria for publishing, and the excerpt below:

"I just finished an article and have submitted it to [prestigious journal]. Now if it doesn’t get accepted, or they want revisions that are going to take up too much of my time, I’ll just turn around and submit it to (journal) and so on down the line. Sure I’d like the article in a top flight journal where it’s more likely to be read, but mainly I want it in print."

(Assistant Professor, 3 years)

The ideal of publication succumbs to the reality of being a necessary and time consuming step. Some periodicals have strict formats and academics were prone to complaining about how the issues addressed are sometimes ignored due to the preoccupation with an article’s length, the structural restrictions on introductions and conclusions, or even the decision of where to submit an article based on its theoretical or methodological content. The emphasis on publication can affect individual autonomy through the way in
which academics are compelled to approach their research. Nowhere is this more telling than for the untenured, who, by wishing to overcome the hurdle of tenure, feel they must co-opt their research by "packaging" it correctly:

"Tenure certainly affects the kind of research you do, before you get tenure the research is directed towards getting articles in journals... Writing a book is a bit more of a riskier proposition. There is more time involved and getting a publisher could present a problem. It's also seen as kind of pompous to only be directing your efforts towards a book - almost as if you haven't earned your stripes so no one is going to believe in the existence of your book. So before getting tenure your research is definitely directed towards getting little segments of things done and having them packaged as papers."

(Assistant Professor, 6 years.)

IV. REALIZING AUTONOMY THROUGH KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION

(i) Retaining Control

Even if approaches to research are modified or packaged by the academic to ensure tenure is achieved, the individual still retains a great deal of control over the work performed. This control, and the corresponding autonomy it confers, is often assumed to be a derivative of academics being "professionals." Indeed, many writers on the subject are prone to freely intersperse their discussions with reference to professionalism (Hughes, 1958, Millett, 1961, Caplow and McGee, 1965, Finkelstein, 1984). The problem with such studies is that they are vague in defining
what the term professional means, and do not elaborate upon the controls such a model presupposes. The model is taken for granted and thus there is never any consideration of whether it is even applicable.

It can be stated that academia and academics share few of the structural and attitudinal properties of professional occupations. Structurally, they are both 'full-time' endeavours, and there are training schools whereby the socially defined prerequisites for participation in the occupation are achieved. Attitudinally, there is a general ethos which places a priority on self-regulation and autonomy. The former refers to colleague control of the occupation, and the latter concerns the ability of the individual to make their own decisions.

There are, however, fundamental differences between the professions and academia. Where academia most noticeably diverges from the professional model is when the attitudinal desire of colleague control is faced with the structural reality that no professional association exists. The formation of a professional association normally plays the role of a guardian of standards, the aim is to eliminate from the profession practitioners who are deemed incompetent (Hall, 1973:121). In academia there is no monitoring of performance such as those found in the medical profession where, for example, operations are monitored and licenses can
be withdrawn if individuals perform too many or execute them incompetently (Riesman, 1961:252). There is in Canada the Canadian Association of University Teachers (CAUT), but it does not have the just mentioned licensing authority of a medical association or Bar Society. Ethical codes are thereby unenforceable in any legalistic sense (Wilson, 1979:150). Of course there are stated administration guidelines which provide details and procedures for dismissal when responsibilities are neglected, but rarely are they activated. The awareness of a lack of professional association is evident among academics, as are its implications:

"I don't see any notion of professionalism at this university. I mean professional in the legal or medical sense... We don't have a board of ethics to which we are bound. There is only an informal hierarchy and status within the organization, with no notion of kicking out the shits [i.e. the less than competent]."

(Professor, 19 years)

Even if the mechanisms of dismissal are brought to bear, and an academic loses his/her position at a university, this does not preclude the individual from practicing elsewhere. This has led to much haranguing in academia, especially over academics abusing the tenure system. The authors of such treatises claim that tenure has come to represent nothing more than a glorified pension plan. They downplay or ignore the subtle pressures that colleagues can exert in keeping others active in publishing and the
potential loss of status that threatens an academic's identity, if research is not maintained. More narrowly, they see only that dimension of tenure related to job security and then appeal for the adoption of a professional association to ensure that the knowledge acquired is sufficient and demonstrable.

The lack of a parallel professional association is only one obvious difference between the professions and academia, but it highlights the central importance of knowledge and the controls surrounding the knowledge base of an occupation. When just knowledge is discussed, academia and the professions differ in the relationship individuals have with respect to knowledge. Professional occupations which rely on knowledge to legitimate positions of power, status and wealth, normally acquire the knowledge from others in a restricted, uni-portal environment. Rather than creating new knowledge, they merely put what they have learned to use in a work setting - ever mindful to keep the knowledge beyond the everyday use of lay people. Their monopoly on the knowledge represents authority since they possess information which others do not (Johnson, 1972:58). More importantly, knowledge possession is strengthened by a politically bestowed exclusive right to use the knowledge. Academia does not have the same claims to exclusivity, others trained in the various disciplines who do not work in academia can
legitimately use the relevant skills and knowledge in their work setting. However, of greater significance, in academia there is (ideally) no distinction between the individual who develops the knowledge and the person who uses it. With the academic as catalyst, the end result, borrowing a term from labour process theorists, is an occupation where individuals are able to exercise a qualitatively different "real control" when they work. Qualitatively different in the sense that it is not politically legislated but dependent upon individual ability.

(ii) Real Control

The real control aspect refers to the degree of control the worker has in a particular work setting in relation to the products produced. When workers have real control in their occupation there is no separation between the conception of the work and its execution (Gartman, 1982:92). This is particularly the case with research production, which ideally is the generation of new knowledge. If one considers research and its publication as new knowledge production, then the academic is one of the few within a particular area with the ability to produce it. Where outsiders, or those not intimately involved, have little understanding of how the research is conceived and developed, the mastery the individual exhibits allows for a general authority derived from 'imputed expertise' (Freidson, 1973:24). This expertise
is similar to professionals, but is differentiated by an individualistic claim to uniqueness. Anyone in an administrative position has little or no power to decide the specific amount of time spent on a task, or what it will eventually comprise. There are the residual persuaders of withholding rewards if research is not forthcoming, but this does not altogether negate the high level of discretionary content (the diffuse definition of the occupation) academics enjoy with respect to their labour (Fox, quoted in Littler, 1982:7-8). The more diffusely defined an occupation, the higher the discretionary content and, hence, the greater the autonomy the individual is likely to have over the work performed.

With discretionary content in hand, occupational direction becomes the purview of the individual. As has been illustrated in this chapter, differences exist between the degree of choice. Tenure would appear to be the most obvious dividing line. Those desiring tenure still have real control, but their products need to be directed towards publication. External controls are weakened once tenure is granted and thus the ability to pressure academics to produce is correspondingly decreased. With tenure, many of the impediments to the full realization of control are removed. It could be expected that academics would, if they so desired, either let up on their research as the one
Associate Professor remarked earlier (p. 153), or become less enamoured with the rigours of publishing:

"When I submit something now and it comes back with suggestions or criticisms, I just file it. I used to spend hours redoing an article, now I just can't be bothered."

(Associate Professor, 9 years)

The discretionary content afforded academics allow them to exercise the option of the above Associate Professor in deciding to just 'file' articles that are not accepted by journals outright. Similarly, given real control of the labour process academics may, once tenured, choose to try and sink into what Aubern Waugh termed 'a life of benign inactivity'. For those unconcerned with further advancement after tenure, or who are at the highest rank and salary level so that job security is no longer an issue, the decision to relax the pace of publishing or terminate it altogether is certainly one option (but an option that is not without its consequences). However, extending beyond the discretionary content that is enhanced once tenure is granted, is the ever-present formal control of the labour process.

(iii) Formal Control

Technically, formal control is the legal separation of workers from the ownership of the means of production (Gartman, 1978:101). As such it occurs in the marketplace and is readily observable where almost any capitalist
endeavor is initiated. Private ownership of the work site gives the purchaser of labour the power to set the initial conditions of employment and therefore decide who will be employed. Depending upon market conditions, there will be variability in the amount of competition for jobs and in opportunities to move from one employer to another. However, even if markets fluctuate, formal control is still retained by the employer. Simply stated, to be a steel-worker one needs to be employed by a steel company. Similarly, to qualify as an academic one has to work at a university. This statement of the obvious aside, it is important in that although academics have real control over their labour, there is still the institutionalized formal control that must be taken into consideration. With persons in positions of authority at other universities controlling who they choose to hire, there is the awareness on the part of academics that they are also making a priori decisions on what skills are deemed valuable when filling positions.

By not publishing the academic is by default relinquishing choices in the extended labour market beyond the institution, and thereby must be content at the employing institution. Autonomy of action is delimited by the present institution and in essence dependent upon it. Apart from the potential ostracism academics invite when they no longer continue to publish, they, along with others, are aware of
other repercussions:

"If you stop publishing I think even your closest friends start worrying about you. They know that you have become vulnerable to the administration."

(Associate Professor, 8 years)

The vulnerability referred to is that academics can be left in a position of powerlessness. When salaries are frozen or cutback, class sizes increased, library resources become outdated, or when any other number of academic dramas unfold to disrupt the status quo for the worse, a nonpublishing academic’s career options are severely curtailed. Without other viable options academics in such situations must resign themselves to having to take whatever is given — which is typically the large classes or administrative duties that no one else wants. As already noted in the previous chapter, administrators and other colleagues in one’s department may not be particularly pleased with the presence of a non-researcher, but if such a person is employed (and tenured) there is little desire and even less compassion to allow the individual to be totally idle. The security of tenure cuts two ways, the academic gains the security of a pay cheque, but meanwhile what the university has given up in terms of controls centered on evaluation, it gains through binding the academic more tightly to the institution. An individual wishing to change universities may have to consider the ramifications
of leaving a secure position to again compete elsewhere.

It would seem that the realization of individual autonomy has an ironic twist - the willingness of an academic to conform to the expectations of those in positions of authority can ultimately lead to greater autonomy. Those that conform to institutionalized expectations and vigorously pursue the rewards commensurate with research publication, gain the most autonomy from the employing institution. Through publishing an academic's commitment to, or dependence upon, a specific university is reduced. The generally superior status of research gives the individual greater opportunities and in the process reduces their exclusive allegiance to their present institution (Blau, 1973:274). The academic is a marketable commodity highly valued for the products produced. As a result s/he can pick and choose among universities to select the one that provides the most attractive salary, research funding and facilities, the lightest teaching and administrative loads, and even - for some - the desired position upon entering an institution:

"I came in as an Associate Professor. I would not have accepted an Assistant Professor position. I had a substantial list of publications, which was well above that expected of an Assistant. When I was having my interview it was agreed that I hadn't done very much teaching and so the deal was that I could put in for promotion to Professor after my first or second year as long as my teaching was okay."

(Professor, 7 years)

The above Professor came to McMaster at a time when
shrinking academic labour markets and intense competition for positions was the norm. However, the person was still able to gain a favourable settlement of employment conditions purely on the strength of publications. Similarly, if the attractiveness of the present institution begins to wane, the publishing academic can actively lobby to have problems rectified, or begin making overtures elsewhere. In some cases academics are instrumental in effecting changes as they themselves can be the authority figures at the university and in the department. Whatever the situation, active researchers are acutely aware that their knowledge production is its own bargaining tool, and the authority it projects allows them the greatest degree of autonomy possible:

"I did not, and do not, want to be beholden to this university. The easiest way to avoid it is to have a strong research program. If I don't like what's going on around here, my research background allows me to go elsewhere and still be able to set terms that I wish to abide by. From a personal standpoint, the university doesn't really matter anymore."

(Professor, 13 years)

It was relatively easy to understand the motivations to do research for those who do not have tenure. Once tenured motivations become more complicated, but as the discussion on personal pride has shown, tenured faculty are not necessarily producing research for purely unselfish reasons. Beyond personal pride is the autonomy publication can offer and it becomes apparent, as the above academic
implies, that elements of careerism can influence decisions to publish irrespective of rank. If academic institutions have a mixture of careerists, then it is likely that there will be differing levels of involvement in research and publication:

"There are sort of three tiers, there is one level where people are building international reputations. Then there is an intermediate level of people who are sort of churning along— I’m sort of in this stratum I would say. Finally there is a level with varying degrees of research inactivity; either they’re very sporadic, used to publish but have now stopped, or they’ve never published anything."

(Associate Professor, 8 years)

The relevance of the above quote is not whether it is accurate or possibly overly reductionistic, but that it sheds light on the differentiation among academics with respect to their occupation. As Finkelstein (1984:225) neatly proposed, the professoriate ‘may be less a social species than a genus encompassing several distinct species.’ The idea of distinct species is not a particularly new one in academia. Gouldner (1957) distinguished two latent social roles which he termed cosmopolitan and local. Within these concepts he delineated six sub-categories – four defined the characteristics of locals and two for cosmopolitans. The properties of the six-subcategories are less important for the purposes of this thesis than the three variables he used for analyzing the latent identities in organizations, specifically academia. The three variables were: loyalty to the employing
institution; commitment to specialized skills; and reference
group orientations.

Locals were deemed to exhibit a high degree of
loyalty to the institution, were low on commitment to
specialized skills and likely to use an inner, that is
institutionally bounded, reference group orientation
(Gouldner, 1957:29). The cosmopolitans were, in direct
contrast to the locals, low on variable one, high on variable
two, and were allied to an outer reference group. As shown by
the quote from the Professor who did not wish to be beholden
to the university - researchers are generally the
cosmopolitans. This thesis is not so much concerned, as
Gouldner was, with the determination of discrete categories
and the potential tension engendered by latent identities,
but with the pressures and ambitions associated with latency.

For argument's sake it will be assumed that every
department has its share of those who are locally oriented to
either (or both) the administrative hierarchy, or teaching
and students, and those who have a discipline - focused,
inter-institutional cosmopolitanism (Cairns, 1986:255). Of
importance to recognize is that each addresses different
audiences and thus is likely to have qualitatively different
pressures exerted upon it. Propositions can be generated if
Gouldner's conceptual framework is linked with respondent's
attitudes towards their labour. The two combined present a
better understanding of the overall academic labour process. Based upon what has already been stated in reference to the tasks, it is suggested that the enforced parochialism of the non-researcher can lead them to be at best content with, and at worst resigned to, local enterprises and to addressing primarily local audiences. In contrast, researchers can become comparatively oblivious to local issues and intra-institutional competition (although residual antagonisms can surface when promotion decisions are being made). In addition, the potential autonomy gained through research can release academics to not only address different audiences, but identify with them. Consequently, the larger academic community, specifically a commitment to a particular discipline, and the recognition it bestows can become of primary importance:

"It's easy to be a big fish in a small pond. To be known around the university for your administrative position, or as a teacher when you receive one of those teaching awards that float around. My aim was to gain respect in my field of expertise and the grounds for that respect are research achievement. So I have been very competitive in getting things published and in getting research funding."

(Professor, 17 years)

For the outwardly oriented academic, the employing institution provides a poor secondary form of recognition compared to the recognition others in the field of specialization can offer. The ambition for recognition is
the pursuit of prestigious symbols of achievement that are beyond the purview of the university to confer. The most extreme example of a prestigious award that is coveted for its symbolic significance, although it carries a high monetary reward as well, is the Nobel Prize. Competition is for the respect garnered from the others one regards as the primary reference group. On a less grand scale are appointments to editorial boards, research fellowships, membership in the National Academy of Sciences, and in Canada, nomination into the F.R.S.C.:

"At this institution, by way of senior administrators, none have any scope to give me a meaningful pat on the back, or a meaningful blackeye. The sort of thing that means something to me comes from being elected a (prestigious honourary position) — that is a meaningful pat on the back in academia. It doesn't come from anybody at McMaster and it doesn't come from anybody whom I'm dependent upon."

(rank and year withheld) (II-2-14-4)

What makes these awards coveted, apart from a broader audience showing recognition, is that some quality assessment has been done. At the institutional level, quality distinctions are not seen as a major factor when either tenure or promotion is being decided. Quantity appeared to be the primary basis of assessment, according to those who were involved in assessments:

"Rationally you might think this rather strange (lack of quality assessment), after all someone might write ten articles and it might all be
drivel. Whereas someone else might write one article and it's a brilliant seminal piece of work. Unfortunately, I don't see that one can do otherwise than to assess people in terms of quantity. Once one starts talking in terms of quality I think one gets so bogged down because there are so many areas of disagreement. So you get departments moving to point systems — a person gets x amount of points for an article, book, or book review. Tote up the points the person is tenured or promoted. I'm sure they're a little more scientific and conscientious than I make it out to be, but the emphasis is the same."

(Professor, 32 years)

Other academics noted that in some cases a book is so well known and/or the person is so well established that quality can be evaluated — they also noted that typically this occurs when the person is well beyond the stages of tenure and promotion. Refereed journals help in quality assessments, and digressing back to the 'clutter' arguments, academics did agree that while research of dubious merit does get published a whole lot worse probably does not. However, since even the elaborate screening techniques are not seen as foolproof, academics are left with little alternative but to conclude that quantity is the only real measurement that take place at the institutional level.

Consequently, awards, honours and titles become important simply because they are non-formalized, quasi marks of recognition for excellence. For the most part, they are given as symbols of esteem for prolonged efforts and cumulative achievement (Wilson, 1978:243). Therefore,
someone, somewhere outside of the employing institution, has made a quality assessment of an individual's research contribution. The awards are few and far between and only the acknowledged 'stars' receive them. As such, they are distinctions dispersed in a limited fashion and provide, for many, very distant attainable marks of achievement. Although the academy as a whole gives the outward appearance of brimming over with persons of outstanding intellect, Livesey may have come closest to an accurate description when he observed the occupation to be one of 'mediocrity bracketed by clumps of stupidity and dollops of brilliance' (Livesey, 1975:50). If true, the general rank and file researcher whose ambitions may not be matched by talent, must settle for recognition of a less lofty sort than what has been mentioned so far. Those without the prestigious awards are left to their own devices when attempting to ascertain the impact of their publications. The methods can range from the number of invitations an academic receives to present papers at conferences, to more rigorous peer comparisons:

"Every so often I go over to the library and take a look in the Social Sciences Citation Indices. I find it a useful tool just to see how I compare with others in (discipline). I like to keep track of what's going on as far as my readership is concerned and to find out if what I write is noted. Call it author's vanity, I mean everybody likes to read something about themselves."

(Associate Professor, 9 years)

The reference to the egotistical reasons for checking
citations is noteworthy, as it clearly indicates the origin of feelings of accomplishment. The satisfaction an academic feels is not exclusive to a job well done, but from others recognizing that a job has been well done - as in the above instance where being cited is a measurement of the quality of a publication. It was common among academics who had a cosmopolitan view of academia to tie their self-satisfaction in producing research with the self-serving aspects of research gaining individual recognition.

Quite simply, intrinsic gratification does not occur in a social vacuum. Significant others are needed to offer tangible encouragement. These references are essential because they not only reinforce an identity the individual is committed to, but also to carry weight with the employing institution whenever the academic wishes to assert her/his autonomy. In order to retain researchers, whether they be renowned or just ambitious, people who have the authority to decide monetary issues, various working conditions and a multitude of other sundries, must make some attempt to keep individuals at least satisfied with the institution as a whole.

It is not a difficult decision to make, after all the benefits of having researchers on staff accrues status for both the individual and the institution. The problem lies in realizing the decisions, for with funding cutbacks there is a
scarcity of capital to fully cater to researchers. Fortunately for those who wish to keep their researchers, the financial difficulties and general dependence on government funding has created similar conditions across universities. Research funding is scarce and monetary incentives have been reduced, yet the latter can still be used as a symbolic token of recognition. As the following quote from a former chairman indicates, the situation is far from ideal for the cosmopolitan academic. Recognition is still not a direct quality judgement, but at least a message has been delivered and a limited form of appreciation has been shown:

"Merit increases, by their very nature are comparative ... you have to assess who is more deserving than another and then the message gets communicated annually. You've only got to tell (sic) a chap that he's getting 1 1/2 times the average salary increase and he knows that he's being recognized for doing something right. Whereas a 3/4's increase is a caution. For the most part the money these days is quite insignificant, but at least it's a gesture of good faith to those who are doing research - that they are not going unrewarded for their efforts."

(rank and year withheld) (IV-2-8-40)

To the outwardly oriented academic, the only institutional reward to increase in terms of its value as a direct result of hard financial times are sabbaticals. Their value has increased precisely because they are less common and handed out with greater reluctance. Academics who were employed at McMaster throughout the late 1960's and the
1970's have seen what used to be a right - release time from the university every six or seven years - become a privilege. Research was always the stated criteria for getting a sabbatical. However, academics admitted that the places people on sabbatical chose to conduct their research often conjured up images of vacation spots as opposed to centers for research. Today, the sabbatical is rarer and the requirements are geared towards the cosmopolitan researcher who can mix with people at the site which presents the most promising research results. Even the name is under review and has implications of its own:

"With financial restraints becoming the norm, sabbaticals are being phased out and it's starting to be called 'research leave'. I'm not exactly certain what the difference is, but what it's supposed to mean in basic terms is that someone who wants a research leave has to have a project that is well defined, that clearly merits support, and does get support."

(Associate Professor, 16 years)

The support referred to was funding that comes from outside the university - a form of recognition by others in the field that the research project is a worthwhile pursuit. Sabbaticals are therefore highly compatible with the extended ambitions of academics. The institution acts merely as a stepping stone for the realization of greater individual autonomy. The rudimentary rewards associated with publishing that are nurtured within the university, and can eventually be expressed through sabbaticals, can ultimately enhance an
academic's autonomy. In devoting energies exclusively to research when released from the regular duties of an academic, the person is provided with an opportunity to build upon their cumulative record of publications.

In the end, the success of institutionalized controls, including the use of sabbaticals as rewards or withholding them as punishment, is the close fit between what is being emphasized locally and extra-locally. In essence, the research emphasis at the university is closely coordinated with the potential rewards that attract individuals to the larger academic community. The actual level of success of the controls can be inferred from academics themselves. They do not question the ground rules, nor the premises upon which they are based. Through their participation in an activity that offers the chance of achieving personal recognition beyond the confines of the institution, the status of the institution is also enhanced. Those who have authority at the university are in the fortunate position of being able to remove themselves from the front lines of control, and allow market demands to pressure academics to publish research.

SUMMARY

In conclusion, differences between tenured and untenured faculty exist when motivations to do research are considered. Senior faculty have what their junior colleagues
would classify a luxury - the opportunity to be able to set standards, reflect on the responsibilities of publishing and be intrinsically motivated to publish. However, it has been demonstrated that it would be erroneous to assume all research published by tenured academics is a result of inner directed self-satisfaction. Such an assumption would be valid if other more instrumentally directed internal controls such as personal ambitions and aspirations suddenly came to a halt, or an academic was no longer influenced by market forces once tenured. Although, it could be tentatively proposed that tenure wipes away most of the local competition and pressures, the larger academic community remains competitive.

As a result, publishing can leave the exclusive realm of research as an exercise in knowledge generation and become characterized as a highly competitive process where varying levels of personal ambition, careerism, and egotism are the motivating factors. For the most part the pressures, while internally derived, are directed towards externally recognized achievements. As the chapter progressed, it was suggested that knowledge production is a form of authority that rests with the academic and as such, it can play a critical part in the real control academics have over their labour. This point cannot be overstated, academics are in a unique position in that the knowledge they generate is itself
an important control built into the labour process. Individual ability and desire to develop and publish that knowledge will have an effect on the level of occupational autonomy an academic experiences. Simply stated, the autonomy academics enjoy is largely derived from their ability to publish research. It is publications that can provide a defence against the formal control that overlays academia. In the final instance, formal control is beyond the scope of the individual to master completely, but academics can take advantage of its emphasis.

CHAPTER FIVE END NOTES

34. For a good summary of the structural and attitudinal elements which distinguish professions see, Richard H. Hall, "Professionalisation and Bureaucratisation" in Graeme Salaman and Kenneth Thompson (eds.) People and Organizations. London: Open University, 1973, especially pages 120-123.

35. CAUT Bulletin (Sept. 1983) outlines how infrequently disciplinary actions are taken.

36. Blau (1973:278) has noted that those faculty members whose renown gives them the most authority at a university may be the least interested in administrative tasks (i.e. Fermi unconcerned with the budget distribution at the University of Chicago). This thesis would speculate that such a lack of interest on the part of such individuals is predicated on decisions not affecting their research programs.

37. Terms which were in themselves originally used by Merton to distinguish the types of roles in communities (Gouldner, 1957:287).
CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION

To fully comprehend the control mechanisms that influence academics, there had to first be a rudimentary awareness of the politics and economics that surround research production. A recent historical survey came to the conclusion that economic exigency shaped the politics of higher education in the last half of the 1970's (Axelrod, 1982: 188). Axelrod's analysis examined the institutional responses to government cutbacks and the ensuing political debates that occurred with an eye to noting how universities have been affected by such a reversal in economic fortunes. Axelrod stayed in the realm of a macro, political economic analysis. This thesis chose a limited, micro perspective that probed the effects of the above mentioned economic difficulties as they began to emerge in the form of institutionalized political pressure upon individual academics. By dividing the thesis into two major sections the first section could accommodate a discussion on the aforementioned political and economic issues, while the second part could examine the relation of these issues to the control mechanisms experienced by academics.

In the first part, which contains Chapters Two and Three, the premise that introduced the thesis was elaborated upon. It will be remembered that the first premise stated that the accumulation of status was one of the primary preoccupations of an academic institution. By considering,
the veracity of this premise, it would later be easier to understand the intent of both the internal and external controls found in academia.

With this in mind, Chapter Two laid down the preliminary foundation by proposing where the emphasis on academic job tasks is placed. In order to begin a discussion regarding emphasis, the main tasks of teaching and research had to be delineated. In so doing it became apparent that the two tasks were complex and while considerable compatibility between them was noted, it was also true that they could become antagonistic when competing for the limited resources of the individual. Previous literature on the subject and accounts given by academics who participated in the study made it clear that although published documents emanating from the university professed an equality—where neither task outweighed the other in importance—there was a de facto disparity between the tasks. As with any occupation, a substantial increase in the demand of one’s time in one task is more than likely met with a reduction in the time available to service other tasks (Tuchman, 1976: 41). Thus, when competition over time demands occurred, research was seen as the task that took precedence because of the perceived emphasis it was given at the institutional level and beyond.
With Chapter Two contending that the task emphasized in academia was the research component, Chapter Three strove to understand why research was emphasized. The chapter outlined the critical nature of research in realizing status accumulation. In order to help explain this, the chapter first dealt with the inadequate rationales most often put forth to justify the emphasis on research and its generally higher status position in academia. The major contribution of this chapter to the overall development of the thesis is the distinction made between research and published research. The former was noted as primarily a producer of use values, whereas the latter developed exchange values. Published research has a high, visible profile that makes it a valued commodity. The transformation from use to exchange value was deemed pivotal in published research forming the currency of status in academia—particularly when institutions faced funding difficulties. Status itself was described as the social form of wealth, and as such publications add to that wealth because they enhance the subjective form of status.

The first part of this thesis sensitized the reader to the specific historical context, and its attendant political and economic implications, in which research publication is inextricably bound. The second part developed these implications, as the second premise extended the
preoccupation with status into an analysis of the actual mechanisms of control that help realize status accumulation. As every organization has a particular amount of work that needs to be accomplished (so stated the second premise) there is embedded in the structure of the organization a corresponding need to control workers in order to ensure the work is in fact carried out. In academia, controls present a difficulty unto themselves that is due not only to changing conditions within universities, but also because of the nature of the work that precludes attempts to precisely structure it. An additional complication that was noted were the social conventions of liberal ideology that overlie academia and influence what controls are deemed acceptable.

When mechanisms of control were discussed, changing market conditions were found to be both problematic and beneficial for employing institutions and academics. During the economic prosperity of the 1960's and early 1970's, government incentives to expand resulted in a "Golden Era" of funding for universities and hiring for academics. Institutions concerned with taking advantage of the incentives, while ignoring the long range implications, were afforded the opportunity to expand physical plants and student populations. Preoccupations with status still existed and research publication was still the basic currency to achieve it, but with the tremendous upsurge in the growth
of institutions there was also the implied assumption that bigger was synonymous with better (Mayhew, 1970: x). The benefits for the academic were relatively obvious – as near to full employment as there had ever been in academia. Hence, the content of their labour could express itself in virtually any manner and on whatever task. More importantly, if the work was not appreciated, other options, still in academia but at other institutions, could be pursued.

The downside for institutions, was that the expansion created an increasing dependency upon government financial assistance. Axelrod (1982: 252-259) presents tables showing how institutional expansion decreased the percentages of income from traditional sources (i.e., endowments, investments and tuition) while reliance upon government funding increased dramatically. Quite simply, institutionally generated funding could not keep pace with growth rates. Such a dependency is not a problem when funding is plentiful, but as soon as the economy slid into recession funding also became scarcer. As with any resource dependent organization, universities became most responsive to the claims of those external groups that supply the resources (Karabel, 1984: 5).

The difficulty for university advocates lobbying for more funding, is to try and justify why one university is
more deserving than another, especially when there has been widespread replication of programs. This is where the visibility of research once again comes to the forefront. Publication can generate funding and can also be a rationalization unto itself for maintaining and increasing funding. According to the academics surveyed, influential persons at McMaster were cognizant of this and used it as a campaign platform when politicking for funding. Of course for politicking to be successful some history of research (with its current controls) is helpful to bolster claims that research will continue in the future.

To achieve a high level of research production, controls are needed, but constraints on the level of control that can be initiated are always present. Clearly, academia cannot be run as bureaucratically as other organizations, but this does not suggest administrators are ineffectual at getting their desired emphasis across and ensuring that the work is produced. As Blau (1973) has noted, and academics confirmed, intra-organizational power rests on control over economic resources once they are obtained. The control the President, Board of Governors and other administrators exercise through the allocation of economic resources leaves staff much freedom and indeed a great deal of influence. However, their control is the ultimate source of power at the institution, for it determines the shape of the university
and the direction in which it is heading (Blau, 1973: 278). The second premise of this thesis would suggest that the controls in place would attempt to realize the emphasis constructed by those involved in shaping and directing McMaster. Chapters Four and Five examined specifically the mechanisms of control that are exerted upon academics to pressure them to produce research.

Chapter Four took the reader through the external mechanisms of control that are developed by authority figures within the university to ensure that publication is pursued by academics. The selection process was seen as only the first control in a series that academics encounter throughout their careers. The choice of whom to pick among candidates applying for positions was a major decision. With the permanency of tenure looming a few years away, screening was geared towards hiring those that would be able to contribute to the accumulation of status. In brief, hiring was oriented towards research and, once chosen, how the tasks were defined left little doubt in the minds of academics as to which task time should be devoted. It was, however, a process that had to be learned, and academics were obliged to observe their colleagues in order to gauge what could be classified as sufficient output.

In some cases, the effectiveness of controls is not
exclusively related to controlling people to produce a particular valuable commodity, but also by exhibiting a lack of concern or emphasis upon other tasks. Bearing this in mind, Chapter Four also devoted time to contrasting the external, "objective" controls centered on research with the relative lack of controls that appear to surround the teaching component.

Beyond the extensive literature which simply stressed the inadequacy of academic evaluations, this thesis found the evaluation process to be a complex system of controls. It was at times contradictory and fraught with a dualism that employed less than objective standards. Regardless of its often stated shortcomings, the evaluation process was, paradoxically, very effective at achieving its purpose. The effectiveness stemmed from its very lack of explicitness. Without stated achievement levels, those wishing to secure positions who already knew the emphasis were inclined to produce as much as possible. Academics were perceptive enough to notice that the evaluations of their performances were characterized by differential rewards across the job tasks. Hence, they organized their time to comply with the pressures of evaluation. That academics would become predisposed to research should be no surprise. After all, those roles that actually benefit the individual through the gaining of extrinsic rewards will tend to weigh more
prominently than those that gain the person little or nothing (McCall and Simmons, 1966: 78).

Chapter Five extended the analysis of controls to include internally directed motivations that led academics to produce research. The distinction between research and publications was revisited, but the context in which it was discussed differed from the purely analytical treatment it received in Chapter Three. In this chapter, the emphasis was on what academics preferred to do with respect to the job tasks in academia. Research in the field noted that the task of research had a limited appeal among academics. The problem with such studies was their lack of precision when defining what they meant, both to their respondents and readers, by the term research. This thesis, by making the research/publication distinction revealed a willingness among academics to engage in systematic studies of particular areas of inquiry and to partake in critical thought. A few carried over genuinely unselfish reasons for publishing, but overall, publication was seen in pragmatic, instrumental terms. The instrumentalism had different motivations depending upon the position of the academic. Senior academics revealed that a certain amount of pride kept them publishing, a pride that was directly related to imbuing colleagues with the perception that they were still to be counted as ‘researchers’. In contrast, lower ranking academics who
looked at publishing pragmatically, saw it as an endeavor that expedited their passage through the career hurdles of academia. Across rank divisions, the value of publishing was seen as a way of maximizing individual autonomy. Institutional concerns could be left behind as relatively inconsequential and broader audiences could become an academic's main priority. Whatever the personal ambition, it became apparent that the academic was surrounded by two major mechanisms of control. The first, real control, was the purview of the academics for they retained decisions regarding the content of their labour. However, irrespective of production levels they still had to defer to the second form of control - formal control - which is exercised by institutional authority figures.

The omnipotence of this formal control was seen to be one that fluctuated depending upon market conditions. In market conditions that are favourable to the seller, in this case the academic, the organizational "buyer" must take into account that the seller has other options and therefore there are limits to the outright demands that can be made. During these times, control rarely is a major problem because typically there is a corresponding growth rate in which everyone is benefiting to some degree (Gartman, 1978: 98). However, when market conditions favour the buyer, formal control increases and demands upon academics to produce
research can be made. The demands are in effect backed up by the limited options of the academic to go elsewhere. In a situation where alternatives are scarce, the academic who produces research (and produces prodigiously) is in a far better position to take advantage of whatever alternatives that do exist. Autonomy becomes, contrary to logic, realizable through conformity to organizational expectations.

Taking the above summary of the chapters into consideration, it was not the task of this thesis to verify any previously articulated theoretical stance pertaining to academia. The intent was to use literature in the field and data from interviews to generate a variety of propositions in order to eventually come away with a better understanding of status, mechanisms of control and individual autonomy in academia. The realization of such an objective does not provide a perfect description of academia, but instead develops an account of the interrelationships of the concepts. A more detailed and empirically based study, that would verify the role status plays in influencing both external and internal controls - which in turn affect individual autonomy, is required if the interplay of the concepts occurs in the manner suggested by this thesis.

The difficulty of such a study as this thesis undertook is that it tends to generate more questions
concerning the concepts than what was under examination.

Among the questions which are worth considering in any future study (above and beyond questions surrounding the issue of gender as observed in Appendix B) are the following:

1. Is the pursuit of status, and the controls surrounding, it as unique to academia as this thesis contends?

2. Can the proposed effect of market conditions be supported through studies of controls across other occupations that exhibit similarities to academia (i.e. the professions or crafts)?

3. Has the general societal trend towards credentialism played a role in the structuring of academia which, in part, can account for the emphasis on research?

4. Will academic autonomy be eroded if tenure and promotion committees become more selective as this thesis has suggested?

5. How much variance is there in the criteria used by tenure and promotion committees?

6. Can it be shown empirically that researchers are the power brokers at the departmental and institutional level?

7. Are there differences in the stated self-images of researchers and non-researchers as a result of the higher status accorded research?

8. Are academics in the post-expansion era imbued with a greater commitment to research?

9. What is the threshold level where the non-rewards of one activity begins to influence a shift to activities where there are rewards?

10. How widespread are the sentiments expressed by academics participating in this study?

More questions could be cited, but the range of the above questions points out some of the limitations of this
qualitative study. If a study were to stay in the realm of qualitative analysis, it would be advantageous to broaden the study to incorporate other occupations. As Glaser and Strauss (1970: 293) noted, the credibility of findings are maximized through the comparisons of groups in relation to the concepts under examination. Therefore, the intent of questions one through three are of interest because they would generate data in a cross-occupational setting, and be able to substantiate any inferences in a way this study could not.

To answer some of the questions, a researcher would need access to confidential information such as curriculae vitarum and committee meetings. A particularly interesting participant observation study could be conducted to develop answers to questions of committee criteria (questions four and five) and the composition of committees (question six) if access was gained to meetings. Noble and Pym (1970) have already documented the opacity of the general decision making process found in academia, however, the group dynamics surrounding specific issues and decisions, and how they are handled remains to be explored.

Recourse to quantitative data techniques would be an asset with the remaining questions (including six) as the answers hinge on verifying both the implicit and stated hypotheses which are contained in the questions. A
quantitative study could attempt to group respondents, distinguish discrete conceptual categories, perform cross tabulations and establish statistical significance. Definitive answers could be provided for statements that in this thesis remain only tentative hypotheses generated through interviews.

In the final analysis, concepts such as status, control, and autonomy are difficult to categorize, or to determine precisely the direction of causality between them - irrespective of the research techniques used. This study realized its limitations from the outset and intended to only provide a preliminary examination of academia. Its contribution, if it can be said to have any, lies in revealing the complexity of the concepts and proposing that certain relationships between the concepts exist. Returning to the tentative hypothesis which was stated at the outset of this thesis, the data generated from interviews suggests that the organization of an academics time does, in part, reflect the mechanisms of control in place to achieve status. These controls can be both institutionally based and internally derived, but it should not be concluded that they are entirely pervasive in orienting academics to research publication.

"I'd prefer not to", was the often repeated
phrase of Melville’s Nicholas Bartelby to any suggestion of work that did not sit well with him. Academics too can exercise a similar option with regards to research publication, but such a decision has its risks. Apart from potential job loss, ‘preferring not to’ publish research can jeopardize what the content of an academic’s labour will constitute and reduce the number of career options they will be able to exercise. Fortunately for academics, their fate may not be as drastic as Bartlebys. Unlike the employer of Bartleby, academic institutions cannot relocate without informing recalcitrant employees of their whereabouts, but they need not resort to such extravagences. As was noted in Chapter Four and later in Chapter Five, the institutionalized controls that are in existence and the congruence of them with the broader academic market are effective in ensuring research production is realized.

CONCLUSION END NOTES

38. A good illustration of this point are the briefs submitted to, and subsequent hearings during, the Bovey Commission which resembled a continual one-upmanship approach. Rather than collectively claiming a need for more funding, each institution chose to present its own case. See the government/university publications bibliography for specific cases.
APPENDIX A
APPENDIX A
RESPONDENT SELECTION - THE SAMPLING METHOD

There were two factors that guided the stratification of respondents into categories: length of time at the institution, and location in the occupational hierarchy. The basic hypothesis that was put forth maintained that how academics defined the controls and the corresponding pressures in academia, were likely to be differentially perceived according to the proximity to, and the frequency of experience with, the forms of control designed to accumulate status.

Two academic calendars were used in determining the boundaries of the categories for the sample group. The first calendar listed the staff employed at McMaster University during the 1977-78 academic year, the second listed the staff hired as of January 1, 1984. The former was used because it was the last calendar to cite the year an academic was hired. The latter calendar was consulted to choose the sample group, it aided in the deletion of those no longer employed, added those who have been employed since January 1, 1978 (and are still at McMaster), and, of lesser importance, noted promotions through cross-referencing of the two calendars.

The boundaries of the categories were determined by graphing faculty members entry year of employment to McMaster. Then a rough determination of the breaks in the pattern of hiring were used to distinguish a category. Admittedly the breaks are not clearly self-evident, but this was deemed a more appropriate method of developing categories
than arbitrarily choosing cut off points (i.e., employed for ten years or less). There was an attempt when selecting the 'breaks' to produce a relative uniformity of numbers across the categories, and to reflect the general expansion and retrenchment phases of the university. Of course attrition rates (retirements, resignations, death) directly affect the numbers involved (probably there were, for example, more than two professors in the social sciences in 1958 and 1959), but the year of entry does to an extent reflect the growth and recession years of the institution (note since 1978 only 30 faculty members have been retained compared to the 31 in the three year period of Group 3 - see graph p. 198). Once the categories were established, and the boundaries of each category were delineated such that no sampling unit appeared in more than one group, a random sample was drawn using a random number table.

As the accompanying graph indicates, five groups were distinguished:

Group 1
- includes all academics employed for 22 or more years. (N=19)

Group 2
- academics employed for less than 22 years, but at least 16 years. (N=53)

Group 3
- less than 16 years, but 13 or more years at McMaster. (N=31)

Group 4
- less than 13 years, at least 7 years employed. (N=39)

Group 5
- employed less than 7 years. (N=30)

The study attempted to interview twenty-five percent of the academics eligible within the stated boundaries of the
thesis (see Limitations/Boundaries section, Chapter One, pp. 21-26). In each category twenty-five percent of the total group were selected using a random number table. The major drawback of this selection process was the relatively few numbers of Assistant Professors available. As Table One indicates, there are only 29 Assistant Professors in the social sciences (or 16.8% of the total).

TABLE ONE
(N 172)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professors</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>45.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assoc. Professors</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>37.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ass’t. Professors</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>172</td>
<td>99.9*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(* does not add up to 100.0 due to rounding)

When the random selection was done only seven (15.9%) of the sample) Assistant Professors were chosen.

TABLE TWO
(n 44)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>%</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professors</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>47.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assoc. Professors</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>36.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ass’t. Professors</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15.9</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>44</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The need to sample an adequate number of Assistant Professors in order to analyse the control mechanisms present in academia presented problems. Typically, these individuals were relatively new to academia, were untenured, and thus presumably had the dubious distinction of being both the least knowledgeable with respect to the expectations of
performance, while at the same time they were in the most precarious of positions in terms of occupational security. Therefore, their comments were seen to have an enormous value in understanding the controls experienced by academics to produce research for status accumulation. Two options for increasing the number of Assistant Professors in the study could have been undertaken. Since new academics are normally hired as Assistant Professors, the 1985-86 calendar could have been incorporated into the study to include recent appointments. Alternatively, Assistant Professors as a group could be more heavily sampled and then placed back into their year of employment categories.

The first option was considered inadvisable. Those academics who were 'new' to McMaster (although not necessarily new to academic employment) had little time to settle into their positions and take stock of the expectations and controls that surround them. These individuals present an interesting longitudinal study relating to changing attitudes towards the academic labour process, but were of little utility to this thesis. Given the drawback associated with the first option, the second was chosen. To have enough interview material, the percentage of Assistant Professors who could potentially participate was raised to fifty percent of the total (15 out of a total of 29). Thus, the total number of respondents selected for interviews (n') was fifty-two persons. Table Two shows both
the new figures once the selection process was completed and
the actual number of academics who were interviewed.

TABLE THREE

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
& \text{Interviewed} & \\
\text{n'} & \% & \# & \% \\
\text{Professors} & 21 & 40.4 & 16 & 36.4 \\
\text{Assoc. Professors} & 16 & 30.8 & 14 & 31.8 \\
\text{Ass't. Professors} & 15 & 28.8 & 14 & 31.8 \\
\hline
52 & 100.0 & 44 & 100.0 \\
\end{array}
\]

The fifteen Assistant Professors were randomly
selected, then returned to the categories their year of entry
designated. From a quantitative standpoint the above
methodology employed is less than purely scientific.
However, this study is exclusively interested in the
qualitative aspects of data gathering and presentation.
Obviously the procedures are not representative in a strict
statistical sense (i.e. little, or no attention was given to
the mathematical intricacies of weighting or determining
sample error), but the steps taken were felt necessary in
order to gather enough interview material. The overemphasis
of Assistant Professors was an attempt to compensate for
their smaller numbers and institutionally implemented "six
years - up or out" policies that reduce Assistant Professors
numbers either through the granting of tenure (and fairly
soon afterwards, promotion to Associate) or unemployment.
NUMBER OF ACADEMICS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AT McMaster University by Year of Entry into Faculty. (N = 172)
APPENDIX B

DIFFERENTIAL CONTROLS RELATED TO GENDER

This thesis has discussed the relationship between status, controls and individual autonomy without reference to gender. A discussion incorporating gender was thought to inescapably involve itself in an analysis of discrimination and this thesis was too narrow to give substantial time to such an important and complex issue. Complicating matters further, is the small number of women at McMaster. At the time the study began, the most up to date computer listing of women academics that could be provided from the McMaster General Office to the Committee on the Status of Women was 1983. Through cross referencing, a more recent list of full time women at McMaster was obtained, although omitted from this list were women affiliated with the Medical Center. The original list, including the Medical Center, show only 170 women were on staff. The revised list indicated 69 women were in departments other than the Medical Centre. Of the 69, 21 were in social science departments. Two were excluded because the Ph.D. was not in evidence. This left the number of women available for the study at 19 out of a possible 172 academics.

That nine were eventually selected and seven interviewed out of a total of fifty-two selected and forty-four
Interviewed (respectively constituting 17.3% and 15.9%) can be partially attributable to the research design which over-represented Assistant Professors. Academia is typically top heavy, that is until gender is taken into account. As the following Table shows, women in the social sciences at McMaster are almost completely reversed in terms of rank.

**ACADEMICS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES BY RANK AND GENDER**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professor</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>49.7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>45.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associate</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>37.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Totals 151 100.0 21 99.9 172 99.9

The difficulty with such a Table is how to account for the disparity? Any attempt to answer this question in this Appendix must be regarded as speculative at best.

In the introductory chapter a tentative hypothesis stated that full time academics, regardless of gender, are participants in a labour process which puts a premium on research publication. There were no detectable difference of
opinion across gender when controls to produce research were being discussed until the researcher specifically broached the subject of pressures unique to women. Gender differences were only discussed towards the end of the interviews and the data obtained was limited. With the benefit of hindsight, it has become clear that insight into the issues concerning women should have been more centrally located during interviews to give a more indepth perspective to pressures in academia. In addition, given another opportunity the researcher would have solicited opinions from male academics to see where perceptions of academics contrasted and what issues were seen as particularly contentious.

The unique pressures women experience in academia are the result of a complex interplay of basic inequities. The most obvious inequity is suggested by the Table above. Women are operating within a male dominated organization and that entails difficulties just gaining access. One study which was able to put forward the case of discrimination quite persuasively was Fiddell (1970). Fiddell mailed the descriptions of ten individuals to the department heads of over two hundred graduate Psychology departments. In the covering letter attached to the descriptions, the department heads were asked to judge the chances of the candidate being offered a full time position. The author states that when the reviewer believed the candidate was a women differences
appeared in what would be offered to the candidate. Women were less likely to be offered a tenure track position, and the entry level position was typically at a lower level. No women, while some men were offered full professorships.

The traditional response to the limited number of women on staff is that there is a scarcity of qualified women in academia. Wolfe, et. al. (1973) concluded in an article concerning sex discrimination in the hiring practices of Graduate Sociology departments, that the major cause of underrepresentation of women in such departments was the lack of women with the Ph. D. However, in a letter rebuttal in the American Sociologist (1973), data did not suggest the above claim, for it was found that women earned twenty-five percent of the Ph.D.'s but comprised only twelve percent of those hired during the time the research was carried out (1969-70). It should be underscored, that this was at a time when jobs in academia were plentiful. Even during this study, in a rare moment when a male academic reflected on why women were a distinct minority, or in the case of one department where there were no women, justification still rests with the lack of qualified women. It becomes pertinent to ask by whose standards is someone deemed "qualified"? Before proceeding to examine this question closer, it should be noted that at least one variation of the scarcity rationale that does not sound like an outright fabrication
was put forth by an academic in the discipline with no women on staff:

"We just can’t compete. Our discipline has seldom attracted women in great numbers, those that do come through can virtually write their own tickets down in the States. Down there they’ll get better starting salaries, tenure track positions and access to research funding we only dream about."

(Associate Professor, 5 years)

Returning to the assessment of whether there are qualified women to fill positions, it would be erroneous to assume that judgements of competence are not value laden. Access is predicated on satisfying a selections committee, which more often than not is comprised primarily of males. This in itself would not be a problem if quality and quantity of published research and/or potential for publications in the future were judged with purely the form and content of the research in mind – not the subject matter of the content. As Tancred-Sheriff (1985) has noted, subject matter in academia can be given an hierarchial ranking.

These "knowledge hierarchies" traditionally are male inspired, that is, what constitutes the top of the knowledge hierarchy is determined by males. Contributions to research done from a women’s perspective or on women’s issues are relegated to the lower ranks of the knowledge hierarchy (Tancred-Sheriff, 1985: 110). This poses additional hurdles for women when it comes time to publish their research. In this type of scenario, highly regarded journals are unwilling
to publish the articles since, in part, editorial boards are male dominated and have little interest in the subject matter, and in addition it is not high prestige research. The obvious repercussions of not getting material published has been dealt with at length in the body of this thesis and needs no further embellishment. (The reader should be made aware that this facet of inequity pertaining to publication is not entirely gender specific, but reflects a more generalized discrimination against publications which are not regarded as dealing with the established fields of knowledge within a discipline. Therefore, such studies as Marxist, homosexual studies, or cross disciplinary studies are equally dubbed as suspicious intellectual enterprises.)

This study did not encounter the sentiment expressed above during interviews with women academics, although when it was mentioned the academics did not deny it occurred. That the women themselves had not directly experienced discrimination at the level of publication is perhaps a result of interviewing women who were "successful" in academia. In the words of Tancred-Sheriff, who was commenting on women who had involved themselves in studies of organizations (a high prestige field within the knowledge hierarchy), the women interviewed in this study were not "challenging the prevailing male definition, they participated in it and their relative success arose from such
an acceptance (Tancred-Sheriff, 1985: 110)." It would not be stretching the limits of credibility to propose that they were actually hired because their research was within the established fields of knowledge. Since they have retained employment, it is also likely they remain active in mainstream knowledge production.

Research production can be impeded for women for a variety of other reasons that extend beyond position on the knowledge hierarchy. To understand the impediments, it is first necessary to recognize the implications of being a minority group. Like any visible minority, women in academia appear to suffer at the level of interaction. In some occupations this may not be very critical, the work day is less comfortable and one may experience a kind of compounded alienation from not only the job tasks but an additional co-worker ostracism. In contrast, the implications on non-interaction can be career threatening. The threat to employment begins at the graduate level, where, apart from the feelings of loneliness that women unanimously experience, there are limited learning and career prospects which males do not encounter:

"I never knew what it was like to have easy access to someone who was a little ahead of me in the profession. I remember meetings with professors, who were as a rule rather gracious, were always rather formal. The fellow male student would go into their offices have easy conversations, get into cars with them and go to conferences and always be given lots of advice."
All of those cliches about mentoring - they are true and they really are important. It wasn't until after I had gained employment and for the first time had this person slightly older than me - in a related area and whom I liked and with whom I could just spend time with, that I realized just how much informal learning goes on - just to survive - gets passed down in this way. It made me in retrospect think that I'd missed out on something very valuable. Of course at the time I just didn't know about these things."

Beyond just the knowledge and accreditation graduate school supplies for the female academic, it enables the male academic to set up extended contacts. These contacts can be useful when it comes time to publish an article, if only to have people read drafts and provide helpful criticisms. Finkelstein noted in a summary of studies, that males outpublish females across all types and prestige strata of institutions by as much as two or three to one (Finkelstein, 1984:201). The reasons for this discrepancy are varied, but much of it may be explained with references to the inequity of the system of extended contacts.

One reason which regularly appears to account for the differences in publication rates, is that women are less likely to be employed at universities renowned for research. This of course begs the question of why they are not found at such institutions? Without contacts, women are at a disadvantage in securing employment anywhere, much less at high status institutions. As the above quote suggested,
women are not exposed to the sorts of opportunities that are conducive to the development of a "mentoring" relationship with the faculty member who can serve as a sponsor in the early stages of an academic career—a critical factor in gaining access to the best academic positions (Finkelstein, 1984:209).

Lack of contacts can also impede the ability to be on the leading edge of the discipline because access to the information through the so termed "invisible universities" is denied. It is not necessarily choice that keeps women from publishing, as has been suggested in some studies (Bernard, 1964, Cole, 1978), but that many women continue to be excluded from the very activities that allow for full participation and productivity. The informal activities of research production, the debates and discussions, where academics state ideas and generate new ones are, for the most part, closed to women (Cole, 1981:385).

It may very well be that it is at this informal level that women are placed in the most inequitable position with the greatest effects on the direction of their careers. In another occupation, women could compete once they had access to the basic knowledge and achieved a mastery of it. However, in academia where the creation of new knowledge garners the accolades of recognition and opens the door to other resources, women may be pigeon-holed into more
localized activities and suffer from the immobility it suggests.

It should not be inferred that localism holds any great attractions or exhibits fewer inequites. Localism for women academics is still not predicated on acceptance into the community. Experiences at the local institutional level can still be characterized by varying degrees of non-interaction as the following academic attempts to point out:

"I don't know if I can explain this. I think the experience of university life is different for males and females. Sometimes when there's a meeting and you're the only woman you feel like a piece of furniture, it's hard to document, but you feel as though it is not your place to speak up.

(U-1-4-39)

This is a particularly hard aspect to deal with for women who have been trained to think critically and articulate those criticisms. The feeling of not being taken seriously led to vivid recollections of the first time they did speak up:

"It would be laughable if you didn't know the latent discrimination which prompts the reactions. I mean in my case, I was quite young in comparison to my male colleagues, and in this meeting you have varying degrees of interests ranging from the few who constantly participate in discussions and those who are so bored they can barely keep their eyes open. Then you say something for the first time. Well! Heads jerk up and swivel to your little corner in a way they never did whenever a male colleague had spoken up for the first time. Those old enough to be your father are paternalistic and you feel as though you should go around and get a pat on the head. Younger colleagues are just plain surprised. All this is just to say it can be
a very demeaning experience and I don’t think males have any conception of the courage it takes to continue to speak or attempt it again in the next meeting.”

(IV-6-31-35)

It would be a misconception to conclude from what has just been stated, that gender relations in academia are wholly antagonistic. Women were quick to point out that they have some very high quality relationships with male colleagues, but in the words of one women academic, "there is something about the collective male presence." What exactly that "something" is typically could not be defined.

What women were indicating in interviews was that at the institutional level exclusion and isolation extended beyond the knowledge component and into the decision making process. The prevailing attitude, which is only suggested in the above quote, is that women are not solicited for their opinions, nor are their unsolicited comments given credence (until they are rearticulated by a male colleague).

Important committee work has, for the most part, been done by males, but women felt they were in demand for the time consuming less important committee. One reason is their quality of being isolated from the rest of the community:

"Sometimes we are perceived to be an asset because people can speak freely and they assume their thoughts are safely tabled because we are not likely to have another forum to repeat what has just transpired."

(IV-5-40-32)

"It’s like being a mother confessor and
conciliator all rolled into one. You’re included in private conversations to allow someone basically to vent their personal grievances and then conciliate committee differences. You’re not there because of what you can necessarily contribute, but because you can be trusted as a confidante who has no opportunity to tattle."

(IV-4-19-29)

More frequently than reasons of isolation, women stated their presence amounted to little more than tokenism:

"I think the university wants to be seen as taking everybody’s interests into account. As a woman on a committee you lend at least appearance of democracy in action. That it is absurd to think one women represents the interests of every minority which is disenfranchised, is not taken into account."

(V-6-23-18)

The notion of tokenism was eschewed at the departmental level, but women were fully aware of the burdening responsibility of being a role model for students. Female students consistently wanted to discuss their courses, topics for papers, and a host of other general areas of conversation. Since women academics could empathize with what students, particularly graduate students, were experiencing, some stated that it was hard not to spend time giving advice that they themselves never received. One major drawback of tokenism is that one becomes the in-house expert on token issues which becomes translated into more students asking for advice on how to go about studying the issues.

Whatever the case may be, isolationism, tokenism, position on the knowledge hierarchy, all detract or take time
away from the research task. This is particularly problematic for women because, even with the inequities they experience which their male colleagues do not, to be placed on an equal footing with men they must produce more work:

"From what I've witnessed, I would have to say quite definitely a women has to publish more to get ahead than a male in a similar position."

(U-7-26-27)

This sentiment is not particularly unique to academia; most literature concerning women's studies will at some point make reference to this basic inequity. Interestingly, the women did not dwell on the matter; having to prove oneself to a greater degree than males, has been a fact of life which has been impressed upon them since graduate school - or before. The point to be made is the direct contrast between males who are at all points actively encouraged to produce research and women in academia who experience hurdles that can discourage them from publishing. When dealing specifically with the issue of research production and gender, the question is no longer why women produce research, but how do they manage to produce research given the inequities they face?

An entire thesis could be devoted to answering such a question. This appendix only briefly touched upon some of the issues surrounding women in academia. It is, and does not purport to be, a comprehensive treatment. Its purpose was mainly to alert the reader to problem areas and that the
researcher was aware of the inequities which can affect the labour process of academics. It also stands as a cautionary warning that no definitive generalizations concerning the work academics do can be made unless gender inequities are worked into the analysis.

APPENDIX B END NOTES

39. See Berlowitz (1976) for a specific reference to the troubles Marxists encounter in trying to publish their research.

APPENDIX B - BIBLIOGRAPHY - WOMEN IN ACADEMIA


A general overview of the meaning of the succeeding Tables was provided in Chapter Two. What follows is a brief description of each Table. The source of the Tables are listed below the title of the Tables.

The first Table mentions the term 'sponsored research', this refers to revenue provided for research from either the provincial or federal governments. Table One indicates that McMaster has steadily increased the amount of revenue for research the university has taken in since 1978. Equally important is that McMaster ranks second in Ontario when the funding it takes in is expressed as a percentage.

Table Two is an elaboration of Table One. It shows that from all the revenue McMaster takes in, its outflow of capital put towards research - when expressed as a percentage of its total expenditures - ranks it number one in the province. This Table is of interest because it reveals a strong commitment to research in that, while the revenue in 1982 for research was 38.5% of the total operating revenue, the expenditures were approximately 43% of the total expenditures. Therefore, McMaster was setting aside a considerable sum of money, approximately 4.5% of its operating expenditures, that originated internally. In contrast, the only university with a greater research revenue
percentage, the University of Guelph, has research revenue and expense figures which are identical.

Table Three indicates McMaster receives a greater percentage of research awards than its Ontario counterparts when the awards are stated as a percentage of its operating expenditures. As noted in Chapter Two, this distinction was not overlooked in a McMaster publication, The Character and Role of McMaster (1983-84). Mention was made in this publication that the awards were concentrated mainly in the Faculty of Science, Engineering and Health Science and there were larger NSERC awards than national averages (183-84: 1). It was also commented upon that the fellowship awards in the SSHRC competitions were above national averages (1983-84: 3).
## Sponsored Research Revenue in Ontario Universities

**Absolute Amounts and Expressed as a Percentage of Operating Revenues.**

**Source:** Committee of Finance Officers—Universities of Ontario

**Figures in Thousands of Dollars**

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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td></td>
<td>$</td>
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<td>$</td>
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<td>45,094</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>48,452</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>57,270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trent</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>575</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waterloo</td>
<td>8,207</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>10,150</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>13,730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td>14,942</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>18,442</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>23,191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Laurier</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windsor</td>
<td>2,129</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>3,033</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>3,056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>York</td>
<td>4,969</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>5,439</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>6,034</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note the Sponsored Research figure does not include funds or gifts in kind received in support of research as part of an endowment campaign.*
RESEARCH EXPENDITURES AT TWO YEAR INTERVALS EXPRESSED AS A PERCENTAGE OF OPERATING EXPENDITURES

SOURCE: COMMITTEE OF FINANCE OFFICERS - UNIVERSITIES OF ONTARIO
AWARDS AS % OPERATING EXPENDITURES

MRC, NSERC, SSHRC

PERCENTAGE

INSTITUTION

BR  CA  GU  LAK  LA  MC  OT  QU  TO  TR  WA  WE  WLU  WI  YO


Total granting council awards were used in this graph rather than only R & D grants.
APPENDIX D
APPENDIX D
THE ROLE OF PUBLISHED RESEARCH IN INSTITUTIONAL RANKINGS

Many studies exist with respect to the return an article or book has for the individual (Katz, 1973, Tuckman, 1976). However, no similar studies exist which assess the specific return an institution receives for a piece of published research. Nor are they likely to be produced due to the complexity of the variables that would have to be accounted for in determining the specific gains in status a published research product garners. If these studies do not exist, then what other 'proof' can be put forth, which supplements statements by academics, that research is emphasized because of its visibility and this visibility in turn plays a fundamental role in the inter-institutional accumulation of status? The only recourse left to verify that published research is a primary determinant of institutional status is to examine studies that have attempted to rank institutions.

There have been numerous studies that have attempted to develop hierarchical rankings. When they speak of ranking an institution, what is ordinarily meant is that an attempt is made to determine an institution's prestige-status based on its perceived quality and distinction as an academic institution. (Trow in Clark, 1984: 135). With one exception, (Gourman, 1977), the studies referred to in this section are exclusively U.S. oriented, and are therefore of little specific value to this case study of the social sciences at McMaster. But their general emphasis does
provide insight into what constitutes high status academically. The studies tended to concentrate on two areas of inquiry, either the relative merits of various graduate programs were investigated (Hughes, 1925, Keniston, 1959, Cartter, 1966, Roose and Anderson, 1970), or specific departments and individual disciplines were compared (Somit and Tannenhaus, 1964, Hagstrom, 1971, Gaston, 1973). The emphasis upon graduate schools is one clue to the likely task emphasis of the studies, since graduate programs are usually concerned with research skills of their charges (Millett, 1961: 50).

All the studies had their drawbacks and faults in the data gathering techniques used. Somit and Tannenhaus, when developing their own ranking system, found that with the earlier studies (Hughes, 1925, Keniston, 1959) it was sometimes difficult to determine what exactly was being ranked, the quality of faculty, the student body, the course offerings, the research facilities, or some combination of these. Vague questions like, 'rate departments in terms of the overall quality of the doctoral program' were the rule, not the exception (Somit and Tannenhaus, 1964: 32). Queries are also raised with respect to the particular emphasis of each study, who was chosen to participate, or who selected the participants. Any rigorous inter-study comparisons would be difficult for any number of the reasons stated, but
particularly important are the differences in the sample groups. For instance, Keniston was only interested in the University of Pennsylvania's position relative to other senior universities. His study therefore had a limited scope of twenty-five institutions and consulted only department chairmen. Carter included 106 institutions and nearly four thousand academics; his method of respondent selection was to let the chairmen choose the individuals they felt were 'outstanding senior scholars' and 'younger promising academicians' (Carter, 1966, vii).

A further handicap when dealing with these studies was the lack of background information they gave to the reader. Particularly guilty of this omission was Gourman (1977), the only study that gave rankings internationally. Although he explicitly stated the findings and the criteria used for evaluation (which he roughly divided into quantitative and qualitative attributes (p. 3-4), there were no details as to how the qualitative attributes were initially determined, what weights were assigned them, nor how the criteria were realized through the questionnaire.

For this thesis, interest in these studies lay in what the considerations of the status rankings were based upon. As circumstances unfolded it became apparent that it was easier to determine what was generally left out of consideration, namely attributes associated with the teaching
and administrative capabilities of the staff in particular institutions. The studies were based almost exclusively on derivatives of research production as determinants of rank and, correspondingly, the status accorded an institution.

This is evidenced by the more specifically articulated questions of the studies. Cartter leaves little doubt as to what the main ingredient is in assessing the 'quality' of institutions. His first question provides a list of the 106 institutions being considered and asks for a judgement of the quality of the faculty in the respondent's field by institution. It asks the respondent to, 'consider only the scholarly competence and achievement of the present faculty' (Cartter, 1966: 127). The study then asks for a broader (and vaguer) rating of the doctoral programs offered; here academics were allowed to take into account other factors than just scholarly competence, but due to the visibility of research production it is still a prime consideration in any institutional ranking of 'quality'.

There is an attempt on the part of all these studies to objectify the qualitative determinants of institutional prestige. By way of an example, references are made to and lists drawn up of the numbers of Nobel laurates or members of the National Academy of Sciences an institution employs. If studies of Canadian universities were done, probably the number of faculty who were members of the F.R.S.C. would be
taken into account. However, as Cartter insightfully points out, these so-called objective measures of quality are for the most part subjective measures once removed. Whether it be Nobel prize winners or elevation to a Fellow, the persons concerned are selected by peers on the basis of subjective assessments (Cartter, 1966: 4).

When this is related directly to studies on institutional rankings, criticisms generally state that the studies cannot be taken seriously because they constitute little more than opinion surveys, in brief, gossip elevated to pseudo-scientific social analysis of highly dubious validity. (As one of Cartter's respondents wrote upon completing the questionnaire "a compendium of gossip is still gossip (Cartter, 1966: 8)."

The initiators of the research were fully aware of the shortcomings of the rankings and that the results, 'depend on highly subjective impressions; they reflect old and new loyalties; they are subject to lag and the halo effect of prestige' (Keniston, 1958: 117). Cartter, in particular, was aware of the liabilities. He presents his study as no more than an informed opinion of individuals where, 'lacking agreed upon units for precise measurement, they [the units] can at present only approximate an elusive entity through a rank ordering of cumulative judgments' (Cartter, 1966: vii).

There is no doubt that quality is someone's subjective
assessment, which leaves very little chance of objectively measuring what is in essence an attribute of value; hence the quality of an institution or department is largely a matter of what the field recognizes as such (Berelson, 1960: 125). This does not have to diminish the findings, especially if one takes the perspective of Somit and Tannenhaus (1964: 32), where there is 'less concern with what is actually the situation than with what the academy as a whole believes to be the case'.

What 'the academy as a whole believes to be the case' appears to be remarkably consistent. Given the different techniques used in data gathering, there has been little change amongst the top universities during the almost half century of analysis. This was true whether the studies considered only one discipline (Somit and Tannenhaus studied political science), a number of disciplines (Hagstrom's study was limited to biology, chemistry, math and physics), or institutions in general. Apparently the consistency is due to more than just a residual halo effect. The advantages elite institutions are able to gain are overwhelming. They are able to create what is for them a kind of 'virtuous circle', where initial privilege of position can in turn extend the privileges and the status of an institution (Trow in Clark, 1984: 148).

In assessing how advantage is developed and what
sustains it, Carter noted that there was a clear correlation between reputation of a department and the scholarly productivity of its members. More specifically, departments with high faculty scores tended to show high article equivalents and vice-versa (Carter, 1966, 81, 101). When making these statements Carter was examining in greater detail two specific disciplines, economics and political science, but in the other disciplines that he gave special treatment to the same trends were discerned. His specific attention with certain disciplines and the findings he came away with were supported elsewhere by Somit and Tannehaus and Hagstrom. The latter noted that the correlates of departmental prestige for a sample of 154 math, physics, chemistry and biology departments were article productivity; citations and the ratings of peers (Hagstrom, 1971: 382-3). Thus, the visibility of research production, specifically publication of articles, monographs and books, to return to the theoretical orientation put forth in Chapter Three can be seen as enabling it to constitute the social form of wealth in academia. Research publication plays a critical role in stratifying institutions, having the capacity to determine the ranking of an institution by way of the amount of status it is able to accumulate through the quantity and quality of the finished product.
40. Roose and Anderson (1970) another American Council of Education study basically replicated Cartter's study. It did enlarge the Cartter Study, adding a few disciplines or shifting disciplines to different categories. Essentially the same findings were discovered.


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