POWER RELATIONS IN 19TH-CENTURY ENGLISH MONITORIAL SCHOOLS.

THE SUBJECT OF A DISCIPLINED SPACE:

POWER RELATIONS IN ENGLAND'S NINETEENTH-CENTURY MONITORIAL
SCHOOLS.

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Abstract

Monitorial schools became popular in nineteenth-century Britain. Under the panoptic control of a single master who was assisted by a cadre of specially selected pupils -- monitors -- these institutions responded, ostensibly, to the need to "educate" the underclass. I argue that rather than being concerned with the improvement of literacy, the promoters of these schools -- The Reverend Andrew Bell, Joseph Lancaster and Matthew Davenport Hill, among others -- were driven more by a desire to contain and manage a segment of the population that constituted a perceived threat to social order.

The efficient management of the schools' populations demanded of their pupils an unrelenting self-discipline, a seemingly innocuous concept that carries within it chilling implications for the definition of an ideal subject. I refer throughout to the "literature" of the nineteenth-century English monitorial school -- its theoretical and pedagogical treatises, pictorial representations and accounts of educational experiments -- and by using Michel Foucault's theories of power, I determine the actual force relations that obtain there, defining precisely the nature of a discipline that operates, as Bell writes, "through the agency of the scholars themselves".

Having established the educational context out of which monitorial schools emerged, I proceed, in part one of the dissertation, to examine mainly the works of Joseph Lancaster

and Matthew Davenport Hill. By reference to their tracts, I show how the monitorialists used the emerging technologies of detention to create a subject population whose bodies became the point of application not only of "education," but also a complex form of socio-political experimentation.

In the second part I investigate the attraction for Samuel Taylor Coleridge of The Reverend Andrew Bell's monitorial theory, revealing that what some critics have seen as Coleridge's paradoxical attraction to monitorialism is, in fact, a confirmation of his own idealistic vision for England's social hierarchy.

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I

So I am speaking of relationships that exist at different levels, in different forms; these power relations are mobile, they can be modified, they are not fixed once and for all (Foucault, *Ethics* 292).

The applicability to educational institutions of Michel Foucault's work on the nature of discipline has not gone unremarked. I speak here not about discipline conceived as a way by which an external power imposes itself on an already defined and constituted subject. Rather, I speak of it as being a vital component of the process of subjection, that which is essential if power is to become productive, to form the subject that will be *subjected*. Judith Butler, for example, sees "Subjection [as], literally, the making of a subject, the principle of regulation according to which a subject is formulated or produced" (84). And, as Foucault argues, "it is not necessary to use force to constrain the convict to good behaviour . . . the schoolboy to application" (*Language* 202). Given the proper environment, the institutional inhabitant becomes both disciplinarian and disciplined. The end result of these conditions in which "he becomes the principle of his own subjection" (203) constitutes what I am arguing is the limit case of a specific variety of discipline: self-discipline.

Recognizing Butler's explicit engagement with the creation and policing of the subject, my dissertation addresses the evolution and application of discipline in a specific theatre of regulated efficiency--the nineteenth-century English monitorial school over whose

"invention" an intense rivalry would develop between an Anglican, The Reverend Andrew Bell (1753-1832), and a Quaker, Joseph Lancaster (1778-1838). This type of institution is notable for its employing only one master for hundreds of pupils, the "teaching" being carried out by monitors--themselves pupils and unpaid. It is important to note that these schools were designed for boys only, and it is the monitorial schooling of boys that I discuss in this dissertation. The education of girls in these institutions, records of which are rare almost to the point of non-existence, awaits further study.

The importance of Foucault's recognition that nineteenth-century schools become places of "process," of production, is that it points the way to a radical appreciation of the nature and purpose of monitorial discipline. We need to see its application not in the traditional way simply as a force to be imposed *externally*, as it were, but as a subtly different method of ensuring obedience, of constructing politically docile subjects through the agency of the pupils themselves who *internalize* the means of control. Let us be quite clear: The sophisticated application of discipline is not simply the result of a binary in which one of the parties possesses "power" to the exclusion of the other party that is dispossessed. This much Foucault establishes in *The History of Sexuality* (1976) when he writes, "power is not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a certain strength we are endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society" (93). It follows, then, that any possession or dispossession of power can only ever be temporary since it is from the *relations* of power--always in motion--that any relative advantage occurs. That adults enjoyed precisely this kind of leverage in the operations of the monitorial school is

beyond question, as we shall see; we cannot deny the obvious. However, to dismiss the forces that are strategically arraigned against each other, by reference to what Foucault terms-- perhaps too quickly--"The Repressive Hypothesis"[1] is to miss the subtler play of power within the social body, the interplays of resistance and dominance and their mutual dependencies, the implicit recognition of one by the other, all of which I speak about later.   The analysis of self-discipline in the nineteenth-century monitorial school cannot be divorced from a consideration of the very nature of power itself, and to this extent Foucault's radical rethinking in his introductory volume to *The History of Sexuality* is particularly germane to my present study. To state this is to hear already the question "why?" Why, if Foucault has already advanced an alternative theory of power, am I engaged in a similar endeavour? Such a question approaches the nature of my dissertation obliquely. It must be rephrased: *What* are you doing *with* Foucault's theory? And the answer to that is, that I view through that theory a specific pedagogical space in order to define and interpret its unique social texture. I identify material examples of "the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate" (*Sexuality* 92) about which Foucault speaks. My purpose is to make manifest the myriad points of contact--pupil and pedagogue, school population and school geometry, pupils and monitors, bodies and spaces, for example--and to break them down into their

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[1]Foucault's theory of the repressive hypothesis challenges ideas that one section of society was reduced to silence as a result of its successful domination by another. This is not to say that Foucault refutes class-conflict or class-difference, but he requires us to refine the ways that we view them, to appreciate the subtleties inherent in the complex components of power relations.

individual parts in order to understand the nature of the relations that are the preconditions of monitorial discipline's existence. To this extent, then, my study of the monitorial school seeks not simply to confirm Foucault's assertion that "power is everywhere" (93), but more importantly tests it against the conditions that obtain within the pedagogical space that I have chosen.

There is, equally as important, another purpose to this study, and that is to refute an implication that nineteenth-century pedagogical change arose out of a resistance movement identified with, and centred in, an oppressed class that was aware of a social injustice to which it was subjected, a site of alternative thought that was somehow external to the application of power. Educational historian J.W.Adamson, for example, writes: "The great religious revivals of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries stimulated a desire for instruction amongst working people" (36). Another historian, E.L. Archer, argues even more suggestively, that "[s]ooner or later the doctrines of the French Revolution were bound to lead to a demand by the workers for levelling up or levelling down--for education" (99). Taken together, these statements might conceivably lead to the notion that a uniform awareness for educational reform existed in the underclass. Indeed, educational commentator Harold Silver gives this theory an additional impetus when he concludes, "By 1831 . . . in the charged atmosphere of reform agitation, independent working class action for political rights had assumed new proportions" (Silver *Concept*, 169), a reference to the working class's growing self-consciousness that would express itself in Chartism. We need to remind ourselves though, that regardless of the fact that Chartism emerged after the demonstrable failure of the

monitorial school, agitators such as the Chartist leader William Lovett were hardly typical of

the materially and educationally impoverished that constituted the underclass. Lovett's words

are unquestionably stirring:

> While proposing these various means for the political and social amelioration
> of the people, let it not for a moment be supposed that we agree with those
> 'educationalists' who consider the working classes 'too ignorant for the
> franchise'. So far from giving countenance to such unjust and liberty-
> destroying notions, we think the most effectual means to *enlighten* and
> *improve* them is to place them on a footing of political equality with other
> classes. (55)

However, not only does Lovett privilege political equality over educational opportunity--a

facet of Chartism to which I later return in this dissertation--but also he *subjects* the body for

whom he is an advocate when he uses the third person plural pronoun. Again I return to

Foucault's theory of power, which maintains that just as power operates at numerous points

of contact, so too, is resistance always already present in any power relationship. If true, this

causes us to reconsider not only the motives for the educational changes that occurred in

nineteenth-century Britain, but also the reliability of attributing those changes to an

underclass-driven movement--a resistance, as otherwise understood. For if power is not

wielded as a weapon, but results from the interplay of forces, then it is surely arguable that

resistance does not function as a shield but is an integral part of the very relations out of

which power is born. And so my dissection of the multiple relations that come into play in the

monitorial school also tests Foucault's assertion that, regarding resistance, "there is no locus

of great Refusal, no soul of revolt, source of all rebellions, or pure law of the revolutionary"

(96). By this he does not mean that resistance is non-existent. Rather, he means that we

cannot trace opposition to a single, unadulterated well-spring of pure thought. The definition of power with which I am working recognises the immanence of resistance in the relations that are in play. This is a concept that destabilizes the traditional Marxist idea of suppression by state apparatus,[2] and assigns an element of resistance--now tacit, now obvious--to each of the many participants in the power calculus.

It is worth recognizing, though, that to promote a greater fear of the underclass is tantamount to "manufacturing" a problem. The "solution" then lies within the social designs of the very people who must rationalize institutions that will contain the threat. Thus we must take under a certain degree of advisement the ostensibly altruistic motives of those who promote educational reform, including Bell and Lancaster. That is not to say that the underclass and its potential for disorder was simply produced. That schools and other institutions predicated on the necessity of control exist gives tacit acknowledgement of a latent resistance to the will to rule. Within the schools that order the bodies and minds of the underclass, a continual and repeated process of subjection takes place. This process is not straightforward and can never be complete. As Judith Butler writes, "The Foucaultian subject is never fully constituted in subjection . . . it is repeatedly constituted in subjection, and it is in the possibility of a repetition that repeats against its origin that subjection might be understood to draw its inadvertently enabling power" (94). It is continuous and repetitious precisely because the "laws" that allow the process to function take their strength from an

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[2]Louis Althusser's essay "Ideology and the State" is a prime example of this approach.

ability (that is never finite) to police whatever it is that would resist them. At the same time, this necessary repetition--by virtue of its obvious reference to that which it is directed--has the potential to define its very object. Butler again: "The term which not only names, but forms and frames the subject . . . mobilizes a reverse discourse against the very regime of normalization by which it is spawned" (93). The process and its institutions seethe with anxieties, it seems.

I scrutinize monitorial tracts in part to separate theory from practice, to both identify what actually took place in the institutions to which I refer and the extent to which the behaviour conformed to the monitorialists' design. The target texts of this dissertation speak of schools that are already in existence at the time the authors publish their treatises. They do not predate the institutions; on the contrary, they are contemporaneous with them, and thus relate the experiences of the writers as well as their visions. At the same time we need to appreciate that the monitorialists' books and pamphlets articulate a desire, a desire informed by a social vision that, in the nature of all desire, cannot ever be completely realised. Consequently, I closely examine the rhetoric to determine precisely those points where the writer sometimes consciously and, arguably, sometimes inadvertently reveals an inconsistency between the ideal and the practical result.

I investigate three varieties of monitorial school. While the institutions are, at first glance, similar, the separate examinations to which I subject them reveal significant differences as well as important concurrences in their individual routines and procedures. Joseph Lancaster's establishments reflect a non-conformist ideology, whereas those of the

Reverend Andrew Bell are informed by the doctrine of England's national religion. And to

provide a secular counterpoint I also study Matthew Davenport Hill's Hazelwood school, an

institution that is founded on predominantly capitalist virtues of competition, reward and

personal gain. I deliberately show the disciplinary fundamentals that monitorial schools share.

It is because the type of examination upon which I am engaged has not been done before that

I find it imperative to reveal the will to subjugation in monitorial regimes, whether religiously

or secularly driven. While the ends of monitorial schooling -- the creation of docile, obedient

and conforming bodies -- are the same, the means are subtly different. For that reason, the

many examples that I incorporate in the following chapters do not overlap; the results may

coincide, but it is my purpose to expose the variations by which those results are achieved.

Indeed, it is at that point where my description of monitorialism is strongest. For it is there

that we experience -- albeit ever so slightly, and at a remove of some two hundred years --

the relentless drive to homogeneity that underpins the monitorial theories of which I speak.

Speaking in *Discipline and Punish* of the role of the school in the disciplinary process,

Foucault argues: "The school became a machine for learning, in which each pupil, each level

and each moment, if correctly combined, were permanently utilized in the general process of

teaching" (165). The machine trope figures prominently in descriptions of the monitorial

school, whose total disciplinary productivity[3] I also examine. Another recent commentator,

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[3]By total disciplinary productivity I mean a combination of both the methods and the results
obtained from within the monitorial space that, rather than delimiting an area within which
discipline was applied, was itself disciplined in its very architecture and design.

Dave Jones, utilizes machine imagery when he argues for the wider social implications of the monitorial school: "The school as an engine of instruction could manufacture a disciplinary society" (58), he writes. Jones, however, is concerned with only one component part of the organisation--the teacher. My dissertation, though, begins with the assumption that what is needed is an explanation of the way in which the total operation coheres, how its multiple levels and parts are relevant to each other and what, precisely, constitutes the process of monitorialism.

My investigation of the monitorial system is not predicated on the belief that these schools represent a stage in the transition from one type of educational system to another. However, it is necessary to establish the historical context within which monitorialism emerges. These schools co-exist with, rather than replace, other formal and informal institutions--dame schools and charity schools, for example--whose ostensible purpose it was to educate society's less materially fortunate members, and public schools--private institutions--which provided for "gentlemen's" children who needed financial assistance for their education if they were to assume their own rightful place in society.[4] Like educational historian Richard Johnson, I refute the idea that "the development of state educational systems has been an unambiguously progressive process" (*Educating* 77). Indeed, I show that in many cases the fundamentals of monitorialism are reactionary and have little to do with educational advances, despite the hyperbole of the schools' supporters. It is important to

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[4] I speak further of these schools in part two of this introduction.

recognise that monitorial schools--regardless of the desires of their "inventors" to establish them on a national scale--were privately run. The idea that government should be involved in the provision of education was still a radical notion identifiable with disquieting "continental" notions of egalitarianism that smacked of Jacobinism. As historian Michael Sanderson argues, "The English radical tradition in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries owed much to the French philosophers who attributed a central importance to education" (56). Thus, Bell's Anglicanism and Lancaster's non-denominationalism, although in clear opposition to each other, implicitly stand against revolutionary ideas originating from across the English Channel.

That Bell should consider only the "rudiments of letters"[5] as being necessary confirms what quickly becomes clear from an examination of the schools operated under his and Lancaster's direction: very little in the way of "learning" as we might understand it today actually takes place. It would seem that a school in which its pupils learn very little would find it difficult to attract students and yet, as I show, the number of boys under monitorial instruction increased rapidly. The potential threat to social order arising from the schooling of the underclass remains, as I also show, a constant source of anxiety. A fear of "the mob" was ever present, but the extent to which that fear is justified in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries is open to debate. Speaking of the urban situation at the time, historian John Stevenson argues that "the security of some of the larger towns and cities was being

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[5]See page 52 of this dissertation

undermined by the twin processes of population growth and urbanisation" (29). There is no

denying that civil unrest was a cause for concern, but during the eighteenth century "[s]erious

casualties, though by no means entirely absent, were the exception rather than the rule" (29).[6]

It seems, though, that although the eighteenth century was not a period of calm, it is

something of a construct that portrays the early nineteenth century as a period violently

different from the preceding years. The apprehension comes from the potential for disorder

represented by a disgruntled populace manipulated by articulate agitators.

Arguably, the titles of some of the putatively pedagogical treatises betray their

authors' preference for a form of management as a solution to this apparent social problem.

Bell, for example, speaks of "Conducting Schools Through the Agency of the Scholars

Themselves" in two of the texts that I cite; Matthew Davenport Hill, who developed his

Hazelwood School along monitorial lines, is concerned with "Government" before "Liberal

Instruction," and the subject of both is of "Boys, in *Large Numbers*" (my emphasis).

Lancaster, admittedly, includes "education" in the titles of his books and pamphlets, but we

should note that he specifically refers to what he calls "the industrious classes" in his first

book in 1807, singling out a specific segment of society for special treatment and

inadvertently defining the meaning of education for that class. In the manual that Lancaster

publishes in 1831,"instruction" replaces "education," implicitly confirming his long-held belief

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[6]It must be said, however, that London's problems were a concern. As Stevenson reminds us, "in 1780 occurred the most serious riots of the century when the mob held the streets of London against the civil and military authorities for almost a week. The death toll was over 400 people killed or executed ..." (30).

that pupils--here synonymous with the underclass--should listen and obey.

Something occurs at the end of the eighteenth century and the early years of the nineteenth century that drives a movement to gather boys for collective instruction. Britain's voracious industrial appetite demanded a work force, to be sure. It needed bodies whose permanent location would ensure labour's stability. But, as educational historian P.W. Musgrave reminds us, "the economy . . . did not yet depend upon the educational system for a supply of formally educated manpower" (7), an observation that renders suspect the emerging early nineteenth-century interest in education. If the rootlessness of the poor was a continuing impediment to the stability required, it was also true that a satisfactory way of achieving that permanence had not been devised. Thus the emphasis shifts from the adult to the juvenile. Contain the children and justify that containment by posing it as a solution to a problem, and the chances are very good that the parents will become "rooted." The "problem" to be solved is the children's lack of education. The lack of "education," a putative observation which until then had been forwarded as a means of containing the underclass, now becomes figured as a problem to be rectified. Hence we have lurid details of youth running riot when not constantly employed,[7] and these accounts bolster the perception that a problem exists. It is a problem--a lack of orderliness, of sense of social place, of duty, of self-discipline--for which the monitorial school provides an envisioned solution.

It is important to appreciate that the "problem" is one that is articulated by middle-

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[7]See pages 80, for example.

class radicals regardless of political stripe. While it could be argued that greater literacy would promote discontent, the potential for a network of educational institutions was attractive to those who wanted to confine and observe that segment of the population from which perceived threats to order might come. "The essential dilemma," as Michael Sanderson argues, was "whether to deny education to the poor and so avoid trouble, or whether to provide ample education in the hope that it would serve as an agency of social control" (*Education* 20). The idea that crime would diminish if the poor were subjected to at least a rudimentary education maintained its grasp on middle-class sensibilities.[8] It is not surprising, then, that an economic element to the debate emerges, namely that any expenditure incurred in large-scale education would be offset by savings achieved as a result of less criminal activity. This is an argument designed to appeal to the middle-class and, predictably, much of the impetus towards educational reform arose from that part of society.[9] Significantly, it would be the

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[8]I use the term middle-class here to suggest values and ideologies that are essentially commercially informed and appeal to a sense of independence and personal responsibility-- albeit that these qualities are arbitrarily assigned in a social sense. To this extent, Lancaster and Bell are not middle-class in the way that many of their contemporary reformers were. Robert Owen, for example, initiated New Lanark in 1809 at the height of monitorial enthusiasm, but his was a cradle-to-grave concept with schools that formed part of an industrial community. The 1833 Factory Act that guaranteed some education for child operatives may be traced to Owen's efforts. This is not to say that his motives, or those of his followers, were particularly altruistic, but such reforms as did occur were the result of agitation from his socio-political class rather than the monitorialists who were much more religiously informed.

[9]Educational historian Brian Simon confirms this when he writes, "Those who took up the cause of educational change in the early nineteenth century represented a new political grouping on a national scale. Adherents of the radical movement, representing middle-class

supporters of Jeremy Bentham (the designer of the Panopticon) "who over a generation pressed the cause of state intervention in the education of the lower orders" (58). It is important to appreciate the fact that the working class was not yet organised in any way, and whatever change they felt was a result of middle-class efforts directed toward their own concerns. As Brian Simon argues,

> the aristocracy was engaged in the defence of vital class interests. Opposed to them stood the middle class, also engaged in a struggle for *their* vital interests. But here the case was different. Unlike the aristocracy, the middle class . . . contributed everything of value to the nation. It was by constantly elaborating on this theme that . . . such men as Francis Place,[10] artisan turned master--contributed to forming the class consciousness of that section of the population for whom they spoke. (77)

If education were valued, it was an education envisaged to suit the middle-class--not the underclass--for the role in society for which they considered themselves most fit. As a leading article in the *Westminster Review* was to put it, "The proper education of this portion of the people is therefore of the greatest possible importance to the wellbeing of the state" (Simon 68-69). From this we might well deduce that the middle-class was concerned solely with its own education, that this endeavour was another example of what Foucault sees as a direction

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interests, they played a leading part in the struggle for Parliamentary reform which culminated in the passing of the Reform Act of 1832. The demand for educational reform developed as an essential aspect of this movement" (72).

[10]Interestingly, Place was instrumental in removing Joseph Lancaster from his position at Borough Road in the wake of an incident to which I refer on page 158 and following. That Place and others like him should have populated the board of the British and Foreign School Society is a further indication of the extent to which middle-class interests drive educational reform.

of techniques "applied first, with the greatest intensity, in the economically privileged and politically dominant classes" (*Sexuality* 120). He speaks in this context of the middle-class subjecting itself first in terms of sexuality as a means of authenticating its status as a legitimate class body, and he does so in order to refute the repressive hypothesis--which relies on notions of class dominance--to which I have already referred.[11] Thus, we seem to be faced with a paradox. On the one hand, I argue, agreeing with Foucault, that clear-cut binaries of oppressor and oppressed are not as established as previous readings of history have maintained. On the other hand, I find it difficult to see an application of the middle-class drive to legitimacy being played out in the pedagogical arena. As I argue in this dissertation, the middle-class was not solely pre-occupied with the education of its own members. Indeed, its pedagogical agenda was concerned with the underclass, even if, as evidenced by schools like Davenport Hill's Hazelwood institution, there was a move to reinforce commercial virtues in middle-class youth. Thus, my dissertation provides an alternative understanding of the relations of power between the middle and underclass where they delimit pedagogical space.

We must, then, question the extent to which the working class was the agent of its own educational reform in the early nineteenth century. It is important, I think, to appreciate that the dissatisfaction that manifested itself was not directed, particularly, at the monitorial

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[11]Foucault's pursuit of the construction of sexuality as a technique of power recognises that sexuality "invest[s] relationships . . . teacher and student . . . [and] spaces . . . the school" (*Sexuality* 47). I would argue, in light of his reference to the pedagogical space, that it is legitimate to expand his assertion to consider whether the middle-class uses education as a means of class-authentication.

system. If British education was found to be wanting, and it certainly was, then the monitorial schools were only a part of the problem. Moreover, there was no one body or organization to speak for the monitorial pupils. We need to realise that the monitorial system was in an advanced state of decline by the passing of the 1833 Factory Act which guaranteed a modicum of instruction for operatives, and it is by no means certain that that act would have been passed had the potential for a minimally "educated" work-force not been advantageous to the middle-class supporters of the legislation.

One might look to the Chartist movement as a source of reform, but this would be historically inaccurate. For one thing, it was not until 1839--840 that the Chartists developed an educational paper of their own, and for another, the movement was itself riven with dissent concerning the importance of an educational platform.[12] At the heart of this particular debate was the question as to whether the franchise or educational reform should come first. To assert that the underclass needed to be educated before they could vote was to give tacit agreement to the opposition's charge that "that the masses were not worthy of the franchise since they were ignorant and uneducated" (Cullen 65). To be sure, the Chartists inaugurated a number of schools, but these were never established on a large scale, a fact that indicates an ideological Achilles heel from the standpoint of a national educational system. The Chartists, historian Michael Cullen argues, "inherited a long radical tradition of suspicion of powerful governments which could not help but be a factor in their approach to the solution

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[12]Brian Simon points out that "[d]ifferences arose over Lovett's desire to collaborate with middle-class Radicals, and to limit activities in order to retain their support" (267).

of social problems" (170). Thus, while they might have been adept at "attacking what they saw as the failings of existing attitudes toward, and provision for, education" (166), they showed themselves to be lacking when it came to the implementation of alternative solutions. Again we need to remember that Chartism did not emerge until after the Government had made its first "grant-in-aid of elementary education" (162), and must be seen as travelling in the wake of a movement for change that was already under way, and which drew its momentum from outside the ranks of the underclass.

In the end, it must be said that Chartism suffered from its own sense of confusion concerning educational reform. In many ways their ideas were similar to those of the middle-class: "Like [them] they believed that there were certain undeniable facts concerning moral, social, and political relationships which could legitimately be instilled in the young by means of an educational system" (172). And while they might be said to have "departed from their contemporaries in terms of the function of education . . . at the point where education became a means of transmitting ideology" (169), they could still display a troubling similarity to the kinds of ideas promulgated by Lancaster and Bell, for example: according to the *Chartist Circular*, education would provide for "'the parties instructed a knowledge of their duties-- personal, relative and national'" (169). Chartists were never able to forcefully articulate their educational position, and we may see their ultimate failure in this area of social reform arising from the fact that, paradoxically, they were too close to their ostensible middle-class opponents to be able to formulate a feasible alternative. It would be misguided to attribute whatever meagre reforms occurred to Chartist initiative, and very wrong indeed to assume

that the efforts they did make were grounded in an awareness of the educational failings of the monitorial school. The children, it seems, were invisible to the movement.

Foucault's assertion that "Discipline makes possible the operation of a relational power that sustains itself by its own mechanism and which, for the spectacle of public events, substitutes the uninterrupted play of calculated gazes" (*Discipline* 177) informs my reading of the texts, pamphlets, commentaries, sermons, and all of the paraphernalia that is part of the monitorial school. And since the monitorial space is itself disciplined by the meticulous attention paid by its designers to measurements of area, features of furniture, width of throughways, for example, my work is also informed by critics of building science such as Thomas A. Markus who recognises the significance of an architectural analysis to the study of discipline in this type of institution. Asserting in a recent article that "space was organised to produce relations between individual children, groups of children and teachers based on a strong ideological base of religion, order, surveillance, discipline, hierarchy, competition and the limited formation of solidarities" ("Early" 9), Markus goes on to argue that the "more or less simultaneous . . . invention of monitorial teaching, by Bell and Lancaster . . . is the crucial case for demonstrating the use of space as an ideological instrument" ("Early" 33).

My dissertation's purpose is to examine precisely this "crucial case," to investigate the way in which discipline evolves in the monitorial space. That is to say, I take Markus's assertion about the role of discipline and explicate the myriad components that his use of that word implies. This necessarily involves a consideration of the ways in which the design of the monitorial school mirrors and evidences other disciplines--religious, economic, legal--that

constitute its complex genealogy. Chief among the number of nineteenth-century pedagogical texts upon which my work concentrates are the Reverend Andrew Bell's *The Madras School* (1808), *Instructions for Conducting a School Through the Agency of the Scholars Themselves* (1808), and *Mutual Tuition and Moral Discipline; or, Manual of Instructions for Conducting Schools Through the Agency of the Scholars Themselves* (1823); Joseph Lancaster's *Improvements in Education, As it Relates to the Industrious Classes of the community* (1807), *The British System of Education: Being a Complete Epitome of the Improvements and Inventions Practised at the Royal Free Schools, Borough-Road, Southwark* (1810), and *Manual of the System of Primary Instruction Pursued in the Model Schools of the British and Foreign School Society* (1831); and Matthew Davenport Hill's *Plans for the Government and Liberal Instruction of Boys, in Large Numbers; Drawn from Experience* (1822). I examine these texts in order to show the ways in which the constituents of the monitorial space--the school population (masters, monitors, pupils), the educational materials employed, the bricks and mortar of the institution--all contribute to the development of a disciplinary regime that eventually becomes internalized and indiscernible from the players in the pedagogical theatre. When Foucault writes that a "relation of surveillance, defined and regulated, is inscribed at the heart of the practice of teaching, not as an additional or adjacent part, but as a mechanism that is inherent to it and which increases its efficiency" (*Discipline* 176), he issues an implicit challenge to demonstrate the effect of this mechanism on the various parts of the monitorial machine. By not only dissecting the nature of pedagogical discipline but also by defining and demonstrating what precisely constitutes *self-*

discipline and what it means in the nineteenth-century monitorial school, my dissertation responds to Foucault's challenge.

II

A variety of institutions populate the nineteenth-century English educational landscape. They range from those with a recognisable organized structure to those that are little more than child-minding operations, and include charity schools, mechanics' institutes, dame schools, public schools, grammar schools, county schools and Sunday schools. In part, the monitorial school comes into being as a response to what was being seen as the shortcomings of these other "schools"--a lack of conformity, the need to pay for education, the absence of a common curriculum, their inability to deal with the "problem" of idle youth. The instructional method around which the monitorial schools were organised was known also as the "Madras,"[13] or "Lancasterian" system, acknowledging the two rival claimants for the "discovery" of the monitorial idea. It is important to know something of the main players on England's nineteenth-century monitorial pedagogical stage: not only people like Bell and Lancaster, but also Matthew Davenport Hill who, while apparently opposing what he argued to be the physical brutality of the system, developed--as we shall see--a sophisticated psychological disciplining of his pupils. The monitorialists' backgrounds reveal what is, at

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[13]In 1797 Bell was serving as a chaplain to the British army in Madras, India. At the same time he was also the honorary superintendent of a school for the male children of British soldiers and native Indian women. Educational historian Frank Smith writes that when Bell "returned to London he published *An Experiment in Education made at the Male Asylum in Madras* .... " Subsequently, "monitorial" and "Madras" came to be used synonymously for the teaching methods used in schools designed by both Bell and Lancaster.

times, a fascinating mixture of ideological zeal, personal ambition, religious inflexibility and a pedagogical theory that is on many occasions simplistic on the one hand, and chillingly restrictive on the other.

Lancaster "'began his career as an educationist in the year 1798, at the age of eighteen, when he opened a school for ninety children, in the house of his father, and taught many of them free of all expense'" (Silver, *Concept* 43).[14] Three years later he was to open a school--his first to operate under monitorial principles--in London's Borough Road. The sheer size of the school's eventual student body--"[Lancaster] taught as to a thousand children" (Armytage 90)[15]--demanded a corresponding increase in the number of monitors, and he "began in 1805 to board a selected number of monitors as 'apprentices'; by 1808 he had 24 and by 1811 he had 50" (92). Ironically, the development of a system that responded, in part, to a fiscal crisis, fell under the control of one whose financial ineptitude became legendary. The supporters of Lancaster's method, tiring of the school's constant financial precariousness, eventually wrested control from the Quaker, and governed the growing educational organization under the auspices of the newly formed British and Foreign School Society. Lancaster died penniless--not surprisingly perhaps--in New York.

The established church felt a need to respond to the Nonconformists, and the

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[14]In a footnote, Silver attributes this information to *"The Westminster Review*, Vol. XLVI, No. 1, October, 1846, p.20" (43).

[15]Smith comments on the significant early growth in the number of pupils in Lancaster's schools: "his scholars numbered over 200 in 1802, 300 in 1803, 500 in 1804, and 800 in 1805" (72).

Anglicans recruited one of their number, the Reverend Andrew Bell, who had already

published the results of what he called an educational "experiment" that he had carried out

in Madras, India. Unlike Lancaster, "Bell founded no school" (Smith 77), although his

particular methods were, eventually, to be widely applied. At the foundation of both men's

theories there is little to distinguish between the two. Order, discipline and regularity inform

the pamphlets and instructions of each. Both systems, moreover, had as their aim the

formation of an ideal citizen, a subject who, in the society outside school would know and

keep to his place just as he had within the walls of the monitorial school. Bell's aim, though,

was to form a particular kind of *Christian* subject. It is debatable whether, as Mary Sturt

asserts, "[Bell's] . . . mind [was] far less liberal and imaginative than Lancaster's" (28). The

examination of the systems reveals, as I will show, that imagination has little to do with the

philosophy of either. We can safely say, however, that Bell, and the movement which funded

him, was more overtly religiously partisan than Lancaster. Haunted by the doctrines that had

led to the establishment of Charity schools, the National Society's committee[16] would opine:

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[16]The National Society for Promoting the Education of the Poor in the Principles of the Established Church was established in 1811. It was the Anglican equivalent of the British and Foreign School Society which administered the non-denominational monitorial schools.

> One of the most important lessons impressed upon them will be the duty of resignation to their lot; and common sense, experience and Scripture will unite in assuring them that 'he who will not work, neither shall he eat.' Where dissent from this doctrine is so unwise, so unreasonable, and indeed so impracticable, it is not very likely to arise. By the very constitution of society the Poor are destined to labour, and to this supreme and beneficial arrangement of Providence they must of necessity submit. (29)[17]

Here, as in Bell's own expositions, the emphasis falls on the naturalness, the pre-ordination of one's class position. It becomes clear, as I will show, that at the level of ideas, Bell reaches to the supernatural for justification, arguing that the principle of mutual instruction is not so much a discovery, an invention, but a revelation of an inherent--in some cases undeveloped--mental faculty. Although not always overt, a socio-political agenda informs monitorial school theory.

If Lancaster and Bell occupy opposite religio-educational poles, Matthew Davenport-Hill occupies the space that they leave vacant for contest. Interestingly, Hill was to become noted for his efforts in the field of law reform. This was a development that, perhaps, grew out of his vision of the school with which he was connected as being organized along the principles of democratic government, and explains in part at least his obsession with establishing an intricate juridical apparatus to govern the boys' conduct. As will become clear, an awareness of the subtleties of psychological control and its productive potential informs this particular version of democracy in Hill's institution. Where Bell's and Lancaster's monitorial schools reflect their socio-religious backgrounds and ambitions, Hill acknowledges

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[17]Mary Sturt attributes this statement to the National Society's committee, but gives no particulars concerning date or publication of the source.

the growing interest in education as a science to be studied,[18] hence his appropriation of "experiment" to describe the school's activities. In a curious parallel to Lancaster's situation, Hill and his brother, as R.L. Archer informs us, "took over their father's school in Birmingham" (90), the elder Hill's lack of financial skill precipitating the abdication of management duties to his sons. No doubt influenced in his decision by his earlier exposure to the school's day-to-day routine, Matthew Hill would also have seen at first hand the advantages to be gained from the employment of youthful assistants.[19]

The Bell-Lancaster controversy[20] seems to have relegated commentary on Hill's school to the margins of educational theoretical analysis, and that which is available is not particularly enlightening. Archer, for example, points out that the brothers "avoided . . . the growing craze among educational modernists for the mere pouring forth of knowledge" (90).

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[18]To Matthew Davenport Hill . . . public education was 'of the nature of a science'" (Lawson and Silver, *Social History* 353).

[19]Armytage writes: "[Hill's] children began to assist him when they had barely reached their teens .... The Hill boys all learnt by teaching" (82-83).

[20]Bell and Lancaster's opposite theological allegiances originally fuelled the rivalry that would envelop them both. The antagonism developed into a pointless competition the subject of which was to determine who "discovered" the system. Lancaster's desire to avoid a sectarian bias invoked the ire of Sarah Trimmer, an advocate of Anglican education, who wrote to Bell: "From the time, Sir, that I read Mr. Joseph Lancaster's *Improvements in Education* in the first edition, I conceived an idea that there was something in his plan that was inimical to the interests of the Established Church, and, when I read your *Experiment in Education*, to which he referred, I plainly perceived that he had been building on your foundation" (Sturt 23). "Bell," Sturt writes, was quite ready to agree that Lancaster was a plagiarist and a knave," and although we might find the quarrel risible today, it is perhaps important to note Sturt's observation that this squabble "prevented the establishment of a state system of education, and so gave to English education its curious haphazard character" (23).

This statement is in itself suspect, as I will demonstrate in my examination, but it is his subsequent observation, a conclusion that he offers as evidence of the brothers' progressiveness, that reveals how little has been understood about the relationship between the workings, the routine of the school, and the psychological considerations upon which the success of this routine depends. He writes: "The most striking feature in their teaching was their constant use of the pupils' activity" (90). I shall examine in detail the psychological and disciplinary implications of this desire for constant employment, recognising in this desire a requirement to establish within the underclass a sense of place and permanence.

III

A number of different documents and records comprise the textual geology whose succeeding strata must be peeled away in order to determine the ways in which these "texts" have been written. Apologists for monitorial schools produce myriad pamphlets and treatises, part of the nineteenth-century's "discursive explosion" *(Sexuality* 38) of which Foucault speaks, and which evidences the middle-class's desire to "know" its subjects in order to control and manage them. Some of these materials begin their lives as little more than a few pages of preliminary and rudimentary thought. As the school evolves, these pamphlets undergo revisions, increase in size and influence, become recognizable as books, at first confirming and then contradicting the arguments made in their earlier versions. There are the commentaries on these materials that in themselves form a picture of a monitorial pupil and his institution that is not always consistent. We have the fragments of biographical and autobiographical material, both of the founders and their charges, that may be compared and

contrasted. On the one hand, we have the idealism of the theoretical pedagogical treatise with

its idea of the perfect pupil produced by the perfect system. On the other hand, we have the

recollections of some of those pupils--meagre though those reminiscences may be--who might

not find themselves motivated to offer an overt criticism (although some of them do), but

from within whose descriptions we can retrieve a sub-textual counter-memory[21] of the system

of which their authors are part.

There are, too, records from which the day-to-day administration of the school may

be re-constructed: its reading lists, its timetables, its records of attendance. To what extent,

I must ask, are these apparently functionally separate items complicit in the construction and

the subsequent disciplining of the pupil subject? The books that the pupils read reflect a high

degree of theological and moral investment. If--and I will show this to be the case--much of

the pedagogical method in Bell's monitorial school is essentially and unapologetically

catechistic, it seems fair to see the adherence to routine, to time and to order as an example

of what becomes a now-internalized catechistic response. We see the verbal language of

question and answer transformed into a different, though no less effective, form of sign,

where the guaranteed movement of cohering bodies in response to the dictates of an

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[21]If, as I am arguing, the "official" documents that evidence the plans, systems and mechanics of monitorial schools constitute, as per Foucault, a *discourse* of monitorialism, then these fragments that record the voices that the discourse seeks to silence constitute in turn an alternative discourse of their own. I borrow the term "counter-memory" from Donald F. Bouchard who reminds us that Foucault sees that "literature [in opposition to language] has transformed, since the nineteenth century, into a counter-memory" (8), by which he means an other voice. The pupils' recollections, where they may be heard, seem to me to be analogous to the alternative about which Foucault speaks.

omnipresent organizational map takes language and silences it, while at the same time evidencing and reinforcing its effectiveness. Thus the records of attendance become something *other* than a point of reference concerning the system's functionality, a resource at which to look in isolation, whose function is in a regulatory sense, discrete. On the contrary, these records constitute a different voice that fills the space vacated by the verbal command when the student body reacts to the silent dictates of the timetable. Those pupils who are absent register their resistance to conformity and consequently stand apart from the homogeneity that typifies the regulated body whose "other" they constitute. We will see that fundamental to the monitorial school's regime, its technicalities of control, is the drive to sameness, the eradication of difference. Those tools of which I will speak--for example the registers, the black books, the labels marked "truant" that offenders wear in some cases--do not simply identify an absentee. Rather, they serve to focus the institution's resources in such a way that they absorb the errant material, or alternatively classify it as unworthy of further effort in order to discharge it.

The school's physical partitions and austerely organized spaces, its elevations, its machinery, form another "textual" material to be examined. We must understand the ways in which geometry, architecture, design and psychology intersect and reflect each other. The principle of Jeremy Bentham's panopticism--the constant certainty of observation--influences the design of these schools, to be sure, but there are other considerations, less overt, yet equally significant. There is an important connection to be made between the absence of decoration, the almost puritanical resistance to any imaginative materials, and a strong thread

of associationist thinking that informs monitorial pedagogy. But again we must ask whether these connections stand in isolation, as it were. It is possible to separate our consideration of their influences on each other, to see that the bare walls, the rooms devoid of pictures, the preponderance of religious texts reflects the Lockean heritage that sees the child's mind as a *tabula rasa* that will be written over by that to which it is exposed. We can see in these austere settings a reflection not only of belief in the ability to impress the mind, but also the attendant fear that that mind in its impressionability is never stable and constantly represents territory that may not only be colonised, but also must be denied exposure to alternative doctrines and ideas. It is why the concept of place is so important. "A place for everything and everything in its place" becomes much more than a slogan denoting tidiness. Reflecting an anxiety concerning the potential for social disorder, it implies that people have their pre-ordained places and must be educated to be kept in them. "A place for everything ..." becomes synonymous with the desire for order that arguably underwrites the monitorial school as it responds to the visibly increasing failure of the main methods of providing an education for the poor--dame schools and charity schools.

If the monitorial school and its operations were predicated on a need for control, a perception that social order needed to be reinforced, that the economics of education demanded a radical alternative, then it is necessary to understand the educational and pedagogical environment out of which the monitorial "solution" arose. Did the monitorial school react against a particular type of establishment, or did it fill a space that was hitherto unattended or left vacant through neglect or failure? England in the late eighteenth century

still contained remnants of the local dame school. In the early years of the century these schools' growth had been prolific. Writing about nineteenth-century English educational institutions, Eric Midwinter has estimated that in 1818 "there were 3,000 [dame schools]... or one sixth of the total schools" (18). In the absence of any regulatory or pedagogical standard, the operation of these establishments varied widely. Midwinter writes:

> Some resembled the cosy nook of well-scrubbed infants and comfortable matrons delineated in Charles Kingsley's *Water Babies*. Others existed in the cellars of the large cities, accommodating children whose parents were at work. Forty or fifty boys and girls were confined in a squalid basement, with on one or another occasion, the dame dying of cholera or some other disease in a corner. (19)

Whether or not the dame school catered to a particular age or type of child is not, it seems, a subject upon which later commentators altogether agree. Midwinter refers both to "infants" and "children," while J.M. Goldstrom--who has studied the social background to English nineteenth-century education--argues that "they were largely minding institutions for very young children," and as such were "not schools as understood in the modern sense" (5). Mary Sturt, however, who has investigated the evolution of state intervention in the educational process, draws a distinction between dame schools whose charges were "very small children," and "common day schools for those rather older" (38). Alan Richardson in his study of the connections between Romanticism and children's literature describes dame schools as "informal establishments, often kept by widows, which took children off their parents' hands and (sometimes) provided basic instruction in reading, writing, and perhaps needle-work or other skills" (79). John Burnett, editor of a collection of nineteenth-century autobiographical

material, provides a most succinct summary:

> The 'typical' dame school . . . defies definition. At its worst, in some of the so-called 'lace schools', it was no more than a means of exploiting tiny children on the pretext that they were learning a useful trade; most were in the nature of nursery-schools where busy mothers could leave their children out of harm's way in the reasonable expectation that they would be taught to read; at the top, some merged into the private schools and 'academies' where children of the better-off classes were introduced to penmanship, [and] mathematics ....(144-145)

Eye witness accounts of conditions in the early part of the century are few. In his memoirs, the poet John Clare (born in 1793) writes little of his schooling except to say that his education came "first with an old woman in the village, and latterly with a master at a distance from it" (48). This latter school seems to have been one of the "common day schools" to which Sturt refers. The majority of evidence suggests that these schools, both dame and common, were operated for profit. However, some pupils were lucky enough to receive free schooling in them. Poet Joseph Blackett (born in 1786) writes, for example: "I was first sent to school, which was early in youth, owing to the village school-mistress being very partial to me, and giving me a free education" (2-3). Whether the absence of detail serves as a lack of criticism we shall probably never know, but it seems likely that the rural "dame" was on the whole somewhat more humane than her urban counterpart if only because of the lesser number of children with whom she might have to deal. William Wordsworth remained a firm supporter of the dame school. In Penrith he attended Mrs. Ann Birkett's establishment, to whose sparse educational material Morris Marples alludes when writing of Wordsworth's early schooldays: "Her only text-books were, incongruously, the *Bible* and the *Spectator*, the

latter contributed weekly by pupils of another Penrith family" (18). Wordsworth's nephew

Christopher in his *Memoirs of Wordsworth* suggests that "the Poet had [Mrs. Birkett] in mind

when he wrote, in 1828, to . . . the Rev. Hugh James Rose, 'The old dame did not affect to

make theologians and logicians; but she taught to read; and she practised the memory'"(33).

This may be true; it is impossible to determine, but one should note that Wordsworth's

concern in his letter is to refute the usefulness of the Madras--or Monitorial system--to female

education. Thus "the old dame" refers more specifically to the operators of dame schools in

general, and to state on the strength of this quotation, as does Alan Richardson, that

Wordsworth "warmly remembered his school at Penrith" (79) is to miss the significance of

the poet's argument. We need to note that a politically reactionary nostalgia informs

Wordsworth's conclusion. Writing of the times in which dame schools proliferated, he asserts:

> I am sure as good daughters, as good servants, as good mothers and wives, were
> brought up at that time as now, when the world is so much less humble-minded. A
> hand full of employment, and a head not above it, with such principles and habits as
> may be acquired without the Madras machinery, are the best security for the chastity
> of wives of the lower rank. (Hill, *Letters* 686)

Some records are less complicated. One Thomas Cooper, for example, remembers

with apparent affection his time at the dame school kept by "[A]ged Gertrude Aram .... Her

schoolroom--that is to say the larger, lower room of her two-storied cottage--was always full;

and she was an expert and laborious teacher of the art of reading and spelling" (Burnett, 146).

Burnett recognizes that "typically, autobiographers recall their days at dame school with

gratitude, affection, and admiration for the skill of their untrained teachers"(145). This

presents us with a considerably different picture from that provided by Sturt and others; we

must remember, however, that the former pupils who might be motivated to record their biographies would most likely be those who were successfully taught to read and write. The failures, the children who were little more than a cheap natural resource, would be confirmed in their silence for the most part. Nevertheless, the dame schools enjoyed some successes, and the harsh criticism to which they have been subjected has come under some scrutiny of its own in recent years. As Thomas W. Laqueur observes, "The dame and other private-venture schools of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were not what educational reformers looked for in a school, but many did apparently teach the skills of basic literacy" (199). These schools were tenacious in their ability to remain part of the English educational scene. One former pupil, Charles Shaw, writes of his time at "old Betty W's school" (1) in the early eighteen-thirties: "The school was the only room on the ground floor of her little cottage. It was about four yards square, with a winding, narrow staircase leading to the one bedroom above" (1). Of the curriculum he writes:

> The course of education given by the old lady was very simple . . . There was an alphabet, with rude pictures, for beginners. I have an impression . . . that the distinctness of that old alphabet had something to do with the success of old Betty's teachings, for though she never taught writing, her scholars were generally noted for their ability to read while very young. (2)

Like some other former dame-school pupils, Shaw remembers his teacher with warmth, and values her contribution:

> Poor old Betty! She was, perhaps, above the average of her class who taught the children of England in those days for a mere pittance, when our rulers were squandering the resources of the nation in less useful ways, and were blind to the wisdom of educating the children of the country. (5)

Despite Shaw's impassioned attack, it is not at all established that governments "were blind" in this matter. The debate concerning whether or not education should be extended to the underprivileged, and if so to what extent, is not unique to the nineteenth century, and I deal with this specific political implication of education later in this dissertation.

Apart from these schools' lack of conformity, their lack of adherence to any curricular standard, their being symbolic of the arguably chaotic state of English education in the nineteenth century, they also focus our attention on the already established debate concerning the merits of public and private education. Dame schools were, after all, private enterprises run for profit. Examining the roots of schooling for the English working classes, Richard Johnson makes explicit the private nature of the dame school. He writes: "This was the expression of a pecuniary arrangement between schoolmaster and parent" (*Schooling* 44). Thus, an essential feature of these schools' emergence is the fact that parents had to pay for the education that their children received; indeed, Johnson observes that "private schooling won and held the support of parents" (44). Be this as it may, it leaves without a voice those whose inability to pay excluded them from whatever dubious benefits might be purchased from the various establishments that were available, and it is to this sector of society that the charity school and its apologists address themselves.

Chapter One of the dissertation looks at the social context of charity out of which the monitorial school arises, and in the first part of this chapter I consider the charity school, one of the institutions to which monitorialism responded. They are schools in which the children of the destitute are collected, clothed, and to varying degrees "educated." These schools seek

to demonstrate society's success in identifying and containing the poor, and yet they are unable to accommodate the increasing number of poor children that arise as a result of the higher proportion of disadvantaged in society. The schools, as I show, further the fiction of their success by parading the children in churches to sing for the pleasure of the financially better-off to whom a continuing appeal is made to support the schools' operations. I use an examination of two typical charity school hymns to expose the ways in which a perverse interpretation of Christian charity locks both the rich and the poor into a relationship designed not to improve the lot of the less advantaged, but to maintain it.

M.G. Jones' work on charity schools is still the most extensive treatment of the movement. She introduces her analysis by stating that it

> is an attempt to present a study of eighteenth-century elementary education, not as the history of educational ideas, nor as the history of administration . . . but as the study of a neglected aspect of social history. Its main interest lies in the different reactions of philanthropic men and women . . . to the movement for establishing schools on a religious basis for the children of the poor. (xi)

To the extent that Jones has covered a vast amount of ground in her examination I will not repeat her important findings. However, I draw on her research to establish the nature of a school movement 1) that sought to provide education for a segment of society who would otherwise, in all probability, receive none at all, and 2) whose increasing inability to succeed in its aims signalled its ultimate failure and provided an opportunity for the development of the monitorial school. In an age when philanthropy had a number of causes on which to concentrate its efforts at improvement--Jones includes "the distress of religious refugees, the

misery of Negro slaves, foundling children and climbing boys" (3)--"[t]he charity school was [the philanthropists'] favourite form of benevolence"(3). Despite the socio-economic puritanism that Jones identifies, and to which she attributes a belief that "charity was obligatory" (7), she is also aware that this charitable attitude is never quite stable, that it is always to some degree informed by a need to establish an agreed-upon social order. Thus, although she writes that "the eighteenth century was marked by a very real sense of pity and responsibility for the children whose physical and spiritual interests were lamentably neglected" (4), she also writes that this same sense was "coupled with a determination to reform them by application of what Defoe aptly called 'the great law of subordination'"(4). Capitalist society's others--the rootless, those without fixed or convertible assets--as always, threaten social stability and the *status quo*: "The political and religious unrest of the seventeenth century contributed in no small degree to the desire of the upper and middle classes to establish social discipline among the poor, who in contemporary opinion were peculiarly susceptible to the poison of rebellion and infidelity"(4).

Jones' at times somewhat charitable position towards the classes who are motivated to ameliorate the conditions of the less fortunate can be problematical. She writes, for example: "It would be a misreading of the age of benevolence to see in the prominence enjoyed by the principle of subordination a harsh and unsympathetic attitude of the superior to the lower classes" (4). If by "harsh" and "unsympathetic" she means evidence of naked oppression and aggression she may be partly correct, although as we shall see there are plenty of examples of this in some of the charity schools. Nevertheless, when she asserts that "the

well-being of the State and the happiness of individuals were bound up with the injunction that men should do their duty in the station of life to which they were called" (4), she opens up the possibility of identifying the very harshness of attitude that an ostensible concern with benevolence camouflages.

It is this attitude, common to both the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, that informs the various educational establishments that serve the dual roles of identifying those members of society that constitute the putative problem. The purpose of the school in many cases is not to effect a transformation, but to fashion an unquestioning acceptance of social position and order. In an observation that, ironically, stands opposed to her earlier acquittal of the privileged, she concludes: "The charity schools came into being chiefly, although by no means exclusively, as a comparison of the movement in the four countries of the British Isles demonstrates, to condition the children for their primary duty in life as *hewers of wood and drawers of water*" (5 my emphasis). Political and pedagogical theories intersect at this point. The conditioning to which the charity school pupils are to be subjected depends upon the belief that one's development is a function of environment, of social position, of external influences. If order is to be maintained and satisfaction with one's lot inculcated, then education becomes a vital component in the socio-political machinery. A plan to ensure an acceptance of a pre-ordained order conceals itself within the guise of pragmatism, the acquiring of practical skills. The philosophy was not new. Jones reminds us that in his *Thoughts Concerning Education* John Locke had already argued that "As children will not have time and strength to learn all things, most pains should be taken about that which is most

necessary, and that principally looked after which will be of most and frequentest use to them in the world" (Locke 94).[22] It is a short step from a theory that envisages the most practical education to be offered, to the determination of what position these children will "rightfully" fill. Education seen from this latter perspective reveals itself as a reductive political tool, and it was the potential for social manipulation and management that the successors to the charity school movement recognized.

In 1797 the Reverend Andrew Bell would declare his opposition to any system of education predicated on the belief "that the fault lay in the nature of the children, rather than the condition in which they were placed" (*Experiment* 155). This is far from being the benign approach that it at first might seem to be. Bell had (as we shall see) a very clear vision of the place and capabilities of the underclass, and the necessity to restrict the degree of education by which they were to benefit. He writes later in the same tract: "There is a *risk of elevating, by an indiscriminate education, the minds of those doomed to the drudgery of daily labour above their condition,* and thereby render them discontented and unhappy in their lot" (292).

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[22]Locke would exert a continuing influence on apologists for "practical" education in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Richard Lovell Edgeworth co-authored with his daughter *Practical Education* which was published in 1798, the same year that Lancaster opened his first monitorial school. In 1809 Edgeworth published *Professional Education*. Of the Edgeworths' contribution, the educational historian J.W. Adamson writes: "In one respect their influence is to be regretted: like Locke, they distrusted the creative imagination and banned all such things as fairy tales.'Why', asks Maria Edgeworth, 'should the mind be filled with *fantastic visions* instead of *useful knowledge*'" (98, my emphasis). The pre-occupation with usefulness and utility is, as I have made clear, typical of nineteenth-century educational reformers, and the title of the Edgeworths' book, as Adamson also points out, "is an intimation of the author's belief that education as usually conducted was not practical" (97).

Bell's position is incoherent and argues against itself. How, one must ask, can he determine one's station based upon his recognition of mediocre intellectual capacity without implying that that "deficiency" lies in the children's very nature, an approach that he explicitly denies? Somehow, though, Bell must satisfy the demands that an education of sorts be provided. If Wordsworth's dame school suffered from a paucity of reading material, the establishments that Bell envisaged as nation-wide centres of learning for the poor would themselves be no better supplied: "All . . . may be taught, on an economical plan, to read their Bible and understand the doctrines of our holy religion" (292). Bell, Lancaster and others propose their own solutions to what they see as the shortcomings of the charity school. While we need to understand the nature of these establishments, we must recognize that there is a shortage of recorded first-hand experience upon which to draw. And yet we must try to determine why these schools were vulnerable to the monitorial assault.

Mary Sturt sees little educational achievement in the Charity School: "Most of the time in the schools was taken up with 'industry'; that is, the mechanical performance of some task. The children might well work seven hours a day and be taught to read for a short period now and then" (6). M.G. Jones also recognizes the system's failings. She writes:

> The schools were inadequate in number, their management was not lacking
> in corruption, nor their discipline in brutality. The instruction given in them
> was limited and mechanical; the spirit which informed it was that of class
> discipline enforced by religious sanctions. (344)

Despite this condemnation, however, she still sees a degree of virtue in their existence, observing that "the schools provided tens of thousands of children in the eighteenth century

with their only means of instruction" (344). Her position is one of what I will call endorsement by omission, a willingness to overlook--in the final analysis--a system's shortcomings on the basis of there being no other viable alternative. It is an attitude that appears again in the work of some commentators on the monitorial school, and I shall criticize it more directly when I look closely at the charity school's successors. Just as few first-hand accounts of dame schools exist, so too there are not many recorded experiences of the charity school inmate. Again the schools themselves varied, being little more than factories in some cases, and more concerned with the consumption of knowledge in others.[23]

A particular version of charity school deserves mention since we will immediately recognise from its structures, its operations, its curricula, a significant difference from those charity schools whose inmates were drawn from the most disadvantaged in society. Arguably, it is because of the social class that provided its pupils, and the subjects that they were taught, that more personal recollections exist; a literary proficiency naturally enables the recording of one's experiences. Christ's Hospital, where Samuel Taylor Coleridge was sent following the death of his father, is an example. This was not the type of school for paupers about which Jones and Sturt have written, but, given its policy of admitting the impecunious as well as those whose parents could afford fees, it qualifies for a brief consideration. In its tendency

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[23]I say "consumption of knowledge" as opposed to education because there is no inclusive definition of what education actually means. I would argue that schools, of whatever genre, create by their varied and collective discourses the belief that the purpose of attendance by pupils is to receive an education. The term justifies, reflexively, the reason for these institutions' existence.

towards brutal discipline it shared some of the features of the lesser-known schools, and

serves as a point of reference against which to consider the emergence of the monitorial

school. Marples describes the punishment that a boy at Christ's might expect:

> It was even possible at this school which produced so many good scholars and
> so many good citizens and good Christians, for a truant to be kept chained
> alone in a sort of dungeon, from which he was brought out twice a week to
> be flogged; and hardened offenders were thrashed round the hall in the
> presence of the whole school by the beadle, before being expelled. (55)

As we shall see, the monitorial school is extremely interested in the apprehension and

punishment of truancy, and I deal later with the disciplinary theory that underlies this

preoccupation. Nevertheless, we should recognize that it is not simply a physical truancy, an

absenting from place, that emerges here, but a moral departure that must be corrected by

chastising what may be apprehended--the body. It seems that this type of charity school

stands at the crossroads of what Foucault has described as "the punishment-body relation"

(*Discipline* 11); that is, a change where punishment consists not in an endless infliction of pain

on the body, but on its imprisonment in order to appreciate better the body's deviation. The

pain is present--twice-weekly floggings--but it is used to reverse and correct rather than exact

revenge. It is upon the success of the punishment that the outcome rests. A "corrected" errant

soul may, presumably, be re-situated among the "Good Christians" of the school's

conforming populace; that which is beyond redemption must be expelled. But in this duality

of outcomes lies the implicit assumption that correction is possible. An element of spectacle

exists, certainly, but in the public beatings lies a hope that the morally lax can be reunited with

their more morally proper brethren. And yet the dungeon, an instrument of *invisibility*, is a

central part of this punitive process, marking a significant difference between this kind of school and the monitorial institution whose efficient operation depends on the *visibility* of conformist and offender alike.

Christ's, and schools like it, differs also from other charity establishments in its tradition, its history. William Pitt Scargill, a former pupil, records in his autobiography that "Christ's Hospital was founded by Edward the Sixth on the dissolution of the monastery of the Grey Friars" (2), and the preface notes that the school's charter provided "for the education of poor children." A comparison to the type of institution that has become more popularly known as the charity school quickly shows that the history and subsequent direction of schools like Christ's mark them as distinctly different types of establishment. They are situated at the crossroads where what was to become known as the British "Public school" divides itself from those educational institutions spawned by the movement for popular education. Christ's had what would now be known as a preparatory school in Hertford where those who knew no Latin would be taught the language before moving on to the school in London. Speaking of the texts with which he was faced in his grammar classes at Hertford, Scargill explains:

> There were four classes . . . the first form went no farther than to Ovid's *Metamorphoses* and *Selecta è Profanis*. The second form read the *Latin Testament* and *Phaedrus's Fables*. The third learnt the *syntax* and *prosody*; and the fourth was only in accidence. (10)

This school, then, despite its willingness to admit charity pupils, was a school for "gentlemen." Its purpose was to educate its pupils in a much broader sense than would the

monitorial institution. It is in Christ's, and schools like it, however, that we can recognize the

particular type of physical discipline that the monitorial school tried, with varying degrees of

success, to efface.[24] Whereas the monitorial school apologists would, for the most part,

develop a more psychological approach to the disciplinary process, seeing prevention as better

than cure, and control of the mind rather than chastisement of the body as being an effective

process for a "productive" discipline, the notion remained firm in those schools for

"gentlemen" that learning could be facilitated by direct physical contact. Scargill writes of his

early experience of a master at Christ's main school: "I saw him take a little boy by the ears,

and pinch him till the poor little fellow roared and shrieked with agony" (49). Interestingly,

Scargill rationalizes this treatment:

> If I were to relate to you the cruelties that have been inflicted upon children
> in public schools many years ago, you would shudder to hear them. The fact
> is, that in those times it was generally considered next to impossible to teach
> the learned languages without frequent use of severe punishment. And
> perhaps there was some ground for that opinion: for the grammars and
> elementary books were then so very dull and difficult, and required so much
> labour in learning, that very few boys, especially when very young, could be
> induced to give attention to such books without the use of great severity. (50)

This equation of pain and learning develops what seems to be a tradition of its own. As the

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[24]Joseph Lancaster, for example, was always open to criticism concerning his tendency towards harsh physical treatment of his pupils. This variety of discipline was, as I shall show later, one of the reasons for Coleridge's disapproval. Tracing the history of Borough Road College, the establishment that grew out of Lancaster's first monitorial school, a former Borough Road archivist, G.F. Bartle, writes of an "unsavoury scandal" that erupted in the wake of one of Lancaster's apprentice teachers revealing that Lancaster "'used to flog his apprentices for his amusement'" (Bartle, *History* 7). I speak of this at length on page 158 and following.

public schools established their own niche and became even more isolated from the movement

towards popular education, it is arguable that this physical punishment had less to do with the

process of learning and more to do with a ritual of cruelty[25]--what we would today call

"hazing"--a practice which became so extreme that later progressive educators such as

Thomas Arnold sought to discontinue it. That the school and its unique society was rarely the

subject of fiction indicates that the situation in schools had not yet been perceived as a subject

worthy of attention. Education was still, for the most part, the stuff of pamphlet, treatise and

sermon, and it would be some considerable time before writers would fashion fictional

characters with whom actual pupils could identify. As Michael Hearn writes in his afterword

to Thomas Hughes' *Tom Brown's Schooldays*: "The literature then generally available for

boys and girls was indeed dismal" (308). He might have replaced "for" by "about" since the

school experience was not influencing writers for adults either. Hughes' novel stands out

because its audience is both child and adult. The potential public-school pupil would be able

to see himself--with, presumably, a mixture of excitement and trepidation--while the adult

sees underneath the adventures and the cruelty the potential for an isolated institution to

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[25]The exploitation of smaller boys by their older and larger fellows came to be known as
"fagging," a term which is still recognizable in British public schools today. That its practice
caused something of a scandal is evident from "School Experiences of a Fag" written by a
former pupil George Melley whose introduction commences: "A recent instance of the abuse
of monitorial power in a public school, has given rise to a controversy on the subject of school
government, and led to the inditing of many letters and leading articles in Newspapers on
'Fagging and Flogging' in our public schools" (iii). We need to note that the term monitor
has a very different meaning in 1838, when Melley writes his book, than it did for Bell and
Lancaster. Moreover, Melley argues for the practice of fagging in public schools, but
condemns the bullying and persecution by ushers in private establishments.

constitute a world of its own that is resistant to change. The seventeen-year-old Flashman, "a formidable enemy for small boys" (152) and one of a number of bullies given to such practices as "roasting"[26] younger boys, is the evil figure opposed by the humane headmaster-- the Doctor--a character inspired by Hughes' exposure to Thomas Arnold, the author of legendary reforms at Rugby during his tenure there from 1828 to 1842.

At the level of administration and organization, the embryo public schools differed significantly from the institutions that sought to redress their shortcomings. The monitorial school, as I have already mentioned, applies the principles of panopticism in its search for efficiency. Scargill's description indicates that his school was run on different lines, although we can recognize certain features that Lancaster and others appropriated in the cause of effectiveness:

> [T]here were other officers in the establishment, to whom we were under
> subjection. There was the steward, who had the general superintendence and
> care of us all; to see that we behaved orderly and quietly. And there were
> several beadles who were continually walking about in the several play-
> grounds, and there were our nurses and monitors who had authority in the
> wards; and, therefore we felt our-selves to be under constant superintendence,
> and in most inevitable subjection. (52-53)

The main differences are that these schools disperse the pupils, where the monitorial school constantly locates them and enforces the sense of place. Moreover, and necessarily so given

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[26]This was the name given to a practice whereby a boy was held against an open fire, not in order that burns be inflicted, but so that an extreme discomfiture be felt from the proximity to heat. Flashman subjects Tom Brown to this treatment: "His shoulders are pushed against the mantelpiece, and he is held by main force before the fire, Flashman drawing his trousers tight by way of extra torture" (156).

the distribution of boys, the number and variety of superintending functionaries in the schools such as Scargill describes are greater. But most important, perhaps, the appreciation by the pupils of the controlling apparatus differs from their monitorial successors. Certainly the public school pupil becomes aware of an external presence--"we felt our-selves to be under constant superintendence," but at this stage discipline still rests with an *exterior* figure. The boys are not yet the full agents of their own discipline. Lessons must be learnt, accompanied quite often by physical "encouragement" as we have already seen, but the features that will make the monitorial school so distinctive--the quiet, the certainty not of superintendence but of the *possibility* of surveillance, the pre-occupation with the "rudiments of letters," the accounting for every movement, the relentless drive for economy--all these are missing, or at least they are not nearly as developed as they will be under monitorialism. This is not surprising perhaps, because the pupils in schools like Scargill's were not drawn from the social classes that constituted a perceived threat to order. "The establishment is not altogether designed, nor is it entirely calculated, for the children of the poorest class in the community; it was originally designed for the orphans of citizens, and afterwards its advantages were extended to others" (Scargill 202). Implicit in Scargill's description is the exclusion of the rights of citizenship for the underclass. In another of those ironies that populate the study of the monitorial school, while it is for orphans of citizens that Christ's was founded, it was for orphans of another class altogether--the "half-caste" offspring of British soldiers and native women in India--that the Reverend Andrew Bell began his school. But whereas Christ's aim

was, it seems clear, to produce leaders in Britain's growing mercantile empire[27]--Bell and Lancaster's goal was to provide those leaders with the malleable, obedient material that they would need if Britain's expansion were to be successful.

At the same time as the charity school's failure was becoming evident, a potential social problem surfaced in the numbers of children who, having been employed in appalling conditions in factories for six days a week, were suddenly let loose on Sundays. The existence of the very class that could be hidden away and virtually denied for the majority of the time erupted to declare itself, and in many cases expressed its enjoyment at this brief occasion of freedom in widespread vandalism and wanton acts of violence.[28] The extent to which this activity constituted a problem to be addressed is open to conjecture. Accounts of unruly behaviour were reported in the press, but one should pause to consider whether the problem was the children's actions or the fact that they were unconfined and visible. Those occasions when damage to property occurred would certainly provide a reason for the children to be confined to some degree on the one day when they did not work. The Sunday School tried to address this particular problem. It was, however, no more successful than the charity

[27]Scargill writes of "the upper boys in the mathematical school" for example: "They were brought up for the sea-service, and were bound apprentices to Captains in the East India Company's service, or went as midshipmen on board ships of war; and as the service for which they were destined was one which required hardihood and boldness, they seemed most part pretty well prepared for it" (60). Having spoken of his master's brutality, he goes on to observe "With all his severity, however, he certainly did manage to send to the Universities some very good scholars" (51). Neither Bell nor Lancaster exhibits similar ambitions in respect of their charges.

[28]I deal with this at some length in chapter one.

school. While society's more advantaged sectors could see the virtue in employing the poor, they were not so generous when it came to their instruction. An ignorant, productive mass was much more easily contained than one that was relatively educated and mobile. Thus the notion of the Sunday School met with suspicion and in some cases outright hostility. Moreover, what was actually taught varied widely from school to school, a direct reflection on the generally low quality of the teachers and the lack of any national standard to which the instructors should adhere. It seems as if the Sunday School's contribution to increased literacy among the underclass was minimal. As Michael Sanderson shows, "after sabbatarian disputes in the 1790s many schools ceased the teaching of writing" (*Education* 13). Sanderson also questions the veracity of the notion that Sunday Schools "were the creation of a working-class culture of respectability and self-reliance," when he refers to "those who see them still as middle-class conservative institutions for the reform of the working-class from above" (14). Although I would have to take issue with Sanderson's social binary--his seeing class, apparently, in terms of oppression--the influence of the middle-class in educational reform is significant, and it is a facet that I also consider in chapter one. Whatever the Sunday Schools' failing might have been--and they were plentiful and obvious--they did make apparent the need for a system of education that would address the problem of the uneducated poor. Clearly this problem demanded a solution that was not only effective, but efficient and economic, and it is against this background that the monitorial school emerges.

In the second part of chapter one I consider the monitorial school as a site of containment. I begin here to explore the ways in which it is designed to confine its population

both physically and socially. By drawing attention to the need for the boys to be under a

constant, controlling gaze, I emphasize the fundamental importance of the principle of

panopticism which underwrites the drive to achieve the pupils' self-discipline, a subject that

I continue to examine in subsequent chapters. It is important here to appreciate that

panopticism is not limited to the sheer physicality of observational certainty. Foucault asserts:

> [T]he Panopticon must not be understood as a dream building; it is the
> diagram of a mechanism of power reduced to its ideal form; its
> functioning, abstracted from any obstacle, resistance or friction, must
> be represented as a pure architectural and optical system: it is in fact
> a figure of political technology that may and must be detached from
> any specific use. (*Discipline*, 205)

To the extent that Foucault directs us away from an idealistic vision of the structure itself, he

recognizes the wider and most significant implications of panopticism. The building, like

Bentham's never constructed, although highly influential Chrestomathic school, stands as a

symbol, a distillation of the myriad techniques and modalities of power that operate upon the

material from which the subject is to be formed. Dreyfus and Rabinow, in their commentary

on Foucault's work point out: "In Foucault's terms, the Panopticon brings together

knowledge, power, the control of the body, and the control of space into an integrated

technology of discipline" (189). It is within this Knowledge-Power dyad that the principle of

the panopticon proves itself adaptable to the training of the nineteenth-century pedagogical

subject. Foucault again: "[The Panopticon] is polyvalent in its applications; it serves to reform

prisoners, but also to treat patients, *to instruct schoolchildren*, to confine the insane, *to*

supervise workers, to put *beggars and idlers to work*" (*Discipline* 205, my emphasis). Out

of the five categories that Foucault lists, the monitorial school finds three areas from within which to recruit its population. The panoptic influence, as Foucault's recognition of its polyvalency implies, is much more sophisticated than being simply a means of exercising control while imparting knowledge. The ability to effect that control, to establish a power relationship, is contingent upon the *gathering* and *use* of knowledge. The success of the required control, after all, depends on the involvement in the process of the very pupils who are to be restrained, inscribed, "written", and for this to occur the institution must gather knowledge *of* the pupil. The background out of which he arrives must be determined. Is his a God-fearing household? For the day boy, will his parents support the requirement that he attend? Can his family be counted upon to ensure that he learn his catechism? What kind of boy is he? Fundamental to Bell's version of monitorialism is the pairing of the accomplished with his lesser endowed fellow. Thus the school must ascertain the attainment, potential and ability of each pupil. It must be determined whether the child is truthful or not. Bell writes: "When a *bad, lying* boy comes to school, the teacher of the lower classes must find a *good* boy to take care of him" (*Madras* 177, my emphasis). Implicit in his direction is the observation, examination and subsequent classification that obtains in order that a boy may be marked as either good or bad. Moreover, it implies a constant valuation and re-evaluation, the purpose of which is to maintain a moral resource that can be brought to bear on those whose conduct identifies them as candidates for reformation.

This evaluation is not a passive procedure whereby the boys are the mere subjects of a meticulous observation. They must contribute to the process, must make manifest their own

traits and characteristics as well as their willingness, their desire, to change. Consequently,

place-capturing and emulation are two basic tenets of monitorial doctrine. Emulation consists

of a continual effort to change oneself, to mould one's character in the image of that which

is held up to be exemplary. Thus the pairing of good with bad, more accomplished with less,

bright with dull, constitutes an opportunity for the boys to determine their own positions on

the register of achievement. It is no accident that this constant means of comparison exists

in monitorial schools of whatever denomination or type. For an inculcated desire to achieve

this standard--intellectual or moral--exercises a controlling mechanism that makes of the boys

governors of their own direction. They constitute a series of forces and counter-forces that

simultaneously move upward and downward, a mechanics of action and reaction out of which

the required coherence of the student body will not only arise, but will be seen to arise.

Furthermore, the established order, the hierarchy, is visible not simply to the master whose

eye can fall on any part of the scholastic machine at any time, but to the boys themselves who

are in constant contact with those to whom they are being compared, with those to whom

they compare *themselves*. It is from within this fluidity where successful emulation guarantees

advancement, and where failure meets decline, that a power relationship emerges. This is not

a relationship of oppression where the dictates of a central visible figure are to be followed

for fear of physical retribution. Rather, it is a social calculus, the relative position of whose

terms are dependant upon the strength, the abilities of the others in the equation. The more

accomplished term in one bracket must necessarily be the lesser of the pair in the next higher

comparison. No-one is exempt from the shaping force that emulation demands. Importantly,

the emulative process appropriates both the observer and the observed. In Lancaster's system, the boy monitor who checks and classifies is as disciplined as those for whom he is responsible. Lancaster asserts that: "[E]mulation employs the monitor's attention continually; he cannot look one way, while the boy is repeating his letters another . . . It is not the monitor's business to teach, but to see the boys in his class or division teach each other" (*Improvements*, 5). And out of emulation, the desire to change, comes the need to prove one's success. In the monitorial school there is a name for the constant drive to make one's progress manifest. It is called "place-capturing."

The actual operation of place-capturing varies from school to school, from practitioner to practitioner, but the principle is the same. Competition drives one's existence and success must be rewarded. There must be visible evidence of the change in place of both the successful and the unsuccessful. Some schools offer badges as marks of accomplishment, others prizes; some rely on the identification of superior and inferior classes--and one's entry and exit to and from them--as motivators. Whatever method is used, the object remains the same: to forge a link between accomplishment and place; to make visible the *results* of the operation of the disciplinary process while the pupils internalise the mechanics of the operation itself. The concept of place, one's duty to find it, achieve it, identify with it, informs many of the routines that are common to the different examples of monitorial school that this dissertation examines. Implicit in this drive to locate oneself that has been inculcated by the pupils (an influence that has insinuated itself and exercises from within its hosts an efficient micro-economy of control) is a restriction, a barrier that covertly prevents the attainment of

position other than that decreed by the authors of the regime of which they are part. The Reverend Andrew Bell, as I will show, grounds much of his pedagogical theory in his own interpretation of divine ordinance. He will, for example, endorse emulation by attributing its origin to God: "[E]mulation or desire of excellence which the Creator has implanted in the human breast for the wisest and noblest purposes . . . proves a powerful and unceasing incentive to laudable exertion--a mild, yet effectual instrument of discipline" (*Instructions* 5). And yet he remains ominously quiet as to what his pupils might expect from their efforts, opening his introduction to the pamphlet from which I have just quoted with the following statement: "To render simple, easy, pleasant, expeditious, and economical, the acquisition of the rudiments of letters, and of morality and religion, are the leading objects of Elementary Education" (3). The exploratory treatment of the monitorial school, which concludes the latter part of the first chapter, serves also as a preparation for chapter two where I look at the semiotics both of the institution's physical design and its internal operation.

In Chapter Two I show how the monitorial school--sometimes housing hundreds of pupils where the objective was to teach what Wordsworth, like Bell, called the "rudiments of letters"[29] in the most economic and efficient way--functions as a site where techniques of production developed in the mushrooming factories of industrial Britain come to be employed in the service of rigid instruction, training, the doctrine of usefulness.[30] I have already briefly

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[29]See the Wanderer's speech in Book IX of *The Excursion.*

[30]The monitorial system was, to Sir Thomas Bernard, "'the division of labour applied to intellectual purposes'" (Armytage 90).

mentioned the occurrence of machine imagery in descriptions of monitorial schools. The

Reverend Andrew Bell who, with his Non-Conformist rival Joseph Lancaster, would lay claim

to the "invention" of the monitorial method, describes his school in the following terms: "The

entire machinery of the New School, is fitted to prevent idleness and offences, to call forth

diligence and *exertion*" (*Mutual* 63). For his part, Samuel Taylor Coleridge saw the

monitorial method as "this incomparable machine, this vast moral steam-engine" (Coburn 6:

41).[31]

Later commentators also find the machine metaphor useful to describe the monitorial

institution, although the mechanical allusion becomes, in the twentieth century, a pejorative

device. M.G. Jones recognises that "a later age does not hesitate to condemn [the monitorial

school] as cheap and mechanical" (334). More recently, Alan Richardson draws a critical

parallel between monitorial schools and factories: "The monitorial school adopted not only

the basic principles of factory production--the division of labour--but also a contemporary

vision of the factory as exemplary disciplinary institution, characterized by clockwork

regularity and subject to constant surveillance" (93). What must be examined is the

connection that arises in the nineteenth century between evolving techniques, whose objective

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[31]Coleridge (who would later criticise monitorialism) has no qualms at this juncture in using
a trope of mechanisation that is totally opposed to his pre-occupation with organicism. In
chapter four I deal with the ambiguous attitude of Coleridge and other "Lake Poets" toward
monitorial schools and the problems that this ambiguity causes some current critics .

is to increase industrial output,[32] and parallel strategies that seek to deliver an education which is by its very nature a form of social management, of discipline. The purpose is to produce from the docile, malleable material that constituted its students a particular type of subject, a resource, that was useful in the wider, political service of the state. Such a subject would serve unquestioningly the imperialist expansion, either as a member of the colonising military, the intricate administrative apparatus that followed in its wake, or as part of the domestic machinery upon which the success of the state depends.

Beginning with descriptions of a typical monitorial school provided by The Reverend Andrew Bell (1823) on the one hand, and two much more recent commentators--John Lawson and Harold Silver (1973) on the other--the second chapter concentrates first on the school's geometry. I examine the use and location of spaces--mustering areas, learning stations, the school's channels of interiority--and identify what I argue is a resultant illusion of freedom. Thomas Markus reminds us that Hillier and Hanson in *The Social Logic of Space* determine that the users of many public spaces (he cites shops, museums, churches as examples), in so far as they are visitors, are the ones subject to control. Occupying a position on the periphery of the operation, these visitors are remote from the locus of government that is situated in the relatively impenetrable interior of the building: "Increasing depth here denotes increasing power" (*Early* 17), Marcus asserts, before reminding us also that Hillier and Hanson see the obverse example in those buildings whose purpose is confinement,

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[32] Armytage describes the monitorial system as "mass production applied to instruction" (75).

"especially from the nineteenth century--hospitals, prisons, asylums and workhouses . . . including to some extent early school plans" (17). His point here is that "visitors" in these establishments are housed much deeper within them, but in *this case* "increasing depth denot[es] decreasing power" (17). I am interested in the extent to which this observation is applicable to the monitorial school, and implicit in my analysis of the design and function of the school is a questioning both of the site and nature of power in it. If, as Foucault argues, power is not synonymous with force, is not suppressive but productive, can it be legitimately said that the more that the monitorial students are subsumed by the school, the deeper that they are absorbed within it, the lesser is the degree of power that they possess? It seems to me that the regime's coherence must reflect a significant contribution by the students to the power relations that obtain within the school. To this extent the illusion of freedom that I have mentioned becomes even more complicated, embracing the actors--masters, administrators, governors--that would, in a conventional interpretation, be seen as possessing power. It is worth repeating that one of the purposes of this dissertation is to argue, as does Foucault, that power is not a commodity whose ownership may simply be disputed, or whose possession guarantees the ability to command.

From an examination of the school's physicality, I proceed in the second chapter to examine in detail the varieties of ways in which order is instilled in the school. I identify in Joseph Lancaster's pedagogical theory a curious turning away on his part from the use of spoken language in the schoolroom. For Lancaster, it seems, the ideal site of conformity is a silent one where the verbal sign gives way to the visual. The removal of speech denies, as

far as it is possible, any attempt at dispute and increases the potential for total compliance. As a result, the function of the master--whose teaching duties have already devolved to the monitors--increases in its supervisory component. No longer is the master the origin of the word; now it is from him that the gaze of silent surveillance originates. This marks a radical change in the way in which the school's population perceives him. The master as an instrument of panopticism replaces the master as a figure synonymous with corporal punishment. Obedience arises not from physical threat, but from a certainty that transgressions will be detected.

I turn in Chapter Three to an analysis of Matthew Davenport Hill's Hazelwood school. There are a number of features that make this establishment an interesting study: heavily influenced by the monitorial system, Hill was to recognise the psychological leverage that could be applied in the service of discipline and would develop this aspect to a far greater degree than Lancaster and Bell; in addition, Hill's pupils were predominantly middle class and, as such, their aspirations and those of their parents were of a different order from the underclass from whose ranks Lancaster and Bell would populate their schools; and most important, perhaps, is the connection that Hill draws between the government of the school and the government of the country. Hill would assert that "A school is but a nation in miniature" (*Government* 86), and the routines and management of the school--as I show in this chapter--reflect Hill's vision of a capitalist state with its intricate banking, accounting and juridical systems of support.

Educational historian Christopher Jones notes that "it was in the areas of pupil self-

government and curriculum development that Hazelwood really stood out as an innovatory and influential model" (38). Innovative it might have been, but in what areas and for what purpose? Ostensibly, the goal of "self-government" might appear a laudatory feature of Hill's school, but, as I argue in this chapter, the extent to which the boys really govern themselves is open to question. Again, any sense of freedom that obtains within the school is to a large degree illusory. Hill asserts, as Jones observes, that a fundamental principle of the school's operation was "to leave as much as possible all *power* in the hands of the boys themselves" (38 my emphasis). At first glance, this may appear to evidence an atypical devolution of authority, a recognition of "pupils' rights" that anticipates "progressive" pedagogical theories of the late twentieth century. But such an interpretation predicates itself on an understanding of the nature of power to which this dissertation is opposed. I argue that, far from being a move towards an institutional emancipation, Hill's desire for the boys' self-government reflects his acute appreciation of the psychological dimension of discipline. Indeed, if discipline is to become productive, it must allow power to devolve on all of the components that interact with one another, since it is within the *relationships* of power that productivity arises.

The Hazelwood system is designed to reinforce the state's hierarchy. All decisions reached by the boys are subject to a master's veto, a facet that invests the master with a monarchical authority. Consequently, the boys will establish such rules and procedures that will meet with sovereign approval. The power has indeed been shifted, but it has moved to a site where its collective application makes it more efficient, more capable. Self-government

in the Hazelwood school is the manifestation of self-discipline to an advanced degree, and in this chapter I examine the various ways in which the boys are conditioned to discipline themselves both individually and collectively. I scrutinize the components and function of government at Hazelwood: the relationship between pupils and master, the system of rewards and forfeitures, the intricate records that constitute ledgers of the boys' characters, the judicial system, and the advanced application of panopticism that ensures compliance with a set of rigid standards and expectations.

I conclude chapter three by showing that in Hazelwood a bell, punctuating time and metronomically pacing the school's disciplinary rhythm, becomes the "pure sign" for which Joseph Lancaster apparently yearns when he seeks to impose a regime of silence on his classroom. However, although Hazelwood conditions its pupils to respond to the bell, it is not simply a desire to ensure a slavish adherence to command that underwrites this disciplinary instrument. It is a fundamental tenet of Hazelwood pedagogy that all time must be spent usefully, that time must not be wasted in any way. We see here an advanced case of the doctrine of the useful citizen, a productive subject whose every waking second is to be productively utilised. Hazelwood takes the religiously informed theories of the Reverend Andrew Bell and applies them with equal vigour to a secular capitalist vision of the state. It is to Bell and Samuel Taylor Coleridge that I turn in Chapter Four.

Bell's texts with which I am concerned in this chapter are *The Madras School, or Elements of Tuition*, which he published in 1808, and *Mutual Tuition and Moral Discipline* published in 1823. The former is a controversial work, not for the principles of monitorialism

that it endorses under the name of "Mutual" instruction, but for the fact that it seems that many of its ideas have their origins in the pedagogical theories of Joseph Lancaster. Thus, supporters of Bell--and Samuel Taylor Coleridge was one of them--find themselves in the curious position of giving assent by default to the very person whose ideas they oppose. This is not to say that Bell's texts are indistinguishable from his rival's. There are peculiar and particular differences, especially in the extent to which Bell appreciates the psychological leverage he can exert by the application of the monitorial principles of surveillance and minute attention to detail. The most significant difference, of course, between Bell and Lancaster is theological, with Bell being concerned to use his schools to promote the national religion--Anglicanism. The structures of the church, both administrative and physical, are features in which Bell recognises a panoptic potential.

He leaves us in no doubt as to the sector of society for whom the benefits of Madras are to extend. Like his Non-Conformist counterparts, Bell targets the underclass or, as he puts it, the "lower order of youth" (*Madras* 289). That which initially determines the lowness of which Bell speaks is not moral or ethical "deficiency," but rather a lack of economic means, although, once classified, the underclass will be deemed, by Bell, to be in need of moral instruction. It is an example of Bell's sophisticated rhetorical skill--and I quote other examples in the fourth chapter--a manoeuvre whereby, in this case, he constructs a problem that his system is designed to solve. The Church, it seems, cannot justify the adoption of Madras simply on the basis of there being materially deprived people at large. And so the problem that is to be faced must be framed in terms that give the Church a reason to exist. By converting

the underclass's material poverty into moral destitution, the Church justifies itself by seeking

to eradicate a "problem" that it is instrumental in creating. Morality in this case is tantamount

to duty, and I show that Bell's national vision is predicated on the idea of the underclass being

inculcated with the idea of service to the state's demands, even extending to the provision of

personnel for Britain's military machine.

The Church is ideally structured to provide the panoptic supervision and control that

such a national system requires. Bell sees the clergy's training as having fitted them for the

very role that the efficient operation of a national system of education requires, namely

"*inspection* and direction" (320 my emphasis), all carried out by means of an already existing

hierarchy and chain of command. But Bell must always ground his theories in a higher

authority, must continually refer to the infallibility of the Word if the Church's involvement

is to be justified. And so, by reiterating, as he does, the connection between the Gospel and

the Word, he positions himself to assert that any organisation able to trace its legitimacy to

a scriptural basis must be safe from critical assault. Not only does this strategy authenticate

his use of the Church's administrative potential, but also it warrants the dissemination of

Anglican doctrine. To be non-Anglican is, by implication, to be immoral, and the justification

of correction by Madras is, in yet another example of Bell's reflexive rhetoric, to be found in

the Word.

That Bell understands the psychological implications of his system becomes clear

when he speaks about his intended pupils. It is children whom he targets because he

recognises their malleability, their potential for "education," that is their *docility*. He

understands very well that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to reverse the habits, the behaviour of an adult, but his concentration on youth goes beyond a recognition of adult inflexibility or perceived resistance to change. The success of his school system depends on the pupils' ability to manage themselves, to be their own teachers, and for this to occur they must be inculcated with the principles of order and of unquestioning obedience. Age brings with it, in varying degrees of magnitude, an inclination--if not an ability--to question and to critically examine. Bell knows that the self-discipline that he desires stands a far greater chance of being achieved if he can impress young minds that are not yet critically accomplished in any way.

I examine also in the fourth chapter the mechanics of Madras's discipline, showing that in many cases the control is even more particular than that which obtains in Lancaster or Davenport Hill's establishments. I show, for example, that the preoccupation with writing and the geometry that determines the method of holding a writing instrument are all designed to establish a visible uniformity. The boys contract to write in accordance with a principle that demands that their letters will, as near as possible, be identical to those of their fellows. Thus, a perpetual visible evidence exists by reference to which one can identify, at a glance, the boy who is still undisciplined. Importantly, the boys are able to recognize this for themselves and contribute to their own control. As a result, the nature of punishment undergoes a transformation. Rather than acting as a correction after the fact, it now operates as a deterrent by exercising an all-consuming vigilance on the school population as it endeavours to maintain the compliance that the system demands.

In *Mutual Discipline and Moral Instruction*, Bell reveals his understanding of the psychological component of self-discipline. That he speaks at length in this text of the mind-- "the infant mind" (16), in particular--is not particularly new. He recognizes, as I have already shown, that success depends on treating his "material" at an early age. What is significant, however, is that he now *locates* Madras's principles in the mind, and argues for there being an inherent mental predisposition for "receiving Mutual Instruction" (16). Ever mindful of the need for Divine warrant, he goes on to establish the origin of this faculty; it is, he says, "the gift of God" (17). His assertion, though, contains within it much more than a repetition of his deference to the justifying Word. By placing the principle of Madras in the mind and making of it a universal, he argues, albeit implicitly, for a panoptic discipline in that he sees the potential for an internal propensity to control, a congenital inclination to become one's own agent in the disciplinary process.

The nature of the pedagogical space in the Madras school extends beyond the self-discipline with which so much of Bell's texts are concerned. In that he would determine the truthfulness, the meaningfulness, of the questions and responses that constitute the catechismal method of Madras learning, Bell makes of his schools producers of pedagogical discourse. Certain questions are allowed and others disallowed; only the "right" questions may be asked, presumably those that evoke a similarly "right" response and prevent the possibility of debate. In such an environment, the function of the pedagogue also changes: The erstwhile teacher becomes the Master whose duty it is to oversee the school, while the pupils themselves become their own teachers. Teaching and self-discipline become almost

synonymous now, as the pupil-teachers disseminate themselves among the school's population, managing it and assisting in its overall compliance. It is important, though, to recognize that even as they manage, the boys are themselves managed. The effect of perfected self-discipline is to harness resistance and turn it in on itself in a movement that produces a synergy from all of its constituent parts.

An examination of Coleridge' interest in monitorialism is pertinent because his reasons for endorsing this method of instruction have fundamental political implications. There is, as I show, an explicit affinity between both his ideas of the clerisy--and the role of the national religion in the functioning of the state--and Bell's recognition that the Anglican church's existing administrative apparatus is ideally suited to the expansion of a network of Anglican sponsored schools. Certainly, Coleridge's support for Madras appears problematical given, as Alan Richardson points out, that the poet and his circle were more concerned with one's freedom than with one's subjection. With this apparent paradox in mind, I proceed in chapter four to examine the nature of Coleridge's educational theory and how it both complements and is complemented by his own socio-political vision of the state. His interest in Bell and Madras occurs at the same time as he begins work on *The Friend,* and he asserts in that journal's prospectus that his essays will address the questions of "private and National education" (18). Coleridge fails to live up to his promise in that *The Friend* never contains a specific and consistent critique of the practicalities of education as they existed in Britain at the time. Rather, he introduces his socio-political concerns under the cover of the abstract. He speaks about the potential effects on society arising from education, for example, but

whereas other apprehensive commentators argue for instruction to be withheld on the grounds that its provision will create unrest, Coleridge sees that in the absence of a national initiative those in the underclass who are congenitally better mentally endowed will be able to influence the mass. Thus, the argument for a universal education that he goes on to make, carries within it the implicit belief that the purpose of such provision is to homogenize the underclass, making the possession of unusual intellectual accomplishments or potential in some of its members less noticeable, if not invisible. The underclass's education, for Coleridge, is not emancipatory but pacific.

A fundamental component of Coleridge's educational theory is his idea of what he terms "method." This does not concern, as one might suspect, the administration or the routine of educational institutions. On the contrary, Coleridge uses the word to indicate a universal order in accordance with which one occupies a particular place and performs a particular, pre-ordained role in the world. If the existence of method is not obvious, then presumably one must be educated to understand its significance, and again we can appreciate the attraction to Coleridge of Madras with its specific target population of the "lower order[s]." Method becomes inseparable from education in that to be methodical, in the sense that Coleridge uses it, is, for him, precisely to be educated. But it is not something that may be taught. It seems that Coleridge sees method as always already existing in potential, that it is something that will make itself manifest when one achieves a high degree of mental discipline with a consequential understanding of the inviolate nature of the relation of things with each other.

There is a similarity here to Bell's assertion that the principle of Mutual instruction resides in the mind. Where Bell justifies that belief by a continual reference and deference to the Word, then Coleridge justifies his position by similarly referring to an ultimate source; in his case it is what he terms "the leading Thought" (455), the quality of which determines one's potential for education. The political implications of such an assertion are obvious. "Thought" is synonymous with suitability, and method's social taxonomy is grounded on a belief in occupying a place for which one is not simply suitable, but *suited*, that is to say, pre-determined. Coleridge's support for Madras is now somewhat less paradoxical since concepts of freedom are surely qualified by a belief that one is suited from birth to occupy a particular place, to perform a particular function.

Nevertheless, Coleridge's attraction to Madras is not entirely explained by an identification of those politico-theological sympathies that he seems to share with Bell. It has become something of a commonplace to assert, as does the educational historian G.H. Bantock, that Coleridge's enthusiasm was temporary and that his initial interest waned once he recognised the mechanical nature of Bell's system. It is not at all proven that this was, in fact, entirely the case. There is no doubt that Coleridge's early attraction lost some of its vigour, but he neither directly criticised Bell nor did he subject Madras to the critical censure that would be typical of one who had become disenchanted; on the contrary, Coleridge reserved his opprobrium purely for Lancaster. Rather than concentrating on a perceived diminution in Coleridge's enthusiasm for Madras, we need to recognise the significance of discipline to him if we are to appreciate his interest in Bell's system.

Discipline, it seems to me, is directly related to Coleridge's thoughts on method, which is to say that to be educated is simultaneously to be disciplined. For Coleridge, discipline is not *simply* the inculcation of order and recognition of place on the part of the underclass but a quality that represents the responsibility on that class whose place--according to the principle of method--it is to lead the country. If Coleridge becomes less voluble on the benefits of Madras, it is because he sees no effort being made to educate the middle ranks of society. And in the absence of a disciplined education, not only would those ranks be unable to govern, but also they would be unable to produce from their numbers governors *in the future*. Coleridge's apparent diminished endorsement reflects his concern with a country that cannot see the need to provide *appropriate* education for all ranks of society.

The appropriateness is vital to Coleridge because, as I proceed to show in this fourth chapter, he reiterates his opposition to a universal emancipatory education. Indeed, he equates what he terms the "popularisation" of knowledge with what he also describes as its "plebification" (Knights 61). It is as if he sees the widespread dissemination of knowledge as being tantamount to its dissipation, which is another way of saying that knowledge should be the province of that class whose place fits them for the possession of knowledge, a class upon whom lies the responsibility to make known just as much as is desirable for the population as a whole. It is a philosophy that Coleridge confirms at one stage in *The Statesman's Manual* where he considers that national education will not be achieved merely by ensuring general literacy. On the one hand, this is a laudable sentiment, prefacing, as it does, Coleridge's assertion that education "consists in educing the *faculties* and forming the habits" (40). On

the other hand, though, we cannot ignore the reference to habits which implies the disciplinary component that is inseparable from monitorial theory. And if the faculties are to be "educed," to be drawn out, there is surely a return to that belief in pre-ordination of social place in that that which is not there in the beginning may never be elicited. To be sure, as Coleridge argues, the ability of a nation's people to read and write does not confer upon them an educated status, but there is a troubling connection between Coleridge's assertion in this regard and Bell's that the intention is not that everyone be taught to write and cypher.[33]

Just as Bell sees the ordained ministers of the Church as being ideally suited to teaching in Madras schools, so too Coleridge sees a certain class of person upon whose shoulders the responsibility for the nation's future rests. This is the clerisy, an intellectual elite, the idea of which "was active in [Coleridge's] thinking all along" (Knights 63). The attraction of the Church is as obvious to Coleridge as it is to Bell, for similar, if not exactly the same, reasons. Coleridge's educational vision is always national in its broadest sense, which is to say that he does not restrict his ideas solely to the underclass, as does Bell. Whereas Bell sees the benefit of the clergy to the Madras school, Coleridge sees an existing clerisy from whose ministrations and erudition the country as a whole might benefit. I show, as I conclude the fourth chapter, that the panoptic principles that obtain in Madras--surveillance, the certainty of observation--apply equally in the relationship between the minister and the congregation. If the master stands in the place of God in the school, so too does the minister in his *raised*

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[33]See page 94 of this dissertation

pulpit.[34] Moreover, I show that the texts used by both teacher and minister are the same, and the catechismal language of worship finds its counterpart in the question and response of the Madras school.

IV

The monitorial school, it now seems clear, comprises something of a confused space. Spawned by what seems to be a variety of philanthropic impulses, it also has as its *raison d'être*--for Bell and Lancaster at least--the confinement of the underclass, the collection and classification of those from whom the greatest potential threat to public order might be expected to arise. Typical of the ambiguity that informs the writings of monitorial apologists is the following by Sir Thomas Bernard commenting upon the Barrington School:

> In the progress, however, of our investigation, it became evident that nothing essential and permanent could be done for *bettering the condition of the poor*, without the improvement of their moral and religious character, by an increase in places of worship for their *sacred duties*, and of schools for the *education* of their children. (4)

When Bernard speaks of "bettering the condition of the poor," as opposed to eradicating their poverty, he effectively subjugates them in the name of philanthropy. The class about which he speaks is, as has already been shown, essential to the progress of an expanding mercantile and imperialist economy. Nevertheless, its subjugation is dependent upon its relative comfort and, as a consequence, some consideration must be given to ameliorating their circumstances. It is necessary also to establish and emphasise the poor's duty to the national religion.

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[34]See page 222 of this dissertation where I speak about the role of the teachers as substitutes for God.

Bernard's concern to increase the number of available churches and schools recognizes two primary disciplinary sites. One might pause for a moment and consider out of which social class the corresponding necessary increase in clergy would appear. The Anglican church, as is well known, was considered a profession worthy of a "gentleman" in the same way as were the armed forces and the law. A picture slowly comes into focus. The poor will be the subject of a concentrated effort at "improvement," both physical and moral, while at the same time education is to be provided for their young. Never, we should note, do the poor ever rise above the status of a species. It is "their sacred duties" which are to be provided for; it is "their children" who are to be educated. The poor, in other words, are categorised as a variety of "other," examined, and then made the subject of a number of schemes all of which are designed to ensure their integration into society, and by so doing to vaccinate the established class structure against the potential of a destructive social disease.

This is not to say, however, that the instigators of the monitorial schools were driven simply by a desire to separate, confine, control--in other words imprison--their charges. The criticisms that have been levelled at the monitorial school system have concentrated on the unavoidable pre-occupation with order, and on the construction of the non-thinking, automatically reacting subject. Valid though these criticisms are, they nevertheless leave themselves open to the counter-charge that the monitorial system did at least provide an education at a time when the existing alternative was barely worthy of mention. Mary Sturt, for example, after having devoted a number of pages to the obvious shortcomings of the system, writes: "Yet bad as many of the monitorial schools inevitably were, they represented

a very considerable advance. They set out to give children an education, though a very simple

one" (37). Two years previously, Harold Silver had argued:

> [O]ne must remember, as Graham Wallas pointed out (in 1898), that the
> monitorial system, though discredited, was, at least, 'the first serious attempt
> to think out any system of class-teaching whatsoever.' This view certainly has
> some validity, and is an important counter-balance to the sort of hindsight
> with which many writers have dismissed the monitorial schools. (51)

Again, writing seven years after Sturt, Pamela and Harold Silver apparently confirm the

latter's earlier approach. For them, the relative lack of documentation pertaining to monitorial

schools makes a decision, one way or the other, difficult to reach:

> The level of achievement in the schools was low. As a concept and in practice
> the monitorial system is open to every possible kind of criticism. *The criticism*
> *must take into account, however, our lack of detailed information about*
> *schools, and the historical context within which the monitorial system was*
> *adopted—including the availability and credibility of alternative approaches*
> *to education.* (15, my emphasis)

By arguing that the monitorial school provides some sort of education when little else was

available, these critics avoid providing a deeper analysis. There is, it seems, a reluctance on

the part of many of those who have written about the monitorial system to go beyond what

is, more or less, a cursory condemnation of its regimentation.[35] Alan Richardson recognizes

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[35]A survey of earlier critics on this subject is not encouraging. Smith pp. 70--102, Gaull
pp.58--64, Curtis and Boultwood pp. 10--12, for example, do little more than reiterate what
is, despite Silver's assertions to the contrary, already well documented. In one case at least,
this decidedly superficial treatment leads to a blatant inaccuracy. Gaull, in a non-documented
reference, attributes to the Reverend Andrew Bell the description of the monitorial system as
being "the Steam Engine of the Moral World" (61). It was in fact Coleridge who described
it in *The Statesman's Manual* as "this incomparable machine, this vast moral steam-engine"
(See Coleridge 6: 41). (David Wardle, though, it must be said, spends some time discussing
associationist theory, the position of the child in nineteenth-century educational theory, and

the long history of this tendency. Speaking of a system "which has been described as marking 'perhaps the most coercive and negative moment in the whole history of schooling,'" he writes that the questionable acceptance of the system by the Romantic poets " has too often been shrugged off; it is argued that the monitorial system, whatever its faults, was at least preferable to unrelieved child labour, and (most recently) that the Lake poets were not 'consciously aware of the ideological significance of the new system of education'"[36] (95). The overt regimentation demands, then, a close examination that investigates the order as being a *part of* the process rather than constituting the process in total.

To say, as Silver does, that there is a lack of detailed information about the schools is only partly accurate, and says more about that critic's particular methodology than it does about the availability of material to be used in fully understanding what the monitorial system really meant to its practitioners. What, then, should be the approach if, as I am arguing, the

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the psychology of education in the nineteenth century).

This was not the first time that Coleridge had used the phrase. The editor points out that "[Coleridge's] earlier use of the term . . . was in 1809 as a description of Thomas Clarkson, a leading figure in the abolition of the slave-trade" (41.) Coleridge's repetition is not particularly remarkable given that he concluded a lecture on the subject of education that he gave on May 3 1808: "And if I were called upon to say which two men in my own time had been most extensively useful and who had done most for humanity I should say Mr. Clarkson and Dr. Bell" (See Coleridge V: 109.) Indeed, a month earlier, he had written to Bell himself: "I wish to make you acquainted with Clarkson. You and he have given the sublimest proofs I am aware of, how much good one man can effect" (Griggs III: 87).

[36]Richardson cites David Simpson's *Wordsworth's Historical Imagination* pp. 196-200 as being "[m]ore critical" (289). Simpson, however, is primarily concerned with the extent of Wordsworth's awareness of the monitorial method, and not with the educational theory that underlies it.

commentators who have devoted any time at all to these schools leave an area which only *appears* to have been explored? Quite obviously, we might delve into the monitorial system and its nineteenth-century derivatives in order to determine the influences whose traces may be found in the variety of educational institutions that have followed it. This may well prove useful, but the danger exists that we might fail to recognize that for the monitorial apologists "education" implies a fundamental acceptance of a given social order. The monitorial school with its regimentation, its machinery, its relentless worship of order, does not stand in isolation. It is both a symbol and a vehicle of subjugation.

To fully understand the significance of the monitorial school, we must locate ourselves at that point where social and monitorial educational theories converge. The monitorial process, with the emerging sophistications and disciplinary efficiencies which underwrote it, cannot be bracketed simply as a means of instruction. We might conclude that this is so if we concentrate purely on the practice of the monitorial school, but Lancaster, Bell and the others did not operate in an intellectual and philosophical vacuum. Accordingly, my dissertation identifies, and comments upon, the social, psychological and pedagogical theories and practices that manifest themselves to varying extents in the institutions that have become known as monitorial schools.

Part One

Chapter One

Charity: Failure and Replacement

I

Hymn	Hymn
Did Jesus weep for human woes	Eternal Father of Mankind
Will ye a tear deny?	From whom all Blessings Spring!
Your hearts against a brother close	The rich man's wealth, the poor's support
Nor heave a tender sigh?	The breath by which we sing.
Did Jesus human woes relieve	Through thine abundant care of us,
And human wants supply?	Whose parentage is poor,
Will ye your Boon refuse to give	In the Assemblies of the Just
The Boon of charity?	We sing, give praise, adore!
O may his bright example fire	Like sheep that had no Shepherd we
Each sympathetic heart	Were running far away,
Kindle a generous warm desire	But now are taught to know thy will,
Its kindness to impart.	And walk the perfect way.
Be yours ye rich, the sweet employ	Reward, O Lord, their pious care,
The broken heart to bind,	By whom to Thee we're brought;
To pour the balm of Sacred joy	Guard them by their special Grace
And clear the drooping mind.	By whom we're clothed and taught.
Be your's the dear delightful place	Since Heav'n contrives for *Orphan's* lives
To assist the infant poor	When they are in distress,
Their souls t'enrich with heavenly grace	We'll magnify our God most high
From Mercy's copious store.	Whence flows our happiness.

Then may you not nor ask in vain,
For Mercy in that day,
When those rich mercy shall obtain
Who mercy here display.

Father of Mercies deign to bless
The gen'rous good design
And let our grateful hearts confess
The Power of Glory thine (Anon. 1780).

To the *Father*, *Son*, and *Holy Ghost*
Be Glory as is past,
And now it is, and so shall last
When time shall be no more (Anon. 1791).

Envision for a moment a charity school pupil in the latter part of the eighteenth century. He or she might well have been part of a youthful congregation whose duty it was to appear publicly once a year singing hymns of thankfulness, hymns of which the above verses are surviving examples. The two anthems--approximately contemporary with Blake's "Holy Thursday" poems[1]--reward examination in that they reveal much concerning the status of the charity school inmate, and comment, albeit from within the lines' subterfuge, on the charity school movement's situation at that time. By the late eighteenth century, "[t]he . . . charity schools had lost the impetus with which they had started," and, whether or not the initial zeal which accompanied their introduction had waned, "their number," as John Adamson argues, "was insufficient" (18). This latter point is important. These schools found themselves to be an inadequate solution to the problem posed by an expanding population of which a large proportion was poor and uneducated. And so in the final two decades of the century, children sing a hymn the purpose of which is to solicit more funds for their support. But it is a complex role that these children are called upon to play. For, while they sing, they

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[1]Blake wrote the first of these poems in 1784; he wrote the second ten years later.

must be proof positive of the charity schools' success, they must show the benefit of further donations; and yet they must also demonstrate their need for continuing beneficence. They need to arouse the pity of potential sponsors, must emphasise the social distinction that exists in order to extract the required financial commitment, while simultaneously appealing to a sense of brotherhood, an underlying human bond that cannot resist a fundamental Christian appeal: "Did Jesus weep for human woes / Will ye a tear deny?"

That the children sing from an underprivileged position is obvious enough, and yet there is an implicit awareness that, despite the degree of charity that might be forthcoming, the relative social position of both groups will remain unaltered. In effect, the children are begging to be kept in exactly the same situation; their appeal, arguably designed to evoke pathos on the part of the listener, seems to offer the rich a way to purchase their place in heaven: "those rich mercy shall obtain / Who mercy here display."[2] It is not, however, that those who possess wealth are being asked to give it away in its entirety. There is never any suggestion that they should interpret the hymn as a command to "go, sell your possessions, and give the money to the poor" (Matt. 19. 21); rather, the singing voices offer the privileged a way out of their "predicament," ask only for an undefined amount, and give the wealthy an alternative that apparently defies scriptural precedent.[3] Whatever is to be given, whatever

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[2]"Again I tell you, it is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for someone who is rich to enter the kingdom of God" (Matt. 19.24)

[3] "He sat down opposite the treasury, and watched the crowd putting money into the treasury. Many rich people put in large sums. A poor widow came and put in two small copper coins .... Then he called his disciples and said to them, 'Truly I tell you, this poor widow has

amount might be spared, will do more than provide mere subsistence. For in the straightened circumstances of the charity school, in the maintenance of what we can now begin to see as a controlled poverty--a place of incarceration where society's sores and diseases may be kept from public view--in precisely this condition, the "infant poor" will be the recipients of a heavenly largesse that promises a reward for their impoverished existence even while it promotes its very continuance.

The hymn that the children sing in the last decade of the eighteenth century emphasises what they have, apparently, come to see as the pre-ordination of their status. Both wealth and poverty are divine "Blessings," and if the underprivileged children are to be maintained in their condition, then they should be grateful not simply for whatever it is that keeps them alive, but for the very state in which they find themselves, into which they are born. It is not that they might legitimately harbour any thoughts of social improvement. The polarity, of which they constitute one extreme, is not to be viewed as in any way inequitable; rather, the children should give thanks for the opportunity to endure the life that is given them, that is their birthright. And in the words that they sing, they offer up an apology, a confession, as it were, of their unworthiness to function in any other way in society. It is an apology that carries within it an overt sense of gratitude, that they "Whose parentage is poor" must appear before "the Assemblies of the Just" to participate in this annual ritual. It is a kind

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put in more than all those who are contributing to the treasury. For all of them have contributed out of their abundance; but she out of her poverty has put in everything she had, all she had to live on" (Mark 12. 41-44).

of drama in which the children constitute, quite literally, the chorus. They appear as a physical manifestation of the good works that their very existence allows the wealthy to perform.

Both the rich and poor are caught up in this religio-moral duet. By means of an apparently perverse reversal that inverts the spirit of the beatitudes, the children come to equate poverty with a sense of distance from, of disobedience towards, God: "Like sheep that had no shepherd we / Were running far away." It is within the confines of the charity school, as a result of the wealthy's generosity, that the children will be brought back to an understanding of the truth, of God's purpose for them: "But now are taught to know thy will / And walk the perfect way." But God's will must be mediated, the wherewithal provided, and the recipients must pray not for their own amelioration, but for further reward for their benefactors. The hymn gives no hint that the children might be entitled to any favour while they learn to "walk the perfect way"; any Heavenly recognition will be reserved for those whose function it has been to introduce them to their "Eternal Father." Thus the rich are God's representatives, natural legatees of His "special Grace."

The children occupy a pivotal position in this relationship. They are at once the objects of charity--confirmation to the rich of their goodness, their piety--and reminders also of the way by which the wealthy may enter Heaven. They are evidence of the charity schools' "success." We see them singing, perhaps, as did Blake, "Thousands of little boys & girls raising their innocent hands" (*Holy Thursday* 8), or standing in perfect order, grateful citizens-in-embryo formed from the shapeless, undisciplined mass that is the poverty stricken. But they are also an uncomfortable reminder to the nation's conscience of the unseen and the

unpalatable, a social problem that the beleaguered charity school movement was incapable of solving.

Such was the lot of the "fortunate" recipient of charity in the city as the nineteenth century approached. But what, a few years later, of the child whose parents were able to afford a small amount for instruction? In the first decade of the nineteenth century, William Lovett, who would become a pivotal member of the Chartist movement, received his primary education at the dame schools in his hometown of Newlyn, Cornwall, where, apparently, the educational standards varied widely: "Of my first school," Lovett recalls, "I remember being sent home at midsummer with a slip of paper round my hat with my name on it in red-ink, given as a holiday present" (3). Such frivolity could not apparently be tolerated, and he was sent to another school where the emphasis lay on the more serious nature of education. Lovett recalls: "I remember being put in the coal-cellar for bad conduct" (3).

A subsequent spell of tutelage under the direction of his eighty-year-old great-grandmother resulted in his being able, after a period of sustained effort, to recite *Dr. Watt's Divine Songs*. Some months later, he was lucky enough to be accepted by the town's only school, a private establishment. The purpose of his attendance there was to teach him nothing more than "to write and cypher"(3). It was not an ambitious educational project, yet the masters under whom he studied took their responsibilities seriously. If their pupils were privileged in their being able to attend school at all, the masters would ensure that their time was not wasted, that they would learn their lessons well, and that their powers of recall would be enhanced by the application of the most effective techniques at their disposal: "Custies on

the palm of the hand and very severe canings were punishments for not recollecting our tasks" (3), Lovett remembers. It was important too that the students at this country school were imbued from the outset with a sense of school spirit, a pride of place, that this was an educational space with which they were to identify as a home away from home. And consequently it was necessary for the masters to reinforce upon their youthful charges the latter's duty to remain within the school's confines, that there--and only there--would they develop the skills they needed to take their pre-ordained place in society. Of this Lovett writes: "[O]n one occasion I saw [the master] hang a boy up by the two thumbs with his toes just touching the ground for playing truant" (3).

Lovett "benefitted" from the educational opportunities that prevailed in England's rural South-West. In the more industrialised areas of the country, such facilities were not so widely available. Here, children were to find themselves employed--if they were "lucky"--in the burgeoning factories and mills. The charity schools, as previously stated, were proving themselves incapable of educating the growing numbers of poor children. David Wardle confirms Adamson's analysis when he writes that the schools "were generally in a state of decline, and were rarely very large, most charities being limited to the education of a limited number of poor pupils" (Wardle 63). At this level of society a division reveals itself: on the one hand, the poor, both urban and rural, the majority of whom are excluded from instruction; on the other hand, their more financially privileged counterparts whose family means make a number of educational opportunities available to them. Even though the quality of education varies widely in the fee-paying establishments--dame schools were after all run for profit as

were the type of village school to which Lovett was sent--the ability to pay ensures a measure

of instruction.

The Sunday School, originating in the 1780s, partly addresses the twin concerns of

an inadequate supply of free schools and the perceived problem of riotous youth. Released

from the confines of the factory one day a week, the child-worker represents an affront to a

social orderliness that--if not prevailing entirely--has at least that appearance. As Frank Smith

observes, "[I]t was the specially lawless behaviour of the Gloucester children on Sundays that

attracted the attention of Robert Raikes,"[4] who would assert in an editorial that "'farmers and

other inhabitants of the towns and villages receive more injury in their property in the Sabbath

than in all the week besides" (48). There was, too, the added advantage that instruction on

Sundays did nothing to interfere with the pupils' potential industrial productivity for the other

six days of the week. This type of school, though, was to prove itself no more successful than

the charity school in solving the problem of educating the poor. The ever-present concern

with the social implications of an educated underclass caused the Sunday School movement

to be viewed with suspicion: "Even the pious Hannah More was accused of spreading sedition

and disaffection because she taught reading (writing she considered unnecessary) to the poor

in her Sunday School" (Goldstrom 9-10). The fear of educating the poor (a concern which

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[4]Robert Raikes was an early promoter of the Sunday School movement, "establishing the
Sunday School Society in 1785" (Armytage 74). This interest arose, as Armytage also points
out, out of a reaction to what Raikes saw as the connection between idleness and criminal
activity: "'the misuse of Sunday appears, by the declaration of every criminal to be their first
step in the course of wickedness'" (74).

I address again later in this chapter) surfaces repeatedly. Typical is the following which Smith

quotes from a 1797 edition of *The Gentlemen's Magazine* :

> Industry is the duty to impress on the lower classes. A little learning makes a man ambitious to rise, if he can't by fair means then he uses foul.... His ignorance is a balm that soothes his mind into stupidity and repose, and excludes every emotion of discontent, pride, and ambition. A man of no literature will seldom attempt to form insurrections or form an idle scheme for the reformation of the State. (Smith 54)

Despite the motives for establishing these once-a-week schools, the degree of

education by which their pupils benefitted was minimal. In many cases the administrators saw

fit--in a decidedly retrograde and ironical step--to include manual labour as part of the

curriculum.[5] Mrs. Trimmer, who started a school in Brentford, "soon added spinning on

weekdays to the usual teaching on Sunday" (Adamson 19), and in Hannah More's own school

"Knitting and spinning were added to the customary religious teaching and Bible-reading"

(19). The extent of the Sunday School movement's achievements is a matter of debate. Smith

asserts that "[its] success was strikingly rapid" (59), but it seems that his criterion for

achievement is in the main strictly numerical. While he quotes the numbers of pupils

registered--half a million by 1818, for example--he says little about the standards of teaching

or the results achieved. Adamson too passes over this subject, although he does admit to the

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[5]We cannot ignore the self-disciplinary implications of this connection of work and schooling. "Work is defined, with isolation, as an agent of carceral transformation" (*Discipline* 240), Foucault writes. "It [work] is intrinsically useful, not as an activity of production, but by virtue of the effect it has on the human mechanism. It is a principle of order and regularity"(242). Work becomes an educational tool. If prisoners are reformed by work, then the poor can also be inculcated with habits whose purpose is a specific form of re-education.

dubious quality of the teachers: "Sunday School teachers, some of whom were paid for their

services, were often persons of very humble attainments with crude ideas respecting method"

(18). Even later commentators seem reluctant to engage the topic, with Silver arguing at one

stage that Sunday Schools "helped to prepare for the next phase of development--the

weekday schools on the monitorial system" (Silver, *Social History* 241). That the Sunday

School must be considered in the educational context out of which arises the monitorial

system is obvious. How this type of school actually "helped," and of what, precisely, its

contribution consists Silver does not say, remaining content to leave us with his assertion.

Wardle, however, is much more critical:

> As an instrument of secular instruction Sunday Schools achieved
> disappointing results considering the time, effort, and money spent upon them.
> The hours of attendance were inadequate, the curriculum was almost
> invariably confined to reading and religious instruction, and the teaching was
> frequently inefficient. By the early years of the nineteenth century their failure
> to solve the social and political problems which had inspired their
> establishment was evident. (63)

Whatever might be said in hindsight, we should not ignore what was obvious to nineteenth-

century observers. The Central Society of Education, a body formed in 1836 and one of

whose aims was to institute qualifications for schoolmasters, observed in its second

publication, "In many country villages where Sunday Schools have been established, not only

is writing not taught, but the master of the school is frequently a person unable to write

himself (348). This then was the situation some fifty years after Sunday Schools began to be

established and evidences their failure over the long term to contribute significantly to an

increase in literacy. The significance of Sunday Schools to this dissertation, however, lies not

in the degree to which they failed or succeeded, but in the fact that their popularity demonstrated once again the sheer volume of children to be educated. Certainly these once-a-week establishments could never be seen as an adequate solution to the pressing need for an organised, systematic education for the poor. They, like the charity schools, could no longer be considered a viable alternative, but in making the problem manifest they also defined it. As a result, the monitorial system could justify itself as a response to a situation that no other system could satisfactorily address. If the methods employed in these other types of school were inefficient, then opportunities existed for the more effective delivery of instruction, out of which, in turn, comes a concentration on the development of a highly regulated, disciplined space. This will-to-efficiency permeates, as I show later, every facet of the monitorial system, shaping not only the apparatus and the design, but the function of the pupils themselves. Although monetary considerations are always a fundamental concern, the fact that boys become monitors and pupil-teachers is more than the desire for an efficiency arising from economies of scale. It is part of the overall drive to impose a sense of place, to discipline one's position, to form the embryo subject.

II

[T]here had never been any suggestion that universal literacy was either possible or desirable, or that there should not be at least part of the nation cut off from the pleasures and dangers of the written word (Sturt 1).

Nineteenth-century Britain's developing industrial base demanded a permanent work-force. That is to say, the factories, the foundries, the spinning-mills, all those myriad fixed sites heavily invested with the apparatus of production demanded a no-less fixed and stable pool of labour. There is a paradox here. While industry might demand permanence of its labour force, the nineteenth-century English labourer was prone to move from one place to another, his location determined by the availability of work. The possessors of wealth, the class which would extract the advantages of efficient production to transform that wealth into a more productive, less static capital, were dependent, therefore, on the continued existence of a manageable underclass. But that underclass also introduced a potential for disorder, either actual or perceived; a de-racinated, mobile, and "undisciplined" mob was a constant spectre to the establishment.

The fear of social instability and the resultant anxieties, spread themselves across numerous disciplines. Subterranean in their progress, they surface to evidence a commonality of concern that links architecture, education, religion, literature--in all its various guises and genres--in a movement whose discrete parts, while appearing to function separately, in fact complement and reinforce each other in a combination whose purpose is the perfection of a variety of social control in the service of the state. Nowhere, perhaps, is this confluence of objectives more readily apparent than in the buildings that evidence the influence of

developing social institutions. As Thomas Markus points out, "Although religion, law, . . . science and the power of reason as the main tool of the Enlightenment were the primary mechanisms of control, buildings for *institutional care and restraint* were the concrete instruments of these invisible mechanisms (*Order*, 26 my emphasis). Occupying a pivotal spot in this social architecture is the school. Apparently it functions as a site for the transfer of knowledge, but arguably--given the circumstance out of which it emerges, those social conditions to which I have already referred--it is first and foremost a space of socialization, an institution within which theories of the training of ideal citizens are put into practice. The Glasgow Normal Seminary appropriates its motto from the book of Proverbs: "Train up a child in the way he should go and when he is old he will not depart from it" (22:6) It is a sentiment that establishes the importance of the school as a facility where the pupils absorb a certain kind of knowledge, the emphasis of which lies on the moral government of conduct. It is arguable also that it is a site that produces knowledge not simply for, but *of*, the pupils to advance a project the aim of which is to form a malleable, politically useful, subject.

An institution is so much more than the building or combination of buildings that in a physical sense attests to its existence. Internally, it may function and generally conform in its own way to the purpose for which it is built, and yet the structure evidences a larger social design. The asylum for the mentally ill, of which Foucault has spoken in such detail,[6] would neither have come into existence nor would existing facilities have been adapted for that

[6]See Michel Foucault, *Madness and Civilization.*

purpose, were it not for the fact that in the Enlightenment, madness--or at least that which is understood and denoted by madness--undergoes a transformation that opposes it to reason itself. Where reason is one of those lenses of normality through which society is observed, analysed, understood, that which is beyond reason must be isolated, cast away, yet contained and controlled. To this extent the institutional building is a "concrete instrument," a space within which functionality results from the melding of theory, of practice, and experimentation. And yet these spaces--the asylums, the workhouses, the hospitals, factories, prisons, schools--ostensibly defined and inscribed by their overt purpose, reflect at a deeper level, in fact, the multiple points of intersection where the social disciplines and philosophies converge. Here, the theories and regimes applicable to one are brought to bear on another, are tried, tested and--if refined--return, their effectiveness now more powerful, to the original site. "Concrete instruments" these institutions are, to be sure, but instruments resulting from the mixture of a variety of components. In a structural sense as Markus, echoing Foucault, makes clear, "their forms, functions, and spatial structures are capable of analysis in terms of the relationships and orders in society" (26).

If the school, as I have already begun to argue, plays such a fundamentally important role in providing what we might classify as "finished material" for the state's consumption, then it seems clear that an analysis of nineteenth-century educational facilities of the type designed for the education of the poor might well reveal much about the nature of that society's attitudes towards the underprivileged. Consequently we must ask how the school's architecture and its operations reflect the influences of emerging economic theory. Markus

points out that " [Adam] Smith's *The Wealth of Nations* (1776) laid the foundations for the English . . . school of economists--a cornerstone of whose theoretical stand was the rational division of labour and limited popular education" (*Order* 3). How penetrating were these influences in early nineteenth-century educational thought? In a society where Smith's ideas were applied "to various models of education" and considered "appropriate to utilitarian, mechanised systems for intellectual improvement and institutional care" (3), ostensibly philanthropic motives of educational theorists must surely warrant examination. It is arguable that philanthropy becomes a mask for the exploitation of a potentially productive work-force with philanthropy's object undergoing a transformation into philanthropy's subject. Philanthropy ceases to "philanthropise" and begins to experiment. If "Elizabeth Fry needed the female wards of Dance's Newgate prison as much as the wretched inmates needed her ministrations" (Markus, *Order* 27), then it can surely be argued that the theorists, philosophers, and apologists for popular education needed a similarly underprivileged class to (re)-form, to observe, to maintain as docile.

That the social vision informing the theory of the monitorial system exerts a far-reaching influence is evident from interpretations such as those offered by Carl Kaestle and Beryl Madoc-Jones. Kaestle, for example, seeks to dilute the criticism that monitorial schools have attracted from educational critics. Acknowledging that "Cheapness was certainly a foremost consideration for promoters of the Lancasterian system," he goes on to argue that "later critics exaggerated the importance of economy in its appeal" (5). We might well keep this comment in mind when reading the opening lines of the Reverend Andrew Bell's section

on economy in his *Mutual Tuition and Moral Discipline: (1823)* "It is worth observing, that every improvement of our System has been attended with a *diminution of expense*" (121 my emphasis). Lancaster, too, saw the correlation between a fiscal frugality and the overall efficiencies that he wanted to extract from his system. His recommendation for the economic provision of reading materials, although somewhat lengthy, rewards quotation:[7]

> It will be remembered, that the usual mode of teaching requires every boy to have a book: yet, each boy can only read or spell one lesson at a time, in that book. Now, all the other parts of the book are in wear, and liable to be *thumbed* to pieces; and, whilst the boy is learning a lesson in one part of the book, the other parts are at that time useless. Whereas, if a spelling book contains twenty or thirty lessons, and it were possible for thirty scholars to read the thirty lessons in that book, it would be equivalent to thirty books for its utility. To effect this, it is desirable the whole of the book should be printed three times larger than the common size type, which would make it equal in size and cost to three common spelling books . . . Again, it should be printed with only one page to a leaf, which would again double the price, and make it equivalent in bulk, and cost to five or six common books; its different parts should then be pasted on pasteboard, and suspended by a string, to a nail in the wall, or other convenient place: one pasteboard should contain the alphabet; others, words and syllables of from two to six letters....

> When the cards are provided, as before mentioned, from twelve to twenty boys may stand in a circle round each card, and clearly distinguish the print . . . If one spelling book was divided into thirty different parts or lessons, and each lesson given to a different boy, it would serve only thirty boys, changing their lessons among themselves . . . and the various parts would be continually liable to be lost or torn. But, every lesson placed on a card, will serve for twelve or twenty boys at once: and, when that twelve or twenty have repeated the whole lesson, as many times over as there are boys in the circle, they are dismissed to their spelling . . . and another like number of boys may study the same lesson, in succession: indeed, *two hundred boys* may all repeat their lessons from *one* card, in the space of *three hours*. (Kaestle 68-69)

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[7]Re-printed from Joseph Lancaster, *Improvements in Education as it Respects the Industrious Classes of the Community.*

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Concealed within Lancaster's exposition of an ideal pedagogical space--an area where efficiency and utility rule--lies a transformation of the very nature of that space. The removal of the pages, their extraction and enlargement destroy the concept of the book. Now the artifact undergoes a literal and figurative dismemberment, the end result of which is to take its constituent parts and transfer them almost into the structure of the building itself. There is, that is to say, a demolition of the text as a discrete entity upon which depends the strengthening of the institution. And the institution comprises its inmates. The commonality that it demands of them denies refuge or retreat into any private, non-public, non-observable space. Thus reading itself also becomes dismembered. Reading, the possession of and engagement with a book, a relationship that must always resist the knowledge of the overseer, is in effect outlawed. No knowledge must be private. Learning is to be communal and measurable. Lancaster disperses the text. Its letters magnified, it remains at once an integral part of the lessons that are to be taught, while, in their abstraction, its pages now constitute another order of signs that connote the efficiencies that he seeks.

Kaestle concludes that "Although it was no panacea, the system was not as bad pedagogically as many historians have made it out to be" (48), adding "it was probably an advance over most elementary schooling of the early nineteenth century" (48). He may or may not be correct in asserting "Also, instead of seeing the regimentation, classification, competition, constant testing, and factory mentality of the monitorial school as something unconnected with today's schools, we can, from a more critical viewpoint, see a fundamental continuity" (48). But the establishment of continuity, as I have argued in my introduction, is

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not the purpose of my dissertation. Only by a detailed examination of the myriad interactions,

sub-systems--the discursive regimes--at play in the monitorial school can we really understand

them.

Although she subsequently recognises the control that manifests itself in monitorial

schools, Madoc-Jones is, nonetheless, sympathetic to the institution when she argues that the

system "made an important contribution to the need for social integration in the context of

an industrializing society." Identifying "a paradoxical situation" that reveals itself "by the

middle years of the century," she goes on to say:

> The monitorial school represented the principle of separate educational
> provision on the basis of class division. At the same time, it was to provide the
> beginning of new opportunities for social mobility, not the least of which was
> the position of elementary school master or mistress, which was generated
> through the successful establishment of the monitorial system. (3-4)

Monitorialism must surely be a seductive ideology if it is still able to find converts some one

hundred and forty years after its failure becomes evident. Leaving aside for the moment the

obvious implications of a system that would educate citizens on the basis of class, the

"opportunities for social mobility" to which Madoc-Jones refers are a large way from being

proven, allowing always that any opportunity for increased self-sufficiency represents a

positive change. The motivation for the monitorial system, as is becoming clear, lies in its

appeal to efficiency, to a vastly increased pupil-teacher ratio. Certainly some positions would

become available as the monitorial institution mushroomed, but the school was predicated in

part on the belief that in "Joseph Lancaster's school, one master alone educates one thousand

boys in reading, writing, and arithmetic, as effectually and with as little trouble as twenty or

thirty have ever been instructed by the usual modes of tuition."[8] Certainly schools proliferated,[9] but if teachers as a profession subsequently enjoyed greater numbers, it was due to the inability of the monitorial system to meet its promises of efficiency and effectiveness.

The figure of "[S]ocial mobility" also elides considerations of how mobile female teachers in fact were. That large numbers of women subsequently found themselves employed as teachers is not overwhelming evidence of a new-found flexibility of choice. On the contrary, it is quite possible that this increase indicates a certain type of social inscription; that as the inadequacy of the monitorial school with its single master and its tentacular system of monitors becomes more obvious, the policing, the managerial role becomes dissipated. When the elementary school becomes the surrogate family, the teacher becomes the mother. Where it is the middle-class idea of what the family unit should ideally be that drives the composition

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[8]Westminster Review, vol 1. January 1824, quoted in Kaestle p. 99. Whether or not, as Curtis and Boultwood write, "Lancaster boasted that under his plan it was possible for one master to teach *a thousand pupils*" (10 my italics), is not determined. In the preface to *The British System of Education*, Lancaster states: "Two young men lately established schools for a thousand children each, and a lad of seventeen did the same the year before" (xviii).

[9]"By 1814 [the National Society] had 230 schools and 40,484 pupils" (Armytage 91). Andrew Bell's estimation, not surprisingly perhaps, puts the total higher: "In 1816, five years after its formation, the numbers were officially reported to be 100,000. In the following year, 1817, they amounted to upwards of one-half more, 155,000. In the official report of last year, (1821), it is stated, that 'very little less than' (double the former number, viz.) '300,000 children, are now receiving sound religious education in schools united to the Society, or formed mainly on its principles'" (Bell *Mutual* 33).Regardless of their apologists' hyperbole, the rate of growth is evident from the following: "By 1820 there were over 1,100 day schools on the monitorial plan, of which about 235 were affiliated with the BFSS, most of the rest belonging to the National Society" (Kaestle 24).

of the theory of the school, it follows that social pressures exert themselves to ensure a regular supply of females to fill the positions that become available. What might appear to be mobility, then, may be seen as something quite different.

Conceptually, mobility is both evasive and suggestive in this context. While it conveys notions of choice, of opportunity, and thus links an Enlightenment ideal of human freedom with capitalism's values, at the same time it connotes the continual movement, the industry, the activity of the school's inhabitants. And, while it does so, it attempts to deny, with its suggestions of fluidity, the very rigidity which is the monitorial system's foundation. Thus, what Madoc-Jones sees as a paradox, a conflict between a theory of pedagogy, grounded in class division, on the one hand, and social mobility and opportunity on the other, is not a paradox at all. Only when misreading the implications in all their social and pedagogical ramifications does it appear so. An examination of much of the prevailing monitorial educational theory reveals the intricate and intimate relationship between pedagogy and social design, between ideas of morality and the government--that is management--of the pupil, and between government in the school and government of the state.

If the school, both physical and theoretical, constitutes a site through which flow so many social influences, it follows that the institution must become an ideological battleground. It is over this terrain that alternately allied and opposing forces contend in an effort to determine mastery over the subjects that are mustered there. The established Church--The Church of England--identifies with the Reverend Andrew Bell as I mentioned in the introduction. His opponent is Joseph Lancaster whose Non-Conformist schools The British

and Foreign School Society eventually absorbs. The polarisation that leads to the formation of these bodies reflects the Church of England's fear that a dissenting sect might exert an inappropriate influence over the management of a human resource that is vital to the development of the state. It is surely no accident that one of the forerunners of the English educational system was the Sunday School movement to which I have already referred. Here, Non-Conformist doctrine, with its puritanical allegiance to the sanctity of the Sabbath, merges with a philanthropic desire to improve the educational condition of the poor. The same motivation, to divorce the impoverished young from the influences of their daily social deprivation, informs the later movement for the formation of infant schools.

The alliance between an apparently altruistic desire to improve the lot of the underprivileged and the need to establish and maintain social order is an unstable one. A constant fear of the results of an educated labouring class makes itself manifest. Although Adam Smith could recognise in the division of labour the danger that workers might become "as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become" (273), the Tory Patrick Colquhoun was concerned that an educated work force might entertain ideas that would make it potentially seditious. In his view the goal was to maintain a balance between social relations and industrial development and thus negate the possibility of raising "their minds above the rank they are destined to fill in society . . . A right bias to their minds, and a sufficient education to enable them to preserve, and to estimate properly, the religious and moral instruction they receive, is all that is, or ought ever to be, in contemplation." Speaking

in the House of Commons, one Mr. Giddy was overtly hostile to the idea of education for the

poor. It

> would be found to be prejudicial to the morals and happiness of the labouring
> classes; it would teach them to despise their lot in life, instead of making them
> good *servants* in agriculture and other laborious employments to which their
> rank in society had destined them; instead of *teaching* them *subordination* it
> would render them fractious and refractory . . . it would render them insolent
> to their superiors. (Smith 79, my emphasis)

The speaker's fear had already been anticipated by the Reverend Andrew Bell. Two years

earlier, as Smith points out, he had asserted:

> It is not proposed that the children of the poor be educated in an expensive
> manner, or even taught to write and cipher . . . There is a *risk of elevating*, by
> an indiscriminate education, the minds of those *doomed to the drudgery of
> daily labour above their condition*, and thereby render them discontented and
> unhappy in their lot. (79)

Subsequently writing in 1808, a year after Giddy, Bell changes his approach slightly but

nonetheless significantly: "It is not proposed that all the children of the poor be taught to

write and cypher--*all may be taught to read*" (Bell *Madras*, 292 my emphasis). Thus the

process has undergone a refinement, and emerges as a more sophisticated instrument. The

ability to read is an aid to the efficient dissemination of information, of instruction, of

command; the conscious designed prohibition of writing goes a long way, on the other hand,

to ensure compliance since written and recorded protest becomes impossible.[10]

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[10]I examine Bell's insistence on a minimum of writing instruction in greater detail later in this
dissertation.

Religious and economic considerations complicate each other. To be sure, the demands of an emerging industrial power required a work-force of a different nature. That those who constituted that pool of labour were to be confined together had its advantages from the point of view of sheer efficiency, but that same congregation posed an inherent threat to the society that gave it birth. The industrial growth that transforms wealth into capital and in turn creates more wealth, impoverishes and deprives the work force upon which the production depends. In a terrible irony, the philanthropic class casts its gaze over the inhabitants of the slums that are being spawned by industrial expansion and implicitly lays the blame for social ills on the inhabitants. Thus, Samuel Wilderspin can write, "If any thing were wanting to prove the utility, indeed I may say the necessity, of establishing Infant Schools in every part of the kingdom . . . I might refer to the alarming increase of Juvenile offenders ..." (140). In what is arguably a calculated logical manoeuvre, Wilderspin first identifies the fact that these offenders result from the exploitation of what he terms "evil and designing persons" and "vile miscreants" (140-141), and then expresses concern that the children are not being punished. In a transparent apologia for the efficacy of his infant schools, Wilderspin ignores the need to remove the influences on the young, preferring to treat the symptom and not the malady. The school, then, that progresses in its visible form from a one-day-a-week collection point for the disadvantaged[11] now complicates itself even further, incorporating elements of

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[11]Robert Raikes appears to be aware of the need to establish order, even while he argues for the provision of what we, today, recognise as a very rudimentary and doctrinally influenced education: "'To remedy this evil [the misconduct of children on Sunday], persons duly qualified are employed to instruct those who cannot read, and those that may have learnt to

the carceral, as its complexion becomes more identifiably punitive in the service of social management.

The nature of the disciplinary process is no less a subject for debate. Joseph Lancaster would assert that his intent was to purge his system of militaristic language, although, as will become clear, the military influence is never far from the surface when he treats the subject of order. Robert Owen, on the other hand, whose New Lanark educational experiment arose out of a reaction against Bell and Lancaster's methods, overtly employed the methods of the parade ground. In yet another of those curious ironies that punctuate the history of the monitorial school, he uses the playground (a space that was entirely absent in the early institutions) as a site where "Boys over five were drilled in military exercises . . . including how to handle guns" (Markus, *Buildings* 7). Marching, like the clock, makes visible (literally) the measurement of time. Each regulated footfall, each co-ordinated arm and leg movement, registers time's use. It makes manifest the doctrine of war against idleness and utilises a strategy of the full and total employment of time, as Matthew Davenport Hill would also recognise:

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read are taught the Catechism, and conducted to Church. By thus keeping their minds engaged, the day passes profitably and not disagreeably'"--*The Gloucester Journal*, November 3, 1783. Quoted in Bartley, p.370.

> Economy of time is a matter of importance with us: we look upon all restraint as an evil and, to young persons, a very serious evil; we are, therefore, constantly in search of means for ensuring the *effective employment of every minute* which is spent in the school-room, that the boys may have ample time for exercise in the open air. The middle state between work and play is extremely unfavourable to the habits of the pupil; we have succeeded, by great attention to *order and regularity*, in reducing it almost to nothing. We avoid much confusion by accustoming the boys to *march*, which they do with *great precision*, headed by a band of young performers from their own *body*. (2-3, my emphasis)

The marching figure, it becomes clear, is not the simple object of this disciplinary application, this regime. The boys, metronomic in their precision, evidence the assault launched by the system on that which otherwise remains undefined--the "middle state." As yet free from inscription, it poses a threat to the overall definition of the system. This "middle state" must be eradicated by the advance of both overt and covert activity, an activity that informs both poles of existence. In the name of "order and regularity," a *blitzkrieg* of movement colonises and impresses the void with a homage to motion dissolving the distinction between work and play, despite an apparent assertion to the contrary. Is it a simple metaphor that Hill uses when he sees the marchers as being part of their own "body"? Or is it a slip of the tongue that indicates his realization that the boys are, in fact, members, limbs, of a much larger and more significant entity, one that extends and expands itself in the service of a socio-politico-educational philosophy that abhors not so much inactivity, but perhaps indefinable, unregulated activity? Yet the border is never completely overrun. It is "reduced almost to nothing," but it still remains, a space in which incubates an anxiety over non-productive, non-classifiable time. Regularity and predictability are fundamental to the school's discipline, to

its successful operation. "Discipline was strengthened in our School by a regular system of exercises in daily work, by successive changes of studies and necessary movements of slates, copybooks and caps" (Bonwick, 34). Control, then, makes its presence felt at the level of the most basic activities. It is not that movement itself is the subject of restriction, of censure. Discipline does not require immobility. Rather, it demands that certain movements be co-ordinated; that they take place in conformity with a timetable that dictates when those movements should occur. It is superfluous activity that is to be denied. Movement is, in fact, the requirement, but it is a certain kind of movement: ordered, precise, useful. It is necessary movement. And to police the co-ordination, to ensure the collective utility of the school-room body, the boys are, as ever, subject to a ceaseless observation: "A sharp eye in the Master or Monitor, and unremitting attention to duty, saved many a fault" (34), Bonwick writes.

Every action, every activity is subordinate to the constant allegiance to the effective disposition of time. In 1822 Matthew Davenport Hill, for example, writes in his "Sketch" that describes the monitorial system in the Hazelwood and Bruce Castle Schools:

> In leading a pupil through any course of study, he should be presented with a succession of definite objects for attainment, and the time should be assessed in which, with moderate exertion, he may advance to each. (This plan has all the advantages which a master and workman both obtain, in the man's being employed in piece-work instead of day work). (5)

Both the language and philosophy of the factory invade this sophisticated variant of the monitorial system in the same way as they influence other similarly organised schools. The advantage that Hill sees accruing to both "master" and "workman" undergoes a subtle variation here. In his application of this precisely measured division of labour, he implies that

the "benefit" attaches both to pupil and teacher. However, time's strict government--each task

has an aggregate time within which it should be completed, each task must be done *on* time--

binds pupil and teacher together in a common cause. If the pupil's progress is to be judged

on his ability to complete his studies within the established time, then the teacher, too, is

subject to the same constant measurement. The "beneficiary" in this method is in fact the

school; it is the organised institution which is the master.

Consideration of time can never be divorced from the institution's objective. Its

economic and efficient use, the constant war on indolence, is a mainstay of monitorial theory.

"The entire machinery of the New School, is fitted to prevent *idleness* and offences, to call

forth diligence and *exertion* ..." (Bell, *Mutual* 63 my emphasis). And again: "[T]o attain any

good end in education, the grand desideratum is, to fix attention, to call forth exertion, to

prevent the waste of time in school" (Bell *Mutual*, 58). And yet again: "The health of the

body and the mind, and the efficiency of labour, are much increased by the regular and

systematic disposal of time" (Hill, *Sketch* 7). The boys seem to internalize the institution's

clock, a regulatory mechanism that leaves no room for misunderstanding. On the one hand,

it simultaneously creates a constant expectation:

> [H]e shall know the precise time by which his various duties are to be
> performed. Thus a boy knows that the instant the clock strikes seven, the bell
> for morning school will ring; that at a signal given an exact number of seconds
> after the first stroke on the bell, he shall be expected to be in the muster room;
> and that in twenty seconds more he must occupy a particular place in the
> room. (Hill, *Sketch* 10)

On the other hand, it creates an apprehension: "The boy is fully aware, that though he may be in his place as much before the time as he chooses, if he be a single second too late, he will incur a certain loss, which . . . is sufficient to produce the desired effect" (Hill, *Sketch* 10). The clock and the bell--the former a constant reminder of the passing of time, the latter that which punctuates the day--signify the necessity to make efficient use of every second. They are inseparable from one another, and are as fundamental to the monitorial school as the monitors themselves. As essential instruments, working in unison, they appear in the very earliest Monitorial schools, indispensable components in the system of signs that regulates the day and its activities: "A clock was fixed over the platform, and a large bell stood on the Master's desk. Yet that was seldom used, as the sharp call 'Halt!' for order, was distinctly heard over the room" (Bonwick 5).

Where the school functions as a "social laboratory and instrument for shaping society" (Markus, *Buildings* 93), discipline, in whatever form it becomes manifest, functions both to locate, delineate and form the subject. David Goyder, another infant school promoter and friend of Wilderspin, also recognises the utility to be gained from drilling pupils:

> The *Mechanical* parts of the System, particularly the *marching*, which has delighted every visitor who has attended the School, will be found perhaps one of the most *efficient ways to promote subordination* which has yet been adopted . . . coincident with the principles of *the truly benevolent Robert Owen*. (Markus, *Buildings* 74 my emphasis)

In this one short extract, a number of those concerns and influences that are integral to nineteenth-century educational thought intersect and act upon each other. The reduction of the pupils' choreographed movements to "Mechanical parts of the System" not only reflects

the pervasiveness of industrial metaphors in educational discourse, but also visits a transformation on those who are the subject of experiment. Goyder abstracts the marching process, implicitly acknowledging the semiotics of this particular form of representation, this *dressage*. It is not the *pupils* marching that instills delight. It is the very act of marching itself: the rhythm, the order, the conformity. The spectacle subsumes the pupils such that delight arises from an efficient performance of the whole, and the individual parts that function in the service of the larger mechanism lose their identity.

Is it a benign pleasure, this "delight" that the observers feel? The authors of the first report of the National Society see "delight" as an essential ingredient in the acceptance of discipline by those, that is the pupils, upon whom a naked form of discipline is being imposed. We should ask, however, whether there is a difference in the quality, or what we might describe as the purpose of pleasure, when that same delight infuses the spectator. In this reaction, this response that arises from the integration of the spectator and the spectacle that he witnesses, there is, perhaps, a certain aesthetic that occurs--ideally speaking--in an unmediated sense at the level of feeling. I shall return to a consideration of the aesthetic in discipline. For the moment it seems that the very performance of marching children functions as a sign to reinforce the efficacy of the system of which both children and visitors are part. Those that view the workings of the machine are themselves somehow deluded by their physical separateness from it. If delight camouflages for the children the regime of control that does not end with the school but only begins, is only born there, then that very same delight, an almost sublimated pleasure, also casts a disguise over the fact of the visitors' inclusion in

a pervasive vision of social control and construction. These apparent externals to the process are in fact an integral and fundamental part of it. The economy of control and order, society reduced to an abstraction in a playground, provides a prototype of what that society would, from one particular vantage point, ideally be. Seduced by this vision, the observers are no less the agents of their own disciplining than the component parts of the socio-political apparatus they observe. These considerations cause us to ask whether it is simply the pupils who are subordinated, or are what otherwise appear to be peripheral players also subordinate themselves to a disciplinary ideology that embraces them, needing their acquiescence for its success just as much as it does the pupils. In 1808, William Allen, a Quaker philanthropist, would enthuse in the following manner after visiting Lancaster's first school: "Here I beheld a thousand children collected from the streets, where they were learning nothing but mischief, one bad boy corrupting another, *all reduced to the most perfect order, and training to habits of subordination and usefulness ...*" (Smith 75-6, my emphasis). No doubt unwittingly, he indicates the invidious nature of the process that he endorses when he says, "I can never forget the impression which the scene made upon me" (75).

Foucault has made clear how the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the time that he describes as the classical age, "discovered the body as an object and target of power" (*Discipline* 136). Now, in the nineteenth century, both observer and observed are united in the functioning of a discipline that operates both vertically and horizontally. That "technico-political register" of which he writes, "constituted by a whole set of regulations and by empirical and calculated methods relating to the army, *the school* and the hospital" (136, my

emphasis), still obtains in the educational institution; now, though, it is more perfected, more

effective, and begins to inscribe its disciplinary message on the text of society as a whole,

rather than just one or two of its constituent chapters.

Chapter Two

Design and Sign: Monitorial operations [12]

I

Joseph Lancaster includes an illustration as a frontispiece to his *The British System of Education* (Fig. 1). It is an illustration that demands comment here, not only because of its content which is ostensibly simple, but also for the fairly detailed description of it which Lancaster provides some six pages later. The author finds it necessary to title the page "Explanation of the Frontispiece."

> The monitor [he writes] is represented standing with a pointing stick in his hand, to enable him to point out the best performance, without touching the writing on the slate, which might accidentally obliterate the writing.
> The boys are represented as sitting in the first desk in a class, in common with which they are exhibiting their slates, at the command from the monitor--

> "Show Slates!"

> They are represented as having written not merely a word, but a sentence; and a sentence that every true Briton will wish to be engraven, not only on the memory, but on the hearts of the rising generation, as a tribute of duty to the monarch, who reigns in the affections of his people--

> "Long Live the King!" (ii).

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[12]Pages 104--112 of this dissertation form part of an article entitled "Shapes and Spaces: Inside Joseph Lancaster's Monitorial Laboratory," and are reprinted by permission from the *Journal of Educational Thought,* Vol. 32, #2, August, 1998. Copyright © 1985 by the University of Calgary.

It is, arguably, no accident that Lancaster uses "represented" three times in this short passage to establish his reading of the illustration. We look, after all, at an abstraction, a sharply focused and concentrated depiction of what he would have us believe is the conformity of the educational procedure, a procedure, we might say--after Foucault--reduced to its ideal form. The details that will become so apparent in later monitorial material--the straight lines, the grid-like floor patterns--do not yet form part of this introductory picture. The minimal details apparently confirm Lancaster's assertions, but why is the representation so significant? It seems that he feels the need to explain just what it is that his characters represent, to supplement somehow the representation. Something, perhaps, manifests itself in the picture demanding, albeit unconsciously, an explication of what is apparently obvious.[13]

Although the boys under the monitor's charge are sitting down, their bench and desk are elevated such that from the perspective of the viewer, both pupils and monitor are at eye level. In his hand, as Lancaster says, the monitor holds a pointer, an instrument with which to indicate excellence, but in the illustration the pointer barely indicates at all. An extension of the arm of its possessor, it seems superfluous giving no impression of its being raised or lowered. In so far as it points, it attracts attention to nothing, its end being directed not to the slate of any particular boy, but to an indefinable area beneath the desks where they sit. The

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[13]We should note, too, that the boys and monitors in the illustrations are almost physically identical to each other. Their "cloning" draws our attention to the nature of Lancaster's explanation; that is to say it is as much prescription as description in so far as the text in its entirety reveals itself to be an image of his pedagogical desire, the envisaged subject both inside and outside the classroom.

monitor is, then, represented in precisely the way that Lancaster describes him, but the representation is at variance with the function that the boy performs. The pointer, if it does anything, enhances the distance between the boy in front of the desks, and the pupils behind them. It is as if it forces the monitor to take up a position from which the other students are always in view. Thus, instead of moving forward to use the pointer in the way that Lancaster describes, the monitor seems, rather, to be retreating; his body is tilted slightly backwards, his weight is on his rear leg, and whereas the pointer's tip is virtually indistinguishable, what attracts our attention is the pool of light in which he stands. The light's source is directly behind him, a fact that we ascertain from the position and direction of the shadow. That same light encompasses four boys who sit in front of him, only now the light is more intense. With the exception of the boy on the bench's end, no-one throws a shadow. The wall behind them-- light vertical engraving on the right, and becoming darker on the left hand side--is noticeable for an almost semi-almond shaped white space against which they are silhouettes. It is like the white of an eye, as if in some strange fashion the artist has projected the monitor's vision, symbolizing it and inscribing its objects whose determination is obvious only to the monitor, and to the viewer who observes the tableau that the engraving depicts.

The observer, then, *sees* the monitor *seeing*. We do not see as if through his eyes; on the contrary, we look from the outside, able to see what he sees while at the same time we can detect those areas that might escape his attention. Is there not an anxiety in Lancaster's representation? If the four boys directly in front of the monitor are directly in his view, their inability to escape it symbolized by the halo of light against which they are outlined, the same

is not true of the boys on the monitor's left. The first two to be enveloped in the darkening area have their heads turned towards each other. Far from showing interest in making the content of their lesson an object of examination, they seem to be engaged in conversation with each other. On the boundary of what is literally light and dark, the monitor's power instantly suffers a degree of dissipation.

If we look carefully, we count *ten* slates in whole or in part that the boys present for inspection. However, we see only *nine* boys. Why, we must ask, should this be? It is not simply a matter of perspective. A slight shift of the monitor's position to his right would have been ample to bring the missing child into view. Indeed, a closer inspection indicates that there is room enough in the picture as it is to have included enough of the anonymous pupil's head to confirm his presence. It is difficult to say with any authority whether this is an oversight, but it cannot go unremarked that beneath the desk that accommodates the boys, the pupils' legs are visible; visible, that is to say, for nine of the pupils only. The tenth's are as absent as is the remainder of his body. Whether consciously or not, the artist (and we do not know who that is, the engraving does not include a signature) has omitted all representation of this tenth boy. Or has he? Because in an illustration that is so apparently concerned with representation that Lancaster reinforces it with a written explanation, should the absence be taken as a *lack* of representation, or more precisely as representing a certain anxiety or recognition? Perhaps there is a tacit acknowledgement that, despite the objective and the plan of the monitorial school, there is always an element, at least at this early stage, that is able to escape detection. And this in turn constitutes the reason for the written

explanation; Lancaster's expansion and argument arise out of the inherent weaknesses that he has, perhaps subconsciously, admitted but not yet addressed.

There is no evidence of the pupils being controlled by the intersecting gaze of independent observers. The monitor's position allows him to fix in his view those directly in front of him, but those who are in his peripheral vision--those represented by increasing shadow--those pupils are not as yet controlled, propelled into conformity by the certainty that they might be seen at anytime. And if their position in the dark indicates a degree of freedom from observation, it can also suggest a reciprocal ability on their part to observe. The boys on the extreme left of the engraving look towards the monitor. Although they present their slates to the front at the same angle as the others, and although they appear to be paying attention to the monitor, it is their representative function with which we ought to be concerned. From our position as observer we are able to see at a glance one of the productive features of the panopticism that fuels the monitorial machine. For while, as I have already pointed out, we see the monitor observing, we also see him being *observed*. This is one of the great and fundamental cornerstones of this disciplinary apparatus. No-one, neither supervisor nor supervised, is exempt from view, from examination, from classification. From the relative obscurity of their position at the desk's extreme end, a position that is *represented* by the heaviest shadow, from this position of concealment they exercise a component in the power relationship upon which the disciplinary regime depends. We must not lose sight of the fact, though, that the monitor does not stand at the apex of control. He is still subject to the disciplining observation of the master. For the monitor to be effective, he too must operate

in the certainty that he too may be viewed, and his potential transgressions may be observed by pupil and master alike. This confirms, rather than modifies, panoptic theory. Although, as Foucault points out, "in the central tower, one sees everything without ever being seen" (*Discipline* 202), the monitor does not occupy the "central tower." He operates in a space between the master--the central locus of control--and the subject population--the other pupils--and as a pupil himself is subject to the same unremitting possibility of observation. The illustration of the Borough Road school reduces the dynamics of observation to a geometrical precision. At this stage, though, Lancaster can only hint at it.

A consideration of the dual aspect of observation--viewing, while at the same time potentially being viewed--invites a contemplation of the nature and significance of the viewers who see Lancaster's observations. We might say that the engravings depicting the order and "ideal" society of the monitorial school depend for their appreciation upon a similarly ideal audience, a body that confirms the ideology of which the images and the supporting text are representative. It might, however, also be argued that this audience comes into existence precisely *because* of the engravings. That is to say, the fundamentals of the illustrations that "need" Lancaster's written supplement imply, rather than confirm, the presence of a particular kind of audience. If the image of self-discipline in practice demands an unquestioning, complying viewer to finally endorse monitorialism's process, that observer is as much a product of Lancaster's imagination as his ideal subject. To be sure, the engravings position the audience, placing it in a position of absolute, albeit virtual, mastery. But *this* audience can only ever be virtual. Despite his attempts to force a closure, to terminate further

consideration, Lancaster's representations must always be part of a process of deferral that the illustrations' creation seems designed to deny.

Lancaster concludes his booklet with a series of two diagrams and three engravings accompanied by another set of explanatory notes. The former are interesting for their precise delimitation and ordering of the school's interior. However, it is to the first engraving of the series (Fig. 2) to which we should turn our attention, comparing it and its own explanation to its equivalent in the frontispiece. The note is remarkable for its brevity: "[It is] a representation of boys reading a lesson, on the plan of one book serving for the whole school. The monitor with a pointing stick, pointing out part of the same" (55). Now, at the end of this booklet the author does not feel the same need to explain in detail the illustration's contents, indicating perhaps a lessening of what was, arguably, his earlier anxiety or concern.

We note immediately that our vantage point has altered radically. Like the master, we now view the scene from a position of heightened elevation. Our perspective is also different in so far as we now see the monitor full-face. The illustration's shading is slightly darker on our right than it is on the opposite side, but nevertheless no pupil is reduced to invisibility; all eight are accounted for. The boys are noticeable for the precision with which they stand in front of the lesson card. Without exception they are situated within the semi-circle that has been marked out with geometrical accuracy for the purpose. Thus located, they distance themselves from the monitor who uses his pointer in a manner that conforms to Lancaster's note. Whereas in the frontispiece the light illuminated only a section of the subject pupils, now

together" (3). And the groups are split in this illustration to reveal the figure of the monitor, the system's essential and indispensable actor. Separated from the pupils, their space and his fully delineated, their attention unwavering, he is also in our full view. There is a confidence in his depiction that the frontispiece lacks. To be sure, he seems to be leaning back in a similar fashion, but he wields his pointer with a new authority. Unquestionably in control, the monitor conducts the movements of the system whose orchestration Lancaster has pointed out in the preceding portions of the text.

If Lancaster's visual depiction of a schoolroom together with his written analysis cannot, as I have argued, be taken at face value, what then did the monitorial school, this regimented, "productive" space, look like? Armytage suggests that it "was not unlike the new factory both in appearance and in method, the definite rewards and punishments of the one corresponding to the wages and fines of the other" (75). This suggestive image has the potential to conjure up pictures of a workhouse-like environment, a Dickensian tenement perhaps, with emaciated children rarely seeing the light of day, subjected to a perpetual physical abuse and exploitation. Illustrations, verbal and pictorial, indicate something rather different:

> [Monitorial] schools were conducted in single large schoolrooms, in which the master could keep the whole school under scrutiny. Under the Lancasterian arrangement the central area was filled with rows of benches for writing drill, and the surrounding space, where the bulk of the time was spent, was occupied by 'drafts' of children standing for instruction by their monitor, usually with the aid of cards hung on the wall. Under Bell's arrangement the desks for writing occupied the outer space, facing the wall, and the central area was used by classes of children standing in squares for instruction by their monitors. (Lawson and Silver 242)

Andrew Bell describes his typical school as follows:

> The form of the class is sometimes circular, or rectangular, but oftener square, three sides of which are occupied, each by one third of the number of scholars, who are arranged at equal distances from one another, and the fourth by the master, teacher, or visitor. But, whatever be the form, it is generally called the circle on the floor (*Mutual* 60).

What emerges from these descriptions is not a confirmation of overt, physical oppression so much as a realisation that the school's operators appropriate elements of industrial management--constant observation, full employment of resources--and apply them in a special instructional arena where the children do not simply, themselves, produce, by which I mean where they learn specifics to a set and defined standard. On the contrary, waiting like inventory to be used, they form the basis of something--a subject--that is itself the end result of a specialised production. Thus the emphasis in this hybrid institution comes to bear not on that which the children can "manufacture," as in the factory but on what can be manufactured, constructed, constituted *out* of the children. The school concentrates on psychological methods by which control may be exercised and its results recorded.

In his study of English school architecture, Malcolm Seaborne provides an illustration prepared by the engraver the Reverend Absolam Hamel in 1818 of the interior of Joseph

Lancaster's Borough Road monitorial school (Fig. 3). While Seaborne identifies functions and apparatus, he does not analyse the engraving in terms of power relationships. To appreciate fully the dynamics at play in this room, we must see the actors, the room's contents not, as Seaborne's description suggests, as isolated, functional islands only loosely connected to each other. Rather, we need to appreciate the ways in which the pupils and their overseers *inhabit* the school-room, perform various roles in it; we must recognize the complex relationships between human-being and paraphernalia. None of these is simply a suspended satellite in an unordered space, an area that is defined only by the enclosure effected by the walls of the room. The "master's platform"--invisible in this engraving--is significant precisely by virtue of its very invisibility. We view the room from behind the desk that we cannot see. The interior components--both animated and stationary--are not randomly connected; and the significance of the school's architecture is not limited simply to what may be seen from the outside. The notion of the school does not pre-suppose a particular type of construction identifiable by its exterior, whose social function is inseparable from an objective whose main concern is the gathering together of children for the purpose of offering them instruction. The internal dimensions and layout of the monitorial school were the subject of much meticulous design. Lancaster writes: "It is essential to leave aisles 5 feet wide on each side, so that the children, when not at their desks, can stand in semi-circles facing the side-walls, on which the lesson-boards should be hung (for this reason also the windows should not be too low)" (Lancaster, *British* 1).

Lancaster's concern with the school's architecture is beyond dispute. "The building and arrangement of school-rooms, is of so much importance in the minute and accurate details, that I have thought it proper to publish a separate work on that subject" (3). If his pre-occupation with detail reflects his widely documented anxiety with cost and efficiency, then it must be somewhere within this precise ordering, placing, and justification that the greater significance of the school's design lies.

Commenting on the function of buildings, Hillier and Hanson make the observation that, "Buildings may be comparable to other artefacts in that they assemble elements into a physical object with a certain form; but they are incomparable in that they also create and order the empty volumes of space resulting from that object" (1). The purpose of ordering that space reaches into the very social fabric of the people who are brought together within it. "The ordering of space in buildings is really about the ordering of social relations between people" (2). Hence, the study of the monitorial school's architecture must necessarily go beyond a mere description of the artefacts that break up the space within the room. It must examine the geometry, both explicit and implicit, in an endeavour to determine the psychological influences on the pupils. It must follow the trajectories of observation in order to see how the relations between pupil and teacher, pupil and master, master and teacher, form themselves, maintain themselves, and become manifest in the daily behaviour of the school.

Lancaster is explicit on the subject of school-room design: "The best form for a school-room is a long square, or parallelogram" (1). While this affords an apparently

unrestricted arena over which the master may conduct his constant observation, the lack of

obstruction also serves to order the relationship between the boys themselves. Concerning the

function of ostensibly open areas in modern buildings, Thomas Markus writes: "An obvious

effect of such a spatial device is that movement through spaces which appear to be open and

free, is in fact highly constrained. This contradiction between space and form hides social

control mechanisms" (*Paedagogica* 22). Thus, Lancaster designs the placement of furniture

in order to control the movement of the pupils within a constrained space. The desks--they

"should all be *single desks*"--must "front the head of the school" (1). All of the boys face the

same direction--[they] sit with [their] face[s] towards the head of the school; conformity

exerts itself even at this fundamental level of design. There must be space enough for

movement, of course: "Room should be left between each desk for a passage for the boys,

that the scholars in one desk may go out without disturbing those in another" (1). But,

although Lancaster seems to exhibit a concern for the mutual right of the students to enjoy

their own space, nevertheless that space is subject to a decided control and order. The amount

of available room within which to move must not vary. Thus: "It is desirable the desks and

forms should be substantial, and firmly fixed in the ground, or to the floor" (1). Even in this

elementary description, the notion of permanence--"A PLACE FOR EVERYTHING, AND

EVERYTHING IN ITS PLACE" (3)--makes itself felt.

For Lancaster, considerations of efficiency and economy as well as the ever-present

need for an unobstructed view of the school-room condition the organization of space. For

example, he is explicit in his instructions concerning both the design of the desks behind which

his pupils sit, and the location of the furniture: "No half desks should be placed against the

walls, nor should any double desks be admitted into the school-room" (1). He recognizes in

these latter items the potential for obstruction and the refuge that they afford the pupils from

the master's overseeing eye: "Desks so placed and constructed, merely afford pretence for

idleness and play, the scholars being wholly or partly out of their master's sight" (2). The

utility of the desks is, then, of paramount importance whether viewed simply as stations at

which the pupils gather in the regimented learning process, or whether as potential obstacles

to observation. The objective is to process as many pupils as possible. Consequently each

piece of furniture must be of the optimal size and shape:

> There can be no propriety in filling a room with timber when the space is
> wanted for the children. Desks and forms when of a broader surface than is
> actually needed, really occupy that room, which, were they made of proper
> dimensions, would contain more desks and consequently more children. (2)

Hence the importance that Lancaster places on the location of passageways designed to

permit the rapid movement of his pupils: "Room should be left between each desk for a

passage for the boys, that the scholars in one desk may go out without disturbing those in

another" (1). Everything is pared down to the minimum permissible dimensions that will allow

a continued functioning of the system. The pupils may be packed in to the school-room, but

if the desks and forms are shaped such as to prevent collision, then the process can, in theory

at least, proceed unimpeded, no child interfering with another despite their close proximity

and the desire for rapid deployment: "The ends or corners of the desks and forms, should be

rounded off, as the boys, when running quickly in and out, are apt to hurt themselves by running against them" (1).

No part of the design is complete unless it conforms to the demands of constant vigilance and observation. The desks may be constructed so as to afford no protection from the master's eye, but Lancaster ensures the pupils' visibility by raising, literally, the master's position: "At the head of the school there should be an elevated platform for the master's desk, as a convenient place to overlook the school" (1). Again there is the tension between the desire for a school that will process as many pupils as possible on the one hand, and the requirement to facilitate their movement on the other. Much of the monitorial punishment process rests, as we have already seen, with the objective of establishing in the pupils a sense of place, a permanent identification with the school, with one's class. That is not to say, however, that the daily routine demands that the school's inmates be frozen into immobility. Lancaster implies this when he speaks of the desks' design. He is, however, explicit when considering how the spatial organization of the room contributes to the greater order. Here he uses a military allusion to establish his position: "Children confined in a small school-room, can no more be expected to be in order, than soldiers can perform their exercise without a parade" (1).[15] "Parade" in this context is arguably ambiguous. The school-room in his opinion, it seems clear, is an arena within which the effects of the disciplinary machinery make themselves manifest. The room is far from being an area simply within which instruction takes

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[15]I speak on page 130 of the incongruity of a Quaker using military language and metaphors.

place. Lancaster's organization of the school extends much farther than a separation or isolation of an institutional area. The definition of the school--that "long square, or parallelogram" (1)-- is only the starting point. The space within the rectangle's perimeter must be meticulously delimited, its surface divided, its functions established. Each separate location is designed with the overall efficiency of the others in mind. Nothing may be permitted to escape the master's vigilance. But, lest the master's view of the operation, the "parade" that is a continual integrated functioning of these separate but dependent parts, stand in danger of losing its power to observe, then Lancaster designs a solution to forestall that eventuality also:

> Wherever the floor of a school-room can be placed on an inclined plane it should be so. The master being stationed at the lower end of this plane, the elevation of the floor at the farther end of the room, would cause a corresponding elevation of the desks placed there, so that, from the platform the boys at the last desk would be as much in view as those at the first. (2)

The geometry of Lancaster's classroom, as we have seen, ensures a flow of pupils around the room's perimeter. This space, which, like the area in the middle of the room, is under the potentially permanent gaze of the schoolmaster, serves also as a marshalling area. The movement, from one learning station to another, regulates, determines, and promotes no sense of freedom. The pupils are forced to stand while under instruction by monitors. Directed from one discrete position to another, the educational materials--the cards on the wall--being reduced to the bare minimum in the name of efficiency, the pupils find no relief from a tread-mill-like monotony and regularity. The sense of movement, illusory and seductive, in reality only reinforces the pupils' place in a "machine" that punctuates their days

by an acute observation of time and progress. They occupy a pre-arranged place in a groove, so to speak, a groove from which they are occasionally "liberated," only to be more firmly rooted once they enter the central area to sit at their desks and practise "writing drill[s]."

The Reverend Andrew Bell's advancements on this design are even more overtly geometrical. Now the roles of the different spaces are reversed: the centre becomes the mustering area, the pupils being formed into squares for their instruction. Confined within this central place, the lines of pupils out of which the squares are formed exercise a tension on the other component parts, stressing, flexing, and ensuring a regularity of formation which visits a constant individual and collective discipline on a body which is under a gaze as equally omnipresent as that of its Lancasterian counterpart. And in a significant acknowledgement of the ability of that gaze to establish an internalized discipline and control on the part of those who are subjected to it, Bell has those pupils who populate his perimeter face the wall. These occupants of the classroom's boundary confront the wall, face the architectural limit of the space which confines them, receive a constant re-affirmation of their inability to escape the institution of which they are fundamental components. It is as if the pupils--these internal organs, so to speak--of a developing educational body are forced into a metaphorical encounter with the inscription to which they are subject. At the extreme edge of the very limited instructional process afforded by the school, not so much members, perhaps, as capillaries of the institutionalised body of which they are part, they write, while the wall that encloses them, confines them, restrains them, functions as a permanent reminder of the very message, that is to say the text of social order, that underwrites their presence in the school.

And all the while, unable to look behind them, they are subject to a gaze that may or may not alight on them, a gaze that--present or not--ensures the pupils' compliance in the design, the structure, of an apparatus which includes, embraces, utilises them, even as it exercises a control over them. It is the principle of the Panopticon refined, applied, utilised.

Above all, it is in the attention to order, to predictability, to permanence that one can see the appeal that the monitorial system had for those who were concerned about the potential danger posed by a de-racinated and consequently potentially mobile underclass. As the English educational historian Frank Smith observed in 1931: "What impressed the governing classes was the orderliness that prevailed" (75). The shift towards the classification, regulation, and training (these in all of their connotations), of the children of the poor represented a move by which a segment of the population could be both regimented and re-formed: "To see wild, turbulent, neglected and almost ruined children suddenly converted to *submissive, orderly and quiet* habits was a result too much desired not to be welcomed" (75, my emphasis). Whether it is confinement, containment, or both that informs an enthusiasm of which this is but a typical example, is not always clear. What cannot be ignored, however, are the insistent references to quietness, to passivity, to docility. At the same time as the children are being identified and made the subject of strategies designed to bring them together, to identify them with a specific location or institution, there is a parallel movement designed, it seems, at the very level of the instruction they receive, to reduce them to silence.

There is a significance in Lancaster's aversion to the spoken command in his school. It refines the functioning of discipline when he moves inexorably towards an institutional

silence. When he writes, "It [was] unavoidable, on a large scale of education, to do without giving many commands, and some of a very trivial nature" (107), he leaves open for discussion not the fact that he harbours a distaste for the language of discipline, but that he conceals an anxiety concerning the use of language in the first place. It is by no means a given that the orderly administration of the monitorial school's daily routine arose from a simple reaction on the part of the pupils to verbal instructions from the master. Indeed, in the same way that the master becomes a central panoptic figure whose teaching duties are re-situated through a network of pupil assistants, so too, by delegating to those same pupils the authority to issue commands, the master's role becomes less overtly active, and appreciably more observatory in nature. Pedagogical practice, already blurred by the monitorial school theory, reflects the influences of an emerging managerial science in which a frugality of speech typifies an institutionalised educational economy where conduct is governed by conditioned response, where the sign, in many cases, is reduced to its basic form and function. The monitorial school, that is to say, becomes an institution of naked semiotics.

The school operates, simultaneously, as laboratory and factory. Pupils who, as we shall see, are trained to silence behave in accordance with a regime of observation whose embodiment is the single figure of the master. Under his delegated and omniscient gaze, deviations from the required norm are detected, recorded, registered, analysed. At the same time, pupils are required to produce. Their achievements at their lessons are measured, quantified, again subjected to meticulous notation, and an elaborate system of rewards and demerits set up to motivate learning. And underlying this intersection of objectives--on the

one hand, observation, on the other, production--with their multiple points of intersection and abutment, is the requirement not only for obedience, but for an *unquestioning* obedience resulting from an efficient and economical method of delivering the instructions. It is not sufficient that orders be carried out, but that both command and reaction be effected with the utmost economy of time. "It is an important object," Lancaster writes, "to secure implicit obedience to those commands, on the part of the scholars; and, for the monitors to acquire as prompt a manner in giving them, as will secure the attention of the scholars, and lead them to a ready compliance" (107). Yoked together by the demands for immediate action and reaction, monitor and pupil hold each other captive in a reciprocal relationship where time, efficiency, economy of movement, determine their existence.

In the service of efficiency, language--that is to say speech--will be pared down until the incidence of the spoken word takes on an almost Trappist-like inaudibility. To avoid the circulation of a multiplicity of conflicting orders with their concomitant potential to devalue the currency of control, Lancaster prohibits spontaneous and arbitrary direction on the part of the monitors. He inhibits, at the very level of communication by which control is to be initially effected, not simply the form of the language that may be used, but its very content, its quantity. He writes: "As it is not proper that commands without number, and perhaps of a nature opposite to each other, should be given at random by the monitors, it becomes needful to limit the number that are to be given ..." (107). It is "not proper," perhaps, because "commands without number" suggest language that is not controlled, classified, purposeful. Neither is it enough that commands cause order to be instilled. Discipline, a mechanism

serving the cause of production--production of knowledge, useful pupils, an efficient, docile

(that is to say, teachable) body--must function at the most fundamental level, that of the

linguistic unit. Thus commands are not seen to be disciplinary tools whose application should

be restricted out of a humanitarian concern with the pupils. In a society such as that evidenced

by the monitorial school, the purpose of speech becomes subject to a radical violence that

operates on its very purpose. As an agent, the deliverer of discipline, speech operates in one

direction only: from the centre outwards. No longer functioning as a conduit of

communication then, where meaning is always negotiable, it is reduced to the part of a bit

player on a linguistic stage, where the sound-image component predominates, where words

act as a simple stimulus to which a slavish reaction is not only expected, but required; indeed

it is demanded.

A central lexicon of control must exist if the quantity of words, the number of

commands used, is to be established. The "implicit" obedience to which Lancaster refers

results, in part, from a set of instructions that at once covers every eventuality while leaving

no opportunity, on the monitor's part, to deviate from the language of the order. To achieve

the objective, Lancaster asserts, "It is only [necessary] to write down on paper the commands

most necessary to be given by the monitor to the whole class; and, it is essentially needful,

that he should not vary from the rule once laid down" (107). A grid of control thus operates

that makes each individual--master, monitor, pupil--an integral and indispensable component

of the functioning apparatus. Responsible for putting into circulation the quantity and variety

of commands, the master occupies the centre, determining eventualities by envisaging

dependent on the voice. The extent of possible orders is, as has been mentioned, determined by the master who collapses the distinction between instruction and regulation by creating a central "depository" of permissible imperatives. The "commands most necessary" are, we recall, simply written. Their operation, their putting into play, demands, though, a vocalisation, an expression, an enrichment that establishes the plenitude of the sign, a plenitude that in a reflexive sense confirms and re-affirms itself, albeit paradoxically, with the silent response of the class, the student body. Thus the sign, affirmed, confirmed, reflected, voided now of the potential for misunderstanding, rebounds on to the monitor who, internalising it, assists in the perfection of his own continuing disciplinary efficiency: "The practice of giving short commands aloud, and seeing them instantly obeyed by the whole class, will effectually train the monitor in the habit of giving them with dignity and propriety" (107), Lancaster writes. The sign, silent now, and stripped to its fundamental elements, must be recognised if it is to function. Yet that silence is evidence of a completed, reflexive dialogue that exists between the monitor and his students. At the precise moment where verbal instruction results in obedience, in efficient, economic movement, language, returning to silence, undergoes its third transformation of the cycle through which it passes from master, monitor, and pupil. The response of the pupils, reacting as a whole, answers the monitor just as surely as if a verbal assent had been given. The silence of confirmation makes language visible. While the obedience of the class to the order confirms the success of the instruction's communication in one direction, it works in the opposite way to deny the possibility of an alternative. Reaction on the part of the class ensures future compliance on

the part of the monitor. Where the orders originate in a desire to react to a variety of eventualities, their continued application and visual confirmation result in the inculcation of habits. The purpose of the instructions becomes self-serving and reflexive. Originally designed to react to behaviour, the commands finally create behavioural patterns where the monitor becomes no less trained, no less conditioned, than the pupils he commands. The execution and confirmation of the order constitute at the level of signs a dialogic relationship where the silent acquiescence becomes as significant as the audible command which demands that obedience. The monitor does not stand apart, does not merely observe the results of his actions. He is an irreducible part of an apparatus, a regime of cause and effect that now flows through him in one direction, now returns in the other, training him just as surely as it shapes those for whom he is responsible.

Lancaster identifies those "commands which are strictly military" (108) and prohibits their use, their enunciation. Nevertheless, the end result is the same as a parade ground operation: the student body will turn to the right, to the left, will halt, will move off. It is just that the words employed to effect the manoeuvre will be different. Interestingly, Lancaster sees martial attitudes, what he describes as "love of war and false glory" (108), arising from the nature, that is, the sound, of the command. He implies that it is not the immediate response, the unquestioning obedience, the slavish action and reaction of pupil and monitor that is dangerous. Rather, it is the substance of the command. To issue the order "To the right" (108), is unacceptable, but to indicate that that is the direction in which the class is to move, to replace the audible by the visible--by pointing--to efface any possibility of argument

or Non-Conformance by arbitrarily robbing the relationship of the one thing necessary to establish conventional dialogue, this *is* acceptable. Similarly, when verbal orders are indispensable he uses synonyms: "'Go on,' instead of 'March' - and 'Stop' in lieu of 'Halt'" (108).

In an apparent lapse from the strict order that thus far has informed his philosophy, Lancaster permits the "classes . . . occasionally to measure their steps" (108). However, he uses a military term, "close order" (108), when describing the situation where a laxity in regulation is allowed. It is as if, despite his intent to the contrary, he is unable to divorce himself from the language of professional, overt, regimented discipline. While he forces a distance between the terminology of the manoeuvre--"measure their steps" masquerades as something other than what it otherwise describes, marching--the effect on the student populace is the same. Moving in "close order," a traditional parade-ground exercise, forces those on the move to *internalise* the necessary regulation of their steps. Once used to their regular and swift deployment from one part of the school to another, the pupils' cadence becomes automatic. In a descant on military procedure and method, it is their close formation that determines the need for measurement, and not the reverse. That is to say, repetition already determines the design, the shape of the student body to be moved. A class must be moved *en masse* from location to location. The movement is predictable and conforms to a timetable of events. The length of step, its uniformity, follows naturally from the need to move in isolation from one's neighbour. The efficient forward momentum arises from a maximisation of effort; success is dependant upon synthesis. And the step, ostensibly self-

determined, the gift of an authority relaxing its grip, exercises its control, "commands [the pupils'] attention to one object, and prevents their being unruly or disorderly" (108). That same step which Lancaster maintains has no requirement to be "*regular,*" of which the measurement need not be "exact," nonetheless separates and distributes one student from another at the optimum efficient distance. If the step is not regular, it does not imply a lack of uniformity. The rhythm exists because it is the distance between a student and "the one who precedes him" (108) that is individually measured and determined. Thus each student, subject to an internalized control, proceeds within his own self-imposed, self-disciplined space.

Matthew Davenport Hill, founder of the Hazelwood monitorial school is, in his own way, fully aware of the "benefits" to be extracted from close order drill:

> The other boys, by their frequent practice in marching, learn to *measure time* with all the precision of soldiers, an acquisition that is not only useful in contributing to the order and celerity with which the various evolutions of the school are performed, but which has been in many instances of great assistance in enabling boys to subdue serious impediments of the speech. We believe that stammering results altogether from the habit of speaking *without an attention to time.* (32, my emphasis)

The purpose, clearly, is not to achieve a proficiency in marching *per se*. The attention to step, to pace, to the very precision required, is subordinate to the fundamental aim which is both the recognition and delimitation of time. Thus, speech or, more properly perhaps, incorrect or unordered speech--an undisciplined language--must be eradicated. In a regime where "order and celerity" form the foundation of the day's operations, and speech, when allowed, must conform to a catechistic response, language that falls outside the limits of what is

acceptable becomes the target. In the same way, as I shall show, that absent boys are traced and prosecuted, so "truant" language is made the object of a rectifying procedure. The daily rhythm, the symbolic conformity, maintains a constant assault on speech that falls outside the norm. That which is perceived to be irregular must be regularised. As Carl Kaestle observes: "The Lancasterian system of education was more than simply a recommendation to use student monitors; it was an elaborate set of rules, routines and pedagogical inventions for implementing such a system" (4). He is quite right, of course; this much has become clear from the examination thus far. However, this same "elaborate" system cannot come into being without a sophisticated understanding of the nature of authority.

It becomes increasingly apparent that, despite his assertions to the contrary, Lancaster is very much indebted not only to the vocabulary of the military, but also to its underlying disciplinary principles. By the time that he writes *Improvements in Education*, he is already acutely aware of the subtle differences in the ways by which authority manifests itself. Authority, if it is to be effective, must be synonymous not with the person with whom it is identified--in this case the master or monitor--but with the system itself. Lancaster recognises a distinct shift from what he defines as "personal" authority to an authority that is so heavily invested in the institution that it resists abstraction or definition by those who are subject to its control. Ironically for a Quaker, it is to the army that Lancaster turns for the model after which his own institution is to be designed: "In the army authority is vested in the system more than the person;-- *the station* more than the man commands obedience, and the subordinate officer is as readily obeyed as his principal" (*System* 39). Here then is the theory

of the monitorial system in microcosm. It marks a radical departure, in Lancaster's view at least, from the ways in which his predecessor's schools were run. Then, as I have already argued, the office of master was synonymous with fear. It was the physical presence of the master that ensured order: "when he comes into the school, fear produces silence, *pro tempore* at least, when he goes out all is bustle and confusion" (39). In the monitorial system, it is not the body of the master that is important; rather, it is the certainty of his ability to observe, an ability that is indistinguishable from the authority of his position, and an ability, moreover, that permeates the whole of the institution and its component parts. Lancaster's assertions notwithstanding, he has a keen appreciation of the sophisticated methods by which the military disciplines itself. He is, too, just as keenly aware of the extent to which that order may be appropriated by non-military institutions. We might very well substitute master and monitor for old man and boy in the following passage--which is a curious statement indeed for a Quaker--without losing the sense that he implies: "An old man of three score, or a boy of sixteen, gives the command, and obedience, implicit obedience follows. The order of *war* will not become disorder by an application of it to *peaceful* purposes" (39-40).

Such orders as are given by the monitors hide their efficiency, their ability to exert leverage, to induce momentum, under a subterfuge of triviality. The commands, as Lancaster writes, are "trifling in appearance, but conducive to good order" (*Improvements* 108). It is these "trifling" commands that insinuate themselves into the consciousness of new students. The orderly regime, ostensibly innocuous and delivered with an imperative frugality, creates a sense of pleasure. Discipline, overtly economical, covertly pervading and invasive, seduces

the new entrant. Pleasure, now parasitic on the pupil's understanding, exercises a sovereign control under the influence of which individualization, conformity, efficiency appear as "uniformity, novelty, and simplicity" (108). Subject to, and subjected by, this influence, the pupil "readily obeys, the same as the other boys do" (108).

The commands are not, in and of themselves, oppressive. At the level of the new individual's response, it is not the command, the verbal or silent instruction, that ensures compliance. It is the "force of example" applied by the already conditioned, conforming and performing body that acts as the inducement. Just as that body reinforces and trains the monitor, so too does it function to efface individuality. The mass body's discipline masks its true intentions. Determining and ensuring responses, it impresses on the new student an habitual obedience, an unconscious acquiescence to an energy that once applied, propagates within its subject, and returns outside it to subsume the new material with which it is fed. The "force of example" (109), once it moves outside itself, crosses the boundary from responding body and functions as an autonomous sign, undergoes another change, a transformation that Lancaster, perhaps inadvertently, reveals in precisely the language of his description. The "force of example" is now "the *power* of example," and that power is manifest not, as one might immediately assume, by virtue of the example, by its very performance. Rather, it reveals itself in its inscription on the body and behaviour of the newly inducted pupil where it appears as "the *force* of habit" (109, my emphasis). It is as if the ingredients necessary to

constitute a relationship of power--that is to say, forces in opposition[17]--declare themselves and confront each other. Lancaster's design is conscious and pre-meditated: "a boy gets into habits of obedience before he is aware of what he has been *allured* into" (109, my emphasis), he writes.

Audible language, the phonic sign, represents one side of a dialogue that is in turn answered and reinforced by responses that themselves function as signifiers. In this structured exchange where the volume of the spoken word is regulated, the efficiencies manifest in the actions that result from obedience to the order represent a reciprocal paucity of language. If "[t]he commands that a monitor usually gives his class, are of a simple nature" (109), it is not because the monitor is incapable of an increasing verbal ability; rather, it is because the vocabulary of the participants in the disciplinary dialogue has been reduced to the bare minimum required to ensure a methodical adherence to order.

In the same way that the movement of a class is regulated so as to facilitate its most efficient transfer from one place to another, so too, the pupils, when in the classroom, are subject to a continuing regime that reduces physical activity to a minimum. Conditioned to

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[17]This is an example of the productiveness of power about which Foucault writes when showing that power relationships are not simply a function of control of one party by another. Rather, it is precisely the enabling ability of power that allows the parties to be in contention. In *The Subject and Power*, for example, he asserts: "[W]hat characterizes the power we are analysing is that it *brings into play* relations between individuals (or between groups).... The term 'power' designates *relationships between partners* (and by that I am not thinking of a zero-sum game, but simply, and for the moment staying in the most general terms, of an *ensemble of actions which induce others and follow from one another*) (Dreyfus and Rabinow 217, my emphasis).

respond in one way and one way only, to the binary logic--the code of command--the class as a body will enter or leave its seats: "'In'--'Out.' The whole class do this at one motion" (109). A verbal response is neither required nor expected. The slates upon which the pupils write are, when not in use, attached to a nail on the side of their desks. This does away with non-productive movement of the students within the classroom: "all going in and out for slates is avoided" (109). Again ironically reminiscent of the military orders to which he objects, Lancaster asserts: "They 'show slates,' at the word of command; take them up, or lay them gently down on the desk in the same manner" (109). The objective, then, is to maintain the subject population in positions where their observation is made easier and permanent: "when boys are writing, there are very few who have any occasion to get off their seats" (110). Thus, while they become mute, the students also become racinated. Their permanence, their enforced lack of mobility furthers the order, the predictability, of the domain of which they are part. A place for each pupil, and each pupil in his place; the students enforce their own identifiableness, their own observability. They are not simply instructed; rather, their instruction *is* their management.

Each pupil wears a hat, and each pupil slings and unslings that hat when entering and leaving the school. The headwear is, however, slung and unslung around the pupils' own necks. In a curious conflation of subject and architecture, the demands of efficiency transform the students into mobile pieces of furniture. "This," writes Lancaster, "alludes to a very convenient arrangement, which prevents all the loss of hats, mistakes, and confusion in finding them" (110). This may well have been so, but it is the continuing monitoring of movement,

of reducing that movement to its bare minimum, that represents the greatest advantage. Just as the slates are permanently fixed to desks, so the hats are permanently attached to the pupils, "every boy slinging his hat across his shoulders, as a soldier would sling his knapsack" (111). In this way, these little clothes-pegs function to reduce the incidence of non-productive time. Time otherwise spent in hanging or retrieving hats may now be spent at the desk, "sav[ing] sixteen hundred motions, . . . motions that, before this arrangement was made, produced much inconvenience in the school" (110).

These continual orders, although apparently designed to produce patterns of behaviour, are not envisaged to form students who will eventually behave cognitively or independently. The command to "sling hats" might be given every morning, but it is still *given;* the pupils would see that in order to write they would have to place their slates in front of them, but they do nothing until ordered to "show slates." Quite clearly, then, the boys are trained to respond, to react, but their actions always reciprocate another's order. They become automatons, miniature machines who will perform tasks when one pulls the correct levers, or presses the proper switches, so to speak, but they can never be allowed to function in isolation and of their own volition. And yet it is arguable that the repeated attempts to perfect the disciplinary apparatus that orders the boys imply the very possibility, the threat, the potential for that independence and volition to manifest itself. It is a complicated relationship that exists between the system and the subject that it produces. Nevertheless, the synthesis, the mechanical advantage of the scholastic body, arises from the uniform and immediate response to instructions received. To encourage unprompted, individual action is

to deny the overall momentum, the functioning of the *individualised* parts from whose efforts and conformity the class, the school, obtains its identity. Not just the students, but the very *space* in which the students exist must be disciplined. And this is effected, in a circular mechanism which feeds upon itself, by concentrating on the discrete units--the pupils--of which the larger body is comprised, extracting from them the maximum possible advantage, and subjecting them to a process of normalization where non-performing, non-productive constituents may be silently, economically, and efficiently identified and re-constituted.

The roll-call, a fundamental feature of observation, of the maintenance of order, that echoes, literally, across parade grounds, exercise yards, prison corridors, is no less at home in the monitorial school. Lancaster describes the most common practice of calling the roll, highlighting what he sees as its inherent inefficiency: "The list of the scholars contains the name of every boy that attends it. In calling over the list every name is repeated, *although three-fourths or more of the boys, whose names are called over, are present"* (111, my emphasis). Nevertheless, he engages in a modified attendance ritual, a move that suggests, it would seem, that Lancaster is compelled (even if he does not realize it) to concede a certain irreducible resistance to his model of subjection. His version of the "parade" serves, as does that which he replaces, to fix positions of relative authority in the minds of both observers and observed. The necessity to prove one's existence functions also as a sign by which the pupil registers his acceptance of the regime to whose order he is subjugated. Were this subjugation absolute, there would be no need for the repetition, the proof of one's presence. The constant

return to one's place, the identification of pupil and fixed location, recognizes the resistance even as in its ritualistic posture it proclaims victory over the pupil's individuality.

Lancaster modifies the roll-call, pares away all unnecessary movement and language, envelopes in silence the mustering and recording process. The solution that he envisages to a problem arising from a procedure that he finds "so tiresome and noisy" (111) is startlingly simple: "As the number of absentees bear but a small proportion to the numbers that attend, I conceived the design of taking an account of *the lesser number, without the repetition of names*" (111, my emphasis). Not surprisingly, an essential feature of his plan is the assignment of a number to each student. Numbers and names exist in a grid of equivalency on a class by class basis, the class monitor being responsible for the list on which both are recorded. We should note that the numbers do not stand in place of the names entirely; they do not replace one form of individual signification by another. The numbering system is designed for an orderly and efficient notation of those pupils who are absent: "One series of numbers on the school-room walls, serve for all the classes in the school to muster at in succession" (114). The student's own number, therefore, pertains only within the realm of the classroom. He identifies with it, will answer to it, is controlled by it, but since that same number will be used by another pupil in another class, any possibility of it providing the boy with an alternative identity vanishes. Revealing the intimate affinity existing between each component of the school's disciplinary domain, Lancaster describes a typical class list, referring to its "shape" (111), before he proceeds to further define his procedure.

The schoolroom is a "canvas" that displays a set of identical numbers. The number does not reflect the boy's performance relative to his classmates: "These numbers are never changed by precedence and improvements in learning. They remain fixed for the sake of order ..." (114). When the time comes to determine absences, "The monitor calls his boys to muster--the class go out of the seats in due order" (112), the implication being numerical order, an observation that betrays the extent to which the numerical system becomes an integral part of the pupils' own internalized discipline. Filing around the room, "each boy stops, and ranges himself against the wall, under that number which belongs to his name in the class list" (112). There is no need for speech following the order to muster. The boys recognise their numbers and stand under them, mute witnesses to the permanence of body and sign that bracket both in an essential equation of visibility. "The monitor of the class then passes *silently* round the school-room, and writes on the slate the numbers which are vacant" (112, my emphasis). Those whom the monitor records speak, as it were, out of their very absence; in some strange way presence and non-presence constitute a reversal of that which we understand as the phonic sign. Those who are present are silent, joined to their numbers, yet their silence signifies not only their normalcy, their existence within the school, but also the aberrant, the deviant behaviour of those who are not to be seen. The bare places on the wall, the numbers naked, somehow incomplete, for want of the body that otherwise would make them whole, shriek of their non-conformity, their standing outside of the homogeneity that is the school, the system. And subject to the orderly, meticulous, relentless gaze of the monitor, those who are, one might say, eloquently absent demand--from the space that defines

their difference, their otherness--that the juridical apparatus of a system designed to determine and correct truancy be brought to bear upon them. Hence the monitor, having policed the assembly, transforms numbers into names, and delivers a list of offenders to a "monitor of absentees [who] has under his charge an alphabetical list of the whole school" (113). The Panoptic design of the building, the gaze of master and monitors, the determining of presence and absence, all combine in this single procedure of the roll-call to form an apparatus, whose objective is to replace individual identity with overall conformity, and to punish waywardness by enforcing rootedness.

From the moment that a pupil is classified as truant, a whole administrative network operates to return the fugitive to the school. The "monitor of absentees" writes individual notes, one for each absent pupil, and dispatches "trusty boys" (a description chillingly reminiscent of that given to long-term, thoroughly institutionalised and "docile" prisoners) to the absentees' parents. The disciplinary mechanism constrains these messengers too, their duties extending beyond the mere delivery of the notices to include the requirement that they return with an answer. Thus the trusted--invested now with a moral value--fan out in a network that radiates from the school's centre, highlighting, by the certainty of their arrival, the very untrustworthiness of those about whom they carry reports. It is a mechanism that subsumes each individual with whom it comes into contact. Boys become little bailiffs, incorporating the truants' parents into the web of surveillance and enforcement. The boys return with their reports which the monitor compiles into a central registry in which is kept, for each day of the month, a detailed list of absentees and the reasons for their absences.

Those pupils deemed truant--absent without valid excuse--now become the object of a meticulous search and subsequent further classification. "When [the truants are] brought to school, either by their friends, or by a number of boys sent on purpose to bring them, the monitor of absentees ties a large card round his neck, lettered in capital letters, TRUANT"(114). The card marks the offender, then, with the sign of his guilt, confirms his presence at the same time as it records his absence. Reduced to silence, he nonetheless confirms in the language of his accusers the judgement they have passed on him. His status pronounced, his guilt written large, inscribed on him as surely as if he had been branded, he must purge his otherness, his truant tendencies, by publicly reaffirming his association with the institution's place. He must fill the space that his absence created. He must be forced into permanence.

I have already mentioned the machine imagery and technological metaphors that pervade nineteenth-century educational literature. In the Lancasterian school, certain orders were issued by use of what Lancaster called the telegraph. Of this, Kaestle writes: "Commands were given by a 'telegraph' at the front of the room, a wooden frame with several message panels, like 'C.S.,' signifying that the students were to "clean slates." (94). Initially, Lancaster seems quite certain of the instrument's utility, although later, as we shall see, he appears less convinced. In 1821, for example, he treats the design and function of the telegraph to a detailed examination:

> The telegraph placed at the head of the school, consists of six squares, each square about four inches by three. These squares play on pivots, in the sides of a wooded frame. On each side is a letter as F. *front,* on seeing which, the whole school face the master: or S.S. as show slates. (Lancaster, Lancasterian 10)

There is, apparently, in this one implement a reduction to its purest, most efficient form of Lancaster's desire that verbal commands be kept to a minimum. If the telegraph operates in the way he describes it, then there will be no need for monitors to issue the "show slates" command at all. Indeed, it is evident that the very commands with which he is concerned when seeking to eliminate unnecessary directives--"commands without number"--are the same commands that the telegraph will convey. As always, the commands are designed to "secure implicit obedience and prompt attention" (Kaestle 92) with the frugality of the directive being matched with movement stripped of all superfluity: "T.S. Turn Slates; S.S Shew Slates; C.S. Clean Slates; S.S.C. Show slates clean; L.D.S. Lay down slates; C. Commence; H.D. Hands down" (*Lancasterian* 10-11). In theory, nothing is left open for interpretation. There can be no questioning of what is required. Imperative and response have been envisioned and formulated, the single machine silently ensuring the required coordination and general order. It becomes an extension of the master, requiring his intervention only to change the message or to draw the school's attention to it. The school must obey the command given, looking at the telegraph only when ordered to do so, and here again the directive is no longer verbal: "The attention of the school is called to [the telegraph] by means of a very small bell *affixed,* which does not require loud ringing, but has a sharp clear sound" (10). It is a nightmarish scenario in which the human voice is completely eradicated. The directive and the compliance

which follows it are all reduced to the simplicity of the pure sign. The "sharp clear sound" can

have no meaning other than to look at the telegraph for instruction. In turn, the device, mute

yet unequivocal in its demand, ultimately directs in utter silence.

Having stated earlier that "There is no part of the system more interesting to the eye

of a visitor, than the pupils of a large school, in the act of obedience to general commands"

(10), and having described the operation of an instrument that seems designed to ensure the

very obedience about which he speaks, Lancaster displays a certain lack of confidence when

he subsequently qualifies the telegraph's importance in the school:

> The reader will perceive that a series of commands may be given in this
> manner, so as to relieve the human voice. In hot weather, or in times of great
> fatigue, it is beneficial, and to relieve the voice, it is occasionally of much use
> but the tones of the voice have so powerful an effect on the human ear, that
> merely emphasis and manner, will often render a command so impressive, that
> no silent inanimate substitute can be found. (10)

The emphasis in the school is always on "the act of obedience to general commands."

Consequently, the devices and methods used are subject to a constant evaluation regarding

their efficiency in promoting that obedience. It is not that Lancaster sees the telegraph as the

reductio ad absurdum of his desire to reduce commands to their most basic, most direct form

that leads to his criticism. Rather, he recognises that the instant obedience that he demands

may, in some instances, result precisely from the unique effects that result from the

intervention of the human voice. It is for this reason, perhaps, that he reserves a criticism for

his contemporaries who use "a telegraph for everything" (10). He realises that the control of

the student population must ultimately devolve upon a human being. The telegraph has its

uses, "and if a telegraph could have brains, or communicate intellect, too much could not be said of its importance" (10), he writes. He will extract from it the maximum utility, ever mindful of the need to employ it as efficiently and economically as possible: "These telegraphs vary in power according to the number of letters on them, and to have numerous letters is non essential, as few and simple duties often repeated, require few and simple commands to dictate the moment of execution" (11).

Ten years later Lancaster would publish another manual in his sustained drive to convince the country of the benefits of the monitorial system. In this *Manual of the System of Primary Instruction Pursued in the Model Schools of the British and Foreign School Society,* Lancaster's view of the telegraph undergoes a considerable revision. In the explanatory notes, Lancaster specifically refers to "telegraphs," multiple machines which replace the single device at the head of the room and are now located at the end of each row, or class, of pupils. In a separate and somewhat uncharacteristically brief and arguably vague exposition, Lancaster explains:

> Telegraphs Are small boards, 6 inches long and 4 broad. One of these boards is attached to each class except the first. Upon one side of the board is inscribed the number of the class and on the other the letters E X. They are made to turn freely on an iron rod about 12 inches in height, the other end of which is firmly screwed into the perpendicular standard at the end of the desk; by furnishing the top of each of these standards with a nut, the Telegraphs may be changed from one to another, as occasion requires. (69)

There is a fundamental theoretical shift in the way in which he now sees the telegraph. Instead of introducing it, as he did in the earlier text, as the mechanical equivalent of the master, Lancaster now appears to concentrate on its potential as a monitorial aid. It can be employed

at whatever location is required, and presumably may still be made to assist in the control of any class to which it is assigned. Certainly, regardless of its location, any commands it issues must be necessarily silent, but reaction to the signal demands that the pupils turn their heads away from the front of the class, or their work, in order to be aware of it. There seems little disciplinary advantage in this. The bell no longer has a function in so far as it forms a unit with the telegraph, since it can only validate itself by drawing attention to one telegraph at a time. Thus it seems that it is the function of identification, the instant observation, identification and classification of the pupils by the master that is of prime importance. The purpose of the telegraph has altered drastically then. What is it that lies at the heart of this change? Is it that Lancaster has expanded upon the evident unease that he voiced in the earlier text, or is there something more fundamental at work?

If his notes in this section of the manual do not dispel a sense of ambiguity, he states his disquiet more openly elsewhere in the text. A tension appears to exist between his desire to dispense with verbal commands as much as possible and the sheer necessity of passing orders. It is as if the demands of disciplinary utility--the need for silence--and his own unvoiced recognition of the impossibility to run the school without verbal articulation come into conflict. Perhaps in the space between desire and reality he acknowledges the potential for his subject material to avoid the restrictions of his pedagogical discipline:

Verbal commands to direct the movement of the pupils have hitherto in large schools been deemed unavoidable; silent signals have been occasionally substituted, but they have failed in keeping up the attention, and consequently in producing prompt obedience. *Sliding and wheel telegraphs have been tried with as little success.* (55, my emphasis)

Despite the preponderance of machine-imagery, then, there is with Lancaster a continued reluctance to embrace this particular mechanical device. Indeed, his notes and those of other apologists for monitorial schools studiously avoid mention of any mechanical aids. Why, in an age that was so heavily informed by technological progress, should this be? Kaestle, perhaps unconsciously, provides a clue when he comments: "The Lancasterian movement [was representative of] a whole generation who seized enthusiastically upon the notion that people could be treated like dependable parts of a machine" (14). There is a vast difference, though, between using mechanical aids, no matter how basic, and seeing people as potential machines. The fundamental principle in the monitorial school's disciplinary process was to employ the component parts, master, monitors, pupils, in such a way as to ensure that the efficient and economic operation of the institution was a function of their combined efforts. The intrusion of anything approaching mechanical animation, anything that was not human implies, it seems to me, a certain degree of failure in the attempt to reduce the school's population to the collective automaton that was its ultimate goal. Any such instrument evidences the distance that remains between the objective of total human automation and the degree to which achievement falls short of that goal.

Among the most intriguing things Lancaster says about discipline is that it forms the source of a certain pleasure, for him, for those who observe the monitorial schools, and for

the readers of his treatise. On one occasion he writes, "A school governed by such order, exhibits a *scene of delight* to visitors, and happiness among the children, which baffles the power of description" (*System* 9, my emphasis). The nature of this pleasure is worth pursuing. Although multiple images of the eye, literally or figuratively, drive Lancaster's justification for the procedures he initiates, we should not assume separate physical locations for the disciplinary and "artistically" appreciative eyes. In an assertion that tacitly acknowledges the aesthetic component of discipline, Lancaster writes, "Some general duties, performed, either by the word of command, or telegraphic signs, have a powerful effect on the *eye*" (95, my emphasis). And yet, in a return to the image's disciplinary panoptic function he reminds us that "The monitor should have a continual *eye* over every one in the class in his care" (*System* 33, my emphasis). Discipline and delight, interdependent on each other, are located in the observer's eye. The monitor, in this case, is the receptor of pleasure even while he is indispensable in ensuring compliance and control.

The image of the eye commands that intersection of perspectives where observation is both productive (ensuring compliance) and appreciative (taking a special pleasure from the result that it sees). Where discipline becomes pleasurable to the observer, the optic image occupies a position whose focus, while always acute, nonetheless shifts from one function to another, effecting the boys' disciplinary coordination at one moment, and becoming affected as a result of its success the next. In every example of presentation, "[t]he effect on the eye is considerable" (95). Witness the pleasing effect that arises from the mass coordination required when the pupils prove their cleanliness: "It is wished to know that the hands of every

boy in school are clean, a command is given 'show fingers,' each pupil at once holds up his hands and spreads open his fingers" (95). There are a number of sources for the special pleasure that the observer experiences: from the instant response, the implied precision with which the pupils raise their arms before spreading their fingers, the conditioned movement of the monitors who, in response to the pupils' action, "pass between the desks of their respective class" (95) to inspect the hands thus presented; and from the knowledge that, if the performance goes according to plan, "[a]n examination as to cleanliness is thus effected, over the whole school in five minutes" (95). It is arguable that Lancaster perceives in his system an aesthetic that results not only from that which is presented to the eye, but also from that which the coordinated actions necessarily imply. Although the effect on the eye may well be "powerful" or even pleasurable, the root cause of that satisfaction lies, perhaps, in the knowledge that it is the system itself with all its converging, complementary parts, a system evidenced in the evolutions that he describes, that gives Lancaster delight. It is surely not accidental that he concludes that section of his treatise with a reference combining considerations of economy and efficiency: "In a school of three hundred pupils, three thousand fingers and thumbs will be exhibited in a minute" (96). "[T]he effect on the eye [may be] singular" (96)--the causes most definitely are not.

Because a consideration of the pleasure alone, about which I shall shortly speak, is inadequate to unravel the connection of the aesthetic to discipline, it is necessary to reach beyond an examination of the simple reaction of the observer to the disciplined body. The monitorial regime proceeds on a power/knowledge diad. Subjectivity in the sense that one

becomes *subjected* arises out of an intimate knowledge of that subject. But the ability to perceive, to extract the knowledge, to filter and use it, demands of the person so engaged that he be an autonomous, thinking *subject* in his own right. The observer's legitimacy, then, is always subject to the instability of a subjectivity whose significance is far from a semantic difference, much in the same way as the image of the eye in monitorial literature has a shifting significance, as I have already shown.

If in *The Critique of Judgement*, Kant's model of the aesthetic argues--in spite of itself--not for the inherent quality of beauty in objects designated as "art," but for a constructed mode of apprehension, then it may be argued that this "aesthetic" appeals to a need in the observer for a system of rules, of an order. To believe, as does Kant, in this "common sense" is to subscribe to a level of universal comfort. Eagleton observes, for example, "[the aesthetic] has about it something of the form and structure of the rational; it thus unites us with all the authority of a law, but at a more affective, intuitive level" (75). What could be more appropriate to the revelation of the monitorial idea made visible in a co-ordinated, precisely ordered body, than a sense of appreciation of something so fundamental that subjectivity--both boys' and observer's--receives the sanction of "legal" warrant; a sanction so intuitive that it transcends written rules and invests itself with an apparent moral *a priori?*

It seems then that we may speak of an aesthetic of discipline, that there is an inherent and recognizable quality in a disciplined, regulated and ordered body--a quality that we might call beauty for want of a more accurate description. This being the case, we can justifiably say

that that is what constitutes its aesthetic quality. Clearly, the very movement, the fluidity, the always-present potential for change, renders this body (this mobile that is made up of multiple cohering and coordinating parts) something other than a "simple" artefact for appreciation. The object within which the quality exists and from contemplation of which a certain reaction on the part of the observer occurs, differs from more traditionally defined *objets d'art*. It is possible that the fascination, the delight in observation, is situated in the observer who passively reacts to the artistry of the movement and responds to that "universal" quality against which he is powerless and, hence, unable to deny. But at the same time it is also possible that the observation is an active seeking for a confirmation, a quest for a mirror whose reflection justifies the socio-political motivation for the creation of that which is being observed. Terry Eagleton draws attention to the political nature of the aesthetic and aestheticism: "The construction of the modern notion of the aesthetic artefact is thus inseparable from the construction of the dominant ideological forms of modern class-society, and indeed from a whole new form of human subjectivity appropriate to that social order" (3). Its ambiguity--a facet to which Eagleton repeatedly draws our attention--surely resists its definition as a totalising entity.

To be sure, if we understand the nature of the aesthetic as being a "construction," then we can see how it may be applied diversely, to various objects. For it no longer requires that we search for its origin within the object, the artefact, the body. We look not for what the object brings to us, but for what we bring to the object. The aesthetic, complete with the Kantian construct of disinterestedness, is a supreme exercise in subjectivity. It is

simultaneously a declaration and affirmation of one's status, of one's authority. Nothing is

beyond the reach of the individual's power to deliver a verdict. Eagleton again:

> The aesthetic is . . . a vision of human energies as radical ends in themselves
> .... It signifies a creative turn to the sensuous body, as well as an inscribing of
> that body with a subtly oppressive law; it represents on the one hand a
> liberatory concern with concrete particularity, and on the other hand a
> specious form of universalism. (9)

If, with Eagleton's comments in mind, we look again at the student population and its

inspector, we find ourselves faced with the necessity to determine which of the bodies--

student or observer--is in fact sensuous. In so far as the sensation of pleasure that arises from

the spectacle is a function of feeling, that pleasure finds itself at variance with the strict

pragmaticism, the emotionless application of order and its resultant efficiencies and

economies. And yet the location of both coincides in the inspector--the spectator--who

observes. While he is at once a physical manifestation of rule, the regime of confinement and

inscription, his pleasure evidences the obverse of rationality--that is to say emotion, sensual

reaction. Thus the "creative turn" about which Eagleton speaks is not necessarily a turn away

from the self, an action that satisfies its aesthetic appetite in the voyeuristic contemplation of

what has already been defined as beautiful. On the contrary, it turns and looks inwards upon

itself. It takes gratification in what it has achieved, while, in order to re-affirm the sovereignty

of Reason, it must demonstrate that it can re-locate the feeling in the natural order of things.

It attempts to distance itself from the subjectivity that it exercises, engages in an exercise of

nomination whose purpose is to elevate the personal to the communal, to invest the particular,

and the particularly judgmental, with all of the indefinable and unassailable qualities of the universal.

This is a clear indication of the dilemma that faces the disciplinarian. On the one hand, he must acknowledge, indeed promote, the autonomy of the subject. For without the power of Reason, without the ability to act on the decisions that it makes, the subject enfeebles and emasculates itself. On the other hand, by displacing the sensuality that he experiences, by re-defining it and granting it to the remainder of humanity, he dissolves the differential that is essential for his unquestionable right to govern.

I find myself asking whether it is legitimate to speak of the aesthetic in the context of the monitorial school and its pupils. This question opens up a host of issues, none of which this dissertation is designed to explore, and yet which exercise a continuing influence over any discussion that concerns a pleasurable reaction to the "perfection" of a disciplined, multiplicity of parts. What sets the nature of this response apart from the "aesthetic" that has been so widely written about,[18] is the fact that this sensual appreciation emerges as a result of the various descriptions and observations that have been recorded, as opposed to the feeling being identified, and in turn subjected to a subsequent classification designed to establish the observer's superior sensual acuity. Nevertheless, the recognition of the disciplined body's ordered, precise and predictable movements causes an identifiable response on the part of the onlooker. It is a response to what seems to be an inherent quality of that body, a result of the

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[18]For polar positions on the subject see Terry Eagleton's *The Ideology of the Aesthetic* and George Levine's *Aesthetics and Ideology*.

remorseless efforts that have shaped it. If the proponents of the monitorial system who revel in the spectacle do not talk about the feeling they experience, *we* may nevertheless abstract their response, bracket it and separate its consideration from what, in other contexts, the aesthetic might imply, and reflect upon the nature of the particular reaction, what I shall momentarily nominate, the 'aesthetic of discipline.'

The body, whether in its singular or multiple physical forms--its corporeal sense--on the one hand, or in its metaphorical sense on the other, plays an essential yet dualistic role in the consideration of this aesthetic of discipline. It functions in one way as the location near or around which, in some imprecise and yet to be defined place, resides the cause of delight or pleasure. But that same body, fulfilling now another function, is the very site of emotion within which the pleasure reveals itself. It is at once a site for possession of which the rival forces of reason and sensation contend. As such, the site is in conflict with itself, never able to distance itself from the object which it observes--or, importantly, by which it in turn may be considered. Moreover, it also shows itself to be incapable of establishing the absolute objectivity it demands in order that it may authenticate its judgment. There are, surely, the rumblings of something profoundly disturbing in this recognition. For the sovereignty of Reason can never be absolute, unquestionable, inviolate, if it contains within itself (despite attempts to prove the contrary) traces of its other, if it must continually confront its other*ness*. It is as if--in the contemplation of that which the pragmatic and the reasonable have created-- the homogeneity that links observer and observed casts off its camouflage and declares its presence. The fortress of Reason, hitherto considered impregnable, contains within its

imposing structure a fifth column whose presence contests, if not denies, Reason's claim to supremacy. The senses spring an ambush at the very moment when Reason exults in its primacy. And the threat posed by the senses' covert potential makes manifest the aesthetic's Realpolitik. For to take pleasure in the ordered movement of the representatives of a certain class, to make of the pupils an object whose cohesion is capable of invoking in the observer an appreciative response, is to deny--futile though it may be--the very same appreciative qualities in those pupils. Their "transformation" carries with it a desire to render the sensual *insensate*. Considerations of the aesthetic, at least in so far as they may apply to the disciplinarily constructed subject, cannot avoid a simultaneous consideration of the political.

The intricate and complicated connections that link pleasure, delight, appreciation and politics demand, I would argue, a consideration of their relationship to the aesthetic as Friedrich Schiller sees it. It seems to me that Schiller provides a useful point of entry by means of which we come to appreciate, as the result of the study of a concrete example--the monitorial school--the political complexion of the aesthetic of discipline. Consequently, the very attempt to define that term, arising out of the need to explain the observer's reaction, reveals its political ambition rather than its aesthetic nature.

Schiller's concern with the political elements of the aesthetic causes us to recognize the extent to which the "ability" to appreciate art is closely entwined with one's socio-political status and position. As David Lloyd, discussing Schiller's position in *Naive and Sentimental Poetry*, observes, "[f]or aesthetic experience is a common property of the human species only as pure potential, and it is an essential part of Schiller's argument that aesthetic feeling may

not be developed at all in the savage, and is scarcely more than embryonic in the barbarian or

the bourgeois" (164). In this way, Schiller rationalises the paradox to which I have already

referred. The very ability to feel, to sense, to appreciate, must be seen to reside only in those

who are to envision, and in turn to shape and mould, a society. That this same facility may

exist in the "material" out of which the state is to be formed is, as I have already argued,

disquieting and de-stabilizing. Thus the relative positions of the socio-political "sculptor" and

his "clay" may be maintained by reducing the ability to nothing more than potential. To that

extent, Schiller admits its universality, but by giving only a tacit acknowledgement to its

viability, he is able to maintain the division that is necessary for his idea of the state. It is

surely not coincident that his "idea" and the organizing principle of the monitorial school--a

state in miniature--arise out of what Lloyd refers to as "the political turmoil of [Schiller's]

time" (162). And the confusion of aesthetic and politic becomes even more apparent when

examining Schiller's solution to that turmoil, the "most perfect of all the works to be achieved

by the art of man [*mit dem vollkommensten aller Kunstwerke*]" (162).[19] This is the politicized

notion of the aesthetic that informs the vision of the monitorial school and its population, and

it is even more closely allied with the concept of the state as perfect art in Davenport Hill's

Hazelwood school, as I show in the next chapter. The pleasure in observation arises out of

the recognition that a body may be organized. The aesthetic of discipline is not an inexplicable

reaction so much as a self-congratulatory response to the living, co-ordinated manifestation

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[19]Lloyd explains in a footnote to that quotation that he "cite[s] the German . . . since it stresses more clearly than the translation the idea of the state as an *artwork*.

of success. The disciplined student body is at once an abstract and blue-print of society and of the state whose work of art that society is imagined to be.

Despite the unease that attends the recognition that the aesthetic potential never quite allows for an absolute social division, never permits the installation of a superior type, in the universal nature of that potential lies the ability to justify the establishment of norms, of standards, of what may be deemed acceptable. As Levine writes, "The totalizing drive of culture and its need of 'central' standards demand that the essence of the human be seen as universal, and that anything that deviates from this central archetype be seen as *incompletely developed* historically rather than as *radically different*" (166, my emphasis). It is an important distinction, this differentiation between an incomplete development and a radical difference. For if Lancaster's pupils are seen to be in the early stages of development, that their deviation from an established norm is not so vast as to make them untrainable, then the methods of the monitorial school with its concentration on the minute and the particular justify themselves in the service of correction. That which is incomplete may always be brought to completion, and the attainment of that result-- what it is precisely that constitutes completion--is a decision that may be made only by those in whom the necessary perception is fully developed. For Bell, the central principle of monitorial education--namely, the method of mutual instruction--is a natural inclination, a constituent part of the human mind that needs only exposure to his system in order to supply its universal proof.[20] Success is guaranteed,

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[20]I deal with this aspect at length on page 237 and following.

because the determination of under-development is necessarily contingent upon the determination of a complete development in the first place. Bell locates the idea, the natural truth, in the very persons who will be called upon to witness the results of the experiment. In the act of witnessing, they embody the ideal, represent the standard, personify the completeness of development which is the school's goal. Thus we come to the realization that the aesthetic of discipline must be further defined. It is no longer--after this short discussion-- sufficient or adequate to say in this context, aesthetic of *discipline;* rather, we should qualify it by stating the experience as the aesthetic of *monitorial* discipline. For the aesthetic in this context, we see now, is not simply the response to the physical movement, the co-ordination, the predictability of the student body, although this reaction, as has been seen, does indeed occur. Rather, the aesthetic lies in the very idea, the theory itself. It is as if the pupils' exquisitely ordered, unwavering, adherence to the standard makes manifest the idea in corporeal form. If the teachers are God's representatives in the classroom,[21] then in the pupils' performance--the idea, the "Word" becomes flesh.

II

Borough Road School: 1814

Today the master is angry. When he is displeased, and he often feels that way, he needs to be angry. He feeds his anger, letting it seethe and boil until the only way he can relieve himself

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[21]See page 222 of this dissertation for more on Bell's assertions in this regard.

is to beat one of his boys. He will select a pupil at random--a monitor whose duty it is to instruct the children of the underclass who populate the school. The master singles out his subject, a lad of thirteen or fourteen who has proved himself adept at delivering the school's rudimentary instruction to the younger boys. He stands before the master who, dressed in the drab black cloth of the Quakers, towers over him. He beckons to the boy to follow him, and the pair enter the master's chamber. In response to another motion the boy bends across a wooden chair. The routine is familiar. It has been played out many times. The master speaks now. Perhaps he tells the boy to remain still, not to make any noise. Or perhaps he admonishes the boy for the fault which he, the master, has found with him. As he runs his hands along the length of the rod which he will shortly apply to the boys' buttocks, he speaks, maybe, of the monitor's ingratitude towards his benefactor; and the boy braces himself for the initial blow, promising himself that he will do better, yet knowing that the regularity of the beatings affirms his unworthiness for the position that he holds. He knows, too, that he will continue to be chastised, just as he knows that he will never be worthy enough for the beatings to stop. The rod rises and falls, rises and falls until the master is satiated, his humour restored. He places his hands under the boy and lifts him from the chair. He hugs the boy and kisses him to let him know that all is now well before he sends him back into the school.

The master's good humour persists into the following day. The embers of the fire which he had lit earlier in his room cast a series of flickering "strangers" on the hearth and beyond, licking the fabric of the couch which he has moved forward towards the fireplace. He walks to the school's interior and selects a number of pupils who are to be favoured. They

follow him silently to the chamber where he detaches two from the group and, holding their hands, leads them to the couch. He moves from between them and encourages them in the acts with which they are familiar. Prostrate now, they fondle each other while he watches. The other boys move in front of the dying fire, and at a signal from the master they remove their trousers and raise their shirts. The master attends to each one in turn, first caressing and then kissing the boys, persuading them, again, that they should be flogged. And while he holds them, eventually turning them to face the fire, he lets the rod with which he will flagellate them press against their flesh. This row of boys hides most of the fire's remaining light, and on the couch in the darkness the first two boys continue with each other. Casting an occasional glance in their direction, the master stands back to admire the others who are exposed to his view. He strokes the cane again, and the first blow falls.

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I have spoken at length of the disciplinary nature of the constant gaze. We must appreciate that while the certainty of potential observation is fundamental to the monitorial schoolroom, the very ability to observe carries with it the possibility of being observed also. This is one of the force relations out of which panoptic power arises. However, when the view is only one-sided the nature of power radically alters. It is to illustrate this that I have begun this chapter with a lurid tableau drawn on the basis of evidence presented by William Brown, a former monitorial pupil of Lancaster's, who had complained to a member of the Borough Road school governing committee about Lancaster's conduct. I am going to refer to what a former archivist at Borough Road, George Bartle, describes as an "unsavoury

scandal" (*History* 19) and examine, first, a space where aestheticism and pedagogy are perverted, and, second, possible reasons why, regardless of Bartle's description, a scandal did not in fact ensue. Let us listen to Brown whose evidence Francis Place, a member of the Borough Road board, records in his own papers:

> Lancaster frequently flogged his apprentices with a rod when they displeased him and he was very easily displeased when he wanted to flog the boys. At other times he flogged them when he was in good humour for his amusement. His practice was to hug and caress and kiss them to induce them to consent to be flogged. Sometimes one boy kissed another, sometimes he laid them down upon the Sopha (sic) and sometimes several of them stood before the fire with their trousers down and their shirts tucked up around their waists while Lancaster flogged them. The lads who were thus treated were from about 12 to 18 years of age. (26)

Brown's accusation would lead to an investigation of Lancaster by a sub-committee (of which Place was a member). The findings of this committee were to result in Lancaster's resignation from his position as Superintendent of the school which he had founded. Although his treatment of the boys caused a local commotion within the school's governing body, the broader scandal that we might expect to have erupted did not occur. Lancaster's letter of resignation, for example, "completely ignored the immediate reason" (Bartle 19), and in a later publication "he again gave the impression that his withdrawal was due to the machinations of the committee which had deliberately planned to exclude him from the Borough Road institutions" (19). Moreover, David Salmon who wrote a biography of Lancaster in 1904, some years before the content of Place's papers came to light, would only allude to the incident in an article that he published subsequently, and "[i]n none of the many

articles which Salmon was to produce was he ever again to refer to Lancaster's conduct towards his apprentices (Bartle 19).

Interestingly, in the one article where Salmon acknowledges the affair he refers to a "medical specialist" and rationalises Lancaster's behaviour as a result of his "'suffering from a form of aberration now classified and named and [the specialist] showed me in a modern pathological textbook the typical case'" (19). The classification, the reference to recorded detail, is characteristic of the categorization and collection of information that proceeds under the construct of Victorianism that Michel Foucault terms "the repressive hypothesis." Thus, Bartle's explanation of Salmon's ostensible squeamishness--"During the years when Salmon was writing . . . a certain reticence over sexual conduct was indeed common, particularly if it had a homosexual or masochistic character" (19)--is unsatisfactory.

And yet, with William Brown's deposition in mind, we are able to examine the sexual tableau that his statement suggests. We may discover the ways in which Lancaster's conduct and the secrecy that surrounded the findings of the investigative committee reveal the monitorialists' own anxiety with the nature of the inspection, the gaze that, I am arguing in this dissertation, is so fundamental to the monitorial school. We may also extricate the connection between the panoptic visibility that underwrites the schools' daily routine on the one hand, and the personal visibility that Lancaster enjoys in his intimate encounters with his monitors on the other: in the panoptic arena of the monitorial schoolroom--the dimensions and geometry of which I have already spoken in this chapter--no-one is exempt from view. The economy of power enfolds all of the players within its field of force relations. But, in the

private encounter, the boys turn away from the older man, are seen without themselves being seen, are physically and metaphorically laid bare in order to be known, and are subject to his commands, his voice, those audible commands the nature of which Lancaster's pedagogical treatises seem designed to eradicate, an important detail to which I have already referred. In these meetings conducted out of view, we may determine variant micro-principles that manifest themselves in the macro-economy of the school. I have shown in this chapter, for example, that there is a definite aesthetic of monitorial discipline, and that that aesthetic is inseparable from the pleasure experienced by the spectator when confronted by disciplined, ordered bodies. While the source of that pleasure is, in some cases, undoubtedly the spectacle of co-ordinated, precise bodies, arguably there also exists, to some degree or another, a sexual component to the delight that rewards the onlooker's vigilance. If the delight returns from the tableau that is co-ordination on a grand scale, then Lancaster's private scenario de-sublimates the two-pronged foundation of desire and pleasure. It brackets them for our consideration, causing us to recognize the anxiety in that room where panoptic discipline is suspended, where the balance-weights of interactions that constitute power relations are unequally assigned. In the gloom of his chamber, Joseph Lancaster acknowledges the sado-masochistic trace that haunts the onlooker's feelings of pleasure.

In the sequestered calm of the sub-committee room, Place and the other investigators would also have found themselves confronting the same uncomfortable realization. If the details of Lancaster's behaviour had been made public the British and Foreign School Society's reputation would have suffered, as Place makes clear in his papers when he writes,

> Lancaster knew well enough that he could have been exposed by the committee as a very bad man, but he also knew that in doing this, great injury would be done to the Institution and that it was very possible we should refrain from bringing his conduct before the public. (19)

Place, then, justifies the committee's silence on the grounds of a sensibility towards the society under whose aegis the school operates, but the reputation that the members are so ostensibly concerned to protect is, we need to appreciate, largely the result of the monitorialists' own promotion. As I show later in this dissertation, the movement to educational reform is a middle-class initiative and, so far as Place is concerned with reputation, it is the potential damage that a scandal might cause to that class's emerging distinction that alarms him. But, it seems to me, the committee's silence is to do with more than protecting the honour of an institution. Just as the monitorial school constitutes a pervasive normalizing machine where the objective is a homogeneous mass of conforming boys, so too the investigation subjects Lancaster to a review against a standard of normalcy and naturalness.

In light of his actions, he is judged to be anything but human, a fact to which Place alludes in a private letter, as Bartle points out: "It is too disgraceful to be related on paper, [Lancaster] is a damnable *beast*" (19 my italics). The function of silence is complicated in this instance, for it is obvious that the silence falls after the investigation. That is, Brown's testimony is heard, his letter reviewed, the witness examined, evidence brought before the committee, facts enough to put Lancaster's conduct "beyond all doubt" (Place 26). Far from silencing the affair, the details have, as a result of the committee's assiduous actions, been

entered into the normalizing discourse of sex and power. The purpose of this procedure lies in the emerging pre-occupation with population, production, the concern with the furtherance of commerce. The standards of normalcy that ensure a commitment to the nuclear family demand that deviance from those standards be identified and delimited. "[The] transformation of sex into discourse [was] . . . governed by the endeavour to expel from reality the forms of sexuality that were not amenable to the strict economy of reproduction," Foucault writes (*Sexuality* 36). And once classified, Lancaster could be distanced. To be sure, the act of Lancaster's removal required a delicacy that was, apparently, beyond the reach of the committee. As Place recalls in his papers, "The committee were at a loss what course to take" (26), and in the end Lancaster, as I have mentioned, resigned. Regardless of the society's apparent reticence to speak of the matter, Lancaster's difference informs the very silence that accompanies his departure. In the same way as incorrigible truant boys are ejected from the monitorial school, so Lancaster is forced to relinquish the post that otherwise establishes his fundamental connection to Borough Road. And yet the persistent identification of the school with his name is a continuing reminder of that trace of sexual otherness that the normalizing process of the school's government has been at pains to eradicate.

Although the details of the sado-masochistic floggings were kept out of official reports, and no public mention of the incidents seems to have taken place, it is highly likely that, as Bartle surmises, "rumours of [Lancaster's] conduct must inevitably have spread by word of mouth" (20). That, in light of the early nineteenth-century enthusiasm for monitorialism, Lancaster was not the subject of a public denunciation needs to be considered

separately from the committee's own motives. One might expect a parallel to be drawn in the public's mind between the practices in which Lancaster was engaged--his "bestiality," to extrapolate Place's opinion--and the very nature of the monitorial schools themselves. If those people who were aware of what was happening at Borough Road were not motivated to speak out, it is because that within the walls, collected and confined, the monitorial school's inmates were rendered invisible. Unseen, that is to say, by the public from whom they were drawn and unseen, also, by that section of the population who, ostensibly, had their interests at heart. I argue in a later chapter that the underclass itself was essentially silent regarding the plight of the boys. But so, too, in the early years of the nineteenth century was the middle class whose purpose it served to maintain institutions inside which notions of duty and place were impressed on the otherwise uneducated young. Whereas in *Tom Brown's Schooldays*, Flashman's "roasting" of Brown in front of an open fire would become an icon that focused attention on the systemic bullying in public schools, William Brown's testimony to Place's committee did not galvanise the public into action. It was enough that the "problem" of uneducated youth was being dealt with. The details that surrounded the monitorial solution were of little moment to those--the middle-class reformers--within whose purview it was to effect change.

As I have argued, the monitorial school movement does not represent a stage of progression, a point on a curve of increasing pedagogical awareness that comes to enlightenment by a linear appreciation of the shortcomings of the various pedagogical institutions that preceded and succeeded monitorialism. While, for example, the underclass

were inhabiting Lancaster and Bell's schools, Matthew Davenport Hill opened Hazelwood,

an institution that, far from being designed to inculcate in the underclass notions of

subservience, subjected its more middle-class pupils to a capitalist and mercantile doctrine.

It is to this school and its sophisticated, psychologically-driven disciplinarity that I now turn.

Chapter Three

Towards the Government of the Body: Hill's Hazelwood Experiment

I

"For it is only from the Observance of a due Subordination, and a strict
Conformity to the Rules and Discipline of Government, that Men can promise
themselves Security in their various Pursuits of the Studies and Arts of Life."
<div align="right">(Nicolls, 11)</div>

In 1822, Matthew Davenport Hill writes his *Plans for the Government and Liberal*

Instruction of Boys in Large Numbers, a text detailing the pedagogical methods employed

in the Hazelwood school--an establishment designed for boys and boys only--of which he was

the founder. Although monitors were a prominent feature in the school, this establishment

was not run on the precise monitorial lines as advocated by Bell and Lancaster. It was,

however, influenced by the monitorial system. The doctrine of emulation, about which I have

already written,[22] propels an involved system of reward and punishment. I show in this

chapter how that system operates as a qualifying mechanism, complete with a unique system

of currency and intricate accounting records, by means of which the Hazelwood boys

continually strive to attain higher ranking relative to their fellows. I also show the extent to

which Hill understood and enhanced the psychological element of discipline. That is to say,

he displays a sophisticated appreciation of the important difference between a personal

authority emanating from and located in the body of the teacher, on the one hand, and, on the

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[22]See page 50.

other, an institutional authority that is all-pervading and made manifest by the teacher's presence. It is an element that, although present in his co-reformers' schools, was not nearly as developed in them. A significant difference between Hazelwood and the more recognizable monitorial school concerned the social class from which Hazelwood drew its pupils. Christopher J.M. Jones, an educational historian, observes "Hazelwood [represented] to some extent, the Chrestomathic proposals of Bentham, [and] reflected the desires and aspirations of the middle classes to obtain such an education" (37-38). As will become apparent, it is a decidedly middle-class and capitalistic philosophy that informs Hazelwood's administration. The school's aim--no less than its more rigidly monitorial counterparts--was the subjection, the self-disciplining, of its human material, by which I mean the pupils' internalization of capitalist economic doctrines and the formation of a particular political view of an ideal citizen in an ideal society. But whereas, for example, the Reverend Andrew Bell might question the need for his pupils to learn to write, Hazelwood's emphasis lay on the inculcation of a commercial liturgy. Not only would the school's pupils learn the skills necessary to record accounts, to keep books, but also they would be imbued with the belief that society could run properly only if its activities could be recorded and predicted, its successes rewarded by monetary gain, and its failures by impoverishment. If the monitorial school's ideal subject was obedient and non-discerning, Hazelwood's success would be the production of the capitalist in miniature.

In Hill's book the intricate connections in the school between educational, juridical and social theory become obvious. "[W]e must consider the boys both as a community and

as a body of pupils" (1), he states in the introduction to his treatise. Thus, he simultaneously

establishes the scholastic population as a society in microcosm, subject to all the laws,

procedures and penalties for infringement that obtain in the sovereign State, while recognising

a "sample" upon which may be carried out a variety of experiments, the results of which are

to be, in theory at least, meticulously recorded. Hill's preface makes very clear that what

follows has nothing to do with a broad philosophy or methodology of education, but, on the

contrary, concerns both the means and the ends--a will to subjectivity--that apply within the

Hazelwood institution. He is explicit in this respect:

> The slightest examination of the following pages will show that we have not
> attempted to lay down a general system of education. Our attention has, both
> from necessity and inclination, been confined to the instruction and
> government of *boys* at *school.*" (vii)

There are, surely, some significant implications if, as Hill seems to imply, "education" gives

way to "instruction." It seems that Hill anticipates Barrow and Woods when they write:

"education (as process) is a polymorphous concept and that it is a mistake to think of

'educating' as the name of one, and only one, particular activity" (12). We must determine,

then, whether Hill chooses his words simply to focus his reader's attention on a particular

component of the educational process--instruction, that is to say--or whether he is aware of

a much more significant difference, one that is implicit in his concentration on government,

efficient use of time, and due process.

Hill's text vacillates between an overt, scientific rationality and an often-stated

"liberal" purpose. Thus he can write, "for numerous and excellent as are the writers on

education, they have seldom been *practical* men, possessing the advantage of trying *experiments* in the science, and have consequently left us a field sufficiently large" (viii, my emphasis), only to follow it shortly with, "let us say what our object is *not*. It is not to change the course of Nature by transmuting boys into *little men* . . . We endeavour to teach our pupils the arts of *self-government* and *self-education*" (ix). And while he can appear progressive in the context of the monitorial movement, stating for example that his school aimed to dispel notions "that to talk fluently can be any excuse for not thinking deeply; or that manners may be a succedaneum for conduct"(ix), he can also revel in the extent to which the students constitute a population on which he may experiment. Comparing his "material" with that of Richard Edgeworth, the father of Maria Edgeworth,[23] he writes:

> In one respect we have enjoyed greater advantages than he for making observations. We have had a larger number of pupils, all differing in their natural and acquired powers . . . and therefore likely to furnish more correct average results than can be reasonably expected in his case. (viii-ix)

It is of considerable significance, this "larger number" of pupils. While it provides Hill with a numerically superior sample upon which to base his conclusions, it also provides a living, experimental body which reflects the results of methods the purpose of which is to efficiently mold and modify behaviour: "We have been astonished to find the ease with which, by practice, boys conform to new modes, without the loss of time and the confusion which may be supposed to attend any changes affecting a large number" (vii), he writes. As will become

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[23] I have referred to the Edgeworths and Locke's influence on them in the introduction to this dissertation. See page 37.

clear, the school's legal apparatus and that of the state--school government and civil government, that is to say--replicate each other. The conformity for which both strive depends not on freedom of thought or choice, but on a willingness to accept that which is promulgated as acceptable, desirable, the norm. Hence the inherent indoctrination that invests "self-government" and "self-education" reveals itself. It is not by accident that instruction replaces "education" here. Hill's continued use of both terms might at times be confusing, but it is in the area of connotation that occupies the space between the two that we must look for the wider social implications of their employment.

The relationship between schoolmaster and pupils at first appears to be typically hierarchical. "A schoolmaster," Hill writes, is "a governor as well as a teacher" (1). But he immediately uses this observation as a justification for "consider[ing] the boys both as a community and as a *body* of pupils" (1, my emphasis). It is not purely semantics that distinguishes the modes of government that are called for in a "community," as opposed to those that direct a "body of pupils." The terms imply a fundamental difference in the schoolmaster's function. In his *Sketch*, another pedagogical text in which Hill speaks of the Bruce Castle School which was run along identical lines to Hazelwood, he explains the pupils' own role in school government: "With a view of obtaining the assistance of the boys themselves in the enforcement of the laws by which they are governed, and of convincing them of the justice and necessity of laws generally, we admit our pupils to a considerable share in the government of the school" (41). Regardless of Hill's assertion that the pupils enjoy a "considerable share" of the school's government, his argument is grounds itself in the

admission that he seeks the boys' active participation "in the enforcement of the laws by which they are governed." This is the primary purpose of involving the scholars in the administrative machinery. By their being subsumed into the apparatus of the school's administration they not only become the instruments by which they govern themselves, but also they contribute to their own self-discipline.

That the school is like the state in microcosm emerges repeatedly in Hill's text. Government succeeds by replicating the state's legal apparatus, its administrative offices and punitive remedies. Implicit in the complex system of jurisprudence--its trials and appeals, its court officers, its juries, its penalties for infringement of laws--is the reproduction and reinforcement of the operation of an ideal state which reduces a mass of individuals to a disciplined, predictably behaving and conforming whole. It is as if this process of diminution simultaneously effaces the sheer impossibility of achieving the control that, on a grand scale, is the political goal. In this respect, we can see the synonymous connection between education and socialization. To be educated at Hazelwood is to be socialized to an acceptance not only of the rules that govern one's conduct, but also to the political dogma and theory that underlies Hill's vision of the state. That Hill speaks of managing boys "in Large Numbers" obviously refers to the physical problem with which he is faced. Arguably, however, it also betrays his recognition of the problem posed to political stability by the size of the country's population, and the impossibility of achieving its socialization to his capitalistic vision. Explicitly, Hill writes "A school is but a nation in miniature" (86), an assertion that

complicates both the nature of the scholastic population and its relationship with the person responsible for its government.

Hill's concept of nation is worth consideration, since it *seems* to be as concerned with the daily workings of the state as much as it implies esoteric notions of democracy and nationhood. I speak shortly of his "coining"of a unique form of currency, the possession of which evidences success in his system. This "money" emphasises Hill's concentration on full employment, the war that he wages against idleness. Allowing for the moment a certain quaintness in expression, we might consider the analysis of one commentator, R.L. Archer:

> Competition was accepted at Hazelwood as an honourable motive. The shape, however, which it assumed was peculiar. A foreigner might say it was the natural shape for it to assume among a 'nation of shopkeepers.' Among adults in a mercantile community money is the usual reward of industry, and want of it the usual punishment for idleness .... the Hills were acquainted with political economy, and knew that money is only a symbol of value and a medium of exchange, the true value residing in the commodities which it will purchase. (92-93)

The school, this laboratory in which Hill performs the experiment, functions to develop the embryo out of which the nation will grow. Hill's problem, of course, is that the result of his researches is never finite, can never be complete. He can measure his success only by reference to the degree to which the embryonic form both of his citizens and his miniature state match his idea of what they should be. Thus constructed and constituted, Hill's pupils must leave their sterile environment to contend with the world as it is, and not as he would have it be. The real testing of his work, then, must always take place in an environment over which he has no control. The controlled conditions of his school, it now seems clear in

retrospect, were hardly an adequate preparation for the external Darwinian world. In a

statement that refutes Hill's assertion that his purpose is not to make "little men" of the boys,

W.L. Sargant, a former pupil at the school, records:"By juries and committees, by marks, and

by appeals to a sense of honour, discipline was maintained. But this was done, I think, at too

great a sacrifice: the thoughtlessness, the spring, the elation of childhood were taken from us;

we were premature men" (93, my emphasis).[24]

A sophisticated application of the principles of power exerts itself in the Hazelwood

school. While the schoolmaster is visible as a figure of authority, the control, the mechanisms,

the forces that achieve the desired cohesion, rest within the individual pupils. Hill argues,

"The principle of our government is to leave, as much as possible, all power in the hands of

the boys themselves" (1). This statement is not so much an exhibition in democracy as it is

an indication of the way in which Hill sees the school as a laboratory in which the

experimental material is conditioned to become the agent--both singular and multiple--of its

own discipline, its own behaviour.[25] The schoolmaster does not impose standards from above,

but observes the machine in operation, each part dependant upon the other. The boys might

"elect a Committee which enacts the laws of the school," but the committee's decisions are

always "subject . . . to the veto of the Head Master" (1), who, in the exercise of his ultimate

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[24]Interestingly, Sargant was to become a prominent manufacturer, a testimony, perhaps, to the Hazelwood school's commercial bias.

[25]The experimental nature of Hill's regime did not go undetected by his pupils. Sargant writes: "The discipline was framed after the newest experiments of the newest philosophy" (189).

prerogative, functions as the Monarch, the head of parliament in this miniature state. The master's role is to direct government, then, to interject whatever influence is required to ensure the efficient performance of the community's duties. It is the precise definition of the population that in turn determines the master's role at any time. Seen as a community, the pupils must be subject to government, to influence. Such freedom as they have may be exercised only within the confines of a quasi-legal machinery that is already established. The boys might "elect" members of the administrative bodies, but their right to do so is contingent upon the permission of those who permit their government to exist. And while those people-- the masters--are visible, the actual nature of their influence is not. The successful operation of the school requires that deviations be identified, offenders apprehended, and the process of law initiated.

The schoolmaster, as Hill makes clear, remains external to the pupil population. It is the boys whom we are to view "both as a community and a body" (1). As a "community," the school's population takes on an identity, a "character" with its own already defined and understood culture, which may be expected to react in accordance with established precedent. As a body, though, its shape is obvious, its members identifiable, but it constitutes, now, material whose behaviour is uncertain, whose reactions must be conditioned, whose responses to stimuli both tangible and intangible must be determined, recorded and refined. And the results, carefully observed by the schoolmaster, will be fed back into the system of governance in order that a silent, predictable obedience will prevail.

Integral to this method, the purpose of which is to elicit behavioural norms, conditioned responses, is the system of rewards and forfeitures. Hill draws on an established monitorial tradition when he uses the promise of reward as a behavioural motivator. In Lancaster's Borough Road school some twenty years earlier, the pupils had gone to extraordinary lengths in order to become the recipients of reward. One former monitorial pupil, James Bonwick, writes, "One particular contest in which I was engaged, for a silver medal, the marks for which extended over many days, was a very severe one. I lost the prize through illness, from intense cerebral excitement. The victor never recovered the shock to his brain" (35). Hill's rewards consist of two categories of marks: premial and penal. These marks constitute a currency which circulates within the school, a medium of exchange that, with each transaction, affects both payor and payee, and reinforces a recognition of one's relative worth, one's standing, one's rank. Such is the desire to amass these marks that the difference between work hours and leisure hours becomes increasingly indistinct: "Other Teachers are occupied in giving rewards for voluntary labour," Hill writes (24). The ability to pay fines rests solely on the boy's possession of counters. These he can accumulate only by conforming to certain standards of behaviour both within and without the classroom.

The penal mark system spawns a parallel system of recording both award and forfeiture: "[P]enalties are entered at the time they are incurred in a book which is kept for the purpose" (24). The school must record the award of merits and demerits, the possession of counters--evidence of the pupils' moral standing. Individually, these records assist in the determination of rank, the bestowing of privilege, finally constituting a chronological, written

summary of each boy's behaviour. Collectively, the aggregate information forms a chronicle, the purpose of which is to record the nature of the student body--the school:

> It appears to us desirable, that every school should preserve records of all such transactions as affect its well-being (whenever they can be made *without an undue sacrifice of time*), to enable the conductors to ascertain whether the character of the school is progressive or otherwise. (27, my emphasis)

An intricate set of records now comes into existence. "[V]arious records . . . are preserved of the good and bad conduct of the scholars." Upon the content of these records depends another journal, "[a] weekly register [which] is made of the rank of each boy." Rank, as is already clear, is a primary component in the process which shapes behaviour and governs the conduct of the school. It is to the register recording rank that the teachers refer when awarding half-yearly prizes, "in the order of their value, to those boys whose aggregate rank is found to be the highest" (19). The conservation of time, always of primary importance, drives the system's design. There is a register in which are entered the penalties--fines, or forfeiture of counters--that have been levied by the Judge. The Sheriff makes the actual entry in the log and presents it to the Master who "can, if he please, exercise his power of mitigation or pardon" (10). A record of convictions forms another history. In this will be found the names of all those whom the Court of Justice has found guilty. A boy may avoid the spectacle of a trial by paying an increased fine. Nevertheless, the indelible identification with guilt ensures that his name, too, will appear in this register. This record constitutes, like the trial, a symbol--more permanent, if somewhat less majestic, yet complementary to its juridical function--of the institution's legal apparatus, its ability to reach into and affect every

facet of the lives of those whose conduct it determines. Whether or not he appears in court,

the appearance of a boy's name in the book identifies him as a member of a class of pupil

defined by its criminality, its disciplinary otherness. Regardless of the way he chooses to admit

his guilt, the book remains as a constantly visible record of his malfeasance. It is a function

of the book's existence that is not lost on some of the pupils:

> Some boys are acutely sensible of the disgrace of appearing in this book; and
> in order to make this very proper feeling a spur to moral improvement, it has
> been thought advisable to allow any one whose name, at the last arrangement
> according to good behaviour . . . shall have stood above a certain number, to
> move the Court to order the erasure of his name from the criminal register.
> The boy in this case is obliged to give notice of his intention to the Attorney-
> General, and, to succeed, he must prove to the satisfaction of a Jury, that his
> conduct for a long time past has been exemplary. This has been done in some
> instances. (11)

"[G]ood behaviour," obviously, does not ensure the automatic erasure of one's

criminal record. The system, predicated, as mentioned previously, on the assumption of the

existence of guilt, must reinforce that notion even as it seems to clear a way in order to allow

a fresh start. The procedure is by its very nature indeterminate, guaranteed to keep the

convicted in a state of imbalance, never able to measure precisely whether current conduct

qualifies one's name for removal, for re-classification. To be considered, a boy must hold an

elevated rank. The position to which he should aspire, though, remains undefined--it is simply,

"above a certain number"--and consequently he must continually strive for the attainment of

rank by means of all the procedures and mechanisms which are set up for that purpose. The

book, and the influence it exerts, stands at the centre of the model for behaviour in the school.

Where the goal resists definition, the pupil must discipline himself, must act in such a way as

to establish for himself not merely what is good behaviour, but what is "exemplary." Without written standards, the requirement must constantly increase. The "criminal," striving to position himself within the community, serves as an example to the others. Thus, the desire to remove oneself from the criminal register works in tandem with a desire to keep one's name from appearing in it at all, becomes manifest in a two-pronged assault whose target is the school's conduct, and whose strategy is to transfer the ordering, the compliance, the imposition of standards from the governing officers to those who are governed.

Non-payment of fines results in a further penalty: "The names of those boys who cannot pay their fines are entered on a list (called the defaulters' list), which is kept by the Sheriff, the penalties being doubled" (25). Inclusion on this list "qualifies" the boy for further punitive attention. It is not enough to impress on the offender that the school is the place in which his new character is to be formed; he must be forced into the recognition that he has not conformed to the doctrine, the philosophy, that delimits the arena in which the instruction takes place. His continued inability to redeem his account guarantees confinement "to the school-room, except at meal times, and during one half hour in each day which is allowed for exercise" (25). The focus on his retraining is, therefore, progressively more intense. The boys whose names are on the list are those who will be "called" in order that they "rise an hour earlier than the other boys" (25). This enforcement provides continued "opportunities" for the boys to redeem themselves. Those whose behaviour does not warrant the award of counters by which they may expiate their guilt become the subjects of an even more concentrated remedy. Concerning a corrective that apparently shares with Lancaster's

methods a belief in the curative powers of nocturnal isolation, Hill writes: "the Sheriff has the power of confining them separately in the dark, for a time proportionate to the amount of their debts" (25).

Possession of marks is the sole determinant of the presence or absence of one's name on the defaulters' list. The desire, indeed the necessity, to accumulate this currency is a vital element of the discipline that shapes the general order even as it moulds the individual's behaviour. "[I]t is *always the interest* of every boy to have a considerable stock of marks in his possession," Hill reminds us (25, my emphasis). Constituting an insurance against the ever-present promise of penalty, the need to amass large sums of counters creates a behavioural "anxiety" in the students:

> Prudent boys are careful never to be without some hundreds of these marks; and there are those who have thousands.... A remarkable instance of anxiety was given by a boy who . . . in a very short time translated, into tolerably blank verse, the whole four books of the Georgics without any assistance from a translation. (25-26)

The labour might be "voluntary," but the influence that the promise of rank exerts over the boys' use of their time results in an extensively controlled and disciplined day. Demands imposed by the collection of "marks" increasingly colonise the boys' spare hours with the result that the work week becomes, in effect, considerably extended. "Each of our pupils employs, on an average, upwards of *twelve hours* per week, which is the equivalent to a day and a half of compulsory school time" (Hill, *Sketch* 39).

If the school is a "nation in miniature," the accounting system that determines the denomination of the marks, or counters, and administers their circulation emulates the state's

central banking system. In another variant of the controlling mechanism that organizes Hazelwood, receipts and payments of marks all flow through a central fund--the "public treasure," maintenance of which is the responsibility of "a boy who is called the Banker" (26). Again, the whole of the school's community comes together under an administrative and judgemental eye. The actions of all parties in the process become a matter of record. The teachers, no less than the boys from whom they extract retribution, or upon whom they bestow reward, must account for their actions. A daily accounting records the income--the total extracted from the boys as a result of fines--and expenditure, the sum of the marks "drawn upon the banker by the teachers," in order that they may be paid out as rewards.

A rigorous procedure accompanies the payment of fines. The constant observation to which the boys are subjected ensures the apprehension of offences which merit penalty. The subsequent recording of that penalty in turn underwrites the daily accounting that is fundamental to the precision that has as its object the perpetual classification of the boys' characters. The recording of misdemeanours was not new--Bell kept a black book in which punishments were recorded. Where Hill's method differs is that it is designed not simply to record the event, but to assist in the compilation of a composite abstract, a behavioural balance sheet, the completion of which accords with the "banking" principles upon which so much of the school is run:

> The penalties are entered at the time they are incurred in a book which is kept
> for the purpose; and at an appointed hour in each day the boys are expected
> to pay to certain Teachers, who are in readiness to receive them, all penalties
> which may have been registered against them on the preceding day. (24)

With the same regularity with which the teachers levy the penalties, the Banker reconciles "his accounts, which are kept in the common form" (26). And acknowledging the doctrine that rewards performance of duty with a deposit of the currency that evidences the pupils' relative worth, the system assures a reward for the Banker: "[H]e is paid for his trouble by a commission of one per cent. on his receipts and issues" (26). Just as the individual's final character judgement reflects upon the school's ability to create the character that it desires, this perpetual calling to account represents another medium by which to measure the success or failure of the school. "Fiscal" and moral assets combine in a daily reckoning of Hazelwood's wealth, a determination of "whether . . . the school at large has become richer or poorer" (26).

The "premial" mark system parallels its more punitively motivated "penal" relation. It rewards "productions of the very best quality" (28), and thus grounds itself in a more refined productive capacity. It is a restricted, "personal" currency--"[i]t cannot be transferred from one boy to another" (28). Its possession reinforces a form of self-sufficiency, or at least its illusion, while simultaneously fitting this embryo capitalist subject into an economy of "pain" and "pleasure," an economy that underlies how this "free" subject is entirely answerable, is entirely constituted by the rigidity of the regime within which he finds himself. A fixed rate of exchange ties premial and penal marks to each other. Established primarily for the purpose of obtaining additional holiday, premial marks may nevertheless be redeemed for their equivalency in penal currency, thereby increasing the boys' insurance against penalties involving the imposition of fines and imprisonment. Conduct on one register of behaviour,

therefore, influences that on another. Axes on a grid that is itself a foundation of required performance--scholastic and civil--the currencies exert upon the subjects who seek to increase their "holdings" a set of opposing and complementary forces. Nothing may be allowed to obstruct the administration's function. Thus, while premial marks may qualify one for extra holiday, that time off may only be taken within certain limits: "To prevent unnecessary interference in the arrangements of the school, the purchase of holiday with premial marks is confined to a certain afternoon in each week." Perhaps unconsciously, Hill seems to acknowledge the carceral potential of the educational institution when he goes on to say that at that time, "any one who is able *may obtain his liberty*" (28, my emphasis).

Hill now reveals a mechanism in which the doctrine of the free market and individual competition have the potential to determine the students' hierarchy, making the premier position in the school contingent upon exemplary behaviour: "[O]nce and sometimes twice in every half year . . . the first place is put up to auction, and given to the boy who is willing to sacrifice for it the greatest number of premial marks" (29). This desire for rank, as has already been noted, constitutes a powerful conditioning effect on the boys' behaviour. Thus:

> [S]o powerful is the motive thus created, that we find, on an examination of the accounts, that a boy of fourteen . . . although in constant possession of marks amply sufficient to obtain a holiday per week, has bought but three quarters of a day's relaxation during the whole of the last year. The same boy, at a late arrangement, purchased his place on the list by a sacrifice of marks, sufficient to have obtained for him twenty-six half days' exemption from labour and confinement of the school. (29)

Rank is fundamental as a motivator for producing conforming, obedient subjects: "All our arrangements tend to make rank in the school an object of great importance to the boys, and

to confer it in proportion to moral and mental excellence" (18). Such is the importance placed on rank that every action carries with it the potential to advance or retard a pupil's progress along the scale on which rank is measured and recorded: "To obtain rank is an object of great ambition among the boys; with us it is entirely dependant on the state of their acquirements and our arrangements according to excellence are so frequent, that no one is safe, without constant exertion, from losing his place," Hill writes (2).

Just as in Bentham's Panopticon "the inmate must never know whether he is being looked at at any one moment; but he must be sure that he always may be so" (Foucault, *Discipline*, 201), so the pupils in Hill's school must be sure that every action that they perform bears upon the rank they hold within the student community. It is a descant on Bentham's visibility that comes into play in the internal disciplining of the school. The principle of the Panopticon operates most obviously when the solitary master observes, when the pupils are subject to the potential of an unremitting gaze. It is less obvious, but equally as effective when, refined and distilled, the principle acts upon its recipients not so as to prevent certain types of behaviour, but to promote others.

Panopticism in its rawest form prohibits. Certainty coupled with invisibility ensures order: "If the inmates are . . . schoolchildren, there is no copying, no noise, no chatter, no waste of time" (Foucault, *Discipline* 201). Coupled with a scale of rewards, however, this application of the panoptic principle moves away from its purely preventative role and becomes more overtly "productive." It no longer promotes a stasis, an immobility. Rather, it engenders a "positive" reaction out of which arises a collective momentum that

characterises the culture of the institution and its inhabitants. No less subjugated, no less

docile, their behaviour as equally determined as their more identifiably regulated counterparts-

-prisoners and hospital patients for example--the students at the Hazelwood school contribute

to their own surveillance by acting so as to be rewarded, to enhance their rank. In the same

way that the effective government of the school is a function of the boys' involvement in the

managerial structure, so too the disciplinary mechanism relies largely on the pupils' active

participation: "The school is divided into circles of ten boys each . . . every member of a circle

being accountable to a certain extent for the conduct of his fellow members" (Hill, *Sketch* 42).

Accordingly, the guardian's duties are, themselves, circular in function. He is bound to his

charges in a self-reflexive and reciprocal relationship where he is at once counsellor and

enforcer, adviser and policeman. "[I]n a word, he is expected to act in every way as [the

boys'] friend and intelligent adviser. He is also bound to levy the established fines, when any

of them commit breaches of the law" (Hill, *Sketch* 42). Any denial of the truth, any statement

that is at variance with the school's established moral doctrine, constitutes an offence of the

highest order. Consequently, "The punishment of . . . falsehood, is not left to the guardian:

such cases are referred to a Jury Court" (43).

The ringing of a bell formally punctuates the passage of time in the Hazelwood version

of the monitorial system: the bell, an instrument of regulation that replaces the voice; the bell,

that "pure" sign after which Lancaster thirsted in his quest for a school in which the language

of command undergoes a thorough revision. While the marching, quite literally, keeps step

with time's advance, the bell signals its division into discrete units: "The Monitor has to ring

the bell at the proper times" (30). The definition and recognition of what time is proper, and an adherence to this routine requires a painstaking recording. Time in this system becomes more overtly visual: "*A statement of the times at which the bell is to be rung,* and of the other duties of the Monitor, is *hung in the school-room, which is furnished with a clock* (30, my emphasis). The rule of time is not merely available for view; rather, it is public, a mandatory statement that exerts its influence on a captive audience. The three components, bell, clock, written rules, occupy adjacent positions in the space which they, in close conjunction with each other, effectively regulate. And the Monitor is, by virtue of the system's design, incapable of separation from the operation. "[A] fine is imposed upon any one who shall ring the bell except the Monitor" (30-31). Where time and discipline are dependant upon one another, the routine subsumes the monitor. If, as Hill writes, "this officer knows that he must depend upon himself alone" (31), the monitor is, arguably, unaware that that "self-dependancy" results from the imposition of a system of regularity, a system in which he is inextricably caught up, and where his performance is guaranteed by the threat of penalty: "If the Monitor should ring the bell or call over his list at the wrong time, he pays a considerable fine" (31).

The monitor is indispensable to the school's order, its regularity, the punctuality of its population--"a great deal depends upon his punctuality" (30). And it is punctuality in the strictest sense of the word. The bell must be rung on time, and only on time. Anticipation of time is as great a crime as its being forgotten altogether. Hill warns, "[The fine] increases with every minute of error, whether he be too early or too late" (31). The bell announces the

beginning and end of each unit; it demands and receives a coordinated reaction; it is a basic producer of sound which marks the cohesion of the pupils and their conformity to the discipline of time; it speaks where speech is otherwise denied; it reduces the necessity for verbal commands--"silence [obtains] in the school when the boys are not occupied in classes" (36). It is constant, unrelenting, monotonous. "In the course of a week the Monitor has to ring the bell more than 250 times" (31), Hill confirms.

The whole of the school community disciplines itself as a result of the certainty of observation and the responsibility that that certainty reinforces. The bell's regularity not only signals that one activity is to replace another, but also it constantly reminds those who are subject to its dictates that tardiness will never pass unnoticed. It measures the passing of time, the efficiency with which the day is being partitioned, to be sure, but its prominence, its sound, its very signification, regulates the co-ordination upon which the daily routine depends. "At 9^h. 5^m., a bell for breakfast. The bell is rung for each meal mechanically at the appointed time; the cook is therefore aware that she must be ready to serve at a moment, or keep all the boys waiting at the table" (57-58). Out of the cook's awareness arises her conformity to the routine. It is not, of course, that she responds to the bell's sound. On the contrary, disciplined to behave in a distinctly different fashion from the boys whom she serves, she must *anticipate* the bell, must govern herself in such a way that her re-action to it simply confirms, to all those who observe her, her conformity. And in a reciprocal action that authenticates the community's fundamental rhythm, the mutual dependence of its members, the boys themselves respond to the bell. No section is exempt from its command. Visible, yes; audible,

of course; yet the bell's significance lies not so much in its location, its sound, but in the way the school internalises its demands. It is not simply its punctuation of the day that signals the bell's success. Rather, it is the order that it achieves by its constant presence. For in that order lies the certainty that the institutions' various component parts will act in pre-determined and predictable ways. Variance from routine is now no longer expected nor tolerated. The expectation of transgression never being invisible works in conjunction to produce an administrative symmetry. "[It] has been found sufficient to ensure uniform punctuality" (58), Hill asserts.

Bell and clock operate in tandem. Neither simply measuring time nor confirming the accuracy of the other, the clock's chime and the bell's clapper work together to condition the pupil to an awareness, an acceptance of an institutional certainty. He "knows" that the clock and the bell will sound at the same time, just as he knows that their co-ordination constitutes a continual reminder of the organizational imperative that requires him to synchronize his actions with those of the rest of the school. The pupil, Hill's "living timepiece," therefore conditions himself to behave with a precision and an accuracy almost indistinguishable from that of the instruments to which he reacts. "We have known boys go on for more than four years without a single deviation from punctuality, arising from illness, or any cause whatever" (10), Hill boasts. The pupils, then, inhabit what we might call compartments of time, where every activity takes place within boundaries that, although not physical, are nonetheless undeniably delimited. The pupils' thoroughly governed temporal existence matches the compartmentalising made manifest in the institution's architecture.

Music fills the intervals between the bell ringing for the end of one activity and the beginning of another. Under no circumstances must the significance of time be lost on the pupils. Time must be fully utilised, and idle time kept to a bare minimum. Boys marching to and from classes, to and from activities, are made aware of time's importance by a continual musical accompaniment. "The boys assemble in their various classes, and proceed to the places where they are taught, as well as march to their meals, always accompanied by music. We thus avoid much confusion and loss of time" (31). Music and movement in combination enforce the order, ensure compliance with commands both implicit and explicit. An award of the marks that are the currency in the school's economy of reward and forfeit, induces pupils to become band members. In return for a "tolerable proficiency" with a musical instrument, the boy will perform "more than twenty times per day" (32). These performances are the background for a variety of functions. During the roll-call, the purpose of which is to number and identify absentees, [t]he band . . . commences a tune, which is played once over" (33). While the band performs, the business of arranging boys into a concert of "instruction" takes place.

The music prevents verbal communication; comparison of those present with a master list of names determines the extent of "defaulters." Speech is necessarily absent until the band stops. This signals the completion of the time allotted for the roll-call, and the boys charged with the responsibility of reporting "declare[] aloud the result of [their] examination" (32). The evolution completed, "the words 'Face' and 'March' are given, the band plays, and the classes proceed to their respective stations" (35). The band plays when the boys move from

their dormitories to their classes; it plays when they proceed from breakfast to the first classes

of the day; it plays when they change classes, and it signals the arrival of day scholars. It fills

spaces, it delimits routines, it becomes language. Only in exceptional cases does language step

outside this system of conformity in order to communicate. Boys who are to be punished--

defaulters--begin their day "[at] five in the morning," a full hour in advance of their fellows.

These boys are "called by the Monitor" (52). Hill is not clear, but the implication is that some

form of conversation takes place. It is as if those who exist outside the established routine can

engage in a form of communication that is less rigid, less regimented; that the "call" to which

they are subject constitutes in its implication of a different discourse, the defaulters' very

marginality. In a reversal of that which we might expect, the majority of the pupils, those who

conform, adhere, abide by the law, awake to the sound of the ever-present bell. Subsequent

instruction is minimal: "All the boys leave their beds at the word of command" (52). It is a

special form of communication--a specialised discourse reserved for those whose behaviour

confirms their compliance with established norms. It is "*the* word of command" (my

emphasis) to which they respond. The definitude of the grammatical article that Hill applies

rejects any conjecture that there might be more than one applicable word. And for those who

do not hear or disobey this command, language becomes even more diminished, reduced to

pure sound, an arbitrary noise designed to ensure obedience: "The Monitor goes into each

dormitory, and *blows a horn* to awake such as may be sleeping" (52, my emphasis). Into the

area that lies between the agreed-upon and understood form of communication--the single

word, the command, the imperative--and the language of the outsider--multiple words,

superfluous, shapeless and imprecise sentences--comes a reminder that the objective is a conditioned response to a single sound, a sound stripped of all ambiguity. The blast of the horn, violent in its amplification, reinforces the standard. Opposing the defaulters, its auditors occupy the other extreme of the register of signification.

The Hazelwood and Bruce Castle schools recognise the "contaminative" potential in an offender and move quickly to prevent moral infection. Nothing must be allowed to spread the contagion. "When a boy's conduct and example are very bad, we separate him from his school-fellows" (Hill, *Sketch* 43). The penal system eradicates the influence, isolates it, separates the "disease" from the healthy body, works on it, "cures" it, and returns it, healthy again, to the community. Punishment in these schools walks a fine line between a method of extracting the retribution for which the complex penal system has been established and a form of moral and behavioural immunization where the practice--not simply the threat--of punishment attacks the source of the illness. Hill writes, "Punishments we look upon as medicines. They may be rendered necessary by the diseased state of moral man; but they are nevertheless injurious; and he whose pure health enables him to dispense with such remedies is by far the more perfect and happy man" (44). A palpable ambiguity underlies his assertion. He seems clearly uncomfortable with the thought of punishment--"we always resort to punishment with reluctance" (45)--and yet the regime of control and observation that he has established is, in many ways, a punitive variant. His distaste seems to be more semantic than purely moral. He may describe as preventative the restrictions, the recording of information, the constant vigilance, yet they constitute a form of punishment that exacts its control on the

basis of its anticipation, its very conviction that offences will be committed against the established order. Thus, he can justify and legitimate an experiment the object of which is the abolition of what he terms "artificial punishments" (45).

It is important to understand what it is that Hill considers "artificial" about punishment. It seems clear that he envisages his ideal subject as a moral being that is inherently self-regulating, self-policing. In the context about which he writes, artificial punishment signifies the application of an external corrective, a purging agent that may be necessary as a means of last resort to effect an internal moral health, but whose utilization is always suspect, and should be avoided wherever possible. Hill's purpose is to promote "pure health," by which he means, as is increasingly clear, an adherence to order, an unquestioning response to a central authority, an identification with one's pre-ordained place, the very same objectives of the monitorial system. He differs not so much in the methods by which he aims to achieve these goals as in the application, the refinement of those methods. The artificiality about which he speaks lies in the degree to which they may be identified as punishments. That which is corporal is artificial because it is imposed from the outside by a third party. The success of his methods rests with their insinuation by the student body so that the disciplining becomes even more invisible, even more self-regulatory.

Punishment, as hitherto understood, no longer applies for the subject population, the control group consisting of "[a] large class of boys, generally exceeding one half of the school" (45). As if to further the distinction between them and the others, Hill identifies as "*franks*" the boys upon whom the experiment is conducted (Hill, *Sketch* 45). Their conduct,

their obedience, directly reflects "the *regular* and *systematic* operation of superior motives" (45, my emphasis). It is an operation that requires a meticulous accounting and "[e]very frank . . . keeps a journal, in which he states the amount of voluntary labour performed in the day; whether or not he has committed any breach of the laws, and, if so, the precise nature of the offence; his stock of personal marks and some other particulars" (45). That the boy himself completes this record distinguishes it from those others about which I have already written. Moreover, the details that it contains constitute a cross-check on the details of the boy that others compile. This personal journal operates as a component of a system of moral double-entry. The record is permanent and available to be sure, but it is also much more than that. At the same time it is a daily confessional document, another example of a moral balance sheet. Offences for which the boys are responsible become the subject of identification, discussion, analysis. A private consultation ensues. Its purpose is to make clear the effects, both individual and communal, of the "crime," the commission of which leads to an interview with another official--the "conductor." "[A]ny violation of the law is referred to one of the conductors, who, in a private conversation with the offender, enters into a careful consideration of the consequences of such offences, of their effects on the habits and happiness of the offender himself, and on the comfort of others," (45), Hill explains. The nature of crime undergoes a transformation as a result of this process. It is not so much the lack of compliance, the refusal to adhere, that attracts attention, although this is not ignored. Now, importantly, the emphasis is on the accurate recording of these misdemeanours. Where the record's purpose is to replicate exactly every nuance of character, the object becomes,

quite literally, the *bringing to book* of malfeasance, not malfeasance in and of itself. No longer punished for infractions against the school's laws, the "frank" must now obey the dictates of this moral accounting system that demands that each and every action be recorded. "If a frank omit to enter an offence in his journal, such an occurrence is of course made the subject of a serious animadversion; and if it be repeated, the boy is, for a time at least, disenfranchised or subjected again to the system of punishments" (Hill, *Sketch* 44).

This variation of the disciplinary mechanism relies also on the public display of individual records, the contents of the journals that the boys keep for themselves. An intricate accounting system records behavioural debits and credits on a daily basis. The entries and their constant visibility are an "instrument by which [the institution] acts powerfully on [its] pupils in inducing good *conduct*" (46, my emphasis). The conduct sheet's availability, its "ubiquitousness," exerts a force whose purpose is to produce conformity, regularity. At the same time as the ledger reflects changes in behaviour, it enlists the powerful energy of the boys' collective observation, a group gaze. Each boy has the potential to review his school-mates' progress; in turn, the potential exists for each boy to be observed. The account, the individualized items that denote the progress or regression of the boy, subsumes within it his individuality. Identical conduct is the goal. The balance sheet itemizes and displays conduct. But in this display, something changes. Conduct and character become synonymous. Character is limited to, inscribed by, identified with, conduct. The process of observation and entry, the compilation of the account "[displays] at a single glance a boy's *character in all its particulars*, as estimated by his teachers" (Hill, *Sketch* 46, my emphasis). Conduct--now

predominantly, what it is, what it should be, how it is measured--effaces considerations of what else might constitute character.

Conduct demands a detailed examination if compliance to, and variance from, the required standards are to be noted. Moral and legal obligations now exist in an emulsion, the constituent parts of which are to be extracted, refined, used as categories under which the boys are to be measured in the institution's relentless pursuit of the definition of character, the formation of the subject. Hill writes: "We have analysed . . . that very compound quality *conduct*, and have given to each element a distinct place in the account ...[E]ach boy's behaviour is considered, and a distinct entry made under the respective heads, Honesty, Truth, Prudence, &c" (46). The ledger reflects precisely the deviations, both positive and negative, from the behavioural norm. A material representation of the boys' characters, it registers almost instantaneously the control group's "complexion": "Every change in a boy's conduct is followed by a corresponding change in the register" (46). The omnipresent account mirrors what has now been defined as the boy's character. It is as if that character, in the process of its re-shaping, its re-formation, reflects back upon the subject from which it has been abstracted: "every one . . . has always before him a distinct picture of his conduct" (46). The boy, confronted with the results of his conduct, reacts accordingly. Under his own gaze he conditions and disciplines himself.

Such is the importance of conduct, that a cadre of moral police, an institutional conduit for the transmission of information, comes into being. We have seen them already, the "conductors" whose role it was to act as confessors to boys whose journals reflect the

commission of offences against school laws. Now, their function inscribed at the very level of the language by which it is described, they assist in the determination of the boys' own assessments of their conduct. Although the boy may see for himself that his position on the behavioural register has advanced or retarded, this knowledge must be conveyed with certainty. No possibility must exist that the boy is unaware of the results of his actions. Thus, Hill informs us: "[c]hanges in a boy's position in any department of conduct are communicated to him by one of the conductors, and the pupil's success or failure is made the subject of kind and sympathizing consideration" (46). Whatever the extent of the conductors' kindness and consideration may be--and Hill does not elaborate--that charity to his charges is never allowed to interfere with his mission, however: "These explanations afford excellent opportunities for *enforcing the precepts of morality*" (46, my emphasis).

An experiment in the abolition of punishment this variant may be, but nonetheless it forms part of the complex chain of disciplinary relations that holds the school's organization together. An intimate and detailed knowledge of the boy results from the various methods of observation and classification to which he is subject. This particular concentration on the pupil, a focus that extracts elements in order to analyse them, that sets them on display in order to re-inforce standards of behaviour, that provides a way by which the boy is in constant and perpetual dialogue with himself, this confusion of moral government and empirical tabulation has at its root the need to obtain accurate details. We can see that the emphasis has moved from the compilation of an overall assessment to a determination of individual characteristics. "By means of the *account of conduct* we are enabled to estimate a boy's good

and bad qualities with considerable precision" (46), Hill writes. The analysis of the account

provides a statement, based on carefully collected evidence, of the boy's moral health; and

in a manoeuvre that completes the circular, self-disciplinary grip, this same statement now

links him to the overall controlling instrument which the school employs to maintain control:

the ambition to attain rank. "[T]he general result [of the account] determines his rank in the

school, the degree of liberty he enjoys, and his claim to many rewards and privileges" (47).

The concept of conduct, therefore, operates in precisely the same way as the other

inducements to procure higher rank. On the one hand, there is the full employment of leisure

hours, the mammoth translations, the accumulation of credits in order to purchase position;

on the other hand, there is the direction to fulfill what Hill has already described as "the

precepts of morality." Still, the precision of the methods by which the details are known and

examined do not find a counterpart in Hill's description of what constitutes the measure of

conduct to which the boys should aspire: "For a boy to maintain a high position, it is

necessary not only that he should abstain from doing wrong, but that he should evince the

possession of active virtues" (47). In the absence of definition of those "active virtues," the

boys' attainment and maintenance of rank are forever in thrall to the potentially capricious

judgement of their "teachers."

This constant awareness, this surveillance, of the boys with regard to one another not

only works to prevent misconduct, but also instills an element of guilt on the part of the other

group members, a guilt that in turn reinforces disciplinary principles. "[O]ur boys become at

an early age familiarized with one of the most important principles of the rationale of

punishment; namely, that next to the culprit himself those persons ought most to suffer who, by their influence, might have prevented the commission of the offence"(42), Hill explains. Thus this circular system, by means of which no-one is invisible, works as an integral component of the disciplinary process, reinforced and complemented by the related system of rewards and privileges. Both systems nourish each other. Constant observation instills the necessity for behavioural conformity, while the promise of reward encourages the diligent ferreting out of offenders on the part of their fellows: "[I]t becomes the interest of every boy to prevent breaches of the law on the part of all the boys in his circle: and moreover, when an offence is committed, to obtain the enforcement of the law" (Hill, *Sketch* 42-43).

Advancement and demotion cannot be undergone anonymously. In a regime where rank is of the utmost importance, it is necessary that all public gatherings, all assemblies regardless of purpose, recognise the boys' relative achievements. Observation works both before and after the fact. The boys--those rigorous police--observe each other so as to maintain order. Those who contribute most to the establishment and furtherance of that order receive awards which in turn lead to higher rank. And the attainment of rank becomes the subject of universal observation, of recognition, when rank determines one's place, literally and figuratively, among the population:

> The weekly arrangement determined for a time the precedence of the boys. With a few exceptions . . . they sit according to it at their meals: when presenting their exercises to a Teacher for examination, superiority in rank gives them a prior claim to his attention; and it has been seen, that the higher a boy ranks, the more influence he acquires in the election of the Committee, and, consequently the greater is his control in the affairs of the school. (21-22)

The boy's rank is to be recorded, to be given the authority of writing. As a part of the constant procedure that classifies and reclassifies the pupils, working an inexorable comparison of one against the other, that establishes in minute detail the boy's "character," the record keepers compile yet another variety of ledger. This time it is a "weekly register . . . of the rank of each boy" (19). The position of the boys must be made visible. That which is the subject of record and to which the bureaucratic machine continually refers must be promulgated. Rank ceases to influence behaviour if it is not in regular and constant view, if the result of conduct becomes invisible. Thus: "In order that a boy may know exactly the effect of any new arrangement of the school upon his aggregate rank, it is ascertained and published, and *the boys are made to stand in the order of such rank on a certain day of the week"* (19, my emphasis). This routine makes the record's written text more physically visible. No longer merely writing in a ledger, it manifests itself in the pupils' display, pupils who, while their "characters" are being defined, shaped, abstracted, become physical characters in a living, taxonomic register.

High rank carries other privileges. Curiously, given the fundamental structure of the type of school, exemplary pupils "called *par eminence* the students . . . are excused from serving certain labourious offices, as that of Monitor" (22). It is a strange reward, an exemption from the very role the existence of which identifies Hazelwood as a school indebted to monitorial principles. Ironically, Hill seems tacitly to acknowledge the system's inherent weakness when he distances these pupils from part of the disciplinary machinery. These exemplars are also excused from "the regular discipline for the preservation of silence

to which the others are subjected" (22). At both poles of behaviour, then--defaulters and eminent students--language distinguishes a certain otherness. What sets these latter boys apart, reinforcing their exemplariness, is that in the removal of the rule of silence there is the implication that they may converse with one another. This is not the case with defaulters, however, who, we recall, are merely the *objects* of language when they are "called."

The Hazelwood school functions, as already stated, as a little society, a simulacrum of the state. However, it is a particularly authoritarian version of the state upon which it is modelled. The apparatus which the school emulates concentrates on the state's penal characteristics, its machinery of law enforcement, its connections between government and law. Thus, the administrative committees that establish and enforce the day-to-day routine elect officials--"officers"--whose titles reflect the majesty, the spectacle, that signifies the sovereign power of state jurisprudence. The committees have their "Judges," "Magistrates," "Sheriffs," and "Keepers of Records." The position of magistrate is a juridical hybrid, an amalgam of judge and policeman. Not only does he sit in judgement of minor offences--he "decides petty cases of dispute between the boys"--but also he "is expected, with the assistance of his Constables, to detect all offences committed in the school" (7). Thus, in flagrant breach of judicial impartiality he finds himself in the position of trying an offender whom he has personally apprehended. Such an apparatus might have some bearing on the high rate of convictions achieved by the "courts." Hill admits of only two appeals against a magistrate's decision to acquit. In each instance the magistrate's verdict was overturned. The magistrate, then, is an agent of the governing power in the school. Not surprisingly, perhaps,

the system provides for rewards that act as an inducement not only for his continued zealous

performance, but also for the co-operation of the boys among whom his "constables" must

circulate to identify crime:

> At the end of the month the boy who has officiated as Magistrate is rewarded
> with a half-holiday, and in order to secure to him the good will and active co-
> operation of the other boys, he has the privilege of choosing a certain number
> of them to enjoy the holiday with him. This number is estimated by the
> Master, according to the success of the police in preserving order. (7)

This is a system the successful functioning of which is contingent upon the establishment of

a web of relationships. The promise of reward welds every connection. The office of

magistrate is predicated upon return--the "half-holiday" attaches to the position. And the

discretionary power that the magistrate possesses to choose other boys to "enjoy the holiday

with him" is locked to the master's decision as to how many boys should share the reward.

The holidays are an inducement to ferret out transgressors. It is not enough to be "law-

abiding." The magistrate needs the "active co-operation" of the boys in bringing offenders

before the court.

"The government of the school is lodged in the hands of the Master, the Teachers, and

a Committee of boys"(4), Hill writes. The regulatory machinery, for that is what it is,

insinuates itself into the school's administrative structure. With the mutually re-inforcing parts

of the hierarchy as its host, government houses itself within the complex of relationships, both

feeding and *feeding on* the institutional body that it controls. Rank exerts itself in the selection

of the committee even as a variety of proportional representation appears to inform the

procedure. An open meeting of the school determines the "chairman" of the committee, but

it is "the boy who is then highest in rank" who chooses the first member. "[T]he two next in elevation jointly nominate a second; the three next choose a third, and so on to the bottom of the list" (4). Thus, one's capacity to affect the committee's composition is in direct proportion to one's standing in the school. Rank, that "object of great ambition among the boys" (2), confers the ultimate influence in the selection process. The individual character of those in the upper echelons of the school's populace determines the collective character of the committee upon which devolves a degree of managerial responsibility: "[t]he higher a boy ranks, the more influence he acquires in the election of the Committee and, consequently, the greater is his control in the affairs of the school" (22).

The distinction between management and government continues to be blurred. To be sure, when Hill writes "we think it desirable to leave the management of affairs as much as possible in the hands of the boys themselves" (5), he creates an impression of delegated authority. At first glance he appears to be re-stating his theory of school government which, one recalls, is ostensibly similar, "to leave, as much as possible, all power in the hands of the boys themselves" (1). But the "management" of which he speaks constitutes, after all, the execution, the putting into practice of procedures, routines, "laws," that have been formulated by those who *govern.* And the pupils whose influence is most significant in selecting those of their number who will share in government, those possessing higher rank, attain that distinction in large part at the pleasure of the "Master," or "Teachers," who themselves are fundamental to the governing process. By virtue of its self-reflexiveness, the system continues

to discipline the administration, keeping it within the boundaries it sets, carefully delimiting areas of responsibility.

Hill is demonstrably vague when stating the committee's frame of reference, being explicit only when detailing the liabilities from which it is exempt or excluded: "it has the formation of all laws and regulations of the school, excepting such as determine the hours of attendance, and the regular amount of exercises to be performed" (5). What, precisely, "the laws and regulations" comprise escapes explanation. That the school's routine is as regimented as it has been shown to be suggests that the rules formulated by the committee are not particularly significant. Moreover, in yet another instance of the exercise of prerogative, any "laws" that the committee passes must receive the assent of the Head Master. The committee, though, as Hill asserts, is far from being idle:

> The first committee was appointed on the 3d of February, 1817; and although from that time to the present (October 1821), the Committees have been constantly employed in repealing, revising, and correcting the old laws, and in forming new ones, the master's assent has never, in a single instance, been withheld, or even delayed. (5)

What, though, is the significance of the master's singular approval? On the one hand, it suggests an exemplary degree of administrative efficiency on the committee's part; that is to say, it operates at a level of competency such that any regulations that it passes are beyond censure. On the other hand, it implies that its duties are so carefully defined, so regimented, so precise, its composition and execution so disciplined, that assent is never more than a formality. Nevertheless, the laws and their introduction into the administrative domain form a part of the perpetual system of signs that permeates the school. Writing may make the law

permanent, but first it must be proclaimed. Visibility and audibility join together in a public spectacle which announces its legitimacy: "The law is . . . read aloud in the presence of the school, when its operation immediately commences, and a copy is hung in a conspicuous part of the school-room, for at least three days" (5).

Hazelwood's legal system reflects its civil counterpart in many ways. Enforcement of "all penalties levied by the Court of Justice" (7) devolves upon the Sheriff. The penalties generally take the form of a fine, the forfeiture of marks that the boys accumulate for the express purpose of avoiding "imprisonment," which is the alternative punishment. This potential loss of freedom reflects the carceral character of the school, to be sure, but the necessity to restrict movement within an institution where movement is always regulated, measured, defined, goes beyond the mere imposition of punishment. To understand the significance of "imprisonment," one needs to look at the types of crimes with which the court is occupied: "The offences which come before the Court of Justice are, principally, leaving the school before the appointed exercises are completed and examined, going beyond the school boundaries, and falsehood" (11). The bias, it seems clear, lies with attempts by the boys to establish their independence. In a sense, the third category of misdemeanour is no less concerned with the breaking of boundaries than are the others. "Falsehood," and here again Hill is suggestively imprecise, represents a deviance from the acceptable, the delineated, the unquestionable. In the same way, to stray outside the perimeter of the school, whether it be purely the physical confines--the boundaries--or to attempt a breach of the school's discursive regime--escaping the stricture of lessons as well as the restriction of the classroom--represents

a wildness, a lack of identification with place that must be rectified by a period of confinement. Imprisonment, the reinforced constraint of the errant pupil within the school's physical limits, serves further to circumscribe the deviant, reduce his horizons, shorten his focus. It is not simply an institutional revenge, a particular kind of redress that drives imprisonment in this educational environment. Rather, it is the constant need to remind the boys of their identity and, more importantly, their *position, their situation*. No less so than in the state of which the school is but a distorted replica, the boys must be firmly established within the social orders that are pre-determined for them.

The legal paraphernalia that takes hold of the boy from the minute he joins the school, forming, inscribing, moulding him as a homogeneous member of the scholastic body, demands that it pass a final verdict on him when he leaves the institution. In a terminal act of legitimation, the school makes him the object of an examination, a final accounting: "his character becomes the subject of judicial consideration" (13). The process involves a compilation and study of the records that have mapped his progress. The multiple registers to which I have referred reveal the rewards, the penalties, the wealth or poverty represented by his success or failure in the accumulation of counters. This information forms the basis of another report which is "laid before the general Committee" (13). The boy's education has been dictated by an allegiance to the clock, by the necessity to apportion each day as efficiently as possible. Every duty, every function, must have its own official. No opportunity must be lost to ensure the unambiguous delegation of responsibility. Here, as in the meticulous observation, recording, analysing that has typified the boy's characterisation within

the institution, the duties of each official are carefully defined. A "sub-committee appointed for the purpose" prepares the final document. It is a precise catalogue, a moral balance-sheet with its debits and credits: "[T]he boy's merits and demerits are impartially stated; his improvement while at school, his rank and general character, and the offices of trust he may have served, are here recorded" (13). The sub-committee also consults the criminal register. Does the boy's name appear within its pages? "[S]hould his name be found therein, the fact is now brought forward against him" (13). What offences caused its inclusion? Are the entries recent? Hazelwood exists to create a moral subject; it is necessary to chart that creation, to acclaim the institution's success in its endeavour. Thus, offences that form part of the permanent record, that condition the boy's behaviour when he attempts to qualify for the record's eradication, may be looked at less severely now. The record, if not erased by exemplary conduct, remains, but "Offences committed long ago . . . are not unkindly dwelt upon (13). This last reckoning visits a "leniency" upon the pupil that was hitherto invisible--submerged as it was in the regime's constant visibility, its relentless focus--simply because the emphasis now lies with the school's desire to authenticate itself, its practices, its philosophy: "moral improvement is always recorded with pleasure" (13), Hill writes.

Hazelwood has brought its intricate systems, its perpetual vigilance, its webs of disciplinary influences to bear on the boy during his time within the school's confines. Now the product of the regime must be paraded, the result examined. And in this ultimate spectacle, the boy virtually "disappears." The observations that fill the various registers and accounts are now extracted, collated, and compiled into a final composite, the contents of

which will be made available to the rest of the school's population. "These reports are entered in a book, and read to the whole school" (13). It is the record, the evidence, that becomes visible to the others. That which has been formed, the character, is now removed from the boy. The "book" signifies the process. The boy stands apart from the object with which the school has been so concerned to define. Implicit in Hill's following comment is the division between the boy as an individual on the one hand, and a constituted subject, a product of a disciplinary process on the other: "If any boy desire a copy of his character, he is furnished with one by the secretary (13). His "character" is not essential, individual, unique, incapable of definition. Rather, it is now reduced to writing, to evidence. It can be both extracted from and given to the boy in a final act of confirmation. Inscribed and thoroughly written through by the process, the boy has become text.

The control of the student population visibly manifests itself at the level of the body: the school determines how much space it is allowed,[26] it orders its movements, it marches it, arranges it, displays it. Nevertheless, the observation, the recording, the analysis, the formation and re-formation, while choosing as its object that which may be seen (the body), have their final objective, as the psychological aspects of the disciplinary procedures have shown, in the organization of the mind. And the example of those boys who are held up as exemplum for the others must continue to influence the conduct and thought of those they leave behind:"When a boy leaves us distinguished alike for moral excellence and intellectual

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[26]See page 113, and following, of this dissertation for specific considerations of the architecture of the Monitorial school.

acquirements, his name is recorded on a tablet of honour, in order that his memory may continue to *dwell in the minds* of his former schoolfellows," Hill records (48, my emphasis). For the boys who remain in the school, self-discipline now arises from the interaction of two complementary influences. The pupils not only internalize the regime, the physical manifestation of which confronts them daily, but they also respond to the constant and unseen direction of their erstwhile classmates to which their minds play host. Under the silent gaze of the names on the honour role, Panopticism confirms the extent of its ultimate control.

Part Two

Chapter Four

Modelling Minds--Bell's Solution

I

The lower classes ought to be educated to discharge the duties cast upon them. They should also be educated that they may appreciate and defer to a higher cultivation when they meet it, and the higher classes ought to be educated in a very different manner in order that they may exhibit to the lower classes, that higher education to which, if it were shown to them they would bow down and defer (Wardle 25).[1]

As I will argue in the next chapter, Coleridge's understanding of what he calls "method" is integral to his theory of education. It was a contemplation of the educated as opposed to the uneducated that caused him to enter method into the theatre of examination in the first place. And if the very nature of method is open to question--assuming for the present that its nature may indeed be determined--then the politico-educational implications that arise from its consideration surely direct us to the Madras school. Something about the system, its procedures, its routines appeals to Coleridge. Perhaps it is that in his very recognition of the duality that, for him, attends the term "method," he recognises also the relentless processes--or methods--within the Madras site. He may see in these particular methods a practical application of what has hitherto been for him a theoretical exercise. It may also very well be that the Madras system, for Coleridge, constitutes a physical confirmation

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[1]This passage comes from a pamphlet published in 1867, by the politician Robert Lowe.

of what he otherwise was able to describe only at the level of language. It could be argued, then, that the Madras system with its potential for national expansion, its ability to provide widespread control, represents an institutionalised endorsement of what is otherwise only a socio-political theory. In order to determine whether this is the case, and appreciate fully the attraction of Madras for Coleridge, we must turn to the one text of Bell's with which Coleridge was familiar--*The Madras School, or Elements of Tuition*--written in 1808.

The date of this publication is significant because this latter version was the third edition to appear, and, as Joseph Fox pointed out, "Since [1797] the doctor has published two pamphlets, the one in 1805, the other in 1807, with title pages somewhat unlike that of the first, but purporting to be second and third editions of that work" (1). Fox's own pamphlet, in which he accuses Bell of plagiarising Lancaster's theories, formed part of his contribution to the "sterile" debate surrounding the claim to discovery of the monitorial system. The importance of Fox's assertion rests in our subsequent realisation that the document upon which Coleridge founded his enthusiastic approval was considerably different from Bell's original publication. Fox writes: "The first part of the third edition, as far as page 47, with the exception of an extract on writing in page 42, is not to be found in the first edition, and it is arranged exactly upon the same plan of section's as Mr. L's book" (36). If Fox is correct, a heavy irony attends Coleridge's endorsement. Intent on displacing Lancaster, while establishing Bell's claim to authenticity, Coleridge unwittingly ratifies fundamental components of the system that otherwise attracts his vehement disapproval. The importance of Fox's observation reaches far beyond a consideration of whatever type of theologico-

political legerdemain to which Coleridge may have succumbed. If Bell was motivated to alter subsequent editions of his pamphlet so drastically, then there seems to be an implicit agreement between his philosophy and that of Lancaster whom he opposes. Moreover, that agreement must surely exert an influence on the description that Bell provides of his system. We must, then, view with suspicion denials and rejections of the Lancasterian method--whether Coleridge's or Bell's, be they explicit or implicit--as we attempt to define further the nature of the disciplinary process that is common to both practitioners.

The attraction for Coleridge of Bell's philosophy is readily apparent. "The grand and ultimate aim of the Madras system of Education is to spread knowledge and truth--the best friends of virtue and happiness--the sure harbingers of the progress of civilization--and of the diffusion of the Gospel of truth, Bell proclaims" (*Madras*, 92). I speak in the next chapter of Coleridge's preoccupation with the location and definition of truth, and with the authority of the written, as well as the spoken word. For the moment, however, we need to recognize that Bell provides Coleridge with a plan for an institution whose legitimacy derives from an ultimate author for whom Bell is merely the agent. It is a plan the design of which at once appeals both to Coleridge's socio-political vision and to his sense of a social aesthetic. Bell writes:

> The same difference . . . there is between two pieces of ground alike by nature.--The one, rude and uncultivated, overgrown with weeds and thorns, is at once offensive to the spectator, unprofitable to the proprietor, and useless to the community.--The other, a garden richly laden with herbs and fruits, and adorned with plants and flowers, is at once pleasant to the eye, grateful to the sense, profitable to the owner, and advantageous to the public. (93)

Given what Coleridge was eventually to say about the importance of method--and this is a word Bell often uses, as we shall see--the attractions for the poet of a methodical education become quite obvious. It is education, informed by the undeniable truth in whose service it is enlisted that can reform an inherent ugliness in society. Applied at that location where ignorance is most manifest--the minds of the poor--it can work a transformation, the benefits of which are far reaching. Bell does not, apparently, allow for the co-existence of mental ability and poverty. It is the "education of the poor under an appropriate system" that is one of his aims. Clearly, it is the poor that constitute the visible ugliness, the offense to the sensibilities. And if their physical presence is abhorrent, Bell argues, then so too is their intellectual grossness.

> The same is the disparity between the mind, which, rude and uncultivated, is covered with ignorance, and overgrown with error, and that which is enriched with the fruits of useful knowledge, and adorned with the flowers of ornamental literature. (93)

We must read nearly all of Bell's text[2] before we come to his assertion concerning the sector of society for whom his Madras system is designed: "It is for the lower order of youth that this prospectus is intended" (289), he writes, in a chapter where he develops some ideas on the concept of "Schools of Industry." Not that he sees these "lower orders" as being in particular need of a broad education; he asserts, as we have already seen, that "It is not proposed that the children of the poor be educated in an expensive manner, or all of them be

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[2] Bell is a rhetorician *par excellence*. Having devoted most of the text to extolling the undeniable benefits of Madras, he introduces his system's intended subjects at a point where it becomes almost impossible to refute his logic.

taught to write and cipher" (292). He remains silent on the relative sizes of the groups who will, or will not, be taught. The purpose of congregating the children of the underprivileged is, apparently, to prevent crime rather than punishing it. Bell's solution carries within it an identification, a delimitation of that area from which the threat to orderly society emerges. He writes: "This higher and nobler aim, as far as it is attainable, must, it is granted, originate in the right education of the lower orders of the community, by watching over, guiding, and directing their early conduct" (290). Thus, he concentrates on the "right education," and that consists not so much of an emphasis on particular academic subjects, but, as he makes explicit, a continual surveillance, a relentless watch that seeks to form an acceptable compliance with, and subservience to, a particular form of conduct. Neither is it the propensity to crime that constitutes the "lowness" that Bell seeks to eradicate. It is not that criminal activity alone determines one's position within his socio-moral hierarchy. On the contrary, one "qualifies" for inclusion in the ranks of the "lower orders" simply by one's economic position. To be materially poor is sufficient reason to be "convicted." Thus, the poor, despite Bell's comments concerning the need to prevent crime, are "sentenced" to a term of education that comprises a process demanding a cleansing to be undergone, an exorcism of those social demons which, he also implies, are to be found within, and only within, the ranks of the underclass. Justifying the continued maintenance of the existing social order, it is a philosophy that gives Bell the freedom to justify and rationalise the privileges that obtain for the economically advantaged on the one hand, while continuing the chimera of philanthropy on the other.

There is a price to pay for the transformation of the corrupt "lower orders." It is a price, despite Bell's efficiencies, that is beyond reach of his subjects due to their inherent poverty. Naturally, if the poor cannot pay for an education, it must be provided for them. This fact also gives Bell an opportunity to extract the maximum use from a potentially productive resource by means of a combination of educational and industrial institutions. Just as the "sin" of the parents' poverty stains their offsprings' prospects, so too the wealthy are able to foresee a future that reflects the parents' ability to provide for their children's schooling: "Parents will always be found to educate, at their own expense, children enow to fill the stations which require higher qualifications" (292). There is no hint that these elevated stations will ever be peopled by economically underprivileged children, regardless of their ability. Where the "right education" serves as a euphemism for an institutionalised control, so "higher qualifications" is equally as obfuscatory a term. What, precisely, those qualifications are Bell does not say, but privilege clearly remains the domain of those children whose parents can afford to educate them. If qualifications of a higher order are required, and there is no reason to doubt this, the credentials are reserved for a certain class, a class whose security, both in those positions and in the promise of their continued availability, rests safe in the knowledge that the necessary qualifications will forever be denied those from the "lower orders" for whom a more restricted, more disciplined education is envisaged.

Bell is ever cognizant of the existing administrative structure that the Church of England enjoys, and of the advantages that will accrue from that organization if it can somehow be employed in the service of a national system of education, albeit a system

designed to remain separate from government control. And it is a national system in every

sense of the word that he envisages, which is to say that his vision extends far beyond an

outline of a method by which a standard curriculum is to be delivered. At once conceptually

broad in scope while also being narrowly concentrated in its delivery, education, for Bell,

consists of a method by which "the people [may be instructed] in the principles of morality

and religion" (96). In that the monitorial or Madras system lends itself more to national

indoctrination than it does to the universal accomplishment of critical ability, Bell recognises

the importance of a national system as an integral component in a network of institutions

whose ultimate purpose is the furtherance of the nation's interests, domestic or foreign. The

maturity of the state, and of the myriad interests and organisations of which it is comprised,

demands a more sophisticated level of organization than that which allowed it to develop in

the first place. The inculcation of "the principles of morality and religion" is paramount in

Bell's scheme: "no other check sufficiently powerful can be found to the vices of increasing

luxury and other effects of manufactures, trade, and commerce, and of the societies,

communities, and governments, which are verging to maturity" (96). If mercantile adventures

are to be profitable, they must be protected at the point where colonies are to be

appropriated. If raw materials are to be converted by a developing industrial machine, they

must be worked on by a work-force that is stable--socially and politically. Nothing must be

allowed to operate independently. Nothing is to escape the influence of the twin prongs--

morality and religion--that maintains the state's present structure while simultaneously

fashioning its future. The function of that influence is to engender new forms of surveillance--

"no other check sufficiently powerful can be found"--to vitalise existing parts of the apparatus, to replenish them--"An engine of the most general and extensive utility, it furnishes means of giving new strength and force to our army and navy" (96), Bell writes. But this energy does not simply rest content with the maintenance of such bodies as already exist. Bell sees an opportunity within his system to concentrate on a specific form of educational process that simultaneously recognizes the state's military demands and the collection, identification and subjection of the underclass: "Schools for [the army and navy] incorporated with parochial schools for the poor, will grow out of this system" (96).

Thus the appetite of commerce and political expansion must be satisfied by another form of raw material, itself suitably rendered and transformed, shaped and moulded, into a recognizable and reliable conformity. In a decidedly Lockean-informed statement, Bell asserts, "Young minds are pliant and flexible. Like melted wax, they are ready to receive any impression. Like the tender twig, they are ready to be bent in any direction" (103). And what better machine to effect the required conversion than the church: "Nothing remains to be added, no new and unprecedented burden to be imposed, no expense to be incurred for that without which every system is of small avail--faithful, able, and professional superintendence and control" (320). The existing structure of the church makes it ideal for the uncompromising inspection that is inseparable from the concept of Madras: "The schools . . . would naturally fall . . . under the inspection and direction of the parochial clergy--an order of men formed, as it were, for the purpose--subjected to archidiaconal visitation and episcopal jurisdiction and control--the most perfect archetype of the Madras system," Bell proceeds

(320).

Bell rationalizes his design--a marriage of national religion and national education--by returning to what he sees as the undeniable truth of the Bible. It is a belief in an ultimate reference to which Coleridge would no doubt have been attracted. The reverend's strategy is as simple as it is clever. He must first reiterate the unassailableness of the doctrines upon which the state's official religion is founded, doctrines that in their logocentricism justify the invincibility of a Word to which they return and refer in order that they themselves be seen as impregnable. The Word sanctifies itself as a result of what Bell describes as "the eternal and immutable basis, on which the Gospel rests" (100).[3] It follows, then, that any body that is formed from it must be equally resistant to argument, must be as infinite, as perpetual. Thus the church as an organization, secularly designed though that organization may be, enjoys, Bell asserts, a privilege that is indistinguishable from the "truths" upon which it is built. If the primacy of his system is to be put beyond question, then he must in some way establish an impregnable link to a truth that is itself beyond doubt. He has, as we have already seen, promoted the organization of the church as being a natural administrative vehicle for his purposes; and yet to sanction it, to give a secular body the authority of that which is beyond argument, requires the supremacy of a spiritual warrant. He requires a link that resists any doubt concerning "the supreme excellence and infinite sublimity of the superstructure which is built on [the 'truth']" (100). The organization whose potential he recognizes must receive

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[3]This part of Bell's text comprises an extract of one of his sermons, and is, as might be expected, especially moralistic.

the ultimate affirmation. Bell appropriates the Gospel therefore, enlists its assertions regarding truth, and inserts them as the cornerstone of his own design. "[W]e must infer," he argues, "in the words of the Apostle in the text, 'other foundations can no man lay than that is laid, which is Jesus Christ'" (100).

Bell's ambitions are not limited to efficiencies, to the advantages that may be gained from an existing administrative structure. The combination of church and educational institution--whatever the latter term might mean for him--provides an opportunity for the increased subjectification of those members of society to whom his efforts are directed. Merely to recognize, to promote, to assert "the truth of the doctrines of the Gospel" (100) is not sufficient for his purpose. The simple declamation of that which he deems to be beyond doubt is to repeat the obvious. To be effective, to justify his own zeal, it requires an audience, a population whose ignorance becomes a target, and whose eventual conversion validates the efficacy of the "truth" which is brought to bear upon them. With the recognition of the Word comes the responsibility to promulgate it. The "truth," then, exerts a pressure both on those to whom it is to be introduced and on those who have chosen to deliver it:

> The more firm our belief in the Gospel, the higher our admiration of the transcendent excellence of its doctrines, the stronger our sense of their obligation, and the greater the comfort, the peace, and the joy, which we derive from this source; the more will it appear our indispensable duty, to diffuse among those, who stand in need of them, these inestimable blessings. (101)

For Bell, education, delivered, of course, by the application of Madras, is a natural consequence of his socio-religious analysis. He is, however, quick to affirm the qualifications

of the clerical orders for the service that he envisages for them, enlisting the confirmation of the highest authority possible as he pursues his argument, and demonstrating how the ability to teach the Gospel implies a divinely ordained mission.

If his scheme for the education of the underclass must be seen to have divine sanction, then not only must the "truth" of his theory be established, but also those who are to instruct, to carry out the purpose, must be similarly favoured. Precedent for the authority of the teacher must be found in the Word. The ostensibly Christian and socially responsible act of delivering the underclass from ignorance and poverty transforms the message of the Gospel into daily practice. It is difficult to censure a system that is putatively grounded in the duty to "'consider one another to provoke unto love, and to good works'" (101). The establishment of schools such as Bell envisages, with their concentration on the underclass, their desire to form useful citizens, their inculcation of the National religion and its doctrines, satisfy, from his perspective it would seem, the requirement demanded by Holy writ. The institutions, that is the edifices themselves, the constructions, their physical presence, in turn comply with the supplementary Biblical admonition to which Bell also refers: "He requires of all of us . . . that . . . 'our light so shine among men, that they may see our good works, and glorify our Father which is in Heaven'" (101). This is an appropriation of the Gospel and a self-serving justification *par excellence*. For if the theory of the Madras system can first be shown to be the "true" way to enlighten the disadvantaged, then the structures, the buildings that are converted for the purpose are incontrovertible evidence of the "good works" of which Bell speaks. Evidence, certainly, but these constructions perform an additional

function: they give a concrete, identifiable shape to what "good" actually is. By their presence, by the statement that they make, by their identification with the transformation, the conversion of something *other*, they also mark that "other" as the very opposite of their own inherent goodness. In the act of proclaiming what is "good," they also define what is bad. And if this is the case, then their proliferation serves to delimit the areas against which they are called into opposition. The proclamation of goodness necessarily demands its opposite in order for goodness to function, to have meaning.

Bell, however, must still subsume the education of the underclass within the dictates of the Gospel, must establish irrevocably the divinity of the mission on which he is engaged. His task, it seems, is to draw a parallel between both what he describes as "an appropriate order of men for the ministration of the Gospel in his church" (101), and the schools that he promotes. He links the two by first expanding upon the composition of the "order of men" to whom he has referred. They are, he writes, "apostles, and some prophets, and some evangelists, and some *pastors and teachers*" (101-102 my emphasis). The requirement now is to collapse the distinction between the message of the Gospel, its abstractions, its theory, and to transform it into a secular practice. The "saving health of the Gospel" (102) must be given a target, a population to whom it will be applied, and Bell needs to show by what means this medicine will be delivered. He quotes with an apparent authority, stating that "the friends of religion, throughout the Christian world, have formed various plans, and *auxiliary institutions* . . . for 'the healing of the nations'" (102 my emphasis). He thus positions himself to argue further the utility of his schools. Indeed, of all these institutions, "there are none

more deserving of attention, or better fitted to the end proposed than charity, or free schools"

(102). That education--and we must always take this word in a qualified sense--indicates for

Bell something far more closely defined than instruction, becomes apparent when he

continues:

> It is among the young, then, that the ministers of Christ are to look for their
> chief success, in imbuing the mind with moral and religious principles . . . and
> in forming the character and disposition of the lower orders to industry,
> frugality, and obedience. (103-104)

Bell is never under any misapprehension concerning the material upon which his efforts are

to be brought to bear. He recognizes the near-impossibility of changing ingrained, established

modes of behaviour: "On men, grown up in evil habits, and inured to a vicious course of life,

we know from high authority, as well as from experience, that it is difficult to produce a

change, or work a reformation" (103). On the importance of making the young his subjects,

he quotes from Proverbs, using exactly the same passage that the Glasgow Normal Seminary

appropriated for its motto: "' Train up a child in the way he should go, and when he is old he

will not depart from it'" (103).[4]

Not content to ground his efforts in the authority of the Gospel, Bell sees also what

one might describe as a supernatural transformation taking place at the time when children

are instructed. The act of instruction, he would have us believe, becomes something other

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[4]See page 85 of this dissertation.

than a Gradgrindian inculcation of facts, the impression of information.[5] It is now an act of

creation. The stocking and storing of the mind is a physical process; it can do more than refine

or cultivate that which already exists, that which is already known. But the instruction of

children on the moral level, a much more highly elevated plane than the physical, involves the

transition from one world to another. It is not simply that the nature of the duty is of a higher

order--although Bell continues to make clear that this is indeed so. Rather, the teacher, the

instructor, the pastor, undergo what seems to be a transfiguration: "[They] surpass, as it were,

the limits of this terrestrial globe--this mortal state" (109). Bell refers to the ends of education

when he speaks of teachers breaking boundaries. It is not the act of teaching itself that

transcends the mortal limits. Even Bell would not make such a claim; but it is the effect on

the young who are being taught that exceeds the confinements otherwise suffered as a result

of an instruction whose capability is limited only to a hope of "improvement of art and

science" (109). This is magnificent stuff indeed, worthy of the prophets to whom Bell alludes

earlier. To exceed the mortal compass, as he asserts, demands more than a divinely inspired

effort, indeed requires more than action that can be justified by reference to the authority of

the Word. Creation is impossible without the sanction of God, and to create "young

candidates for eternity" (109) necessitates that the teachers become "'workers together with

God'" (109). And yet, Bell reflects, to be simply God's co-worker might not be enough in the

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[5]It is impossible to disregard the irony that emerges when comparing this assertion to his earlier affirmation concerning the intention of teaching only some of the poor to "write and cipher"to which I refer on 94 of this dissertation.

eyes of the pupils. If God's work is to be done, it must be seen to be done, it must be seen and understood by the subjects who are being groomed for eternity. There must be no space, no schism between God and the messengers who are doing his work. The teacher and God must be indistinguishable. There is nothing beyond the presence of the teacher to whom the pupils may refer. If the constant gaze in the schoolroom constitutes an omniscience against which the boys have no appeal, it is the omnipotence of God in human form to which they are subject: "[W]e are, if I may so speak, in the place of God to them," Bell tells us (109).

The religious inspiration that lies behind Madras also leads to a complex form of social colonization. When the purpose of the "Christian philosopher [lies in] discovering and bringing into notice every living soul around him, which has heretofore escaped observation, which has no place in the rolls of Christianity, to which the book of God is still a dead letter" (110-111), it does not matter, ultimately, where such lost souls are to be found. The principles that underlie Bell's founding his establishment at Edgemore in India are freely transferable to those areas in England whose occupants constitute further fuel for an educational process that he describes as "so powerful an engine" (114). That which makes the system so attractive for Bell, the feature that he relentlessly promotes, is its efficiency, its economy: "By its economy of time, labour, and expense, it is admirably fitted to diffuse the blessings of religious knowledge among the great body of the rising generation" (113). In Edgemore, the system's development was experimental, its subject population relatively small in number; in England the refinements could be brought to bear on a larger scale, the advantages of Madras applied nationally. And when the objective is to achieve an "improvement" in society's "lower

orders," to increase their productive power while increasing the observation to which they are subject, the vehicle by which this is most likely to be achieved is one whose "power of checking vice of every kind, and promoting good order and good conduct [that] cannot fail to elevate the character and improve the morals of the lower orders of the people, and establish in them habits of sobriety and subordination ..." (113). Always the emphasis is on the establishment of "good" habits, on the creation of a sense of duty, of obligation, of gratitude to the state and its government just as there is always the repetition of the need to foster subordination. Concerning the Madras system Bell was

> deeply impressed with a sense of its importance in every point of view to the public and to the individual; and especially as an engine fitted for the instruction of the people in morality and religion, and for *training* them in *habits of subordination,* of industry, and of well grounded attachment to the government, under which they enjoy so many blessings, *the only rational ground of attachment, which they can either feel or comprehend.* (128 my emphasis)

It is an unthinking, insensate material that he perceives to be the objects upon which he will concentrate the energies of his system. The underclass's allegiance must be bought, and as simply and economically as possible. Obedience is assured when loyalty may be purchased simply by the provision of "blessings." So the poor are to be shaped, their behaviour made to conform, their place confirmed. Whatever education they might receive, it is not of a sort that is likely to foster ideas of emancipation. Their conduct is not simply to be prescribed; the object of the disciplinary process is to make their behaviour habitual, self-imposed; it will, in other words, make them predictable. What is most desirable for them, what they need in order to function usefully, what it is that will make them happy, all this is to be decided for them.

The "habits" which they will form will be "conducive to their real happiness and best interests" (113). Which is to say that whatever it is they are experiencing without the confines, the strictures, the examination resulting from a constant, methodical system, whatever they feel, whatever might currently ameliorate their condition, is of little or no account. For if the desired regularity of their behaviour, indeed of their very existence, is instrumental to "their real happiness," then whatever else it is of which they might be sensible must necessarily be "unreal," must have no inherent value, cannot participate in the very goodness that is to be imposed upon them. And their best interests are, of course, to serve the state in the manner decreed. The extent of their formal education will also be determined for them. What constitutes the correct amount will be decided by the apologists for the system by which they are to be subjected, as Bell's prescription makes clear: "[I]nstruction [will be limited to] the elements of letters and . . . that portion of religious knowledge, which is useful and necessary to the great body of the children of the poor, to a small part of the day, (two half-hours may suffice)" (113). Two limits, then, one a result of the other, operate on the children. Limit one: the content, the amount of instruction that is not, it seems, designed to promote the ability to think or reason, but simply to recognize; "elements of letters," a token improvement in literacy. Limit two: The amount of time to be spent in such instruction, a period the extent of which evades definition--"a small part of the day, (two half-hours may suffice)." These are limits that evidence the provision of education while simultaneously opening up the possibility of extracting more labour from the institution's subjects: "the rest

of the time usually spent in school [will be devoted to] handicrafts, to trades, to gardening, to works of husbandry, or other manual labour" (113).

If the development of the system in India was experimental, then it is the implementation of something that has been tried and tested that Bell envisages for England. It is as if he sees a need to stamp upon Madras a uniquely British seal, a kind of "Made in England" endorsement, that, while it owes its prototypical first steps to Edgemore, must, nevertheless, undeniably associate its success with the sovereign power at the centre of the expanding empire. Bell recognizes the system's potential regarding the subjugation of those whom Britain will colonize: "This most successful mode of propagating Christian knowledge, and industrious habits, with the elements of letters, we may . . . hope, will gradually spread, like any mechanical invention or improvement, over the civilized world" (114). It is not sufficient, though, that his system merely be exported. Those upon whom the task of instruction will eventually fall must also *believe*. And Bell is ever aware of the difficulties inherent when attempting to reverse the habits, the routines, the patterns that constitute the adult. "Upon men advanced in years, and confirmed in their habits of thinking and of living, it is always difficult to make any great impression, so as to produce a change or work a reformation; and perhaps this difficulty is increased in foreign parts" (153), he writes. A difficulty, certainly, but not one that resists a solution, for in the very population to whom the benefits of Madras are to be delivered, Bell will find the flexible, pliable material that will absorb belief, imbibe his message, will so discipline themselves that the system may be

impressed--undiluted and as inflexible as ever--on "those regions, which are now barbarous and savage" (114).

Yet it is more than just a matter of overcoming a certain adult inflexibility, of overturning long ingrained habits. Monitorial discipline demands that the child himself be the agent by which the process is effected. And before that process can be fully internalized, before each individual turns the system back upon himself, the method must be made known to him, must be made recognizable, must be understood in the language that he uses. At all times the rules of order, and the method that they both evidence and ensure, govern the selection of those who are to implement the system. The gap that exists between the adult and adolescent sensibility, experience, perception, resists the essential communication that must take place, silences almost before they are articulated, Madras's principles of order: "It is a more difficult task to train ushers--men grown up in different habits, and drawn from occupations widely different, to that knowledge, *order, method*, and inflexible, but mild discipline, essential to the right conduct and just improvement of their pupils" (156 my emphasis). This is not to say that the inflexibility of which Bell speaks is the only consideration for the disqualification of adult ushers. It may have been no easy task to re-form adults--"I found it difficult beyond measure to new model the minds of men of full years" (156)--but once this had been achieved, Bell had produced a "commodity" whose market value exceeded the financial capabilities resulting from the stringent economies of which he was so proud: "whenever an usher was instructed so far as to qualify him for discharging the office of a teacher of this school, I had formed a man who could earn a much higher salary

than was allowed at this charity, and on far easier terms" (157). Regardless of the age of his subjects, and the purpose of his attentions, Bell's objective is to form, to give shape, to homogenize. It is not that he restricts the application of his principles to schools run on the Madras system. On the contrary, he sees the universal application of that which has been developed and perfected in his schools, "good order, taught according to that method and system which is essential to every public institution" (156). Thus, one institution feeds on, relies on another. And at the centre is the school, producing the material that is to be ultimately consumed by the state in institutions that duplicate the method and order to which the pupils have been conditioned. It is necessary that at the school--this first stage of "manufacture"--that independence be eradicated, that obedience, unquestioned and predictable, be the result. At Edgemore he strips away all superfluity, dispenses with paraphernalia, and concentrates on the boys' minds in order that they be prepared for instruction. He could do nothing until "[H]e had trained boys whose minds [h]e could command, and who only knew to do as they were bidden, and were not disposed to dispute or evade the orders given them" (158).

It is not, then, philanthropy that drives Bell to look for suitable subjects in England to be instructed. It is a political manoeuvre that confirms the necessity of duty to the state on the part of the instructor, while inculcating the pupil with belief, with doctrine:

> It is by forming [children] to habits of diligence, industry, veracity, and honesty, and by instructing them in useful knowledge, that [the teacher] can best promote their individual interest, and serve the state to which they both belong. (153)

Arguably, there is an even more pragmatic purpose that underlies Bell's desire to bring the

benefits of Madras to England. It is easier to view the system's progress at home rather than

abroad. There is, that is to say, a distinct element of an applied panopticism at work, a system

of observation that monitors the working of the growing network of systems. He writes: "It

is, at all events . . . advisable to begin where you can direct the operation of your charity,

watch over its progress, *witness* its success, experience its beneficial effects, and reap the

fruits which . . . religion alone can produce--good morals, frugal industry, orderly conduct"

(115 my emphasis). Rather than the school itself being the limit case, as it were, of

surveillance, of inspection, the larger community of which it is part exercises its own

vigilance, effects its own control. Charity now demands accountability, requires physical

evidence of the success of the system that it enables. And it is the potential for

superintendence that, for Bell, constitutes the advantage of which the people to whom he

speaks must be made aware. The provision of the necessary funding contains within it an

inherent right to view--whenever and wherever it is thought fit--the objects that are being

worked upon, the subjects that are being created. Now, the finished product or the subject

that is in the process of re-formation can be brought into the church to be, literally,

examined.[6]

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[6]In a footnote, Bell explains that "The scholars of the charity were, during the service, examined in the church."

II

The true perfection of discipline in a school is--The maximum of watchfulness with the minimum of punishment. (Coleridge *Sermons* 40).

Like his Lancasterian counterpart, the Madras boy is subjected to a rigid routine. A scrupulous standard attends and determines the way in which a boy learns to write and shape his letters. He uses no paper or writing instrument to begin with. Rather, he will practice "in sand spread over a board or bench" (158) using his finger to trace the outlines. With one rapid movement the record can be erased and the letters begun anew. It is Bell's efficiency carried to the limit, but one that he rationalizes not as an economy but as proof of "a practice which . . . will elucidate a passage in holy writ" (158).[7] The continual repetition of letters becomes a useful and evocative metaphor for the school system. The relentless shaping and re-shaping, whether of person or letter, typifies Madras. The sand box becomes the principle of the school reduced to its most basic form. Out of the sand, a shapeless non-conforming entity, the boys form letters that must agree in every respect--size, form, distance from each other--with the standard that Madras imposes. The cyphers of one pupil will, ultimately, be indistinguishable from those of the next. All are on constant view; all are contained within the confines of the

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[7]The footnote here reads "'Jesus stopped down, and with his finger wrote on the ground.' John viii. 6--We see here every day customs and practices illustrative of the Scriptures" (158). It is surely significant that Bell should cite the one passage from scriptures that shows Jesus writing. That is, drawing on the power of the Word to justify his system, Bell uses a citation that is evidence of a supplementary writing to give his argument additional force. John's account does not relate what it was that Jesus wrote. Thus, while Bell authenticates monitorialism by reference to the Word, he turns to writing whose content we cannot know in an effort to render his position unassailable.

box. It is as if the boys write themselves even as they are themselves being defined, being written upon.

In the same way, the principles of constant attention follow the boy when he begins to put his letters together, to form words, to write on paper. He must provide a sample of his letters which the teacher inspects:

> Each boy writes in the first page of his copy, or other book, ruled for the
> purpose, from the largest to the smallest hand, a line of each; when the teacher
> on comparing this specimen with his former book, singles out that hand which
> it is fittest the scholar should write. (165)

The most desirable example having been determined, the pupil must inscribe, as a perpetual reminder of the required standard, a sentence, the existence of which in his book functions as a constant sentinel, a silent enforcer of the model to which he is to adhere. Not only does he provide this example, but also, in the very act of writing it, he subjects himself to punitive measures should his performance decline. The boy contracts thus: "This hand I am to keep to in writing throughout this book; and should I deviate from this rule wilfully and through carelessness, I am to be brought to punishment according to the regulations of this school" (164). Every sign that he is required to make is subject to the same regulation, to the same standard of conformity: "[I]n the books of ciphering this sample page contains the signs in arithmetic, instances of the different ways in which they are used, and fractional numbers expressed; so that the learner may never be at a loss for the patterns by which he is to go" (164-65), Bell confirms.

Discipline in Madras concentrates itself in its minutest forms on the smallest units. It

takes the pupil and breaks him down, concerns itself with his actions, makes them the object

of an all-embracing entity whose purpose is the re-creation of a body, the individual parts of

which are regulated, defined, formed. If the pupils' letters are to be indistinguishable from

each other, for example, if the boys' writing is to be in all respects the same, it is not enough

that a vigilance be brought to bear on the execution of forming letters. The desired uniformity

depends on an identical method of writing. That is, the very mechanics of recording a sign

must itself be designed, regulated, managed:

> For holding the pen (and even the pencil, which is sometimes put into a case
> of tin, or a quill,) the following brief rules must here suffice,--... 1st, Sit at a
> convenient distance from the table;--2d, Let the body rest principally on the
> left arm;--3d, Rest the right arm slightly on the edge of the table, between the
> wrist and the elbows;--4th, Keep the right arm near your side;--5th, Let the
> hand rest on the little finger, having the one next to it bent a little inwards;--
> 6th, Hold the pen loosely;--7th, Let the top of the pen point to the right
> shoulder;--8th, Keep the point of the thumb opposite the first joint of the
> forefinger;--9th, The point of the pen to be nearly an inch from the end of the
> finger. (83)

If the ultimate objective in this demonstrably infinitesimal interest in position, distance and

angles is a concern purely with the most efficient method of the writing process, then it may

evidence, in the monitorial school, what Foucault has termed "a general theory of *dressage*"

(*Discipline* 136). Alternatively, however, this meticulous attention to line and form might

serve another purpose. The geometric precision with which the pupils extend through

themselves the architectural planes of the very buildings that confine them, functions also to

identify at a glance the non-conforming child, to see at once him who breaks the uniformity

of the line, the design, the pattern. Thus, the knowledge that such deviation is perpetually

visible works also to impress upon the pupils the need to maintain the common line, the essential continuity. This is the reason, then, that expulsion from school represents the most severe form of punishment. If expulsion is "a fatal and deplorable issue, which every possible means should be employed to obviate" (*Mutual* 65), it is not because of the stigma that attaches to the boy who is ejected. The ejection of the non-conformist is a disgorgement, an evacuation of the scholarly body's *other*, the presence of which constitutes evidence of failure, not just of the pupil but of the system itself.

Constant accounting and comparison seek to ensure that the pupil produces both the required quantity and quality of work. In this way the boy's work functions to measure his own output, his own productivity, while at the same time it is used to compare him with the other pupils.

> Every day he puts down in his books, with a pencil or otherwise, the day of the month, at the termination of his day's task. And on a page at the end of his book, he daily registers the number of lessons said, pages written, sums wrought . . . which the teacher compares with what he did the day before, and what the other boys do; and, at the end of the month, these are all added by the scholar, and compared by his teacher with the former month, and what has been done by others in the school. (165)

The evidence of the boys' books serves also as a check on the ability of the master and the teachers. The same comparison that charts the individual pupil's progress records as well the efficiency, the success, of those who are charged with the function of teaching. Lessons and results are pared away to their barest essentials, Bell explains: "In all this there is nothing but what is simple, easy, and beautiful. The teacher of every class, and his assistant, are answerable that, in the performance of the daily tasks, one single, invariable rule be observed"

(165). Consequently, the required standard of conformity is ever-present, ever-influential. The gaze of the teacher, with its attendant certainty of potential observation, itself becomes even more efficiently delivered. For the teacher does not function as the location within which the authority, the reference, for the mandatory standard exists. That point has been displaced with the inclusion of that standard in the book and resides now within the gaze of the pupil. Thus the boy turns his own observational eye on himself, monitors his ability to produce and reproduce, allows the teacher to concentrate on the detection of deviation, as opposed to the additional task of ensuring compliance. When every movement--every slope and slant of the hand--is subject to this "one single invariable rule," punishment no longer functions as a means of effecting a reversal of the incorrect completion of a whole operation or exercise. Punishment derives its force, its majesty, from its ability to mirror the magnitude of the offence. Now that the slightest divergence is certain of detection, punishment diminishes almost to the point of invisibility, works to correct the difference none the less, but is no longer recognizable as such: "The nice sensibility among the teachers, when the least error is detected, is astonishing, and almost always supersedes the necessity of punishment" (165).

This disappearance of punishment is, we must recognize, only virtual. Punishment operates before, not after, the fact. And along with the transformation in the nature of the punishment we also witness a change in the master's role. It is a change that must be the eventual outcome of a system defined as "'a new mode of conducting a school, through the medium of the scholars themselves'" (Bell *Mutual* 16). Concerning masters, Bell writes, "Their duty is not to teach, but to *look after* the various departments of the institution, to

observe that the daily tasks are performed . . . to *mark* any irregularity, inattention and neglect among the teachers or the scholars" (*Madras* 167). The boys and their teachers are both subject to a close scrutiny on the part of a person whose role is limited simply to the management of the school, whose concern rests neither with the quality of the boys' work nor necessarily with the quantity, but with its completion. The school's administration separates each function, extracts the maximum efficiency from the operative upon whom the duty devolves. At every level of the operation, the optimum economy is to subject the largest number of subordinates as possible to review: "So many teachers, each having only the tuition of such a number of boys as he can at once have under his eye, and within his reach, command a constant, and perpetual attention on the part of the scholar" (172), Bell adds. And the "little teachers" (172) are, moreover, subject to a constant evaluation by those whom they teach, a body capable of delivering a disciplinary verdict of its own, Bell makes clear: "[A]mongst our pupils, there is no hesitation in degrading a teacher who fails in any of the tasks required of him, and making trial of another, till, by repeating the experiment, you find such as will best suit your purpose" (173).

Bell begins the fourth chapter of *Mutual Discipline and Moral Tuition* with the following quotation from the antiquarian scholar Quin:

> The whipping of boys I cannot endure, though the practice is common, and is not disapproved of by Chrysippus. *** Lastly, if an assiduous exactor of studies watch over the scholar, there will be no need of this castigation (chastisement). But as matters now stand, through the negligence of the pedagogue (tutor), boys seem to be so corrected, that they are not constrained to do their duty, but punished for not doing it. (62)

At once an especially revealing statement, given its opposition to corporal punishment (a method of correction about which Bell is unambiguous), it is also significant for its enunciated principles of control that Bell appropriates in Madras: "The entire machinery of the New School, is fitted to prevent idleness and offences, to call forth diligence and exertion, and thereby to supersede the flagellation, which he so justly reprobated" (63), Bell explains. To be sure, Bell sees the failure that beating symbolises, but his rejection might not be as humane as it seems. A philosophy whose methods are predicated on the performance of "correct" action as opposed to "incorrect" behaviour surely implies correction in some form or another. If punishment is, by and large, to be avoided, then not only must the prescribed behaviour be minutely articulated, understood and absorbed in its most fundamental units, but also the most meticulous records must be kept. Certainly these exist to confirm the success of the methods employed, but they act too as silent, accurate policing instruments. Variations may be instantly noted and displayed, as a result of which the apparatus that ensures conformity may be further refined. Bell, although concerned, as he must be, with the strictures, proscriptions, constrictions and demands that shape the behaviour of his pupils, nevertheless concentrates on the result of this apparatus. He does not employ mechanical aids such as Lancaster's telegraph, although the image of the machine informs every element of Madras from the movement of the pupils, to the learning of lessons, to the full employment of time.

Bell's epigram is significant for the clues to the disciplinary nature of Madras that it contains. This obscure quotation that Bell has culled from the crumbling parchments of antiquity reflects much of his pedagogical theory. The principle around which both the

quotation and the Madras system are organized is that of a constant vigilance: "an assiduous exactor of studies [must] watch over the scholar." What Bell does, with his dispersal of the teaching function, the reproduction of the pedagogue, his dispersal throughout the school, is to ensure that the scholars are indeed watched over. But he takes the process of surveillance further. If he can turn the process of teaching inwards so that the boys instruct themselves, if he desires to make them *manage* themselves, then he must surely be able to enlist them in the process of surveillance. The ultimate achievement of the disciplinary process in the Madras system is that it results in the pupils actually watching themselves.

III

It is in his *Mutual Tuition and Moral Discipline* that Bell reveals to the greatest extent his educational theory. His apparent aversion to corporal punishment, his reluctance to employ physical means to ensure the order that he requires, support his identification of that part of the body with which he is ultimately interested: "The Madras System of Education . . . has its seat in the *infant mind*," he writes (16 my emphasis). This is not an assertion that is as trite as it might at first appear. To be sure, it is the infant, or more precisely, the young child's mind with which he is concerned in his efforts at formation, in achieving uniformity. It is those children too, or at least those who show the most promise, who will become the actual teachers, whose successful subjection results in the ultimate transfer of teaching duties from one site--the master--to another--themselves. In that respect also, Bell is concerned with

the training, the regimentation of their minds. But, as he states, the system "has its seat in the

infant mind," which is to say something much more significant. He speaks, in fact, about what

for him is an undeniable natural law: "There is a faculty, inherent in the human mind, of

conveying and receiving Mutual Instruction" (16). On the one hand, then, he justifies his

system by seeming to ground it scientifically, verifying it by what he argues to be a methodical

examination: "It is . . . entirely practical and grounded on experiments" (16), and yet, on the

other hand, the congenital capacity of which he also speaks confirms the theological basis, the

existence of an irrefutable truth to which he will always return:

> It is this faculty, or rather the development, exercise, and application of this
> faculty, that constitutes the Madras system . . . though it has been applied in
> the first instance, to the science of education, and the art of tuition--an *organ*,
> not the work or invention of man, but 'Donum Dei,' 'the gift of God,' which,
> like the principle of gravitation in the material world, pervades, actuates,
> invigorates, and sustains the entire scholastic system. (17)

Thus, the "discovery" that Bell makes is not simply that boys can replace teachers, that his

methods are proof of "a new mode of conducting a school, through the medium of the

scholars themselves" (16). Though he purports to have discovered the existence of a facility

that "had lain hidden for ages in the human breast" (17), "[f]ounded on an innate faculty of

the human mind, a principle . . . powerful in operation, and *universal in operation*" (17 my

emphasis), his hyperbole obscures the definition of what it is he has unearthed. He can write

that "this system will last as long as man remains constituted as he is at present--as long as

the power of interchanging thoughts, by speech, writing, and printing, shall endure" (17). He

can also enthuse "nor will [the system's] extension be limited by any other bounds than those

of the habitable globe" (17). Rather than having discovered an essential feature that will revolutionize teaching, he has stumbled upon the application of panopticism, the recognition that the internalizing of disciplinary methods is somehow productive. Unconsciously, perhaps, he recognizes the "true" universal property of his "discovery": *"On this principle, a superior can conduct any institution . . . through the instrumentality of its own members"* (17 my emphasis). He identifies, although he does not define them, the efficiencies that arise from a well-ordered system of surveillance, of constant attention to detail: "In a school, it gives to the master *the hundred eyes of Argus, the hundred hands of* Briareus . . . By multiplying his ministers at pleasure, it gives to him indefinite powers" (17-18). Bell's extraordinary figure of speech reveals a preoccupation with the necessity of panopticism's certainty of observation. To be sure, in some myths Argus possessed many eyes, but Briareus (a member of the Hecatoncheires), in addition to having multiple limbs, also had fifty heads, a detail from which we might imply a somewhat panoptic capability of his own.[8] Thus it seems that Bell is anxious to reinforce the importance of observation to monitorial discipline--explicitly and implicitly referring to eyes--while augmenting this image of mastery by affirming that the boys will never be beyond reach of "the hundred hands."

Emulation, the continual striving by students to displace those higher in the order of ranking is, as has already been demonstrated, a basic principle of monitorialism.[9] Its

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[8]See Grimal, pp. 17, 76, 171,

[9]See, for example, page 50 and following of this dissertation.

implementation demonstrates the existence of what, for Bell, is yet another natural law in that

he sees the drive to achieve higher rank as something more than a motivation that can be

instilled in his pupils. The desire arises from a resident pre-disposition, "another principle"

(18). He may initially locate this "principle" in the heart--"the human breast" (18) as he puts

it--but if Madras "has its seat in the infant mind," then it is there that he must situate the

principles upon which the system rests. And this principle, "that of a virtuous and generous

emulation, . . . is peculiarly predominant in the unsophisticated and uncorrupted mind of

youth" (18). The principle cannot be allowed to lie dormant. It cannot be productive without

the necessary stimulus. The desire to progress, the tendencies to ambition may already exist,

but they must be cultivated, encouraged, promoted: "the motives and inducements, which the

Madras System comprehends within itself, take a strong hold on the infant mind" (64), he

asserts. Thus Bell justifies his system on the grounds of an undeniable faculty, implicitly refers

its existence to an immanent authority, and yet cannot allow the undisciplined development

of the mind; he must deliver "a powerful operation in producing diligence and exertion, which

are never suffered to flag" (64). The effort is unceasing, the movement of pupils from one

rank to another continual. Certainly, in common with other monitorial institutions, the many

books and registers (Madras has at least six different categories) record the boys' daily

behaviour, their successes and failures, but the pupils' position is never constant, stable or

guaranteed: "[T]he first and grand law . . . is, that every scholar finds for himself his level,

and unceasingly rises and falls in his place in the form, and in the ranks of the school,

according to his relative performance " (60). The school becomes more than simply a place

of competition. It is a demonstrably violent space that Bell describes, in which the pupils are in constant opposition with each other: "In short, the law of equalized classification, renders a school an *arena*, in which rewards and punishments are every moment assigned to the scholastic *combatants*, according to their good or ill success" (64 my emphasis). Observation must be relentless. "Every moment" must be accounted for if the process of reward and demerit is to function.

More than the boys' academic performance determines their place in the school. Behavioural aberrations also result in their "degradation." "[L]ow utterance, reading fast, or in a singing or drawling tone, indistinct articulation, being unsteady, inattentive, holding down the head, not standing upright, or in the proper place ..." (64), these are offences that mark the student as being alien to the order, the uniformity, that the school demands. The voice must be pitched at the same level, words read with the punctual predictability of a catechismal chant. The body must conform to the lines that are drawn around it and through it. It must correspond to the overall geometry that delimits the space that it inhabits. It must not be allowed to stray from that location with which it is identified. Every body situates itself in accordance with its behaviour. The agreement of conduct and place is ostensibly physical: the pupil conforms and he takes up his position; he belongs, he is identifiable. And as such, he contributes to the creation of a dependancy. He becomes disciplined to associate himself with his place, and his behaviour ensures his continuance there. Physical it may be, the manifestation of his conformity or deviance from the standard that is required, but just as the system "has its seat in [his] mind," so too are the effects of non-conformance visited there,

and continue to exercise a psychological control, as Bell confirms when he writes: "The loss of more than one place, being attached to any offence, will, in a well regulated school, be sensibly felt by the *tender mind*" (65 my emphasis). To appreciate more fully, however, Bell's recognition of the role of the mind in the successful operation of Madras, one needs to go back to the introduction of his *Mutual Tuition and Moral Instruction* where he writes: "The intellectual lever, now discovered, requires no new planet, no distinct fulcrum on which to rest. The seat of its *power*, and its *operation*, is equally in the infant mind" (3 my emphasis).

In Madras, every action, reaction, sound and sign must echo, reflect and reinforce the set standard. It is not enough that content be absorbed, that "every scholar be taught to rehearse prayers, graces, catechisms"(68) on a daily basis. The purpose of the repetitions is to enforce the imitation of the very sound by which the evidence of the memorised material is made manifest. Thus the pupils repeat their lessons "in the style and *tone* of a good reader, which all will soon be able to do" (68, my emphasis). Again, it is the pupils' youth, their essential malleability at that time "while the organs are pliant" (68), upon which the perceived success of this practice depends. And it is a persistent process that seeks to stamp the boys with the mark of conformity, a constant attention that has the pupils "unceasingly repeat [the material] with their instructors and fellows" (68). Uniqueness of intonation or pitch, variation in speed of delivery, distinction of enunciation, all are subsumed within that norm of verbal delivery, what Bell defines as the "better manner" (68).

Regardless of the transformation in the role of the teacher to which I have referred, it is questionable whether Madras is, in fact, the model of efficiency that Bell and his imitators

hold it up to be. It is necessary to determine how many teachers there actually are, and what happens in the transformation of teacher to master and vice versa. The assertion that one master can instruct a thousand boys might well attempt to mask what is obvious, what Bell in fact admits and makes plain. It is already clear that the master and the surveillance function are indivisible. While the pupils are engaged in their lessons, the master maintains a constant watch over them. It is as if by virtue of his monitors and their dispersion through the school (and here we recall Bell's reference to Briareus), the master's eyes are multiplied, the application of his mastery made tentacular. But the vehicles by which the activity of the school is noted, regulated and reported upon--that is the monitors--must themselves be supervised, must perform their duties as a result of the application of the regime of which they are part:

> After all, however, it is absolutely requisite that the master exert his utmost vigilance and discretion, in overlooking all his ushers and teachers, and in preventing, or in stopping, on its first occurrence, the smallest irregularity, or deviation from rule. (74)

It is not that the teaching function has undergone a miraculous change, that it benefits from a metamorphosis that alters the very *meaning* of what it is to teach. On the contrary, it is the *process* that becomes the subject of a vast devolution. The system demands, as I have already shown, that that which is to be taught be broken down into the most basic units. And the monitors, whose function it has become to teach the material, convey those units to the other pupils. It is impossible to foster an atmosphere in which an overall critical faculty may develop. The orderliness of the mass of students depends upon their concentration on one

point at a time. Thus the "sixth practice" that pertains in a well-regulated Madras school: "Each child is . . . taught to reduce every sentence into its component parts, which, by *fixing* the eye, the voice and the mind, on a *single* idea, tends at once to the utmost distinctness in reading ..." (80 my emphasis). The objective is a singular concentration. Every part of the child must co-ordinate to determine the idea, ingest it, repeat it so that in its articulation, in the distinctness that is sought after, no room exists for an interpretation other than that which is to be instilled. "In the initiatory lessons, each child in turn reads a single *pause*, that is, the smallest portion of a sentence, which conveys a *distinct* idea" (80). If what is to be taught is to be minimalized, it is because that which is to be understood must also be reduced to the smallest possible unit. The pupils recognize ideas as discrete, isolated. Madras trains their attention to search for the one inviolate truth.

For Bell, an idea resides at the heart of everything. Order obtains both in the quest for this truth and the subsequent examination by which the pupils demonstrate their "understanding." At no time does Madras promote an analysis by means of which the connections or relations between ideas may be determined. Regardless of the length of what is to be read, the same principle remains. What is to be understood, and the method of proving that that understanding exists, must be uniform, standardized. The procedure is formulaic; it reinforces an unyielding servitude to a hermeneutical pedagogy that insists on "meaning," on "truth." And in the unfolding of the process, the distinction between teacher and pupil dissolves even further. For now the understanding buttresses itself by an apparent subjection to questioning, as Bell shows: [W]hen the lesson has been read, the members of

the class, in succession, question one another on its meaning ..." (80). That is not to say that they endeavour to establish a meaning for themselves by submitting their interpretations to the intellectual analysis of their fellows. On the contrary, it seems that the questioning has no purpose other than the regurgitation and repetition of what has been already decided upon as the essential truth, the meaning. If any latitude remains within which individuality might be expressed, it is brought under control and eradicated by the discipline that delimits the nature of the questions themselves. Only the right questions may be posed. Questions, the answers to which may cause debate concerning the meaning of the lesson, will be ruled out of order Bell makes clear: "The teacher and assistant act as umpires; seeing that no fit questions are omitted ..." (80). The very pupils upon whom the responsibility of teaching hitherto rested now exercise a totally different function. They operate to enforce the terms, the rules that govern the conduct of the "scholastic combatants."[10] By their legislative function, they do not simply determine or enforce the limits of allowable discourse, but participate in the *production* of monitorial pedagogical discourse itself. Truth and meaning, in this arena, are *themselves* devoid of truth and meaning. That which emerges to be designated as true does so only as a result of the type of questioning that the "umpires" permit. Yet it is not only the questions that are permissible, that which is allowed to be voiced that influences the shape, the form, the content, of what the school admits to be true. There is also the influence of that which is not heard, that which is thought, perhaps, but which must be silenced, stifled, suffocated even

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[10]See page 240.

at the moment of its birth: "[N]o unfitting [questions may be] asked" (80). Under such circumstances, the truth is not even allowed to define itself in terms of what it is not, because whatever it is *not* must not be voiced. Meaning, in the Madras system, acknowledges no other; it suppresses and denies its inherent other*ness*. It is inflexible; it will suffer no assault. Its existence continually seeks to re-establish itself by its refusal to admit the possibility of anything that calls its immanence into question. Thus the very notion of what it means to question, what precisely a question is, constitutes a problematic that arises from a consideration of what occurs in the pursuit of meaning in the Madras school. Because if the results of the system--in this sense, the pupils themselves--can be traced back to the operation of the inherent principle, the law about which Bell speaks, then the principle of emulation is important not only in the act of answering, of achieving a uniformity of response, but also in the formulation of what passes for the question itself. If the truth can only appear in one acceptable form, then so too must the question whose shape causes meaning to emerge: [T]he incitement of emulation operates as well in the *art of questioning* as answering," Bell writes (80 my emphasis).

This delimitation of the acceptable has another purpose. The success of Madras depends, as I have shown, upon the removal of the teaching function, as far as is possible, from the figure who oversees the operation. At the first level of succession, those upon whom the responsibility now rests are still identifiable as teachers. They stand apart from the pupils

they teach, they are authority figures in miniature. If Masters stand in the place of God,[11] then

the teachers that they create stand in their place, become representative of the central

authority, ensuring a recognizable and inescapable authority:

> The new power, which the system of Mutual Tuition puts into his hands,
> furnishes [the Master] with ample measure and means for the performance of
> this important duty. When not actually present himself, he is *virtually* so, by
> his faithful ministers, with *every* child, *every moment of time*. (72 my
> emphasis)

The movement embraces the total student population. Thus the process must continue to

infuse the pupils who are being taught, must make them part of the scheme, must involve

them even as it teaches them. The disciplinary function of Madras reaches its optimum when,

in the transfer of the recognizable teaching duty from one to another level, yet another

responsibility emerges to fill the space now created. Teaching gives way to managing. And

if those boys--that special cadre to whom the duty to teach is first given--are to fulfill the

demand of passing that duty still further, if they are themselves to be part of the overall

management, then a change must take place in the remainder of the pupils. They too must

teach: "Thus is the grand spring or principle of the Madras System--the tuition by the scholars

themselves, actually carried to its utmost limits. *Every child becomes his own teacher* ..." (80

my emphasis).

But the process does not now terminate; the regime does not satisfy its appetite for

control by the imposition of a dominant management sector. Discipline in Madras is not the

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[11]See page 222 of this dissertation.

result of an unquestioning obedience to the demands of a government class that it spawns from within itself. It is not that the process runs out of material upon which to operate once the teaching function has devolved to the limits of the student population. Once located there, the transformation from teacher to manager turns in on itself, replaces one function with another within the very body which is being taught. Tuition may have been "carried to its utmost limits," but beyond those limits exists the capacity for the body that is "taught" to be thoroughly inscribed. And so the endless disciplinary routine continues. Boys become teachers, become managers, manage themselves, return--thus managed--to become teachers again and jettison the teaching function in order to manage. This internalization of the necessary means of control lies at the heart of the system. To be a teacher, then, is to be something considerably different from that which the term might connote in the twentieth century. We must not read "teachers" as being synonymous with managers, or even as that word's cover, its subterfuge, its camouflage, although in Madras this is always partly the case. Rather, we should read it as "managed." To be elevated to the rank of teacher is to be recognized as having thoroughly imbibed the narcotic with which the system would subdue its pupils. To become a teacher is to demonstrate one's total subjugation, one's capitulation to the grinding machinery that takes individuality and consumes it in the service of uniformity. We might well now read, from a different perspective, Bell's assertion which follows his comments on the questioning process designed to ensure understanding :

[A]ll children are qualified to become teachers, by being habitually practised in the highest duty, in point of instruction, belonging to that character; and a lasting foundation is laid for their invariable attention to the sense of all they read, not only as scholars, but, what is far more, as teachers." (80)

Chapter Five

Church and State: Indications of Coleridge's Social Vision

I

Now, I say, that for this establishment the church presents to the state the most appropriate facilities and advantages, which the fondest friends of the system could have framed in its behalf (Bell *Madras School*, 320).

Alan Richardson's previously mentioned concern at the so-called Lake Poets' endorsement of monitorial schools constitutes a point of departure from which to examine Coleridge's enthusiasm for the Reverend Andrew Bell's Madras system. Richardson writes, "Southey, Coleridge, and Wordsworth . . . were quite active in framing and disseminating the ideology of the monitorial system. It represented for them a radical cure for England's social ills and political unrest, a means for facilitating and justifying colonial expansion ..." (95). In light of these comments, it may have been the poets' recognition of the carceral potential in the monitorial school that allowed them to "give [it] such vocal and, for a time, unqualified support" (95). This is an unsettling proposition concerning a group who, as Richardson argues, were "usually seen as defenders of the child's freedom and imagination" (95).[12]

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[12]The received notion of Romantic imagination has been called into question (see McGann's *Romantic Ideology*), and Richardson's statement must be taken under advisement. The relationship of imagination to Coleridge's theory of education is vital, as is the necessity to define in what sense the word is being used. As will become obvious, it is important to appreciate the importance that Coleridge places on the child's imagination. Given that the description of the monitorial school system so far provided seems destined to destroy creativity, his support for Madras seems, initially, all the more paradoxical.

Richardson's question about the Lake Poet's ambivalence to monitorial schools deserves an answer. It is to be found, perhaps, not by searching the tracts and pamphlets of monitorial apologists, but by examining what Coleridge and others say about education. We might understand the extent to which ideas of what constitutes an orderly society inform monitorial theory by determining first the educational philosophy of those critics that endorsed it, and then bringing those positions to bear on the institution itself.

In May of 1808 Coleridge delivered a lecture--"On Education"--at the Royal Institution in London. His lecture notes have not survived, but Henry Crabb Robinson reported on the lecture in a letter to Mrs. Clarkson some four days later. According to Robinson, Coleridge "began by establishing a commonplace distinction neatly between the *objects* and the *means* of education" (*Works* 5: 105). Robinson's letter does not explicitly state the objective. However, given that he repeats the "cardinal rules of early education" which, for Coleridge, constituted "the means of forming the character" (105), we are left to deduct that formation of character is also the object. Paraphrasing Coleridge, Robinson writes, "[T]he cardinal rules of early education [are] . . . 1. to work by love and so generate love: 2. to habituate the mind to intellectual accuracy or truth: 3. to excite power" (105).

When Coleridge speaks of the necessity of love in the educational process, he is saying that a child learns best in an atmosphere of mutual respect: "'[L]ittle is taught or communicated by contest or dispute, but everything by sympathy and love. Collision elicits truth only from the hardest heads'" (106). It is, perhaps, comments like this that lead some critics to equate the monitorial system with Gradgrind's school in Dickens' *Hard Times*. R.A.

Foakes, for example, writes:

> A further irony emerges in the gap between Coleridge's lofty idea of
> education as educing the best from within the pupil, and the essential concern
> of the Bell-Lancaster systems, which was, in the wake of the French
> Revolution . . . only to provide enough knowledge for the basic needs of the
> lower classes in a pattern of monitored rote learning; the shadow of Gradgrind
> hovers in the background .... (197) [13]

Coleridge's concept of "love" is complex, as is his vision of a national system of education.

Recognising this, then, we must not simply dismiss as an aberration the imponderables posed

by his enthusiasm which William Walsh has described as a "rhapsody in praise of Bell's

monitorial system" (14).[14]

It is by no means certain that Coleridge ever set foot inside a school that was being

run on monitorial principles. Indeed, the only slight evidence of his being exposed to an

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[13] The Gradgrind allusion is only partly correct. *Hard Times* begins: "Now what I want is
Facts. Teach these boys and girls nothing but Facts. Facts alone are wanted in life ... You
can only form the minds of reasoning animals upon Facts"(1). To be sure, the insistence
on facts and nothing but facts is exactly the pedagogical style against which Coleridge was
speaking. However, we must remember that Dickens wrote his novel some forty-six years
after Coleridge's first lecture on education, and that, moreover, Gradgrind's school was
not run on monitorial lines at all. Indeed, by that time the classroom system had replaced it.
It is not so much that "the shadow of Gradgrind hovers in the background." Rather, it is that
Coleridge anticipates the direction in which elementary education might go. Nevertheless, as
Foakes implies, while the inculcation of facts alone might be of concern to Coleridge, the
confinement and regimentation are not.

[14] In a chapter of *The Use of Imagination* that otherwise provides a useful insight into much
of Coleridge's concept of the child and elementary education, Walsh does not come to a
conclusion on the poet's support for Bell. He is content to reject it as one of Coleridge's
"surprisingly few . . . ecclesiastical absurdities," and one that is irrelevant to "the civilisation
implicit in Coleridge's thought" (14). I shall argue that in the context of Coleridge's
perception of the child, his acceptance of Bell's system was, on the contrary, especially
relevant.

operational monitorial school comes in an entry in one of his notebooks where he writes

"Langour and Procrastination are learned by Boys waiting to say their Lessons" (Coleridge

notebook 3348).[15] Wordsworth, though, had long been an advocate of Bell's,[16] as is evident

from a letter that he wrote to Francis Wrangham in October of 1808: "Since I wrote to you

I have read Dr. Bell's book upon education which no doubt you must have seen, it is a most

interesting work and entitles him to the fervent gratitude of all good men" (De Selincourt,

Letters, 245-246). This is not to say that Wordsworth's interest was at all an isolated one.

Indeed, Coleridge was by this time in communication with Bell, to whom he wrote in April

of the same year: "I have been more than usually unwell; and I trust that it will be of no

material result, if I send you, as I assuredly will do, the sheets tomorrow" (Coleridge, *Letters*

691).[17] The content of these sheets gave Coleridge much of the background for the lecture

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[15]Kathleen Coburn confirms that this note and the three that come after it "record a visit to Ackworth school" that Coleridge made in July or August of 1808. She goes on to wonder, "Was this comment a quotation from a conversation with teachers, or a result of such conversation . . . It is the kind of observation that would readily be made by an advocate of Dr. Bell's 'Madras System'" (Coleridge *Notes* 3348). Alternatively, it might well indicate an apparent fault in the Ackworth school which, by the time that Coleridge visited it, was being run on Lancaster's principles. Coleridge's dislike of the Quaker was already well advanced by this stage.

[16]The interest was shared by Dorothy Wordsworth who was to write in August of 1812: "I am helping Dr. Bell arrange and correct his various publications in one work--and this employs me constantly--and I suppose will do so for a fortnight longer" (De Selincourt, *Letters* 521).

[17]Griggs, in an editorial footnote to this letter, comments on the "sheets" as follows. "Coleridge had borrowed the sheets of Bell's The Madras School, or Elements of Tuition: comprising the analysis of an experiment in education, made at . . . Madras . . . to which are added, extracts of sermons preached at Lambeth; a sketch of a national institution for training

on education that he delivered at Bristol in May of that year. In fact, it seems that 1808 was

the year in which Coleridge was most involved with Bell, although they would continue to

meet intermittently until as late as February 1813.[18] It is during 1808 that he wrote most of

the letters, and his meetings with Bell were most frequent during that time. By May,

Coleridge was becoming thoroughly embroiled in the controversy regarding the origins of the

Madras system, and, in a letter dated May 17, he assures Bell that he has had no "impulse

from you respecting Lancaster; . . . and that, on the two (or three) times in which I had had

the pleasure of meeting you, you had evidently *waived* all discussion on that subject" (706).

Coleridge, then, was evidently greatly impressed by Bell himself, although, as indicated, the

two met only sporadically. To an "unidentified correspondent" he writes a letter, part of

which at least is as self-congratulatory as it is complimentary to Bell: "That same day, I saw

Dr. Bell & was pleased, highly pleased with him--for it is one of the privileges of a virtuous

man, who has confined himself to the Society of good & wise men, that he has a sort of

intuitive knowledge of an eminently good man, the first hour he is with him" (694). Despite

their meetings, no mention is made of whether Coleridge visited a monitorial school with Bell.

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up the children of the poor; and a specimen of the mode of religious instruction at the Royal
Military Academy, Chelsea, 1808. Letter 694 shows that Coleridge was using these sheets in
preparing his lecture on education" (691). Kathleen Coburn, commenting on Coleridge's
notebook entries, writes: "Coleridge perhaps had already seen [Bell's] first publication, *An
Experiment in Education made at the Male Asylum of Madras (1797)*" (Coleridge *Notes*
3291).

[18]One of Coleridge's notebook entries on March--April 1809 shows Bell as a subscriber
to *The Friend.*

Moreover, his sons Derwent and Hartley had for some years been attending a non-monitorial school in Ambleside under the instruction of a Mr. Dawes, and continued to be educated there even while Wordsworth was working to install Bell's system at Grasmere. That Coleridge's boys should be exempt is not altogether surprising. For one thing, as I argue shortly, monitorialism, with its emphasis on order and obedience in its pupils, reflects Coleridge's model of a state organized along class lines where the potential to be educated is inherited with one's "blood," as Foucault would put it.[19] As early as 1798 when he wrote "Frost at Midnight," Coleridge would reveal his hopes for a privileged educational place for Hartley. While the father had laboured under the gaze of a "stern preceptor's face," (37)--an image that brings to mind the monitorial schools' central managing master--the son, Coleridge envisions, would "... learn far other lore / And in far other scenes! For I was reared / In the great city, pent mid cloisters dim" (50-52). Coleridge's educational theory as it provides for those without the advantages of blood is closer, as we shall see, to the dull, unimaginative schooling, ideas of which he invokes earlier in the poem.

Wordsworth's keen interest also did not easily translate into practical action. As late as November 1811, when writing to Sir George Beaumont whom, incidentally, Coleridge had initially interested in Madras, Wordsworth was able only to admit to trying to install the Madras system in Grasmere: "I have been the means of *introducing* the plan here, that is we are trying to have it adopted, and the present Master who is a worthy Man gives into it with

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[19]"The blood relation long remained an important element in the mechanisms of power" (*Sexuality* 147), Foucault writes.

great spirit; but I am sorry to say he is not likely to remain with us" (472). He goes on: "We

had the pleasure of seeing Mr. Bell here with Southey for half an hour, two thirds of which

were spent in the School, he kindly taking upon him to teach the Boys, and also the Master

and myself" (472). Significantly, his comments reveal that whatever he might have done to

introduce Madras, it was still in an elementary state of advancement since not only

Wordsworth, but the master, too, required teaching by Bell himself. Moreover, and even more

important, Coleridge, by now hard at work with the publication of *The Friend,* and installed

in rooms in Fetter Lane in London, was not in the party. Given Southey's inclusion, Coleridge

might well have not lamented his own absence. He was to become annoyed at the delight with

which Bell read some of Southey's comments concerning the Reverend's doctrine:

> Good Dr Bell is in town--He came from Keswick, all delight with my little
> Sara, & quite enchanted with Southey. Some flights of admiration in the form
> of questions to me--('Did you ever see any thing so finely conceived?--so
> profoundly thought? as this passage in his Review on the Methodists?--Or on
> the Education?'--&c--) embarrassed me in a very ridiculous way--and I verily
> believe, that my odd way of hesitating, left on Bell's mind some shade of a
> suspicion as if I did not like to hear my Friend so highly extolled--Half a dozen
> words from Southey would have precluded this, without diminution to his
> own fame--I mean in conversation with Dr. Bell. (354)[20]

Coleridge's only other contact with Bell during that time consisted of a letter which he wrote

to the Reverend on November 30, 1811. The ingratiating tone of its conclusion[21] tends to

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[20]The "Education" to which Bell and Coleridge referred was probably an early draft of
Southey's *The Origin, Nature and Object of the New System of Education* which he published
the following year.

[21]He writes: "May the Almighty bless and preserve you, my dear sir! With most unfeigned
love and honour, I remain--and till I lose all sense of my better being, of the veiled immortal

deflect one's attention from what might, arguably, be a hint of Coleridge's recognition of the

system's inherent weaknesses.

> I wrote a long letter to you concerning the sophistications of your system at
> present in vogue, the inevitable consequences on the whole mass of moral
> feelings, even of the dissenters themselves, and the courage, as well as
> fortitude, required for the effort to do one's duty. But I asked myself why I
> should give you pain, and destroyed it. Yet come what will come, the subject
> shall be treated fully, intrepidly, and by close deduction from settled close
> principles, in the first volume of the recommencing *Friend,* which I hope to
> bring out early in the spring .... (349)

Typical Coleridgian ambiguity clouds the concerns that he has with Madras's sophistications,

and the promised treatment in *The Friend* did not materialise. Nevertheless, it seems quite

clear that he was struggling to reconcile to himself the aims of Bell's system with the means

of their attainment. Perhaps the necessity to obtain a commitment from potential subscribers

to *The Friend* played a part in his reticence; we shall never know.

The circumstances surrounding Coleridge's sanction of Bell do, however, coincide

historically with his production and publication of *The Friend.* If, as Barbara Rooke argues,

"*The Friend* . . . occupies a central position not only in his life, but also in his thought"

(Coleridge, *Works* xxxv), it seems likely that his writings in that periodical may help determine

the nature of a position that has been seen as paradoxical by so many critics. From the outset

his intention was to produce a journal that was to be philosophical in content, as opposed to

concentrating on the contemporary political climate. In a letter to Humphry Davy, December

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within me, ever must remain--your obliged and grateful friend" (Coleridge, *Letters,* 349).

14 1808, he outlines his intentions.[22] They are illuminating when considering the social aspects

of the educational system upon which he would eventually bestow his approbation:

> I do not write in this Work for the *Multitude*; but for those, who by Rank, or
> Fortune, or official Situation, or Talents and Habits of Reflection, are to
> *influence* the Multitude. I write to found the true PRINCIPLES, to oppose false
> PRINCIPLES, in Criticism, Legislation, Philosophy, Morals, and International
> Law. (Coleridge *Works*, xxxvi-ii)

Coleridge does not on this occasion, at least, specifically mention education. While it may be

legitimately argued that he speaks here in terms so broad that a variety of interests could

claim common ground with him, it seems to me that the very foundations upon which he

proposes to publish *The Friend* incorporate much that informs the socio-theoretical base of

Madras. His demonstrable preoccupation with the truth, with morals, with legislation, have

their counterparts in the religion, that is, the Anglicanism, that unites Church and State for

both him and Bell. The prospectus for *The Friend* mirrors their mutual concern for what they

both see as the "truth," and its location in its indivisibility from Nature:

> The *Object* of "THE FRIEND," briefly and generally expressed, is--to uphold
> those Truths and those Merits, which are founded in the nobler and permanent
> Parts of our Nature, against the Caprices of Fashion, and such Pleasures, as
> either depend on transitory and accidental Causes, or are pursued from less
> worthy Impulses. (Coleridge *Works*, 18)

Moreover, he expands when listing "[t]he chief subjects of [his] own Essays," to include

"Education in its widest Sense, private and National" (18). Not surprisingly, given his oft

demonstrated penchant for failing to live up to his intentions, Coleridge fails to look at the

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[22]Rooke advises: "It is still the tersest description of the theme and content of *The Friend*"
(Coleridge *Works*, xxxvii).

subject "in its widest Sense." His references to actual monitorial schools are rare, and his

specific comments upon the operation of "Madras" in the classroom non-existent.

Nevertheless, we must examine the comments that he made on monitorialism if we are to

understand the reasons why he was attracted to it.

II

It is not always from Coleridge's original thoughts that we can appreciate his

educational philosophy. His endorsement, his valorisation of others, is also informative--

witness his evident admiration for Bell. That he is never very far away from considering, in

the same breath, education and the need for social control is evident from *The Friend* of

January 25, 1810 where he includes "Sketches and Fragments of the Life and Character of

the Late Admiral Sir Alexander Ball" (Coleridge, *Works* II 287). Having revealed an anxiety

that certain texts cannot be assured of being distributed solely among "the educated classes

of society" (288), Coleridge paraphrases the Admiral's views on society in general:

> [N]o Body of Men can for any length of time be safely treated otherwise than
> as rational Beings: and that, therefore, the education of the lower classes was
> of the utmost consequence to the permanent security of the Empire, even for
> the sake of our Navy. (288)

This is not to say that Ball and, presumably, Coleridge, envisage the extension of education

to the underclass as a means, necessarily, of improving their lot. On the contrary, Coleridge

displays a very succinct grasp of the psychological implications of partial education. He

realises that the provision of education to a portion only of the "lower classes" is to promote

dissatisfaction among them. Hence he asserts:

> The dangers apprehended from the education of the lower Classes, arose
> entirely from it's (*sic*) not being universal, and from the unusualness in the
> lowest classes of *those* accomplishments, which He, like Doctor Bell,
> regarded as one of the means of Education, and not as education itself. (288)

Although the possession of these "accomplishments" among the lower classes clearly

constitutes a danger for Coleridge, as indeed it does for Bell, the precise nature of the threat

lies in their unequal distribution. For education to subject thoroughly and efficiently, it must

be delivered universally to the intended population leaving no-one unattended. A population

homogenously educated will have no cause to look among its own members for leadership

when no one member is better educated than another. The argument in this passage addresses

one of the very fundamentals of pedagogical theory, the debate concerning the ends and the

means of education. The outstanding accomplishments are not to be made the objective, are

not to be taught, but are in some way to be utilised, appropriated, and ultimately effaced. The

pedagogical ends, then, are not to produce accomplished citizens whose abilities will serve

as an example to others. Rather, the purpose of a universal[23] education is to diminish the

recognizable differences, to remove the potential for discontent by making the distinguished

no longer distinguishable. It is, perhaps, why Coleridge, while remaining silent on the actual

definition or expansion of the accomplishments about which he speaks, uses a footnote to

explicate what education means to Bell:

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[23]"Universal" must be read in a qualified sense as applying only to the underclass.

> [Education] consists in *educing*, or to adopt Dr. Bell's own expression, *eliciting* the faculties of the Human Mind, and at the same time subordinating them to the Reason and Conscience; varying the means of this common end according to the sphere and particular mode, in which the Individual is likely to act and become useful. (288)

Coleridge emphasises the fact that he sees social stability as arising from a concerted program to homogenize what he has defined as the "lowest classes." He sees very clearly that their discontent, always a potential, might well be mobilized in the event that a privileged few among their number become noticeably educated. To a thus far uneducated populace, the distinction between an adequate and inadequate education is purely a matter of semantics; they are unable, because unequipped, to judge. Education, whatever that might mean in this context, has little to do with raising the standards or conditions of those who are to be its subjects. If a lack of universality poses a potential threat, so too does the recognition among the lower orders of those in their number possessing the unusual "accomplishments" about which Coleridge writes.

It is a subtle process that blurs the subsumption of these never defined accomplishments by Bell's educational incubus. Initially emancipatory in its appearance--its objective ostensibly to elicit, to liberate one might say, "the faculties of the Human Mind"-- Bell's version of education frees in order to circumscribe, releases only to determine. The very faculties that are supposedly to be released never enjoy their freedom. They are emancipated in name only, and for a fleeting period of time. Ostensibly set at liberty one moment, they are instantly enthralled to the dictates of "Reason" and "Conscience" the next. The intent, it seems clear, is to extract that which is identifiable with individuality, to locate, define and

expose to inspection that part of the pupil that attests to his particularity in order to change it, shape it, control it, to render it, and therefore the pupil, an indistinguishable part of an envisaged homogeneous sector of society. And the "end" exerts a constant influence. The end, "this common end," the subordination of individual faculties to the authoritarian dictates of "Reason" and "Conscience," determines the means to be employed in a process whose objective is to provide "useful" material for the state.

The nature of the accomplishments, then, the character and distinguishing features of those facets of certain individuals that comprise the threat from within, as it were, is never actually defined. It is enough to recognize the potential for discontent that arises out of an unequal distribution of faculties, of abilities, of potential. And in the tacit recognition of this potential lies the reason for the drive to educate the underclass. The potential constitutes its ability to resist, and it is to this barely articulate opposition that the educationalists respond. Ball, to whose ideas Coleridge has been paying homage in the passages quoted, does not see any disequilibrium being driven from a wild, uneducated mob. Rather, he perceives a danger if that same mob were to be manipulated by those few who possess the very faculties the possession of which it is the purpose of Madras and its derivatives to eradicate: "If, he observed, the lower Classes in general possessed but one Eye or one Arm, the few who were so fortunate as to possess two, would naturally become vain and restless, and consider themselves as entitled to a higher situation" (288).

If the potential for reversal is to be contained by Reason and Conscience, it is to these moral guardians that we should now turn, not the least since it is very clear that Coleridge

does not see them simply as mercenaries in the employ of an intellectually superior class: "[I]t follows of necessity, not only that all men have Reason, but that every man has it in the same degree" (295). Moreover, since "Reason applied to the *motives* of our conduct, and combined with the sense of our moral responsibility, is called the *Conscience*" (295), it necessarily follows that Conscience is also omnipresent. Thus, what he has already described as controlling agents (to which are to be subordinated the autonomous faculties that, if allowed to operate unrestrained, constitute chaos and disorder), already exist within the very persons over whom they will exercise dominion. To subordinate the mental faculties to Reason and Conscience is, then, at once to determine the nature of the discipline to be imposed while turning it back upon oneself in the ultimate example of self-control, that is, *self-discipline.*

It is not simply that the consideration of Reason and Conscience is necessary to the internal discipline upon which the Madras system depends, although undeniably, for Coleridge, they form an indispensable part. Rather, they are inseparable from what becomes his educational theory: "Reason consists wholly in a man's power of seeing, whether any two ideas, which happen to be in his mind, are, or are not in contradiction with each other" (295). It is a simplistic, dismissive definition invested with typical Coleridgean authority, and yet we can appreciate how this works in tandem with Madras in which Reason and Conscience exercise a more carceral function, a more overtly sovereign control. Whereas Coleridge can define Reason as a "power," a capability, a necessary tool whose purpose is to determine the agreement or "contradiction" of co-existent ideas--implying thereby the independence, the autonomy of the subject--in the service of the Madras school, Reason operates to deny that

autonomy. Placing itself at the pinnacle of a hierarchy consisting of the faculties that are released for inspection, for classification, it determines which are acceptable and which are not.

Coleridge was to philosophise on Reason at considerable length in much of his writing, and although there are indications here of the interest he would later exhibit, nevertheless it is Bell's socio-political vision of education that informs his commentary. It is not that education is ever a means to an end. Rather, it is the end itself, "this common end" (288), and the means employed are always determined by a consideration of the eventual social station of those being educated. How and in what way they are to be educated, to what extent their mental faculties are to be emancipated is always dependent upon "the sphere and particular mode, in which the Individual is likely to act and become useful" (288). The decision, it seems, is already made for the pupil. The institution, exercising its authority, determines his function, his utility, his place; determines in what area he is most likely to "become useful," and the methods, procedures--the means--of the Madras educational machine adapt themselves to form the required, pre-determined subject.

III

I soon found that, if ever the school was to be brought into good order, taught according to that method and system which is essential to every public institution, it must be done either by instructing ushers in the economy of such a seminary, or by youths from among the pupils trained for the purpose (Bell *Madras,* 156).

What are we to say of Coleridge the educational theorist? As Satya Pachori writes, "Coleridge never produced any extended work on his philosophy of education" (26). Certainly, Coleridge did not concentrate on producing an educational treatise along the lines of Bell, Lancaster and others--indeed it would have been most unlike him to complete such a work even if he had begun it. However, his educational musings "scattered in his letters, poems, lectures, speeches, comments in strange places and in incidental remarks such as his notes on Jeremy Taylor" (26) can be rewarding for their content, if not for their organization. G.H. Bantock writes, for example:

> It seems strange that a person like Coleridge, superficially so disorganised in his life and writings, so chaotic in the setting forth of his ideas--so that they often have to be educed from ephemeral journalism, notebook jottings, or occasional writings as well as from more sustained work--should, nevertheless, when examined, display such coherence of attitude and general orientation ...." (92)

Some of Coleridge's work--his first essay in the series, "Essays on the Principles of Method"[24] in *The Friend,* his specific lecture on education delivered on May 3 1808 in Bristol, and

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[24]Both Bantock and Knights refer to this essay. Neither writer, however, looks for the socio-political implications in Coleridge's ideas on method. Indeed, they give the essay a somewhat cursory treatment.

another lecture given in Bristol on November 18, 1813[25]--constitute a very clear statement

of what he considers education to be. It is with the essay concerning method that we must

begin.

Coleridge's thoughts here are important because, unlike his lectures, he deals with

education abstracted and removed from the consideration of a specific system. He leaves

himself free to think through what he considers to be the fundamentals of what it means to

be educated, pondering the ends, as opposed to the means. And yet even as he first poses and

then addresses the question with which he opens his essay, "What is that which first strikes

us, and strikes us at once, in a man of education?" (Coleridge *Works* 4, 449), he implies that

the answer will be applicable only to those who benefit from a certain kind of education, that

they will be from a certain class. Education in this context is something different from that

envisaged to be delivered to Bell's charges. And this in turn leads us to question in what sense

Coleridge uses the term "Method." The word is important enough that it forms part of his

essay's title, and yet, as his argument unfolds, it becomes clear that the term has little to do

with the routine, the administration, the mechanics of Madras. What begins to emerge is that

method, for Coleridge, is proof of a universal order, a taxonomy that ensures one's relative

place, a register against and by reference to which, society can be continually arranged. Such

a consideration is applicable, among other things, to the more mundane requirements of

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[25]The text of the first lecture has not survived, as I have previously mentioned. Similarly, only very brief notes of the second lecture are available. However, the *Bristol Gazette*, November 25 of that year, contained a fairly detailed description of the lecture's contents.

ensuring that that order is not only extracted from the seeming chaos of existence, but that, once recognised, it is imbibed, absorbed, inculcated as a natural law on the part of those among whom it is found. Ironically, given his vitriolic dislike of Joseph Lancaster, Coleridge apparently endorses one of the Quaker's basic administrative principles when arguing for a state of cohesion that exists in "active or domestic life": "From the cotter's hearth or the workshop of the artisan, to the palace or the arsenal, the first merit, that which admits neither substitute nor equivalent, is, that *every thing is in its place*" (449).[26] It is not simply a question of tidiness that appeals to Coleridge, although it is at that level that his argument initially formulates itself. The correct location, *"everything in its place"* extends far beyond a consideration of a certain social aesthetic whose ultimate end is the visual representation of order. Place, for Coleridge, is not a static site with which one is simply identified, where one belongs. Rather, it is a pre-ordained position that achieves its potential from its relation to the correct placement of the other constituent members with which its occupant interacts. And if he only implies in his comments the potential for productivity in a general sense, he explicitly states the advantages when localised, individualised: "Of one, by whom [method] is eminently possessed, we say proverbially, he is like clock-work" (449). This is a very similar sentiment to that which Hill would repeat some four years later when referring to his pupils as "living timepieces."[27] Coleridge, it seems, takes the images of regularity, of

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[26]See page 116 of this dissertation for comments on Lancaster's use of this phrase.

[27]Writing of the "almost superstitious punctuality on the part of the Monitor" that he requires, Hill comments: "It is amusing to see what a living timepiece the giddiest boy will become

conformity, of inexorable adherence to routine--all of which are manifest in the monitorial

school--and valorises them as qualities to be desired. Moreover, he goes further when in his

next breath he seems to question both the veracity and the utility of the metaphor that he

employs: "The resemblance extends beyond the point of regularity," he writes, "and yet falls

short of the truth" (449). That is, the precision, the predictability about which he speaks is

only the external evidence of a larger more significant awareness. "[T]he man of methodical

industry . . . realizes [time's] ideal divisions, and gives a character and individuality to its

moments" (450). Coleridge argues here that someone thoroughly shaped and formed by

method, who operates in conformity to its dictates, supplements "the silent and

indistinguishable lapse of time" (450). He makes time productive, that is to say.

And productive use of time, another staple of monitorial theory as we have seen,

becomes a moral issue in Coleridge's essay. The under-employment of time, a failure to use

every minute, is not simply a matter of wasting what can never be recovered. Rather,

Coleridge sees non-activity as constituting an ethical offence, as it were. To be idle, to be un-

methodical, is a perverse action in its own right. It is a preoccupation that, as we have seen,

recurs in many monitorial tracts. The non-methodical he sees as nothing more nor less than

the idle, those who "are described as killing time" (450). Opposing them, the forces of

rectitude take time and somehow add to it, fertilise it, give it form, create viability from its

shapelessness. To be methodical is more than being creative; it is the act of creation itself. It

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during his week of office" (*Government* 88-89).

is more than extracting utility, more than gaining whatever advantage is available from the fleeting employment of that which is never to return. To be methodical, for Coleridge, is to effect a transformation of the very nature of time. In that the methodical man "may be justly said to call [time] . . . into life and moral being," (450), he may be said to resist, even deny, death. He refutes the temporality of history, causing "that, the very essence of which is to fleet away, and evermore *to have been*" (450), to become permanent. Such is the power, the potential, of method, Coleridge argues, that its practitioner is able to grasp the ungraspable, to bring about its metamorphosis. In the very act of transformation--"He organizes the hours, and gives them a soul" (450)--he colonises time, subsumes its uniqueness, "takes up into his permanence, and communicates to it the imperishableness of a spiritual nature" (450).

To recognize that a lack of method "characterizes the uneducated" demands that we look at education in terms of the precise characteristics of method itself. We must satisfy ourselves as to whether its possession results from the type of education that Coleridge endorses--whether method can be learned--or, alternatively, whether a predisposition to method, to methodological thinking, determines one's suitability for education. It seems as though Coleridge sees method not as something that can be taught; it is not as if the acquisition of method depends upon the adoption of a proven (method)ology. On the contrary, it arises autonomously as a result of a certain mental discipline, an awareness, an habitual contemplation not of things alone, but of the *relation* of things. For Coleridge, it seems, an appreciation of what might be termed the natural order, the underlying grid that delimits and delineates the position of things relative to each other causes an internal

discipline to be imposed. It is an intensely political doctrine in its implications. Seemingly grounding itself in an acceptance of the ability to think for oneself, to look beyond the mere physical presence of things, rejecting the "habitual submission of the understanding to mere events and images as such" (451)--what we today might determine as being educated--it argues for the irrefutable presence of an organising, inviolate truth; the relation of things, one to another, is not a subject for individual interpretation. This is why, as the essay proceeds, Coleridge defines method as a science. The relations--the innumerable interplays, interactions, assumptions, subsumptions--all are to be given the authority that invests the compilation of a scientific register: "To enumerate and analyse these relations, with the conditions under which they alone are discoverable, is to teach the science of Method" (451). Thus, what separates the educated from the uneducated, as Coleridge defines them, is the extent to which the undeniable truths, the existence of those maps of relations, are made available to one or the other of what he terms classes in order to distinguish between the two. We now begin to see another level at which the existence of the uneducated constitutes a threat to the socio-intellectual *status quo*. There is an element of freedom that typifies those marked as inferior by "the absence of Method." We might say, then, that to subscribe to the invisible truths that method alone purports to reveal is no less restricting to our appreciation of the relations of things than the "ignorance" against which Coleridge rails. Perhaps the presence of the uneducated remains as a physical manifestation of a potentially resisting "other" that the adherence to underlying truths seeks constantly to efface. As a consequence, education, as it applies to the processes obtaining in Madras schools, attempts to inculcate a belief in the

existence of truths--one's predetermination and predisposition to a certain social class, for example--by means of a system that denies that which it ostensibly advances as its purpose, suppressing freedom even while it argues for emancipation.

A belief in method is a belief in the ability to understand what it is that structures and orders our existence. And always there is the appeal--one Coleridge shares with Bell--to the ultimate truth, that absolute authority, which Coleridge calls "the leading Thought" (455). His argument centres around the need to establish a subordination to a site of supremacy, the author(ity) from which issues the organizing principle against which no appeal can be entertained. It is the presence of this "*leading Thought*" that separates the educated from the "uneducated and unreflective talker" (454). Its absence, like the absence of method, prevents comprehension, distorts perception, reduces the inherent order to an unrelated chaos in which the relative proximity of occurrences to each other defies any attempt at reduction to cohesion: "Hence the nearer the things and incidents in time and place, the more distant, disjointed, and impertinent to each other, and to any common purpose will they appear," Coleridge writes (454). But the method, possession of which is necessary to an appreciation of the order about which Coleridge speaks, is always contingent upon the "*leading Thought,*" what he also calls "a *staple*, or *starting-post*" (455), that, it seems, must always already exist. For Coleridge's educated man, then, the end result of education manifests itself in the very application of method, "the unpremeditated and evidently habitual *arrangement* of his words, grounded on the habit of foreseeing, in each integral part, or (more plainly) in every sentence, the whole that he then intends to communicate." (449) And yet it is the "Thought," the agent

of the ultimate author that predisposes, qualifies and fits its possessor to the level of education with which he is concerned. Method is only ever a habit, the product of a disciplined approach to thinking. And by this point in the essay Coleridge must draw a line between what is, on the one hand, nothing more than technique (method) and on the other hand, ability, suitability, (that which arises from the implantation of "Thought").

Method, in Coleridge's essay operates at two distinct levels. It denotes the results of a process involving the logical ordering and classification of things, a result that evidences itself in a recognizably controlled language, a measured diction, the meaning of which is never in doubt: "However irregular and desultory his talk, there is *method* in the fragments" (449). Yet underneath this external manifestation, method returns on itself, justifies its own ground by citing a universal arrangement of which method is itself the proof and final arbiter. And Coleridge recognizes the danger that this split, this dual-personality represents. To mistake the outward manifestation--the visible, the audible--for the universal--invisible, silent, constantly directing--is to misunderstand what he considers to be the very nature of method. That is to say, it must always extend beyond a passive ordering, a reduction of the active to the static, for in his insistence on the omnipresence of method lies his implicit assertion that what appears on the surface to be a final resolution, a confirmation of cohesion, is in fact the result of a dynamic influence that is constantly and resolutely in a state of advance: " without continuous transition, there can be no method. The term, 'Method,' cannot therefore, otherwise than by abuse, be applied to a mere dead arrangement, containing in itself no principle of progression" (457). Thus, "there is *method* in his fragments" reveals itself to

indicate something far more than an appreciation for the ability to use language convincingly,

the application of a procedure, a form to render coherent the otherwise incoherent. Method--

within the context that Coleridge uses it here--far from being the confirmation of linguistic

aptitude, exists within the form and body of the utterance itself. It is method that gives the

utterance meaning. We return to the spoken word for the authority for what is being spoken.

And always, method is that which emanates from the truth, reflexively circling back even as

it deploys itself to determine the origin, the truth, the meaning: "For method implies a

progressive transition, and it is the meaning of the word in the original language" (457).

IV

I am greatly deceived if one preliminary to an efficient education of the labouring classes be
not the recurrence to a more manly discipline of the intellect on the part of the learned
themselves .... (Coleridge, *Political* 227)

The content of the first section of this chapter notwithstanding, Coleridge's

involvement with Madras theory remains something of a mystery. It is possible to explain the

paradox of his enthusiasm simply by saying that the system's fundamental order initially

appealed in some way to him, but that his interest was a temporary aberration. We might say,

with Bantock, that "For a time he was, rather surprisingly, enthusiastic about Andrew Bell's

monitorial educational system--he saw in it a means towards a steady progression of

understanding ...", and then distance him from Bell by saying "Of course, he became

disillusioned by what he came to see as the mechanical aspects of Bell's system" (116). But

we would then be guilty in the first place of a certain vagueness, an identifiable imprecision, in that we leave undetermined the means by which this "progression" may be established and maintained, to say nothing of our failure to define "a steady progression of understanding." In the second place, the assertion concerning Coleridge's eventual disenchantment poses as an *a priori* something for which no factual evidence exists. That he ceased to valorise Bell in the manner of his earlier letters and speeches is undeniable, but so is the fact that he offered no direct criticism and did not subject Bell's methods to a subsequent scrutiny of the type that one might expect from the "disillusioned." The attacks that he made on the Madras system were limited to Joseph Lancaster for whom he reserved a particularly intense dislike. To see Bell's relevance as somehow transitory is to dismiss the vital importance of discipline to Coleridge's educational thought. Coleridge's interest in Madras is paradoxical only if we ignore his ongoing allegiance to discipline. We may, with the dubious benefit of hindsight, register a degree of amazement at Coleridge's inability to recognize the psychological ramifications of the system with which he was so enamoured. Dubious, that is, because Coleridge's silence can neither prove nor refute a charge of naiveté on his part. On the significance of discipline, we might well consider the following assertion that has implicit consequences for the social class about which its author is ostensibly silent. "Coleridge's educational programme demanded the re-education, or rather the education, in a more disciplined, permanent and far-reaching fashion of the higher classes" (Knights 63). The necessity to educate that portion of society to whom the responsibilities of leadership should naturally devolve also becomes clear in this statement that Coleridge makes in a letter when

complaining to his friend John Rickman about the "plebicolar" nature of parliament:

> I fear, I fear, that it is a hopeless business & will continue so till some fortunate Giant-mind starts up & revolutionizes all the present Notions concerning the education of both Gentry and Middle Classes. While this remains in statu quo, I suspect that good Dr. Bell's scheme carried into full effect by the higher Classes may suggest to a thinking man the Image of the Irishman on the Bough with his face towards the Trunk sawing himself off. (Griggs 3:414)

This is not, as one might think, an implied criticism of the Madras system. Rather, it is a

lament for the country whose politico-educational structure is, in Coleridge's view, so

weakened, so unsuitable either to govern or to produce those whose duty it is to govern, that

Bell's system cannot be introduced to the upper classes with any hope of success. This does

not exclude the less fortunate from the "privileges" of Madras, and if Coleridge turns his

attention away from monitorial schooling it is to concentrate upon what he sees as the harmful

potential inherent in a system that can produce a docile, subjected lower class, but cannot

properly educate those under whose command they are to fall.

The question of Coleridge's support for Madras may well, then, be explained if we see

his interest as another facet of his desire to establish a defined social order. If "Coleridge

provides much that is important in the educational thinking of the nineteenth century"

(Bantock 91), it may well be that his consideration of the Madras method was essential to his

ideas of clerisy. Interestingly, Bantock answers the question that he earlier implicitly elides.

Speaking of the socio-political considerations arising out of the subject-object dichotomy, a

debate that resulted in part with the Romantics "postu[lating] uniqueness and irreplaceability"

(104), he draws attention to the potential for what he describes as a resultant "anti-

egalitarianism" (104). It is debatable whether or not this move to individuality constitutes "the

swan song of the European aristocracy" (104)--an opinion shared, as he notes, by some

commentators--but there is no doubt as to the possibility for a social polarisation that this

focus on the self represents. Certainly, Coleridge can talk at some length of the benefit to be

gained from an education that is neither imposed nor external, an education the purpose of

which is to awaken the mind to its own capacity. Sharing an apparent affinity for natural

principles with Bell, Coleridge, bemoaning the inadequacy of available education, writes:

> young men, the most anxiously and expensively be-school-mastered, be-
> tutored, be-lectured, any thing but *educated* . . . perilously over-civilised, and
> most piteously uncultivated! And all from inattention to the method dictated
> by *nature* herself, to the simple *truth* that, as the forms in all organised
> existence, so must all true and living knowledge proceed from within; that it
> may be trained, supported, fed, excited, but can never be infused or
> impressed. (Knights 59)

This is a mode of education that Ben Knights refers to as "education from within" (59). It

would seem, though, that the quality of that education depends in turn upon the quality of the

mind within which it is to be born. A mind that is not to be "infused or impressed" will enjoy

a large degree of autonomy, will find itself unfettered, will not lend itself willingly to the

dictates of others. It is by no means certain that this is the universal social vision that

Coleridge pictures. Knights draws attention to the dangers that Coleridge saw when he

described the movement towards "'general illumination'" in educational philosophy.

> You begin, therefore, with the attempt to *popularise* science: but you will only affect its *plebification*. It is folly to think of making all, or the many, philosophers, or even men of science and systematic knowledge. But it is duty and wisdom to aim at making as many as possible soberly and steadily religious;--inasmuch as the morality which the state requires in its citizens for its own well-being and ideal immortality, and without reference to their spiritual interests as individuals, can only exist for the people in the form of religion. (Knights 61)

To make unlimited opportunities for knowledge generally available, to widen the educational base in fact, is, for Coleridge, tantamount to a dilution, a weakening of knowledge. In the same way as he would, ideally, determine the readership of his books,[28] he would also precisely delimit both the recipients of education and the extent to which they would be educated. It is a futile task, he suggests, to attempt to create an increased interest in things, the implication being that only minds of a certain cast, a special capacity, can appreciate the "truths" that may be known. It is not that he warns against a desire to transform the whole population. His concern arises from a fear that the majority may benefit. And within that majority are the underclass for whom Madras is specifically designed. The state, as Coleridge explicitly asserts, depends for its continuance upon an established, recognizable, and ordering morality. It is that morality's existence, its very *impression*, that ensures the perpetuation of the state, and along with it the continuance of that privileged class to whom the benefit of education in its broadest sense will always be available. The fundamental appeal of Madras

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[28]For example, in *Aids to Reflection* first published in 1825, Coleridge argues, "An Author has three points to settle: to what sort his work belongs, for what description of readers it is intended, and the specific end or object, which it is to answer" (61).

in such a society is obvious. Within this system with its concentration on the national religion,

Coleridge recognizes a method which fuses the socio-political goals of a religious education.

For him, the Word, as it was for Bell, constitutes the beginning and the end of the educational

process for the poor. He sees

> the sufficiency of the scriptures in all knowledge or requisite for a right
> performance of his duty as a man and as a Christian, of the labouring classes,
> who in all countries form the great majority of the inhabitants . . . more than
> this is not generally desirable. (Knights 61-62)

That Coleridge should allow for a certain degree of education in this way indicates his larger

social strategy. He sees, as I have already shown, the fear created in the ranks of the

privileged by the movement towards a more general interest in education, but argues against

a reactionary response that would deny education altogether. Commenting in *The Statesman's*

Manual that "it is [i]n this rank of life [that is the aristocracy] the danger lies," he draws

attention to "two opposite errors" concerning the nature of education: "The first consists in

a disposition to think that, as the Peace of Nations has been disturbed by the diffusion of a

false light, it may be re-established by excluding the people from all knowledge and all

prospects of amelioration" (White 6: 39). He shows in this assertion a psychological acuity,

a sharpness of perception, in that he recognises that the necessary control arises not so much

from imposing a regime whose purpose it is to foster ignorance, but from a strategy that

makes the lower classes part of the very process itself. The localised self-discipline of

monitorialism makes itself felt here in a broader political sense. Coleridge may talk of "the

people," but it seems clear that he has in mind a specific sector of the population. Moreover,

in arguing against the exclusion from "all" knowledge, he still allows for the denial of *some*.

Thus he can justify systems such as Madras which provide a degree of education for a certain

class. He realises that any attempt to reverse curiosity is futile, as he shows when observing

that "The Powers, that awaken and foster the spirit of curiosity, are to be found in every

village: Books are in every hovel" (39). It is to the ways in which that curiosity may be made

productive that the nation's attention should be turned. And where the "Peace of Nations"

is concerned, a concomitant consideration with government must also exist: "The Infant's

cries are hushed with *picture*-books: and the Cottager's child sheds his first bitter tears over

pages, which render it impossible for the man to be treated or *governed* as a child" (39 my

emphasis). This latter, for Coleridge, is the predominant concern. The good government of

the state depends upon the establishment of government over its citizens from their earliest

age. Coleridge is quick to perceive the way by which this control might be effected. He

understands, I think it is quite clear, the very subtle difference between the terms general and

universal. To be general is to be widespread but not all encompassing. A general interest in

improved education, especially on the part of those hitherto uneducated, creates an imbalance:

some might benefit and some might not. To be universal, on the other hand, is to include the

total population. To subject the whole of the class with whom the concern rests to a

universalizing, homogenous methodology is to deliver education--of a sort--but it also aims

for the destruction of discontent. It is at once a political and rhetorical strategy. Coleridge

identifies the source of potential instability, but negates it not by its removal but by its

promotion under a different guise: "Here as in so many other cases, the inconveniences that

have arisen from a thing's having become too general, are best removed by making it universal" (40), he writes.

It is here, in this passage from *The Statesman's Manual*, that Coleridge again defines what he understands by education. His thoughts are reminiscent of his earlier comments in *The Friend* and bear considering in light of Bell's reluctance to teach all children to "write and cipher":

> The other and contrary mistake proceeds from the assumption, that a national education will have been realized whenever the People at large have been taught to read and write. Now among the many means to the desired end, this is doubtless one, and not the least important. But neither is it the most so. Much less can it be held to *constitute* Education, which consists in educing the *faculties* and forming the habits. (40)

And it is here, too, that Coleridge reveals his critical appreciation of both the potential and the limitations of Madras: "it would yet appear to me a most dangerous delusion to rely on it as if this of itself formed an efficient national education" (41). That is to say, he does not mistake form for content:"We cannot, I repeat, honor the scheme too highly as a prominent and necessary part of the great process; but it will neither supersede nor can it be substituted for sundry other measures that are at least equally important" (41). Bell's system is a part, and part only, of what Coleridge determines to be the overall reformation of the state's system of education. He recognizes only too well that without the necessary contribution of those whom he describes as "the rich and powerful" (41), Bell's system cannot carry the day:

> Nay, let Dr. Bell's philanthropic end have been realized, and the proposed
> *modicum of learning* universal: yet convinced of its insufficiency to stem up
> against the strong currents *set in* from an opposite point, I dare not assure
> myself, that it may not be driven backward by them and become confluent
> with the evils, it was intended to preclude. (42)

This is not, I would argue, the "disillusionment" which Bantock and others perceive in

Coleridge's attitude towards Madras. Rather, it is a simple recognition that what Bell offers

is not in and of itself sufficient to bring about the national scheme of education which

Coleridge envisages. If Coleridge steadfastly avoids any particular criticisms of the system's

day-to-day operations, failing to single out for censure those areas that are similar to those

of the Lancasterian schools that he is quick to condemn,[29] it is most likely because he was not

as interested in the methodology as he was in the sheer organisational potential that Madras

represented. Moreover, its alliance with the Church of England, the national Religion, made

Madras an obvious organ through which that class of educated elite--the clerisy--could

exercise their influence. As Knights observes, "Coleridge's idea of the clerisy--although not

fully developed until his last years--was active in his thinking all along" (63). And as Knights

also points out, the concept of this elite segment involved far more than the idea of a superior

teaching cadre. "From an early age," he writes, "[Coleridge] looked to an elite to purify and

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[29]Coleridge writes in *The Statesman's Manual*, for instance, "I do not hesitate to declare,
that whether I consider the nature of the discipline adopted, or the plan of poisoning the
children of the poor with a sort of *potential* infidelity under the 'liberal idea' of teaching those
points only of religious faith, in which all denominations agree, I cannot but denounce the so-
called Lancastrian schools as pernicious beyond all power of compensation by the new
acquirement of Reading and Writing" (*Works* 41). Coleridge had also publicly denounced
Lancaster in a lecture on education that he delivered in Bristol in 1808. That he could still
powerfully attack Bell's rival some ten years later indicates the depth of his antagonism.

revivify society . . . and developed a theory in which speculative philosophy was essential to the cultivation, ultimately even the *existence* of the nation" (63). How little difference there is between Coleridge's vision of an elite, whose mission it is to keep the country pure, and Bell's, with its recognition of an already organised intellectual force waiting to exercise itself on the forces of ignorance. It is here--in the Anglican church with its existing administrative apparatus, its permeation, its ubiquity, its already existing clerisy--that Coleridge sees the opportunity to deliver the type of influence of which he speaks. "The church . . . provided a model for diffusion, for the means of spreading the benefits accrued through speculative and scholarly activity" (64). Thus the church and the Madras school system would work hand in hand. On a general level, the hierarchy of the church inculcates--via the pulpit--the larger population, whereas in the schools, fostered and maintained under its sponsorship, the youth, the future citizenry, collect, recite, learn and shape themselves in the national religion's ideological image. The parallels, the similarities, the identical methods that operate in both school and church are obvious. The cleric in his necessarily raised Anglican pulpit surveys the congregation in much the same way as the monitorial master subjects the schoolroom to his gaze. The same certainty of observation, whether by man or God, operates upon the worshippers. Where the teacher stands "in the place of God"[30] to his pupils, the cleric re-presents this figure to his congregation, and the texts and the language of worship are the very language of the school:

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[30]See page 222 of this dissertation

In the same manner are perused the following books, in succession;--*The Parables--Miracles--Discourses--and History of our Blessed Saviour*. After these comes *Ostervald's* (admirable and concise) *Abridgement of the History of the Bible* ....

At the same time that the scholar is initiated in this course of study, extracted and abridged from the Old and New Testament, he learns by heart *the Catechism*: When he can *repeat* every question, in any order in which it can be put, in the most distinct, accurate, and perfect manner, he proceeds to a minute analysis and exposition of it. (Bell, *Mutual* 106) [31]

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[31] This paragraph goes on to say: "For this purpose, the Catechism broken into short questions, will be found better adapted, perhaps, than all the explanations which have yet been given of it.... It alters nothing, but merely resolves every question into its simplest elements, after the manner of the daily examination of the Madras School, so as to present a single idea, at a time, to the mind--furnishing a model of that decomposition and division of labour, by which the most complex and difficult tasks may be rendered simple, and easy of acquisition" (106) This confirms the invasion of educational discourse by the language of industrial efficiency, to be sure; it also demands, though, a deeper consideration of how the Catechism is taught. That is to say, that this passage, together with the preceding section that deals with the repetition of questions, might profitably be read through the concerns that I raise earlier, on page 208 of this dissertation, regarding the apparent necessity in ideo-pedagogic discourse to shape the form that the question must take.

Conclusion

The purpose of this dissertation, as I made clear in the introduction, has been to show the ways in which self-discipline is inculcated in the pupils who populate the particular pedagogical space of the monitorial school. I have argued, explicitly and implicitly, that education, while functioning as the school's ostensible primary purpose, in fact both mobilizes and is mobilized by a disciplinary regime that aims to subject, in both senses of the word, its students. In support of this argument, I have examined the workings of Anglican, non-denominational, and secular monitorial institutions. I would further argue that it follows that if my premise is correct, then evidence should exist of the monitorial schools' failure to instruct its pupils in those rudiments with which Bell and Lancaster, for example, appear so concerned.

Just how closely the monitorial experience reflected the desires of its various practitioners is not a simple task. As I have mentioned, the pedagogical treatises that constitute much of written monitorial discourse are a mixture of the founders' own theoretical treatments and practical observations, and it would be unrealistic to suppose that one does not influence the other. Additionally, the educational ideal, though apparently couched in the language of the pedagogical reformer, is, as I have argued, heavily informed by a reactionary social vision. Thus, the desire itself may not be that which we would initially assume it to be--a more effective and economic educational process. Rather, by (re)-forming,

and (re)-defining the meaning and the functions of the school and its pupils, and the very meaning of education, by mirroring in some schools a capitalist ideology, the monitorialists reveal a desire that speaks more about the middle-class's desire to manage than it does of providing increased opportunities for the underclass to be educated. Importantly, the population that the "reformers" would control and make productive is as idealistically conceived as the methods they would employ; hence the reasons for the slippage between the ideal and the results that I have shown. We must, then, view claims for educational achievement with caution, if not suspicion. Monitorial schools, being privately instigated and run, were not, at least in the early years, the subject of objective evaluation, and independent reports are scarce. That little remains in the way of former pupils' personal written records of their experiences may reflect nothing more than a lack of awareness at the time of the value that such papers might hold for the future, resulting in the destruction of whatever juvenile "trivia" accumulated. Alternatively, this silence might indicate a lack of literary skills on such a scale that the pupils were, in the main, actually incapable of recording what it was like to be a monitorial pupil. Thus we have to accept that the pupils' voices were either mute, or muted, and any evaluation of monitorial pedagogical achievement is dependent, to a large extent therefore, not on what *they* say, but on what has been said *about* them.

Criticism of monitorial schools is not, though, only a current phenomenon. Although early nineteenth-century Britain seems to have had a very large number of supporters for this type of institution, by the 1830s there is evidence of an increasing opposition. In 1838, for example, the Central Society for Education published a collection of papers, one of which was

a "Report of a Visit to the Model School of the British and Foreign School Society in the

Borough Road." The editor of the Central Society's publications commissioned the report as

a response to adverse comments that had begun to appear in print:

> [S]ome passages in the previous publications of this Society have been
> considered as unfairly disparaging the efforts of the British and Foreign
> School Society, and the success of those efforts, the Editor requested the
> writer of the present article to examine the school, and make such a report as
> in his opinion the facts justified. (329)

The ensuing report is interesting not only for its support of the Borough Road School, but

also for the rationalising of monitorialism that implies the existence of the criticism that the

report is designed to deny. Having established the justification for publishing the paper, its

author, one Thomas Coates, then significantly narrows its scope by limiting his examination

to the model school. He writes:

> However useful a general investigation of the transactions of the British and
> Foreign School Society, and a review of the state of its schools throughout
> England, may be, it certainly is not the object of this paper to enter into so
> large a field. Its intention is to show what the system of instruction
> recommended by that society is *capable* of effecting, by showing what it has
> effected, and is effecting, with regard to the children who frequent its model
> school. (329 my emphasis)

Thus, the writer acknowledges that a widespread investigation is desirable but attempts to

draw attention away from this necessity, arguing in effect that a more worthwhile endeavour

is to concentrate on potential rather than actual achievements. The spotlight falls on the model

school--the showcase establishment--leaving in shadow those institutions that require a

detailed examination. Coates makes early reference to the efficiencies that I have previously

mentioned, "[The school] is under the superintendence of a master, who is assisted by a

number of young men who are learning the system of instruction" (329). The important observation of the school's organisation he reduces to a footnote: "It is not admitted on all hands that these pupils, who are in training to become teachers, do afford assistance; nay, it is even said that some impede the business of the school" (329). But if "the business of the school" does not proceed smoothly, Coates is able to offer a reason that lies outside the institution's control. It is a reason that, in the circularity of its logic, re-confirms the need for the monitorial school's existence while providing ostensible grounds for monitorial failure. Coates writes,

> Above all, the homes of the poor are usually a great impediment to education. The children are often confined to one small, inconvenient, unfurnished room with their parents, and perhaps, younger children ... they are without books, or if these are lent to them, they are without the quiet necessary for reading; they are unassisted by the superior information of parents or governesses, to which their more fortunate brethren are solicited to resort; and the topics which they hear discussed at home can tend little to their improvement. (330)

The lack of books and opportunities for independent reading, the absence of both an informed assistance and the benefits of a pedagogical osmosis are the very deficiencies that the monitorial school exemplifies, and Coates conveniently displaces them as he absolves the school from responsibility. We should note that the report is based on the experience of three visits to the school, "two paid ... in the morning, and one in the afternoon" (331). Given that each session is three hours in length, the ringing endorsement that Coates offers is based on a very short time sample indeed, and although "the writer was left to his own discretion as to the course and subjects of his examination" (331), it is surely pertinent that "sometimes the

master was with him in order to remove any obstacle which might have arisen to his progress, and a monitor was generally beside him" (331). The pupils whom Coates observes behave all the while under the close scrutiny of the institution's disciplinarians.

The report's author devotes a number of pages extolling the high degree of knowledge imparted at Borough Road. Apparently quoted to provide examples of independent thought in action, much of the material is catechistic in nature. *"Parable?* a story.--Are all stories parables? No; it is a story in which one thing is compared to another--especially things earthly to things heavenly. Mention three or four parables" (332) and so it goes on. Coates admits to being "frustrated by the eagerness with which all the class pressed forward to answer" (332), an apparent indication of the boys' level of attainment. Nowhere in this description, though, is there any mention of there being a variance in the response, other than from level to level, suggesting perhaps that the same stock replies are expected at any particular stage of advancement. Another example is indicative. *"Soap?* a greasy substance. What is it used for? This definition was obviously inadequate, and the writer wished to see whether it prevailed throughout the school; a boy in a higher class defined soap to be a mixture of alkali and grease." (332). The opportunity to question a boy at the same level as the initial respondent in order to ascertain the lateral dispersion of knowledge and the implications inherent in such an examination is clearly lost on Coates. Regardless, he is pleased to relate example after example of the Borough Road pupils' proficiency in mechanics, mental arithmetic, geography and history among other subjects. It is a comprehensive catalogue of accomplishments that he cites, but one that he follows with yet another disclaimer, as if he

tacitly recognises the lack of applicability of his findings both to Lancasterian schools in particular and to the condition of British schools in general: "It is not the object of this paper to inquire whether the monitorial system is better or worse, in all circumstances and for all sorts of instruction, than other systems of teaching" (337), a pronouncement that deserves to be challenged with a resounding "why?" if, as an unnamed contributor to the Central Society's collection of papers convincingly argues, "The truth is, England will soon be, if it be not already, the worst educated country in Europe" (398).

The author of this paper, having investigated a number of schools and interviewed many former pupils of monitorial schools run by both Lancaster and Bell's successors, draws very different conclusions to Coates. Posing the question "What is really done" in these institutions, he concludes that "as regards mere elementary instruction in reading, writing, and arithmetic, it is a lamentable fact that in many of these day schools ... nothing is taught but reading" (356). This writer, it must be said, reserves his harshest criticism for the National Schools, although, as I will show, the schools of the British and Foreign School Society are by no means exempt from severe censure. Of the National Schools he writes, "We have met with so many cases of boys spending years in a school of this description without being able to do more than spell through a few words, that we doubt exceedingly whether, under such circumstances, the art of reading is ever effectually acquired" (357). He qualifies this to some extent when he goes on to say that,

> In the majority of National Schools, however, the course of instruction is not so restricted …. Reading writing and arithmetic are taught or professedly taught. We say, professedly taught; for partly through the inefficient training of the teachers, and defects of the system, and the impossibility of getting children to submit to the required discipline for any very long period, the greater number of children entering these schools leave them, after a few months' trial, no wiser than when they entered. (357)

Two points need clarification here. There is no doubt that teaching as we might understand it today was absent in these schools and that teacher training was, beyond doubt, inadequate. This is, to be sure, a factor in the schools' failure. The writer's understanding of discipline is, of course, predicated upon notions of domination and subservience, of external force bringing about a desired reaction, and this, as my dissertation has argued, is the very antithesis of the self-discipline, the internalising of obedience that obtains in the monitorial school. We should not criticise a nineteenth-century writer for adhering to a long-established model in his analysis; it would, after all, be almost one hundred and forty years before Michel Foucault caused a radical rethinking of the very nature and workings of the technologies of power and their disciplinary consequences. We can agree with the author that the schools were failing, in so far as the objective against which he measures them is the attainment of literacy and the ability to think critically, but we must also recognise that the subjection, the forming of obedient subjects who would accept their place in society, was alive and well within the monitorial confines.

Interestingly, the author argues that "[t]he rote system is not adopted to the same extent, and the course of instruction embraces many branches of knowledge which, if effectually taught, would tend greatly to raise the character of our working population" (361).

It is a case, it seems to me, of "damning with faint praise" since the ultimate achievement--

and again we need to note the putative moral deficiency in the underclass's character--is

contingent upon effective teaching and that, as I have shown, does not occur. Indeed, as the

writer argues, "The merits of the mutual instruction, or monitorial system, common to both

the Bell and Lancasterian schools, have been much exaggerated" (363). Appendix one of this

dissertation contains examples from the interviews that he conducts with former pupils. They

are compelling evidence in support of his position and, I would argue, augment my earlier

proposition that a lack of literacy is one of the reasons for the paucity of personal written

records left by monitorial students.

By the time attention became focussed on the monitorial schools' instructional

inadequacies, the institutions were already in an advanced state of decline. As educational

sites they are worth study because of the information that they yield concerning an increasing

awareness of the psychological component of discipline. I have maintained that the purpose

in examining monitorial schools is not to determine their position on a curve of pedagogical

ineptitude. To do so is to force upon them an unwarranted genealogical significance. To have

exposed the workings of power in these schools, though, does not mark the end of a project.

There is much that power's discursive properties have caused to become almost hidden.

Tantalising glimpses of other aspects of the monitorial operation come briefly into view,

inviting further study on my part. For example, the Charles Street National School in London

had one hundred more girls than boys enrolled, and yet monitorial education for females is

barely mentioned by nineteenth-century writers or later commentators. Occasionally, there

are references to English masters leaving for schools in Ireland, but no work as yet exists that explores the nature of the politico-religious discourse that enables these colonial schools to be established while causing their history to be submerged. And if critical commentary is lacking in these areas, so too are the pages of fiction. For nearly forty years monitorialism exerted an influence over a large sector of society. It is not, I would argue, purely accidental that the lasting image of the nineteenth-century teacher is Mr. Gradgrind, who, as I have already mentioned, does not preside over a monitorial school. If he personifies the nineteenth-century pedagogue, then there is a need for a theory which explains his fictional construction and the collaboration of fiction writers in the erasure of a more pertinent and typical figure, the monitorial schoolmaster.

Appendix

"'Thomas Bennett, age 15 .... Cannot read or write; went for one year and a half to a free school ... 250 boys, and only one master. He (Bennett) never got beyond a, b, ab and words in two syllables, all the time he was at school'" (365).

"'Benjamin Humphries, aged 14 .... went to St. Sepulchre's charity school ... for seven years; made very little progress in either reading, writing, or arithmetic. The master was frequently out, and would leave the school to the care of the monitors .... Examined the father of the same lad, who confirmed the above statement .... He (Humphries) sent one of his sons to a Lancasterian school, but thought he did not make sufficient progress in reading with lessons pasted on boards'" (389).

"'George Ellis, age 15 .... Went to a school kept by Mr. Mills, three years ago; did not attend regularly. Used to learn to read and repeat the catechism; cannot repeat it now; cannot read or write'" (392).

"'Joseph Billinger, age 16 .... Cannot read or write. Went for a twelvemonth to the Barking National School to learn, but did not make any progress; always attended regularly'" (393).

"The above testimonies are ample evidence of a widespread illiteracy which, by all accounts, the monitorial schools were inadequate to counter. A final example clearly illustrates that even where rote learning impresses some details on a pupil's mind, the ability to use that knowledge is never fostered. Having ascertained that fourteen year old Charles Smith had attended "Rickling National School" for nearly six years, the author observes that the boy "cannot read or write," although he "[h]ad learnt his catechism very perfectly." Asked whether he thought " killing a horse murder," Smith answered no 'because he had seen a horse killed." Moreover, he was unable to "explain what was meant by 'piety, charity, neighbour, parents, intemperance, unchastity,' all of which words occurred either in the catechism or in the explanatory questions attached to it" (396).

Figure One

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Figure Two

No. 3.

Figure Three

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