NATURE AND HISTORY IN THE KNOWLEDGE OF VALUE
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A STUDY IN BERNARD LONERGAN’S
ACCOUNT OF VALUE

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Abstract

This dissertation examines Bernard Lonergan’s understanding of value, its assumptions and its development, for the sake of determining the role of human nature and human historicity in the experience of value. The categories of nature and history reflect a specifically modern form of the long-standing question of the relationship between physis and nomos—i.e., nature and convention, or ‘nature and nurture’—for modernity has made us acutely aware of the historicity of cultural conventions. We ask of Lonergan: how or to what extent is the experience of value determined by human nature, and how or to what extent is it historically conditioned?

To understand Lonergan’s position one must appreciate both the difference and the continuity between his earlier and later thought. Lonergan’s earlier thought reflects a rather Kantian formalistic account of value as the rational good, but his later thought embraces Scheler’s non-formal, material account of value—i.e., the good is an object of natural appetite—a position in which affectivity plays a role in revealing value. In spite of this development, there yet remains an underlying unity: there is a fundamental opposition of affect and intellect that precludes the possibility of understanding value as both rationally and materially good. Lonergan associates affect with natural spontaneity, and intellect with the deliberate, progressive dynamic of history. Because of this, in his earlier work he presents value as rationally, and therefore historically, determined; yet in his mature position value is grasped primarily in affective apprehensions, which are ahistorical intuitions, grounded in human nature and the ‘reasons of the heart’.

In response, it will be argued that this dichotomy of feeling and rationality can be transcended without sacrificing Lonergan’s account of self-transcendence.
I would like to acknowledge my gratitude to Drs. John Robertson and Ben Meyer, who provided me with the critical dialogue and encouragement that made this task an enjoyable one. Both of them know a divine balance between order and freedom, insisting on clarity and accuracy yet allowing room for others’ questions and others’ answers. To Ben, in particular, thank you for your depth of insight into Lonergan, which always prodded me to think and rethink my own interpretation. To John, thank you for your style of supervision, present but not dominant, encouraging but not demanding.

I would also like to thank my wife, Joan, who did not know when she first promised herself to me that the road ahead would be so long, and yet who has not ceased to choose our life together. Thank you for your love and your support.

Finally, yet first as well as last, thanks to my God for the joy of words and the delight in meaning. May what I have meant in this work and in these words be in harmony with the meaning You have given the world. May it be a little of your breath moving over the face of the deep.
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Bernard Lonergan, a Roman Catholic philosopher and theologian, saw his life's work in terms of an integration of history and the transhistorical truth claim implicit in Christian theology. The task might seem daunting in the modern world, for various currents of contemporary thought have conspired to render human historicity synonymous with cultural relativity, the rejection of all appeals to anything beyond historical contingency. Lonergan is right, however, in recognizing that the challenge is not a new one, for the Greeks themselves acknowledged the reality of cultural diversity and the broad scope of convention in human living. In his essay, "Natural Right and Historical Mindedness," Lonergan sets out the basic structure of his integration of history and truth against the background of Greek thought, for just as they appealed to nature as a universal and permanent principle over against the malleability of cultural convention, so does Lonergan find in nature a principle of transcendence that sets a limit on historical contingency. Human nature is an orientation to reality, to value and to God, an orientation operative in our contingency, and as such it points us beyond the merely contingent. So the integration of truth and history relies on an adequate account of the interplay of nature and history, an account that does justice to the breadth of human diversity as well as to the depth of the conviction of a reality and a goodness beyond ourselves and our times.

The task before us is to examine and evaluate Lonergan's integration of nature and history specifically in relation to his understanding of value. That is, we seek to know how human nature and human history ground the awareness and conviction of value. One might formulate the question in the following terms: What is there in human nature that enables us to discern the truly good, and how
does historical contingency enter into this process of discernment? How does the knowledge of value reflect an unchanging principle in human nature, and how does it express cultural and historical circumstance? In terms of evaluating Lonergan’s account of value, the question becomes one of whether Lonergan adequately harmonizes the tension between historical contingency and transcendence in knowing the good.

Though recent works have dealt with Lonergan’s account of value, the focus has been on its implications rather than on the deeper assumptions and the development of his position. So, for example, Walter Conn argues that in the context of current theories of moral development Lonergan offers the most adequate account of conscience, grounding it as he does in the thrust of the individual toward transcendence. Cynthia S.W. Crysdale has formulated well a Lonerganian challenge to Kohlberg’s developmental ethics and to a radical feminist position. These authors make clear the strengths of Lonergan’s position vis-à-vis other contemporary positions. My concern, however, is not primarily with the implications of Lonergan’s position but rather with its basic assumptions, especially as these are revealed in the development of his position over the course of his writing career.

John Finnis is one writer who has examined the foundation of Lonergan’s account of value and, from a more traditional viewpoint, finds it inadequate. Finnis is concerned to defend an understanding of the rational good as materially good, a perspective that appeals back to Aristotle, Augustine and Aquinas. To this end, Finnis appraises various modern ethical approaches, Lonergan’s among them. Though the discussion of Lonergan is accurate in the sense that it catches the shape of his thought in broad brushstrokes, the analysis is too brief to capture the detail or subtle nuances of his thought. Nor is there any consideration of the development of Lonergan’s position. He cites freely from both Insight and Method in Theology (hereafter referred to as Method) in spite of the fact that
Lonergan's ethical position underwent a significant revision between these two works. A greater problem with Finnis' book, however, is that he does not address what Lonergan would claim to be the fatal flaw in the classical position: it appeals to rational norms independent of the historical, constructive process through which the knowledge of meaning and value are progressively determined.8

It is against the background of works such as these that I seek to contribute a critical study of Lonergan's account of value, considering the development of his position, clarifying the assumptions on which it is built and evaluating its strengths and weaknesses.

Though this study has a narrow focus, it is relevant to a much broader concern, because it lays a basis for considering whether Lonergan's account of the relationship between history and transcendence can bridge the chasm between transcendental and hermeneutical theology, between a theology based on universals and a theology giving priority to historicity.9 There are some who hold these two paradigms to be irreconcilable, for, as Francis Schüessler Fiorenza notes, they understand the meaning of historicity implied in hermeneutical theology in terms of a radical incommensurability of perspectives that undermines any and every appeal to universality.10 Fred Lawrence, however, claims that Lonergan does in fact manage to reconcile these two theological approaches.11 Historicity from this perspective is understood in terms of the historical conditioning of human existence. That is, within human existence there is some underlying reality, some unchanging principle distinguishable from the myriad forms of human meaning and living that arise in history.

This disagreement over the meaning of historicity itself exemplifies the conflict between transcendental and hermeneutical theology: are these two understandings of historicity themselves incommensurable, or is it possible to resolve this antithesis intelligently. It can be resolved, I believe, only if the
transcendental perspective can prove capable of a unifying account of the concrete diversity in human existence while preserving respect for the radical otherness intrinsic to that diversity. Respect is important to the solution, for the understanding of historicity as incommensurability draws its strength from the contemporary aesthetic of diversity, which sees value manifest in diverse cultures and perspectives, and as such it resists and mistrusts the appeal to universality as failing to appreciate and preserve the uniqueness of the other. This mistrust is even greater when claims of a normative wholeness are implicit in definitions of universality, and there is a concern that transcendental theology can too readily confuse one narrow cultural perspective with what is universal and natural. So the integration of transcendental and hermeneutical theology—or, rather, the resolution of the two readings of historicity—can only be achieved by defining universals without sacrificing the aesthetic of diversity.

The question of how the truly good is known is particularly germane to this tension, for there is a sense in which values present the greatest challenge to anyone who seeks both to discern universals and yet to recognize the virtue and uniqueness within diversity. In mathematics and the ‘hard’ sciences the quest for universals is easier—this is not to deny that the sociology of science has rendered it less straightforward—for there is a sense in which the meaning of Euclid’s geometrical axioms or al-Khwarizmi’s algebra is straightforward across cultures and times. Yet the more meaning enters into the realm of value, the less transparent the concrete embodiment of meaning becomes across cultures and times. For this reason the sphere of human values is central to the question of whether transcendence and historicity can be harmonized. Whether this harmony has been achieved by Lonergan is not the issue of our study, yet the project of understanding and evaluating Lonergan’s account of value is motivated and guided by this broader concern.

There is much in Lonergan, I believe, that contributes to harmonizing
nature and history, unity and diversity, the universal and the concrete. His focus on human nature as a spiritual exigence toward truth, value and love, a nature in which there are immanent criteria for answering historically-contingent questions, leads us to see transcendence as deeply conditioned by history. For knowing the true and doing the good depends upon the constructive role of the subject in answering questions, and though these questions have their source in a dynamic that leads us beyond any particular, historical perspective, and though the answers are determined according to immanent criteria, still the questions we can raise and the answers we can entertain rely on the previous achievements and present circumstances of the time and culture in which we live. Nature contributes the desire for and the criteria of truth and goodness; history determines concretely what is true and good.

The reason for examining Lonergan's account of value arises not only because the issue of value is central to harmonizing nature and history in a way that might reconcile transcendental and hermeneutical theology but also because it is the point at which, in my opinion, Lonergan falls short of an adequate answer. I believe that an adequate answer lies in the direction of integrating Lonergan's emphasis on the constructive role of the self-transcending subject with a more classical account of the truly good as both rationally and materially good. For the rational good to be materially good, one must conceive intellect and affect as inextricably interwoven. In Lonergan, however, there is a persistent dichotomy between affectivity and rationality that runs throughout his account of the good, and this works against recognizing the full weight of history in determining value. Because Lonergan associates historical development primarily with rationality, the dualism between affect and intellect leads him in his earlier works to omit affectivity from the historical determination of value so that value is rational but not material. In his mature position it leads him to admit affectivity into the determination of value but in a way that is fundamentally
In short, there are three things this study seeks to demonstrate in answering the question of how Lonergan grounds value in human nature and history. First, there is a basic dichotomy between affectivity and rationality throughout Lonergan's writings. Second, his account of value changed significantly between his earlier and later works from seeing value as rooted in rationality to seeing it as rooted primarily in affectivity. Third, the dichotomy of feeling and knowing is a key to understanding the limitations of both accounts of value. In response to Lonergan's account of value it will be argued that this dichotomy is unwarranted and dispensible, and that it can be resolved without rejecting the basic thrust of Lonergan's account of self-transcendence, which I take to be his central contribution to contemporary thought.

There are three basic components to our investigation, but they correspond only roughly with the points just outlined. The first component seeks to show that the separation of intellect and feeling in Lonergan's early thought reflects the dialectical tension between the psyche and the intellect, which in turn is rooted in the most basic principles of Lonergan's account of nature. The second component takes up the argument that Lonergan's thought did indeed undergo a rather radical change, for Insight's account of ethics can be described as both formalistic and intellectualistic but in the late sixties he abandons both aspects of his earlier ethical thought. The third component examines Lonergan's mature account of value and seeks to show that the apprehension of value, upon which the historical process of determining value depends, is itself an ahistorical intuition grounded primarily in human nature. Woven into the second and third components is the argument that the dualism of reason and feeling is a crucial factor in Lonergan's account of value.

The first component, "Nature and Human Nature," examines the basic dialectic between limitation and transcendence in nature, which in human
existence translates into a tension between the psyche and the intellect. This serves two functions in the overall context of the study. First, it presents a basic account of Lonergan’s explanation of transcendence, which provides the necessary background for dealing with his treatment of value. Second, it lays the groundwork for showing that the exclusion of affectivity from Lonergan’s account of value in *Insight* is not simply due to an oversight. Some would argue that there is no substantive change between Lonergan’s earlier and later ethical positions, and that the latter merely fills in a lacuna—the absence of affectivity and intersubjectivity—in the earlier position. However, Lonergan’s understanding of the dialectical tension in nature between psychic affectivity and disinterested rationality leads us to see that his early exclusion of affectivity from value follows from the basic structure of his thought. Affectivity in Lonergan’s early thought is associated exclusively with the psyche, and there is an ineluctable tension between psyche and intellect, in which the psyche all too easily interferes in the functioning of the intellect. As we will see, this interpretation of human affectivity finds expression in a Kantian kind of formalism in *Insight*. So recognizing the juxtaposition of psyche and intellect as a key element in Lonergan’s early thought lends force to the argument that there is a dichotomy of affect and intellect, and that the downplaying of affectivity is systematic rather than accidental.

"Nature and Human Nature" comprises two chapters, the first focusing on nature and the second on human nature. Admittedly, the concept ‘nature’ can be vague, and Lonergan does not necessarily use it as a technical term, but the clarification of how he uses it had best wait until the end of Chapter I, when we have a basic grasp of Lonergan’s portrayal of nature. Chapter I provides a brief introduction to Lonergan’s for the themes of finality, hierarchy and limitation, which are central to understanding his account of nature and the dialectic implicit in human existence. This dialectic is the foundation upon which his account of
human transcendence and his dualism of psyche and intellect are to be understood, and so it prepares the way for Chapter II. Considering nature in general first also serves at the outset to dismiss the impression of a tacit dualism in the opposition of nature and history. It is one of the virtues of Lonergan’s thought, I believe, that he offers a credible account of the unity of nature and history. For Lonergan, nature no less than humankind reveals a capacity for transcendence, which is manifest both in natural evolution and in human history. By developing the discussion and criticism of Lonergan’s thought upon the foundation of his account of nature, I hope to show that what I take to be a problem in his account of value is not a necessary one given the interpretation of nature on which it is built. One can embrace his account of nature and transcendence without accepting the dichotomy of affect and intellect.

Chapter II looks at Lonergan’s early understanding of human nature as we find it in Insight. To catch the contours of his early account of value requires that we grasp the central features of his explanation of human nature, for the opposition of the conservative, self-interested psyche and the progressive, disinterested reason is evident in and accounts for his early ethical formalism. This chapter begins with Lonergan’s account of the patterns of experience, for these serve to clarify the psychic and rational principles operative in human living. The chapter then demonstrates the pervasive tension between intellect and psyche, showing how Lonergan opposes them in terms of progressive, disinterested reason and conservative, self-interested psyche, an opposition clearly displayed in his account of the biases that undermine personal and social development.

The second component of our investigation, Chapters III through V, argues that Lonergan’s account of value did indeed undergo a significant change between Insight and Method. In Insight his position can best be described as an amalgamation of Thomistic intellectualism and a rather Kantian ethical formalism.
His later engagement with existentialism leads him to a position that denies both intellectualism and formalism in affirming the priority of praxis and the material goodness of value.

Chapter III studies Lonergan’s early ethical thought on its own terms, taking Chapter XVIII of Insight as its primary focus. Of primary importance are Lonergan’s account of value and his discussion of practical rationality. The explanation of value takes up the first of Chapter XVIII’s three sections, and it is there that we are introduced to the threefold structure of value and the implications of this structure for ethics and the defense of the goodness of being. It is in this section also that Lonergan argues for ethical intellectualism, the position that speculative intellect has priority over the will in practical matters. In the second section of this chapter of Insight Lonergan presents his account of practical intelligence, which, in spite of its difficulties, clarifies the relationship between practical and speculative intelligence, a relationship that changes as Lonergan abandons his early intellectualism.

Chapter IV deals with Lonergan’s account of value in greater depth, showing that Lonergan’s early ethical position reflects two different traditions of thought: Thomistic intellectualism and Kantian ethical formalism. First, it outlines the basic differences between these positions by contrasting Thomas and Kant in order to provide a background over against which Lonergan’s position can be evaluated. The fundamental difference between them is whether the rational good is materially good, as in the classical tradition represented by Thomas, or formally good, as in Kant’s refutation of the classical position. Lonergan brings elements of both together, formulating the threefold structure of value in a way that is consonant with Thomas’ yet reflecting the kind of formalism espoused by Kant. Lonergan’s position is not an integral synthesis of these two perspectives, yet it will be argued that Lonergan’s definition of value and the distinction between spontaneous desire and value make his position
basically formalistic. In one regard, however, Lonergan’s early position borrows very directly from his understanding of Thomas’ thought: Lonergan’s intellectualism, and the idea of a fourth level of consciousness in which it finds expression, is a direct transposition of Thomas’ account of how intellectual knowledge determines or informs the will.

Chapter V examines Lonergan’s later position. First we consider how his reformulation of the fourth level of consciousness moves away from scholastic intellectualism to affirm the priority of praxis, a change evident in the emergence of Lonergan’s notion of existential consciousness. In light of this change, it will be argued that the reformulation of the fourth level was specifically intended to overcome the earlier intellectualism. Lonergan’s engagement with existentialism both challenged that intellectualism and provided him with a method, ‘intentionality analysis’, for going beyond the scholastic framework that made his intellectualism meaningful. Second, it will be shown that Lonergan’s earlier formalism is transcended by reconceiving the judgment of value in existential consciousness as a synthesis of intellectual knowing and an affective apprehension of value. The notion that values are apprehended in feelings implies that they are materially good, and so implies a rejection of formalism. This new openness to affectivity is seen in Lonergan’s association of love with existential consciousness. The way Lonergan distinguishes between love and moral responsibility makes apparent the priority he gives to love as an affective involvement in his reformulation of the fourth level of consciousness.

There is an ambiguity in saying that Lonergan abandons his intellectualism in his mature works, for intellectualism can have two meanings with regard to Lonergan. On one hand, he distinguishes his position from conceptualism by calling it intellectualism. For Lonergan, conceptualism is a form of naive, scholastic realism; it holds that the intellect intuitively and directly apprehends concepts, which in turn provide a basis for the systematic deductions that are the
substance of philosophy. He objects to such a position as implicitly anti-empirical and incapable of accommodating modern science in its approach to knowing. Against this, Lonergan emphasizes the constructive role of the intellect in inquiry, insight, formulation and evaluation. He sees this as not only empirically more adequate, but also as a more adequate basis for scientific research. In this sense of the word, Lonergan remains an intellectualist throughout his works. However, there is another sense of intellectualism, ‘ethical intellectualism’, which denotes the position that the intellect has priority over the will in matters of practical action. It is in this sense that Lonergan’s early account of ethics is intellectualistic and in this sense that, from his mature position, he comes to speak of intellectualism as meaningless.\(^{13}\)

The third and final component, Chapters VI and VII, examines and evaluates Lonergan’s mature position on how value is grounded in human nature. Chapter VI seeks to show that the affective apprehension of value, which is foundational to the judgment of value, is an ahistorical intuition grounded in human nature. That is, the historical process of determining value appeals to an ahistorical intuition as a basis for its deliberate judgments. The fact that these apprehensions are ahistorical is indicative of the ongoing dichotomy in Lonergan’s thought between spontaneous affectivity, which belongs to nature, and deliberate intelligence, which is the source of historical progress.

In the final chapter, Chapter VII, Lonergan’s explanation of how value is known is evaluated. I believe that the general structure of his account of transcendence does indeed provide an adequate way of reconciling nature and history: it locates in human nature an indeterminate dynamic orientation toward transcendence and recognizes that the process of determination is a historical one. In this Lonergan both preserves the classical faith in transcendence and finds a basis for affirming a historicity that overcomes the limitations of the relatively static world of classicism. However, the opposition of affectivity and reason,
which can be understood in terms of a more basic opposition between natural spontaneity and historical deliberation, implies that history does not enter into the apprehension of value but only into the deliberate judgment of value. Lonergan’s opposition of spontaneity and reason precludes a positive and fundamental interpenetration of rationality and affectivity. However, research in subliminal cognitive processes can be interpreted as indicating that rationality penetrates to the most basic levels of consciousness, where it suffuses affectivity and grounds feeling in meaning. On this basis one can affirm—contrary to Lonergan—that spontaneous desire can be rational, and that this rational affectivity is such that it is open to historical transformation. In accord with this it will be argued that the desire to know is itself a rational desire, which implies that it is a spontaneous response to being and not simply an unknowing desire to know. Not only does this overcomes a problem with Lonergan’s account of the "flight from understanding" but it also opens the door to a meaningful reappropriation of the classical position which identified a thing’s being with its goodness. Not only is the desire to know a rational desire in the sense that is a response to being but, contrary to Lonergan’s emphasis on its detachment, it is an interested desire. For the desire to know being is also a desire to be, to ground personal existence substantially in grasping what is true and good and beautiful. Therefore both feeling and knowing enter into the natural, upward thrust of transcendence which leads human existence through its historical transformations.

Finally, I would add that, contrary to those who hold the hermeneutical and the transcendental approaches to be theoretically irreconcilable, my firm conviction is that this is not the case, and that Lonergan’s approach—the integration of an indeterminate transcendence and its historical determination—is the path that can bring them together. Though such a thesis is beyond the scope of the present work, it is hoped that this work of clarification and evaluation will contribute to that final goal.
PART I. NATURE AND HUMAN NATURE

Chapter I. The Ground of Dialectic in Nature

We begin by exploring Lonergan's understanding of the basic principles of nature, which explain the tension between limitation and transcendence and of which the opposition between psychic affectivity and intellectual disinterest is an expression. This elucidates the basis for his early ethical thought as well as for his account of transcendence, which stands as central to his explanation of value. There are three themes to be considered. The first is finality, the principle that accounts for the on-going emergence of higher, more complex structures within nature and history. It is operative in all things, and in human existence it takes the form of a spiritual exigence toward self-transcendence. As such, it is basic to the dynamic structure of intellectual and moral transcendence.

Finality gives rise to orders that are hierarchically structured, and the relationship of higher and lower orders in this hierarchy is the second theme to be considered, for this is central to understanding both transcendence and the dialectic of limitation and transcendence. Hierarchy enters into intellectual transcendence, by which we know truth, for knowing is constituted by an integral hierarchy of perceiving, understanding and judging. Similarly, practical or moral transcendence intends a hierarchically-structured good. Hierarchy is also a factor in dialectic, for the tension between limitation and transcendence is one that exists between the lower and higher orders of a hierarchical relationship; the lower order both limits and potentially interferes with the higher. Human existence is constituted by a hierarchy of organic, psychic and rational processes, and in Lonergan's early thought the tension between the psyche and the intellect is particularly meaningful for his account of the precariousness of personal and
social progress.

Third, we consider Lonergan’s account of the principle of limitation, which accounts for the existence of a tension between the lower and higher orders, between psychic affectivity and intellectual rationality.

Finally, on the basis of this account of the principles operative in nature, a brief treatment will be given to Lonergan’s use of the word ‘nature’, showing both its technical meaning and the variety of ways in which he uses it in contrast with history. This will serve to explain what is meant by the opposition of nature and history in this study.

1. Finality

We experience nature as a complex order of recurrent processes, which Lonergan deals with in general terms as intelligible ‘schemes of recurrence’. Whether one is considering the motions of the solar system, the economic patterns of production and exchange, or the daily routine of human living, there are intelligible orders or regularities that have emerged in the course of time and have persisted. The emergence and survival of novel orders and regularities reflects the fertile potential of the cosmos, a potentiality that is realized not with the predictable necessity of classical laws but according to an unpredictable possibility formalized in terms of probability. Because of this, Lonergan speaks of the primary characteristic of nature as ‘emergent probability’. Nature’s fertile potential is progressively realized in the emerging complexity of the universe, for there is a "universal striving toward being," a principle that seeks the greatest possible realization of that intrinsic potential. This potential is realized in limited ways with the emergence of higher orders, and the best orders are those which prove adaptive, those which survive and go on toward ever higher development, and so provide the basis for fuller realizations of nature’s vast potential. In this sense, nature has its own immanent criterion of adequacy—the fullest realization
of the most potential. This is the nature of nature, so to speak.

Finality is the name Lonergan gives to this pervasive 'upward' movement in nature that pushes toward new, higher forms of order. Finality is manifest in the evolutionary tendency toward increasing complexity and in the historical development of cultures and civilizations; it is also seen in the physical and psychic maturation of the individual and in the spiritual progress of humans toward the true and the good. In short, finality accounts for transcendence and novelty in nature and history. As we will see, finality is also at the heart of the tension between limitation and transcendence.

Finality arises only among a plurality of individuals, for it is a tendency to bring unity out of multiplicity, a tendency toward a collective fulfillment beyond the fulfillment of the individual. Within multiplicity there is a potential for a higher unity, a potential grounded in the cooperation of the individuals comprising the multiplicity, and finality is the movement of this potential towards its realization. All of nature can be understood as a series of successively higher integrations of a lower plurality: a group of atoms is a manifold that admits organization into a molecule, molecules give rise to an organism, organisms form a community and an ecosystem, etc. Each of these exemplify a fertile plurality giving way to unity.

Finality grounds the emergence of new, unprecedented orders, because finality is indeterminate. What arises through finality is determined neither by an extrinsic end nor by the underlying manifold. Since the emergent order is not determined by an extrinsic cause, Lonergan is careful to distinguish between finality and final causality: the latter indicates an extrinsic cause. Finality is closer to Aristotle's notion of physis or 'nature', an intrinsic principle of movement, than to that of telos or 'purposive end', an extrinsic principle of movement. Final causality means that the end or goal of a process causes the process, for the goodness of the goal motivates and so initiates the process. This
implies a determinate process, for the process is determined and so guided by its specific goal. So for Thomas, as for Plato and Aristotle, the universe was informed by static, final principles, and the development of each thing, plant, animal and person sought a determinate, fixed ideal. For Lonergan, however, finality is not determined by an already existent telos, and so it can be the source of real novelty in evolution, history, and intelligent insight.

Insight makes the theme of indeterminacy quite clear:

[T]he directed dynamism of finality is not determinate in the more obvious meanings of that term. It is not headed to some determinate individual or species or genus of proportionate being. On the contrary, the essential meaning of finality is that it goes beyond such determinations. Finality goes beyond lower genera and species to higher genera and species and, if it is halted at some genus, the halt reveals not finality but the limitations which it endeavour to transcend.

The directedness of finality is not meant in a teleological sense, for the process does not seek to realize a specific good but rather an "indeterminate betterment." Because of this indeterminacy, finality's goal is obscure and 'multivalent'. It is obscure, for no one can say where a process will end until it has reached an ultimate conclusion. Finality gives rise to a succession of higher integrations, but at no point in the development of species (or theories, or societies, etc.) can one point to something finally complete, for each determinate realization is a limit to be transcended. It is multivalent, for within unorganized multiplicity there is a potential for a variety of new and higher forms, and which one is realized (if one is realized at all) is intelligible only in terms of possibilities and probabilities.

The basic thrust of this concept of an indeterminate finality is to render the process of development an immanent one. That is, the criteria which govern the adequacy of a new development—whether it be a new biological species, a new form of social organization, or a new theory—are immanent ones. What it means to be better is not evaluated over against an extrinsic criterion; it is a matter of what is, according to immanent criteria, more harmonious, more integral, more full, more satisfying.
Lonergan's appeal to immanence is seen by some to be self-defeating. For example, Owen Bennett, whose criticisms we will consider more fully in Chapter VII, attacks the epistemological form of this position and compares Lonergan's "non-knowing desire to know" to Schopenhauer's blind will to live, for it is not guided by something outside and beyond itself toward fuller understanding. Though there is a point to Bennett's criticism, as we will see, I have little doubt that Lonergan's emphasis on immanent criteria of an indeterminate process is the position that will stand the test of time and best admit development, in accord with the process of emergent probability.

2. Hierarchy and Ordination

Lonergan's account of hierarchy is important for his analysis of human nature and human transcendence. The potential for human fulfillment depends on maintaining the proper order between higher and lower principles in human living—organic, psychic and intellectual—for these principles may either cooperate or conflict. The possibility of conflict underlies Lonergan's early opposition between psyche and intellect, feeling and knowing, and so his idea of hierarchy is basic to the dichotomy between affectivity and rationality in Lonergan's early thought.

Two things need to be considered regarding Lonergan's understanding of the hierarchical ordering of nature. First, there is an ongoing reciprocity between the higher and lower orders, for the finalistic link between the lower and higher orders keeps the relationship between them from being a static one; changes in either the lower or the higher require a corresponding change in the other. Second, the direction of this change is not simply random, for finality governs the relationship between the higher and lower so that the change works to effect the perfection and the domination of the lower by the higher, and change continues until this perfection and domination are achieved.
The reciprocity between the higher and lower orders is made clear in the way Lonergan distinguishes his account of nature from that of Thomas. In "Mission and the Spirit" Lonergan says that Thomas understood the lower multiplicity to have only an instrumental relationship to the higher unity, while his own position is that the lower multiplicity also admits a participative relationship to the higher unity. The latter relationship is one in which the lower "enters into the being and functioning" of the higher unity, whereas in an instrumental relationship the lower simply "serves" the higher. Lonergan's discussion of the 'principle of correspondence' and the 'law of integration' in Insight make this distinction clearer. The principle of correspondence is one of the principles of development: there is a relationship between what is integrated and its higher integration such that a difference or change in the lower demands a corresponding difference or change in the higher. So, for example, with the relationship between stimulus and percept—perception is a higher integration, a transposition of physical stimulus into conscious awareness—a change in the stimulation of optic nerve reveals itself in consciousness as a change in what is seen.

Where the principle of correspondence generally deals with the influence of a lower multiplicity on its higher unity, the law of integration reflects the fact that change in the higher requires a corresponding change in the lower. In the context of human development—human nature being a hierarchically organized unity of organic, psychic and intellectual processes—the law of integration indicates that a change occurring in understanding, which belongs to the intellectual level, may require a corresponding change on a lower level. For example, intellectual understanding of the implications of a certain act may lead one to cultivate self-control in one's psychic or organic processes, and the achievement of self-control integrates these various aspects of one's existence. What Lonergan means, therefore, by a participative relationship is that the lower
multiplicity is intrinsic to the higher unity, giving it its particular nature, and involving a reciprocity between the higher and the lower levels of organization so that change in one leads to change in the other.\textsuperscript{14}

Finality is a 'directed' principle of change, and so change is oriented toward a certain end, an end which is to be understood as both the perfection and the domination of the higher by the lower. The higher unity emerges as a perfection of the lower multiplicity. For example, in "Finality, Love, Marriage," Lonergan presents a hierarchical order between three levels of love, which correspond to three levels of human fulfillment: natural spontaneity, reason and grace.

... [T]hese three levels are realized in one subject; as the higher perfects the lower, so the lower disposes to the higher; and it is in this disposition of natural spontaneity to reinforce reason, of reason to reinforce grace ... that is to be found the ascent of love ....\textsuperscript{15}

In marriage for example, the deliberate love and friendship that expresses itself in a reasonable mutual esteem and good will—loving the good in the other and wanting the good of the other—is a higher order of love, one that perfects natural erotic love, which primarily seeks procreation. Similarly, charitable love, in which divine goodness becomes the criterion of what one looks for in the other and desires for the other, perfects what is otherwise a merely reasonable love. The theme of the higher being a perfection of the lower echoes Lonergan's explanation of finality as a dynamic orientation to completeness. Perfection is a fulfillment of the lower potential, one which realizes fully the lower potential: "[P]erfect beatitude satisfies all desire because it fulfills all potentiality."\textsuperscript{16}

Perfection implies a complete domination of the higher by the lower, so that the multiplicity of the lower is wholly under the unifying control of the higher. The element of domination in the general discussion of finality accounts for the theme of control which pervades Lonergan's discussion of human processes. It is present in unconscious processes and so, for example, "... the
dramatic pattern of experience penetrates below the surface of consciousness to exercise its own domination and control and to effect, prior to conscious discrimination, its own selections and arrangements.\textsuperscript{17} It is present as well in conscious processes. The control of meaning becomes a central issue when Lonergan later turns his attention to the historical contingency of meaning. Lonergan even deals with the sacrament of confession as a means of dominating history.\textsuperscript{18} The scientific desire for understanding is also described as "the scientific spirit that inquires, that masters, that controls."\textsuperscript{19} Intellectual finality has this dynamic orientation toward control precisely because finality in general is explicable in terms of an increasing approximation of a state of complete domination of the underlying manifold by successive integrations.

Frederick E. Crowe, one of Lonergan's primary interpreters, cautions that Lonergan's emphasis on control needs to be kept in perspective by recognizing his equal emphasis on openness.\textsuperscript{20} It is too easy to think of control in terms of a repressive force that imposes on the lower manifold a pattern which is alien to its natural potential; the notion of the higher as a perfection or higher realization of the lower is a helpful corrective to this misunderstanding. Openness is important, for control aspires to a complete domination, a domination which realizes the full potential of the lower. Only by openness can the higher unity recognize what is not yet realized or perfected, and so be moved to a more comprehensive domination, a greater perfection.

Finality only continues as long as there remains unrealized potential in the lower manifold, that is, as long as the lower multiplicity is not fully perfected and dominated by a higher unity. For, as the notions of perfection and domination imply, finality is a dynamic movement from incomplete realization to a condition of completeness. This completeness is juxtaposed to three conditions of incompleteness: instability in the lower manifold, incompleteness in the higher, and an imperfect correspondence between the higher and the lower. Intellectual
processes can serve to illustrate these kinds of incompleteness underlying the
dynamic of finality. 21

First, the instability of the lower manifold reflects the absence of a higher,
integrating unity that orders and stabilizes it. Intellectually this lack of order is
the absence of intelligible coherence in data; intelligence is moved to discern an
intelligible order within the complexity, and so it seeks insight into the data.
While insight may eventually discern intelligible order, 'instability' remains as
long as there are data that have not been brought within and accounted for by that
order. So one integration of the data may be incomplete and finality continues
until all the data are wholly and integrally accounted for.

Second, incompleteness in the higher means that the higher is not as well
integrated as it might be. The intellect exemplifies how the higher moves toward
completeness in two ways. First, there is the intellectual effort towards internal
coherence. Here it is not a matter of making the data cohere through insight, but
of achieving systematic coherence among insights. Second, there is an impetus
from a general, undifferentiated knowledge of a subject to a fully detailed grasp.
In short, there is development within the higher level of organization toward
increased coordination and differentiation, and completeness is the fullest possible
extent of this development.

Finally, the correspondence between the higher and lower can be
incomplete. That is, changes in the lower or the higher require corresponding
changes in the other level. New data can require a modification of previous
understanding. Or the lower may be incomplete, in the sense that an integral
theoretical synthesis may have insufficient warrant in the known data, so that
further empirical research is guided by theory and hypothesis.

Because finality as a dynamic orientation is a reflection of incompleteness,
it is contrasted with a static higher integration. 22 A higher integration is static
"when it dominates the lower manifold with complete success and thereby brings
about a notable imperviousness to change." Inert elements such as helium represent a static integration of subatomic processes. In contrast to static integrations, a dynamic integration is one that does not yet admit such stability.

[A dynamic integration] is not content to systematize the underlying manifold but keeps adding to it and modifying it until, by the principle of correspondence, the existing integration is eliminated and, by the principle of emergence, a new integration is introduced.

So to the extent that an integration has not achieved the full stability of completion, there is an ever present impetus toward a higher stability.

In summary, the reciprocal, hierarchical relationship between the lower multiplicity and the higher unity heads toward the perfection and the domination of the lower by the higher. The hierarchical order of the cosmos intimates something of the positive direction of finality. Since the higher is a perfection of the lower, finality is realized by the evocation in the higher of the full potential implicit in the lower. Because the higher controls the lower, finality achieves its ultimate end in the complete control of the lower by the higher.

This account of hierarchical relationships is applicable throughout the natural world, including the structure of human existence, which comprises organic, psychic and rational orders, each of which is a higher unity of a lower multiplicity. Psychic processes are a higher unity of organic ones, and rational processes a higher unity of psychic ones. This is the basis for a normative account of what it means to be properly human, for as we will see, the human ideal is that the rational should perfect and dominate the psychic: knowing should perfect and dominate feeling. This is the ideal, yet the ideal is not necessarily the actual, for the lower can interfere with the higher.

3. Limitation and Transcendence

As we have seen, the basic dynamic of the universe is an indeterminate thrust toward higher forms of order. Yet every realization of this lower potential
is determinate. That is, the universe is constituted by determinate things and processes. While there is within this determinate array a potential for ever higher orders and an immanent tendency for this potential to be realized, every actualization of potential comes about only as this potential takes on determinacy. As determinate, nature has a definite, abiding structure and regularity, which is conserved over time, and to know the structure of a thing or process is to know its 'nature'. It is in this determinate nature that Lonergan locates a principle of limitation that stands in tension with finality, the principle of transcendence. It is this tension that gives weight to Lonergan's early disjunction between affect and intellect, for affectivity is associated with the conservative principle of limitation and intellect with progressive finality. Let us, therefore, consider in general terms the relationship of limitation and transcendence, determinacy and indeterminacy.

In Insight Lonergan presents a fully general account of the meaning of limitation and transcendence, both of which are grounded in the potency of a thing. Metaphysically the structure of a 'thing'—the intelligible object of human knowing—has three aspects: potency, form and act. The thing as act is the concrete, 'actual' occurrence of a particular kind of intelligible thing. The thing as form is the intelligible, defining structure which makes the entity the particular kind of thing it is. Potency is the implicit potential for the thing to take on the structure that form gives it. For example, among hydrogen and oxygen atoms there is a potential for the emergence of water molecules; so prior to the formation of a water molecule, it can be said that the molecule exists potentially, or that there is a potency for water. As atoms are formally organized into the specific structure of H₂O they become an actual water molecule. As formally organized they become intelligible as water—i.e., at an explanatory level 'water' means this intelligible order, this form of organization, of hydrogen and oxygen. The actual molecule is a unity of this intelligible order and the actual atoms that
it unifies. So a disorganized manifold of adjacent hydrogen and oxygen atoms is the lower multiplicity or manifold in which potency resides, and 'water' is the higher order that realizes this potency.

Potency has two aspects, limitation and finality. The aspect of finality, as we have seen, is the potential for higher integrations. Yet in contrast with this, potency also limits what emerges, and it does so in two ways. First, the composition of the manifold sets limits on the kinds of higher unity that can arise. Water cannot arise from helium and oxygen, and the meatloaf lost in the inner recesses of the refrigerator will not become sentient. The lower the level of the multiplicity, the more comprehensive and general are the limitations it imposes. Energy, which Lonergan suggests may be the most fundamental level of the underlying manifold, imposes very general constraints on the universe, while the chain of higher integrations—subatomic particles, atoms, molecules, etc.—impose increasingly specific constraints on the possibilities of what may emerge.

Second, potency imposes constraints on the functioning of the higher unity. The higher unity is not free to disregard its dependence on the lower, for this would compromise its own survival. In human existence, for example, organic processes constrain psychic ones, for physiological needs set limits on conscious living. The lower might be altered by the higher by being caught up into a higher integrity, as is possible in the artistic act or the priestly life through the sublimation of biological urges, but without sublimation the repression of biological demands would be dysfunctional; the lower would interfere with the higher, leading to psychological disorders. Similarly psychological processes and needs constrain intellectual ones, and if a harmony is not maintained between the two orders through the intellect perfecting and dominating the psyche, the latter might interfere with the proper functioning of the intellect.

Potency is a principle of finality as well as of limitation, and so it is a tension of opposites. As a general rule, every determinate realization of potential
is a limited one, and because of this finality presses beyond the limited order toward an order that realizes more potential, aspiring ultimately to the complete actualization of all potential. Until that perfection is achieved, the tension between limitation and transcendence, between determinate realization and indeterminate potential, allows for the possibility of interference, so that the lower interferes with the higher.

In summary, there is a twofold potential within nature, a potential that sets limits on what can be actualized and also a potential for transcending these limits and achieving a higher realization. This twofold potential accounts for the possibility of a tension and an interference of the lower multiplicity on the functioning of the higher order.


The purpose of this section is to clarify and justify the use of the contrast between nature and history as relevant to Lonergan's thought. This study is predicated on a meaningful distinction between nature and history, but this distinction needs to be made in the context of the fundamental continuity between them. That is, there is a sense in which history is not something other than nature, for finality in nature gives rise to and extends itself through rational creatures, who in the exercise of their rationality express the finalistic principle of transcendence in history, which makes progress possible.

Though Lonergan has a technical meaning for 'nature', he also uses it in a less technical sense, and it is in this latter sense that the juxtaposition of nature and history is a succinct metaphor for the distinction between limitation and transcendence, determinacy and indeterminacy, in human existence.

In its technical sense, Lonergan defines 'nature' as a heuristic concept; it specifies what one seeks to discover in explaining a phenomenon. The history of attempts to define fire, for example, was a process that sought to grasp the
nature of fire. A thing’s nature, then, is the explanation of what a thing is. In transposing the discussion of nature into metaphysical categories, Lonergan speaks of ‘form’, which conveys the notion of an intelligible unity. Things and processes, or relations, have an intelligible unity which can be grasped through abstraction and conceptually formulated. The concepts of ‘fire’ and ‘gravity’, for example, reflect intelligible unities. Both change and the underlying thing that changes are intelligible unities, and Lonergan refers to the thing that changes as a ‘central form’ and the change as a ‘conjugate form’. Central form is the equivalent of the Aristotelian notion of essence, or substantial form; conjugate form redefines and replaces the notion of accidental form. Central and conjugate forms are, like nature, heuristic concepts, for form becomes known through the process of explanation. The effort to discover a thing’s nature is a process of defining its form in an explanatory fashion.

It is in this metaphysical context that Lonergan deals with human nature in Insight, for it is a matter of defining the central form of the human individual. Lonergan’s argument is oriented to the point that, though we are both material and spiritual (i.e., intellectual) beings, our central form—our nature—is spiritual, and so can exist independent of material existence. In the context of formulating the argument, Lonergan frames the distinction between the material and the spiritual, and the spiritual is identified with the processes (the conjugate forms) of human intellectual activity, over against the lower orders—the organic and psychic processes—of our being. Because Lonergan’s focus is on the independence of the spiritual from the material, he identifies human nature specifically with the spiritual.

In less technical contexts, Lonergan uses nature in a looser fashion, as we can see in three ways he uses nature when contrasting nature and history. Consonant with his account of the human central form in Insight, he uses nature to convey the principle of transcendence, the spiritual exigence of the finalistic
urge to know, to act responsibly and to love. It is in this context that Lonergan appeals to nature in "Natural Right and Historical Mindedness." Human nature is the transcendent urge toward the realization of truth, value and love, and history is the process of determining what is realized.

A second sense in which Lonergan uses nature is to convey the principle of limitation. In "Finality, Love, Marriage" Lonergan contrasts the conservative, repetitive character of nature with the progressive orientation of reason. Nature in this context is used in the narrow sense of "physical, vital, sensitive spontaneity," that is, the organic and psychic aspects of nature and human nature. Reason, however, is a principle of progress, making novelty possible, and so is the principle of transcendence and history. The contrast between nature and reason, therefore, is in effect a contrast of nature and history, but here nature is the principle of limitation and reason the principle of transcendence.

Finally, Lonergan uses nature in a more holistic sense to convey the totality of organic, psychic and intellectual processes, which endure beneath the transformations of history. It is in this sense that he says,

That totality of human subjects has a natural aspect, as what was reproduced by birth, transmitted characteristics, and, on the other hand, the historical process that lies on the technical, social and cultural level.

The context of this quote is Lonergan's argument for an adequate account of human nature as a basis for philosophy and for a response to existentialism. The necessary and normative understanding of nature becomes evident later:

You have to examine the self-constituting subject and find in the self-constituting subject whether norms or evidence or invariants or principles that have a natural basis, an ontic basis, that are a reality to be discovered, apart from particular attitudes of particular men, that recur in everybody ... That have some cogency, inevitability, necessity, normativeness independently of the horizon of any given particular thinker.

This nature, this necessity, reflects what humans are per se, what we are determined to be by birth. Though there can be little doubt that Lonergan's interest is particularly on the principles immanent in the intellectual exigence, the
fact that he associates nature with "what was reproduced by birth" indicates he is thinking of human nature in its most comprehensive sense. In contrast to the association of human nature just with the spiritual, this more holistic sense is warranted by the fact that the intellectual processes are a higher system of sensitive processes, and sensitive processes are a higher system of organic ones.\textsuperscript{33}

In spite of the looseness of Lonergan's use of nature, one can see an underlying unity. Nature conveys that which is abiding, unchanging. Yet what is presented as unchanging depends on the contrast he is trying to develop. In the first case, he focuses on the principle of transcendence as unchanging in contrast to the change to which it gives rise in history. In the second, nature is the principle of limitation in contrast to the historical change brought about by reason as a principle of transcendence. In the last, both aspects are acknowledged as enduring over against the changes of historical process. It is in the latter, more holistic, sense of nature that the juxtaposition of nature and history is intended in this study.

5. Conclusion

Lonergan's notion of finality is that of a pervasive, indeterminate tendency towards higher, more integral or harmonious orders. Though the concrete universe is constituted by determinate things and processes, terms and relations, this determinacy has grown up in an indeterminate fashion into the order it has, for at the heart of the universe there is a multivalent thrust from potency toward being. The element of indeterminacy in finality opens up both the natural and human worlds to the emergence of real novelty, for natural evolution and human history reflect the on-going determinate realizations of an indeterminate potential.\textsuperscript{34}

Out of this finality there emerges a hierarchical array of orders nested within orders of increasing complexity: energy, atom, molecule, organism,
community, ecosystem, etc. The relationship between the higher and lower orders is dynamic, for changes in one evoke a reciprocal change in the other. Furthermore, the higher seeks to dominate and perfect the lower by the full and stable realization of all its inherent potential. Until this realization is complete, finality continues to press for further development.

However, in tension with the finalistic tendency toward increasing order and higher orders, the actual determinacy of what has been realized operates as a limiting principle. It sets a limit on what can be realized in the sense that water cannot arise from nitrogen and oxygen. Yet, more significantly, in hierarchically ordered processes, the functioning of the lower may set limits on the functioning of the higher, and if these limits are not respected or taken into account, conflict and interference arise. It is this capacity of the lower to interfere with the functioning of the higher, the failure to harmonize the higher and lower, that is the source of the dialectical tension in human existence, a tension which exists between the psyche and the intellect, and which figures largely in Lonergan’s account of personal and social dysfunction. As we will see, this tension is central to human nature, and it is against this background that the dualism of reason and affective desire—so central to his early ethical position—is to be understood.
Chapter II. Dialectic in Human Existence

Chapter I laid the foundation for examining the dialectical opposition between psychic affectivity and rational intelligence in Lonergan’s account of human nature, to which we now turn. This chapter highlights the early dichotomy between affectivity and intelligence in order to show that the exclusion of feeling from his discussion of value in *Insight* is rooted in the basic structure of his thought and not merely an oversight. For Lonergan, there is a dialectical tension in human existence between the natural tendency toward a conservative self-centeredness and the equally natural tendency to see the world from an objective frame of reference, through which we orient ourselves by knowledge to a universe that stands independent of our hopes and wishes. Lonergan presents this tension of self-centeredness and disinterestedness, conservation and progress, as one between the psyche and the intellect. Affectivity is associated strictly with the psyche, and so is implicated in this tension. Both the psyche and the intellect are principles necessarily operative in human existence, but order and progress are possible only to the extent that intellect, as the higher principle of order, dominates and perfects the psyche, for disorder and decline arise when the self-interested psyche interferes with and subverts the disinterested intellect.

We will begin by considering what Lonergan means by psyche and intellect, examining first his account of the hierarchy of principles—organic, psychic and rational—operative in human existence and, second, his explanation of the nature and primacy of intellectual concern. Because the three principles are interrelated, we need to consider all three, though our primary concern is with the opposition of psyche and intellect. This tripartite structure is to be found in Lonergan’s discussion of the patterns of experience, which give concrete
expression to the three principles. The aesthetic and dramatic patterns of experience in particular embody the psychic principle in human living, while the intellectual and practical patterns of experience express the rational principle. The latter two patterns clarify the nature and primacy of intellectual concern, and are important for understanding Lonergan’s explanation of intellectual transcendence, upon which his early account of value rests.

Having defined these principles, we turn next to the dialectical tension between the higher and lower principles, intellect and psyche. This tension is evident in the oppositions they represent: conservation and progress, self-interest and disinterestedness. It is also apparent in Lonergan’s treatment of individual and social development, for the interference of psychic sensitivity in the proper functioning of intelligence is the root of the various biases—dramatic, individual, group and general bias—that undermine personal and cultural development.

A. The Structure of Human Existence and Experience

1. Patterns of Experience

Consciousness is an experiential unity, an organization of experience. Yet there are different ways of organizing experience, and this is manifest in the fact that there are different patterns of experience. Contemplative prayer is a kind of experience distinct from that of analyzing a text, writing a poem or looking for something to eat. Each kind of experience notices and ignores particular features of the environment and one’s inner processes; each perceives and responds within a particular kind of frame of reference. The unity of consciousness is a higher organization of the manifold of subconscious neural processes. The different patterns of consciousness result from the fact that there are different ‘operators’ or organizing principles—i.e., different kinds of interest or purpose that order consciousness within a specific orientation.

Lonergan is not interested in providing an exhaustive list of all the
possible patterns of experience;² his concern in Insight is primarily to preserve the integrity of the intellectual pattern of experience over against the distorting influence of other patterns. He provides an analysis only of the biological, aesthetic, dramatic, practical and intellectual patterns. In our present discussion, we will focus attention on the biological, aesthetic, and dramatic patterns; the intellectual merits its own full discussion, and the practical is more easily considered after the intellectual, with which it is closely associated.

In Insight Lonergan first discusses experiential patterns in order to explain how the freedom of consciousness, especially in the dramatic pattern of experience, can subvert common sense, so that common sense cannot be appealed to as a refutation of the more abstract and less immediately relevant orientation of speculative reason.³ Dramatic bias, a distorting dynamic within the dramatic pattern, is the root that undermines common sense. To prepare the way for his account of dramatic bias, Lonergan discusses briefly the concept of patterns of experience and offers a short explanation of some of the more basic ones.

The sources of interest or purpose on which the organization of consciousness rests are to be found in the organic, psychic and rational aspects of human nature. At the lower end of the hierarchy, the organic aspect of human nature is a higher organization of an underlying chemical manifold, and as a distinct level of organization it reveals itself in the motivation toward sustenance, reproduction and self-preservation. These tendencies within organic existence are the organizing principle of what Lonergan calls the biological pattern of experience. This pattern is extroverted, since sustenance, reproduction and self-preservation are all needs that find their fulfillment through objects in the organism's external environment.

At the higher end of the hierarchy, the rational dimension of human nature is the ground for the pure desire to know, which is the organizing principle for the intellectual—i.e., theoretical, or speculative—pattern of experience. The
nature of this pure desire demands fuller treatment later but for the moment we might simply describe it as a desire to know and explain things fully and truly. In this pattern, awareness of the external environment, if indeed it is attended to at all, is subject to the intellectual question at hand.

Between human existence as organic and human existence as rational there stands a psychic, or sensitive, principle, to which belong the capacity for perception, imagination, memory, physical coordination and emotion. Just as organic existence is an organization of a chemical substratum, psychic existence is an organization of an underlying ‘neural manifold’, the organically-based activity of the nervous system. The neural manifold is comprised of unconscious events and processes; the psyche selectively renders them conscious in perception and coordinates conscious responses. Development in the psyche moves in the direction of increasing differentiation in perception and in affective and motor response, as well as in the increasing coordination of responses. These developments reflect both a finer sensitivity to neural activity and a finer control of it. As a higher system of neural processes, the psyche is conditioned and limited by organic existence and yet distinct from it, having its own specific dynamics:

Intersubjectivity, companionship, play and artistry, the idle hours spent with those with whom one feels at home, the common purpose, labour, achievement, failure, disaster, the sharing of feeling in laughter and lamenting, all are human things and in them man functions primarily in accord with the development of his perceptiveness, his emotional responses, his sentiments.

This passage describes what Lonergan speaks of as sensitive living. It is to be noted that emotion and intersubjectivity belongs particularly to sensitive living. Though Lonergan does not explicitly associate the psyche with any particular patterns of experience, it is apparent that these creative, emotional and social interests reveal themselves in what Lonergan calls the aesthetic and dramatic patterns of experience.

The aesthetic pattern of experience is manifest primarily in a spontaneous
self-justifying joy. "Conscious living is itself a joy that reveals its spontaneous authenticity in the untiring play of children, in the strenuous games of youth, in the exhilaration of sun-lit morning air ..."6 Lonergan emphasizes the freedom of the aesthetic pattern. This pattern participates in both biology and intelligence but is not determined by either. Participating in both, it embraces the joy of organic existence as well as artistic pleasure in the fine arts. Not determined by either, it is not restricted to the 'elemental purposiveness' of biology nor to the factual orientation of the spirit of inquiry; it is a liberation of experience from biological needs and the demands of intelligence.

The dramatic pattern of experience is an extension of the aesthetic.7 Its distinction resides in the fact that its organizing principle is the concern for social existence. It is called dramatic in the sense that social existence is mediated by the art of acting well in the context of others.

Such artistry is dramatic. It is in the presence of others, and the others too are also actors in the primordial drama that the theatre only imitates. If aesthetic values, realized in one's own living, yield one the satisfaction of good performance, still it is well to have the objectivity of that satisfaction confirmed by the admiration of others; it is better to be united with others by winning their approval; it is best to be bound to them by deserving and obtaining their respect and even their affection. For man is a social animal.8

Aesthetic values here refer to "the fair, the beautiful, the admirable ... embodied by man in his own body and actions."9 Lonergan regularly illustrates this pattern of experience by noting the fundamental difference between being alone and having someone else enter the room.10 In the presence of others people become concerned with the aesthetic dimension of their social performance.

As with the aesthetic pattern, the dramatic participates in the organic and intellectual without being determined by either. Gourmet cooking and romantic interludes transform eating and sexual involvement into particularly human activities that reflect and yet go beyond mere biological necessity. Intellect participates in the dramatic moulding of one's character, for involvement in the drama of living involves insights into who one can be. In the dramatic pattern,
however, intellect informs character in artistic terms, rather than providing abstract blueprints for social roles.

There is both a psychic and an intellectual dimension to the dramatic pattern. The dramatic pattern involves common sense, and as we will see below, Lonergan argues for the intellectual character of common sense. With respect to the dramatic pattern Lonergan affirms that in the formation of character "rational consciousness with its reflection and criticism, its deliberation and choice, exerts a decisive influence." Still, the emphasis throughout the discussion of the dramatic pattern is on the artistic and affective rather than on the rational. The "pressure of artistic and affective criteria" operates in the selection of one's dramatic role. Dramatic inspiration resides not in any intellectual insight but in the social context of example and emulation; it is confirmed not by judgment but by social admiration and approval; it is sustained not by conviction but by respect and affection. This is suggestive of what Lonergan says elsewhere about "a nice distinction between the sensitive mechanism that enforces a taboo and the rational judgment that imposes a moral obligation." The contrast is between the inner constraint of reason and the external constraint of "commands imposed through affection and fear". "Feelings instilled through parental and social influence" are juxtaposed to feelings adapted to moral judgment. One might note that Lonergan tends to define the dramatic pattern of experience by distinguishing it from the intellectual.

The biological, aesthetic and dramatic patterns of experience each in their own way express a principle in which rational or intellectual concerns are subordinate to physical needs or to psychic needs, desires and fears. As such they stand in contrast to the intellectual concern for truth, to which we now turn.
2. The Nature and Priority of Intellectual Concern

The intellectual pattern of experience is distinct from the biological, playful, social and practical dynamics of living. It comprises a hierarchy of processes or levels of consciousness: experience, understanding and judgment. Experience is that which makes possible understanding, and finality seeks to realize this potential in the formulation of an intelligible explanation. Similarly, understanding makes possible judgment, which reflects an orientation to truth and objectivity. This hierarchy reflects the rational principle of human existence, a principle Lonergan defines as the "pure, unrestricted desire to know." Our discussion will consider the intellectual pattern of experience first in terms of the levels of consciousness that constitute it, and then in terms of the meaning of the pure desire to know. Third we will consider how intellect expresses itself in practical matters, specifically in the context of Lonergan's account of common sense. Finally we will deal with some of the ways in which Lonergan's emphasis on the priority of the intellect manifests itself in Insight, specifically in his account of meaning and of spirit. The various aspects of this discussion not only clarify Lonergan's account of intellectual concern but also show, by virtue of the primacy given to the intellect, how significant the opposition between intellect and affect is.

a. Experience, Understanding and Judgment

Lonergan's explanation of the intellectual pattern of experience begins in the realm of the descriptive, in the experiences of coming to understand something through insight and coming to a conviction that something is true through judgment. Insight is a transition from not understanding to understanding, or from one kind of understanding to a fuller or deeper kind. This crucial experience is the occasion for making the first distinction between experience and understanding.
Experience here needs to be understood in a restricted sense, for while all that happens within consciousness—including insights, understanding, judgment—is experienced, in this more restricted sense experience connotes the consciousness of empirical data from which insight abstracts understanding. Two qualifications of this definition are needed. First, empirical data embrace not only that which is given in the five external senses but also that which is internally given by consciousness and imagination. The experience of insight, for example, is also an empirical given, no less than the falling of an apple or the moon hanging in the sky. Second, it must be remembered that empirical data are attended within a particular dynamic context—the intellectual pattern of experience. As we have seen, all consciousness occurs within some context; experience within a biological pattern is not the same as that within the dramatic. Even so, according to Lonergan experience within this intellectual context has a distinctive orientation:

The interests and hopes, desires and fears, of ordinary living have to slip into a background. In their place, the detached and disinterested exigences of inquiring intelligence have to enter and assume control. Memories will continue to enrich sensations, but they will be memories of scientific significance. Imagination will continue to prolong the present by anticipating the future, but anticipations with a practical moment will give way to anticipations that bear on a scientific issue.¹⁴

So experience in this context is a keen, detached attentiveness to what one seeks to understand.

Insight marks the transition from experience into understanding. As consciousness is a higher, psychic organization of organically-based neural activity, even so understanding is the abstraction of a higher, intelligible unity from the psyche’s sensory presentations and imaginative representations. The data from which insight is derived is the lower manifold, and the intelligibility that emerges in insight is a higher organization of that manifold in consciousness. For understanding is a matter of abstraction, and abstraction is the discernment of a unity within multiplicity.
The intelligibility grasped in understanding may be of three kinds: a concrete unity, systematic relations, and non-systematic probabilities. A concrete unity is an intelligible 'thing', whether it be a particular physical object or, less concretely, a biological species. Systematic relations are the principles that define the causal relations and correlations between things—e.g., $E=mc^2$. Non-systematic probabilities reflect an understanding of phenomena that admit an intelligible regularity but are sufficiently complex to resist a complete, systematic account of all the causal factors involved. These three kinds of intelligibility correspond with descriptive, explanatory and statistical approaches to understanding. While statistical method is extremely important for Lonergan's attempt to make scholastic philosophy adequate to the current state of science, more relevant to our concern is the distinction between descriptive and explanatory understanding, for it exemplifies hierarchy and finality within the intellectual process, and it gives a clearer understanding of the nature of objectivity.

The desire to know begins with description but is ultimately satisfied only by explanation. Description pertains to subjective understanding and explanation to objective. This distinction reflects the difference between things as they subjectively appear to us and things as they objectively are in their relations to each other. Description, dealing as it does with what is material—i.e., tangible or sensible—deals with things as presented by the senses or as represented in imagination. From this perspective a circle would be a perfectly round plane curve and heat would be a source of warmth. Explanation deals with things objectively, in terms of their relations to each other. According to an explanatory, essential definition, the cause of a circle being a perfectly round plane curve would be that all of its radii are equal; heat becomes a measurable quantity of energy. The desire to understand is oriented toward objective explanation, and descriptive understanding is at best an intermediate step between experience and true understanding. Intellect aspires to know a thing's nature, and its nature is
revealed in causal explanation. Only explanation fulfills the eros of the intellect and corrects the confusions that arise from description masquerading as explanation.\textsuperscript{17} To be content with anything less than explanation is to subvert the whole project of science, philosophy and metaphysics, for it gives up the true world of objective explanation for the apparent world, the world known to our senses and imagination. Explanation and intelligibility are so closely associated in Lonergan that he can say the intellect is not content to discover mere matters of fact; to affirm facts which are neither explanatory nor explicable is to fall short of true intelligibility, and it falls short of the natural orientation of the intellect.\textsuperscript{18}

Though understanding arises from insight, understanding in itself does not settle the question of truth. The validity of an insight is determined by the further process of judgment or reflection to complete it. Just as the intellect has the ability to abstract, so does it have the ability to determine the validity of an insight, to recognize the sufficiency or insufficiency of evidence. Lonergan presents this process in terms of determining whether a proposition is 'virtually unconditioned'. Whether something is true or not depends on whether it satisfies certain conditions, and it is virtually unconditioned when the conditions of it being true have all been fulfilled. In practical terms something is virtually unconditioned when it answers fully all the possible relevant questions. The conviction that the earth does indeed circle the sun reflects such a judgment of truth, for all the possible questions arising from all the relevant data are answered by this understanding and so support the conviction.\textsuperscript{19} While an insight may be judged true on the basis of all the known data, questions and answers, this does not imply that further data and better questions may not arise in the future, showing the best judgment of the present to be false or only partially true. In this way the Newtonian notions of absolute time and space have been supplanted by the Einsteinian notions of the relativity of space and time as more adequate to the data and to the questions of science.
In summary, the intellectual pattern of experience is primarily a speculative orientation toward explanation and objective truth. The process moves from a detached mode of experience that attends to data, through insights that determine and formulate the intelligibility inherent in the data, and is finally complete when judgment determines the truth or falsity of the insight.

b. The Pure Desire to Know

The intellect's orientation is not simply toward the knowledge of particular truths but toward the fullness of all truth. This is the underlying dynamic, the orientation of finality in human rationality; this is the whole, of which each act of understanding and judgment is an expression and a part. Lonergan speaks of this dynamic as the "pure, unrestricted desire to know."

Calling the desire to know 'pure' indicates its distinction from other desires—it lacks any vestige of self-interest. It is "cool, disinterested, detached," seeking something beyond oneself rather than for oneself. As pure, it seeks objective truth, a truth independent of any particular perspective and, therefore, free of the personal or collective needs and desires which may dominate and distort one's particular perspective. Without such detachment, Lonergan believes, there is no possibility of objectivity: "If my cognitional process is guided by my desires and fears, the result is not knowing but simply wishful thinking. There has to be a detachment from self in knowledge." When asked whether there are not some kinds of involvement that grant one greater access to truth, Lonergan specifically makes it clear that intellectual detachment implies a lack of affective or intersubjective involvement. Elsewhere Lonergan speaks of the "'existential' concerns that invade and mix and blend with the operations of intellect to render it ambivalent and its pronouncements ambiguous." As we will see there is little doubt in light of the persistent tension of psyche and intellect in Insight that this interference is a matter of affective or
intersubjective involvement. Detachment—or pure desire—is essential to objectivity.

The pure desire to know is the desire to know being. As Lonergan makes clear in his epistemological theorem, being is to be understood in terms of objective knowledge. The theorem asserts "that knowledge is intrinsically objective, that objectivity is the intrinsic relation of knowing to being, and that being and reality are identical." Objectivity is the correspondence of knowing and being. Knowing is the process of determining being, and being is what is illumined by the discernment of truth. Yet being goes beyond what is already known to be true, for being encompasses all that could ever possibly be judged to be true, embracing all that concretely exists and actually is true. Being is an all-inclusive category; there is only being and nothing. It is concrete because only concrete things actually exist; ideal forms are not the real world. Each true judgment—each judgment that such and such a thing or systematic causal relation or non-systematic probability factor actually exists—illumines a part of being. Yet being in its fullness can only be known by the totality of true judgments.

Because the pure desire to know is a desire to know being, and being is a comprehensive term, the desire is unrestricted; there are no limits to what it seeks to know. Though on every occasion the desire to know seeks particular truths, the only thing that could ultimately satisfy it is the totality of all truth. Only with such a comprehensive knowledge would all the potential for truth in the concrete universe be perfectly realized, and the finality implicit in the quest to know come to rest. Because it knows no bounds, the possibility of questions seems endless and every new answer gives rise to new questions.

Though the nature of the intellectual pattern of experience has a determinate structure, the desire to know is an indeterminate dynamic, and so it is the ground of history and progress, the source of novelty in human existence. The indeterminacy of the pure desire to know is important then for Lonergan’s
understanding of the intellect’s role in human affairs. Its indeterminacy is evident in Lonergan’s account of what he calls the ‘notion of being’, in which the pure desire to know is grounded.

By ‘notion’ of being Lonergan means not the concept of being but rather the intelligent tendency or orientation toward knowing being. He uses notion in a unique way to convey a finalistic directedness in which intelligence guides that directedness to its fulfillment or completion. The intelligent purposiveness implied in notion is contrasted with merely biological or conscious directedness. The biological directedness of a foetal eye developing into a fully functional, mature eye is a physical process rather than an intelligent one. Psychic purposiveness is evident when a desire for food is present in consciousness; it is only as one adverts to the hunger and seeks food that a notion of food consciously and intelligently directs the desire. Similarly one can speak of intellectual appetite where one is moved to do what is known to be good. However, Lonergan notes that these determinate, intellectual notions provide poor analogies for the notion of being. The notion of being is not a desire for something known as is a desire for food or justice; it is a desire for something—an insight, an answer, a truth—as yet indeterminate in the sense of being neither defined nor known. It is a desire for the ‘known unknown’, a hunger for the answer one knows that one does not yet know. The quest is guided by intelligence but not in the sense that what is sought is known to intellect. The intellect in search of knowing is guided by its intrinsic nature, by its innate capacity for discerning intelligibility and adequacy. Though it is not guided by a knowledge of the goal, it is intelligently oriented to a goal and so Lonergan speaks of the intellect as having a notion of that goal—the notion of being. It is this indeterminate notion of a goal that is the source of the effort to know and the criterion of fulfillment; it is the beginning and the end, the source of wonder and the goal to which wonder moves us.
c. Common Sense as Intellectual

Though the intellectual pattern of experience is a speculative concern for objective truth, there is also a practical side to the intellect, which he comes to speak of as the practical pattern of experience. This merits our attention because it shows rationality to be at the heart of social progress, and it is in this context that Lonergan situates his discussion of value; social progress both illustrates the primacy of rationality in human living and prepares the way for discussing the dialectic of community, the biases that reflect the interference of the psyche with rational social development.

Lonergan has a twofold purpose in dealing with common sense. First, he seeks to show its intellectual character as the ground of technological, economic and political progress; it is intellectual because the practical pattern of experience is an expression of the pure desire to know. Second, he is concerned to show the limitations of common sense as a popular, cultural orientation; it is vulnerable to distortion and, therefore, must depend on the speculative orientation of the pure desire to know. The latter theme will be dealt with in our discussion of the tensions in human existence. For the moment we will focus on the intellectual nature of common sense.

The intellectual character of common sense is evident in the spontaneity of the child’s questions, in the accumulation of related insights, and in the social collaboration of individuals. Common sense has its beginnings in the curiosity of childhood, in the wonder over what things are and why things happen as they do. Interaction matures with the accumulation of insights into how things are done and how things might be done. These insights ground collaboration, which requires a shared wisdom and know-how that is offered to beginners and received from elders. In all this, inquiry and insight reflect the dynamism of the pure desire to know; "the cool shrewdness of common sense" takes its place alongside "the disinterestedness of science, the detachment of philosophy."
Though common sense expresses the pure desire to know, it remains quite
distinct from mathematics and science, for it lacks concern for universal
definitions and systematic rigour, remaining in the world of the concrete and the
particular. It arises from the same intellectual alertness and curiosity that spawns
science, but does not seek the remote, abstract clarity of science; it seeks rather
a short cut, an answer which is readily intelligible and practical. Common sense
is oriented to living and is satisfied by answers that facilitate success in dealing
with personal and material situations. For such success, universal definitions,
technical vocabulary, and logical rigour seem quite irrelevant. Insights expressed
in practical manuals, proverbs, fables and allegories function adequately for much
of the daily routine of living.

Common sense is intellectual, therefore, but not fully so. Lonergan
presents it as something short of what is truly natural to the objective orientation
of the pure desire to know.

The supreme canon of common sense is the restriction of further questions to the
realm of the concrete and particular, the immediate and practical. To advance in
common sense is to restrain the omnivorous drive of inquiring intelligence and to
brush aside as irrelevant ... any question whose answer would not make an
immediately palpable difference. 29

Words like ‘restriction’ and ‘restrain’ convey the holding back of what is
naturally inclined to a full, systematic objectivity. Because common sense is not
completely dominated by the pure desire to know, this renders it vulnerable to a
various kinds of bias. This is not to imply that common sense is inferior or
unnecessary; it is simply limited in what it can deal with competently. There is
a necessary complementarity of common sense with science and philosophy: the
former deals with the particular, the latter with the universal. Still, in this
complementarity, common sense is the more vulnerable to distortion, and for this
reason it needs to rely on science and philosophy to offset the potential for bias.

In summary, common sense is an expression of the practical intelligence,
reflecting the disinterested desire to know in the more restricted context of
successful living. As such the practical pattern of experience is the source of social organization and progress.

d. The Centrality of Intellect in Human Nature

The centrality of the intellect in Lonergan's early understanding of human nature is apparent in his understanding of language and meaning, and in his definition of spirit. Noting his singular emphasis on intellect as the central characteristic of the human spirit helps us to see that the opposition between affectivity and rationality pervades his early work.

In the discussion of "the core of meaning" Lonergan asserts that all conceptualization reflects the orientation toward knowing objective truth. Without an intellectual desire for objective truth, life would stay within the habitual, repetitive course of sensitive living; new ideas and concepts would simply not arise. All meaning is rooted in the intellectual process of deriving understanding from experience, and truth from understanding. This is not to say, however, that meaning arises only *from* the intellectual pattern of experience, for meaning may emerge from any pattern of experience—dramatic, practical, mystical, etc. Still, these are simply sources of meaning, experiences from which meaning can be derived; such experience possesses merely potential meaning, rather than formal or actual meaning: formal meaning arises with conceptualization and definition, and actual meaning has its source in judgments of truth. Lonergan's distinction between formal and actual, or full, terms of meaning accentuates the difference between what is meaningful as intelligible and what is meaningful as true. Actual meaning is found in concepts like 'horse' and 'electron', which correspond to reality, while concepts like 'unicorn' and 'phlogiston' (an early chemical explanation of fire) are merely intelligible, and so only formally meaningful. Because thought is naturally oriented toward being, there is an inferior quality to concepts that are merely formal. Fully human knowledge—as
opposed to immediate consciousness governed by conservative organic and psychic factors—is such because of its intellectual underpinning, and this naturally subordinates thought and meaning to the question of objective truth: Does the meant exist?

What is it to mean? Whenever you mean, you are thinking or knowing. Thinking is a stage; you think in order to know. Knowing is knowing being. ... The object of all meaning is being.33

Central to human meaning, therefore, is the intention to mean what actually exists. Because of this intention, human language grows and develops, escaping the routine of sensitive living and making possible history and progress.

The desire for objective truth also has a central place in Lonergan’s understanding of the meaning of ‘spirit’. When Lonergan argues for the possibility of the soul surviving after death, he appropriates the classical distinction between spirit and matter, identifying the spirit with intellectual processes and materiality with the lower processes. Matter and spirit correspond—roughly—to the difference between the intelligible and the intelligent.34 Physical, chemical, organic, psychic and rational processes are all intelligible, but only rational processes go beyond being intelligible to being intelligent, and are thus spiritual.35 Psychic processes, though conscious, are deemed material because they are intrinsically conditioned by material phenomena. The affective and intersubjective dimension of human living, therefore, belongs to the material order.36 Only intellectual processes are spiritual.

In conclusion, human nature demands knowing, knowing demands truth, and truth assumes objective actuality. This is the simple constellation of facts that Lonergan would have us advert to as the basis for a critical realism capable of grounding science, philosophy and theology. His position finds its empirical support in the wonder and curiosity, the scrutiny and insight, the critical reflection and judgment that comprise knowledge. Central to Lonergan’s position is his insistence that the crucial link between knowing and truth is a pure
detachment, an exclusion of the potentially distorting influences of affective and intersubjective tendencies; only a disinterested orientation yields objective knowledge. This is crucial for appreciating the systematic opposition of the psyche, with its desires and hopes, and the intellect. To this opposition we now turn.

**B. The Tensions in Human Existence**

The intellectual and practical patterns of experience provide a basis for progress in human knowing and living, but an adequate account of human existence must also account for decline. Lonergan introduces the concept of dialectic to account for the possibility of personal and social decline. Dialectic connotes the tension that exists between linked but opposing principles of change.\(^{37}\) In very general terms, there are two ‘linked but opposing principles of change’: spontaneous affectivity and deliberate intelligence. They are linked principles of change in that the person with spontaneous desires and fears seeks to be reasonable and, in turn, practical reason would have nothing to order if not for the person’s desires and fears. They are opposing principles of change because each would orient change in a radically different direction. In this section we begin by considering the tension between the intellect and its underlying organic and psychic manifold, which can be formulated as two oppositions: conservative psyche vs. progressive reason and self-interested psyche vs. detached reason. Secondly, we will consider the four biases—dramatic, individual, group and general bias—each of which are particular expressions of these tensions, reflecting the interference of the psyche with the intellect.

**1. The Opposition of Psyche and Intellect**

Though we deal with the conservative/progressive and self-interested/detached oppositions separately, one should note that Lonergan does not
distinguish them thematically in this manner. In Insight he tends not to
distinguish the conservative from the self-interested or the progressive from the
detached. Still, Lonergan’s earlier work relies simply on the conservative/
progressive dichotomy, so the juxtaposition of self-interest and detachment seems
to have emerged as an extension of the earlier contrast.


The conservative/progressive duality in Lonergan’s thought is already
apparent in "Finality, Love, Marriage," where he contrasts the conservative
character of nature with the progressive orientation of reason.\(^{38}\) Nature in this
context is used in the narrow sense of "physical, vital, sensitive spontaneity" and
so it corresponds to the organic and psychic aspects of animal nature. ‘Spontanei-
ty’ here is opposed to that which is deliberate, and this is a key distinction
between nature and reason. Because nature is a spontaneous expression of an
immanent principle, it is repetitive, remaining within a regular scheme of
activities. Reason by contrast is a principle of progress, making novelty possible.
Furthermore, that which is spontaneous is efficient, so that "nature with the ease
of a superautomaton pursues with statistical infallibility and regularly attains …
its repetitive ends." Reason on the other hand, though it has the potential for
progress, is also more vulnerable to the vicissitudes of improper development and
the possibility of decline.

The conservative orientation of sensitive living—i.e., living dominated by
psychic concerns—is also apparent throughout Insight. All progress comes
through intellectual understanding, for "[w]ithout the pure desire to know,
sensitive living would remain in its routine of perception and conation, instinct
and habit, emotion and action."\(^{39}\) The psyche is a principle of inertia. In his
discussion of the notion of development Lonergan defines a law of limitation and
transcendence, which expresses the tension between the tendency to maintain an
integration already achieved and the tendency toward a higher integration; the
tendency to conserve the achieved integration is an inertial one. In human
existence, the tension becomes a conscious one in psychic development.

Present perceptiveness is to be enlarged, and the enlargement is not perceptible to
present perceptiveness. Present desires and fears have to be transmuted and the
transmutation is not desirable to present desire but fearful to present fear.\(^{40}\)

The first tendency toward a higher integration may be marked by uncertainty and
fear, for the emergence of the higher is in a sense also an undoing of the lower.
In his later Existentialism lectures Lonergan would come to speak of
anxiety—which has its basis in the sensitive psyche—as the conservative principle
in human living.\(^{41}\)

Just as the psyche is a conservative principle in the individual, intersubjec-
tivity is its corresponding expression in the dynamics of social processes.
Intersubjectivity is a natural or spontaneous love or affection, a sense of
belonging together. It provides the basis for an intelligent social order in the
same way the physical organism and the conscious psyche provide the basis for
rationality; intersubjectivity grounds the collective fears, desires and activities that
constitute the underlying manifold, of which the social order is an intelligent
unification. Social order does not replace the lower manifold of fears and desires
but transforms it, for the natural sense of unity—implicit in the extended family
and in a common language and culture—becomes extended to broader unities such
as the nation, which instills a new spontaneous affection. In short, intersubjecti-
vity is the affective unity of community, a unity which belongs primarily to the
subrational spontaneity of nature.\(^{42}\)

The conservative character of intersubjectivity first appears in its definition
in "Finality, Love, Marriage," where it denotes

the mutual adaptation and automatic correlation of the activities of many individuals
as though they were parts of a larger organic unit. This phenomenon may be
illustrated by the antheap or the beehive; but its more general appearance lies in the
unity of the family, a unity which nature as spontaneously and as imperiously attains
in the accidental order as in the substantial it effects the unity of the organism.\(^{43}\)
The use of beehives and anthills to illustrate intersubjectivity accentuates the element of the nonrational, repetitive conservation of order at the heart of the family. The stability of familial unity as an aggregate of individuals is compared to the unity of the individual organism. In line with this Lonergan attributes certain affections to nature: the sexual eros of romance expresses "the merely organistic tendencies of nature," as does the "spontaneous devotion of parents to each other and to children, of children to parents and to one another." 

The conservative tendency of intersubjectivity is also apparent in Insight's discussion of the tension between intersubjectivity and intelligent social order. Social harmony within progress depends on the integration of common sense with human feeling. Common sense is the principle of progress, for it is the source of new technologies, economies and polities. As these change the social order, there is social disquiet and crisis until spontaneous affectivity has been adapted to the new order. The theme of adaptation of the lower to the higher is a persistent one; only the higher can be a progressive source of order. Disorder continues until the lower is conformed to the higher, consolidating the progress initiated in the higher.

If human intelligence takes the lead in developments, still its products do not function smoothly until there is effected a suitable adaptation of sensitive spontaneity. The social order not only gathers men together in functional groups but also consolidates its gains and expedites its operations by turning to its own ends the vast resources of human imagination and emotion, sentiment and confidence, familiarity and loyalty.

Intersubjectivity is conservative, then, in the sense that it is not a principle of progress. It contributes to progress only in the sense that the stability of progress is realized only when human fellow-feeling is adapted to the lead of intelligence.

While Lonergan is concerned to distinguish the progressive character of reason from the conservative aspect of the psyche and intersubjectivity, he does not mean to imply that it is a negative force. A facet of human genuineness is that it "respects inertial tendencies as necessary conservative forces."
conservative tendency becomes negative only when it is allowed to dominate the progressive rather than being conformed to it, in which case it inhibits self-transcendence.

b. Self-interested Sensitivity and Detached Reason

The psyche is also characterized as being self-interested in contrast to intellectual detachment. Lonergan writes,

For the self, as perceiving and feeling, as enjoying and suffering, functions as an animal in an environment, as a self-attached and self-interested centre within its own narrow world of stimuli and responses. But the same self, as inquiring and reflecting, as conceiving intelligently and judging reasonably, is carried by its own higher spontaneity to quite a different mode of operation with the opposite attributes of detachment and disinterestedness. It is confronted with a universe of being in which it finds itself, not the centre of reference, but an object co-ordinated with other objects and, with them, subordinated to some destiny to be discovered or invented, approved or disdained, accepted or repudiated.

Such then is the height of the tension of human consciousness. ... On the side of the object, it is the opposition between a centre in the world of sense operating self-centredly and, on the other hand, an entry into an intelligible ordered universe of being to which one can belong and in which one can function only through detachment and disinterestedness.49

Human existence is in tension between the natural, 'animal' tendency toward self-centeredness and the equally natural but intelligent tendency to see the world from an objective point of view.

The tension between animal self-interest and intelligent detachment is an abiding aspect of human existence. Because self-interest is rooted in the very nature of the psyche, human existence cannot escape its presence.

"Not only is the opposition complete but also it is ineluctable. As a man cannot divest himself of his animality, so he cannot put off the Eros of his mind. ... [A]ll development is development inasmuch as it possesses a point of departure, a concrete material to be transmuted, but in man this concrete material is permanent in the self-centered sensitive psyche .... [T]he perfection of the higher integration does not eliminate the integrated or modify the essential opposition between self-centeredness and detachment."50

Though the opposition cannot be overcome, it may be integrated, and this is the ideal. Again, the integration comes about through the subordination and adaptation of the lower to the higher.
The starkness of the opposition between self-centeredness and detachment is ameliorated somewhat by the recognition that self-interestedness is not to be equated with an individualistic selfishness. Lonergan is closer to Hume than to Hobbes, for individualism is tempered by affective involvement. Because of intersubjectivity, self-interested desire involves a concern for the welfare of those to whom one is affectively bound: "men are led by their intersubjectivity both to satisfy their own appetites and to help others in the attainment of their satisfaction." So intersubjectivity and intellect both mitigate individualistic selfishness, intellect by aspiring to an objective order beyond one's desires and intersubjectivity by extending one's sympathy beyond the narrow boundaries of the self.

Nevertheless, there is a real opposition between self-interested intersubjectivity—the desires and fears of people whose lives are interwoven with others—and the dispassionate intellect which isolates itself from the potential distortion of emotional associations. For, as we will see, this opposition underlies the 'dialectic of community'. This brings us to consider how these tensions reveal themselves as various kinds of dialectic in the four biases.

2. Bias: The Dialectics of the Individual and of the Community

The notion of dialectic provides a basis for the explanation of bias, and bias in turn accounts for conflict and decline. Progress and harmony are the result of intelligence, supported by a subordinate, psychic affectivity. Yet to the extent that sensitive spontaneity is allowed to dominate, it manifests itself in the form of bias, and bias is the source of psychological and social conflict.

Lonergan speaks of a dialectic of the individual and a dialectic of community. The first is the tension relevant to psychic wholeness or conflict, where conflict arises from dramatic bias. Lonergan's discussion of psychic conflict is an attempt to incorporate psychoanalytic theory into his account of human welfare. Similarly, the dialectic of community is meant to be a higher
synthesis of liberal and Marxist perspectives; it seeks to account for the possibility and precariousness of social progress as well as for social conflict. Social conflict arises from three kinds of bias: individual, group and general. In total, then, the dialectic of the individual and of community reflect four kinds of bias, to which we now turn.

Dramatic bias is the most complex of the four. The linked but opposing principles of change in the dialectic of the individual are, on one hand, the dramatic desires and fears that interfere with psychological wholeness and, on the other, the unconscious intellectual 'censor' that governs the organization of consciousness. These two principles condition whether 'unconscious neural demand functions' are satisfied, and to the extent that neural demand functions are repressed or inhibited, psychopathology develops.

Neural demand functions belong to the unconscious activity of the nervous system, but they are specifically processes that press for conscious representation and integration in the psyche. These unconscious neural processes are to be understood as Lonergan's counterpart to the psychoanalytic notion of the subconscious, the demands of which seek to be met consciously but which, if frustrated, express themselves in dreams or in various dysfunctional ways. Neural demand functions derive from the organic neural manifold, and so their demands must be met; conscious, psychic processes are freer of material determination than unconscious, organic processes, and rational processes are freer still than psychic processes, so subconscious demands radiating from the organic substratum of consciousness emerge with a certain necessity. But the interplay of dramatic concerns and the intellectual censor determine whether these demand functions will find expression in consciousness.

Lonergan sees Freud's notion of a 'censor' as the mechanism which determines which neural demand functions receive conscious representation.
intellectual activity. Intelligence operates nonconsciously to organize perception and imagination in order to facilitate the emergence of understanding. Dramatic bias is the result of passions interfering with the censor so that it is repressive rather than constructive. As is clear from the nature of attention, consciousness necessarily involves selection from all that one could be aware of, and this implies exclusion, so even in its constructive role the censor must omit things. Yet when the censor is constructive, it "does not introduce any arrangement of perspective into the unconscious demand functions of neural patterns and processes." That is, the constructive censor allows the neural demand function to express itself, without the attempt to repress or distort that which seeks representation and integration. When repressive, the censor positively excludes patterns that would promote unwanted insights.

Repressive censorship results in what Lonergan calls 'scotosis', a blockage in the possibility of understanding. The censor, which should facilitate understanding, functions to prevent it. There is a downward spiral in scotosis, for when understanding is blocked, one is crippled in one's interactions with others, which limits the possibilities of both learning through association with others and finding affective fulfillment with others. It is this crippled and crippling dynamic that Lonergan posits at the root of the various forms of illness exposed by psychoanalytic psychology. So psychopathology has its root in a flight from understanding, which in turn is the result of the unconscious distortion of intellectual functioning by sensitive passion.

We turn now to the social biases—individual, group and general. Individual bias is simply a matter of egoism, the inordinate concern for one's personal interests. Though egoism, like the other biases, is ultimately a result of the tension between sensitive spontaneity and intelligence, egoism itself is not directly linked with psychic affectivity. That is, there is no correlation of egoism with the psyche and altruism with reason. Like Aristotle, Lonergan holds that the
more reasonable one is, the more one recognizes that one’s best interests are served by seeking the welfare of others. That is, egoism and altruism converge when one is reasonable. Egoism and altruism are also interwoven in natural spontaneity, for as we saw earlier the natural tendency of intersubjectivity is to be concerned for those of one’s group and not just for one’s self. Even in nature an animal will give its life to save its offspring. So egoism and altruism do not map neatly onto the dichotomy of psyche and intellect.

Nevertheless egoism is an expression of the tension between natural spontaneity and detached intelligence, a tension which arises because sensitive spontaneity is oriented to immediate circumstance while detached objectivity tends toward universal generalization.\(^{58}\) Intelligence tends toward universalization in the sense that practical intelligence seeks a course of action that is valid for any person in similar circumstances; any individual in the same situation should understand the situation and respond in the same way. Questions naturally arise until the situation and its demands are fully grasped. Because spontaneous affectivity is oriented to particular, immediate circumstances, it lacks this higher perspective. Egoism is the effect of the psyche’s concern for immediacy curtailing and restricting the tendency of practical reason toward universalized responses to situations. As Lonergan puts it,

> Egoism, then, is an incomplete development of intelligence. ... [I]t fails to pivot from the initial and preliminary motivation, provided by desires and fears, to the self-abnegation involved in allowing complete free play to intelligent inquiry. Its inquiry is reinforced by spontaneous desires and fears; by the same stroke it is restrained from a consideration of any broader field.\(^{59}\)

So affectivity initially motivates practical reason, but then it refuses to allow reason to go its full distance.

Lonergan is careful to point out that egoism is not a matter of subordinating intelligence to desire. Egoism is realistic, attentive to actual circumstance, relying on dispassionate insight and critical judgment so that one acts in accord with the actual facts of the situation. In Lonergan’s scheme, to subordinate
intelligence to desire is to give it over to wishful thinking—thinking something true because one wants it to be true. So egoism reflects an interference of desire with intelligence.

Egoism not only restricts the natural tendency of reason, but also curbs the native orientation of intersubjectivity. It must subdue the spontaneous demands of intersubjectivity which, if they lack the breadth of a purely intellectual viewpoint with its golden rule, at least are commonly broader in their regard for others than is intelligent selfishness. Because egoism must overcome the natural tendency of both intersubjectivity and reason, egoism involves a conscious determination to resist what comes naturally.

In summary, practical reflection begins from spontaneous desires and fears that are neither egoistic nor altruistic. Reflection pursues questions that are intrinsically neither selfish nor altruistic. Whether egoism or altruism emerges depends on whether affectivity short circuits the process of reflection. Here again we see Lonergan’s tendency to interpret conflict in human living in terms of the interference of the psyche in the proper functioning of the intellect, in terms of the lower restraining the higher.

Group bias is a collective form of selfishness, and as such it is an important source of social and class conflict. Group bias generates its own common sense, so that the common sense of each community or class reflects its own interests.

Primitive community is relatively homogenous and its unity is rooted in spontaneous intersubjectivity. The development of technology, economy and polity leads to specialization and social diversity so that subcultures emerge in the form of guilds, classes and such. With progressive differentiation within society, there needs to be a consequent adaptation of intersubjectivity, so that the guild or class finds in friendship, loyalty and mutual confidence a basis for their cooperation.
Because intersubjectivity belongs to the conservative, self-centered aspect of human existence, it is a principle of inertia. The fragmentation of social solidarity fostered by increasing social diversity and specialization tends to resist further intelligent change. Practical intelligence naturally transcends the narrow perspective of the group; if it were allowed to dominate in dealing with social problems, it would arrive at disinterested solutions that serve society as a whole. In group bias one’s sense of group solidarity avoids the lead of new practical insights that discern superior forms of social organization, in which the interests of all groups are served. The ethos and interests implicit in group spontaneity lead the group to see only what serves or threatens its own welfare.

Finally, general bias is a broad cultural disdain for theoretical knowledge. It reflects the domination of common sense, which in its concern for immediate results tends to disdain abstract, universal, more comprehensive issues and long-term implications. With general bias there emerges the distinction between two kinds of decline, the shorter cycle which is associated with group bias, and the longer cycle which is associated with general bias. The longer cycle of decline is characterized by the emergence of a culture in which theoretical knowledge—empirical science and philosophy—is not taken seriously. Thus common sense lacks the guiding force of a higher, explanatory perspective which would enable it to correct its biases. Yet because common sense also has its immediate source in motivating desires and fears, it holds that the satisfaction of these affective needs is the only real warrant for ideas; concern for long-term issues and for the resolution of philosophical issues is considered irrelevant to meaningful human action.

The effects of the longer cycle are that the social order becomes less intelligent, less intelligible and, subsequently, disinterested intelligence is disdained because it seems so far removed from social reality. The fragmentation of society, its inability to maintain a coherent center, is evidence of it becoming
less intelligent. The incoherence of society leads to it being less intelligible. This lack of intelligibility in turn creates the impression that intelligence has little to do either with the problems of society or with their solutions.

Lonergan’s position is that it is precisely the lack of fully-developed intelligence that has led to many of the social problems of the modern world. The social situation is intelligible in terms of a lack of detached, intellectual development. Therefore, a philosophy that offers a coherent account of the problem and in its analysis discerns the immanent, intelligent norms for resolving social incoherence would provide a theoretical perspective capable of uniting social science, philosophy and common sense. Lonergan’s explanation of the nature of inquiry and insight in mathematics, empirical science, and common sense is meant to provide this higher perspective: an empirical, critical, normative and integrating science of humankind, upon which the various fields of social science could collaborate in directing human history. To this collaboration the fact of bias is important, for to the extent that the various human sciences—psychology, sociology, anthropology, etc.—espouse a concern for social progress and policy, each needs to distinguish critically between "the purely intellectual element in its field and, on the other hand, the inertial effects and the interference of human sensibility and human nerves." However, more than a philosophical unification of the social sciences is needed. For this only deals with the intellectual component of the problem. A new culture is also needed. Culture conveys an ethos that informs art, literature, theatre and the mass media. Culture is a synthesis of intelligence and affectivity in which feelings have been adapted and conformed to understanding. It is a compound of intelligence and intersubjectivity, and only this can effectively offset both the affective and intellectual components of the bias toward common sense.

In conclusion, the four biases of common sense reflect a common dynamic. In each case the tension underlying personal and social progress and
decline is between "incompletely developed intelligence and imperfectly adapted sensibility." Intelligence is incomplete to the extent that it is not allowed to realize its proper fulfillment. The position that the proper place of affectivity is in subordination to intellect is the natural implication of characterizing it as conservative and self-centered; if one is to hope for progress, then certainly it must come from disinterested, progressive intelligence. Affectivity can only escape its natural limitations by being adapted to the judgments of rational reflection. This is not to say that affectivity is evil and rationality good. Both are good, and both reflect important aspects of being human. Evil emerges through the failure to harmonize them properly, the failure to transform the relative goodness of affectivity into the higher good of rationally ordered emotions.

In Chapter I we spoke of the directedness of finality, its orientation to an indeterminate betterment. One of the principal features of emergent probability is that dysfunctional orders—those resulting from the various biases—ultimately lead to their own undoing. Repression, selfishness, class conflict and indifference to truth might seem adequate in the short term, but in the long term the trajectory they begin falters and fails; the order they generate falls into disorder. Habits of the psyche, the individual lifestyle, the social order proves to be non-adaptive, and natural selection weeds it out from the orders that are more adaptive and have more potential for growth. Though the potential for bias must necessarily persist, rooted as it is in the structure of nature and human nature, what it produces inevitably heads off to extinction—or to correction. With conflict there is suffering, and suffering in its own way teaches the goodness of harmony and the need for reason to dominate emotion. This harmony is the positive potential in the tension of rationality and affectivity.
C. Conclusion

A striking feature of Lonergan’s early understanding of human nature is the centrality of the disinterested desire for objective, explanatory truth. In *Insight* and other early works, reason has a strict priority in the hierarchy of organic, psychic and rational natures. The discernment of objective truth has priority in the hierarchy of intellectual processes. The desire to know objectively is the source of a uniquely human knowledge of the world, evident in common sense, mathematics, science and philosophy. It grounds the possibility of healthy integration in personal and social development. It is the sole fountain of human progress, for it discovers the technologies, the economies, the polities that satisfy and organize human wants and desires. Human finality is fundamentally the extension of rational control throughout all of human living.

The higher constellation of reason, detachment, progress and objectivity stand over against the lower grouping of psyche, self-centeredness, conservation, subjectivity and intersubjectivity. The contrast is so stark that Lonergan finds a mythic counterpart of this juxtaposition in the Iranian dualism of darkness and light. The source of disorder is invariably the interference of the lower with higher, of affectivity with intelligence, just as harmonious order is, without exception, the domination of the lower by the higher.

An important feature of Lonergan’s understanding of human nature is that the psyche’s sensitive spontaneity is open to transformation. Though it tends to be conservative and self-interested, it is not fixed by nature. The scope of those with whom one intersubjectively identifies can be extended so that loyalty to the tribe can give way to class or national loyalties, in which one feels an immediate kinship with one’s compatriots. At the psychological level, though there is the relatively fixed pressure of neural demand functions for conscious representation, the drama of social living is open to a variety of ways of mediating these pressures. Sublimation can be a healthy way of redirecting these energies,
guiding libidinal energy in ways that serve scientific, philosophic or religious pursuits.

The possibility of the transformation of affectivity is important for the question of how value is grounded in human nature. Because progress is grounded in reason, and because affectivity can ride on the tail of rational progress, there is room for the historical evolution of sensitive spontaneity. Yet if reason is the engine of history, if value comes to be associated with an affective apprehension, as it is in Lonergan's later writings, does it follow that the apprehension of value is strictly natural and ahistorical? This is a question to be considered in Chapter VI. First we must consider Lonergan's early account of ethics and value, in which he maintains the priority of the rational objectivity, and in which the opposition of psyche and intellect leads to a systematic exclusion of affectivity from Lonergan's definition of value.
PART II. THE EVOLUTION OF LONERGAN’S NOTION OF VALUE

Chapter III, *Insight* XVIII: The Possibility of Ethics

The next three chapters argue that between *Insight* and *Method in Theology* Lonergan’s account of value undergoes a significant transformation. His early position needs to be understood as a combination of a Thomistic ethical intellectualism and a Kantian ethical formalism, but both of these elements are left behind by the time *Method* is written. Chapters III and IV deal with his early position, the first dealing with Lonergan’s ethical position in *Insight* on its own terms, and the second examining the intellectualistic and formalistic themes present in it.

The first task is to understand Lonergan’s account of value and practical rationality in *Insight*. Chapter XVIII of *Insight*, "The Possibility of Ethics," is the focus of attention, though other early writings are considered in order to expand and clarify what is presented in *Insight*.¹ Not all of *Insight*’s Chapter XVIII is relevant to our purpose, for of its three sections only the first two deal with Lonergan’s account of value and practical rationality. The first section of Chapter XVIII, "The Notion of the Good," gives an account of the good as rational, and shows how this explanation provides a basis for ethics and for an account of ‘being’ as good. In the second, "The Notion of Freedom," Lonergan addresses moral freedom, arguing that his account of emergent probability and statistical residues allows for a meaningful explanation of free will. The importance of this section for our purposes lies in its discussion of practical rationality, to which moral deliberation belongs. In the third section, "The
Problem of Liberation," he deals with the actual limitations of moral freedom, and his purpose is to prepare the way for the argument that religion offers a necessary resource for sustaining personal and social development. Like the issue of moral freedom, this section is beyond the scope of our concern.

The structure of our discussion will follow the structure of Insight's Chapter XVIII. In "The Notion of the Good" Lonergan begins by outlining the tripartite structure of value. Though he does not here develop the parallel between the structure of community and the structure of the good—as he does when he first introduces his account of value in the early fifties—we shall consider the structures of the good and of community together, for this sets his explanation of the good within the broader context of social progress, where Lonergan understood it to properly belong. Next Lonergan gives an account of how practical action depends on the priority of knowledge, and it is here that his defense of ethical intellectualism is most apparent. He then presents the implications of his account of value for ethics, showing how the hierarchical structure implicit in value provides a basis for the systematic ordering of values. Finally, he builds upon the threefold structure of the good to demonstrate the ability of his position to account coherently for the goodness of being. This will provide us with a basis for a deeper analysis of Lonergan's position in Chapter IV, where it will be seen that each of these themes expresses the intellectualistic and formalistic character of Lonergan's early position.

We turn next to Lonergan's account of practical intelligence as we find it in "The Notion of Freedom." More specifically we focus on the problem of defining the relationship between what he calls rational consciousness and rational self-consciousness. Clarifying this relationship gives insight into Lonergan's early ethical intellectualism, for though obligation is determined by practical intelligence, the knowledge of obligation belongs to speculative intelligence so that the will is informed by the intellect. Recognizing this will allow us to see in Chapter
V how Lonergan’s later formulation of the fourth level of consciousness is significantly different from the earlier, for in the earlier work it is specifically intended to convey a Thomistic intellectualism—as Chapter IV will make clear—but later it is meant to transcend this same intellectualism. For this reason we need to carefully define Lonergan’s early understanding of the relationship of between rational conscious and rational self-consciousness.

A. "The Notion of the Good"

Our investigation will follow the course of Lonergan’s own discussion, beginning from his account of the basic structure of value, going next to the notion of will, and then to his position that the structure of value provides a solid basis for ethics and for an affirmation of the goodness of being.

1. Three Levels of the Good and Community

Though in Insight Lonergan does not deal with the three levels of the good together with the three levels of community, to do so in our analysis of his position has the virtue of showing how much his thought was moulded by practical considerations of social welfare and the economy. When Lonergan first introduces the threefold structure of the good in "The Role of the Catholic University ...," he presents it as paralleling the three levels of community. Though in Insight’s Chapter XVIII the correspondence between the levels of the good and of community is not drawn—Lonergan deals with the ‘levels of community’ in the context of practical common sense in Chapter VII—nevertheless the good and social order remain inextricably interwoven and complementary. For Lonergan the rational good is to be understood primarily in terms of the social and historical dynamic through which the economy has developed. The good is progressively discerned and realized through the evolution of an intrinsically social good, for social order is both a realization of the good and the
potential for the further realization of goods.

We begin with a brief summary of the threefold, hierarchical structure of the good and of the corresponding structure of community, and then proceed with a more detailed exposition. The rational good has a universal, threefold structure that parallels the universal, threefold structure of truth. Just as truth is a unity of empirical, intellectual and rational elements—i.e., experience, understanding and judgment—even so the rational good is a synthesis in which there are three discrete levels of good: the empirical good, the good of order and the rational good, or value. The empirical good parallels experience, for as experience represents the unorganized manifold of data which is given systematic order by the higher level, so the empirical good is the manifold of natural desires that require a higher unification. As understanding discerns a unity in data, the intellectual good, or the good of order, emerges through the ordering and unifying of a manifold of natural desires so as to maximize and harmonize them. The third level of the good involves the judgment of value and rational choice, which parallels the intellectual judgment of truth. It is a reflective judgment upon the second level, a judgment which determines whether a certain ordering is indeed good. The threefold structure of the good is universal and unchanging, for wherever there is deliberate choice, what is chosen reflects a synthesis of these three levels of the good.

Similarly Lonergan presents community as having three levels, which correspond to the three levels of good. Intersubjective community is, like the natural spontaneity of the manifold of human desires, simply a natural expression of human affectivity, intersubjectivity and cooperation. Civil community reflects the more rational ordering of cooperation that emerges with technological, economical and political development. Cultural community, or 'cosmopolis', is a level of community that takes its stand on values; it seeks to inform and criticize civil community from a higher moral vantage point.
Moving from summary to analysis, empirically the good is the object of desire, experienced in "the tendencies, the drives, the unrest of our spontaneities." The manifold of spontaneous desires which constitute the first level of the good are not simply biological, isolated or hedonistic ones. Empirical desires are not just biological, for they are modified by the artistic dimension of human nature. The desire for food might be transformed by the desire for a comfortable milieu, a well-arranged place setting, a gourmet's flair. Nor do these desires arise as simply isolated occasions, for spontaneously a secure supply and a sustained succession of satisfactions is sought. We do not just want food for the present moment of hunger, but we desire a regular source of food so that we need not fear future want. Finally, desires are not simply hedonistic, for among these natural desires there is the intellectual desire to know, a desire that heads beyond personal satisfaction toward objective truth and thus makes possible the good of order.

Intellectually, the good is the good of order. A 'good of order' is an intelligent ordering of empirical goods, a system integrating the various elements necessary for the satisfaction of desire. In writings other than Insight the term may denote orders with varying degrees of comprehensiveness, from the systematic order implied in seeking a single object of desire to the divinely ordained order of the cosmos. However, in Insight and more generally Lonergan's central concern is with "the human good of order"—that is, with the social order and its constituent processes and institutions—for this is where the dialectic of social progress and decline is played out. Key examples of goods of order are institutions such as the nuclear family, the institutions which embody technological, economical and political processes, and the broader social order which sustains these institutions. The central characteristic of a good of order is that it makes possible the regular satisfaction of particular desires. It systematizes the satisfaction of desires, and "it stands to particular goods as a dynamic
artificial form to the materials put in order by artifice." Just as a house is comprised of material components but, because of the order it gives to them, is more than these components, even so the good of order is not reducible to particular goods; the intelligible order is a good in its own right. It orders particular goods by defining roles that coordinate the efforts of each and by promoting the conditions that sustain this cooperation so that the flow of particular goods is sustained. In other words, the social structures and conventions that make possible coordination and specialization and so introduce rationality to the pursuit of human desires express an intelligent order, a good of order.

An important aspect of goods of order is that they give rise to new relationships through establishing new roles and a need for cooperation, and in this way they take up one level of community and redefine it at another level. It is in these positive relationships that the good of order is most concretely realized. In Insight a good of order "is anticipated and reflected by spontaneous intersubjectivity." It is anticipated in that the good of order extends and fulfills the tendency toward interpersonal harmony that intersubjectivity spontaneously generates among kin. It is reflected in that the good of order is finally only realized as intersubjectivity conforms itself to the intelligent social order, redefining spontaneous affectivity to accord with new social relationships.

Though there is development in how Lonergan characterizes positive interpersonal dynamics, it is a stable feature of his thought is that he holds positive personal relationships to be essential to authentic living and a truly good social order. The concept of status, introduced in his "Philosophy of Education" lectures, offers a representative indication of the importance of relationships to a good social order. Status brings together the individual and the more comprehensive order of which he or she is a part, for through having status the individual is integrated into that order. Lack of respect and the corresponding
lack of dignity is an evil that works against social stability, for it leads to classes, such as the proletariat, who lack concern for society—people who are in society but not of it.\textsuperscript{15} Progress counteracts this lack of status, for one aspect of progress is that "There is status for all because everything is running smoothly."\textsuperscript{16} It follows, then, that to understand the actual good of order operative within a certain institution or society, one must consider the relationships even more than the frequency and efficiency of the satisfaction of desires.

The most efficacious example of the human good of order is the family, and the family subsists on personal relations. It is in the personal relations, in their relations with one another, that the members of the family concretely perceive their good of order. Through personal relations there is the concrete, immediate apprehension of what the good of order concretely is.\textsuperscript{17}

So the goodness of the good of order is discerned above all in the fact of relationship, in the mutual recognition and esteem that social roles make possible.

Finally, there is value, the rational good. As with understandings that are misunderstandings, not all intelligent orders are equally good. Indeed, a good of order may reflect selfish interests, for selfishness may also operate in the systematic organization of desires and satisfactions.\textsuperscript{18} Goods of order require rational reflection to determine whether they are truly good. So on the level of rational deliberation and choice, the good is defined as value. By value is meant the rational good, that which is rational to approve, to desire and to realize in practice. Just as the judgment of truth depends on understanding and adds nothing to understanding beyond the judgment of validity, even so the judgment of value depends upon the good of order, for value implies a valid intelligible order. A particular, empirical good can be a value, and a good of order may itself be a value, for both individual things and social orders may be chosen on the basis of rational judgment. Yet it is only as the particular good is brought within a good of order and as that good of order is rationally judged to be good that empirical goods become values.\textsuperscript{19} In other words, a particular, empirical good becomes a value when choosing it is in harmony with a valid intelligent order.
As Lonergan’s discussion of the good of order generally focuses on institutional and social order, so his treatment of value finds its center of gravity in social order as an object of human devotion, whereby people become committed to the practical implementation, maintenance and development of a certain social order. Lonergan tends to deal with value as a choice between alternative social orders, specifically in terms of the choice between Western liberalism and Marxist socialism, which was so prominent during the Cold War era in which he was writing. This accounts for the frequent description of the rational determination of value in terms of a selecting between orders. By contrast, the determination of truth is not a choice between understandings but an estimation of the adequacy of a particular understanding. Similarly, one would expect—and it is otherwise quite in line with Lonergan’s system—that value might be determined according to innate, rational criteria of adequacy with respect to a single good of order. Yet, Lonergan sets value always in a context of choice, and he often presents choice as being between alternative orders.

The level of community corresponding with the rational good is described in varying ways over the course of Lonergan’s writing career, but its essential features remain unchanged. In his early writings he speaks of this community as "the great republic of culture" and as ‘cosmopolis’. It is a form of community that transcends the boundaries of a particular place and time, for it intends truth and wisdom beyond the confines of the common sense and the historical circumstances of a people. Lonergan first introduces it in "Marriage, Love, Finality" in the traditional context of the three ends of life—life, the good life and eternal life. Lonergan interprets these as three kinds of process. Life is a process of natural, conservative repetition, the good life is one of rational, historical development, and eternal life is a process which provides an eternal perspective, a wisdom and truth by which historical development is judged. The latter corresponds with the republic of culture, for it consists of a community in
which one esteems the great people of the past who are abiding resources for a knowledge of what is eternal and definitive. In the fifties Lonergan shifts from the traditional framework of life’s three ends to that of the three levels of consciousness—so cosmopolis comes to correspond to rational consciousness—yet the implication remains that culture transcends any particular civilization, for it is rooted in the transhistorical medium of literature and is relevant to all civilizations.

In summary, Lonergan’s analysis of the good in terms of three levels—particular goods, organized or systematic goods and rational goods—sets out the general and invariant structure underlying the historical diversity of what is deemed good, a structure which provides a way of understanding any human good of any age on a theoretical level. The basic building block of this structure is that universally people seek a continuous, secure flow of particular satisfactions. The desires they seek to satisfy are not simply biological ones, for they also desire dramatic transformations of biological needs, and objective truth. The concern for sustained satisfactions and intelligent living invariably leads to collaboration, shared institutions, and interpersonal relationships, which constitute the social order, the human good of order. When one judges a particular order to be good, one has moved to the level of value.

2. The Notion of Will

The primary purpose of Lonergan’s discussion of the notion of will is to affirm an ethical intellectualism, the view that the intellect has priority over the will in practical and moral matters. He does this by explaining that moral obligation reflects a rational demand that doing should conform to knowing, and that knowing needs to be understood in terms of intellectual, or speculative, knowledge.

Lonergan defines will as intellectual or spiritual appetite, a desire for an
intellectually grasped object—i.e., either an intelligent good of order, or a
particular object subsumed under a good of order.\textsuperscript{25} This definition implies an
ethical intellectualism in light of what Lonergan says in both earlier and later
works. When Lonergan later comes to reject both intellectualism and its
underlying Aristotelian error—a misplaced emphasis on objects rather than
subjects—he asserts that ethical intellectualism necessarily follows from such a
definition of will: "[T]he priority of objects entailed a priority of intellect over
will, since will was conceived as rational appetite."\textsuperscript{26} Lonergan recognized very
early the connection between intellectualism and this definition of will, for in his
treatment of Aquinas' position in "Imago Dei"—a position which, as we will see
later, clearly reflects his own—he asserts that unless the will is governed by
intellectual knowledge, one could not define will as rational appetite.\textsuperscript{27} It follows
then, that it is precisely this position that is being affirmed in Insight, and this is
his point in declaring that the categorical imperative is derived "wholly from
speculative intelligence and reason."\textsuperscript{28}

Lonergan asserts that willing is moral because it is rational. The
connection between rationality and morality, however, is drawn in an overly
economical manner. The pure desire to know expresses itself not only in
speculative intelligence but also in practical. The pure desire to know in its
practical expression envisions possible ways and better ways of organizing one's
environment and one's own 'spontaneous' living. Integrating one's spontaneous
living within a higher system—that is, bringing the spontaneous pursuit of
empirical goods into harmony within a broader, more comprehensive
order—seems to be the essence of morality in this discussion, for Lonergan
moves directly from the possibility of this higher ordering of human living to
saying:

\begin{quote}
So it is that the detached and disinterested desire extends its sphere of influence
from the field of cognitional activities through the field of knowledge into the field
of deliberate human acts. So it is that the empirically, intelligently, rationally

\end{quote}
conscious subject of self-affirmation becomes a morally self-conscious subject. Man is not only a knower but also a doer; the same intelligent and rational consciousness grounds the doing as well as the knowing; and from that identity of consciousness there springs inevitably an exigence for self-consistency in knowing and doing.29

This is an important passage, for it can be taken as prefiguring Lonergan’s later theme of existential concern emerging as a fourth level of consciousness. Yet, in spite of its importance, it is rather unclear about how the pure desire to know in its speculative orientation relates to the practical ordering of one’s spontaneous living. This is an issue to be addressed later in dealing with the relationship between practical intelligence and rational consciousness. For the moment it is enough to recognize that Lonergan’s own conclusion to this discussion affirms the reliance of moral obligation on speculative intelligence. When Lonergan speaks of "the exigence for self-consistency in knowing and doing," his point is that one’s native rationality demands that one’s living conform to speculative knowledge.

While a full answer to the question of how obligation derives from speculative knowledge must wait until we discuss Lonergan’s treatment of practical intelligence, a partial answer is to be found immediately in the text, in Lonergan’s account of hypocrisy and rationalization, which are both ways of avoiding the demand of knowing on doing.30 Two other ways of sidestepping obligation are also dealt with: one can avoid self-knowledge by never stopping to scrutinize one’s motives and the moral significance of one’s endeavours; one can also recognize the demand of moral obligation, yet give oneself over to despair about being able to meet them adequately, and so live a life of moral defeat. Rationalization and hypocrisy are particularly important for our study, for they explain—in part, at least—the sense in which moral obligation is derived "wholly from speculative intelligence and reason."

Both hypocrisy and rationalization are ways of avoiding obligation by distorting one’s knowing so that it is consistent with one’s refusal to do what one
should. Both are explained in terms of a practical syllogism. The major premise is the knowledge of a moral principle and the minor is a knowledge of particulars, the recognition of fact. Though Lonergan gives no examples, I would offer as a major premise, "stealing is wrong," and as a minor premise, "this is a case of stealing." The rational conclusion is the act of doing, or the decision to do. Hypocrisy distorts the minor premise, the facts of the situation, and rationalization skews the major premise, the moral principle. Although both principles involve a knowledge of reality, only distorting the major premise is presented as a matter of "playing fast and loose with the pure desire to know in its immediate domain of cognitional activity." The reference to the "immediate domain" of the pure desire to know implies the speculative sphere. So the major principle is uniquely associated with speculative knowledge, presumably because it is the grasp of a universal, that is, an abstract reason. The distortion of fact in hypocrisy does not compromise the fundamental integrity of the pure desire to know the way the distortion of a principle in rationalization does. So when Lonergan says that the categorical imperative is derived "wholly from speculative intelligence and reason," he means that obligation is derived from speculative intelligence because it depends upon the speculative knowledge of a major premise; and obligation is derived by reason, which works from the major premise in specific situations to determine that a course of action is obligatory.

Lonergan concludes by noting that his account of obligation as the demand for consistency between knowing and doing is thoroughly general. Though different cultures and subcultures may have very different moral codes, universally there is a sense of obligation, which reflects the immanent dynamic of the pure desire to know that seeks to express what is known in ways that are consistent with that knowledge.

In conclusion, Lonergan's account of the will shows itself to be implicitly intellectualistic, giving priority to the intellect over the will. Action can only be
rational, and so moral, to the extent that the will is governed by the intellect, which is associated with a speculative knowledge of reality. While Lonergan’s discussion is clear on this point, it does raise a question that is not yet resolved: if morality is a matter of choosing to realize in one’s life a higher order and this possible higher order is discerned by practical intelligence, then why is the knowledge expressed in moral action speculative rather than practical? What is the relationship between practical inquiry into what might be done and the speculative knowledge of what ought to be done? This is a question to be addressed below in considering Lonergan’s account of practical intelligence.

3. The Notion of Value and the Method of Ethics

The purpose of Lonergan’s discussion of the concept of value is to show that his account of the tripartite structure of the good and his analysis of value make possible a hierarchical ordination of values and so provide the basis for a moral code. For that reason, it will discussed together with his following theme, the method of ethics.

In general terms, value is defined as the object of rational choice. That is, it is an intelligent order or a particular, empirical good subsumed under a rational order insofar as that order is judged to be good. More specifically, Lonergan presents an analysis of value in terms of three divisions. Values can be specified as true or false depending on whether they are sincerely rational or are simply the product of inauthenticity. Values can also be distinguished as either originating or terminal. Terminal values are things or goals that can be chosen. Originating values are those internal to the subject, things that condition one’s "habitual willingness" and one’s "effective orientation in the universe" such that one contributes to progress. Precisely what he means is not made clear within the narrow confines of this discussion. He does mention that they ground good will, and so it is likely that originating values are the three theological
virtues—faith, hope and love—which make effective human freedom and good will. Finally, values can be specified as actual, in process, or in prospect depending on whether they are goals that have been already achieved, are being realized or simply considered. These three ways of specifying values come together in any particular value, so that one can have a false, actual, terminal value such as a stolen necklace, or a true, prospective, originating value such as a potential act of love.

Value implies order and order in turn implies hierarchy. Because one can only have value in the context of a good of order, it follows that, independent of a good of order, all empirical goods are of equal worth. But with the emergence of a good of order, there is a hierarchy of the three levels of good. The good of order has greater value than the satisfaction of individual desires, and value is superior to the good of order, for responsible affirmation and choice make progress possible. Elsewhere, Lonergan adds that within the good of order technology is subordinate to economics, and economics to social welfare.

There is also a hierarchical order among terminal values, among specific objects of choice. Lonergan speaks of a terminal value being an intelligible order. The cosmic order can be seen as an extended series of orders nested within orders, and the relative value of any given object or intelligible order reflects its place in the overall scheme. Within this hierarchy of orders "some of these orders include others, some are conditioning and others conditioned, some conditions are more general and others less." Generally, relative worth among values is determined by relationships of inclusion and dependence; the whole is superior to the part, and that upon which something depends is superior to that which depends upon it. For example, the good of a person being physically nourished depends in an urban setting upon the good of the economic processes which make possible an income as well as the maintenance of food stores, wholesale suppliers and systems of transportation. Therefore, a stable economy
is a superior value in that it is the whole of which the satisfaction of individual need is a part, and it is the condition upon which individual satisfaction depends. The same principle explains the superiority of originating values to terminal values, for the choice of terminal values depends on good will, and good will depends on originating values.

Because innate rationality naturally moves us both to an intelligent ordering of satisfactions and to consistency between our knowing and our doing, it is the basis for the development of a moral code. It is a natural feature of the human condition that even before we take responsibility for our moral choices, we have spontaneous desires, order them in such a way that they can be best satisfied, and experience the sense of obligation to act according to our knowledge. Since desire, understanding and rationality conspire to make us choose, we have no choice but to choose, and by taking responsibility for our choices we can make better—i.e., more rational—choices. Furthermore, the pure desire to know presses toward complete consistency between knowing and doing, and this implies that choice is made within an intelligible order that recognizes a hierarchy between values. One cannot choose the part and the neglect the whole, or choose that which depends upon some other or higher value without also choosing the value upon which it depends. Through the clear formulation of these orders—the relationships of part and whole, condition and conditioned—one can determine a system of ethical principles.

Lonergan’s discussion at this point turns to the method of ethics. He sees two implications of this approach to ethics. The first is "a conclusion of fundamental importance, namely, the parallel and interpenetration of metaphysics and ethics." Just as metaphysics has a sure and unshifting foundation in the structured dynamic of consciousness, ethics stands securely upon this same foundation. Because the threefold structure of the good parallels that of the true, the ethics that emerges from this perspective has the same virtue as the
metaphysics grounded in his account of knowledge: with the passing of time it can be confirmed, developed and enriched due to its coherence with reality. Ethical systems are like scientific theories: true theories progressively prove themselves by their ability to accommodate new data, false ones eventually falter because of their inability to account for new information. Similarly, the validity of an ethical order, over against less integrated or less rational orders, is attested by its ability to stand the test of time, for inferior orders yield a collective frustration that inevitably lead to their undoing.

The second implication of this approach to ethics is that, because the basis for ethics is to be found in the universal and immanent dynamism of the human spirit, there emerges the possibility of an ethics that avoids the extremes of relativism and legalism. If individuals properly exercise their responsibility, they will base their actions on judgments of what is the truly good thing to do in the given situation. This does not mean that all such judgments will be good. Yet, where there is openness to the inner, spiritual dynamic, such judgments will be self-correcting as one learns from mistakes and becomes a more prudent judge. One's judgments are also open to dialectical criticism, which reveals the blindspots in one's self-knowledge. So one can give due weight to the importance of ever-changing situational factors without embracing the relativism of a purely situational ethic. Legalism, on the other hand, is associated with principles that are remote and static generalities. As remote, they lack any nuanced sensitivity to the concrete situation. As static, they are incapable of addressing the changes that characterize concrete actuality. As generalities, they do not offer a concrete good that defines the practical possibilities of the specific situation. So basing ethics on the immanent dynamism of the spirit provides a way of keeping ethics rooted in the particularity of concrete situations without losing the appeal to higher principles, which keeps it from degenerating into relativism.

In summary, the dynamic structure of the spirit provides an immanent
basis for ethics. Its structure provides a principle that determines the distinction between empirical goods and values, and between higher and lower values. As an expression of the indeterminate finality of nature, the rational validity of an intelligent order is sustained by its openness to development, while less valid orders undo themselves by their inability to sustain social progress and the satisfaction of empirical desires. Because the dynamic is immanent, it ultimately appeals to and relies upon individual conscience. Because it is universal, there is a basis for challenging less adequate orders and for criticizing the choices of responsible (and irresponsible) individuals.

4. The Ontology of the Good

In this discussion Lonergan seeks to show that his account of the good can be brought to the defense of the goodness of ‘being’. He builds here upon the parallel between metaphysics and ethics. Metaphysics affirms that ‘being’ is an intelligible unity; the threefold structure of the good provides a way of affirming that being is also good.

Lonergan’s argument for the goodness of being begins from the premise that the objects of desire are good because of the satisfactions they yield. On this basis he builds his case that all of being must be good:

If objects of desire are instances of the good because of the satisfactions they yield, then the rest of the manifold of existences and events also are a good, because desires are satisfied not in some dreamland but only in the concrete universe. ...
If the intelligible orders of human invention are a good because they systematically assure the satisfaction of desires, then so also are the intelligible orders that underlie, condition, precede, and include man’s invention.77

Implicit in this argument is the demand of rational consistency that one cannot embrace the part apart from the whole, or the conditioned apart from the conditions on which it depends. To affirm that the satisfaction of empirical desires is good necessarily implies that the goods of order are also good, for they systematize the satisfaction of desire, and so facilitate and sustain recurrent
satisfactions for more people.

Lonergan recognizes that one might argue there is much in the cosmos that is neither directly desired nor immediately relevant to the intelligent ordering of desire. Nevertheless, the universal order—that is, what has come to exist, what potentially could come into being, and the very nature of nature as emergent probability—is good, for it is the necessary condition of every possible good. Both the intelligible natural order and the intelligent human orders that exploit the natural order are expressions of nature’s expansive fertility, which seeks the full and harmonious realization of its own potential. This natural order both corrects and develops the intelligent orders in which and by which humans seek satisfaction. Beliefs, understandings, and choices that do not accord with the actual order of the universe eventually prove themselves inadequate, while those that do prove adequate accord with and enhance the expansiveness of the universal order. Therefore, nature is good because it is the necessary condition of the satisfaction of desire, and because it provides the impetus and the guidance for the orderly satisfaction of human desires. By the same argument, being itself is good, for it is the ultimate condition upon which the satisfaction of desire and the formulation of intelligible orders depends.

It follows, then, that in every rational choice, there is an implicit choosing of being. For one cannot rationally choose to satisfy a desire without an implicit affirmation that being itself is good. Being is the ultimate condition upon which every other order and satisfaction depend. Being, therefore, is the highest value.

A strong theme in Lonergan’s discussion is that the goodness of being is identical with its intelligibility. That is, being is good insofar as it is intelligible. As we saw in Chapter II, being is identical to the intelligible. Even so, the goodness of being is identical to its intelligibility. That is, its goodness is known intelligently and rationally. Lonergan says:

"it will not be amiss to assert emphatically that the identification of being and the
good by-passes human feelings and sentiments to take its stand exclusively upon intelligible order and rational value.  

The goodness of being is not known affectively, for feelings and sentiments only know the goodness of empirical goods. The goodness of the intelligent orders which harmonize these empirical goods, and the goodness of the total manifold of existent things, which make both empirical goods and goods of order possible, are known only through intelligence and rational judgment.

The affirmation of the goodness of being neither denies nor overlooks the existence of evil and suffering in the world. Because goodness is identified with the intelligibility of being, goodness can be affirmed in the face of evil just as intelligibility can be affirmed in spite of much that is not understood and much that is irrational. In some ways the world is still an unordered manifold in which an intelligible order has yet to emerge, and its goodness resides in its potential for these possible orders. In other ways the order which has been realized is immature, needing further development, and the goodness of the world is implicit in its capacity for maturity. In still other ways, the potential order of the social world is distorted by irrationality, and the goodness of being is a matter of the inability of evil to sustain itself and grow; the nature of the world is such that only the good is sustained and developed over the course of history. In this way Lonergan finds in his account of the threefold structure of value a basis for affirming the goodness of being.

B. Practical intelligence

The second section of Chapter XVIII, "The Notion of Freedom," presents Lonergan's explanation of free will, but our concern is specifically with the account of practical intelligence upon which his explanation depends. He presents an analysis of practical rationality in order to show how the free act of deciding has its antecedents in practical understanding and deliberation, and yet, because
choice is not strictly determined by them, choice is both rational and free. Our purpose, however, is twofold: to understand the relationship between practical and speculative intelligence, and to probe deeper into the question of how moral obligation depends upon speculative knowledge. Both of these issues serve to clarify the nature of the fourth level of consciousness that was introduced in "The notion of will." This in turn is important for understanding the intellectualism of Lonergan’s earlier position and its difference from his later position. As we will see, in Insight practical and speculative intelligence are treated as parallel processes, with the relationship between them left generally unspecified except in the case of obligation, where a specific practical choice is demanded by a determinate, speculative knowledge of obligation. In Lonergan’s mature thought he will relate them serially so that practical, existential concern is no longer parallel but becomes a fourth level of consciousness beyond the three levels of speculative consciousness.

1. The parallel of practical and speculative intelligence

Lonergan’s account of practical intelligence in Insight shows it as having a parallel structure to that of speculative intelligence, for practical intelligence is explained in terms of the ‘underlying sensitive flow’, practical insight, practical reflection, and decision, which mirrors the structure of experience, factual insight, speculative reflection and judgment. We begin by considering this parallel structure in practical intelligence.

While the structural parallel is explicit and straightforward, Lonergan’s account of practical intelligence is rendered somewhat confusing by his formulation of moral decision as having a four-level structure, with rational self-consciousness being a fourth level beyond the level of rational consciousness. The confusion arises specifically in his definition of rational self-consciousness and its relation to rational consciousness. On one hand, rational self-conscious-
ness expresses itself in practical deliberation and arises out of the intelligent consciousness of practical insight; on the other it is expressed in moral decision and arises out of speculative rational consciousness. The confusion can be resolved, however, by understanding that rational consciousness arises within rational self-consciousness, within what is otherwise a process of practical intelligence, and that the role of rational consciousness is to mediate the knowledge of duty.

a. Practical and speculative intelligence

Like speculative intelligence, practical intelligence operates through a hierarchy of levels in which an underlying manifold is unified by insight, reflected upon by reason and rationally chosen. The 'underlying sensitive flow' is to practical insight what experience is to speculative insight, the unorganized manifold upon which intelligence imposes a higher integration. Whereas experience is an unorganized manifold of just perception and imagination, the sensitive flow includes these as well as feelings and acts that reflect the psyche's sensitive spontaneity. These acts express nothing more than 'sensitive routine', and so they cannot be rational and free unless they are brought within an a higher, intelligent order.39 We will have occasion at a later point to consider the nature of these acts in more detail.

Practical insight is the grasp of possible goals, actions, and higher integrations of spontaneous acts. Like speculative insight it fulfills a desire to grasp intelligible unities (i.e., things) and correlations between things, but in practical insight these things and correlations are goals to be realized. What distinguishes the two kinds of insight is simply their orienting concern, for the speculative is concerned with a knowledge of being, and the practical with the making of being; the one is concerned with things and correlations that already exist, the other with things and correlations that might be brought into existence.
Where speculative insight leads to reflection in order to discern the truth of one’s insight, practical insight leads to reflection, or deliberation, in order that one’s acts might be well-grounded. Practical reflection asks two kinds of questions: one pertains to the object of choice and seeks to know it more clearly, the other considers the motives, evaluating whether it should be chosen. Questions dealing with the object may involve deliberation over whether the intelligently conceived object is truly possible, how the goal is to be accomplished, or what its feasibility and consequences are. Questions regarding motives consider the goodness of the goal and the means: are the end and means agreeable, useful, or valuable. Questions of motive also consider whether the values involved are true values—that is, whether one is being authentic and reasonable or merely selfish—and whether one has considered the long range implications of one’s choice. Practical deliberation is also responsible for determining whether a course of action is obligatory.\(^{40}\)

Finally, as the judgment of truth concludes speculative reflection, so practical decision concludes practical reflection. Judgment and decision are alike in some ways but unalike in one important respect. They are alike in that both deal with a simple yes or no choice; decision consents to or refuses a course of action in the same way that judgment concludes a yes or a no regarding the validity of an insight. Both are rational in that they rely on insight and reflection. Just as speculative rationality is compelled to affirm truth when it is recognized that one’s understanding is fully adequate to the phenomenon to be understood, even so is practical rationality compelled to choose in accord with what is known to be true. Both deal with actuality, but judgment considers something that already actually exists while decision addresses whether a proposed action or goal will be actualized.

The significant difference between them is that speculative judgment is a matter of rational consciousness but practical decision expresses rational self-
consciousness. Rational consciousness is a matter of speculative intelligence, the product of the desire to know, but decision is rational only to the extent that it conforms to the rational demand of rational consciousness: "the rationality of decision emerges in the demand of the rationally conscious subject for consistency between his knowing and his deciding and doing."\textsuperscript{41} Rational self-consciousness is characterized as the final enlargement of consciousness, the end of a continuum that runs from dreaming, through waking, the inquiry of intelligent consciousness, the critical reflection of rational consciousness, to rational self-consciousness. The meaning of rational self-consciousness, however, is not immediately clear, and to its clarification we now turn.

\textit{b. The meaning of rational self-consciousness}

The reason for the lack of clarity regarding rational self-consciousness is that both practical reflection and practical decision constitute rational self-consciousness, yet their unity is confused by their relation to rational consciousness. Though it is quite clear that with speculative intelligence both reflection and judgment together constitute rational consciousness, the unity of practical reflection and decision is not so straightforward. For rational self-consciousness in its expression as practical deliberation, which determines obligation, depends upon practical insight (i.e., \textit{practical intelligent} consciousness), yet rational self-consciousness in its expression as moral decision arises from \textit{speculative rational} consciousness. There seem to be two different perspectives operative in Lonergan's treatment of rational self-consciousness and these two perspectives are not clearly integrated. I will begin by clarifying these two perspectives and the differences between them, and then argue that the two can be integrated by recognizing that rational consciousness emerges within practical intelligence, within rational self-consciousness, and so it mediates between practical deliberation and decision.
The first perspective focuses on rational self-consciousness as practical deliberation. Deliberation is rational self-consciousness rather than rational consciousness because it is concerned with acting rather than knowing, and to this end one deliberates about the object and the motives of one's possible choices. However, practical deliberation does not arise out of rational consciousness, but rather follows upon practical insight, as is evident in the very structure of Lonergan's discussion of practical intelligence. Because of this, there is a sense in which rational self-consciousness (as deliberation) seems to parallel rational consciousness as a practical expression of third level consciousness. The apparent parallel is supported by the fact that in defining value as the third level in the tripartite structure of the good, Lonergan associates this third level with deliberation and choice. In "The Role of the Catholic University" the speculative judgment of fact finds its practical parallel in the judgment of value and decision. In Insight also Lonergan affirms that value as a third kind of good "emerges on the level of reflection and judgment, of deliberation and choice." The sentence structure here implies that deliberation and choice occupy the same level as reflection and judgment, though reflection and judgment are rational consciousness and deliberation and choice are rational self-consciousness. Such passages suggest that rational self-consciousness (deliberation and choice) is a practical expression of the third level of consciousness, parallel to the speculative expression of the third level. The explanation of this perspective is to be found in Lonergan's concern to maintain the tripartite parallel of being and the good, of metaphysics and ethics. The fact that, in writing Insight, Lonergan originally intended to deal with 'The notion of the good' and 'The notion of freedom' only as sub-topics under the rubric, 'The deepening of metaphysics', shows how central this parallel was in his thought. The strong threefold parallel is not surprising in this light, and one is led to wonder how the four-fold structure of obligation relates to Lonergan's account of the threefold good.
The second perspective focuses on rational self-consciousness as moral decision. According to this perspective, rational self-consciousness emerges specifically with the act of decision, not with deliberation.\textsuperscript{46} Rational self-consciousness emerges from rational consciousness in the shift from knowing an obligation (i.e., rational consciousness) to choosing to fulfill it. This perspective is reflected in Lonergan's summary of practical action:

> For the higher integration effected on the level of human living consists of sets of courses of action, and these actions emerge inasmuch as they are understood by intelligent consciousness, evaluated by rational consciousness, and willed by rational self-consciousness.\textsuperscript{47}

Here evaluation belongs to rational consciousness—not to practical reflection—and beyond evaluation rational self-consciousness simply introduces the element of decision. \textit{Understanding and Being} makes this position clearer. As a rational knower, one can say what ought to be done or what another person should do, but with rational self-consciousness the question turns to whether one will personally do what ought to be done.\textsuperscript{48} In rational consciousness one knows that a certain action has a claim on people in general; in rational self-consciousness one takes seriously that claim on one's own choosing.

If the previous perspective reflects Lonergan's focus on the tripartite structure of the good, this perspective expresses Lonergan's concern with obligation as an extension of rational, speculative knowledge, which in turn follows from his ethical intellectualism.\textsuperscript{49} The will's decision must be governed by a determinate knowledge of obligation, which is rational consciousness. Note that the discussion of rational self-consciousness as a fourth level process arises only in the context of moral obligation. It is there that he regularly speaks of the 'demand' for consistency between knowing and doing (or the 'demand' for conformity of doing to knowing) and the 'extension' of the field of knowledge into the field of deliberate human acts:

\textit{O}ne's own rational consciousness is an accomplished fact in the field of knowing and it demands in the name of its own consistency its extension into the field of...
The felt sense of obligation or duty is the demand that knowing imposes upon doing, for knowing implies the recognition of the rational necessity of a certain act. So whenever Lonergan speaks of an extension of rational consciousness into rational self-consciousness, this needs to be understood narrowly in terms of the shift from knowing one's duty to choosing in accord with one's duty, for in this context rational consciousness is identified specifically with the determinate knowledge of obligation.

What these two perspectives on rational self-consciousness share is that both deal with the spiritual dynamic that presses for conformity between knowing and doing. What distinguishes them from each other—though Lonergan does not make this explicit—is that the relationship between knowing and doing is different in practical deliberation and in moral decision. In the first perspective deliberation expresses the exigence toward conformity between knowing and doing in that it seeks to determine knowledge in order to act. That is, after grasping a practical possibility, one seeks to know what, how and why so that one's doing might be informed by one's knowing: "Reflection occurs because rational self-consciousness demands knowledge of what one proposes to do and of the reasons one has for doing it." So practical deliberation can not take its point of departure from rational consciousness—that is, from knowing—but rather it is prompted toward knowing and acting on the basis of the intelligent consciousness of practical insight. In moral decision, however, there is already a determinate knowledge of what one must do, and that determinate knowledge is a matter of rational consciousness. Here rational self-consciousness emerges from rational consciousness because of the demand of knowing upon doing. The knowledge of obligation in rational consciousness, calls forth the higher resolution achieved only through deciding to fulfill one's obligation.

These two perspectives can be brought together by recognizing that the
knowledge of obligation is determined through practical reflection. In other words, rational consciousness emerges within rational self-consciousness between practical reflection and moral decision, for it is determined by reflection and in turn it grounds decision.

It is possible for practical reflection to reach with certitude the conclusion that a proposed course of action is obligatory, that either I decide in favour of the proposal or else I surrender consistency between my knowing and my doing. Now in such instances it is apparent that the emergence of an obligation is the emergence of a rational necessity in rational consciousness.

The speculative knowledge of obligation arises out of practical deliberation and mediates the demand of knowing on choosing.

When it is recognized that rational consciousness emerges within rational self-consciousness between reflection and decision, we are in a better position to understand that Lonergan’s description of an exigence through four levels of consciousness is not a process in which the first three levels are speculative and the fourth practical. Rather the fourfold dynamic from empirical consciousness to rational self-consciousness expresses a practical exigence. The following passage makes this clear:

An account of freedom has to turn to a study of intellect and will. In the coincidental manifolds of sensible presentations, practical insights grasp possible courses of action that are examined by reflection, decided upon by acts of willing and thereby either are or are not realized in the underlying sensitive flow. In this process there is to be discerned the emergence of elements of a higher integration. For the higher integration effected on the level of human living consists of sets of courses of action, and these actions emerge inasmuch as they are understood by intelligent consciousness, evaluated by rational consciousness, and willed by rational self-consciousness.

Empirical and intelligent consciousness here occur within a practical pattern of experience. Rational consciousness, representing speculative knowledge, intrudes into this otherwise practical process, for Lonergan’s intellectualism requires it. It is apparent from this passage that Lonergan’s previous statement that "... disinterested desire extends its sphere of influence from the field of cognitional activities through the field of knowledge into the field of deliberate human acts," should be understood in the same light. The ‘field of cognitional activities’ is to
be understood as an exercise of practical intelligence, and only the 'field of knowledge' is an expression of speculative intelligence, or rational consciousness. If Lonergan fails to mention that he is speaking of practical intelligence in this progression of levels of consciousness, it is because he is focusing specifically on the fact that it is an intellectual progression, not on its practical nature. In short, the fourfold exigence in the text cited above must be understood as a practical exigence that parallels the threefold speculative exigence. The only twist in the parallel is that Lonergan's intellectualism requires that speculative knowledge mediate the determination of obligation by practical reflection and the act of will in moral decision.

2. The speculative knowledge of obligation

A significant remaining question is why the knowledge of moral obligation is a matter of speculative knowledge. The fact that obligation is determined by practical reflection throws the present question into relief, for, as we will see later, Lonergan's account of the determination of obligation is quite Kantian—practical reason discerns objective, universalizable maxims—but Kant does not identify the knowledge of duty as speculative. Indeed, as we have seen, this is precisely the point on which Lonergan distances himself from Kant's understanding of obligation. Lonergan's insistance on the major premise of the practical syllogism being a matter of speculative intelligence is important for his defense of intellectualism. So why does Lonergan's intellectualism require that the knowledge of obligation be speculative knowledge?

I believe the reason is to be found in the fact that Lonergan associates certainty uniquely with rational consciousness. However, this is a matter of interpretation, rendered tentative by Lonergan's ambiguous treatment of the relationship between practical reflection and cognitive certainty.

The ambiguity surfaces in the question of whether practical reflection has
an 'internal term', a cognitive resolution in the judgment of truth and certainty, prior to its practical resolution in decision and action. The ambiguity is apparent in the following passage.

... [T]hough [practical] reflection heads beyond knowing to doing, still it consists simply in knowing. Thus, it may reveal that the proposed action is concretely possible, clearly effective, highly agreeable, quite useful, morally obligatory, etc. But it is one thing to know exactly what could be done and all the reasons for doing it. It is quite another for such knowledge to issue in doing.

... [Practical] reflection has no internal term, no capacity of its own to come to an end. For it is a knowing that leads to doing. In so far as it is a knowing, it can reach an internal term, for one can grasp the virtually unconditioned and thereby attain certitude on the possibility of a proposed course of action, on its agreeableness, on its utility, on its obligatoriness. But in so far as this knowing is practical, in so far as its concern is with something to be done and with the reasons for doing it, the reflection has not an internal but an external term; for the reflection is just knowing, but the term is an ulterior deciding and doing. 55

The main point of denying that practical reflection has an internal term is to emphasize that it is properly resolved only by practical deciding and not by cognitive certainty. Yet certainty may indeed emerge prior to deciding, for one may know how possible or morally necessary an act is. So the place of certainty in practical reflection is rendered ambiguous by an apparent contradiction: though reflection has no internal term, it can reach an internal term "in so far as it is a knowing," but reflection "consists simply in knowing."

One way of dealing with this ambiguity is to posit that practical reflection reaches an internal term only when rational consciousness emerges within reflection. This position draws support from the fact that Lonergan distinguishes practical reflection from rational consciousness precisely on the grounds that reflection lacks, and rational consciousness has, an internal term:

If [practical reflection] were concerned simply with knowing what the proposed course of action is and what are the motives in its favour, it would be an activity of rational consciousness and would possess an internal term in certain judgments upon the object and the motives of the proposed action. But practical reflection is concerned with knowing only in order to guide doing. 56

The association here of rational consciousness with an internal term, suggests that inasmuch as certainty regarding a proposed act arises within reflection, this
certainty is a matter of rational consciousness.

Certainty is uniquely a matter of rational consciousness because of the association of rational consciousness with the 'virtually unconditioned'. Lonergan brings this out indirectly in the context of contrasting the difference between speculative and practical insights. He notes that rational consciousness can discern a virtually unconditioned when speculative insight is correct, but practical reflection cannot, for practical insight deals with possibility, not with actuality. Only what is real can be true and certain. This, I would suggest, is why practical reflection cannot reach an internal term, or certain knowledge. And yet, there can be certainty with regards to possibility, for one can know that a course of action is certainly possible, useful, or obligatory, and this requires that one know what is—in some sense—actually the case. Though the course of action is only possible and not yet actual, the possibility, utility or moral necessity of the action is in some sense real. Since Lonergan affirms that practical reflection has no internal term, and since the knowledge of certainty that emerges within practical reflection can reach an internal term, it seems reasonable to conclude that such certainty, being in some sense a knowledge of reality, is a matter of rational consciousness emerging within reflective rational self-consciousness.

If this interpretation is correct, the knowledge of moral obligation is a matter of rational consciousness simply because it is a matter of certainty, and all certainty reflects the speculative orientation of rational consciousness, even if it arises within the practical framework of rational self-consciousness. So practical reflection gives rise to a certain knowledge of what one ought to do, which in turn demands expression in one's moral choice. In this way rational self-consciousness gives rise to rational consciousness, and rational consciousness in turn demands decision.

There is one significant weakness in this interpretation: to affirm that all certainty emerging from practical deliberation is a matter of rational conscious-
ness implies that all acts predicated upon certainty—even just the certainty of possibility or utility—would be fourth level acts, arising out of rational consciousness. Yet Lonergan only explicitly identifies rational consciousness with the certainty of moral obligation. Whether all practical certainties or just the certainty of moral obligation are associated with rational consciousness, the fact that Lonergan only explicitly links moral duty with rational consciousness is evidence that his primary concern is with grounding obligation in speculative intelligence. For Lonergan the dependence of rational self-consciousness upon rational consciousness is only significant as it relates to a known moral duty expressing itself in decision. In summary, Lonergan presents practical rationality as a parallel process to speculative rationality, having the same basic structure. Nevertheless, in moral obligation rational consciousness emerges within rational self-consciousness so that moral decision has a fourfold structure.

There are two important points in our analysis of Lonergan’s account of practical intelligence. First, Lonergan’s account of a fourfold exigence from empirical consciousness to rational self-consciousness is to be understood as a practical exigence. It is not a speculative exigence from empirical consciousness to rational consciousness followed by a transition to practical concern in rational self-consciousness. As we will see, this differs significantly from Lonergan’s mature formulation of the fourfold structure of intentionality. Second, the ‘intrusion’ of rational consciousness into an otherwise practical exigence, is indicative of Lonergan’s commitment to intellectualism, a position which his mature formulation purposely seeks to negate.

C. Conclusion

Lonergan’s early formulation of the foundation for systematic ethics has two central features: its tripartite structure of the good and its ethical intellectual-
ism. The threefold structure of the good is important for three reasons. First, Lonergan sees it as providing a secure foundation for ethics, for it establishes a parallel between metaphysics and ethics, both of which are grounded in the structure of human knowing and in the finalistic dynamic of emergent probability. The correlation of the structure of knowing, being, and the good supports the conviction that this structure is both true and explanatory. Second, it provides a theoretical framework for defending the goodness of being, identifying the goodness of being with its intelligibility.

Third, and most importantly I believe, is that Lonergan’s tripartite good provides a basis for an account of ethical and social progress. He brings the issue of social progress to the very center of the discussion of ethics. The ordering of human desire and human society to promote an ever fuller, an ever more secure satisfaction of desires, provides the basic context for ethics. So the rational good participates in the indeterminacy of emergent probability, of which history is a social expression. Human history becomes identified with the human good. To seek the good is to seek it in society and history through individual responsibility, in the victory of social progress over decline. Within this framework one can argue for an evolution of value, for value is determined within the context of an encompassing order, and the judgment of the best possible ordering of society is open to historical change as new insights emerge. The knowledge of value can develop—or decline.

Lonergan’s ethical intellectualism is a central theme of his defense of the possibility of ethics. Speculative knowledge determines the act of moral decision in the sense that it specifies what ought to be done. The rationality of knowing an obligation demands that one’s choice conform to one’s knowledge. The universality of a sense of obligation is taken as evidence of our native rationality extending its domain from the realm of knowing into that of doing.

To this point, our examination of Lonergan’s account of value and ethics
has been superficial. A deeper understanding requires that we consider the
assumptions that find expression in Lonergan’s account of value, for by
discerning Lonergan’s reliance on Thomas’ ethical intellectualism and his tacit
agreement with a Kantian ethical formalism, we lay a basis for appreciating just
how radically his position changes with its mature formulation.
Chapter IV. Intellectualism and Formalism in Insight

This chapter continues the exploration of Lonergan’s early ethical position as part of the larger argument that Lonergan’s thought underwent a significant change between Insight and Method. Specifically, this chapter will show that his early position reflects both Thomas’ intellectualism and a Kantian formalism, preparing us to recognize in Chapter V how Lonergan’s mature position goes beyond both. For his formulation of the nature of rational self-consciousness and its relationship to rational consciousness implicitly denies both his earlier intellectualism and formalism.

Though Lonergan’s ethical thought is built upon his analysis of the threefold structure of the rational good, a foundation that is uniquely his own, it is apparent that he embraces elements of two different traditions, for both Thomistic and Kantian influences meet in his account of the rational good. Thomas and Kant represent two different and divergent approaches to defining how the good is rational. Thomas reflects the classical position, which considered the rational good to be materially good—i.e., the rational good is an object of rational desire. Kant sought to refute this position, formulating an alternative in which the rational good is formally good—i.e., the rational good is a principle or duty to which desire is irrelevant. Relative to these two positions Lonergan’s explicit intellectualism follows Thomas and as such is directed against Kant. Yet in a fundamental way his position is closer to Kant’s in that it assumes the rational good to be formally rather than materially good.

To set the context for considering the Thomistic and Kantian elements in Lonergan’s ethical position, a brief summary of the distinctive differences between Thomas and Kant will clarify the central issues. Before considering how
Lonergan's thought manifests a strong formalism, it needs to be shown that he draws from both a Thomistic and a Kantian framework in a way that lacks systematic integration. Recognizing this will help us to see that, in spite of a Thomistic element in Lonergan, the Kantian element is predominant. This predominance is rooted in the definitions operative in his analysis of the three-fold structure of the rational good. It is evident in his understanding of all spontaneous desires as non-rational, in the formalism and tacit utilitarianism to which it leads, and finally in Lonergan's account of good will as disinterested. These themes all rely on the disjunction between reason and desire, which is the basic premise of Kant's own ethical formalism. In one regard, however, Lonergan follows Thomas closely, for his ethical intellectualism is clearly derived from Thomas. His early notion of rational self-consciousness as a fourth level of consciousness is a direct transposition of Thomas' account of love emerging in the will from knowledge in the intellect.

A. Thomas and Kant on the Rational Good

Thomas and Kant agree in associating ethics with the pursuit of a rational good and with practical rationality, but that is the extent of their agreement. They disagree in their answers to a number of questions: Is the rational good materially or formally good; that is, is the rational good good because it satisfies a rational, teleological longing for human fulfillment or because it satisfies rational, formal criteria? To what extent is human action rational and, therefore, moral? Is there any natural order and priority among the goods that humans spontaneously desire?

Thomas represents the classical conviction that the rational good is materially good. A material good is a particular object or goal that evokes desire and a rational material good is one that is evokes desire because it is intellectually known to be good. Justice, courage, and the other virtues exemplify rational
goods, for their goodness is discerned by the intellect. Not all material goods are rational goods, for there are also sensitive desires, such as desires for food and drink, sex, and sensual pleasure. Yet ethics is specifically concerned with choices informed by rational material goods.

Thomas’ perspective is inherently teleological. This is true in the sense that the awareness of a goal motivates, and so initiates, the process of attaining the goal. More importantly, however, his position is also teleological in the sense that an object is desired because it fulfills or perfects the desirer. A thing’s nature is fulfilled in realizing its potential perfection, and in human nature both sensitive and rational desires are oriented to what brings about this perfection. Sensitive desires seek fulfillment of the animal aspect of human nature, for humans desire sustenance, procreation and pleasure in common with all animals. Rational desires seek the fulfillment of what is uniquely human, and the intellect apprehends an object as good insofar as the object promotes a specifically human perfection—the life of virtue and the contemplation of God. So it is that sustenance, health, happiness, virtue, etc. are rationally and intuitively known to be good, for they are implicated in the fulfillment of human nature.

Within this perspective all intentional, or motivated, acts are matters of rational choice, even if they are motivated by sensitive desire. Though desire may be merely sensitive, it cannot lead to intentional action unless reason discerns the goodness of the end. The desire for a piece of cake is not a rational one per se, but one cannot choose to take and eat that piece of cake unless reason discerns it to be a fulfilling act.

Again, all intentional acts are rational, even if they are bad choices. To clarify this one might distinguish between acts being either formally or actually rational. All intentional acts are formally rational in that they intend an apparent good, something that appears to fulfill the actor. To choose what is truly good and fulfilling is actually rational and not merely formally rational. So for Thomas
all intentional human action is rational, for it is a response to a good, even if that good is only apparently and not actually good.

Thomas' position implies that all intentional action, because it is rational, has a moral context, even when particular actions are not directly concerned with moral ends. For example, sculpting a statue is not a moral act, but it occurs within a broader framework which constitutes its moral context, for it cannot be divorced from considerations such as the broader social purpose of the work, or whether the sculptor is ignoring his or her family's welfare in the act of sculpting. All specific ends are nested within orders of increasingly general ends, and ultimately the most general ends are the principles of natural law, the first principles of moral action. Most generally the principle of natural law is "The good is to be done and pursued and evil avoided." This yields three more specific fundamental principles: One ought to preserve one's existence, provide for the nurture and education of one's family, and know God and live well (i.e., virtuously) in society. These three obligations express the most basic moral imperatives, and at the same time they articulate the basic kinds of fulfillment that humans—as physical, animal and rational beings—are naturally inclined towards. To the extent that one's specific intentional acts do serve and preserve these most basic desires or imperatives, the good one seeks is actually good.

There is an order among the desires for fulfillment, and rational desire has priority over the others. The human good depends upon satisfying the three different kinds of natural inclination, but rational inclination has priority, for this is the uniquely human aspect of human fulfillment. It is the kind of satisfaction most fitting to our nature. Also, reason enters into the lower orders of inclination, transforming them into human concerns. Through reason the desire for self-preservation enters into the human good, so that it is harmonized with and subordinated to other moral concerns. So rational inclination has a natural priority because it is the proper expression of human nature and is the source of
order among the diverse natural inclinations.

According to this teleological perspective, one does not deliberate about ends but only about the means of attaining them. The notion that there exist first principles of action implies that the multitude of human desires are ultimately informed by certain fundamental goods or ends, and these ends are rationally apprehended even though one may not consciously reflect upon what they are. To explain why one is doing a specific act one can follow a chain of purposes until one arrives at an ultimate, irreducible purpose or goal. For example, a woman studies hard in order to do well in school, in order to get a good job, in order to spend her life doing the kind of work she enjoys, using her mind and will to the fullest. The final purpose, to enjoy using her mind and will to the fullest, is not something that needs an extrinsic justification, for this is a basic fulfillment of rational human nature. Certain ultimate values or ends are rooted in our very nature and recognized as ultimate, albeit perhaps only implicitly, by reason. It would not make sense to ask why someone is seeking certain ultimate goods such as life or health or virtue, for reason intuits the ultimacy as well as the goodness of these pursuits. One does not deliberate about these ultimate goods but, motivated by them, one deliberates about how to attain them. Though on occasion there may appear to be a conflict between ultimate goods so that one has to deliberate to discern which good has priority, the ultimate goods are themselves given as rational ends rather than being products of rational deliberation.

In summary, Thomas' material ethics asserts that goodness is a matter of desire, and desire a matter of the fulfillment of one's nature. Implicitly all human action—all conscious, intentional, motivated action—is rational, for it intends an object as good and fulfilling, whether it be truly or only apparently so. Accordingly, every intentional action has a moral context and significance, even though it may not be immediately a morally significant act. Rational goods have
a basic priority in human fulfillment, for they are both the apex of human striving and the means of ordering the other goods in which fulfillment consists. Finally, the first principles of practical action, the obligations which define and direct natural desire, are implicit in our choices as givens, as naturally known criteria of the good that need no further justification; so we deliberate not about ultimate goals but only about how to attain them.

Turning now to Kant, we find a rejection of the notion that the moral good is a material good, an object of desire and a source of teleological fulfillment. Kant criticizes such teleological ethics for failing to recognize the distinct character of moral action over against desire-oriented action. In his attempt to understand the nature of ethics and practical reason, he takes his stand on the experience of moral obligation, the immanent sense of a duty that must be fulfilled. Sculpting a statue is something one does because one wants to, but one fulfills a duty because one experiences duty as compelling, regardless of what one wants to do.

Kant’s position, in keeping with the Newtonian scientific paradigm, is purposely anti-teleological. He rejected the notion that things move according to an immanent desire for fulfillment; things proceed, rather, according to rational, formal laws. So moral goodness is not concerned with the satisfaction of human fulfillment; it is a matter of conforming to a formal law, a law that satisfies a rational criterion. The criterion is: can the action be formulated as a universalizable maxim or law? This is Kant’s categorical imperative: one’s actions should conform to a principle that is applicable to and binding on any person whatsoever in a similar situation. Just as objective truth stands beyond any particular perspective and is true for all, even so practical reason finds an objective morality in those actions which are binding upon all. The desire for a particular end is only morally relevant in that it prompts practical deliberation, and such deliberation determines universal obligations and prohibitions—i.e., "the moral
law"—and judges whether a desire accords or conflicts with these moral maxims.

Whereas teleological ethics posits that reason is implicit in all action, Kant holds that reason only governs action insofar as action is determined to be morally relevant. One might consider Kant as falling between the two extremes of Thomas and Hume. Hume holds no action is rational, for reason does not determine what should be done but only how desire is to be satisfied—reason is strictly instrumental, the slave of passions; what is often taken as reason is simply a calmer sort of passion. Thomas holds all intentional action to be rational (at least formally) and guided by a fulfilling good. Contrary to Hume, Kant affirms that dispassionate reason can give rise to or prevent action; disinterested reason can know what ought and ought not to be done, and this knowledge can prompt action or resist temptation. Kant affirms that practical reason determines not just how but whether a given desire is to be satisfied, and it does so by referring action to objective criteria. Contrary to Thomas, Kant asserts that only actions known to be obligatory are rational. For Kant all desire is non-rational and non-moral, and so actions that proceed from desire—i.e., all the things one does because one wants to—are non-rational and non-moral. Rational or moral action comes about only as practical reason effects a shift from non-rational desire to the sphere of rational duty, so that it is only in going beyond one's desires to what one is rationally obliged to do that one's acts are rational and ethical.

It follows that the rational principles defining moral goodness, or obligation, are only determined through deliberation, contrary to the classical affirmation that one deliberates only about the means and not the end. Reason does not intuit the teleological goodness of an end, for there are no inherently rational desires.

In summary, Kant sees the moral good strictly as a matter of obligation, where obligation is wholly divorced from desire. The dividing line between rational and non-rational action lies between that which is deliberately determined
to be good and that which is directed to ends that are spontaneously desired, with
the assumption that all desire is spontaneous. Rationality is not implicit in human
action except to the extent that one has deliberately formulated universalizable
maxims that define one's sense of duty.

Though there is little common ground between these two positions, Lonergan embraces elements of both in his early work. He follows Thomas in
affirming an ethical intellectualism. He is more akin to Kant, however, in his
focus on obligation and in his disjunction of reason and desire.

B. Lonergan's Ethical Formalism

Though Lonergan is too much an independent thinker to be considered any
philosopher's disciple, there is much in his early ethical thought that bears a
Kantian stamp, though this may readily be obscured by the Thomistic elements
he preserves within his system. Indeed, the mixture of Thomistic and Kantian
elements in Lonergan's account of ethics renders his position somewhat
ambiguous, for where Thomas would put a premium on the rational good as the
central principle of ethics and Kant on obligation, Lonergan draws upon both
without a systematic integration. These two elements in Lonergan's
thought—value and obligation—need to be clarified at the outset, for unless one
recognizes that Lonergan draws from these two traditions in ways that wax
sometimes Thomistic and other times Kantian, it is easy to overlook that the
central pillar of his position—the threefold structure of the good—reflects a
Kantian dichotomy between reason and desire. After clarifying this ambiguity,
we will consider the three ways in which Lonergan's thought echoes Kant: in his
view that empirical goods are by definition non-rational, in the consequent
implication that the rational good must be formally good and so, ultimately,
utilitarian, and in his understanding of good will as independent of desire. The
latter in particular clarifies the basic factor behind the agreement between
Lonergan and Kant—the dualism they posit between affectivity and rationality.

1. Value and Obligation

Depending on whether one accepts a material or formal account of the rational good, choice can be seen as rational either in the sense that one desires and chooses value, a rationally good end or object, or in the sense that one chooses in accord with obligation, a rational principle. Both senses are present in Lonergan, and the relationship between them is not well defined. This ambiguity derives from the fact that his understanding of value and of obligation is informed by more than one tradition, and his own position moves too easily between them. The definition of value as the object of rational desire and the notion that particular goods or ends can be values have their origin in Thomistic intellectualism. Yet Lonergan's definition of and emphasis on obligation owes much to Kant. The ambiguity of how these two traditions are brought together in Lonergan's system may readily obscure the unique thrust of Lonergan's ethics and its debt to Kantian formalism. Our purpose in this section is to show that both traditions find their way into Lonergan's account of rational, moral choice. This will set the context for a closer examination of his explanation of how the rational good is rational.

As we have seen, Lonergan defines will in *Insight* as intellectual appetite, and affirms that the act of will is moral because it is rational. In the following section he goes on to clarify that the object of will, the rational choice, is value. This implies that willing is moral insofar as it chooses value. Values can be either goods of order—i.e., intelligent systematizations of particular goods—or particular goods within a good of order. A material good can be a value if it is compatible with and chosen within an intelligent order, judged to be good. Though Lonergan's definition of value may be unique, the account of will as an appetite for the rational good reflects a scholastic perspective. Though Lonergan
does not develop this line of thought, it seems to follow from his premises that non-obligatory acts can be moral in the sense that they subordinate amoral, material desires to a rational consideration of a broader social order. If sculpting a bust is a value to the extent that it is subsumed under an intelligent ordering of goods, then to choose to do it is a rational choice and so, in some sense, a moral choice. A moral act may be as much a matter of proper desire as a matter of obligation. Simply put, morality is a matter of choosing a rational good.

Whenever Lonergan speaks of ethics, however, the principal theme of his discussion is obligation. In his parallel between metaphysics and ethics he juxtaposes the "heuristic structure of our knowing" with "the obligatory structure of our rational self-consciousness." Indeed, when will is introduced as rational and so moral in Insight, the point to which the discussion is driving is that obligation reflects the rational demand of knowing upon doing. Lonergan's account of the rationality of decision makes it clear that the knowing he is referring to is the knowledge of obligation. So, generally, Lonergan's treatment of ethics is not a matter of choosing value but of acting in accord with a knowledge of obligation.

Lonergan does not treat these two perspectives as alien to each other, so the question becomes one of how he understands the relationship between value and obligation. Here again we see two different tendencies in Lonergan's work, one which reflects a Thomistic influence, and the other a Kantian one. Sometimes he grounds obligation in the knowledge of value, and so seems rather Thomistic. Yet when he gives an account of how practical deliberation determines obligation, it is quite Kantian.

In Understanding and Being Lonergan grounds the knowledge of obligation in the knowledge of value. As in Insight he bases his affirmation of the possibility of ethics on the fact of obligation, the experience of moral imperatives. The intellect requires certain kinds of choices and excludes others, and to act
rationally one must act in accord with rational judgment, so that "the rationally self-conscious knower and doer cannot be rational without making the choice dictated by practical judgment, judgment upon value."9 Here practical judgment (a term conspicuously absent in Insight, where he insists practical deliberation lacks an internal term) determines not obligation (the focus of Insight's discussion of decision) but value. To know that some order or particular good is a value implies an imperative; it 'dictates a choice'. He says:

One can grasp the existing good of order, the actually functioning good of order, as a value that cannot be replaced overnight. One can see that that good of order has certain implications that cannot be violated without a destruction of the good. ... We considered the good of order in terms of the family, the technology, the economy, the polity, but there is also an immanent good of order in self-developing subject, in the subject who is making himself by his choices. ... The order without and the order within, in concrete practical judgments, can result in the judgment that this is what ought to be concretely, this is what I ought to do, or this is what I ought not to do.10

The 'order without' is a certain concrete order, known to be a value. The 'order within' is the immanent good of order, the individual taking responsibility for his or her moral development, recognizing the need to choose, and the need to choose value. These two orders come together in practical judgment, determining obligation. So judgment determines obligation on the basis of the knowledge of value. While the link between value and obligation is not made explicit, it seems straightforward that knowing one's family is a value obliges one to support and develop it. In such a case, the knowledge of obligation follows from and is implicit in the knowledge of value. One can hear an echo of Thomas in this passage, for it reflects Lonergan's commitment to intellectualism. The rational knowledge of value grounds obligation, and the rational knowledge of obligation grounds the act of will.

In contrast to this, the account of the determination of obligation in Insight is quite Kantian, for there it arises through a process of objectifying and universalizing one's acts. This account is presented most clearly in the explanation of individual bias.11 As we saw in Chapter II, individual bias is the
interference of spontaneous affectivity with intelligence in the process of discerning what one should do. In the context of explaining how moral reflection is short-circuited, Lonergan outlines the natural course of practical intelligence in determining how one should act.

For intelligence is a principle of universalization and of ultimate synthesis; it understands similars in the same manner; and it gives rise to further questions on each issue until all the relevant data are understood.

... Just as in the sciences, intelligence begins from hypotheses that prove insufficient and advances to further hypotheses that successively prove more and more satisfactory, so too in practical living it is through the cumulative process of further questions and further insights that an adequate understanding is achieved. As in the sciences, so also in practical living, individuality pertains to the empirical residue, so that there is not one course of action that is intelligent when I am concerned and quite a different course when anyone else is involved. 12

Since intelligence naturally tends to universalization, practical intelligence has not reached its full term until it arrives at a course of action that is valid for any person in similar circumstances. This implies a process of abstracting both act and actor from their particularity: what is the nature of this particular kind of act, independent of who does it? The notion of stealing, for example, specifies a certain kind of act, for which the question of who is doing it is irrelevant. The act is the same regardless of whether it is done by a king or a beggar, by you or me. This is what is meant by understanding similars alike—any individual in the same circumstances should always pursue the same course of action. Questions naturally arise until the situation and its demands are fully grasped and such a universal perspective is attained. It is through such reasoning that one comes to recognize what one is objectively obliged to do and not to do. So in this passage Lonergan is implicitly affirming Kant's categorical imperative both in the sense of moral obligation being grounded in a rational maxim and also in the sense that the formal principle of the categorical imperative is one of universalizability. This lends substance to Lonergan's assertion that, though his position disagrees with Kant's rejection of intellectualism, it agrees with Kant's affirmation of a categorical imperative.13
It is doubtful that these two accounts of obligation, one depending on the knowledge of value and the other being a matter of formal abstraction, can be fully integrated. However, both are present, and to the extent that one focuses on one aspect or the other, Lonergan’s ethics could be thought to fall within either a scholastic framework or a Kantian one. Acknowledging the presence of both forces us to recognize that Lonergan does not conform wholly to either position, but is working out his own position. The foundation of Lonergan’s own account is his analysis of the threefold structure of the good, which is derived from his account of intelligence as unifying an unordered manifold and as judging this unification according to immanent criteria. Upon this foundation Lonergan appropriates both Kantian and Thomistic elements, but the appropriation is not as systematic as the formulation of foundation. He adopts the Thomistic notion of ethics as grounded in a knowledge of the rational good, and the Kantian notion that ethics is primarily a matter of obligation. The connection between the two perspectives remains vague, and in different contexts he will emphasize one rather than the other.

In light of this ambivalence, a more fruitful approach to understanding Lonergan’s ethics is to examine carefully his foundation, the threefold structure of the good. In particular we need to grasp the sense in which the rational good is rational. As we will see, his definition of the rational good as distinct from empirical desire, owes much to a Kantian formalism.

2. Empirical goods and non-rational acts

There are two ways in which Lonergan’s explanation of empirical goods sounds a Kantian note. First, empirical goods are all non-rational. Second, Lonergan allows that not all intentional action is necessarily deliberate, rational and moral, for empirical goods can themselves prompt human action.

Lonergan’s innovative analysis of the threefold rational good implies a
hierarchical and intelligent ordering of empirical goods, which are themselves non-rational. Empirical goods are distinguished by the fact that they are particular objects of spontaneous desire, and as such they are per se non-rational: "Objects of desire are values only inasmuch as they fall under some intelligible order."\textsuperscript{14} This is most explicit in the fact that not even the spontaneous desire for understanding is counted as an intrinsically rational good, but rather is counted among other empirical goods. In "The Subject" value is distinguished from the goods sought by spontaneous desire: food, drink, union, communion and pleasure. Among these spontaneous desires Lonergan also includes the "appetite for knowledge, or virtue."\textsuperscript{15} As this clearly indicates, knowledge and virtue are not rational goods per se. Knowledge and virtue are empirical goods even though they are desires that make the rational good possible. One might say that the desire which gives rise to value is not a desire informed by rational apprehension but a desire to be rationally informed. So Lonergan’s definition of value as the intelligently ordered and evaluated good, necessarily implies that all empirical goods, all objects of spontaneous desire, are non-rational.

One might bring this into clearer relief by contrasting it with Thomas’ position. He, too, held that reason orders and harmonizes the wealth of natural human inclinations.\textsuperscript{16} Yet he also held that among these goods being ordered there are intrinsically rational goods. Reason is implicated in spontaneous desire, both in the intuition of the goods that fulfill rational human nature and in grasping the material goodness of objects intended by the non-rational aspects of human nature. The intellect, in grasping the goodness of things, also discerns their relative worth and this discernment provides a basis for ordering the manifold of desires. With Lonergan, however, all spontaneous desire is non-rational, and the objects of spontaneous desire become rational only when brought within an intelligent ordering of desires.

The contrast between desire and rationality is pronounced in Lonergan’s
account of the goodness of being, where Lonergan stresses the intelligibility, and thus the objectivity, of the good. The goodness of being is only established at the level of value, the level of rational judgment, not at the level of the empirical good:

'It will not be amiss to assert emphatically that the identification of being and the good by-passes human feelings and sentiments to take its stand exclusively upon intelligible order and rational value.'

The goodness of being is quite unrelated to desire, for feelings and sentiments only pertain to empirical goods. Spontaneous desire and satisfaction are irrelevant to the objective discernment of the rational good.

Lonergan’s notion of non-rational, empirical desire echoes Kant’s account of all material goods as non-rational objects of desire and, as in Kant, this raises the possibility that not all human action is implicitly rational and moral. In spite of Lonergan’s traditional definition of will as intellectual appetite, which suggests the traditional position that all deliberate action is indeed rational and so implicitly moral, I would interpret Lonergan’s position to be closer to Kant’s. For Lonergan suggests that there may be non-rational, yet intentional acts that seek empirical goods. The empirical good can be acted upon independent of a good of order, for the empirical good in and of itself can be a motivating source of intentional human action.

One might argue against this interpretation of Lonergan’s position on the basis that, while there may exist non-rational, empirical goods, they cannot motivate action until they are brought within a good of order and determined to be rational goods—i.e., goods that harmonize with the intelligent order. So, for example, there is no moral significance in seeing and spontaneously desiring a physically attractive member of the opposite sex. Yet one cannot act on this desire without considering it within a broader, moral context: Is that person actually or potentially one’s spouse? Does one want the other’s welfare as well as one’s own? What is the meaning of the other’s welfare (and one’s own) not
only physically considered but also emotionally and spiritually? In this way, amoral desire may be theoretically distinguishable but actually inseparable in practice from a good of order which renders the object of desire a value. This interpretation may find support in Lonergan’s assertion that "sensitive desires and aversions arise spontaneously; their objects cannot be willed until they are subsumed under some intelligible order." According to this interpretation, sensitive desires require an intelligible order before they can be intentionally acted on.

Though this interpretation is plausible, I would argue that Lonergan did not mean to treat empirical goods as theoretically distinct but practically inseparable from a good of order. The distinction between empirical goods and goods of order corresponds to the distinction between intersubjective community and civil community, which in turn rests on the distinction between the spontaneity of human nature and the rational artifice of convention. Therefore, the issue of whether the empirical good can be intended independent of a good of order is analogous to the question of whether human nature can function independent of rational, artificial conventions. Now, one might argue that humans do not and could not function independent of rational artifice—i.e., that rational convention permeates human nature such that human nature is inextricable from the conventional context within which it develops. If this were true, it would support the above position that empirical goods and goods of order are theoretically distinguishable but inseparable in practice. However, I would argue that this is not Lonergan’s perspective, for as we saw in the last chapter, his dualism of sensitive psyche and rational spirit presents the spontaneous dimension of human experience as something merely amenable to rational control; the sensitive psyche is not necessarily and intrinsically informed by rationality.

It is not surprising, therefore, that with respect to society Lonergan finds it possible to posit a level of human community based simply on the conservative
rhythms of natural spontaneity. Intersubjective community has its basis in "spontaneous tendency"19 or "organistic" spontaneity, which he defines as "the mutual adaptation and automatic correlation of the activities of many individuals as though they were parts of a larger organic unit."20 This organic unity is illustrated by the anthill and the beehive. The themes of spontaneity and "automatic" correlation bear out the notion that the sensitive psyche is a non-rational source of human action.

The notion that there may be intentional but non-deliberate action is confirmed in the discussion of free will, where it is pointed out that not all acts are free. There are acts that come about "through mere sensitive routine and that can be accounted for without appealing to the introduction of some higher integration by intelligence."21 The psyche has its own laws and schemes of recurrence, and these operate spontaneously without rational deliberation and free choice.

This non-rational, spontaneous action is neither pre-human animality nor the simple reflex action by which one warded off a blow or moves to catch someone stumbling. I quote at length:

Initially and spontaneously, [man] identifies the good with the object of desire, and this desire is not to be confused either with animal impulse or with egoistic scheming. Man is an artist. His practicality is part of his dramatic pursuit of dignified living. His aim is not for raw and isolated satisfactions. If he never dreams of disregarding the little matter of food and drink, still what he wants is a sustained succession of varied and artistically transformed acquisitions and attainments. If he never forgets his personal interest, still his person is no Leibnizian monad. ... As the members of the hive or herd belong together and function together, so too men are social animals and the primordial basis of their community is not the discovery of an idea but a spontaneous intersubjectivity.

Thus, primitive community is intersubjective. Its schemes of recurrence are simple prolongations of prehuman attainment, too obvious to be discussed or criticized, too closely linked with more elementary processes to be distinguished sharply from them.22

The pursuit of food and drink and dignified living belong to the class of pre-rational acts that express the non-deliberate schemes of recurrence of the sensitive psyche. Though human spontaneity has something of the automatic, organistic
quality of ants and bees, it is qualified by human artistry, which makes of it something more than mere animal adaptation. Still, human artistry belongs to the aesthetic or dramatic pattern of experience, which belongs primarily to the realm of the psyche from which the sensitive desires and acts proceed. Such acts intend empirical goods without reference to a rational order. Though they are certainly human acts, they are neither rational, deliberate, free or moral. Rather, they are pre-rational and as such they merely provide an initial basis for, and can be preserved within, the higher framework of rational living. Where reason has not yet introduced a higher integration, the sensitive psyche seeks its satisfactions with pre-moral, spontaneous simplicity.

The above analysis makes it clear that for Lonergan no spontaneous desires—even intellectual ones—are rational in the sense that they intend an intrinsically rational good. Spontaneous desires and the acts that intend them are the non-rational, unorganized manifold from which intelligence synthesizes its integral orders. In this respect, Lonergan’s notion of non-rational empirical goods corresponds to Kant’s account of material goods as non-rational. For both Lonergan and Kant, rationality is something distinct from natural desire, introduced only through deliberate reflection, and not present in all intentional action. This is a first indication that Lonergan’s understanding of the rational good is a formal one.

3. Formal Criteria and the Ultimacy of Satisfaction

The argument to be put forward here is that to hold all material goods to be non-rational finally leads one to a position in which the ultimate criterion of goodness is the satisfaction of non-rational desires. That is, the rejection of material rational goods can not but lead to a form of utilitarianism. Though Lonergan criticizes utilitarianism and certainly does not see himself in these terms, his own position can be seen as a form of utilitarianism. Curiously, these
same things can be said about Kant's position and self-understanding, and this is evidence that the rejection of rational material goods leads to a utilitarian ethical formalism.

Since empirical desires are non-rational, it follows that the criteria by which they are ordered must be formal ones. That is, if empirical desires are in and of themselves non-rational, this implies that there is no intrinsic superiority of one empirical, material good over another; all material goods *per se* are of equal worth. When Lonergan asserts that there can only be a hierarchy among values through the intelligent ordering of goods, this is not an arbitrary principle but one that follows naturally from the premise that empirical goods are non-rational. By contrast, a position that holds there are *rational* material goods affirms that some empirical goods have priority over others for they are grasped by reason as being more relevant to human fulfillment; for example, the desire for knowledge or virtue has a natural, intrinsic priority over the desire for pleasure. With the rejection of a material rational good, however, one can no longer appeal to the intrinsic worth of one material good over another. That is, if all material goods are equal, then there are no material criteria to guide the ordering and harmonization of desires, or to evaluate the goodness of the intelligent order in which one harmonizes them. So a good of order cannot be evaluated on the basis of how well it preserves a natural hierarchy of material goods, such as the superiority of virtue over physical gratification. By default the only criteria can be formal ones.

The formal criteria operative in the intelligent good of order are implicit in the very definition of what a good of order is: a systematization of the pursuit of empirical goods. Even in the most simple form of a good of order—in the ordered whole which intends and makes possible the satisfaction of a single desire—the intelligent order is an organization of the ends and means of satisfying non-rational desires.\(^{25}\) While goods of order constitute a qualitatively new kind
of good, an intelligent good, the warrant for this new kind of good is that it mediates the satisfaction of desire. This is expressed most simply and clearly within Lonergan's affirmation of the goodness of being: "the intelligible orders of human invention are a good because they systematically assure the satisfaction of desires." 26

In Chapter III we saw that the hierarchy of values is based on relationships of dependence and inclusion. As Insight's account of the goodness of being makes clear, the cosmos is a set of orders nested within orders such that lower orders depend on higher, more comprehensive orders, and higher orders are wholes that include lower orders as their parts. The more general, comprehensive and inclusive an order is, the more necessary it is as a basis for the more particular orders. Ultimately, however, the warrant for the higher orders is grounded in the satisfaction of desire. So, for example, the good of order is of greater value than any particular satisfaction, for it is a higher order and the condition upon which many particular satisfactions depend. And the highest values are those which are most fundamental to the pursuit of satisfaction.

The implication here is that Lonergan's position is essentially utilitarian, yet this conflicts with Lonergan's own self-understanding. He is critical of utilitarianism on the grounds that it deals only with empirical goods. He holds that utilitarianism is oblivious to the fact that the intelligible order is itself a good. In "Philosophy of Education" he says:

*In the sensate civilization or culture, attention concentrates on the particular goods. The only point to any system is not that it is good, but that it is a means to other goods. There is an expression of that in Bentham's formula, 'the greatest good for the greatest number'. And the greatest good is the greatest number of particular goods. They want a utilitarian calculus to calculate, add up, and portion out equally the particular goods. The good of order is conceived simply as a function of particular goods.*

So Lonergan sees his position as non-utilitarian, because it considers an intelligible order to be a good in its own right and not just as a means to an end.

Though Lonergan does not explain how the good of order is more than
just a means to an end, one can interpret the intelligent order as a higher good in the sense that a whole is greater than the sum of its parts.28 Using this metaphor of whole and part, there are two possible ways of construing the goodness of the good of order. First, if one thinks of the parts in terms of the individual pursuit of particular desires, then the whole is the order which represents the possibility of satisfaction and security. Lonergan discusses the good of order in these terms when he speaks of the actual order of society, regardless of its imperfections and incompleteness, as a value because it is the basis for further development and progress. By analogy one might argue that just as the ‘wholeness’ of the body grounds the possibility of health even when it is sick, so the ‘wholeness’ of the social order makes possible improvement in collective satisfaction. As a second way of construing the part and whole metaphor, one might think of the parts in terms of the people who are organized by the order, so that the whole grounds a sense of community and identity. That is, the good of order may be deemed good because it is a source of new goods—community, friendship, status—that are generated within an intelligent order.29 These two lines of interpretation are not mutually exclusive, for considering the family as an example of an intelligent good, it is immediately clear that it is a good in and of itself and not simply a means to other goods, and this goodness may be seen both in the sustained security it affords and in the relationships it nurtures.

In spite of Lonergan’s criticism of utilitarianism, however, he does not manage to escape its gravity. For ultimately the good of order finds its warrant in its ability to mediate empirical goods. Though a good of order can be a value in and of itself, its only warrant as a good lies in its ability to orchestrate and fulfill the collective pursuit of desires, even if only potentially. If the whole is considered from the perspective of the collective satisfaction of desires, the goodness of an order is a reflection of its actual or potential ability to satisfy its component members. To the extent that people recognize the inability of an
order to facilitate satisfaction or to be reformed so that it can facilitate satisfac-
tion, there is no basis for considering it to be a good; indeed, it becomes an evil. If the whole is considered from the perspective of community, as the basis for friendship and status, these goods as something to be desired are merely empirical goods, so community as a good still finds its warrant in its ability to mediate empirical goods. In determining the relative worth of intelligent orders it seems natural to assume that a more valuable order is one that sustains a broader range of satisfactions, or sustains it for a greater number of people, or sustains it more securely. So while Lonergan wishes to maintain that the good of order becomes an end in itself and not simply a means to an end, the fact that it is fundamentally an organization for the satisfaction of non-rational, empirical desires locks it into a utilitarian frame of reference.

If it were asked why Lonergan did not see this himself, the answer undoubtedly lies in the fact that he had a specific understanding of utilitarianism in mind. The same was true of Kant, who in criticizing utilitarianism in his day did not realize that his own position was formulating a new utilitarian perspective. Let us consider Kant more fully, for the analogy between the two philosophers on this point is instructive.

Kant criticizes utilitarianism for its occupation with immediate consequences, and considers the categorical imperative to be a denial of utilitarianism, for a moral action is one which is done for its own sake, not to achieve some immediate end. Nevertheless, the categorical imperative implicitly appeals to the long-term consequences of everyone doing a similar act, and this renders it a form of utilitarianism. Kant's own illustrations of the categorical imperative make the appeal to consequences explicit. For example, lying in general would be wrong, for if everyone lied, this would undermine social trust and cooperation, leading to undesirable long-term consequences. So Kant's categorical imperative is basically an appeal to ultimate rather than immediate consequences. Kant's
criticism of utilitarianism is directed at what would later be called act-utilitarianism, which holds that any given particular situation should be evaluated on the basis of its utility. Rule-utilitarianism, on the other hand, claims that rules should be established on a more general basis than the particular situation. Kant's position is a rule-utilitarian one. The categorical imperative ultimately is warranted by a rational estimation of what serves the long-range interests of society. Similarly, Lonergan's position can be considered rule-utilitarian, for the good of order finds its justification ultimately in its ability to coordinate, moderate and maximize the collective satisfaction of desires—i.e., the long-range interests of society.

The similarity between Kant and Lonergan is probably not a matter of direct borrowing but rather a consequence of abandoning the notion of rational material goods. To the extent that one is committed to a rational ethics, the appeal to the satisfaction of desires follows quite naturally from the rejection of material rational goods. If desire is divorced from the notion of human fulfillment, and the notion of fulfillment from some ideal of what it means to be human, then the only criterion left for reflectively evaluating choices and intelligent orders is ultimately the satisfaction of non-rational desires.32

4. Good will

I have suggested that the basic reason for the parallels between Lonergan and Kant is to be found in the dichotomy between rationality and desire that they share. As we have seen, the underlying premise of Lonergan's ethical formalism is that all spontaneous desires, as desires, are non-rational and can become rational only insofar as they are ordered by the disinterested desire to know. In Chapter II we saw how thorough and systematic the disjunction of interested desire and disinterested reason in Lonergan's early thought is.

The purpose of the present section is to show that the dichotomy between
desire and reason extends into Lonergan's understanding of good will. This demonstrates a final point of continuity between Kant and Lonergan. For good will is an ambiguous concept—it may connote both an affective orientation or a sense of duty. This problem of definition reflects a real tension in the experience of good will between natural desire and duty. The classical and Kantian positions handle this tension in different manners, the classical emphasizing the continuity between the affective and the obligatory, and the Kantian emphasizing the obligatory at the expense of the affective. The classical position, understanding both will and certain kinds of desire as rational, does not divorce the two in its treatment of the rational good and the pursuit of personal fulfillment. For Kant, however, the pursuit of a moral good is moral precisely because it overlooks one's own desires, considering only what one ought to do. So when Kant affirms that the only unqualified good is the good will, he means by good will simply a willingness to do what one ought.

Lonergan's discussion of good will emphasizes detachment and disinterestedness, for good will is an openness to being directed by intelligence and in its cooperation with intelligence as it wills to be purely objective. As an orientation of the will to comply with reason "good will ... is nothing but a willingness to follow the lead of intelligence and truth." Again:

Will is good by its conformity to intelligence. It is good in the measure that antecedently and without persuasion it matches the pure desire both in its detachment from the sensitive subject and in its incessant dedication to complete intelligibility.

Intelligence is a principle of objectivity in contrast to the sensitive psyche's self-interest. The will is good to the extent that it antecedently matches the pure desire to know—that is, it is ready to do what ought to be done even before it is known what ought to be done. But good will is not good simply because of this openness: "good will is never better than the intelligence and reasonableness that it implements." The will is good only insofar as it wills to be objective, and
wills in conformity to objective value or obligation.

The theme of detachment is also present in Lonergan's affirmation that "the goodness of man's will consists in a consuming love of God."39 This is most apparent in his first explanation of how this is so.40 Succinctly, he argues that because good will conforms to disinterested intellect, and because the intellect is oriented to God, therefore good will is also oriented to God, and this orientation is a matter of love. Lonergan's argument relies upon the position that the pure, disinterested desire to know seeks an absolute knowledge of being, and since God is to be understood as an absolute act of knowing being, then what the intellect naturally aspires to 'see' is identical with what God is. That is, intellectual eros is naturally inclined and open to a wholeness and fullness of knowing which is ultimately identical to God; the openness to knowing is an openness to God. It follows also that in every act of knowing, the known truth is a facet of that absolute knowing that is God, and so in a very limited way is a knowing of God. Since good will conforms to the intellect, much the same can be said of it. The openness of good will is open to a goodness that is ultimately identical to God, and each good chosen is a choosing of God; "the good that is willed by good will is God." Lonergan makes the transition to love by simply asserting that "to will the good of a person is to love the person" and, since God is a person, good will is a love of God.41 Moreover, since good will is detached and disinterested, it is not concerned with one's own advantage but rather is prompted by God's goodness.

In this argument there is a strong emphasis on good will as detached and disinterested. Rational desire is indifferent to one's own desires; good will is not a desire for something in which one anticipates satisfaction. That this general way of thinking is a departure from a more traditional position is clear in light of Lonergan's objection elsewhere to Aristotelian eudaemonism:

If you start off from happiness as your fundamental goal, are you not prejudicing
If we seek to know in order to be happy, then the pursuit of truth is an interested one and, in Lonergan's eyes, little different from any other self-interested pursuit. Similarly if good will is not detached, this compromises its concern for the other. So the love of God here is not a species of desire in which there is an affective attraction toward the good and a desire for fulfillment.

In light of this contrast between Lonergan's position and a classical eudaemonism, it is difficult to say in what sense the 'pure desire to know' is a species of desire. His dichotomy is between rationality and affectivity, not rationality and desire, yet it is difficult to sustain a distinction between affectivity and desire. Desire connotes a need or a lack that seeks to be satisfied, and it is difficult to understand satisfaction independent of some form of enjoyment and feeling on the part of the desirer, and indeed it is this fact that underwrites the classical notion of philosophy as a form of eros. I would suggest that Lonergan's very distinction between affective desire and 'pure' desire can be taken as evidence of a Kantian dualism, for the subjective affectivity that aims at personal satisfaction stands in radical contrast to the objective dictates of reason.

It might be countered that Lonergan's emphasis on a detached love in his first explanation of good will as a love of God is offset by the second explanation, where he speaks of good will as being in love with God. The very expression, 'being in love with God', suggests a comprehensive involvement of feeling, mind and will. Lonergan argues from the spontaneous tendency toward the good as a type of love for God. People know that they are in love by discovering "that all spontaneous and deliberate tendencies and actions regard the beloved." Both spontaneously and deliberately human existence participates in the perfective dynamism within creation that progresses toward the realization of the order of the universe. Mute nature reveals a finalistic drive toward increasing order, a
drive from which complexity emerges. Human spontaneity in the family, the clan, the social class seeks the welfare of the whole. Deliberate action furthers a concern for welfare that goes beyond the confines of intersubjective community to the broader intelligent order. Because the universal order that the cosmos both is and aspires to depends upon its intelligibility, and its intelligibility reflects the perfect goodness and love of God, every movement to realize or will that order expresses a love for God. "[A]part from the surd of sin, the universe is in love with God." The irrationality of sin is the opposite of good will, for good will conforms to rational obligation just as sin is a failure to conform. Since sin is the only exception to the love of God, it follows that "the man of good will is in love with God." Succinctly, because all of nature aspires to an order that is an expression of God, this aspiration reflects nature's being in love with God. Good will is simply a rational form of this universal aspiration.

Though this argument asserts that good will is a form of being in love, one should guard against interpreting it to involve an affective dimension, any more than mute nature aspires to a divine order by virtue of affection. Lonergan's argument relies heavily on a Thomistic, teleological idiom, one that does not fit well with his own notion of finality as indeterminate. In that more traditional framework of determinate final causes, all things are motivated toward the universal order by virtue of their apprehension of a determinate good and the natural love that this evokes. Desiring any good is implicitly a desire for God, for the goodness of each particular thing participates in and is infused by his ultimate goodness; so every desire is an intimation of our longing for the ultimate satisfaction of divine union. Into such a context, relying as it does on love as an apprehension of and desire for the good, the metaphor of being in love fits more neatly. In Lonergan's position, however, the forward thrust of the spirit is not a response to a known but rather an openness to the determination of an unknown. Though the unknown can ultimately (in a logical sense) be correlated
with God, in human living the unknown is intended intellectually by the disinterested desire to know. This is made clear in Insight’s discussion of mystery and myth; the human orientation to the ultimate unknown is primarily intellectual and, when properly ordered, the affective dimension of this orientation is simply a corresponding conformity of psyche to intellect. Myth, which Lonergan understands in a negative sense, is the result of feeling and imagination leading where they should follow, interfering with intellectual openness. Because of this understanding of finality as generally indeterminate and of human finality toward God as primarily intellectual and disinterested, the metaphor of being in love does not transfer well from the Thomistic framework to the Lonerganian.

In conclusion, Lonergan’s treatment of feelings and rationality in Insight maintains a dualism between subjective desire and the objective, rational good. He specifically seeks to exclude affectivity from the rational good. This is implicit in the dualism of sensitive feeling and rational ‘disinterested desire’, in his strong assertion that the goodness of being is a matter of rational intelligibility rather than affectivity, and in his account of good will as matching the disinterested objectivity of the pure desire to know.

C. Lonergan’s Intellectualism

In Chapter III it was noted that in Insight Lonergan’s defense of ethics as rational takes the form of a defense of intellectualism, a defense that explicitly challenges Kant’s affirmation of the priority of practical reason. Our purpose here is to show that Insight’s discussion of rational self-consciousness as a fourth level of consciousness is to be understood primarily as an appropriation of Thomas’ notion of an ‘intelligible procession’ of love in the will from the inner word in the intellect. To this end it can be demonstrated that Lonergan’s early treatment of Thomas’ account of love as rational is implicit in his own treatment of practical decision as an extension of rational consciousness. That is, Thomas’
intellectualism is the source of Lonergan's early notion of a fourth level of consciousness and it is the key to recognizing that the relationship of rational self-consciousness to rational consciousness initially conveyed a strict ethical intellectualism.

In the last Verbum article, "Imago Dei," Lonergan deals with Thomas' account of the procession of the Trinity as analogous to the psychological dynamic of human knowing and loving. The Word proceeds from the Father, and the Holy Spirit from the Word. This is analogous to the process of knowledge proceeding from understanding, and the act of will—i.e., love—proceeding from intellectual knowledge. At the level of what Lonergan will come to call intelligent consciousness, understanding emerges through insight, and at the level of rational consciousness knowledge arises from the reflective act of judgment. Love is a subsequent procession, for the knowledge of what a thing is embraces also a knowledge of its goodness, and from the intellectual awareness of its goodness there arises in the will a love that motivates one toward that goodness. Each step of this psychological process is an 'intelligible procession', for it is an expression of one's native intelligence and rationality. The emergence of love from knowing is an intelligible procession, for the will is informed by the intellect. A thing is not loved unless it is known to be good, and such knowledge is a matter of intellectual discernment. The definition of will as rational appetite requires that will is only motivated by rational knowledge.

Though Lonergan is giving an exposition of Thomistic thought in his Verbum articles, it is clear that the position he is outlining is in many ways also his own. A first indication of this is to be found in the obvious parallel between Thomas' intelligible processions and Lonergan's levels of consciousness. Further evidence is to be found in the polemical nature of the Verbum articles, which is directed against the same conceptualist opponents and develops the same argument.
one finds in Lonergan’s own later works. In presenting Thomas’ position, Lonergan is also articulating his own: conceptualists posit that the intellect simply ‘sees’ or intuits objective reality, so that knowing is simply a matter of apprehending objective givens and deducing proper conclusions from them, but this position ignores the constructive role of intellect in abstracting insight from phantasm and in formulating insight conceptually. The continuity between Lonergan’s account of Thomas and his own work has been recognized by Frederick Crowe, who says in his discussion of *Verbum*: “Readers of *Insight* may have noticed there the recurring phrase, insight and formulation, without realizing that Lonergan had already given a book-length exposition of its meaning.”

Not only does *Verbum* anticipate Lonergan’s theory of cognition, but also his account of rational action.

Lonergan, in setting the context for Thomas’ account of the procession of the Holy Spirit, summarizes the dependence of love on the intellect:

> As complete understanding not only grasps essence and in essence all properties but also affirms existence and value, so also from understanding’s self-expression in judgment of value there is an intelligible procession of love in the will. Evidently so, for without an intelligible procession of love in the will from the word of intellect, it would be impossible to define the will as rational appetite. Natural appetite is blind; sensitive appetite is spontaneous; but rational appetite can be moved only by the good that reason pronounces to be good. Because of the necessity of intelligible procession from intellect to will, sin is not act in the will but failure to act; it is failure to will to do the good that is commanded, or it is failure to will to inhibit tendencies that are judged to be wrong. Because of the same necessity of intelligible procession from intellect to will, the sinner is driven by a fine disquiet either to seek true peace of soul in repentance or else to obtain a simulated peace in the rationalization that corrupts reason by making the false appear true that the wrong may appear right. Finally, however much it may be disputed whether there is any *processio operati* from the word of our intellects to the act in our wills, it cannot be denied that there is a *processio intelligibilis* from the word of intellect to the act of rational appetite.

The final point of this passage makes clear that Lonergan is not simply defining Thomas’ position; he is also defending it as true: there was controversy in medieval scholasticism over whether the act of will was the effect of an efficient cause (*processio operati*) or the actualization of a potency, a shift from a
potential to an actual operation (a *processio operationis*); Lonergan brushes this issue aside to affirm what is beyond controversy—that the definition of will as rational appetite requires the act of will to be directly dependent on intellectual knowledge, and this is what is meant by calling it an intelligible procession, a *processio intelligibilis*.

This *Verbum* passage provides insight into Lonergan’s treatment of rational self-consciousness. Earlier we noted that wherever rational self-consciousness is presented primarily in terms of decision, evaluation is treated as a matter of rational consciousness. The Thomistic identification of the judgment of value with the word of intellect—i.e., with intellectual knowledge—explains why *Insight* identifies evaluation with rational consciousness. Lonergan’s association of value and evaluation with rational consciousness is even clearer in *Understanding and Being*: “Value lies upon the level of judgment; it is the rational choice.” Soon afterward he clarifies that rational self-consciousness emerges with the question of willing what one knows ought to be done. The transition from rational consciousness to rational self-consciousness is a shift from knowing what ought to be done to deciding whether one will do it. The division of labour between rational consciousness and rational self-consciousness, between knowing and doing, can be understood as a reformulation of Thomas’ account of love as an intelligible procession from intellect to will.

This interpretation is made all the more probable by the parallels between the *Verbum* passage and “The Notion of Will” in Chapter XVIII of *Insight*, where the pure desire to know is first portrayed as ‘extending’ into human action. Both texts seek to explain the rationality of ethics in intellectualistic terms and both depend on the definition of will as rational appetite—i.e., as responsive to the rational determination of value. Furthermore, the *Verbum* text speaks of the *necessity* of intelligible procession from intellect to will, which echoes *Insight*’s ‘demand’ for conformity of doing to knowing, a demand revealed in moral
conscience: "the emergence of a moral obligation is the emergence of a rational necessity in rational consciousness." Though Lonergan deals with sin in a different context in Insight, he essentially repeats what is found in the Verbum passage: sin is a failure to choose according to a rational obligation. Finally, in both texts rationalization is presented as a chief means of distorting this demand, which it does by subverting rational truth—rendering the false true. The correspondences between the two passages, therefore, suggest that Lonergan’s notion of rational self-consciousness derives directly from his understanding of Thomas’ position. Just as Lonergan understands Thomas as affirming that the rational knowledge of a determinate good necessitates a specific act, so in Lonergan the knowledge of a determinate obligation demands a specific act.

In summary, Lonergan’s notion of rational self-consciousness has its immediate source in Thomas’ account of an intelligible procession from the intellect to the will. His reformulation of Thomas’ position simply transposes the concept of successive intelligible processions into successive levels of consciousness. As the act of will proceeds from the intellect, so is rational self-consciousness a higher level proceeding from rational consciousness. Rational consciousness determines the possible object of choice, and will simply determines whether or not it will be chosen.

It should be noted, however, that though Lonergan appropriates the structure of Thomas’ notion of a procession from understanding to judgment and finally to love, he gives it a new meaning. With Thomas the exigence is initially a speculative one, and the shift from judgment to love is a shift from speculative to practical concern, both of which intend the same object. Speculative intellect defines what a thing is and, in knowing what it is, knows its goodness, and this in turn motivates practical concern toward that thing. However, as we saw in Chapter III, in Insight the fourfold dynamic from empirical consciousness to rational self-consciousness is an expression of practical intelligence. The reason
Lonergan recasts this dynamism as one of practical concern is that, as we will see shortly, he rejects a materially rational good. The rational good must be determined by practical intelligence since nothing in and of itself is a rational good. So though Lonergan utilizes Thomas' structure as a basis for his intellectualism, he transforms Thomas' series of intelligible processions into a practical exigence.

Nevertheless, Lonergan's intellectualism follows Thomas in maintaining that the knowledge of obligation is speculative. Though Lonergan agrees with Kant that morality is defined by obligation and obligation by practical reason, he is concerned that Kant divorces practical knowledge from scientific and speculative knowledge, cutting moral certainty off from the broader context of metaphysics and the knowledge of reality. Against this, Lonergan seeks to assert that moral knowledge, no less than scientific and metaphysical knowledge, is a knowledge of reality. Therefore, although the maxims of moral knowledge are determined by practical deliberation, the maxims are grounded in the judgment that they constitute a knowledge of actual reality no less than scientific and metaphysical principles do, and so moral maxims are a matter of speculative knowledge.

In short, Lonergan's fourfold structure of moral obligation is strongly informed by his understanding of Thomas' ethical intellectualism. His notion of rational self-consciousness as a fourth level of consciousness is derived from Thomas' notion of and intelligible procession of love in the will from knowledge in the intellect. Though with Kant he embraces the definition of the moral good as a formal product of practical reason, so that the spiritual exigence from which action arises is primarily a matter of practical intelligence, Lonergan insists that the act of will is derived from rational consciousness, from speculative knowledge. In this way Lonergan affirms an intellectualism in spite of his rejection of a materially rational good.
D. Conclusion

Our purpose has been to demonstrate that an adequate understanding of Lonergan's early ethical thought must consider its explicit intellectualism and its implicit formalism. The intellectualism reflects Lonergan's debt to Thomas. We have argued that Lonergan's concept of rational self-consciousness as a fourth level, determined by rational consciousness, is a transformation of Thomas' notion of the will's act of love being an intelligible procession from the knowledge of truth in the intellect. One of the implications of this observation is that there is a scholastic faculty psychology implicit and operative in Lonergan's early account of ethics. Recognizing this is relevant to Chapter V, which will argue that Lonergan abandons his ethical intellectualism in abandoning faculty psychology.

Though Lonergan in part develops his thought along the lines of traditional Thomistic thought, nevertheless the basic dichotomy between spontaneous desire and rationality leads him to an ethical formalism similar to Kant's. This dichotomy lies at the heart of his distinction between empirical goods and rational goods, with the consequence that the rational good must be understood as formally good. As with Kant, though he rejects utilitarianism, understanding it in terms of a concern for only immediate or empirical satisfactions, yet his position cannot ultimately escape the charge of being a form of utilitarianism if all empirical goods are by definition non-rational.

To offset these comparisons to Thomas and Kant, one should note Lonergan's unique genius in grounding the rational good in the indeterminacy of emergent probability. Lonergan's position is unique in that he conceives of practical intelligence as the expression of an indeterminate finality and not merely as a determinate response to an actual good, as is true of both Thomas and Kant. For Lonergan practical intelligence is an expression of emergent probability, which seeks further realizations of nature's inherent potential, and that potential
includes higher organizations of the natural and social environment and of one's own motives and acts. Because of this intellectual finality, there emerge practical questions and insights into the possible transformations of the environment or one's living. So practical intelligence is not evoked by specific, determining motivations any more than speculative knowledge is caused by the unorganized data which ground insight. Just as speculative knowledge stems from an irreducible hunger to know actual being, a hunger which is not in any sense a response to being, even so does practical intelligence express a hunger to grasp the novel possibilities inherent in being. This stands in contrast with both the Thomistic and Kantian positions, both of which assume a good that in some sense is already known to exist because they rely on the primacy of motivating goods. For Lonergan, however, practical reason is not simply responsive to what exists but generative of novel possibilities. In such cases motivation emerges through rationally determining that a novel course of action can or ought to be done. Such a position allows for the radical novelty of the good, for it is the structure of the good that is given as universal, not the content of the good.

Over against this strength, let us briefly consider one significant weakness of Lonergan's early position: its divorce of rationality from the aesthetic sphere. Lonergan's account of being argues for its unity, truth and goodness. Yet being is beautiful as well. This is the most significant casualty of a formal account of the rational good, for beauty—the apprehension of the loveliness of the good—is excluded from the good and the true. It is a virtue of the classical position that it embraces the beautiful, the good and the true as ultimately converging. If the ethical is simply formally good, then the good is devoid of the subtle shades of aesthetic appreciation which ideally render it delightful and which, at least in some primitive, pre-reflective way, attest to its goodness. Furthermore, reducing the ethical to the formal good effectively divorces the beautiful from the true, so that aesthetic delight is no longer grounded in a fundamental orientation of the
mind to reality and to the specific fulfillment of human nature.\textsuperscript{53}

As we will see in Chapter V, the loss of the affective dimension is a significant problem that Lonergan addresses in his redefinition of the fourth level of consciousness and his formulation of the \textit{notion} of value.
Chapter V. Beyond *Insight*:
The Priority of Praxis and Love

In the last chapter we demonstrated that Lonergan’s early account of ethics is both intellectualistic and formalistic. It explicitly gives priority to intellect over will and makes a radical distinction between the empirical good—i.e., the object of non-rational, spontaneous desire—and value, the rational good. Both aspects of his early position are abandoned by his mature formulation of the fourth level of consciousness, which he comes to speak of variously as the existential level or the level of responsibility. In this chapter we will show that, when existential consciousness is properly understood, it indicates a significant reorientation of Lonergan’s thought regarding the knowledge of the good.

Existential consciousness is concerned with the good, or value. It is not to be confused with what Lonergan earlier called rational self-consciousness, for Lonergan’s account of value has changed and with it the meaning of the fourth level of consciousness. Lonergan gives his own synopsis of the nature of the change:

> In *Insight* the good was the intelligent and reasonable. In *Method* the good is a distinct notion. ... Just as intelligence sublates sense, just as reasonableness sublates intelligence, so deliberation sublates and thereby unifies knowing and feeling.¹

This brief summary indicates two changes. First, practical deliberation and what we might generally call the sphere of practical concern is seen as belonging to a higher level of consciousness, sublating the sphere of speculative concern in the same manner that understanding sublates experience and judgment sublates understanding. Second, Lonergan breaks with his early identification of the truly good with the rational, so that the good is no longer reducible to the objectively, rationally intelligible; the knowledge of value becomes a synthesis of feeling and
knowing. These two changes are inextricably interwoven, yet they are distinct and we will deal with them separately, for each provides an important perspective on the course of Lonergan’s development.

It is a major departure from his earlier position that Lonergan puts the sphere of practical and existential concern on a level of consciousness above that of speculative concern. Though in *Insight* rational self-consciousness is a fourth level beyond rational consciousness, it takes on a whole new meaning in his mature position; originally it expressed an affirmation of scholastic intellectualism, but in the later context it becomes a way of escaping intellectualism and giving priority to praxis. Lonergan’s early position assumes a faculty psychology, and this framework is both challenged by and resolved through Lonergan’s engagement with existentialism. He finally rejects the faculty psychology which his intellectualism assumed. He embraces existential praxis and escapes the intellectualism that faculty psychology had required of him by reformulating the fourth level of consciousness as existential consciousness.

Lonergan’s revision of the fourth level of consciousness demands a new account of value. His earlier account of value as a formally rational good depended on speculative intellect determining the good according to a rational criterion. Yet if value is beyond the true and the real—that is, if the will is not determined simply by rational consciousness—then a new explanation of value is needed. Existentialism’s emphasis on the concrete and the dynamic allowed Lonergan to affirm a more significant contribution of affectivity to the knowledge of the good. The fourth level becomes a synthesis of rational, cognitive knowledge and the apprehension of value in feelings. Value is discovered especially through being in love. The fact that feelings are no longer associated only with the empirical good but also with the apprehension of value, the true good, shows that Lonergan has left his early formalism behind.

In this context attention will also be given to the relationship between love
and responsibility, for the contrast between these makes it clear that existential consciousness goes beyond the strictly moral to include also the affective dimension of love. Love can be morally responsible without operating out of an affective involvement with the one toward whom one acts responsibly and, indeed, Lonergan does use love in the sense of moral responsibility. Yet he does not restrict love to this, for he recognizes a distinction between love and responsibility that makes clear the affective nature of the love that reveals value. It will be shown that it is Lonergan’s recognition of love as a affective fulfillment of human intentionality plays a significant role in his reformulation of the fourth level of consciousness.

A. From Scholastic Intellectualism to Existential Praxis

The fourth level emerges for the first time in its mature form in Lonergan’s Aquinas Lecture, "The Subject," given in 1968. It marks a pivotal point in the reformulation of his thought on ethics, for he rejects intellectualism and, accordingly, there is a new tendency in his account of value to downplay the rationality of the good. To see how Lonergan’s revision of the fourth level serves to cut the ties with his intellectualistic past we need to understand the nature of existential consciousness, and so we begin with a brief study of existential consciousness as given in "The Subject." In light of this, it will be argued that Lonergan’s mature understanding emerges from his engagement with existentialism, and judging from the evidence of Lonergan’s reasons for abandoning faculty psychology, it appears that his ethical intellectualism in particular had become problematic for him.
1. "The Subject"

Lonergan’s purpose in "The Subject" is to show how limitations in one’s horizon of understanding are rooted in philosophical oversights, which in turn reflect a neglect of the subject and consequently an inadequate self-understanding. The structure of the lecture is built upon five themes: the neglected subject, the truncated subject, the immanentist subject, the existential subject and the alienated subject. The first three themes deal with the first three levels of consciousness and summarize the central points of Lonergan’s epistemological position, outlining the importance of his cognitional theory. The final theme, the alienated subject, argues for the importance of cognitional theory and the inadequacy of existential reflection for authentic living. It is in the ‘existential subject’ that he introduces the fourth level of consciousness, existential consciousness. Though the latter is the focus of our attention, a brief summary of the other themes will set it in context.

In the ‘neglected subject’ Lonergan explains why phenomenological introspection and self-awareness, so central to much of modern and existential philosophy, had been neglected by previous philosophy. The traditional emphasis on objectivity and metaphysics led to a focus on static categories and deduction that eclipsed the subject. This led to the ‘truncated subject’, the subject in whom the dynamic presence of intelligence is overlooked. Positivists ignore the meaning and nature of intelligence altogether, while conceptualists focus on the products of intelligence—concepts—and overlook the conscious and subjective process from which objective knowledge emerges. The ‘immanentist subject’ suffers from an inadequate notion of objectivity because of a failure to recognize the nature of knowing, which heads beyond mere understanding to a knowledge of being through judgments of truth. Here Lonergan is directing himself against conceptualist misunderstandings of knowing and objectivity as well as against Kant’s denial of transcendent or non-empirical knowledge.
In the fifth and final theme, the ‘alienated subject’, Lonergan seeks to show that, though existential reflection on human meaning and choice provides an invaluable resource for authentic living, one still needs an adequate cognitional theory. For though existential reflection can explore what it means for humans to be good, it cannot answer the broader, more objective, question of the goodness of being; and if human goodness is not of a piece with a comprehensive moral order, then alienation is ultimately the only alternative.

Turning now to the fourth level, which is subsequent to the three levels of cognition, Lonergan portrays the existential subject as "a doer, as one that deliberates, evaluates, chooses, acts." The link with his earlier account of practical intelligence is made clear in calling this fourth level of consciousness rational self-consciousness, which in Insight was identified with practical deliberation, evaluation and choice. In speaking of the existential subject rather than the practical subject, Lonergan is emphasizing the self-constituting nature of the subject. People construct their own character and personality by virtue of the practical choices they make. Because of this, practicality is not simply a matter of determining what is good and what one should do; it is a matter of determining what kind of person one will be.

Existential subjectivity is to be understood as the fullest level of consciousness, the level that intends value. Faculty psychology offers no way of grasping existential subjectivity, for it deals with static categories like intellect and will, and not with the subject who changes, who becomes good or evil in accord with his or her choices. Lonergan speaks of six levels of consciousness from the unconsciousness of deep sleep, through dreaming, experiencing, understanding, and judging to human consciousness at its fullest. "Then the existential subject exists and his character, his personal essence, is at stake." In this context, for the first time, Lonergan introduces the metaphor of sublation to characterize the relationship between these levels. Each higher level sublates the
lower, where "sublating means not destroying, not interfering, but retaining, preserving, going beyond, perfecting." Each level relies on the previous but goes beyond it. Of the conscious levels, each has its own objective. Intelligent consciousness intends understanding, rational consciousness truth, and rational self-consciousness value.

Lonergan’s definition of value is continuous with his earlier work. He describes the threefold structure of the good: the good of appetite, the good of order, and value. Value is the basis upon which other goods are judged, for values provide a standard for determining what appetites should be satisfied, what orders are to be approved, and what actions are right and wrong.

Though the definition of value has not substantially changed, it takes on a new meaning in that Lonergan reconceptualizes value as a _notion_—what he now calls a ‘transcendental notion’—comparable to the _notion_ of being.

Just as the notion of being intends but, of itself, does not know being, so too the notion of value intends but, of itself, does not know value. Again, as the notion of being is dynamic principle that keeps us moving toward ever fuller knowledge of being, so the notion of value is the fuller flowering of the same dynamic principle that now keeps us moving toward ever fuller realization of the good, of what is worthwhile.

Beyond this, Lonergan says it is difficult to define the _notion_ of value more specifically—i.e., by specifying more precisely the good that the _notion_ of value intends. Part of the reason for this is that its meaning cannot be discerned without one being good. Only to the extent that one finds oneself concerned with being truly good and doing what is good can one reflect on what one actually does and discover in oneself the intention of value. The good and the good person are always concrete, not something that can be meaningfully defined in the abstract. The _notion_ of value is implicit in and expressed through every concrete judgment of value and good action, yet it cannot be defined apart from these concrete determinations of the good. That is, there is no way of defining the _notion_ of value in such a way that it provides an abstract criterion of goodness,
a fixed standard against which one can measure one's choices. Just as truth is not a matter of having an extrinsic standard against which to measure the accuracy of one's understanding but rather an intrinsic standard that recognizes the adequacy of an answer, even so the notion of value is an intrinsic ability to judge something to be truly good. Because one cannot define the good abstractly, ethical systems are very limited in their ability to communicate what is concretely good, but the effort to know the good is facilitated by the example of others, the social attribution of praise and blame, and one's own experience of elation or shame that attend moral and immoral acts.

Lonergan concludes his discussion by making explicit that his account of rational self-consciousness and the notion of value is to be understood as an affirmation of the primacy of the existential, or the fourth level of consciousness. In asserting this, Lonergan is concerned to qualify it in three ways. First, the fourth level needs to be seen as something harmonious with the preceding three levels, and so completing them. Second, he affirms that the value intended by rational self-consciousness is not to be confused with the object of appetite, or with the good of order. Beyond these there is a distinct meaning of good, and it is the basis of any moral distinction between right and wrong, between good and evil. Finally, Lonergan distinguishes his position from other positions that give priority to doing over knowing. Pragmatism assigns primacy to results, voluntarism to the will, and Aristotle and Kant to practical reason. What is primary for Lonergan, however, is existential concern, a concern to act for the sake of the good and for the sake of one's own goodness.

In many ways Lonergan's discussion of the existential subject is quite in keeping with his earlier thought. To the extent that the existential subject is a doer, existential consciousness echoes his earlier account of practical rationality; the reformulation of practicality in terms of existential decision is a theme Lonergan appropriated from existentialist thought a decade earlier. The idea that
rational self-consciousness is the highest or fullest level of consciousness we have already seen in *Insight*. The definition of value as beyond the object of appetite and the good of order is continuous with his early thought as well.

However, in spite of these continuities Lonergan's position has been transformed by his reconceptualization of value as a *notion* comparable to that of being. This is evident in two points of difference between *Insight* and "The Subject" regarding the conceptualization of the four levels of consciousness. First, where the relationship between practical to speculative intelligence is undefined in *Insight*, aside from them being parallel expressions of intelligence, practical intelligence comes to sublate the speculative knowledge of being. In *Insight* the fourfold structure of moral obligation, to which the discussion of rational self-consciousness belongs, is a practical exigence. It begins from a manifold of feelings, acts and percepts, proceeds through practical insight of what might be done, and through practical deliberation about one's goals and motives, and issues in practical choice. The tripartite structure of this practical exigence parallels the speculative, except that a rational consciousness of obligation emerges between reflection and decision as a moment of speculative knowledge of obligation. In "The Subject," however, the first three levels of consciousness reflect a speculative orientation, for experience, understanding and judgment are oriented to a knowledge of the true and real. The first three levels intend being, and only with the fourth does the practical and existential concern with value emerge.

A second difference between *Insight* and "The Subject", one that makes the first clearer, is that on the fourth level the *notion* of value is intended, and so value is now determined on the fourth level rather than on the third. In *Insight* the determination of value and the knowledge of obligation is a matter of rational consciousness. What is chosen on the fourth level is determined on and by the third level; rational self-consciousness as a fourth level is simply a shift from a determinate knowing of what should be done to deciding whether it will be done.
In "The Subject," however, rational self-consciousness as a fourth level is not just a matter of choice, but a process of seeking, determining and choosing the good.

The implication of this is that, in associating the fourth level with the notion of value, Lonergan is turning his back on his earlier intellectualism. As we saw in Chapter IV, this intellectualism assumed that the will was determined by the intellect, in the sense that the object of choice is a matter of rational (or third level) knowledge. Since value is sought, determined and chosen on the fourth, the object of choice is no longer defined on the third level, rational consciousness. In keeping with this change, Lonergan's explanation of the threefold structure of the good no longer defines value as the 'rational good', a phrase which earlier had meant to associate value with rational consciousness. Lonergan makes explicit the anti-intellectualist implication of his reformulation of the fourth level in affirming the "primacy of the existential." Indeed, there is evidence that a key reason for reformulating the fourth level is to escape his earlier scholastic intellectualism. To this evidence we now turn.

2. Beyond Intellectualism

In this section it will be argued that existentialism both challenged Lonergan's ethical intellectualism and provided a way beyond it. Existentialism's emphasis on the priority of praxis raised for Lonergan the question of the relationship of the intellectual and practical patterns of experience. Lonergan eventually found his earlier intellectualism untenable, and existentialism's phenomenological focus on the concrete processes of conscious intending provided a methodological framework that transcended the scholastic dualism of intellect and will, upon which his intellectualism was built. Evidence for this is to be found in the fact that, whenever Lonergan asserts the inadequacy of faculty psychology, he does so in terms that are immediately relevant to intellectualism.
a. Lonergan’s encounter with existentialism

When Lonergan first addresses existentialism at length in his 1957 "Existentialism” lectures, one of his aims is to show its limitations as well as its congruence with Catholic scholastic concerns. He seeks to integrate existentialism into scholasticism in such a way that each remedies the weaknesses of the other. The fact that he encountered in existentialism a challenge to his intellectualism is apparent in the fact that he transposes the question of the relationship between scholasticism and existentialism to one of the relationship between the speculative and practical patterns of experience. Scholasticism emphasizes intellectual objectivity and existentialism the priority of decision.

Lonergan’s attempt to reconcile the two perspectives builds upon his earlier work, for just as in Insight there is a parallel between practical and speculative intellect, there is a complementarity of the speculative and practical patterns of experience. Just as in Insight the practical pattern is vulnerable to the biases of common sense, existentialism’s focus on choice needs the speculative concern for disinterested, objective truth to rise above blindness or arbitrariness. The complementarity of the two modes of human concern is formulated in terms of Toynbee’s paradigm of withdrawal and return. The speculative pattern is expressed in ‘withdrawal’ from a life of action in the world, and the ‘return’ to active life is a resumption of the practical pattern. One example given is that of St. Paul, whose years of withdrawal to the desert bore fruit in his return to active mission.

[A] man has to have both. When I get into the intellectual pattern of experience I am choosing because I’ve chosen to submit entirely to the exigences of knowing and to meet completely the demands of the effort to know. And without that knowing there would be not merely a residual incertitude, a risk that I have to assume in my choices, but a total blindness, that makes choice indistinguishable from mere force or instinct or passion or arbitrariness. ... To give oneself over entirely to the practical is to become blind and to give oneself over entirely to the speculative is to become ineffective.

In the emphasis on complementarity, there is no priority of one pattern over the
other. Withdrawal and return are mutually dependent on each other for the enrichment of human history, and each is crippled without the other.

The lectures on existentialism build upon Lonergan's earlier thought, yet there is a subtle but important change in the relationship of speculative and practical intelligence. In *Insight* practical intelligence is an expression of the pure desire to know, and so the practical pattern of experience is itself oriented to objectivity. Though common sense, one expression of the practical pattern of experience, is a restricted form of intellectual concern, the process of practical deliberation that determines moral obligation does aspire to objectivity. Disinterested knowing belongs as much to the discernment of practical possibility and obligation as to the speculative judgment of actual being. In other words, the pure desire to know is not restricted to the speculative pattern of experience. The practical pattern is itself an expression of intelligence; it is not blind without the speculative orientation, and certainly not in the sense that it is a matter of "mere force or instinct or passion or arbitrariness." So in the juxtaposition of scholasticism and existentialism, speculation and praxis, there has been a realignment of meanings such that the concern for objectivity is associated uniquely with speculative intelligence. In this realignment the practical pattern comes to reflect and represent existentialism, which in some forms advocates the life of the will, the courage to act, independent of rational or objective criteria; and in seeing the practical pattern in these terms Lonergan is concerned to assert the dependence of action on knowing, which now becomes a matter of the general dependence of practical deliberation on disinterested, speculative concern.

The issue of ethical intellectualism is not explicitly addressed in the above text but Lonergan's reformulation of intellectualism in terms of the dependence of practical concern on speculative concern is made explicit in his "Philosophy of Education" lectures of 1959. In the context of defining the human good in terms of the existential development of the subject, Lonergan recapitulates the
significance of existentialism for facilitating a grasp of one's concrete existence. It provides a phenomenology of consciousness that allows one to understand oneself in terms of the flow of consciousness, the exposition of which we will address in Chapter VI. The examination of the concrete functioning of consciousness culminates in a discussion of 'differentiations of consciousness', the point of which is to formulate the relationship between the practical and speculative 'patterns of the flow of consciousness'. After outlining the objective concern for truth in the speculative pattern, Lonergan raises the question of its relationship to "willing, choosing, doing." He first answers this question by saying that in choosing to develop and organize one's speculative pursuits, one is willing a good, the good of the intellect. This is important, he says, for the defense of intellectualism. His explanation of this centers on the fact that the speculative pattern transcends private interests, so that one goes beyond one's private world, defined by narrow interests, to the objective universe. Lonergan eventually concludes his discussion by asserting that the speculative orientation toward being is unlimited by personal concern, and that this unlimited orientation can only be effective in the context of the practical pattern to the extent that supernatural charity makes it possible. ‘Withdrawal’ into speculation leads toward a disinterested truth, and practical charity depends on extending this disinterestedness from knowing into doing. Intellectualism is a matter of the dependence of the practical pattern upon the disinterested orientation of speculative intelligence.

Again, one sees here both continuity and discontinuity with Insight. It echoes the earlier theme of the disinterestedness of knowing being carried forward in the disinterestedness of choosing. The difference lies in the fact that in Insight practical intelligence is itself disinterested and objective, for this is the very nature of intelligence. Therefore, it is capable of reflectively determining value, for though the knowledge of obligation is a matter of rational consciousness, this
rational knowledge derives from practical reflection. In both the "Philosophy of Education" lectures and the "Existentialism" lectures, however, the practical pattern of experience is not necessarily intelligent. The practical pattern as a whole—not just the act of choice—depends on the objectivity of speculative intelligence. Disinterestedness is associated exclusively with the speculative orientation.

In summary, Lonergan's understanding of the relationship between knowing and doing has been transformed by his concern for a rapprochement between scholasticism and existentialism, one that would preserve the relevance and priority of scholasticism. Existentialism has given him a new sense of the meaning of choice, one in which one's own self is at stake because human existence is self-constituting. Yet existentialism marginalizes speculation by its lack of regard for propositional truth and systematic definition. Only scholastic philosophy is adequate to the conciliar and credal history of Roman Catholicism, which has sought to define the propositional content of the Christian faith. So the engagement with existentialism has both altered Lonergan's understanding of the meaning of choice and challenged his concern for speculative philosophy, and this tension has found expression in the question of the relationship of the speculative and practical patterns of experience.

b. Beyond faculty psychology

Since Lonergan formulates the relationship between existentialism and scholasticism in terms of the relationship of the speculative and practical patterns of experience, one cannot help but note that when Lonergan affirms the superiority of existentialism's intentionality analysis as a method over scholastic faculty psychology, he does so in terms that are immediately relevant to the issue of intellectualism. Lonergan's rejection of faculty psychology can be taken as evidence that he came to find his earlier intellectualism untenable.
Lonergan identifies intentionality analysis with the phenomenological, introspective method introduced by Husserl.\textsuperscript{15} It connotes the analysis and clarification of what consciousness intends, or what consciousness is oriented toward. When Lonergan defines his own philosophical method as intentionality analysis, it does not mark a significant break from his procedure in Insight as much as it indicates a new way of conceptualizing his earlier procedure and its results. In Insight Lonergan discusses the 'intention of being' as a spiritual orientation to truth. Intending being—seeking to know being—underlies the effort to understand and to judge truth. Similarly the levels of consciousness are each defined by a distinct kind of intention and so they can be understood as levels of intention. Empirical consciousness intends experience, intelligent consciousness seeks intelligibility, rational consciousness aims at truth, and in Lonergan’s mature thought existential consciousness intends the realization of the good. Though the basic structure of his method remains unchanged, reconceptualizing it in terms of intentionality analysis marks a deliberate break from scholastic faculty psychology, which it supersedes.\textsuperscript{16}

Lonergan ascribes two faults to faculty psychology, both of which are related to the issue of intellectualism. First, faculty psychology focuses the definition of human nature on static categories, and these categories have led to conflicting positions over priority among the faculties. Because it concentrates on the unchanging, it yields static definitions which overlook the fact that people construct their own character and personality by virtue of their practical choices. The existential subject

... is a notion that is overlooked on the schematism of older categories that distinguished faculties such as intellect and will, or different uses of the same faculty, such as speculative and practical intellect, or different types of human activity, such as theoretical inquiry and practical execution. None of these distinctions adverts to the subject as such ... to draw attention to him in his key role of making himself what he is to be.\textsuperscript{17}

In this passage Lonergan is not denying the validity of these scholastic categories,
but he believes that they are ineffectual in communicating what is crucially important. It is significant that the specific static categories he cites as inadequate are those central to the issue of the relationship between knowing and doing.

When the focus is on these static categories, the result is that there arise conflicts over the priority of faculties. In "The Response of the Jesuit," originally presented in 1970, he gives his reasons for preferring to describe human transcendence in terms of existential authenticity. The first corresponds to and is clarified by what we have just seen: he wants to avoid "the abstract, static context dictated by logical clarity, coherence and rigor." The second reason is more pointed in its evaluation of scholastic categories:

I wished to get out of the context of a faculty psychology with its consequent alternatives of voluntarism, intellectualism, sentimentalism, and sensism, none of which has any serious, viable meaning, and into the context of intentionality analysis that distinguishes and relates the manifold of human conscious operations and reveals that together they head man towards self-transcendence.18

Here Lonergan is less kind to faculty psychology; it leads to a variety of meaningless alternatives. The various alternatives represent interpretations of which faculty is primary over the others—will, intellect, the emotions, or the senses. The rigorous logical clarity of scholasticism led people to play one capacity off against another instead of seeing consciousness more holistically as oriented to an common end. In "Mission and the Spirit," he would commend his new method because "the old questions of priority, of intellectualism and voluntarism and the like, are removed and in their stead comes what at once is simple and clear."19 Intentionality analysis allowed one to transcend these thorny and meaningless disputes over priority. Though Lonergan refers to various conflicting positions built upon faculty psychology, the only one that had held any meaning for him was intellectualism.

There are further indications that it was not faculty psychology in general but intellectualism specifically that Lonergan found problematic. For example, in discussing the inadequacy of Aristotelian science, which begins from the object
of awareness rather than the aware, existential subject, Lonergan distances himself from his own earlier position:

[T]he priority of objects entailed a priority of intellect over will, since will was conceived as rational appetite; and on the priority of intellect over will, there somehow followed a priority of speculative over practical intellect.  

The 'somehow' in this passage suggests that, though Lonergan had once affirmed precisely this priority, at some point it lost its critical clarity and coherence. Elsewhere he makes explicit the fact that his affirmation of the primacy of existential deliberation is a denial of the primacy of speculative intellect. For example, in "Aquinas Today," after introducing existential deliberation as a sublation of speculative judgment, he concludes: "On this showing speculative intellect loses its primacy. The key position now pertains to the deliberating subject." Therefore, one may perhaps catch a hint of autobiography when Lonergan assigns faculty psychology, which he identifies here specifically with intellectualism, to the "age of innocence." In the age of innocence rationality was thought to be an adequate basis for human action and history, but it has been superseded by an age concerned with praxis, an emphasis on the will and practical action. Intellectualism has given way to praxis.

I would suggest then that Lonergan's engagement with existentialism eventually led him to be dissatisfied with his earlier intellectualism, and that faculty psychology had little to offer in resolving this dissatisfaction. To abandon the priority of intellect within the framework of scholastic psychology could only mean to affirm the priority of will, which bears with it the untenable implication that will is irrational, blind. It is this opposition that proves the inadequacy of scholastic categories to survive the turn to praxis.

Yet the virtue of Lonergan's new position is that it resolves his dilemma of how to give primacy to the practical without abandoning the importance of the speculative. Because the practical orientation of existential consciousness sublates the speculative orientation of rational consciousness, it preserves the
importance of speculative rationality but one's choices are no longer determined by it. For, according to a basic principle of Lonergan's notion of finality, the higher is not determined by the lower, yet it preserves the lower within the higher synthesis.

The existential can be said to have primacy—Lonergan also speaks of it as "the primacy of conscience"—because of the hierarchical order among levels. The lower exists for the sake of the higher. So the concern for objective truth occurs for the sake of existential involvement. "We experience to have the materials for understanding .... We understand and formulate to be able to judge .... We experience and understand and judge to become moral." As in Aristotelian and Thomistic thought, the teleological end has priority in the sense that it is the ultimate purpose and initial cause of the process of which it is also the fulfillment. Existential action is the culmination of the process, but also the beginning: "For the intending subject intends, first of all, the good but to achieve it must know the real; to know the real he must know what is true ..." The operations comprising speculative reason are "under the rule and guidance" of existential consciousness. So in the reformulation of rational self-consciousness as existential consciousness, the sphere of ethical responsibility achieves a primacy which it did not have in Insight.

In conclusion, Lonergan's rejection of intellectualism both clarifies and is clarified by the difference between the earlier and later meaning of the fourth level of consciousness. In Insight rational self-consciousness was an extension of a speculatively known rational good into the sphere of living and so it preserved intellectualism, giving priority to intellect over will. With "The Subject" the fourth level comes to be a concern to know the good and to be good above and beyond the concern for discerning objective truth. A speculative exigence gives way to a practical and existential exigence, in which the good is as yet undefined. Knowledge of the good does not belong to speculative intelligence or rational
consciousness, and thus Lonergan discards his earlier intellectualism.

B. From Formal Value to Affective Value

So far our treatment of the fourth level of consciousness in Lonergan's mature thought has focused on its practical and existential character. Existential consciousness is more than this, however, for it is also interpersonal. As interpersonal, it finds its fulfillment in being in love, the highest realization of which is a religious love for God. Hand in hand with Lonergan's adoption of existentialist themes we find an increasing concern with love as a fulfillment of human affectivity, and so love becomes associated with existential responsibility and the fourth level of consciousness. One might say that love and responsibility are the twin themes of existential consciousness, for love reveals value, and one is responsible to the extent that one is motivated by value. The notion that love reveals value takes Lonergan beyond his earlier formalism, which dissociated the knowledge of value from affective responses to specific goods. Lonergan's new emphasis on the apprehension of value in feeling and on love as revealing value marks the end of his earlier ethical formalism.

We will consider how Lonergan's mature position goes beyond his early formalism from two perspectives. First, the good comes to be distinct from and higher than the intelligible and the true by being a synthesis of knowing and feeling. Second, this shift toward a unification of cognitive and affective elements needs to be seen within the general framework of Lonergan's increasing focus on existential responsibility and being in love. The distinction and tension between love and responsibility in Lonergan's thought clarifies the reliance of moral responsibility on love, in which value is revealed.

1. The Good beyond the True

A formal definition of the good relies on a fundamental dichotomy of
reason and desire in which the rational good is determined strictly according to
rational, formal criteria. Desire—the affective response to particular goods—is
irrelevant to the knowledge of the rational good. Lonergan rejects this as he
comes to see value as distinct from the intelligible and reasonable. Earlier we
cited Lonergan’s later reflection that in Insight the good lacks any distinction
from the intelligible and reasonable. Insight presents "the good as identical with
the intelligibility that is intrinsic to being." Lonergan adds:

It will not be amiss to assert emphatically that the identification of being and the
good by-passes human feelings and sentiments to take its stand exclusively upon
intelligible order and rational value. This by-passing of sentiments reflects the formalistic tenor of Lonergan’s early
ethical thought. His later position, however, denies the earlier identification of
objective truth and the good; the knowledge of value comes to be a synthesis of
rational knowledge and affective apprehensions of value.

The change in Lonergan’s concept of the good is illustrated by a
corresponding change in his account of being, for being and good are correlative
terms. The redefinition of being is made clear when Lonergan is asked whether
the fourth level, which is characterized as being in love, takes one beyond the
horizon of being:

The good is beyond the intelligible, the true and the real. It’s more comprehensive.
... But it’s not beyond being, if this being in love ... is the full actuation, the
ultimate actuation of the movement towards the intelligible, towards the true,
towards the real, towards the good. The correlation of the good and being is a stable feature of Lonergan’s thought,
but this answer reflects his mature thought in that being, no less than love, is
more than just a matter of the true and the real. In his earlier works ‘being’ was,
like the good, originally restricted to the intelligible and rational. This is evident
in the epistemological theorem:

Knowledge in the proper sense is knowledge of reality or, more fully, that
knowledge is intrinsically objective, that objectivity is the intrinsic relation of
knowing to being, and that being and reality are identical.
Here being and the real both convey the realm of actual existence as determined by rational affirmation. In Lonergan's later thought, though, both the good and being are beyond that which is rationally known, no longer reducible to that which is intended by the intellectual desire for objective truth.  

Lonergan's affirmation that the good is more comprehensive than the true and the real needs to be carefully defined, for even in *Insight* Lonergan could say that practical living is more comprehensive than simply knowing. For example, he contrasts "the field of knowing" with the "larger field of both knowing and doing". Living, however, from this early perspective is ideally and primarily a matter of extending the knowledge of the rationally defined good into the broader realm of action. What distinguishes the later understanding of the good as more comprehensive is that Lonergan brings a new, affective component into the knowledge of the good that was missing in earlier works. He says in his explanation of sublation that "each later level sublates those that precede in the sense that it goes beyond them, introduces something entirely new, makes that new element a new basis of operation." In the fourth level, that something "entirely new" is the affective apprehension of value. This is what Lonergan means in saying that "deliberation sublates and thereby unifies knowing and feeling." By incorporating feeling as an essential component in the knowledge of value, such knowledge becomes a higher, more comprehensive integration than that implied in rational knowing alone.

Though Lonergan introduces the new notion of value in "The Subject," it seems that he has not fully developed his definition of value. Already Lonergan avoids defining value as the rational good, for as something intended beyond the true and the real it must be something more than merely rational. Yet one would search in vain for any explicit reference to affective apprehensions of value as relevant to the notion of value. The fact that value involves the affective and interpersonal dimension of living is present but not thematically addressed in "The
Subject," in his description of how the knowledge of value is possible:

We come to know the good from the example of those about us, from the stories people tell of the good and evil men and women of old, from the incessant flow of praise and blame that makes up the great part of human conversation, from the elation and from the shame that fill us when our own choices and deeds are our own determination of ourselves as good or evil, praiseworthy or blameworthy.37

Affective and interpersonal factors are sufficient for learning to know the good, but how these factors make possible the knowledge of value is not made clear. Indeed, Lonergan almost seems to be retreating to what he dealt with in Insight as the dramatic pattern of experience, in which non-rational artistic and affective criteria are dominant.38 The ambiguity of Lonergan’s indication of how value is known and the absence of any reference to affective apprehensions of value both suggest that he has not yet conceived of the fourth level of consciousness as a synthesis of knowing and feeling.

The mature characterization of existential consciousness as a synthesis of knowing and feeling first appears in Lonergan’s writings in 1970. Lonergan’s engagement with Max Scheler and Dietrich von Hildebrand, from whom he adopted his understanding of affective apprehensions of value, is evident as early as 1968, but it is not until 1970 that he appropriates their notion of a natural scale of values and explicitly discusses the apprehension of value.39 Lonergan’s reliance on Scheler and von Hildebrand provides a solid indication of his rejection of formalism, for von Hildebrand followed Scheler’s account of ethics, and Scheler explicitly defined his ethical position explicitly against Kant’s formal ethics in his Formalism in Ethics and Non-formal Ethics of Values.40 Lonergan’s fullest account of the apprehension of value and the judgment of value appears in Method in Theology, which was likely worked out in 1969.41 To this account we now turn.

Lonergan begins his discussion of value by summarizing von Hildebrand’s analysis of feelings.42 Value is intended by a certain kind of intentional feeling; that is, it is the object to which a certain kind of feeling is a response. Intentional
feelings, as opposed to non-intentional, arise as responses to objects of which one is conscious, whether they be present to consciousness through direct perception, imagination or representation. Non-intentional feelings, on the other hand, are not responses but rather they are either physiologically caused 'states', such as fatigue or anxiety, or goal-oriented 'trends', like hunger or thirst; in both cases the feeling precedes rather than proceeds from the awareness of the cause or goal. By contrast, intentional feelings are caused by or responsive to what we are aware of. They relate us to people, places, things, ourselves, the past and future, and whatever else can experienced, imagined or thought about. Such feelings pervade our experience, giving life a sense of direction, depth and substance.

There are two classes of intentional objects, or two kinds of things that evoke affective responses: that which is relevant to pleasure, and that which is valuable. With respect to pleasure there are things that are agreeable or disagreeable, things which spontaneously evoke delight or dread, hope or fear, satisfaction or regret. Judgment may reflectively determine that a pleasurable good is truly good but, aside from such judgments, these goods are ambiguous. Values, however, are things that are truly good. The apprehension of value "greets either the ontic value of a person or the qualitative value of beauty, of understanding, of truth, of noble deeds, of virtuous acts, of great achievements."

The apprehension of value in intentional feelings is an important component in the judgment of value. Judgments of value belong to the fourth level of consciousness, in which value is intended and realized through moral self-transcendence. Like judgments of fact, judgments of value seek an objectively true good, a value independent of the subject. In the hierarchical ordering of the levels of consciousness, the affective apprehension of value comes between judgments of fact and judgments of value. These three components—judgments of fact, apprehensions of value, and the notion of value—come together in the judgment of value. Judgment of fact provides a knowledge of reality, especially
as it relates to the human situation. The notion of value is the spiritual exigence toward moral self-transcendence, which grounds both the choosing and the reflective, deliberate determination of what can and should be done. In deliberation one formulates a realistic course of action and anticipates the probable consequences of one's choices. Without such judgment one is inclined to be led by moral feeling and to espouse a moral idealism that contributes little to human welfare. Yet there is a need for moral feeling, for "knowledge alone is not enough." Moral feeling—i.e., the apprehension of value—is needed together with knowledge in discerning the truly good.

From this account of the judgment of value we can see how Lonergan has left behind the ethical formalism of his earlier days. Though Lonergan maintains his earlier distinction between spontaneous affectivity and the deliberate judgment of value, a central difference is found in the fact that there are spontaneous, affective apprehensions of value. In his earlier position spontaneous goods were strictly empirical, non-rational goods, distinct from values. Since feelings now intend values and not simply empirical goods, value must be understood as materially good, an object of affective desire. Though the judgment of value may exercise control, deliberating whether moral feeling is in harmony with the facts of the situation and conducive to beneficial consequences, value is grasped independent of such deliberation so that deliberation relies in part on moral feeling.

In conclusion, Lonergan's account of the fourth level of consciousness transcends ethical formalism in its account of moral judgment as a synthesis of feeling and knowing. As a synthesis of these two elements, the good is distinct as a fourth level from the intelligible and reasonable, for it is in part guided by affective intuitions of value. Because value can be apprehended in affective responses, value is no longer a formal good, for it is grounded in the desires of the heart.
2. Ethical responsibility and being-in-love

Though enough has been said to demonstrate Lonergan’s rejection of formalism, we would do well to see this development in the broader perspective of his increasing attention to love as a higher, affective fulfillment of the human eros. His recognition of the positive contribution of love to self-transcendence arises hand in hand with his turn to an existential framework. It fills out and enriches what he means by existential consciousness, and provides the basis for his new account of value. A adequate account of existential consciousness requires, therefore, consideration of its affective dimension. On the fourth level of consciousness love is distinct from and stands in tension with moral responsibility, and this tension would eventually expresses itself in the formulation of love as a fifth level. Yet whether love is on the fourth level or on a fifth, it both grounds the knowledge of value and is the highest fulfillment of self-transcendence.

a. Being in love and existential consciousness

The association of being in love with existential responsibility first appears in opposition to a scholastic, rational account of devotion in 1964, in a paper later published as "Existenz andaggiornamento." In it he challenges his religious community toward authenticity and frames this challenge within the distinction between being in Christ as a substance and as a subject. The notion of ‘being in Christ’ connotes being within the redemptive sphere of the power, the will and the love of Christ. In this context the distinction between substance and subject—Lonergan’s conventional metaphor for the distinction between the scholastic and existential perspectives—takes on a new aspect. ‘Being in Christ as substance’ points to a condition of being in love with God without being aware of it; it means doing all the right things for the right reasons.

Inasmuch as [being in Christ] is just the being of substance, it is known only
through faith, through affirming true propositions, meditating on them, concluding from them, making resolutions on the basis of them, winning over our psyches, our sensitive souls, to carrying out the resolutions through the cultivation of pious imagination and pious affects, and multiplying individual effort and strength through liturgical union. Inasmuch as it is just the being of substance, it is being in love with God without awareness of being in love. 45

It is more than coincidental, I believe, that this description of religious devotion echoes his defense of devotion in *Insight*, with the conforming of affectivity to rational propositions for the sake of effectively and collectively willing the rational good. 46 This process is indeed an expression of being in love with God, but it is one in which God’s presence and transforming initiative is experientially undiscerned. Becoming a subject in Christ is a matter of experiencing the divine initiative, being aware of being in love with God, which draws one toward transformation:

> But inasmuch as being in Christ Jesus is the being of a subject, the hand of the Lord ceases to be hidden. ... For the love of God, being in love with God, can be as full and as dominant, as overwhelming and as lasting an experience as human love. 47

In this passage, then, the distinction between subject and substance is to be found in the difference between an experiential love for God and a relationship in which the experiential, affective component is absent. As Lonergan came to appreciate the more mystical, affective side of religious devotion, his attempt to formulate this love over against his earlier intellectualistic approach to devotion found expression in the same metaphor which distinguished the scholastic and existential: substance and subject. We might ask, however, why those who do all the right things for the right reasons are ‘in Christ as substance’, since this kind of devotion, no less than the existential, involves choice and taking responsibility for who one is becoming. In what sense are they not subjects, when the conventional distinction between substance and subject is that the subject develops responsibly, while substance is static? The reason is to be found in the fact that scholastic, ‘substantial’ devotion is built upon static, abstract propositions; it comprises practical choices governed by speculative knowledge.
‘Subjective’ devotion takes its departure from concrete experience, the experience of being in love.

Being in love—or as Lonergan sometimes puts it, ‘being-in-love’—is a dynamic state, a principle in one’s living that governs thought and feeling in a comprehensive way. Lonergan speaks of three kinds of being in love: familial love between husband, wife and offspring; civic love of the clan, the nation, the neighbour, the community of humankind; and the religious love for God, and in God a love for all things. Each kind of love involves total self-surrender, a willingness to serve and sacrifice for the other. Religious love, however, is the highest possible expression of love, for unlike the other two it is "being in love without limits or qualifications or conditions or reservations." Such love is not only complete but it is also unrestricted in the sense that it is not confined to any particular object or range of objects. It is a love of God, and in loving God it embraces one’s spouse, one’s neighbour, and the whole of God’s creation. So, being in love with God can be a foundation of familial and civil love, yet it goes beyond these loves to satisfy the deepest longing of human aspiration. Being in love is not a human achievement, and religious love in particular is a gift of God’s grace. In his mature works Lonergan never tires of quoting Romans 5:5—"The love of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Spirit of God who has been given to us." God has taken the initiative in planting within us a love for him, and that love seeks its final fulfillment in a complete being in love:

This complete being-in-love, the gift of God’s grace, is the reason of the heart that reason does not know. It is a religious experience by which we enter into a subject-to-subject relation with God.

As ‘the reason of the heart’ love is the light that reveals value, showing us what is otherwise inaccessible to objective rationality. As religious experience it is a communion with God, which has its fullest realization in mysticism.

The theme of being in love stands in contrast to Lonergan’s earlier account of the affective dimension of human living. Where emotion and conation had
previously belonged to the sensitive psyche, Lonergan now speaks of the heart as something distinct from the psyche. In an interview in 1971, he defines symbols as the communication link between psyche, mind and heart.

> Where mind is experience, understanding, judgment; and heart is what's beyond this on the level of feeling and 'is this worthwhile?'—judgment of value, decision.

Without feelings this experience, understanding, judgment is paper-thin. The heart is associated with feelings as they pertain to moral, existential evaluation. That is, the heart is the seat of the affective apprehension of value.

When Lonergan develops the general notion of being in love and the more specific notion of religious love and religious conversion, he associates it with the fourth level of consciousness. Being in love with God transforms existential consciousness, for it is this level of consciousness "brought to fulfillment," given a new foundation. Love does not take one beyond the sphere of moral responsibility, but it changes the motivating context of responsibility. The relationship between love and moral responsibility needs further clarification, for this will provide a basis on which Chapter VI can build in exploring the role of love in revealing value.

b. The tension between responsibility and love

Though Lonergan saw being in love as an important element in existential consciousness, there is both a distinction and a tension between moral responsibility and love as different aspects of this fourth level of consciousness. The distinction is evident in the fact that Lonergan regularly contrasts them. The tension is revealed in the way Lonergan tries to come to an adequate account of what it means to speak of love as a higher fulfillment than moral responsibility.

The distinction between moral responsibility and love is discernible throughout Lonergan's mature works. Sometimes it is merely implied and at other times explicit. For example, the contrast he draws in 1964 between being in Christ as substance and as subject can be understood in terms of whether one
is doing the right things for the right reasons or whether one is consciously, affectively involved. While both imply a love for God, the one is merely responsible and the other is a matter of experiential love. In a lecture given in 1977 Lonergan distinguishes the self-transcendence of understanding, judgment and moral responsibility from the higher fulfillment of being in love. Being in love is beyond moral self-transcendence, for "self-transcendence reaches its term not in righteousness but in love." Righteousness is a matter of moral fulfillment, and as such it falls short of full self-transcendence.

The distinction between love and responsibility is present even when Lonergan speaks of moral responsibility in terms of love, for this love is distinct from what he means by being in love. Morality is a matter of self-transcendence, in which one transcends a concern for personal satisfaction and becomes benevolent and beneficent. Lonergan speaks of this as becoming capable of genuine love. Such love is a matter of decision and commitment, and through such choices common meaning is realized in a community:

Common meaning is realized by will, especially by permanent dedication, in the love that makes families, in the loyalty that makes states, in the faith that makes religions.

In this passage we find the three loves treated as kinds of commitment, as forms of responsibility that make communal meaning—and so, community—possible. Though love is an expression of existential responsibility, Lonergan distinguishes between such acts of love and being in love. After saying that moral self-transcendence renders people "principles of benevolence and beneficence, of genuine co-operation, of true love" he continues:

Now there is a profound difference between particular acts of loving and the dynamic state to which we refer when we speak of falling in love and of being in love.

Being in love is a distinct kind of motivation, for it is "the origin and source that prompts and colors all one's thoughts and feelings, all one's hopes and fears, all one's joy and sorrows." The character of motivation is implicit again in
Lonergan's discussion of the superiority of religious conversion to moral:

Moral conversion takes you beyond intellectual conversion; and religious takes you beyond both. ... [Religious conversion] occurs, insofar as it does, through God's grace. ... [The fundamental text with regard to this operative grace is Ezekiel, God plucking out the heart of stone which has no desire whatever to be a heart of flesh and putting in the heart of flesh ... .]

The contrast between the hearts of stone and of flesh suggests that moral responsibility is possible without the affective involvement, the deep and conscious caring for the other, which is a sustained and sustaining source of motivation. An act of moral responsibility may indeed be an act of love in that it is done for the sake of a higher, more common good rather than for oneself, but it does not require an affective caring, which is a higher expression of self-transcendence.

The distinction between responsibility and love expresses a tension in Lonergan's thought regarding the nature of the fourth level. If being in love is a higher fulfillment of existential responsibility, how is 'higher' to be understood? Previously, issues of higher and lower had been dealt with in terms of levels of consciousness, a metaphor that conveys the successive sublation of one kind of consciousness by another. The idea that being in love should be a higher fulfillment and yet on the same level creates a tension that eventually expresses itself in Lonergan declaring love to be a fifth level. One sees this development in Lonergan's thought in the contrast between two essays, "Mission and the Spirit," written in 1974, and "Natural Right and Historical Mindedness," published in 1977.

In "Mission and the Spirit" Lonergan preserves the picture of existential consciousness as the highest level and being in love as the highest fulfillment of that level. In the context of integrating the disinterestedness of morality—and presumably of the other levels of intentional consciousness as well—with "the passionateness of being," or the affective aspect of living, Lonergan contrasts them as two different kinds of process. The contrast is apparent in two ways.
First, the four levels of consciousness are explained in terms of three distinct 'operators', or causal principles, while affectivity is dealt with as a 'quasi-operator'. The three operators are the questions that move consciousness from one level to another—the questions that take one from experience to understanding, from understanding to knowing, and from knowing to realizing the good. Calling affectivity a quasi-operator suggests that it effects a change in consciousness but the change is of a different sort than that associated with a transition in levels of consciousness. The difference is unspecified, though it seems to relate to how the levels of consciousness function, so that the changes are not from one level to another but changes within levels.

Second, with respect to the four levels of consciousness, the passionateness of being "has a dimension of its own." That is, it is a different kind of process, one that "underpins and accompanies and reaches beyond the subject as experientially, intelligently, rationally, morally conscious." It underpins the intentional operations by effecting the transition from the neural to the psychic, from unconscious processes to experiential consciousness. It accompanies those operations, in the sense that it is present in the feelings that render consciousness substantial, lending it "mass and momentum." It reaches beyond, or "overarches," the intentional operations, which suggests that it includes or comprehends them but is not limited to them or by them and so it is somewhat independent of them. In this capacity affectivity is described as "the topmost quasi-operator that by intersubjectivity prepares, by solidarity entices, by falling in love establishes us as members of community." Intersubjectivity is a matter of spontaneous experience, solidarity implies the further development of voluntary commitment, and falling in love indicates the highest affective fulfillment. The general picture drawn by the contrast of the levels of consciousness and the passionateness of being is that there are two different but overlapping kinds of process. Both participate in vertical finality, aspiring to the highest human
fulfillment, yet the affective dimension of this aspiration is both basic to and somewhat independent of the achievements of intentional consciousness. Though being in love is the highest possible fulfillment, it occurs within existential consciousness as the fulfillment of a relatively independent affective process.

By 1977 Lonergan takes a new direction in explaining the relationship of being in love to the levels of intentional consciousness. The four levels of consciousness become aspects of an affective movement toward self-transcendence, one that has its fulfillment on a level beyond moral responsibility.

What is complete under the aspect of intelligibility, is not yet complete under the aspect of factual truth; and what is complete under the aspect of factual truth, has not yet broached the question of the good. Further, if what the several principles attain are only aspects of something richer and fuller, must not the several principles themselves be but aspects of a deeper and more comprehensive principle? And is not that deeper and more comprehensive principle itself a nature, at once a principle of movement and of rest, a tidal movement that begins before consciousness, unfolds through sensitivity, intelligence, rational reflection, responsible deliberation, only to find its rest beyond all of these? I think so.

The point beyond is being-in-love, a dynamic state that sublates all that goes before, a principle of movement at once purgative and illuminative, and a principle of rest in which union is fulfilled.66

Here the relationship of being in love to the various levels of consciousness is one of part and whole, in which the whole is more than just the sum of the parts. With respect to the other four levels, it goes "beyond all of these" and "sublates all that goes before." As noted above, the metaphor of levels of consciousness depends upon the notion of sublation, and so being in love implicitly becomes a new level of consciousness. As the ultimate level of fulfillment, the notion of hierarchy indicates that the other levels are for the sake of this end, and this is reflected in the assertion that being in love "unfolds through sensitivity, intelligence, rational reflection, [and] responsible deliberation."67 Just as in Method the intention of realizing the good unfolds through the desire to understand and the desire to know, so does the dynamic orientation of being in love develop through the other four levels of consciousness. Though this effectively renders being in love a fifth level, it is not until 1981 that Lonergan
makes it explicit. We might also consider the tension between responsibility and being in love from another perspective: why does Lonergan for so long keep being in love on the same level as existential consciousness? Lonergan regularly treats religion as distinct from moral responsibility, just as moral responsibility is distinct from the other levels of consciousness, yet he refrains from considering it a distinct level. For example, he would describe the method of theology as being "attentive, intelligent, reasonable, responsible, and religious," adding that "responsibility includes the element not only of morality but also of religion." Religious experience is called a modality of consciousness, a heightening of consciousness comparable to the transitions from attentiveness to intelligence, and from reasonableness to responsibility. Yet in spite of this recognition of religious experience or being in love as a higher kind of awareness, Lonergan seems to resist making it an independent level.

The reason for this, I believe, is that the affective apprehension of value is fundamental to moral responsibility, and love's significant contribution is that it reveals value. It is a condition of the possibility of moral deliberation, for it is an element in the judgment of value upon which responsibility depends. As such, the affective apprehension of value is part of the manifold brought into the higher synthesis of existential authenticity. Being in love is closely associated with the affective apprehension of value, and so love must reveal the values upon which the judgment of value depends. This is what Lonergan means in saying that being in love with God is the ground and root of existential consciousness. Love cannot be something beyond existential, moral responsibility, since it is a necessary condition of that responsibility. So the tension between love and moral responsibility arises from the fact that love is both higher than and yet basic to responsibility. Lonergan could eventually resolve this tension through his notion of an upward and a downward movement, for in the downward movement love
can be higher than and yet basic to responsibility. But further discussion must wait until we can consider these two movements in more detail in the next chapter.

In summary, the association of value with affective apprehensions of value is a key aspect of Lonergan’s recognition of the positive contribution of love to self-transcendence. As early as 1964 Lonergan associates an affective, experiential love with the existentialist emphasis on responsibility, and contrasts it with the more scholastic and intellectualistic account of devotion typical of Insight. Love becomes a central component in his account of value, for it reveals value and makes responsibility possible. The fundamental importance of love for the knowledge of value makes clear Lonergan’s rejection of ethical formalism.

C. Conclusion

It has been our purpose to demonstrate that Lonergan’s early and mature accounts of ethics, when properly understood, reveal two fundamentally different perspectives. Both his early intellectualism and formalism are left behind in favour of a position that gives priority to existential praxis and sees value as materially good, discovered through affective apprehensions. The contrast between his earlier intellectualism and his later emphasis on love is nowhere more stark than in his earlier and later account of the procession of the Trinity as analogous to human intentionality. His Verbum articles follow Thomas in accounting for the procession of the Trinity: reflective understanding (the Word) emerges from direct understanding (the Father), and love in the will (the Spirit) from reflective understanding. In the mid-seventies Lonergan formulates it in radically different fashion. God the Father is love, and from that love proceeds the Word, the judgment of value; the judgment of value grounds the loving act, or "the Proceeding Love that is identified with the Holy Spirit." 72

The relationship between the change from intellectualism to praxis and the
change from a formal to a material good is an intimate one, for Lonergan's intellectualism and formalism are closely associated. Both are united for Lonergan by the rationality of the good. Intellectualism depends on the good being rational, and—according to Lonergan's structural parallel of being and the good—for to be rational the good must be formal, independent of personal feelings and desires. Though these positions do not logically imply each other—Thomas embraced intellectualism without a formally rational good, and Kant espoused formalism without intellectualism—Lonergan understood them in such a way that to change one would require a corresponding change in the other. Lonergan reformulates the fourfold structure of moral duty, which had previously been a practical exigence parallel to that of the speculative, so that the practical and existential concern for both determining and realizing value becomes a fourth level of consciousness. Thus, he could assert both that praxis has priority—in the sense that it is the ultimate end that the spiritual eros serves—and that praxis depends upon rational judgments of fact to keep from being blind. From the work of Scheler and von Hildebrand he adopted the notion that feelings intend values and not just empirical goods. This made it possible for him to leave behind his understanding of value as the rational good and embrace an understanding of the truly good as a reflective synthesis of knowing and feeling, where feelings themselves grasp value in an immediate way.

One could argue that there is one basic trend underlying Lonergan's rejection of intellectualism and formalism. Lonergan rejected faculty psychology because he could not accommodate the priority of praxis within scholasticism, and his acceptance of the priority of praxis reflects his increasing association of existential responsibility and love. As "Existenz and Aggiornamento" makes clear, by 1964 Lonergan has come to recognize the positive contribution of human affectivity to self-transcendence and has associated it with the concrete, experiential focus of existentialism, and with practical, existential responsibility.
This essay expresses a tension between intellectualism, in which affectivity is accommodated to a primarily intellectual exigence, and experiential love as a higher fulfillment of our spiritual eros. Love and responsibility are rooted in the concrete, experiential immediacy of persons being human in the network of communal relationships. Love and responsibility are both the fulfillment and the means of fulfillment of our humanity. Love in particular is the new foundation stone, which Lonergan had earlier overlooked. In short, I believe love is the scandalon over which Lonergan’s earlier formalistic intellectualism stumbled and by which it is ultimately crushed.

With the demise of his formalism and intellectualism, the question arises as to whether in Lonergan’s new framework the apprehension of value is open to historical development. As we saw in Chapter II, the affective dimension of human living was associated with the conservative, self-interested psyche. Only reason was a principle of progress, and though affectivity could be conformed to rational progress, it was a principle of limitation that tended to resist progress and transcendence. Now that Lonergan admits an affective dimension to transcendence, and appeals to the heart as the basis for affective transcendence, how does historical progress relate to the heart? What is the nature of the heart? To what extent is the apprehension of value culturally informed and to what extent natural? These questions are at the heart of our attempt to understand Lonergan’s mature ethical position, which is the concern of Chapter VI.
PART III. LONERGAN'S MATURE ACCOUNT OF VALUE

Chapter VI. The Apprehension of the Good

As we have seen, Lonergan’s early emphasis on the priority of the intellect and his association of affectivity with the conservative, self-interested psyche gives way in his mature works to the primacy of affective love and responsible praxis. Where the emotional dimension of human living has virtually no moral significance in Lonergan’s early work, except as either an impediment or a support to rational, moral living, it has a central significance for the responsible judgment of value in his later works.

In this chapter it will be argued that the judgment of value relies upon apprehensions of value that are not historically determined but rather are ahistorical intuitions grounded primarily in human nature. That is, the affective response to value is not—like understanding, judgments of truth or value—moulded by the historical process. Rather they stem simply from the ‘heart’, a natural capacity to respond to value that may be thwarted or distorted but which develops naturally. The reliance of value judgments on these apprehensions, needs to be qualified for only to the extent that apprehensions of value are grounded in love do they adequately ground value judgments. Though history enters into the judgment of value, the judgment of value relies upon an ahistorical apprehension of value. The ahistorical character of apprehensions of value reflects an underlying continuity with his earlier position—the opposition between feeling and reason, which identifies feeling with nature and reason with history.

In short, this chapter seeks to demonstrate three things: first, that the apprehension of value is ahistorical in the sense that it is immediately given as
determinate and, if nature is not thwarted, veridical; second, that the judgment of value, into which history enters, depends upon these determinate apprehensions of value; and third, that the ahistorical character of affective responses to value reflects the abiding dualism in Lonergan’s thought between the natural spontaneity of feeling and the historical deliberateness of reason.

First, it will be shown that for Lonergan apprehensions of value are intuitions that reflect a natural capacity to respond to value. This is evident both in the independence of such apprehensions from the notions of truth and value, which ground the process of inquiry and insight, and in his account of the development of feeling as a natural process. Though historical and cultural factors play a part in developing affective apprehension, the affective response to value is neither a learned response nor a response to something historically discovered and defined.

Second, we will examine Lonergan’s account of conversion and especially religious, or affective, conversion, for it is closely associated with the apprehension of value, and its uniqueness vis-à-vis intellectual and moral conversion further demonstrates the ahistorical character of these apprehensions. In contrast to intellectual and moral conversion, which do not disclose particular truths or values but simply the intention of truth or value, only affective conversion entails the revelation of something particular—the values that satisfy the heart’s immanent criteria. A second reason for exploring Lonergan’s notion of conversion is that it shows how closely conversion is related to natural development. Conversion realizes a potential immanent in the natural process of growth, and this indicates that the disclosure of values in love through conversion is to be understood as the realization of a natural potential.

Both of these lines of argument assume that history enters into the process of understanding and evaluating by determining the intention to know truth and to realize value. As is clear from Lonergan’s later writings, the apprehension of
value is developed through the process of acculturation, and this might suggest that, though it is not culturally and historically determined by the upward path of development, it may yet be determined by the downward path. In the third section, then, we will examine the development of Lonergan’s notion of the downward path to see how it comes to denote both the developmental process rooted in religious conversion and the process of acculturation. In this context it will be argued that the acculturation of the apprehension of value does little to alter the picture of a natural, ahistorical intuition of value.

Fourth, it will be shown that the judgment of value is ideally quite dependent on the apprehension of value. The judgment of value is dependent on the apprehension of value in a general sense as part of the manifold that is sublated in the higher integration of a value judgment. Generally these apprehensions are not trustworthy, for they can be distorted by the tensions of development and the process of socialization, and so the judgment of value does not take them at their face value. Yet, to the extent that development is unstopped and corrected by conversion, in which love reveals values, the apprehension of value provides a firm foundation for the judgment of value. It reveals the good in such a way that it becomes a new basis for evaluation, and is itself beyond critical evaluation. To the extent that value is apprehended in love, the good is discerned by the reasons of the heart that reason does not know; and the heart’s reasons are ahistorical.

Finally, the ahistorical character of the apprehension of value indicates that Lonergan’s mature position maintains the dualism between affectivity and reason. Though feelings now belong to the highest reaches of human fulfillment, spontaneous affect and deliberate reason still function as two distinct principles. It is suggested that this stems from Lonergan’s concern to preserve the constructive character of reason, which he rightly sees to be necessary to the historical nature of the knowledge of truth and value.
A. The Ground and Development of the Good

The first task is to demonstrate how Lonergan grounds the apprehension of value strictly in nature. This is evident first in his account of apprehensions as spontaneous responses to value and in his understanding of them as independent of the notions which historically determine truth and value. It is also apparent in his discussion of the natural and educational development of feelings. Both themes show that value apprehensions are potentially and naturally veridical intuitions of value.

1. Apprehensions of Value and the Notions of Truth and Value

It has been noted that history enters human knowing and acting through the notions of truth and value. Nature provides the indeterminate intention to know and to act, but what is affirmed as true and chosen as good depends on a process of deliberate inquiry that determines what will be affirmed and chosen. Though by nature we respond affectively to value, neither this response nor the object to which it is a response, is historically determined.

The apprehension of value is an affective, intentional response to a value.\(^1\) It is an intentional response in that it is a response to something of which one is consciously aware. This response registers in one's feelings and so indicates the goodness of that to which it is a response. It is specifically a response to what is perceived as a value, rather than to what is seen as merely agreeable or satisfying. They are distinct from responses to what is agreeable precisely because they respond to things perceived as truly good:

Apprehensions of value occur in a further category of intentional response which greets either the ontic value of a person or the qualitative value of beauty, of understanding, of truth, of noble deeds, of virtuous acts, of great achievements. For we are so endowed that we not only ask questions leading to self-transcendence, not only can recognize correct answers constitutive of intentional self-transcendence, but also respond with the stirring of our very being when we glimpse the possibility or actuality of moral self-transcendence.\(^2\)

Lonergan compares the affective response to value to the natural tendency to ask
questions and to grasp intelligibility and truth. Just as we raise questions, and recognize the intelligibility and adequacy of answers, even so we respond affectively to the apprehension of the truly and unambiguously good. As we will see in the discussion of development, the apprehension of something as truly good does not necessarily imply that it is truly good. The point rather is that there is a qualitative difference between goods that are perceived as merely desirable and those which strike us as truly good. This qualitative difference is to be explained by criteria of value rooted in human nature. So it is that Lonergan can appeal in his discussion of natural law to the "norms immanent in human affectivity" together with those immanent in understanding, judgment, and evaluation.

Though the apprehension of value is compared to the natural ability to grasp intelligibility and truth, unlike them it does not find its source in a transcendental notion, and this implies that the apprehension of value does not reflect the indeterminate process of inquiry and answer by which history progressively determines meaning and value. Nature and history cooperate in judgments of truth or value, for they reflect the two sources of meaning, the transcendental and the categorial. The transcendental notions are the transcendental source of meaning; this is the natural dynamism of intentional consciousness which both seeks to determine and has immanent criteria for determining intelligibility, truth and value. The categorial source is the historical process of raising questions and answering them. In short, nature provides the desire and the criteria for knowing, acting responsibly and loving; history determines the answers, so that what is known, done and loved necessarily reflects cultural and personal development (or decline). Apprehensions of value, however, do not have their source in a transcendental notion, which implies that they are not progressively determined.

That the response to value is independent of the notion of value is apparent from Lonergan's discussion of vertical liberty. Vertical liberty stands in contrast
to horizontal liberty, the freedom that one can exercise within the limitations of one's worldview. Vertical liberty is the freedom in which people 'choose' how limited their world will be, the freedom to go beyond current limitations to a higher, more comprehensive perspective or to remain within a comfortably narrow perspective. Vertical liberty can be either implicit or explicit. As implicit this freedom "occurs in responding to motives that lead one to ever fuller authenticity" or in ignoring such motives and 'drifting'—a word which expresses for Lonergan the passive, irresponsible acceptance of what the crowd is doing. Vertical liberty is explicit in the deliberate reflection and choice that leads to meaningful commitment and to the ongoing effort to hone, clarify and correct that commitment. Only the latter reflects the transcendental notion of value, and this raises the question of what implicit vertical liberty is. The only possible answer, I believe, is that it is non-reflective action in response to the apprehension of value, for only value can lead one in the direction of greater freedom and authenticity. Since the apprehension of value does not express the notion of value, the implication is that it is not historically determined.

Neither is the apprehension of value grounded in the notions of intelligibility or truth. That is, it does not depend on an intelligent grasp of what a thing is, or on the rational grasp of truth. The third level of consciousness does not ground the fourth in terms of the knowledge of a particular thing grounding the apprehension of its value; rather the general grasp of reality—the knowledge of what is really possible and probable given the nature of humankind and the social situation—grounds the possibility of responsible judgments of value. When Lonergan places the apprehension of reality intermediate between judgments of fact and judgments of value, this is not meant to imply that they arise from judgments of fact but rather that together judgments of value require them as part of the manifold to be organized in the judgment of value. This is evident when Lonergan says shortly afterward that apprehensions are responses to "the
possibility or actuality of moral self-transcendence." That is, they are responses to something belonging to the fourth level, not the third. In short, Lonergan does not embrace an intellectualistic account of the apprehensions of value; they are not prompted by an intellectual knowledge. Indeed, as we will see below, he attributes the apprehension of value to love, and does so explicitly as a denial of the adequacy of intellectualism. Again, the implication is that the affective response to value, as independent of the historical process of determining truth, does not reflect historical determination.

Further evidence that these apprehensions owe more to natural intuition than to historical determination can be found in the fact that there is a natural hierarchy among classes of values so that some values are intrinsically to be preferred above others. This "spontaneous scale of preference" ranges from vital values, which are the lowest, through social, cultural, and personal values, to religious values. Vital values like health and strength are preferred over the discomfort of maintaining health. Social values are those things that contribute to social order, and so make possible the pursuit of vital values for the whole community. Cultural values are associated with the meaning and value of human and communal existence; they are associated with the definition, development and communication of meaning and values, for community depends on the collective sharing of these. Personal value is the worth of the person, as capable of achieving self-transcendence and promoting it in others. Religious values have as their the supreme value God, who is loved first and foremost, and from this center all other values come to be seen as an expression of God's love in the world. As spontaneous and natural this hierarchy reflects the immanent criteria of human nature.

In summary, we naturally discern value just as we naturally question and recognize the intelligibility and adequacy of answers. However, apprehensions of value are not grounded in the notions of truth and value, and so they do not
arise from the process of inquiry, through which history plays its formative role
in the determination of knowledge and choice. Like the recognition of intelligibility
and rational adequacy, the affective response to value is not learned, but
unlike them it is not the resolution of an historically defined question. Implicit in
the apprehension of value is a hierarchical order, according to which some are by
nature more important than others. In each of these ways, the affective response
to value does not rely upon historical determination.

2. The Development of the Apprehension of Value

In spite of the independence of the apprehension of value from historical
determination, culture does play a role in the development of affective responses.
Even here, however, the evidence points to the natural rather than the historical
character of the apprehension of value.

Apprehensions of value, like other feelings, undergo development through
both growth and education. There is growth in affectivity from "the initial
infantile bundle of needs and clamors and gratifications" to the final affective
maturity of being in love with God. Infants do not respond to value but simply
to the agreeable and disagreeable. As they grow, they progressively become
responsive to vital values, then social, cultural, personal and, eventually, religious
values. There is a sense in which the affective dimension of one's being seeks
a unifying wholeness, and development continues until the highest integration of
values is found in the love for God. So the natural scale of preference in the
apprehension of value is something that emerges over the course of normal
psychological and spiritual development. Unlike cultural and historical
development, which depend on the intellectual exigence, it is a development
rooted in the natural growth of the individual. The hierarchical criteria of value
arise because of an intrinsic or natural principle that governs human development
rather than as an effect of social circumstance.
The educational development of the apprehension of value is dealt with in the broader context of the development of feelings. Though there is a natural spontaneity in feelings, feelings can be developed in two ways. First, they can be encouraged by advertence and approval or discouraged by disapproval and distraction, both of which can modify the student's "spontaneous scale of preferences." The purpose of Lonergan's point here is not clear, but since nature itself spontaneously defines the order of preference, the point should not be taken to say that the scale of preferences should necessarily be modified. Rather, I believe his point is that, as a matter of fact, what is spontaneous and natural can be altered for better or for worse. The following paragraph notes that the natural scale can be distorted in the course of development, and his point here may serve to explain how education can distort the natural scale by promoting bias. His point might also be that, by education, distortions of the natural scale of preference can be corrected.

Second, feelings can also be "enriched and refined by attentive study of the wealth and variety of the objects that arouse them." The choice of words—"enrich" and "refine"—implies that students do not need to learn to recognize value. Rather their natural capacity to recognize it can be rendered more sensitive and more nuanced by exercise. The ideal process of education "will conspire with the pupil's ... own capacities and tendencies, enlarge and deepen his apprehension of values, and help him towards self-transcendence." The tone throughout is one of cultivating what is already present and natural, preventing it from being undermined by competing tendencies, helping it to blossom as fully as possible.

Though the development of apprehensions of value is a natural process, the normal process of development can be thwarted. Neurosis, anxiety regarding change, and ressentiment can distort the natural scale of preference and open the door to bias and rationalization so that what one 'naturally' responds to reflects
aberration. One can come to love what is truly evil, and hate the truly good.\textsuperscript{13} Nor is it simply in the individual that development can be undermined, for ressentiment can foster bias and distort the natural scale of preference in groups and in nations, as well. How this happens is not specifically addressed, though it is explicable in terms of Lonergan’s earlier comment that the "spontaneous scale of preferences" can be modified by reinforcing some feelings and discouraging others. By bringing bias and rationalization into his discussion of the distorting power of ressentiment, Lonergan resituates his earlier, intellectualistic themes within his later, non-formal framework. In doing so, he strengthens the picture of ressentiment as something unnatural, as something that does not redefine what is natural as much as it prevents the expression of what is natural, for bias and rationalization early implied the failure or refusal to be what we are naturally—i.e. rational.

The very notion of ressentiment implies an appeal to a natural, immediate and pre-cultural apprehension of value, and this can be seen readily in the thought of Nietzsche, from whom the concept comes. Lonergan adopts the notion of ressentiment from Max Scheler, whose own account of ethics—including the idea of ressentiment—depends very much on Nietzsche.\textsuperscript{14} Nietzsche’s idea of ressentiment as we find it in his \textit{Genealogy of Morals} belongs to his argument that master morality is superior to Christian slave morality on the grounds that it is a truer, healthier expression of nature.\textsuperscript{15} Master morality is more natural in the sense that it is grounded in the experience of vitality, domination and self-affirmation. Christian or priestly morality is rooted in ressentiment, which distorts the natural response to what is truly desireable.

According to Nietzsche, ressentiment grows from pride and impotence: impotence feels unable to attain what it truly desires, so pride denies desire, asserting contrary to fact that the desired object is not unattainable, merely undesirable. Aesop’s fox cannot reach the grapes it so dearly wants, so it
concludes the grapes are sour. Christians renounce power and force, but only because they are (or feel) incapable of attaining and wielding it. The assumption is that value is intuited naturally—the desirability of grapes or of dominating power—but impotence leads Christians to deny the goodness of that which, at a deeper level of their being, they apprehend to be good. They 're-feel' their immediate response to the good, refusing to 'feel' its goodness as good. Master morality, by contrast, affirms the natural love of vitality and power; this makes the ferocious blonde beast more authentic than the huddling herd, and the superman, who transposes ferocious power into playful magnanimity, superior to the blonde beast. Such values are grounded in nature, Nietzsche asserts, and to deny it is unnatural.

Whether one agrees with Nietzsche's convictions about what kinds of desire are truly natural—and neither Scheler nor Lonergan do—the notion of ressentiment necessarily implies a natural receptivity to or intuition of value. One can conclude that though the natural scale of preference can be distorted so that feelings are not trustworthy, this is a deviation from what is natural to human existence. Were nature to follow its proper course of growth, the apprehension of value would be veridical, and the education of value would simply enrich and enlarge the apprehension of value, by 'conspiring with nature'.

Nevertheless, culture can interfere with the development of feeling, instilling bias on such a level that spontaneously feeling responds to false values, or according to a skewed scale of preference. Since this is the case, the verity of affective apprehensions cannot be assumed. So Lonergan speaks of the need "to keep scrutinizing one's intentional responses to values and their implicit scales of preference." 16 This leads us to Lonergan's account of conversion, which is at the heart of the revelation of value, for conversion is the emergence of a new horizon within which value becomes clear.
B. Conversion and the Apprehension of Value

Existentialism led Lonergan to understand conversion in terms of a discontinuous shift or leap from a lower level of personal integration to a higher. The significance of this in the present context is that the difference between religious, or affective, conversion and intellectual and moral conversion gives further evidence that the apprehension of value is a matter of natural intuition. In intellectual and moral conversion only the spiritual intention of truth and value is revealed, for the indeterminacy of truth and value precludes the intuition of particular truths or values, but in religious conversion—which makes possible true apprehensions of value—determinate values are immediately given.

To understand Lonergan's account of conversion we need to set it in the context of his appropriation of Husserl's and Heidegger's phenomenology of consciousness, which provides the basic framework for his thematic account of the correspondence between one's horizon, one's self and one's existential concern. This provides a basis for exploring Lonergan's understanding of conversion and the distinctiveness of religious or affective conversion.

1. Lonergan's Phenomenology of Consciousness

Lonergan's engagement with Husserl and existentialism in his 1957 "Existentialism" lectures shaped his reflection on the role of the subject in constituting its own world, and the necessity of conversion for a subjectivity that is properly grounded in the universe of being. Lonergan judged Husserl's phenomenology to be a major methodological advance for science. From Husserl's phenomenology of consciousness Lonergan adopted the notions of intention and horizon. From Heidegger Lonergan accepted the correlation of 'world' and 'concern'.

Husserl begins from the fact that all of consciousness is an expression of the subject's intention; the subject is the source of whatever is intended,
symbolized, represented, or meant. Though any object is only ever experienced as a collection of profiles or perspectives, since it is never seen from more than one angle simultaneously, yet the object is ever intended as a single object, a unity or whole within which the various perspectives are coherently meaningful. This whole which unifies the wealth of perspectives and so renders them intelligibly one is what is meant by 'horizon'.

The notion of horizon needs to be complemented by the concept of a 'world'. One's world is a coherent unification of many particular horizons, and in this sense one can speak of it as a horizon of horizons. It is a comprehensive horizon, which gathers together what one understands and responds to. The subject does not live within a single world, however, for one lives in a variety of worlds in the sense that the various circumstances of our lives—being at home with the family, being at work or at school—each has a different organizing principle. The things one notices, the underlying tendency of one's thought, the goals that are immediately meaningful—each of these change according to the context in which one finds oneself, and each is a different world. In spite of the distinction between world and horizon, Lonergan normally uses horizon in a more comprehensive sense as a synonym for world. So horizon, or world, denotes the limit to which one's understanding and curiosity extend. It is dividing line between what one is capable of making sense of or wondering about and what lies beyond both one's understanding and one's curiosity. Later he comes to describe horizon succinctly as "the boundary of what [one] knows and values."

It is the subject's concern—or Sorge, to use Heidegger's term—that governs the selection of horizons and imparts unity to a given world. The notion of concern needs to be understood in the context of the autonomy of consciousness, its freedom from extrinsic determination. Though certain events have a way of imposing themselves on consciousness, as when one stubs one's toe, the flow of consciousness is not determined strictly by external events. Nor is it
determined by the demands of the nervous system, though these demands impose themselves upon consciousness and press for satisfaction in either healthy or pathological ways. Lonergan speaks of this freedom as a floating; consciousness rides upon but above the direct push and pull of material circumstances. The critical factor in the direction of consciousness is the subject’s concern, which Lonergan speaks of at one point as a willing acceptance of a particular orientation, or attitude. He distinguishes the freedom of consciousness from the rational freedom of the will, for the freedom of consciousness is more primitive; it is a freedom in which consciousness may attend to whatever the subject is interested in.

The subject’s concern reflects the concrete organization within the subject of its world, itself and its living, and this organization is an expression of the self-constituting effects of past choices. For example, the drifter’s ‘choice’ to go with the crowd, to be passively directed by others, is a decision and, though it may be simply the result of a lack of initiative, one is responsible for it. Such a choice reflects who one is, and who one is in turn reflects the dispositions and habits that have been developed by past decisions. For, "it is in choosing that I become myself."  

Though Lonergan goes far in agreeing with the existential, phenomenological analysis of consciousness, he adopts it only to appropriate it within his own epistemological framework. So while he agrees to the correlations of subjective intention and horizon, and of concern and world, he challenges the potential for relativism in this position by juxtaposing two spheres of concern: the subjective and the objective, common sense and theory, one’s own world and the universe of being. One’s own world is the world as it correlates with one’s concern, or Sorge. "My world is centered on me, and as I move out from that center in a series of concentric circles, my concern steadily decreases." Over against this is the universe of being, the objective universe, intended by the pure
desire to know. Though Lonergan does at one point speak of the desire to know becoming a dominant Sorge such that the world of one's concern converges with the objective universe, for the most part he associates Sorge strictly with the subjective realm of common sense. So it is that Lonergan refuses to accept as ultimate the correlative categories of concern and world, or horizon. Though one's horizon reflects the extent of one's understanding and concern, the pure desire to know extends beyond any horizon to the objective universe. In this way Lonergan breaks from existentialism's insistence that the subject's intentionality cannot ultimately appeal to an objective order beyond the confines of one's horizon.

Growth and development is a matter of moving from a narrow, limited horizon to a higher, broader, more encompassing horizon. Yet the transition to a higher horizon might not be easily or readily accomplished for two reasons. First, with respect to the horizon itself, the higher horizon lies beyond the range of one's understanding and concern. Because one's horizon is the boundary of what one knows and values, it does not fall within the range of experience and so is not something one can advert to or understand. It is the framework within which things are intelligible, but for it to become intelligible itself requires that one attain a higher perspective, a more comprehensive horizon within which the narrower horizon becomes something one can advert to.

Second, with respect to the subject, one's horizon is bound up with the very constitution of oneself and one's living. Anxiety is a conservative principle that restricts one's horizon, because change threatens the established constitution of one's very self. It is the source of tension that arises when one is invited to accept a philosophy that would demand a reorganization of one's world. Argument and proof can only go so far in philosophy. At some point conversion is necessary, and that can only be affected on the part of the subject.

Conversion overcomes these obstacles to natural growth. It is an
acceptance of a higher horizon, a willingness to see, and a choice to live beyond the limitations of anxiety. It is important to recognize that there is a consonance between natural development and conversion. For religious or affective conversion is a falling in love that reveals values, and to recognize that conversion is a matter of restoring natural development is relevant to the argument that the apprehension of value is rooted in human nature. So though the emergence of the higher integration is the expression of a natural principle of development, to the extent that this development is resisted or impeded, conversion marks the shift to an assent, perhaps belated, to what comes naturally.

2. Conversion and the Apprehension of the Good

Though Lonergan accepts the existentialist idea that conversion involves the disclosure of something immediately given, his position that insights, truths and values are not given but constructed requires that conversion be a recognition not of particular truths or values but of the structured intention toward truth or value; for only the intention is immediately given. The only exception to this is found in religious or affective conversion, in which there is disclosed not only the intention to love but also the values revealed by love.

a. Disclosure and the immediately given

From existentialism Lonergan adopted an understanding of conversion as the discovery of what was previously apparent but unacknowledged. "It is only by the discovery, the unveiling, the revealing of things that have been hidden, depressed, just given systematic oversight, that change can take place." There is an element of responsibility in the hiddenness of that which is unacknowledged, for its hiddenness is simply a matter of being unwilling to see. Lonergan speaks of this process of avoiding truth as obnubilation. Conversion is a matter of acknowledging what was avoided, discovering what one had not allowed oneself
Lonergan's position that truth and value are indeterminate until determined by the transcendental notions is evident in his account of what is immediately given but unacknowledged. For Heidegger, the notion of truth as disclosure implies that the truth is something already present, something intuitively, immediately grasped. For Lonergan, however, particular truths and judgments of value are products of inquiry, insight and judgment. In no sense are they already given or intuitively known, for they are indeterminate, undefined until consciously defined by intelligence, and unknown until rationally judged true. So conversion does not—can not—entail the recognition of specific truths or values. Rather, only the spiritual dynamic that intends truth and the good is immediately given.

The idea that only the spiritual intention of truth and the good are immediately given in experience finds expression in various ways in Lonergan's thought. It is implicit in the understanding of symbol in Insight's discussion of mystery and myth, where symbols mediate not specific insights or truths but the unchanging dynamism of the human spirit. Both mystery and myth depend upon symbols which render sensitively and imaginatively the 'known unknown' intended by the intellect; the diversity of religions and anti-religions reflects divergent interpretations of these symbols, some interpretations tending toward myth and others to mystery. The symbols as images, as sensitive expressions of the pure desire to know, do not undergo change, for they mediate and express the unchanging spiritual orientation toward unknown being. As such, symbols can be progressively interpreted more adequately but the symbols themselves mediate the apprehension of an invariant principle. So for Lonergan symbol is intimately related to the abiding structure of the desire to know, which alone is immediately given. This position is implicit also in the "Philosophy of Education" lectures, where Lonergan identifies the compact apprehension of truth to see.
in symbols as apprehensions of the invariant structure of the good.\textsuperscript{33} Lonergan wants to affirm that symbols can express an intelligent and true grasp of reality. But since specific truths and values are indeterminate except for insight and judgment, it follows that what is intelligently and truly grasped can only be the structured intention of truth and value. Symbols grasp the invariant structure of the good rather than a particular insight, truth or value. So it is that the process of critically clarifying the symbol leads to a clearer understanding of the invariant structure rather than a better grasp of the particular good.\textsuperscript{34}

\textbf{b. Immediacy in intellectual and moral conversion}

Lonergan’s insistence that only the presence and structure of the intention of truth and value is experientially and immediately given is implicit in his account of both intellectual and moral conversion. Lonergan’s earliest treatments of conversion to a more adequate horizon deal with the enlargement of the intellectual horizon. He discusses intellectual conversion within the context of a broader discussion of development.\textsuperscript{35} Development is a change in which a higher integration sublates a lower, extending previous development so that new capacities, new concerns and orientations are actualized, and so that the inabilities and problems of the lower integration are resolved. Lonergan deals with intellectual development in terms of both scientific and philosophic development, but his primary concern is with the latter.\textsuperscript{36}

Philosophic development, unlike scientific development, faces a unique problem, for it must deal not just with the objective universe but also with the knowing subject; philosophy requires an adequate self-understanding and to the extent that philosophers have an inadequate self-understanding philosophy will fail to achieve the consensus of the natural sciences. Lonergan speaks of this inadequate self-understanding as the ‘existential gap’. The notion of an existential gap goes back to the distinction between one’s world and the universe of being,
between what is real to the individual and what is actually real. To the extent that one’s horizon keeps one from having a full or adequate grasp of a thing, there is a gap between one’s horizon and the reality of a thing. The existential gap exists when the reality of the subject is beyond the horizon of the subject—i.e., when the subject’s self-understanding falls short of a full, accurate self-understanding. Lonergan ascribes philosophy’s fundamental problems to the existential gap. This gap is inexcusable, for to know oneself is not to know some arcane subtlety but to know what is immediately given: one’s intelligence, freedom and responsibility. Furthermore, to truly know oneself is not simply a matter of learning propositions but of embracing transformation so that there is an effective realization of that knowing in the actual exercise of one’s intelligence, freedom and responsibility. As such, attaining this adequate, higher horizon requires conversion.

A similar theme is found in the discussion of moral development and conversion. The theme of moral conversion is quite undeveloped in Lonergan’s early work, and is barely referred to in “Existentialism.” When Lonergan does come to speak of moral conversion in Method he means simply what he deals with in “Philosophy of Education” as moral development. The discussion of moral development in “Philosophy of Education” proceeds without any reference to conversion; here Lonergan draws chiefly upon Piaget’s work with the moral development of children, which suggests that children move from an absolute morality based on respect for authority to a morality of mutual consent based on mutual respect. Lonergan interprets this shift in terms of the emergence of the child’s autonomy, responsibility, and respect for the autonomy and responsibility of others. This is the natural order of development, the process of natural maturation. What is developing is the awareness that one chooses, that one is free to choose and free in choosing, and that such choices have as their necessary context criteria of true and false, good and evil. Similarly, in Method, moral
conversion is to orient oneself responsibly to value, to recognize and concede to the dynamic structure of one’s being toward the truly good. Moral conversion entails changing "the criterion of one’s decisions and choices from satisfactions to values." When we become free from the immediate authority of others, discovering our freedom to choose and recognizing that by choosing we play a part in the formation of our own character, and when we orient ourselves to value rather than personal satisfaction, this constitutes moral conversion.

The implication of the discussion of moral conversion is that, because only the presence and structure of the intention of value is immediately given, it involves the recognition of and assent to the immanent demand to be responsible, to choose freely according to what is truly good. Conversion is an assent to the intention of value, and so it opens up the possibility of determining specific values, but specific values themselves are not immediately given. One cannot be converted to a specific vision of justice, for justice as a value is not something immediately given yet hidden; it is something to be determined by the responsible effort toward moral transcendence. What is immediately given is the dynamic that leads us to determine a criterion of justice by which to exercise responsibility.

c. Religious or affective conversion

When we come to Lonergan’s account of religious or affective conversion we find a picture different from intellectual or moral conversion, for though religious conversion is, like them, a matter of recognizing and consenting to an immanent dynamic, it also reveals value. As intellectual and moral conversion both imply acknowledging an immediately and experientially given spiritual dynamic, religious conversion is the recognition and assent to a love for God, a love that leads us toward God. Though it may be unnoticed or unacknowledged, this tendency is present in conscious experience as "being in love without limits
or qualifications or conditions or reservations." Religious conversion is a matter of noticing, acknowledging and assenting to this love. Just as religious love is but one form of being-in-love—familial and civic love are other forms—even so religious conversion is a specific kind of affective conversion, albeit the highest and most comprehensive form of affective conversion.  

As noted in the discussion of the development of affectivity, being in love with God is the culmination of the natural process of development, so that here again the themes of conversion and development overlap. Nevertheless, Lonergan’s insistence on the radical transition implied in falling in love with God takes the form of denying that it is explicable in terms of a natural development. Religious conversion "is not merely a change or even a development; rather it is a radical transformation on which follows ... an interlocked series of changes and developments." In saying that religious conversion is the basis for development rather than an expression of development, Lonergan is affirming the fact that the horizon of one who is in love with God does not arise naturally from what one determines to be true or judges to be good.

The fulfillment that is being in love with God is not the product of our knowledge and choice. It is God's gift. ... So far from resulting from our knowledge and choice, it dismantles and abolishes the horizon within which our knowing and choosing went on, and it sets up a new horizon within which the love of God transvalues our values and the eyes of that love transform our knowing.

So religious conversion is not a natural development in the sense that it is not grounded in knowing or in the judgment of value and choice. The emergence of this highest horizon is a gift rather than an achievement of the individual. It is this lack of grounding in human rationality and responsibility that leads Lonergan to cite on a regular basis Pascal’s dictum that the heart has reasons which reason does not know. There is a sense in which love does not grow out of knowledge but makes a more profound knowledge possible. This primacy of love leads Lonergan to challenge the intellectualistic, scholastic dictum, "Nothing is loved except it is first known." Love gives rise to a new truth: "Nothing is truly
known except it is first loved."\textsuperscript{46}

This emphasis on the primacy of love and the inability of knowledge and choice to effect a change of heart is apparent even after Lonergan formulates the notion of two paths of development. We will deal with the two paths later, but for the moment it needs to be noted that the concept of the upward path of development implies a natural progression from intellectual concern and conversion, through moral and finally to religious concern and conversion. This raises the question of how (on the upward path) religious conversion is grounded in knowledge and choice, in intellectual and moral authenticity. Lonergan says of development from below that it "is directed not to satisfactions but to values, and the priority of values is comprehensive, not just of some but of all, to reveal affective conversion as well as moral and intellectual."\textsuperscript{47} In other words, moral conversion is what makes one open to values, and when moral conversion is truly realized in one’s living, there are no limits on what values one becomes open to. One is open not only to cultural and personal values but also to religious values. Shortly afterward Lonergan makes reference to humanists who "are open to values generally yet draw the line at such self-transcendence as is open to God."\textsuperscript{48} The upward path of development does not bring about affective conversion by determining something to be true or good, but rather full moral conversion renders one open to the higher, religious conversion. Still that higher conversion can only come about by the gift of God’s love moving downward.

The revelation of value by love is to be understood in this context of religious conversion dismantling one’s old horizon and creating a new one. "[W]hat really reveals values and lets you really see them, is being in love."\textsuperscript{49} In the interview from which this quote is taken, the structure of the discussion of value makes it clear that the revelation of value in love reflects the affective apprehension of value, for love’s recognition of value belongs to the ‘feeling side’ which is synthesized with the ‘cognitional side’—the judgment of fact—in the
judgment of value. Falling in love, therefore, opens the eyes of love to the affective apprehension of value.

This indicates the central difference between religious conversion and the lower conversions. Where intellectual and moral conversion do not entail a knowledge of particular truths and values but only of the presence and structure of the spiritual intention of truth and value, religious conversion entails the apprehension of values. For though religious conversion is fundamentally just a recognition and assent to the love of God, this falling in love grounds the capacity to respond naturally and spontaneously to particular things as values. This is impossible for intellectual and moral conversion, for particular truths and values are not immediately determinate or given; they rely on the notions of truth and value to determine them through a process of question and answer. Values are apprehended, however, as immediately determinate, for the affective responses are informed (i.e., determined) by the objects to which they are an affective response, according to the inmanent criteria of the heart.

The difference between what conversion reveals or discovers marks the contrast between the historicity of judgments of truth and value and the natural, ahistorical ground of apprehensions of value. Particular truths or judgments of value are made because of the spiritual intention that determines them, and the process of determination is a historical one. The apprehension of value occurs because love allows one to see what is already determinately and truly so, and so these apprehensions could only be natural and ahistorical. No explanation is needed to explain or justify these apprehensions other than 'love reveals it to be so'. It is a revelation that has no history.

C. The Two Paths of Development

Our approach to this point has been to demonstrate that the apprehension of value is ahistorical because it is given as determinate independent of the
notions of truth and value that account for the historical process of progressive
determination. The justification for this approach is that Lonergan explicitly
distinguishes between nature and history on the basis that nature provides the
desire and criteria for determining truth and value, while history is the process
of inquiry and insight that actually determines them. One might reasonably ask,
however, whether the process of inquiry and insight is the only way that the
cultural and historical conditioning of values comes about. Though the
apprehension of value is not mediated by the notions of truth and value, might it
nevertheless be culturally conditioned by another mechanism so that one drinks
in cultural values with mother's milk, so to speak?

There is evidence in Lonergan's thought that he wrestled with how to
integrate the process of acculturation into his account of knowing and valuing.
On one hand, he was inclined to see it as a matter of inquiry whereby one
appropriated the meanings and values of one's culture in the course of seeking to
understand.50 On the other, he recognized that there is an element of spontaneity
in the way cultural meanings and values are immediately grasped and shared.51
The tension between these two perspectives is finally resolved in Lonergan by the
formulation of the two paths of development and by the incorporation of the
process of acculturation into the downward path. Since the concept of two paths
of development demonstrates the maturest form of Lonergan's position on the
integration of culturally-informed meanings and values and the intellectual process
underlying historical development, it is in this context, therefore, that the
argument for the natural, affective intuition of value needs to be made.

Another reason for examining the twofold path of development is that it
expands our understanding of affective conversion, in which values are revealed
by love. The apprehension of value is associated with the downward path, which
Lonergan eventually identifies with the process of acculturation. Though the
treatment of religious or affective conversion above might suggest that the
disclosure of value in love belongs to a relatively uncommon quality of religious experience, in the downward path of development we find that the natural process of acculturation has its source in love. For this reason, we will begin by considering the development of Lonergan’s account of the downward path, which goes from being a developmental process rooted in falling in love with God to being more generally a process of acculturation.

Against this background, it will be shown that Lonergan’s account of how values are culturally acquired does not compromise the explanation of apprehensions of value as grounded in an ahistorical intuition. For the cultural values that the child appropriates are—to the extent that they are grounded in love—the product of a process in which the natural, intuitive apprehension of value has been operative.

Lonergan’s idea that there are two paths of development emerges clearly for the first time in "Mission and the Spirit," first written in 1974 and published in 1976, after which it becomes a regular feature in his writings. Of course, the notion of an upward path of development had long been a feature of Lonergan’s thought, for from the outset his tendency to understand emergent complexity in nature in terms of hierarchical ordination led to him thinking of vertical finality as "an upthrust from lower to higher levels" and as "an upwardly but indeterminately directed dynamism towards ever fuller realization of being." In 1976 a downward path of development is introduced to convey that God’s gracious love as effectively realized in religious conversion is the foundation of a developmental process quite distinct from the one that emerges from the natural effort of the individual. As the beatific vision of God is the apex of the spiritual exigence toward knowing in Insight, so does the apex become the foundation of a principle that begins from the highest, deepest and most comprehensive of loves. Being in love with God transforms the lower levels of knowing and acting, for love is an irreducible principle of knowing and valuing, revealing what
reason could not discern.

By 1975 the idea of love as a developmental principle is generalized to embrace familial and civic forms of love as well. In Method Lonergan restricts the principle that loving precedes knowing to the love of God. Yet eventually the continuity between familial, civic and religious love comes to the fore, so that Lonergan includes earthly loves in the downward path of development. In contrast to the ‘ordinary’ upward process, Lonergan speaks of the downward movement in this way:

Man’s insertion in community and history includes an invitation for him to accept the transformation of falling in love: the transformation of domestic love between husband and wife; the transformation of human love for one’s neighbor; the transformation of divine love ….

Such transforming love has its occasions, its conditions, its causes. But once it comes and as long as it lasts, it takes over. One no longer is one’s own. Moreover, in the measure that this transformation is effective, development becomes not merely from below upwards but more fundamentally from above downwards. There has begun a life in which the heart has reasons which reason does not know. There has been opened up a new world in which the old adage, nihil amatum nisi prius cognitum, yields to a new truth, nihil vere cognitum nisi prius amatum.  

This passage implies that the downward process of development is not automatic, or naturally spontaneous. Individuals exist in community but as such there is only the potential for falling in love. The ‘invitation’ may be—like the gift of God’s love—the presence of love or the tendency toward love implicit in conscious experience but unattended, unacknowledged, unchosen. Yet it is only through the acceptance of this invitation that the downward principle becomes operative. This gives evidence that the downward path, though it now embraces earthly loves, does not yet entail the process of acculturation, for acculturation does not depend on accepting an invitation but rather emerges through spontaneous intersubjectivity.

Because love is the central principle of the downward path, when Lonergan first begins to entertain the idea that the ‘downward’ path embraces the more general, spontaneous process of acculturation, he resists speaking of it as
a downward path.

In its spontaneous unfolding cognitive development may be characterized as from below upwards ... . It remains, however, that these operations occur within a context and that this context is all the more complex and extensive the richer the culture and the more nuanced the social arrangements one has inherited. Nor is this context just some inert datum that attains influence only in the measure that it is noted, understood, verified, evaluated. Rather it exerts a major influence on the interest that motivates our attention, on the language that selects what we can name and study, on the preunderstanding that underpins our further advance, on the opinions that have to be revised before anything novel or new can be entertained or accepted.

So it is that besides development from below upwards there also is development, if not from above downwards, at least from within an encompassing, enveloping worldview or horizon or blik.57

Here the process of development from within a horizon is that by which one's worldview is inevitably formed by culture prior to the exercise of one's own effort toward discerning truth and acting responsibly. So the process of acculturation is distinct from the upward path of development, but Lonergan has not yet drawn the connection between acculturation and the love upon which it depends, a connection that will enable him to identify the process of acculturation with the downward path.

The downward path is first clearly identified with the process of acculturation in "Natural Right and Historical Mindedness." Development from above downwards begins with the affectivity inherent in relationships—the relationship of child to parent or of disciple to master. This affectivity is the basis for development: "On affectivity rests the apprehension of values. On the apprehension of values rests belief."58 Through belief one grows to understand, and understanding makes possible a more mature, nuanced perceptiveness. So from love through to experience the process of learning proceeds and makes possible the intelligent, upward process of inquiry. It is not evident here that affectivity is a matter of love, yet this is made clear in a subsequent treatment of the downward path in "Theology and Praxis."59 Individual development begins along the downward path as "children are born into a cradling environment of
love." Love, trust and belief are the basis for "a long and slow process of socialization, acculturation, education" by which they learn the meanings and values of their culture. In both of these passages the association of love and acculturation is possible because love is an irreducible principle of knowing and valuing, distinct from the principles by which truth and value are intended.

Though in both passages the apprehension of value emerges from the affective bond between people, how this occurs is not explained. However, a subsequent essay, "Pope John's Intention," provides a possible answer. There Lonergan defines horizon succinctly as the boundary of what one knows and cares about. The 'main stem' of one’s horizon consists of what one knows and cares about. Yet one’s horizon also entails "extensions through the persons we know and care for, since knowing them and caring for them involve us in what they know and care for." By virtue of love, then, there is a natural appropriation of the values of the loved one so that one comes to care for what the loved one cares for. The process of development by which one’s horizon grows, by which the scope of one’s knowledge and care expands, is one of cultivating an understanding and love for others. To a large extent this is a matter of breaking through the barriers that people allow to divide them, and opening the way to a broader intersubjectivity, solidarity and love.

Though the apprehension of value is informed in the course of socialization, this does not imply that it is learned in such a way as to deny the natural intuition of value. By love one enters into the values of his or her culture, but the culture’s values are themselves products of an upward process through which values are apprehended, objectified and judged. To the extent that a culture’s values are informed by love, they find their warrant in the immanent criteria of the heart. Insofar as the judgments of value informing a culture objectify and refine the values revealed by love, the education of feeling is a matter of conspiring with the natural propensity of the child, the student and the disciple
to deepen and refine their own natural responses to value. To the extent that a culture's values are not informed by love, the people of that culture operate within a limited horizon, one not adequate to the reasons of the heart. This account assumes that the judgment of value relies upon affective intuitions of value, a position that the next section seeks to justify.

D. The Apprehension and Judgment of Value

To this point it has been shown that apprehensions of value are ahistorical intuitions, for they depend neither on the notions that give rise to the historical determination of truth and value nor are they acquired strictly through an intersubjective process of acculturation. Finally, it will be argued that the judgment of value, in which the knowledge of value is historically determined, ideally relies upon these ahistorical apprehensions of value for a veridical indication of what is truly good. I qualify this as an ideal, for this dependence exists particularly when value is revealed by love. Though every judgment of value assumes an apprehension of value, apprehensions are not necessarily trustworthy; the apprehension itself needs to be evaluated. Yet when value is revealed by love, when a new horizon is established by falling in love, the apprehension of value becomes the basis for evaluation. In such a case, the judgment of value is informed by an ahistorical yet veridical intuition of value.

The first step is to define more clearly the relationship between the apprehension and judgment of value: what do the three components of the judgment of value contribute to value judgments? On this basis it can be shown that the judgment of value is not limited by the fallibility of affective responses to value. Yet, the judgment of value is limited by the scope of its horizon, and this limitation is overcome in the revelation of value by love.

The judgment of value—the deliberate determination of goals and acts that are truly worthwhile—depends on three things: judgments of fact, apprehensions
of value and the notion of value.\textsuperscript{61} The notion of value is the tendency toward moral transcendence, which brings together knowledge and feeling for the sake of deliberately determining and realizing the moral good. Judgments of fact pertain to the objective knowledge of the nature of things, especially of human affairs, for acting prudently assumes an adequate knowledge of the context and implications of one’s acts, and an understanding of what is really possible given the potential and the limitations of society and humankind. Knowledge of reality and possibility enables one to judge realistically the feasibility of what one seeks to do and the effects of one’s choices. Without knowledge the apprehension of value—or ‘moral feeling’—may yield merely an ineffective or misguided moral idealism, for it lacks the reflective realism upon which responsible choice depends.

Moral feeling is a necessary component in the judgment of value, and its contribution seems to be the initial motivation toward value, for moral self-transcendence is described at one point as a deliberate response to value.\textsuperscript{62} The notion of value is not itself a response to value, but an attempt to determine value, so one must assume that its initial trajectory arises from the affective response to value. It is in this sense that factual "knowledge is not enough",\textsuperscript{63} moral feeling contributes a sense of the good, the moral vision, without which knowledge lacks moral import or direction.

The judgment of value depends on factual knowledge and moral feeling, yet it goes beyond them. As we have seen, the judgment of value involves a synthesis of knowing and feeling, and in this sense knowing and feeling can be seen as the lower manifold from which the knowledge and pursuit of value emerges as a higher level. In this sense it is dependent on and limited by knowing and feeling. Yet the judgment of value also goes beyond them, for the higher level is not determined by the lower; the apprehension of value does not strictly determine the judgment of value.
Since the judgment of value both depends on the apprehension of value and transcends it, one might ask how the deliberative judgment of value overcomes the limitations and potential untrustworthiness of apprehensions of value. For the feeling that something is truly good is not necessarily reliable. The development of feelings can be thwarted, stunted or immature. Moral feelings need to be "cultivated, enlightened, strengthened, refined, criticized and pruned of oddities."64 Being responsible implies that one must engage in self-criticism.

One has to keep scrutinizing one's intentional responses to values and their implicit scales of preference. One has to listen to criticism and protest. One has to remain ready to learn from others. For moral knowledge is the proper possession only of morally good men and, until one has merited that title, one has still to advance and learn.65

While an openness to others' criticism and wisdom is straightforward, one might ask by what standard self-scrutiny measures the affective response to value. If one's intuitive response to value is faulty, how can it be corrected through deliberation, especially if deliberation is dependent on feeling?

The answer is to be found in the criteria immanent in the notion of value, and the historical clarity to which the notion gives rise. To feeling, deliberation adds an intelligent formulation and affirmation of what feelings merely intimate, and so isolated affective responses are brought into a framework that orders and integrates responses. It is here that history plays a role in the formulation, integration and affirmation of values, and provides a context and a resource for individual authenticity. For judgments of value "attain their proper context, their clarity and refinement, only through man's historical development and the individual's personal appropriation of his social, cultural, and religious heritage."66 This social and intelligent context provides a point of reference against which immature, unrefined, and eccentric apprehensions of value can be evaluated.

However, one must also recognize that the responsible intention of value
has its limitations vis-à-vis the affective apprehension of value, and this is apparent from Lonergan's treatment of religious or affective conversion as that which reveals value. The *notion* of value is limited by one's horizon, the limit of what one knows, can inquire into, understand and care about. Though moral conversion may render one open to the full range of values, the *notion* of value itself is not capable of dismantling its narrow horizon and establishing a higher horizon in which values are revealed by love. This limitation is implicit in Lonergan's affirmation that falling in love is "not the product of our knowledge and choice," not a product of the upward thrust towards knowing truth and realizing value. Lonergan affirms the primacy of love specifically against the notion that love depends upon knowing: "Nothing is truly known except it is first loved." Love is the basis for a higher knowing and a truer apprehension of value, for "the love of God transvalues our values and the eyes of that love transform our knowing." This reliance of judgment on the apprehension of value is reflected in Lonergan's discussion of the Trinitarian procession as reflected in the conscious process of "judgments of value based on the evidence perceived by a lover, and the acts of loving grounded on judgments of value." So though the *notion* of value leads to a deliberative, self-critical evaluation of apprehensions of value, the horizon within which this process of evaluation occurs may itself be limited, and this limitation is transcended only by the love that reveals value and so provides a new basis for evaluating. For this reason, Lonergan says religious conversion is causally prior to moral conversion:

> From a causal viewpoint, one would say that first there is God's gift of his love. Next, the eye of this love reveals values in their splendor, while the strength of this love brings about their realization, and that is moral conversion.

There is a sense, then, in which moral conversion is dependent on falling in love, for moral conversion is grounded in the affective apprehension of values previously beyond the scope of one's moral horizon.

The affective response to value in love is a natural thing in the sense that
it is grounded in the immanent criteria of human affectivity. We have noted above that conversion is a matter of recognizing and consenting to what is natural, to what arises in the natural course of development, but which may have been thwarted or distorted. The responsiveness to value is natural to human development, not simply in the sense that we naturally register a distinction between the agreeable and the truly good, but in the sense that there is a natural capacity for a veridical apprehension of value. Though this capacity is obscured by neurosis, ressentiment and the social conditioning of one's scale of preference, which render the apprehension of value untrustworthy, nevertheless the revelation of value by love is indicative of the capacity for veridical apprehensions made possible by the immanent norms in affectivity.

It is against this background of spontaneous affective apprehensions that the historicity of value is to be understood. Apprehensions provide the basis for the historical articulation of value, and it is in this articulation that culture and history plays its conditioning role. The nature of the relationship between apprehension and articulation is not straightforward, for there is an ambiguity in Lonergan regarding the relationship between experience and its objectification. On one hand, objectification is presented as a reflective process of taking meanings and values that are shared by a community and thinking more critically about them. On the other, it is a matter of taking a 'pure experience', which lacks any cultural interpretation, and noticing and objectifying that experience within a mediating cultural framework. In either case, the historicity of value depends upon the reflective, deliberate process of formulating, refining, integrating, evaluating and applying these apprehensions of value to the concrete circumstances of one's living. Yet, unlike experience as the raw data from which one draws intelligible insight, the feelings that respond to value are in a sense already determined by the values to which they are a response. The feeling itself is not historically conditioned, only its objectification and interpretation are.
For this reason, I believe that Frederick Crowe's interpretation of moral development—which I think to be quite meaningful—does not accurately reflect Lonergan's account of moral development. He says:

In the primitive stages of any development—whether of the human race as it emerges into the world of homo sapiens, or of any culture as it takes a new step forward in the discovery of values—there will occur, perhaps in the consciousness of some moral genius, the emergence of a sense of uneasiness and so of responsibility in regard to some of the society's mores—the already mentioned refinement of the moral sense; there will be an impulse of conscience, which will find expression in determinate acts. ... Sooner or later the corresponding moral principles will become enunciated in the public conscience of the community: Slavery is evil. Nuclear war is evil. Male domination of women is evil. Etc. 74

This interpretation presents moral development as driven primarily by a historical process in which the refinement of feeling leads to the emergence of new values—a "discovery of values." On two points this does not seem adequate to Lonergan. First, Lonergan relates the uneasiness of conscience not to the apprehension but to the judgment of value, for an easy or uneasy conscience depends upon a judgment of value. Second, Lonergan presents progress as an improvement in judgments of value, not in apprehensions of value. So, for example, in defining historicity as a process of cultural change, he says of cultures, "they wax and wane; meanings become refined or blunted; value-judgments improve or deteriorate." 75 Both points suggest that moral development relates not to feeling but to the interpretation of feeling.

In conclusion, insofar as the judgment of value is informed by love, it is grounded in an intuitive, ahistorical and veridical apprehension of value. For when love reveals value, such apprehensions cannot be deliberately evaluated regarding whether they need to be "cultivated, enlightened, strengthened, refined, criticized and pruned of oddities." Rather these apprehensions become a new basis for deliberate evaluation. That new basis is a recognition of value grounded strictly in the heart's natural and immanent criteria. Though the process by which the natural and veridical apprehension of value is objectified, ordered and affirmed is a historical one, the apprehension of value itself is not historical, for
it is not determined through inquiry and insight.

E. The Continuing Dualism of Affect and Intellect

Though in one sense Lonergan's account of value hinges on the notion of value, which prods us toward moral self-transcendence in deliberate, realistic and worthwhile choices, there is another sense in which the cornerstone of the judgment of value is ultimately the apprehension of value. For to the extent that one is in love, it is the apprehension of value that provides moral deliberation with its horizon. We have sought to show that the apprehension of value is an ahistorical intuition; it is not explicable in terms of the notions of intelligibility, truth, or value, which ground the historical process of seeking and determining answers to questions, and it is a spontaneous response determined by its object, according to the immanent criteria of the heart.

One can posit a correlation between the fact that affective responses to value are ahistorical and the fact that they do not reflect a rational principle. In Lonergan's early work, there is a straightforward correlation between reason and history: reason breaks out of the conservative, repetitive rhythms of nature and gives rise to history. Even in his mature work where he goes beyond conceiving the upward exigence of self-transcendence as more than a pure desire to understand, it is the upward exigence from which history arises. Yet love, though it may be the culmination of this exigence, is not the product of this exigence. Love does not emerge through a historical process of determining meaning and value. In this sense love does not express a rational principle—that is, there is no reason for apprehensions of value. They do not grow out of an intelligent grasp of what a thing is or what it means for human fulfillment. Intuitions of value simply reflect the reasons of the heart that reason does not know.

In this regard, Lonergan maintains the dichotomy between feeling and
reason, and in doing so he keeps his distance from a classical perspective. His earlier position affirmed a rather classical intellectualism but denied the material understanding of value. His mature position espouses a material understanding of value but rejects intellectualism; the affective response to value is a response to a particular thing, event or possibility, yet this apprehension is not rooted in human rationality.

The virtue of Lonergan's earlier formalism was the fact that it grounded value in history, for value was held to be the rational good, and as rational it was governed by the notion of being, operative in the notions of intelligibility and truth. As such value was determined historically in a manner no different than that of truth. A problem with Lonergan's early position, however, is its inability to incorporate the affective dimension into his account of the good, for his formalism explicitly rejected any affective contribution to the discernment of value. As noted at the end of Chapter IV, being is one, true and good, but not beautiful. The good does not evoke the aesthetic response which renders it intrinsically delightful and which attests in a primitive way its goodness. Nor is aesthetic delight grounded in the mind's orientation to reality and to the spiritual fulfillment of human nature.

In Lonergan's mature position, there is a unification of the good and, if not the beautiful, then at least the affective.77 Affective response affirms in a rudimentary way the goodness of a value. Yet by grounding the historical determination of the good in love's apprehension of value, the historical determination of the good is tethered to a natural intuition of value that is unchanging aside from the natural development of feelings as emergent in maturation, unstopped or corrected by conversion, and rendered more acute through education. Historical development is restricted to the reflective objectification, critical clarification and realistic application of these already determinate apprehensions.
It is conceivable that Lonergan might have maintained his earlier intellectualism in spite of rejecting his formalism. I would suggest that the reason he did not is to be found in the continuing radical distinction he saw between spontaneous affectivity and deliberate intellect. The dichotomy of affective desire and intellect is sustained throughout Lonergan’s works, both early and late. So it is that in Lonergan’s earlier thought, as we saw in Chapter III, spontaneous desire operates independently of rationality. The desire for empirical goods is capable of being brought within the higher ordering of reason, but rationality does not necessarily govern the pursuit of empirical desires. This pattern is evident on the social, historical level as well. The development of technology, economy, polity and culture reflects the introduction of rationality to society, for society is not intrinsically rational. Conservative, natural processes provide a nonrational basis; history introduces the rational conventions that order, govern and transform natural processes. In Lonergan’s mature thought, though he revises his account of affectivity significantly, the dichotomy between affectivity and rationality remains fixed. His later position no longer associates affectivity strictly with the sensitive psyche for by introducing the notion of ‘heart’, which accounts for the affective response to value, he brings feelings within the sphere of the highest human fulfillment. Nevertheless, the dichotomy of heart and rationality is implicit in the two paths of development, for affective responses to value are not determined through the upward path of historical development but belong to a distinct and complementary process, by which one is drawn into a community, its heritage and horizon and by which the love of God may become operative in one’s living. Lonergan’s affirmation of the primacy of love as the basis for valuing and knowing implies that the upward process cannot arrive at the knowing characteristic of love. Love and reason remain two distinct principles. The material good, revealed by love, does not reflect a rational knowledge.

In short, in spite of the significant change in Lonergan’s account of value,
there is an underlying continuity—the dualism of rationality and affectivity. Though affectivity now embraces the apprehension of value, it is still characterized by the immediacy of natural spontaneity over against the constructive and deliberate process through which history enters our knowing.
Chapter VII. A Critique and Response

It has been argued that to understand Lonergan’s account of value adequately one must recognize both discontinuity and continuity between his earlier and later works. The discontinuity is to be found in the shift from value as strictly rational to value as primarily apprehended affectively. The understanding of value as rational underlies the formalistic and intellectualistic character of Lonergan’s early position. It was argued that the opposition of desire and reason implicit in his early formalism was not simply the expression of an oversight, a failure to deal with the affective dimension of human living, but rather it was rooted systematically in Lonergan’s understanding of the metaphysical tension between limitation and transcendence, which in human living took the form of a dialectical tension between psyche and reason. In Lonergan’s mature account, value is no longer primarily rational, for it is apprehended in affective responses to the good, and these affective responses ground the historical determination of value. In spite of the significant discontinuity between these two accounts of value, there is a significant underlying continuity: the opposition of spontaneous affectivity and deliberate rationality.

This chapter will argue that the dualism of spontaneous affectivity and deliberate rationality reflects Lonergan’s recognition that the historicity of knowledge and value requires an account of the intellectual or spiritual eros as constructive and context-dependent. The dualism also depends upon his conviction that this constructive process is at odds with the spontaneous character of feeling. Together the constructive character of history and the spontaneity of feeling necessarily exclude the possibility of rational, material desires—i.e., particular goods that are grasped spontaneously and intelligently as relevant to human fulfillment.
In response, while I agree with Lonergan’s affirmation of the constructive and context-dependent nature of the spiritual eros as necessary for an adequate account of history, I believe the loss of rational, material goods leads to an inadequate, impoverished account of the good and of the desire to know. For with the classical tradition I hold that the rational good is central to the intellectual exigence. That is, the desire to know is a response to being. As a response, it is moved by something apprehended as good, something grasped as meaningful for one’s fulfillment. The notion of the desire as a response to being seems alien to the premises of Lonergan’s thought, for it may suggest the kind of ‘knowing as taking a look’ that Lonergan so ardently opposed, and to compromise the characterization of rationality as constructive. For if being evokes a response, then in some sense it must be immediately apprehended, and such an intuition seems to deny the constructive character of intelligence. This is not the case, however, for the constructive role of intelligence is operative even in the apprehension of that to which we spontaneously respond; constructive processes underlie the ‘spontaneity’ of awareness and feeling. In place of Lonergan’s opposition of constructive rationality and spontaneous affectivity there needs to be a recognition of the penetration of rationality into the subliminal processes of consciousness.

The adequacy of this position stands upon two points. First, it resolves a problem implicit in Lonergan’s concept of a flight from understanding. The flight from understanding is the antithesis of the pure desire to know, but the problem is raised: how could—and why would—one avoid something that is wholly unknown? Must there not be a prior apprehension to which one’s flight is a response? And if the flight is a response, then why the desire to know not also be a response? Second, recognizing that there is a constructive element underlying spontaneity allows allows us to recognize that spontaneity may not be as ‘natural’ as it may seem, for even what is spontaneous—including the ‘pure’
desire to know—enters into the ambivalence of all human constructions. Existential desire suffuses the constructive process, qualifying its character, such that the character of the desire to know may not necessarily be wholesome. Gabriel Marcel seems to recognize this in his negative portrayal of systematic definition. Between Lonergan's positive evaluation of systematic knowledge and Marcel's negative one, there comes the recognition that even the desire to know is an ambivalent one, for it enters into the tension of all human desire between lust and charity.

A. Construction and Spontaneity

Though the dichotomy between affectivity and intellect in Lonergan's work is partially to be explained by his early concern to preserve the notion of disinterested objectivity, I would suggest that a more basic reason is to be found in Lonergan's association of reason and history. Though in Insight and directly subsequent works the opposition is one between self-interested affectivity and objective reason, this was neither the original nor the enduring opposition between feeling and intellect. As noted in Chapter II, prior to Insight the dichotomy was simply one of conservative, spontaneous sensitivity and progressive, deliberate reason. This remains true of his mature position, where affective responses to value are spontaneous and, therefore, not products of the upward, deliberate exigence. In light of this, I believe that the opposition is rooted primarily in Lonergan's association of history with the mind's capacity for attentive inquiry, insight and reflection, a process distinct from what is natural and spontaneous. That is, history and progress depend on the constructive capacity of intelligence to achieve better answers to its questions, and this provides the basis for the historical emergence of communal meanings and values. Feeling can be adapted to change, but even so it simply conveys the non-reflective spontaneity of nature.
The fact that the desire for knowledge or virtue is cast as a non-rational, empirical desire gives a first indication that the opposition of feeling and reason is more properly one of natural spontaneity over against reflective progress. The desire for knowledge is non-rational, not because it is a desire—for it is a pure, disinterested desire—but because it is spontaneous. Though its spontaneity is the source for the reflective ordering of desires, it is not a desire for a rational good, for reason implies a reflective rather than a spontaneous process.

A second indication is to be found in the basic contrast between Lonergan's and Thomas' understanding of insight. With Thomas, intellectual insight had a very restricted meaning, and was associated specifically to the knowledge of abstract universals, but with Lonergan the whole cultural web of meanings reflects the constructive role of insight. Thomas' understanding of insight is made clear in Lonergan's account of Thomas' contrast between intellectual and sensitive knowledge, which conveys the difference between the expert's or technician's knowledge and that of the experienced person. The experienced person knows from experience that this medicine will cure this person; the expert knows why this medicine will cure this person. The experienced person knows the universal in the particular but the expert knows the abstract universal. The important difference between these two kinds of knowing is that experiential knowledge, the knowledge of the universal in the particular, is not a matter of intellectual knowledge. Rather it is sensitive knowledge, attributed to a sensitive potency called the cogitativa or intellectus passivus. This sensitive potency is under the influence of the intellect but is not properly intellectual, for it does not know the universal by a process of abstraction (i.e., insight). It is in this non-intellectual manner that people know Socrates and Callias not simply as Socrates and Callias but as 'these men'. Only expert knowledge involves insight, for abstraction is a matter of drawing out the abstract universal from the knowledge of the particulars. That is, only intellectual
knowledge is the fruit of an active process of inquiry and insight; the universal in the particular is simply immediately 'given' in sensitive apprehension. No insight is needed to know the universal in the particular. It follows that, for Thomas, the majority of human knowledge would be a matter of sensitive knowledge, not intellectual, and that only a small portion of human knowledge would be an intellectual product of insight.

In contrast to Thomas' definition of intellectual knowledge Lonergan asserts in *Insight* that common sense is intellectual—i.e., the whole web of cultural meanings is the result of a process of inquiry, and each child appropriates those meanings by a process of inquiry. Nor can there be any doubt about why Lonergan sees common sense as intellectual: only in this way does it truly enter into the process of historical development. Thomas' account of sensitive knowledge allows for little historical development, for if the discernment of the intelligible in the sensitive is not a matter of inquiry and insight, then it follows that sensitive knowledge is an intuitive grasp of intelligibility prior to and independent of the historical process of seeking and determining truth. Lonergan recognizes that common sense can be historical only if it is intellectual. Immediate apprehension and intelligent insight are mutually exclusive, and it is this exclusiveness that separates affective spontaneity and reasonable reflection.

While I believe Lonergan is right in identifying history with the constructive dynamic of intellect and in interpreting common sense as intellectual, there is a need to go beyond his position, just as his notion of common sense as intellectual goes beyond Thomas' affirmation of sensitive knowledge. Not only does intellect suffuse common sense but there is also an intellectual dimension to the domain of spontaneity and affectivity.

B. Lonergan and the Apprehension of Being

The opposition between spontaneity and deliberation is not a necessary
one, for research in subliminal, cognitive processes demonstrates how much constructive processing underlies what is spontaneously given in consciousness, and one can construe this process as rational. These processes can account, I believe, for an apprehension of being, to which the desire to know is a response. The virtue of this position is that it resolves a problematic aspect of Lonergan's account of the flight from understanding, without sacrificing the constructive role of intelligence. From this position one can affirm a more classical account of the desire to know as a response to an apprehension of being. Yet because the apprehension of being is grounded in the constructive processes of conscious awareness, it is not absolute; there is an interplay between being and the subject's experience such that there is a dynamic and mutual determination. In short, because of the presence of rationality in the depth of the psyche, it is possible to reaffirm the rationality of spontaneous desire, and because of the constructive character of this subliminal rationality, it is possible to affirm the full historicity of the apprehension of value.

Empirical research on the relation between conscious and pre- or nonconscious processes shows that the brain attends much more information—intelligent information—than actually achieves consciousness. Unconsciously data is analyzed, its multiple interpretations formulated through an uninhibited process of association, and its implications weighed with respect to its emotional content. This process occurs for every mode of perception: hearing, seeing, etc. Consciousness emerges through the selection of one interpretation and the concomitant inhibition of alternate interpretations. In some ways this sounds like Lonergan's account of the censor, but it differs in that it recognizes the scope of preconscious processing, which both interprets meaning (indeed, many meanings) and evaluates its emotional significance prior to consciousness awareness. Among those preconscious processes there is a capacity to discern pattern, to discriminate between information and noise, which implies the
presence of abstraction even at the most primitive level of preconscious processing. This indicates that rationality is operative at the very root of consciousness, abstracting pattern, interpreting meaning and evaluating emotive significance, bringing into conscious experience a tacitly meaningful world or raising to consciousness a question that cannot be resolved as a lower level process.

The apprehension of being is grounded, I believe, in this unconscious process of abstraction. Such apprehension may be merely a primitive grasp of the presence of pattern in which meaning is yet to be found, as with the child who knows written words to be meaningful but does not yet grasp their meaning. Or it can burst into consciousness as the apprehension of a profound beauty. Rationality relates us to being in the innermost recesses of our psyche, grounding the apprehension of pattern, meaning and beauty.  

It is within this depth that the interplay of spirit and being occurs. Though subliminal intelligence is constructive, relying as it does on abstraction, not all constructions require the same quality of effort. Just as there are different qualities of physical effort—to lift weights is thoroughly unlike dancing, in which one both moves and is moved—even so, inquiry as a conscious pursuit may be quite unlike listening to Beethoven, yet both rely upon the constructive capacity of mind. Being admits infinite degrees of order and complexity, some of its harmonies being immediately discernible within the 'noise' of complexity, others being obscured by it. At times a comprehensive harmony might touch us in the midnight sky, and at others all music and order may be lost, so that order is only grasped at the most mundane and tedious level. This is the interplay of spirit and being, the intellectual counterpoint of the transparency of order and the search for transparency.

Rationality penetrates to the depths of our being, and it is there that we apprehend being and so are moved to know. In the desire to know the sense of
not knowing is real, but the not knowing is a part of a greater whole, a tacit knowing within which and to which the unknown is meaningful. This is the knowing implicit in the desire to know that Augustine discusses in On the Holy Trinity.\textsuperscript{6} He asks what kind of love it is that leads people to seek what they do not know, since no one can love what is wholly unknown. For example, when people seek to discover the meaning of a word, it is not the word’s meaning they love, for it is unknown. So what is known and loved in the desire to know a word’s meaning? One loves, because one "knows and perceives in the reason of things" the great goodness of learning, and this in turn is loved because language makes possible the good of belonging fully and truly to a community.

For he beholds in the light of truth how great and how good a thing it is to understand and to speak all tongues of all nations, and so to hear no tongue and to be heard by none as from a foreigner.\textsuperscript{7}

In the desire to know a word’s meaning there is a tacit recognition of a whole, of which the unknown is a part and to which the unknown is relevant. It is the unvoiced grasp of the whole that makes the question meaningful, and renders the desire to know a response to the known. Also, the unknown thing is known to be related to that which is loved, so in some respects there must be an intimation or an apprehension of the meaning of the unknown thing. For Augustine, then, the desire to know is properly in part a love of something known, a love that makes both the content and the import of the unknown meaningful. Only the curious person is moved by a love of knowing the unknown rather than by the love of something known, for such knowing is removed from a grasp of the reasons that intimate true human fulfillment.

Lonergan holds, however, that the desire to know is not moved by a love of the known, and for this he has been criticized by those who maintain a more traditional perspective. Owen Bennett, for example, criticizes Lonergan’s position for its emphasis on indeterminacy, that is, for the fact that the desire to know is not prompted and guided by a determinate apprehension of being. For Lonergan
the pure desire to know is a desire for something initially "totally unknown."

Bennett notes that Lonergan compares human intelligence to an empty stomach, which feels its emptiness as emptiness, and so is prompted to ask questions, and he compares this to Arthur Schopenhauer’s grounding of objectivity in the blind Will-to-Live. The desire to know is moved by a sense of not knowing, and though it intends being as one, intelligible and unrestricted, the desire is neither evoked nor informed by being.

The adequacy of Lonergan’s position can be challenged in terms of its internal consistency. Lonergan’s discussion of the ‘flight from understanding’ in Insight presents it as a dynamic that is antithetical to the pure desire to know, and so as the root cause of bias. It is explained in the particular context of dramatic bias, which, as we saw in Chapter II, Lonergan accounts for in terms of the repressive role of the censor. The censor governs the organization of consciousness, selecting and determining what will be consciously represented, and arranging the data in such a way that insights are possible. When the censor is repressive however, it positively excludes patterns that would promote unwanted insights. The question can be raised, however, as to how an insight can be unwanted if the meaning of the insight—both in terms of the insight’s content and of its implications for one’s living—are not yet known. There must be some intimation prior to insight that reveals to the repressive censor the content of the potential insight and its threatening implications. In short, Lonergan’s account of bias is a strong indication that the flight from understanding implies some grasp of meaning prior to the formal determination of being through inquiry and insight. The flight from understanding, the desire to not know, must be a response—albeit a perverse one—to being.

It seems reasonable in light of this that the desire to know might also be a response to an intimation of being, contrary to Lonergan’s understanding of wonder and the desire to know. For him wonder is simply the unknowing desire
to know being. Yet, each of us experiences a world full of things not yet intelligible or known, and there must be something that renders certain questions more meaningful or central than others; not all unknowns or questions are of equal import. Furthermore, the process of determining the answer tends to anticipate which data and which avenues of inquiry, hold the most promise of resolving the question; just as all questions are not equally meaningful, so not all data are equally meaningful. So just as the flight from understanding must imply a knowing prior to insight, it seems that wonder must express a knowing—i.e., some sense of a whole within which a particular insight is anticipated as meaningful and some sense of particular data as relevant to that whole for that whole.

The censor is as relevant to the question of wonder as it is to that of the flight from understanding. In its constructive role the censor has the function of selecting and arranging the images or phantasms from which intelligence abstracts insight. Yet, what guides this selection and arrangement of images? The constructive role of the censor is not simply to select what comes into consciousness but also to arrange it in such a fashion that materials "emerge in consciousness in a perspective that gives rise to an insight." Different insights arise from different arrangements of images. The censor can arrange these images in a way that is more than haphazard because it is a non-conscious expression of intelligence. Yet if intelligence is primarily moved by an absence of intelligibility, then on what basis does it select and arrange images. On this point one can see how Lonergan's censor differs from Thomas' notion of the cogitativa, on which Lonergan in part bases his account of the censor. Thomas understood the cogitativa as a sensitive faculty, informed by the intellect, that effects the arrangement of images which makes insight possible. In this regard it has the same role as Lonergan's notion of the censor, but it differs in that the cogitativa is a faculty that grasps immediately the universal in the particular, and so it
grounds sensitive knowledge. That is, the arrangement of images is guided by a conscious, sensitive grasp of intelligibility.\textsuperscript{14} For Thomas there is a sensitive knowing that guides the intellectual effort toward insight.

As noted above, Lonergan cannot accept the idea of sensitive knowledge, for it implies that in some sense knowing must be simply ‘taking a look’. If the desire to know is a response to a prior apprehension of being, then how is history and novelty possible if intellectual knowledge is nothing more than the clarification of something already given. This is a weakness, I believe, in Bennett’s position, for in asserting that the desire to know is grounded in a prior apprehension of being, he makes this apprehension absolute and so seems to preclude historical novelty. He says,

\begin{quote}
My desire to know is born of knowing, not of non-knowing. It is because I am, by my very intellectual nature in its very first actualization, already participating in perfect knowledge (the knowledge of purely actual being), that I seek always to attain more perfectly that which I already know.\textsuperscript{15}
\end{quote}

Understanding begins from a perfect participation, because by our very nature as intellectual creatures we are perfectly related to being. For Bennett, being is known from the outset as one, intelligible and unrestricted. It might be asked, however, what it means to desire to know? If knowing is perfect, what prompts one to go on to know more perfectly? Why is there a shift from a participation in being to objectification, especially if the shift is from an apprehension of an unrestricted intelligible unity to a process of trying to overcome the limitation, unintelligibility and fragmentation that objectification seeks to overcome? Furthermore, this grasp of being is fully abstract, independent of and unconditioned by an experience of the world in its concrete actuality. Does the Rumanian orphan, whose early life was spent in a cell-crib, starved intellectually by the drab simplicity of its world, participate intellectually and perfectly in being? Is being by its very nature as touching our intellect necessarily a source of wonder and not also potentially the dead weight of existence? In short, where
Lonergan exaggerates the unknowing in the desire to know, Bennett exaggerates the knowing, and neither seems adequate to account for both the directedness of the desire to know and the perplexity of not understanding.

Against these two extremes I would suggest that the apprehension of being reflects the interaction of the individual and being, an interaction that takes place in the depths of one’s being and determines dynamically the relation between them. Neither Lonergan nor Bennett ground the apprehension of being in a dynamic interplay of individual and being, and so they overlook how their characterization of being reflects a specific quality of experience and a specific cultural context. For one could argue that the grasp of being as one, intelligible and unrestricted is itself characteristic only of a particular orientation to being, which reflects a variety of individual and cultural, dispositional and environmental factors. For those who are dull, either intrinsically or as the reflection of a dull environment, it is meaningless to speak of being as unrestricted; their world may be one and intelligible, but it is, from the viewpoint of one rich in understanding, relatively small and restricted. Such is being for all those who cease to wonder early in life out of dullness. Also, there is one kind of mystical orientation in which being is one and unrestricted but not intelligible, for intending being as intelligible disrupts its unity and encloses its unrestrictedness. According to such a perspective, the apprehension of being reveals the emptiness of intelligible concepts. In short, the character of being cannot be divorced from the character of one’s relation to it, and this relation is not strictly determined either by the nature of the individual, in whom there is a pure desire to know being, nor by a natural, absolute relation between being and the individual’s intellect.

There are two implications of the depth of human rationality, both of which mitigate Lonergan’s dichotomy of affectivity and rationality. First, it implies that the apprehension of value—though it appears to emerge fully developed prior to a reflective or even conscious awareness of the meaning in
which it is grounded—is indeed rooted in meaning and interpretation. Therefore, apprehensions of value, though they arise spontaneously, depend on an individual and cultural determination of meaning; they belong to history.

Second, grounding affectivity in rationality allows us to draw beauty back within the sphere of reason, so that we might reappropriate what Gadamer calls the Logos philosophy\textsuperscript{17}—that of Plato and Aristotle—in which reason grasps both a thing’s essence and its goodness. Contrary to this tradition, Lonergan’s dissociation of affectivity and reason leads him to identify beauty with the empirical level of consciousness rather than with the good and the true. In \textit{Insight} Lonergan discusses the aesthetic pattern of experience in terms of the "spontaneous, self-justifying joy" of experience for the sake of experience, and in terms of "intellectual creation."\textsuperscript{18} Art is an intellectual creation but only in the sense that the artist has insights about "novel forms that unify and relate the contents and acts of aesthetic experience." That is, the artist intellectually grasps ways of expressing aesthetic experience symbolically, but the experience itself is not an intellectual apprehension. In Lonergan’s later work he continues to associate beauty with sensitive experience, for though he affirms the affective apprehension of goodness, he nevertheless continues to see art and beauty as primarily sensitive. This is apparent in his discussion of the unity of the transcendental \textit{notions} in \textit{Method}:

Indeed, so intimate is the relation between the successive transcendental notions, that it is only by a specialized differentiation of consciousness that we withdraw from more ordinary ways of living to devote ourselves to a moral pursuit of goodness, a philosophic pursuit of truth, a scientific pursuit of understanding, an artistic pursuit of beauty.\textsuperscript{18}

The order of these differentiated pursuits reflects the order of the \textit{notions}, and Lonergan’s description here moves from the level of the good, to the true, the intelligible, and finally to experience on the lowest rung. The artistic pursuit of beauty belongs to the lowest rung. So there is in Lonergan a persistent picture of beauty as empirical rather than rational. The answer to why this is the case,
I would suggest, is found in the fact that the apprehension of beauty belongs to the realm of spontaneous experience.

For Aristotle, however, rationality not only reveals what a thing is but also discloses its beauty and goodness. Indeed, this is Aristotle’s point against the earlier materialists, who acknowledged material and efficient causes but failed to discern the need for a further, formal cause:

>When these men and the principles of this kind had had their day, as the latter were found inadequate to generate the nature of things, men were again forced by the truth itself, as we said, to inquire into the next kind of cause. For it is not likely either that fire or earth or any such element should be the reason why things manifest goodness and beauty both in their being and in their coming to be ...."^{20}

To know adequately what a thing is also involves a grasp of its goodness.

We see a similar affirmation of the unity of the true and the beautiful in Augustine.\textsuperscript{21} He uses the process from conception to birth as a metaphor for different degrees of understanding. What is conceived and born reflects the quality of one’s love—either lust or charity. Conception is the emergence of the ‘inner word’, the meaning or intelligibility which grounds the spoken word, such that ‘hand’ and ‘la main’ can both signify the same meaning. Yet this is only the beginning of understanding, for a meaning is ‘born’ when it is known in its fullness, when in and of itself it is a motivating source of action or delight. A lust for material gain conceives an understanding of money that gives birth in the preoccupation with acquiring money, but charity is conceived in understanding a virtue like justice, for example, which gives birth to a delight in justice. So one knows justice fully only when it is beautiful, when one is motivated by the intrinsic beauty of justice to be just. It is the failure to recognize the convergence or identity of the true, the good and the beautiful in the Logos philosophy that leads many modernists to see its ethical intellectualism—the conviction that virtue is knowledge—as naive and simplistic, in spite of its profound insight. Moral knowledge is only knowledge to the extent that it moves one by its beauty and goodness.
In summary, it has been argued that to recognize the constructive character of subliminal cognitive processes as rational, as abstracting pattern and meaning, and as relating meaning to conation, helps to resolve the opposition of spontaneity and deliberation. Recognizing the penetration of rationality into the depth of the psyche allows a reaffirmation of the desire to know as grounded in an apprehension of being (contra Lonergan) without divorcing this apprehension from the concrete experience of the subject vis-à-vis its environment (contra Bennett). It also allows a reaffirmation of the rationality of beauty, and a reintegration of knowing a thing's intelligible unity (its central form, or essence) with its goodness.

C. Knowing, Having and Being

The account of rationality as penetrating spontaneous desire works against the opposition both of spontaneity and history, and of desire and reason. It also works against the opposition of a disinterested desire to know and an interested affectivity. Though this dualism is operative most clearly in Lonergan's early work, and seems to be mitigated by the mature position that all four levels of consciousness belong to a more encompassing whole which is fulfilled in falling in love, I would suggest that the relationship between the desire to know the truth and falling in love is never fully clarified and so it leaves room to think that the desire to know is indeed pure or disinterested. Against this possibility, the recognition of subliminal rationality works against an account of the notion of truth as primarily disinterested, for even the desire to know reflects the tension in all human desire between lust and charity. It will be argued that a phenomenological analysis of the continuity of having, being and knowing supports the classical position that rational desire, which includes the desire to know, is an interested desire, a desire for personal fulfillment. For the desire to know is not simply oriented to being but is also oriented to the being of the
knower. For the person's own being—the person's immediate sense of substantiality—is implicated in the knowing of being.

A central theme of Lonergan's early account of objectivity is that the desire to know is disinterested. Even in his mature work he deals with objectivity in terms of detachment, and so he speaks of "the disinterestedness of morality." The desire to know and to do the good is not oriented towards the discovery of something that serves the inquirer's personal interest; the notion of being orients one to something beyond what one wants to be true or wishes to be good. We would suggest, however, that Lonergan's 'disinterested' desire to know is better understood as an expression of rational desire, in the Aristotelian sense of rational desire.

It is something of an oxymoron to speak of a desire as disinterested, for the very notion of desire implies a pursuit of the satisfaction of the desirer, and in this we see a basic difference between Lonergan and Aristotle in their understanding of rational desire. For Aristotle, a rational desire is an appetite for that which is perfective of the person as a rational being. Rational desire is no less oriented to one's interests than is irrational desire; what distinguishes these two kinds of desire is not their 'selfish' orientation, but the nature of the goods in which they seek the happiness of the individual. Though Lonergan appeals to Aristotle to affirm that the apparent tension between egoism and altruism is more truly understood as a tension between rational and irrational desire, his early dichotomy between detachment and self-interest gives a quite un-Aristotelian meaning to his notion of rational desire, one that simply and effectively reintroduces the opposition of egoism and disinterested altruism in another form. However, the notions of interest and disinterest are no more ultimate than egoism and altruism, and so Lonergan's disinterested desire to know is better understood as an expression of rational desire, in the Aristotelian sense of the term.

This position rests on the continuity between knowing, having and being,
a continuity that one might begin to explore in Gabriel Marcel, who offers a phenomenology of having in which knowing is presented as a kind of having. One can integrate this with the observations of Walker Percy, who notes the intimate correspondence between having and being. The focus of both writers is on unhealthy expressions of the orientation toward knowing and having, having and being, but this line of thought can be developed to show that the desires to know, to have and to be can also be positive. The desire for knowing a truth above and beyond the limitations of time and culture can be understood in a more nuanced fashion as a quest for having, or being, that comprises a truly substantial existence.

Marcel's phenomenology of having and being emphasizes the discontinuity between them, such that being transcends having.\(^24\) Having assumes the existence of something independent of and extrinsic to oneself that is brought within oneself. It implies that the thing possessed can be detached from oneself, disposed of. One does not 'have' what is intrinsic to one's existence, and so, for example, one does not have a self but is a self. In its strongest sense having means to have exclusive possession or control of something. Marcel is interested in the dynamic of desire, for he sees in the effort to control something, in the struggle to incorporate something into oneself and make it a part of oneself, the beginning of a tyranny by which the possessed thing comes to master and control the one who has it.\(^25\) The only way to resist being overcome by what one possesses is to transcend the distinction between self and possession in the creative act, as when the violin and musician, or the laboratory and the scientist, are caught up in a higher creative unity. In the creative act having is sublimated in being: "the duality of possessor and possessed is lost in a living reality."\(^26\) Love, too, takes one beyond the antinomies of self and other, autonomy and heteronomy.

Marcel extends the above analysis to knowing, which he presents as a
form of having. For example, when one has ideas in such a way as they possess the possessor, this is merely ideology rather than thinking. He also opposes the "will to characterize," which deals with reality in terms of things that are objectively definable, as an orientation that treats them as other, that seeks to possess them as defined. Against this he asserts that Being or Reality is undefinable, unpossessable, for it transcends the world of 'things'. To know something as an object is to empty it of its being, to reduce it to a mere thing; Reality is only approached through love or charity, which transcends the desire to have.

    Marcel properly recognizes the continuity between having and knowing. To know something is to 'grasp' it as other, as both Thomas and Lonergan have affirmed. The weakness of his analysis, however, is that he identifies having with lust, or inordinate desire, and being with charity. In doing so, he drives a wedge between having and being that disregards their fundamental continuity. This misses the fact that having can also be an expression of charity. Though one might point to the biblical notion of God having a people, and the metaphors of marital intimacy or paternal devotion that expressed this having, for me personally the power of these metaphors stems from the fact that I have a wife and children. This having may indeed be a lustful possession, which tends toward tyranny, in which I draw my unique being from them but give them no being of their own in return. Yet it might also be a charitable possession, in which, by virtue of that intimate bond, I not only draw my being from them but I do so precisely insofar as I give each of them their unique being. Having is intrinsic to both kinds of being—being tyrannical and being gracious.

    Just as Marcel's focus on having as lust excludes having as charity, so does his account of being exclude the recognition of being as a process of individuation. As Marcel sees it, being simply transcends self and other in charity. Marcel is right that having assumes a distinction between self and other
but, in overlooking a charitable form of having, he does away with the individuation which fully human love realizes and from which fully human love flows. For love is only in part a transcendence of self and other, and the mystery of love—and of the Trinity—is that charity is generative of both unity and the differentiation of self and other. In loving the other, the self takes on its greatest substantiality as person, and grants to the other its greatest substantiality as person.

Similarly, Marcel's understanding of knowing as having, and of having as lust, overlooks the positive dimension of knowing as a potentially wholesome kind of individuation. The desire to know can be an expression of either lust or charity, and each yields a different kind of individual. The desire to know can be as obsessive and tyrannical as one's will to exist through drawing the lives of others into one's own. The desire to know can be a will to control, in which the measure of one's being, or one's substantiality, is the magnitude of one's effect, expressed either in physical control in the world or in the scope of one's theoretical synthesis. Objectivity can simply be an expression of mastery, proof that what is understood is well and thoroughly dominated. Or the desire to know can be an act of charity, either in the sense that the broader context of an inquiry is the love of a good—consider the difference between doing cancer research strictly for fame or money and doing it for the sake of healing persons—or in the sense that one grasps a coherence or beauty in something and wants to bring it to light. There is an analogy, I believe, between love and discovery, for both entail a giving and receiving of being. For love does not merely give substance to another without in some sense discovering the substance of the other. The knowledge of harmonic ratio in harmony or the inverse square relationship implicit in celestial orbits, in some sense substantiates the meaning of the phenomenon—gives it added weight or a further dimension—and at the same time imparts to the knower a sense of his or her substantiality.
Walker Percy in a whimsical exploration of the meaning of the self in a secular and technological society touches on the continuity of having and being. In the context of a "Twenty-Question Multiple-Choice Self-Help Quiz" he probes the Envious Self, the Promiscuous Self, etc. Among them he also deals with the Self as Nought, the basic theme of which is "how the self tries to inform itself" by possessing unusual things and dressing in the latest fashion. Percy considers the extravagant ways that fashion-conscious people try to make coffee tables out of all manner of bizarre materials—a lobster trap, a Coca-Cola sign, etc. Why is a lobster trap deemed a more desireable coffee table than a simple, functional coffee table? In his multiple-choice quiz of explanations of this phenomenon, he gives a clue to his own conviction under answer 'd':

Because the self in the twentieth century is a voracious nought which expands like the feeding vacuole of an amoeba seeking to nourish and inform its own nothingness by ingesting new objects in the world but, like a vacuole, only succeeds in emptying them out.

A functional coffee table ceases to be noticed, it no longer excites one's attention, and the fact that it is no longer noticed is an indication that it has lost its substantiality, its manifest quality of being something. As unnoticed and insubstantial, it no longer imparts any sense of substantiality to the one who has it. Exotic tables demand notice, and so their substantiality is evident, and the one who has it shares in that substantiality. The same dynamic is at work, Percy suggests, in the continual change of fashion in clothes. A new fashion satisfies temporarily one's desire for substantiality; when the saleswoman says 'This dress is you' it reflects the fact that the dress gives the person her being. With time, however, the substantiality of the dress fades. What was once exotic and prompted notice—both one's own notice and the notice of others—becomes transparent, unnoticeable, empty of significance, and one's self becomes empty along with it. Percy suggests that this may explain the modern fascination with antiques, for they are saturated with another time and place and so resist being
emptied or absorbed by the emptiness of our own time and place.

The twentieth century may be emptier than the past (though I suspect this to be a Quixotic romanticism), but the identification of having and being has a broader, universal relevance.\(^{30}\) Percy's profound playfulness exposes a timeless truth: the substantiality of the self is implicated in the substantiality of what one has. In this is to be found the ground of what some call 'objectivity', though I prefer to speak of substantiality. Truth, goodness and beauty are the measure of substantiality. In knowing these things we participate in—or are assimilated to—their substantiality. This perspective echoes antiquity, for one find the themes of substantiality and assimilation in Plato:

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\text{The man who has been guided thus far in the mysteries of love ... will suddenly have revealed to him as he approaches the end of his initiation a beauty whose nature is marvelous indeed ... . This beauty is first of all eternal; ... it neither undergoes any increase or diminution nor suffers any change. ... What may we suppose to be the felicity of the man who sees absolute beauty in its essence, pure and unalloyed, who ... is able to apprehend divine beauty where it exists apart and alone? ... Do you not see that in that region alone where he sees beauty with the faculty capable of seeing it, will he be able to bring forth not merely reflected images of goodness but true goodness, because he will be in contact not with a reflection but with the truth? And having brought forth and nurtured true goodness he will have the privilege of being loved of God, and becoming, if ever a man can, immortal himself.}\(^{31}\)
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Eternality and immutability signify the substantiality of ultimate beauty, which is also the ultimate truth and good. Harmonic ratios and the other particular things we seek to know each reflect this substantiality, and in knowing what is substantial we acquire a splendid weight of being.

The pursuit of being, then, is a given in human existence, and what differs is how or in what being is sought. It can be sought in public acclaim, whether it be the affirmation of fame or the size of one's paycheck. It can be pursued in the incredible lightness of being found in physical delights or in the magnitude of efficacy, which is the will to power. Yet such forms of substantiality become empty over time. The true, the good and the beautiful are ultimately substantial and so are the proportionate fulfillment of human rationality: these alone satisfy
the human and rational hunger to be.

This is the response to Lonergan’s notion of the pure desire to know as disinterested. It is no less disinterested than our very desire to exist, to be substantial, to be real. And that desire to exist is only pure to the extent that it is an act of charity, for the will to be, to know and to have expresses the fundamental ambivalence of human existence, in which both tyranny and grace intermingle, conceptually as distinct as 1 and 0, but existentially intertwined, and easily confused with each other. Interest, for good or evil, penetrates the desire to know, and the satisfaction of this interest is the immanent criterion of substantiality.

D. Conclusion

The question we set out to answer was whether Lonergan’s account of value provides an adequate way of harmonizing the tension between historical contingency and transcendence. The answer is a mixed one. The general structure of Lonergan’s integration of nature and history is a fruitful one, locating in nature the ground of an indeterminate potential for transcendence and in history the process of progressive determination. He appropriates the classical affirmation of transcendence, yet overcomes the limitations of the relatively static classical perspective by reformulating the human eros, and indeed the fundamental eros of nature, as an indeterminately-directed striving for betterment. In Lonergan the traditional emphasis on determinacy—implicit in the notion of eternally-fixed species and in the notion that intellect is informed by a determinate grasp of being, so that knowing is in some sense simply a ‘seeing’ of what is there—is rejected for an emphasis on indeterminacy, which brings us into a world in which novelty and progress is possible, and in which historicity is intelligible. This, I believe, is Lonergan’s abiding contribution to a synthesis of the new and the old, of history and transcendence.
However, Lonergan's opposition of affectivity and reason, spontaneity and deliberation, nature and history limits the scope of this synthesis. It reduces the good either to the rationally obligatory or attributes it primarily to a spontaneous, affective intuition. In the first case, which reflects his earlier approach, the knowledge of the good belongs to the historical process of progressive determination because the good is strictly rational. As such, the truly good is good independent of any affective indication. In the second case, the apprehension of value depends strictly on the natural, immanent criteria operative in human affectivity, and as such it is not determined historically. The immediate, affective response to value is ahistorical, explicable primarily in terms of nature, and history is operative only in the critical clarification and reflective application of these values to practical courses of action. So Lonergan's identification of transcendence and history with the upward thrust toward the deliberate determination of truth and value, together with his emphasis on disinterested objectivity, either reduces the good to the reasonable or excludes it from the dynamics of history.

In response I have argued against a dichotomy between spontaneous desire and deliberate reason. Rationality suffuses the depths of the psyche, relating us to being and its beauty, grounding spontaneous affectivity in an intelligent apprehension of meaning. Spontaneous desire relies on a rational penetration into meaning, which is a constructive act of discerning coherence and relevance. Similarly, the 'disinterested' desire to know enters into the interested orientation of the spirit toward substantial being. Substantiality can be sought in many ways—power, pleasure, fame, truth—but the desire to be is actually rational insofar as it seeks being in that which is truly substantial, truly perfective of human existence.

It has not been our concern to go into the implications of this response to Lonergan for the broader structure of his thought. One might note in passing,
however, that if there is no dichotomy between spontaneous affectivity and deliberate rationality, this raises the question of whether there are indeed two paths of development, an upward one of individual achievement through disinterested inquiry, and a downward intersubjective one of being incorporated into the meanings of a family, a community, a tradition. As suggested in Chapter VI, the formulation of two paths reflects Lonergan’s dissociation of affectivity and rationality. If there is no such separation, then it would follow that there should be a single, upward path. So though I have focused on Lonergan’s account of value, the conclusions have ramifications for other aspects of his thought.

Nor has my concern been to articulate fully a position to replace Lonergan’s own. Much of what has been said assumes the integrity of a more classical position, and attempts to appropriate that integrity within Lonergan’s approach to integrating history and nature. Yet I have assumed rather than argued that a classical intellectualism is a superior ethical position. A fuller study would have to go beyond assuming to arguing for its superiority, considering the Kantian challenge to teleological ethics, and the existentialist challenge to Kantian formalism.

Finally, one of the more subtle implications of this study, I believe, is that it affirms Lonergan’s position at a very basic level. For Lonergan himself taught that the virtue of every positive achievement is that it is open to further development, while mistaken judgments of truth or value ultimately fail. What has been said by way of response to Lonergan’s position is intended as a development of Lonergan’s position, and so is offered as a testimony to his achievement.
Footnotes: Introduction


3. Lonergan speaks of the truly good in terms of 'value', and I shall follow his usage. This use of 'value' is at odds with a tradition that associates the term with the subjective attribution of value in contrast to the objective apprehension of worth or goodness. In following his usage, I accept the implication of the 'subjectivity' of value, with the qualification that this is not meant to imply a radical relativity of value. The notion of objectivity is liable to a variety of misunderstandings, and may suggest that the truth is 'out there' just waiting to be seen by the subject. As Lonergan argues, though one can affirm the objectivity of truth or value, that discernment is rooted in the operations of the subject: "The fruit of truth must grow and mature on the tree of the subject, before it can be plucked and placed in its absolute realm." ["The Subject," in Second Collection, (Wm. F.J. Ryan and B. Tyrrell, eds.) London: Dartman, Longman & Todd, 1974, p. 71. (Originally presented as the Aquinas Lecture, Marquette University, Mar. 3, 1968.)]


7. For an explanation of the two ways of understanding the rational good—i.e., as materially or formally good—see the discussion in Chapter IV, "Thomas and Kant on the Rational Good."
8. Finnis himself appeals to self-evident human goods, of which there are seven: human life, knowledge and aesthetic appreciation, skilled performance, self-integration, practical reasonableness, justice and friendship, and holiness. [Recovery of Virtue, p. 18.] With some of these in particular it may be difficult to make the claim that their 'self-evidence' is independent of the historical process which has shaped modern values.


11. "On the Relationship between Transcendental and Hermeneutical Approaches to Theology", Horizons 16 (1989), pp. 342-345. Lawrence delivers a more extensive treatment of Lonergan as a hermeneutical thinker in "Method and Theology as Hermeneutical", in Creativity and Method: Essays in honor of Bernard Lonergan, (M. Lamb, ed.) Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1981, pp. 79-104. Though Lawrence does not explicitly assert that Lonergan reconciles the two perspectives, it is implicit in his characterization of Lonergan as a hermeneutical theologian, which he justifies by outlining the essential features of hermeneutical thought. Hermeneutical philosophy is a radical form of phenomenology's rebellion against the inadequacies of neo-Kantian epistemology, which based science on deductive abstractions. The hermeneutic tradition argues for a radical contingency against the notion of necessary, abstract concepts. Similarly, Lonergan offers a refutation of the inadequate epistemologies of our times, also arguing for the contingency of understanding. Furthermore, hermeneutics moves away from the notion of objective knowledge by isolated subjects. Lonergan, too, leaves behind the notion of isolated subjectivity, for consciousness is experienced as 'self-presence-in-the-world', a self-preservation that discovers itself spontaneously understanding and judging, rather than controlling at will the emergence of its questions and answers. Finally, just as hermeneutical philosophy is more radical than phenomenology in its concerted attempt to stay more in touch with matters of practical human concern, so is Lonergan primarily concerned with practical matters. He focuses on the actual practice of understanding, judging and deliberating with the goal of transforming practice and effecting social change.

12. By 'classical' I mean the ethical tradition that runs through Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Augustine and Thomas.

13. "I wished to get out of the context of a faculty psychology with its consequent alternatives of voluntarism, intellectualism, ... sentimentalism, and sensism, none of which has any serious, viable meaning ...." ["The Response of the Jesuit as Priest and Apostle in the Modern World," in Second Collection, p. 170. (Originally read as a paper in the Jesuit Institute, Feb. 1970, on "The Jesuit Priest Today").]
Footnotes: Chapter I
The Ground of Dialectic in Nature


2. The discussion of finality here brings together discussions found in "Finality, Love, Marriage," [first published in *Theological Studies* 4 (1943), pp. 477-510, and reprinted in *Collection*, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 4, F. Crowe, ed., Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988, pp. 17-52], in *Insight*, and in "Mission and the Spirit," [first published in *Experience of the Spirit: To Edward Schillebeeckx on his sixtieth birthday*, (P. Huizing and Wm. Basset, eds.), *Concilium*, vol. IX, no. 10, 1976, pp. 69-78, and reprinted in *A Third Collection*, (F. Crowe, ed.) New York: Paulist Press, 1985, pp. 23-34.] A caution is needed regarding Lonergan’s terminology. As we will see below, when he first introduces the concept of an indeterminate finality he calls it ‘vertical finality’ and the term ‘finality’ means the same as final causality; that is, ‘vertical finality’ is presented as a species of ‘finality’. In *Insight* finality comes to mean vertical finality and it is distinguished from final causality. (For a fuller discussion, see fn. 5 below.) Nevertheless the term vertical finality does not drop out of use, for it is used again in "Mission and the Spirit." [p. 26.] ‘Vertical finality’ seems to be used only in circumstances where Lonergan can assume a scholastically trained audience.

3. "Finality, Love, Marriage," *Collection*, p. 22: "Horizontal finality results from abstract essence; it holds even when the object is in isolation; it is to a motive or term that is proportionate to essence. But vertical finality is in the concrete; in point of fact it is not from the isolated instance but from the conjoined plurality." Horizontal finality in this early perspective is the tendency of the individual thing to its individual fulfillment.

4. Lonergan’s notion of finality builds upon a Thomistic idea. In *Summa contra Gentiles* III.22.7 Thomas speaks of the potency that exists in a concrete individual entity to contribute to a higher entity. Thomas describes these part-whole relationships in hierarchical terms, the lower existing for the sake of the higher, and, as we will see, Lonergan follows him in this. However, Lonergan understands this potency from a modern, evolutionary viewpoint. Lonergan sums up the difference between his position and Thomas’ Aristotelian position in terms of the "fertility of concrete plurality." [*Collection*, p. 21.] For Thomas the nature of a individual thing is determined either by essence and accident, where accident is the result of mutual interference between a plurality of essences. Against the notion of accident as a matter of interference, Lonergan envisions a plurality of essences co-operating and complementing each other so that in plurality there resides a potential for the emergence of new species and novel forms of higher organization. [Ibid.] Through co-operation, plurality has a fertile potential.

5. *Insight*, p. 451. Cf. "Mission and the Spirit," *A Third Collection*, p. 24. There is a significant development in Lonergan’s thought on the indeterminacy of finality. When Lonergan first introduces finality in "Finality, Love, Marriage" he calls it ‘vertical finality’ and treats it as one of three kinds of ‘finality’. In this context ‘finality’ means the same as final causality, and accordingly ‘vertical finality’ is presented as a teleological process, which implies that it is a
determinate process. Though Lonergan tries to introduce an element of indeterminacy into natural processes through the notion of vertical finality, the teleological framework is not really conducive to such indeterminacy. This problem is resolved by Insight's new emphasis on indeterminacy, which is apparent in Lonergan's transforming 'vertical finality' into a more general concept, which he now calls finality, and in his explicit distinction between finality and final causality. Finality is a more general principle than vertical finality, for, though it conveys the same basic idea of an upward, indeterminate movement toward higher forms of order, it is now a more comprehensive principle. For example, in "Finality, Love, Marriage" vertical finality as an indeterminate source of higher orders is contrasted with the horizontal finality, a determinate principle by which an individual realizes its own species-specific fulfillment. In Insight, however, what had been dealt with as horizontal finality is subsumed under a pervasively indeterminate finality. This is evident in Insight's 'principle of development': "[Development] is the linked sequence of dynamic higher integrations. An initial coincidental manifold is systematized and modified by a higher integration so as to call forth a second, the second leads to a third; the third to a fourth; and so on, until the possibilities of development along a given line are exhausted and the relative stability of maturity is reached." [p. 452.] In other words, even the finalistic tendency of the organism to its mature form is to be understood as an indeterminate, transcending dynamic, for each stage of an organism's development is a lower manifold from which the subsequent stage emerges as a higher order until the highest integration, maturity, is reached.


7. Insight, pp. 447 f. Cf. also p. 450: "[T]he directed dynamism of universal process is directed, not to a generically, specifically, or individually determinate goal, but to whatever becomes determinate through the process itself in its effectively probable realization of its possibilities." (In the text cited above "proportionate being" is a technical designation for the realm of human investigation, the natural order proportionate to our ability to experience it.)

8. Insight, p. 450. Cf. p. 447. Directedness implies the emergence of a positive order, over against which the "negative picture" of death and disorder is juxtaposed. Generally speaking, indeterminate potential is dynamically oriented to its actualization, and increasingly higher orders realize and integrate more of that potential. Even in orders which fail, species that do not prove adaptive, theories which are eventually discarded, societies that prove unstable, the positive directedness of finality is to be discerned: "Its trials will far outnumber its successes, but the trials are no less a part of the programme than the successes." [P. 448.]


13. Ibid., pp. 471 f. The general discussion of the principle of correspondence on pp. 451 ff. omits discussion of this mutuality. The reason for this is that only in consciousness can
order emerge on a higher level, independent of lower level processes and requiring a corresponding change in them. So the law of integration is a more particular aspect of the principle of correspondence—particular, that is, to conscious creatures.

14. The distinction between the positions of Lonergan and Thomas, between instrumental and participative relationship, is echoed in an earlier distinction, where Lonergan contrasts instrumental and dispositive finality. [*Finality, Love, Marriage,* Collection, pp. 20 f.] Instrumental finality is characterized by many lower things or processes serving to bring about the higher end of another subject, as when many strokes of the chisel contribute to the beauty of a statue. Dispositive finality occurs when many lower things or processes contribute to the higher end of the same subject, as when many acts of concentration lead to an insight. The element of identity between higher and lower in dispositive finality must be understood in terms of the higher order being implicit in the lower. Concentration seeking understanding has an implicit potential to be realized in and through an act of insight. By contrast, the statue's beauty is not implicit in the chisel's movements, for the movements are indifferent to the broad range of ends which they might accomplish. As participative relationship is mirrored in the principle of correspondence, dispositive finality finds its later formulation in another of Insight's principles of development, the principle of emergence: unorganized but adjacent processes "invite" integration by a higher organizing process. [Insight, p. 451.] There is something in the collective potential of the manifold that seeks realization in a higher unity.


17. Insight, p. 190.

18. Confession is a type of rite related to Eliade's "myth of the eternal return," which gives a new start to life: "Eliade criticizes these rites as a flight from history. But I think one can also think of them as a primitive means, on the symbolic level, to deal with and dominate history. It is true that man is historical, but he is historical in the sense that his apprehensions and choices form a cumulative process, and there is no contradiction between the historical and the use of apprehension and choice to dominate and control that process in some manner. In that sense the myth of the eternal return ... can be thought of as a symbolic technique on a rather primitive level for dealing with the fundamental problem of history. History dominates man enough without him attempting to free himself from it." [The Philosophy of Education, lectures given at Xavier University in Cincinnati, Aug. 3-14, 1959, (transcribed and edited by James and John Quinn, 1979) p. 82.]

19. Insight, p. 324: "Praise of the scientific spirit that inquires, that masters, that controls, is not without an echo, a deep resonance within me, for, in my more modest way, I too inquire and catch on, see the thing to do and see that it is properly done." Cf. also the discussion of the freedom of consciousness in "Existentialism", p. 84: "Human consciousness is not in a flow that is determined by external data. It is as it were a free creation. It is man the artist realizing his art primarily in himself, in a spontaneous fashion. This expresses the truth that the flow of consciousness is not determined by environment and external data. On the contrary
mankind prunes the data of an environment. They are merely clues for a man to think out the way in which he can dominate and recreate his environment."


21. Lonergan's own discussion of finality in terms of these three conditions of incompleteness (Insight, pp. 365 f.) occurs in the more specific context of organic development, where he first introduces the notion of an "operator", the function of finality in moving a process towards a higher completion. Since the notion of an operator is equally relevant to intellectual processes, we will consider his discussion in these terms since it is more experientially accessible. The notion that incompleteness of the higher is a movement toward internal coherence does not have its counterpart in Lonergan's discussion in the organic context, even though the effort of an organism toward the coordination of its increasingly fine motor control provides a reasonable counterpart.

22. Insight, p. 452.

23. The positive directedness of finality is also implicit in Lonergan's argument that the higher order is the purpose for the existence of the lower multiplicity, and that finality moves toward the realization of that higher purpose. This is expressed clearly in "The Natural Desire to See God" where Lonergan challenges a Thomistic perspective that he calls 'static essentialism'. Static essentialism is the view that finite natures are permanently fixed and that God's ordering of creation was a matter of fitting these predetermined natures together into a coherent cosmos; therefore, in God's mind finite natures were logically prior to the world order that they comprise—the part is prior to the whole. Against this Lonergan asserts the primacy of cosmic order. God knew all possible coherent world orders and the natures required to constitute them; in God's mind the whole was prior to the part, and the part was ordained for the sake of achieving the excellence of the whole. [Ibid., p. 85.] The individual thing serves a purpose in the realization of an excellent world order and, because of the priority of this ultimate order, the individual is expendable. The extinction of species and the toleration of physical evils are intelligible as conducive to a higher fulfillment. In Insight Lonergan even recognizes moral evil as belonging to the indeterminate betterment of the natural order, for by corruption no less than by honesty do people come to learn how to act from the consequences of their actions. [Pp. 448 f.] So the primacy of the higher unity implies that the higher is the purpose of the lower, for the higher is impossible without the lower.


25. Ibid., pp. 442-444.

26. Ibid., pp. 36f., 737.

27. Ibid., p. 434 ff.

28. Ibid., p. 498: "[F]orms become known inasmuch as the sciences approximate towards their ideal of complete explanation."
29. Ibid., pp. 514 ff. The question of the human ‘central form’, which is directed to the argument for the survival of the spirit, begins on p. 518.


31. "Existentialism" (Transcript of lectures given at Boston College, Boston, 1957. Transcript provided by the Lonergan Research Institute, Toronto.), pp. 114 f.

32. Ibid., pp. 120 f.

33. Insight, p. 515. It is also in this more holistic sense that Lonergan contrast human nature and history in "Theology in its New Context." [Second Collection, (Wm. F.J. Ryan and B. Tyrrell, eds.) London: Dartman, Longman & Todd, 1974, p. 61. (The essay was originally published in Theology of Renewal, vol. I, Renewal of Religious Thought, New York, 1968, pp. 36-46.)] There he says that alongside understanding humankind in terms of human nature, the individual needs to be seen as an historical being, an incarnate subject. Human nature connotes both body and soul.

34. This emphasis on indeterminacy needs to be qualified, for though it is proper to stress indeterminacy from a philosophical and scientific point of view, Lonergan sees this perspective as incomplete from a theological point of view. The cosmos has its ultimate ground not just in the indeterminate possibilities of energy but in a wise and benevolent creator. Indeterminacy reflects the natural limitation of human understanding, which can neither grasp the culmination of the universal process nor the virtually infinite wealth of intelligibility implicit in the profound complexity of concrete events. From a divine perspective, however, there is no such limitation: "the non-systematic [i.e., the indeterminate] vanishes to yield place to a fully determinate and absolutely efficacious plan and intention. It follows that finality, instead of being an upward but indeterminately directed dynamism, reflects the intended ordination of each potency for the form it receives, of each form for the act it receives, of each manifold of lower acts for the higher unities and integrations under which they are subsumed. So it is that every tendency or force, every movement and change, every desire and striving is designed to bring about the order of the universe in the manner in which in fact they contribute to it." [Insight, p. 665.] The nature of the cosmos is designed such that its implicit potential and all the determinate orders that realize that potential conform to God’s will for what the cosmos is and is to become. "[A]ll that is for the order of the universe is headed ultimately to the perfection and excellence that is its primary source and ground." [Ibid.] Furthermore, though finality is multivalent, to the extent that God has acted in historical revelation and continues to guide us, we are given a grasp of the order to which our understanding and our wills are to be conformed. [Cf. "Mission and the Spirit," A Third Collection, pp. 26 f.]
Footnotes: Chapter II
Dialectic in Human Existence

1. *Insight*, pp. 181 ff.

2. *Understanding and Being*, p. 320. In response to the question of whether there are other patterns of experience aside from those Lonergan has discussed, Lonergan says: "Quite possibly. I'm not attempting an exhaustive account of possible patterns of experience."

3. The purpose of the discussion of the biological, aesthetic, intellectual and dramatic patterns of experience is implicit in the structure of the chapter, but it is also made explicit in *Understanding and Being*, p. 322. There Lonergan is responding to the question of the purpose of identifying the patterns of experience, yet the nature of his answer suggests that he is summing up the purpose of the whole of *Insight*’s Chapter VI. That is, he first shows that ordinary living (not just mathematics and science) is intelligent and then undermines the ultimacy of common sense.


5. Ibid., p. 471.

6. Ibid., p. 184.


8. *Insight*, p. 188.


11. *Understanding and Being*, p. 306: "In general, I conceive common sense as a mode in which insights accumulate. ... Common sense occurs, ordinarily, it develops, in the dramatic and practical patterns of experience."

12. *Insight*, p. 188.

13. Ibid., p. 199.

14. Ibid., pp. 73 f.

15. The distinction between descriptive and explanatory understanding is a development of an Aristotelian distinction between sensitive and intellectual knowledge. [Cf. *Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas*, (David B. Burrell, ed.) Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967,
Sensitive apprehension is associated with sensory experience, with the kind of knowing that precedes the intellectual apprehension of an abstract universal (i.e., an explanatory cause). Sensitive apprehension is a matter of experiential knowledge, as when one knows that a medicine is effective for curing certain symptoms without knowing why; intellectual knowledge implies a knowledge of causes, as when one recognizes the cause of the medicine's effectiveness. On this Aristotelian-Thomistic basis Lonergan builds his distinction between description and explanation, between subjective and objective understanding. Another aspect of the sensitive-intellectual distinction is found in Lonergan's contrast between "nominal" and "essential," or "explanatory," definitions. [Cf. Insight, pp. 10 f.] ('Explanatory' is the term used in Insight; 'essential' is the term used in "A Note on Geometrical Possibility", Collection, pp. 94 f. (Originally published in The Modern Schoolman 27 (1949-50), pp. 124-138.)) According to Lonergan, who (as we will see in Chapter VI) departs from Thomas on this point, both kinds of definition involve understanding and insight, but what is understood is different. Nominal definition involves understanding of words, how they are used and what they mean. One knows that Socrates is a man because one knows how words are used. Essential definition expresses an understanding of the reality itself; one knows what a man is in terms of an abstract, universal definition. In keeping with Aristotle's distinction, knowledge of words is based on the empirical, on that which is given to the senses; knowledge of reality is based on the intelligibility intrinsic to the empirical.

16. The distinction between objective and subjective, explanatory and descriptive, is similar but not equivalent to Galileo's distinction between primary and secondary qualities, or the quantitative and qualitative aspects of a thing. The difference lies in the fact that Galileo reduced the objective to the quantifiable, whereas Lonergan understands the objective in terms of intelligibility. There is overlap in that the quantifiable is intelligible, but for Lonergan there is also logical intelligibility. Meanings of words can also be objective, defined technically and univocally.

17. Insight, p. 505: "When one is endeavouring to explain, one is orientated to the universe of being; one is setting up distinctions within being; one is relating distinct beings to one another; and one is relegating all the merely descriptive elements in knowledge to particular instance [sic] of the case that arises when some being with senses and imagination is related ... to other beings. But while explanatory knowledge includes descriptive, descriptive knowledge is a part that is prone to fall under the illusion of being the whole."

18. This point becomes most clear in Lonergan's argument that only a first cause (God) can ultimately satisfy the intellectual desire for the explanation of particular things. Without an ultimate, comprehensive explanatory principle of this sort, all less ultimate explanations become mere matters of fact, which are themselves inexplicable. For example, emergent probability is a broad explanatory principle, but if one cannot account for it by finding a higher cause for it, then it is merely a matter of fact, intelligible but inexplicable. Cf. ibid., p. 652: "In the first place, being is intelligible. It is neither beyond nor apart nor different from the intelligible. ... On the other hand, what is apart from being is nothing, and so what is apart from intelligibility is nothing. It follows that to talk about mere matters of fact that admit no explanation is to talk about nothing. If existence is a mere matter of fact, it is nothing. If occurrence is mere matter of fact, it is nothing. ... This is rude and harsh, and one may be tempted to take flight into the counter-positions .... [U]ltimately one will be back to affirm that being is intelligible and that the mere matter of fact without explanation is apart from being."

19. Lonergan classes all scientific theory as merely probable and never fully certain, so
one might question whether the affirmation of the earth orbiting the sun provides an appropriate example of a virtually unconditioned (i.e., certain) proposition. Some would say that true and certain judgments can only be made regarding empirical facts, such as the fact that I am sitting at my desk now, or that you are reading this text now. However, this is an overly narrow definition of empirical, and one that I doubt Lonergan would agree with. In *Insight* certainty is a mean between rash judgment and indecision, a mean that is determined well only by the person of good judgment. [P. 284-287.] The question of good judgment seems out of place if one is simply talking about empirical facts like "I am sitting down."

The question, then, is what is meant by an empirical fact, of which one can be certain. Is the affirmation that the earth orbits the sun a statement of empirical fact or scientific theory? The explanation of why scientific theory is only probable is that science finds correlations between abstract correlatives. [Pp. 301 f.] The concepts of mass, velocity, etc. are abstract and so the definition, measurement and correlation of such abstractions depend on an ever-growing web of further definitions, measurements and correlations. By contrast, the observation that the earth orbits the sun does not deal in the realm of abstract correlatives, for earth and sun are not theoretical abstractions, and while the explanation of their relative movements depends upon abstractive insight, it does not involve or depend upon the level of abstraction embodied in the law of gravitation which explains why the earth orbits the sun. Similarly, discovering the cause of lunar eclipses involves abstractive insight and yet no one could conceivably doubt that they are the shadow of the earth on the moon. The judgment that the earth does indeed orbit the sun does not seem a rash one, for it is difficult to imagine the existence of any relevant question that could compromise it, and to refrain from such a judgment indicates the indecision that only a dyed-in-the-wool relativist could sustain.

20. *Insight*, pp. 348 f.

21. *Understanding and Being*, p. 228. For this same reason Lonergan resists the classical understanding of human living as oriented toward happiness: "If you start off from happiness as your fundamental goal, are you not prejudicing your account of knowledge as a means towards obtaining happiness? Is your knowledge ... going to be objective knowledge, or is it going to be wishful thinking?" [Ibid., p. 310.] If we seek to know in order to be happy, then the pursuit of truth is an interested one and, in Lonergan's eyes, little different from any other self-interested pursuit.

22. Ibid., p. 266: "There are insights that arise in ordinary intersubjective living. When you are familiar with people, the slightest sign will let you know what mood they are in today. ... But if you are in a perfect state of detachment, you lack this kind of rapport with people, you don't understand them that way." That Lonergan does view intersubjective knowledge in a positive light is apparent in "Theology and Understanding", originally published in 1954: "Knowledge is involved not only in defining compunction but also in feeling it, not only in discoursing upon the Blessed Trinity but also in pleasing it. Still, these two types of knowledge are quite distinct, and the methodological problem is to define the precise nature of each, the advantages and limitations of each, and above all the principles and rules that govern transpositions from one to the other." [Collection, p. 127] He does not go on to resolve the problem of theoretically distinguishing these two types of knowledge. His concern is to keep them distinct without denigrating either. Even there, however, he makes it clear that, though intersubjective knowledge is important, it is relatively limited. One must recognize the distinct contribution of objective knowing, which alone moves us beyond the apprehension of the particular and concrete
to the apprehension of the whole. "To know God and all things in their relations to God the human mind must effect the difficult shift from the familiar categories of intersubjective living to the objective categories in which the notion of being is potentially both completely universal and completely concrete." [Ibid., p. 128.]

23. Insight, p. xix. In support of this interpretation cf. pp. 244, 266.


25. Insight, pp. 354 f. Lonergan has his own unique definition of notion, and so except within quotations we will italicize notion to indicate when it is meant in Lonergan's specific sense.

26. The progression from experience to judgment indicates a hierarchical order within the notion of being. The intellectual dynamism is a hierarchical arrangement of notions, for each stage in the process of knowing—understanding and judgment—has its own notion, an orientation to its own goal. Understanding reflects the notion of intelligibility and judgment the notion of truth: "Just as the notion of the intelligible is involved in the actual functioning of intelligence, just as the notion of the grounded is involved in the actual functioning of reasonableness, so the notion of being is involved in the unrestricted drive of inquiring intelligence and reflecting reasonableness." [Ibid., p. 356] The notion of intelligibility is an intelligent directedness toward understanding for the sake of knowing truth. The notion of truth is a purposiveness toward judgment for the sake of knowing being, the comprehensive whole of which every particular truth is a part. The notion of being, therefore, is a higher unity which subordinates particular investigations. [Ibid., p. 354.]

27. In the early chapters of Insight the practical aspect of rational human living is not initially presented as a distinct pattern of experience. Rather it appears to be subsumed under the dramatic pattern: "Man is an artist. His practicality is part of his dramatic pursuit of dignified living." [Ibid., p. 212.] Cf. p. 207: "In the drama of human living, human intelligence is not only artistic but practical." It is not until Chapter XIV when Lonergan turns his attention to metaphysics and ethics that the practical begins to be listed as a distinct pattern alongside the dramatic. [Cf. Ibid., p. 385.]

28. Insight, p. 349.

29. Ibid., p. 178.

30. Ibid., p. 356: "Without the pure desire to know, sensitive living would remain in its routine of perception and conation, instinct and habit, emotion and action. What breaks that circuit and releases intellectual activity is the wonder that Aristotle described as the beginning of all science and philosophy. But that wonder is intellectual inquiry. ... Still more obviously all ideas and all concepts are responses to the desire to understand, and all judgments are responses to the demand for the unconditioned."

31. Ibid., p. 580.

32. Ibid., pp. 358 f.: "[O]ne can think of the latter, but there is something idle, something superfluous, something futile about such thinking. The reason for this is that thinking
is a moment in the unfolding of the pure desire to know; though the thought as thought is merely a formal term of meaning, ... still we do not merely think. Our thinking is purposive. It is a tentative determination of the all-inclusive notion of being. ... Because the unicorn and phlogiston are known to be unsuccessful determinations of being, they are formal terms in which the core of meaning, the intention of being, has become uninterested."


34. The correspondence is 'rough' because the simple distinction between intelligent and intelligible does not adequately distinguish the spiritual and the material, for the intellect is both intelligent and intelligible. This calls for a further distinction: whether or not intelligibility relies on an "empirical residue"—that which is left over from the abstraction of intelligibility. (Abstraction is a process of extricating intelligibility from concrete particulars. The concept of a horse, for example, prescinds from any particular colour, height, etc. These empirical particulars are not relevant to understanding the meaning of horse, so they are residual.) So beyond the distinction between intelligent and intelligible, Lonergan also qualifies the material as something that "is constituted by the empirical residue or is conditioned intrinsically by that residue." [*Insight*, p. 517.] In other words, the intelligibility of intelligence does not render it material, for its intelligibility is not dependent on empirical factors.

35. *Insight*, p. 517: "Man, the concrete being, is both material and spiritual; he is material by his physical, chemical, organic and sensitive conjugates; he is spiritual by his intellectual conjugates." Cf. ibid., p. 516.: "[T]hus as we are spiritual, we are orientated towards the universe of being, know ourselves as parts within that universe, and guide our living by that knowledge."

36. *Insight*, p. 517.: "[T]he material can be defined as whatever is constituted by the empirical residue or is conditioned intrinsically by that residue. It follows that [processes] on the physical, chemical, organic, and psychic levels are material." Though Lonergan is not explicit on this point, it seems straightforward that physical, chemical, and organic processes are "constituted by the empirical residue" and that psychic processes are "conditioned intrinsically by that residue."


40. Ibid., p. 473. It is evident from the discussion of the law of limitation and transcendence in *Insight* that there is a tension between conservation and progress even within the psyche; the conservation of achieved psychic development is in tension with the progress of emergent psychic development. However, even this tension within the psyche is attributed to the influence of the intellect, which leads to the emergence of a more nuanced psychic sensitivity.


42. Ibid., p. 212.
43. Collection, p. 39.

44. Ibid., p. 32.

45. Ibid., p. 44. Over against this early comparison of intersubjectivity and insect communities, Lonergan would later clarify that human intersubjectivity is not fixed in the manner of the beehive, for though it is limited by the psyche, it participates in the freedom of dramatic artistry. (Cf. Insight, p. 188.)

46. Insight, pp. 214 ff.

47. Ibid., pp. 222 f.

48. Ibid., p. 477.

49. Ibid., pp. 473 f.

50. Ibid., pp. 474 f.

51. Ibid., p. 219.

52. Ibid., pp. 217 f.

53. Ibid., p. 467: "The higher the level of integration, the greater the freedom from material limitation."

54. Ibid., p. 190.

55. Cf. ibid., pp. 267, 515.

56. Ibid., p. 192: "Just as wanting an insight penetrates below the surface to bring forth schematic images that give rise to the insight, so not wanting an insight has the opposite effect of repressing from consciousness a scheme that would suggest the insight."

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid., p. 219: "For intelligence is a principle of universalization and of ultimate synthesis; it understands similars in the same manner; and it gives rise to further questions on each issue until all the relevant data are understood. On the other hand, spontaneity is concerned with the present, the immediate, the palpable; intersubjectivity radiates from the self as from a centre, and its efficacy diminishes rapidly with distance in place or time."

59. Ibid., p. 220.

60. Ibid., p. 221.

61. This passage raises a significant question that Lonergan does not clearly address. If egoism interferes with the "spontaneous demands of intersubjectivity" as much as it does with practical intelligence, how can sensitive spontaneity be the source of interference? Lonergan
suggests that sensitive concerns restrict objectivity, but what restricts sensitive concerns, inhibiting their spontaneous intersubjectivity? In short, how can sensitive spontaneity interfere with itself? The psyche might restrict the scope of consideration to immediate concerns, but since people spontaneously care for others, then one would expect these immediate concerns to reflect the interests of the group rather than the individual. Lonergan seems to rule out the possibility of a tension between individual and intersubjective desires and fears, for he consistently qualifies individual desire as naturally intersubjective. [Insight, pp. 211 f., 215.] There is a hint that egoism may in part stem from the tendency of detached intelligence, for in discussing the nature of egoism, Lonergan says of practical deliberation, "It rises above the merely inherited mentality. It has the boldness to strike out and think for itself." [Ibid., pp. 220.] Reason takes one beyond the constraints of natural intersubjectivity, but because it does not go all the way to a universalized course of action, it fails to return one from the individualizing orientation of reason to a rational, universal identification with others. Nevertheless, while deliberation may be a naturally individualizing process, there is still no indication of what prevents deliberation from completing its natural course. Within Lonergan's framework, I believe, egoism remains something of a conundrum.

62. Ibid., pp. 222 f.: "In a school, a regiment, a factory, a trade, a profession, a prison, there develops an ethos that at once subtly and flexibly provides concrete premises and norms for practical decisions. ... The social order not only gathers men together in functional groups but also consolidates its gains and expedites its operations by turning to its own ends the vast resources of human imagination and emotion, sentiment and confidence, familiarity and loyalty."

63. Ibid., p. 224.

64. Ibid., p. 244.

66. Ibid., p. 266.

67. Ibid., p. 592: "[T]he Iranian contrast of light and darkness corresponds to our own contrast between the detached and disinterested desire to know and the interference of other desire; but while the Iranian allegory expands into the personification of a cosmic dualism, into a pantheon, and into extrinsicist theory of history, our corresponding contrast has led to a conflict immanent in the dramatic individual and expanding into a dialectic of social and cultural life."
Footnotes: Chapter III

Insight XVIII: The Possibility of Ethics

1. Though our focus is on Insight, Lonergan’s account of value as a formally rational good spans a much broader period of his writing career, emerging first in the early fifties and continuing well into the sixties. In the 1940’s when Lonergan touches on the good—in "Imago Dei," the last of his Verbum articles, and in "Finality, Love, Marriage"—his discussion reflects a basically traditional Thomistic position, in which the rational good is materially good. Lonergan’s formal account of the rational good is first presented in "The Role of the Catholic University in the Modern World," published in 1951. His purpose in this essay is twofold: to situate Roman Catholic education within the broader context of social responsibility and transformation, and to situate social concern within an understanding of the historical and social development of the good. After Insight the good is addressed again in the 1958 Halifax lectures on Insight, subsequently published as Understanding and Being. As in Insight, Lonergan’s treatment of the good seeks to ground ethics in a practical expression of intellectual finality, and the twofold thrust of his discussion is to show that moral obligation is an expression of rationality and that his notion of emergent probability accounts for the freedom of the will. An extensive treatment of the good is given in two later works. In his 1959 "Philosophy of Education" lectures at Xavier University Lonergan develops in much greater depth the very same theme originally explored briefly in "The Role of the Catholic University". His most abstract and theoretical treatment of the subject is found in his supplementary class notes, "De Bono et Malo," ("On Good and Evil") written for a course on the Incarnate Word, which he taught at the Gregorian University in 1964. In these notes he again focuses on the Church’s mission of social transformation, but he relies on a more abstract analysis of the good and an analysis of the process of communication through which the cultural transmission of values is preserved.

2. Collection, pp. 108 f.

3. Though Lonergan deals with a more comprehensive system than just that of the economy—he treats technology, economy and polity as the whole which constitutes social and historical existence—one can argue that the economy has a central place in his thinking. His own testimony that he was interested in economics before theology, and that his concern for economics was with its ethical dimension, attests to priority of economics in his thinking. [Lambert, P., Tansey, C., Going, C. (eds.) Caring About Meaning, Montreal: Thomas More Institute, 1982, pp. 30 f.] Lewis Watt, his ethics professor at Heythrop College (where Lonergan was from 1926 to 1930), had published a book called Capitalism and Morality. The economic wisdom of the day claimed it was wrong to interfere with the Irish famine, because it would breach the iron law of supply and demand. Lonergan grappled with the question: "How can you get economic moral precepts that are based on the economy itself?" This concern for economics was strengthened by his return to Canada in 1930, during the Great Depression. In light of this, Lonergan’s treatment of the intelligent good as a system that sustains collective satisfaction can be seen as giving economics a central place in defining the good.

4. Insight, p. 596 ff. Cf. pp. 603 f.: "Just as the universe of proportionate being is a
compound of potency, form and act, because it is to be known through experience, understanding
and judgment, so the universe of man's proportionate good is a compound of objects of desire,
intelligible orders, and values, because the good that man does intelligently and rationally is a
manifold in the field of experience, ordered by intelligence, and rationally chosen."


University in Cincinnati, Aug. 3-14, 1959, transcribed and edited by James and John Quinn,
1979], p. 49: "Our acquaintance with the particular good is mainly a matter of experience. To
know about the good of order one has to understand."


8. Ibid., p. 596: "It is a desire to know and its immanent criterion is the attainment of
an unconditioned that, by the fact that it is unconditioned, is independent of the individual's likes
and dislikes, of his wishful and his anxious thinking. Now through this desire and the knowledge
it generates, there comes to light ... the good of order." Cf. Understanding and Being, pp. 225
f.

a process and context which comprise a good of order: Not only is the object of desire good, but
so are the appetite, the desirer, the pursuit, the means, the enabling circumstances, the attainment
and the enjoyment of the object of desire. Each component of the process is good in its own way,
and together they constitute a single good of order. It should be noted that the interpretation of
particular desires as implying a good of order is a later development in Lonergan's thought, for
his earlier works all focus on institutional goods of order. On one hand, this later theme seems
to be the result of scholastic abstraction determining the simplest essence of a good of order. On
the other hand, it seems an extension, a particularization, of the argument for the goodness of
being: being is good because it is the systematic context that makes possible the satisfaction of
desires.

10. Lonergan tends to discuss the good of order in very general terms, thinking of it
primarily in terms of social processes and institutions, and the social order that these constitute.
Only in "On Good and Evil" [pp. 3 ff.], where he is striving for more theoretical clarity, does
he make explicit that social order is but one specific kind of good of order, 'the human good of
order', with systematically-pursued specific desires and the whole cosmos as an ordered system
being other kinds.


12. Insight, p. 597.

13. Status is not an enduring part of Lonergan's analysis of the good of order. It is not
mentioned in either Insight or Understanding and Being. In the latter, the focus is on personal
relations: "In the family, technology, economy, and polity there is a flow of operations, and a
flow of benefits, distributed among members, resulting from the operations. Finally, there are
personal relations. That is the order as realized concretely in human living." [Understanding and
Status comes to the fore soon after this. By the time "On Good and Evil" is written, Lonergan speaks of "interpersonal relationships of love" rather than status as a component of the good of order. [p. 14] The element of love ceases to be a feature of the good of order in Method in Theology, and this reflects a change in Lonergan's analysis which puts personal relations in the context of the third level, the level of value and commitment, rather than the second level, the good of order.

14. This point is brought out through a discussion of the tension in Thomas between whether the human soul or the whole cosmic order is the best approximation of divine perfection. In some contexts Thomas affirms the former, and in other places he affirms the latter. Lonergan's discussion of this tension transposes the notion of cosmic order onto that of social order, so that the tension between cosmos and soul becomes a tension between the social order and the individual: "There is a conflict between order and person. Are we interested in the order that helps persons or in persons simply? Do we sacrifice persons for the order? The law does. People are executed, there are wars, and so on. Persons can be sacrificed for the order, and the order can be sacrificed for persons. The two can be united insofar as the person emerges with personal status within the order. The order is an order between persons." ["Philosophy of Education", p. 48.] Order and individual dignity are both realized when the social order is such that all are granted status within the order.

15. Ibid., p. 51.

16. Ibid., p. 61.

17. Ibid., pp.48 f.

18. Understanding and Being, p. 234: "The self that is organized on the level of objects of appetite is radically in conflict with guidance by the good of order, any good of order. He wants to rearrange the world about himself; he is an egoist. ... The good of order, from that standpoint, is the ordering of things around me."

19. Insight, p. 601: "Objects of desire are values only inasmuch as they fall under some intelligible order, for the value is the possible object of choice, choice is an act of will, and the will is intellectual appetite that regards directly only the intelligible good."

20. Ibid., pp. 597 f. The East/West contrast is most explicit in "Philosophy of Education", p. 43.

21. Insight, pp. 624 f. Lonergan is summarizing his position over against the counter-position: "one lumps objects of desire along with objects of aversion as instances of the potential good, subordinates both to the formal good of order, and selects between alternative orders by appealing to the rational criteria that are the sources of the meaning of the name, value." Cf. also "Philosophy of Education", p. 49: "To know the good of order one has to understand. ... And it is when one reflects on different orders, different possible set-ups and systems, that one comes to the notion of value." Also in "On Good and Evil" [p. 12] is the emergence of value based on having to choose between possible social orders.


24. Frederick Crowe in his editorial comments [Collection, p. 262] points out that the republic of culture in "Finality, Love, Marriage" does not exactly correspond to eternal life in the way intersubjective community and civil community correspond to life and the good life. I would suggest, however, that Crowe’s evaluation depends too much on a traditional interpretation of eternal life as relating strictly to the Church, the mystical body of Christ. In this article Lonergan does deal sometimes with eternal life as relevant particularly to the body of Christ and the process of spiritual perfection [eg. p. 37], yet it is important to recognize that the essence of his thought works against the restriction of the spiritual and eternal to the religious domain. Because the worlds of science and practical wisdom express a spiritual aspiration, they also participate in grace: "[T]he distinctive eternity of the order of grace is submitted to human progress inasmuch as grace sets up a human society or a human science or human advance in virtue." [p. 40]

25. Insight, pp. 598-600.


27. Verbum, p. 201.

28. Insight, p. 600.

29. Ibid., p. 599.

30. Ibid., pp. 599 f.

31. Ibid., pp. 698-702. These virtues are offered as the solution to the problem of moral impotence, raised in the final section of Chapter XVIII, the problem of liberation. Moral impotence is essentially presented as the lack of habitual willingness to do what one recognizes to be obligatory. Cf. p. 623: "In brief, effective freedom itself has to be won. The key point is to reach a willingness to persuade oneself and to submit to the persuasion of others. For then one can be persuaded to a universal willingness. ... But to reach the universal willingness that matches the unrestricted desire to know is indeed a high achievement, for it consists ... in the adoption of an effective attitude in which performance matches aspiration."


33. "The Role of the Catholic University ...", p. 109. This order is merely implicit in Insight. [Cf. p. 208]

34. Insight, p. 601.

35. Ibid., p. 602.

36. Ibid., p. 604: "[B]ecause such a method clearly grasps an unchanging dynamic structure immanent in developing subjects that deal with changing situations in correspondingly changing manners, it can steer a sane course between the relativism of mere concreteness and the legalism of remote and static generalities."
37. Ibid., p. 605.

38. Ibid., p. 606.

39. Ibid., p. 609: "If it happens that we discover the existence of free acts of will, at least it will not happen that we discover all the acts of all men to be free. For from the outset we are excluding from consideration any act that occurs through mere sensitive routine and that can be accounted for without appealing to the introduction of some higher integration by intelligence."

40. Cf., ibid., p. 614: "It is possible for practical reflection to reach with certitude the conclusion that a proposed course of action is obligatory ..."

41. Ibid., p. 613.

42. Collection, pp. 108 f.

43. Insight, p. 597.

44. Note this tripartite structure, for example, in the context of his account of the parallel of metaphysics and ethics: "Just as the universe of proportionate being is a compound of potency, form and act, ... so the universe of man's proportionate good is a compound of objects of desire, intelligible orders, and values, because the good that man does intelligently and rationally is a manifold in the field of experience, ordered by intelligence, and rationally chosen." [Ibid., pp. 603 f.] Choice corresponds to the third metaphysical category, act.

45. Frederick E. Crowe, Lonergan, p. 72. Crowe examines the development of the structure of Insight by looking at the changes it went through as Lonergan wrote and revised it.

46. Ibid., p. 615: "If a proposed action is obligatory, then one cannot be a rational knower and deny the obligation, and one cannot be a rational doer and not fulfil the obligation. But one can be a rational knower without an act of willing, and one cannot be a rational doer without an act of willing. It is the further constitutive requirement of an act of will that ... marks the shift from rational consciousness to rational self-consciousness ...."

47. Ibid., p. 617. Cf., Understanding and Being, p. 21: "We are all present to ourselves. And as present to ourselves we are not looking at ourselves, we are not objects, we are subjects. It is the present subject that counts, and that present subject is not only present but also intelligent, reasonable, and, when making decisions, self-conscious." (Cf. also ibid., p. 228.)

48. Understanding and Being, p. 228: "[W]e reach a fourth stage, rational self-consciousness, when there arises the question, What am I to do?" Though this question is vague, its scope is made clear by p. 233: "In virtue of the coherence of the rationally self-conscious subject, in virtue of the fact that one is a knower and so quite detached and has no difficulty telling someone else what he ought to do, and at the same time a doer and consequently also telling oneself what one ought to do, there emerges the moral imperative."

49. This concern is apparent in Lonergan's comparison between "the heuristic structure of our knowing" with "the obligatory structure of our rational self-consciousness." [Insight, p.
Obligation captures the orientation of practical intelligence as the desire to know expresses that of speculative intelligence.

50. Ibid., p. 602. The fact that the 'extension' of knowing into doing is related specifically to acting upon a determinate moral obligation is explicit again on p. 614. The context is that of distinguishing between the rational knower, who knows that he or she is obliged to do something, and the rational doer, who chooses to act according to knowledge: "[T]he rational subject as imposing an obligation upon himself is just a knower, and his rationality consists radically in not allowing other desire to interfere with the unfolding of the detached and disinterested desire to know. But the rational subject as carrying out an obligation is not just a knower but also a doer, and his rationality consists not merely in excluding interference with cognitional process but also in extending the rationality of his knowing into the field of doing. But that extension does not occur simply by knowing one's obligations. It occurs just inasmuch as one wills to meet one's obligations." The use of the metaphor of extension in these two passages suggests that the vague passage on p. 599 ("So it is that the detached and disinterested desire extends its sphere of influence ... into the field of deliberate human acts.") should be understood in the same sense—i.e., as indicating the shift from knowing one's duty to fulfilling one's duty.

51. Ibid., p. 612. 52. Ibid., p. 614.

53. Ibid., p. 617. 54. Ibid., p. 613.

55. Ibid., pp. 611 f. 56. Ibid., pp. 613 f.

57. Ibid., p. 610: "When speculative or factual insight is correct, reflective understanding can grasp a relevant virtually unconditioned. But when practical insight is correct, then reflective understanding cannot grasp a relevant virtually unconditioned; for if it could, the content of the insight already would be a fact; and if it were already a fact, then it would not be a possible course of action which, as yet, is not a fact but just a possibility."

The association of the virtually unconditioned with rational consciousness rather than with rational self-consciousness is also implicit on p. 611, in the context of summarizing the distinctive characters of empirical, intelligent and rational consciousness and rational self-consciousness: "I am ... rationally conscious inasmuch as I am seeking to grasp the virtually unconditioned or judging on the basis of such a grasp. But I become rationally self-conscious inasmuch as I am concerned with reasons for my own acts ..."

58. Lonergan's "Philosophy of Education" lectures begin by defining the human good as "a history, a concrete, cumulative process resulting from developing human apprehension and human choices that may be good or evil." [p. 38, emphasis mine] but later he comes to identify human history and the human good: "When [the negation of religious values] arises, then human history, which is the human good, the cumulative process resulting from human apprehension and choice, ceases to be man cooperating with God." [p. 56]
Footnotes: Chapter IV

Intellectualism and Formalism in *Insight*


2. *Summa Theologiae* IaIae.94.2: "It is because good has the note of end and evil is its contrary that all those things to which man has a natural inclination reason naturally apprehends as goods and consequently as to be actively pursued and their contraries to be avoided as evils." [Quoted by McInerny, pp. 44 f.]

3. The discussion here builds upon McInerny's *Ethica Thomistica* but the distinction between formal and actual rationality is my own paraphrase of his discussion.

4. *Insight*, p. 598.

5. Ibid., p. 601.

6. "Sensitive desires and aversions arise spontaneously; their objects cannot be willed until they are subsumed under some intelligible order." [Ibid.]

7. Ibid., p. 603.

8. Ibid., p. 614.


10. Ibid., p. 233.

11. *Insight*, pp. 219 ff.

12. Ibid., pp. 219 f.

13. Ibid., p. 600.


15. "The Subject," Second Collection, p. 81. This is not as clearly stated in *Insight*, but it can be seen as implicit in the discussion of particular goods, where Lonergan says the pure desire to know is one "among men's many desires." [*Insight*, p. 596.] Though he goes on to
emphasize its uniqueness as the ground of the intelligent and rational good, he begins from its continuity with the rest of human desires.

16. Lonergan himself acknowledges the correspondence of his notion of the intelligent good of order and Thomas' notion of a good of order in "The Subject." Yet he distinguishes the meaning of value from Aristotle's account of the good as 'that which all things desire' and also from the meaning of good "in the intellectual, and, indeed, Thomist sense of the good of order." [Second Collection, p. 84.] Note that Lonergan's point of disagreement with Aristotle is the association of the good with desire.

17. Insight, p. 606.

18. "The Subject," Second Collection, p. 84.


20. Ibid., p. 39.


22. Insight, pp. 211 f.

23. This becomes apparent in the fuller quote from Insight, p. 597: "the good of order, while it is anticipated and reflected by spontaneous intersubjectivity, essentially is a formal intelligibility that is to be discovered only by raising questions, grasped only through accumulating insights, formulated only in conceptions."

24. There is evidence that during the early sixties Lonergan tries to incorporate rational material goods into his thought. In "On Good and Evil" he speaks of 'spiritual goods' that need to be included in formulating a good intelligible order. ["On Good and Evil," pp. 12 f. and 15.] He does not clearly define what he means by spiritual goods; they might be either the virtues of wisdom and goodness, or more generally the goods which satisfy the desire for truth, goodness, happiness and immortality. What is certain is that they are goods upon which the interior good of order depends. [Cf. ibid., pp. 4-8, 11-14.] The interior good of order is identified with value, or the cultural good, is contrasted with the 'external good of order', or the historically evolving social order constituted by the processes and institutions of technology, economics and politics. The interior good of order emerges out of the "deeper yearnings"—the natural and universal human desire for knowledge, moral rectitude, ideal happiness, and immortality—and aims particularly at wisdom and goodness. Spiritual goods seem to be empirical goods, for they are presented as goods among the manifold of empirical goods from which the good of order is abstracted. Yet they are satisfactions of a spiritual desire, upon which individual fulfillment depend, and the good of order cannot be adequately good if they are not incorporated within that order.

In this text Lonergan is not working within a strictly formal account of value. Spiritual goods seem to be intelligent ones (i.e., goods of order) for they require a certain level of intellectual development to be grasped, yet they are not intelligent in the sense that they are just intelligent orderings of empirical goods. Spiritual goods also seem to be rational goods in spite of the fact that they are not judged so on formal grounds, for they are desires that satisfy and point to the fulfillment of our rational nature. In short, spiritual goods are not values formally
determined by a good of order but rather they provide the basis for determining whether a good of order is indeed good. Yet Lonergan offers no definition of the intelligent good or of value that allows us to make sense of this systematically.


26. Insight, p. 605. Cf. "On Good and Evil," p. 2: "[S]ince the desirable is good, so are the appetite, the desire, the desirer, the pursuit, the means, the circumstances, the attainment, and the enjoyment also good, each in its own way. All of these are not simply a collection of things but are naturally related to one another so as to form one concrete dynamic whole. And if each of the parts of this whole is said to be good in its own way, all the more is the whole complex of them to be called good. Hence besides particular desirables or goods, the good of order also must be acknowledged as such."


28. This line of argument is implicit in Lonergan's account of the good of order in "On Good and Evil." Cf. fn. 30 above.

29. In "On Good and Evil," p. 4, Lonergan gives a brief account of the general human situation. Humans band together for the sake of collaboration in the pursuit of a more secure and more easily attained flow of empirical goods. This gives rise to institutions and relationships, and so the good of order "through mutual friendly relationships embellishes and improves the life of community."


32. It might be countered that Lonergan neither divorces desire from fulfillment nor fulfillment from a human ideal. One may think of fulfillment in terms of the satisfaction of desire, since among the multiplicity of desires there are the specifically human desires for truth and virtue. Fulfillment can be thought of as a matter of fulfilling as many of these desires as possible. Lonergan does offer a human ideal defined by spiritual desire: be attentive, intelligent, rational and responsible. To the extent that one satisfies this ideal, it makes fulfillment possible because it orders the satisfaction of the broad range of desires.

The central issue, however, is whether there is a natural order of priorities among human desires. This is a more basic question than that of whether or not desire is intimately linked to human fulfillment. Are we to be attentive, intelligent, etc. because this is central to human nature and fulfillment, or because it is a means of satisfying the broad range of human desires. To affirm the former is to affirm that rationality has a natural priority over other desires, while the latter implies that the value of rationality lies in its utility. Though I doubt Lonergan would want to affirm the latter, his account of the empirical good as non-rational and of value as an ordering of non-rational desires denies any natural or rational priority to the exercise of intelligence. By default this leads to the exercise of rationality having its warrant as a value in its utility. One can only escape this implication by reformulating the notion of value, which Lonergan would do in his mature work.
33. Cf. Augustine, *On Free Choice of the Will*, (Anna S. Benjamin and L.H. Hackstaff, trans.) New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1964, p. 24: "Evodius: ‘What is good will?’ Augustine: ‘A will by which we seek to live rightly and honorably and to come to the highest wisdom. Only see whether you do not desire an upright and honorable life, or whether you do not earnestly want to be wise. And would you dare to deny with certainty that we have a good will when we wish for these things?’" 


35. *Insight*, p. 561.

36. Ibid., p. 691 f.

37. Ibid., p. 691.

38. Ibid., p. 629.

39. Ibid., p. 692.

40. Ibid., p. 698.

41. There is an ambiguity in the genitival phrase "the good of a person." Does it mean the good that is the person, the person's goodness, or what is good for the person (what serves the person's welfare). The latter is the most conventional way of interpreting the phrase. If this is how it is meant, there seems to be a leap in the shift from loving the good that is God to wanting what is good for God's sake. One can love goodness without knowing that this goodness is an expression of a person, and yet it makes sense to affirm that the love of the person is implicit in the love of the goodness. Yet one cannot want the welfare of another without consciously being aware of the other and intending the welfare of the other. Though the shift is something of a leap, it can be seen as flowing from an understanding of love not as a desire or a motivated response to a good but as a concern to do what is right, to do what one ought. If love is a matter of doing what one ought, and doing what one ought has the effect of serving the welfare of another, then one's responsible choices serve the other's welfare even if one does not know it.

42. *Understanding and Being*, p. 310.

43. *Insight*, pp. 698 f.

44. Ibid., pp. 531 ff.

45. Crowe, *Lonergan*, p. 50. Crowe also makes explicit that the purpose behind the *Verbum* articles—made explicit in the original articles but omitted from the book—was specifically to discern Thomas' account of the procession of the Holy Spirit, to which end he clarifies also the procession of the Word. [Ibid., p. 49] This implies that Thomas' account of the procession of love from the inner word is a central issue in the text and not merely a side-issue, as it seems from the final form of the book.

46. *Verbum*, pp. 201 f.
47. Eg., *Insight*, p. 617: "For the higher integration effected on the level of human living consists of sets of courses of action, and these actions emerge inasmuch as they are understood by intelligent consciousness, evaluated by rational consciousness, and willed by rational self-consciousness."

48. *Understanding and Being*, p. 226. Crowe remarks in his editorial notes [ibid., p. 421] that Lonergan’s use of ‘level’ is in transition here, because Crowe recognizes that here the judgment of value is attributed to rational consciousness though in Lonergan’s later works the judgment of value is associated with the fourth level of consciousness, rational self-consciousness. While it is true that Lonergan will later identify both with the fourth level of consciousness, his perspective here is not in transition, for the association of the judgment of value with rational consciousness has its precedents in *Insight*, "The Role of the Catholic University" [Collection, p. 109] and ultimately in the *Verbum* passage cited above.


50. Ibid., p. 666.

51. *Insight*, p. 619: "[P]ossible courses of action are grasped by practical insight, motivated by reflection, and executed by decision." Motivation is not the beginning of practical reflection, but a response to an intelligible and, perhaps, novel possibility.

52. The fact that the classical position understands the knowledge of a thing’s goodness to arise with knowledge of its essence attests to the convergence of goodness and truth. This is a point to be addressed further in Chapter VII.

53. Aside from this general problem with ethical formalism, the rule-utilitarianism implicit in Lonergan’s position is also open to criticism: it is impossible to define it in such a way that it does not degenerate into the act-utilitarianism it opposes. This follows from the difficulty of how one defines a situation and a possible course of action in universalizable terms. For example, "do not murder" is a very general principle, but is it murder if one is a soldier on a battlefield? To what extent do the particularities of a situation enter into the definition of the principle? If all particularities are excluded, it is easy to imagine circumstances in which the generality of the principle seems to lead contrary to moral sense. For example, "one should not lie" is a universalizable maxim. Should a German family, hiding Jews, confess the truth if asked by the SS? If an informant is intent on telling the SS that Jews are hiding in a certain place, is it right to kill that person to protect the innocent, if he or she cannot be deterred by any other means? Such situations can be handled by rule-utilitarianism through less abstract, more qualified principles: eg., only lie to preserve the life or welfare of another, or only kill to preserve the life or welfare of the many (or the innocent, or the more deserving, etc.) A qualified principle of this sort satisfies Kant’s categorical imperative, since one may be willing that everyone should follow it. Yet as one moves away from abstract, unqualified principles, one comes ever closer to an act-utilitarian position with its concern for immediate consequences.
Footnotes: Chapter V
Beyond Insight: The Priority of Praxis and Love


2. Originally presented as the Aquinas Lecture, Marquette University, Mar. 3, 1968, it was published as "The Subject," in Second Collection, pp. 69-86.

3. Ibid., p. 79.
4. Ibid., p. 80.
5. Ibid., p. 84.
6. Ibid., p. 82.

7. The theme of practical self-constitution first appears in Understanding and Being, the 1958 Halifax lectures on Insight. (Cf. pp. 228-232.) Frederick Crowe comments that the theme of "man's making of man" goes back at least as far as 1935, but in that earlier context it referred rather to the social constitution of corporate human existence. Only after his interaction with existentialism in 1957 does it come to take on a more individual sense of the person constituting himself or herself through making choices. [Ibid. p. 422.]

8. Second Collection, p. 81.

9. "Existentialism," p. 26: "Now in existentialism there is a marked tendency to block out everything that doesn't fit into that concrete flow of consciousness, oriented upon the individual's choice. But apart from that is the type of work done by idealists and positivists and scientists and philosophies of the older type. ... How does one unite with these? What is really the relation between the speculative pattern of experience, in which you get philosophy like the philosophy of scholasticism, the scientist, the idealist and, on the other hand, the concrete practical pattern which we can't reject; it is a component in Christianity and in Christian morality and in spirituality."

10. Ibid., pp. 26 f.: "What are the relations between the two? Very briefly, I think we can find something in the way of a formula in one of those couplets coined by Toynbee in his Study of History, withdrawal and return. You may remember that Toynbee gives the example of men who have left their mark on history, who withdrew like St. Paul to the desert and Ignatius at Manresa. They withdrew from active life to a life of quiet and returned to the world and made a terrific difference. ... And that idea of withdrawal and return, the point of the speculative and intellectual world is the point of the withdrawal, the point of the practical is the point of the
return."

11. Ibid., p. 27.


13. Ibid., pp. 113 f.: "The purely intellectual pattern of experience is beyond any particular horizon; it is oriented, as long as the intellectual pattern of experience exists, upon the totality, upon being, upon everything. But the moment the intellectual pattern of experience ceases to be dominant, then one can shift back to a narrow concern.

"To move into the practical pattern of experience without contracting one's horizon presupposes perfect charity. ... It is by charity that we can move into the practical pattern of experience without contracting our horizon."

14. In the "Existentialism" lectures Lonergan makes explicit his concern for scholasticism in the context of discussing intellectual conversion. His reason for pursuing a theological method, of which Insight was the philosophical prolegomenon, was to establish a unifying foundation for scholasticism. He notes the lack of consensus and method among scholastic philosophers, and their lack of desire and conviction "that some method ... has been found to put an end to all that." He goes on: "It is an issue for survival of scholasticism particularly at the present time to think of the critical problem ... as the elimination of unnecessary disputed questions. Finding a methodical solution ... that is where the shoe pinches me ...." [Pp. 32 f.]


17. "The Subject," Second Collection, p. 79.


20. Ibid., p. 28. Emphasis added.

21. In A Third Collection, p. 46. Cf. "Revolution in Catholic Theology," in Second Collection, pp. 236 f.: "The dethronement of speculative intellect has been a general trend in modern philosophy. ... I am far from thinking that this tendency is to be deplored."

22. "It is only after the age of innocence that praxis becomes an academic subject. A faculty psychology will give intellect precedence over will and thereby it will liberate the academic world from concern with the irrational in human life. The speculative intellect of the Aristotelians, the pure reason of the rationalists, the automatic progress anticipated by the liberals, all provided shelter for academic serenity. But since the failure of the absolute idealists to encompass human history within the embrace of speculative reason, the issue of praxis has repeatedly come to the fore." [*Lectures on Religious Studies and Theology,* in A Third Collection, (originally presented as The Donald Mathers Memorial Lectures, Queen's University, Ontario, Mar. 2-4, 1976.) p. 159.]
23. "To deprive speculative intellect of its pride of place and to acknowledge the primacy of conscience not only is a recognition of fact but also quiets the opponents of intellectualism without diminishing the power of intellect. ["Aquinas Today: Tradition and Innovation," in A Third Collection, (originally presented as a lecture in the series, A Colloquy on Medieval Religious Thought, University of Chicago, Nov. 8, 1974.) p. 46.]

24. Ibid.


26. "Natural Knowledge of God," Second Collection, (Originally published in the Proceedings of the Twenty-Third Annual Convention, (Washington, D.C.. 1968, pp. 54-69.) of the Catholic Theological Society of America.) p. 128: "[T]he many levels of consciousness are just successive stages in the unfolding of a single thrust, the eros of the human spirit. To know the good, it must know the real; to know the real, it must know the true; to know the true, it must know the intelligible; to know the intelligible, it must attend to the data." [Method in Theology, Seabury Press, 1979, p. 13. (Originally published in 1972.])


28. These three aspects—practical, existential and interpersonal—are explicit in "Mission and the Spirit", in Third Collection, (F. Crowe, ed.) New York: Paulist Press, 1985, p. 29: "[W]e experience and understand and judge to become moral: to become moral practically, for our decisions affect things; to become moral interpersonally, for our decisions affect other persons, to become moral existentially, for by our decisions we constitute what we are to be."

29. Insight, p. 604.

30. Ibid., p. 606.

31. "Interview with ... Lonergan," Second Collection, p. 228. More explicitly this quote is a response to whether the horizon, or mindset, informed by the love of God is beyond the horizon of being. The fourth level of consciousness is not concerned solely with ethics but also with the love of God and the religious conversion through which it becomes operative in one's living. The fact that Lonergan frames his answer in terms of the good being beyond the true and the real shows that his response is not just specifically directed to the relationship between religious experience and being but more generally to the relationship between the fourth level (which is both moral and religious) as a concern for the good and the lower levels which aspire to truth.


33. There is a certain fluidity in Lonergan's juxtaposition of being and reality. When Lonergan says that the good is beyond the real but not beyond being, the implicit distinction
between reality and being is not the same as that found in his discussion of 'Hellenic technique' in handling Christology, where he says that the Greeks prefer 'being' over 'reality' when these are distinguished from each other: "... for being is that which is; it is that which is to be known through the true proposition; and the technique operates on true propositions. On the other hand, reality, when contrasted with being, denotes the evident or present that provides the remote grounds for rationally affirming being, but, unlike being, is in constant flux." ["The Dehellenization of Dogma," in Second Collection, p. 24 f. (Originally a review of L. Dewart's The Future of Belief: Theism in a World Come of Age, in Theological Studies, 28 (1967), pp. 336-351.)]

Here the contrast is between the rationally true and the experientially immediate sense of what is real. In the context of the interview quoted above the contrast is between the real as the rationally true and being as something more comprehensive than what is known just in rational truths.

34. Insight, p. 615. Cf. "Cognitional Structure," Collection, p. 219: "one has to move beyond strictly cognitional levels of empirical, intellectual, and rational consciousness to the more inclusive level of rational self-consciousness. Though being and the good are coextensive, the subject moves to a further dimension of consciousness as his concern shifts from knowing being to realizing the good."


36. "Insight Revisited," Second Collection, p. 277. Cf.: "[C]ognitional theory, epistemology, and metaphysics are needed but they are not enough. They have to be subsumed under the higher operations that integrate knowing with feeling and consist in deliberating, evaluating, deciding, acting." ["Philosophy and Theology," in Second Collection, p. 204. (Originally published as the Medalist's Address in Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, 46 (1970), pp. 19-30.)]

37. Second Collection, p. 83.

38. Insight, p. 199. In this passage Lonergan notes "a nice distinction between the sensitive mechanism that enforces a taboo and the rational judgment that imposes a moral obligation." He contrasts the inner constraint of reason and the external constraint of "commands imposed through affection and fear". "Feelings instilled through parental and social influence" are juxtaposed to feelings adapted to moral judgment.


41. In an interview early in 1970 Lonergan would summarize both Method in Theology and an account of the apprehension of value, which suggests that already in 1969 he had written that portion of Method dealing with the apprehension of value. ["Interview with ... Lonergan," Second Collection, p. 221.]
42. Method, pp. 30 ff.

43. Ibid., p. 38.

44. Ibid., p. 38.


46. The progression of knowing truth, willing to act according to truth, and the conforming of sensitivity to knowing and willing can be seen in the explanation of the love for God in Insight, p. 688 f.: "An unrestricted desire to understand correctly heads toward an unrestricted act of understanding, towards God. A will that is good by its consistency with knowledge is headed towards an antecedent willingness that matches the desire to know both in its essential detachment from the sensitive subject and in its unrestricted commitment to complete intelligibility, to God. A sensitivity and an intersubjectivity that have their higher integration in knowing and willing are headed towards objects and activities that can be no more than symbols and signs of what they cannot comprehend or appreciate. The whole world of sense is to be, then, a token, a mystery of God, for the desire of intelligence is for God and the goodness of will is the love of God."

47. Ibid., p. 231.

48. "Theology and Man's Future," in Second Collection, p. 145. (Originally presented as a paper at the St. Louis University's Sesquicentennial Symposium, "Theology in the City of Man," Oct. 1968.)

49. Method, p. 106. There is a strong element of continuity between familial, civil and religious love, for each in its own way reveals a common meaning, the meaning of being in love. For this reason Lonergan can shift from speaking specifically of religious conversion, as he regularly does in the early seventies, to speaking more generally of affective conversion: Self-transcendence "includes an intellectual, a moral, and an affective conversion. ... [A]s affective, it is commitment to love in the home, loyalty in the community, faith in the destiny of man." ["Natural Right and Historical Mindedness," A Third Collection, p. 179.] It may be more than coincidental that he adopts this phrase around the same time he makes being in love a higher level of consciousness.

50. Ibid. The association of religious love with a love for creation is found in "Aquinas Today," A Third Collection, p. 52. There he speaks of being "in love with one's family, in love with the human community, in love with God and his universe."

51. Lonergan's prose bears repeating: "But the love of God is not restricted to particular areas of human living. It is the foundation of love of one's neighbor. It is the grace that keeps one ever faithful and devoted to one's mate. But it is also something in itself, something personal, intimate, and profoundly attuned to the deepest yearnings of the human heart. It constitutes a basic fulfillment of man's being. Because it is such a fulfillment, it is the source of a great peace, the peace that the world cannot give. It is a wellspring of joy that can endure despite the sorrow of failure, humiliation, privation, pain, desertion. Because it is such a fulfillment, it removes the..."
temptation of all that is shallow, hollow, empty, and degrading without handing man over to the fanaticism that arises when man's capacity for God is misdirected to finite goals." ["Theology and Man's Future," Second Collection, pp. 145 f.]


53. Ibid., p. 132.

54. "Interview with ... Lonergan," Second Collection, p. 220 f.

55. "[T]he gift of God's love is on the topmost level. It is not the sensitive type of consciousness that emerged with sensing, feeling, moving. It is not the intellectual type that is added when we inquire, understand, think. It is not the rational type that emerges when we reflect, weigh the evidence, judge. It is the type of consciousness that also is conscience, that deliberates, evaluates, decides, controls, acts. But it is this type of consciousness at its root, as brought to fulfillment, as having undergone conversion, as possessing a basis that may be broadened and deepened and heightened and enriched but not superseded, as ever more ready to deliberate and evaluate and decide and act with the easy freedom of those that do all good because they are in love. The gift of God's love takes over the ground and root of the fourth and highest level of man's waking consciousness." ["The Response of the Jesuit," Second Collection, p. 173.] Cf. also "It is on this [fourth] level that people move from unauthenticity to authenticity; it is on this level that they decide to believe; it is at the root of this level that God's love floods their hearts through the gift of the Holy Spirit." ["Philosophy and Theology," Second Collection, p. 204.]

56. "Natural Right and Historical Mindedness," A Third Collection, p. 175.


58. "Existenz and Aggiornamento," Collection, p. 226. This becomes a recurrent theme in Lonergan's discussion of community. Community depends upon common meaning, and common meaning depends upon the four levels of consciousness. Shared meaning develops on the basis of a common field of experience, common and complementary ways of understanding, common judgments of truth and common commitments. Commitment is a matter of responsible choice.


60. "Interview with ... Lonergan," Second Collection, pp. 228 f.


62. Though the original publication date of this essay is 1976, the essays in A Third
are arranged chronologically, and its placed between two lectures given in 1974, reflecting the editor’s knowledge of when it was written.

63. Between these two essays one can find a variety of expressions of love as something higher or more comprehensive. I focus on these two essays because they provide the clearest indications of Lonergan’s treatment of love. Still it is worth noting here the variety of ways he expresses himself in the mid-seventies.

In "Aquinas Today," published in 1974, he writes: "For [Aquinas] theology was ... wisdom; and this we can retain in terms of the successive sublations observed in intentionality analysis, where the curiosity of sense is taken over by the inquiry of intelligence, where inquiry is taken over by rational reflection, where reflection prepares the way for responsible deliberation, where all are sublimated by being-in-love—in love with one’s family, in love with the human community, in love with God and his universe." [A Third Collection, p. 52.] There is a contrast here between the levels, which sublate the preceding level, and love which sublimates them all. How sublimation differs from sublation is left unspecified—it suggests a positive transformation or redirection of energy—but there is little doubt that Lonergan has carefully avoided saying that love is a level that sublates the others.

In "Christology Today: Methodological Reflections," presented in 1975, Lonergan develops his own psychological analogy of the Trinitarian procession. This analogy has "its starting point in that higher synthesis of intellectual, rational, and moral consciousness that is the dynamic state of being in love." [A Third Collection, (originally a lecture at the Colloque de Christologie, Université Laval, Québec, Mar. 22, 1975.) p. 93] As with the notion of sublimation, 'higher synthesis' conveys the fact of transformation but its precise meaning is left vague.

Finally, in "Lectures on Religious Studies and Theology," presented in 1976, Lonergan uses the metaphor of the whole and the part, as he would in "Natural Right and Historical Mindedness": "As self-transcendence is the meaning of each of the many levels of human reality, so too it is the meaning of the whole. But that meaning of the whole, when realized concretely, is falling in love." [p. 133.] Yet, at this point he does not flesh out precisely what he means by love being the whole of which the levels of conscious are parts.


65. This is a matter of interpretation, for Lonergan does not explain the difference between an operator and a quasi-operator. My definition is based on the fact that, while the passionateness of being underpins, accompanies, and reaches beyond the intentional operations, its function as a quasi-operator is discussed only with regard to its role as underpinning and overarching the other operations, not as accompanying them. What the underpinning and overarching share in common as quasi-operators is that they involve a transition from lower levels of functioning to higher levels—from unconscious to conscious processes, and from spontaneous intersubjectivity to being in love. As accompanying the intentional operations, it is not described as a quasi-operator because it effects no change; it is simply present, lending the "mass and momentum" of feelings to those operations.


67. Lonergan says shortly following the above quote that "The source of natural right lies in the norms immanent in human intelligence, human judgment, human evaluation, human
In light of the discussion above, human affectivity here seems to be a level of the same sort as the others and the highest of the levels.

68. Taped interview from the question session at a Lonergan Workshop, Boston College, on June 16, 1981:

"Question: Yesterday you spoke of five levels of consciousness. Does this give us ten specialties? If not, why not?

"Lonergan: Well it adds another specialty on to the theological specialties, namely Spirituality. ... So the fifth level puts religion into the other four ... it's the supernaturalizing of the other four." [Transcribed in John Batherby, The Foundations of Christian Spirituality in Bernard Lonergan, S.J., unpublished thesis (Rome, 1982), p. 131.]

69. "Interview with ... Lonergan," Second Collection, p. 211.

70. Ibid., p. 214.

71. "The gift of God's love takes over the ground and root of the fourth and highest level of man's waking consciousness." ["The Response of the Jesuit," Second Collection, p. 173.]

Footnotes: Chapter VI
The Apprehension of the Good


2. Ibid., p. 37 f.

3. Ibid., p. 38.

4. "An Interview with ... Lonergan," Second Collection, p. 223: "[T]here are feelings that respond to objects—pleasure and pain and so on. But of themselves they do not discriminate between what is truly good and what is only apparently good.

"There are feelings that are intentional responses and that do involve such a discrimination and put themselves in a hierarchy—and you have your vital values, social values, cultural values, religious values."


7. The account of the judgment of value in Method, p. 38, indicates that only the judgment of value depends upon the knowledge of reality (i.e., third level). This is implicit as well in passages which speak of the ordination of the levels of consciousness. Cf. ibid., p. 13: "the many levels of consciousness are just successive stages in the unfolding of a single thrust, the eros of the human spirit. To know the good, it must know the real; to know the real, it must know the true;" etc.

8. Ibid., p. 37.

9. Ibid., p. 38.

10. Ibid., pp. 31 f.

11. Ibid., p. 39. "In the measure that one’s love of God is complete, then values are whatever one loves, and evils are whatever one hates so that, in Augustine’s phrase, if one loves God, one may do as one pleases .... Then affectivity is of a single piece."

12. Ibid., p. 32.


14. Ibid., pp. 31, 33, 40. Lonergan credits Scheler as a major source for his understanding of value and ressentiment, but it is unlikely that Lonergan read Scheler, for he only ever refers to Manfred Fring’s book, Max Scheler [Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1965.]
15. The basic theme of *On the Genealogy of Morals* is how life turns against itself in Christian morality (an ethic of self-sacrificing love), in guilt and in asceticism. In each case Nietzsche sees something wholly unnatural, something alien to an instinct for life, and he seeks to find a natural principle to account for it.


17. Lonergan’s account of Husserl’s phenomenology of consciousness is given in both "Existentialism" [pp. 43 ff.] and in "Philosophy of Education," pp. 98-106. From Lonergan’s presentation of Husserl’s work [*Existentialism,* pp. 33-55] it is clear that there is a great deal of overlap in their raison d’être. Lonergan’s formulation of his own method as intentionality analysis and transcendental method rises out of the theoretical clarity Husserl provides, for Husserl clears the term ‘intention’ of any metaphysical connotation and gives it a strictly empirical meaning. Lonergan’s account of his method as transcendental method rises out of Husserl’s Kantian use of ‘transcendental’—i.e., as indicating the conditions of the possibility of knowledge—for Husserl spoke of the need of a transcendental psychology, phenomenology, philosophy and ontology. Lonergan’s praise for Husserl’s phenomenology of consciousness is evident: "Husserl has done with an enormous labour and time an analysis of the psychological process. And two of his most brilliant discoveries are the correlation of the ‘intentional’ and the horizon." [p. 43]

18. "Existentialism," pp. 111 f. Lonergan does not clearly distinguish between his use of ‘world’ as a horizon of horizons and his more comprehensive use of horizon. The clearest statement he makes on this is to say, "a world is what lies within a horizon." [*Existentialism,* p. 85] This conflicts, however, with his definition of a world as "a horizon of horizons." [*Philosophy of Education,* p. 105.] To a large extent world and horizon overlap, but world seems to have a more constitutive sense—i.e., it implies the whole contained within and constituted by the horizon. Horizon, however, refers more specifically to the limit which defines the whole, the world. By analogy, horizon is the circumference and world is the circle. There seems another connotative difference, for Lonergan speaks of school, work and home as different worlds, but the discussion of different horizons—scientific, moral, philosophic, religious—functions at a higher level of generality.


21. Ibid., p. 78.

22. "Existentialism," Ibid., p. 23. (Direct quotes from this text, though verbally correct, do not replicate the text exactly, for the abundance of spelling and punctuation mistakes are an unnecessary distraction.)


24. Ibid., p. 182.
25. Ibid., p. 183: "But the pure desire to know can also become a dominant Sorge, and then, though there will not be a complete elimination of merely personal concern, still this world of one's concern will move into coincidence with the universe of being."

26. Ibid., p. 193: "My common sense is the home of my Sorge, my world, my horizon. It is its citadel. To insist on common sense, to appeal to common sense, is one of the best ways of avoiding the transition from Sorge to the pure desire to know, from my world to the universe of being." Cf. pp. 184 f.: "Now if our view is right—that the underlying problem is a tension between the Welt and the pure desire to know—then the solution is dialectical. ... [D]ialectic is concerned with the contradictory: the contradiction is not in propositions but in the subject, for the subject as intelligent and rational consciousness is not identical with the subject of Sorge; hence what is real in the Welt is not real in the universe of being, and vice versa."

27. "Philosophy of Education," p. 113: "In the general case we have the subject and his concern determining a horizon that selects out of the universe a world. And there is an intellectual pattern of experience. Correlative to it is the universe, all that exists. The purely intellectual pattern of experience is beyond any particular horizon; it is orientated, as long as the intellectual pattern of experience exists, upon the totality of being, upon everything. But the moment the intellectual pattern of experience ceases to be dominant, then one can shift back to a narrow concern."

28. "As trees grow in the direction in which they catch the most sunlight, so generally there is a law of effect. Development goes forward where it succeeds. So one's horizon, world, blik tends to extend and expand where extension and expansion are already under way." ["Method: Trend and Variations," in A Third Collection, pp. 16 f. (Unpublished lecture to the Southwestern Regional Joint Meeting of the societies affiliated with The Council on the Study of Religion, Austin College, Texas, Mar. 15, 1974.)] The word 'blik' conveys the general sense of whatever is meaningful, whatever may bear meaning even though that meaning may not be readily accessible to others.

29. "Existentialism," p. 86: "Anxiety is the anchor that keeps you where you are, it is the conservative principle." In passing, note the assumption that growth or development is natural and that it is the absence of growth that needs to be accounted for. This reflects Lonergan's conviction that vertical finality, the tendency toward higher integrations, is a basic dynamic of nature. Resistance to this dynamic is a frustration of nature.


31. "Existentialism," p. 31: "The possibility of a radical discovery, where the discovered has been present all along and there has been a hiding of what has been discovered. These notions of obnubilation, discovery, uncovering what has been there all along, conversion, transformation of one's living, all those ideas are right in the center of existentialism." [Cf. also p. 32.]

32. Insight, pp. 531-534. Cf. in particular pp. 532 f.: "[O]n the intellectual level the operator is concretely the detached and disinterested desire to know. It is this desire, not in contemplation of the already known, but headed towards further knowledge, orientated into the known unknown. The principle of dynamic correspondence calls for a harmonious orientation on the psychic level, and from the nature of the case such an orientation would have to consist in
some cosmic dimension, in some intimation of unplumbed depths that accrued to man's feeling, emotions, sentiments. ...

"... [I]t will be well to distinguish between the image as image, the image as symbol, and the image as sign. The image as image is the sensible content as operative on the sensitive level; it is the image inasmuch as it functions within the psychic syndrome of associations, affects, exclamations, and articulated speech and actions. The image as symbol or as sign is the image as standing in correspondence with activities or elements on the intellectual level. But as symbol, the image is linked simply with the paradoxical 'known unknown'. As sign, the image is linked with some interpretation that offers to indicate the import of the image."

33. "Philosophy of Education," p. 68: "The invariants can be operative in the life of a man who never thinks of them, or thinks of them only in the vaguest way, symbolically in images .... They are implicit. They are known in a compact sort of fashion. The doctrine of heaven and hell contains compactly the whole of Christian morality. But the compact apprehension that one must save one's soul ... becomes something extremely refined and differentiated when one gets to the theology of the four last things; and in between there are a series of stages. There is the history of theological thought upon that subject. Not only is there the development of reflective analysis upon these structural invariants of the human good, but along with it there is a differentiation of consciousness."

34. Lonergan's position in this regard is difficult to understand, for it is not quite clear how the examples he gives—the symbols of heavenly salvation and of the deity of Christ—are apprehensions of the invariant structure of the good. They seem to be particular truths, which by differentiation become more clearly or technically grasped particular truths, rather than symbolic expressions of a formal structure. It seems at this point that Lonergan's position is a hybrid of, on one hand, his position that the only immediately given is the experience of the structure of knowing and choosing by which the indeterminate is determined, and on the other, the position of Voegelin and Eliade that symbols are immediately apprehended yet intelligent and philosophically intelligible apprehensions of reality.


36. Ibid., pp. 115 ff. An earlier but more developed discussion is found in "Existentialism," pp. 75 ff.

37. "Existentialism," pp. 77 f.: "Insofar ... as your reality is beyond your own horizon, your own reality is hidden from you. And as hidden from you, it is not entirely without any fault on your part ('fault' means faulty in the broadest sense possible)."


39. Similarly when Lonergan speaks of responsibility earlier in the text [ibid., pp. 44 f.] he sets it in the context of the social attribution of responsibility: children are not legally responsible before the age of twenty-one.


41. Ibid., p. 106. Cf. also "Lectures on Religious Studies and Theology: Religious Experience," in A Third Collection. (Originally a series of lectures presented as The Donald
Mathers Memorial Lectures, Queen's University, Ontario, Mar. 2-4, 1976.) pp. 125:
"[C]onsciousness is like a . . . concerto that blends many themes in endless ways. So too
too religious experience within consciousness may be a leading voice or a middle one or a low one;
it may be dominant and ever recurrent; it may be intermittently audible; it may be weak an low
and barely noticeable. Again, religious experience may fit in perfect harmony with the rest of
consciousness; it may be a recurrent dissonance that in time increases or fades away; it may
vanish altogether . . . . As the metaphor from music offers an enormous variety of suggestions,
so too the lives of men and women present every degree and shade in the intensity of religious
experience, in the frequency of its recurrence, in the harmony or dissonance of its conjunction
with the rest of consciousness."

42. There is only one essay in which Lonergan speaks of affective conversion rather than
religious: "Natural Right and Historical Mindedness," in A Third Collection. As we will see later
in this chapter, the introduction of this term coincides with the incorporation of the process of
acculturation into his concept of the downward path of development; the downward is no longer
associated strictly with religious conversion.

43. "Theology in its New Context," in Second Collection, pp. 65 f. (Originally published


"Lectures on Religious Studies and Theology: The Ongoing Genesis of Methods," A Third
Collection, pp. 161.

46. "Christology Today: Methodological Reflections," in A Third Collection, p. 77:
"Such transforming love has its occasions, its conditions, its causes. But once it comes and as long
as it lasts, it takes over. One no longer is one's own. Moreover, in the measure that this
transformation is effective, development becomes not merely from below upwards but more
fundamentally from above downwards. There has begun a life in which the heart has reasons
which reason does not know. There has been opened up a new world in which the old adage,
 nihil amatum nisi prius cognitum, yields to a new truth, nihil vere cognitum nisi prius amatum."
[Originally given as a lecture at the Colloque de Christologie, Université Laval, Québec, Mar. 22,


48. Ibid., p. 182.

Creating in History," in A Third Collection, p. 106. (Originally a lecture in the series,
Anniversary Lectures, The Thomas More Institute, Montreal, May 13, 1975.)

50. This perspective is apparent in his account of the immediately given as pure
experience, as the infant's world of immediacy. The process whereby the world comes to be
mediated by meaning is described in such a way that it is clear that Lonergan intends it as an
account of acculturation. "[S]ensations, feelings, movements are confined to the narrow strip of
space-time occupied by immediate experience. But beyond that there is a vastly larger world. Nor is anyone content with immediate experience. Imagination wants to fill out and round off the picture. Language makes questions possible, and intelligence makes them fascinating. So we ask why and what and what for and how. Our answers construct, serialize, extrapolate, generalize. Memory and tradition and belief put at our disposal the tales of travellers, the stories of clans and nations, the exploits of heroes, the treasures of literature, the discoveries of science, the reflections of philosophers, and the meditations of holy men. [*The Response of the Jesuit,* Second Collection, p. 167.]

51. Cf., "Belief: Today’s Issue," Second Collection, p. 91: "In its immediacy the cultural is the meaning already present in the dream before it is interpreted, the meaning in a work of art before it is articulated by the critic, the endless shades of meaning in everyday speech, the intersubjective meanings of smile and frown, tone and gesture, evasion and silence, the passionate meanings of love and hatred, of high achievement and wrathful destruction. "But besides the meaning and value immediately intuited, felt, spoken, acted out, there is to any advanced culture a superstructure. ... Besides the meanings and values immanent in everyday living there is an enormous process in which meanings are elaborated and values are discerned in a far more reflective, deliberate, critical fashion." Cf. also "The Absence of God ...," Second Collection, p. 102. In these passages the immediately given is the culturally-conditioned, pre-reflective experience of meaning and value. These immediate meanings and values do not appear to be the product of intelligent inquiry but rather are intuited and felt.


54. Insight, p. 452.

55. Method, p. 278: "It may be objected that nihil amatum nisi praecognitum. But while that is true of other human love, it need not be true of the love with which God floods our hearts through the Holy Spirit he has given us."


63. Ibid., p. 38.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid., p. 240.
66. Ibid., pp. 40 f.
68. A Third Collection, pp. 31, 77.
69. Second Collection, p. 172.
70. A Third Collection, p. 93.
72. This perspective is evident in Lonergan's treatment of undifferentiated meaning as an immediate aspect of culture, distinct from the cultural superstructure that reflectively objectifies what is immediately given. Undifferentiated meaning and value is the "spontaneous substance of every culture." ["The Absence of God ...," Second Collection, p. 102.] In differentiated cultures these immediate meanings are reflectively considered. Differentiated consciousness "is not content to act out what it feels and intuits. Rather it seeks to mirror spontaneous living by analyzing it, making all its elements explicit, subjecting them to scrutiny, evaluation, criticism." [Ibid., pp. 102 f.; cf. "Belief: Today's Issue," Second Collection, p. 91.]
73. This second perspective is found in Lonergan's distinction between the infrastructure within human knowing and the suprastructure which names and interprets it. Infrastructure is the element of "pure experience" underpinning and distinct from the suprastructure, which names and defines it. ["Prolegomena to the Study ....," A Third Collection, pp. 57 f. Cf. "Lectures on Religious Studies and Theology: Religious Experience," A Third Collection, pp. 116 f.] The broader context of the discussion of infrastructure is the distinction between religious experience as infrastructure and the outer sociocultural factors as suprastructure. Culture supplies a suprastructure that directs attention to experience, names and interprets it. Lonergan's primary point is that religious experience—which, according to its Christian interpretation, is to be understood as the experience of God's love flooding our hearts—is prior to and independent of its cultural interpretation; each major religion has its own interpretation of the underlying experience. Another illustration of the distinction between infrastructure and suprastructure in the same passage asserts that feelings as merely felt belong to an infrastructure, and they become part of a suprastructure insofar as they are integrated into conscious living, which can occur in a therapeutic relationship that enables feelings to be noticed, distinguished, named and integrated.


77. As we will see in Chapter VII, though Lonergan sees beauty as a value [Method, p. 38], he associates beauty with art and art with sensitive experience.
Footnotes: Chapter VII
A Critique and Response

1. Verbum, p. 30: "[T]he technician knows the abstract universal, which is an inner word consequent to insight. But the man of experience merely knows the universale in particulari, and that knowledge is not intellectual knowledge but exists in a sensitive potency variously named the ratio particularis, cogitativa, intellectus passivus. It carries on comparisons of particulars in virtue of the influence of intellect, and it knows Socrates and Callias, not merely as Socrates and Callias, but also as hi homines, and without this sensitive apprehension of the universal in the particular it would be impossible for intellect to reach the abstract universal."

2. Ibid., p. 39: "[K]nowing the universal in the particular, knowing what is common to the instances in the instance, is not abstraction at all."


5. It might be noted that Paul Davies, an expositor of contemporary science and its philosophical implications, deals with "Beauty as a Guide to Truth" in his book, The Mind of God: The scientific basis for a rational world. [New York: Touchstone Books, 1992, pp. 175-177.] Among modern theoretical physicists and mathematicians there are 'Platonists' who readily recognize beauty as a criterion of truth. He cites Roger Penrose, who says of mathematical verification, "Rigorous argument is usually the last step! Before that, one has to make many guesses, and for these, aesthetic convictions are enormously important." [p. 177.]


7. Ibid., p. 135.


9. Cf. Insight, p. xii: "Besides the dynamic context of detached and disinterested inquiry ... there are the contrary dynamic contexts of the flight from understanding in which oversights occur regularly and one might almost say systematically." Cf. also ibid., p. xv: "How, indeed, is a mind to become conscious of its own bias when that bias springs from a communal flight from understanding and is supported by the whole texture of a civilization?"

11. Cf. Insight, p. 9: "This primordial drive, then, is the pure question. It is prior to any insights, any concepts, any words, for insights, concepts, words, have to do with answers; and before we look for answers, we want them; such wanting is the pure question. ... Just as insight is into the concretely given or imagined, so the pure question is about the concretely given or imagined. It is the wonder which Aristotle claimed to be the beginning of all science and philosophy."

There is one passage where wonder seems to be more than this. Relating art to wonder, Lonergan says: "Prior to the neatly formulated question of systematizing intelligence, there is the deep-set wonder in which all questions have their source and ground. As an expression of the subject, art would show forth that wonder in all its elemental sweep." [Insight, p. 185.] Even here, however, the general structure of Lonergan’s thought requires that we understand wonder not as an aesthetic response to being but rather as an unrestricted appetite for being.

12. Insight, p. 192.

13. Though the concept of the censor is Freud’s, Lonergan’s understanding of it reflects his discussion of Thomas’ ‘cogitativa’ in Verbum. For Thomas, one of the requisites for insight is the proper disposition of the sensitive faculties, and Lonergan notes that this “is connected with the work of the cogitativa which operates under the influence of intellect and prepares suitable phantasm.” [Verbum, p. 173] Elsewhere in Verbum, [p. 81] Lonergan associates this process with a subconscious operation of intelligence: "Perhaps, agent intellect is to be given the function of the subconscious effect of ordering the phantasm to bring about the right schematic image that releases the flash of understanding; for agent intellect is to phantasm, as art is to artificial products."

14. Because the cogitativa is a sensitive faculty, it properly belongs to conscious experience rather than being the arbiter of consciousness, contrary to Lonergan’s suggestion in Verbum, p. 81., that the arrangement of phantasm be construed as a subconscious process in Thomas.


16. This is the danger of phenomenology when it assumes the individual to be an adequate basis for discerning fully universal truths. While we hold phenomenology to be a valid source of data and insight, we believe that a true grasp of the universals in human existence and experience requires a higher synthesis of existential and experiential diversity. This conviction leads us to see a weakness in Lonergan in the lack of a more traditional kind of dialectic, the kind of dialectic one finds in Plato and Aristotle, which relies on community and conversation, argument and clarification, to achieve a higher synthesis of conflicting perspectives.


18. Insight, pp. 184 f.


22. "Mission and the Spirit," Third Collection, p. 29. In this passage Lonergan sees the 'passionateness of being', the affective, intersubjective dynamic in human progress, as a complementary process. He has not yet come to see "falling in love" as the whole of which each notion is a part. I doubt, however, that Lonergan's reformulation of the notion of the true and the real within the more basic orientation toward love was meant to compromise the disinterestedness of the desire to know. It simply means that falling in love is the higher fulfillment of knowing and doing the good, just as knowing the true is the higher fulfillment of grasping the intelligible.

23. Cf. "Finality, Love, Marriage," p. 25: "As Aristotle saw with remarkable clarity and set forth in a famous chapter of his Ethics, the opposition is not between egoism and altruism but between virtue and vice. The wicked are true friends neither to themselves nor to others. On the other hand, a wise and thorough egoist will take to himself what is best; but that is knowledge and virtue; and as he attains these, he becomes the opposite of what is meant by a selfish man." Cf. also Lonergan's account of egoism in Insight, p. 219: "[A]s Aristotle's answer suggests, when one turns from the realm of spontaneity to that of intelligence and reasonableness, one does not find that egoism and altruism provide ultimate categories."

24. The following discussion is drawn from Gabriel Marcel's Being and Having, [Glasgow: The University Press, 1949] and especially from part II, "Outlines of a Phenomenology of Having."

25. Ibid., 163 ff.: "I hug to myself this thing which may be torn from me, and I desperately try to incorporate it in myself, to form myself and it into a single and indissoluble complex. A desperate, hopeless struggle. ... Having as such seems to have a tendency to destroy and lose itself in the very thing it began by possessing, but which now absorbs the master who thought he controlled it. It seems that it is of the very nature of my body, or of my instruments in so far as I treat them as possessions, that they should tend to blot me out, although it is I who possess them."

26. Ibid., p. 166.

27. Cf. Verbum, pp. 72 f., where Lonergan discusses the weakness of Aristotle's understanding of knowing as identity; though knowing begins from identity it involves a reflective act whereby one objectifies this identity and knows it as other.


29. Ibid., p. 24.

30. A hint of this may be found in the fact that the Chinese word, yu, conveys both 'to have' and 'to be', and its opposite, wu, means 'to not have' and 'to not be'. [Wing-Tsit Chan,
Yu would be used to express 'I exist' as a philosophical assertion, but it would also be used in common discourse to say "I have a bike." This has made it possible for Chinese Marxists to interpret ancient Taoist texts, which espouse the emptiness of wu, as advocating a collective, agrarian way of life that negates private property.

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