THE MOVABLE MOSAIC

THE MOVABLE MOSAIC:

AN INQUIRY INTO THE THEORY OF

RECONSTRUCTION OF POLITICAL REALITY

By

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A Thesis

Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies

in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements

for the Degree of

Ph.D.

McMaster University

June, 1975

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY   (1975)   McMASTER UNIVERSITY
(Political Science)   Hamilton, Ontario

TITLE: THE MOVABLE MOSAIC: AN INQUIRY INTO THE THEORY OF
          RECONSTRUCTION OF POLITICAL REALITY

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NUMBER OF PAGES: vii, 362

SCOPE AND CONTENTS:

        The dissertation is devoted to the development of a systematic
theory of political experience. While this project involves, at first,
the synthesis of the pragmatist tradition in political philosophy into
a theory of reconstructive empiricism, it also entails the elaboration
of this revision of political epistemology into a paradigmatic theory
of human action. Using this paradigmatic theory of human action as
the basis of analysis, an examination then follows of three generalized
modes of political experience, and of the relationships which hold
between them.

Preface

The German philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey noted in his monograph

The Essence of Philosophy "that the method of the human studies involves

a perpetual reciprocity between lived experience and concept." And,

towards the end of his life, the American philosopher George Santayana,

in his seminal writing Dominations and Powers, furthered this insight by

the profound reflection that the peculiar responsibility of a political

philosopher is to fuse self-consciously inquiry and experience into a

vivid image of the human prospect, both in terms of its enduring problems

and in terms of the possibilities present, at any given moment, for the

creation of a more rational order of society.

This treatise is intended to discharge, at least partially, my

responsibilities as a political philosopher. It does so in three related

ways. First, this dissertation is a summary statement, to a large extent,

of my intellectual development as a political philosopher during the sec-

ond half of the twentieth century. Second, as a process of self-conscious

reflection on the human circumstance, this treatise is aimed at a system-

atic synthesis of the major paradigms of human experience which histori-

cally have dominated the human imagination and which have monopolized

the human will. Third, this synthesis of the human prospect, coordinating,

as it does, reason and lived experience, is directed not only at a rigor-

ous description of the human sensibilities, mentalities, activities, and

value-qualities associated with the formative problems of salvation, se-

curity, and freedom, but also at an appraisal of the opportunities avail-

able in the modern age for the creation of a genuinely libertarian, and thereby substantively rational construction of political reality.

Like all political inquirers who have felt driven to a comprehensive and coherent understanding of their political situation, and of their place within it as social and historical beings, and who have not been satisfied to rest content with either an abstract and reductive empiricism or with an appeal to dogma, whether structuralist or idealistic, I have been forced to rely on an expansive theory of political knowledge: one which is simultaneously a philosophy of governing principles, an anthropology of the human mentality, a reconstructive sociology, and a radical mysticism. It is a philosophy of governing principles because it seeks to elucidate the fundamental human sentiments which regulate and anticipate the moral quality of the present political condition. It is an anthropology of the human mentality because it strives to penetrate, and thereby fully to comprehend, the inherent, and, indeed, immanent, processes of political thought which serve to rationalize collective order. It is a reconstructive sociology because it is devoted to an exhaustive appreciation of the patterns of political action which intermediate sensibilities, consciousness, and value-experience in the contemporary political situation. And, finally, this expansive theory of political knowledge is a radical mysticism because of its willingness to integrate into a unitary vision of human experience all the elements of lived existence, whether emotional, reflective, active, or moral, and to employ this provisional unification of human experience as the basis for prescribing new, and possibly more adequate, principles of political conduct.

This widening of the responsibilities and scope of political scholarship ultimately entails, of course, a broadening of the domain of political experience and a revision, albeit a moderate revision, of the vocabulary of political philosophy. From this perspective, political experience is not exhausted by its public aspect, but extends well beyond its conventional presentation to a mode of human experience which successively coordinates human sentiments, habits of political thought, and distinctive moral qualities. Thus, to comprehend the human political condition in its totality is to begin with political life as it is immediately experienced as a rhythm and tempo of moral impulses and qualitative dispositions, and thereon taking this felt sense of the adequacy or inadequacy of the public domain as our guide, to work back deeper and deeper into the more mediate aspect of the political condition until a coherent understanding has been achieved of the central images of political reality, dominant human aspirations, and patterns of political organization which inform, and even preform, the quality of the political circumstance, old and new. In addition, since this inspection of political experience deals less with a static phenomenon than with a dynamic human process, it has been necessary to employ such terms as "grounds" and "principles" in a manner strikingly different from their traditional usage. This modification of the philosophical vocabulary is intended to emphasize both the presence of a single, unitary process of human experience and to compensate for the absence in the contemporary idiom of suitable words to describe relationships of summation, intermediation, and transformation.

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Chapter 1. An Inquiry into the Theory of Reconstruction of Political Reality

Political reality is not exhausted by the changing scene of public life. Contemporary political scholarship has, however, devoted itself almost exclusively to this publicly observable dimension of human politics. This concentration is at odds with longstanding traditions in the history of political thought. In the history of political thought, the study of public life has been consistently held relative to another, and perhaps more vital, dimension of political reality. This dimension of political reality devolves on the question of political being. The problem of political being may be summarized as the following query: What quality of political life emerges from the presence of different modes of political action across the public domain? The attempt to clarify the qualitative implications emergent from distinctive modes of political action has never, of course, been held separate from the more general query concerning which quality of social being develops from different modes of social action. The question of political being has been conceived as one aspect of the broader problem of social being and political action as one dimension of the broader process of social action. To comprehend the different modes of social action together with their emergent qualities is thus to master successfully the complementary questions of political being and political action.

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This treatise will follow in the tradition of political thought. It will address the problem of political being by enveloping it within a broader treatment of social action. This treatment will be fundamentally reconstructive. It will seek to unify contemporary human experience into a new, and more satisfactory, mosaic of social reality. This mosaic of social reality is intended to provide a more lucid appreciation of the human circumstance through past actions, present realities, and future possibilities. The mosaic of social reality which will be introduced here has been developed as a paradigmatic theory of social action. The paradigmatic theory represents the most generalized image possible of social action. This image develops from the thesis that a significant portion of present human experience may be understood as a complex working-out of three competing paradigms of social action and of the relationships which hold between them. The three competing paradigms of social action will be identified as the cosmological, the corporate, and the organic. Each paradigm of social action may be visualized as a unique expression of the complete social process. The complete social process describes the characteristic movement of the history of social action itself. The history of social action is a process which unifies a general human problem, a broad phenomenology of the human circumstance, a pattern of human practices, and a consequent human condition into the experience of a total social reality. The complete social process thus contains four, relatively distinct, dimensions, all conjoined as related features in a single process of historical action. The latter, taken as a whole, represents a paradigm of social action. A paradigm of social action is thus a qualitatively distinct expression of the complete social process. This expression

begins with a formative human problem of urgent and general significance, continues with the elaboration of a broadly conceived image concerning what must be done for its resolution, advances into a pattern of concrete human activities, and culminates in the qualitative consequences of the actions taken. These consequences set the stage for the appearance of a new human problem of urgent and general significance and the process of paradigmatic action begins anew.[1]

There is only one complete social process. It may, however, be given many different expressions. Each different representation of the complete social process represents a paradigm of social action. Thus, the _cosmological_ paradigm is that expression of the complete social process which emerges from general concern with the problematic character of human salvation. The _corporate_ paradigm is that mode of the complete social process which develops from preoccupation with the problematic character of human order. The _organic_ paradigm is that expression of the complete social process which emerges from commitments to resolve the problematic character of human freedom. The formative problems of salvation, order, and freedom inculcate competing visions of social reality. These visions are expressed as root assumptions concerning what constitutes the basic nature of social action. The problem of salvation engenders an _absolutist_ vision of social reality. The problem of order precipitates an _entitative_ viewpoint on social action.[2] The problem of freedom leads to a _reconstructive_ image of the human social reality. Each competing image of social reality, when taken as a whole, forms a phenomenology of the human circumstance. These phenomenological visions provide the root postulates out of which

distinctive social realities have, or may be, constructed. The
absolutist vision results in a social reality characterized by the
activities of mythification, conversion, transformation, and redemption.
The entitative viewpoint leads to the activities of reification,
mobilization, canalization, and commitment. The reconstructive
perspective engenders a social reality characterized by the activities
of actualization, reconstruction, consolidation, and creation. Finally,
each construction of social reality culminates, or may culminate, in
a distinctive human condition. The cosmological paradigm culminates
in the condition of human chaos. The corporate paradigm results in the
human condition of reinforced meaninglessness. The organic paradigm
may culminate in the condition of human uncertainty.

The competing paradigms of social action are linked together
by means of their consequences. The cosmological paradigm culminates
in chaos. The polarity of chaos is order - the formative problem out
of which emerges the corporate paradigm. The latter results in the
human condition of reinforced meaninglessness. The polarity of rein-
forced meaninglessness is freedom. The problem of freedom inspires,
for its solution, the creation of an organic paradigm. The latter tends
towards the condition of human uncertainty. Human uncertainty is the
breeding-ground out of which the cosmological paradigm has developed.
The cosmological paradigm thus anticipates, and even requires, the
development of a corporate world. The corporate paradigm sets the
stage for the possible creation of the organic. And, in an ironic twist,
the organic paradigm prepares the condition out of which the cosmological
may once again develop. This is not, of course, a historical inevit-

ability. Human conditions, even if found undesirable, do not have to
be rectified. Formative human problems do not have to be solved.
The paradigmatic theory of social action simply describes what has
happened and what is likely to happen in a social reality characterized
by the problems of salvation, order, and freedom. Insofar as each
problem has resulted, or may result, in a distinctive paradigm of
social action, then the history of social action is literally dead-
locked. It is condemned to the rise and fall of the generalized human
experiences associated with the struggles for salvation, order, and
freedom.

The competing paradigms of social action do not exist in
isolation from one another. Each is a distinctive expression of the
same complete social process. These expressions may coexist in the
same human situation. They may overlap one another and be experienced
simultaneously as conflicting tendencies across the same human social
reality. None is ever totally absent from human experience. Nor is any
of the competing paradigms of social action ever completely absolute.
Each paradigm achieves, or may achieve, only relative predominance over
the other two. In terms of relative predominance, the three paradigms
of social action may be spaced out over time. The corporate paradigm
expresses the significant tendencies of twentieth century experience.
The problem of order and the generalized human experience which it
precipitates appear as the dominant social facts of contemporary human
life. The cosmological paradigm exists, at the present moment, only in
residual form. The salvation experience, while important, no longer
captivates the social scene. The cosmological paradigm is, however, the

formative experience to which present social reality is a continuing
response. Likewise, the organic paradigm exists now only as a possibility
on the forward horizon of human experience. It has nowhere been fully
realized as a major expression of the human social reality. It has,
however, been partially realized whenever the human condition of reinforced
meaninglessness has catalyzed the struggle for human liberation.

The themes of salvation, order, and freedom have thus shaped
the contemporary human predicament. Each has yielded a distinctive
paradigm of social action. The present social reality is, to a large
extent, the locus for the intersection of these competing paradigms
of social action and of the relationships which hold between them.
The three paradigms of social action have as their common ground the
complete social process. Each exhausts a certain content which can be
given to the complete social process. This exhaustion sets the stage
for a movement, or a possible movement, out of one paradigm and into
the next. The synthesis does not continue indeterminately but "comes
full circle", metaphorically speaking, when the condition of human
uncertainty makes possible, once again, the condition out of which the
cosmological paradigm may develop. This is a fateful and significant
contention. It will require for its verification a thorough presentation
of the assumptions which have led to a vision of the complete social
process and, thereby, to the paradigmatic theory of social action.

The present chapter will discuss the assumptions which have
led to a process interpretation of human experience and will outline
the general features of the paradigmatic theory of social action itself,
while succeeding chapters will examine, in more detail, the competing

paradigms of social action and the relationships which hold between them. This chapter will proceed through the following six stages. First, the basic working assumptions which underly the present study will be presented in terms of a theory of reconstructive empiricism. Second, the argument will be made that the reconstructive empirical approach complements a process interpretation of human experience. A discussion will then ensue concerning the philosophical development of the process perspective. This discussion will concentrate on the remarkably thorough and profound theory of human process which has been elaborated by Michael A. Weinstein, a contemporary American political theorist. It is Weinstein's statement of process theory, together with the social action theory of Talcott Parsons, which informs the present study. Third, the four dimensions of the complete social process will be described. Fourth, a paradigm of social action will be presented as a unique interpretation of the complete social process. The general features of the paradigmatic theory of social action will then be outlined. Finally, some concluding comments will be made and the chapters which follow will be outlined.

Reconstructive Empiricism

The development of the paradigmatic theory of social action has been preceded by certain assumptions concerning the character of human knowledge and the relationship between inquiry and social experience. These assumptions constitute the working postulates which guide the present study. They have not been conceived a priori to an interpretation of social action but directly emerge from an investigation of concrete human experience and from a fundamental decision,

based on that investigation, concerning how the salient tendencies

of social action may most fruitfully be disclosed and clarified.

These working assumptions may be scrutinized, debated, and criticized

in a principled fashion. They are not rigid dogmas but verifiable

hypotheses concerning the constitution of human knowledge and the

place of inquiry in social action. While they may be tested according

to the usual canons of evidence and logic, their ultimate ground of

verification lies in the degree to which they promote a genuinely

moral interpretation of the process of human experience. A genuinely

moral theory is distinguished by its readiness to expose to recon-

structive thought every dimension of human life – whether sentiments,

ideas, activities, or values – and by its eagerness to employ the

results of such inquiries to hasten the appearance of human liberation.

The working assumptions of this study are intended to advance a

critical reappraisal of every feature of human life. They are also

woven through by the present author's commitment to the fullest expansion

possible of a substantively meaningful, and thereby libertarian, human

situation. Rather than being value-free, the present study is thus

value-full. As a fundamentally moral statement, this inquiry begins and

ends with a commitment to lucid inquiry as the first step in the creation

of a genuine human social experience. To the extent to which the present

study succeeds in fostering a genuinely moral interpretation of human

experience, to that extent it may be considered successful. Conversely,

insofar as it fails to do so, then it may be considered less than an

adequate political theory.

The present inquiry begins with the assumption of reconstructive

empiricism as its chief epistemological tool. Reconstructive

empiricism may be viewed as a "movement" towards a genuinely empirical

theory of human knowledge.[3] A genuinely empirical epistemology is one

which continuously unifies the more ideal aspect of human life with

prescriptions for social conduct, human practices with reflections on

their emergent qualities, and social inquiry with the intuitive

apprehension of life out of which it has been bred. In a genuinely

empirical mode of thought, there is no study of social life which is

not simultaneously a moral commitment to a particular way of life,

no moral commitment which does not engender activity as a response,

and no social practice which is not grounded in a formative impression

of the world and of one's fate, as a social and historical being,

within it. Moreover, inasmuch as the unification, indeed the organic

unification, of sentiments, practices, reflections, and ideals

constitutes the touch stone of the process of human freedom, then in a

genuinely empirical mode of inquiry the process of thought itself 'takes

its place' in the struggle for a more libertarian world. Reconstructive

empiricism advances the development of such a genuine mode of social

study by presenting human inquiry as the activity of synthesizing human

sentiment into substantive human meanings. A substantive human meaning

is any representation of the social world which discloses how impression-

istic experience may be harmonized with the conduct of personal life,

and how social endeavour may be made reflective of genuine moral

aspirations. A substantive human meaning is, in other words, a momentary,

intuitive disclosure of the possibilities existent, at any given time,

for binding together the actual with the possible, practice with

reflection, aspirations with realities, and apprehensions with conduct.

Three premises underly this conception of human inquiry. First, human reflection is conceived as implicitly a process of self-expression.[4] Second, the content of self-expression is envisioned as any concretely apprehended aspect of human experience.[5] Third, the process of self-expression – the creation of substantive human meanings – is understood as being advanced by the combination and recombination of concrete human experience into a more comprehensive synthesis of the human social process.[6] This synthetic effort is always reconstructive. It continuously shatters the customary presentation of social reality in favour of a new and more satisfactory reworking of human experience. This reworking of concrete human experience is intended to portray a broader swath of the human social reality and to reveal more acutely the possibilities existent for the organic unification of the process of social action. And it is precisely the organic unification of social action – the binding together of affectivity, consciousness, practices, and moral aspirations into a unitary movement – which advances self-expression and, thereby, provokes the libertarian impulse.

The reconstructive viewpoint on human knowledge overcomes traditional conceptions of the place of social inquiry in human experience. Reconstructive empiricism does not conceive of human thought as a reality-in-itself, detached from the actual life-situation of concrete human beings, or as a neutral instrument capable of "discovering" a pre-existent subject matter. Moreover, the reconstructive empirical approach does not envision human reflection as a way of bridging an inevitably sundered universe:

a connective between the private realm of subjectivity and the more objective domain of public happenings. On the contrary, reconstructive empiricism simply presents human inquiry as the process of self-expression. And it views self-expression as the process of creating the world anew for oneself around the fountainhead of impressionistic experience. This proposal springs from a peculiar image of the human self. The human self is not maintained as a philosophical nicety or as a mechanical cog. It is envisioned neither as the embodiment of a hidden "spirit" nor as a discrete entity but, on the contrary, as an active, and potentially creative, social process. The human self is a social process which is concretely experienced, and in that experience, created. Rather than being the ultimate datum of human existence, the social self is developed through the process of merging the person,biologically conceived, into the broader forum of human experience. What is meant by the social self - the fact that people achieve an affective sense of being - is a complicated working-out of this merger. The scope of this merger cannot be reduced to a solitary person engaged in readily observable activities but extends well beyond the person, biologically conceived, to the complete social process out of which certain modes of social being have emerged as possibilities while others have not. To give full expression to the social self, therefore, is to comprehend the complete social process out of which it has developed. Self-expression is thus synonymous with the study of the broader process of social existence. And inquiry into any aspect of human experience is co-terminous, or may be co-terminous, with advances in self-expression.

The material out of which self-expression develops is any

concretely apprehended aspect of social action. Concrete human

knowledge is knowledge which may be gained independently.[7] And

human knowledge gained independently is knowledge which does not

depend for its existence on "before the fact" assumptions concerning

the character of human existence, dogmatic convictions, irreducible

explanatory principles, primal acts of faith, or on intense "credos."

All the latter may be considered, in fact, as the necessary presuppo-

sitions for dependent forms of human thought. There are two central

varieties of dependent thinking – one metaphysical and the other

more abstract.[8] Neither metaphysical nor abstract modes of human

thought yield concrete human knowledge. On the contrary, metaphysical

thought is always an emergent of an intense human "credo." And

knowledge which may be gained only.abstractly is always dependent for

its existence on an a priori willingness to 'reify' human existence.

While metaphysical thought yields creeds and dogmas, abstract thought

asserts a 'method of study' as the fullest representation possible of

the human social reality. Thus, while theology is an example of meta-

physical knowledge, the systems approach to human inquiry is an example

of abstract knowledge. Although the contents of metaphysical and abstract

thought may differ, their origins are exactly the same. Both emerge from

a shared commitment to overcome the concrete social world in favour of

that which may never be independently grasped. Dependent forms of social

thought provide an "escape hatch" by which human beings may reach beyond

the concrete social world to the nether world of abstractions and

preformed realities. While such abstractions and preformed realities

may be transformed into the "lightning rods" of human creed, they

have never been, and can never be, apprehended concretely. Their

very appearance implies the loss of independent reflection.

Reconstructive empiricism dispenses with such "escape hatches"

in favour of retaining an immediate and intuitive contact with the

concrete social world. It encourages independent reflection. And

such reflection is independent precisely because it is grounded in

concrete human experience.[9] Reconstructive thought is never, in

this case, thought about nothing. It is always reflection on the

actual life-situation of real men and women, on the history of social

action of which their life-situation is but a working-out, and on

the immediate possibilities for its improvement. Reconstructive thought,

in short, is grounded in the entire historical panorama of human

affectivities, modes of human consciousness, patterns of social

organization, and dicta of moral life. It weighs the results of all

knowledge independently gained against the concrete process of human

experience itself. And it further demands that all such grounded

inquiries prescribe how the actual life-process of concrete human beings

may be advanced towards the condition of human liberation. Conversely,

metaphysical and abstract modes of human knowledge are implicitly

ungrounded.[10] They do not designate anything in the concrete social

world. Instead, they represent a negation of concrete social experience

and an affirmation of that which may be only dependently experienced.

Metaphysical and abstract modes of human thought, in short, are the

leading agents in the flight beyond the empirical social world to the

domains of anti-empiricisms and counterfeit empiricisms respectively.

So far, reconstructive empiricism has involved two basic assumptions. First, human thought has been described as implicitly a process of self-expression. Second, the content of self-expression has been defined as any concretely, or independently, apprehended aspect of human experience. As its final assumption, reconstructive empiricism maintains that self-expression may be achieved by synthesizing concrete human experience into substantive human meanings. A substantive human meaning is a fleeting vision of social reality which sums up human sentiments and which discloses the possibilities existent for organically unifying such sentiments with other dimensions of human existence – whether reflections, practices, or moral aspirations. This vision of social reality is like a movable mosaic. It unifies, for an instant, the central tendencies of human experience into a lucid image of the process of social reality. This mosaic of social reality relates the affective social self to the larger process of human experience within which the person is inextricably immersed. In doing so, the mosaic of social reality further clarifies the full web of social action out of which qualitatively distinct modes of social being have emerged and provides a tentative answer as to why other, perhaps more laudable, modes of social being have not developed. The social mosaic also reveals possibilities for concrete action and discloses how such activities may be related to the realization of libertarian ideals. The synthesis of the process of human experience thus plunges the social self, on the basis of sentiment, into the history of social action of which it is the focal point at the present moment. In a literal sense, the social self reconstructs its way to the creation of a sub-

stantively meaningful world. This implies, of course, that
reconstructive thought emerges from reconstructive sentiments and
anticipates the reconstruction of social life and aesthetic experience.
It further implies that the process of reconstruction - the creation
of substantive human meanings - is itself the process of human freedom.

This reconstructive activity is always relative, partial,
provisional, and prospective. It is relative rather than absolute
because broad portraits of social reality are grounded in particular human
situations. The latter have referents in space and time and contain a
unique constellation of experiences. There may be, at the minimum, as
many images of the history of social process as there are different
human situations, as many social reconstructions as there are libertarian
sentiments to be expressed and possibilities for freedom to be disclosed.
The creation of substantive human meanings must, therefore, be held
relative to the human circumstance. It follows that no social reconstru-
ction completely exhausts the entire process of human experience but
that each image is a partial representation of a larger whole. The mosaic
which is created encompasses only that narrow band of social reality
which is relevant to particular human situations. Similarly, reconstructive
activity is provisional rather than permanent because the changing scene
of social life cannot be immobilized. Any change in independently
apprehended experience alters the basis for the reconstruction of that
experience. Human life is, or may be, temporarily 'thrown off balance.'
And it is 'thrown off balance' by the prospective aspect of all substan-
tive images of social action. The synthesis of human sentiments into
substantive human meanings opens up opportunities for concrete social

action. Reconstructive thought 'stirs up' the necessity for reconstructive activity. And this reconstructive activity serves to add a moral dimension to every aspect of human existence. Human life of this sort is bound together by the realization and practice of genuine moral aspirations. It is such genuine moral aspirations which provide the well-spring for impressionistic experience and which ultimately inspire reconstructive thought.

Reconstructive thought succeeds, of course, only to the extent that the customary presentation of human history as a serial, chronological, and epochal affair is overcome.[11] Human history, in the most complete sense, is the history of social action. And the history of social action is the history of the concretely apprehended universe of human experience and of the emergent qualities which develop from its combination and recombination into new and more profound portraits of social reality. While that which is "in sight" across the social domain may be dated and, on the basis of chronology, arranged serially, that which is "out of sight but not out of experience" cannot be grasped so simply. And yet, it is precisely in the domain of affectivities, reflections, practices, and moral visions that the answer to which quality of social being is co-terminous with which mode of social action lies. The study of concrete human experience from the perspective of its emergent qualities leads to an unfamiliar historical process. In the study of independently apprehended experience, there are no customary land-marks, no simple divisions, and no tidy arrangements of periods into past, present, and future. The study of independently apprehended experience is, in fact, nothing less than the creation of the history of

that experience from the perspective of human sentiment and from the

prospective urge to freedom. In short, the reconstructive empirical

approach to human thought is a way of making history. And the history

which is created is the history of the process of social action. The

history of social process partially clarifies human experience and

encourages a transformation, whether large or small, of the content

of human life. This transformation is always preceded by the creation

of a relative, partial, provisional, and prospective mosaic of social

reality.

These remarks conclude the discussion of reconstructive

empiricism. This study will now demonstrate how such basic working

assumptions provide the ground for the development of a paradigmatic

theory of social action, which is a broad mosaic of the history

of social experience. This mosaic of social reality has been inspired

by a desire for a substantively meaningful world, deals in concretely

apprehended experience, and is implicitly reconstructive. It begins with

the formative vision of the social process.

The Social Process

The history of social experience is the history of the <u>process</u>

of social experience. And the history of the process of social experience

is always the history of a unitary process of social action, its content

and its qualitative modes of transformation.[12]

The unitary process of social action may be defined as a

dynamic working-out of concretely experienced relations of preformance,

anticipation, and summation between human dispositions, queries,

materializations, and qualitative consequences. This unitary social

process provides the single, dynamic point of reference around which

every aspect of the history of concrete social experience may be

organized. There has never been any occurrence in the concrete social

world which does not maintain as its referent either a human disposition,

a query concerning how that disposition may be alleviated or advanced,

a concrete process of materialization by which the products of human

consciousness are transformed into social practices, or a qualitative

consequence of the actions undertaken. Moreover, there has never been

any fundamental transformation of human dispositions which does not

preform and anticipate a corresponding alteration of human thought.

There have been no queries which fail to summarize a past history of

human affectivity, no transformation of human consciousness which

does not set the stage for a further reconstruction of social life, no

social reconstruction which does not sum up a prior process of human

affectivity and consciousness, and, finally, no qualitative outcome

of social action which does not simultaneously summarize a previous

movement of human dispositions, queries, and materializations, and

establish a new basis for the transformation, or possible transformation,

of human affectivity. The domain of social experience is, in short,

bound together by a dynamic process of social action. And this dynamic

social process is always a movement out of human affectivity and into

consciousness, beyond consciousness and into the more material aspect of

social existence, beyond human materializations and into the domain of

qualitative outcomes, and, finally, beyond qualitative consequences

and into the possibility of a new reconstruction of the process of

social action. This dynamic social process has never received a single

enduring interpretation throughout the history of concrete social experience. There has never been a single mode of human affectivity, a homogeneous state of human consciousness, a universal process of human materializations, or a unitary condition of qualitative consequences. Additionally, there has never been a universally identical process by which human dispositions, queries, materializations, and qualitative consequences are combined into a unitary movement. On the contrary, the process of social action has received many different expressions, each of which has yielded a distinctive mode of social experience. To comprehend the full range of social experience, it is thus necessary to clarify, at first, the history of transformations undergone by the unitary social process.

This clarification begins with the seminal insight that concrete social experience always contains four qualitatively distinct aspects, namely, a human disposition, a query, a materialization, and a qualitative consequence. Each is woven into a unitary social process by concretely experienced relations of preformance, anticipation, and summation. This insight does not originate with the present study. It is a product both of the substantively creative thought of Deena and Michael Weinstein, contemporary American social and political theorists respectively, and of the formative reflections of Talcott Parsons.[13] While the Weinsteins have extended the critical notion of a four dimensional human process into a full examination of social process theory and, thereupon, into an admirable description of the different modes of human action present within the contemporary social world, Parsons has implicitly grounded the construction of a general theory

of social action in concretely experienced relations of preformance, anticipation, and summation.[14] Working independently, the present author has achieved many of the same conclusions. Like the Weinsteins, this author has been led to the conclusion that social experience may be best understood as a dynamic movement involving four qualitatively distinct dimensions, each of which provides the ground for a different content of human existence. Similarly, the mutual conclusion has been reached that there are three generalized modes of social experience, each of which represents a major reconstruction of the unitary process of social action. Like Parsons, the present author has concluded that the direction of particular reconstructions of social action may be best clarified through concretely experienced relations of preformance, anticipation, and summation. These shared conclusions are intended, of course, to serve the limited aims of the present study. This work is not primarily concerned with the elaboration of social process theory nor with the construction of a general theory of social action. On the contrary, the present study is devoted simply to the construction of a generalized mosaic of social reality. The definition of social action used here has, in fact, been derived directly from a concrete investigation of what consitutues the content and direction of the three generalized social experiences which compose this portrait of past, present, and possible social realities. This investigation has disclosed that the content of any given mode of social experience may be clarified by examining which dispositions, queries, materializations, and qualitative consequences have gained ascendency at particular times and places. It has also revealed that the direction of

a given mode of social experience may be understood by studying

how human dispositions, queries, materializations, and qualitative

consequences have been combined into a unitary process of social

action by means of concretely experienced relations of preformance,

anticipation, and summation.

For example, the content of any given mode of social

experience consists of human dispositions, queries, materializations,

and qualitative consequences. A human disposition is a social process

involving the summing-up of a formative impression of the concrete

social world, and of one's fate as a social and historical being with-

in it, into an active awareness concerning what is most problematic in

human existence.[15] An active awareness of what is most problematic

in human existence may be described as a definition of the human

situation. A definition of the human situation always has an affective

human being, or a plurality of affective human beings, as its subject

and some or all features of the concrete social world as its object.

It is precisely the passing of the concrete social world through the

well-spring of human affectivity which provides the ultimate ground

for the development of definitions of human situation. And such defini-

tions, once developed, unify a formative impresssion of the concrete

social world with an understanding of what constitutes its most

problematic feature. Similarly, a human query is a social process

which involves the transformation of an active awareness of what is

most problematic in human existence into an assumption about what

must be done for its rectification. The movement from a human

disposition to a human query is not simply a movement out of affectivity

into consciousness. It is also, in a profound sense, a movement

beyond a more individualistic and definitional dimension of social

experience into a more collective and intentional one.[16] While a

human disposition designates the social process by which an individual

human being, or a plurality of individual human beings, may achieve

a definition of the human situation, a human query denotes the social

process by which as aspect of intentionality is added to social

experience. And it is precisely this aspect of intentionality which

procides the keynote for the appearance, or possible appearance, of a

human collectivity. In this case, a human collectivity begins to

emerge, or may begin to emerge, when a definition of the human situation

leads to the intention of acting upon that definition. Human beings

not only become aware of the human situation, but also organize themselves

around the task of rectifying its problematic features. And this process

of organization is a product of a human query. Similarly, a human

materialization is a social process involving the translation of an

assumption concerning what must be done for the rectification of a

pressing human problem into a concrete social practice which specifies

how this might be accomplished. A concrete social practice may be

viewed as a realization of the products of human consciousness. This

process of actualization is always more relational than definitional

or intentional.[17] A human materialization does not provide the basis

for the process of arriving at a definition of the human situation or

for the process of human intentionality. It does ground, however, the

process of transforming the products of a human disposition and of a

human query into a qualitative reconstruction of the conduct of

everyday social life. A human materialization is, in this case, concretely experienced as a qualitatively distinct way of being related to others. In a similar way, a qualitative consequence is a social process involving the summing-up of human dispositions, queries, and materializations into a transformation, whether partial or complete, of the human situation. This transformation of the human situation is concretely experienced as a quality of human life. And a quality of human life may be viewed as a lived valuation of a resultant human situation from the standpoint of a prior history of human dispositions, queries, and materializations.[18] Social experience, in this case, contains a qualitative aspect. And this qualitative aspect is grounded in the process of weighing a transformed human situation against the human desires, intentions, and practices which have led to it.

The content of social experience thus includes, at the minimum, human dispositions, queries, materializations, and qualitative consequences. There is no social experience which does not contain a definition of the human situation, an intention to act upon that definition, a concrete social practice, and a quality of human life. However, social experience does not only contain a content. It also includes a direction. The direction of a given mode of social experience may be viewed, in its simplest espression, as an emergent of how a human disposition, a query, a materialization, and a qualitative consequence are combined into a social process by means of concretely experienced relations of preformance, anticipation, and summation. There are different modes of social process, each of

which represents a qualitatively unique working-out of the relationships which hold between the different aspects of social experience. Each mode of social process moves the domain of social experience in a particular direction. Thus, while all social experience is unified by means of the presence of a process of social action, not all social experiences are organized in precisely the same way. And it is the differences between the ways in which social dimensions are unified into a process of social action that account for the many possible directions of social experience. Such differences may be traced to the many possible variations of concretely experienced relations of preformance, anticipation, and summation.

For example, the different aspects of social experience are joined together, at first, by relations of preformance.[19] By preformance is meant the contents of a given mode of social experience mutually foreclose and circumscribe one another. A particular mode of human disposition gives rise to certain forms of human consciousness while foreclosing the possibility of others. A particular mode of human consciousness channels and directs the contents of human materializations. Only certain consequences, and not others, emerge from the materialization of human intentions, and these consequences circumscribe and foreclose, once again, the contents of human dispositions. Likewise, the different aspects of social experience are joined together by relations of anticipation.[20] By anticipation is meant the contents of a given mode of social experience mutually necessitate each other. A human disposition requires for its fulfilment the appearance of a

human query. A human query demands for its fulfilment the presence

of a human materialization. A human materialization "leads into" a

qualitative consequence. And there is no qualitative consequence

which does not demand, and even require, an adjustment, or a possible

adjustment, of a human disposition. Similarly, the different aspects

of social experience are joined together by relations of summation.[21]

By summation is meant the contents of a given mode of social experience

mutually "work-out" one another. A human disposition represents a

working-out of a past history of social action. A human query may be

viewed as a working-out of a formative human disposition. A human

materialization represents a working-out of the products of human

dispositions and human queries. A qualitative consequence may be

viewed as a working-out of a process of dispositions, queries, and

materializations. There is no aspect of social experience, in this

case, which does not represent a summing-up of one dimension of social

existence into another.

The different aspects of social experience are, therefore,

always unified into a dynamic movement by means of concretely experienced

relations of preformance, anticipation, and summation. Such relations

are concretely experienced since they do not depend for their existence

upon an external source of validation. They are not objects of human

reification, products of human dogma, manifestations of a hidden

'purpose' in social existence, or empty connections between isolated

phenomena. Relations of preformance, anticipation, and summation are,

on the contrary, independently knowable because it is possible to

detect their presence across the concrete social world without resorting

to abstract thought or to a priori assumptions. And they are independently knowable as the internal dynamic of social experience because they constitute the very process by which the different aspects of social existence combine into a unitary movement. In this case, human dispositions, queries, materializations, and qualitative consequences are not externally related to one another as isolated phenomena. Nor are they joined by empty connections. They are, instead, internally related to one another as different aspects of a unitary social movement. And their internal relations consist of concretely experienced conjunctions of preformance, anticipation, and summation. Accordingly, social experience contains its own dynamic. And the dynamic of social experience is grounded in the presence of relations of preformance, anticipation, and summation between the central aspects of social existence. This dynamic of social experience does not, of course, always operate in exactly the same way. There are different modes of social action. And each mode of social action is different because it represents a qualitatively unique working-out of concretely experienced relations of preformance, anticipation, and summation between the major dimensions of social experience. This results in the possibility of social experience being unified by different modes of social process, each of which moves the social world, whether partially or completely, in a particular direction.

The history of social experience is thus the history of the different interpretations which may be given to a unitary process of social action. Whatever its interpretation, this social process

contains both a content and a direction. The content of social

action consists, at the minimum, of a human disposition, a query,

a materialization, and a qualitative consequence. The direction of

social action consists, in its simplest expression, of a dynamic

working-out of concretely experienced relations of preformance,

anticipation, and summation between a human disposition, a query, a

materialization, and a qualitative consequence. Social action has,

however, never consisted of a dynamic working-out of concretely

experienced relations of preformance, anticipation, and summation

between a single human disposition, a single human query, a single

materialization, or a single qualitative consequence. On the contrary,

social action has always consisted of many dispositions, queries,

materializations, and qualitative consequences, each of which preform,

anticipate, and summarize each other. And interpretations of social

action have always dealt with the process of social action in its

fullest expression. In its fullest expression, the process of social

action may be visualized as a complete social process. The complete

process represents the most exhaustive statement possible of social

action. It is the complete social process which provides the ground

for the construction of a paradigmatic theory of social action.

The Complete Social Process[22]

The domain of social experience is unified, in the fullest

sense, by a complete process of social action.* The complete social

process interrelates into a unitary human social experience a process

of human dispositions, a process of human queries, a process of human

materializations, and a process of qualitative consequences. The

* See Table 1 below, p. 332

complete social process is simply the process of social action

brought to its fullest fruition. The process of social action

consists of a movement between a human disposition, a query, a

materialization, and a qualitative consequence. There has never

been, of course, a <u>single</u> human disposition or a human disposition

which has not transformed a formative impression of a <u>specific</u>

aspect of the concrete social world into a particular definition

of the human situation. In a similar way, there has never been a

<u>solitary</u> human query or a human query which has not advanced a

particular definition of the human situation into a <u>unique</u> assumption

concerning what must be done for its rectification. Likewise, there

has never been a single human materialization or a human materialization

which has not organized a specific assumption concerning what must be

done for the rectification of a particular definition of the human

situation into a <u>specific</u> social practice which relates how this

might be accomplished. And, finally, there has never been a <u>solitary</u>

qualitative consequence or a qualitative consequence which has not

combined a specific human disposition, a particular human query, and

a specific human materialization into a <u>unique</u> alteration of the

human situation.

On the contrary, social action has consisted, at first, of

a <u>process</u> of human dispositions, each of which organizes a formative

sensibility about a <u>different</u> aspect of the concrete social world

into a partial definition of the human situation, and all of which

preform, anticipate, and summarize each other.[23] Likewise, social

action has been composed of a <u>process</u> of human queries, each of

which transforms a partial definition of the human situation into a *specific* assumption concerning what must be done for its rectification, and all of which preform, anticipate, and summarize each other.[24] Similarly, social action has consisted of a *process* of human materializations, each of which advances a specific assumption concerning what must be done for the rectification of a particular definition of the human situation into a *unique* social practice which relates how this might be accomplished.[25] Finally, social action has been composed of a *process* of qualitative consequences, each of which integrates a specific definition of the human situation, together with its related assumption and practice, into a *partial* revision of the human situation, and all of which preform, anticipate, and summarize each other.[26] In short, social action may be viewed, in its fullest expression, as a relentless development of relationships *within* processes of human dispositions, human queries, human materializations, and qualitative consequences, and *between* them.

Thus, the complete process of social action is grounded in a *process of human dispositions*. The process of human dispositions combines into a unitary human sensibility four root sentiments about the concrete social world, each of which provides the basis for a particular definition of the human situation. A human disposition has previously been described as a social process which channels a formative impression of a specific aspect of the concrete social world into a particular understanding of what is most problematic in human existence. There are four basic human dispositions, each of which advances a formative impression of a different feature of concrete

social reality into a particular, albeit partial, definition of

the human situation. They may be described as subjective, collective,

social, and aesthetic dispositions. A subjective disposition is a

social process which organizes sentiments about the more personal

aspect of the concrete social world into an appreciation of what is

most problematic in the human survival situation. A collective

disposition provides the basis for the transformation of feelings

about the more postulational aspect of human existence into an

understanding of what is most problematic in the human political

situation. A social disposition advances a formative impresssion of

the more material aspect of the concrete social world into an appre-

ciation of what is most problematic in the human social situation.

And an aesthetic disposition is a social process which transforms

sensibilities about the more qualitative aspect of social life into

an understanding of what is most problematic in the human value

situation.

The concrete social world is, in this case, always apprehended

impressionistically. It is not, however, always apprehended impression-

istically in the same way. On the contrary, four affective responses

to the concrete social world are possible, each of which furnishes a

particular understanding of what is most problematic in human existence.

For example, human affectivity may have, as its object, the more

personal and introspective aspect of the concrete social world. An

affective human being, or a plurality of affective human beings, may

organize an impression of the concrete social world on the basis of

its subjective adequacy.[27] By subjective adequacy is meant an intuitive

appreciation of the quality of social being emergent from a given transformation of the human survival situation. The submission of social experience to the standard of subjective adequacy affords an understanding of what is most problematic in a given process of human survival. Since any given process of human survival results, or may result, in the creation of a particular mode of social being, then there is no affective response to the quality of a particular mode of social being which does not produce, or may not produce, an active awareness of what is most problematic in the human survival situation. It is the unification of an impression of the concrete social world on the basis of its subjective adequacy with a definition of the human survival situation which comprises a subjective disposition. Likewise, human affectivity may be directed towards the more postulational and collaborative aspect of the concrete social world. Human beings may develop an impression of a given mode of social experience on the basis of its collective adequacy. By collective adequacy is meant an intuitive appreciation of the quality of social consciousness emergent from a given transformation of the human political situation. An impression of the collective adequacy of the concrete social world provides for an understanding of what is most problematic in a given process of human politics. Processes of human politics culminate, or may culminate, in the development of particular modes of social consciousness. Consequently, an affective response to the quality of a particular mode of social consciousness produces, or may produce, an active appreciation of what is most problematic in the human political situation. The synthesis of an impression of the collective adequacy of human experience with a

definition of the human political situation represents a collective

disposition. In a similar way, an impression of the concrete social

world may be organized on the basis of its social adequacy. By social

adequacy is meant an intuitive appreciation of the quality of social

activity emergent from a given transformation of the human social

situation. An appreciation of what is most problematic in the process

of human materializations may be gained from a sense of the social

adequacy of human existence. Insofar as any given process of human

materializations results, or may result, in a particular mode of social

practice, then an affective response to the quality of a particular mode

of social practice yields, or may yield, an active awareness of what

is most problematic in the human social situation. It is the

unification of an impresssion of the concrete social world on the basis

of its social adequacy with a definition of the human social situation

which comprises a social disposition. Finally, human affectivity may

be oriented towards the more qualitative and consequential dimension

of the concrete social world. The aesthetic adequacy of the concrete

social world may context the development of human sensibilities. By

aesthetic adequacy is meant an intuitive appreciation of the quality of

social morality emergent from a given transformation of the human value

situation. An appreciation of the aesthetic adequacy of human exper-

ience furnishes an understanding of what is most problematic in the process

of human valuations. Since processes of human valuation always result

in the creation of particular modes of social morality, then an affective

response to the quality of a particular mode of social morality engenders,

or may engender, an active awareness of what is most problematic in the

human value situation. The interrelation of an impression of the

concrete social world on the basis of its aesthetic adequacy with

a definition of the human value situation comprises an aesthetic

disposition.

There are, therefore, four basic human dispositions, each

of which transforms a formative impression of the adequacy of a

specific aspect of the concrete social world into a particular definition

of the human situation. The four basic human dispositions may be

viewed as interrelated aspects of a broader movement of human

sensibilities. Impressions of the more subjective aspect of human

existence preform and anticipate sentiments about the more collaborative

dimension of social experience. Collective sensibilities sum up personal

feelings, and provide the basis for a further appreciation of human

social life. The process of social affectivity summarizes subjective

and collective sensibilities, and sets the stage for a more aesthetic

impression of the human circumstance. And aesthetic sentiments sum up

a prior history of subjective, collective, and social dispositions,

and anticipate, once more, an appreciation of the quality of a given

mode of social being. Moreover, a definition of the human survival

situation preforms and anticipates an awareness of what is most

problematic in the human political situation. Political problems

summarize survival concerns, and point to particular social problems.

Definitions of the human social situation sum up specific survival

and political problems, and anticipate specific images of the human

aesthetic situation. And aesthetic problems summarize a past history

of survival, political, and social problems, and lead back into

redefinitions of the human survival situation.

Although the complete social process originates in a process of human dispositions, it also includes a process of human queries. While the process of human dispositions provides the basis for a complete awareness of what is most problematic in human existence, the process of human queries provides the basis for a complete understanding of what must be done for its rectification.

The process of human queries may be defined as a dynamic working-out of concretely experienced relations of preformance, anticipation, and summation between four fundamental human assumptions, each of which specifies what must be done for the rectification of a specific human disposition. A human query has previously been described as a social process which transforms a specific human disposition into an assumption concerning what must be done for its resolution. There are four fundamental human queries, each of which responds to a specific human disposition. They may be described as ontological, epistemological, axiological, and aesthetic queries.[28] An ontological query is a social process which organizes a subjective human disposition into an assumption concerning what might constitute a more desirable mode of social being. An epistemological query transforms a collective human disposition into a postulate concerning what might comprise a more desirable mode of social consciousness. An axiological query is a social process which channels a social disposition into an assumption concerning what might constitute a more desirable mode of social activity. And an aesthetic query advances an aesthetic human disposition into a postulate concerning

what might comprise a more desirable mode of social morality.

Human dispositions thus give rise to postulations concerning how they might be resolved most satisfactorily. However, human dispositions do not always yield the same postulations. On the contrary, there are four basic human dispositions, each of which integrates a formative appreciation of a specific aspect of the concrete social world into a particular awareness of what is most problematic in the human situation. And each particular appreciation of what is most problematic in the human situation yields a specific postulate concerning what must be done for its rectification. For example, a subjective definition of the human situation anticipates, and even requires, for its solution an ontological query concerning the nature of a more satisfactory mode of social being. An impression of the more subjective aspect of human experience calls into question the quality of social being engendered by a given process of human sur- vival. And an ontological query draws this impression of human experience into a postulate which details the salient features of a more adequate mode of social being. An ontological query represents, in this case, the first step in the revision, or possible revision, of the human survival situation. In a similar way, collective human sensibilities require for their prosecution a reformation of the human epistemology. This reformation of the human epistemology originates in an aversive reaction to the mentality of a given political process. And it concludes with a prophetic query which spells out the ingredients of a more efficacious mode of political consciousness. An epistemological query may thus be visualized as

the lead-point in the reconstruction, or possible reconstruction, of the human political situation. Likewise, an axiological query emerges in response to human social sentiments. Such sentiments have, as their object, the quality of social activity emergent from a given process of human sociability. As the vanguard of an alteration, or a possible alteration, of the human social situation, an axiological query organizes social sensibilities into an image of human experience which describes what might constitute a more desirable mode of social activity. And, finally, an aesthetic definition of the human situation anticipates for its solution an aesthetic query concerning the character of a more adequate mode of social morality. An impression of the more valuational aspect of human experience calls into question the quality of the human moral condition. And an aesthetic query responds to this qualitative assessment of the human moral condition by providing a vision of the human prospect which outlines the broad strokes of a more satisfactory mode of value experience. An aesthetic query thus serves as the first step in the transformation, or possible transformation, of the human value situation.

There are, therefore, four fundamental human queries, each of which organizes a specific human disposition into a particular postulate concerning what must be done for its rectification. The four fundamental queries may be viewed as complementary features of a broader movement of human consciousness. Assumptions concerning the nature of social being preform and anticipate postulates concerning the nature of human knowledge. An epistemological query represents simultaneously a working-out of an ontology of social reality and a movement towards

a particular axiological assumption. Axiological postulates summarize a past history of ontological and epistemological queries and engender a particular human aesthetic. And an aesthetic query constitutes a working-out of a past history of ontological, epistemological, and axiological assumptions, and anticipates, once again, a new human ontology.

The complete process of social action is thus grounded in a process of human queries. While the process of human dispositions provides the basis for a complete impression of what is most problematic in human existence, the process of human queries provides the basis for a complete understanding of what must be done for the rectification of the human situation. The complete social process does not cease, however, with a unitary movement of human postulations. On the contrary, it also includes a process of human materializations. This process of human materializations provides the basis for a complete actualization of the assumptions necessary for the resolution of each basic human disposition.

The process of human materializations consists of an active playing-out of concretely experienced relations of preformance, anticipation, and summation between four rudimentary human activities, each of which specifies how a particular human query might be actualized. A human materialization has previously been depicted as a social process which transforms a specific postulate concerning what must be done for the rectification of a particular human disposition into a unique social practice. There are four rudimentary human materializations, each of which connects with a specific human query. They may be

described as survival, political, social, and aesthetic materializations. A survival materialization is a social process which channels an onto-logical query into an activity which represents a concrete working-out of a more desirable mode of social being. A political materialization organizes an epistemological query into an activity which constitutes a concrete development of a more adequate mode of social consciousness. A social materialization incorporates an axiological query into an activity which represents a concrete working-out of a more satisfactory mode of social organization. And an aesthetic materialization is a social process which transforms an aesthetic query into an activity which concretely symbolizes a more efficacious mode of social morality.

Human queries are thus structured out into the domain of concrete social experience by means of particular human practices. And such human practices are particular precisely because they constitute an actualization of specific human postulates and of their related sensibilities. For example, the process of survival activity may be viewed as a materialization of the ontological realm. The realm of ontology transforms subjective human sensibilities into an image of a more adequate mode of social being. This image of social being is objectified, or may be objectified, by a fundamental reconstruction of the human productive order. In a similar way, the process of human politics may be visualized as an expression of the epistemological domain. The domain of epistemology organizes collective human sensibilities into a vision of a more satisfactory mode of human consciousness. This vision of human consciousness is advanced, or may be advanced, into a "social fact" by a root revision of the structure of associative activity.

Likewise, the process of social activity may be envisioned as a concrete actualization of the realm of axiology. The realm of axiology incorporates human social sensibilities into a vision of a more desirable mode of human relationships. This vision of human relationships is materialized, or may be materialized, by a radical revision of the structure of human sociability. Finally, the process of aesthetic activity may be understood as a realization of the domain of moral postulates. The domain of moral postulates advances human aesthetic sensibilities into an image of a more adequate value experience. This image of value experience is transformed, or may be transformed, into concrete human experience by a fundamental alteration of human moral practices.

There are, therefore, four rudimentary human materializations, each of which serves as a concrete expression of a specific human query. The four rudimentary human materializations interrelate as partial aspects of a more comprehensive movement of human activity. The process of survival activity anticipates the content of political experience. The structure of political action, while summarizing the salient features of the human productive process, also sets the stage for a certain mode of human sociability. The process of social activity intermediates political and aesthetic activity. And the process of human aesthetics incorporates a past movement of social activity into a new description of the human survival experience.

The complete process of social action is thus rooted in a process of human dispositions, continues with a process of human queries, and advances into a process of human materializations. The

process of human dispositions provides the context for a complete
impression of what is most problematic in human existence. The
process of human queries affords the basis for a complete appreciation
of what must be done for the rectification of the human situation.
And the process of human materializations furnishes the ground for
a complete actualization of the postulates necessary for the
rectification of human experience. Ultimately, the complete social
process culminates in a process of qualitative consequences. This
process of qualitative consequences provides the basis for a complete
transformation of the human situation.

The process of qualitative consequences may be visualized as
a movement, indeed a dynamic movement, between four central qualities
of human life, each of which sums up a specific human disposition, a
particular human query, and a unique human materialization into a
partial transformation of the human situation. A qualitative consequence
has previously been described as a social process which transforms a
specific dimension of social experience into a particular reconstruction
of the human situation. There are four central qualitative consequences,
each of which articulates with a particular aspect of social experience.
They may be described as the quality of survival experience, the quality
of political experience, the quality of social experience, and the
quality of aesthetic experience.[29] The quality of survival experience
is a social process which involves the integration of a subjective
human disposition, an ontological query, and a survival materialization
into a particular transformation of the human survival situation. The
quality of political experience is a social process which entails the

organization of a collective human disposition, an epistemological

query, and a political materialization into a particular reconstruction

of the human political situation. The quality of social experience is

a social process which involves the summing up of a human social

disposition, an axiological query, and a social materialization into

a particular alteration of the human social situation. And the quality

of aesthetic experience is a social process which entails the incor-

poration of an aesthetic human disposition, an aesthetic query, and

an evaluative materialization into a particular revision of the human

aesthetic situation.

The process of human materializations thus engenders a qualitative

transformation of the human situation. And this qualitative revision of

the human situation consists of a playing-out of the relationships which

obtain between four key processes of human experience, each of which

represents a lived summation of human sentiments, postulates, and activities.

For example, the process of survival activity results, or may result, in

a radical transformation of the quality of social being. This trans-

formation of social being is concretely experienced as a summation of

a subjective human disposition, an ontological postulate, and a

survival practice into a qualitative alteration of the human survival

situation. A quality of survival experience represents, in this case,

a lived synthesis of the more subjective aspect of social experience.

In a similar way, the process of political activity culminates, or may

culminate, in a root reconstruction of the quality of human consciousness.

Such a reconstruction of human consciousness is directly apprehended as

a summation of collective sensibilities, queries, and practices into a

qualitative transfiguration of the human political situation. A

quality of political experience may thus be viewed as a totalization

of the more postulational dimension of social experience. Likewise,

the process of social activity leads, or may lead, to a modification

of the quality of human sociability. This modification of human

sociability is directly experienced as a summation of a human social

sentiment, an axiological query, and a social practice into a qual-

itative revision of the human social situation. A quality of social

experience may thus be visualized as a lived unification of the more

material aspect of the concrete social world. Finally, the process

of aesthetic activity produces, or may produce, an abrupt change

in the quality of social morality. This abrupt change in social

morality is concretely apprehended as a summation of aesthetic

sensibilities, postulates, and practices into a qualitative revolution

of the human value situation. A quality of aesthetic experience

constitutes, in this case, a dynamic synthesis of the more valuational

aspect of social experience.

There are, therefore, four central qualities of human life, each

of which provides the context for a partial transfiguration of the human

situation. These four central qualities of human life may be understood

as interrelated features of a unitary process of human experience. The

quality of social being backs up the quality of human consciousness.

The quality of political experience intermediates the processes of

survival experience and social experience. Changes in the human

social situation anticipate the modification of the human aesthetic

experience. And the quality of human aesthetics channels the process

of human sociability into a new revision of the human survival situation.

The complete process of social action thus integrates into a single, comprehensive human experience a process of human dispositions, a process of human queries, a process of human materializations, and a process of qualitative consequences. The process of human dispositions provides the ground for the development of a complete human sensibility. The process of human queries furnishes the basis for the appearance of a new human mentality. The process of human materializations affords the context for the creation of a complete pattern of human sociability. And the process of qualitative consequences provides the basis for the ascendency of a new human condition.

The domain of human experience is unified, in the broadest sense, by the complete process of social action. It is not, however, always unified in exactly the same way. On the contrary, the complete social process may receive many different interpretations, each of which yields a qualitatively unique mode of human experience. To comprehend the history of social experience, it is thus necessary to clarify the history of transformations undergone by the complete process of social action. This clarification begins with the seminal observation that each transformation of the complete social process results in the development of a distinctive paradigm of social action. It is precisely a description of the major paradigms of social action and of the relationships which hold between them which provides the basis for the construction of a generalized mosaic of the human social

experience.

A Paradigm of Social Action[30]

As the moving frame of the human social experience, the

complete process of social action is not a neutral phenomenon, emptied

of all content and direction. On the contrary, the complete process of

social action incorporates as many contents as there are different

expressions of the human social reality, and as many directions as

there are significant tendencies in the human social experience. However,

rarely, if ever, have the many different contents and directions of

human social existence been organized eclectically into the complete

process of social action. The more usual case has been for the human

social reality to be unified, at any given moment and in any given place,

around particular, and indeed dominant, expressions of the processes

of human dispositions, human queries, human practices, and human value-

qualities. While these different unifications of the human social

reality are commonly grounded in a reconstruction of the content of

each dimension of the complete process of social action and of the

relationships which obtain between them, they are divided according

to the uniqueness of the expression which they lend to the complete

human social process. And they are divided according to the uniqueness

of their expressions of the complete human social process precisely

because each unification of the human social reality may be viewed as

a paradigm of social action in its own right.

A paradigm of social action may be defined as a qualitatively

unique reconstruction of the complete process of social action. As such,

a paradigm of social action integrates into a unitary reconstruction

of the human social reality a generalized human problem, a

phenomenology of the human circumstance, a pattern of social

organization, and a human condition. Each of these four phases of

a paradigm of social action is grounded in a fundamental transformation

of a specific dimension of the complete human social process. A

generalized human problem arises out of a root reconstruction of the

process of human dispositions. A phenomenology of the human circum-

stance may be viewed as an emergent of a core alteration of the process

of human queries. A pattern of social organization is grounded in a

fundamental transformation of the process of human materializations.

And a human condition is rooted in a radical alteration of the process

of qualitative human consequences. These four dimensions of a

paradigm of social action may be seen as interrelated, albeit partial,

aspects of a single, unitary reconstruction of the complete human social

process. A generalized human problem anticipates, for its solution, the

emergence of a specific phenomenology of the human circumstance. A

specific phenomenology of the human circumstance demands, for its

prosecution, the ascendency of a particular pattern of social organization.

And a particular pattern of social organization culminates in the

creation of a distinctive human condition. Thus, when combined, the

different dimensions of a paradigm of social action coalesce as

complementary features of a single unification of the human social

reality. And this single unification of the human social reality is

grounded in a fundamental transformation of the different phases of

the complete process of social action and of the relationships which

hold between them.

Human life is always enveloped in a dynamic working-out of the relationships which exist between competing paradigms of social action. However, this process of envelopment is never concretely experienced as a simple linear movement or as one in which the elements involved are clearly delineated from one another.[31] It is possible, and, indeed, empirically justifiable, to visualize a single paradigm of social action as progressing from a generalized human problem to a phenomenology of social reality, from a phenomenology of social reality to a pattern of social organization, and ultimately from a pattern of social organization to the creation of a new human condition. Moreover, it is empirically justifiable to stretch out over space and time the relationships existing between contending paradigms of social action in order to discern more accurately their implications for one another. While such momentary totalizations of the process of paradigmatic action provide the basis for a substantive discussion of the interrelationships existing within and between the different reconstructions of the complete human social process, they are inevitably distortions of the fluid and dynamic qualities of concrete social experience. In the domain of concrete social experience, paradigms of social action have no point of first inception or of final completion. Generalized human problems merge indissolubly into phenomenologies of social reality; phenomenologies of social reality are incorporated as implicit, albeit intangible, aspects of different processes of social action; and human conditions, as manifestations of the dominant value-qualities emergent from different reconstructions of the complete human social process, are immanent in each element of their respec-

tive processes of paradigmatic action. Moreover, nowhere in the domain of concrete social experience are there to be found any clear and lucid delineations between competing paradigms of social action. Generalized human problems emerge even though the human conditions, of which such problems are but a consequence, have not yet been given full expression. Contending phenomenologies of social reality co-exist in the same human situation. Processes of social action rise and fall in response to the saliency of different modes of human consciousness. And contradictory value-qualities often infect the human social reality at one and the same time. The domain of concrete social experience is, in short, relative, partial, provisional, and prospective. In such a world, the process of paradigmatic action is ever more fluid than linear, and always more indeterminate than delineated. While it is possible, and even imperative, for purposes of clarification to isolate momentarily the relationships which hold within and between the different paradigms of social action, the generalized mosaic of social reality which results is fated to remain but an inadequate vision of the indeterminate and dynamic domain of concrete social experience. With this admonitory note, a brief description will now be given of each of the four major dimensions contained within a paradigm of social action.

The Generalized Human Problem

A paradigm of social action is grounded, most fundamentally, in the development of a generalized human problem. A generalized human problem may be visualized as any central and formative question which arises out of a fundamental transformation of the process of

human dispositions, and which requires for its solution a radical
reconstruction of the entire process of social reality.

Most human problems are inherently particularistic and of
limited consequence. They emerge out of specific human situations
and anticipate, for their settlement, a limited alteration of a given
social order. While this limited alteration of a given social order
involves a playing-out of the relationships which obtain between
human sentiment, reflection, practice, and morality, it does not
call into question the dominant arrangement of societal institutions.
On the other hand, human problems of paradigmatic stature are
inherently general and of revolutionary consequence. They raise a
question which cannot be satisfactorily answered within a given
construction of social reality.[32] Accordingly, they anticipate, for
their settlement, not only a root reconstruction of human sensibilities,
but also a radical transformation of the dominant processes of human
consciousness, social organization, and social morality. The
ascendency of a generalized human problem may thus be visualized as
the precise point at which a new human social reality arises, or may
begin to arise, in direct response to insoluble contradictions within
an old one.

A generalized human problem emerges out of a sweeping
transformation of the process of human dispositions. The process
of human dispositions has previously been portrayed[*] as a dynamic
working-out of the relationships which obtain between four formative
impressions of the concrete social world, each of which contributes

* See above, pp. 29-30

to an understanding of what is most problematic in the human

situation. The four directions in human affectivity have been

identified as the subjective, collective, social, and aesthetic.

These different directions in human affectivity fully represent

the social process by which an intuitive appreciation of the adequacy

of a given human situation is summed-up into an understanding of its

most problematic feature. This social process is both retrospective

and prospective. It is retrospective because each dimension of

human affectivity provides the basis for an evaluation, albeit

an intensely impressionistic evaluation, of the adequacy of a different

aspect of a past history of social experience. And it is prospective

because each dimension of human affectivity provides the basis for the

transcendence, or possible transcendence, of a past history of social

experience by elucidating its most problematic feature. It is precisely

when the retrospective and prospective qualities of the four major

directions in human affectivity fuse into a unitary appreciation of an

insoluble contradiction within a past history of social experience that

a generalized human problem begins to develop. A generalized human

problem emerges, in this case, whenever and wherever the subjective,

collective, social, and aesthetic dimensions of the process of human

dispositions interrelate as complementary features of a single, urgent

comprehension of the crisis of human civilization which has been

brought on by a given human condition. Although this intuitive

awareness of a general crisis of human civilization is motivated by

an aversive response to a past history of social experience, it results

in a question, indeed, a central and critical social question, which

cannot be resolved within a past construction of social reality.

The Phenomenology of Social Reality

While a paradigm of social action is grounded in a generalized human problem, it is advanced by means of a phenomenology of social reality. A phenomenology of social reality may be envisioned as any comprehensive image of the human situation which emerges out of a root reconstruction of the process of human queries, and which entails, for its prosecution, the transformation of a generalized human problem into a radical reconstruction of the process of social action.[33]

Most processes of human consciousness are truly intra-paradigmatic. Being embedded in particular human problems, they concentrate upon a clarification of the obstacles to be overcome for the solution to such problems within the framework provided by a given realm of social possibilities. Accordingly, such modes of human reflection are more concerned with the elucidation of immediate strategies for social action than with an appraisal of the mediating principles of social action. On the other hand, phenomenologies of social reality are genuinely extra-paradigmatic. They emerge in response to generalized human problems and anticipate, for their settlement, a radical alteration of prevailing patterns of social organization and social morality. Being motivated by a key question which cannot be answered within a given construction of social action, phenomenologies of social reality are neither apologetic nor reformist. They are, on the contrary, fundamentally revolutionary. And they are fundamentally revolutionary because the emergence of a new phenomenology of social reality constitutes the exact social process by which the principles of an

alternative, and more adequate, human social reality may be worked out. Phenomenologies of social reality thus function to transform a prior reconstruction of human sensibilities into a coherent vision of the possibilities of breaking beyond contradictions contained within an old paradigm of social action to the creation of a new human social reality.

The development of a comprehensive image of the human situation in response to a generalized human problem is not a narrowly intellectual exercise or one which is limited to competing schools of philosophy. It is, instead, a phenomenological process. And it is a phenomenological process because the working-out of a fundamentally revolutionary vision of the human condition is the product of an emergent awareness on the part of many human beings, at any given moment and place, of new, and more satisfactory, modes of being, thought, action, and valuation. This emergent awareness of a new human prospect is grounded in a fundamental reconstruction of the process of human queries. The process of human queries has previously been described* as a dynamic working-out of the relationships which hold between four fundamental human assumptions, each of which specifies what must be done for the rectification of a specific human disposition. The four fundamental human assumptions have been described as ontological, epistemological, axiological, and aesthetic. These different directions in human consciousness represent completely the social process by which a prior revolution of human sensibilities may be transformed into a comprehensive vision of a new, and more adequate, human condition. This social process is both expressionistic and projective. It is expressionistic because it

* See above, pp. 34-37

elevates the subjective domain of human affectivity into a more objective transformation of human consciousness. And it is projective because it sets the stage for a further transformation of the more objective domain of human consciousness into a root reconstruction of the process of social organization. It is precisely when the expressionistic and projective qualities of each dimension of the process of human queries integrate into a unitary, comprehensive image of the human situation that a phenomenology of social reality results. A phenomenology of social reality develops, in this case, whenever and wherever a fundamental transformation of the process of human sensibilities gives rise to an emergent human awareness concerning what must be done for the actualization of a new social reality.

The Process of Social Organization

Although a paradigm of social action originates in a generalized human problem and is advanced by means of a phenomenology of social reality, it also contains a process of social organization. A process of social organization may be viewed as any pattern of human activity which emerges out of a core alteration of the process of human materializations, and which involves, for its prosecution, the transformation of a generalized human problem and of a phenomenology of social reality into the creation of a new value-quality of human experience.[34]

Most processes of human activity are highly routinized and have a limited scope. They are highly routinized because they represent a working-out, indeed an often unselfconscious working-out, of a particular human problem and of a specific mode of human

reflection within a given network of social conventions. And
most processes of human activity have but a limited scope because,
rather than challenging this given network of social conventions,
they implicitly affirm it by serving as a lived and concrete
celebration of the status quo. On the other hand, processes of
social organization which attain paradigmatic stature are both
reconstructive and indeterminate. They are reconstructive because
they represent a systematic and voluntaristic working-out in the
domain of concrete social experience of a new generalized human
problem and of its emergent phenomenology of social reality. This
process of social actualization entails the abolition of the prevailing
pattern of social organization and the inception of a new one. And
such processes of social organization are indeterminate because they
lead, or may lead, to the creation of a new human value-quality, the
character of which is often an unintended consequence of a given
reconstruction of the human social reality.

Processes of social organization of paradigmatic stature
develop out of radical transformation of the process of human
materializations. The process of human materializations has previously
been envisioned as a dynamic working-out of the relationships which
obtain between four rudimentary human activities, each of which serves
to actualize a specific assumption concerning what must be done for
the construction of a more adequate human situation. The four rudimen-
tary human activities have been described as human survival practices,
human political practices, human social practices, and human aesthetic
practices*.

* See above, pp. 37-39

These four directions in human activity fully represent the social process by which a prior reconstruction of human sensibilities and human consciousness may be objectified as a unique pattern of social organization. This social process is simultaneously a point of summation and a point, or a possible point, of a new transformation of human existence. It is a point of summation because the development of a unique pattern of social organization remakes each aspect of concrete social experience into an active working-out of a generalized human problem and of its emergent vision of the human condition. And it is prospective because the creation of a new pattern of social organization anticipates, and even requires, a fundamental revision of the quality of human life. Thus, it is precisely when the retrospective and projective qualities of each dimension of the process of human materializations fuse into a single, unitary working-out of a new human social reality that a process of social organization develops. This process of social organization represents a point of mediation between a past history of human sentiment and human reflection, and a future human value-quality.

The Human Condition

Although a paradigm of social action interrelates a generalized human problem and a phenomenology of social reality with a process of social organization, it is not exhausted by them. On the contrary, a paradigm of social action also contains a human condition. A human condition may be visualized as the value-quality of human experience which arises out of a radical reconstruction of the process of qualitative human consequences.[35]

There is no process of social action which does not culminate, or may not culminate, in a qualitative transformation of the human situation. Most qualitative transformations of the human situation are, however, partial and of limited significance. Their partiality derives from the fact that most processes of social action result in an alteration, albeit a modest alteration, of a specific dimension of human experience. And their limited significance is based in the fact that even such modest alterations of human experience are typically more complementary of, than antithetical to, the dominant value-quality of a given social order. On the other hand, the process of paradigmatic action ever culminates in the ascendency of a new human condition. And the ascendency of a new human condition implicitly entails a complete and irrevocable transformation of the quality of human life. This transformation of the quality of human life is complete since a human condition interrelates all dimensions of the process of human experience around a single, unitary value-quality. And it is irrevocable since the emergence of a new human condition symbolizes a qualitative transformation of the very process of social reality itself, and thus anticipates the development of competing definitions of the human situation.

A human condition is not an elusive and unprincipled social phenomenon. On the contrary, it may be viewed as a direct result of a fundamental transformation of the process of qualitative human consequences. The process of qualitative human consequences has previously been portrayed*as a dynamic working-out of the relation-

* See above, pp. 40-43

ships which hold between four core qualities of human experience,
each of which sums up a particular dimension of the process of human
materializations into a partial reconstruction of the human situation.
The four core qualities of human experience have been described as
the quality of survival experience, the quality of political life,
the quality of social experience, and the quality of aesthetic life.
These four directions in the more qualitative aspect of human experience
exhaust the social process by which a past reconstruction of human
sensibilities, human consciousness, and human activities may be fused
together into a fundamental transfiguration of the human situation.
This social process is both retrospective and anticipatory. It is
retrospective because each quality of human life, whether productive,
political, social, or moral, represents a lived summation of a
particular transformation undergone by human affectivity, reflection,
and practice. And it is anticipatory because each dimension of the
process of qualitative human consequences sets the stage for the
appearance, or possible appearance, of a new impression of what is
most problematic in human existence. It is precisely when the
retrospective and anticipatory qualities of each aspect of the process
of human consequences combine into a single, unitary transformation
of the human situation that a human condition develops. A human
condition results, in this case, whenever and wherever the process
of social reality is imbued with a new, and more dominant, value-
quality.

In conclusion, a paradigm of social action may be regarded as
a qualitatively unique transformation of the complete process of

social action. As such, a paradigm of social action contains four

interrelated dimensions, each of which is grounded in a radical

reconstruction of a particular phase of the complete social process.

These four interrelated dimensions may be referred to as a generalized

human problem, a phenomenology of social reality, a process of social

organization, and a human condition. A generalized human problem

arises out of a fundamental transformation of the process of human

dispositions. A phenomenology of social reality develops from a

core alteration of the process of human queries. A process of social

organization is grounded in a root reconstruction of the process of

human materializations. And a human condition derives from a radical

transfiguration of the process of qualitative human consequences. A

paradigm of social action results when these four particular recon-

structions of the complete social process fuse together into a single,

unitary construction of social reality. While this single, unitary

construction of social reality may always be viewed as a product of a

fundamental revision of the complete process of social action, it

may receive many qualitatively unique expressions.

A Paradigmatic Theory of Social Action

The complete process of social action lineaments the development

of the process of paradigmatic action. And the process of paradigmatic

action gives rise to three competing constructions of social reality,

each of which intermediates a generalized human problem, a phenomenology

of social reality, a process of social organization, and an emergent

human condition. These three competing paradigms of social action

have been introduced previously as the processes of cosmological

experience, corporate experience, and organic experience. The

process of cosmological experience* is an emergent of the formative

problem of human salvation. The process of corporate experience* is

a derivative of the generalized problem of human security. And the

process of organic experience* is a product of the enduring aspiration

for human freedom. These three contrasting human problems require,

and even demand, for their solution the development of distinctive

phenomenologies of social reality. The quest for human salvation

engenders an absolutist image of the social universe. The aspiration

for human security anticipates the creation of an entitative vision

of the human social experience. And the struggle for human freedom

requires, for its settlement, the emergence of an organic conception

of social reality. These three contending images of the human

situation are structured out into the domain of public life by means

of unique processes of social action. The phenomenology of human

salvation is actualized by means of a process of cosmological action.

The phenomenology of human security is materialized by means of a

process of corporate action. And the phenomenology of human freedom

is realized by means of a process of organic action. Finally, these

three competing processes of social action give rise to qualitatively

unique transformations of the human situation. The process of

cosmological action culminates in the condition of human chaos. The

process of corporate action results in the human condition of reinforced

meaninglessness. And the process of organic action concludes, or may

conclude, in the condition of human uncertainty.

* See Table 2 below, p. 333
* See Table 3 below, p. 334
* See Table 4 below, p. 335

As qualitatively unique reconstructions of the <u>same</u> complete social process, the three principal paradigms of social action are interrelated by means of their consequences. The uncertainty of concrete social experience motivates the development of the problem of human salvation, the first phase of the process of cosmological experience. The cosmological paradigm culminates in the condition of human chaos. Chaos makes salient the problem of human security, the basis of the process of corporate experience. The corporate paradigm results in the human condition of reinforced meaningless-ness. Reinforced meaninglessness provides the basis for the inception of the problem of human freedom, the nucleus of the process of organic experience. And the organic paradigm, being imbued with the value-quality of human uncertainty, dissolves, or may dissolve, once more into the process of cosmological experience.

The interrelation of these three competing paradigms of social action intimates that the history of the process of social experience may be understood, to a large extent, as a dynamic working-out of the relationships which obtain between qualitatively different constructions of social reality. In this sense, each paradigm of social action exhausts a certain content and direction which may be given to the process of social experience, and thus sets the stage for a movement, or a possible movement, beyond one construction of social reality to another. For example, the cosmological paradigm is formative to the human scene insofar as it emerges directly from an aversive response to the indeterminacy of concrete social experience. This aversion to human indeterminacy gives rise to an essentially

metaphysical expression of social reality. Likewise, the corporate

paradigm, while not formative to the human scene, develops directly

from contradictions contained within the social reality of human

salvation. The corporate paradigm simultaneously negates the

indeterminacy of concrete social experience and transcends the

contradictions of the metaphysical by enveloping human existence

within a fundamentally abstract construction of social reality.

And, finally, the organic paradigm emerges from an aversive response

to both the social realities of human salvation and human security.

This aversion to human metaphysics and to human abstraction engenders

a genuinely reconstructive, and thereby concrete, interpretation of

social experience. The history of the process of social experience

may thus be visualized as a chronicle of the rise and fall in

importance of metaphysical, abstract, and concrete constructions of

social reality. While the metaphysical construction has monopolized

the human past, and the abstract has typified the human present, the

concrete remains, and will likely continue to remain, an active social

possibility on the human horizon. The following discussion will

briefly sketch the relationships which exist between the different

dimensions of these qualitatively unique expressions of the human

social experience.

Competing Generalized Human Problems: Salvation, Security, and Freedom[36]

There is only one process of human dispositions, but it may

be the basis of competing definitions of the human situations. While

all competing definitions of the human situation commonly emerge out

of a temporal unification of subjective, collective, social, and

aesthetic human sensibilities, each grounds this unification in an aversive response to a different human condition.

For example, the problem of human salvation unifies the process of human dispositions around an aversive response to the condition of human uncertainty. The condition of human uncertainty may be viewed as a product of the relative, partial, provisional, and prospective character of the directly apprehended domain of social experience. Accordingly, the problem of human salvation becomes salient whenever and wherever the direct experience of human uncertainty engenders a generalized human desire for the construction of a social reality imbued with absolute certitude. Since human uncertainty comprises the elemental value-quality of the empirical process of social experience, the quest for absolute certitude is fated to remain a metaphysical venture. The generalized human desire for the stillness of absolute certitude can be assuaged, in this case, only by breaking beyond the domain of concrete social experience to a fundamentalist interpretation of social reality.

Likewise, the problem of human security organizes the process of human sensibilities around an aversive response to the condition of human chaos. The condition of human chaos may be regarded as a derivative of the absurd, apathetic, anomalous, and amoral qualities of a metaphysical process of social experience. The problem of human security gains the ascendency   wherever an aversion to human chaos sparks a generalized human aspiration for the creation of a more orderly social world. While the quest for an orderly social reality represents the antithesis of human chaos, it also counter-points the

inde terminacy of concrete social experience. The aspiration for human security is thus neither metaphysical nor concrete, but fundamentally abstract. And it is fundamentally abstract because the generalized human desire for the security of social order can be satisfied only by enveloping the process of human existence within a social apparatus which, while providing the means to social order, is devoid of any principled human content.

Similarly, the problem of human freedom interrelates the process of human dispositions around an aversive response to the human condition of reinforced meaninglessness. The human condition of reinforced meaninglessness may be visualized as the emergent value-quality of an abstract process of social experience. Human freedom becomes problematic at whatever moment and place the direct apprehension of the value-quality of reinforced meaninglessness leads to a generalized human desire for the construction of a substantively meaningful social world. The creation of a substantively meaningful social world is neither a matter of human metaphysics, nor a product of human abstraction. It is, instead, a genuinely concrete endeavour. And it is genuinely concrete because the desire for substantive human meaning can be fulfilled only be working through the indeterminacy of the empirical social world to the organic unification of human experience.

The single process of human dispositions may thus be expressed in different ways. Each full expression of the process of human dispositions provides the basis for the development of a generalized human problem. There are three major generalized human problems, each of which grounds a particular paradigm of social action. The problem

of human salvation motivates the development of the cosmological

paradigm of social action. The problem of human security precipitates

the construction of the corporate paradigm of social action. And

the problem of human freedom leads, or may lead, to the creation of

the organic paradigm of social action. However, the three major

paradigms of social action do not include only competing definitions

of the human situation. On the contrary, they also contain con-

trasting phenomenologies of social reality.

Contrasting Phenomenologies of Social Reality [37]

Although there is only <u>one</u> process of human queries, it may

be interpreted in different ways. Each different interpretation

of the process of human queries gives rise to a contrasting image

of the human situation. While all contrasting images of the human

situation commonly interrelate ontological, epistemological,

axiological, and aesthetic human postulates, each grounds this process

of interrelation in the solution to a particular generalized human problem.

Thus, the phenomenology of human <u>salvation</u> unifies the process

of human queries around the solution to the quest for social certitude.

In its fullest expression, the quest for social certitude is grounded

in the generalized human desire for the stillness of an absolute,

complete, predetermined, and consistent process of social reality.

While the social reality of human salvation originates in a funda-

mental transformation of human sensibilities, it requires for its

prosecution a corresponding alteration of human consciousness. It is

precisely such a radical revision of human consciousness which is

symbolized by the phenomenology of human salvation. The phenomenology

of human salvation develops, in this case, whenever and wherever

the desire for human salvation gives rise to an emergent human

awareness concerning what must be done for its realization. This

emergent human awareness is neither empirical nor abstract. It is,

instead, metaphysical. And it is metaphysical because the phenomenology

of human salvation interrelates into a single, unitary world-view four

equally unprincipled human postulates: an absolutist ontology, a

tautological epistemology, a teleological axiology, and a consistency

aesthetic.

Similarly, the phenomenology of human security organizes the

process of human queries around the solution to the aspiration for

social order. In its fullest expression, the aspiration for social

order entails the creation of an inert, patterned, homogenous, and

redundant process of social reality. While the construction of an

orderly social world grounds in a fundamental transformation of

human emotions, it continues with a root reconstruction of human

consciousness. It is precisely such a root reconstruction of human

consciousness which is represented by the phenomenology of human

security. The phenomenology of human security denotes, in this case,

an emergent human understanding concerning what must be done for

the realization of a more orderly process of social reality. This

emergent human understanding is neither a product of human dogma

nor a derivative of direct experience. It is, instead, a matter of

abstraction. And it is a matter of abstraction because the

phenomenology of human security unifies into a single, idealistic

world-view four pseudo-empirical human postulates: an entitative

ontology, an _analytical_ epistemology, an _instrumental_ axiology,
and a _redundant_ aesthetic.

Likewise, the phenomenology of human _freedom_ interrelates
the process of human queries around the solution to the quest for
substantive human meaning. The quest for substantive human meaning
requires, for its settlement, the development of a holistic,
reconstructive, substantive, and critical process of social reality.
While the construction of a libertarian process of social reality
is grounded in a radical revision of human sensibilities, it proceeds
by means of a further alteration of human consciousness. It is precisely
such a core alteration of human consciousness which is afforded by the
phenomenology of human freedom. The phenomenology of human freedom
gains the ascendency, in this case, at whatever moment and place the
desire for substantive human meaning leads to the creation of a
comprehensive image of the human situation which specifies, albeit in
an emergent sense, what must be done for the actualization of human
freedom. This comprehensive image of the human situation is neither
anti-empirical nor pseudo-empirical. It is, instead, genuinely
empirical. And it is genuinely empirical because the phenomenology
of human freedom unifies into a single, dynamic vision of the human
condition four directly apprehended human postulates: an _organic_
ontology, a _reconstructive_ epistemology, an _intrinsic_ axiology, and
a _transformational_ aesthetic.

The unitary process of human queries may thus be interpreted
in different ways. Each different interpretation of the process of
human queries principles the development of a distinctive phenomenology

of social reality. There are three major phenomenologies of

social reality, each of which responds to a particular generalized

human problem. The phenomenology of human salvation emerges from

the generalized human aspiration for absolute certitude. The

phenomenology of human security develops from the generalized human

desire for social order. And the phenomenology of human freedom

responds to the generalized human aspiration for substantive human

meaning. The three major phenomenologies of social reality, however,

do not articulate only with competing generalized human problems.

On the contrary, they also anticipate the development of contending

processes of social organization.

Contending Processes of Social Organization [38]

There is only one process of human queries, but it may

lineament the development of contending patterns of human activity.

While all contending patterns of human activity commonly represent

a complex synthesis of productive, political, social, and aesthetic

human practices, each grounds this synthesis in the working-out of a

different phenomenology of social reality.

For example, the process of cosmological action unifies the

domain of human activity around the actualization of the phenomenology

of human salvation. The phenomenology of human salvation has been

described as that comprehensive image of the human situation which

specifies what must be done for the resolution of the quest for absolute

certitude. While this image of the human situation generalizes the

quest for absolute certitude beyond its basis in human affectivity

into the realm of human consciousness, it does not provide an

answer concerning how it might be possible to materialize the social

reality of human salvation. Such an answer is provided, however,

by the process of cosmological action. In this vein, the process

of cosmological action may be visualized as transforming each aspect

of human experience into a dynamic working-out of the problem of

human salvation, and of its emergent mode of human consciousness. It

accomplishes this task by patterning the domain of human activity

around a single, metaphysical process of social organization. This

single, metaphysical process of social organization consists of

four complementary, and consequently equally ungrounded, human practices,

each of which actively embodies a particular dimension of the struggle

for human salvation. The four interrelated constituents of the process

of cosmological action may be described as the activities of

mythification, conversion, transformation, and redemption.

Similarly, the process of corporate action organizes the

realm of human activity around the materialization of the phenomenology

of human security. The phenomenology of human security denotes that

emergent vision of the human condition which discloses what must be

done for the realization of a more orderly process of social reality.

While this emergent vision of the human condition advances the quest

for social order beyond its basis in human sensibilities into the

more reflective dimension of human experience, it does not reveal

how social order might be instatiated as the dynamic nucleus of

human social life. Such a revelation awaits the development of the

process of corporate action. In this case, the process of corporate

action may be understood as transfiguring every aspect of human

social life into a complex working-out of the problem of human security,

and of its related phenomenology of social reality. This trans-

figuration of human social life is accomplished by the patterning of

human activity around a single, distinctive process of social

organization. This process of social organization is neither a product

of human metaphysics nor an emergent of concrete social experience.

It is, instead, a lived embodiment of human abstraction. And it is

a lived embodiment of human abstraction because the process of

corporate action interrelates into a unitary pattern of social

organization four reciprocal, and thereby equally idealistic, human

practices, each of which serves to negate a specific content of

concrete social experience and to affirm a particular form of social

order. The four complementary dimensions of the process of corporate

action may be described as the activities of <u>reification</u>, <u>mobilization</u>,

<u>canalization</u>, and <u>commitment</u>.

Likewise, the process of organic action unifies the domain

of human activity around the actualization of the phenomenology of

human freedom. The phenomenology of human freedom refers to that

emergent image of the human situation which reveals what must be

done for the materialization of a substantively meaningful social

world. While this emergent image of the human situation transforms

the struggle for human freedom from its basis in human dispositions

into the realm of human consciousness, it does not respond to the

pressing question concerning how might it be possible to concretely

realize a libertarian construction of social reality. Such a response
is provided, however, by the process of organic action. The process
of organic action may be viewed as transforming every aspect of the
human social experience into a dynamic working-out of the problem of
human freedom, and of its emergent image of the human situation. This
transformation of the human social experience is neither an object
of human dogma nor an embodiment of human abstraction. It is, instead,
an expression of the empirical, and thereby concrete, possibilities
of human life. And it is an expression of the empirical possibilities
of human life because the process of organic action unifies human
activity around a single, directly apprehended pattern of social
organization. This pattern of social organization consists of four
principled human practices, each of which transforms a particular
dimension of the quest for substantive human meaning into a specific
unification, indeed, organic unification, of human experience. The
four interrelated constituents of the process of organic action may
be depicted as the activities of actualization, reconstruction,
consolidation, and creation.

The single, unitary process of human materializations may
receive, therefore, many different expressions. Each different
expression of the process of human materializations principles the
development of a qualitatively unique process of social organization.
There are three major processes of social organization, each of which
actualizes a different phenomenology of social reality. The process
of cosmological action represents a dynamic working-out of the
phenomenology of human salvation. The process of corporate action

constitutes a complex working-out of the phenomenology of human security. And the process of organic action represents an active working-out of the phenomenology of human freedom. However, the development of these three major processes of social organization does not exhaust the process of paradigmatic action. On the contrary, the process of paradigmatic action also includes a plurality of clashing human conditions.

Clashing Human Conditions [39]

There is only one process of qualitative human consequences, but it may principle the development of clashing transformations of the human situation. While all clashing transformations of the human situation commonly represent a dynamic unification of the value-qualities emergent from productive, political, social, and aesthetic processes of human experience, each grounds this dynamic unification in a different process of social organization.

For example, the condition of human chaos may be envisioned as the emergent value-quality of the process of cosmological action. The process of cosmological action denotes that pattern of social organization which specifies how it might be possible to concretely materialize the social reality of human salvation. While this pattern of social organization advances the quest for absolute certitude beyond its basis in human consciousness into the domain of human activity, it does not sum up the quality of human life which is engendered by the process of cosmological experience. This quality of human life is summed up, however, by the condition of human chaos. The condition of human chaos combines in a single, unitary transformation of the human

situation the four major value-qualities emergent from the process

of cosmological experience. The four modes of human chaos may be

described as absurdity, apathy, anomaly, and amorality. These four

modes of human chaos fully represent the value-quality of a process

of social reality which is distinguished by the presence of many

routes to absolute certitude, and by the absence of any principled

way of choosing between them.

Similarly, the human condition of reinforced meaninglessness

may be visualized as the emergent value-quality of the process of

corporate action. The process of corporate action has been described

as that pattern of social organization which provides for the

actualization of the social reality of human security. While this

process of social organization generalizes the problem of human

security beyond its basis in human consciousness into the realm of

human practice, it does not represent the quality of human life

which is emergent from the process of corporate experience. Such

a representation is provided, however, by the human condition of

reinforced meaninglessness. The human condition of reinforced

meaninglessness interrelates into a single, qualitative revision

of the human situation the four dominant value-qualities which are

engendered by the process of corporate experience. This process

of corporate value-qualities may be understood as a synthesis of

four interrelated modes of human meaninglessness, each of which is

backed up by a specific process of social reinforcement. The four

interrelated modes of human meaninglessness may be described as
irrationality, reactiveness, accidentality, and immorality. And
their relevant processes of social reinforcement may be visualized
as the domination of human necessity, obligation, self-interest,
and duty respectively. These four dimensions of the human condition
of reinforced meaninglessness fully sum up the value-quality of a
process of social reality which is characterized by the presence
of many means of ordering the social universe, and by the absence
of any substantive reason as to why this should be done.

Likewise, the condition of human uncertainty may be
envisioned as the resultant value-quality of the process of organic
action. The process of organic action describes that pattern of
human activity which provides for the materialization of the social
reality of human freedom. While this pattern of human activity
transforms the quest for substantive human meaning beyond its basis
in human consciousness into the domain of human practice, it does
not sum up the quality of human life which is immanent in the process
of organic experience. However, this immanent quality of human life
is summed up by the condition of human uncertainty. The condition
of human uncertainty unifies into a single, holistic transformation
of the human situation the four central value-qualities emergent
from the process of organic experience. The four modes of human
uncertainty may be described as relativity, partiality, provisionality,
and prospectiveness. These four modes of human uncertainty fully
describe the value-quality of a process of social reality which is
distinguished by the presence of many libertarian human possibilities,

and by the absence of any way of realizing human freedom with any
degree of finality.

The single, unitary process of qualitative human consequences
may receive, therefore, many different interpretations. Each different
interpretation of the process of qualitative human consequences
contours the development of a distinctive human condition. There are
three central human conditions, each of which sums up the value-quality
emergent from a particular paradigm of social action. The condition
of human chaos denotes the quality of human life emergent from the
process of cosmological experience. The human condition of reinforced
meaninglessness describes the quality of human life emergent from the
process of corporate experience. And the condition of human uncertainty
sums up the quality of human life derivative from the process of
organic experience. The three dominant human conditions are not, of
course, isolated from one another. On the contrary, they are linked
together as points of intermediation, albeit as clashing points of
intermediation, between the different paradigms of social action. The
condition of human chaos interrelates the decline of the process of
cosmological experience and the ascendency of the process of corporate
experience. The human condition of reinforced meaninglessness unifies
the corporate and organic paradigms of social action. And the condition
of human uncertainty represents the precise point at which the organic
paradigm of social action dissolves, or may dissolve, into the process
of cosmological experience. Each human condition thus symbolizes the
fall, or possible fall, of an old paradigm of social action and the
emergence of a new human prospect.

Conclusion

This chapter has elucidated the principles of human inquiry which guide the creation of a generalized mosaic of the human social reality. This task has been accomplished by unifying an epistemological theory of reconstructive empiricism with a libertarian revision of the theory of social action. This libertarian revision of the theory of social action has led to the vision of the complete social process. And the vision of the complete social process has ultimately principled the development of a paradigmatic theory of social action. This paradigmatic theory of social action has been presented as the nucleus of a generalized mosaic of the human social experience. While the salient features of the three competing paradigms of social action have been introduced, they have not been exhaustively explored. Consequently, the remainder of this treatise will be devoted to a rigorous investigation of the three competing paradigms of social action and of the relationships which obtain between them. This rigorous investigation will begin with a consideration of the process of cosmological experience, will continue with an examination of the process of corporate experience, and it will conclude with a discussion of the process of organic experience.

Chapter 2. The Cosmological Experience

The preceding chapter has introduced the broad features of a reconstructive theory of the history of social experience. This reconstructive theory has begun with the thesis that contemporary social experience may be understood, to a large extent, as a complex working-out of three paradigms of social action, and of the relationships which hold between them.

The present chapter will elaborate this thesis by describing, in more detail, one of the major expressions of the complete process of social action--the cosmological paradigm. The argument will be developed here that the cosmological paradigm represents the social reality which emerges from the struggle to resolve, on a mass scale, the formative problem of human salvation. With reference to the complete social process, the problem of human salvation sums up the urgent desire to overcome the uncertainty of concrete social experience in favour of a metaphysical quest for absolute certitude. The quest for absolute certitude always requires, for its resolution, the creation of a distinctive phenomenology of salvation, one which transforms the yearning for absolute certainty into a process of social assumptions concerning how the problematic character of human salvation might be rectified. The phenomenology of salvation is materialized by means of a unique process of cosmological action. And the process of cosmological action always culminates in a consequent condition of human chaos.

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The condition of human chaos will be treated in the following

chapter. This chapter will describe the problem of human salvation,

the phenomenology of human salvation, and the process of cosmological

action.

No attempt will be made here, other than by way of example,

to fence the cosmological paradigm within specific historical periods.

Instead, the argument will be presented that a general concern with

the problematic character of human salvation has been a recurrent

theme throughout the history of social experience. At times, this

concern has erupted into the creation of a unified social reality

which has represented, on a continuing basis, a widespread effort to

resolve satisfactorily the metaphysical quest for absolute certitude.

For example, it has become commonplace in contemporary scholarship to

identify the beginnings of "modernity"--the corporate paradigm--

in terms of a radical breakthrough during the sixteenth and seventeenth

centuries from scholastic philosophizing to an empirical scientific

viewpoint, from teleological to instrumental relations, from monistic

moralities to more pluralistic ones, and from belief in "souls" to
                                    1
acquiescence in roles. The present study is in agreement with this

reconstruction of the history of social action with the exception of

two important reservations. First, there has never been an exclusively

cosmological historical situation. The problem of human salvation and

its emergent social reality have always been coexistent, to some extent,

with the competing problems of order and freedom and with the quali-

tatively distinct modes of social experience which emerge from each.

Second, although the cosmological paradigm is no longer dominant

across the contemporary human scene, it is not altogether absent.
A significant portion of contemporary inquiry is distinctly scholastic
rather than scientific, many people continue to hedge their participation
in the corporate life-order with faith in various certainty principles,
cosmological polities in the guise of modern totalitarianisms are
yet operative, and the search for an aesthetic of consistency continues
despite the predominance of corporate morality. These reservations ,
suggest the futility of either attempting to enclose the cosmological
paradigm within specific historical situations or of treating the social
reality emergent from the problem of human salvation as something which
has disappeared from the social scene. In this case, it seems more
fruitful to concentrate on the general structure of cosmological
experience rather than on the particular histories of cosmologies old
and new. This concentration, if successfully prosecuted, is intended
to provide a more coherent way of grouping particular cosmologies as
well as a more lucid way of clarifying elusive but critically important
relationships between the cosmological and corporate paradigms. The
following discussion of the cosmological paradigm is, therefore, an
attempt to clarify the central tendencies of the generalized social
experience which has preformed and anticipated the quality of
contemporary social existence.

The present chapter will discuss the first three phases of
of the cosmological paradigm. Their description will proceed as follows.
First, the problem of human salvation will be described as a product of
a fundamental transformation of the process of human dispositions
in the direction of absolute certitude. Second, the phenomenology

of social reality emergent from concern with the problematic character

of human salvation will be identified and examined. Third, the process

by which the phenomenology of human salvation has been materialized

will be clarified. Finally, a summary will be presented of the above

three phases of the cosmological paradigm. The following chapter

will then describe the final phase of cosmological reality--the condition

of human chaos.

The Problem of Human Salvation

The problem of human salvation may be summed up, in its most

general expression, as the following concern: How might it be

possible to break beyond the uncertainty of concrete social experience

to the creation of a mode of social life invested with absolute

certitude? This general query does not, of course, suddenly appear out

of nowhere. On the contrary, the problem of human salvation, in its

fullest expression, is grounded in a fundamental transformation

of the process of human dispositions. The process of human dispositions

has been defined previously as a directly experienced synthesis of the

relationships which obtain between four formative impressions of the

concrete social world, each of which provides the basis for a parti-

cular definition of the human situation. There are four basic human

dispositions, each of which transforms a formative impression of a

different aspect of the concrete social world into a particular

understanding of what is most problematic in human existence. There

are, in this case, subjective, collective, social, and aesthetic human

dispositions. The problem of human salvation, in its most general

statement, is grounded in a qualitative transformation of each of the

above basic human dispositions. And each qualitative transformation of

a basic human disposition provides a particular statement of the general

problem of human salvation. There are, therefore, four particular

problems of human salvation, each of which represents a fundamental

transformation of a specific human disposition. There is, in this

case, a subjective problem of salvation, a collective problem of

salvation, a social problem of salvation, and an aesthetic problem

of salvation. The four particular problems of salvation are not un-

related to one another. Rather, each particular expression of the

problem of human salvation may be viewed as a partial aspect of a

broader query concerning how it might be possible to break beyond the

uncertainty of concrete social experience to a human situation

qualified by absolute certitude.

For example, the subjective problem of human salvation may

be summed up as the following query: How might it be possible to

reach beyond the relativity of concrete social experience to the

creation of an absolute human survival situation? The relative,

and thereby uncertain, character of the concrete social world is

grounded in the fact that human subjectivity is conditioned by a past

history of social experience. There is no impression of the concrete

social world, and consequently no affective sense of the human cir-

cumstance and of one's fate as a social and historical being within it,

which does not ground in a particular human situation. And there is

no particular human situation which does not represent a qualitatively

unique working-out of a past movement of human dispositions, queries,

materializations, and qualitative consequences. It is precisely

this working-out of a past history of social experience which provides the content for the development of a subjective snese of social being. However, there has never been a <u>single</u> past history of social experience. There are, on the contrary, <u>many</u> past movements of social experience, each of which sums up the many variations possible of human dispositions, queries, materializations, and qualitative consequences. And each past history of social experience provides, or may provide, the basis for the development of a unique mode of human subjectivity. There are, therefore, many possible modes of human subjectivity, each of which is relative to a particular human situation. It is precisely an aversive response to the uncertainty of a relative social world which serves as the fountainhead of the subjective problem of human salvation. The subjective problem of human salvation emerges, in this case, whenever and wherever the uncertainty of human relativity fosters a desire to break beyond the concrete social world to the creation of an absolute human survival situation. An absolute human survival situation is one in which human subjectivity is not conditioned by a past history of social experience, but is enclosed within a single, affective vision of the social world, and
of one's position within it.[2] In an absolute human survival situation, the uncertainty of human subjectivity is overcome by the certitude of being enveloped within a mode of social being which remains constant across the many past histories of social experience. It is the quest for a process of human survival which provides absolute certitude of social being which yields the subjective problem of human salvation.

The concrete social world is not, however, only relative. It
is also partial. While the subjective problem of human salvation responds
to the uncertainty of human relativity, the partial character of concrete
social experience provides the basis for the development of a more
collective problem of human salvation. The collective problem of human
salvation may be summed up as the following concern: How might it
be possible to move beyond the partial, and thereby uncertain, character
of concrete social experience to the creation of a complete human
political situation? The partial, and thereby uncertain, character
of concrete social experience derives from the fact that human consciousness
is an emergent of particular impressions of the concrete social world.
There is no process of human consciousness which does not respond to a
specific mode of human affectivity. And there is no process of human
affectivity which does not anticipate, and even require, for its resolution
a particular mode of human consciousness. However, there has never
been, and will probably never be, a single impression of the concrete
social world. There are, on the contrary, many impressions of the
concrete social world, each of which is relative to a particular human
situation. And each impression of the concrete social world provides
the basis for the development, or possible development, of a particular
mode of human consciousness. There is, therefore, no single, complete
process of human consciousness. There are, instead, many partial processes
of human reflection, each of which provides an understanding of human
existence from the standpoint of a particular mode of human affectivity.
It is an aversive response to the absence of a single, complete process
of human consciousness which inspires the development of the collective

problem of human salvation. The collective problem of human salvation

appears whenever and wherever the uncertainty contingent upon the partial

character of social experience leads to the desire to break beyond the

concrete social world to the creation of a complete human political

situation. A complete human political situation is one in which a

particular process of human consciousness is presented as the single,

full expression of an absolute mode of social being.[3] In a complete

human political situation, human consciousness is not contexted by the

many possible modes of human subjectivity. On the contrary, the many

possible modes of human subjectivity are first reduced to a single,

absolute mode of social being, and then a particular process of human

consciousness is presented as the full embodiment of this absolute

mode of social being. Thus, in a complete political situation, the

uncertainty of a partial universe is overcome by the certainty of being

enveloped within a mode of human consciousness which remains the full

expression of an absolute mode of human subjectivity. And it is pre-

cisely the quest for a process of human politics which provides absolute

certitude of human consciousness which yields the collective problem

of human salvation.

Concrete social experience is not, however, only relative and

partial. It is also provisional. The provisional character of the

concrete social world provides the basis for the development of a more

social problem of human salvation. The social problem of human

salvation may be summed up as the following query: How might it be

possible to break beyond the provisional, the thereby uncertain,

character of the concrete social world to the creation of a predetermined

human social situation? The provisional, and thereby uncertain, character

of concrete social experience is grounded in the fact that the more

social aspect of human existence is always a materialization of human

consciousness. There is no social practice which does not actualize

a particular process of human consciousness. And there is no process

of human consciousness which does not anticipate, and even require,

for its solution a specific mode of social activity. However, there has

never been a single process of human consciousness. There are, on the

contrary, many processes of human consciousness, each of which is

based in a particular impression of the concrete social world. And

each particular process of human consciousness leads into, or may

lead into, a specific alteration of the human social situation. There

is, therefore, no single way of actualizing the products of human

consciousness. Rather, there are many processes of human materialization,

each of which responds to a particular mode of human consciousness. It

is an aversive response to the provisional character of concrete social

life which motivates the development of the social problem of human

salvation. The social problem of human salvation emerges whenever and

wherever the uncertainty contingent upon the provisional nature

of social experience grounds the desire to break beyond the concrete

social world to the creation of a predetermined human social situation.

A predetermined human social situation is one in which a single mode

of social activity is presented as a way of actualizing a complete

process of human consciousness.[4] In a predetermined human social

social situation, social practice is not conditioned by the many

possible modes of human consciousness. On the contrary, the many

possible modes of human consciousness are first reduced to a single

complete mode of human thought, and then a particular process of

social activity is described as a way of materializing this complete

mode of human consciousness. Thus, in a predetermined human social

situation, the uncertainty of a provisional social world is overcome

by the certitude of being enveloped within a mode of human materialization

which remains the single means of actualizing a complete process of

human consciousness. It is precisely the quest for a predetermined

mode of social life which yields the social problem of human salvation.

The concrete social world is not, however, only relative,

partial, and provisional. It is also prospective. The prospective

character of the concrete social world provides the basis for the

development of the more aesthetic problem of human salvation. The

aesthetic problem of human salvation may be summed up as the following

concern: How might it be possible to go beyond the prospective,

and thereby uncertain, character of the concrete social world to the

creation of a consistent human value situation? The prospective, and

thereby uncertain, character of concrete social experience is based

in the fact that the more moral aspect of social existence anticipates

the transformation, or possible transformation, of the human survival

situation. There is no process of social experience which does not

culminate in a qualitative transformation of the human situation. And

there is no valuation of this emergent human situation which does not

provide the possibility of a new reconstruction of the process of

social being. The domain of concrete social experience is thus always

prospective. And it is an aversive response to the prospective

character of concrete social experience which inspires the development

of the more aesthetic problem of human salvation. The aesthetic problem

of human salvation develops whenever the uncertainty of a provisional

social experience engenders the desire to break beyond the concrete

social world to the creation of a consistent human value situation.

A consistent human value situation is one in which the process of

social morality reinforces, rather than reconstructs, an absolute mode
                        5
of social being.   In a consistent human value situation, the process

of social morality does not lead to an alteration of the human survival

situation.   On the contrary, the process of social morality leads to

the certitude of consistency itself.   And it is exactly the quest for

the certitude of moral consistency which yields the aesthetic problem

of human salvation.

There are, therefore, four particular problems of human

salvation, each of which is grounded in the transformation of a basic

human disposition.   The four particular problems of human salvation

are linked together by concretely experienced relations of preformance,

anticipation, and summation.   The subjective problem of human salvation

preforms and antipates the collective problem of human salvation.

The quest for a complete mode of human consciousness summarizes the

search for an absolute mode of social being, and sets the stage for the

social problem of human salvation.   The quest for a predetermined

mode of social practice intermediates the desire for absoluteness and

completeness, and anticipates the aesthetic problem of human salvation.

Finally, the quest for moral certitude summarizes and reinforces the

yearning for absoluteness, completeness, and predetermination.   Taken

together, the four particular problems of human salvation

represent partial aspects of the general human query concerning how

it might be possible to break beyond the uncertainty of the concrete
social world to a mode of social life characterized by absolute
certitude. While this general human query provides a full statement
of the problem of human salvation, it does not provide an answer as
to what must be done if the yearning for absolute certitude is to be
satisfied. Such an answer is provided by the phenomenology of human
salvation.

The Phenomenology of Human Salvation

The problem of human salvation begins to develop whenever the
immediate experience of the concrete social world fosters an aversive
response to the absence of absolute certitude. The attempt to render
absolute that which is experienced as uncertain requires, for its
prosecution, the creation of formative postulates concerning what
qualitatively more desirable modes of social being, social consciousness,
social activity, and social morality might comprise. These formative
postulates, when taken together, constitute the central features of
the phenomenology of human salvation. The phenomenology of human
salvation details, in lucid terms, how the concrete social world must
be reconstructed if the quest for absolute certitude is to achieve
a satisfactory solution. This vision of what must be done for the
rectification of the problem of human salvation is grounded in a
fundamental transformation of the process of human queries. The
process of human queries has previously been defined as a dynamic
working-out of concretely experienced relations of preformance, anticipation,
and summation between four fundamental human assumptions, each of which
specifies what must be done for the resolution of a specific human

disposition. There are, therefore, four fundamental human queries,
each of which responds to a particular understanding of what is most
problematic in human existence. There are, in this case, ontological,
epistemological, axiological, and aesthetic human queries. The
phenomenology of human salvation, in its fullest expression, is grounded
in a qualitative revision of each of the above fundamental human queries.
And each qualitative revision of a fundamental human query provides
a particular understanding of what must be done for the resolution
of a specific problem of human salvation. The phenomenology of human
salvation thus consists of four fundamental postulates, each of which
responds to a particular expression of the general problem of human
salvation. There is, in this case, an ontology of human salvation,
an epistemology of human salvation, an axiology of human salvation, and
an aesthetic of human salvation. The ontology of human salvation
specifies what must be done to obtain subjective certitude. The
epistemology of human salvation describes what must be done to obtain
collective certitude. The axiology of human salvation specifies what
must be done to obtain social certitude. And the aesthetic of human
salvation describes what must be done to obtain moral certitude. These
four postulates of human salvation are not, of course, unrelated to one
another. On the contrary, each postulate of human salvation may be
viewed as a partial aspect of a general human awareness concerning
what must be done to attain a mode of social life invested with absolute
certitude. For example, the ontology of human salvation is grounded
in a vision of an absolutist universe. The assumption of an absolutist
universe preforms and anticipates the appearance of an epistemology

of human salvation. The epistemology of human salvation is based

in a vision of tautological human consciousness. The reduction of

human consciousness to tautology serves as the postulate by that which

is absolute may be recognized, and thereby admitted, into the more

collective aspect of social experience. The presentation of a tautological

structure of human knowledge sets the stage, in turn, for the appearance

of the axiology of human salvation. The axiology of human salvation

postulates teleology as the basis of the more material aspect of social

existence. The assumption of teleology as the basis of social practice

sums up the vision of tautological human consciousness and sets the

stage, in turn, for the appearance of the aesthetic of human salvation.

The aesthetic of human salvation presents the process of social morality

as the experience of consistency itself. The struggle to achieve a

more perfect consistency between the operative principle of absolute

certitude and the concrete social world turns the phenomenology of

human salvation inward upon itself in a complete circle of self-

confirmation and self-justification. The following section will review

briefly each of the four assumptions composing the phenomenology

of human salvation, and will describe the relationships which hold

between them.

The Absolutist Universe

The phenomenology of human salvation begins by grounding

human subjectivity in a principle of absoluteness. The principle

of absoluteness has been envisioned, at different times and in

different places, as the primal origin of social experience, the first

cause of human life, as the rudimentary life force, or as an inexorable

historical process.[6]   Regardless of its particular presentation,

this principle of absoluteness has been intended to lend, by its very

presence, cohesiveness, consistency, and purpose to the social drama.

It is the penultimate fundamentalism to which the entire spread of

concrete social experience constantly reduces itself.

The assumption that the concrete social world is populated,

in its essential features, by absolutes, essences, or immutabilities is

a necessary prelude to the successful resolution of the formative

problem of human salvation. The problem of human salvation emerges,

at first, from an aversive response to the uncertainty of human relativity,

and from an unwillingness to accept concrete experience as the fullest

extension possible of social reality. Given the problem of human

salvation in these terms, the single alternative remaining has to do

with challenging human relativity by widening the limits of social

reality to include that which has never been concretely experienced.

The vision of an absolutist universe thus begins with the denial that

concrete experience exhausts the full limits of human reality, and

with the corresponding assertion that a widening of the experiential

frame discloses an alternative and more laudatory reality--one which

links human beings into a special relationship with an irreducible

principle of absolute certitude. The concrete social world is thus

reinterpreted as being held together by the unifying capacity of

a dominant, and metaphysically experienced, principle of certainty.

The investiture of social experience with an absolutism is

intended to throw off balance the customary presentation of the more

subjective aspect of human existence.   In this case, human subjectivity

is no longer what it seems to be--a relative process of working through

particular human situations to an adequate vision of the social world,

and of one's position within it.   Instead, human subjectivity becomes

a manifestation of a larger principle which, lurking beneath the surface

of social existence, binds together in a unitary design all dimensions

of social experience.   This ontology of social reality implies that the

subjective problem of human salvation--the quest for a world filled

with absolute meaning--will be unsatisfactorily resolved if limited to

concrete social experience.   Within the vision of an absolutist universe,

the relativity of concrete human subjectivity must be transformed into

the certitude of cosmological being.   This transformation occurs by

means of an intense conviction that the process of social experience

is backed up by and ultimately is grounded in a subterranean reality,

the presence of which may be only metaphysically grasped.   To enter

into the certainty of cosmological being, therefore, is to ally oneself

actively with an absolutism by means of a formative credo.   This

leap beyond the empirical social world into the certitude of faith is

the first necessary condition for the successful resolution of the

formative problem of human salvation.   By itself, however, the ontological

assumption of an absolutist universe, and the consequent realignment

of human subjectivity into cosmological being, is not sufficient for

the realization of absolute certitude.   It is further necessary that

the absolutism be generalized across social existence.   In this case, a

procedure must be found for calling forth that which is absolute onto

the social scene. This procedure must allow for consciousness, in

the most primary sense, concerning the full limits of the primal

vision of certainty, and must establish how the primal vision of

certainty may be further disclosed across social experience.

The requirements are met by the epistemological postulate that the

certainty principle reveals itself in terms of knowledge tautologically

conceived.

Tautological Consciousness

The phenomenology of human salvation has begun with the ontological

assumption of an absolutist universe. The vision of a social universe

bound together by a certainty principle represents the first step

in resolving the problematic character of human salvation. The desire

for certitude may be assuaged only if the limits of social existence

have been expanded to include an absolutism, even though this absolutism

has never been concretely apprehended. The phenomenology of human

salvation does not end, however, with the declaration of an absolutist

universe. On the contrary, the phenomenology of human salvation

continues with an epistemological assumption concerning the tautological

character of human consciousness. While the ontology of human salvation

relates what must be done to obtain subjective certitude, the

epistemological vision of human consciousness as a tautological process

relates what must be done to obtain collective certitude. In this

case, the absolutism must not only exist. It must also reveal itself

in social experience. And the process of disclosing the absolutism

must lead to a mode of human consciousness which is complete in itself

rather than partial. It is precisely the quest for a complete process of human consciousness which defines, in the first instance, the collective problem of human salvation.

The epistemology of human salvation thus responds to the collective problem of human salvation be reducing human consciousness to a tautological process. The reduction of human consciousness to a tautological process is an emergent of the ontology of human salvation. This point is elusive but important. It may be clarified by recalling that the ontology of human salvation has no justification whatever in terms of an empirical investigation of the concretely apprehended domain of social experience. The ontology of human salvation presumes that empirical knowledge, which relies on concrete experience, may be downgraded in favour of a metaphysical appeal beyond the concrete social world to the existence of an absolutism. This appeal is metaphysical since it relies on an intense credo--a blind conviction in the existence of something which appears nowhere in concrete social experience. The ontological assumption of an absolutist universe is thus the product of an anti-empirical appeal to the existence of that which may be known only metaphysically. Such a metaphysical appeal presupposes that the postulated principle of certainty is independent of concrete social experience. In this case, while the whole of social experience may be reduced to an absolutism, variously conceived, the reverse is definitely not the case. That which is absolute is such precisely because it is a self-contained, self-verifying, and self-acting thing. If this were not the case, then the certainty principle would be subjected to the empirical plight of human relativity.

This would be, or course, a straight-forward contradiction. Thus,

the absolutism, if it is to provide the key to human salvation, must

be conceived as something which moves under its own power. In a literal

sense, the absolutism must reveal itself in social existence as a

complete circular tautology. AS a self-contained tautology, the

absolutism remains independent of concrete experience, and appears in

social existence as that which maintains its own principle of locomotion.[7]

For this reason, the absolutism cannot be grasped directly by means of

an empirical investigation of concrete social experience. It may only

be appreciated metaphysically by recourse to knowledge tautologically

conceived. Insight into the tautology is provided, not by empirical

inquiry, but by a prior act of faith or belief. Once a metaphysical

commitment to the existence of an absolutism has been obtained, then the

full disclosure of the absolutism may take place. Having repudiated

the empirical basis of human consciousness, there are no grounds

remaining outside the tautology for testing its accuracy. One either

believes in the tautology, and accepts the consequences of that belief,

or one does not. Given a prior act of belief, the absolutism becomes

that which it is revealed to be; and that which the absolutism is

revealed to be, is what it is. The absolutism is thus disclosed as

that which the activity of disclosing it reveals it to be. The activity

of disclosing absolutism is, therefore, a process of tautological thought.

It is consciousness which continuously moves inward upon itself in

a complete circle of self-confirmation. And tautological consciousness,

of this sort, is consciousness which has been imbued with absolute certitude.

The epistemology of human salvation thus grounds the quest

for collective certitude in the reduction of human consciousness

to a tautological process. This epistemological reduction is intended

as a challenge to the partial character of concrete human thought.

Within the vision of tautological consciousness, human thought is no

longer what it seems to be—an incomplete process dependent upon the

changing character of particular human situations. Instead, human thought

is transformed into a complete process—a means of providing the fullest

expression possible of an unchanging absolutism. The epistemology

of human salvation implies, therefore, that the collective problem

of human salvation—the quest for a world filled with absolute purpose—

will be inadequately resolved if limited to the domain of concrete

human thought. The partial character of concrete human thought must

be transformed into the certitude of tautological consciousness. This

transformation takes place by means of a metaphysical appeal beyond

empirical social inquiry to the existence of a process of human

consciousness which remains complete in itself. It is precisely this

tautological process of human consciousness which is postulated as the

single means by which that which is absolute may be revealed, and thereby

generalized, across the social world. However, it remains insufficient

for a certainty principle to be proposed, and for a method to be

postulated by which that which is absolute may be disclosed. A

procedure must also be found for actualizing that which the absolutism

is revealed to be. And this process of actualization must reduce the

uncertainty contingent upon the provisional character of social

activity to the certitude of predetermination. These requirements

are met by an axiological assumption concerning the teleological
character of social activity.

Teleological Activity

So far, the phenomenology of human salvation has involved two
formative assumptions: an ontological postulate concerning the absolutist
character of the social universe; and an epistemological postulate
concerning the tautological character of human consciousness. While
the ontology of human salvation has responded to the request for subjective
certitude, the epistemology of human salvation has described what must
be done to obtain collective certitude. The phenomenology of human
salvation does not cease, however, with the epistemological reduction
of human consciousness to a tautological process. On the contrary,
the phenomenology of human salvation continues with an axiological
assumption concerning what might comprise a more desirable mode of
social activity. The axiology of human salvation responds to the quest
for social certitude. The quest for social certitude requires, in the
most rudimentary sense, a means of breaking beyond the provisional
character of concrete social activity to the certitude of predetermination.
The axiology of human salvation provides a way of bursting beyond the
provisionality of concrete social activity by grounding the more material
aspect of social existence in a larger telos or direction. This larger
telos or direction is envisioned as the ultimate source of a predetermined
mode of social life. And it is precisely the attainment of a predetermined
mode of social life which provides the collective problem of human
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salvation with a social expression.

The vision of a universe principled in teleology implicitly assumes, of course, that the domain of concrete social activity is not what it is experienced as--a provisional process by which the products of human consciousness may be actualized. Instead, the assumption of teleology overrides the provisionality of concrete social activity in favour of the certitude of a predetermined direction in social experience: a direction which may be actively appreciated, and whose appreciation leads to the insight that the telos manifest itself in terms of a certain range of social activity. The telos is thus released through a particular range of social practices, and this range of social practices represents the process by which the concrete social world may be actively wrenched into a closer and closer alignment with that which is necessary for the experience of absolute certitude. In this sense, the reduction of social activity to teleology thrusts the quest for absolute certitude beyond questions of being and consciousness and into the domain of social practice. Not only is there a particular vision of the social universe which provides subjective certitude, and a particular vision of human knowledge which provides collective certitude, but there is also a particular vision of social life, which if accepted, provides social certitude. The process of social activity, teleologically conceived, thus serves to actualize the products of tautological consciousness. However, it remains insufficient for a method to be found by which the products of tautological consciousness may be realized in social activity. It is also necessary that the social realization of that which is held to be absolute lead to the experience of moral consistency. This requirement is met by the aesthetic of human salvation.

Consistency Values

The aesthetic of human salvation grounds the moral dimension

of social experience in the quest for consistency itself. The quest

for moral consistency represents the root value experience of the pheno-

menology of human salvation. This value experience involves the resolution

of any contradiction between concrete social experience and the assumptions

necessary for the solution of the problem of human salvation in favour

of a greater faith in the postulated absolutism. The quest for moral

consistency thus involves an evaluative reordering of the concrete

social world until it "fits" without contradiction into the image of

social reality inspired out of concern with the problematic character

of human salvation. The aesthetic of human salvation--the reduction of

moral life to a quest for consistency--is thus the exact process by

which the concrete social world is "forced" into conformity with the

metaphysical desire for absolute certitude. The assumption that the

concrete social world may be made consistent with an ungrounded vision

of that world turns the phenomenology of human salvation inward

upon itself as a complete circle of self-confirmation and self-

justification. In this case, the reduction of human subjectivity to

faith in a certainty principle is advanced by morally reinterpreting

the concrete social world until it harmonizes with a prior conviction

concerning the essentialist nature of the social universe. This process

of harmonization strengthens, in turn, the belief that an absolutism

may be known tautologically, and may be actualized teleologically.

And the grounding of social activity in teleology reaffirms, once more,

the struggle for moral consistency. It is the experience of moral

consistency which represents, in the most fundamental sense, the final
solution to the problematic character of human salvation.[9]

The phenomenology of human salvation thus provides the key
to resolving the desire for absolute certitude. This key is expressed
as a lucid image of social reality which details in ontological,
epistemological, axiological, and aesthetic terms what must be done if
the flight from the uncertainty of the concrete social world is to
be successfully achieved. This image of a more desirable social reality
represents a necessary but not sufficient condition for the ultimate
settlement of the problem of human salvation. It is also necessary
that the phenomenology of human salvation be actualized. While the
phenomenology of human salvation provides the basis for a complete
understanding of what must be done for the rectification of the uncertain
human situation, it does not provide an answer as to how this might
be accomplished. This answer is provided, however, by the process of
cosmological action.

The Process of Cosmological Action

The phenomenology of human salvation contains the formative
assumptions necessary for the resolution of the problematic character
of human salvation. These formative assumptions require, for their
realization, the creation of a distinctive pattern of social organization.
This distinctive pattern of social organization reveals, in exact
detail, how it might be possible to actualize the assumptions contained
within the phenomenology of human salvation. This pattern of social
organization may be viewed, in its essential features, as the process
of cosmological action itself.

The process of cosmological action is grounded in a fundamental transformation of the more material aspect of human existence. The more material aspect of human existence has previously been described as a process involving a dynamic working-out of concretely experienced relations of preformance, anticipation, and summation between four rudimentary human activities, each of which specifies how a particular human query might be actualized. There are four rudimentary human activities, each of which transforms a specific assumption concerning what must be done for the rectification of a particular human situation into a unique social practice. There are, in this case, survival, political, social, and aesthetic human practices. The process of cosmological action, in its most complete expression, is based in a qualitative transformation of each of the above rudimentary human practices. And each qualitative transformation of a rudimentary human activity provides a particular answer as to how a specific aspect of the phenomenology of human salvation might be materialized. The process of cosmological action thus consists of four rudimentary human activities, each of which serves to materialize a particular understanding of what must be done for the rectification of the problematic character of human salvation. These four cosmological activities may be described as <u>mythification</u>, <u>conversion</u>, <u>transformation</u>, and <u>redemption</u>.

The activity of mythification refers to the process by which the ontology of human salvation is actualized as a distinctive mode of human survival practice. The activity of conversion refers to the process by which the epistemology of human salvation is materialized as a distinctive mode of human political practice. The activity of

transformation refers to the process by which the axiology of human

salvation is actualized as a distinctive mode of human social practice.

And the activity of redemption refers to the process by which the aesthetic

of human salvation is materialized as a distinctive mode of human

moral practice. These four cosmological activities are not isolated

from one another. On the contrary, each activity represents

a partial aspect of a broader process of cosmological action. This

broader process of cosmological action begins with the activity of

mythification, continues with the activity of conversion, advances

into the activity of transformation, and culminates with the activity

of redemption. The following section will review briefly the four

rudimentary human activities composing the process of cosmological

action, and the relationships which obtain between them.

Mythification

The process of cosmological action begins with the activity

of mythification. The activity of mythification refers to the process

by which the ontological assumption of an absolutist universe is

transformed into a distinctive mode of human survival practice. This

process centres around the presentation of a <u>primal salvation myth</u>.

A primal salvation myth is any vision of the process of social experience

which reduces it to interpretation through one of its dimensions,

specially conceived. This vision simultaneously contains the prophecy

that the process of bringing this dimension of social experience,

specially conceived, into the ascendency is coterminous with the
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experience of human salvation. The activity of mythification may

be understood, therefore, as the process by which a compelling and

and inspiring image concerning the fundamentalistic character of social existence is presented. This fundamentalistic interpretation of social experience casts the concrete social world into a qualitatively different light. It portrays the concrete social world as but a confusing manifestation of a single principle of absoluteness which has not yet been made fully apparent as the ultimate determinant of social existence. In the case, the primal salvation myth reinterprets the uncertainty of human relativity as being simply a sign that the ascendency of that which is the determinant of social existence has not yet been fully achieved. The first step in its achievement lies in the crucial decision to link one's destiny as a social being with the prophetic vision contained in the primal salvation myth. This crucial decision requires an act of faith in the adequacy of the primal salvation myth. The primal salvation myth, while providing a reinterpretation of the concrete social world, does so from the standpoint of that which has never appeared anywhere in concrete experience—a principle of absolute certitude. Thus, one either believes, or does not believe, in the adequacy of the primal salvation myth. The myth is not subject to empirical verification since it begins as a denial of the concrete in favour of that which is distinctly metaphysical. To commit oneself by faith to the adequacy of a primal salvation myth is, therefore, to release oneself from the necessity of working out one's location within a particular human situation into an adequate vision concerning what it means to survive as a social being in a given place and at a given time. The answer to the formative question concerning what constitutes a desirable process of survival

as a social being is ready-made. This ready-made answer may be obtained
by merging one's subjective sense of self with that which is ascendent
in the social drama--the postulated principle of absolute certitude.
An act of faith in the primal salvation myth is thus coterminous with
the experience of being overwhelmed, and, in a profound sense, reborn
with the awareness that a larger principle conditions and binds together
the concrete social world, and that this larger principle can be
immediately appreciated by faith as the basis for social being. Moreover,
the appreciation of a primal salvation myth fosters the conviction
that human beings are not condemned to the particular concrete situations
within which they find themselves lodged, but can alter and eventually
master their condition by regarding themselves as participants within
a broader and more prophetic salvation drama. Human beings can,
in other words, escape the uncertainty of human relativity by taking
on as their own a mode of cosmological being. This mode of cosmological
being has, of course, no basis in concrete social experience. Its
timelessness and spacelessness may be obtained only metaphysically by
means of an initial and intense credo in the primal salvation myth.

The process by which human beings take on as their own a mode
of cosmological being represents the first, tentative step in the
resolution of the formative problem of human salvation. In this case,
the activity of mythification distinguishes the frontier of the process
of cosmological action in its movement across the landscape of concrete
social experience. Through mythification, human beings enter the
cosmological paradigm and, thereby, take their place as active participants
within the working-out of a broader salvation drama. This decision

releases human beings from having to confront their empirical

social situation on its own terms by providing a fundamentalistic

doctrine which, even though it fails or may fail to alter their concrete

circumstance, succeeds in reducing its uncertainty to the certitude

of absoluteness.

The activity of mythification resolves the quest for absolute

certitude at the level of human subjectivity. Through the promulgation

of a primal salvation myth, the ontological assumption of an absolutist

universe is structured into social existence. By making an act of

faith in the adequacy of a primal salvation myth, human beings leap

beyond the relativity of concrete social experience into the absoluteness

of cosmological being. In a profound sense, human selfhood dissolves

into unity with that which is held absolute. There are, however,

four qualitatively different absolutes to which the process of

social experience may be reduced, and thus four basic salvation myths

by which entry may be gained into the cosmological experience. Each

certainty principle corresponds to a different dimension of social

experience, specially conceived. For example, the whole of social

existence may be grounded in the emergence of a special mode of historical

being.[11] A primal salvation myth may be presented which reduces

the concrete social world to the working-out of a history of economic

struggle, and which makes human salvation synonymous with the recognition

of one's position as an historical actor within this broader salvation

drama. Likewise, the domain of concrete social experience may be

viewed as but a manifestation of an absolute conceived as thought itself.[12]

A primal salvation myth may be advanced which grounds the concrete

social world in a determinant philosophical principle. Similarly, the more

material aspect of social experience may be considered the repositer

of a certainty principle. A primal salvation myth may be presented

which reduces social existence to clarification by means of a

special type of _social_ practice--whether the quest for happiness, the

pursuit of self-interest, or the expansion of altruism. [13] Finally, the

whole of social existence may be reduced for its interpretation to

a _religious_ principle. A primal salvation myth may be advanced which

grounds the concrete social world in the working-out of an aesthetic

creation--a god.

      There are, therefore, four qualitatively different gateways

by which admittance into the cosmological experience may be gained.

Each gateway reduces the process of social experience to interpretation

by means of one of its dimensions, specially conceived--whether historical,

philosophical, social, or religious. Regardless of which primal

salvation myth is accepted as the receptacle of human faith, the

empirical consequence is the same. Human beings surrender the struggle

for an adequate and concrete vision of the social world, and of their

position within it, in favour of allegiance to that which is distinctly

metaphysical--a principle of absolute certitude. This momentary

identification with a metaphysical principle of certitude will not

endure, however, unless the object of human faith--the primal

salvation myth--is transformed into the very basis of a given process

of social existence. The primal salvation myth must, in other words,

be embodied in a conversionary polity, and this conversionary polity

must provide for the organization of human beings around obedience

to the guardians of a given tautology.

Conversion

The process of cosmological action has begun with the activity of mythification. The activity of mythification has provided for the actualization of the ontology of human salvation. Through mythification, the quest for subjective certitude has been broken down into four qualitatively distinct principles of absoluteness, each of which has grounded the quest for salvation in a different dimension of social experience. Each prophetic vision of salvation has described a different aspect of the process of social experience as the repositer of the fundamentalism to which the whole of social existence may be reduced. The certainty principle has thus been envisioned, at different times and places, as either historical, philosophical, social, or religious. Admission into the cosmological experience occurs by taking on as one's own a particular salvation myth. Since no primal salvation myth has ever been concretely experienced, identification with any of them pre-supposes a willingness to lose oneself, by means of faith, within a metaphysical experience. The willingness to plunge beyond concrete social experience represents the first step in the struggle for absolute certitude. This initial step will not be sustained, however, unless the formative credo has been further transformed into a process of political action. In this case, private faith, taken by itself, is like an island in the midst of the uncertainty of concrete social experience. While private faith produces subjective certitude, it does not produce collective certitude. It is the attainment of collective certitude which solidifies private faith, and which provides an additional barrier against the uncertainty of the concrete social world. The

primal salvation myth must, therefore, be structured out into a salvation polity. And the salvation polity must provide a mode of collaborative action which has, as its dominant motif, the experience of collective certitude.

The reduction of poitical life to certitude occurs through the activity of conversion. The activity of conversion refers to the process by which the epistemological assumption concerning the tautological character of human thought is transformed into a distinctive human political practice. This process centres around the creation of a conversionary polity. A conversionary polity is any collectivity which maintains itself as the concrete embodiment of a primal salvation myth, and which organizes faith in the adequacy of a primal salvation myth into the politics of absolute obedience. A conversionary polity thus serves as the keeper or guardian of a primal salvation myth. It defines what must be done if the prophetic vision contained in the primal salvation myth is to be brought into ascendency across social existence, and rules explicitly as to who does, and who does not, belong to the particular cosmology. A conversionary polity thus publically certifies faith in a primal salvation myth, and transforms this faith into absolute obedience to a collective body which is presented as the interpreter of that myth. This transformation reduces the uncertainty associated with collective life to the experience of complete certitude. Political life is reduced to unquestioning obedience to the collectivity into which one has been converted. In this case, the activity of conversion "cashes in" faith for a higher and more secure order of certitude, one which invests collective life

itself with the possibility of completeness.   A conversionary polity

may range in size and extensiveness from a monolithic totalitarianism

to a small bible-reading group.   Regardless of its size or extensiveness,

the political process involved is the same.   A formative act of faith

is generalized into obedience to a metaphysical collectivity.   The

process of generalization occurs through conversionary activity.

Conversionary activity is implicitly based on the assumption of

knowledge, tautologically conceived, and a conversionary polity is,

in a literal sense, a concrete tautology.

It should be recalled that in the phenomenology of human salvation,

the ontological assumption of an absolutist universe was followed by

an epistemological postulate concerning the tautological character of

human thought.   While the ontology of human salvation has been actualized

by the activity of mythification, the epistemology of human salvation

is materialized by the activity of conversion.   Through conversion,

certitude of political life is obtained, and this mode of certitude

complements and strengthens the leap into cosmological being—the product

of mythification.   The conversionary process is implicitly tautological.

It involves taking on as one's own a metaphysical collectivity which

maintains itself as the medium for the disclosure, and thereby the

ascendency, of a particular primal salvation myth.   The epistemology

of human salvation has involved the assumption that the proposed

principle of absoluteness proceeds into experience as a thing moving

under its own power.   The movement of the absolutism may be disclosed,

therefore, but not empirically verified.   The primal salvation myth

is, in fact, what the activity of disclosing it reveals it to be;

and what the primal salvation myth is revealed as, then that is what
it is. Generalized into a mode of political action, the vision of
an absolutism tautologically conceived, results in the creation of a
collective body--a conversionary polity--which presents itself as
the concrete embodiment of the primal salvation myth in social
existence. The conversionary polity mediates between the primal
salvation myth and its adherents. In order to testify concretely
to one's faith in the primal salvation myth, therefore, one must give
absolute and unquestioning obedience to the conversionary polity which
concretely embodies the working-out of the myth. The conversionary
polity, like the primal salvation myth which it represents, may thus
be envisioned as a thing turning on its own head. Although the
conversionary polity discloses the implications of the primal salvation
myth for everyday life, the accuracy of this disclosure cannot be
verified by an appeal to concrete social experience. Thus, what the
primal salvation myth means in practical terms is synonymous with
what the conversionary polity reveals it to mean. The conversionary
polity thus acts as a concrete tautology. It binds together in a
collective form a common allegiance to a particular certainty
principle, the basis of which is to be found nowhere in concrete social
experience. As such, the conversionary polity constitutes the concrete
embodiment of a metaphysical experience. As the embodiment of a
metaphysical experience, the conversionary polity cannot claim legitimacy
as the rightful interpreter of a primal salvation myth by means of an
appeal to concrete social experience. There is nothing in concrete
experience which would lead to the conviction that one conversionary

polity, rather than another, is more legitimate as the concrete

embodiment of a particular fundamentalism. Legitimacy thus comes to

rest on the belief that a particular primal salvation myth is revealed

by means of a particular conversionary polity. This belief is the act

of conversion itself. The act of conversion has, as its basis, the

conviction, albeit ungrounded, that a particular conversionary polity

concretely represents the working-out of a given primal salvation myth.

This conviction involves the complementary assumption that the expansion

of the salvation polity into which one has been converted is coterminous

with the advance of a particular certainty principle across social

existence. That is, the prophetic vision contained in all salvation

myths concerning the inevitable ascendency of one dimension of social

experience, specially conceived, over all the others is viewed as being

collectively represented by the conversionary polity to which legitimacy,

and thereby absolute obedience, has been rendered. However, the primal

salvation myth must not only be interpreted as to its concrete implications.

These concrete implications must also be employed as guiding principles

in the transformation of the social universe. Obedience to the guardians

or keepers of the primal salvation myth must be solidified by the

diligent exercise of a prescribed set of right actions or correct conduct.

This prescribed set of right actions functions to narrow the domain of

social activity to that which is necessary for the experience of absolute

certitude. The quest for human salvation is thus not only a matter of

faith and obedience, but also of diligence in the conduct of everyday

relations.

Transformation

The process of cosmological action has involved, thus far,
the complementary activities of mythification and conversion. Both
activities have been viewed as necessary but not sufficient conditions
for the successful resolution of the formative problem of human salvation.
While the activity of mythification has provided for the actualization
of the ontology of human salvation, the activity of conversion has
provided for the materialization of the epistemology of human salvation.
Through mythification, a transcendent meaning--whether historical, philo-
sophical, social, or religious--has been injected into the domain of
social experience. And admittance into the cosmological experience
has been made synonymous with the acceptance of this transcendent meaning
as one's own. The activity of mythification has thus lodged the quest
for human salvation in the private conviction that a primal salvation
myth, however conceived, is both efficacious and correct, and that the
attainment of absolute certitude entails the linking of one's destiny
to the playing out of this larger meaning in social experience. Belief
in the adequacy of a primal salvation myth has been generalized into
a mode of political action by means of the activity of conversion.
Through conversion, faith in a primal salvation myth has been directly
translated into absolute obedience to the guardians or keepers of the
myth. The emergent conversionary polity serves as the vehicle for the
playing out of the certainty principle upon the social scene. The
conversionary polity may thus be viewed as a metaphysical collectivity
which moves in a circle of self-justification and self-confirmation.
It appeals for its legitimacy to a fundamentalism of its own making,

a mythification, of which it claims to be the concrete embodiment and loyal guardian. In this sense, while serving as the interpreter of its own creation, the conversionary polity denies its own power of creation, and presents itself as merely the passive vehicle by which a given certainty principle may be exercised onto the social scene. An ungrounded mode of social being carries through, therefore, into an equally ungrounded mode of human politics.

The politics of absolute obedience prepares for the investiture of the more social aspect of human existence with the stillness of absolute certitude. The reduction of the domain of social practice to the certitude of predetermination occurs through the activity of transformation. The activity of transformation refers to the process by which the axiological assumption concerning the teleological character of the social universe is materialized as a distinctive human social practice. This process centres around the creation of a code of approved social conduct. A code of approved social conduct may be viewed as any predetermined description concerning what does, and does not, constitute an adequate range of social practices vis-a-vis the ascendency of a given certainty principle.[15] In this case, the conversionary polity discloses what must be done if the more social aspect of human existence is to be reduced to a predetermined working-out of a transcendent principle. Diligence in practicing this code of approved social conduct provides a concrete sign that the members of a given cosmology are themselves advancing towards salvation, and that this advance is coterminous with the transformation of broader and broader sections of concrete experience in the direction of the primal

salvation myth. The activity of tansformation thus narrows the domain

of social practices to those actions which reduce the distance between

the concrete social world as it _is_ empirically experienced, and as

it _should_ be experienced if the ascendency of a primal salvation was

firmly established. The social universe is, thereby, remade in the image

of the transcendent principle. This implies, or course, that the whole of

social existence may be invested with a predetermined purpose. The

recognition of this predetermined purpose, and diligence in exposing it

more fully, imbues the routine of social life, however trivial,

with cosmological significance. Every social act becomes, in a

profound sense, a way of giving witness to the conviction that all

social existence may be viewed as a manifestation of an irreducible

principle of absolute certitude. What social acts are performed required

of course, a prior description of a code of approved social conduct.

This code of approved social conduct, as dictated by the conversionary

polity, specifies how participants in a given cosmology must act if

a particular primal salvation myth is to be fully realized.

The reduction of the domain of social activity to the exposure

of a larger telos provides for the experience of social certitude.

It is the unrelieved certitude of having to make "no choices" in the

everyday conduct of social life. The creation of a mode of social

life requiring "no choices"--only diligence in practicing that which

has been prescribed--elevates the quest for absolute certitude to

the level of social practice and, thereby secures the basis for

salvation not only in faith and obedience, but in diligence or

propriety as well. The activity of transformation thus brings the

process of cosmological action to the threshold of a social reality

which maintains, as its dominant quality, the experience of absolute

certitude. The quest for human salvation requires, however, one final

step. The reduction of social life to transformational activity must

be solidified in a dogmatic moral experience. The dogmatic moral

experience must resolve any inconsistencies between the 'way things

actually are' in the concrete social world and the prophetic vision

contained in the primal salvation myth. The creation of a dogmatic

moral experience thus represents the last step in the struggle

for human salvation. To attain consistency, even though only

momentarily, is to experience the act of redemption itself.

Redemption

The process of cosmological action has consisted, so far,

of the related activities of mythification, conversion, and transformation.

Through mythification, human subjectivity has been absolutized.

Through conversion, political life has been made complete. And through

transformation, the provisional character of concrete social activity

has been reduced to the certitude of having to make "no choices."

The quest for human salvation would be incomplete, however,

if it were to cease at this point. One final measure is necessary.

This measure devolves on the reduction of the moral dimension of

social existence to the certitude of consistency. Moral consistency

is obtained by the activity of redemption. The activity of redemption

refers to the process by which the aesthetic of human salvation is

actualized. This process centres around the creation of a dogmatic moral

<u>experience</u>. A dogmatic moral experience may be viewed as any human
value situation which allows the consequences of actions taken to
be evaluated in such a way, that regardless of their empirical description,
these consequences are forced into congruity with the activities necessary
for the resolution of the problem of human salvation. A dogmatic moral
experience thus redefines the concrete social world until it "fits"
the prophetic explanation of the social universe contained in the
primal salvation myth. In this case, a dognatic moral process allows
for the experience of living "without contradictions." And the experience
of living "without contradictions" represents, in a profound sense,
the act of redemption itself.

The moral process by which the concrete social world is reduced
to its certainty principle is coterminous with the entire process
of cosmological action itself. Every aspect of the process of cosmological
action may be viewed as a way of reducing the incongruity between
the primal salvation myth and concrete social experience. For example,
<u>faith</u> in the primal salvation myth represents the dogmatic moral
process by which human subjectivity is absolutized. Unquestioning
<u>obedience</u> is the dogmatic moral process by which political life is
narrowed to that which is necessary for the experience of collective
certitude. <u>Diligence</u> in the exercise of right actions represents the
dogmatic moral process by which the domain of social activity is
made consistent with the primal salvation myth, and with its process
of disclosure. Finally, the quest to make consequences <u>consistent</u>
with the objects of human faith, obedience, and diligence represents
the dogmatic moral process by which the human value experience is reduced

to an exercise in self-confirmation and self-justification. The entire process of cosmological action itself is thus the moral process by which a world without inconsistencies and contradictions may be obtained. In such a world, human beings are redeemed or saved. The struggle for absolute certitude is momentarily realized. The activity of redemption is the process, therefore, by which the activities composing the process of cosmological action are unified in a dogmatic moral experience. The moral activity involved in reducing concrete social experience to dogma finally succeeds in turning the process of cosmological action back upon itself as a complete circle of absolute certitude.

While the dogmatic values composing redemptive activity describe what must be done if the circle of absolute certitude is to remain unbroken, they do not, by themselves, control this continuity. Instead, each dogmatic value must be further backed up by a sanction or control. There are four cosmological sanctions, each of which defines the permissible, outer limits of a given salvation experience. Participants in a given cosmology may reach beyond these limits only at the risk of doing violence to the experience of absolute certitude itself. For example, the value of absolute faith is backed up by the threat of psychic terror. To lose faith in a primal salvation myth is, in a profound sense, to lose oneself, and to be set adrift once again in the uncertainty of human relativity. Likewise, obedience to the guardians or keepers of the primal salvation myth is backed up by the threat of censure. By censure is meant that the person is threatened with the loss of a political life which provides the only legitimate insight into an operant tautology. Similarly, to

be careless in the exercise of approved social conduct is to be subjected to social opprobrium. Social opprobrium involves the bringing into play of such controls as criticism, ridicule, and rebuff. If a participant in a given cosmology has lost the faith, disobeyed the guardians of the myth, and become slothful in his social duties, then the danger of moral inconsistency becomes acute. The single remaining sanction which can prevent dissidence of this sort is that of excommunication or expulsion. The threat of excommunication is the ultimate control possible, other than physical extinction, within the cosmological experience. Once it has been exercised, then the dissenter is purposely expelled from the experience of absolute certitude, and is allowed to fend for himself in the condition of human uncertainty. The dogmatic values of faith, obedience, diligence, and consistency are, therefore, backed up by the sanctions of psychic terror, censure, opprobrium, and excommunication.

The activity of redemption constitutes the final phase of the process of cosmological action. The process of cosmological action has been depicted as the pattern of social organization necessary for the actualization of the phenomenology of human salvation. In this case, the ontological postulate of an absolutist universe has been described as being materialized by the activity of mythification. The epistemological postulate of tautological knowledge has been portrayed as being actualized by the activity of conversion. The axiological assumption of teleological relations has been conceived as moving into experience by the activity of transformation. And the aesthetic postulate of consistency values has been described as being ushered into actuality by the activity

of redemption. The process of cosmological action has thus been
envisioned as the pattern of social organization emergent from concern
with the problematic character of human salvation. Only in a figurative
sense do the problem of human salvation and the phenomenology of human
salvation remain separate from the process of cosmological action.
In a concrete sense, the cosmological experience unifies the problem
of human salvation, the phenomenology of human salvation, and the process
of cosmological action into a complex Gestalt which is experienced as
a single process of social reality. In this sense, every aspect of
the process of cosmological action represents a concrete, albeit
partial, working-out of the formative problem of human salvation and
of the root assumptions necessary for its resolution.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the following three phases of the
cosmological paradigm of social action: the problem of human salvation,
the phenomenology of human salvation, and the process of cosmological
action. There remains now one last phase of the cosmological experience
to be discussed--the condition of human chaos. The following chapter
will be devoted to a description of the condition of human chaos.
It will be viewed as the quality of social existence which emerges
from a general concern with the problematic character of human salvation.

Chapter 3. The Condition of Human Chaos

So far, the thesis has been developed that the problem of human
salvation,while arising out of a fundamental reconstruction of the
process of human sensibilities, anticipates for its prosecution a
further alteration of the human mentality and of the pattern of social
organization. It will be contended now that the process of cosmological
action engenders a qualitative transformation of the human situation.
This qualitative transformation of the human situation may be viewed
as the human condition which emerges from a full playing-out of the
cosmological experience.

This chapter will propose chaos as the central value-quality--
the human condition--which always follows upon the attempt to create
a social reality which has, as its dominant motif, a general pre-
occupation with the problematic character of human salvation. The
condition of human chaos may be defined as that quality of human life
which is characterized by the presence of many competing cosmologies,
and by the absence of any principled means of choosing between them.
In a chaotic human situation, human beings are confronted by the necessity
of choosing between mutually exclusive perspectives concerning what
constitutes the correct route to human salvation. Each perspective
or cosmology maintains itself as the single most adequate expression of
the salvation drama. Human beings desiring absolute certitude are
compelled to select between such opposing representations. This
choice remains fundamentally unprincipled. It is always a matter of

faith and blind commitment, never a matter of genuine empirical knowledge.
There is nothing in concrete social experience--the domain of empirical
human knowledge--which would provide a clue as to which cosmology
represents the most adequate response to the human desire for salvation.
All cosmologies are, by definition, unique exponents of that which is
anti-empirical--a metaphysical principle of absolute certitude. The
choice between competing cosmologies is, therefore, incapable of being
resolved by means of an appeal to the concrete social world. The
choice must remain ungrounded. This permits, of course, the presence
of many competing cosmologies, each of which may legitimately assert
itself as the embodiment of the salvation drama. The degree to which
a particular cosmology succeeds in having itself recognized as the
most satisfactory expression of the desire for human salvation is
a product not of its empirical adequacy, but, rather, of the extent
to which the cosmology manages to "win out" over other perspectives
by methods ranging from intellectual clashes to warfare. This struggle
has, as its ultimate court of settlement, the extinction of all other
competing perspectives. The annihilation of all other cosmologies allows
one particular perspective to proclaim itself as the most worthy
receptacle of human faith. The supremacy of one cosmology over all
others has rarely, if ever, succeeded anywhere in the history of
social experience. The more common occurrence has been that of protracted
struggles between opposing cosmologies. In the course of such struggles,
particular cosmologies have emerged, declined, and sometimes have appeared
once more. For example, religious cosmologies have vied, and continue
to vie, with one another as to which may lay the most legitimate claim

to being the representative of a god, albeit variously conceived, on earth. Historical cosmologies have engaged, and continue to engage, in intense rivalries as to which embodies most adequately an absolute mode of human subjectivity.[1] Philosophical cosmologies have continually been caught up within bitter disputes as to which expresses most lucidly the ideational fundamentalism to which the domain of social experience may be reduced for its explanation.[2] And, finally, social cosmologies have contended, and continue to contend, with one another as to which expresses most adequately that which is primal in the more material aspect of social existence.[3] In addition, the history of social experience has been littered with bitter struggles between cosmologies advancing fundamentally different absolutisms. For example, religious cosmologies have competed, and continue to compete, against historical determinisms.[4] Historical cosmologies have repudiated the claims to superiority made by philosophical perspectives. Philosophical determinisms have continuously been held superior to social absolutisms. And social cosmologies have, in turn, asserted themselves as superior to either historical, religious, or philosophical determinisms.

The cosmological experience thus culminates in a human situation characterized by the presence of many competing cosmologies, and by the absence of any principled means of selecting between them. Such a human situation may be described as the condition of human chaos. This chapter will examine the development and content of the condition of human chaos. This examination will proceed through the following four stages. First, the thesis will be advanced that chaos represents less an accidental outcome of the cosmological experience than a necessary

consequence, the orgins of which are to be located in the very way

in which the problem of human salvation has always had to be posed.

The proposal will be made that the problem of human salvation is

implicitly imbued with a fatal flaw. This fatal flaw is simply that

there has never been, and can never be, a single interpretation

of the problem of human salvation. The problem of human salvation

may always receive, at the minimum, four qualitatively different

expressions which are mutually exclusive. It will then be demonstrated

that this fatal flaw has been magnified into four competing phenomenologies

of human salvation, and ultimately into four opposing processes of

cosmological action. The disintegration of the cosmological experience

into four competing presentations has, as its ultimate result, the

appearance of the condition of human chaos. Four central modes of

human chaos will be described. They will be identified as absurdity,

apathy, anomaly, and amorality. Absurdity will be viewed as the quality

of the cosmological survival experience. Apathy will be described

as the quality of the cosmological political experience. Anomaly

will be viewed as the quality of the cosmological social experience.

And amorality will be described as the quality of the cosmological

aesthetic experience. After a discussion of each of the above modes

of human chaos, some concluding comments will be made.

Before proceeding to a discussion of the origins of human

chaos, a cautionary note must be sounded. This chapter will be

intentionally limited to a clarification of the central tendencies

of the concluding phase of the cosmological experience. Its major

interest will not lie in an exegetical and narrowly historical interpre-

tation of the many particular expressions which the cosmological

experience has received. The justification for this approach is

straightforward. This inquiry began with the assumption that paradigms

of social action reflect generalized social experiences. These generalized

social experiences do not necessarily conform to an epochal and lineal

vision of human history. While it is possible to identify which

paradigm of social action seems to be in the ascendency across a parti-

cular civilization, it would be impossible, if not fruitless, to

describe the many concrete reasons why a particular paradigmatic

experience has declined at a specific point in space and time. Thus,

rather than concentrate on an exegesis of the particular historical

expressions received by a specific paradigm of social action, it would

appear more productive to dwell on the broader tendencies of social

experience of which such particular histories are but transient

manifestations. This cautionary note should be borne in mind

throughout the following discussion of the condition of human chaos.

Chaos is a specific quality of the human social experience. As such,

it remains a possibility whenever and wherever human beings assume

salvation to be problematic, and strive to realize a social reality

invested with absolute certitude.

The Fatal Flaw

The cosmological experience contains a fatal flaw which

ever limits its range and duration, and which prevents it from casting

the domain of social experience into a permanent unification. This

fatal flaw is simply that the cosmological experience, in its fullest

expression, culminates in a human situation which has chaos rather

than absolute certitude as its central quality. This tendency to chaos effectively prevents social existence from being unified, on a mass scale and over a long duration, around the resolution of the problem of human salvation. The presence of the condition of human chaos signifies that the quest for absolute certitude has been doomed to failure once again.

The origins of human chaos can be seen in the very statement of the problem of human salvation itself. The problem of human salvation, in its most general expression, has previously been portrayed as a flight beyond the uncertainty of concrete social experience to the certitude of absoluteness. This portrayal was immediately qualified by the comment that there are four _particular_ statements of the problem of human salvation, each of which responds to a specific aspect of human uncertainty. There is, in this case, a _subjective_ problem of human salvation, a _collective_ problem of human salvation, a _social_ problem of human salvation, and an _aesthetic_ problem of human salvation. The subjective problem of human salvation responds to the query concerning how it might be possible to break beyond human relativity to the certitude of absoluteness. The collective problem of human salvation queries how it might be possible to break beyond the partiality of concrete social experience to the certitude of completeness. The social problem of human salvation queries how it might be possible to burst beyond the provisional character of the concrete social world to the certitude of predetermination. And the aesthetic problem of human salvation queries how it might be possible to burst beyond the prospectiveness of the human value experience to the certitude of

consistency. There are, therefore, four particular problems of

human salvation, each of which connects with a specific dimension of

human uncertainty.

There has never been, however, a single interpretation given

to each of the four particular problems of human salvation. On the

contrary, each particular problem of human salvation has been capable

of receiving at least four opposing interpretations. Four clashing

contents may always be read into each aspect of the general problem of

human salvation. And it is precisely the disintegration of each

particular problem of human salvation into four competing interpretations

which provides the well-spring out of which develops the condition

of human chaos. The reason for this is as follows. The quest for

certitude demands, above all, an absolutism to which the whole of

social existence may be reduced for its clarification. An absolutism

is, however, the product of a metaphysical experience. Nowhere in

the empirically knowable domain of social experience has a principle

of absolute certitude ever been concretely apprehended. An absolutism

must, therefore, be invented, and then imposed upon the concrete social

world. The framework within which the invention of an absolutism

occurs is provided by the process of social experience itself. The

process of social experience has previously been defined, in its

simplest expression, as a dynamic working-out of concretely experienced

relations of preformance, anticipation, and summation between human

dispositons, queries, materializations, and qualitative consequences.

These four dimensions of social experience, and the relationships

which hold between them, provide the boundary around the content of all

social existence. Nothing happens in social existence which does not

ultimately have, as its referent, either an affective social self,

an element of consciousness, a social practice, or an aesthetic meaning.

If an absolutism is to be imported into social action, it must be

envisioned as one of the basic dimensions of the process of social

experience, albeit specially conceived. The conferral of primacy

upon one dimension of social experience succeeds, in a single stroke,

in imposing an absolutism upon the concrete social world, and in

providing a bridgehead against the relative character of concrete

social experience.

There are, however, four dimensions composing the process of

social experience, each of which may serve as the repositer of a

metaphysical experience. Each particular problem of human salvation

may thus be stated in four qualitatively different ways, according to

which dimension of social experience has been specially conceived

as the vehicle for the entry of a principle of absolute certitude

onto the social scene. For example, there is only one subjective problem

of human salvation. It may, however, receive four conflicting inter-

pretations, depending upon which dimension of social experience has,

at first, been absolutized. The quest for subjective certitude may

be reduced, in this case, to either a religious principle, a social

determinism, a mode of human consciousness, or a historical process.

Likewise, there is only one collective problem of human salvation.

It may, however, be interpreted in four fundamentally different ways,

according to which absolutism the quest for collective certitude has

been dependent. The quest for collective certitude may be reduced,

in this case, to either a religious organization, a closed social

grouping, a political party, or an economic unit. Similarly, there is

only one social problem of human salvation. It may, however, receive

four contradictory interpretations, according to which complete

collectivity social practice has been made dependent. The quest

for social certitude may be reduced, in this case, to four different

sources of predetermination, whether religious, material, philosophical,

or historical. Finally, there is only one aesthetic problem of human

salvation. It may, however, be interpreted in four opposing ways,

according to which social predetermination has been made the ground

for moral consistency. The quest for aesthetic certitude may be

reduced, in this case, to four qualitatively different dogmas,

whether religious, social, philosophical, or historical.

Each particular problem of human salvation may receive, therefore,

four conflicting contents at the minimum. These four conflicting

contents are, by definition, mutually exclusive. Each competing content

grants primacy to a different dimension of social experience, and

makes this dimension the determinant of all other aspects of social

existence. Or, stated in another way, each different interpretation

of the quest for absolute certitude grants primacy to a particular

aspect of the problem of human salvation, and makes this particular

statement of the problem of human salvation the determinant of its

other three phases.[5] For example, religious approaches to human

salvation grant primacy to the quest for aesthetic certitude, and make

subordinate the quests for subjective, collective, and social certitude.

Likewise, social expressions of the problem of human salvation grant

primacy to the quest for relational certitude, and reduce the subjective,

collective, and aesthetic aspects of the salvation problem to explanation

in its terms. Similarly, philosophical interpretations of human

salvation grant primacy to the quest for collective certitude, and make

subordinate the quests for subjective, social, and aesthetic certitude.

Finally, historical expressions of human salvation grant primacy to

the quest for subjective certitude, and reduce the collective, social,

and aesthetic aspects of the salvation problem to explanation in its

terms.[6] These four competing interpretations of the problem of human

salvation cannot exist in parity. The assertion of superiority on

the part of one dimension of social experience, and, thereby, on

the part of one particular statement of the problem of human salvation

directly contradicts the primacy of any other dimension of social

experience and thus of any other aspect of the salvation problem.

Absolutisms, of course, brook no relativity. Either a particular

dimension of social existence, and thereby, a specific statement of the

problem of human salvation can be considered the determinant of all

the others, or it must be considered as their subordinate. There is no

middle ground! The four competing interpretations of the problem of human

salvation must, therefore, vie with one another as to which expresses

most lucidly the human desire for certitude. Religious deities must

pit themselves against historical determinisms. Historical determinisms

must compete against philosophical absolutisms. And philosophical

absolutisms must struggle against social fundamentalisms. The stage

is thus set for a chaotic human situation.

There are, therefore, four competing interpretations of the human desire for certitude, each of which grants primacy to a different statement of the problem of human salvation. Each opposing perspective points to a different route by which the flight from the uncertainty of concrete social experience may be prosecuted. The different contents which may be given to the desire for human salvation thus originate mutually exclusive cosmologies. Since each cosmology, or grouping of cosmologies, is ultimately grounded in a metaphysical experience, there is no principled method available for testing the adequacy of one cosmology against another. There is nothing in concrete social experience which would lead to the conclusion that one dimension of social existence rather than another may be considered the repositer of absoluteness. How, then, is the adequacy of one metaphysical experience against another to be evaluated? How might the four conflicting interpretations of the problem of human salvation be evaluated in light of their simultaneous claims to being the correct route to human certitude? Since no evaluation grounded in concrete social experience is possible, then the answer must be that the competing contents which may be read into the problem of human salvation can be evaluated only in an unprincipled manner. The ultimate criterion for accepting a particular interpretation of the problem of human salvation to the exclusion of all others is thus the formative credo. The human situation, at this level, is thereby one of chaos. There are many competing interpretations of the problem of human salvation, but no principle available which would guide choice between them. The fatal flaw—— the tendency to human chaos—thus emerges directly from the very statement

of the problem of human salvation itself. This fatal flaw has been

further magnified by means of the phenomenology of human salvation,

and has been structured into social existence by means of the process

of cosmological action itself.

The Flaw Magnified

The problem of human salvation is capable of disintegrating,

at any given instant, into four opposing interpretations, whether historical,

philosophical, social, or religious. Each competing expression of

the problem of human salvation represents the starting point for the

development, or possible development, of a qualitatively different

grouping of cosmologies. And each grouping of cosmologies, whether

historical, philosophical, social, or religious, commonly reduces

social existence to clarification through one of its dimensions,

albeit specially conceived. For example, historical cosmologies

commonly reduce the problem of human salvation to the quest for

subjective certitude. This reduction results in the dissolution of

the social self into a deterministic process of human history.

The content of the historical determinism may be variously represented

as class, nation, or race. In each case, the formative query concerning

"Who am I?" is locked into a prearranged historical absolutism.

Likewise, philosophical cosmologies commonly grant primacy to the

quest for a complete mode of human consciousness. The philosophical

reduction results in the dissolution of the social self, by means of

thought itself, into a larger idealism. This premises the quest for

absolute certitude on the ability of human beings to reach beyond

the partiality of concrete human thought to the completeness of

metaphysical consciousness itself. Similarly, social cosmologies commonly reduce the problem of human salvation to the quest for a source of social predetermination. This reduction results in the dissolution of the social self into a particular mode of social practice. The content of the social determinism may be variously represented as the maximization of self-interest, the hedonistic pursuit of pleasure, or the instinctual urge to altruism.[8] In each case, a source of social predetermination is presented, and human existence is reduced to explanation in its terms. Finally, religious cosmologies commmonly give primacy to the quest for aesthetic certitude. The religious reduction results in the dissolution of the social self into a larger transcendental principle. What ultimately constitutes the religious design for human salvation varies, therefore, according to the transcendental principle which has been invented. Regardless of which transcendental absolutism has been invented, religious cosmologies commonly reduce social existence to explanation by means of an aesthetic experience, albeit specially conceived.

There are, therefore, four competing interpretations of the problem of human salvation, each of which provides the basis for the development of a unique grouping of cosmologies. These competing interpretations of the problem of human salvation further magnify into qualitatively distinct expressions of the phenomenology of human salvation. In this case, the formative postulates composing the phenomenology of human salvation may be interpreted in four mutually exclusive ways according to which representation of the problem of human salvation is taken as a point of reference. For example, historical cosmologies commonly

treat human salvation as primarily an <u>ontological</u> problem. Historical

representations of the salvation drama absolutize social being,

whether through <u>a priori</u> assumptions concerning the deterministic

character of class, nation, or race, and make derivative postulates

concerning knowing, acting, and valuing. Philosophical cosmologies

absolutize consciousness, and make derivate assumptions concerning

being, acting, and valuing. The problem of human salvation is

considered, in this sense, as fundamentally <u>epistemological</u>.

Consciousness is thus held to be the determinant of social being, social

practice, and social morality. On the other hand, social cosmologies

define human salvation as primarily an <u>axiological</u> problem. Social

cosmologies thus absolutize a mode of social practice, and make

derivative assumptions concerning being, consciousness, and valuing.

Finally, religious cosmologies treat human salvation as fundamentally

an <u>aesthetic</u> problem. They thus absolutize a mode of moral experience,

and make derivative assumptions concerning being, consciousness, and

practice.

The phenomenology of human salvation alters significantly

according to whether the quest for absolute certitude has been

conceived as fundamentally ontological, epistemological, axiological,

or aesthetic in character. In this vein, the possibility always exists

for the phenomenology of human salvation to be composed of four competing

perspectives concerning what constitutes an absolutist social universe,

four contrasting images concerning what constitutes the tautological

character of human knowledge, four opposing social teleologies, and

four mutually exclusive descriptions concerning what is meant by a

consistency value. Moreover, given the fact that there has never

been <u>one</u> but <u>many</u> historical cosmologies, an <u>indeterminate</u> number

of philosophical cosmologies, <u>many</u> social fundamentalisms, and a

<u>multitude</u> of religions, the emergent human situation becomes exceedingly

complex. Further, given that <u>all</u> absolutisms, tautologies, teleologies,

and consistency values are ultimately grounded in a metaphysical

experience, and are thereby unprincipled, the emergent human situation

becomes exceedingly chaotic. While there are many competing inter-

pretations of the phenomenology of human salvation, no principle is

available for selecting between them. Human beings, enclosed within

the cosmological experience, are thus beset by an array of contra-

dictory assumptions concerning what must be done for the successful

resolution of the problem of human salvation. The tendency to human

chaos, which originates in the very statement of the problem of human

salvation, spreads, therefore into the phenomenology of human

salvation itself.

It follows that there has never been, and will likely never

be, a single content which may be read into the process of cosmological

action. On the contrary, the process of cosmological action has

received, and will likely continue to receive, four clashing inter-

pretations. Each competing interpretation of the process of cosmo-

logical action has, as its framework, a qualitatively different grouping

of cosmologies, whether historical, philosophical, social, or

religious. These four groupings of cosmologies bring to bear on the

same process of cosmological action opposing interpretations of the

problem of human salvation, and competing images of the phenomenology

of human salvation.   For example, historical cosmologies originate

primal salvation myths which are grounded in the ascendency of an

absolute process of social being.   Philosophical cosmologies contain

primal salvation myths which trace the origins of social existence

to the presence of an ideational fundamentalism.   Social cosmologies

espouse primal salvation myths which reduce the social world to the

working-out of a relational absolutism.   And, finally, religious

cosmologies contain primal salvation myths which ground in a tran-

scendental principle of certitude.   There are, therefore, at least

four competing primal salvation myths, each of which provides a

different gateway by which human beings may enter the cosmological

experience.   Since competition exists not only between the four

major groupings of cosmologies, but also within each cosmological

grouping, the alternative possibilities available for entering the

cosmological experience may be viewed as indeterminate.   Each

possibility, as manifested by faith in a particular primal salvation

myth, is, by definition, mutually exclusive of all other possibilities.

And since all primal salvation myths are ultimately grounded in a

metaphysical act of faith, no principled decision is possible

concerning which primal salvation myth embodies most adequately the

source of absolute certitude.   The tendency to human chaos is thus

reinforced once again.   While there are many competing primal salvation

myths, no concrete principle exists for choosing between them.   The

adequacy of a given primal salvation myth is solely dependent, therefore,

on the extent to which all other competing mythologies are extinguished.

The assertion of one primal salvation myth as the determinant

of all others begins with the embodiment of the myth in a metaphysical

collectivity--a conversionary polity. Each primal salvation myth is capable, by definition, of being generalized into a broader political collectivity. And each conversionary polity contains guardians or keepers of the primal salvation myth who exact obedience to their directives in return for the public bestowal of membership within a given cosmology. Once again, there are many opposing metaphysical collectivities, but no principled means of choosing between them. Each metaphysical collectivity succeeds only to the extent that it manages to attract complete obedience from larger and larger groupings of human beings. However, each conversionary polity asserts itself as the single, most legitimate embodiment of the single, most adequate primal salvation myth. The presence of any other metaphysical collectivity casts doubt on this claim. This doubt must be removed. There cannot be opposing collective embodiments of the same primal salvation myth, or competing collective embodiments of different primal salvation myths. A conversionary polity is either complete, or it is nothing. The question of political completeness cannot be settled by means of an appeal to concrete social experience since all conversionary collectivities are ultimately the products of an anti-empirical experience. The question of political completeness can be resolved, therefore, only by the acid test of protracted struggle between all metaphysical collectivities. In the last resort, survival itself represents the single criterion, albeit ungrounded, of the adequacy of a given conversionary polity.

It has been demonstrated so far that the activities of mythification and conversion, the first and second phases respectively of

the process of cosmological action, may receive opposing interpretations,
and that no principled method is available for evaluating the adequacy
of one interpretation as opposed to another. Accordingly, the conclusion
has been drawn that the tendency to human chaos permeates both aspects
of the process of cosmological action. This conclusion applies
equally well to the activity of transformation, the third phase of
the process of cosmological action. The activity of transformation
denotes the entire process by which faith in a particular primal
salvation myth, and obedience to the leaders of a metaphysical
collectivity, are generalized into the diligent practice of a code of
approved social conduct. The code of approved social conduct represents
the social process by which the social and non-social universe may be
gradually transformed in the direction of a given design for human
salvation. And diligence in the exercise of this social code represents
a means of giving testimony in daily life to the adequacy of a
particular primal salvation myth, and to the legitimacy of a given
conversionary polity. There are, however, as many codes of approved
social conduct as there are conversionary polities to prescribe
them. There may be, in this case, qualitatively different processes
of social transformation relative to each of the four major groupings
of cosmologies, whether historical, philosophical, social, or religious.
In addition, there may be distinctive codes of approved social conduct
relative to all of the different cosmologies which combine into each
of the four general cosmological groupings. Each process of trans-
formation activity is ultimately based, once more, on a non-experience,
that is, on a telos which has never been concretely apprehended anywhere

in the domain of social experience. There is, therefore, no ground

available for evaluating the competing claims on the part of each

process of transformational activity to be the embodiment of the human

desire for social certitude. Once again, there are many possible

interpretations of the process of transformational activity but no

principled means of choosing between them with any degree of certitude.

The human situation, at the level of transformational activity, is

thereby one of chaos.

The tendency to human chaos culminates in the activity of

redemption, the final phase of the process of cosmological action.

The activity of redemption refers to the entire social process by which

faith in a particular primal salvation myth, obedience to the guardians

of the myth, and diligence in the exercise of "right conduct" are

generalized into the experience of moral consistency itself. It is

the quest for moral consistency which establishes congruence between

the "way things actually are" in concrete social experience and the

"way they should be" if absolute certitude is to be realized. Redemptive

activity, in this case, reduces the domain of social experience to a

dogmatic vision about that experience. And it is this dogmatic vision

which engenders aesthetic certitude, the closest approximation possible

of the desire for human salvation. There are, however, as many dog-

matic moral processes as there are cosmologies to advance them. Each

moral dogma proceeds through the closed value process of faith,

obedience, diligence, and consistency. In this vein, there are as

many articles of faith as there are primal salvation myths to be

believed in. Each conversionary polity is backed up by the dogmatic

value of obedience. The value of diligence permeates each process
of transformational activity. And, finally, there are as many ways
of establishing congruency between the concrete social world and the
values of faith, obedience, and consistency as there are cosmologies
present. All dogmatic moral processes are ultimately grounded, however,
in a metaphysical experience. Nowhere in the domain of social experi-
ence has a consistent human value situation been concretely experienced.
Redemption is a product of metaphysics, never of an empirical process
of social morality. The choice between moral dogmas is, therefore,
fated to remain ungrounded. While there are many competing routes
to human redemption, there is no principled criterion for deciding
between them with any degree of certitude.[9] The process of redemptive
activity, like the activities of mythification, conversion, and trans-
formation, is tainted with the possiblity of human chaos.

The penetration of human chaos into the redemptive aspect
of the process of cosmological action represents its final point of
magnification. While the origins of human chaos have been located in
the very statement of the problem of human salvation itself, the develop-
ment of human chaos has been demonstrated to be an axiomatic feature
of both the phenomenology of human salvation and the process of cosmo-
logical action. The proposal will now be made that the tendency to
human chaos ultimately results in a qualitative transformation of the
human situation. This qualitative transformation of the human situation
may be described as the condition of human chaos. The following section
will be devoted to an examination of four central modes of human chaos--
absurdity, apathy, anomaly, and amorality.

Modes of Human Chaos

There are four central modes of human chaos, each of which
summarizes a specific aspect of the cosmological experience into a
particular qualitative transformation of human situation. The four
central modes of human chaos may be identified as absurdity, apathy,
₁₀
anomaly, and amorality. Each of the above modes of human chaos
represents a specific quality of human life emergent from a particular
statement of the problem of human salvation, a specific postulate
of human salvation, and a particular phase of the process of cosmo-
logical action. Taken together, these four qualities of human life,
and the relationships which obtain between them, constitute the central
features of the condition of human chaos. For example, absurdity
represents the central quality of the cosmological survival experience.
As such, absurdity denotes the quality of social being emergent from
a desire for subjective certitude, the transformation of this desire
into an ontological postulate concerning the absolutist character
of the social universe, and the actualization of the ontology of human
salvation by means of the activity of mythification. Likewise, apathy
represents the central quality of the cosmological political experience.
As such, apathy reflects the quality of human consciousness emergent
from a desire for collective certitude, the transformation of this
desire into an assumption concerning the tautological character of
human knowledge, and the materialization of the epistemology of human
salvation by means of the activity of conversion. Similarly, anomaly
represents the central quality of the cosmological social experience.
Anomaly reflects, in this case, the quality of social relations emergent

from a desire for social certitude, the organization of this desire

into a postulate concerning the teleological character of social

practice, and the actualization of the axiology of human salvation

by means of the activity of transformation. Finally, amorality

represents the central quality of the cosmological value experience.

As such, amorality denotes the quality of the human value experience

emergent from a desire for aesthetic certitude, the transformation

of this desire into a postulate concerning the consistency function

of human valuing, and the materialization of the aesthetic of human

salvation by means of the activity of redemption. The four central

dimensions of human chaos are not, of course, isolated from one

another. On the contrary, absurdity preforms and anticipates

political apathy, apathy summarizes absurdity and sets the stage for

an anomalous social experience, anomaly leads into amorality, and

amorality reinforces absurdity once again. The cosmological experience

thus culminates in the condition of human chaos. And the condition

of human chaos may be described as a dynamic working-out of concretely

experienced relations of preformance, anticipation, and summation

between absurdity, apathy, anomaly, and amorality.

The appearance of a chaotic human situation militates directly,

of course, against the continuation of the cosmological experience.

Inasmuch as the cosmological experience is an emergent of the human

desire for absolute certitude, the four modes of human chaos represent

the antithesis of human salvation. A chaotic human situation thus

signifies the decline, or possible decline, of the social reality of

human salvation. However, a cautionary note is necessary. It is

conceivable, and even probable, that human beings may commit themselves

to membership within particular cosmologies without experiencing

the strains of human chaos. The condition of human chaos reflects the

quality of human life emergent from the cosmological experience taken

as a whole. Within a particular cosmology, the appearance of human

chaos is neither inevitable nor even likely. On the contrary, as

long as human beings retain absolute faith in a particular primal

salvation myth, obey the guardians of the myth, diligently exercise

"right conduct," and strive for moral consistency, then absolute

certitude rather than human chaos is likely to be the central quality

of their experience. Human chaos becomes salient only when attention

is turned to the cosmological experience in its entirety. The cosmo-

logical experience, as a reconstruction of the complete process of

social action, always contains many cosmologies. And it is the

inevitable opposition of such cosmologies which provides the seed-

bed for the development of the condition of human chaos. To the degree

that participants within particular cosmologies are drawn into these

larger rivalries, their experience will be chaotic. The condition

of human chaos thus represents a qualitative social strain which appears

whenever an attempt is made to transform the desire for human salvation

into a generalized social experience. When a given mode of social

life is grounded in the salvation drama, then absurdity is likely to

counterpoint absolute faith, apathy to undercut complete obedience,

social anomalies to weaken diligence, and amorality to replace moral

consistency. With this in mind, an examination may now be made of

each of the four central dimensions of the condition of human chaos.

Absurdity

The cosmological experience culminates in the creation
of an absurd human survival situation. The human situation
denotes the entire social process involved in the transformation
of an affective vision concerning what is most problematic in
the more subjective aspect of social existence into a more adequate
mode of social being. The human survival process entails, in its
fullest expression, a dynamic movement between a subjective human
disposition, an ontological query, a survival practice, and an emergent
quality of social being. This emergent quality of social being re-
presents the qualitative human consequence of a given tranformation
of the human survival situation. Accordingly, the cosmological survival
situation refers to the entire social process involved in the resolution
of the formative quest for subjective certitude. The formative
quest for subjective certitude may be viewed, in its most complete
expression, as a dynamic working-out of the relationships which hold
between the subjective problem of human salvation, the ontology of human
salvation, the practice of mythification, and an emergent quality of
cosmological being. The emergent quality of cosmological being represents
the qualitative human outcome of the cosmological reconstruction of the
human survival situation. As such, the emergent quality of cosmological
being may be described as one of absurdity. Absurdity denotes
the quality of human life emergent from a human survival situation
characterized by the presence of many opposing absolute modes of social
being, and by the absence of any principled means of deciding between
them. In the condition of human absurdity, human beings are overwhelmed

by a diversity of routes to subjective human certitude, and by the

inexistence of any concrete ground upon which to base a choice

between them. Ironically, the condition of human absurdity may have

as its ultimate result a generalized inability to accept a given

route to subjective human salvation with any degree of certitude.

Human absurdity represents, in this case, the negation, or possible

negation, of a human survival situation grounded in faith, and aimed
                                11
at absoluteness.

The condition of human absurdity is not, of course, an accidental

outcome of the cosmological experience. On the contrary, it is only

a short step from the desire for subjective human certitude to the

qualitative experience of human absurdity. The pursuit of subjective

human certitude involves a commitment to a mode of social life rent

by a fatal strain. In this vein, the subjective problem of human

salvation may be viewed as the product of an implicitly metaphysical

venture. It represents an elusive quest for that which has never

been concretely apprehended--an enduring principle of absoluteness. A

principle of absoluteness, however conceived, is always an anti-

experience. Accordingly, the ontology of human salvation and the practice

of mythification directly reflect the advance of an anti-experience into

the concrete social world. The quest for an absolute mode of human

subjectivity thus involves the immersion of the social self within a non-

event. Social existence dissolves into a metaphysical charade. The

element of absurdity present within such a social process is heightened

when mutually contradictory cosmologies begin to vie with one another

concerning which provides the single most adequate route to subjective human

certitude. Suddenly, there is not one but many absolute modes of social being, each of which enjoys complete parity. Nowhere in the concrete social world is there to be found any clue which would assist human beings in weighing the merits of competing interpretations of the subjective problem of human salvation, opposing visions of an absolutist universe, and clashing primal salvation myths. This has, as its qualitative human consequence, the condition of human absurdity. To survive as a cosmological being is, thereby, to be lost within a maze of subjective absolutisms without the guidance of a principle of clarification. While human absurdity represents the central quality of the cosmological survival experience, it does not exhaust the condition of human chaos. On the contrary, human absurdity anticipates the development of political apathy, the more collective aspect of the condition of human chaos.

Apathy

The cosmological experience doesᵣnot only culminate in the creation of an absurd human survival situation. It also results in an apathetic human political situation. The human political situation refers to the entire social process involved in the transformation of an impressionistic vision concerning what is most problematic in the more collective aspect of social existence into the creation of a more adequate mode of human consciousness. The human political process involves, in its most general expression, a dynamic working-out of the relationships which exist between a collective human disposition, an epistemological query, a political practice, and an emergent quality of human consciousness. This emergent quality of human consciousness

resents the qualitative human experience engendered by a given

.ansformation of the human political situation. It follows, therefore,

that the cosmological survival situation represents the entire social

process involved in the rectification of the collective problem of

human salvation. This social process entails, in its fullest expression,

a dynamic movement between the desire for collective certitude, the

epistemology of human salvation, the practice of conversion, and

an emergent quality of cosmological consciousness. The emergent quality

or cosmological consciousness may be viewed as a summation of the

entire enterprise involved in the reduction of the more collective

aspect of social experience to completeness. As such, the emergent

quality of cosmological consciousness may be described as one of apathy.

Apathy represents the quality of human life emergent from a human

political situation which is characterized by the presence of many

complete processes of human consciousness, and by the absence of any

principled standard for choosing between them. In the condition of

human apathy, human beings are bombarded by a multiplicity of possi-

bilities for collective certitude, none of which contains an internal

standard for its own verification. This has, or may have, as its

conclusion a human political situation distinguished by a generalized

inability, and thereupon a possible unwillingness, to recognize any

metaphysical collectivity as the most legitimate embodiment of the

human desire for salvation. Human apathy, of this genre, represents

the antithesis, or possible antithesis, of a human political situation
12
grounded in obedience, and aimed at completeness.

The condition of human apathy does not, of course, suddenly appear out of nowhere. On the contrary, the qualitative experience of human apathy represents a direct outcome of the desire for collective human certitude. The quest for collective human salvation requires a commitment to a mode of political life imbued with a fatal flaw. The fatal flaw is simply that collective human salvation always requires the presence of that which has never been concretely apprehended-- a complete process of human consciousness. A complete process of human consciousness is not an empirical datum but an anti-experience. Accordingly, the collective problem of human salvation, the epistemology of human salvation, and the practice of conversion directly represent the advance of a process of non-consciousness into social existence. Political life, conceived as the process of organizing human consciousness, thus degenerates into a non-event. The tendency to apathy present within such a political experience is made more apparent when competing cosmologies begin to engage in protracted struggles over which provides the single most adequate path to collective human certitude. Suddenly, there is not one but many metaphysical collectivities, all of which are totally equivalent to one another. Nowhere in concrete social experience is there to be found anything which would aid human beings in deciding between competing interpretations of the collective problem of human salvation, opposing images of the tautological basis of human knowledge, and clashing conversionary polities. If generalized, political indecision of this kind will culminate in the condition of human apathy. In an apathetic political condition, human beings are entrapped within a thicket of "complete" processes without the

assistance of a principle of selection. Thus, loss of faith expands,

or may expand, into a degeneration of the will to political obedience.

Anomaly

Subjective absurdity and political apathy may be viewed as

residual qualities which are ever present within the cosmological

experience. These residual qualities become more pronounced whenever

an attempt is made, on a mass scale and over a long duration, to organize

social existence around the resolution of the problematic character

of human salvation. However, the cosmological experience does not

only culminate in an absurd human survival situation and an apathetic

human political situation. It also results in an anomalous human

social situation. The human social situation refers to the entire

social process involved in the transformation of an affective vision

concerning what is most problematic in the more material aspect of

social existence into the creation of a more adequate mode of human

sociability. This social process involves, in its broadest expression,

a dynamic working-out of the relationships which obtain between a

human social disposition, an axiological query, a social practice,

and an emergent quality of human sociability. The emergent quality

of human sociability represents the qualitative human experience

spawned by a given reconstruction of the human social situation.

Accordingly, the cosmological social situation denotes the entire

social process involved in the resolution of the formative quest

for social certitude. The formative quest for social certitude

entails, in its most general expression, a dynamic movement between the

social problem of human salvation, the axiology of human salvation,

the practice of transformation, and an emergent quality of cosmological

sociability. The emergent quality of cosmological sociability represents

a summation of the entire social process involved in the reduction of

the more material aspect of human existence to the certitude of pre-

determination. As such, the emergent quality of cosmological sociability

may be portrayed as one of anomaly. An anomalous social experience

may be defined as one distinguished by the presence of many competing

modes of social predetermination, and by the absence of any principled

means of choosing between them. In an anomalous social experience,

human beings are confronted by many opposing routes to social certitude,

none of which may be empirically verified. This results, or may result,

in a human social situation characterized by a generalized incapacity,

and thereupon by a possible resistance, to reduce the quest for social

salvation to any given code of approved social conduct. An anomalous

social experience thus represents the negation, or possible negation,

of a human social situation grounded in diligence, and aimed at
13
predetermination.

The condition of human anomaly emerges directly from the desire

for human social certitude. The quest for social salvation anticipates

a process of human sociability fractured by a fatal strain. This fatal

strain is simply that the desire for social certitude requires, for

its satisfaction, the existence of that which has never been concretely

apprehended--a predetermined process of human sociability. A predeter-

mined process of human sociability is, however, less a product of

empirical social existence than an object of metaphysical reflection.

Accordingly, the social problem of human salvation, the axiology of

human salvation, and the practice of transformation directly reflect

the advance of an unprincipled process of human sociability into the

concrete social world. The material aspect of social existence is thus

grounded in a non-event. The tendency to anomaly present with such

a social experience is heightened when competing metaphysical collectivities

begin to assert mutually contradictory routes to social certitude.

Suddenly, there is not one but many predetermined processes of human

sociability, each of which enjoys complete parity. There is nothing

in concrete social experience which would guide choice between opposing

interpretations of the social problem of human salvation, competing

images of the teleological character of human relations, and clashing

codes of approved social conduct. If generalized, social chaos,

of this sort, culminates in an anomalous social expereince. In the

condition of human anomaly, human beings are condemned to participation

within a domain of mutually contradictory "right actions", and cut off

from any ground upon which to base a choice between them. The loss

of faith and the degeneration of obedience may thus expand into the

erosion of social diligence.

Amorality

The cosmological experience does not culminate only in the

creation of an absurd human survival situation, an apathetic human

political situation, and an anomalous social experience, but it also

results in an amoral human aesthetic situation. The human aesthetic

situation refers to the entire social process involved in the trans-

formation of an impressionistic sense of what is most problematic in the

more evaluative aspect of social experience into the creation of a

more adequate mode of social morality. The human value process

entails, in its fullest expression, a dynamic working-out of the

relationships which hold between an aesthetic human disposition, an

aesthetic query, a value practice, and an emergent quality of social

morality. The emergent quality of social morality represents the

qualitative human experience emergent from a given transformation

of the human aesthetic situation. Accordingly, the cosmological

aesthetic situation denotes the entire social process involved in

the resolution of the quest for moral consistency, the aesthetic

problem of human salvation. This social process involves, in its

most general expression, a dynamic movement the aesthetic problem

of human salvation, the aesthetic of human salvation, the practice

of redemption, and an emergent quality of cosmological morality.

The emergent quality of cosmological morality represents a summation

of the entire social process involved in reducing the more evaluative

aspect of social experience to consistency. As such, the quality

of the cosmological value experience may be described as one of amorality.

Amorality represents the quality of human life emergent from a human

aesthetic situation characterized by the presence of many consistent

processes of social morality, and by the absence of any principled

means of deciding between them. In the condition of human amorality,

human beings are confronted by a diversity of routes to aesthetic

certitude, none of which is susceptible to empirical verification.

This has, or may have, as its consequence a generalized inability,

and thus a possible unwillingness, to recognize any metaphysical moral

dogma as the most legitimate expression of the desire for human

salvation. Human amorality may represent, therefore, the antithesis,

or possible antithesis, of a human aesthetic situation grounded in
14
dogma, and aimed at consistency.

The condition of human amorality develops directly out of the

desire for aesthetic human certitude. The quest for aesthetic salvation

anticipates the construction of a process of social morality imbued

with a fatal flaw. This fatal flaw is simply that the search for

aesthetic salvation requires, for its resolution, the appearance of that

which has never been concretely experienced--a closed process of social

morality. A closed process of social morality is not, however, an

empirical phenomenon but an anti-experience. Accordingly, the aesthetic

problem of human salvation, the aesthetic of human salvation, and the

practice of redemption reflect the advance of an anti-experience onto

the social scene. The human aesthetic experience thus degenerates into

a non-event. The tendency to amorality implicit to such an aesthetic

experience is brought to the surface when opposing cosmologies engage

in bitter rivalries over which provides the single most adequate

route to moral certitude. There is not one but many closed processes

of social morality, each of which shares complete parity. And nowhere

in the concrete social world is there to be found any principle which

would guide choice between competing interpretations of the aesthetic

problem of human salvation, opposing visions of the aesthetic of

human salvation, and contending moral dogmas. Aesthetic chaos,

of this kind, engenders the condition of human amorality. In an

amoral aesthetic condition, human beings are enfolded within an

unprincipled domain of moral dogmas without the benefit of any ground

upon which to base a decision between them. Accordingly, the loss

of faith, the degeneration of obedience, and the erosion of diligence

may culminate in the dilution of moral consistency itself.

A chaotic human situation thus contains four central dimensions,

each of which is grounded in the qualitative transformation of a

specific aspect of social existence. The four major modes of

human chaos may be described as absurdity, apathy, anomaly, and amorality.

Absurdity represents the quality of human life emergent from the

cosmological survival experience. Apathy describes the central

quality of the cosmological political experience. Anomaly represents

the quality of human life emergent from the cosmological social experience.

And amorality describes the central quality of the cosmological aesthetic

experience. When combined, the four central dimensions of human chaos

constitute the salient features of the human condition emergent from

the cosmological reconstruction of social reality.

Conclusion

The above discussion of human chaos concludes the present

investigation of the cosmological experience. This investigation has

disclosed that the quest for absolute certitude requires for its

prosecution the dynamic intermediation of a distinctive process of

human sensibilities, a unique mode of human consciousness, and of

a novel pattern of social organization. It has also disclosed that

the cosmological experience contains the seeds of its own destruction--

the tendency to human chaos. While the tendency to human chaos accounts

for the decline in historical significance of the cosmological

experience, it also anticipates the ascendency of the corporate

experience--the governing world-paradigm of the twentieth century.

Chapter 4. The Corporate Experience

For those fated to possess the twentieth century as their social history, reinforced meaninglessness rather than chaos has been the central quality of human life. The contemporary human survival experience has been distinguished more by irrationality than by absurdity. Political life has been qualified more by reactiveness than by apathy. The domain of social relations has become more accidental than anomalous. And the present human value experience has been characterized more by immorality than by amorality. In twentieth century life, the whole social existence has been made to service the continuation of the existent mode of social reality. The salient problem is no longer that human beings are condemned to a chaotic human situation, but rather that human beings have now become enveloped within a process of social experience which has, as its central value, the desirability of human security itself.

What has occurred to move social existence so dramatically from the condition of human chaos to one of reinforced meaninglessness? How has the crisis of human civilization precipitated by the appearance of human chaos been averted? And what implications has the conquest of human chaos had in terms of the emergent reconstruction of social reality? This chapter will investigate the above questions. The proposal will be made that the condition of human chaos always requires for its resolution a fundamental transformation of the complete process

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of social action. Human chaos represents the culminating phase of
one unique reconstruction of the complete social process, the cosmo-
logical experience. A chaotic human situation cannot be rectified,
however, <u>within</u> the framework of the cosmological experience. The
reason for this is as follows. The four central dimensions of human
chaos--absurdity, apathy, anomaly, and amorality--emerge <u>directly</u>
from the social reality of human salvation. The creation of a mode
of social life grounded in the quest for absolute certitude always
sets the stage for the appearance of a chaotic human situation. Accord-
ingly, human chaos is not an accidental but a necessay outcome of the
cosmological experience. As long as the desire for human salvation
exists as a central human motivation, human chaos will likely remain
a recurrent possibility. The resolution of human chaos thus requires
that the cycle of social life out of which it has been bred be broken.

The annihilation of the cycle of social life out of which the
condition of human chaos emerges is synonymous with a movement beyond
the cosmological experience towards the construction of a more corporate
mode of social existence. This movement begins with the supercession
of the problem of human security over the quest for human salvation
as the central object of human dispositions. It continues with the
ascendency of the phenomenology of human security, as opposed to the
phenomenology of human salvation, as the prevailing image of social
reality. It is materialized by the decline of the process of cosmo-
logical action in favour of the process of corporate action. And,
ultimately, the movement beyond the cosmological experience towards a
more corporate world culminates in a qualitative human situation

characterized more by reinforced meaninglessness than by chaos. In short, the condition of human chaos requires, for its resolution, the development of the _corporate_ paradigm of social action. The corporate paradigm of social action begins with the problem of human security, continues with the creation of a phenomenology of human security, is materialized by means of the process of corporate action, and culminates in the condition of reinforced meaninglessness.

This chapter will examine the first three phases of the corporate paradigm of social action. This examination will proceed through four steps. First, the thesis will be advanced that the corporate experience begins, at the very instant, that an aversive response to the condition of human chaos originates a general human desire for a more orderly social world. The desire for a more orderly social world will be depicted as the central feature of the problem of human security itself. The problem of human security will be described, in its most general expression, a a qualitatively unique reconstruction of the process of human dispositions. Four particular statements of the problem of human security will then be presented, each of which will be portrayed as addressing a specific mode of human chaos. Second, the phenomenology of human security emergent from the quest for a more orderly social world will be investigated. This investigation will reveal that the phenomenology of human security may be understood as a qualitatively unique reinterpretation of the process of human queries. The four fundamental human assumptions composing the phenomenology of human security will then be introduced, each of which will be defined as a response to a particular expression of the problem of human security.

Third, the process of corporate action necessary for the actualization

of the phenomenology of human secutity will be examined. This examin-

ation will propose the process of corporate action as a qualitatively

unique reconstruction of the process of human materializations. The

four social practices composing the process of corporate action will

then be presented, each of which will be viewed as a materialization

of a specific aspect of the phenomenology of human security. Finally,

the above three phases of the corporate paradigm will be summarized,

and some concluding comments made. The chapter which follows will then

be devoted to a description of the final phase of corporate reality--

the human condition of reinforced meaninglessness.

Before undertaking an examination of the problem of human

security, some preliminary comments are necessary concerning the

relationship which holds between the cosmological and corporate

experiences. It should be noted, above all, that the cosmological

and corporate experiences are not fundamentally dissimilar. On the

contrary, both modes of social existence may be viewed, in their

fullest expressions, as paradigms of social action. As such, the

cosmological and corporate experiences commonly represent qualitatively

unique reconstructions of the same complete process of social action.

The complete process of social action has previously been defined as

a dynamic working-out of concretely experienced relations of preformance,

anticipation, and performance between a process of human dispositions,

a process of human materializations, and a process of qualitative human

consequences. The cosmological experience begins with the unification

of the process of human dispositions around the problematic character

of human salvation, continues with the transformation of the process of

human queries into the assumptions necessary for the attainment of

absolute certitude, actualizes these assumptions by means of a

fundamental transformation of the process of human dispositions, and

culminates in a chaotic human situation. Likewise, the corporate

experience originates in the unification of the process of human

dispositions around the problem of human security, continues with

the revision of the process of human queries into the postulates

necessary for human order, actualizes these postulates by means of a

reconstruction of the process of human materializations, and culminates

in the human condition of reinforced meaninglessness. The cosmological

and corporate experiences thus commonly represent reconstructions, albeit

qualitatively different reconstructions, of the same complete process

of social action. Moreover, these two reconstructions of the complete

social process are linked together by means of the condition of human

chaos. The condition of human chaos, the final phase of the cosmo-

logical experience, sets the stage, in this case, for the development

of the problem of human security, the first phase of the corporate

experience. Human chaos represents a point of transition, or a <u>possible</u>

point of transition, between the decline of cosmological reality, and

the emergence, or possible emergence, of a more corporate mode of

social existence. In addition, the cosmological and corporate experiences

are linked together by a shared aversion to the relative, partial,

provisional, and prospective qualities of concrete social experience.

While the cosmological experience, as a metaphysical venture, militates

<u>directly</u> against the development of a concrete social world, the

corporate experience, as a more abstract enterprise, <u>indirectly</u> counter-

points the emergence of a concrete process of social experience.

Whether directly or indirectly, both modes of social existence provide escape-routes beyond the uncertainty of concrete social experience. The cosmological experience provides for a flight beyond human uncertainty to the certitude of an object of human faith. And the corporate experience provides for an escape beyond the concrete social world to the security of a product of human reification, Accordingly, the formative problems of human salvation and human security are not altogether dissimilar. On the contrary, the problem of human security may be viewed, most aptly, as a "fall-out" from the failure of the cosmological experience to successfully prosecute the problem of human salvation. The problem of human security represents, in this case, but a more limited and banal version of the enduring human aspiration for a social world filled with absolute certitude. The quest for a more orderly social world represents a second chance, albeit in different form, at forestalling the appearance of a concrete process of social experience distinguished, at each and every instant, by relativity, partiality, provisionality, and prospectiveness.

The commonalities existenct between the cosmological and corporate experiences are muted by fundamental differences. The problem of human salvation is not the _same_ as the problem of human security. And thus, the social reality emergent from the quest for human salvation is not the same as the one which develops from the pursuit of human security. For example, while the problem of human salvation grounds in the quest for an _absolute_ process of social experience, the problem of human security represents the quest for a _restrictive_ mode of social existence. While an absolute social

experience is implicitly fundamentalistic, complete, predetermined, and consistent, a restrictive social experience is inherently inert, patterned, homogeneous, and redundant. Likewise, while the phenomenology of human salvation contains an absolutist ontology, a tautological epistemology, a teleological axiology, and a consistency aesthetic, the phenomenology of human security includes an entitative ontology, an analytic epistemology, an instrumental axiology, and a redundant aesthetic. Similarly, while the process of cosmological action organizes the domain of social practices around the activities of mythication, conversion, transformation, and redemption, the process of corporate action refers to that pattern of social organization characterized by the activities of reification, mobilization, canalization, and commitment. And finally, while the cosmological experience culminates in a chaotic human situation, the corporate experience culminates in the human condition of reinforced meaninglessness. While human chaos anticipates the problem of human secutity, reinforced meaninglessness anticipates the problem of human freedom.

In terms of _relative_ dominance, the corporate experience represents the operative paradigm of social action across contemporary human existence. The cosmological experience is no longer in the ascendency. The social reality of human salvation is not, however, altogether absent from the social scene. Its presence is felt whenever and wherever human beings seek to overcome the uncertainty of concrete social experience in favour of absolute certitude. The central theme of contemporary human life appears to be, however, the quest for human security rather than the struggle for human salvation. The

quest for human security is not, of course, alienated as a distant

goal from contemporary human experience but represents instead the

central quality of every aspect of the present process of social

existence. Thus, to live in the twentieth century is to contribute,

albeit unintentionally, to the development of a mode of social

experience which represents, to a large extent, a working-out of the

problem of human security. If an understanding of the cosmological

experience is indispensable for an appreciation of modern life, then

a comprehension of the corporate experience is imperative. This does

not mean that the corporate experience is unique to human existence

during the twentieth century. On the contrary, the corporate

experience, as a generalized reconstruction of social reality, has

appeared in the past, occurs in the present, and will undoubtedly

remain as an active human possibility in the future. However, what

lends special significance to the corporate experience at the present

moment is that rarely, if ever, in the history of social experience

has the quest for human security achieved such extensiveness and

duration as during human existence in the twentieth century. With

this in mind, the problem of human security will now be examined.

<u>The Problem of Human Security</u>

The problem of human security originates in an aversive

reaction to the condition of human chaos. The condition of human

chaos has previously been described as that qualitative human

situation which is characterized by the presence of many competing

cosmologies, and by the absence of any principled means of choosing

between them. In a chaotic social experience, the human survival situation is reduced to absurdity, political life to apathy, human sociability to anomaly, and the human value experience to amorality. This has, as its ultimate consequence, the very real possibility that the quest for human salvation, if sustained, may precipitate the complete disintegration of social existence itself. It is the possible disintegration of social life which lends prominence to the problem of human security. The problem of human security represents, in this case, a direct emergent of the social ravages of human chaos. As such, the recognition of human security as the most problematic feature of human life signifies a fundamental shift in human dispositions away from the yearning for absolute certitude to the more banal desire for an orderly social world. And this fundamental shift in human dispositions represents, in turn, the precise point at which the cosmological experience concludes, and the corporate experience begins.

The problem of human security, in its most general expression, may be summed up as the following query: How might it be possible to break beyond the condition of human chaos to the creation of a more orderly social world? Like the problem of human salvation, the quest for human security is grounded in a fundamental transformation of the process of human dispositions. The process of human dispositions has previously been described as a dynamic working-out of concretely experienced relations of preformance, anticipation, and summation between four formative impressions of

social existence, each of which furnishes a particular definition of

the human situation. There are four basic human dispositions, each

of which summs up a formative impression of a different aspect of

social existence into a particular understanding of a problematic

situation. There are, in this case, subjective, collective, social,

and aesthetic human dispositions. The problem of human security,

in its most general expression, is grounded in a qualitative trans-

formation of each of the above basic human dispositions. Thus, the

problem of human security may be expressed in four qualitatively

different ways, each of which represents a fundamental transformation

of a specific human disposition. There is, in this case, a subjective

problem of human security, a collective problem of human security, a

social problem of human security, and an aesthetic problem of human

security. These four particular expressions of the problem of human

security are not unrelated. On the contrary, each particular state-

ment of the problem of human security may be viewed as a complementary

aspect of a broader human query concerning how it might be possible

to construct a more orderly social world out of the condition of

human chaos.[1]

For example, the subjective problem of human security may be

summed up as the following concern: How might it be possible to

burst beyond the condition of human absurdity to the creation of an

inert human survival situation? The conditon of human absurdity has

previously been described as that qualitative process of human

survival which is characterized by the presence of many competing

expressions of absoluteness, and by the absence of any principled

means of choosing between them. In the condition of human absurdity, the quest for the certitude of absoluteness is thereby reduced to a protracted struggle between opposing objects of human faith. Such a survival conditon is inherently disorderly. It is distinguished less by the certitude of human faith than by a fatal tension existent between different receptacles of human faith. This tension, if generalized, makes problematic the very continuance of an orderly process of social life. In this case, a world filled with many absolute processes of human survival, none of which contains an internal standard for its own verification, is also a world devoid of any single most adequate process of human survival. The presence of many absolute processes of human survival thus ultimately culminates in the absence, or possible absence, of a single process of human survival capable of binding together the whole of social existence. The divisiveness existent between different objects of human faith must be generalized, however, since the cosmological experience nowhere provides a grounded standard for the orderly resolution of competing claims to absoluteness. The quest for the certitude of absolute faith thus breeds the chaos of human absurdity.

It is the inherent disorderliness of the cosmological survival experience, together with the absence of any possibility for its internal resolution, which provides the basis for the development of the subjective problem of human security. The subjective problem of human security arises, in this case, whenever and wherever an aversive response to human absurdity sparks a desire for the creation of an inert,

and thereby orderly, process of human survival. An inert human

survival situation is one in which human expectations concerning the

nature and limits of social reality are organized in such a way as

to promote the contuance of a given process of social existence. In

an inert social world, human beings are motivated less by the promise

of absoluteness than by the possibility of being integrated into a

given social reality as agents of human order in their own right.[2]

The appearance of inertness as a central human motivation presupposes,

of course, a fundamental movement of human dispositions away from the

yearning for absolute certitude to the more banal desire for order.

It is such a transformation of human sentiments which is represented

by the subjective problem of human security.

The general problem of human security does not have only a

subjective dimension. It also has a collective aspect. The collective

problem of human security may be defined as the following query: How

might it be possible to break beyond the condition of human apathy

to the creation of a patterned human political situation? The

condition of human apathy has previously been depicted as that human

political situation which is characterized by the presence of many

clashing conversionary polities, and by the absence of any principled

means of choosing between them. Human apathy brings the more collective

aspect of social existence to the point of collapse. In an apathetic

political world, there are many "complete" processes of human consciousness

but no way of selecting between them with any degree of certitude.

This has, or may have, as its ultimate consequence a process of political

life marked by the absence, on a large scale, of any common associative

bonds between human beings. This breakdown of the binding ties

of associative existence makes problematic the very continuance of

an orderly process of political life.

It is the collapse, or possible collapse, of political life

which engenders the collective problem of human security. The collective

problem of human security achieves prominence, in this event, whenever

and wherever a negative reaction to the possible loss of associative

life fosters a yearning for the development of a patterned human

political situation. A patterned human political situation is one in

which a process of orderly human expectations is linked to goals which

must be fulfilled for the survival of a given process of social

existence.[3] In a patterned human political situation, the quest for

the certitude of completeness is thereby forsaken in favour of the

security of being enveloped with a mode of associative life which

functions to maintain order. The patterning of human consciousness

presupposes, of course, a turnabout in human sentiments away from

an understanding of collective life as a source of salvation to the

expectation that associative existence will provide order. It is

exactly such a turnabout in human dispositions which lies at the

heart of the collective problem of human security.

The problem of human security, in its fullest expression, does

not possess only subjective and collective expressions. It also

contains a social dimension. The social problem of human security

may be summed up as the following query: How might it be possible to

burst beyond the condition of human anomaly to the creation of a

homogeneous human social situation? The condition of human anomaly

has previously been described as that human social situation characterized by the presence of many absolute processes of social transformation, and by the absence of any principled means of deciding between them. The condition of human anomaly brings the more material aspect of social existence to the point of disintegration. In an anomalous social experience, there are many competing "approved" codes of social conduct, but no method of selecting between them with any degree of certitude. This results, or may result, in a process of social life distinguished more by a diversity of fundamentally contradictory human relations than by a uniformity of shared social bonds. The absence of a network of shared social ties casts into jeopardy the very existence of an orderly process of human relations.

It is exactly the disintegration, or possible disintegration, of an orderly process of social life which grounds the development of the social problem of human security. The social problem of human security originates, in this case, in an aversive response to the absence of a homogeneous social order. A homogeneous social order is one in which the entire domain of human relations has been reduced to that portion necessary for the actualization of the expectations and goals of an orderly human world. In a homogeneous social experience, each and every aspect of social intercourse is made to service the continuation of a given social reality. The creation of a homogeneous social experience requires, of course, a prior shift in human emotions away from the yearning for the certitude of predetermination to the more banal desire for the security of uniformity. It is precisely such a sudden shift in human emotions which is signified by the appearance of the social problem of human security.

While the general problem of human security includes subjective, collective, and social expressions, it is not exhausted by them. On the contrary, the general problem of human security also contains an aesthetic dimension. The aesthetic problem of human security may be summed up as the following query: How might it be possible to break beyond the condition of human immorality to the creation of a redundant human value experience? The condition of human immorality has previously been portrayed as that human value situation which is distinguished by the presence of many clashing moral dogmas, and by the absence of any grounded way of differentiating between them. The condition of human immorality threatens the very survival of the more evaluative aspect of social existence. In an amoral value experience, human existence is strained by the presence of a diversity of mutually exclusive dogmas, and by the absence of any hope for their internal resolution. This culminates, or may culminate, in the annihilation of all possibilities for an orderly process of moral life.

Once again, it is an aversive reaction to the possible annihilation of a uniform, and thereby orderly, process of moral life which motivates the development of the aesthetic problem of human security. The aesthetic problem of human security develops, in this event, whenever and wherever the impossibility of a uniform moral experience fosters a desire for the orderliness of a redundant human value situation. A redundant human value situation is one in which the quest for moral consistency has been subordinated to the necessity of constructing a process of value experience which unifies human existence

by summarizing the principles requisite for an orderly social world.

A redundant human value experience is thus one in which the entire

range of moral possibilities has been reduced to that narrow sector

necessary for the reaffirmation of a secure mode of social existence.[4]

In a redundant human value experience, the persistence of a given

mode of social reality is granted priority over either the evaluation

of the consequences of past actions, or the creation of new human

possibilities. There is the maximization of present actualities,

but no substantive change. Social existence is thereby frozen into

a stationary pattern. The emergence of redundancy as a central human

motivation presupposes, of course, a fundamental transformation in

human sentiments away from the urge to moral consistency to the more

melancholic desire for moral order. It is exactly such a downgrading

of human aspirations which is summed up by the aesthetic problem of

human security.

There are, therefore, four particular statements of the

problem of human security, each of which is connected with a specific

aspect of the condition of human chaos. These four partial expressions

of the problem of human security are not, of course, unrelated to one

another but are linked together by means of concretely experienced

relations of preformance, anticipation, and summation. In this vein,

the subjective problem of human security sets the stage for the develop-

ment of the aspiration for collective order. The quest for collective

order sums up the desire for an inert processs of human survival, and

anticipates the appearance of the social problem of human security.

The desire for a homogeneous social experience summarizes the subjective

and collective expressions of the problem of human security, and
sets the stage, in turn, for the development of the urge to moral
redundancy. Finally, the aesthetic problem of human security sums
up the aspiration for an inert, patterned, and homogeneous process
of social life, and reinforces, once again, the quest for subjective
security. Taken together, these four partial expressions of the
general problem of human security combine into a single human query
concerning how it might be possible to construct an orderly social
world out of a chaotic human condition. This single human query
represents, in its fullest expression, an outcome of a root reconstruction
of the process of human dispositions. While this transformation of
human sentiments provides for the inception of the general problem of
human security, it does not yield an answer as to how an orderly social
world might be concretely realized. Such an answer awaits the develop-
ment of the phenomenology of human security.

The Phenomenology of Human Security

The problem of human security originates in an aversive
response to the condition of human chaos. The creation of an inert,
patterned, homogeneous, and redundant social world requires, however,
the development of a coherent image of social existence which includes
assumptions concerning what might comprise more desirable modes of
social being, social consciousness, social practice, and social
morality. This coherent image of social existence may be viewed as
the phenomenology of human security. The phenomenology of human
security represents the emergent vision of social reality necessary
for the successful prosecution of the quest for a mode of social

life invested with human order. As such, the phenomenology of human
security grounds in a qualitative transformation of the process of
human queries. The process of human queries has previously been
defined as a dynamic working-out of concretely experienced relations
of preformance, anticipation, and summation between four basic human
assumptions, each of which relates what must be done for the resolution
of a particular problematic human situation. There are, in this event,
four basic human assumptions, each of which transforms a specific
impression of what is most problematic in human existence into a
particular query concerning what must be done for its rectification.
The process of human queries thus consists of the relationships which
hold between ontological, epistemological, axiological, and aesthetic
human queries. The phenomenology of human security, in its most general
expression, originates in a qualitative transformation of each of the
above fundamental human queries. And each qualitative transformation
of a fundamental human query provides a particular awareness of what
must be done for the resolution of a specific expression of the problem
of human security. The phenomenology of human security is thus composed
of four fundamental human assumptions, each of which responds to
particular problem of human security. There is, therefore, an ontology
of human security, an epistemology of human security, an axiology of
human security, and an aesthetic of human security. The ontology of
human security specifies what must be done to attain subjective order.
The epistemology of human security relates what must be done to attain
collective order. The axiology of human security specifies what must
be done to obtain social order. And the aesthetic of human security

relates what must be done to attain moral order. Moreover, the four postulates of human security are not independent of one another. On the contrary, each postulate of human security may be viewed as a complementary feature of a general human understanding concerning what must be done to ensure the survival of a given process of social existence. For example, the ontology of human security is based in a vision of an _entitative_ universe. The assertion that the social universe is, in its first appearance, entitative or "thing-like" represents the central assumption necessary for the reduction of human subjectivity to inertness. This key human assumption sets the stage for the appearance of the epistemology of human security. The epistemology of human security injects an _analytic_ level of human consciousness into social existence. The separation of human consciousness into two levels, one concrete and the other analytic, and the consequent assertion of superiority on behalf of the analytic represents the crucial assumption necessary for the patterning of an entitative, and thereby inert, social universe. This crucial episte-mological postulate anticipates, in turn, the development of the axiology of human security. The axiology of human security defines as "real" only that narrow portion of human relations which may be treated as _instrumentalities_. The reduction of the more material aspect of social existence to the homogeneity of instrumentalism reinforces prior assumptions concerning the entitative and analytic character of the human social reality, and anticipates the appearance of the aesthetic of human security. The aesthetic of human security reduces the human value experience to an exercise in redundancy.

The creation of a process of social morality which exemplifies the

principles necessary for the maintenance of an orderly social world

sums up the axiological assumption concerning the instrumental character

of human sociability, and reinforces, once again, the ontological

vision of an entitative universe. The phenomenology of human security

thus ultimately turns inward upon itself as a descending spiral of

mutually reinforcing assumptions concerning the nature of social

existence. The following section will briefly examine the descending

spiral of human assumptions necessary for the realization of a more

secure social world.

The Entitative Universe

The phenomenology of human security begins with an ontological

vision of an entitative or "thing-like" universe.[5] The entitative

viewpoint simply maintains that the social universe is neither held

together by a transcendental principle nor unified by a concrete

social process but is, in its first appearance, shattered into a

plurality of solitary constituents separated from one another at a

distance. In the entitative universe, social being is neither the

product of a metaphysical appeal to the presence of an absolutism

nor the developmental outcome of a process of working-out human

relativity into an adequate vision of the social world and of one's

position within it, but is, instead, a given datum by the simple fact

of existence. As a given datum, social being becomes less an object

of human faith or a creative possibility than a vacuum into which

may be read the cross-pressures present within a universe populated

by solitary objects distanced from one another. The diremption of

the social universe into a plurality of discrete single entities

thus represents the central assumption necessary for the reduction

of human subjectivity to inertness. And the reduction of human

subjectivity to inertness comprises the first tentative step towards

the creation of a more orderly mode of social existence.

The ontological vision of an entitative universe may be

viewed as a direct outcome of the subjective problem of human security.

The subjective problem of human security originates in the human

desire to create order out of the condition of human absurdity.

The condition of human absurdity is ultimately principled, however,

in the attempt to realize an absolutist universe. The quest for

subjective human order begins, therefore, with the abandonment of

the quest for absoluteness, and with the consequent recognition that

the social universe is composed, in its most elementary features,

of a plurality of autonomous parts in desperate need of some principle

of unification. This need is accentuated by the complementary obser-

vation that the entitative universe is imbued with a natural

tendency to human chaos, and that this natural tendency to human

chaos represents a residual property of the isolated components of

the entitative universe. In this vein, the problematic character of

order is squarely lodged in the tendency of discrete single entities,

if left to their own devices, to rapidly dissipate towards the condition
6
of human chaos. In its most contemporary expression, the natural

tendency to human chaos has been described in terms of the first

and second laws of thermodynamics which poignantly detail the bio-

physical universe tilting towards mass instability. Similarly, the

laws of thermodynamics when presented as a model of social action,

and when combined with a hedonistic metaphysics of "human nature,"

have grounded a parallel vision of impending crisis across the human

domain. In either case, the problematic character of order has

been envisioned as the given condition of an entitatively constituted

universe, implicitly ensconced either within the "laws of nature" or

within a universal "human nature." The impulse to disorder across

the social and non-social domains has, as its mode of public expression,

the observable behaviour of social and natural entities. The domain

of public behaviour is filtered through inter-actions which serve

as the mode of connection between the isolated constituents of the

entitative universe. It is the possibility of analytically liberating

inter-actions from their dependency on specific concrete entities

which forms the next step in the flight from human chaos. This step

requires, of course, the epistemological assumption that the domain

of social experience contains two qualitatively different "levels"

of social action, one concrete and the other analytic. While the

concrete level of social action is grounded in the solitary entities

composing the publically observable universe, the analytic level of

social action describes the total pattern of inter-actions through

which things-at-a-distance are related to one another. It is the

epistemological vision of an analytic level of social action which

provides the key to the successful prosecution of the quest for

human security.

Analytical Consciousness

The entitative ontology dirempts the social universe into

a plurality of autonomous parts, and introduces the possibility of

human chaos as its central quality. While providing the conditon

necessary for the inception of the problem of human security, the

entitative ontology does not, by itself, clarify how a more orderly

social world might be attained. The ontology of human security must

be complemented by the further epistemological assumption that

the social universe does not consist only of discrete single entities

but also of a web of inter-actions or activities between such entities.

The inter-actional viewpoint situates discrete entities into relations

which extend from the surface to the surface of the things connected.[7]

It is through an inter-actional field that the impulse to disorder

on the part of isolated entities is released into the more public

aspect of social experience. In this case, whether the impulse to

disorder originates in an occult quality such as a "human nature"

or in laws of motion between natural phenomena, it is always expressed

through an inter-actional field.

The expression of the tendency to human chaos in terms of

activities-between-things provides the key to the resolution of the

problem of human security. The reason for this, while somewhat

difficult to grasp, is crucial to an understanding of the phenomenology

of human security. First, social inter-actions are not the property

of the things which they connect but constitute a level of social

action in their own right. There is a significant difference between

the solitary entities which compose the publically observable universe

and the sum total of inter-actions which relate things-at-a-distance.
While whole human beings and, by extension, the intuitable domain
of nature constitutes concrete social action, the total patterning
of their inter-actions forms a more analytic level of social action.
There are, therefore, two levels of social action--the concrete and
the analytic--which, while existing simultaneously, are fundamentally
dissimilar. While the "concrete" level of social action is based in
the solitary entity, the "analytic" level of social action is grounded
in the total sum of activities-between-entities. The concrete and
the analytic represent, of course, alternative viewpoints on the same
entitative universe. The efficacy of the analytical, however, derives
from the fact that unlike concrete social action it is not rooted in
specific entities <u>but represents a detachable, and hence manipulative,</u>
<u>level of social action in its own right</u>. This implies the possibility
of circumventing the impulse to social disorder by deliberately
patterning the analytic level of social action around the requirements
for human order. In this case, the analytic viewpoint, by liberating
activity-between-things from the things connected, permits that narrow
sector of inter-actions to be identified which services human security
rather than human chaos. Since concrete entities receive social
character through a constant process of pushing and pulling across the
public domain, and since the activity of pushing and pulling may be
visualized analytically as a pattern of inter-actions which is detach-
able from, and hence indepndent of, the things connected, then the
entitative universe may be effectively controlled by freezing it
within an analytic pattern of social organization. The concrete

domain may, therefore, be subordinated to the analytic. The publicly

observable universe of intuitable things may be made subservient to

an abstract process of social organization.[8] The imprisonment of the

concrete within the analytic, of the publicly observable within a

general abstraction, continues with the further axiological assumption

that the domain of social relations across the entitative universe

is exhausted by instrumentality. In this event, it is not sufficient

that social existence be reduced to the inertness of an entitative

universe or that the more conscious, and hence intentional, aspect

of social experience be reduced to an analytical pattern. If the

quest for human security is to succeed, then the domain of social

relations must be reduced to the homogeneity of instrumentalism.

Instrumental Relations

The phenomenology of human security has involved, so far, two

formative postulates, each of which responds to a particular aspect

of the general problem of human security. First, the subjective

problem of human security has elicited, for its solution, an ontological

vision of an entitative universe. The image of the entitative universe

has set the stage for the reduction, or possible reduction, to inertness

of human expectations concerning the nature and limits of social

reality. Second, the collective problem of human security has yielded,

for its satisfaction, an epistemological assumption concerning the

priority of analytical human consciousness over the immediate experience

of the concrete social world. The epistemology of human security

has provided the key to the patterning of an entitative universe. In

this case, the epistemology of human security has proposed a dualistic

universe, composed of an _intuitable_ domain of concrete social

entities on the one hand, and of an _analytic_ domain of patterned

inter-actions between such entities on the other. While the natural

impulse to human chaos has been assigned to the intuitable world

of concrete "things," the task of preventing human chaos has been

grounded in the analytic world of abstract relationships. And it

is the analytic domain which has been envisioned as capable of being

penetrated, and hence manipulated, by human thought alone. The quest

for human security thus anticipates the subordination of the concrete

social world to a general abstraction. But how is the analytic

world of abstract relationships to be successfully superimposed on the

intuitable domain of concrete social entities?

The subordination of the intuitable universe of concrete

social entities to an analytical pattern of social organization requires

a further axiological assumption concerning the instrumental character

of social relations. The axiology of human security proposes that

the domain of social relations may be divided pluralistically into

four major groupings of social inter-actions, each of which serves

to suppress a different aspect of _concrete_ social existence. From

this viewpoint, the domain of human sociability is exhausted, or

may be exhausted, by that narrow band of social inter-actions instrumental

to the realization of a more orderly social world. And this narrow

band of social inter-actions may be "broken down" into four distinctive

groupings, each of which responds to a different aspect of the general

problem of human security. There is, in this case, a problem of

ordering social inter-actions around the control of the social and

non-social "evironments" of concrete social experience, of trans-

forming control over the "environment" of conrete social existence

into an orderly process of political life, of generalizing the

requirements for political order into a network of compliant social

relations, and of linking such compliant social relations with

commitments to those valued futures necessary for the fullest

realization possible of a more secure process of social existence.

The axiology of human security thus restricts the possible

range of social relations across the entitative universe to those

instrumental in resolving the problematic character of human order.

Taking the single inter-action considered, the task is to order

it instrumentally into the different levels of analytic action. Taking

the different levels of analytic action, the task is to order them

instrumentally around the resolution of the different dimensions

of the general problem of human security. The expansion of the

analytic universe of patterned social inter-actions across the concrete

domain of intuitable "things" is thus solidified through the reduction

of human sociability to instrumentalism. By reducing the human social

experience to the homogeneity of instrumentalism, the distance

between the publically observable and the general abstraction becomes

annihilated. The quest for human security is actively inserted into

the very process of human sociability itself. The inception of analytic

action and its qualitative expression through instrumental relations

brings the phenomenology of human security to the brink of successfully

prosecuting the flight from human chaos. The single requirement

remaining is that the exercise of instrumental relations be made

coterminous with the fullest expression possible of human order.
This requirement is fulfilled by postulating human values as agents
of redundancy, and by making their attainment synonymous with the
resolution of the problem of human security itself.

Redundancy Values

The axiology of human security has posited instrumentalism
as the basis for the creation of a homogeneous social experience.
While the reduction of the process of human sociability to instru-
mentalism advances the quest for human order beyond the subjective and
collective dimensions of human existence and into the social domain,
it does not conclude the phenomenology of human security. On the
contrary, the persistence of an orderly social world would remain
problematic and without focus if it were lodged exclusively in the
conduct of human social relations. Sudden disruptions in the human
social situation coud threaten the pursuit of particular goals,
instrumental to the maintenance of a secure process of social
existence, thereby regressing the basis for human order towards the
"environment" of concrete social action.[9] Thus, the flight from
human chaos must be liberated from its basis in human sociability,
and lodged in commitments to the attainment of a particular human
value experience. The homogeneity of social instrumentalism must,
in this event, be generalized into the redundancy of moral order.
Social order must be made anticipatory of the security of a redundant
human aesthetic.

The creation of an orderly process of social morality is
grounded in an aesthetic reduction of the human value experience to

an exercise in redundancy. The reduction of the human value experience to redundancy represents a direct outcome of the aesthetic problem of human security. The aesthetic problem of human security originates in an aversive response to the amorality of a chaotic human value experience. Since the chaos of human amorality is a product of the human desire for moral consistency, then the rectification of human amorality requires a repudiation of the quest for the certitude of moral consistency in favour of the security of moral order. The abandonment of the search for moral consistency, and the consequent human aspiration for moral order, ultimately result in a human aesthetic which postulates human values as agents of redundancy. Redundancy values are neither sources of moral consistency nor active social processes by which provisional social relations may be totalized, and thereby made the basis for the creation of a more meaningful social universe. Instead, redundancy values represent inert points of closure which sum up into an image of a more desirable mode of social existence the human commitments necessary for the development of an inert, patterned, and homogeneous social world. In short, a redundant human value experience is neither absolutist nor prospective, but is a source of those social reinforcements necessary for binding together a social universe composed, in its most elementary features, of a conglomerate of autonomous, competitive units.

The reduction of the human value experience to an exercise in redundancy concludes the phenomenology of human security. The phenomenology of human security has bound together into a coherent vision of social existence four central human assumptions, each of

which responds to a different aspect of the general human problem concerning how it might be possible to create order out of a chaotic human condition. This coherent vision of social existence has begun with an ontological vision of an entitative universe imbued with a natural impulse to human chaos. It has continued with an epistemology of human security which advances the possibility of nullifying the natural impulse to human chaos by the establishment of an analytical pattern of social inter-actions across the entitative universe. This epistemological possibility has been materialized by an axio-logical postulate concerning the feasibility of "breaking down" the domain of analytic social action into four distinctive groupings of social inter-actions, each of which serves to control a different aspect of the concrete social world. Finally, the domain of instru-mental human relations has been bound together by a process of orderly human values, conceived as agents of human redundancy in their own right. In this case, a redundant human value experience reinforces the homogeneity of social instrumentalism, and solidifies the quest for human order at a high level of abstraction and generality.

The phenomenology of human security provides the image of social existence necessary for a satisfactory settlement of the quest for a more orderly social world. It does not reveal, however, how its solution of the general problem of human security might be materialized. The materialization of the phenomenology of human security takes place by means of the development of a distinctive pattern of social organization. This unique pattern of social organization may be described as the process of corporate action.

The process of corporate action represents the operative model of

social action necessary for the actualization of an inert, patterned,

homogeneous, and redundant mode of social existence. The following

section will be devoted to a brief examination of each of the basic

human practices associated with the process of corporate action, and

of the relationships which hold between them.

The Process of Corporate Action

The thesis has been advanced, so far, that corporate

existence begins at the precise instant that an aversive response

to the condition of human chaos fosters a compelling human desire for

the security of a more orderly social reality. The desire for human

security has been portrayed, in its fullest expression, as marking

a turnabout in human dispositions away from the metaphysical aspiration

for absolute certitude to the more secular aspiration for an inert,

patterned, homogeneous, and redundant social world. This turnabout

in human dispositions has anticipated the development of a compelling

vision of the human circumstance, one which sums up the desire for

human security into a systematic understanding concerning what must

be done for its prosectution. This compelling vision of the human

circumstance has been described, in its most complete expression, as

the phenomenology of human security. The phenomenology of human

security has linked together into a single image of social existence

the ontological, epistemological, axiological, and aesthetic assumptions

necessary for the creation of a life-process invested with human order.

The assumptions constituting the phenomenology of human security would

be condemned to remain idle speculation if a means did not exist for

their actualization. However, a means has existed for the actualization of the vision of social existence emergent from the general problem of human security. This means may be described as the process of corporate action.

The process of corporate action refers to the entire pattern of social organization involved in the actualization of the general problem of human security, and the assumptions necessary for its solution. This pattern of social organization binds together into an interrelated process of human activities that which must be done if the quest for human security is to be generalized beyond its basis in human affectivity and human consciousness into the very structure of social existence itself. The process of corporate action thus provides for the transformation of every aspect of human social existence into a working-out, on a continuing basis, of the desire for human security, and its associated phenomenology of the human circumstance. This transformation of the human social reality develops from a fundamental reconstruction of the process of human materializations. The process of human materializations has previously been portrayed as a dynamic working-out of concretely experienced relations of preformance, anticipation, and summation between four rudimentary human practices, each of which serves to actualize a particular understanding of what is most problematic in human existence, and a specific assumption concerning what must be done for its rectification. The four rudimentary human practices may be identified as human survival activity, human political activity, human social activity, and human aesthetic activity. The

process of corporate action is grounded in the qualitative trans-

formation of each of the above rudimentary human activites in the

direction of human order. Thus, the process of corporate action

begins with the reduction of human survival activity to a process

of reification. The activity of reification represents the qualitative

process of human survival necessary for the actualization of the

subjective aspiration for human inertness and its emergent ontology

of human security. Similarly, the process of corporate action

continues with the reconstruction of human political activity into

a process of mobilization. The activity of mobilization represents

the qualitative process of human politics necessary for the materiali-

zation of the collective problem of human security and its emergent

epistemology of analytical human consciousness. Likewise, the

process of corporate action results in the reduction of human social

activity to a process of canalization. The activity of canalization

represents the qualitative process of human sociability necessary

for the actualization of a homogeneous social experience bound together

by instrumentality. Finally, the process of corporate action culminates

in the reduction of human aesthetic activity to a process of commitment.

The activity of commitment represents the qualitative process of

social morality necessary for the materialization of a redundant human

value experience.

The pattern of social organization emergent from the desire

for human security thus consists of a dynamic movement between the

activities of reification, mobilization, canalization, and commitment.

These four phases of the process of corporate action represent comple-
mentary features of a unitary process of social action. For example,
the activity of reification marks the rough forward edge of the
advance of corporate experience across the environment of concrete
social action, whether that "environment" consist of concrete human
beings or of the intuitable domain of nature. Through reification,
the constituents of the concrete social universe are funnelled into
inert corporate roles. The activity of mobilization links the domain
of inert corporate roles with the pursuit of tasks within vast
organizations. Through mobilization, the inertness of corporate
roles is transformed into a patterned human political experience.
The activity of canalization directs the fulfilment of corporate
goals through a process of social relations which maintains instru-
mentality as its dominant quality. Through canalization, a patterned
human political experience is solidified by means of a homogenous
network of social relations which ground in the active pursuit of
self-interest, albeit narrowly conceived. The activity of commitment
makes the maximization of self-interest coterminous with the expansion
of the process of corporate morality across wider and wider reaches
of the concrete social universe. The accumulation of commitments to
the expansion of the process of corporate morality lodges the basis
for human security at a high level of abstraction and generality, and
sets the stage, once more, for new incorporations to enter the
corporate experience. In this case, the process of corporate action
ramifies across the concrete social universe as a spiralling process,
which at every instant incorporates, mobilizes, consolidates, and

commits wider and wider section of human social existence around

the creation of an inert, patterned, homogeneous, and redundant social

reality. The following discussion will briefly treat each of the four

central dimensions of the process of corporate action.

Reification

The process of corporate action begins with the activity
of reification.[10] The activity of reification denotes the entire

social process involved in the expansion of an abstract, conceptual

framework—an analytic pattern of social action—across the concrete

social universe, and in the consequent assertion of this abstract,

conceptual framework as the single empirical expression of social

reality. Before reification, the fundamental constituents of

concrete social existence may be considered (from the corporate

perspective) as humanity per se and nature per se. After reification,

the fundamental constituents of the human social reality are the

corporate self and corporate nature. The reifying process thus

encompasses all the activity involved in moving "beyond the human"

and "out of the natural" into corporate existence.

The activity of reification may be viewed as a direct

response to the ontological vision of an entitative universe, and

thereby, as an emergent of the subjective aspiration for human

inertness. The ontology of human security has posited a social

universe which is, in its first appearance, composed of a plurality

of autonomous parts, each of which serves as the locus of a natural

impulse to human chaos. It is social and non-social behaviour

across such an entitatively constituted universe which must be
controlled in the interests of human inertness. In this event, the
behaviour of natural phenomena must be adapted to the requirements
of human survival, and human behaviour adapted to the requirements
of corporate survival. The quest, in both cases, is for the liberation
of the basis of human order from environmental problems—for the
preemption of the potentially problematic character of concrete
social action. This dual process of mastery is effected through the
activity of reification.

The leading agent in reifying activity is the role. From
this perspective, a role is not simply an abstract concept which
defines general sets of rights and obligations for the performance
of certain human activites but represents the exact conceptual
tool by which the concrete social universe is shattered apart and
funnelled into corporate experience. The role is the gateway
between corporate reality and its concrete environment. It is the
leading wedge in the diffusion of an analytic pattern of social action
across concrete social experience. Once enclosed within roles, the
concrete human being succumbs to the image of the corporate self,
and concrete nature to its corporate counterpart. This process
continues with the intentional annihilation of distance between the
role as an abstract concept and as an aspect of concrete social
experience—between participation-in-a-role and being-a-role. The
reification of roles as empirical expressions of concrete social
reality serves to preempt the domain of concrete social action, and,
consequently, to subordinate social and non-social behaviour to the
creation of an orderly process of human existence.

The annihilation of role-distance establishes the basis for human order by making corporate existence less dependent on the shifting currents of concrete social action. Once the analytic has been transformed into the concrete and _vice versa_, then the object of mastery--social and non-social behaviour--has already been partially controlled. Their preemption through reification shifts the focus of control away from nature _per se_ and humanity _per se_ to human and natural action analytically conceived. The envelopment of the social and non-social domains within an analytic pattern of social action presupposes their prior alienation from the universe of concrete social action and, thereby, their capability of being fully mobilized into corporate reality. In this vein, the activity of reification pacifies broad sections of the "environment" of concrete social action, creating the condition necessary for orderly, albeit analytic, exchanges across the social and non-social domains. Once concrete phenomena have been hurled through roles into an analytic pattern of social organization, then the stage is set for their full mobilization into corporate existence. The creation of an inert process of social being anticipates, in this event, the development of a patterned human political situation.

Mobilization

The activity of reification advances the basis for human security "beyond the human" and "out of the natural" into an analytic network of social and non-social roles. This advance represents the exact process by which corporate reality confronts and overcomes its concrete environment--the behaviour of social and non-social phenomena.

While the activity of reification provides for the reduction of

human subjectivity to the inertness of corporate roles, it must be

supplemented by another process of corporate activity which directs

reified phenomena towards the attainment of corporate goals. The

objects of reification must be mobilized into a patterned human

political situation. Through mobilization, the mastery of the

"environment" of concrete social action is reinforced by the political

control of action analytically conceived. The role is linked with

a goal. The allocation of goals is implicitly political activity.

The thrust of this political activity is towards the patterning

of corporate roles with massive organizations which function to

fulfil certain tasks. From the corporate standpoint, these tasks

are indispensable to the survival of an orderly process of social

existence.

The domain of concrete social action is not incorporated at

random into corporate experience but is systematically mobilized into

different collectivities, each of which organizes the objects of

reification around the performance of particular tasks. The patterning

of corporate roles involves, in this event, a dual process of

differentiation and stratification. Differentiation refers to the

social process by which the network of corporate roles is divided

into a plurality of collectivities, whether productive, political,

social, or aesthetic. Productive collectivities, the keynote of

reification, organize corporate roles around the control of the

"environment" of social and non-social behaviour. Political collectivities

lodge the basis for human order in the active quest to gain compliance,

on a mass scale, for those futures deemed desirable from the corporate standpoint. Social collectivities fuse political compliance with the instrumental pursuit of self-interest. And aesthetic collectivites link the instrumental pursuit of self-interest with the expansion of the process of corporate morality. Each dimension of political differentiation thus advances the survival of corporate existence through the performance of a particular task.

The differentiation of corporate roles is, by itself, a political act of mobilization. There are different types of futures attached to different types of roles. For example, the role of the worker differs from that of the voter, the role of the voter is distinct from that of a student, and the role of the student is distinct from that of a client of a particular organ of propaganda. Thus, the activity of patterning corporate roles around the different levels of corporate action is run through and through with political consequences. The process of mobilization does not cease with the division of roles into the four levels of corporate action. It continues <u>within</u> each of the four central corporate collectivities as well. In this case, each corporate collectivity is further stratified according to political position. Since corporate politics, from this standpoint, involves the activity of assigning goals to roles, a system of political stratification exists which is divided according to who envisions goals, who administers them, who implements administrative decisions, and who is without a goal, and thereby without a relevant role. This internal process of stratification completes the political activity involved in differentiation.

The process of mobilization, which began with the division of roles
into four levels of corporate action, terminates with the creation of
hierarchies of political control which direct specific roles towards
the performance of particular tasks. To assume a corporate role,
therefore, is to be instantly enclosed within a pervasive process
of political control. The fact that the extensiveness of corporate
politics has often been overlooked does not indicate its non-existence.
It may simply imply that its existence, and hence its importance in
patterning human futures, may depend on its being overlooked. Just
as reification succeeds because of the uncritical annihilation of
role distance, mobilization succeeds because of a restricted vision
of human poltiics. The patterning of human consciousness is grounded,
in this event, in the concealing quality of corporate politics. The
concealing character of corporate politics is indispensable to the
successful prosecution of the activity of mobilization, and thereby
prepares the way for political order to be canalized into the security
of a homogeneous social experience.

Canalization

So far, the creation of an orderly pattern of social organi-
zation has involved the complementary activities of reification and
mobilization. The activity of reification has qualified the movement
of corporate reality across the environment of concrete social action.
This movement is synonymous with the development of the corporate self
and corporate nature out of the concrete human being and the intuited
natural domain. The process of reification has been reinforced by
casting participation within any dimension of corporate experience

as part of a broad political process in which human activity is patterned around the pursuit of corporate goals. To enter the corporate experience is, therefore, to suffer reification and to be the victim of a general process of political mobilization.

The activity of canalization advances the basis for human order beyond political mobilization into a homogeneous social experience. Canalizing activity refers to the social process by which compliance in the quest of corporate goals is transformed into a restricted range of social relations which are grounded in the instrumental pursuit of self-interest.[11] In this way, the continuance of corporate reality is liberated from its dependency on political mobilization, and lodged directly in the conduct of everyday social life. For the corporate self, the persistence of an orderly public situation becomes a matter of direct personal interest.

The pursuit of self-interest transforms political compliance into a homogeneous network of social relationships. Just as there are four dimensions of political compliance, there are four objects of self-interest which integrate relationships across the social domain. The four objects of self-interest are money, power, prestige, and the enhancement of favourable self-images.[12] In terms of corporate reality as a whole, participation in the ends of productive activity is rewarded with money. Compliance in the shaping of human futures has its interest base in power. Participation in sanctioned social relationships is reinforced by gains in status and prestige. Finally, acceptance of the process of corporate morality has, as its interest stake, the reinforcement of a positive self-image. In this vein,

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to be employed, to obey political directives, to be socially

responsible, and to acquiesce in corporate values is implicitly to

possess a vested interest in the survival of corporate existence.

Just as there are four central levels of political stratifi-

cation, there are four major levels of social stratification as well.

It is the complex interplay between these four major levels of social

stratification which binds together each dimension of corporate

experience. Thus, the productive aspect of corporate reality, which

has money as its object of self-interest, may be socially stratified

into four interest levels. Each interest level corresponds to its

relevant dimension of political stratification--whether of initiators,

administraters, workers, or of the impoverished. Monetary rewards

are distributed unequally from the top of the hierarchy to the

bottom. Initiators, the commanders of economic conglomerates, reap

astronomical salaries while the impoverished receive nothing (except

at the largesse of the political conglomerate). Initiators may

translate, however, their gains in the interest basis of money into

positive self-images (the wizard financier, the patron of the arts,

the educational "angel"). Administraters "buy" status with their

money stake (the expert consultant, the brilliant engineer, the

astute city planner). Workers use money to increase their consuming

power (earning money to buy the dream cottage or to purchase another

travel trailer). Finally, the impoverished, possessing little if

any money, have nothing to offer in trade, and consequently have an

interest in gaining money itself.

The same situation holds across the other dimensions of corporate existence--whether political, social, or aesthetic. Each dimension of corporate reality is grounded in the pursuit of a particular object of self-interest, and involves trade-offs between that object of self-interest and the remaining dimensions of social gain. Everybody, therefore, whether rich or poor, powerful or defenceless, influential or without status, possessing a morally laudatory self-image or other, has some stake in engaging in social relations which augment self-interest narrowly conceived. Since these relationships advance the homogeneity of social order, the survival of a corporate mode of social reality becomes synonymous with the conduct of everyday social life. In this way, the basis for human security is liberated beyond political mobilization, and rooted squarely in lived experience. The final step necessary in actualizing the desire for human security lies in the establishment of a connection between the pursuit of self-interest and the maximization of the process of corporate morality. This final step is fulfilled by the activity of commitment.

Commitment

The activities of reification, mobilization, and canalization have secured the basis for human order on a very high level of abstraction and generality. While the reifying process hurls the concrete into the corporate, and thereby reduces to inertness the "environment" of social and non-social behaviour, mobilization links the experience of being assimilated into corporate existence with the conditions necessary for the patterning of human political existence, and canalization makes

the continuation of a homogeneous social experince a matter of

concrete self-interest. Thus, challenges against the persistence

of corporate reality face the formidable task of not only unmasking

the reifying process but also of weakening the vast process of

political mobilization, and of questioning, on a mass level, concrete

self-interest. These corporate defences are further supplemented

by the advance of human order into the process of value experience

itself. This advance to value experience liberates the basis for

human security beyond the pursuit of self-interest, rooting it

directly in commitments to a process of corporate morality. Such

commitments cloak corporate reality in the trappings of moral righteousness.

In this vein, appeals to the "moral worthiness" of corporate experience

supercede and complement demonstrations concerning its usefulness

in advancing concrete self-interest. The corporate experience is

transformed into a laudable moral venture. The activities of reifi-

cation, mobilization, and canalization become not only <u>necessary</u> phases

in the quest for human security, but <u>morally desirable</u> ones as well.

Corporate values have previously been portrayed as agents

of human redundancy. As such, corporate values sum up into images of

more desirable human futures whatever is necessary for the maximi-

zation of an orderly process of social existence. It is precisely

commitments to the realization of such images of more desirable futures

which assures the corporate enterprise of moral legitimacy, and thereby

sets it in motion as a self-justifying and self-perpetuating process

of orderly human experience. But what constitutes the process of

corporate morality? What valued futures are necessary for the

maximization of the process of corporate action?

An answer to the above questions may be gleaned from an

examination of each of the four central human activites composing

the process of corporate action. The four dimensions of the process

of corporate action have been set in motion as responses to the

different phases of the general problem of human security. Reification,

which represents the corporate transformation of human survival

activity, creates inertness out of a potentially chaotic concrete

social universe. The "currency of exchange" across the corporate

survival experience is money.[13] Mobilization, which is associated

with political activity, obtains compliance, on a mass scale, to

corporate directives. The coinage across the corporate political

experience is power. Canalization, which is connected with social

activity solidifies political compliance into a homogeneous social

experience. The currency of exchange across the corporate social

experience is influence. Commitment, which represents the corporate

transformation of human aesthetics, provides for moral allegiance

to the legitimacy of the corporate enterprise. The coinage across

the corporate value experience is value-commitments. Each currency of

exchange generates a sanction which backs up the relevant dimension

of the process of corporate action.[14] Inducement looms behind reifi-

cation, compulsion behind mobilization, persuasion behind canalization,

and appeals to moral duty behind the activity of commitment. The four

currencies of exchange and their relevant sanctions mediate and enforce

the expansion of each dimension of the process of corporate action.

In fact, the currencies of exchange and their associated sanctions

represent the principal inspiration behind the very persistence of

corporate reality. The persistence of corporate reality appears to

be grounded, in this case, in the desire to expand the major currencies

of exchange to the limits that human existence can bear.[15]   Reification

appears to be set in motion by the urge to maximize monetary profits;

mobilization by the desire to expand political power; canalization by

the urge to maximize influence; and commitment by the quest to solidify

laudatory self-images. The expansion of each of the four major

currencies of exchange thus binds together corporate existence, and

thereby services the maximization of a social reality generated out

of the desire for human security. In other words, the maximization

of profits, power, influence, and value-commitments represents the

content of the process of corporate morality. And this process of

corporate morality spurs onward the steady expansion of corporate reality

across human existence. The quest for profits sets the stage for new

incorporations into corporate experience; the desire for power advances

the mobilization of the objects of corporate reification; the lust for

influence anticipates the canalization of social life; and the propa-

gation of value-commitments provides moral legitimacy for the entire

corporate enterprise. To be committed to the corporate value experience

is, therefore, to be enveloped within the redundancy of an inert,

patterned, and homogeneous process of social existence.

The process of corporate action thus consists of four rudimentary

human practices, each of which contributes to the development of a more

orderly social world. The activity of reification represents the

dynamic of human survival necessary for the actualization of the sub-

jective aspiration for human inertness. The activity of mobilization

represents the key feature of a patterned human political situation.

The activity of canalization represents the pattern of social

relations necessary for the materialization of a human social experience

linked together by the homogeneity of instrumentalism. And, finally,

the activity of commitment represents the moral dynamic necessary for

the materialization of a redundant human value experience. Taken

together, the activities of reification, mobilization, canalization,

and commitment constitute complementary features of a pattern of social

organization which, at every instant, organizes human existence around

the settlement of the general problem of human security and the

postulates necessary for its solution.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined three important dimensions of the

corporate paradigm of social action--the general problem of human

security, the phenomenology of human security, and the process of

corporate action. While these three dimensions of corporate

existence ground the inception, development, and actualization of

the general human aspiration for the security of an inert, patterned,

homogeneous, and redundant social world, they do not exhaust the

corporate life-order. On the contrary, the corporate life-order

contains one other dimension. This final dimension of corporate

relaity is grounded in the quality of human life engendered by the

appearance of the process of corporate action. The quality of human

life emergent from the corporate life-order may be described as the

human conditon of reinforced meaninglessness.

Chapter 5. The Human Condition of Reinforced Meaninglessness

While not the unique property of human life during the

twentieth century, the corporate experience has served as its

dynamic nucleus. A large portion of the contemporary process of

social experience may be understood as a working-out of the general

problem of human security. The phenomenology of human security has

provided the compelling vision of social reality which has dominated

human consciousness during twentieth century existence. And the

prevailing pattern of social organization across the existent

social world has been the process of corporate action. The present

moment has thus been enveloped within the driving momentum of the

corporate reconstruction of the complete process of social action.

This driving momentum has not ceased, however, with the transformation

of the general problem of human security into a coherent process of

human assumptions concerning what must be done for the realization of

a more orderly social world. Nor has it ceased with the full develop-

ment of the process of corporate action. On the contrary, the process

of corporate action has anticipated the appearance of the culminating

phase of corporate existence. This final phase of corporate reality may

be described as the qualitative transformation of the human situation--

the human condition--emergent from the resolution, on a vast historical

scale, of the general problem of human security. This human condition

both sums up corporate existence into a distinctive quality of human

life and sets the stage, in turn, for any attempt at breaking beyond

the corporate world to the creation of an alternative mode of social

existence. The human conditon spawned by corporate reality thus

serves simultaneously as a point of summation as well as a point, or

a _possible_ point, of new beginnings.

This chapter will investigate the central features of the

quality of human life emergent from the corporate paradigm of social

action. This quality of human life will be described as the human

condition of _reinforced meaninglessness_. The human condition of

reinforced meaninglessness may be defined as that quality of human

life which is characterized by the _presence_ of many means of

ordering the social universe, and by the _absence_ of any substantive

reason as to why this should be done. There are four modes of human

meaninglessness, each of which is backed up by a specific process of

social reinforcement. These four modes of human meaninglessness may

be identified as _irrationality_, _reactiveness_, _accidentality_, and

immorality. Irrationality represents the central quality of the

corporate survival experience. Reactiveness comprises the dominant

quality of the corporate political experience. Accidentality represents

the dynamic quality of the corporate social experience. And immorality

comprises the central quality of the corporate value experience. Each

of these qualitative transformations of the human situation is grounded

in a particular process of social reinforcement. There are four parti-

cular processes of social reinforcement, each of which is connected

with a specific dimension of human meaninglessness. They may be

envisioned as _necessity_, _obligation_, _self-interest_, and _duty_. An

irrational process of human survival is bound together by the systematic

manipulation of access to the gratification of basic human necessities.
A reactive political experience is linked together by the control
of human obligations, whether through the actual use of coercion or
through the constant threat of coercion. An accidental process of
human sociability is bound together by the distortion, on a mass
scale, of the content of human self-interest. And an immoral value
experience is perpetuated by the systematic manipulation of appeals
to moral duty.

The four modes of human meaninglessness and their associated
processes of social reinforcement are not estranged from one another.
On the contrary, each dimension of the human condition of reinforced
meaninglessness comprises a partial aspect of a unitary process of
qualitative human consequences. In this sense, the emergence of an
irrational process of human survival, backed up by the domination of
human necessity, anticipates the creation of a reactive human political
situation. The reduction of political life to the meaninglessness
of reactiveness, through the domination of human obligation, sets
the stage for the development of an accidental process of social
relations. The creation of an accidental human social experience, backed
up by the distortion of human need-dispositions, anticipates the appear-
ance of social immorality. And the emergence of a process of social
immorality simultaneously summarizes and reinforces the tendency to
irrationality, reactiveness, and accidentality. The human condition
of reinforced meaninglessness thus consists of four interrelated
dimensions, each of which represents a specific qualitative outcome
of a paradigm of social reality characterized by the presence of many

techniques for ordering the social universe, and by the absence of
any principled justification for the urgency or usefulness of such
order.

The process of corporate existence is condemned to culminate
in the human condition of reinforced meaninglessness. The tendency
to reinforced meaninglessness represents, in this case, less a
fortuitous outcome of corporate reality than a necessary consequence,
the origins of which are to be found in a fatal flaw which cross-
cuts the process of corporate existence as a whole. This fatal flaw
originates in the fact that the corporate life-order is neither an
expression of human metaphysics nor an emergent of concrete social
experience, but a spurious product of human abstraction. As a spurious
product of human abstraction, the corporate life-order represents, in
its essential features, a vast conceptual design, albeit an orderly
conceptual design, devoid of any principled human content. It is a
form stripped of all substance--an idealism barren of any genuine
empirical ground. Consequently, the corporate life-order consists of
a network of functions of human order, alienated from any substantive
reason for the existence of that order. It is a process of means to
order, rather than a process of creating substantive human meanings.[1]
This ultimately results in a qualitative human situation which, while
containing the mechanisms for the maintenance of human order, does not,
and indeed cannot, principle that order in any substantive human
content. Mass instincts and pathological whims, rather than the
creation of genuine human aspirations, thereby provide the guiding
impulse of the corporate survival experience.[2] Reaction to irrational

impulses, rather than reconstructive social inquiry, monopolizes the content of the corporate political experience. The materialization of the products of political reaction, rather than the deepening and broadening of human relationships, characterizes the corporate process of human sociability. And, finally, the transformation of socially actualized impulses into objects of moral duty, rather than the creation of new substantive human meanings, constitutes the core dynamic of the corporate value experience. In addition, to the degree that corporate reality results in a qualitative process of human meaninglessness, to that degree the corporate life-order requires, for its continuation, the presence of a process of social reinforcements. Human irrationality begets the domination of human necessity. Political life becomes more obligatory as it becomes more reactive. The more accidental the social experience, the more the distortions of human self-interest. And, ultimately, the more immoral the human value experience becomes, the more prominent becomes the systematic manipulation of human conscience. The abstract, and thereby unprincipled, character of corporate existence thus anticipates the development of a human situation qualified by meaninglessness, and held together by a process of social reinforcements.

The discussion which follows will examine, in more detail, the origins and development of the human condition of reinforced meaninglessness. This examination will proceed through the following five steps. First, the thesis will be advanced that the origins of the human condition of reinforced meaninglessness are to be found in the very statement of the problem of human security itself. The quest

for human security will be portrayed, in this case, as a spurious

human problem, one which neither originates nor terminates anywhere

in the domain of concrete social experience. The spurious character

of the problem of human security will be traced to the fact that the

aspiration for a more orderly social world represents a more abstract

than concrete response to the condition of human chaos. And it is

precisely the abstract, and thereby unprincipled, character of the

problem of human security which will be considered as the fatal flaw

which anticipates the development of the human condition of reinforced

meaninglessness. Second, it will be demonstrated that this fatal flaw

has not remained the exclusive property of the problem of human

security but has been magnified as the core feature of the process of

human consciousness by means of the phenomenology of human security.

The phenomenology of human security will be depicted, in this event,

as binding together a unitary process of assumptions, each of which

specifies what must be done for the realization of human order, but

none of which provides any substantive justification for the necessity

of such order. The phenomenology of human security will thus be

portrayed as an abstract image of social existence, one which is

logically consistent but experientially false. Third, it will be

shown that this tendency to abstraction has been transformed into the

core dynamic of a pattern of social organization by means of the process

of corporate action. The process of corporate action will be viewed,

in this case, as providing means for the realization of human order, but

no substantive reason for the urgency or potential uses of such order.

The process of corporate action will thus be depicted as an abstract

pattern of social organization, one which yields the appearances of

human order but not any principled human content. Fourth, it will

be contended that a process of social existence driven by the affir-

mation of the form of human order and by the negation of content

ever culminates in the human conditon of reinforced meaninglessness.

The tendency to reinforced meaninglessness will be portrayed as

an inevitable product of a mode of social reality grounded in a

spurious human problem, and advanced by abstraction. The four

dimensions of human meaninglessness, and their associated processes

of social reinforcement, will then be examined. Each mode of reinforced

meaninglessness will be described as the specific quality of human

life emergent from a particular phase of the process of corporate

existence. Finally, after examining the different dimensions of the

human condition of reinforced meaninglessness and the relationships

which exist between them, some concluding comments will be made.

The Fatal Flaw

The corporate life-order is imbued with a fatal flaw.

This fatal flaw has, as its ultimate consequence, the dissolution of

the quest for human security into a human situation experienced as

qualitatively meaningless, and bound together by a process of social

reinforcements. And this fatal flaw has, as its point of origin, the

abstract, and thereby unprincipled, character of the problem of human

security itself.

There are two related ways of demonstrating the spurious character of the problem of human security. First, it can be shown that the aspiration for a more orderly social world represents less a principled reaction to the condition of human chaos than a pseudo-response. Second, it may then be demonstrated that the quest for human security necessarily precludes the presence of any substantive human content. The problem of human security can be shown, in this case, to be a matter of appearances and not a matter of reason.

To begin, there is <u>nothing</u> in the condition of human chaos which would point, in any principled fashion, to the urgency of the problem of human security. The conditon of human chaos has previously been portrayed as a qualitative outcome of the attempt to actualize the metaphysical desire for absolute certitude. As such, the condition of human chaos simply represents the unprincipled end of an unprincipled process of social experience. Human chaos emerges when-ever human beings strive to overcome the relative, partial, provisional, and prospective qualities of concrete social experience in favour of the salvation of absolute certitude. A chaotic human condition is thus the <u>symptom</u> of a prior problem--the unprincipled character of the quest for human salvation--and not the problem itself. Accordingly, a <u>principled</u> response to human chaos would entail a root critique of the aspiration for human salvation, and a corresponding willingness to draw out, as fully as possible, the relative, partial, provisional, and prospective qualities of concrete social experience. On the other hand, an <u>unprincipled</u> response would treat human chaos as a problem in its own right, and thus simultaneously avoid both a root critique of

the quest for absolute certitude and a commitment to the uncertainty
of concrete social experience.

It is such an unprincipled response to the condition of human
chaos which is represented by the problem of human security. The
problem of human security may be visualized, in this case, as a
means, indeed as the only means known to human beings, of compensating
for the loss of absolute certitude while forestalling the appearance
of a relative, partial, provisional, and prospective social world.
The problem of human security transforms the absurd, apathetic, anomalous,
and amoral qualities of human chaos into a systematic justification
for the creation of an inert, patterned, homogeneous, and redundant
social world. Such a world does not represent a principled repudiation
of the quest for absolute certitude, but its continuation, albeit
under a different guise. In this vein, the aspiration for an inert
process of social existence is but a derivative of the enduring human
desire for the certitude of absoluteness. The patterning of human
consciousness is but a more banal version of the human aspiration for
a source of social predetermination. And the quest for moral redundancy
is but a second chance, albeit in different form, at realizing the
certitude of aesthetic consistency. In short, the problem of human
security represents a sustained exercise in using the threat of human
chaos as a justification for the development of a process of social
existence which systematically compensates for the loss of absolute
certitude.

Likewise, to the extent that the aspiration for human security
compensates for the loss of absolute certitude, it also precludes the

appearance of a concrete process of social experience. In this sense,
the reduction of social existence to inertness militates against the
creation of a relative human situation. The patterning of human
consciousness negates the partiality of concrete human thought. The
creation of a homogeneous social experience precludes the development
of a provisional process of human relations. And the aspiration for
moral redundancy negates the prospective character of a concrete process
of value experience. Thus, at each and every instant, the aspiration
for human security stands mutually exclusive of those qualitative
features which, when taken together, constitute the core dynamic of
a concrete process of social experience. Moreover, inasmuch as the
actualization of these qualitative features--that is, the fuller
and fuller exposure of the relative, partial, provisional, and pros-
pective character of the concrete social world--provides content for
any empirically grounded process of social existence, the problem of
human security is implicitly devoid of any principled human ground.
Nowhere in the concrete social world is there to be found any principled
basis for the reduction of social existence to inertness, for the
patterning of human consciousness, for the creation of social homo-
geneity, or for the aspiration to moral redundancy. On the contrary,
everywhere in the concrete social world there is to be found a
principled basis for the repudiation of human inertness in favour of
human relativity, for the transformation of patterned human consciousness
into the partiality of concrete human thought, for the dissolution of
social homogeneity into provisional social relations, and for the annihi-
lation of moral redundancy in favour of moral prospectiveness.

The problem of human security is, therefore, neither an
expression of human metaphysics nor a derivative of concrete social
experience, but a product of an unprincipled human abstraction.
Neither human faith nor critical human thought but the loss of faith
and the suspension of critical human thought lead to belief in the
problematic character of human security. This belief is grounded in
the empirically false notion that the condition of human chaos requires
for its resolution the emergence of an orderly social world rather
than a confrontation with the uncertainties of concrete social experience.
It is such a confrontation which is postponed by the aspiration for
human security. The aspiration for human security serves, in this case,
as a buffer between the loss of absolute certitude and the emergence,
or possible emergence of a process of social existence qualified by
relativity, partiality, provisionality, and prospectiveness. As a
mid-point between the metaphysical and the genuinely empirical, the
problem of human security is condemned to remain an unprincipled
abstraction--a human desideratum which is both independent of human
faith and alienated from any ground in the concrete social world.
Accordingly, while the problem of human security expresses the means
by which a more orderly social world might be created, it does not
and, in fact, cannot provide any substantive justification for the
necessity of such a world. It is a method stripped of all substance--
a form devoid of any principled human content. The tendency to human
meaninglessness, and the contingent necessity of appealing to the
binding capacities of a process of social reinforcements, are, therefore,
generic to the very statement of the problem of human security itself.

The Flaw Magnified

The spurious character of corporate reality is not the exclusive property of the problem of human security. On the contrary, the tendency to reinforced meaninglessness has been further magnified by the emergence of the phenomenology of human security. The phenomenology of human security may be viewed, in this case, as an unprincipled image of social existence: one which links together into a coherent world-view the abstract, and thereby ungrounded, assumptions necessary for the realization of human order. The phenomenology of human security has previously been described as a dynamic working-out of the relationships which exist between four fundamental human assumptions, each of which relates what must be done for the actualization of a specific dimension of the general problem of human security. This dynamic process of ordering assumptions consists of an entitative ontology, an analytical epistemology, an instrumental axiology, and a redundant human aesthetic. The ontological vision of an entitative universe sets the stage for the creation of an inert process of social being. The epistemology of human security provides the key for the patterning of human consciousness. The axiological vision of instrumentality as the keynote of human relations is the necessary prerequisite for the creation of a homogeneous social experience. And the aesthetic of human security provides the necessary condition tor the creation of a redundant human value experience.

The four assumptions which constitute the phenomenology of human security are not independent of one another but represent,

instead, interrelated aspects of a unitary vision of social existence. For example, a redundant human aesthetic simultaneously reinforces and is backed up by an instrumental axiology. The axiology of human security simultaneously sums up and is grounded in an analytical epistemology. The epistemology of human security simultaneously reinforces and is backed up by an entitative ontology. And the onto-logical vision of an entitative universe establishes the necessary condition for the development of all the above phases of the pheno-menology of human security. But what, however, provides the basis for the development of the ontology of human security? The answer appears to be that nothing--nothing, that is, in the concrete social world--principles the ontological assumption of an entitative universe. Nowhere in the domain of concrete social experience is there to be found any substantive justification for either the assertion of an entitative universe, or for the correlative assumption of a natural impulse to human chaos. In the relative, and thereby concrete, social world, there are no discrete single entities or classes of discrete single entities, only active processes of social being enmeshed in a web of moral aspirations, human sensibilities, and political ideals. And in the contextual world of human relativity there is no natural impulse to human chaos, only the concretely apprehended possiblity of enriching social existence with substantive human meanings. The ontology of human security is not, therefore, a derivative of concrete social experience, but a product of human abstraction. It is a logically consistent but experientially false image of social reality.

Since the ontological assumption of an entitative universe
ultimately grounds the development of the phenomenology of human
security, it follows that each of its dimensions may be viewed as
lacking any principled basis in the concrete process of social
experience. In this vein, nowhere in the domain of concrete social
experience is there to be found any principled justification for an
epistemological vision of a dualistic universe: a universe
shattered into a concrete domain of intuited things and into an
analytic domain of activities-between-things. Nor can any substantive
ground be discovered for an axiology of social reality which maintains
that human sociability is exhausted by instrumentality. And, finally,
the prospective character of the concrete process of value experience
militates against an aesthetic vision of moral redundancy. Thus,
at each and every instant, a spurious ontology gives rise to an
unprincipled epistemology; an unprincipled epistemology anticipates an
abstract axiology; and an abstract axiology preforms a pseudo-aesthetic.
The phenomenology of human security may thus be viewed as an unprincipled
image of social existence. As an unprincipled image of social existence,
it provides the assumptions necessary for the realization of human
order, but it does not yield any substantive reasons as to why such
a world should be created. Like the problem of human security, the
phenomenology of human security represents a conglomerate of functions
of human order rather than a process of principles of human order.

The tendency to reinforced meaninglessness has thus been
extended by means of the phenomenology of human security into the
pervasive social assumptions which lineament the process of corporate

existence. The abstract, and thereby ungrounded, character of the

phenomenology of human security does not, however, culminate the

tendency to a world qualified by meaninglessness, and held

together by a process of social reinforcements. Instead, this

tendency has been actualized as the core feature of a pattern of

social organization by means of the process of corporate action.

The process of corporate action represents the vehicle by which the

tendency to reinforced meaninglessness has been magnified beyond

human affectivity and human consciousness into the central dynamic

of human social existence. Accordingly, the process of corporate

action may be envisioned as comprising the salient features of a

fundamentally unprincipled pattern of social organization, one

which specifies the exact social processes by which an orderly process

of social existence may be maintained, but which nowhere specifies

how such a world may be filled with any substantive human content.

The process of corporate action has previously been portrayed

as a dynamic working-out of the relationships which hold between

four rudimentary social practices, each of which materializes a

different dimension of the phenomenology of human security. These

four rudimentary social practices have been described as the activities

of reification, mobilization, canalization, and commitment. The

activity of reification represents the specific process of human

survival necessary for the control of an entitatively constituted

universe. The activity of mobilization represents the central feature

of a patterned process of human politics. The activity of canalization

transforms instrumentalism into the basis of a homogeneous social

experience. And, finally, the activity of commitment represents the core dynamic of a redundant process of social morality.

These four corporate practices have been further described as partial, although related, aspects of a unitary process of social organization. In this vein, commitments to the process of corporate morality reinforce the persistence of a homogenous social order based on the maximization of self-interest. This homogenous social order both controls the content of the process of corporate morality and reinforces, in turn, the persistence of a political order based on the activity of mobilization. The mobilization of human beings into orderly political patterns both preforms the content of the corporate process of human sociability and strengthens the persistence of a productive order based on the activity of reification. The activity of reification provides content for the patterning of human politics, and thereby provides the basis for the development of the entire process of corporate action. However, what principles the content of the activity of reification? What basis exists for deciding the time and pace of the expansion of corporate existence across the "environment" of social and non-social behaviour? Once again, the answer seems to be that nowhere in the domain of concrete social experience is there to be found any principled basis for the incorporation of human beings into corporate reality by means of the activity of reification. In the concrete social world, there is the materialization of possibilities for creating a holistic social universe rather than the reification of a given actuality. And in a world distinguished by the actualization of human possibilities as opposed to the reification of human actualities

there is the distancing of human beings from the roles which they
happen to occupy rather than the annihilation of role-distance.[3]
The activity of reification may be viewed, therefore, as a tool

of abstraction rather than a process of concretization. It is the

social process necessary for the affirmation of form, and for the

negation of content. Accordingly, the activity of reification

represents the central dynamic of a fundamentally unprincipled process

of human survival, one which elicits means to human order but not

any substantive reasons for such order.

Since the activity of reification provides the ground for

the development of the entire process of corporate action, it follows

that the practices of mobilization, canalization, and commitment may

also be envisioned as fundamentally unprincipled processes of social

action. In this case, there is nothing in the domain of concrete

political experience which would lead to the development of a politics

of human mobilization. While the activity of mobilization is based

on the organization of reified parts into patterned wholes, a <u>concrete</u>

process of political experience is based upon the reconstruction of

social existence in the direction of substantive human meaning. While

the activity of reconstruction has, as its content, the actualization

of human possibilities, the activity of mobilization has no content

other than reaction to the products of human reification. Similarly,

there is no principled justification to be found anywhere in the domain

of concrete social experience for the canalization of human relations

around the maximization of self-interest. While the activity of canali-

zation is based on the generalization of political order into homogeneous

social groupings, a _concrete_ process of social experience is based

on the consolidation of political reconstructions into substantive

human solidarities. While the activity of consolidation has, as

its content, the materialization of political reconstructions, the

activity of canalization has no content other than the accidentality

of self-interest. And, finally, there is nothing in the domain of

concrete value experience which would principle the development of a

morality of human commitment. While the activity of commitment is

based on the legitimization of social order, a _concrete_ process of

moral experience is based on the transformation of a provisional

social experience into new, and more satisfactory, totalizations.

While the activity of transformation has, as its content, the critical

evaluation of substantive human solidarities, the activity of commitment

has no content other than the affirmation of that which has gone before.

The process of corporate action thus consists of four

fundamentally unprincipled social activities, each of which transforms

the tendency to reinforced meaninglessness into a central, albeit

particular, dynamic of social existence. The activity of reification

transforms the spurious desire for human inertness, together with

its emergent ontology of human security, into an unprincipled process

of human survival. The activity of mobilization transforms the

ungrounded aspiration for a patterned process of human consciousness,

together with its emergent epistemology of human security, into a

spurious process of human politics. The activity of canalization

transforms the unprincipled desire for social homogeneity, together

with its emergent axiology of human security, into a spurious process

of human sociability. And the activity of commitment transforms the

abstract aspiration for moral redundancy, together with its emergent

aesthetic of human security, into an equally abstract human value

experience. A spurious human problem thus anticipates the development

of an abstract phenomenology of the human circumstance. And an

abstract phenomenology of the human circumstance preforms the appear-

ance of an ungrounded pattern of social organization.

The envelopment of human existence within the pseudo-reality

of order does not, however, have the process of corporate action as

its final point of magnification. On the contrary, the reduction of

every aspect of the human social reality to a function of human order

ultimately culminates in a qualitative transformation of the human

situation. This qualitative transformation of the human situation may

be described as the human condition of reinforced meaninglessness.

The human condition of reinforced meaninglessness represents the

quality of human life emergent from a social reality which is typified

by the presence of many means of securing an orderly social universe,

and by the absence of any substantive reason as to why this should be

done. The following discussion will be devoted to an examination of

the central dimensions of human meaninglessness, and their associated

processes of social reinforcement.

Modes of Reinforced Meaninglessness

The human condition of reinforced meaninglessness represents

the quality of human life emergent from the corporate life-order. This

quality of human life is grounded, in its fullest expression, in a

fundamental reconstruction of the process of qualitative human consequences.

The process of qualitative human consequences has previously been portrayed as a dynamic working-out of concretely experienced relations of preformance, anticipation, and summation between four core qualities of human life, each of which sums up a particular dimension of a process of social experience into a specific transformation of the human situation. These four core qualities of human life may be described as the quality of survival experience, the quality of political experience, the quality of social experience, and the quality of aesthetic experience. The quality of survival experience refers to the mode of social being emergent from the actualization of a given subjective definition of the human situation by means of a particular ontological query and a specific human survival practice. The quality of political experience refers to the mode of human consciousness emergent from the materialization of a given collective definition of the human situation by means of a particular epistemological query and a specific human political practice. The quality of social experience refers to the mode of human sociability emergent from the actualization of a given definition of the human social situation by means of a particular axiological query and a specific process of social activity. And the quality of aesthetic experience refers to the mode of human morality emergent from the materialization of a given aesthetic definition of the human situation by means of a particular value theory and a specific process of evaluative activity.

As a reconstruction of the process of qualitative human consequences, the human condition of reinforced meaninglessness also consists of four core qualities of human life, each of which represents

a specific alteration of the human situation. For example, the human conditon of reinforced meaninglessness begins with the reduction of survival experience to a process of irrationality, continues with a reactive political experience, advances into an accidental social experience, and culminates in an immoral aesthetic experience. The reduction of the human survival situation to a process of irrationality is sustained by the domination of human necessity. The qualitative transformation of the human political situation in the direction of reactiveness is maintained by the domination of human obligation. An accidental social experience is held together by the domination of human self-interest. And an immoral human aesthetic situation is backed up by the repressive domination of the human conscience.

The four modes of human meaninglessness, and their associated processes of social reinforcement, may be viewed as products of the different dimensions of the process of corporate experience. For example, irrationality represents the central dynamic of social being in a world characterized by the presence of many means of securing subjective human order, and by the absence of any substantive justification for the necessity of such order. Reactiveness constitutes the core quality of human consciousness in a world transfixed by the desire for political order. Accidentality represents the central quality of human sociability in a world motivated by the quest for social homogeneity. And a world driven by the desire for the security of aesthetic redundancy is qualified by immorality. Moreover, an irrational process of social existence, lacking any internal principle of consolidation, must ultimately be held together by the use of physical extortion.

Political order, albeit a reactive political order, can be sustained

only by the monopolization of human obligations, whether through the

use of violence or through the more seductive lure of grants of

political power. An accidental process of human sociability, lacking

any internal principle of cohesion, must ultimately be reinforced by

a network of external rewards and punishments. And the process of social

immorality can be maintained only by the systematic distortion, on a

mass scale, of human value aspirations. The corporate life-order thus

culminates in a human situation which is qualified by irrationality,

reactiveness, accidentality, and immorality, and which is linked together

by methods ranging from the domination of human necessity to the

manipulation of moral consciousness. The following discussion will

be devoted to a brief examination of each of the four major dimensions

of the human condition of reinforced meaninglessness.

Irrationality

The corporate life-order culminates, at first, in the creation

of an irrational human survival situation. The human survival situation

has previously been portrayed as the entire social process involved

in the transformation of an impression concerning what is most problematic

in the more subjective aspect of social existence into a qualitatively

more desirable mode of social being. The human survival situation

represents, in its fullest expression, a dynamic working-out of the

relationships which hold between a subjective human disposition, an

ontological query, a human survival practice, and an emergent quality

of social being. This emergent quality of social being may be envisioned

as the summed-up consequence of a given reconstruction of the human
survival situation. Accordingly, the corporate survival experience
denotes the entire social process involved in the quest for subjective
human order. The quest for subjective human order entails, in its
most complete expression, a dynamic movement between the subjective
problem of human security, the ontological vision of an entitative
universe, the activity of reification, and an emergent quality of
corporate being. This emergent quality of corporate being designates
what an inert social world is actually experienced as. It is a lived
consequence of the human aspiration for an orderly and thereby inert,
process of human subjectivity.

The process of corporate being possesses irrationality as
its emergent quality. Irrationality represents the central quality
of social being in a world characterized by the presence of many means
of securing subjective human order, and by the absence of any sub-
stantive reason for the existence of such order. In an irrational
social universe, the very process of human survival is reduced to a
social apparatus for the processing of concrete human beings into their
corporate functions. While this social apparatus has, as its structure,
the incorporation of human beings into an orderly network of corporate
role-positions, it maintains, as its dynamic, a dual process of externa-
lization and estrangement. Through a social process of externalization,
human beings are wrenched beyond reflection on their concrete social
situations and dismembered into a plurality of corporate functions,
each of which serves as the locus for the development of a subjective
sense of social identity. The individual human being becomes a corporate

being, and the corporate being becomes a cog within a mechanical

apparatus aimed at the fullest realization possible of subjective

human order. And an orderly process of human subjectivity, once

realized, results in the subordination of the internal to the external,

of existence as a process of self-expression to existence as a

function of one's position within the corporate life-order. Through

a social process of estrangement, the various modalities of corporate

being are ripped apart, and situated into relations of mutual competition.

Considered individually, the solitary corporate being, in his various

public roles, is alienated even from himself. The role of the worker

is performed at a different time and in a different place from the role

of the political partisan; political life is cleaved from the domain

of human sociability; and the social functions remain separate from

the activity of moralizing. Considered collectively, all corporate

beings are thrust apart into positions of mutual antagonism and

distrust. In the corporate economy, success is a matter of trampling

underfoot the aspirations of as many other human beings as possible.

Political order rests on a division of spoils between those who are

most adept at dealing in the pathological politics of power. The

process of corporate sociability is grounded in a tension between the

manipulators of the organs of social consciousness, whether the mass

media or educational institutions, and the objects of manipulation--

humanity at large. And the process of corporate aesthetics has, as

its moving spirit, the division of the human race into those who,

by seizing the moment, manage to translate private affect into moral

injunctions and those who serve merely as the pawns of such propaganda.

In a world torn asunder by a dual process of externalization
and estrangement, no basis remains for the unification of social
existence other than the commonality of membership within the corporate
life-order. And this basis of unification is fundamentally irrational.
It is grounded neither in the satisfaction of basic human needs nor
in the creation of possibilities for substantive human development.
On the contrary, the process of corporate existence makes the maximi-
zation of a social apparatus—one which is structured by roles and
driven by the social processes of externalization and estrangement—
the basis for the development of an orderly process of human subjectivity.
It is the maximization of this social apparatus—the dissolution of
human beings, on a mass scale, into their corporate functions—
rather than the grounding of social existence in a substantive human
content which represents the key feature of the corporate survival
experience. In the presence of order and in the absence of purpose,
the direction assumed by the corporate process of human survival comes
to be whichever mass instinct, pathological whim, capricious desire,
or popular fantasy happens to be in the ascendent at any given moment.[4]
The romanticism of space flights, the stock-piling of military
weaponry, the creation of spurious human wants, and the development of
new technological toys provide momentary contents for an otherwise
purposeless, and thereby irrational, survival experience. And insofar
as human beings have been dissolved into their corporate functions, their
estimation of their own social significance rises and falls in direct
proportion to how their position within the corporate life-order is
related to whichever project happens to monopolize the public imagination
at any given time.

The process of corporate existence thus reduces the more subjective aspect of social existence to irrationality. An irrational mode of social existence, lacking any internal principle of consolidation, must be held together by the domination of human necessity. The domination of human necessity ranges from threats of starvation, in its negative extreme, to the amassing of enormous monetary profits on its positive side. Whether through physical deprivation or through a continuous upgrading of what constitutes an elementary necessity of human life, human beings are condemned to participation within an irrational human survival experience. And as the irrationality of corporate existence becomes more prominent, the use of necessity itself as a social reinforcement becomes more blatant. The poor are locked into corporate existence by the bureaucracies of hunger, the workers by consumerism, the professionals by the need of maintaining a certain "style of life," and the corporate bosses by the arrogance of wealth. Resistance against irrationality is met by the systematic starvation of the poor, the firing of workers, the making of factory hands out of the professionals, and the demotion of corporate leaders. In short, an irrational social world demands, for its perpetuation, a tacit monopolization of the means of human survival.[5] And this monopolization of the means of human survival solidifies the expansion of a process of social being which is a matter of externalities and not a product of substantive human meaning.

Reactiveness

The process of corporate existence does not only culminate in the creation of an irrational human survival experience. It also

results in the development of a reactive human political situation.

The human political situation has previously been depicted as the

entire social process involved in the transformation of an impression

concerning what is most problematic in the more collective aspect

of social existence into a more adequate mode of human consciousness.

The human political process constitutes, in its most general expression,

a dynamic movement between a collective definition of the human

situation, an epistemological query, a human political practice, and

an emergent quality of political consciousness. This emergent quality

of political consciousness may be envisioned as the end result of

a given reconstruction of the more collective aspect of social

existence. It follows, therefore, that the corporate political experi-

ence envelops whatever is necessary for the resolution of the quest

for collective human order. The quest for collective human order

involves, in its fullest expression, a relentless working-out of the

relationships which exist between the collective problem of human

security, the epistemological vision of analytical social action,

the activity of mobilization, and a resultant quality of political

consciousness. This resultant quality of political consciousness may

be conceived as a lived summation of the human aspiration for the

patterning of collective experience.

The corporate political experience has a reactive mode of

human consciousness as its emergent quality. Reactiveness constitutes

the core quality of human consciousness in a world typified by the

presence of many means of obtaining collective human order, and by the

absence of any substantive justification for the necessity of such order.

A reactive political experience is grounded neither in the expression of substantive human sentiments nor in the creation of genuinely valuable human goals. And a reactive process of human politics does not transform possibilities for the unification of social experience into a critical reconstruction of the human social reality. On the contrary, a reactive political experience reduces the more collective aspect of human existence to an orderly set of techniques for the mobilization of corporate beings around the prosecution of irrational projects. In a reactive political world, the occupants of corporate role positions are organized into massive conglomerates. While such massive conglomerates have, as their structure, a set of institutional techniques for the maintenance of political order, they possess, as their dynamic, whichever mass whim, pathological desire, or capricious fantasy has gained currency across the corporate domain. A reactive political experience is, therefore, neither creative nor reconstructive but simply a collective apparatus for the actualization of irrational sentiments.[6]

A process of political order which is more reactive than creative necessarily lacks any internal principle of consolidation. What intrinsic ground can be found which would justify obedience to the leaders of massive conglomerates? Political obedience of this sort must be based upon the domination of human obligation. The domination of human obligation takes place by methods ranging from overt coercion to the conferring of the "powers of dominion" upon the corporate directors. While the "powers of dominion" may allow, and even oblige, the corporate bosses to displace private affect

upon the public domain, it does not liberate those occupying the

command positions of the corporate world from the politics of

reaction. On the contrary, the corporate directors, like the true

victims of corporate existence—the poor, the prisoners, and those

in mental institutions, are condemned to participation in a political

universe which has, as its driving spirit, the meaninglessness of

action and reaction. The difference is, of course, that while the

politics of reaction may entail mental strain or hysterical rage on the

part of the corporate bosses, reaction to such cerebral piques may

involve matters of life and death for the disinherited. In other

words, corporate leaders are obliged cerebrally to participation

within the politics of reaction; professionals are obligated by

gains and losses of prestige; workers are obliged economically; and

the the disinherited are obligated by the problematic character of

survival itself. Whether the source of political obligation be

mental or physical, the principle remains constant that all who

suffer such a process of social reinforcement are the puppets

of a political experience which is aimed at collective human order,

and which results in the distortion of human consciousness into a

state of enfeebled reactiveness.

Accidentality

While irrationality and reactiveness constitute important

dimensions of the human condition of reinforced meaninglessness,

they do no exhaust the qualitative human experience engendered by

the corporate life-order. On the contrary, corporate reality also

culminates in the creation of an accidental human social situation.

The human social situation has previously been portrayed as the

entire social process involved in the transformation of an impression

concerning what is most problematic in the more relational aspect

of social existence into a more adequate mode of human sociability.

The process of social experience involves, in its most general state-

ment, a dynamic movement between a definition of the human social

situation, an axiological query, a human social activity, and an

emergent quality of human sociability. The emergent quality of human

sociability may be viewed as a lived summation of a given transformation

of the human social situation. Accordingly, the corporate social

experience represents the entire network of activities involved in

the quest for a homogeneous, and thereby orderly, process of human

relationships. This network of activities involves, in its fullest

expression, a dynamic working-out of the connections which exist

between the social problem of human security, the axiology of social

instrumentalism, the activity of canalization, and an emergent quality

of human sociability. This emergent quality of human sociability

sums up what a homogeneous social order is actually appreciated as.

The corporate social experience has accidentality as its

emergent quality. Accidentality represents the dominant quality of

human sociability in a world which is characterized by the presence

of many means of securing a homogeneous social order, and by the

absence of any substantive reason for the existence of such order.

In an accidental social world, the process of human sociability does

not have, as its content, either the enhancement of genuine human

solidarities or the materialization of an active process of political

reconstruction. Neither the development of substantive human friend-

ships nor the appreciation of heterogeneous life histories provide

the binding web for human sociability across the corporate world.

On the contrary, an accidental process of human sociability is

typified by the presence of many competing pseudo-groupings, each

of which strives to actualize a particular product of the politics

of reaction.[7] Such pseudo-groupings represent the leading edge in

the advance of irrational human sentiments across the social world.

And the relationships which exist between such pseudo-groupings

constitute the battle ground for the ascendency or defeat of whichever

pathological whims, mass instincts, or capricious fantasies have

managed to infect a reactionary political process at any given time.

For example, urban ecological groupings, guided by young professionals,

challenge the concrete interests of blue collar construction workers.

And resistance by construction workers to the anti-growth dogma of

ecologists directly advances the economic interests of developers.

Native protest organizations, goaded on and financed by liberal

bureaucrats, are used as a strike force against increases in public

appropriations to other social groupings, whether scientific, militar-

istic, or educational. And consumer groupings, nurtured into existence

by governmental agencies, are employed to counter-point the growth

of other bureaucratic empires, such as agriculture and defence. In

each of the above cases, the general principle remains constant that

the corporate life-order reduces social existence to membership

within a variety of pseudo-groupings, each of which acts as a point-

of-reference for the materialization of a particular element of

corporate irrationality. The process of corporate sociability may thus be envisioned as a matter of rivalries between equally unprincipled groupings, whether the basis for the division of human social life be age, sex, economic status, educational attainment, ethnic background, citizenship, or geography. Regardless of which criteria are employed to split the human race into a plurality of contending social rivalries, such pseudo-groupings, once formed, are always more accidental than substantive. Rather than being grounded in the deepening and broadening of genuine human relationships, they are based on the transformation of whims and fantasies into orderly social homogeneities. Appropriation rather than appreciation thus comprises the guiding spirit of the corporate social domain.

In a world which has been shattered into a conglomerate of accidental social groupings, no basis remains for the unification of social life other than the domination of human self-interest. In this vein, no _internal_ source of cohesion can be found for an accidental social experience. There is nothing intrinsically appealing about a social order which is based on the division of humantity into competing pseudo-groupings, by standards ranging from age to economic status. And in the absence of any internal source of social cohesion, the maintenance of a homogeneous social order is dependent upon the systematic imposition of an external network of rewards and punishments. For example, the mass media and educational institutions tacitly function to create a sense of envy, and even inferiority, on the part of the disinherited for the social life-styles of the workers, professionals, and corporate

bosses. Workers are inculcated with a "feeling of belongingness"
8
within the corporate social order.   This feeling of belongingness

blossoms forth as a contempt for the poor, loathing of the admini-

strators, and as admiration for the corporate bosses. Professionals

are locked into the process of corporate sociability by positive

rewards in the form of gains in status and prestige. Professionals

sympathize, albeit at a distance, with the lot of the disinherited,

despise workers, and fear their corporate superiors. And the corporate

bosses, motivated by possessive pride in the organizations under their

care, are baffled by the disinherited, contemptuous of the administrators,

and patronizing towards their workers. Thus, whether through envy,

belongingness, prestige, or possessive pride, human beings are

persuaded to occupy quietly their social niches within the corporate

life-order. This process of social persuasion ultimately provides

the basis for the maximization of a homogeneous social order, qualified

by accidentality.

Immorality

The transformation of the human social experience into a

process of accidentality anticipates a further reduction of the

human aesthetic experience to a process of immorality. The human

aesthetic experience has previously been described as the entire

social process involved in the transformation of an impression

concerning what is most problematic in the more evaluative aspect

of social existence into a more adequate process of social morality.

This social process involves, in its fullest expression, a dynamic

working-out of the relationships which hold between a definition of

the human value situation, an aesthetic query, a process of evaluative

activity, and an emergent quality of value experience. The emergent

quality of value experience sums up a given transformation of the

human aesthetic situation into a distinctive moral condition.

Accordingly, the corporate value experience includes all the activities

involved in the quest for aesthetic human order. The quest for

aesthetic human order involves, in its most general statement, a

dynamic movement between an aesthetic problem of human security, an

image of the human moral experience as a process of redundancy, an

activity of commitment, and an emergent quality of aesthetic experience.

This emergent quality of aesthetic experience represents the human

value condition which results from the actualization of moral order.

The corporate aesthetic experience possesses immorality as

its emergent quality. Immorality represents the central quality of

value experience in a human situation which is characterized by the

presence of many means of securing aesthetic human order, and by

the absence of any substantive reason for the existence of such

order. In an immoral social universe, the very process of value

experience is reduced to an empty technique for obtaining loyalty

to the products of an irrational, reactive, and accidental mode of

social existence. As a process of technique, an immoral value

experience has, as its content, whatever pettifoggery, propaganda,

seductive appeal, or method of proselytization promises to help

mazimize allegiance to the corporate life-order. And it is the

maximization of loyalty, on a mass scale, to the process of corporate

existence rather than its critical evaluation which distinguishes

an aesthetic experience that serves more as a means to order than as

                9
a reason for it.

The process of corporate aesthetics is not grounded, in

this event, either in the exploration of genuine moral possibilities

or in the submission of social experience to the standards of a

ruthlessly honest human ethic. The corporate aesthetic experience

is neither evaluative nor creative, but simply apologetic. And

its capacity as a source of justification for that which has gone

before, the process of corporate aesthetics is driven by the trans-

formation of private affect into objects of moral duty. For example,

corporate directors, moved by possessive pride in the social organi-

zations which serve to actualize their irrational caprices, manufacture

seductive appeals linking such organizations with the advancement of

the human condition. Toothpaste becomes a moral imperative, and

organized sports a value currency. Administrators present themselves

not as fat parasites living off the sweat of the workers and the

blood of the dispossessed, but as neglected, and even victimized,

servants of an unappreciative public. Workers protect their economic

interests by appealing to the sanctity of the very "rites of capitalism"

which enslave them. And even the disinherited attempt to win

sympathy for their lot by resorting to the emptiness of "natural"

rights. In each of the above instances, an accidental social grouping

maneuvers to generate support fot its particular object of self-

interest by cloaking itself in the garb of moral propaganda. Such

maneuvering is continually counteracted by other corporate groupings,

each of which peddles its own claim to human loyalty with a greater

clamour. This eventually results in a human aesthetic experience

which is typified by the presence of many seductive moral appeals,

all of which are equally unprincipled.

In the absence of any intrinsic merit, the process of corporate

aesthetics is condemned to be held together by the domination of human

value aspirations. While the domination of human value aspirations has

the maintenance of loyalty to the corporate life-order as its product,

it possesses as its dynamic the envelopment of human existence within

a process of moral repression. This process of moral repression

contains four qualitatively unique dimensions. In its negative

extreme, moral repression may involve labelling as mentally insane

those who actively dissent against the corporate life-order. While

this tactic has typically been employed against political revolutionaries,

it has also been used, and, in fact, continues to be used, as an

ultimate negative reinforcement against all forms of popular dissent,

whether economic, social, or cultural. The labelling of opponents

of the corporate life-order as mentally unstable takes place, however,

only when the three other modes of moral repression have failed to

induce loyalty to the corporate world. First and foremost among

these is the systematic nurturing into existence of a state of

"happy tranquillity" among large masses of human beings. This state

of happy tranquillity is characterized by the dulling of all human

value ideals and by the widespread conviction that the corporate world

represents the inevitable order of social reality. There is no

agency in the corporate life-order which does not participate in

feeding this state of happy tranquillity with a steady diet of bombast

and propaganda. Such bombast and propaganda are intended not only

to inculcate a positive, albeit passive, acceptance of the corporate

world, but also to deflect all criticism of the crisis of human

civilization brought on by the corporate life-order into the cynical

belief that this general human crisis is the product of ineptness

and corruption on the part of those occupying the command positions

of the corporate world rather than a derivative of the structure of

corporate experience itself.[10]   Second, the process of moral repression

also involves the transformation of a sense of "professional superiority"

into commitments to the perpetuation of corporate existence. This

dimension of moral repression is primarily associated with admini-

strative or professional groupings. It is grounded in the belief

that loyalty to the corporate life-order is justified by the fact

that a social order, of this sort, provides considerable opportunity

for the playing-out of professional interests, and for the choice of

professional careers. Thus, the key to the repressive domination of

administrators is neither the inculcation of a state of happy tran-

quillity nor the fear of being defined mentally unstable, but the

systematic manipulation of a distorted sense of self-esteem.[11]

Third, human repression is totalized when human beings actively merge

their destinies as social and historical actors with the fate of

the corporate life-order. This mode of moral repression is peculiar

to corporate directors. In this vein, corporate directors may be

envisioned as being completely immersed in the pathological morality

of order. They suffer total moral repression since no distance exists

between their commitment to their own personal aspirations and their
sense of loyalty to the corporate world. By and large, the whims
and fantasies of corporate directors provide the content of the process
of moral order. In being loyal to this content, corporate directors
are, in effect, being loyal to themselves. Since it is the private
affect of corporate directors themselves which is generalized into
an unprincipled moral order, their loyalty to this moral order is
less a matter of fear, tranquillity, or self-esteem than a product
of a complete and highly personalized identification with the fate
of the corporate life-order.

There are, therefore, four different modes of moral repression,
each of which functions, albeit in a different way, to ensure human
commitments to the continuance of a fundamentally immoral process of
value experience. This immoral process of value experience represents
the culminating phase of the human condition of reinforced meanglessness.
In its fullest expression, the human condition of reinforced meaning-
lessness may thus be viewed as containing an irrational human survival
experience, a reactive human political experience, an accidental human
social experience, and an immoral human value experience. Moreover,
each of the above qualities of corporate experience may be described
as being grounded in a specif process of social reinforcement. An
irrational human survival experience is backed up by the domination of
human necessity. A reactive political process is sustained by the
domination of human obligation. An accidental human social experience
is backed up by the domination of human self-interest. And, finally,

an immoral process of value experience is sustained by the repressive

domination of human value aspirations. Taken together, these four

dimensions of human meaninglessness, and their associated processes

of social reinforcement, represent the quality of human life emergent

from the corporate life-order.

Conclusion

The twentieth century has witnessed the ascendency of the

corporate life-order. Its ascendency has been accompanied by a

historic transformation of human sensibility, consciousness, action,

and morality. The process of human sensibilities has been monopolized

by the problem of human security. The process of human consciousness

has been enveloped within the phenomenology of human security. The

prevailing pattern of social organization has been structured out of

the process of corporate action. And, finally, the human condition

has been implanted with the value-quality of reinforced meaninglessness.

While the development of the human condition of reinforced meaninglessness

testifies to the ascendency of the corporate life-order, it also

anticipates its possible decline. The polarity of reinforced meaning-

lessness is human freedom. While reinforced meaninglessness denotes

the human condition emergent from the corporate life-order, the quest

for human freedom gives rise to the development, or possible

development, of a new human condition--one which is bred out of an

organic process of social experience.

Chapter 6. The Organic Experience

The corporate life-order does not have to be overcome. Nowhere
in the history of social experience is there to be found any guarantee
that the human race will rise to the task of mastering a process of
social existence which is aimed at the maximization of an apparatus
of social order, and which is sustained by a network of social re-
inforcements. Since inevitability has never been a property of the
history of social experience, humanity may content itself in the
future, as it has in the past, with quiet acquiescence in a structure
of social reality which always culminates in the human condition of
reinforced meaninglessness. However, in the event, albeit the unlikely
event, of generalized human resistance against the continuance of
the corporate life-order, and in the equally improbable event that
such opposition to the corporate world has, as its collateral, a
generalized human determination to master, at whatever the cost,
the process of corporate domination, human existence may be qualitatively
transformed in a certain direction.

It has previously been demonstrated that the human condition
of reinforced meaninglessness represents a direct emergent of the
process of corporate experience. The reduction of the human situation
to the vacuity of irrationality, reactiveness, accidentality, and
immorality, and the creation of a life-order distinguished by the

domination of necessity, obligation, self-interest, and duty,

constitute, in this event, less accidental than necessary consequences

of the development of corporate reality. Whenever and wherever the

quest for human security results in the creation of a generalized

social experience distinguished by the assumptions and activities

necessary for the maintenance of human order, that process of social

experience will culminate in a human situation qualified by reinforced

meaninglessness. Since the human condition of reinforced meaninglessness

represents a necessary derivative of the generalized social experience

associated with the aspiration for human security, the rectification

of this human condition cannot take place within the paradigmatic

limits of corporate reality. Instead, the human condition of reinforced

meaninglessness requires, for its resolution, a movement going

beyond the corporate life-order to the creation of an alternative

process of social experience. This movement begins when participation

in the corporate world engenders a widespread human conviction that,

in a universe dominated by the presence of many techniques for max-

imizing social order, human freedom rather than human security represents

the most problematic feature of social existence. It continues with the

transformation of belief in the problematic character of human

freedom into a series of assumptions concerning what must be done for

the realization of a more libertarian social world. And this movement

beyond the corporate life-order is actualized by a further trans-

formation of a libertarian process of human consciousness into an

organic pattern of social organization. In short, the human condition

of reinforced meaninglessness demands, for its rectification, the

dissipation of corporate reality and the ascendency of an organic

process of social experience. An organic social world instatiates

human freedom as the basis of human dispositions, provides a liber-

tarian description of the nature and limits of the human social reality,

unifies the process of social organization around the creation of

a substantively meaningful social universe, and ultimately culminates,

or _may_ culminate, in the condition of human uncertainty.

Before proceeding to an examination of the problem of human

freedom, some prefatory comments are necessary. To begin with, a

discussion of the central features of an organic social world must

necessarily be more prophetic than either historical or descriptive.

Such a discussion cannot be historical since nowhere in the human

past has an organic process of social experience ever been _completely_

actualized. And it cannot be descriptive since everywhere in the human

present the process of corporate experience inveighs against the

possibility of human freedom. Thus in the absence of either a complete

historical model or a contemporary source of inspiration, a consider-

ation of an organic social reality is condemned to prophecy. It is,

however, condemned to a peculiar sort of prophecy. Although an organic

process of social experience has never been fully materialized

anywhere in human history, the desire for human freedom has rarely

been absent from the social scene. And to the extent that the desire

for human freedom has often motivated a transformation, albeit a

partial transformation, of social consciousness and social practice,

to that extent an organic social experience has begun to make its

presence felt across the human drama. It is this enduring struggle

for human freedom which provides a basis of solidarity for the

present examination of the organic process of social experience.

Moreover, while the domain of corporate experience does not provide

any positive inspiration for the development of a libertarian social

universe, it does preform, albeit in a negative fashion, the content

and direction of such a universe. The conviction that the continuance

of human freedom constitutes the most problematic concern of cont-

emporary human life does not originate in a social vacuum. On the

contrary, human freedom is made problematic by the envelopment of

larger and larger portions of human existence within the corporate

life-order. And it is precisely an aversive response to the human

condition of reinforced meaninglessness which provides an enduring

ground for the development of the problem of human liberation.
The issue of human freedom is not, in this event, an eclectic

human concern. It is, instead, a general human problem which system-

atically derives from the will to break beyond a world which has been

reduced to the dominion of corporate order.[1] In sum, a description

of an organic social world may be condemned to prophecy, but such

prophecy is both tempered by active solidarity with the longstanding

tradition of libertarian human struggles, and guided by a negation of

the dominant social fact of twentieth century life - the process of

corporate experience.

The fact that the development of an organic process of social

experience is conditioned by the corporate life-order does not preclude

the existence of a direct relationship between the cosmological and

the organic. On the contrary, this work has emphasized the presence

of direct connections between each of the three generalized social

experiences, whether the cosmological, corporate or organic. While

the corporate experience provides the immediate impetus for the

emergence, or possible emergence, of an organic social world, the

relationship which holds between the corporate and the organic must

be held relative to a prior relationship existent between the

cosmological and the corporate. For it is precisely this prior relat-

ionship between the social realities of salvation and security which

unifies the corporate and the cosmolgical as twin opponents of the

organic. In this vein, the process of corporate experience has

previously been portrayed as a generalized method of compensation

for the loss of absolute certitude. The corporate life-order functions

to "soften" the impact of the decline of cosmological experience by

reducing human existence to the security of an inert, patterned

homogeneous, and redundant mode of social reality. While the quest for

human security is the product of human reification, the desire for

human salvation is always an emergent of human metaphysics. An

abstract social reality is not, of course, the _same_ as a life-order

which responds to the metaphysical urge. However, an abstract social

reality is _like_ a metaphysical one insofar as each process of social

existence commonly militates against the appearance of a _concrete_

social universe. While a metaphysical process of social experience

negates the development, or possible development, of a concrete

social world in favour of the anti-empirical, an abstract social

reality postpones the appearance of the genuinely empirical in favour

of that which is simply pseudo-empirical. Thus, the metaphysical and

the abstract unify as twin opponents, albeit in different ways,

of the relative, partial, provisional, and prospective features of a

concrete process of social experience. And inasmuch as the fullest

actualization possible of a concrete process of social experience

provides the keynote of an organic, and thereby libertarian, social

reality, the cosmological and corporate experiences, as the repositer

of human metaphysics and human abstraction respectively, commonly

counterpoint the emergence, or possible emergence, of an organic social

world. Only in a relative sense, therefore, is it possible to

consider an organic social reality as directly derived from the

corporate life-order. In terms of the _full_ history of social experience,

human freedom has always been problematic, and the actualization of

an organic process of social experience has been a human possibility.

What lends special significance to the problem of human freedom at

the present time is that rarely, if ever, in the history of social

experience have libertarian human sentiments been so systematically

threatened as during the corporate age. While the project of human

liberation – the abandonment of social metaphysics in favour of a

direct confrontation with the empirical process of social reality –

has in the past been "put off" by the development of corporate

existence out of the ruins of cosmological experience, the issue must

now be squarely met. No point of intercession remains between a further

expansion of corporate reality and the task of creating a libertarian

social world. The corporate life-order has wrenched human existence

into a fateful moment of choice: a choice between a process of social

experience which thrives on the maximization of human domination,

and a mode of social reality which is nothing less than a process

of human freedom in its own right.

The creation of an organic social world is complicated, however,

by the very character of human freedom itself. The realization of a

libertarian social universe is not simply a matter of removing the

yoke of corporate reinforcements from the human situation. While

the annihilation of all modes of corporate domination represents

a necessary precondition for the development of a libertarian world,

it does not exhaust the full process of human freedom. On the

contrary, the full process of human freedom involves not only the

negation of corporate reinforcements but also the creation of a

substantively meaningful social universe. A substantively meaningful

social universe is one which is distinguished by the unification,

indeed the organic unification, of every aspect of human experience.

The organic unification of human experience refers to the entire social

process involved in establishing balance and harmony between the natural

and the social, the affective and the conscious, the conscious and

the practical, and between the more practical aspect of human life

and the process of social morality. It is precisely the organic

unification of human experience which constitutes the social process

by which a substantively meaningful social universe may be created.

And it is the process of creating a substantively meaningful social

universe which represents, in the fullest sense, the enterprise of

human freedom itself. Since human freedom may be visualized as the

active social process involved in the organic unification of human experience, it follows that the libertarian future cannot be reduced to an ideal end-state. There is no final point of culmination, no utopian mode of social existence, which stands external to the process of human freedom. Instead, human freedom manifests itself in the very process of achieving freedom. And the process of achieving human freedom – the entire enterprise involved in the creation of an organic mode of social experience – is condemned to be more contextual than inevitable, more incomplete than completed, more transitive than enduring and more projective than retrospective. Thus, an organic social world represents less an _end_ of the struggle for human freedom than a contextual, incomplete, transitive, and projective _means_ to human freedom. As such, an organic process of social experience is fated to remain a provisional expression of the possibilities existent for creating a substantively meaningful social universe, and thereby of the opportunities present for the fullest maximization possible of human freedom.

The Problem of Human Freedom

The creation of an organic social world begins with a fundamental transformation of human sensibility. This transformation of human sensibility is distinguished by the emergence of the problem of human freedom as the central object of human concern. The problem of human freedom arises in direct response to the envelopment of the process of social existence within the human condition of reinforced meaning-lessness. The human condition of reinforced meaninglessness has

previously been portrayed as the quality of human life which issues from

the actualization of the process of corporate experience. The quality

of corporate experience is characterized, in the most general sense,

by the presence of many means of securing human order, and by the

absence of any substantive reason for the existence of such order.

An orderly social world, lacking any basis in the concrete process of

social experience, results in irrationality, reactiveness, accidentality,

and immorality. And an irrational, reactive, accidental, and immoral

social world, lacking any intrinsic appeal, must always be held

together by a process of social reinforcements which include the

domination of human necessity, obligation, self-interest, and duty.

It is precisely an aversive response to such a human condition which

provides the basis for the development of the problem of human freedom-

The problem of human freedom arises, in this case, whenever and

wherever an intense aversion to the process of corporate order

engenders the following human concern: How might it be possible to

break beyond the human condition of reinforced meaninglessness to

the creation of a substantively meaningful social universe? This

general human query does not originate, of course, in a social vacuum.

It is grounded in a root reconstruction of the process of human

dispositions. The process of human dispositions has previously been

described as a dynamic working-out of concretely experienced relations

of preformance, anticipation, and summation between four dimensions

of human sensibility, each of which yields a particular understanding

of what is most problematic in the human situation. There are four

basic human dispositions, each of which sums up an impression of a different aspect of the human situation into a particular mode of human sensibility. There are, in this event, subjective, collective, social, and aesthetic human dispositions. The problem of human freedom, in its fullest expression, is based in a fundamental transformation of each of the above basic human dispositions. The problem of human freedom may be expressed, therefore, in four qualitatively unique ways, each of which represents a root alteration of a particular dimension of human sensibility. There is, in other words, a subjective problem of human freedom, a collective problem of human freedom, a social problem of human freedom, and an aesthetic problem of human freedom. Each particular statement of the problem of human freedom may then be viewed as a complementary, albeit partial, aspect of a single human query concerning how it might be possible to construct a substantively meaningful social world out of the human condition of reinforced meaninglessness.

Thus, the subjective problem of human freedom may be summed up as the following query: How might it be possible to break beyond the condition of human irrationality, and thereby beyond the domination of human necessity, to the creation of a holistic human survival situation? The condition of human irrationality has previously been described as that qualitative process of human survival which is characterized by the presence of many means of securing subjective human order, and by the absence of any substantive justification for the necessity of such order. In the condition of human irrationality, the human self is systematically dissolved into its

corporate function. And the emergent corporate functions have, as

their content, pathological whims, mass desires, and capricious fantasies.

Nowhere in an irrational social world is there to be discovered any

basis for either the fulfilment of genuine human needs or for the

actualization of opportunities for creative human development. Instead,

an irrational social world – a world motivated by spurious human

wants and by unprincipled human whims – is held together by the

transformation of necessity into a process of social reinforcement.

Human irrationality begets the domination of human necessity; and the

domination of human necessity sustains the maximization of human

irrationality. The more apparent it becomes that the process of corporate

survival is flawed by irrationality, the more mandatory it becomes to

induce participation within the corporate life-order by controlling

access to the basic necessities of human existence. The irrationality

of the corporate survival experience must become more apparent, however,

since nowhere within the process of corporate reality is there to be

found any principled possibility for its internal resolution. The

condition of human irrationality represents, in this event, a direct

emergent of the quest for an inert process of human subjectivity,

the transformation of this quest into an entitative ontology of social

reality, and of the actualization of an entitative ontology by means

of the activity of reification. The aspiration for subjective human

order thus results in the meaninglessness of human irrationality, and

the meaninglessness of human irrationality anticipates, and even

demands, the domination of human necessity.

It is the inherent oppressiveness of the corporate survival

experience, together with the absence of any possibility for its internal

resolution, which grounds the development of the subjective problem

of human freedom. The subjective problem of human freedom arises, in

this case, whenever and wherever an aversive response to the condition

of human irrationality sparks a desire for the creation of a holistic,

and thereby more meaningful, human survival situation. A holistic

social world is distinguished, at each and every instant, by the

transformation of the very process of human survival into a means of

realizing the organic unification of human experience. In a holistic

social world, human necessity does not counterpoint human freedom.

Instead, a holistic process of human survival is one in which the

generalization of the means of human livelihood is made to complement

the harmonization of all dimensions of human experience, whether of

the affective with the conscious, of thought with action, of practice

with morality, or of aesthetics with sentiment.[2] And it is precisely

the creation of an organic balance between the quest for human

sustenance and the harmonization of human experience which forms

the nucleus of the process of subjective human freedom. In this

vein, a libertarian process of human subjectivity is neither a

product of human faith nor an object of human abstraction, but an

emergent of the human determination to create a world which is

typified by a dynamic reciprocity between the provision of basic

human necessities and the creation of genuine human possibilities.

In a libertarian world, social being becomes substantively meaningful

in direct proporation to how successful a reconciliation has been

effected between the necessary and the desirable, and between the

contingent and the possible. How such a substantively meaningful process of social being might be constructed out of the irrationality of corporate existence represents the cornerstone of the subjective problem of human freedom.

The general problem of human freedom does not, however, have only a subjective dimension: it also contains a collective aspect. The collective problem of human freedom may be defined as the following concern: How might it be possible to move beyond a reactive political experience, and thereby beyond the domination of human obligation, to the creation of a reconstructive process of human consciousness? The condition of human reactiveness has previously been portrayed as that qualitative process of associative existence which is characterized by the presence of many means of obtaining collective human order, and by the absence of any substantive reason for the necessity of such order. In a reactive political experience, the process of social consciousness is patterned around the actualization of the products of human irrationality. Nowhere in such a world is there to be found any substantive human purpose which would add meaning to the more associative aspect of human life. And in the absence of any substantive human purpose, a reactive political experience must be sustained by the coercive, or potentially coercive, monopolization of human obligations. Political order is thus qualified by reactiveness; and a reactive political experience is always more obligatory than intrinsically appealing. In addition, the more reactive the political experience, the more necessary it becomes to reinforce political order by resorting to the domination of human obligation.

The process of corporate politics is condemned, however, to the

maximization of the quality of human reactiveness since nowhere in

the corporate life-order does there exist any substantive human goal

which would lend a prospective edge to a mode of associative life

which has irrational human sentiments as its content and the

aggrandizement of collective human order as its dynamic. Given

this inherent tendency to human reactiveness, the corporate life-

order is also fated to compensate, or to attempt to compensate,

for its absence of intrinsic appeal by resorting more and more overtly

to the coercive manipulation of human loyalties.

It is the mandatory vacuity of the corporate political

experience, together with the absence of any possibility for its

internal rectification, which provides the ground for the development

of the collective problem of human freedom. The collective problem

of human freedom emerges, in this event, whenever and wherever an

aversive response to a reactive political situation inspires a

generalized human aspiration for the creation of a reconstructive,

and consequently more meaningful, process of associative activity.[3]

A reconstructive process of associative activity is characterized

by the transformation of political life into a means of clarifying

opportunities for the realization of a more holistic social world.

In a reconstructive political reality, human collectivities are

neither the handmaidens of metaphysical dogmas nor instruments for

the mobilization of human loyalties, but represent vehicles for the

liberation of human consciousness. While the liberation of human

consciousness has, as its content, the transformation of political

life into a cooperative venture aimed at clarifying possibilities
for the organic unification of human experience, it has, as its
dynamic, the development of a reconstructive human mentality. A
reconstructive human mentality is one which continually breaks beyond
the bonds of blind obedience and political obligation to the criticism
and revision of all aspects of human life. It is when the human
mentality becomes more reconstructive than either dogmatic or apologetic
that the process of human consciousness becomes one with the project
of creating a substantively meaningful social universe. And it is
the creation of a genuinely meaningful social world which provides the
guiding impulse of the collective problem of human freedom. The
problem of collective human liberation thus responds to the reactiveness
of corporate politics by proposing, as a more desirable human future,
a mode of associative life which is based on the development of a
reconstructive process of human consciousness, and which is aimed
at the discovery of concrete opportunities for the actualization of
a holistic, and thereby more meaningful, social universe.

· The problem of human freedom does not, however, possess only
subjective and collective expressions. It also contains a more social
dimension. The social problem of human freedom may be summed up
as the following query: How might it be possible to break beyond
an accidental social experience, and thereby beyond the domination of
of human self-interest, to the creation of a more substantive process
of human sociability? An accidental social experience has previously
been depicted as one which is characterized by the presence of many
means of securing an orderly network of human relations, and by the

absence of any genuine reason for the necessity of such order. In
an accidental social world, the process of human sociability is organized
around the materialization of the objects of political reaction.
Accidental social relationships serve to <u>canalize</u> politically
sanctioned whims into an apparatus of spurious social groupings,
each of which advertises the actualization of a particular product
of corporate politics as a matter of direct self-interest. In such
a world, the process of social intercourse is ever more instrument-
ally motivated than intrinsically worthwhile. Social persuasion
rather than social appreciation represents the keynote of an accidental
process of social order. And in the absence of any internal source
of appeal, an accidental social experience must be backed up by the
monopolization of means for the gratification of human self-interest.
Social <u>order</u> is thus distinguished by accidentality; and an accidental
social experience is always more a product of suppression than an
object of genuine human interest. Moreover, the more accidental the
social experience, the more mandatory it becomes to reinforce social
order by invoking techniques of social persuasion. The process of
corporate sociability is condemned, of course, to the maximization of
accidentality, since nowhere in the corporate world is there to be
found any genuine basis of human solidarity which would add meaning
to a mode of social life which has rewards and punishments as its
content and the materialization of collectively approved whims as its
dynamic. Accordingly, the corporate life-order is also condemned to
sustain, or to <u>attempt</u> to sustain, its social apparatus by invoking,

on an ever increasing scale, the suppressive techniques of social
persuasion.

It is the inherent supressiveness of the corporate social
experience, together with the absence of any hope for its internal
resolution, which catalyzes the development of the social problem of
human freedom. The problem of human social liberation thus arises at
whatever time and place an aversive response to an accidental social
experience sparks a desire for the creation of a more substantive
process of human sociability. A substantive social world is typified
by the formation of genuine human solidarities around the appreciation
of the products of reconstructive human thought.[4] In a substantive
social world, self-interest and human freedom are not mutually
exclusive. A substantive process of human sociability is always
distinguished by a broadening of the content of human self-interest to
include such genuine human aspirations as the desire for social
solidarities. Genuine human solidarities cannot, of course, either be
predetermined or be nurtured out of instrumentalism. They develop
within provisional social groupings which emerge and decline in
response to the possibilities present for the organic unification of
human experience. Such provisional social groupings have no basis of
justification other than their own intrinsic appeal. They are neither
sources of social certitude nor conglomerates of rewards and punish-
ments but simply active social processes which promote the deepening
and broadening of substantive human friendships. It is the creation
of a dynamic union between human self-interest and the development
of solidary social groupings which constitute the nucleus of the

problem of human social liberation. In this vein, human sociability

is made substantive in direct proportion to the convergence established

between social interests and social solidarities. The creation of

a direct relationship between the maximization of human self-interest

and the development of genuine human solidarities marks, in turn, the

precise point at which an accidental social experience, based upon

the systematic distortion of human social aspirations, begins to

decline.

While the general problem of human freedom includes subjective,

collective, and social expressions, it is not exhausted by them.

On the contrary, the issue of human freedom contains one final dimension –

the aesthetic problem of human liberation. The <u>aesthetic</u> problem of

human freedom may be defined as the following concern: How might

it be possible to move beyond the condition of human immorality,

and thereby beyond the repressive manipulation of human moral sentiments,

to the creation of a more <u>critical</u> human value situation? The condition

of human immorality has previously been portrayed as that human value

situation which is characterized by the presence of many means of

securing moral order, and by the absence of any substantive reason

for the necessity of such order. In the condition of human immorality,

the process of value experience dissolves into a technique, albeit

an empty technique, for garnering commitments to the continuance of

corporate existence. The emergent network of human commitments has, as

its content, whichever mode of mental seduction or propagandistic

appeal appears most efficacious in fostering human loyalties to the

perpetuation of an irrational, reactive, and accidental life-order.

Nowhere in an immoral social world - a world linked tegether by

seduction and propaganda - is there to be found any genuine human value

which would principle either the criticism of a past history of social

experience or the creation of a more desirable human future. In the

absence of any genuine value principle, the corporate world is condemned

to be held together by the repressive manipulation of moral conscious-

ness. And the more apparent it becomes that the corporate world is

fundamentally immoral, the more necessary it becomes to compensate

for the absence of any genuine human value principle by resorting to

psychic repression. Moral <u>order</u> thus depends upon psychic repression;

and the repressive manipulation of moral consciousness serves to

reinforce a process of value experience which has propaganda as its

basis, and the maximization of commitments to the corporate world as

its dynamic.

It is the inherent repressiveness of the corporate value

experience, together with the absence of any possibility for its

internal rectification, which provides the basis for the develop-

ment of the aesthetic problem of human freedom. The problem of aesthetic

human liberation emerges, in this event, whenever and wherever an

aversive reaction to moral repression breeds an intense yearning for

the creation of a more critical human value situation. A critical

human value situation is distinguished, at every instant, by the

transformation of the very process of social morality into a means,

albeit a <u>prospective</u> means, of synthesizing genuine human solidarities

into new, and more satisfactory, totalizations of human experience.

A totalization of human experience refers to any broadly conceived

image of the human situation which both discloses human progress

towards the creation of an organic social univers, and which reveals

new opportunities for the development of a more holistic social

world. A totalization of human experience thus combines in a single

vision of the human condition an evaluation of a past history of

social experience, and the creation of new possibilities for establish-

ing balance and reciprocity between all aspects of the human social

reality.[5] As a process of totalization, a critical human value

experience represents neither a source of moral consistency nor an

apology for a given actuality. Rather, a critical process of value

experience constitutes a point of active social transformation in

its own right. It is the social process by which human beings may

reflect upon their experience, and attempt to break beyond it. This

dual process of reflection and creation has no external basis of

justification. It is neither a matter of human belief nor a product

of human commitment, but simply a process of human liberation in and

of itself. As a process of human liberation, a critical human value

experience invests each aspect of the human social reality with a moral

dimension. This moral dimension - the synthesis of a past history of

social experience into new, and more adequate, totalizations of the

human condition - remains an internal · feature of a libertarian

social reality. In a libertarian social world, there is no process of

human survival, no human political practice, and no act of human

sociability which does not ultimately culminate, or may not ultimately

culminate, in a better understanding of what has already been accomplished,

and what remains to be accomplished, in terms of the organic unification

of human experience. And insofar as each aspect of a liberatarian social world contributes to a better understanding of possibilities yet unrealized for the organic unification of human experience, each phase of a free human world may be viewed as fundamentally moral. A critical process of social morality is thus a process of human liberation in its own right; and this process of human liberation streams through each of the activities involved in the creation of an organic social world. How such a critical process of social morality might be wrested out of the repressiveness of corporate existence represents, of course, the nucleus of the aesthetic aspect of the general problem of human freedom.

The creation of an organic social reality thus begins with a root reconstruction of the process of human sensibility. This transformation of human sensibility is distinguished by the generalized human conviction that the problematic character of human freedom constitutes the most pressing issue of human life. In its fullest expression, the problem of human freedom contains four interrelated dimensions, each of which is grounded in a radical alteration of a particular aspect of the process of human sensibility. These four particular expressions of the general problem of human freedom are not isolated from one another, but are linked together by means of concretely experienced relations of preformance, anticipation, and summation. The quest for a more holistic, and thereby libertarian, process of human subjectivity preforms and anticipates the yearning for collective human freedom. The desire for a more reconstructive mode of human consciousness summarizes the quest for subjective

human freedom, and sets the stage for the development of the social problem of human liberation. The quest for a more substantive process of human sociability sums up the subjective and collective dimensions of the problem of human freedom and anticipates the desire for aesthetic human liberation. And, finally, the yearning for a more critical process of value experience develops out of a prior history of libertarian human sentiments, and grounds, once more, the development of the subjective problem of human freedom. Taken together, these four particular problems of human freedom represent complementary features of a unitary process of human sensibility. While this unitary process of human sensibility provides the basis for a complete impression concerning what is most problematic in the corporate life-order, it does not provide an answer to what must be done for the creation of a more organic process of social experience. Such an answer awaits the development of the phenomenology of human freedom.

The Phenomenology of Human Freedom

In the complete process of social experience, human sensibility preforms and anticipates both the content and the direction of human consciousness. Thus, while the problem of human freedom is grounded in an aversive response to the human condition of reinforced meaningless-ness, this core alteration of human sensibility further anticipates the development of a libertarian process of human consciousness. In its fullest expression, this libertarian process of human consciousness may be described as the phenomenology of human freedom.   The phenomenology of human freedom sums up in a single unitary vision of

the human social reality key postulates concerning what must be done

for the realization of a more holistic, reconstructive, substantive,

and critical social world. These key social postulates establish,

albeit in the sense of an emergent human awareness, the modes of being,

knowledge, practice, and morality which lineament a libertarian

human situation. An emergent human awareness concerning what must

be done for the actualization of human freedom does not, of course,

suddenly spring out of nowhere. On the contrary, the phenomenology

of human freedom is based in a radical transformation of the process

of human queries. The process of human queries has previously been

described as a dynamic working-out of concretely experienced relations

of preformance, anticipation, and summation between ontological,

epistemological, axiological, and aesthetic human assumptions, each

of which responds to a particular dimension of human sensibility.

The phenomenology of human freedom emerges directly from a qualitative

reconstruction of each of the above basic human assumptions and of

the relationships which hold between them. Considered individually,

each qualitiative reconstruction of a basic human assumption, whether

ontological, epistemological, axiological, or aesthetic, provides the

basis for a specific understanding of what must be done for the

resolution of a particular expression of the general problem of human

freedom. Taken together, these four qualitative reconstructions of the

different dimensions of the process of human queries provide the

basis for a complete understanding of how it might be possible fully

to materialize the desire for human liberation. The phenomenology

of human freedom thus interrelates into a unitary process of human
consciousness all the critical social assumptions necessary for the
development of a libertarian social world. This unitary process of
human consciousness contains, in its fullest expression, an ontology
of human freedom, an epistemology of human freedom, an axiology of
human freedom, and an aesthetic of human freedom. The ontology of
human freedom specifies what must be done for the realization of a
more holisitc social world. The epistemology of human freedom provides
the assumptions which precondition the development of a reconstructive
process of human thought. The axiology of human freedom specifies
what must be done for the actualization of a more substantive process
of human sociability. And the aesthetic of human freedom provides
the basis for an active appreciation of what might constitute a more
critical value experience. When combined, these four libertarian
human postulates may be viewed as complementary aspects of a single,
unitary world-view which responds fully to the desire for human
freedom. For example, the ontology of human freedom transforms the
yearning for a more holistic process of human subjectivity into an
organic definition of social reality. The organic viewpoint provides
the context for the development of social holisms, and sets the stage
for the appearance of the epistemology of human freedom. The
epistemology of human freedom transforms the desire for a more
reconstructive process of human consciousness into the nucleus of a
genuinely empirical theory of human knowledge. This genuinely empirical
theory of human knowledge represents a complete answer to the formative

human query concerning what might constitute a more adequate mode of

human thought vis-à-vis the problem of human freedom, and anticipates,

in turn, the development of the axiology of human freedom. The axiology

of human freedom transforms the aspiration for a more substantive

process of human sociability into a radical reconstruction of the

fundamental human assumptions which "context" the more material

aspect of social existence. This radical reconstruction of the critical

social assumptions surrounding the process of human sociability sets

the stage for the creation of genuine human solidarities, and furnishes

the ground for the development of the aesthetic of human freedom.

The aesthetic of human freedom transforms the desire for a more critical

value experience into a transformational description of the process

of social morality. This transformational description of the human

value experience preconditions the development of a more genuine

process of moral activity, and summarizes, in turn, assumptions

concerning the organic, reconstructive, and intrinsic character of

the human social reality. The phenomenology of human freedom thus

consists of an ascending spiral of interrelated assumptions, each of

which represents a response, albeit a partial response, to the

general human query concerning what must be done for the realization

of a more libertarian world. The following section will briefly

examine the fundamental human assumptions necessary for the actualization

of human freedom.

The Organic Universe

The phenomenology of human freedom is grounded in the vision of an organic social universe. The organic viewpoint holds that social reality is neither apprehended pluralistically nor held together by a metaphysical principle of absoluteness, but is concretely unified by means of the process of social action itself. From the organic standpoint, nothing transpires in human existence which is not concretely apprehended; and nothing is concretely apprehended which may not be viewed as one aspect or dimension of a broader process of social action. This broader process of social axtion provides the ultimate ground for all social experience, and represents the furthest extension possible of empirical social reality.[6]

Ontologically, therefore, the phenomenology of human freedom maintains that concrete social reality is exhausted by the different dimensions of the unitary process of social action, and by the relationships which exist between them. In such a universe, no definitive separations, irredeemable dualisms, or deterministic reductions are possible between the bio-physical and the intuitive, the intuitive and the conscious, the conscious and the active, the active and the moral, or between the moral and the more environmental aspect of social experience. In an organic social universe there is simply a unitary, dynamic process of social action which principles the entire spread of social experience. This unitary human social process provides for the interrelation of all dimensions of social experience, whether of the bio-physical, affective, reflective, active, or aesthetic, in a solitary human movement mediated by concretely experienced relations

of complementarity and reciprocity. In an organic social world, human

sentiment serves as a dynamic connective between a past history of

social experience and a present bio-physical condition; human thought

transforms an intuitive appreciation concerning what is most problematic

in the human situation into an exploration of possibilities for its

rectification; human practise provides for the concrete actualization

of the products of human reflection; and human morality organizes

the process of social activity around the consideration of new

opportunities for the development of a more holistic, reconstructive,

substantive, and critical social world.

While limiting concrete social reality to the history of

the relationships existent between the different dimensions of social

action, the organic viewpoint does not assume that the internal unity

of social experience has ever been fully appreciated. On the contrary,

the organic viewpoint holds that the presence of a complementary and

reciprocal human social process as the ultimate ground of concrete

social reality has never been fully realized anywhere in the history

of human experience, and, even if realized, can never be fully

actualized. The human imperative in an organic social universe is not

to submit passively to the vision of a finished world but actively to

accept the responsibility of drawing out more and more fully the

unitary character of the human social experience. An organic process of

social experience is, in other words, less a finished fact than an

active human possibility.

It is the possibility of establishing complementarity and

reciprocity between all dimensions of the process of social action,

and thereby materializing the concrete and organic character of the human social experience, which principles the solution to the subjective problem of human freedom. The subjective problem of human freedom originates, in its most elementary expression, in an aversive response to the condition of human irrationality. Human irrationality derives, above all, from the general human belief that the social universe is populated, in its essential features, by a plurality of discrete entities in need of some principle of external unification. The mastery of human irrationality thus requires, at first, the ontological observation that concrete social reality, organically conceived, contains its own internal principle of unification - the dynamic process of social action itself. Accordingly, the human task in an organic social universe is not to order parts into some whole, but to synthesize a whole into some substantive human meaning. And insofar as the creation of substantive human meanings provides content for the problem of human freedom, the human project in an organic social universe is less the attainment of social order than the fullest realization possible of human liberation. Human freedom is thus, at root, an ontological problem. And as an ontological problem, the quest for human liberation requires for its solution an abandonment of the entitative world-view in favour of an organic definition of social reality. While the vision of an organic social universe preconditions the development, or possible development, of a more holistic process of human subjectivity, it does not provide an answer as to how the internal unity of social experience might be more fully exposed. The creation of a holistic social world awaits, in this case, a further

epistemological assumption concerning the reconstructive character
of human thought.

Reconstructive Consciousness

While the phenomenology of human freedom originates in the
vision of an organic social universe, it always continues with an
epistemological assumption concerning the reconstructive character
of human thought. The reconstructive viewpoint holds that human thought,
empirically conceived, is neither tautological nor analytical but
a concretely apprehended process of human liberation in its own
right. From the reconstructive standpoint, the adequacy of any
given mode of human thought depends, above all, upon its empirical
character; and its empirical character depends upon the degree to
which it manages to evade both the metaphysical and the abstract
in favour of a direct confrontation with the concrete social world.
While such a direct confrontation with the concrete social world is
distinguished by the absence of either the certitude of human dogma
or the security of human reification, it is guided by the dual
impulses of all empiricisms - the desire to limit social inquiry to
that portion of the human social experience which may be examined
without the benefit of a priori assumptions, primal credos, or
excessive formalisms, and the consequent willingness to employ the
results of such inquiry to advertise rigorously the possibilities
existent, at any given time and place, for the creation of comp-
lementarity and reciprocity between all dimensions of the process
of social action. Reconstructive human thought is thus always

genuinely empirical; and a genuinely empirical process of social

inquiry is always fundamentally libertarian.[7]

The reconstructive viewpoint of human thought may be viewed

as a direct response to the ontology of human freedom. The ontology

of human freedom is grounded in the dual observation that concrete

social reality has, as its outer limit, the relationships which obtain

between the different aspects of the unitary process of social action,

and that the project of human liberation devolves on the organic

interrelation of the constituents of concrete social expereince

into a process of complementarity and reciprocity. The ontological

assumption of an organic social universe is, moreover, fundamentally a

product of human sentiment insofar as it derives, in large part, from

the subjective human aspiration for a more holistic social world.

While human sentiment serves as the nucleus of the vision of an

organic social universe, such sensibility requires, for its satis-

faction, a concrete means of expression. The reconstructive viewpoint

of human thought acts as such a concrete means of expression. In

this event, the epistemological assumption concerning the reconstructive

character of human thought functions to generalize a libertarian

process of human sensibility into an equally libertarian process of

human consciousness, and thus transforms the _desire_ for a more holistic

social world into an active process of social _inquiry_ which seeks out

opportunities, albeit within the limits of concrete social reality, for

the organic unification of human experience. Reconstructive consciousness

thus serves as an avenue of expression for an organic process of

human sensibility; and the epistemology of human freedom sums up the

human ontology into a radical alteration of the place of thought
in social existence.

The epistemolgical vision of reconstructive human consciousness
does not, however, only advance the ontology of human liberation.
It also responds directly to the formative human query concerning
what must be done for the realization of collective human freedom.
The problem of collective human freedom derives from an aversive
response to the condition of political reactiveness. While a reactive
political experience originates, in its most fundamental expression,
in the human conviction that the process of social consciousness
is inevitably dualistic, it is actualized by the transformation of
this human conviction into the activity of mobilization. The rect-
ification of a reactive political experience thus requires, at first,
a root reconstruction of the epistemological theory which ultimately
provides the basis for the process of political mobilization. This
root reconstruction of the epistemology of human order begins with
the assumption that social inquiry, empirically considered, is never
dualistic, but unitary; and that the project of empirical social
inquiry is never the subjugation of concrete human beings to a process
of reification, but the actualization of opportunities for becoming
genuinely human. Such a fundamental revision of the place of thought in
human affairs is provided, of course, by the epistemology of human
freedom. The epistemology of human freedom proposes a more substantive
empiricism, indeed, a reconstructive empiricism, as the basis for the
development of a more adequate mode of human knowledge, and regards
reconstructive empiricism as a point of release for the creation of an

organic social universe. While reconstructive empiricism counterpoints

a reactive political experience, it does not explain how the products

of libertarian human thought might be actively transformed into the

basis of a more substantive process of human sociability. An under-

standing concerning how empirical social inquiry might be generalized

into a libertarian process of social activity awaits the development

of the axiology of human freedom.

Intrinsic Activity

So far, the phenomenology of human freedom has involved two

formative postulates: an ontological assumption concerning the organic

character of the social universe, and an epistemological assumption

concerning the reconstructive character of empirical human consciousness.

While the ontology of human freedom has responded to the subjective

human aspiration for a more holistic social world, the epistemology

of human freedom has depicted what must be done for the realization

of a more principled process of social inquiry. The phenomenology of

human freedom does not conclude, however, with the epistemological

observation that human consciousness, empirically conceived, is

fundamentally reconstructive. Rather, the phenomenology of human

freedom continues with a further axiological assumption concerning

the intrinsic character of a libertarian process of human sociability.

The axiology of human freedom proposes, in this event, that a genuinely

meaningful process of human sociability is neither a product of teleology

nor a matter of instrumentalism, but an object of intrinsic human

worth.[8] As an object of intrinsic human worth, a genuinely meaningful

process of human sociability contains no principle of justification

other than that it constitutes the exact social process by which

human freedom may be generalized beyond the reflective and into the

more material aspect of social experience. Thus, while teleologically

motivated relations may possess as their source of validation a meta-

physical principle of some sort, and instrumental relations may be

grounded in a network of rewards and punishments, intrinsically

appealing human relations, being neither anti-empirical nor spurious,

may claim only an internal validation as processes, albeit partial

processes, of human liberation in their own right. Human freedom,

in other words, is the practice of human freedom; and the practice

of human freedom is self-validating and self-rewarding.

The intrinsic viewpoint arises in direct response to the

problem of human social freedom. The problem of human social freedom

is the product of an aversive response to the condition of human

accidentality. An accidental social experience derives, most fundamentally,

from the widespread human conviction that the process of human

sociability is exhausted by instrumentality, and from the consequent

transformation of this general human belief into a pattern of social

organization which is distinguished by the activity of canalization.

The rectification of an accidental social experience thus requires,

above all, the diminution of the instrumentalist perspective, and the

ascendency of a human axiology which holds that the substantiveness

of a given process of human sociability varies in direct proportion

to its intrinsic appeal. What lends intrinsic value, and thereby

substantiveness, to a given process of human sociability is not, of

course, a matter of human eclecticism.

Human relationships gain intrinsic appeal to the extent that they constitute, or strive to constitute, social processes by which the products of reconstructive human thought might be actualized. Intrinsically appealing human relationships are thus always principled human relationships; and principled human relationships always represent a dynamic working-out of the fruits of libertarian human thought in the domain of social practice. It is the transformation of the products of reconstructive human consciousness into a dynamic process of intrinsic human relationships which provides the basis for the development of a substantive social experience, and thereby of human social freedom. The project of human social freedom, therefore, demands for its materialization the creation of a more substantive process of human sociability. And the development of a more substantive social experience requires, for its inception, an abandonment of both the teleological and the instrumental in favour of a mode of social practice which bases its claim to internal validation upon the social fact that it represents an active working-out of the opportunities present, at any given moment, for the organic unification of human experience. While the intrinsic viewpoint provides the key to the solution of the problem of human social freedom, it does not respond to the human aspiration for a more critical value experience. Such a response is privided, however, by the aesthetic of human freedom.

Transformational Values

The aesthetic of human freedom responds to the desire for a more

critical value experience by providing the central principles of a

new human understanding of what might constitute a more adequate

definition of the process of social morality. The aesthetic of human

freedom proposes that the adequacy of a given process of social morality

is less a matter of its ability to yield either a consistent or redundant

world-view than of its capacity to serve as an active process of

social transformation in its own right. From the libertarian viewpoint,

the human value experience, concretely conceived, cannot, and, indeed,

should not, function as either a repositor of human dogma or an

object of human commitment, but should, instead, serve as the social

process by which libertarian human sensibilities, reconstructive human

consciousness, and intrinsic human relationships are solidified as

complementary and reciprocal aspects of a general human movement

towards the creation of an organic social world. A libertarian human

value experience is, in other words, an active process of social

transformation; and this active process of transformation is nothing

less that the very process of achieving the organic unification of

social experience.[9] There is, therefore, no inherent separation

between the human value experience, when considered as an active process

of social transformation, and the other constituents of an organic

social world. In an organic social world, the process of social

morality is not irretrievably cut adrift from either human affectivity,

consciousness, or activity. On the contrary, an organic social world

is distinguished by the investiture of every aspect of the human social

experfience w: ` a moral dimension. And this moral dimension serves
as a concrete ;· ˉ of expression for the progress made, at any given
moment, towards   dynamic unification of the process of social
experience. The ˉ :·ization of the moral possibilities of every
aspect of the human social experience is simultaneous, therefore,
with the fullest actualization possible of the opportunities existent
for the development of an organic social world.

The vision of the human value experience as a process of
social transformation responds directly to the aesthetic problem of
human freedom. The aesthetic problem of human freedom has previously
been portrayed as originating in an aversive response to the condition
of human immorality. An immoral value experience is based, most
fundamentally, in the generalized human belief that human values are
agents of social redundancy, and in the consequent transformation of
this root human belief into a process of value experience which is
characterized, at every instant, by the activity of commitment. The
rectification of an immoral value experience thus requires, at first,
an abandonment of the redundancy viewpoint, and the assertion of a
human aesthetic which holds that the genuineness of a given process of
social morality is a derivative of its ability to function as a dynamic
process of social transformation. What adds genuineness, and thereby
a transformational character, to a given process of social morality
is not, of course, a product of human chance. A human value experience
becomes genuine to the extent that it constitutes, or strives to
constitute, a social process by which a given history: of holistic
human sentiments, reconstructive social inquiries, and intrinsic

human solidarities might be summarized, criticized, and, thereupon, generalized into new opportunities for the creation of an organic social world. A genuinely moral value experience is thus one which is grounded in a past history of social experience; and a grounded value experience always represents a means for the dynamic transformation of a past history of social experience into the creation of new libertarian human possibilities. Ultimately, it is the development of such a genuine process of social morality which counterpoints the redundancy of human immorality, and thus provides the key to the successful solution of the aesthetic problem of human freedom.

The emergence of a new, and more genuine, human aesthetic represents the point of culmination of the phenomenology of human freedom. The phenomenology of human freedom thus consists, in its fullest expression, of four interrelated human assumptions, each of which contributes to a general human understanding concerning what must be done for the realization of a more substantively meaningful social universe. The ontology of human freedom has proposed the image of an organic social universe as a necessary prelude to the development of a more holistic process of human subjectivity. The epistemology of human freedom has presented empirical social inquiry, reconstructively conceived, as the basis for a more creative political experience. The axiology of human freedom has grounded the quest for a more substantive process of human sensibility in the vision of intrinsic human solidarities. And finally, the aesthetic of human freedom has proposed the image of transformational human values as

a necessary precondition for the appearance of a critical moral

experience. While these fundamental human postulates clarify the

central principles of a libertarian social world, they do not explain

how human freedom might be concretely actualized. Such an explanation

awaits the development of the process of organic action.

The Process of Organic Action

The phenomenology of human freedom has elucidated the basic

assumptions necessary for the creation of a libertarian social world.

These basic assumptions are structured out into the domain of concrete

social action by means of a unique pattern of social organization.

This pattern of social organization represents the social process

by which the quest for human liberation may be generalized beyond its

basis in human affectivity and human consciousness into the realm of

concrete social practice. This social process of human liberation

may be viewed, in its essential features, as the process of organic

action itself.

The process of organic action is grounded in a root reconst-

ruction of the more active dimension of the complete process of social

experience. The more active dimension of the complete human social

process has previously been described as a dynamic working-out of

relationships between four rudimentary human activities, each of

which serves to materialize a specific human query. These four

rudimentary human activities have been identified as human survival

practices, human political practices, human social practices, and

human aesthetic practices. In its fullest expression, the process

of organic action derives from a core alteration of each of the above

rudimentary human practices. And each core alteration of a rudimentary

human practice yields a specific explanation concerning how a part-

icular libertarian human postulate might be materialized. The process

of organic action thus consists of four rudimentary human activities,

each of which transforms a particular aspect of the phenomenology of

human freedom into a specific pattern of social organization. These

four constituents of the process of organic action may be described

as the activities of <u>actualization</u> , <u>reconstruction</u> , <u>consolidation</u> ,

and <u>creation</u>. Each of these four libertarian activities may be viewed

as complementary aspects of a single, unitary process of organic

action, which is grounded in the activity of actualization, continues

with the activity of reconstruction, spreads out into the activity

of consolidation, and culminates with the activity of creation.

Actualization

The activity of actualization denotes the entire social

process involved in the transformation of the human survival experience

into a concrete working-out of the ontology of human freedom. In

responding to the desire for a more holistic process of social being,

the ontology of human freedom has advanced the vision of an organic

social universe as the basis of a more adequate understanding of

the nature and limits of the human social reality. Basically, the

organic viewpoint has held the resolution of the problem of subjective

human freedom to be a matter of establishing relationships of comp-

lementarity and reciprocity between all dimensions of the human social

experience. Indeed, the very process of achieving such a dynamic

unification of the human social experience has been viewed as the ultimate ground for the development of a genuinely libertarian, and thereby substantively meaningful, process of social being. Thus, according to the ontology of human freedom, the more organic the social experience, the more libertarian the process of social being; and the more libertarian the process of social being, the more substantively meaningful the social world.

The materialization of the ontological assumption of an organic social universe grounds in the seminal insight that in a libertarian social world the human survival experience is neither concerned with the reification of a given actuality nor with the mythification of metaphysical dogma, but is, instead, driven by the actualization of genuine human possibilities. The term "genuine human possibilities" refers to those prospective directions in human action which, if actualized, would result not only in the widest distribution possible of the means to human livelihood but, more importantly, in the up-grading of human sustenance in such a way as actively to engender the organic unification of social experience. Thus, while genuine human possibilities always have the maximization of the physical requirements of human life as their content, they possess as their dynamic the transformation of the quest itself for human necessity into a means of achieving an organic social world. It is the actualization of such genuine human possibilities which forms the nucleus of a libertarian human survival experience. In this vein, a libertarian human survival experience may be understood as providing for the fullest disclosure possible of the opportunities

present in any given human situation for the creation of relationships of complementarity and reciprocity between the demands of human necessity and the ideals of human freedom. In a libertarian process of human survival, the positive synthesis of human necessity and human freedom is concretely evidenced by the struggle to actualize only those human futures which would prove conducive to greater balance and harmony between the bio-physical, intellectual, social, and moral dimensions of human experience. Such a dynamic synthesis of the human social experience represents, of course, nothing less than a concrete working-out of the ontology of human freedom.

The transformation of the human survival experience into a process of actualization cannot occur without a prior revolution of human sensibilities. This prior revolution of human sensibilities is given witness by human beings striving to break beyond the chains of human mythification and the bonds of human abstraction to a social universe which is actively embraced as both a product of human will and an object of human responsibility. From the vantage point of libertarian human sensibilities, the core social fact of human existence is that the process of concrete social experience is neither predetermined nor inherently meaningful but developmental and only potentially meaningful. Substantive human meaning can neither be found outside of concrete social experience nor imposed upon it, but has to be actively created. The human conviction that meaning is created rather than given requires, at first, a rejection of human dogma and the intention to distance oneself from the apparatus of

corporate roles. While human dogma subordinates the social self to

a preformed meaning, the apparatus of corporate roles isolates the

social self from the question of meaning altogether. However,

demythification and role-distance only set the stage for the addition

of substantive human meaning to concrete social experience. What

ultimately adds meaning to human life is the profound human sensibility

that the liberation of social being involves the same process as the

actualization of genuine human possibilities. From this viewpoint,

a sustantively meaningful social world is always distinguished by

the actualization of genuine human possibilities; and the actualiz-

ation of genuine human possibilites is always concurrent with the

fullest development possible of a libertarian process of social

being. Meaning is added to human life, in other words, by the human

determination to consider being itself as an emergent of the reconcil-

iation which has been achieved, or may be achieved, between the different

dimensions of the human social experience.[10] While the activity of

actualization constitutes the exact social process by which a

genuinely libertarian, and thereby substantively meaningful, mode

of social being may be developed, it does not provide a political

expression for the quest for human freedom. A political expression

for human freedom is provided, however, by the activity of reconstruction.

Reconstruction

The activity of reconstruction refers to the entire social

process involved in the transformation of the human political experience

into a concrete working-out of the epistemology of human freedom.

In addressing the desire for a less reactive mode of human consciousness, the epistemology of human freedom has proposed a theory of reconstructive empiricism as the basis of a more adequate understanding of the place of thought in human experience. In its essential features, the theory of reconstructive empiricism has held the solution to the problem of collective human freedom to be a matter of transforming human thought, concretely conceived, into a means, albeit a partial means, of providing expression for the opportunities existent, at any given moment, for the organic unification of social experience. Rather than isolating human thought from human sensibility, reconstructive empiricism has viewed inquiry and sentiment as interrelated aspects of a unitary process of human freedom. While libertarian human sentiment provides the ground for the development of genuine human possibilities, concrete human thought transforms such possibilities into the vanguard of a root reconstruction of the human social experience. Thus, according to the epistemology of human freedom, the more concrete the process of human inquiry, the more libertarian the social experience; and the more libertarian the social experience, the greater the degree of coalescence between human feeling and human reflection.

The materialization of the epistemology of human freedom is grounded in the formative insight that in a libertarian social world the human political experience is neither a conversionary process nor a technique of mass mobilization, but rather a means by which genuine human possibilities may be developed into substantive human meanings. The term "substantive human meanings" refers to those fleeting images

of the human social reality which capture, at least for an instant,

an intense human awareness of the impediments which confront the concrete

realization of libertarian human possibilities. Thus, while substantive

human meanings always have genuine human possibilities as their content,

they possess as their dynamic the transformation of such possibilities

into a rigorous investigation of the obstacles to human freedom

present within any given human situation. This rigorous investigation

of the human social reality is neither a product of human apology

nor an object of human obedience. It is, rather, a process, indeed,

an active and critical process, of social reconstruction. As a

reconstructive social process, the creation of substantive human meanings

has, as its core, the severance and revision of all dimensions of

concrete social experience. This dual process of disseverance and

revision is intended to expose fully all impediments to human freedom

and to provide the basis for a new, and more satisfactory, realignment

of human experience. It is the development of a more adequate realign-

ment of human experience which forms the nucleus of a libertarian

human political experience. A libertarian human political experience

may be envisioned as a process which moves by negation and creation

towards a better understanding of how human experience must be

reconstructed if the remaining imediments to human freedom are to

be surpassed. While this proposed reconstruction of human experience is

primarily a product of human reflection, it is fueled by libertarian

human sensibilities. Libertarian human sensibilities impel reconstruct-

ions of the human condition; and such reconstructions of the human

condition elevate human sentiment into qualitatively more profound

modes of human reflection. The politics of reconstruction thus provides

for a dynamic synthesis of human thought and human affectivity.

Such a dynamic synthesis of feeling and reflection constitutes nothing

less than a concrete working-out of the epistemology of human freedom.

The emergence of reconstructive activity presupposes a radical

alteration of human beliefs about the nature of political life.

From the libertarian viewpoint, the human political experience has

nothing to do with either obedience or obligation. Having rejected

salvation as a central human problem, the libertarian perspective

cannot find any principled reason for human beings to seek certitude

within metaphysical collectivities. And having repudiated order as a

spurious human problem, the libertarian viewpoint cannot discover

any genuine human need for mobilizing human beings into mass collectivities.

In the absence of either obedience or obligation, the libertarian

approach considers political life as nothing more than a celebration

of the human capacity to reflect critically upon its concrete social ·

condition and to break beyond it. Political life, of this sort, has

no necessary collective form. It is concerned neither with the formation

of metaphysical communities nor with the creation of enduring conglom-

erates. Rather, it is devoted to the subordination of all collective

forms, whether communal or organizational, to the process of critical

human reflection. In its essential features, the process of critical

human reflection is a product of individual human scholarship. While

individual human scholarship may, at times, be broadened out into a

cooperative venture, such cooperation must be held relative to the

reconstructive propensities of libertarian human thought. And at

the exact instant that cooperative intellectual relations threaten

to fossilize into collective ones, even scholarly cooperation must

be subordinated to the rigorous demands of constructive and reconstructive

human inquiry.[11] Reconstructive political inquiry is fated, of course,

to remain highly negative. The politics of reconstruction does not

spring out of a void, but develops out of a social world in which

many human beings are doubly constrained by mobilization and

conversion. In such a world, the task of reconstructive political

inquiry is to demonstrate continuously the deficiencies of both

political order and political certitude, and to synthesize its findings

into substantive human meanings. While the creation of substantive

human meanings ultimately provides content for political freedom,

this content needs to be socially materialized. The transformation

of the content of political freedom into social practice takes place

by means of the activity of consolidation.

Consolidation

The activity of consolidation denotes the entire social process

involved in the transformation of the human social experience into

a concrete working out of the axiology of human freedom. In responding

to the human aspiration for a substantive social experience, the axiology

of human freedom has advanced the image of intrinsic human relationships

as the basis of a more adequate process of human sociability. Fundamentally,

the intrinsic viewpoint has held the solution to the problem of human

social freedom to be a matter of principling the process of human

relationships in the appreciation of the products of reconstructive

thought. Thus, rather than alienating human sociability from reflection

and sensibility, the intrinsic viewpoint has postulated human sentiment,

social inquiry, and social communication as complementary dimensions

of a unitary human social process. While libertarian sensibilities

ground the creation of genuine human possibilities and reconstructive

thought transforms such possibilities into substantive human meanings,

the process of human sociability, intrinsically conceived, provides

for the lived appreciation of such substantive human meanings. Thus,

according to the axiology of human freedom, the more intrinsic the

process of social relationships, the more libertarian the human

experience; and the more libertarian the human experience, the greater

the interrelatedness of human sentiment, thought and practice.

The materialization of the axiology of human freedom begins

with the formative observation that in a libertarian world the human

social experience represents neither a working-out of teleology nor

a process of canalization. It represents a means by which the fruits

of reconstructive inquiry may be consolidated into genuine human

solidarities. The term "genuine human solidarities" refers to those

enduring bonds of social interrelationship which emerge out of the

human struggle to realize concretely the results of reconstructive

inquiry. While genuine human solidarities are principled in a shared

appreciation of the obstacles to human freedom present within the

human siutation, they are fueled by the transformation of this common

appraisal of the human scene into a concrete living-out of the

possibilities existent, at any given moment, for the organic unification

of human experience. This concrete living-out of libertarian human

possibilities is neither inspired by rewards and punishments nor is it

a matter of "right social conduct." It is motivated by the consolidation

of every aspect of human social life around the implementation of a

dynamic unity between all dimensions of human experience. Although

this process of consolidation is not backed up by gains in social

prestige or by the maximization of social certitude, it is, nonetheless,

intrinsically rewarding. And it is intrinsically rewarding because

the transformation of human social life into a living-out of the

project of human freedom constitutes the social process by which

human relationships may be made substantive. Human relationships

obtain substantiveness, in this case, in direct proportion to their

providing a social expression for the struggle to realize an organic

social world. Or, stated in another way, substantive human relationships

are directly principled in the process of establishing reciprocity

and complementarity between all dimensions of the human social

experience. As principled social processes, substantive human relation-

ships do not culminate in the development of either closed social

groupings or the pseudo-groupings of the corporate world. They do

culminate in the formation of genuine human solidarities. And it is

the formation of such genuine human solidarities which represents the

nucleus of a libertarian human social experience. A libertarian human

social experience may be thus viewed as a means to the formation of

enduring bonds of social interrelationship between human beings who

are inspired by the ideals of human freedom. While these enduring

bonds of social interrelationship are based upon an identity of interests,

they are concretely experienced as a living-out of the possibilities

present for the organic unification of activity, thought, and sentiment.

This dynamic unification of human sensibility, inquiry, and sociability,

of course, constitutes nothing less than a concrete working-out of the

axiology of human freedom.

Creation

The process of social consolidation has summed up the activities

of actualization and reconstruction into a libertarian revision of

the human social experience. While this libertarian revision of the

human social experience has provided for the development of a

substantive process of human relationships, it has not responded to

the problem of human aesthetic freedom. Such a response is provided
12
by the activity of creation.

The activity of creation refers to the entire social process

involved in the transformation of the human value experience into a

concrete working-out of the aesthetic of human freedom. As an emergent

of the human desire for a critical moral experience, the aesthetic of

human freedom has advanced the image of human values as active processes

of social transformation in their own right. Basically, the transform-

ational viewpoint has held the solution to the problem of human aesthetic

freedom to be a matter of grounding the process of value experience

in the totalization of the different constituents of organic social

action. Thus, rather than abstracting the process of value experience

from human relationships, inquiry, and sensibility, the transformational

viewpoint has envisioned the human value experience as a means by which sentiment, thought, and sociability may be organized into new, and more adequate, understandings concerning what remains to be accomplished for the creation of an organic social world. Therefore, according to the aesthetic of human freedom, the more transform-ational the process of social morality, the more prospective the human experience; and the more prospective the human experience, the greater the possibility of a dynamic unity between human sensibility, reflection, activity, and morality.

The materialization of the aesthetic of human freedom is grounded in the seminal observation that in a libertarian social world the human value experience is neither a source of human consistency nor an object of human loyalty. Rather it is concerned with the transformation of an appreciative process of social activity into a critical moral synthesis. The term "critical moral synthesis" refers to that concrete, albeit prospective, realization of libertarian human possibilities which emerges out of a rigorous evaluation of a past history of social experience. While the development of a critical moral synthesis is grounded in an appraisal of a past history of social experience, it is neither a product of human ideology nor a derivative of human repression. On the contrary, the creation of a critical moral synthesis is motivated by the human struggle to achieve an organic social world, and, having achieved it, to break beyond it to the development of new libertarian human prospects. This dual process of criticism and creation is not removed, of course, from the other constituents of a libertarian social world. Indeed, the development

of a critical moral synthesis may be viewed as coexistent with the process of organic action itself.

Thus, the realization of libertarian human possibilities ultimately begins with the activity of actualization, continues with the practice of reconstruction, advances into the activity of consolidation, and culminates in the practice of creation. The creation of a critical moral synthesis may thus be viewed as binding together genuine human possibilities, substantive human meanings, and genuine human solidarities into a unitary process of value experience. And this unitary process of value experience may be envisioned, in its core features, as a concrete working-out of the aesthetic of human freedom.

The activity of creation represents the last point of culmination of the process of organic action. The process of organic action thus consists of four interrelated processes of social activity, each of which represents a concrete working-out of a specific dimension of the phenomenology of human freedom. The activity of actualization represents the social process by which possibilities for the development of a more holistic social world may be disclosed. The activity of reconstruction constitutes the social process by which a libertarian epistemology may be generalized into a process of political freedom. The activity of consolidation represents the social process by which a more substantive mode of human sociability may be materialized. And, finally, the activity of creation constitutes the social process by which the transformational viewpoint may be made the basis of the human value experience. Taken together, these four interrelated

processes of social activity may be envisioned as providing a complete answer concerning what must be done for the creation of a libertarian social world.

Conclusion

While not a historical inevitability, an organic paradigm of social action has always been a human possibility. This human possibility has required, for its prosecution, a fundamental reconstruction of the complete process of social action. This revision of the complete human social process begins with a core alteration of the process of human dispositions, continues with a transformation of the process of human queries, and is concretely materialized by means of a root reconstruction of the process of human activities. Or, stated in another way, an organic paradigm of social action commences with the ascendancy of the problem of human freedom, blossoms out into human consciousness by means of the phenomenology of human freedom, and is realized in concrete social experience by means of the process of organic action. While the activities of actualization, reconstruction, consolidation, and creation concretely materialize the quest for human liberation, they do not exhaust the full contours of an organic process of social reality. An organic process of social reality also manifests itself in a unique transformation of the quality of human life. This reconstruction of the quality of human life may be described as the condition of human uncertainty.

Chapter 7. The Condition of Human Uncertainty

Generalized processes of social experience are often associated

with a dominant value-quality. In terms of the history of social

action, this dominant value-quality is simultaneously retrospective

and prospective. Retrospectively, it constitutes the nucleus of the

human condition emergent from the resolution of a particular paradigmatic

problem. And prospectively, it symbolizes a qualitative transformation

of the human situation and thus sets the stage for the development, or

possible development, of a new human problem of paradigmatic proportions.

For example, the cosmolgical experience culminates in the condition

of human chaos. Chaos represents a lived summation of the quest for

human salvation and anticipates, in turn, the ascendency of the problem

of human order. Likewise, the corporate experience always tends

towards the human condition of reinforced meaninglessness. Reinforced

meaninglessness represents the value-quality associated with the desire

for an orderly social world. The antithesis of the human condition of

reinforced meaninglessness is, of course, the will to human freedom.

The will to human freedom motivates, and will likely continue to

motivate, the development of a more organic process of social experience.

And the organic experience, like its competitors – the corporate and the

cosmological experiences, culminates, or may culminate, in a distinctive

quality of human life.

This chapter will investigate the value-quality associated with the struggle for human freedom. This value-quality will be described as the condition of human uncertainty. The condition of human uncertainty may be defined as that quality of human life which is distinguished by the presence of many libertarian human possibilities, and by the absence of any way of achieving finality for the process of human freedom.[1] There are four modes of human uncertainty, each of which is grounded directly in a particular dimension of the process of organic experience. These four modes of human undertainty may be described as relativity, partiality, provisionality, and prospectiveness. Relativity represents the type of human uncertainty emergent from a human survival experience which is devoted to the fullest actualization possible of the opportunities present for the development of a more holistic social world. Partiality symbolizes the uncertainty of a reconstructive political experience. Provisionality refers to the mode of human uncertainty which is associated with a substantive process of human sociability. And, finally, prospectiveness denotes the uncertainty of a creative aesthetic experience. These four modes of human uncertainty are not independent of one another. On the contrary, each mode of human uncertainty may be viewed as a partial, albeit related aspect of a single, unitary process of qualitative human consequences. For example, the relativity of a libertarian process of social being anticipates, and even necessitates, the reduction of reconstructive human thought to the uncertainty of partiality. Similarly, the partial character of a libertarian process of human consciousness backs up, and even requires, the reduction of a consolidating social experience

to the uncertainty of provisionality. Further, the provisionality of

a libertarian process of human sociability anticipates, and even

demands, the reduction of a creative aesthetic experience to the

uncertainty of prospectiveness. Finally, the prospective character

of a libertarian process of social morality anticipates, once more,

the transformation of a wider and wider expanse of human experience

into the uncertainty of relativity, partiality, and provisionality.

The condition of human uncertainty thus contains four interrelated

dimensions, each of which sums up a particular aspect of the process

of organic experience into a specific, qualitative transformation

of the human social reality.

The inception of a relative, partial, provisional, and prospective

human situation proceeds directly out of the process of organic

experience. The process of organic experience is imbued with a critical

strain, one which restricts its range and duration, and which sets

the stage for a regression, or a possible regression, of social

existence to the quest for human salvation. This critical strain

simply signifies that the process of organic experience, while providing

the means to human freedom, does not, and, indeed, cannot, serve as the

end of human freedom. The process of organic experience cannot, in

other words, enclose the struggle for human liberation within the

certitude of finality. It simply provides concrete social processes

which, if prosecuted, will result in the fullest actualization

possible, at any given moment, of libertarian human possibilities. These

social processes of human freedom are never, of course, absolute,

complete, predetermined, or consistent. On the contrary, they are fated

to remain contextual, incomplete, transitive, and transformational.
Furthermore, they are fated to remain more indeterminate than final
because the struggle for human freedom does not originate in a social
void, but arises out of the human determination to remain faithful to
the concrete qualities of the process of social experience. The social
processes involved in the libertarian struggle are, in this event,
neither a product of human metaphysics nor an object of human
abstraction. They are an emergent of the human will to principle the
realization of human freedom in the organic unification of concrete
social experience. Nowhere in the domain of concrete social experience
are there to be found any ultimate ends, complete processes of social
thought, enduring modes of social experience, or inevitably consistent
processes of value experience. Instead, the domain of concrete social
experience is exhausted by a dynamic working-out of the relationships
which exist between human sentiments, queries, activities, and lived
evaluations. Human sentiments are embedded in particular socio-
historical contexts. Human queries are partial to the specific human
sensibilities which they serve to expresss. Human practices act as
provisional points-of-release for particular processes of social
consciousness. And the more evaluative aspect of concrete social experience
sums up what has gone before into new, and more prospective, totaliz-
ations of human existence. Thus, in the domain of concrete social
experience, there is no finality but only the uncertainty of the
contextual, indeterminate, transitive, and prospective process of
human life itself. Being principled in this process of concrete

social experience, the project of human freedom is <u>not</u> to eradicate the uncertainty of human existence but to work actively through it to the organic unification of human experience. Indeed, the task of human liberation is to promote actively the fullest disclosure possible of the uncertainties of concrete social experience. For it is exactly the direct apprehension of human uncertainty which reveals that the human enterprise has shifted away from both the certitude of human salvation and the orderliness of human security to an immediate confrontation with the exigencies of the concrete social world.[2] Human uncertainty represents, in this case, less the antitthesis of social liberation than the very life-blood of the process of human freedom itself. Human freedom is thus synonymous with the organic unification of the process of social experience; and the organic unification of the process of social experience has, as its working material, the relativity, partiality, provisionality, and prospectiveness of the concrete social world.

The absence of any finality on the part of the process of human freedom is not without consequence. On the contrary, the fact that freedom begets uncertainty provides a preliminary insight into the fate, or likely fate, of the organic experience and into the curious relationship which exists between the contradictory quests for human salvation and human liberation. In this vein, the ascendency of uncertainty as the dominant value-quality of the human social reality circumscribes the development of the process of organic experience and condemns the struggle for human freedom to a position of permanent opposition against the social reality of human salvation, and thereby against the process of corporate experience. Seldom in the history of human existence have libertarian social movements demonstrated an

ability to deal continuously with the indeterminate character of concrete social experience. And rarely, if ever, in the chronicle of human history have libertarian struggles principled themselves in the firm conviction that the indeterminacy of the process of concrete social experience constitutes the nucleus, indeed, the positive and fundamental nucleus, of an organic social world. The obverse has, however, all too often held true. Repeatedly, libertarian social movements, having seized the dynamic of their historical situations, have managed to actualize, however fleetingly, particular dimensions of the process of human freedom, whether productive, political, social or aesthetic. And just as often such libertarian struggles have regressed at the last instant, when confronted by the uncertainty of existence which their efforts have reaped, towards the absolutization of their gains. Freedom has dissolved into "salvation." The concrete experience of human indeterminany has spawned the desire for absolute certitude. And the very process of libertarian action itself has been reduced to a cosmology. In short, the inability of libertarian social movements to instatiate human uncertainty as the life-blood of the process of human freedom has given rise to a peculiar historical momentum. This peculiar historical momentum has had as its content the passage of the process of organic experience into the cosmological, and thereby the passage of the quest for a substantively meaningful social world into the desire for the stillness of absolute certitude.[3] While this process of social transformation appears to be the product of an enduring fear of human indeterminacy, it is not a historical inevitability. On the contrary, it is possible that human beings,

at any given moment, may begin to back up their commitments to
libertarian social ideals with an active, and even fervent, acceptance
of the uncertainty which the process of human freedom ever entails.
Such a genuine commitment to the indeterminacy of a libertarian
social world requires, of course, an intensive appreciation of the
origins, development, and content of the condition of human uncertainty.

The ensuing discussion will provide the basis for an active
appreciation of the condition of human uncertainty. It will do so
by examining, in more detail, the inception, growth, and content of
an indeterminate process of human experience. This examination will
proceed through four steps. First, the thesis will be presented that
the condition of human uncertainty represents less a fortuitous
consequence of the process of organic experience than a direct emergent
of it. This thesis will be explored by tracing the origins of human
uncertainty to the very statement of the problem of human freedom
itself. The problem of human freedom will be viewed, in this event, as
the ultimate ground of the fatal flaw which cross-cuts the process of
organic experience - the tendency of a libertarian social reality to
dissolve into indeterminacy. Second, the argument will be made that
the tendency to human uncertainty has not been limited to the level
of libertarian human sensibilities, but has been magnified by means
of the phenomenology of human freedom into the dominant value-quality
of an organic world-view. It will then be demonstrated that the
value-quality of human uncertainty has been structured out, albeit
implicitly, by means of the process of organic action into the key

dynamic of a distinctive pattern of social organization. Third,

following this discussion of the genesis of an indeterminate human

experience, an examination will be made of the four major dimensions

of the condition of human uncertainty - relativity, partiality,

provisionality, and prospectiveness. Each of the above modes of human

uncertainty will be investigated both for its content and for the

transformation, or possible transformation, of the direction of human

experience which it anticipates. Finally, after a consideration of

the four central modes of human uncertainty, some concluding comments

will be made.

The Fatal Flaw

The process of organic experience is imbued with a fatal flaw.

This fatal flaw may be visualized as the tendency of an organic social

reality to dissolve into a human condition which is typified by the

presence of many means to human freedom, and by the absence of any

end to the libertarian struggle. While the ascendency of this fatal

flaw in human experience signifies that the libertarian enterprise

stands on the very edge of a fundamental and unparalleled transformation

of the process of social reality, it also intimates the dissolution,

or possible dissolution, of the libertarian urge into the desire for

the certitude of human salvation. An indeterminate human conditon

thus exists simultaneously as the apex of human freedom and as the

point, or possible point, of its disintegration.

The tendency to human uncertainty has its genesis in the

very statement of the problem of human freedom itself. The problem

of human freedom, while elucidating the principles of a substantively

meaningful social world, does not, and, indeed, cannot, provide an

answer concerning how these principles might be actualized with any

degree of finality. Rather, the problem of human freedom suggests,

by its very statement, that the struggle for substantive human

meaning can never be fully and irrevocably concluded. It intimates

that the libertarian enterprise is fated to remain a contextual,

partial, transitive, and prospective process of means rather than a

network of ultimate ends. And it further intimates that whenever and

wherever the libertarian struggle is invested with finality, then

human freedom concludes and human salvation begins.

The reasons for the indeterminate character of the problem

of human freedom are as follows. It has previously been contended

that the libertarian venture is grounded, at first, in a fundamental

transformation of the process of human dispositions. This fundamental

transformation of human sensibilities has given rise to four particular

expressions of the problem of human freedom, each of which responds,

albeit in a different way, to the general human query concerning how

it might be possible to break beyond the human condition of reinforced

meaninglessness to the creation of a substantively meaningful social

world. There is, in this case, a subjective problem of human freedom,

a collective problem of human freedom, a social problem of human freedom,

and an aesthetic problem of human freedom. The subjective problem

of human freedom originates in the human desire to burst beyond corporate

irrationality to the development of a holistic survival experience.

The collective problem of human freedom queries how it might be
possible to reach beyond the reactiveness of the corporate political
experience to the meaningfulness of a reconstructive inquiry. The
social problem of human freedom is motivated by the human determination
to escape the accidentality of corporate sociability in favour of a
more substantive process of social experience. And the aesthetic
problem of human freedom queries how it might be possible to break
beyond the apologetic quality of an immoral process of value experience
to the critical spirit of a genuine human morality. There are,
therefore, four particular problems of human freedom, each of which
represents a complementary, although partial, aspect of a unitary process
of libertarian human sensibilities. This unitary process of libertarian
human sensibilities has never received, however, a single content. On
the contrary, each particular problem of human freedom has been
capable of being expressed in four different, although complementary,
ways. Each of these four major contents may be visualized as a
distinctive way of basing the quest for human freedom in the domain
of concrete social experience. Taken together, the four major dimensions
of the problem of human freedom - whether subjective, collective,
social, or aesthetic - and their relevant contents form the essential
ingredients of a process of human sensibilities which, while disclosing
many libertarian possibilities, does not reveal any final solution to
the quest for substantive human meaning. Or, stated slightly differently,
the tendency to human uncertainty originates not only in the interrelated
and transcendent character of the central dimensions of the problem
of human freedom, but also in the striking fact that each libertarian

sensibility constitutes a complicated working-out of diverse social

contexts, pluralities of social thought, indeterminate social

relationships, and congeries of moral visions.

Thus, there is only one problem of subjective human freedom,

but it may receive many different expressions according to which

concrete social context motivates the human desire for a holistic

process of social being. While the aspiration for a holistic human

survival situation is primarily a product of an aversive response

to the irrationality of corporate existence, such irrationality may

manifest itself in productive, political, social or aesthetic forms.

Depending on which form of corporate irrationality inspires the yearning

for social holisms, a fundamentally different starting-point is gained

for the project of human freedom. Some human beings may suffer a

primacy of productive irrationality, and thus be driven to define the

problem of human freedom as fundamentally a matter of economic

exploitation. Other human beings may suffer, above all, the consequences

of political irrationality, and thereby be driven to visualize the

problem of human freedom as involving resistance to coercive collective

obligations. Yet others may experience a primacy of social irrationality,

and thus be prone to accept the reconstruction of human relationships

as the fundamental datum of human liberation. Finally, some human

beings may experience most acutely the irrationality of the corporate

value experience, and consequently be compelled to define human

freedom as essentially a moral problem. There are, therefore, four

different contexts out of which may develop the yearning for a more

principled process of social being. These major human contexts are not,

of course, antithetical to one another but complementary. Each represents a particular, and thereby relative, interpretation of the single problem of human subjective freedom. The problem of human subjective freedom is thus condemned to be embedded in the indeterminacy of a diversity of shifting human contexts.[4]

Likewise, there is only one problem of human collective freedom, but it may obtain many different contents depending upon which element of corporate reactiveness provides the basis for the project of social reconstruction. While the desire for a more reconstructive process of social inquiry is essentially a derivation of an aversive response to the reactiveness of corporate existence, such reactiveness represents, in turn, an expression of a particular form of corporate irrationality, whether economic, collective, relational, or aesthetic. Thus, depending upon which expression of corporate irrationality, and thereby of corporate reactiveness, motivates the reconstructive urge, a fundamentally different mode of libertarian though ensues. The process of reconstructive thought may take, as its object, an exploration of the possibilities present for the rectification of economic domination, political coercion, social manipulation, or moral repression. These different objects of reconstructive human thought are not, of course, mutually exclusive of one another. On the contrary, they may be viewed as relative, albeit partial, aspects of the single problem of collective human freedom. While the relativity of the different objects of reconstructive inquiry is based in the fact that each of them constitutes a concrete working-out of libertarian opportunities present within a

particular context of human experience, their partiality originates

in the fact that none of them scans, or can scan, the entire human

context. The problem of collective human freedom is thus fated to

be anchored in the uncertainty of a plurality of contextual and

incomplete processes of human thought.

Similarly, there is only one problem of human social freedom,

but it may receive many different expressions according to which dimension

of social oppression preforms the desire for a more substantive

process of human sociability. While the yearning for a more substantive

social experience is primarily a product of an aversive response to

the oppressiveness of corporate existence, such oppressiveness may

be experienced in a number of different ways. Some human beings may

suffer, most acutely, the unsubstantiality of social relationships

emergent from the productive sector of corporate existence. Other

human beings may experience a primacy of political oppression. Yet

others may suffer, most severely, the pathological character of everyday

relationships across the corporate world. Finally, some human beings

may experience a primacy of moral oppression. There are, therefore,

four qualitatively different modes of corporate oppression, each of

which grounds the development of a fundamentally different interpretation

of the problem of human social freedom. These different interpretations

of the problem of human social freedom are neither unrelated to one

another nor estranged from the other dimensions of the libertarian

human struggle. Indeed, each expression of the problem of human social

freedom may be viewed as a partial, albeit complementary, aspect of

a larger unitary whole. And each element within this larger, unitary

whole may be both visualized as an emergent of a <u>specific</u> desire

for subjective human liberation, and as a manifestation, although a

fleeting manifestation, of a <u>particular</u> process of reconstructive

human thought. In short, the problem of human social freedom is

condemned to the indeterminacy of a congerie of contextual, partial,

and provisional processes of libertarian relationships.

Finally, although there is only <u>one</u> problem of human aesthetic

freedom, it may be expressed in many different ways depending upon

which mode of corporate repressiveness motivates the human aspiration

for a critical process of social morality. While the yearning for

a critical value experience is essentially an emergent of resistance

against the repressiveness of corporate existence, such repressiveness

may manifest itself in different ways. Corporate repression may

involve the popularization of a distorted network of economic values,

the aggrandizement of the pathological politics of power, the

reduction of human social life to the externalities of status and

prestige, or the ascendency of loyalty itself as the dominant standard

of the process of social morality. There are, therefore, four quali-

tatively unique modes of corporate repression, each of which provides

a fundamentally different starting-point for assigning content to

the problem of human aesthetic freedom. These different expressions

of the problem of human aesthetic freedom are not isolated from one

another nor are they independent of the other dimensions of the process

of libertarian human sensibilities. On the contrary, each expression

of the desire for a critical value experience is ever relative,

partial, provisional, and prospective. It is relative because it

grounds in a particular human context; partial because it embodies

only incompletely a specific process of libertarian struggle;

provisional because it represents but a transient manifestation of

this struggle; and prospective because it sums up a unitary, albeit

particular, content of the process of libertarian human sensibilities

into new, and more adequate, totalizations of human experience. In

sum, there may be only one problem of human aesthetic freedom, but

this single problem of aesthetic liberation is embedded in a content

which is both transformational and vitalistic.[5]

The process of libertarian human sensibilities, whether

considered subjectively, collectively, socially, or aesthetically,

is thus distinguished by the indeterminacy of many different contents.

While these different interpretations of the content of each dimension

of the problem of human freedom elucidate libertarian possibilities

across the domain of concrete social experience, they do not provide

a way of actualizing human freedom with any degree of finality. On

the contrary, the presence of many possible contents for the problem

of human freedom intimates that the libertarian struggle is fated

to remain a process of working though these contents to the organic

unification of human experience. Accordingly, the project of human

freedom - the organic unification of human experience - remains, and

will likely continue to remain, more contextual than absolute, more

incomplete than determinate, more transitive than predetermined, and

ultimately more prospective than static. The tendency to human uncertainty

is thus firmly grounded in the very statement of the problem of human

freedom itself. Human freedom anticipates, and even requires,
uncertainty; and human uncertainty provides content for the process
of social liberation. However, the tendency to human indeterminacy
is not peculiar to the statement of the problem of human freedom.
On the contrary, it has been magnified into the dominant value-
quality of the organic experience by means of the phenomenology of
human freedom and the process of organic action.

The Flaw Magnified

So far, it has been demonstrated that the emergence of the
problem of human freedom as an object of general social concern is
accompanied by the transformation of human sensibilities into a process
of indeterminacy. It will now be argued that this tendency to indeterminacy
– the fatal flaw which is immanent in the organic experience – has been
generalized into the structure of libertarian consciousness itself by
means of the phenomenology of human freedom, and has been further
extended into the dynamics of libertarian practice by means of the
process of organic action.

In this vein, it has been asserted previously that the libertarian
struggle requires, for its solution, a fundamental transformation
of the process of human consciousness. This root alteration of human
consciousness has been described, in its entirety, as the phenomenology
of human freedom. The phenomenology of human freedom interrelates into
a unitary world-view four key assumptions concerning the nature of
social existence, each of which responds to a particular dimension of
the general problem of human freedom. There is, in this event, an

ontology of human freedom, an epistemology of human freedom, an

axiology of human freedom, and an aesthetic of human freedom. The

ontology of human freedom sums up the aspiration for subjective

liberation into the vision of an organic, and thereby holistic,

social universe. The _epistemology of human freedom bases the quest

for collective liberation in the development of a reconstructive, and

thereby genuinely empirical, process of human inquiry. The axiology

of human freedom transforms the desire for social liberation into

the image of an intrinsic, and thereby substantive, process of human

sociability. And the aesthetic of human freedom generalizes the

yearning for moral liberation into the vision of a transformational,

and thereby critical, process of value experience. The phenomenology

of human freedom thus contains four interrelated postulates, each of

which represents a concrete, albeit partial, response to the process

of libertarian sensibilities. However, this unitary process of

libertarian human consciousness has never received a single expression.

On the contrary, it has always been receptive, and will likely continue

to be receptive, to many different expressions, each of which discloses

the libertarian possibilities present within a specific interpretation

of a particular dimension of the problem of human freedom. Taken

together, these different interpretations of each dimension of the

phenomenology of human freedom - whether ontological, epistemological,

axiological, and aesthetic - provide the single process of libertarian

human consciousness with an element of indeterminacy. This element of

indeterminacy inheres in the fact that the phenomenology of human freedom,

rather than manifesting a principle of finality, unifies into a single process of libertarian consciousness four key postulates, each of which serves as a <u>means</u>, albeit a complementary, incomplete, provisional and transcendent means, to social liberation.

For example, there is only <u>one</u> ontology of human freedom, but it may be interpreted in many different ways according to which content of the problem of human subjective freedom preforms the vision of an organic social universe. While the ontological assumption of an organic social universe is primarily a response to the desire for social holisms, this human desire may originate in four different social contexts, whether productive, political, social, or aesthetic. Depending upon which of these four major social contexts provides the basis for the development of the problem of human subjective freedom, a fundamentally different viewpoint ensues concerning what constitutes an organic social world. The nucleus of an organic social world may be variously conceived as the development of a dynamic synthesis between necessity and nature, the creation of new political unities, the harmonization of the process of social experience, or as the enactment of a new moral synthesis.[6] These different images of an organic social universe are fundamentally complementary because each vision of an organic social world represents a relative, albeit partial, working-out of a specific dimension of the single problem of human subjective freedom. The ontology of human freedom is thus fated to be embedded in the indeterminacy of a variety of principled human viewpoints.

Likewise, although there is only <u>one</u> epistemology of human freedom, it may receive many different expressions according to which

interpretation of the problem of human collective freedom provides

the basis for the development of a reconstructive, and thereby

genuinely empirical, process of human inquiry. While the epistemological

theory of reconstructive empiricism responds primarily to the quest

for collective liberation, this quest is grounded, in turn, in a

specific interpretation of the nature and content of an organic

social world. Thus, depending upon which image of the organic social

universe contexts the desire for collective liberation, a specific

interpretation emerges concerning the content of reconstructive

empiricism. In this sense, reconstructive empiricism may be visualized,

albeit at different moments and places, as a _means_ of expression

for the organic possibilities immanent within human necessity,

political life, social relationships, or within the process of value

experience itself. In addition, these different interpretations of

the content of reconstructive empiricism are more mutually inclusive

than alienated from one another. Their reciprocity originates in the

fact that each understanding of reconstructive empiricism constitutes

but a partial response to the single problem of collective freedom.[7]

The epistemology of human freedom is thus condemned to be principled in

the incompleteness which is the hallmark of all genuine empiricisms.

Similarly, there is only _one_ axiology of human freedom,

but it may receive many different interpretations according to which

expression of the problem of human social freedom principles the

image of an intrinsic process of human sociability. While the vision

of an intrinsic social experience derives, above all, from the struggle

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for social liberation, this struggle may manifest itself in different forms, whether in substantive human relationships founded on a commonality of survival interests, political ideals, social aspirations, or moral prophecies. Depending upon which _type_ of human social freedom provides the basis for the vision of an intrinsic social experience, a strikingly different viewpoint ensues concerning the content of a libertarian process of human relationships. Thus, an intrinsic social experience may be variously conceived as having as its internal principle of validation its expression, indeed its _concrete_ expression, of the opportunities present for the reconstruction of political life, productive experience, associative existence, or of the moral domain itself. These different bases for the development of an intrinsic social experience are not, of course, estranged from one another. On the contrary, they are unequivocally complementary. And they are comlementary precisely because each content of an intrinsic social experience represents but a provisional, and thereby relative and partial, working-out of the unitary problem of human social freedom. The axiology of human freedom is thus ever fated to be embedded in the indeterminacy of a plurality of possible bases for the creation of genuine human solidarities.

Finally, although there is only _one_ aesthetic of human freedom, it may receive as many different interpretations as there are possible expressions of the human desire for a more critical process of value experience. While the vision of a critical value experience derives, most fundamentally, from the quest for moral

liberation, the quest may move in different directions. The direction

taken by the struggle for moral liberation is dependent upon which

dimension of the human social experience - whether productive, collective,

social, or aesthetic - has been visualized as the primary object of

value renewal. According   to which dimension of the human social

experience   has been   accepted as the principal object of moral

liberation, a distinctive perspective emerges concerning the range

and content of a critical value experience.   A critical value

experience may be grounded, albeit at different times and in different

places, in the totalization of productive relations, in the appreciation

of genuine political solidarities, in the rigorous evaluation of

human social bonds, or in the transformation of the more symbolic aspect

of human existence.   These different processes of moral liberation are,

of course, more harmonious than competitive. Their harmony is grounded

in the striking   social fact that each content which may be given

to a critical moral experience comprises but a prospective, and thereby

contextual, incomplete, and transitive, working-out of the single
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problem of human aesthetic freedom.   The aesthetic of human freedom is

thus condemned to be principled in the uncertainty of a congerie of

possible modes of human social transformation.

The process of libertarian human consciousness, whether

visualized ontologically, epistemologically, axiologically, or

aesthetically, is thus characterized by the uncertainty of many

different interpretations. While these different interpretations of

the phenomenology of human freedom designate what must be done for

the actualization of a holistic,reconstructive, substantive, and

critical social world, they do not disclose any way of achieving

closure for the libertarian struggle. On the contrary, the presence

of many contents, albeit reciprocal and harmonious contents, for the

phenomenology of human freedom suggests that the single process of

libertarian consciousness, like the process of libertarian sensibilities

itself, represents, and is likely to continue to represent, a

contextual, partial, transitive, and prospective means of working

through these contents to the organic unification of human experience.

In short, the tendency to human uncertainty ramifies beyond its

basis in human sentiment, and it squarely lodged in the very structure

of libertarian consiousness itself. This momentum towards indeterminacy

does not cease, however, at the frontiers of the libertarian construct-

ion of social reality. Rather, the tendency to human uncertainty has

been further magnified into the realm of social activity by means of

the process of organic action.

In this event, it has been contended previously that the

libertarian enterprise demands, for its progression, not only a

fundamental transformation of the processes of human sensibilities

and human consciousness, but also a root reconstruction of the

pattern of human social organization. This root reconstruction of

the pattern of human social organization has been visualized as

being principled in the ascendency of the process of organic action.

The process of organic action unifies into a libertarian pattern of

social organization four central processes of social activity, each

of which serves to actualize a particular dimension of the phenomen-

ology of human freedom. These four central processes of social

activity may be described as the practices of actualization,

reconstruction, consolidation, and creation. The activity of

actualization transforms the ontological vision of an organic social

universe into the nucleus of a libertarian mode of human survival

practice. The activity of reconstruction represents a concrete working-

out of the epistemology of human freedom. The activity of consolidation

generalizes the image of an intrinsic social experience into the core

dynamic of a more substantive process of human sociability. And the

activity of creation represents a concrete working-out of the aesthetic

of human freedom. The process of organic action thus consists of

four interrelated activities, each of which constitutes a concrete

expression of a particular phase of the phenomenology of human freedom.

However, this unitary process of libertarian human activities has

never received a single content. On the contrary, it has always attracted,

and will likely continue to attract, many different contents, each of

which serves to materialize a specific interpretation of a particular

phase of the process of libertarian consciousness. When combined, these

many different contents imbue the process of organic action with an

element of uncertainty. This element of uncertainty is grounded in the

root social fact that the process of organic action, rather than

demonstrating a final solution to the problem of human freedom, integrates

into a unitary human social process four central activities, each of

which serves as a means for the creation of reciprocity and harmony

between the different approaches to social liberation.

In this way, there is only one process of actualizing activity,
but it may receive as many different interpretations as there are
contrasting visions of an organic social world. The activity of actual-
ization may be variously conceived as having, as its object, the disclosure
of the opportunities present for the organic unification of work exerperience,
political life, social experience, or moral action. While these different
human possibilities are commonly unified as means, albeit alternative
means, to the creation of the same organic social world, they are
divided according to the concrete social context in which they originate.
Different human situations thus preform, and even anticipate, the emer-
gence of unique libertarian opportunities; and different libertarian
opportunities require, for their solution, unique experssions of the
single process of actualization. In short, there may be only one
process of actualizing activity, but this unitary human social process
is distinguished by the indeterminacy of a thoroughly relative content.

Moreover, although there is only one process of reconstruct-
ive activity, it may be expressed in many different ways according to
which interpretation of the epistemology of human freedom preforms the
project of political liberation. While the process of reconstructive
activity responds primarily to the quest for a genuinely empirical
mode of human inquiry, this quest is grounded in turn, in the
actualization of libertarian human possibilities. Thus, depending upon
which human possibility principles the libertarian struggle, a fund-
amentally different viewpoint ensues concerning the content and direction

of the process of reconstructive activity. The nucleus of the

process of reconstructive activity may be considered, albeit at

different moments and places, as the conferring of substantive human

meaning upon the quest for human necessity, the struggle for a more

adequate mode of associative existence, the pursuit of genuine human

relationships, or upon the task of moral liberation. These different

images of the process of reconstructive activity are linked together

by bonds of reciprocity and complementarity. And they are linked

together by bonds of complementarity and reciprocity because each

expression of the politics of reconstruction represents but an incomplete

and contextual working-out of the possibilities immanent in human

experience for the unification, indeed, the organic unification, of

human sensibilities and human consciousness. In other words, the

single process of reconstructive activity is capable of dissolving

into the uncertainty of a relative and partial content.

Similarly, there is only one process of consolidating activity,

but it may be interpreted in as many different ways as there are

contending visions of an intrinsic social experience. In this case, the

activity of consolidation may be variously conceived as having, as

its content, the development of genuine human solidarities around the

reconstruction of economic experience, political action, social life,

or of the human moral experience itself. While these different manifest-

ations of human solidarity commonly contribute to the creation of a

single, substantive social experience, they also possess an element of

autonomy. This element of autonomy inheres in the striking social fact

that each process of social consolidation represents a qualitatively

unique working-out of a different human possibility, and thereby, of a
                                                    9
different process of political reconstruction. Unique human possibil-

ities thus preform, and even require, distinctive political expressions;

and distinctive processes of political reconstruction anticipate

unique manifestations of human solidarity. In sum, there may be only

one process of social consolidation, but this single human social

process is ever principled in the indeterminacy of a contextual, partial,

and provisional content.

Finally, although there is only one process of creative activity,

it may be interpreted in many different ways depending upon which

expression of the aesthetic of human freedom guides the task of moral

transformation. While the process of creative activity grounds, most

fundamentally, in the struggle for a genuinely transformational, and

thereby critical, human value experience, this struggle responds, in

turn, to the totalization of libertarian human solidarities. Thus,

depending upon which genuine human solidarity provides content for the

project of moral freedom, a strikingly different perspective ensues

concerning the nature of the process of creative activity. In this case,

the process of creative activity may be principled in the totalization

of a diversity of genuine human solidarities, whether economic, political,

social, or cultural. Rather than being mutually exclusive of one another,

these different bases for the process of creative activity are fundament-

ally reciprocal. And they are reciprocal because each expression of the

creative enterprise represents but a contextual, partial, transitive,

and prospective working-out of the opportunities available in human experience for the organic unification of human sensibilities, consciousness, practice, and values. In short, the process of creative activity is distinguished by the undertainty of a transcendent and transformational content.

The process of organic action is,therefore, imbued with the indeterminacy of many different contents. While these different contents specify the exact social processes by which an organic, reconstructive, intrinsic, and transformational social world may be materialized, they do not provide the process of human freedom with any degree of finality. Indeed, the indeterminacy of the process of organic action intimates that the libertarian social struggle is fated to remain a means , albeit a highly uncertain means, of synthesizing many different perpsectives into the dynamic integration of human experience. Accordingly, the tendency to human uncertainty - the fatal flaw which originates in the very statement of the problem of human freedom and which is magnified by means of the phenomenology of human freedom - is structured out into concrete social existence by means of the process of organic action. The ascendency of the process of organic action thus discloses that the dominant value-quality of a libertarian social reality is fully expressed by the different modes of human uncertainty, and by the relationships that hold between them.

Modes of Human Uncertainty

While the tendency to human indeterminacy originates in the
very expression of the problem of human freedom and is extended into
human existence by means of both the phenomenology of human freedom
and the process of organic action, it ultimately blossoms forth as
the nucleus of a distinctive, and indeed qualitative, transformation
of the human situation. In its fullest expression, this qualitative
transformation of the human situation may be visualized as the condition
of human uncertainty. The condition of human uncertainty interrelates
in a unitary transformation of the human situation four central
value-qualities, each of which represents a specific mode of human
experience, whether productive, political, social, or aesthetic,
emergent from a libertarian social reality. These four central
value-qualities have previously been introduced as relativity,
partiality, provisionality, and prospectiveness. Thus, all that
remains to be done is a consideration of the specific transformations
of human experience brought about by the ascendency of each mode
of human uncertainty, and an investigation of the consequences, or
likely consequences, of this transformation of the human situation
for the libertarian prospect.

Relativity

Relativity is the key-note of the process of human freedom.
There can be no libertarian endeavour which is not based in an active
appreciation of the contextual character of the process of concrete
social experience; and there can be no awareness of the relativity

of human experience which does not lead, or may not lead, to a
strengthening of the libertarian urge. Human freedom begets uncertainty;
and human uncertainty is directly apprehended, first and foremost,
in terms of the relativity of the process of social liberation.[10]

While the tendency to human relativity manifests itself, and
is, indeed, made more and more apparent as the dominant value-quality
of human existence, at each instant in the process of social liberation,
the tendency to human relativity extends well beyond the frontiers
of human freedom to the domain of concrete social experience. In
this vein, relativity is a value-quality of human freedom because the
overriding task of all libertarian enterprises devolves on the fuller
and fuller disclosure of the concrete qualities of human experience.
And one of the principal qualities of the process of concrete human
experience is that it is divided into four interrelated dimensions,
and that each of these major dimensions of human experience provides
the context, or may provide the context, for the development of liber-
tarian human sensibilities. The longing for human freedom may originate,
in other words, in an aversive response to either the domination of
human necessity, political coercion, social control, or moral
repression. These different modes of human freedom are not, of course,
independent of one another. On the contrary, they are fundamentally
complementary. And they are complementary because each mode of human
freedom is based in the transformation, or possible transformation,
of a different dimension of the unitary process of concrete social
experience and is, therefore, but a relative manifestation of a single
human social process.

The relativity of concrete social experience thus breeds a

contextual process of human freedom; and the contextual character

of human freedom contains three important implications for the

future of the process of organic experience. First, there has never

been, and can never be, a single direction in the libertarian social

struggle. The libertarian enterprise is capable of moving simultaneously

in four qualitatively different directions, each of which principles

the struggle for human freedom in the reconstruction of a different

dimension of the process of concrete social experience. While the

different directions which may be taken by the libertarian social

struggle are dissimilar to the extent that each of them grants

primacy to the transformation of a different phase of human experience,

whether productive, political, social, or cultural, they are like

one another insofar as eachof them represents but a partial, and indeed

reciprocal, manifestation of the single process of human freedom. In

this case, there is no struggle to relieve economic exploitation

which is not simultaneously a process of political, social and aesthetic

transformation; no process of political freedom which is not based

in a prior transformation of economic life, and which does not

anticipate the reconstruction of human sociability and human morality;

no campaign for social freedom which does not direct a past history

of productive and political liberties into the project of moral

renewal; and, finally, there is no process of aesthetic freedom

which does not sum up a prior reconstruction of the productive,

political, and social phases of the human situation, and which does

not disclose new possibilities for the liberation of the human condition.

In short, the diversity and interconnectedness of the different

directions assumed by the libertarian social struggle stands as the

primary implication of relativity for the future of the organic social

experience. In addition, the value-quality of human relativity also

entails a temporal and spatial progression in the struggle for human

freedom. While human freedom always has, as its basis, the liberation

of human beings from the constraints of physical necessity, it enjoys,

as its apex, the expansion across the human social domain of a

creative process of value experience. Human freedom is grounded, in

other words, in the realm of survival, advances into the domain of

the political, progresses by means of the social, and culminates in
the moral.[11] This rough ordering of the progressive stages involved

in the libertarian social struggle is not, of course, an absolute

sequence. On the contrary, it is only indicative of a relative

movement. And it is only expressive of a relative movement because the

human project in a libertarian social world is not to work towards

a final solution to the problem of human freedom, but to strive for

a gradual redirection of the libertarian effort. While this gradual

transformation of the content of human freedom is grounded in a

movement beyond the physical to the political, beyond the political

to the social, and ultimately beyond social freedom to moral liberation,

it must, of necessity, be conducted with the expectation that human

freedom will never be a fully moral enterprise, but will always involve

a dynamic working-out of the libertarian possibilities present within

the physical, collective, and social dimensions of human experience.

In short, the task of those commited to human freedom is not to work

towards the extinction of human relativity, but to strive actively

to employ the opportunities inherent in a relative human condition for

the liberation of humanity. While an active acceptance of the value-

quality of relativity constitutes the cornerstone of the process of

human freedom, its rejection entails the dissolution of the organic

social experience and the ascendency, or possible ascendency, of a

generalized human preoccupation with the quest for absolute certitude.

The quest for absolute certitude signals, of course, the appearance,

once more, of the problem of human salvation - the antithesis of

human freedom. Thus, the final implication which relativity holds

for the libertarian prospect is simply that a denial of the affirmative

qualities of a contextual human situation leads, or may lead, to the

termination of human freedom and to the reemergence of the social reality

of human salvation.

Partiality

While the process of human freedom is principled in relativity,

it is also imbued with partiality. The partiality of the process of

human freedom derives, most fundamentally, from the special position

occupied by reconstructive empiricism in the task of achieving the

organic unification of human experience. In this case, the process

of human freedom is not exhausted by the struggle against the different

manifestations of human domination, but also contains another, more

positive,element. This more positive aspect of human freedom may be

visualized as the root social fact that the libertarian struggle is

also concerned with the injection of substantive human meanings into

the human social domain. Indeed, the creation of substantive human

meanings represents the exact point at which the libertarian enterprise

rises above reactiveness towards a past history of social dominations

to a consideration of the concrete social processes which may be

deployed for the organic unification of human experience. The develop-

ment of such substantive human meanings is, of course, the special

function of reconstructive empiricism. As a process of libertarian

social thought, reconstructive empiricism serves to generalize the

domain of human possibilities into images of the human situation

which reveal, indeed which concretely reveal, how it might be possible

to create a dynamic synthesis between all dimensions of the process

of concrete social experience. Reconstructive empiricism thus operates

to create temporal unities between human sentiment, reflection,

activity, and morality. However, such temporal unities are an expression

of particular libertarian human possibilities; and the domain of

human possibility is always imbued with relativity. Accordingly,

there never has been, and can never be, a single, complete process

of libertarian social thought. Rather, reconstructive empiricism is

embedded in specific libertarian opportunities, and is, by that

reason, fated to remain but a partial expression of the possibilities

existent, at any given moment and place, for the organic unification
                              12
of human experience.

The partial character of reconstructive empirical inquiry

intimates that no complete and final expression can be given to the

libertarian urge. Substantive human meanings are principled in

particular concrete social contexts and must, therefore, be held

relative to the specific modes of human freedom which they serve

to generalize. Moreover, while all expressions of reconstructive

empirical thought complement one another as partial aspects of a

unitary human social process, such inquiries, when combined, do not

constitute a finished whole. Human freedom is genuinely indeterminate.

And the indeterminacy of human freedom has, as one of its products,

the rise and fall of particular processes of libertarian reflection

in response to the materialization of unique human possibilities.

While the rise and fall of particular expressions of reconstructive

empiricism provides for the shattering and reconstitution of existent

social orders, it does not, and indeed, cannot, culminate in a final

libertarian synthesis. To achieve a final libertarian synthesis,

reconstructive empiricism would have to be reduced to an apology for

a particular human possibility. And this reduction would entail an

abandonment of the central role played by reconstructive empiricism

as a creative agency in the indeterminate process of human freedom.

In other words, the creation of a finished whole - a final libertarian

synthesis - would mean that the directly apprehended process of human

reflection would cease to be either reconstructive or empirical. The

indeterminacy of creativity thus militates against the finality of

apology. Moreover, given a genuine human commitment to the indeterminacy

of reconstructive empiricism, there can be no expectation that the

libertarian process of human reflection will ever manifest itself in

an enduring collective form. Libertarian polities are but relative

expressions of particular processes of reconstructive empirical thought;

and such modes of human inquiry are but partial manifestations of the
diverse and active realm of human possibilities. Thus, just as
particular processes of reconstructive empirical thought, having
completed their function, are doomed to dissolve, so, too, libertarian
polities, having provided an adequate collective basis for the
formation of genuine human solidarities, are condemned to disintegration.
Libertarian polities are, therefore, but temporal arcs between
human possibility and human sociability. The temporality of libertarian
polities represents a necessary condition for the development of
human freedom. The process of human freedom depends, for its prosecution,
upon the transformation of every aspect of concrete social experience
into a means for the organic unification of human life. While this
transformation of human life is grounded, at first, in the relativity
of libertarian human sensibilities, it also requires that libertarian
polities be imbued with the value-qualities of partiality and
temporality. Libertarian polities thus represent a means to the organic
unification of human experience only to the extent that they are
self-consciously visualized as incomplete, and thereby dispensable, aids
to the actualization of substantive human meanings. At the exact instant
that such polities are elevated into substantive human meanings in
their own right, and consequently envisioned as .final embodiments of
the libertarian aspiration, the struggle for human freedom ends,
and the quest for the certitude of completeness begins. The quest for
the certitude of completeness, whether in reflection or in politics,
represents, of course, a dynamic nucleus of the process of cosmolgical
experience.

Provisionality

Although the process of human freedom is qualified by relativity and partiality, it also contains the value-quality of provisionality. The provisionality of the process of human freedom may be viewed as a special attribute of the genuine human solidarities emergent from the playing-out of reconstructive empirical thought. Reconstructive empiricism provides for the creation of substantive human meanings; and substantive human meanings, once developed, serve as the nucleus of genuine human solidarities. As the embodiment of a substantive process of human sociability, genuine human solidarities are not, of course, absolute, complete, or static. On the contrary, they are contextual, partial, and transitive. They are contextual because principled human relationships are but concrete manifestations of particular human possibilities and of specific processes of libertarian human reflection. They are partial because genuine human solidarities, rather than encompassing the full range of libertarian social action, fuse a particular process of reconstructive empirical inquiry into a specific process of libertarian practice. And, finally, genuine human solidarities are provisional because they provide but a fleeting expression of the possibilities immanent in the human social experience for the materialization of libertarian ideals. The provisionality of substantive human relationships does not contradict the libertarian social struggle. Indeed, the element of provisionality, like the value-qualities of relativity and partiality, constitutes the very life-blood of the process of human freedom.

And provisionality constitutes the life-force of social liberation
because the process of human relationships attains substantiveness,
and thereby facilitates the growth of human freedom, in direct
proportion to the extent to which it provides a momentary, concrete,
and solidary bond between the products of libertarian human reflection
and the realization of genuine moral ideals. Endurance is thus not
the acid-test of human freedom. The process of human freedom is condemned
to frailty. And the frailty of the libertarian social struggle
manifests itself, above all, in the striking social fact that genuine
human solidarities are fated not only to remain transient expressions
of the heterogeneous and shifting domain of human sentiment and human
reflection, but also to dissolve once the moral ideals which they
concretely embody have been realized.[13]

The provisionality of genuine human solidarities suggests
the prophetic insight that the principle of indeterminacy is, in the
most critical sense, the key-note of a substantive process of human
sociability. There can be no substantive process of human sociability
which is not thoroughly imbued with the qualities of transiency and
heterogeneity; and there can be no element of provisionality which
does not contribute, or may not contribute, to the creation of a
truly indeterminate, and thereby libertarian, human social experience.
The uncertainty bred by provisionality is thus the fountainhead of
a substantive process of human sociability. Accordingly, an aversive
response to the uncertainty of genuine human solidarities represents
a direct challenge to the libertarian prospect. And if this challenge

is accompanied by a generalized human desire for the certitude of predetermination, then the prospects for human social freedom dissolve into the stillness of the social reality of human salvation.

Prospectiveness

While the process of human freedom is principled in relativity, partiality, and provisionality, it also contains an element of prospectiveness. The prospectiveness of the process of human freedom derives, most fundamentally, from the special position assigned to the human value experience in the project of achieving dynamic reciprocity and complementarity between all aspects of concrete social experience. When considered from the libertarian viewpoint, the process of human value experience is neither a source of social dogma nor a receptacle of human loyalties. It is a concrete social process by means of which libertarian human possibilities, substantive human meanings, and genuine human solidarities may be totalized into a critical moral synthesis. Since this critical moral synthesis sums up a past history of libertarian social struggles into a rigorous, and, indeed, creative, appraisal of what remains to be accomplished, it is never unprincipled, complete, predetermined, or regressive. A critical moral synthesis is never unprincipled because, by definition, it is based in an active appreciation of the human condition. It is never complete nor predetermined since it provides but a provisional evaluation of a particular process of social liberation. And a critical moral synthesis is never regressive because it serves as the point at which the libertarian venture breaks beyond the chains of its own

history to the consideration of new possibilities for the organic

unification of human experience. The creation of a critical moral

synthesis, as the nucleus of a libertarian human value experience,

thus adds a final note of indeterminacy to the process of human

freedom. This final note of indeterminacy intimates that the struggle

for human freedom is fated to remain a process without end. Libertarian

sentiments generalize into substantive human meanings; the products

of empirical human reflection ground the development of genuine social

solidarities; substantive human relationships dissolve into a critical

moral synthesis; and this critical moral synthesis, in disclosing that

libertarian ideals have not yet been fully realized, prepares for

the transformation, or possible transformation, of the human social

reality. The prospectiveness of the process of human freedom harmonizes,

however, with the nature of concrete social experience. In the domain

of concrete social experience, there is simply a unitary human

social process which, while interrelating into a complementary whole

human sentiments, reflections, practices, and ideals, has no ultimate

point of inception or completion. As a qualitative emergent of the

process of concrete social experience, the libertarian endeavour is

thus condemned to the prospectiveness of a contextual, indeterminate,

and transitive human social reality. Indeed, any challenge to the

uncertainty of a prospective human value experience is, at one and

the same time, a repudiation of the empirical, and thereby genuinely

concrete, basis of human freedom. And any repudiation of the basis of

human freedom in the domain of concrete social experience is but

another step towards the certitude of moral consistency, the hallmark
of the cosmological experience.

The condition of human uncertainty thus integrates into a single
human social process four central value-qualities, each of which
symbolizes a specific transformation of the human situation brought about
by the ascendency of the organic experience. Relativity denotes the
value-quality of human sensibilities in an organic social world.
Partiality describes the quality of human life emergent from a
libertarian process of human politics. Provisionality denotes the
central value-quality of the human social experience in an organic
social universe. And prospectiveness describes the quality of value
experience emergent from a libertarian process of social morality.
Taken together, these four dominant value-qualities form the final point
of magnification of the fatal flaw which is implicit in the process
of organic experience - the fact that the process of organic experience,
while providing for the presence of many libertarian human possibilities,
does not, and indeed cannot, provide any way of securing finality for
the libertarian prospect.

Conclusion

This investigation of the condition of human uncertainty,
the final phase of the process of organic experience, has revealed
that human freedom, while an active social possibility, is not a
historical inevitability. Human freedom does not have to be realized;
and even if actualized, no assurance can be gained from anywhere in
the history of social experience that human beings will finally

demonstrate themselves capable of dealing continuously with the indeterminacy of relativity, partiality, provisionality, and prospectiveness. It is more likely that the libertarian prospect, whenever actualized, will dissolve rapidly into the process of cosmological experience, and that those committed to libertarian ideals will remain opponents of their historical situations rather than creators of a new human social reality.

Table 1. The Complete Process of Social Action

Process of Human Dispositions		Process of Human Queries		Process of Human Materializations		Process of Human Consequences	

Arising
out of
a past
human
condition

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Aesthetic Sensibilities	Preformance, Anticipation and Summation	→ Aesthetic Assumptions	Preformance, Anticipation and Summation	→ Aesthetic Practices	Preformance, Anticipation and Summation	→ Aesthetic Experience
Social Sensibilities		→ Axiological Assumptions		→ Social Practices		→ Social Experience
Collective Sensibilities		→ Epistemological Assumptions		→ Political Practices		→ Political Experience
Subjective Sensibilities		→ Ontological Assumptions		→ Survival Practices		→ Survival Experience

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Culminating
in a new
generalized
human
problem

Table 2. The Cosmological Paradigm of Social Action

	The Problem of Human Salvation		The Phenomenology of Human Salvation		The Process of Cosmological Action		The Condition of Human Chaos	
) Arising) out of the) condition) of human) uncertainty)	Aesthetic Consistency	Preformance, Anticipation and Summation →	Consistency Values	Preformance, Anticipation and Summation →	Aesthetic Redemption	Preformance, Anticipation and Summation →	Amoral Value Experience	)) Culminating) in the
	Social Predetermination		Teleological Relations		Social Transformation		Anomalous Social Experience	) problem) of human
	Collective Completeness		Tautological Consciousness		Political Conversion		Apathetic Political Experience	) security
	Subjective Absoluteness		The Absolutist Universe		Productive Mythification		Absurd Survival Experience	)))

Table 3.   The Corporate Paradigm of Social Action

The Problem of Human Security	The Phenomenology of Human Security	The Process of Corporate Action	The Human Condition of Reinforced Meaninglessness
Aesthetic Redundancy	Redundancy Values	Aesthetic Commitment	Immoral Value Experience (Duty)
Social Homogeneity	Instrumental Relations	Social Canalization	Accidental Social Experience (Self-Interest)
Collective Patterning	Analytical Consciousness	Political Mobilization	Reactive Political Experience (Obligations)
Subjective Inertness	The Entitative Universe	Productive Reification	Irrational Survival Experience (Necessity)

Arising out of the condition of human chaos

Preformance, Anticipation and Summation

Preformance, Anticipation and Summation

Preformance, Anticipation and Summation

Culminating in the problem of human freedom

Table 4.   The Organic Paradigm of Social Action

The Problem of Human Freedom		The Phenomenology of Human Freedom		The Process of Organic Action		The Condition of Human Uncertainty	

Arising out of the human condition of reinforced meaninglessness

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Aesthetically Critical

Socially Substantive

Collectively Reconstructive

Subjectively Holistic

Preformance, Anticipation and Summation

Transformational Values

Intrinsic Relations

Reconstructive Consciousness

The Organic Universe

Preformance, Anticipation and Summation

Aesthetic Creation

Social Consolidation

Political Reconstruction

Productive Actualization

Preformance, Anticipation and Summation

Prospective Value Experience

Provisional Social Experience

Partial Political Experience

Relative Survival Experience

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Possibly

culminating in

the problem

of human

salvation

CHAPTER 1. AN INQUIRY INTO THE THEORY OF RECONSTRUCTION OF POLITICAL REALITY

1. For some formative treatises on the contents of the process of paradigmatic action, see particularly John Dewey, Experience and Nature (Chicago: Open Court Publishing Company, 1925)., and Arthur F. Bentley, Knowing and the Known (Boston: Beacon Press, 1949)., William James, A Pluralistic Universe (New York: Longmans, Green and Co.,)., Karl Jaspers, Man in the Modern Age (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1957)., Talcott Parsons, Politics and Social Structure (New York: The Free Press, 1969)., Deena and Michael Weinstein, Living Sociology (New York: David McKay Company, Inc. 1974)., Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (London: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964).

2. Michael A. Weinstein, "New Ways and Old to Talk about Politics", a paper presented at the Midwest Political Science Association meetings, 1971.

3. For some excellent descriptions of the impediments confronting the development of a genuinely empirical mode of human knowledge, see especially John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1948)., William James, Essays in Radical Empiricism (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1912)., and Deena and Michael Weinstein, Living Sociology, op. cit.

4. Professor Howard Aster, conversations, October 1973.

5. An excellent discussion of concretely apprehended experience as the context of all empirical inquiry is provided in William James' Essays in Radical Empiricism, pp. 42-43.

6. John Dewey, How We Think (Boston: D.C. Heath and Co., 1910), pp. 79-80.

7. Ibid., p. 118.

8. Arthur Kroker, "Epistemologies, Visions, And Political Inquiry", an unpublished paper, 1973.

9. Many contemporary social philosophers have contended that the concrete process of social experience itself provides the ultimate ground for the verification of libertarian inquiry. For two interesting proposals of this sort, see Selected

Readings from the Works of Mao TseTung (Peking: Foreign
Language Press, 1971), p. 503., and John Dewey, Theory of
Valuation (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1943),
p. 57.

10. Professor Michael Weinstein, conversations, November, 1971.

11. The indeterminacy of human history does not disallow the
    possibility of temporal and spatial relationships between
    the different paradigms of social action. Indeed, the history
    of social action may be understood as moving in two directions
    simultaneously. In the most primitive sense, human history
    is concretely experienced as the space and time of now: a
    space and time in which the tendencies to human salvation,
    security, and freedom rise and fall with no apparent connec-
    tion and with no significant regularity. In a more mediate
    sense, the history of social action may be visualized as a
    vast and dynamic progression from one construction of social
    reality to another: a progression which is typified by a move-
    ment beyond the cosmological experience to the social reality
    of human security, and, by a leap, or a possible leap, beyond
    the corporate experience to an organic social reality. These
    two directions in the history of social action are more com-
    plementary than disconnected. Their complementariness origin-
    ates in the salient social fact that the history of social
    experience is always more a matter of relative dominance than
    of absolute domination. For a similar viewpoint on the recon-
    structive quality of the historical experience see Gordon Leff,
    History and Social Theory (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books,
    1971).

12. The conception of a "unitary human social process" has been
    explicitly elucidated by many thinkers, including, among
    others, Henri Bergson, Arthur F. Benley, Pierre Teilhard de
    Chardin, John Dewey, William James, Hannah Arendt, George
    Herbert Mead, Radhakamal Mukerjee, and Deena and Michael
    Weinstein. It has also been an implicit and, indeed, highly
    important feature of the writings of Karl Marx, Talcott Par-
    sonse, and Max Weber.

13. The Weinsteins have transformed an ontological and aesthetic
    criticism of the corporate life-order into a profound synthe-
    sis of the human social process. Although working independent-
    ly, I am intellectually indebted to them. This debt includes
    not only the Weinsteins' introduction of the present author
    to social process theory, but also their demonstration that
    militant activity is best tempered by militant philosophical
    reflection. For an appreciation of their writings, see par-
    ticularly Michael A. Weinstien, "Politics and Moral Consicous-
    ness", Midwest Jorunal of Political Science, XIV, 2(May, 1970),
    pp. 183-215., Systematic Political Theory (Columbus: Charles

E. Merrill, 1971)., Philosophy, Theory and Method in Contemporary Political Thought (Chicago: Scott,Foresman and Co., 1971)., The Political Experience: Readings in Political Science (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1972)., and Deena Weinstein, Living Sociology, op. cit.

14. This interpretation of Parsons' contribution to the theory of paradigmatic action has developed from a reappraisal of his seminal writings on the basis and direction of social change. See Talcott Parsons, Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1966)., Politics and Social Structure (New York: The Free Press, 1969)., and The Social System (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1951).

15. For an interesting discussion of the place of impulse in human politics see John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct (New York: The Modern Library, 1930), pp. 100-103.

16. Jean-Paul Sartre has commented that "all consciousness is positional in that it transcends itself in order to reach an object". See Justus Strellar, To Freedom Condemned (New York: Philosophical Library, 1960), p. 25.

17. The Weinsteins have described a complete human action as "a group of people in relation to one another, using a set of objects for the realization of purposes". Implicit to this interpretation of human activity is the insight that human relationships are not individual properties, but active social processes. Seen Deena and Michael Weinstein, Living Sociology, p. 129.

18. Radhakamal Mukerjee has described the more qualitative aspect of human existence as follows: "The basic impulsion which shapes and works out human destiny and the process of civilization is the full flowering of human intuition and imagination - comprehension of total meanings and values, anticipation and appreciation of fresh transcendent situations and possibilities and consecration to new universal goals and purposes". See Radhakamal Mukerjee, The Sickness of Civilization (Bombay: Allied Publishers Private Ltd., 1964), p. 107.

19. For a historical application of the principle of "preformance," see my "Competing Visions of Nature: Cosmological, Anthropomorphic, and Ecological", an unpublished paper, 1972.

20. For a concrete interpretation of the principle of "anticipation," see my "Cosmologies of Nature", an unpublished paper, 1972.

21. The term "working-out" is <u>not</u> intended to imply that the process of social action is imbued with a teleological principle. On the contrary, the different dimensions of the process of social action represent a "working-out" of another because human existence is not bound together by a fundamentalism, but by directly apprehended relations of reciprocity, complementarity, and intermediation.

22. For other presentations of the complete social process, see particularly Hannah Arendt's treatise on "Action," in <u>The Human Condition</u>, pp. 155-223, John Dewey's writings on "The Analysis of a Complete Act of Thought" in <u>How We Think</u>, pp. 68-78, Talcott Parsons' description of the constituents of social action in <u>The Social System</u>; the Weinstein essay on "Human Action" in <u>Living Sociology</u>, pp. 118-141, and Max Weber's commentary on "The Fundamental Concepts of Sociology," in <u>The Theory of Social and Economic Organization</u>, pp. 87-157.

23. For an admirable discussion of the place of dispositions in human conduct, see George Herbert Mead's treatise on "The Self and the Process of Reflection" in his <u>Mind, Self, and Society</u>, volume 1, pp. 354-378.

24. Karl Manheim has eloquently described the contextual and summational qualities of the process of human consciousness in his <u>Ideology and Utopia</u> (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Co., 1936).

25. In his <u>Social System</u>, Talcott Parsons has described the social processes of adaptation, differentiation, integration, and pattern-maintenance as the dominant principles of organizational activity in the modern age. For a revision of this aspect of Parsonian theory, see my "The Corporate Experience: Ontology and Contradictions," an unpublished paper, May 1973. And for an excellent interpretation of the social process of human freedom, see Michael Weinstein's discussion of the activities of creation, aesthetic appreciation, participation, and inquiry in his essay entitled "Socialism and Humanism." Jeffrey R. Orenstein and Louis Patsouras, <u>The Politics of Community: New Aspects of Socialist Theory and Practice</u> (Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company, 1973), pp. 13-37.

26. For a persuasive image of the different directions in the process of human experience, see Deena and Michael Weinstein, <u>Living Sociology</u>, pp. 123-126.

27. Or, as Josiah Royce has argued, "...the whole universe, precisely insofar as it is, is the expression of a meaning, is the conscious fulfillment of significance in life...;" Josiah Royce, <u>The World and the Individual</u>, (London: The Macmillan Company, 1920), p. 443.

28. Michael Weinstein, conversations, April 1972.

29. Ibid., Living Sociology.

30. For an epistemologically derived image of "paradigms," see Thomas
    S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: The
    University of Chicago Press, 1962).

31. Paradigms of social action, as concretely experienced constructions
    of social reality, transcend the "normal" dimensions of past, present,
    and future. It is only when their central features have been
    "distanced" from immediate existence by means of critical reflection
    that it becomes possible to discuss relationships of emergence and
    summation between generalized human problems, phenomenologies of
    social reality, processes of social organization, and human conditions.

32. For an evocative description of the sensibilities involved when
    possessed by such a "question," see Arthur Koestler, Darkness at
    Noon (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1973).

33. For a comprehensive description of the phenomemological dimension
    of the process of social experience, see Edmund Husserl, Ideas:
    General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology (New York: Macmillan Co.,
    1931).

34. For a comparable vision of the process of social organization, see
    Karl Jaspers' eloquent portrayal of the "technical mass-order"
    in his Man in the Modern Age, pp. 33-88.

35. For some penetrating discussions of the value-quality of the process
    of human experience, see Simone De Beauvoir, The Woman Destroyed
    (London: Wm. Collins Sons and Co. Ltd., 1969), and Andre
    Malraux, Man's Fate (New York: Vintage Books, 1961).

36. The three generalized human problems have inspired a diversity of
    intellectual commentaries. For a cross-section of writings on
    the problem of human salvation, see particularly Saint Augustin,
    Les Confessions (Paris: Garnier-Flammarion, 1964), H. Richard
    Niebuhr, The Social Sources of Denominationalism (New York:
    Meridian, 1970), and Michael Oakeshott, Experience and its Modes
    (Cambridge: University Press, 1966). Among others, Gabriel
    Almond, David Apter, David Easton, Samuel P. Huntington, and
    Talcott Parsons are modern representatives of the intellectual
    tradition motivated by the problem of human security. For a sampling
    of the writings on human freedom, see particularly John Dewey,
    Reconstruction in Philosophy, L. T. Hobhouse, Liberalism
    (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), Herbert Marcuse, Negations
    (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels,
    The Communist Manifesto (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1955),
    George Santayana, Dominations and Powers (New York: Charles
    Scribner's Sons, 1955), and Deena and Michael Weinstein, Living Sociology.

37. Karl R. Popper has developed a similar image of human episte-
    mologies in his Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth
    of Scientific Knowledge (New York: Harper and Row, 1963).

38. See Talcott Parsons, The Social System, and Deena and Michael
    Weinstein, Living Sociology, and my "The Corporate Experience:
    Ontology and Contradictions," Op. Cit.

39. For an excellent discussion of the relationship between chaos and
    order, see George Santayana, Dominations and Powers, pp. 33-35.

CHAPTER 2. THE COSMOLOGICAL EXPERIENCE

1. For some excellent descriptions of the ontological and epistemological development of the corporate experience, see P. W. Bridgman, The Logic of Modern Physics (New York: Macmillan, 1961), Herbert Butterfield, The Origins of Modern Science (New York: Collier Books, 1962), Leszek Kolakowski, The Alienation of Reason: A History of Positivist Thought (New York: Anchor Books, 1969), and Karl R. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge (New York: Harper and Row, 1965).

2. The philosopher Nicolas Berdyaev has described the absolutization of subjectivity as emanating from "ontological philosophy...from the philosophy of the all-in-one." See his treatise The Beginning and the End (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1952), p. 142.

3. An example of a philosophical work which commits itself to the value of completeness is Michael J. Oakeshott's Experience and its Modes (Cambridge: The University Press, 1966).

4. For example, Plato seems to identify "justice" with acquiescence in an antecedent moral design and, on this basis, prescribes the social and political relationships necessary for its actualization. See especially Books 1 and 4 of the Republic in The Dialogues of Plato (New York: Random House, 1937), volume 1.

5. A classic example of the consistency of moral absoluteness is Immanuel Kant's "categorical imperative." See his monograph Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1959), p. 33.

6. For an admirable discussion of the principles of an absolutist universe, see Josiah Royce's The World and the Individual, pp. 141-182.

7. John Dewey and Arthur F. Bentley have described the central features of tautological consciousness (under the category of "self-actional" epistemologies) in their book Knowing and the Known (Boston: Beacon Press, 1940).

8. A representative example of this mode of philosophy is Pierre Teilhard de Chardin's Christianity and Evolution (New York: Harcourt and Brace Jovanovich, 1971).

9. For a lucid exposition of this position, see Sterling P. Lamprecht's
   The Metaphysics of Naturalism (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts,
   1967).

10. For some insightful historical descriptions of the process of
    mythification, see particularly James G. Frazer, The Golden Bough,
    A Study in Magic and Religion, abridged edition (London: Macmillan,
    1971), and Edward B. Tylor, Primitive Culture (Boston: Estes and
    Lauriat, 1874). A contemporary appraisal of the place of myth in
    the history of social action has been developed by Talcott Parsons
    in The Social System, pp. 516-517.

11. A philosophical illustration of this is Karl Marx's and Frederich
    Engels' The Communist Manifesto (Chicago: H. Regnery Co., 1954).

12. For example, see George Hegel's The Phenomenology of Mind
    (New York: Macmillan, 1961).

13. A representative writing in this tradition is Wilhelm Reich's
    The Function of the Orgasm (New York: Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux,
    1973).

14. Note the resemblance of this process of objectifying faith to the
    "cybernetics" of corporate existence. The collectivization of faith
    seems to be one way that cosmologies strive to enhance their "adaptive
    capacity," thus anticipating the structural-functional ideal of
    survival.

15. An example of this is the "Ten Commandments."

CHAPTER 3. THE CONDITION OF HUMAN CHAOS

1. A contemporary example of this is the Soviet-Chinese rivalry over
    rights of succession to the Marxist-Leninist cosmology.

2. The Spanish philosopher Miguel de Unamuno has opined that this
    interior tension of the philosophical tradition originates in an
    intense opposition between reason and imagination. Having described
    reason as a "dissolving force" and imagination as "integrative and
    totalizing," he was led to the conclusion "that the vital longing
    for human immortality finds no consolation in reason and that
    reason leaves us without incentive or consolation in life and life
    itslef without real finality." Miguel de Unamuno, The Tragic Sense
    of Life (New York: Dover Publications, 1954), p. 106.

3. For an excellent account of the decline of religious cosmologies
    into sectional social movements, see H. Richard Niebuhr's The
    Social Sources of Denominationalism (New York: Meridian Books, 1970).
    And for an exhaustive description of important social "monisms,"
    see Deena and Michael Weinstein's Living Sociology, pp. 40-46.

4. The decline of the Christian cosmology, however, may be perhaps
    attributed more to an internal source of chaos (Protestantism)
    than to chaos from without.

5. However, while commiting itself to the primacy of a particular
    dimension of human experience, each cosmology also includes elements
    of the other phases of human existence. In this sense, there is
    no cosmology which is bereft of experience, reason, will, or
    imagination.

6. For a representative writing in this tradition, see Karl Marx,
    The Poverty of Philosophy (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr and Co., 1910).

7. For some insightful expositions on national and racial determinisms,
    see particularly Leo Snyder, The Idea of Racialism: Its Meaning and
    History (New York: Van Nostrand, 1962), Hannah Arendt, The Origins
    of Totalitarianism (New York: Meridian Books, 1966), Morris Ginsberg,
    Nationalism: A Reappraisal(Leeds: University Press, 1963),
    and Aurobindo Ghose, The Human Cycle: The Ideal of Human Unity
    (Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Ashram, 1962). And for an unambiguous
    demonstration of the racist mentality, see Adolph Hitler's Mein
    Kampf (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1943).

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8. For a philosophical understanding of the "social dissolution," see Georges Gurvitch's <u>Determinismes Sociaux et Liberté Humaine</u> (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1955). A contemporary example of social determinism is Robert Ardrey's <u>The Territorial Imperative</u> (New York: Atheneum, 1966).

9. For example, there does not appear to be any empirical basis upon which a decision of "veracity" may be made between Maritain's and Strauss' opposing perspectives on the origins and development of natural rights and natural law. See Jacques Maritain, <u>The Rights of Man and Natural Law</u> (New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1947), and Leo Strauss, <u>Natural Right and History</u> (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963).

10. I am indebted to Mr. T. J. Farrell for his stimulating commentary on the relationship of chaos to reason and imagination.

11. The sense of "absurdity" described here is less the absurdity of "nothingness" than that of an irreconcilably contradictory plenitude.

12. It will become apparent in the following two chapters that while "apathy"--the paralysis of will--represents the negation of cosmological experience, it is a necessary condition for the persistence of the corporate experience. Thus, the corporate experience transforms the seeds of destruction of the cosmological into a means for its own survival.

13. In a related way, Nicolas Berdyaev has pointed out the opposition between the development of a philosophy of life and any attempt at suppressing social anomalies: "Philosophical knowledge depends on the range of experience, and it also supposes an essentially tragic experience of all the contradictions of human existence. Philosophy is therefore based upon the maximum experience of human existence." See his <u>Solitude and Society</u> (London: The Centenary Press, 1947), p. 13.

14. For a philosophical "fall-out" of this immobility of morality, see Friedrich Nietzche's <u>On the Genealogy of Morals</u> (New York: Vintage Books, 1969).

CHAPTER 4. THE CORPORATE EXPERIENCE

1. For some important political and social theorists who have
   embraced the problematic character of order, see particularly
   Talcott Parsons, The Social System (New York: The Free Press of
   Glencoe, 1951), Niccolo Machiavelli, Discourses (London: Routledge
   and Paul, 1950), Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Middlesex, England:
   Penguin Books Ltd., 1974), and David Easton, A Framework for Political
   Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1965).

2. Or, stated more technically, "the problem of order, and thus of
   the nature of the integration of stable systems of social interaction,
   that is, of social structure,...focuses on the integration of the
   motivation of actors with the normative cultural standards which
   integrate the action system, in our context interpersonally."
   Talcott Parsons, The Social System, pp. 36-37.

3. David Easton has described this political process as involving the
   "authoritative allocation of values." The Political System: An
   Inquiry into the State of Political Science (New York: A. Knopf, 1963),
   pp. 129-134.

4. For an excellent critique of the process of moral repression, see
   Herbert Marcuse, Negations (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968).

5. For some admirable descriptions of the place of the "entitative"
   ontology in the theory of human action, see especially John Dewey,
   Experience and Nature (Chicago: Open Court Publishing House, 1925),
   chapter 2, William James, Essays in Radical Empiricism (New York:
   E. P. Dutton and Co., Inc., 1971), pp. 23-48, and Michael A.
   Weinstein, "New Ways and Old to Talk about Politics," Review of
   Politics, 35 (January, 1973), pp. 41-60.

6. This radical shift of the tendency to entropy from a patterned
   flaw to a personal failing is intended, of course, to make the
   problem of human chaos "ontologically," and thereby concretely,
   manageable.

7. Weinstein, "New Ways and Old to Talk About Politics," Op. Cit.

8. For a treatment of the same process from a sociology of knowledge
   perspective, see William Leiss, The Domination of Nature (New York:
   George Braziller, 1972).

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9. Parsons has described "process regression" of this sort as the ultimate negation of corporate experience. Talcott Parsons, Politics and Social Structure (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1969).

10. I am indebted to Professor John Burke, a Canadian political theorist, for his insightful observations on the problem of reification.

11. While the corporate experience entails a privatization of concern with salvation and of value-experience, it does not, of course, eliminate them.

12. Parsons, Politics and Social Structure, p. 397.

13. The four "currencies of exchange"--money, power, influence, and value-commitments--have been taken directly from Parsons' description of the "symbolic media" which regulate movement within and across the different systems of human action. Parsons has described the maximization of the four "symbolic media" as the central feature of the "public morality of instrumental activism," the governing value-experience of modern institutional existence. Talcott Parsons, Politics and Social Structure, p. 397.

14. The regulatory sanctions which coordinate the expansion of the different currencies of exchange have been developed by Talcott Parsons in his Politics and Social Structure, p. 363.

15. For a lucid description of the "mazimizing" qualities of the corporate process of value-experience, see Michael A. Weinstein, "The Sociology of Public Morality: Talcott Parsons and Phenomenology," private communication with "Michael A. Weinstein."

CHAPTER 5. THE HUMAN CONDITION OF REINFORCED MEANINGLESSNESS

1. For a penetrating discussion of the abstract instrumentalism of corporate experience, see Karl Jaspers' Man in the Modern Age (New York: Anchor Books, 1957), pp. 41-64.

2. Laswell has traced the development of the psychopathology of power politics to the "displacement of private affect upon public objects." Harold Laswell, Psychopathology and Politics (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1951), Chapter X, "The Politics of Prevention," pp. 173-203.

3. For an excellent account of the forms of political, social, and economic stratification which develop from the annihilation of role-distance, see Pitrim A. Sorokin,Social and Cultural Mobility (London: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1959).

4. Deena and Michael Weinstein, Living Sociology, pp. 156-162.

5. The survival referred to here is, of course, that of the massive organizations and pervasive institutions that are supposed to ensure the survival of humanity. Thus, corporate experience is not simply abstract, but it is doubly abstract! This insight was offered to the present author in a letter from Michael A. Weinstein, April, 1975.

6. Compare this description of the necessary irrationality of corporate political activity with proposals for a "rational" political policy process put forth by Anthony Downs in his An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper, 1957), and by David Braybooke and Charles E. Lindbloom in their A Strategy of Decision (New York: The Free Press, 1970).

7. Radhakamal Mukerjee, an Indian social theorist, has associated Toennies' vision of pseudo-grouping with the perversion and distortion of moral experience. In discussing the genealogy of "disvalues," Mukerjee has commented: "...man's social regression is associated with the pursuit of low and spurious needs and values, infantilism, social inadequacy and neurotic state of personality and disintegration of the social order--different facets of the pathology of life, mind and civilization." Radhakamal Mukerjee, The Sickness of Civilization (New York: Paragon Book Gallery, 1964), p. 64.

8. Op. Cit., Living Sociology, pp. 19-20.

9. In sum, the corporate actively perverts moral experience by making
   values the cutting-edge of individual and organizational interests.
   Thus, in the corporate experience, interests regulate moralities,
   and pathological desires govern interests. For an excellent
   critique of the inadequacy of the corporate value experience, see
   Michael A. Weinstein's article "A Fourth Branch of Government:
   For Whom?" in his book The Political Experience (New York:
   St. Martin's Press, 1972).

10. The Canadian critic, Northrop Frye, has summed up the repressive
    consciousness of happy tranquillity into the poetic phrase—
    "the alienation of progress." For an admirable description of the
    social and intellectual consequences of corporate propaganda, see
    his book The Modern Century (Toronto: Oxford University Press,
    1967).

11. In describing the desire for glory or reputation as a principal
    cause of civil strife, Thomas Hobbes was a prophet of the corporate.
    See his Leviathan, Op. Cit., p. 185.

CHAPTER 6. THE ORGANIC EXPERIENCE

1. The fountainhead of human liberation is, in this event, less noetic or aesthetic than the decisiveness of intentionality. The human will, steeped in passion and driven by moral conviction, leads, or may lead, humanity beyond the corporate experience.

2. Radhakamal Mukerjee has described a holistic universe as a "bio-social-ideal situation." See his insightful treatise The Dimensions of Human Evolution: A Bio-Philosophical Interpretation (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1967).

3. For an insightful description of the obstacles confronting the development of a reconstructive mode of political activity, see John Dewey's The Public and Its Problems (Chicago: Gateway Books, 1946).

4. For example, the social psychologist George Herbert Mead has traced empirically the development of genuine human solidarities from a shared appreciation of the value of cooperation. Mead, Mind, Self, and Society, pp. 317-336.

5. For an illuminating discussion of the method of "totalization," see Jean-Paul Sartre's book Search For a Method (New York: Random House, 1968).

6. William James, Essays in Radical Empiricism, Op. Cit., p. 42.

7. For a similar fusion of epistemology and axiology, see John Stuart Mill's Philosophy of Scientific Method (New York: Hafner Publishing Company, 1950).

8. Michael A. Weinstein has identified "creative freedom, aesthetic appreciation, participation, and inquiry" as the principal intrinsic values of a more rational human order. See his essay, "Socialism and Humanism," in Jeffrey R. Orenstein's and Louis Patsouras" The Politics of Community: New Aspects of Socialist Theory and Practice (Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company, 1973), pp. 33-37.

9. Contrast this description of the ideals and functions of an empirical process of value experience with Kant's proposal for a "pure moral philosophy." Refer especially to Kant's Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1959).

10. The present author is indebted to Mr. T. J. Farrell for his insightful comments on the relationship of meaning and freedom.

11. The point is, of course, that in a libertarian world the existence of a political apparatus signifies a failure of both reason and morals.

12. Weinstein, "Socialism and Humanism," Op. Cit., pp. 33-35.

CHAPTER 7. THE CONDITION OF HUMAN UNCERTAINTY

1. For some excellent philosophical discussions of the principle
   of human indeterminacy, see Wilhelm Dilthey, The Essence of
   Philosophy (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina
   Press, 1954) and Stephen C. Pepper, World Hypotheses (Berkeley:
   University of California Press, 1972).

2. Taken to its logical conclusion, the direct experience of human
   indeterminacy also discloses that, while the cosmological and
   corporate experiences are intelligible and comprehensible, they
   can never be synthesized by the process of organic experience.

3. Noting this inner tension of the will to human freedom, the
   philosopher Albert Camus has essayed that "a revolutionary action
   wishes to be coherent in terms of its origins should be embodied
   in an active consent to the relative. It should express fidelity
   to the human conditon." Albert Camus, The Rebel (London: Hamish
   Hamilton, 1953), p. 257.

4. Or, stated negatively, the four freedom "situations" may be
   suppressed by the development of particular "statist" theories,
   whether moral, social, political, or economic. For example,
   Marcuse's plea for cultural liberation is counterpointed by
   Mao Tse-tung's proposal for the domination of value experience.
   The normative libertarianism of the philosophical anarchists
   Kropotkin and Proudhon is offset by the Leninist theory of social
   control. Stalinism negates the political rebelliousness of Fanon
   and Julius Nyerere. And Pitrim Sorokin's challenge to the desirability
   of "experts" is met by the dogma of socialist economic planning.
   See particularly Herbert Marcuses's An Essay on Liberation, Mao
   Tse-tung's Four Essays on Philosophy, Kropotkin's Mutual Aid, Stalin's
   "Socialism in One Country," Fanon's The Wretched of the Earth, Lenin's
   "Left-Wing" Communism: An Infantile Disorder, Julius K. Nyerere's
   Ujamaa-Essays on Socialism, and Pitrim Sorokin's Who Shall Guard
   the Guardians?

5. Vitalistic, that is, in the sense that the process of human
   experience, being internally coordinated, contains its own
   principles of determination and evolution. Or, as the pragmatic
   tradition in philosophy has maintained; change itself is an
   object of immediate experience.

6. Or, described in another way, the source of libertarian solidarities may be either ecological, philosophical, existential, or aesthetic.

7. As the American philosopher Stephen Pepper has pointed out, there are as many theories of truth as there are world hypotheses, and as many world hypotheses as there are "root metaphors" to support them. See his World Hypotheses, Op. Cit., pp. 328-332.

8. And, following Nietzsche, each dimension of this critical value experience represents a moral critique in its own right--a valuing of all values. See particularly Frederich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals (New York: Vintage Books, 1969), p. 6.

9. For an excellent description of the different bases of social consolidation, see John Stuart Mill's essay on "Civilization," Essays on Politics and Culture (New York: Anchor Books, 1963), pp. 45-76.

10. For a penetrating defence of human relativity, see Hannah Arendt's chapter on "Ideology and Terror: A Novel of Government," in her book The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: The World Publishing Company, 1966), pp. 460-479.

11. The American philosopher, George Santayana, has referred to social and moral liberation as the domain of "vital freedom." Santayana, Dominations and Powers, Op. Cit., pp. 57-60.

12. John Dewey has commented that "the meanings which are termed ideal as truly as those which are termed sensuous are generated by existence; that as far as they continue in being they are sustained by events; that they are indications of the possibilities of existences, and are, therefore, to be used as well as enjoyed; used to inspire action to procure and buttress their causal condition." Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 416.

13. Of course, that dimension of sentiment and reflection which is founded on either teleological or instrumental principles can never be integrated into genuine human solidarities.

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